

# Pacific Fury

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Born in Melbourne, Peter Thompson now lives in London, having enjoyed a successful career as a journalist in the UK. He has written biographies of Robert Maxwell and Jack Nicholson, among others. More recently, his books have included *The Battle of Brisbane and The Battle for Singapore*, and, with Robert Macklin, *Kill the Tiger* and *The Big Fella: The Rise and Rise of BHP Billiton*. **PETER THOMPSON PACIFIC FURY HOW AUSTRALIA AND HER ALLIES DEFEATED THE JAPANESE WILLIAM HEINEMANN: AUSTRALIA** All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted by any person or entity, including internet search engines or retailers, in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including printing, photocopying (except under the statutory exceptions provisions of the Australian *Copyright Act 1968*), recording, scanning or by any information storage and retrieval system without the prior written permission of Random House Australia. Any unauthorised distribution or use of this text may be a direct infringement of the author's and publisher's rights and those responsible may be liable in law accordingly. Pacific Fury ePub ISBN 9781864715613 Kindle ISBN 9781864717600 &#160; &#160; A William Heinemann book Published by Random House Australia Pty Ltd Level 3, 100 Pacific Highway, North Sydney NSW 2060 [www.randomhouse.com.au](http://www.randomhouse.com.au) First published by William Heinemann in 2008 This edition published in 2009 Copyright &#169; Peter Thompson 2008 The moral right of the author has been asserted. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted by any person or entity, including internet search engines or retailers, in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying (except under the statutory exceptions provisions of the Australian *Copyright Act 1968*), recording, scanning or by any information storage and retrieval system without the prior written permission of Random House Australia. Addresses for companies within the Random House Group can be found at

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940.5426 Cover photograph: a Bren-gunner of the 2/12th Battalion AIF fires at Japanese soldiers fleeing from a ruined pillbox as Australian troops go into action with Stuart tanks in a successful attack on Buna on 2 January 1943. (Australian War Memorial 014001) Cover design by Christabella Designs Internal text and picture-section design by Midland Typesetters, Australia Typeset in Sabon by Midland Typesetters, Australia Printed and bound by Griffin Press, South Australia *For Brenda Macduff, Catherine Hoskins, Alex Roberts and Bill Maccauley* CONTENTS [Acknowledgements](#) [Maps](#) [Note on Measurements](#) [Introduction: Their Rightful Place](#)

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS One Saturday night more than 60 years after the end of the Pacific War, I had dinner with three Australian veterans and their wives. Our host had done well in civilian life and we were in his penthouse at Admiralty Towers overlooking the broad sweep of the Brisbane River. All three men had fought for the unjustly maligned 2/8th Division in Malaya, had been taken prisoner at the fall of Singapore and had shared the privations of the Burma Railway. Two had survived the torpedoing of one of the Japanese &#8216;hellships&#8217; and had worked as slave labourers in Japan &#8211; three remarkable men who had suffered terribly at the hands of the Japanese. In front of their wives, they joked about captivity as though it had all happened at some particularly nasty boarding school run by sadistic, half-witted staff. I asked about Japan: what had it been like? Ian MacDiarmid, a slimly built man in his eighties with a shock of unruly grey hair and piercing blue eyes, said he hadn&#8217;t had much chance to see the country or meet the people. &#8216;My job was to unload coal from a lighter from daybreak until dusk,&#8217; he said.

I had a kidney infection and the coal was wet and dripped cold water on to my kidneys. It was agony, so I tore a strip off an old army blanket and wrapped it around my waist to protect my kidneys. One of the Japanese guards saw this strip of material and asked me where I&#8217;d got it. When he saw what it was, he went berserk. I was accused of &#8216;destroying Japanese Government property&#8217;, and bashed and kicked until I was unconscious. His wife Chaseley said: &#8216;You never told me that.&#8217; They had been married for 60 years and this was one of the things he had kept to himself. The other veterans understood. They had wanted to forget, to move on, to make up for lost time. But now memories of those incomparably grim days came

flooding back and they no longer saw any need to remain silent. I owe a great many debts of gratitude to those three soldiers and to the many other men and women who shared their experiences for *Pacific Fury*, especially the following: **Alex Roberts**, a young Lismore pilot who fought with the Chindits in the Battle of Burma in 1944 after being shot down over Occupied France in the Battle of Britain, captured by the Nazis and making an incredible escape across France to neutral Spain; **Brenda Macduff**, a Lancashire-born nursing sister now living in Auckland, who escaped from Alexandra Military Hospital 24 hours before Japanese troops massacred many of the patients, but became a prisoner-of-war in Sumatra after being sunk in one of the last ships to leave Singapore. "For years and years," she says, "we never spoke about the war at all, even when we were with old friends from Malaya"; **Guy Griffiths**, who was a midshipman in the battle cruiser HMS *Repulse*, which went down with the battleship *Prince of Wales* in Malaya, and who later fought in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the biggest naval action of all time, in HMAS *Shropshire*; **Catherine Hoskins**, a Cotterman, who was a captive of the Japanese in Santo Tomas Internment Camp as a young woman and who survived the Battle of Manila in which 100,000 civilians perished; **Horrie Young**, a member of Operation Jaywick, which sank seven Japanese ships in Singapore Harbour in the most daring commando raid of the Pacific War; **John Augustine Wyatt**, the last survivor of the Alexandra Hospital massacre, who had fought the Japanese all the way down the Malay Peninsula and then had to survive beatings and starvation with D Force on the Burma Railway; **Mackenzie Gregory**, a young Royal Australian Navy officer who was on the bridge of HMAS *Canberra* when she was sunk in the Battle of Savo Island and lived to fight again in the Battle of Lingayen Gulf in HMAS *Shropshire*; **Neville Hogan**, an 18-year-old member of the Rangoon Battalion of the Burma Rifles who was at the Sittang Bridge when it was blown up, stranding two-thirds of the 17th Indian Division on the wrong side of the river, and who fought the Japanese as an officer in the Chindit special forces; **Sylvester Puccio**, a young American sailor who saved hundreds of lives in the great United States battleship *West Virginia* by preventing her from capsizing when he calmly flooded her starboard bilges while under torpedo and bomb attack at Pearl Harbor; And **Bill Macauley**, who was born in China and who witnessed the Japanese Army's advance from Shanghai to Hankow to Canton until he was finally taken prisoner following the fall of Hong Kong on Christmas Day 1941. I would like to thank the following people (in alphabetical order) for additional interviews: Barbara Anslow (née Redwood), Marvin Bain, Frank Baker, Joan Bentson (née Staines), William A. Bentson, Mervyn Blyth, George T. Chandler, Frank Davies, Fred Day, Dr Jim Dixon, Richard Dobson, William M. Drower, Jesse Dunn, Charles Edwards, Julius A. Finnern, Bob Firehock, Joy Foord, Dr Bob Goodwin, Harry Hesp, Freda Ingham (née Howkins), Ray Jacobs, Alton C. Jensen, Cliff Johnston, Tom King, Sir George Laking, Alan Lewis, Clive Lyon, Ian MacDiarmid, Ted Matthews, William Muehleib, Jim O'Rourke, Cliff Olsen, Charles Peall, Alexander Pimson, Loreign Randall (née Finch), Dr Rowley Richards, Curtis Roosevelt, Alan Ryall, Fred Ryall, Russell Savage, Larry Simms, Bill Sinclair, Keith Smith, C. H. "Spud" Spurgeon, James Templer, Bill Thomas, Dick Tobiason, George Toni, Lance Watts and Horrie Young. Special thanks go to Nikki Christer, my publisher at Random House Australia, and to Random House senior editor Kevin O'Brien for his splendid work; to Tim Whiting for the idea and the title; and to my agent, Andrew Lownie. I am extremely grateful to Robert Macklin and Rod O'Loan, both of whom read the work-in-progress and made many valuable suggestions; to Sir Leslie Froggatt for permission to quote from his father's unpublished memoirs, "Nothing Lasts For Ever: Singapore Swan Song and After"; to Alison Keating for her uncle Cecil Hay's diary on the fall of Singapore; and to Loreign Randall (née Finch) for permission to quote from her mother Julian Finch's correspondence. I have also referred to diaries and personal accounts written by Jack Allured, Henry Bartol, Jesse Bumpass, Cliff Causton, Bill Daly, Bobb Glenn, Willard A. Heath, Lloyd V. Henrichs, James Jacobs, Clifford Johnson, Louis H. Kohl, Paul R. Lutjens, Brenda Macduff, Bob McMahon, Mark T. Muller, Kenneth R. Scurr, Howard L. Steffy, Byron Wilhite and Walter G. Winslow. Others who helped immensely with my research are: Patricia Savage, John Parker, Dimity Torbett, Clive Lyon, Madeline Lyon, Oliver Lindsay, Sue Mitchell, Margaret Morrison and Ian Macduff. I am indebted to Ron Bridge and Frederick Jones of the Association of British

