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Integral Discourse: A Commodious, Growthful, and Cooperative Approach to Conflict:

Integrative Practices in Rhetoric, Developmental Psychology, and Conflict Management

Lynn Christine Holaday

Degree Field: Conflict Resolution

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The Graduate School of The Union Institute

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Abstract

A common method of conflict resolution employed by academics, media specialists, and policy makers is the argument, a form of positional discourse in which competing points of view vie with one another. However, this format has its limitations, particularly when it is applied to the conflicts of "postmodern" society. Recently, writers in the fields of argument and conflict resolution have described ways of dealing with conflict that go beyond argument. These approaches to conflict management involve practices and attitudes that are typically demonstrated by people at higher stages of psychological and cognitive development. Using the developmental model of Ken Wilber as a frame, an investigation was done of the work of theorists and practitioners of argument and conflict management. The conclusion was reached that a different approach to conflict management was emerging in our world, one that could be housed in Wilber's "vision-logic" stage and the "higher" stages of other developmental theorists. This new approach was called integral discourse, which was described as going beyond prior discourses (the discourses of physicality, emotionality, authority, and positionality) in terms of expanded content, higher levels of participant maturity, and greater emphasis on relationship. The suggestion was made that this new integral discourse holds possibilities for handling conflicts that have proved resistant to traditional methods of conflict resolution.

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This work is dedicated to my children, Patrick and Brett, who first taught me how to mediate and who remain a continuing inspiration to me as vessels of compassion and forgiveness, and also to the members of my doctoral committee, Drs. Carol Barrett, Catherine Frerichs, Jonathan Shailor, Diane Katz, Gayl Welch, and Patricia Deer who donated huge amounts of time for very little remuneration and whose contributions have made this a much more coherent and scholarly work than it would otherwise have been. I also want to give credit to my friends who have cheered me on and stood by me as I dealt with the numerous personal conflicts I encountered during the period I was writing this document.

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Out beyond right and wrong,
There is a field.
Meet me there.

Rumi

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Foreword

After I had spent a few semesters teaching students how to write an argument, I began to wonder why I was doing it. Our world seemed to have enough arguing as it was. To put my efforts into improving students' armaments before sending them into combat did not seem to me to be the most productive use of my time or theirs. I started to look for other ways to write about conflict. At the time, I had no idea that anyone else had related argument to war (Lakoff and Johnson); that anyone else had raised similar questions to my own (Lamb, Corder); nor that there were already proposals for change out there (Rogers, Bohm). I also didn't really understand the value of argument (I had not read Crosswhite or Perlman or Billig).

As I set out to investigate argument, I expanded my research to include the fields of conflict resolution, developmental/transpersonal psychology, and personal growth all of which I felt offered new ways of looking at the management of conflict. Investigating the problem thus sent me into many disciplines and philosophical houses: I read works by psychologists, sociologists, composition teachers, and anthropologists, encountered the constructivists, the deconstructionists, the expressivists, the utilitarians, and the empiricists. My individual conflicts, the conflicts of those near to me, and my professional experiences as a lawyer, mediator, and teacher all fed the development of my thinking.

More specifically, in order to increase my understanding of this area, I did the following:

1. I entered into a Ph.D. program in which I concentrated on the disciplines of rhetoric, conflict resolution, and transpersonal and developmental psychology.

Within the first discipline, rhetoric, I studied works on composition, argument, expanded notions of argument, language and reality, and cognitive development and writing. Some writers in particular (Lamb, Elbow, Teich) helped me to conceptualize nonadversarial ways of writing about conflict; many others (Booth, Lynch, Crosswhite) provided me with interesting ideas for re-envisioning argument.

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Within the second discipline, conflict resolution, I looked at new developments in negotiation and mediation. The classic works of Fisher and Ury, Karrass, and Nierenberg were helpful to me as were the more recent, more spiritually oriented writers such as Crum, Bush and Folger, and Mindell.

In conjunction with my work in stage development, I looked at the theories of several developmentalists, among them Piaget, Kohlberg, Gilligan, Maslow, Kegan, and particularly Wilber. I also considered the history of the development of consciousness; Gebser in particular was influential in this respect. I looked at interpersonal relations and communication theory and reviewed some practical therapeutic psychological techniques such as circular questioning and future vision.

Finally, I attempted to gain an overview of the various schools of philosophy which form the backdrop for my work and to look at some modern philosophies that have yet to fully coalesce as schools such as social constructionism and postmodernism (that amorphous, ubiquitous phrase that seems to cover everything from avant-garde movies to abstruse rhetorical theory).

2. I investigated conflict presented in a creative context. I spent time trying to understand conflict in the theater and in literature. I took acting classes and playwriting classes, attended plays, read novels and poetry. Seeing conflict presented creatively led me also to consider the creative aspects of conflict - how might it be used to open new vistas and images? what role does the body play in conflict?

3. I gained practical experience as a mediator and as a teacher of composition, adult development, and conflict management. I attended a variety of workshops, classes, and professional conferences relating to these fields and also presented at the Conference on College Composition and Communication.

4. I spoke with lawyers and judges and mediators and students and teachers, with people involved in conflicts from petty squabbles to the life-threatening battles endured by battered women, seeking to understand their perspectives on handling conflict.

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5. I went on an inner journey. I spent time journaling, meditating, and engaging in therapy in an effort to "grow" myself, to develop my ability to speak truthfully, to understand my biases. I included body work, energy field work, and shadow work in my search. I have had some what I consider to be transpersonal experiences that I have tried to understand. Chopra, Kornfield, Huxley, Seth, Wilber, Thesenga, Strauch, Small, Chodron, and Bohm have all been helpful in this regard. I have taken to heart Gandhi's admonition: "You must be the change you seek in the world" (even while I find this enormously difficult to do).

All of these areas have provided me with various 'shoulders to stand on,' bodies of information that gave me both information and a sense of direction. Each of the disciplines I have studied is sprouting new ideas about conflict and its management; my own experience has shown me that new ideas are needed - and possible. I have attempted to gather these ideas together in what I am calling 'integral discourse.'

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, I have had to come face to face with how I personally handle conflict. As a lawyer, mediator , and mother, I have worked at managing conflict for many years. However, I had never really stopped to look at my role in this phenomenon, whether as manager or participant. While I planned to use work experiences as fodder for my study, I did not originally regard my personal life as relevant. The fates, however, must have thought that insufficient, for only a few days after I formally began my investigations into the issues of conflict management (a.k.a. my Ph.D. program), my twenty-six year marriage began to unravel, a process which culminated in a divorce three years later. This process gave me an excellent laboratory for self-examination, which I attempted to use, even though it meant living two lives with it: the one a personal struggle filled with emotion and crisis and unthinking interchanges, and the other an observer role in which I reflected on those same emotions, crises, and exchanges in an effort to understand myself and the others involved in this conflict. Along the way, I encountered mediators and lawyers and friends and therapists, all of whom had different takes on argument, on conflict, on values, on gender issues, and on ethics, and all of whose presences live in these pages.

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Despite what I learned, however, I failed at my own project: I could not keep the family together. So, while I offer a multitude of ideas for changing how we deal with conflict, I do not suggest that any one human being can achieve them all, nor that using them will always bring success. Instead, I see them as goals, as a level to which we might aspire, as ideas from which to pick and choose, as potentials we all have, as practices that could increase our ability to live with one another more productively and joyfully. And I have ceased to define success as getting what I want. Success, I think now, has to do with growth, with developing one's capacities to manage conflict, with understanding oneself and others, with increasing one's ability to love, with overcoming fear, with appreciating what one has rather than what one is lacking. I see it as being able to get beyond argument, to stop seeing conflict as two-sided, as antagonistic, as negative and to begin to find in it opportunities for growth, for creativity, for integration of ideas, for development of whole human beings.

At various times I have lost confidence in my ideas, wondered why I think I have anything to say at all. At other times, I have moved to the other extreme and exhibited too much confidence, resisting criticism and well-meant advice from others. I hope that both of these tendencies have moderated themselves. I have tried to know myself, to walk my talk, to test my ideas so that I could have confidence in them. I have also tried to keep from assuming I have the last word to say on the subject, to realize that there is much I do not know about any of the fields I have investigated, to offer my views as just those - my own, bounded by my circumstances and my experience, colored by my personal, social, and economic situation, limited by what I have seen and heard and read and thought. I have tried to make my own limitations and biases obvious and the contributions of others apparent. Whether I have done that well enough or not will be up to the reader.

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Introduction. Thesis and Plan for the Book.

Approaches to conflict range from physical violence to emotional harangue to the imposition of rules and laws to negotiation among autonomous subjects. These approaches can be roughly categorized (as other aspects of human behavior are categorized[1]) in a developmental hierarchy, both chronological and ontological. The more 'primitive' stages (e.g. physical violence/restraint) were used more often in the past[2] or in childhood and are used now by more "undeveloped" societies and people. Each approach to conflict can be categorized as a discourse: a discourse of physicality, of emotionality, of authority, or of positionality.

In positional discourse (a.k.a. formal argument), one takes a position, supports it with evidence, and presents it to one's audience. Another may disagree and present her own arguments in response. This approach to conflict management is embedded in our educational structure, our media, and our governmental processes. College students are taught to clarify their positions, to state them as theses; they are taught to avoid unsupported assertions and to find evidence for their positions; they are taught to weigh evidence and come to reasoned conclusions. In the media, editors and commentators often follow the structure of formal argument. In the public forum, our political contests are staged as debates: positions are announced, evidence is amassed, and points are refuted or acknowledged. The ability to articulate a formal argument, in fact, is regarded as a requirement for an educated individual.[3]

However, the limitations of argument, of positional discourse, are becoming increasingly apparent. Its detractors have claimed that it polarizes disputants, increases combativeness, supports patriarchy, and is not sufficient

[1] biological evolution (Darwin), psychosexual development (Freud), cognitive development (Piaget), moral development (Kohlberg and Gilligan), etc.

[2] While recent conflicts may show us that that physical violence is still very much in vogue as a tool of conflict resolution, public opinion does not favor it. The concept of 'an eye for an eye' is no longer accepted in 'civilized' society as it might have been in earlier epochs.

[3] That we may not do a particularly good job of maintaining a rational stance is a given both in politics and in other exchanges; often diatribes, rabble rousing, and even physical clashes overcome our stated intent to remain rational. However, it is rational debate that is held up as the ideal.

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to handle many of the conflicts of multiplicity and incommensurability that our postmodern world has spawned; further, that it cannot handle conflicts where those involved are unwilling or unable to engage in rational discussion. As a result, people from many disciplines, from rhetoricians to mediators to teachers to business people, are experimenting with new ways to deal with conflict both orally and in writing. Many of these "new" approaches have existed previously (in fields as diverse as spirituality, literature, ancient rhetoric, and the feminine conversational style); many are being newly minted, particularly in the fields of composition studies and conflict resolution.

Most of the time, these new ideas are presented as expanded notions of argument; in fact, the argument label is currently being pasted on such an increasingly wide variety of methods of communication that we find ourselves dealing with such oxymorons as "agonistic inquiry" and "confrontational cooperation" (Lynch, 64) or find that argument covers the entirety of language arts from literature to theatre. While all of these ways of communicating may have their argumentative aspects, and while it may be fascinating and useful to investigate them all, calling them all argument is confusing and unnecessary and obscures the value of both argument and the discourse that is now emerging. Worse, it obscures what to me is a wonderful happening: we are developing a radically new set of responses to conflict, responses that differ from argument as profoundly as argument differs from quarrel, responses that hold some promise for dragging us out of the theoretical hopelessness of deconstruction and the practical hopelessness we feel in the face of many of our most intractable conflicts. I believe we need a new container for these new approaches, which, using a term from Ken Wilber's work, I propose to call integral discourse.

Therefore, in the pages that follow, I will:

1. present a brief overview of stage development theory and relate it to the four discourses we have developed heretofore around conflict.

2. examine the values and limitations of the fourth stage, positional discourse, as represented in the practice of formal argument.

3. define and describe the emerging fifth stage of integral discourse,

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drawing from the fields of conflict resolution and rhetoric for examples of practices related to this discourse and distinguishing them from argument or expanded notions of argument.

4. describe some applications of this new discourse.

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Chapter 1. Stage Development Theory.

Approaches to conflict appear to develop chronologically (at least in the Western world) both in terms of the individual and in terms of society. Whether this is because there is a intrinsic human tendency to develop along a particular path or because our culture encourages this kind of development, I do not know. At any rate, most children begin with a distinctly physical approach to conflict. They grab and hit, push and run away; their orientation is that might makes right, you take what you want, and there is no justification needed. At a later age, when it becomes clear that taking what you want requires some justification, they learn the power of emotional appeal. Desire *is* the justification; whining, crying, and begging are the methods of satisfying that desire.

Next, rules enter the picture; one gets what one wants because one is "supposed" to have it. Endless arguments about whether or not one "should" get to have or do something characterize this level of development. Authority figures are powerful. ("My Daddy can beat up your Daddy.") Later, rationality enters the picture, and the arguments move from simple appeals to authority to the amassing of evidence on one's "side." When reason fails to solve the problems facing us, we may break down into hopelessness, initiate border wars with one another over boundaries and meanings, and/or seek to run away or avoid conflict altogether.

However, if we are able to see beyond our despair, we may begin to sense the interrelatedness of the self and everything else, to see the value in all perspectives. At this point different kinds of solutions to conflict become possible. We get a sense of the "whole" conflict. Satisfying our own needs begins to seem partial and unsatisfying. As the integration of self with "other" is deepened, we may develop a "felt sense" that goes deeper than ordinary forms of communication, a kind of "knowing" that guides us.

Finally, if we are lucky (or, more likely, dedicated to developing our consciousness), we become able to see each human being *as* the self - just as powerful, just as desirous, just as righteous, just as "right," just as needy - and therefore to be cared for just because he exists, regardless of power, desire,

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righteousness, or even need. For example, one whose second level emotional magical self is stirred might give to poor child, but she might not extend the same kind of caring to a mob boss. Mindell illustrates this attitude when he describes his embarrassed discovery that he was uncomfortable giving equal attention to the mainstream point of view in a dispute involving minority complaints (35-36). One who sees everyone as the self, however, could extend love and caring even to someone who was "undeserving." Thich Nhat Hanh has a poem which I think illustrates beautifully this kind of consciousness.

Please Call Me by My True Names

Do not say that I'll depart
tomorrow because even today I still
arrive.

Look at me; I arrive in every second
to be a bud on a Spring branch, to
be a tiny bird, whose wings are still
fragile, learning to sing in my new
nest, to be a caterpillar in the heart
of a flower, to be a jewel hiding
itself in a stone.

I still arrive, in order to laugh and
to cry, in order to fear and to hope.
The rhythm of my heart is the birth
and death of all that are alive.

I am the mayfly metamorphosing
on the surface of the river. I am
also the grass-snake, who,
approaching in silence, feeds itself
on the frog.

I am the child in Uganda, all skin
and bones, my legs as thin as
bamboo sticks.

I am also the merchant of arms,
selling deadly weapons to Uganda.

I am the 12-year-old girl, refugee on
a small boat, who throws herself
into the ocean after being raped by
a sea pirate.

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I am also the pirate, my heart not
yet capable of seeing and loving.

I am a member of the politburo,
with plenty of power in my hands.

I am also the man who has to pay
his "debt of blood" to my people,
dying slowly in a forced labor
camp.

My joy is like Spring, so warm it
makes flowers bloom in all walks
of life.

My pain is like a river of tears - so
full it fills up all the four oceans.

Please call me by my true names so
that I can hear at the same time all
my cries and my laughs, so that I
can see that my joy and pain are
butone.

Please call me by my true names so
that I can become awake, so that
the door of my heart be left open,
the door of Compassion.

Thich Nhat Hanh

On a global level, we also see evidence of chronological development in our ways of handling conflict. Historically, we have moved from a world of barbarian attack to battles for riches or "love" (i.e. Helen of Troy) to imperialism (with "God on our side" or under orders of the king) to revolution based on ideas (the Communist Revolution) to fragmentary and internecine skirmishes all over the globe (Vietnam) to negotiating arms reduction to lending aid and finally (rarely) to offering real forgiveness and joining hands to help one another in a context of equality (Mandela's efforts in South Africa are an example). I do not mean to imply that the development of these methods of handling conflict has proceeded historically in such a clear step-by-step manner, nor do I have the space here to offer a full defense of this claim, but I believe that a reading of history will demonstrate that resort was had more frequently to physical methods of conflict resolution

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earlier in human history, later to more rational or care-based approaches. All are in existence today, although we tend to decry the physical (war) and seek to handle disputes at "higher" levels (formal argument).

While there are no published models of growth around conflict per se that I know of[1], the broad patterns of human growth in areas such as cognitive, psycho-sexual, and moral development have been studied extensively by psychologists and philosophers, and there are many theories extant which document them. In this chapter I would like to discuss some of these theories and offer Ken Wilber's model in particular as a template for categorizing developmental shifts in our approaches to conflict.

The concept of life as a developmental project is something with which we are all acquainted in one way or another. Physically, the child metamorphoses into the adult, Darwin's evolutionary scheme describes a progression from less complex to more complex forms of life, anthropologists offer us a hierarchy of societal development from primitive tribe to complex civilization. There have been many other developmental models in other fields. Compositionist Peter Elbow has pointed outthat "[T]he three giant theories of 19th century: Darwin, Marx, and Freud - are all

[1] With the exception of a master's thesis by Colorado mediator Randy Compton who has also related Wilber's stages to conflict handling. Our similar ideas were developed independently although I have benefitted from reading his work. Compton's thesis is a call to bring higher orders of development, namely spiritual ones, to bear on the management of conflict. He proposes that "the dynamics of conflict change according to the level of consciousness we operate on" (16), that the causes of and approaches to conflict vary from stage to stage in both the individual and in society. He uses as examples: 1. Marxists at the material/physical level who struggle for position, power, wealth, status, and resources, 2. Darwinists and Freudians at the emotional-sexual level who see an instinctual drive for survival in competition with others and between individual impulses and moral social behavior, 3. Social psychologists at the membership/ mental level who see conflict as misunderstanding and temporarily inharmonious relations within an overall order, 4. Scientists/rationalists at the rational-mental level who view conflict as irrational or pre-rational impulses within a mechanically ordered society, and 5. Existentialists at the mental-intentional level who attempt to achieve meaning. (79, 80). According to Compton, many of today's conflicts are between what he refers to as the mythic-membership stage, the rational-mental stage, and the mental-intentional stage. He also claims that much of our current conflict comes from a belief that immortality can be reached through the ego. These, and a plethora of other ideas, while interesting and definitely worth exploring further, are minimally developed in his thesis as it is written and stand primarily as unsupported generalizations. Thus, other than to acknowledge that we have independently arrived at some of the same ideas and to note that when I use the concept of exchanges, I am borrowing it from him, I will not be drawing from his work.

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cases of insisting on an historical or developmental model . . . Einstein's theory of relativity is, of course, the most striking instance of a theory that insists on the time dimension . . to make sense of phenomena in which it had not seemed to be needed before. . . " (1986, 249).

In addition to these observable exterior developmental phenomena, we have discovered developmental stages in our interiors: our psychological, mental, and spiritual selves. Over time and with the right kind of environment (which usually includes education and guidance from those further along on the path), we grow in our capacity to understand and cope with our lives. We learn to handle more and more complex ideas. We may grow closer to our idea of spiritual perfection. Each epoch and each culture has interpreted this interior growth in its own way. Our own modern version is generally considered to have begun with Jean Piaget's theory of cognitive development (Wastell, 575) which has provided the foundation for subsequent theories of cognitive, moral, psychological, and spiritual development. "Piaget . . . argues that all growth results from the interaction in time of contradictory processes, assimilation and accommodation. His model has been fruitful in spawning others (e.g., Perry; Kohl [sic])" (Ibid, 249). Kohlberg refers to "an "invisible college" of developmentalists" (1984, viii). While the models differ considerably in their explication, most particularly in their endpoints, there are common threads running through them.

All describe a widening of perspective, an ability to step outside the self that previously existed and include more of the world within one's view. Cognition advances from understanding concrete objects to seeing them as a subset of abstract ideas; morality advances from pure self-interest to reflection upon rights and responsibilities in community; the ego progresses from a physically oriented self to a mentally oriented one, from an "I" that sees itself as consistent to one that embraces conflicting ideas to the disappearance of the "I" entirely at the transpersonal levels. Often those who are more advanced in one developmental mode are more advanced in another; movement in one dimension seems to encourage, if not propel, development in another. Wilber describes evolution of all types as having directionality in the form of increasing complexity, increasing differentiation/integration, increasing

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organization/structurization, and increasing relative autonomy. Each move up the developmental ladder means a larger context.

As one develops, one gains access to a greater and greater range of understandings and behaviors. However, while the limited worldview of the earlier stages is lost, the earlier capacities are retained. "The question is not just what floor of the building you're living on . . . but how many floors you have ready access to as you negotiate your way through life" (Wilber in Schwartz, 367).

Stage development theory assumes that there are structures that one can describe, structures that are either innate to the human organism or constructed as a result of interactions with the environment. The differences among the developmental theorists seem to reside in their different foci: cognitive, psychosexual, affective, object-relational, moral, ego, or spiritual development. They hold different beliefs regarding the endpoint of human growth, different opinions regarding the contents and power of the unconscious, different views on whether developmental structures are innate or environmentally caused, and different uses toward which the model is to be put (therapy, education, spiritual growth). Some cover more than one arena, some attempt to integrate several. Says Weaver,

> "Some of the theories are created from new definitions of human *teleos* (purpose) . . . . Others represent a fresh slant on . . . a predecessor's work . . . others seem to be creating a composite from the work of two or more previously developed theories or branches of psychology . . . some . . . addressed [sic] stages of childhood only . . . occasionally those who followed expanded the founder's original theory to include adult issues . . ." (4).

The most common divisions seem to fall along disciplinary lines: Cognitive developmental theory (e.g., Piaget) concerns itself with mental structures (either innate or constructed) and the capacity to order and reflect upon experience; in other words, the ability to think. Moral developmental theory, most comprehensively developed by Kohlberg and Gilligan, has more to do with what we think *about*, in particular, how we think about ethical issues. Moral development also involves relations with other human beings rather than simply relations with the physical world or the world of ideas.

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Wilber would say that moral development *follows* cognitive development, that cognitive development is necessary for moral development but not sufficient. Moral development is also a cultural rather than solely an individual matter; a 'we' as well as an "I" is implied. Ego/psychological development deals with issues of feelings as well as thought, with human relationships as well as relations with the physical world. Erik Erickson, Jane Loevinger, and many others have developed stage models of this line of development.

Spiritual development refers to a capacity that is not recognized by all developmentalists, or, if recognized, is often seen as more of a frill than a basic element in human development. Some, however, see it as fundamental. Says Aldous Huxley in The Perennial Philosophy[2]:

> The divine Ground of all existence is a spiritual Absolute, ineffable in terms of discursive thought, but (in certain circumstances) susceptible of being directly experienced and realized by the human being .... The last end of man, the ultimate reason for human existence, is unitive knowledge of the divine Ground - the knowledge that can come only to those who are prepared to "die to self" and so make room, as it were, for God. Out of any given generation of men and women very few will achieve the final end of human existence; but the opportunity for coming to unitive knowledge will, in one way or another, continually be offered until all sentient beings realize Who in fact they are (21).

Many of the great mystics and theologians speak of spiritual development in similar terms, as having an endpoint toward which we strive and steps along the way that indicate progress. Wilber has connected psychological models of development of the West to spiritual models of development of the East. He believes that the full "spectrum" of development must go beyond prepersonal and personal development to transpersonal, or spiritual, development. He says of the writings on the

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[2] The Perennial Philosophy, a term coined by Leibniz, is "the metaphysic that recognizes a divine Reality substantial to the world of things and lives and minds; the psychology that finds in the soul something similar to, or even identical with, divine Reality; the ethic that places man's final end in the knowledge of the immanent and transcendent Ground of all being ... Rudiments of the Perennial Philosophy may be found among the traditionary lore of primitive peoples in every region of the world, and in its fully developed forms it has a place in every one of the higher religions" (Huxley, vii). This divine Reality may be "directly apprehended by a mind in a state of detachment, charity and humility" (Ibid, xi).

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world's great contemplative and meditative disciplines, "The models are sufficiently similar to suggest an underlying common invariant sequence of stages, despite vast cultural and linguistic differences as well as styles of practice" (Wilber, Engler, and Brown, 5). Wilber speaks of a Human Consciousness Project converging on a "master template" of the various stages, structures, and states of consciousness available to men and women (1997, 30), a template which describes the move from physiocentric to biocentric to egocentric to sociocentric to wordcentric to theocentric consciousness (1995, 627).

In these models, each developmental stage brings its characteristic way of looking out at the world, a way of seeing that changes with each move up the ladder. Each stage has its tasks which may be negotiated well or badly (if badly, then "blobs"[3] of the personality may remain at the lower stages and conflict with the rest of the personality which has moved on to higher stages). Each stage, says Wilber, has "a different sense of space-time, law and morality, cognitive style, self-identity, mode of technology (or productive forces), drives or motivation, types of personal pathology (and defenses), types of social oppression/repression, degrees of death-seizure and death-denial, and types of religious experience" (1995, 119). And further, "At each rung in the developmental unfolding there is a different view of the world - a different view of self and of others - a different worldview. The world looks different - is different! - at each rung in the developmental unfolding" (1996, 145).

Our worldview affects what we see and how we interpret what we see. We see what we expect to see, and we interpret what we see in accordance with the perspective of the stage we are inhabiting. For example, we can interpret a demotion as persecution by the boss, as the workings of fate, as a sign of personal inadequacy, as a wake-up call to develop new skills, or as a gift that presents us with an opportunity to reassess our life direction. Strauch tells the story of an experiment in which people were exposed from time to time to a red spade. They persisted in calling it a heart. Having no category for a red spade, it did not exist for them (18). Says Strauch,

> [W]hatever does exist "out there" is very different than we perceive it to be.

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3 Wilber's term

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> By the time we have processed our perceptions to the point that we become conscious of and able to attach a label to them, we are no longer perceiving the external object at all. Rather, we are perceiving a curious mixture of the object and of our reactions to it, our expectations about it, and our past experience with similar objects. What we perceive, then, is largely our own creation (86).

With movement upward, the capacities of the lower stage are kept, but the worldview is lost (1995, 244). As we progress, we reorder and reshape our past to coincide with our new way of seeing. "The self rewrites its history, reinterpreting everything through the perspective of the new worldview" (Strauch, 176). Wilber gives as an example the Piagetian experiment in which children were asked to watch as the same amount of water was poured from a short, fat beaker into a tall, thin one. At one level of development, the children insisted that the tall beaker had more water. At the next level, not only did the children recognize that the volume of water had not changed, but they refused to believe that they could ever have thought it did (1996, 176).

Schaef has pointed out that each level is "true" for one operating in it. If we have passed through a level, we may sympathize with one operating within it; otherwise we cannot (158-60). As Gee notes, all discourses incorporate a tacit theory of normal and right ways to think, feel, and behave (xx). Says Wilber, "the hermeneutics of any worldspace is closed and perfectly evidential for that worldspace" (376). There is "proof" available that satisfies at each stage. There was evidence for gods and goddesss when the mythical stage was paramount (1995, 376). My own daughter, happy in her three-year-old magical world, was quite convinced that the Easter Bunny had visited when she found a piece of gray fluff under the dining room table.

At each stage the next higher stage is an "invisible world" that has no existence for the individual - even if it is all around. To a scientist fully ensconced in Wilber's formal reflexive stage, the intuition of the psychic stage is totally irrelevant. The language of that next world is not comprehensible because the referents do not exist until the interior perception has developed to that worldspace (1995, 267, 272). For example, a library will be significantly different to a three-year-old and a twelve-year-old. The former will be aware of the physical appearance of the books; the latter will be aware that they

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contain knowledge. To a culture such as Iran in which most people believe that truth is contained in the words of the religious leader, arguing about issues such as international law can seem a ridiculous enterprise. Wilber describes the "deer in the headlights look" that one gets when trying to explain transpersonal experience to one who has not had that experience.

People have a tendency to believe that wherever they are on the developmental ladder is the ultimate. We have trouble conceiving of higher stages and even if we can conceive of them, they usually do not appeal to us. Imagine suggesting to an unhappy business person that he take up the existence of a monk. Even though many spiritual writers suggest that giving up our attachment to our possessions may be a significant step on the way to true happiness, few of us are willing to take that step. We prefer to stay embedded in the troubles of our own stage until something (usually something traumatic) shoves us out of that bed and forces us to recreate our existence. In Wilber's terms, we then "transform" upward.

Wilber suggests that the only way out of these limited worldviews is to develop psychologically and spiritually until we can inhabit the higher levels at which one can integrate all the dimensions of experience: the sensory, the emotional, the social, the mental, the psychic, and the spiritual (Wilber, 1995, 265). "We do not see things only as they are, but also as we are. Contemplative training changes the way we are and opens us to the hidden wisdom and higher grades of significance" (Wilber in Walsh, 225).

Objections to hierarchical developmental schemes.

A hierarchy, as many have pointed out, implies that "higher" is "better" and "lower" is "worse." Objections to such categorizations center around the discriminatory evils that result from categorizing people. Clearly, calling one person "worse," or less developed, than another can have negative consequences ranging from lost income opportunities to negative social treatment to lowered self-esteem. While most of us would agree that labeling people in this fashion can lead to discrimination, we regularly formulate hierarchies in all areas of life with positive intent. We have hierarchies of mental illness, of criminal behavior, of success. We educate

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our children (in a graduated, hierarchical system) because we believe it is better to be more educated than less educated. To discriminate against a kindergartner because he/she cannot multiply is not helpful, but knowing his "level" so that we might find appropriate educational materials to enable him to develop such skills is. That hierarchical frameworks can help us to understand our world has been repeatedly demonstrated. The problem is not so much the fact of hierarchy but whether it is used to justify unfair treatment.

Some, particularly those who favor the "web of life" concept (e.g., deep ecologists), see a world in which every element and every capacity is equal, each contributing to the whole. They dislike hierarchies because they imply inequality. While it is may be true that all elements and capacities are equal, or at least all necessary to the human experience, we can also say that certain elements or capacities are more complex or have an apparently greater range of usefulness or represent a "better" response to a situation. Wilber mounts an impressive defense of hierarchy (or holarchy[4]), a central part of his philosophy, in Sex, Ecology, and Spirituality and again in A Brief History of Everything, especially chapters one and two. He stresses that reality is composed of holons, wholes which are parts of larger wholes which are parts of larger wholes, etc. Each holon is both part and whole, is an agentic and a communal entity. Higher levels of the hierarchy have greater depth, though less span. They are more complex and thus have 'better' or greater capacities. Pathological hierarchy occurs, says Wilber, when a holon usurps its usual place and attempts to dominate other holons; that is, he says, what the "web of life" or systems theorists are objecting to. Nonpathological hierarchy, however, does not contain this repressive tendency. The existence of pathological hierarchies does not damn the existence of hierarchies (1995, 22).

According to the developmental schemes infra, more "developed" people *are* "better." They tend to be people who can take into account the perspectives of a broader range of other people, and the broader range of circumstances and events which those people experience (Basseches, 282). Wilber claims that each succeeding stage is more valuable because it allows

[4] a term he has drawn from Koestler.

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for wider range of interactions (1995, 21). In a 1967 study, Nevitt Sanford reported that as students developed, they became "less stereotyped in their thinking, less conformist, less prejudiced, more open to experience, possessed of more firmly internalized values, more sophisticated and enlightened in their views of the world, and more capable of expressing their deeper feelings" (Sanford, 20, cited in Basseches, 295). Certainly, these are qualities that would seem to benefit society in general.

Kegan says about his higher (fourth and fifth) stages that they provide "even more protection from the captivation and dominance of other reality constructions" (333); in other words, they militate against fads and cults and totalitarianism and mob thought. Maslow lists some characteristics of people at his self-actualized stage: 1) a superior perception of reality, 2) increased acceptance of self, of others, and of nature, 3) increased spontaneity, 4) an increase in problem-centering, 5) increased detachment and desire for privacy, 6) increased autonomy and resistance to enculturation, 7) greater freshness of appreciation and richness of emotional reaction, 8) higher frequency of peak experiences, 9) increased identification with the human species, 10) changed/ improved interpersonal relations, 11) more democratic character structure, 12) greatly increased creativity, 13) certain changes in the value system (23).

Another criticism of hierarchies is that they are culturally relative and gender relative. Kohlberg has been criticized for obscuring women's experience, for example. This bias may be more evident at the level of the prepersonal and personal stages than the transpersonal ones. Wilber and Huxley claim that the higher stages are not bound by cultural or gender bias because, in their schemes, they are not *personal*. The self that appears at the higher levels of evolution is not a self that is tied to a culture or a body or even a point of view.

Another objection to hierarchies is that the theory we employ decides what we will observe and thus limits or biases us. It provides a structure through which we view the world; when we work with a structure, we tend to ignore things outside it. This is clearly a weakness for any structure we might propose, from a scientific hypothesis to an experimental sample to a concept to a developmental hierarchy. We tend to divide the world into parts

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so as to examine it more closely, but when we do, we are no longer looking at the same reality. Perhaps the best we can do is to maintain a healthy skepticism about our structures and theories and experiments and what they can actually tell us and to step back occasionally for a more holistic view.

More problematic, though less commonly put forth, is the objection that comes from those who promote a nondual perspective in which everything "is" and is "Now." From this perspective, or, more accurately, lack of perspective, linear development and stages or "better" and "worse" are illusory. I am inclined to believe that this is a more "true" description of reality than is the hierarchical one. However, we do not generally live at the stage of the nondual, and we regularly use mental constructs as frameworks for looking at reality. A stage model is just one of the frameworks we can use for this purpose. Based on the number of people who have adopted them and their apparent usefulness in helping us to understand our world, I think there is precedent for my own endeavors.

As is probably obvious, I favor using hierarchical schemes of human development. I agree with Loevinger when she says, "In spite of reservations about the structural approach, I believe that the only way to understand development consists in conceptualizing it as a sequence of structural changes, often stimulated by the interaction of an organism with its environment" (51). The personality, she says, "develops by acquiring successive freedoms," first from impulses, then from conventions, etc. Feuerstein points out that structures are not concretely existing facts in real life but are in a *"bardo* state between the reality of experience and the reality (or ideality) of abstraction" (196). If we seek to grow ourselves, we need to know where we can go. Pictures of developmental possibilities can be helpful in this regard.

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Chapter 2. The Developmental Schemes

I will outline several developmental schemes in this chapter. The first of the modern Western developmental schemes to which Wilber and other developmental theorists refer is Piaget's. Following are three others: Wilber's, Kegan's, and Gebser's. The first two deal with individual growth and development; the third with collective shifts of consciousness. Wilber's scheme[1] is a synthesis of most of the developmental schemes extant (Piaget, Erickson, Loevinger, Kohlberg, Gilligan, Eastern models of spiritual development, etc.). Kegan's is also a synthesis of modern developmental theory, though directed more to the teacher. I include it because it is more practically oriented and also because the phenomenon of independently developed but strikingly similar schemes is significant. The two are amazingly similar up to Wilber's vision-logic and Kegan's fifth order consciousness, although they differ in what they see as the driving force behind development. For Kegan it is the demands of our culture which drive our development. For Wilber it is the drive of humans toward the divine. Gebser, author of the third scheme, describes discrete epochs of consciousness beginning with the archaic consciousness of the caveman and proceeding to the integral consciousness he sees emerging now. I allude from time to time to parallels to other developmental theories for those readers who are familiar with them.

Jean Piaget[2]

Piaget was primarily a genetic epistemologist[3] who saw mental development as a process of adaptation to the environment and an extension of biological development (Wadsworth, 1, 3). He disagreed with both empiricists and *a priorists*. He did not believe that knowledge was either

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[1] See Appendix A for diagram.

[2] It is important to point out that Piaget studied children only . However, even though my primary interest is in adult development, I feel it is important to give a brief overview of his theory since Piaget is generally regarded as the 'father' of developmental stage theory. Many of his successors accept his formal operations stage as a definition of adult cognition or as a beginning point for further adult development. In addition, Piaget's scheme has been 'lifted' into adult developmental schemes either because of an apparent misunderstanding of his research or because of a difference in opinion as to the ages at which the various stages occur.

[3] one who describes and explains how knowledge is acquired.

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imposed through experience or was a reflection of innate structure, but argued that it was "actively constructed and reconstructed over time by human beings in such a way as to maintain an equilibrium betwen their activity and the external world" (Basseches, 33). Experience creates disequilibrium which leads to new constructions. This process is called assimilation and accommodation.

Piaget described four basic stages.

1. Sensorimotor intelligence (ages 0-2). At this stage the child's consciousness is body-consciousness. Children at this age do not recognize themselves as separate from their caretakers or their world. They are embedded in physical existence.

2. Preoperational thought (ages 2-7). The child begins to decenter, to look at the world as distinct from herself. However, she fixes attention on only one aspect of an object, takes the specific for the general, and treats mental events as corporeal. In other words, a child at this stage cannot categorize or generalize, nor can she take a perspective outside her own. She assumes that everyone thinks as she does. She is limited to her own mind.

3. Concrete operations (ages 7-11). The child at this stage can operate only on concrete objects. Abstract, hypothetical ideas are outside his abilities. The child can conserve and reverse operations but cannot deal only in verbal terms. He still has "trouble imagining the psychological world of others in any detail" (Kurfiss, 2).

4. Formal operations (ages 11-15). The child now has the cognitive structural equipment to think as well as adults, although "content and function of intelligence may [still] improve" (Wadsworth, 101). She can engage in abstract thought, deal with propositions, generate hypotheses, and consider proportion and combinations. She can reflect upon her own thought and the thought of others, consider implications, and identify contradictions.

Growth that continues after this stage is not seen by Piaget as a continuing development of new structures but as wider applications of the same skills. For example, adolescents are idealistic and try to adapt the environment to their idealistic conceptions, being unable to see the difference

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between possibilities in their imaginations and possibilities in reality. True objectivity is not achieved until "the adolescent assumes adult roles in the real world and can differentiate the many possible points of view" (Wadsworth, 112).

Growth to the stage of formal operations is also not assured. According to Arlin, "it has been widely demonstrated that only 50% of the adult population ever attains the Piagetian stage of formal operational thinking, the problem-solving stage" (605).

Ken Wilber

Wilber's developmental theory is the most comprehensive and most integrated scheme in existence. He draws from all of the mainstream Western theorists and adds, for his transpersonal stages, the wisdom of the Eastern mystics and sages. His stages are similar to the matter, body, mind, soul, spirit categorizations of many spiritual writings (sometimes reduced to simply body, mind, and spirit).

Wilber presented his developmental project as "the spectrum of consciousness"[4] in his 1986 book, Transformations of Consciousness. The most complete rendering of this spectrum, in Sex, Ecology, and Spirituality, is an evolved version and integration of that spectrum plus the developmental scheme presented in The Atman Project in 1980 (a discussion of the drive of humans toward transcendence or "the drive of God towards God" (1980, ix)) and melds psychological, cognitive, and spiritual lines of development. In Eye of Spirit he elaborates on and alters some of his earlier views, mostly by adding to the complexity of his vision. All of these various lines of development are housed within a "self" which in Eye of Spirit he calls "the balancing act of the psyche" (228).

While many of these stages are negotiated in childhood, Wilber regards them as persisting in some form in the adult, due to the fact that each stage is not lost but is incorporated within succeeding stages, because different "lines" (cognitive, moral, psychosexual) of development may not have proceeded at the same rate, or because people have failed in some significant way to

[4] first described in a slighly different form in 1975 in an article, "Psychologia Perennis: The Spectrum of Consciousness." Walsh and Vaughan, p. 21.

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progress beyond a particular stage. Many adults, he points out, have failed to successfully complete the tasks of the early stages and may thus remain largely "stuck" in them. Thus, even if they are not fully stuck in these earlier stages, "blobs" of the personality may still be lodged there.

