

A Guide to the Trump Administration's China Policy Statements

EDITED BY DR. MICHAEL PILLSBURY
DIRECTOR FOR CHINESE STRATEGY, HUDSON INSTITUTE



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Hudson Institute

1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Fourth Floor
Washington, D.C. 20004

+1.202.974.2400
info@hudson.org
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Cover: US President Donald Trump holds a press conference on China on May 29, 2020, in the Rose Garden of the White House in Washington, D.C. With Trump are Director of Trade and Manufacturing Policy Peter Navarro, National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, US Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin, and US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer. (Mandel Ngan/AFP via Getty Images)

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INTRODUCTION

United States policy toward China is the preeminent strategic issue of our time. In the last several years, the U.S.-China relationship has undergone its most dramatic changes in over forty years. This report is a guide to the Trump administration's most important policy statements on China, going up to July 23, 2020. It organizes nearly two hundred statements into what I believe—based on discussions with the president and his senior advisors—are the seven most significant areas. Each document, interview, and tweet is hyperlinked.

The Trump administration has issued thousands of pages about its China policy, many of them showing continuity and consistency with previous administrations. Therefore, I have carefully selected and excerpted only those statements that show significant differences from previous policies. These selections also rely on advice from many senior officials about what the administration considers to be its most significant statements.

The report has two tables of contents. The first is arranged by policy area and organizes the statements into seven categories, beginning with more than sixty of President Trump's interviews in his own words and tweets. The remaining six categories are organized according to the many challenges addressed by the president's cabinet secretaries and their assistants. These six categories include issues such as removing unfair trade barriers; preserving American global economic primacy; maintaining dominance in space and the U.S. Space Force; forming a global coalition against technology transfer threats; reducing U.S. dependence on critical materials; rebuilding the U.S. military in the Indo-Pacific; addressing China's human rights violations as "the stain of the century"; rejecting China's Belt and Road Initiative; designing a new approach to China's compliance with the World Trade Organization; creating new approaches to the Arctic, South Pacific, and Africa; and withdrawing from the World Health Organization after it mishandled China's role in the COVID pandemic. The administration's most recent authoritative [statement](#) was delivered July 23, 2020 by Attorney General William Barr at the Gerald P. Ford Presidential Museum.

The report's second table of contents is chronological and appears as an appendix. It is intended for the convenience of readers who wish to follow the development of the Trump administration's China policy over time. All the statements are public and designed to be public. Administrations usually are guided by classified policy documents that remain closed to research for at least thirty years. For example, President Truman's well-known Cold War strategy, NSC 68, which he signed in 1950, was not made public for twenty-five years. President Reagan's strategic decision documents, such as NSDD 75 and NSDD 166, which he signed in the mid-1980s, were not released publicly for more than twenty years. We may safely assume the Trump administration strategy toward China has been guided by such documents. For the time being, however, the public statements in this report offer a guide to new features of U.S. policy toward China.

About the Editors

Dr. Michael Pillsbury

Dr. Pillsbury is a senior fellow and the director of Chinese strategy at Hudson Institute. He served as assistant under secretary of defense for policy planning in the Reagan administration, and is the author of three books on China.

Malcolm Palley

Malcolm Palley was a research intern at Hudson Institute, working with Dr. Pillsbury to identify and provide online references to major China policy statements made by the Trump administration. Mr. Palley graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 2019 with a degree in philosophy, politics, and economics.

HOW TO READ THIS DOCUMENT

Given the comprehensive nature of this report, the outline below reflects the organization of the quotes and general themes to assist with navigating the material. Section 1 of this report includes statements made by President Trump in speeches, interviews, press conferences, and tweets. Sections 2 through 7 are organized by policy area and include quotations from cabinet secretaries and senior officials. The title of each section introduces the subject matter with a relevant quotation. The sections are:

1. Quotations by President Trump: “We Are Winning with China for the First Time”

2. “U.S. Strategic Approach to China”

3. “Engage China from a Position of Strength”

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- 3.3. “A Global Coalition Against Chinese Technology Transfer Threats”
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- 5.3. “China Is the Main Perpetrator. It’s an Unprecedented Level of Larceny”

6. “The Worst Human Rights Crises of Our Time ... the Stain of the Century”

7. “Instigating a Global Pandemic”

Each section and subsection entry in the table of contents displays the source or sources cited in that section. Within each section, the quotations are in chronological order. A list of all the quotes in chronological order can be found in the appendix. Within the body of the document, each source has a date, author, title, date, and hyperlink. To make the document more accessible to readers, abbreviated quotations are used to introduce full quotations.

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Apr. 24, 2020: Secretary of State Pompeo, Interview with Ben Shapiro, *"We're also working with those countries to make sure they understand that this was in fact a virus that originated in Wuhan..."*217

Apr. 29, 2020: Secretary of State Pompeo, Interview with Fox and Friends, *"This is classic communist disinformation. This is what communists do."*217

Apr. 29, 2020: Secretary of State Pompeo, Interview with Shannon Bream, *"We have an obligation to do our best to hold those accountable who have inflicted so much harm..."*218

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1. “WE ARE WINNING WITH CHINA FOR THE FIRST TIME”

—President Donald Trump¹
Statements by the President

Dec. 2, 2016: President Trump, *The Wall Street Journal*: “Trump Spoke with Taiwan President in Break with Decades of U.S. Policy”

[wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-spoke-with-taiwan-president-tsai-ing-wen-1480718423](https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-spoke-with-taiwan-president-tsai-ing-wen-1480718423)

“It is believed to be the first time a president or president-elect has spoken with the leader of Taiwan since diplomatic ties between Washington and Taipei were cut off in 1979.

Photo Caption: U.S. President Donald Trump holds a press conference on China on May 29, 2020, in the Rose Garden of the White House in Washington, D.C. With Trump are Director of Trade and Manufacturing Policy Peter Navarro, National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin, and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer. (Mandel Ngan/AFP via Getty Images)

Mr. Trump offered an explanation of the call in a Twitter post: 'The President of Taiwan CALLED ME today to wish me congratulations on winning the Presidency. Thank you!'

A short time later, he tweeted again: 'Interesting how the U.S. sells Taiwan billions of dollars of military equipment but I should not accept a congratulatory call.'"²

Dec. 11, 2016: President Trump, Interview with Chris Wallace on Fox News Sunday, *"I don't know why we have to be bound by a One-China policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade."*

[foxnews.com/transcript/exclusive-donald-trump-on-cabinet-picks-transition-process](https://www.foxnews.com/transcript/exclusive-donald-trump-on-cabinet-picks-transition-process)

"I took a call. I heard the call was coming probably an hour or two before. I fully understand the One-China policy. But I don't know why we have to be bound by a One-China policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade.

I mean, look, we're being hurt very badly by China with devaluation, with taxing us heavy at the borders when we don't tax them, with building a massive fortress in the middle of the South China Sea, which they shouldn't be doing.

And, frankly, they're not helping us at all with North Korea. You have North Korea, you have nuclear weapons, and China could solve that problem. And they're not helping us at all.

So, I don't want China dictating to me."³

Nov. 9, 2017: President Trump, Remarks at Business Event with President Xi of China | Beijing, China

[whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-business-event-president-xi-china-beijing-china/](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-business-event-president-xi-china-beijing-china/)

"We must immediately address the unfair trade practices that drive this deficit":

"As we all know, America has a huge annual trade deficit with China—a number beyond anything what anybody would understand. This number is, shockingly, hundreds of billions of dollars each year. Estimates are as high as \$500 billion a year. We must immediately address the unfair trade practices that drive this deficit, along with barriers to market success. We really have to look at access, forced technology transfer, and the theft of intellectual property, which just, by and of itself, is costing the United States and its companies at least \$300 billion a year."⁴

"I don't blame China." "I give China great credit":

“Both the United States and China will have a more prosperous future if we can achieve a level economic playing field. Right now, unfortunately, it is a very one-sided and unfair one. But—but I don’t blame China. After all, who can blame a country for being able to take advantage of another country for the benefit of its citizens? I give China great credit.

But, in actuality, I do blame past administrations for allowing this out-of-control trade deficit to take place and to grow.”⁵

Nov. 10, 2017: President Trump, Remarks at APEC CEO Summit | Da Nang, Vietnam, “*Our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific*”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-apec-ceo-summit-da-nang-vietnam/

“Our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific”:

“I’ve had the honor of sharing our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific—a place where sovereign and independent nations, with diverse cultures and many different dreams, can all prosper side-by-side, and thrive in freedom and in peace.”⁶

“They engaged in product dumping, subsidized goods, currency manipulation, and predatory industrial policies”:

“We adhered to WTO principles on protecting intellectual property and ensuring fair and equal market access. They engaged in product dumping, subsidized goods, currency manipulation, and predatory industrial policies.”⁷

“What we will no longer do is enter into large agreements that tie our hands, surrender our sovereignty, and make meaningful enforcement practically impossible”:

“I will make bilateral trade agreements with any Indo-Pacific nation that wants to be our partner and that will abide by the principles of fair and reciprocal trade. What we will no longer do is enter into large agreements that tie our hands, surrender our sovereignty, and make meaningful enforcement practically impossible.”⁸

“We will no longer tolerate the audacious theft of intellectual property. We will confront the destructive practices of forcing businesses to surrender their technology to the state, and forcing them into joint ventures in exchange for market access.

We will address the massive subsidizing of industries through colossal state-owned enterprises that put private competitors out of business—happening all the time.

We will not remain silent as American companies are targeted by state-affiliated actors for economic gain, whether through cyberattacks, corporate espionage, or other anti-competitive practices. We will encourage all nations to speak out loudly when the principles of fairness and reciprocity are violated.”⁹

“We must uphold principles that have benefitted all of us, like respect for the rule of law, individual rights, and freedom of navigation and overflight, including open shipping lanes”:

“In addition, we must uphold principles that have benefitted all of us, like respect for the rule of law, individual rights, and freedom of navigation and overflight, including open shipping lanes. Three principles and these principles—(applause)—create stability and build trust, security, and prosperity among like-minded nations.”¹⁰

Dec. 18, 2017: President Trump, Remarks on the Administration’s National Security Strategy

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-administrations-national-security-strategy/

“This strategy recognizes that, whether we like it or not, we are engaged in a new era of competition. We accept that vigorous military, economic, and political contests are now playing out all around the world.”¹¹

“This strategy includes plans to counter modern threats, such as cyber and electromagnetic attacks”:

“This strategy includes plans to counter modern threats, such as cyber and electromagnetic attacks. It recognizes space as a competitive domain and calls for multi-layered missile defense. This strategy outlines important steps to address new forms of conflict such as economic and political aggression.”¹²

Mar. 22, 2018: President Trump, Remarks at Signing of a Presidential Memorandum Targeting China’s Economic Aggression

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-signing-presidential-memorandum-targeting-chinas-economic-aggression/

“But in particular, with China, we’re going to be doing a Section 301 trade action. It could be about \$60 billion but that’s really just a fraction of what we’re talking about.

I’ve been speaking with the highest Chinese representatives, including the President, and I’ve asked them to reduce the trade deficit immediately by \$100 billion. It’s a lot. So that would be anywhere from 25 percent, depending on the way you figure, to maybe something even more than that. But we have to do that.

The word that I want to use is ‘reciprocal.’ When they charge 25 percent for a car to go in, and we charge 2 percent for their car to come into the United States, that’s not good. That’s how China rebuilt itself. The tremendous money that we’ve paid since the founding of the World Trade Organization—which has actually been a disaster for us. It’s been very unfair to us. The arbitrations are very unfair. The judging has been very unfair. And knowingly, we always have a minority and it’s not fair.”¹³

Aug. 13, 2018: President Trump, Remarks at a Signing Ceremony for H.R. 5515, the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, “*It is not enough to merely have an American presence in space. We must have American dominance in space.*”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-signing-ceremony-h-r-5515-john-s-mccain-national-defense-authorization-act-fiscal-year-2019/

“In order to maintain America’s military supremacy, we must always be on the cutting edge. That is why we are also proudly re-asserting America’s legacy of leadership in space. Our foreign competitors and adversaries have already begun weaponizing space, developing new technologies to disrupt vital communications, blind satellites, and just—I mean, you look at what they’re doing. They’ve given me rundowns. I’ve seen things that you don’t even want to see, what they’re doing and how advanced they are. We’ll be catching them very shortly. They want to jam transmissions, which threaten our battlefield operations, and so many other things. We will be so far ahead of them in a very short period of time your head will spin.

China even launched a new military division to oversee its warfighting programs in space. Just like the air, the land, the sea, space has become a warfighting domain. It is not enough to merely have an American presence in space. We must have American dominance in space.

So that is why, just a few days ago, the Vice President outlined my administration’s plan to create a sixth branch of the United States military, called the United States Space Force.”¹⁴

Aug. 16, 2018: President Trump, Remarks in Cabinet Meeting, “*China was on a one-way road to becoming the biggest economy and all of that. And we were just going to be left behind.*”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-cabinet-meeting-10/

“Could I ask you one question? China. As you know, China was, for many years—as long as anybody up here, including the media, could remember—China was on a one-way road to becoming the biggest economy and all of that. And we were just going to be left behind. I’d like you to say how are we doing versus China, and how is China doing.”¹⁵

Mar. 2, 2019: President Trump, Remarks at the 2019 Conservative Political Action Conference, “*Nobody called, so we just left it.*” And I don’t blame them.”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-2019-conservative-political-action-conference/

“President Xi of China, I have great respect. We have a great relationship. I say, ‘How is it possible that you got away with this for so long?’ (Laughter.) And he said, ‘Because nobody ever asked us to change.’ It’s true.

When they charge 40 percent tariffs on our cars going into China, and we charge them nothing coming into our country; when they raise their tariff from 10 percent to 25 percent and then to 40 percent—and they said to me, ‘We expected that somebody would call and say you can’t do that.’ (Laughter.) ‘Nobody called, so we just left it.’ And I don’t blame them.”¹⁶

May 20, 2019: President Trump, Interview with Steve Hilton, *“If Hillary Clinton became president, China would have been a much bigger economy than us by the end of her term. And now it’s not even going to be close.”*

realclearpolitics.com/video/2019/05/20/trump_interview_immigration_reform_china_trade_iran_terror_tax_cuts_2020.html

“They took advantage of us for many, many years. And I blame us, I don’t blame them. I don’t blame President Xi. I blame all of our presidents, and not just President Obama. You go back a long way. You look at President Clinton, Bush—everybody; they allowed this to happen, they created a monster. We rebuilt China because they get so much money.”¹⁷

“Their economy’s not great. Our economy has been fantastic. Because they were catching us, they were going to be bigger than us. If Hillary Clinton became president, China would have been a much bigger economy than us by the end of her term. And now it’s not even going to be close.”¹⁸

“Not going to happen—not going to happen with me”:

HILTON: So what do you think of that analysis? A lot of people look at what—the statements of Chinese leaders, they’ve written in down in speeches and so on. And they say look, China’s got a clear plan. They want to replace the U.S. as the superpower by—

TRUMP: Not going to happen—not going to happen with me. HILTON: But do you—do you believe that that’s their intention?

TRUMP: Yes, I do. I think that’s their intention. Why wouldn’t it be? I mean they’re very ambitious people, they’re very smart. They’re great people. It’s a great—it’s a great culture, an amazing culture.”¹⁹

“China 25. That means that in six years—now, I said to President Xi that’s very insulting because it’s not going to happen, and it’s very insulting to me, and you notice they don’t use that anymore?”:

“China is a massive competitor of ours. They want to take over the world. OK? They have China 2020—you know they have 2025. Right, China 25. That means that in six years—now, I said to President Xi that’s very insulting because it’s not going to happen, and it’s very insulting to me, and you notice they don’t use that anymore?”²⁰

“But if there’s one reason that China—and you understand what I’m going to say—didn’t make that deal, it’s because they’re hoping that in 16 months Donald Trump will be defeated by anyone of those Democrats, and they’ll go back to making \$500 billion a year.”²¹

June 10, 2019: President Trump, Interview by Joe Kernan on CNBC’s Squawk Box, “Had a Democrat gotten in, namely, the one we’re talking about, China would have caught us by the end of her term. They’re nowhere close. They’ll never catch us.”

cnbc.com/2019/06/10/cnbc-transcript-president-donald-trump-speaks-with-cnbc-joe-kernen-on-cnbc-squawk-box-today.html

“Before citing a specific figure for China’s losses, Trump said earlier in the CNBC interview that China has ‘lost many, many trillions of dollars.’

He added: ‘They’re way behind. They were going to catch us. Had a Democrat gotten in, namely, the one we’re talking about, China would have caught us by the end of her term. They’re nowhere close. They’ll never catch us. Not with what I’m doing.’”²²

June 29, 2019: President Trump, Remarks in Press Conference | Osaka, Japan, “We send and we sell to Huawei a tremendous amount of product that goes into the various things that they make. And I said that that’s okay, that we will keep selling that product.”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-conference-osaka-japan/

“China is going to be buying a tremendous amount of food and agricultural product, and they’re going to start that very soon, almost immediately. We’re going to give them lists of things that we’d like them to buy.”²³

“We send and we sell to Huawei a tremendous amount of product that goes into the various things that they make. And I said that that’s okay, that we will keep selling that product”:

“One of the things I will allow, however, is—a lot of people are surprised—we send and we sell to Huawei a tremendous amount of product that goes into the various things that they make. And I said that that’s okay, that we will keep selling that product. These are American companies, John, that make product.”²⁴

“And I’ve agreed—and pretty easily—I’ve agreed to allow them to continue to sell that product so American companies will continue. And they were having a problem. The companies were not exactly happy that they couldn’t sell because they had nothing to do with whatever was potentially happening with respect to Huawei. So I did do that.”²⁵

Jul. 12, 2019: President Trump, Remarks on Supporting the Passage of the U.S-Mexico-Canada Agreement, *“For years, politicians let China take the crown jewels out of our country. My administration has taken the toughest-ever stance to stop these incredible abuses.”*

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-supporting-passage-u-s-mexico-canada-agreement-milwaukee-wi/

“For years, politicians let China take the crown jewels out of our country. My administration has taken the toughest-ever stance to stop these incredible abuses.”²⁶

“It’s not China’s fault that we were stupid. It’s not China’s fault that we allowed it to happen. We lose \$500 billion a year. It’s now turning. We’re taking in billions and billions of dollars in tariffs. I’m giving billions of dollars back to the farmers because they pinpointed the farmers. They said, ‘We’re not going to buy here. We’re not going to buy there because then Trump will stop doing to us what he’s doing.’ Except the farmers said, ‘We don’t care because he’s right.’ Because for 15 years, the farmer—if you look, 15 years, it’s been like this. It’s a one-way street and it was a street downward.”²⁷

Jul. 23, 2019: President Trump, Remarks at Turning Point USA’s Teen Student Action Summit 2019, *“We have a long way to go as far as tariffs, where China is concerned, if we want.”*

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-turning-point-usas-teen-student-action-summit-2019/

“The World—the World Trade Organization has been a horrible thing for us. That’s what built China. That, and the fact that our former Presidents did nothing about the fact that China was making hundreds of billions of dollars a year. And I guess they didn’t see it. I mean, 25 years, they didn’t see it. But we see it. And right now, they’re paying us billions and billions of dollars, folks. Billions. And they want to—they want to make a deal badly. And we’ll see whether or not we make a deal. We’ll see. We’ll see. But our farmers are being helped. I said to our Secretary of Agriculture, Sonny Perdue—you know, because the—China, very smart. I don’t blame them. Look, I’m not blaming them. I blame our past leaders for allowing it to happen. I’m not blaming China. We should have done that to them. I blame our past leaders. I said that to President Xi of China. I said it.”

“We have a long way to go as far as tariffs, where China is concerned, if we want”:

“And we have a long way to go as far as tariffs, where China is concerned, if we want. We have another \$325 billion that we can put a tariff on if we want.

So we’re talking to China about a deal. But I wish they didn’t break the deal that we had. We had a deal where China opened up. We had a deal where there’d be—intellectual property theft would be taken care of because it’s estimated that they steal \$300 billion worth of intellectual property a deal. Who knows. Who knows. That’s what they tell me. Three hundred billion. That’s a big number. How they get to that number, I’ll accept it—they’re experts. That’s what they do. But that’s a big number.”²⁸

“If my opponent had won, China would right now be number one in the world”:

“If my opponent had won, China would right now be number one in the world. Right now, we’re number one in the world, by far. We’re going to keep it that way. And if you have smart people sitting in this chair, in this position, you’re not going to lose.”²⁹

Jul. 30, 2019: President Trump, Remarks Before Marine One Departure, “China reduced their currency. They devalued their currency, and they’re pumping money into the system in order to pay for it.”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-55/

“So the talks are moving very well with China, but they were often with China. But China always makes a new deal at the end, or seems to. We’re taking in billions and billions of dollars from China in the form of tariffs. Our people are not paying for it. China reduced their currency. They devalued their currency, and they’re pumping money into the system in order to pay for it.”³⁰

Aug. 1, 2019: President Trump, Remarks Before Marine One Departure, “I think President Xi, who’s somebody I like a lot, I think he wants to make a deal. But frankly, he’s not going fast enough.”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-56/

“We’ve taxed China on 300 billion dollars’ worth of goods and products being sold into our country. And China eats it because they have to pay it. Because what they do is they devalue their currency and they push money out.

Our people haven’t paid, as you know. We’re also charging them 25 percent on \$250 billion. So we’re taking in many billions of dollars. There’s been absolutely no inflation. And frankly, it hasn’t cost our consumer anything; it costs China.”³¹

“And we had a President that would never do anything—a number of Presidents that never would do anything about it”:

“What would you say when China, for the last 20 years, has been taking hundreds of billions of dollars out of our country? And we had a President that would never do anything—a number of Presidents that never would do anything about it. What would you say?

For many years, China has been taking money out by the hundreds of billions of dollars a year. We have rebuilt China. So now it’s time that we change things around. If they don’t want to trade with us anymore, that would be fine with me. We’d save a lot of money.”³²

“I think President Xi, who’s somebody I like a lot, I think he wants to make a deal. But frankly, he’s not going fast enough”:

“No, I don’t know. I think President Xi, who’s somebody I like a lot, I think he wants to make a deal. But frankly, he’s not going fast enough. He said he was going to be buying from our farmers; he didn’t do that. He said he was going to stop fentanyl from coming into our country—it’s all coming out of China; he didn’t do that. We’re losing thousands of people to fentanyl. And this was time.

And very importantly, for many years—you know this better than anybody; you’ve been covering it for a long time—for many years, China has been taking out hundreds of billions of dollars a year and rebuilding China. It’s time that we rebuild our country.

And, you know, the one thing I have to say—and you have to say this: What China is doing is they’re devaluing their currency and they’re pumping money out like they’ve never done before. And they’re paying for these tariffs; we’re not.”³³

“I can always do much more or I can do less, depending on what happens with respect to a deal”:

“Look, I did more than anybody thought with the first \$250 billion. And the 10 percent is for a short-term period, and then I can always do much more or I can do less, depending on what happens with respect to a deal.

But I’m very happy the way it is right now. My people came back. They’re going to meet again in September. I said, ‘Look, if you meet, that’s great.’ But in the meantime, we’re going to pay—they’re going to pay a tariff and it’ll be a very substantial tariff.

Now, if you remember, when I did the 25 percent, I did it in stages. And this can also be lifted, ultimately, in stages, or it can be taken off. But it can be lifted in stages. So we’re starting at 10 percent, and it can be lifted up to well beyond 25 percent. But we’re not looking to do that necessarily.

But this would be done in stages. So I put on 10 percent on 300—it’s approximately \$300 billion. We already have a 25 percent tariff on the first \$250 billion. So, the 10 percent follows the \$250 billion at 25 percent.”³⁴

Aug. 19, 2019: Remarks by President Trump Before Air Force One Departure, “*It would be much harder for me to sign a deal if he did something violent in Hong Kong.*”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-air-force-one-departure-12/

“Look, I put out—and I told you that I really believe—I have a confidence in the—in the talents of President Xi. I think if he met with the protestors, within a very short period of time, they would work something out that’s good for everybody. I really believe that.

He's a very talented man. I mean, aside from everything, he's a very talented man. He's very smart, very talented. And I know him well, probably as well as anybody, And I believe if he sat down with them—now, you know, he's not—that's not his deal, sitting down with people. You know, he doesn't do that. But I think, maybe, the world changes. I really believe if President Xi sat down with representatives of the protestors—and they do have representatives; pretty good representatives, pretty strong representatives. I've been watching and seeing them. If he sat down, I think he'd work something out. And I think it would be good for everybody. But it does put pressure on the trade deal. If they do something negative, it puts pressure.

Now, that deal I can sign by myself. It's structured so I don't have to go to Congress. But I respect Congress. I respect the views of Congress. And I respect, most importantly, the views of the people of our country. And I think it would be much harder for me to sign a deal if he did something violent in Hong Kong.”³⁵

Aug. 30, 2019: President Trump, Remarks Before Marine One Departure, “*But I do believe that because of what I’m doing with trade, that’s very much keeping down the temperature in Hong Kong.*”

[whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-62/](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-62/)

“Yeah, I do. I do. The question was, do I see a connection between Hong Kong and what’s going on with the trade talks.

I think if it weren’t for the trade talks, Hong Kong would be in much bigger trouble. I think it would’ve been much more violent. I really believe China wants to make a deal, and they know it puts us in a very bad position if there’s not a humane way of handling the problems. And I let them know that: ‘Look, handle it in a humane fashion.’ And we’ll see.

But I do believe that because of what I’m doing with trade, that’s very much keeping down the temperature in Hong Kong. I think it’s by really a lot. Because China wants to make a deal. I actually think China has to make a deal. But that’s holding it down in Hong Kong. You understand that.”³⁶

Sept. 12, 2019: President Trump, Remarks Before Marine One Departure, “*We gave them a two-week—in honor of President Xi, we gave them a two-week reprieve.*”

[whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-64/](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-64/)

“I got a call from heads of China. The call was directed to my people, actually. And they asked whether or not it would be possible to delay the hit on the tariffs up to 30 percent from 25 percent—would it be possible to take it off of the October 1st date. We gave them a two-week—in honor of President Xi, we gave them a two-week reprieve. And so, we’ll be doing the tariffs on October 15th, instead of October 5th or 1st.

They were going to be set on October 1st; we’re moving it to October 15th because they’re having their 70th anniversary. And I will do that, again, in honor of President Xi.”³⁷

Sept. 13, 2019: President Trump, Remarks at the 2019 House Republican Conference Member Retreat Dinner, “*We’re ending years of economic surrender and we’re confronting China’s chronic trading abuses.*”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-2019-house-republican-conference-member-retreat-dinner-baltimore-md/

“And President Xi of China, he is tough. Oh, boy, he’s a furious kind of a guy. Great guy, but fur—he’s dying to see—he wants Sleepy Joe. Can you imagine those two guys in a room? Here’s Xi: ‘Hwah!’ And here’s Sleepy Joe, ‘What?’ (Laughter.) ‘Where am I? Where am I?’ ‘Just sign here, Sleepy Joe. Just sign here.’ (Laughter.) ‘Like you guys have been doing for the last 25 years. Let us keep taking \$500 billion out of your account. Let’s keep rebuilding China with America’s money.’ That’s stopping. A lot of things are stopping that are bad and foolish, crazy.”³⁸

“That’s why we’re ending years of economic surrender and we’re confronting China’s chronic trading abuses. For years, past leaders let China freely loot our economy, racking up trillions and trillions of dollars in costly trade deficits. Now, the world is on notice that people aren’t going to be able to do that to the United States anymore. They’re not doing it anymore, and they know it. They know it. They get it.”³⁹

Oct. 21, 2019: President Trump, Interview with Sean Hannity, “*We’re going to get together with Russia and with China, and we’re going to workout our nuclear pact...*”

factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-interview-sean-hannity-october-21-2019

“We’re going to get together with Russia and with China, and we’re going to workout our nuclear pact so that we don’t all continue with this craziness”:

“I believe that we’re going to get together with Russia and with China, and we’re going to workout our nuclear pact so that we don’t all continue with this craziness. Right now we have the most powerful nuclear force in the world. Russia is second and China is third. It’s very costly and very dangerous.”⁴⁰

“If Hillary Clinton had gotten elected, right now China would have had the number one economy in the world”:

“The economy’s the best it’s ever been, ever been. And you look again. China’s gone way down. If Hillary Clinton had gotten elected, right now China would have had the number one economy in the world, and right now they’re not even close. They’re way behind.”⁴¹

“Had Hillary Clinton got in, right now we would be the number two economy in the world. We are so far in front of China that if we have smart people sitting right in that chair, right next to us, it will never happen.”⁴²

Nov. 12, 2019: President Trump, Remarks at the Economic Club of New York, “*If we don’t make a deal, we’re going to substantially raise those tariffs.*”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-economic-club-new-york-new-york-ny/

“For many years, Americans—leaders have just sat back”:

“Nowhere has the change in U.S. strategy been more vital or dramatic than in our dealings with respect to China. Before my election, Washington politicians stood by and did nothing while China ransacked our companies, stole our intellectual property, subsidized their industries at the expense of ours, and dumped their products in a deliberate strategy to close American factories all across our land.

For many years, Americans—leaders have just sat back. Maybe they didn’t understand what was going on. It’s impossible to believe that. But they just let it happen. And it’s gotten worse and worse and worse. And now we’ve changed it. It’s changed a lot. I’m sure you haven’t noticed, but it’s changed a lot.”⁴³

“Nobody has cheated better than China”:

“In particular, since China’s entrance into the World Trade Organization in 2001, no one has manipulated numbers better or taken advantage of the United States more. And I won’t use this word, ‘cheated.’ I will not say the word, ‘cheated.’ But nobody has cheated better than China, but I will not say that.”⁴⁴

“I don’t blame China, by the way. I blame our leaders”:

“And I don’t blame China, by the way. I blame our leaders, because we should’ve been doing what they were doing. They did it to use. We didn’t do it to them. We were defenseless. We had no leadership. This was for a long time. This is long beyond the Obama administration.”⁴⁵

“China is paying because they’re devaluing their currency to such an extent and they’re pouring tremendous amounts of cash into their system”:

“But the theft of American jobs and American wealth is over. They understand that. My administration has taken the toughest-ever action to confront China’s trade abuses. We are taking in billions and billions of dollars in tariffs that China is paying for. We’re not paying. China is paying because they’re devaluing their currency to such an extent and they’re pouring tremendous amounts of cash into their system.”⁴⁶

“They are dying to make a deal. We’re the ones that are deciding whether or not we want to make a deal”:

“They’re having their worst year in more than 57 years, more than half a century. Their supply chains are cracking very badly, and they are dying to make a deal. We’re the ones that are deciding whether or not we want to make a deal. We’re close.

A significant phase one trade deal with China could happen. It could happen soon. But we will only accept a deal if it’s good for the United States and our workers and our great companies, because we’ve been hit very hard.”⁴⁷

“If we don’t make a deal, we’re going to substantially raise those tariffs. They’re going to be raised very substantially”:

“Then I put on 25 percent tariffs on everything coming in—on the first \$250 billion of product. It’s going to 15 percent very soon. And I tell this to Larry, I tell it to everybody: If we don’t make a deal, we’re going to substantially raise those tariffs. They’re going to be raised very substantially.”⁴⁸

Jan. 15, 2020: President Trump, Remarks at Signing of the U.S.-China Phase One Trade Agreement

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-signing-u-s-china-phase-one-trade-agreement-2/

“Under this deal, transfers and licensing of technology will be based on market terms that are fully voluntary reflect mutual agreement.

Phase one will also see China greatly expand imports of the—to the United States. We want to buy a lot of their product inexpensively.

But we have an additional \$200 [billion]. They are going to be what—what is, to me, very important. Number one, they’re going to be spending much more than \$200 billion over the next two years, including up to \$50 billion just on agriculture alone.

And some of the numbers that I wrote down—on manufacturing, they’ll be spending \$75 billion. They’ll be putting into our country, okay? They’re going to be putting into our country \$75 billion on manufacturing”⁴⁹

Jan. 19, 2020: President Trump, Remarks at the American Farm Bureau Federation Annual Convention and Trade Show, *“We now perhaps have the best relationship that we’ve had with China in many, many years. And China respects us now.”*

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-american-farm-bureau-federation-annual-convention-trade-show/

“But, on Wednesday, after two years of hard-fought negotiations, where the farmers and ranchers stood with me all the way—they knew we had to do it. It wasn’t done by other administrations. They didn’t want to do it because it was nasty. We signed a groundbreaking trade agreement with China. (Applause.)

Under this landmark agreement, China will now be purchasing \$40- to \$50 billion of American agricultural products every single year, tripling our agricultural exports to China.”⁵⁰

“And I have to tell you, another benefit, and a very big benefit, is we now perhaps have the best relationship that we’ve had with China in many, many years. And China respects us now. They didn’t respect us. They couldn’t believe they were getting away with what they were getting away with.”⁵¹

“Under the deal, China has agreed to spend many billions of dollars on American services, energy, and manufactured goods. China has made substantial commitments regarding the protection of American ideas, trade secrets, patents, and trademarks. China has also pledged firm action to confront pirated and counterfeit goods. Most important of all, the deal is enforceable—very, very powerfully enforceable. In fact, it was probably the thing that we negotiated the most. And rest assured, we will vigorously enforce its terms. Hopefully, we Won’t have to. Hopefully, it’ll go just as we anticipate.”⁵²

Jan. 24, 2020: President Trump on Twitter, “*China has been working very hard to contain the Coronavirus. The United States greatly appreciates their efforts and transparency.*”

twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1220818115354923009

“China has been working very hard to contain the Coronavirus. The United States greatly appreciates their efforts and transparency. It will all work out well. In particular, on behalf of the American People, I want to thank President Xi!”⁵³

Feb. 4, 2020: President Trump, State of the Union Address, “*For decades, China has taken advantage of the United States. Now we have changed that, but, at the same time, we have perhaps the best relationship we’ve ever had with China, including with President Xi.*”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-state-union-address-3/

“I also promised our citizens that I would impose tariffs to confront China’s massive theft of America’s jobs. Our strategy has worked. Days ago, we signed the groundbreaking new agreement with China that will defend our workers, protect our intellectual property, bring billions and billions of dollars into our treasury, and open vast new markets for products made and grown right here in the USA. (Applause.)

For decades, China has taken advantage of the United States. Now we have changed that, but, at the same time, we have perhaps the best relationship we’ve ever had with China, including with President Xi. They respect what we’ve done because, quite frankly, they could never really believe that they were able to get away with what they were doing year after year, decade after decade, without someone in our country stepping up and saying, ‘That’s enough.’”⁵⁴

Feb. 18, 2020: President Trump on Twitter: *“The United States cannot, & will not, become such a difficult place to deal with in terms of foreign countries buying our product, including for the always used National Security excuse, that our companies will be forced to leave in order to remain competitive.”*

twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1229790099866603521

“The United States cannot, & will not, become such a difficult place to deal with in terms of foreign countries buying our product, including for the always used National Security excuse, that our companies will be forced to leave in order to remain competitive. We want to sell...”⁵⁵

“...product and goods to China and other countries. That’s what trade is all about. We don’t want to make it impossible to do business with us. That will only mean that orders will go to someplace else. As an example, I want China to buy our jet engines, the best in the World...”⁵⁶

“...I have seen some of the regulations being circulated, including those being contemplated by Congress, and they are ridiculous. I want to make it EASY to do business with the United States, not difficult. Everyone in my Administration is being so instructed, with no excuses...”⁵⁷

“...THE UNITED STATES IS OPEN FOR BUSINESS!”⁵⁸

Mar. 20, 2020: Remarks by President Trump, Vice President Pence, and Members of the Coronavirus Task Force in Press Briefing, *“There’s been some discussion about China and what they knew and when they knew it. And I’ve been very critical. We need to know immediately.”*

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-vice-president-pence-members-c-oronavirus-task-force-press-briefing/

“There’s been some discussion about China and what they knew and when they knew it. And I’ve been very critical. We need to know immediately. The world is entitled to know. The Chinese government was the first to know of this risk to the world. And that puts a special obligation to make sure that data—that data gets to our scientists, our professionals. This is not about retribution. This matters going forward.”⁵⁹

Mar. 22, 2020: Remarks by President Trump, Vice President Pence, and Members of the Coronavirus Task Force in Press Briefing, *“The fight against the Chinese virus...”*

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-vice-president-pence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-briefing-8/

“The fight against the Chinese virus”:

“As we continue to marshal every resource at America’s disposal in the fight against the Chinese virus, we’re profoundly grateful to our nation’s state and local leaders, doctors, nurses, law enforcement, and first responders who are waging this battle on the ground.”⁶⁰

“I did discuss that about sending our people in. And, they didn’t really respond”:

“But they should have told us about this. And I did ask him whether or not we could send some people, and they didn’t want that—out of pride. I think, really, out of pride. They don’t want—they don’t want us sending people into China, to help them. You know, China is a strong country. They have—they have their scientists and they have their doctors—very smart. A lot of people.

And, you know, but I did discuss that about sending our people in. And, they didn’t really respond. We went again; they didn’t respond. If they went in, they would have been able to tell us—give us a much earlier indication. But we had an early indication, and that’s why I closed out China. I mean, I felt—it was my instinct, but that’s why I closed out China at a very early time.”⁶¹

Mar. 24, 2020: Remarks by President Trump, Vice President Pence, and Members of the Coronavirus Task Force in Press Briefing, “*They very much stepped up their purchases, and significantly. So we’re very happy about that.*”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-vice-president-pence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-briefing-9/

“By the way, I just want to say while we’re thinking about it: China has very much stepped up, as you probably know, the agricultural purchases from our farmers, and some other purchases too. So they have a difficult time also right now. But they very much stepped up their purchases, and significantly. So we’re very happy about that.”⁶²

Mar. 26, 2020: Remarks by President Trump, Vice President Pence, and Members of the Coronavirus Task Force in Press Briefing, “*I talk about the Chinese virus and—and I mean it. That’s where it came from.*”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-vice-president-pence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-briefing-12/

“I think it was time though, because, you know, I talk about the Chinese virus and—and I mean it. That’s where it came from. You know, if you look at Ebola, if you look at all—Lyme. Right? Lyme, Connecticut. You look at all these different, horrible diseases, they seem to come with a name with the location. And this was a Chinese virus. But I don’t have to say it, if they feel so strongly about it. We’ll see.

But, you know, we have—we just made a great deal with China—great, hopefully, for both parties. But we’ve made a deal with China and we’re going to do another one, it looks like.”⁶³

April 14, 2020: President Trump, Remarks in Press Briefing, “*The WHO pushed China’s misinformation about the virus...*”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-briefing/

“The silence of the WHO on the disappearance of scientific researchers and doctors and on new restrictions on the sharing of research into the origins of COVID-19 in the country of origin is deeply concerning, especially when we put up, by far, the largest amount of money. Not even close.

Had the WHO done its job to get medical experts into China to objectively assess the situation on the ground and to call out China’s lack of transparency, the outbreak could have been contained at its source, with very little death—very little death—and certainly very little death by comparison. This would have saved thousands of lives and avoided worldwide economic damage.

Instead, the WHO willingly took China’s assurances to face value, and they took it just at face value and defended the actions of the Chinese government, even praising China for its so-called transparency. I don’t think so. The WHO pushed China’s misinformation about the virus, saying it was not communicable and there was no need for travel bans.”⁶⁴

Apr. 17, 2020: Remarks by President Trump, Vice President Pence, and Members of the Coronavirus Task Force in Press Briefing, “*I’m not happy with China.*”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-vice-president-pence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-briefing-april-17-2020/

“And, in all fairness, World Health couldn’t get in, and that’s why I wish they took a different stance. They took a very pathetic stance and a very weak stance. But they say they couldn’t get in.

But, ultimately, they got in; they got in much sooner than anybody, but they didn’t report what was happening. They didn’t report what was happening inside of China. No, I’m not happy with China.”⁶⁵

Apr. 27, 2020: Remarks by President Trump, Vice President Pence, and Members of the Coronavirus Task Force in Press Briefing, “*We are not happy with China. We are not happy with that whole situation because we believe it could have been stopped at the source...*”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-vice-president-pence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-briefing-33/

“And we are not happy with China. We are not happy with that whole situation because we believe it could have been stopped at the source”:

“We’re doing very serious investigations, as you probably know. And we are not happy with China. We are not happy with that whole situation because we believe it could have been stopped at the source, it could have been stopped quickly, and it wouldn’t have spread all over the world. And we think that should have happened. So we’ll let you know at the appropriate time, but we are doing serious investigations.”⁶⁶

Question: “Germany sent a bill to China for 130 billion dollars in—excuse me, 130 billion euros for the damages caused by the coronavirus. Would your administration look at doing the same?” ⁶⁷

“Well, we can do something much easier than that. We have ways of doing things a lot easier than that. But Germany is looking at things and we’re looking at things. And we’re talking about a lot more money than Germany is talking about.”⁶⁸

Apr. 29, 2020: President Trump, Reuters Interview, “Exclusive Trump says China wants him to lose his re-election bid”

[reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-china-exclusive/exclusive-president-trump-says-china-wants-him-to-lose-re-electionrace-idUSKBN22C01F](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-china-exclusive/exclusive-president-trump-says-china-wants-him-to-lose-re-electionrace-idUSKBN22C01F)

“‘China will do anything they can to have me lose this race,’ said Trump. He said he believes Beijing wants his Democratic opponent, Joe Biden, to win the election to ease the pressure Trump has placed on China over trade and other issues.”⁶⁹

May 1, 2020: President Trump, Remarks on Protecting America’s Seniors, “China doesn’t want to see me elected...”

[whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-protecting-americas-seniors/](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-protecting-americas-seniors/)

“Well, China doesn’t want to see me elected”:

“Well, China doesn’t want to see me elected, and the reason is that we’re getting billions and billions of dollars—many billions of dollars a month from China. China never gave our country anything. China gave us nothing. Not 10 cents. And whether it was Biden in charge of China, which was a joke because he ripped off—they ripped off our country for eight years. And in all fairness to Biden and Obama, this went on long before they got into office. I mean, you can go through many administrations until I came along.

And then we signed a trade deal where they’re supposed to buy, and they’ve been buying a lot actually, but that now becomes secondary to what took place with the virus. The virus situation is just not acceptable.”⁷⁰

“But when I was—of course. I was very rough with China. I mean, Biden, as an example—the previous administration, they let China rip off this country like nobody has ever ripped off this country.” ⁷¹

“Q Mr. President, you keep referring to China, but do you hold President Xi Jinping responsible for misinformation?”

“Well, I don’t want to say that. I don’t want to say that. But certainly, it could have been stopped. It came out of China, and it could have been stopped, and I wish they stopped it. And so does the whole world—wish they stopped it.”⁷²

“Q And then on holding them—and then on holding them accountable, is that something you’d prefer to do now in the next few weeks or —”:

“No, I don’t want to do that. I want to find out what happened. I think we’ll be able to get a very good, very powerful definition of exactly what happened. We’re working on it strongly now and I think it’s going to be very powerful. But they could have stopped it. They are a very brilliant nation—scientifically and otherwise. It got loose, let’s say, and they could have capped it. They could have stopped it. But they didn’t. And—but they stopped planes from going to China, but they didn’t stop them from going to the rest of the world. What was that all about?”⁷³

“Q Mr. President, would you consider having the United States not pay its debt obligations to China as punishment for the virus?”:

“Well, I can do it differently. I can do the same thing, but even for more money just by putting on tariffs. So I don’t have to do that.

You know, it’s appr—it’s approximately a trillion dollars—a little bit more, as I understand it. A trillion dollars. But we can do that in a, I think, probably a little bit of a more forthright manner. You start playing those games and that’s tough. You know, we have the dollar to protect. We want to protect the sanctity of the dollar, the importance of the dollar. It’s the greatest currency in the history of the world. It’s become stronger.

We have a very strong dollar. That’s why we’re borrowing at zero—zero interest rate. You know, with all of the stimulus that we’re talking about, we’re—that sounds good though, General, doesn’t it? We’re paying zero interest so, essentially right around zero, but zero. And you want to protect—it’s a very good question.

You know, you say, ‘Oh, gee. You owe us. We owe you a certain amount of money. We’re going to keep it.’ But when you start playing that game, you’re really hurting the sanctity, the importance of the greatest currency on Earth. But we can do it in other ways. We can do it with tariffs. We can do it other ways, even beyond that, without having to play that game. That’s a rough game.”⁷⁴

“So far, I think China has been trying to be—or at least they seem to be trying to be somewhat transparent with us, but we’re going to find out”:

“So far, I think China has been trying to be—or at least they seem to be trying to be somewhat transparent with us, but we’re going to find out. You’ll be learning in the not-too-distant future. But it’s a terrible thing that happened.

Whether they made a mistake or whether it started off as a mistake, and then they made another one or—did somebody do something on purpose? Say, ‘Hey...’ You know, I don’t understand how traffic, how people weren’t allowed into the rest of China, but they were allowed into the rest of the world. That’s a bad—that’s a hard question for them to answer.”⁷⁵

May 4, 2020: President Trump, Remarks in a Fox News Virtual Town Hall, “*Now they have to buy, and if they don’t buy, we’ll terminate the deal. Very simple.*”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-fox-news-virtual-town-hall/

“Now they have to buy, and if they don’t buy, we’ll terminate the deal. Very simple.”⁷⁶

May 15, 2020: President Trump, Remarks Before Marine One Departure, “*The trade deal—I don’t know, somehow I lost a little flavor for it.*”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-91/

“I just don’t want to talk to him right now. We’ll—we’ll see what happens over the next little while. They’re buying a lot of our material. They’re spending a lot on the trade deal, but the trade deal—I don’t know, somehow I lost a little flavor for it. You can understand.”⁷⁷

May 19, 2020: President Trump, Remarks in a Cabinet Meeting, “*I feel differently now about that deal than I did three months ago. And we’ll see what all happens.*”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-cabinet-meeting-17/

“And the China deal is kicking in. They’re buying a lot, but I feel differently now about that deal than I did three months ago. And we’ll see what all happens.

But it’s been a very disappointing situation. Very disappointing thing happened with China because the plague flowed in. And that wasn’t supposed to happen, and it could have been stopped.”⁷⁸

“Q When you say you feel “differently” now about the China trade deal, could you amplify on that a little bit?”

“No, it just seems to mean less to me, because, you know, we did this great deal with China—they have to buy billions and billions of dollars of product, farm product and other product, and it was very exciting. One of the biggest deals ever made.

Actually, not as big as the USMCA, which surprises people. But it could have been bigger over a period of time, because the potential there is just beginning, in a sense. And it was very exciting.

