

21st Century U.S. Military Manuals: The Targeting Process - Field Manual 3-60 - Principles and Philosophy, Dynamic Targeting (Professional Format Series)

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Field Manual 3-60

(FM 6-20-10)

NOVEMBER 2010

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Headquarters, Department of the Army

Purpose

This publication (Field Manual [FM] 3-60, The Targeting Process) describes the targeting process used by the United States Army. The FM 3-60 is descriptive and not prescriptive in nature. This manual has applicability in any theater of operations. The manual offers considerations for commanders and staffers in preparing for challenges with targeting, yet it is flexible enough to adapt to dynamic situation. FM 3-60 replaces FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process.

The development and research of FM 3-60 parallels similar ongoing efforts by other Army proponents to develop their own supporting branch doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures for the division, support brigades, brigade combat teams, and subordinate elements.

Administrative Information

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The United States Army Training and Doctrine Command is the proponent for this publication.

Introduction

Scope

Field Manual (FM) 3-60, The Targeting Process consists of five chapters and eight appendices to describe the Army's targeting process. Each chapter and appendix addresses how the decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) methodology enhances the targeting process. The D3A is a

methodology which optimizes the integration and synchronization of maneuver, fire support, and intelligence from task force to corps level operations. The D3A is described without tying it to specific hardware that will eventually become dated. The Army's targeting process consists of time tested techniques organized in a systematic framework.

The FM 3-60 addresses how D3A methodology interfaces with the joint targeting cycle, military decisionmaking process (MDMP), and operations process. The joint targeting fundamental principles and doctrinal guidance are also presented in this publication.

Successful targeting requires that the leadership team and their staff possess an understanding of the functions associated with the targeting process. The FM 3-60 builds on the collective knowledge, experience gained through recent operations, and numerous exercises. The manual is rooted in time tested principles and fundamentals, while accommodating force design, new technologies, and diverse threats to national security.

The targeting process is challenging. The challenge includes locating, identifying, classifying, tracking, and attacking targets and assessing battle damage with limited assets and weapon systems, which makes this process complicated. The process becomes even more difficult with long range and fast moving targets. It is even more complex at division and higher echelons with more decisionmakers, acquisitions, surveillance assets, and weapon systems. This challenge is particularly true when joint and combined assets are included. The competition for assets is intense. Many intelligence systems are capable of situation development, target acquisition, and battle damage assessment (BDA), but may not be able to do all at the same time. Detailed guidance, thorough planning, and disciplined execution prevent unnecessary redundancy and make the most of available combat power.

Chapter 1 begins with the basics and introduction to targeting.

Chapter 2 describes the Army's targeting process in detail.

Chapter 3 addresses targeting at the corps and division level.

Chapter 4 addresses targeting at the brigade combat team and battalion level.

Appendix A describes the joint dynamic targeting process.

Appendix B describes a method for targeting high-value individuals (HVI).

Appendix C describes the targeting support available from national agencies.

Appendix D provides examples of targeting products applicable to the operations process.

Appendix E provides a targeting checklist.

Appendix F provides a targeting working group standard/standing operating procedure.

Appendix G provides information on the common datum.

Appendix H explains the target numbering system for targeting.

Chapter 1

Targeting Principles and Philosophy

According to joint publication (JP) 3-60, a target is an entity or object considered for possible engagement or other action. Targets also include the wide array of mobile and stationary forces, equipment, capabilities, and functions that an enemy commander can use to conduct operations. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). The emphasis of targeting is on identifying resources (targets) the enemy can least afford to lose or that provide him with the greatest advantage, then further identifying the subset of those targets which must be acquired and attacked to achieve friendly success. Denying these resources to the enemy makes him vulnerable to friendly battle plans. These resources constitute critical enemy vulnerabilities. Successful targeting enables the commander to synchronize intelligence, maneuver, fire support systems, nonlethal systems, and special operations forces by attacking the right target with the best system at the right time. Targeting is a complex and multidiscipline effort that requires coordinated interaction among many command functions. These command functions in collaboration are referred to as the targeting working group and include, but are not limited to, the fires, intelligence, current operations, future operations, and plans cells. Representatives from these cells are essential to a comprehensive targeting process. Other members of the staff may help them in the planning and execution phases of targeting. Close coordination among all cells is crucial for a successful targeting effort. Sensors and collection capabilities under the control of external agencies must be closely coordinated for efficient and quick reporting of fleeting or dangerous targets. In addition, the appropriate means and munitions must attack the vulnerabilities of different types of targets.

Doctrinal Basis

1-1. The Army will not operate alone in the uncertain, ambiguous security environment described in JP 3-0, JP 3-60, and field manual (FM) 3-0. Operations involving Army forces will frequently participate in joint operations. The overarching operational level considerations are for the joint force commander (JFC) to synchronize the action of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces to achieve strategic and operational objectives through integrated, joint campaign and major operations. The JFC seeks to win decisively and quickly and with minimum casualties and minimal collateral damage. The application of scalable fires is essential in defeating the enemy's ability and will to fight. The JFC uses a variety of means to divert, limit, disrupt, delay, damage, or destroy the enemy's air, surface, and subsurface military potential throughout the joint operational area. The specific criteria of the above terms must be established by the commander and well understood by targeting working group members. Conflicts will be dominated by high technology equipment and weapons and fought over extended distances by highly integrated joint and combined task forces. The characteristics of the future battlefield will challenge the joint force and Service component commanders' ability to efficiently and effectively employ limited numbers of sophisticated acquisition and weapon systems against a diverse target array with efficiently and effectively.

1-2. Targeting is a critical process of the fires warfighting function. The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires and joint fires through the targeting process (FM 3-0) It includes tasks associated with integrating and synchronizing the effects of the types of fires with the effects of other warfighting functions. Commanders integrate these tasks into the concept of operations during planning and adjust them based on the targeting guidance. Fires normally contribute to the overall effect of maneuver, but commanders may use them separately for decisive and shaping operations. The fires warfighting function includes the following tasks:

- Decide surface targets.
- Detect and locate surface targets.

- Provide fire support
- Assess effectiveness.
- Integrate and synchronize cyber-electromagnetic activities .

1-3. These tasks are integrated into the operational level during planning and adjusted based on the targeting guidance.

Targeting Principles

1-4. The enemy presents a large number of targets, frequently more than can be serviced with available intelligence, acquisition, and attack assets. The targeting process weighs the benefits and the cost of attacking various targets in order to determine which targets, if attacked, are most likely to contribute to achieving the desired end state. Adhering to four targeting principles should increase the probability of creating desired effects while diminishing undesired or adverse collateral effects. These principles are—

- The targeting process is focused on achieving the commander's objectives. It is the function of targeting to achieve efficiently those objectives within the parameters set at the operational level, directed limitations, the rules of engagement, or rules for the use of force, the law of war, and other guidance given by the commander. Every target nominated must contribute to attaining the commander's objectives.
- Targeting is concerned with the creation of specific desired effects through lethal and nonlethal actions. Target analysis considers all possible means to achieve desired effects, drawing from all available capabilities. The art of targeting seeks to achieve desired effects with the least risk and expenditure of time and resources.
- Targeting is a command function that requires the participation of many disciplines. This entails participation from all elements of the unit staff, special staff, special augmentees, other agencies, organizations, and multinational partners. Many of the participants may directly aid the targeting effort while working at locations vast distances from the unit. Even company level targeting elements frequently have access to intelligence and analysis generated by national elements.
- Targeting seeks to achieve effects through lethal and nonlethal actions in a systematic manner. A targeting methodology is a rational and iterative process that methodically analyzes, prioritizes, and assigns assets against targets systematically to achieve those effects that will contribute to achieving the commander's objectives. If the desired effects are not achieved, targets are recycled through the process.

