

(For IACO Annex 13 NTSB Investigation)

BA2276/8th September 2015

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Name DENISE HUNTER	Staff No
Position/Grade CABIN MANACEC	DOJ 12 FEB 1985
Working position on BA2276	Door I left Seat Position for Take-off. (POI WOVE Facing
Roster for the last 7 days	

IMPORTANT INFORMATION

The NTSB have asked for each cabin crew member to complete an individual witness statement based on their recollection of events. You should not complete this statement in coordination with any other crew member.

Please describe the following in full detail, giving as much explanation as possible.

Please make sure your statement is legible and use more paper if you require it.

Make a copy of your individual statement and retain it for your own future reference.

You must place the original into an envelope and give to the BA representative who will pass on the statement to the NTSB.

Description of the event, your decision making and actions taken by yourself
We took our take off positions promptly. At
take of roll but not at full speed I heard
a land thud coming from somewhere down
the back, the aircraft appeared to swerve to
my right aircraft letter I glanced at my colleague
and then looked down the colon where there
were no signs of onlithing unusual in the cabin.
I unfastered my harnes to look cut of the
window at door 1 left for signs of anything
ant of the norm I did not see onything to

13ch nog 4 myzelt shouling unfastan Jour seatbelt come this way

alarm me. Next the First officer Cheavy even member came out of the flight speed and walked towards Door 2 left - shouling Temain in your sects, as passengers were by now standing in the distes blacking his path way. I went to my interphone and made on assertive PA 'ladies + gottemen remain soctodi The first afficer made his way back to the flight dock; in the meantine "I heard theres a file on the right" - I have no idea who saud this I indicated to NO9, watch the door, whilst I made my way to the Fight deck. Howard, in that time we were given the command avacuate, evaduate . I returned to door 1 left, checked for signs of Fire, checked my door mode, glanced at NO9 for confirmation it was safe to open and we both said "OK". I opened the door and remember thinking that was easy to open" Approx 5 passengers went down the Slide when the 1009 said Derise Fire on the Floor', I then saw there were firmes coming from He termac floor, aft of the slide. I we immediately reduced passengers to door 1 right, at this point I noticed smoke in the cobin-no9 was also directing possengers to door I right I grathed a lady and pushed her towards the day.

Once the cobin slear NO9 said my side is

clear at the same time NO5 also said 'wo're clear, I then received the NO 2's we've clear. I lold no 5 (90' and then ordered the NO 2+9 to get out" I the looked down the cabin and jumped down the slide - the foomliqued made it so slippary that I landled on my bottom. I could not stand up so the NOZad passanger. holped me up to walk away from passanger. The craw then went into crowd (control)

Description of communication (or attempted communication) between crewmembers (both				
cockpit/cabin crew and cabin crew/cabin crew)				
both flight deck and cabin crew.				
both fight deck one could				
Use of any emergency equipment				
Emorgancey Slides -				
,				
Operation and function of emergency exits and slide/rafts				
Door 1 left easy to open and deployment				
of slide without incident				

Passenger behaviour (Initially and following the command to evacuate)
A mix of panic of calm - generally listoring and carrying out cabin arew commands.
Any other relevant information
As por report.





(For IACO Annex 13 NTSB Investigation)

BA2276/8th September 2015

LAS-LGW

Name KARCI DOUGLAS Staff No.
Position/Grade MAIN CREW DOJ 11 APRIL 2012
Working position on BA22762 Seat Position for Take-off2 rear facing
Roster for the last 7 days. PART TIME WEEK OFF.

IMPORTANT INFORMATION

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Description of the event, your decision making and actions taken by yourself
we were going very fast down the runway
when I heard a very loud boing from the
inch hand side of the alc. The plane
1 to an about
Pax were school to
Thought it was a burst tyre. (It sounded I thought a burst tyre.)
T thought it was a burst tyre
and felt how I thought a burst tyre and felt how I thought a burst tyre
would feel) The Captain Paid 'Awart would feel) The Captain Paid 'Awart
see snoke billowing from left hand

Cont....

... engine. I was up (I cant remember at what point 1 got up) Pax were snouting 'we need to get off' The Capt PA'd please remain in your seats 'At this point I saw flames coming out of the enguil. I told pax to remain calm, and picked up the phone to call the Flight deck. I was just pushing the buttons when I saw the F.O at the front of the cabin, and shouted 'I can see fire coming from left hand engine! He ran to the window and shorted 'we reed to evacuate! At this point pax by my door were sharting at me to open the door. I then heard PA evacuate X3. I reduced the decision not to open the door and shouted to pax 'evacuate through the front right door'- or something wike that. Pax were trying to get their wheelies up the cabin. I was shouting ! Run to the front as snoke was coming through my door and the frames were more visible. After the last pax disemband, I checked the cabin & tollet and shouted Iny caloin is clear to my colleagues. I nade the decision not take my tabard as the snoke twoigh the door seemed thicker. I then evacuated through 1 Right. The shole was much slippier than I anticipated. my skirt was soaking when I got to the bottom. the cabin manager tupped off the stide and landed on her bottom hurting her back.