But once the virus came in—once the plague, as I call it, came in, I said, ‘How did they let that happen? How did they let that happen?’ And how come it didn’t go into other sections of China? Why did they block it from leaving Wuhan but they didn’t block it from going to the rest of the world, including the United States? Why is that? Beijing doesn’t have it; other places don’t have it. So why is it that it was blocked very effectively from leaving that area and going into China, but it went out to the rest of the world, including the United States? And why didn’t they let us go in and help them fix it? So I’m very disappointed in China.”⁷⁹

May 20, 2020: President Trump on Twitter: “China is on a massive disinformation campaign because they are desperate to have Sleepy Joe Biden win the presidential race.”

twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1263282623939477511

“China is on a massive disinformation campaign because they are desperate to have Sleepy Joe Biden win the presidential race so they can continue to rip-off the United States, as they have done for decades, until I came along!”⁸⁰

May 21, 2020: President Trump, Remarks Before Marine One Departure, “We’re probably going to make a deal with Russia on arms treaty. And China will be maybe included in that.”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-92/

“But whenever there’s an agreement that another party doesn’t agree to—you know, we have many of those agreements around the world, where it’s a two-party agreement, but they don’t adhere to it and we do. When we have things like that, we pull out also. That’s why, with the arms treaties, if you look at the arms treaties, we’re probably going to make a deal with Russia on arms treaty. And China will be maybe included in that. We’ll see what happens.”⁸¹

May 29, 2020: President Trump, Remarks in the Rose Garden on Actions Against China

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-actions-china/

“I never solely blamed China”:

“But I never solely blamed China for this. They were able to get away with a theft like no one was able to get away with before because of past politicians and, frankly, past presidents. But unlike those who came before, my administration negotiated and fought for what was right. It’s called: fair and reciprocal treatment.”⁸²

“China’s cover-up of the Wuhan virus allowed the disease to spread all over the world, instigating a global pandemic”:

“The world is now suffering as a result of the malfeasance of the Chinese government. China’s cover-up of the Wuhan virus allowed the disease to spread all over the world, instigating a global pandemic that has cost more than 100,000 American lives and over a million lives worldwide.”⁸³

“I will issue a proclamation to better secure our nation’s vital university research and to suspend the entry of certain foreign nationals from China who we have identified as potential security risks”:

“This pandemic has underscored the crucial importance of building up America’s economic independence, reshoring our critical supply chains and protecting America’s scientific and technological advances.

For years, the government of China has conducted illicit espionage to steal our industrial secrets, of which there are many. Today, I will issue a proclamation to better secure our nation’s vital university research and to suspend the entry of certain foreign nationals from China who we have identified as potential security risks.”⁸⁴

“Investment firms should not be subjecting their clients to the hidden and undue risks associated with financing Chinese companies that do not play by the same rules”:

“I am also taking action to protect the integrity of America’s financial system—by far, the best in the world. I am instructing my Presidential Working Group on Financial Markets to study the differing practices of Chinese companies listed on the U.S. financial markets, with the goal of protecting American investors.

Investment firms should not be subjecting their clients to the hidden and undue risks associated with financing Chinese companies that do not play by the same rules. Americans are entitled to fairness and transparency.”⁸⁵

“I am directing my administration to begin the process of eliminating policy exemptions that give Hong Kong different and special treatment”:

“China’s latest incursion, along with other recent developments that degraded the territory’s freedoms, makes clear that Hong Kong is no longer sufficiently autonomous to warrant the special treatment that we have afforded the territory since the handover.

China has replaced its promised formula of ‘one country, two systems’ with ‘one country, one system.’

Therefore, I am directing my administration to begin the process of eliminating policy exemptions that give Hong Kong different and special treatment.

My announcement today will affect the full range of agreements we have with Hong Kong, from our extradition treaty to our export controls on dual-use technologies and more, with few exceptions.

We will be revising the State Department's travel advisory for Hong Kong to reflect the increased danger of surveillance and punishment by the Chinese state security apparatus.

We will take action to revoke Hong Kong's preferential treatment as a separate customs and travel territory from the rest of China.

The United States will also take necessary steps to sanction PRC and Hong Kong officials directly or indirectly involved in eroding Hong Kong's autonomy and—just if you take a look, smothering—absolutely smothering Hong Kong's freedom. Our actions will be strong. Our actions will be meaningful.”⁸⁶

May 30, 2020: President Trump, Remarks in Roundtable Discussion with Industry Executives on Reopening, *“We’re very, very saddened by what happened to our relationship with China.”*

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-roundtable-discussion-industry-executives-reopening/

“Q If I could follow up: Are you going to eliminate the special status for Hong Kong? I know you announced the measures (inaudible)”:

“Well, we’re talking about doing a lot of things. And we’re not—we’re very, very saddened by what happened to our relationship with China.

They should have never allowed this to happen. They could have stopped it at the source. We asked them to come in and help them and they didn’t want help from anybody. Even the World Health Organization, they wanted to go in and they were delayed. But we asked to go in, very specifically, and they didn’t want any help. They didn’t need any help. And then it got out of control in some form.”⁸⁷



2. “U.S. STRATEGIC APPROACH TO CHINA”

—White House Report in Accordance with FY2019 NDAA⁸⁸
Quotations from White House, DOD, State, CIA, FBI, DNI

Apr. 7, 2017: The White House, “Statement from the Press Secretary on the United States-China Visit”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-united-states-china-visit/

“They established a new and cabinet-level framework for negotiations. The United States-China Comprehensive Dialogue will be overseen by the two presidents and have four pillars: the Diplomatic and Security Dialogue; the Comprehensive Economic Dialogue; the Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue; and the Social and Cultural Issues Dialogue. The two sides agreed to undertake an ambitious agenda and meeting schedule to show progress and demonstrate meaningful results.”⁸⁹

Photo Caption: U.S. Vice President Mike Pence offers remarks on the Trump administration's strategic approach towards China at Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C., on October 4, 2018. (Hudson Institute)

Dec. 2017: President of the United States, “National Security Strategy”

[whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf)

“China and Russia want to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests”:

“China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity. They are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence.”⁹⁰

“China and Russia want to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests. China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor.”⁹¹

“Enhanced missile defense is not intended to undermine strategic stability or disrupt longstanding strategic relationships with Russia or China”:

“The United States is deploying a layered missile defense system focused on North Korea and Iran to defend our homeland against missile attacks. This system will include the ability to defeat missile threats prior to launch. Enhanced missile defense is not intended to undermine strategic stability or disrupt longstanding strategic relationships with Russia or China.”⁹²

“Contrary to our hopes, China expanded its power at the expense of the sovereignty of others”:

“For decades, U.S. policy was rooted in the belief that support for China’s rise and for its integration into the post-war international order would liberalize China. Contrary to our hopes, China expanded its power at the expense of the sovereignty of others. China gathers and exploits data on an unrivaled scale and spreads features of its authoritarian system, including corruption and the use of surveillance. It is building the most capable and well-funded military in the world, after our own. Its nuclear arsenal is growing and diversifying.”⁹³

“Chinese dominance risks diminishing the sovereignty of many states in the Indo-Pacific”:

“Its efforts to build and militarize outposts in the South China Sea endanger the free flow of trade, threaten the sovereignty of other nations, and undermine regional stability. China has mounted a rapid military modernization campaign designed to limit U.S. access to the region and provide China a freer hand there. China presents its ambitions as mutually beneficial, but Chinese dominance risks diminishing the sovereignty of many states in the Indo-Pacific.”⁹⁴

“An alternative to China’s often extractive economic footprint on the continent”:

“We will expand trade and commercial ties to create jobs and build wealth for Americans and Africans. We will work with reform-oriented governments to help establish conditions that can transform them into trading partners and improve their

business environment. We will support economic integration among African states. We will work with nations that seek to move beyond Assistance to partnerships that promote prosperity. We will offer American goods and services, both because it is profitable for us and because it serves as an alternative to China's often extractive economic footprint on the continent.”⁹⁵

Jan. 2018: Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy”

dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf

“Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.

China is a strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features in the South China Sea.”⁹⁶

“The far-reaching objective of this defense strategy is to set the military relationship between our two countries on a path of transparency and non-aggression”:

“The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.

China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage. As China continues its economic and military ascendance, asserting power through an all-of-nation long-term strategy, it will continue to pursue a military modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future. The far-reaching objective of this defense strategy is to set the military relationship between our two countries on a path of transparency and non-aggression.”⁹⁷

Jul. 14, 2018: Michael Collins, Deputy Assistant Director of CIA, East Asia and Pacific Mission Center, Remarks at the Aspen Security Forum, “*The Chinese fundamentally seek to replace the United States as the leading power in the world.*”

“But look, at the end of the day, the Chinese fundamentally seek to replace the United States as the leading power in the world. We wouldn’t have said that 10, 15 years ago. Increasingly, the Chinese ...

Let me be careful about this, because terms are important in what we're talking about, what we're not talking about. We're talking about this rising China under this leadership directed by this Communist Party of China. I say that with purpose, because the Chinese will accuse commentary like this as being anti-China or anti-Chinese. The threat that China poses to US national security, economic interests, political wellbeing, and the international order we stand behind, is not necessary coming from the country itself, its rise, its contribution to international wellbeing, nor from the diaspora or the Chinese citizenry in general. It's under this leadership, which increasingly has been aspiring, expanding its ambitions, its interests, its activities around the globe to compete with the United States, and at the end of the day, to undermine our influence relative to their influence."⁹⁸

Jul. 18, 2018: FBI Director Christopher Wray, Remarks at the Aspen Security Forum, "*China is trying to position itself as the sole dominant superpower...*"

aspensecurityforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ASF-2018-A-Chat-with-Christopher-Wray.pdf

"China is trying to position itself as the sole dominant superpower, the sole dominant economic power. They're trying to replace the United States in that role. There is a long-term game that is focused on, as I said, just about every industry, every corner of society in many ways. It involves academia, it involves research and development, it involves everything from agriculture to high tech. There is a, as I said, a more pervasive, a broader approach, but, in many ways, more of a long-term threat to the country."⁹⁹

Sept. 25, 2018: CBS: "DNI Dan Coats Warns China Cyber Activities Target U.S. State, Local Governments"

cbsnews.com/news/dni-dan-coats-warns-china-cyber-activities-target-u-s-state-local-governments/

"Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats issued one of the starkest and most explicit warnings to date about China's cyber activities, calling them 'unprecedented in scale' and explicitly aimed at undermining U.S. interests at home and abroad.

In remarks at The Citadel, a military college in South Carolina, Coats said the Chinese government is actively targeting U.S. state and local governments and officials, 'trying to exploit any divisions between federal and local levels on policy.' He did not name either states or officials, nor did he elaborate on which policies had been targeted.

His warning about the breadth of China's activities was itself broad. 'From its continued hacking of our defense secrets to its focus on collecting vast repositories of personal and personality-identifying information to better enable espionage activities, China exploits our transparency and open society,' Coats said."¹⁰⁰

Oct. 4, 2018: Vice President Pence at Hudson Institute, “Remarks on the Administration’s Policy Toward China”

“President Trump made clear that the United States of America has adopted a new approach to China”:

“In this strategy, President Trump made clear that the United States of America has adopted a new approach to China. We seek a relationship grounded in fairness, reciprocity, and respect for sovereignty, and we have taken strong and swift action to achieve that goal.”¹⁰¹

“The dream of freedom remains distant for the Chinese people”:

“Previous administrations made this choice in the hope that freedom in China would expand in all of its forms— not just economically, but politically, with a newfound respect for classical liberal principles, private property, personal liberty, religious freedom—the entire family of human rights. But that hope has gone unfulfilled.

The dream of freedom remains distant for the Chinese people. And while Beijing still pays lip service to ‘reform and opening,’ Deng Xiaoping’s famous policy now rings hollow.”¹⁰²

“Beijing has directed its bureaucrats and businesses to obtain American intellectual property—the foundation of our economic leadership—by any means necessary”:

“Now, through the ‘Made in China 2025’ plan, the Communist Party has set its sights on controlling 90 percent of the world’s most advanced industries, including robotics, biotechnology, and artificial intelligence. To win the commanding heights of the 21st century economy, Beijing has directed its bureaucrats and businesses to obtain American intellectual property—the foundation of our economic leadership—by any means necessary.

Beijing now requires many American businesses to hand over their trade secrets as the cost of doing business in China. It also coordinates and sponsors the acquisition of American firms to gain ownership of their creations. Worst of all, Chinese security agencies have masterminded the wholesale theft of American technology— including cutting-edge military blueprints. And using that stolen technology, the Chinese Communist Party is turning plowshares into swords on a massive scale.”¹⁰³

“China wants nothing less than to push the United States of America from the Western Pacific and attempt to prevent us from coming to the aid of our allies. But they will fail”:

“China now spends as much on its military as the rest of Asia combined, and Beijing has prioritized capabilities to erode America’s military advantages on land, at sea, in the air, and in space. China wants nothing less than to push the United States of America from the Western Pacific and attempt to prevent us from coming to the aid of our allies. But they will fail.

Beijing is also using its power like never before. Chinese ships routinely patrol around the Senkaku Islands, which are administered by Japan. And while China’s leader stood in the Rose Garden at the White House in 2015 and said that his country had, and I quote, ‘no intention to militarize’ the South China Sea, today, Beijing has deployed advanced anti-ship and anti-air missiles atop an archipelago of military bases constructed on artificial islands.”¹⁰⁴

“Previous administrations all but ignored China’s actions. And in many cases, they abetted them. But those days are over”:

“Now these are only a few of the ways that China has sought to advance its strategic interests across the world, with growing intensity and sophistication. Yet previous administrations all but ignored China’s actions. And in many cases, they abetted them. But those days are over.

Under President Trump’s leadership, the United States of America has been defending our interests with renewed American strength.”¹⁰⁵

“We’re investing as never before in our armed forces”:

“We’ve been making the strongest military in the history of the world stronger still. Earlier this year, President Trump signed into law the largest increase in our national defense since the days of Ronald Reagan—\$716 billion to extend the strength of the American military to every domain.

We’re modernizing our nuclear arsenal. We’re fielding and developing new cutting-edge fighters and bombers. We’re building a new generation of aircraft carriers and warships. We’re investing as never before in our armed forces. And this includes initiating the process to establish the United States Space Force to ensure our continued dominance in space, and we’ve taken action to authorize increased capability in the cyber world to build deterrence against our adversaries.”¹⁰⁶

“We will levy even more tariffs, with the possibility of substantially more than doubling that number, unless a fair and reciprocal deal is made”:

“At President Trump’s direction, we’re also implementing tariffs on \$250 billion in Chinese goods, with the highest tariffs specifically targeting the advanced industries that Beijing is trying to capture and control. And as the President has also made clear, we will levy even more tariffs, with the possibility of substantially more than doubling that number, unless a fair and reciprocal deal is made.”¹⁰⁷

“There can be no doubt: China is meddling in America’s democracy”:

“As I said before, as we speak, Beijing is employing a whole-of-government approach to advance its influence and benefit its interests. It’s employing this power in more proactive and coercive ways to interfere in the domestic policies of this country and to interfere in the politics of the United States.

The Chinese Communist Party is rewarding or coercing American businesses, movie studios, universities, think tanks, scholars, journalists, and local, state, and federal officials.

And worst of all, China has initiated an unprecedented effort to influence American public opinion, the 2018 elections, and the environment leading into the 2020 presidential elections. To put it bluntly, President Trump's leadership is working; and China wants a different American President.

There can be no doubt: China is meddling in America's democracy. As President Trump said just last week, we have, in his words, 'found that China has been attempting to interfere in our upcoming [midterm] election[s].'¹⁰⁸

“America's commitment to the Indo-Pacific has never been stronger”:

“We're forging new trade deals on a bilateral basis, just as last week President Trump signed an improved trade deal with South Korea. And we will soon begin historic negotiations for a bilateral free-trade deal with Japan.

I'm also pleased to report that we're streamlining international development and finance programs. We'll be giving foreign nations a just and transparent alternative to China's debt-trap diplomacy. In fact, this week, President Trump will sign the BUILD Act into law.

Next month, it will be my privilege to represent the United States in Singapore and Papua New Guinea, at ASEAN and APEC. There, we will unveil new measures and programs to support a free and open Indo-Pacific. And on behalf of the President, I will deliver the message that America's commitment to the Indo-Pacific has never been stronger.”¹⁰⁹

Apr. 29, 2019: Kiron Skinner, Director of Policy Planning, Department of State, “What Does the State Department Think Will Be the Challenges of 2030?”

warontherocks.com/2019/05/problematic-thinking-on-china-from-the-state-departments-head-of-policy-planning/

“This is a fight with a really different civilization and a different ideology, and the United States hasn't had that before”:

“[Competition with China] is different as an adversarial dyad than in the 20th century with the Soviet Union in the sense that ... when we think about the Soviet Union and that competition, in a way it was a fight within the Western family. Karl Marx was a German Jew who developed a philosophy that was within the larger body of political thought ... that has some tenants even within classical liberalism... You could look at the Soviet Union—part West, part East—but it had some openings there that got us the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 which was a really important Western concept that opened the door to undermine the Soviet Union—a totalitarian state—on human rights principles. That's not really possible with China. This is a fight with a really different civilization and a different ideology, and the United States hasn't had that before. Nor has it had an economic competitor the way that we have. The Soviet Union was a country with nuclear weapons, a huge

Red Army, but a backwards economy. ... In China we have an economic competitor, we have an ideological competitor, one that really does seek a kind of global reach that many of us didn't expect a couple of decades ago. And I think it's also really striking that it's the first time that we'll have a great power competitor that is not Caucasian."¹¹⁰

Jul. 12, 2019: Secretary of State Pompeo, Interview with Sebastian Gorka, *"China is a nation that has a set of values that are so deeply at odds with the American way that we think about the world."*

state.gov/interview-with-sebastian-gorka-of-america-first/#.XskWepY9HdY.twitter

"It is absolutely the case that China is a nation that has a set of values that are so deeply at odds with the American way that we think about the world. You see it in President Trump's efforts on trade. You see it in our efforts in the South China Sea. It's a country that has emerged in a way that is not good for global trade, not good for freedom and the very values that the United States sets.

Our mission set in the State Department today is to execute the President's vision, which is that if China is prepared to compete on a fair and reciprocal and transparent basis, that is perfectly reasonable. We hold no grudge against that. But if they're going to do so in ways that are inconsistent with those fundamental freedoms, then the United States is going to respond in a way that is appropriate to try and deliver on that outcome on behalf of the American people."¹¹¹

Jul. 16, 2019: *Breitbart*: "John Bolton: Apple, Google Would Compromise U.S. Safety for Chinese Market Share"

breitbart.com/politics/2019/07/16/john-bolton-trump-technology-chinese-market-share/

"They're so desperate for market share that they'll do things to compromise our safety here":

"Whether it's Apple, Google, or any of the high tech companies, any of the social media companies, they're so desperate for market share that they'll do things to compromise our safety here,' John Bolton said at the inaugural National Conservatism Conference in Washington, DC.

'It calls to mind Lenin's famous remark that the "Capitalists will sell us the rope we hang them with." And I say to that—'Not on our watch,' he said. 'That's called taking a hard line.'" ¹¹²

"We're entitled to look at Chinese companies like Huawei and say, 'You're not selling in the United States'":

"In the case of any of the high tech companies, when they engage in activity that benefits China and potentially harms America ... we're entitled to look at Chinese companies like Huawei and say, 'You're not selling in the United States.'"

'We don't want your malign intentions to gain control and access to all of our telecommunications and information technology systems. We're not going to pretend you're a real private company engaged in real private competition. You're a state-owned enterprise doing what your masters in Beijing want you to do,' he said." ¹¹³

“Contrary to the argument that a more prosperous China will become a more democratic China, the opposite has happened. We now have Xi Jinping, the most authoritarian Chinese ruler since Mao Zedong”:

“We agreed China should come into the World Trade Organization (WTO) 20 years ago, and I remember the arguments very well,” he said. “I accepted the arguments that China would come into the WTO, the pressure of international norms would force it to change their system, they would behave, they would become more like us, and by the way, they would become more democratic too.”

“Neither of those things have happened,” he said. “The Chinese played the WTO like a fiddle for 20 years. They’ve taken advantage of us and everyone else in it. Contrary to the argument that a more prosperous China will become a more democratic China, the opposite has happened. We now have Xi Jinping, the most authoritarian Chinese ruler since Mao Zedong.”” ¹¹⁴

“We see very hostile activity by China on a range of military fronts”:

““We see very hostile activity by China on a range of military fronts, in the East China Sea, the South China Sea. We see a tremendous build-up of their nuclear and ballistic missile and blue-water navy capabilities, and we see a very determined form of mercantilistic economic policy internationally, and I think it’s on that front that the president has particularly confronted China,” he said.” ¹¹⁵

“Elements of Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations”:

“He demurred on whether the U.S. was approaching a ‘Cold War’ with China but said there are ‘elements of Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations’—the historian’s theory that conflict would eventually come, not between nations, but between cultures.

‘Ultimately, national, political, and military power and its projection around the world rests on economic power. And when one country is abusing the rules of the international trading system for its own advantage, particularly taking advantage of the United States, that should stop,’ Bolton said.”

Jul. 31, 2019: *Breaking Defense: "Competition (With China) IS the New Deterrence, US Military Leaders Say"*

breakingdefense.com/2019/07/competition-with-china-is-the-new-deterrence-us-military-leader-say/

Gen. Timothy Ray, commander of Air Force Global Strike Command:

"At the same time, Ray said that the US military cannot simply 'spend our way out of this competition' with China. Rather, he said, the US must very carefully recalculate its international relationships and its responses. That includes understanding how you can keep an edge in geopolitics and economic competition that is sustainable, something that US political leaders 'in Washington' especially have to focus on, Ray said. 'You can try to set a pace in a race that you can't keep, or you can pick the races in which you can set the pace at a rate where you can have a dominant hand.'"¹¹⁶

Oct. 24, 2019: Remarks by Vice President Pence at the Frederic V. Malek Memorial Lecture, *"No longer will America and its leaders hope that economic engagement alone will transform Communist China's authoritarian state..."*

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-frederic-v-malek-memorial-lecture/

"No longer will America and its leaders hope that economic engagement alone will transform Communist China's authoritarian state into a free and open society that respects private property, the rule of law, and international rules of commerce."¹¹⁷

"Taiwan's place as one of the world's great trading economies and beacons of Chinese culture and democracy":

"And we've stood by Taiwan in defense of her hard-won freedoms. Under this administration, we've authorized additional military sales and recognized Taiwan's place as one of the world's great trading economies and beacons of Chinese culture and democracy."¹¹⁸

"The international community must never forget that its engagement with Taiwan does not threaten the peace; it protects peace on Taiwan and throughout the region. America will always believe that Taiwan's embrace of democracy shows a better path for all the Chinese people."¹¹⁹

"We are not seeking to contain China's development. We want a constructive relationship with China's leaders":

"We are not seeking to contain China's development. We want a constructive relationship with China's leaders, like we have enjoyed for generations with China's people. And if China will step forward and seize this unique moment in history to start anew by ending the trade practices that have taken advantage of the American people for far too long, I know President Donald Trump is ready and willing to begin that new future...."¹²⁰

“People sometimes ask whether the Trump administration seeks to ‘de-couple’ from China. The answer is a resounding ‘no’”:

“The American people want better for the people of China. But in pursuit of that end, we must take China as it is, not as we imagine or hope it might be someday.

And people sometimes ask whether the Trump administration seeks to ‘de-couple’ from China. The answer is a resounding ‘no.’ The United States seeks engagement with China and China’s engagement with the wider world, but engagement in a manner consistent with fairness, mutual respect, and the international rules of commerce.”¹²¹

Oct. 30, 2019: Secretary of State Pompeo at Hudson Institute’s Herman Kahn Award Gala, “The China Challenge”

state.gov/the-china-challenge/

“I’ll be clear about what the United States wants: We don’t want a confrontation with the People’s Republic of China. In fact, we want just the opposite.

We want to see a prosperous China that is at peace with its own people and with its neighbors.

We want to see a thriving China where the Chinese business community transact business with the rest of the world on a fair set of reciprocal terms that we all know and understand.

And we want to see a liberalized China that allows the genius of its people to flourish.

And we want to see a China that respects basic human rights of its own people, as guaranteed by its own constitution.”¹²²



U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo gives remarks at the Hudson Institute’s Herman Kahn Award Gala on October 30, 2019.

“We don’t want them to engage in violence either. We hope they can find a path forward that is consistent with the idea of ‘One Country, Two Systems’”:

“We say this to—I say this to my Chinese counterparts, I say this publicly when we want the protesters to hear this too. We don’t want them to engage in violence either. We hope they can find a path forward that is consistent with the idea of ‘One Country, Two Systems.’ That’s the commitment that the Chinese Government made. We hope they’ll live up to it.”

Apr. 24, 2020: Secretary of State Pompeo, Interview with David Brody, “*The difference in how this administration relates to the Chinese Communist Party.*”

state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-with-david-brody-of-faith-nation-with-david-brody-cbn/

“This President has taken fundamentally a hundred and eighty degrees different approach with respect to how we respond to the challenge that China presents to American security”:

“I’ve seen the difference in how this administration relates to the Chinese Communist Party. The previous administration allowed China to walk all over us and gain trade, great opportunities, create wealth and trade benefits for China. This President has taken fundamentally a hundred and eighty degrees different approach with respect to how we respond to the challenge that China presents to American security.”¹²³

“Relative to this administration, they were wildly soft. It wasn’t just trade. It was during the previous administration that the Chinese Government began to arm the South China Sea, something that General Secretary Xi said he would not do. The previous administration didn’t respond. It allowed them to continue to develop their capacity to move their People’s Liberation Army—excuse me—People’s Liberation Navy out and around in the South China Sea. That was the kind of things that the previous administration permitted, and this administration has worked very hard to turn that around and make sure that everywhere there was an American interest we strongly protected it.”¹²⁴

May 20, 2020: The White House, “United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China”

whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/U.S.-Strategic-Approach-to-The-Peoples-Republic-of-China-Report-5.20.20.pdf

“Our competitive approach to the PRC has two objectives”:

“Our competitive approach to the PRC has two objectives: first, to improve the resiliency of our institutions, alliances, and partnerships to prevail against the challenges the PRC presents; and second, to compel Beijing to cease or reduce actions harmful to the United States’ vital, national interests and those of our allies and partners. Even as we compete with the PRC, we welcome cooperation where our interests align. Competition need not lead to confrontation or conflict. The United States has a deep and abiding respect for the Chinese people and enjoys longstanding ties to the country. We do not seek to contain China’s development, nor do we wish to disengage from the Chinese people. The United States expects to engage in fair competition with the PRC, whereby both of our nations, businesses, and individuals can enjoy security and prosperity.”¹²⁵

“United States policies are designed to protect our interests and empower our institutions to withstand the CCP’s malign behavior”:

“United States policies are not premised on an attempt to change the PRC’s domestic governance model, nor do they make concessions to the CCP’s narratives of exceptionalism and victimhood. Rather, United States policies are designed to

protect our interests and empower our institutions to withstand the CCP's malign behavior and collateral damage from the PRC's internal governance problems. Whether the PRC eventually converges with the principles of the free and open order can only be determined by the Chinese people themselves. We recognize that Beijing, not Washington, has agency over and responsibility for the PRC government's actions."¹²⁶

“When quiet diplomacy proves futile, the United States will increase public pressure on the PRC government and take action to protect United States interests by leveraging proportional costs when necessary”:

“The United States sees no value in engaging with Beijing for symbolism and pageantry; we instead demand tangible results and constructive outcomes. We acknowledge and respond in kind to Beijing's transactional approach with timely incentives and costs, or credible threats thereof. When quiet diplomacy proves futile, the United States will increase public pressure on the PRC government and take action to protect United States interests by leveraging proportional costs when necessary.”¹²⁷

“Our whole-of-government approach supports fair trade and advances United States competitiveness, promotes United States exports, and breaks down unjust barriers to United States trade and investment”:

“The United States is committed to rebalancing the United States-China economic relationship. Our whole-of-government approach supports fair trade and advances United States competitiveness, promotes United States exports, and breaks down unjust barriers to United States trade and investment. Having failed since 2003 to persuade Beijing to adhere to its economic commitments through regular, high-level dialogues, the United States is confronting China's market-distorting forced technology transfer and intellectual property practices by imposing costs in the form of tariffs levied on Chinese goods coming into the United States. Those tariffs will remain in place until a fair Phase Two trade deal is agreed to by the United States and the PRC.

In response to Beijing's repeated failure to reduce or eliminate its market-distorting subsidies and overcapacity, the United States imposed tariffs to protect our strategically important steel and aluminum industries. For those unfair Chinese trade practices that are subject to dispute settlement at the WTO, the United States continues to pursue and win multiple cases. Finally, to crack down on China's dumping and subsidies across a broad range of industries, the Department of Commerce is making greater utility of United States antidumping and countervailing duties laws than in past administrations.”¹²⁸

“These capabilities are intended to deter and counter Beijing's growing ambitions and the PLA's drive toward technological parity and superiority”:

“The Department of Defense is moving quickly to deploy hypersonic platforms, increasing investments in cyber and space capabilities, and developing more lethal fires based on resilient, adaptive, and cost-effective platforms. Together, these capabilities are intended to deter and counter Beijing's growing ambitions and the PLA's drive toward technological parity and superiority.

As part of our worldwide freedom of navigation operations program, the United States is pushing back on Beijing’s hegemonic assertions and excessive claims. The United States military will continue to exercise the right to navigate and operate wherever international law allows, including in the South China Sea.”¹²⁹

“Beijing’s failure to honor its commitments under the communiques, as demonstrated by its massive military buildup, compels the United States to continue to assist the Taiwan military in maintaining a credible self-defense”:

“Beijing’s failure to honor its commitments under the communiques, as demonstrated by its massive military buildup, compels the United States to continue to assist the Taiwan military in maintaining a credible self-defense, which deters aggression and helps to ensure peace and stability in the region.”¹³⁰

“Beijing instead promotes or abets authoritarianism, self-censorship, corruption, mercantilist economics, and intolerance of ethnic and religious diversity, the United States leads international efforts to resist and counter these malign activities”:

“As a large, developed country and a major beneficiary of this order, the PRC should help guarantee freedom and openness for other nations around the globe. When Beijing instead promotes or abets authoritarianism, self-censorship, corruption, mercantilist economics, and intolerance of ethnic and religious diversity, the United States leads international efforts to resist and counter these malign activities.”¹³¹

“The United States recognizes the long-term strategic competition between our two systems”:

“The United States recognizes the long-term strategic competition between our two systems. Through a whole-of-government approach and guided by a return to principled realism, as articulated by the NSS, the United States Government will continue to protect American interests and advance American influence. At the same time, we remain open to constructive, results-oriented engagement and cooperation from China where our interests align. We continue to engage with PRC leaders in a respectful yet clear-eyed manner, challenging Beijing to uphold its commitments.”¹³²

July 23, 2020: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo at The Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, *“We must engage and empower the Chinese people”*

state.gov/communist-china-and-the-free-worlds-future/

“We, the freedom-loving nations of the world, must induce China to change, just as President Nixon wanted. We must induce China to change in more creative and assertive ways, because Beijing’s actions threaten our people and our prosperity.”

“And if we don’t act now, ultimately the CCP will erode our freedoms and subvert the rules-based order that our societies have worked so hard to build. If we bend the knee now, our children’s children may be at the mercy of the Chinese Communist Party, whose actions are the primary challenge today in the free world.”

“But our approach can’t just be about getting tough. That’s unlikely to achieve the outcome that we desire. We must also engage and empower the Chinese people – a dynamic, freedom-loving people who are completely distinct from the Chinese Communist Party.”



3. “ENGAGE CHINA FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH”

—DOD Report on Security Developments in China¹³³

3.1. “Deter and counter Beijing’s growing ambitions”

—U.S. Strategic Approach to the PRC¹³⁴
Quotations from DOD, DNI, DIA, and State

May 15, 2017: Department of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017”

dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017_China_Military_Power_Report.PDF?ver=2017-06-06-141328-770

“U.S.-China defense contacts and exchanges provide opportunities to explore and expand cooperation in areas of mutual interest and to manage competition constructively. In 2016, DoD’s plan for military-to-military contacts with the PRC

Photo Caption: U.S. President Donald Trump applauds as the flag for the new U.S. Space Command is revealed in the Rose Garden at the White House on August 29, 2019 in Washington, D.C. (Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)

focused on three interconnected lines of effort: (1) building sustained and substantive dialogue through policy dialogues and senior leader engagements; (2) building concrete, practical cooperation in areas of mutual interest; and (3) enhancing risk management efforts that diminish the potential for misunderstanding or miscalculation.

The pace and scope of China's military modernization provide opportunities as well as challenges for military-to-military engagement. The PLA's growing military capabilities can facilitate deeper practical cooperation in areas ranging from humanitarian assistance to counter-piracy; however, as China's military develops and expands its reach, the risk of an accident or miscalculation also increases, which puts a premium on risk reduction efforts.

Pursuit of a constructive, results-oriented relationship with China is an important part of U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. DoD seeks to strengthen the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship in ways that best serve the interests of the United States and its allies and partners. Sustaining the positive momentum in the military-to-military relationship supports U.S. objectives of ensuring that China acts in a manner consistent with international laws and norms and that China serves as a source of stability and shared prosperity in Asia.

As the United States builds a stronger foundation for a military-to-military relationship with China, it will continue to monitor China's evolving military strategy, doctrine, and force development, and will encourage China to be more transparent about its military modernization program. The United States also will continue adapting its forces, posture, and operational concepts to deter aggression, defend its allies, and ensure it continues to engage China from a position of strength. The United States will continue to build the capacity of its allies and partners, enhance regional cooperation, and deepen partnerships to maintain a stable and secure Asia-Pacific security environment."¹³⁵

Feb. 5, 2018: Department of Defense, "Nuclear Posture Review"

media.defense.gov/2018/feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-nuclear-posture-review-final-report.pdf

"Russia and China are pursuing asymmetric ways and means to counter U.S. conventional capabilities":

"China has continued to undertake assertive military initiatives to create 'facts on the ground' in support of its territorial claims over features in the East and South China Seas.

Russia and China are pursuing asymmetric ways and means to counter U.S. conventional capabilities, thereby increasing the risk of miscalculation and the potential for military confrontation with the United States, its allies, and partners. Both countries are developing counter-space military capabilities to deny the United States the ability to conduct space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3); and positioning, navigation, and timing. Both seek to develop offensive cyberspace capabilities to deter, disrupt, or defeat U.S. forces dependent on computer networks. Both are fielding an array of anti-access area denial (A2/AD) capabilities and underground facilities to counter U.S. precision conventional strike capabilities and to raise the cost for the United States to reinforce its European and Asian allies and partners."¹³⁶

“China continues to increase the number, capabilities, and protection of its nuclear forces”:

“Consistent with Chinese President Xi’s statement at the 19th Party Congress that China’s military will be ‘fully transformed into a first tier force’ by 2050, China continues to increase the number, capabilities, and protection of its nuclear forces. While China’s declaratory policy and doctrine have not changed, its lack of transparency regarding the scope and scale of its nuclear modernization program raises questions regarding its future intent. China has developed a new road-mobile strategic intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a new multi-warhead version of its DF-5 silo-based ICBM, and its most advanced ballistic missile submarine armed with new submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). It has also announced development of a new nuclear-capable strategic bomber, giving China a nuclear triad. China has also deployed a nuclear-capable precision guided DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of attacking land and naval targets. As with Russia despite criticizing U.S. homeland missile defense—which is directed against limited missile threats—China has announced that it is testing a new mid-course missile defense system, plans to develop sea-based mid-course ballistic missile defense, and is developing theater ballistic missile defense systems, but has provided few details.”¹³⁷

“Our tailored strategy for China is designed to prevent Beijing from mistakenly concluding that it could secure an advantage through the limited use of its theater nuclear capabilities”:

“China’s military modernization and pursuit of regional dominance have emerged as a major challenge to U.S. interests in Asia. It has adopted an increasingly assertive posture in disputes with its neighbors, many of whom are U.S. allies or partners. These encompass a variety of historical and border disputes, including over territorial boundaries, claims to contested island territory, and an island-building campaign in the South China Sea. China possesses nuclear warheads on protected ICBMs and SLBMs capable of reaching the United States and nuclear armed, theater-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching U.S. territory, allies, partners, forces, and bases in the region. China’s expanding non-nuclear military capabilities include space and cyber warfare capabilities that could decisively affect the outcome of a conflict.

China is developing capabilities to counter U.S. power projection operations in the region and to deny the United States the capability and freedom of action to protect U.S., allied, and partner interests. Direct military conflict between China and the United States would have the potential for nuclear escalation. Our tailored strategy for China is designed to prevent Beijing from mistakenly concluding that it could secure an advantage through the limited use of its theater nuclear capabilities or that any use of nuclear weapons, however limited, is acceptable.

The United States will maintain the capability to credibly threaten intolerable damage as Chinese leaders calculate costs and benefits, such that the costs incurred as a result of Chinese nuclear employment, at any level of escalation, would vastly outweigh any benefit.

The United States is prepared to respond decisively to Chinese non-nuclear or nuclear aggression. U.S. exercises in the Asia-Pacific region, among other objectives, demonstrate this preparedness, as will increasing the range of graduated nuclear response options available to the President. Both steps will strengthen the credibility of our deterrence strategy and improve

our capability to respond effectively to Chinese limited nuclear use if deterrence were to fail. The United States will also continue to seek a meaningful dialogue with China on our respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and capabilities in pursuit of a peaceful security environment and stable relations.”¹³⁸

May 16, 2018: Department of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018”

media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF

“The United States will continue to seek areas of cooperation with competitors, while preserving the ability to compete successfully from a position of strength. The United States seeks a constructive and results-oriented relationship with China. U.S. defense contacts and exchanges conducted in 2017 were designed to support overall U.S. policy and strategy toward China. They are carefully tailored to clarify and develop areas of cooperation where it is in our mutual interest and to manage and reduce risk; contacts are also conducted in accordance with the statutory limitations of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.

While the Department of Defense engages substantively with the People’s Liberation Army, DoD will also continue to monitor and adapt to China’s evolving military strategy, doctrine, and force development, and encourage China to be more transparent about its military modernization. The United States will adapt its forces, posture, investments, and operational concepts to ensure it retains the ability to defend the homeland, deter aggression, protect our allies and partners, and preserve regional peace, prosperity, and freedom.”¹³⁹

Aug. 8, 2018: *Defense News*: “MDA ‘Not Averse’ to Space-Based Interceptors, Its Director Says”

defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/smd/2018/08/08/mda-not-averse-to-space-based-interceptors-its-director-says/

Missile Defense Agency Director, Gen. Samuel Greaves: “We are developing options to pursue that capability if the nation decides that is what we should be doing”:

“The U.S. Missile Defense Agency is ‘not averse’ to developing and fielding space-based missile defense interceptors, its director, Gen. Samuel Greaves, said Aug. 8 at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium.

While it has appeared, in a way, like Congress has been pushing the development of space-based missile defense interceptors on an unenthusiastic MDA, Greaves stressed that the capability was part of many discussions within the MDA and the Pentagon.

‘We are developing options to pursue that capability if the nation decides that is what we should be doing,’ Greaves said. ‘Congress has already written some language that would push us, direct us, guide us in that area, so it’s part of the overall suite of activities we are pursuing as part of our portfolio.’

3. “ENGAGE CHINA FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH”

But Greaves added that should not take away from the agency’s current priorities. ‘The liability of the systems we have got in place today, we cannot take our eyes off of that; expanding our capacity and capability, developing our sensor suite and dealing with the advanced threat.’”¹⁴⁰

Michael Griffin, Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering:

“A space-based interceptor, if deployed, would go after ballistic missiles in the boost phase or in the post-boost phase of flight before the re-entry vehicle has deployed, or it could go after a deployed re-entry vehicle, Michael Griffin, the undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, told reporters at the symposium.

What it can’t do is reasonably go after hypersonic threats, he explained, ‘because hypersonic threats that we have seen to date are flying at altitudes low enough within the atmosphere. So effectively your space-based interceptor would have to itself be a re-entry vehicle; you would have to survive re-entry in order to go after the hypersonic target, and that may not be a bridge too far, but it’s a pretty far away bridge.’”¹⁴¹

Aug. 13, 2018: H.R.5515 - John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Sec. 889 (Prohibition on certain telecommunications and video surveillance services or equipment), Sec. 1261 (United States Strategy on China), and Sec. 1286 (Initiative to Support Protection of National Security Academic Researchers from Undue Influence and Other Security Threats)

[congress.gov/115/plaws/publ232/PLAW-115publ232.pdf](https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ232/PLAW-115publ232.pdf)

On August 13, 2018, President Trump signed into law H.R. 5515, the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019. This bill stated in Sec. 889 (Prohibition on certain telecommunications and video surveillance services or equipment) that:

“(2) COVERED FOREIGN COUNTRY.—The term ‘covered foreign country’ means the People’s Republic of China.

(3) COVERED TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT OR SERVICES.—The term ‘covered telecommunications equipment or services’ means any of the following:

(A) Telecommunications equipment produced by Huawei Technologies Company or ZTE Corporation (or any subsidiary or affiliate of such entities).

(B) For the purpose of public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes, video surveillance and telecommunications equipment produced by Hytera Communications Corporation, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company, or Dahua Technology Company (or any subsidiary or affiliate of such entities).

(C) Telecommunications or video surveillance services provided by such entities or using such equipment.

(D) Telecommunications or video surveillance equipment or services produced or provided by an entity that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of the National Intelligence or the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, reasonably believes to be an entity owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected to, the government of a covered foreign country.”¹⁴²

Sec. 1261 (United States Strategy on China):

“(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—Congress declares that long-term strategic competition with China is a principal priority for the United States that requires the integration of multiple elements of national power, including diplomatic, economic, intelligence, law enforcement, and military elements, to protect and strengthen national security.

(b) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than March 1, 2019, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing a whole-of-government strategy with respect to the People’s Republic of China.

(2) ELEMENTS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) Strategic assessments of and planned responses to address the following activities by the Chinese Communist Party:

(i) The use of political influence, information operations, censorship, and propaganda to undermine democratic institutions and processes, and the freedoms of speech, expression, press, and academic thought.

(ii) The use of intelligence networks to exploit open research and development.

(iii) The use of economic tools, including market access and investment to gain access to sensitive United States industries.

(iv) Malicious cyber activities.

(v) The use of investment, infrastructure, and development projects, such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative, in Africa, Europe, Central Asia, South America, and the Indo-Pacific region, and the Polar Silk Road in the Arctic, as a means to gain access and influence.

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(vi) The use of military activities, capabilities, and defense installations, and hybrid warfare methods, short of traditional armed conflict, against the United States or its allies and partners.

(B) Available or planned methods to enhance strategic communication to counter Chinese influence and promote United States interests.

(C) An identification of the key diplomatic, development, intelligence, military, and economic resources necessary to implement the strategy.

(D) A plan to maximize the coordination and effectiveness of such resources to counter the threats posed by the activities described in subparagraph (A).

(E) Available or planned interagency mechanisms for the coordination and implementation of the strategy.

(3) FORM.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(4) ANNUAL BUDGET SUBMISSION.—The President shall ensure that the annual budget submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, clearly highlights the programs and projects proposed to be funded that relate to the strategy required by paragraph (1).¹⁴³

Sec. 1286 (Initiative to Support Protection of National Security Academic Researchers from Undue Influence and Other Security Threats):

“a) INITIATIVE REQUIRED. — The Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with other appropriate government organizations, establish an initiative to work with academic institutions who perform defense research and engineering activities—

(1) to support protection of intellectual property, controlled information, key personnel, and information about critical technologies relevant to national security;

(2) to limit undue influence, including through foreign talent programs, by countries to exploit United States technology within the Department of Defense research, science and technology, and innovation enterprise; and

(3) to support efforts toward development of domestic talent in relevant scientific and engineering fields.”¹⁴⁴

Nov. 9, 2018: Department of State, “U.S.-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue”

state.gov/u-s-china-diplomatic-and-security-dialogue-3/

“U.S.-China Relations: The United States highlighted President Trump’s vision for a constructive, results-oriented U.S.-China relationship based on fairness and reciprocity. Both sides committed to coordinate on resolving differences and cooperate on common goals. Both sides will be preparing for the success of the planned meeting between Presidents Trump and Xi at the G20 summit in Argentina.

Strategic Security and Mil-Mil Relations: The United States and China recognized that the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship could be a stabilizing factor for the overall bilateral relationship, and committed to a productive mil-mil relationship. The two sides reaffirmed the importance of improving communication mechanisms to reduce the risk of misunderstanding between the two nations’ militaries. Both countries seek to maintain communication on implementing existing Confidence Building Measures and developing a military-to-military Crisis Deconfliction and Communication Framework. The two sides decided to deepen engagement to advance their shared commitment to the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The United States and China committed to convene consultations on cyber and space security, and deepen communication on nuclear and strategic issues.

North Korea: Both sides emphasized their continued commitment to achieving the final, fully verified denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, as committed to by President Trump and Chairman Kim. The United States and China committed to continue coordination and to fully, strictly implement the relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

Regional Security: Both sides acknowledged their mutual interest in Afghanistan’s stability, committed to work together on a political settlement to end the conflict, and supported an Afghan-led peace process with direct negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban. The United States raised the threat posed to regional stability by Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, support for terrorist organizations, and other malign behavior. Both sides intend to continue consultations on topics related to Iran.

South China Sea: The two sides committed to support peace and stability in the South China Sea, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea in accordance with international law. Both sides committed to ensure air and maritime safety, and manage risks in a constructive manner. The United States discussed the importance of all military, law enforcement, and civilian vessels and aircraft operating in a safe and professional manner in accordance with international law. The United States called on China to withdraw its missile systems from disputed features in the Spratly Islands, and reaffirmed that all countries should avoid addressing disputes through coercion or intimidation. The United States remains committed to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows.

Taiwan: The United States reaffirmed its commitment to the U.S. One China policy, based on the Taiwan Relations Act and the three joint communiques, and called on China to restore cross-Strait stability and respect Taiwan’s international space. The United States opposes unilateral actions by any party aimed at altering the status quo, including any resort to force or coercion.

Xinjiang: The United States raised concerns about China’s lack of adherence to its international obligations and commitments on human rights and religious freedom. China’s campaign of repression in Xinjiang undermines human rights and regional security.

U.S. Institutions and Citizens: The United States urged China to respect the autonomy of U.S. academic, political, media, and other institutions. The United States also reiterated the importance of fair and transparent treatment of U.S. citizens in China, including by raising concerns about China’s use of exit bans.”¹⁴⁵

Dec. 2018: Department of Defense, “Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access”

media.defense.gov/2019/jan/14/2002079292/-1/-1/1/expanding-global-access-report-final.pdf

“China intends to use OBOR to develop strong economic ties with other countries, shape their interests to align with China’s, and deter confrontation or criticism of China’s approach to or stance on sensitive issues”:

“In 2017, China’s leaders said OBOR, which at first included economic initiatives in Asia, South Asia, Africa, and Europe, now encompasses all regions of the world, including the Arctic and Latin America, demonstrating the scope and reach of Beijing’s ambition. While some OBOR projects appear to be motivated by economic considerations, OBOR also serves a greater strategic purpose. China intends to use OBOR to develop strong economic ties with other countries, shape their interests to align with China’s, and deter confrontation or criticism of China’s approach to or stance on sensitive issues.