Targeting Guidance

1-5. The commander's targeting guidance must be articulated simply yet authoritatively. The guidance must be easily understood across the combined and joint environment of operational areas. Targeting guidance must focus on essential enemy capabilities and functions that could interfere with the achievement of friendly objectives, such as, the ability to exercise control of forward units, the ability to mass fire support, or (in stability operations) the ability to manufacture explosive devices. These are high value targets needed by the enemy to accomplish his own mission and to keep friendly forces from achieving theirs.

1-6. The commander's targeting guidance describes the desired effects to be generated by scalable fires, physical attack, and cyber/electromagnetic activities against enemy and adversary

operations. The ability to execute the listed elements in different locations at the same time producing the following desired effects— deceive, degrade, delay, deny, destroy, disrupt, divert, exploit, interdict, neutralize, and suppress. Terms such as delay, disrupt, divert, and destroy have long been used to describe the effects of artillery fire on enemy capabilities; as have terms such as destroy, disrupt, degrade, deny, deceive, and exploit to describe the effects of information operations (FM 3-13). The terms are not mutually exclusive. Action associated with one desired effect may also support other desired effects. For example, delay can result from disrupting, diverting, or destroying enemy capabilities or targets.

1-7. Various scalable fires can be employed by a commander to achieve the following effects on an enemy or adversary—

- **Deceive.** To deceive is to cause a person to believe what is not true (FM 3-13). Military deception seeks to mislead adversary decisionmakers by manipulating their understanding of reality. Decisionmakers can be deceived because they operate in an uncertain environment. Uncertainties about the situation and the inability to predict outcomes accurately require adversaries to take risks that can expose them to the effects of friendly fires.
- **Degrade.** To degrade is to use nonlethal or temporary means to reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of adversary command and control systems and information collection efforts or means (FM 3-13).
- **Delay.** To delay is to slow the time of arrival of enemy forces or capabilities or alter the ability of the enemy or adversary to project forces or capabilities. When enemy forces are delayed friendly forces gain time (JP 3-03). For delay to have a major impact, the enemy must face urgent movement requirements or the delay must enhance the effect(s) of friendly operations. When delayed enemy forces mass behind a damaged route segment a more concentrated set of targets and a longer period of exposure to friendly fires results. (JP 3-03).
- **Deny.** To deny is to withhold information about Army force capabilities and intentions that adversaries need for effective and timely decisionmaking (FM 3-13). To deny is also to hinder or prevent the enemy from using terrain, space, personnel, supplies, or facilities. Destruction of enemy equipment is an effective means of denying his use of the electromagnetic spectrum; however, the duration of denial will depend on the enemy's ability to reconstitute. The electronic warfare (EW) representative must consider unintended consequences of EW operations. Friendly electronic attack could potentially deny essential services to a local populace, which in turn could result in loss of life and/or political ramifications.
- **Destroy.** In the context of defeat mechanisms, to destroy is to apply lethal combat power on an enemy capability so that it can no longer perform any function and cannot be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt (FM 3-0). A building is destroyed when all vertical supports and spanning members are damaged to such an extent that nothing is salvageable. In the case of bridges, all spans must have dropped and all piers must require replacement. The amount of damage needed to render a unit combat ineffective depends on the unit's type, discipline, and morale. Any such percentages must be specified by the supported unit commander. Area fire weapons require considerable ammunition and time to destroy armored or dug in targets as direct hits with high explosive shells are generally required. Precision guided munitions are a better means of destroying such targets. When used in the EW context, destruction is the elimination of targeted adversary's systems. Sensors and command nodes are lucrative targets because their destruction strongly influences the enemy's perceptions and ability to coordinate actions. EW support supports destruction by providing target location and/or information. Adversary systems that use the electromagnetic spectrum can be destroyed by a variety of weapons and techniques, ranging from conventional munitions and directed energy weapons to network attacks.

- **Disrupt.** To disrupt is to interrupt or impede enemy or adversary capabilities or systems, upsetting the flow of information, operational tempo, effective interaction, or cohesion of the enemy force or those systems (JP 3-03). Disrupt is a tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to upset an enemy's formation or tempo, interrupt his timetable, or cause his forces to commit prematurely or attack in piecemeal fashion. In information operations, disrupt is breaking and interrupting the flow of information between selected command and control nodes (FM 3-13). Any of these may in turn cause enemy forces to commit prematurely or attack in a piecemeal fashion. Attacking command and control nodes may force the enemy to use less capable, less secure backup communications systems that can be more easily exploited by friendly force. Attacking enemy lines of communications may force the enemy to use less capable transportation modes to communicate with and sustain their forces. Uncertainty as to whether or not forces, materiel, or supplies will arrive can directly affect enemy commanders, their staffs, and forces.

- **Divert.** To divert is to force the enemy or adversary to change course or direction. Diversion causes enemy forces to consume resources or capabilities critical to enemy operations in a way that is advantageous to friendly operations. Diversions draw the attention of enemy forces away from critical friendly operations and prevent enemy forces and their support resources from being employed for their intended purpose. Diversions can also cause more circuitous routing along lines of communications, resulting in delays for enemy forces (JP 3-03).

- **Exploit.** To exploit is in information operations, to gain access to adversary command and control systems to collect information or to plant false or misleading information (FM 3-13).

- **Interdict.** To interdict is to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's military surface capability before it can be used effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives (JP 3-03).

- **Neutralize.** To neutralize is to render enemy personnel or material incapable of interfering with a particular operation (FM 1-02). The unit is effective again when the casualties are replaced and/or damage is repaired. Any such percentages must be specified by the supported unit commander. Neutralization fires are delivered against targets located by accurate map inspection, indirect fire adjustment, or a target acquisition device. The assets required to neutralize a target vary according to the type and size of the target and the weapon ammunition combination.

- **Suppress.** To suppress is to temporarily degrade the performance of a force or weapons system below the level needed to accomplish the mission (FM 1-02). Firing high explosive rounds with variable time fuzes reduces the combat effectiveness of personnel and armored targets by creating apprehension and surprise and by causing tracked vehicles to button up. Obscuration is used to blind or confuse. Fires used to suppress are useful against likely, suspected, or inaccurately located enemy units where time is essential. They can be provided by small delivery units or means and require little ammunition. Suppression fires such as a smoke screen continue long enough to degrade enemy performance.

1-8. The commander can also provide restrictions as part of his targeting guidance. Targeting restrictions fall into two categories. The two categories are no-strike list and restricted target list. The no-strike list consists of objects or entities protected by the following—

- Law of armed conflict.
- International laws.
- Rules of engagement.

- Other considerations.

The no-strike list is developed independently of and in parallel to the candidate target list.

