Tabletop Exercise 2019: Security in Northeast Asia

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A tabletop exercise (TTX) was held at Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. from June 25–27, 2019. The TTX was modeled on the Taiwan Strait crisis, which occurred in 1995–96.

Exercise Purpose
The regional structure of Northeast Asia, including Taiwan, is very fragile. One reason is the presence of major military powers — the United States, China, and Russia — and major economic powers — the U.S., China, and Japan. Another is that China’s rapid economic development and military buildup in recent years, and new developments in North Korea, have contributed to instability.

This TTX, unlike a military exercise, was not held to pursue the “best answer.” Its purpose was to command a bird’s-eye view of the current situation in Northeast Asia; to acknowledge each party’s positions, views, and differences; to confront the “issue without an answer”; and to learn each party’s challenges.

See the Appendix for the full scenario and instructions used to conduct the TTX.

How the Exercise Was Organized
The participants represented five groups: Korea, Taiwan, Japan, the United States and China. The groups were made up mainly of retired flag and general officers from each country, and a China group composed of retired American military officers. The China group’s role was to act as a regional provocateur in order to challenge the other country teams, individually and collectively.

How the Exercise Played Out
The exercise consisted of multiple moves, each supposed to be taking place over a period lasting from about one to seven days. In each move, the parties first presented their issues in a plenary meeting. Afterwards, each party discussed its actions in a separate room before presenting them and receiving questions in a plenary meeting on the following move.

Prior to the moves, the Red team (China) expressed its discontent with the status quo and pointed out three major issues: 1) the free flow of oil; 2) the unification of Taiwan; and 3) territorial issues and the “militarization” of Japanese islands in the East China Sea. The Red team argued that the issues could be solved without the presence of the United States, and that U.S. intervention across the Pacific is unfair.

Move 1
To address these issues, China made a broad range of diplomatic and military moves:

- Had North Korea fire a ballistic missile, leveraging bilateral economic ties.
- Proposed establishment of a “Greater Asia Co-Prosperity System” composed of Pacific Rim states, except the U.S., to replace the modern Asian security order.
- Sent Chinese aircraft carriers and the bulk of the South Sea Fleet to the Malacca Strait to secure trade and the flow of supplies and appealing to ASEAN states to provide logistic support to the fleet.
- Took legal and diplomatic action in the UN to contest Japan’s “militarization” in the Ryukyu Islands and renewed territorial sovereignty disputes in international courts.
- Warned other states of economic retaliation if they intervene in internal affairs on the issue of unifying Taiwan.
- Encouraged other states to remove foreign citizens from Taiwan without using military assets in the event that anything happens during unification, which China announced it would complete by the end of the following month.
- Shot down an inactive U.S. commercial satellite in the next four hours to show its capabilities in space.
- Immediately established a no-fly zone 200 miles from the Chinese coast.

See the Appendix for the full scenario and instructions used to conduct the TTX.
Established a no-sail zone 250 miles east of Taiwan in five-to-ten days, when the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) completes mobilization of the North and East Sea Fleets.

Moderator Response
In response, one moderator noted that considering China’s refusal to adhere to the international tribunal’s rulings on the South China Sea, it is unrealistic to expect it to bring its territorial dispute to international courts. In addition, the moderator pointed out that there was no mention of Russia during China’s move 1, which also has a naval fleet in the region, and the moderator asked China to consider whether it can convince Russia to join its endeavors. As for oil shipments, one moderator questioned each team as to how operations would change if maritime trade and the flow of oil stopped.

Move 2
In response to an increased deterrence posture by the Blue teams (those groups representing Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and the U.S.) in move 1, China reiterated its position on Taiwan and took the following actions:

- Urged North Korea to shoot another ballistic missile, this time over South Korean airspace, and to mobilize forces near the demilitarized zone (DMZ). On the other hand, it informed South Korea that China would be favorably disposed to those who take friendly positions and announced it was ready to host peace talks between North and South Korea.
- Announced that it would convene a Pacific Peace Conference to discuss the regional order with Pacific Rim nations in three days.
- Announced that the South Sea Fleet would be deployed to the Malacca Strait in three days. China also stated that it would take responsibility for any damage done to merchant vessels in the Malacca Strait in order to encourage the free flow of traffic.
- Mentioned that it would be able to bring Russia onto its side using its economic relationship with Moscow. In return, China stated, it would respect Russian claims in the North Pacific, particularly the Northern Territories, where there is currently a territorial dispute between Russia and Japan.
- Mentioned that there was no problem with oil and other strategic reserves, since China’s Eurasian partners would provide energy resources and pipelines through the continental route.