The first stage in Wilber's scheme is the **sensoriphysical** which he describes as similar to Maslow's physiological, Loevinger's autistic and symbiotic, and Kohlberg's premoral stages. At this stage of development, the self *is* the body. The matters that concern this self are food, shelter, and the satisfaction of instinctual needs. A young child or perhaps an ancient gladiator might represent the consciousness of this stage. In this stage, the person is blind to the understandings of the higher selves; capacities that go beyond instinct such as social conformity or rationality play no role in the person's life. The "other" is not present as a real being with feelings, thoughts, or needs. Wilber emphasizes that this infant consciousness is not one of mystical union but is in fact "the greatest point of alienation or separation from all of the higher levels" (1993, 188). The consciousness of the sensoriphysical stage is an archaic consciousness (see Gebser infra).

The second stage is the **phantasmic-emotional**[5]. This self is egocentric and narcissistic. There is still no well-developed individuality, no sense of emotional boundaries. This is the level of impulse, libido, elan vital, bioenergy, and prana. Here the child is differentiating itself from the material world and identifying with its own body, but there is no understanding of the self as a separate emotional being. The child assumes that others feel as he/she feels, want what he/she wants. The self is one with the group. Others are pursued for approval and admiration but there is a lack of interest in or empathy for them. If problems arise with this differentiation, then the narcissistic and borderline pathologies develop. At this level, the first mental forms appear as images (1993, 185); however, symbols are confused with the physical events they represent (1995, 165). Consciousness is at the magical stage, one in which the person believes he or she can magically influence the

[5] Wilber sometimes combines this stage and the next and/or uses similar terms to describe the non-cognitive aspects of the two levels (cf. 1996, 173 and 1983, 282). He also says that magical cognition dominates the entire early preoperational period which includes both the emotional/magical and the rep mind stages (1995, 216).

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world by merely thinking or wishing. The worldview is animistic; the outside and the inside are confused: "The clouds move because they are following you . . . It rains because the sky wants to wash you off . . ." (1996, 173).

The next stage is the representational or **rep mind,** an emerging mental self similar to Piaget's preoperational, Maslow's safety needs, Loevinger's impulsive and self-protective, and Kohlberg's magic wish and obedience and naive hedonism stages. Now, one begins to identify with the mental or conceptual self and to work with symbols (images that represent something but which do not look like it) and concepts (classes of things). In general, children between the ages of two and seven negotiate this stage. Language emerges; the self is no longer just a body dominated by present feelings and impulses but is a mental self with an identity, hopes, and wishes. At this stage, time can be experienced as past and present. Because the individual can picture the past and the future, guilt and anxiety emerge. Unacceptable (to the family, the culture) drives are repressed, and the shadow begins to develop. Her own magic does not seem to work, so the child assumes that more powerful figures are ordering the world around; thus a mythological worldview begins to develop.

The next stage is the **rule/role mind,** similar to Maslow's belongingness, Loevinger's conformist and conscientious-conformist stages, Kohlberg's approval and law and order stages, and Piaget's concrete operations stage. This stage typically emerges at around ages 6-7 and continues to 11-14. "It involves the capacity to form mental rules and to take mental roles. And - this is crucial - the child finally learns to take the role of other" (1996, 174). A child at this stage can take the role of other, can, for example know that placing a ball that is half one color and half another color between herself and the other person means that she is looking at one color and the other person at another.

The moral stance shifts from egocentric to conformist. The person behaves as he does to conform to group rules. He can manage rules of multiplication, rules of games, etc., and take on the roles of the society. Myths and archetypes are active at this stage as representatives of what roles the

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person might take on. Myths are typically taken literally; ritual is added to incline the gods to favor one's prayers. The individual can not order the world around, but God can, and therefore one needs to know how to please God. Wilber does not agree with Jung's or Joseph Campbell's elevation of myth to the transpersonal: "beyond mythology is reason, and beyond both is Spirit" (1995, 242), he says.

This is the stage at which organized religion takes on great importance. Gebser points out that only with the mental stage could religion be a fact or an alternative. "Briefly, religion is the characteristic world-experience of the mythical consciousness which arose and developed in the foundations of the magical and archaic structures of consciousness. Religion is, on one level, a matter of memory (the ability to reach back into the experienced past) and, on another level, of feeling (beyond magical emoting and archaic presentiment) and of social sentiment. And both memory and feeling (together with introspection) are capacities that were added to the human repertoire of adaptive responses through the emergence of the mythical consciousness" (87).

Care and concern is now extended beyond the self to the groups that share the individual's mythology or ideology. The person develops a sociocentric or ethnocentric worldview, enlarging the self to include the group, but still regarding those outside the group as other than self.

Next is the **formal-reflexive** stage, sometimes called the mature ego or rational stage, which is similar to Piaget's formal operations, Maslow's self-esteem, Loevinger's conscientious and individualistic, and Kohlberg's individual rights and principled stages. There is now the capacity to think about thinking. This capacity leads to justifying and giving evidence for beliefs (1995, 173). What if and how if, reflection and hypotheticals are possible, rules and roles can be reflected upon. One can grasp multiple perspectives (cf. Perry's stage of multiplicity); one is relational and systemic. Because people at this level are capable of criticizing the society of which they are a part, the moral stance moves to a worldcentric one. Possible worlds can be imagined - thus the idealism of this stage. Ego identity now replaces role identity (1995, 171-180). The self is located in the individual mind rather than

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in the role. Autonomy is a major theme. People at this stage are experimental and introspective: "Who am I?" becomes a burning question. Issues of mortality, finitude, integrity, authenticity, and meaning in life dominate (1993, 194). Birth and death are not only physical but metaphoric.

The worldview is now *worldcentric.* Care and concern is extended to the entire globe. Identification is less with the culture, nation, religious group, etc. than with the human family. Human life is valued per se, universal principles are applied to moral problems. According to one study, only 4% of the American population actually reaches this highly developed stage (1996, 188).

Wilber describes "languages" for each stage from here on. The languages of the formal-reflexive stage are the languages of "representation and reflection"; the world is described as if pregiven to a disengaged subject. They are empiric and analytic (1995, 621-2). The mental ego is still trapped in duality; it sees things as either/or (1996, 191).

Many stage models stop at this stage. Wilber and a few others have included within their schemes stages that go beyond the rational. These "transpersonal" stages come *after* Piaget's formal operations stage, the point at which his and many other Western stage development theories end. Most of those who propose additional stages suggest only one additional one; at most, two. Wilber, however, proposes four distinct stages that lie beyond the rational including first a worldcentric, integrative consciousness which can synthesize ideas and grasp gestalts (the vision-logic stage) and later, spiritual perspectives that grow out of contemplative practice. His description of these higher stages is drawn from the writings of Eastern sages and saints. Wilber's stages are often divided into a tripartite categorization of Prepersonal (Preconscious, Pre-Ego), Personal (Conscious, Ego), and Transpersonal (Superconscious, Egoless) development.[6] The third group, according to Wilber, has not been acknowledged as "real" in Western culture or has been confused with the Prepersonal stages (i.e. all psychic or mystical experience is evidence of pathology or is the oceanic infantile ground from which we have

[6] corresponding roughly to the common division of the self into body, mind, and spirit.

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sprung).[7] Because of this attitude, because every stage appears to be the final one for its adherents (Loevinger, 430) and because it is usually difficult to comprehend a stage more than one stage beyond the one one inhabits (Wilber, Kegan), I will begin with a defense of the existence of additional stages. Following that, I will recap the higher stages of Wilber's scheme and those of other theorists who have postulated such stages. I will describe only the vision-logic stage in detail, the later stages being beyond the scope of my work and beyond my capacity to describe in much depth.

Evidence for the higher stages of development

The divergence of opinion among developmental theorists as to the endpoint of human development is due in part to the particular capacity that is being examined, but more often, it depends upon the theorist's beliefs about the limits to human growth, which is, in turn, largely dependent on the theorist's own level of growth. Because stages beyond those with which someone is familiar tend to be viewed with suspicion, confusion, and outright denial as to their existence, one who has not had personal acquaintance with a stage (or sufficient faith in someone else's description) is unlikely to include it in his/her model. Significant, too, is the population studied. Since it is rare for people to advance into most of the higher stages before the age of thirty, even forty (Kegan, 352), those who study children and college students are not likely to run across these later stages. In addition, Western culture has militated against investigation of the higher stages, wedded as it is to the discourse of positionality.[8]

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[7] This confusion he calls the 'pre/trans fallacy.'

[8] Stages are also found in society as a whole. Robert Pirsig, a philosopher, suggests in Lila a three-step pattern of human evolution in which during various epochs, inorganic patterns triumphed over chaos, biological patterns triumphed over inorganic forces, social patterns triumphed over biology, and intellectual patterns triumphed over social institutions. Beyond these patterns lies "pure dynamic quality," the state of being which is experienced by the mystic. Each organizing pattern has arisen and stabilized into static conditions only to be overcome by a "superior" pattern which encompasses it. These patterns are recapitulated within the human being: first, he develops an organic form, then she develops biological capabilities (eating, sleeping, manipulating objects, etc.), then he becomes part of a social organization which suppresses and controls his biological urges. It is in this century, Pirsig suggests, that ideas have become an organizing force that control society. Each succeeding "level'" is more '"valuable" than the preceding: "it is more moral for an idea to kill a society than for society to kill an ideal," he says (349), just as it is more moral for a society to kill one individual than for that individual to kill a social group and for a person to control her biological instincts than for them to control her.

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Say Walsh and Vaughn, "Contrary to long-held assumptions, psychological development can continue throughout the lifespan. Motives, emotions, morality, cognition, life tasks, and the sense of identity are all capable of growth in adulthood . . . Examples of advanced development include Abraham Maslow's metamotives, Lawrence Kohlberg's postconventional moral thinking, and Ken Wilber's postformal operational cognition. In addition, the world's religious traditions offer maps of contemplative development" (109).

Arlin says, "Recent research seems to indicate that formal operational thinking is not necessarily the final equilibrium" (602). A Canadian psychologist, Herbert Koplowitz, has suggested two steps beyond Piaget: Systems Thinking (an understanding that there are simultaneous causes that cannot be separated), and Unitary Operational Thinking (direct communication with ultimate reality, whole knowing, interdependent opposites, nonduality) (Ferguson, 37, citing the Brain/Mind Bulletin, October 2, 1978).

Kohlberg proposes two stages beyond his stage of principled reasoning which deal with agape or responsible love and a cosmic perspective or mystic union with God (401). Loevinger proposes an Autonomous Stage in which one can transcend the polarities of the previous stage and "unite and integrate ideas that appear as incompatible alternative at lower stages. . . " (23).

Maslow speaks of self-actualizating people who are more integrated, egoless, effortless, free, spontaneous, and *"here-now"* (97). Wilber offers several hundred pages in defense of his transpersonal stages in Sex, Ecology, and Spirituality and in his previous works. In fact, one only needs to look in a bookstore today to see a plethora of works attesting to the validity of a transpersonal reality. Acceptance of realities beyond the rational have gained wide acceptance in our culture.

Another phenomenon which is fueling interest in these stages is that there is an apparent acceleration occuring in cognitive development. Perry discusses the contents of Harvard exams during different eras and points out that at the beginning of the period 1900 to 1960, only 10% of questions required consideration of two or more frames of reference in government, history,

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English literature, and foreign literatures, while toward the end of the period the percentage rose to 25-80% or an average of close to 50%. He estimates that 75-80% of exam questions in the period 1950-60 were of this type (214). He comments,

> Fifty years ago . . . a college senior might achieve a world view such as that of Position 3 or Position 4 [Multiplicity][9] on our scheme and count himself a mature man. Now he must go beyond the assertion of his individualism in certainty to affirm his individuality in doubt. To be viable, the new aloneless [sic] requires a new realization of community" (5).

Perry adds, citing a 1931 comment by a Henry Adams, "The movement from unity to multiplicity, between 1200 and 1900, was unbroken in sequence and rapid in acceleration. Prolonged one generation longer, it would require a new social mind," and goes on to point out that "The rate of acceleration has been greater than perhaps even Adams foresaw, and not one but two generations have passed" (5) - and this was in 1968, yet another generation ago!

Wilber's postconventional stage, and probably the most important stage for my purposes, is the **vision-logic stage,** also sometimes referred to as the existential stage. Vision-logic, a term Wilber says he has chosen over "dialectical," "integrative," and "creative synthetic" is the capacity to establish networks of relationships,

> "the beginning of truly higher-order synthesizing capacity, of making connections, relating truths, coordinating ideas, integrating concepts. Interestingly, this is almost exactly what Aurobindo called 'the higher mind' which 'can freely express itself in single ideas, but its most characteristic movement is a mass ideation, a system or totality of truth-seeing at a single view; the relations of idea with idea, of truth with truth, self seen in the integral whole'" (1986, 71).

This is the vision.

The logic is to Wilber a logic which is "not divisive, but inclusive,

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[9] His scheme includes the following stages: Position 1 in which the student seeks the Right Answer, Position 2 in which the student attributes diversity of opinion to confusion or poorly qualified Authorities, Position 3 in which the student accepts diversity of opinion as temporary, Position 4 in which the student decides 'anyone has a right to his own opinion,' Position 5 in which the student sees knowledge as contextual and relavistic, Position 6 in which the student sees the necessity for some personal Commitment, Position 7 in which the student makes a Commitment, Position 8 in which the studnet explores issues of responsibility, and position 9 in which the student sees Commitment as an ongoing activity.

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integrating, networking, joining" (1993, 186). "Where rationality gives all possible perspectives, vision-logic adds them up into a totality . . . As such, vision-logic can hold in mind contradictions, it can unify opposites, it is dialectical and nonlinear, and it weaves together what otherwise appear to be incompatible notions . . ." (1995, 185). Vision-logic integrates the it-ness of fact, the I-ness of sincerity in reporting our interior experience and the we-ness associated with goodness, justness, relational care and concern, mutual understanding, and worldcentric fairness - Kant's categorical imperative" (1995, 393). "The point is to place each proposition alongside numerous others, so as to be able to see, or "to vision," how the truth or falsity of any one proposition would affect the truth or falsity of the other" (1983, 271). There is a shift in how one relates to time. The present is the dominant mode; yesterday and tomorrow are seen as aspects of the present. There is here and now awareness rather than thinking (1985, 148).

At this stage there is body-mind integration; vision-logic can integrate the physiosphere, the biosphere, and the noosphere (1995, 260). Wilber uses the image of the centaur to represent this integration. The self is aware of both the mind and the body as experiences. There may be regression to earlier levels where there is still some fixation or repression or unfinished business. "As egoic translation starts to wind down, these earlier "stick-points" jump out" (1996, 201). Problems arise at this stage because although the self is integrated, the world has gone flat. The personal seems meaningless, the transpersonal isn't here yet. There is thus a concern with meaning. Not yet seeing the answer in a spiritual existence, the person asks "Why should I live?" (1995, 260).

Issues of mortality, finitude, integrity, and authenticity assume great importance (1993, 194). The body and the emotions are reintegrated with the mind, producing a "centaur." This is a stage of self-actualization and creativity. The immediate and vivid present is the dominant mode of time; thoughts of past and future are present occurrences. The centaur has the ability to live in the present and tolerate ambiguity. This is a time of self-actualization. There is a struggle to become authentic instead of lying about the responsibility for one's own choices, to be in the present instead of back in

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guilt or forward in anxiety, to be responsible instead of hiding in the herd mentality (1993, 194). This is the stage at which one tries to create "a self strong enough to die" (1980, 147).

The languages of vision-logic are languages of depth and development. The exterior is new structuralism and the interior languages are hermeneutics (1995, 621-2). Examples are psychoanalysis and linguistics and the writings of the postmodern theorists. The world is not just a perception but also an interpretation (1996, 322, 325). Dualism begins to disappear; there is an interpenetration of opposites. Vision-logic is similar to Hegel's "Reason" and to the philosophy of idealism in Schelling and Whitehead, to Habermas' communicative action, to Gebser's integral-aperspectival mind, to Heidegger's being-in-the-world, to Foucault's truth, power, ethics self (1995, 393).

This existential level is the doorway to the transpersonal. "By integrating the body, the world becomes "reenchanted," (1993, 200); the "centaur" realizes that there is more to the world than the rational.[10]

The four quadrants

At the vision-logic stage, another of Wilber's models becomes particularly relevant. This is his four-quadrant theory.[11] Briefly, Wilber sees the Kosmos[12] as divisible into four quadrants: the upper right (UR) quadrant which houses, as a representative example, the empiricists; the lower right (LR) which houses the systems theorists; the upper left (UL) which houses the subjectivists (psychologists, aestheticians, spiritual seekers); and the lower left (LL) which houses the constructivists. The upper half of the model deals with the individual (person, atom, etc.), and the lower half deals with the collective (culture, tribe). The left hand describes the interior, dialogical, subjective dimensions and the right hand describes the exterior, measurable, objective dimensions.

Each of these quadrants cannot be reduced to another. Thus, says Wilber, the reductionism that permeates science (it doesn't exist unless it can

[10] See Appendix C for a description of the stages beyond vision-logic.

[11] See diagram in Appendix B.

[12] He uses the term Kosmos instead of cosmos because the former includes the subjective dimensions.

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be measured) is as faulty as is the reductionism that permeates the New Age movement (throw out science and rely solely on inner knowing). Instead, says Wilber, everything must be considered from the perspective of all four quadrants. For example, individual consciousness is not located only in the UL quadrant, the quadrant which deals with the psychic, interior aspects of the human being; instead, the individual is at least in part constructed by the culture (LL), by the institutions and systems in which she lives (LR), and by the physical realities of his life (UR).

Others have suggested similar possibilities: Says Booth, "there are many logics, and . . . each of the domains of the mind (or person) has its own kind of knowing" (99). Pepper: "we get a definite sense that from different angles our theories are closing in upon the world. The division of the four relatively adequate theories into analytic and synthetic, and each of these divisions into dispersive and integrative . . . would be puzzling in its symmetry if it did not suggest the same conclusion" (331).

At the vision-logic stage, the individual becomes more able to integrate these four quadrants, to live life both as an individual and as part of a collective, to grasp the interior and exterior dimensions of existence. A person at the vision-logic stage is also capable of integrating all of the previous stages: the physical, emotional, rep mind, and role/rule. Wilber calls this being the "centaur." As I will describe later, it is this centauric, vision-logic level that I see as the model for an integrative approach to conflict management.

Robert Kegan

Robert Kegan's stage development model parallels Wilber's in many respects. Like Wilber, he believes that each successive principle subsumes or encompasses the prior (33). "We make what was subject into object so that we can 'have it' rather than 'be had' by it - this is the most powerful way I know to conceptualize the growth of the mind" (34).

However, while Wilber speaks of the drive toward the divine, Kegan sees growth as spurred on by the claims culture makes on the minds of its members. Growth from childhood to adulthood is driven by the need to learn to function in the world; the more advanced types of development he

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describes are driven by the increasing complexity of modern society. Development is age-related but not age-determined.

Kegan is a constructivist *and* a developmentalist.

> "Subject-object theory" he says, "brings together . . . constructivism, the idea that people or systems constitute or construct reality; and developmentalism, the idea that people or organic systems evolve through qualitatively different eras of increasing complexity according to regular principles of stability and change. Subject-object theory is a "constructive-developmental" approach to human experience. It looks at the growth or transformation of how we construct meaning (198).

Kegan describes the human developmental project in terms of five different orders of consciousness, the first two occurring in childhood, the third representing the change from childhood to adulthood, and the last two being stages of adult development. He sees our society as containing three societies (which correspond to the latter three stages): "the traditional, the modern, and the postmodern" (304).

Kegan's **first order consciousness** involves fantastic and illogical thinking, impulsive and fluid feelings, and egocentric social-relating. This is the principle of independent, momentary, and atomistic events and objects. This is the state of consciousness of the young child and is similar to Wilber's sensoriphysical stage.

Second order consciousness, also called the stage of durable categories, begins at approximately age seven or eight. Thinking becomes concrete and logical. There is now an independent point of view that recognizes concrete things, knows that there are other distinct points of view, and acknowledges the self as having "enduring dispositions, ongoing needs, self interest" (22). There is not yet a sense of a "we." The person is still very egotistical and self-centered. This stage is similar to Wilber's emotional/magical stage.

Third order consciousness (also sometimes called traditional or trans-categorical or cross-categorical construction) develops between twelve and twenty (37). This stage is similar to Belenky's Subjective Knowing and Perry's Relativism and Wilber's Role/Rule stage. This is the kind of consciousness we hope our teenagers will develop. At this stage, one can "subordinate self-interest to the needs and value of a relationship" (29), one can identify inner motivations, one has a capacity for insight, and one can construct values,

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ideals, and beliefs. At third level consciousness, one's inner psychological state may be observed, one sees the future as real. One can use the concrete as a route to the abstract - example to definition. We need this ability to say "what the movie was about" (53). One can now restate an opposing view in other than straw man fashion while still holding on to one's own (while at stage two, in order to contemplate another point of view, one had to temporarily surrender one's own) (54, 57). People at the third order of consciousness are able to "share in the bigger purposes of social regulation and fair treatment . . ." (26). Marriage among those of the third order is not idealized but is seen as a partnership with differences and conflicts.

The Third order can take the concrete as an instance; it can generalize, infer, and reflect. However, it cannot evaluate or relate to its inferences or reflections. A student at this level, for example, hears "think for yourself" as "be sincere, use your own original opinions and views," rather than "take charge of the concepts or theories of the course and bring them to an issue of your own choosing" (285).

Says Kegan, "The habit of mind I call the third order of consciousness establishes the person as a citizen, one capable of joining a community as a fellow participant rather than as a ward who must be watched over for his own good and the good of those around him" (288). This habit of mind allows one to be socialized into a "discourse community" but does not include the capacity "to reflect critically on that into which it is being socialized" (288). A person at the third order defines herself by her community. Loyalty and team and group participation are important. The community establishes the vision, direction, limits, roles, etc. Says Kegan, "[T]he modernism Havel[13] thinks has come to an end has never actually begun for people whose animosities reflect their enduring loyalty to the ethnic subcommunities with which they have never ceased identifying themselves" (349).

Fourth order (Modern) **consciousness** involves understanding one's relationship to relationships. One is able to create one's own ideology or belief system: "values and ideals [become] the object rather than the subject of

13 The President of the Czech Republic and a frequent speaker on transcendent ways of viewing political problems.

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our knowing" (91). Says Kegan,

> Phylogenetically, I would put it this way: the mental burden of modern life may be nothing less than the extraordinary cultural demand that each person, in adulthood, create internally an order of consciousness comparable to that which ordinarily would only be found at the level of a community's collective intelligence .... We grieve the "loss of community" we take to be a condition of modern life .... Are we unaccompanied because the gods have died or abandoned us, as early modern philosophers contended, or because we feel charged to become them? (134).

Most people, he claims, are "in over their heads." "Even among those adults we generally see as the most affluent, most sophisticated, best educated, and most "professional," about half have not fully reached the fourth order" (197).

At the fourth order, a person abandons his romantic ideals and expectations of lack of conflict. Instead, he refashions relationships (with partner, work, community), recruits others to take ownership of them as well, finds value in conflict, releases ideas of personal control, ceases looking for authority (91). At this stage, one holds

> onto one's precious connections and loyalties while refashioning one's relationship to them so that one makes them up rather than gets made up by them. "Increasing autonomy" does not have to be a story of increasing aloneness. "Deciding for myself" does not have to equal "deciding by myself." "Autonomous" means self-regulating .... It is differentiation, after all, that creates the possibility of a new relationship to that with which one was formerly fused (222).

Direct communication is necessary to romantic relationship (whereas the third order may see it as unromantic).

Moving from the third to the fourth order means leaving the family's "faith" (266). At the third order our shoulds are our wants (275), but at the fourth order, we take an objective look at these shoulds, at the values our families had, at what we have heretofore uncritically accepted as truth. Returning to school at this point can accelerate this process: midlife learning, Kegan suggests, encourages people to "separate what they feel from what they should feel, what they value from what they should value, and what they want from what they should want" (274).

At work, someone at the fourth order 'owns' her work, is "self-initiating, self-correcting, self-evaluating . . ." (152), takes responsibility for what happens to herself both internally and externally, sees the organization

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as a whole, not just from her own part of it. One does not need to leave to hold on to loyalty to the self (as Nora feels she must leave Torvald in A Doll's House) (154). One does not feel "that the whole self has been violated when its opinions, values, rules, or definitions are challenged" (231).

Kegan's final stage, **fifth order consciousness** (Postmodern), which very few adults ever reach and practically never before they are in their forties, involves joint determination of goals, willingness to let go of plans, seeing differences as aspects of the self, using conflict to transform the self, not seeing the self as complete. In essence, the self is seen as multiple, the other is seen as part of the self, and relationships are seen as prior to and constituting the self.

Kegan sees two types of postmodern thinking: deconstructive, which is anti-modern, and reconstructive, which tries to redo modernism's reason, freedom, equity, rights, and self-determination less absolutistically (324). The deconstructive fifth order involves differentiation from fourth order consciousness, the reconstructive fourth order involves integration. With deconstruction, "The celebration of difference becomes a presumption of incommensurability, a denial of the possibility of inter-subjective understanding, and an exaggerated critique that any attempt to establish reasonable and consensual discourse across difference inevitably involves the imposition of dominant groups' values, beliefs, and modes of discourse upon others. These views are antimodern in their rejection of such goals as dialogue, reasonableness, and fair treatment of alternative points of view . . . In our view, this antimodernist position is unsustainable either intellectually or practically. It derives from a deep misunderstanding of the nature of difference . . ." (328).

With reconstructive postmodernism, dialogue does not need to lead to eliminating difference or imposing one group's views on others; instead, "dialogue that leads to understanding, cooperation, and accommodation can sustain differences within a broader compact of toleration and respect. Thus what we need is not an antimodern denial of community, but a postmodern grounding of community on more flexible and less homogeneous assumptions. . ." (329, quoting Bauman).

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Kegan's fourth, and particularly fifth, orders of consciousness suggest ways of being that go beyond argument in managing conflict. A preference for duality gives way to an understanding of the interpenetration of opposites, to more openness and less defensiveness, to interests rather than to positions, to integration rather than contradiction.

Jean Gebser.

Jean Gebser, whose work has been most accessibly summarized by Georg Feuerstein, takes as his field "the entire spectrum of human culture, beginning with the first stirrings of consciousness" (8). While Gebser's approach is not concerned with the individual as are those of the other theorists described so far, I include his discussion of mutations of consciousness here because it is picked up and adapted by Wilber to his stage theory in which the individual recapitulates the evolution of consciousness experienced by human beings in general. Says Feuerstein, "As psychologists like Sigmund Freud (psychosexual development), Jean Piaget (cognitive development), Erik Erikson (psychosocial development), and Lawrence Kohlberg (moral development) have shown, our individual growth and maturation proceed in distinct stages. Each new stage represents a qualitative gain in which new capacities come to the fore" (53).[14]

Gebser proposes comprehensive historical structures of development but stresses that the unfolding is not evolutionary in the strict sense of the term. These states of consciousness are not abandoned with growth; each remains as a portion of our way of being as new ones are unfolded. Instead, he says, the structures are "active co-constituents of the modern psyche. In other words, the past is present, just as the future is present. . ." (Feuerstein, 9)

The development of consciousness as described by Jean Gebser suggests that at different periods of human history, we experienced the world very differently. Not only was the outside world different, but our inside worlds were also different; our consciousness was less or more focused, we were less or more self-aware. Gebser has identified five epochs of consciousness: the

[14] Duane Elgin suggests a similar progression and unfolding of humanity as a whole (Awakening Earth) as does Ken Wilber (Up from Eden). This historical unfolding is regarded by Gebser and Wilber as being recapitulated in the development of the human being from birth to maturity. Again, all states of consciousness co-exist in the mature adult.

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Archaic (beginning in the dawn of history and akin to deep sleep and infancy), the Magical (roughly 200,000 B.C.E. to 40,000 B. C. E. and similar to sleep or the perspective of a one-year old), the Mythical (beginning around 40,000 years ago with Cro-Magnons and similar to the dream state), the Mental (beginning somewhere around 1500 B.C.E and similar to the waking state), and a fifth just now emerging, the Integral or Integral-Aperspectival (a "really" awake state). The Archaic correlates somewhat with Piaget's preoperational thought and Wilber's sensoriphysical stage, the Magical with Wilber's phantasmic-emotional stage, the Mythic with concrete operational thought and Wilber's role/rule stage, and the Mental with formal operational thought and Wilber's formal-reflexive stage.

During the period of Archaic consciousness, sometimes also called Biblical paradisiacal, there was no separation between the individual and the whole. Archaic consciousness is an experience of total Gestalt, larger comprehension, presentiments; it is similar to Freud's infant's 'oceanic' feeling and to deep hypnosis. "'Dawn man' lived by his instincts, always seeking to appease his hunger, thirst, and sexual needs" (Feuerstein, 56). He operated by gut response, was perpetually vigilant, ready to take flight or fight, and was keyed into the ecosystem. It was a moment to moment existence. There was no dread of death, no ego to do evil, no higher power, no real emotional ties, no mental anguish or delight because there was no self-conscious subject.

During the Magical period, people became aware of a separate external world of nature and of objects. Thinking at this time was associative and emotion-based. To avoid anxiety, boundaries were set which became laws. Silence was a primary condition; sound was magical; there was a rudimentary language. "Meaning was still one with sensate experience" (Feuerstein, 66). Emotion (love and hatred) was ego-consuming. The whole remained unknown, a part was substituted for the whole. There was an awareness of male/female difference; woman <u>was</u> nature.

Characteristics of this structure include egolessness, space and timelessness, a pointlike unitary world, and an interweaving with nature. The ego is scattered over the world. There is a rudimentary self-sense; the

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person lives through the 'we' or the horde. The family group *is* the self. The interior world is experienced in the exterior world as images, symbols, and projections of interior states. There is no sharp line between reality and imagination; learning is through role play. "Responsibility is lodged in the external world and its objects, a sure sign of egolessness" (Gebser, "Foundations," 84).

The Mythical period witnessed the advent of stone-tool technology, imaginative artists, calendars, and a complex mythology. Imagination allowed the person to reach into the self and into the world: "imagination is the duplication of external realities in the plastic field of the psyche" (Feuerstein, 77). There was a hunger for experience. Feeling became conscious; thus, there was the development of sympathy and antipathy (Gebser, Foundations, 87). Polarity, but not duality, was a theme. "Whereas dualities are mutally exclusive principles, polarities complement one another" (Feuerstein, 81). The ellipse symbolized the mythical consciousness - an expansion of the point of magical consciousness and a flowing from one pole to another. Language became crucial - to name a thing is to participate in its essence and to create it. Time in cyclical form appeared. There is a past paradise; all great mythologies remember a golden age. Symbols appeared; psychic space was "the domain newly conquered by the mythic consciousness" (Feuerstein, 88). Imagery was important as were magic and daydreaming (Ibid). The Great Mother was transformed into the Mother Goddess - the mother as other who can console and deny consolation. There was an emergent awareness of soul (77).

During the transition (approximately 10,000 to 500 B. C. E.) to the Mental Structure of Consciousness there were tremendous upheavals. There was a shift to to patriarchy, to monotheism, and to personal responsibility, to cities and the social evils of distrust, theft, nepotism, bribery, and infidelity; there was the invention of nationality and law and the advent of war, brutality, and slavery; there was racial and cultural intermixture and political instability. Man became the measure of all things. Imperialism developed as a power that could be utilized (instead of numinousness or psychic energy). The mood was one of adolescent rebelliousness; self-consciousness was a

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burden. A self-world duality was established. Speech totally embodied meaning; language was object oriented.

The Rational Consciousness (a 'deficient' aspect of the Mental according to Gebser) came with the Renaissance in the fourteenth century. There was the discovery of landscape, awareness of space, scientific exploration, individualism. Believing was not faith but seeing. "[M]aterialism, the independent ego's first and last resort, emerged as dubious victor - in the guise of modern scientism" (Feuerstein, 115).

Once there was faith in reason instead of God, the focus of identity shifted from the heart to the head; the brain and the self became fragmented (Ibid, 117). Doubt reigned supreme. "[E]very thoughtful person experienced massive confusion, as is the case in our modern pluralistic society" (103). The Greeks relied on oracles and Apollo and sought religious experience (Dionysus). There was the dualistic separation of soul from body; the suppressed body became assigned to woman. The final wisdom of the Rational is Nietzsche's madness or the ennuie, despair, and disgust of Sartre and Camus wherein even the privileged suffer from disorientation and the decline of psychic and physical health.

Gebser's claims that the next stage, the Integral consciousness, is emerging now. This stage involves a balancing and integrating of all the different structures within. There is a shift from property to work (and work is also time rather than space oriented). Value rather than quantity plays a central role. Life and death are not opposites (129). There is a resurrection of the body. There is a breaking away from spatial perspectivity, and the irruption of qualitative time, time as intensity. Abstract thinking leads to conclusions that can no longer be visualized or perspectivally fixed (Feuerstein, 133). Sheldrake's morphogenetic fields, Prigogine's reorganizing of systems into higher-order systems, Maslow's Fourth Force, and parapsychology are all evidence of this emerging consciousness. Philosophy has gone beyond the rationalist paradigm with Heidegger, Bergson, Husserl, Polanyi, and Langer.

Self-knowledge is key. Says Feuerstein, "Self-knowledge is in essence contextual: it is experiencing oneself as a unique but integral part of the total

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"environment" of existence. As such it is a moral force inasmuch as it engenders social responsiveness and responsibility" (142).

The Integral Consciousness depends on "personal transformation combined with societal change" (Ibid 145). The myth of otherness disappears and one's existence is realigned in the light of that realization. Gebser offers "a short catalog of salient integral features and their mental-rational counterparts.

Mental/Rational		Integral/Aperspectival
self-consciousnesss	-	mind-transcending freedom
ego-fulfillment	-	ego transcendence
search for perfection	-	present happiness
self-opacity	-	self-transparency
space-fixity	-	space freedom
obsessions with and fear of time	-	time-freedom
past- or future-orientedness	-	presentiation
now-orientedness	-	living in the full continuum of time
boundedness, maskedness	-	openness
rigidity, defensiveness	-	fluency, availablity
intolerance/toleration	-	playful tolerance
control	-	letting be
hesitancy	-	immediacy
anxiety	-	enjoyment
alienation	-	participatory freedom
internalized responsibility	-	personal responsiveness
emotional dependence/ independence	-	freedom of feeling
observer consciousness	-	participatory consciousness
forced action	-	responsive doing
purposive orientation	-	humorous participation
categorization	-	name-transcendence
abstraction, obsession with thinking	-	bodily presence
knowledge	-	understanding, wisdom
dogmatism	-	acknowledgment of the multivalency of life
fear of intimacy	-	freedom for intimacy
doubt	-	reverence for life
guilt	-	freedom from the superego
ennui	-	equanimity
exploitative orientation	-	service

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falling in or out of love - *being* love (Feuerstein 182-3)

> This nascent structure of consciousness, for the first time in human history, permits the conscious integration of all previous (but co-present) structures, and through this act of integration the human personality becomes, as it were, transparent to itself so that the originary presence, "the spiritual" . . . is directly "awared" (42).

There are themes that run through all of these schemes. Among them are the importance of self-knowledge, the development of a broader perspective, the expansion of personal capacities, the recognition of responsibility for others and the importance of relationship, the concepts of self-transcendence and of a witnessing consciousness, the actuality of communion with a higher power, and the embodiment of "higher" values including love. The literature of personal growth and spirituality which has exploded in this country in the past couple of decades also deals with these matters as does some of the literature of conflict resolution. I will review some of the writings on these themes when I describe integral discourse.

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Chapter 3. A History of Discourses.

Just as we develop in recognizable stages in our cognitive, moral, psychosexual lives, etc. so do we develop in our abilities to manage conflict. Each stage has its characteristic issues about which people conflict, its characteristic approaches to conflict, and its characteristic ways of resolving (or not resolving) it. Our handling of conflict is in fact one of the behaviors which demonstrates our level of cognitive, emotional, and moral development.

In the following pages, I describe a history of the "discourses" of conflict, including the issues around which conflict develops, the characteristic ways in which participants act with regard to the conflict, and the locus (loci) of power (perceived and actual) at each level. In outlining these discourses, I rely heavily on the theories put forward in the last chapter, particularly that of Ken Wilber.

Before continuing, however, I want to stress again the problem of categorical perception, the idea that once categories are established, there will be a tendency for people to slide to the center of them and ignore the many gradations and interconnections between the levels. Doing this can lead one to oversimplify people and issues, to fail to see "reality," to easily succumb to prejudice, to view people stereotypically, etc. One way to counteract these tendencies is to use a variety of models with different dividing lines, thus exposing the arbitrariness of any particular categorical division, or as Wilber does, to use various categorizations to convey a particular scheme.[1]

I would also like at this point to get rid of the idea of one rigid and inescapable hierarchy as the sole way of describing these developmental levels. While we may have a tendency to progress through these stages chronologically and developmentally, one stage is not always better than another. Also, we contain all them within us at all times. The *potential* is always there for us to act out of one or another stage (even the transcendent); whether or not we do depends more on our familiarity and comfort with it. Thus any adult has the capacity to respond to a conflict over scarce resources

[1] At various times he has presented his model in 3, 5, 9, and even 27 categories.

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physically, emotionally, rationally, authoritatively, integratively, vibratorily, or transcendently.

As I have previously suggested, there are several discourses that we already employ in the management of conflict. They include nonverbal methods of physical force and restraint (fighting, enslavement, genocide, etc.), the inducing of agreement by exciting the passions and/or invoking the ethos of the community (social pressure, advertising, political speeches, sentimental narrative, rabble rousing), the imposition of rules and sanctions (e.g. company policies, social norms, the court system), and the negotiation of difference (legislation, business, academic writing).

These discourses have developed historically and ontologically as our consciousness and our world have changed.[2] As we see "more," the context appears to change and thus so do our methods. What capabilities the participants have for managing conflict derives directly from their level of consciousness. For example, a child (or developmentally arrested adult) is likely to solve a conflict by grabbing, a teenager by emotional appeal. An adult is more likely to invoke authority or use reason. Typically, if the more "adult" methods fail, people resort to the more "childish." While a greater range of capabilities may develop with maturity, there are many adults who do not develop significant rational abilities[3] and continue to employ physical means of managing disputes (e.g. batterers)[4], incite passions unsupported by reason (e.g. the Ku Klux Klan), or invoke absolute authority (e.g. fundamentalists). To the extent these methods are used they encourage a similar response: physical restraint against the physically violent (e.g. by the police), heckling and counter-emotional appeals against the inciters, and

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[2] D'Angelo sees a series of stages in the composing process that he says recapitulate stages in the evolution of consciousness. He describes them as a move from undifferentiated poetic narrative to hierarchic integration, articulation, etc. (51). He theorizes that "the composing process is a movement from an undifferentiated whole to differentiated whole and that it repeats in microcosm the history or the evolution of consciousness" (66).

[3] Arlin notes that "it has been widely demonstrated that only 50% of the adult population ever attains the Piagetian stage of formal operational thinking, the problem-solving stage (605).

[4] their counterparts being perhaps Belenkey et al's silent knowers, those women who do not have a voice.

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counter-authority claims against the invokers of authority. Thus each "discourse" has its typical exchanges. Each discourse is also supported by different institutions and cultural practices. For example, at the physical level we have jails; emotions can find outlets around sports events and public rallies; the legal system, the military, and the corporate hierarchy provide guidance for those who seek authority; the free market and our communication systems encourage interaction among autonomous subjects.

While these discourses may be depicted as less or more "civilized," or less or more mature, each one still retains its usefulness. For example, while the discourse of physicality may encourage violence, it may also make us aware of the somatic content of conflict, a way of knowing that "higher" forms of discourse often discount. Also, since physical discourse is employed by many in our society, it is necessary for all of us to understand how to respond to it and how to use it. Physical restraint may well be the most effective response to physically violent action. It is hard to imagine offering someone who has broken into our home in the middle of the night an opportunity for rational discussion.

