Perface to the First Edition

Man is `homo sapiens'. He has built civilizations and destroyed them too. Magnificent empires were built, mighty in their day. It was difficult to doubt their power. But their day is done and their courts `the lion and the lizard keep'. We have seen the phememenal advancement of science in our own day. As we gaze at the incredible rapidity of scientific progress we are losing touch with the spiritual side of man. We are on cross-roads of life, between two worlds; `one dead and the powerless to be born'. We see everywhere social and political chaos. There is distrust and frustration, and for a decade or more we have lived on the brink of another world war more disastrous than the earlier too, which would mean total destruction of human race. Whether it would mean pralaya we do not know. But when it comes we can only see the broken bits of civilization, if we are to survive this catastrophe. And all this is due to a wrong approach to the understanding of the problems of life and experience. A new kind of a materialism is being emphasised today wherein we pay exclusive attention to material comforts and ignore the higher values. But to understand life and nature we have to transcend the narrow partial points of view and adopt a synoptic view of life. We have to realize that others' points of view have also to be considered and respected. Dogmatic approach of looking at the problems leads to intolerance and then to violence. Jainas have preached the synoptice view of life in their theory of Anekanta. It emphasises the catholic outlook towards life. Intellectual non-violence, respect for other points of view are the key-note of this doctrine, and that would be a panacea for all the ills of our social and political life today. Jainism is an ancient religion which prevailed even before Vardhamana Mahavira, the twenty-fourth and Par'sva the twentieth Tirthan'karas. It is a pre-Aryan religion coming from the Sramana current of thought, and Sramana thought was prevailing in India long before the Aryans came to this country. The antiquity of Jainism as reflecting the Pre-Aryan thought of the upper class of North-Eastern India has now been established beyond dispute. Jainia tradition is unanimous in making Rsabha the first Tithankara as the founder of Jainism. Long before the Aryans reached the Ganges or even Sarasvati, Jainism, had been taught by prominent saints or Tirthankaras, prior to the historical twentythird Parsva of the eighth or ninth century B. C. Many Wwstern scholars like Jacobi, Vincent Smith, Furlong and Zimmer have accepted the Pre-Aryan prevalence of Jainism. Radhakrishnan accepts the view that Jainism pre-valied in India even before Parsava and Vardhamana, the last two Tirthankaras. Hiralal Jain has interpreted the mention of Kesi and Kesi Rsabha in the Rgveda as referring to the first Tirthankara. When Buddhism arose Jainism was already an ajncient sect with its strong hold near about Vaisali which was visited and admired by Buddha.

The Anekanta outlook of the Jainas pervades their entire philosophy and life. The whole texture of Jaina philosophy and ethics is woven in the Anekanta attitude. We have accordingly analysed in this treatise some of the conceptions in Jaina philosophy and ethics as reflecting the Anekanta outlook. Jiva has been considered from the noumenal and the phenomenal points of view. From the noumenal points of view it is pure and perfect, and from the phenomenal it is the agent and the enjoyer of fruits of Karama. Our experience can be graded into levels as the sense and the supersensual experience. Jiva in its empirical existense is involved in the wheel of Samsara through the Yoga (activity). This involvement is beginningless, though it has an end. The end is freedom from the wheel of life and the attainment of Moksa. For this we have to remove the Karma that has accrued to the soul. The Jainas have worked out an elaborate theory of Karma almost making it a science. The Anekanta view pervades the analysis of Karma. Karma is substantive force. It is material in nature. It consists of fine particles of
matter, which are glued to the soul as soot to the surface of the mirror. The influx of Karma leads to bondage of Jiva to the wheel of life. The i) nature (prakrti), duration (sthiti), intensity (anubhagha) and quantity (pradesa) of Karma determine this bondage of soul to Karma. Karma has its psychological aspect also in the Bhava-karma.

Moksa is to be achieved through the triple path of right intuition, right knowledge and right conduct. The belief in the Tattvas is the right faith, knowledge of the real is right knowledge and freedom from attachment and aversion is right conduct. The path of virtue is the path, which leads to self-realization. The five Vratas are fundamental for the Jainas. However, the practice of the Vratas and the ethical life has been graded in two levels as duty of a muni (ascetic) and the life of sravaka (lay follower). The purpose is to realize the highest gradually and with ease. In this analysis of ethical concepts we find the application of the spirit of Anekanta. The same can be found in their interpretation of Ahimsa as an ethical principle. The Jaina attitude to the conception of God expresses the spirit of Anekanta. The Jainas are against the Theistic conception of God. But each soul in its pure and perfect form is divine. Still the Tirthankaras are worshipped not because they are gods but because they are human, yet divine—to be kept before us as ideals for emulation. Apart from the worship of the Tirthankaras, we find a pantheon of gods as a social survival and a psychological necessity.

Life is to be considered as a struggle for perfection. We do not get ready-made views. We have to look at life through manycoloured glasses and as a “vale of soul making”. This is the picture of Jaina outlook on life as presented in this book. It may, perhaps, give a discrete picture. The purpose has been to see some of the problems in the light of synoptic point of view as expressed in the Anekanta.

The metaphysical elements of Jainism have not been discussed in detail as the main object of this work has been to present the Jaina view of life. However, principle of asrava, bandha samvara and nirjara have been incidentally woven in the texture of the scheme while describing the entanglement of the soul in samsara and the efforts to attain Moksa. Jiva and Moksa are the prius and the end of the noumenal world. We have studied them at length.

This problem has been engaging my attention for some time past, and it has developed in the form of this book at the inspiration and guidance of Dr. A. N. Upadhye of Kolhapur. I gave a synopsis of this work in my talk at the Jaina Boarding at Kolhapur during the Paryusana festival in 1963. I have made use of two chapters from my earlier book—Some Problems in Jaina Psychology. I can grateful to the Register, Karnataka University, Dharwad for permitting me to use this material from my previous book. I have incorporated in this book some of my articles already published in different philosophical Journals by retouching them here and there to form a part of this book.

I am grateful to the Editors and Publishers of these Journals for their permission to use my articles in the book. I must express my gratitude to the late Professor Charles A. Moore, of the Unverstity of Hawaii, Honolulu (U. S. A ) for permitting me to use my article The Doctrine of Karma in Jaina Philosophy published in Philosophy East and West, a Journal of Oriental and Comparative Thought, Volume XI, Numbers 3 and 4 July, October 1965. I have intended, in this book, to weave out some of my papers published earlier so as to bring out a coherent picture of the Jaina view of life as expressing the Anekanta outlook. I must express my sense of profound gratitude to Dr. A. N. Upadhye for all the encouragement and guidance he has given me. I thank the authorities of the Jaina Samskrti Samraksaka Sangha, Sholapur, for publishing this work. I thank my colleague Shri S. R. Gunjal, M.A., M.Lib. Sc. for assisting me in going through the proofs.
Preface to the Second Edition

I have pleasure in presenting the second edition of the *Jaina View of Life*. I am grateful to the scholars of the Jaina Studies for their kind appreciation. In this edition I have revised some portions of the papers included in the first edition. I have added the following Papers in this edition – 1. Right Understanding – Some Hurdles, published in Studies in Indian philosophy (L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad 1981) and 2. Jaina Mysticism published in the Proceedings of The Indian Philosophical Congress 1961-1965.

I am grateful to The Jaina Samskriti Samrakshak Sangha, Sholapur for having got the book published in the second edition. I sincerely thank M/s. Manohar Printing Press, Dharwad specially Shri Ravi Akalwadi, for the careful and fine printing of the book.

‘Ratnatraya’

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SYNOPTIC PHILOSOPHY: Meaning of philosophy – philosophy in India – historical survey – a priori way leading to Absolutism far removed from the commonsense – empiricist way – logical positivism – leading philosophy to the brink of extinction – the way out to be found in the synoptic philosophy as expressed in the Anekanta view of the Jainas.

II. APPROACH TO REALITY: Introduction – meaning of Anekanta

-- Historical survey – development of the theory of Anekanta


III. THE JAINA THEORY OF THE SOUL: Conception of soul

in philosophy – Jaina theory of soul – considered from

noumenal and the phenomenal points of view – Upayoga as characteristic of soul – bahiratman antaratman and paramatman – compared with distinction between ‘Me’ and ‘I’ of Willian James – seat of the soul – classification of Samsari Jivas

- supersense experience and Avadhi, Manah-paryaya and Kevala as supersense experiences – some observations on the basis of modern researches in Parapsychology.

Chapter-1: SYNOPTIC PHILOSOPHY

1. Plato and Aristole have traced the beginnings of Philosophy to the feeling of wonder which arises in the mind of man when he contemplates on the nature of things in the worlds.’ But wonder at the level of primitive men is in the instinctive stage and does not give rise to higher speculation. It is only nature does philosophy begin. It is the fruit of society’s maturer age. As Hegel said, philosophy makes its first expression when experience and thought have fully matured in their process. The owl of Minerva does not start upon its flight till the evening twilight has begun to fall.

   Philosophy is a reflection on experience in order to comprehend the ultimate reality. We may say it is a synoptic view of life. It is, in the lines of Mathew Arnold, to see life steadily and to see it whole. In a narrower sense it is an academic pursuit of the solutions of the ultimate problems of life.

   Philosophy is not merely an unusually obstinate effort to think consistently, not a construction of a super-structure of thought, nor is it a mere collection of noble sentiments. For Plato and Bradley philosophy was the knowledge of reality, of that which is. For the Logic Positivists, however would not be complete except as a synoptic view of life, as a world view. In this sense alone can philosophy be a guide to life.

   In India, philosophy was and has been well grounded in life. It has permeated the lives of the people. It has never been a mere academic pursuit nor a luxury of the mind. It was intimately connected with life. It is to be lived. Mundaka Upanisad speaks of ‘Brahma Vidya’ as the basis of all knowledge. Knutilya makes philosophy the lamp of all sciences. Philosophy has been called darsana in the sense of the spiritual perception and vision of the seers, and the highest triumphs of philosophy are possible only to those who have achieved in themselves a purity of the soul.

   Realization of the Atman is the highest end in Philosophy there is no other way. In this sense, philosophy is darsana and intimately connected with life.
2. Philosophy enquiry has proceeded in two directions: i) The first uses a priori and deductive methods. It is analytic in approach and is the way of the rationalists. ii) The second adopts inductive methods and is the empiricist way. In ancient Indian thought, philosophic speculation relied on Sruti and Smrti.

The course of philosophy has been long and arduous. From Plato and the Upanisads to the present day, philosophers have sought to find solutions to the perennial problems of philosophy, and by pursuing the one way or the other have reached either the summits of speculation from human experience, or have ultimately faced the impossibility of metaphysical speculation.

i) We may first consider the a priori approach to the study of philosophy. In western thought, deductive and a priori methods were first used by Parmenides and his disciple Zeno, who made, for the first time, a distinction between sense and reason. The Philosophic speculations of Plato were largely based on a priori methods. He abstracted sense from reason and built a world of ideas independent of the physical world. In the Middle Ages of Europe, philosophy was sustaining itself under the shadow of theology and Aristotle's deductive methods. In the modern Age, Descartes and Spinoza built systems of rationalism. From cogito ergo sum he went on to heaven and looked at the physical world with confidence, which is, indeed, a way far removed from that of common sense. Descartes split the world into two substance distinct from each other and postulated a God separate from each of them. Spinoza's task was to establish a connection between God and the world on the basis of mathematical deduction. The result is, Spinoza's Substance became a lion's den to which all tracks lead and from which none returns. In Hegel and Bradley we go much further away from common sense. We see the superstructures of philosophic speculation, and we are left in the world of appearance only to gaze at the ivory towers in which these philosophers lived. Thus the a priori speculative method led us far from the madding crowd to the dizzy heights of the 'Absolute'.

In India, we were saved from the separation of the speculative and the practical, because philosophy, with us, is essentially spiritual: it takes its origin in life and enters back into life.” In Samkara we come to a great speculative system. Still, we do not feel ourselves strangers here, as we are not cut off from the ideals of life. “Samkara presents to us the true ideal of philosophy, which is not so much knowledge as wisdom, not so much logical learning as spiritual freedom.”

ii) Empiricism uses a posteriori and inductive methods. In the Theaetetus, Socrates explains the Protagorean doctrine that knowledge is through perception, and shows the impossibility of arriving at any objective truth. For the Sophists, sense experience was the only source of knowledge; while Gorgias asserted the impossibility of any knowledge or communication whatever.

In ancient Indian thought the Carvakas led us to a similar conclusion.

For them, Lokayata is the only Sastra and perceptual evidence the only authority. This would logically lead to scepticism and nihilism; but they did not go to the whole length, because their immediate aim was to break down the ecclesiastical monopoly and still assert the spiritual independence of the individual. The Buddhist empiricism was to have gone the way of Gorgias in the Madhyamika School, but for the predominance of the ethical ideal
and the goal of nirvana. Nagarjuna’s philosophy is ‘now nearer to scepticism and the mysticism.’ The rigour of logic would have led him to nihilism, but for his spiritual fervor and thirst for nirvana.

English empiricism repeats this logical movements but does not save itself from its own conclusions. We can see the empiricist method steadily marching from Locke to Berkeley to Hume. Berkeley denied matter, and Hume denied everything except impressions and ideas. Reid, summing up the English empiricist movement, states that ideas, first introduced for explaining the operations of the human understanding, undermined everything but themselves, pitifully naked and destitute, “set adrift without a rag to cover them.” Knowledge became impossible and philosophy could go on further without a radical reconsideration of its fundamental position.

But the Humean tendency has been recently revived, by the Cambridge philosophers who brought philosophy to the brink of extinction. Wittgenstein’s Tractates discusses problems of meaning, the nature of logic, facts and propositions and the task of philosophy. It states: ‘What can ve said at all can be said clearly, and whereof one cannot speak, there one must be silent’. ‘The world is the totality of facts not of things’. There must be simple entities called objects because there are names, and there must be names because propositions have a definite sense. Names have no sense expect in the context of propositions; and propositions are related to facts as ‘picture of facts’. He states that all the truths of logic are tautologies, and logical proofs are only mechanical devices for recognising categories. Mathematics consists of equations, and the propositions of mathematics are also without sense. The metaphysician talks nonsense in the fullest sense of the world, as he does not understand “the logic of our language”. Metaphysical suggestion is like the composition of a new song. We are told that he made no essential change in his attitude towards the aim of philosophy. Russell writes that the influence of the Tractates on him “was not wholly good”, and that the philosophy of the Philosophical Investigations remains to him completely unintelligible.

Logical Positivism ia a philosophical movement emanating from ‘The Vienna Circle’. It was a thorough going empiricism backed by the resources of modern logic and tempered by exaggerated respect for the achievements of Science. Ayer’s Philosophy is the logical outcome of Hume’s empiricism. Like Hume, he divides all genuine propositions into two classes: i) a priori propositions of logic and pure mathematics, which are analytic and therefore necessary and certain; and ii) propositions concerning empirical matters of fact which may be probable but never certain and need to be tested by the verification principle. No statement which refers to a reality transcending the limits of all possible sense experience can possibly have any literal significance. Ayer shows that the Logical Positivist charge against the metaphysician is not that he attempts to employ the understanding in a fields where it cannot probably venture, but that he produces sentences which fail to conform to the conditions under which alone a sentence can be literally significant. A metaphysician talks nonsense because he is deceived by grammar. Thus, Logical Positivists, claim that they have completely overthrown speculative philosophy. Philosophy, to them, is only logical analysis; not a theory, but an activity. Its function is analysis. Logical clarification of concepts, propositions and theories proper to empirical science. Thus, philosophy is identified with logical syntax, the higher-level discussion of languages, and the perennial problems of philosophy are dismissed as nonsense. Philosophy classes are, accordingly, converted into super-grammar classes.

However, Logical positivism has ceased to become a fashionable philosophy today, because I) its attack on metaphysics has damped the vigor and chastened the style of its remaining adherents, and ii) its approach to
language is unnecessarily rigid and doctrinaire. Even Ayer is doubtful about carrying through the program of phenomenalism and uneasy about the verification principle.

Still, the impasse that Logical Positivism has reached is unfortunate, because:

i) The doctrine of Logical Positivism has led to dogmatism and intolerance; so that metaphysical question are dismissed as unworthy of attention of sensible men. Theories like the veridical principle, the emotive theory of ethics and logical construction are simply announced as if they formed a part of revelation denied to other philosophers except Hume.

ii) Sense experience, as the criterion of truth, has led to solipsism, as it did in the case of the sophists and Hume. Sense experience is private and cannot be communicated. The more radical among them, like Carnap and Neurath, were hence led to physicalism, which is nearer to behaviors in psychology.

iii) For logical positivists, as for other empiricists, sense experience is the only criterion knowledge. Modern psychical Research, in the other hand, affirms the possibility of extra-sensory experiences. In addition there are certain other experienced, like the speculation, moral and aesthetic.

The problem of supersensuous emixperience is not new to us in India. All schools of Indian philosophy, except the carvakas and Mimamsakas, believe in it. Supersensuous experience transcends the categories of time, space ad causality; " Our sense organs are narrowly specialised to serve biological and practical ends. In the face of these facts, it would be narrow and fanatical to insist on sensory experience and the verification principle as the only criteria of knowledge. Like the men chained against the walls of the cave in The Republic. The empiricists refuse to see beyond what they would like to affirm.

iv) Moreover, for the Logical Positivists the verification principle has been a dogma and a commandment. But the principle of verification is not a self-evident statement, nor is it capable philosophy is itself based on a metaphysic. Certain presuppositions about the universe.

v) Nevertheless, the effects of Logical Positivism have been serious. It has engendered a negative climate of opinion, and was likely to shatter the old beliefs in the social, moral and religious spheres with nothing else to fill the gap except, analysis of propositions. Its has produced a ‘ waste land’ of mind of which T.S.Eliot’s poem is at once description and, by implication, a denunciation.

3. A survey of the course of philosophy in the past shows that philosophy continually faced this impasse. The a priori deductive method took us the lion’s den. At the height of its speculation, it built super – structures of philosophy were led t solipsism and to the feverish denial of metaphysics,
To save philosophy from this impasse, we have to adopt a synoptic view towards the problems of philosophy. We should realise that reality is complex and life is a many-coloured dome. Idealism was unable to see the wood. While empiricism could not see the wood in the trees. These were two ways of approaching the problem; but they are not the only ways, nor were the approaches absolute. This is the synoptic outlook. In this sense, philosophy is to see life steadily and see it whole. Broad says “If we do not look at the world synoptically we shall have a very narrow view of it.” He thinks that a purely critical philosophy is arid and rigid.”

The Jaina view of anekanta comes nearer to this approach. Anekanta consists in a many-sided approach to the study of problem. Intellectual tolerance is the foundation nonviolent attitude. It emphasizes the many – sidedness of truth. Reality can be looked at from various angles.

Whitehead’s fundamental attitude in philosophy is essentially the same as the anekanta view of life. Whitehead defined speculative philosophy as the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted.

We have to note that the function of philosophy is not merely an academic pursuit of reality. It is a way of life, philosophy has had the dual purpose of revealing truth and increasing virtue. Philosophers have sought to provide a principal to live by and purposes to live for. For this practical end, philosophers have striven to achieve a synoptic view of the universe. The consciousness of the finiteness of our being makes us yearn for the beyond, in the spirit of the Upanisads from the unreal to the real, from darkness to light, and from death to eternal life.

For this, we have to look to the spiritual experience of the great seers. Broad says there is one thing which speculative philosophy must take into most serious consideration and that is the religious and mystical experience of mankind. It is they who are in constant touch with the innermost depth of life and to them we are to look for guidance. Such ‘enlightened ones’ or ‘sages’ are the first- hand exponents of philosophy.

**Chapter-2 : APPROACH TO REALITY**

Jainism is realistic and pluralistic. Its philosophy is based on logic and experience. Moksa is the ultimate aim of life. It is realised by the three-fold path of right intuition, right knowledge and right conduct. Right knowledge is possible by the right approach to the problem of life. Anekanta, the Jainas believe, gives us the right approach to looking at the fundamental non- violent attitude of the Jainas. It is the expression of intellectual non- violence.

In surveying the field of Indian philosophy, Dr. padmarajiah mentions five types of philosophy considered from the point of view of the nature of reality. They are:

1. **Philosophy of Being** – samkara represents this school of thought

   Or identity.

2. **Philosophy of Becoming (change or difference)** Buddhism
Buddhism presents this view.

3. Philosophy subordinating difference to identity-
   i) The samkhya ii) Bhedabhedacada and
   iii) Visistadavaita hold this attitude.

1. Philosophy subordinating identity to difference-
   i) The vaisesika, ii) Dvaita of Madhvacrya gives this view.

2. Philosophy co-ordinating both identity and difference –
   The Jaina view of reality presents this attitude.

Jainism meets the extremes and presents a view of reality which comprehends the various sides of reality to give a synthetic picture of the whole. It recognises the principle of distinction and develops the comprehensive scheme of anekanta Realism. Anekanta is the ‘most consistent form of realism’, as it allows the principal of distinction to run its full course until it reaches its logical terminus on the theory of manifold reality and knowledge.

Anekanta consists in a many-sided approach to the study of problem. It emphasizes a catholic outlook towards all that we see and experience. Intellectual tolerance is the foundation of the doctrine. It arose as an antidote to the one-sided and absolute approach to the study of reality of the philosophers at the time. It arose out of the confusion of the problem of the nature of reality. The Upanisadic philosophers sought to find the facts of experiences. This search gave rise to many philosophical theories. Buddhism tried to presents a fresh and a different approach in the Madhyana pratipada Drsti. The Anekanta view presents a coherent picture of the philosophies, pointing out the important truths in each of them. It looks at the problem from various points of view. The cardinal principal of the Jaina philosophy is its Anekanta, which emphasize that ‘there is not only diversity but that real is equally diversified.

II. Although Anekanta was a special feature of the Jaina point of view, it is possible to say that some other schools of thought were aware of this view. In Buddhist philosophy the phrase majjhima magga bears the same significance as Anekanta. Pandit sukhalaji sanghavi, in his introduction to the sanmati Tarka, says that the doctrine of Anekanta and the madhyma marag have great resemblence in the fundamental idea underlying them. Anatmavada of sanjaya, vibhajjavada, madhyma pratipada which induced the Buddha to treat all prevalent opinions with respect may be mentioned as expression of Anekanta attitude. Similarly Bhedabheda- vada of Bhartrprapance is referred to as Anekanta. Gautama, the Buddha, faced the confusion of thought presented in his time about the ultimate nature of reality. He was silent about these problems. In Digha Nikaya, Gautma says ‘It is not that I was, it is not that I will be, I will not be; it is not that I am, I am not’ The Buddha described his attitude to Manavaka as Vibhajjavada. This is similar to Anekanta, although it is not so clearly defined and developed. No specific
words suggesting the doctrine of Anekanta are found in the philosophic literature of ancient India. It is suggested that the doctrine of evolution as propounded by the Samkhya School imply the Anekanta attitude. However, the Jainas perfected the doctrine and systematized it. The Buddhist philosopher sanataraksita makes mention of the Anekanta of the vipremimamsakas, Nigghantas and kaplia samkhayas. Among the Jaina exponents, Mahavira practised the attitude and is supposed to have expresses it in the syadvada.

A clear expression of the Anekanta attitude is seen in Mahavira’s discussions with his disciples. In the Bhavavatisutra, there is a dialogue between Mahavira and his disciple Gautama.

“Are the souls lord, eternal or non-eternal?”

“The souls are eternal in some respects and non-eternal in some other respects. …… They are eternal, o Gautama, from the point of view of substance and non-eternal from the point of view of modes.”

Again, the problem of body and mind was answered by Mahavira as-

“The body, O Gautama is identical with the soul and not identical with soul in different respects.”

The application of the principal of Anekanta can be seen in their analysis of the metaphysical question concerning the categories. The Jaina theories of atoms, of space and soul, to mention a few instances, illustrate the pervading influence of the Anekanta viewpoint. Atoms are of the same kind: they can yet give the infinite variety of things, pudgala has certain inalienable features, but within limits it can become anything through qualitative differentiation. The transmutation of elements is quite possible in this view and is not a mere dream of the alchemist.

Space is another instance of a manifold real. It is incorporeal and formless, yet divisible and its divisibility is spontaneous feature, Abhayadeva develops the concepts of manifoldness of space as a polemic against the Naiyayika view of space as one and partless. The souls are individual centres of experience. Like the Leibnizian monads the soul mirrors the entire universe within self as a unique centre of experience. The universe it mirrors is infinitely complex; and its experimental powers must be manifold commensurate with the complicity of the experienced universe.

In the Anga literature of the Jainas the doctrine of Anekanta was briefly and incidentally discussed. But in the commentaries of the Jaina scripture written in Prakrit it has received greater attention. But when the Sanskrit language found a place in the Jaina literature, it occupied an important position. The commentary on the Tattvarthasutra of Umasvati gives an exhaustive description of the problem. Latter, a systematic exposition of the doctrine was given by Jaina scholars like samantabhadra, siddhasena Divakara, mallavadi, pujyapada, Akalanka, vidyanandi and others.
The Anekanta view does imply the principal of reciprocity and interaction among the reals of the universe, as given by Kant, although this principal is more implied than expressly stated in Jainism.

In kantianism as in Jainism, the principal of reciprocity goes beyond the ‘coexistence’ or the inter-relatedness of the substances and explains the ‘dynamical community’ among them. But the Jaina is a thorough-going realist. Anekantavada is a theory of reality which asserts the manifoldness and complexity of the real. In apprehending the complexity of the universe, it has crystallized itself into the two-fold dialectic of Nayavada and syadvada; and they are complementary processes forming a normal and inevitable development of the relativistic presupposition of the Jaina metaphysic.

III. Anekanta emphasizes that the truth is many-sided. Reality can be looked at from various angles. Two doctrines result from the Anekantavada: I) Nayavada and ii) syadvada. Nayavada is the analytic method investigating a particular standpoint of factual situation. Syadvada is primarily synthetic designed to harmonise the different viewpoints arrived at by Nayavada. Nayavada is ‘primarily conceptual’ and the syadvada is synthetic and mainly verbal, although this sometimes maintained that conceptual is also verbal and the verbal method is so much changed with epistemological characters. The distinction between the conceptual and the verbal has mainly a reference to the fact that point of view have to be expressed in language and predicated in specific forms so as to embody them. The concept is formed from this point of view.

Naya refers to the point of view one takes when one looks at the object. A naya is defined as a particular opinion or a viewpoint of looking at an object. It expresses a partial truth about an object as known by a knowing subject. The Jainas give example of the blind men and the elephant. The blind men feel the animal and describe it, each in his own way similarly, we look at objects and describe them in our own way from different angles. Other viewpoints are also recognised; and they need to be recognised with each in the scheme of a fuller and more valid knowledge which is the sphere of pramana.

The Jainas have formulated a methodological scheme consisting of seven ways of looking at reality. There was a problem whether the seven Nayas can be reduced in number. There are three tradition. The first tradition adopts seven Nayas. The second eliminates Naigama Naya and reduces the list to six. In the third tradition we have five, as samabhirudha and Evambhuta Naya have been subsumed under sabda Naya. Umasvati is largely responsible for the first and the third traditions. In the Digambara version of the tattvarthasutra seven ways have been mentioned, but the svetambara version given five Nayas as mentioned in the third tradition. The different points of view are the Nayas. Various Nayas have been mentioned. As shown above Umasvati first mentions five Nayas and then adds the subdivision. The Agamas have mentioned two points of view: I) samgraha Naya, the point of view of the universal, the synthetic point of view and ii) paryaika Naya, the viewpoint of the particular, the analytic point of view.

Siddhasena Divakara in his sanmati Tarka adopted the two points of view and distributed the Nayas under two heads. He described the six Nayas. But the generally accepted classification of Nayas is sevenfold. Three of them refer to objects and their meaning, and the others to the words. In the first category we get three: I) samgraha Naya, ii) Vyavahara Naya, and iii) Rjusutra Naya. Siddhasena
Divakara says that samgraha and Vyavahara are subdivisions of the Dravyarthika Naya. Samgraha Naya gives the synthetic point of view. It gives, as Radhakrishanan points out, the class point of view. In this, we seek to approach the unity amidst the diversity by finding the common element in the variety presented in the world. Absolute monism is the conclusion of this point of view. Exaggerated emphasis on the universal would lead to samarahabhasa; and samkhya and Adcaita schools of philosophy are notable instances. The absolute emphasis on the one and unity dismissing all diversity as appearance, is the position of the absolutists. The Jainas maintain that such a point of view, if it is taken in the absolute sense, presents a partial point of view.

Vyavahara Naya is the empirical point of view. It is the analytic point of view. It emphasises the diversity in the universe presented in the experience. We know things in their details and emphasize their individually. The attitude of the pluralists and the materialists is the outcome of the view.

Rjusutra Naya is narrower than the Vyavahara Naya, it looks at an object at a particular point of time, and does not see the continuity of the thing. The Jainas say that the Buddhist philosophy of ksanikavada is an example of the Rjusutra Naya.

Naigama Naya refers to the end or the purpose involved in the action. We interpret an activity an activity with references to the end for which it is done. For instance, a man who is carrying water and firewood will say that he is cooking or he is asked what he is doing. Siddhasena Divakara adopts a different point of view. Naigama Naya comprehends both the generic and specific qualities.

Another interpretation of Naya involves non-discrimination between the generic and the specific elements of an object. For example, when we state "The Bamboo grows here in plenty” the generic and the specific features of the bamboo are not within the focus of our attention. The principal of configuration and the Gestalt suggested by Gestalt school of psychology holds goods in this case.

The non-distinction is not, however, absolute and if the distinction is asserted absolutely there would be a fallacy of Naigamabhasa.

Paryayarthika Naya is the analytic point of view referring to the words and their meaning. It is a verbal interpretation of the terms used. It has three subdivisions: i) Sabda Naya, ii) Samabhirudha Naya, and iii) Evambhuta Naya. Sabda Naya consists in looking at the functional importance of the terms. The name has a function calling to our mind the object implied by the name. However, we very often forget that the meaning of a term is relative and varies with different contexts. We emphasize that the meaning is fixed. That gives rise to fallacies. Samabhirudha Naya is the application of the Sabda Naya. It refers to the roots of words. For instance, raja as a person who shines is different from the nṛpa, a person who rules over men and protects them. Evambhuta not only sees the difference between words with their different etymologies; but it sees the difference between one and the same word, if it does not signify the meaning denoted by the root in the word. For instance, there is a difference between raja when he is shining and raja when he is not shining. In this we give a word a fixed meaning, something by usage. For instance, a ‘nut’ has come to mean in English a showy man.
The Cambridge philosophers and analytic school of philosophers in the present day assert the exclusive application of the form of Paryaya Naya to express Sabda-nayabhasa.

In Evambhuta Naya we restrict the meaning of the word to the very function connoted by the name. It is a specialised from of the Samabhirudha. For instance, a building will be called a house as long as it is used for residential purposes. But if it is used for office purposes, it will not be appropriate to call it a house.

Thus, each Naya or point of view represents one of the many ways for which a thing can be looked at. The Nayas remind us that our points of view looking at the things are relative, and over-emphasis on one point of view as absolute and the only point of view would be a mistake. It would give an abhasa, or appearance of truth, only. It gives rise to the wrong point of view. According to the Jainas, Nyaya-Vaisesika, Samkhya, Advaita Vedanta and the Buddhist systems adopt one of the Nayas; but they believe that their point of view is absolute and unerring. However, they present only partial truths. The Jainas point out that the controversy regarding causation presenting different views like the asatkaryavada and the satkaryavada, are one-sided and partial. But an object can be described in different ways. For instance, a gold necklace will be gold if we consider the substance out of which it is made but if it is looked at from the point of view of the modification, it may be described differently. Similarly, each Naya has a different extent. Naigama Naya has the greatest, and the Evambhuta Naya the least extent. Naigama deals with the real and the unreal, Samgraha with the real. Vyavahara deals with part of the real. Rjusutra refers to the present condition of the real, and Sabda only to the expression of the real. Samabhirudha has a reference to the particular expression. Evambhuta applies to the present activity.