Moderator Response
Following each team’s moves, the moderators commented on the rules of engagement of PLAN forces in the no-sail zone east of its coast and in the Malacca Strait, including how these forces will fire warning shots. Also, one moderator questioned whether China’s deployments on its aircraft carrier to the Malacca Strait would exclude the possibility of its being in the “no-sail zone” east of Taiwan.

Move 3
As the crisis continued, China took the following measures to pursue its interests and initial goals:

- Announced it had prevented North Korea from deploying a large number of units near the DMZ, but implying that it could not continue to do so if the crisis continued.
- Completed deployment of the bulk of its South Sea Fleet, including submarines and support ships, to the Malacca Strait. Its aircraft carrier was deployed in the West Philippine Sea to provide air cover.
- Continued to mobilize its North and East Sea Fleet to enforce its no-sail zone. China told other parties of its redlines in the crisis: that they must not accept reinforcements or support ships of any sort entering Taiwan.
- Announced it had convened a peace conference.
- Continued to fortify its artificial islands in the South China Sea, deploying anti-ship defense systems and strike fighters. It also threatened to occupy other territories.
occupied by other claimants, such as the Philippines and Vietnam.

- Threatened U.S. regional allies that if they allowed reinforcements and U.S. forces to deploy from their bases, it would not honor those “sanctuaries” in the rear.
- Attempted to disrupt and influence U.S. actions and the actions of U.S. allies through cyber operations and political warfare, in addition to military deployments and diplomatic moves.

Moderator Response
After the move, the moderator questioned the Red team about its deployment of minelayers in the scenario.

Chinese Actions (Morning of Day 2)
Prior to the fourth move, assumed to have taken place 15 days into the exercise, China announced it had landed special operations forces, marines, and paratroopers on the Japanese Senkaku, Miyako, and Ishigaki Islands. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) took further defensive postures in the area by deploying anti-aircraft batteries and anti-ship missiles on the islands and laying mines in nearby straits. The Chinese also took Japanese civilians hostage in the occupied islands and demanded that Japan accept the situation.

Move 4
In the final move, China stressed that its actions against the Japanese islands were solely between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Japan and urged other parties not to intervene. It threatened to attack U.S. bases that launched attacks against PRC or PLA forces and announced further measures:

- Declared a 150-mile no-fly, no-sail zone around the occupied islands without warning shots.
- Threatened to close the Lombok Strait and Malacca Strait if any further hostile actions were taken against PLA forces.
- Conducted cyberattacks against U.S. satellite, communications, and homeland installations as well as Japanese infrastructure.
- Massed Russian forces in the Northern Territories.

During the wrap-up session, the Red team revealed the objectives of its moves in the TTX. The first was to take the Japanese island chains southwest of Okinawa and adjacent to Taiwan to gain open-water access for Chinese forces. The second was to observe U.S. force deployment for future actions in the region. Third, the Red team wished to determine the viability of a U.S.-led Pacific coalition and prevent such a coalition from forming.
EXERCISE FINDINGS

Shared Viewpoints
It was clear to all participants, and even to the China group, that Chinese interventions affecting the territorial integrity of one or more of the other countries were regarded by all as hostile actions that were not acceptable and could not be tolerated.

Energy Security and Freedom of Navigation
All groups aside from China recognized the great importance of the sea lines of communication (SLOC), which assure freedom of navigation and delivery of oil and other commodities to the region.

There was, however, concern expressed by the Blue team groups that any blockade of transit would cause serious problems, especially disruption of energy supplies. For example, one of the moderators pointed out the risk of commercial vessels not being insured and the limited U.S. capacity to provide oil to Asian allies.

Participating teams expressed concerns about the status of strategic reserves, the impact tsunamis and earthquakes have had on Japanese nuclear power production, and the impact of Taiwan’s unilateral decision to shut down its nuclear-power production facilities.

