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The Rise of the Violent Muslim Brotherhood

By Mokhtar Awad

The past four years witnessed a significant transformation inside the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the impact of which will likely be felt for generations to come. Sudden changes in the group’s fortunes—from seizing power, to quickly losing it in a coup, to subsequently suffering the worst crackdown in its history—have left the Brotherhood searching for answers to chart a path forward. The group’s use of violence as a methodology for change has been a key feature of this forced reevaluation in the new Egyptian context.

Although much debate in recent decades has focused on the group’s commitment to democracy and electoral politics, the body of the organization has not significantly evolved ideologically. In its early days, the group had no trouble reconciling clandestine violent action through its Secret Apparatus while its leader Hassan al-Banna engaged in politics and even ran for office. The reality is that the Brotherhood in Egypt was never new to electoral politics and democracy for it to have registered as a significant “evolution” in scholarship exploring the group’s attitudes.

When President Sadat released Muslim Brothers from prison in the 1970s, they were allowed to rebuild their organization, and eventually, under Mubarak, they once again participated in elections. The group “abandoned” violence then
because it was unnecessary and futile. Although soldiery and violence is not central to the Muslim Brotherhood’s stated methodology for social and political change, at least in the initial stages, it features in Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna’s writings and vision for an ideal Muslim society. The group may have been non-violent since the 1970s, but it was never pacifist, and this proved to be key when the Brotherhood faced its first true adversity since the abrupt end of its decades long détente with the Egyptian state in 2013.

There are no more than 900,000 full members of the organization inside Egypt, yet with their families, low level members, and supporters, the Muslim Brotherhood represents an important minority in Egyptian society. More importantly, the global nature of the organization and the historical centrality of the Egyptian chapter still makes the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood important to both Muslim Brothers worldwide and Islamism overall.

For this reason, it is important to carefully examine the relationship between one of the oldest Islamist movements in the world and violence over the past four years, and what ideological revisions have taken place. This paper will focus more on the latter, specifically related to a recent book authored by a group of Muslim Brothers worldwide and Islamism overall.

The Jurisprudence of Popular Resistance to the Coup 2016 interview on Turkey-based pro-Muslim Brotherhood channel Mekamleen: “After the clearing of Rabaa al-Adawiya [square], he [Kamal] and his Brothers left [the square] and reunited the Muslim Brotherhood. He managed the Muslim Brotherhood through what was called the Crisis Committee, or the High Administrative Committee, which was seconded by the General Shura Council [of the Muslim Brotherhood] in February 2014… he could be credited for establishing a new generation in the life of the dawah of the Muslim Brotherhood.”

Kamal gave the green light to limited violent action in early 2014, in what the Egyptian government and even some Brothers called “Special Operations Committees.” The Muslim Brotherhood internally called it a plan to “disorient, attrite, and fail [the regime].” Kamal oversaw the affairs of the Brotherhood uncontested until Spring 2015, when his detractors attempted to take over the leadership of the organization. A year later, he offered his resignation from the executive committee, but maintained de-facto leadership until his death. He benefited from the fact that, unlike many of his detractors, he was on the ground and had rebuilt the Brotherhood internally.
Several factors, including personality clashes, careerism, and arguments over whom had legitimacy, contributed to the leadership disagreements. Some older leaders protested Kamal’s new committee, claiming it was meant to be temporary and not to replace the actual Guidance Bureau, and thus not replace them and their positions. Some of these older leaders, like Mahmoud Ghozlan, Acting Supreme Guide Mahmoud Ezzat, Deputy Acting Supreme Guide Ibrahim Mounir, and Secretary General Mahmoud Hussein began to talk more about “non-violence” in spring 2015, and lobbed hushed accusations that Kamal and his wing were abandoning the “fundamentals” of non-violent action.\textsuperscript{10}

The exact reasons for the falling out are still being examined. However, the centrality of disagreements over violent action is indisputable. There was also much talk of disagreements in “visions,” although this tended to ultimately boil down to the issue of what constitutes “revolutionary action” and what can be done to overthrow the regime short of full-scale armed confrontation. Other issues were and still are at the center of the debate. These include disagreements over how best to engage the international community, media, the Egyptian population, and other political players, as well as technical matters related to bylaws, terms of appointments, and opening the space for younger leaders to climb the ranks and energize the organization. Yet the consequential nature of the question of violence has always cast a shadow over the different disagreements between quarreling factions.

The older leaders comprising the so-called “old guard” waited over a year and a half before voicing their objections—something that Kamal’s supporters keenly point out. Where they simply unaware of the activities of Kamal and his associates, thus really never having influence over the organization in the first place? Or did it become clear that Kamal’s plan was ineffective and even counterproductive as the Brotherhood paid a human cost and its international reputation as a non-violent organization was now being scrutinized? It is difficult to ascertain intentions. Yet it is important to note that this “old guard” had, for instance, founded satellite networks like Masr al-An, which explicitly incited violence and cheered armed groups as late as spring 2015.\textsuperscript{11}

Understanding the internal machinations of the post-coup executive committee overseeing the affairs of the Muslim Brotherhood is critical to shedding light on the nature of the debate over violence and the group’s relationship to it. This is highly contested, due to the secretive nature of these matters and the conflicting narratives pushed by either the Muslim Brotherhood, their apologists, or the regime. Although this confusion should not surprise observers, the result has been a collective resignation among researchers, journalists, and others that no information can be known and that the organization’s relationship with violence simply remains unsubstantiated. The reality is far more complex.

Even the most cursory reading of literature and articles published on Islamist platforms shows how the issue was being internally debated. Some of the content posted on Islamist websites like Noonpost and others drop any pretensions that the Muslim Brotherhood, whether in whole or a faction, has not had any relationship to violence. A prime example can be found in a series of articles written by Islamist researcher Ahmad al-Tilawy,\textsuperscript{12} who describes himself as a “loyal [Muslim] Brother” who formerly was in the organization proper.\textsuperscript{13} Although al-Tilawy’s focus, like other Islamist writers, is not on the issue of violence—as they see focusing on this as harmful to the organization and unfair due to the differences in opinion—they nonetheless cannot avoid mentioning the issue when discussing internal disagreements. In a February 2016 article explaining the internal disagreements inside the Brotherhood, al-Tilawy wrote:

“...The main disagreement [related to] the use of cadres and financing of activities that were not adopted by the [Brotherhood] leadership in accordance to the rules of Shura [consultation] per the by-laws. Specifically, as it relates to a project adopted by the [Brotherhood] leadership which is the creation of “strong arms,” which is a special apparatus inside the Muslim Brotherhood that is meant to carry out specific special operations during the stage of Hassm [decisiveness] with the regime. This is after the stages of disorienting and attrition [of the enemy]. These are the three stages that the [Brotherhood] specified in its literature following the coup in order to overthrow the military regime and bring back legitimacy [Morsi]... [the old guard] did not believe that this stage [Hassm] has come about yet.”\textsuperscript{14}

It is perhaps a coincidence that only months later a new terrorist group called Hassm, which is suspected of Muslim Brotherhood ties due to the background of its cadres and ideology, unleashed an ongoing campaign of violence across Egypt.\textsuperscript{15} Notably, old guard Muslim Brotherhood Secretary General Mahmoud Hussein appeared to explicitly confirm al-Tilawy’s mention of an early plan of “disorienting and attrition,” understood to mean the types of low-level violence that swept Egypt early on after the coup. The brief and perhaps accidental revelation happened during a January 2016 interview on the old guard-owned channel Watan.\textsuperscript{16} Hussein was being questioned on strategic planning and answered that
plans come and go and must be reevaluated as conditions change, giving the example of “disorienting and attrition” as an early plan that was later replaced.17

In an interview conducted by the author of a Muslim Brotherhood youth who had been incarcerated and now works for a Brotherhood-tied online website, the term “disorienting and attrition” was confirmed as having been discussed by the group’s cadres and leaders, but that many found it to be insufficient, due to its focus on arson and small bombings.18

Al-Tilawy went on to write that:

“The other wing which is represented by Dr. Mohamed Kamal …did indeed begin in using some youths in these special operations, which included activities such as attacking army and police checkpoints and [public] facilities. Something which the other leaders did not wish, at least at this stage and the way it was done, as there were dead among citizens, army, and police.”19

In his 2016 interview on Mekamleen, Brotherhood leader Shalash provided further context and confirmation of what Al-Tilawy wrote and others have expressed in interviews with this author regarding the “disorientation and attrition” plan. Commenting on the issue of strategic planning under Kamal, Shalash said, “[Kamal’s committee] understood the revolutionary role that the stage necessitated and the revolutionary action that suited at that time.”20

Shalash, as is common with all other Brotherhood leaders in his faction, carefully uses words such as “power,” “strength,” and “tools of power,” in clear contrast to proposals for mere protests, and “revolutionary” as a euphemism for action that goes beyond non-violent protests. In fact, some Muslim Brotherhood leaders have explicitly stated to reveal attacking the foundations of the regime so it may collapse, Shalash strongly hints at this. In the same interview, Shalash clarified that these “joints” are only few and if the “revolutionaries owned limited and simple tools they can deal with this regime.”21

The consistent emphasis on what is understood to be a limited approach to violence is due to the unpopularity of proposing full scale armed confrontation, which virtually all Brothers recognize is a doomed endeavor. Shalash himself recognizes this in the interview when he contrasts his and Kamal’s “vision” with the militarism and whole scale violence their detractors accuse them of promoting. This is in fact a critical distinction that is central to the nature of violent activity sanctioned by this Muslim Brotherhood faction, as the nature of violent activity is both convoluted and clandestine by design.

As the Mekamleen interview progressed, Shalash emphasized the significance of January 25, 2015, in Kamal’s planning by saying that it was the opening salvo of a strategy to bring the regime to its knees by January 2016. Indeed, January 2015 was perhaps one of the last times the Brotherhood came out in large numbers and caused significant havoc across the country through road blocks and other activities. Dozens were also killed and injured. At the same time, something new came to the fore. A group calling itself Revolutionary Punishment (RP) announced its founding and began to carry out several attacks.22 RP was significant due to its consistency and overt focus on using firearms to attack police, carrying out over 150 attacks during its roughly one year of activity.23 Although the group never revealed who was behind it, its rhetoric, ideology, area of operations, and choice of targets, clearly point to a connection with at least one faction inside the Brotherhood, especially as it was not a Salafi Jihadi group. Recent investigative reporting has demonstrated further evidence that Mohamed Kamal’s committee specifically founded RP and another group by the name Popular Resistance Movement.24

Another source of information that helps shed light on the nature of the Muslim Brotherhood’s internal disagreements and Kamal’s activities are interrogation transcripts of jailed Brotherhood leaders affiliated with the old guard. The nature of this source is controversial, but the specific sources consulted are interrogations conducted by the Supreme State Security Prosecution, where there are no reports of torture. Prisoners can of course still be under duress due to prior torture or threat of it after the fact, but this is not known to be the case for senior leaders.

The content of the interrogations themselves makes them worth considering...
and have been corroborated by independent research. The leaders’ statements in the transcripts are diverse, indicating that it is unlikely to have been a government dictated script, and the Muslim Brotherhood did not dispute their content. For instance, some senior leaders refused to talk and denied all charges, while insisting the organization is non-violent and that they were mistreated, though not tortured. Leaders who do talk refrain from incriminating themselves and the Brotherhood as a whole. Curiously, most of the statements attempt to directly or indirectly lay the blame on Mohamed Kamal, painting him as a manipulative liar who acted without consulting them. This is surprising, considering the senior leadership position Kamal had both during and after the coup and even after these leaders’ arrests.

Old guard leaders easily tarnishing Kamal’s reputation appears to be a common theme. Senior leader Mohamed Sudan, in an interview with the author—ironically in the waiting area of the UK Parliament while his superior Ibrahim Mounir testified on the group’s activities—did as much. Sudan refrained from explicitly confirming that Kamal was involved in violent activity. He was, however, quite cautious with his words. “Mohamed Kamal had a different point of view from the others…he took his own decisions,” he said.28 “He would lie to intermediaries and tell them he had approval for decisions.”29 Sudan also appeared to lay the blame for the authorities killing several senior Muslim Brotherhood leaders in 2015 on Kamal. “Other movements [by Mohamed Kamal] led to the arrests of Mahmoud Ghozlan and Abdel Rahman al-Barr. Mohamed Kamal took risks. He made wrong assumptions about his power and the state. He is responsible for [this incident and arrests].”30 When asked specifically about Kamal and the Special Operations Committees, Sudan refused to specifically confirm or deny that the Muslim Brotherhood was violent, but added, “Mohamed Kamal is from Upper Egypt. They all have weapons there. There were rapes, imprisonment, and torture. You know the culture there and vendettas. The youth also pressured him. We [old guard leaders in the UK] were surprised by things that happened in Egypt done by the Muslim Brotherhood.”31

In his interrogation in Case no. 423/2015, Brotherhood leader Mohamed Saad Elowa echoed the same. “Mohamed Kamal and three assistants would take decisions on their own. They were Abdel Fatah el-Sisi, Hussein Ibrahim, and Ali Batekh.”32 Elowa would go on to claim that he was unaware of what was happening and was surprised when a mid-level leader told him there were orders from the Guidance Bureau to engage in violence.33 At that time, he and others outside of Kamal’s close circle allegedly wanted to write a statement about the need for non-violence, but Kamal and others refused to sign it.34

Senior Muslim Brotherhood leader Mahmoud Ghozlan would allege the same story in his interrogation. He added, “we discovered that Dr. Mohamed Kamal was responsible for a group of youth calling themselves ‘The Special Operations Committee,’ and he would issue them orders carrying the name of the Guidance Bureau. These orders were not legitimate.”35 Ghozlan then alleged that when he and others tried to interfere and objected to the use of violence, specifically assassinations, Kamal and his wing said they were not legitimate and the differences escalated.36 “[I told Kamal] we used to hear about attacks that took place and we did not know that they were done under his orders.”37 Mohamed Mahna Moussa, a Muslim Brother, denied the charges against him, but clarified the nature of “special operations” work. He said that all orders were coming from the same executive committee, but that the core of the disagreements were over “advanced operations”—specifically assassinations and any shedding of blood—which old guard leaders found objectionable.38

For their part, old guard affiliated leaders Abdel Rahman al-Barr and Mohamed Taha Wahdan categorically denied the charges against them, insisted the Muslim Brotherhood was non-violent, and went so far as to deny that Special Operations Committees ever existed or professed ignorance.39

Quarreling between the two Brotherhood factions continues to this day. Several attempts at mediation have failed. In December 2016, Kamal’s faction, whom can be called the “new guard,” launched a coup of their own and assumed all leadership positions inside the organization. They went so far as to relieve all senior Muslim Brotherhood leaders who were not imprisoned of their positions, including many old guard leaders.

There are now two largely distinct factions claiming leadership over the group. Both sides do not recognize the legitimacy of the other, yet both are legitimately part of the Muslim Brotherhood. They also command their own constituencies, not only in Egypt, but also in foreign countries.

That Mohamed Kamal and his new guard had a relationship with violence and established the “Special Operations Committee” is no longer in serious dispute. The bitterness of the internal disagreements pushed each side to have to defend themselves and attack the other, leaving behind a trail of information that helps researchers piece together some of what had happened. When it comes to the old guard and the question of what relationship to low-level violence they may have had, and why exactly they ultimately turned on Kamal, this will likely continue to be a matter of deciphering who knew what when.

As he is now dead, it is easier to know about Kamal and some of his faction’s activities. Kamal was memorialized after his death by Egyptian terrorist group...
Liwa al-Thawra in 2016, which is suspected of ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. Finally, that Kamal was engaged in “Special Operations” work was so well-known in Brotherhood circles that in an interview with Islamist-leaning news site Ma'av al-Arabia Kamal’s own daughter commented: "Dr. Mohamed [Kamal] was executed in this way, and all have tarnished him with [engaging in] violence, including leaders in the Muslim Brotherhood, because he wanted change…The issue [disagreements] were not about Special Operations Committees, but because [Kamal] was calling for a third founding for the Muslim Brotherhood through the injection of new blood and the reliance on youth…Special Operations Committees were just a part of the disagreement.”

The Jurisprudence of Popular Resistance to the Coup

AT THE HEIGHT OF THE INTERNAL DISAGREEMENTS IN AUGUST 2015, A GROUP called “The Sharia Committee of the Muslim Brotherhood” published a statement addressed to the entire organization on an affiliated, though unofficial Muslim Brotherhood website. The statement takes an annoyed tone, as if emanating from a disillusioned, whistle-blowing employee. The authors claim the Muslim Brotherhood’s executive committee, headed by Mohamed Kamal, tasked them to formulate Sharia-based theorizations for “revolutionary work” in response to demands by the Brotherhood base for a religious opinion on the matter. They said that they had, in fact, written a complete study that they refrained from distributing widely for months, but have done so now in light of the growing disagreements over strategy. The statement linked to a file sharing website which hosted the only known link to their book. Upon inspection, the site showed that the document was uploaded in January 2015. The scholars made several points in their statement:

1. That the “putschists,” meaning the post-coup Egyptian regime, are worse than the *Khawarij*—a despised early Muslim sect—and were worse than seditionists, as they pose a grave danger to the *Ummah,* or global Muslim community. They should therefore be treated as “aggressors.”

2. That the Sharia ruling against the regime is “the necessity of resistance, in all of its forms and types.” The “resistance” ranges from “disabling” to “an equilibrium in fear and terror,” to “confrontation and Hasm [decisiveness].”

3. That their rulings are general and that the “Sharia restrictions must be considered in execution.” They clarify that this half-step is to not “militarize the revolution and target innocents so that the revolutionaries may not be accused of violence.” Their study aims to educate the “revolutionaries” of their rights to fight back against the aggressors and “target only the guilty ones.”

4. That their book was “recited word for word before the [Muslim Brotherhood] administration, was adopted by it, and was distributed to all Brothers.” And that it had an impact during the January 2015 protest wave.

5. That their book is now the ownership of all Brothers and “it is not the right of any person or group to abrogate it…because it was adopted in a highly transparent and institutional manner.”

The statement and the book understandably created a great deal of controversy for its explicit nature. It took several months for this author to definitively authenticate that a body called the Sharia Committee of the Muslim Brotherhood did in fact exist, that the book was authentic, and was sanctioned by internal Brotherhood leadership at the time and even authored by some Brotherhood scholars.

The first corroboration of the existence of the Sharia Committee was by Muslim Brotherhood leader Amr Darrag when he was asked about it during a television interview on *Al-Araby* television network days after the statement. Darrag quipped that it should not be a surprise that a group like the Brotherhood, whose point of reference is Islam, would have a group of scholars to consult. When this author wrote an article in February 2016 in *Foreign Affairs,* in part discussing the book, the article was covered in a segment on a television show hosted by Muslim Brotherhood leader Hamza Zobaa on *Mekamleen.* In critiquing the article, Zobaa talked of the book and said that it did not sanction violence, but
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Translated Excerpts and Analysis

What follows is the translation of several passages from the book, along with some commentary for clarity and analysis. The digital copy of the book itself does not have a proper table of contents, but can be divided into two major sections. The first section, which expands on why the new Egyptian regime is illegitimate, establishes the theoretical framework for the second section that proscribes violence and sets forth the conditions for it.

Forward:

We need to know the Sharia classification for the military coup in Egypt, so that we may issue fatwas on how to deal with it.

A military group, their leader the Minister of Defense, overthrew President Mohamed Morsi. He is the legitimate president for which there was the first correct bay’ah (oath of allegiance) we can recall or know of in modern history. He was chosen by a popular majority with total free will without pressure or force…The bay’ah contract was in the 2012 constitution, which the people agreed to in total freedom.

The coup happened after the military group took over power, with coercive force, and kidnapped the legitimate president, imprisoned him, and fabricated charges against him. They also killed his supporters, burned their corpses, made lawful [the confiscation] of their wealth, stripped them and all the honorable men of the nation of their freedom, and implemented the plans of the enemies…

There are several crimes before us:

First: Treachery and treason against a president they swore to serve and be loyal to.

Second: Rebell ing against the rightful Imam with force. This rebellion either puts these putchists in the ranks of the bugha rather “self-defense,” like the “liberations movements” in places such as Latin America, Mozambique, Zambia, and South Africa. Moreover, the Sharia Committee had begun to publish statements on its own Facebook page with its own logo before eventually changing its name to “The Association of the Revolution’s Scholars.”

Most importantly, in correspondence with the author, Brotherhood leader Magdy Shalash confirmed the authenticity of the book and existence of the Sharia Committee. He further added that those who have cast doubt about the authenticity of the book were ignorant. At the time of the Sharia Committee statement and publishing of the book there was much confusion due to its heretofore secretive nature. A Brotherhood linked website, Rassd, had ran the sole story disputing the authenticity of the statement quoting leader Abdel Khaleq al-Sharif. Al-Sharif would later retract his statements on his personal Facebook page after saying that Muslim Brothers responsible for the committee reached out to him to explain that it indeed existed. Shalash confirmed the same to the author. He further explicitly confirmed that he participated in drafting the book. When asked about whom exactly commissioned the book, Shalash explained that a specialized committee working under the executive committee of the Muslim Brotherhood at the time oversaw their work.

Shalash had also said the same in his 2016 Mekamleen interview. When Shalash was asked about the Muslim Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide’s famous line in 2013 “Our peacefulness is stronger than bullets,” he responded that this is not a fundamental of Islam nor even the Brotherhood, meaning that things can change. “There is a time when ‘our peacefulness is stronger than bullets,’ is appropriate and another when ‘our peacefulness is stronger with bullets.’” He added that there is no debate over the issue of self-defense. He and the elected leadership of the Brotherhood have “transcended this and we have as a Sharia Committee established theorizations for revolutionary work…because the term ‘special operations,’ that is a security term.” Special Operations, as mentioned, is the term used by Egyptian authorities to specifically label violent Muslim Brotherhood operations. He also confirmed that the Sharia Committee was officially tasked by the executive committee, then headed by Kamal, with writing the book.
So that the opponents of the coup may know the Sharia proofs that fulfill the needs of this revolutionary stage.54

The subsequent section details the Sharia classification of the new Egyptian regime. The authors are specifically responding to arguments made by some Salafis and other Islamists who believe that obedience to the ruler, whomever he may be, is required in order to avoid bloodshed. Even if this rule is through Wilayet al-Mutghalib, or rule of the vanquisher or usurper, that is a ruler who assumes his throne through force and his rule is subsequently legitimized.

The issue of what constitutes a legitimate Imam and what can remove him from his position has been a key feature in Islamic writings for centuries. One of the most comprehensive books, *The Ordinances of Government*, written by medieval Islamic jurist Al-Mawardi (d. 1058) remains a key reference on the subject and is heavily cited in the book. Despite it being the 21st century, the nature of the Muslim Brotherhood as an Islamist organization necessitates dealing with jurisprudential issues of kingship even for a democratically elected leader to engage its Islamist base. The authors of the book, while expressing their reservations towards the applicability of the concept of the rule of the vanquisher, and questioning it at times, still write a detailed jurisprudential argument for why Sisi’s coup cannot be compared to the common medieval palace coups of centuries past. What results is a treatise full of references to Morsi as if he was a medieval Caliph.

They write that the difference between the coup and the rule of the vanquisher is that of heavens and earth. “The rule of the putschists over President Morsi in Egypt is not legitimate rule in any way as outlined by Islam in reaching power. Therefore, they are usurpers, thieves, thugs, and killers.”55 They go on to make their strongest argument that “the actions of the putschists contravene those of the ruler in Islam.”56 They also state that the Sisi regime does not implement Sharia and is therefore illegitimate. “A ruler that implements Sharia, the punishments, establishes Jihad, and protects the Muslims, their religion, and their property is the lesser evil of anarchy and infighting between Muslims.”57

The authors cannot completely dismiss the historical precedent for the rule of the vanquisher as the conditions of kingship abound in Islamic books of jurisprudence. Rather, they narrow its definition by saying that the rule of the vanquisher only comes when there is no Imam who has been given bay’ah. This happens when the Imam is “lost” due to death, his own resignation, or his removal by the people who “loose and bind,” that is essentially the “wise men,” which they define as “the Muslims’ Shura and parliamentary councils.”58 In the authors’ view, the removal of the rightful Imam—Morsi—certainly cannot be done through “a military coup whose
One sub-section is dedicated to the issue of “collaboration with the enemy,” saying “Sisi has declared...[that] he protects the security of Israel and considers Hamas, which wages Jihad, his primary enemy.”62 It adds, “and for the sake of the Zionist-American projects [Sisi] forcibly evacuates the people of Sinai and sends our forces to Libya and Iraq, instigates discord in the Moroccan desert [Western Sahara], and declares his willingness to send forces to protect Israel.”63

The book further states that the old Islamic rulers engaged in Jihad and conquest for Islam, whereas “these traitorous tyrants [the regime] have criminalized Jihad in the way of God and have described it as a disaster and terrorism.”64 Adding that among the reasons scholars had accepted the rule of the vanquisher in earlier periods was to protect the borders, something that is no longer applicable because Sisi “does not protect our borders from our Jewish enemies, rather he engages and coordinates with them and serves their interests.”65 The authors further allege that, in the view of Israel and the United States, the coup happened “because Morsi wished to rule by Sharia and establish the Caliphate state.”66

Although the Khawarij are despised in Islamic history, the authors go on to state that calling the putschists Khawarij is an “honor they do not deserve.”67 To them, the Khawarij were good but misguided Muslims. The regime, however, “wants to abolish Sharia and rule by man-made laws, and bring in...Christians, secularists, and all who hate Sharia.”68

Finally, while accepting the rule of the vanquisher was once considered the lesser of two evils, it has today become the greater evil. To the authors, the current rule must therefore be contested due to the many crimes of the regime. They also mentioned Morsi did not seek rule, which is frowned upon in Islamic jurisprudence, but rather was nominated by the Sharia Committee for Rights and Reformation—a short-lived body comprised of a hodgepodge of Salafi and other scholars with Brotherhood backing. This, they argue, further shows how Morsi was a legitimate Muslim Imam.

The Justifications for Violence

WITH THE KNOWLEDGE IN HAND THAT SISI AND THE COUP DO NOT SATISFY ANY Islamic conditions for kingship, the authors declare “The rule of the putschists in Egypt is not legitimate, rather it is a violation and oppression that must be resisted by all means possible.”69

Although the new regime’s abuses are central to the authors’ arguments on the permissibility of violence, the matter of the regime’s non-Islamist nature and alleged collaboration with “infidels” is equally and consistently emphasized. On the issue of the regime’s supposed secularism, the book declares: “They [the regime] have also engaged in the gravest act of innovation in Islam by declaring a separation between religion and state, and innovators can never be obeyed.”61

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The regime is also deemed to possess the characteristics of the Khawarij, seditionists, and aggressors. Therefore, “Sisi, and all whom are with him ranging from ministers, media figures, [judges], and [Sheikhs], all are deemed enemy combatants and the punishment of Hinabah must be implemented [against them].”70 The Quran proscribes the punishment as “[to be] killed or crucified or that their hands and feet be cut off from opposite sides or that they be exiled from the land.” [Quran 5:33] The book never mentions exile as an option.

The authors go on to explain how the regime is in the position of aggressor, whom in Islam is permissible to kill, especially in self-defense. After the coup and “the killing of thousands who demanded legitimacy [Morsi’s return to power], they [the new regime] have thus become combatants that must be fought.”71

The book moves on to detail the actions of the new regime, from killings to mass imprisonment of Islamists and the need for retribution, and says that their actions are even worse than the infidels who had fought the early Muslims. It draws on early Islamic examples to qualify the judgement that the regime must be fought in kind. One example is that of the first Caliph Abu Bakr al-Sadiq who had ordered an enemy burned. The authors celebrate this as a “unique Islamic precedent,”72 and as Islamists believe bodies were burned during the clearing of Rabaa by Egyptian authorities, the authors decree, “those [in the regime] deserve to be burned.”73

The next chapter is titled “Resistance is Legitimate: Principles and Regulations,”74 and details the authors’ instruction of how violence can be undertaken in the new Egyptian context. One important principle is that “resisting [the regime] does not mean total war that is open on all fronts…between peacefulness and total confrontation are many stages of attrition.”75 The authors go on to offer a disclaimer that their study is of general rulings, and that a specific fatwa must be sought after from trusted individuals when it comes to actions. They also explain that someone who is not engaged in Jihad cannot issue fatwas for those who are. They specifically single out Muslim Brotherhood leaders who are imprisoned or on the run, understood as old guard leaders, saying that their views on the matter cannot be considered.

The authors argue that “resistance” is not only natural, but a “Sharia necessity.”76 It is also the lesser of two evils: “If we compare between the harm of staying silent towards the oppression of the oppressors and resisting them—with the possibility of harm and some evil occurring—it is clear that resistance is the lesser of two evils.”77

The book then asks the following rhetorical questions: “Why the change now? Were not these Sharia-based reasons available before? Were not the proofs of the obligation of Jihad known?”78 The authors reply that the “freemen,” meaning the Brotherhood, took the path of democracy “to its end.”79 Along the way, it won majorities in parliament and the presidency. However, “when the tyrants moved against them [the Muslim Brotherhood] with the power of arms, with no consideration for the mechanisms of the democracy that even those who called for it abandoned, it was the right for the freemen [Muslim Brothers] to seek change through other mechanisms to force the tyrants to respect [the outcomes].”80

They add that so long as there was hope to achieve their change through “soft means,” it was not permissible at that time to use violence, as it would have led to a greater evil. However, when this non-violent experience was aborted, “it became permissible for peoples to use force as an alternative means for change [as conditions permit].”81 They further claim Quranic precedent in that God at times forbade Muslims and the Prophet Muhammad from fighting and at times made it a duty: “Fighting has been enjoined upon you while it is hateful to you.”82 [Quran 2.216] The authors declare:

“This period of weakness and feebleness the Ummah is living in is a period when only strength is respected. It is a period when the world only deals with you peacefully when you are prepared for war. It needs a new vision and a new beginning.”83

Briefly channeling Sayyid Qutb, the authors discuss “the obligation of overthrowing collaborator states.”84 The significance of this section is its intentional general language to apply for all Muslim states and not just Egypt:

“The visible and hidden powers in the Islamic world are evil powers, brainwashed, whom were groomed by the enemies of Islam for this role a long time ago...these powers cannot be conquered and overtaken without Jihad, a Jihadi movement, and a Jihadi education...These powers have the green light from all the enemies of Islam, inside and outside, and chief among the international powers: the Zionist and global Crusader powers...Removing these [Muslim] powers and replacing them with Islam is not an easy or simple matter...achieving this requires a movement that has prepared itself for a long and bitter Jihad.”85

The book then says that enemies of Muslim peoples—meaning Israel and the West—have long harmed the Muslims who were in turn unable to retaliate due to
Muslim regimes that protect the West. Retaliating against these aggressors is a “Sharia obligation” which Muslims were unable to carry out due to the treachery of their collaborator regimes. Thus, these Muslim regimes must be fought first. The authors go on to further extol Jihad, say that Muslims have neglected it, and state that martyrdom can be achieved through two primary means: being killed by the infidels or the despotic regimes.

The next section, which is perhaps the most important, is titled “Special operations are a middle stage between peacefulness and confrontation, or creative non-violence.” The authors explain that there can be a middle ground between complete non-violence and total armed confrontation, which may backfire. They indicate that their ruling on the permissibility of these special operations does not mean they must be immediately carried out, and that there is gradualism there too. They then attempt to legitimize said “special operations” by claiming there is precedent with the Prophet Muhammad, who gradually warned, threatened, and then fought his enemies. Another example of a “special operation” is when early Muslims secretly destroyed polytheistic idols. The prophetic example, the authors assert, is that in “engineering a conflict” they must be able to hold out for the long term and be careful not to escalate matters into armed confrontation when not ready.

The book further argues that “resistance” is a type of Jihad and lament the “mistake of delaying Jihad under the pretext of preparation.” The authors emphasize the comprehensive nature of Jihad, but to specifically make the point that ideological and spiritual preparation is important and that this can be done before, during, and after violent work. They also say that waiting for there to be a balance in the strength of Muslims vis-à-vis their enemies is not possible in light of the ruling Muslim regimes. In this, they dismiss one of the biggest arguments made by Islamists who do not prioritize Jihad on the basis that it is a failed endeavor. The authors also argue that the least that can be done is supporting the “popular resistance [in Egypt],” as it is not only “to defend the resistance, but rather Islam itself.” Even if “the confrontation led to the complete extermination of those who hold the truth.”

To the authors, Jihad against infidels and defensive Jihad are not the only permissible types, but also “Jihad against the hypocrites.” This Jihad is “obligatory on all whom can against the anti-Islam hypocrites in the media, judiciary, politics, legislative [bodies], and all state institutions.”

The authors further lament what they see as an absence of Jihadis from the Islamist environment and attribute the “loss of Muslim lands to its enemies” to this absence.

"Because these [Muslim] territories lacked flexible and conscious Jihadi movements that can appropriately resist... any attempt targeting Islam... Perhaps this is what Imam al-Banna meant with the logo of a Quran guarded by two swords."
They add:

“Imam al-Banna dedicated a special message to Jihad titled ‘The Message of Jihad.’ He concluded it by saying: ‘the people that excel in the manufacturing of death know how to die an honorable death. God grants [them] a precious life in the [material] world and eternal bless in the hereafter. So, work towards an honorable death to win total happiness. May God grant us and you the honor of martyrdom’. The Jihadi tendency settled as a doctrine in the foundation of Imam al-Banna’s methodology and the acculturation of the Muslim Brotherhood. Until it became a slogan they repeat day and night and on every occasion: ‘God is our objective, the Prophet is our leader, the Quran is our constitution, Jihad is our way, and dying in the way of God is our greatest hope.’”