President Xi has promoted the ‘21st Century Digital Silk Road’ alongside OBOR. Chinese state-owned or state-affiliated enterprises, including China Telecom, China Unicom, China Mobile, Huawei, and ZTE, have invested or submitted bids globally in areas such as 5G mobile technology, fiber optic links, undersea cables, remote sensing infrastructure connected to China’s Beidou satellite navigation system, and other information and communications technology infrastructure. While providing benefits to host countries, these projects will also facilitate China’s efforts to expand science and technology cooperation, promote its unique national technical standards, further its objectives for technology transfer, and potentially enable politically-motivated censorship. Data legally acquired via some of these projects may also contribute to China’s own technological development in areas such as artificial intelligence.

China is also pursuing global leadership in strategic industries through state-backed investment, as outlined in its Five-Year Plans, “Made in China 2025” industrial strategy, and other national Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access documents. China seeks to be the world leader in artificial intelligence by 2030, for example. Many of the key technologies China is targeting are integral to the rapid technological change occurring in multiple industries. These capabilities are key not only to economic growth, but to the United States’ ability to maintain its military advantage.”

“China’s expanding global activities in some of the areas listed above present military force posture, access, training, and logistics implications for the United States and China”:

“China’s expanding global activities in some of the areas listed above present military force posture, access, training, and logistics implications for the United States and China. The PLA’s first overseas military base in Djibouti and probable follow-on bases will increase China’s ability to deter use of conventional military force, sustain operations abroad, and hold strategic economic corridors at risk. The PLA’s expanding global capabilities provide military options to observe or complicate adversary activities in the event of a conflict. Some OBOR investments could create potential military advantages for China, should it require access to selected foreign ports to pre-position the necessary logistics support to sustain naval deployments to protect its growing interests in waters as distant as the Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, and Atlantic Ocean.

China’s wider global activities could also be leveraged to exert political influence. While many of China’s generous investment financing offers benefit their host nations, they often come with strings attached. The report provides 17 examples of cases in which Chinese investment and project financing that bypasses regular market mechanisms has resulted in negative economic effects for the host country; in which economic deals have carried costs to host country sovereignty; or in which China has employed economic incentives or economic coercion to achieve specific political objectives. China’s attempts to gain veto authority over other countries’ decisions, and its coercion directed at U.S. allies and partners in particular, will likely threaten U.S. posture and access if not addressed.”¹⁴⁶

“DoD also supports a whole-of-government response as China’s expanding global activities are not primarily or exclusively a military issue”:

“DoD also supports a whole-of-government response as China’s expanding global activities are not primarily or exclusively a military issue. The report lists several select interagency initiatives DoD has supported including 1) aligning the NDS with the U.S. National Security Strategy, which identifies growing competition with China as a long-term challenge and prompts a whole-of-government focus; 2) the U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific, which emphasizes a vision for a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ that provides security, stability, and prosperity for all; 3) continuing to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows; 4) confronting China over its market-distorting policies and practices, forced technology transfers, failure to respect intellectual property, and cyber intrusions into U.S. commercial networks; and 5) working with the executive branch and Congress to maintain U.S. competitiveness and protect the U.S. national security innovation base.”¹⁴⁷

Jan. 3, 2019: Defense Intelligence Agency, “China Military Power”

dia.mil/portals/27/documents/news/military%20power%20publications/china_military_power_final_5mb_20190103.pdf

“Chinese leaders characterize China’s long-term military modernization program as essential to achieving great power status. Indeed, China is building a robust, lethal force with capabilities spanning the air, maritime, space and information domains which will enable China to impose its will in the region. As it continues to grow in strength and confidence, our nation’s leaders will face a China insistent on having a greater voice in global interactions, which at times may be antithetical to U.S. interests.”¹⁴⁸

Jan. 17, 2019: Department of Defense, “Missile Defense Review”

defense.gov/portals/1/interactive/2018/11-2019-missile-defense-review/the%202019%20mdr_executive%20summary.pdf

“China is aggressively pursuing a wide range of mobile air and missile defense capabilities”:

“China is aggressively pursuing a wide range of mobile air and missile defense capabilities, including the purchase of S-400 systems from Russia, each with four interceptor missiles, and is developing additional theater ballistic missile defense systems. China also has announced that it is testing a new mid-course missile defense system. Further, China is developing a suite of antisatellite weapons, continues to launch ‘experimental’ satellites that conduct sophisticated on-orbit activities to advance counterspace capabilities, and has conducted multiple ASAT tests using ground-launched missiles.”¹⁴⁹

“Principles Governing U.S. Missile Defense”:

“It is imperative that U.S. missile defense capabilities provide effective, continuing protection against rogue state missile threats to the homeland, now and into the future. The United States is technically capable of doing so, and has adopted an active missile defense force-sizing measure for protection of the homeland. DoD will develop, acquire, and maintain the U.S. homeland missile defense capabilities necessary to effectively protect against possible missile attacks on the homeland posed by the long-range missile arsenals of rogue states, defined today as North Korea and Iran, and to support the other missile defense roles identified in this 2019 MDR.

This force-sizing measure for active U.S. missile defense will require the examination and possible fielding of advanced technologies to provide greater efficiencies for U.S. active missile defense capabilities, including space-based sensors and boost-phase defense capabilities. It calls for a missile defense architecture that can adapt to emerging and unanticipated threats, including by adding capacity and the capability to surge missile defense as necessary in times of crisis or conflict.

Consequently, the United States will not accept any limitation or constraint on the development or deployment of missile defense capabilities needed to protect the homeland against rogue missile threats. Accepting limits now could constrain or preclude missile defense technologies and options necessary in the future to effectively protect the American people.

U.S. missile defense capabilities will be sized to provide continuing effective protection of the U.S. homeland against rogue states’ offensive missile threats. The United States relies on nuclear deterrence to address the large and more sophisticated Russian and Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities, as well as to deter attacks from any source consistent with long-standing U.S. declaratory policy as re-affirmed in the 2018 NPR.”¹⁵⁰

“Current and emerging missile threats to the American homeland”:

“China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region and reorder the region to its advantage. Offensive missiles play an increasingly prominent role in China’s military modernization, its coercive threats, and efforts to counter

U.S. military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. It has deployed 75-100 ICBMs, including a new road-mobile system and a new multi-warhead version of its silo-based ICBM. Beijing also now possesses 4 advanced JIN-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), each capable of carrying 12 new submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), the CSS-N-14. Consequently, China can now potentially threaten the United States with about 125 nuclear missiles, some capable of employing multiple warheads, and its nuclear forces will increase in the coming years. Beijing also is developing advanced technologies, such as MaRVs and HGVs.

While the United States relies on deterrence to protect against large and technically sophisticated Russian and Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile threats to the U.S. homeland, U.S. active missile defense can and must outpace existing and potential rogue state offensive missile capabilities. To do so, the United States will pursue advanced missile defense concepts and technologies for homeland defense.”¹⁵¹

Jan. 29, 2019: Director of National Intelligence, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community”

dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf

“China presents a persistent cyber espionage threat and a growing attack threat to our core military and critical infrastructure systems”:

“China presents a persistent cyber espionage threat and a growing attack threat to our core military and critical infrastructure systems. China remains the most active strategic competitor responsible for cyber espionage against the US Government, corporations, and allies. It is improving its cyber attack capabilities and altering information online, shaping Chinese views and potentially the views of US citizens—an issue we discuss in greater detail in the Online Influence Operations and Election Interference section of this report.

Beijing will authorize cyber espionage against key US technology sectors when doing so addresses a significant national security or economic goal not achievable through other means. We are also concerned about the potential for Chinese intelligence and security services to use Chinese information technology firms as routine and systemic espionage platforms against the United States and allies.

China has the ability to launch cyber attacks that cause localized, temporary disruptive effects on critical infrastructure—such as disruption of a natural gas pipeline for days to weeks—in the United States.”¹⁵²

“We assess that China will continue to expand and diversify its WMD capabilities”:

“We assess that China will continue to expand and diversify its WMD capabilities.

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China continues its multiyear effort to modernize its nuclear missile forces, including deploying sea-based weapons, improving its road-mobile and silo-based weapons, and testing hypersonic glide vehicles. These new capabilities are intended to ensure the viability of China’s strategic deterrent by providing a second-strike capability and a way to overcome missile defenses. The Chinese have also publicized their intent to form a nuclear triad by developing a nuclear-capable, next-generation bomber.”¹⁵³

“Both countries recognize the world’s growing reliance on space and view the capability to attack space services as a part of their broader efforts to deter an adversary from or defeat one in combat”:

“We assess that China and Russia are training and equipping their military space forces and fielding new antisatellite (ASAT) weapons to hold US and allied space services at risk, even as they push for international agreements on the nonweaponization of space.

Both countries recognize the world’s growing reliance on space and view the capability to attack space services as a part of their broader efforts to deter an adversary from or defeat one in combat.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has an operational ground-based ASAT missile intended to target low-Earth-orbit satellites, and China probably intends to pursue additional ASAT weapons capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit.

China’s and Russia’s proposals for international agreements on the nonweaponization of space do not cover multiple issues connected to the ASAT weapons they are developing and deploying, which has allowed them to pursue space warfare capabilities while maintaining the position that space must remain weapons free.”¹⁵⁴

“Using its influence to press the UN and member states to acquiesce in China’s preferences on issues such as human rights and Taiwan”:

“China has become the second-largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget and the third-largest contributor to the UN regular budget. It is successfully lobbying for its nationals to obtain senior posts in the UN Secretariat and associated organizations, and it is using its influence to press the UN and member states to acquiesce in China’s preferences on issues such as human rights and Taiwan.”¹⁵⁵

“Both countries probably will use the UN as a platform to emphasize sovereignty narratives that reflect their interests and redirect discussions away from human rights, democracy, and good governance.”¹⁵⁶

“Building military and dual-use infrastructure in the Spratly Islands to improve its ability to control access, project power, and undermine US influence in the area”:

“We assess that China will continue increasing its maritime presence in the South China Sea and building military and dual-use infrastructure in the Spratly Islands to improve its ability to control access, project power, and undermine US influence in

the area. A body of open-source reporting shows that China seeks to achieve effective control over its claimed waters with a whole-of-government strategy, compel Southeast Asian claimants to acquiesce in China's claims—at least tacitly—and bolster Beijing's narrative in the region that the United States is in decline and China's preeminence is inevitable.”¹⁵⁷

“Russia and China are likely to intensify efforts to build influence in Europe at the expense of US interests”:

“Russia and China are likely to intensify efforts to build influence in Europe at the expense of US interests, benefiting from the economic fragility of some countries, transatlantic disagreements, and a probable strong showing by anti-establishment parties in the European Parliament elections in late May 2019.”¹⁵⁸

May 3, 2019: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Randall Schriver, Press Briefing on the 2019 Report on Military and Security Developments in China”

dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1837011/assistant-secretary-of-defense-for-indo-pacific-security-affairs-schriver-press/

“China’s continuing use of cyber theft, its targeted investment, its exploitation of private Chinese nationals’ access to foreign military technology, all to support its modernization goals”:

“Our report also talks about China’s continuing use of cyber theft, its targeted investment, its exploitation of private Chinese nationals’ access to foreign military technology, all to support its modernization goals. In 2018, we saw specific efforts targeting such areas as aviation technologies and anti-submarine warfare technologies.”¹⁵⁹

“China’s leaders are leveraging their growing diplomatic, economic, as well as their military clout to secure China’s status as a great power”:

“We believe China will seek to establish additional military bases overseas, as well as points for access. Press reporting in 2018 indicated China sought to expand its military basing and access in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific.

Regarding some strategic developments—and it’s important to note that all these developments occur in a larger context. China’s leaders are leveraging their growing diplomatic, economic, as well as their military clout to secure China’s status as a great power, and with the aim of becoming the preeminent power in the Indo-Pacific.”¹⁶⁰

“China continued its militarization in the South China Sea”:

“In 2018 China continued its militarization in the South China Sea and, as been widely reported, placed anti-ship cruise missiles, long-range surface-to-air missiles and jamming systems on some of the outposts in the Spratly Islands.

This violated a 2015 pledge made by General Secretary Xi Jinping in the Rose Garden of the White House when he stated that China does not intend to pursue militarization of the Spratly Islands.” ¹⁶¹

“Mass imprisonment of Chinese Muslims in concentration camps”:

“And, of course, our concerns are significant when it comes to the ongoing repression in China. The Communist Party is using the security forces for mass imprisonment of Chinese Muslims in concentration camps.” ¹⁶²

Q “You mentioned the—the Chinese were using concentration camps. Could you explain why you used that—the terminology?”:

“On the first point, the detention camps, given what we understand to be the magnitude of the detention, at least a million but likely closer to 3 million citizens out of a population of about 10 million, so a very significant portion of the population, what’s happening there, what the goals are of the Chinese government and their own public comments make that a very, I think, appropriate description.” ¹⁶³

“I don’t think we’re as concerned with the dollar-for-dollar side-by-side comparison with China, because what we offer are clean, transparent, scandal-free approaches”:

“I think we can offer alternatives. We can also offer alternatives alongside our partners and allies. So in many cases, development assistance can be produced not only from the United States, but U.S.-Japan solutions, U.S.-Japan-Australia solutions, et cetera.

I don’t think we’re as concerned with the dollar-for-dollar side-by-side comparison with China, because what we offer are clean, transparent, scandal-free approaches that benefit the people of the recipient countries, not just a few of the corrupt elites.

So we—we need to brand that and market that in a way that countries understand that the choice isn’t just one potential source of financing versus another, it’s a—it’s a qualitatively different approach that benefits their country a lot more.” ¹⁶⁴

“When we talk about competition, we don’t say ‘enemy,’ we don’t say ‘adversary’”:

“And by the way, when we talk about competition, we don’t say ‘enemy,’ we don’t say ‘adversary.’ Our expectation is we can compete and not spiral into a conflict or any kind of military confrontation. So we have an expectation that we can address the trade imbalances and the unfair trade practices while we’re competing in the security sphere.” ¹⁶⁵

Jul. 11, 2019: General Mark A. Miley, “Advance Policy Questions for GEN Mark A. Milley, U.S. Army, Nominee for Appointment to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff”

armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Milley_APQs_07-11-19.pdf

“U.S. delivery of high quality and timely security assistance in Africa is a way to challenge Russia and China’s military access and influence”:

“The current U.S. strategy focuses on building our partners, working toward shared objectives, operating transparently, and promoting good governance, while highlighting that Russian and Chinese projects do not adhere to high standards and can saddle countries with opaque or excessive loans. Our competitive edge lies in (1) the quality of the equipment, training, and other security assistance we provide, and (2) our support of counterterrorism operations, which neither China nor Russia currently supply.

African leaders often view Russia and China as easier to work with than the United States due to fewer restrictions and conditions on security assistance and sales. To counter this perception, U.S. delivery of high quality and timely security assistance in Africa is a way to challenge Russia and China’s military access and influence.

Increasing the speed of delivery for commonly sought-after equipment, demonstrating our commitment and prioritization of African needs at a high level, and developing positive messaging that will resonate with African leaders’ aspirations.”¹⁶⁶

Q “In your assessment, what are the priority investments DoD could make that would implement the NDS and improve the military balance in the Indo-Pacific?”:

“Investments in advanced technologies such as hypersonics, Artificial Intelligence, and robotics will be key to ensuring the U.S. maintains our competitive advantage versus China.”¹⁶⁷

Q “What is your view of the purpose and relative importance of sustained U.S. military-to-military relations with China?”:

“One of the most far-reaching objectives of the National Defense Strategy is to set the military relationship between the U.S. and China on a long-term path of transparency and non-aggression. Our military-to-military relationship is centered on reducing risk and preventing/managing crises. Our sustained military-to-military engagements are designed to continue to encourage China to maintain regional peace and stability and support the rules-based international order instead of undermining it. When China and the PLA operate in a manner consistent with international norms and standards, the risk of miscalculation and misunderstanding is reduced. With this in mind, bilateral military engagements with China which include high-level visits, policy dialogues, and functional exchanges are centered on reinforcing the procedures necessary to reduce risk and prevent and manage crises.”¹⁶⁸

Q “If confirmed, what recommendations would you make to the President and Secretary of Defense to deter Russian, Cuban, and Chinese influence in the SOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility?”:

“China is the top trading partner for many countries in the region. However, China’s influence presents security challenges because of the access Chinese infrastructure investments provide to strategic locations. These investments, paired with Chinese debt diplomacy, can undermine U.S. regional interests.”¹⁶⁹

Q “In your view, what impact, if any, would U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention have on emerging maritime disputes, such as in the South China Sea and in the Arctic?”:

“Acceding to the Convention would strengthen our credibility and strategic position on issues pertaining to these regions. While we do not take sides in the various territorial disputes in the South China Sea, we do have a national security interest in ensuring disputes are resolved peacefully, that countries adhere to the rule of law, and that all nations fully respect freedom of the seas. However, we undermine our leverage by not signing up to the same rule book which we are asking other countries to accept. As for the Arctic, the other Arctic coastal nations (Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark (Greenland)) understand the importance of the Convention and are in the process of utilizing the Convention’s procedures to establish the outer limits of their extended continental shelves (ECS) in the Arctic. The United States has a significant ECS in the Arctic Ocean, but cannot avail itself of the Convention’s mechanisms to gain international recognition of its ECS. We should put our rights on a treaty footing and more fully and effectively interact with the other seven Arctic Council nations who are parties to the Convention.”¹⁷⁰

Jul. 11, 2019: Mark A. Miley, Confirmation Hearing for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, “We, the United States, need to make sure—that we do not lose our advantages that we have relative to other countries, specifically relative to China”

“China is not an enemy. I want to make that clear. They are an adversary. I would say they are our competitor, but that is different than an enemy. An enemy in my language, in military language, means you are in an act of armed conflict. You are at war. We are not there and we do not want to be there. We want peace not war with China.

But having said that, I think that the best way to do that is to make sure that we are prepared. China is in fact— and it is not hype. It is not a rat under a bed. It is none of that. China is improving their military very, very rapidly in space, air, cyber, maritime, land domains, et cetera. Their capabilities in doctrine and organization and so on are—their technological development, their procurement—they are outspending us in research and development and procurement. You would never think that but they are. So China is advancing very, very rapidly, and they have a national mission, a China dream. And they are very open about it, and they write about it in speeches and so on and so forth.

So we need to make sure—we, the United States, need to make sure—that we do not lose our advantages that we have relative to other countries, specifically relative to China.”¹⁷¹

Feb. 15, 2020: Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper, Remarks at the Munich Security Conference, “Unlike China and others, we will use these advanced capabilities to help keep the peace, promote prosperity, ensure security, and protect the sovereignty of all freedom-loving countries.”

defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/2085577/as-prepared-remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-mark-t-esper-at-the-munich-security/

“We have watched them seize and militarize islands in the South China Sea”:

“The PRC’s growing economic, military, and diplomatic power often manifests itself in ways that are threatening, coercive, and counter to the rules-based international order.

Over time, we have watched them seize and militarize islands in the South China Sea, and rapidly modernize their armed forces, while seeking to use emerging technologies to alter the landscape of power and reshape the world in their favor... and often at the expense of others.”¹⁷²

“The global community should be deeply concerned about the Party’s use of artificial intelligence and other cutting-edge technologies to surveil and repress Muslim minorities, journalists, and pro-democracy protestors”:

“Furthermore, the global community should be deeply concerned about the Party’s use of artificial intelligence and other cutting-edge technologies to surveil and repress Muslim minorities, journalists, and pro-democracy protestors.

To make matters worse, the government is now exporting these tools worldwide in a manner that could bolster other authoritarian regimes.”¹⁷³

“We are investing in cutting-edge technologies and accelerating the modernization of our force, while at the same time, divesting from legacy systems”:

“As part of this strategy, we are doing our part to safeguard American innovation and reinvigorate our industrial base.

Thanks to our largest Research and Development budget in 70 years, we are investing in cutting-edge technologies and accelerating the modernization of our force, while at the same time, divesting from legacy systems and re-investing those savings into hypersonic missiles, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and other game-changing technologies.

Unlike China and others, we will use these advanced capabilities to help keep the peace, promote prosperity, ensure security, and protect the sovereignty of all freedom-loving countries.

For example, while Beijing uses artificial intelligence to tighten its grip over its people, the Department of Defense has established well-regarded principles for the lawful and ethical use of AI.

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While the PRC develops and deploys long-range fires to intimidate and threaten its neighbors, we are investing in both conventional and advanced missile defense capabilities to protect the homeland, our interests, and our allies.

And while Communist China is weaponizing the space domain through the development of directed-energy weapons and killer satellites, the Pentagon is standing up its first new military service in over 70 years—the United States Space Force—to ensure freedom of use, commerce and navigation in, to, and through space, for all.”¹⁷⁴

“The United States does not want an adversarial relationship with China”:

“The United States does not want an adversarial relationship with China.

It is a great country with an extraordinary history, a rich culture, and a wonderful people.

Rather, we want China to behave like a normal country that adheres to the international rules and order that generations before us have fought hard to protect and preserve.

And that means the Chinese government needs to change its policies and behaviors.

If the PRC will not change its ways, then defending this system must be our collective priority.”¹⁷⁵

May 22, 2020: Special Presidential Envoy Marshall Billingslea, Remarks at Hudson Institute on the Future of Arms Control

hudson.org/research/16062-transcript-special-presidential-envoy-marshall-billingslea-on-the-future-of-nuclear-arms-control

“Russia help us to bring China to the negotiating table”:

“I made perfectly clear that it is our expectation that Russia help us to bring China to the negotiating table, just as the deputy minister himself said needed to happen.”¹⁷⁶

“Russia and China are, simply put, arms racing. The United States is modernizing our forces without significantly increasing our overall number of nuclear weapons”:

“We must confront the reality that countries such as Russia and China are, simply put, arms racing. The United States is modernizing our forces without significantly increasing our overall number of nuclear weapons. The same cannot be said of Russia’s and China’s projected upward trajectories.”¹⁷⁷

“A three-way arms control agreement would provide the best way to avoid an unpredictable three-way arms race”:

“Instead, the world is presented with a great wall of secrecy while Beijing relies on selective shows of force and disturbing insinuations in state-controlled media. This is irresponsible, it’s dangerous behavior. If China wants to be a great power, and we know it has that self-image, it needs to behave like one. It must demonstrate the will and the ability to reverse its destabilizing nuclear buildup, and it should engage us bilaterally and trilaterally with the Russians.

The notion that China should not be expected to engage in nuclear arms control until it has built up to US and Russian levels is an outdated display of Cold War logic. We intend to establish a new arms control regime now, precisely to prevent a full-blown arms race. It is for all of these reasons that President Trump has expressed his strong desire to see China included in future nuclear arms control agreements. A three-way arms control agreement would provide the best way to avoid an unpredictable three-way arms race.”¹⁷⁸

“Promote real transparency and confidence-building regarding our respective nuclear forces plans and intentions”:

“First, the president has made clear that effective and verifiable arms control is both possible and worth pursuing actively, but that the arms control agenda should address the threats and challenges of today, and not those of yesteryear, which means including both Russia and China.

Second, we agree with the Senate’s clear view expressed when they provided advice and consent to ratification of New START, that the next agreement must include all nuclear weapons, both those currently constrained by arms control and those unconstrained.

And finally, we will design a truly verifiable agreement, not just to deter noncompliance and give us timely warning of militarily significant violations, but to promote real transparency and confidence-building regarding our respective nuclear forces plans and intentions.”¹⁷⁹

3.2. “We must have American dominance in space”

—President Trump¹⁸⁰

Quotations from DNI, FBI, NASA, VP Pence, DIA, and DOD

Feb. 13, 2018: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Open Hearing on Worldwide Threats”

intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-worldwide-threats-0#

Director of National Intelligence Coats: “Anti-satellite weapons as a means to reduce U.S. and allied military effectiveness and perceptions of U.S. military advantage in space”:

“The global expansion of the space industry will extend space-enabled capabilities and situational awareness to nation-state and commercial space actors in the coming years. Russia and China will continue to expand to space-based reconnaissance, communications, and navigation systems in terms of numbers of satellites, breadth of capability, and applications for use. Both Russian and Chinese counter-space weapon will mature over the next few years, as each country pursues anti-satellite weapons as a means to reduce U.S. and allied military effectiveness and perceptions of U.S. military advantage in space.”¹⁸¹

FBI Deputy Director Wray: “It’s going to take a whole of society response by us”:

“So one of the things we’re trying to do is view the China threat as not just a whole of government threat, but a whole of society threat on their end. I think it’s going to take a whole of society response by us. So it’s not just the intelligence community, but it’s raising awareness within our academic sector, within our private sector, as part of the defense.”¹⁸²

Oct. 15, 2018: Executive Director of the National Space Council Scott Pace, Interview with *GeekWire*, “50 Years after Apollo Moonshots, Will Rivalry with China Spark a New Space Race”

geekwire.com/2018/50-years-apollo-moonshots-will-rivalry-china-spark-new-space-race/

“If China does succeed in bringing lunar samples back for study, Pace said it might be possible to arrange a sample exchange program involving moon rocks and soil held by the U.S. and China as well as Russia. ‘Nothing has been ruled out,’ he said.

‘The problem with China, as in spaceflight generally, is in establishing levels of trust,’ Pace said.

He pointed to the example of a Chinese lunar orbiter, apparently the Chang’e-1 probe, which crashed into the moon’s surface at the end of its mission in 2009. Pace said U.S. scientists put a lot of effort into plans to monitor the cloud of debris thrown up by the impact, but the Chinese didn’t let them know in advance when and where the crash would come.

‘This is not the way to build trust,’ Pace said. ‘So, China has some great capabilities. There are some cooperative activities that we could engage in, and I want to engage in. But there has to be a reciprocal balancing with the scientific community.’”

Oct. 23, 2018: Vice President Pence, Interview by Robert Costa at the Washington Post’s Space Summit, *“We have to have the capacity to protect our existing infrastructure in space.”*

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/interview-vice-president-pence-robert-costa-washington-posts-space-summit-transformers-space/

“And so the first order of business is ensuring that the infrastructure of our satellite technology is protected. And the reality is, the more we look at our competitors in space—chiefly among them are China and Russia—we see the deployment of technologies by both of those countries—anti-satellite technologies.

China, not long ago, actually tested a missile that took out one of their own satellites. We’re seeing the deployment of additional, new anti-satellite technology that’s placed into orbit, literally satellites that are able to move in proximity to existing satellites. All of this informs the fact that we have to have the capacity to protect our existing infrastructure in space.

But also, what the President’s vision is, is that we stand up a Space Force that very much—similar to the way that the Air Force was launched after World War II—will evolve into ensuring that America remains as dominant in outer space militarily as we are here on Earth. And that will be the project of the Space Force going forward. And there are a number of steps that will be launched in the very short term but that will ultimately lead to the launch of a Department of the United States Space Force in the next National Defense Authorization Act.”¹⁸³

Nov. 24, 2018: Executive Director of the National Space Council Scott Pace, Interview with *Nikkei*, *“US to Ease Restrictions on Space Tech Tie-Ups--Except with China”*

asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/US-to-ease-restrictions-on-space-tech-tie-ups-except-with-China

“‘I don’t see any liberalization or relaxation of space export controls with respect to China,’ said Scott Pace, the man leading development of the new U.S. space policy. ‘I can imagine some relaxation with respect to close friends and allies,’ he added.”¹⁸⁴

“However, he was candid when asked about the possibility of China playing a part. ‘Probably not,’ he said.

‘The reason is that human space flight requires a very, very high degree of trust,’ he explained. ‘China has good capabilities but the political situation is difficult. As a result, trying to build trust in civil space cooperation is very, very challenging.’”¹⁸⁵

Jan. 1, 2019: NASA Administrator James Bridenstine, Interview with *Quartz*, "NASA Administrator James Bridenstine Wants to Go Back to the Moon"

qz.com/1499925/qa-with-nasa-administrator-james-bridenstine/

"When they do a science mission to the Moon, we're hopeful they will be able to share with us the data they receive, and when we do a mission to the moon, we can share data with them."¹⁸⁶

Jan. 19, 2019: NASA's Campaign to Return to the Moon with Global Partners, "NASA's Cooperation with China Is Transparent, Reciprocal and Mutually Beneficial"

nasa.gov/feature/nasa-s-campaign-to-return-to-the-moon-with-global-partners

"This past month, NASA held discussions with the China National Space Administration (CNSA) to explore the possibility of observing a signature of the landing plume of their lunar lander, Chang'e 4, using LRO's LAMP instrument. For a number of reasons, NASA was not able to phase LRO's orbit to be at the optimal location during the landing, however NASA was still interested in possibly detecting the plume well after the landing. Science gathered about how lunar dust is ejected upwards during a spacecraft's landing could inform future missions and how they arrive on the lunar surface.

Since the Chinese landing, LRO instruments have been collecting data that are currently being analyzed. LRO is expected to image the Chang'e 4 landing site on January 31 in a manner similar to what was done on Chang'e 3. NASA and CNSA have agreed that any significant findings resulting from this coordination activity will be shared with the global research community at the 56th session of the Scientific and Technology Subcommittee meeting of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space meeting in Vienna, Austria, February 11-22, 2019. All NASA data associated with this activity are publicly available. In accordance with Administration and Congressional guidance, NASA's cooperation with China is transparent, reciprocal and mutually beneficial."¹⁸⁷

Feb. 11, 2019: Defense Intelligence Agency, "Challenges to Security in Space"

dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf

"Enhanced situational awareness, enabling them to monitor, track, and target U.S. and allied forces":

"Chinese and Russian military doctrines indicate that they view space as important to modern warfare and view counterspace capabilities as a means to reduce U.S. and allied military effectiveness. Both reorganized their militaries in 2015, emphasizing the importance of space operations.

Both have developed robust and capable space services, including space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Moreover, they are making improvements to existing systems, including space launch vehicles and

satellite navigation constellations. These capabilities provide their militaries with the ability to command and control their forces worldwide and also with enhanced situational awareness, enabling them to monitor, track, and target U.S. and allied forces.”¹⁸⁸

Mar. 26, 2019: Vice President Pence, Remarks at the Fifth Meeting of the National Space Council, “Make no mistake about it: We’re in a space race today, just as we were in the 1960s, and the stakes are even higher.”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-fifth-meeting-national-space-council-huntsville-al/

“Now, make no mistake about it: We’re in a space race today, just as we were in the 1960s, and the stakes are even higher.

Last December, China became the first nation to land on the far side of the Moon and revealed their ambition to seize the lunar strategic high ground and become the world’s preeminent spacefaring nation.”¹⁸⁹

“The United States must remain first in space, in this century as in the last, not just to propel our economy and secure our nation, but above all because the rules and values of space, like every great frontier, will be written by those who have the courage to get there first and the commitment to stay.”¹⁹⁰

Mar. 29, 2019: Secure World Foundation Event: “U.S.-China Engagement in Space”

swfound.org/media/206424/us-china-engagement-in-space-transcript.pdf

Patrick Besha, Senior Policy Advisor for Strategic Engagement and Assessment, Office of the Administrator, NASA:

“Low-level bilateral cooperation over the years has likely been mutually beneficial, in terms of scientific gains, including the spread of norms of free and open access to data. That’s something that NASA champions.”¹⁹¹

Audrey Schaffer, Director, Space Strategy and Plans, Office of the Secretary of Defense:

“In fact, actually a more positive chord, if you will, from the National Defense Strategy says that the most far-reaching objective of this defense strategy is to set the military relationship between the United States and China on a path of transparency and non-aggression. Yes, it’s a far-reaching goal. It’s a stretch goal if you will. That is the objective, one of the objectives in our strategy.”¹⁹²

Schaffer: “We don’t actually have a lot of that really basic foundation in the US-China relationship”:

3. “ENGAGE CHINA FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH”

“We don’t actually have a lot of that really basic foundation in the US-China relationship. As much as I know folks would like to talk about developing norms, for example rendezvous and proximity operations. That’s what I would call a stretch goal because we don’t even have the really, really basic stuff in place yet.”¹⁹³

Apr. 9, 2019: *Defense News*: “Chinese Threats Necessitate New Space Structures, Shanahan Warns”

defensenews.com/space/2019/04/09/chinese-threats-necessitate-new-space-structures-shanahan-warns/

“The threat is clear: We’re in an era of great power competition, and the next major conflict may be won or lost in space,’ Shanahan said in prepared remarks. ‘We are not going to sit back and watch—we are going to act. We are going to deter conflict from extending into space and ensure we can respond decisively if deterrence fails.’”¹⁹⁴

“China’s Communist government has exercised and continues to develop the capability to jam, targeting [satellite communications; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities; and GPS,’ Shanahan said in prepared remarks. ‘The [People’s Liberation Army] is also deploying directed-energy weapons, and we expect them to field a ground-based laser system aimed at low-orbit space sensors by next year.’”

“They are also prepared to use cyberattacks against our space systems and have deployed an operational ground-based ASAT [anti-satellite] missile system. And China has moved rapidly in advanced weapon capabilities—particularly hypersonics—that we are not capable of tracking’”¹⁹⁵

June 13, 2019: *Politico*: “A New Moon Race Is On. Is China Already Ahead?”

politico.com/agenda/story/2019/06/13/china-nasa-moon-race-000897

“This time, we will do more than plant our flag and leave our footprints,’ he said at a meeting of the National Space Council. ‘We will establish a long-term presence, expand our economy and build the foundation for the eventual mission to Mars, which is actually going to happen very quickly.’”¹⁹⁶

3.3 “A global coalition against Chinese technology transfer threats”

– Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford¹⁹⁷ Quotations from State and DOE

Jan. 2018: Department of Defense, Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx), “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable A Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation”

[admin.govexec.com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018_\(1\).pdf](https://admin.govexec.com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018_(1).pdf)

“The technologies where China is investing are the same ones where U.S. firms are investing and that will be foundational to future innovation: artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, augmented/virtual reality, robotics and blockchain technology. Moreover, these are some of the same technologies of interest to the U.S. Defense Department to build on the technological superiority of the U.S. military today. The rapidity at which dual-use technologies are developed in the commercial sector has significant impact on the nature of warfare; mastering them ahead of competitors will ‘ensure that we will be able win the wars of the future.’”¹⁹⁸

“The U.S. government does not have a holistic view of how fast this technology transfer is occurring, the level of Chinese investment in U.S. technology, or what technologies we should be protecting”:

“The U.S. does not have a comprehensive policy or the tools to address this massive technology transfer to China. CFIUS is one of the only tools in place today to govern foreign investments but it was not designed to protect sensitive technologies. CFIUS is only partially effective in protecting national security given its limited jurisdiction.

The U.S. government does not have a holistic view of how fast this technology transfer is occurring, the level of Chinese investment in U.S. technology, or what technologies we should be protecting.

DoD has several specific areas of risk resulting from the scale of China’s investments and its technology transfer:

- Supply chains for U.S. military equipment and services are increasingly owned by Chinese firms.
- China’s targeted investments to close the gap in capabilities between its military and the U.S. military.
- Industrial espionage and cyber theft mean key defense designs and plans are in Chinese hands.
- There is no agreed upon list of technologies to protect for the future though an effort exists today to delineate technologies critical to current acquisition programs (JAPEC7).”¹⁹⁹

June 22, 2018: *Bloomberg News*: “U.S. Faces ‘Unprecedented Threat’ From China on Tech Takeover”

[bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-22/china-s-thousand-talents-called-key-in-seizing-u-s-expertise](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-22/china-s-thousand-talents-called-key-in-seizing-u-s-expertise)

“US’ ‘open society’ had ‘offered China and others access to the same technology and information that is crucial to the success of our future war-fighting capabilities’”:

“The Pentagon ‘is facing an unprecedented threat to its technological and industrial base,’ as the US’ ‘open society’ had ‘offered China and others access to the same technology and information that is crucial to the success of our future war-fighting capabilities,’ Michael Griffin, undersecretary for research and engineering, said at Thursday’s hearing.”

“‘We have seen the Chinese target top talent in American universities and research labs of the private sector, including defense contractors and the US government,’ he said. The solution must include strengthening American counter-intelligence capabilities and elevating the private sector’s focus on security, he said.”²⁰⁰

“Tech transfer to China is occurring in part through increased levels in investment and acquisitions of US companies”:

“Tony Schinella, the national intelligence officer for military issues, testified that in addition to using the Thousand Talents program, ‘Beijing has also employed Western-trained returnees to implement important changes in its science, engineering, and maths curricula that foster greater creativity and applied skills at China’s top-tier universities.’

Another tool to gain access to US technology is ‘joint ventures, mergers, and acquisitions,’ he said. ‘Tech transfer to China is occurring in part through increased levels in investment and acquisitions of US companies, which hit a record level in 2016 before dropping somewhat in 2017 and again in the first half of 2018.’”²⁰¹

Jul. 11, 2018: Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford, “Chinese Technology Transfer Challenges to U.S. Export Control Policy”

[state.gov/remarks-and-releases-bureau-of-international-security-and-nonproliferation/chinese-technology-transfer-challenges-to-u-s-export-control-policy/](https://www.state.gov/remarks-and-releases-bureau-of-international-security-and-nonproliferation/chinese-technology-transfer-challenges-to-u-s-export-control-policy/)

“China’s internal technology ‘barriers’ are extraordinarily permeable”:

“China’s internal technology ‘barriers’ are extraordinarily permeable, and they are becoming steadily more so. What’s more, there is absolutely nothing haphazard or inadvertent about this, for it is a matter of deliberate and explicit Chinese national policy and high-level prioritization.”²⁰²

“The Chinese system is thus working to eliminate all barriers between its civilian and defense industrial sectors to promote the free flow of technology, intellectual property, talent, and expertise between civilian and defense entities. Under this strategy,

civilian and defense industries are pooling financial resources to enhance research and development opportunities and officials there are working systematically to employ all aspects of the Chinese economy to advance military programs, while simultaneously developing a high technology innovation base.”

“This may require us to re-examine how we approach our national security export controls”:

“This may require us to re-examine how we approach our national security export controls, at least vis-à-vis China. Not all technologies have special significance in this way, of course, nor are all sensitive technologies uniquely held by U.S. suppliers. But as they relate to Chinese engagements, our traditional approaches may place much more faith in the integrity of end-use promises and internal institutional firewalls than we now know such protections really deserve.”²⁰³

“If we are not part of the game, we don’t set the rules for the game”:

“Given the important linkages between the U.S. civil nuclear sector and U.S. nuclear defense capabilities and industrial base, it is in U.S. government national security interests for our nuclear export industry to be strong. It is through nuclear trade that the United States gains much of its ability to set and maintain high nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation standards – global standards we have championed for more than 60 years. If we are not part of the game, we don’t set the rules for the game. And with more than 30 countries expressing new interest in nuclear power to meet their clean energy needs, a U.S. industry unable to compete for reactor sales could severely impair U.S. strategic influence abroad as others get these sales and set the rules of the future.”²⁰⁴

Sept. 13, 2018: Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford, “Coalitions of Caution: Building a Global Coalition Against Chinese Technology Transfer Threats”

state.gov/remarks-and-releases-bureau-of-international-security-and-nonproliferation/coalitions-of-caution-building-a-global-coalition-against-chinese-technology-transfer-threats/

“The real risks posed by collaboration with Chinese entities that must ultimately take orders from the Communist Party”:

“What this means, in practice, is that it is a huge Chinese priority to develop or acquire advanced technology, including Western technology—and including, especially, militarily-useful technology. This may occur through licit means such as technology transfers and joint research and development with foreign firms, or through collaboration with foreign universities. But it also occurs illicitly, through theft and both traditional and cyber-facilitated espionage—and a raft of U.S. indictments over the past decade demonstrate illicit Chinese targeting of U.S. corporations to gain economic advantage and to improve military capabilities. Either way, however, a key enabler for China’s military modernization and economic expansion has been its access to the U.S. economy, including America’s sophisticated industrial and technology sectors and our world-class universities.”²⁰⁵

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“As a result, it is imperative that we—not just the United States alone, but also acting together with as many international partners as possible—find an appropriate balance between the economic and strategic advantages of an open economy, the allure of the Chinese market, and the real risks posed by collaboration with Chinese entities that must ultimately take orders from the Communist Party. We’ve clearly not gotten that balance quite right in the past, so how can we be safer in the future?”²⁰⁶

“The advent of MCF, however, means that in dealing with China, at least, they cannot rely upon end-use promises”:

“The advent of MCF, however, means that in dealing with China, at least, they cannot rely upon end-use promises in the usual fashion. The traditional question for national security export controls and licensing determinations is something like: ‘To whom is this being sent and what will they do with it?’ The more appropriate question, given Chinese strategy under MCF, however—and this is, of course, a much harder one to answer—may now be a bit more like: ‘Could this item or technology be of significant value to anyone, anywhere in China and in ways that would help the regime augment its military power?’”²⁰⁷

“As we review visa applications we must therefore keep in mind China’s own system of funding military research and development”:

“In a country such as China—where, under the MCF strategy, there is now essentially no reliable distinction between civilian and military end users—this knowledge acquired in the United States will inevitably end up making its way to the Chinese military. As we review visa applications we must therefore keep in mind China’s own system of funding military research and development at its universities, and consider how that corresponds to the proposed research and development that will be taking place in U.S. universities and labs.

Accordingly, we need to improve screening procedures against intellectual property and technology theft, develop more effective conditions or restrictions upon employment or research access, improve potential mitigation measures, and be more willing than before to say ‘no’ in cases where the risk of a problem transfer appears too high.”²⁰⁸

“Coalitions of Caution”:

“We should do more to mobilize technology-holding partners into effective ‘coalitions of caution’ in order to share information on tech-transfer threats and to develop and promulgate ‘best practices’ through which we can together be both safer and more prosperous in the future.

Furthermore, where others in the international community may be struggling to bring their own efforts up to such best practices, we should expand effective programs to help them—so that they do not become ‘weak links’ in the international system, through which military-facilitating technologies can flow to China, to our collective detriment. My bureau at the State Department does extensive programming around the world helping countries with export control and border security issues related to preventing the spread of materials and technologies related to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, WMD

delivery systems, and conventional weapons. Why not expand capacity-building programming in order to help partners 'improve their game' in becoming 'harder targets' in the face of systematic Chinese efforts to acquire technologies in support of Beijing's military and geopolitical power? This is what I hope to do, and I have directed the development of a new initiative in which we will seek to build capacity among partners in the manner that I've just described."²⁰⁹

Oct. 11, 2018: Department of Energy, "DOE Announces Measures to Prevent China's Illegal Diversion of U.S. Civil Nuclear Technology for Military or Other Unauthorized Purposes"

energy.gov/articles/doe-announces-measures-prevent-china-s-illegal-diversion-us-civil-nuclear-technology

"These national security measures are the result of a U.S. government policy review prompted by concerns about China's efforts to obtain nuclear material, equipment, and advanced technology from U.S. companies.

'The United States cannot ignore the national security implications of China's efforts to obtain nuclear technology outside of established processes of U.S.-China civil nuclear cooperation,' said U.S. Secretary of Energy Rick Perry.

The policy guidance establishes a clear framework for the disposition of DOE's 10 CFR Part 810 authorization requests for transfers to China that are currently on hold because of military diversion and proliferation concerns.

Notably, there will be a presumption of denial for new license applications or extensions to existing authorizations related to the China General Nuclear Power Group, which is currently under indictment for conspiring to steal U.S. nuclear technology."²¹⁰

Oct. 24, 2018: Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford, "Why China Technology Transfer Threats Matter"

state.gov/remarks-and-releases-bureau-of-international-security-and-nonproliferation/why-china-technology-transfer-threats-matter/

"Where once we cooperated all too uncritically with Beijing in civil nuclear power applications, we are now doing so much more cautiously, and will deny licenses for anything that China could use for military purposes":

"We are not stopping all nuclear technology cooperation with Beijing, but we are ending cooperation on advanced projects such as small modular reactors or other advanced designs that China could use—and clearly plans to use—not merely for civilian power generation but to facilitate advances in ballistic missile submarine propulsion, or to power military outposts seized by force in the South China Sea. Where once we cooperated all too uncritically with Beijing in civil nuclear power applications, we are now doing so much more cautiously, and will deny licenses for anything that China could use for military purposes under its MCF strategy."²¹¹

Nov. 14, 2018: Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford, “Nonproliferation with Attitude: Counterproliferation Tools and Diplomacy in U.S. Foreign Policy”

state.gov/remarks-and-releases-bureau-of-international-security-and-nonproliferation/nonproliferation-with-attitude-counterproliferation-tools-and-diplomacy-in-u-s-foreign-policy/

“Beijing’s reluctance to take concrete measures to prevent Li’s ongoing support to Iran’s missile program suggests China chooses not to resolve this problem”:

“As a fifth and final note, we face a major CP challenge from China, which still remains the supplier of choice for many of the world’s proliferators, especially with respect to missile technology. U.S. diplomats have repeatedly and insistently raised numerous proliferation cases with Chinese officials, but the response is uneven at best. Often, very little action is taken.”²¹²

“Beijing’s reluctance to take concrete measures to prevent Li’s ongoing support to Iran’s missile program suggests China chooses not to resolve this problem, calling into question its commitment to nonproliferation. China’s inability or unwillingness to curtail such activities is of ongoing, and increasing, concern—and it represents one of the key challenges in the counterproliferation business today.”²¹³

Mar. 14, 2019: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Joseph Dunford, Testimony at Hearing on the Department of Defense Budget Posture, “*The work that Google is doing in China is direct—is indirectly benefiting the Chinese military.*”

armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/19-25-03-14-19.pdf.

“I’m nodding a head on exactly the point that you made, that the work that Google is doing in China is direct—is indirectly benefiting the Chinese military. And I’ve been very public on this issue, as well. In fact, the way I described it to our industry partners is, ‘Look, we’re the good guys, and the values that we represent, in the system that we represent, is the one that will allow, and has allowed, you to thrive.’ And that’s the way I’ve characterized it. So, I was just nodding that what the Secretary was articulating is the general sense of all of us as leaders. And we watch with great concern when industry partners work in China, knowing that there is that indirect benefit. And, frankly, indirect may be not a full characterization of the way it really is. It’s more of a direct benefit to the Chinese military.”