Similarly, the discourse of emotionality forces us to acknowledge the emotional component of conflict. This discourse, too, is widely employed in conflict situations; we need to be able to respond to it and to use its tools effectively. Those who would conduct discussions on abortion or capital punishment or other issues that provoke strong emotional responses are regularly brought up against the limits of rational exchange. To have skill at eliciting and managing emotional content would stand them in good stead. Each "higher" discourse would ideally engage us not just at a higher but at a more comprehensive level, allow us to respond from *all* levels, not just the most advanced.

The Discourse of Physicality

The first discourse is almost entirely nonverbal. It is employed by beings who tend to be (permanently, or temporarily as a result of stress) narcissistic, egocentric, self-absorbed, impulsive, and prone to seeing conflict as interference with their hegemony. People at this stage see the world

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"through a glass darkly." They are limited to the nearby in terms of time and space. Biological concerns predominate. Gebser's description of the Archaic epoch is helpful in grasping what the world looks like to someone at this stage.

Typically someone using this discourse to respond to conflict is not capable of recognizing, or refuses to recognize, the existence of another point of view and thus sees no reason to engage with it. The interfering "other" is an object to be annihilated, similar to the way one might swat a fly. Right and truth resides with the holder of the greatest physical force or greatest store of material resources. Conflict is resolved by the principle of might makes right; moral behavior is achieved through obedience or punishment. Resolution of conflict occurs when one party succeeds in dominating the other. Writing (indeed, language) is largely irrelevant to conflict at this stage.

Conflict at this level involves survival needs, those needs at the bottom of the Maslow hierarchy, needs that involve the physical self. Food, clothing, shelter, instinctual sex, and money or other means of obtaining them are what matter. Conflict arises because someone is physically uncomfortable, lacking some basic requirement for maintaining homeostasis. People battling at this level are not much interested in what is right or reasonable, or in how others feel; their need is so great and so basic that any means to satisfy it will do. The consciousness of someone at this level is very limited: the inner world *is* the outer world; whatever the party feels is "truth" *is* truth; the other is not separate from the self. There is no need to justify the need because there is no "other" who needs to have such a justification.

Physical, rather than verbal, interaction is representative of this level. If stories are told at this level, they are stories of territory, of conquests, of physical feats; in the movies, we have chase scenes and horror movies. Communication is through body language: bristling, gestures of submission or aggression, outright attack, flight, etc. If language is used, it will often be used to intimidate or relieve tension as with threatening or swearing. Conflict is resolved by one party physically dominating another (win/lose), postponed if one or both are restrained (lose/lose), or dropped if an outside

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source relieves the need (as, for example, when a parent provides two cookies to children fighting over one).

Activities of participants are likely to be limited to "fight or flight"; there will be little social concern or remorse. Littlejohn comments that convicts used to be tortured and executed because "the body was seen as the central object of political relations. It was very natural that power should be exerted against the body and that punishment should involve bodily pain. . . [However] the body lost this status, as power became more a matter of the individual human psyche or soul" (101).

Power at this level resides in physical strength. Either one party can physically overcome the other or an outside authority such as the police can overcome both. Resolution basically requires annihilation of the "other." Theft or murder may be seen as the only way to obtain whatever is seen as crucial to the individual's well-being or to defend real or perceived threats to the self. If an outsider attempts to intervene in such a conflict, it may be difficult to do anything but restrain one or more of the parties. Appeals to reason or compassion are generally ignored.

The fact that the parties are using physical means for dealing with conflict does not always mean, however, that the issues are those of the physical level. When "higher" level methods fail, regression to lower ones is common. Our jails are filled with people who resorted to physical violence because pleading did not get others to respond to their emotional needs, because they were constrained by an authority with which they disagreed, or because their legal rights were not enforced as they felt they should be, etc. Booth mentions how even Bertrand Russell "moved . . . further and further away from argument toward mere assertion, and finally toward laying his body on the line, the last resort of those who feel that reason has failed" (79).

Conversely, if a "higher" level solution to a physical conflict is imposed, the parties will interpret it according to their own stage. For example, a contract that includes a promise of nonviolent behavior between warring neighbors will be, for those at the physical level, only as good as the police power that enforces it. Imprisonment will represent an eye for an eye for those at the physical stage, as a way of making people "safe" from the

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criminal at the emotional stage, as vindicating the rules of authority to people at the role/rule stage, and perhaps a necessary evil but the only "rational" thing to do under the circumstances to those at the positional stage.

Incarceration and capital punishment are social institutions which reinforce the physical level of conflict management. Some social practices encourage its expression in a ritualized fashion such as boxing matches, football games, and other physcially aggressive sports. At the national level, we maintain a fighting force and a store of weapons.

The Discourse of Emotionality[5]

This discourse is used by individuals who see others largely as instruments to satisfy the self, a self that is magically inflated as the whole. Different perspectives are still not acknowledged; one is either part of the groupthink or out of it ("on the bus" or "off the bus"). The goal is to reunite everyone in a magical emotional communion, a shared dreamlike consiousness. If reunion fails, the unconnected cease to exist for the group or are viewed as "lost souls" - a kind of figurative annihilation. Referring to Gebser's scheme, Mahood characterizes "Magic man" as 'secure only within his group, his tribe or clan. It was the transition from the Archaic to Magic structure of consciousness that has probably been mythologically captured in the story of the 'Fall of Man'" (12). In other words, once one could view himself as a separate individual, then paradise was lost.

At this level, emotional needs arise. As long as one is mired in something akin to Gebser's Archaic stage, one is not separate enough from the environment or from the passage of time to develop any feelings about it. As Boal points out, an animal cannot enter onto the affective space of a stage in a theatre - the locus of memory and dream - it lives always in one space, the physical (21).

Interactions at this stage revolve around the exchange of feelings. "I

[5] Even though I have drawn primarily from Wilber's scheme, I have combined his stages two and three, finding that the distinction between them seem less relevant to conflict management. Wilber himself has frequently varied the number of categories in his model, so I do not feel that combining some levels does any real disservice to his ideas.

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need it so I should get it," is typical of the response of those in conflict. "You need it, so you should get it," is the response of their supporters. "You don't need it," or "I need it more," is the response of their adversaries. Appeals to the rules, to reason, or to empathy are usually ignored. Conflict is not well-tolerated within the group. It is generally viewed as evidence that one is not with the program, does not belong. Exile is a serious punishment. While I don't presume to know the reasons behind the recent Columbine High School shootings, it is likely that the perpetrators were acting out of this level; shunned by the rest of the group, they acted on their feelings without concern for others.

At this stage, conflict becomes more verbal; the stories constructed around conflict are stories of passion and desire (romances and adventure stories) with heroes and heroines who struggle to overcome the environment and the past to achieve a golden future. Pathos dominates in this type of discourse. Littlejohn, Shailor, and Pearce's expressivist moral reality would appear to fit at this stage, a reality in which the pursuit of individual rights and free expression predominates (70).

A person at the emotional level can range beyond the specific locale to experience nostalgia and hope and fear, project onto immediate experience the experience of the past and the future, and thus feel desire and hatred. There is usually some control over the physical, however. People do not automatically strike out or require instant satisfaction of physical needs; an emotional overlay is necessary. Murder may be a crime of passion, sex may occur because of love or infatuation. We have moved from "might makes right" to "desire makes right." "I was in love," or "I couldn't help myself," are sufficient explanations for behavior. Whether the behavior is allowed or reasonable (considerations of the next two stages) is not important. Romeo and Juliet is a story of this stage; the young lovers' passion leaves them blind to the concerns of their families who inhabit the next (role/rule) stage.

Power at this level resides in passion. Whoever feels the most strongly is the most powerful. Religion is experienced as feeling rather than ideology or intellectual or spiritual experience. Conflicts about religion have a passionate character: i.e. the Ayatollah and his inflammatory rhetoric.

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People at this stage commonly see the world in terms of good and evil: my wants are good; yours, which threaten the satisfaction of mine, are evil. Thus, jealousy, envy, desire, rage, fear, or greed may arise out of thwarted emotional needs.

This is Kegan's second stage, akin to that which many teenagers experience. Says Pipher, "Teenage girls [6] engage in emotional reasoning, which is the belief that if you feel something is true, it must be true . . . There's a limited ability to sort facts from feelings" (60). People at this stage also have a tendency to overgeneralize from one incident to others. This way of thinking is what Booth encountered when he dealt with student protestors (ix). He comments, "If proof about our values is impossible, if rational argument is by definition irrelevant, and if one still believes and cares, the man of action can only woo, exhort, plead, shout, and wheedle" (78). He notes that Hemingway's attitude that "what is good is what feels good . . ." was what predominated among the students (97).

Adolescents' approach to difference exemplifies this kind of tribal consciousness; one is either part of the group or scorned. Their view of the actions of those at higher stages is interpreted within their own perspective on the world. If they see someone stand out as an individual, they do not assume, as might someone at a higher level, that the person is thinking for him or herself, but rather assume he or she is adopting a rival group's thought. Says Burke, "Indeed, where witchcraft is imputed as a motive behind the individual search for wealth, power, or vengeance, can we not view it as a primitive vocabulary of *individualism* emerging in a culture where *tribal* thinking had been uppermost, so that the individualist motive would be admitted and suspect?" (40).

This lack of awareness of other perspectives is mirrored in the kind of writing students at this level do. Typically, they offer up a diatribe instead of attempting to defend their opinions by quoting authority or offering objective evidence to support an assertion. W. Mark Lynch notes how egocentrism and lack of audience awareness are connected (36). Ong comments, "Until the age of romanticism reconstituted psychological structures, academic teaching

6 Pipher studied only girls

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of all subjects had been more or less polemic, dominated by the ubiquitious rhetorical culture, and proceeding typically by proposing and attacking theses in highly partisan fashion" (1975, 18).

The Emotional Stage is primarily an oral stage. D'Angelo mentions how the epic poem with which one identifies is a "felt experience" (53). Plato feared poetry because it led to hypnotic trance. Havelock in Preface to Plato calls poetry the organizing principle of oral culture, and alleges that Plato provided writing as the means for an oral culture to "wake up." He says, "[a]fter Plato 'the personality which thinks and knows' distinguishes itself from the "body of knowledge which is thought about and known'" (Neel, 76). Thompson comments on "[t]he African concept of Nommo, a belief in the magic power of the word" (Berrill, 223, 224). Bizzell and Herzberg mention how Goriga portrays "Helen as a victim of the psychogogic power of *logos* . . . [b]y claiming that speech acts on the psyche like a drug or witchcraft . . ." (772) and talk of the difference between the "self-conscious study of the power of language, as opposed to the self-forgetful submission to its power induced by poetry" (21). "The Romantic poet," they point out, "is engaged in a soliloquy, not an argument" (665).

Emotion may be the response at this level even if the issue is not one of emotion. Conflicts that begin over issues of authority may quickly devolve into emotional conflicts as, for example, when an employee feels unappreciated or frightened when his/her boss attempts to discuss ways in which he or she might improve, or when a husband and wife treat disagreement with each other's ideas as evidence of lack of love.

Resolution of conflict is often lose/lose at this stage because the parties are unable to see the consequences of their continued conflict. Participants in emotional level conflicts tend to be narcissistic, self-centered, unable to get outside themselves in order to take the perspective of another. They may have confused boundaries; they may assume others think as they do or they may be unduly influenced by the feelings of others. They are easily persuaded to abandon standards of the next two stages in favor of satisfaction of their emotional needs.

Emotional level people may be irresponsibly dramatic, unaware of the

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problems they are generating for their future (including the continued necessity to deal with the other participant(s) to the conflict), more interested in revenge than reasonable settlement, often unable to control their emotions even if they want to. The frustration that may result from an inability to "win" these conflicts may, in intense situations, lead to regression to the physical level. I have mediated several cases in which seemingly "ordinary" and apparently unaggressive citizens have been brought to court for assaulting one another after a history of unresolved conflict.

Again, solutions of other stages are interpreted within the mindset of this stage. For example, if a contract is the outcome of a dispute, parties at this level will adhere to its terms as long as emotions do not once again overwhelm them. If they do, they will try to find a way out of the contract, usually by pleading that they are hurt in some way by the terms or that the deal is "unfair." A contract does not in itself carry the weight of authority that it carries for people at the next level of development and the mutual understanding of the vision-logic stage has no binding force at all.

Societal institutions that support this level of development are cliques of all forms (fraternities, clubs, high school groups, etc.), romantic novels, TV programs that show people behaving at this level (as in many soap operas and situation comedies), inflammatory political rhetoric, etc.

The Discourse of Authority

The third discourse is the first of the fully mental/linguistic discourses. It is used by those who rely on the authority residing in an expert or leader (often of mythic proportion) whether religious, governmental, appointed, societal, etc. to handle the burden of weighing conflicting ideas as to what to believe and how to act. The moral sense shifts from preconventional to conventional, from wholly selfcentric to sociocentric. Whatever the authority/society has laid down in the way of rules is correct; there is no independent judging of rules or roles. While more than one perspective may be acknowledged, there is only one correct perspective, that of the authority figure. Conflict is resolved by decree of that authority.

At this stage, power resides in the chosen authority, religious or

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secular. Societies are based on codes of conduct (chivalry, feudalism, class distinctions). Interactions are around belongingness, conformity, norms, and self-esteem derived from this authority. Social needs take precedence over biological and emotional needs. One is concerned with one's place in the world and is willing to give up some of the freedom to pursue physical needs and emotional passions in order to obtain the security of a role and membership in a group. *Intra* group conflict arises over threats to roles and/or membership status. One defends one's place or attacks in order to gain a better one. *Inter* group conflict develops between authorities. One defends one's own king or church or ideas or attacks another's. Littlejohn, Shailor, and Pearce's biblical or authoritarian moral reality would appear to fit at this stage, a reality in which duty and public service are important (70).

Two or more perspectives are not possible at this level. Authority is either right (if it is one's own) or wrong (if it is another's); otherwise it would not be authority. Thus there is a tendency to see everything in terms of black and white. "My country - love it or leave it" is an example of such an outlook. Subjugation of one view to the other is seen as the only solution. People at this level are ethnocentric. Their own group is right; other groups are wrong. Cults may thus be particularly appealing to people at this stage.

Writing about conflict at this stage includes reference to authority; no longer is desire sufficient to justify a position. However, it is not obvious yet that the authority needs evidential support; often the discourse of authority involves the recitation of unsupported assertions, or the making of assertions supported by unquestioned texts promulgated by authority, or the discovery and setting down of historical precedent. Ethos dominates in this kind of discourse: who speaks is more important than what is spoken.

People in this stage tell and read stories of the triumph of the good guys and destruction of the bad, stories that give answers and certainty; some examples are TV dramas, police stories, cowboy stories, moral tales (Reader's Digest), myths (Tolkien, Greek myths), nonfiction (especially how-to), regulations, religious texts (which are generally taken literally), sermons. Language is used to record reality, repeat the words of the leaders, or codify dogma, but not to question the status quo or to think critically. Say Young,

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Becker, and Pike,

> The dogmatic writer often seems less interested in communication than in indoctrination. . . . Cooperation in a search for truth is possible (1) only if each of us in the discussion is ready to lay his basic position open to careful scrutiny and test and is ready to accept modification of that position if facts brought to our attention warrant it, and (2) only if others can see that this is in fact our attitude (207).

For someone in the discourse of authority, such openness is not appealing.

This stage is grounded in the positivistic assumption that it is possible to have direct knowledge of the world, that there is a truth out there if we can just find it. Logic is intellectually appealing. Says Nye, "Logic was . . . the grammar of the cosmos: a divine law that keeps the physical world in place and a universal will to which the virtuous must conform" (66). Students at this level are likely to conceive of the idea of composition as text-oriented; they may be heavily invested in style and form. This approach defines the Current Traditional style (Winterowd, 31). Rorty captures the difference between this stage and the next perhaps when he says, "Resistance for the strong, foundations for the weak; answers for beginners, questions for the adept" (Spellmeyer, 79).

Resolution of inter group conflict is most often of the classic win/lose type. One party is the persecutor, the other the victim; one the conquerer, the other the vanquished. The same holds true for intragroup conflict; if new ideas arise that are in conflict with old ideas, they are quickly suppressed. There is no ability to entertain competing philosophies either in the outside world or in one's own mind. Theater director Augusto Boal refers to the "cop in the head": the internalized oppressor who prevents the individual from thinking or acting in ways that do not accord with the norm. This is a self who is concerned with belonging and with authority - either exercising it or obeying it. The self becomes identified with group norms, and when they are threatened, the individual sense of self is threatened. Kegan points out how difficult it is for someone at this stage "to keep from feeling that the whole self has been violated when its opinions, values, rules, or definitions are challenged" (231).

People at this level cling tenaciously to their beliefs; their beliefs define

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them. "The collapse of a belief system can be like the end of the world. . . . People can literally cease to know who they are" (Anderson 27). He points out that "The shift to postmodernism is far more likely to be traumatic if you are convinced that there can be no truth without absolutes, no science without objectivity, no morality without rules, no society without uniform values and beliefs, no religion without a church" (254). Control is thus a big issue; control being necessary to avoid being faced with ideas (external or internal) that are incompatible with one's own.

Attempting to resolve conflicts at this level can involve endless harangues as each side trots out the truisms of his or her authority to "prove" its rightness. Because the other side has just as many truisms, and there is no objective standard by which to compare them (there being no objectivity at this level because objectivity would involve recognition of more than one possible point of view), resolution often seems impossible, as is the case with many ethnic and religious conflicts in which allegiance to a particular group carries with it total acceptance of that group's structure of beliefs. Discussion may seem hopeless; at this stage, communication has less to do with listening than speaking. People who are in the grip of certainty talk *at* each other; they do not hear each other. Regression to this level is possible even if the dispute itself is not over a role/rule issue. When reason fails to convince, people are pretty rapidly drawn back into quarrel and contradiction (as opposed to the reasoned argument of the positional level). If a contract is the outcome of a dispute resolution, it will be accepted as absolute and literal; different interpretations will be regarded as efforts to confuse or deceive or as threats to the inviolability of the contract.

This is the stage of Kegan's third order: traditional people. Cultural institutions such as the family and the church support this discourse. Working in a stable corporate 'family,' living in homogeneous neighborhoods in which the rules for interaction are clear, growing up to perform predictable roles, especially gender roles, are all part of this discourse. Unfortunately for people at this level, traditional institutions are breaking down; we are no longer living in a stable, predictable, world, and there are no universally acceptable roles and rules for behavior. The comfort and peace

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that ultimate authority once brought no longer works when many authorities compete for ascendancy. As Kegan says, "The claim of modernity is the call to fourth order consciousness . . ." (105). Rather than following in the footsteps of one's parents, one now needs to fashion one's own work, relationships, rules, and roles.

The Discourse of Positionality

People operating at the level of the fourth discourse are able to take a position and defend it with evidence. They have a perspective. They recognize the existence and potential validity of other perspectives.

The fourth discourse is also conducted at the mental level; in fact, at this stage, emotional and physical ways of knowing are often specifically excluded. Says conflict resolution specialist Nierenberg, "Things, positions, and situations can be negotiated, but it is more difficult to negotiate feelings. It is advisable in an emotional situation to try to get beyond the feeling, to move to the levels of the things and actions that caused the emotion" (106). However, instead of turning to an authority to decide what is true or what should be done, positional level participants to a dispute seek the right answer for themselves through the reasoning process. They recognize that not everyone has the same perspective but have faith that empirical and rational debate will reveal which one is most nearly correct.

To go from the one right answer of the sovereign to the competing claims of the modern state demands an enormous shift in the way we deal with conflict. Instead of looking for authority to speak, we become aware of the inability of any one person to be authoritative regarding the multiple issues and activities of our world. We recognize that everyone has different information and skills and goals, that we need to listen to one another, to negotiate and compromise, to make agreements that are workable without constant resort to the courts, in brief, to recognize the "other."

Recognition of this other brings with it the need to convince the other to work with us rather than against us. It requires us to argue, to present claims and reasons, to rethink our ideas, to rethink the ideas of another. This is the stage of Littlejohn, Shailor, and Pearce's utilitarian moral reality

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wherein one fulfills one's individual interests by negotiating agreements with others (70).

In discussing this shift, Bizzell & Herzberg speak of how "concrete imagery that appeals to the sense and the emotions; . . . ritualized references to authority in the form of proverbs, epithets, incantations, and other formulas; and . . . a competitive, emotion-laden posture in disputation" (20) was supplanted by "hypotaxis, the subordination of one idea to another in logical hierarchies; generalizations that appeal to reason and text-assisted memory for validation; and a questioning relationship to authority and custom, encouraging, in place of agonistic combat, the disinterested criticism of ideas" (Ibid). They comment on how Descartes displaced received wisdom with human reason and how culture-bound knowledge then came to seem second-rate (477), how Bacon rejected Scholasticism which relies on received wisdom and the tautologies of syllogism and used instead the inductive logic of the scientists (623), how Perelman attacked the premise that there may be self-evident truths and proposed an informal logic based on argumentation, seeing it as dangerous to suggest that arguments rest on immutable truth (915), how Toulmin opposed absolutism and eternal standards of truth and relativism (1105), how Foucault championed the idea that truth is determined by the discursive practices of a community in opposition to philosophy's quest for universals and absolutes (916). All of these philosophers/rhetoricians are chroniclers and promoters of the shift from an emotional/magical reality to a rational one.

A perspectival reality allows for multiple voices and interplay among them. Social construction, the idea that reality can be constructed by the interchange among peers, begins to find favor at this level. Compositionist Bruffee sees social constructionism as a democratic corrective to foundational notions (1986, 787) and claims that socially justified belief places knowledge in the assent of a community of knowledgable peers (1982, 107).

To accept a socially constructed reality, one must be able to see positions as other than hegemonic and to recognize one's own power to put a position forward. Crosswhite points out that "to hear a claim as a claim - and not, for example, as an order, or command or threat - is to assume a position of

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privilege" (89). "Until an assertion is understood as something questionable, its being a claim stays closed off to us" (90).

Education becomes training in how to sort through different systems of belief rather than the memorizing of traditional truths. Crosswhite says, "to learn means learning to take the questioner's position. . . . People who do not experience challenges to their beliefs, their social roles, their self-understandings, are probably not receiving much of an education" (92). Rhetoric, then, instead of logic, becomes the way to arrive at truth. Says Derrida, "Whereas philosophy has always sought knowledge about absolute truth and regarded language as a tool for communicating (and often distorting) the truth, rhetoric has sought knowledge of contingent truth in human affairs and recognized that probability and consent are created rather than discovered" (quoted in Bizzell and Herzberg, 902).

This discourse is worldcentric. Allegiance is no longer to one's own group, but to the whole of humanity. General principles of fairness and justice are invoked as standards. This is the stage of Fisher and Ury's principled negotiation. The right of everyone to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is taken seriously; democracy is, in some ways, *the* government of this stage. Multiple interests are represented, ideas are debated in a formal context. Capitalism, too, is an economic system congruent with this stage of development in that it assumes competition among multiple interests will work to everyone's benefit.

At the positional level, power is located in the intellect, in information, in reasoning ability, in persuasive ability. The individual becomes the locus of power rather than the king or pope, and he/she is usually intent upon keeping it. Conflict thus occurs over self-esteem, identity, reputation, and recognition issues; over abstract concepts such as pride, love, and justice with which the individual identifies him/herself; and over individual rights. This is the stage at which we find "man" against nature, "man" against "man," and "man" against himself. Everything is "other" - and others are often perceived as being in the way of our achieving what we want. Internally, the self is split. Body and mind and persona and shadow do battle, although the split is usually not in awareness. This is a

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stage of multiple conflicts: organizational, group, interpersonal, intrapersonal.

The positional worldview acknowledges and accepts the presence of multiple worldviews. However, the acceptance is usually only provisional and temporary; empirical research/reason is expected to expose the false and the true. The failure of science to accomplish this task in any but the "hard" sciences (and not, of late, there as well) demonstrates some of the weaknesses of this point of view. The best that one can do is choose from among the different "truths" depending upon the context.

The stories told at this stage are stories of analysis and observation and fact. There are psychological stories of gaining control over the self and nature and technology, stories of the triumph of reason over the forces of superstition and emotion, stories of negotiated or jointly constructed ideas over fixed truth, stories of discovery, of progress, of struggle, of reward for hard work and cleverness. Fiction features the hero with principles, a victim of outside forces battling for right and justice (Anderson, 141). Because knowledge is equated with power, there is a quest for knowledge of all kinds. Self-help books on health and exercise and sexual technique and making money and gaining influence and overcoming personal problems are popular.

Interactions at the rational level of discourse center around language: articulateness is prized, discussion and written argument are seen as the ways to put forward different perspectives. The ability to analyze a variety of positions is a key skill. Critical thinking, weighing of evidence, and objective procedures (due process, research studies, statistical analysis) are adopted as the means of discovering the best answer to the problem at hand. Credentials and other signs of particular intellectual skill tend to be important: experts are valued; personal experience and anecdotal information and the honorifically titled are given short shrift.

The preferred form for writing about conflict is the "argument" in which a thesis is set forth and facts are adduced to support that thesis. Ruby describes argument as "a unit of discourse in which beliefs are supported by reasons. . . . Argument in this sense," he says, "is the heart and soul of the

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rational enterprise" (quoted in Berrill, 173). History and precedent are regarded as only one kind of evidence, not conclusive in themselves. Other evidence, often produced by the scientific method, is equally, if not more, persuasive. Logos dominates. Emotional appeal, if used, is regarded with some suspicion. Resolution is found in the contract or policy decision which expresses the agreement between the parties. I'll scratch your back if you'll scratch mine.

Writing at this stage, in fact, takes on supreme importance. Having ideas set down in print affords the participants to a conflict the opportunity to weigh ideas, to think critically. In fact, many suggest that the kind of critical thinking necessary for rational thought is not possible without writing. Faigley refers to Ong's idea that the Greek alphabet allowed memory to be externalized, thus bringing with it an opportunity for analytical thought. "Ong theorizes that those in 'primary oral cultures' cannot realize the fuller human potential and the higher level of consciousness itself made possible by literacy because literacy is not merely necessary for gaining access to knowledge but is a prerequisite for the cognitive operations required in a technologically advanced culture" (Faigley, 201). He comments that unsupported assertions are dominant in oral cultures (202). D'Angelo agrees that preliterate people were unable to think logically (52) as does Neel (110).

While the role/rule mind was more interested in eliminating other points of view, the positional person wants to attract adherents from other points of view to his/her own. "Negotiation . . . is *not* a game - and it is not war. Its goal is *not* a dead competitor" says Nierenberg (21). Negotiation and compromise become important skills; annihilation is not necessary.

Finding resolutions to conflicts is important to people at the rational stage. Even if participants do not change their underlying beliefs, practical solutions are seen as necessary. In fact, at this stage, conflict is generally regarded as a negative, not something to be endured for any longer than is necessary. At the extreme, there is outright fear of diverse opinions, change, emotional instability, and other threats to order. Bush and Folger's "satisfaction story" describes the attitude of people at this stage: the way to handle conflict is to satisfy the parties' needs (ideally with a win-win

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outcome) using problem-solving techniques. Resolution occurs when agreement is reached between autonomous subjects.

However, although there is an attempt to encourage the losers to come over to the side of the winners, because people at this stage are achievement oriented - they want to win and succeed - resolution of conflict still tends to be win/lose. Consensus is a goal, but often it is achieved only outwardly. Dissent is suppressed by agreement; people acquiesce in the loss of certain freedoms in order to gain certainty and other goals.

Resolving a conflict takes precedence over understanding it in all its aspects. Time pressures are important; the focus is on strategy and tactics; the methods are analysis and discussion. Even where mediation or other alternative means of dispute resolution are employed, the emphasis remains on resolution rather than transformation. Communication at this stage is still regarded primarily as a way to transmit information: messages are sent between pre-existing entities whose attitudes, character, and relationships are relatively solid and static; a model that Shailor points out is compatible with a problem-solving orientation (5). While people may listen better than they did at earlier stages, they are still focused more on presenting their positions than they are on really understanding the other person. Listening may even be seen as evidence of a lack of power.

Although this stage represents an advance on earlier stages in terms of the the breadth of response and the possibilities available for resolution, the dualism inherent in the rational way of thinking can also actually create conflict, both outer and inner. Says Schaef, "Once a dualistic assumption is made and the dualistic thinking process is engaged, conflict and misunderstanding usually ensue . . ." (157). As with the struggle between Bertrand Russell the "poet and mystic" and Bertrand Russell "the man of reason" (Booth, 47), to people at this stage, both perspectives cannot be true.

We may feel despair at this stage due to the loss of a comforting single true perspective. We feel the burden of constructing our own ideology, a burden that sometimes seems overwhelming as multiple voices refuse to be assimilated or to compromise, as reason fails to convince, as minorities rebel against government by the majority and rail against the (hidden) majority

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rule of free enterprise, and as more and more of our conflicts seems to be sliding into fragmentation, hopelessness, violence, and avoidance.

Moving through the developmental levels means acquiring a larger context: the emotional/magical person has acquired an ability to see herself as a person distinct from her environment who has individual feelings and thoughts. Someone living in the discourse of authority has enlarged his world to see that others may know more than he does; to recognize that some social order is necessary to contain both biological and emotionally based drives. The mental/rational level person has stepped outside the rule of one authority to recognize that there are many potential authorities among which she must decide using her own ability to reason. A person at the integral level embraces all of these authorities and himself in a gestalt. He is able to see that each position is part of a whole Truth, that none can be wholly reduced to the others, that eliminating any one detracts from the whole.

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Chapter 4. The Benefits and Limitations of Positional Discourse; Expanded Notions of Argument

As I suggested in the last chapter, positional discourse is most often expressed in the form of argument. In this section, I will focus on the benefits and limitations of argument as a tool of conflict management, drawing primarily from the writings of rhetoricians and compositionists.

Argument Defined

Before beginning my discussion of argument's benefits and limitations, I want first to define what I mean by argument and also to distinguish between argument and rhetoric. I am, except when otherwise noted, referring to formal argument and not to contradiction or quarrel.

Argument is housed in the field of rhetoric - which itself has been variously defined. The most famous definition of rhetoric is Aristotle's. He called rhetoric "the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever" (11). Argument, in this case, might be described as the method through which the persuasion will take place.

Other definitions, however, give a wider role to rhetoric and thus also to argument. Rhetoric, say Bizzell and Herzberg,

> has grown to encompass a theory of language as a form of social behavior, of intention and interpretation as the determinants of meaning, in the way that knowledge is created by argument, and in the way that ideology and power are extended through discourse. In short, rhetoric has become a comprehensive theory of language as effective discourse" (899).

Lanham concurs: "Rhetoric has always tended to outgrow its original concern with persuasive public speaking, or direct verbal communication, and to lend itself to written communication as well. And it has from earliest times vacillated between a concern with specific techniques only . . . and a larger ethical concern . . ." (131). Argument, then, can be a way of creating knowledge and extending power and ideology.

Most modern definitions of rhetoric seem to center on its goal of knowledge production. James L. Golden says that the "major function of

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rhetoric is to generate, create, and discover knowledge" (19). John Gage says rhetoric aims "at producing mutual understandings and therefore becomes the basis for inquiry into sharable truths. The end of rhetoric from this point of view would not be to argue any case, but to assemble the means by which mutually believable conclusions can be distinguished from those that do not earn assent. In this view, rhetoric has knowledge as its goal, rather than operates on knowledge as raw material" (153-4). There are others who see rhetoric/argument as primarily a way to exert power and control. Lamb quotes Gearhart as saying that any attempt to persuade is an act of violence (260). Young, Becker, and Pike suggest that the goal of argument is "the control of one human being by another" (8). Others see argument's persuasive function as less negative, but still significant. Argument thus can be used as the method by which truth is to be obtained and communicated and/or persuasion conducted.

Formal argument is a way of presenting a point of view by stating a thesis and adducing competent evidence to support it. This evidence is generally empirical, material, and/or rational. Emotion is not excluded (though it is sometimes frowned upon), but it is generally used in the service of logos and is subordinate to logos. Fulkerson calls argument "a full discourse designed to establish a position by rational support (although not to the exclusion of pathos and ethos)" (16).

Formal argument is generally presented with an introduction that includes necessary background information, a thesis statement, evidence (whether scientific, anecdotal, qualitative, quantitive, personal, impersonal), development of that evidence (including presentation and consideration of opposing viewpoints), and a conclusion. Respect is given to different points of view: they are not ignored, nor are they treated as straw men. A proper argument avoids the traditional fallacies. It does not seek to convince by subterfuge or obfuscation. Instead it looks to accuracy, coherence, and cogency to win the day.

Formal argument can be distinguished from contradiction and quarrel which are based more often in emotion rather than in reason. In a quarrel, opinions are asserted without evidentiary support, and what evidence is

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offered may be fallibilistic or deceptive. Argument of this type has no agreed upon structure; it is an "ad hoc" production. Sometimes it masquerades as formal argument, using the form but not the content. This practice has resulted in the negative view of argument beginning with Plato's condemnation of sophistry and extending to Deborah Tannen's recent work, The Argument Culture.[1] Argument as it is practiced today in the media and in interpersonal exchange is a far cry from the rational debate envisioned by either classical or modern rhetoricians. To distinguish between the two, I will refer to formal argument as argument and the more colloquial, less reasoned, form as quarrel, polemic, contradiction, or other similar terms.

Argument has been variously defined. Most definitions by composition theorists include some reference to claiming, to reasoning, to persuasion, and to a (sometimes tacitly understood) precondition of conflict. Rottenberg says, "we write to persuade the unconvinced, to acquaint them with good reasons for changing their minds" (44). She notes that "we use the term *argument* to represent forms of a discourse that attempt to persuade readers or listeners to accept a claim, whether acceptance is based on logical or emotional appeals or, as is usually the case, on both . . . *An argument is a statement or statements offering support for a claim*" (9, italics hers). Similarly, Ramage: "the core of an argument is a claim with reasons" (vi), and "the heart of an argument is an issue question that invites two or more competing answers. . ." (47). Fulkerson calls an argument "any set of two or more assertions in which one (or more) is claimed to offer support for another" (2).

Young, Becker, and Pike say that "[t]he essential appeal of the classical rhetorician was to reason. Logical argument - deductive reasoning in particular - was the heart of persuasive discourse" (6). Burke reiterates Aristotle's definition: "the art of persuasion, or a study of the means of persuasion available for any given situation" (46). Govier says, "A writer who uses an argument provides, or tries to provide, a rational justification for a claim stated or implied in the text. Arguments offer evidence, or

[1] Tannen has problems with formal argument as well, many of which I echo later in this document.

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provide reasons, for claims made . . . . Pragmatically, the function of written argument is to rationally persuade readers that the conclusion is true or rationally acceptable . . ." (73). Says Lynch: "Certainly, the aim of argument is to influence specific decisions in a specific context, to recommend a particular course of action . . ." (77).

Berrill sums up the perspectives on argument in her collection of essays on the subject in the following way:

> Traditionally, Western argument has been about persuasion - about convincing others with different points of view that one's own point of view is best. At its most conciliatory, this understanding of argument emphasizes Aristotelian dialectic, that is, a final truth is discovered through a mutual process in which a new understanding grows from consideration of two different initial points of view" (2).

Conciliation, however, is not necessary to argument. While formal argument avoids fallacy and hyperbole, it does not preclude using "all" the available means of persuasion. In fact, much of Aristotle's Rhetoric is given over to a discussion of how to *win* at persuasion. "[T]his strategy," as Teich points out, "may include criticizing, refuting, or even ridiculing opposing viewpoints and their representatives. "Balance," he says, "resides in the system of oppositions, not in the individual presentation" (87). Toulmin compares arguments with lawsuits (7) which are manifestly conducted for the purpose of winning, often regardless of the merits of the case.

Crosswhite stresses the making of claims as central to argumentation: "Argumentation has to do with asserting and challenging, assenting and dissenting - in general, with making claims, challenging them, modifying and defending them . . ." (52). He also explicitly acknowledges the conflictual basis of argument: "[C]onflict is the spirit and life of reason and argumentation . . ." (9); "to make a claim is both to reject a host of incompatible assertions and to bring the claim to bear on someone, and thus to create the potential for conflict. The potential is actualized when, for example, someone puts forth an incompatible counterassertion, or directly challenges the claim. Different versions of reality come into conflict in argumentation by way of being asserted. . . " (102). "Thus, I propose that argument is a kind of social conflict, and that in important ways it resembles

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violent conflict" (103). And finally, "Theorists who agree on little else share the view that arguments involve disagreement and occur in contexts of controversy" (308, n. 10).

Thus the consensus appears to be that argument is associated with persuasion, with claiming, with competition, and with conflict. Truth is presumed to emerge in the clash of competing claims; as Teich noted, no one party is assigned to seek it (86). Argument is essentially combative and concerned with strategy and tactics. It is easy to see how the use of battle metaphors has gained such currency.

In response to this agonistic interpretation of argument, several modern theorists have sought to develop more conciliatory, less competitive possibilities for argument. Argument's role in reconciling difference and in constructing and maintaining knowledge has been emphasized; ideas for cooperation and collaboration have been aired; alternative structures have been proposed; traditional argument has been reconceptualized.

Crosswhite, for example, suggests that "[a]rgumention is the attempt to reconcile the claims of different disclosures of the world in a way that is fair and just. The most immediate application of this idea is that argumentation is the renunciation of violence and is the practice of respect for others' disclosures of what is" (36). John Gage refers to three different things that argument does: it helps one to win or survive; leads an audience to a truth independent of the rhetorical process; and produces mutual understandings and inquiry into shared truths (153-155). When Berrill asks, "Is argument about persuasion, or is it about exploration of differences, or is it about learning or maintenance of social relationship?" (6), she is reflecting the many views of argument extant today.

Redefining Argument

As we have grown disenchanted with various aspects of argument, we have attempted to amend it, to enlarge it, and to attach to it more palatable forms of discourse until finally the original sense of it as an adversarial process in which one party attempts to convince another has nearly

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disappeared. Not only do we cast argument as less combative, not only have we appended more cooperative strategies to its practice, but we have even changed its structure. Argument has been identified with literature, collaborative writing, inquiry, expressive writing, hypertext, empathy, and love. Argument has flowed out of its traditional stream, over the banks, and into the worlds of narrative, dialogue, poetry, therapy, and theater. The term has become so bloated, in fact, that it is hard to know now, when someone uses it, exactly what kind of argument he/she is talking about. Distinguishing between argument as quarrel and argument as reasoned discourse is insufficient any more to let us know what manner of discourse is being discussed.

But this subsuming of multiple practices under the heading of argument does a disservice both to those who argue in the traditional sense and to those who wish us to look at new ways of engaging in conflict. To call these other processes argument is, in my opinion, to obscure their value as *alternatives* to argument, alternatives that can offer us a way to get beyond argument in those situations where argument is not serving us well. By wedding them together we tend to obscure the radical nature of some of these innovations and the societal shifts that have called for new ways of dealing with conflict.

Combining them also denies argument its full value, its adversarial, combative, clarifying, purposeful aspects. Argument is not just to inform, it is not just to share ideas, it is to convince. Writers of arguments are careful to craft them so as to make them watertight, convincing, and based on evidence that is likely to sway their audiences, and to present themselves as qualified to speak, as authorities. They have a motive (Burke) or an aim (Kinneavy) which is to advance their point of view. While we might categorize literature or self-expression as argument because it often makes a case for a point of view, when we set out to write a short story or record our thoughts in a journal, we do not have this kind of aim in mind. We may create a kind of combat among our characters or within ourselves, but our purpose is not to persuade.[2]

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2 except in cases like socially conscious fiction

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But even more importantly, diluting argument robs us of the recognition that argument belongs in our repertoire and is something that students need to learn to use effectively. It is an essential tool for conflict management and a crucial step in the development of our ability to think critically. In experimenting with writing more integrally about conflict in my classes, I have noticed that students who cannot already write a decent argument often produce mush when asked to combine positions or have them interact more cooperatively. Having them race to reconcile positions before they can even separate them out, to have them provide support for their collaborative ideas before they can even give reasons for a partisan one seems to invite confusion and resistance. I wonder if Lassner's students were resisting so strongly (221) because they had yet to get a firm hold on their own beliefs. Without knowing how to do that, giving them up seems like asking them to lop off differences that they have barely defined. And how will they manage the academic world or the world of politics or business or law if they do not understand what argument is all about?