Internees Far East Region; Alan Ryall, Fred Hesp and Fred Ryall of the Far East Prisoners of War Association, and Carol Cooper, Ronald Cooper, Cec Lowery and Keith Andrews of the Children of Far East Prisoners of War Association; Keith Smith of the 7th Division AIF Association, Dr Rowley Richards and Ron Ferguson of the 8th Division AIF Association; Bill Sinclair of the 9th Division AIF Association, Bob Batty of the Returned and Services League of Australia; Paul Gemmell of the 2/18th Battalion AIF Association; James Keady of the 2/20th Battalion AIF Association; Roger Perry of the Royal New South Wales Regiment incorporating the 2/19th Battalion AIF Association; Fred Hodel of the 2/26th Battalion AIF Association; the Ex-Prisoners of War Association of Australia, Nola Anderson, Australian War Memorial and the Research Centre of the AWM (Canberra); Neville Hogan of the Chindits Old Comrades Association and Alan Matthews, Force Z Association. I am also grateful to Gillian Simpson and Bill Richards (Australian National Maritime Museum); Sallyanne Atkinson; Peter Johnson (Australian Government Department of Defence); Simon Blundell, Librarian of the Reform Club (London); the National Archives (formerly the Public Record Office, Kew), the Reading Room at the Imperial War Museum (London), the London Library, the British Library; Professor David Horner (Australian National University); Patricia A. Ames (US Army Center of Military History, Fort Leslie J. McNair, Washington DC); the Mitchell Library and State Library of New South Wales (Sydney); the State Library of Victoria (Melbourne); the Oxley Library and State Library of Queensland (Brisbane); the New York Public Library, the Library of the Cosmos Club (Washington DC), the Library of Hawaii (Honolulu) and the Library of the Tanglin Club (Singapore). As well as people interviewed specifically for this book, I have also drawn on several interviews from my earlier works on the Pacific War where the interviewees are no longer alive but whose contribution should not be forgotten. These include the remarkable Beryl Daley who, as Beryl Stevenson, served as secretary to two senior British commanders and two American generals, and the incredibly brave Major John William Cardwell Wyatt, a member of General Gordon Bennett's staff in the Battle for Singapore. Regarding style, I have taken the liberty of using the present tense for example, 'he says' or 'she recalls'; when a specific recollection may in fact have taken place years earlier. My own interviews are clearly flagged in the Notes and References. The ranks of many service personnel changed during the course of the Pacific War. While I have kept track of some promotions in this work, more usually I refer to the rank at the time of a particular incident. In several instances, I have retained the offensive term 'Jap'; in direct quotations taken from memoirs or official histories. Peter Thompson London The Pacific Ocean as far east as Pearl Harbor in December 1941 The Malayan peninsula, showing Allied troop dispositions in December 1941 Hong Kong Island, showing the Japanese attacks in December 1941 The Netherlands East Indies, showing the Japanese advance in March 1942 Papua New Guinea, showing the key areas of conflict in 1942;43 The Kokoda Track over the Owen Stanley Range towards Port Moresby The shaded areas indicate the Japanese Empire at its height in 1942 The Battle of Leyte Gulf, a series of actions from 13 to 25 October 1944 NOTE ON MEASUREMENTS Distances and altitudes in the narrative have been expressed, where practicable, in (rounded) metric units; but in quotations from other works, the original units have been retained. The displacements of ships; expressed in tons; are not converted because of the difficulty of knowing whether long (UK) or short (US) tons are referred to. A similar difficulty applies in the difference between British and international knots in referring to a vessel's speed. • **Metric equivalents** 1 inch = 25 millimetres 1 foot = 30 centimetres 1 yard = 0.914 metre 1 mile = 1.6 kilometres • 1 pound = 0.45 kilograms 1 long (UK) ton = 1.016 tonnes 1 short (US) ton = 0.907 tonne • 1 acre = 0.4 hectare • 1 knot (distance in sea miles travelled in one hour) = approximately 1.85 kilometres per hour INTRODUCTION THEIR RIGHTFUL PLACE For the past six decades, controversy has been attached to Australia's role in the Pacific War like some malevolent limpet. Her fighting forces and her people have been vilified by critics ranging from Churchill and his generals down to the British military historian Sir Max Hastings. The reasons for this are complex, especially as the contribution of Australian soldiers, sailors and airmen to the defeat of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy was exemplary. Yet outrageous allegations that began at the time of the fall of Singapore in 1942 persist in one form or another to the present day. In consequence, some

Australian troops have been left with an undeserved reputation for cowardice in the face of the enemy, Australia's political leaders have been traduced in London and Washington for not caring what happened to other nations so long as Australia was all right and the country as a whole has been accused at various times of being a 'bludger's paradise', a hotbed of Communist-inspired industrial unrest or of simply lacking a firm commitment to the Pacific War. It is time these smears were swept aside. That is most effectively done not by diminishing the efforts of the major Allied powers but by presenting a balanced account of the war, based on exclusive interviews with eyewitnesses, that affords Australia her rightful place in the Pacific pantheon. This is the first book to give a complete overview of the Pacific War from a largely Australian perspective, while hopefully sacrificing none of its political significance or historic importance. By following the fortunes of dozens of civilians and military personnel – in most cases, survivors who have been interviewed specifically for this book – the highly personalised, four-part narrative charts each phase of the conflict. **Part I** sketches the origins of the war among the militarists at the heart of the Imperial Japanese Army who were determined to achieve their country's territorial ambitions through force of arms. For more than a hundred years, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan and the United States had been embroiled in a struggle for dominance of the Asian mainland. For historic reasons, Australia had been content to leave her representation in Tokyo in the hands of the British ambassador, while her security rested on the unproven concept of Imperial Defence, under which the Admiralty would dispatch the Fleet from home waters to counter any military threat to Britain's Asian territories. In the 1920s, however, the power of *Pax Britannica* had waned in the East and a powerful isolationist bloc in Congress assured that the United States would remain aloof from entanglement in foreign wars. Seizing its chance, the Japanese Army wrested Manchuria from the Chinese in 1931. When the West failed to intervene militarily, Japan, led by the god-emperor Hirohito, launched a full-scale invasion of China. The Pacific War segued out of the long-running Sino-Japanese War and was indivisible from it. At the eleventh hour, the then Australian prime minister, Sir Robert Menzies, appointed Sir John Latham, the 63-year-old chief justice, as Australia's first minister to Japan. Unfortunately, Latham did not reach Tokyo until the end of 1940, after Japan had joined the Axis powers; he found himself completely powerless to alter her belligerent course. Less than a year later, in September 1941, he left Japan for consultations in Singapore but fell ill and was back in Melbourne when the Pacific War erupted three months later. Without the formality of a declaration of war, Japan bombed the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, uniting Americans behind their president in a way that the Japanese had never anticipated. **Part II** describes Japan's attacks on the Philippines, Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, Burma and the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) with only 11 divisions, while her main forces remained in China and Manchuria. In just a hundred days, colonial rule was swept away throughout South-East Asia. Weakened by the ravages of the European war, Britain and Holland were easily defeated in Malaya, Singapore, Sumatra and Java; the Philippines also fell, after General Douglas MacArthur had been evacuated to Australia to lead Allied forces in the South-West Pacific Area (SWPA). By April 1942, more than 100 million people had been added to Hirohito's Empire of the Sun and Japanese forces had broken through the Malay Barrier protecting the northern approaches to Australia. With most of her fighting men serving abroad in the 2nd Australian Imperial Force (AIF), the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in the Middle Eastern, North African and Mediterranean theatres, Australia's security was threatened as never before. Without any reservations or misgivings, the Australian people joined the Grand Alliance of the United States, China, Britain and New Zealand to drive the Japanese scourge from occupied Asia. And for a nation of just seven million people, they punched well above their weight, despite a shortage of manpower and a rash of strikes, notably in the coal industry and on the docks. No one interviewed for this book claims that everything was perfect, but allowing for the usual failings in any democratic country during wartime, the Australian record is impressive by any standards. The Australian Army's problems with its Allies began with the British commander-in-chief, Sir Archibald Wavell, whose reputation had been badly tarnished by some of the most humiliating defeats in British military history. Stung by failure, Wavell commissioned a report that unjustly

blackened the name of the soldiers of the 8th Division, who were blamed for the fall of Singapore in February 1942 when the real culprits were to be found among the High Command, including the British commanding officer, General Arthur Percival, the Australian commanding officer, General Gordon Bennett, and Wavell himself. **Part III** covers what John Curtin, the Labor Party leader who had become prime minister of Australia in October 1941, described as 'the Battle for Australia'. Curtin demanded that Churchill return three Australian divisions from abroad to protect their homeland. Curiously, he received no help from his representative with the British War Cabinet, Sir Earle Page, who sided with the British prime minister and urged Curtin to give in to British demands to divert the troops to Burma or Java. But Curtin got his way and 46,000 men of the AIF under their commander-in-chief General Sir Thomas Blamey were back in time to counter the Japanese attack on Papua New Guinea. Churchill, who had never visited Australia, New Zealand or indeed anywhere else in the Pacific theatre, bitterly criticised Curtin's intransigence and complained that Australians came from 'bad stock', a reference to the country's convict legacy and the population's large Irish component.<sup>1</sup> However, Australia's harshest critic and the most damaging was Douglas MacArthur, the supreme commander who had taken charge of all troops in Australia. Australians had greeted him as a saviour in their hour of peril but MacArthur, devastated over the loss of the Philippines and believing that President Franklin D. Roosevelt would use any further setback to terminate his military career, contrived to exclude Australia's officer corps from the higher direction of the war. When the Japanese made swift advances along the Kokoda Track against untrained and poorly armed Australian militiamen and also proved difficult for AIF troops to dislodge from Milne Bay, MacArthur blamed a lack of fighting spirit among the Australian forces. By manipulating the media through his well-oiled PR machine, he ensured that the diggers and their officers received none of the kudos for many of the battles in which they fought with great success against a supposedly invincible enemy. In reality, the AIF had been thrown into action against the Japanese in the Battle of Papua without adequate training; indeed, any training in jungle warfare, without the benefit of an even barely adequate supply line and with little air support. Officers and men had to adapt quickly to new conditions and they proved to be fast learners. The Australian campaigns on the Huon Peninsula in 1943 and, later, in the islands were conducted with intelligence, dedication and great professionalism. By war's end, the Australian soldier had no equal as a jungle fighter. The fightback in New Guinea was marred by ructions at the top of the Australian command and an unseemly struggle between MacArthur and Blamey for control of the Australian Army. Relations between Australian and American troops had already been seriously damaged when the AIF returned from the Middle East to discover that United States servicemen were, in the phrase of the time, 'overpaid, oversexed and over here'. The anti-American riot that broke out in Brisbane on Thanksgiving Day 1942 exacerbated an already inflammatory situation. When MacArthur on his return from a brief visit to New Guinea was subjected to personal abuse outside his headquarters by a group of angry Australian soldiers, he formed the opinion that they were incorrigible and began to distance his command even further from Blamey.<sup>2</sup> At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, the combined chiefs of staff from Britain and the United States discussed for the first time a master strategy to defeat Japan. Curtin was kept in the dark that the meeting was even taking place, a snub that confirmed his suspicions that, as far as Churchill and Roosevelt were concerned, Australia had become the 'forgotten land', even though her vital interests were being discussed. In his 2007 book, *Nemesis: The Battle for Japan*, Max Hastings claims that the Allies were grateful for Australia's huge contribution towards feeding their soldiers, but as the war progressed there was 'sourness about the limited combat contribution being made by this country of seven million'.<sup>3</sup> This is a canard that deserves to be exposed. During the first half of 1943, the Australian Army was reinforcing its ranks after sustaining huge losses in Papua and reorganising itself in preparation for the vital New Guinea campaigns that lay ahead. The 'sourness' presumably relates to the absence of Australian troops in other theatres, notably Burma, where the British Army was struggling to make any progress whatsoever against the Japanese. In fact, Australia had 732,000 men and women under arms by August 1943