The authors then offer three examples of Brotherhood jihadism: fighting Jews in the 1948 war, the British in Egypt in 1951, and the “holy naw’y [the same word used for special operations] Jihad,” of Hamas.

The priority of the so-called “greater Jihad,” that of the heart and mind, is explicitly dismissed by the authors as a weak hadith, or prophetic saying. They quote Hassan al-Banna as saying that those who refer to this distract people from the importance of fighting and preparing for it.

The authors go on to defend the Muslim Brotherhood from “accusations from some [with regards to] shortcomings and slacking in the matter of Jihad.” They explain that strength and force have been central in al-Banna’s writings:

“The first level of power is that of creed and faith, after that the power of unity and association, then this is followed by the power of arms and weapons.”

The authors explain that a group can only be described as having “power” if it has all that al-Banna mentioned, and if it escalates by using weapons without it, then it will fall apart. Referring to al-Banna’s message at the 1938 Fifth Conference, they quote him as saying:

“The Muslim Brothers must be powerful...The Muslim Brotherhood will use force when nothing else will work, and only when they are confident that they have completed the preparation of faith and unity. When they use this force, they will be honorable and clear. They will warn first and wait. Then they go forward with honor and dignity and bear all the results of their position with full acceptance and ease.”

The authors also explain that the Brotherhood’s—and al-Banna’s—traditional reluctance towards revolutionary change was due to their belief that revolutionary change is fundamentally violent. The Muslim Brotherhood only rejected it, however, if it was not built on al-Banna’s requirements for what constitutes power. This meant that there must be preparation for revolution, and especially violent revolution, or else it does not work.

The book’s concluding section is a sort of FAQ, or Frequently Asked Questions, answering specific questions raised by those “on the path of resistance.” The authors justify individual acts of violence deemed as “retribution” without having to go back to authority, a usual requirement in Islam, by arguing that the state is no longer legitimate. They expand the list of accepted targets beyond police to include hired civilian thugs, sometimes used by police or others, and informants.

The authors also highlight that despite their lengthy justification for the killing of regime officials and their civilian supporters, this does not mean that they are explicitly labeling them as infidels. This is a significant distinction that acts as a bellwether in judging the ideological inclinations of both the authors and those whom rely on their jurisprudential justifications for violence. Had they explicitly called their enemies apostates, then this would indicate a more dominant Qutbist strand re-emerging in Muslim Brotherhood discourse. However, this may change over time, and may also indicate an explicitly Salafi-Jihadi orientation, which is not the case for this book or the terrorist groups suspected of ties to the Brotherhood, such as Hassm and Liwaa al-Thawra.

The authors further support individual violent action and say that if it happens then the Islamist movement cannot be held to blame, as this violence is only natural. They say that “youth operations” that are not claimed can do a great deal of damage and they must be supported secretly and not officially.

Burning and destroying police cars is also permissible, although with the caveat that ideally, they should not be because they are a “nation’s treasure.” If, however, this equipment is used to kill or sow corruption, then it is permissible to destroy it. Yet with all of these caveats, the authors instruct that police equipment and cars should be destroyed wherever they are found, even if they are not being used to repress a protest. The same goes for public property and even private property that is owned by the “heads of the criminals.”
Some more questions and answers include:\[113\]

Q: What is the ruling on officers who are not involved in killing the revolutionaries?

A: Assaulting police officers that do not assault protesters, like the checkpoint officers and conscripts, border guards, and those who work in passport control, traffic, and others, is not permissible... However, if the checkpoints assault and arrest protesters, and the thugs and aggressors barricade inside them, or if it participated in opening fire, then the ruling against them is that of against the aggressor. Resisting them is done on levels as is clarified in the rulings on aggressors.

Q: What is the ruling on operations that may harm the innocent. Meaning if a car owned by a criminal officer, or an unjust judge, or a police car is set on fire and it spreads to other cars?

A: It is not permissible to destroy [property] without a right... However, if all paths are closed and this is the only way, it is permissible...

Q: What is the ruling on individuals, who are not targets, but try to prevent special operations?

A: If, for example, the garage attendant or a conscript is guarding the building targeted...it is not permissible to kill him. He may be threatened, warned, and beaten. If he pulls out a weapon, he is to be killed.

Q: What is the ruling towards someone who has stripped one of the sisters and tore her clothes, and he is known specifically? And what if he raped her?

A: Tearing clothes in this way is an act of harabah (banditry). For this person, it is permissible to beat them severely even if it leads to him being paralyzed. If his hands and legs are cut off, that is permissible, so is if he was killed. Whomever raped an anti-coup woman, then his punishment is death if he is known, especially right then and there. He may be under protection and could escape, for this case he can be tracked and killed. As you know, an [early] Muslim killed a Jew who stripped a Muslim woman in the market of Banu Qaynuqa.

Q: A police officer from a known station killed someone before us, but we do not know the officer, though he is for sure from that station. Another from this station also raped a girl, but we do not know the specific perpetrator. Can the entire police station be targeted?

A: It is not permissible in Islam to kill someone [without specificity]...Therefore, whomever seeks retribution should send messages to all the officers inside the station before targeting it, so those who have not killed or raped may leave. Whomever remains is supportive of murder and rape. He is content and contributes through support and assistance, even if he does not participate with action. Just by not turning over the perpetrators to justice, as is the case, then this constitutes their collaboration. It is not a secret that the officer killed relying on his and his colleagues’ weapons, and if he was alone he would not have done this...[Caliph] Umar bin al-Khattab had killed collaborators. The officer’s superiors, who knew what he did and even ordered him, are also [permissible] targets.

Q: What is the ruling on resisting forced relocations in Sinai in relation to the Camp David Accords?

A: It is known that the goal of Egyptian army operations in the Sinai is only to protect Israel’s security, empty Sinai of its people, and to harass the Mujahidin of Hamas in Gaza for the benefit of the Jews. Therefore, we say it is obligatory to resist this forced relocation by all possible means within the limits of what is possible. There is no obedience to anyone who forsakes Muslims... resisting this is a form of the highest degrees of Jihad.

The youth who were made lawful to kill, their houses destroyed, were forced out of their homes and their regimes did not come to
their aid, but rather conspires against them; if they carried out operations against the transgressing entity [Israel] then they are not in the wrong per Sharia.

Other answers emphasize the permissibility of killing police and army officers. One deals with civilians such as media figures and politicians, and although the authors say that it is not permissible to kill someone who has not killed, the aforementioned civilians are labeled as collaborators and thus can be targeted. Although it may be permissible to kill them, it is best not to if it will lead to the enemy gaining sympathy as a result. Such civilian collaborators can, however, be injured or their property destroyed.\(^1\)

One specific answer veers into explicit sectarianism, alleging that Christian thugs are used in “besieging mosques, killing worshipers, arresting freewomen [Islamist women],”\(^2\) and thus it is permissible to retaliate against them. The authors then argue that there is precedent for this in how Napoleon had allegedly formed “Christian militias... to kill Muslims.”\(^3\) The authors give a moot caveat that “not all Christians are like this,” however, whatever Christian is caught red-handed “removing a niqab [from a Muslim woman’s face], besieging or burning a mosque, then he is to be killed...”\(^4\) They conclude on the topic:

“Add to this what the Church commits in terms of sectarian mobilization, storing weapons, and supporting and training militias to fight the revolutionaries [Islamists]... We say to the thugs of the Christians... whomever attacks us among you, there is no protection for him.”\(^5\)

**Impact of the Book**

THE LANGUAGE AND RHETORIC USED IN THE BOOK ECHOES IN THE DISCOURSE of new terrorist groups—such as Hassm and Liwaa al-Thawra—that have emerged in Egypt.\(^6\) Furthermore, the arguments made in the book are actively used by those in the new guard to win over supporters in their dispute with the old guard.

A key example was a memo uploaded in the form of a post on the official Facebook page of the Office of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey shortly after the new guard pulled their internal coup in December 2016. The Facebook page had uploaded other statements signed by the Turkey office, including a eulogy for dead Islamic Group leader, and convicted terrorist, Omar Abdel Rahman.\(^7\) They also uploaded a video message of one of their executive office officials named Ayman Ali.\(^8\) Ali is not only a mid-level Muslim Brotherhood leader, but also served as a member of the Morsi campaign’s official administrative team.\(^9\)

The memo, titled “Accusations and responses related to the general Shura meeting and elections,” made several points, at times directly copying from the book. Some are translated below:

**Second accusation:** This direction takes the organization [Muslim Brotherhood] to militarizing the revolution.

The [regime] does not have the designation of being legitimate to rule Egypt. The Sharia commands us to bring them down because they are *Khawarij*, *Bugha* (seditionists), transgressing combatants that qualify for retribution and their crimes are more egregious than the crimes of Abu Jahal (a polytheist enemy of Muhammad).

And what is agreed upon is that resisting them does not mean total war that is open on all fronts, but rather as the situation dictates it should be based on the jurisprudence of balancing [what is preferable, and what is not]. Between non-violence and total confrontation are many levels that the enemy can be worn down through. And “special operations” is a middle stage between non-violence and confrontation, or creative non-violence.

And the alternative to non-violent work does not necessarily need to be total armed resistance and confrontation whose [negative] consequences cannot be appreciated. Between them are levels and stages that we can exercise change through that can prolong the life of the resistance and shakes the criminals and preserves the strength of those resisting tyranny. So that they do not go down the path of militarizing their revolution with a conflict that they have not calculated [its consequences] and have not adequately prepared for.

**Third accusation:** This way, you all are at odds with the Imam’s
principles of Islam. This type of jihad is to be with what one is capable of, even if the methods and means differed based on the type of aggression.\textsuperscript{123}

**Conclusion**

THE STARK DISCOURSE OF *The Jurisprudence of the Popular Resistance to the Coup* is the result of an ongoing fundamental reorientation in Egyptian Islamism and specifically the Muslim Brotherhood. It is the consequence of the Muslim Brotherhood witnessing significant and dizzying changes, extreme repression, and both internal and outside pressure to articulate an Islamist methodology that can be relevant to its base.

It is, however, not a discourse that was created out of thin air. As the authors of the book meticulously outline, their arguments are based on a long history of Islamist and Brotherhood discourse. One that does not even require explicitly citing the ideas of Sayyid Qutb, but can sufficiently accomplish its mission by relying on the writings of Hassan al-Banna. Thus, although the Brotherhood has shown itself to be largely non-violent in action over the last four decades, the arguments laid out in this book should not come as a surprise, considering that the movement never underwent any serious ideological reforms on the permissibility of violence and meaning of Jihad beyond al-Banna and Qutb.

Yet, as explained, not every Brother is completely on board with the new vision laid out by the new guard of the Muslim Brotherhood. Although they may agree with the premises of some of the arguments, they fundamentally disagree on the utility of violence in the current Egyptian context. Others who do so on personal and religious grounds may find some acts of violence allowed, but murder to be strictly prohibited unless in cases such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Although it is important to highlight that the views expressed in the book, and other radical documents,\textsuperscript{124} are not representative of the entire Muslim Brotherhood, it is also important not to dismiss that they are representative of at least one major legitimate faction of the group. This faction, to a considerable extent, is represented in the Muslim Brotherhood’s new guard, which as of December 2016 has claimed total leadership over the organization. The detractors of this wing dismiss these arguments, the book, the Sharia Committee, and deny any relationship to violence. Despite this, violence has nonetheless been committed.
by actors who appear to be clearly inspired by and tied to this Brotherhood faction and it remains to be seen which faction has more supporters inside Egypt.

The book and the ideological revisions by the new guard are arguably representative of the wider body of the Muslim Brotherhood as Kamal oversaw the Muslim Brotherhood’s affairs after the coup. These ongoing revisions should be studied closely as they offer a critical corrective to analysis of the organization. It demonstrates how a great deal of the scholarship on the group produced in recent decades is increasingly becoming less useful and is in serious need of updating.

Moreover, as the book’s own language shows, the radical arguments made within it are not confined to Egypt. There is today a new generation of Muslim Brothers, both young and old, who see the utility in violence, support it, and even engage in it. The Egyptians among them are scattered outside Egypt in Turkey, Sudan, and beyond. Other Brothers and fellow travelers in Libya, Syria, Yemen, and the Gulf, have also been involved in either supporting or carrying out violence in recent years—even if this takes the form of rebel militias. The risk to Egypt is further radicalization and adoption of violence in the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood that could prove destabilizing if it is not checked by authorities. The risk to the region, and perhaps beyond, is that Salafi-Jihadi groups may no longer be the only Islamists with a monopoly over the use of violence to bring about the sought-after Islamist change.

As to the question of whether an ideological revision has indeed taken place and that the Muslim Brotherhood has changed, Shalash explained:

“The Muslim Brotherhood inside [Egypt] has revised itself since the beginning of 2014. It is a reformist organization that believes in the constitutional approach, gradualist reform, and participated in many elections, and so on. Then after that, the Muslim Brotherhood changed to [adopt] revolutionary thought. This change did not come overnight. This is a change that [is based] on much literature [produced] inside the group, meetings, and workshops. The revolutionary transformation is now in every Muslim Brotherhood household, in every Brotherhood Shu’ba (local branch), and no can, whomever they may be, extinguish this revolutionary thought. This is the transformation. The Muslim Brothers have indeed changed.”

NOTES

1. See, for instance, Hassan al-Banna’s letter “Towards the Light.” It should also be noted that when the Muslim Brotherhood new guard announced their takeover of leadership positions in December 2016, their slogan was “Towards the Light.”


4. All translations done by the author. Some of the translations have been slightly edited for clarity and flow without changing meanings. Words between brackets indicate the author’s own interjection explaining what a word or statement may be a reference to or to collapse a long description of an entity, thing, or place, into one word. For instance, if the book discusses the “murderous putschists,” later references to the same will simply be shortened to “[the regime.]”


9. Mekamleen TV.


13. Interview with the author, online, April 2016.

17. Ibid.
19. Al-Tilawy.
20. Youtube.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.

26. Ibid.
27. Mohamed Hamama, “A group with no name: The road of the group of beginners to assassinate the prosecutor general,” Mada Masr, July 27, 2017, https://www.madamasr.com/ar/2017/07/26/feature/%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%8B3%D9%85.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Investigation papers in Case no.423 for year 2015, commonly referred to in Egyptian media as the Assassination of Wael Tahoun case. The papers were obtained by the author from Egyptian journalists covering the case, who had in turn obtained them from the defense attorneys.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Mohamed Abdel Monem, Maar al-Arabia, 2016, https://www.madamasr.com/ar/2017/07/26/feature/%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%85-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%82-%D9%85%D8%A6%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%85-

42. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
46. See:
47. Correspondence with author, online and phone, June and July 2017.
49. See:
51. Ibid.
52. The Jurisprudence of Popular Resistance to the Coup.
53. Despite the use of the singular pronoun, Shalash and the Sharia Committee statement make clear that there were in fact several authors and not just one.
54. Ibid., pp 3–4.
55. Ibid., p 8.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., p 10.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid., pp 10–11.
61. Ibid., p 12.
62. Ibid., p 36.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid., p 18.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid., p 16.
70. Ibid., p 18.
71. Ibid., pp 24.
72. Ibid., p 28.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., p 36.
75. Ibid., p 37.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., p 38.
78. Ibid., p 40.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid., p 41.
84. Ibid., p 45.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid., pp 45–46.
87. Ibid., p 46.
88. Ibid., p 47.
89. Ibid., p 49.
90. Ibid., pp 49–51.
91. Ibid., p 53.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid., p 54.
94. Ibid., p 55.
95. Ibid., p 56.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid., pp 57–60.
98. Ibid., p 60.
99. Ibid., p 64.
100. Ibid., p 65.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid., p 66.
103. Ibid., p 67.
104. Depending on usage, context, and for clarity this is also sometimes translated as strength or force.
105. Ibid., p 68.
106. Ibid., p 69.
107. Ibid., p 73.
108. Ibid., p 76.
109. Ibid., p 77.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid., p 78.
112. Ibid.
113. The following translations are gist translations for clarity and brevity. Ibid. pp 79–81.
The Cold War-era Origins of Islamism in Turkey and its Rise to Power

By Behlül Özkan

The dichotomy between Kemalism and Islamism is one of the dominant paradigms in studies of Turkish politics. According to this paradigm, the Kemalists achieved a monopoly over the Turkish political establishment with the founding of the Republic in 1923, at which point they undertook far-reaching reforms with the aim of thoroughly modernizing Turkey politically, economically, culturally, and socially. These reforms, especially during the first decade of the Republic, resulted in lasting changes to many areas of Turkish life, such as the adoption of the Latin alphabet, Western dress, a civil code, and a modern educational system. The fiercest resistance to the reforms came from the traditionalists in Turkish society, namely the Islamists, who—along with the religious communities known in Turkish as cemaats—lost much of their former standing in politics between 1923 and the end of the 1940s. Accordingly, the aforementioned dichotomy between Kemalism and Islamism is, to some degree, a useful lens through which to understand this era. There is, however, a danger in viewing it as the main dynamic.
in Turkish politics and in assuming that it has been in full force throughout the whole 90-year history of the Republic of Turkey.1

Starting in the early 1990s, Islamists began to win greater and greater percentages of the vote during a political ascendancy whose causes remain the subject of much scholarly debate. The paradigm most commonly employed to explain it is as follows: Islamists represent a strand of politics originating in the periphery and demanding democratic reform; they are ranged in opposition to an authoritarian, secularist Kemalist bureaucracy (and its political representative, the CHP, founded by Atatürk in 1923), which has controlled the levers of power in Turkey, being particularly strong in the military and judiciary. According to this narrative, the once-invincible Kemalists steadily lost power to the Islamists during a process that started in the 1990s and culminated in the latter’s 2002 electoral victory.2 Furthermore, the struggle for power continued after 2002, with the Kemalists resorting to yet more coup attempts in order to effect a purge of the Islamists. In 2007, the Constitutional Court stepped in to block the election of the AKP’s presidential candidate, Abdullah Gül. This was followed by a closure case against the party, which was decided in the AKP’s favor by a margin of one vote. Starting in 2008, the AKP retaliated against the military and judiciary bureaucracy as well as opposition politicians and journalists through a series of indictments that it later admitted had been concocted. By means of such show-trials, it effected a purge of anti-AKP elements (in the state, media, and especially the military) which was unprecedented in the history of the Republic.3 It bears mentioning that the AKP’s coming to power in 2002, and its victory in the subsequent power struggle against its opponents, particularly in the military and judiciary, occurred with the support not only of Turkish Islamists, but also some Turkish liberals and, to an extent, leftists, as well as the EU and the U.S. The AKP was billed as a proponent of a well-integrated and global market economy; it was also expected to bring about a democratic transformation. In his 2005 article, Vali Nasr described the AKP’s political ascendancy as “the rise of Muslim democracy”; even as late as 2009, Henri Barkey and Morton Abramowitz, two U.S. scholars and diplomats with an expert knowledge of Turkey, wrote an article for the prominent international relations journal Foreign Affairs entitled “Turkey’s Transformers”—referencing, of course, the ruling AKP. In the article, Barkey and Abramowitz argue that the West should support the AKP in its quest towards “becoming a tolerant liberal democracy.”4

The present article rejects the paradigm that reads Turkish politics in terms of a Kemalist-Islamist dichotomy and—as a result—characterizes Islamism as a political actor representing the periphery in opposition to the center and civil society in opposition to the state. At present, in 2017, after 15 years of being governed by an AKP majority, Turkey is under a State of Emergency regime, in which rule of law and freedom of the press have been suspended, opposition politicians have been arrested, and the preconditions for free and fair elections no longer exist. The AKP has failed to realize the mission to democratize Turkey that has taken up for well over a decade; on the contrary, as of 2017, democracy in Turkey has regressed to a state worse than in 2002. This article likewise rejects the claim that Turkey has had a secularist, authoritarian, Kemalist establishment for more than 90 years. With the beginning of the Cold War in 1945, domestic and foreign policy in Turkey were shaped by an opposition to communism and to the Soviet Union. When Turkey joined NATO in 1952, anti-communism, which became the backbone of its state ideology, was fortified by nationalist and conservative values; the Islamists, for their part, were happy to seize this opportunity to forge an alliance with the establishment. In short, contrary to popular belief, Islamism in Turkey during the Cold War era was never a movement representing a periphery oppressed and victimized by the political center. Rather, it had the full blessing of the center, which had seen it as an antidote to the post-1960s ascendancy of the Left. Consequently, the Turkish establishment was unperturbed by the fact that the Islamists began to form parties and take part in coalition governments from the 1970s onward or, during the same decade, to run critical ministries like the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Justice.

By the 1990s, the alliance between Islamism and the state had dissolved. By that point, Islamism, which the state had supported during the Cold War as an antidote to the Left, had become far more powerful than expected. Moreover, as the Left’s influence diminished following the collapse of the Soviet Union, its social base increasingly swelled the ranks of the Islamists, who emerged as a political force with designs on total power.5 In short, with the end of the Cold War, Islamism—having outgrown the rather limited role assigned to it by the state—filled a gap created by an increasingly anemic Left; at the same time, it replaced center-right parties which were perceived as corrupt and responsible for Turkey’s economic woes. Thus, far from being a political outsider, Islamism was the representative of a burgeoning far-right political movement within the establishment which adopted the authoritarian, repressive, anti-pluralist, majoritarian character of the Cold War-era Turkish state, holding that in its struggle for power, the ends always justified the means. Not surprisingly, predictions from the 1990s and onwards regarding the imminent democratization of Turkey by a far-right political movement, namely Islamists, turned out to be entirely mistaken.
Islamism as an Antidote to the Left

In Turkey’s November 2015 elections, AKP deputy Ismail Kahraman, currently in his late 70s, was elected speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. Aside from a brief period between 1996 and 1997 when he served as minister of culture for Erbakan’s Welfare Party, Kahraman was not a well-known politician. In August 2016, Kahraman delivered a seemingly inexplicable outburst concerning Cuban revolutionary Ernesto Che Guevara: “Che was a killer who personally carried out executions and was slain at age 39...he was a guerilla. A bandit’s image shouldn’t appear on the collar or on the shirt of a Turkish high school student.”

What could have caused Kahraman to flare up in outrage against the world-wide cult figure of Che, more than a quarter-century after the end of the Cold War? It is worth noting that Kahraman got his first taste of politics as a member of the Millî Türk Talebe Birliği (Turkish National Students Union, MTTB)—a focal point of anti-communist youth activity in Turkey—in his 20s, and in 1967 he became its president. In other words, Kahraman has been active in anti-leftist politics in Turkey for more than half a century; thus his political career sheds a good deal of light on Islamism’s record in Turkey over that same time period.

During the 1960s, the Turkish Left truly became a mass movement, in parallel with the rising tide of leftist worldwide. In the 1965 elections, for instance, the Workers Party of Turkey became the first socialist party to enter Parliament; even the CHP described its own political stance as “left of center.” Islamism, too, became increasingly visible—in politics, the media, publishing, youth organizations, religious events, and elsewhere—during this period. At the same time, Islamism in Turkey underwent a significant transformation, moving further away from the Ottoman tradition and becoming closer to Islamist movements in the Middle East.

The rise of Arab nationalism in the 1950s under the leadership of Nasser was perceived by the U.S. as a threat to its interests in the Middle East. For example, Report No. S820 by the U.S. National Security Council explicitly stated, “The West and the radical pan-Arab nationalist movement have become arrayed against each other. The West has supported conservative regimes opposed to radical nationalism, while the Soviets have established themselves as its friends and defenders.” Two years previously, U.S. President Eisenhower had written in his diary that in order to counter the influence of Egyptian leader Nasser, “my own choice of such a rival is King Saud.” In Eisenhower’s words, “[Saudi Arabia is a country that contains the holy places of the Moslem world, and the Saudi Arabsians are considered to be the most deeply religious of all the Arab groups. Consequently, the King could be built up, possibly, as a spiritual leader.” The Saudis themselves were well aware that, in light of the Cold War balance of power, it would be much to their advantage to become the leader of Islamist movements as a counterweight to growing Arab nationalism and socialism in the Middle East. The establishment of the Rabitat al-Alami al-Islami (Muslim World League) under Saudi leadership in Mecca during the 1962 Hajj pilgrimage season greatly facilitated coordination among Islamist groups. Indeed, in his 1987 book Rabita, Turkish journalist Uğur Mumcu described, in exhaustive detail, how Islamism had spread in Turkey (with the help of Saudi capital and the support of the MWL) and how linkages between Islamic capital and politics had been created through the religious orders known as cemaats. Yet a full 20 years before the publication of Mumcu’s book, left-wing bureaucrats within the state had already leaked whatever intelligence they possessed about these matters to the press. Such bureaucrats saw the rise of the Islamists—fostered by the anti-communist climate in Cold-War era Turkey—as a threat to the country’s secular republic.

Indeed, an in-depth article on Islamist activities in Turkey with the headline “Who are the ones behind the reactionary movement in Turkey?,” based on reports by Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization, was published in the March 19, 1968 issue of the socialist journal Ant. Notably, the article featured an organizational chart with the title “The Muslim Brotherhood,” and it is striking, when one considers the events of the past half century, how nearly all of the article’s predictions concerning Islamism have been fulfilled. The article stresses that two foreign powers lie behind the rise of Islamism in Turkey: “Reactive forces in Turkey are acting in concert with the Muslim Brotherhood organization in the Middle East...Anglo-American imperialism views the recent strengthening and coming to power of nationalism and socialism in the Arab states of the Middle East as endangering its own oil revenues. Accordingly, it has seen fit to politicize Islam and, through the CIA, has begun supporting the Muslim Brotherhood movement. The Muslim Brotherhood movement in the Middle East has the patronage of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia.” Accusing the U.S.A. and the CIA of supporting Islamist activities, which were threatening Turkey’s secular republic, this intelligence report is clear evidence that there was a faction within the Turkish state during the 1960s that was critical of Turkey’s NATO alliance. Its presence within the state was a reflection of the increasingly leftist, anti-American social and political climate in Turkey during that period. According to the article, two
individuals ran the activities of the Saudi-founded MWL in Turkey: Ahmet Gürkan and Salih Özcan.

Gürkan and Özcan were present at the foundational meeting of the MWL in 1962 and played an important role in the rise of Islamism in Turkey. Gürkan, a Justice Party MP from Konya, was the deputy who introduced a motion in Parliament in 1950 to change existing legislation in order to have the prayer call read in Arabic. Gürkan also served as president of the Turkish-Saudi Arabian Friendship Association. Özcan was likewise a politician who played many vital roles in the Islamist movement. A native of the Southeastern Turkish city of Urfa, Özcan was from an Arab ethnic background and was fluent in Arabic; he enjoyed considerable clout in the Nur Movement, which is a religious movement founded by Said Nursi (1878–1960) and centered on his writings called as Risale-i Nur (Epistle of Light), becoming known as “the foreign minister of Bediüzzaman” (Bediüzzaman was an honorary title of Said Nursi, the founder of the Nur Movement). When President Cevdet Sunay visited Saudi Arabia in 1968, Özcan was able, through his connections, to arrange a meeting between Sunay and MWL President Suroor Sabban. Özcan was also the one who introduced pro-Saudi propaganda to Turkey by founding the publishing house Hilal Yayınları (with Saudi support) in the late 1950s. From the 1960s onwards, Hilal Yayınları translated the works of Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Abul Ala Maududi, and other Islamist thinkers, playing a key role in bolstering their influence over Turkish Islamism. In 1977, Özcan was elected a deputy for the Islamist Millî Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party, MSP). After the 1980 coup, he was responsible for setting up a meeting between Mohammed bin Faisal (the son of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia), six generals in the Turkish Armed Forces, and Prime Minister Bülent Ulusu, in order to persuade the Turkish military to allow Saudi capital into the country. In return for his efforts, Özcan was made the first founding partner of Faisal Finans Kurumu, an Islamic bank established in Turkey in 1984 by Saudi capital.

As early as 1968, the article published in Ant was already referring to both Turgut Özal (who would rise through the ranks to become prime minister and president in the 1980s) and his brother Korkut Özal (who would serve as a minister for the MSP in the 1970s) as “the Muslim Brotherhood’s main in key areas of the state sector.” At the time, Turgut Özal ran Turkey’s State Planning Organization while Korkut Özal was in charge of Turkish Petroleum. As soon as Turgut Özal became prime minister in 1983, one of his first actions was to sign a decree dated December 16, 1983, which allowed Saudi capital access to Turkey under the name of “interest-free banking.” This influx of Saudi capital ushered in by Özal acquired two main footholds in Turkey: Al Baraka Türk, under the leadership of Korkut Özal; and Faisal Finans, established under the leadership of the Saudis’ right-hand man Salih Özcan.

The intelligence report in Ant described Necmettin Erbakan—then the president of the Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği (Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey)—as a key name in the “Muslim Brotherhood.” First entering Parliament as an independent deputy from Konya in 1969, Erbakan went on to found the Islamist Millî Nizam Partisi (National Order Party). By the 1990s, he had transformed Islamism in Turkey into a profiteering ring with a network of cemaaats that had effectively become holding companies. Remarkably, the intelligence report in Ant—evidently based on highly reliable information—described Erbakan as a “candidate for prime minister” in 1968, predicting his rise from deputy prime minister in the coalition governments of the 1970s to prime minister in 1996.16

Two of the newspapers and their owners mentioned in the intelligence report in Ant, constituting the Muslim Brotherhood’s media wing in Turkey, have been highly influential over the past 48 years: Bugün and its owner Mehmet Şevket Eygi, a prominent thinker in Turkish Islamism; and Muammer Topbaş (of the Topbaş family, one of the most powerful Islamist family businesses in Turkey), the owner of Babhull’dé Sabah. Publishing headlines like “The anti-NATO com-mies have dirtied the streets,” in the Islamist Bugün staunchly advocated a Turkey with strong NATO ties, lambasting Turkey’s ascendant left with the words, “No to NATO, eh? God damn all of you.”17 In 1968, Eygi wrote an article for Bugün entitled “In the Country of Sharia,” which consisted of his impressions of Saudi Arabia, and was effectively a piece of pro-Saudi propaganda. Muammer Topbaş, the owner of the other aforementioned Islamist newspaper, Babhull’dé Sabah, also had close ties to Saudi Arabia. Another member of the Topbaş family, Eymen Topbaş, founded Al Baraka Türk together with Korkut Özal during the 1980s, while various other prominent members of the family took on high-ranking posi-tions at the Saudi-funded İlim Yayma Cemiyeti (Society for the Propagation of Knowledge) and Bereket Vakfı (Baraka Foundation). Yet another scion of the Topbaş family, Mustafa Latif Topbaş, a highly successful businessman during the AKP era, was named the 14th richest person in Turkey by Forbes magazine in 2012.

Also presented in the “Muslim Brotherhood” organizational chart in Ant was a list of the institutions and societies through which Islamism sought to acquire a popular base in Turkey, along with their associates. One organization in the chart, the aforementioned İlim Yayma Cemiyeti, received donations from the King of

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Saudi Arabia at the time. Moreover, the Islam Enstitüleri (Islamic Institutes), which were represented as being connected to the İlim Yayıma Cemiyeti, hosted a talk by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who spent the summer of 1967 in Turkey. The ties between al-Qaradawi and Islamists in Turkey have steadily grown closer over the past half-century. Known today as a prominent Muslim Brotherhood ideologue, al-Qaradawi described Erdoğan as “the hope of Muslims and of Islam” in a 2016 speech.20 Another organization featured in the chart is the Associations for the Struggle against Communism, which had a significant Islamist presence. In the 1960s, Fethullah Gülen, the founder and leader of the Gülen Movement, played a key role in the founding of the Erzurum branch of the Associations for the Struggle against Communism.21

One of the societies listed in the “Muslim Brotherhood” organizational chart is especially worthy of mention given its role in the rise of Islamism in Turkey over the past half century: the aforementioned Turkish National Students Union (MTTB). As was noted at the beginning of this section, Ismail Kahraman, the current speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, was the MTTB’s president at the time of the publication of the 1968 report, which described the organization as “under the control of the pan-Islamists.”22 Kahraman, who has served as a mentor in the training of Islamist youths at MTTB, has been a lifelong opponent of secularism. Seeking to promote the Islamist line at MTTB, Kahraman described the ascendant left of the 1960s as “the servants of our national enemy, communism”; he resolutely opposed the anti-NATO protests of the time, describing them as “part of a plan to make Turkey communist.”23 AKP leaders like Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül cut their political teeth at the MTTB during the 1970s and served as managers in the organization as well.24 Furthermore, in a book published by the MWL entitled A World Guide to Organizations of Islamic Activities, the MTTB was at the top of the list of “the MWL’s offices and representatives” in Turkey.25

During the Cold War, Turkey was hardly immune from the anti-communist ideology that predominated among NATO member countries. The intelligence report that Ant published in 1968 called attention to the fact that Islamism in Turkey had benefited from this situation; it also singled out then-Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel for criticism. “National intelligence reports on the threat of reactionism” had been provided to Prime Minister Demirel as well; however, the report complained that Demirel had “deceived the ignorant masses by exploiting religion to gain votes” and that he remained indifferent to “the danger of reactionism which is threatening our constitutional regime and reforms, a danger which is about to draw Turkey into the darkness of the Middle Ages.” The report added the following warning: “The forces of reactionism, which today are rapidly organizing and have become a state within the state, will one day demand the head of Demirel as well.”26 It is surely no small irony that Demirel, who did not perceive the rise of Islamism in the late 1960s as a threat—but rather facilitated its presence within the state by forming coalition governments with Islamist parties during the 1970s—led the struggle against Islamism as president during the 1990s, working hand in hand with the military.