Description of communication (or attempted communication) between crewmembers (both cockpit/cabin crew and cabin crew/cabin crew)

1st PA from fught deck "Await further instructions"

2nd PA from fught deck "Please remain seated"

3rd PA evacuate 43.

- I was continually communicating with crew member at 2R

- I shouted to F.O ' Fire in engine etc'
- I told coveragues my cabin was clear

Use of any emergency equipment

None.

Operation and function of emergency exits and slide/rafts

I did not open door, but redirected passengers.

Passenger behaviour (Initially and following the command to evacuate)

Initially pax were particled and questioning what we had happened. They then were sharting at me to open door. Afrer evacuation command, some were running, some were just strolling, some were on their phanes, some were trying to get their wheelies up the cabin.

Any other relevant information

stide was very wet and slippery. we were on the tarmac for an hour and it was very hot b. (Just an observation, not a critisism.)





(For IACO Annex 13 NTSB Investigation)

BA2276/8th September 2015

LAS-LGW

Name JADE POWERS	Staff No
Position/Grade. MAIN CREW	DOJ 23 TAN 2015
Working position on BA2276	DOOR BLEFTSeat Position for Take-off. REAR FACING
Roster for the last 7 days	

IMPORTANT INFORMATION

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Description of the event, your decision making and actions taken by yourself SECURED THE CABIN AND WAS STRAPPED INTO MY SEAT AND RECIEVED THE DOUBLE DINGS FOR TAKE OFF. WE BECFAN TAXING AT SPEED WHEN WE HEARD A RANGIADPING SOUND, ABOUT 7-10 SECOUNDS AFTER THE CHIMES. THE MECRAFT LEANT TOTHE LEFT AND IT WENT BUMPY AS IF ON UNEVEN TERRAIN I THOUGHT THAT MAYBE A TIRED HAD BURST. THE ARCRAFT THEN STARTED BRAKING SHARPLY, I WATCHED AS PASSENCHES MMEDIATELLI STOOD LP. I SHOUTED AT THEM TO "REMAIN SEATED! LEANED FORWARD TO LOOK OUT OF THE WINDOW AND COLLONT SEE ANU HAZAROS. CAPTAIN MADE A PA "PARTENGEES AND CREW REMAIN SCATED AND WAIT FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS ! I CONTINUED TO SHOUT AT PASSENGERS TO "REMAIN SEATED! I UNDONE MY SEAT BELT TO SHOUT BEHIND ME. I THEN CHECKED OUTSIDE THE WINDOW ACTAIN AND SAW ORANG FLAMES MOD THICK BLACK SMOKE.

Cont....

I HEARD DAVID AT MORE RSD SHOUT I CAN SEE FIRE AND FLAMES AS I WAS LOOKING OUTSIDE, I THEN NENT TO PUSH THE EVAC BUTTON, BUT THE CAPTAIN SAID "EVACUATE" AND THE AVARIN WAS SCUNDED. I SILENCED THE ALARM AND BEGAN THE EMERGENCY EVACUATION PROCEDURE, AFTER CHECKING FOR MAZARDS ACIAIN, IMAGE THE DECISION TO NOTOPEN THE DODR AND TO REDIRECT PASSENGERS . I SHOUTED AT THEM TO "UNGASTEN SCATBELTS AND COME THIS WALL". I USED STECKE COMMANDS AND HAND MOVEMENTS TO DIRECT THEM TO DODE BE AND DODES 4. ONCE ALL WERE OFF. I LET CREW KNOW THAT I WAS CHECKING TOILETS AND FORWARD CABIN, I USED THE TOECH, WHEN I GOT TO DOORS Y , LET CREW CNOW ALL WAS CLEAR. I WENT TO CLET MY TABBITED, BUT THERE WAS SMOKE IN THE CABIN. CHEIS (NO. 4) THEN TOLD ME TO EVACUATE.

anceon the TARMAC, I SHOUTED FOR PEOPLE TO "HOVE AWAY AND STAY TOGETHER! I WAS THEN ORDERED TO GET PASSENGERS INTO UNES TO DO A HEADCOUNT, WE HAINTAINED CROWD CONTROL AND ATTENDED TO ANY MEDICALS. I LIASED WITH GUERGENCY SCRUICES WHO WERE ARRIVING ON THE SCENE.