1-9. A restricted target list is a valid target with specific actions. Listed below are some examples of specific actions—

- Limit collateral damage.
- Preserve select ammo for final protective fires.
- Do not strike during daytime.
- Strike only with a certain weapon.
- Proximity to no-strike facilities.

Note. See JP 2-0 and JP 3-60 for additional information on legal considerations and targeting restrictions.

Targeting Categories

1-10. There are two targeting categories— deliberate and dynamic.

Deliberate Targeting

1-11. Deliberate targeting prosecutes planned targets. These targets are known to exist in an operational area and have actions scheduled against them. Examples range from targets on target lists in the applicable plan or order, targets detected in sufficient time to be placed in the joint air tasking cycle, mission type orders, or fire support plans.

1-12. There are two types of planned targets: scheduled and on-call-

- Scheduled targets exist in the operational environment and are located in sufficient time or prosecuted at a specific, planned time.
- On-call targets have actions planned, but not for a specific delivery time. The commander expects to locate these targets in sufficient time to execute planned actions. These targets are unique in that actions are planned against them using deliberate targeting, but execution will normally be conducted using dynamic targeting such as close air support missions and time-sensitive targets (TST).

Dynamic Targeting

1-13. Dynamic targeting prosecutes targets of opportunity and changes to planned targets or objectives. Targets of opportunity are targets identified too late, or not selected for action in time, to be included in deliberate targeting. Targets prosecuted as part of dynamic targeting are previously unanticipated, unplanned, or newly detected. If the target is not critical or time-sensitive enough to warrant prosecution during the current execution period, the target may be developed for prosecution during a later execution period. Analysis of the target may also determine that no action is needed.

1-14. There are two types of targets of opportunity: unplanned and unanticipated-

- Unplanned targets are known to exist in the operational environment, but no action has been planned against them. The target may not have been detected or located in sufficient time to meet planning deadlines. Alternatively, the target may have been located, but not previously considered of sufficient importance to engage.
- Unanticipated targets are unknown or not expected to exist in the operational environment.

Time-Sensitive Targets

1-15. A TST is a JFC designated target requiring immediate response because it is a highly lucrative, fleeting target of opportunity or it poses (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces (JP 3-60). TST is a JFC designated target or target type of such high importance to the accomplishment of the JFC mission and objectives or one that presents such a significant strategic or operational threat to friendly forces or allies, that the JFC dedicates intelligence collection and attack assets or is willing to divert assets away from other targets in order to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA) it/them.

1-16. TST comprises a very small or limited number of targets due to the required investment of assets and potential disruption of planned execution, and are only those targets designated by the JFC and identified as such in the JFC guidance and intent. TSTs are normally executed dynamically; however, to be successful, they require considerable deliberate planning and preparation within the joint targeting cycle.

1-17. Service component commanders may designate high-priority targets that present significant risks to or opportunities for component forces and/or missions. These are generally targets that the Service component commander(s) have nominated to the JFC TST list, but were not approved as TSTs. This class of targets may require rapid processing and cross component coordination, even though they did not qualify for inclusion on the JFC TST list. The JFC and Service component commanders should clearly designate these targets prior to execution of military operations. Such targets will generally be prosecuted using dynamic targeting. These targets should receive the highest priority possible, just below targets on the JFC TST list.

Sensitive Targets

1-18. Certain targets require special care or caution in treatment because failure to attack them or to attack them improperly can lead to major adverse consequences. Example includes leadership targets (high-value individuals [HVI]) that must be handled sensitively due to potential political repercussions; targets located in areas with a high risk of collateral damage; and weapons of mass destruction facilities, where an improper attack can lead to major long-term environmental damage. Such targets are often characterized as "sensitive" in one respect or another, without having the intrinsic characteristics, by definition, of a sensitive target. Nonetheless, the manner in which they are attacked is sensitive and may require coordination with and approval from the JFC or higher authorities. In most cases, it is best to establish criteria for engaging such targets in as much detail as possible during planning, before combat commences. (See figure 1-1.)

Targeting Methodology

1-19. Targeting process and the decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) methodology is time tested and performed by the commander's staff in planning and executing of targets. The methodology has four functions. Details of each function are presented in Chapter 2. This methodology organizes the efforts of the commander and staff to accomplish key targeting

requirements. The targeting process supports the commander's decisions. It helps the targeting working group decide which targets must be acquired and attacked. It helps in the decision of which attack option to use to engage the targets. Options can be lethal or nonlethal and/or organic or supporting at all levels through the range of operations as listed—maneuver, electronic attack, psychological, attack aircrafts, surface-to-surface fires, air to surface, or a combination of these operations. In addition, the process helps in the decision of who will engage the target at the prescribed time. It also helps targeting working groups determine requirements for combat assessment to assess targeting and attack effectiveness. (See figure 1-2.)

Targeting and Military Decisionmaking Process

1-20. The D3A methodology is an integral part of the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) from receipt of the mission through operation order (OPORD) execution and assessment. Like MDMP, targeting is a leadership driven process. Targeting frequently begins simultaneously with receipt of mission, and may even begin based on a warning order. As the MDMP is conducted, targeting becomes more focused based on the commander's guidance and intent. The composite risk management process is an integral tool in the MDMP and is compatible process that aligns with MDMP. The S-3 in units without a protection cell and the safety officer integrates the composite risk management into the MDMP. See FM 5-19 for a more detailed illustration of the first four steps of composite risk management conducted in the MDMP.

MDMP

1-21. The commander is responsible for mission analysis but may have his staff conduct a detailed mission analysis for his approval. The mission analysis considers intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), environmental considerations, enemy situation, and potential enemy course of action (COA).

Note. The joint targeting cycle uses the term joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE).

1-22. The commander provides his initial planning guidance and intent for further COA developments. The initial guidance and intent is given in a warning order. A warning order is sent to subordinate units to allow them to begin planning, providing them as much lead time as possible.

1-23. The plans cell develops potential friendly COAs based on facts and assumptions identified during IPB and mission analysis. These developed friendly COAs are usually checked by the commander or chief of staff to ensure they comply with the commander's initial guidance and intent and meet considerations for COA development. The intelligence staff develops as many possible enemy COAs as time allows.

1-24. The rules are developed by the rules of engagement cell under the supervision of the operations offices and assisted by staff judge advocate, based on commander's guidance, during the planning phase of the operations process.

1-25. Once approved for further development, a friendly COA is war gamed against the most likely and/or most threatening enemy COA to determine their suitability, acceptability, and feasibility. These results are normally briefed to the commander in a decision briefing. Following a decision by the commander, adjustments are made, if necessary, to the selected COA and orders preparation begins. A warning order is with as much information as possible to expedite their

planning.

1-26. The OPORD is completed by the staff and approved by the commander and then issued to subordinates. Subordinate units continue their planning process and modifying supporting plans as necessary. Rehearsals should be conducted before execution. The order is executed, and the commander and staff assess activities and results. The assessment provides them with feedback for modifying current plans or identifying new missions.

1-27. Figure 1-3 illustrates the relationship between the D3A methodology and the MDMP along with products generated during the targeting process.

D3A in MDMP

1-28. The decide function coincides with the MDMP from the mission analysis through the issuing of the approved plan or order. The detect function starts with the commander's approval of the plan or order and is accomplished during execution of the plan or order. Once detected, targets are attacked and assessed as required. Targeting working groups are used as a vehicle to focus the targeting process within specified time.

