Security Sector Capacity Building and Corruption

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Security Sector Corruption’s Vital Role in Kleptocracy

- Security sector is not an innocent bystander, but a key player in kleptocracy

- Maintaining a kleptocratic regime requires a high degree of coercion, especially violence or the threat of violence

- Security sector—especially key leaders—often incentivized against conflict resolution or establishment of rule of law, an inclusive market-based economy, and democratic reform

Current American security assistance doctrine assumes government and its security forces seek legitimacy; in a kleptocracy, this assumption is not valid.
“Coup proofing” often leads to deliberate inefficiencies

• Kleptocratic regimes’ “winner takes all” governance means plenty of elite jostling at the top; often insurgencies at the margins

• Typical kleptocratic security sector structures
  • Numerous armed actors in varying combinations of legal, illegal, and grey area
  • Personal body guard, “Republican Guard,” intelligence service, or special forces unit answers personally to kleptocratic leader
  • “Normal” military forces often poorly paid, equipped, and led
  • Intelligence services seem to spend more time spying on each other than actual state enemies

• Human rights violations by various armed actors, including government actors
Corruption Hollows Out Security Forces

- Military budgets diverted to personal use by politicians or military leaders
- Overpriced contracts &/or contracts that are never completed
- Poor quality equipment or no equipment
- Equipment and personnel diverted for private, commercial, or criminal purposes rather than security-related ones
- Ghost soldiers & even whole “ghost units”
- Poor leadership—promotions based largely on who you know or what you’re paid rather than mer

Result: local citizens may rely on their own self-defense, insurgent groups, or even criminals rather than their own security forces
Predatory governments’ actions help ignite new crises & no amount of US equipment or training may be able to “fix” the problem

- Iraq: US spent ~ $26 billion thru 2012 ($3.4 billion on equipment)
- US spent $1 billion on Mali, and the troops it trained took part in a coup that ultimately brought Al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb to the fore

US military assistance as an inadvertent contributor to corruption / predatory behavior

- Creates new powerful actors; new winners and losers; new balances of power amongst corrupt patronage networks
- Creates new sources of money and patronage
- US training & equipment can inadvertently make a predatory security force a more efficient and better equipped predatory one
- Can unintentionally make the corrupt governments pact stronger & more exclusionary

Predatory governments are unlikely to forward US policy goals of economically sustainable, democratic governments that are solid American allies

Effects on US National Security:

Iraq spend from CRS Report RL33110 pg 62 (does not include funding for fight against ISIS); Afghanistan from Security Assistance Monitor
Policy Recommendations: First Do No Harm

- Mainstream transparency, accountability, and counter-corruption (TACC) into all lines of DoD, DoS, DOJ, and DHS security-related assistance; Establish doctrine and policies for TACC

- Establish DoD point of contact for anti-corruption efforts and relevant training for personnel

- Improve training on corruption for all FSOs and other DoS personnel, especially those with high risk posts or programs

- Corruption risk assessment and mitigation strategies for security assistance programs
  - Overall political economy assessment, including a corruption assessment; map key patronage networks;
  - Red team how US security assistance programs may affect the local political economy, including corruption and conflict dynamics
  - Risk mitigation plan for corruption-related issues

- Better transparency in contracts/contractors
  - Beneficial ownership information required on US foreign assistance contracts
  - Anti-corruption clauses for termination if necessary
  - Clawback clauses to recover US taxpayer money
  - Special Inspector Generals for substantial and high risk aid programs
  - Vendor vetting and Task Force 2010-like organizations to investigate contractors and corruption risks

- Establish strong oversight functions through special inspectors general
Policy Recommendations: Security Assistance to Host State

- **Mainstream** transparency, accountability, and counter-corruption (TACC) into all training and assistance programs throughout all phases

- Establish appropriate **training** requirements for contracting officers, FMS, and deploying personnel working with host state

- Establish TTPs for personnel to **monitor and report** corruption; develop guidelines for response

- Push host state establishment of **TACC in host forces**
  - Independent, vetted, and resourced inspectors general & internal affairs with high level backing
  - Capacity development (not replacement) for personnel and logistics systems established as “good enough” for local context
  - Parliamentary and civil society oversight

- **Strong Procurement, Contracting, and Budgeting Transparency**
  - Maximum transparency; minimize security waivers only to critical security and intel issues
  - Beneficial ownership information requirements
  - Anti-corruption clauses for termination if necessary
  - Clawback clauses
  - Limit or forbid offset contracts
  - Contracts in accordance with Open Contracting Partnership standards
Thank You

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