Description of communication (or attempted communication) between crewmembers (both cockpit/cabin crew and cabin crew/cabin crew)

- -CAPTAIN MADE PA "STAY IN YOUR SCAT AND AWANT FLETHER INSTRUCTION"
- -CAPTAIN MADE PA " EVACUATE EVACUTE"
- -DAVID (NO:10) TOLD ME HE "COULD SEE DEATHER FLAMES AND BLACK SMOKE FROM LEFT HAND SIDE OF ATECRAFT"
- -I SHOUTED TO DAVID (NO 10) "CHECKING FORWARD CABIN AND TOILETS" ONCE THAT WAS DONE, I SMO "ALL CLEAR!
- I INFORMED CHRIS (NO. 4) THAT ALI WAS CLEAR".
- CHRIS TOLD ME TO "EVACUATE"
- DAVID TOLD ME ON THE TARMAC TO "GET PASSENGIES INTO LINES TO DO A MEAD COUNTY
- · I LET CHEIS KNOW THAT I HAD COUNTED "IS PASSENCHEES" IN MY LINE.

Use of any emergency equipment

I USED THE TORCH FROM MY CREW SEAT TO CHECK THE CABIN AND TOILET

I USED THE SLIDE TO EVACUATE FROM DOOR 4 LEFT.

Operation and function of emergency exits and slide/rafts

I WAS UNABLE TO OPEN MY DOOR AS WHEN I BECTAN THE EVACUATION PROCEDURE, THERE WERE HAZARDS OUTSIDE (ORANGE FLAMES AND BLACK SMOKE) I MADE THE DECISION TO KEED THE DOOR SHUT AND REDIRECT PASSENGERS.

Passenger behaviour (Initially and following the command to evacuate)

PASSENGEES WERE CLEARLY SCREED AND PANICKED ONCE THE ARCIENTT HAD COME TO A STOP, BUT PRICE TO THAT ALI WAS CALM. IN SEAT 26 A WAS A NERVOUS FLUER, BUT WAS REASURRED BY ME PRIOR TO TAKE OFF.

PASSENGERS BECOME STANDING UP AND RUNNING TO THE POOLS. A FEW, WHEN TOLD, TOOK THER SEATS AGAN. WHEN WE BEGAN THE EMERCANCH EVACUATION. PASSENGERS PANICKED AND SOME RAN, EVEN WHEN I TOLD THEN NOT TO. TWO MEN BEGTAN CIMBING ONCE SEATS TO JUMP INTO THE QUEUE, ALL IN ALL PASSENGERS MOVED QUICKLY AND EFFICIENTLY. ONCE ON THE TARMAC, I HAYO TO TELL PEOPLE TO STOP

FILMING, TAKING PI-1070S, TO MOVE AWAY & STAY TOGETHER and to step smoking!

Any other relevant information

I MADE SURE I FOUND THE COULLAT 2GA TO CHECK HE WAS OCPU, ONCE OF THE AIRCRAFT.

I NOULD LIKE TO THANK EXCHANCE FOR ALL THER HELD & SUPPORT ON THE GROUND.





(For IACO Annex 13 NTSB Investigation)

BA2276/8th September 2015

Name CHRISTOPHER TOM Staff No. 12 50 10
Position/Grade Pulsel DOJ 03/04/06
Working position on BA2276 N Seat Position for Take-off. DAL FWD FACING
Roster for the last 7 days 30A BGI + 3 days Cff.
IMPORTANT INFORMATION

The NTSB have asked for each cabin crew member to complete an individual witness statement based on their recollection of events. You should not complete this statement in coordination with any other crew member.

Please describe the following in full detail, giving as much explanation as possible.

Please make sure your statement is legible and use more paper if you require it.

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Description of the event, your decision making and actions taken by yourself
Rolling DOWN Runway for TAKEOFF, APPROX
7 SECONDS WE MEARN A Lound BANG/POPPAG
Sound a the AIRCRAFT LISTED to thE LHS.
I felt A Bumping, as if a tyle HAD BLOWN.
DebRis started Flying Past my wood
At DAL. THE AIRCRAFT BRAKED SHARPY
d came to A complete Stop on the Runway.

At this point Pax's Jumpeo out of the SEATS. I Showton for them to sit down Some DiD'nt Lister, Sou I get out of Seat WALKED 4-5 Rews into CABIN LASAN ordered them to sit down + trey did. Captain then made PA" will customers d clew Remain Seated + AWAIT FURTHER IN Struction! At this time I SAW Smore on the atside of the Aircraft. At this point CAPT MADE Andrew PA "Wacrate 42" - At this point 1 Commerced my Glaculation. I Checked cutside Conditions a made + opened my Dock, Pulled manual Inflation Hample a Gacuated Passensers. Once Pax's well off I Warvated myself + my clew through D4L with all omergency Equipt. We then commenced crewd control-Moved customers Away Flom Alc-LIAISED with Emergency Services a STARTED HRIAGE Proceedules.