IV. Syadvada is the logical expression of the Nayavada. The various points of view from which the reality can be looked at give the possibility of a comprehensive view of reality. Such a view needs expression for the sake of clarity and communication. This has been possible by means of sevenfold predication. It is called Saptabhangi, because of its sevenfold predication. It is the formulation of the doctrine of the possibility of apparent contradiction in a real whole. The real may as well contain contradictions without affecting the nature of the real, because the contradictions arise only because we take partial views of reality. According to the Jainas, other Darsanas present only the gleams of the broken light, while the Jaina view visualises the whole truth in its different aspects. Nayavada and Syadvada are varieties of Anekantavada. Syadvada is complementary to the Nayavada. Nayavada is analytic in character and Syadvada is synthetic. It investigates the various shades of the truth given by a Naya and integrates them into a consistent comprehensive synthesis. Dasgupta suggests that the relation between them expresses the many alternatives indicated by the Syadvada for any and every Naya. In the Syadvada all the aspects of truth are woven together into the synthesis of the conditioned dialectic.

Some have raised a controversy as to whether Syadvada is synonymous of Saptabhangi or of the entire Jaina philosophy. It is true that Syadvada has as important place in Jaina philosophy, but it cannot be equated with the entire Jaina philosophy. Prabhacandra states that Syadvada is synonymous with Saptabhangi. However, this is just a scholastic problem and is needless from the philosophical
point of view. Syadvada is that conditional method in which the modes, or predications (bhangah) affirm (vidhi), negate (nisedha) or both affirm and negate severally and jointly in seven different ways a certain attribute (bhava) of a thing (vastu) without incompatibility (avirodhena) in a certain context (prasnavasat). Reality is complex and its nature cannot be expressed in an unconditioned position. And the ‘syat’ would mean ‘in a certain sense’ or ‘from a certain point of view’. In this sense Syadvada warns us against building a dogmatic structure of reality in a single concept or judgement. That would be logical dogmatism (nirapeksavada) as against the sapekasavada expressed in Syadvada.

It is difficult to decide which is the earlier of the two. Nayavada seems to be earlier, because Umasvati in his Tatvartha-sutra describes the kinds of Nayas, but makes no mention of the Syadvada and the sevenfold propositions. Yet it is possible that it existed long before him. Buddhist Suttas mention the doctrine in an erroneous way as the doctrine not of the Nigganthes but of some recluse and Brahmins. In the earlier literature of the Jaina canon there are only a few passages in which there is a reference to Syadvada. They occur in the Bhagavati-sutra, in which it is expressed in the form of three propositions. Among the other early reference, Bhadrabhu’s Sutraktanga-Niryukti is prominent. The developed form of the doctrine in the form of the seven-fold propositions is well described in Pancastikayasara of Kunda-kundacarya and Aptamimamsa of Samantabhadra. Siddhasena Divakara, Akalanka and Vidyanandi are among the later writers who have given a systematic exposition of the doctrine.

Syadvada shows that there are seven ways of describing a thing and its attributes. It attempts to reconcile the contradiction involved in the predictions of the thing. It is possible to describe a thing in seven ways.

1. Syad asti asserts the existence of the thing. The word syat is difficult to translate. It is very often said that it connotes ‘perhaps’ or probability. But it would be more appropriate to say that it refers to the special context. Syat would then mean ‘in the context’. From the point of view of the substance, place, time and nature, we may say that a thing is. For instance, the jar exists, as it is made of clay in a particular place and time. Thus substance (dravya), attribute (bhaya), time (kala), and space (ksetra)—from the context of these relations existence and other attributes are predicated. A house exists, i.e., it is a house as built up and as long as it is occupied for the purpose of residence.

2. But the affirmation of an attribute necessarily involves the negation of its opposite; and such a negation is a logical necessity. Then we get the predication syad nasti. It means in the (other) context the thing does not exist. The jar does not exist if it is to mean that it is made of metal. The house is no longer a house if it be used as a godown. The existence of the house is denied in different contexts. Thus, if existence and non-existence are to be understood in different relations and contexts, there would be no opposition between them. One in a necessary concomitant of the other. These predictions are necessary and compatible in another sense. The affirmation of existence and denial of non-existence are meant to rebut the possibility of unqualified and absolute existence and non-existence. Thus the predications are logically necessary.
The importance of this predications lies in the irrefutable statement of the non-existence of a thing in the other context. 'Non-existence or non-bing is a determinate fact with a content and not a void'.

It would not be correct to say that one first and the second predications involve contradiction, because i) they are mutually complementary and ii) the two predications are not absolute assertions. The definition itself includes the clause ‘avirodhenā’.

It is very often contended that the contradictions, absolute existence and non-existence, are not objective facts, as no existence is known to have absolute existence and absolute non-existence as its characteristics. The opposition is unreal and the predication of the unreal opposition is not necessary. But, as Prof. Mukerji points out, it cannot be denied that it is possible to conceive the existence and non-existence of a thing though not ontologically real. The predications are therefore logically necessary to rebut such a conception of absolute existence and absolute non-existence. The Vedantist believes in the absolute existence of the one reality. The Sunyavadin does not believe in the existence of the absolute. The Jainas contend that the two may be predicated in different contexts. The first two predications are logically valid and psychologically necessary, as they serve to exclude absolute existence and absolute non-existence. The mention of the word syad function as a necessary condition and work as a corrective against the absolute way of thought. We may here refer to the logical opposition of Hegel, who said that affirmation and negation are ultimately reconciled by a higher unity, for they are the aspects of the same reality. However, the reference would be limited to the dialectical process, because the Jaina is realist and believes in the validity of empirical experience.

3. The third predication is syad asti nasti: ‘It is, it is not’. This refers to different contexts simultaneously. For instance, in a certain sense the jar exists and in a certain other sense the jar does not exist. The building is a house in so far as the purpose of the construction was for residence. But it is not a house as it is actually used as a godown. It is very often maintained that the predication is a mere summation of the first two. But the Jainas would appeal to experience and say that it gives a separate and necessary predication. It refers to a separate entity arising from the two but not the summation of the two. For instance, a garland of flowers may be said to be flowers, as it contains flowers, and also not merely flowers at the same time, because the flowers enter into a new relation with each other to form a whole. Similarly, in the description of the soul and the ultimate reality contradictory predicates have been made.

4. The fourth is a new predications. It expresses the indescribability of a thing. It is syad abaktavyam. It is possible that the real nature of the thing is beyond predication, or expression in the form of words. For instance, in the case of the jar, it exists in the svadāvaya, svarupa, svakala and svaksetra and no existence is predicated in the para-dravya, para-rupa, para-ksetra and para-kala. Yet its nature may be such that it cannot be easily described.

It is contended that the fourth predication is only an abbreviated form of affirmation and negation. The third predication shows the successive presentation, while the fourth gives the simultaneous presentation of the two. But, as Prof. Mukerji points out, it is still logically necessary, because it presents the facts of experience, that existence and non-existence are equally possible to be predicated.
in the same degree. Moreover, experience shows that the inexpressible asserts that the attributes are existing together, and a new element has arisen due to the synthesis. For instance, intoxicating liquor may be formed due to the combination of jaggery and ghataki flowers. But it is not a mere combination of the elements. It has in itself as identity of its own which cannot be described easily. In metaphysical speculation, the ‘unknowable’ of Herbert Spencer may be likened to predication of this type. Prof. Bhattacharya writes, ‘The given indefinite’ –‘the unspeakable’ or avaktavya as it has been called, as distinct from the definite existence, presents something other than consecutive togetherness: it implies saharpansa or co-presentation, which amounts to non-distinction or indeterminate distinction of being and negation. The common sense principle implied in its recognition is that what is given cannot be rejected simply because it is inexpressible by a single positive concept.

The primary modes of predication are three: syad asti, syad nasti and syad avaktavyam. The other four are obtained by combining the three.

The third predicate asti nasti offers successive presentation. In the fourth predication ‘inexpressible’ (avaktavyam) we get the expression of simultaneous predication. Dr. Padmarajiah discusses the four stages through which the concept or ‘inexpressible’ has developed: i) The naïve negative attitude in the Rgveda as expressed in the song of creation (BOOK V, 129) ii) A positive attitude as expressed in ‘sadasadvarenyam’ in the Mundaka Upanisad. It conceives with being and non-being as inherent in reality, owing to the positive character, this tendency has been discussed as the ubhaya phase of the concept. iii) The third phase is the logically sophisticated phase of the ‘negative tendency’ as shown in the expression like sa esa neti neti (Br. Up. 5-15). In this phase here is the clear awareness of the inexpressible nature of the ultimate as efforts to express the reality would be beset with contradictions. The Vedanta conception of anirvacaniya, the Buddha’s avyakta and Nagarjuna’s conception of the ultimate as being catuskoti-vinirmukta came under this stage. iv) The last phase in ‘the dialectical evolution’ of the idea of the inexpressible is expressed in the avaktavya of the Syadvada. It is a relativistic (sapekṣa) view and not the absolute view as presented in anirvacaniya. The Jaina states that sat and asat, in these combinations, are inevitable and distinctive feature of our objective experience. Again the avaktavya may show the inability to embody, within one symbol, the two fundamental aspects of reality with equal prominence. But this limitation is itself a necessary step in the dialectical movement of Syadvada.

K. C. Bhattacharya states ‘….If the inexpressible is objective as given, it cannot be said to be not a particular position nor to be non-existent. At the same time it is not the definite distinction of position and existence. It is a category by itself.

5. The fifth predication is formulated as syad asti avaktavyam. From the point of view of its own contexts (dravya, rupa, kala and ksetra) a thing is and indescribable. It asserts the co-presence of the two attributes, existence and inexpressibility. Both are real and necessary attributes. Existence relates to an object in the context of substance in respect of its internal determinations. Inexpressibility is an attribute which relates substance, in relation of identity and distinction, to its changing modes.
6. The sixth proposition expresses the negative aspect together with inexpressibility. It is syad nasti avaktavyam. In the context, it is not and is indescribable. In relation to the para-dravya, para-rupa, para-ksetra and para-kala it is not :- it is indescribable.

7. The seventh proposition asserts existence, non-existence and inexpressibility. It reads : syad asti nasti avaktavyam. In the contexts, it is, is not and is inexpressible. With reference to the sva-rupa, sva-dravya, sva-ksetra and sva-kala it exists, and with reference to the para-dravya, para-rupa, para-ksetra, para-kala non-existence can be predicated. Yet, in its real nature it may be such that it cannot be easily described. As Prof. Mukerji says, this predication gives a fuller and a more comprehensive picture of the thing than the earlier ones. The predicated attribute is a synthesis of the three attributes; still, it is not a mere summation of the attributes. It brings out the inexpressibility of a thing as well as what it is and what it is not.

Affirmation and negation inexpressibility are the three fundamental predications. This implies that all negation has a positive basis. Even imaginary concepts like the sky-flower possess a positive basis in the two reals, the sky and flower, although the combination is unreal. All things which are objects of thought are in one sense, and are not in another sense.

I. The doctrine of Syadvada has been criticised in various ways :-

1. it is said that the theory of sevenfold predication can only be the cause of doubt and not of certainty, the assertion of contradictory predicates implies that the present predication is in doubt. Belvalkar says that Syadvada is sceptical and non-committal in its attitude. With this agnostic and negative attitude one cannot have any dogma; and samkaracarya lays his finger accurately on the weakest point in the system when he says- "As thus the means of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of knowledge, are all alike, indefinite, how can the Tirthamkara (Jina) teach with any claim to authority and how can his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether indeterminate. Prof. Hiriyanna makes Syadvada a variety of skepticism. If all our Knowledge concerning reality is relative, they say (the old Indian critics like samkara, Ramanuja etc.), the Jaina view must also be relative. To deny this conclusion would be to admit, at least, one absolute truth; and to admit it would leave the doctrine with no settled view of reality, and thus turn it into a variety of scepticism.

But it may be pointed out that the conditions of doubt are not present in this assertion. For instance, a man sees a tree in the dusk and doubts whether it is a man or a branchless tree. This is due to the lack of determination between the specific features of the object as the perception is faulty. But in the case of the sevenfold presentation the attributes of existence and non-existence are each defined by their specific determinations. The condition of these determinations makes doubts impossible.

2. It is said that the sevenfold predication of the Jainas is beset with contradictions. Affirmation and denial of the attribute in the same object is not logically possible. It would be a self-contradiction. In this context we may refer to the criticism of samkara and Ramanuja. samkara’s criticism can be analysed into three stages. 1) He tries to point out the intrinsic impossibility of the prediction because of the inherent contradictions involved in it. Mutually contradictory and conflicting attributes
cannot exist together. But if we take into consideration the different contexts referred to, we may say that
the contradictions can be easily reconciled. In Experience in we get examples of co-existing conflicting
attributes. For instance, the branches may be in motion but the tree does not move. The same individual
may be father in relation to X and son in relation to Y. 2) He points out the futility of the doctrine because
the doctrine is indefinite. The unlimited assertion that all things are of non-exclusive nature gives
indefinite assertion like syad asti and syad nasti. Hence a man who holds such a doctrine of indefinite
context does not deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a mad man.

Recent writers on Indian philosophy have re-iterated the entire charge made by samkara and
Ramanuja and have shown that it is a kind of eclecticism, ‘a putting together of several partial truths’
without a proper synthesis. It is therefore characterised as a sort of compromise philosophy. The
halfhearted attempt of Jaina enquiry as expressed in Saptabhangi stops at giving partial truth together
and does not attempt to overcome the opposition implied in them by a proper synthesis.

But if we mean by definiteness unconditional and absolute assertion, then the ‘indefiniteness’ of
the doctrine is a logical necessity. As a Radhakrishnan points out the criticism of the Saptabhangi
doctrine as of on practical utility is an expression of personal opinion and as such need not be
considered.

Samkara also saya that the Saptabhangi doctrine is inconsistent with the other views of Jaina
philosophy. The assertions of existence, non-existence and indescribability are alike applicable to the
doctrine of the soul and the categories. Similarly, the final release may exist and not exist and may be
indescribable.

The dialectic of Syadvada is inconsistent with the Jaina philosophy. It could not have sprung from
the same teacher and the same philosophical background. “AS a mere ‘anaikantika’ (sic) theory of
prediction, the Syadvada must return upon itself and end in doubting the doubter himself. Prof.
Radhakrishnan after mentioning the strong points of syadvada says “Yet in our opinion the Jaina logic
leads to a monistic idealism (by which he means ‘the hypothesis of absolute’) and so far as the Jainas
shrink from it they are untrue to their own logic”. But in the Saptaabhiangi tarangini we read a counter
argument: If the final release and heavenly bliss are eternal and existing, where is the chance for
samsara and the attempt to obtain moksa? If the other alternative the only truth, what is the purpose of
preaching such an ideal which impossible to attain? Radhakrishnan points out that the Saptabhangi
doctrine is not inconsistent with the other views of the Jainas. It is logical corollary of the Anekantavada.
All that the Jainas say is that everything is of a complex nature and the real reconciles the difference in
itself. Attributes which are contradictory in the abstract co-exist in the world of experience.

Ramanuja also pinked out that contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot at the
same time belong to one thing any more than light and darkness. However, he seems to accept the
distinction between dravya and parayaya, substance and modes. He also sees that the substance has
permanence; parayaya implied change.
But the predications give severally partial truths. The truths presented by them are alternative truths from different points of view; and the seven predications would present a complete comprehensive picture of reality. It is neither skepticism not agnosticism, for each individual truth is valid. It is supplemented and harmonised by the other predication into a signal comprehensive picture of reality, as we get a harmony in orchestra by the combination of different notes.

With all their criticisms, Belvalkar makes Syadvada a most searching characteristic. Radhakrishnan observes “Samkara and Ramanuja critisse the Saptabhangi view on the ground of the impossibility of contradictory attributes co-existing in the same thing”. After quoting the relevant passage from Ramanuja he proceeds to say: “The Jainas admit that a thing cannot have self-contradictory attributes at the same time and in the same sense. All the they say is that everything is of a complex ature, reconciles differences in itself. Attributes which are contradictory in abstract co-exist in life and experience. The tree is moving in that its branches are moving and it is not moving since it is fixed to its place in the ground”.

VI. In Western thought, at the time of the Greeks, when there was intellectual confusion due to the conflicting theories presented by the different philosophers, several approaches to problems were possible. Promenades had emphasized ‘Being; Heraclitus had talked of change; Empedocles and Anaxagoras had thought that the reality consists of a plurality of substance. The atomizes left the infinite atoms floating in the air. Thus there was intellectual confusion. It was difficult to reconcile these conflicting views. Protagoras escaped the problem and said, Homo measure. The Sophists left the wise to wrangle with them and the quarrel of the universe let be.

But the Jainas did not accept such an escapist attitude. They faced facts squarely and tried to find out what was common between the conflicting views of the philosophers. This was the Anekanta attitude of the Jainas.

The Jainas appeal to experience and say the \textit{a priori} reasoning independent of experience is incompetent to yield insight into the nature of the rea. The Jainas steer clear of conflicting views of reality. They make us aware of the fact that intellectual dogmatism is not healthy and a many-sided approach to the problem will develop in us a sense of tolerance and respect for others. Intellectual Animas is most necessary especially in an age when conflicting ideologies are trying to claim the monopoly of truth for themselves and give rise to intolerance and hatred. We live in a world of fear, distrust. It is time we tried to understand each other in an atmosphere of give ad take. We must find out what is common between us rather than emphasize the differences. The Anekanta view is not skepticism because it is not founded on doubt and distrust; it is not solipsism, because it is based on an objective determination of things; but it presents catholic approach to the problems of life. Bernard Russell has mentioned that truth or falsity refers to propositions and this is based on facts: it is to be true. Similarly, a negative proposition must have a corresponding objective fact if it is to be true. He mentions this as ‘negative fact’. Thus we find that contradictory predications are not merely subjective, but they have an objective basis.
Thus we find that Anekantacada manifests itself as the most consistent form of realism in Indian philosophy. It has allowed the principle of distinction to run its full course until it reaches its logical terminus, the theory of manifoldness of reality and knowledge. It postulates the multiplicity of the ultimate release constituting the cosmos. The Anekanata view of reality permeates every aspect of life and experience.

Whitehead's theory of coherence comes nearer to Anekanta attitude of the Jainas. He elucidates his attitude to reality by presenting the complete problem of the metaphysics, of substance and of flux as a ‘full expression of the union of two notions’. Substance expresses permanence and flux emphasizes impermanence and change. Reality is to be found in the synthesis of the two. He interprets the lines:

‘Abide with me;

Fast falls the eventide’

By showing that the two lines cannot be torn apart in this way and we find that a wearing Balinese between the two is a characteristic of the greater number of philosophers. Whitehead shows that reality can be best understood by the integral viewpoints in which the ultimate postulates of permanence and flux are harmoniously blended. Heraclitus emphasized the partial truth of change and flux. Promenades presented permanence and being as the reality. Reality is to be found in the blinding with the two viewpoints into a comprehensive whole.

For Whitehead, coherence would mean that the fundament ideas presuppose each other. In isolation they are meaningless. It does not mean they are definable in terms of each other, though they are relevant to each other. No entity’ can be conceived in complete abstraction from the system of the universe, and that it is the business of speculative philosophy to exhibit this truth. This character is its coherence.

He also says: ‘The systematisation of knowledge cannot be conducted in watertight compartments. All genera truths condition each other; and the limits of the application cannot be adequately defined apart from their correlation by yet wider generalities.

This is the attitude of the Jainas also. The Jaina emphasis on the material and spiritual as a synthesis of opposites leads to a concrete universal involving unity in diversity. It is comparable to Jasper’s unfanatical absoluteness’ Jainas in their theory of Anekanta illustrate a ‘non-attachment of partial truths; and they have made creative use of the contradictions by removing the sting out of them, Headgear presents a similar point of view.

In our political life, Pancasila, as our late Prime Minister has pointed out, is the paced for the ills of our present-day life. And Pancasila expresses the spirit of Anekanta.
Right Understanding – Some Hurdles

I. Right understanding (Samyagcarīra) constitute the triple path towards self-realisation. There is need to a harmonious blending of the three paths. Right understanding is the basis; it leads to right knowledge. This is faith rooted in intuitive rasp of the truth and not related to superstitious uncritical acceptance of truth. It is looking inward and it may be referred to as the “menta set” in the psychological sense.

46 Acarya Samantabhadra has mentioned 8 characteristics of Samyagdarsana:

1. Nihsankita is the deep-rooted faith in the persons who are authorities and in the validity of the sacred texts.
2. Nihkaniksita spirit of non-attachment towards the fruits of Nihkanksa. It should be purely spiritual craving.
3. Nirvicikitsa: it to be free from illusions and stupor.
4. Amudhadṛsti is to be grew from the perversity of beliefs, which may be called amudhatva.
5. Upaguhana refers to the emphasis on the right aspect of the Samyagdrsti in the sense that we should discourage to aim at patria and half-hearted right-mindedness,
6. Sthitikarana is to secure steadfastness and to lead towards rightness of understanding. The fallen angel’s in the path have to be restored to the path of right direction.
7. Vatsalya emphasis’s that we should have love and kindness towards those leading the path of righteousness without of course showing ill-will towards the fallen. Those “who hunger and thirst after righteousness shall be filled.” 47
8. Pravavaba is to kindle the light of right understanding by removing many misconceptions, inadequacies and deficiencies. The hurdles in the path of right understanding are many and varied. Some of the difficulties are psychological. Acarya Samantabhadra has give an enlightened adable descriptions of the psychological and sociological impediments in the acquisition of rightness of outlook and right understanding.

II. Acarya Samantabhadra says that right understanding and right faith would be vitiated by the two psychological and sociological processes: 48

1. Eight types of city (Arrogance) and 2 three types of folly. We may also class them as forms rooted in ignorance. The first distinction refers to the 8 forms of Mada (vanity) and the second has reference to the 3 types of mudhata.

The 8 types of vanity are primarily psychological. They vitiate the working of the mind and create perversity of outlook, which becomes an obstacle in the development of right understanding. We lose
the balance of understanding and are strayed away from the right path of grasping the truth. We live in the world of self- verge illusion about ability and achievements. We are lost in the jungle of subjective fantasies The 8 types of verity are:

(i)  
**Jnana mada:** In this we live in the world of our own creation that we are the wisest me on the earth. It is the Vanity of knowledge. Vanity (arrogance) of knowledge is born out of the immaturity of mind. We gloat over our own intellectual achievements and suffer from the illusion of vanity of knowledge.

(ii)  
**Pujaniyata mada:** In this we become blind to our short comings and failures because some people respect us. Respect and admiration for whatever little we have achieved, sometimes takes us off the rails of the right perspective of our personality. We gloat in our glory and we move with half open eyes in the illusion of superiority. This is the vanity of superiority.

(iii)  
**Kula mada** refers to the arrogance of the status of the family and birth. A person born in a high family and endowed richly with the emanates of life is likely to lose the balance of his mind in the matter of estimating his personality in the right perspective. He thinks no end of himself and he develops an attitude of conceit for his way of life and dices for the lower round of society. He looks at the lowliest and the lose with sneering disdain. He is far away from the path of rightness of understanding and righteousness.

(iv)  
**Jatimada** is the arrogance of birth in a particular ‘higher’ society and community. This also makes him lose the balance of the perspective of life and society. It leads him towards the disdain of the lowly in society and exploits them to his advantage.

(v)  
**Bala mada** In this, one develops the sense of superiority for strength and valour. He may become a tyrant and maniac. Adolf Hitler is an example of a person who suffered from the illusion of racial superiority and of the need for the extermination of the Jewish people. He was so full of arrogance of power and authority, that when, once, it is reported, Lord chamberlain asked him how he was so confident of winning the war for which he was so greatly clambering. Adolf Hitler called a few of his guards of the suicide squad and ordered them to jump from the 4th floor and die. The Guards did jump and die. They had to sacrifice their lives for the sake of glorifying the power of Adolf Hitler. This is the arrogance of strength and power.

(vi)  
**Rddhimada** This is the vanity of the possession of some extra-ordinary power. The possession of miracles and supernormal powers through the tapas and yougic practices may bring some powers. But one, pursuing the path of spiritual perfection, should desist from using them. Otherwise, one is likely to lose the balance of mind and become arrogant towards the fellow mortals. There are numerous instances *Rsis* who have fallen from the height of spirituality because of their arrogance of the attainment of certain power, and possession of wealth.
(vii) Tapo mada refers to the vanity of ascetic practices. One feels superior because he unlike the lowly fellow mortals’ practises penance, that gives arrogance of tapas, and he strays away from the true path of perfection.

(viii) Sarira mada is the arrogance of having a beautiful body. We forget that the form and the physical beauty are temporary. They fade. We forget that we get old and that in old and that in old age and in accidents. Defocoescoes and deformities are formed. To gorged this and to love and admire one’s beautiful body creates an illusion of superiority and a disdain for the less fortunate fellow mortals.

The 8 types cavity vitiate the mind, make us forget the real nature of the pursuit of truth. We do not get back the perspective of life and personality and we ‘lose the soul’

2. we now turn our attention towards understanding the 3 types of folly (Mudhata). They are

(i) Loka-mudhata: It refers to the superstitious practices in social and religious matters. These practices are based on blind irrational foundations generations. These refer to the customs and mores which are not directly recant to the purpose of achieving the personal social and spiritual excellence. For take the holy dips in the river and in sea for the sake washing off our sins. If taking bath in the holy rives were to wash away our sins, the Buddha asked, then the fish and crocodiles living permanently in the river would have washed all their sins ans. would have been assured of a seat in heaven. Similarly, practices like jumping from the top of the mountain for the same reason would be blind practice. men worship all sorts of deities made of sand and stone. Going ‘sati’ after the death of the husband is also irrational. All these practices are rooted in ignorance and blind superstitious beliefs regarding the good of man. They constitute the ignorance of the populace Lokamudhata.

(ii) Devamudhata 50 refers top the worship of the fierce and benevolent deities from whom we expect protection, punishment or rewards. We worship the deities for the sake of propitiating them so that the fierce deities may not harm us and benevolent may reward us with prosperity. We forget the fact that the god is a spiritual force. He neither rewards punishes. If he or she were to indulge in such tasks of rewarding and punishment, they would be steeped in the baser impulses and emotions of the animal world. Such gods are no gods. We should free ourselves from such superstitious practices. They are rooted in the practices of the primitive ma handed down to us for centuries on end. This is an anthropological problem for study.

(ii) Gurumudhata 50 is the following a guru ( teacher or preceptor) who does not possess the requisite excellence of a guru. A true teacher is one who has mental, moral and spiritual excellence. He must have knowledge and wisdom. He is selfless and compassionate. He is a seeker after truth. But very often we run after persons who do not possess these qualities and who are not fit to be called guru. They indulge in all sorts of unseemly activities. To follow such gurus constitutes Gurumudhata. This type of analysis of the folly has great social significance. In our age, we find we run after those mediocre
men who profess to have knowledge and power and who dote on authorities. In our academic institutions like colleges and the Universities, we rarely find real scholars who are devoted to their studies, pursuit of knowledge and teaching. They are more interested in their personal benefit and they run after administrative and political power. They indulge in unacademic and unseemly activities. They are the teacher politicians. Such men should be avoided and be kept away from the young impressive minds. However, it is not to be said that this type of intellectual and social climate is to be found in our time only. Socrates railed against the sophists and the academic and political brigands. He crusaded against hypocrisy. And he had to drink hemelok.

III. We are, here, reminded of similar attempts made by eminent philosophers in the Middle Ages and in the modern period in the west to clear the cobwebs of thought for the sake of establishing the truth. Socrates aimed at defining terms. Some the logins in the middle ages sought to give the guidelines for thought. But we should note that til the beginning of the era, philosophy was tied down to the apron stings of Aristotle’s philosophy. One who deviated was condemned. There is a story of a serious attempt made by eminent philosophers to find out the number of teeth a horse has. They referred to the Classical texts and the books of Aristotle. But when a young scientist, imbued with the modern sprit of investigation, humbly suggested that a horse be brought to the Conference hall to count the teeth instead of pouring in the ancient classical texts, the elderly scholars looked at him with surprise and derision, because “Aristotle never did that”.

It was against this type of stagnation of knowledge and academic slavery that Francis Bacon protested. He said that if we have to pursue truth, we have per force to be free from the follies arising out of the fallacies I thought and due to the purely deductive approach towards the seeking of truth. Truth needs to be sought in the world outside and not merely in the deduction of conclusions from the premises in the Aristotelian syllogisms. Francis Bacon started the movement of induction in the scientific investigation as a methodology of investigation.

Francis Bacon wanted to remove the cobwebs of thought in order to get the correct picture of reality. Bacaon put more life into logic. Making induction an epic adventure and a conquest. Philosophy needed a new method. In order to seek the truth in the real sense of the term, Bacon urged us to free ourselves from the traditional stagnation’s and the fallacies of thought. “Expurgation of thought is the step” we must become, as little children, innocent of ‘isms’ and abstractions, washed clear of prejudices and preconceptions. We must destroy the Idols of the mind. Idol is a picture taken for a reality, a thought mistaken for a thing. Becon mentions 4 Idols of the mind we should scrupulously avoid in seeking truth.

The 4 Idols of the mind are:

(i) Idols of the tribe,
(ii) Idols of the Cave,
(iii) Idols of the market place and
(iv) Idols of the Theatre.

(i) The idols of the tribe constitute the fallacious nature to humanity in general. “For man’s sense is falsely asserted to be standard of thing- Our thoughts are pictures rather of ourselves than of their
objects. For instance human understanding, from its peculiar nature, easily supposes a greater degree of order in the Universe than it really finds. Hence, the fiction that the celestial bodies move in perfect circle. All superstition is much the same, whether it be that of Astrology, dreams, omens, retributive judgement or the like, in all of which the deluded believers observe events which are fulfilled, but neglect and pass over their failure, though it be much more common

(ii) The Idols of the cave are errors peculiar to the individual man. “For every one. has a cave or den of his own, which refracts or discolors the light of nature” The judgements are vitiated by individual moods and the personal factor in the constitution of the mind. Some minds are synthetic, and some analytic. Some show unbounded enthusiasm for antiquity, some others eagerly embrace novelty. Only a few can have a just perspective. Truth has no parties.

(iii) The Idols of the Market place arise from the commerce and associatio of ment with one another. They use language as the medium, but they forget that words are sometimes misleading, as they are imposed according to the understanding of the crowd. We I the present day have used the word ‘socialism’ without understanding the connotation of the word. Philosophers have used the phrases like “the infinite” or ‘The first mover unmoved’ but these are Fig-leaf phrases used to cover naked ignorance and perhaps indicative of a guilty conscience in the user.

(iv) The Idols of the Theatre have migrated into men’s minds from the various dogmas of philosophers and also from the wrog lowas demonstration. All the systems of philosophy are so many stage plays representing worlds of their creation after an unreal and scenic fashion. And in the plays of this philosophic theatre you may observe the same thing which is found in the theatre of poets, -- that stogies invented for the stage are more compact and elegant, and more as we would wish them to be, than true stories out of history. The world as Plato, ad pictures of Plato rather than the world.

We shall never get far along the path of truth if these idols are still tied to us. We should free ourselves from the subjective elements in the pursuit of truth. Truth is to any man’s monopoly. It is universal as objective. The philosophers and the seers from times immemorial have striven to reach the highest through the means of reason and intuition. Reasion leads us to the understanding of empirical reality, while it is the highest experience, which leads us to the Truth. Francis Bacon had the limited objective of providing the methodology of scientific investigation. Acarya Samantabhadra has taken the perspective of spiritual reality and has shown the pitfalls in the path to self-realisation. It is the seers; the Rsis light they lead us on. Such enlighten ones or the ‘sages are the first hand exponents of philosophy.

Chapter-3 : THE JAINA THEORY OF THE SOUL

The problem of the soul has been a perennial problem in religion and speculative philosophy. Primate man had made a distinction between body and soul. The burial of the death with their belongings and even the mummification of the Egyptians are based o such a distinction between body and spirit. The philosophical concept of the soul has developed from such primitive distinctions.