Therefore, rather than expanding upon argument by inflating the term to conform to whatever we now find more palatable in the light of postmodern thinking and recent ideas about reality construction, modern concerns with holism and empathy and the ethic of care, I suggest we use a new term, *integral discourse*, to cover the myriad more collaborative, less combative, more socially constructionist ways of interacting around conflict and keep the term argument to mean something closer to Aristotle's definition.

This would also enable us to see more clearly the benefits of argument. Bizzell notes that "recently . . . some rhetoricians have begun to suspect that the whole point of argumentation is being lost in our talk about cooperation and collaboration, that we are losing the value of challenging, opposing, and resisting 'the interplay of social, cultural and historical forces' that structure our lives" (Bizzell, Discourse, 284). Susan Jarratt calls for composition instructors to rethink their objections to agonistic rhetoric and conflict-based pedagogy" (Lynch, 1997, 62). Just as there is still a need for physical force to restrain destructive behavior, for group will to re-cement community, and for

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knowledgeable authority to make decisions, so there is a need for rational debate to negotiate agreement. Integral discourse is simply another alternative for dealing with the intractable (at least to argument) conflicts that our postmodern world has spawned. "First," says Burke,

> there is the rhetoric of the dramatic agon, the clash of the partisan rivals, each of whom seeks to overthrow the others; next, there is the rhetorical appeal of the dialectical resolution, the formal satisfaction that comes of transcending such conflicts by systematic means; and finally, there is the rhetoric of enargeia, as the New Vision, which transcended imagery, is reduced to terms that "bring it before our very eyes . . ." (207).

The Benefits of Argument.

As recent books by Crosswhite and Billig and Perelman and many others attest, argument is a highly valued process, one that many regard as essential for anyone who would responsibly enter into public citizenship. Says Gerry Spence, a phenomenally successful lawyer,

> While birds can fly, only humans can argue. Argument is the affirmation of our being. It is the principal instrument of human intercourse. Without argument the species would perish. As a subtle suggestion, it is the means by which we aid another. As a warning, it steers us from danger. As exposition, it teaches. As an expression of creativity, it is the gift of ourselves. As a protest, it struggles for justice. As a reasoned dialogue, it resolves disputes. As an assertion of self, it engenders respect. As an entreaty of love, it expresses our devotion. As a plea, it generates mercy. As a charismatic oration, it moves multitudes and changes history. We must argue - to help, to warn, to lead, to love, to create, to learn, to enjoy justice - to be (5).

The following are what I see as some of the primary benefits that we gain from using this process and by having it used by others in our society:

1. Argument fits well within a society that encourages freedom and independent thought and action. While decree is sufficient for a monarchy (the recipient must listen or be punished), in a society that is based on democratic principles, opinion is not enough; one who asserts a point of view must support it with reasons sufficient to sway someone who is under no obligation to either listen or adopt another view.

2. Argument encourages the development of knowledge and

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information and its dissemination to others. Argument is in line with the modernist scientific ideal. The scientific model requires evidence that a hypothesis is true; it tests its hypotheses in the "real" world before announcing them as accurate conclusions. Similarly, a rhetor who wishes to advance her hypothesis (claim) develops evidence from the "real" world that demonstrates that the claim can be accepted as correct. The more and better evidence, the more believable is the claim.

3. Argument defines problems and clarifies issues. Crosswhite points out that high-intensity arguments "can also be immensely clarifying. . . . one way we demand integrity of ourselves and one another" (117). Each permutation of an idea becomes more clear as it is forced to explain itself in the face of additional questioning and competing models. Muddy thinking, overgeneralizations, vague definitions, and the like are all exposed by the critical process.

4. Argument forces truth-telling. Presenting a claim makes us vulnerable. Where we are in error, someone who disagrees with us will very likely point it out; where we are hiding or obscuring facts, someone else will bring them to light; where we are involved in self-deception, someone else will notice it. The Emperor's clothes are carefully scrutinized.

5. Argument raises the possibility of multiple competing truths and spurs exploration of differences. Instead of assuming that we are all alike or that we will all agree, presenting a claim is a recognition that there are those who think differently and an invitation to those who disagree to put forward their disagreements. Society is thus alerted to the views of its citizens, whether majority or minority. It is harder to impose a general will on the unwilling if they are allowed to speak and to present their own reasons. Argument also helps one to sharpen one's own identity and to see where one might contribute (Katz, 11).

6. Argument implies respect. We do not argue with those whom we regard as beneath us; instead, we try to control or manipulate or ignore them. Arguing demonstrates a willingness to engage as equals. "To question a claim is no longer simply to defer or to ignore or resist but to pay attention, and to regard either one's interlocutor or one's audience (as well as oneself) with a

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measure of respect. Without this respect, or trust, or love - this attachment - what would be the motivation for hearing a claim as a claim?" (Crosswhite, 96).

7. Argument can remedy imbalances of power. If anyone can bring a claim into a court of law or a public forum, the weak have a way of being heard. The dichotomous nature of argument (which also has its disadvantages as I outline them infra), has a tendency to equalize the two sides to a dispute. Two sides usually implies two equal sides; two sides equally worthy of being heard. Both a poor tenant and a millionaire landholder get equal time and respect in an ideal argument situation. Imbalances in civil rights, women's rights, and other previously glossed over societal inequities have been raised and often redressed through argument.

8. Argument is a means of self-defense. Says Aristotle, "there would be absurdity in a stigma's attaching to the incapacity for bodily, but not to that for rational, self-defence, given that reason is a more particular human property than the use of the body" (69).

9. Argument can help to resolve conflict. Crosswhite calls argument "a form of conflict and conflict resolution" (78). "Arguments," he says," are simply conflicts which have been contained in reasonable language" (110). This tool is available to those who have developed a sufficient level of maturity to see the value in verbally handling conflict reather than engaging in war, fistfights, and other violent forms of dispute resolution; relying on pleading, rabble-rousing, petitioning, or mob action; or practicing tyranny and other forms of authoritarian control. Instead of annihilating the opposition (either literally or figuratively), we have to persuade it. In order to be heard, we have to extend the courtesy of hearing another. The ceremonial combat of debate enables us to avoid the battlefield. Says Crosswhite, "I believe that in argumentation we have the greatest containment of conflict found in any of our discourse practices" (121).

We try to teach this means of self-defense to our children so that when they leave our tutelage and go out into the world they will have a means of handling disputes that will not put them in jail, turn them into rebels, or turn them into objects who can be pushed about rather than subjects who can

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take charge of their own lives.[3] We want them to be able to stand up for what they believe in without destroying others or themselves. Formal argument is a way to do that.

The Limitations of Argument.

While positional discourse/formal argument has significant advantages over the conflict resolution strategies of previous stages, it, like all other methods, has limitations - limitations which have become increasingly problematic as our world has shifted to a global economy, a postmodern attitude, and a freeflowing information system.

In a world in which reason rather than a person is king, in which assimilation is the goal, in which the decision maker is an autonomous individual, and in which continuing new discoveries in science and the social world demand exploration and justification of certain ways of being, argument is invaluable. However, when reason's hegemony is in question, when scientific truths seem no more certain than any others, when assimilation is resisted, when continued justification of one's beliefs seems less important than figuring out how to live with conflicting ones, and when the conception of the person is less autonomous and more socially constructed, argument comes to be seen as a less satisfactory way of dealing with conflict. Even argument as a methodology for arriving at "truth" depends upon an assumption that there is a truth, (total or partial), to be found.

Even conceptions of argument which take into account the socially constructed nature of knowledge and the uncertainty of truth are still not fully adequate to handle many of our most intractable disputes. The overwhelming complexity of our world joins with our jarring modern philosophies of deconstruction and postmodernism to pull the rug out from under our feet. We have nowhere to stand when we take our stands, no text to present as our claim, and no ability to persuade someone who will not even accept the basic conditions for argument. This "postmodern" condition

[3] In some ways, a college education is an effort to turn people into subjects (in the Freierian sense).

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has heightened many of the following problems facing those who would use argument:

1. Argument is not usable by everyone. Argument requires people who are willing to argue and capable of arguing. Unfortunately, large numbers of people (probably the majority of US citizens and certainly a majority of the global population) do not meet these requirements. Formal argument requires that human beings be rational, self-determining, self-interested, autonomous subjects, free (at least during the time that they are engaged in argument) of the "clutter" of irrational belief or determinism. Many people are neither fully self-determining nor free of irrationality much of the time.

Even though in a democracy a forum for resolving disputes is supposed to be open to all, practically, it is not always. Social barriers and personal incapacities can render some incapable of taking part. Argument can thus solidify privilege and exclude marginal voices. When selected voices are suppressed, debates about their welfare go on without their participation. The very medium that was to grant a hearing to all effectively excludes them.

Says Crosswhite, "argument furthers very particular ways of disclosing the world and understanding things. It promotes certain kinds of action and undermines others. It makes some forms of life seem desirable and deprives others of any justification" (195). Says Mindell,

> Public abuse goes hand in hand with an adversarial legal system whose goal is to determine who's right and who's wrong instead of how to improve relationships. An adversarial system supports power, supports right and might rather than understanding and connection to others. An adversarial system works toward increasing conformity and productivity, not compassion (134).

He asks that we break the cycle of vengeance and mudslinging by insisting all be heard and present.

And if "[a]ll argumentation furthers a particular perspective on what is real, what is possible, and what is worthwhile" (Crosswhite, 190), then if what one wants is not in the realm of the real, the possible, or the worthwhile, one will be denied an effective hearing. And even if one's wants and needs *are* within the real, the possible, and the worthwhile, one may not be capable of

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arguing for them because of a lack of educational/intellectual competence, mental capacity, emotional stability, or because one's status subjects one to punishment for arguing (an employee utterly dependent on the income from a job, an abused spouse fearful of retribution, a child). Those at Wilber's lower levels of development have no ability to participate in a "rational" society, those at the top may prefer other ways of interacting. Says Crosswhite,

> any argumentative conversation depends on a fairly extensive network of shared competences and agreements . . . shared knowledge, values, beliefs, and abilities that are taken for granted, as well as some conception of what kinds of challenges are relevant . . . . unless one shares these understandings. . . one cannot experience an argument as an argument (53).

Some abstain from the process because they do not believe that argument is likely to do them any good. "Among individuals without much power to choose, argumentation may not seem to be a very important kind of discourse" (Crosswhite, 203). Whether one perceives the value of argument or not depends in large part on such factors as one's education, social status, age, and sex - all factors around which the possibility of discrimination looms. What seems like a choice to refrain from engaging in argument may not actually be a choice at all. Most often, the powerful choose to argue, the less powerful do not.

Some may see the value of argument but not want to participate or feel that their personal experience cannot be expressed through argument. Crosswhite notes that if women have experiences that are "fugitive to explicit articulation and reasoning," then they will be "conflicted in claiming" (213). Many feminists have raised doubts about argument, calling it implicitly oppositional, adversarial, and domineering (Govier, 1997, 84; Lamb, 1997, 6; Nye). Some people dislike argument as a matter of personal taste or as a result of negative experiences with it in the past or because they see it as warlike and do not want to engage in combative exchange. Says Crosswhite, "the commitment to continuing argumentation is itself a commitment to particular ethical ideals, ideals which must be shared for argumentation to succeed" (106). If engaging in argument does violence to one's ideals, one will avoid arguing. Argument requires that the claimants share the assumption

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that argument is a reasonable way to resolve conflict. One who wants to argue may be faced with an opponent who refuses to do so, either from lack of capacity or lack of interest.

2. Argument does not deal with the nonrational and thus is not an available tool in many disputes. There are many problems and issues that are not amenable to argument, most particularly those that involve values, beliefs, emotions, intuition, and other "irrational" features, or those in which no shared context can be found. While traditional argument works well for monologic problems where objective truth or a finding of social utility is potentially available, for dialogic concerns, it is less satisfactory. According to Young, Becker, and Pike, traditional argument "tends to be ineffective in those dyadic situations that involve strong values and beliefs. . . . [L]ogical demonstration may seem irrelevant and conventional argumentative strategies suspect" (274). Crosswhite, a defender of argument, says we cannot argue about deep competences (the framework), or improper things to discuss, or matters which are not living issues, or private ideas and experiences that some would call nonrational (191-2). Nor can we argue if we are determined not to have our minds changed. "People can argue only concerning those things about which they are willing to learn, and change their minds" (Crosswhite, 283). Since there are many things about which we are not willing to change our minds, these subjects are effectively excluded from debate - and those are the subjects that most beg for resolution.

Argument does not operate in all of Wilber's four quadrants or in all of his stages. Emotions, intuition, and direct contact with the divine are other means by which we come to understand the world, find solutions to inner and outer conflict, and relate to one another. If the educated public insists on rationality as our only way of finding solutions to and interacting around conflict, we will perforce be ignoring the full range of human experience. As Feodor Dostoyevsky points out in Notes from Underground: ". . . reason is only reason, and it only satisfies man's rational requirements" (quoted in Young, Becker, and Pike, 273). When we do not acknowledge nonrational ways of knowing and do not bring them into our decision-making, they cannot play a significant part in what we think and do.

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For example, in considering the issue of abortion we look to the medical community to give us an idea of when life begins and to our social scientists to tell us what effect it has on society, but we tend to lop off the highly emotional, very religious aspects of the problem as irrational, not subject to debate, and the cultural aspects as too relativistic. These concerns, because they cannot be reduced to logical propositions, are avoided, and, of course, they erupt and do away with our "logical" answers in the form of violence or hysteria. Argument, almost by definition, has no means of engaging irrationality. Expanded notions of argument *are* being pressed into service in Lower Left (cultural) quadrant issues, e.g. probabilistic argument, and Upper Left ones (interior individual), e.g. Rogerian argument, but, as I have suggested, many of these expanded notions bear little resemblance to the persuasive claiming of traditional argument.

3. Argument cannot be used without a shared context. "Argument," suggests Berrill, "operates best in contexts of connectedness and community" (11). Teich points out,

> the whole orientation of the great classical tradition has been toward the conduct of public affairs; it is a rhetoric that presupposes communities with widely shared beliefs and conflicts in which opponents are willing and able to communicate. It has not spoken directly to dyadic situations where a sense of threat makes it difficult and at times impossible for one or both of the participants to even consider adopting another position; where fundamental beliefs are often not shared, where there is a greater sense of diversity than of community, indeed, where in some cases . . . the differences are so extreme that one questions whether mutual understanding is possible; where confrontation often veers toward coercion and violence (111).

In a society in which there is sufficient heterogeneity, the search for common context can end upon the discovery of the underlying assumptions the community shares. For example, in the America of the fifties, we had a dominant majority which valued progress, science, hard work, puritan values, free enterprise, etc. Those who were outside this group did what they could to get into it. That situation has changed. Most nations, and most particularly this one, are a polyglot of cultures, values, assumptions, worldviews. The dominant ideology is under attack, nearly all of our modernist assumptions are being challenged, and we find ourselves without

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a common ground on which to stand in order to negotiate our conflicts. One cannot be sure that even the simplest assumptions will be shared by one's readers. Say Bizzell and Herzberg, "classical rhetoricians could assume a culturally homogenous society. . . . So if sharing cultural values is indeed a prerequisite to finding common ground on which to base action for the common good, then the rhetorician's task is going to be much more complicated in America" (1997, 6). Unfortunately, as Lovins points out, "Our society has mechanisms only for resolving conflicting interests, not conflicting views of reality" (12).[4]

And even when we have apparent cultural similarity, we may still have no foundational truths. Faigley describes a world in which

> there is nothing outside contingent discourses to which a discourse of values can be grounded - no eternal truths, no universal human experience, no universal human rights, no overriding narrative of human progress. . . . The foundational concepts associated with artistic judgment such as "universal value" and "intrinsic merit," with science such as "truth" and "objectivity," and with ethics and law such as "rights" and "freedoms" suddenly have no meaning outside of particular discourse and are deeply involved in the qualities they are alleged to be describing objectively (8).

Argument, therefore, cannot handle many of today's worst conflicts. Littlejohn, Shailor, and Pearce point out that "When differences involve incommensurate conceptions of morality, conflict, and justice, they may be very difficult indeed" (68, citing Kressel & Pruitt, 1989a, p. 404). Young says,

> Aristotle is very clear that there are only certain situations that he would call rhetorical. There are other situtations, characterized by conflict, where we don't do rhetoric. Rhetoric is concerned only with a certain kind of situation where there is a disagreement and where there is the possibility for argument. We [Young, et al, 1970] were asking the question: what about the other situation that we find ourselves in all the while? . . . when the disagreeements go deep and we get upset.
>
> I maintain we do not have anything in traditional rhetoric that addresses this kind of situation directly ( ).

Teich concurs. Aristotelian argument works, he says, "only if the opponents

---

[4] cited in Littlejohn, Stephen W., Jonathan Shailor, and W. Barnett Pearce. "The Deep Structure of Reality in Mediation." in New Directions in Mediation: Communication Research and Perspectives, Folger, Joseph P. and Tricia S. Jones, eds. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1994, p. 67.

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have been brought to the position where they are willing to talk" (82).

As we have lost our shared assumptions, so we have lost the ability to reason together. Says Crosswhite, "The traditional concepts of reason and argument depended on the assumption that there was something we all had in common, that it was possible to settle our differences peacefully provided only that we were willing to reason" (44). Ramage agrees: "Rational arguments depend also on two additional factors: (1) reasonable participants, . . . and (2) potentially shareable assumptions that can serve as a starting place or foundation for the argument" (47). If we cannot argue when we do not share root assumptions, and if we cannot argue about issues over which we have strong commitments, then what is left to argue about?

4. Argument may distort reality. Argument has a tendency to polarize, to flatten, to press unruly bits of evidence into a shape that will make them amenable to rational discussion. The danger here, as Crusius points out, is that argument has "a tendency to obscure relations and interrelations in the very act of making useful distinctions, a tendency to reify the concept to the point at which its seemingly fixed and static nature begins to cover over the shifting identities of a phenomenal world always in process" (42). Argument needs fixed positions on which to operate, but once we fix ideas into positions or claims, the dynamism, flow, and changeability of the world get lost. Nye sees this kind of reductionism as forcing debate and thought into approved channels (34). She says, "The purpose of logic was not to open the discussion to all viewpoints with the purpose of establishing a consensus, but to establish a model of discourse that excluded what was contradictory or irrational" (49). She condemns the reductiveness of logical argument vis a vis women's experience: "Once rationality is defined as what is not emotional and emotionality established as the characteristic of women, once rationality is seen as a characteristic of mind, not body, and a slave is understood as what is only a body, there could be no discussion of the institutions of slavery or sexism" (50). Until very recently values were not thought to be amenable to rational discussion, and we still have no generally respected format for discussing religion, or art, or flying saucers, or energy fields. As a result, these and other nonrational topics are often ignored by mainstream society.

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Argument can obscure and complicate problems. Says Lynch, "focusing on stark controversies at the expense of the complexities of an issue is also a way of evading or covering up the painful and complex problems that face us and that we must resolve if we want to have a society that's worth living in" (76). Lanham:

> Genuine two-sided argument is not the same thing as finding out the "real" truth by looking at all sides of the question. That procedure, which we normally think of as "philosophical" argument, does not allow really two-sided argument. The truth is whole and one-sided. . . . The formal two-sided procedures of Western jurisprudence are just such a formal, social, invented procedure for dealing with an uncertain world. Again, the jury's verdict may approach the Truth asymptotically . . . but it can never be more than an interim report from a reality always rendered multiplex through the changing scales of sentient perception, human and other (58).

5. Argument divides. The dichotomizing that is inherent in Aristotle's law of contradiction (that something cannot be both A and not A) is enhanced in argument. Taking a position leads to distinguishing that position from its opposite. Dichotomizing causes us to see the world as antagonistic, as either/or rather than both/and. We then find ourselves competing rather than cooperating, convincing rather than sharing, emphasizing our differences rather than searching for common ground. Such polarization can encourage both superficiality and extremism, as a glance at some of the television programs in which ideas are debated will confirm.[5] Says NPR host and social commentator Andrew Bard Schmookler, "When people divide on an issue, unless they find a resolution, they tend to push each other further out toward the opposite ends of the spectrum. Each end represents a value that is legitimate, but that also must be balanced against another value" (2). Such polarization tends to exclude points of view that are elsewhere on the continuum - or that are off it entirely. Says Nye, "The terms of logic still guaranteed that discussion would take place safely within a universe of dichotomous categories closed to alien points of view" (49).

Dichotomizing also precludes consideration of context. Everything may be true at some level, in some places, at some times. To express an idea

[5] i.e. McLaughlin Group, Meet the Press, Crossfire.

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as fixed, as wholly distinct from another idea or even as antagonistic to it limits that idea, bounds it in ways that prevent full exploration of its possibilities. Its wrongness or rightness cannot be considered without reference to such variables as our values, our perspective, the context.

6. Argument supports fragmentation. Traditional argument favors fragmentation over integration, a trend that is already epidemic in our world today. We are divided into enclaves of ethnicity, financial condition, educational achievement, religious belief, age, race, and gender, and each group's root assumptions differ widely. In the modern world, all these groups rub up against one another; we live like porcupines in a cage, unable to get away from one another, unable to assimilate one another, and unable to convince one another.

People themselves feel fragmented; body and mind are separate, the psyche is split between persona and shadow, acceptable and unacceptable. There are no guiding moral principles, and situation ethics, "refusing to acknowledge any common ground of shared values, guts the potential for building consensus on any basis but fear, ignorance, or malice" (Kidder, 189).

A critical approach involves taking things apart, looking at individual parts; it involves differentiation and dissection. Close analysis gives birth to shades of meaning, differentiation multiplies the number of positions to consider. Ultimately, there can be as many positions as there are people (or inner selves) to take them. Lynch raises the "possibility that traditional argumentation, even reconfigured as a rhetoric of inquiry, might still isolate students more than it connects them" (67). We bemoan this fragmentation in many contexts - political, familial, psychological - but we have few alternatives for handling difference in ways that do not split us apart.

Argument also relies on language which, while able to clarify and connect, may also serve to separate and confuse. Says Huxley, "homo loquax, the talking animal, is still . . . as helplessly the victim of his own words, as he was when the Tower of Babel was being built" (129). There are too many interpretations, too little certainty. Elbow points out that "no argument is ever compelling . . ." (1986, 280). There is always evidence on either side, always a reason not to agree. Even "law students report that legal argument

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never convinces anyone" (Riskin, 80).

7. Argument encourages combativeness. Because of this fragmentation and because of the war metaphor around which it is constructed, traditional argument very often increases combativeness. Lakoff and Johnson's discussion of the war metaphor associated with argument is much-quoted. Deborah Tannen in her new book, The Argument Culture, speaks of

> a pervasive warlike atmosphere that makes us approach public dialogue, and just about anything we need to accomplish, as if it were a fight . . . . The argument culture urges us to approach the world - and the people in it - in an adversarial frame of mind. It rests on the assumption that opposition is the best way to get anything done. . . . Nearly everything is framed as a battle or game in which winning or losing is the main concern" (3, 4).

Others have also noted the inherent agonism of argument. "To argue is to commit yourself to an idea . . . and to be committed to an idea ensures that you will run into conflicts and disagreements with others" (Gage, 168). "[A]rgumentation, as a form of discourse, is closely allied with modern suspiciousness and doubt, with interrogation, and with a will to power" (Crosswhite, 200). "[A]rgumentation is concerned with differences as *conflicts*." (Young et al, 282, italics theirs). "Rhetoric fixed knowledge in agonistic structures" (Ong, 18). "Since persuasion so often implies the presence or threat of an adversary, there is the 'agonistic' or competitive stress. Thus Aristotle, who looks upon rhetoric as a medium that 'proves opposites,' gives what amounts to a handbook on a manly art of self-defense" (Burke, 52). "Since the 'Old Rhetoric was an offspring of dispute,' it is not surprising that its defining metaphor is 'the battle of words' and its strategies antagonistic . . . *the rhetors who argue are trying to defeat, not to convince each other*" (Teich 87, italics his). "The assertiveness of traditional argument often constitutes verbal violence, lack of empathy, lack of respect and consideration for others" (Ibid 94).

The legal system is a prime example of the excesses of this attitude. Walt Bachman, writing from inside the profession, says, "Flowing from the overriding imperative of zealous advocacy is the duty to attack and, if possible, destroy a harmful witness by any means permitted by law" (35).

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"[T]he other side's short-comings are amplified and exaggerated" (73) and "[s]ecret-keeping, manipulating other people, taking advantage of others' weaknesses, and rationalization" (77) are staples in the advocacy process. While argument does not *demand* this kind of behavior, the process often encourages it.

Even if it is not inherently agonistic, argument is vulnerable to corruption, to disintegrating into mere quarrel or contradiction, to becoming a vehicle for deception (either intentional or unintentional), to sophistry, to fallacies - even when the intent of the arguer is wholly honorable. Says Ehninger, "Because unsound or inadequate proofs may through skillful handling be made to appear sound, argument often is at the mercy of those who would abuse it" (5). This fact has had enormous consequences for the criminal justice system. Nye: "In the new courts, success depended not on guilt or innocence, but on cleverness and dexterity in argument" (45). "The old inner restraints could only be binding on a community of men and women with shared values and commitments" (44). And even when we intend to be fully honest, our considerable abilities to deceive ourselves, increased in the heat of argument and in the urge to defend positions with which we are identified, can prevent this from happening.

8. Argument may lead to premature closure. Protracted conflict is often regarded as a negative. Argument is designed to overcome difference, to reach agreement. However, rushing to resolve conflict is often not the best course. The search for closure inhibits alternatives from being explored (Cobb, 54); alternatives which may be growth-producing and creative for all participants. Conflict can in fact create growth, it can cause people to transcend their current levels of development, it can open new opportunities to view, it can increase creativity. Argument does not encourage this view of conflict and thus closes possible doors to new ways of handling difference. Crum calls our conflicts "literally, the best opportunities we have to grow, to learn, and to create. Often this requires a courageous leap into a whole new perception of relationships . . . . When we see conflict as the enemy, we tend to use much of our immense brain-power and energy avoiding it, denying it, or fighting it" (12). By favoring closure, traditional argument may deny us

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growth opportunities.

9. Argument may cause us to miss other, better ways of dealing with conflict. Even when argument may be useful or adequate, it is not necessarily the best way to handle a problem. When Solomon ordered that a baby be cut in half so as to ferret out the real mother, he was looking for evidence to prove one side right in an argument. But how much better to have let the argument go and assign both women to care for the child. Why put the innocent child at such risk? Too often, casting a problem as an argument leads to greater suffering. Emphasizing rights rather than responsibilities (a male/female difference according to Gilligan) often does more harm than good. "Solving" the problem may often mean only a temporary lull in the hostilities.

David Bohm claims that rational thought, argument, is the problem not the solution. Thought, he says, needs to prove itself, and to create "facts" which are not really facts" (57). "Opinions . . . tend to be experienced as 'truths,' even though they may only be your own assumptions and your own background" (9).

Expanded Notions of Argument

Responding to these limitations of positional discourse, several compositionists and rhetoricians have attempted to expand argument to include a spirit of cooperation instead of competition or combat, a larger, more "commodious" context, and a more open and honest speaker. Young, Becker, and Pike suggest, "It has become imperative to develop a rhetoric that has as its goal not skillful verbal coercion but discussion and exchange of ideas" (9).

Teich suggests the use of a Rogerian-based rhetoric which "refocuses or reframes the query toward an assessment of the inherent validity of premises, morality of positions held, respect for differing audience views entailed, and provision of public justification for positions demonstrated" (233). This is essentially a meta-view of conflict, one that takes the participants out of their own positions and into a stance which allows them to see the whole of the conflict: the different positions, the people who hold them, and the contexts

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in which they are held.

Watson-Gegeo challenges the idea that difference necessarily means conflict:

> Difference need not amount to disagreement; disagreement can be understood as something other than conflict; conflict need not be a contest but can be an opportunity for constructive change. And contests need not amount to battles ..... With the dead metaphors of defense and victory a key part of our conceptual apparatus, we all too easily leap the gaps, interpreting disagreement as conflict and conflict as something calling for winners and losers (85).

She points to the example of mediation to demonstrate that differences can be treated as opportunities for win/win; she even suggests that differences can be "cherished" (87).

Says Govier,

> One can think of argument as building . . . trying to get good evidential foundations .... Or one can think of argument as inquiry or exploration: In arguing one explores what reasons and evidence there are for various positions, and by comparative critical evaluation, comes to better understand the content of these positions and their comparative merits" (87).

Lynch attempts to expand argument by embracing both contest and collaboration.

> "It sometimes seems in recent arguments over argument, that we must choose between two contrasting styles of argument, competitive or collaborative, but such a decision is unnecessarily abstract and ignores the historical development of thought about argument .... Throughout most of this century, as Andrea Lunsford and Lisa Ede argue ... we have steadily moved away from argumentation as competition and contest. . . .What we are seeking is a way of reconceiving argument that includes both confrontational and cooperative perspectives, a multifaceted process that includes moments of conflict and agonistic position as well as a moments of understanding and communication" (62, 63).

He uses the terms "agonistic inquiry" and "confrontational cooperation" to describe this process (64).

Lamb suggests that we that we "respond" instead of "refute" (1996, 265) and proposes "[a] writer/reader relationship characterized by loving attention . . ." (Ibid, 261) so as to keep parties in conflict connected while resolving the conflict. She sees argument as problem solving rather than as a contest and

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advocates seeking out and understanding perspectives other than our own, acknowledging the place of emotions and personal experience in decision-making, requiring any solution to be seen as fair by all, and making argument open to assessment and reformulation (Ibid, 262).

Says Fulkerson,

> "I endorse a broad view of argument, a view in which the purpose is not victory over an opponent but mutual dialectical interchange through which, out of opposing yet simultaneously cooperating voices, wise decisions can be reached, decisions always subject to revision as better arguments and better evidence become available" (ix).

In this one sentence we see several themes that are part of the new integral discourse: mutuality, lack of closure, a cooperative search for truth, integration of opposites, and a shift from a focus on win/lose to one on win/win.

An Emerging Discourse

These and others in the field are searching for ways to reduce the combativeness of traditional argument; all propose methods for bringing us to common ground and/or a wider understanding. All of them embrace the idea that different perspectives can coexist; even celebrate one another. There is no rush to resolution, no demand for the dominance of one, nor even a compromise between them.

Their theoretical and practical suggestions, along with recent contributions of personal growth and conflict resolution specialists, constitute the pieces of a new integral discourse, an approach to conflict and difference that overcomes some of the limitations of the previous discourses and offers some potential for us to manage the seemingly intractable conflicts that beset us in the interdependent yet fragmented world that is ours today. As I have suggested, these new ways of interacting around conflict are more than just expanded notions of argument. Thus I disagree with Lynch when he says,

> "We need to see argumentation . . . as an array of human activities, including institutionalized formal debate, legal trials, shouting matches that threaten to end in fist fights, conversational games of one-upsmanship, disagreements among friends, and extended deliberations within a community

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> over what course of action to pursue. We need to see it not just as a matter of winning or losing but as a way to connect with others which may lead to change, not only in the world but also in ourselves. But, most of all, we need to see it as a means of coming to decisions, a way of getting things done in the world, that includes moments of agonistic dispute, moments of inquiry, moments of confrontation, and moments of cooperation" (84).

However, we can *employ* all of the above methods, but use terms that clarify what we are doing. We can speak of the *diatribes* or quarrels of the emotional stage, the *assertions* and pronouncements of the discourse of authority, and the *reasoned claiming* of the positional stage. Both processes, formal argument and integral discourse, can remain available for our use; distinguishing them can help us to clarify what it is we are selecting when we set out to deal with differences, and can, in fact, serve to highlight the benefits of formal argument.

There is another reason as well to change the name. The way we tell our story changes the story, and if changing the name changes the way we look at conflict, makes it clear that there are alternatives to win-lose scenarios, makes it harder to pretend that we are being cooperative when we are not, then perhaps more of us will consider adopting some of these new approaches. Hill points out that the field of composition studies is bulging at the boundaries, that there are "abundant voices begging to be housed in orderly fashion" (101). Perhaps this is another house.

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Chapter 5. The Pieces of Integral Discourse: A Template and Prototypes

"The last function of reason is to recognize that there are an infinity of things which surpass it." Pascal

"It is not impossible to think that argumentation could itself be transformed by some more powerful agency of reconciliation" (Crosswhite, 219)

Any postmodern discourse must be able to contain multiple worldviews and widely varying assumptions. Previous communities tended to share basic assumptions about how to get along in the world (e.g. by bowing to superior strength, living in harmony under communal beliefs, following a leader, or negotiating agreement) and what is valued (e.g. physical safety, community, social order, or property). When a group that did not share those assumptions or values appeared in the midst of the community, either the newcomer or the existing group was destroyed, driven away, enslaved, bracketed out (i.e. Untouchables, women), or assimilated. But today these solutions do not satisfy: we cannot geographically or mentally separate ourselves, we have formally rejected annihilation and enslavement, and cultural domination is generally resisted by those who would be assimilated. Argument often seems only to exacerbate our differences. Say Young, Becker, and Pike, "Perhaps never before in our history has there been such a need for effective communication, but the old formulations of rhetoric seem inadequate to the times" (9).

I propose that we are developing new formulations, new agencies of reconciliation, a new discourse around conflict; that the pieces of it lie everywhere. The writers referred to in the next few chapters speak of wedding reason and emotion, value and fact, and self and other; they advocate integral practices such as Elbow's believing game, Bohm's dialogue, and Rogerian argument. Instead of convincing, persuading, and strategizing, they talk of building, evaluation, inquiry, and response. They are more person-oriented than task-oriented, more process-oriented than results oriented, and they tend to be more interested in the whole picture than in analyzing its parts. They often sound more spiritual than scientific. They see

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conflict as positive, not negative; it is considered to be a tool for growth and change. There is an emphasis on inclusion of multiple perspectives, on "growing" participants, and on relationship.

Wilber's Models as a Template

Ken Wilber, whose philosophy is an attempt to integrate a vast spectrum of thought (Socrates to Foucault, Descartes to Aurobindo), has two models that are relevant to integral discourse: his four quadrants and his stage development model, both of which I described in chapter two. The four quadrants encompass multiple ways of knowing about the world; the vision-logic stage describes persons who are able to integrate these ways of knowing.

Wilber's four quadrant model is a container for a whole array of warring philosophies which have sometimes been reduced to the "Big Three": physical, psychological, and social approaches to explaining our world; the *It, I,* and *W e* dimensions of life. The *It* is the objective, factual, measurable, observable part of our universe, the part that science investigates, the "outer" as opposed to the "inner" world. Wilber's *It* includes both his upper right quadrant (the individual empirical) and lower right quadrant (the collective empirical). The individual *It* is the world of the physical sciences; the collective *It* is the world of the social sciences. We can observe the behavior of molecules; we can observe the behavior of institutions. The scientist and the so-called "rational man" of legal terminology operate out of this quadrant.

The *I* is the upper left quadrant (the individual subjective), the quadrant that contains information that can only be retrieved in dialogue with a subject who reports her subjective interior experience. This is the quadrant of psychology, of artistic expression, of religious experience. The more inwardly guided person, the person who "marches to his own drummer" operates primarily out of this quadrant.

The *We* or the social/cultural quadrant is the lower left (the collective subjective), the quadrant of mutual understanding, of shared beliefs and attitudes. Also discoverable only through reports of the experiencers, it differs from the lower right social/institutional quadrant by being dialogical

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rather than monological (i.e. anthropologists of the lower left enter into a dialogue with the members of a culture to ask them to report on their subjective experience of their beliefs and attitudes while anthropologists of the lower right observe the objective behavior of a culture and derive their own conclusions about its beliefs and attitudes). A "company man" might be an example of someone who operates out of the lower right quadrant, a mythologist of the lower left.

In handling conflict, as in other fields of endeavor, we often demonstrate a preference for objective or subjective and individual or collective ways of knowing; we may rely on facts or our experience or we are interested in individual behavior or group norms. When we find curselves engaged in disputes, it is often because we are speaking out of different quadrants. For example, when we discuss UFO's, some will argue about whether there is or is not physical evidence of flying saucers, others will report their personal sightings (whether as strangely behaving objects or as ordinary aircraft or natural phenomena). Some may point to cultures who have had apparent encounters with extraterrestrial life by reading reports recorded by those cultures; others may observe artifacts such as the Nazca lines in Peru; some will look for less other-worldly explanations for those reports and artifacts. When one party is focusing on a personal sighting and another is arguing that there is no physical evidence, the speakers are not even arguing in the same ballpark. It is not surprising that no resolution is available to them. Another example of arguing from different realities might be the different responses to the issue of capital punishment: some focus on recidivist statistics, others on Biblical verses, others on cultural values.

Integral discourse would take into account all four quadrants. It would engage physical and anecdotal, individual and collective data as all making a contribution to the discussion. Integral discourse says, in effect, everything is valuable: all quadrants contribute to an understanding of a phenomenon; scientific observation, social analysis, individual experience, or collective understanding. Wilber takes the position that no one can be 100% wrong and that each perspective has something valuable to contribute (Noetic Sciences Review, Winter, 1996, 13). This is similar to Rescher's term "syncretism" (the

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belief that every theory is true to some extent) which he opposes to "skepticism" (the position that doubts that anything can be true) (Petraglia, 329, note 6). Elbow's believing game is another syncretic theory.

Integrating the four quadrants does not mean reducing one to the other, nor does it equal assimilation. Instead of a cream soup in which the various perspectives are blended, integral discourse creates a salad in which they may remain distinct but still make up a part of a greater whole.

Wilber's stage development model is also a template for integral discourse. His vision-logic stage, the stage at which consciousness expands to include the "other," the stage at which information is taken in in gestalts rather than linearly, the stage at which all the ways of knowing (physical, emotional, social, mental) of the previous stages are integrated is echoed in Kegan's Fifth Order consciousness and Gebser's aperspectivity, also described in Chapter Two. Others, too, have suggested characteristics of those at the integral level of development. Maslow, known for his hierarchy of needs,[1] describes self-actualizing people (those in his final stage) as having a superior perception of reality, an increased acceptance of self, of others and of nature, increased spontaneity, an increase in problem-centering, increased autonomy, a higher frequency of peak experiences, greater creativeness, and a more democratic outlook on the world (23). Because they are less needy, they are less anxious for prestige and rewards (31-2), and they can love more altruistically, basing their love on the objective, intrinsic qualities of the person, not on whether or not he gives out love (34).

They have an ability to see the whole, including the whole person.

> It is as if less developed people lived in an Aristotelian world in which classes and concepts have sharp boundaries and are mutually exclusive and incompatible, eg, male-female, selfish-unselfish, adult-child, kind-cruel, good-bad. A is A and everything else is not-A in the Aristotelian logic, and never the twain shall meet. But seen by self-actualizing people is the fact that A and not-A interpenetrate and are one, that any person is simultaneously good*and* bad, male and [sic] female, adult *and* child. One cannot place a whole person on a continuum, only an abstracted aspect of a person (Maslow, 37).

[1] safety, belongingness, love, respect, self-esteem, and self-actualization

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Maslow's higher level people also embrace contradictions within themselves. "At the higher levels of human maturation, many dichotomies, polarities, and conflicts are fused, transcended or resolved. Self-actualizing people are simultaneously selfish and unselfish, Dionysian and Appollonian, individual and social, rational and irrational, fused with others and detached from others, and so on" (86).

Lawrence Kohlberg is known for his six-stage moral development scheme which begins in egocentricity and culminates in the acceptance of universal principles of justice, reciprocity, equality, and respect.[2] Kohlberg has proposed an alternative or supplementary stage six which deals with agape or responsible love and a further stage seven which he sees as related to the cosmic perspective, or mystic union with God (401).

James W. Fowler, who charted the development of faith, describes people at his higher stages as able to recognize the pull between self-fulfillment and commitment to the welfare of others, able to take on another world view in its full complexity. They can maintain a "vision of meaning, coherence, and value while being conscious of the fact that it is partial, limited and contradicted by the visions and claims of others. It is not simply relativist, affirming that one person's faith is as good as another's if equally strongly held. It holds its vision with a kind of provisional ultimacy: remembering its inadequacy and open to new truth, but also committed to the absoluteness of the truth which it inadequately comprehends and expresses . . . ." (Kohlberg, 1981, 330).