**Saudi Capital and Islamism’s Rise**

MUMCU’S BOOK “RABITA” PUBLISHED IN 1987 PROVIDES A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF how Turkey’s state ideology shifted to the “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” following the 1980 military coup and how Islamism—with Saudi support—flourished during the administration of Özal, who made no secret of his Islamist sympathies. By that time, left-wing bureaucrats—especially within the security and intelligence apparatuses—who were concerned about Islamization had long since become a minority. In all likelihood, they were the ones to provide Mumcu (who shared their essential worldview) with the information he used in his work. On January 24, 1993, Mumcu himself was the victim of a mysterious assassination by car bomb.

A close examination of the networks exposed by Mumcu—networks linking politics, Islamic capital, and the cemaats—reveals a striking fact about present-day Turkey: the individuals and firms in question were ones that would later achieve prominence during the AKP era. The following are some of the individuals involved with the Saudi-financed organizations and foundations listed by Mumcu in 1987: Eymen and Mustafa Latif Topbaş of the Topbaş family, which has a share in BİM supermarkets, is part of the Erenköy cemaat (a branch of the Nakşibendi religious order), and has close ties to Erdoğan; Hasan Kalyoncu, the founder of Kalyon İnşaat—which was awarded a contract for Istanbul’s third airport and is one of the owners of the pro-AKP media outlet Sabah-ATV—along with its current president, Cemal Kalyoncu; Sabri Ülker, the founder of the Ülker Group (which has long supported Islamist publications and foundations) as well as former prime minister Davutoğlu’s high school classmate Murat Ulker; former AKP finance minister Kemal Unakıtan; and Abdullah Tıvnikli, who joined the board of directors of Türk Telekom following its sale to the Saudi firm Oger Telecom.27
Islamism and Turkey’s Relations with the West

By the 1990s, Islamism had become a redoubtable economic force in Turkey, consisting of a network of cemaats that had evolved into holding companies, and with a presence in all state institutions. Rather than share political power with anyone, it sought total power for itself. Around the same time, Turkey’s judiciary and military bureaucracy had also begun to perceive political Islam as a threat. Thus the “reformist” wing of Islamism spearheaded by Erdoğan and Gül reckoned there would have to be a purge of the judiciary and military, and that in order for this to happen, they would need support from Turkey’s foreign allies, particularly the U.S. and EU. In the run-up to the February 28 coup and the subsequent closing down of the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) and the founding of the AKP, this reformist wing distanced itself from the Millî Görüş (National Vision) line espoused by Erbakan, and began to climb the rungs of power by forming strategic alliances with the West.

As scholar İlhan Uzgel has remarked, two of the AKP’s most prominent politicians, Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül, underwent “a significant cognitive learning process” starting in the mid-1990s, realizing that the West, and the U.S. in particular, played an indispensable role in their “coming to power, and staying in power, in Turkey”: “Therefore, the young generation [reformists] of the National Vision preferred to rise to power not in spite of the West, or the U.S., or the Jewish lobby, but with the full support of all of the above, using them as a means by which to bargain for more and more power.”31 And indeed, during their visits to the U.S. in 2002, both before and directly after the elections, Gül and Erdoğan delivered important messages regarding the course to be charted by the AKP. In January of 2002, for instance, Erdoğan met with Graham Fuller (a CIA Middle East expert and one of the architects of the “moderate Islam” project sponsored by the RAND Corporation) as well as former U.S. ambassador Morton Abramowitz; at a talk at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), an important think tank, he described the U.S. as “Turkey’s natural partner.”32 Erdoğan’s statement regarding his contacts in the U.S.—“they are keeping track of us” —is quite telling.33 Undoubtedly, Erdoğan was aware that high-ranking members of the U.S. political establishment sought to use the AKP model to turn the tide of post-September 11 Middle Eastern religious fundamentalism; Erdoğan viewed this as an invaluable...
resource in the power struggle about to erupt in Turkey. The following lines, written by journalist Derya Sazak in January of 2002, are a striking reflection of the relationship the AKP leadership established between domestic and foreign policy: “Making references to the ‘moderate Islam’ of his electorate, Erdoğan has declared that the political model found in Turkey, based on the principle of ‘coming to power and departing from power through elections’ within a democratic, secular state order, can set an example for every country in the Muslim world.”34 As early as November of 1999, Abdullah Gül visited the U.S. together with Recai Kutan, the founder of the Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party, FP). During their visit, he stated, “We have learned our lesson from the experience of the Refahyol government” [the short-lived coalition government between Necmettin Erbakan’s Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) and the center-right Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party)]. Gül went on to explain that he “was in favor of EU membership” rather than an “Islamic Common Market.”

This policy of rapprochement with the U.S., which Uzgel described as “pragmatic change,” along with the AKP’s in-person messages to Washington that it had embraced democratic principles, did not represent a fundamental shift resulting from a process of profound introspection. Rather, it represented a pragmatic search for a foreign ally that would strengthen the AKP’s hand at home. As early as November of 1999, Abdullah Gül visited the U.S. together with Recai Kutan, the founder of the Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party, FP). During their visit, he stated, “We have learned our lesson from the experience of the Refahyol government” [the short-lived coalition government between Necmettin Erbakan’s Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) and the center-right Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party)]. Gül went on to explain that he “was in favor of EU membership” rather than an “Islamic Common Market.”

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Around the same time, Fethullah Gülen, who moved to the U.S. in 1999, and was a close ally of the AKP from 2002 to 2013, also advocated establishing close ties with Washington. Gülen’s own Cold War-era anti-communist discourse owed much to Said Nursi, the leader of the Nur Movement, within which Gülen was raised. In the 1940s, Nursi urged the CHP government of the time to oppose communism—which he likened to “the invasion of the terrible dragon from the Northeast [the USSR]”—and to “embrace the Quran and the reality of belief.” According to Nursi, it was necessary to side with the U.S. in this conflict: “It is possible for a devout Muslim to become good friends with a mighty state like America, which is earnest in its defense of religion.”37 In 1997, Gülen publicly expressed the pro-U.S. stance he had inherited from Nursi, stating, “Fanatical communists harbor antipathy towards America without any rational or logical basis.” He added, “It is important to follow the U.S. closely—along with whatever parts there to which we feel an affinity—and to avail ourselves of it properly. In this way, one can raise a ‘golden generation,’ a young generation which will represent science and technology throughout the world.”38

During that same period, others began to find fault with Turkey’s unilateral dependence on the West, arguing that a Cold War-style alliance with the West would ultimately be untenable, and that new approaches to foreign policy were necessary. İsmail Cem, Turkey’s foreign minister between 1997 and 2002, argued that Turkey needed to align itself with the East, not just with the West; Cem aimed at turning Turkey into a “world power” by developing independent policies towards the surrounding regions.40 In ulusalı (leftist-nationalist) circles and among certain high-ranking army officers, a new foreign policy approach known as “Eurasianism” emerged, which questioned the validity of Turkey’s relations with the West. This outlook reached its zenith in 2002, when the secretary-general of Turkey’s National Security Council, General Tuncer Kilçin, declared that Turkey had not received the slightest benefit from the EU, stating, “I view it as advantageous for Turkey, if possible, to adopt an approach which would also include Russia and Iran, without neglecting America.”41 With the AKP’s coming to power in 2002, these trends in foreign policy came to an end, while the era of unconditional rapprochement with the U.S. and EU began. Following the September 11 attacks, the U.S. settled on the AKP as a “model” for Middle Eastern countries, as a means of countering the rise of religious fundamentalism in the Muslim world. The U.S. viewed the AKP as suitable because it was a standard-bearer of neo-liberalism, having embraced free-market economics, and because it had come to power by free and fair elections. In 2004, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell presented Iraq with the example of Turkey, stating that in Iraq, “there will be an Islamic republic, as there are other Islamic republics—Turkey and Pakistan.”42 Thus the West supported the AKP as a model of moderate Islam; Erdoğan, for his part, was quick to turn this to his advantage in domestic politics. The AKP believed that a purge of the military and judicial bureaucracy and, more broadly, the country’s Republican secular elites—who, in any case, had begun to question the nature of Turkey’s relations with the West—would be inevitable in order to reinforce its own power. It waged a fierce campaign against them, not hesitating to resort to show trials
when necessary; in all of this, it had the full support of the West. In the resulting struggle for power—which included such events as the 2007 presidential crisis, the 2008 closure case against the AKP, and the subsequent Ergenekon and Balyoz operations—political Islam emerged triumphant.

Thus the AKP’s domestic policy began to drift towards authoritarianism, while in foreign policy its relations with the West grew increasingly more awkward. Cultivating ties with radical groups in the Middle East following the Arab Uprisings, the AKP diverged significantly from the moderate Islam the U.S. had come to associate with it. Notably, debates in the U.S. about Turkey’s political drift and its distancing itself from the West began in earnest after 2009. Especially following 2011, the AKP supported Muslim Brotherhood parties in the Middle East, taking sides in the internal chaos and clashes in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, and Libya. One could also cite the AKP’s misguided approach to radical groups like the Nusra Front in the Syrian Civil War and its use of the refugee crisis as a means of threatening the EU. At present, the U.S. and the EU have a problematic relationship with Turkey’s Islamist government. Ankara, for its part, is aware that the West has considerable leverage over the AKP. The AKP views the U.S.’s close ties to the Gülen Movement, the July 15 coup attempt, and the prosecution of Reza Zarrab (who is alleged to have overseen the flow of billions of dollars through Turkey to circumvent the embargo against Iran) as attempts to overthrow Turkey’s government. One could cite, for example, the following statement from none less than Justice Minister Bekir Bozdağ: “It is unclear whether the person on trial is Reza Zarrab, our Honorable President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, or [his wife] Emine Erdoğan.”44

Behind Turkey’s tensions with the U.S. and EU lies a paranoid fear that the methods, which the AKP (along with the West and the Gülen Movement) once used against its opponents from 2002 onwards, are now being used against the AKP itself. In 2004, when negotiations regarding Turkey’s EU bid officially commenced to great fanfare, the country’s economy and politics seemed firmly tethered to the EU, allowing foreign capital to flow into Turkey in abundance. Now, in 2017, the situation could not be more different. The rule of law has been suspended in Turkey, corporations have been taken over by the government, pro-AKP trustees have been appointed as mayors in numerous municipalities, opposition politicians and journalists have been arrested, and the country as a whole has become increasingly authoritarian as it leaves the orbit of the EU. As a result, Turkey’s economy is in utter turmoil. Many, not least the AKP, are aware that these problems have reached a boiling point and that a solution is unlikely to materialize. There is no doubt that this sense of desperation induced Erdoğan, the leader of a NATO country, to state, “If Turkey joins the Shanghai Five, things will go much more smoothly.”45 In short, Turkish Islamism, which rose to prominence in Cold War-era Turkey as part of the struggle against an ascendant Left, is now transforming a secular democratic republic into an authoritarian far-right Islamic polity, in line with its own world view. Turkey’s Western allies, especially the U.S., are trying to determine a framework and a set of principles on which to base their relationship with the Islamists. Turkey was once a secular republic and—for all its flaws—a functioning democratic polity. The alliance, which was formed to put an end to that polity, in the name of defeating authoritarian Kemalism, has now been dissolved. The relationship between Turkey and the West exists, for the moment, on a transactional basis. Yet at a time when Turkish democracy has been shaken to its foundations, such a pragmatic relationship is unlikely to last for long.

NOTES

1. For a leading analysis of Turkish politics based on the dichotomy of the center and the periphery, see: Şerif Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?” Daedalus (1973) 102:1, pp. 169–190.


11. Ibid.
12. Mumcu, Rabhta, p. 139.
16. Ibid.
27. For an English-language academic work on the network of all these relationships, see: Birol Ali Yeşilada, “Islamic Fundamentalism in Turkey and the Saudi Connection.” Universities Field Staff International Reports 18, 1989.
40. Nevval Sevindi, Fethullah Gülen ile New York Sohbeti (İstanbul: Sabah Kitapçılık, 1997).
Jamaat-ud-Dawa: Converting Kuffar at Home, Killing Them Abroad

By C. Christine Fair

JAMAAT-UD-DAWA (JUD, SOCIETY FOR PROSELYTIZATION), BETTER KNOWN as Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), is the most capable and competent Islamist militant group operating in South Asia. It gained notoriety for holding the Indian megacity of Mumbai hostage in November 2008, when it sent several assault teams (fidayeen) to attack prominent targets, including the luxurious and iconic Taj Mahal Hotel (on the Gateway of India), the Oberoi Trident Hotel, the Café Leopold—popular among tourists and locals alike—the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (formerly known as Victoria Terminus), and the Nariman (Chabad) Jewish Community Center. LeT is the most loyal proxy of the Pakistani deep state—it kills on instruction abroad while keeping the peace at home—and as such, most scholarship on the group focuses upon the external utility of the organization to Pakistan.

Nonetheless, such studies exhibit little awareness of the important domestic perquisites JuD affords its handlers in the army and the brutal intelligence agency that the army oversees, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). In this regard, JuD, with its Ahl-e-Hadees (also known as “Salafi”) moorings, is at sharp variance with the vast majority of militant groups savaging Pakistan, which are tied to the Deobandi interpretative tradition (maslak). As I have previously argued, JuD abjures all sectarian violence in Pakistan among Muslim groups.

While JuD’s opposition to sectarian violence has increasingly entered the public domain, JuD’s position on non-Muslim minorities within Pakistan is less appreciated. Paradoxically, while JuD may have pejorative views of these religious communities outside of Pakistan and even encourages violence against their adherents, JuD does not advocate violence against them within Pakistan. JuD’s approach instead is to convert them through dawah or tabligh—both of which refer to preaching and proselytization—and the provision of relief and public services. Extraordinarily, within Pakistan, Hafiz Saeed, leader of JuD and LeT, purports to believe that whenever one is facing hardship, she or he should be helped irrespective of whether that person a Muslim, Jew, Christian, or Hindu and/or the person’s caste, ethnicity, or political affiliation.

In this article, I mobilize key JuD publications to demonstrate that while the JuD preaches murderous jihad against non-believers outside of Pakistan, it collaborates with the state in trying to dissuade Pakistanis from undertaking violence within the state, whether against state or non-state targets, to include Pakistan’s various religious minorities. Unsurprisingly, some of JuD’s numerous publications deal with the Hindu and Christian minorities within Pakistan, which are the largest religious minorities in the country. In this essay, I exposit what JuD says about these non-Muslims who live among Pakistani Muslims, including Ahmadis, about which the organization is generally silent. I argue here that while it supports brutal slaughter of so-called kuffar (pl. of kafar, “nonbeliever”) abroad, it argues for the conversion of religious minorities at home through the provision of medical and other social services, emergency relief and extensive proselytization.

The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In the second section, I provide a brief overview of JuD. In the third section, I describe the key textual sources for this analysis. In the fourth, fifth, and sixth sections respectively, I describe JuD’s views towards Ahmadis, Christians, and Hindus. I end with a discussion of conclusions and implications.

Who is the Lashkar?

LET CAME INTO BEING IN 1986-1987, WHEN ZAKI UR REHMAN LAHKKHI MERGED his Ahl-e-Hadees militant group with Jamaat ud Dawah (JuD), another Ahl-e-Hadees organization that had been established by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and
Zafar Iqbal. The ensuing organization took the name Markaz al-Dawah Irshad (MDI, “Center for Preaching and Guidance”). Hafiz Saeed, the current Amir of the organization, and its sprawling subsidiaries established LeT as its armed wing a few years after MDI’s establishment. While scholars do not know the exact year that Saeed raised LeT, they generally assess that it was established in 1989 or early 1990.4

Following a suicide attack on India’s parliament by a Deobandi militant group known as Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), the United States declared both LeT and JeM as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” (FTOs) and pressured Pakistan’s military dictator and president, General Pervez Musharraf, to ban the organizations.7 Pakistan, despite commitments to the contrary, did not act in good faith. Pakistani intelligence warned the leaders of LeT and other prized proxies, which allowed them to set up new names for their organizations, establish new bank accounts, and transfer their assets. Saeed publicly announced that MDI would be dissolved and replaced by JuD.4 Saeed resigned as LeT’s Amir and took up the helm of JuD. Yahya Mujahid, spokesperson for LeT cum JuD and a founding member of MDI, proclaimed that “We handed Lashkar-e-Tayyaba over to the Kashmiris in December 2001. Now we have no contact with any jihadi organization.”8 In practice, the vast majority of LeT’s assets and personnel were subsumed into JuD, while organizational nodes and operatives outside of Pakistan continued to operate under the banner of LeT. In the organization’s various publications, Saeed is still referred to as the “Commander of the Mujahideen.”

In the last decade, JuD spawned numerous related organizations, such as the Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq (IKK, Organization for Humanitarian Assistance), de- declared by the U.S. Department of Treasury to be an FTO in April 2006.10 In 2009, Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq (IKK, Organization for Humanitarian Assistance), de- referred to as the “Commander of the Mujahideen.”

JuD has undergone only one temporary split, which occurred in July 2004 when several leaders were annoyed that Saeed was emplacing relatives to top positions. Lakhvi particularly was piqued by this blatant nepotism, and feared that Saeed was sidelining him in an organization he co-founded. Lakhvi subsequently broke with Saeed and formed the Khairun Nas (“Good People,” a reference to the companions of the prophet). However, this rupture was very brief and Khairun Naz rejoined JuD, likely thanks to an ISI intervention.18 For these varied reasons, I use LeT and JuD interchangeably, reflecting the organizational reality on the ground.

Methods and Sources

THIS PARTICULAR ESSAY IS TIED TO TWO LARGER PROJECTS ABOUT LET FOR WHICH I, working with Mustafa Samdani, compiled a maximally comprehensive sample of Dar ul Andlus publications, the sole publisher for JuD.19 This sample included materials I collected during dozens of trips to Pakistan between 1995 and 2013; materials Samdani collected during an extensive stay in Pakistan between 2016...
and 2017; as well a list of all Dar-ul-Andlus publications available on WorldCat, a master catalog of library materials from 16,131 partner institutions in 120 countries. WorldCat lists 54 books that were published by Dar-ul-Andlus between 1999 and the end of 2016. Samdani and I requested the volumes from inter-library loan facilities at Georgetown and Harvard Universities' libraries. We next reviewed these publications to identify sources that clarified JuD’s positions on religious minorities, among others. While the vast majority of the texts address legitimate targets of jihad—all of which reside outside of Pakistan—a limited number of texts deal with religious minorities within Pakistan, who are not objects of LeT’s jihad. Instead, as I show here, they are targets for conversion.

The key publications I use in this essay include JuD’s foundational document, titled Hum Kyon Jihad Kar Rahe Hain, which translates as “Why We Are Waging Jihad.” This publication broadly lays out the organization’s immutable position that persons who are kalima-go (one who has uttered the kalima or affirmation that there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is his prophet) are not to be killed. Instead they are to be reformed through dawah (invitation to JuD) and tabligh (proselytization). I also briefly draw upon Abul Hassan Mubbashir Ahmed Rabbani’s 2015 treatment on takfiri, titled Masalah-yi takfir aur is ke wali o zawabit (The Problem of Takfir and its Principles and Regulations). In this volume, Rabbani lays out the extremely onerous circumstances under which a Muslim can be declared a kafar (nonbeliever) through takfir (the process of apostatizing someone), and qualifications religious scholars must have to do so.

To understand how it views Hindus in Pakistan, I turn to Abdussalam bin Muhammad’s 2007 treatise, titled Hindu Customs Among Muslims. JuD has published volumes on Christianity such as al-Rahman and Malakavi’s 2007 Isaiyat? (“What is Christianity?”)—an exposition of several books of the Old Testament of the Christian Bible—which mainly reveal what JuD believes about Christianity rather than what the organization believes about Christians who live in Pakistan among Muslims. One text, however, that does provide such insights into the question is Maulana Amir Hamza’s 2004 Shahrukh-e-Bahisht (“Highway to Paradise”).

AHMADIS HAVE LONG SUFFERED ENDLESS CAMPAIGNS OF MURDEROUS VIOLENCE, generally perpetrated by sectarian Deobandi militant groups (e.g. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan) as well as individuals who believe that Ahmadis are wajib ul qatal and those who murder them will receive divine rewards. Since the 1950s, Ahmadis have long drawn the ire of Pakistan’s Islamists, who lobbied to have them declared “non-Muslim” because they do not recognize the ordinal finality of the prophet and recognize a living prophet. In 1974, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto—an ostensible liberal—declared them to be non-Muslim by constitutionally redefining their status. This constitutional provision rendered Ahmadis a non-Muslim minority overnight—despite their prominent role in the movement to secure an independent Pakistan—while expanding legal and extra-legal justifications for killing Ahmadis with ever-more impunity. Despite the widespread antagonism against Ahmadis and the prominent campaign of violence against them, Samdani and I found no JuD publication that directly or even indirectly refers to Ahmadis. Over the course of the last two years, JuD refused to clarify this matter despite repeated queries. Given JuD’s political savvy and the evermore salience of this affair in Pakistan’s domestic politics, this silence appears to be strategic rather than accidental.

At one level, one could interpret the organization’s resolute belief, as articulated in Hum Kyon Jihad Kar Rahen Hai, that those who are kalima-go (those who say the kalima) are not to be killed as indirect justification for not murdering Ahmadis and treating them as other deviants, principally by redeeming them through dawah. In fact, this may be a “reasonable Muslim” interpretation of this injunction against killing those who are kalima-go. Such a straightforward reading is problematicized by the fact while the Ahmadis believe they say the kalima; when they do, many Pakistanis believe that they are committing apostasy. Ahmadis cannot employ the terms masjid (mosque) to describe their place of worship, namaz or salat to describe their prayer, or even the word “Quran” to describe their holy book. They can be charged formally with blasphemy if they do so.

The only JuD document that came close to addressing the specific issue of Ahmadis in Pakistan is Rabbani’s Masalah-yi takfir aur is ke wali o zawabit (“The Problem of Takfir and its Principles and Regulations”). Here, Rabbani argues...
against violent or other political opposition to Muslim rulers, irrespective of their shortcomings. The only time a wayward Muslim leader can be subjected to takfîri is when he explicitly encourages kufr (the act of disbelief). Unfortunately, Rabbani offers no historical or contemporary example of a leader who meets these criteria. However, he does note that “it is only when someone explicitly states that they do not believe in the finality of the prophet, or rejects the Quran, prayer, and fasting altogether, that they can be called an infidel and exiled from the realm of Islam.” This is the most germane pronouncement that the organization makes about Ahmadis, albeit without mentioning them directly. After all, while they do not reject the Quran, prayer, or fasting (although they are not permitted to call these actions by their rightful names), they do reject the ordinal finality of the prophet and recognize a living, contemporary prophet. This statement does suggest that Ahmadis should be considered kuffar. However, the statement clearly applies only to Muslim leaders. As noted, the organization resolutely refuses to clarify whether or not it considers Ahmadis to be kalma-go—and thus exempt from violence—which is the position of JuD’s Deobandi militant competitors. JuD appears to be maintaining a strategic silence about a very controversial and imperiled group.

Hindus Among Muslims in Pakistan

PAKISTAN IS HOME TO SOME 800,000 HINDUS, 94 PERCENT OF WHOM LIVE IN Sindh. Sindh is Pakistan’s second most populated province with about 51 million people, although this number is contested and impossible to verify since Pakistan has not conducted a census since 1998. A mere 4 percent live in the Punjab, and smaller numbers yet in Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Not coincidentally, in recent years, Pakistan’s Sindh province has been an important area for JuD activity. Even though Haﬁz Saeed has declared an unending war against Hindus in India, he averred that “his organization will not allow destruction of Hindu temples and other holy places of non-Muslims in the country.”

JuD’s principle tools to secure conversions are provision of social services, medical care, and disaster relief work as well as its dedicated humanitarian relief arm, the FIF. In Sindh, JuD’s medical teams have provided relief to Hindu-dominated areas plagued by preventable child deaths. JuD also took advantage of floods in 2011 to provide relief to Hindu-affected areas in the form of tents, food, and ample proselytization. FIF has been active in efforts to ameliorate the ongoing draught in Sindh by digging wells and installing hand pumps, and by “helping the poor and marginalized sections of Hindu minority with economic incentives,... facilitating admission of Hindu children into Madrasas without converting them to Islam,... [and] opening new seminaries for the purpose.” FIF boasted about imparting Islamic education at a relief camp in Badin (in Sindh) which housed about 2,000 persons displaced by the 2011 ﬂoods in Sindh. A FIF volume explained that “We have taught them namaaz (Islamic prayer), as well as the required prayers to recite before and after a meal. Even the Hindus sit in the session.”

While JuD works through these means to convert Sindh’s Hindus, others have more draconian methods, such as kidnapping Hindu girls and forcing them to convert and marry local Muslims. About 1,000—mostly Hindu but some also Christian—girls are abducted and forcibly converted and married per year. This provoked the Sindh government to attempt to pass a bill against these sectarian activities. However, religious groups such as JuD opposed this measure arguing that it was part of a conspiracy to make Pakistan a secular country. Of the measure, Haﬁz Saeed said, “We will not remain silent on this controversial law.” The religious groups successfully killed the proposed legislation. What has outraged JuD, however, is the degree to which Pakistanis have appropriated practices moored in Hinduism. Thus, when it comes to Hindus in Pakistan, JuD seeks to encourage Muslims first to become aware of these accretions, then eschew them.

The mudeer (director) of Dar al Andalus, M. Saifullah Khalid, opens Hindu Customs Among Muslims with a prefatory avowal that the “Hindu is the worst polytheist and propagator of Polytheism in the world....It is deplorable that today’s Muslim is imitating and emulating the unholy and ugly Hindus like anything.” After reciting several ways in which Muslims have taken on Hindu habits, he concludes that “it is difﬁcult to tell a Muslim from a Hindu.” Bin Muhammad begins this exposition by declaring that many changes occur when a person truly embraces Islam, the most important of which regards the selection of friends and identification of enemies. So “strong is this bond [with Islam] that he is prepared now to wage war against his friends of the past (who are still non-believers). He won’t spare...even his life for the sake of his newfound truth—Islam.”

After this opening, the reader anticipates that bin Mohammad will advocate violence against Hindus. However, the author recounts incidents from Islamic history to describe the suitable treatment of polytheists. Instead of selecting from sections of the Quran calling for violence against the kuffar, however, he recounts the story of Samama bin Assal—a kafir and chief of the Banu Hanifa clan who...
tried to murder the prophet Mohammad. Before he could kill the prophet, his companions captured him and tied him to a pillar in the prophet’s mosque in Medina. When the prophet Mohammad approached his would-be assassin, he asked him “How are you?” Samama retorted, “O.K. if you kill me, I’ll be avenged upon but if you set me free, I can pay you as much as you may desire.” The prophet reportedly ignored his intemperate response. In this way, the prophet visited Samama on two other occasions. On the third such visit, the prophet ordered the companions to release him. Upon being discharged, Samama went to a nearby garden where he performed ablution. He went back to the mosque where he was held captive and declared that he had embraced Islam. Samama confessed to the prophet that, while he hated the very face of the prophet and Islam before becoming a Muslim, “now it is the most beloved of all religions to me.” Similarly, bin Muhammad relates the story of a woman named Hinda Bint Uqba who mutilated the corpse of the prophet’s uncle. Once she embraced Islam she proclaimed to the prophet, “I had every wish you and your followers lick the dust before embracing Islam but now I very much wish that you and your colleagues should be the most honoured ones in the world.” In both cases, the author asks the reader to note the change of heart of these non-believers before and after submitting to Allah.

The selection of these two stories is puzzling. As Surat-ul-Tobah makes clear, the author could have selected episodes where kaifaf are treated with violence until they elected to succumb to Islam or perish. Instead, the author impresses upon his readers the notion that kindness can turn the heart of the non-believer into a believer. There is an obvious tension in this volume: how can the author expect his readers to understand when polytheists should be killed as JuD argues elsewhere in its myriad publications and when they should be treated as advocated herein. The author never explicitly articulates that this treatment is reserved for Pakistan’s own Hindus, although it is implied by the context of the discussion.

Having established the fundamentally base and vile nature of Hindus and the redeeming capacity of kindness and generosity towards them, the author turns to the real subject of this volume: Muslims who have adopted the mannerisms of Hindus. This is an important point that merits further reflection: JuD appears to have no problem with Hindus in Pakistan perse, rather with Muslims who ape their affectations. The author begins with the concession that most of Pakistani Muslims’ ancestors were Hindus, which implies that he is talking about Pakistanis rather than all Muslims generally, and that some of these accretions are historically understandable even if they are detestable. However, since “Allah favored [the Hindus] with the blessing of Islam...[it became] incumbent upon them all to follow Islam in its entirety and they should have abhorrence for the non-Muslim culture.” The author has written this booklet in the spirit of educating Muslims who may be unaware that many of their habits and pietic practices are actually imbricated with Hinduism. Specifically, he addresses the following topics, each addressed in turn below: concepts of worship in Hinduism and Islam; dubious social and customary practices in which Pakistani Islam is steeped; and problematic rituals that Pakistani Muslims practice in error.

Concepts of Worship

AHL-E-HADEES ADHERENTS BELIEVE IN THE ONENESS OF GOD (tawheed). HINDUS are polytheists who “believe in numberless gods and goddesses” and thus are particularly anathema to JuD. To the author’s chagrin, he observes that some [Barelvi] Muslims have embraced a similar notion of wahdat-ul-wajood (unity of being) according to which “everything is a reflection of God’s grandeur, hence God is to be found in everything around us,” which he rejects as misleading.

Bin Muhammad next observes the ways in which Hindus pray and remember god and draws parallels to the ways in which Muslims in South Asia do the same. First, the author dilates upon a practice called “sandhia” according to which Hindus shut their eyes and nose while remembering their three most important gods. In the morning, the author claims they offer sandhia facing the east. At noon and in the evening, they raise their hands and face the west while performing the same respective reflection. He draws attention to similar practices enjoined by adepts of Sufi paths who hold their breath with eyes shut while remembering god. Similarly, he denounces the way Muslims revere mystical leaders akin to the ways in which Hindus revere their pantheon of deities. Bin Mohammad notes that Sufis encourage the practice of chanting “Lá iláha illallah” (there is no god but Allah) while concentrating on particular body parts while doing so or meditating on the word “Allah.” He expositis that Muslims have developed these practices in effort to find “Muslim” analogues of things that Hindus do and say under similar circumstances, such as chanting “Ram Ram” (Ram is an important Hindu god) or “Om” while meditating. Instead, the author instructs his readers on the specific ways in which Allah has instructed Muslims to remember him when undertaking specific actions (waking up, entering the toilet, while coming home, when sneezing, etc.). Muslims have also adopted the Hindu use of tasbeh (rosary beads) to chant their...
Dubious Social and Customary Practices

THE AUTHOR REPINES THAT MUSLIMS HAVE ADOPTED SEVERAL SOCIAL AND CUSTOMARY PRACTICES FROM HINDUS. HE FIRST TAKES ON THE ISSUE OF GREETINGS. MUSLIMS, LIKE HINDUS IN SOUTH ASIA, CONTINUE TO GIVE DEEP BOWS, INCLUDING THE TOUCHING OF FEET, UPON GREETING ELDERS OR SOCIAL SUPERIORS, EVEN THOUGH THE PROPHET FORBANDEE KNEELING OR BOWING FOR HUMANS BECAUSE SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS OF RESPECT ARE RESERVED FOR ALLAH ALONE. ANOTHER “SOCIAL MALPRACTICE” IS THE HABIT OF SAYING “YA ALI MADID” (HELP ME ALI!) AS A SALUTATION. THIS IS REMINISCENT OF THE WAYS IN WHICH SOME HINDUS WILL INVOCATE A SIMILAR REQUEST FROM THEIR OWN DEITIES AS A FORM OF GREETING. IN CONTRAST, THE PROPHET PROVIDES EXPLICIT GUIDANCE ON THE APPROPRIATE ETIQUETTE WHEN ACKNOWLEDGING OTHERS. UPON ENCOUNTERING SOMEONE, ONE SAYS “AS-SALAAM-ALAIKUM” (“MAY ALLAH’S BLESSING BE UPON YOU”). THE PERSON SO ADDRESSED IS TO RESPOND WITH “WA-ALAIKUM-SALAAM” (“AND UPON YOU AS WELL”). IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, HANDSHAKES ARE ALSO PERMISSIBLE.