Anthropological evidence shows that the notion of soul and spirit was first formed by primitive man as an explanation of certain features of his experience like dream and sleep. For him soul is an ethereal image of the
body. It is ethereal, tenuous or filmy; ad it possesses the power of flashing quickly from one place to another. Yet it was not conceived as purely immaterial. In Plato we find the emphatic primacy of the psyche or soul I the dialogues from the *Apology* onwards to the *Laws*.

In the Homeric thought psyche appears as a shadowy double of the body. But Socrates and plato recognised the soul as man’s real self. Socrates said that we should aim at the perfection of our souls. Plato shows that of all the things that man has, next to the gods, his soul is the most diva and most truly his own. Body in fact is the shadow of the soul. Jowett says that Plato was concerned with emphasising the priority of soul to the body, towards the end of his ife, as he gave importance to the idea of good in the *Republic* and of beauty in the *symposium*. Plato said that the soul is immortal because its very idea ad essence is the self-moving and self-moving, that which is the fountain and the beginning of motion to all that moves besides.

Plato reversed the primitive conception of the soul as a shadowy double of the body and identified the true as the soul, but he pressers and accentuates the origin animistic dualism. Approaching the question with the scientific spirit, Aristotle started with the living organism and defined the psyche as the principle of life. He distinguished the different levels of psychical functions, from the vegetative to the ration. The soul is the actualistion of the potentiality of life, and therefore defined as the ‘entelechy’, as the fulfillment of the body. The idea of the soul is intrinsically independent of the body implies the conception of its substantiality. Conceiving the soul as a simple and indestructible substance its immortality. So did plato emphasize the simple ad unitary nature of the soul.

In modern psychology, the idea of the soul is no longer important. In its place has come notion self or ‘the centers of interest’. The word soul is ambiguous. Sometimes it stands for MD, sometimes for self and sometimes for both. The English world points to an entity as the cause or vehicle of physical or psychical activities of the individual person. The soul is a spiritual substance. In Indian though the word *atman* has undergone various changes. It is little used in the vedas. It primarily meant breath. In the *Upaisads* another word, *pra*, is used for breath, ad atma stands for the innermost part of ma man was *atmmavat*. For the Upanisadic seers, the soul was a propositio for a experiences. Indian philosophies, with the exception of Mayavada of samkara and Ksanikavada of Buddhists, fundamentally agree about the nature of the soul as a permanent, eternal and imperishable substance. But the primitive Aryans believed that the essence of ma is continued after death in a shadowy existence in some subtle bodily form. This is not the soul of the later philosophers. Jacobi cas it psyche. This is the development of the primitive notion of life after death lingering in some form. It is found eve today in the practice of *sraddda*. The psyche is frequently spoken of as *purusa* of the size of the thumb (agustha-matra). At the time of death it departs from the body. In the oldest Upanisads the psyche is described as costituted by the *praas*, psycho-physyciscal factors. Still, these factors were not regarded as principles of personality.

II. The idea of the soul has occupied an important position in Jaina philosophy. Jainism aims at the liberation of the soul from the cycle of birth and death. The saving of the soul is the Christia ideal. In the *Apology*, plato makes socrates say that his mission was to get men to care for their souls and to make them as good as they can be.

Jainism is dualistic. There is a dichotomous decision of categories. All things are divided into living and non-living, souls and non-souls. In the first verse of the *Dracyasamgraha*, we read," the ancient amont: the great Jainas have described the dracyas as *jiva* and *ajiva* Jiva is a category, and *jiva* personalised becomes atman.
Jainism believes in the plurality of souls. Souls are substances distinct from matter. Souls influence one another. But they are quite distant from one another and not connected in any higher unity. They may be called spiritual monads. Jainism emphasizes the diversity of souls. Amongst the Muslim theologians, Nazam and his Scholl maintained that the soul is a spiritual substance.

Jainism considers the soul from two points of view: the noumental (niscaya naya) and the phenomenal (vyavahar) Dravyanuyougatarkana of Bhoja describes the distinction as motioned in the viseasvasyakabhasya by saying that the niscaya narrated the real things and the vyavahara narrates things in a populate way. In the samayasara, kaundakundacaraya points out that the practical standpoint I essential for the exposition of the inner reality of things, as a non- Arya is never capable of understanding without the non-Arya tongue.6

The existence of the soul is a presupposition in the Jaina philosophy. Proofs are not necessary. If there are any existence of the soul. “Oh Gautama, the soul is pratyakasa” said Mahavira,” for that in which your knowledge consists is itself soul”. What is pratyaksa need not be prove like the pleasure and pain of the body. It is prartyaksa owig to the ahampatyaksa, the realization of the I, which is associated with the functions pertaining t all the three tenses. William James and James word present self- consciousness in this form. Ward talks of the internal perception’ or self – consciousness. The last order of knowledge of the duality of subject ad object is an indispensable condition of all acute experience. It is the subject of experience that we call the pure ego or self.7

William James says, “for this central part of the self is felt. It is something by which we also have direct sensible consciousness in which it is present, as in the whole life-time of such moments.8 thus , one who ignores the self-accidence of the soul is like one who says that sound is inaudible and the moon is devoid of the moon. The existence of the soul can be inferred from the behavior of others. Similarly, the soul exists because “it is my word, O Gautama.” 9

The jiva is described from the nominee and phenomenal points of view. From the oumenal point of view, the soul is described in the pure form. The phenomenal describes the empirical qualities of the soul. From the pure point of view, it is not associated with body or any physical or mental qualities. Mahavira points out the third Ganadhra that the soul is different from the body it sees; just as Ddevadatta recollect san object perceived through the five widows of the palace, which is different from the palace and the five windows, so also a person recolecting an object perceive through the if senses of the body is different from the sense as the body 10

The Buddhist impermanence of the soul is also refuted. Buddhistas had said that there was no self except the khandas kundakundacaraya points out that from the noumea point of view the soul and the body are not one, also though in worldly practice the soul having a beautiful body is called beauiful ad fair like the beautiful body of the living Arhati. 11 In the Chanadogyopanisad, in the dialogue between yajanavakaya and Janaka, the idea of the self is progressively brought out by showing that it is not a physical entity nor a dream –state.

From the nominal pint of view, the soul pure and perfect. It is pure consciousness. From the real point of view, the soul is unbound, untouched and not other than itself. The soul is one and not composite. In the Sthananga we get a description of the soul as one(ege atta). The commentator describes it as ekavidhah a tmanaah. 12 Samasara kundakaundacaraya describes the absolute oneness of the soul “On the strength of my self- realisation”. 13 This does not contradict the plurality of souls in Jainism. It only emphasizes the essential identity of souls. Jivas in al their individual characteristics are essentially the same. If the souls were one, then, “O
Gautama, there would not be sukh duhkha, bhandha mosksa, etc” Individual souls are different like the kumbhas.14

The nature of jiva has been well described by Nemicandra in his Dravyasamgradha. He describes the foul both from the nominee and phenomenal points of view. He says that jiva is characterised by upayoga, is formless and is an agent. It has the same extent as its body. It is the enjoyer of the fruits of Karma. It exists in samasara. It is siddha and has a characteristic of upward motion. 15 We get a similar description in the pancastikayasara of kundakundacaraya. Jiva is formless. It characterised by upayoga. It is attached to karama. It is the Lord, the agent and the enjoier of the fruits of karama. It pervades bodies large or small. It has a tendency to go upward to the end of loka being freed from the impurities of kiarama.16 The Tattavarthasutra describes the nature of the soul as possessing upayoga as its essential characteristic:

Eight Characteristics:

Every Jiva possesses an infinite number of qualities, Flasebappi, in his Doctrine of karama in jaina philolophy mentions eight important characteristics:

1. The faculty of omniscience (kevala-jnana)
2. The faculty of absolute undifferentiated cognition (kevala-darsana)
3. Superiority over joy and grief.
4. Possession of belief in complete religious truth (samayakatva), and irreproachable moral conduct (caritra)
5. Possession of eternal life (aksayashiti)
6. Complete formlessness (amurtava)
7. Unrestricted energy (viryatva)
8. Complete equality in rank with other Jivas.

The first characteristic of the soul is supayoga. The word upayoga is difficult to define. It is the source of experience. The cognitive, cognitive and adjective aspects spring form it. It is different a of living organism. Umavati says that upayoga is the essential characteristic of the soul. 17 Upayoga has contain prominence. Upayoga is that by which a function is serve: upayujayte anena it upayogah. It is also described as that by which a subject is grasped. 18 In the Gommatasara: jivakanda, Upayoga is described as the drie which leads to the apprehension of object. 19 It is the source of the psychical aspect of experience. It gie rise to the experiecne of objects, and the experience expresses itself in form sof jnana and darsana. Upayoga is of two types: anakara, formless, ans sakara, possessed of form. Anakara anakara, formless, ans sakara, possessed of form. Anakara Upayoga is formless, indeterminate cognition. Sakara Upayoga is determinate cognition, a defined form of experience. It would not be out of place to point out that upyoga is ot the resultant of consciousness as it is
sometimes maintained. This was one of the earlier attempts to translate Upayoga. Nor is it a sort of inclination arising from consciousness. It is the cognitive drive, which gives rise to experience. It is, in fact, the source of all experience, the Jaina philosophers were aware of the driving force of experience, the force by which experience, the force by which experience is possible. This may beckoned to the ‘horme’ of the modern psychologists. It may be called home in the sense that McDougall has used the term. It is a vital impulse for urge to action. Nunn has stated that home is the basis of activity the at differentiates the living animal from dead matter. It is like Schopenhauer’s will to lie’, and Bergson’s elan vital' jnana and darsana are manifestations of upyoga.

The biological studies of the lower animals from the amoebae onwards show that all animals are centers of energy in constant dynamical relation with the world, yet confronting it in their own characteristic way. A name was needed to express this fundamental property of life, the drive or a felt tendency towards a particular end. Some psychologists called it conation or the coactive process. But this drive may not always be conscious.

There is the presence of an internal drive in such processes. “To this drive or urge, whether it occurs in the conscious life of men and the higher animals war propose to give a single name.... horme”20 This activity of the mind is a fundamental property of life. It has various other names, like ‘ the will to live’ elan vital’, the life urge and the libido. Horme under one form or another has been the fundament postulate of amarck Butler, Bergson ad Bernard Shaw. McDougall took great pains to present the hormic theory of psychology as against the mechanistic interpretation of life and mind.

The hormic force determines experience and behavior. We get conscious experience because of this drive. The conscious experience takes the form of perception and understanding. Horme operates even in the unconscious behavior of owe animals. In the plants and animals were see it operate I the preservation of organic balance. In our own physical level. We circulate our blood, wr breathe and we digest our food, and all these are the expressions of the hormic energy. It operates at all legalese both in individual and the racial sense. 21 But the Horme expressed and presented by the Jaina philosophers could not be developed and annualized in terms of the modern psychology, because their analysis of Upayoga was purely an epistemological problem tempered with metaphysical speculation. They were aware of the fact that there is a purposive force which actuates and determines experience. This is clear from the distinction between jnana and darsana as two forms of upayoga.

Citta or cetana as a characteristic of the our is important in Indian philosophy. In thr Dravyasamgradha, jiva is described as possessing cetaa from the nominal point of view. Cetana is a sort of incliatio, which arises rom upayoga. This inclination branches in two direction jnana and darsana. Darsana may be said to be undifferentiated knowledge. Janana is cognition defined the jiva has indinite jnana and darsaa but certain classes of Karman, like jananavaraiya and Darsanavaraniya tend to obscure and confuse the essential nature of the jiva. From the phenomena point of view, darssaa ad jnana tend to manifest themselves in eight kinds of jnana and four kinds of darsana.

The possession of Upayoga raises the question whether the Jiva possesses upayoga and is yet different from it , or whether it is identical with it . the Nyaya theory does not recognise the identity of quality and its possessor . Jainism asserts that oly from the phenomenal point of view they are separable . In pancastikayasara we read “Only in common parlance do we distinguish darsana and jana. But in reality there is o separation” 22 The  SOUL IS INSEPARABLE FROK Upayoga. Horme is an essential characteristic of the living organisms. It is
manifested in the fundamental property experienced in the incest adjustments and adventures that make up the
tissue of life and which may be called drive or felt tendency towards an end. 23 Animal life is not merely
permeated by physical ad chemical processes; it is more tha that even the simplest animal is autonomous.

The soul is simple ad without parts it is formless as the soul is immaterial it has no form. This quality has
been mentioned in other systems also. The Jaina thinkers were against the Buddhist idea of the soul as a cluster of
khandas Buddhists do not refer to the permanent soul. It is a composite of mental states called khanadas . in
modern western thought Hume says, “ when I enter most intimately into what I cal myself, I always stumble upon
some perception or other of hear or cold light or shade, love or hatred , pain or pleasure. I never catch myself any
time without perception, and never can observe anything but the perception,” hoffding stated that the ego has
been looked for in vain as something absolutely simple. The nature of the ego is manifested in the combination of
sensation, ideas and feelings, but Herbart maintains that the soul is a simple being not only without parts but
also without qualitative multiplicity. Modern psychology has emphasized substantiality, simplicity persistence and
consciousness as the attributes of the soul. Descartes has said, I am the thing that thinks, that is to say who
doubts, who affirms. Who loves, who hates and feels,” he designates this thing as substance.25

Hamilto advocated the four characteristics with the greatest explicitness. Other prominent names are
those porter, Calkins, Angelli and Aveling.26

From the phenomenal pint of view jiva is also dscribeed as possessing four pranas. They are sense
(indriya), energy (bala), life (ayus ) and respiration (ana). The pancastikayasara gives the same description. The
idea of prana is found in Indian and western thought. In the Old Testamet (Fenesis book I) we read , " the lord
God breathed into the nostril the breath of life and man became a lying soul". In the primitive men life when it
ceases to blow men die, I the Navaho leagued there is a description of the life force according to which we see
the trace of the wind in the skin at the tips of fingers parkas refers to psycho-physical factor of the organism. The
jiva assumes the bodily powers when it takes new forms in each new birth. Whatever thing manifests in the four
pranas live and is Jiva. The four pranas are manifest in ten forms. The indriya expresses itself in five senses .
bala may refer to the mind the body ad speech. Ayus and an are one each. These pranas in all their details need
not be present in all organisms, because there are organisms with less than five sense organs. But there must be
the four main characteristics. The most perfectly developed souls have all the ten pranas and the lowest have
only four. This has a great biological and psychological significance. Comparative psychology points out that in
the psycho-physical development of the various animal species at the lower leave, the chemical sense which is
affected by chemical reaction is the only sense function; and it later becomes the separate sense of test and
smell. Experiment investigations carried b Riley and Forel point out that the chemicalsense is used but insects like
moths even for mating. Fore has given a top- chemical theory for explaining the behavior of bees. As we go
higher I the scale of life, the chemical sense plays little part. In birds, sight and smell are wel developed. In
mammals, we find a higher degree of qualitative discrimination of smell. As we go higher still, we get the
variability of adaptation, which may be called intelligence.

In the Brahamanas and the oldest Upanisads there is a description of the psyche as consisting of five
pranas. They are regarded are regarded as gactors of the physicao-psychological life. Occasionally, more than
five pranas are mentioned. But still the idea of a permanent self had not shaped itself. In the third Adhyaya of the Brahadaranyakopanisad Yajvalka was asked to explain what happened to a person after the body has been dissolved and the parts of the psyche have been remitted to the fire and wind. He avoids the discussion and suggests that Karama remains after death. This was step forward towards the formation of the permanent self. Brahadaranyakopanosad also contains a discussion about the constituent parts of the soul. Eight instead of five have been suggested. Vijanana and retah are mentioned. This vijnanamayapurusa comes nearer to the conception of the soul, although personal immortality is not emphasized in Jainism also, the idea of a permanent soul possessing pranas must have developed on the same lines.

From the phenomenal point of view, the soul is the Lord (prabhu), the doer (karata), enjoyed (bhakata) limited to his body (dehamarta), still incorporeal, ad it is ordinarily found with Karama. As a potter considers himself as a maker and enjoyer of the clay pot so from the practical point of view the mundane soul is said to be the doer of things like constructing house and the enjoyer of sense objects. As the soul produces impure thought—captivities and as a consequence the material Karmas, it also enjoys thoughts with the help of the material Karmas. Thus Jiva enjoys its thought—created activity. However, from the nominal point of view, Jiva is the doer of suddha bhavas or pure thought (Karmas); and from the phenomenal point of view, it is the doer of pudgala karmas or Karmic matter. The distinction between the formal cause—nimiety (nimitta), and material cause upadana, has been introduced for the description of the soul the Jainas say that the soul is the efficient cause of the material Karmas. The Jiva possesses consciousness and consciousness manifest itself in the form of various mental states. These mental states are responsible for activities, which produce material Karmas. It is therefore asserted that Jiva is the agent of its own bhavas but it is not the agent of pudgala Karmas. Jainism emphasizes the activity of the Jiva as against the Sakhya view of the passive udasia purusa. As a consequence. Of activity, the Jiva experiences happiness and misery. But Nemicandra says that it is only from the phenomenal point of view. From the oumenal point of view, Jiva has consciousness and it enjoys eternal bliss. In the Dravyasamgraha we read, “niccayanayado cedaa-bhavam khu adassaa” The joys and sorrows that Jiva experiences are the fruits of dravyakarmas. But Buddhism believes that the agent never enjoys the fruits of karma James ward giving the genera characterization of the varied contents of empirical self, says that the self has first of all: a) a unique interest and b) a certain inwardness, further it is c) an individual that d) persists, e) is active and finally it knows itself.

But the process of entanglement in activity and enjoyment is beginnings. The soul gets entangled in the samsra and embodied through the operation of karmas. It assumes various forms due to the materially cause conditions (upadhi) ad it is involved in the cycle of birth and death. It is subjected to the forces of Karmas which express themselves, first through the feelings and emotions and secondly in chains of very subtle kinds of matter, invisible to the eye ad the ordinary instruments of science. Who the soul in embodied it is affected by the environment. William James distinguishes between the self as known or the me the empirical ego as it is sometimes allied, ad the self as know or the I pure ego the constituents of the me may be divided into three classes: the material me, the social me and the spiritual me. The body is innermost part of the material me. The come the clothes our home and property. they become parts of our empirical ego with different degrees of intimacy. A man’s social me is the recognition that he gets from his fellowmen. A man has a many selves as there are individuals and groups who recognize him. The spiritual me also belongs to the empirical me. It consists of the
“entire collection of consciousness, my psyche faculties and disposition taken concretely” but the pure self the self as the kower, is very different from the empirical self, it is the thinker that which thinks this is permanent what th philosophers call the soul or the transcendent ego.33 James ward also makes a distinction between the self known or the empirical ego, and the pure self For him, the empirical ego is extremely complex it is the presented self. The earliest element is presented self, the bodily or the somatic consciousness, but they never have the same inwardness as “the sense of embodiment” we also find a certain measure of individual permanence and inwardness that belongs to the self. We may call this ‘the sensitive and the appetite self.’ With the development of ideation there saris what we call the inner zone, having still greater unity and permanence. This is the imaging and desiring self. At the level of intellect we come to the concept that every intelligent person is a person having character and history ad his aim in life through social interaction. This gives conscience a social product as Adam smith has said. At this stage a contrast between the thinker and the object of thought is clearly formed. This is the thinking and willing self. At this stage even the inner ideation and desire become outer no longer strictly self. The duality of subject and object is three last order of knowledge and is the indispensable condition of all actual experience. It is the subject of experience that we call pure ego or self.34

The Jaina thinkers made a distinction between the states of the soul as bahiratman, antaratman and paramaatuman. Bahiratman consists in the identification of the self with body and eternal Belgians it is the bodily self I this wr say, “I am the body, I am lean etc” this identification is due to ignorance. The same soul is in the karmavastha and is characterized by suddha caitanya and bliss. It is free from all sense of otherwise. It has discriminative knowledge. This conscious self is ataraman in the samyagdrsti gunasthana the pure and perfect self which is free from the impurities of Karma is the paramatman. It is characterized perfect cognition and knowledge. It is freed ad is a Siddha. This paramatma is jnaamaya ad is pure consciousness it cannot be known by the sense it has o indriyas and not manas. From the oumea point of view these are the attributes of the soul.35

The Jaina approach to the problem is metaphysical it contains elements of psychological instigation; but the language is the language of metaphysics. Modern psychologists, especially the rational psychologists, stopped psychological analysis and explained the process of realizing the pure nature of the self from the empirical stage to stage of pure ego. But the transcendental self is not the subject of psychology. William James has said that states of consciousness are all that psychology needs to do her work with. Metaphysics or theology may pore the existence of the soul: but for psychology the hypothesis of such a substantial principle of unity is supersluos.36

Jainism refers to the size of the soul. Although souls are not of any definite size, they contract and expand according to the size of the body in which they are incorporated for the time big. The soul is capable of adjusting its size to physical body, as the lamp placed in a large or small room illuminates the whole space of the room. Nemicandra describes it as the phenomenal characteristic of the soul. From the numeral point of view it is said to exist in innumerable pradesas. 37 In respect of the elasticity of the soul, Jainism differs from the other Scholl’s of Indian thought. As Jacobi says the Jains have a tenet of the soze of the soul which is not shared by other philosopher.38

Some philosophers like the Vaisesikas, Demarcates and the atomizes, thought of the soul as atomic. Some others talked of the omnipresence of the soul. Jacob says that the origin Vaisesika was not clear this point. Some Samakhya writers preferred the soul to be infinitely small while Isvara Krana and later writers characterized
Upanisadic psychology agrees with the Aristotelian localizing the soul in the heart. It was later thought that it was in the brain. Yogic and Tatic books recognized the cerebrochemical processes, and aconsciousness was traced to the brain. In the Taittriyounisae (1.6.1.2.) we read that the soul in the heart moves by passage through the bones of the palate, right up to the skull, where the hari are made to part. The soul in the heart is called manomaya in the Kausitaki Upanisad; the soul is described as the master of all bodily functions. The sense depends on the soul as ‘relatives on the rich’ the self’s immanent in the whole body, and is hidden in it. This passage leads to the view like the Jaina view, that the soul fills the body. Different other accounts are given in the Upanisads. In the brhadrañyaka the self is described as small as grain of rice or barley. In the kathopainsad we find that the soul is of the size of the thumb. It dwells in the center of the heart. In the Candogya, it is said to be of the measure of the span between the head and the chin. William James tares the feeling of self to the cephalic movements. He says that the self of sells when carefully examined is found to nosiest mainly in the collection of these peculiar motions in the head or between the head and the heart. Descartes merits that the seat of the soul is the pineal gland. Fichte holds that the soul is a space filling principle. Lotus says that the soul must be located some where in the matrix of the arterial brain events. These accounts tend to make us believe that the soul is something material, which occupies space. It is sometimes pointed out that the idea of the spatial attributes of the soul constitutes a contradiction. If the soul has no form it cannot occupy space, en the infinite pradesas; and if it is immaterial it cannot have form. However, this contradiction is due to the difficulties of expressing the immaterial in thermos of the materials this has bee the perenoculary of its own, the Freaks had the same difficulty plato had to resort to allegories and myths for expressing the immaterial. In Jainism although the description of the soul is not metaphorical, it is just an tempt to come nearest immaterialism. It may be that the difficulty is due to the complexity of substance in Jainism. Jainism gives the cross division of substances as spiritual and non-spiritual, and again as corporeal and non-corporeal substance like Dharma ad Adharama; and there is the corporeal which is called pudgaga. From the phenomenal point of view, jiva comes under the spiritual but corporeal the corporeal need not necessarily be material.

The classification is as follows:-

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        Substance
           /\           \\
         /  \         /  \\
        Spiritual  non-spiritual
           |           |
          /\         /\  \\
        Corporeal  Corporeal  noncorporeal
           |           |
          /\         /\  \\
        Jiva  Matter  1. Akasa
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If this division is accepted, there need be no contradiction. Again when size is attributed to the soul, it is possible that it refers to the spheres or extent of the affiance that is intended. In the *pancastikayasara* we read that just as a lotus hued ruby, when placed in a cup of milk imparts its luster to the milk, the soul imparts its luster to the milk, the soul imparts it slushier to the whole body.

Jiva is characterized by upward motion. Nemicandra described the pure soul as possessing *urdhavagati*. In the *pancastikayasara* it is said when the soul is freed from all impurities it moves upward to the end of Loka. For Plato the soul was above all the source of motion. It is only the self that moves. In the *phaedrus*, Socrates says in his decoded speech, “The soul in immortal for that which is ever in motion is immortal” The soul never eases to move and it is the fountain and the beginning of motion to all that moves. The movement of the soul in *samsara* is possible in pure space with is devoid of the medium for motion. The Jain conception of the soul as possessing *urdhavagati* appears to be more an ethical expediency that a metaphysical principle or a psychological fact.

All these attributes belong to the nature of every soul and they are clearly seen if the Jivas are pure and free. However most of the Jivas are not pure and reed. They are contaminated by some foreign elements which veil their purity and perfection. The foreign elements is Karman, very fine matter, imperceptible to the senses, and which enters into the soul and causes great changes. The souls are then involved in the wheel of *samsara*. They become *samasarins*.

III The *samsarijjas* are classified on the basis of various principles like the suites and the number of sense organs possess ed by the they are the *sthavara jivas*, immovable souls. This is the vegetable kingdom. Sri J.C. Bosehas pointed out that the vegetable world has capacity for experience. They are one–sense organisms. Earth water fire and plats are such *jivas* they possess the sense of touch. This view is peculiar to Jainism. Itrasa jivas (movig souls) have tow to five sees worms, oysters, conschs etc. possess taste ad touch. Ants bugh and lice have three senses taste touch and smell . Mosquitoes, bees and flies possess four senses taste touch, smell and sight . and birds beasts and me have all the five senses Again fie sensed organisms may possess mind. They are called *samnaska*. They may be bereft of mind (amanaska)

Plato talked of a determined number of souls the souls that exist must always be the same they cannot be come fewer, not yet an they become fewer, not yet can they become more numberous. In the *timaeus* he said that the number of souls is equal to the number the stars.

In Gommatasara Jicakanada, we get a detailed classification of *samasarijivas*. This classification is shown in table I
Comparative psychology points out that there have been various stages in the development of animal life. The first simple animals, the protozoa. Of one sense. In fact, till we reach the insect species we find that the chemical sense predominates positive negative and food reactions are mainly due to the chemical sense. As we go up the animal scale we find sensory discrimination in qualitative distinctions even the othersenses get discriminated ad developed as we proceeded in the development of animal life. Similarly the distinction between the Jivas as paryapta and aparyapta has great psychological significance . Gommatasara thus illustrates the paryapta developed, “as the thing like the room jars, and clothes are full or empty so the Jivas should be understood be complete or incomplete.46 Jiva becomes parayapta with the absorption of Karmic matter for building up its body sense, respiration and manes. One sensed organisms plate with the possession of food, drink body sense and repiration. The possession of these attributes makes the first four- sensed organisms parayapta or complete For five sensed organisms all the six are necessary in the absence of these the Jivas are incomplete Comparative psychology has shown that sensory discrimination has been a gradual process. Miss washburn points out that ability to distinguish between the different sensory experiences depends on several factors, like the nature of the sense organs and the ability to make aired reaction movements .47 On the basis of these investigations, three different classes of senses, like the chemical sense hearing and sight, have been mentioned the chemical sense is manifested in the combined senses of taste and touch. As sensory discrimination becomes more complex the mental life of animal becomes more developed and pronounced.

IV. these characteristics of the soul are mentioned from the practical point of view Defilement of the soul takes place who the Karma pours into the soul this is called asrava. The soul then begins to experience mundane and emotional experiences like the passions. The karama which comes into contact is retained . the soul is eternally infected with matter every moment it is getting new matter. In the normal course of things it has
no end but the deliverance of the soul from the wheel of samsara is possible by voluntary means. By the prose of samvara the soul can stop the influx of karama; by nirjara it can eliminate the Karana already glued to the soul. The al obstacles are removed and the soul becomes pure and perfect, free from the wheel of samsara. Being free, with its upward motion the Jiva attains the liberation or moksa. In the last lines of the Formmatasara: Jivakanda, it is said that the liberated soul remains pure and free.

Pure and perfect souls live eternal bliss. But they do not lose their identity as the Vedatin sold emphasize. In the Jaina Theory of the soul eight Kahanada of the Chandogyopanisad, it is said that when a man departs his speech is merged in mind, his mind I breath, his breath in fire, which I the highest being is sat. Now, that which is the subtle essence has its self. It is the self, “and thou Oh secetaket, art that.” In the eleventh Kahanada we, read that when the body withers and dies ad the living self leaves it, the livig self dies not.48 Jacobi says that here we come nearer to the concept of the soul. It differs from the Jaina concept in that the soul here does not possess a permanent personality, for in muki the jiva is merged I Brahma and its individuality is lost. For the Jaina, Mc Taggart’s analogy of the ‘college of selves’ would appear to be atper, although what type of spiritual unity there is in Moksa, Jainism cannot say. Mc Taggart seeks of the unity of the absolute as that of a society. All the seles are perfect, and “ if an oppnent should remind me” he writes, “of the notorious imperfections of all the lives of all of us, I should point out that every self is in reality eternal and that its true qualities are oly seen in so far as it considered as eternal” 49 Sub specie eternitatis it is progressing towards perfection as yet unattained. The never—ceasing struggle of the soul is an important tenet in Jainism. The universe is not, theu, an amusing pantomime of infallible marouettes, but a fight for perfection, in which “something is eternally gained for the universe by the success”. The Jaina outlook is melioristic.

Chapter-4 : CRITIQUE OF KNOWLEDGE

1. The Jaina attitude is empirical and realistic. The Upanisadic philosophers found the immutabel reality behig the world of experience. Fautama, the Buddha, denounced everything as fleeting and full of sorrow.mahaira stood on commonsese and experience and found no contradiction between permanence and change. The Jaina philosophy is based on logic and experience. Moksa is the ultimate aim of life. It is realised by the three- fold path of right intuition right knowledge ad right conduct. Right knowledge is one of the major problems of Jaina philosophy. It is necessary to understand the Jaina theory of knowledge and experience for the proper understanding of Jainism. The Jaina epistemology is very complex and developed gradually in reponse to the demand of time.

The problem of mid eludes the grasp of philosophers and psychologists because it can beanalyzed into both metaphysical and psychological problems. Metaphysically it refers to mind as the principle of the universe stading in realation to the phenomenal world. This is the cosmic principle which is emphasized by the idealists as the primary principle. Psychologically, it is the individual mind, the individual’s system of psychic stated in realation to the worls of sense. Phgilosophers could not make a distinction between the two aspects of the problem.

The Indian thinkers were gropig to grasp the itangible, the ineffable and the immaterial. the distinction between mind and matter, the mental and the physical, was vague and unclear. In the pre-Upanisadic thought, the principle of Ttabecame the principle of order in the universe. It is the underlying dynami force at the basis of the universe.” Even the Gods cannot transgress it.” We see in the conception of Rta the development from the physichal to the dicie.2 it is by the force of Rta that human brains function.” Man kows by the divie force of the same immanent power which makes fire to burn and river to flow.3 The interpretatio of the famous Rgvedic hymn of creation. “nasad asin no sad asit tadanim” ad again of “kamas tad agre samavratadhi manaso retah prathamain yad asit . sato bandhumasti niravindahradi pratisya kavayo manisa”4 gives a description that for the first time there aswose kama which had the primeel germ of maas withi it. Similarly the word krtu is shown to be the antecedent of the word manas or prajna. In sat. bra 4.1.4.1. there a statemet that when a man wishes, “may I do that may I have that,” that is Krtu, when he attains it, that is Daksa. The same term later changed its meaning to manas and prajna. 5

The analysis of the Jaina theory of mind shows that there has been a conflict between the metaphysical and the psychological approaches to the problem. It is predominatly a realistic approach. The mind and its stares are analysed on the empirical level. The Jaina ideal is Moksa, freedom of the
The function of mind which is an inner organ, is knowing and thinking. *Sthanaga described* it as *samkalpa vyparavati*. *Anuvamiska* gives the *citta vijnana as equivalent of the manas*: “Citta manovejianaam it i paryayah.” The *Vaisesavayakabhasya* defines manas in terms of mental processes.6 It is taken in the substantitive sense. The *Nyayakosa* defines *manas* in the sense of the inner organ which controls the mental functions.