Says psychologist Jane Loevinger of her Autonomous Stage:

> A distinctive mark of the Autonomous Stage is the capacity to

[2] Someone in Preconventional stage 1 will obey to avoid punishment, someone in stage 2 (an instrumental relativist) will conform to obtain rewards and act based on principles of fairness: "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." Conventional stage 3 persons conform to get approval for being 'nice' and to avoid disapproval or dislike. They have concern for others and believe in a concrete Golden Rule, but they do not have a systemic perspective. Stage 4 is a society maintaining orientation. People at this stage believe in authority, fixed rules, and doing their duty. They conform to avoid censure by legitimate authorities among which they pick and choose. At Postconventional stage 5 (the social contract stage), people conform to maintain the respect of the impartial spectator judging in terms of community welfare. They find it difficult to integrate moral and legal points of view. This is the rational man stage. At stage 6, "[r]ight is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. Rules are abstract, not moral. The person conforms to avoid self-condemnation" (Kohlberg, 1981, 17-19).

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> acknowledge and to cope with inner conflict, that is, conflicting needs, conflicting duties, and the conflict between needs and duties. Probably the Autonomous person does not have more conflict than others; rather he has the courage (and whatever other qualities it takes) to acknowledge and deal with conflict rather than ignoring it or projecting it onto the environment. Where the Conscientious [previous stage] person tends to construe the world in terms of polar opposites, the Autonomous person partly transcends these polarities, seeing reality as complex and multifaceted. He is able to unite and integrate ideas that appear as incompatible alternatives at lower stages; there is a high toleration for ambiguity (23).

At Carol Gilligan's higher levels, the female emphasis on caring and responsibility and the male emphasis on self-fulfillment and rights (100) would no longer be mutually exclusive. She comments on "[t]he ongoing human conversation about separation and connection, justice and care, rights and responsibilities, power and love," (xxii) and suggests that these do not have to be dichotomized.

For each of these writers, there is a widening of perspective; more and more of what was previously seen as other is regarded as part of the self. The self is not seen as separate from relationship but as constructed, at least in part, from it. A more positive constructionism appears; one may grasp with Kegan that, "We may have this conflict because we need it to recover our true complexity" (319). The drive is for mutual understanding and communication.

At this level, all previous stages/discourses are integrated. Persons who reach this stage no longer see themselves entirely as discrete entities or fully autonomous subjects. Multiple perspectives are acknowledged, the search is for wholeness. Objectivity is on a par with subjectivity. Say Fisher and Ury, "As useful as looking for objective reality can be, it is ultimately the reality as each side sees it that constitutes the problem in a negotiation and opens the way to a solution" (23). Conflict is managed creatively, even bizarrely.

Integration is the goal; integration of the component parts of the self, and integration of the self with the "other," whether nature, God, or another human being. Power is located in the whole rather than in its parts; in the

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relationship rather than the individuals. Power is power with, not power over. There is an egalitarianism, a sense that all the voices to a conflict are worth hearing, a search for commonalities that includes a celebration of differences. Conflict is seen as a clarifier, as a catalyst rather than as a divisive force.

Needs at this stage include a desire for connection and wholeness. There is a striving for reunification of parts, a caring for the forgotten both within the self and in the community at large. Relationships reflect this care for the other; there is a beginning altruism that is based on more than rational self-interest, need to conform, or hunger to be liked. Says Jung, "Emotional relationships are relationships of desire, tainted by coercion and constraint; something is expected from the other person, and that makes him and ourselves unfree . . . Only through objective cognition is the real coniunctio possible" (296). Relationships at the integrated stage *unite* rationality and emotionality.

Truth is not to be found in information as it was in the rational stage, but neither is it unavailable as the deconstructionists claim. We no longer equate truth or the lack of it with words, nor our personal interpretation with reality. We recognize the gap between the happening and the story we tell of it, the gap being all the filters and defenses and attitudes we bring to that happening. There is a rebirth of belief in the existence of some "better" ways of doing things, in an underlying ground of truth, in faith in human nature. There is a sense of the flow of the universe.

At this stage, there is a desire to use conflict to grow personally, to expand one's understanding, to enlarge one's perspective. Self-knowledge takes on more and more importance. Says Feuerstein, "a man who fails to pursue self-knowledge is and remains a danger to society, for he will tend to misunderstand everything that other people say or do, and remain blissfully unaware of the significance of many of the things he does himself" (140).

People at the integrated stage become observers of themselves (Senge, 242). They seek out their hidden assumptions, recognize that psychological defenses affect their behavior in conflict. Inner conflict is seen as a mirror of outer; they recognize that the other may be embodying something about

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ourselves that we don't want to see. They learn to live with more than one perspective. This is the stage of Wilber's vision-logic: truth-seeing at a single view, a grasping of the whole picture.

Morality becomes an important force at this stage of development. Says Midgley, *"as soon as you take seriously this difference of points of view you are involved in doing morality"* (70, italics hers). Kohlberg's morality of rights meshes with Gilligan's morality of responsibility. Gebser sees this happening now: "notions of fairness and responsibility have entered the language of law in juxtapostion to justice and rights" (Feuerstein, 140). Ethicist Kidder says ethics ceases to be used as a club and becomes a way of seeing. "Ethics is not simply a set of politically correct views on specific issues, or a particular moralistic stand, or a bully flag planted in the sand. It's a way of looking at the world . . . . It's not a compromise; it's a lens" (1995, 32). Once the either/or orientation is weakened, his four dilemmas (truth vs. loyalty, individual vs. community, short-term vs. long-term, justice vs. mercy (18)) become less like dilemmas and more like interesting ways to look at a problem.

Therapy, particularly existential therapy, can be a useful, even necessary adjunct to people at this stage. Breton suggests that it is at this point that myriad unfinished psychic business arises: "unfulfilled needs, role expectations, corked-up frustrations, grief, anger, and manipulative, self-deceived ways of dealing with all this painful stuff" (268). Wilber would agree (1996, 201).

Solutions may be seen as possible by people at this stage, but not always as desirable. They do not make resolution the first or only goal. When resolution is sought, the approach to conflict is definitely win/win. Positions (which are seen as akin to posturing and thus part of a win/lose strategy) are less important than interests. Collaboration rather than compromise is the rule. People try to imagine solutions in which everyone gains rather than those in which a pie is divided up or they look for ways to make the pie larger.

Conflict is, in fact, no longer a negative. It can be seen as "an opportunity to achieve greater awareness, intimacy, self-growth, true peace-

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making, and community in a time of escalating social turbulence" (Leviton, 51). Says Mindell, "The sooner we come to terms with conflict and learn how to acknowledge and process it , the sooner we make lasting peace . . . when we see the light, we will be empowered partners in a win/win resolution; as components of a conflicted field, we won't deny, suppress, or shoot, we'll be collaborators and cocreators of something altogether new and of global significance" (Leviton, 52). Crum calls our conflicts "literally, the best opportunities we have to grow, to learn, and to create" (12).

Just as Nierenberg is perhaps *the* conflict theorist of the postrational stage (and Mindell, perhaps, of the psychic stage), so Bush and Folger are the theorists of the integrative stage. They advocate using mediation to foster empowerment and mutual recognition, thereby transforming disputants into more compassionate and stronger people. They propose that "mediation's transformative dimensions are connected to an emerging, higher vision of self and society, one based on moral development and interpersonal relations rather than on satisfaction and individual autonomy" (3). This higher vision they call the Relational worldview; it unites the Individualist (autonomy-oriented, rational, "good" as subjectively defined) and Organic (community-oriented, role/rule, "good" as defined by the group) worldviews. They also suggest a developmental process in which one moves from a distributive orientation to a problem solving orientation to a transformative orientation (which parallels the role/rule, rational, and vision-logic stages of Wilber's scheme).

> Rethinking the problem-solving orientation starts by questioning the premise that conflicts need to be viewed as problems in the first place. A different premise would suggest that disputes can be viewed *not* as problems at all but as opportunitites for moral growth and transformation. This different view is the *transformative orientation* to conflict (81).

This transformative stage incorporates the best aspects of both the Individualistic and Organic worldviews (strength and compassion, respectively) while leaving behind the negatives of these stages (selfishness and individual oppression).

At the integral stage there is a gathering in of parts of the self, a healing of internal splits, a building of bridges and of canopies, an awareness of

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multiplicity, and the discovery of interrelatedness. Parties at the higher stages are increasingly able to grasp the "field" of the conflict: the atmosphere, the unspoken, intangible aspects of the personal relations and the issues, as well as the larger context in which the conflict is situated. There is less emphasis on what is right and more on understanding, less on resolution and more on staying within the process and allowing it to transform the parties and the conflict. Conflict may be used for soul-searching. There is a desire to fully "live" the experience. Arnold Mindell's description of "worldwork" or the "politics of awareness" (27) gives insight into how to deal with conflict as a process, how to "sit in the fire" and allow full expression of all aspects of the encounter. Says Mindell: "the big problems are so interconnected that the only way to address them is the field approach" (235). There is a change from a "once-and-for-all integration of your inner parts" to "openness to what is happening at the moment" (238). Crum calls conflict a "dance of energy . . . that disorganizes the species and causes it to reorganize into a higher and more effective life system" (Leviton, 52).

Time and space are viewed differently at this stage; time may be seen as a quality rather than a dimension. People at these levels live increasingly in present moment time, in the flux (but not in the blind present of Gebser's Archaic stage). They see the past and future as aspects of the present; thus memory and anticipation are not the same as they are in the rational stage. For example, if memory is seen as an aspect of the present, it becomes malleable; there is no certain past that can be discussed and mutually understood.

There is an endless reinventing of self. Almaas points out that ego depends on memory, but since the memory of a person is not the person, the ego is not a static entity that can be known (27). People are regarded as holding the power to create their own reality and this power includes determining who they will be in that reality. Thus, future plans (and the future self) may not be pinned down in the same way they were in the rational stage. In such a time-free world, synchronicity (Jung's concept of connections that are not based in cause and effect) and systasis (Gebser's word for the process whereby partials merge with the whole) replace linearity and

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causation as governing principles. Latency, another of Gebser's terms which he defines as "the demonstrable presence of the future" (Mahood, 3), is an expression of the infinity of possibilities available in the future. Similarly, when the past is not static, when it is recognized that an infinite number of pasts (interpretations) may be created around a few bare facts, when the future does not depend on the past, nor on traditional views of cause and effect, then the possibilities for "dancing" with one another also become infinite.

Are higher stages better?

Although it may seem that the higher stages are preferable (certainly they offer more options), each stage has its usefulness and a "higher" stage is not automatically the preferred choice for management of a conflict. Sometimes physical restraint is the only sensible alternative, sometimes following convention is the best course.

It should also be noted that these categorizations are not rigid ones. It is certainly possible that someone could exhibit some aspects of a particular stage of development but not all. It is also highly probable that people will shift from one level of development to another depending upon the context. For example, a person could be capable of recognizing the validity of several points of view on an academic issue (Perry's Relativism), but when an issue touched close to some particular psychological "hotpoint," to regress to the "only one right way" stance (Perry's Dualism). Still, the different areas of development are sufficiently related that most people progress along most of these lines in tandem, and the exceptions (the brilliant psychopath, the morally corrupt guru) are rare.

Also, while we may develop our competence in these stages in rough chronological order, as adults we may draw from any of them in resolving our conflicts. Children, who have had less exposure to the possibilities, are perhaps more limited in their abilities to engage in higher level methods, but even there we see surprising leaps. Mediation, for example, seems to be a skill that children can learn. Similarly, at the societal level, while we may progress socially from using war to resolve conflict to relying on the rule of law to engaging in negotiation, at any time in our history each of these approaches was available (though not necessarily encouraged by the society).

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The Beginnings of Integral Discourse

Those who are exploring these higher stages of development in respect to conflict management, whether oral (mediators and conflict resolution specialists) or written (rhetoricians and compositionists), have responded to the limitations of argument by proposing several new techniques and expanding on existing ones. They have attempted to build bridges across the philosophical divides, looking for ways to expand on current methods for handling conflict and devising new ones. Their ideas, when gathered together, offer us prototypes for this emerging integral discourse.

Compositionist Jim Corder calls for "a commodious discourse, more filled with possibilities than we had suspected, large enough for us to enter and to live freely" (1989, 314). Corder's commodious discourse is a place in which he suggests self and other can merge.

> What can free us from the apparent hopelessness of steadfast arguments contending with each other, of narratives come bluntly up against each other? Can the text of one narrative become the text of another narrative without sacrifice? If there is to be hope, we have to see each other, to know each other, to be present to each other, to embrace each other
>
> What makes that possible? I don't know. We can start toward these capacities by changing the way we talk about argument and conceive of argument (25).

Corder also says, "[W]e need time in our argumentative discourse and arguments full of the anecdotal, personal, and cultural reflections that will make us plain to all others, thoughtful histories and narratives that reveal us as we're reaching for the others. . . . Rhetoric," says Corder, "is love . . . creating a world full of space and time that will hold our diversities" (31). He suggests that we can emerge toward the other, risking revelation of the self if we "learn to love before we disagree . . ." (26).

Winterowd, referring to Burke's concept of identification, describes the desired change as follows:

persuasion	becomes	understanding
convincing	"	agreeing
logic	"	dialaectic [sic]
argument (debate)	"	discussion
speaker	"	participant
hearer or reader	"	participant

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Burke, he says, is setting forth not merely a new "technical" rhetoric, but a view of how language brings about (or might bring about) unity rather than division, peace rather than war" (73).

Crosswhite also looks to language as a way to avoid violent conflict: "argumentation is not only nonviolent action, but in principle the renunciation of violence. It is, in fact, the great alternative to violence" (102). - Lynch, too, describes a change occuring within the framework of argument: "Throughout most of this century, as Andrea Lunsford and Lisa Ede argue . . ., we have steadily moved away from argumentation as competition and contest. . . . The ultimate aim of rhetoric should be communication, not persuasion, we are told" (62).

Teich looks to Rogerian principles to bridge "the gap betwen the individual and collaborative approaches (balancing self and society) . . ." (14). He says, "Rogerian principles provide a way of proceeding from the self to society, from the individual with personal awareness, self-motivation, and increased learning - to larger social, economic, and political concerns . . ." (16). He suggests connecting "Perelman's new rhetoric, Toulmin's approach to argument, the good reasons movement as articulated by Wayne Booth, and other rhetorical approaches that have been characterized as a rhetoric of inquiry . . . (220) as part of a more integrative commodious rhetoric.

> None of these approaches sets out to refute an Aristotelian or Ciceronian rhetorical tradition. Rather, in a post-Freudian age, they seek to offer students of rhetoric a perspective which accentuates the dialogical upon the dialectical, the empathic upon the agonistic, the provisional upon the dogmatic . . . [these] models of discourse . . . recommend a pluralistic persuasion theory that is inclusive rather than exclusive" (220).

Teich connects the upper and lower left hand quadrants: "Rogerian principles bridge the gap between the 'internal dialogic perspective' and the 'collaborative perspective' . . ." (6). He also connects the left hand and right hand: "Because Rogerian principles address both the ideas and the feelings with which the ideas are held, when we take a Rogerian perspective, we seek to bring together the cognitive/rational and the affective/emotional qualities of ourselves and others as whole persons . . ." (6).

Lamb speaks of integrating the cognitive and affective, a characteristic,

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she says, of feminist pedagogy (1991, 11). She also suggests combining asserting with listening and negotiating: "Particularly in a world where communication is not free from domination," she says, "it is the interplay of these impulses that matters and that we ought to be articulating to our students" (Paper delivered at the Conference on College Communication and Composition, 1998, p. 3).

Joseph Petraglia connects the social constructionist viewpoint[3] with the idea of an objective universe through "mitigated subjectivity" in which some realities (objects) are independent of subject's perception, while others (values) are constructed intersubjectively (319). He says, ". . . there is only one reality. . . . people appear to disagree only because they stand in different relationships to reality" (252). It is our perspective that leads us to see the world in a certain way: "apparently contradictory judgments are really not contradictory at all, since they are judgments about different aspects of the same object. . . " (264, italics his).

In his "rhetoric of assent," Wayne Booth weds the arenas of value and fact. His theory presages the right hand/left hand aspects of Wilber's philosophy when he speaks of the "misleading split between fact and value: objective versus subjective, matter versus mind, mechanism versus vitalism, scientific reason versus faith or 'the heart' or 'the wisdom of the body'" (17). He says,

> What we must find, I think, are grounds for confidence in a multiplicity of ways of knowing. . . . there are many logics, and . . . each of the domains of the mind (or person) has its own kind of knowing. . . . There may be, though I doubt it, a grand new philosphical synthesis hiding in the wings somewhere, or looming over the horizon . . . " (99).

Elbow proposes his "believing game" (left hand exploration) as a counterpoint to the standard "doubting game" (right hand critique) that we use when evaluating ideas: "[T]hinking is not trustworthy unless it also includes methodological belief: the equally systematic, disciplined, and conscious attempt to believe everything no matter how unlikely or repellent it might seem - to find virtues or strengths we might otherwise miss" (257).

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[3] The view that reality is co-constructed by persons in communication.

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> "Methodological doubt caters too comfortably to our natural impulse to protect and retain the views we already hold. Methodological belief comes to the rescue at this point by forcing us genuinely to enter into unfamiliar or threatening ideas instead of just arguing against them without experiencing them or feeling their force. It thus carries us further in our developmental journey away from mere credulity" (263).

Spellmeyer suggests that we connect expressionism (upper left), cognitivism (upper right), and social constructivism (lower left). He says,

> Proponents of what might be called the expressionist pedagogy, most notably Peter Elbow, have reconceived the activity of writing as a public demonstration of the writer's private "power" and autonomy. Other theorists like Linda Flower and John Hayes have tried, with results by no means widely accepted, to restore through linguistics and cognitive science the unity lacking in the present curriculum. The third and now-dominant approach, the pedagogy of discourse communities often linked to the names of Kenneth Bruffee and Patricia Bizzell, accepts the fragmentation of knowledge as a fait accompli and conceives the teaching of writing to be an initiation into various warring tribes of the academy (17).

Referring to a debate between Elbow and Barthomae, Spellmeyer notes the drawbacks to remaining in one quadrant:

> "Once Elbow and Bartholomae each declined to address the remarks of the other, they dismissed much more than alternative pedagogies. They left unresolved, and unconsidered, the overriding predicament of our times: the fragmentation of discourse and the waning of what might be called the social imagination - our ability to believe that public life might truly be public, truly open to all. Untroubled by the fragmentation, the masquers continued to advance their own assumptions as if these were self-evident to everyone else" (268). "[I]t no longer makes sense to choose sides, since both are right, both are justified from a certain point of view" (274).

Rhetoricians are not the only ones who have suggested such bridges. Conflict resolution specialist Mindell believes that every conflict exists everywhere (Leviton, 104) and that everyone expresses it. "Every one of us sense that the big problems are so interconnected that the only way to address them is the field approach," (235) he says. He advocates enlarging the conflict to take in the whole field.

Mindell goes beneath the surface of disputes to work with the energy that is flowing, the atmosphere, the mood. He says, "We must pay attention

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to what people say, but if that's all we notice, if we do not approach the spirit of groups - the spirit of love, jealousy, hostility or hope - stalemates and repetitions of world history result. To achieve sustainable peace, we need to break through to a new level of communication" (23). Mindell "unites the formerly separate disciplines of politics, psychology, spirituality, physics, dreamwork, bodywork, relationship work, and transnational organizational development" (Leviton, 104).

Others agree that conflict cannot be wholly isolated and dealt with without considering whole systems, societal attitudes and practices, and beliefs about conflict itself. Says communication specialist Shotter, "the current view we have of persons, as all equal, self-enclosed (essentially indistinguishable) atomic individuals, possessing an inner sovereignty, each living their separate lives, all in isolation from each other - the supposed experience of the modern self - is an illusion . . ." (110).

If we approach conflict from a "field" or systems approach, the whole of society becomes a key player in every conflict. According to Bush and Folger, when conflict resolution is viewed from this perspective, society becomes not an entity in which individuals serve as parts, but "a medium in which human beings can relate to one another and, in doing so, integrate the duality of human consciousness and achieve the kind of ideal human conduct that integrates strength and compassion" (244).

David Bohm, a physicist who had a lifelong friendship with mystic Krishnamurti, advocates dialogue. Dialogue, Bohm tells us, comes from the word "dia" which means through, not two. It is "a *stream of meaning* flowing among and through us and between us" (6). Dialogue as he conceives of it is quite different from argument.

> Conviction and persuasion are not called for in a dialogue. The word "convince" means to win, and the word "persuade" is similar. It's based on the same root as are "suave" and "sweet." People sometimes try to persuade by sweet talk or to convince by strong talk. Both come to the same thing, though, and neither of them is relevant. There's no point in being persuaded or convinced (27).

Nor does he connect it to argument as epistemic. "Truth does not emerge from opinion; it must emerge from something else - perhaps from a more free movement of the tacit mind" (35).

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Some make the leap to love as a way to relate. Kidder quotes Reinhold Niebuhr: "love is the final or highest possibility in man's relationship to man. . . . this love must take precedence over the 'tolerable harmonies' of justice" (141). The care-based approach requires us to feel what it is like to be the other (202). "The care-based approach begins with empathy, with feeling the life of another from the inside out, and with understanding the currents and desires of that life in its own context. As global communications improves, the potential for care-based resolutions increases . . ." (Ibid).

All of these attempts at synthesis make up the pieces of integral discourse, a discourse that combines apparently incompatible points of view, allows for interpenetration of opposites, embraces contradiction and paradox, eschews dichotomies, moves away from logic and formal argument. There is a welcoming of the body, the emotions, the imagination, and the intuition, even of spiritual "knowing."

These writers entertain expanded notions of what is relevant and play with a myriad of formats and methods. Instead of seeking only to resolve conflict, they seek to transform the parties and the relationships. Interactions are around interpretations, mutual understanding, personal development, and correspondences and connections. Power resides in the relationships among the parties and in the connection between all aspects of the conflict. Says Elbow, "we are not trying to construct or defend an argument but rather to transmit an experience, enlarge a vision" (1986, 261).

Based on these themes, I propose that the integral discourse that is emerging has the following characteristics:

First, the **content of the conflict is expanded and more inclusive** than previous discourses have allowed. Multiple perspectives are entertained in a gestalt, multiple ways of knowing are engaged in, premature closure is avoided, and paradox and contradiction are embraced (Chapter Six.)

Second, the **participants to the conflict are or are encouraged to be "larger"** and more complex. The conflict manager or disputant seeks to know himself, to integrate her conflicting selves, to take responsibility for creating his experience, to use conflict as a source of growth, to cultivate

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within herself the qualities of the higher stages such as wholeness, honesty, responsibility, aperspectivity, and compassion, and to view conflict as a source of growth and change. Essentially, what is sought is a state of consciousness akin to those higher stages described in Chapter Two (Chapter Seven.)

Third, the **relationship of the parties is large enough to contain their differences,** and interactions are characterized by more openness, by empowerment and recognition of the "other," by equality, cooperation and collaboration, and by attempts at synthesis or integration of different viewpoints. The focus shifts from win/lose to win/win since the other's satisfaction is regarded as as important as one's own (Chapter Eight.)

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Chapter 6. Integral Discourse: Enlarging the Content.

Some Hindus have an elephant to show.
No one here has ever seen an elephant.
They bring it at night to a dark room.

One by one, we go in the dark and come out
saying how we experience the animal.

One of us happens to touch the turnk.
"A water-pipe kind of creature."

Another the ear. "A very strong, always moving
back and forth, fan-animal."

Another, the leg "I find it still,
like a column on a temple."

Another touches the curved back.
"A leathery throne."

Another, the cleverest, feels the tusk.
"A rounded sword made of porcelain."
He's proud of his description.

Each of us touches one place
and understands the whole in that way.

The palm and the fingers feeling in the dark are
how the senses explore the reality of the elephant.

If each of us held a candle there,
and if we went in together,
we could see it.

Rumi in Barks, 252

If we are to communicate around our conflicts, we can no longer ignore the multiplicity of perspectives and incommensurability of goals that are so much a part of our modern, global society. Nor can we attempt to assimilate them into a WASPish whole; instead we can seek out the value in each of them, see all points of view, all kinds of knowledge as useful, necessary, and significant.

Thus, integral discourse differs from previous discourses in terms of what it accepts as relevant information. It embraces multiple perspectives,

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including the marginal and previously hidden. It lives with different perspectives in juxtaposition instead of requiring a single solution (whether by compromise or triumph). It does not rely solely on reason and empirical data, but welcomes information from nonrational sources. It does not demand closure; it allows for uncertainty, even chaos. These four ways of expanding and integrating the content of a conflict (embracing multiple perspectives, allowing contradiction and paradox, resisting premature closure, and seeking knowledge from a variety of sources) are described below.

1. Multiple perspectives

Our modern, rational society is fond of dichotomies. We search for truth through a clash of ideas. If one point of view surfaces, someone presents the "other side." In our law courts, we hear from "both" sides. After hearing from both sides, we pick the "best" one: Democratic or Republican, pro-life or pro-choice, for or against capital punishment, for or against the bond issue, etc. etc. But why two sides? Why not three or five or seventeen? Why not emphasize the positions in "the middle"? As Deborah Tannen has pointed out in The Argument Culture, there are many "sides" to any discussion. Focusing on two may distort the relative importance of either or both and may close off thinking about other ways to approach the subject. This practice also, as she emphasizes, encourages a battle mentality.

Eliminating dichotomies leaves us aware of the multiplicity of positions that may pertain to any dispute. Jung speaks of "several views of same subject 'like a bird circling a tree' (1964, x). Pir Vilayat Kahn, head of the Sufi Order in the West, says, "Something is gained by this multiplication of centers, each one having some influence on the others * * * awakening is overcoming the limitation of one's personal vantage point. It's extraordinary to what extent people get stuck in their vantage point" (Elliott, 198). Young, Becker, and Pike note that "the exclusive use of any one perspective would inevitably result in an incomplete, distorted image . . ." They note Kenneth Burke's comment, "A way of seeing is also a way of not seeing" (130).

Moving away from one or two perspectives and taking in several allows us to escape the prison of our own beliefs and see reality much more

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completely. Says Mindell, "Part of clarity is understanding that almost every conflict is a mixture of social, physical, psychological and spiritual issues" (137).

There are several ways to multiply the number of perspectives we consider; knowledge for one engaged in integral discourse is located everywhere. Lynch proposes teaching argumentation as inquiry so as

> to engage students in a kind of writing that moves beyond the "opposing viewpoints," disputatious, display type of argumentation . . . and give students more time to learn and think about the issues they [a]re engaging, with the idea in mind that in the process they will recognize that the positions we take - especially the first, easy positions that we have 'accepted' - usually have been socially, culturally, and historically determined and, not coincidentally, usually have unforeseen consequences for others, others whose positions are often not even represented by the manner in which the issues are handed down to us ('Pro and con') (69).

One way to engage in this inquiry is to expand the number of sources from which we draw. We may derive objective facts from empirical studies, practical truths from rational argument, mutual understandings from dialogue, and creative ideas from intuition and revelation. Integral discourse values all forms of knowledge - it only insists that the way it is derived be as truthful as possible. Truth, however, has a different meaning depending upon the form of knowledge acquisition.

Wilber suggests that the key to deriving knowledge is to follow the "injunction" of each field, the "do this" in order to "learn that." For example, if one wishes to present objective scientific truths, one needs to study science and follow the scientific method to learn how to conduct research that will yield accurate results. Likewise, our social truths should be presented by people who have learned to glean them (anthropologists, ethnographers, dialogists) using methods accepted in those fields. Our practical political truths should be uncovered and described by those trained in politics and sociology using methods validated by those fields. Those proposing truths derived from inner search or divine revelation should be trained in psychology and/or spirituality and experienced in the information gathering methodology of those fields (e.g. psychological analysis, self-discovery, or

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prayer and meditation). Just as inner truths can be contaminated by wishful thinking, so can empirical studies be based on poor statistical techniques and/or unrepresentative samples, and argument be littered with logical fallacies.

Thus, if when we deal with a conflict, we ensure that we consider the systemic aspects (Lower Right), the cultural aspects (Lower Left), the interior, psychic aspects (Upper Left), and the empirical, factual aspects (Upper Right), we will greatly enlarge the number of perspectives we consider. For example, when the decision was made to bomb Iraq, did we consider simply the information derived from our intelligence about what Saddam Hussein was doing in the way of weapons buildup or did we truly consider what effect that action might have on the Iraqi culture, the American culture (what kind of people are we, for example, if we engage in such an action?), and the world culture? Did we really consider the effect on Hussein's psyche, did we think about Clinton's psyche at the time he ordered the bombing, did we consider the economic impact on our society and on Iraqi society, did we look at the impact on world systems, the world psyche?

My guess is that for decisions of this magnitude in which many people are involved, some of these matters are considered (though in most cases, I suspect the non-tangible and more long-term ones are given lip service only). But what about our personal interactions when only a few, or even two, are involved? When we fight with a spouse, how many of us really think about the effect on the family structure, on our children's psyche, on future generations? Do we consider how the issue in front of us may grow out of our culture or our institutions? Do we take the trouble to ascertain what the facts really are? Whatever position we take, whatever truth we believe we are advocating, how can it really be truth unless it involves all of these factors? And what about considering the idea that both parties have only a partial truth and that adding them together rather than eliminating one or slicing off pieces of either is the more complete answer?

As another example, in considering the debate over abortion, what if we were to specifically include such issues as religious beliefs, the effect on the consciousness of our citizens, the medical and technological aspects of

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pregnancy and birth, the emotional reactions of mothers who abort, etc. rather than, as happens now, having each perspective shut out those not favoring his or her "side"? As it is now, the anti-abortionists may ignore social realities, the pro-choicers may dismiss religious belief, the medical community may duck both social and religious issues, and an individual woman contemplating abortion may ignore all of them in her personal struggle to decide what to do.

Usually no one focuses what they all have in common: a high regard for human life and the desire to protect it. Whether it is the mother's or the fetus's, whether quality of life should take precedence over the simple gift of life are secondary issues. Perhaps if we all focused on protecting and enhancing human life, we would find ways of accommodating all our concerns; perhaps we could find ways to change young women's experience profoundly enough that they would not seek early sexual experience, perhaps we would find that pregnancies created through rape could be transplanted to donors who would provide them for those wishing to adopt, etc. (I am not saying these are good solutions, just that the range of possibilities can increase exponentially if we take a larger perspective.)

The whole story. Whereas argument isolates particular issues and excludes "irrelevant data," an integral discourse welcomes what I call the whole story. In a dispute, each claimant will have a different story to tell, not only about what has happened but about what it means. For example, the Clinton/Lewinsky story may be told as a sex scandal, as a legalistic wrangle, as a story of a basically good man caught in a compulsion, as confirmation of Clinton's already slippery character, as a love story, as a harmless peccadillo, as an example of partisanship run amok, or as a determined effort to see justice done. Cobb suggests that instead of issuing out of the conflict, stories may in fact create the conflict and set the context for it (59), something that clearly seems to be operating with this incident. Gee offers another example when he points out how certain conceptions of the literacy crisis allows us to situate the problem in individual people instead of in the social institutions that sustain the social hieracrchy and advantage elites in the society (30).

Says Anderson about our stories, "the accumulation of further

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information becomes a constant source of irritation: the information has to fit the story, or the story has to change to fit the new information, or the information has to be denied or repressed " (182), and later, "Information acts upon stories as rain acts upon sand castles" (249). People either adjust their stories to incorporate the new information or erect barriers to prevent new information from entering, trying to keep out the rain. Kuhn describes science's efforts to do many of these repair jobs.

Mediation is a process which incorporates the whole story and promotes the changing of stories. While the legal system and most forms of negotiation discourage or forcibly exclude discussion of what are regarded as tangential issues, mediation welcomes them. For example, in a landlord tenant dispute, the question for argument in a court of law becomes, "Has the tenant paid the rent?" and/or, "Has the landlord fulfilled his responsibilities vis a vis maintenance and quiet enjoyment?" Depending on the evidence provided, the tenant will be evicted or the landlord will be ordered to make the home habitable. However, the "whole story" might include matters such as the tenant's recent job loss; the landlord's inability to retain competent repair people; the current availability or unavailablity of housing; the parties' differing beliefs around the importance of caring for others versus making a profit; the condescending, rebellious, or regretful attitude of one of the parties; the relationship they have had and the one they might have, etc.

When the whole story is told, interests surface, positions fade. The parties feel heard; that is often enough to make them open to new ideas for resolution (i.e. the tenant could do some work for the landlord, the landlord's fear that he/she will be taken advantage of in the future by other tenants if he/she is helpful now could be addressed by the tenant's pledge of silence, etc). As the different "stories" are revealed, the parties can see other perspectives than their own and begin to incorporate them into their own stories. Thus they may be more inclined to develop relation-based stories rather than rule based ones, inclusive ones rather than exclusive ones, explanatory rather than blame-filled ones.

The more stories, the more complex the conflict. Pearce notes that "the apparent chaos of postmodernity lies in the number of stories in which we

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are enmeshed" (263). Often we try to lop off as many as possible so as to bring an apparent order to our analysis. However, in doing so, we lose marginal voices and potentially helpful ideas and may set the stage for continued conflict as those voices continue to clamor to be heard and solutions continue to evade us. Including them all may seem difficult, but ignoring them can create even greater difficulties. When we have more material to work with, we can co-construct new stories. We can tap into the change that occurs in stories and redirect them into forms that help us to better manage conflict. As Cobb points out, conflict stories are rigid, constructed to fix blame and responsibility (54); getting parties to tell their stories from different perspectives can help them to reframe the way they view the conflict and to move from positions to interests and then be more accepting of another's point of view.

Exploring marginal perspectives. Another way of broadening the context is suggested by Crosswhite. He points out that we can refuse to focus on the *apparent* conflict and look at *suppressed* or *neglected* ones. "Thus, one can use existing argumentation as a kind of map to domains that have been neglected, domains that can be opened for new inquiry" (264). If we are truly to open ourselves to multiple perspectives and multiple truths, we can seek out the nondominant stories, the off-the-wall perspectives, the middle positions. We can begin by assuming that there may be multiple right answers, that we can integrate what has previously been seen as unconnected, that we are all intimately affected by what everyone else does.

When we write, especially for public consumption, we can write essays that are oriented to inquiry rather than argument. Crosswhite suggests the exploratory essay. He points out that inquiry writing wouldn't have a thesis, support, restatement format, but might instead track "the emergence of new foci of conflict, slowly removing its attention from the ostensive focus to the newly emerging ones" (263).

Literary essayist Mairs also suggests writing essays of this sort.

> [H]ence I write essays in the Montaignesque sense of the word: not the oxymoronic "argumentative essays' beloved by teachers of composition, which formalize and ritualize intellectual combat with the objective of

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> demolishing the opposition, but *tests*, trials, tentative rather than contentious, opposed to nothing, conciliatory, reconcilatory, seeking a mutuality with the reader which will not sway her to a point of view but will incorporate her into their process, their informing movement associative and suggestive, not analytic and declarative (75).

Looking to the past and the future. We can also expand the time in which the conflict lives. Developmental stage models introduce time and changes over time into the equation; thus, not only do we investigate a larger arena in space but we look at the past and the future as integrally affecting the present. Perhaps, Y2K would not be happening had we had such a perspective twenty-five years ago. Time can be nonlinear - in the form of "quality time," as the eternal Now, in seasons, in absorption in a task, as flow, etc. Elgin speaks of time-ful-ness: "simple present, natural cycles, relativistic dynamics, the pulses of cosmic-scale manifestation, the expansiveness of oceanic time, and the focused thread of creational time" (187). Hill speaks of women's time - fluid, cyclical, spatialized (213). Corder says, "we must pile time into argumentative discourse . . . . in our most grievous and disturbing conflicts, we need time to accept, to understand, to love the other. . ." (1985, p. 31).

At the integral stage, Gebser combines the time of all previous stages with a "time-freedom." Feuerstein explains it thus: "Gebser does not mean freedom from time, which is the pipe dream of the mythical consciousness, but freedom in time. He puts it this way: The courage to accept along with the mental time concept the efficacy of pre-rational, magic timelessness and irrational, mythical temporicity makes possible the leap into arational time-freedom. This is not a freedom *from* previous time forms, since they are co-constituents of every one of us; it is to begin with a freedom *for* all time forms" (Feuerstein, 132). Thus, he says we can have "clock time, natural time, cosmic time, biological duration, rhythm, meter, mutation, discontinuity, relativity, psychic energy, vital dynamics" (Ibid). Gebser speaks of latency: "Latency [is] . . . the demonstrable presence of the future. It includes everything that is not yet manifest as well as everything which has again returned to latency. . . ." (Feuerstein, 14).

While obviously not everyone will live with such an understanding of

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time, just being aware of the possibilities can lead us to new understandings about how to write about and engage in conflict. For example, we can shed some of our concern for finality, recognizing that the dynamic quality of the universe makes a mockery of most "final" solutions, and seek to enter into ongoing relationships that include shifting agreements and plans. We can accept the impossibility of annihilating an idea with which we disagree, recognizing that it is present all the time, whether latently or patently, and is likely to surface again at any moment; thus we need to embrace it in some fashion, perhaps to seek out the truth of it, to accommodate it in some respect.

The positional worldview tends to focus on the past - on precedent, on fixing blame, on righting wrongs, on compensating - but at the integral stage, both past and future are seen as part of our present - equally unsettled, equally changeable. If the past exists only in our minds, it is just as malleable as the present or the future.

Looking at the future opens up new possibilities. Says Penn, "When you consider your own condition in the future, you are automatically fitting another context around your present context . . . all future questions suggest that change is possible" (301). Tomm suggests asking questions which cause the answerer to focus on the future, to become an observer, to bring forward opposite content, to consider what-ifs as a way of reframing, to consider cultural implications, to clarify causality, to reveal recursivness, to reveal defense mechanisms, basic needs, motivations, dangers of change (173 - 182). Senge proposes scenario planning (238). Looking at the future leads to a more positive outlook, one which asks "what do we want," not "what has gone wrong," that asks "what kind of relationship do we want to create," not "who was to blame."

2. Paradox and contradiction.

Opening our conflicts to embrace multiple perspectives ensures that they will be full of contradiction and paradox. If we truly enter into the believing game, if we really open our minds to multiple positions, to the truths of all four quadrants, then we will find ourselves running into ideas

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that seem radically antagonistic to one another. But as many spiritual traditions can attest, paradoxes often express the greatest truths; the Zen koan is a prime example, so are many of the great spiritual truths (e.g., "It is in dying that we achieve eternal life"). As Crum points out, "a willingness to accept another's sense of the truth does not invalidate our own, no matter how contradictory it appears" (105).

Say Young, Becker, and Pike,

> "We can respond to . . . conflict by partisan denial of one of the truths, as some have done . . . . Or we can can . . . live with the conflict, exploiting one or the other of the conceptions as it suits our needs . . . Such a strategy is not necessarily an evasion of intellectual responsibility. 'Both-and' may well be, for the moment, a more appropriate response than 'either-or.' For as Niels Bohr (1958, p. 66) once observed, the opposite of a correct statement is an incorrect statement; but the opposite of a deep truth may well be another deep truth" (59).

Many suggest a dialectical approach. Says Crusius, "When we encounter a dichotomy, our commitment should be to overcoming it, to an accommodation of opposites . . . The idea is not to avoid contradiction but rather to court it, to bring the conflict of opposites to light, to reconcile them by finding a place where they can work within the whole" (162). Crusius suggests that we can hold contradictory insights through the medium of dialectical logic.

> Traditional logic says that if statements a and b are contradictory, one of three possibilities must obtain: *a* is true and *b* is false; *a* is false and *b* is true; or both are false. But dialectical logic tries to preserve both statements as partial truths, perhaps by seeing them as true at different points in a process or from differing points of view at the same point. . . . a creative synthesis does something that the literal synthesis normally eschews as illogical: accommodation of contradictory insights (109).