Description of communication (or attempted communication) between crewmembers (both cockpit/cabin crew and cabin crew/cabin crew)

CAPT made PA'S X2 d Ceew Communication was fantastic, well All Communicated well. which Resulted in A full t Sucess Ful Evacuation

Use of any emergency equipment

WE USED MEGAPHONES & HABARDS.

Operation and function of emergency exits and slide/rafts

DAL- my Stide a doce operated Perfectly. I Pulled my manual infation Handle at Evacuated my custements of Crew. I Evacuated the Majority through DAL. I was the last crew member to leave via DAL. once WE Commenced the Evacuation, the customers were compliant to DID Exactly what WE told tham, we told them not to film & Stepsmovy, we told them not to film & Stepsmovy, o including when people were up out of their Sects - It took A while fee them to Sit Back Down.

Any other relevant information

THE HEIP fear the Emergency Securcion was fantashic. They well an the scene peantly. However it took quite Along time for the Buses to Arrive to tove pax's to terminal Building d it was 100 degrees on the

HEIP WELL RECEIVED.



9/9/15





(For IACO Annex 13 NTSB Investigation)

BA2276/8th September 2015

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Name AMY OSBORNE	Staff NoStaff No
Position/Grade 5 - MAIN CREW	рој 12/03/15
Working position on BA22765	Seat Position for Take-off. DOOR 1 RIGHT.

Roster for the last 7 days. I. DBV ON SUNDAY, HOME STANDBY 17-2:30 ON SAT. SICK DAY OFF IMPORTANT INFORMATION FRIDAY. SICK BEFORE THAT FOR 2

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Description of the event, your decision making and actions taken by yourself we were sat in our crew seats, strapped in ready for take-off. We were at high speed going clown the runway for take off when I heard a very loud bang and felt the plane jold swerve. The brakes then went on and we made a very quick stop. There was a PA from the flight deck to remain caim and stay seated. I stayed in my seat but as I looked clown the cabin I saw passengers in the back cabin standing up, running around and shouting to let them off. At this point I considered they could see something that I couldn't. I saw kevin run out of the flight deck heading down to boor 2 Left. At this point I saw thick black smoke outside of my window.

Cont....

I then heard kevin shout "Evacuate, Evacuate!" The Evacuation alarm then went on, I was out of my Seat by now and began to shout "unfasten your seat belt and come this way." I only said this once as passangers were already there. During this I checked Olitside my window for hazards but all I could see was thick black smoke. I could have marie at occr 2 Right redirecting passengers to my door. I heard a PA which I thought said "hazard on the left" but passengers were shouting so loud I wanted to be sure so I called across to Denise at Door 1 LEFT and confirmed with her"is Hazard on the LEFT?" and Denise said "Yes". This series of events happened over seconds. I checked again out of my window for hazards-There was Smoke but no flames. I checked door was in automatic and opened. Passengers were screaming to get out. As I went to pull the manual inflation handle I was pushed by a lady behind me so quickly grabbed my assist handle and blocked door. The slide was inflating at this time. I was shouting "wait wait slide inflating!" As soon as the slide had inflated I bagan evacuating passengers. Once everyone was of I ran winto the cabin to check there was moone left. I met marie half way down and we confirmed with each other "CABIN CLEAR" At this point smoke was filling the cabin. I shouted across to make sure penise was or and said "everyone is off" and she said "go". I left the aircraft and started directed people away and getting them to stop filming.

Description of communication (or attempted communication) between crewmembers (both cockpit/cabin crew and cabin crew/cabin crew)

CAPTRID MADE 2 PA'S

REALLY GOOD AND RESULTED IN A SUCCESSFUL EVACUATION.

Use of any emergency equipment

THE DOOR + SLIDE AT I RIGHT.

Operation and function of emergency exits and slide/rafts

SUCCESSFUL INFLATION AND USE OF DOOR I RIGHT.

Passenger behaviour (Initially and following the command to evacuate)

PASSENGERS INITIALLY SHOUTING OVER ME. I HAD TO USE VERY LOUD ASSERTIVE COMMANDS TO STOP PUSHING.

Any other relevant information

AND ASH FALLING ON PEOPLE AS THEY WENT DOWN SUDE.

EMERGENCY SERVICES WERE SO QUICIC ON SCENE.







(For IACO Annex 13 NTSB Investigation)

BA2276/8th September 2015

Name MARIA TIFFNEY Staff No. /// //	
Position/Grade MAIN CREW DOJ 09-11-98	
Working position on BA2276. NO. 6 Seat Position for Take-off. FORWARD FACING DOOR & RIGH	нт
Roster for the last 7 days 3 DAY BARBADOS 3 DAYS OFF IMPORTANT INFORMATION	

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in coordination with any other crew member.