&#8211; more than 10 per cent of the population &#8211; and, despite Hastings&#8217; claims to the contrary, thousands of Australian airmen and sailors were still serving with Allied forces abroad. [4](#) **Part IV** relates the dramatic events arising from MacArthur&#8217;s long-running feud with Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander-in-chief of the United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, over the route to be taken to Tokyo: either via the Philippines, to which MacArthur had vowed to return, or Nimitz&#8217;s preference via the Japanese colony of Formosa (now Taiwan). When the United States joint chiefs of staff opted for the Philippines, MacArthur took the opportunity to deny Australian soldiers their rightful place in the major campaigns of 1944&#8211;45. While the United States Army claimed the battle honours &#8211; and while ships of the Royal Australian Navy fought valiantly alongside the United States Navy in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the biggest sea battle of all time &#8211; three Australian divisions were given the dangerous, thankless and probably unnecessary task of destroying isolated Japanese garrisons on Bougainville, New Britain and New Guinea, and later Borneo. However, a claim by Max Hastings in his book that &#8216;the last year of the war proved the most inglorious of Australia&#8217;s history as a fighting nation&#8217; would be ridiculous if it were not so offensive, as is his assertion that some units were driven &#8216;to the edge of mutiny and beyond&#8217; when acts of insubordination constituted an infinitesimal part of the big picture. [5](#) Such rhetoric as &#8216;to the edge of mutiny and beyond&#8217; betrays the fact that mountains are being constructed out of molehills. And that is hard to forgive. For the Japanese people, the Pacific War ended in total defeat. The Imperial Navy ceased to exist. The Japanese Army was annihilated in the Solomons, New Guinea, Burma, Micronesia, the Philippines, Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Tokyo and 66 other Japanese cities were firebombed. In the napalm raid on the Japanese capital on 9 March 1945, approximately 185,000 people, many of them women and children, were killed or wounded. And still Japan refused to surrender. It was only after two atomic explosions had vaporised the populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, accounting for another 135,000 deaths, and Stalin had attacked the Japanese Army in Manchuria that Hirohito agreed to broadcast a message of capitulation to his people on 15 August 1945. Japan&#8217;s ferocious southern thrust was heartless and ultimately suicidal. Millions had been killed or maimed, whole cities destroyed, women raped and enslaved, men treated as beasts of burden, children imprisoned, even executed. Twenty million Asian and European civilians and six million servicemen and women &#8211; a conservative estimate, because no one knows the exact figure &#8211; were wiped out in the fighting or died of disease, starvation and mistreatment. The death toll among Australia&#8217;s armed forces was 17,420, almost double the number who were killed or died of wounds fighting the Germans. [6](#) The stories of combat and survival, of heroism and self-sacrifice related in these pages are a tribute to the men and women who never came home.

PART I RISING SUN, 1853&#8211;1941 ~ 1 ~ DESTINY&#8217;S WAR A merciless Arctic wind sliced through the young sailors peering into the fog-shrouded North Pacific night. The Pearl Harbor Striking Force, showing no lights and maintaining radio silence, plunged through high seas at around 14 knots. Ice formed on the radio masts and the flight decks of the aircraft carriers were like skating rinks. Exposed to the elements for hours on end, several of the lookouts lost their grip and were blown overboard, but the ships of *kido butai* (&#8216;mobile force&#8217;) ploughed steadily on. [1](#) This was the beginning of the astonishing mission that would provide the flashpoint of the Pacific War, a lightning dagger thrust into America&#8217;s side where she least expected it, while Japanese forces surged south to seize British, American and Dutch possessions in South-East Asia. In the cabin of his flagship, the aircraft carrier *Akagi*, Vice-Admiral Chuichi Nagumo studied Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1: &#8216;To the east, the American Fleet will be destroyed. The American lines of operation and supply lines to the Far East will be severed. Enemy forces will be intercepted and annihilated. Victories will be exploited to smash the enemy&#8217;s will to fight.&#8217; [2](#) Devised by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto and approved by the god-emperor Hirohito himself, *kido butai* &#8211; the greatest killing machine ever assembled in naval warfare &#8211; had weighed anchor in heavy fog on the morning of 26 November 1941 and silently slipped out of Hitokappu Bay in the Kurile chain, north of Japan&#8217;s Home Islands. The route for the 5600-kilometre voyage to Pearl Harbor on the south coast of Oahu in the Hawaiian Islands had

been carefully plotted to avoid ships in commercial sealanes and airborne patrols from United States bases on Wake and Midway islands. Nagumo was instructed to shepherd his 30 vessels to the flying-off position some 360 kilometres north of Oahu just before dawn on Sunday 7 December. Now, as the Japanese fleet in its battle grey warpaint approached the first refuelling point in the northern Pacific after 24 hours at sea, it was 4.45 pm on 26 November in Washington on the other side of the International Date Line. At the State Department at Foggy Bottom, America's 71-year-old secretary of state, Cordell Hull, handed to Japan's 'dumbfounded' emissaries a Ten-Point Note demanding that Japan renounce the Tripartite Pact with her Axis allies Germany and Italy, and withdraw all of her military, naval, air and police forces from China and Indochina. President Roosevelt had ordered the tough line after United States intelligence had detected an invasion force of five divisions of Japanese troops in up to 50 ships heading south from Formosa (Taiwan) and Hainan Island in the Gulf of Tonkin. Roosevelt accused the Japanese of covertly sending a huge military expedition to Indochina, while at the same time negotiating with America to achieve a lasting peace in the Pacific.<sup>3</sup> The Japanese translation of Hull's note reached the Imperial Palace around midday on 27 November during an Imperial Conference at which the emperor, seated on a dais in front of an eight-gate golden screen, listened to the arguments of his ministers, generals and admirals. Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, a former secret policeman known as *Kamisori* 'the Razor'; read the note aloud while Hirohito and the Cabinet listened in stunned silence. 'This is an ultimatum,' Tojo angrily declared. Compliance with its demands would nullify four years of national sacrifice in China and threaten the very existence of *Dai Nippon Teikoku*, the Great Empire of Japan. Japan had numerous grievances against the United States, Britain, the Netherlands and Australia, many of them historical and some of them justified, but her desperation for the sinews of war – the oil, iron ore, tin and rubber of the 'Southern Resources Area'; had driven her to risk everything on one colossal gamble to overthrow the Western powers in the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia), Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore and Burma and seize these territories for herself. There was every reason to believe war was imminent. Hirohito had been briefed on 8 November on the Pearl Harbor attack plan and on 15 November he had been shown the full war plan.<sup>4</sup> Daily intelligence reports from an unimpeachable Japanese source had alerted Britain and the United States to the fact that Tokyo had set a deadline of the end of the month for a peaceful settlement of the many issues bedeviling Japan's relations with the West. America's top soldier, General George C. Marshall, and his naval equivalent, Admiral Harold R. Stark, had cabled United States forces in the Pacific to expect 'a surprise aggressive movement in any direction'. On 27 November, the Navy Department sent a further strongly worded cable to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander-in-chief of the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilisation of conditions in the Pacific have ceased *and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days*. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organisation of naval task forces indicates [*sic*] an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo'.<sup>5</sup> As the 'war warning' made no mention of Pearl Harbor, Admiral Kimmel regarded it as 'no more than saying that Japan was going to attack some place'. The 60-year-old commander was nobody's fool but over the preceding months Hawaii had become a fool's paradise in which inter-service rivalry, personality clashes and lack of resources had blunted the edge of the United States Army and Navy's preparedness, inadvertently pushing their country towards the greatest military disaster in its history – a disaster that could and should have been avoided. Chief among the leading players was the abrasive Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, head of the Navy's War Plans Department in Washington, who had drafted the war warning. 'Terrible Turner', as he was known, was a heavy drinker with an overbearing ego who would later become one of America's most successful fighting admirals of the Pacific War. He expected Kimmel to deploy his forces outside the confines of Pearl Harbor to meet any Japanese threat head-on. Kimmel, however, had sent his two aircraft carriers, USS *Enterprise* and