1-29. D3A methodology functions occur simultaneously and sequentially during the operations process. While an individual target may progress through each step of the process sequentially, there are normally multiple targets in each step of the process. As decisions are made in planning future operations, the current operations staff conducts the detection, execution, and planning of targets based on prior decisions.

Decide

1-30. The decide function is the most important and requires close interaction between the commander and the intelligence, plans, operations, fires cells, and staff judge advocate. The staff officers must clearly understand the following—

- Unit mission.
- Commander's intent (scheme of maneuver and scheme of fires).
- Commander's planning guidance.
- Rules of engagement.

1-31. With this information, the staff officers can prepare their respective running estimates. From the standpoint of targeting, the fire support, intelligence, and operations estimates are interrelated and closely coordinated among each cell. Key staff products include target value analysis, and the intelligence estimate from the intelligence and targeting the intelligence officers. War gaming allows the chief of fires/fire support officer (FSO) to develop the decide function products. The decide function gives a clear picture of the priorities that apply to the following—

- Tasking of target acquisition assets.
- Information processing.
- Selection of an attack means and measures of effectiveness.

- Requirement for combat assessment.
- Target sets.

1-32. The resulting OPORD addresses key points of the decision support template. The order contains commander's critical information requirements to include the following—

- Priority intelligence requirements (PIR).
- Information requirements.
- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan.
- Target acquisition tasks.
- High-payoff target list (HPTL).
- Attack guidance matrix (AGM).
- Target selection standards (TSS).
- Any requirements for assessment.

Detect

1-33. The detect targeting function is conducted during the execution of the OPORD. During detection, the assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2)/intelligence staff officer (S-2), and assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3)/operations staff officer (S-3) supervise the execution of the ISR plan. Target acquisition assets gather information and report their findings back to their controlling headquarters, which in turn pass pertinent information to the tasking agency. Some collection assets provide actual targets, while other assets must have their information processed to produce valid targets. Not all of the information reported would benefit the targeting effort, but it may be valuable to the development of the overall situation. The target priorities developed in the decide function are used to expedite the processing of targets. Situations arise where the attack, upon location and identification, of a target is either impossible (for example out of range) or undesirable (outside of but moving toward an advantageous location for the attack). Critical targets that we cannot or choose not to attack in accordance with the attack guidance must be tracked to ensure they are not lost. Tracking suspected targets expedites execution of the attack guidance. Tracking suspected targets keeps them in view while they are validated. Planners and executors must keep in mind that assets used for target tracking may be unavailable for target acquisition. As targets are developed, appropriate weapon systems are tasked in accordance with the attack guidance and location requirements of the system.

Deliver

1-34. The deliver function main objective is to attack targets in accordance with the attack guidance provided. The tactical solution (the selection of weapon system or a combination of weapons system) leads to a technical solution for the selected weapon. The technical solution includes the following—

- Specific attack unit.
- Type of ordnance.

- Time of attack.
- Coordinating instructions.

Assess

1-35. The commander and staffers assess the results of mission execution. If combat assessment reveals that the commander's guidance has not been met, detect and deliver functions of the targeting process must continue to focus on the targets involved. This feedback may result in changes to original decisions made during the decide function. These changes influence the continue execution of the plan and made available to subordinate units as appropriate.

1-36. The targeting process is continuous and crucial to the synchronization of combat power. The identification and subsequent development of targets, the attack of the targets, and the combat assessment of the attacks provide the commander with vital feedback on the progress toward reaching the desired end state.

Targeting Interrelationships

1-37. While the targeting process may be labeled differently at the joint level the same targeting tasks are being accomplished, as demonstrated in table 1-1. For more information on the Joint Targeting Process see JP 3-60.

Service Components Targeting Methodology

1-38. Targeting occurs at all echelons within a joint command. Targeting is complicated by the requirement to deconflict procedures and priorities among the different Service components and multinational forces. The JFC is responsible for integrating attacks throughout the operational environment.

1-39. Each Service component has established unique doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures for targeting. Several publications address targeting procedures through their emerging doctrinal manuals. The habitual integration of resources from one or more Service components has been developed to support the targeting requirements of another Service component and multinational forces. Chapter 3 discusses the joint targeting process and phases.

1-40. Targeting is a multifaceted and a coordinated process. Existing Service components have four procedures in common for acquisition, selection, and attack of targets—

- Deciding in advance what is to be targeted.
- Locating the target.
- Attacking the target.
- Assessing the results of the attack.

1-41. This common approach to targeting mirrors the D3A methodology functions presented in this manual. The targeting process is accomplished by each Service components applying their developed tactics, techniques, and procedures within a joint framework established by the JFC. The

organizational challenge for the JFC is to meld existing Service component architecture into an effective joint targeting working group for operational level targets without degrading their primary mission of targeting support to their respective components.

1-42. From the JFC perspective, a target is selected for strategic and/or operational reasons. Subsequently, a decision is made whether to attack the target involves weapons employment. The targets selected or nominated in this process must support the JFC campaign plan and contribute to the success of present and future major operations. The JFC relies on the tactical level commanders to orchestrate the execution of matching the appropriate response to target. Control measures, such as a fire support coordination line, must be repositioned as needed to take full advantage of all assets available to the joint force. The JFC best influences the outcome of future tactical battles by setting the conditions for those battles and allocating resources to the Service components.

Air-Ground Operations Relationship

1-43. The air and ground component commanders' have capabilities that overlaps. The JFC assists in planning, coordinating, and integrating of these operations. Both components have intelligence collection assets and weapon systems with long-range capabilities. The capabilities of one Service component complement the capabilities of the other. Therefore, both air and ground weapons system must be synchronized to gain the greatest efficiency and technological advantage. This requires air and ground component commanders and their staffers to share the effort in acquiring and attacking targets throughout the operational area.

1-44. Staffers must understand the coordination requirements, measures to acquire, attacks targets safely and efficiently in an operational environment at all echelons. The battlefield is four-dimensional. The four dimensions are width, length, altitude or depth, and time. Current coordination and control measures for example fire support coordination measures (FSCM), airspace coordinating measures, and graphic/maneuver control measures permit the complementary, simultaneous attack of targets by air and ground weapons system.

Targeting Personnel and Responsibilities

1-45. Key targeting working groups are members of the commander's coordinating and special staffs. These members perform the targeting process as part of their normal responsibilities within the MDMP. From their initial estimates and analysis, to their supervision and execution of the plan, they continue to revise and update their estimates. The relative formality of the decisionmaking process depends on time available and the level of the command (see FM 5-0).

1-46. The commander is responsible for the targeting effort. The intelligence, operations, and fire support officers form the core of the targeting working group at each level. The targeting working group has three primary functions in assisting the commander—

- Helps in synchronizing operations.
- Recommends targets to acquire and attack. The team also recommends the most efficient and available assets to detect and attack these targets.
- Identifies combat assessment requirements. Combat assessment can provide crucial and timely information to allow analysis of the success of the plan or to initiate revision of the plan. See Chapter 2 for more details on combat assessment.

