Parikshamukham

By Acharaya Vidyananda

Translation by Sarat Chandra Ghoshal

Opening Verse

From Praman (valid knowledge) knowables are rightly ascertained and from Pramanabhasa (false knowledge), the opposite happens. For this reason, I shall describe the definitions of these as laid down by authorities in a concise manner for the benefit of those who desire a short exposition (of this subject).

I.1. Pramana is valid knowledge of itself and of things not proved before.

I.2. Because Pramana enables acquiring beneficial things and having non-beneficial objects, this is nothing but knowledge.

I.3. That (viz. Pramana) being opposed to Samaropa (viz. fallacies) consists of definiteness like Anumana (inference).

I.4. Apurvartha is that which has not been ascertained.

I.5. Even an ascertained thing becomes so (i.e., unascertained) through Samaropa (fallacies).

I.6. The ascertainment of self is the illumination of it towards itself.

I.7. It becomes its own object, like other objects.

I.8. I know the pitcher through myself.

I.9. Because (in our knowledge) we have an understanding of the subject, an instrumental cause and the verb, in the same manner as the object.

I.10. Just as in the case of objects, there is understanding of itself (the knowledge) without utterance of the word (signifying it).

I.11. Who does not accept it (i.e. knowledge) to be of that manner (i.e. being the subject-matter of experience) when one admits that in Pratyaksa the object is illumined by knowledge?

I.12. Like a lamp.

I.13. The validity of Pramana rises from itself or through another (Pramana).

Section II

II.1. This (Pramana) is of two kinds.

II.2. As it is of two varieties, Pratyaksa and another (viz. Paroksa).

II.3. (The knowledge) which is clear is Pratyaksa.

II.4. Clearenss means illumination without any other intermediate knowledge or illumination in details.

II.5. (The knowledge) which is partially clear and arises from Indriya (the senses) and Anindriya (the mind) is Sanvyavaharika Pratyaksa.

II.6. The object and light is not the instrument (of Pratyaksa knowledge) as the same are capable of being ascertained as in the case of darkness.

II.7. That (is established) from universal affirmative and universal negative propositions like the knowledge of mosquito on a hair and like the knowledge of animals which see during the night.
II.8. Though it (i.e. knowledge) is not caused by it (i.e. the object), it (i.e. knowledge) illumines it (i.e. the object) like a lamp.

II.9. Surely (Pratyaksa knowledge) always illumines objects according to its power characterised by the mitigation of its hindrances.

II.10. There will be non-application in the case of senses etc. if you accept the cause as the thing perceived.

II.11. Mukhya or supreme (Pratyaksa) is clear in every respect, has no dependence on any sense and arises after destruction of all obstructions by perfection of Samagri (Dravya, Ksetra, Kala and Bhava).

II.12. Obstruction may arise in the case of a knowledge which is caused by senses and which has hindrances.

Section - III

III.1. The other variety of Praman is Paroksa.

III.2. (Paroksa) consists of varieties Smriti, Pratyabhijnana, Tarka, Anumana and Agama and is caused by Pratyaksa etc.

III.3. Remembrance (Samiti) is of the form "it is that" produced by the raising up of previous experience.

III.4. As for example, "This is Devadatta".

III.5. Pratyabhijnana is the deduction following from Darsana and Smriti e.g. this is verily that, this is like that, this is different from that, this is opposite to that etc.

III.6. As for example, this is Devadatta.

III.7. A Gavaya is like a cow.

III.8. A buffalo is different from a cow.

III.9. This is far from this.

III.10. This is a tree etc.

III.11. The knowledge of universal concomitance arising from finding and not finding, is Uha (or Tarka).

III.12. Such as, this exists when that exists and this does not exist when that does not exist.

III.13. For example, smoke exists only in fire and when there is no fire, there is no smoke.

III.14. Anumana (inference) is the knowledge of Sadhya (the major term) from Sadhna (the middle term).