USS *Lexington*, to deliver navy fighter planes to United States bases at Wake and Midway islands, leaving his battleships without air cover at sea. Instead of setting sail, Kimmel had kept the fleet exactly where it was; tied up and immobile in harbour. The admiral was outspoken in his view that Pearl Harbor was simply too far away from Japan and too well defended to be in jeopardy. Never in his worst nightmare could he have dreamed that the Japanese High Command, defying every logical principle of warfare, was planning simultaneous attacks across no fewer than seven Pacific time zones, stretching from the northern beaches of Malaya to the very heart of Hawaii. Holding his First Fleet in reserve in the Inland Sea between the islands of Honshu and Kyushu, Admiral Yamamoto, commander-in-chief of the Imperial Combined Fleet, had ordered the Second Fleet; the one that had been spotted heading towards Indochina; to deliver the 25th Army to Malaya and Thailand, while the Third Fleet would take the 14th Army to the Philippines. The Fourth Fleet, still undetected, was the one that would attack Pearl Harbor and then take the 144th Infantry Regiment to occupy Guam, Wake Island and finally Rabaul in Australian-administered New Britain. Meanwhile, the Fifth Fleet would patrol the waters east of Japan to rebuff surprise enemy attacks and to keep an eye on Japan's traditional enemy, Russia. The Pearl Harbor Striking Force consisted of the six aircraft carriers of the First Air Fleet, two battleships *Hiei* and *Kirishima*, two heavy cruisers *Tone* and *Chikuma*, one light cruiser *Abukuma* and nine destroyers, plus three submarines and a refuelling fleet of seven tankers. Spearheading the attack were the flat-tops *Akagi* and *Kaga* (First Carrier Division; colour red), *Soryu* and *Hiryu* (Second Carrier Division; blue) and *Shokaku* and *Zuikaku* (Fifth Carrier Division; white).<sup>6</sup> Each carrier could deploy more than 70 aircraft comprising the Nakajima B5N2 high-level and torpedo-bomber (Allied codename; Kate;), the Aichi D3A1 dive-bomber (Val;), and the Mitsubishi A6M2 fighter (Zeke; but better known as the Zero; after its 00 fuselage markings). In addition to the blood-red Rising Sun roundel, every aircraft was painted with one or two stripes to identify its home carrier; thus planes from *Akagi* had a single red stripe; those from her sister ship *Kaga* two red stripes. No navy on earth had ever concentrated so many carriers into a single striking force capable of attacking its target with some 400 warplanes. Nagumo's target was the biggest prize in the Pacific: the United States Pacific Fleet wherever it might be found, either in Battleship Row; the two lines of dreadnoughts moored off Ford Island in the middle of the lochs that formed Pearl Harbor; or in Lahaina Roads off the island of Maui, or; if the task force had been detected (which Yamamoto thought quite likely); somewhere at sea waiting to give battle. With every mile the furrows in Admiral Nagumo's brow seemed to deepen at the immensity of his task. At 54, he suffered from arthritis, a legacy of the brutal physical punishment he had received as a *kendo* fencer in his younger days. He was also a chronic worrier. Tactical war games played at the Naval War College in Tokyo had shown that Japan could expect to lose two or three carriers in the Pearl Harbor attack and that worried him a great deal.<sup>7</sup> Nagumo's specialities were torpedo weapons and surface manoeuvres; he had limited expertise in naval aviation, the field that was absolutely crucial to the success of Operation Hawaii. Moreover, his archrival, Rear-Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi, commander of the Second Carrier Division, had vowed to kill him if the mission failed. As events would show, if there were a weak link in the Japanese chain of command, it was the commander of the First Air Fleet. Leaving his flag cabin; unheated like the rest of the ship to save fuel; Nagumo climbed the ladder to join Captain Kiichi Hasegawa on *Akagi*'s bridge, located in a heavily fortified portside island next to the flight deck. *Kido butai* was maintaining good formation despite high seas. Four fast destroyers scouted ahead for enemy ships, followed by the heavy cruisers *Tone* and *Chikuma*. Then came the six carriers in two parallel columns, with *Akagi* leading *Kaga* and *Shokaku* in the starboard column and *Soryu*, *Hiryu* and *Zuikaku* sailing to port, with more destroyers guarding both flanks. The supply train of oil tankers was slightly astern of the main body, while the two giant battleships *Hiei* and *Kirishima*, their pagodalike superstructures bristling with armaments and radio antennae, brought up the rear. Leaving nothing to chance, the Japanese had sent the liner *Taiyo Maru* to Hawaii on the same course across the; Vacant Sea; just beneath the Great Northern Circle, then south towards the Tropic of Cancer. Arriving at Honolulu on 1 November, the

captain reported to Yamamoto that he had seen no other ships en route, that conditions were favourable for refuelling at sea; and, crucially, that his ship had reached a point 320 kilometres north of Oahu before it sighted a single United States reconnaissance aircraft. Total surprise was essential to the success of Operation Hawaii, so transmission keys in the radio rooms of every ship had been sealed to prevent breaches of radio silence.<sup>8</sup> The striking force could receive instructions from Tokyo but communication between ships was by flag until daylight faded, at which time Nagumo brought his blacked-out vessels closer together and kept in touch by narrow-beamed blinker light. At times, the fog was so thick that searchlights momentarily pierced the gloom to avoid collisions. To mislead United States intelligence eavesdroppers in Washington, the Philippines and Commander Joseph Rochefort's Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, the carriers' call-signs had been transferred to other ships, which continued to broadcast from Japanese ports to give the impression that the aircraft carriers were still in home waters. Britain and the United States, however, had been furnished with numerous telltale clues to Japan's biggest wartime secret. They came not from the Imperial Navy itself but from the very heart of the *Gaimusho*, the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Just over a year earlier in August 1940 Lieutenant-Colonel William F. Friedman's team in the United States Signal Intelligence Service had succeeded in cracking the Japanese diplomatic machine cipher, known as Purple, after First-Lieutenant Frank B. Rowlett had actually duplicated one of the intricate enciphering machines. The cipher was called Purple after the colour of the folders in the Office of Naval Intelligence in which its decrypts were stored; Friedman had given the name 'Magic' to its decrypted material because he considered his staff to be magicians. Purple machines had been provided to the British and to General Douglas MacArthur's command in Manila, but not to Admiral Kimmel, who remained unaware of its existence. President Roosevelt and a restricted list of Cabinet members and key military commanders were soon plugged into signals intelligence derived from intercepted radio messages between Tokyo and Japan's diplomats in Washington, London, Berlin and Honolulu.<sup>9</sup> The diplomatic corps knew that Japan was preparing for war, although her armed forces had maintained strict secrecy about the timing of the first attacks and the designated targets. Even so, there was a rich harvest of material in the diplomatic traffic that, as we shall see, would have pointed to a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor if all of the clues had been pieced together in a timely fashion. Ironically, both Yamamoto and Nagumo were opposed to war with the United States. Nagumo made no bones about his doubts. 'The success of our surprise attack on Pearl Harbor,' he predicted, 'will prove to be the Waterloo of the war to follow.' Yamamoto, like Nagumo, had seen the industrial might of America at first hand. He told a reunion of schoolmates in September 1941:

It is a mistake to regard Americans as luxury-loving and weak. I can tell you that they are full of spirit, adventure, fight and justice. Remember that American industry is much more developed than ours and unlike us they have all the oil they want. Japan cannot vanquish the United States. Therefore we should not fight the United States. Oil, the fuel that drove the turbines of Japan's colossal war machine, was the determining factor in all of Japan's pre-war thinking and the chief motivator of her aggressive actions against the West. Lacking her own oilfields and suffering from an American embargo on petroleum imports, it was imperative that Japan find alternative sources of energy or watch her armed forces and her territorial ambitions wither on the vine. 'Without oil,' wrote Louis Morton, one of America's official war historians, 'Japan's pretensions to empire were just empty shadows.'<sup>10</sup> The last time Admiral Nagumo had met Yamamoto was when the commander-in-chief visited *Akagi* at the First Air Fleet's training base in Saeki Bay on Kyushu, the southernmost of Japan's four major islands. 'Although we hope to achieve surprise, everyone should be prepared for terrific American resistance,' Yamamoto told Nagumo, his staff and his two key airmen, the tactical mastermind Commander Minoru Genda<sup>11</sup> and the Hitler-loving airman Commander Mitsuo Fuchida.<sup>12</sup> 'Japan has faced many worthy opponents in her glorious history; Mongols, Chinese, Russians; but in this operation we will meet the strongest opponent of all.'<sup>13</sup> Nagumo, Genda and

Fuchida then joined the commander-in-chief in eating *surume* (dried cuttlefish) for happiness and *kachiguri* (walnuts) for victory. Glasses of *sake* were raised and the men toasted the emperor with shouts of *Banzai! Banzai! Banzai!*; <sup>14</sup> Five days later the task force gathered at its remote anchorage in the Kuriles, where Nagumo called a meeting of his ships' captains and executive officers in *Akagi's* wardroom. His audience listened transfixed as he uttered the historic, earth-shattering words, "Our mission is to attack Pearl Harbor." It was an electrifying moment and few of those present could prevent a gasp of excitement breaking from their lips. The plan was so bold, so outrageous, so *Japanese*. The attack was to take place on X-Day (8 December in Tokyo, 7 December in Hawaii); there were, however, several conditions: if the enemy sighted the entire task force at any time prior to X + 1 Day, then Nagumo would turn back to Japan. But if he and his staff believed the Americans had discovered only some of the Japanese ships, the task force would change course and proceed to the target. If, however, the enemy located the force on X-Day itself, or fired on them prior to that date, the Japanese would fight their way to within striking distance of the Pacific Fleet. Nagumo then addressed the men who would carry out the actual attack; the pilots, bombardiers and radio operators of the First Air Fleet. "This Empire is now going to war with an arrogant and predestined enemy," he said. "However difficult the situation you may face, don't lose your confidence in victory. Cope with it with calmness and composure. Is there anything, no matter how difficult it may be, that cannot be done by an intrepid spirit and a burning loyalty?" <sup>15</sup> ~ Despite their doubts about the outcome of war in the Pacific, Nagumo and Yamamoto were in agreement that the impending conflict had been predestined. Indeed, Yamamoto liked to tell young officers he had enlisted in the Imperial Navy so he could return the 1853 visit of Commodore Matthew C. Perry, the gruff American imperialist who was credited with forcing Japan out of her state of semi-seclusion and opening her ports to foreign trade. Perry had been a militant advocate of Manifest Destiny, the belief that his country had a God-given right to impose Anglo-Saxon leadership on the Asian races of the Pacific. <sup>16</sup> It was in pursuit of these ends that his little squadron had emerged through a curtain of sea-fog at 5 am on 8 July 1853 and entered Uraga Harbour, part of present-day Yokosuka, at the headwaters of what is now Tokyo Bay. Inside a rosewood casket in the commodore's cabin was a letter from the president of the United States, Millard Fillmore, requesting Japan to open her borders to American traders, mariners and missionaries. The letter was addressed to His August Majesty the Emperor of Japan; an understandable mistake considering America's ignorance of Japanese affairs. Although Japan had been a monarchy since the beginning of recorded history, the effective rulers for the past 250 years had not been the emperor (or mikado) but the shoguns of the Tokugawa clan, all of whom were implacably opposed to intercourse with the barbarian West. The main consequence of this policy was that the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century had bypassed Japan and she had been left suspended in a feudal time warp in which a rigid caste system determined the place of every Japanese man, woman and child. The *bushi* or nobility, consisting of the *daimyo* warlords and their two-sworded *samurai* warriors, were at the top of this hierarchical structure, then peasant farmers and artisans who provided food and shelter, then merchants who practised the despised trade of commerce. At the time of Perry's arrival, Emperor Komei was confined to the old imperial capital of Kyoto as an isolated and purely symbolic figure. The incumbent shogun, Yoshinobu Tokugawa, regarded Perry's uninvited presence as a violation of his country's sovereignty. Had he possessed modern weapons, he would probably have declared war on the United States that very day and blown Perry's ships out of the water. Perry was astonished and relieved to discover that the Japanese were still using primitive cannon modelled on those of the Portuguese galleons that had arrived 300 years earlier with the first European visitors to reach the shores of ancient Nippon (*ni* = land, *pon* = sun: the Land of the Rising Sun). Jesuit missionaries had followed in their wake and within a generation 150,000 Japanese had been converted to Catholicism. Following a revolt by Japanese Catholics in 1637 in which some 30,000 people were massacred, Shogun Ieyasu Tokugawa outlawed Christianity, expelled foreigners including all priests, and forbade the Japanese on pain of death to travel abroad. The only Westerners permitted to enter the waters of