SECOND, HE TURNS HIS IRE TO THE FACT THAT MANY MUSLIMS STILL RETAIN A BELIEF IN ASTROLOGY, WHICH IS DERIVED FROM THEIR HINDU ANCESTRY. HE DENOUNCES THOSE “IGNORANT MUSLIMS WHO ALSO BELIEVE IN THE SPECIAL ATTRIBUTES AND POWERS OF STARS” AS “UNDER THE EVIL INFLUENCE OF HINDUS.” HE MOCKS THE PRACTICE OF THOSE MUSLIMS WHO REVERE THE POLAR STAR (“QUTH TARA”) TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT THEY WILL NOT SLEEP WITH THEIR FEET POINTING IN THAT DIRECTION. HE ALSO DENOUNCES MUSLIMS WHO, LIKE HINDUS, RELY UPON ASTROLOGICAL FORECASTS BEFORE UNDERTAKING AN ARRAY OF ACTIVITIES (MARRIAGE, STARTING A BUSINESS, ETC.) OR SEEK OUT MAULVIS WHO ENGAGE IN A LUCRATIVE BUSINESS PRACTICE CALLED “ISTIKHARA” (A PRAYER THROUGH WHICH ONE SEeks GOODNESS FROM ALLAH). WHEREAS DEOBANDI MILITANTS GROUPS MAY RESPOND TO THESE HINDU ACCRETIONS EMBRACED BY BARELVIS VIOLENTLY, BIN MUHAMMAD ADVOCATES PREACHING TO THESE IGNORANT PEOPLE TO HELP THEM UNDERSTAND THE PATH OF THE TRUE AND VIRTUOUS MUSLIM.

THIRD, HE SCRUTINIZES THE USE OF VARIOUS TALISMANS AMONG MUSLIMS. HE OBSERVES THAT IT IS COMMON AMONG HINDUS TO HANG SHOES (OR EVEN PAINTED IMAGES OF SHOES) ON THE FRONT OR BACK OF VEHICLES. WHILE HINDUS ENGAGE IN THIS “STUPID SHOW” TO AVOID ACCIDENTS ON THE ROADS, MUSLIMS TOO HANG FROM THEIR REARVIEW MIRRORS AN IMAGE OF A TABLET WITH THE IMPRESSION OF THE PROPHET’S FEET. IN THE VIEW OF THE AUTHOR, THIS IS LITTLE MORE THAN IDOL WORSHIP AND REDOLENT OF THE KINDS OF IMAGES WITH WHICH HINDUS ADMORN THEIR VEHICLES.

A FOURTH SET OF DUBIOUS PRACTICES INCLUDE PILGRIMAGES. IN HINDUISM, THERE ARE MANY SACRED PLACES THAT ARE WORTHY OF PILGRIMAGES WHERE HINDUS GO TO WORSHIP IDOLS AND THEIR DECEASED FAMILY MEMBERS, AS WELL AS TO BEG FOR WISHES AND OFFER ALMS. IN ISLAM, THE ONLY PLACE THAT MERITS SUCH A SACRED JOURNEY IS THE HAJJ, DURING WHICH ONE TRAVELS TO THE HOLY KA’ABA IN MECCA. NONETHELESS, MANY MUSLIMS UNDERTAKE LONG JOURNEYS TO VISIT SUFI SHRINES BELIEVING THAT DOING SO SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT TO COMPLETE A HAJJ TO MECCA. AT THESE SHRINES, MUSLIMS OFFER EULOGIES AT THE GRAVES OF DEAD SAINTS. THE AUTHOR MOCKS THE FACT THAT AT SOME SHRINES THERE IS A DOORWAY DUBBED “BAHIshiTHI DARVaza” (“THE DOOR TO PARADISE”). MUSLIMS VISITING SUCH SHRINES BELIEVE THAT WHOSOEVER PASSES THROUGH THIS “BAHIshiTHI DARVaza” WILL ENTER PARADISE. THE AUTHOR DERIDES THIS AS ERRANT NONSENSE AND QUIPS THAT THERE IS NO SUCH DOOR IN MECCA OR MADINAH. EQUALLY ANNOYING FOR THE AUTHOR, MANY MUSLIMS VISIT THESE SHRINES IN HOPES THAT THE DEAD SAINTS WILL FULFILL THEIR PRAYERS. CITING “SAHIH MUSLIM,” THE AUTHOR NOTES THAT THE “HOLY PROPHET [PBUH] FORBANDED US TO ERECT OR MAKE GRAVES (WITH STONES OR BRICKS) OR ERECTING ANY BUILDINGS, OVER IT OR SITTING ON IT.” THE AUTHOR ENCOURAGES HIS READERS TO “STOP SUCH MUSLIMS FROM DOING THIS AND SAVE THEM FROM GOING TO HELL. WE MUST TELL [THEM] THAT ALL THEY ARE DOING IS AGAINST ISLAM.”

Problematic Rituals and Customs

BIN MUHAMMAD BEWAILS A “CLUTCH OF CERTAIN UN-ISLAMIC RITUALS AND CUSTOMS,” PERTAINING TO BIRTH, DEATH, MARRIAGE AS WELL AS A CLUSTER OF “SOCIAL RITUALS.”

THE AUTHOR OBSERVES THE COMPLEX MARRIAGE RITUALS CURRENTLY PRACTICED BY MANY MUSLIMS DESPITE THE VARIOUS WAYS IN WHICH THEY CLASH WITH ISLAMIC MODES MARRIAGE. HE EXCORIATES FAMILY WHO FIXATE UPON CASTE OR CLAN AND/OR DELAY THE MARRIAGE OF THEIR DAUGHTERS AND ENJOINS THEM TO MARRY THEM OFF AS SOON AS THEY ARE “ADULT, HEALTHY AND MARRIAGABLE.” HE CRITICIZES THE ELABORATE MEALS SERVED BY THE FAMILIES OF THE BRIDE AND GROOM, WHICH ARE EXTREMELY COSTLY. FIRST, HE NOTES THE
common “wrong practice of enjoying dinner at the bride’s house” in which hundreds of persons from the groom’s side expect a lavish meal from the bride’s side. This, he contends, is a Hindu practice that still lingers among Muslims. Instead, the meal that is authorized is called walima and comes from the groom’s side as a token of appreciation, after the couple has met in isolation.

Similarly, he reproves the practice of dowry, which is another Hindu custom according to which the family of the bride grants lavish sums of money to the groom’s family. The author observes that the families of girls find it financially very difficult to marry them off when one combines the expenses of the meals and the dowry, and consequently “many a girl stale themselves away in wait for formidable dowry but they die maiden.” According to bin Muhammad, Allah “has enjoyed upon the male to undertake all the bridal expenses.” He is also to offer mehr (the sum the wife is to receive if he divorces her), pay for the walima meal, incur all marriage expenses, and arrange a decent home for his new family as well as meals and medical treatment for his bride. In contrast to how Muslims are supposed to marry, Hindus expect that the bride will bring all domestic requirements to the marital households such as bedding, crockery, clothing, etc. In fact, girls’ families will begin assembling these items (dehej) from an early age of the girl and they will be stored in a large chest. Indeed, as the author notes, this practice is very common in Pakistan, particularly among Punjabis. The logic of dowry among Hindus, according to the author, is that they receive no inheritance from their families. Instead, family assets are divided among the brothers of the family. In Islam, women do have inheritance rights, even though they are not equal to those of her brothers. Nonetheless, women’s inheritance rights are often honored in the breach, which the author denounces as un-Islamic as well. (Due to female inheritance rights, many families arrange marriages between first and/or second cousins to ensure that family wealth remains within the family.)

Curiously, the author does not take up other un-Islamic marriage practices in Pakistan which are highly debated: arranged marriages that are not desired by both parties and opposition to so-called love marriages. The Quran is clear that couples must marry by consent. Nor does the author take up the controversy of what it means to be “a healthy adult” female. In Pakistan, Muslim girls can marry at 16 years of age while boys can marry at 18. Many marriages—though illegal—happen much earlier. These omissions are puzzling, as many of the practices the author exposes as un-Islamic are very common among Punjabis in particular—dowry, lavish meals thrown by the wife’s family—the primary constituency of LeT.

He also notes that both funerals and nuptials bear the imprint of Hindu customs. Whereas Hindus enjoin to have separate celebrations. Whereas Hindus casually drop into person’s homes without any invitation or prior warning, Muslims must first seek permission to enter any home but his own residence, including that of his parents. The fear of course is that men and women who are suitable to marry each other may meet each other inappropriately. In Islam, a person can engage with someone who is mahram, which references a person with whom marriage cannot be contracted. The author is particularly vexed by the common practices of the devar (husband’s brother) meeting with the wife of said men, because she has easy sexual access to him. The author asserts in Hindi the word devar actually means “second husband,” which he believes is a further indicator of the “depravity of Hindu culture.”

He posits and then contends Hindus’ inability to countenance the remarriage of a female widow, which condemns them to sati (immolation on her husband’s funeral pyre), celibacy, or single motherhood. Yet Muslims in Pakistan cling to these norms against widow remarriage even though Islam exhorts its adherents to “marry away widows as early as possible. Islam wishes to see a widow resettled in society soon after the demise of her husband.” The reason for making this argument in the context of this Lashkar volume is practical: “A true believer never hesitates from participating in Jehad. He has the assurance that in case of his martyrdom, some of his Mujahid fellows would marry his wife and his family would get instant support. The recent Jehad-e-Kashmir gives us many such examples.” This is ultimately why the author believes it is so important that Muslims be true Muslims and wrest themselves from the weight of their inherited Hindu cultures. If Muslims followed these above-noted Hindu customs, “would a wife easily let her husband go for jehad? She has been living under the awe that if after his death, nobody is there to take care of her.” She asks herself why she would even consider sending him off to participate in jihad. Instead, the author encourages Muslims to arrange for the marriage of widows, as well as divorcees.

In a similar vein of argument, the author encourages polygamy in lieu of the more typical Pakistani practice of monogamous marriage. He disparages contentment with one marriage by explaining that “This is no manliness. Look, if a person dies, his brother should come forward to marry his bhabhi (sister-in-law) who has become a widow. A real uncle can be a kind and caring guardian for his orphan nephews and nieces.” He further cites the prophet’s marriage to a widow and his patronization of her children because her deceased husband had been very helpful to him. The author declares that “The more marriages a Muslim contracts, the more Muslim population would grow.” This is important to Lashkar’s mission because “Muslim manpower would increase manifold. [Thus the] Hindu would...
never be in a position to combat Muslims.”

The author informs his readers that this explains why non-Muslims are so worried about the swelling populations of Muslims. “They have declared it a more dangerous bomb than the Atom-bomb.”

Christians Among Muslims

PAKISTAN’S CHRISTIAN POPULATION CONSTITUTES ABOUT 1.6 PERCENT OF PAKISTAN’S burgeoning population of over 201 million. More than 80 percent of Pakistan’s Christians are concentrated in the Punjab and Islamabad, with smaller populations in the other provinces and tribal areas. JuD has made fewer public overtures towards Pakistan’s Punjab-based Christian community. However, when it has spoken it has spoken in defense of the community, even though its publications revile Christians elsewhere. For example, in 2013 when a Pakistani Taliban faction, the Jandullah Group, dispatched suicide bombers to attack Christians praying in their church in Peshawar, Hafiz Saeed made Pakistani headlines by accusing India of conducting that suicide attack and generally spreading extremism and terrorism inside Pakistan. While denouncing India, he also declared that the “Whole nation should support Christian community at this time and steps should be taken to stop such incidents.” JuD’s views of Christians in Pakistan are very similar to its views towards Hindus: the biggest problem is not Christians, per se; rather, that Muslims in Pakistan have adopted many of their practices and rituals.

In Shahrah-e-Bahisht (Highway to Paradise), by Maulana Amir Hamza, the author explains to his readers that he attended a church one Christmas day with the explicit purpose of observing their rituals. While he certainly found the mixed gender congregation engaged in boisterous music to be distasteful and even dissolute, he was most annoyed that they released several Christian musical cassettes which feature the voice recordings of prominent Muslim singers, whom he denounces as Sufis, ceremonial maulvis, and artists “who will do anything for money” who are “spreading the Christian message for money…..concerned only with stuffing their stomachs, even if that means” emulating the Christians amongst them.

He believes that Christians have a polytheistic philosophy, which likely refers the “Holy Trinity” or God, The Son and the Holy Ghost and other Christian beliefs that equate divine status to Jesus which should, in JuD’s worldview, only be reserved for God. While he has no use for this theosophical point of view, he is discomfited that Muslims in Pakistan also go “overboard in praising the Prophet.”

In a sense, he is using Christian practice and belief as a mirror with which he demonstrates to Pakistani Muslims their inappropriate practices. He explicitly draws a parallel to Christians’ reference to the God, the Son and the Holy Ghost to those Sufi Muslims who refer to their prophet as God’s light or even God himself. Whereas Christians have made three into one, he opines that Muslims made two into one.

He draws parallels between the ostensibly Muslim hymns to those he heard being sung by Christians in the service he attended. In these Muslim hymns, he notes that the distinction between the prophet and Allah are elided, as the distinctions between Christ and God are in Christian hymns. Given JuD’s firm commitment to tawheed, this is an example of shirk or attributing attributes of Allah to others, including the prophet. He cites various other hymns, presumably sung by mystics, which mimic the Christian ambiguity between Jesus and God by asserting that Muhammad is Allah and Allah is Muhammad.

He dedicates considerable space to making unsavory comparisons between Muslim and Christian commemorative festivals, especially the parallel between the ways in which Christians celebrate Christmas as the birthday of their messiah and the way in which Pakistanis Muslims are celebrating Eid Milad-ul-Nabi, to commemorate the birth of their prophet Mohammad. To emphasize the deviance of this, he draws from a popular Hadees that was narrated by Abu Sa’eed al-Khudri. According to him, the Prophet said: “You will certainly follow the ways of those who came before you hand span by hand span, cubit by cubit, to the extent that if they entered the hole of a lizard, you will enter it too.” We said: “O Messenger of Allah, (do you mean) the Jews and the Christians?” He said: “Who else?” [Bukhari and Muslim].

To discredit the celebration of Eid Milad-ul-Nabi, he first argues that the Christian Bible itself has no credibility because, even if Christians had the text in its original form, it was not revealed as the Quran was. In his estimation, neither the Christian Bible nor Christian rituals have any credibility and thus it is lamentable that “Muslims emulate the festivities of Christians despite having access to both the Quran and Hadith,” in which every diacritical mark has been preserved. Moreover, he contends that Islam has no concept of birth commemoration. There is no evidence that either the Prophet or his companions observed birth celebrations. He notes that there is no mention of Eid Milad-ul-Nabi in any hadees and “for good reason. This festival is celebrated exactly the same way Christians celebrate Christmas with processions, parades, songs, music, sloganeering, dances, drums, and Indian and English music.”

There are considerable parallels between the ways in which Hamza uses Pakistani Christian practices as a foil to reveal to Pakistani Muslims their own degenerate
practices and the ways in which bin Mohammad uses Hindu practices among Muslims for the same end. While both authors are clearly contemptuous of their subjects, their real goal is not to foment violence against either minority; rather to motivate Muslims in Pakistan to jettison these polytheistic accretions.

Conclusions and Implications

**JUD Remains the Subject of Scholarly and Policy Analytical Inquiry.** Most extant scholarship views this organization from the singular point of view of its external utility as a loyal and effective proxy of Pakistan’s military and intelligence agency. This singular focus upon its role in waging so-called jihad in India and, to a lesser extent, in Afghanistan significantly understates the significance of JuD to Pakistan’s deep state. Not only is it a crucial partner in prosecuting its national security interests abroad, it is also a vital partner in managing Pakistan’s internal security arrangements. JuD is the only militant organization in Pakistan that deliberately preaches the message that the only legitimate jihad is the external security. It is also the only militant organization that explicitly disavows not only sectarian violence, but also communal violence. This does not mean that JuD is insouciant about deviations from tawheed or other shortcomings. However, it believes that within the borders of Pakistan, the only method to deal with wayward Muslims—either ordinary citizens or in leadership—is through dawah and preaching the message of the external jihad. With the launch of the MML, JuD will be even more effective in spreading this message. Consequently, JuD will likely become even more valuable to its masters in the Pakistani army and intelligence community, even if it comes at the cost of being more difficult to control and manage over the longer term.

**NOTES**

1. Acknowledgements: I am deeply indebted to my collaborator and colleague Mustafa Sambani. I am also thankful to Georgetown University’s Edmund A Walsh School of Foreign Service which provided extensive support to this project.


5. Ahl-e-Hadees adherents self-identify, and are considered by others, as ghair-muqallid (those who do not follow taqlid, which is guidance that has been historically given). Ahl-e-Hadees proponents see the various schools of jurisprudence as being tantamount to personality cults surrounding their various founders. As such, they are even more zealous than Deobandis in establishing a singular standard of piety and behavior, and even more unremitting in extirpating the various customary practices that they understand to be bid’at. Bid’at literally translates as innovation, but it carries the valence that it is heretical and displeasing to Allah. Ahl-e-Hadees followers are frequently confused with Wahhabis; however, Wahhabis follow the Hanbali school of jurisprudence. See Abou Zahab, Mariam, “Salafism in Pakistan: The Ahl-e Hadith Movement,” in *Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement*, (ed.) Roel Meijer, New York: Columbia University Press, 2009, pp. 126–139; and Metcalf, Barbara, *Islamic Contests: Essays on Muslims in India and Pakistan*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004.


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I am deeply indebted to my collaborator and colleague Mustafa Sambani. I am also thankful to the Edmund A Walsh School of Foreign Service which provided extensive support to this project.


27. “Wajib-ul-qatal” literally means worthy of being killed. However, this translation does not do the phrase justice because it also implies that those who kill persons so deemed will actually receive a boon for doing so.


31. As of July 6, 2017, the population of Sindh is estimated to be 50.7 million, according to “Population Clock,” Government of Sindh’s Bureau of Statistics Planning and Development Department. Available at http://sindhbos.gov.pk/development-statistics/.


33. Data from The Pakistan Hindu Council. See “Hindu Population (PK), n.d., http://pakistanhinducouncil.org.pk/?page_id=1592. It is also impossible to verify this estimate because Pakistan has not conducted a census since 1998.


35. Imitaz Ahmad, “Child deaths help JuD make inroads into Hindu-majority Pakistan region,” Hindustan Times, March 14, 2016,


41. Bin Muhammad, Hindu Customs Among Muslims, p. 9.

42. Bin Muhammad, Hindu Customs Among Muslims, p. 11.

43. Bin Muhammad, Hindu Customs Among Muslims, p. 15.

44. Cited in Bin Muhammad, Hindu Customs Among Muslims, p. 16.

45. Bin Muhammad, Hindu Customs Among Muslims, p. 17.

46. Bin Muhammad, Hindu Customs Among Muslims, p. 20.

47. Bin Muhammad, Hindu Customs Among Muslims, p. 20.

48. The author acknowledges that there is a Hadees by Sheikh Nasir-ud-Din that advocates the use of rosary beads (“tasbeeh”) to facilitate the remembrance of Allah. However, this author denounces this Hadees as “self-made” and thus not legitimate.


50. Bin Muhammad, Hindu Customs Among Muslims, p. 38.

51. Hajj is one of the five pillars of Islam, which also include: shahadat (reciting the Muslim profession of faith “There is no god but Allah and Mohammad is his prophet); salat (praying in the ritually appropriate way five times daily); zakat (paying alms); sawm (fasting during the month of Ramadan).

52. Bin Muhammad, Hindu Customs Among Muslims, p. 41.

53. Bin Muhammad, Hindu Customs Among Muslims, p. 42.

54. Bin Muhammad, Hindu Customs Among Muslims, p. 42.

55. Bin Muhammad, Hindu Customs Among Muslims, p. 43.

56. Bin Muhammad, Hindu Customs Among Muslims, p. 45.

57. Bin Muhammad, Hindu Customs Among Muslims, p. 48.


59. Bin Muhammad, Hindu Customs Among Muslims, p. 49.


63. Bin Muhammad, Hindu Customs Among Muslims, p. 55.

64. Bin Muhammad, Hindu Customs Among Muslims, p. 59.


68. Bin Muhammad, Hindu Customs Among Muslims, p. 60.

69. Bin Muhammad, Hindu Customs Among Muslims, p. 60.


72. Hamza, Shahrah-e-Bakhti (Highway to Paradise) p. 86.

73. Hamza, Shahrah-e-Bakhti (Highway to Paradise) p. 86.

74. Hamza, Shahrah-e-Bakhti (Highway to Paradise) p. 100.

75. Hamza, Shahrah-e-Bakhti (Highway to Paradise) p. 120.

76. Hamza, Shahrah-e-Bakhti (Highway to Paradise) p. 127.

77. Hamza, Shahrah-e-Bakhti (Highway to Paradise) p. 127.
India’s Invisible Jihad

By Praveen Swami

The killings at the church in India began soon after mid-morning mass, carried out by two young men armed with knives who had mingled among the worshippers. In dozens of other places around the world today, the script has been much the same: violent attacks carried out by terrorists in the name of God and his self-proclaimed regent on earth, the so-called Caliph of the Islamic State. Yet, there is one important caveat to the aforementioned Indian church attack; this attack took place, not in the 21st Century, but in March 1764, at the Portuguese colonial fort of Darmapatnam, on the Malabar Coast.

Like the U.S. special forces who killed Osama bin Laden, the guards at the Darmapatnam church wanted to erase the killers from history. A contemporary account records:

The bodies of the above Moors were immediately ordered to be thrown in the sea as an example to deter others from the like attempts in future and to prevent any religious [illegible] being got of them, that they may not be worshipped as saints as is the practice by their cast[e] by all who murder a Christian.1

Two and a half centuries on, as Indians contemplate the rise of the Islamic State, the story of the suicide-attackers of Darmapatnam helps illuminate our understanding of the macabre theatre of death ISIS has unleashed. Though jihadist violence seems to have exploded in the last few years, it in fact has deep roots in India’s religious and political landscape. The Darmapatnam suicide attackers were driven by an understanding of Islam, much as today’s jihadists are. Their response was only one of the many responses by Muslims of the Malabar Coast to the new situation they found themselves in during the 18th Century.

This history remains vitally important in the current geopolitical context. It helps us contextualize the activities of contemporary Indian jihadists, growing numbers of whom are now headed to the Islamic State and hope one day to return to initiate an Islamist insurgency at home. The dozens—perhaps hundreds—of young Indian men who are, or have been, involved in jihadist groups aren’t simply motivated by religious bigotry, nor can they be simply dismissed as crazed nihilists. For as long as we persist in seeing Indian jihadists through the lenses of ignorance and cliché, both our cultural responses and our strategic ones are fated to fail.

Beginnings

Late one morning in the summer of 2014, Areeb Majeed left his home in Kalyan, a suburb of Mumbai—and never returned. His father Ejaz Badrudin Majeed, a soft-spoken homeopathy practitioner, later found the letter Areeb Majeed had left behind explaining his actions. “Fighting has been enjoined upon you, though it is hateful to you,” it read, quoting from the Quran.2 In a note to his mother, Areeb further explained the angel of death would ask why he didn’t migrate to Allah’s land to fulfil that command. “May we all meet in paradise,” the letter concluded.

Fahad Tanvir Sheikh, Aman Naim Tandel and Shaheem Farooq Tanki had left with Areeb Majeed for Iraq to join the Islamic State. Throughout the next year, I saw similar farewell notes—the maudlin literature generated by Indian jihadists leaving for battlefields in Iraq and Syria. These texts were populated, almost without exception, with religious clichés drawn from the many Islamist sites on the Internet. In no case was any significant body of texts on Islam, or even on Islamist ideology—or even secular literature and poetry—discovered amongst the personal possessions of this jihadist cohort—collectively known as the Thane jihadists.

The poverty of the Indian jihadists’ intellectual life may point us in the direction of an important aspect of the landscape which birthed them. In contrast with other groups of radical young people—whether Maoists, environmental activists, or neo-Gandhians opposed to capitalist modernity—the jihadists did not emerge...
from movements which valued intellectual rigor and questioning. Instead, the Islamic State offered agency: the prospect of being able to give form to youth rage through a nihilist project of death.3

The evidence makes clear that while the four Thane jihadists were of a fringe—India has sent far fewer jihadists to the Islamic State and al-Qaeda than neighboring countries like Pakistan, China, let alone European and West Asian countries—they weren’t alone. India’s intelligence services estimate perhaps 100 Indian nationals have traveled to West Asia for jihad. There is no firm count, though, because many suspects had been living in the Indian Diaspora.

Behind the scenes, India has seen a string of alleged plots inspired by the Islamic State; cells have been discovered in Delhi, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala. Despite their savage reputation—or, perhaps, because of it—the Islamic State and al-Qaeda have even acquired a certain utopian lure: in July 2016, entire families from Kerala upped and moved to the Islamic State’s affiliate in southern Afghanistan, seeking an Islamic lifestyle.

Indeed, in the years since I met the Thane jihadists’ families, the numbers have multiplied: sixty-seven Indian citizens are facing trial for Islamic State-related plots within the country and another sixty-two have left to join it either in Syria or Afghanistan.

Estimates collected from official press-releases show that 68 percent come from middle class families; 68 percent had university or post-graduate degrees, primarily in engineering; while only 11 percent had a religious education. In interviews, about half have cited global causes as their inspiration for becoming jihadists; another half say Indian issues related to communalism, ranging from riots to compulsory yoga practice, accounted for their radicalization. There is a conspicuous dearth of scholarly work on these issues. More research on Islamic radicalization among Indian youth is desperately needed.

In 2016, the Thane men appeared in a video that made explicit their linkages with the wider jihadist movement in India. Aman Tandel reappeared, using the pseudonym Abu Amr’ al-Hindi, vowing to return home “with a sword in hand, to avenge the Babri Masjid, and the killings of Muslims in Kashmir, in Gujarat, and in Muzaffarnagar.” He paid homage to his friend from Thane, Shahim Tanki, who is said to have been killed in a bomb attack in Raqqa, Syria in 2015.4

Explaining his personal journey, Uttar Pradesh resident Abu Rashid Ahmad says he was forced to leave Mumbai for the Khorasan region, or the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands, after the 2008 shootout at Batla House in which Indian Mujahedeen commander Atif Amin was killed. This first hijrat, or religious migration, was followed by a second one to Syria, Ahmad recounts. “In India,” he says, “we see that it is the cow, the trees, the sun, the moon…that is worshipped. Instead of fighting these things, the Muslims of India trade and maintain social relations with these infidels.” He vows, though, to return to India to fight and avenge atrocities against Muslims. “Have you forgotten the train bombings in Mumbai, or the bombings in Ahmedabad, and Surat, and Jaipur and Delhi?” he asks.

The video also features several other Indian Mujahedeen members known to have served with Islamic State forces after breaking with their Pakistan-based leadership. “To those in the Indian state who wish to understand our actions,” says an unidentified jihadist, “I say you have only three options: to accept Islam, to pay jizya, or to prepare to be slaughtered.”

Large parts of the video, narrated in Arabic, seek to provide context to the presence of Indian jihadists in the Islamic State—men it describes as jihadists from “Hind wal’Sindh,” a phrase referring to India and Pakistan. The video begins with medieval warlord Muhammad Bin Qasim’s conquest of the region, saying this laid the foundations for Islamic rule. The British, the narrator states, then handed over control of India to Hindus—people described as “cow-worshippers” who have been responsible for violence against Muslims in many places, including Mumbai, Gujarat, Assam and Moradabad. “Hindus are striving to convert you Muslims to their faith, O’ sons of Bin Qasim,” one recruit says, recounting a string of communal riots. “Is there any other humiliation that you still need to suffer before you will give up chanting that Islam is a religion of peace, and learn from the Prophet, who fought with the sword?”

The video assails mainstream Muslim politicians and clerics for compromising with what the narrator describes as a tyrannical system responsible for mass-crucifying Muslims. Images of the Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen leader Assaduddin Owaisi and All India United Democratic Front politician Badruddin Ajmal are juxtaposed with dead bodies of victims of communal riots. Indian Muslim politicians are also attacked for associating with non-Muslim leaders: one image shows the Congress’s Mani Shankar Ayer embracing a Hindu priest and Muslim cleric.

The most acidic invective, though, is reserved for Indian clerics who, the video says, are supporting the forces of kufur and un-Islam against the mujahedeen of the Islamic State. Insisting that armed jihad “in the way of Allah” is an individual religious obligation incumbent on every individual Muslim, the video warns clerics that they will soon meet their reckoning. “Do not listen to those who tell you that Islam is a religion of peace,” one jihadist says, his face digitally masked over. “Islam was never a religion of peace for even one day. Islam is a religion of war. The Prophet commanded us to remain at war until the day the rule of Allah is established.” The video mocks Muslims protesting against the Islamic State.
The jihadists interviewed also praised the quality of life in the Islamic State. “Here there is shari’a,” one says. “Here the hands of thieves are cut off. Here, our religion is safe.”

India’s Hidden Jihadi History

In 1498, the famed Portuguese explorer, Vasco da Gama, arrived in the Indian Ocean. Within a few years, imperial Portugal had established a string of coastal fortresses choking the main sea lanes, at the entrances to the Red Sea, the Malabar Coast, the Straits of Malacca, and the southern Chinese coast. Their most valuable prize was Calicut, center of the world’s pepper and spice trade, increasingly valued in Europe. Portuguese strategy directly undermined the interests of the Muslim merchants who carried spices from the Malabar coast to the Persian Gulf, and then over land to the rest of the world. In 1510, Portugal attempted to conquer Calicut, and succeeded in burning down large parts of the Muslim quarter, including its great mosque, before being repulsed by the Raja and his Hindu troops.

For the next three centuries, a great war between Portuguese colonialists and Muslim traders raged across the Indian Ocean region—from Malabar to the South China Sea—which would only be settled by the consolidation of British power in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.

Scholar Stephen Dale’s work shows how ideas of jihad and shahadat (martyrdom) came to define what he calls a cultural-ideological “Islamic frontier” along the Malabar coast. Forged in colonial-era warfare, Dale argues, these ideas came to be markers of a distinct Islamic cultural space that defined itself as distinct from, and sometimes in opposition to, the wider cultural landscape. Jihad and martyrdom continued to play an important role in shaping modern Muslim identity in this region.

In modern Malabar popular culture, the Malabar jihadists continue to be venerated: the story of Kotturpalli Malla celebrates the martyrdom of the seaman Kunju Marakkar, who abandons his own wedding to rescue a Muslim girl kidnapped by Portuguese sailors. Marakkar is killed, his limbs severed and thrown into the sea. Each place they wash up witnesses miracles, evidence of divine approval for his acts. Eighteenth century East India Company records describe fidayeen suicide squad attacks along the Malabar coast, on occasion targeting religious congregations.

For the most part, these were greeted with an incomprehension not dissimilar to the way many of today’s contemporaries treat terrorism. Imperial authorities saw the violence as madness. There is evidence, too, from this colonial account that the violence by no means had the approval of all Muslims:

The Several Treacherous actions late Committed by the Malabar Moors at Callicutt as well as at this place [Tellichery] & Elsewhere & the French Chief having wrote hither, that he had twice Warning given to him to take Care of his Life, have much alarmed the Christians on the Coast in so much that they seldom Stir Out but with Arms for their defence Altho’ all Danger Apprehended is from every small Number of ye Mahomitan Profession who have selected themselves to Murder any Christian when if they Die in the Attempt they are persuaded it is very meritorious and have Adorations paid to their memory by many Enthusiasticks of their faith, which have been performed at the Tomb of him who killed the Sergeant in this Fort in March last & much more at that of him who Afterwards killed the Portuguese Padre at Callicutt Altho’ the more prudent Part of the Moors deny that such Evil Conformable to their Religion.

Historian Ayesha Jalal’s work has shown that the notion of jihad was an important ideological theme elsewhere in India both during the pre-colonial and colonial period. The eighteenth-century theologian Shah Waliullah, for example, wrote to Muslim rulers and notables calling for measures against Hindus and followers of the Shia faith. He also wrote to the Afghan warlord Ahmad Shah Abdali, calling on him to invade India. During the great rebellion of 1857, Indian insurgents fighting imperial British troops included among their ranks numbers of self-described jihadis, including at least one regiment of suicide ghazis, who vowed to fight until they met death at the hands of the infidel. While it would, perhaps, be misleading to read this form of jihadi resistance in the context of our times, the fact remains that the rise of the ghazis, or Muslim warriors, became one cause of Hindu-Muslim communal friction of a kind that is startlingly modern.

Early in the twentieth century, the jihadi-ghazi tradition in Indian Islam acquired a renewed momentum. In 1919, Hindu and Muslim leaders agreed to work with one another for the restoration of the Ottoman caliphate—the notional political authority of the entire Muslim umma, or global community. This cause had little support in post-Ottoman Turkey. It was, however, seen by India’s Con-
gress leadership as a means to incorporate Muslim concerns within its larger anti-imperial mobilization agenda.

As things turned out, this Khilafat movement in India collapsed, though it had the effect of strengthening rather than dissolving communalist identities and boundaries through its use of pan-Islamic themes. As Yoginder Sikand has noted, the agitation

...actually helped to further consolidate the sense of distinct Indian Muslim community identity, separate and sharply cut-off from the Hindus. It also enabled the Ullema to establish links with ordinary Muslims all over the country, seeking to rally them under their leadership for the pan-Islamic cause. That this instigating of religious passions would further widen the chasm between Hindus and Muslims was hardly surprising.12

In 1921, fired up by the pan-Islamic rhetoric of the Khilafat movement and the communal zeal it unleashed, Muslim peasants in the Malabar region attacked their largely Hindu, British-backed landlords. Scores are believed to have died in the violence that followed. From then on, the progress of India’s independence movement would be scarred by communal warfare, culminating in the horrors of the 1947 Partition of India—and the murderous riots which have periodically erupted afterwards.