III.15. Hetu (or Sadhana or Linga) is that which is fixed in concomitance with Sadhya.

III.16. Avinabhava (or Vyapti i.e. universal concomitance) is the rule of co-existence or the existence of one following the other (being related as cause and effect).

III.17. Sahabhava exists in objects co-existent or in objects Vyapya and Vyapaka.

III.18. Karma-bhava exists in cases when one follows the other or in the case of cause and effect.

III.19. This is ascertained by Tarka (Universal concomitance).

III.20. Sadhya is what is desired and what is Abadhita (i.e. opposed to Pratyaksa etc.) and what is not Siddha (already established).

III.21. The word "Asiddha" has been used in defining Sadhya so that the doubtful, the false and the not understood may become Sadhya.
III.22. The words "Ista" and "Abadhita" have been used so that what is not desired and what is opposed to Pratyaksa etc. might not be (included in the definition of) Sadhya.

III.23. In the case of an adversary, "Ista" is not required like "Asiddha".

III.24. The intention to explain exists only in the speaker.

III.25. Sadhya is a Dharma and sometimes it is Dharmi in which there is the abode of the Dharma.

III.26. This is also known as Paksa (the minor term).

III.27. Dharmi is well known.

III.28. When it (Dharmi) is established by Vikalpa, the Sadhya consists of existence and non-existence.


III.30. When (a Dharmi) is established by Pramana or by both (i.e. by Praman and Vikalpa), it is characterised by having the Dharma as Sadhya.

III.31. As for example, this place has fire; sound is transient.

III.32. In universal concomitance, the Sadhya is only Dharma (and not Dharmi).

III.33. Otherwise, it (i.e. universal concomitance) cannot happen.

III.34. The Paksa (minor term) is used though it is understood (from Pratyaksa) to dispel doubts regarding the abode of Sadhya (major term) when it is a Dharma.

III.35. As for example, Upanaya is used to explain the Dharma of Sadhana (the middle term, sign or mark) in the Dharmi containing Sadhya.

III.36. Is there any one who does not use a Paksa to substantiate after mentioning the three kinds of Hetu (Middle term)?

III.37. These two only are the limbs of Anumana (inference) and not the Udaharana (illustration).

III.38. That (Udaharana) is not the cause of understanding the Sadhya because, the aforesaid Hetu works there (as the cause).

III.39. (That Udaharana) also is (not necessary) for establishing the universal concomitance (with the Sadhya). That (universal concomitance) is established from the opposition to its adverse (character).

III.40. A Udharana deals only with particular but Vyapti deals with universal concomitance. If that is not understood, the fault of Anavastha will arise, as recourse to another example will have to be made.

III.41. (This Udaharana) cannot remind the universal concomitance, because such a reminiscence arises from the use of Hetu of that kind (which is connected with previously understood knowledge of the connection between smoke and fire.

III.42. This (Udaharna) only raises a doubt in establishing Sadhya (e.g. fire) in the Dharmi (e.g. mountain) containing Sadhya (e.g. fire).

III.43. Otherwise, why should there be Upanaya (application) and Nigamana (conclusion)?

III.44. These (Upanaya and Nigamana) are not parts of that (Anumana) because by mentioning the Sadhya and the Hetu in the Dharmi containing the Sadhya, no doubt exists.

III.45. (The establishment e.g. fire) is got from the support of the limb of Anumana named Hetu (e.g. smoke) as this (Hetu e.g. smoke) is connected with the Sadhya (e.g. fire).
III.46. These (Dristanta or illustration) etc. may be for understanding of those who have little knowledge and for this purpose may be discussed only in the Sastra, but these are quite unfit to be used in logical discussions.

III.47. The Dristanta is of two kinds, being with Anvaya and Vyatireka.

Commentary: It has been mentioned that Dristanta, Upanaya and Nigamana are not parts of Anumana. But in the previous aphorism it was stated that these may be discussed in the Sastra for teaching students. So in this and the next two aphorisms the two kinds of Dristanta, and in aphorisms 50 and 51 Upanaya and Nigamana are explained.