It is difficult to define mind. If at all it is to be defined, it is always in terms of its own processes. Even the psychologists of the present day find it difficult to give a definition of mind without reference to the mental processes. Older psychologists meant by mind something that expresses its nature, powers and functions in the modes of individual experiences and of bodily activity. McDougall also says that we are bound to postulate that “something”; ad “I do not thing”, he writes, “that we can find a better word to denote something than the old fashioned word mind.” 7 McDougall defines mind as an organized system pre-scientific concept. It covers the whole field of internal experience.8

The Jaina did not merely postulate the existence of mind without any evidence. They found the evidence in the experiences of the world. They also give the empirical proof for the operation of the mind. The contact of the sense organ with the soul alone does not give cognition in the relevant experiences because there is the absence of *manas* something else is necessary for the cognition, and that is the mind. Again, the mind has the functional connotation which speaks for its nature. “Just as speech signifies the function of burning and the light shows the light.”9

Orthodox schools of Hindu philosophy postulate the existence of mind as an internal sense organ. In the evidence of cognition the contact of the soul with the sense organs is not sufficient. We must posit the existence of *manas*, some additional condition, which brings them together. For instance a man may not hear a sound or see an object when the mind is pre-occupied when the mind is elsewhere as we read the Upanisads. There is also the positive evidence in the facts of memory ad of experiences like pleasure and pain.10 As mind is not tangible, the proof of mind has always to be indirect, and not direct. McDougall infers the structure of the mind from its functions. He writes that we have to build up our description of the mind by gathering all possible facts of human experience and behaviour, and by inferring from these the nature and structure of mind. He thus makes a distinction between the facts of mental experiences ad the facts of mental structure. It is comparable to the structure and the functions of the mechanical joy; ad one who wishes to ascertain the nature of the machinery within it, ca only watch it move in under various conditions.11

Mind is characterised by mental processes like doubting, imagining, dreaming and expecting. It is also characterised by pleasure and pain and desires. These are the distinguishing marks of mind.12 The *Nandisutra* describes mind as that which grasps everything *saarvartha- grahanam manah*.13 In the *Tattavarthasutra*, we are told that cognition of what is stated on authority, as in scripture, is the object of mind *srutam anindriyasa*.14 In *maitri Upanisad* mind is described I its reflective aspect as source of all mental modifications. He sees by mind by mind he hears, and by mind too, he experiences all that we call desire, will and belief, resolution, irresolution. All this is but mind itself.15 In modern psychology also, wundt says that mind will be the subject “to which we attribute all these separate facts of internal experience.” Mind, in the popular thought, is ot simply a subject in the logical sense, but a substance in real being, ad the various activities of the mind are its expressions or notions. But this involves, he says, some metaphysical presuppositions. For him, mind is a logical concept of interal experience.16 The *Abhidhanarajendra* mentions that the word *manas* has a functional signfificance, because it describes the functions of the mind like thinking, imagining ad expectig.17 and from this functional significance of the mind the structure of the mind is inferred. The Jaina thinkers make a distinction between two phases of mind *dravya manas* and *bhava manas* (*manah dividividham dravya manah bhava-bhava-manas ca*). In the *visesavasyakabhasya*, we get a description of the two phases of the manas. The matter mind which may be called the mental structure, is composed of infiile, fineand coherent particle io matter meant for function of mind- *dravyatah deavyamanah*. It is further described as a collection of fine particles which are meant for exciting thought processes due to the yoga arising out of the contact of the jiva with the body.18 In the *Gommatasara*: Jiva-kanada also there is a description of the material mind as produced in the heart from the coming of mind molecules like a full blow lotus with eight petals.19

Sucha description of mind as *dravya manas* and *bhava manas*, the structural and the psychical aspect, can be compared to the description of mind given by some modern philosophers. C.D.Broad, in his Mind and its place in nature presents a similar view. It is a modification of the instrumental theory.
according to which mind is a substance that is existentially independent of the body. For Broad, mind is composed of twofactors neither of which is ad for itself has the property of mind, but which when combined exhibits menta properties. The factors are the bodily and the psychic factors. It is comparable to a chemical compound like NaCl and H2O in which the individual components lose their individual identit when composed of living body possessed of i) the nervous system and somethig else and ii) the psychic factor, which possesses some feeling like mental. Bodily factor is described as “the liig brain and the nervous system”. About the psychic factor, Broad seems to be vague. Neither mental characteristics not mental events seem to belong to it. It is likely to be sentience only. However, the psychic factors must be capable of persistig for a period at least after the death of the body; and it must be capable, when separated from the body, of carryig ‘traces’ of experience which happen to the mind of which it was formerly a constituent. In other words. It must comprisre the ‘mnemonic mass’. Broad’s view comes nearer to the Buddhist vinana, rather to the Jaina view of bhava manas. Of all the psychic factors in the Buddhist view. Vinnaa has morepermanent nature. I the Dighanikaya it is mentioned that ager death the body is dissolwed mind ceases, but vinnana, the coefficient of the desire to enjoy, clings to produce its effects in some other embryo waking wsewhere.22 with this differerene of the psychic factor the Jaina distinction between the dravya manas ad bhava manas corresponds with Broad’s theory of the compositio of mind. In speakig of the mental structure. Mc Dougall has likened it to the structure of a machine. However, mcdougall also warns us that it shouod not be taken in the sense of material structure of arrangement of parts. He likens it more to the compoition of a poem of music. “the structure of the mind is a sonceptual system that we have to build up by inference from the date of the two orders , facts of behaviour and the facts of intropection.”23 The same ca be said of the composition of the manas.

Each Jiva has its own mind, although the general nature of minds is one: mano laksanatvena sarvananasam ekatvat’ because the essential nature of mind is the expression of metal states. In the situation, the Fods, men and Asuras have each his won mind. In the Rattvarthasutra, the classificatio of the souls, five sensed organisms with minds, is mentioned; sajinah samanakah.25 In the five- sensed organisms only some possess minds comparative psychologists like akohler and Alverdes have shown that mind in the developeed form is possible in case of higher animals having insight. Naiyayaikas also believe that each organism possesses a mind and sensitive organs in order that it may be in a position to coignoe the objects and to experience pleasure and painin accordance with past Karman. Each self has one mind, because a singel mind of atomic magnitude cannot be shared by all. This mind in each self can funktion only inside the organism with which the self is connected.26 if the Jiva was sarvagata, there would be cognition of everything by everyone.27 Their arguments were metaphysical and epistemological than pschological. But modern psychoogy has analysed the same problem from te psychological point of view. McDougall writes, “it seems probable that mind has the same nature wherever and whenever it exists or manifests itsel, whether in animals, men or superhuman beings, whether I the new-born infant, the fool or the wise man. On the other hand, the structure of the mind seems to be peculiar to each individual; “not only is it different in the various species of animals (if they hae minds) and in man; but the structure of the mind of e man is different from that of every other man; ad in any one man at each stage of his career or life-history, it is not quite the same as at any other stage.28

The ancient Indian philosophers were faced with problems concerning the instrumenta nature of the mind. It was generally believed that like other sese organs, mind was also a sense orga, and the instrumet of the soul. In the Upnishads we fine references to the mind as one of the organs alongs with the other sense and motor organs (jnanenduiyas and Karmendriyas) 29 prasna Upnishad mentions manas as a central organ. Reference to the manas as the diser of the ten organs I the Mairti Upnishad may also be noted. Orthodox Hindu philosopy accepts mind as the internal organ. There were some philosophers who made buddhi, ahankara and manas together to consitute the interna organ atahkarana. But Jayanta believes that mind is an internal organ. Similarlu, vidyanandi maintains that buddhi and ahankara cannot be regarded as sense organs. The Nyaya Vaishekske philosophers regarded mind as the internal organ. But Gautama did not include it in the list of sense organs. Kanada is also silent. Vitsysyan incldes manas under the senses. He calls it the inner sense by with we apprehend the inner the internal organ. But the Jinaas believed that the mind is a no-indriya. In the sense that it is differen from the fice sese organs. Its sense contents and functions are not entirely idetical with those of indriyas. The prefix here does not mean not but is at times rendered as isa. It is a quasi sense organ. Still they accept the instrumental funcition of the mind. In the Gommatasara : Jivakanda we get a descriptio of mind as the no-indriya. It is through the mind that meta knowledge and mentao activity arise. But in the case of the mind there is no external manifestatio as in the case of other sense organs. The function of mind is assimilative.30 Thepramaa mimamsha
describes mind as the thing, which grasps everything. In the vr`iti of the same it is said, the ‘mano’ nindriyam iti no indriyam iti a ucyate’. 31 In the Rattvarthasutra, the function mind, which is anindriya, is described as the sruta cognition. the second function is the mati and its modifications.32 It is caed the organ of apprehension of all objects because all sense experiences are apprehended by the mind. The Jainas accepted the instrumental nature ( karanatva) of the mind. But it is said that the karana is of two types – bahya karana and antahakaran the dravya- manas is described as the antahkarana, the internal organ. Being the internal organ it is different from the other sense organs.33 However such a description of need not be interpreted in the sense that according to the Jaina view, mind is not a sense organ; in fact it is more than a sense organ. It is sarvarthagrahanam, at is stated in the praanamimamsa.

ii. In the Dravyasamgradh, Nemicandra says that soul in its pure form has the quality of consciousness. Brahmadeva, in his commentary, writes that fro the ultimate points of view, Jiva is distinguished by its quality of consciousness.34 It is most direct and nearest reality of which any one who has introspected is most immediately aware.

Consciousness has been the most important of discussion for philosophers, psychologists as well as scientists. Attempts have been made to solve the problem from various angles. In the Aitareya Aranyaka, an effort is made to understand the different stages of the development of consciousness in the universe. In the evolution of herbs, trees and all that is animal, the atman is gradually developing. In the herbs, only sap is seen; in the animated beings, citta is sees; in man there gradual development of atman, for he is now endowed with prajña.35 Similarly, in the Chandogyopanisad, prajapati describes the progressive identification of atma with body consciousness. The psycho-physiological method is adopted in the Taittiriya.36 Finally, the atman as jananamaya ad aadādāmya is emphasized. The Jaina classification of the Jivas places the problem of the evolution of consciousness on the scienitfic basis. Jivas have bee classified into one, tow three, four and five sensed according to the number of the sense organs possessed by the Jivas possessing the five seses are divided into those having mind and those without mind. It is now realized that the rise of consciousness is late in the evolution of life, from physical evloution to the evlution of life mind and conscounsness.

Cetana as a sundamental quality of the soul is pure consciousness, a king of fame without smoke. This consciousness is eternal, although it gets manifested in the course of the evolutionary process of life in the empirica sense. This empiral consiousness arises from the cotact of the sense organs with the objects. Centa in its pure form gets embodied with the Atama and ces into contact with empirical life with the sense organs and objects. It manifests itself in the form of jana and darsaa. Jnana and Darsaa are therefore aspects of cetaa ad cetana is the springboard from which they arise. It is like the flood of light in which objects are illuminated. It is the psychic background and the psychic halo of cognition in its two aspects jnana ad darsaa. Cetana, therefore is the light of consiousness that the soul possesses ad throught this lift the cognition of objects arises.

The analysis of the states of consciousness has been an important problem for philosphers as well as the psychologists Consciousessss has three aspects- the cognitive, the affective and the conatie. They are modes of consciousness. It perceiveing, belieeong or otherwise appreheding, that sch and a thing exists ad has characteristics’ one’s attitude is cognitive. In the affective attitude oe is either pleased or displeased about it and tries ot alter it I some respect. This attitude is conative.37 but stout says that though these three modes of consciousness are abstracty ad analyticaaly distince phases I a concretion from each othe r. mind is an organic unity ad its activites have the ackisest degree of organic inter-action. However, in every psychosis oe of the aspects may be predominat. In the pleasure of pursuit, feeling presupposes conation. Sometimes feeling is dependent on certain conative attitude involved in the perceptual process. Similar reciprocity is found in conation and cogition.

India thinkers were aware of the distinction of states in consciousness. The Jainas recognize three forms of consciousness. They make a distinction between conscioussees as knowig, as feelting and as exeperieing the fruits of Karma (karma-phala-cetana) and willing.38 conation and feeling are closely allied. As a rule we have first feeling, next onation and then knowledge.39 mc Dougall has emphasized that feelig is the core of al instinctive activity. In fact in al experience there is a core off feeling, while the cognitve and conative aspects are varying factors. In the ajitareeya Upanisad there is motion of differet modes of experiece. Sensation, perception ad ideation are differet modes of intellecution. Perception and ideation are different modes of intellecution. It recognizes feeling and volition as the other two forms of experience. The seers of Upanisads give a classification of seven meanta functuion. 40 At the basis is intellecution the chandogyopanisad emphasizes the primacy of the will. The Buddhists also recognize such a distinction. We have perception or an conception, feeling and affection, and conation or wil. In
the Buddhist theory, will is the most dominant aspect of conscious experience, the basa element of huma oife. Radhakrishan in his *indian phiolosphy* suggests the *vijnana, vedana and samskara* roughly correspond to knowledge, feeling and will.41 childer in his dictionary brings the concept of conation under *samskara* Mrs Rhys Davids believes that, although there is no clear distinction between conation in the psychologial sense and will in the ethical sense, still in the pritakas there is consistent discrimination between psychologial importance and ethical imploication.42 professor stout has given up old tripartite classification of mental states and reverts to the ancient bipartite analysis of mind bringing the affective and conative elements together under the name of interest. Radhakrishanan syas that if we discard the separation of cognition and make it the theoretal aspect of contation, we get to buddihist emphasis on contaon as the central fact of mental life.

In the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory also there is a description of the mainfestation of the three aspects of self as knowledge, desire ad vloition. We have to know a thing before we feel the wat of it. In order to satisfy the want, we act thus, as Hiriyaa says, feelig mediates between cognition and conation. Thus the modes of consciousness have been the probelern of philosophers and psychologists. There is a genera agreement regardig th edilision of consciousness into three modes, although deffeet philosophers have emphasized different aspects in the concrete psychosis. Buddhists have emphasized in the Chandorya and mariti Upanisads.43 In the Chandogya again we get a dwscription of the primacy of the will but this has reference to the cosmic will rather than to its psychological aspect. The Jainas emphasize the close ralation between conation and feeling. The Nyaya theory describes the functio of feeling as a mediating factor between cognition and conation.

III.self-cpscopismess: The teem self-consciousness is very ambiuous. It may mean consciousness of the self, as an object igve in introspectio. In this sense, the self, the empirical ego becoes both an aspect of experience and also an object of experience. Self-consciousness. It is not an object of knowledge. It is the ultimate subject presupposed in acts of knowledge. Again consciousness may mean the ultimate eternal consciousness, which is a metaphysical concept. It is also used in the empirical sense as consciousness which is changig.44some of the erlier philosphers have ot ade a cear distinction between the metaphysyal and the psychologial sense of consciousness. In the Upaisads, the atman is described as the basis and the absolute knower, ad how ca the knower itself be known.45 it cannot becomprehended by intelect. It is the seer and the knower.46 yet higher intuito. It is knowable as th epratyagatmanman, apprehended by adhyatmayoga.47 the Buddhists recogize the distinction between subject and object within the consciousness. They do not believe I the transcendentata self. Their view of consciousness is like the stream of consciousness of William James. Yogacaras believe theat self is a series of caonition or ideas. There is not self apart from cognition. They reaal neither the self ot the non-self.

Some Nyaya philosophers, specially the eo-naiyayikas belliceded that the self is an oject of interna perception *manasapratyaksa*. The Caishesikas also maintain that, aostough the self is not an object of perception but of inference, it can be apprehended by Ypogic intuitin. The samkhya philosophers maintain that consciousness is the essence of sef. It is self-intuition. Self is inferred through its reflection in *buddhi*. But patanjali accepts the supernorma intuition of the self through the power of concetration. The self can know itself through its reflecio it its pure *sattva* and alsoishe mixed with rajas and tamas by supernormal itution (*pratibha-jnana*). So, the pure self can know the empirical self, but the eprrirical self cannot know the pure self. There is the contradiction involved in the self-being both subject and object and the reflection theorydoes not uch improve the situatuion. Cacaspiti tries to avoid the cotraction by saying that transcendental self is the subject, and the empirical self-the object, of self-apprehension.

According to prabhakara, self in necessarily known in every act of cognition. Cognition is self-luminous. it not ony manifests itself but also supports the *atma* much as the fame and the wick. Neither the self not the object is self- luminous. There can be consciousness of a object without the consciousness of the self. In every act of cognition ther eis a direct and immediate apprehension of te self. But the self can never be known as object of knowledge. It is ony to be known as a subject it it is recel by *triputa samvit*.

The Jainas holds with prabhakara that cognition is always apprehended by the self. Cognitio reaes itself, the self and it s object. Every act of cognition cognizes itself, the cognizig subject and the cognized object. But the Jainas denies that consciousness alones is self- luminous. He regards sef is the subject of interna perception. Whe I feel that I am happy have a distinct and immediate apprehension of the self as an oject of internal perception, just as pkeasure can be perceive though it is without form. “Oh Fautama” said Mahavira,"the self is pratyaksa even to you The soul is cogizeabel even to you.46 again unlike the view of prabhakara. The Jainas hold that it is the object of perception ad it is maifested
by external and internal perception. To the question “how can the subject be an object of perception?” the Jainas replies that whatever is experienced is an object of perception.

William James made a distinction between the empirical self, the me, and the transcendental self, the I. The self is partly the known and partly the knower, partly object and partly subject. The empirical ego is the self as known, the pure ego is the knower. It is that which at any moment is conscious.” Whereas the me is only one of the thing it is conscious of. But this thinker is not a passing state. It is something deeper and less mutable.49 Prof. Ward holds that the pure self is always immanent in experience, in the sense that experience, without the experient will be unintelligible. It is also transcendental, in the sense that it can never be the object of our experience.50 The Jainas were aware that consciousness of self is not possible by ordinary cognition. Therefore, they said it is due to internal perception.

Self-consciousness does not belong to the realm of pure consciousness which is foundational and without limitation. That is the cetana which is the essential quality of the soul. But when we descend to the practical level, the realm of vyavahara, we find the distinction between subject and object in consciousness. The question whether the self is perceived by direct experience like the internal perception of the Jainas, or by the immediate intuition, (pratibha jnana) of the Vedantins is raised as a consequence of this distinction. In all this, the question is answered from the empirical point of view on this basis, we can say that there are two aspects of consciousness: a) empirical consciousness. Atma is pure consciousness. Jiva is consciousness limited by the organism. Atma is the subject of consciousness. It is also the object of internal perception. But only in sense that it is immanent in consciousness though not clearly cognised as object. Jiva is both the subject and the object of consciousness, because it is the cognizer as well as the cognized.

iv. The Agama theory of knowledge is very old and probably originated in the premahavirea period. The jana pravada formed a part of the purvasrut which formed a part of the ancient literature. Jinabhadra in his Visesavasyakabhasya, quotes a purva Gatha on jana. There seems to have been no difference of opinion between the followers of parsvea and mahavira regarding the division of knowledge. Both of them accept the five-fold distinction of knowledge. The agamas have also presented the five divisions of knowledge.

Knowledge is inherent in the soul, but owing to perversity of attitude arising out of the veil of Karman, we may get wrong knowledge, ajana. Knowledge is perfect when the veil of Karman is totally removed. It is imperfect even when there is partial subsidence or destruction of Karman. The soul can get perfect knowledge directly when the veil of Karma is removed. That is pratyaksa jana. But empirical knowledge experience of this world, is possible with the help of the sense organs indirectly. Such knowledge was called parokṣajñana. Matinahana (sense experience), aremanahaparayaya (telepathy), and Kevalajanana (omniscience), were called pratyakṣa. But later, in order to bring the Jaina theory of knowledge in line with the theories of other systems of Indian thought, they modified their conception of pratyakṣa and parokṣa Jnana. In the anuyogadvara sutra, we we fing a hage in terminology. Matian and sruta began to be called pratyakṣa as they were possible through the operation of the sense organs. Jinabhadra als the two samyavahaara pratyakṣa. Alongside of Jnana, we have direct intuition of the object it is darsana. Darsana has similar subdivisions. The genre classification of knowledge and intuition
mentioning their perversities is shown in table I. The subsidence ad destruction of the veil of karman is a necessary condition of knowledge and intuition. Wrong knowledge is characterised as samasay (doubt) viparayaya (perversity,) and anadhayavasaya (wrog knowledge caused erence.) Owing to the lack of discrimination between the real and the unreal, the lack of discrimination between the real and the unreal the soul with wrong knowledge, i.e. the lunati, knows thig according to its own whims. Perersity of attitude veils the faculty of perception and knowledge, becomes vitiated. It becomes ajana.55

TABLE No. I (A)

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<tr>
<td>Indriya nibandhana</td>
<td>Anindriya nibandhana kevala</td>
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<tr>
<td>Avagraa lha Avaya Dharaba Avadi Manahprayaya</td>
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TABLE No. I (A)

<table>
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<tr>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Pratyaksa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Avadi Maahaprayaya kevala</td>
<td>Mati sruta</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jnana Ajnana (vibhagavadhi)</td>
<td>Jnana Ajnana (kumati) Jnana Ajnana (kusruta)</td>
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</table>

Note: this is based on the analysis give by s.o. Ghoshal I his edition of the Dravyasamraha

Prtyksa: we may now consider sense perception or pratyakasa jnana, as the nandisutra4-5 calls it. it is knowledge obtained through the operation of the sese organs and the manusas. Heachandra describes in the pramanaminasa that pratyaksa is that which is immediate, clear and unambiguous. He analyses the various defiitions of pratyaksa of other schools and shows that they are not adequate. The Naiyayika defination of perception as unerring cognition which is produced by the ssnese object cotact is ot adequate. How can the sense object contact and the like, he asks, which is not of the nature of cognition, function as efficient instrument for the determination the object? The Buddhists have given a definition of perceptual cognition as that which is free from conceptual construction and is ot erroneous. But hemacandra says that this defination is irrational since it has no bearing on practical ctivit. It has no pragmatic value. Jaimini defines perception as that which is engendered in the mind of a person upon
the actual contact of the sense organ with the object. This definition is also too wide, since it overlaps such cognition, as doubt; and illusions also occur as a result of sense contact. The older exponents of the Samkhya School define perceptual cognition to be modification of the sense organs such as the organ of hearing. But sense organs are devoid of consciousness, therefore, their modifications cannot be conscious. If on the other hand it is assumed to derive its conscious character from its association with a conscious principle like the self, then the status of the organ of knowledge should be accorded to the self. Therefore, Hemachandra said perceptual cognition is immediate and lucid.56

In Plato's dialogue Theaetetus, Socrate said that, ‘if knowledge and perception are the same, it leads to an impossibility, because a man who has come to know a thing and still remembers it does not know it, since he does not see it and that would be a monstrous conclusion.57 In the Nandisutra a distinction is made between indriyapratyaksa and anindeiya pratyaksa. Indriya pratyaksa is cognition which is immediate and direct as arises out of the operation of the five sense organs. There are therefore five types of sense perception: the visual, auditory, tactual, olfactory and gustatory. The experience that does not need the sense organs and is immediate may be called extra-sensory perception. It is also pratyaksa, because it is immediate and direct as it is of three types avdhi, aah- paryaya ad kevalpratyaksa.

The old Jaina thinkers thought that knowledge born with the help of the five senses as well as the manas maybe called matijanana. But in indriya-pratyaksa they included knowledge born of the five sense organs as the mind is of the exactly a sense organ. It is a quasi-sensory organ, Umasvati defines matijanana as knowledge caused by the senses and mind, since mind is a quasi-sense no indriya.58 The commentator Siddhasenaganin mentions three types of mati: (i) knowledge born of the sense organs, (ii) knowledge born of the mind, and (iii) knowledge due to the joint activity of the sense organs and mind.59 However, from the Bhasya of the Tattvarthasutra we find that Matijnana can be distinguished into different types, as (i) knowledge due to sense organs, like sense perception; (ii) knowledge due to the mind only, like cinta; (iii) knowledge due to the joint activity of the mind and the senses. Memory and recognition can be included in Matijnana. Senses perception (indeiya-pratyaksa), as a species of Matijnana is of three types based on the nature and function of the sense organs.60 The five senses possess the capacity of sense experience because the cognition of the stimulation must be conditioned by the relevant instruments. The Jaina analysis of sense perception has a great psychological significance, also though perception was a local ad metaphysical problem for the Jainas as for other Indian philosophers in fact, even in the west, philosophers were first busy with the logical and the metaphysical analysis of the problem of perception, but with the advancement of psychology as a science may have realized that perception is more a problem for psychology. Bertand Rusel says that, the problem of perception has troubled philosophers from a very early date. My own belief is that the problem is scientific, not philosophical or rather no longer philosophical’61

The contact of the sense organs with the object is a condition of perception as mentioned by the Naiyayikas 62. Although, according to the Jaina, such a contact is not necessary in the case of visual experience. Hemachandra said that objects and light are not conditions of experience, because of lack of concomitance between the two.63 But it is not denied that they are remote conditions, like time and space, which subserve the subsistence and destruction of the knowledge obscuring Karmas. They are indirectly useful to the visual organs, like collyrium. Perception of a particular object is fact, according to
According to the Jainas, sense perception can be analysed into four stages as (i) *avagraha*, (ii) *iha* (iii) *avaya* and (iv) *dharaa*. These stages of sense experience arise through the operation of the sense organs and the mind. The earlier forms like Avagraha, develop into the subsequent forms, all of them partake of the same essential nature. *Avagraha* refers to the first simple and primitive stage of experience this may be said to be merely the stage of sensation. Next comes *Iha* In this stage there is a mental element, and it refers to the integrative factors of the mind. In the third stage, we get a clear and decisive cognition of the object. This is *Avaya*. It implies the presence of the inferential element in perception. *Dharaa* is retention of what is already experienced in the perceptual cognition. In fact it is not actually a stage of perceptual experience.

Psychologists point out that perception is not a simple process nor is it merely the sense-datum. It consists in the organization and interpretation of sensations. It is ‘knowledge about, and not merely ‘knowledge of acquaintance’, as William James said perception involves certain psychological factors like association discrimination, integration assimilation and recognition perception also involves inference. We perceive a table, and when we perceive the object as a table we recognize it and we get a defined picture of the object. As Agell said perception is a synthetic process, and the combination of the new and the old is an essential part of the synthesis. This process of combining was often called, by early psychologists, ‘apperceptionists’ like Wundt and Titchener analysed perception into sensations. They said that perceptions combine and fuse together a number of sensory elements as in the process of forming H2O. It is not merely a sum of sensations. It gives a new psychological product, a creative synthesis, like the mental chemistry of J.S. Mill. Later, the Gestalt psychologists gave a new turn to the psychology of perception. They hold that every perceptual experience is an unanalysed whole: it has a quality of its own. The
Jaias were concerned with giving logical and epistemological analysis of the perceptual experience. Therefore, they were more interested in giving the conditions and the stages of knowledge. Their analysis was more on the basis of logic of common sense and on insight; and yet the stages of perception mentioned by the Jain philosophers very much correspond to the analysis of perception given by the traditional psychology and the structuralist school.

Acagraha senstion: Avarraha is the first stage of sense experience. It may be said to be analogous to sensation. It is the level of sensation in which perceptual experience can be analysed. Umasavti defines avagraha as implicit awareness of the object of sense. He says that graha (grasping), aloca (holding), avadharana (prehending), are synonyms of avagraha. It is indeterminate. The object presented through sense stimulation is cognized in an undefined and indeterminate way. In this stage, we are merely aware of the presence of the object without any association, without cognizing the specific features, and in fact without even being aware of its association and name. In the Avasyaka-Niryukti Avagraha has been deduced as awareness of the sense data. Jinabhadra insists that Avagraha is indeterminate in its character. He is not prepared to consider that it has reference to any specific features of the object, because even relative reference is enough to promote experience to the stage of Avaya.

Sensations, as William James said are the first things in consciousness. This does not mean that all our experience is only fugitive and compound of sensations our experience can be analysed into sensations, and these form the elements of our sensory experience. As Stout says, sensations are of the nature of immediate experience, like the experience of cold and warm, a specific tinge of pain, or a touch located in the body or at the surface of the body. The term sensation is also extended to cover the usual data sound, taste, and smell which may enter into immediate experience. Sensations vary not only with the variations in the presented object but also in accordance with the state of the individual. During the period of two hundred years between the publication of Locke's Essay and of James's principles, two further characteristics, now largely of antiquarian interest, were gradually attributed to sensation. Sensations were held to be the simple elements of which complex ideas are formed as well as the matter crude stuff out of which the associative machinery fashions the organized and meaningful world of everyday experience.

Avagraha has been further distinguished into two stages: i) vyajanaavagraha and ii) arthavagrha. Vyajanaavagraha is the earlier stage. It is a physiological stimulus condition of the sensation of the immediate experience. In the Visesavasyaka Bhasya, we get a description of Vyajavagraha. There it is said that what reveals an object, as a lamb reveals a jar, is Vyajaaavagraha. It is the relation of the sense organ and the object in the form of sense stimulation such as sound. In the Nandisutra, we get an example of the earthen pot and sprouts of water malaka-drastanata. It gives a description of the stage of Vyajaaavagraha, a clay pot is to be filled with water. In the beginning when a person pours out one drop of water, it is absorbed and there is not sign of existence of water. He goes on pouring drops of water and at a certain stage a drop of water will be visible. Then the water begins to accumulate, we may call this stage when the water becomes visible the threshold of saturation. The drops of water below the threshold are all absorbable. Similarly, a person who is asleep receives sound stimulation successively for
some time. The sound atoms reach stimulation sucessively for some time.the sound atoms reach the ears. Innumerable instances have to occur before the ears become full of sund atoms. At a partifcular stage the person becomes coscius of the sound. So far he was not aware the sound although the auditory stimulation was pouring in . We may acall this stage of first awareness' the threshold of awareness.' The sensation of sound starts the moment the tresho is crossed and we become aware of the sound. That is the immediate experence of sound, arthavagraha. So far there was awareness. Of sound although the cditions of stimulatio sor such awareness were operating beow the threshold.77 The stimulus was pouring in constantly although no awareness of sound was possible up to a praticualr stage. Such a preparatory stage of sesation presents physilological ad stimulus conditions ofr the senasationa stage.it is indeterminate and undefined. Vyajanavarraha has been just described as impliciti awareness the physiological and sutmulus conditionof awareness. It gradually deelops into awareess ad gives the sentstion. It gradually deelops into awareness and gie the senstion. It is ery often described a scntact awareness' althought there is the stimulation flowing in Awreess gradually emerges later’ through the accumulation of stimulation. It is merely potentiality of awareness, or implicit awareness.

As soon as a person becmes conscious, the stage of Vyanjanavagraha is over, and it transrofm itself into arthavagrha. This may be cale dt the stage of sestaio proper . it is aware ness of the object in the Nandisutra there is stanement that, in this stage, we are aware of the sound as ‘this is sound or coour’ or touch’ but not exactly cognize the nature of the sound colour or touch’, but not exactly cgnze the ature of the sound, colour or touch.78 but in the visesavasyakabhasya‘this kind of determinate awareness as this is sound’s is denied in the stage of sensation. It is merelyawareness of the occurrence of the cognition becaee it lastas oly for one moment.79 It is,therefore indeterinate and indefinite. It does not reach the stage of cogition of specific content.

On the basis such a distinction regardig the two stages of Avargaha it is stated that yanjanavagaraha lastas for indefinaite mimens gradually proceeding towards the lie of consciounness.80 The physiological and stimulus onditions of awareness in the form of sensation continue to accumulate foe aa nuber f mamets til the threshold of awareness is reached. But once the stage of awareness I the form of sensation is reached, it lastas only for an instant, which is an idivisible point of time ad is infinitesimal.