The Khilafat movement, of course, was not the sole driving force behind the hardening of communal identities in South Asia. In Jammu and Kashmir, where both Islamist mobilization and jihadi violence would acquire growing momentum after the first quarter of the last century, it had almost no impact at all. There, as Chitralekha Zutshi has argued, state policies were the principal factor contributing to the “articulation of antagonistic communitarian identities.”13 Nonetheless, the Khilafat movement remains a key moment, and the idea of the restoration of the caliphate a central concern for modern jihadi organizations.

In the build-up to the Partition of British India, the ideological foundations of the modern jihadist movement in India were laid by the founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami—the largest Islamist political group in both Pakistan and India.

“Jihad Fee-Sabilillah,” or “Jihad in the way of God,” a 1939 essay by Sayyid Abu Ala Mawdudi, argues that the pursuit of political power—rather than what he called “a hotchpotch of beliefs, prayers and rituals”—was integral to the practice of the Islam.14 “Islam,” he insisted, “is a revolutionary ideology which seeks to alter the social order of the entire world and rebuild it in conformity with its own tenets and ideals.”15 It was therefore imperative for Muslims to “seize the authority of state, for an evil system takes root and flourishes under the patronage of an evil government and a pious cultural order can never be established until the authority of government is wrested from the wicked.” Indeed, Mawdudi insisted that the word “Muslims” referred not to a religious community but to a politically-bound “international revolutionary party.”16

“The party of the Muslims,” Mawdudi concluded, “will inevitably extend the invitation to citizens of other countries to embrace the faith which holds out the promise of true salvation and genuine welfare. At the same time, if the Muslim Party commands enough resources, it will eliminate un-Islamic governments and establish the power of Islamic government in their place.”17 He concluded: “Hence it is imperative, for reasons both of the general welfare of humanity and for its own self-defence, that the Muslim Party should not be content just with establishing the Islamic system of government in one territory, but should extend its sway as far as possible all around.”18

It is worth noting, parenthetically, that these ideas resonated in the works of Islamist movement elsewhere. Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Said Qutb’s work drew extensively on Mawdudi; indeed, he liberally acknowledged the debt.19 Palestinian jihadist Abdullah Azzam, al-Qaeda leader Osama bin-Laden’s ideological mentor and co-founder of arguably the largest terror group in the world, Lashkar-e-Taiba. In this view, “jihad is incumbent on the Islamic state,” he stated, “to send out a group of mujahideen to their neighboring infidel state. They should present Islam to the leader and his nation. If they refuse to accept Islam, jizya (a tax) will be imposed upon them and they will become subjects of the Islamic state. If they refuse this second option, the third course of action is jihad to bring the infidel state under Islamic domination.”20

As the scholar Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr observed, Mawdudi’s position was “closely tied to questions of communal politics and its impact on identity formation, to questions of power in pluralistic societies, and to nationalism.”21 His worldview, Nasr notes, was “informed by the acute despair that gripped the community [Muslim]” in the early decades of the twentieth century. Mawdudi saw the Hindu revivalism of the Arya Samaj as an existential threat to Muslims, “a proof of the inherent animosity of Hindus towards Islam.”

Mawdudi would die in 1979, a relatively marginal figure in Pakistan’s politics and all but unknown outside Islamist circles in his homeland of India. However, inside a decade Mawdudi’s ideas would give birth to a cult of the bomb—led, improbably, by a man with only one hand, a rudimentary knowledge of bomb-making acquired from making fireworks, and no organizational resources behind him.
The Pre-Networks of India’s Jihadists

They buried Abdul Karim’s left hand under an acacia tree in the scraggly forest just outside Tonk. The hand, blown off in a bomb-making experiment, was wrapped in a plastic bag along with the remains of the metal tube he’d been trying to turn into an explosive device. It was 1986, and just a few months earlier a district judge had ordered the gates of the Babri Masjid—which Hindu nationalists of the Ram Janambhoomi movement claimed was built by the Mughal Emperor Babur on the ruins of a Hindu temple—opened to Hindu worshippers. This was a period of intense communal strife between Hindus and Muslims that exploded every few months, causing much bloodshed across India. In the years to follow, Abdul Karim—known to friends and police as “Tunda,” the cripple—would lead the first wave of Indian jihadists born of the Babri Masjid violence. He would lead his own militant movement, a counterforce to the one unleashed by Hindu nationalist groups.

The son of a metal casting artisan, Abdul Karim was born in 1941, on the eve of Independence, and grew up girl in Pilkhuwa, Ghaziabad. Life was hard for the young Karim: forced to drop out of a missionary-run school at the age of 11 when his father died, he was put to work making cartwheels for his uncle. He began travelling across northern India, working as a metalworker, a cobbler, a carpenter, barber and bangle-maker.

In 1964, Karim married Zarina Yusuf, the daughter of his uncle. For the next two decades, he lived a conventional lower-middle class life, working as a trader in dyed cloth and bringing up three children, Imran, Rasheeda and Irfan. Karim responded to the communal strife caused by the Hindu nationalists and Babri Masjid by discovering religion. He turned to the neo-fundamentalist Ahl-e-Hadis sect for answers to the question of why Muslims in India seemed to be passive victims in the face of oppression. The search led him, in 1984, to Ahmedabad, where he began preaching Islam at a small seminary. He got married again, to Mumtaz Rahman, after his first wife refused to accompany him, and fathered a fourth child, Shahid.

He also had an experience that would transform his worldview: witnessing communal riots first hand in 1985. In his testimony to police, Karim described how Zafar Rahman, one of his in-laws, and seven other relatives had been burned alive. He talked of shops burned down, a mosque destroyed, and a police force that had joined mobs in attacking Muslims.

For weeks after the riots, Karim discussed the issue with an elderly local cleric, Maulvi Wali Muhammad. He segregated himself to study verses of the Quran on jihad. Karim emerged determined to defend his faith. He worked with a local vendor of fireworks to produce low-grade explosives using potash, sugar and sulfuric acid, packed into steel pipes.

Karim was far from the only Indian Muslim during this period with this idea. Ever since he’d been a medical student, Jalees Ansari would later to tell police, he’d heard Hindus “branded us traitors and Pakistani agents.” From his clinic in a municipal hospital in Mumbai, Ansari read of the breakouts of riot after riot—in Moradabad, Meerut, Bhagalpur, and Bhiwandi. He saw what had happened in Bhiwandi first hand, as a volunteer distributing medical supplies.

In 1985, Ansari met the man who would give shape to his ideas, a former Maoist from Karimnagar in Andhra Pradesh named Azam Ghauri. The fifth of 11 children from an impoverished family, Ghauri too had discovered religion in the Ahl-e-Hadis. These men would set up an anti-riot vigilante group, the Tanzim Islahul Muslimeen (TIM), or Organization for the Correction of Muslims. Initially, the group consisted of volunteers from Mumbai’s Mominpura slum, who trained in rudimentary self-defense. Inflamed by the wave of communal violence that had ripped apart the industrial town of Bhiwandi in 1985, though, the activists’ discussions soon turned to Muslim reprisal.

In the late 1980s, the TIM’s activities barely merited an entry in the local police station’s diaries of daily events. Mimicking the drills of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’s militias, Mohammad Azam Ghauri, Mohammad Tufail Hussaini, and Abdul Karim paraded their recruits around the grounds of the Young Men’s Christian Association. Most of the TIM’s membership consisted of young Mominpura residents angered by communal discrimination and violence.

It was on December 6, 1992, the day Hindu fanatics demolished the Babri Masjid, that the TIM decided the time had come to act. Flying the banner of the Mujahideen Islam-e-Hind a year to the day after the Babri Masjid was destroyed—martyred, in the words of the faithful—surgeon turned bomb-maker Jalees Ansari organized a series of 43 bombings in Mumbai and Hyderabad and 7 separate strikes on inter-city trains. While most of the explosions were small, it was a demonstration of the group’s discipline and skills. Central Bureau of Investigations agents caught up with Ansari just thirteen days before he had been ordered to set off a second series of reprisal bombings, this time scheduled for India’s Republic Day in 1994. It should be noted that these early Indian jihadists had no known connection with the organized crime elements who, under the influence of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, executed the Mumbai serial...
bombings of 1993. Though the jihadist movement would, later in its course, have extensive support from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, it is important to note that Islamist terrorism in India was born independently, as a reaction to the demolition of the Babri Masjid and the communal violence which followed it.25

Today, most major Islamist terror cells in India can trace their roots to TIM’s founders. The accounts of prosecutors involved in the case against Abdul Karim suggest he made contact with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence and Lashkar-e-Taiba after escaping India in 1993. In subsequent years, the logistical support of Pakistan-based organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad enabled new waves of jihadists to form far more rapidly.

These new groups largely drew their cadre from an organization called the Students Islamic Movement of India. Ehtesham Siddiqi, a central figure in organizing the 2006 Mumbai serial bombings, was SIMI’s general-secretary for Maharashtra. Mohammad Sabahuddin, who carried out a series of attacks in Uttar Pradesh and Bangalore, and went on to become the first Indian Lashkar operative to command Indian nationals, was active in the organization. So, too, was Raziuddin Nasir, the commander of a Hubli cell which was planning attacks on western tourists in Goa.

Despite SIMI’s emergence as one of the principal threats to India’s internal security, though, neither the history or objectives of its cult of the Kalashnikov are well understood.

**SIMI and the Jihadist Tendency**

LIKE MANY OTHER SOUTH ASIAN ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS, SIMI’S GENESIS LIES IN the Jamaat-e-Islami. Established in 1941 by Mawdudi, the Jamaat-e-Islami went on to emerge as a major political party in Pakistan, fighting for the creation of a Shariah-governed state.26 In post-Partition India, however, the Jamaat gradually transformed itself into a cultural organization committed to propagating Salafist Islam amongst Muslims. It set up networks of schools and study circles, devoted to combating growing post-independence influence of communism and socialism. A student wing, the Students Islamic Organization (SIO), was set up in 1956, with its headquarters at Aligarh. As Muslims in north India were battered by communal violence, the Jamaat slowly moved away from Mawdudi’s hostility to secularism. It began arguing that the secular state needed to be defended, as the sole alternative was a Hindu-communalist regime.

SIMI was formed in April 1977 as an effort to revitalize the SIO. Building on the SIO’s networks in Uttar Pradesh, SIMI reached out to Jamaat-linked Muslim students’ groups in Andhra Pradesh, Bengal, Bihar and Kerala.27 From the outset, SIMI made clear its belief that the practice of Islam was essentially a political project. In the long term, SIMI sought to re-establish the caliphate, without which it felt the practice of Islam would remain incomplete. Its pamphlets warned that Muslims comfortable living in secular societies were headed to hell. Ideologies other than Islam were condemned as false and sinful.28

Mawdudi’s writings played a considerable role in shaping SIMI’s notion of its historic, vanguard role. As Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr has pointed out, Mawdudi’s reading of the Quran led him to believe that:

...an important aspect of the Prophet’s organization had been segregating his community from its larger social context. This enabled the Prophet to give his organization a distinct identity, and permitted the nascent Muslim community to resist dissolution into the larger pagan Arab culture. Instead, they were able to pull the adversary into the ambit of Islam. For Mawdudi, the Jamaat, much like the Prophetic community, had to be the paragon for Muslim community of India.29

Developments in Pakistan and elsewhere gave this project an increasingly hard edge. SIMI’s leadership was drawn to General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamist regime in Pakistan, and threw its weight behind the United States-backed mujahideen fighting the Soviet Union and the socialist regime in Afghanistan. SIMI also developed a broad common front with the forces of Sunni reaction in West Asia. As Sikand has noted:

SIMI’s rhetoric grew combative and vitriolic, insisting that Islam alone was the solution to the problems of not just the Muslims of India, but of all Indians and, indeed, of the whole world.30

Interestingly, the Jammu and Kashmir Islami Jamaat-e-Tulba—the student wing of the Jammu and Kashmir Jamaat-e-Islami—was undergoing a similar process of transformation. Formed in 1977, the JJT was to develop transnational linkages with neoconservative Islamist groups in much the same manner and much the same time as SIMI.

At the outset, the JJT reached out to Saudi Arabia-based neoconservative patronage networks for help. In 1979, the JJT was granted membership in the World
Organization of Muslim Youth, a controversial Saudi-funded body which bankrolled many ideologically Islamist groups that later turned to terrorism. The next year, the IJT organized a conference in Srinagar, which was attended by dignitaries from across West Asia, including the Imam of the mosques of Mecca and Medina, Abdullah bin-Sabil.

By the end of the decade, the IJT had formally committed itself to armed struggle against the Indian state. Its president, Sheikh Tajamul Husain told journalists in Srinagar that Kashmiris did not consider themselves Indian, and forces stationed there were an “army of occupation.” Husain also called for the establishment of an Islamic state through a revolution. A year later, in 1981, Husain reiterated his call to followers to evict the Indian “occupation.”

At the time, Indian authorities did not appear to have been particularly concerned by these pronouncements. Jammu and Kashmir’s chief minister, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, did proscribe an IJT meeting scheduled in 1980, but no serious effort to crack down on SIMI took place elsewhere in India. Many of those who would later acquire central positions in the Hizb ul-Mujahideen, the largest jihadist group operating in Kashmir. Notably, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen’s supreme commander, Mohammad Yusuf Shah, cut his political teeth as an IJT activist.

Interestingly, when SIMI first appeared on the scene, Jamaat leaders in India showed more concern for the radical movement than the government. They sought to distance themselves from SIMI, fearing its politics would allow the government to proscribe the Jamaat. Much of the Jamaat rank and file, though, was incensed at what they saw as their leadership’s betrayal of Mawdudi’s authentic Islamicism. In the view of many Jamaat members, the leadership was too enmeshed in establishment politics, at the cost of pursuing Mawdudi’s call to struggle for an Islamic state. The sympathy among the Jamaat rank and file for SIMI allowed it to survive even after 1982, when the Jamaat formally distanced itself from SIMI.

Interestingly, while the SIO insists on peaceful means, its ideological agenda is not dissimilar to that of SIMI. One official publication, for example, points to SIO’s heritage of Salafi neo-conservatism, saying it represents “Ibn Abdul Wahab’s belief, Syed Qutb’s smile at the gallows, and Syed Mawdudi’s revolutionary call.”

Given that Qutb’s notion of revolution inspired the assassins of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat—and legions of Islamist terror cells after—the violence implicit in the ideology is evident.

Part of the reason for SIMI’s spectacular growth after 1982 lay in precisely this heritage and the support that ideologically-kindred organizations from Arabia, including the Kuwait-based World Association of Muslim Youth and the Saudi Arabia-funded International Islamic Federation of Student Organization, were able to provide. Generous funding from West Asia helped SIMI establish a welter of magazines—Islamic Movement in Urdu, Hindi and English, Iqra in Gujarati, Rupantar in Bengali, Sedi Malar in Tamil and Vivekam in Malayalam—that propagated the idea of an Islamic revolution. SIMI also set up a special wing, the Tehreek Tulba e-Arabiya, to build networks among madrasa students, as well as the Shaheen Force, whose recruiting efforts targeted children.

Much of SIMI’s time was spent persuading its recruits that Islam alone offered solutions to the challenges of the modern life. In 1982, for example, it organized an anti-immorality week, where supposedly obscene literature was burned. A year later, in an effort to compete with the Left in Kerala, SIMI held an anti-capitalism week. Predictably, it held out Islam, rather than socialism, as the solution.

SIMI also worked extensively with victims of communal violence, and provided educational services for poor Muslims. It appeared to give young Muslims a sense of purpose and identity, urging them to reject drugs and alcohol.

Was SIMI, then, in essence a Muslim social service organization, occupying spaces the state had vacated? Yes—but it was also more than that. As Irfan Habib, Iqtidar Alam Khan and KP Singh observed in a seminal 1976 essay, the conditions of Muslims were not what Islamists “regarded as their principal grievances.” Rather, their objective was to use discrimination and grievance for their own purposes of legitimizing Islamism. Indeed, SIMI wished for “preservation of Muslim separateness, not the end of Muslim backwardness, as their basic aim.”

SIMI’s polemics appealed to the growing class of lower-middle class and middle-class urban Muslim men in the 1980s who felt cheated of their share of the growing economic opportunities in India. In SIMI’s vision, this discrimination was intrinsic to, not an aberration from, the Indian secular-nationalist project. Safdar Nagori, one of SIMI’s leading figures, even claimed in one interview that Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister, had wished for all Muslims to embrace the heretical teachings of the Punjabi mystic Ghulam Ahmed Qadiani. No historical substantiation of this claim exists—but it, and others, were used to buttress the claim that the secular state was inherently hostile to what SIMI characterized as orthodox Islam.

SIMI’s attacks on Hindu polytheism, Indian secularism and western decadence drew a plethora wide swathe of young Muslim men hit by educational backwardness and discrimination. SIMI’s claims that there could be no justice for Muslims other than in a Shariah-based political order resonated further with communities battered by decades of communal violence, and under the Indian state. At its peak in 2001, SIMI had over 400 Ansar, or full-time workers, and 20,000 Ikhwans, or volunteers. As Yoginder Sikand has perceptively noted, the organiz-
tion provided “its supporters a sense of power and agency which they were denied in their actual lives.”

SIMI’s tilt towards terrorism appears to have begun around the period of the demolition of the Babri Masjid—the same time, it should be recalled, that Abdul Karim’s group was preparing itself for jihadist action. Soon after the tragic events of December 6, 1992, and the anti-Muslim pogroms which followed it, SIMI president Shahid Badr Falahi demanded that “Muslims organize themselves and stand up to defend the community.”40 Another SIMI leader, Abdul Aziz Salafi, demanded action to show that Muslims “would now refuse to sit low.”41

Growing numbers of SIMI members responded to their call, making their way to Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Harkat ul-Jihad-e-Islami training camps in Pakistan. SIMI leaders continued to insist their organization itself had nothing to do with terrorism. The group’s rhetoric, however, became increasingly bitter and violent. In a 1996 statement, SIMI declared that since democracy and secularism had failed to protect Muslims, the sole option for Muslims was to struggle for the caliphate.42 Soon after, the movement put up posters calling on Muslims to follow the path of Mahmood Ghaznavi and appealing to God to send down a latter-day avatar of the eleventh-century conqueror to avenge the destruction of mosques in India.43

By the time of SIMI’s 1999 Aurangabad convention, many of the speeches delivered by delegates were increasingly inflammatory. “Islam is our nation, not India,” thundered Mohammad Amir Shakeel Ahmad, one of over a dozen SIMI-linked Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives arrested in 2005 for smuggling in military-grade explosives and assault rifles for a planned series of attacks in Gujarat. Among those listening to Ahmad’s speech was Azam Ghauri, TIM member and participant in the 1993 train bombings that Abdul Karim “Tunda” had organized. Ghauri, by the accounts of some of those present, was even offered the leadership of SIMI at the conference.

When 25,000 SIMI delegates met in Mumbai in September 2001 at what was to be its last public convention, the organization for the first time called on its supporters to turn to jihad. In an article published just after the convention, the commentator Javed Anand recalled seeing stickers pasted “in large numbers in Muslim shops and homes, a thick red ‘NO’ splashed across the words DEMOCRACY, NATIONALISM, POLYTHEISM. ‘ONLY ALLAH!’ exclaims SIMI’s punch-line.”44

For years, Lashkar had attempted to build a network across India using local Islamists.45 Perhaps the most successful of Lashkar’s agents was Mohammad Ishtiaq, the son of a shopkeeper from Kala Gujran in Pakistan’s Jhelum district. Operating under the alias Salim Junaid, Ishtiaq obtained an Indian passport and even married a local resident, Momina Khatoon. Ishtiaq, however, was arrested before he could do real harm.

In late 1998, in response to desperate pleas from Lashkar’s leadership, Hyderabad resident Mohammad Azam Ghauri returned to India to help rebuild its networks.46 Ghauri—who figured earlier in this paper as one of the three co-founders of the Indian jihad—turned to friends in Hyderabad’s organized crime cartels for help. In 1999, his long-standing friend Abdul Aziz Sheikh—a hitman linked to Karachi-based mafioso Dawood Ibrahim Kaksar—attempted to assassinate the Shiv Sena leader Milind Vaidya—one of the key organizers of the post-Babri Masjid communal riots in Mumbai.
Ghauri also sought and received help from remnants of the mafia of Mohammad Fasiiadin, which had executed Andhra Pradesh Hindu fundamentalist leaders Papiah Goud and Nanda Raj Goud in retaliation for the 1992 anti-Muslim riots there.

Soon after Makki’s speech, Ghauri’s new mafia-linked network set off bombs cinema theatres in Karimnagar and Nanded. Eight weeks after these bombings, Ghauri was shot dead by the police.

Jihadi organizations continued their attempts to build new networks in Hyderabad. In August 2001, the Hyderabad Police arrested one of the most intriguing figures in this effort, an unassuming electrician named Abdul Aziz. While working in Saudi Arabia, Aziz came into contact with an Islamist recruiter looking for volunteers to join the global jihad. Aziz served in Bosnia in 1994, and then fought alongside Chechen Islamists in 1996. In 1999, Aziz again flew to Tbilisi, in search of a second tour of duty. He was, however, deported. With the help of funds from Hamid Bahajib, a Saudi Arabia-based Lashkar financier who also paid for Ghauri’s work, Aziz returned home to try and initiate a jihad of his own.

Aziz, investigators found, hoped to draw on the resources of the Daruljihad-o-Shahadat, or Institute for Holy War and Martyrdom—an Islamist vigilante group set up in the mid-1980s, at around the same time SIMI was gathering momentum. Although its website claims that the organization’s purpose is “protecting the life and properties of [the] Muslim community,” and “preserving the honor and chastity of women,” the organization also candidly states that “Islamic supremacy is our goal.”

For the most part, these efforts had only limited successes. But starting in September 2002, at least fourteen young men from Hyderabad set out on secret journeys to terrorist training camps in Pakistan. A decade earlier, the demolition of the Babri Masjid had led several recruits from Hyderabad into the lap of Lashkar. This time around, the hatred generated by the communal pogrom in Gujarat helped Islamist groups reap a fresh harvest.

Mohammad Abdul Shahid’s story, and the fluid, cross-organizational networks he built, cast considerable insight into the evolving story of the Indian jihad. Police records show Shahid dropped out of college less than a year after his graduation from the Asafiya High School in Hyderabad. He was amongst the first generation of his inner-city family to have access to a higher education—and grew up in a new home paid for, in part, by remittances from his brothers who found work in West Asia. In the wake of the Gujarat pogrom, Shahid involved himself with SIMI groups in the city. He evidently found political activism alone inadequate, as he soon sought access to terror training camps in Pakistan through a relative, Rasool Khan Yakub Khan Pathan—a mafioso and one of India’s most wanted men.

Better known by his alias, Rasool “Party” Pathan was a long-standing vassal of the Karachi-based mafia of Dawood Ibrahim Kaksar. After the Gujarat riots, Pathan took responsibility for transporting the new wave of jihadi recruits for training. According to the testimony of mafia operative Javed Hamidullah Siddiqui—who was arrested in 2004—Dawood lieutenant Shakeel Ahmad Babu arranged the new recruits’ passage on flights through Bangkok and Dhaka. Pathan, wanted by Interpol ever since 1993, was waiting for them on their arrival in Karachi. While some recruits trained with Lashkar, others were routed on to Jaish and Harkat: a fluid dispersion of assets across organizational lines not seen before the 2002 pogrom.

Within months of their departure, the new recruits executed their first successful strikes. Asad Yazdani, a resident of Hyderabad’s Toli Chowki area, helped assassinate former Gujarat Home Minister, Haren Pandya. Pandya, a Central Bureau of Investigations inquiry later determined, was killed in reprisal for his role in pogrom.

Although the new recruits had trained with Lashkar and Jaish, they turned to the Bangladesh-based Harkat for operational support. Founded by Bangladeshi veterans of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, Harkat operates at least six camps where several hundred Pakistani, Indian, Thai and Myanmar nationals are known to have trained. Its founder, Mufti Abdul Hannan, spent several years studying at the Dar-ul-Uloom seminary at Deoband, Uttar Pradesh, and developed a large network of contacts among Islamists in India. He also built links with key organized crime figures. Among the group’s most high-profile actions in India was the January 2002 terror attack near the American Centre in Kolkata, executed in collaboration with Dawood-linked mafioso Aftab Ansari.

Most often, Harkat operations involved infrastructure provided by one-time SIMI cadre from India and Bangladesh nationals who executed the actual strike. In 2007, for example, the Delhi Police arrested Yazdani’s Bangladeshi bomb-makers, the twin brothers Anishul Mursalin and Muhibbul Muttakin. Both confirmed Yazdani’s SIMI links had the June 2005 bombing of the Delhi-Patna Shramjeevi Express at Jaunpur and October 2005 suicide bombing of the headquarters of the Andhra Pradesh Police’s counter-terrorism Special Task Force. A Bangladeshi national, Mohtasim Billa, had carried out the bombing—the first Harkat operation of its kind.

Yazdani was shot dead in March 2006, just hours after the bombing of the Sankat Mochan temple in Varanasi—another lethal attack which was traced to
Sultan Salahuddin Owaisi, his son, took over the organization in 1976. Salahuddin Wahid Owaisi, who drafted a new constitution committing it to the Union of India, was reborn in 1957, under the leadership of the affluent cleric and lawyer Abdul Wahid Owaisi, who drafted a new constitution committing it to the Union of India. Sultan Salahuddin Owaisi, his son, took over the organization 1976. Salahuddin Owaisi’s sons, Asaduddin Owaisi and Akbaruddin Owaisi, are now its most visible faces.

Starting from nothing, the Majlis rapidly established itself as the principal spokesperson for old-city Muslims. By 1977–1978, the Congress—which had unleashed the Indian Army on the Majlis just three decades earlier—has even sought electoral alliances with it. In 1986, a Majlis-Congress alliance took charge of Hyderabad’s municipal corporation. The Majlis spoke for two distinct constituencies within the old city: a devout traditional elite disenchanted by the coming of democratic rule, and an urban underclass which remained economically disenfranchised despite it.

Just how did the party succeed in re-establishing itself so fast? Ashutosh Varshney has offered this simple explanation:

In the 1960s, there were riots in eight out of ten years in Hyderabad. After 1978, the trend towards communal violence took a turn for the worse. Except for the period 1986–89, riots took place virtually every year between 1978 and 1993, often many times in the same year.59

Communal parties, not surprisingly, took center stage. With growing support from Hyderabad Muslims based in west Asia, the Majlis grew into a formidable competitor to the Hindu Right.

With the Congress and Majlis locked in political embrace, Hindu nationalist forces were able to represent themselves as the sole credible defenders of Hindu interests. Violence became institutionalized, giving rise to what the historian Paul Brass described as an “organized riot system.”60 For example, gangs of killers were set up to wage war on behalf of their respective religious communities, operating under political immunities granted by various groups—a phenomenon documented in the psychoanalyst Sudhir Kakkar’s book, “The Colors of Violence.”61 Violence, the historian Javed Alam’s work on the Majlis shows, acquired growing legitimacy.62 “The distinction between crime and valor,” Varshney has noted, “thus disappeared for a large mass of Muslims and Hindus in the old city of Hyderabad.”63

Islamist terrorism in Hyderabad represented a breakdown of faith in the Majlis’ riot-protection system. Muslim interests, recruits to SIMI were told, could only be defended by integration into the wider global jihadi movement.

Majlis leaders have, in recent years, found themselves in opposition to the jihadism they once advocated. In a recent interview, Majlis leader Asaduddin Owaisi noted that “these misguided youths call me a kafir.”64 “I am on their hit list,” he
said. Majlis leaders have continued to use chauvinism, for example by leading protests against a visit by the Bangladeshi author Taslima Nasreen. However, there is no sign that these tactics have succeeded in mitigating the success of SIMI and other jihadi groups outside of the political system drawing new recruits.

Addressing poverty in old-city Hyderabad is often advertised as a solution to the jihad’s success. While worthwhile as a policy objective, it may not be a prescription for peace. As Varshney pointed out:

Hyderabad Muslims have done much better than their Lucknow counterparts. Their success however has led not to a reduction but an increase in communal tensions, partly through a strengthening of the Majlis. The relative economic betterment of Muslims is not a cause of increased tensions. An absence of symbiotic linkages is. The two communities do not constitute a web of interdependence.

The Making of the Indian Mujahideen

HE APPEARED ONLINE IN 2015 ON THE ANSAR UL-TAWHID WEBSITE, HIS FACE digitally masked, a laptop to his left, religious books to his right, and a Glock 9mm automatic on his desk, to deliver the first-ever call by an Indian for Muslims in the country to join the global jihad. “My beloved brothers,” he said, his voice woven into images of communal carnage, “what has happened to you that, in the sight of god, you do not fight for helpless children, women and the aged, who are begging their lord for rescue?” He went on. “Rise, like Ahmad Shah Abdali and Muhammad ibn-Qasim, like Syed Ahmad the martyr, like the Prophet and his companions, take the Quran in one hand and the sword in the other, and head to the fields of jihad.”

That video marked the coming joining of the old jihadist networks—birthed in the mid-1980s—with the Islamic State. The medium for tying together these threads was an organization called the Indian Mujahideen, which in the number of its victims and extraordinary scale of its attacks must be counted as India’s most successful urban terror group.

Behind the digital mask was Sultan Abdul Kadir Armar, the 39-year-old son of a small businessman from Bhatkal, northern Karnataka and soft-spoken cleric trained at the respected Darul Uloom Nadwatul Ulama seminary in Lucknow. A key recruiter for the Indian Mujahideen, Armar joined a rebellion against its leadership, and is believed to have led more than a dozen Indians to camps run by the Tehreek-e-Taliban in Pakistan. His brother Shafi Armar would later succeed him as a guide for Indian nationals seeking jihadist training in camps in Syria and Afghanistan.

The first jihadist group based abroad formed by Indians, Ansar ul-Tawhid believes terrorism will not achieve anything. Their imagination fired by the Islamic State’s success against better-equipped and trained forces in Syria, its leaders see themselves as the kernel of a full-blown insurgency in India. In the online address, the man believed to be Armar exhorts, “Listen to the calls rising from the dust in Iraq and Syria... and migrate to the motherland of jihad, Afghanistan, gather your courage, and teach these Brahmins and worshippers of cows, as well as the whole world of unbelievers, that the Indian Muslim is no coward.”

Ansar ul-Tawhid’s Twitter has published video footage of cadres training in camps on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The members it lost in fighting include Anwer Husain “Bhatkal”—allegedly killed during a raid on an Afghan border outpost—the first Indian killed of several known to have trained in Afghanistan.

Much like the Armar brothers—one cleric, the other a digital-era media producer—Ansar ul-Tawhid’s membership is diverse. One member is Afif Hassan Siddibapa—also known as Afif Jailani—a 41-year-old businessman who left a job in Saudi Arabia and settled in Karachi with his wife and children. Additional Indians linked to the group are: Shanawaz Ahmad, an Unani doctor and the son of a local Samajwadi Party politician in Uttar Pradesh’s Azamgarh; Abu Rashid Ahmad, who once worked at an eye hospital in Mumbai; and students Mohammad “Bada” Sajid and Mirza Shadab Beig.

The Indian Mujahideen grew out of a religious circle called al-Isbah—literally meaning “a group in search of truth”—started from Bhatkal in late 2001. The group listened to sermons by cleric Muhammad Shish. Leading member Ahmad Zarar Siddibappa, better known as Yasin Bhatkal, who was arrested by the Indian government in August 2013, was among those drawn to the Indian Mujahideen at these meetings.

Early in the summer of 2004, a group of young men—mostly one-time members of SIMI—gathered for a retreat at one of the sprawling villas that line the cheerfully-named Jolly Beach, the pride of small, south Indian fishing town of Bhatkal. They swam, went for hikes into the woods, honed their archery skills, and occasionally indulged in some target practice with an air gun. Local residents recall occasionally hearing small explosions, but assumed the men were setting off fireworks. Nothing the men did gave the Bhatkal police cause for concern.
It should have: the young men on Jolly Beach would form the core of a jihadist network, calling itself the Indian Mujahideen, that would carry out a succession of bomb attacks from 2005 onward that killed and injured hundreds of Delhi prosecutors say the principal organizer of the Jolly Beach gathering, Riyaz Ismail Shahbandri—also known as Riyaz Bhatkal—along with his brother, Iqbal Shahbandri, signed a manifesto issued by the Indian Mujahideen after its September 2008 bomb attacks. We, the Indian Mujahideen, ask Allah, the Almighty to accept from us these 9 explosions,” the manifesto had read, “which were planned to be executed in the holy month of Ramadan. We have carried out this attack in the memory of two most eminent Mujahids of India: Sayyed Ahmed Shaheed and Shah Ismail Shaheed (may Allah bestow His Mercy upon them) who had raised the glorious banner of Jihad against the disbelievers in this very city of Delhi. It is the great hard work and sacrifices of these visionary legends [sic.] that shall always inspire us, Inshallah, to carry on the struggle and fight against the Kufr (disbelief) till our last breath.\textsuperscript{68}

Riyaz Shahbandri’s father, Ismail Shahbandri, left Bhatkal some three decades prior in the hopes, like millions of other Indians, to make his fortune in Mumbai. He set up a successful leather-tanning works in the city’s Kurla area, and eventually bought an apartment in Kardar Building off the busy Pipe Road—an impossible dream for most migrants to the city. Ismail Shahbandri’s prosperity ensured Riyaz Shahbandri was able to study at local English-medium schools, and later study civil engineering at Mumbai’s Saboo Siddiqui Engineering College. He married a Bhatkal-area woman, Nashua Ismail, the daughter of an electronics store owner, in 2002. By this time, however, Riyaz Shahbandri’s story began to diverge significantly from the bourgeois trajectory his businessman father had likely envisioned for him.