III.48. Where the Sadhana is shown as always concomitant with Sadhya, that is (an example) of Anvaya Dristanta.

III.49. Where the absence of Sadhana is mentioned through the absence of Sadhya, that is (an example) of Vyatireka Dristanta (illustration).

III.50. Upanaya is the application (asserting the existence) of the Hetu (in the Dharmi after a knowledge of concomitance).

III.51. Nigamana is the (conclusion) of the Pratijna (Proposition).

III.52. This Anumana is of two kinds:

III.53. Svartha and Parartha.

III.54. Svartha (Anumana) has already been defined.

III.55. Parartha (Anumana) arises from words touching that (Svarthanumana).

Commentary: Anumana is of two kinds, Svarthanumana and Pararthanumana. The former variety has been defined in aphorism 14 of the third samuddesa (Section) of this work viz. "the knowledge of Sadhya (the major term e.g. fire) from Sadhana or Hetu (the middle term e.g. smoke) is Anumana." Pararthanumana arises through words of another.

III.56. The words expressing this (Pararthanumana) is also Pararthanumana as these (words) are the cause of that (knowledge arising in Pararthanumana).

III.57. That Hetu is of two kinds: Upalabdhi and Anupalabdhi.

Commentary: We have already mentioned that universal concomitance can be expressed in two ways viz. affirmatively called Anvaya e.g. 'wherever there is smoke there is fire' or negatively called Vyatreka e.g. where there is no fire there is no smoke.' The first kind of Hetu is known as Upalabdhi and the second Anupalabdhi.

III.58. Upalabdhi is subdivided into Vidhi and Pratisedha. Anupalabdhi also (is subdivided into the same two kinds).

Commentary: In Upalabdhi Hetu, the Sadhya may be of two kinds Vidhi and Pratisedha. These two kinds of Sadhya also can exist in Anupalabdhi Hetu. It should not be said that in Upalabdhi the Sadhya is only in the form of Vidhi and in Anupalabdhi, it is in the form of Pratisedha.

The Upalabdhi and Anupalabdhi Hetus are subdivided into two kinds each: those which prove the existence of a fact (Vidhi) and those that prove the non-existence of a fact (Nesedha).

A Hetu may also be of Viruddha (contradictory) nature implying existence of a fact which is incompatible with the Sadhya e.g. there is no fire in this pitcher, because it is full of water; or it may be of Aviruddha (non-contradictory) nature such as in an argument which is not based on any fact incompatible with the existence of Sadhya e.g. there is fire in this hill, because there is smoke on it.

III.59. Aviruddha Upalabdhi is of six kinds in Vidhi (existence of fact) viz. Vyapya, Karya (effect), Karana (cause), Purvachara, Uttarachara and Sahachara (coexistent).

Commentary: Upalabdhi in Vidhi will be explained in Aphorisms 65, 66, 67, 68, 69 and 70 respectively.
III.60. From Rasa (juice), one thing is inferred and from that, Rupa (form) is inferred. Those who accept this, accept also some Karana as Hetu where there is no other Karana to obstruct the potency of (the Karana or cause).

III.61. In the case of antecedence and consequence, there is no identity or its appearance, for there is no knowledge of these after an interval of time.

Commentary: In this aphorism, it is asserted that the Purvachara and Uttarachara Hetus (i.e. Hetus concerned with antecedence and consequence) cannot be said to be included within the Svabhava-Hetu or Karya-Hetu as accepted by the Buddhists. Svabhava-Hetu is concerned with identity and in Karya-Hetu, one thing arises from another. So in both these cases the two things exist at the same time. But in antecedence and consequence, the two things do not exist together. The example of identity is as follows: - There is no jar in this room, because its Svabhava (identity) is not to be found (that is, nothing resembling its identity is present in it). The example of Karya is: There is fire in this hill, because there is smoke on it. Now these illustrations will show that Svabhava or Karya Hetu cannot include Purvachara (antecedent) or Uttarachara (consequent) Hetus in which cases there is an interval between two things e.g. It will be Sunday tomorrow because it is Saturday to-day (antecedence), or yesterday was a Sunday, because it is Monday to-day (consequence).