the sacred Home Islands were the red-haired, blue-eyed barbarians from the Netherlands, who had sensibly left their missionaries at home (and who had assisted the shogunate in suppressing the uprising by bombarding Christian enclaves). To limit Dutch influence to an absolute minimum, the Japanese confined their tea-and-silk-trading activities to Deshima, a 1.2-hectare, artificial island off the south-western port of Nagasaki.<sup>17</sup> Shipwrecked seamen fared badly in Japanese hands; many were imprisoned or killed in accordance with the shogunate's desire to repel foreigners. In 1831, Captain Bourn Russell, an Englishman commanding the whaler *Lady Rowena* out of Sydney, sought refuge for his leaking ship in Hamanaka Bay on the east coast of Hokkaido, the northernmost island of Japan. When the inhabitants attempted to drive off the visitors, Russell burned down their fishing huts and took two prisoners, who were later released with a letter to the emperor explaining that the villagers had been punished for refusing help to a ship in distress and informing him of the racial superiority of Europeans.<sup>18</sup> In the years between Russell and Perry, emissaries from Britain, France, Russia and the United States had tried all manner of threats and blandishments to open Japan to Western trade, but the *daimyo*,<sup>19</sup> alarmed at the seizure of Hong Kong and the opening of 'treaty ports' on the Yangtze following Britain's victory over China in the 1840-42 Opium Wars, had maintained strict adherence to the traditional 'closed country' policy. Contrary to Perry's view of Japan as a primitive feudal society, the Japanese saw themselves as defenders of an Asian civilisation that had been perverted by the decadent Manchu rule of China and destroyed by Europeans, aided and abetted by their Chinese collaborators, the compradors. For nearly a millennium, the Japanese had adopted Chinese religion, culture, philosophy, writing and technology; they had now come to believe that Japan was the new Middle Kingdom. When Matthew Perry arrived on that summer's day in 1853, he gazed upon lush coastal plains with snow-topped Mount Fuji rising in the distance and must have licked his lips at the prospect of opening this rich land to American traders. For their part, the residents of Uraga, never having seen a steamship before, were startled to see clouds of black smoke pouring from the funnels of two of the American vessels, USS *Mississippi* and the commodore's flagship, USS *Susquehanna*. The steam-driven side-wheelers were towing two sloops-of-war, USS *Plymouth* and USS *Saratoga*, and were making good progress *against* the wind in defiance of the laws of nature. The Japanese thought the steamships were 'giant dragons puffing smoke' and called them 'the black ships (*korofune*) of evil mien'. Their misgivings about the visitors' intentions were confirmed when the *Susquehanna*'s decks were cleared and rows of cannon flanking the steam-driven paddlewheel were loaded and fired a 13-gun salute.<sup>20</sup> It was abundantly clear to Japanese commanders in the forts guarding the harbour entrance that the barbarians' armaments were vastly superior to their own ancient cannons. Though uninvited, Perry had been expected. While he was visiting Hong Kong, Shanghai and Okinawa on his way to Japan, the Dutch had warned the *bakufu*, the shogun's government at Edo, the sprawling capital that later became Tokyo, that an American fleet was on its way.<sup>21</sup> So while Perry's little squadron was anchoring in line of battle at five that afternoon, the nearest fort fired two guns as a prearranged signal to alert the *bakufu* that the Americans had indeed turned up. Orders were given to mobilise 20,000 cavalymen, long-swordsmen, archers with long bows, musketeers carrying antiquated smoothbores and spearmen with three-metre-long pikes to repel them. The United States ships were surrounded by Japanese guard boats packed with soldiers who attempted to scramble aboard. Perry ordered his bluejackets to hurl the boarders back into the sea.<sup>22</sup> Through a Dutch-speaking interpreter on one of the Japanese boats, Perry's aide-de-camp informed the Japanese that the commodore, a most important man with the highest rank in the United States Navy at that time, was carrying a letter from the president of the United States to the emperor of Japan; it would be delivered only to someone of imperial status. The *bakufu* were furious that the barbarians should make any demands at all, but that the leader of a country a mere 75 years old should address the Son of God as an equal was an enormous insult. The Japanese would have been ever more scandalised had they read Fillmore's letter, which began with the salutation, 'Great and good friend'; as though he were addressing one of his constituents. Lacking the means to destroy the American

ships, the *bakufu* sent courtesans to carouse with the invaders while they considered their next move; as historian Ian Buruma puts it, ‘The Americans had guns, the Japanese lifted their skirts.’<sup>23</sup> Perry was ordered to take the president’s letter to Nagasaki but he refused, knowing that would put him on the same level as the supplicant Dutch. Insisting he would deal only with an emissary from the emperor, he remained sequestered in his cabin, which the Japanese called ‘the abode of the high and mighty mysteriousness’. This policy paid off. On 12 July, a message from the *bakufu* informed Perry that a meeting had been arranged at the village of Kurihama, near modern Yokosuka, in two days’ time. Amid great pomp, including another 13-gun salute from the *Susquehanna*’s cannons, and flanked by two huge black American bodyguards and a detachment of United States marines, Perry stepped ashore at Kurihama to present President Fillmore’s letter in its rosewood box. The welcoming committee, however, was actually composed of retainers loyal to the shogun rather than Emperor Komei, while an assassination squad of ten *samurai* lurked unseen with orders to kill Perry at the first signs of treachery. Everything went according to plan; the Japanese plan; and the commodore sailed away after handing over his letter and announcing that he would return with ‘a much larger force’ the following year for the emperor’s reply. Perry duly reappeared eight months later with a larger squadron and sailed to within sight of Edo itself. The Japanese persuaded him to move some 70 kilometres west to Kanagawa, where he landed and presented the shogun’s representatives with gifts including an electric telegraph machine, books, maps and a three-quarter-sized steam locomotive and carriages. The Japanese, however, were not as backward as Perry seemed to think: they already knew all about the telegraph and locomotives from the *Illustrated London News*, to which the shogun was an enthusiastic subscriber. On 31 March 1854, Japan and the United States signed the Treaty of Kanagawa, which opened two ports to American ships, authorised the establishment of an American consulate, protected shipwrecked American seamen and gave American ships the right to buy coal in Japan. But it did not authorise trade as Perry had wished; that privilege was withheld for another four years, when the Treaty of Amity and Commerce was concluded by the first United States consul-general to Japan. Similar treaties with Britain, France, Russia and the Netherlands soon followed, all of which granted the Westerners one-sided economic and legal advantages in Japan and sought to limit Japan’s control over foreign trade in her own ports, exactly as they had done in China through similar gunboat diplomacy. The forcible opening of Japan’s borders sounded the death knell of the shogunate. Uniting behind the rallying cry ‘honour the emperor, expel the barbarians’ (*sonno joi*), two dissident *samurai* clans, the Satsuma and the Choshu, attempted to sabotage the treaty arrangements by murdering Westerners and closing the Straits of Shimonoseki to foreign vessels. Their rebellion collapsed in May 1864 when a punitive expedition of British, French, Dutch and American warships bombarded fortifications in the straits and landing parties destroyed Japanese shore batteries. The rebellious domains, however, were not finished. Following Emperor Komei’s suspicious death in 1867, the Tosa and Hizen clans joined Satsuma and Choshu in putting Komei’s 15-year-old son, Mutsuhito, on the Chrysanthemum Throne; in 1868, after a brief but bloody civil war against the shogun’s supporters, they declared him the new ruler of Japan. Mutsuhito’s reign was known as Meiji (‘Enlightened Rule’), while the process of restoring the country’s feudal fiefdoms to the emperor’s authority was called the Meiji Restoration. Edo, the capital of the Tokugawa shoguns, was renamed Tokyo (‘eastern capital’) and Meiji moved his court into the shogun’s old castle.<sup>24</sup> Progressive young statesmen, known collectively as the *Genro*, took control of the young emperor’s domains with the intention of creating a new Japanese state capable of competing with Western countries on equal economic and military terms. That the Japanese, a brave, industrious and resourceful people, achieved this goal in the first generation of the Meiji era rates as the most remarkable achievement of any country in modern times. To end the *samurai*’s traditional role, Meiji’s advisers reintroduced emperor worship, or *Kami no michi*: ‘the Way of the Gods’, which promoted the emperor to the status of deity. A number of hand-picked *samurai* were sent, first, to France for training in modern military methods, then to Germany following France’s defeat