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Description of the event, your decision making and actions taken by yourself 40 in 4 down Runway HEARD A LOWD BANG AIRCRAFT CAME TO A CONCLETE STOP. CAPTAIN ANNOUNCED "CABIN CREW REMAIN SEATED AWAIT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS, PASSENGERS WERE GETTING UP OUT OF THERE SEFITS, I LOOKED OUT MY DOOR A RIGHT AND WAS HAZARD SMOKE COULDN'T SEE AWYTHING OUT OF IT. EVACUATION WAS ORDERED I COULDN'T OPEN DOOR A RIGHT AS HAZARD SMOKE. DIRECTED PASSENGERS TO DOOR I PIGHT WHICH WAS OPENED SICCESSFULLY SHOUTED COMMANDS TO PASSENGERS TO MAKE THERE WAY TO DOOR I RIGHT. "EXIT BLOCKED USE FORWARD RIGHT SIDE WAY TO DOOR I RIGHT. "EXIT BLOCKED USE FORWARD RIGHT." SUCCESSFULLY EVACUATED. I LEFT THROUGH DOOR I RIGHT. SUCCESSFULLY EVACUATED. I LEFT THROUGH DOOR I RIGHT.

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Description of communication (or attempted communication) between crewmembers (both cockpit/cabin crew and cabin crew/cabin crew)

I LOOKED OUT MY DOOR & RIGHT AND SEEN
THE HAZARD SMOKE TOLD MY COLLEAGUE AT
DOOR & LEFT AND SHE COMMUICATED TO ME
HER DOOR WAS HAZARD SMOKE TOO.
FIRST OFFICER CAME OUT AND TRYED TO GET
PASSENGERS TO GIT BACK DOWN ME AND
COLLEAGUE AT DOOR I LEFT ALERTED HIM ABOUT
THE SMOKE AND HAZARDS AT BOTH DOORS.

Use of any emergency equipment

EMERGENEY SLIDE USED

Operation and function of emergency exits and slide/rafts

1 DIDNT OPERATE MY SLIDE AT DOOR 2 RIGHT AS

IT WAS HAZARD SMOKE,

Passenger behaviour (Initially and following the command to evacuate)

PASSENCIERS HAD ALREADY GOT OUT THERE SEATS AND WERE MAKING THERE WAY TO THE FRONT OF AIRCRAT BEFORE EVACUATION COMMAND AS THE HAD SEEN THE ENGINE FIRE,

A FEW PASSENGERS WERE HESTATING AND I SHOUTED FOR THEM TO HURRY AND MOVE FORWARD TO THE EXIT. PASSENGERS ALSO WERE HESTATING IN FORWARD CLUB CABIN AND AT ONE POINT WERE FALLING BUTTON ALMOST OVER ONE ANOTHER AGAIN I SHOUTED FOR THEM TO HURRY AND EVACUATE.

Any other relevant information

THANK YOU FOR ALL THE HELP WE RECEIVED FROM GROUND STAFF AND ESPECIALLY THE EMERGENCY SERVICES.







(For IACO Annex 13 NTSB Investigation)

BA2276/8th September 2015

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Name SUELY MCLOUGHLIN	Staff No	0 0 - 1				
Position/Grade. MAIN CREW	LOO	7 Feb 0	17			
Working position on BA2276 N. 7	Seat Positi	on for Take-off.	3R			
21 ct AVG	\ ist SEP	2nd (314	1 4+h	6th	7+17
Working position on BA2276N. 7 315T AUG Roster for the last 7 days. 960 HRS Grounded	Oft	Airp. Stby	AGP	VCE	off	off

IMPORTANT INFORMATION

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Description of the event, your decision making and actions taken by yourself

I WAS ON MY CREW SEAT When the AIRCRAFT WAS TAXING ON
THE RUNWAY. AS SOON AS THE AIRCRAFT WENT ON FULL SPEED
I HEARD A BIG "BANG" AND I ALSO COULD SMELL
BURNING RUBBER. I thought it could have been a burst
TYTRE. THERE WERE SOME FUME FROM OUTSIDE WINDOW
Which I thought my the heat as it was loof the TEMPERATURE
OR ALSO FROM THE TYRE. ONCE WE I HEARD THE BANG
THE AIRCRAFT STOPPED. I STAYED ON WAS SEAT AND
WAITED FOR INSTRUCTIONS. I COULDN'T SEE WHAT
WAS HAPPENIG OUTSIDE DOOR AT THE OPPOSITE SIDE

but some PASSENGERS STARTED to GET OUT of their seats. We then heard a PA coming from the flight Deck from one of the pilots instructing passengers to remain Seated. I TOLD PASSENGERS TO Stay STATED the next imediately PA from the flight crew was "EVACUATE, EVACUATE".