1-47. The targeting effort is continuous at all levels of command. Continuity is achieved through

parallel planning by targeting working groups from corps through battalion task force. Targeting is not just a wartime function. This process must be exercised before battle if it is to operate effectively. The members of the targeting working group must be familiar with their roles and the roles of the other team members. That familiarity can only be gained through staff training.

Chapter 2

The Targeting Methodology

The modern battlefield presents high volume of targets and vulnerabilities for attack. The purpose of targeting methodology is to integrate and synchronize scalable fires with the maneuver operations. The targeting planning team has the responsibility to conduct planning, coordination, and deconfliction associated with the Army's targeting process. The purpose of this chapter is to explain the decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) methodology, which is designed to enhance fire support planning and the intelligence targeting process.

General

2-1. Targeting is a combination of intelligence functions, planning battle command, weaponeering, operational execution, and combat assessment. Effective targeting identifies the targeting options, both lethal and nonlethal that support the commander's objectives. The D3A methodology facilitates the attack of the right target with the right asset at the right time (see figure 2-1).

2-2. The targeting process provides an effective method for matching the friendly force capabilities against enemy targets. Lethal targets are best addressed with operations to kill, damage, disrupt, or capture; nonlethal targets are best engaged with civil-military operations, inform and influence activities, negotiation, political programs, economic programs, social programs, and other noncombat methods. In a counter insurgency operations, nonlethal targets are just as important as lethal targets and the targeting is frequently directed toward nonlethal options.

2-3. A very important part of the targeting process is the identification of potential fratricide situations and the necessary coordination measures to positively manage and control the attack of targets. These measures are incorporated in the coordinating instructions and appropriate annexes of the operation plan (OPLAN) and/or operation order (OPORD).

2-4. Targeting is a dynamic process. The process must keep up with the constant changing within area of operations. The tools and products described in this chapter must be updated based on combat assessment and situation understanding. Remember also, that the targeting process is repetitive. It is very seldom that decisions are made without any information from a previous targeting cycle. Intelligence from external agencies or intelligence previously generated internally feeds the decisionmaking.

2-5. The Army's targeting process comprises the following four functions—

- Decide which targets to engage.
- Detect the targets.
- Deliver (conduct the operation).

- Assess the effects of the operation.

Decide

2-6. The decide function is the first step in the targeting process. This step provides the overall focus and sets priorities for intelligence collection and attack planning. The decide function draws heavily on a detailed intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and continuous assessment of the situation. Targeting priorities must be addressed for each phase or critical event of an operation. The decisions made are reflected in visual products. The products are as follow—

- The high-payoff target list (HPTL) is a prioritized list of high-payoff targets (HPT). The HPT is a target whose loss to the enemy and will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action (COA). HPT is those high-value targets (HVT) that must be acquired and successfully attacked for the success of the friendly commander's mission. The HVT is a target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. The loss of a HVT is expected to degrade important enemy functions significantly throughout the friendly commander's area of interest.
- The intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan is designed to answer some of the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR), to include those HPT designated as PIR. The plan, within the availability of additional collection assets, supports the acquisition of more HPT. Determining the intelligence requirements is the first step in the collection management process. For a more detailed description. See Field Manual (FM) 5-0.
- Target selection standards (TSS) address accuracy or other specific criteria that must be met before targets can be attacked.
- The attack guidance matrix (AGM) is a matrix, approved by the commander, which addresses which targets will be attacked, how, when, and the desired effects.

2-7. The products of the decide function are briefed to the commander. Upon his approval, his decisions are translated into the OPORD with annexes. Specific targeting products are required at echelons indicated in figure 2-2 below.

Mission Analysis

2-8. The commander and staff plans for future operations by analyzing one or more alternative COAs at all echelons. Each COA is based on the following—

- Mission analysis.
- Current and projected battle situations.
- Exploit opportunities.

2-9. The process begins with receipt of a mission, whether assigned by higher headquarters or deduced by the commander. The commander, with or without input from his staff, analyzes the mission; considers tasks that must be performed, their purpose, and limitations on the unit. The completed analysis is the basis for developing a restated mission. The restated mission is the origin from which to start the targeting process.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

2-10. IPB can be best described as the process of understanding the battlefield, the enemy, and the options presented. The objective of IPB is the early identification of probable enemy COA. It is a continuous and systematic method for analyzing the enemy, weather, and terrain in a geographical area. The IPB provides much of the information for the intelligence estimate and is the foundation for the rest of the targeting process.

2-11. IPB begins with analysis of enemy doctrine and capabilities in a geographical area, the terrain, and the effects of weather on that terrain to include tactics, techniques, and procedures that threat/adversary forces prefer to employ. The products of IPB are HVT list, civil considerations, modified combined obstacle overlay, threat models, threat capabilities, weather effects matrix, and event template/matrix. These products are used to visualize the threat/adversary characteristics, predict enemy intentions, and develop COA with statements. These products assist in target value analysis and initial identification of potential HVT. Doctrinal templates convert the threat characteristics into graphics. Situation graphics help in refining HVT for specific area of operations and threat/adversary COA.

2-12. Concurrent with development of the situation graphics are an examination of enemy decision points and/or critical nodes as a part of each COA. The examination shows what might happen if the enemy commander's plan fails and what actions make up his failure options. Evaluation of threat/adversary COA with statement leads to identification of critical enemy functions in each COA and the HVT associated with each function.

2-13. IPB in counterinsurgency operations places greater emphasis on civil considerations, especially to win the local population's support to defeat an insurgency in the area of operations. A continuous IPB process identifies new intelligence requirements. The IPB products are revised throughout the operation. Intelligence and civil affairs personnel provide information on the relative importance of different target personalities and areas and the projected effects of scalable fires. Specifically, the intelligence analysts need to identify individuals and groups to engage as potential counterinsurgency supporters, targets to isolate from the population, and targets to eliminate. IPB in counterinsurgency operations requires personnel to work in areas like economics, anthropology, and governance that may be outside their expertise. Civil affairs forces are subject-matter experts. The personnel trained and equipped specifically to analyze the civil aspects of the common operating picture. Therefore, integrating staffs and drawing on the knowledge of personnel not trained in intelligence operations and external experts with local, regional, and cultural knowledge are critical to effective preparation.

2-14. Applying the IPB process helps the commander to selectively apply and maximize combat power at critical points in time and space. It does this by describing the battlefield environment, how the natural environment affects friendly units and likely threat/adversary COAs. Situational graphics support the development of event templates. Event templates help identify critical enemy activities. It also identifies named areas of interest where specific enemy activities or events will help confirm or deny the adoption of a particular COA. Potential HPTs are identified. HPTs are those HVT that must be attacked to give the commander a significant advantage in defeating the enemy. This work is further analyzed in the war gaming process.

Note. See the Field Manual Interim (FMI) 2-01.301 and FM 3-24 for additional details.

Target Value Analysis and War Gaming

2-15. The intelligence staff and targeting officer evaluates and integrates the various factors of the operational environment that affects both friendly and threat/adversary operations. This

coordination helps to develop the intelligence summary which contains HPT, HVT lists, and may include high-value individual (HVI). Target value analysis yields HVT for a specific enemy COA. Target value analysis involves a detailed analysis of enemy doctrine, tactics, equipment, organizations, and expected behavior for a selected COA. The target value analysis process identifies potential HVT sets associated with critical enemy functions that could interfere with the friendly COA or that are vital to enemy success.