Western psychologists like stout deschibe senstion as somethig of the atue of immediately exerienced warm or cold a specific tinge of pain touch loateed in or at the sufae of the body rather than anything outside. Psychogists have exteded the term to cover the isua data, te sounds ad the smes that may enter into immediate edperince Stout fruther says that all refotion of sensation as of a certain kind, and all apprehension of it as continuing to be of the same nature or as changing in nature at different momets, inoves a reference beyond this experiecnce . For, sensations are genuine and afactual, while menta construcrs are spruius and artifical. Sensations are new, uncontaminted and untouched by those menta processes which render ideas suspect. They are ot structured by percpitio dimmed and blurred through detention, abridege dthrough for gettig or artifically aranged as a result of fortuitous associations. From hume to Russell modrn empiricism has tende to regard th einchoate beginnings of knowledge in unformed sensation as more authenti that the cognitive refineet which reent enquiry proide.82
Iha cognition of object in empirical experience is not complete with the mere awareness at the sensationa stage. In fact, pure sensations are not possible. As stout says, we have hardly any pure sensations sensations absoutely devid of mean either origina or acquied except perhaps in the case of chingdren sensations transecen the immediate experience because they ar inseparably conedted with though. They have a regerence to ecteral objects. They mean somethig beyond themselves.

In the sense, our empirical experiece wil not be complete with avagraha. Avargaha is not self subsistent. It invloves meaning and it has reference to object. It brings in iha a fatornvolvig meaning. The next stage in experiece’ the is iha. Inavagraha a person simpy hears a sound. I iha he cognises the ature of the sound also.83 jinabhadra sayas that iha is equiry for the distintie features of the objet84. Akalanaka defines iha similarly.85 Hemacandra defines it as strivig for the cognition of the specific details of the object apprehended by senstion .86 It woud be apter to use ‘associative itergration’ as standig for iha Ad iha is the stage in the formation of perceptual experience. It brings in associative iteration of sesory eemets experenceced in the stage of senstion.

Avaya: From the stage of associative integration iha we come to the stage of interpretation.sensations are interpreted and a eaing assinged to the sensations are interpted and a meaning assinged to the sensation. That would be perception. Sensation is the first impression of something the meaing of which is not coginsed. Perception is the iterpretatio of senstion is which the meaig is known. Avaya followd in the wake of iha in this stage we rach a determinate experiecnt. The strivig fro a cognition of the specific nature of the object. The Avasyakaniryukti defines aaya as determinate cognition.87 Tattarthasutra Bhasaya desricbes avaya as the stage of ascertainmet of the right exlusion of the qrong.89 Avaya may becompared to the apperception involved in perceptual experience. Perception is complex experiece. The olde psycholoists analysed perception as invoving apperception. A pprecation is assimilating new experience to old experience.

Dharana: Retaention, dharana, is the next stage in perceputal experience . the Nanadisutra defines retention as the act of retaiging a perceptual judgement for number instasn or unnumberabe intssants. Acording to Umasavati retention devlops throug three stages as i) the nature of the object is finally cognise, ii) the cognition so formed is retained ad iii) the object is recogniseds on future occasios. The Avasyakaniryukti defies dharana as retention.90 Jiabhadra says that retention is the absence of the lapse of perceptual cognition. Like Umasavati he also metios three stage os retentionas i) the abseence of the oapse of perceptual judgement, ii) the formation of the menta traces and iii) the recolection of the cognitio on the future aoccasions. In this description the absence of the lapse, avicyuti meta trace, vasaa, and recolectio siriti arethree stges icluded in the condception of dharana.

Thus some logiians make dharana a mere retantion of perceptual experriene; while some other would make it also a condition of recal of that eperiece at a future time. Hemecandra recls his iew of retntion as the condition of real with the iew as th eabcsense of rtention of the lapse mentioned in the Visesavasyaka Bhasya. He says that retation is the abseence of the lapse of perception but it is included in the perceputal judgement aaya . that is why it has not been separately mentioned by him. Avaya whe it continues for some length of time may be caed retantionas the absece of the lapse of experience. It may also be said that absece of the papse if also a condition of reall in the sense in which he defines
Dharana Mere perception without the absence of the lapse give rise to recollection perceptual judgements which are not attendeed by reflectie meta stage are almost on the lege of ouuattended perception like the touch of gras by a person in hurried motion, and such perceptions are not capable of giving rise ot recolection.

Hemancandra’s description of Aaya and his analysis o Dharana comes earer t the psycholgical analysis or perceptio espewly of the structuralist school. Perception is concrete experience in which sesations are aorganised and iterpreted. Meaning is assined to sensations. Without the factor of eaig interpretation of the sense impressions perception would be ipossible.

The Jainas have gie an exhaustie descriiption of the four stages of Avagraha perceptua experiece, so far discussed. Each of them is of six types as they arise due to the fie sense organs ad due to mind. Again Vyanjanavagraha is of four types nly. Thus there would be twentyeight forms of perypeutal cognition. Each of twenteight forms agai is of twelve types aoeding tot the nature of the ojeject thery can have. Therefore the jainas have mentioned that there are three hudred thirtysix types of sense experience namey Matijana or Abhinibodhikanna. This elaborate classification has no psychological sigifcance, this elaborate classification has to psychological significace, although it has logical and mathematia interese. The Jaina logicans were fond of presenting eaborate mathimatical calculations. This is found in their eaborate calssification of Karma as gien I the Goata Sara: *Karma Kanada*. Glasenap in his ‘Doctrine of karma in Jainism’ has given a detailed aylysisi of this division. The same tedency must have inspired the Jiana logicaans to give such an eaborate classification o Aagraha.

V. Super-sense Experiece: the problem of super- sesible experiece is not new in Iddian psychoogy. In the process of self-realization, man acquires certain experiences and powers, which are not possible for the common man with thre orna function of the sense organs. All systems of Indian philosophy exvept the Carakas and Mimamsakas, accept the possibility of such experiences. Sridhara argues that by the force of constant mediation on the self, *akasa* and other supersensible object, we acquire knwedge of them, because the varying graedes of consciousness must reach the imit beyond which it annot go . Jayata Bhatta showed that we an dexelop different degrees of perception eading to Yogic perception whi sees all objects past, future remote etc. he gies instances of cats which can see in darkness and the vaultured srom long distances. Yogis can see al objects inculding the supersensible like *dhara*.92 such is the nature of divine perception aso with the difference that the divie perception is teternal while the Yogic perception is acquired through the practive of mediation.

Prasatapada dives Yogic perception into i) *yukta* in ecstati condition; and ii) *viyumta*, of those who have falled from the ecstactic state. iN the state of ecstacy on eca see one’s own sef, other seves, *akasam* time and atoms. Those who are not in ecstacy can see the supersensible and hidden objects through a pecuilar contact of the sef, *maas* sense orgas and the objects. Neo –Naiyyayikas divide yougic perception into: i) perception of those who have attained the union with the Supreme Being; and ii) those who acquire it with some Yougic efforts. The former have constant perception. Arasajana as intuition of sages has also been recogiised.
Vijanabhiksu states that the Yogis can come into contact with distant objects by virtue of power acquired through meditation. This peculiar power of the mind consists in its all-pervasiveness. Through such powers under the influence of perception, Arṣajñana as intuition of sages has also been recognised.

In the Patanjala Yoga, mind is described as a continuous stream of functions flowing into five stages: I) kṣipta, ii) mudha, iii) bksipta, occasionally steady, IV) ekagra oncentrated and v) nirudha, withdraw. In the fourth and the fifth stages mind is withdraw from the objects and concentrated on one of the objects. In the fourth the mind gets the conscious ecstasy (samprajanta –samadhi) and in the last there is the supra-conscious state of ecstasy (asaprajata-samadhi). The concentration proceeds from the gross objects to the subtler. In the different stages of samprajnata samadhi, the Yogi acquires miraculous powers. The Vedaitins generally recognise two kinds of samadhi: samarajaata and asapraajnaata while different distinctions have been made by the Yoga psycholofists.

Among the Buddhists Anuruddha divides consciousness into two legs: I) subliminal consciousness and ii) supraliminal consciousness, which is supernormal consciousness. The yogi has to pass through three stages in the supraliminal consciousness, which is supernormal consciousness. The Yogi has to pass through three stages in the supraliminal consciousness: I) rupacitta, where he sees visible and material forms. Clairvoyance may be included in this form of experience. II) arupacitta. In this stage the Yogi sees things which are invisible and formless, iii) in the final stage of lokottaracita he reaches the stage of transcendentental consciousness which is above the three worlds. This may be compared to omniscience, the bodhi. A monk has to go through the severe physical and mental discipline in order to pass through the different levels of consciousnesss. Concentration of mind has to proceed through that of gross objects to highest level of concentration of the four noble truths in graded way.

According to the Jainas there are two leels of experience: pratyaksa which is pure experience of the soul without the help of the sense organs. Then, on the lower ovel, we have the empirical experience, which is possible through the sense organs. It is not really direct experience of the soul. It is paroksa indirect experience, as the sense organs are impediments in the direct experience of the pure soul. It is also called samvyaahara pratyaksa, empirical experience. When the eil of karma is remoed the soul in its pure form gets direct experience without the help of sense-organs. These experiences are supersensuous experiences. They have been classified into: I) avadhi which is anaogous to chairvoyance ii) manahaparayaya telephy, and iii) kevala, omniscience.

Avadhi: Avadhi is a for of supersensible perception. In this, we apprehend objects which are beyond the reach of the sense organs. However, we perceive things in Aadhi which have form and shape. Things without form like the soul ad dharma can not be perceived by Avadhi. This can be compared with clairvoyance. Due to the varying degrees of the destruction and subsidence of the karmic veil the individual can perceive supersensible objects in different degrees. The highest type of Avadhi can perceive all objects having form. The Jainas interpret the capacity of perception in Avadhi in terms of space and time. They have developed a technique of athematial calculation of the sutleties of time and space. Regarding space Avadhi can extend over a space onfupied by innumerable pradesas of the size of
the universe. With reference to time it can perceive through innumerable points of time both past and future. Avadhi can perceive all the modes of the things according to the degree of intensity of perception. The lowest type of Avadhi can perceive an object occupying a very small fraction of space like the *angula* or finger breadth. Regarding the capacity in terms of time, the lowest type of Aadhi can last for only a short time like a second. It cannot extend beyond a second. Similarly it cannot know all the modes of the objects. It can only cognise a part of the modes. Thus Aavadhi which may be compared to clairvoyance, differs with different individuals according to the capacity of the persons perceiving. The capacity is in turn, determined by the relative merits acquired by the persons.

Modern psychical research has carried perception beyond opaque wall. Precognition and foreknowledge have been of great interest to para-psychology even Kant was greatly interested in ostensible clairvoyance by Swedenborg with reference to queen Loisa I, 1761 and the clairvoyant cognition of the Stockholm fire. In Indian society we get many instances of such forms of perception and dreams. A scientific study of such forms of perception is necessary.

The Jainas do not make Aadhi a form of superormal perception, because beings living in hell, and even the lower animals, are capable of possessing Avadhi. Heavenly beings and being in hell possess Aadhi naturally from birth. They are endowed with it from birth. It is *bhava pratyaya* in them in the case of human beings as well as the fivesensed lower organisms Avadhi is possible due to the destruction and subsidence of the relevant vei of karma. It is acquired by effort. It is called *gunapratyaya*. The *viseasavayaka Bhasya* gives a detailed description of Avadhi from the fourteen points of view and it varieties with reference to spatial and temporal extension. The *pancasitkayasare* divides Avadhi into three types with reference to spatial extension: desavadhi, paramavadhi and sarvavadhi. The *Nandi-sutra* gives six varieties of Avadhi that are possible in the case of homeless ascetics. It mentions subdivisions of these.

The psychic phenomena called ‘French sensitiveness or sometimes called as ‘psychometry mind and the sense organs play their parts. C.D. Broad accepts that clairvoyance is non-sensuous perception. Clarivoyant experiences are facts. Eminent philosophers like Sidgwick, price and broad have accepted that there are asess of such experiences.

**Manahaparyaya:** Next form of superormal perception, which is *manahparyaya*. It is the direct experience of the modes of mind substance working in other individual mind. The *Aasyaka iryuki* gives a brief description of the nature of Manahaparyaya knowledge. Manahparyaya cognises the object of thought by the minds of other people. The *viseasavasyaka Bhasya* stated that a person possessing Maahparyaya directly cognises the meta states of others without the insturentality of the sense organs and the mind.

In western thought such a form of cognition was called ‘thought trasferences’ Myers coined the phrase ‘Telepathy’ for describing such experience. Tyrrel gives many instances of Telepathy cognition. He also mentions instances of cooective telepathy which he calls cooecltie telepathic calculations. In the publication called ‘apparitions’ published by the society for psychical Research many interesting examples of telepathic cognition have been mentioned.
Manahaparyaya. Telepathic experience, is not easy to get and is not common for all. Certain physical and mental discipline is the condition for getting such capacity of intuition. In the Avasyaka Niruyukti we are told that Manahaparayaya is possible only for human beings of character, especially for homeless ascetics. Human beings acquire this capacity due to effort and by the practice of mental and moral discipline. The conditions for the possession of Manahaparayaya are (i) the human beings in the Karma-bhumi must have fully developed sense organs and a fully developed personality i.e. they must be laparyapta (ii) they must possess right attitude, saayg drist. As a consequence they must be free from passion. (iii) they must be self-controlled and they must be possessed of raddhi, extraordinary powers the discipline and occult powers attainable by the yogis entioned in the patajala yoga is analogous to such a description of the qualifications for the human beings possessing Manahaparayaya.

Siddhasens Divakara says that lower organisms possessing two or more sense organs are also found to possess Manahaparayaya. But the traditional Jaina view does not accept the possibility of Manahaparayaya in the case of lower animals. Thine says that it is possible to find instances of the possibility of such perceptions in the case of lower animals especially the higher vertebrates. Several experiments have carried in this connection and several instances have been quoted.

The Sthanana recognise two arieties Manahaparyaya as rjumati and vipulmati. Umasacati makes a similar distinction. He says that Rjumati is less pure and it sometimes falters. Vipulamati is purer and more lasting. It lasts upto the rise of omniscience. We also get such a description in the pancastikayasara. Rjumati gives a straight and direct intuition of the thoughts of others, while in Vipulamati the process of knowing the ideas of others is manifested in an irregular way. Puiyapada describes the nature of Manahaparayaya as the intuition or events of the activities of the sense organs of speech, body and mind. He says that Vipulaati knows less number of objects of the than Rujuatio but whatever it knows it knows perfectly ad bividolypulameti is more penetrative and it is more lucid than Rjumati. Rjumati flatters. One who is at the upward stage of spiritual development has quiesced Vipulamati while on ewho is sure to descend in the spiritual development gets the Rjumati Manahparyaya.

In the west the phenomena of extra-sensory perception like clairvoyance, telepathy, precognition and edumbing have been accepted as facts. Een psychologists like McDougall are inclined to believe that extra-sensory perception like clairvoyance telepathy ad knowledge seems in a fair way established. Prof. H.H. Prince says that evidence for clairvoyance and telepathy is abundant and good. Prof. Rihet admits that telepathy experiences certainly exist. Dr Rhine has done good work in extra-sensory perception. He says that extra-sensory perception in the form of clairvoyance ad telepathy is an actual and demonstrable occurrence. It is not a sensory phenomenon.

Kevala: According to the Jainas the soul, in its pure form is pure consciousness and knowledge. It is omniscient. But it is obscured by the karmas as the mood or the sun is liable to be obscured by the cloud of dust,
for or a patch of cloud. when such a veil of karma is removed omniscience dawans. That is *kevala jnana*. That is a stage of perfect knowledge and a stage of *kaiva*. 

Omniscience intuits all substances with all their modes. Nothing remains unknown in omniscience. It is knowledge of all substances and modes of the past, present and the future, all in one. It is lasting and eternal. It is transcendent and pure. It is the perfect manifestation of the pure and the real nature of the soul when the obstructive evil of karma is removed.

This omniscience is coexistent with the supreme state of absolute clarity of life monad. This is precisely the release. No longer is the monad dimmed with the beclouding passion but open and free and unlimited by the particular rising qualities that constitute individuality. The moment the limitation that makes particular experience possible if eliminated perfect intuition of everything is attained. The need of the experiences in dissolve in infinite—this is the positive meaning of *kaivalya*. Zimmer says that one is reminded of the testing of the modern French poet and philosopher Paul Valery in his *mansieru Tests*. There are people who feel that the organs of sense are cutting them off from reality and essence knowledge, a cloud obscuring the essence of being; the shining moon, like darkness or a cataract of the eye! Take it all away so that modern theory of knowledge from which it arises, is remarkably close to the old idea which Jainism holds: that of the limiting face of our various faculties of human understanding.

Mimamsakas are not prepared to accept the possibility of the occurrence. The Mimamsakas raised a series of logical objections to the possibility of omniscience. According to the Mimamsakas omniscience cannot mean the knowledge of all the objects of the word either at the same time or successively. Nor can omniscience be knowledge of archetypal forms and not of particular things. There can be no omniscience because knowledge of the past, the present and the future can never be exhausted. Moreover, if all objects were known in omniscience at one moment then the next moment it would be unconsciousness and bank. The omniscient, gain would be tainted by the desire and aversions of others in knowing them.

But Jainas refute the argument of the Mimamsakas regarding the problem of the occurrence of omniscience. In the *pramana* Mimamsa we get the refutation of the Mimasa arguments against the occurrence of omniscience. Similarly Mimamsakas have been replied by Prabhacandra *prameya-kamala-martanda*. The Jainas say that it is not correct ontologically the occurrence as the Mimasakas do. Omniscience is the single intuition of the whole aord because it does not depend upon the sense organs and the mind. The pure intuition of the omniscient selfknows the object simultaneously by a single strike of intuition since it transcends the imits of time and space. Prabhacandra says that the Mimamsaka objection that the omniscient soul would be unconscious the next moment of the occurrence of omniscience is not correct, because it is a single ueding intuition For the omniscient. Cognition and the word are not destroyed the moment the omniscience is possible. Similarly the Jainas conted, as against the Mimamsakas, that the omniscient soul knows the past as existing in the past and future as existing in the future. The omniscient self is absolutely free form the bondage of physical existence as past present
and future. In fact the Mamasakas also admit that recognition we apprehend the past as we apprehend the present, and a flash intuition called pratibha jnana in empirical life we apprehend the future. It is therefore possible for the omniscient soul who is eternally free from the fetters of karma to have a supersensuous vision of the whole world past, present and future by as agile unending flash of intuition. In the pramana Mimamsa the possibility of the occurrence of omniscience is logically proved by the necessity of the final consummation of the progressive development of knowledge. There are degrees of excellence in knowledge, and the knowledge must reach its consummation somehow where it is the stage of omniscience when the obsuring Karmas are totally aihilated.

The nandi surta mentions two types: I) Bhavastha omniscience of the liberated who still live in this world as for instance the omniscience of the Tirthamakars ii) Omiscience of the one who is totally liberated which may be called Siddha. The Bhavastha omniscience is again of two types as I) Sayogi and ii) Ayogi. There are sub-divisions in both these. Similarly Siddha omniscience is of two types as I) Anantara-kevala and ii) Paramapara-Kevala, each having it sub-divisions.

The Jaina view of omniscience may be compared to the Nyaya view of the divine knowledge, and the Yoga theory of divine perception. Divine knowledge is all-embracing intuition. It is perceptual in character as it is direct and as it is not derived through the instrumentality of any other cognition. The divine perception grasps the past, the present and the future in one eternal ‘now’. The soul according to the Jaina, is itself divine and perfect and there is no there is any other transcendental being than the individual soul. Each soul is a God by itself although it is obscured by the Karmic veil in its empirical state. The Kaivalyastate of the individual soul may be compared to the divine omniscience. However, the Naiyayikas and Pratanjali accept that man has sometimes the flash of the intuition of the future, and he can attain omniscience by constant meditation and the practice of austerities. The Jainas believe that the removal of obscuring Karms by meditation, threefold path and self-control, the individual soul reaches the consummation of omniscience, the state of Kaivalya. That is the finality and the end. But others like the Naiyayikas posit a divine omniscience which is higher, natural and eternal.

It is not possible to establish the possibility of omniscience on the basis of empirical methods of investigation which psychology and empirical science follow. However, its logical possibility cannot be denied. Progressive realization of greater and subtler degrees of knowledge by the individual is accepted by some psychologists especially with the introduction of psychical Research for analysing extra-sensory perception. A consummation of this progressive realization would logically be pure knowledge and omniscience, a single al embracing intuition.

Chapter-5 : THE DOCTRINE OF KARMA IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY

I. “O Gautma, just as a sprout has a seed for its hetu as there is a hetu for happiness and misery; since it is a karaya. That hetu is the karman.” We find in this life persons, having the same means for enjoying happiness, misery, in this life, is too much of a fact to be ignored. It is also true that there is abundant inequality in the status and experiences of individual men, which is inexplicable by our empirical methods of enquiry. Good men suffer as the evil prospers like the green banyan trees. It is necessary to explain this provident inequality in the status and development of individuals.

Attempts have been made to refer this inequality to man’s first disobedience and the fruit of that forbidden tree. Others have denied the existence of evil and the consequent inequality; still others would like us to think of...
II. The doctrine of Karma is one of the most significant tenets of Indian thought. It has profoundly influenced the life and thought of the people in India. It has become the ‘logical pricis of all Indian thought’ It is the basal presupposition of Buddhism, Hinduism and Jainism (of course with minor differences). As a man sows, so does he reap: our actions have their effects. These effects cannot be destroyed. They have to be experienced and exhausted. If we cannot exhaust the effects of our actions in this life, we have to complete the visual of birth ad deaths to ear the fruit for al that we have doe. No ma inherits the good or evil of another man. The doctrine of Karma is, thus closely associate with the transmigration of souls. Every evil deed must be expatiated, and every good deed must receive its reward. If it is not possible to reap the fruits in one single empirical existence, it must be experienced on earth in fresh incarnation. Plato has made a reference to this theory in the Law, perhaps under the influence of orphic mysticism, and refers to the tradition which is firmly believed by many and has been received from those who are learned in the mysteries. In Indian thought, the Jainas have developed the doctrine of Karma o scientific basis.

Karma etymologically whatever is done, any activity. It got associated with the after-effects of actions, both physical ad psychical. Ever Jiva (living being) is constantly active, expressing the activity in the three-fold functions of body, speech and mind. It leaves behind traces of after-effects in the physic and psychic forms. Every action word or thought produces, besides it visible, invisible and transcendent effects. It produces under certain conditions certain potential energies which forge the visible effects in the form of reward or punishment. As in the case of a bond which continues to operate until, but loses it validity on the repayment of the capital sum; so does the invisible effect has disappeared. Actions performed in this life would be the causes of future life, and the present life is the result of actions performed in the precious life. So it’s the chain of life connected in the series of actions and their effects realised. The Karma doctrine involves the idea of a eternal metempsychosis. 5 Ker potter in his presuppositions of India’s has tried to interpret Karma as a form of habit. Human being faces challenges from many sides which have to be met by birth, social act ion and by the application of scientific techniques in order to be free from the bondage in life. But the more subtle challenges lie underneath the surface, and ‘arise form habits themes, which continues after the conditions that engender them have been removed, and which engender new habits which in turn must be removed somehow. This round of habits breeding habits is a part of what is called in Sanskrit samsara, the wheel of birth, which is governed by Karma, the habits themselves’ 6 Karma is described in the Jaina philosophy as a kind of dirt which accretes to the other wise pure Jiva by virtue of one’s actions. In the bhagaadgita the dirt is described as of three kinds. “one may think of these as types of habits” 7 I have not been able to understand how potter interprets Karma as a type of habit. One must be steeped in the Indian tradition in order to understand the nature and significance of Karma.

C.J. Jung, while distinguishing, personal and the collective unconscious, hints at the possibility of comparing the archetypes of the collective Unconscious to the Karma in Indian thought the collective unconscious stands for the objective psyche. The personal layer ends at the earliest memories of infancy, but the collective layer comprises the pre-infantile period that is the residue of ancestral life. The force of Karma works implicitly and determines the nature and development of personality. The Karma aspect is essential to the deeper understanding of theatre of an archetype. 8 Although it is possible to say that Karma has essentially a reference to individual differences and hence a personal acquisition, yet each India has a common heritage which he shares with the community and which shapes his being. The archetypes refer to the common heritage. To this extent they regret to the Karma aspect.

However, Jung was primarily concerned with and interpretations of dermas and fantasies in presenting his theory of the collective unconscious. He would have reached the doctrine of Karma the store-house of the physical ad psychical effective of the past.

It is difficult say who ans. where the Karma doctrine originated in India. Some have traced the origin of Karma in the principle of Rta. Rta is the socmic principle. It pervades the whole world, and gods and man must obey it. It is the anticipation of the law of Karma. In the revedic hymns the doctrine of Karma is yet in its infancy as Rta. The doctrine does not appear in the old hymns of the Rgeda. The edit seers were mainly interested in the good of this life, and when death came they went the way of their fathers to the world where Yaa, the first to die ruled. The doctrine us have developed against a number of other doctrines about creation. Some regarded time as the determinant factor of creation. Others believed in nature(svabhava)as the prominent factor. There were other theories as well. The Jainas rejected these doctrines and said that even time and svabhava are determined by Karman. 10 Concept of Karma must have existed at least a thousand years before the beginning of the Christian era, and has since become the basis ad center of religious though.11 it is probable that Karama and rebirth must have been pre-Aryan doctrines which were important in the Sramaba culture later assimilated in the
is on the force of Karma. Of the three kinds of Karma, by Kara. 13 and while thus we feted yourselves with the effect of our deeds. In the ancient Indian thought, except for the Caravaka. In the Samyasa Upanisad we are told that the Jivas are bound by Kara. 13 and while thus we feted yourselves with the effect of our deeds. In the Mahabharata, the emphasis is on the force of Karma. Of the three kinds of Karma, prarabdha, samcita and agami mentioned in the Bhagavadgita, agami and samcita can be overcome by knowledge. In Buddhism, as there is no substance as soul, what transmigrates is not a person but his Karma. When the series of mental states which constitutes the self resulting from a chain of acts ends, there would still be some acts and their effects which contumue; and the vijñana projects into the future due to the course of the effects of Karma. The Buddhista distinguish acts accompanied by asrava (impure acts) from pure acts which are not accompanied by asrava. Samasara is the effect of Karma. Our present happiness and misery are the fruit of what we have ourselves done in the past. Operation of Karma can be considered as a principle of more life, as force limiting and particularizing personality as as a principle of conservation of energy in physical world.15 but Buddhism maintains that involuntary actions, whether of body, speech and mind do not constitute karma, ad there fore cannot bring about the results accruing to karma. It only means that unwilled actions do not modify character.16 Karma theory has been expressed in a variety of ways ‘from the most extreme realism which regard Karma as a compldeity of arterial particles in fetching the soul to the most extreme idealism where it is a species of newly produced invisible force, it its highest unreal the Jainas give a realistic view of Karma. It has existed from the pre-Buddhist time. The idea of the pollution of the soul due to Karma has been largely allegorical in other religious philosophies in India, while the Jainas ‘have adopted it in the ra sense of the word’ and have worked out into an original system.17 the Jaina conception of Karma must have been completely developed after a thousand years of Mahavira’s nirvana. The Sthanaaga, Uttaradhayanaa-su tra contain genera outline of the doctrine, ad the details have been worked out in the karmagrantha, panchasmgra and the Karmapakriti. In working out the details there have been two schools of thought: I) agamikas and ii) Karmagranithikas.

The Jaina tradition distinguishes two aspects: I) the physical aspect (drvyaa-karman) and ii) the psychic aspect (bhava-karman.) The physical aspects comprises the particles of Karma (karma-pudgala) accruing into the soul and polluting it. The psychic aspect is primarily the mental states ad events arising out of the activity of mind, body and speech. They are like the mental traces of the actions, as we experience the mnemonic traces long after the conscious states experienced vanish. The physical and the psychic Kara are mutually related to each
other as cause and effect. The distinction between the physical and the psychic aspects of Karma is psychologically significant, as it presents the interaction of the bodily and the mental due to the incessant activity of the soul.

This bondage of the soul to karman is of four types according to nature (parkarit) duration (sthiti) intensity (anubhaga or rasa) and quantity (pradesa).

Karma can be distinguished into eight types: 1) jana karma, that which obscures right knowledge; 2) darsanavara niya that which obscure right intuition; 3) vedaniya, arousing affective states like feelings and emotion; 4) mohaniya, that which deludes right faith; 5) ayus karma, determining the age of the individual; 6) nama karman, which produces various circumstances collectively making up an individual existence, like the body and other special qualities of individuality; 7) gotra-karman, which determines the family, social standing etc; of the individual; and 8) ataya karman which obstructs the inborn energy of the soul and prevents the doing of good actions.

Each kind of karma has its limits in time within which it must exhaust itself. The accumulated karma brings a trance dental he or hallo to the soul which is called lesya. There are six Lesyas. These Lesyas have predominantly a moral resultant.

Karma is substantive force. It has the property of developing the effects of merit and demerit. The Karmic particles build up a special body which is called karma-sarira which does not leave the soul till its emancipation. Karma has its psychic effects also. Bhava-karma is immediate to the Jivas while Dravya-karma belongs to the body. Five classes of Karmic conditions are mentioned on account of the rise (udaya), suppression (upasama), annihilation (ksaya), suppression ad annihilation (ksayopasama) and psychological effect (parinama), the soul has ice conditions of thought and existence. In the usual course of things, Karma takes effect and produces results. The soul is said to be in audayika state. Karma may be prevented from its operation for sometime. In this state it is still present, like fire covered by ashes. The soul is in the upasamika state it is still present, like fire overhead by ashes. The soul is in the upasamika state. When Karma is annihilated, it is in a kasayika state. The fourth state is the mixed state. The last, unconditioned state leads to moska.

The aim is to seek freedom from the miseries of this life, to seek deliverance. But the path to Moksa is ling and endless. We have to free ourselves from the Karma that has already been accumulated and to see that no new Karma is added. The soul gets bound by the constant flow of Karma. This is called bundha. Mental states, like passion attachment ad aversion, which prepare the ground for the binding of the soul by Karma are called psychic bondage (bhava- bhandha; and the actual binding by the particles of Karma is called dravya-bhandha. When passions overcome us, the particles get glued to our souls and bind them, just as a heated iron ball when immersed in water, absorbs water. But the first step to the realization of the self is to see that all chancels through which Karma has been flowing have been stopped so that no additional Karma can accumulate. This is samvara. There are two kinds of Sanvara: bhava-samvara which is concerned with mental life, and dravya-sammvara which is concerned with mental life, and dravya samvara which reebers to the removal of Karmic particles. This is possible by self-control ad freedom from attachment. The practice of vows (vrata), carefulness (samiti), self-control (gupti) observance of ten kinds of dharma, reflection (anupreksa) and removing the various obstacles like hunger and thirst and passion, will stop the inflow of karma and protect us from the impurities of fresh Karma. Here right conduct (caritra) is of help.

The next important task is to remove the Karma that has already accumulated. The destruction of Karma is called nirjara. Nirjara is of two types: bhava-burhara and dravya nirjara. The karma may exhaust itself it its natural course when the fruits of karma are completely exhausted. This is called savipaka or akama nirjara, where no efforts would be required on one’s part the remaining karma has to be removed by means of penance. This is avipaka nirjara. The soul is like a mirror which looks dim when the dust of karma is deposited on its surface. When the Karma is removed by Nirjara, the soul shines in its pure and transcendent form. It then attains the goal of Moksa. The Ghati karmas are first removed still, to disappear. Last of all is the final ayogi state of kevala.

The influx of karma affects the soul and brings bondage. The soul’s activity (yoga is due to its inherent energy (virya). The infinite energy of the soul gets imperfect expression by which karma accumulated and this imperfect expression of energy is responsible for the various processes of the Karmic matter.

Karmic matter undergoes virus processes due to the different types of activity. The panchasamgradh describes eight processes of expression of energy (karma) in its limited form. These processes lead to
The soul activates Karmic matter at every moment of its worldly existence and assimilates it with different types of karma which express themselves in due course and being the disabilities and defilement of the soul.