Legal, Political, and Constitutional Issues
Each delegation was candid about legal, political, and constitutional issues that could hinder cooperation. One of the moderators raised the issue of freedom of action for U.S. forces in allied territories — including Korea, mainland Japan, and Okinawa — and potential domestic opposition within those countries.

All the parties seemed to rely on strong U.S. support to stabilize the region in the event of Chinese intervention, whether in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, or the Miyako Strait.

On the other hand, a moderator raised the issue of how the U.S. government should deal with Congress in such crises to ensure a smooth and rapid response. The parties recognized that the Miyako Strait is one of the few international waterways that China’s PLA Navy can use to gain access to the Pacific Ocean from the East China Sea. Japan expressed concern about the Ryukyu Islands, which it is in the first stages of fortifying, since China has been pushing sovereignty claims to Okinawa, the largest of the islands, and has been stirring up trouble urging the removal of U.S. forces.

Defense Resources
Considerable attention was given to the defense resources that the United States, Korea, Taiwan, and Japan could bring to bear in any crisis. One of the moderators commented on the importance of allies cooperating with the United States on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), given the need to cover vast areas of water during such a crisis. The ShinMaywa US-2 amphibious plane could play a role in those operations.

Command Coordination and Communication
There was recognition that the existing means of military-to-military communication was inadequate and that as a result, command coordination in a crisis would be quite difficult. Under current arrangements, it would be difficult to deconflict the parties’ operations on the land, at sea, and in the air in pursuit of common objectives.

All the parties thought that a common operational framework would be a step forward in assuring the common defense of the region.

Defense Arrangements with the United States
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan spoke of the importance of existing defense arrangements with the United States.
Japan’s defense treaty with the United States, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, originated at the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951 and was last amended in 1960. To a certain extent, this agreement is connected with the Japanese Constitution, which was approved with Washington’s support and limits the freedom of action of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces. Even so, Japan has shown some flexibility concerning the restraints on its military and where it can, has supported U.S. operations, including regional military exercises and an important upcoming bilateral exercise in Guam.

Though the moderators raised the issue of whether the treaty can be updated, this was not taken up at the TTX. Japan — along with the U.S. and other allies, including Britain, France, and Canada — is supporting assertions of freedom of passage, particularly in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.

South Korea also has a defense treaty with the United States, the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953. Operationally, this treaty has been supplemented multiple times. The U.S. maintains bases in South Korea and a joint command with Seoul. There is also a UN command in South Korea that is mostly focused on the North Korean threat. However, the Korean delegation made it clear that it is concerned about threats to transit and the impact on its oil reserves and ability to export globally.

Taiwan’s relations with the United States rest on the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which aims to promote peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific and provides the legal basis for the U.S. to supply Taiwan with defense materials.

On the other hand, the question of providing credible reassurance and commitment to Taiwan was an underlying issue during the TTX, and the moderators raised questions about how the U.S. could take specific measures for reassurance. Also, one of the moderators brought up the issue of the timing for invoking the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act if China attacked surrounding countries — this time the Japanese islands — but Taiwan itself was not directly under attack.

The parties all saw these agreements and legislation between the United States and Korea, Taiwan, and Japan as a possible framework for modernizing cooperation to assure that the regional balance of power and regional stability are preserved and to deter China.
RESULTS OF THE EXERCISE

The participants in the TTX do not make direct recommendations to governments. The information developed in the TTX will be passed on to the individual governments, along with whatever recommendations each delegation wishes to convey.

All the participants expressed the view that this first TTX was very successful but that much more needs to be understood and explored. They expressed a strong interest in holding a follow-up TTX to continue and deepen this process.

A unique and powerful factor in the success of the exercise was that it brought together military personnel and engendered new relationships. The participants’ interactions, both in formal sessions and in private exchanges, was extraordinarily important and will be beneficial to regional cooperation and stability.

Agreements Between TTX Participants and Hudson Institute

The participants agreed with Hudson Institute not to include the names of TTX members or their remarks in any official Hudson report or summary. They also agreed to allow each team to inspect those publications and to attach its own report.
Editor’s note: The text has been lightly edited for grammar

Ver. 2
June 25–27, 2019
At Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C.
Proposed Tabletop Exercise

Background
The tabletop exercise scenario is modeled on an updated version of the actual crisis that unfolded between 1995 and 1996 in the Taiwan Strait. This provides a point of departure for the exercise.