Shafiq Ahmad, Riyaz Shahbandri’s future brother-in-law, lived in the family’s apartment as he pursued his studies—and his work as a Students Islamic Movement of India activist—in Mumbai. Shahbandri began to spend time at SIMI’s offices in Mumbai around 2001—at the peak of the organization’s radical phase—with men who would play a key role in the development of the jihadist movement of India. Among them were Abdul Subhan Qureshi and Mohammad Sadiq Israr Sheikh, too, had no conception of the jihadist project when he began attending SIMI’s Sunday study meetings at a friend’s apartment in 1996. However, it would be these meetings, over tea and biscuits, that gave birth to the idea for the Indian Mujahideen.\textsuperscript{70}

From his testimony to Mumbai Police investigators, Sheikh appears to have been drawn to SIMI’s political Islamism by the same resentments common to millions of lower middle-class Mumbai residents. Born in 1978 to working-class parents from the north Indian town of Azamgarh, Sheikh grew up in the Cheeta Camp housing project. Home to thousands of slum residents who had been evicted to make way for the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Cheeta Camp provided the foundation for tens of thousands of families to make the journey to the fringes of India’s middle-class. Sheikh’s parents were able to give their children a decent home and an education.

Sheikh’s story did not quite run according to the script his parents had in mind. Having dropped out of high school, he obtained certification as an air-conditioning mechanic. Sheikh could only find ill-paid freelance work, not a regular job. Like many of his contemporaries, he felt cheated of the growing economic opportunities emerging around him and came to believe he was a victim of religious discrimination. In 1993, communal riots tore the city apart and killed hundreds of Muslims, and SIMI gave voice to Sheikh’s rage.\textsuperscript{71} As scholar Yoginder Sikand perceptively noted, SIMI’s aggressive polemic gave “its supporters a sense of power and agency which they were denied in their actual lives.”\textsuperscript{72}

SIMI’s language turned increasingly violent as the years rolled by; at a rally held at Mumbai’s Bandra Reclamation Ground soon after the al-Qaeda attacks of
September 11, it voiced support for Osama bin-Laden and hailed the Taliban’s Mullah Omar as a role-model for Muslims. Even this, though, wasn’t enough for Sheikh. Early in 2001, he stormed out of a SIMI meeting, complaining that the organization did nothing other than talk.

In April 2001, Sheikh ran into a distant relative who helped turn his dreams into reality. Salim Islahi—the son of a Jamaat-e-Islami linked cleric who was expelled from the organization for his extremism—put Sheikh in touch with Aftab Ansari, a gang lord reputed to have discovered Islamist radicalism while serving prison time in New Delhi along with Jaish-e-Mohammad terrorist Syed Omar Sheikh. Syed Omar Sheikh’s lieutenant, Asif Reza Khan, arranged for Sadiq Sheikh to travel to Pakistan in September 2001.

Qureshi, like Sheikh, was the son of working-class migrants from north India. However, Qureshi received an elite education—ironically, at the Catholic-run Antonio D’Souza High School. In 1996, he had begun working as a software engineer, specializing in network solutions. Qureshi joined SIMI around the same time. Later, he edited the SIMI-affiliated journal, Islamic Movement. In 2001, Qureshi submitted a letter of resignation to his employers, saying he intended to “devote one complete year to pursue religious and spiritual matters.” Like Sheikh, he left India to train at a Lashkar camp in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir.

By the autumn of 2002, spurred on by anti-Muslim violence which had claimed hundreds of lives in the state of Gujarat, dozens of volunteers were joining the Indian Mujahideen network—although the group did not yet have that, or indeed any, name. Many came from Hyderabad for training in the wake of the Gujarat pogrom, among them Abdul Khwaja. Using the alias “Amjad,” Khwaja now heads a Lashkar-linked, Lahore-based cell operating against India. Others came from Maharashtra. By 2003, Sheikh himself regularly dispatched volunteers from the Azamgarh area for training at Lashkar camps.

In 2005, the network was ready to carry out their first bombings, an attack on a Hindu temple in the north Indian city of Varanasi. Over coming years, the Indian Mujahideen succeeded in staging attacks of ever-increasing intensity, among them the July 2006 strikes on Mumbai’s suburban train system that claimed at least 183 lives.73

By 2006, there is evidence that the organization had begun to develop significant transnational linkages.74 Authorities in India say that Kerala-born Sarfaraz Nawaz and Muscat-based entrepreneur Ali Abdul Aziz al-Hooti operated a key Lashkar-e-Taiba logistical hub, supporting the terrorist group’s operations in India, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, Bangladesh—and even the Maldives.

For counter-terrorism forces across the region, this is bad news. From its origins in Pakistan’s Punjab, the investigation shows, Lashkar has grown into a truly transnational organization.75

Nawaz began his jihadist journey in 1995. It was then, when he was just eighteen years old, that he joined SIMI.76 Five years later, Nawaz was elected to SIMI’s New Delhi-based central committee. His contemporaries included many who later played key roles in building India’s jihadist movement—among them, key SIMI ideologue Safdar Nagori, along with Peedical Abdul Shibly and Yahya Kamakutty, both successful computer professionals now being tried for plotting jihadist operations in southern India.77

Like the overwhelming majority of SIMI members, Nawaz chose a life of middle-class respectability. He obtained a computer networking qualification from an institute in Kochi, married and found a job in Oman.78

It wasn’t long, though, before Nawaz was drawn back into the world he appeared to have escaped. During a visit home in early 2006, he heard Tadiyatavide Nasir—an Islamist political activist who, improbably enough, also served as a preacher with the Noorisha order of Sufi mystics—delivered a speech casting jihad as an imperative of the practice of Islam.79 Inspired, Nawaz set about making contacts with jihadists in Muscat. Friends from his days in SIMI put him in touch al-Hooti, a successful automobile components dealer who also owned string of internet cafés.

Born to an Indian mother, al-Hooti’s radicalization had been driven by stories of atrocities against Muslims he heard on visits home to Miraj, near Mumbai. Before he turned thirty, Indian investigators say, al-Hooti had twice trained at Lashkar camps in Pakistan. By 2006, Indian investigators say, al-Hooti had emerged as one of Lashkar’s key organizers in the Gulf. Working with Lashkar intelligence operative Mohammad Jassem—also known by the code-name “Tehsin”—al-Hooti helped send dozens of jihadists to Lashkar’s training camps in Pakistan.

Many of those men proved themselves to be valuable Lashkar assets. Early in 2007, al-Hooti and Jassem dispatched Dubai-based, Indian-origin printing press mechanic Fahim Arshad Ansari to a Lashkar camp in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir.80 Having finished a Daura Ribat covert tradecraft course, Ansari was tasked with carrying out surveillance at several important locations in Mumbai. Footage he generated, Indian prosecutors have said, helped facilitate the training of the Lashkar assault that targeted Mumbai in November 2008.

Funds generated by al-Hooti are thought to have helped Lashkar commander Faisal Haroun—code-name “Naim”—set up Indian ocean networks that eventually enabled the group to target India’s western seaboard. Haroun is believed to
have crafted the 2006 landing of assault rifles intended to have been used in a terror attack in Gujarat, as well as an abortive 2007 effort to land eight Lashkar fidayeen off Mumbai.81

Al-Hooti and Jassem recruited widely across the India ocean region. Maldives investigators have, for example, learned that the men facilitated the training of Ali Assham—a Malé resident who was forced to suspend jihadist career after losing an eye in a bomb-making accident.

Oman authorities believe that by 2007, the pro-western Emirate itself had begun to figure on al-Hooti’s list of targets. In June that year, al-Hooti held discussions with Lashkar sympathizers in the country on the prospect of targeting prominent landmarks in Muscat—among them, a British Broadcasting Corporation office, the Golden Tulip Hotel, and a spa in the upmarket Nizwa area. No final operational plans were made, but Oman authorities found enough evidence to secure a conviction in 2013.

Most importantly from the point of view of Indian investigators, al-Hooti provided an interface between Lashkar in its dealings with the Indian Mujahideen.

In 2008, Nasir turned to Nawaz to secure funding for the training of a new group of Indian Mujahideen volunteers he had raised from the Indian state of Kerala. Nasir also said he needed cash to pay for a planned bomb attack in the city of Bengaluru. Between March and May 2008, police say, al-Hooti transferred an estimated U.S.$ 2,500 for Nasir’s use to a Kerala-based hawala dealer. Lashkar commander “Rehan,” one of al-Hooti’s associates, also arranged for Nasir’s recruits to train with a jihadist unit operating near the Line of Control Jammu and Kashmir’s Kupwara district.

In November 2007, the networks began using the Indian Mujahideen name in e-mail manifestos released to the media. A manifesto, released minutes before the Indian Mujahideen group carried out synchronized bombings in three north Indian cities in November 2007, expressly spelt out the ideological basis of the SIMI cadre’s turn to jihad.82

Describing the “wounds given by the idol worshippers to the Indian Muslims,” the manifesto voiced anger that Hindus had “demolished our Babri Masjid and killed our brothers, children and raped our sisters.”83 The 2002 Gujarat pogrom had “forced us to take a strong stand against this injustice and all other wounds given by the idol worshippers of India.”84 “Only Islam,” it concluded, “has the power to establish a civilized society, and this could only be possible in Islamic rule which could be achieved by only one path: jihad.”

If the ideological resonances and modes of praxis of the Indian Mujahideen are global, the specific conditions in which it operates are local.

Is Perdition Ahead?

THOUGH JIHADIST ATTACKS WITHIN INDIA HAVE BEEN AT A LOW EBB SINCE THE Indian Mujahideen cadre fled the country in 2008, there remains a durable threat. In 2016, Pakistan-based jihadist groups demonstrated their continued ability to strike targets in India, hitting Gurdaspur, Pathankot and Uri, among other targets. Pakistani-American jihadist David Headley, convicted in 2011 for his role in Lashkar’s November 2008 attack on Mumbai, has spoken of what he called the “Karachi Project”—a joint operation involving jihadists and elements in Pakistan’s intelligence services to use Indian nationals for further strikes on the country.84

Now, there is a further threat: the recruitment and training of Indian jihadists overseas, who could yet turn into the core of a future threat. Islamist terror groups understand that acts of violence do not in themselves further the Islamist political agenda, or hasten the disintegration of the Indian state. In 2006, terrorism in India, including its Maoist variant, claimed 2598 lives; whereas traffic accidents killed a staggering 105,749.85

What jihadi groups instead hope is that violence will sunder Hindu from Muslim, bringing about an apocalyptic religious war. In their imagination, this war will lead to the triumph of neconservative Islam and the re-establishment of the Caliphate. While this enterprise may seem somewhat disconnected from the real world, India’s long history of communal hostilities has raised concerns that jihadi violence could act as a catalyst for a holocaust of this kind. It is to this challenge that India’s political system must respond.

Broady, three major challenges lie ahead:

First, funneling funds towards improving educational access or economic opportunity—the chosen weapons of government counter-radicalization efforts across the world—should not be seen as a deus ex machina which will solve the problem. Sabahuddin Ahmed, the first Indian to lead a Lashkar cell which included Pakistani nationals, lacked neither. His father was a lawyer; his middle-class secularized family included doctors, engineers and multinational firm executives. Yet, Ahmed joined SIMI in the wake of the Gujarat pogrom—as did so many others—and went on to execute both the 2005 attack on the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore and the 2007 assault on the Central Reserve Police Force’s training camp at Rampur.86

Instead of purely economic interventions to address the rage of young Muslims, which can at best be palliatives rather than prescriptions for peace, a rigorous
commitment to the rule of law is needed. Former Prime Minister Singh often voiced a commitment to justice and secularism—soon after taking power, he called for action to ensure “painful incidents like [the 1984 anti-Sikh massacres] and the Gujarat riots never happen again”—but on-ground implementation has been poor.87 State governments have, for example, failed to act against housing denial, a major grievance for the middle-class and lower middle-class Muslims who often join Islamist political organizations.88

Neither have institutional reforms been put in place to insulate the police from the political pressures, nor laws reworked to ensure rapid justice for victims. Most importantly, nothing has been done by mainstream political parties to address the de-facto exclusion of Muslims from political life in highly-communalized states like Gujarat—a phenomenon that cedes political space to Islamists.89 As such, government policies centered on the rule of law and citizenship are essential to counter jihadist narratives.

Second, the problem of religious chauvinism must be openly addressed. The growing sensitivity of Indian political parties to Muslim concerns has nourished the religious reaction which forms the firmament from which jihadism has sprung. In late 2007, Bangladeshi author Taslima Nasreen was forced out of the state West Bengal after riots broke out there in protest against her presence.90 Later, the Bengali-language novelist was compelled to leave India altogether. Uttar Pradesh authorities earlier refused to take legal action against a state minister Haji Yaqoob Qureshi, who announced an Rs. 510 million bounty for the lives of Danish cartoonists who caricatured the Prophet Mohammad.91 Similarly, police in Andhra Pradesh were reported to have been restrained from pursuing counter-terrorism investigations for fear it might alienate Muslim voters, provoking a major national newspaper to charge Prime Minister Singh’s government with “what can be bluntly called communalization of internal security.”92

It is true that Hindu fundamentalists have enjoyed similar legal immunities. Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and several cities in Haryana—all governed by different political formations—proscribed a film on the Mughal Emperor Akbar in the wake of protests by Hindu organizations.93 Maharashatra, a Congress-ruled state, forbad scholarly literature on the medieval ruler Shivaji and demanded the extradition of its author.94 Moreover, the even-handed treatment of Muslim and Hindu chauvinism by political leaders falls well short of constituting a meaningful campaign to combat the deeper communalism that threatens the Indian Union and secular state.

Third, politicians—Hindu or Muslim, Left or Right—must begin to articulate a coherent ideological response to Islamism. Even as India’s political and clerical orders continue to maintain a discreet silence on this question, Islamism has expanded its reach and influence.

Increasingly, the invisible jihad is drawing numbers of highly-educated, successful young Muslims—the class that ought to have an abiding stake in a prosperous India and a globalizing world.

Back in 2001, SIMI’s Safdar Nagori proclaimed that he was “very bitter” about India.95 He voiced the rage of a generation of young men who saw opportunity opening around them—but also found doors slammed shut in their face because of their faith. Many found in the venom of the Lashkar’s Hafiz Mohammad Saeed a manifesto for praxis: “the Hindu is a mean enemy and the proper way to deal with him is the one adopted by our forefathers, who crushed them by force. We need to do the same.”96 Indian politics, sadly, has done little to strip Nagori’s position of legitimacy. It must do so now; otherwise, India could face a long and murderous war from within.

NOTES

3. It is clear the Islamic State’s anti-intellectualism led jihadists to obliterate the markers of the sophisticated Islamic culture which formed part of the rich heritage of the lands they conquered. It is also possible to conjecture that this anti-intellectual nihilism was a core part of the Islamic State’s global lure.
6. In one prominent example, Zayn al-Din al-Ma’bari, a sixteenth century Malabar historian, compiled the Tuhfat al-Mujahiden fi Ba’d Alkwal Al-Partukalayyis (History of the Mujahiden), hoping to “inspire the Faithful to undertake a jihad against the worshipers of the cross.” Al-Ma’bari recorded “the evils which the Portuguese inflicted upon the Muslims of Malabar as well as a brief account of the laws and religious merit of the


19. Ma’alim fi’l-Tariq [Signposts on the Road, or Milestones], (Cairo: Privately published, 1964), page 166.

20. Abdullah Azzam Signs of Allah the Most Merciful, al-Rahman, in the jihad of Afghanistan (Publisher not stated, undated), page 58.


23. For a full journalistic account of contemporary communal riots, see MJ Akbar, Riot After Riot (New Delhi: Penguin, 1988).


26. For a compact account of the Jamaar-e-Islami’s role in Pakistani politics during this period, see Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift Into Extremism (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 2005), pages 81–82, 100–101.


33. Students Islamic Movement of India,” South Asia Terrorism Portal (Online: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/terroristoutfits/simi.htm), undated.


57. Muzammil Jaleel and Siddhartha Sarma, “Pieces in terror jigsaw, two top Lashkar men shot in UP, Delhi,” *The Indian Express* (New Delhi), March 9, 2006.


82. For example, see Sunanda Mehta, “Not allowed to sell her flat to a Muslim, Pune woman takes on entire society,” The Indian Express (New Delhi), April 2, 2008.


This essay broadly examines how Islamist currents in Algeria have evolved and contended with deep changes in the domestic sociopolitical milieu since the Black Decade.² It focuses chiefly on the case of the Islamist party Movement for a Society of Peace (MSP), Algeria’s self-avowed branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and the largest formal Islamist organization to emerge from this war. It also devotes some attention to the shifts in and spread of Salafist strains, Sufi brotherhoods and smaller Islamist parties. Some of these actors are represented in the formal political sphere and have expressly political/electoral goals, while others exist outside this fray with avowedly non-political impetuses but still actively shape the electorate. These dynamics are in many ways reflective of larger patterns in North Africa and the Middle East. But Algeria’s complex political-religious landscape also compels us in its own right, to reconsider how Islamism can be defined, as well as conventional wisdom about Islamist behavior.

Partisan Islam

Since the birth of modern Algeria in 1962, Islam and Muslim identity have been a foundational pillar of the sovereign Algerian state. The revolutionary generation saw a centralized Muslim-Algerian identity as a bulwark against attempts by the French during the colonial occupation to erode the country’s social fabric and sow division among ethnic groups, regions and religious sects. Islam thus was discursively linked with Algerian indigeneity and identity, and religion became a central rallying point of the revolution itself, whose many voices and movements were eventually consolidated under the National Liberation Front (FLN). The religious and existential character of the country’s liberation struggle was—and still is—reflected in the fact that the freedom fighters are called moudjahideen, and those who died in the struggle are called chouhada, or martyrs.

In the run-up to independence in 1962 and during the nation-building that followed, various religious tendencies were integrated and consolidated by the state—the FLN party-army machine. To this end, the state appropriated the famed refrain of 20th century Islamic reformist Abdelhamid Ben Badis:³ “Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, and Algeria is my country” along with the full extent of its attendant religious-nationalist symbolism.⁴ In practice, the state attempted to control religious doctrine by creating a Religious Affairs Ministry that monitored and administered Islamic activities throughout the country. Religious
scholars and preachers became state employees, and Islamic practices and ideas outside the government-approved framework were dissuaded and suppressed. (Who and what exactly constitutes the “state” remains obscured to most. It is usually seen as a trialect of the FLN party, the military, and the security services, known as Le Pouvoir, or “The Power.” These elements have jockeyed with one another for clout over the decades.)

However, as far back as the early 1960s, the government faced opposition to its efforts to centralize religion under the state. Within the FLN itself, religious opponents to second Algerian president Houari Boumediène’s socialist policies called instead for an “Islamic socialism.” Outside of the party, organized Islamic scholars’ fervently criticized the various presidents’ secular, leftist policies, and specifically attacked the alleged moral laxity of Boumediène’s 1971 “socialist revolution.”

Influential religious associations such as al-Qiyam also pressured the regime to draw upon both Shari’a and nationalism in crafting policy—alleging that elements of the socialist proposals contravened Islamic scriptures outright. In the 1970s and 1980s, religious, political, and economic grievances continued to build throughout Algeria, and in 1988, these pressures erupted in violent protests that shook the heavily populated north. In response to the unrest, the Algerian state abolished the single-party system in 1989 and replaced it with a multi-party system—albeit one still dominated by the FLN—in a new constitution. This political opening led to an explosion of new parties each along the lines of almost every ethnic, religious, intellectual, and cultural current in the country.

Though the Islamic activists had disagreed with Boumediène’s policies, he nevertheless promoted Islamic activity and Arabization to cement the nationalist identity the state had been trying to forge since before independence. This empowered religious activism, which had intensified throughout the 1970s and 1980s, as Islamist movements and tendencies had converged and splintered along ideological and strategic lines. By the 1989 opening, three main (though not comprehensive) partisan movements had taken shape: The Movement for a Society of Peace (MSP, known as Hamas until 1996, although sometimes still referred to as such by party outsiders) under Mahfoud Nahnah, the Al-Nahda tendency led by Abdallah Djallalah, and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) led by Ali Belhadj and Abassi Madani.

The FIS formed from various religious movements, platforms, and intellectual strains in direct response to the mass uprisings and the new 1989 constitution. Through its novel and fiery rhetoric, the FIS mobilized large segments of the populace and was the first contemporary organization to more substantially erode the state’s control of Islamic discourse and institutions. Compared to the FIS, Nahnah’s MSP and Djallallah’s Al-Nahda were more restrained in their deployment of antisystem frames, mostly refraining from calling for the subversion of the military-backed system. As a result, these movements mobilized only modest numbers of people at this time, but unlike the FIS, they also secured for themselves a safer relationship with the regime.

Of these Islamist parties, the FIS initially became the most important player, first in the 1990 local and regional elections where it won the mayoral offices and majorities in most local governments in the populous north, and then again in the first round of parliamentary elections in 1991. Threatened by the FIS’s electoral successes, the military canceled the results as well as the second round of elections in 1992, dismissed the sitting president, and dissolved the FIS. The military cadres in favor justified its position as one that was “saving democracy.” This move unleashed radical elements within the FIS and pushed still other FIS activists into hitherto marginal radical organizations which then violently targeted the state, with later iterations targeting civilians.

The military violently cracked down on the FIS as well as these armed groups, sometimes indiscriminately, and armed Islamist groups retaliated, equally indiscriminately. From 1991-2002, the unremitting circle of violence between these insurgent factions and the army’s eradicateur (eradicator) program claimed hundreds of thousands of civilian lives in what came to be known as the “Black Decade.” Ultimately, the military succeeded in crushing the FIS, and the main surviving Islamist parties—the MSP and Al-Nahda—found themselves in a wholly transformed environment in at least two respects.

First, the experience and memory of the conflict made the public at-large deeply averse to Islamism. The public, often not knowing qui tue qui, or “who was killing whom” during the conflict—the state or the insurgents—was further confused by the seeming multiplication of armed groups; it thus slowly came to conflate the FIS Islamist party with the insurgency. This trauma and confusion rendered a majority of citizens wary of radical politics; revolution, religious or otherwise, came to be widely seen as a false promise in the war’s aftermath. Though the conflict initially helped chip away at some of the state’s claims to religious authority, as the war wound down much of the Algerian populace came to prefer “state Islam” to challenger Islamist currents. Nowadays, it is rare (though not impossible) to hear someone say they oppose state control and provision of mosques, or that the 1992 cancellation of the election was unnecessary. Also, it is not always common to hear the period referred to as the Black Decade (or décennie noire in French). Instead, in everyday parlance the civil war is more commonly described as “waqt al-irhab”—the time of terrorism.
This is partly because the state appropriated and iconized individuals’ experiences of violence to support its framing and official history of the war, which cast Islamist insurgents as the sole aggressors. This discourse was cyclically reproduced as civilians were enlisted in this process, and led much of the Algerian public to blame the insurgents as the sole aggressors, rather than the army’s use of violence against civilians, or the state’s cancellation of what were in fact free and fair elections.

Second, in addition to having to contend with a polity averse to Islamism, the MSP and Al-Nahda parties after 2002 also had to deal with a public that was growing weary of party politics itself. Parties were increasingly delegitimized for several reasons. First, following the 1989 political opening and through the 1990s, the sheer number of parties exceeded the number of social cleavages and political leanings, thereby saturating the partisan arena and confusing voters. Second, for much of the wider public, the idea of parties as vehicles for political representation was still new; Algerians were both inexperienced with multi-party politics and their political preferences were still evolving.

The public’s faith in parties was further eroded by the fact that the electoral process and parties themselves became tightly controlled by the state, especially during the Black Decade. The regime fragmented and coopted the opposition through political deals, trivial policy concessions, and financial rewards via its embedded patronage networks and rentier (chiefly oil) economy—while retaining a veneer of multi-party dynamism. Because of these factors, Algeria has emerged as a prototypical “liberalized autocracy,” where nominal competitiveness in political life has provided cover for entrenched authoritarianism.

This has become increasingly evident to the public, where the notion of “hizb” (party) or “tahazub” (literally partisanship, often used to reference the process of party-fication of a movement) have become shorthand for political opportunism, or relinquishment of organizational and ideological integrity.

In the meantime, the state came to be seen as an all-powerful “man behind the curtain.” To be sure, the feared Department of Intelligence and Security, or DRS, (re-constituted in 2015 as the Department of Surveillance and Security, DSS) was for decades the linchpin of state power, but gained even greater clout after the Black Decade. The powerful DRS infiltrated the armed Islamist groups, embedded itself throughout civilian life and, later, seized control of the narrative on the conflict. These methods renewed another sentiment: of an omnipotent regime backed by an invincible army and omnipresent intelligence apparatus. (The state also won back some political legitimacy as the broker of reconciliation and stability after the conflict.) Since the end of the war, the regime has established itself as the sole protector of the citizenry, while harnessing fears over the threat of terror and the unknown. Political processes, including elections and the founding of new parties, are widely thought to be pre-determined and orchestrated by the DRS—as a result, the polity has generally retreated from its stakes in political and electoral outcomes. Whether real or perceived, this predominating belief in the regime’s pervasive power has nevertheless altered the electorate of the Islamist parties have pursued.

For Islamists, the political environment after the Black Decade posed new challenges: What path, after all, could surviving Islamist parties like the MSP and Al-Nahda forge in a context where both political Islam and the partisan arena were increasingly distrusted?

A New Path Forward

The trauma and historical memory of civil war—compounded by the parties’ own inability to effectively dodge state efforts to coopt and divide them—produced shifts in the population’s political preferences unfavorable to Islamists. Meanwhile, an increasingly constrictive legal environment (explained more fully in the next section) dampened the parties’ core initiatives and political identity. Taken together, these factors left Islamist parties swimming upstream. Nevertheless, Algeria’s Islamist parties have come up with ways—suited specifically to the challenges of their context—to mobilize people, advance their agenda, and even contest the state.

In 1989, Abdallah Djaballah founded the Al-Nahda movement. Like the MSP, Al-Nahda was influenced in part by the Muslim Brotherhood. The party opted to participate in the 1997 parliamentary elections, and through this it helped to legitimize, along with the MSP, one of the first political processes since the Black Decade. Djaballah, however, was a more vociferous opponent of the regime and less of a loyalist than his counterparts in the MSP. As such, Al-Nahda under his guidance drew stricter terms and did not accept ministerial positions, in a stated bid to maintain credibility and retain nuisance power. However, the more cooperative MSP’s 1997 electoral performance—second place with 14 percent of the vote and winning 69 seats, more even than the FLN, which placed third with 62 seats—inspired debates within Al-Nahda. Various early party cadres deemed Djaballah’s approach too rigid, and he was ejected from Al-Nahda, after which he
immediately formed a new party Islah. Years later, this scenario repeated itself, with Islah expelling Djabbalah as its cadres again sought greater proximity to state interests and grew tired of Djabbalah’s commitment to non-cooperation—which the state actively incentivized. In 2011, Djabbalah founded its latest party, Adala.

For the three smaller Islamist parties of Djabbalah’s “eastern tendency,” pursuit of ministries led to consecutive internal coups. For the MSP, in contrast, it would be the search for the ever-elusive “original vision” of late founder Nahnah—particularly as it related to the extent of cooperation with the regime—that led to breakaways and a proliferation of micro-parties. Of course, the state played a large role in incentivizing splinters here and in the wider Islamist landscape. Its rewarding of the MSP’s more obsequious stance, by boosting its numbers at the polls, however led its ranks to agonize over what they saw as their increasingly tokenized participation and its implications for their autonomy and claims to moral rectitude.

The MSP’s relative success versus the Djabbalah camp can be attributed in part to state meddling. But the Nahnah camp (for a time at least) also achieved a more optimal balance between opposition credibility and selective loyalism to the state, perhaps having better considered public opinion and the wary polity in two ways. First, MSP figures hedged against antipathy to political Islam by selectively downplaying their Islamist orientation and platforms, and positioning themselves as nationals and “moderate” alternatives to the more militant Islamists of the Black Decade. Second, it hedged against disdain for parties by harnessing the ascription and its implications for their autonomy and claims to moral rectitude.

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The MSP (then Hamas) was legalized in 1990 after the political opening of 1989. The movement aimed to compete directly with the FIS, and in this, it had the regime’s implicit support. The MSP founder Mahfoud Nahnah, supported by co-founders Mohamed Bouslimani and Mustapha Belmehdi, attempted a more gradual, loyalist, reform-oriented, bottom-up approach. Nahnah criticized what he considered the FIS’s coercion of disenfranchised groups, and the MSP recruited among a more educated demographic.

As the FIS won handily, the MSP’s mobilization efforts peaked much later, during the Black Decade when the violence, instability, and fear seemed to have no end in sight. The MSP portrayed itself as the moderate alternative to the FIS. Its cooperative relationship with the regime lent the party considerable latitude, which the MSP used to vigorously canvas and publicize. By creating its own newspaper and holding regular press conferences, its ideas on the role of women, the economy, and jihād on such issues, were promulgated and set discursively apart from those of the FIS. For example, the latter’s fiery, austere Ali Belhadj had announced (to the chagrin of other FIS leaders, it should be noted) that “there is no democracy in Islam,” whereas Nahnah emphasized the ideal of “Shuracracy,” highlighting the democratic norms inherent in the Islamic principle of_shura_ (consultation). He envisioned democratic processes as arbitrated by an Islamic council, with Shari’a as the basis for laws. The MSP also set itself apart from the FIS (and from Djabbalah) through an ostensibly more socially tolerant approach. It also used humor and charisma to win over youth. As one ex-member shared:

Nahnah and Bouslimani related to the common people. They didn’t wear and mandate beards. Their speeches were not high-level, if you listen to their Friday sermon or lessons in mosques, they use simple words and concepts. Nahnah even used [Algerian dialect] and told jokes. He did not have an air like other Islamists of “I am a sheikh, I speak only _fus’ha_.” People got attached to them, especially in such a hopeless period.

While the MSP sometimes downplayed its Islamist identity and ideas, it also moved to highlight its nationalism. “Ana mouch Islami, ana Jaza’iri,” (I’m not Islamist, I’m Algerian) remains a common refrain among MSP leaders. The experience of the Black Decade reinforced the independence-era notions of Algerian indigeneity and nationalism as cornerstones of political legitimacy, especially as the FIS and other extremist elements from the 1990s came to be retrospectively characterized as importations without basis in Algerian history or culture.

Another MSP slogan, “maslahat al watan qabl maslahat al hizb,” (the interest of the nation before that of the party), illustrates Nahnah’s rationale, despite being an avowed opposition party, for legitimizing (by participating in) the 1997 parliamentary elections, widely seen as a completely regime-run process. The party also endorsed a referendum which would outlaw fellow Islamists of the FIS. The MSP claimed that this loyal participation in the first political process since the start of the Black Decade would help prevent state collapse.

The MSP also signaled its nationalism through the party’s adoption of state discourses on martyrdom. The status of _mawdjahid_ or _chahid_ in the independence war still carries great symbolic weight. These individuals are celebrated widely and often, and their families receive a plethora of state benefits. For many today, these discourses on _jihād_ and _martyrdom_ surrounding the liberation struggle hold a continued connotation of political purity and nostalgia for a politically virtuous Algeria untouched by contemporary decay.
In 1993, Bouslimani was found murdered on the Blida mountainside. The accepted narrative was that armed militants slit his throat after he refused to grant a fatwa legitimizing their violent methods and to have the MSP boycott the national conference on the crisis. Bouslimani has since been rendered a martyr of the Black Decade, held up by the party as an Islamist nationalist who died defending his country against extreme Islamism—an example of the MSP’s commitment, at any cost, to moderation. Within the MSP national headquarters is a wall that commemorates members who lost their lives in the Black Decade. Nahnah’s speeches and sermons repeatedly invoked Bouslimani’s “patriotic sacrifice” (in a tradition that MSP leaders continue today), and the media widely publicized his murder. This appropriation of martyrdom allows the party to stake out a seemingly natural place among Algeria’s nationalist parties. It also helps it preempt accusations of having extra-national Islamist allegiances, and to discursively place the party on the side of the state in the state-versus-Islamist dichotomy, through which the conflict is still largely conceived.

The MSP tempered this strategy of loyalism and rhetorical support for the state with discriminating shows of opposition. Nahnah at times advocated for the implementation of a more Shari’ah-compliant government and legal system, although he argued that reform needed to be incremental and gradual, free of conflict or subversion. While Nahnah criticized the de facto secularism of the Algerian regime, he and his contemporaries used scripture to highlight the merits of working within such a system, using as an example of prophets who cooperated with kafira (blasphemous, unfaithful) governments in order to introduce guiding changes.