In a similar vein, Carter speaks of a dialectic which "is no Hegelian dialectic in which the opposing thesis and antithesis are both overcome and eradicated in a new synthesis . . ." but one which can "retain the original tension, to preserve both thesis and antithesis as such" (221). This is "a both/and logic, which correctly observes that every thing that is in opposition is also in opposition from a common place, a common starting point, a

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common heritage, a common perspective, and has a complementary role to play within the identity of the whole of opposition/unity" (212). Carter points out that "The identity of self-contradiction, that A is A and not A, and therefore is both. . . breeds a spirit of tolerance and openness to consensus" (218). This both/and approach to truth avoids the linearity of the traditional dialectic which is dependent upon the passage of time into which new ideas come that transform our thinking. Instead, it is inherently integrative; it synthesizes all in the "now."

To consider that A may be both A and not-A is a mind-expanding concept. It leads one to think of contexts, of wholes, of levels of profundity not available to an either/or mentality. Holding contradictions open may allow the emergence of new orders of consciousness and make participants "larger" people. One may even find that the contradictions dissolve into a larger context. Crosswhite claims that letting contradictions stand "may lead to new ways of thinking, as when we discovered that there was good evidence that light was composed of particles and good evidence that it was made of waves. Contradictions can be powerful enablers of discovery" (262). Is it this spirit that Lynch et al are invoking when they speak of "agonistic inquiry" and "confrontational cooperation" (64)?

Says Small,

> The contradictory nature of our lives reflects the nature of reality. Jung's point of view, 'All opposites are of God,' is validated in physics by the law of complementarity. When an entity behaves as both *form* and *wave function* (creature and God force), the entity or whole contains both within its nature.
>
> At the archetypal level, our human psyche, made in God's image, encompasses these contradictory characteristics without problem. Integrated opposites are part of our wholeness pattern at the psyche's level of reality. There, opposites are building blocks to our nature, not obstacles at all in their unmanifest state. But when existing in our ordinary human reality, they become our "afflictions of soul": To make complementary what was, while unconscious, conflictual, is a shift that automatically creates transcendence of a troublesome pattern. Once this process is thoroughly understood, we can learn to make this shift at will. You may want to ponder this for a while. There is a great secret here (1994, 45).

Small suggests that that our philosophy change from either/or to both/and. "To do this, we must sacrifice our attachment to judge, compete,

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and divide ourselves into 'I'm right and you are wrong,' 'This part of me is 'good,' this part 'bad.'" (Ibid, 46).

One elephant

Ultimately, it becomes clear that the multiple perspectives are not so much opposites as different aspects of a whole, larger truth. We ourselves can house multiple perspectives and yet be a whole organism. A novel can contain multiple characters with multiple points of view, and yet the author remains one person, the text one text. A Bach fugue has multiple melodies but functions as one composition. The differences have to do with context, with time and space, and not with ultimate truth or falsity.

Wilber connects different developmental stages and different philosophical validity claims to different means of obtaining knowledge. "An integral approach to consciousness has two broad wings: one is the 'simultracking' of events in 'all-quadrant, all-level' space; the other is the interior transformation of the researchers themselves" (1997, 382). Referring to the four quadrants, he says, "each . . . . has a different architecture and thus a different type of validity claim through which the three strands operate: propositional truth (Upper Right), subjective truthfulness (Upper Left), cultural meaning (Lower Left), and functional fit (Lower Right)" (376). The three strands,[1] four claims,[2] and ten levels,[3]" he says, "thus present us with a fairly comprehensive methodology of knowledge acquisition . . . ." (1997, 377).

Similarly, Burke says,

> The "dialectical" order would leave the competing voices in a jangling relation with one another (a conflict solved *faute de mieux* by "horse-trading"); but the "ultimate" order would place these competing voices themselves in a *hierarchy*, or *sequence*, or *evaluative series*, so that, in some way, we went by a fixed and reasoned progression from one of these to another, the members of the entire group being arranged *developmentally* with relation to one another. The "ultimate" order of terms would thus differ essentially from the "dialectical" (as we use the term in this particular connection) in that there would be a "guiding idea" or "unitary principle"

[1] matter, mind, spirit

[2] four quadrants

[3] developmental stages

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> behind the diversity of voices. The voices would not confront one another as somewhat disrelated competitors that can work together only by the "mild demoralization" of sheer compromise; rather, they would be like successive positions or moments in a single process (186, italics his).

An aperspectival view does not imply an indiscriminate mush. Each perspective is left as it is. Ideas are differentiated and clarified (often initially through the use of argument); differences are not glossed over in an effort to smooth out conflict. We see all the elements - in a panoramic view. Integration is not reduction but combination. Says Burke: "Encountering for some division . . . [we must] . . . retreat to a level of terms that allow some kind of merger . . . . then we 'return' to the division, now seeing it pervaded by the spirit of the 'One' we had found in our retreat" (440). We have only one elephant, but we also have a tail, a trunk, and legs.

3. Postponing closure.

Increasing the number of perspectives may mean living with ongoing conflict for some period of time rather than resolving it immediately. The complaint usually arises that enlarging the area of discussion this way requires additional time. Sometimes this is true, although an observer of the court system might well note the hours devoted to paperwork, the further hours spent waiting in court for frequently rescheduled hearings, and the delays (often of years) caused by full dockets. He could also note the productivity lost due to inner turmoil of the disputants and the fact that failing to get at the root problem often means disputes will recur in the same or another garb. The time issue is thus not a simplistic one.

Often, too, our closures are arbitrary, pasted on, not really closures at all. In reality, there are no settled issues, everything is always reopened, there are always new perspectives to consider. Says Mindell, "There are no permanent solutions to social problems. It is necessary to come together again and again" (86).

Nor is there any final or certain truth. "Inquiry is an ongoing process; the goal at any particular stage of the process is not Truth, absolute and unchanging, but partial truth, sufficient for the moment" (Young, Becker, and Pike, 160). Elbow has us look at the message of Othello: "the realization that

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certainty is rarely if ever possible and that we increase the likelihood of getting things wrong if we succumb to the hunger for it" (1986, 257).

Those of us who write frequently are painfully aware of this truth. One is never sure of what one thinks until one writes, and one is always aware that more (or less) could be said, that what was said could have been said differently, that, in fact, what has been said may be wholly wrong. Says Crusius, "Our written exploratory drafts are almost always published only in the sense of being read by a few trusted colleagues. They don't often appear in print because the medium calls for closure, not open-endedness * * * There is . . . a kind of cultural enmity between print and exploration . . ." (29). Our '"finished" works are simply expressions of a certain point in time, abandoned because we have no more to say at present, because we have a deadline to meet, because we can't bear the thought of reopening all the issues we have so neatly tied up.

Writing is, in fact, a perfect metaphor for the recursiveness, the open-endedness, the tentativeness of all of our truths. Instead of bemoaning our uncertainty and our tentativeness, we should perhaps celebrate it. Spellmeyer calls for a pedagogy with "openness to correction and . . patient struggle for accord" (22). So do Anson and Beach when they suggest dialogue journals to promote "dialectical reasoning within a social context that encourages tentativeness rather than definitiveness" (8). Says Neel,

> writing could have been introduced to the West as a celebration of endless possibility. It could have opened the ultimate mode of democracy because it allows everyone the time and the place to discover the rhetoricity of whatever text presents itself as the closure of truth. The first thing the writer learns is the impossibility of writing to close itself down in truth. The only real possibility for a philosopher-king to rule is in an oral society where there are no writers to reveal the king's essentially rhetorical nature . . . (73).

But once we have passed out of the discourse of authority and into a positional one and beyond, we can no longer accept a non-rhetorical king.

While frustrating to the modernist value of efficiency, postponing closure has several benefits: it allows for all the voices to be heard, it prevents hasty generalizations and the imposition of solutions whose consequences are not adequately foreseen, it clears time for solutions to arise naturally, and,

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perhaps most important of all, it gives us the time to hold contradictions in our minds and hearts. Holding contradictions in this way allows new ideas to emerge from the juxtaposition of difference. Kegan talks of how something wholly new can emerge when we hold contradictions juxtaposed for awhile. Muldoon suggests that we grow larger when we can hold contradictory positions within us (lecture, Chicago, 9/26/96).

Avoiding closure allows us to go from positions to the real interests of the parties involved. Positions are what have been presented in a conflict that has hardened. They are our conclusions as to how to solve the problem. Our interests, however, are what have led us to this conclusion. Getting to interests opens up many more possibilities for solving issues. What we *really* need may be able to be satisfied in many ways. For example, if our car has been covered in graffiti, we may say we need money as compensation, but what we may really need is to have our car cleaned, to regain a sense of safety in our neighborhood, and to have an apology. These needs might be satisfied by having the perpetrator agree to clean up the car, stay out of the neighborhood, offer an apology, etc. Getting underneath positions opens up possibilities for creative solutions. Resisting the urge to closure, we open ourselves to what Chopra calls "the wisdom of uncertainty." We leave room for the miraculous to happen.

And finally, our search for closure may be taking us down an entirely unnecessary path. Says Bohm, "There may be no pat political answer to the world's problems. However, the important point is not the answer - just as in a dialogue, the important point is not the particular opinions - but rather the softening up, the opening up of the mind, and looking at all the opinions" (46). This is akin to Lamb's unending conversation, a place in which one welcomes change, invites giving and receiving while remaining in connection, creates "a space in which it is possible to move toward the other" (1991, 12).

4. Using nonrational sources of information

Instead of restricting discussion to "just the facts, ma'am," values, emotions, body wisdom, and intuition can form part of the substance of

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conflict resolution. In this regard, feminine values come into prominence. "It is the feminine archetype - with its emphasis on relationships, reflective listening, and nurturing - that supports the trust and understanding that are the true foundation for an enduring global civilization" (Elgin, 135). Says Mairs,

> to have power is to alienate self, because power is always power *over*, and the preposition demands an object. The fundamental structure of patriarchy is thus binary: me/not me, active/passive, etc. . . . a structure predicated upon separation, not relation . . . [w]hich is not women's language. . ." (41).

Women speak to create collaboration and consensus, to enhance relationships, to maintain connection. "Feminine discourse is not the language of opposites, but a babel of eroticism, attachment, and empathy" (Mairs, 42). Women's language says, Kahn, "is the language of interaction" (33).

The feminine style of speaking has, however, been largely excluded from public discourse. Crosswhite says,

> In attempting to filter out the influence of the body, the senses, emotions, interests, and history, Descartes and his many followers were effectively excluding everything "feminine" from the practice of reason. . . . . What I am trying to do is strengthen those ideals of reason in which reason is contrasted with violence rather than with the senses or the emotions" (212).

Whereas emotions used to be regarded as peripheral, something that got in the way of dealing with a conflict, recent writers on conflict are emphasizing the central role that they play. Muldoon defines conflict in part as passion plus moralism, a feeling plus a decision that someone is wrong (lecture, Chicago, Illinois, 9/26/96). Fisher and Ury explicitly address the importance of dealing with feelings: "In a negotiation, particularly in a bitter dispute, feelings may be more important than talk" (29). They advocate making emotions explicit and acknowledging them as legitimate (66). Mediators regularly reach beyond the presenting conflict to consider relationship issues, values, and emotions.

Bohm, too, sees the necessity of welcoming all ways of knowing. "What's required then," he says, "is that we notice the connection betwen the thoughts going on in the dialogue, the feelings in the body, and the

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emotions" (20). That the emotions may be difficult ones does not matter. "Even though there may be frustration and anger and rage and hate and fear, we have to find something which can take all that in" (36).

Mindell sees the suppression of emotion as part of a general Western attitude: "[T]he Eurocentric style of conflict-management emphasizes procedures, compromise and solutions. It is weak in dealing with the emotional background of interpersonal conflict and relationships" (164). Northern Europeans, he says, "keep a lid on passion, power, sexuality and spirituality, split them off, and project them onto people they consider less educated or less evolved. These projections create a complex system of jealousy, anger and attraction" (154). He claims that avoidance of emotion fits with a vision of everybody being good and not conflicting, but points out that adapting means we hide parts of ourselves, and that we suffer more if we conflict with conflict. He asks, "Can you become tolerant of what others might call "bad" processs like fury, jealousy, competition, sexism and racism?" (193). Mindell believes we need places to meet and have it out where we can get access to the unknown, to anger, vengefulness, love, and insight (235).

Becoming aware of what our bodies are feeling can open up for us an entire new way of knowing. Says Small, ". . . our bodies know truth and so do our souls; it's only our intellects that can lie" (29). Chopra says that we can know what choice to make by experiencing a sensation of discomfort or comfort in our bodies (1993, 43). Eugene Gendlin, a psychotherapist, spoke of a bodily awareness that profoundly influences our lives.

To refocus our attention on these emotional and physical "ways of knowing," we can use a technique which Senge calls "moments of awareness" in which we ask ourselves: What am I doing/feeling/thinking right now? What do I want right now? What am I doing right now to prevent myself from getting what I want? (216). We can do a body scan and note where we have pain and discomfort and then ask what feelings we might be holding there. Often we find a metaphorical connection. Is this pain in my neck related to an experience with an unpleasant person? Are my shoulders sore because I am carrying a heavy emotional burden?

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Another area that is often ignored in positional debate, but that takes an important role in integral discourse is values. Gorbachev frequently mentions the need to consider morality as well as politics.

> The secularization of mass consciousness, having expanded the possibilities for rational analysis, has also weakened and sometimes even undermined the moral foundations of mankind's common existence. Perhaps the time has come to define the moral maxims, a kind of ethical commandments that should underlie all universal human values (27).

Rushworth Kidder also calls for moral renewal and a search for common values. He decries situations ethics.

> Carried to its extreme, it insists that you and I have divergent ethical standards simply because we are individuals. . . . Such a thesis, refusing to acknowledge any common ground of shared values, guts the potential for building consensus on any basis but fear, ignorance, or malice (1995, 189).

Other areas that have much to contribute to the management of conflict are somatics, the study of bodily experience, and energetics, the study of energy fields, which can include anything from an internal sensing to *chi* and auras and subtle energies. We can know through the body - our encounters with others can be registered at a somatic level,[4] we can sense danger, we can feel compassion and kindness. Our personal energy fields can both hold experience and sense the external world. Some work with this field to heal and alter aspects of the self. Others, like Mindell, work with large fields that affect whole communities. Mindell speaks in terms of a "field" which surrounds any person or group dealing with a conflict. He describes it in this way:

> The atmosphere, or "field" permeates us as individuals and spans entire groups, cities, organizations and the environment. The field can be felt; it is hostile or loving, repressed or fluid. It consists not only of such overt, visible,

[4] I had an experience in a somatics workshop that forever changed my mind about the ways we can know something. We did an experiment in which we paired up: my partner was to manufacture within himself an emotion (usually by remembering a situation which evoked it), and I was to try to know what that emotion was. We made contact through my hand on his knee. For awhile I tried to figure out what he was feeling. I searched his face for clues, looked at his stance, I concentrated fiercely. Then suddenly, I let go of working with my mind, and the emotion flowed directly through my hand, so powerfully that I was absolutely certain I knew what he was feeling. And I was right. This type of "knowing" is suspect in intellectual circles, but it was much more profound than any kind of knowing I have achieved through reading or listening.

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> tangible structures as meeting agendas, party platforms and rational debate but also hidden, invisible, intangible emotional processes such as jealousy, prejudice, hurt and anger. . . . . solutions will hold up . . . only if disturbances in the feeling atmosphere have been addressed first (19).

Crum, a martial artist who has developed a system for dealing with conflict which he calls *aiki*, offers several exercises to demonstrate the actuality of the energy fields in and around the body. In particular, he speaks of the use to which *chi*, or *ki*, may be used.

> The ability to extend *ki* is real, and your relationship to the environment around you becomes one of response rather than reaction. . . . By extending *ki* or increasing connectedness, we take the most important first step toward the resolution of any conflict because we are creating and nurturing an environment of acceptance, compassion, and trust. It is in this environment that we deeply touch the lives of others (97).

All of these areas have typically been excluded from serious consideration. Musicologist Berendt calls this exclusion ". . . a kind of ascetic convulsion: thinking and feeling human beings, for whom (as for any other human being) the most important thing in the world is their own thinking and feeling, were trying to explain the world as if thinking and feeling never existed" (74).

Enlarging the content to include multiple perspectives and a wider span of time, looking at the positions in the "middle" or those at right angles to the dominant ones, allowing for the overlaps and "messiness" of the complex real world, and "seeing" in new ways can keep us from the unfortunate results that can come from argument, increase the likelihood that common ground will be found, place the focus on what can be done rather than what who was to blame, and promote creative solutions.

Very often conflict persists because the participants are embedded in a narrow worldview and cannot see the larger picture. Serbs and Croatians destroy each other while the rest of the world looks on in disbelief that they can be so ignorant of their common interest in preserving the lives of their children. Competition over weapons development loses its importance when one looks at it from the perspective of global annihilation. The dispute over logging vs. saving trees shifts when the participants realize that the

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forests are essential for both future jobs and the future of the planet.

The discussions that followed the killings at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado in April of 1999 are, I think, evidence of how this integral point of view is infiltrating our public forums. Whereas previous discussions of the responsibility for terroristic killings have often focused on how the perpetrators should be dealt with (Oklahoma City, the World Trade Towers), Littleton has aroused a whole slew of issues. We find ourselves in a swirl of debates over gun control, parental responsibility, teacher/administration responsibility, internet censorship, high school cliquishness, psychological stress, media violence, school safety, prejudice, ideology, even toxins in one the perpetrators' childhood. All four of Wilber's quadrants have been opened up for examination; all levels of development are significant.

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Chapter 7. Integral Discourse: Growing the Self.

"You are the change you wish to see in the world."
Gandhi

"Everywhere, men and women are striving to substitute inferior instruments -- pathetic little methodologies -- for a superior instrument, an astute, informed, wise human being. With the advent of the information revolution, a communication revolution that focuses in large part on the human being, all that belongs to our personality is valuable -- what we sense, what we imagine, what we feel, what we think" (Whitburn, 245).

Just as positional discourse put additional demands on those who would participate in it, so does integral discourse demand more of those who would practice it. Operating with an expanded content requires that we *be* different. Wilber explains that while the right hand (objective) quadrants can be investigated without any particular requirement on the part of the people doing the investigating (except the requirement that they be educated in their field), the Left hand quadrants of subjective truthfulness and cultural meaning cannot be investigated without the psyche of the researchers themselves being involved.

Growing the self thus becomes an essential part of the program for those who would attempt to practice or write at the level of integral discourse. This is, of course, asking a lot more of the writer or conflict manager. However, it is not so different from the expecations of growth that we have experienced at earlier stages. Each move up the developmental ladder requires more of us. The shift from the discourses of physicality and emotionality required us to practice new skills of physical restraint and respect for others. When we shifted from the discourse of authority to the discourse of positionality, we had to learn to make up our own minds, to listen to other points of view, to reason.

Functioning at the level of integral discourse requires that we curb the negative aspects of the previous discourses and develop new skills and personal traits. Now, not only do we have to take responsibility for ourselves, we have to decide who those selves will be. Not only do we need to learn to see other perspectives, we need to learn to see all of them at once.

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Not only do we need to learn to negotiate, we need to learn to integrate. We need to put less stock in facts and objectivity and more in values and the "knowings" of the heart.[1]

The higher stages described by Wilber and others describe the kind of *I* that is able to practice integral discourse. People at the vision-logic level, the level at which this kind of integration takes place, are, at least to some degree:

1. self-aware: acquainted with their biases, their baggage, their internal conflicts.

2. integrated: body, emotions, roles, mind, and soul operate as one; the multiple selves that make them up are known and integrated.

3. responsible: rather than blaming, they take responsibility for creating the reality they are experiencing;

4. open to transformation: they are able to use conflict as a source of growth

5. able to see clearly and comprehensively: they can take a metaview and synthesize; they can live with ambiguity and contradiction

6. cultivate the "higher" qualities such as compassion.

People who have these characteristics become the kind of people that Maslow and other developmentalists speak of as highly evolved. They are able to see and speak the truth, to sense the emotions and thoughts and "fields" of others in the conflicts, to come up with creative answers to difficult problems, to connect with a a variety of people. They are much more effective at handling conflict than most of us.

Personal transformation, of course, is difficult. Young, Becker, and Pike point out that "[m]any people would rather struggle with a dilemma or

[1] The heart is not, however, the same thing as the "feelings" which people are so prone to follow of late. Feelings are prerational, changeable, often treacherous as guides to behavior. The heart, on the other hand, is postrational, stable, and wise. The heart as it is used in spiritual discussions implies a "knowing" that is greater than either reason or emotion but one that encompasses both. Maslow warns about "instinct theory" which suggest that one is to look inward for guidance. "But, of course, this is an ideal counsel. They [instinct theorists] do not sufficiently warn that most adults don't know how to be authentic and that, if they "express" themselves, they may bring catastrophe not only upon themselves but upon others as well. What answer must be given to the rapist or the sadist who asks "Why should I too not trust and express myself?" (152). However, once someone has followed the difficult path of self-knowledge and self-improvement, the self-actualizing person's develops "an easy self discipline" and his/her desires come into line with what in fact is good for him/her (153).

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seek, although mistakenly, to change the world around them than venture to change themselves" (98). It is often painful to make the transition from earlier stages. Just as most children resist pressure to postpone gratification of their desires or to respect authority or to analyze a short story, so we resist having to give up the the sense of ourselves as separate and as objective, resist taking on full responsibility for creating our own experience, resist looking at our own failings. Says Maslow, "Self-knowledge and self-improvement is very difficult for most people. It usually needs great courage and long struggle. . . . we need a proper respect for and appreciation of the forces of fear, of regression, of defense, of safety" (156).

Just as we needed support as well as challenge (Kegan, lecture, Chicago, spring, 1998) to progress through earlier developmental periods, so we need support and challenge to progress through this one. Our culture offers little of either since the prevailing view is that there is nothing beyond the rational stage. Thus we may need to develop personal support systems for ourselves and others who seek to go beyond purely rational ways of dealing with conflict.

Before we can change ourselves, however, we must first know who we are. Thus the first step in personal growth is one of self-discovery. Self-discovery requires that we get behind the masks we have worn for most of our lives, that we open up the areas we have hidden from others and from ourselves, that we practice being fully honest, that we revive our unused physical, emotional, and intuitive ways of knowing. Aikido master and conflict resolution specialist Crum suggests that we move "from a point of view to a viewing point" (166) and shift to a mind-set of discovery in which "you are natually open to having your beliefs changed . . . . Belief systems," he points out, "take energy to constantly protect their boundaries" (115).

1. Getting acquainted with biases, baggage, and internal conflicts.

"Until it is made conscious, the shadow causes us to create emotional explosions and catastrophe or to explode in emotionalism" (Small, Embodying Spirit, 132). The shadow, a term popularized by Carl Jung, represents all the characteristics of ourselves that we have "split off" (because

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they were unacceptable to our parents or our culture) and denied that we own. For example, if our family did not approve of aggressive behavior, we will have suppressed it in ourselves. However, it will tend to come out in other ways - as manipulativeness, for example.

Says Wilber, "The pursuit of one's highest possibilities must be balanced by the willingness to acknowledge and engage one's darker or shadow side" (Schwartz, 367). "Self-discovery demands the dropping of facades, rigorous exploration and critique of personal beliefs, and honest inquiry into the self" (Stewart in Teich, 1972). Connecting with our shadow, becoming aware of it, embracing it, transforming it is crucial to the development of a higher consciousness since until we clear our vision we will not see others or ourselves as they really are.

Once we become aware of these hidden characteristics, we can begin to transform them. Says Huxley, "The importance, the indispensable necessity, of self-knowledge has been stressed by the saints and doctors of every one of the great religious traditions" (162). De Mello says,

> there's only one way. Get deprogrammed. Become aware of the programming. . . . You cannot change by an effort of the will; you cannot change through ideas; you cannot change through building up new habits. Your behavior may change, but you don't. You only change through awareness and understanding (136).

Gebser says we must "become so well-acquainted with ourselves that we become "self-transparent." "[W]hat is required of us is just that which no one is particularly willing to undertake - work on oneself. . . . would-be reformers . . . often demand of others what they have not required of themselves" (1974, 108).

Nierenberg lists several personal defenses that appear in conflicts: "People *rationalize*; they *project*; they *displace*; they *play parts*. Sometimes they *repress* things or *react*, conform to *self-images*, . . ." (43). Rationalization means that we put ourselves in a favorable light when justifying a particular action; projection means that we attribute our own motives to others; displacement involves redirecting anger onto a scapegoat; repression causes us to forget an unpleasant past event or future duty; reaction formation is our practice of acting in a way that is directly opposite to

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our repressed drives; conforming to a self-image means that we protect our self-image by publicly behaving the way we would like others to see us.

Washburn, too, lists several ego-defense mechanisms that interfere with fully seeing the world as it is: repression, projection, sublimation, reaction formation, rationalization, intellectualization, and denial (136). "Traumata," he says, "typically cause negative fixations or blind spots and corresponding hostile, fight-or-flight reaction routines . . . . . 'Unfinished business,' on the other hand, typically causes fixations on the satisfiers of unmet (usually infantile) needs and compulsive behavior with respect to those satisfiers, or their adult surrogates" (138).

Typically, we do not recognize these defense mechanisms in ourselves. We resist what is incompatible with our preferred self-concept and project it onto others. We thus have a distorted picture of both ourselves and others. Thesenga says we need to reclaim our complex selves. You need, she says,

> to accept destructive impulses and desires in you without condoning them, to understand them without hanging onto them, to evaluate them realistically without acting them out. You need to avoid the traps of projection, self-justification, self-righteous exoneration, blaming of others, and making excuses for the self, or the traps of self-indulgence, denial, repression, and evasion (240).

When we feel defensive, it is most likely that the mask of the ego is threatened.

> Something threatens to expose us, to make us once again vulnerable to buried pains, and to topple our shaky, limited, idealized version of ourselves Whenever you are on the defensive, your primary aim cannot be truth . . . it becomes more important for you to prove that the other is wrong or unjustified, and that you are right . . . (132).

Key to developing an awareness of our psyche and our emotions and body signals and intuitive understandings is being honest with self and others. Dishonesty is central to all of the defense mechanisms. Without being truthful, we cannot investigate the upper left quadrant; otherwise, all our reports will be colored by lies. But once we begin to tell the truth about ourselves, we have access to truth, to real knowledge. Says Teich, "each individual, when in harmony with the truth, achieves his or her own moral/spiritual/emotional health. The healthy soul - the soul possessed of

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its own self-knowledge - exercises the capacity to repudiate illusions, fears, and the false opinions that parade as knowledge" (124, italics his).

Self-Discovery

There are ways to uncover these unproductive habits of mind and being, foremost among them being to get the help of a trained professional such as a psychologist or counselor.[2] Often another person is necessary - what we are blind to is not always easy to excavate. However, there are things we can do ourselves. Some of my favorites are:

1. simply to watch for them. We can ask why we forgot the dentist's appointment, but not the movie date. We can ask why it is that we excuse ourselves for unpleasant behavior (I was having a bad day - sorry), but not other people (how can he be so thoughtless?). We can ask what we are avoiding when we dull our perceptions with alcohol or TV or love addictions or compulsive overwork? We can look at our motives (instead of saying I quit the job because the boss was a jerk, maybe I quit the job because I was afraid of taking on responsibility). We can ask with whom we are "really" angry when we blow up at a child for some minor infraction. We can ask what this present conflict reminds us of. Usually there will have been some situation in the past that is similar to the one we are experiencing. When we can identify it, we can look for parallel behaviors. Just getting in the habit of asking these questions reveals a dimension to ourselves that often we didn't know we had.

2. to assume that whatever I react to strongly in another person I am blind to in myself. I rarely have much of a reaction to messiness because I don't mind admitting that I am messy, but I am much more likely to be indignant about someone else's self-centeredness - because I don't like to think that I am self-centered.[3] We can use others as a mirror. We can look within and without reflexively, continuously, train ourselves to see every

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[2] A discipline recommended by Wilber is Hameed Ali's (a.k.a. Almaas) Diamond Approach (see bibliography). But there are other groups and therapies that wed psychological and spiritual growth such as the School for Exceptional Living in Chicago and the Pathwork (see Thesenga in the bibliography).

[3] This practice works for positive as well as negative behaviors. If we wax rhapsodic over someone's kindness, we may well be unaware of our own.

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upset as an indication that we need to investigate ourselves.

3. to assume that the world is a school, that every mishap or crisis is here to teach us about ourselves. To ask, what can this experience teach me? If there were a "teacher" who gave me this lesson, what would it be that I was supposed to be learning? Small claims there are only two types of events the evolving soul seeks: tests and expressions of the true soul (Transformers, 107, 108). At fifth level consciousness, she says, we see life as a teaching and can love any experience (Transformers, 220).

2. Integrating body, emotions, roles, mind, and soul; managing the multiple selves within.

Another route to developing self-awareness is through the emotions and the body. The rational mind for the most part ignores these sources of knowledge, dismisses them as irrational or unimportant. They have not played much of a part in formal argument. "Emotional appeals are something of an embarrassment in the classical system" (Bizzell and Herzberg, 6). "Ever since Aristotle argued that emotional appeals have no place whatsoever in a proper argument (Rhetoric, III, 1414a) entering only because of our weak and fallen nature, it has been taken for granted that emotional appeals are a necessary evil only: a needful trick but still a trick" (Lanham, 173).

But this is the limited thinking of the positional discourse. Emotions are a major part of any conflict. They are present whether or not we choose to ignore them. It is very difficult to negotiate rationally in circumstances where the repressed emotion is creating an unbearable level of tension. Our positions are derived not only from what we think about something but from what we feel about it.

Lanham says,

> We might reason . . . that "facts" do not occur in an emotional vacuum, and that there might be something to be said for recreating the emotional atmosphere in which the "facts" occurred. That, too, is part of a full human truth. That atmosphere can be distorted and manipulated, of course; but so can the "facts" (173).

Says Booth, "every desire, every feeling, can become a good reason when

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called into the court of symbolic exchange" (164).

Getting to our feelings is a way of making conflict more manageable. Mindell points out, for example, that passivity, anxiety, numbness, withdrawal, and despair are signs of repressed anger (79). Uncovering the rage (and hurt) that led to such alienation might open up potential solutions. Similarly, suppressed grief maybe distorted into self-pity, fear into anxiety, anger into viciousness, and joy into hedonism or false gaiety. Uncovering the more primary emotions can "clean up" the emotional field and change the dynamics of conflict. Says Spence: "Openly revealing our feelings establishes credibility. We are what we feel" (55). Feelings get us to the authentic self. They help us to develop empathy. Says Jeffers, "feelings are the great connector" (148).

The body, too, is a source of wisdom. Almaas says, "As we get more present in our bodies, in our bellies, we can get closer to our essence which is truth, which is what makes us know what is true, what is false, not from logical deduction, or from the unconscious. You just know" (98). We all know the feeling of clenched teeth, tension in the shoulders, an adrenaline rush, etc. But the body gives us much more information. Bodies contain memory of trauma in chronic muscular tension and fascial adhesions; disease can be an expression of of our psychic condition. Experiments have shown that people with multiple personality disorder can experience a physical disorder (i.e. asthma) in one personality and not in another.

We can also use intuition as a route for knowing ourselves and the world. Says Jung, "Sensation tells you something exists, thinking tells you what it is, feeling tells you whether it is agreeable or not: and intuiton tells you whence it comes and where it is going" (49). Intuition is the retrieval of information from the unconscious or spirit. Jung suggests that considering the present sorry conditions of our world, "since nobody seems to know what to do, it might be worthwhile for each of us to ask himself whether by any chance his or her unconscious may know something that will help us" (1964, 91).

Paying attention to our bodies and our feelings and our intuitions can get us away from a purely "head" oriented approach to conflict and into our

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"hearts." It can also show us where our rational minds have split off from what we "know" to be true. While we can deceive ourselves with rationalizing and projecting, our emotional and bodily signals can bring us back to the "truth."

Becoming aware of all these other "ways of knowing" provides us with a much broader understanding of our world and of other people. If we can integrate the wisdom of our body and our emotions and our intuition with our thinking, with our rational mind, we may be able to hold a much larger picture of a conflict in our consciousness. Says Washburn,

> The integrated person . . . is a person who cannot think about or be witness to something without knowing at once how he feels about it. For the integrated person, feeling is an integral part of thinking or perceiving. . . The integrated person is in full touch with his own humanity, and he therefore feels for humanity as a whole. . . The thinking-feeling unity of conscience is also a unity of thought and action (217).

Almaas agrees. "The integrated person acts unhesitatingly upon the heartfelt insights of his conscience" (217).

Paying attention simultaneously to feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuition is one kind of integration; another is to integrate the contradictory points of view within which can be looked upon almost as separate "selves." These selves debate endlessly with one another. A simple example is the self who wants to eat ice cream vs. the self who wants to be svelte. But we debate other issues: there is the self who wants to give to others vs. the self who wants everything for him/herself, the self who is unprejudiced and the one who is carrying around childhood messages of ethnic superiority, the self who believes in rational discussion and the self who throws tantrums, the self who wants to get married and the self who sabotages every intimate relationship, etc. etc. We are not aware of many of these selves. They operate below the level of consciousness, show up to sabotage many of our plans, or pop up in arguments to derail our certain positions. In addition to being at war with others, we are also at war within. We are, says Crum, "constantly defending our old beliefs from new and opposing beliefs and thoughts. . . . We begin to witness where the root of all violence lives - within

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ourselves and our need to protect our belief systems" (115).

There are many ways to categorize these inner selves. As Wilber's four quadrants would indicate, we are a biologically-determined organism, a cookie-cutter cog in a system, an autonomous individual subject, and a socially constructed entity. His stages tell us that we are physical, emotional, social, mental, integrative, psychic, and spiritual beings. We create different selves for different occasions, different selves to satisfy the demands of different childhood caretakers, and so on. We may operate out of any one of these selves at any time. No wonder we find ourselves being inconsistent, confused, or uncertain. "The 'whole person,' then, is the sum of a variety of interrelated but not necessarily harmonious parts" (Teich, 11).

Voice dialogue, a therapy designed by Hal and Sidra Stone, brings these voices out into the open so that we can see them. When we get to know the "inner critic," the "pusher," and the "pleaser," we understand better why we act and think and feel as we do. Crosswhite, in referring to Wayne Booth's "notion of the self as a field of selves" (66) says,

> "the most important feature of the conversation among these voices is their ethical relations with one another . . . . In *Invisible Guests: The Development of Imaginal Dialogues*, Mary Watkins has elaborated a critique of standard theories of development which imagine maturity and health as the silencing of inner voices and the ascendance of monological thinking. Instead, she proposes that health and fulfillment can be found in lively, thriving inner dialogues. Pathology is a consequence of ethical failures in the relations among these inner voices - an inability to hold the inner dialogue of reason. Therapy is restoring respect and a capacity for productive conversation and conflict resolution among these "invisible guests" (284).

When there is conflict among these inner selves, it is often reflected in outer conflict. We may reject in another an aspect of ourselves with which we are doing battle; an external conflict may mirror an inner one. In some sense, all arguments are arguments with ourselves. When we can recognize that we also hold the opposite opinion to the one we are expressing, we can be more tolerant of someone else who holds it.

To the extent that participants to a conflict can deal with their internal battles, the external battles will be easier to solve. Jeffers says, "As we heal

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our inner world, everything 'miraculously' gets healed in our outer world as well" (33). Says Jung: "A collective problem, if not recognized as such, always appears as a personal problem . . . psychotherapy has hitherto taken this matter far too little into account" (233). And Maslow, "inner problems and outer problems tend to be deeply similar and to be related to each other" (57).

We do this collectively as well as individually. Says Kornfield, "The wars between peoples are a reflection of our own inner conflict and fear" (23). And Small: "the big patterns of Humanity are acting out as well. Currently, we are dealing with the perpetrator/victim archetype, the battle of the sexes, and the greed and megalomania patterns; our massive collective shadow is exposed" (Transformers, 213). Grof believes that we have a failure of peace initiatives because we don't address the human psyche (219).

3. Taking responsibility for creating our own reality.

Much of our time and energy is devoted to assuring ourselves that reality is what we think it is. We tell stories to fortify our image of what the world is, stories which become ever more rigid the more we tell them to others and ourselves. We process everything through the filters of our beliefs. We do not see clearly what is, nor do we see our own role in creating what we see. Says Strauch,

> [W]hatever does exist "out there" is very different than we perceive it to be. By the time we have processed our perceptions to the point that we become conscious of and able to attach a label to them, we are no longer perceiving the external object at all. Rather, we are perceiving a curious mixture of the object and of our reactions to it, our expectations about it, and our past experience with similar objects. What we perceive, then, is largely our own creation (86).

An example of distorted interpretation occurred in a dispute between neighbors that I once mediated. The parties detailed a history of several years of escalating vituperative exchanges. Finally, we got around what appeared to have begun the difficulty: the first neighbor didn't say thank you to the second neighbor for allowing the first to fell a tree on the second's yard. Because the felling of the tree had been discussed beforehand, the first neighbor didn't think a "thank you" was expected. The second did, and

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when it didn't materialize, assumed that the feller of the tree was rude and uncaring and felt justified in retaliating with coldness (which escalated to rude verbal exchanges and finally to physical violence). The precipitating event had never been discussed. Our assignations of malicious or positive intent often overwhelm the actual event.

Wishful thinking is another trap we set for ourselves. A reality check: does the tenant have any money with which to pay the landlord, can an old building really provide even heat? can bring the combatants to a more moderate position.

At the integral level we learn to break through the screens we put up and see more clearly. Once we see how we create our experience, we develop a willingness to take responsibility for changing it. We learn that we are not victims of our physical bodies, our emotions, our social worlds, or our minds.

At earlier stages, we did not believe we had the power to choose our own lives; instead, they were dictated by authority, or by the whims of other people, or by what was "reasonable." For example, when we are functioning at the physical stage we assume that we are limited by the physical world; we do not think of altering it to fit ourselves. At the emotional level we are dominated by ours and others' emotions; we don't yet see the value of social institutions as ways of controlling emotion. At the level of the discourse of authority, we assume we are controlled by authority; we don't yet know how to become our own authority. At the level of positionality, we are controlled by our perspective and feel a need to convince others of its rightness; we don't see that we can change our perspective as easily as we could change the authority by which we live. When we recognize our responsibility for creating the situation we find ourselves in, we are less likely to blame others and thus more likely to be able to work out solutions to our conflicts. Says Kottler, "when you believe that your troubles are the result of what someone or something else is doing to you, you are powerless to stop them. Your only recourses are to duck, endure, or get out of the way" (91).

Shailor stresses that reframing is key to helping disputants to develop awareness (17). Reframing is a technique that is used in mediation to recast a dispute so as to make it more amenable to resolution. For example, an

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employee who is fired may see the firing as due to discrimination, the employer may see it as due to inadequate work; a reframe might include the possibility that the two have failed to communicate expectations clearly.

4. Being open to transformation through conflict.

> "Dissonance
> (if you are interested)
> leads to discovery"
>
> William Carlos Williams

While those involved in the discourses of authority or positionality assume that conflict should be resolved or quickly gotten past so that life can get back to "normal," at the integral level of consciousness, conflict *is* regarded as normal. "Conflict is merely an interference pattern or dance of energy that is constantly going on in nature. It is conflict and perturbation that disorganizes the species and causes it to reorganize into a higher and more effective life system" (Crum, 52).

Conflict is also regarded as a positive. Kottler says,

> Conflicts can help you test out your most cherished ideas by bouncing them off others who feel equally strongly about their perceptions. It is through disagreement with others that you are most easily able to determine what it is that you care about the most" (148).

He also claims that conflict maintains stability in relationships. "The alternatives to conflict are avoidance and withdrawal, solutions that initially prevent clashes but ultimately lead to irreconcilable differences" (156). "There are things you want that you could never have without conflict" (158).