Below is a summary of the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Crisis.

The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, also called the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Crisis, was the result of a series of missile tests conducted by the People’s Republic of China in the waters surrounding Taiwan, including the Taiwan Strait, from July 21, 1995–March 23, 1996 (246 days). The first set of missiles, fired in mid-to-late 1995, was allegedly intended to send a strong signal to the government of the Republic of China (the ROC, or Taiwan) under Lee Teng-hui, who had been seen as moving the country’s foreign policy away from the One-China policy. The second set of missiles, fired in early 1996, was allegedly intended to intimidate the Taiwanese electorate in the run-up to the 1996 presidential election.

On July 7, 1995, China’s Xinhua News Agency announced that missile tests would be conducted by the PLA and argued that this would endanger the peace and safety of the region. The PRC conducted tests from July 21 to 26 in an area only 60 kilometers (37 mi) north of ROC-held Pengjia Islet. At the same time, the PRC mobilized forces in Fujian. In the later part of July and early August, Xinhua and People’s Daily published numerous commentaries condemning Lee and his cross-strait policies.

Hundreds of people fled small islands under Taiwan’s control off the Chinese mainland, close to the area where Chinese troops began a new round of air, land, and naval war games.

Another set of missile firings, accompanied by live ammunition exercises, occurred from August 15 to 25, 1995. Naval exercises in August were followed by highly publicized amphibious assault exercises in November.

On March 8, 1996, a U.S. presidential election year, the U.S. government under President Clinton announced that it was deploying the USS Independence carrier battle group (CVBG), already stationed in the Western Pacific, to international waters near Taiwan.

While Clinton administration officials said there was no evidence that China had military plans to invade Taiwan or its scattered island territories, the White House nonetheless sent a second carrier force to the Western Pacific to underscore Washington’s insistence that China and Taiwan resolve their longstanding differences by peaceful means.

On the following day, the PRC announced live-fire exercises to be conducted near Penghu from March 12–20. On March 11, the U.S. dispatched Carrier Group Seven, centered on USS Nimitz, which steamed at high speed from the Persian Gulf. Tensions rose further on March 15 when Beijing announced a simulated amphibious assault planned for March 18–25.

The United States, by sending two carrier battle groups, not only made a symbolic gesture toward the ROC, but demonstrated a readiness to fight. The ROC government and Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party welcomed America’s support, but Lin Yang-kang, a staunch Taiwanese unificationist presidential candidate, along with the PRC, decried “foreign intervention.”
The PRC, aware that U.S. Navy carrier battle groups posed a credible threat to the PLAN, decided to accelerate its military buildup. Soon the People’s Republic ordered from Russia Cold War-era Sovremenny-class destroyers, designed to counter U.S. Navy carrier battle groups. This allegedly took place in mid-December 1996, during Chinese premier Li Peng’s visit to Moscow.

The PRC subsequently ordered modern attack submarines (Kilo class) and warplanes (76 Su-30MKKs and 24 Su-30MK2s) to counter the U.S. Navy’s carrier groups.

During the military exercises in March, Taipei was deeply concerned that the PRC would occupy some small islands controlled by Taiwan. This caused panic among many Taiwanese and therefore, a large number of flights from Taiwan to the United States and Canada were full.

**General Questions for Players to Answer in the TTX**

Considering the precedents set by the 1995–96 crisis, the tabletop exercise will need to account for both the potential similarities and differences between today’s crisis and the

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**Figure 1. The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis**

![Map of the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis](image)

The announced area reserved for military exercise.
1: Off Keeling between Mar. 8 and Mar. 15, 1996
2: Off Kaohsiung between, Mar. 8 and Mar. 15, 1996
3: Between Mar. 12 and Mar. 20, 1996
4: Between Mar. 18 and Mar. 25, 1996
1. Do nothing and let Taiwan fend for itself.
2. Do the minimum and let the U.S. resupply Taiwan if it is able.
3. Prepare to evacuate personnel and leading figures, especially from Taiwan.
4. Take public steps to condemn China and call for international action (e.g., by the UN Security Council).
5. Exercise treaty commitments and other obligations.
6. Take operational steps such as moving warships, carriers, submarines, fighter aircraft, and patrol ISR assets into position, even prepositioning assets in the Ryukyus and possibly on Taiwan.
7. Test China’s intentions and resolve. As for Taiwan, it will have to decide how to respond to active threats, Chinese mobilization, or even Chinese air, naval, or land attacks.