June 12, 2019: Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford, Remarks at the American Academy for Strategic Education, “*We merely need to slow their rate of progress so that they cannot outpace our own...*”

state.gov/remarks-at-the-american-academy-for-strategic-education/

“It is surely impossible entirely to preclude a reasonably advanced and technologically sophisticated state gaining some such advantage if it really wants to, but the steps we are taking can still hamper their progress”:

“When we act to restrict the transfer of military-facilitating resources or sensitive technologies to strategic competitors such as China or Russia – as we have begun to do using new tools such as the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) in the case of Russia, or by raising awareness among global partners of the risks of sensitive trade with China – we need not pretend that we will (or can) ‘prevent’ them from using any advanced technology to augment their military power in potentially significant ways. It is surely impossible entirely to preclude a reasonably advanced and technologically sophisticated state gaining some such advantage if it really wants to, but the steps we are taking can still hamper their progress—and that, as we’ll see, can be very important over the course of an ongoing competition.”²¹⁴

“We merely need to slow their rate of progress so that they cannot outpace our own”:

“We do not necessarily need to keep our competitors from making any progress in the development of threat capabilities such as advanced conventional weaponry; we merely need to slow their rate of progress so that they cannot outpace our own, thereby developing and exploiting a qualitative edge against us. In this context – again, one that is dynamic rather than simply static – nonproliferation can be a powerful contributor to overall success irrespective of whether it is possible entirely to ‘prevent’ an adversary’s acquisition of any given capability.”²¹⁵

June 20, 2019: Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford, Testimony to U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission, “Technology and Power in China’s Geopolitical Ambitions”

uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Ford_USCC%20Testimony_Final.pdf

“In the scope of its ambitions, the Chinese Communist Party is inescapably revisionist, even revanchist”:

“Despite the ‘win-win’ propaganda rhetoric, then, this is no peaceable, benevolent live-and-let-live vision of 21st -Century international engagement. In the scope of its ambitions, the Chinese Communist Party is inescapably revisionist, even revanchist, in its approach to influence the rest of the world. Its self-conceived national mission is to make itself ever more powerful vis-à-vis everyone else – and particularly vis-à-vis the United States—and it has devoted its national security policy to what Beijing’s 2002 Defense White Paper described as a policy of ‘unrelentingly enhancing the overall national strength.’”²¹⁶

“Reforming national security export control rules and recalibrating export control policy”:

“And, in turn—to fuel MCF itself—China has focused relentlessly not just upon developing technology indigenously but also upon acquiring it abroad, by means both fair and foul, tilting the playing field in its favor at the expense of U.S. and global companies. Not surprisingly, this is one of the reasons we are focusing so much, in the U.S. Government right now, upon reforming national security export control rules and recalibrating export control policy, upon building out recent statutory changes designed to help close loopholes in our traditional methods of screening foreign investments in the United States for national security implications, upon screening visa applicants to try to weed out persons seeking sensitive technologies,

and upon shoring up defenses against the cyber-facilitated intellectual property theft that former National Security Agency director Keith Alexander has suggested may constitute ‘the biggest wealth transfer in history.’”²¹⁷

“Business people, researchers, academics, technologists, and scientists all need to understand the broader context of China’s global strategy, and the implications of its ‘fused’ military-civilian industrial complex. This is not a call for anything like a complete high-technology “boycott” of China, but there is a need for serious risk mitigation.”²¹⁸

Sept. 11, 2019: Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford, “Bureaucracy and Counterstrategy: Meeting the China Challenge”

state.gov/bureaucracy-and-counterstrategy-meeting-the-china-challenge/

“We are today focused upon and coordinated against China-related policy challenges as never before”:

“At the State Department, our building has been reorganizing itself in significant ways around a new, forward-leaning policy to help meet the challenges presented by China’s competitive strategy as it has targeted us and our friends and allies. All of the policy bureaus, for instance, have been told to build bureau strategic plans that pull together, organize, and prioritize ways to contribute to U.S. China strategy; these bureau strategies have been collected and coordinated by officials at the Under Secretary level, and are now being overseen on a building-wide level by a steering committee chaired by the Deputy Secretary. We are today focused upon and coordinated against China-related policy challenges as never before.”²¹⁹

“We are today doing much more to prevent sensitive U.S. technologies from being injected into this system”:

“One of the most important features of our new licensing policy is to restrict technology transfers related to small modular reactors (SMRs) and advanced reactors that are currently in research and development phases.”²²⁰

“Naturally, we don’t think any foreign nuclear supplier should support efforts to augment China’s military buildup and territorial expansion, and we acted last year to keep U.S. companies from participating in this dangerous game. We imposed new licensing rules to end U.S. cooperation with China on such reactors, and are we are working to raise awareness of these threats among partners around the world to prevent them from also being exploited in this way.”²²¹

“In export licensing, for instance, we have not abandoned end-use and end-user vetting. However, we are making it more vigorous and wide-ranging—focusing not merely upon the specific end-users or intermediaries who are listed on an export license, but also upon everything we can figure out about the relationships and associations that these entities have with other parts of the Chinese system. In particular, we look for connections to military research and development, including with the many Chinese universities that support military research and development, or with China’s defense conglomerates or the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) itself. It is these relationships that provide China with the most direct connective tissue between peaceful and non-peaceful end uses, and we are today doing much more to prevent sensitive U.S. technologies from being injected into this system.”²²²

“Improve how we scrutinize the flow of students and researchers coming from China in order to weed out the occasional ‘bad apples’ who travel abroad to acquire technology”:

“Accordingly, it is one of the challenges of modern U.S. policy—as it should be for many countries around the world—to improve how we scrutinize the flow of students and researchers coming from China in order to weed out the occasional ‘bad apples’ who travel abroad to acquire technology for Beijing’s military machine and repressive domestic security apparatus.”²²³

Apr. 2020: Department of State, “Executive Summary of the 2020 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments”

state.gov/2020-adherence-to-and-compliance-with-arms-control-nonproliferation-and-disarmament-agreements-and-commitments-compliance-report/

“Nuclear testing moratoria as interpreted in accordance with the U.S. ‘zero-yield’ standard”:

“China maintained a high level of activity at its Lop Nur nuclear weapons test site throughout 2019. China’s possible preparation to operate its Lop Nur test site year-round, its use of explosive containment chambers, extensive excavation activities at Lop Nur, and lack of transparency on its nuclear testing activities – which has included frequently blocking the flow of data from its International Monitoring System (IMS) stations to the International Data Center operated by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization – raise concerns regarding its adherence to the ‘zero yield’ standard adhered to by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in their respective nuclear weapons testing moratoria.”²²⁴

“Other states’ compliance with and adherence to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments pertaining to biological issues”:

“During the reporting period, the People’s Republic of China (China) engaged in biological activities with potential dual-use applications, some of which raise concerns regarding its compliance with Article I of the BWC. In addition, the United States does not have sufficient information to determine whether China eliminated its assessed biological warfare (BW) program, as required under Article II of the Convention.”²²⁵

Apr. 2, 2020: Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford, “Preventing U.S. Industry’s Exploitation by China’s ‘Military-Civil Fusion’ Strategy”

state.gov/preventing-us-industry-exploitation-by-chinas-military-civil-fusion-strategy

“My impression is that U.S. industry has become quite good, over the years, at developing sophisticated ‘know your customer’ (KYC) practices that help American enterprises avoid entanglement with money launderers, drug dealers, sanctions evaders,

proliferators, and other such dangerous actors. This is done for very good reasons, as it's well understood that involvement with such entities represents an important potential source of business, legal, and reputational risk that due diligence can help avoid or mitigate.

Given what is now known about the national security implications of the PRC's MCF strategy, I'm here to suggest that it's time to begin to expand our concept of KYC vetting to include helping protect U.S. businesses, the U.S. economy, and indeed America's future national security from the systematic technology-transfer and military diversion threats represented by the Chinese Communist Party's MCF enterprise.”²²⁶

Apr. 27, 2020: Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, “Commerce Tightens Restrictions on Technology Exports to Combat Chinese, Russian and Venezuelan Military Circumvention Efforts”

commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2020/04/commerce-tightens-restrictions-technology-exports-combat-chinese-0

“The Department of Commerce announced today new export control actions to prevent efforts by entities in China, Russia, and Venezuela to acquire U.S. technology that could be used in development of weapons, military aircraft, or surveillance technology through civilian supply chains, or under civilian-use pretenses, for military end uses and military end-users.

‘It is important to consider the ramifications of doing business with countries that have histories of diverting goods purchased from U.S. companies for military applications,’ said Department of Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross. ‘Certain entities in China, Russia, and Venezuela have sought to circumvent America’s export controls, and undermine American interests in general, and so we will remain vigilant to ensure U.S. technology does not get into the wrong hands.’

Specifically, the rule changes include:

- **Expansion of Military End Use/User Controls (MEU)** Expands MEU license requirements controls on China, Russia, and Venezuela to cover military end-users in all three countries, as well as items such as semiconductor equipment, sensors, and other technologies sought for military end use or by military end-users in these countries.
- **Removal of License Exception Civil End Users (CIV)** Removes a license exception for exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) to civilian end-users in countries of national security concern for National Security-(NS) controlled items.
- **Elimination of License Exception Additional Permissive Reexports (APR) Provisions** Proposes to eliminate certain provisions of a license exception for partner countries involving the reexport of NS-controlled items to countries of national security concern to ensure consistent reviews of exports and reexports of U.S. items.”²²⁷

July 7, 2020: FBI Director Christopher Wray, “The Threat Posed by the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party to the Economic and National Security of the United States”

hudson.org/research/16201-transcript-the-threat-posed-by-the-chinese-government-and-the-chinese-communist-party-to-the-economic-and-national-security-of-the-united-states

“The greatest long-term threat to our nation’s information and intellectual property, and to our economic vitality, is the counterintelligence and economic espionage threat from China. It’s a threat to our economic security—and by extension, to our national security.

As National Security Advisor O’Brien said in his recent remarks, we cannot close our eyes and ears to what China is doing—and today, in light of the importance of this threat, I will provide more detail on the Chinese threat than the FBI has ever presented in an open forum. This threat is so significant that the attorney general and secretary of state will also be addressing a lot of these issues in the next few weeks. But if you think these issues are just an intelligence issue, or a government problem, or a nuisance largely just for big corporations who can take care of themselves—you could not be more wrong.

It’s the people of the United States who are the victims of what amounts to Chinese theft on a scale so massive that it represents one of the largest transfers of wealth in human history. If you are an American adult, it is more likely than not that China has stolen your personal data. In 2017, the Chinese military conspired to hack Equifax and made off with the sensitive personal information of 150 million Americans—we’re talking nearly half of the American population and most American adults—and as I’ll discuss in a few moments, this was hardly a standalone incident.

Our data isn’t the only thing at stake here—so are our health, our livelihoods, and our security. We’ve now reached the point where the FBI is opening a new China-related counterintelligence case about every 10 hours.”

3.4 “Join us in calling on nations across this alliance to reject that Huawei technology”

— Vice President Pence²²⁸

Quotations from FBI, VP Pence, State, DOD,
Commerce, DOJ, FCC, and White House

Jan. 28, 2019: FBI Director Christopher Wray, Remarks Regarding Indictments of Huawei and Wanzhou Meng

[fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-director-christopher-wrays-remarks-regarding-indictments-of-huawei-and-wanzhou-meng](https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-director-christopher-wrays-remarks-regarding-indictments-of-huawei-and-wanzhou-meng)

“Both sets of charges expose Huawei’s brazen and persistent actions to exploit American companies and financial institutions, and to threaten the free and fair global marketplace.

As you can tell from the number and magnitude of charges, Huawei and its senior executives repeatedly refused to respect the laws of the United States and standard international business practices. Huawei also intentionally and systematically sought to steal valuable intellectual property from an American company so it could circumvent hard-earned, time-consuming research and gain an unfair market advantage.

In pursuit of their commercial ambitions, Huawei relied on dishonest business practices that contradict the economic principles that have allowed American companies and the United States to thrive. There is no place for this criminal behavior in our country or any other committed to the rule of law.

The prosperity that drives our economic security is inherently linked to our national security. And the immense influence that the Chinese government holds over Chinese corporations like Huawei represents a threat to both.

As Americans, we should all be concerned by the potential for any company beholden to a foreign government—especially one that doesn’t share our values—to burrow into the American telecommunications market. That kind of access could give a foreign government the capacity to maliciously modify or steal information, conduct undetected espionage, or exert pressure or control.

These cases make clear that, as a country, we must consider carefully the risk that companies like Huawei pose if we allow them into our telecommunications infrastructure.”²²⁹

Feb. 16, 2019: Vice President Pence, Remarks at the 2019 Munich Security Conference, “America is calling on all our security partners to be vigilant and to reject any enterprise that would compromise the integrity of our communications technology...”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-2019-munich-security-conference-munich-germany/

“The United States has also been very clear with our security partners on the threat posed by Huawei and other Chinese telecom companies, as Chinese law requires them to provide Beijing’s vast security apparatus with access to any data that touches their network or equipment. We must protect our critical telecom infrastructure, and America is calling on all our security partners to be vigilant and to reject any enterprise that would compromise the integrity of our communications technology or our national security systems.”²³⁰

Mar. 14, 2019: Secretary of State Pompeo, Interview with Fox and Friends, “If you put this technology in your equipment, it will make it incredibly difficult for the United States to work alongside you...”

state.gov/interview-with-brian-kilmeade-of-fox-and-friends/

“Huawei and Chinese telecommunications equipment in one’s network, in a nation’s network, presents a real risk that the Chinese Government will have access to data that no American wants them to have. And so when you talk about this happening in countries like Poland or Germany or the UK, we’re very concerned about that – not only for American national security, because we have information stored there too, but for the security of their own peoples. We have urged these countries to reconsider those policies. We view this technology as being threatening to their security, and we’ve told them. If you put this technology in your equipment, it will make it incredibly difficult for the United States to work alongside you in some of these places.”

Apr. 4, 2019: Defense Innovation Board, “The 5G Ecosystem: Risks & Opportunities for DoD”

media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/04/2002109654/-1/-1/0/DIB_5G_STUDY_04.04.19.PDF

“Even if the United States were to restrict use of Chinese equipment suppliers domestically, the United States is not a big enough market in wireless to prevent China’s 5G suppliers from continuing to increase market share globally”:

“If the future 5G ecosystem adopted by most of the world is built on the sub-6 mid-band spectrum, the United States will also be faced with mmWave device interoperability challenges and sub-6 infrastructure security concerns. As sub-6 becomes the global standard, it is likely that China, the current leader in that space, will lead the charge. This would create security risks for DoD operations overseas that rely on networks with Chinese components in the supply chain. Even if the United States were to restrict use of Chinese equipment suppliers domestically, the United States is not a big enough market in wireless to prevent China’s 5G suppliers from continuing to increase market share globally, resulting in significant pressure on a declining set of vendors that would serve the U.S. market. These vendors will in turn be unable to invest R&D towards

future 5G offerings due to decreasing market share, limiting the number of competitive products and depriving DoD and U.S. industries of better and cheaper global supply chains.

China plans to deploy the first widespread 5G network, with its first set of sub-6 services becoming available in 2020. First-mover advantage will likely drive significant increases in their handset and telecom equipment vendors market along with their domestic semiconductor and system suppliers. As a result, Chinese internet companies will be well-positioned to develop services and applications for their home market that take advantage of 5G speed and low latency. As 5G is deployed across the globe in similar bands of spectrum, China’s handset and internet applications and services are likely to become dominant, even if they are excluded from the US. China is on a track to repeat in 5G what happened with the United States in 4G.”²³¹

Apr. 26, 2019: Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Kimberly Breier, “A powerful lesson to us all of the corrosive power of China’s so-called ‘unconditional’ lending.”

as-coa.org/articles/remarks-assistant-secretary-state-western-hemisphere-affairs-kimberly-breier

“The transformational nature of 5G technology”:

“Given the transformational nature of 5G technology, procurement and deployment decisions made now will have a generational impact on national security, economy, and society. As such, we encourage partners—in this hemisphere and globally—not to commit to any one system or vendor until they are able to compare and contrast available technologies, and fully factor security into procurement decisions.”²³²

“The fatherland card illustrates how China exports technological know-how that can help authoritarian governments track, reward, and punish citizens”:

“According to media reporting, Chinese telecom giant ZTE helped the Maduro regime build a database and create a mobile payment system for use with a voter identification card. The ‘fatherland card’ has become a tool for Maduro to monitor citizens and allocate scarce resources to his loyalists.

The fatherland card illustrates how China exports technological know-how that can help authoritarian governments track, reward, and punish citizens through a tyrannical system of digital surveillance. The use of a sole identity card in Venezuela as a tool of control and repression is similar to the Communist Party’s worsening crackdown on ethnic and religious minorities in [Shin Jiang] Xinjiang Province, China. Since April 2017, one million Muslims and ethnic minorities have been detained in internment camps. The Communist Party has exhibited extreme hostility to all religious faiths since its founding. We have received many reports of deaths and allegations of torture from within these camps. With China’s ubiquitous and arbitrary use of intrusive high-tech surveillance systems, collection of biodata, and increased numbers of embedded security personnel in the region—including in peoples’ homes—the Communist Party has clearly turned Xinjiang [Shin Jiang] into a ‘police state.’ We will continue to call attention to, and demand accountability for, those who commit human rights violations.

While touting ‘non-intervention,’ China has hypocritically intervened by supporting corrupt business practices and cronyism in Venezuela, precipitating and prolonging the suffering of the Venezuelan people. Even as the Venezuelan people demand change, even as the Lima Group condemns Chinese interference in Venezuela, China stands by Maduro and his brutal gang of thugs. Chinese lending has helped destroy what was once one of the region’s greatest economic success stories. This should serve as a powerful lesson to us all of the corrosive power of China’s so-called ‘unconditional’ lending.”²³³

May 8, 2019: Secretary of State Pompeo, “The Special Relationship”

state.gov/the-special-relationship/

“A credit system in which users trade freedom and privacy for government benefits”:

“But separately, separately it’s important that we speak honestly about the nature of the Chinese regime. I’ve been talking to other audiences about the more than one million Chinese Muslims detained in camps in Xinjiang. That’s the same province in China that pioneered a credit system in which users trade freedom and privacy for government benefits. And it’s the same province that’s the beginning of the Belt and Road. It’s the future China wants for China and for the world.”²³⁴

“We can’t let the High North—or any other area—go the way of the South China Sea”:

“Even more in plain sight, China steals intellectual property for military purposes. It wants to dominate AI, space technology, ballistic missiles, and many other areas. China’s growing capacity is matched by its appetite for expansion. I just gave a major speech in the Arctic Council warning against China’s incursions in the Arctic. We can’t let the High North—or any other area—go the way of the South China Sea.” ²³⁵

“We know that 5G is a sovereign decision —we respect every nation’s right to make its own choices—but it must be made in the broader context, the broader strategic context of China’s efforts”:

“Look, I know it’s a sensitive topic, but we have to talk about sensitive things as friends. As a matter of Chinese law, the Chinese Government can rightfully demand access to data flowing through Huawei and ZTE systems. Why would anyone grant such power to a regime that has already grossly violated cyberspace? What can her majesty’s government do to make sure sensitive technologies don’t become open doors for Beijing’s spymasters?

This is a discussion that extends far beyond technology and trade, although it’s often couched that way. Insufficient security will impede the United States ability to share certain information with trusted networks.

This is exactly what China wants; they want to divide Western alliances through bits and bytes, not bullets and bombs. We know that 5G is a sovereign decision—we respect every nation’s right to make its own choices—but it must be made in the broader context, the broader strategic context of China’s efforts throughout the world.”²³⁶

May 15, 2019: Executive Order 13873, “Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain”

federalregister.gov/documents/2019/05/17/2019-10538/securing-the-information-and-communications-technology-and-services-supply-chain

“Section 1. Implementation. (a) The following actions are prohibited: any acquisition, importation, transfer, installation, dealing in, or use of any information and communications technology or service (transaction) by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, where the transaction involves any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest (including through an interest in a contract for the provision of the technology or service), where the transaction was initiated, is pending, or will be completed after the date of this order, and where the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary), in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the United States Trade Representative, the Director of National Intelligence, the Administrator of General Services, the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, and, as appropriate, the heads of other executive departments and agencies (agencies), has determined that:

(i) the transaction involves information and communications technology or services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied, by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary; and

(ii) the transaction:

(A) poses an undue risk of sabotage to or subversion of the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, operation, or maintenance of information and communications technology or services in the United States;

(B) poses an undue risk of catastrophic effects on the security or resiliency of United States critical infrastructure or the digital economy of the United States; or

(C) otherwise poses an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.

(b) The Secretary, in consultation with the heads of other agencies as appropriate, may at the Secretary’s discretion design or negotiate measures to mitigate concerns identified under section 1(a) of this order. Such measures may serve as a precondition to the approval of a transaction or of a class of transactions that would otherwise be prohibited pursuant to this order.”²³⁷

Jul. 11, 2019: Press Briefing with Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Strayer, “*The Cloud Hopper attacks were Chinese attacks from the Ministry of State Security...*”

state.gov/press-briefing-with-deputy-assistant-secretary-robert-strayer/

“The Cloud Hopper attacks were Chinese attacks from the Ministry of State Security that compromised global-managed service providers and cloud providers”:

“We also know that China was behind one of the largest thefts of information from companies as was attributed to them in December of last year. What was known as the Cloud Hopper attacks were Chinese attacks from the Ministry of State Security that compromised global-managed service providers and cloud providers. That gave them access to large companies’ entire networks of information. Some of that information was then supplied to other Chinese companies in order for them to benefit economically.

Next I’d like to turn just briefly to what the United States has done.

On May 15th to secure our networks President Trump signed an Executive Order entitled Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain. This Executive Order allows the Secretary of Commerce to prohibit transactions involving information communications technology that could be controlled by or subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign adversary and that pose an unacceptable risk to our national security. We’re now in the implementation phase of that executive order with regulations to come in the coming months.

Also on that same day the United States added Huawei to what’s called the Restricted Entities List. Huawei was added to this list because of its years of supplying, in violation of international sanctions, years of supplying telecommunications equipment to Iran and then being deceitful about its practice of supplying that technology to Iran.”²³⁸

Aug. 19, 2019: “Department of Commerce Adds Dozens of New Huawei Affiliates to the Entity List and Maintains Narrow Exemptions through the Temporary General License”

commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2019/08/department-commerce-adds-dozens-new-huawei-affiliates-entity-list-and

“Today, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the U.S. Department of Commerce identified 46 additional Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. affiliates that require inclusion on the Entity List, as part of a routine review of all Entity Listings. Since May, the Department has added over one hundred persons or organizations to the Entity List in connection to Huawei. The new restrictions on these affiliates are effective today, August 19th.

BIS has also announced that it will extend the Temporary General License (TGL) authorizing specific, limited engagements in transactions involving the export, reexport, and transfer of items—under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)—to Huawei and its non-U.S. affiliates which are subject to the Entity List. The continuation of the TGL is intended to afford

3. “ENGAGE CHINA FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH”

consumers across America the necessary time to transition away from Huawei equipment, given the persistent national security and foreign policy threat. This license will be effective on August 19, 2019 and last an additional 90 days.

‘As we continue to urge consumers to transition away from Huawei’s products, we recognize that more time is necessary to prevent any disruption,’ said Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross. ‘Simultaneously, we are constantly working at the Department to ensure that any exports to Huawei and its affiliates do not violate the terms of the Entity Listing or Temporary General License.’

Outside of the scope of the TGL, any exports, reexports, or in-country transfers of items subject to the EAR will continue to require a license granted after a review by BIS under a presumption of denial.

Huawei was added to the Entity List after the Department concluded that the company is engaged in activities that are contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, including alleged violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), conspiracy to violate IEEPA by providing prohibited financial services to Iran, and obstruction of justice in connection with the investigation of those alleged violations of U.S. sanctions, among other illicit activities.”²³⁹

Feb. 6, 2020: Attorney General Barr, “Keynote Address at the Department of Justice’s China Initiative Conference”

justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-keynote-address-department-justices-china

“It is an architecture of state power, whose principal features are central planning, state-owned enterprises, and government subsidies”:

“While individuals have been permitted some degree of economic freedom, the Communist Party remains in firm control of the economy. It is an architecture of state power, whose principal features are central planning, state-owned enterprises, and government subsidies.

Politically, the PRC remains a dictatorship under which the Communist Party elite jealously guards its monopoly on power. Marxism-Leninism and Maoism linger on as justification for Communist rule, which is authoritarian through and through.

The Communist party is willing to resort to harsh measures to repress any challenge to its one-party rule, whether it be suppressing religious organizations, rounding up and ‘re-educating’ Uighurs, resisting efforts of self-determination in Hong Kong, or using the Great Firewall to limit access to ideas and penalize their expression.”²⁴⁰

“The United States aligning itself with Nokia and/or Ericsson through American ownership of a controlling stake”:

“Some propose that these concerns could be met by the United States aligning itself with Nokia and/or Ericsson through American ownership of a controlling stake, either directly or through a consortium of private American and allied companies. Putting our large market and financial muscle behind one or both of these firms would make it a more formidable competitor and eliminate concerns over its staying power. We and our closest allies certainly need to be actively considering this approach.”²⁴¹

“The PRC’s ultimate goal is to replace you with a Chinese company”:

“To our private sector friends, I would say that appeasing the PRC may come with short-term benefits, but I urge you to question the longstanding assumption that promises of market access are worth the steep costs. The PRC’s ultimate goal is to replace you with a Chinese company.

University and think-tank colleagues, do not allow the theft of technology under the guise of academic freedom. Do not allow the PRC to dictate your research or pressure you into ignoring diverse voices on controversial topics. Consider whether any sacrifice of academic integrity or freedom is worth the tradeoff.

To our allies, we applaud your efforts to stand up to China’s economic power. But we must do more, and act collectively. Let us not forget our collective economic influence and power.”²⁴²

Apr. 4, 2020: Executive Order 13913, “Establishing the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector”

[govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-04-08/pdf/2020-07530.pdf](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-04-08/pdf/2020-07530.pdf)

“Sec. 3. Establishment. (a) There is hereby established the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector (Committee), the primary objective of which shall be to assist the FCC in its public interest review of national security and law enforcement concerns that may be raised by foreign participation in the United States telecommunications services sector. The function of the Committee shall be:

(i) to review applications and licenses for risks to national security and law enforcement interests posed by such applications or licenses; and

(ii) to respond to any risks presented by applications or licenses by recommending to the FCC, as appropriate and consistent with the provisions of this order, that it dismiss an application, deny an application, condition the grant of an application upon compliance with mitigation measures, modify a license with a condition of compliance with mitigation measures, or revoke a license.”

“Sec. 7. Threat Analysis by the Director of National Intelligence. (a) For each license or application reviewed by the Committee, the Director of National Intelligence shall produce a written assessment of any threat to national security interests of the

United States posed by granting the application or maintaining the license. The Director of National Intelligence shall solicit and incorporate the views of the Intelligence Community, as appropriate.”²⁴³

Apr. 9, 2020: Department of Justice, “Executive Branch Agencies Recommend the FCC Revoke and Terminate China Telecom’s Authorizations to Provide International Telecommunications Services in the United States”

justice.gov/opa/pr/executive-branch-agencies-recommend-fcc-revoke-and-terminate-china-telecom-s-authorizations

“In its recommendation, the Executive Branch agencies identified substantial and unacceptable national security and law enforcement risks associated with China Telecom’s operations, which render the FCC authorizations inconsistent with the public interest. More specifically the recommendation was based on:

- the evolving national security environment since 2007 and increased knowledge of the PRC’s role in malicious cyber activity targeting the United States;
 - concerns that China Telecom is vulnerable to exploitation, influence, and control by the PRC government;
 - inaccurate statements by China Telecom to U.S. government authorities about where China Telecom stored its U.S. records, raising questions about who has access to those records;
 - inaccurate public representations by China Telecom concerning its cybersecurity practices, which raise questions about China Telecom’s compliance with federal and state cybersecurity and privacy laws; and
 - the nature of China Telecom’s U.S. operations, which provide opportunities for PRC state-actors to engage in malicious cyber activity enabling economic espionage and disruption and misrouting of U.S. communications.”²⁴⁴
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Apr. 24, 2020: Federal Communications Commission, “FCC Scrutinizes Four Chinese Government-Controlled Entities Providing Telecommunications Services in the U.S.”

docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-363976A1.pdf

“The Federal Communications Commission today issued Orders to Show Cause against four companies that are ultimately subject to the ownership and control of the Chinese government: China Telecom Americas, China Unicom Americas, Pacific Networks, and ComNet. The Orders direct the companies to explain why the Commission should not start the process of revoking their domestic and international section authorizations enabling them to operate in the United States. Today’s action builds on the FCC’s 2019 rejection on national security and law enforcement grounds of China Mobile USA’s application to provide international telecommunications services between the United States and foreign destinations.

'Foreign entities providing telecommunications services—or seeking to provide services—in the United States must not pose a risk to our national security,' said Chairman Pai. 'The Show Cause Orders reflect our deep concern—one shared by the U.S. Departments of Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and State and the U.S. Trade Representative—about these companies' vulnerability to the exploitation, influence, and control of the Chinese Communist Party, given that they are subsidiaries of Chinese state-owned entities. We simply cannot take a risk and hope for the best when it comes to the security of our networks.'²⁴⁵

May 15, 2020: Department of Commerce, Press Release, “Commerce Addresses Huawei’s Efforts to Undermine Entity List, Restricts Products Designed and Produced with U.S. Technologies”

commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2020/05/commerce-addresses-huaweis-efforts-undermine-entity-list-restricts

“The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) today announced plans to protect U.S. national security by restricting Huawei’s ability to use U.S. technology and software to design and manufacture its semiconductors abroad. This announcement cuts off Huawei’s efforts to undermine U.S. export controls. BIS is amending its longstanding foreign-produced direct product rule and the Entity List to narrowly and strategically target Huawei’s acquisition of semiconductors that are the direct product of certain U.S. software and technology.

Since 2019 when BIS added Huawei Technologies and 114 of its overseas-related affiliates to the Entity List, companies wishing to export U.S. items were required to obtain a license. However, Huawei has continued to use U.S. software and technology to design semiconductors, undermining the national security and foreign policy purposes of the Entity List by commissioning their production in overseas foundries using U.S. equipment.

‘Despite the Entity List actions the Department took last year, Huawei and its foreign affiliates have stepped-up efforts to undermine these national security-based restrictions through an indigenization effort. However, that effort is still dependent on U.S. technologies,’ said Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross. ‘This is not how a responsible global corporate citizen behaves. We must amend our rules exploited by Huawei and HiSilicon and prevent U.S. technologies from enabling malign activities contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.’²⁴⁶

3.5 “Overreliance on China for strategic and critical materials”

—Report on the Defense Industrial Base²⁴⁷

Quotations from DOE, DOD, and White House

Jul. 21, 2017: Executive Order 13806, “Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States”

[govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-07-26/pdf/2017-15860.pdf](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-07-26/pdf/2017-15860.pdf)

“Strategic support for a vibrant domestic manufacturing sector, a vibrant defense industrial base, and resilient supply chains is therefore a significant national priority. A comprehensive evaluation of the defense industrial base and supply chains, with input from multiple executive departments and agencies (agencies), will provide a necessary assessment of our current strengths and weaknesses.”²⁴⁸

The order requires that specified agencies and departments “shall provide an unclassified report to the President” that:

“(a) identifies the military and civilian materiel, raw materials, and other goods that are essential to national security;

(b) identifies the manufacturing capabilities essential to producing the goods identified pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, including emerging capabilities;

(c) identifies the defense, intelligence, homeland, economic, natural, geopolitical, or other contingencies that may disrupt, strain, compromise, or eliminate the supply chains of goods identified pursuant to subsection (a) of this section (including as a result of the elimination of, or failure to develop domestically, the capabilities identified pursuant to subsection (b) of this section) and that are sufficiently likely to arise so as to require reasonable preparation for their occurrence;

(d) assesses the resiliency and capacity of the manufacturing and defense industrial base and supply chains of the United States to support national security needs upon the occurrence of the contingencies identified pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, including an assessment of:

(i) the manufacturing capacity of the United States and the physical plant capacity of the defense industrial base, including their ability to modernize to meet future needs;

(ii) gaps in national-security-related domestic manufacturing capabilities, including non-existent, extinct, threatened, and single-point-of-failure capabilities.”²⁴⁹

Apr. 20, 2018: National Trade Council Director Peter Navarro, *Washington Times* Op-Ed, “A Win for America and Its Allies”

whitehouse.gov/articles/win-america-allies/

“A new and updated U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy”:

“By approving a new and updated U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy Presidential Memorandum and updating the processes for the exports of UAS, President Donald J. Trump is strengthening both our economic and national security, fortifying critical bilateral defense relationships that extend U.S. influence and bolstering the capabilities of our allies and partners to advance shared security objectives.”²⁵⁰

“The CAT Policy is the first step in a wider effort to achieve greater efficiency and flexibility in U.S. defense trade. The presidential memorandum directs a government-wide initiative to improve our conventional arms transfer processes while advancing our national security and economic interests.”²⁵¹

“Further strengthening a critical part of our export economy and defense industrial base is a logical and critical step”:

“As Mr. Trump works to balance our trade with the rest of the world, further strengthening a critical part of our export economy and defense industrial base is a logical and critical step.

The international sale of American-made military and commercial UAS offers an important tool to take this step. The UAS sector represents one of the most dynamic emerging areas of defense technology.

Although the U.S. leads the way in UAS technology, overly restrictive policies enacted by the previous administration have accelerated an undesirable outcome: Strategic competitors like China are aggressively marketing to and making sales in international markets that are forecast to be worth more than \$50 billion a year within the next decade.”²⁵²

Oct. 4, 2018: National Trade Council Director Peter Navarro, *New York Times* Op-Ed, “America’s Military-Industrial Base Is at Risk”

nytimes.com/2018/10/04/opinion/america-military-industrial-base.html

“President Trump’s maxim that ‘economic security is national security’ comes with an important corollary: A strong manufacturing base is critical to both economic prosperity and national defense.

Policies advanced by the administration under this banner include corporate tax cuts and a wave of deregulation to stimulate investment and spur innovation; steel and aluminum tariffs to bolster core industries; a stout defense against China’s brazen

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theft and forced transfers of American intellectual property and technologies; a significant increase in the military budget; expansion of Buy American rules for government procurement; and tough steps on trade to level the playing field for American workers, businesses and farmers.”

“China represents a significant and growing risk to the supply of materials deemed strategic and critical to U.S. national security”:

“A core threat to the American industrial base comes from China. According to the report, ‘China represents a significant and growing risk to the supply of materials deemed strategic and critical to U.S. national security,’ including a ‘growing number of both widely used and specialized metals, alloys and other materials, including rare earths and permanent magnets.’

The American military is also heavily dependent on foreign suppliers in such critical areas as printed circuit boards, machine tools, materials for propulsion systems and even nuclear warheads. As the report notes: ‘Because the supply chain is globalized and complex, it is challenging to ensure that finished assemblies, subsystems, and systems’ for nuclear warheads utilize ‘trusted, discrete components due to diminishing U.S.-based microelectronic and electronic manufacturing capability.’”²⁵³

Oct. 5, 2018: Interagency Task Force Report, “Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States”

media.defense.gov/2018/oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/assessing-and-strengthening-the-manufacturing-and%20defense-industrial-base-and-supply-chain-resiliency.pdf

“A key finding of this report is that China represents a significant and growing risk to the supply of materials and technologies deemed strategic and critical to U.S. national security; a challenge shared by key allies such as Germany (Department of Defense 36n88) and Australia (36n89). In addition to China dominating many material sectors at the upstream source of supply (e.g., mining), it is increasingly dominating downstream value-added materials processing and associated manufacturing supply chains, both in China and increasingly in other countries. Areas of concern to America’s manufacturing and defense industrial base include a growing number of widely used and specialized metals, alloys and other materials, including rare earths and permanent magnets.

China is also the sole source or a primary supplier for a number of critical energetic materials used in munitions and missiles. In many cases, there is no other source or drop-in replacement material and even in cases where that option exists, the time and cost to test and qualify the new material can be prohibitive – especially for larger systems (hundreds of millions of dollars each).

From commodity materials to rare earths (37n90), Chinese investment in developing countries in exchange for an encumbrance on their natural resources and access to their markets, particularly in Africa and Latin America (37n91), adds an additional level of consideration for the scope of this threat to American economic and national security.”²⁵⁴

Mar. 30, 2020: Ambassador Robert Lighthizer, Remarks at G20 Virtual Ministerial, “*dependence on other countries as a source of cheap medical products and supplies has created a strategic vulnerability to our economy.*”

ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/march/remarks-ambassador-lighthizer-g20-virtual-ministerial

“Now, all countries are trying to get a handle on how best to support our economies, while also ensuring the non-disruption of supply chains that are necessary to deliver critical medical supplies and agricultural products for citizens. Unfortunately, like others, we are learning in this crisis that over-dependence on other countries as a source of cheap medical products and supplies has created a strategic vulnerability to our economy. For the United States, we are encouraging diversification of supply chains and seeking to promote more manufacturing at home.

President Trump’s economic policies are helping to overcome our vulnerabilities by tackling the supply side constraints and encouraging companies to increase production. We have a whole-of-government approach to produce more supplies for ourselves and for others throughout the world.”²⁵⁵

Apr. 3, 2020: National Trade Council Director Peter Navarro, Remarks at a Coronavirus Task Force Press Briefing, “*Buy American, secure borders, and a strong manufacturing base...*”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-vice-president-pence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-briefing-17/

“One of the—one of the things that this crisis has taught us, sir, is that we are dangerously over-dependent on a global supply chain for our medicines, like penicillin; our medical supplies, like masks; and our medical equipment, like ventilators.

We have—right now as we speak, over 50 countries have already imposed some forms of export restrictions in their country against the rest of the world. And what we’ve—what we’re learning from that is that no matter how many treaties you have, no matter how many alliances, no matter how many phone calls, when push comes to shove you run the risk, as a nation, of not having what you need.

And if there’s any vindication of the President’s ‘Buy American, secure borders, and a strong manufacturing base’ philosophy, strategy, and belief, it is this crisis—because it underscores everything that we see there.

So the ‘Buy American’ order, which—which is going through process, would do a couple things. It would simply say—not during this crisis, because we don’t want to disrupt anything. I want to be really clear about that. But going forward, after this is over, the VA, DOD, HHS, and this government buys American for essential medicines, our medical countermeasures, and the medical supplies and equipment we need.

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At the same time, it will deregulate so we can get the FDA and EPA to facilitate domestic manufacturing. And then, innovate. Because the key here—the key here is having advanced manufacturing on U.S. soil that can leapfrog other countries so we don’t have to worry about competing against cheap sweatshop labor, lax environmental regulations, different tax regimes, and the massive subsidies of foreign governments who are actually directly attacking our industrial base.

So be patient with that, sir. It’s—the other priorities we have right now are to DPA and what the task force is doing. But if we learn anything from this crisis, it should be never again. Never again should we have to depend on the rest of the world for our essential medicines and countermeasures.”²⁵⁶

3.6. “Protecting our nation’s energy infrastructure”

—Secretary of Energy Rick Perry²⁵⁷

Quotations from DOE and White House

Dec. 20, 2018: “Department of Energy Statement on Chinese Hacking Of Global Managed Service Providers”

energy.gov/articles/department-energy-statement-chinese-hacking-global-managed-service-providers

“The U.S. Government is taking steps to mitigate the impacts of this activity and hold the Chinese government accountable for these unacceptable actions.

‘As the Secretary for the Sector Specific Agency for cybersecurity in the energy sector, I have no higher priority than protecting our nation’s energy infrastructure against the threat of cyberattacks,’ said Secretary of Energy Rick Perry. ‘Malicious actors are conducting sophisticated attacks to threaten our Nation’s critical infrastructure. Today’s announcement affirms our government’s vigilance and resolve to respond swiftly and forcefully against those who would use technology to threaten our way of life.’”²⁵⁸

May 1, 2020: Executive Order 13920, “Securing the United States Bulk-Power System”

whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-securing-united-states-bulk-power-system/

“I therefore determine that the unrestricted foreign supply of bulk-power system electric equipment constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, which has its source in whole or in substantial part outside the United States. This threat exists both in the case of individual acquisitions and when acquisitions are considered as a class. Although maintaining an open investment climate in bulk-power system electric equipment, and in the United States economy more generally, is important for the overall growth and prosperity of the United States, such openness must be balanced with the need to protect our Nation against a critical national security threat. To address this threat, additional steps are required to protect the security, integrity, and reliability of bulk-power system electric equipment used in the United States. In light of these findings, I hereby declare a national emergency with respect to the threat to the United States bulk-power system.

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Accordingly, I hereby order:

Section 1. Prohibitions and Implementation.

(a) The following actions are prohibited: any acquisition, importation, transfer, or installation of any bulk-power system electric equipment (transaction) by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, where the transaction involves any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest (including through an interest in a contract for the provision of the equipment), where the transaction was initiated after the date of this order, and where the Secretary of Energy (Secretary), in coordination with the Director of the Office of management and Budget and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and, as appropriate, the heads of other executive departments and agencies (agencies), has determined that:

(i) the transaction involves bulk-power system electric equipment designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied, by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary; and

(ii) the transaction:

(A) poses an undue risk of sabotage to or subversion of the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, operation, or maintenance of the bulk-power system in the United States;

(B) poses an undue risk of catastrophic effects on the security or resiliency of United States critical infrastructure or the economy of the United States; or

(C) otherwise poses an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.”²⁵⁹



4. “A FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC” AND “REJECTING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE”

—Vice President Pence^{260 261}

4.1. “As we rebuild our military, we will continue to assert American interests across the Indo-Pacific”

—Vice President Pence at Hudson Institute²⁶²

Quotations from State and DOD

Photo Caption: U.S. President Donald Trump does a fist bump with Japan's Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, and India's Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, during a trilateral meeting on the first day of the G20 summit on June 28, 2019 in Osaka, Japan. (Carl Court/Getty Images)

Jan. 12, 2017: Rex Tillerson, Secretary of State, Confirmation Hearing, *"Building islands and then putting military assets on those islands is akin to Russia's taking of Crimea."*

"China has proven a willingness to act with abandon in pursuit of its own goals, which at times has put it in conflict with America's interests":

"We should also acknowledge the realities about China. China's island-building in the South China Sea is an illegal taking of disputed areas without regard for international norms. China's economic and trade practices have not always followed its commitments to global agreements. It steals our intellectual property, and is aggressive and expansionist in the digital realm. It has not been a reliable partner in using its full influence to curb North Korea. China has proven a willingness to act with abandon in pursuit of its own goals, which at times has put it in conflict with America's interests."²⁶³

"Building islands and then putting military assets on those islands is akin to Russia's taking of Crimea":

"The island building in the South China Sea, the declaration of control of airspace in waters over the Senkaku Islands with Japan, both of those are illegal actions. They are taking—they are taking territory or control or declaring control of territories that are not rightfully China's. The island building in the South China Sea itself in many respects, in my view, building islands and then putting military assets on those islands is akin to Russia's taking of Crimea. It is taking of territory that others lay claim to."²⁶⁴

"A whole-of-government approach to deter further Chinese coercion and land reclamation as well as challenges to freedom of navigation or overflight in the South China Sea":

"We are going to have send China a clear signal that, first, the island building stops, and, second, your access to those islands is also not going to be allowed."²⁶⁵

"To expand on the discussion of U.S. policy options in the South China Sea, the United States seeks peaceful resolution of disputes and does not take a position on overlapping sovereignty claims, but the United States also does not recognize China's excessive claims to the waters and airspace of the South China Sea. China cannot be allowed to use its artificial islands to coerce its neighbors or limit freedom of navigation or overflight in the South China Sea. The United States will uphold freedom of navigation and overflight by continuing to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows. If a contingency occurs, the United States and its allies and partners must be capable of limiting China's access to and use of its artificial islands to pose a threat to the United States or its allies and partners. The United States must be willing to accept risk if it is to deter further destabilizing actions and reassure allies and partners that the United States will stand with them in upholding international rules and norms. If confirmed, I would look forward to working with interagency partners to develop a whole-of-government approach to deter further Chinese coercion and land reclamation as well as challenges to freedom of navigation or overflight in the South China Sea."²⁶⁶

Feb. 4, 2017: Joint Press Briefing by Secretary Mattis and Minister Inada in Tokyo, Japan, “*The United States will continue to recognize Japanese administration of the islands, and as such article five of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty applies.*”

defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1071436/joint-press-briefing-by-secretary-mattis-and-minister-inada-in-tokyo-japan/

“Today the minister and I discussed the security situation and I made clear that our longstanding policy on the Senkaku Islands stands. The United States will continue to recognize Japanese administration of the islands, and as such article five of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty applies.”

“What we have to do is exhaust all—all efforts, diplomatic efforts, to try and resolve this properly, maintain open lines of communication. And certainly our military stance should be one that reinforces our diplomats in this regard”:

“China has shredded the trust of nations in the region. Apparently having to have a veto authority over the diplomatic, and security and economic conditions of the neighboring states. And the point behind a rules-based international order, what those words mean, is that we all play by the rules, and if we have disputes, we take them to arbitration. We don’t settle them by taking military means and occupying land that is subject to question, to say the least about who actually owns it, or is it international waters.

So, what we have to do is exhaust all—all efforts, diplomatic efforts, to try and resolve this properly, maintain open lines of communication. And certainly our military stance should be one that reinforces our diplomats in this regard.

But there is no need right now at this time for military maneuvers or something like that, that would—that would solve something that’s best solved by the diplomats.

At the same time, freedom of navigation is absolute, and whether it be commercial shipping or our U.S. Navy, we will practice in international waters and transit international waters as appropriate.

So, at this time, we do not see any need for dramatic military moves at all.”²⁶⁷

Jun. 19, 2017: Susan Thornton, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “*Previewing the U.S.-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue*”

state.gov/previewing-the-u-s-china-diplomatic-and-security-dialogue/

“Specifically, we are going to give the DPRK/North Korea issue top priority in our discussions, aiming to advance concrete cooperation with China towards a peaceful resolution”:

“Reflecting our desire for a streamlined approach, the Diplomatic and Security Dialogue will more narrowly focus on key security issues than we had in the previous strategic dialogue with China, which was more wide-ranging.

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Specifically, we are going to give the DPRK/North Korea issue top priority in our discussions, aiming to advance concrete cooperation with China towards a peaceful resolution of the nuclear and missile threat from North Korea. The United States remains committed to holding North Korea accountable for its flagrant and repeated disregard for multiple UN Security Council resolutions which expressly prohibit its ballistic missile and nuclear programs. We continue to urge China to exert its unique leverage as North Korea's largest trading partner, including by fully implementing all UN Security Council sanctions."²⁶⁸

June 2, 2018: Secretary of Defense Mattis, Remarks at Plenary Session of 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue, *"China's policy in the South China Sea stands in stark contrast to the openness of our strategy."*

dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1538599/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-at-plenary-session-of-the-2018-shangri-la-dialogue/

"Our Indo-Pacific strategy informs our relationship with China. We are aware China will face an array of challenges and opportunities in coming years. We are prepared to support China's choices, if they promote long-term peace and prosperity for all in this dynamic region.