in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Universal conscription was introduced in 1873 and an Army General Staff was set up in 1878 to mobilise Japan's martial elements into an effective fighting force. The most radical reform was the division into two entities of the Military Ministry, which had hitherto controlled both the army and the country's fledgling naval forces. This move went ahead despite the strenuous objections of the General Staff and led to a rupture in army-navy relations; the army was closely allied to the Choshu clans, so the new Navy Ministry gravitated towards Satsuma, the sea-going principality of Japan in southern Kyushu.<sup>25</sup> Internecine rivalry between the two services burst into the open in 1890 following the opening of the country's new legislature, the Imperial Diet, when the clans realised that the newly created democratic system would place control of state funding in civilian hands. Friction between the army and the navy and their civilian champions in the battle of the budgets became an integral part of the Japanese political system.<sup>26</sup> Recognising Britain's naval predominance, Japan invited the Royal Navy to train her cadets, decked them out in British-style uniforms and constructed a redbrick naval academy that would not have looked out of place at Dartmouth; indeed, the bricks had been made in England. Discipline was as severe as in England, possibly more so: cadets were brutalised with hard slaps to the face or punches to the body to enforce an attitude of unquestioning obedience to their officers.<sup>27</sup> Future naval leaders, such as the Japanese Nelson, Admiral Heihachiro Togo (1848-1934), were sent to England for advanced training, while the keels of great warships were laid down in British shipyards for the new navy that would defend Japan's meandering coastline. But it was to the American naval strategist Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) that the Japanese looked for strategic guidance. Mahan's seminal work on naval warfare, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, had been translated into Japanese soon after its publication in the United States in 1890 and became required reading for a generation of Japanese admirals. Taking the British Empire as his template, Mahan argued that sea power went hand in hand with economic advancement. The 'eminence of sea power', he said, depended on a nation's ability to control the sea lines of communication. It must concentrate its ships and firepower on the enemy's main fleet and force the issue of dominance in a decisive battle, as Nelson had done at the Nile (1798) and Trafalgar (1805). It was inevitable, Mahan added, that the expansion of the United States merchant fleet across the Pacific would bring her into conflict with other nations, probably Japan and possibly Britain. The dramatic process of transforming Japan from a reclusive feudal state into a modern industrialised power had fallen to a new industrial class, the *zaibatsu*, headed by family holding companies such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda and later Nissan.<sup>28</sup> Armed with the latest Western weapons, Japan exploded on to the Asian scene in the early 1890s when the founder of the modern Japanese Army, Count Aritomo Yamagata, warned the Meiji emperor 'no longer a mere boy but the charismatic and forceful leader of his people'; that the Trans-Siberian Railway, which was creeping across the Russian steppes towards the Pacific, posed the threat of Russian domination.<sup>29</sup> The ultimate aim of Tsar Nicholas II, a weak and vacillating autocrat who believed he was God's accomplice on earth, was to drive the British out of India, but in the short term he was content to increase his territorial stranglehold on ailing China (and enrich himself in the process through large personal investments in Manchuria). In 1894, Japan picked a fight with the Ching Dynasty over conflicting interests in Korea and sent an expeditionary force to the Asian mainland. It was the second time China had faced such a threat: in 1592, the Shogun Hideyoshi had invaded Korea in an attempt to take over the Chinese throne, but his forces had been beaten off, a defeat that had propelled Japan into her period of isolation. This time, to the great embarrassment of the Ching court, China's army and navy were easily defeated. Japan's sailors, assisted by rigorous training by the Royal Navy, had scored impressive victories; indeed, *The Times* was moved to comment after the decisive Battle of the Yalu, 'master and pupils have just reason to be proud of each other'.<sup>30</sup> Although the Sino-Japanese War was nominally about wresting control of Korea from China, Tokyo's real purpose was to prevent further Russian encroachment into Manchuria. Once China had been defeated, Japan could then join the 'eagles'; Mahan's epithet for the Western powers; in devouring the Chinese 'carcass'. Hostilities ended

in the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895 in which Japan gained control of Formosa and the Liaotung Peninsula of Manchuria. Her grievances against the West began when France, Germany and Russia intervened to deny her the fruits of victory. She was forced to give up Liaotung, including the strategic ice-free anchorage at Port Arthur (now Lushun), which Russia then sequestered as a haven for her Pacific Fleet and a terminus for the Trans-Siberian Railway, thus looping much of Manchuria on to the Russian Empire. Japan was rightly incensed but Meiji, counselled by Britain and the United States to adopt a conciliatory attitude, exhorted his subjects to 'endure the unendurable' and accept this humiliating reverse. Despite this enormous setback, the Imperial Japanese Navy had emerged from the war as a powerful and respected force, a vital defender of the country's security. Henceforth, the navy's needs became paramount; to the army's dismay, much of the large war indemnity paid by China was invested in new warships. Meanwhile, the forces of Manifest Destiny had presented the United States with a Pacific empire of her own; celebrated in the supremacist poem, 'The White Man's Burden'; by Rudyard Kipling; after she acquired the Philippines and Guam in the Spanish-American War of 1898. No one welcomed America's presence in the Western Pacific more than the Australian colonies, which had very few military resources of their own. Disconcerted at Japan's sudden emergence as a militarised nation, Australians saw the possibility of an Anglo-American alliance as one of the mainstays of their security. The Americans, however, had other ideas: their objective in the East was to impose an 'Open Door' policy on China to enable United States merchants to seize a greater share of the lucrative Chinese trade. Their main rivals in that regard were not the Japanese but the British, who enjoyed control of the Yangtze River system and its fabulously wealthy port of Shanghai.<sup>31</sup> The 'Japanese question' arose the following year when the United States annexed Hawaii after Captain Mahan and other American imperialists urged Washington to intervene before the Japanese, who already made up 40 per cent of the population, overran that strategic island chain. When Hawaii's predominantly white rulers banned further Japanese immigration, Tokyo dispatched the battle cruiser *Naniwa* to Honolulu to protect the rights of its citizens.<sup>32</sup> Instead of stabilising the situation, the presence of a Japanese warship in Hawaiian waters merely gave credibility to the annexationist case. Japan's first chance to achieve parity with the great powers arrived with the new century when the Boxer Rising of 1900 threatened the annihilation of all 'foreign devils' in China. 'All nations,' the Australian writer Banjo Paterson observed during a visit, 'sent troops to China to take up the white man's burden and, incidentally, any of the yellow man's concessions that might be lying about.' Japan dispatched a force of 10,000 troops; the largest of any nation; to join the international rescue mission, which stormed the walls of Peking and ended the 55-day siege of the legations. According to one of the besieged, the *Times* correspondent G. E. 'Chinese' Morrison, 'The Japanese did more fighting and killed more men than anybody else because they did not worry their heads as to what the Chinese would think of them.' At the end of the siege, he had seen Japanese soldiers charge, laughing and cheering, on to a bridge that was swept with rifle-fire. 'They ran up to a gate and laid mines against it,' he said, 'and were shot down, man after man, till at last they blew it down. They'll be tough gentlemen to tackle in a war.'<sup>33</sup> In the Boxer Protocol of the following year, Japan gained the same rights as Western nations to station troops permanently in Peking and Shanghai to protect Japanese diplomats and nationals. Japan then avenged Russia's perfidy by crushing the Tsar's Imperial Army and sinking two of his navies in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, probably the most popular victory of the period in both the East and the West. The Japanese emulated the European powers; and the United States; in dispensing with a formal declaration of war. Hostilities began when Admiral Togo, hero of the Battle of the Yalu, launched a sneak torpedo attack on the Russian Pacific Fleet at Port Arthur.<sup>34</sup> The rotating signal of the harbour lighthouse informed Togo's destroyers that they had found their target. Sixteen torpedoes carved through the freezing, mist-shrouded waters, seriously damaging two Russian battleships and an armed cruiser. There were no outraged howls from Washington; indeed, American newspapers heaped praise on

Togo's ingenuity, with the *New York Times* leading the pack in saluting the prompt, enterprising and gallant feat of the Japanese. Tsar Nicholas, who had referred to the Japanese as 'monkeys'; ever since an attack on his royal person when, as Crown Prince, he had visited Tokyo, dispatched 38 ships of his Baltic Fleet halfway around the world to engage the enemy. At one point, the ships completely disappeared. After they had been missing for several weeks, W. H. Donald, an Australian reporter working for the *China Mail* in Hong Kong, travelled south in search of them. Through some clever detective work, he located the Russians enjoying a welcome respite in Camranh Bay in French Indochina; the sympathetic French had secretly allowed the Russian admiral's bedraggled fleet to limp into port to recover from its arduous voyage before facing the Japanese in battle. Donald's scoop was published around the world. On 28 May 1905, the Russian fleet arrived in the Tsushima Straits between Korea and Japan, where Togo won a resounding victory in what became known as the 'Trafalgar of the East'. Togo's flagship *Mikasa*, a pre-dreadnought battleship of 15,000 tons, had been built by Vickers at Barrow-in-Furness and, given his English training, it was little wonder that Signal Z, the message he flashed to his fleet prior to the battle, had heavy overtones of Nelson's 'England expects' exhortation at Trafalgar: 'ON THIS ONE BATTLE RESTS THE FATE OF OUR NATION. LET EVERY MAN DO HIS UTMOST.' The Russian fleet was almost annihilated: 21 ships out of 38 were sunk and seven captured for the loss of just three torpedo boats. Once again, Britain raised her hat to the 'plucky little Japs' for their success in vanquishing the wicked Russians. One of the wounded aboard the cruiser *Nisshin* during the Battle of Tsushima was Isoroku Takano, a 21-year-old ensign, who lost the middle and index fingers of his left hand in an explosion. Popular myth has it that Isoroku served in Togo's flagship and that he had been hit by shrapnel from a Russian shell. Less romantically, one of *Nisshin's* heavy guns had burst after overheating, showering his battle station with red-hot debris.<sup>35</sup> Eleven years later in 1916 when he was one of the rising stars of the Imperial Navy, Takano changed his surname to Yamamoto after Admiral Gonbei Yamamoto, Togo's chief of staff at Tsushima, had begged him to continue his family's venerable line.<sup>36</sup> The Russo-Japanese War was the first modern conflict in which weapons of mass destruction were employed on the battlefield. Mukden fell after a 12-day battle in which almost half the Russian force of 380,000 were killed, wounded or captured. At that point, President Theodore 'Teddy' Roosevelt of the United States, fearful that Japan might become 'puffed up with pride and turn against us', offered his services as mediator to end the conflict. With Russia humiliated on the battlefield and Japan crippled by debt (largely to American creditors), peace talks were scheduled for Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Meanwhile, fighting continued in north-eastern Korea, with Japanese troops threatening Vladivostok, while others occupied Sakhalin Island, off Siberia, and the mouth of the River Amur on the Russian border.<sup>37</sup> The first peace-making skirmishes between representatives of the two belligerent nations; Russia's Count de Witte and Japan's Baron Jutarō Komura; took place in New York, where the Russians operated from the St Regis Hotel and the Japanese from the Waldorf Astoria. The urbane Witte quickly won the public relations battle with the world's press by giving interviews and posing for photographs, while Komura, quiet, dignified and silent, went unnoticed in the background. The result was stalemate until Roosevelt exerted pressure on Komura to drop his demand for reparations. Instead, Russia agreed to recognise Japanese control of Korea (as a preliminary step towards annexation as a colony five years later) and transferred to Japan the Kwantung Leased Territory on the Liaotung Peninsula, including Port Arthur and the Southern Manchurian Railway. Japan also retained the sparsely populated southern half of Sakhalin Island (later discovered to be rich in oil and natural gas). Both countries agreed to restore Manchuria to Chinese sovereignty and to evacuate their forces, although Japan was permitted to retain some troops to guard her rail network.<sup>38</sup> Teddy Roosevelt's skilful handling of the negotiations was rewarded with the Nobel Peace Prize, but the United States was soon at odds with an aggrieved Japanese public who felt they had been cheated out of the spoils of war for a second time. The Japanese press blamed Roosevelt. There were riots in Tokyo's Hibiya Park in which a thousand people were killed or injured. The