Assessing Warlike Intentions
One key task will be to identify China’s war intentions and which actions would require a military, rather than a purely political, response. Examples would be mobilization of Chinese invasion forces or Chinese occupation of small Taiwanese and Japanese islands preparatory to an attack, artillery or missile shelling, or specific live-fire provocations. How would the parties respond to China’s closing the Taiwan and Miyako Straits?

Assessing Capabilities
Each side in the conflict will have to consider what forces it has to engage in a crisis and what operations they can be authorized to carry out.

A key question is what communications exist between the parties, and especially, what communications are available for the military commands of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the United States.

Are there any hotlines available to the leaders of the U.S., Japan, Taiwan, and Korea so that strategic information,
intelligence, and other operational issues can be managed in a crisis?

A related but important command question is how to deconflict the various forces under operations.

On China, the question is whether it will seek to bring in outside forces, including Russia and North Korea, either directly or for diversionary purposes, and to weaken U.S. forces and complicate U.S. political decision-making.

Also at issue are new types of weapons and their implications, such as Chinese, U.S., and Japanese stealth aircraft, new generations of Chinese submarines, or new “carrier-killer” missiles such as the DF-21.

**Scenario Team Structure**

Each team should have three members and represent diverse opinions. For example, the U.S. team should have at least one person with a very strong military background, at least one who has strong relationships with the Republican Party, and another who has strong relationships with the Democratic Party. All should possess some regional expertise and avoid political gestures.

The Taiwan, Japan, and Korea teams likewise should reflect a balance in political outlook and subject-matter expertise. Taiwan, for example, should have at least one member who is an expert connected to the Democratic Progressive Party, one with connections to the Kuomintang, and one with a professional military background.

No currently serving officials from any country should participate.

**Scenario and Specific Questions: TTX 2020**

In South Korea, opinion has shifted toward strengthening the nation’s security relationship with the U.S. This follows the Trump administration’s failure to reach agreement with North Korea on denuclearization. It is also a partial consequence of the curtailment of major U.S.-South Korean military exercises, and of Pyongyang’s resumption of nuclear and ballistic missile tests. Discussions have begun to resume on major bilateral military exercises.

Tokyo continues to build a line of anti-ship, anti-aircraft missile batteries along 243 islands in the East China Sea that stretch 1,200 km (750 miles) from the country’s mainland toward Taiwan. This is a Japanese version of the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) doctrine, and it will serve as a barrier to Chinese control of the space. However, by itself it cannot prevent a successful Chinese action against the Ryukyus, especially in the vicinity of Taiwan.

Elsewhere, Chinese president Xi Jinping is acting on promises he has made on numerous occasions to “resolve” the “Taiwan problem” by 2020. Events in Taiwan appear to offer him opportunities to fulfill his pledge.

In 2020 Taiwanese voters elected a presidential candidate who promised voters to increase defense spending substantially, redouble the search for regional security partnerships, and accept Washington’s invitation to upgrade its engagement with the annual RIMPAC exercise from observer to active participant.

With U.S. assistance Taiwan continues to upgrade its F-16 fleet, improving its missile defenses, adding to its land-based anti-ship missile capability, and substantially improving its UV ISR capability. Nevertheless, it remains years away from building its own submarines. Taipei’s 12 P3C maritime patrol aircraft have proven to be effective as submarine-monitoring platforms. Their active anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability has not been tested.

The PLA has mobilized naval, marine, and coast guard reserves at its Southern and Eastern Theater Commands. Despite claims that the call-ups are no more than preparations for a planned joint exercise, rail and road shipments to major naval facilities in both area commands have increased significantly above levels associated with previous large-scale naval exercises.
These have been accompanied by accelerating cyberattacks that test Taiwan’s and Japan’s ability to defend such critical infrastructure as government communications and electrical grids.

The PLA has significantly increased its patrols of fixed-wing airborne electronic and maritime patrol aircraft over the Taiwan and Miyako Straits. This increase is complemented by an increase in sea-borne sensors and platforms.