According to Muldoon, people who can hold irreconciliable contradictions in themselves usually get "bigger," discover their true nature, find their genius (lecture, Chicago, 9/26/96). Says Crum, "Conflict is nature's prime motivator for change" (153). Say Littlejohn, Shailor, and Pearce, "The *co nflict maintenance model* sees conflict as healthy, functional, or unavoidable and as something to be promoted, maintained, managed, or

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endured" (71, emphasis theirs).[4]

Bush and Folger point out that the Chinese character for conflict means both crisis and opportunity.

> A conflict . . . presents parties with the opportunity to clarify for themselves their needs and values, what causes them dissatisfaction and satisfaction. It also gives them the chance to discover and strengthen their own resources for addressing both substantive concerns and relational issues. . . . [It] gives people the occasion to develop and exercise respect and consideration for others (82).

They advocate transformative mediation, a practice which, in empowering and recognizing the participants, establishes receptivity for a change in perspective, and creates the potential for a leap to a higher stage of development. "[M]ediation's transformative dimensions are connected to an emerging, higher vision of self and society, one based on moral development and interpersonal relations rather than on satisfaction and individual autonomy" (3). Transformation, they believe, changes people from "dependent beings concerned only with themselves (weak and selfish people) into secure and self-reliant beings willing to be concerned with and responsive to others (strong and caring people)" (29).

Without conflict, we would have little motivation to develop through the stages. Says Kottler, "Unless you experience conflicts and challenges, there is very little likelihood that you will be motivated to search for higher-level ways to solve problems" (153). Conflict, he adds, also regulates distance, is a path to intimacy, prevents stagnation, promotes growth, and releases tension (150). Say Young, Becker, and Pike,"Whenever a person has a problem, his way of thinking about the world is automatically called into

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[4] They contrast this model with several others: "The *economic bargaining model* is an exchange approach in which conflict is treated as opposing objectives to be resolved through negotiation and compromise. The *power model* sees conflict as a struggle for resources in which the strongest side will prevail, as in fighting and war. The *coalition model* is a difference of opinion or interest that is settled by weight of alignment, as in an election. The *consensus model* is a difference of opinion on alternative solutions, which is settled by discussion and creative problem solving" (71). Each of these models could be categorized as belonging to different discourses, the power model being most closely aligned with the discourse of physicality, the coalition model with the discourse of authority, the economic bargaining model with the discourse of rationality. The consensus model seems to be related to the conflict maintenance model, the latter being a point of view and the former a process.

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question" (98).

Kottler says conflict forces us to examine our reasoning, regulates distance, is a path to intimacy, prevents stagnation, promotes growth, and releases tension. He suggests we ask:

> How is this disagreement helping me focus my attention on issues that I have been neglecting? What cues leading up to this eruption did I miss that signaled impending escalation of feelings? What can I learn from this encounter that will be helpful to me the next time I am in a similar predicament? What is this conflict doing for me, however annoying its side effects, that I might accomplish in other ways? What are the underlying issues that we are both really upset about?
>
> What determines whether conflict is likely to lead to constructive gains or dangerous escalation are the intentions of the parties involved. If the implicit goal is aggression, coercion, or the submission of other, ultimately somebody is going to end up worse than before he or she started (151, 2).

A future focus also makes conflict easier to deal with. If, instead of rehashing the past (and assigning blame) we focus on how to make the future better for everyone involved, we can begin to see how the conflict might be leading us to a better way. When all parties are working toward mutually satisfying goals, when they demonstrate flexibility in their methods of problem solving, and, most of all, when they show respect for one another, then conflict ceases to be an adversarial experience and becomes, instead, one of mutual growth and learning. If the goal is to create better relationships in the future, to see that all parties experience a win, to empower the other, then a positive outcome is more likely.

Conflict brings growth. Conflict also brings pain. The literature of personal growth, however, teaches us, however, that pain may be a necessary part of the transformation. "Wounding allows for the opening of ourselves . . . I have never known - never - a being of depth who has not undergone some sizable suffering" (Jean Houston in Elliott, 92). "Suffering is the way in which we learn, after the fact, the consequences of our moves" (Rabbi Zalman Schachter-Shalomi in Elliott, 186). "Spiritual work is the discipline of slowly, steadily expanding the boundaries of self to integrate into awareness more and more of who we are. . . We must be willing to remove our defenses against our buried pain in order to grow" (Thesenga 12). This theme is

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echoed over and over again. Says Almaas,

> Your conflicts, all the difficult things, the problematic situations in your life are not chance or haphazard. . . . They are specifically yours, designed specifically for you by a part of you that loves you more than anything else
>
> [T]he most difficult things that happen to you on the deepest level are the most compassionate things (140).

5. Developing an aperspectival ability and an ability to synthesize; learning to live with ambiguity and contradiction

Integrating multiple views of reality requires a new level of cognition. Elbow describes it thus:

> If . . . we are trying to know something that is especially hard to check or verify, our best hope of doing so is to gain as many different and conflicting knowings as possible. Holding all these conflicting views in mind, we must then try to get a sense of the unknown behind them. People who are good at doing this seem to call upon some subtle tact, judgment, or intuition. I think that they are using a metaphorical, analogical, Gestalt-finding kind of ability. They are good at maintaining contradictory points of view simultaneously and at living with ambiguity in order to refrain from premature resolution" (1986, 242).

Strauch says we can "maintain and use more than one view, switching between them and not getting stuck thinking of any one as real:

> Faced with superficially competing explanations you may feel less compelled to choose between them - rejecting one in order to accept another. Instead you may find it possible to integrate both into a deeper synthesis, seeing each as a different perspective on the same underlying phenomenon"(83).

Says Burke, "We need never deny the presence of strife, enmity, faction as a characteristic motive of rhetorical expression . . . yet we can at the same time always look beyond this order, to the principle of identification in general . . ." (20). Also relevant in this context is Elbow's believing game.

> The believing game encourages what may be the most valuable intellectual process for inquiry in meetings or groups - namely, the act of seeing the strength in someone's [sic] else's position and the weakness in one's own. When the doubting game is dominant, discussion tends to be a matter of "winning" and "losing," and people give in only when coerced - and then of course with a residue of resentment and a desire to get back at the winner . . . when people cannot really affect each

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> other's thinking, decisions get made on the basis of power, fashion, or loyalties (289).

Elbow contends that using the believing game will expand our frames of reference and make us wiser. "The surest way to get hold of what your present frame blinds you to is to try to adopt the opposite frame . . . . A person who can live with contradiction and exploit it - who can use conflicting models - can simply see and think *more*" (241). The rational method is to doubt, to accept nothing as true unless it cannot be doubted. To integrate, however, we must accept everything as true, to eliminate nothing unless we cannot find any reasons why it might be true. "

> [M]ethodological doubt is only half of what we need. . . . thinking is not trustworthy unless it also includes methodological belief: the equally systematic, disciplined, and conscious attempt to believe everything no matter how unlikely or repellent it might seem - to find virtues or strengths we might otherwise miss (257).

In order to develop this level of consciousness, to become Wilber's "centaur" (an integrated bodymind that can synthesize and grasp gestalts), it is necessary to develop a new kind of awareness, an observer self, often called a witness. Says Elgin,

> *To see how we see* requires that we stand back from immersion in the process of seeing and look at both the scene and the seer simultaneously so as to put them into accurate relationship. Three-dimensional depth perspective, then, requires a new step back in consciousness: a person must move, in their [sic] consciousness from inside the three-dimensional reference frame to outside of it . . . (97).

Contemplative practices help to strengthen this ability. Gebser says that no idea of the aperspective world can be formed; it transcends our ideas (1973, 87). He believes it can, however, be accessed through spiritual techniques such as meditation. Just as one learns to apply the scientific method, understands something from doing so, and then confirms the results with one's peers, so the interior dimensions require that one apply the methods of contemplation, learn something, and confirm that understanding in dialogue with other contemplatives.

6. Cultivating the beliefs and habits of a higher stage.

We can seek to align ourselves with the personal characteristics and behaviors of those at a higher stage. Some of these qualities include

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detachment, self-referral, truthfulness, humility, lack of defensiveness, compassion, forgiveness, love - characteristics which render conflict of the sort we have now obsolete.

These qualities are often associated with spirituality. According to Maslow, the

> description of the actual characteristics of self-actualizing people parallels at many points the ideas urged by the religions, e.g., the transcendence of self, the fusion of the true, the good and the beautiful, contribution to others, wisdom, honesty and naturalness, the transcendence of selfish and person motivations, the giving up of "lower" desires in favor of "higher" ones, the easy differentiation between ends (tranquility, serenity, peace) and means (money, power status), the decrease of hostility, cruelty and destructiveness and the increase of friendliness, kindness, etc. (149).

There is, he says, a

> presence within the human being . . . toward unity of personality, toward spontaneous expressiveness, toward full individuality and identity, toward seeing the truth rather than being blind, toward being creative, toward being good, and a lot else . . . . toward what most people would call good values, toward serenity, kindness, courage, honesty, love, unselfishness, and goodness (147).

Many of these values are associated with what is currently being called "the divine feminine." It includes, according to Christian mystic Andrew Harvey, the "feminine powers of imagination, attention, receptivity, capacity to wonder, nurture, and cherish. . . "(1996, 25).

Mindell speaks of becoming an "elder." To become an elder, one must go beyond leadership to being able to let a process be, to enable what is hidden to appear, to focus on feelings as well as issues (187).[5] Elders must therefore have done the inner work necessary to achieve a state of detached caring, a process Mindell refers to as "burning your wood" so that it does not remain as fuel for anger. Wilber says we can reach a position of worldcentric consciousness, rising above *biocentric* impulses (sex and survival), *egocentric* wishes, and *ethnocentric* proclivities "to stand as a *worldcentric* locus of moral awareness that insists on universal compassion" (1986, 282).

In the end, of course, it is our ability to love that we will be developing. Says Huxley, "Love is a mode of knowledge, and when the love is sufficiently

[5] See appendix D for a list of elder characteristics.

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disinterested and sufficiently intense, the knowledge becomes unitive knowledge . . " (81). And Elgin, "The same love that binds together an ordinary family is the unifying force that makes global reconciliation and commitment possible" (158).

Some hold that this kind of personal evolution will heal the world. "Whoever has ennobled, intensified and prepared his consciousness, so that an enrichment of the Integral consciousness is achieved, lives in a state of participation in the world as a whole. This participation . . . holds the possibility for the healing of the world" (Gebser 1974, 109). Even on a global level, Grof argues, our peace initiatives have failed because we do not address the human pyche (219).

Wilber sees a similar evolution at the societal level. Currently, he says, vision-logic is struggling to emerge (1995, 185). Gebser lists as examples of this emergence Freudian and Jungian psychology, linguistics and phenomenology in philosophy, care and responsibility in jurisprudence in conjunction with justice and rights, Schoenberg and Stravinsky in music (because they overcame fixities of meter and tonality), the new physics, and a rising global culture.

Wilber applauds this movement. "It is the integrative power of vision-logic, I believe, and not the indissociation of tribal magic or the imperialism of mythic involvement that is desperately needed on a global scale" (1995, 187).

> This global movement is coming about through individuals who create a "cognitive potential" in the form of *new worldviews* . . . that in turn feed back into . . . social institutions, until the previously "marginalized" world view becomes anchored in institutional forms which then catapult a collective consciousness to a new and higher release (1995,197, italics his).

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Chapter 8. Integral Discourse: Relating to the Other

"The essential nature of matter lies not in objects but in interconnections."
Review of Mindwalk, Noetic Sciences Review, Autumn, 1994. p. 42.

If we expand our perspective and grow ourselves then we become capable of relating differently to others when we are in conflict. We become larger, able to contain more perspectives, more emotion, more uncertainty, more conflict. Conflict, in fact, can bring us together: "all our conflicts, differences and issues, oppressions and prejudices, unconsciousness and power struggles - the very themes that separate us - if suffered through to an awakening, draw us together" (Mindell, 240). Says Crum, "we are connected just by being in conflict with one another. Separation is an illusion. . . Increasing your connectedness, recognizing and welcoming your relatedness to the world and the people around you, will always support the resolution of a conflict" (87).

Integral discourse honors relationship, sees it not as a limitation but as a way to enlarge the self. When we emphasize relationship in this way, our incentive changes. We become invested in solving "our" problem rather than in solving "my" problem. Maintaining the connection becomes more important than putting forth our position. Fully realizing our relatedness encourages us to move from intimidation or capitulation to cooperation, from win/lose or lose/lose to win/win, and from independence or fusion to mutual interdependence. Our interactions become more cooperative, honest, open, and non-defensive. While this kind of relating may seem utopian, if the other is committed to win/win (essentially to getting you what you need), then there is no need for the strategizing and withholding of the rational discourse.[1]

To maintain connection and be open to others' point of view requires something other than the objective, adversarial approach of positional discourse. Integral discourse requires us to reveal the self, really see and

[1] Obviously, if only one operates at this level, she can be taken advantage of, just as a person at the emotional level can be physically harmed by one at the physical level. Thus, it may be necessary to operate out of other levels as well. I take up this issue at the end of this chapter.

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honor the other, cooperate in constructing creative solutions for the future (and at a societal level, using our institutions to foster this cooperation), communicate across the gaps that divide us, and cultivate interactions of love and compassion rather than defensiveness and mistrust. Lamb suggests we employ Sarah Ruddick's concept of maternal thinking to help us remain in relationship while disagreeing. Maternal thinking means giving loving attention, holding without controlling, welcoming change, and giving and receiving while remaining in connection (Lamb, 1991, 16).

1. Revealing the self

Honestly communicating ourselves - including our fears, hopes, values, and biases - instead of hiding behind a screen of objectivity may increase the level of trust among the parties. Speaking/writing to a human being with feelings and values and a physical body is different from reacting to disembodied words. Says Breton, "the way to break through the barriers is shared self-disclosure . . . admitting our feelings, confusions, fears, and defenses breaks the pattern" (185). Says Wiesbord, "I have found that when people reveal personal history, they become more trustful of themselves, each other, and this process; more open-minded, and more likely to shift their mental maps and behavior" (165). "[W]ithout deep and authentic communication across these barriers of suffering, humanity will remain divided and mistrustful . . ." (Elgin, 123).

When we are writing rather than facing each other in person, this means an authorial presence. Says Corder, "we must learn to speak and write arguments full of the anecdotal, personal, and cultural reflections that will make us plain to all others, thoughtful histories and narratives that reveal us as we're reaching for the others" (1985, 31). Lamb suggests that we rely less "on close, packaged forms and more on narratives that show who we are and what our values are. . ." (1991, 18). In fiction, a character becomes believable because of the detail offered about his life. We can provide the same kind of believability in our "real life" discourse. Crosswhite suggests "composition courses that teach and encourage what Peter Elbow calls 'rendering.' Rendering is the written sharing of experience. Its aim is not to

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overcome conflicts through explicit reasoning, but to deepen one another's understanding of what it's like to be the other person" (201).

Revealing the self prevents suppressed thoughts and feelings from appearing in another guise. Says theater director Boal, whose "Theater of the Oppressed" dramatizes conflicts, "any unexpressed thought, emotion or sensation will always, inevitably, find issue in other unconscious, invisible ways" (62).

Revealing the self makes our writing and speaking better, more appealing, less dry. Says Anderson, "although the myth of objectivity pervades all kinds of journalism, the best of it is produced by reporters who let their feelings, their interpretations, and their subjective biases be present and visible" (127).

Revealing the self makes one vulnerable. "[T]o open one's own world to others is to run the risk of discovering its inadequacy or falsehood . . . " (Halloran, 625). But in vulnerability is another kind of power; when we reveal our own struggle we have nothing to hide, no reason to fear exposure. And in our vulnerability lies connection to other human beings.

Spence says we need to tell the truth about our hurt, anger, dread, fear, joy, jealousy, hunger, ideas, and our insecurities. "*Credibility* comes out of the bone - deeper yet, out of the marrow" (47, italics his). But we don't realize how often we lie: our culture supports it, our defensiveness makes us rationalize it. Says Carter, "Our looks, our actions, and even our silence can lie. Reports, promises, and even apologies lie. We lie by implication and suggestion. . . . Lying extends to all sorts of statements and behaviors that may be misleading, deceptive, and confusing" (90). It takes effort to tell the truth.

2. Honoring the other

The corollary to self-revelation is, of course, listening to the revelations of others. This, too, can be difficult. We don't want to deal with another's anger or hurt, most particularly if it is directed at us. Says Kottler, "The more you care for someone, the more deeply you are committed to one another, the greater is the potential for explosive outbursts that can escalate into major conflicts" (166). However, hearing these emotions is important. "The things

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we feel most passionately about, the ideas we hold most dear, are not necessarily those we can convey in the most controlled manner. . . . If . . . you really want to *know* me . . . you must risk contact that is potentially more explosive" (157).

We do not want to hear opinions that differ from our own. Integral discourse, however, demands this of us. Says Corder, "The arguer . . . . must . . . discover and offer all grace that he or she can muster, and most especially, extend every liberty possible to the other. The arguer must hold the other wholly in mind and yet cherish his or her own identity" (1985, 28). Lamb seeks to promote "the kind of atmosphere in which students can think honestly and openly about their position on an issue about which they care and then can reflect on the most generous response of which they are capable" (Ibid, 265). She encourages silence because then "people would be listening more" (Ibid, 267).

Listening is a key skill of the integral stage.

Listen

I don't know if you have ever examined how you listen, it doesn't matter to what, whether to a bird, to the wind in the leaves, to the rushing waters, or how you listen in a dialogue with yourself, to your conversation in various relationships with your intimate friends, your wife or husband . . .

If we try to listen we find it extraordinarily difficult, because we are always projecting our opinions and ideas, our prejudices, our background, our inclinations, our impulses; when they dominate we hardly listen at all to what is being said . . .

In that state there is no value at all. One listens and therefore learns, only in a state of attention, a state of silence, in which this whole background is in abeyance, is quiet; then, it seems to me, it is possible to communicate. . . . real communication can only take place where there is silence.

Krishnamurti

Real listening changes people. They come to understand what lies

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behind another's stated position, they develop sympathy, they give recognition, they begin to care. They may be able to empathize. Says Teich quoting Shelley: "A man, to be greatly good, must imagine intensely and comprehensively; he must put himself in the place of another and of many others; the pains and pleasures of his species must become his own. The great instrument of moral good is the imagination . . . " (289). If we can imagine, we can shift perspectives, "believe" another point of view.

Listening can be demonstrated in writing by accurate presentation of the point of view of others. We can be careful and respectful and complete in documenting the ideas of those that conflict with ours. If possible, we can ask for input; if not, we can present our own ideas and interpretations of others' ideas with humility, recognizing that we may not be presenting them as they would have wished. We can present our writing as open to change, ideas as not final but as partial and temporary.

There are other ways to honor the other. Bush and Folger stress the importance of empowerment and recognition. Their focus is on strengthening the participants so that instead of feeling vulnerable and defensive and thus unable to look at the situation from the other's perspective, they can become secure enough to be able to hear it.

Shailor adds to empowerment and recognition a third factor, awareness. This awareness is of "thoughts, feelings, actions, persons, and points of view . . . that may have been unacknowledged, . . . connections that may have been unsuspected, and . . . alternative visions. . . ." (in publication, 17). Awareness ideally leads disputants to recognize their interdependence, to see how conflict is a way they are pursuing their beliefs, and to understand how their actions contribute to the pattern of conflict (12).

Senge advocates using reflection and inquiry to slow down our thinking processes so we can become more aware of how we form our mental models. Otherwise, he says, we leap to knee-jerk conclusions.

> Individuals who are undiscplined in reflective thinking have difficulty hearing what others actually say. Instead, they hear what they expect others to say. They have little tolerance for multiple interpretations of events because they often "see" only their own interpretation (237).

Thus they end up arguing forever or getting some unsatisfactory compromise

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or deferring to senior person in the room (Ibid).

Young, Becker, and Pike suggest that we make an assumption of similarity: "The reader is addressed as if he were intelligent, curious, honest, sincere - in short, as if he possessed the same qualities that the writer attributes to himself" (208). We can "identify" with our reader, a la Burke. Says Halloran, "to achieve identification, or, as Burke also calls it, consubstantiality, is . . . . to articulate an area of shared experience, imagery, and value; it is to define my world in such a way that the other can enter into that world with me" (626).

We can grant others dignity and respect even when they seem to us to be wholly wrong. While Gandhi may have set a model for us in many ways, Gilligan criticizes him for his claim to exclusive possession of the truth, his "unwillingness to learn from *anybody anything* except what was approved by the inner voice'" (p. 236, italics hers).

> "This claim led Gandhi, in the guise of love, to impose his truth on others without awareness of or regard for the extent to which he thereby did violence to their integrity. . . .
>
> In denying the validity of his wife's reluctance to open her home to strangers and in blinding himself to the different reality of adolescent sexuality and temptation, Gandhi compromised in his everyday life the ethic of nonviolence to which, in principle and in public, he steadfastly adhered. The blind willingness to sacrifice people to truth, however, has always been the danger of an ethics abstacted [sic] from life" (104).

We can use Elbow's believing game not just to enlarge the content but to also honor the other's point of view.

We can enlarge our sphere of care to include nonpresent parties. In integral discourse, people are not sacrificed to principles. A story which I believe elucidates this difference is one told by Nierenberg of Alexander Hamilton when he was Secretary of the Treasury. Apparently, instead of succumbing to the pressure of a blackmailer who threatened to expose his affair with a Mrs. Reynolds, Hamilton told the president and the cabinet and published the details of his relationship so as to allay fears of impropriety in his conduct of the Treasury. Nierenberg offers this story for the purpose of demonstrating the maturity of self-sacrifice. However, his next comment,

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"As a direct result of this disclosure, Hamilton's wife ended up in an insane asylum and his son was killed in a duel defending his father's honor" (104), lays bare how narrow and self-centered such a heroic stance can be. Better perhaps to have resigned or to have found some solution that would not wreak such devastation on others. I get the impression that Nierenberg sees this tragedy solely from Hamilton's viewpoint instead of including the viewpoint of his wife and son. A perspective that went beyond the rational concern with doing "right" might have included some care for them.

Similarly, Abraham was willing to sacrifice his son Isaac to prove his love for God. However, the mother who gave up pursuit of the truth so her child would not be cut in two by Solomon's edict was following, in my opinion, a higher level of moral development.

Rogerian argument and Senge's combination of advocacy and inquiry are ways to both reveal the self and honor the other. In Rogerian argument, one takes care to present each point of view and acknowledge the contexts in which it may be right. Senge calls for everyone to makes his thinking explicit and subject to public examination. No one hides the evidence or advances reasons without opening them to scrutiny (199).

3. Cooperating in constructing creative solutions to problems: changing attitudes and practices

At the integral stage, cooperation rather than competition is the norm. The difference derives from differing beliefs in the basic nature of human beings. Ong says,

> "Contest is a part of human life everywhere that human life is found. In war and in games, in work and in play, physically, intellectually, and morally, human beings match themselves with or against one another. Struggle appears inseparable from human life, and contest is a particular focus or mode of interpersonal struggle, an opposition that can be hostile but need not be, for certain kinds of contest may serve to sublimate and dissolve hostilities and to build friendship and cooperation" (quoted in Bleich, 170).

Others, however, see these as false assumptions. Young, Becker, and Pike quote from an article in Biotic Communities by Marston Bates:

> this competition, this "struggle," is a superficial thing, superimposed on an

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> essential mutual dependence. The basic theme in nature is cooperation rather than competition - a cooperation that has become so all-pervasive, so completely integrated, that it is difficult to untwine and follow out the separate strands (139).

Carter speaks of "stereoscopic vision" that sees the interconnectedness of all things and the multiplicity of differentiation. (211). Axelrod, a professor of political science and public policy, has constructed a model that demonstrates that simple connection and a visible future lead to cooperation, regardless of the parties' ability to communicate or to understand one another (19). Kegan highlights the interdependence of conflicting parties:

> [The] postmodern approach to conflict and its resolution does not assume the wholeness, distinctness, or priority of the competing parties"(319), he says. "In essence, the postmodern view bids disputants to do several things: (1) consider that your protracted conflict is a signal that you and your opponent have probably become identified with the poles of the conflict; (2) consider that the relationship in which you find yourself is not the inconvenient result of the existence of an opposing view but the expression of your own incompleteness taken as completeness; (3) value the relationship, miserable though it might feel, as an opportunity to live out your own multiplicity; and thus, (4) focus on ways to let the conflictual relationship transform the parties rather than on the parties resolving the conflict. Postmodernism suggests a kind of "conflict resolution" in which the Palestinian discovers her own Israeli-ness, the rich man discovers his poverty, the woman discovers the man inside her (320).

Thus, the practices in which the integral self will want to engage will be different from the practices of the positional stage. Instead of the lawsuits of the discourse of authority or the negotiations of the discourse of positionality, integral persons will seek to ways to communicate, to cooperate, to heal relationships. The following are some practices that can help a disputant to achieve these goals:

A. Formal dispute resolution practices

1. Mediation. Recently, more options have become available for dispute resolution. The courts are experimenting with mini-trials and summary jury trials as well as with court-annexed arbitration and mediation. Students are taught mediation in law school. Even elementary school

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students are being trained to handle conflicts with their peers.

Mediation[2] is is an ideal technique for parties at this stage because it permits inquiry into the whole, and because it allows participants the freedom to construct their own relationship. Mediation also permits both flight *and* fight,[3] so that participants may feel less constrained, less fearful, and thus freer to postpone resolution, to be creative about proposing solutions, to offer empowerment and recognition to the other parties, and to get past positions to interests.

2. Bush and Folger advocate a problem-solving orientation over what they call the distributive view.

> In the distributive view, conflict is defined as an adversarial, winner-take-all contest among competing claimants for resources. The ideal response to conflict is the assignment of contested resources to the party with the superior claim, according to principles of rights and fairness. This orientation underlies the formal legal dispute resolution system, as well as the arbitration process and even adversarial approaches to negotiation . . . Problem solving offers an alternative to the distributive outlook, an alternative based on a less adversarial and more expansive view of both resource use and self-interest (57).

They point out other advantages that accrue from the problem-solving method: resources are expanded and value is created; parties can address the other's needs as a way of addressing their own; openness, collaboration, and creativity are emphasized; power imbalances, escalation, and destructive avoidance of issues are minimized (58).

3. Fisher and Ury recommend principled negotiation. In principled negotiation one looks for mutual gains and uses independent standards to weigh conflicting positions. One is hard on the merits, soft on the people (xviii).

4. Large group work is advocated by Mindell. He uses the term "worldwork" to describe the process of dealing with the field of a conflict (23). "The domain of worldwork includes the unconscious, dream-like processes in corporate bodies . . . . Awareness of the "field" is different from knowledge

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2 mediation is a form of dispute resolution in which disputants are aided by a third party who is in charge of the process, but not the outcome. Unlike an arbitrator, a mediator makes no decision. There are two types: facilitative and evaluative. The latter involves more intervention by the mediator regarding solutions and options.

3 because emotion is acceptable and because mediation is voluntary

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of the parts of a system. It's like dreaming the overall dream, which includes everything that surrounds and permeates the body" (43).

Some, such as Ross Speck of the Union Institute, will bring whole communities together, including neighbors, business associates, relatives, and friends, to help solve a particular person's problem. Businesses are using concepts like Wiesbord's future search conferences which engage several hundred people at a time. The broadest possible participation is sought both as a way of generating ideas and as a way of getting commitment from people who will be affected.

5. Dialogue. Dialogue is variously defined as anything from debate to Bohmian interchange, but the writers at the leading edge of conflict theory typically mean something closer to the latter. Bohm's view of dialogue is a radical one. Says Lee Nichol in the foreword to On Dialogue,

> As conceived by Bohm, dialogue is a multi-faceted process, looking well beyond typical notions of conversational parlance and exchange. It is a process which explores an unusually wide range of human experience: our closely-held values; the nature and intensity of emotions; the patterns of our thought processes; the function of memory; the import of inherited cultural myths; and the manner in which our neurophysicology structures moment-to-moment experience. Perhaps most importantly, dialogue explores the manner in which *thought* - viewed by Bohm as an inherently limited medium, rather than an objective representation of reality - is generated and sustained at the collective level (vii).

Bohm himself says, "Dialogue is a space where we may see the . . . assumptions which drive us, assumptions around which we build organizations, create economies, form nations and religions. . . These mental habits drive us, confuse us and prevent our responding intelligently to the challenges we face every day" (2). "What is called for," he says, "is a deep and intense awareness, going beyond the imagery and intellectual analysis of our confused process of thought, and capable of penetrating to the contradictory presuppositions and states of feeling in which the confusion originates" (76). This process involves what he calls proprioception, the ability to observe thought itself (81).

Breton also advocates dialogue:

> As a response to the control-paradigm worlds around us, dialogue

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> sends a liberating message. It communicates openness, trust, mutual respect, as well as adventure and shared exploration. . . . Discussion works like Ping-Pong; we toss opinions back and forth to see whose views will win out. It's a competitive game of scoring points: one-up, one-down, argument and rebuttal. . . . Discussion isn't designed to increase but to narrow options. . . . . Discussion operates on a win-lose model . . . discussion . . . isn't equal to the challenge of exploring a multi-dimensioned, multioptioned universe. Issues of soul evolution and system transformation have many layers to them. They're not one-dimensional. The value of one perspective doesn't diminish or exclude the value of another. . . . Neither is there one solution to the challenges we face. The way forward holds many possibilities - no one of which is the right one. . . .
>
> Dialogue has a different dynamic. Its purpose isn't to establish a victor or to prove a position but to "love the truth" and pursue it. We let truth be what it is, whether it fits our paradigm agendas or not. . . (217).

Isaacs advocates the use of dialogue in business settings to pierce collective illusion, re-establish common sense, harness collective intelligence, create a container, and create a new basis for social organization (13).

9. Therapy. It may seem odd to include therapy as a conflict resolution technique, but at the integral level, when the biggest obstacles to dealing with our disputes may be our internal conflicts, we may benefit a great deal from this option. Participants to a conflict can engage in individual therapy or joint. If the latter, they also get the benefit of hearing one another in an environment that encourages listening and discourages game-playing.

B. Changing the way we speak

The field of psychology has also produced a host of suggestions for changing the way we speak *about* conflict, how we speak *in* conflict, and *where* we speak when in conflict.

1. Changing metaphors. Instead of using battle words like "opposing party" and "taking a stand" and "defending a position," we can speak of the harmony and counterpoint found in music. We can dance together, build bridges, grow gardens, nurture seeds, and erect structures. Instead of seeing the world as a machine, we can see it as Gaia, a living organism. Instead of a march of progress, we can have a dance of opposites. Instead of survival of the fittest, we can have a web of life.

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2. Revealing our process. We can avoid presenting our views as fully settled or monological. We can include our own contradictory internal voices in the debate, admit our own inconsistencies, tentativeness, uncertainty. Crusius suggests that we shift back and forth in our thinking, be "systematically inconsistent" (115). We can let go of defensiveness and be unashamed to admit when we are wrong.

3. Maintaining a future focus. Looking to the future may give us hope and open us to creative possibilities. Penn encourages families in conflict to imagine the pattern of their relationships at some future point in time.

> The consideration of these future maps places the family in a metaposition to their own dilemma, and the system increases its view of its own evolutionary potential. . . . . [F]uture questions . . . promote the rehearsal of new solutions, suggest alternative actions, foster learning, discard ideas of predetermination, and address the system's specific change model (1985, 299).

Fantasies, wishes, opinions, and hopes are fed back into present. Future questions help people to overcome the idea that the past is determinative (1985, 300, 301). Katz and Lawyer speak of a "vision model" in which bridges are built from the unsatisfactory present to the envisioned workable future (5).

4. Inquiring into systems. In addition to future visioning, Penn suggests circular questioning as a way of developing a metaview of conflict. She proposes questions such as "who worries when mother worries?" what is the problem in the family *now?*" "is it better or worse now than it was then?" as ways of getting people to consider the whole system, their own membership in it, and the potential for change (1982, 271-274).

5. Using giraffe language[4] is an example of a respectful and empowering process. Giraffe language is the language of requests: please meet my needs. Jackal language is the opposite; it is the language of blaming: you didn't meet my needs. To practice giraffe language, one needs to 1) see without judgment (what is happening here?), 2) pinpoint one's need in the form of an "abstract universal" (for information, education, celebration,

[4] I learned of this process at a conference entitled Ghandi and King: A Season for Nonviolence: Peacemakers Workshop, Northeastern Illinois University, 1/30/98. I don't know the original source.

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integrity), and 3) make a request that the other perform a "doable action." In this process, we empathize before we educate and move from thinking (our interpretation of our needs) to feeling (the reality of our needs).

5 Many of these ideas are similar to the feminine conversational style, a style which is inclusive rather than exclusive and which builds on each contribution so as to make a whole that incorporates what everyone has said.

6. Being courteous. Mairs suggests that we apply ordinary courtesy to our conflicts. She suggests nothing less than

> A new world order - a wholly fresh way of conceiving relatedness as inclusive and egalitarian rather than exclusive and hierarchical . . . . [This] requires a shift to the rhetoric of communion, in which, she says, we generally conduct our ordinary affairs already: "Would you like half my sandwich? May I please have a glass of water?" . . . These are commonplaces at the personal level. Why should these analogues sound weird at the global level? If we used them often enough, they wouldn't (1993, 190).

A simple apology can work wonders. I discovered this to my shock when a doctor in a medical malpractice case apologized to a woman who had been grievously injured, and she dropped her lawsuit.

7. Being open to new formats. We can change the mental space and the physical place in which we conduct our discourses. Formal argument employs a context that is primarily that of Wilber's right hand: a rational, empirical, structured universe. The setting is often an office or conference room; the structure is often introduction, position, negotiation, resolution; the content is usually factual; the participants are often representatives, not the real parties in interest; the involvement is usually mental and verbal. Issues of values and morals are usually ignored, logos dominates both pathos and ethos,[5] and the emphasis is on past happenings leading to a present resolution that locks in the future.

Integral discourse, however, can occur anywhere. The place depends upon who is involved (children, the handicapped, etc.) and what will be done (body work, for example). The structure is not preset except that usually there are a few ground rules relating to civillity. The focus is on the future. The

[5] When emotions, body sensations, value, and morals are brought in, it is usually after they have been reduced to a rational container (ie words, numbers).

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participants are the real parties in interest with their hopes, dreams, fears, and anger; the buffer of representation is not necessary since objectivity and passionless exchange is not highly valued.

C. Changing the way we write

Particularly in writing is integral discourse viable. The verbal one-upmanship of debate, the rapidfire response to an annoying comment, the errors born of the lack of opportunity to reflect in oral exchange are not present. People have time to digest the words, to take in the whole rather than picking at one point, to really consider another point of view. Writing, as many have noted, allows for higher level thinking. We can take advantage of this medium to get beyond the limitations of oral debate, to take a meta-perspective, to include more than two points of view, to speak of our own biases and inclinations, to become aware of emotions, to think of where we might be wrong or be missing something, to play with a variety of approaches.

1. We can change the form as well as the content of our writing. "[R]hetorical forms matter because they are not just containers; they shape as well as convey ideas" (Teich, 94). Lanham points out that "The classical oration structure . . . can offer a form for argument but not for compromise. How many compromises, it is then reasonable to ask, have been hindered by the *form*?" (174).

There are multiple forms available to us. Young, Becker and Pike find more relevance in "serious popular songs, group discussions, or articles written as tentative contributions to a continuing discussion within a large community of scholars" (9) than in the standard essay. Says Corder, "[S]ome of us have restricted the range of rhetoric to only one kind of discourse, argumentation. That will have to change" (1985, 164). He suggests we learn about the interplay of the visual and the verbal and recognize a rhetoric of painting, biology, of any form of expression. Jameson says that the emotional intensities of the postmodern world may best be expressed in schizophrenic or drug language: "The frequent breaks become the meaning itself,

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diminishing the content" (Faigley, 205).

We can use poetry or literature or drama to illuminate conflict. Poetry can capture what is often inexpressible in prose. Theater *is* conflict. Crosswhite speaks of the "capacity of fiction and film to elaborate parallel lines of argumentation without resolution" (99). Kidder says, "We often find we understand . . . otherness better through art than diplomacy, literature than politics, feature writing than news reporting, movies than statistics, music than lectures" (Kidder, 202).

In Slaughterhouse 5, Kurt Vonnegut imagines a kind of writing by the "Tralfamadorians" that is composed of symbols, all intended to be read together in a "burst of understanding." We can use hypertext which allows us to "write in the margins," elaborating on what has been written, expanding a text from within rather than adding linearly to it at the end. This is similar to the feminine text that starts on "all sides at once" (Mairs, 85).

2. We can make our writing more vivid. Whitburn calls for "vivid appeals to the sense and subtle appeals to the emotions" (226) instead of boring impersonal prose. Says Spence, "words that do not create images should be discarded. Words that have no intrinsic emotional or visual content ought to be avoided. Words that are directed to the sterile intellectual head-place should be abandoned. Use simple words, words that *create pictures* and *action* and that *generate feeling.*"(104). Maslow comments that "At higher levels communication tends to become 'poetic, mythical and rhapsodic. . .'" (104) (cf. some of Wilber's writing).

3. We can change the way we report on events. Tannen notes that "The journalistic culture . . . emphasize[s] conflict and dissent rather than clarification of alternatives and the search for consensus" (34). However, some journalists are experimenting with efforts to reduce antagonism. Instead of seeking the sensational by pressing interviewees to take a stance opposite to one that has been raised by another, they are encouraging participants and viewers/readers alike to see the events reported on as part of a larger whole, to bring potential opponents together, to suggest ways in which they may be similar rather than different (Hannes Siebert, Capetown, South Africa, March 1995, personal communication).

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4. We can invite other voices to speak in our writing. We can intersperse our own ideas with the ideas of others, acknowledging where others have contributed to our thinking, adding to what others have said rather than trying to critique it.

D. Exploring nonlinguistic ways of relating

Positional discourse is highly dependent upon, even obsessed with, language. Integral discourse, however, may eschew language altogether.

1. Littlejohn speaks of nondiscursive symbols: "Some of the most important human experiences are emotional and are best communicated through forms such as worship, art and music" (1978, 71). Shotter says we need to understand "oral, preliterate . . . non-conceptual, non-logical, poetic, rhetorical forms of communication" (63). Says Crosswhite, "There is no reason that inquiry cannot take visual and auditory and tactile forms" (266).

2. We can consider women's experience. "Women's experience includes a sense of interdependence and relationship, the legitimacy of emotionality, fusion of public and private realms of experience, egalitarian values, concern for process over product, and openness to multiple ways of seeing and doing" (Littlejohn, 1978, 238). He comments that often there is not a word for a feminine experience, that women may feel constrained by language and communication rules (240).

3. We can dance" with one another. Crum advocates skills derived from the martial arts: extending *ki* to increase connectedness, deflecting an attack, even using the power of an adversary's assault (97). Riskin says:

> do not push back, sidestep. . . . look behind their position (treat it as an option, don't accept or reject) . . . ask how it addresses the problem . . . don't defend, invite criticism and advice . . . recast an attack on you as an attack on the problem . . . ask questions and pause. . . use silence (72-75).

4 . We can use our bodies both internally and externally. We can do a body scan to find the place in our bodies where the conflict resides. We can use the body to express ourselves by acting out a conflict that we are incapable of expressing verbally.

The following story exemplifies the power of this technique. A mediator, Patricia Deer, tells of an experience in Cyprus during the civil war

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between the Turks and the Greeks. The incident involved an ongoing upset between two Turkish Cypriots. Zehra[6] was impulsive and emotional; Guldem was strong-willed and unemotional. The relationship was explosive. Deer suggested a nonverbal enactment of the dynamics in their relationship, asking each of them to make a silent motion picture of how they experienced their relationship with each other.

Zehra told Guldem to punch her in the stomach. As Guldem pantomimed a punch, she was amazed to realize how much impact she had on Zehra. Then Guldem told Zehra to knock her knees out from behind. Zehra (who believed she was the innocent victim) was amazed that she had any impact on the apparently impervious Guldem. Then to demonstrate what they wanted their relationship to be, Guldem put her arm around Zehra's shoulders and they marched in step across the room like a powerful force. Says Deer, "When they marched back to me with their arms around each other, they were both crying" (personal communication, December, 1998).