The influx of karma (asrava) into the soul and the consequent bondage involve certain processes like i) transformation (samkrmaa) of one type of karma into that of another, ii) edurance of Karma for a certain time (stta), iii) endurance without producing the effect (abadha) ad iv) coming effect (udaya). Transformation is a process by which the soul transforms the nature, duration intensity and extensity of Karma into those of another. This transformation is generally restricted to the change of one sub-type of the same kind. For instance, in the vedaniya Karma, soul can transform the Karma producing pain (asata vedaniya) into that producing pleasure (satavedaniya). In the Janavaraniany a karma it can transform caksu- darsana. A person having right intuition (samyamithyatva). But two are told any karma cannot be transformed into any other. One cannot transform karma obscuring intuitive experience (darsana moha) with the karma obstructing conduct (caritra-moha) into that of any karma (determining life duration.) This expiation is scientifically plausible and logically acceptable. We find that electrical energy can be transformed into heat or light energy. Transformation of one Karma into another requires energy and this energy is determined by the degree of the purity of the soul. A person having perversity of attitude (mithyatva) cannot convert, cannot change the mithyatva karman into the mixed or samyakta, because the person with wrong belief is not pure and not capable of such transformation. Conversely a person with right belief (samyaktava) cannot easily transform the karma to any of the pure forms.

Transformation of karma may also affect increase (udvartana) decrease (apavartana), duration (sthiti) and intensity of the function (anubhaga) of karma. The Jains have worked out a scientific and detailed analysis of these processes with a view to explaining the process of the operation of Karma.

Karma may be made to express its effect prematurely by this process the souls attract back the karmic particles which are to fructify later. Karma is made to realize it effect prematurely. Through gradual subsidence and destruction of Karma, the soul reaches the state of perfection wherein all the karmas are removed and no additional karma accumulates. The inherent energy of the soul gets perfect expression. It is possible that one who is free from energy-obstructing karma may still continue to act in this word. The enlighten one is perfect. He may continue to work for the welfare of all creatures. But his is a purely detached activity and therefore free from any contamination ending to the coloration of the soul (lesya).

III. The analysis of karma and the involvement of Jiva in the wheel of Samsara due to the impact of karma on it raises a more fundamental question as to how the soul which is immaterial and simple is affected by the material Karma. Some seem to think that such a contact between contradictory entities is logically difficult to accept. But souls are imperfect because the particles of Karma which are foreign to the nature of the soul enter into the soul and cause great changes in it. The karmic matter produces in the soul certain conditions even as a medical polio given to an individual produces manifold physical and psychic effects. In the state of bondage the soul is infected with a kind of susceptibility to some into contact with matter.

This susceptibility finds expression in the affective states. Through the Yoga (kaya-van-manh –karma yogah) the soul puts into motion the material substrata of its activity, and fine particles of matter are dawn to unite themselves to become karma, and enter into union with the Jiva. This mixing up is more intimate than milk and water, than between fire and iron ball. The matter once entered into the soul separates itself into a greater number of particles, karma-*prakrti, with varying effects. Their number and character are determined but the conduct of Jiva if the activity is good, Jiva assimilates good karma; if it is bad, there is bondage of Karma.

The soul’s embodiment in the wheel of Samsara is an empirical fact; and beginingless nature of this bandage is also a fact, a presupposition as some would like to say. The problem as to how the immaterial soul gets mixed with karma and is involved in the empirical life has been considered from different point of Jew. Schools of philosophy have annualized it on the basis of their metaphysical views. For the Buddhist, soul is namarupa, psycho-physical in nature. Nescience (avidya) is the seed of worldly existence; and nescience is formless like consciousness, for according to the Buddhists the formless acna alsone agsect the formless. The material rupa cannot affect the formless nama. But the Jaina contends that emancipation would not be possible, as the seed for the emancipation would then be within consciousness itself. The Yogacara school avoids the difficulty by making the physical world unreal. But the Jaina is a realist, and he asserts the reality of the material world. He says that it would be consistent to believe that the material would affect the mental, as consciousness would be affected by intoxicating drugs.
The Nyaya-Vaisesika believes that conditions of bondage belong to the soul, and the unseen potency expressing in merit and demerit belongs to the soul. But the Jaina pinpoints out that as passions according to them are equalities of the soul, conditioning its bondage, they must be rooted in something material, for conditions of the passions must be distinct from the qualities of the soul. There is no bondage without the integration between spirit and matter; and there is no interruption without bondage. According to Jaina, worldly existence is possible in the reaction of identity-cum-difference between the spiritual and the material. The Nyaya Vaisesika regard merit and demerit as arising out of the activity of the body and mind, though it does accept any form of duality between spirit and matter. The Jaina does not understand this situation. The Samkhaya Yoga presents a duality between pursua and prakriti. The conscious principle is involved in the evil of the world, though it does not belong to it. The pursue is ever kept aloof from the material and conditions of worldly existence in the nature of Prakriti. But the Jaina finds this position and as such presupposes a fall of the principle of consciousness for the fruition the world is only empirically true. And karma belongs to the empirical existence and as such an illusion.

The jaina philosopher bases his stand on experience and avoids absolute conceptions of soul and karma. Je ad,ots concrete relation between the soul and karma. Soul is affected by the influx of karma. The change effected in the soul is determined by the nature of the Karmic matter, and the nature of Karma is in turn determined by the passions. Similarly, the nature of passions is determined by the nature of karma. This is a reciprocal relation affecting the soul and matter. In this conception, the distinction between the material Karma (dravya-karma) and psychic karma (bhava karman) is very significant. The former is associated with avraa; the latter is associated with dosa (defect). Every act brings with it the after-effects in physical and psychic aspects. The physical aspects of the passions is dravya-karma; while the psychic traces are have karma. The material karma and the psychic counterpart are related as caused as cause and effect. In a passage in the karamagrantha, a question regarding the cause of the Karmic influx has been raised. How is it possible that particular particles of Karmic matter entering the soul can transform themselves into various forms of karma? And we are told that this is possible through the my stories power of the soul and through the peculiar quality of matter itself. We find matter of one form is transformed into another; water is transformed into clouds and rain again. Why them cannot matter of karma besmearing the Jiva be transformed into different types of karma? We are then told that all further discussions would not be necessary. 

The discarding of rational argument, in this connection, is justified, because Jainism does not pretend to have attained this doctrine by human rational means. It is not through the limited comprehension of an average man that the view has been presented but by revelation on the authority of a kevalin.

IV. Karma theory has been found buy some to be an inadequate explanation for the prevalent inequalities in life. It is suggested that the theory suffers from serious defects.

1. Karma leads to the damping of the spirit and men suffer the ills of life with helpless equanimity of attitude simply because they get the awareness that it is beyond their power to change the course of their life as it is determined by Karma. Karma leaders to fatalism. It does not give any incentive to social service. The general apathy of an India towards the natural, social and political Elise is mentioned as an examples of the impact of karma on our life. The famous temple of Samantha was destroyed; and there was no visible resistance because the common man in India was overpowered by the belief that everything that happens is the result of karma.

But this is more an over-statement of a fact, if not a misstatement. It is not true to say that the Karma theory does not give any incentive to social service. The Upanisads enjoin social service. The Jaina ethics is based on service and sacrifice, although on the highest level one has to power social morality. The five vows to be unsaved by and SciTech and the layman (sravaka) imply the recognition of dignity and equality of life. Schweitzer maintains that the attitude in the Cincinnati Indian thought was that of world and life negation. Still the problem of deviance in the Jaina and the Buddhist thought the purity of conduct, ‘and the soul cleanses itself from the besmirching it has suffered and altogether frees itself from it. What is new then, in Jainism is the importance attained but ethics. An it full of significance for the thought of India. And Karma is not a mechanical principle, but a spiritual necessity’. It is the counterpart in the moral world of the physical low of uniformity. Unfortunately the theory of Karma became confused with fatality in India when man himself grew feeble and was disinclined to do his work. Still the importance of karma as after effects of our action and determining the course of life cannot be easily underestimated. Karma has to be looked at as a principle involving explanation of action and reaction. Fatalistic theory of life was presented by Mikhail Fosala, a contemporary of Mahavira. He considered himself a rival of Mahavira. He said that happiness and misery are measured to one as it were in bushels. The duration of life and the transmigration of souls have their fixed forms. No human effort can change them. Mahavira and the Buddha opposed Gosala mose vigorously.
2. It is also said that the karma theory is inconsistent with individual freedom of the will. It does not guarantee true freedom to the individual which is essential to his moral progress 39. Karma works as the inexorable law of causation, in its essentially mechanical way. And in the background of caste system, the boon of individual inequality becomes a curse; if Karma had not to work with caste, a varnasrama-dharma, a wrong idea of the self and transmigration, we might reconcile Karma with freedom. But as it is, it is not possible. The theory in entirety cannot escape the charge of ‘determinism’ from the point of view of higher morality 40. Older Buddhism ans. Jainism were much concerned to defend self-regulative character of Karma; salvation was essentially through self-reliance: and there was fear of the antinomian tendencies of the notion of reliance on others (e.g. the Lord) 41. The answer to the charge of fatalism was that by our own efforts we can annihilate the existing Karma and neutralise its effects.

But it is difficult to determine the nature of this objection. We are told that from the point of view of higher morality Karma theory cannot escape the charge of determinism. Yet the objection is determined by and based on the individual’s status in a particular caste. It is more a sting against caste system than a criticism of karma theory. The object appears to confuse the essential from the acquittal. It is a fallacy of Ifnoratio Elenchi. Caste system is a sociolifia problem ad it is not essential for understanding the nature and operation the nature and operation karma. In fact determinism is determined by the past karma, yet the individual is free to act in such a way as to mould his own future by reducing or destroying the existing karma. The present is determined, but ‘the future is only conditioned’ 43. In general, the principle of karma reckons with the material in the context in which each individual is born.45 But the spiritual element in man allows him freedom within the limits of his own nature.44 there is room for the lowliest of men even of animals to rise higher and price his self, Attempts were made to reconcile the law of Karma with freedom of man. Karma is compared to a fire which were can, by one’s own efforts. Grace of Food has no place in Jaina ethics. Self effort in the direction of purification of the soul is the one way towards perfection. A thief for instance, undermines his own character and being every time he commits theft. No amount of prayer and worship will erase the effect that has been accumulated, although it may create mental atmosphere for eliminating such future possibilities Jainas have, therefore given a detail theory of conduct distinguishing it into two grades as that of the mui an ascetic, and of a sravaka, a householder.

3. It has been objected that that Karma theory connects actions and its consequences in a rather mechanical way. In its mechanical aspect. It mistakes the means for the end in this it is presumed that repentance is the end and paying the due penalty is only a means. It is said that Karma theory overemphasis’s the retributive aspect of punishment.

But here again, we find a confusions between end and means. Repentance has its place in life but it is not the end to be achieved. Reentrance does purify the mind and has the effect of a catharsis. This would be a means for the future development of an individual. Even as a means it is not all. The Jaina theory of Karma emphasis’s that but individual efforts at moral and srivital development we can reduce the intensity of Karma, suppress it effects or even annihilate. We have seen that one can, by suitable efforts, transform the energy of one form of Karma into that of another, 45 as we can transform electrical energy in to that of heat or light. Repentance is not to be taken as the final end. It only creates an atmosphere for moral efforts towards self-realization. It is at best a powerful psychological means which would help us in attainment of spiritual perfection. If repentance were sufficient to lead to purification the after—effect of past action cannot be accounted for, not can they by explained away, as that would be contrary to the laws of physical and moral nature.

4. Karma doctrine implies that sin is a finite offence that can be made good by private temporary punishment. It presupposes that we can make godour sin which is entirely beyond our power.

It is also said that the domination impression that one gets of the Karma doctrine is that the individual is in the grip so power, which heedless of his own wishes, is working out a burden of an immemorial past 46. Pringle-pattison shows that the whole emphasis of the karma theory is on retribution. There is nothing redemptive in its operation, and the process becomes ans endless one, leading t no goal of ultimate release. He quotes Deussen and says that expiation involves further action which in turn involves expiation and thus the process is endless. The clock work of requital, in running down, always winds itself up again, and s in perpetuity. Accumulation of merit may ease a future life, but it would not suffice to effect a release from the wheel of life. even when a new world follows after the deluge in the cycle of worlds, it does not start with a Sean balance-sheet, as the operation of will proceeds from the point where it was suspended 48. Karma only perpetuates the curse of existence. So the karma doctrine ‘seems open to the criticism to which the vindictive theory of punishment has been subjected in modern times. To conceive this universe as primarily a place for doling out punishment is to degrade it to the level of a glorified police – court 51.
The dominate note in the objection is that to make good our sin is beyond our power and the emphasis on the reributue element in the doctrine of Karma makes this world frightful and miserable as a glorified police-court but this is far from truth. It is not beyond our power as we said earlier, to improve our states of existence. The Jainas have shown that self-effort can shape the future the present is with us and the further is in our hands.

Retributive theory is a more consistent theory of action and reaction and not merely of punishment, that Reformative theory. Man gets what he martins to get; and to with hold it would be injustice to him unless he makes his won efforts to modify the effects of his own efforts modify the effects of his actions. Reformative theory may be full of noble and soft sentiments, it may be comforting to be told that by the grace of God, we would be better. But that destroys the individuality and dignity of an individual and he destroys the individuality and dignity of an individual and he would become a too in the hands of a higher power or his agent in this world. We refuse to be treated as things. Moreover, it is good to tell men, though it is unpleasant to do so that they are alone responsible for their present state. To put the responsibility on the individual is hard truth. And Radhakrishanan says that karma is not so stomach a principle of retribution as one of continuity.

5. Some have said that the doctrine of karma leads to unbridled individualism. It fails to see that we all belong to community, that there is what is called joint Karma corporate sin or guilt. It allows the fortunate ones it boast of their self merited happiness. Explanation for the inequality is referred to the vicarious suffering. The ethical justice is to be found in the crucification of Christ; and the Cross is a symbol of taking over the sufferings of man upon oneself so as to lighten the suffering of man.

But according to the Jainas, as also in other Indian thought, except in the Carvaka, self-realization is to be attained through a moral effect which is essentially social it contain. We have seen that the Jaina ethics is essentially social in its significance. Moksa is to be attained through the practice of goodness, charity compassion and humility, although the Moksa is attained but one who practices the virtues and the three-fold noble path. It is, therefore, more accurate to say that Karma theory awakens an man to his responsibilities to himself and to others, and does not make him isolated and self-centered.

We may also add that Karma does not imply a hedonistic outlook on life. Reward for pleasure is not a life of pleasure nor is the punishment for is pain. The theory is not to be confused with hedonistic or a judicial theory of rewards and punishments. Pleasure and pain are determinants of animal experience, but for human life the end to be attained is nothing short of perfection. His efforts are to be directed to the attainment of this highest end. The universe is, in the words of Tennyson, a vale of soul-making and not a pleasure garden.

v. Therefore the karma there is an explanation of the moral justice in the universe. It is the conception of an all controlling law of natural retribution which links together the successive earth lives of each individual soul. It satisfied my sense of justice and threw light on the problem of unmerited suffering. For the modern European verities of karma theory it is not the mechanical idea of an identical soul-substance passing form body to body, the mystical idea of suffering with and for other, that forms the real attraction of doctrine. And perhaps that may be the rue explanation of its ascendancy in the East as we see.

Judged by the historic standards, the Karma theory did much to raise man’s status and to wean him from caxing gods through sacrifice and prayer. It insisted on individual expiation, and emphasized the moral continuity of life here and here after.

Karma is in fact a striking answer to the “fathomless injustice to the nature of thing” and it appeals to the overpowering sense of the necessity of justice. The conception of an all contorting law of natural retribution which links together the successive earth lives of each individual soul, both satisfied my sense of justice and threw light on the problem of seemingly unmerited suffering.

Having discussed the arguments and counter arguments of the logical justification of the doctrine of Karma, we may say that, from the real point of view (niscaya-naya) logical justification of the doctrine is not possible not necessary. It is the expressio of the highest knowledge and expression of the highest knowledge and experience of the seers. We must accept it as authority. When the ascetic, named Kaladecala saw the newborn Siddhartha Gautama he was at one delighted and sad. Delighted because he saw vision of Siddhartha as one to be the Buddha, and sad because he saw that he could not live to see that glorious day. This need not be taken as mere fable. It has a great significance in presenting the experience of a seer. The story is told of Pythagorean remonstrating with a ma who was beating a dog, because in the howling of the animal he recognised the voice of a departed friend. The spice of malice in this anecdote is perhaps misplaced. And, “Oh, agnibhuti Karma is pratyaksa to me, the omniscincent being, just as your doubt is pratyaksa to me.”
VI. we may add here a note on the much discussed doctrine of Lesya.

We have seen that the perfect soul may continue to work for the welfare of all creatures. But he is detached from all activity and is free from any creatures. But he is detached from all activity and is free from any contamination which leads to the coloration of hallo for the soul (lesya).

1. According to the Jaias, the soul is a substance distinct from matter. Matter and soul influence each other, yet are quite distance from one another. The soul is a spiritual monad. From the nominal point of view, the soul is pure and perfect. It is pure consciousness. It is characterised by upayoga ad is formless. Upayoga is the hortmic force. But the purity of the soul is defiled but the influx of karma. It gets entangled in the wheel of samsara and remodified through the operation of Karma. This entanglement is beginningless, though it has an end. It is subjected to the forces of karma through feelings, emotions and activity (yoga). The soul is associated with Karma and forms a subtle body called the Karma-sarira comparable to the linga-sarira of the Samkhya school. The immediate presence of the Karmic matter in the soul throws reflection, as it were on the soul, as a colored flower does in a mirror or a crystal. The subtle Karmic is invisible to the eye and to the instruments of Science. The influx of Karma effects the soul in various forms and produces certain type of ‘aura’ or coloration about it. This coloration or hallo is the lesya. But this coloration does not affect the soul in its pure nature. The color of the revelation does not belong to the soul. When the soul becomes free from Karma matter ad reaches the Siddhahood, it becomes free from this foreign element of coloration.

2. Lesya is of two kinds:—dravyalesya ad bhava lesya. Drya Lesya refers to the karmic material affecting the organism. Bhava lesya refers to the psychic conditions affecting organism and thereby radiating the colour which may allude than scedental coloration. Thus, the effect of dharma in matters affecting the nature of the organism though it an not be said that Lesya refers to the colour of the body. We are told that the denizens of hell are black in colour. Celestial beings get difference colors on the basis of the pact of a different karma. So is the case with human beings begins 61. This distinction may be referred to the racia colors and innumerable distinctions I the individual shades of color. Bhava Lesya refers to the psychic conditions affecting the individual in verging an aurarong the organism. The psychic conditions create reflexes and they, in turn may give rise through some form of radiation to some kinds of cloration round the organism. This may not be ordinarily visible to the eye, but only to persons disciplined in yoga further distinctions are made I lesya six types of primary colours are suggested three of them refer to egilminded persons. The remaining are attributed to morally good persons. The six Lesyas are: 1) black (krshana), 2) blue (nila), 3) dovegrey (kepota), 4) yellow (pita), 5) oink (padma), 6) white (sukla). For instance, a man who is wicked ad cruel gets the black lesya. A man who has affected by anger and envy and who loves pleasure get was the blue lesya. One who is base an dishonest has gray. On the contrary, a weldisciplined man develops the red lesya. One who has subdued the passions has yellow. One who is engrossed in mediation of the Dhrama and truth has the white lese. But the fully liberated souls have no lesya at all 62. The ethical or moral significance of this doctrine has been emphasized in this distinction. The lesyas are treated as an index of temperament and character. Lesyas have a moral bearing. 63 The Jainas give the example of six travelers in the forest. They see a tree full of fruits. The ma with a black Lesya intends to uproot the tree; that with a blue to cut the trunk; that with a grey to cut the breaches; that with a yellow, to take the twigs only; the ma with the pink Lesya intends to pluck the fruits, while the one who has a pure white lesya is content to take whatever fruits have fallen on the ground. 64

There are degrees of expression of Lesya in terms of time and intensity. We are told that in the case of black Lesya the duration varies from half a muchurta to thirty- three sasaropamas. The effect of the blue Lesya varies from half a Muhurta to ten Sagaropamas plus one Palyoama and a part of an asamkhhyeya. So is the variation in the duration of other Lesyas. 65 The Jainas have given a fabulous mathematical calculation of the effects ad the generation Lesya 66 I think they were fond of such arithmetical formulations.

3. There has been a controversy regarding the antiquity and the nature of Lesya. leumann found a resemblance between the six lesyas and Gosal’s division of mankind into six classes. 67 Jacobi was perplexed but the resemblance and though it difficult to bring the lesya doctrine into harmony with there rest of their creed 68.

However, as Dr. upadhye pints out, these early scholar on Jinism were misled but their supposition that the Lesyas represent that colors of the soul. Tradition never says that the soul itself has colour 69. Colour and sense qualities are associated with Karma throws a reflection on the soul, as a colored flower does on crystal. The colour does not form part of the crysta; so Lesya is not part of the soul. It may also be noted that the liberated
soul is free from Karmic matter and also from any of esyas. Thus, the conception of esya is closely associated with the karma theory.

In Buddhism too, Karma is classified according to colours: 1) black, 2) white, 3) black and white, and 4) not black and not white 71. The same classification was adopted in the yoga school. But these systems do not accept the material nature of karma. Therefore, Dasgupta suggests that the idea of the black and white Karma in the Yoga philosophy was probably suggested by the Jaina view 72.

4. The problem of interpreting the Lesya theory in terms of modern psychology, especially para-psychology has been engaging my attention for some time past. The bhava-lesya has a psychological significance. It is an aura created round the soul due to psychic effects and yoga. It is dependent on the activity of the mind. The six primary colours are effects of Karmic influx arising out of the mental states and events. Every psychosis brings some after-effects which are both physical and psychic; it is possible to show, by proper analysis and investigation, that such psychic phenomena exist and are detectable. The effects of psychic states are transformed through some form of radiation into the ‘aura’ of colour spreading round the organism, like the halo supposed it surround a prophet. We have heard that the gods and the prophets like Jesus, Mhahavira and Buddha, had halo round them. The Jainas have said that three enlightened ones still living in this world get a white halo around them. But those who are liberated are without any Lesya or coloration. They are alesyi. Such aura or coloration may not be visible to the eye, not detectable by the ordinary instruments of science. But men disciplined in the Yoga and those who have developed an extrasensory capacity may see it. We may perhaps find some methods pertinent to para-psychology by which we may discover the possibility and existence of such phenomena. It would therefore, be a problem for the para-psychologist’s research.

I have recently read an autobiographical not by Lama Managalabjong Rama, who states that he could see, owing to the Yogic discipline he had undergone, the ‘aura of colour round an individual’. It varied with individual difference in the mental states at the moment. He once saw blue rays of light emanating from a Chinese delegation which had gone to see the Dalai Lama. He then appealed to the Dalai Lama not to take the delegation at their word, as they were full for read.

It would not therefore, be a presumption to suggest that the Lesya phenomena should be investigated by the methods of parapsychology.

I may also point out that some have suggested a resemblance between the Lesya doctrine and the theosophical view of the transcendental colours in the individual 73. We may refer here to the theosophical writing of Mrs. Besat.74 The Jainas say that the soul is immaterial; consciousness and its states are also immaterial and colorless. Colour is in matter; and matter certainly acts ad reacts on the soul by the inflow and bondage (bandha) of the Karmic matter due to passions and modifications in the mental states.

Chapter-6 : THE PATHWAY TO PERFECTION

I. Moksa is the ideal of life. Supernormal experiences, like the yogaja- pratyaksa, arsa, and avadhi, manahparyaya are only incidental. Kevala is symptomatic of the realization of the consummate end of life. Moksa is to be realized through self-discipline in the affective, the cognitive and cognitive sense. Samyak- crater is as important as Samyag-darsana and jana. The way to self-realization is primarily ethical. “If deliverance is to be chained, the lower matter is to be subdued but the higher spirit. When the soul is free from the weight which keeps it down, it rises to the top of the universe where the liberated dwell. The radical conversion of the inner man is way to freedom.”

The Jainas were that physic and mental discipline are necessary conditions of moral discipline. Knowledge and faith are preliminary steps on the path of self-realization. Ordinary sources of knowledge are not adequate to comprehend the nature of truth. Reason fails here. Kant showed that categories of understanding are fraught with antinomies. One has to transecen reason and seek the truth in the supernormal forms of experience. Implicit faith in the truth to be sought in is necessary. It is the starit pint of self-realization. Samkara’s prescription
of the four qualifications of a student of philosophy, as stated in the commentary on the first sutra of the Vedanta Sutra, is very pertinent in the case of those who seek the truth. There are different processes which lead us from faith to the realization of the final end. Meditation (dhyana) is an important factor in this process. One cannot gas the truth unless one meditates on it; and one cannot realize it unless one grasps it meditation on the nature of the self is the highest form of Dhyana. One reaches the stage of meditation these if whe one is free from passions and is self-controlled, self-controls is in turn, possible through the practice of physical and mental discipline. Thus the ancient Indian philosophers developed a science of self-realization called yoga. They have bee ingeneral agreement regarding the principles and practice of Yoga, the Yoga prescribed by panatela regard moral and physical discipline to the indispensable preliminaries to the spiritual progress. The Jainas are in agreement with the fundamental principles and practice of this system. Among the Jain authors Haribhadra gives a comparativo sudey of Yoga in his works the janarnava of subhacandra and the Yoga sastra of hemachandra are valuable contributions to the study of Yoga as a science of spiritual progress.

II. In ancient India, yoga was a science of self-realization. The word occurs in reveda meaning ‘bringing about conection’. In the atharva-veda is stated that supernatural powers are attained by the ascetic practices. Later it was used I the sense of yoking a horse. The senses have been compared to the unbridled horses and Yoga is the means of controlling the horses. in the Jaina literature, Harbhadr defines Yoga as that which leads one to emancipation’, and the terms dhyana and samadhi were more in vogue than yoga. It is only in the yoga-sutra of pjanlani that we find the proper location of Dhyana in the whole pores called yoga. However, panatela probably did not start the Yoga school, but he must have ‘cooected the different forms of practices and gleaned the diverse ideas which were and could be associated white Yoga’. yoga a we see now is to be considered as fully developed science of self-realization.

The yogatattva upanisad mentions four types of Yoga: 1)Hathayoga is one in which the primary aim is to control bodily activities. 2)Mantra- yoga aims at healing the diseased by means of mantra or incantations of certain esoteric hymns. It is base of the influence of suggestion as psychologiiva factor. 3)Layayaoga is based on the physiological analysis of human organism. The aim is to effect concentration of an image through the Mantras and to be absorbed and lost in them. 4) the last is Rajayoga. It is prtanjala Yoga. Its aim is higher; and it consists in achieving spiritula beatitude, though bodily control is a part of Patanjali’s yoga. According to S dasagupta. The Yoga practices grew in accordance with the doctrines of the saiva and skta schools and assumed a peculiar form as the Manrayoga. They grew in another direction as Hathayoga throygh constant practices of nervous exercises and produced mystical feats. The influence of these practices in the development of Tantra was also great. Jaigisaya in his Dharamastra mentions different parts of the body like heart, tip of the nose, plate, forehead and the centre of the brain as centres of menory where concentration made. 8

Moral discipline is a necessary condition for the practice of Yoga leading to spiritual relization. The purpose of moral discipline is to remove the bondage due to Karma. The Jaina theory of morality is centred round the prici;le of ahimsa, nonvilokence. Patanjali also gives prminance to non-viliece I moral discipline. The Jainas have dittinguised two levels in the practive of orality: I) for the lay follower (sravaka), and ii)for the ascetic (muni). However, some general principles are embedded in their theory of morality. Five vartas (vows) are to be practise more rigorously by the Muni but with less rigour by the lyman. In the fomer case they are called Mahavratas and in the latter Anuvratas. The five vows are: i)ahimsa (non violence),ii)satya (truth, )iii) astey (nonstealing), iv) brahmacarya (cellibacy ) and v) aparigraha a bstinence from personal possessions) 9. A number of ways have
been prescribed for the observation of the gows. For instance, regulation of movement (iryasamiti), and control of thought (manogupti) are prescribed for the practice of non-violence. What is important is the cultivation of equanimity and indifference to the things of the world. Frendship (maitri) right understanding (praoda) compassion (karunya) and indifference towards evil (madhyaasthya) are qualities necessary for oral preparation to be developed by one seekig self-realisation. 10 This in bried is the moral practice as a background to self-realization. In te yoga sutra, yama and niyama are ethical preparations for Yoga. Without this moral training, practice of yoga will not succeed. Yama is negative in alue; and Niyama gives the code of observance. The five vows mentioned buy the Jainas are also given by patanjali.11 The yama is uniceral validity regardless of differences of aste and aoucnty, age and condition.12 Niyama is for self-prufication. The observances are austerity (tapas), aontentment (saatosa ), purification (sauca) and devotion (isvara- pranidhana) By practising Yama and Niyama one develops Ivairagaya or detachment and freedom from desires. It is only to be means to the attainment of the proper conditions for self-realization. In this sense, patanjali’s yoga is a scientifc deiscipline. The idea of God is a useful hyphtiesis which gives oa focus, a pulley ring as it wre, on which the weight of consciousness can be lifted.13 Similarily for Haribhadra, Yoga consists of hreligious cativity of far as it leads one to fail emancipation, though there is no place for god in Jainism. Haribhadra gives promithere is not place for god in Jainism. Haribhadra gives prominence to five types of practices in Yoga: i) sthaana (properposture ) ii) uma ( correct uttenance ofr sound), iii) artha ( proper understnding ) and iv) alamabaa (concentration of abstract attributes of Tirthankara.14 The first two of these are externa activities prepartory to the practive of concentration. The last three are inne activity (jana-yoga) those who have reached the fifth stage of Gunasthana (spiritual progress), viz Desairata samyagdrsti aca practise yoga. Sthana and uma are qualifying conditions for practising Dhyaa (concentration) 15 The Jnanarnava describes ith conditions of Asana. A self controlled man may select a suitable place, like the top of mountain, the bank of a river, etc, for the practice of concentration. Some asanas like paryanka, vira, subha and kamala are said to be most sutabe, the object of an asana is to enable one to be free from physical discomfort and the consequent mental distraction. 16 Similarly pranayama is a preparation for the concetaration of mind. Subhacandra, ike patanjali realised the importance of Pranayama. Three forms of praayama were suggested: i)puraka, ii)kumhaka and iii)Recaka.17 Pratyahara is given an important place in the stages of Yoga. Here the senses are withdrawn from the external object and ficed on the internal function. 18 however, the ethical preparation. Asana pranayama and pratyahara are only accessories to Yoga and not themselves elements of it. 19 in the practice of Dhyana, the first stage is concatenation on the image of tirthankara. this is the concrete symbol for concentration. After achieving steadfastness in this concepcion, one should practice aocentration n the abstract qualities of a tirthankara. The practice of Yoga is closely connected with the various stages of spiritual realization (unasthana) Dhyaa is in its primary stage in the seventh Gunasthana (apramata- samyata) The urge to self-realization leads us to the eighth stage of Gunasthana, called Apruvaa- karnana: greater self-control and a more definite progress on the path of self-realization are possible in this stage. steadfastness of concentration gradually develops till one reaches the twelfth stage of Gunasthana, called ksina mha ins which the passions are altogether subdued. In this stage, the transcandental self is possible to be realized. 20 We have, here analambana yoga. This is the state of omniscience. It is often compared to the asamprajnata samdhi of patanjali. 21 Still there is a higher stage of self-realization. In the fourteenth storage of Gunasthana called ayogakevali a activity is stopped; and the soul attains final emancipation. It is analogous to the dharmamegha of the panatela’s system,. To the amrataman of another system and to the para of still another.
As one ages ascending the stages of self realization and practice of yoga, one gradually develops the perspective of truth (dristi). This gradual development has been classified into eight stages: mitra, tar, bala, dipra, sthira, kanta, probha, and para. The eighth drsitis are capered to the eight fold stages (astanga of patajli's yoga). As higher in the stages of Drsti the perspective of truth becomes clearer; and finally, in the last stage one reechoes the Samadhi, the consummation of Dhyana.