In parliament, the MSP aimed to be a sort of watchdog. It focused on advancing “Islamic” agendas and sought to guide any legislation on education (especially related to Islam and the Arabic language), alcohol policy, conversion laws, and women’s policies. The MSP’s language policy partly resulted from a dogmatic opposition to what it held was a residual French influence in Algeria, the often elevated status of French (at the expense of Arabic), and the attendant colonial—and secularist—baggage. Due to this balancing act over the late 1990s and early 2000s, the MSP became the biggest, most popular and pervasive Islamist party to emerge from the Black Decade. However, as we will explore below, the party’s clout in parliament has faded over the years.

Harnessing Associations

SUSPICION OF PARTY POLITICS DEEPENED IN THE 2000S. DESPITE SOME ELECTORAL success in its earlier period, the MSP became increasingly considered one of Algeria’s cosmetic, coopted parties whose participation in the country’s pseudo-democratic institutions served primarily to entrench state power. Structural limitations—such as laws curbing the prerogatives of local elected governments (enhancing those of the regime-appointed walis) and a 1996 law against religious rhetoric in campaigns and platforms—further constrained parties’ campaigns, programs and platforms, as well as their ability to respond to their local constituents. (Indeed, it was the 1996 amendment that prohibited parties from making any reference to religion, ethnicity, language or other identity-markers, that prompted the name change from Hamas to MSP.)

Nahnah died in 2003 in the immediate aftermath of the Black Decade. The relevance of the party’s raison d’être, still discursively wound up with the conflict, began to wane rapidly. Stuck in a mantra of gradualism, moderation, and why it’s not the FIS, the party seemed to have little in the way of concrete proposals on economic, social, and other policies being debated in the post-conflict period, as well as on the party’s relationship to the public now that the armed Islamists no longer loomed in the same way. And while the party has successfully mobilized under Nahnah’s cult of personality, his dominance became a liability once existing intra-party divisions—sown during MSP’s participationist period after 1997—were no longer unified under his leadership. Then, its legislative priorities stalled due to the MSP’s subordinate position in the governing coalition. The party soon saw its political legitimacy erode. Meanwhile, corruption scandals—some of the most infamous in recent memory—rocked MSP-held ministerial positions. For many, this damaged the party’s ideological credibility; onlookers as well as the party’s own base felt it had forsaken piety for political opportunism. Party unity suffered, rival splinters multiplied, and serial defections ensued. While the MSP (and the Djaballah camp) entered the political fray subject to rising antipathy to tahazub, their own trajectory ultimately contributed to it. The small Islamist-leaning electorate, with its few cleavages and tendencies was inundated with an overwhelming number of Islamist parties. The fissiparous Islamists overcrowded the already-congested party sphere, and became an archetype of the confusion and incoherence that had come to characterize Algerian party politics.

Because of this, the MSP began to ramp up “non-partisan” activity and created
its own networks and civic institutions outside the partisan sphere. Examples include Irshad wal Islah, the MSP’s official religious outreach wing (which preceded the party); Kaфиl Yatim, its orphan-care NGO, Jil Tarijih, its youth leadership training program; CHEMS, its official youth wing; and various local-level organizations who also undertake its da’wa (religious education) work. Members of these groups that I met were (usually young) Islamists disillusioned with politics. They recast their associations and reinterpreted its mission, thus also renegotiating their own identities and affiliations.

This new strategy allowed the MSP to do two things. First, using the associative sphere allowed the movement to feign being apolitical in these spaces, and thus distance the movement from discredited party politics. The divide between the haraka (movement) and hizb (party)—the former as an arena for more authenticty, leaving the messiness of politicking to the latter—is characteristic of most Brotherhood-based groups and observable throughout North Africa and the Middle East. In the Algerian context, however, the distinction between the haraka and hizb seems to be more than just this functional division of labor—emphasizing the distinction helps the MSP and other similarly-structured Islamist parties adjust to popular aversion to talâzuwâb. Where this distaste for party politics is present even within the member base, the MSP has expanded its influence through associations and social networks that often deny any formal relations with the party itself.

Importantly, the technical border established to distinguish the MSP’s social-mobilization activities from its formal political body is not always upheld on the ground, where there is often great deal of overlap between the haraka and hizb. Nevertheless, the disavowal of the latter preserves organizational legitimacy, while also propagating the party’s ideology and drawing even more politically-weary recruits into the MSP.

Second, in addition to forming its own associations, the MSP has also penetrated spaces traditionally dominated by the state. Through this, the MSP has been able to compete with, and contest, state presence and influence. Two paradigmatic examples are in the MSP’s gradual takeover in several regions of the Algerian Muslim Scouts (SMA), and the university union scene.

Founded in 1935 under the model of the International Boy Scouts, the SMA became a key mobilizing force in the Algerian independence struggle, preparing youth, seen as “soldiers of the future,” ideologically, pedagogically, and militarily for the war. After independence, the SMA became an important vessel through which the FLN spread political ideas, and consolidated its grip throughout various societal strata and localities. As early as the 1980s however, the scouts began to find their ideology and societal vision, as well as their religious and organizational structure, to be much more compatible with the Islamist parties than the socially-liberalizing FLN. After the dissolution of the FIS, the scouts were coopted chiefly by the Muslim Brotherhood-leaning MSP. The young scouts began incorporating many of the MSP’s educational activities into their existing scout training, with study sessions focused additionally on the teachings of Hassan al-Banna and Mahfoud Nahnah. The scouts’ resources were partly allocated to them by the state. Thus, in effect, MSP’s management of hundreds of troops throughout the country became a means by which the MSP began to funnel state funds into party activities. While the MSP’s control over the scouts has declined slightly in recent years, for decades the scouts were a venue linking members and non-members, enabling the transfer of party ideas and expanding the boys’ network for recruitment. This allowed the MSP to compete directly with the FLN’s well-established and well-resourced patronage and recruitment networks and ideological influence.

The General Union of Free Students (UGEL) represents another example of the MSP’s efforts to contest a traditionally state-held sphere. MSP figures founded this university student union in 1989 with the stated mission of acting as an intermediary between students and the administration. It mainly led strikes for improved on-campus living conditions, but also for a more austere and religious student environment, including but not limited to mandating gender-separated cafeterias and opposing activities which they considered “immoral,” including dance shows and certain types of song. Such unions were also important for political parties more generally, as they provided a selection of elite, educated, involved, and professionally-trained youth—who might comprise the future elite political class—for recruitment. UGEL also became a mechanism to monitor (and even regulate) the religious character of the student population, rendering it a tool by which the MSP surveyed and gathered information about the student constituency. To be sure, conflicts over the religious nature of the student environment at times morphed into proxy wars between UGEL and the FLN-linked National Union of Algerian Students (UNEA).

Similarly, the residence halls have become battlegrounds for the MSP and state-supported quieter Salafists. The MSP’s ideological grip, according to sociologist Mohamed Merzouk, extends overwhelmingly to university towns, wherein associative life and group activity are virtually inescapable, and further where the structure of the dorm itself has been conducive to systematic congregation and MSP (and Salafist) recruitment. The MSP and the Salafists compete not only for spatial control (mosques, prayer rooms, and dorms), but also for brokering positions...
in dorms’ administrative proceedings and symbolic positions as prime religious influencers over the student population. As they gradually became de facto players in the management of the residences, the MSP members saw to programmatic changes (in conferences, library books, posters) toward devotion to religion and faith.

Here we see why a political contender might opt for cooptation. Knowing that the political environment was hostile to more profound antisystem opposition, the party wing had opted for a strategy of loyalism, moderation, and cooperation. This less perilous option eventually conferred it some latitude (from the state) in its associational activity. With subversion out of the question, the MSP circumvented the limitations of the formal political arena instead by working through less-controlled associational avenues like the Muslim Scouts and the university spaces. The MSP was ultimately able to: encroach on the very mechanisms the state used to monopolize cultural, religious, and political codes; expedite recruitment into the movement at a time when the party base was hemorrhaging; and meet the party’s ideological mandate of incremental, bottom-up Islamization.

Muslim Brotherhood Branch

IN NAHNHA’S YEARS AS AN ARABIC PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ALGIERS, many of his colleagues were from the east, chiefly Egypt—and many were members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Significantly influenced by their precepts, Nahnah made several long visits to Egypt, after which he returned to Algeria to lay the foundations for his movement. The party he later formed adopted the Brotherhood’s organizational model and some of its religious interpretation. It adopted to a less obvious extent, the Brotherhood’s stated commitment to a pan-Islamic state with Shari’a as the basis for political and social conduct, and the parameters in the interim, for engaging with “secular entities.”

But the struggle against French colonial forces and later against “imported” extremism together bolstered the requirement of indigeneity and hypernationalism, and made being viewed as a foreign current profoundly hazardous for movements, political groups and individuals alike. Algerians view the *ayad kharijyyat*—the notion of a meddling foreign hand—with a collective (and institutionalized) anguish. And allegations of influence under such a hand—whether Saudi Arabia and Egypt in decades past, or Qatar and Iran more contemporarily—have especially been weaponized against Islamists in Algeria. To avert suspicions of extra-nationalist loyalty, the MSP often oscillates between emphasizing and downplaying its ties to the transnational Muslim Brotherhood, as well as broader discourses on the “global umma.”

To be sure, in private, party leaders often allude to transnationalism with an air of “if only” or “in an ideal world,” where notions of Algerian religious indigeneity are expressly interrogated. As one former MSP spokesperson put it:

Nahnah could not subscribe to the Jaza’ri ideology, we cannot Algerianize our faith. This is consistent with the thought of the Ikhawan. Islam is not Algerian, Tunisian or Egyptian. Islam is universal and Algeria cannot be a reference for Islam.

The MSP’s young ranks, for their part, appear to truly wrestle with this paradox, and can be observed constantly balancing and negotiating their notions of Islam and the umma as in fact border-transcending, and the requirement of algérianité. Thus, the movement’s appeals to indigeneity—and occasional homages to foundational Islamic thinkers who emphasized Algerian religious particularity—are probably more than just acquiescence to the state’s core principles of sovereignty.

For some readers, the spokesperson’s statement validates the trope of Islamists seeking ascendancy only to abolish the nation-state and consoldate the umma. But while MSP leaders often abstractly praise transcending tribe, modern borders, and other man-made constructions, they have never moved to actualize these notions. Instead, pan-Islamic aspirations are dismissed as irrelevant to the context in which they operate day-to-day. The idea of abolishing borders is described as far too lofty to warrant serious discussion, and as something that distracts from more pressing domestic issues for the movement.

Likewise, while the MSP has a more abstract affinity for and solidarity with the broader Muslim Brotherhood, various factors inform the careful ways the MSP engages its foreign Brotherhood counterparts. For instance, inspired by the successes of Tunisia’s Ennahda party, the MSP advertises the positive relationship it has with Ennahda, and it has likewise explored shedding the “Islamist” label (as Ennahda has done) as unreflective of its evolving ethos.

With regards to Egypt, while the MSP has maintained that the 2013 coup was a miscarriage of democracy by the deep state, it has restrained its rhetoric about the Sisi regime, which enjoys a generally positive relationship with the Algerian government with shared interests in military hegemony and in curbing political Islam.

The MSP’s links to Palestine’s HAMAS have been important for its credibility...
The Rise of Salafism

THE PARTISAN MSP IS NOT THE ONLY ISLAMIC TENDENCY AFFECTED BY THE antipathy to parties and political Islam in Algeria. Neither a state-created body nor a state-sanctioned party, quietist Salafism—also known as Salafiyya 'ulama, or scholarly/scientific Salafism—has become an appealing alternative to youth in search of more “authentic” spiritual outlets. And unlike Brotherhood-based parties, young followers need not spend decades climbing party hierarchy. Salafism first rose in Algeria in the 1900s (indeed, Ben Badis44 was a Salafist), and then it returned again in the 1980s. Like the Islamist parties, the Salafist movement became suspect during and immediately after the Black Decade. Soon, however, quietist Salafists turned to media (i.e. internet and satellite channels) instead of the street to revamp their image, to differentiate themselves from both the political and/or jihadist Islamist elements then abounding in the country, and to recover pre-conflict levels of support.

Focusing almost entirely on da‘wa, the quietist Salafists benefit from an implicit arrangement with the state that is premised on their disavowal of partisan aspiration. Their reasons for rejecting any form of political participation are not necessarily strategic, but based on a religious imperative that considers modern political systems to be bida’ (heretical innovation). “Quietist” Salafists are therefore seen as unthreatening to the political status quo, and are tacitly encouraged by the state as a potential wedge against political Islam and religious parties. Their avoidance of partisanship is preferred to the more overtly political impetuses animating the latter.

This arrangement has allowed Salafists to, informally, assume control of a sizeable portion of the country’s mosques despite government funding, oversight, and the presence of state monitors. Some theories suggest that there was an unwritten deal between Salafist movement leaders and the military in the late 1990s to convince insurgents to lay down their arms and declare a ceasefire. This won the Salafis favor with the army, allowing them to expand.

Quietist Salafists have been able to generate their own commercial and patronage networks, and open their own schools. Not unlike the MSP’s associational wings, Salafists have played a growing role in Islamizing Algerian society. They dominate the hanut (small-shop) scene in the urban areas, where they are able, for example, to pressure fellow shopkeepers not to sell alcohol or tobacco. In 2010, Salafists demonstrated against a state plan to have veiled women remove headscarves in passport photographs.46 In exchange for their tacit support of the regime, they have more recently held increasing unseen sway over religious policy—one recent example, among many, being the crackdown47 on members of the Ahmadi sect that Salafists denounced as Shiite encroachment.48

Preachers like the popular Sheikh Ali Ferkous, who has a large following out of the Kouba neighborhood in Algiers, and “teleevangelists” like now-celebrity Sheikh Chemseddine Al-Djazairi (nicknamed Chemsou),49 all belong to this quietist trend and are popular on television and radio. Chemsou’s well-known show “Nsahouni” (Counsel Me) discusses a range of conservative topics, but what he, Ferkous, and other preachers often do not broach is politics, save for the occasionally implicit support given to the aging President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and the security services.

Many domestic experts see this alliance of convenience between Salafis and the state as potentially hazardous to the religious and social balance, particularly if Salafis become too empowered or large in number. Because they broadly emphasize a strict and sometimes literalist adherence to the traditions of the Salaf, some observers worry members may be more easily susceptible to other known among its supporters. With implicit support from the Algerian government, which is more staunchly and openly pro-Palestine than its neighbors, the MSP plays up its relations with HAMAS, including by providing aid and moral support. The MSP even built the Mahfoud Nahnah High School in Gaza, named after MSP’s founder. As the situation in Gaza is important to many Algerians, playing up links to HAMAS is also an essential recruitment tool for the MSP. Abdellah Youssi was the “Official Responsible for the Issue of Palestine,” for the Blida commune branch—a titled position that existed in all province- and commune-level MSP branches. According to Youssi, “Hamas and MSP are the same movement, we are Hamas Algeria, they are Hamas Palestine. And Palestine is arduha [our land].”44

The wider MSP still holds up Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) as the ultimate model of modern Islamist governance, despite the AKP’s dramatic democratic regressions. MSP president Abderrazak Mokri is widely known to admire President Erdogan, and claims more ideological proximity to the AKP than to the flagship Brotherhood movement in Egypt. Indeed, Mokri in 2012 modeled the aforementioned youth leadership-training program, Jil Tarjih, off the same program he observed in the AKP. Several other MSP leaders have defended the results of the April 16, 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum, simply as the “will of the people” in interviews with the author.
Salafi doctrines that do endorse subversion or violence. Others are concerned that Salafis are responsible for funneling Wahhabi ideology into the country. This is far from ideal for the Algerian government, although at the moment the state appears reticent to clamp down on the religious freedoms of such a pervasive tendency—opting for strategic management rather than an eradicateur approach.

**Sufi Brotherhoods**

**Like the Salafis, Sufi brotherhoods have come to have a larger political function in Algeria despite their outwardly apolitical character. Many play important roles in how the state attempts to manage political Islam and to maintain a monopoly over religious symbolism and power. This has not always been the case. In the past, traditional Sufi brotherhoods have been besieged, seen, especially during the Boughedène era, as threats to state consolidation, state Islam, the societal fabric, and modernizing policies. The shift from their violent repression to their cooption and utilization occurred under President Bouteflika for several reasons.**

First, many contemporary approaches in Algeria and elsewhere to countering Islamist extremism have cast Sufi brotherhoods as home-grown bulwarks whose meditation and mysticism can provide a “moderate” counterbalance to “imported” extremist ideology. In Algeria, this strategy was originally driven chiefly by domestic interests. Now, as international counterterrorism cooperation has become the key axis for Algerian engagement with the U.S. and EU, Sufi mysticism has increasingly been promoted as the panacea against extremist ideologies. Through this, the Algerian government has tried to position itself vis-à-vis its Western allies as uniquely suited to handle the ideological drivers of terror and as a voice of moderate Islam. Of course, these dynamics are not unique to Algeria; Morocco and Tunisia, among many others, have also pursued similar Sufi promotion policies in tandem.

As a result, state authorities have increasingly taken on Sufis as a loyal ally against political Islam and “foreign” Wahhabi ideology. Through this, Sufi networks have helped to expand state influence and reach. Especially in the rural areas where Sufi zaouïas still have some informal clout, they help legitimize state policies, mobilize voters, and in some cases even serve as channels for government services. As such, Sufi networks aid in boosting the legitimacy of the incumbent:

**Looking Ahead**

**Insofar as the public sees Salafis and Sufis as “apolitical” avenues for collective Islamic engagement and activism, they could further siphon popular support from the Islamist parties, and perhaps even bolster the FLN if they grow more empowered. People may become reticent about quietist Salafism, however, if its state-encouragement becomes more obvious. Such perceptions of political expediency and being extensions of the state have already somewhat sullied some of the Sufi zaouïas. Should the quietists Salafist grow too much for regime comfort, the latter will likely find a way to defang them. Right now, their expansion to the point where they might threaten the regime’s equilibrium will take time. They are locked into their dogmatic refutation of political subversion, and their evolution is closely state-monitored.**

In turn, Islamist parties like the MSP see the Salafi movement and Sufi brotherhoods as two distinct threats. Among other things, Salafists threaten the MSP’s political expansion. When pious youth gravitate toward the Salafists, these potential recruits are removed altogether from the Islamist party market. The Salafist movement moreover has the capacity to galvanize devotees around a cause, a...
policy (though their social causes sometimes align with the MSP’s, e.g., on the family/women’s code, alcohol policy, etc.), and even political candidates—often in favor of the FLN. Thus, the contest between Salafists and Islamist parties is on display both in the rhetoric of their respective leaderships as well as in more informal spaces such as the aforementioned dorm-wars and in other da’wa efforts.

The vast majority of MSP individuals see Sufism as anathema to acceptable Islamic jurisprudence, and can often be heard deriding Sufi beliefs as folklore (though a few MSP Islamists do see Sufism as legitimate spiritual expression.) Of late however, instead of competing with Sufi influence—important in mobilizing voters—some MSP figures seek their blessings. While rare, some MSP members have joined zaouïas to get closer to regime interests—like Bouteflika. Also rare, still other Islamists join Sufi brotherhoods for more personal reasons. This suggests that MSP members adhere to religious traditions that are more eclectic than is commonly believed or let on by MSP members themselves.

Nowadays, in considering their formal political endeavors, Islamist parties have entered a period of recalculations. Empowered by the Arab uprisings that began in 2010, Mokri led the MSP’s departure from the coalition government in 2012 and formed the Islamist Green Alliance (Alliance de l’Algérie Verte, AAV) with Al-Nahda and Islah, an electoral bloc that for a time saw improved electoral numbers even in the face of breakaways.

But after four years of banal disagreements, conflicts of interest and MSP domination, the AAV was dissolved in January 2017. Ahead of the May 4, 2017 parliamentary elections, the Islamist parties announced unlikely new sets of electoral coalitions. The MSP announced a new alliance with its first, 2009 breakaway, Front for Change (FC) formed by defector Abdelmadjid Menasra—a plan in the works since both the MSP and FC suffered additional breakaway parties in 2012 and 2013. After again coming in third place in the parliamentary election and winning only 33 seats, the MSP-FC alliance refused to join the governing coalition, citing fraud, blank ballots, and discrepancies in the final tabulations. On July 22, 2017, in an extraordinary congress, Menasra became interim president. Meanwhile, another breakaway party from the MSP-FC allied with Djaballah’s Adala and MSP’s own former AAV partner, Al-Nahda.

Islamists have tried to present these electoral realignments as important strides toward reunification of the broader Islamist movement, but the rival electoral blocs have only reinforced the image of Islamist disunity, as they have actively competed with one another for the same electorate.

Back in 2014, under Mokri’s leadership, the MSP co-founded the multi-party coalition, National Coordination for Liberties and Democratic Transition (CNLTD)—a miscellany of Islamist parties, secular Berberist-oriented parties, the Workers’ Party and personalities from former governments. The bloc’s stated aim was to consolidate the opposition toward a consensus-based democratic transition, in direct response to Bouteflika’s controversial fourth mandate. The coalition aimed to effect national dialogue toward the introduction of freer elections, a system of government with checks and balances, and a new constitution. However, several important member parties defected, constrained by inter-party conflicts of interest, loss of credibility among the population, and apparently strangled by the MSP’s hegemony within the bloc.

Meanwhile, the MSP’s focus on da’wa endeavors and the associational sphere has allowed it to deal with both structural and ideational closures in political opportunity, and to compete informally with state power and presence. MSP president Mokri has also since 2012 reclaimed lost bases by traveling the country, whipping up support, and launching new party satellites and programs. But the MSP should manage expectations that these efforts will have immediate formal, electoral returns, especially as they eye the fall 2017 municipal elections with hope. While the party cries election fraud—which evidence supports—the ongoing crisis within MSP leadership cadres doesn’t help, as the likes of Boujerra Soltani and Abderrahmane Saïdi, who oppose Mokri and Menasra’s methods, hardly conceal their wishes to bring the MSP closer to the regime. The ideationally disjointed state of the country’s Islamist actors, the explosion of and divisions among indistinguishable Islamist micro-parties, the public’s progressively worsening view of the partisan and election process, compounded by a potential ascendance of Salafism and Sufism, could together continue to erode numbers for the parties.

So, Who Are the “Islamists”?

ALGERIANS’ “IMAGINED COMMUNITY” AND NATIONAL IDENTITY CONTINUES to be one bound, in part, by entrenched narratives of a shared religious background and history. And, important shifts in religious attitudes, expression and behavior are underway. By many accounts, Algerian society is increasingly “Islamizing,” despite the (apparent) collective disdain for Islamism. This is not to say Algerians are any more religious/spiritual than a decade ago, rather that outward displays of piety are of growing significance. Public attitudes are growing more socially conservative, to the extent that even the wider political class and members
of the (non-Islamist) nationalist centrist parties have been progressively more conspicuous in their displays. Whether this is the result of: the success of the aforementioned “extra-institutional” undertakings of the Islamist parties; of permutation of quietist Salafists’ doctrine backed tacitly by the state; of ubiquitous foreign religious channels; residual influence from the state-sponsored project of Islamic identity promotion and Arabization in the 1970s and 80s; or simply an organic cultural shift arising from new articulations of individual and group identity; or a combination of the above, is being critically debated.

Surely however, the understudied Algerian case compels us to rethink a few concepts. The first is the “collective” nature of Islamism. To be sure, members of a group share various interests due to what Asef Bayat calls the “imagined solidarity” required to galvanize a movement. But the express soul-searching among Islamist party ranks—reflective of the broader national/collective/personal identity struggles among youth and their grievances regarding both Islamism and parties—alongside differing and often competing incentive structures and allegiances among various ranking members, suggest that highly-individualized and personal factors more often shape Islamist preferences. Instead, too much weight is given to the concept, particularly in policy circles, that Islamist movements are necessarily coherent or bound by a single, defined mission.

The second concept that needs rethinking is that of political cooptation. Where state cooptation is usually imagined as something that is passively received, it can in fact be agentive. The literature on cooptation tends to focus disproportionately on the political benefits accruing to the incumbent authoritarian, casting the process as purely zero-sum. However, by vacillating between submitting to the state in certain public and formal institutions, and contesting it in certain extra-institutional or associational realms, Islamist parties in Algeria have retained some agency—as we have seen, in some spaces even disrupting power asymmetries—over the course of their incorporation.

Finally, the case of Algeria (indeed it is not the only one) pushes us to reconsider what constitutes Islamism. It feels counterintuitive to characterize quietist Salafists and Sufi brotherhoods as “Islamist” per its conventional definitions, since for them politics (often, though not always) are a means to secure their religious and ideological ends, as opposed to the other way around. For the quietist Salafis, capturing the state truly seems not to be the end goal. But, as there is no “politics” without a polity, such groups are nevertheless effecting changes in the state even if they don’t actively confront it, or try to contest or seize it; their activities shape the electorate, its social and political preferences, and by extension, the political/policy milieu. Thus, when the Algerian case is cast as another example of the “failure of Islamism,” it elides the informal spaces where contestations of political-religious authority occur. Islamism is far from dead in Algeria; it may change shape yet in the years to come, but it will remain a fixture in Algerian social and political life.

NOTES

2. This paper is based on interviews I conducted from 2015 to 2017 with leading figures in the MSP and successive parties, as well additional interviews and observing members of the rank and file from 2015 to 2016, as well as Salafi youth and young members of Sufi brotherhoods. I also analyzed newspaper archives from the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s.
3. Ben Badis founded the famed Algerian Association of Muslim Ulema (AUMA) which emphasized the need to return to an authentic Algerian Muslim way of life that would empower native Algerians and effect progress—a goal the AUMA and Ben Badis held as inextricable from reclaiming an Algerian nation. Indeed, Ben Badis did not originally take issue with French colonial presence, but rather its ownership of Muslim patrimony and management of Muslim institutions; despite maintaining it was chiefly cultural/religious, AUMA’s demands were highly political, which gave way to more subversive tendencies within the organization whose subsequent movement empowered the ensuing Algerian na leagues Abdelatif Soltani and Ahmed Sahnoun. Ibrahimi was critical of the government’s ideological and policy decisions since independence and denounced what he saw as its departure from the Islamic principles enshrined in the bayan 1 Novembre and for which hundreds of thousands of Algerians died. He penned a letter to then president Ben Bella and company to embrace shura (consultation) for a more equal polity. For this he was condemned to house arrest where he remained until his death in 1965. For more on this, see Berkouk (1998).
5. Established in 1963, it combined the ideas of Ben Badis’ AUMA with influences external to Algeria, including some Muslim Brotherhood doctrine. Al-Qiyam was banned after criticizing Egypt’s execution of Sayyid Qutb.
6. Many of these parties grew out of the eruption of religious and civic organizations that took place in the previous decade.
7. As well as to counter some rising Berberist and leftist opposition.

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12. Whether these two were the “true leaders” or simply the de facto faces of the movement at the time, is contested by today’s ex-FIS leadership now in exile in various parts of Europe and the United States.

13. There is plausible evidence that the Algerian military at this time carried out attacks on civilians under the guise of the hardline armed Islamist factions, precisely to build anti-Islamist sentiment and garner support for its eradicateur counter-terror approach.

14. Eradicateurs were the hardliners among the security, military and political apparatus who refused compromise with armed Islamist factions, refused negotiation with their leaders, and argued they should be dealt with only by forceful elimination. This is in contrast to the “conciliateurs” (sometimes called dialoguistes) who promoted national dialogue and reconciliation.

15. One must also qualify the “unanimity” of the apparent popular consensus that the 1992 coup was a positive development and that the population uniformly reviles the FIS. This narrative has been mediated by the Algerian regime, state media, and peers who circulate the same reinforcing notions, regardless of whether they actually believe them. Thus, many Algerians may feel inclined to conceal or falsify their opinions about the coup, the FIS, and other political preferences.

16. Andrea Liverani refers to this phenomenon as Algeria’s “hyperpluralism” in his 2008 work, Civil Society in Algeria: The Political Functions of Associational Life (Abingdon: Routledge.)


18. For more on this reconstitution, and the contemporary power contests between the executive and the military nodes of the Pouvoir, see Vish Sakthivel, “As the Bouteflika Era Ends, Crisis or Continuity for Algeria?” World Politics Review (October 2016), www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/20203/as-the-bouteflika-era-ends-crisis-or-continuity-for-algeria.

19. Before the 1990s conflict, the state had far more legitimacy, using aphorisms, religious practice, pledges of national allegiance and any participation in national/nationalistic as well as metaphysical tradition, cult of leadership, mythology, and other value systems to engender notions of state rujia (manliness).

20. The Concorde Civile announced by then-new president Abdelaziz Bouteflika—while controversial—absolved repentant Islamists involved in the conflict, reintegrated them into society (so long as they had not been accused of murder or rape), and effectively ended the war, with an 85 percent turnout and 98 percent voting in favor in the referendum.

21. An influential figure in the academic Islamic circles of the eastern region around Constantine, Djaballah galvanized the earliest followers and party cadres in this region, having less influence over the west or the south.

22. Then-secretary general Labbib Adami and his entourage looked to pursue incorporation into the government, to seek cabinets by allying with the RND party. At the 1998 party congress, Adami was elected as party president, ejecting Djaballah, who in 1999, founded Islah in an effort to recreate the party with a sort of oppositional virginity, and continue on his path of moderate non-participation.

23. Djaballah founded his third party, al-Adala after he was jettisoned again in 2007 from Islah by its secretary general, Djahid Younsi (again, not without encouragement from the deep state). After this, Islah has struggled to attract support in the absence of Djaballah’s cachet. Unlike Nahnah, Djaballah perhaps suffered having not generated the same cult of loyalty, nor did he have the gravitas of the same venerated death that would hold future cadres fast to his ideology.

24. This refers to the strain of Djaballah’s Brotherhood-based doctrine which has its origins in the eastern region of Algeria, around Constantine and Skikda.

25. At one point the new Islah party did so well that in 2002, it displaced the MSP as Algeria’s leading Islamist group—a development not lacking the regime’s encouragement—in parliament winning 43 seats out 389, versus the MSP’s 38 seats. Some understood this to be the Islamist electorate’s rewarding of Djaballah’s thus far principled non-participation, which had grown wary of the MSP’s slow cooptation. This compounded the MSP’s already lesser role to the FLN and the RND in the coalition. In 2007, however, the MSP rose to 52 seats, again dislodging rival Islamist al-Islah, following that party’s implosion.

26. Belmehdi’s role continues to be contested—while some hold he was indeed a co-founder, others within the party allege he was too young to be as versed as Nahnah and Bouslimani and was simply “in the room,” when decisions were made regarding the movement’s direction.

27. But this of course is a matter of discourse. In fact, many of the more moderate/nationalist elements within the FIS were formed of individuals from “Jazara,” (the “Algerians”), who were influenced by Islamic thinker Malek Bennabi, who held that Algerian society, Islamist or otherwise, was too fixated on adopting foreign models, misguided as they ignored the spiritual foundations of their own society. They reject the “Jazara” label however, as it was used pejoratively by the MSP’s Mahfoud Nahnah, who in fact disliked their promotion of Algerian religious particularity and their rejection of Eastern, pan-Islamic notions.

28. OJAL, the Organization of Free Algerian Youth, a violent, vigilante anti-Islamist militia—believed by some to be a front for the DRS to slaughter Islamists (and suspected Islamists) with impunity—also claimed responsibility for his murder. The DRS itself is also sometimes thought to have been involved, although this remains very difficult to corroborate among the many conspiracy theories that abound on such topics.

29. These terms “marhali, tadriji” are used by Nahnah himself in interviews on his group’s goals.
30. Bouteflika upon re-election in 2004 planned to amend the 1984 Family Code to enhance women’s rights in the issues of divorce, citizenship, marital guardianship (wali), custody following a divorce, inheritance, and in polygamy, after years of criticism by feminist groups and secular parties calling for it to be in greater accordance with international norms. However, when amendments were ultimately passed in March 2005, reforms were far more restrained than in initial proposals (leading many feminists to criticize it as chiefly cosmetic and intended for international audiences). They were seen as concessions to Islamist parties whose approval Bouteflika sought on the forthcoming Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation in September 2005. Indeed, the Charter was a substantially larger priority for the state than the liberalization of the laws concerning women.

31. In 1996, the state looked to scale back some party liberties—framed as having originally imperiled the state. A constitutional amendment went into effect in November 2016, and among its many provisos, was a stipulation on voting and campaign laws in the revised Article 42: “political parties may not be founded on a religious, linguistic, racial, gender, corporatist or regionalist basis. Political parties may not resort to partisan propaganda on the elements mentioned.”

32. MSP vice-president and MP, Boujerra Soltani, was implicated in several scandals, the most sordid in 2003 where approximately USD$1,500,000,000 worth of public funds (as well as housing and land) were embezzled through Rafik Khalifa’s private investment bank. Soltani exploited his position as Minister of Labor and Social Security to approve the government-run social security funds to invest 10 billion Algerian dinars in Khalifa’s bank, marking one of its largest transactions ever. The testimonies among the hundreds accused of investing public monies to generate kick-back, implicated Soltani as well as the erstwhile head of the powerful General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA). See “Le point du samedi: L’éthique à l’épreuve de la corruption” El Watan, May 22, 2005, and “Algérie: procès de Rafik Khalifa, acte II” Jeune Afrique, April 1, 2013.