Yet China's policy in the South China Sea stands in stark contrast to the openness of our strategy. It promotes—what our strategy promotes, it calls into question China's broader goals. China's militarization of artificial features in the South China Sea includes the deployment of anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missiles, electronic jammers, and more recently, the landing of bomber aircraft at Woody Island.

Despite China's claims to the contrary, the placement of these weapons systems is tied directly to military use for the purposes of intimidation and coercion. China's militarization of the Spratlys is also in direct contradiction to President Xi's 2015 public assurances in the White House Rose Garden that they would not do this.

For these reasons, and as initial response to China's continued militarization of the South China Sea, last week we disinvited the People's Liberation Army Navy from the 2018 Rim of the Pacific Exercise, as China's behavior is inconsistent with the principals and the purposes of the RIMPAC exercise, the world's largest Naval exercise, and exercise in which transparency and cooperation are hallmarks."²⁶⁹

Sept. 12, 2018: *Washington Examiner*: "Trump Administration: India Can Help US Counter China"

washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/trump-administration-india-can-help-us-counter-china

"An enhanced U.S-India relationship could help counter China's expanding military and diplomatic influence around the world, senior Pentagon and State Department officials said Wednesday.

‘That’s something where there’s no boundary, or no seam, to how the United States and India can conceive of items for discussion or areas of potential cooperation,’ David Helvey, the principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs, said in Washington, D.C.”²⁷⁰

“‘This year we talked quite extensively in the report about China’s roles, behavior and activities not only in the western Pacific, but in the Indian Ocean and beyond,’ Helvey told the Center for Strategic and International Studies. ‘When we talk about where the United States and India can have conversations, it’s not bound by a line in the middle of the Indian Ocean at all.’”²⁷¹

Feb. 12, 2019: Admiral Philip S. Davidson, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Senate Armed Services Committee Testimony, “China, however, represents the greatest long-term strategic threat to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific and to the United States.”

armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Davidson_02-12-19.pdf

“China, however, represents the greatest long-term strategic threat to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific and to the United States”:

“China, however, represents the greatest long-term strategic threat to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific and to the United States. Through fear and economic pressure, Beijing is working to expand its form of Communist-Socialist ideology in order to bend, break, and replace the existing rules-based international order. In its place, Beijing seeks to create a new international order led by China and with ‘Chinese characteristics’—an outcome that displaces the stability and peace of the Indo-Pacific that has endured for over 70 years.”²⁷²

“The PLA is the principal threat to U.S. interests, U.S. citizens, and our allies inside the First Island Chain”:

“Over the last 20 years, Beijing has undertaken a massive effort to grow and modernize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The PLA is the principal threat to U.S. interests, U.S. citizens, and our allies inside the First Island Chain—a term that refers to the islands that run from northern Japan through Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia—and the PLA is quickly increasing its ability to project power and influence beyond the First Island Chain. Beijing pursues both qualitative and quantitative efforts to transform its military, modernizing its military platforms while simultaneously increasing the number of platforms in service.”²⁷³

Mar. 27, 2019: Randall G. Schriver, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, Statement Before Committee on Armed Services, “*Shared security in the Indo-Pacific continues to rest on U.S. military presence and a growing stable of alliances and close partnerships...*”

“The U.S. National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy affirm the Indo-Pacific as our priority theater. As a resident power in the region, the United States recognizes the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific and our interests

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in the region are mutually-reinforcing: security enables the conditions for economic growth; burgeoning economies offer opportunities for American businesses; and American prosperity and security leads to a strong economy that protects the American people, supports our way of life, and sustains U.S. power.”²⁷⁴

“China’s rapid military modernization continues to increase PRC capacity to threaten U.S. interests and those of our allies”:

“China is working to transform this order toward one favorable to its authoritarian governance model—one which has grown increasingly harsh and repressive. China is utilizing tools such as the One Belt, One Road to erode the sovereignty of other countries and induce them to behave in accordance with Chinese interests. China continues to challenge the rules-based system of international trade and intellectual property protection in order to erode U.S. technological advantages for commercial and military gain. In the security domain, China’s rapid military modernization continues to increase PRC capacity to threaten U.S. interests and those of our allies and partners. China continues to militarize disputed features in the South China Sea and has also delivered coastal defense cruise missiles (CDCM) and long-range surface to air missile to Spratly Islands outposts, a clear sign that its intentions are not benign. This marks the most capable land-based weapon system yet deployed by China in the disputed Spratly Islands.”²⁷⁵

“Shared security in the Indo-Pacific continues to rest on U.S. military presence and a growing stable of alliances”:

“Shared security in the Indo-Pacific continues to rest on U.S. military presence and a growing stable of alliances and close partnerships that promote interoperability and coordination. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a key component of—and central to—our efforts to promote the values and policies enshrined in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy: freedom of the seas; market economics; good governance; and respect for an order based on clear and transparent rules.”²⁷⁶

June 2019: Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report”

dod.defense.gov/news/news-releases/news-release-view/article/1863396/dod-releases-indo-pacific-strategy-report/

“As China continues its economic and military ascendance, it seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and, ultimately global preeminence in the long-Term”:

“As China continues its economic and military ascendance, it seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and, ultimately global preeminence in the long-term. China is investing in a broad range of military programs and weapons, including those designed to improve power projection; modernize its nuclear forces; and conduct increasingly complex operations in domains such as cyberspace, space, and electronic warfare operations. China is also developing a wide array of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, which could be used to prevent countries from operating in areas near China’s periphery, including the maritime and air domains that are open to use by all countries.

In 2018, China's placement of anti-ship cruise missiles and long-range surface-to-air missiles on the disputed Spratly Islands violated a 2015 public pledge by the Chairman of the CCP Xi Jinping that 'China does not intend to pursue militarization' of the Spratly Islands. China's use of military presence in an attempt to exert de facto control over disputed areas is not limited to the South China Sea. In the East China Sea, China patrols near the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands with maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft. These actions endanger the free flow of trade, threaten the sovereignty of other nations, and undermine regional stability. Such activities are inconsistent with the principles of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Simultaneously, China is engaged in a campaign of low-level coercion to assert control of disputed spaces in the region, particularly in the maritime domain. China is using a steady progression of small, incremental steps in the 'gray zone' between peaceful relations and overt hostilities to secure its aims, while remaining below the threshold of armed conflict. Such activities can involve the coordination of multiple tools, including: political warfare, disinformation, use of A2/AD networks, subversion, and economic leverage.”

“Singapore, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Mongolia are reliable, capable, and natural partners of the United States. All four countries contribute to U.S. missions around the world”:

“As democracies in the Indo-Pacific, Singapore, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Mongolia are reliable, capable, and natural partners of the United States. All four countries contribute to U.S. missions around the world and are actively taking steps to uphold a free and open international order. The strength of these relationships is what we hope to replicate in our new and burgeoning relationships in the Indo-Pacific.”²⁷⁷

“The objective of our defense engagement with Taiwan is to ensure that Taiwan remains secure, confident, free from coercion, and able to peacefully and productively engage the mainland on its own terms”:

“The objective of our defense engagement with Taiwan is to ensure that Taiwan remains secure, confident, free from coercion, and able to peacefully and productively engage the mainland on its own terms. The Department is committed to providing Taiwan with defense articles and services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. DoD is continually engaged in evaluating Taiwan's defense needs to assist Taiwan in identifying capabilities that are mobile, survivable, and effective in resisting the use of force or other forms of coercion.”²⁷⁸

June 6, 2019: Washington Post: “To Avoid Conflict, the United States Must Deter Chinese Aggression,” Interview with Admiral Phillip Davidson, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

[washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/to-avoid-conflict-the-united-states-must-deter-chinese-aggression/2019/06/06/400b8ef0-8899-11e9-98c1-e945ae5db8fb_story.html?utm_term=.007a51765243](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/to-avoid-conflict-the-united-states-must-deter-chinese-aggression/2019/06/06/400b8ef0-8899-11e9-98c1-e945ae5db8fb_story.html?utm_term=.007a51765243)

“The goal of U.S. military strategy in Asia is “to dissuade China from pursuing their ambitions”:

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"Davidson said the goal of U.S. military strategy in Asia is 'to dissuade China from pursuing their ambitions, which are centered on the first island chain in the near term but are much more broadly and globally ambitious in the long term.'"²⁷⁹

"They would like to supplant the U.S.-led international order and lead one with Chinese characteristics":

"‘They’ve made quite plain that they would like to supplant the U.S.-led international order and lead one with Chinese characteristics,’ Davidson said. ‘When you think about that, being led by a nation that has a closed and authoritarian internal order, it’s got to send a chill down everybody’s spine across the globe.’"²⁸⁰

4.2. “America’s Indo-Pacific economic vision”

—Secretary of State Mike Pompeo²⁸¹

Quotations from POTUS, VP, DOD, State, OPIC, and USAID

Nov. 12, 2017: President of the United States, Joint Statement between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, *“The two leaders underscored the strategic importance to the international community of free and open access to the South China Sea...”*

“The two leaders underscored the strategic importance to the international community of free and open access to the South China Sea, the importance of unimpeded lawful commerce, the need to respect freedom of navigation and over-flight, and other lawful uses of the sea. The two sides reiterated the stance on the South China Sea in the previous United States-Vietnam and United States-ASEAN joint statements, including their call on parties to refrain from escalatory actions, The militarization of disputed features, and unlawful restrictions on freedom of the seas. They reaffirmed their shared commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law, including full respect for legal and diplomatic processes. They called for the full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), and an early conclusion to an effective, legally binding Code of Conduct for the South China Sea (COC). They further called for all South China Sea claimants to clarify and comport their maritime claims in accordance with the international law of the sea as reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and to implement their international legal obligations in good faith in managing or resolving these disputes.”

Nov. 13, 2017: Joint Statement between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines, *“Both sides reiterated their commitment to uphold their principles including the freedom of navigation and overflight...”*

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-united-states-america-republic-philippines/

“Both sides reiterated their commitment to uphold their principles including the freedom of navigation and overflight, and the exercise of self-restraint. They stressed the importance of peacefully resolving disputes in the South China Sea, in accordance with international law, as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. They further underscored the need to continue pursuing confidence-building measures to increase mutual trust and confidence, and to refrain from actions that would escalate tensions, including militarization.”²⁸²

Apr. 2, 2018: Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alex Wong, "Briefing on the Indo-Pacific Strategy"

state.gov/briefing-on-the-indo-pacific-strategy/

"What we mean by Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy":

"I want to discuss what we mean by Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. And the best way to do that is to focus on the two modifiers that we've chosen to describe the strategy: free and open. So by free we mean, first of all, the international plane. We want the nations of the Indo-Pacific to be free from coercion, that they can pursue in a sovereign manner the paths they choose in the region. Secondly, we mean at the national level, we want the societies of the various Indo-Pacific countries to become progressively more free – free in terms of good governance, in terms of fundamental rights, in terms of transparency and anti-corruption."²⁸³

"We also mean more open trade. Free, fair, and reciprocal trade is something the United States has supported for decades and that the Trump administration supports":

"Secondly, we mean more open logistics—infrastructure. There's an infrastructure gap throughout the Indo-Pacific. What is needed throughout the region to encourage greater regional integration, encourage greater economic growth? We want to assist the region in doing infrastructure in the right way, infrastructure that truly does drive integration and raises the GDPs of the constituent economies, not weigh them down.

We also mean more open investment. For decades, the United States has supported more open investment environments, more transparent regulatory structures, so that it's not – so that the region is not only open to more U.S. foreign direct investment, but that indigenous populations, indigenous innovators, indigenous entrepreneurs can take advantage of the investment environments to drive economic growth throughout the region.

And we also mean more open trade. Free, fair, and reciprocal trade is something the United States has supported for decades and that the Trump administration supports."²⁸⁴

"It's our policy to ensure that India does play that role, does become over time a more influential player in the region":

"Secondly, I want to turn your attention to the term 'Indo-Pacific.' It's significant that we use this term. Before, people used the term Asia Pacific, or just simply Asia, but we've adopted this phrase for two reasons, and it's significant for two reasons.

Number one, it acknowledges the historical reality and the current-day reality that South Asia, and in particular India, plays a key role in the Pacific and in East Asia and in Southeast Asia. That's been true for thousands of years and it's true today. Secondly, it is in our interest, the U.S. interest, as well as the interests of the region, that India play an increasingly weighty role in the region. India is a nation that is invested in a free and open order. It is a democracy. It is a nation that can bookend and anchor the free and open order in the Indo-Pacific region, and it's our policy to ensure that India does play that role, does become over time a more influential player in the region."²⁸⁵

Apr. 4, 2018: “Asian Pacific Centre for Security Studies Hosts Indo-Pacific Strategy Workshop”

“Pottinger shared the U.S. vision for the region with a desire to see ‘countries upholding the sanctity of sovereignty, respect for individual rights, and the rule of law.’

Deputy Assistant Secretary Alex Wong reiterated the U.S.’s commitment in the region with ‘five treaty allies and strong military partnerships in the region, the construct is unlike any other in the history of the world. We give more aid and direct foreign investment in the Indo-Pacific than any other nation; we are the number one trading partner, and we are the number one economic partner.’”²⁸⁶

Jul. 30, 2018: Secretary of State Pompeo, “Remarks on America’s Indo-Pacific Economic Vision”

ph.usembassy.gov/remarks-on-americas-indo-pacific-economic-vision/

“When we say ‘free’ Indo-Pacific, it means we all want all nations, every nation, to be able to protect their sovereignty from coercion by other countries. At the national level, ‘free’ means good governance and the assurance that citizens can enjoy their fundamental rights and liberties.

When we say ‘open’ in the Indo-Pacific, it means we want all nations to enjoy open access to seas and airways. We want the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes. This is key for international peace and for each country’s attainment of its own national aims.

Economically, ‘open’ means fair and reciprocal trade, open investment environments, transparent agreements between nations, and improved connectivity to drive regional ties—because these are the paths for sustainable growth in the region.”²⁸⁷

Jul. 30, 2018: USAID Administrator Mark Green, Remarks at Indo-Pacific Business Forum, “Non-capitalist powers are looking to buy influence and lock up access to strategic resources.”

usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/jul-30-2018-administrator-mark-green-remarks-indo-pChineseTaiwanic-business-forum

“One final thought this morning—it is impossible to talk about the future of the Indo-Pacific region, and America’s role there, without acknowledging the proverbial elephant in the room. Other powers—and other interests—are reaching out as well, and not just China and not just in Asia. While we strive to promote independence and self-reliance, they offer a very different bargain. One that is very often more enticing in the short-term, but one that we both know will exact a heavy price in the years ahead. Let’s be clear: non-capitalist powers are looking to buy influence and lock up access to strategic resources. They offer easy money to countries, cash up front, but these funds come often with disturbing strings attached: unsustainable debt, decreased transparency, restrictions on market economics, and the loss of control of the natural resources. In essence, they offer a mortgaged future. America’s Indo-Pacific strategy offers our partners

an enterprise-driven future—and private enterprise is after all the greatest known to man for lifting lives and building communities.”²⁸⁸

Nov. 15, 2018: Overseas Private Investment Corporation Executive Vice President David Bohigian, *Washington Times* Op-Ed, “Win-Win or Winner Take All?”

[washingtontimes.com/news/2018/nov/15/how-america-can-help-advance-global-security-in-th/](https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/nov/15/how-america-can-help-advance-global-security-in-th/)

“U.S. infrastructure development helps improve local business conditions, connect countries with global markets, and reduce dependence on foreign aid and capital. In contrast, China seeks to build spheres of influence”:

“While China is lending vast amounts to infrastructure projects across the region, the United States is the largest source of investment into the Indo-Pacific, and the recent passage of the BUILD Act will more than double U.S. development finance resources.

The Indo-Pacific needs this investment in power plants, ports and other infrastructure to create modern connected economies. However, from predatory lending to corruption, China’s approach to development raises red flags.”²⁸⁹

“U.S. infrastructure development helps improve local business conditions, connect countries with global markets, and reduce dependence on foreign aid and capital. In contrast, China seeks to build spheres of influence, often through corrupting elites, rather than empowering citizens and creating free and open networks of nations. This mercantilist zero-sum approach doesn’t deliver long-term benefits.”²⁹⁰

“Loan-to-own exchanges, or “debtbook diplomacy,” do not create sustainable sovereign states”:

“Loan-to-own exchanges, or ‘debtbook diplomacy,’ do not create sustainable sovereign states. I’ve visited a strategic port in Sri Lanka that China has claimed for 99 years. Angola now sends the majority of its oil to China for debt repayment. Deals like these threaten a country’s economy and autonomy.”²⁹¹

“The Western development finance model, combining private capital with limited government support, has been proven to be a superior model than state-directed investments”:

“State-based investing is insufficient, inefficient and unsustainable. Including true private-sector partners shows investors and employers that a country is a viable commercial destination.

The Western development finance model, combining private capital with limited government support, has been proven to be a superior model than state-directed investments, and takes into account the factors countries and projects need to thrive.”²⁹²

Nov. 16, 2018: Vice President Pence, Remarks at the 2018 APEC CEO Summit, “We will continue to fly and sail wherever international law allows and our national interests demand; harassment will only strengthen our resolve. We will not change course.”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-2018-apec-ceo-summit-port-moresby-papua-new-guinea/

“The United States of America will continue to uphold the freedom of the seas and the skies”:

“The United States of America will continue to uphold the freedom of the seas and the skies, which are so essential to our prosperity. We will continue to fly and sail wherever international law allows and our national interests demand; harassment will only strengthen our resolve. We will not change course. And we will continue to support efforts within ASEAN to adopt a meaningful and binding code of conduct that respects the rights of all nations, including the freedom of navigation, in the South China Sea.

“Today, it’s also my privilege to announce our new Indo-Pacific Transparency Initiative”:

“Today, it’s also my privilege to announce our new Indo-Pacific Transparency Initiative. In conjunction with more than \$400 million in American funding, this program will help empower the region’s citizens, combat corruption, and strengthen sovereignty.”

“The United States is drawing closer to our allies every day. We’re working with Japan to invest \$10 billion in the region’s energy infrastructure, and we’re now partnering with Japan and Australia to support a vast array of private development projects across the Indo-Pacific.”²⁹³

“Our strategic partnership with India is a key component of our vision”:

“As the world’s oldest democracy, the United States also feels a kinship with the world’s largest democracy, India. And our strategic partnership with India is a key component of our vision. As we speak, we’re increasing our security collaboration with our major defense partner. We’re strengthening our trade relationship with India, and promoting our shared values across the region.”²⁹⁴

Dec. 4, 2018: USAID Acting Assistant Administrator, Gloria Steele, Senate Subcommittee on East Asia Testimony, “The alternative choice we offer is one of strategic partnership, not strategic dependence”

usaid.gov/news-information/congressional-testimony/dec-4-2018-gloria-steele-aaa-asia-china-challenge

“Across Asia, USAID sees countries making short term economic decisions that can lead to unsustainable debt, undermine sovereignty, or limit economic, political and social freedoms, which ultimately undermines a country’s path to self-reliance.

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Put simply: the alternative choice we offer is one of strategic partnership, not strategic dependence.

Over the last five years, democratic institutions across Asia have been significantly tested. Some foreign influences overtly and covertly have co-opted political leaders and exploited institutional weaknesses, giving rise to increased corruption, opaque commercial deals and subversions of national sovereignty. These developments consequently undermine the democratic institutions and the long-term stability of our partner countries.

Across Asia, and in support of President Trump’s vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific region, USAID promotes democratic, citizen-centered governance that is representative of the will and interests of the people, and is infused with the democratic principles of participation, inclusion, transparency and accountability. We support legal and institutional respect for human rights—the protection of which is a cornerstone of democratic governance and ensures meaningful citizen engagement. We promote adherence to international rules and standards and the integrity of electoral processes. Our work helps protect human rights and promote religious freedom, support the independence of media and information integrity, strengthen reliance on evidence-based policy analysis and advocacy, and foster anti-corruption initiatives. We advance these objectives through support for like-minded civil society leaders and strategic alliances between current and emerging democratic leaders.”²⁹⁵

“Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt that China is increasingly exerting its influence across the region. This presents challenges to our partner countries’ sustainable development and can threaten country sovereignty. The strategic partnership we offer to countries throughout the region provides a clear, alternative choice—one that invests in increasing country self-reliance and sustainable prosperity, and helps countries to make informed decisions about their own futures.”²⁹⁶

Jan. 3, 2019: *The Diplomat*: “Trump Signs Asia Reassurance Initiative Act into Law”

thediplomat.com/2019/01/trump-signs-asia-reassurance-initiative-act-into-law/

“The act ‘establishes a multifaceted U.S. strategy to increase U.S. security, economic interests, and values in the Indo-Pacific region,’ according to the White House.

Specifically, the ARIA will authorize \$1.5 billion in spending for a range of U.S. programs in East and Southeast Asia and “develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region, and for other purposes.”²⁹⁷

“The ARIA devotes considerable energy to reasserting U.S. support for Taiwan and calls on the president of the United States to ‘encourage the travel of high level United States officials to Taiwan, in accordance with the Taiwan Travel Act,’ which was made law in 2018.

Elsewhere, ARIA devotes attention to the maritime commons in the Asia and the South China Sea, where it calls on the United States to support the ASEAN nations as they adopt a code of conduct in the South China Sea with China.

The law calls for the president to ‘develop a diplomatic strategy that includes working with United States allies and partners to conduct joint maritime training and freedom of navigation operations in the Indo-Pacific region, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea, in support of a rules-based international system benefiting all countries.’²⁹⁸

May 3, 2019: Ambassador David Hale, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Press Briefing, *“Economics is at the forefront of this approach of private sector led investment, which we believe is most sustainable and the best method to untap the economic potential of this region.”*

state.gov/telephonic-press-briefing-with-ambassador-david-hale-under-secretary-of-state-for-political-affairs/

“Economics is at the forefront of this approach of private sector led investment, which we believe is most sustainable and the best method to untap the economic potential of this region”:

“ASEAN is the number one destination for U.S. investment, over \$900 billion in cumulative investments have been made from the United States—which is more than China, Japan, Korea and India combined.

We see ASEAN’s approach as one based on respect. Respect for each other as sovereign independent states, respect for the supremacy of the rule of law, respect for equality. These are principles that are not only shared in the region, but are the core of our own Indo-Pacific Strategy which does not seek to impose any singular model on any one country. Economics is at the forefront of this approach of private sector led investment, which we believe is most sustainable and the best method to untap the economic potential of this region.”²⁹⁹

“But where we aren’t able to find that kind of cooperation, we’re going to be actively defending American interests and values and those of our allies”:

“But where we aren’t able to find that kind of cooperation, we’re going to be actively defending American interests and values and those of our allies. That is an area, some of which you touched on—trade, religious freedom, human rights, and predatory and aggressive action in the South China Sea and even further afield.

But in all this, I come back to the point, our goal is to have a constructive relationship. I think in the case of trade, for example, the objective is fair and reciprocal trade. In the case of the Belt and Road Initiative, we just want to make sure that countries

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are aware of the strategic risks there. And that they can see for themselves whether these initiatives are all that they are said to be, or in fact whether there are debt traps and other ways in which these countries will be caught into relationships that they had not intended when they started out.

But our own approach is different, in the sense that it's a fundamentally different approach to economic development and governance, one in which free market and free and fair trade are key elements to this. Market-driven investments rather than state-driven investments.”³⁰⁰

May 21, 2019: “Joint Statement from the President of the United States and the Presidents of the Freely Associated States”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-united-states-presidents-freely-associated-states/

“We resolve to continue developing joint initiatives, both bilaterally and through multilateral forums, such as the Pacific Islands Forum, to tackle the region’s most pressing issues, including responding to natural disasters; combating illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing; advancing economic development; strengthening the rule of law; and supporting the resiliency of the Pacific islands environment. We recognize these shared priorities and are committed to collaborate on effective solutions responding to the unprecedented challenges of the 21st century.”³⁰¹

June 26, 2019: Secretary of State Pompeo, “America and India: Embracing an Age of Ambition”

state.gov/america-and-india-embracing-an-age-of-ambition/

“Then there’s our shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific region—a vision which we arrived at independently, but which today we pursue together. We both seek to uphold national sovereignty, the rule of law, transparency, good government, and basic freedoms. And we look forward to working with you in the western Indian Ocean, alongside countries such as France. Later this year, for the first time ever, the U.S. military will participate in a tri-service exercise with their Indian counterparts. We respect your sovereignty, and seek a true partnership. Can we have a more robust defense relationship grounded in interoperability, with common platforms, shared doctrines, and new technologies?

Today 60 percent of global maritime trade transits through the Indo-Pacific. In past weeks, the Islamic Republic of Iran has attacked tankers from Japan, Norway, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. In recent years, China has sought dominance in the South China Sea. Can America and India strategize more comprehensively on how to safeguard free and open seaways all throughout the world?”³⁰²

Jan. 16, 2020: Deputy National Security Advisor Matthew Pottinger at the Raisina Dialogue, “What does President Trump mean when he talks about a free and open Indo Pacific?”

youtube.com/watch?v=gotKrQTVKQ4

“What does President Trump mean when he talks about a free and open Indo Pacific?”:

“What does President Trump mean when he talks about a free and open Indo Pacific? So he’s talking about cherished principles, he’s talking about the principles that make this region, as he put it, quote, ‘a beautiful constellation of nations, each its own bright star, satellites to none, satellites to none.’ So in other words, a free and open Indo-Pacific is really, it’s not a block, it’s not a military alliance. It’s a principled vision and it’s a community of countries that respects the rule of law, that stands up for freedom of navigation in the seas and in the skies above, that promotes open commerce, that promotes open thinking and above all that defends the sanctity of each nation’s sovereignty. So a free and open Indo-Pacific, it doesn’t exclude any nation, but it does ask each nation to respect and promote those principles that we all hold in common.”³⁰³



U.S. President Donald Trump and Matthew Pottinger at a meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders’ summit in Danang on November 10, 2017. (Jim Watson/AFP via Getty Images)

“Beijing has been decoupling from the broader world since they entered the WTO”:

“Quite frankly Beijing has been decoupling from the broader world since they entered the WTO in 2001.”³⁰⁴

“When you have a Great Firewall where not a single Western Internet company has been able to prosper or survive and in China by design, that’s decoupling. When Christian churches are torn down and ethnic minorities are put into re-education camps, that’s decoupling. So the decoupling is something that’s been underway for quite a long time and it is not driven by the United States.”³⁰⁵

Apr. 22, 2020: Secretary of State Pompeo, “The United States and ASEAN Are Partnering to Defeat COVID-19, Build Long-Term Resilience, and Support Economic Recovery”

state.gov/the-united-states-and-asean-are-partnering-to-defeat-covid-19-build-long-term-resilience-and-support-economic-recovery/

“Even as we fight the outbreak, we must remember that the long-term threats to our shared security have not disappeared. In fact, they’ve become more prominent. Beijing has moved to take advantage of the distraction, from China’s new unilateral

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announcement of administrative districts over disputed islands and maritime areas in the South China Sea, its sinking of a Vietnamese fishing vessel earlier this month, and its 'research stations' on Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef. The PRC continues to deploy maritime militia around the Spratly Islands and most recently, the PRC has dispatched a flotilla that included an energy survey vessel for the sole purpose of intimidating other claimants from engaging in offshore hydrocarbon development. It is important to highlight how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is exploiting the world's focus on the COVID-19 crisis by continuing its provocative behavior. The CCP is exerting military pressure and coercing its neighbors in the SCS, even going so far as to sink a Vietnamese fishing vessel. The U.S. strongly opposes China's bullying and we hope other nations will hold them to account too.

We expressed concerns over a scientific report showing that Beijing's upstream dam operations have unilaterally altered flows of the Mekong. The report found that such operations significantly deprived the Mekong countries of water for years, with catastrophic results during the most recent dry season for the 60 million people who depend on the river for food, energy, and transportation."³⁰⁶

4.3. “Rejecting the Belt and Road Initiative”

—Vice President Mike Pence³⁰⁷

Quotations from Treasury, USAID, State, EXIM, and VP Pence

Nov. 27, 2018: Under Secretary of the Treasury David Malpass, Senate Foreign Relations Testimony, *“We are working with allies and like-minded countries to guide the MDBs away from what could be viewed as endorsement of China’s geopolitical ambitions.”*

home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm555

“If countries default on these debts, China often gains influence over the host government and may take ownership of the underlying assets”:

“We engaged repeatedly with China on our trade and investment concerns and the problems caused by their One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, which often leaves countries with excessive debt and poor-quality projects. If countries default on these debts, China often gains influence over the host government and may take ownership of the underlying assets. We have built a common awareness of these concerns in the G7 and G20.”³⁰⁸

“We are working with allies and like-minded countries to guide the MDBs away from what could be viewed as endorsement of China’s geopolitical ambitions”:

“With regard to China’s excessive lending, the MDBs (alongside the IMF) can be an effective tool in helping vulnerable countries better understand the risks and implications of such lending. The MDBs present a better source of development finance with higher environmental, social, procurement, and debt sustainability standards. They can also help countries constructively channel bilateral loans toward growth-positive projects that serve the borrower, not just the lender. Finally, the MDBs and IMF can help countries build capacity to negotiate transparent, non-corrupt terms for infrastructure projects with foreign financiers, taking into account the macroeconomic consequences of new non-concessional debt.

But it is worth noting that China has made substantial inroads into the MDBs despite its financing practices. In combination, China is absorbing decades of financial knowhow into its institutions in a few short years, a similar pattern to its absorption of manufacturing technology.

We are working with allies and like-minded countries to guide the MDBs away from what could be viewed as endorsement of China’s geopolitical ambitions.”³⁰⁹

Dec. 12, 2018: Under Secretary of the Treasury David Malpass, Statement Before the U.S. House Financial Services Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade, *"We will continue to challenge China's unfair trade practices and lack of reciprocity in trade, lending, and investment."*

home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm572

"We will continue to challenge China's unfair trade practices and lack of reciprocity in trade, lending, and investment":

"There will be substantial work to deepen our major initiative on debt transparency. And we will continue to challenge China's unfair trade practices and lack of reciprocity in trade, lending, and investment. We will continue our work in the G7, G20 and other forums to discuss the challenge to our market system from China's non-market policies. There is already widespread acknowledgement of the problems in many key countries, but more work needs to be done on strengthening the debt transparency and financial resiliency of market-oriented countries."³¹⁰

"Negative repercussions associated with Chinese lending":

"In addition to greater private capital flows, there is another important feature in the creditor landscape: developing economies are grappling with significant and growing inflows from non-traditional official creditors such as China. While Chinese financing may fill some gaps in financing for infrastructure investment in developing countries, there are often negative repercussions associated with Chinese lending. China's use of non-market export credits, opaque financing, and exclusive procurement practices often benefits the donor more than the recipient and undermines debt sustainability, domestic institutions, and environmental and social standards. China, for example, does not adhere to legally binding international standards to criminalize bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions. Its financing also often includes conditions that do not show up on the government balance sheet but burden borrowing countries with future liabilities such as commodity deliveries."³¹¹

Mar. 9, 2019: U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, 2019 DFC Reorganization Plan, *"DFC will provide a robust alternative to the Chinese state-directed, debt-heavy model..."*

dfc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-08/shelby_letter_usidfc_reorg_plan_08032019.pdf

"Significantly, the DFC will provide a robust alternative to the Chinese state-directed, debt-heavy model that can leave developing countries worse off. The DFC will better incentivize private sector-led development projects in developing countries that adhere to high standards and are financially viable over the long haul, while ensuring that contracts are transparent, and that transactions properly assess economic and social impacts. Financing for high-quality private sector-led development from the DFC and other like-minded bilateral and multilateral development finance institutions will help countries throughout the developing world sidestep opaque and unsustainable debt traps, and help more American businesses invest in and open developing markets, including in places that are of key strategic importance to the United States."³¹²

Mar. 28, 2019: Secretary of State Pompeo, Conversation with Rich Lowry at the National Review Institute's 2019 Ideas Summit, *"Predatory lending practices, that's not straight and we are working diligently to make sure everyone in the world understands that threat."*

state.gov/conversation-with-rich-lowry-at-the-national-review-institutes-2019-ideas-summit/

"But the threats that—the security threats—and I don't want to separate the two. There's a security component to that as well. But the security threats more narrowly defined are very real. They're moving into the South China Sea is not because they want freedom of navigation. Their efforts to build ports around the world aren't because they want to be good shipbuilders and stewards of waterways, but rather they have a state national security element to each and every one of them.

The Belt and Road Initiative is no different. We've said this every place we've gone, every—if you talk to any of our ambassadors or our charges, they will tell you we are happy to compete on a fair, transparent basis under rule of law with the Chinese anywhere in the world. We'll win more than our fair share, but we'll lose some to them too. But when you're showing up with a non-economic offer, whether that's through state-facilitated, below-market pricing or handing someone something knowing that you can foreclose on their nation shortly, so predatory lending practices, that's not straight and we are working diligently to make sure everyone in the world understands that threat."³¹³

Apr. 25, 2019: USAID Administrator Mark Green, *Foreign Policy* Op-Ed, "China's Debt Diplomacy"

foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/25/chinas-debt-diplomacy/

"Under the Trump administration, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which I lead, centers development initiatives on helping countries on what it calls their "journey to self-reliance." As reflected in the administration's Africa Strategy, USAID wants to help partner countries adopt reforms and address the challenges necessary for them to achieve first self-reliance and then, hopefully, prosperity.

President Donald Trump's National Security Strategy emphasizes that private sector development in emerging economies is the best alternative to state-driven approaches. As a result, Congress has passed the president's proposal to increase the United States' ability to provide transparent, sustainable finance through a new U.S. International Development Finance Corp., and USAID has undertaken a major cultural and operational transformation to expand our engagement with the private sector to achieve long-lasting and sustainable results."³¹⁴

Jun. 26, 2019: Secretary of State Pompeo and Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar at a Press Availability, *"Beijing's deals come not with strings attached, but with shackles."*

state.gov/secretary-of-state-michael-r-pompeo-and-indian-foreign-minister-subrahmanyam-jaishankar-at-a-press-availability/

"Look, we've got to get this piece right, the economic piece right, because there are a myriad of opportunities that lay before us in the Indo-Pacific region. Countries in this part of the world which have signed on to the Belt and Road projects have found Beijing's deals come not with strings attached, but with shackles. Countries are looking to provide infrastructure, digital connectivity, and energy supplies to their people without relinquishing their sovereignty. We, together, should act quickly to fulfill the ambitious vision for prosperity that's shared by President Trump and Prime Minister Modi—not just for our own people, but for the good of the region and the world."³¹⁵

Jun. 27, 2019: Kimberly Reed, President and Chairman, Export-Import Bank of the United States, Written Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, *"Serving as a market-oriented counterweight to China."*

banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Reed%20Testimony%206-27-19.pdf

"At the same time, China has outlined its 'Made in China 2025' strategy—a strategy designed to transform China into a manufacturing superpower and in which China's ECAs play an important role—to develop domestic industries in sectors of key strategic importance. By developing critical infrastructure expertise, China can establish footholds in strategic geographic regions, control power generation, the electrical grid, and telecommunications networks, and reshape its economic footprint to align with its global ambitions."

"In the face of these changes, the U.S. export community has strongly expressed the need for a fully functioning EXIM that is empowered to level the playing field for American companies in this increasingly competitive international marketplace. In fulfilling its mission and in accordance with Charter requirements, EXIM can ensure U.S. exporters have the opportunity to win export sales, including in strategically important projects in key markets around the world, while serving as a market-oriented counterweight to China. As President Trump often says, 'economic security equals national security.'"³¹⁶

Sept. 4, 2019: Remarks by Vice President Pence and Prime Minister Katrin Jakobsdóttir of Iceland Before Bilateral Meeting | Keflavík, Iceland, *"Our desire to work with Iceland and other freedom-loving nations to find alternatives to essentially China's state-based 5G operation."*

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-prime-minister-jakobsdottir-iceland-bilateral-meeting-keflavik-iceland/

"And we're also grateful, with China's increased activity and efforts to make the economic investments in the region, that, so far, Iceland has declined the Belt and Road Initiative."

And we also spoke today—and perhaps we can again—about the United States’ concerns about 5G and our desire to work with Iceland and other freedom-loving nations to find alternatives to essentially China’s state-based 5G operation.”

Sept. 4, 2019: Vice President Pence, Remarks in a Press Gaggle | Reykjavik, Iceland, “Join us in calling on nations across this alliance to reject that Huawei technology.”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-press-gaggle-reykjavik-iceland/

“So now is the time for us to strengthen our alliance, to strengthen our cooperation for security, and rejecting the Belt and Road Initiative, as Iceland did recently. But also, as I urge today—I encouraged Iceland to also recognize the profound issues that arise from any free nation, embracing the technology and equipment of Huawei. Huawei is essentially a Chinese company that, under Chinese law, is required to turn over all of the data that it collects to the Chinese government and the Communist Party.

And the reality is we don’t believe that that’s consistent with the security of free nations. We don’t believe it’s consistent with the privacy of people that enjoy freedom in nations like the United States and Iceland. And so, I urged the Foreign Minister today, as I will the Prime Minister, to join us in calling on nations across this alliance to reject that Huawei technology.

The United States is taking a strong stand on free and fair and reciprocal trade with China. We just had a new round of tariffs that we announced that were imposed on China. President Trump will continue to take a strong stand until we see China begin to open their markets and begin to recognize the international rules of commerce that govern the interaction between Iceland and America, and nations all across the globe. And we remain very hopeful.”³¹⁷

Feb. 15, 2020: Secretary of State Pompeo, “The West is Winning”

state.gov/the-west-is-winning/

“Huawei and other Chinese state-backed tech companies are Trojan horses for Chinese intelligence”:

“China encroaches on the exclusive economic zones of Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia. And on that point, China has had a border or maritime dispute with nearly every nation bordering it.

And let’s talk for a second about the other realm, cybersecurity. Huawei and other Chinese state-backed tech companies are Trojan horses for Chinese intelligence.”³¹⁸

“It exacts pieces of national infrastructure as payment when countries can’t meet its onerous loan terms”:

“China demands silence on Taiwan and Hong Kong so that deals will keep flowing. It exacts pieces of national infrastructure as payment when countries can’t meet its onerous loan terms.”

"The United States, too, has warned the Arctic Council about Russian and Chinese designs to exploit the Arctic for unfair gain":

"The United States has convinced the C5+1 to bolster Central Asian nations' sovereignty against Russian hegemony and Chinese economic pressure.

The United States, too, has warned the Arctic Council about Russian and Chinese designs to exploit the Arctic for unfair gain—something I know we care about collectively."³¹⁹

Mar. 4, 2020: Kimberly Reed, President Export-Import Bank of the United States, Written Testimony Before the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, "*Clear direction that EXIM should continue to focus on the economic and national security challenges from China.*"

exim.gov/news/archives/speeches/written-testimony-kimberly-reed-president-and-chairman-board-directors-export

"American economic security is national security, and EXIM cannot sit idly while China uses these unfair trade practices, often at the expense of American workers. Countries around the world are waking up to the costs of doing business with Chinese companies, which do not follow international standards and do not adhere to anti-corruption and environmental practices. Now is a crucial time for EXIM to step up in support of U.S. goods and services. We have a vital role to play in ensuring U.S. companies can compete with China on a global scale, and our historic seven-year reauthorization provides clear direction that EXIM should continue to focus on the economic and national security challenges from China.

The 2019 reauthorization directs EXIM to establish a program on China and Transformational Exports. This program sets a goal of reserving 20 percent of EXIM's total financing authority, equal to \$27 billion, "to support the extension of loans, guarantees, and insurance ... that are fully competitive with the rates, terms, and other conditions established by the People's Republic of China...'

Financing under the program is to 'directly neutralize export subsidies for competing goods and services provided by China, as well as to support American leadership, innovation, employment, and technological standards in ten specific transformative industries: artificial intelligence; biotechnology; biomedical sciences; wireless communications equipment (including 5G); quantum computing; renewable energy, energy efficiency, and energy storage; semiconductor and semiconductor machinery manufacturing; emerging financial technologies; water treatment and sanitation; and high-performance computing. As we look to implement this important program, I look forward to working with this Committee to achieve these goals."³²⁰

4.4. “Strong unofficial relations with Taiwan in accordance with our ‘One China’ policy”

—U.S. Strategic Approach to the PRC Quotations from State, AIT, and White House

Feb. 9, 2017: The White House, “Readout of the President’s Call with President Xi Jinping of China”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/readout-presidents-call-president-xi-jinping-china/

“President Donald J. Trump and President Xi Jinping of China had a lengthy telephone conversation on Thursday evening. The two leaders discussed numerous topics and President Trump agreed, at the request of President Xi, to honor our ‘one China’ policy. Representatives of the United States and China will engage in discussions and negotiations on various issues of mutual interest. The phone call between President Trump and President Xi was extremely cordial, and both leaders extended best wishes to the people of each other’s countries. They also extended invitations to meet in their respective countries. President Trump and President Xi look forward to further talks with very successful outcomes.”³²¹

Mar. 21, 2018: Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alex Wong, Remarks at the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei Hsieh Nien Fan, “*I can greet you by calling you President Tsai.*”

ait.org.tw/remarks-deputy-assistant-secretary-state-alex-wong-american-chamber-commerce-taipei-hsieh-nien-fan/

Secretary Wong: “I can greet you by calling you President Tsai”:

“Being here at this event is personally gratifying to me because it’s a chance to renew some old connections. President Tsai, on the occasions we’ve met in years past, I referred to you as Dr. Tsai. It is an honor for me that this time, on this trip to Taiwan, I can greet you by calling you President Tsai.”³²²

On Taiwan’s democracy: “an example for the entire Indo-Pacific region”:

“We can be certain that Taiwan’s democracy and resulting development are an example for the entire Indo-Pacific region. We can be certain that the United States, Taiwan, and all of our other like-minded partners can work together to strengthen the rules-based fabric of this region. And we can be certain that the United States’s commitment to the Taiwan people, to their security, to their democracy, has never been stronger.”³²³

"Taiwan is an inspiration to the rest of the Indo-Pacific":

"Dynamic, broad-based, and sustainable economic growth can never hinge on the whim of a dictator. It can only arise in the stable and certain conditions created under a constitutional government. Taiwan is a clear example of this truth, and Taiwan is an inspiration to the rest of the Indo-Pacific."³²⁴

"The United States has been pleased to note the continuous improvement of Taiwan's legal and regulatory environment. Taiwan's leaders have embraced administrative procedures more in line with international norms. They've protected intellectual property and vigorously prosecuted the theft of trade secret. They oppose market-distorting subsidies, and are focused on forging close economic ties with countries throughout the Indo-Pacific."³²⁵

"Taiwan can no longer be excluded unjustly from international fora":

"Taiwan can no longer be excluded unjustly from international fora. Taiwan has much to share with the world on issues of public health, humanitarian relief, and sustainable development. That it would be hindered from doing so is not only unjust for Taiwan, but unjust for every country and every individual in need who could benefit from Taiwan's contributions.

This is why it's U.S. policy to promote appropriate respect and treatment for Taiwan's role in the world. I can assure you, the United States government—and the United States private sector—will do their part to ensure Taiwan's stellar international example shines brightly."³²⁶

"We welcome Taiwan's intent to join the CBPR system":

"We welcome Taiwan's intent to join the CBPR system. That demonstrates the island's strong commitment to embracing the digital age, robustly and responsibly."³²⁷

June 17, 2019: *Wall Street Journal*: "Trump Administration Is Split Over Arms Sale to Taiwan"

[wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-is-split-over-arms-sale-to-taiwan-11560805016?shareToken=st8164e118a0e84b80a1f5ec0c2e7dee69](https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-is-split-over-arms-sale-to-taiwan-11560805016?shareToken=st8164e118a0e84b80a1f5ec0c2e7dee69)

"Mr. Trump got word that a State Department diplomat, Alex Wong, had traveled to Taipei, Taiwan's capital, to communicate the Trump administration's commitment to closer ties with the island.

Mr. Trump sounded off to his aides.

"Who the f— is this guy?" he lashed out, referring to Mr. Wong, and questioned what U.S. diplomats were doing in Taiwan, according to a person with direct knowledge of the discussion. The president requested that no American diplomats travel to Taiwan while he is working on a deal with China."³²⁸

Feb. 19, 2019: Statement from Secretary Pompeo to the Micronesia Presidents' Summit, "*Taiwan is also a democratic success story, a reliable partner, and a force for good in the world.*"

fj.usembassy.gov/statement-from-secretary-pompeo-to-the-micronesia-presidents-summit/

"Taiwan is also a democratic success story, a reliable partner, and a force for good in the world. As Vice President Mike Pence said: "America will always believe Taiwan's embrace of democracy is an example to be internationally supported. We respect and support the decision those of you have made to continue to support Taiwan."

Mar. 4, 2019: AIT Director Brent Christensen, Remarks at Stanford University, "*The United States and Taiwan will continue to grow closer.*"

ait.org.tw/remarks-by-ait-director-brent-christensen-at-stanford-university/

"It is this enduring interest in Taiwan's security and regional peace that undergirds U.S. policy, as articulated in the TRA, not only to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character but also to maintain 'our capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or social or economic system of the people on Taiwan.'"

"The United States and Taiwan will continue to grow closer":

"Namely, the United States and Taiwan will continue to grow closer. U.S. commitments to Taiwan and to the region more broadly will not wane or wither. Taiwan will continue to grow stronger and its vibrant democracy will remain central to its continued success. And as was articulated by Vice President Pence in a speech last October, 'America will always believe that Taiwan's embrace of democracy shows a better path for all the Chinese people.'"³²⁹

May 16, 2019: Under Secretary David Hale's Call With Solomon Islands Prime Minister Sogavare, "*other democracies, including Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Taiwan.*"

state.gov/under-secretary-hales-call-with-solomon-islands-prime-minister-sogavare/

"Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David M. Hale called newly elected Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare to congratulate him and the people of the Solomon Islands on their national elections. They discussed our growing bilateral relationship including through the Millennium Challenge Corporation's Threshold Program, and the importance of partnership with other democracies, including Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Taiwan, to advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific region."³³⁰

Mar. 26, 2020: "Bill Signing: S. 1678, the 'Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019'"

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/bill-announcement-92/

"S. 1678, the 'Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019,' which requires the Department of State to report to Congress on steps taken by the United States government to strengthen Taiwan's diplomatic relations with other partners in the Indo-Pacific region and alter United States' engagement with nations that undermine the security or prosperity of Taiwan."³³¹

May 4, 2020: Remarks by Deputy National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger at the University of Virginia, "The cliché that Chinese people can't be trusted with democracy was...the most unpatriotic idea of all. Taiwan today is a living repudiation of that threadbare mistruth."