Practice of yoga may be actuated by i) love (priti) ii) reverence (bhakti), iii) duty prescribed by scriptures (agama) and iv) no consideration (asmga.) When the spiritual activity is done out of oe or recurrence, it leads to worldly or other worldly property (abhyudaya.) if it is done as a duty or with no motive whatever it leads to final emancipation.

But Haribhadra is aware of some fiddiculites in the practice of Yoga and the attainment of supernormal experience. He says that we have to overcome some physical and mental inhibition before processing the Yoga exercises. The mind of the common man (prthaagijanacitta) is vitiated by many defects. Eight defects have been mentioned: i) inertia (kheda), ii) anxiety (udvega). ii) unsteadiness (bharanti) vi) attraction for what is not desirable (anyamud), vii) mental disturbance (ruk) and viii) attachment (samaga)

In the practice of Yoga on is likely to acquire some physical and mental powers which are beyond the common man. But these are distractions, and would lead us away from the final goal, the Jainas were primarily concerned with purification of the soul and the development of detachment from the things of the world. They were against the use of paranormal powersand miracles. This was the genera view of other Indian philosopher as well patanjali mentions the acquisition of such powers by the Yogi and warns him against temptations associated with these powers. The Yoga beeches that the citta of ma is like a milstone if we put wheat under it , it grinds it into flour if we put nothing under it, it grinds on until it grinds itself away.

In the highest stage omniscience (kevala) is attained. This is not merely negative state of knowledge. In this one gets experience of everything, past present and future, as if an a moment. In the highest form of samadhi according to patanjali al possibility of confusion between the self and the captivity of the citta ceases.

Concentration of mind (dhyana) is an essential factor as a means to spiritual realization. The lower self sometimes gets the vision of perfection in its purified state ad aims at the attainment of this ideal. On the attainment vision knowledge the self rises to its own state (paramatama) Dhyana is the concentration of thought in a particular object for a certain length of time. The duration of concentration depends on the bodily constitution. The maximum time concentration can be for one antrmuyhurta (about foresight Mounties) Dhyan is further inauspicious (aprasata) and auspicious (prasata) A presets Dhyana leads to the influx of karma (asrava) and the bondage of the soul to the wheel of life (bandha). The auspicious Karma brigs about dissociation and destruction. Artadhyaana is painful concentration, as wee we experience the pain in the loss of a lode object or in the anguish of an unsatisfied desire. Taudradhyana is vengeful concentration as we, smarting under the injury of insult we contemplate on thinking revenge. They express the pain of unsatisfied instinctive urges and are rotted in the anima nature of man. The Jaina analysis of the lower types of Dhyana has a great psychological importance and need to be Dhamadhayana and sukladhyana are conditions of spiritual progress. The nature of revelation, the fact of suffering the operation of karma ad the structure of the universe are object of Dharmadhyaaa. Umasvati defines
Dharmadhyana as a collection of scattered thought (snrtisamanvahar) for the sake of meditation of the objects of concentration. Jnana (knowledge), Darsaa (intuition Caritra (good conduct) and virigarya (non attachment) are needed for developing the steadfastness of mind for attaining concentration. A beginner has to select a suitable lonely place and convenient time. Several placed made holy by the sages create a better atmosphere for Dharmadhyana. Dharmadhyana is possible from the fought to the seventh stage of Guasthana. As en good higher up I the spiritual development one would have developed sufficient physical and mental strength to aim at the final emancipation. The Jaina analysis of right concentration (Dharamadhyana) is intimately woven into the moral texture in this life. One has to practise the four-fold virutes: mairtri (friendship), pramoda (appreciation or the merits of other), karuna (compassion) and madhyasthya (undisturbed equanimity) as the pre-requisites of this type of concentration. And in the graded level of concentration the consummation is reached when the pure and perfect self is the object of concentration. The same type of concentration is to be reached in sukladhyana except for the fact that in the Sukadhyana we get perfect concentration.

In the sukladhyana the range of the objects of concentration is narrowed to the concentration of the atom, just as poison spread our the body is first collected at a point by a mantra and then remove by amore powerful Mandtra. For this type of concentration one must have good physique and must be at least in the sent stage of Gunasthana. Four types of sukladhyaa have been mentioned. In the first two types mind concentrated on the minutest entity like the atom. Then it gets pure and perfect enlightenment, the last two stages lead to final emancipation. The self becomes motionless as a rock and is free from any activity of mind, body and speech, as in the stage of highest Samadhi. In the practice of Dhyana first stage is concentration of the image of Tirthankara. This is the concrete symbol for concentration. After achieving steadfastness in this concentration, one should practice concentration on the abstract qualities of a Tirthankara. The practice of Yoga is clearly connected with the various stages of spiritual realization. Dhyana, in its primary stage is in the seventh Gunasthana. Steadfastness and concentration gradually develop till one reaches the twelfth stage of Gunasthana. In this stage the transcendental self is possible to be realized.

The analysis of Dhyana so far give has a psychological and moral significance. Body and mind have to work together physical strength is the precondition of mental concentration. The Jainas have not been negative in this respect. The body is not merely meant to be cast away as something unholy. Self mortification is not an end in itself, but is only to be understood as a means to an end for the attainment of perfection. Moral life has also to be emphasized as an important means to the attainment of the highest ideal of perfection. The problem perfection. Has been looked at from different points of view. In this sense the spirit of Anekanta pervades the application of this principle.

III. Having studied the proactive of Yoga as the pathway to perfection in the light of the eightfold principles of patanjali’s yoga we may add a comparative note of Jaina Yoga and sivayoga as presented by the irasavia philosophers. The object of this study is to present a synoptic picture of the pathway to perfection and to see how the spirit of Aekanta pervades the application of this principle.

As civilization advances there is a gradual change in the main festation of thought and action. In the early stages of civilization, life was simple and confined itself to interaction between the fewer individual. The environment was smaller, the material facilities we comparatively meager self-expression could narrowed to the withdrawal of the mind. But as we advanced in external developments life became comoex, and men were rotted
ad absorb I the ort activities of life. It was difficult for most men to practice physical and mental discipline on a scale possible in the early stages of civilization, when problems were few and life was simple. New ways to self realization had to be adopted, conforming to the social structure and suited t the individual linking in complex societies. This gave prominence to the devotional method (bhakti-yoga) as a means to the realisation of the self.

Revival of bhakri marga as a means of purification and love, may be for absorption in highest, is an important step in the development of the self. Bhakti-yoga is implied in the sivayoga which the virasaiva saints perched. The second principle f sivayoga is sakti some have suggested that yoga must have its origin in i)Hiranyagarbha and ii)Rudra. The former has a predominantly cognitive orientation and the later is permeated with cognition and will Hiranyagarbha Yoga is presented in the patanjali Yoga and the Rudrayoga is shown in the saivagamas. Where the first ends, the second begins.

The ultimate end of a virasaica is liberation form the bonds of the lie. Positively, it is union with the Highest which may be described as aikya The realization of this end lies in self-surrender and emergence of the self in God it is sivatva. The end to be attained is not merely to discard not to transcend , the life of existence but to divines the human and to spiritualize the material.37 The way to reallise this end is through the spriitulaization of the human and demotion to the Highest . it is achieved thorough a special form of Yoga called sivayoga.

Yoga may be identified with Sahdana. According to different traditions of thought different forms have been recognised Virasaiva philosophers recognise different forms of Yoga and their efficacy in their own way. But sivayoga has distance features which make it suitable for the way of self –realization followed on the basis of self –surrender (sara) and devotion (bhakti) coupled with the necessary energy of self-realisation (sakti) It emphasizes a syntesis of discipline and devotion. The kaivalykalavallari of sarpabhusana sivayogi is a poetic presentation of the four types of yoga , showing their inherent defects.

Hathayoga may enable one to control the bodily and mental functions and make it possible for one to get paranormal powers. It does not ad us to the path of spiritual progress. In his advice to Goraksa, Allama prabhu exhorts him to give up the acrobatics of physical and mental expercise, which may supreme human beings but will not leased to the path of spiritual progress. Men practicing Hathyoga cannot be coninced of their folly, as a blind man cannot see his imagae in the mirror.

The same can be said of those pradtisig mantrayoga those who practice Mantrayoa through the incantations of hymns, like om om namah sivaaya etc .practice suitable Assans and at specific times of the day. But it will lead to mechanical development of certain types of mental habit and not to the final spiritual progress .40 In te Layayoga one practices concentration of mind on an image fo a god or any object of concentration by the physiological processes, ida pingala and nadi. 41 This is a lower form of concentration which is ansogous to the Arta-dhyana of the Jainas . but such a type Yoga and concentration is not useful for developing one’s way to self-realization. It is not possible to reach Moksa but this emthod.42 Allama Prabhu exhorts the hermits in the forests not to be fascinated by such practices of self- mortification .

Patanjali’s yoga has been considered as Rajayoga. In this self- realization is to be attained, not by the objective use of the mind, but by the suppression of the activities of mind. All mental states and events have to be held up so as to remove the impediments in th way of this end. The eightfold path enunciated by the patanjali’s yoga gives the methods of attaining the highest end Samadhi, almost developing the steps into a science of
meant control. Still in the patanjali’s yoga as also among the Jainas, though physical health is not the end of hymn life it is still in of the essential conditions. It is to be treated as only a means to and end. Even surrender to a spiritual power like god is to be considered as a useful seep for concentration and not and end in itself. the idea of God is a useful hypothesis for patanjali.

Sivayoga is different from the four toupees of yoga so far described, alsort it contains the essetia elements of Rajayoga as a method. The cardinal principle of sivayoga are:

i) belief in the existence of the supreme being, god and the ultimate end of the human life as union with the Highest (Lingaanga-aiakaya).

ii) Devotio and self-surrender to the Highest as a principal way t this end bhakti and we may mention sarana interpreted as self —surrender.

iii) Sakti (or psychic and spiritual energy) leading the devotee to the final goal. Sivayoga s as we mentioned earlier, so a synthesis of the devotional and the contrive aspects of human efforts to self-realization.

iv) Astangayoga of Patanjali is also made use of the extent necessary. The final end is the aikya sthala. It is to be realised by the devotee. Physical and mental discipline has to be practiced to the extent necessary to reach this goal.

The first principle of sivayoga is belief in the existence of God, and the ultimate end is to be united (aiakaya) with God in the Patanjali’s yoga the ultimate end is to free the self (purus) form the bonds of prakrti (matter). The idea of God was not an intergra part of Samkhaya and consequently of the Yoga philosophy devotion and self-surrender to God is an integral element of sivayoga. But self-surrender need not involve sacrifice of one’s body of one’s child etc. the story of bedar Kannappa shows that such forms of selfsurrender were present in the early devotional literature. Sivaoga does not admit f such expressions. Aama prabhu shows the ways to Goggayysa but pointing out that prasada is the right way and ahuti is the wrong way. 45 this attitude emphasizes that nonviolence is the fundamental principle of the Virashaiva also. In srif surrender there is self-effacement and the elimnation of the ego-sense. This is evident in the humility Basavesvara shows to Allama prabhu. 46

In Sivayoga the power of will for spiritual progress (samkapa sakti is an important element for the realistion of the highest end. In this the physical and the mental are not negated, but transmuted and transcended. The bodily and the menta are purified and divinised through the power of the citskti. The force of samkala-sakti is expressed thorough prysusagranthi, the pineal gland. The fuller expression of potential powers in the pineal glant will lead the indiidual to the acquisition of omniscience and spiritual force leadig to the state of union with the Abosulte. 47 the integral Yoga of shree aurobindo also emphasizes the primacy of samkalpasakti in the programme of self-reaisation. In sivyagoa as also in intergral Yoga the bodily and the menta are not denied.

To this end wehav to use the methods of Astanga of Patanjali for self —purification. It is not necessary to go through the impossible process fo the eight stages of Raja-yoga in all their rigidity that wouod distract us from the main path reaching union with God what is neeeded is a simple process of Yoga which is possible for even the common ment, women and children. This type of Sadhana is possibibel through Istalingauuja karma and the concetaration through trataka.
In the siyoga darpana we get a description of characteristic of sivaayoga. Five forms of sivayoga have been mentioned: 1) sivajana, 2) sivadhayana 3) sivapuja 4) sivavrata 5) sivacara. The symbol of 'om' is significant. Yoga through sambhavi mudra is a significant step in sivayoga. In the eye is the infinite energy of the sun the moon and the fire. The Detailed description of the practice of sivayoga as given in this book would be beyond the scope of this work.

However it is stated that the importance of sivayoga can be known only by siva and to by others. This process of Yoga would lead us to the supreme experience. Therefore it is also called sianubhave Yoga.

In this sense we can also say that there is some agreement between sivayoga and the Yoga preached by Patanjali in the fundamental stages are accepted in both. But we may say that sivayoga has democratized patanjali's yoga in the sense that it has give men the possibility of reaching the goal it has emphasized the importance of Anubhava as a mystical element in the culmination of this process for Yoga.

But the Jaina way is individualistic and rigoristic. these boodle and mental are empirical adjuncts to be eliminated if possible and also to be used in the process of reaching the highest as one uses a ferry-boat to cross the river and does not carry the boat aslant with him after reaching the other side, out of gratitude for the boat. there for, it is after t say that the Jainas do not discard the odd and aim at it crucifixion only. Fr them as for others the body and bodily health are as necessary for yoga as discarding of the mental activity is necessary (cittavritti-nirogha).

For a virasaiva the final end is unity with the Absolute. Belief in and surrender to god are cardinal principles in sivaayoga. The Jainas do not believe in a supreme deity, like God. There is no place for divine grace either. We have to depend on our own efforts, as every soul is divine.

The ontological status of the individual soul in the moksa is different in two regions. The virasaaiva aims at union with the Absolute (aikaya) while for the Jaina each soul retains its individuality in the highest stage. this has perhaps given the Jainas the need to emphasize the methods of the astangayoga as a discipline and a method.

We can say that the end of human life, according to Indian philosophers, except perhaps the Carvakas, is liberation from the bonds of empirical existence. Moksa as the ideal, is difficult to attain. few have attained it; and the attainment of such a trans-empirical end had to be adjusted according to the needs of individuals in the fight of the prevailing social structure. Therefore to compare one tube of yoga as against the other without understanding the background would be a grievous error. We have to look at this problem in the full perspective of life. Moreover it is difficult to understand the comparative significance of yoga unless one lives it .

IV. The soul has the inherent capacity for self-realization. But self realization is a long process. In the course of its eternal wanderings in various forms of existence, the soul at sometime gets an indistinct vision and feels impulse to realise it. The soul has to go through the various state of spiritual development. These stages are called gunasthana, and they are liked up with stages of subsidence and destruction of the Karmic veil. These are fourteen stages of spiritual development. The first stage is characterised by the presence of mithyadrsti, perversity of attitude. here we accept wrong belief and are under that false impression that what we believe is right. This is cause by the operation of mithyatva-karman. However, we are not entirely
bereft of a vision, though indistinct, of the right. Still, due to perversity of attitude we do not relish the truth, just as a man suffering from fever has no taste for sugarcane.

The next stage is called sasvadana-samyagdrsti. It is a halting and transitory stage in which one may get the vision of truth but is likely to tell back on falsehood due to the excitement of passions. In the third stage, of samag- mithyadrsii, we have a mixed attitude of right and wrong belief. These is neither a desire to have true beliefs nor a desire to remain in ignorance. It is like mixing curds and treacle. This also is a transitional stage. Next comes the stage of right attitude, samyagdrsti. One gets a glimpse of the truth. Yet one has not the spiritual strength to strive for the attainment of it. In this stage we have attainment of it. In this stage we have attained knowledge, but we lack moral effort, as we have not yet developed self-control. We may compare these is gradual expression of self-control. We may compare these four stages to the stage of the persons in Plato’s ‘Parable of the cave.’ The prisoners in the cave would see their own shadows and the shadows of other men and animals. And they would mistake the shadows for realities. This is the stage of mithyatva. If one were to be released, the glare of the light would distress him; and he would persist in maintaining the superior truth of the shadows. This is the stage of sasvadana. But once he gets accustomed to the change, he will be able to see things, and gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heavens. And once he gets the clear vision, he will realize the folly of his fellow prisoners and pity them.

Desavirata – samyagdrsti is the next higher stage of spiritual development, in which we get partial efforts or self-control in addition to the possession of the knowledge of truth. There is a partial destruction of karmic matter which produces passion. Full practice of virtues would not be possible, because there is the possibility of the influence of passions.

In the next stage the moral effort takes a more definite shape, although it is not always successful. A person has a more or less steady glimpse of the truth; and he tries to develop self-control and the obstacles to the practice of virtues are overcome in the sixth stage. But even here, the moral life and the spiritual struggle are not fully successful, because their full expression is vitiated by moral and spiritual inertia. This inertia is called pramada. And pramada is overcome on the seventh stage of apramatta-samyata. Efforts to reach moral excellence take definite shape. The operation of Karma preventing perfect conduct is very feeble; and minor passions called kasayas are also subdued. We can now practise the five great vows and the twenty-four virtues. The process of adhavprahrtti-karana, by which the soul on a lower level can rise higher, begins to operate in this stage.

The eighth stage is called apurvakarana. It leads to greater and more definite self-control. The self attains special purification and is capable of reducing the intensity and duration of Karma. The Gommatasara gives a detailed description of the process of apurvakarana operating in this stage. In this stage, one is affected only by the mild affective stages. It is possible to develop a stoic attitude. In the stages of development called anivrtti – badarsamparaya, it is possible to overcome even the milder emotional disturbances with greater confidence and ease. We have, here, established ourselves as moral and spiritual individuals, although sometimes slight emotional afflictions are possible. In the tenth stage of suksmasamparaya, only greed disturbs us, and that too slightly. Except for this disturbance, one is passionless and clams. This subtle greed can be interpreted as the
subconscious attachment to the body even in souls which have achieved great spiritual advancement. But one is free from even the slightest passions in the eleventh Gunasathana. Of upasantamoha. Still the affections are not altogether eliminated. They are only suppressed through the pressure of moral effort. we are mostly free from the baneful influence of the Karma, except the deluding karma (mohaniya- karman). This state is called chadmastha. It is also called vitaraga, as one is able to remain calm and undisturbed through the suppression of karma. In the next stage, of upasanta- moha. There is annihilation of karma and not mere suppression. And when all the passions and the four types of Ghati- karma are destroyed, one reaches the thirteenth stage of spiritual development, called sayoga- kevali. One is free from the bondage of karma, yet is not free activity and bodily existence as the ayuhkarma is still to be exhausted. In this stage, we find omniscient beings like Tirthamkaras, Ganadharas and the Samanya Kevalins. They attain enlightenment, but still live in this world preaching the truth that they have seen. This stage can be compared to the sate of Jivanmukta. The Vedantasara describes this state as that of the enlightened and liberated man who is yet alive in this physical world. Though he may appear to be active in this world, yet he is inactive, like the man who assists a magician in a magic show yet knows that all that is shown is illusory. Zimmer compares the attitude of the Kevalins in this stage to the function of a lamp ‘lighting the phenomenal expersonality solely for the maintenance of the body, not for the persuit of any gratification of sense or any goal.

The final stage of self- realization is the stage of absolute perfection. All empirical adjuncts, like the bodily functions, are removed. The soul enters the third stage of sukla- dhyana. This stage lasts only for the period of time required to pronounce five short syllables. At the end of this period the soul attains perfect and disembodied liberation. It is described as the stage of parabrahma or Niranjana. It is not possible to give, as Radhakrishnan says, a positive description of the liberated soul. It is state of freedom from action and desire, a state of utter and absolute quiescence. Zimmer shows ha, in this state, the individuality, the makes, the formal personal features are distilled away like drops of rain that descend from the clear sky. Tasteless and emasculate.

**Jaina Mysticism**

I The Jainas were against Gods in general and the God as creator. They presented several arguments against the theistic conception of God. They denied the existence of a created God and refuted the theistic argument of the Naiyayikas. The best way is to dispense with god altogether.

This has raised a question regarding the place of mysticism in Jainism. It is often contended that Jainism and Buddhism are authentic and hence they have no place for mysticism and mystical experience. So there is no God, there is no question of communion with him, and therefore, Jainism is a mundane religion with an empty heart.

II Mysticism has been used to mean the first hand experience and direct contact with God. It is a complex experience. It is a universal yearning of the human spirit for personal communion with God. It is science of the union with the Absolute and nothing else. Mysticism is the attitude of mind in which all other relations are swallowed up in the relation of soul to God. It detaches the heart from all that is not God and directs it entirely to the divine being. All these conceptions of mysticism imply the existence of God and the communion of the soul with God. In this sense, we cannot speak of Jaina mysticism. That would be a contradiction.
But mysticism need not be defined only with reference to the communion with God. Otto and stance, for instance, have shown that it is not necessary to postulate the existence of God for a theory of mysticism. Mysticism can also exist where there is no conception of God at all or where for the final experience itself His existence is a matter of indifference. Stace shows that an atheistic form of mysticism may exist, because the conception of a God need not be the central point of experience. In this sense the Buddha may be considered a mystic. The Buddha denied the existence of supreme Being, although he had the direct experiences of Reality. He got the Enlightenment. The Jaina Tirthankara, as Arhats, had the vision of truth (kevala Darsana and Jnana). Their experiences are not be interpreted, mysticism is to be understood as an immediate non-discursive intuitive relation f the soul to God, there would be no mysticism in atheistic religions, like Buddhism and Jainism. But if mysticism is to cover the whole range of supra-rational experiences presenting the truth in all its aspects as one concrete experience, we can discover the meaning of mystical experiences..

The keynotes of mysticism are growth, autonomy, self-realisation, self-actualisation and self-transcendence. Man cannot complete himself without relating the values of he individualised ego to the wholeness of being and the universe. This is possible only when all the ego-centric desires and goals are transcended into the ultimate-values and meaning of life. The mystic dwells in a different world of his own. The transcendental consciousness dominates the normal consciousness. Time and place, nationality and creed have no relevance for a mystic.

III For a Jaina Moksa is the highest ideal. It is the highest form of self-realsation and the self to be realised and the self – realised is the transcendental self.

For the Jaina, God-realisation is self-realisation. The Jainas sought the divine in man and established the essential divinty of man. This conception has been developed in specific directions in Jaina philosophy.

The existence of the soul is a presupposition in the Jaina philosophy. Proof are no necessary. It is described from the phenomenal and the noumenal points of view, it possesses pranas; is the lord (prabhu), dore (karta), enjoyer (bhokta), limited to his body (dehamatra), still incorporeal and is ordinarily found with karma. Form the noumenal point of view, soul is described in its sure from. It is pure and perfect. It is pure consciousness. It is unbound, untouched and no other than itself. We may also say that from this point of view it is characterised by upayoga that is a hormic force. The joys and sorrows that the soul experiences are due to the fruits of karma which it accumulates due to the incessant activity that it is having. This entanglement is beginningless, but it has an end. The deliverance of the soul from the wheel of (samsara) is possible by voluntary means. By the moral and spiritual effort involving samvara and nirjara, karma accumulated in the soul is removed. When all karma is removed, the soul becomes pure and perfect, free from the wheel of samsara. Being free, with its upward motion it attains liberation or moksa. Pure and perfect souls live in eternal bliss in the siddhasila in the 'alokakasa’. They are the perfect beings. There is no other God. The freed souls are divine in nature as they are perfect and omniscient.

For the Jaina it is not necessary to surrender to any higher being nor to ask for any divine favor for the individual to reach the highest goal of perfection. There is no place for divine grace, nor is one to depend on the capricious whims of a superior deity for the sake of attaining the highest ideal. There is emphasis on individual
efforts in the moral and spiritual struggle for self-realisation. One has to go through the fourteen stages of spiritual before one reaches the final goal in the ayoga kevali stage. These stages are the gunasthans.

The final stage of self-realisation is the stage of absolute perfection. All empirical adjuncts, like the bodily functions are removed. The soul enters the third stage of sukla dhyana. This state lasso only for the period of time required to pronounce five short syllables. At the end of this period the soul attains perfect and disembodied liberation. It is described as the state of parabrahma or Niranjan. It is not possible to give, as Radhakrishnan says, a positive description of the liberated of utter and absolute quiescence. Zimmer shows that, in this state, the individuality, the masks, the formal personal features are distilled away like drops of rain that descend from the clear sky, tasteless and immaculate.

In this highest state, the paramatman, the pure and the transcendental self, shines with the light of omniscience like the light of the sun illuminating itself and other object. Within a moment after self-realisation there flashes forth a great light. The whole world is then seen in the Atman. The Jaina conception of omniscience is very important for understanding the mysticism of the Jainas. The Jainas thought that knowledge is due to the sense organs and the mind is not sufficient to comprehend the nature of reality. They accepted the possibility of immediate and direct experience without the use of the sense-organs and the mind. This is pratyaksa. This is supernormal experience. Their types of supernormal experiences have been mentioned: 1) avadhi (clairvoyance), 2) manahparyaya (telepathy) and kevala (omniscience). Kevala is the direct immediate intuitive experiences of the highest type. Kevala jnana is of two types, (i) bhavastha, the omniscience of the liberated who still live in this world, as for instance, the omniscience of the Tirthankaras; and (ii) the omniscience of one who is totally liberated, who may be called sidha. The bhavastha omniscience is, again, of two types (i) sayogi and (ii) avogi. There are subdivision in both these. Similarly, siddha omniscience is of two types, (i) anantara kevala and (ii) parampara kevala, each having its own subdivisions.

The Jaina view of omniscience may be compared to the Nyaya view of divine knowledge and the yoga theory of divine perception. Divine knowledge is all-embracing and eternal. It has no break. It is a single all-embracing intuition. It is perceptual in character, as it is direct and not derived through the instrumentality of any other cognition. The divine perception grasps the past, the present, and the further in one eternal ‘now’. The soul, according to the Jainas, is itself divine and perfect, and there is no transcendental being other than the individual soul. Each soul is a god by itself, although the karmic veil in its empirical state. The kaivalya state of the individual soul may be compared to the divine omniscience. However, the Naiyayikas and patanjali admit that man has sometimes a flesh of intuition of the future and can attain omniscience by constant meditation and practice of austerities. The Jainas believe that, by the removal of obscuring karmas by meditation, the threefold path and self-control, the individual soul reaches the consummation of omniscience, the state of kaivalya. That is the finality of experience. But others, like the Naiyayikas, posit a divine omniscience which is higher and natural and eternal.

It is not possible to establish the possibility of omniscience on the basis of the methods of investigation which psychology and the empirical sciences follow. However, its logical possibility cannot be denied. Progressive realisation of greater and subtler degrees of knowledge by the individual is accepted by some psychologists, especially since the introduction of psychical research for analysing the phenomena of extra-
sensory perception. A consummation of this progressive realization would logically be pure knowledge and omniscience, a single all-embracing intuition.

Now the great meditation is the sure way to omniscience and self-realization. Concentration of mind (dhyana) is an essential factor as a means to spiritual realization. “The lower self sometimes gets the vision of perfection on its purified state and aims at the attainment of this ideal. On the attainment of prominent the self rises to its own pure state (paramatma).

Dhyana is the concentration of thought in a particular object, for a certain length of time. The Jaina analysis of the lower types of dhyana has a great psychological importance and need to be studied in the light of recent research in depth psychology. Dharmadhyana and sukladhyana are conditions.


Of spiritual progress. The nature of revelation, the fact of suffering, the operating of karma and the structure of the universe are objects of dharmadhyana. Umasvati defines dharmadhyana as a collection of scattered thoughts (Smrtisamanvahara) for the sake of meditation on the objects of concentration. Jnana (knowledge), darsana (intuition) caritra (good conduct) and vairagya (non-attachment) are needed for developing the steadfastness of mind for attaining concentration.

In the sukladhyana the range of the objects of concentration is narrowed to the concentration of the atom. Just as poison spread over the body is first collected at a point by a mantra and then removed by a more powerful mantra. For this type of concentration one must have good physique and must be at least in the seventh of gunasthana. Four types of sukladhyana have been mentioned. In the first two types mind concentrates on the minutest entity like the atom. Then it gets pure and perfect enlightenment, the last two stages lead to final emancipation. The self becomes motionless as a rock and is free from any activity of mind body and speech, as in the stage of highest samadhi. In the practice of dhyana first stage is concentration, on the image of tirthankara. This is the concrete symbol for concentration After achieving steadfastness in this concentration, one should practise concentration on the abstract qualities of a tirthankara. The practice of yoga is clearly connected with the various stage of spiritual realization. Dhyana, in its primary stage, is in the seventh gunasthana. Steadfastness and concentration gradually develop till one reaches the twelfth stage of gunasthana. In this stage the transcendental self is possible to be realized. It is often compared to the asamprajnata samadhi of patanjali. In the fourteenth stage of gunasthana all activity is stopped and the soul attains final emancipation. It is analogous to the ‘dharmamegha’ of the Patanjali system, to the ‘amrtatman’ of another system and to the ‘para’ of still another.

IV. We have so far analysed the various psychological aspects of supernormal experiences and we find that we can speak of Jaina mysticism as we can speak of mysticism of devotional saints. The question whether mysticism is possible in Jainism is not relevant for the simple reason that some of the earliest author-saints like Kunda-kunda and Pujyapada have described transcendental experiences and mystical visions. It would be more reasonable to collect data from earlier Jaina works and see what elements of Jainism have contributed to mysticism, and in what way it is akin to or differs from such a patent mysticism as that of monistic vedanta. To
take a practical views the Jaina Tirthankaras like Rsabhadeva. Neminatha, Mahavira, etc. have been some of
the greatest mystics of the world; and rightly indeed professor Ranade designates Rsabhadeva, the Tirthankara
of the Jaina as yet a mystic of different kind, whose utter carelessness of his body is the supreme mark of his
God- realization. And gives details of his mystical life. It would be interesting to note that the details about
Rsabhadeva given in Bhagavata practically and fundamentally agree with those recorded by Jaina tradition. And
Jaina mysticism turns rounds two concepts: Atman and paramatman. Atmans are essentially the same. And
Jaina contains the essentials of mysticism in the fact that there is the exalted experiences of perfect personality of
Atman and the paramatman. It has a metaphysical structure containing a spirit capable of enjoying itself as
intelligence and bliss. To evaluate mystical visions rationally is not to value them at all. These visions carry a
guarantee of truth undoubtedly with him who has experienced them: and their universality proves that they are
facts of experience. The glimpses of the vision. As recorded by Yogindu, are of the nature of light or of white
brilliance. Elsewhere too we find similar experiences. It may be noted in conclusion that the excessive rigidity of
the code of morality prescribed for a Jaina saint gives no scope for Jaina mysticism to stoop to low levels of
degraded Tantricism. It is for this very reason that we do not find the sexual imagery, so patent in western
mysticism, emphasised in Jainism, though similes like muktikanta are used by authors like Padmaprabha. Sex-
impulse is considered by Jaina moralists as the most dangerous impediment on the path of spiritual realization.
So sensual consciousness has no place whatsoever in Jaina mysticism. The routine of life prescribed for a Jaina
monk does not allow him to profess and practise miracles and magical feats for the benefit of householders with
whom he is asked to keep very little company. The way to salvation has been three- fold: 1) the way of
knowledge (samyaginana), the way of intuition and devotion (samygdarsana) and the way of action (samyag
carita). It would not be proper to say that Jainism is predominantly intellectualistic (jnana pradhanya). The very
fact the Jainas have given prominence to right intuition and faith (samyga darsana) as one of the three ways to
salvation shows that they have given prominence to right intuition and that they have given proper orientation to
the psychological function of intuitive experience.

Intuitive experience is likely to express itself in devotional literature. In the Jaina literature we have
abundant devotional literature. Yogindu’s Paramatmaprakasa is a grand poetic treatise in Jaina mysticism. We
may mention samayasara and pravaacanasara of Kunda- Kundacarya as examples

Of literature with the emphasis on intuition and devotion to the Tirthankaras who have conquered passions
(vitaraga Jinendra) Acarya Pujyapada and Samantabhadra have devotional songs addressed to Jaina. Akalanka
has given us Rajavartika on the one side Akalanka- stotra on the other.