III.62. The future and the past, death and the knowledge of waking are not the causes of Aristas (omens of death) or of rising (in the morning).

III.63. Because that (Karya) happens with the existence of that (Karana) as that is connected with this.

III.64. Co-existence (is also a separate Hetu) because the things exist independently of each other and arise together.

Commentary: The Sahachari (co-existent) Hetu is also not included within Karya Hetu, Karana Hetu or Svabhava Hetu. As the things have separate and independent existence, this Sahachari Hetu cannot be said as the same as Svabhava Hetu which signifies identity. Also, as these arise simultaneously, it cannot be said to be Karya Hetu or Karana Hetu.

Example of Vyapya Hetu: -

III.65. Sound is subject to modification, because it is a product.

All products are seen as liable to modifications e.g. a pitcher.

This is a product, so this is subject to modification.

That which is not a product is not seen as liable to modifications as the son of a barren woman.

This is a product, so this is subject to modification.

Commentary: In Aphorism 59, it has been mentioned that there are six kinds of Aviruddha Upalabdhi in Vidhi. In the present aphorism an example of the first variety viz., Aviruddha Vyapypalabdhi is given.

In this aphorism all the parts of the inference are given in detail showing Sadharmya and Vaidharmya, In subsequent aphorisms only the example in short will be given. It may be expanded like the present aphorism in all its parts.

Example of Karya Hetu (effect): -

III.66. There is intelligence in this animal as it shows activities like speech etc.

Commentary: The familiar example `There is fire in this hill, because there is smoke on it' is also an illustration of Karya Hetu.

Example of Karana Hetu (cause): -

III.67. There is shade here, as there is an umbrella.

Commentary: Another example is this: "There will be rain, as potent rain-clouds are seen"

Example of Purvachara (antecedent) Hetu: -

III.68. The Rohini (constellation) will appear (after a muhurta) as the Krittika (constellation) has arisen.
Example of Uttarachara (consequence) Hetu:-

III.69. The Bharani had already risen before this.

Example of Sahachara Hetu (co-existence):-

III.70. There is colour in this Matulinga (fruit) as there is juice (in it).

Commentary: We have finished the description of the six varieties of Aviruddha Upalabdhi. Now follows the illustrations of six kinds of Viruddha Upalabdhi after its definition.

III.71. Viruddha Upalabdhi is also the same (i.e. of six varieties) implying a Sadhya of non-existent nature (or which is refuted).

III.72. There is no feeling of cold here, as it is hot.

Commentary: By refuting (Pratisedha) the feeling of cold, its antithesis (Viruddha) fire and the heat pervading (vyapya) the same is inferred.

Example of Viruddha Karyapalabdhi:

III.73. There is no feeling of cold here, because there is smoke.

Commentary: Here cold is the antithesis of heat the Karya of which is smoke. So this an example of inference of a Karya (effect) of the antithesis.

Example of Viruddha Karanopalabdhi:

III.74. There is no happiness in this creature because it has grief (the antithesis of happiness).

Example of Viruddha Purvachara Upalabdhi:

III.75. The Rohini will not rise after the end of a Muhurta as the Revatt has arisen.

Commentary: Another examples of this: Tomorrow will not be a Sunday, because it is Friday today.

Example of Viruddha Uttarachara Upalabdhi:

III.76. The Bharani (constellation) did not appear before the Muhurta because (now) the constellation Pusya has arisen.

Commentary: Another example of this is: “Yesterday was not a Friday, because it is Tuesday to-day”.

Example of Viruddha Sahachara Upalabdhi:

III.77. This wall is not devoid of an outside, because it has an inside [the Sahachara (coexistent) of the outside].