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-deputy-national-security-advisor-matt-pottinger-miller-center-university-virginia/

"Taiwan today is a living repudiation of that threadbare mistruth":

"A few short years after the Declaration was adopted by the United Nations, Chang resigned his post as a Chinese diplomat, having grown dismayed by the lack of democracy in China. In diagnosing the problem, it is easy to imagine P.C. Chang prescribing a closer reading not of ancient Greek philosophy, but of traditional Chinese ideals about virtuous leadership. The cliché that Chinese people can't be trusted with democracy was, as both P.C. Chang and Hu Shih knew, the most unpatriotic idea of all. Taiwan today is a living repudiation of that threadbare mistruth."³³²

"China's central government aired a news story about Dr. Li's 'rumor-mongering'":

"When his warning circulated more widely than he intended, Dr. Li was upset and anxious—and with good reason. Supervisors at his hospital quickly admonished him for leaking word of the coronavirus cases. Dr. Li was then interrogated by the police, made to sign a 'confession,' and threatened with prosecution if he spoke out again. Anyone tempted to believe this was just a case of overzealous local police, take note: China's central government aired a news story about Dr. Li's 'rumor-mongering.'" ³³³

"It takes courage to speak to a reporter—or to work as one—in today's China. Even finding an investigative reporter in China, foreign or local, is getting hard. Citizen journalists who tried to shed light on the outbreak in Wuhan went missing, including Chen Qiushi, Fang Bin and Li Zehua. More foreign reporters were expelled in recent months than the Soviet Union expelled over decades. Dr. Ai Fen, a colleague of Dr. Li Wenliang who also raised the alarm about the outbreak in Wuhan, reportedly can no longer appear in public after she spoke to a reporter."³³⁴

"Will its champions be slandered as 'unpatriotic,' 'pro-American,' 'subversive'? We know the Communist Party will do its best to make it so":

“As the May Fourth Movement today marks the inaugural year of its second century, what will its ultimate legacy be? It is a question only the Chinese people themselves can answer. The May Fourth Movement belongs to them. Will the movement's democratic aspirations remain unfulfilled for another century? Will its core ideas be deleted or distorted through official censorship and disinformation? Will its champions be slandered as ‘unpatriotic,’ ‘pro-American,’ ‘subversive’? We know the Communist Party will do its best to make it so.” 335

4.5. “The Trump administration’s new Africa strategy”

—Ambassador John Bolton³³⁶

Quotations from Commerce, NSA, Bolton, and State

Aug. 2, 2018: Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross and Senator Chris Coons, “Opinion: China Is ‘Pouring Money into Africa.’ Here’s How the US can Level the Playing Field”

commerce.gov/news/op-eds/2018/08/opinion-china-pouring-money-africa-heres-how-us-can-level-playing

“China is pursuing a neo-mercantilist vision that uses investment in infrastructure to secure an economic foothold, from which it is attempting to secure political, diplomatic, and in some cases military access”:

“Through efforts such as its Belt and Road Initiative, China is pursuing a neo-mercantilist vision that uses investment in infrastructure to secure an economic foothold, from which it is attempting to secure political, diplomatic, and in some cases military access, with potentially serious consequences for U.S. interests from Central Asia to Eastern Europe and Africa. China is, at the same time, bankrolling new financial organizations that aim to rival or displace the international institutions created by the United States and its allies after the Second World War.”³³⁷

“Mobilize capital for innovative projects that advance our national security and foreign policy objectives”:

“Passage of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018, better known as the BUILD Act, would change this unsustainable situation. This bipartisan legislation would reform and modernize government development finance by establishing the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC).

Moreover, this legislation would allow the IDFC to more than double OPIC’s investment portfolio and allow us to participate in equity investments, provide technical assistance, and issue catalytic grants to mobilize capital for innovative projects that advance our national security and foreign policy objectives.”³³⁸

Dec. 13, 2018: National Security Advisor Ambassador, John R. Bolton, “Remarks on the Trump Administration’s New Africa Strategy”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy/

“We are already seeing the disturbing effects of China’s quest to obtain more political, economic, and military power”:

“Great power competitors, namely China and Russia, are rapidly expanding their financial and political influence across Africa. They are deliberately and aggressively targeting their investments in the region to gain a competitive advantage over the United States.

From 2016-2017, China's foreign direct investment toward Africa totaled \$6.4 billion dollars. And, over the past several years, China has devoted considerable state-directed and state-supported financing to projects in the region.

China uses bribes, opaque agreements, and the strategic use of debt to hold states in Africa captive to Beijing's wishes and demands. Its investment ventures are riddled with corruption, and do not meet the same environmental or ethical standards as U.S. developmental programs.

Such predatory actions are sub-components of broader Chinese strategic initiatives, including 'One Belt, One Road' — a plan to develop a series of trade routes leading to and from China with the ultimate goal of advancing Chinese global dominance.

In Africa, we are already seeing the disturbing effects of China's quest to obtain more political, economic, and military power."³³⁹

"From now on, the United States will not tolerate this longstanding pattern of aid without effect, assistance without accountability, and relief without reform":

"Unfortunately, billions upon billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars have not achieved the desired effects.

They have not stopped the scourge of terrorism, radicalism, and violence.

They have not prevented other powers, such as china and Russia, from taking advantage of African states to increase their own power and influence.

And, they have not led to stable and transparent governance, economic viability, and increasing development across the region.

From now on, the United States will not tolerate this longstanding pattern of aid without effect, assistance without accountability, and relief without reform."³⁴⁰

"America's vision for the region is one of independence, self-reliance, and growth—not dependency, domination, and debt":

"To expand our economic relationships in the region, we are developing a new initiative called 'Prosper Africa,' which will support U.S. investment across the continent, grow Africa's middle class, and improve the overall business climate in the region.

In addition, we will encourage African leaders to choose high-quality, transparent, inclusive, and sustainable foreign investment projects, including those from the United States. We will leverage our expanded and modernized development tools to support access to financing and provide strong alternatives to external state-directed initiatives.

America's vision for the region is one of independence, self-reliance, and growth—not dependency, domination, and debt.

4. “A FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC” AND “REJECTING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE”

We want African nations to succeed, flourish, and remain independent in fact and not just in theory.

In the coming years and months, we also intend to pursue modern, comprehensive trade agreements on the continent that ensure fair and reciprocal exchange between the United States and the nations of Africa. We will begin these negotiations on a bilateral basis, and focus on creating mutually beneficial partnerships.”³⁴¹

“Today, we need to make adjustments to address the pressing challenge of great power competition, and to correct past mistakes in structuring our funding”:

“Today, we need to make adjustments to address the pressing challenge of great power competition, and to correct past mistakes in structuring our funding.

In developing our strategy, we are revisiting the foundational principles of the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan furthered American interests, bypassed the United Nations, and targeted key sectors of foreign economies rather than dissipating aid across hundreds of programs.

Our new foreign assistance strategy will ensure that all U.S. foreign aid, in every corner of the globe, advances U.S. interests.

Our goal is to move recipient states toward self-reliance, and prevent long-term dependency.”³⁴²

Sept. 23, 2019: Secretary of Commerce Ross, Remarks at the U.S.-Africa Leadership Forum, “Strengthening the Future of U.S.-Africa Trade and Investment”

commerce.gov/news/speeches/2019/09/remarks-commerce-secretary-wilbur-l-ross-us-africa-leadership-forum

“China is aggressively extending loans to African nations for large projects that benefit nobody other than China. We have heard woeful stories about poor quality, dubious contracts, punitive financing, and egregious exploitation of resources. We know that U.S. companies offer an unrivaled value proposition. They provide benefits far beyond those that can be measured monetarily, hiring local workers, exposing them to innovation and training them in best business practices and finance, and doing what is right for communities and countries.”³⁴³

Feb. 19, 2020: Secretary of State Pompeo, “Liberating Africa’s Entrepreneurs”

state.gov/liberating-africas-entrepreneurs/

“Look, not every nation doing business in Africa from outside the continent adopts the American model of partnership. Countries should be wary of authoritarian regimes with empty promises. They breed corruption, dependency, they don’t hire

the local people, they don't train, they don't lead them. They run the risk that the prosperity and sovereignty and progress that Africa so needs and desperately wants won't happen.

Real simple. The United States stands for local jobs, environmental responsibility, honest business practices, high-quality work, and mutual prosperity.”³⁴⁴

4.6. “We can’t let the High North—or any other area—go the way of the South China Sea”

—Secretary of State Mike Pompeo Quotations from State and VP Pence

May 6, 2019: *Politico*: “Pompeo Aims to Counter China’s Ambitions in the Arctic”

politicocom/story/2019/05/06/pompeo-arctic-china-russia-1302649

“Pompeo will put special emphasis on Chinese behavior, suggesting that Beijing is using the region as the latest venue for its territorial aggression.

‘Do we want the Arctic Ocean to transform into a new South China Sea, fraught with militarization and competing territorial claims?’ Pompeo will ask.

‘Under President Trump, we are fortifying America’s security and diplomatic presence’ in the Arctic, Pompeo will declare. ‘On the security side, partly in response to Russia’s destabilizing activities, we are hosting military exercises, strengthening our force presence, rebuilding our icebreaker fleet, expanding Coast Guard funding, and creating a new senior military post for Arctic Affairs.’”³⁴⁵

May 6, 2019: Secretary of State Pompeo, “Looking North: Sharpening America’s Arctic Focus”

state.gov/looking-north-sharpening-americas-arctic-focus/

“Just last month, Russia announced plans to connect the Northern Sea Route with China’s Maritime Silk Road, which would develop a new shipping channel from Asia to northern Europe. Meanwhile, China is already developing shipping lanes in the Arctic Ocean.

This is part of a very familiar pattern. Beijing attempts to develop critical infrastructure using Chinese money, Chinese companies, and Chinese workers—in some cases, to establish a permanent Chinese security presence.

Our Pentagon warned just last week that China could use its civilian research presence in the Arctic to strengthen its military presence, including our deployment of submarines—including deployment of submarines to the region as a deterrent against nuclear attack.

We need to examine these activities closely, and we need—and we keep the experience we have learned of other nations in mind. China’s pattern of aggressive behavior elsewhere in the—excuse me—aggressive behavior elsewhere should inform what we do and how it might treat the Arctic.”³⁴⁶

May 6, 2019: Secretary of State Pompeo, Remarks to the Travelling Press, Rovaniemi, Finland, “*I have no earthly idea what they mean when they say they’re a near-Arctic country.*”

state.gov/remarks-to-traveling-press-8/

“So I have no earthly idea what they mean when they say they’re a near-Arctic country. Perhaps they can provide a definition. What we know is there are eight countries that form the Arctic Council that have the vested interest in things that we’re working on here on this trip. All the other nations are non-Arctic countries. But I haven’t seen the Chinese response.”³⁴⁷

“We’ve said all along we have a huge economic interest in China’s success and vice versa. We want that and we are prepared to allow every country to compete”:

“The Chinese effort to the Belt and Road activities are about using government power to achieve national security objectives. We’ve said all along we have a huge economic interest in China’s success and vice versa. We want that and we are prepared to allow every country to compete.

But it’s got to be transparent. It’s got to be on a free and open basis. It can’t be with the idea that you’re going to loan a country money and then foreclose on that facility so that you can then build yourself a port or take that land and real estate. That’s not appropriate. We’ve discouraged that. We’ve educated other countries around the world on that set of issues.

And so where there are elements of the Belt and Road that are truly building a bridge and it’s a commercial transaction—it was—there was a tender, there was a—right?—there was a bid process, they didn’t buy the guy who was making the decision so there was no corruption involved in it either—we welcome China participating in those. But where we see China behaving in ways that are truly not commercial but rather designed to further gain them either access entree for national security purposes, we don’t think that’s what those countries are really buying.”³⁴⁸

May 7, 2019: Secretary of State Pompeo, Remarks at the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, “*cooperation with our partners on emerging challenges, including the increased presence and ambitions of non-Arctic nations in the region.*”

state.gov/remarks-at-the-arctic-council-ministerial-meeting-2/

“The Trump administration has sought to engage the Arctic with renewed vigor, openness, and respect, as I spoke about at length yesterday. America’s new Arctic focus prioritizes close cooperation with our partners on emerging challenges, including the increased presence and ambitions of non-Arctic nations in the region.”³⁴⁹

“Chinese activity, which has caused environmental destruction in other regions, continues to concern us in the Arctic”:

4. “A FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC” AND “REJECTING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE”

“For example, the Trump administration shares your deep commitment to environmental stewardship. In fact, it’s one reason Chinese activity, which has caused environmental destruction in other regions, continues to concern us in the Arctic. The Arctic has always been a fragile ecosystem, and protecting it is indeed our shared responsibility. But once again, the keys are indeed trust and responsibility.”³⁵⁰

Aug. 22, 2019: Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo and Canadian Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland at a Press Availability, “*The Trump administration is eager to work with Canada to increase our shared defense in the region.*”

state.gov/secretary-of-state-michael-r-pompeo-and-canadian-foreign-minister-chrystia-freeland-at-a-press-availability/

“I also stressed the importance of Canadian efforts in defense of the Arctic. Your expansive Arctic territory is the backdoor to the continent, and the Arctic’s strategic importance, including its vast resources and shipping lanes, are of increasing interest to the entire world, especially to China and to Russia. The Trump administration is eager to work with Canada to increase our shared defense in the region.”³⁵¹

Aug. 28, 2019: *Reuters*: “Pence, in Visit to Iceland, to Discuss ‘Incursions’ into Arctic Circle by China, Russia: Official”

reuters.com/article/us-usa-pence/pence-in-visit-to-iceland-to-discuss-incursions-into-arctic-circle-by-china-russia-official-idUSKCN1V11QW

“Vice President Mike Pence, in a visit to Iceland next week, will have talks about ‘incursions’ into the Arctic Circle by China and Russia, a senior Trump administration official said on Wednesday.”³⁵²

Apr. 23, 2020: Department of State, “Briefing on the Administration’s Arctic Strategy”

state.gov/briefing-with-senior-state-department-official-on-the-administrations-arctic-strategy/

“And the department—Department of State—is working in collaboration with other agencies across the United States Government to ensure that the Arctic remains a region free of conflict as well as characterized by respect for national sovereignty, a rules-based order, constructive engagement among Arctic states to address our shared economic, scientific, and environmental challenges.”³⁵³

“We do not accept Beijing’s claims to be a near-Arctic state”:

“China is a bit of a different challenge. It claims that its interests in the Arctic are focused on access to natural resources and the opportunities offered by Arctic sea routes for shipping. And as you all probably know, it outlined plans in 2018 to develop a Polar Silk Road, claimed it was a near-Arctic state, and signaled its intention to play a more active role in Arctic governance.

We have found this disconcerting because the PRC's behavior outside the Arctic, it often disregards international norms, as it has in the South China Sea, for example. And if I can quote Secretary Pompeo, he said this last year in May of 2019 in Finland: 'There are only Arctic states and non-Arctic states.' There are—'No third category exists,' so we do not accept Beijing's claims to be a near-Arctic state."³⁵⁴

"We can't necessarily assume its good intentions with regards to its activities in the Arctic":

"And we've also seen across the globe that China's soft-power tools often have a soft edge when deployed by the PRC. It's weaponized its state capitalism in an effort to secure control of critical infrastructure such as ports and telecommunications networks. It's demonstrated a willingness to use coercion and influence operations and other methods to get what it wants, including in the Arctic. The recent experience of the Faroe Islands over the threats to drop a trade agreement because the Faroese did not sign a 5G contract with Huawei is just one example. So their behavior, the PRC's behavior over the last decade underscores that we can't necessarily assume its good intentions with regards to its activities in the Arctic."³⁵⁵

"Recognition of the importance of Greenland to the United States security":

"So I think it's also a recognition of the importance of Greenland to the United States security. I mean, Thule Air Force Base has been there for a long time and it provides an important—plays an important part in the defense of the United States, and it plays an important part in the defense of NATO and our NATO allies. I mean, Greenland's a critical part of the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap, which is increasingly important to us again as it was in an earlier period, in part because of what Russia has been doing in terms of its aggression in Europe and its buildup of military forces in the High North and in the Arctic. We need to be in a position with our allies to be able to ensure that we can cross the Atlantic in the event of a crisis."³⁵⁶



5. “THE ERA OF ECONOMIC SURRENDER IS OVER”

—President Trump³⁵⁷

5.1. “Address the unfair trade practices that drive this deficit, along with barriers to market success”

—President Donald Trump³⁵⁸

Quotations from Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture, OTMP, SEC, USTR, State, and the White House

Jul. 31, 2017: *Wall Street Journal*: Secretary of Commerce Ross, Op-Ed: “Free-Trade is a Two-Way Street”

[wsj.com/articles/free-trade-is-a-two-way-street-1501542569](https://www.wsj.com/articles/free-trade-is-a-two-way-street-1501542569)

“Unfortunately, many governments across the globe have pursued policies that put American workers and businesses at a disadvantage. For these governments, President Trump and his administration have a clear message: It is time to rebalance your trade policies so that they are fair, free and reciprocal.”³⁵⁹

Photo Caption: U.S. President Donald Trump (L), China’s Vice Premier Liu He (2L), U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin (2R) and others listen while U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer (R) speaks before a meeting between U.S. and Chinese officials in the Oval Office of the White House on January 31, 2019 in Washington, D.C. (Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images)

“In addition to tariffs, both China and Europe enforce formidable nontariff trade barriers against imports. Examples include onerous and opaque procedures for registering and gaining certification for imports; unscientific sanitary rules, especially with regard to agricultural goods; requirements that companies build local factories; and forced technology transfers. The list goes on.

Both China and Europe also bankroll their exports through grants, low-cost loans, energy subsidies, special value-added tax refunds, and below-market real-estate sales and leases, among other means. Comparable levels of government support do not exist in the U.S. If these countries really are free traders, why do they have such formidable tariff and nontariff barriers?”³⁶⁰

“China is not a market economy. The Chinese government creates national champions and takes other actions that significantly distort markets. Responding to such actions with trade remedies is not protectionist. In fact, the World Trade Organization specifically permits its members to take action when other countries are subsidizing, dumping and engaging in other unfair trade practices.”³⁶¹

“The Trump administration believes in free and fair trade and will use every available tool to counter the protectionism of those who pledge allegiance to free trade while violating its core principles. The U.S. is working to restore a level playing field, and under President Trump’s leadership, we will do so.

This is a true free-trade agenda.”³⁶²

Sept. 25, 2017: Department of Commerce, “Readout of Secretary Ross’s Meetings with Chinese Officials During East Asia Travel”

commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2017/09/readout-secretary-rosss-meetings-chinese-officials-during-east-asia

“The meetings provided opportunities to prepare the ground for President Trump’s planned visit to Asia later this fall and to engage in a friendly and honest exchange of views on a range of issues including the need to rebalance bilateral trade and investment relations, protect intellectual property, lower tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and guarantee fair and reciprocal treatment for U.S. firms. The Secretary highlighted his intention to lead a senior level trade mission to China in November and to reduce the trade deficit through increased exports of high-value U.S. goods and services to China and improved market access for U.S. firms.

Chinese officials committed to further market opening and welcomed participation by U.S. firms. Both sides expressed the view that bilateral trade frictions should be resolved through negotiation, commitment to high standards, and good economic governance. Secretary Ross reiterated the need for concrete deliverables and meaningful action on key issues.

Chinese officials also expressed concern about U.S. export controls and about the Section 301 investigation that is being conducted by the United States Trade Representative.

In response, the Secretary relayed the ongoing concerns of the U.S. business community at forced technology transfers, data localization, and other intellectual property rights issues. Chinese officials asked Secretary Ross to inform them of any such issues to them as they arise, saying they would seek to resolve these challenges on behalf of American companies.

Chinese officials continually stressed that dialogue is preferable to unilateral action, saying that they would have to respond in kind to any potential action by the United States. Secretary Ross once again continued to stress the need for concrete action to address the concerns of U.S. businesses, and that the U.S. would take action to defend American workers and businesses if cooperative efforts bear no fruit."³⁶³

Sept. 26, 2017: *New York Times*: "Wilbur Ross, Fresh From China Visit, Warns of 'Lopsided' Trade Relationship"

[nytimes.com/2017/09/27/business/wilbur-ross-china-trade.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/business/wilbur-ross-china-trade.html)

"We do need major change, and I hope and I believe that we've made that clear to the Chinese government, because the relationship is too lopsided at present,' Mr. Ross said in a media briefing."³⁶⁴

Secretary Ross: "the most important thing is better market access":

"During his meetings with officials in Beijing, Mr. Ross said he raised concerns about the imbalance of trade and investment relations, the need to protect intellectual property and lower tariffs.

'The most important thing is better market access both for companies operating there physically and for companies exporting there,' Mr. Ross said on Wednesday. He added that the Trump administration wanted to see less protectionist behavior, calling China 'one of the most protectionist' countries in the world.'"³⁶⁵

"Low-hanging fruit" in the U.S.-China trade relationship:

"In closed-door conversations with United States officials, the Chinese have expressed concerns over a broad inquiry by the Trump administration into China trade practices that has focused on potential violations of intellectual policy. Officials have also complained about the United States' export controls.

On Wednesday, Mr. Ross blamed China for contributing to the United States trade deficit, saying it was 'by far our largest single deficit.' He said he planned to help narrow the gap between the two countries by increasing exports of American goods and services to China. The Commerce Department is leading a trade mission to China in November as part of that initiative.

This year, the United States signed a deal with China to give American companies greater access to the Chinese market in several areas, including agriculture, banking and finance. Mr. Ross referred to the deal as 'relatively low-hanging fruit.'"³⁶⁶

Nov. 8, 2017: Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs David R. Malpass, Statement to the Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade, House Financial Services Committee, *“Recently, the role of the state in China’s economy has been increasing.”*

treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/sm0211.aspx

“Liberalizations seems to have slowed or reversed”:

“A key driver of global poverty reduction has been the progress major emerging markets have made in moving away from planned economies to market-oriented economies. It is in this context that I have expressed concerns about China’s direction. As its portion of world GDP increases, China’s market liberalization is a critical factor in whether global growth will be sustained well into the future.

China’s gradual liberalization was welcome. Price liberalization was powerful. There was some progress in rebalancing the economy away from excess investment toward consumption and services. China also sought to reduce corporate and financial leverage, and to address growing risks in the financial sector. We welcomed those, but are concerned that the liberalization seems to have slowed or reversed.”

“Recently, the role of the state in China’s economy has been increasing”:

“Recently, the role of the state in China’s economy has been increasing. State-owned enterprises have not faced hard budget constraints, and China’s industrial policy has become more and more problematic for foreign firms. Export credits have grown large.

This is not the kind of market-based reform that China has undertaken in the past, or the kind of reform that China needs. It is critical that capital be allocated more effectively and that China stop engaging in massive subsidies that distort global markets and harm U.S. competitiveness. China’s unfair trading practices are unsustainable and harmful to the growth and prosperity of the U.S. and many other nations. The Administration is committed to achieving a fair and reciprocal trading and investment relationship with China, including through market-based reforms.”³⁶⁷

Mar. 22, 2018: President Trump, Ambassador Lighthizer and Vice President Pence, “Remarks at Signing of a Presidential Memorandum Targeting China’s Economic Aggression”

President Trump: “with China, we’re going to be doing a Section 301 trade action. It could be about \$60 billion but that’s really just a fraction of what we’re talking about”:

“But in particular, with China, we’re going to be doing a Section 301 trade action. It could be about \$60 billion but that’s really just a fraction of what we’re talking about.

5. "THE ERA OF ECONOMIC SURRENDER IS OVER"

I've been speaking with the highest Chinese representatives, including the President, and I've asked them to reduce the trade deficit immediately by \$100 billion. It's a lot. So that would be anywhere from 25 percent, depending on the way you figure, to maybe something even more than that. But we have to do that.

The word that I want to use is 'reciprocal.' When they charge 25 percent for a car to go in, and we charge 2 percent for their car to come into the United States, that's not good. That's how China rebuilt itself. The tremendous money that we've paid since the founding of the World Trade Organization—which has actually been a disaster for us. It's been very unfair to us. The arbitrations are very unfair. The judging has been very unfair. And knowingly, we always have a minority and it's not fair."³⁶⁸

Ambassador Lighthizer: "concluded that we should put in place tariffs on appropriate products":

"And we concluded that, in fact, China does have a policy of forced technology transfer; of requiring licensing at less than economic value; of state capitalism, wherein they go in and buy technology in the United States in non-economic ways; and then, finally, of cyber theft.

The result of this has been that the President has analyzed it—we have a 200-page study which we will put out—and he has concluded that we should put in place tariffs on appropriate products—we can explain later how we concluded what products they are; that we would put investment restrictions on China with respect to high technology; and that we'll file a WTO case. Because one of the actions here does involve a WTO violation."³⁶⁹

Vice President Pence: "the era of economic surrender is over":

"The action the President will take today under Section 301 also makes it clear that the era of economic surrender is over. The United States of America is taking targeted and focused action to protect not only American jobs, but America's technology, which will power and drive an innovation economy for decades to come."³⁷⁰

Mar. 22, 2018: Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin, "Statement on Presidential Memorandum on China's Unfair Trade Practices"

home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0330

"There is a shared recognition between China and the United States that our two countries must adjust the balance in our trade relationship, including addressing the trade deficit. We will continue to engage in discussions to meet these goals.

However, China's discriminatory and unfair trade and investment practices are aimed squarely at, and detrimental to, the United States. China has sought to gain access to intellectual property and cutting-edge technology developed by U.S. businesses through such wrongful practices as systemic, government-driven investment in U.S. companies, unreasonable requirements and limiting restrictions intended to pressure U.S. firms, and cyber-enabled intrusions. This conduct threatens our national

interests, undermines the value of U.S. investments and technology, weakens the global competitiveness of our firms, and harms American workers. Today's actions are designed to counter this conduct and address the threat it presents to U.S. national interests.

We support free, fair, and reciprocal trading relationships. The United States offers the biggest consumer market and among the most generous trading terms. We now need better and more balanced trade in return.”³⁷¹

Apr. 6, 2018: The White House, “What You Need to Know about President Donald J. Trump’s Actions Responding to China’s Unfair Trade Practices”

[whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/need-know-president-donald-j-trumps-actions-responding-chinas-unfair-trade-practices/](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/need-know-president-donald-j-trumps-actions-responding-chinas-unfair-trade-practices/)

“The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced an initial proposed list of Chinese goods imports that could be subject to additional tariffs. The initial list included approximately 1,300 tariff lines valued at an estimated \$50 billion. In order to develop the initial proposed list, USTR worked with other agencies to identify products that unfairly benefit from China’s industrial policies. Further, there was extensive interagency analysis to ensure these tariffs maximize pressure on China to change its behavior, while minimizing the impact on the U.S. economy.”³⁷²

“President Trump has therefore directed USTR to determine if an additional \$100 billion worth of tariffs would be appropriate under section 301”:

“Instead of addressing its misconduct, China has retaliated against American farmers and manufacturers. President Trump has therefore directed USTR to determine if an additional \$100 billion worth of tariffs would be appropriate under section 301. Any additional tariffs would be subject to a similar review and public comment period as the initial list.”³⁷³

“President Trump has made it clear that the United States can no longer tolerate such behavior and he is following through on his pledge to take action to ensure that China finally plays by the rules”:

“Year after year, China continues to distort global markets and harm U.S. businesses and consumers with unfair trade practices. For example, China’s unfair industrial policies, like their ‘Made in China 2025’ policy initiative, clearly state China’s goal of taking away domestic and international market share from foreigners. Members of all political parties, the U.S. business community, and workers around the world are concerned about China’s behavior.

President Trump has made it clear that the United States can no longer tolerate such behavior and he is following through on his pledge to take action to ensure that China finally plays by the rules. While previous Administrations let China’s actions go unanswered, President Trump is standing up for American workers to ensure that American businesses are treated fairly and lawfully.”³⁷⁴

May 4, 2018: *Bloomberg*: "Here's What the U.S., China Demanded of Each Other on Trade"

[bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-04/here-s-what-u-s-demanded-of-china-at-the-start-of-trade-talks](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-04/here-s-what-u-s-demanded-of-china-at-the-start-of-trade-talks)

"In a document entitled 'Balancing the Trade Relationship,' seen by Bloomberg News, the U.S. divided its demands into eight sections, ranging from trade-deficit reduction to tariff barriers to implementation. Here's a synopsis of the U.S. requests, which were presented to China at the outset of the talks:

Trade Deficit Reduction

- The U.S. wants China to cut the two nations' trade deficit by at least \$200 billion by the end of 2020 from 2018 levels.
- Chinese purchases of U.S. goods will represent at least 75 percent of a commitment to a \$100 billion increase in purchases of U.S. exports for the 12 months beginning June 1, 2018, and at least 50 percent of China's commitment to an additional \$100 billion increase in purchases of U.S. exports in the 12 months beginning June 1, 2019.

Protection of American Technology and Intellectual Property

- China to immediately cease providing subsidies and government support that fuels excess capacity in industries targeted by the Made in China 2025 plan.
- Specific policies and practices linked to technology transfer are eliminated.
- A cessation of government-sponsored cyber intrusion and cyber theft.
- Strengthened intellectual property rights protection and enforcement.
- By Jan. 1, 2019, China will eliminate provisions of the Regulations on the Administration of the Import and Export of Technologies and the Regulations on the Implementation of the Law on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures identified in the U.S.
- By July 1, 2018, China will withdraw its request for WTO consultations in United States—Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China and take no further action on the matter
- The document also calls on China to take no retaliatory action in response to actions taken or to be taken by the U.S.

Restrictions on Investment in Sensitive Technology

- A demand that China does not 'oppose, challenge, or otherwise retaliate against the United States' imposition of restrictions on investments from China in sensitive U.S. technology sectors or sectors critical to U.S. national security.'

U.S. Investment in China

- A demand that China does not distort trade through investment restrictions and any restrictions are narrow and transparent
- U.S. investors in China to receive 'fair, effective and non-discriminatory market access and treatment, including removal of the application of foreign investment restrictions and foreign ownership/shareholding requirements.'

- China to issue an improved nationwide negative list for foreign investment by July 1, 2018. Within 90 days the U.S. will identify existing investment restrictions that deny U.S. investors market access. China is then to remove all identified investment restrictions on a timetable to be decided by both nations.

Tariff and Non-tariff Barriers

- By July 1, 2020, China will reduce tariffs on all products in non-critical sectors to levels that are no higher than the levels of the U.S.' corresponding tariffs
- China to remove specified non-tariff barriers and recognizes that the U.S. may impose import restrictions and tariffs on products in critical sectors, including sectors identified in the Made in China 2025 industrial plan.

U.S. Services and Services Suppliers

- A demand for China to improve market access in specified ways

U.S. Agricultural Products

- A demand for China to improve market access in specified ways

Implementation

- Both countries to meet quarterly to review targets and reforms
- If the U.S. declares China is not complying with the framework, the U.S. can impose tariffs or other restrictions on Chinese products or restrict supply of services
- A demand that China does not 'oppose, challenge or take any form of action against the United States' imposition of additional tariffs or restrictions.'
- China to withdraw its WTO complaints regarding designations of China as a non-market economy and will refrain from future challenges
- Within 15 days of receiving written notice of a prohibited product that may have been transshipped through one or more countries, China will provide full details of every shipment. Failure to do so will trigger tariffs.
- If China fails to uphold commitments the U.S. will impose tariffs on imports from China and will confiscate counterfeit and pirated goods or levy tariffs to compensate for lost technologies and intellectual property.
- A demand that China does not take any retaliatory action in response."³⁷⁵

May 29, 2018: The White House, "President Donald J. Trump Is Confronting China's Unfair Trade Policies"

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-confronting-chinas-unfair-trade-policies/

"Under President Trump's leadership:

- The United States will impose a 25 percent tariff on \$50 billion of goods imported from China containing industrially significant technology, including those related to the 'Made in China 2025' program. The final list of covered imports will be announced by June 15, 2018.
- USTR will continue WTO dispute settlement against China originally initiated in March to address China's discriminatory technology licensing requirements.
- The United States will implement specific investment restrictions and enhanced export controls for Chinese persons and entities related to the acquisition of industrially significant technology. The list of restrictions and controls will be announced by June 30, 2018."³⁷⁶

June 18, 2018: President Trump, "Statement Regarding Trade with China"

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-regarding-trade-china-2/

"However and unfortunately, China has determined that it will raise tariffs on \$50 billion worth of United States exports. China apparently has no intention of changing its unfair practices related to the acquisition of American intellectual property and technology. Rather than altering those practices, it is now threatening United States companies, workers, and farmers who have done nothing wrong.

This latest action by China clearly indicates its determination to keep the United States at a permanent and unfair disadvantage, which is reflected in our massive \$376 billion trade imbalance in goods. This is unacceptable. Further action must be taken to encourage China to change its unfair practices, open its market to United States goods, and accept a more balanced trade relationship with the United States.

Therefore, today, I directed the United States Trade Representative to identify \$200 billion worth of Chinese goods for additional tariffs at a rate of 10 percent. After the legal process is complete, these tariffs will go into effect if China refuses to change its practices, and also if it insists on going forward with the new tariffs that it has recently announced. If China increases its tariffs yet again, we will meet that action by pursuing additional tariffs on another \$200 billion of goods. The trade relationship between the United States and China must be much more equitable."³⁷⁷

June 25, 2018: Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue, *USA Today* Op-Ed, “Donald Trump Will Protect American Farmers from China’s Trade Retaliation”

usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/06/25/donald-trump-china-tariff-retaliation-intellectual-property-agriculture-farm-perdue-column/725447002/

“To stop China’s predatory attacks on America’s innovation base, President Trump is instituting a program of tariffs and is considering investment restrictions and strengthened export controls. These tariffs will help pressure the Chinese to stop engaging in unfair practices and fully open up its markets to U.S. products, including U.S. technologies. The correct response from China would be to stop stealing from Americans and give American products a level playing field to compete in China, not to retaliate and reinforce its own position.”³⁷⁸

June 28, 2018: National Trade Council Director Peter Navarro, Interview with Dr. Michael Pillsbury at Hudson Institute, “Chinese Economic Aggression”

s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/files/publications/NavarroFINAL.pdf

“It’s a standard matrix where you have these six categories of economic aggression. And this is the industrial policy of China. And what distinguishes China from the rest of the world—most of the rest of the world—is that it’s a nonmarket economy. It’s a heavily state-directed, state-driven economy. And so in the first and second columns here, one goal is to ‘protect the Chinese market from competition in imports.’ No secret there. The second goal is to ‘expand the global share of markets.’ That is, to attack global markets. This would be protectionist, in the vernacular. It would be mercantilist. China also for decades has had a policy of going out and trying to secure the core resources of the world. This is the third category. It can be things like copper in Chile, or it can be things like cobalt—which is really important in high-tech production—in the Congo. And they’ve done a very, very good job doing that. The fourth category is, ‘dominate traditional manufacturing industries.’”

Sept. 25, 2018: “Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States, Japan, and the European Union”

ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/september/joint-statement-trilateral

“Statement on Concerns with Non-Market-Oriented Policies and Practices of Third Countries”:

“The Ministers reiterated their concern with and confirmed their shared objective to address non market-oriented policies and practices of third countries that lead to severe overcapacity, create unfair competitive conditions for their workers and businesses, hinder the development and use of innovative technologies, and undermine the proper functioning of international trade, including where existing rules are not effective.

The Ministers recalled that market-oriented conditions are fundamental to a fair, mutually advantageous global trading system and that their citizens and businesses operate under market-oriented conditions. They discussed actions being taken and possible measures that could be undertaken in the near future.

Accordingly, they directed their staff to further their discussion on various elements or indications that signal that non-market oriented policies and practices exist for businesses and industries, to enhance information sharing on non-market-oriented policies and practices of third countries, to engage with other trading partners on identifying means to maintain market-oriented conditions, and to deepen discussions on enforcement and rule-making as tools to address these problems.”³⁷⁹

Dec. 6, 2018: *Voice of America News*: “Peter Navarro on U.S.-China Talks, Trade”

voanews.com/archive/interview-transcript-peter-navarro-us-china-talks-trade

“What we’re demanding not asking. What we’re demanding is that China obey the rules of the international road, and become a fair actor in international trade, and surely that will require a restructuring of the model that’s now predicated on state-owned enterprises, protectionism, mercantilism, and a whole range of acts, policies, and practices documented by Robert Lighthizer of the USTR that are outside the bounds of the rules. So, yea, they’re going to have to restructure. Now, that doesn’t mean that they lose face with their own people. The fact is their own people should welcome that because if you have a more democratic market in some sense, a market that more reflects the values of the rest of the world in terms of free-market economics, that will be a good thing for China as well. So this is going to be a tough negotiation. The biggest problem will be the ability to actually verify things rather than just being strung along because we’ve seen that movie before.”³⁸⁰

Dec. 7, 2018: SEC Chairman, Jay Clayton, “Statement on the Vital Role of Audit Quality and Regulatory Access to Audit and Other Information Internationally—Discussion of Current Information Access Challenges with Respect to U.S.-Listed Companies with Significant Operations in China”

sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-vital-role-audit-quality-and-regulatory-access-audit-and-other

“While international cooperation and coordination have increased significantly in many parts of the world in recent years, the SEC and PCAOB still face challenges from laws and practices that can impede strong regulation, supervision, and enforcement. For example, both the SEC and the PCAOB currently face significant challenges in overseeing the financial reporting for U.S.-listed companies whose operations are based in China—a market where U.S. investors’ interest has increased and is significant. The business books and records related to transactions and events occurring within China are required by Chinese law to be kept and maintained there. China also restricts the auditor’s documentation of work performed in the country from being transferred out of China.

China’s state security laws are invoked at times to limit U.S. regulators’ ability to oversee the financial reporting of U.S.-listed, China-based companies. In particular, Chinese laws governing the protection of state secrets and national security have

been invoked to limit foreign access to China-based business books and records and audit work papers. As a result, for certain China-based companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges, the SEC and PCAOB have not had access to the books and records and audit work papers to an extent consistent with other jurisdictions both in scope and timing.”³⁸¹

Feb. 27, 2019: Ambassador Lighthizer, “Testimony at House Ways and Means Hearing on U.S.-China Trade”

waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/documents/U.S.-China%20Trade%20Hearing%20Transcript%201.pdf

“It has to be enforceable at all levels of government”:

“Clearly, it has to be specific and measurable. It has to be enforceable at all levels of government. Some things are not appropriate for that, but 99 percent, the core stuff, is all—and in the agreement it will say central, sub-central, local, and—so it has got to be across the board like that. And we have to have the ability to take proportional action unilaterally, to make sure that we have a situation where they are following.”³⁸²

“Getting out of TPP was the right decision. It was a bad agreement”:

“I would say, first of all, getting out of TPP was the right decision. It was a bad agreement. It was poorly negotiated, and a car could have been manufactured 45 percent in Vietnam and 55 percent in China and sold in the United States duty free. It didn’t do much on currency, it had a whole lot of problems. And in any event, to get to your geopolitical problem, had China joined it, they wouldn’t have lived up to the rules. We would have a problem, number one.

Number two, as you know well, we have FTAs with six of the 11 countries that are in it already. And of the other five, 95 percent of the GDP is in Japan, where, with your support and help, we are negotiating.”³⁸³

“Individual companies will come to us with complaints about practices, and we will be able to work those through the process”:

“...if we have an agreement there will be a process that has been agreed to where, at the office-director level, there will be monthly meetings, and then I will go through the process and then I will take a step back. At the vice-ministerial level there will be quarterly meetings. And then there will be semi-annual meetings at the ministerial level. That would be me and the vice premiere, who is my counterpart in this.

And the idea is two things: one, individual companies will come to us with complaints about practices, and we will be able to work those through the process. In many cases, those are going to have to be anonymous, because companies are afraid to come forward, because they know what will happen if they do. They will have real-world effects. It will be negative.

And then, in addition to that, there will be systemic problems, where we will see patterns developing, and a series of things that we disagree with, and we will bring those through the process. Hopefully, in most cases, they will be resolved at the first or second level. If not, they will be resolved at my level. And if there is disagreement on my level, then the United States would expect to act proportionately, but unilaterally, to insist on enforcement."³⁸⁴

Mar. 28, 2019: National Trade Council Director Peter Navarro, Keynote Statement at EXIM Bank Annual Conference, "Exports: Connecting Trade with U.S. Security and Prosperity"

events.twworldwide.com/tvwimages/EXIM/EXIM_2019_D1_1250_KN_Navarro.pdf

"Of course President Trump is also the first President to hold China accountable for a list of unfair trade practices and bad behaviors longer than my sleeve. Let me count the seven ways: First, cyber intrusions into our business networks to steal trade secrets for commercial gain. Two, forced technology transfer. Three, intellectual property theft. Four, weaponized over capacity and related dumping in industries ranging from basic commodities to advanced technology. Five, the long march across the globe of heavily subsidized state owned enterprises. Six, a chronically undervalued currency. And seven, against the backdrop of the slaughter of tens of thousands of Americans annually. The President is also taking China to task for flooding some of America's most economically disadvantaged communities with enough fentanyl to wipe out entire counties.

In carefully documenting these unfair trade practices and bad behaviors, and recognizing China as a strategic competitor, the Trump Administration's whole of government China policy has forever changed the narrative, forever changed the narrative. Today few would disagree that China is engaged in economic aggression against the United States. And the only debate is about how America should defend itself against such aggression."³⁸⁵

"The cost of keeping the EXIM Bank on the sidelines can be measured in tens of billions of dollars in products we fail to export, and in the thousands of jobs we fail to create":

"It's time for Congress to break this log jam. It's time. The cost of keeping the EXIM Bank on the sidelines can be measured in tens of billions of dollars in products we fail to export, and in the thousands of jobs we fail to create when this country does not have a fully functioning export credit agency to compete with its counterparts around the world."³⁸⁶

May 28, 2019: National Trade Council Director Peter Navarro, *Wall Street Journal* Op-Ed, "A Tariff Issue on Which Free and Fair Traders Can Agree"

[wsj.com/articles/a-tariff-issue-on-which-free-and-fair-traders-can-agree-11559084804](https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-tariff-issue-on-which-free-and-fair-traders-can-agree-11559084804)

"To combat such nonreciprocity, President Trump urged Congress in his 2019 State of the Union address to pass the U.S. Reciprocal Trade Act. The USRTA would authorize the president to bring to the negotiating table any American trading

partner that applies higher nonreciprocal tariffs or nontariff barriers. If such a trading partner refuses to lower its tariffs or other barriers, the president would have the power to impose reciprocal duties.”³⁸⁷

June 3, 2019: “U.S. Trade Representative and the U.S. Department of Treasury Respond to the “White Paper” Issued by China on June 2, 2019”

ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/june/us-trade-representative-and-us

“It is important to note that the impetus for the discussions was China’s long history of unfair trade practices. Our negotiating positions have been consistent throughout these talks, and China back-pedaled on important elements of what the parties had agreed to. One such position was the need for enforceability, a position necessitated by China’s history of making commitments that it fails to keep. But our insistence on detailed and enforceable commitments from the Chinese in no way constitutes a threat to Chinese sovereignty. Rather, the issues discussed are common to trade agreements and are necessary to address the systemic issues that have contributed to persistent and unsustainable trade deficits.”³⁸⁸

Aug. 5, 2019: Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Designates China as a Currency Manipulator”

home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm751

“Secretary Mnuchin, under the auspices of President Trump, has today determined that China is a Currency Manipulator.

As a result of this determination, Secretary Mnuchin will engage with the International Monetary Fund to eliminate the unfair competitive advantage created by China’s latest actions.

As noted in the most recent Report to Congress on the Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States (‘FX Report’), China has a long history of facilitating an undervalued currency through protracted, large-scale intervention in the foreign exchange market. In recent days, China has taken concrete steps to devalue its currency, while maintaining substantial foreign exchange reserves despite active use of such tools in the past. The context of these actions and the implausibility of China’s market stability rationale confirm that the purpose of China’s currency devaluation is to gain an unfair competitive advantage in international trade.

The Chinese authorities have acknowledged that they have ample control over the RMB exchange rate. In a statement today, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) noted that it ‘has accumulated rich experience and policy tools, and will continue to innovate and enrich the control toolbox, and take necessary and targeted measures against the positive feedback behavior that may occur in the foreign exchange market.’ This is an open acknowledgement by the PBOC that it has extensive experience manipulating its currency and remains prepared to do so on an ongoing basis.

This pattern of actions is also a violation of China's G20 commitments to refrain from competitive devaluation. As highlighted in the FX Report, Treasury places significant importance on China adhering to its G-20 commitments to refrain from engaging in competitive devaluation and to not target China's exchange rate for competitive purposes. Treasury continues to urge China to enhance the transparency of China's exchange rate and reserve management operations and goals."³⁸⁹

Sept. 17, 2019: Secretary of Commerce Ross, Remarks at the U.S. Investment Advisory Council Meeting, *"It is a communist nation that does not abide by the rule of law, and that also has no regard for intellectual property, human rights, or the basic values of a democracy."*

commerce.gov/news/speeches/2019/09/remarks-secretary-wilbur-ross-us-investment-advisory-council-meeting

"Companies are re-assessing the location of their production facilities and their supply chains. The tariffs have created the incentive for companies to question why are they in China. It is a communist nation that does not abide by the rule of law, and that also has no regard for intellectual property, human rights, or the basic values of a democracy. And despite the media chatter about how tariffs might upend economic growth, there is no evidence of it occurring."³⁹⁰

Dec. 13, 2019: The White House, "President Donald J. Trump Has Secured a Historic Phase One Trade Agreement with China"

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-secured-historic-phase-one-trade-agreement-china/

- "China has agreed to structural reforms in areas of intellectual property, technology transfer, agriculture, financial services, and currency and foreign exchange.
- The agreement includes a strong dispute resolution system to ensure effective implementation and enforcement.
- As a result, we will be able to ensure full enforcement of this phase one agreement and the reforms it includes.
- As a part of this agreement, the United States has agreed to significantly modify its Section 301 tariffs.
- These successful phase one negotiations have begun important progress towards rebalancing our trade relationship with China."³⁹¹

Jan. 15, 2020: Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China”

ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/phase%20one%20agreement/Economic_And_Trade_Agreement_Between_The_United_States_And_China_Text.pdf

“China shall:

1. (a) as an interim step, deter future intellectual property theft or infringements and strengthen the application of existing remedies and penalties by imposing a heavier punishment at or near the statutory maximum permitted under its laws related to intellectual property to deter intellectual property theft or infringements; and
2. (b) as a subsequent step, increase the range of minimum and maximum pre-established damages, sentences of imprisonment, and monetary fines to deter future intellectual property theft or infringements.”³⁹²

“The Parties accordingly seek to work constructively and cooperatively toward an improved bilateral trade relationship and to explore appropriate steps to facilitate increased trade”:

- “1. The Parties acknowledge that trade and economic structural changes resulting from this Agreement and from other actions being taken by China to open up its economy and improve its trade regime should lead to improved trade flows, including significant increases in exports of goods and services to China by the United States and other countries.
2. The Parties believe that expanding trade is conducive to the improvement of their bilateral trade relationship, the optimal allocation of resources, economic restructuring, and sustainable economic development, given the high degree of complementarity in trade between them.
3. The Parties recognize that the United States produces and can supply high-quality, competitively priced goods and services, while China needs to increase the importation of quality and affordable goods and services to satisfy the increasing demand from Chinese consumers.
4. The Parties accordingly seek to work constructively and cooperatively toward an improved bilateral trade relationship and to explore appropriate steps to facilitate increased trade.”³⁹³

Mar. 30, 2020: Secretary of State Pompeo, Interview with Journalists from East Asian and Pacific Media Outlets, *"We will continue to find every opportunity to work alongside China."*

state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-roundtable-interview-with-journalists-from-east-asian-and-pacific-media-outlets/

"Well, just as we went into this moment of crisis, we will continue to find every opportunity to work alongside China. We have important economic relationships. We, shortly before this, completed the first part of a trade deal. The second part of that we hope will follow not too far behind that. But there are also immense challenges with China, places where the President has identified where reciprocity doesn't exist. We've seen that in trade. We've seen that with respect to how journalists are treated, freedom of information, how it flows across borders and across the region.