5. Boal has harnessed the power of theater to help us handle our conflicts. Says Boal, "Observing itself, the human being perceives what it is, discovers what it is not and imagines what it could become" (13). He offers a system of physical exercises, aesthetic games, image techniques, and special improvisations which turn the theatre into "an effective tool for the comprehension of social and personal problems and the search for their solutions" (14).

6. We can engage in a variety of spiritual practices to change our attitude, get in touch with our "higher" wisdom, and effect change at the level of the underlying order. Meditation can bring us to higher states of consciousness, help us to access wisdom we might otherwise not reach. Breton notes that psychologist Win Wenger uses free imaging to break deadlocks in negotiating. "In meditative states, their imaging patterns are amazingly similar and open to common resolutions. . . . The trick for Wenger lies in persuading their conscious minds to back off from polarized positions and to be guided by their own intuitions of common ground" (291). Truth is

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6 the names have been changed

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"known" rather than "arrived at" or "figured out."

Extending *chi* is a way of shifting the environment, bringing oneself closer to others. Says Crum, "By extending *ki* or increasing connectedness, we take the most important first step toward the resolution of any conflict because we are creating and nurturing an environment of acceptance, compassion, and trust. It is in this environment that we deeply touch the lives of others" (97, italics his). Tonglen is a Buddhist practice that involves breathing in the pain of another and breathing out healing.

Centering can help us to remain in our "best" selves when we are involved in a conflict, whether as manager or participant. Centering means that we focus our attention in the center of ourselves, sink down into our being. "Being centered," says Crum,

> - allows you to be more authentic, sensitive, and open;
> - produces emotional and physical stability;
> - has a positive effect on relationships and the surrounding environment;
> - has great impact in developing trust;
> - enables you to appreciate the nature of conflict;
> - brings you to a point of clarity, the point of power . . . (83)

7. We can play. We can use humor, surprise, or zaniness to shift a mood, to capture an idea, to paint a picture. We can play with words, make jokes, find double meanings, look for symbols and metaphors. Maslow says that the most childlike people are often the most mature. They see work and play as one (in Small, Transformers, 54).

> [P]layfulness is an integrator, as beauty is, or love, or the creative intellect. This is in the sense that it is a resolver of dichotomies, a solution to many insoluble problems. It is one good solution of the human situation, teaching us that one way of solving a problem is to be amused by it" (106).

We can open ourselves to unpopular, even bizarre ways of looking at a conflict. Most people are unwilling to look foolish and so they avoid presenting unusual, half-baked, tentative, or playful ideas. Integral discourse would permit the entry of *any* ideas into the discussion. Once we cease to speak from positions (which imply a consequent action), we can be free to expand our discussions to include ideas that are "off the wall" and/or unacceptable to large numbers of people. Once we can say anything, we

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greatly expand creativity. Whether any one idea is correct or not is not what matters; what matters is whether it unlocks an impasse, gets us past conventional thinking, or sparks ideas in the minds of others.

E. Using social institutions to support cooperative conflict management

Our institutions and social practices are designed to support the conflict management behavior of earlier discourses: courts of law follow the authority model, business negotiations follow the positional model. If we are to practice integral discourse we will need support from our institutions and cultural practices. Say Bush and Folger, "Social institutions therefore must do more than be facilitative and protective, . . . they also play what could be called a supportive and educative role" (244).

What kind of education and support they offer depends on society's view of reality and the values that derive from that view of reality. In the past, American society has valued the model of the "rational man," an objective, detached (male) observer who makes decisions primarily on utilitarian grounds using empirical evidence. Reality in this view is "out there," can be discovered, can be analyzed by looking at its parts, and can be described to another rational being. Education under this view of reality has revolved around creating analytical, logical human beings who are capable of discovery, analysis, and description using objective methods and language who support one another in being analytical and logical. While it is still very popular, this model has come under considerable criticism in recent years as being Eurocentric, patriarchal, and devoid of feelings and values.

A competing model of reality and one that is gaining increasing acceptance is the social constructionist model. Under this model reality is constructed by persons in conversation, by selves who both form our world and are formed by it. Yet another model is the one in which humans are infused with divinity and able to mine profound wisdom themselves. Reliance on these models would require a kind of education that emphasized collaboration and communication and more attention to our inner processes.

F. Communicating across developmental levels.

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If we are all at different levels of development with different worldviews and different capacities and different needs, how can we communicate with each other? How many of our conflicts are caused by the "deer in the headlights" phenomenon that Wilber claims occurs when people at higher levels try to communicate their understandings to those at lower levels.

Obviously, when a two-year-old sticks a fork in a socket we can't expect him to engage in a reasoned discussion with us about why that is or is not a good idea; physically removing the child from the area of the socket and the fork from the child makes much more sense. Similarly, if someone believes that emotion should be excluded from conflict and that all conflicts have two sides, then she won't be interested in a more commodious discourse.

The more we evolve on this planet, the more this kind of disparity becomes a problem. Says Wilber, *"the greater the depth of transcendence, the greater the burden of inclusion . . .* even with a new and higher worldspace available, every human being still has to *start its own development at square 1."* (1996, 325 - 326, italics his). Not only is there a gap between people, but there is an internal gap as well, "the gap between the individual's main self or center of gravity and the 'small selves' that remain dissociated and excluded. The internal . . . civil war drives the individual bonkers" (327).

While I do not have any ready answer for this disjunction, whether internal or external, there are some things we can do. The most obvious answer is to "grow" ourselves and others to higher stages. The more we develop, the more options that are open to us. Those who have moved into the higher stages can help educate others.

But this is a long term answer; in the meantime, there are conflicts we have to deal with. The first step, of course, is to approach people in conflict where they are. Having some idea where that might be and what strategies might be most effective for each stage can help us to do that. The wrong strategy can backfire as, for example, when an outside authority hands down a decision to parties who want control of their own agreements and who are capable of working with one another, or when two people who are prepared

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to harm one another physically are left alone with with an admonition to follow a code of conduct. Similarly, while for those at verbal stages experience may be organized via narrative (Cobb, 50) and thus reframable via narrative, discussion may not be appropriate for those at the physical or the transcendent stages. Thus, knowing of the different discourses in which people operate and being able to spot typical behavior of a stage would seem useful.

The person or persons responsible for working with those in conflict thus might ask the following questions:

1. What do the issues tell us about the possible stage(s) in which this conflict is located? Are they matters of authority, of reason, of emotion?

2. What is the remembered past and the expected future of the participants? is there an ongoing relationship? are the parties heavily invested emotionally? are they locked into interpretations of the past? projections of the future?

3. What do the methods that the parties have employed so far tell us about the stage(s) in which they are most comfortable operating? have they used verbal attacks? resorted to authorities? made efforts at mutual understanding?

4. Based on what we know of them, is it likely that they will be interested in learning about other approaches to conflict? Are there ways we might present alternatives so that they will be understood and accepted? What is the next level "up"?

5. What type of outcome are the parties hoping for? annihilation of the other? a quick settlement? growth and transformation? Can the conflict be moved to a level at which a solution is possible?

6. What are the options available? is there an authority that speaks to this matter? would it be acceptable? is mediation, arbitration, or the legal system available or acceptable to the parties? do the resources and time available permit therapy?

Answering these questions and others like them allows one to consider many more variables than simply what type of resolution to seek; they also help the conflict manager to know whether a problem-solving or

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transformative approach would be most valuable, whether exploration of emotions would be tolerated or useful, whether the parties are at the same level, whether externally imposed or mutually worked out solutions would be more likely to be successful, etc. Many of those who are successful at handling conflict doubtless consider and apply these questions unconsciously, but they can be made conscious and thus available to others.

And, of course, no one is wholly in one stage at any one time. People may find that their attitudes and behavior are spread across two or more stages and/or they may act out of different stages in different circumstances. This is, says Loevinger, "the problem Piaget has termed *decalage*, the tendency for a person to be at different stages with respect to different issues or even at different moments" (199, italics hers). Wilber says that we tend to have a "center of gravity" (1996, 139) around one stage, but are not necessarily wholly within in.

If we are threatened by behavior from someone acting out of a lower level, then we need to set boundaries, find ways to protect ourselves. But this does not need to mean that we ourselves act out of those stages. It is possible to physically restrain a child, for example, without being a child, without becoming dominated by our physical self. It is possible to issue orders and still maintain the perspective of a higher level. It is possible to negotiate and still maintain a compassionate attitude.

It is interesting to note that for each stage, the stage above could in some ways "solve" the insoluble problems of the conflict in which people find themselves. Passion/need offers a way of regulating physical behavior, by, for example, making physically weaker parties seem sympathetic and thus protecting them from the bullying of the more powerful. Rules serve to contain passion. Conflict among authorities and rules can be handled with reason. The dryness and lack of mercy inherent in reason can be overcome with the empathy of the integrative stage.

If we have the opportunity to teach, we can try to help students develop. We can also use these ideas to help us develop ourselves and our teaching methods. In particular:

1. We can use the four quadrant model to assess our syllabus. Is there

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an aspect of the subject that we have ignored and should it be included? If we are teaching primarily out of one quadrant, should students be alerted to that fact?

2. We can model new ways of relating around conflict What do we do when confronted with multiple perspectives? How do we manage contradiction and paradox? What approach(es) do we take when we write? How do we deal with classroom conflict? What would happen if we changed our ways of knowing and interacting?

3. We can use the developmental models to determine at which level we are teaching and whether or not that level is appropriate for our particular students. Are we teaching rote learning to students who are capable of higher level thinking? Are we expecting too much of students who cannot yet take a perspective other than their own?

4. If we can identify where our students are, we can consider what combination of challenge and support they need to progress. We can devise exercises to teach them to take a wider perspective, develop a higher level of cognitive understanding, practice a more integrative approach to the subject.

5. We can facilitate the taking of multiple perspectives, point out how internal conflicts can affect external ones discourse. We can suggest ways to expand our thinking: How might somatic, emotional, social, intuitive information expand our understanding of the subject?

6. If we teach writing, we can consider whether our students are capable of learning to write a formal argument. For advanced students, we can consider offering ways of writing around conflict that go beyond argument such as Rogerian argument or Lynch's inquiry. We can teach the difference between polemic, argument, and integral discourse.

7. If we teach in areas related to conflict management, we can teach the techniques of mediation such as reframing, reality testing, empowerment and recognition, etc.

8. We can directly teach Wilber's developmental models and four quadrant philosophy so that students can apply them to various aspects of their learning and their lives outside the classroom.

While it would seem that moving people "up" the stages is beneficial,

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to move a conflict to a higher stage may not be the best strategy. And sometimes, moving to a "lower" level can reveal solutions that may have been missed. For example, stalemate in a contractual dispute might be resolved if the parties were encouraged to reveal their emotional investment or the rules by which they thought they were to live; the shock of a physical encounter could cause parties in an emotional dispute to recognize with what intensity one of the parties holds her views. Each stage has its value. The point is learning to choose from among them, and this means having them all available to us.

If we want to communicate across the levels, we need to find ways to bridge the gaps between us. Young, Becker, and Pike quote Malcolm X: "If he only understands the language of a rifle, get a rifle. If he only understands the language of a rope, get a rope. But don't waste time talking the wrong language to a man if you really want to communicate with him" (181). Their "Maxim 5" says that "Change between units can occur only over a bridge of shared features" (172). Some bridges they suggest are to give examples so as to make new concepts clear, to look for shared attitudes and values, to be aware of social roles and the kind of interchanges they might promote (such as student/teacher or employer/employee.

Other bridges that we can use are nonverbal forms of communication. A hug or a simple glance can convey volumes. Color can affect mood. Art and music are ways to convey feelings and concepts without getting mired in the particularities of language. Fiction, drama, and poetry can convey our experience, can show us what might happen if we pursued a certain course, can give us a feel for what others in the dispute might be feeling and thinking. These methods have barely been explored in the context of conflict management.

And maybe the man with the rifle is not so rigid as we make him out to be. Maybe from time to time he can move out of his usual attitude and try something else. If prisoners can learn to meditate and children can learn to mediate, maybe the physically oriented can learn behaviors from other stages. Even if they can't shift to another worldview on a permanent basis, they may be able to do so for a period of time. If Kornfield is right that it is not the

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be able to do so for a period of time. If Kornfield is right that it is not the person who is enlightened but the activity (270), then there is always hope that we may participate in enlightened conflict management practices.

There is a Japanese story of a sumo wrestler who was drunk and threatening all the passengers on a subway train with violence. Everyone was huddling in terror, except for a little old man who, apparently unafraid, approached him with an offer of a cup of sake and began to talk to him about the way he was feeling. In the end, the sumo wrestler, whose wife had just left him, broke down and wept on the little old man's lap. This is, to me, an example of how to shift someone from a physical to an emotional discourse.

This story also illustrates another important principle: that those at higher stages bear the burden of compassionately understanding - and educating - those at lower levels. As Wilber points out, the increasing depth of society (the extent to which it moves to higher and higher stages) puts a tremendous burden on that society to heal those left behind. For example, those who are "stuck" in the role/rule stage (a huge population according to Kegan (197)) cannot understand the "modern" rational world, much less celebrate an integrative perspective. Who will help them to do this, or failing to do so, who will help them live in a world that seems so out of control?

At the same time, those at higher stages need to be humble about their own failings. Wilber says there are pathologies at every stage. Maslow says the self-actualized may, because of their aperspectivity, be indecisive; because of their sense that everyone can create his own life, be less likely to help others; because of their acceptance of the world as it is, be fatalistic or fail to know when righteous indignation and anger are needed. They may also make others feel they can't live up to the perfection that they are (110).

And maybe the statistics that show such limited numbers of people in higher stages are wrong. Breton cites a study done by the Fetzer Institute/ Noetic Sciences showing that

> 45 million adults, roughly 24 percent of the adult population, have adopted "new paradigm" values and ideas. These new-paradigm values include altruism, creativity, tolerance, openness, interest in spiritual development and higher consciousness, desire for positive cultural change, feminism and racial equality,

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> optimism about the future, preference for holistic health care, environmental and social concern, drives for self-expression and self-actualization (299).

The fact that we don't practice these values all the time does not mean we are not capable of doing so if we have the right kind of environment and enough encouagement. Says Maslow,

> Except for their outgoing spirit and deep genuineness, most integrated persons do not stand out in any way. There are no requirements for attaining integrated existence other than having an ego that, strong in itself, is able to submit itself to the Ground. Given that this is the only prerequisite, it is easy to see that integration, although rare and and of the highest excellence, is a developmental stage open to humanity at large (233).

F. Loving: seeing self and other as one.

The final answer to multi-level communication probably lies in the "awakened heart," a term used by Wilber (lecture, Chicago, 4/98). He says "the whole Kosmos is contained in the Heart" (1997, 309). Corder says, "Rhetoric is love . . . creating a world full of space and time that will hold our diversities" (1985, 31). Crum comments, "When we understand that negativity and contraction from another are simply inappropriate ways of crying out for love and support, it is far easier to extend *ki* and exhibit compassion for him" (107). Says Spence, "The magic of the Magical Argument bursts forth from the same place in us in which the argument is *heard* by them, from the same place from which the decision of the *Other*, for or against our arguments, is always made. . . . Why would we choose to speak to the *Other* in *head language* when the *Other*'s decision is always made out of the *heart zone.*" (188). Says Mindell, "Managed with love, things can change quickly" (240).

Perhaps this is what Plato is getting at in the Phaedrus. Says Walter Hamilton in the introduction to the Penguin Classic version of this work,

> Plato finds in the emotion of love directed aright the key to the whole quest of the philosopher; truth is to be attained by a partnership of two like-minded people, based perhaps in the first instance on physical attraction, but soon leaving this behind in the common pursuit of the beauty not of this world which is ultimately to be identified with the Form of Good, and which gives meaning and coherence to the whole of reality (Phaedrus, 8).

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Chapter 9. Conclusion: Some Examples and a Summary.

Upon this gifted age, in its dark hour,
Rains from the sky a meteoric shower
Of facts . . . They lie unquestioned,
uncombined.
Wisdom enough to leech us of our ill
Is Daily spun, but there exists no loom
To weave it into fabric . . . .

Edna St. Vincent Millay

Our age is characterized by a veritable deluge of information. We are drowned in facts, in perspectives, in possibilities; even that most empirical of our methodologies, science, has been exposed as perspectival. Our conflicts grow more intractable as the globe breaks into smaller and smaller units of ethnicity, religion, ideology, etc. We hunger for ways to make sense of it all, to organize our thinking and the paper that piles up around us as a visible reminder of this chaos. If we teach, we wonder how to prepare our students for the ever increasing number of perspectives with which they will have to deal. We seek a container in which to hold what Geertz has called "a disorderly crowd of not wholly commensurable visions" (161).

Deconstructionists deal with this morass of perspectives by wallowing in it. They tell us there is no way out, that the shifting sands of relativity give us no place to stand, that the unending tension between incompatible basic assumptions, mutually incomprehensible beliefs, and fierce ethnicity within a global context of despair render us helpless.

However, there are *re*constructionists who are pointing the way to more positive ways of dealing with conflict. Where positional stances fail to satisfy, integral ones may serve as a loom upon which we can weave a host of new practices. Particularly in the area of conflict management, integral discourse and the models upon which it depends can offer us a template for understanding and managing our differences. In this chapter, I want to look at some specific ways these ideas help us work with conflict

The chart on the following page lists the key practices that make up the

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emerging integral discourse: practices that can help us to enlarge the context, grow ourselves, and change how we interact. Using all or any of them can move us beyond the limitations of positional discourse. The chart can also serve as a checklist to use when we are considering a particular issue. I will be referring to this chart in my discussion of the examples.

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Some Practices of Integral Discourse

A. Enlarging the content/ensuring that we consider multiple perspectives. Have we

1. used Wilber's four quadrant model to determine whether or not we have looked at individual and collective, subjective and objective sources of information?
2. expanded the conflict in terms of
    a. time?
    b. participants?
    c. ways of knowing?
3. searched out marginal perspectives?
4. used Elbow's believing game?
5. studied other disciplines/cultures to see if there are useful analogies or models?
6. resisted premature closure?

B. Growing ourselves. Have we

1. examined our attitudes around conflict?
2. tried to transform ourselves using the aid of a therapist, coach, support group, or contemplative practice?
3. developed skill at
    a. reflective thinking?
    b. listening?
    c. centering?
    d. bodily/emotional/social/intuitive/energeticawareness?
    e. perspective shifting/reframing?

C. Relating differently. Have we tried

1. finding a larger container?
2. building bridges?
3. including marginal parties/dealing with the real parties in interest?
4. changing our metaphors?
5. changing the way we communicate? by
    a. identifying with the other?
    b. using techniques drawn from therapy and mediation: empowering and recognizing, stroking, acknowledging emotion, giraffe language, the feminine conversational style, future questioning, circular questioning, responding, reality checking, empathy?
    d. responding to or building on what others have said instead of critiquing it?
    e. avoiding positions, expressing interests
6. changing the way we write? Have we tried
    a. self-revelation/authorial presence?
    b. agonistic inquiry?
    c. Rogerian argument?
    d. collaborative writing, hypertext, open-ended writing, aperspectival or Tralfamadorian texts?
7. different conflict management practices such as
    a. mediation/transformative mediation?
    b. Bohmian dialogue?
    c. problem solving?
    d. tonglen?
    e. dramatization?
    f. poetic or visual imagery, music, color?
    f. large group work?
8. taking risks?
9. teaching others?
10. changing our institutions?

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Some Examples of Integral Discourse

Bohm says, "There may be no pat political answer to the world's problems. However, the important point is not the answer - just as in a dialogue, the important point is not the particular opinions - but rather the softening up, the opening up of the mind, and looking at all the opinions" (46). The following are examples of this kind of opening. They represent practices that can soften us, lead us into new ways of thinking and acting that do not so much solve our problems as dissolve them.

First, there are books, movies, plays, poetry that present different perspectives without arguing (either overtly or covertly) for any one of them. Instead, they leave the reader to take them in and integrate them. An example from the field of rhetoric is The Presence of Others, a composition text put together by Andrea Lunsford and John Ruszkiewicz. The editors who differ widely in their views and the essays included in the book reflect this difference. In the preface they say, "disagreement, conflict, and agonism are not guiding principles of this book. It is not a tennis match of ideas, one that will yield winners and losers. Rather, we are interested in how we all come to know and to take positions on various issues, how to nurture open and realistic exchanges of ideas. . . . *The Presence of Others* aims to open and sustain an animated conversation . . . to point up the ways in which all these voices speak from particular perspectives . . ." (vi).

The movie Rashomon depicts an alleged rape in three parts: from the point of view of the woman, her husband, and the rapist. The viewer does not know (ever) whether she cheated on her husband with her lover, whether she was raped, or even whether a rape happened at all. All the possibilities remain open.

Wilber has an article called "How Big is Our Umbrella" in the Winter 1996 issue of Noetic Sciences Magazine. In this article he lays out the multiple schools of consciousness studies which he says are "often opposed, contradictory, and dramatically conflicting." However he calls each one "significant," and "profoundly important," and claims that "each deserves continued and vigorous research and development" (16). Instead of having them compete with one another, a truly integral study, he says, would

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include them all.

All of these works tell us that we do not *have* to pick a position, that wrongness and rightness are not the most significant aspect of something, that context or time or viewing point will shift the way we see and think. We accept this kind of integrative work in art: Picasso painted women from different perspectives all in the same painting; Bach interweaves multiple melodies in one piece. Immersing ourselves in an integrative model in other fields may help us to leap to seeing and understanding in the gestalts of the vision-logic stage.

Some integral institutions and practices act as containers that allow different worldviews to coexist. Democratic government is one that is right under our noses. The U. S. Constitution maintains a distinction between states and the federal government while combining them into one country. It has proved amazingly resilient in allowing for enormous change. Mediation holds conflicting parties together while allow them to express their differences. It welcomes the whole story as relevant. The recent economic integration of Europe is an excellent example of how a larger common interest can do much to erase age-old hatreds and divisions.

These containers allow us to continue the conversation, to build bridges, to accept multiple perspectives without having to choose among them, to grow and change, to include marginal perspectives and marginal parties, to explore and inquire, to believe and doubt, to listen and reflect.

There are efforts by many today to write in a way that is not positional. Lamb applauds an article about homosexuality by Abbot Andrew of the Episcopal Church which broadens the context, avoids an explicit position, and demonstrates a commitment to continuing the conversation (267). Some ways of writing and being can literally shift the way we think. We are taken out of dichotomous thinking and into a space "above the line." Thich Nhat Hanh's poem (page 13) helps us to hold all of humanity within us. Carolyn Myss's article on betrayal (see Appendix E) is a radically different view of an age old experience.

Nonlinguistic experience can also take us out of our usual way of being. Crum's "Aiki Approach" uses the power of energy fields. My own

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experience with bodily knowing recounted earlier provided me with this kind of shock.

Some people offer us models of what we might grow into. In South Africa, Nelson Mandela managed to overcome years of brutal treatment and imprisonment to offer forgiveness and compassion. Gandhi grew himself from a shy average boy into a towering representative of nonviolence. He practiced *satyagraha*, a method for resolving conflict that transforms the parties with sympathy and truth. It "seeks to liquidate antagonisms but not the antagonists themselves" (Easwaren, 157).

Irene Laure, Head of the Women's Socialist Party in France, whose family was persecuted by the Germans in WWII persisted in a virulent hatred of Germans. When she participated in the reconciliation meetings held in Switzerland in order to heal the wounds of war, she would leave when a German got up to speak. One day, a German asked her if she could forgive them. Shocked, she went into seclusion for three days and emerged to ask *them* forgiveness for her hatred. She then spoke all over Germany at labor unions and political gatherings about her experience, asking for forgiveness from everyone.

Inspirational stories of this kind raise our group consciousness, enable us to see that living this way is possible, and shift the consensus about how we might be able to interact with one another.

The field of composition is filled with arguments about whether one focuses on process or product, literature or research skills, grammar or expression. Taking an integral view of this dispute would allow us to acknowledge that all of these aspects of writing are important. Making explicit the four quadrant model and showing how the various practices fit in different quadrants might encourage teachers to expand the content of their classes or to specify more clearly what it is they are teaching. If students knew that a particular class focused on power and politics as they relate to language, another on personal expression, and yet another on research skills and grammar, they would know that no one of them was the "whole" of composition and that exploring each of them might be useful.

Teachers could also design a curriculum with developmental levels in

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mind. We could, perhaps, teach writing with an emphasis on narrative and process for those at the discourse of emotionality, with a focus on structure and evidentiary support for those at the discourse of authority, with with investigation of perspectives for those who can handle an argument.

For students who can handle integral discourse, we could use many of the practices I have collected here. We could experiment with Rogerian argument, Elbow's believing game, Senge's advocacy and inquiry, Lynch's exploratory essays, or Hill's "spatialized, painterly kind of writing," the superimposing of one scene on another (212). We could incorporate models from other media like theater and music. We could have students experiment with voice dialogue and contemplative practices, with dramatization, and with Penn's circular questions so as to help them look at conflict differently. We could develop exercises that promoted perspective shifting and reframing.

At these higher levels, students could learn how their internal processes affect their work; how inner conflicts parallel outer. They could learn to express preferences rather than demands and interests rather than positions. We could suggest they investigate conflict as a source of growth. We could design classes around listening, around somatics, around intuition. Instead of teaching writing as doing battle, we could teach it as the planting of seeds (putting out ideas and hoping they flower) or flowing along a river (joining a larger debate that has been in process and will continue on beyond them).

We could have them seek out larger containers for a dispute. For example, instead of taking a position for or against capital punishment, they could write about how various views on capital punishment reflect attitudes on the value of life. They could build bridges by getting to know someone who took an opposite position and trying to find points of connection. They could write about marginal parties like the families of the felon; they could expand the time by considering the childhood and old age of the felon.

They could join with others in trying collaborative writing and hypertext or have a large group encounter using some of the techniques of Wiesbord or Isaacs or Mindell. They could look at the influence of our

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institutions and our customs on the way conflict is approached; they could suggest ways to change those institutions and customs. If they treated conflicts as offering us an opportunity to really examine our culture and institutions, to change our systems, and to develop institutions with compassion and respect for those they serve, they might find potentials in our society that we barely recognize today.

They could try writing in such a way as to empower another point of view than their own. They could acknowledge emotion, try responding instead of refuting, build on what others have said, put out their biases and prejudices.

We need to offer new ways of handling conflict that have real potential for solving our problems. Adding these approaches to our curricula as many are already doing - *and* making it clear why we are doing it - could equip the next generation to better handle the conflicts it will face. Says Crum, "To be able to let go of our culture's fixation on the forceful, adversarial approach (the war state) as the only method appropriate during a crisis requires that people experience alternatives that contain great power and vitality" (90). Many of these methods do have that kind of power and vitality.

Summary

It is clear that a new discourse is emerging that goes beyond argument in dealing with conflict. The pieces of this discourse are lying about in a wide variety of fields. *Composition studies and rhetoric* offer us Rogerian argument, inquiry, collaborative writing, hypertext, the believing game, dialogue, and feminist approaches. *Psychology* offers us stage development and its collateral worldviews, therapy for self-development, the concept of inner conflicts, new techniques such as future vision and circular questioning, and many other ways of working with differences, changing perspectives and contexts, etc. Ken Wilber's *vision-logic stage*, the stage unites the four quadrants and the several levels of development. The *theater* offers us the perspective shifting techniques of role-playing and an example of what it means to observe the self. *Specialists in conflict resolution* have expanded our thinking about how to deal with conflict by drawing from the

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martial arts and spiritual approaches and by using mediation and other alternative dispute resolution practices. *Somatics* teaches us to locate conflict in places other than the head and to enlarge our concept of what our "self" is. *Philosophy* causes us to think about how we know and what it means to take a position. Deconstruction, for example, gives us the concept of sliding contexts and reduces our fixation on ideas of certainty and objectivity. *Spiritual writings and the literature of personal growth* offer us the concept of nonduality, a reality in which values, feelings, and intuition are valued, and a focus on relationship.

Integrating multiple perspectives involves neither assimilation nor compromise. It is not an issue of who should give in and to what extent, but of how we might use everything. There is no dominant viewpoint which welcomes others into the fold. Integral discourse is not eclecticism, a picking and choosing among perspectives, but the creation of a larger whole in which all the fragments can find a home.

Schmookler says,

> The idea that "the truth lies between the extremes" would be the cliche it appears to be if it meant only the need for a mechanical compromise, a splitting of the difference. But the real truth lies not between but above the extremes . . . The best resolution of our culture war is not to be found through our present mode of conflict. Neither is it to be found in mere centrist political compromise. The real challenge is for both sides to work together toward an integration at that higher level where opposites no longer seem so irrevocably opposed, where the expression of our liberty and the requirements of our civilized order achieve a fuller harmony (2).

At this level, the problem of self and other is finally resolved. In fact, all of Kidder's four dilemmas disappear; real compassion obviates the need for justice, the self and other become one, short and long-term lose their significance in light of revised attitudes toward time, and, in a world without fear, honesty and loyalty are no longer antithetical. That leaves us with compassion and communion in the eternal now: another name for love. Says Kidder, "I can imagine a world so full of love that justice, as we now know it, would no longer be necessary. But I cannot imagine a world so full of justice that there would no longer be any need for love. Given only one

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choice, I would take love" (220). Love that is not tied to perspective - that is, love that does not depend on one's opinion as to whether or not the recipient is worthy of it -transcends these dilemmas.

Says Havel,

> "in today's multicultural world, the truly reliable path to coexistence, to peaceful coexistence and creative cooperation, must start from what is at the root of all cultures and what lies infinitely deeper in human hearts and minds than political opinion, convictions, antipathies, or sympathies - it must be rooted in transcendence:
>
> - Transcendence as a hand reached out to those close to us, to foreigners, to the human community, to all living creatures, to nature, to the universe.
>
> - Transcendence as a deeply and joyously experienced need to be in harmony even with what we ourselves are not, what we do not understand, what seems distanct form us in time and space, but with which we are nevertheless mysteriously linked because, together with us, all this constitutes a single world.
>
> - Transcendence as the only real alternative to extinction" (49).

There are signs that this kind of transcendence is emerging. Kegan says,

> "Those who long for more fifth order consciousness, for the recognition of our multiple selves, for the capacity to see conflict as a signal of our overidentification with a single system, for the sense of our relationships and connections as prior to and constitutive of the individual self, for an identification with the transformative process of our being rather than the formative products of our becoming - let them take heart" (351).

Integral discourse offers us a way out of the combat of argument and the hopelessness of deconstruction. It offers us a vision as to how we might grow. It provides a container into which we can put all perspectives, all parties. Integral discourse interweaves all the individual perspectives into a beautiful tapestry, a Tralfamadorian text.

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Appendix A

The Spectrum of Development

LADDER	CLIMBER	VIEW			
Basic Structure		*Maslow (self-needs)*	*Loevinger (self-sense)*	*Kolberg (moral sense)*	
sensoriphysical	F-1		autistic		
		(physiological)	symbiotic	(premoral)	
phantasmic-emotional	F-2		beginning impulsive		0. magic wish
rep-mind	F-3	safety	impulsive	I. preconven-	1. punishment/obedience
			self-protective	tional	2. naive hedonism
rule/role mind	F-4	belongingness	conformist	II. conventional	3. approval of others
			conscientious-conformist		4. law and order
formal-reflexive	F-5	self-esteem	conscientious	III. postconven-	5. individual rights
			individualistic	tional	6. individual principles
vision-logic	F-6	self-actualization	autonomous		of conscience
			integrated		
psychic	F-7	self-transcendence			Kohlberg has suggested
					a higher, seventh stage:
subtle	F-8	self-transcendence			7. universal-spiritual
causal	F-9	self-transcendence			

FIGURE 9-3. Some examples of ladder, climber, view.

taken from A Brief History of Everything, p. 146

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Appendix B

	INTERIOR • Interpretive • Hermeneutic • Consciousness	EXTERIOR • Monological • Empirical, Positivistic • Form
INDIVIDUAL	Sigmund Freud C. G. Jung Jean Piaget Aurobindo Plotinus Gautama Buddha	B. F. Skinner John Watson John Locke Empiricism Behaviorism Physics, biology, neurology, etc.
	intentional	behavioral
	cultural	social
COLLECTIVE	Thomas Kuhn Wilhelm Dilthey Jean Gebser Max Weber Hans-Georg Gadamer	Systems Theory Talcott Parsons Auguste Comte Karl Marx Gerhard Lenski

Figure 1

The Four Quadrants
From Ken Wilber. Eye of Spirit. Boston: Shambhala, 1997.

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Appendix C. Wilber's Transpersonal Stages of Development.

The following stages come after Wilber's vision-logic stage:

The **psychic** stage is similar to Maslow's self-transcendence stage (which also encompasses the subsequent subtle and causal stages). It has less to do with psychic capacities per se than with the beginning of the transpersonal stages wherein the "individual's cognitive and perceptual capacities apparently become so pluralistic and universal that they begin to 'reach beyond' any narrow personal or individual perspectives or concerns" (Walsh and Vaughn, 116, reprint of "The Spectrum of Consciousness"). As the bodymind is increasingly brought under control, attention is freed to contemplate the transpersonal. Wilber relates this stage to the the "third eye" which is the opening to the transcendent.

One goes from worldcentric conception to worldcentric experience. These higher stages cannot be experienced rationally, but only through contemplative development (1995, 268). It is at this stage that the Witness, the Self that watches the self, appears. The Witness shines through us into the world (1995, 281). There is greater equanimity at this stage because one is no longer fully identified with the bodymind but with the Witness.

The psychic languages are the languages of vision and vibration. Experience with the kundalini force, out-of-body states, psi phenomena, felt body-sense, shamanic voyaging, chakras, auras, etc., are common. "These items are as real in the psychic worldspace as rocks are in the sensorimotor worldspace and concepts are in the mental worldspace" (1996, 208). Enneagram types begin to dissolve as do, presumably, other stylistic differences. This is the stage of the yogis (1993, 195). There may be experiences of oneness with nature, or nature mysticism. Consciousness at this stage involves a sense of a Divinity lying behind the surface that can be contacted through interior experience.

The **subtle** stage is the seat of the transpersonal archetypes (Jesus, Buddha), the Platonic Forms, subtle sounds and audible illuminations, transcendent insight and absorption (1995, 293). When the subtle emerges, the individual may regress (to the point of a schizophrenic break) to a deep structure that was traumatized and rebuild from there (1980, 157). This stage communes with a personal God. It is the stage of the saints, of deity mysticism. Both the inner and the outer world come to

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look like a manifestation of Spirit; "consciousness itself starts to become luminous, light-filled, numinous . . ." (1993 195). There is not just *communion*, but *union* with Spirit.

The subtle stage languages are languages of luminosity and nonJungian archetype, of vision and vibration. There are revelations of light and sound and experiences of intuition, inspiration, rapture, compassion, love, and gratefulness (1980, 69). This and the next stage are the stages of soul (1993, 187).

The **causal** stage is the unmanifest source or transcendental ground of all the lesser structures. There is a radically perfect integration of all prior levels (1980, 74). This is the stage not of a personal God but of a formless godhead, of the Overmind, the Self, cosmic perception, unlimited consciousness of unity (Walsh and Vaughn, 177). Soul and God are transcended in the prior identity of pure formless awareness; the world arises as one's own being. The self with its thoughts parades in front of us, and we are a vast expanse of freedom.

> Things arise in awareness, they stay a bit and depart, they come and they go. They arise in space, they move in time. But the pure Witness does not come and go. It does not arise in space, it does not move in time. It is as it is; it is ever-present and unvarying. It is not an object out there, so it *never enters the stream of time*, of space, of birth, of death" (1996, 223, italics his).

This is the place of Atman and Brahman. One is not yet at supreme union, but at supreme identity. The world of form is seen as a dream; the supernatural and the mundane are the same. "The is the path of sages, of the wise men and women who are so wise you can't even spot it. They fit in, and go about their business" (1993, 196). This stage has been called the abyss, the Void, the Urgrund, or the Uncreate. It is the stage of the last OxHerding pictures. Major characteristics of these higher realms include trans-temporal timelessness, love, no avoidances or attachments, total acceptance, and subject-object unity (1980, 95). The languages are the languages of emptiness and dream.

Nondual/ultimate. The manifest world arises once again, but as a perfect expression of Spirit (1995, 308). There is no resistance to the present moment, no time because there is nothing to go to or away from. The separate self ceases to exist because a separate self is what prevents one from experiencing unity consciousness (1979, 157). The languages are languages of the extraordinary ordinary, the languages of just this (1995, 621-2).

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Appendix D

- The leader follows *Robert's Rules of Order*; the elder obeys the spirit.
- The leader seeks a majority; the elder stands for everyone.
- The leader sees trouble and tries to stop it; the elder sees the troublemaker as a possible teacher.
- The leader strives to be honest; the elder tries to show the truth in everything.
- The democratic leader supports democracy; the elder does this, too, but also listens to dictators and ghosts.
- Leaders try to be better at their jobs; elders try to get others to become elders.
- Leaders try to be wise; elders have no minds of their own. They follow the events of nature.
- The leader needs time to reflect; the elder takes only a moment to notice what's happening.
- The leader knows; the elder learns.
- The leader tries to act; the elder lets things be.
- The leader needs a strategy; the elder studies the moment.
- The leader follows a plan; the elder honors the direction of a mysterious and unknown river.

Taken from Arnold Mindell's Sitting in the Fire.

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APPENDIX E

thoughts on

The Joy of Betrayal

BY CAROLINE MYSS

I have yet to meet a person who has not felt betrayed. The source of the experience may be a lover, a friend, or even a company that promised you a wonderful retirement plan, only to "retire" you just in time to avoid honoring the commitment. Then, too, there is the other side of this experience: We have all also been the betrayer—through a lie, perhaps, or a broken promise, or an illicit relationship. It may well be that the only person you have betrayed is yourself.

To some extent the source is irrelevant, because in the end every betrayal leaves us with rage brewing inside.

So where exactly does "joy" come into this experience?

If betrayal is a universal, archetypal occurrence, we can elevate the pain and confusion it causes to a level beyond ordinary human reasoning. Human reasoning demands logical explanations for events. "Why me? I don't deserve this!" we wail. But we can't use human reasoning to gain insight into why we find ourselves in an act of betrayal. Rather, we must take a symbolic view of betrayal and ask, "Why does betrayal seem to be inevitable?"

Consider this perspective: As we become more conscious, we gain insight into life's many mysteries, but this does not mean that we come to fully understand them. Rather, it means that eventually we realize that all events and relationships can serve as catalysts, moving us beyond the limitations of ordinary perception to a higher level of awareness. When it comes to the greater mysteries of life, human reasoning is useless because it is rooted in the here-and-now and relies on our five senses to explain why things happen as they do. Our efforts to control our lives are bound to be defeated because we need to learn that human logic is an illusion.

This disempowerment of the reasoning mind is necessary to direct us toward learning to trust what is reasonable only to the Divine. Betrayal brilliantly serves as the master teacher, motivating us to seek a higher order. In trying to heal from a betrayal, we demand to know why it happened. But for all our questions, the answer we seek seldom surfaces, so we are forced to move beyond our questioning.

What I'm suggesting is that betrayal is a spiritual message, telling us that it is time to leave the dimension of human logic behind and move to the next plateau of consciousness, divine reasoning. Human logic might say we needed the failure, the betrayal, as a wake-up call. But the higher truth is subtle, giving us an experience that does not make sense so that we are forced to suspend the logical mind and surrender to the Divine.

Whether you are the betrayed or the betrayer, viewing betrayal from this perspective helps you understand it as necessary to the evolution of the spirit. This epiphany is the source of joy. It brings an awareness that the people, places, or events that allegedly "caused" a betrayal were no more than players in a drama to serve our growth, as we serve theirs. Knowing this may not immediately make betrayal painless. But looking at betrayal as anything less than a call to higher consciousness can keep us locked in the pain far longer.

Caroline Myss, Ph.D., is a medical intuitive and the author of Anatomy of the Spirit *(Three Rivers Press) and* Why People Don't Heal and How They Can *(Harmony).*

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