office of the only pro-treaty newspaper in Tokyo was burned down. The government declared martial law and pushed the blame on to the United States. Meanwhile, America's racist Yellow Press characterised Japanese immigrants as 'immoral, intemperate and quarrelsome men bound to labor for a pittance'. In the fiery aftermath of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, the Japanese were accused of looting and committing acts of violence against American women. Reacting to popular demand, the San Francisco Board of Education ordered the segregation of Japanese children in its schools. When anti-American demonstrations broke out in Japan, Roosevelt persuaded the city fathers to relent in exchange for a gentlemen's agreement that Japan would slow down the rate of emigration to the United States.<sup>39</sup> Still fearful that a militant Japan could pose a threat to American ambitions in the East, Roosevelt ordered his Great White Fleet of 16 battleships to make a flag-waving voyage around the world with the express purpose of showing the Japanese that the United States possessed the most powerful navy in the Pacific. In August 1908, the gilded bows of the white-hulled battleships passed through the Heads and entered Sydney Harbour. Many Australians saw the fleet, commanded by the elegant Rear-Admiral Charles S. Sperry, as a deterrent against the 'Yellow Peril' and thousands turned out to welcome what the American press had termed 'Uncle Sam's greatest show on earth'. The premier of New South Wales, Charles Wade, was moved to declare that Australia regarded the United States as her natural ally in the coming struggle against Japanese domination. The visit was notably good-humoured. One United States sailor was found asleep on a bench in the Domain with a sign above his head: 'YES, I AM DELIGHTED WITH THE AUSTRALIAN PEOPLE. YES, I THINK YOUR PARK IS THE FINEST IN THE WORLD. I AM VERY TIRED AND WOULD LIKE TO GO TO SLEEP.'

<sup>40</sup> On 18 October, in a scene reminiscent of Perry's visit, the American fleet hove to off Yokohama. Resplendent in cocked hat, double-breasted jacket and gold-striped trousers, Admiral Sperry was piped aboard Admiral Togo's flagship *Mikasa*. Suddenly, a group of Japanese naval cadets pounced on him and, to rousing cries of 'Banzai!', tossed the grand old seadog into the air, sending his white hair and gold epaulettes flying. Togo assured the visitor that this little ritual signified great respect and, to assuage Sperry's injured pride, entertained him to a sumptuous champagne party in the Shinjuku Imperial Gardens. Although the American sailors were feted, the tension between Japan and the United States had not abated. At the United States Naval War College, students created a war scenario in which the United States (colour: Blue) would fight Japan (colour: Orange).<sup>41</sup> The result was War Plan Orange, a comprehensive scheme to defeat the Imperial Navy for control of the Pacific in the event of war. In Tokyo, Japanese officers who had eagerly devoured Mahan's doctrinaire strategies simply reversed this thinking and made the United States their 'hypothetical enemy number one'. If war broke out between the two countries, the Japanese plan was to lure the United States Pacific Fleet into a decisive battle – the Great All-out Battle; in waters close to the Home Islands, where Japan would inflict a crushing defeat similar to Tsushima.<sup>42</sup> Britain had recognised Japan's regional importance in 1902 by signing an Anglo-Japanese military alliance and renewing it in 1905 and again in 1911. The treaty was an admission that the Royal Navy could no longer police the globe. *Pax Britannica*, which had ruled the waves since Trafalgar, was in decline and the British would shortly need all of their naval resources to counter the challenge of the German High Seas Fleet in Europe. During World War I, the treaty enabled Britain to withdraw five battleships based on China Station at Hong Kong, while Japanese cruisers and destroyers took their place to defend the colony against German raiders. With British help, Japan also seized the showpiece resort of Tsingtao, the Kaiser's 'place in the sun' on the Chinese coast, and occupied the rest of Germany's leased territory in Shantung. The Japanese Navy implemented its 'southward advance' strategy for the first time when it occupied Germany's colonies in Micronesia: the Marshall, Mariana, Caroline and Palau islands. At the Paris Peace Conference, Japan was granted these islands as mandated territories (as opposed to colonies), but the Western nations refused her demands for greater territorial gains in China and rejected a clause endorsing racial equality in the League of Nations charter. There was further cause for bitterness at the Washington Naval Conference of 1921–22 when the Anglo-Japanese

Alliance was peremptorily scrapped to enable Britain to form closer links with the United States. Australia and New Zealand had seen the treaty as a guarantee of stability in the Pacific and, although they welcomed closer ties with America, protested against its abrogation but to no avail. The blow to Japan's self-esteem was enormous. In the words of a former Japanese foreign minister, the treaty had been discarded 'like an old pair of sandals'. Australia was then a small Anglo-Celtic nation of just five million people living on the rim of an island continent the same size as the United States. She was desperate for new settlers to open up the interior, but the 'White Australia' policy, enforced since Federation in 1901, firmly excluded Japanese immigrants. The Australian prime minister, Billy Hughes, warned his countrymen about the dangers of an expansionist Japan, which he described as 'a nation of nearly 70 million people crowded together on the margin of subsistence'. 'She wants both room for her increasing millions of population and markets for her manufactured goods,' he said. 'And she wants these very badly indeed. America and Australia say to her millions, "Ye cannot enter in." Japan, then, is faced with the great problem which has bred wars since time began. For when the tribes and nations of the past outgrew the resources of their own territory they moved on and on, hacking their way to the fertile pastures of their neighbours.'

43 General Kiokatu Sato expressed the widely held Japanese view that Japan and the United States would eventually come to blows. 'We fought China for Korea. We fought Russia for Manchuria. The circumstances will oblige us to fight America,' he wrote. 'The war between Japan and the United States is the inevitable fate of our nation. The fury rises in our hearts.'

44 ~ 2 ~ JAPANESE JINGO On Christmas Day 1926, Hirohito ascended the Chrysanthemum Throne following the death of his sickly father, the Taisho emperor, to serve as Japan's 124th god-emperor. His rule was called Showa, or Enlightened Peace, but for Japan these were anything but enlightened or peaceful times. The modest democratic gains made by constitutional liberals during the 1920s were soon swept aside on a tidal wave of virulent nationalism. Murder for political ends became commonplace, the victims including no fewer than six prime ministers; the ballot box had been replaced by 'government by assassination'. 'There has been for a long time in Japan,' British Prime Minister Winston Churchill later commented, 'a number of military societies & secret societies which have asserted their view of what the policy of Japan should be by murdering the ministers who they thought were not sufficiently jingo' for their tastes.

1 This jingo faction & militarists associated with the Japanese Army, imperialists among the *zaibatsu*, extremists in the Black Dragon Society and totalitarian members of the Imperial Diet & was determined to wage war to achieve its territorial ambitions. As a first step in national indoctrination, it extolled the Showa monarchy as a revival of the triumphant Meiji era. From the moment of Hirohito's enthronement, the animist beliefs of Shinto were directed towards a full-blooded form of emperor worship, with the intention of instilling blind obedience in the Japanese people. The slight, bespectacled emperor, dressed in military uniform and riding one of his imperial greys, was presented to the public as the virile commander-in-chief of the armed forces. There was much the 25-year-old monarch admired about the West, particularly Britain. He had been presented with the Order of the Bath by George V at Buckingham Palace during a visit to the United Kingdom in 1921. He had played golf with the Prince of Wales (later Edward VIII) and retained a passion for bacon-and-egg breakfasts long after Britain had become one of Japan's principal enemies. Having served as regent for five years prior to his father's demise, he knew all about the martial overtones and sporadic outbreaks of patriotic violence that characterised Japanese politics. 'Nineteen-thirty was the time when Japan entered what might be called her convulsive period of history,' Marquis Kido, Keeper of the Privy Seal, told post-war documentary makers who went in search of Japan's path to war. 'The influence of the ultranationalist group and such incidents as the Young Officers' Revolt of 15 May placed Japan step by step under the power of the military.'