So it will continue to be, just as we identified early on in the administration, a true strategic competitor for the United States. I don't expect that that will change, but we have learned some things. We have learned some things about America's need to ensure that we have the right resources that we can maintain for moments just like this one as well."³⁹⁴

5.2. “The Chinese played the WTO like a fiddle”

– National Security Advisor John Bolton³⁹⁵

Quotations from USTR and the White House

May 8, 2018: Ambassador Dennis Shea, Statement at the WTO General Council, “Investigations and Measures Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974”

geneva.usmission.gov/2018/05/08/ambassador-dennis-sheas-statement-at-the-wto-general-council/

“China’s own self-interested policy of contributing to massive global overcapacity in steel and aluminum”:

“Chairman, the United States finds it curious that China has asked to place this item on the agenda for today’s meeting.

For, in fact, we would not find ourselves in the current juncture were it not for China’s own self-interested policy of contributing to massive global overcapacity in steel and aluminum. This policy has been carried out over a period of many years, without regard to global impacts, and China has responded to mounting concerns with considerable talk but not much action.

Against this backdrop, we are perplexed that China now asserts its status as a victim. In any event, I am happy to have this opportunity to recall to Members’ attention the reasons underlying the United States’ defense of critical national security interests.”³⁹⁶

“If the WTO wishes to remain relevant, it must—with urgency—confront the havoc created by China’s state capitalism”:

“It is amazing to watch a country that is the world’s most protectionist, mercantilist economy position itself as the self-proclaimed defender of free trade and the global trading system. The WTO must avoid falling down this rabbit hole into a fantasy world, lest it lose all credibility.

The truth is, it is China that is the unilateralist, consistently acting in ways that undermine the global system of open and fair trade. Market access barriers too numerous to mention; forced technology transfers; intellectual property theft on an unprecedented scale; indigenous innovation policies and the Made in China 2025 program; discriminatory use of technical standards; massive government subsidies that have led to chronic overcapacity in key industrial sectors; and a highly restrictive foreign investment regime—these are the issues that should be on today’s agenda. If the WTO wishes to remain relevant, it must—with urgency—confront the havoc created by China’s state capitalism.”³⁹⁷

“China’s trade-distorting industrial policy objectives”:

“Vague provisions and uncertainty about the applicable rules provide Chinese authorities with wide discretion to use administrative processes to pressure technology transfer or otherwise act in furtherance of China’s trade-distorting industrial

policy objectives. And so I am compelled to ask: is this unilateralism designed to benefit China at the expense of its trading partners?"³⁹⁸

"These restrictions tip the technology transfer regime in favor of Chinese entities before a foreign company even attempts to enter the market in China. And so I am compelled to ask: is this unilateralism designed to benefit China at the expense of its trading partners?"³⁹⁹

July 11, 2018: Ambassador Shea, "Statement as Delivered on Behalf of the United States of America at the Trade Policy Review of the People's Republic of China"

geneva.usmission.gov/2018/07/11/u-s-statement-at-the-trade-policy-review-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/

"China's failure to fully embrace the open, market-oriented policies on which this institution is founded must be addressed, either within the WTO or outside the WTO. Given China's very large and growing role in international trade, and the serious harm that China's state-led, mercantilist approach to trade and investment causes to China's trading partners, this reckoning can no longer be put off. If the WTO is to remain relevant to the international trading system, change is necessary.

When China acceded to the WTO nearly 17 years ago, WTO Members expected that the terms set forth in China's Protocol of Accession would permanently dismantle existing state-led, mercantilist policies and practices that were incompatible with an international trading system expressly based on open, market-oriented policies and rooted in the principles of non-discrimination, market access, reciprocity, fairness and transparency. But those expectations have not been realized. Instead, China has used the imprimatur of WTO membership to become one of the WTO's largest traders, while largely retaining its state-led, mercantilist approach to trade and investment, to the detriment of the United States and other WTO Members and their industries and workers. This situation is actually worse today than it was five years ago. The state's role in China's economy has increased, as have the seriousness and breadth of concerns facing foreign companies seeking to do business in China or attempting to compete with Chinese companies in their home markets."⁴⁰⁰

July 11, 2018: Office of the United States Trade Representative, "China's Trade-Disruptive Economic Model: Communication from the United States"

docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:WT/GC/W745.pdf

"Unfortunately, China's use of the term 'reform' differs from the type of reform that a country would be pursuing if it were embracing market-oriented principles. For China, economic reform means perfecting the government's and the Party's management of the economy and strengthening the state sector, particularly state-owned enterprises. As long as China remains on this path, the implications for this organization are decidedly negative."⁴⁰¹

July 26, 2018: Ambassador Shea, “China’s Trade-Disruptive Economic Model and Implications for the WTO”

geneva.usmission.gov/2018/0de7/27/55299/

“Despite China’s repeated portrayal of itself as a staunch defender of free trade and the global trading system, China is in fact the most protectionist, mercantilist economy in the world. Contrary to Members’ expectations, China has not been moving toward a fuller embrace of market-based policies and practices since it joined the WTO in 2001. In fact, the opposite is true. The state’s role in China’s economy has been increasing.”⁴⁰²

“China’s system also treats law as an instrument of the state, in the sense that it is used to facilitate the government’s industrial policy goals and to secure discrete economic outcomes”:

“China’s system also treats law as an instrument of the state, in the sense that it is used to facilitate the government’s industrial policy goals and to secure discrete economic outcomes. In addition, key legal institutions, such as the courts, are structured to respond to the Communist Party’s direction. This type of system makes it very difficult for enterprises to act independently of approved industrial policies on a systemic or consistent basis.”⁴⁰³

“The claim that it is a developing country on par with many others, and therefore should be exempt from contributing to progressive liberalization of global trade rules, is simply not sustainable”:

“While China undoubtedly struggles with poverty-related challenges in some areas of its economy, the claim that it is a developing country on par with many others, and therefore should be exempt from contributing to progressive liberalization of global trade rules, is simply not sustainable when measured against numerous indicators of China’s rapid development and accumulation of wealth.

Since joining the WTO, China has repeatedly signaled that it is pursuing economic reform. Unfortunately, China’s use of the term ‘reform’ differs from the type of reform that a country would be pursuing if it were embracing market-oriented principles. For China, economic reform means perfecting the government’s and the Communist Party’s management of the economy and strengthening the state sector, particularly state-owned enterprises. As long as China remains on this path, the implications for this organization are decidedly negative.”⁴⁰⁴

Dec. 17, 2018: Ambassador Dennis Shea, Statement of the United States at the 14th WTO Trade Policy Review of the United States of America, "China's actions are incompatible with the open, market-based approach expressly envisioned and followed by other WTO members..."

geneva.usmission.gov/2018/12/17/u-s-statement-by-ambassador-shea-at-the-14th-wto-tpr-of-the-united-states-of-america/

"The fundamental challenge posed by China's state-led, mercantilist approach to the economy and trade":

"Colleagues, I want to leave you today with three key points. First, the United States maintains one of the world's most open trade regimes that is firmly based in the rule of law and that is a powerful engine for global growth. Second, we continue to seek trade liberalization and will deepen our relationships with countries who share our commitment to fair market competition and reciprocity. Third, the United States is raising serious concerns with the functioning and direction of this important institution, and the fundamental challenge posed by China's state-led, mercantilist approach to the economy and trade. This is not mere chatter, nor is it unilateralist or protectionist. The United States is taking important steps to begin to address these fundamental issues, and we are committed to working with like-minded Members to do so."⁴⁰⁵

"China's actions are incompatible with the open, market-based approach expressly envisioned and followed by other WTO members and contrary to the fundamental principles of this organization":

"Second, the WTO is not well equipped to handle the fundamental challenge posed by China, which continues to embrace a state-led, mercantilist approach to the economy and trade. China pursues an array of non-market industrial policies and other unfair competitive practices aimed at promoting and supporting its domestic industries while simultaneously restricting, taking advantage of, discriminating against, or otherwise creating disadvantages for foreign companies and their goods and services. From forced technology transfer to the creation and maintenance of severe excess industrial capacity to a heavily skewed playing field in China, the results of China's approach are causing serious harm to the United States and many other WTO Members and their companies and workers. Simply put, China's actions are incompatible with the open, market-based approach expressly envisioned and followed by other WTO members and contrary to the fundamental principles of this organization and its agreements."⁴⁰⁶

"Some are criticizing the United States' approach as unilateralist and protectionist. In our view, this is a serious and perhaps purposeful misread of our actions and intentions":

"Some are criticizing the United States' approach as unilateralist and protectionist. In our view, this is a serious and perhaps purposeful misread of our actions and intentions. In the case of the Section 301 investigation, the facts demonstrating forced technology transfer were quite clear, and the United States had a stark choice: either take action to protect itself against the serious, ongoing harm from China's policies and practices or accept that this harm will continue because the WTO does not provide the necessary disciplines or remedies. We would prefer being able to use the WTO, but China's trade regime increasingly is not compatible with it."

Feb. 2019: United States Trade Representative, “2018 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance”

ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2018-USTR-Report-to-Congress-on-China%27s-WTO-Compliance.pdf

“The report then describes China’s continued embrace of a state-led, mercantilist approach to the economy and trade, despite WTO members’ expectations —and China’s own representations —that China would transform its economy and pursue the open, market-oriented policies endorsed by the WTO.”⁴⁰⁷

“The United States will defend U.S. companies and workers from China’s unfair trading practices and will seek to restore balance to the trade relationship between the United States and China. As part of these efforts, the United States will take all appropriate actions to ensure that the costs of China’s non-market economic system are borne by China, not by the United States. The United States also will continue to encourage China to make fundamental structural changes to its approach to the economy and trade consistent with the open, market-oriented approach pursued by other WTO members, which is rooted in the principles of non-discrimination, market access, reciprocity, fairness and transparency.”⁴⁰⁸

“The United States’ approach to China is more aggressive than in the past. Out of necessity, the United States is now using all available tools—including domestic trade remedies, bilateral negotiations, WTO litigation and strategic engagement with like-minded trading partners—to respond to the unique and very serious challenges presented by China.”⁴⁰⁹

Feb. 28, 2019: Ambassador Shea, “Statement on Procedures to Strengthen the Negotiating Function of the WTO”

geneva.usmission.gov/2019/03/05/57216/

“This paper argues that the practice of Members self-declaring development status at the WTO has severely damaged the organization’s negotiating arm by inhibiting the ability to differentiate among self-declared developing Members. This practice also allows extremely advanced economies to claim rights to flexibilities that are not commensurate with the strides these economies have made in terms of development.

Further, the practice of self-declaration has not varied since the creation of the WTO. Whether this practice was sensible in 1995, it makes no sense today, in light of vast changes in development and increasing heterogeneity among Members.”⁴¹⁰

May 7, 2019: Ambassador Shea, "Statement at the WTO General Council Meeting on the Functioning of the Appellate Body, Strengthening Negotiation Functions and Development Status"

geneva.usmission.gov/2019/05/08/ambassador-sheas-statement-at-the-wto-general-council-meeting-agenda-items-4-6-7/.

"Third, a few Members have opined that the U.S. proposal is focused on just one Member. This is inaccurate. Our concerns go far beyond just one Member. There are a large number of relatively wealthy, advanced, and/or influential economies who would seek to avail themselves of S&D in current and future WTO negotiations. We believe a broad-based solution is required.

Finally, we have heard a few Members suggest that the U.S. proposal is "polarizing." They seem to believe this is regrettable and a sign that we are on the wrong path. We think just the opposite.

Our proposal seeks to address a problem that is hurting us all, and especially the poorest among us. Trade agreements that could open new opportunities for less developed Members and deepen their integration into the global trading system do not materialize because a good portion of the wealthier or more advanced economies will not make trade liberalizing commitments that are commensurate with their status in the trading system.

To address this problem, we must ask these Members to forego such unjustified treatment in current and future negotiations. This is bound to cause some discomfort. It becomes easy for some among us to brand such requests as 'polarizing.'"⁴¹¹

July 24, 2019: Ambassador Shea, Statement Delivered at WTO General Council Meeting Geneva, "To oversimplify it, countries like China wanted to be treated like countries like Cameroon."

geneva.usmission.gov/2019/07/24/statements-delivered-by-ambassador-dennis-shea-wto-general-council-meeting-geneva-july-24-2019/

"In this vein, we do not support additional work to renegotiate or revise S&D provisions in existing WTO agreements. For example, the CTD-SS has fulfilled its mandate to review all S&D provisions, and this work contributed to a significant harvest.

A few words as well, about the Doha Round. The Doha Round failed because the more advanced, wealthier, and most influential of the self-declared developing countries refused to contribute in a meaningful way. To oversimplify it, countries like China wanted to be treated like countries like Cameroon. The most advanced of the self-declared developing countries hid behind the poorest and least advanced to ensure they did not have to contribute."⁴¹²

Jul. 26, 2019: President Trump, “Presidential Memorandum on Reforming Developing-Country Status in the World Trade Organization”

whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-reforming-developing-country-status-world-trade-organization/

“The United States has never accepted China’s claim to developing-country status, and virtually every current economic indicator belies China’s claim”:

“When the wealthiest economies claim developing-country status, they harm not only other developed economies but also economies that truly require special and differential treatment. Such disregard for adherence to WTO rules, including the likely disregard of any future rules, cannot continue to go unchecked.

China most dramatically illustrates the point. Since joining the WTO in 2001, China has continued to insist that it is a developing country and thus has the right to avail itself of flexibilities under any new WTO rules. The United States has never accepted China’s claim to developing-country status, and virtually every current economic indicator belies China’s claim. After years of explosive growth, China has the second largest Gross Domestic Product in the world, behind only the United States.”

“China and too many other countries have continued to style themselves as developing countries, allowing them to enjoy the benefits that come with that status and seek weaker commitments than those made by other WTO Members”:

“China and too many other countries have continued to style themselves as developing countries, allowing them to enjoy the benefits that come with that status and seek weaker commitments than those made by other WTO Members. These countries claim entitlement to longer timeframes for the imposition of safeguards, generous transition periods, softer tariff cuts, procedural advantages for WTO disputes, and the ability to avail themselves of certain export subsidies—all at the expense of other WTO Members. These countries have also consistently sought weaker commitments than other WTO Members in ongoing negotiations, which has significantly stymied progress. Moreover, many of the world’s most advanced economies have used developing-country status as an excuse not to comply with the most basic notification requirements under WTO rules, depriving United States traders of vital trade data. The status quo cannot continue.”⁴¹³

“Changing the WTO Approach to Flexibilities Associated with Developing-Country Status”:

“Sec. 2. Changing the WTO Approach to Flexibilities Associated with Developing-Country Status. (a) To advance the policy set forth in section 1 of this memorandum, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) shall, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, use all available means to secure changes at the WTO that would prevent self-declared developing countries from availing themselves of flexibilities in WTO rules and negotiations that are not justified by appropriate economic and other indicators.”⁴¹⁴

"Ending Unfair Trade Benefits":

"Sec. 3. Ending Unfair Trade Benefits. (a) If, within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, the USTR determines that substantial progress has not been made toward achieving the changes described in section 2 of this memorandum, the USTR shall, as appropriate and to the extent consistent with law:

(i) no longer treat as a developing country for the purposes of the WTO any WTO Member that in the USTR's judgment is improperly declaring itself a developing country and inappropriately seeking the benefit of flexibilities in WTO rules and negotiations; and

(ii) where relevant, not support any such country's membership in the OECD."⁴¹⁵

Mar. 2020: United States Trade Representative, "2019 USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO Compliance"

ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2019_Report_on_China's_WTO_Compliance.pdf

"It is unrealistic to believe that actions at the WTO alone would be sufficient to force or persuade China to make fundamental changes to its trade regime":

"In sum, as we have made clear in prior reports, it is unrealistic to believe that actions at the WTO alone would be sufficient to force or persuade China to make fundamental changes to its trade regime. The WTO system was designed for countries that are truly committed to market principles, not for an enormous country determined to maintain a state- led, non-market system. No matter how many cases are brought at the WTO, China can always find a way to engage in market-distorting practices. Furthermore, given the extent to which China has benefited from the current state of affairs, it is not likely to agree to effective new WTO disciplines on its behavior."

"The United States will take all appropriate actions to ensure that the costs of China's non-market economic system are borne by China, not by the United States":

"Until China transforms its approach to the economy and trade, the United States will take all appropriate actions to ensure that the costs of China's non-market economic system are borne by China, not by the United States. At the same time, the United States will continue to encourage China to make fundamental structural changes to its approach to the economy and trade consistent with the open, market-oriented approach pursued by other WTO members, which is rooted in the principles of non-discrimination, market access, reciprocity, fairness, and transparency."⁴¹⁶

"The United States will turn to Phase Two of its trade negotiations with China in order to secure resolutions to important outstanding issues":

“Because the Phase One agreement does not cover all of the United States’ concerns, the United States will turn to Phase Two of its trade negotiations with China in order to secure resolutions to important outstanding issues. These discussions will focus on intellectual property, technology transfer, and services market access issues that were not addressed in the Phase One agreement as well as critical issues in areas such as excess capacity, subsidies, state-owned enterprises, cybersecurity, data localization and cross-border data transfers, pharmaceuticals and medical devices, competition law enforcement, regulatory transparency, and standards.”⁴¹⁷

“The United States is working with the EU and Japan as part of a high-level trilateral partnership to address the systemic distortions caused by China’s non-market economic system”:

“At the same time, the United States will continue to work with trading partners that share our vision to take effective action to address market-distorting practices in China. Currently, the United States is working with the EU and Japan as part of a high-level trilateral partnership to address the systemic distortions caused by China’s non-market economic system. This important partnership is examining potential new rules where existing rules are ineffective, including in the areas of industrial subsidies, state-owned enterprises, and forced technology transfer. The three partners have also discussed the need to reach out to and build consensus with other like-minded WTO members in these areas.”

“Existing proposals by various WTO members for WTO reform seem only marginally focused on the China problem”:

“In the United States’ view, existing proposals by various WTO members for WTO reform seem only marginally focused on the China problem. While these reform proposals potentially could address some behaviors that make China an irresponsible member of the WTO, they do not directly address the serious threat that China and its state-led, mercantilist trade regime poses for individual WTO members and the multilateral trading system.”⁴¹⁸

5.3. "China is the main perpetrator. It's at an unprecedented level of larceny."

—Secretary Mike Pompeo⁴¹⁹

Quotations from White House, State, USTR, OTMP, HHS, DOJ, NIH, and FBI

Jul. 31, 2017: "Presidential Memorandum for the United States Trade Representative"

whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-united-states-trade-representative/

"China has implemented laws, policies, and practices and has taken actions related to intellectual property, innovation, and technology that may encourage or require the transfer of American technology and intellectual property to enterprises in China":

"Section 1. Policy. It is the policy of the United States for our trade relations to enhance our economic growth, contribute favorably to our balance of trade, promote reciprocal treatment of American goods and investment, and strengthen the American manufacturing base.

The United States is a world leader in research-and-development-intensive, high-technology goods. Violations of intellectual property rights and other unfair technology transfers potentially threaten United States firms by undermining their ability to compete fairly in the global market. China has implemented laws, policies, and practices and has taken actions related to intellectual property, innovation, and technology that may encourage or require the transfer of American technology and intellectual property to enterprises in China or that may otherwise negatively affect American economic interests. These laws, policies, practices, and actions may inhibit United States exports, deprive United States citizens of fair remuneration for their innovations, divert American jobs to workers in China, contribute to our trade deficit with China, and otherwise undermine American manufacturing, services, and innovation."⁴²⁰

"Determination of Whether to Conduct Investigation":

"Sec. 2. Determination of Whether to Conduct Investigation. The United States Trade Representative shall determine, consistent with section 302(b) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2412(b)), whether to investigate any of China's laws, policies, practices, or actions that may be unreasonable or discriminatory and that may be harming American intellectual property rights, innovation, or technology development."

Sept. 13, 2017: President Trump, “Order Regarding the Proposed Acquisition of Lattice Semiconductor Corporation by China Venture Capital Fund Corporation Limited”

whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/order-regarding-proposed-acquisition-lattice-semiconductor-corporation-china-venture-capital-fund-corporation-limited/

“(a) The proposed acquisition of Lattice by the Purchasers (the proposed transaction) is prohibited, and any substantially equivalent transaction, whether effected directly or indirectly by the Purchasers, through the Purchasers’ shareholders or shareholders’ immediate, intermediate, or ultimate foreign person beneficial owners, or through the Purchasers’ subsidiaries, is also prohibited.

(b) The Purchasers and Lattice shall take all steps necessary to fully and permanently abandon the proposed transaction not later than 30 days after the date of this order, unless such date is extended by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) for a period not to exceed 90 days, on such conditions as CFIUS may require. Immediately upon completion of all steps necessary to terminate the proposed transaction, the Purchasers and Lattice shall certify in writing to CFIUS that such termination has been effected in accordance with this order and that all steps necessary to fully and permanently abandon the proposed transaction have been completed.”⁴²¹

Sept. 28, 2017: Department of State, “Summary of the U.S.-China Social and Cultural Dialogue”

state.gov/summary-of-the-u-s-china-social-and-cultural-dialogue/

“In particular, the sides expressed support for the U.S.-China Fulbright program and for additional opportunities to promote study in the United States by Chinese students, who bring billions of dollars to the U.S. economy every year.

The success of our people-to-people ties is due in large part to the dynamism and commitment of the many American non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—such as universities, museums, foundations, advocacy groups, cultural institutions, and sports groups—that work in China. China committed that its Foreign NGO Management Law would not impede the activities of American NGOs in China. The United States looks forward to a new consultation on China’s Foreign NGO Management Law before the end of this year.

Both sides acknowledged the importance of including effective intellectual property protections for researchers in our science and technology cooperation through the U.S.-China Science and Technology Agreement.”⁴²²

Nov. 10, 2017: The White House, “President Donald J. Trump’s State Visit to China”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-state-visit-china/

“Both sides committed to enhancing cooperation on cybercrime cases and network protection, including by responding to outstanding requests for assistance and enforcement actions, in particular those cases involving cyber-enabled theft

of intellectual property, the use of the internet by terrorists for criminal activities, and online firearm trafficking and online child pornography. The United States and China committed to fulfilling responsibilities under the U.N. law enforcement and terrorism conventions, as well as under the United States-China Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement."⁴²³

"The two presidents also reaffirmed the 2015 commitments on cybersecurity, and they emphasized the need for full cooperation into investigations of potentially contravening activity. They pledged to work together to prevent and mitigate the malicious exploitation of their networks by third countries."⁴²⁴

Mar. 22, 2018: United States Trade Representative, "Findings of the Investigation into China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974"

ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF

"A number of submissions asserted that China uses the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China (AML) as a means to obtain U.S. IP, citing as examples the AML agencies' multiple draft guidelines. Other submissions raised general concern regarding use of the AML for industrial policy purposes, and several complained about poor procedural protections in enforcement of the AML and about certain enforcement actions allegedly addressing abuse of dominance in the exercise of IP rights."⁴²⁵

Mar. 22, 2018: "Presidential Memorandum on the Actions by the United States Related to the Section 301 Investigation"

whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-actions-united-states-related-section-301-investigation/

"First, China uses foreign ownership restrictions, including joint venture requirements, equity limitations, and other investment restrictions, to require or pressure technology transfer from U.S. companies to Chinese entities. China also uses administrative review and licensing procedures to require or pressure technology transfer, which, inter alia, undermines the value of U.S. investments and technology and weakens the global competitiveness of U.S. firms.

Second, China imposes substantial restrictions on, and intervenes in, U.S. firms' investments and activities, including through restrictions on technology licensing terms. These restrictions deprive U.S. technology owners of the ability to bargain and set market-based terms for technology transfer. As a result, U.S. companies seeking to license technologies must do so on terms that unfairly favor Chinese recipients.

Third, China directs and facilitates the systematic investment in, and acquisition of, U.S. companies and assets by Chinese companies to obtain cutting-edge technologies and intellectual property and to generate large-scale technology transfer in industries deemed important by Chinese government industrial plans.

Fourth, China conducts and supports unauthorized intrusions into, and theft from, the computer networks of U.S. companies. These actions provide the Chinese government with unauthorized access to intellectual property, trade secrets, or confidential business information, including technical data, negotiating positions, and sensitive and proprietary internal business communications, and they also support China's strategic development goals, including its science and technology advancement, military modernization, and economic development."⁴²⁶

“The Trade Representative shall publish a proposed list of products and any intended tariff increases”:

“To advance the purposes of subsection (a) of this section, the Trade Representative shall publish a proposed list of products and any intended tariff increases within 15 days of the date of this memorandum.”⁴²⁷

“Pursue dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization (WTO) to address China's discriminatory licensing practices”:

“The Trade Representative shall, as appropriate and consistent with law, pursue dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization (WTO) to address China's discriminatory licensing practices.”⁴²⁸

“Using any available statutory authority, to address concerns about investment in the United States directed or facilitated by China in industries or technologies deemed important to the United States”:

“The Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary), in consultation with other senior executive branch officials the Secretary deems appropriate, shall propose executive branch action, as appropriate and consistent with law, and using any available statutory authority, to address concerns about investment in the United States directed or facilitated by China in industries or technologies deemed important to the United States.”⁴²⁹

Mar. 22, 2018: The White House, “President Donald J. Trump Is Standing Up for American Innovation”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-standing-american-innovation/

- “President Trump’s Administration will propose for public comment adding 25 percent additional tariffs on certain products that are supported by China’s unfair industrial policy.
- Sectors subject to the proposed tariffs will include aerospace, information communication technology, and machinery.
- USTR will confront China’s discriminatory technology licensing practices through a World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute proceeding.
- The Department of Treasury, in consultation with other agencies, will propose restrictions on investment by China in sensitive U.S. technology.

The investigation concluded that China uses foreign ownership restrictions, such as joint venture requirements and administrative review and licensing processes to force or pressure U.S. companies to transfer technology to Chinese entities."⁴³⁰

May 29, 2018: The White House, "Statement on the Steps to Protect Domestic Technology and Intellectual Property from China's Discriminatory and Burdensome Trade Practices"

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-steps-protect-domestic-technology-intellectual-property-chinas-discriminatory-burdensome-trade-practices/

1. "To protect our national security, the United States will implement specific investment restrictions and enhanced export controls for Chinese persons and entities related to the acquisition of industrially significant technology. The proposed investment restrictions and enhanced export controls will be announced by June 30, 2018, and they will be implemented shortly thereafter.
2. The United States will continue to pursue litigation at the World Trade Organization for violations of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights based on China's discriminatory practices for licensing intellectual property. The United States filed the case regarding these violations on March 23, 2018.
3. Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the United States will impose a 25 percent tariff on \$50 billion of goods imported from China containing industrially significant technology, including those related to the 'Made in China 2025' program. The final list of covered imports will be announced by June 15, 2018, and tariffs will be imposed on those imports shortly thereafter.

In addition, the United States will continue efforts to protect domestic technology and intellectual property, stop noneconomic transfers of industrially significant technology and intellectual property to China, and enhance access to the Chinese market. Likewise, the United States will request that China remove all of its many trade barriers, including non-monetary trade barriers, which make it both difficult and unfair to do business there. The United States will request that tariffs and taxes between the two countries be reciprocal in nature and value. Discussions with China will continue on these topics, and the United States looks forward to resolving long-standing structural issues and expanding our exports by eliminating China's severe import restrictions."⁴³¹

June 2018: Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, "How China's Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World"

whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf

"Chinese industrial policy seeks to 'introduce, digest, absorb, and re-innovate' (2n17) technologies and intellectual property (IP) from around the world (2n18). This policy is carried out through: (A) State-sponsored IP theft¹⁹ through physical theft,

cyber-enabled espionage and theft, evasion of U.S. export control laws, and counterfeiting and piracy; (B) coercive and intrusive regulatory gambits to force technology transfer from foreign companies, typically in exchange for limited access to the Chinese market; (C) economic coercion through export restraints on critical raw materials and monopsony purchasing power; (D) methods of information harvesting that include open source collection; placement of non-traditional information collectors at U.S. universities, national laboratories, and other centers of innovation; and talent recruitment of business, finance, science, and technology experts; and (E) State-backed, technology-seeking Chinese investment.”

June 18, 2018: Secretary of State Pompeo, Remarks on America’s Economic Revival, *“It’s the most predatory economic government that operates against the rest of the world today.”*

state.gov/remarks-on-americas-economic-revival/

“Finally, we’re taking a really hard line on foreign practices that harm America. Whether that’s threatening our technology leadership through intellectual property theft or forced technology transfer, we are hard at ensuring that we protect American property. Everyone knows today that China is the main perpetrator. It’s at an unprecedented level of larceny. I was with President Xi on Thursday night. I reminded him that that’s not fair competition.

Chinese actors also continue to conduct cyber activity, so they’re not just taking it by forced technology transfer or stealing it by way of contract, but committing outright theft. We have an enormous responsibility, each of us, to work to stop it.

Chinese investment, too, around the world—it’s welcome, but we need to make sure that it doesn’t come with terms that advantage China in our market or our commercial. To the extent they engage in behavior that American businesses would never engage in, that is using investment to exert political influence and control over rival nations, American diplomacy has an obligation to do our best to respond to it.”⁴³²

“Chinese leaders over these past few weeks have been claiming openness and globalization, but it’s a joke. Let’s be clear: It’s the most predatory economic government that operates against the rest of the world today. This is a problem that is long overdue in being tackled.”⁴³³

June 27, 2018: “Statement from the President Regarding Investment Restrictions”

whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-regarding-investment-restrictions/

“Congress has made significant progress toward passing legislation that will modernize our tools for protecting the Nation’s critical technologies from harmful foreign acquisitions. This legislation, the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), will enhance our ability to protect the United States from new and evolving threats posed by foreign investment while also sustaining the strong, open investment environment to which our country is committed and which benefits our economy and our people.

After reviewing the current versions of FIRRMA with my team of advisors—and after discussing them with many Members of Congress—I have concluded that such legislation will provide additional tools to combat the predatory investment practices that threaten our critical technology leadership, national security, and future economic prosperity. Therefore, upon enactment of FIRRMA legislation, I will direct my Administration to implement it promptly and enforce it rigorously, with a view toward addressing the concerns regarding state-directed investment in critical technologies identified in the Section 301 investigation.”⁴³⁴

Aug. 20, 2018: Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, Letter from Dr. Collins to NIH Applicant and Grantee Institutions and Organizations, “NIH is aware that some foreign entities have mounted systematic programs to influence NIH researchers...”

insidehighered.com/sites/default/server_files/media/NIH%20Foreign%20Influence%20Letter%20to%20Grantees%2008-20-18.pdf

“Unfortunately, threats to the integrity of U.S. biomedical research exist. NIH is aware that some foreign entities have mounted systematic programs to influence NIH researchers and peer reviewers and to take advantage of the long tradition of trust, fairness, and excellence of NIH-supported research activities. This kind of inappropriate influence is not limited to biomedical research; it has been a significant issue for defense and energy research for some time. Three areas of concern have emerged:

1. Diversion of intellectual property (IP) in grant applications or produced by NIH-supported biomedical research to other entities, including other countries;
 2. Sharing of confidential information on grant applications by NIH peer reviewers with others, including foreign entities, or otherwise attempting to influence funding decisions; and
 3. Failure by some researchers working at NIH-funded institutions in the U.S. to disclose substantial resources from other organizations, including foreign governments, which threatens to distort decisions about the appropriate use of NIH funds.”
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Oct. 6, 2018: Department of Justice, “First U.S.-China Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue”

justice.gov/opa/pr/first-us-china-law-enforcement-and-cybersecurity-dialogue

1) **Repatriation.** Both sides acknowledged the need to make continued progress in the area of repatriation of foreign nationals with final orders of removal. The United States and China committed to develop a repeatable process whereby the identities of individuals with final orders of removal are verified in a timely manner and travel documents are issued within 30 days of verification. This process should be finalized within three months following the LECD.

2) **Counter-narcotics.** Both sides intend to continue to enhance cooperation on narcotics control and enforcement. Such cooperation may include: exchanging intelligence and operational information on trafficking of new psychoactive

substances and other synthetic drugs, opioids, and cocaine; combatting the illicit production and trafficking of fentanyl and fentanyl-related substances and precursor chemicals, with attention to applicable laws, scheduling actions, and use of express mail and consignment services; exchanging technical information on the relevant science and law; demand reduction cooperation; exchanging views on international narcotics control issues through UN-based and other multilateral forums; and sharing tracking information for packages between the two countries so as to identify individuals and criminal networks responsible for narcotics trafficking.

3) **Cybercrime and Cybersecurity.** Both sides will continue their implementation of the consensus reached by the Chinese and American Presidents in 2015 on U.S.-China cybersecurity cooperation, consisting of the five following points: (1) that timely responses should be provided to requests for information and assistance concerning malicious cyber activities; (2) that neither country's government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors; (3) to make common effort to further identify and promote appropriate norms of state behavior in cyberspace within the international community; (4) to maintain a high-level joint dialogue mechanism on fighting cybercrime and related issues; and (5) to enhance law enforcement communication on cyber security incidents and to mutually provide timely responses.”⁴³⁵

Nov. 1, 2018: Department of Justice, “Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ China Initiative Fact Sheet”

Attorney General Jeff Sessions: “This Initiative will identify priority Chinese trade theft cases, ensure that we have enough resources dedicated to them, and make sure that we bring them to an appropriate conclusion”:

“Chinese economic espionage against the United States has been increasing—and it has been increasing rapidly. Enough is enough. We’re not going to take it anymore. I have ordered the creation of a China Initiative led by Assistant Attorney General John Demers and composed of a senior FBI Executive, five United States Attorneys including Alex, and several other Department of Justice leaders and officials, including Assistant Attorney General Benczkowski. This Initiative will identify priority Chinese trade theft cases, ensure that we have enough resources dedicated to them, and make sure that we bring them to an appropriate conclusion.”⁴³⁶

FBI Director Christopher Wray: “No country presents a broader, more severe threat to our ideas, our innovation, and our economic security than China”:

“‘No country presents a broader, more severe threat to our ideas, our innovation, and our economic security than China,’ said FBI Director Christopher Wray. ‘The Chinese government is determined to acquire American technology, and they’re willing use a variety of means to do that—from foreign investments, corporate acquisitions, and cyber intrusions to obtaining the services of current or former company employees to get inside information. If China acquires an American company’s most important technology—the very technology that makes it the leader in a field—that company will suffer severe losses, and

our national security could even be impacted. We are committed to continuing to work closely with our federal, state, local, and private sector partners to counter this threat from China."⁴³⁷

"Components of Initiative":

- "Identify priority trade secret theft cases, ensure that investigations are adequately resourced; and work to bring them to fruition in a timely manner and according to the facts and applicable law;
- Develop an enforcement strategy concerning non-traditional collectors (e.g., researchers in labs, universities, and the defense industrial base) that are being coopted into transferring technology contrary to U.S. interests;
- Educate colleges and universities about potential threats to academic freedom and open discourse from influence efforts on campus;
- Apply the Foreign Agents Registration Act to unregistered agents seeking to advance China's political agenda, bringing enforcement actions when appropriate;
- Equip the nation's U.S. Attorneys with intelligence and materials they can use to raise awareness of these threats within their Districts and support their outreach efforts;
- Implement the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRMA) for DOJ (including by working with Treasury to develop regulations under the statute and prepare for increased workflow);
- Identify opportunities to better address supply chain threats, especially ones impacting the telecommunications sector, prior to the transition to 5G networks;
- Identify Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) cases involving Chinese companies that compete with American businesses;
- Increase efforts to improve Chinese responses to requests under the Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement (MLAA) with the United States; and
- Evaluate whether additional legislative and administrative authorities are required to protect our national assets from foreign economic aggression."⁴³⁸

Nov. 1, 2018: Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers, "Remarks Regarding Economic Espionage by the People's Republic of China"

justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-national-security-john-c-demers-delivers-remarks-regarding

"Taken together, these cases, and many others like them, paint a grim picture of a country bent on stealing its way up the ladder of economic development—and doing so at American expense. This behavior is illegal. It's wrong. It's a threat to our national security. And it must stop.

The National Security Division has a variety of tools available to deal with this problem. First, as we've talked about, we can bring prosecutions. These prosecutions have raised the stakes for intelligence officers and their alleged co-optees here in the United States. If you work at an American company and you help the Chinese steal its trade secrets, we will find you and prosecute you.

These charges, in all their specificity, also prevent China from hiding behind their long practiced, ritualized denials and feigned ignorance.

These charges also serve to educate the American public and alert U.S. business to what the Chinese government is doing on all fronts, including their efforts to target commercial technology pursuant to insiders, computer intrusions, and computer intrusions enabled by insiders.

And most important, through the criminal charges, a civil suit for an injunction, an entity listing and other economic tools, the U.S. government is making a coordinated, concerted effort to deprive the thief of the benefit of his crime.

In addition, when the Chinese use their financial clout to buy or make strategic investments to gain access to American technology and personal data, the National Security Division will work with our partners on the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States to protect our sensitive technologies and data from national security risk.

And when Chinese activity turns to the malign influence of American politics in order to further its economic and political agenda, we will use the Foreign Agents Registration Act and related criminal and civil tools to ensure full transparency.”⁴³⁹

Nov. 20, 2018: Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Update of Section 301 Investigation of China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation”

ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/301%20Report%20Update.pdf

“Despite repeated U.S. engagement efforts and international admonishments of its trade technology transfer policies, China did not respond constructively and failed to take any substantive actions to address U.S. concerns.”⁴⁴⁰

“USTR has undertaken this update as part of its ongoing monitoring and enforcement effort. In preparing this update, USTR has relied upon publicly available material, and has consulted with other government agencies. As detailed in this update, China fundamentally has not altered its acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation, and indeed appears to have taken further unreasonable actions in recent months.”⁴⁴¹

Dec. 12, 2018: Bill Priestap, Assistant FBI Director, "China's Non-Traditional Espionage Against the United States: The Threat and Potential Policy Responses"

[fbi.gov/news/testimony/chinas-non-traditional-espionage-against-the-united-states](https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/chinas-non-traditional-espionage-against-the-united-states)

"The Chinese government is attempting to acquire or steal, not only the plans and intentions of the United States government, but also the ideas and innovations of the very people that make our economy so incredibly successful. The Chinese government understands a core lesson of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union: economic strength is the foundation of national power. The competition between the United States and China will be greatly influenced, if not ultimately decided, on the strength of our economies.

The Chinese government means to compete with us in every way possible, playing by the rules at times, bending them at others, and breaking them when necessary to ensure their success. They also aim to rewrite the rules to shape the world in their image, and they have already made progress on this front. The rules they write seek to guarantee the dominance of their businesses and root Chinese national power in the very fabric of an international system."⁴⁴²

"Some foreign governments, especially the Chinese government, selectively and unfairly create and enforce laws and regulations to disadvantage our businesses":

"Part of this new environment is that some foreign governments, especially the Chinese government, selectively and unfairly create and enforce laws and regulations to disadvantage our businesses. The Chinese government is not satisfied to 'stack the deck' for its businesses solely in their domestic market. They are also cultivating other countries' economic dependence, partly to gain geopolitical influence and partly to ensure the success and dominance of Chinese businesses in overseas markets."⁴⁴³

"The Chinese government will permit foreign companies to operate only so long as it is advantageous to China":

"Second, while U.S. companies may be able to operate and profit in China for a time, it is on borrowed time. The Chinese government will permit foreign companies to operate only so long as it is advantageous to China. Is the U.S. company making a product that China needs but cannot yet produce domestically, such as sophisticated agricultural machinery? If so, the U.S. company will be allowed to operate, but only until China learns enough about the business that they can replace it with a domestic version. Is the U.S. company using sophisticated intellectual property or a unique business model? Then such companies may also be allowed to operate, as long as they divulge the required technology, data, or expertise to a Chinese entity. Alternatively, a company may be allowed to operate simply to give China a better opportunity to understand how to copy the business and outcompete it globally. From the viewpoint of the Chinese government, many of the foreign companies doing business in China represent a temporary failure of the domestic market to meet demand. The government believes that if something can be made in China, then it should be made in China."⁴⁴⁴

"These talent recruitment and 'brain gain' programs (as some in China call them) also encourage theft of intellectual property from U.S. institutions":

“At the same time, the Chinese government has created comprehensive programs to identify, develop, and retain their most talented citizens. These talent recruitment and ‘brain gain’ programs (as some in China call them) also encourage theft of intellectual property from U.S. institutions. For example, China’s talent recruitment plans, such as the Thousand Talents Program, offer competitive salaries, state-of-the-art research facilities, and honorific titles, luring both Chinese overseas talent and foreign experts alike to bring their knowledge and experience to China, even if that means stealing proprietary information or violating export controls to do so.”⁴⁴⁵

Dec. 13, 2018: National Institutes of Health, Advisory Committee to the Director (ACD), “ACD Working Group for Foreign Influences on Research Integrity, December 2018 Report”

acd.od.nih.gov/documents/presentations/12132018ForeignInfluences_report.pdf

“American institutions and universities are shaped by foreign trainees, investigators, and employees, and U.S. scientists routinely collaborate productively with investigators in foreign countries. These interactions are critical to scientific advances and are vital to maintain. Unfortunately, some foreign governments have initiated systematic programs to unduly influence and capitalize on U.S.-conducted research, including that funded by NIH. As members of these programs, small numbers of foreign scientists have committed serious violations of NIH’s policies and systems. Issues identified by NIH include not disclosing foreign financial conflicts; not fully and accurately disclosing other financial support during grant application, award, and implementation processes; and not disclosing conflicts of commitment. In some instances, foreign scientists have failed to disclose other affiliations and positions that often come with resources and equities. Finally, NIH has seen peer review violations that range in severity.

The Advisory Committee to the Director working group for Foreign Influences on Research Integrity was established to develop recommendations to address behaviors related to these efforts in ways that build and continue important and successful relationships with foreign scientists in all countries while simultaneously protecting America’s research integrity.

With the importance of upholding relationships with foreign nationals in mind, the ACD working group makes several recommendations to the ACD, under the umbrella of three main themes:

- Communication and Awareness: Opportunities where existing procedures are in place but in need of education, clarification, or increased attentiveness;
- Risk Mitigation: Opportunities for change or enhancement of existing tools that safeguard research integrity; and
- Monitoring, Actions, and Consequences: Opportunities for ongoing monitoring, verification, trust-building, and remediation.”⁴⁴⁶

Dec. 13, 2018: National Institutes of Health, "Foreign Influence on Research Integrity"

acd.od.nih.gov/documents/presentations/12132018ForeignInfluences.pdf

- "The number of people involved in inappropriate activities is small, but the issues are significant, and therefore must be addressed
- The vast majority of foreign nationals make important contributions to American institutions and to science
- 24% of U.S. Nobel prizes have been awarded to foreign-born scientists
- The challenge is to find ways to build and continue important and successful relationships with foreign scientists in all countries while simultaneously protecting the Nation's research integrity
- The focus of current concern is China—but this issue is not unique to China."⁴⁴⁷

Dec. 20, 2018: Department of Justice, "Two Chinese Hackers Associated with the Ministry of State Security Charged with Global Computer Intrusion Campaigns Targeting Intellectual Property and Confidential Business Information"

justice.gov/opa/pr/two-chinese-hackers-associated-ministry-state-security-charged-global-computer-intrusion

"The indictment alleges that the defendants were part of a group that hacked computers in at least a dozen countries and gave China's intelligence service access to sensitive business information," said Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein. "This is outright cheating and theft, and it gives China an unfair advantage at the expense of law-abiding businesses and countries that follow the international rules in return for the privilege of participating in the global economic system."

"It is galling that American companies and government agencies spent years of research and countless dollars to develop their intellectual property, while the defendants simply stole it and got it for free," said U.S. Attorney Berman. "As a nation, we cannot, and will not, allow such brazen thievery to go unchecked."

"Healthy competition is good for the global economy, but criminal conduct is not. This is conduct that hurts American businesses, American jobs, and American consumers," said FBI Director Wray. "No country should be able to flout the rule of law—so we're going to keep calling out this behavior for what it is: illegal, unethical, and unfair. It's going to take all of us working together to protect our economic security and our way of life, because the American people deserve no less."

"The theft of sensitive defense technology and cyber intrusions are major national security concerns and top investigative priorities for the DCIS," said DCIS Director O'Reilly. "The indictments unsealed today are the direct result of a joint investigative effort between DCIS and its law enforcement partners to vigorously investigate individuals and groups who illegally access information technology systems of the U.S. Department of Defense and the Defense Industrial Base. DCIS remains vigilant in our efforts to safeguard the integrity of the Department of Defense and its enterprise of information technology systems."⁴⁴⁸

Feb. 1, 2019: *The Wall Street Journal*: “Energy Department to Ban Foreign Talent-Recruitment Programs”

[wsj.com/articles/energy-department-to-ban-foreign-talent-recruitment-programs-11549052674](https://www.wsj.com/articles/energy-department-to-ban-foreign-talent-recruitment-programs-11549052674)

“This action’s being taken to protect U.S. national security interests and scientific integrity,’ Dan Brouillette, deputy energy secretary, told *The Wall Street Journal*. ‘You’re either going to work for us or work for them.’

The effort is part of an initiative by the Trump administration to more aggressively fight what it has characterized as China’s pervasive theft of U.S. technology and intellectual property.”⁴⁴⁹

Mar. 11, 2019: Department of Justice, “United States Attorney Lydon Hosts Discussion on China’s Threat to America’s National Security”

justice.gov/usao-sc/pr/united-states-attorney-lydon-hosts-discussion-china-s-threat-america-s-national-security

“More than 90% of the Department of Justice’s cases alleging economic espionage over the past seven years involved China. Over two-thirds of the Department’s cases involving thefts of trade secrets are connected to China. The talk aimed to educate attendees about economic threats posed by China, build bridges between law enforcement and law-abiding members of the business community, and ensure that attendees and their employers know that the federal government stands ready to help should they face data breaches, insider threats, or trade secret theft.