2-16. Target spreadsheets (or target folders, as appropriate) identify the HVT in relation to a type of operation. The target spreadsheets give detailed targeting information for each HVT. The information on target spreadsheets and target sheets are used during the IPB and the war gaming processes. The targeting section within the analysis and control element under the operational control of the assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2) incorporates all-source intelligence to develop both tools.

2-17. The target value analysis process provides a relative ranking of target sets. The war game begins when the target analyst in the G-2 or the intelligence staff officer (S-2) plays the role of the threat commander or acts as the ISR officer.

2-18. Alternative friendly developments are analyzed in terms of their impact on enemy operations and likely responses during war gaming. The enemy battlefield functions that must be attacked to force the best enemy response are identified. The commander and his staff analyze the criticality of friendly battlefield functions with regard to a specific COA. The best places to attack HPT become more refined during war gaming of friendly options. These places are called target areas of interest. Target areas of interest are points or areas where the commander can acquire and engage HPTs by fires and/or maneuver. Decision points or decision time phase lines are used to ensure that the decision to engage or not to engage occurs at the proper time. Decision points and target areas of interest are recorded on the assistant chief of staff, operations' (G-3) decision support template. The purpose of war gaming is to finalize individual running estimates and to develop all of the following—

- Scheme of maneuver.
- Fire support plan.
- Friendly decision support template.

2-19. HVTs are identified and prioritized during the war gaming phase of planning. In addition, it identifies the subset of HVTs that must be acquired and attacked for the friendly mission to succeed. HVTs may be nominated as HPTs when these targets can be successfully acquired, vulnerable to attacks, and such an attack supports the commander's scheme of maneuver. Once identified and nominated, HPTs are grouped into a list identifying them for a specific point in the battle. The completed HPTL is submitted to the commander for approval. The approved HPTL becomes a formal part of the fire support plan.

2-20. The G-3 or operations staff officer (S-3) normally leads the war game and role-plays the friendly COA statements. The operations section establishes the technique and recording method for the war game. The G-2 or S-2 role plays the enemy's most dangerous and likely COA by using enemy doctrine and tactics. When available, the assistant chief of staff, and plans/plans staff officer war games the civilian COA. The deputy chief of fires or fire support officer (FSO) advises the G-3/S-3 on using available fire support weapons system and records the needs for fire support. The G-3/S-3 uses the war game to determine adequacy of fire support. Operations staff works directly with the intelligence section to ensure full use of fire support target acquisition assets in the intelligence collection plan. The air liaison officer and deputy or assistant aviation officer

advises on availability and employment of air assets to include airspace coordinating measures. Other key staff officers who are vital and should be consulted, consist of the following—

- G-3 air or brigade aviation officer for airspace integration with organic and supporting airspace users.
- Logistics officer for supportability considerations.
- Engineer officer for mobility, countermobility, survivability, and environmental considerations.
- Air defense artillery officer for air defense coverage.

2-21. Input from the rest of the staff achieves a complete analysis of the impact of all warfighting functions. This ensures the AGM is synchronized with the decision support template, and selection of HPT is supported by PIR and the intelligence collection tasks.

Target Selection

2-22. The staff war games different COA statements to develop the HPT. As each friendly option is war gamed by the staff, the G-2 or S-2 identifies HVT from which the staff nominates HPT. The HPT is targets that are critical to friendly success. Targets that can be acquired and attacked are candidates for the HPTL. Targets that need outside acquisition or attack are sent to higher headquarters. The key to HPT is that they are critical to the enemy commander's needs (HVT) and the friendly concept of the operation. HPTs support the friendly force commander's scheme of maneuver and intent. The war game phase helps the commander to focus reconnaissance assets on HPTs to conduct battle damage assessment (BDA). The analysis and control element's collection manager helps identify and task the sensors needed for collection of the HPT. The collection manager can determine the best sensor and its availability by referencing the ISR synchronization matrix. A detailed discussion of the ISR synchronization matrix is contained in TC 201.

High-Payoff Target List

2-23. The HPTL identifies the HPTs by phases in the battle and order of priority in the figure 2-3. Target value is usually the greatest factor contributing to target payoff. However, other things to be considered include the following—

- The sequence or order of appearance.
- The ability to detect, identify, classify, locate, and track the target. (This decision must include sensor availability and processing timeline considerations.)
 - The degree of accuracy available from the acquisition system(s).
- The ability to engage the target.
- The ability to defeat the target on the basis of attack guidance.
- The resources required to do all of the above.

2-24. Targets are prioritized according to the considerations above within specific time windows. The targeting working group sets priorities for the targets according to its judgment and the

advice of the fires cell targeting officer and the field artillery intelligence officer (FAIO). Target spreadsheets give a recommended priority and attack sequence. If the target spreadsheet or war gaming departs from the commander's guidance, it is noted on the proposed HPTL to inform the commander of the conflict. The target category of the HPT is shown, either by name or by number, on the list. The category name and number are shown on the target spreadsheet. The number of target priorities should not be excessive. Too many priorities will dilute the intelligence collection acquisition and attack efforts. The approved list is given to the operations, intelligence, and fires cells. It is used as a planning tool to determine attack guidance and to refine the collection plan. This list may also indicate the commander's operational need for BDA of the specific target and the time window for collecting and reporting it.

Note. Any format serves the purpose of a HPTL for linking targets with phases of battle.

2-25. One way to organize the HPTL is to group all HPTs into target sets that reflect the capabilities and functions the commander has decided to engage. Target sets are identified and prioritized for each phase of the operation. Within the sets, individual targets are rank ordered by target value, sequence of appearance, importance, or other criteria that satisfy the commander's desired effects. In this way, the targeting working group reduces, modifies, and reprioritizes HVTs while ensuring that HPTs support the concept of operations.

2-26. The commander's guidance may require changes, which should be annotated on the HPTL. The target name or number and description are placed on the list for specific HPTs in each category. Once the commander approves or amends the HPTL, it goes back to the targeting working group to help them develop the AGM and collection plan.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Plan

2-27. The G-2/S-2 develops collection strategies that support the commander's concept of operations with available resources. Collection management orchestrates the intelligence system of weapons system to focus the intelligence effort in support of operations. If BDA is needed, collection is planned to satisfy that requirement as well.

2-28. ISR is a continuous combined arms effort led by the operations and intelligence staffs in coordination with the staff that sets reconnaissance and surveillance in motion. The PIR and other intelligence requirements drive the collection effort. The commander takes every opportunity to improve his situational understanding about the enemy and terrain. Commanders integrate reconnaissance and surveillance to form an integrated ISR plan that capitalizes on their different capabilities. The ISR plan is often the most important part of providing information and intelligence that contribute to answering the commander's critical information requirement. For the G-2/S-2, an effective ISR plan is critical in answering the PIR. Upon the completion of planning, the initial ISR plan becomes annex L (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) of the OPOD/OPLAN. See FM 5-0 for additional information.