2 As the Son of Heaven, Hirohito was the guiding light of Japan's imperial destiny, rather than a passive figurehead like his poor, enfeebled father. 3 He saw the army and the navy as the instruments through which Japan would ultimately have to achieve her territorial

ambitions should diplomacy, never Japan's strongest point, produce its usual meagre results. Following the collapse of the Japanese economy in the Great Depression, Hirohito and his Cabinet looked to China for a solution to the country's ills. They had watched events on the mainland with mounting concern ever since the Kuomintang leader, Chiang Kai-shek, had set up a Nationalist government in Nanking (Nanjing) in 1928. Chiang, a protégé of the Kuomintang's founder Sun Yat-sen, had studied at the Tokyo Military Academy in 1907 and had even served in the 13th Field Artillery Regiment of the Imperial Japanese Army. He had subsequently fallen into the hands of the Russians, who had taken him to Moscow and indoctrinated him in Bolshevik ideology, turning him into a fully fledged anti-foreigner, anti-Christian revolutionary. Placed in command of the Kuomintang by a coup engineered by his Soviet masters, he had then broken away from Moscow, machine-gunned many of his Shanghai comrades and promoted the Nationalist cause as a 'bulwark against Bolshevism'.<sup>4</sup> Spurning Japanese attempts at coercion, Generalissimo Chiang opted to rule the world's most populous nation through a series of loose coalitions with feuding governors and provincial warlords. When it appeared that he might be making headway in unifying the country's warring factions, the Japanese feared they would lose their hard-fought position in Manchuria to the twin evils of Chinese Nationalism and Russian Bolshevism. Jingoist officers inside the Kwantung Army decided to take matters into their own hands. On 18 September 1931, a Japanese officer set off a small explosion beside the Japanese-owned Southern Manchurian Railway line north of Mukden, scene of the great victory against the Russians in 1905. The blast occurred between 10 and 10.30 pm, but damage was so slight that the south-bound train from Changchun arrived in Mukden on time. The 'Manchurian Incident' was blamed on Chinese saboteurs and provided the Army General Staff with a pretext for the occupation of the three rich Manchurian provinces. Later that night, units of the Kwantung Army attacked Peitaying Barracks, where 10,000 Chinese soldiers of the 7th Brigade were stationed. The Chinese commander had given instructions that special care was to be taken to avoid any clash with Japanese troops, so sentries at the barrack walls had been armed with dummy rifles.<sup>5</sup> As the Japanese stormed through the front gates, the Chinese made a hasty exit through the rear. The following day Mukden and Changchun were bombed by Japanese warplanes from Korea, and Mukden was occupied by Japanese soldiers. None of these actions had been authorised by the Imperial Diet or the government, but they were wildly popular with the masses and received the blessing of Hirohito and his Cabinet. The United States Minister to China, the well-informed, Mandarin-speaking Nelson T. Johnson, reported to Washington:

I am driven to the conclusion that the forceful occupation of all strategic points in South Manchuria is an aggressive act by Japan apparently long planned and when decided upon most carefully and systematically put into effect. I find no evidence that these events were the result of accident nor were they the acts of minor and irresponsible officials.<sup>6</sup> The Chinese reacted by boycotting Japanese goods. In a few months, the godowns in the vast port of Shanghai on the mud flats of the Whangpoo River were bursting with unsold Japanese products. One of the officers at the Chinese Maritime Customs Service was Thomas Macauley, a red-headed Ulsterman and former member of the Royal Army Medical Corps who lived with his Cantonese wife, Ling-ying Lee, and four young children on the third floor of the Ramus apartment building in Hongkew across Garden Bridge from the Bund.<sup>7</sup> 'Our home was at a crossroads opposite Japanese Naval Headquarters and we used to watch Japanese marines at bayonet practice,' his son William 'Bill' Macauley says. 'They would invite my two brothers and me in for green tea and would even pose for photographs with us in front of their little armoured cars.'<sup>8</sup> Bill Macauley was a pupil at Thomas Hanbury School for Boys in Haskell Street under the reproachful eye of a matronly spinster, Miss Fiddes. Foreigners like Miss Fiddes and her multinational brood felt secure; there were British troops to protect British citizens in the International Settlement, French troops to protect the adjoining French Concession and United States marines to look after Americans. These peaceful times ended violently when the Kwantung Army decided to foment an 'incident' in Shanghai in order to distract attention from the takeover of Manchuria and, at the same time, break the anti-Japanese boycott.

The Japanese stationed an ancient artillery piece at the front entrance to Naval Headquarters, Bill Macauley says. They said there was going to be trouble and warned us to stay away. Shortly afterwards, the Japanese military attaché at the Japanese Consulate, Major Ryukichi Tanaka, hired Chinese thugs to beat up five Japanese monks and novices, one of whom later died of his injuries. At Tanaka's instigation, 2000 Japanese residents of Shanghai held a protest rally at which they called on their government to send military units to protect them from the Chinese. The Japanese mob then rampaged through the streets, attacking Chinese citizens and destroying Chinese shops, with the intention of provoking a backlash.<sup>9</sup> Three days later, on the weekend of 23-24 January 1932, an ominous Japanese task force of two aircraft carriers, a cruiser and four destroyers, commanded by Admiral Koichi Shiozawa, dropped anchor in the Yangtze downstream from Shanghai. Fearing a naval bombardment, the city's mayor, Wu Tiecheng, took the overnight train to Nanking to consult with the Kuomintang. He was accompanied by the Nationalists' Australian-born adviser (and former newspaper reporter), the mysterious and influential W. H. Donald. At that time, Chiang was involved in a power struggle with his main Nationalist rival, Wang Ching-wei, and he declined to get involved in Shanghai's problems. The city's defences were left in the hands of the 19th Route Army, a 30,000-strong Cantonese outfit, commanded by General Tsai Ting-kai, which had inadvertently turned up in the Shanghai suburb of Chapei in search of back pay and possible loot.<sup>10</sup> Under the circumstances, Donald advised Mayor Wu to accede to Japanese demands. Indeed, on returning to Shanghai, Wu apologised to the Japanese and promised that the assailants of the Japanese holy men would be punished, anti-Japanese societies would be disbanded and an anti-Japanese newspaper that had crowed over a recent assassination attempt on Hirohito would be suppressed. The Japanese, however, had no intention of accepting these assurances. On 28 January, Admiral Shiozawa told Hallett Abend, the *New York Times* correspondent, over drinks in his flagship that the mayor's acceptance of Japanese terms was 'beside the point'; he still intended to occupy Chapei to demonstrate Japan's supremacy.<sup>11</sup> There was a garrison of 2000 Imperial Marines in Hongkew and 1200 reinforcements in the Japanese warships. At 11.15 that night, a detachment of 400 Japanese bluejackets attacked Chapei. Armoured cars with searchlights led the way into the Chinese borough, followed by trucks packed with infantry. Shiozawa was not expecting any organised resistance, but many of General Tsai's men had taken up positions on top of walls and in the upstairs rooms of buildings. As Japanese patrols approached North Station in the heart of Chapei, Chinese marksmen and machine-gunners opened fire. Several hundred bluejackets were caught in the crossfire and mown down.<sup>12</sup> At the sound of gunfire, Westerners in evening dress poured out of the fashionable hotels and restaurants of the International Settlement and took taxis to the battlefield, where they stood around smoking, drinking and urging the Japanese marines 'to teach the cocky Chinese a lesson'. They cheered Japanese reinforcements, who roared down side streets on motorbikes, with machine-gunners in their sidecars firing at anything that moved. When the shooting started, W. H. Donald had been in bed at the Astor House Hotel on the north bank of Soochow Creek. He held the receiver of his telephone out of his bedroom window to convince a disbelieving Mayor Wu that his peace-keeping efforts had been in vain. The Chinese fought back, Bill Macauley says. Chinese snipers got on to the roof of our building and started shooting at the Japanese, who surrounded the building and stormed into our apartment with fixed bayonets. They searched the five-storey block from top to bottom, but all they found were empty cartridges on the roof. That was my first experience of Japanese anger and I was absolutely petrified. General Tsai's troops outnumbered the Japanese marines ten to one and were winning a decisive victory until Admiral Shiozawa ordered planes from his carriers to bomb Chapei. Many innocent people were killed or wounded in Japan's first air attack on a predominantly civilian target. The task force's guns then bombarded the heavily defended Woosung forts 26 kilometres downstream at the confluence of the Whangpoo and the Yangtze. Two British cruisers were sent racing from Singapore to Shanghai; artillery and infantry were ordered up from Hong Kong; French troops barricaded their concession against the Japanese. Nevertheless, Shiozawa's warships forced a passage up the

Whangpoo and their salvos; the first of World War II; reverberated over the rooftops of the International Settlement. Washington was drawn into the conflict when a squad of United States marines stormed Japanese cotton mills in the American sector and seized signalling equipment that was being used to direct Japanese gunfire on to civilian targets. General Tsai's men were forced to retreat after the Japanese Army, much to the navy's embarrassment, diverted 20,000 regular troops from Manchuria to save the bluejackets from extinction. Tokyo then dispatched Vice-Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura to Shanghai to replace Shiozawa as commander of the Japanese fleet. Tall (1.83 metres), grey-haired and distinguished, Nomura had served as naval attaché in Washington and had many American friends. His arrival at Shanghai was quite a social occasion: British and American naval officers accepted his invitations to tea, Western newsmen sought interviews and he made a little speech in the fractured English that was to become a feature of Japan's pre-war diplomacy. Nomura's command did not last long. On the morning of 29 April, he attended a military review at Hongkew Park in honour of the emperor's birthday. After battalions of Japanese infantry had goose-stepped across the parade ground, a Korean patriot rushed past guards and lobbed a bomb into the midst of the Japanese dignitaries. Nomura lost his right eye, suffered damage to his leg and was partially deafened by the blast.

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## **How Australia and her allies defeated the Japanese.**

*Pearl Harbor; The Fall of Singapore; Curtin's Fight With Churchill; The Bombing Of Darwin; POW Camps; The Battle of Midway; Kokoda; Buna; Kamikaze Pilots; Hiroshima...* These words alone are enough to convey the terror, courage and drama of the Pacific War, when the balance of power stood on a knife-edge and when the future of Australia was on the brink - threatened by Japanese aggression on the one hand and British deception on the other. After a conflict that took an unimaginable number of lives and ended with the unleashing of the most powerful weapon the world had ever seen, the Allies emerged victorious. Australia, however, was criticised by Churchill and his generals for showing cowardice in the face of the enemy and for not caring about the fate of other nations. The endorsement of these claims by several military historians today shows that the smear has not gone away. Until now. Peter Thompson presents, for the first time, an account of the conflict that places Australian voices and action at the heart of the struggle. Based on exclusive interviews with eyewitnesses and written with all the pace and verve you would expect of a master storyteller, *Pacific Fury* brings the people and the battles to life in a sensational history not to be bettered in a generation.

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Renaissance Man Jason Lape slayed the snorkel brief - Buy *Pacific Fury* by Peter Thompson (9781741667141) from Boomerang Books, Australia's Online Independent Bookstore. *Pacific Fury* (Guadalcanal, 1942) - East Bay Historical Miniature Wargamers and Book Club.. products: 2nd Edition Brigade Fire and Fury Regimental Fire and Fury Battlefront WWII... NHMGS is an organization of historical miniature gamers located in the Pacific Northwest. *Pacific Fury : How Australia and Her Allies Defeated the - ...* about A court of mist and fury, A court of wings and ruin and Sarah j maas books.. She studied Acting at the Pacific Conservatory of the Performing Arts in

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