‘The Department of Justice and the FBI will use all available tools to respond to China’s economic aggression and the threat that these actions pose to the prosperity and security of the United States and other nations that respect the rule of law,’ said U.S. Attorney Lydon. ‘Law enforcement cannot fight this battle alone, however. We need our corporate citizens to be informed and vigilant about protecting themselves from victimization in this area. The conversation we had today is just the first step in what will be an ongoing dialogue with the business community.’”⁴⁵⁰

Apr. 24, 2019: “Deputy Assistant Attorney General Adam S. Hickey of the National Security Division Delivers Remarks at the Fifth National Conference on CFIUS and Team Telecom”

justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-assistant-attorney-general-adam-s-hickey-national-security-division-delivers-0

“First, criminal prosecution alone is not enough to remediate the harm caused by theft or to deter future thieves. That’s why we are looking for ways to use our tools to support those of our federal partners, including economic tools available to the Departments of the Treasury and Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative, diplomacy by the State Department, and engagement by the military and intelligence community.”⁴⁵¹

“Second, the best strategy empowers American businesses and the private sector to defend themselves in the first

place. That is why we are equipping our U.S. Attorneys around the country with the information they need to speak about these threats to companies and others in their jurisdictions, raising awareness and developing the relationships of trust and cooperation that lead both to effective prevention and to partnerships with law enforcement in responding to incidents."⁴⁵²

"Third, we must better secure our telecommunications networks from supply chain threats and guard against other national security threats through foreign investment. It is this aspect of the China Initiative that I want to spend the balance of my time on."⁴⁵³

Apr. 26, 2019: FBI Director Christopher Wray, A Conversation With Christopher Wray, *"Put plainly, China seems determined to steal its way up the economic ladder at our expense."*

[cfr.org/event/conversation-christopher-wray-0?utm_medium=social_owned&utm_term=conversation-christopher-wray&utm_content=042519&utm_campaign=event&utm_source=tw](https://www.fbi.gov/event/conversation-christopher-wray-0?utm_medium=social_owned&utm_term=conversation-christopher-wray&utm_content=042519&utm_campaign=event&utm_source=tw)

"Put plainly, China seems determined to steal its way up the economic ladder at our expense":

"More than ever, the adversaries' targets are our nation's assets—our information and ideas, our innovation, our research and development, our technology. And no country poses a broader, more severe intelligence collection threat than China.

China has pioneered a societal approach to stealing innovation in any way it can from a wide array of businesses, universities, and organizations. They're doing it through Chinese intelligence services, through state-owned enterprises, through ostensibly private companies, through graduate students and researchers, through a variety of actors all working on behalf of China. At the FBI we have economic espionage investigations that almost invariably lead back to China in nearly all of our fifty-six field offices, and they span just about every industry or sector.

The kind of activity I'm talking about goes way beyond fair market competition. It's illegal, it's a threat to our economic security, and by extension it's a threat to our national security. But it's even more fundamental than that. This is behavior that violates the rule of law. It violates principles of fairness and integrity. It violates our rules-based world order that's existed since the end of World War II. Put plainly, China seems determined to steal its way up the economic ladder at our expense. And to be clear, the United States—our country is by no means their only target."⁴⁵⁴

"We need to focus even more on a whole-of-society approach because in many ways we confront whole-of-society threats":

"We've got to figure out more and more ways to work together, particularly with all of you in the private sector. We need to focus even more on a whole-of-society approach because in many ways we confront whole-of-society threats. It is very clear to me that the next few years will be very much defined by what kind of progress we can make with private-public partnerships."⁴⁵⁵

“The Confucius Institutes are something that we view as part of a sort of soft power strategy”:

“The Confucius Institutes are something that we view as part of a sort of soft power strategy that the Chinese government has, and certainly something we’re concerned about. In many ways, a lot of the things that I talked about in my opening comments are things we’re more concerned about even than the Confucius Institutes.”⁴⁵⁶

June 7, 2019: Department of Energy, “Order DOE O 486.1, Foreign Talent Recruitment Programs”

directives.doe.gov/directives-documents/400-series/0486-1-border

“To ensure the continued flow of scientific and technical information consistent with the Department of Energy’s (DOE) broad scientific mission, while also ensuring protection of U.S. competitive and national security interests and DOE program objectives; and limiting unauthorized transfers of scientific and technical information.

DOE will take appropriate actions to prohibit DOE employees and DOE contractor employees, while employed by DOE or performing work under a contract, from the unauthorized transfer of scientific and technical information to foreign government entities through their participation in foreign government talent recruitment programs of countries designated by DOE as a foreign country of risk.”⁴⁵⁷

Sept. 16, 2019: Department of Justice, “Chinese Government Employee Charged in Manhattan Federal Court with Participating in Conspiracy to Fraudulently Obtain U.S. Visas”

justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-government-employee-charged-manhattan-federal-court-participating-conspiracy

“‘We welcome foreign students and researchers, including from China, but we do not welcome visa fraud—especially on behalf of a government,’ said Assistant Attorney General John C. Demers of National Security. ‘We will continue to confront Chinese government attempts to subvert American law to advance its own interests in diverting U.S. research and know-how to China.’”⁴⁵⁸

“This case is another example of the pervasive and organized effort, in this instance an allegedly flat-out illegal one, to fulfill a top priority of collecting information to advantage a foreign adversary.”⁴⁵⁹

Jan. 13, 2020: Secretary of State Pompeo, Remarks to the Silicon Valley Leadership Group: “Silicon Valley and National Security”

id.usembassy.gov/remarks-by-secretary-pompeo-on-technology-and-the-china-security-challenge/

“I’m not here to demand that you get out of China. In fact, it’s just the opposite. We want American companies to get rich doing business there”:

"I'm not here to demand that you get out of China. In fact, it's just the opposite. We want American companies to get rich doing business there. We want you to grow jobs here in America and build your companies successfully. We want to create conditions so that you can do so on a level playing field, in the spirit of respect between our two nations. Indeed, that's the whole point of President Trump's trade talks.

At the same time, we need to make sure that our companies don't do deals that strengthen a competitor's military or tighten the regime's grip of repression in parts of that country. We need to make sure American technology doesn't power a truly Orwellian surveillance state. We need to make sure American principles aren't sacrificed for prosperity."⁴⁶⁰

"Never permit U.S. sensitive information to transit across a network that we knowingly believe is not a trusted network":

"This is technology that the Chinese Communist Party will have access to this information. How they'll get it, when they'll get it, how much of it they'll decide to have access to, we can all debate. But make no mistake about it, they'll have the capacity to get at this deeply personal information.

It makes—it makes it harder, as someone who ran the Central Intelligence Agency for 18 months; if it's not done properly, the close information-sharing relationships we have with these countries are potentially at risk. We will never permit U.S. sensitive information to transit across a network that we knowingly believe is not a trusted network, and this technology, for all of its glory—indeed, some of the things that make it so special—create those very risks in spades."⁴⁶¹

May 29, 2020: The White House, "Proclamation on the Suspension of Entry as Nonimmigrants of Certain Students and Researchers from the People's Republic of China"

whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-suspension-entry-nonimmigrants-certain-students-researchers-peoples-republic-china/

"The PRC authorities use some Chinese students, mostly post-graduate students and post-doctorate researchers, to operate as non-traditional collectors of intellectual property. Thus, students or researchers from the PRC studying or researching beyond the undergraduate level who are or have been associated with the PLA are at high risk of being exploited or co-opted by the PRC authorities and provide particular cause for concern. In light of the above, I have determined that the entry of certain nationals of the PRC seeking to enter the United States pursuant to an F or J visa to study or conduct research in the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States."

"Section 1. Suspension and Limitation on Entry. The entry into the United States as a nonimmigrant of any national of the PRC seeking to enter the United States pursuant to an F or J visa to study or conduct research in the United States, except for a student seeking to pursue undergraduate study, and who either receives funding from or who currently is employed by, studies at, or conducts research at or on behalf of, or has been employed by, studied at, or conducted research at or on behalf of, an entity in the PRC that implements or supports the PRC's 'military-civil fusion strategy' is hereby suspended and limited subject to section 2 of this proclamation. For the purposes of this proclamation, the term 'military-civil fusion strategy'

means actions by or at the behest of the PRC to acquire and divert foreign technologies, specifically critical and emerging technologies, to incorporate into and advance the PRC's military capabilities."⁴⁶²

"Sec. 6. Additional Measures. (a) The Secretary of State shall consider, in the Secretary's discretion, whether nationals of the PRC currently in the United States pursuant to F or J visas and who otherwise meet the criteria described in section 1 of this proclamation should have their visas revoked pursuant to section 221(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1201(i)." ⁴⁶³

July 16, 2020: Attorney General William Barr, Remarks at the Gerald P. Ford Presidential Museum, *"Hiding behind American voices allows the Chinese government to elevate its influence"*

justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-remarks-china-policy-gerald-r-ford-presidential

"The CCP has long used public threats of retaliation and barred market access to exert influence. More recently, however, the CCP has also stepped up behind-the-scenes efforts to cultivate and coerce American business executives to further its political objectives — efforts that are all the more pernicious because they are largely hidden from public view.

As China's government loses credibility around the world, the Department of Justice has seen more and more PRC officials and their proxies reaching out to corporate leaders and inveighing them to favor policies and actions favored by the Chinese Communist Party. Their objective varies, but their pitch is generally the same: the businessperson has economic interests in China, and there is a suggestion that things will go better (or worse) for them depending on their response to the PRC's request. Privately pressuring or courting American corporate leaders to promote policies (or politicians) presents a significant threat, because hiding behind American voices allows the Chinese government to elevate its influence and put a "friendly face" on pro-regime policies. The legislator or policymaker who hears from a fellow American is properly more sympathetic to that constituent than to a foreigner. And by masking its participation in our political process, the PRC avoids accountability for its influence efforts and the public outcry that might result, if its lobbying were exposed.

America's corporate leaders might not think of themselves as lobbyists. You might think, for example, that cultivating a mutually beneficial relationship is just part of the "guanxi" — or system of influential social networks—necessary to do business with the PRC. But you should be alert to how you might be used, and how your efforts on behalf of a foreign company or government could implicate the Foreign Agents Registration Act. FARA does not prohibit any speech or conduct. But it does require those who are acting as the "agents" of foreign principals to publicly disclose that relationship and their political or other similar activities by registering with the Justice Department, allowing the audience to take into account the origin of the speech when evaluating its credibility."



6. “THE WORST HUMAN RIGHTS CRISES OF OUR TIME ... THE STAIN OF THE CENTURY”

—Secretary of State Mike Pompeo⁴⁶⁴
Quotations from State, DOJ, DOD, and VP Pence

Jun. 19, 2018: Secretary of State Pompeo, Remarks on the UN Human Rights Council, “*Authoritarian governments with unambiguous and abhorrent human rights records, such as China...*”

[state.gov/remarks-on-the-un-human-rights-council/](https://www.state.gov/remarks-on-the-un-human-rights-council/)

“The only thing worse than a council that does almost nothing to protect human rights is a council that covers for human rights abuses and is therefore an obstacle to progress and an impediment to change. The Human Rights Council enables abuses by absolving wrongdoers through silence and falsely condemning those who have committed no offense. A mere look around the world today demonstrates that the council has failed in its stated objectives.

Photo Caption: U.S. Vice President Mike Pence speaks during the first-ever Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom on July 26, 2018 at the U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C. (Alex Wong/Getty Images)

Its membership includes authoritarian governments with unambiguous and abhorrent human rights records, such as China, Cuba, and Venezuela.”⁴⁶⁵

Jul. 24, 2018: Secretary of State Pompeo, “Religious Persecution in Iran, China Must End Now”

whitehouse.gov/articles/religious-persecution-iran-china-must-end-now/

“Earlier this year, the State Department hosted six United States-based Uighur journalists with Radio Free Asia’s Uighur Service. Their reporting indicates that Chinese authorities are likely detaining, at least, hundreds of thousands of Uighurs and other Muslim minorities in internment camps in Xinjiang. One journalist, Gulchehra Hoja, shared that 23 of her family members have been detained in the region. She, like others, have little to no information about her family’s well-being.”⁴⁶⁶

Feb. 25, 2019: Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein, “Remarks at the Center for Strategic & International Studies Event on Defending Rule of Law Norms”

justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-center-strategic-international

“Today, more than one million Uighurs and other minorities reportedly are detained in internment camps”:

“In Xinjiang province, Chinese law allows the extrajudicial mass detention of citizens who are ethnic Uighurs, a minority population native to the province. Today, more than one million Uighurs and other minorities reportedly are detained in internment camps. They are forced to renounce their culture and religion, and they face political ‘reeducation.’ The province’s law authorizes the arrest of anyone for violations that include expressing an allegiance to Uighur culture and reading prohibited religious books. Many people have been arrested and detained for long periods of time, without charge, trial, or due process.”⁴⁶⁷

“China sends agents known as ‘Fox Hunt’ teams to the United States and elsewhere to track down Chinese nationals accused of political or corruption crimes”:

“Some countries also undermine the law by using extralegal means to forcibly repatriate fugitives. China sends agents known as ‘Fox Hunt’ teams to the United States and elsewhere to track down Chinese nationals accused of political or corruption crimes. The squads enter foreign countries under false pretenses, track down fugitives and deploy intimidation tactics to force them to return to China.

Inside China, government officials possess authority to impose ‘exit bans,’ prohibiting some foreigners from leaving the country, without judicial process. They sometimes use bans as a form of coercion, to compel a victim’s relative or friend suspected of wrongdoing to return to China... China’s abuse of foreign visitors as political pawns caused the State Department to issue a travel advisory last month.”⁴⁶⁸

"I want to emphasize that the people of China, Russia, and other nations that do not share our respect for individual rights are not our enemies":

"I want to emphasize that the people of China, Russia, and other nations that do not share our respect for individual rights are not our enemies. It is good for us to seek common ground with their leaders. President Trump describes our relationship as 'a new era of competition.' He extends an open hand to 'rival powers ... that seek to challenge American influence, values, and wealth. We will attempt to build a great partnership with those and other countries, but in a manner that always protects our national interest.'"⁴⁶⁹

Mar. 8, 2019: Ambassador Sam Brownback, "Remarks on Religious Freedom in Hong Kong"

hk.usconsulate.gov/n-2019030801/

"As we have in the past, we will continue to speak out against violations of religious freedom around the world. As Vice President Pence said at the Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom last year and there will be another one this July, 'the right to believe or not believe is the most fundamental of freedoms. When religious liberty is denied or destroyed, we know that other freedoms—freedom of speech, of press, assembly, and even democratic Institutions themselves—are imperiled. That's why the United States of America stands for religious freedom yesterday, today, and always. We do this because it is right. But we also do this because religious freedom is in the interest of the peace and security of the world.'"

"I applaud the countries that have spoken out against China's abuses in Xinjiang. Turkey recently issued a strong condemnation of the human rights crisis there. More countries should do so":

"China has long used its economic weight to silence criticism of its severe human rights abuses. I applaud the countries that have spoken out against China's abuses in Xinjiang. Turkey recently issued a strong condemnation of the human rights crisis there. More countries should do so."

Mar. 13, 2019: Ambassador Sam Brownback, Remarks at Taipei Religious Freedom Conference, "*In China, authorities have arbitrarily detained more than 1 million Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other members of minority Muslim groups in internment camps...*"

ait.org.tw/remarks-by-ambassador-sam-brownback-at-taipei-religious-freedom-conference/

"In China, authorities have arbitrarily detained more than 1 million Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other members of minority Muslim groups in internment camps since April 2017. Tibetan Buddhists are not able to select, educate, or venerate their religious leaders without government interference. House church leaders are detained and their churches are shuttered in accordance with tightened restrictions on religion enforced by the Chinese Communist Party. And Falun Gong practitioners are reportedly tortured and detained by the Chinese government."⁴⁷⁰

Mar. 13, 2019: Secretary of State Pompeo, Remarks, “Release of the 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices”

state.gov/remarks-on-the-release-of-the-2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/

“China, which is in a league of its own when it comes to human rights violations. In just 2018, China intensified its campaign of detaining Muslim minority groups at record levels. Today, more than 1 million Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other Muslims are interned in reeducation camps designed to erase their religious and ethnic identities. The government also is increasing its persecution against Christians, Tibetans, and anyone who espouses different views from those or advocates those of government—or advocates change in government.”⁴⁷¹

Mar. 13, 2019: Ambassador Michael Kozak, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor on the Release of the 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, “*You haven’t seen things like this since the 1930s...*”

state.gov/ambassador-michael-kozak-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor-on-the-release-of-the-2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/

“Yeah, I think as the Secretary just mentioned, it’s in a—they’re in a league of their own. I mean, for me, you haven’t seen things like this since the 1930s of rounding up—I mean, in our—some estimations are in the millions of people —and then putting them into camps and trying—and torturing them, abusing them, and trying to basically erase their culture and their religion and so on from their DNA. It’s just remarkably awful.

We have tried to—over the year we’ve been trying to push this information out, trying to gain wider international attention to the problem. I would say we’ve had maybe some success in that respect in that initially the Chinese Government was denying that there were any camps or that anything was going on. Now they’re saying, well, there are camps, but they’re some kind of labor training camps and that it’s all very voluntary and so on. That does not match the facts that we and others are seeing, but at least I think we’re starting to make them realize that there’s a lot of international scrutiny on this and none of it is good from their standpoint. It’s really—it’s one of the most serious human rights problems in the world today.”⁴⁷²

Mar. 14, 2019: Secretary of State Pompeo, Interview with Fox and Friends, “*This is one of the worst human rights countries that we’ve seen since the 1930s.*”

state.gov/interview-with-brian-kilmeade-of-fox-and-friends/

“It’s both unfortunate and pretty typical of the way they treat their fellow human beings there. This is one of the worst human rights countries that we’ve seen since the 1930s. The magnitude and the scale of this is truly of a global proportion. Whether it’s the Uighurs that are in one part of the country or Christians or other religions in other parts of the country, they don’t honor that religious diversity, the religious freedom.”⁴⁷³

May 22, 2019: Ambassador Sam Brownback and Ambassador Nathan Sales, *Washington Post* Op-Ed, "China's Attack on Uighurs Isn't Counterterrorism. It's Ugly Repression"

[washingtonpost.com/opinions/chinas-attack-on-uighurs-isnt-counterterrorism-its-ugly-repression/2019/05/22/7bfb1d60-7ccb-11e9-a5b3-34f3edf1351e_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/chinas-attack-on-uighurs-isnt-counterterrorism-its-ugly-repression/2019/05/22/7bfb1d60-7ccb-11e9-a5b3-34f3edf1351e_story.html)

"What China is doing is not counterterrorism. It is ugly repression, on a mass scale, enabled by modern technology. It is the Big Brother we all fear. If China expects to be treated as a respectable member of the world's counterterrorism community, it must stop. And it must immediately release all those it has arbitrarily detained."⁴⁷⁴

June 3, 2019: Secretary of State Pompeo, "On the 30th Anniversary of Tiananmen Square"

state.gov/on-the-30th-anniversary-of-tiananmen-square/

"Over the decades that followed, the United States hoped that China's integration into the international system would lead to a more open, tolerant society. Those hopes have been dashed. China's one-party state tolerates no dissent and abuses human rights whenever it serves its interests. Today, Chinese citizens have been subjected to a new wave of abuses, especially in Xinjiang, where the Communist Party leadership is methodically attempting to strangle Uighur culture and stamp out the Islamic faith, including through the detention of more than one million members of Muslim minority groups. Even as the party builds a powerful surveillance state, ordinary Chinese citizens continue to seek to exercise their human rights, organize independent unions, pursue justice through the legal system, and simply express their views, For which many are punished, jailed, and even tortured."⁴⁷⁵

"We urge the Chinese government to make a full, public accounting of those killed or missing to give comfort to the many victims of this dark chapter of history. Such a step would begin to demonstrate the Communist Party's willingness to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. We call on China to release all those held for seeking to exercise these rights and freedoms, halt the use of arbitrary detention, and reverse counterproductive policies that conflate terrorism with religious and political expression. China's own constitution stipulates that all power belongs to the people. History has shown that nations are stronger when governments are responsive to their citizens, respect the rule of law, and uphold human rights and fundamental freedoms."⁴⁷⁶

June 6, 2019: David J. Ranz, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, "Confronting Atrocities in China: The Global Response to the Uyghur Crisis"

geneva.usmission.gov/2019/06/07/confronting-atrocities-in-china-the-global-response-to-the-uyghur-crisis/

"The Chinese government's rampant abuse of the human rights and religious freedoms of Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang is an urgent issue impacting the broader region. We call on China to end this campaign of repression, and immediately release the approximately 1 million arbitrarily detained in camps. We urge other governments of the region and the world to join us.

The deteriorating state of religious freedom in China, including the government's increasing persecution of the Uyghurs and other Muslims minorities, is not only a bilateral issue with China; it is a regional and global one as well. It is a crisis that has engaged all corners of the State Department as we seek to build a global response to the Chinese government's program of oppression."⁴⁷⁷

"We echo Turkey's sentiment that: 'The reintroduction of internment camps in the 21st century and the policy of systematic assimilation against the Uighur Turks carried out by the authorities of China is a great shame for humanity'":

"And, we echo Turkey's sentiment that: 'The reintroduction of internment camps in the 21st century and the policy of systematic assimilation against the Uighur Turks carried out by the authorities of China is a great shame for humanity.'"⁴⁷⁸

July 18, 2019: Vice President Pence, Remarks at the 2nd Annual Religious Freedom Ministerial, *"The Communist Party has imprisoned more than a million Chinese Muslims, including Uighurs, in internment camps where they endure around-the-clock brainwashing."*

"The United States has also spoken out against religious persecution in the People's Republic of China. And we do so again today.

China's oppression of Tibetan Buddhists goes back decades. As part of its efforts to oppress Tibetan Buddhism, back in 1995, Chinese authorities captured the legitimate Panchen Lama, then just a 6-year-old boy, and neither he nor his family have been heard from in the 24 years since.

And in Xinjiang, the Communist Party has imprisoned more than a million Chinese Muslims, including Uighurs, in internment camps where they endure around-the-clock brainwashing. Survivors of the camps have described their experiences as a deliberate attempt by Beijing to strangle Uighur culture and stamp out the Muslim faith."⁴⁷⁹

July 18, 2019: Secretary of State Pompeo, Keynote Address at the Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom, *"China is home to one of the worst human rights crises of our time. It is truly the stain of the century."*

state.gov/secretary-of-state-michael-r-pompeo-keynote-address-at-the-ministerial-to-advance-religious-freedom/

"And in China—in China, the Chinese Communist Party demands control over the lives of the Chinese people and their souls. Chinese Government officials have even discouraged other countries from attending this very gathering. Is that consistent with the guarantee of 'freedom of religious belief' that is found directly in the Chinese constitution? If you're here today and you're a country which has defied the Chinese pressure to come here, we salute you and we thank you."⁴⁸⁰

"And China is home to one of the worst human rights crises of our time. It is truly the stain of the century.

Since April 2017, the Chinese Government has detained more than one million Chinese Muslims and other minorities in camps in Xinjiang."⁴⁸¹

Sept. 6, 2019: Secretary of Defense Esper, Remarks at the Royal United Services Institute, *"For anyone who wonders what a world dominated by Beijing might look like, I would argue all you need to do is look at how they treat their own people..."*

defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/1953749/as-prepared-remarks-by-secretary-esper-at-the-royal-united-services-institute-i/

"The PRC's influence is expanding rapidly as it seeks to pursue new partners, or what have historically been known as Chinese tributes, well beyond Asia. But for anyone who wonders what a world dominated by Beijing might look like, I would argue all you need to do is look at how they treat their own people, within their borders. Over a million ethnic minority Uighurs are in re-education camps in Xinjiang Province. Basic civil liberties such as freedom of speech and freedom of the press are routinely denied. And we all see what's happening to those who continue to speak out against the party's influence in Hong Kong. I was there for the handover in 1997 when the 'one country, two systems' designation was affirmed —I would ask you: given what we see in Hong Kong today, has China kept those promises?"⁴⁸²

Sept. 18, 2019: Assistant Secretary David Stilwell, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *"Hong Kongers took to the streets because Beijing is undermining its own 'One Country, Two Systems' framework."*

foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/091819_Stilwell_Testimony.pdf

"As the President's National Security Strategy makes clear, we are especially concerned by Beijing's use of market-distorting economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and intimidation to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda. Beijing's pursuit of a repressive alternative vision for the Indo-Pacific seeks to reorder the region in its favor and has put China in a position of strategic competition with all who seek to preserve a free and open order of sovereign, diverse nations."⁴⁸³

"China has provided no evidence of a 'black hand' behind the protests in Hong Kong, because it doesn't exist. Hong Kongers took to the streets because Beijing is undermining its own "One Country, Two Systems" framework. As Secretary Pompeo has observed, the protestors are asking that Beijing uphold its commitments under the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. And as President Trump has said, we seek a "humane" resolution to the protests. The United States supports peaceful assembly and freedom of expression."⁴⁸⁴

Oct. 7, 2019: “U.S. Department of Commerce Adds 28 Chinese Organizations to Its Entity List”

commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2019/10/us-department-commerce-adds-28-chinese-organizations-its-entity-list

“Today, the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce announced that it will add 28 Chinese governmental and commercial organizations to the Entity List for engaging in or enabling activities contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States. This action constricts the export of items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to entities that have been implicated in human rights violations and abuses in China’s campaign targeting Uighurs and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR).

‘The U.S. Government and Department of Commerce cannot and will not tolerate the brutal suppression of ethnic minorities within China,’ said Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross. ‘This action will ensure that our technologies, fostered in an environment of individual liberty and free enterprise, are not used to repress defenseless minority populations.’”⁴⁸⁵

Oct. 8, 2019: “Department of State Imposes Visa Restrictions on Chinese Officials for Repression in Xinjiang”

state.gov/u-s-department-of-state-imposes-visa-restrictions-on-chinese-officials-for-repression-in-xinjiang/

“The Chinese government has instituted a highly repressive campaign against Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other members of Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang) that includes mass detentions in internment camps; pervasive, high-tech surveillance; draconian controls on expressions of cultural and religious identities; and coercion of individuals to return from abroad to an often perilous fate in China. Today, I am announcing:

- Visa restrictions on Chinese government and Communist Party officials who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, the detention or abuse of Uighurs, Kazakhs, or other members of Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang, China. Family members of such persons may also be subject to these restrictions.
- These visa restrictions complement yesterday’s announcement by the Department of Commerce regarding the imposition of export restrictions on U.S. products exported to 28 entities, including elements of the Public Security Bureau and commercial companies in Xinjiang, involved in China’s campaign of surveillance, detention, and repression.

The United States calls on the People’s Republic of China to immediately end its campaign of repression in Xinjiang, release all those arbitrarily detained, and cease efforts to coerce members of Chinese Muslim minority groups residing abroad to return to China to face an uncertain fate. The protection of human rights is of fundamental importance, and all countries must respect their human rights obligations and commitments. The United States will continue to review its authorities to respond to these abuses.”⁴⁸⁶

Oct. 24, 2019: Secretary of Defense Esper, Remarks at the German Marshall Fund, *"The ongoing protests in Hong Kong are a consequence of Beijing's gradual erosion of the rights guaranteed under the 'one country, two systems' agreement..."*

defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/1997187/as-prepared-remarks-by-secretary-esper-at-the-german-marshall-fund-in-brussels/

"The ongoing protests in Hong Kong are a consequence of Beijing's gradual erosion of the rights guaranteed under the 'one country, two systems' agreement in 1997. In a world dominated by China, these actions by the state would constitute acceptable behavior."⁴⁸⁷

Jan. 13, 2020: Secretary of State Pompeo at The Hoover Institution, *"The Chinese Government made a commitment that there would be a higher level of autonomy there, and it's our expectation the Chinese Communist Party will live up to that."*

state.gov/the-restoration-of-deterrence-the-iranian-example/

"There's a much longer conversation to be had about China, but with respect to Hong Kong in particular, our policy has been simply this: The Chinese Government made a commitment to Hong Kong. That commitment still exists. It sits at the UN as well, so it's a commitment they made not to the United States or, frankly, even just to the people of Hong Kong. It's a commitment that they made to the people of the world to honor this central understanding that there would be increased autonomy for the people of Hong Kong, and we have done our best to draw a set of boundaries for what we think would be acceptable.

I think the President talked about this at some length when the protests first broke out and there were hints of violence at the front end of those protests. I think we've been unequivocal about our support that says the Chinese Government made a commitment that there would be higher level of autonomy there, and it's our expectation the Chinese Communist Party will live up to that."⁴⁸⁸

Feb. 20, 2020: U.S. Chief Technology Officer Michael Kratsios at Hudson Institute, “There is an obligation among technology companies in the U.S. to be more cognizant when they’re engaging in China.”

<https://www.hudson.org/events/1778-america-s-global-tech-leadership-a-conversation-with-u-s-cto-michael-kratsios2020>

“There are a number of technology companies in China that are being utilized to pursue these human rights atrocities, and these need to be called out for what they are and added to entities lists. The question of U.S. engagement in some ways here, I think, is a little bit tricky and one that I care about deeply.

I think there is an obligation among a lot of technology companies in the U.S. to be a lot more open-eyed and less naïve and more cognizant of these types of activities that are happening when they’re engaging in China. And this idea [is] civil-military fusion. This idea that even if you’re conducting what you believe is innocuous research as an American in China, that type of research is being used for all sorts of reasons and in ways that you often can’t even imagine. So for us as we constantly remind folks, whether you’re investors deciding to invest in Chinese startups, American companies trying to do business in China, there is a prominent American company that was selling medical devices that was used to do biometric analysis, it was used to track and create a database of ethnic minorities. This is tragic. We shouldn’t have American companies complicit in this type of behavior.”



U.S. Chief Technology Officer Michael Kratsios speaking at Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. on February 20, 2020. (Hudson Institute)

Mar. 18, 2020: Department of State, “China’s Expulsion of U.S. Journalists”

state.gov/briefing-with-senior-state-department-officials-on-chinas-expulsion-of-u-s-journalists/

“Our response has been, as you’ve seen, looking to build some reciprocity in this relationship. In terms of reciprocity, you start off in September with—we tried to—a diplomatic relationship more reciprocal. Anybody who’s lived in China, either in the media or as a diplomat, knows that you are treated far differently in the PRC than you are here as far as openness, access, and all the rest. I’ll let you judge how that went, but the message I think was received in Beijing as we simply asked their diplomats to give us five days’ notice before they met with certain (inaudible) national (inaudible).

Second part: In January we announced media reciprocity. Again, the same thing—we asked their media that are sponsored by the Chinese Communist Party acknowledge that through determining that they were foreign missions. They are still

allowed to do what they do in this country, but they just had to acknowledge the fact that they weren't the same media organizations that you all represent. They basically were there to represent the Chinese Communist Party's perspective. And one of you from PBS gave me a good summation of that. Here's the quote: Journalists are constrained by facts while foreign missions are constrained by their governments. So that's the approach we've taken as far as media reciprocity.

The response by the Chinese to this particular initiative has been mixed and in some ways I think overly—they sort of overreacted. In this case, they're trying to (inaudible). It's a strategic competition, therefore we treat each other the same. Because we're resisting in the media space and the economic space, they're having a much more difficult time advancing their interests."⁴⁸⁹

Apr. 17, 2020: Secretary of State Pompeo, Radio Interview with Hugh Hewitt, *"They promised there'd be one country, two systems in Hong Kong, and yet they have expanded their repression there."*

realclearpolitics.com/video/2020/04/17/pompeo_on_moving_2022_winter_olympic_games_from_beijing_well_have_to_take_a_look_at_that.html

"They promised there'd be one country, two systems in Hong Kong, and yet they have expanded their repression there. They've promised that what was going on in the west, in Xinjiang, wasn't harming the Muslim population, the Uighurs there in the West. We know what's taking place. It's a humanitarian catastrophe. Xi himself in the Rose Garden promised that they wouldn't arm islands all across the South Pacific. They've done that. They've put significant weaponry there. And this is a country that the whole world needs to ensure that we watch what they do and not what they say. They want to be a great power. They want to join the community of civilized nations. To do that, you have to be open, you have to be transparent, you have to tell the truth. That's our expectation of the Chinese Communist Party. And it has fallen short of that too often."⁴⁹⁰

Apr. 18, 2020: Secretary of State Pompeo, "Recent Arrests of Pro-Democracy Activists in Hong Kong"

state.gov/recent-arrests-of-pro-democracy-activists-in-hong-kong/

"The United States condemns the arrest of pro-democracy advocates in Hong Kong. Beijing and its representatives in Hong Kong continue to take actions inconsistent with commitments made under the Sino-British Joint Declaration that include transparency, the rule of law, and guarantees that Hong Kong will continue to 'enjoy a high degree of autonomy.'"⁴⁹¹

Apr. 20, 2020: Department of State, “The United States Calls for Wang Quanzhang’s Freedom of Movement and Release of Activists”

state.gov/the-united-states-calls-for-wang-quanzhangs-freedom-of-movement-and-release-of-activists/

“The United States calls on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to allow human rights lawyer Wang Quanzhang’s freedom of movement, including the ability to join his family in Beijing, now that he has been released after five years of unjust detention. We remain very concerned about reports of his declining physical and mental health, and of his mistreatment in prison. Wang was detained as part of the PRC’s nationwide roundup of more than 300 human rights lawyers and legal associates beginning July 9, 2015.

We continue to call for the release of all of those unjustly detained, such as Li Yuhan and Yu Wensheng, as well as other Chinese citizens who are in detention simply for exercising their human rights and fundamental freedoms in pursuit of a more equitable and just society, governed by the rule of law. We remain concerned by the PRC’s weak rule of law, arbitrary detentions, torture in custody, and continued violations and abuses of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals inside its borders. We urge the PRC to uphold its international human rights commitments and promises made in its own constitution.”⁴⁹²

Apr. 29, 2020: Secretary of State Pompeo, Remarks at a Press Availability, “Any effort to impose draconian national security legislation on Hong Kong would be inconsistent with Beijing’s promises, and would impact American interests there.”

state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-at-a-press-availability-4/

“We continue to monitor with growing concern Beijing’s increasing efforts to interfere with Hong Kong’s governance. The erosion of Hong Kong’s freedoms is inconsistent with the promises that the Chinese Communist Party itself made under One Country, Two Systems. Any effort to impose draconian national security legislation on Hong Kong would be inconsistent with Beijing’s promises, and would impact American interests there.”⁴⁹³

May 27, 2020: Secretary of State Pompeo, “P.R.C. National People’s Congress Proposal on Hong Kong National Security Legislation”

state.gov/prc-national-peoples-congress-proposal-on-hong-kong-national-security-legislation/

“Last week, the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) National People’s Congress announced its intention to unilaterally and arbitrarily impose national security legislation on Hong Kong. Beijing’s disastrous decision is only the latest in a series of actions that fundamentally undermine Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedoms and China’s own promises to the Hong Kong people under the Sino-British Joint Declaration, a UN-filed international treaty.

The State Department is required by the Hong Kong Policy Act to assess the autonomy of the territory from China. After careful study of developments over the reporting period, I certified to Congress today that Hong Kong does not continue to warrant treatment under United States laws in the same manner as U.S. laws were applied to Hong Kong before July 1997. No reasonable person can assert today that Hong Kong maintains a high degree of autonomy from China, given facts on the ground.

Hong Kong and its dynamic, enterprising, and free people have flourished for decades as a bastion of liberty, and this decision gives me no pleasure. But sound policy making requires a recognition of reality. While the United States once hoped that free and prosperous Hong Kong would provide a model for authoritarian China, it is now clear that China is modeling Hong Kong after itself.

The United States stands with the people of Hong Kong as they struggle against the CCP's increasing denial of the autonomy that they were promised."⁴⁹⁴



7. “INSTIGATING A GLOBAL PANDEMIC”

— President Donald Trump⁴⁹⁵
Quotations from State, USTR, OTMP & DOD

Mar. 30, 2020: Secretary Pompeo’s Call with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, *“Countering efforts by the People’s Republic of China and Russia to spread disinformation and propaganda related to the virus.”*

state.gov/secretary-pompeos-call-with-nato-secretary-general-jens-stoltenberg-2/

“The Secretary and the Secretary General discussed how NATO is helping to coordinate Allied responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and the importance of countering efforts by the People’s Republic of China and Russia to spread disinformation and propaganda related to the virus.”⁴⁹⁶

Photo Caption: FBI Director Christopher Wray gives a major speech at Hudson Institute on July 7, 2020. In his remarks, Director Wray outlined China’s campaign of economic espionage and efforts to compromise American health and academic institutions conducting essential COVID-19 research. (James O’Gara/Hudson Institute)

Apr. 9, 2020: “Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Europe and NATO; Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia; and China Discuss Disinformation During Press Briefing”

defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2146535/deputy-assistant-secretaries-of-defense-for-europe-and-nato-russia-ukraine-and/

“We noticed immediately as the Chinese made authoritative statements from its—its—its party’s mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, and also from spokespersons from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We communicated what our expectations were and that they should retract that.

They have since backed away from that narrative and we have not seen that, particularly from the Ministry of National Defense, you know, we were very clear that this was unhelpful. This is moving the coronavirus issue out of an area of cooperation between the two militaries and into an area of confrontation.

Subsequent to that both from the secretary’s level down in terms of communicating to that to the Chinese, they—they understood that that was unhelpful and I have not seen that in authoritative commentary or narratives from the Chinese since then.”

Apr. 14, 2020: Secretary of State Pompeo, Interview with Chris Salcedo, “*We know where this virus originated.*”

state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-with-chris-salcedo-of-the-chris-salcedo-show-ksev-houston-newsmx-tv/

“They’ve got to be honest about what’s going on. They’ve got to talk about where the disease is in their country”:

“We know where this virus originated. It originated in Wuhan, China. These are just the facts. And we need every government to do two things. One, they’ve got to be honest about what’s going on. They’ve got to talk about where the disease is in their country, how many fatalities they’ve had, what kind of cases they have, what kind of testing they’re engaged in. And then for the Chinese Government, as the President said when they were talking about the fact that this might have come from an American soldier or an American weapons lab, that’s really risky. That creates risk when you put disinformation out there in that way.”⁴⁹⁷

“I’m very confident that this administration will lead the way in holding both those countries and the individuals responsible for it accountable”:

“There will be a time, and that time is not too far off—there will be a time when the world will get to see which countries performed well, which countries created risk and imposed costs, and in fact, your point is well taken—cost American lives. And I’m very confident that both President Trump and members of Congress like Senator Cotton, when that time is right, those who were responsible for both the loss of lives, the tragedy that’s taken place here in the United States, and the economic damage that has been done all around the world, I’m very confident that this administration will lead the way in holding both those countries and the individuals responsible for it accountable.”⁴⁹⁸

Apr. 16, 2020: Secretary of State Pompeo, Interview with Martha MacCallum of Fox News, “*The Chinese Government needs to come clean. It needs to be accountable.*”

state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-with-martha-macallum-of-fox-news-2/

“The Chinese Government needs to come clean. It needs to be accountable. It needs to explain what happened and why it is the case that that information wasn’t made more broadly available. We could have done things differently. The world would have responded quickly. Frankly, the international health organizations didn’t do us any favors either in making sure this information was broadcast in a way that it needed to be with transparent and full information.”⁴⁹⁹

“It requires leadership that’s prepared to engage in the international community on a fair and reciprocal basis and to share information the way we expect every nation to do that”:

“As for the relationship, we want to cooperate. It’s 1.5 billion people in China. We want the Chinese people to be successful. But it requires leadership that’s prepared to engage in the international community on a fair and reciprocal basis and to share information the way we expect every nation to do that. It doesn’t appear that that happened here. The President talked about their data today and he asked if anybody believed the numbers of deaths and the numbers of cases inside of China.

But that’s the kind of doubt and uncertainty that happens when you close down, when you kick journalists out of your country. All we’re asking is for the Chinese to cooperate and share that information with us. It would be very helpful to the United States. It’d keep us safe. Frankly, it’d keep the Chinese people safer too.”⁵⁰⁰

Apr. 17, 2020: Secretary of State Pompeo, Interview with Maria Bartiromo of Mornings with Maria on Fox Business Network, “*The Chinese Communist Party and the World Health Organization didn’t put that information out into the international space as they’re required...*”

state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-with-maria-bartiromo-of-mornings-with-maria-on-fox-business-network-2/

“General Secretary Xi told us he wouldn’t arm the South China Sea. He did so. They made commitments in Hong Kong, promises there. We demand that they live up to those promises.

And now, in this moment, this authoritarian regime had information, had data. It’s very clear now that the Chinese Communist Party and the World Health Organization didn’t put that information out into the international space as they’re required to do in a timely fashion, and the result of that is that we now have this global pandemic. We are still, Maria, suffering that today. We are still asking the Chinese Communist Party to allow experts to get in to that virology lab so that we can determine precisely where this virus began. It’s not political. This is about science and epidemiology.”⁵⁰¹

“Real moment for business leaders all across America to see the political risk associated with operations inside of China”:

"I think this has been a real moment for business leaders all across America to see the political risk associated with operations inside of China. You know this, Maria; you've been around a lot of these people. They can deal with commercial risk, they can deal with all kinds of—political risk is enormously difficult to deal with, and now we've ripped the band-aid off the political risk connected to that.

Second, the United States Government has a responsibility, too. We need to make sure the supply chains for the products that matter for American national security and keeping people safe are no longer dependent on any single country, and we have a responsibility to get that right. That's the governmental function, and I hope every business leader around the world will take a look at what's transpired over these past weeks and make good decisions for their company about whether they're prepared to deal with the political risk of continuing to operate from China."⁵⁰²

Apr. 22, 2020: Secretary of State Pompeo, Remarks at a Press Availability, *"China didn't share all of the information it had. Instead, it covered up how dangerous the disease is"*

state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-remarks-to-the-press-at-a-press-availability/

"We strongly believe that the Chinese Communist Party did not report the outbreak of the new coronavirus in a timely fashion to the World Health Organization.

Article 6 of the IHRs, which was a part of this reform, further mandates that a State Party—that would include China—'shall continue to communicate to WHO timely, accurate and sufficiently detailed public health information...' That is, there's an ongoing obligation.

Even after the CCP did notify the WHO of the coronavirus outbreak, China didn't share all of the information it had.

Instead, it covered up how dangerous the disease is. It didn't report sustained human-to-human transmission for a month until it was in every province inside of China. It censored those who tried to warn the world, it ordered a halt to testing of new samples, and it destroyed existing samples.

The CCP still has not shared the virus sample from inside of China with the outside world, making it impossible to track the disease's evolution."⁵⁰³

Apr. 23, 2020: Secretary of State Pompeo, Interview with Sean Hannity, *"I am very confident that the Chinese Communist Party will pay a price for what they did here, certainly from the United States."*

state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-with-sean-hannity-of-fox-news/

"I am very confident that the Chinese Communist Party will pay a price for what they did here, certainly from the United States. I don't know exactly what form that will take. Our focus today isn't on that. It's on making sure we keep Americans safe, take down the health risk, keep people healthy as we can, and get this economy going back."⁵⁰⁴

“Make sure that we’re not dependent on China for our pharmaceutical goods”:

“We need to focus on the here and now, and there will be a time to make sure that we get this right, to make sure that we’re not dependent on China for our pharmaceutical goods and all the things that we’ve seen that we just didn’t have right and that President Trump had identified early on as things we needed to fix in the relationship between the United States and China.”⁵⁰⁵

Apr. 24, 2020: Secretary of State Pompeo, Interview with Ben Shapiro, “We’re also working with those countries to make sure they understand that this was in fact a virus that originated in Wuhan...”

state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-with-ben-shapiro-of-the-ben-shapiro-show-3/

“And we’re also working with those countries to make sure they understand that this was in fact a virus that originated in Wuhan, China, that the Chinese Government knew about this certainly by December of 2019, and that they failed to comply with their most fundamental obligations as a nation, and importantly, too, failed to comply with the international health regulations of the World Health Organization and then did a lot of things—and we can talk about them at great length—to cover that up.”⁵⁰⁶

Apr. 29, 2020: Secretary of State Pompeo, Interview with Fox and Friends, “This is classic communist disinformation. This is what communists do.”

state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-with-steve-doocy-ainsley-earhardt-and-brian-kilmeade-of-fox-and-friends-2/

“America needs to hold them accountable”:

“What the Chinese Communist Party did here, in not preventing the spread of this around the world, they are responsible for. America needs to hold them accountable. I’ve been heartened to see Australia, other countries joining this, demanding an investigation, because while we know this started in Wuhan, China, we don’t yet know from where it started.

And in spite of our best efforts to get experts on the ground, they continue to try and hide and obfuscate. That’s wrong, it continues to pose a threat to the world, and we all need to get to the bottom of what actually happened here, not only for the current instant but to make sure something like this doesn’t happen again. There are still many labs operating inside of China today, and the world needs to know that we’re not going to see a repeat of this in the days and weeks and months ahead.”⁵⁰⁷

“We know the kinds of things that communist parties do to try and manage information inside of their own country and around the world”:

“This is classic communist disinformation. This is what communists do. The Chinese people were harmed by this too. The Chinese Communist Party—we know there were journalists that were kicked out. We know that there were doctors that tried

to tell this story, and instead they were pushed aside, covered up, taken out of the news. Those are the kind of things that communist institutions do. We all know them from the Soviet days. We know the kinds of things that communist parties do to try and manage information inside of their own country and around the world.

And so we see these efforts—I saw a foreign ministry official this morning on TV trying to change this narrative. We know that this virus started in Wuhan, China. We now have—the Chinese Communist party now has a responsibility to tell the world how this pandemic got out of China and all across the world, causing such global economic devastation.”

Apr. 29, 2020: Secretary of State Pompeo, Interview with Shannon Bream of Fox News, “*We have an obligation to do our best to hold those accountable who have inflicted so much harm...*”

state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-with-shannon-bream-of-fox-news/

“Look, the President has done his level best to correct 40 years of appeasement of China. He has said we’re going to have fair and reciprocal trade. He has imposed real costs when they have behaved badly. And that’s important. We need to make sure we do the right thing for the American people, and for an awful long time there was this theory that if we just were nice to China that their system would change and the Chinese Communist Party would begin to behave in ways that were consistent with the things that were of a benefit to America.

We’d love to see the Chinese people be successful. We care about them greatly. But we’ve watched the Chinese Communist Party behave in ways that communist parties do, and I think that’s what you heard the President saying earlier today. We have an obligation to do our best to hold those accountable who have inflicted so much harm, so much damage to the global economy and to the lives of Americans and people all across the world.

We will, for the moment, focus on the things that help keep people safe, and then there will come a time when not only the United States but I think the entire world will come to understand what took place, and I think in the end the Chinese Communist Party will ultimately be held accountable for what they did.”⁵⁰⁸

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Hudson Institute
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, Fourth Floor, Washington, D.C. 20004
+1.202.974.2400 www.hudson.org