BEFORE I OPENED My took as I was checking outside My Window for fire and hazars A PASSENGER who was seated by the Exit row 26HJK ShouTED AT ME "OPEN OPEN". This was when I was checking outside my window! It Looked Safe to open but the door was a bit hard so he helped me to open it. Once the slide came out it didn't deploy properly and it was unsafe to use that slide. I then Looked to see which door was being used and I could see door 9L being available. I stayed at my door GARDING MY DOOR AND REDIRECTING PASSENGERS. ONCE CABIN WAS CLEAR I Checked toilet and EVACUATED AT DOOR AL. I WAS the DENULTIMATE CREW to Leave the world traveller eabin. I told Our Senior Porser "Chris tom" that I was Leaving and if he is okay. He told me to go. go. go. He Left soon after ne and brought with him the Megaphore. Once on the tarmae I instructed the passengers to Move away from the current and photos please.

Description of communication (or attempted communication) between crewmembers (both cockpit/cabin crew and cabin crew/cabin crew) Great Communication resulting in Sucessful Again on the tarmac great communication and Use of any emergency equipment Taband. Operation and function of emergency exits and slide/rafts Slide failed to inflate. Door 32


Passenger behaviour (Initially and following the command to evacuate)

Passingers did what was told and were coloned CALM,

Any other relevant information

The crew did an amazing Job. I AM SO PROUD of them. EMERGENCY STAFF absolutely amazing!

thank you everyone!







(For IACO Annex 13 NTSB Investigation)

BA2276/8th September 2015

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NameLYNETTE ROBINSON Staff No.
CABIN CREW Position/GradeNUMBER 8: MAIN CREW DOJ 17 JULY 2006
Working position on BA2276. NUMBER 8 Seat Position for Take-off. FWD. FACING DUR
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Description of the event, your decision making and actions taken by yourself whilst traveilling at speed down the runway, I neard a bang approximately 7-10 seconds into it, the aucraft listed sugnity to the left. The auroraft continued down but felt bumpy in its movement. Aircraft started to brake and then came to a complete stop. I saw some debris going past the windows ar bull and DHR. Passengers started to stand up, so rear crew started shouting to remain seated. Initial thoughts were a tyre bowing mayoe. Captain made announcement for passengers + crew to remain seated a await further instructions. I saw a small amount of smoke

Cont.... on the right hand side of all which dispersed quite quickly. A few seconds later the captain made the annuncement "This is the Captain, Evacuate, Evacuate". On his command, and ofter he untialised the evac alarm, I proceeded into my door drill Immediately, by snouting commands for passengers to unfosten their seatbells a come this way. I checked Outside the door for negards, it was safe for me to Open the door, and the slide inflated at DUR. However it had inflated, but it was pointing upwards, was almost twisted in his Stature, almost being wripped about by the wind, and was a nigh distance Off the ground. May be almost in line with the bottom / underside of aurcraft. It was totally unusuable in that condution, & cut that moment I made the decision to guard the exit a re-direct passengers to DULL as the scide could have caused serious injury to those who had attempted to use it. I checked the cabon + touets in my area were clear, I got the megaphone from us stowage the hi-vis tabard from my jumpseat and exited the autoract at D4L as there was block smoke filtering down by boors 3. After exiting the aircraft, we were snouting commands and using the megaphone to gain crowd control. we assisted unjured passengers who had munor cuts as a result of suide injuries. We directed passengers to form 4 unes so we could perform a head count. we continued monitoring customer Welfare, Crawd control and the use of recording devices.

Description of communication (or attempted communication) between crewmembers (both cockpit/cabin crew and cabin crew/cabin crew)

Captain made PA to remain Seated I await further instruction, followed by the PA to evacuate. I advised purser I was leaving the autoraft as my area was clear.

Good communication between crew on the tormec regarding hasing with need count + Crowd control.

Use of any emergency equipment

Megaphone.

HI-VIS tabards,

Emergency Slides

Operation and function of emergency exits and slide/rafts

Slide deployed + inflated.
However slide unusable are to the wind blowing it, and it didn't settle onto the ground. It was almost twisted and listing to the right and was pointing up, almost level with the bottom/ underside of the aircraft.

Passenger behaviour (Initially and following the command to evacuate) Initially: - After Initial bang and awaiting further instruction PA- pulte alor of passengers got up and moved around the aircraft. Evacuation: - Obvious panic ensued and Some pushing of passengers between each other, Quick evacuation, Instructions followed well, most moved away quickly. On tarmac: - Good Co-operation & assistance. They Listened to our requests a commands, and did as they were asked to. very grateful a thankful to crew.