33. Indeed, instead of occurring as a real procedural delineation as is the intention, the distinction is more a syntactic sleight of hand: numerous members and leaders of the MSP refer to it as ‘’haraka” even when referring to its more ostensible politicking: the party’s parliamentary participation, in its involvement in the Green Alliance, and other opposition umbrella movements.

34. Or state-linked interests.


36. Egyptian founder of the flagship Muslim Brotherhood in 1928.


39. The MSP has a rigid organizational hierarchy. Some local and province level follows this more strictly than others. At the base of the pyramid is the individual (fâni), followed by a family (’ousra) comprised of about seven persons under the authority of an educator (mhourabî), whose role is to conduct the group prayers and study sessions. Above the ’ousra, is the mujmu’a (group) consisting of between five and eight ’ousras. Between two and four mujmu’a at come under the maktab-beladi (the commune-level bureau), the official local headquarters of the party. The mhourabî is typically a member of the maktab beladi, beyond which is the maktab wilayî (the province-level bureau).

40. The term “main étrangère” in French is also common.

41. Influenced by the thinker Malek Bennabi who favored focus on indigenous spiritually, the Jazara were typically elite, highly educated, often rich, and intellectually versed in the Quran, unlike the more demagogic Belhadjies of the FIS. They aimed to “Algerianize” Islam without borrowing from external interpretations (Wahhabism in Saudi, or the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.) By some accounts, including those of some ex-members of the Jazara I interviewed, they were mistaken to enter the FIS.

42. Interview with Sid Ahmed Boull, former MP and former MSP spokesperson, Le Golfe, Algiers, October 22, 2015.

43. In fact, at the time of writing, the party itself has three region/tribe-based poles of power: Mokri from the Msila region (representing the camp focused on creating the semblance of opposition), that of Soltani leading the Tebessa region, and Saïdi from the center, (Algiers/Blida group) (the latter two wish to maintain their previous closeness to the state, retain access to ministries of interest, and leverage these interests to expand the party). Despite Mokri’s 2012 defeat of Soltani in the party election, Soltani and Saïdi retain substantial influence and veto, and lead their own sub-constituencies within the party. Indeed, many attribute Soltani’s electoral success at the 2008 party congress to regionalist mobilization within the party, with support stemming from the influential Nemamicha Brahia tribe of Chaouia Berbers from his home region of Tebessa.

44. Interview with Abdellah Yousfi, former Official for the Palestinian Issue, and president of Blida province branch, MSP Blida Province Headquarters, December 12, 2015.

45. Influenced by the Salafi movement in Tunisia, Ben Badis called for the purification of Islamic practice in Algeria toward a return to the original Muslim leaders (Salafî), which he, ironically used as a launch-pad to attack the French-administered official imams. He soon after founded the AUMA (see endnote 3).


48. Some observers believe this crackdown is opportunistic, serving to distract from the economic crisis.

49. Previously named Chemseddine Bouroubi, he once headed up an independent, successful,
The Origins and Ascendancy of Iraq’s Shiite Militias

By Ranj Alaaldin

Militant organizations have proliferated in Iraq since the fall of the Baathist regime in 2003. Of these, the Shiite militias in particular remain a misunderstood phenomenon. They have been called everything from Iranian proxies and Iraqi nationalists to state-builders and terrorists. Shiite militias emerged from the ruins of post-2003 Iraq to acquire considerable power. Their multiple identities have been a challenge for analysts and policymakers, as they not only overlap and interact with the Iraqi state and society, but include both Iranian proxies as well as militias that deride Iran’s interference in Iraq’s affairs. The war in Syria, where Shiite militias—under Iranian supervision—have shifted the balance of power in the Assad regime’s favor has further compounded the challenge they pose. Indeed, across the region, Iran has exploited instability to establish, empower, and entrench its proxy organizations—including some of these militias—as it attempts to shape the future of the region.

Militant organizations have proliferated in Iraq since the fall of the Baathist regime in 2003. Of these, the Shiite militias in particular remain a misunderstood phenomenon. They have been called everything from Iranian proxies and Iraqi nationalists to state-builders and terrorists. Shiite militias emerged from the ruins of post-2003 Iraq to acquire considerable power. Their multiple identities have been a challenge for analysts and policymakers, as they not only overlap and interact with the Iraqi state and society, but include both Iranian proxies as well as militias that deride Iran’s interference in Iraq’s affairs. The war in Syria, where Shiite militias—under Iranian supervision—have shifted the balance of power in the Assad regime’s favor has further compounded the challenge they pose. Indeed, across the region, Iran has exploited instability to establish, empower, and entrench its proxy organizations—including some of these militias—as it attempts to shape the future of the region.

Shiite militias have a complicated and multi-faceted relationship with the Iraqi state and society. Some are offshoots of Iraqi Shiite opposition groups that opposed the former Baathist regime for decades. Many of these have extensive support bases and legitimacy and enjoy extensive ties to the Shiite religious establishment, or the marja’iyya, which provides them with considerable authority. Some are autonomous,
whilst others are state-aligned and heavily entrenched within the government; some militia leaders have even held ministerial posts.

The political, social and religious characteristics of Iraq’s Shiite militias—together with their entrenchment in or capacity to reject the state—distinguish them from other Iraqi armed groups. As a whole, these militias have become enormously powerful, and they will have far-reaching implications for Iraq’s reconstruction and its future as a unitary state, including on the relations between Iraq’s different ethnic and religious components. At the same time, these militias are not unified but exist along a broad spectrum; they have varying relations to the state, differing ideological orientations, and many of them are not simply criminal organizations or proxies of Iran. Understanding these differences will be crucial if foreign countries are to help Iraq survive.

### Shiite Activism in Iraq

HISTORICALLY, THE SHIITE COMMUNITY IN IRAQ HAS BEEN SITUATED ALONG ideological and political lines, family, class and tribe. The Shiite community is not a homogenous grouping but a loose “cultural designation, which may differentiate a certain group from another in religious terms but never specifies social, cultural (not to mention) differentiated aspects within this ‘group’ itself.”1 Shiism is a complex phenomenon that can be political as much as it can be theological and philosophical. Historically, even under the Baathist regime, there was never a distinct Shiite political grouping and different Shiites engaged differently with the regime. Whilst Baathist repression created a polarization between the state and the Shiite community, particularly during the latter parts of the regime’s rule, the relationship was complicated by the different identities that comprised the Shiite community. This was evidenced during seminal periods in Iraqi history, such as the Iran-Iraq war and the 1991 Shiite uprising, when the southern Shiite tribes played a pivotal role in suppressing the revolt.

The historical origins of Iraq’s Shiite militias and Shiite mobilization more generally can be traced back to the 1950s, when the first Shiite socio-political movement in the modern state of Iraq was established. The Islamic Dawa Party, Iraq’s ruling party today, was founded in 1958 as a response to the political instability and tumult of the 1940s and 1950s. In this period, Iraq fell under heavy British influence and the region more broadly experienced widespread Arab nationalist and anti-colonial sentiments. Islamic movements, too, began to take shape in Iraq and the region. The Shiite activists that established the Dawa Party wanted to contest politics as part of an Islamic framework. Yet they had little in common with existing Islamic groups—such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb al-Tahrir—which limited numbers of Shi’ite members left as those groups retracted from pan-Islamic discourse and adopted sectarian undertones. The founding members of the Dawa Party had long-standing ambitions to establish a Shiite Islamic movement. In the early 1950s, Harakat al-Shabab al-Muslihi (Movement of Muslim Youth) was established in Najaf, only to be disbanded by 1954. Similarly, a group of Dawa Party founding members established the Ja’fari Party in 1952, only to meet resistance from the Shiite religious establishment and quickly disappear.2

It was the subsequent rise in prominence and influence of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) that drove Shiite political activism in Iraq, forcing even the traditionally quietist Shiite religious establishment—which historically rejected executive power and resisted sustained contestation of power—to help create and back the Dawa Party.3 To the dismay of the religious establishment, the vast majority of Shiites in Iraq were Communist and ICP members. This included sons and relatives of the ‘ulama. The ICP also appropriated Shiite religious discourse and symbolism. Shiism, a faith centered on social and political injustices, had enough common overlap with the ideals of communism for it to be instrumentalized by the ICP, particularly at a time when few other prominent parties advocated an “Iraq first” line and when other pan-Arab nationalistic parties had little appeal amongst Shiites.4

Unlike today’s Dawa Party, Shiite militia groups and other factions, the Dawa Party of the 1950s did not entirely see itself as a movement that aimed to capitalize on populist and sectarian sentiments within the Shiite community. Instead, the party saw itself as an intellectual movement that aimed for a revival of Islam and Shiite Islamic thought and doctrine. The ideological founder of the Dawa Party and its spiritual head, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, and other founding members found inspiration and guidance in the revivalist works of Hassan al-Bana and Sayyid Qutb. Like those leading Muslim Brotherhood scholars, al-Sadr had a longer-term Islamic revolutionary objective, and that an Islamic cultural revolution should precede any assumption of executive power.

The party added a nationalist current to its vision by combining its Shiite Islamic identity with an Iraqi identity. While the party did not envisage itself as a populist movement, it did nevertheless have significant basis in and interaction with the broader Shiite community. It was firmly entrenched in the communal...
and religious networks of the predominantly Shiite shrine cities and in Iraq’s southern hinterlands. Baqir al-Sadr, who was executed by the Baath regime in April 1980, believed in reaching out to the broader Shiite community by integrating Islam with modern socio-political and philosophical theories. Study circles were organized and Islamic libraries were established in local mosques, which effectively became recruiting points for the Dawa Party. Al-Sadr’s legacy came in making available Shiite studies to the masses, not just the privileged few.

The Rise of the Radical Shiite

In the 1960s, the Baathist regime used Iraq’s oil-wealth to placate the population, but this was tested by the emotive and mobilizing potential of Shiite communal sentiments and aspirations that the Baathist regime had long attempted to suppress. The deceptive calm of Baath rule was exposed by the 1979 Iranian revolution and the lesser-known 1977 Safar Intifada, often referred to by Iraqi Shiite activists as the “first Islamic revolution”—before the one in Iran. Safar took place in February 1977 during the annual commemorations of the fortieth day of the death of Hussein, known as the Arba’īn, which Shites commemorate by visiting the holy shrines forty days after the Day of Ashura. The Baathist regime banned pilgrimage to the shrines, but this was ignored and led to clashes between pilgrims (as well as other broader sections of the Shiite community) and the state. It was the first instance of large-scale Shiite mobilization against the Baathist regime and the first-time Iraq’s Shiite community proved that, where the environment and opportunities allowed for it, it could violently challenge and thus threaten Baathist rule.

Two years later, what has been described as the modern “surge of Shiism as a political force” burst forth in 1979 in Iran. Immediately after the Iranian revolution, hundreds of Iraqi Shiite activists and ordinary members of the public flocked to Baqir al-Sadr, whom by 1979 was on course to succeed Abu al-Qasim al-Kho’i as marja’ and, therefore, was set to acquire a powerful following and capacity to mobilize the Shiite population that would have seen him rival Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini. Shiite activists called on al-Sadr “to be their Iraqi Ayatollah Khomeini” and lead a revolt against the Baathist regime. Protests erupted in Baghdad and the predominantly Shiite provinces of the south. These were quickly suppressed by the regime and al-Sadr was arrested. That led to another wave of protests and upheaval known as the Rajab Intifada, which was also brutally suppressed and resulted in the detention, torturing and execution of thousands of suspected participants, sympathizers and Dawa Party members. A year later, the Dawa Party’s failed assassination attempt on Tariq al-‘Aziz, then deputy prime minister, precipitated al-Sadr’s demise. He was executed with his sister in 1980.

These episodes of contention and Baath Party repression remain firmly entrenched in Shiite collective memory in Iraq today. They often provide the basis for the symbolism and historical narrative deployed by contemporary Shiite militias, political factions and religious institutions to mobilize their supporters and swell their ranks. However, many of the fighters that comprise the various Shiite militia groups in Iraq today were children or not even born in the late 1970s. Instead, their collective memory and political consciousness has been more directly shaped by the experience of Baathist brutality and destitution in the 1990s.

After the U.S.-led international military campaign ended the Baathist regime’s occupation of Kuwait in 1991, Iraq’s Kurdish and Shiite movements launched a rebellion that sought to capitalize on a weakened Iraqi army and an apparent endorsement from then U.S. President George H.W. Bush. At its height, the rebellion controlled 14 of Iraq’s 18 provinces. Whilst the Kurds went on to maintain their control of Erbil, Dohuk and Sulaymaniah (the Kurds ceded control of Kirkuk to the Baathist regime as part of negotiations that followed the rebellion), the regime brutally crushed the Shiite uprising in the south. No U.S. support materialized as the regime’s indiscriminate crackdown on the population systematically arrested and killed tens of thousands of Shiites and destroyed Shiite shrines, centers of learning, towns and villages. According to eyewitness accounts, Baathist tanks were painted with messages like “No Shiites after today,” people were hanged from electric poles, and tanks ran over women and children and towed bodies through the streets.

From this horror and brutality emerged Mohammad Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr (Baqir al-Sadr’s cousin and student), the founder of the Sadrist movement that today, under the leadership of his son Muqtada, constitutes Iraq’s most powerful political movement. After al-Kho’i passed away in 1992, the Baathist regime endorsed Sadeq as his successor, against the consensus choice of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Sadeq al-Sadr was a useful candidate for the regime because of his nationalist and anti-Iranian rhetoric. He was an Arab Iraqi cleric and a staunch critic of what he described as the elitist Iraqi Shiite opposition and clerical establishment. His endorsement by the regime also fractured the already weakened Shiite opposition. Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim, the head of Shiite opposition group the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI), now called...
the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), denounced the relationship between the Baath regime and Sadeq al-Sadr, proclaiming that “Ayatollah Sadr himself knows that he is not worthy of this position, and he has accepted this position out of fear of the Iraqi Government and under pressure.”

Sadeq al-Sadr attacked his exiled Shiite counterparts for their elitism but at the same time offered advice and counselling to those suffering from Baathist rule and economic hardship. His weekly sermons helped galvanize the masses and provided an outlet for grievances and discontent for a voiceless Shiite underclass. After taking control of the ‘hawza in the early 1990s, he extended his network of representatives and began to send emissaries to all Shiite areas of Iraq, paying attention to the poor and to the clans and tribes. This included the hinterlands of the south, such as the Marshes, which were notorious for criminals and disease. By the 1990s, the mantle of Shiite leadership effectively passed to Sadeq al-Sadr and the mantle of resistance to Iraq’s Shiite underclass. Sadeq al-Sadr and his followers thus filled the lacuna that was left by the intellectuals, technocrats and other middle-class Shiites forced underground, imprisoned, executed or opposing the Baathist regime—with Iranian and Western support—in exile.

Despite initially promoting Sadeq al-Sadr, the Baathists in 1999 assassinated the cleric after he had amassed a powerful following and began to criticize the regime. Throughout the 1990s, his most ardent of supporters and disciples, some of which command their own militias and networks today, clashed regularly. A twenty-something Qaiz al-Khazali, now head of the powerful militia group Asaib al-Haq and a former deputy to Muqtada al-Sadr, was mentored by Sadeq al-Sadr. Interviews suggest that al-Khazali won Sadeq al-Sadr’s affection for his bravery, having once been the only volunteer willing to attend a secret meeting with the Baathist regime—with Iranian and Western support—in exile.

The Rise of the Militias

AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE BAATHIST REGIME IN 2003, THE SADRIST MOVEMENT formally established its own militia, known as the Jaysh al-Mahdi, or the Mahdi Army. The vast Shiite underclass needed protection, social services and leadership, and the Sadrist movement stepped into these gaps by reactivating Sadeq al-Sadr’s network. The movement established local offices and local security patrols as well as social and religious services. One representative of the Sadrist movement in Baghdad, for example, countered the criticisms targeted at the Sadrist movement—in particular its human rights abuses, sectarian atrocities and confrontations with coalition forces—on the basis that the organization’s activities and the creation of the Mahdi Army after 2003 was only symptomatic of the breakdown of the state and the sectarian turmoil and infighting that followed. Indeed, in addition to combating Arab Sunni insurgent groups, the Mahdi Army has also had to combat its rivals within the Shiite political class, including the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and the Badr Brigade (established in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq war), as well as the Islamic Dawa Party.

In the course of the U.S. occupation, the Mahdi Army’s ranks of supporters, members and fighters swelled, particularly as sectarian conflict intensified and discontent towards the occupation grew out of frustration towards the lack of security and basic services. However, the movement was ill-prepared for the greater responsibility that came with greater power. It suffered the twin burden of administration and resistance against Western forces, Arab Sunni militants and their so-called “elitist” Shiite rivals. What was once a movement bound to Sadeq al-Sadr and constrained by a connective nexus with the Baathist regime and sensitive socio-cultural, tribal arrangements in the 1990s subsequently started to divide and fracture.

The toppling of the Baathist regime dramatically altered the configurations of power and authority within the Shiite underclass. Splinter groups emerged from what was a vast, grass-roots organization mobilized around Muqtada al-Sadr’s leadership but that, nevertheless, was operationally decentralized.
These splinter groups acquired their own loyal support bases at the local level, their own resources, a willing patron in Iran and years’ worth of experience combating Western forces. These manifested in Asaib ahl al-Haq (AAH), whose leadership fell out with Muqtada over a series of operational and political disputes. Qais al-Khazali, the head of AAH and former student of Sadeq al-Sadr, sees himself as the rightful heir to the Sadrist movement and the true champion of the Shiite underclass. His background as a protégée of Sadeq al-Sadr and one of the figures that kept the movement functioning after his demise placed him at the pinnacle of the movement, even overshadowing Muqtada, who had little interest in politics in his youth and did not undergo clerical studies as al-Khazali did. According to a senior advisor to Muqtada al-Sadr, Qais al-Khazali and AAH emerged from the special operations unit within the Mahdi Army. After Khazali was arrested by U.S. forces in 2007 for an attack on an Iraqi government compound in Karbala that killed five American soldiers, Khazali used a kidnapped British consultant as a bargaining chip to win his own release. The advisor I interviewed, a lawyer, was ordered by Muqtada to represent Khazali. When Khazali negotiated the release of the Briton, which Muqtada opposed on the premise that his organization did not negotiate with the occupying forces, an irreparable split emerged between the two. Khazali was dismissed from the Sadrist movement by Muqtada and went directly to Iran, where he was embraced by the Iranian regime and subsequently established Asaib ahl al-Haq. As explained below, the organization has developed into a socio-cultural movement and a fully integrated component of Iraq’s post-2003 political system.

Popular Mobilization Forces

In June 2014, the collapse of the Iraqi army and ISIS’ seizure of Mosul prompted Grand Ayatollah Sistani to issue a fatwa calling for a mobilization of Iraqis to defend the country from ISIS’ advance. Numerous Shiite militia groups that splintered from the Sadrist movement and its Mahdi Army militia, as well as many others, feature in the umbrella Shiite militia organization known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) established in response to Sistani’s fatwa. Three categories of militias amalgamated under the banner of the PMF: state-aligned militias, Iranian-aligned militias and “rebellious” militias.

The 2014 fatwa directly established the “state-aligned militias,” also known as the religious establishment or “Sistani militias.” Managed by the holy shrines under Ayatollah Sistani, these include the Imam Ali Brigade, Ali al-Akhbar Brigade, and the Abbas Division. Like Sistani, the fighters of these groups oppose Iranian encroachment into Iraqi affairs. Both ISCI’s Ashura Brigades and Sadr’s Peace Brigade have daily interactions and coordinate closely with the religious establishment militias. The Iran-backed militias, such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib Hezbollah, Sayyid al-Shuhada and others opportunistically exploited, with Iranian patronage, the chaos that followed the fall of the former regime and then, later, the emergence of ISIS and the collapse of the Iraq’s armed forces. These groups were established, empowered, and entrenched by Iran to exploit state fragility and sectarian conflict. With their ideological outlook founded in Shiite supremacism and combating Western imperialism, they have vehemently resisted both the Iraqi state and the U.S.-led coalition.

These actors are all uncompromisingly averse to working and engaging with the U.S., much like their Iranian sponsors. Conversely, the Badr Brigade, formed as the armed wing of ISCI in the 1980s but now functioning independently, has integrated into the post-2003 political system but also retains its capacity to function autonomously. Arguably Iraq’s most powerful militia, Badr exemplifies the multiple identities and complexities that define Iraq’s Shiite militia groups. The group has shown it can both engage with the international community—cooperating militarily with the U.S. and the West—while also maintaining strong ties to Iran—having been established by the Iranian regime during the Iran-Iraq War and been a major beneficiary of Iranian support post-2003. The organization has been heavily integrated into state security forces over the past decade and its head, Hadi al-Ameri, has held ministerial posts, as have other senior leaders. The organization also enjoys a monopoly over the police force and effectively controls its own province, Diyala, al-Ameri’s birthplace. Badr falls in a grey zone between state-alignment and autonomy.

Iraqis today refer to the Sadrist Movement’s Peace Brigades as the “rebellious” militias, because of their refusal to submit not only to Iran, but also to the federal government and religious establishment. Muqtada al-Sadr has oriented his organization around Iraqi nationalist sentiments and derided the Iran-aligned militias. In line with the true political outlook of his father and his followers, Muqtada’s supporters chanted anti-Iranian slogans and stormed the offices of the Dawa Party, ISCI and the Badr Brigade when they protested against the government in May 2016. Sadrists also joined forces with long-time rival ISCI—which commands the Ashura Brigades—to attack “brazen militias” not under the command of the Iraqi army.
Political Appeal and Entrenchment

Despite the fragmentation of the Sadrists’ movement and its support base after 2003, Shiite militia groups still tap into the same demographic of young, destitute, illiterate Shiites. This is a generation that has no memory of Iraq’s days of peaceful co-existence or its status as a commercial and intellectual hub, but instead remembers an Iraq of Baathist repression, bloody sectarian conflict and impoverishment. Historically dismissed as backward and illiterate (disparagingly referred to as the “mob” or شرعيت by the urban, educated middle-class Baghdadis, both Arab Sunnis and Shiites), this demographic fears the possibility of political and economic marginalization at the hands of their “elitist” Shiite counterparts as much as they do ISIS or other Arab Sunni groups. These militias believe they are continuing Sadeq al-Sadr’s legacy by catering to the needs of destitute Shiites against the targeting of the Shiite community by ISIS and other militant groups, as well as the predations of a corrupt and dysfunctional political elite. They see themselves as the rightful social and political leaders of the New Iraq.

Almost every militia group in Iraq will assert their legitimacy and popular base, describe themselves as socio-cultural or socio-political movements and will challenge any suggestion that they are militias. Moreover, Iraqi officials have expressed concern these militias will eventually transform themselves into socio-cultural actors and integrated components of the political system that will continue to weaken the Iraqi state from within.

For example, despite its violent history, over the past decade Asaib has projected itself as a socio-cultural movement engaged in the practice of state-building. Since its inception, Asaib has evolved into a nascent movement with its own social and religious activities, including operating medical facilities. It has offices in Baghdad and throughout the Shiite south. The group has adopted epistemological leanings in an effort to broaden its intellectual appeal to different strata of the Shiite community. It produces publications and is aligned with members of the hawza, as part of its intellectual outreach to different sections of the Shiite population.

It is of little surprise, therefore, that Shiite militia groups believe their political future lies within the Iraqi state. The November 2016 decision by the Iraqi parliament to approve a law that formally integrated the PMF into the security forces law, and their interactions with the state more generally, show that Shiite militias seek to defend and maintain existing territorial boundaries, albeit through the confines of revised or newly established institutions that adhere to their ambitions and worldview. It is not inevitable that these actors will shape the Iraqi state according to their own political and ideological values and, therefore, establish a new political order. However, some militia groups that started off as rag-tag forces established, equipped and trained by Iran have become fully integrated components of the political system and have been helped by members of the Shiite political class looking to capitalize on their ascendancy and capacity to commit acts of violence and human rights abuses with impunity. For example, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki co-opted Asaib ashl al-Haq during his premiership. He saw in the group an opportunity to weaken his fierce rival Muqtada and his Sadrists movement. Malaki thus provided Asaib al-Haq with bullet-proof four by fours, permits that enabled them to roam freely around Baghdad and the opportunity to contest elections in partnership with al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition. Al-Maliki even released all Asaib prisoners who were arrested and detained by the U.S. and Iraqi forces and allowed Asaib al-Haq to conduct an anti-American parade in 2012 to celebrate the U.S. withdrawal.

One of Iraq’s former National Security Ministers expressed fears that other similar groups, such as direct Iranian proxies like Kataib Hezbollah, Sayyid al-Shuhada and Saraya al-Khorasani, will also follow the path of Asaib and become fully entrenched within the political system. However, like officials within ISCI, he also confessed that there is little choice other than to accept and work with the militias that function autonomously from and challenge the state. They have faith in the capacity of existing institutions and socio-cultural dynamics to contain malevolent militia groups. The recently passed Hashd law is seen as a means to regulate their presence. A senior official within ISCI (which controls the 13,000 strong Ashura brigade militia), explained that the Hashd law represents an opportunity to regulate militias, as there may be limited alternatives in the short and medium-term. The official further explained that “we do not want the Hashd to become an alternative to the Iraqi military but instead we want it to support the military and Iraq’s security forces.”

Shiite militia groups, particularly Iran-aligned factions, still refuse to disarm and submit to civilian oversight. The Iraqi government, meanwhile, is unable to enforce the provisions of the Hashd law requiring that those militias disarm before, for example, contesting elections. This allows the militias to continue to have the best of both worlds: the power and resources that come with being autonomous actors and the opportunity to fleece state resources and weaponize patronage networks. When pressed on this point, one official asserted:
All fighters are Iraqi nationalists and it is the militia leaders who are pro-Iranian; we should avoid the over-generalization that the PMF is entirely pro-Iranian. Some of the [Iran-aligned] leaders took the weapons we were given by the U.S. and distributed them as they wished. There are concerns about these groups but we are working on solutions. In the end, our goal is to ensure it is the state that has a monopoly over violence but we all know within the Shiite establishment that it is ultimately only the religious establishment and the hawza that can disband or delegitimize the factions within the PMF. What we lack in fighting experience [compared to the Iran-aligned groups] we make up for with our numbers and nationalism.24

Indeed, Iran’s greatest weakness (and Iraq’s strength) is the strength of Iraqi identity and the Arab tribal values of Iraq’s Shiite militias, both of which have been central to Shiite political and clerical activism in Iraq. Shiite militias in general can be Shiite Islamist in their political and ideological outlook but at the same time adopt Iraqi nationalistic undertones; all militias position themselves as nationalists. Most, if not all, incorporate a combination of Iraqi nationalism and Shiite centric undertones into a broader narrative of resistance that is central to Shiite political and clerical activism in Iraq. Shiite militias in general can be Shiite Islamist in their political and ideological outlook but at the same time adopt Iraqi nationalistic undertones; all militias position themselves as nationalists. Most, if not all, incorporate a combination of Iraqi nationalism and Shiite centric undertones into a broader narrative of resistance that is central to Shiism itself.

While Iran-aligned militias and proxies openly support the Iranian revolutionary doctrine of wilayat-i faqih (the “Rule of the Jurist” doctrine that underpins post-1979 Iran’s system of governance) and embrace Ayatollah Khamenei as their political and spiritual leader, Iraq’s Shites have historically resisted the doctrine. Grand Ayatollah Sistani is Iraq’s strongest bulwark against Iran’s ideological encroachment into Iraq; the leading Shiite clergyman comes from the strand of Shiite doctrinal thought that does not envisage executive power for the clerics. He has called for a “civil state,” based on respect for the law and the constitution, human rights, and equality. Iran has heavily invested in consolidating its influence over the religious south through propaganda and financial resources. Najaf’s resistance to the doctrine is likely to continue even after Sistani’s passing. However, that does not mean the Shiite south will be able to resist the reach and influence of revolutionary Iran in coming decades, particularly if the Iran-aligned militias, through the symbolic power of the PMF, continue to try and shape and influence the fabric of the Iraqi society.25

As previously mentioned, the generation of fighters that comprise the Iranian-backed militias grew up in the 1990s. The political views and values of these mostly young, destitute Iraqi Shites were shaped by Sadeq al-Sadr, a fierce Iraqi nationalist who stressed the Shites’ Arab identity and saw Iran’s clerical rulers as his rivals. As a result, many militia fighters are not necessarily beholden to Iranian interests nor to exporting Iran’s wilayat-i faqih doctrine. In fact, many in all probability have little understanding of this doctrine and share little historical political and cultural overlap with their Iranian counterparts.

It is, therefore, ironic that Asaib al-Haq banners and imagery feature Khomeini or Ali Khameini, the Supreme Leader of Iran, given the historical tensions and differences these figures have had with Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr and his cousin, Sadeq al-Sadr. Khomeini spent a large part of his exile in Iraq during the 1960s and 1970s attacking his Najafi counterparts, becoming increasingly vocal and belligerent against the Najafi establishment, which rejected his doctrine and the notion of executive rule for the clerical establishment. Iraq’s major Shiite parties, the Dawa Party and ISCI have also had a difficult relationship with Iran. The Dawa Party has historically resisted Iranian influence and control, even withdrawing from SAIRI, the umbrella Shiite opposition council established by Iran in the 1980s because it refused to submit itself to Iranian control. Although ISCI supported Khomeini’s wilayat-i faqih doctrine in the 1980s, the party has since retracted from that position.

The Future

IRAQ CANNOT SURVIVE IF IT ENABLES THE RULE OF THE MILITIAS. CONCEDING power to these unaccountable armed groups will sustain the space in which violence and extremism flourishes and will almost certainly enable ISIS to resurrect itself in the future. Yet, the Shiite militia is a dynamic actor that is susceptible to the influences of local governing structures and communities that, unlike outside actors, can either nudge militias into abiding by human rights and international norms or push them to the margins. As Iraq started to stabilize after 2007, the political capital that these actors depended on became constrained. During the civil war in 2006 Iraq’s Shites community turned to these fighters for protection. But when the Iraqi army became more organized and the sectarian war abated, the lawlessness and violence for which these fighters were responsible, including their extortion of local businesses and engagement in petty crime, was no longer tolerated.

The institutionalization of the PMF was a long time coming. The organization has had long-standing interactions and overlaps with the Iraqi state and has

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worked with federal security forces during the course of the anti-ISIS campaign. Although some of its key components only nominally report to Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, officially the PMF was already a government-sanctioned force. Unless the international community dedicates itself to adding and committing to a coercive element that could potentially combat non-state aligned militias—for which there is no appetite at the moment—it will fall largely on political and economic measures to help contain these militias as well as constrain Iran's influence over them. Iran's influence is resilebte and reversible. Tehran has a checkered past with Iraq's Shiite community. Historical differences and divisions over politics, culture and religion make their relationship with Shiite militias and the Iraqi political class vulnerable on multiple fronts. Loyalties among the Shiite militias often shift, even among fighters belonging to hardline Iranian proxy groups. Furthermore, even though Dawa and ISCI backed Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, both groups consistently noted their desire to uphold the territorial integrity of their country. In their party publications, produced from the 1980s onward, they make territorial integrity and Iraqi nationalism key components of their vision for their country's future. After the 2003 toppling of the Baathist regime, the two parties began to distance themselves from Iran, much to Iran's dismay. Shiite militias that reject the Iraqi state, that foment instability or that reject conciliatory politics are also weaker than they appear. They are up against a population that could soon be discontented with militia rule, as it was after 2008 when sectarian conflict abated and militias established a mob-like culture. Policy-makers can leverage the divisions and positions amongst the PMF and the Shiite political class and community more generally. Engagement with state-aligned militias should be intensified. This includes the militias who answer to the religious establishment or Grand Ayatollah Sistani, who commands respect across the political class and community more generally. Engagement with state-aligned militias should be intensified. This includes the militias who answer to the religious establishment or Grand Ayatollah Sistani, who commands respect across the ethnic and religious spectrum, has historically opposed Iranian encroachment into Iraqi affairs and has criticized Iranian-backed Shiite militias for their atrocities. Pursuant to its military campaign against ISIS, the U.S. has, for too long, appeased and placated Iranian-backed Shiite militias that are complicit in sectarian atrocities, the deaths of thousands of Americans (and Iraqis) and has turned a blind eye to these actors’ integration into the Iraqi political system. However, as the dust now looks to be settling from the war on ISIS, the U.S. must choose between its friends and its enemies and can no longer sit on the fence in Iraq. A political order is emerging from the ruins of war in Syria and Iraq. America’s enemies are claiming their stake in the future of the region. Wherever the U.S. disengages and fails to claim its own stake in the future of the Middle East, its enemies will fill the gap.

NOTES

3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. The Safar Intifada took place in February 1977 during the annual commemorations of the fortieth day of the death of Hussein, known as the Arba’i in and is commemorated by visiting the holy shrines forty days after the Day of ‘Ashura. Pilgrimage to the shrines was banned but this was ignored and led to clashes between pilgrims (as well as other members of the Shi‘i community) and the state. Ra‘d al-Musawi, Intifadat Safar al-‘Id-dimiyya fi ‘Iraq [The Safar Intifada in Iraq], 2nd ed. (Qum: Amiyr al-Mu’mnin, 1983). See also Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, Third. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 216.
10. Ibid.

18. Advisor to Prime Minister al-Abadi, interview with the author, Baghdad, January 2017; interview with Advisor to the President, Baghdad, January 2017.


22. Interview with ISCI official, Baghdad, January 2017.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

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