U.S. intelligence has shared with Taiwan and Japan its finding that the PLAN has put to sea three squadrons of minelayers and an unspecified number of amphibious groups, including helicopter carriers (landing helicopter docks, or LHDs) and landing ships (LSTs). U.S. intelligence has also shared with Taiwan and Japan its preliminary finding that the PLAN is discussing detailed targeting options against logistics, port, and airfield facilities on Guam and at Pearl Harbor if a breakout into the central Pacific becomes viable.

The PLAN’s 85,000-ton Type 002 aircraft carrier (the Fujian) completed sea trials early. U.S. intelligence assesses that it has been deployed to assist in providing air cover for the minelayers and amphibious ships and escort vessels. This includes possible close-air support for amphibious operations.

The Fujian has been ordered to take up position north of the Ryukyu Islands and east of the northern tip of Taiwan as it completes its pilot qualification requirements. The Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency are divided in their assessment of Chinese intentions. The PRC accelerated construction and testing of its 53-ton, 4-engine turboprop amphibious seaplane (AG-600) so that deliveries began ahead of schedule, in 2020.

The U.S. Indo-Pac Command is reviewing its 2018 study of communications capability between it and the major U.S. East Asian allies. The study found that although RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) exercises had improved operational communications between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, the ability to communicate at headquarters level between — and among — the three allies and Taiwan was “virtually non-existent.”

Questions for players:
1. Does the U.S. have the political leadership/will to respond to Chinese aggression against any/all potential targets?
2. What are the consequences of U.S. action/inaction?
3. Are sufficient U.S./allied combat capabilities/logistics currently in place to counter Chinese offensive operations?
4. Can a coalition be formed soon enough to be effective?
5. Is there currently sufficient C3I (command, control, communications, and intelligence) capability to coordinate a coalition?
6. Can you identify obstacles to possible coalition — and bilateral — military operations?
7. Assuming that the U.S. would honor its commitments to WestPac (Western Pacific) allies and also provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, what diplomatic, military, and economic measures should it take (including cyber measures)?
8. What will China do as it continues to increase its fixed-wing patrols of land-based naval aviation over the Taiwan and Miyako Straits to levels far above normal? What role will the Type 002 (Fujian) aircraft carrier, LHDs, LSTs, minelayers, and escort vessels play?
9. How will Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the U.S. respond?
10. How will the U.S. react to the Chinese response?
11. Can you identify the vulnerabilities of all players’ states?
Assumptions
1. The PRC will endeavor to use geography and speed to its advantage during the crisis.
2. The PRC will telegraph some of its moves to avoid surprise — and possible escalation of the crisis.
3. The PRC will attempt to find an international legal pretext for its actions.
4. The PRC will launch significant cyberattacks in an effort to immobilize and disrupt its adversaries.
5. The PRC will attempt to delay responses to its provocations by blocking UN resolutions.
6. The PRC will attempt to disrupt any efforts at building a coalition through a “carrot and stick” approach to U.S. partner nations.
7. The PRC will attempt to establish naval “no-go” areas in the South and East China Seas to facilitate its operations.
8. The PRC will look for tactical scenarios where it holds an advantage — and attempt to cause response forces to back down.
9. The PRC will flood international news agencies with false reports to confuse and distort perceptions.
10. The PRC will attempt to achieve its objectives without escalating to large-scale conflict with responding nations.
11. The PRC will threaten to destroy U.S. GPS, communication, and intelligence satellites if it can determine that they are being employed against Chinese forces.
12. The U.S. will have only days, not weeks, to counter Chinese provocations.
13. U.S. forces will avoid activities that could precipitate all-out war with the PRC.
14. Japanese and South Korean forces will defend their sovereignty but will not participate in attacks on Chinese forces around or on Taiwan.
15. Japanese and South Korean forces will conduct search and rescue missions at sea if asked to do so by another nation.
16. Japanese, South Korean, Filipino, and Australian diplomats will vote to condemn PRC aggression at the UN.
17. Should the U.S. put personnel or equipment ashore on Taiwan, it will be subject to fifth column activities by agents of the PRC.
18. The PRC will not interfere with a multinational effort to remove its non-combatant citizens from Taiwan.