Commentary: Six varieties of each of Aviruddha and Viruddha Upalabdhi have now been described. Next we proceed to describe the (seven) varieties of Aviruddha Anupalabdhi and (three) varieties of Viruddha Anupalabdhi.

III.78. When (the Sadhya consists of) Pratisedha (non- existence of some fact), Aviruddha Anupalabdhi is of seven kinds viz. non-finding of Svabhava, Vyapaka, Karya, Karana, Purvachara, Uttarachara and Sahachara.

Commentary: There are seven kinds of Aviruddha. Anupalabdhi which cause knowledge of nonexistence of some fact. Not finding the antithesis consists of Aviruddha Anupalabdhi and when this establishes non-existence of some fact, we call it Aviruddha Anupalabdhi in Paratisedha. This is of seven kinds, examples of which will be given in the following seven aphorisms 79-85.

Example of Aviruddha Svabhava Anupalabdhi:-
III.79. There is no pitcher in this place because (its Svabhava or identity) is not to be found (i.e. nothing resembling its identity is present here).

Example of Aviruddha Vyapaka Anupalabdhi:-

III.80. There is no Sinsapa (tree) here, because no tree is found here.
Example of Aviruddha Karyanupalabdhi:-

III.81. There is no fire whose potency (Samarthya) has not been obstructed here, because we do not find smoke.
Example of Aviruddha Karananupalabdhi:-

III.82. There is no smoke here because there is no fire.
Example of Aviruddha Purvachara Anupalabdhi:-

III.83. There will be no rise of the Rohini after a Muhurta as we have no knowledge of the rise of the Krittika.
Commentary: Another Example is this: It will not be Sunday tomorrow because it is not Saturday to-day.
Example of Aviruddha Uttarachara Anupalabdhi:

III.84. The Bharani had not risen before a Muhurta because now the Krittia is not up.
Example of Aviruddha Sahachara Anupalabdhi:-

III.85. One pan of this pair of scales does not touch beam as the other one is on the same level with it.
Commentary: Now, the varieties of Viruddha Anupalabdhi (nonfinding of antithesis) establishing a Sadhya of Vidhi (existence of a fact) are being described.

III.86. Viruddha Anupalabdhi in Vidhi is of three kinds:- Viruddha Karya Anupalabdhi, Viruddha Karana Anupalabdhi and Viruddha Svabhava Anupalabdhi.

Example of Viruddha Karya Anupalabdhi:-

III.87. As for example, some disease exists in this animal, because the actions of a healthy body are not found.
Example of Viruddha Karana Anupalabdhi:-

III.88. There is grief in this creature, because it has no connection with its dear ones.
Example of Viruddha Svabhava Anupalabdhi:-

III.89. All things are Anekantika (possessed of different aspects) because we do not find that these have only one aspect.

III.90. The Hetus which arise one after the other should be included within those (which have been described).

III.91. There was Sivaka (a clod of earth resembling a Sivalinga) on this potter's wheel because we see Sthasa there.

III.92. (This Hetu showing) effect of an effect will be included within Aviruddha Karya upalabdhi (as already defined).

III.93. There is no play of deer in this cave because there is a roar of lion. Here there is an effect opposed to a cause. This should be (included) within Viruddha Karya Upalabdhi.

III.94. The use by those who are conversant (with the process of inference) is from existence or non-existence of that universal concomitance (between the Sadhya and the Sadhana).

Commentary: It has already been mentioned (Aphorism 46) that though five parts of Anumana are used for teaching students, really there are only two parts of an inference (Aphorism 37). But those who are conversant with processes of reasoning employ inference through the knowledge of the existence of Sadhya (e.g. fire) always along with
Sadhana (e.g. smoke) or the nonexistence of Sadhya where Sadhana is absent. This is amplified in the four aphorisms which follow.

III.95. This place is full of fire, for existence of smoke is only possible if there be fire here or (this place is not full of fire) as smoke does not exist here.