Any other relevant information

Excellent assistance by the fire & rescue services, As Cabin crew we were stood out on the ourreld for a long period of time in extreme temperodures.

Buses were well organised for customers.

Good Organisation in the Terminal + bottles of water distributed by Cabin crew to passenges who had been moved back a seated at the departure gare.



BRITISH AIRWAYS

Cabin Crew Witness Statement

(For IACO Annex 13 NTSB Investigation)

BA2276/8th September 2015

DAZZ70/0 September 2015
LAS-LGW
Name AISLING LAKER Staff No.
Position/Grade Main Crew DOJ O4 12 1997
Working position on BA2276 NO 9 Seat Position for Take-off. DIL FORWARD FACING
Working position on BA2276. NO 9 Seat Position for Take-off. DIL FORWARD FACING Roster for the last 7 days 3 Anu - Low 4 DK 5 DK 1 bh Low VRN Low IMPORTANT INFORMATION The Low - LAS
IMPORTANT INFORMATION 7" LGW - CAS 1
The NTSB have asked for each cabin crew member to complete an individual witness statement based on their recollection of events. You should not complete this statement in coordination with any other crew member.
Please describe the following in full detail, giving as much explanation as possible.
Please make sure your statement is legible and use more paper if you require it.
Make a copy of your individual statement and retain it for your own future reference.
You must place the original into an envelope and give to the BA representative who will pass on the statement to the NTSB.
Description of the event, your decision making and actions taken by yourself
Whilst going down the runway I heard a
loud pop. The aircraft came to a
sudden stop. I thought it was a type
sudden stop. I thought it was a type that had burst. The flight crew said
to remain seated. Within seconds
1000 1100 ala di

Cont....

uay to the doors. We shouted at hax to sit down. Our first officer keven came out of the flight dock to see the damage I incident and he also said to hax its usually sufer to remain onboad. HOWEVER once he saw the damage, Smoke, flames at door 22 he went lack to the flight deck and an evacuation alarm was sounded. I shouted "unfasten your seat letts and come this way", mest people were already up and pushing and shouting to open the doors. 5 pax went down the slide @ 12 but then we noticed the tarmor was online, so ue redirected pay to DIR. They all got off successfully, I checked my cabin area meeting Karen NO. 2 DZL and we confirmed no more pax in our area. We evaluated immidiatly,

Description of communication (or attempted communication) between crewmembers (both cockpit/cabin crew and cabin crew/cabin crew)

Captain: at first: remain seated over PA. Then evacuate over PA. The PA'S from the cockpit, Cabin Chew communication very neel be it shouting due to the noise onboard. Successful disembatication done by all.

Use of any emergency equipment

my position was NO9 DIL I was in charge of evoud control. Was unable to get tabard on evaluating due to excessive smoke.

Operation and function of emergency exits and slide/rafts

Shide @ DIL care out quickly and norked well but we ended up guarding the day and redirecting pax due to fine on the tarmor gettip very close to the slide!

Passenger behaviour (Initially and following the command to evacuate)

Eron their seats showling and desperate to get off. Once off apart from telling people to stop belining they were all very greatful.

Any other relevant information

the emergency services were very good however as crew we were east until last (not a problem) but it has extreanly hot. 100° on the towner.



BRITISH AIRWAYS

(For IACO Annex 13 NTSB Investigation)

BA2276/8th September 2015

Name DAJID LEEMING S	taff No
Position/Grade MAIN CREW D	0,21.01.08
Working position on BA2276Se	at Position for Take-off. 10 Jump SEAT
	AUS OFF-2 EXCESS LEAUE DAYS-

IMPORTANT INFORMATION

The NTSB have asked for each cabin crew member to complete an individual witness statement based on their recollection of events. You should not complete this statement in coordination with any other crew member.

Please describe the following in full detail, giving as much explanation as possible.

Please make sure your statement is legible and use more paper if you require it.

Make a copy of your individual statement and retain it for your own future reference.

You must place the original into an envelope and give to the BA representative who will pass on the statement to the NTSB.