2-29. The ISR plan is not a military intelligence specific product—although the G-3/S-3 is the staff proponent of the ISR plan—it is an integrated staff product executed by the unit at the direction of the commander. The G-2/S-2, however, must maintain situational understanding in order to recommend changes or further development of the ISR plan. Based on the initial IPB and commander's critical information requirement, the staff—primarily the G-2/S-2—identifies gaps in the intelligence effort and develops an initial ISR plan based on available ISR assets. The G-3/S-3 turns this into an initial ISR annex that tasks reconnaissance and surveillance assets as soon as possible to begin the collection effort.

2-30. The G-3/S-3, assisted by the G-2/S-2, uses the ISR plan to task and direct the available ISR

assets to answer the PIR and intelligence requirements. Conversely, the staff revises the plan as other intelligence gaps are identified if the information is required to fulfill the commander's critical information requirement or in anticipation of future intelligence requirements. With staff participation, the G-2/S-2 intelligence officer synchronizes the collection effort through a complementary product to the ISR plan - the intelligence synchronization plan.

Target Selection Standards

2-31. Target selection standards (TSS) are criteria applied to enemy activity (acquisitions and battlefield information) and used in deciding whether the activity is a target. TSS put nominations into two categories targets and suspected targets. Targets meet accuracy and timeliness requirements for attack. Suspected targets must be confirmed before any attack. See Annex D for a sample target selection standards worksheet. Units may develop their own worksheet format.

2-32. TSS is based on the enemy activity under consideration and available weapon systems by using the following—

- Weapon system target location accuracy requirements (target location error [TLE]). Special consideration must be given to TLE for the employment of guided precision munitions.
- Size of the enemy activity (point or area).
- Status of the activity (moving or stationary).
- Timeliness of the information.

2-33. Considering these factors, different TSS may exist for a given enemy activity based on different weapons system. For example, an enemy artillery battery may have a 150-meter TLE requirement for attack by cannon artillery and a 1 kilometer requirement for attack aircrafts. TSS is developed by the fires cell in conjunction with the military intelligence personnel. Intelligence analysts use TSS to quickly determine targets from battlefield information and pass the targets to the fires cell. Weapon system managers such as fires cells, fire control elements, or fire direction centers use the TSS to identify targets for attack quickly. Commands can develop standard TSS based on threat characteristics and doctrine matched with the standard available weapon systems.

2-34. TSS worksheet is given to the G-2 or S-2 by the fires cell. The FAIO use TSS to identify targets that are forwarded to a fires cell. Intelligence analysts evaluate the source of the information as to its reliability and accuracy, confirm that the size and status of the activity meet the TSS, and then compare the time of acquisition with the dwell time. Accurate information from a reliable source must be verified before declaring it a target if the elapsed time exceeds dwell time.

Note. Dwell time is the length of time a target is doctrinally expected to remain in one location.

2-35. The G-2 or S-2 knows the accuracy of acquisition systems, associated TLE, and the expected dwell times of enemy targets. He can then specify whether information he reports to the weapon system manager is a target or a suspected target. Some situations require intelligence assets to identify friendly or foe before approval to fire is given. HPT that meet all the criteria should be tracked until they are attacked in accordance with the AGM. Location of targets that do not meet TSS should be confirmed before they are attacked. The TSS can be graphically depicted in a TSS matrix as shown in the figure 2-4.

2-36. The matrix lists each weapon system that forwards targets directly to the fires cell, fire control element, or fire direction center. The effects of weather and terrain on the collection assets and on enemy equipment are considered. TSS is keyed to the situation. However, the greatest emphasis is on the enemy situation, considering deception and the reliability of the source or agency that is reporting.

Attack Guidance

2-37. Knowing target vulnerabilities and analyzing the probable effect an attack will have on enemy operations allows a staff to propose the most efficient available attack option. Key guidance is whether the commander wishes to disrupt delay, limit damage, or destroy the enemy. During war gaming, decision points linked to events, areas of interest, or points on the battlefield are developed. These decision points cue the command decisions and staff actions where tactical decisions are needed.

2-38. Based on commander's guidance, the targeting working group recommends how each target should be engaged in terms of the effects of fire and attack options to use. Effects of fire can be to harass, suppress, neutralize, or destroy the target. The subjective nature of what is meant by these terms means the commander must ensure the targeting working group understands his use of them. Application of fire support automation system default values further complicates this understanding.

2-39. The decision of what weapon system to use is made at the same time as the decision on when to acquire and attack the target. Coordination is required when deciding to attack with two different means such as electronic warfare (EW) and combat air operations. Coordination requirements are recorded during the war game process.

2-40. The commander, with recommendations from the targeting working group, must approve the attack guidance. This guidance should detail the following—

- A prioritized list of HPT.
- When, how, and desired effects of attack.
- Any special instructions.
- HPTs that require BDA.

2-41. This information is developed during the war game. Attack guidance applies to both planned targets and targets of opportunity. Accordingly, attack guidance may address specific or general target descriptions. Attack guidance is provided to weapon system managers via the AGM.

Attack Guidance Matrix

2-42. The AGM consists of columns for the following—

- Specific HPT.
- Timing of attack.
- How targets are attacked.
- Target categories.

- Restrictions.

Note. An example of the AGM is shown in figure 2-5.

High-Payoff Target Column

2-43. This column lists the prioritized HPTs identified during war gaming. These targets have priority for engagement.

WHEN Column

2-44. Timing the attack of targets is critical to maximizing the effects. During war gaming, the optimum time is identified and reflected in the WHEN column. The letter P indicates that the target should not be engaged now but should be planned for future firing (for example, a preparation, a suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) program, or a countermobility program) or simply should be put on file. Such targets should be engaged in the sequence that they are received in the headquarters, with respect to the priority noted in the HPTL. Designators (A, I, and P) on should be limited to a very small percentage of targets and only for the most critical types. Too many immediate targets are disruptive and lower the efficiency of weapon systems. Immediate attacks take precedence over all others and are conducted even if weapon systems must be diverted from attacks already underway. Some examples of very important targets include—

- Missile systems capable of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attack.
- Division headquarters.
- Certain identified individuals.
- Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons storage and support facilities.

2-45. The G-3 or S-3 and chief of fires/brigade FSO must establish procedures within the main command post (CP) that allow for immediate attack of targets.

HOW Column

2-46. The HOW column links the weapon system to the HPT. It is best to identify a primary and backup weapon system for attack of HPTs.

EFFECTS Column

2-47. Effects refer to the target attack criteria. The targeting working group should specify attack criteria according to the commander's general guidance. Target attack criteria should be given in quantifiable terms (for example, as a percentage of casualties or destroyed elements, time, ordnance, and allocation or application of assets). In addition, it can be noted as the number of battery or battalion volleys.

REMARKS Column

2-48. Some examples of how this column should be used are—

- Note accuracy or time constraints.

- Note required coordination.
- Limitations on the amount or type of ammunition.
- Any need for BDA.

2-49. This column should note which targets should not be attacked in certain tactical situations (for example, targets not to be attacked if the enemy is withdrawing).

2-50. As the operation progresses through time, the AGM may change. The AGM is a tool that must be updated based on the changing enemy situation. It should be discussed and updated during routine staff planning meetings. Consider separate AGM for each phase of the concept of operations.

Formats

2-51. The formats for the HPTL, TSS, and AGM presented in the preceding paragraphs are examples only. Targeting personnel must understand all the considerations that are involved in building these targeting tools. However, experienced staffs may prefer to develop their own formats tailored for their situation. Alternative formats are provided in Appendix D.