III.96. In the employment of Hetu, the use of Vyapti (universal concomitance) is made. That (Vyapti) is understood by the persons conversant (with the process of inference) from it (viz. Hetu) (without use of Udaharana etc.)

III.97. The Sadhaya is established from this (viz. Hetu) only.

III.98. So it has been mentioned that it is necessary to mention Paksa to indicate the Adhara (abode) of Hetu consisting of universal concomitance.

III.99. Agama is knowledge derived from words etc. of a reliable person.

III.100. Words etc. (signs, symbols and other things of life nature) are causes of knowledge of things through their inherent power in connoting things.

III.101. As for example "The Meru etc. exist."

Section - IV

IV.1. The subject matter of it (Pramana) is visaya of two kinds characterised by samanya (general) and visesa (special).

IV.2. As there is attainment of the object (as a result of knowledge) from signs of changes from its original state to a later state preserving its essential characteristics and from our idea of general and special characteristics.

IV.3. Samanya is of two kinds being divided into Tiryak (samanya) and urdhvata (samanya).

IV.4. Tiryak (samanya) is the same modification such as Khanda Munda etc. in the condition of a cow.

IV.5. Urdhvata samanya is a thing which remains the same through changes such as earth in its (modifications) sthasa etc.

IV.6. Visesa (is) also (of two kinds).

IV.7. Being divided into Paryaya and Vyatireka.

IV.8. Pryayas are modifications in sequence in a single substance e.g. joy and grief in oneself.

IV.9. Vyatirekas are different modifications in different objects such as a cow and a buffalo etc.

Commentary: With this aphorism, the description of the subject matter of Pramana ends. In the next samuddesa (section) the result of Pramana will be discussed.

Section V

V.1. The result is the dispelling of false knowledge and leaving (the undesirable things), acquirement (of desirable things) and indifference (to other things).

V.2. (The result) is different and not different (in another sense) from the Pramana.

V.3. He who takes cognizance, becomes free from false knowledge and rejects (undesirable objects), selects (desirable objects) or becomes indifferent.

Section - VI
VI.1. The opposite of it, is Abhasa of the same.

Commentary: In this Chapter, the fallacies will be taken up and described. We have mentioned before hand the nature, number, objects and result of Pramana. The opposite of these will be fallacies of these. The fallacies of Pramana are described in Aphorisms 2-54, those of number are described in aphorism 55; those of object are described in aphorism 61 and those of result in aphorism 66.

VI.2. Pramanabhasas (fallacies of Pramana) are non- cognizance by one's own-self, knowledge of what has already been known, doubt etc.

VI.3. Because (such knowledge) does not establish its own object.

VI.4. As (for example), the knowledge of another person, the knowledge of a thing previously known, the knowledge of touching grass of a person moving, the knowledge whether this is a post or a man etc.

Commentary: By the word "doubt etc." in the aphorism, Samsaya (doubt), Anadhyavasaya and Viparyaya are meant. These have been thoroughly described in the commentary on aphorism 3 section I of this work.

VI.5. Like Samjukta Samavaya (co-inherence) of eye and juice in a thing.

VI.6. When Pratyaksa is accepted in (things) not clear, we have its fallacy e.g. cognizance of fire by the followers of the Buddhist philosophy from sudden vision of smoke.

VI.7. In Paroksa (accepted) in clearness, (we have) its fallacy (Paroksabhasa) e.g. knowledge derived from the senses as accepted by the Mimasakas.

VI.8. Smaranabhasa (fallacy of memory) is the knowledge in one of another e.g. when we (falsely recognise) Jinadatta as Devadatta.

Commentary: Fallacies of each of the subdivisions of Pratyaksa viz. Smriti, Pratyabhijnana, Tarka, Anumana and Agama are described in Aphorisms 8, 9, 10, 11-50 and 51 of this section.