Description of the event, your decision making and actions taken by yourself
ON TAKE OFF ROLL AT SPEED HEARD LOUD BANG,
AIRCRAFT BRAKED HARD, SWERVED TO TO LEFT,
CAME TO COMPLETE STANDSTILL. My FIRST REAKTION
WAS A TYRE BLOW OUT-
SHOUTED TO PAX "STAY IN YOUR SEATS"
THERE WAS LOUD HISTING NOISES TO AIRCRAFT LEFT,
AND LODSERVED THROUGH PORTHOLES LEFT WHAT
APPEARED TO BE EITHER DUST, OR CLOUDS OF HAZY SMOKE.
PAX THEN STARTED JUMPING UP- AGAIN WE WERE

CONT.... SHOUTING " REMAIN SEATED"-GOT MADE PA REMAIN SEATED-ON HEARING THIS I OBSERVED THE SMOKE OR LEFT SIDE OF AIRCRAFT BECOMING VERY BLACK-DENSE-AND I SAW VIVID ORANGE GLOW OF FLAMES FORWARD OF WING AND STARTING TO COME OVER THE WING-ATTHAT POINT I GOT OUT OF MY SEAT TO GET TO INTERPHONE, D3L. IMM THE CAPTAIN 1890ED COMMAND "THIP IS AN EMERGENCY - EVACUATE EVACUATE" AND TO CONFIRM I WAS SEEINGTLAMET SMOKE) I THOUTED TO MY COLLEGUE WO 3@ 3 LEFT Can SEE HAZARDS -WE WERE BOTH AT DOOR 3LEFT, My COLLEGUE WAS CHECKING OUTSIDE FOR MAZARDS - I CONFIRMED HAZAROS (FIRE DENSE Smoke) rendering 3 Left A HAZERD EXIT SO WE WERE SHOUTING COME THIS WAY (FROM MID Cabin-AND Sonding PAX TO Doors 4 Left, Gaurding Door 3 Left. A LADY Stombled - L LIFTED HER UP AND SHOUTED "GO THAT WAY LNDICATING 4 LEFT_ KEEP MUDING" AT THIS POINT DOOR 3 Right was unusable at Smolle was Coming under THE AirCRAFT and up by 3 K. no 7 was gowding Door 3R AND SHOUTING "Go THAT WAY "INDICATING ALTERNATIVE EXIT at DL. .
Smoke was RECOMING MUCH. THICKER AND LOOKING FORWARD LEFT & COULD SEE WHAT SEEMED LIKE FLAME IN CLUB Cabible FT Approx Row 10. WE SWEPT MID CABIN- CHECKED TOILETS. @ DOOR 3 Left + RIGHT - SWEPT AFT CARIW- I SHOUTED TO MY COILEQUE no 3 CABINCLEAR - GO-GO-GO.

WE RAN TOWARDS DOOR 4 LEFT. SMOKEWAY FOLLOWING - WE REACHED D 4 LEFT- PST asked ARE WE ALL HERE-THEN WE EVACUATED VIA 4 LEFT- I BOUNCED OFF SLIDE ONTO CONCRETE-THEN SUM PED UP AND RAN SHOUTING TO PAX' GO THAT WAY" (AWAY FROM SINCKE ETE-

cockpit/cabin crew and cabin crew/cabin crew) EXCELLENT COMMANDS FROM CAPTAIN -CLEHR(CONLISE)-Chew member no 3 and myself no 10 Communicated Situation Clearly- we liabed Over HAZARDS (CONFIRMANT ONTSIDE HAZARD @ 3 Left. Dense Smoke- Flickoring Flames Coming up Fran TRAILING FLAPO + ENGINE - Door was unusable Could not See out of DBL For Dense Smoke- I should be no 3" Guard door". THE REACTED LMM - SHOUTZNG " GO THAT WAY TO ALTERNATIVE EXIT Use of any emergency equipment I COULD NOT GET TO MY EQ at back of Jump Sout 10 as most PAX WERE EVALUATING at our file, Many puthing-Climbing over Seath- I Considered it dangerout to try to got back from 3L to my Cabin Sent no 16-AFTER CARIN SWEEP AND TOILET Check Smoke was thickening - So our near actions were to Evacuate the aircraft ourselves 1 mm. I tries to GET THE TORCH From A Stowage - but Smoke was Thickening schind up so had ro somp down sticle imm. Operation and function of emergency exits and slide/rafts (AFT CABIW) Doors 4 Left and right were deployed. Door 3 right was deployed. Doors 3 Left was rendered unusable by conte Smalle + FLAME APPARENT FORWARD AND AFT OF WING. AND What Seemed like black bits of METAL FLYING around -

Description of communication (or attempted communication) between crewmembers (both

Passenger behaviour (Initially and following the command to evacuate)

PAX were Jumping out of Seathwere instructed " romain Seated" -PAX responded - then EVal Command was issued-Lots of pax were following our elear + Concide instruction? -"Come This way" —" Go THAT way" (For redirected pax)

Any other relevant information

once we had Evacuated the aircraft and reached a lafe distance PAX were in a widespread Group- I cmm liased with por Christom, and Suggethed we formed four lines—Covered by each available Cabin Crew member, and Court heads for the Fine Crews rescue Crews—

we did So and forming the PAX wito four lines seemed to Calm them and made the Courting organised and we then added the four totals together and got a precise total—Our purser took Command Exchartly—

Signed	Date