Detect

2-52. Detect is the next critical function in the targeting process. The G-2 or S-2 is responsible for directing the effort to detect HPTs identified in the decide function. The ability to identify the specific who, what, when, and how for target acquisition, the G-2 or S-2 must work closely with all of the following—

- Analysis and control element.
- Assistant chief of staff, information engagement.
- Information engagement staff officer (S-7).
- FAIO.
- Targeting officer and/or FSO.

2-53. This process determines accurate, identifiable, and timely requirements for collection systems. The analysis and control element's targeting section is responsible for ensuring that the collection system asset managers understand these requirements.

2-54. Information needs for target detection are expressed as PIR and/or information requirements. Their relative priority depends on the importance of the target to the friendly scheme of maneuver and tracking requirements coupled with the commander's intent. PIRs support detection of HPT incorporated into the overall collection plan of the unit.

2-55. Targets are detected and tracked by the maximum use of all available assets. The G-2 or S-2 must focus the intelligence acquisition efforts on the designated HPTs and PIRs. The collection manager considers the availability and capability of all collection assets at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The joint force assets are available to the collection manager. The intelligence officer translates the PIR and intelligence requirement into specific information requirements and specific orders and requests. If possible, he arranges direct dissemination of

targeting information from the collector to the targeting cell or targeting intelligence to the fires cell.

2-56. In counterinsurgencies, intelligence regarding factors of the operational environment affecting the populace requires particular attention. Such intelligence is important for developing political, social, and economic programs. Intelligence personnel continuously analyze large quantities of all-source intelligence reporting to determine the following—

- Threat validity.
- Actual importance of potential targets.
- Best means to engage the target.
- Expected effects of engaging the targets (which will guide actions to mitigate negative effects).
- Any changes required to the exploitation plan.

Detection Procedures

2-57. It is essential that all ISR assets be used effectively and efficiently. Duplication of effort among available assets must be avoided unless it is required to confirm target information. The intelligence cell develops and manages the collection plan to avoid duplication at corps and division level. At the same time, the intelligence cell ensures that no gaps in planned collection exist. This allows timely combat information to be collected to answer the commander's intelligence requirements. This information lets analysts develop the enemy situation and identify targets.

2-58. Desired HPTs must be detected in a timely, accurate manner. Clear and concise tasks must be given to the reconnaissance units or surveillance systems that can detect a given target. Mobile HPTs must be detected and tracked to maintain a current target location. Target tracking is inherent to detection. The fires cell tells the G-2 or S-2 the degree of accuracy required and dwell time for a target to be eligible for attack. The G-2 or S-2 must match accuracy requirements to the TLE of the collection systems. If the target type and its associated signatures (electronic, visual, thermal, and so forth) are known, the most capable collection asset can be directed against the target. The asset can be placed in the best position according to estimates of when and where the enemy target will be located.

2-59. As the assets collect information for target development, it is forwarded to the intelligence analysts of the analysis and control element. They use the information in performing situation and target development. When the analysts identify a target specified for attack, it is passed to the fires cell. The fires cell executes the attack guidance against the target. Close coordination among the intelligence staff and the fires cell is essential to ensure that the targets are passed to a weapon system that will engage the target. To ensure the exchange is timely, the FAIO must have access to the analysis and control element workstation. The FAIO coordinates with the G-2 and fires cell to pass HPTs and other targets directly to the fire control element at the fires battalion or fires brigade or, if approved by the maneuver commander, directly to a firing unit. The result is an efficient attack of targets that have been designated in advance for attack. Some units have found it advantageous to locate the FAIO in the analysis and control element with communications to the fires cell. The FAIO notifies the fires cell immediately when intelligence information warrants attack. This allows the FAIO to focus on intelligence information analysis and the fires cell to manage the control of fires. The FAIO functions are performed by the targeting officer at brigade and the battalion's S-2.

2-60. Tracking is an essential element of the detect function of the targeting process. Tracking priorities are based on the commander's concept of the operation and targeting priorities. Tracking is executed through the collection plan. Not all targets will be tracked. However, many critical targets move frequently or constantly. As such, these HPTs require tracking.

The ISR Synchronization Matrix

2-61. The ISR synchronization matrix is a product used by the intelligence officer to ensure that collection tasks are tied to scheme of maneuver in time and space, effectively linking reconnaissance and surveillance to maneuver and effects. The ISR synchronization matrix is typically constructed in spreadsheet format and is always accompanied by an ISR overlay that graphically depicts the information contained in the matrix. The intelligence officer uses the matrix to synchronize reconnaissance and surveillance tasks in the same way the operations officer uses the maneuver synchronization matrix to synchronize the overall unit scheme of maneuver.

Intelligence Synchronization

2-62. The intelligence officer, with staff participation, orchestrates the entire collection effort to include all assets the commander controls, assets of lateral units and higher echelon units and organizations, and intelligence reach to answer the PIR and other intelligence requirements. Intelligence synchronization activities include the following— *

Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this Army Field Manual describes the targeting process used by the United States Army. The FM 3-60 is descriptive and not prescriptive in nature. This manual has applicability in any theater of operations. The manual offers considerations for commanders and staffers in preparing for challenges with targeting, yet it is flexible enough to adapt to dynamic situation. FM 3-60 replaces FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process.

The development and research of FM 3-60 parallels similar ongoing efforts by other Army proponents to develop their own supporting branch doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures for the division, support brigades, brigade combat teams, and subordinate elements.

Field Manual (FM) 3-60, The Targeting Process consists of five chapters and eight appendices to describe the Army's targeting process. Each chapter and appendix addresses how the decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) methodology enhances the targeting process. The D3A is a methodology which optimizes the integration and synchronization of maneuver, fire support, and intelligence from task force to corps level operations. The D3A is described without tying it to specific hardware that will eventually become dated. The Army's targeting process consists of time tested techniques organized in a systematic framework.

The FM 3-60 addresses how D3A methodology interfaces with the joint targeting cycle, military decisionmaking process (MDMP), and operations process. The joint targeting fundamental principles and doctrinal guidance are also presented in this publication.

Successful targeting requires that the leadership team and their staff possess an

understanding of the functions associated with the targeting process. The FM 3-60 builds on the collective knowledge, experience gained through recent operations, and numerous exercises. The manual is rooted in time tested principles and fundamentals, while accommodating force design, new technologies, and diverse threats to national security.

The targeting process is challenging. The challenge includes locating, identifying, classifying, tracking, and attacking targets and assessing battle damage with limited assets and weapon systems, which makes this process complicated. The process becomes even more difficult with long range and fast moving targets. It is even more complex at division and higher echelons with more decisionmakers, acquisitions, surveillance assets, and weapon systems. This challenge is particularly true when joint and combined assets are included. The competition for assets is intense. Many intelligence systems are capable of situation development, target acquisition, and battle damage assessment (BDA), but may not be able to do all at the same time. Detailed guidance, thorough planning, and disciplined execution prevent unnecessary redundancy and make the most of available combat power.

Chapter 1 begins with the basics and introduction to targeting.

Chapter 2 describes the Army's targeting process in detail.

Chapter 3 addresses targeting at the corps and division level.

Chapter 4 addresses targeting at the brigade combat team and battalion level.

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