Smriti or smarana (recollection) has been defined in Aphorism 3 of section III. We see Jinadatta. Later on when we see him again, we recognize him to be that Jina-datta. This is smriti or recollection. But if we have remembrance of Devadatta when we see Jinadatta, this will be a fallacy of recollection (Smaranabhasa).

VI.9. Fallacy of Pratyabhijnana is the knowledge of "this is that" in things bearing similarity or knowledge or similarity in the identical thing e.g. in the case of twins.

VI.10. Knowledge of concomitance in objects not related is fallacy of Tarka.

VI.11. The following are fallacies of Anumana.

Commentary: Anumana has been defined in Aphorism 14 of Samuddesa III. Anumana is employed by using Paksa, Hetu and Dristanta. Fallacies of these viz. Paksabhasa, Hetvabhasa and Dristantabhasa with their subdivisions will be described in the following aphorisms.

VI.12. Among them Paksabhasa (fallacy of the minor term or thesis) is Anista (un-accepted) etc.

VI.13. Anista (un-accepted) is (the view of) Mimamsakas that sound is monetary.

VI.14. It is established that sounds can be heard by the ear.

VI.15. Opposition (may exist) from Pratyaksa, Anumana, Agama, popular acceptance and one's own words.

VI.16. In these subdivisions, Pratyaksa-vadhita (opposed to Pratyaksa) may be exemplified by "Fire is not hot as it is a thing e.g. water".

VI.17. Sound is without modification as it is something caused e.g. a pitcher.

VI.18. Dharma will produce grief after death as it is subservient to beings like Adharma.
Commentary: This is an example of the fallacy Agama-vadhita. In all sastras, it is accepted that pursuit of Dharma will produce happiness after death and Adharma will cause misery. If we try to establish by inference that Dharma will produce misery after death, it will be an example of Agama-vadhita Anumana (i.e. inference as opposed to the sastras).

VI.19. A human skull is pure as it is a part of the body of an animal like a conch-shell or oyster.

Commentary: This is an example of Loka-vadhita Anumana or inference opposed to public understanding.

VI.20. My mother is barren because she does not conceive in spite of connection with male like women famous as barren.

VI.21. Hetvabhasas are Asiddha, Viruddha, Anaikantika and Akinchitkara.

VI.22. Asiddha is that whose existence is wanting to Paksa and which is not definitely established.

Commentary: Asiddha Hetvabhasa is of two kinds: Svarupasiddha and Sandigdhasiddha.

These will be described in the aphorisms which follow.

VI.23. "Sound is perishable because it can be seen by the eyes."

VI.24. Because it does not exist at all in its self.

VI.25. When there is uncertainty, if one says to a man of inferior intellect `Here is fire because there is smoke.'

VI.26. He has doubt owing to the existence of vapour etc. in the collection of many elements (earth, water, etc., and he cannot definitely ascertain whether it is smoke or vapour).

VI.27. To (the follower of) the Sankhya (philosophy) : `Sound is perishable, because it is caused (by some one).

VI.28. Because he does not know (or accept) it.

VI.29. Viruddha (Hetvabhasa) is concomitance with the opposite of the major term e.g. sound is not perishable because it is caused.

VI.30. In anaikantika (Hetvabhasa), (Hetu) residues also in Vipaksa (in addition to being in Paksa and Sapaksa).

VI.31. Where it is certain that (Hetu) is in (Vipaksa) (we have the fallacy of Nischita vipaksa vritti hetvabhasa), e.g. "Sound is perishable because it is knowable like a pitcher.

VI.32. Because it (the quality of knowability) is ascertained in things like Akasa which are imperishable.

VI.33. Where the matter is involved in doubt (we have the fallacy of sankita vipaksa vritti e.g. an omniscient being does not exist for he can speak.

VI.34. Because there is no opposition of being able to speak with omniscience.

VI.35. Akinchitkara (Hetvabhasa) consists of (use of) hetu (middle term) in connection with a Sadhya (major term) which had already been established and which is opposed by Pratyaksa etc.

VI.36. Capability of being heard by the ear is established regarding sound, as it is sound.

VI.37. Because (Hetu) does not do anything (in such a case).

VI.38. As for example, fire is cold as this a thing. In such cases (Hetu) cannot do anything.

VI.39. This fault arises only in definition. For in use by those conversant its reasoning, the fault is proved by fault of Paksa (minor term).

VI.40. Fallacies of Dristanta (illustration) in Anvaya consists of non-establishment of Sadhya, Sadhana or both of them.
VI.41. Sound is unproduced by man because it has no form like sensual pleasure, atom or pitcher.

VI.42. Viparitanvaya also: "That which is unproduced by man has no form".

VI.43. Because this will be applied in lightening etc.

VI.44. In Vyatireka, Siddha and the Vyatirekas of the same, like atom, sensual pleasure and Akasa.

VI.45. Viparita Vyatireka: the quality of not being without form, is not unproduced by man.

VI.46. The fallacy of Bala-prayoga consists of absense of one of the five limbs (of syllogism).

VI.47. This place is full of fire as it is full of smoke. Where there is smoke there is fire. As for example, a kitchen.

VI.48. Or, this is full of smoke.

VI.49. So it is full of fire and it is full of smoke.

VI.50. As clear understanding of the real thing is not established from it.

VI.51. Fallacy of Agama arises from words of a person seized by attachment, hatred, mistake etc.

VI.52. As for example, Run boys. There are a large quantity of sweetmeats on the river-bank.

VI.53. Or, one hundred elephants are standing on the tip of the finger.

VI.54. Because (these) want (the element of Pramana) viz. true knowledge.

VI.55. Sankhyabhasa (Fallacy of number) is maintaining 'Pratyaksa is the only pramana etc.

VI.56. Because according to the view of the followers of Charvaka philosophy the other world is denied from Pratyaksa and knowledge of others cannot be derived (from Pratyaksa), so these cannot be the subject matter of it (Pratyaksa).

VI.57. Like Vyapti in case of the followers of the Buddhist, Sankhya, Nyaya, Prabhakara (school of Mimamsa philosophy) and Jaimini (school of Mimamsa philosophy) who accept Pratyaksa, Anumana, Agama, Upamana, Arthapatti and Abhava exceeding one by one (in their doctrines respectively).

VI.58. Knowledge of others being the subject of Anumana etc. will become another Pramana.

VI.59. Tarka also being understood from Vyapti will become another Pramana. For that which is not Pramana cannot establish anything.

VI.60. Because there is a difference according to difference of illumination.

VI.61. Visayabhasa (fallacy of object) (happens) where Samanya or Visesa or both of them (are) separately (accepted).

VI.62. As it appears like the same, and as it does not do any work.

VI.63. Accepting it to be Samartha (effective) will lead to creation (of result) at all times, being independent.

VI.64. On accepting dependency on other (causes), the quality of being modified will have to be accepted as otherwise, this does not exist.

VI.65. Because, that which is ineffective in itself cannot cause anything as the former.

VI.66. Phalabhasa (fallacy of result) is either separate or not separate from Pramana.

VI.67. If we accept inseparableness, its (separate) use cannot happen.
VI.68. Its imagination by its opposite cannot (be accepted) for (we) shall have to assume (then) non-result by its opposite (e.g.) another result.

VI.69. Just as Apramana is derived from Pramana by holding the opposite.

VI.70. So, really there is no difference.

VI.71. (If) difference (be accepted), it will not be derived as in the case of another soul.

VI.72. There will be Atiprasanga (if we urge) Samavaya.

VI.73. Pramana and its Abhasa being shown as faulty and being made free from or connected with fault will be Sadhana or its Abhasa in case of the Vadi and Dusana (fault) or Bhusana (adornment) respectively of Prativadi (opponent).

IV.74. Other (varieties) which exist, are to be understood by reasoning (from other works).