The Jaina Acaryas have distinguished twelve types of bhakti. M however they have not made distinction
between ‘nirguna’ and ‘saguna’ bhakti, although there have been devotional songs of the pure and perfect souls
and of the trithankaras as they preached the dharma to the people. The ‘pancparamesthi bhakti’. (devotion and
worship of the five superior souls, is psychologically important as it presents the five types of the graded purified
souls. The namokara mantra, (offering obesecience to the five purified souls) has the greatest importance in the
Jaina way of worship for self- purification. We offer our salutations to (I) Arihantas, (ii) the siddhas, (iii) Acaryas,
(iv) Upadhyayas and (v) all sadhus.

Apart from the worship of tirthankaras, we find a pantheon of Gods who are worshipped and from whom
favours are sought. The cult of the ‘yaksini’ worship and of other attendant Gods may be cited as examples. This
types of worship is often attended by the occult practices and the tantric and mantric cermonialism. Dr. P.B. Desai shows that in Tamilnad Yaksini was allotted an independent status and raised to a superior position which was almost equal to that of the Jina. In some instances, the worship of Yaksini appears to have superseded even that of Jina. Padmavati, Yaksini of Parsvanatha, has been elevated to the status of a superior deity with all the ceremonial worship in prmbuccapura in Mysore area. These forms of worship must have arisen out of the contact with other competing faiths and with the purpose of popularising the Jaina faith in the context of the social and religious competition. The cult of Jwalamalini with its tantric accompaniments may be mentioned as another example of this motivation. The promulgator of this cult was, perhaps, Helacarya of Ponnur. According to the prevailing belief at that time, mastery overspells and mantravidya was considered as a qualification for superiority. The Jaina acharyas claimed to be master mantravadins. Jainism had to compete with the other Hindu creeds. Yaksi from the common men towards Jainism, by appealing to the popular forms of worship.

V. Jaina mysticism as we have said earlier, turns round who concepts: the Atman and the paramatman. Paramatman stands for god, though never a creator. And the creative aspect of divinity is not \textit{sine qua non} of mysticism. Atman and paramatman are essentially the same. In samsara the Atman is in karmic bondage, and once he frees himself from the bondga he is the paramatman. It is for the mystic to realize this identity or unity by destroying the karmic encrustation of the spirit.

Chapter - 7 : IN THIS OUR LIFE

I. We have so far seen the pathway to perfection through the practice of Yoga and the stages of self-realization. But the transcendental perfection is to be rooted in the empirical life; as we cannot ignore the empirical for the transcendental. We have first to learn to live a good life in this world and then we can go higher to spiritual perfection, or else it would be like one aiming at climbing the Mount Everest without setting a foot on the base camp or without training oneself for mountaineering. Moral excellence is, therefore, as much important as spiritual perfection.

It has been alleged that the Jaina outlook, as of other ancient Indian though, is negative. In their zeal for the otherworldly ends they have ignored the things of the world; lie negation and not life affirmation is the dominant spirit of their outlook; and it is throughout pessimistic. For Jains ultimate spiritual excellence could be attained by the gradual process of getting moral excellence. The good man can reach the destiny of perfection of the soul. There is no short cut to \textit{moksa}. As we have seen in the last chapter, Schweitzer maintains that the problem of deliverance in the Jaina and the Buddhist though is not raised beyond ethics. In fact it was the supreme ethic, and it was an event full of significance for the thought of India. And in Indian though category of Dharma is important. “So far as the actual ethical content is concerned, Buddhism Jainism and Hinduism are not inferior to others.” Suffering in the world is a fact: sarvam duhkham was one of the cardinal principles of the Buddha. Misery leads to think of an escape from the bonds of this life. In this sense all philosophy is pessimistic. But, the ultimate ideal of a Jaina is perfection and life-negation is a means to an end. It is the negation of empirical values of life and not of the supreme values; and ethics leads to realization of the supreme values. In the west the Hellenic ideal was to be a good citizen, to attain excellence in this life. The Vedic Aryans aimed at happiness and good life in the world and heaven hereafter. The Indian seers realized that we have to transcend the empirical to reach pure perfection, or else we have no lasting peace. Yet the empirical is a stepping stone for the transcendental perfection. Moral life, therefore, is important as the pathway to perfection. The ways of flesh
and mind are to be channelised to the pathway to perfection giving Caesar what is due to him. Ethics for the Jainas is working in righteousness all the days of one’s life. Of the triple ways to perfection enunciated by the Jainas, Samyak- caritra is equally important. It is a way leading to moksa: without hunger and thirst for righteousness we shall not enter the kingdom of perfection. Caritra is predominately activistic. It refers to moral and spiritual excellence. It implies willed activity, and samyak- caritra (right activity) is an important step one has to adopt in the pathway to self-realisation. To attain samyaktva is not an easy task. One has to be ripe for it. Samyaktva is possible for one who has attained Samyag – drsti (right faith) and Samyga- jnana (right knowledge). One who has cleared the darkness of the deluding karma and who possesses knowledge adopts Samyak- caritra. It consists in avoiding the influx of karma (asrava) coming as it does from the practice of himsa (injury to life), anrta (untruth), steya (stealing) and other forms of sense pleasures. Samyaktva has been assimilated to the status of a vrata and presented with five aticaras (infraction). They were enumerated as early as the Tattvarthasutra, though not found in the canon. Without entering into the minor discrepancies of the Digambara and Svetambara version of the essential qualities of samyaktva, we may mention the characters of Samyaktva. Samyaktva (rightness) is characterised by i) samvega (spiritual craving), ii) Sama (stilling of the passion), iii) nirveleda (disgust for sense pleasures), iv) bhakti (devotion), v) anukampa (compassion), vi) ninda (remorse for the evil acts of relatives and others), vii) garner (repentance expressed in the form of alocana made in the presence of Guru) and viii) vatsalya (loving kindness to the living). Samyaktva expresses itself in nihsanka (freedom from doubt), nihkanksa (desirelessness), nirguhana (absence of repugnance), amudha-drsti (absence of perversity of attitude).

The description of the nature of Samyaktva as shown above has a great psychological significance. It presents the mental setting required for developing character and personality as needed for spiritual progress. The instructive tendencies and emotions have to be channelized and directed by transformation and sublimation with a view to attaining mental equipoise. Ethically considered the characteristics of Samyak-caritra present a background and a canvas for the illumination of one’s self towards the goal of attaining perfect equanimity and spiritual strength.

I. Samyakcaritra has been distinguished into two types:

i) Sakala (complete) and ii) vikala (partial). Sakala – caritra is the rigorous practice of Dharma and is to be adopted by those who are initiated as monks and who have renounced this world: It is Munidharma (the way of an ascetic). But for those who have not renounced the world it is still possible to seek the truth and pursue the path of righteousness though in a convenient and lesser degree. That would be Vikala- caritra, the way of the householder. There are, thus, we levels of moral life. The polarity of householder and ascetic is indeed one of the most characteristic features of the Jaina structure. The layman has the obligation to cherish his family, the monk must sever all ties with them. The monk is excessive since his life is a negation of compromise; while moderation must be the key-note of existence for the householder whose life is rooted on compromise.

II. Munidharma at seeking salvation through the practice of strict moral and spiritual injunctions. Of these, the five vratas (vows) are important. They are 1) ahimsa (nonviolence); 2) satya (truth); 3) asteya (non-stealing); 4) Brahmacarya (celibacy); and 5) aparigraha (non-possession). It is difficult to translate these words in proper from. The Vratas have to be practised rigorously and without exception. In this sense the vratas to be practised by the ascetics are called Mahavrata (great vows). “The reverence towards life (Albert Schweitzer has put it) by
which the realm of life was so immeasurably extended, permeates the discipline of Mahavira's order in a way no other ethical prescription does. We can observe it entering into the fields of other vows like truthful speech as arising out of passion. The vow of non-possession is equally important. A monk is not allowed to possess anything, in some cases including a piece of cloth. The vow of chastity has a large effective range. “The prescriptions cohering with it do not refer to normal sexuality only, but they frequently also indicate events of sexual pathology”. According to one tradition, the fifth was added by vardhamana Mahavira, the twenty third Trihankara did not mention celibacy as a vow. In a discussion between kesi, a disciple of parsva and Gautama, a disciple of Mahavira, it was made clear that the addition of the fifth did not imply any major deviation from the teachings of the Jinas, but was an outcome of circumstance. It indicated a fall in the standards of monastic moral life as there was sufficient interval of time between the last two Trihankaras. Later it is sometimes suggested that the sixth vow raj- bhoyanao veramanam (abstaining from taking food at night) was added with the main intention of avoiding injury to life in the dark. This was primarily meant as injunction for the householder as the ascetic takes only one meal a day at midday. It is a special case of ahimsa. In fact the entire ethical structure of the ahimsa. We find this expressed in the other injunctions to be followed by the ascetics. The ascetics have to practise: 1) the five Mahavratas, 2) five samiti, 3) the control in five senses. 4) six avasyakas, other practices like i) loca (plucking the hair on the head with hands), ii) acelakatva (abstaining from the use of covering of any sort.

iii) asnana (abstaining from bath), iv) prthicisayana, v) adantadhavana (abstaining from cleaning teeth), vi) sthitibhojana (taking food offered by the lay disciple, by using the palm only and by standing), viii) ekabhukta (taking one meal a day). The five samitis are I) irya- samiti (restriction on movement), ii) bhasa- samiti (restriction on speech). iii) esana- samiti (taking pure and permissible food), iv) adana- niksepa (careful use movement of the necessary objects like kamandalu, a pot for use of water etc.) and v) pratisthapana- samiti (answering the nature calls in solitary places). The practice of vows and other injunctions has to be carefully done by the ascetic without exception. The life of a monk is hard and rigorous in this sense. His object is to attain Moksa, and for this purpose rigorous mortification of the body has to be practised. The practice of vows is threefold: in body, mind and speech.

The infraction of the practice of vows and other injunctions has also to be threefold: i) by oneself, ii) by getting others to commit violation, and iii) by acquiescing in the act of violation.

A muni is not to cover himself with any type of clothes or decoration made of cotton, wool, bark of a tree or even grass. He is forbidden to take bath (asnana). He should sleep with care on one side where there is little possibility of injury to living being including the tiniest insects. He should not clean his teeth, nails and other parts of the body nor should he decorate himself in any way (adanta- dhavana). He should eat taking the food on the palm standing on a clean and purified place, and he should eat only once a day midday. These are included in the twenty-eight basic mulagunas of a Muni. Rigorous restrictions are imposed on an ascetic; which if imposed on the layman it would not be possible for him to practise in conformity with his responsibility of household life.

The Dasavaikalika- sutra gives description of the essential qualities required of an ascetic. One who is self-controlled, who is free passion and is non-attached is a real Muni. He saves his soul and hose of others. Such self-controlled persons go to heaven (deva-loka), or are freed from the bonds of life according to the degree of
destruction of Karma. One who gets to heaven is reborn and has to continue his struggle for the destruction of
the remaining karma ultimately to attain Moksa.

A true monk should have no desires, non attachments and should wander about as the known beggar. He should
live as a model of righteousness. He is not to live by any profession or occupation; possessed of full self-control
and free from any ties, he should live the life of a homeless mendicant.

The daily routine of a monk is well regulated and regimented. He has to be severely solemn and is obliged
to behave in a strictly reserved and inobtrusive manner. He cannot indulge in singing, dancing, laughing or any
other from of merry-making. He has to devote much of his time to meditation, study, and in the third part of the
day he has to go only for food and drink.

The Acaragasutra and Dasavaikalika present a detailed picture of the strict rules for taking a midday meal.
He has to be modest in behaviour and give precedence to other receivers and even to animals. And such a monk
practising the rigours of an ascetic for the sake of a fuller and more perfect life here and here-after is superior to
all others, like a trained ‘Kamboja steed’ whom no noise frightens, like a strong irresistible elephant, like a strong
bull and a lion.

Four things of supreme value are difficult to obtain in this world : 1) human birth, 2) instruction in the Law
dharma), 3) belief in the Dharma, and 4) energy in self-control. We must, therefore, make the most of what we
have not because tomorrow we die but because we become immortal and perfect. The attainment of perfection is
in the hands of mans; and knowing this, we should avoid sense-pleasures which are short-lived and apparently
sweet yet fraught with the danger of losing all that we have, as a man lost his kingdom by eating a mango fruit
which was strictly forbidden by his physician and as ‘forbidden fruit whose mortal taste brought death into this
world and all our woe.’ Asceticism is the primary step for the monks on their way to self-realization. External
asceticism consists in dropping one’s meals, in restricting oneself to a few objects and in begging for food. These
are meant for preparing one’s mind for self-purification. The internal asceticism is mainly mental and it aims at
purification in the final form. It includes the control of the senses, subjection to confession and atonement,
readiness to spiritual service, study and the practice of dhyana in gradual stages. And one who has given up all
worldly ties, is well-versed in the Dharma, who practices all codes of ascetic life, is the sramana, a bhikkhu. A
monk complies with the rules of yati as regards posteriors, lying down sitting down, and is thoroughly acquainted
with the Semites and, guptis.

There have been conflicting opinions as to how the ascetic practice and the monastic vows originated.
Buehler held that most of the special directions for the discipline of the Jaina ascetic are copies, and often
exaggerated copies, of the Brahminical rules for penitents. The outward marks of the order closely resemble
those of a Sanyasin. Jacobi seems to support this view when he said ‘Monastic order of Jainas and the Buddhists
though copied from Brahmana were chiefly and originally intended for Kshatriyas. This view was presented in the
early stages of Indological research but it is difficult to be accepted. What we call Indian Philosophy is a synthesis
of the Sramana and the Brahmana currents of thought. The Sramana cult which was primarily ascetic in nature
was pre-Aryan. And “we should no more assess the Samkhya, Jaina, Buddhist and Ajivaka tenets as mere
perverted continuation of stray thoughts selected at random from the Upanisadic bed of Aryan thought currents”.
Dr. Upadhye calls this Pre-Aryan current of thought as ‘Magadhan religion’.
All cannot renounce the world, nor is it desirable. Most men have to live in this world and work for their spiritual salvation, while engaged in daily routine of empirical life. They are the householders (sravakas). They cannot practise rigorous discipline of an ascetic. They have to practise the vows with less rigour, as far as possible, still without sacrificing the fundamental spirit of the Vratas. The ethical code for the layman is twelve-fold consisting of 1) five Vratas which are common for the ascetic and the householder, except for the fact they have to be practised with less rigour without sacrificing the spirit of righteousness and the main goal of self-realization. Great physical and moral advantages accrue from the observation of vows. It keeps the body and mind healthy and leads one in the direction of maintaining moral strength, ultimately to lead to moksa. The vows practised by the layman are the anuvratas (lesser vows). In addition to 1) five anuvratas, he has to practise 2) three gunavrata and 3) four siksavrata.

We may mention some of the aticaras (infractions) of the anuvratas. Some of the aticaras of vrata are:

1. **Ahimsa** : i) bandha tying up, keeping in captivity men and beasts. However, the restraining of cattle by means of ropes and restriction on our children for corrections may be permitted. So may a thief be bound. ii) vadha (beating) : It refers to wanton and merciless whipping of animals out of anger and aroused by other passions, although some exceptions like mild beating, pulling the ears or slapping for correction are permissible. iii) chaviccheda : this applies to acts of injury to the body with sword or sharp instrument. Operations by a physician would be exceptions. iv) atibhararopana : It refers to heavy and merciless loading of beasts by a burden greater than they can bear. Certain types of occupations have been tabooed for a Jaina layman. v) bhakta-pana-vyavaccheda : It refers to making the animal suffer from hunger and thirst for no reason to out of anger or negligence. The context and the implications of ahimsa vrata are much wider than the aticaras indicate. We have, therefore, added in the end a critique of ahimsa in the light of its philosophical justification.

2. **Satya-vrata** (truth-speaking) has also a wide connotation. It has been interpreted as abstention from untruth spoken out of passion, and even from truth if it leads to the destruction of the living being. We may mention some of the infraction of this Vrata. i) Sahasabhyakhyana : It consists in casually or intentionally imputing false charges against a person as : ‘he is a thief, or an adulterer’. Friends of Other committed this grievous crime and sin against Desdemona even if it were in jest. ii) Svadaramantra Bheda : it consists in divulging to others what has been said by one’s wife in confidence under special circumstances. iii) Mrsopadesa. It refers to perverse teaching and advice leading to evil consequences. iv) Kutalekhakarana is preparing a false document like forgery etc.

3. **Asteya-vrata** forbids us to commit theft or even to take others’ articles not specifically meant for us. It forbids us from i) accepting stolen articles at cheaper rates, ii) instigating others to seal, iii) acquiring property in a country which is hostile to our own. Even grass or wood obtained under such circumstances must be regarded as stolen. Even Transgressing the frontiers forbidden by the State is an infraction of this vow. Black market is covered under this aticara. iv) kuta-tula-kuta-mana : using false weights and measures and taking exorbitant interest on loans is an infraction of this vow.
These Aticaras are mainly concerned as a warning to the community in which individuals and groups are likely to violate the five vows here and there. Similar infractions of this Vrata have been mentioned with reference to officials as well in the State. Corrupt officials are also to be considered as thieves.

4. **Brahma-vrata** is important in Jaina ethics. It has been considered from the points of view of personal efforts for salvation and of social health. Detailed classification of the vows and their infractions have been worked out. In their analysis we find psychological acumen. The Vrata has negative and positive aspects. In the negative aspect a householder has to abstain from sexual contact with other’s wife (aparadaragamana), and positively he has to be satisfied with his own wife. He cannot even arrange marriages of other women, except in the case of his own children. He should avoid sex literature and sex brooding. The aticaras of this Vrata cover most aspects of sexual deviation including that with the lower animals and even with inanimate objects like the figures of women. From the earliest days of Jainism, the horror of incest has been constantly felt, as described by Haribhadra while mentioning the disastrous consequences of the violation of this.

5. **Apsrigraha-vrata** (the vow of non-possession) is perhaps the most important of the Vratas in the present context of society. As Mahavrata it is required of a Muni to give up every thing that leads to attachment, except perhaps, in some cases, a piece of cloth, a kamandalu and bunch of features. He must avoid both external (bahya) and internal (antara) possessions (parigraha). As an Anuvrata, emphasises non-attachment. One who accumulates property more than required for him, transgresses this Vrata. Parigraha (possession) is something explained as a sort of the fascination for material possession. It is the expression of acquisitive instinct which needs to be curbed or else it feeds in what it gets. A son’s greed for material possessions will lead to ignore his father; and countless evil consequences will follow. If only we know the importance of this Vrata, in the Socratic sense of the word ‘know’, we would solve most of the problems of social evil. The Gunavratas and the Siksavratas have been mentioned with variations. The Gunavratas are : i) digvrata, ii) bhogopabhpgoparimana and iii) anarthadandavrata. Digvrata restricts the movements in different directions. The purpose is to reduce the possibility of committing violence, and this is to be achieved by circumscribing the area in which injury t the living can be committed. For example, one is forbidden to climb a mountain or a top of a tree, descend into a well or underground storage of a village, to travel beyond a stipulated limit prescribed by the Acarayas and to move at random. There would be infractions of the vow. In the Ratnakarandaka, Digvrata is defined as the Resolve to desist from injury by circumscribing one’s range of movement. As to the limits of time, it is to be practised until death. The Bhogopabhoha-parimana-vrata forbids or limits one in the use of ‘consumable’ goods like food and durable goods like furniture in the house. The Anarthdana-vrata restricts an individual from certain activities, from harmful professions and trades because they would lead to harmful activities which serve no purpose. Four types of Anarthdana-vrata are mentioned in the Svetambara texts, while Digambaras have five. We have tried to avoid the discrepancies in the presentation of the Svetambara and Digambara writers on the different problems as they are largely concerned with minor details. The five types of Anarthadhanda are : i) apadhyana (evil concentration like artadhyana and raudra-dhyana); ii) pramadacaritra (negligent mischief or addition to vices like alcoholism and gambling). It also includes witnessing dancing, sex displays, cock-fighting and other combats of animals. It may includes many others bringing about incitement of excessive instinctive activity; iii) himsaprada (encouraging injury to life in any form). It forbids us form supplying poison, weapons, fire, rope, swords and other articles for destruction of life. iv) papopadesa (sinful advice) like instruction in evil trade. It is also mentioned that sometimes such advice, like giving instructions to the farmer to plough when the rains are no, cannot be avoided when a
question of being helpful is involved, but it should never be given out of mere garrulity. V) duh-sruti (bad reading); it consists in reading kama-sastra, sex and spicy literature including yellow journalism and listening to the faults of others. It is the study of work that disturb and spoil the minds with harmful thoughts, worldly attachments, perverse attitude and excitement of passions.

Coming to the Siksavratas, the Sravaka has to practise four of them: i) samayika, ii) desavakasika, iii) prosadhopavasa, and iv) atithi-samvibhaga. Samayika is one of the important practices for the layman; and it is one of the six avasyakas (necessities) for the layman and also for the ascetic for whom it has to be practised lifelong. It consists in the attainment of equanimity and tranquility of mind. It is a process of becoming one (ekatvagamma), of fusion of body and mind and speech with the Atman. Samayika may be presence of Guru or in a specially built hall, according to the needs of the time and individual. Sometimes a distinction is made between the ordinary laymen, affluent men, and men of official status. Special procedure for Samayika is laid down with the intention of increasing the prestige of the Jaina community by emphasising the fact that he has adhered to the sacred doctrine. In performing the Samayika one should observe the five Samitis and three Guptis and avoid all harmful speech. He should recite pratyakyana avoiding harmful actions and pratikramana expressing remorse for past deeds and pray (alocana) that whatever acts in speech, mind and body made by him in the past may be atoned for. It is to seek forgiveness for what has been done so far. During the period of Samanyika the layman becomes like an ascetic. Samantabhadra shows that a layman performing samayika is like an ascetic draped in clothes, although this likeness is only apparent like the description of a women as candramukhi. Samayika has to be performed at regular intervals of the day. The object of this practice is to gain mental equanimity surcharged with righteousness. Desavakasikavrata is a modified version of Digvrata. It restricts vakasikavrata is a modified version of Digvrata. It restricts the movement of an individual to a house or village or a part therefor for a period varying from a muhurta (about 45 minutes) to a few days or even a couple of months. The basic idea in such restriction of movement seems to be that it would create mental preparedness for the practice of Vratas more rigorously almost leading to the Mahavrata temporarily in the state of an ascetic. Prosadhopavasa-vrata enjoins one to fast at regular intervals in the month, say on the eighth (astami) and fourteenth day (caturdasi). One should avoid adornment of the body including use of garlands, perfumes etc. One should abstain from engaging oneself in worldly duties. This is an important step in the direction of mental purification.

Danavrata covers the most important single element in the practice of religion, for without alms-giving by the laity, there could be no ascetics; and Dharma could not easily be preserved and continued. It is also termed as atithi-samvibhaga-vrata or paying due respects to the guest. Specific injunctions have been given regarding the qualifications of an atithi and the mode of giving alms. Varied interpretations have been possible, the Sadhu or monk being accepted as the best atithi as he is charged with imparting religious instruction. In giving alms one should consider the following five factors: i) patra (the recipient) ii) datr (giver), iii) datavya (the object given), iv) dana-vidhi (the manner of giving), and v) dana-phala (the result of giving alms). We should consider the place and time while giving alms. Due respect should be given to the recipient and the giver should be free from any taints of passions. He should give with full faith in the act of giving. Act of charity has no ethical value, if it is to be done with questionable motives. If it is to be done out of anger or filled with maudlin sentiments of pity, it would not be considered to be of usual significance. Nor is it possible to justify the act of charity if it were not to produce any tangible welcome result. Thus the ends and means must justify each other. The Jainas present a synthetic
picture of the problem of motive and intention in the act of righteousness. The spirit of Anekanta forbids us to take a partial view emphasising either the motive of action or merely the consequences. However, in early days, dana to ascetics formed an important duty of laymen. Food and shelter and books are to be supplied to the monks, so that they can devote themselves to study and meditation. Concentration (dhyana) is not possible without the minimum necessary physical comfort. In addition to dana to the ascetics it is good to do charity to the distressed, strangers from other lands, to the lowliest and the lost. This is Karuna-dana. Above all dana nullifies greed and acquisitiveness is a manifestation of himsa. And dana gives its unfailing fruits. Paradoxically enough the layman charges himself with restrictions exceeding in number than those accepted by the monk. This is due to the large diversity of the evil life in which the layman still stands.

So far, we have briefly mentioned the twelve conditions of a layman if he is to be a pious sravaka and a good citizen. To these twelve may be added Samlekhana as Vrata which is sometimes included as one of the siksavrtas. It is not restricted to the ascetics only. The lay followers of religion may take Samlekhana in the higher stages of their spiritual development. In fact it is regarded as the normal conclusion of one’s life except where death makes it impossible to take this vow. With a view to giving a philosophical justification of Samlekhana we add in the end a note on Samlekhana.

A layman who is desirous of attaining the higher stage in the upward path to Moksa will have to go through the eleven stages of moral and spiritual practice resulting from the careful observations of the twelve vows mentioned so far. They are the Pratimas, stages of spiritual progress; and Schubring says “Horizontally expanded as it were, these obligations are projected in the vertical by the ladder of the 11 uvasaga-padima”. The eleven Pratimas are the injections or the ways of conduct progressively leading towards the development of ideal personality. They present a ladder (sopana-marga) for the layman.

The eleven Pratimas are:- 1) samyagdrsti (right attitude), 2) vrata (practice of vows), 3) samayika (equanimity which helps in the practice of vows), 4) prosadha (fasting on certain days of the month), 5) sacittatyaga (giving up certain types of food like roots etc.), 6) ratribhojana-tyaga (giving up eating at night), 7) brahmacarya (celibacy), 8) arambha-tyaga (giving up certain types of occupations like agriculture involving injury to living being.), 9) parigraha-tyagas (giving up all possessions except clothes), 10) anumati-tyaga. (non-participation in the household responsibilities), and 11) uddista-tyaga. In this stage the Sravaka accepts only the minimum of cloth like the loin cloth (kaupina). There are minor variations in the list of practices presented by the Svetambara and Digambara sects, and they are not relevant for our discussion. Suffice it to say that in the progressive realization of these Pratimas a pious layman is led step by step towards the attainment of samnyasa, i.e. a life of renunciation. There is, in this, a psychological presentation of the principal of varnasrama prevailing in the Hindu way of life, because a householder steadily and surely proceeds towards renunciation. This transformation is much truer to human nature as there is no sudden transformation which needs acute psychological orientation. When one moves from Grhasthasrama to Vanaprasthasrama and then to samnyasa, one cannot just walk into samnyasa unless one is a prophet, but one has to prepare oneself for the gradual transformation. Sudden change from one life into the other may create psychological problems as the reparations would accumulate into the dung-heap of the Unconscious. The conception of Pratimas is, therefore, psychologically sound. This can be easily shown from the fact that the first two Pratimas are mental preparations for the practice of rigorous moral life. Moral control, like continence is always linked with fasting and the control of nourishment. Rich food and clothing have to be avoided as they lead to an easy universe of desires. In the ninth
and tenth stages one has to break away from the household attachments still living with family and friend. He is detached and spends most of the time in contemplation in the temple. He does not take part in the affairs even if his advice is sought. In the eleventh stages he is on the verge of being an ascetic. He has to wear a minimum dress like the lion cloth (kaupina). In the eleventh Pratima two divisions have sometimes been mentioned: i) ksullaka and ii) ailaka. In the former there is only provisional ordination which does not bind the ordinate to the monastic life if he has not the vocation. The second is the quasi-ascetic, the ascetic on probation. Still, in this Pratima certain features of monk's life are forbidden for the layman. He is not allowed to study the mysteries of the sacred texts. He may not go round for alms as a monk does, nor practise trikalayoga, the form of asceticism which emphasizes meditation on a hilltop in the hot season, under a tree during rains and by a river bank in winter. They are to wish others as a layman would. The pratimas are, thus, a means to achieve spiritual development which will, in the end, lead the devotee to take a Samlekhana. As a result of the conquest by Moslems who disapproved of nudity and for other reasons layman in the 11th Pratima came, to a larger extent, to take the place of monks. Today social conditions have considerably changed, and we are becoming more secular-minded. It would be necessary to reorientate our values so as to emphasise the spiritual levels of householder's life in the practice of Vrata and the eleven stages of spiritual development.

The Jaina has a conception of an ideal layman and an ideal monk. A layman develops twenty-one qualities which distinguish him as a perfect gentleman. He will be serious in demeanour, good tempered, merciful, straight-forward, wise and modest. He is sociable, yet careful, in speech, reverent both to old age and old customs. A true ascetic should possess twenty-eight qualities, for he must keep the five vows, control his five senses renounce greed, practise forgiveness and possess high ideals. He must be self-denying and endure hardships, always aiming at the highest ideal of perfection.

In the present survey of the ethics of Jainas we can see the spirit of Anekanta pervading the two levels of mortal life- the ascetics and the householder. They are not opposed to each other, nor do they present any degree of comparison. The distinction between the sravaka-dharma and muni-dharma is only to show that there is a continuity in the spiritual efforts of man. Hunger and thirst for righteousness flowers into perfection only gradually if watered with slow and steady flow of moral and spiritual practice. The lay estate was initially admitted in deference to human frailty and was regarded in theory as a stage of preparation for the ascetic life. Later it gained importance as the foundation for spiritual ends. Layman’s ethic was always considered with reference to the prevailing social and religious conditions. Local usage or customary law- the desacara, though accorded no mandatory force, has always been admitted as a guide, wherever there is no conflict with the Jaina doctrine and more particularly in the modern period it has been increasingly incorporated in the Sravakacara.

The pervasion of the spirit of Anekanta can be demonstrated by the theory and practice of Ahimsa as the cardinal ethical principle of Jainas. It is considered as the fundamental principle of this religion, ashma paramo dharmah. We may, therefore, aptly add a critique of Ahimsa.

The five Vratas have been important for the Jaina way of life. They have undergone modifications as to their application in the practice by householders as and when necessary according to the need of the social structure. And ‘changelessness of Jainism is no more than a myth’. Had Jainism become a majority religion in southern India ‘something akin to Digambara Mahayana might have emerged’. Whilst the dogma remains strikingly firm the ritual changes and assumes an astonishing complexity and riches of symbolism. For instance,
Danavrata has widened its field from feeding the ascetics to religious endowments, and Yatra ceases to be a mere promenading of the idols through city on a festival day and comes to denote an organized convoy going on a pilgrimage to distant sacred places. And all the time more and more stress is being laid on the individual’s duty to the community.

Jainism is a tirtha a way of progress through life, and whilst the yatracara teaches the individual how to organise his own salvation, the aim of sravakacara is ensure that an environment is created in which the ascetic may be able to travel the road of Moksa. The emphasis has also to be on the community as well as the individual. This is clear from modifications of the practices and assimilation of the prevailing ritual and practices in Hindu society, as for instance, in the adoption of the right of Upanayana and marriage rites.

The importance of sravakacara has been enhanced by the fact that it has wide-spread application to the community, and moral ideas of the lay followers have been suited to the needs of the society for good and perfect social order. They are still useful in the perfect social order. They are still useful in the daily life of man, whether he be a Jaina or non-Jaina. A perfect social order would be possible if we follow the Vratas carefully. The Anuvrata movement started by Muni Tulsiji is a welcome crusade against the evils in society, and the most useful effort towards establishing a coherent, healthy and moral social order. The supreme importance of the laythics as given by the Jainas has been clear by the aticaras (infraction) elaborately mentioned by the Acaryas.

The ethical ideal of a Jaina is not mere pleasure of the senses nor gratification of the body. Pleasures of the senses are insatiable. More we get them the more we want and the more pained we are. There is glue as it were in pleasure: those who are not given to pleasure are not soiled by it; those who love pleasure must wander about in Samsara, those who do not will be liberated. Like the two clods of clay, one wet and the other dry, flung at the wall, those who love pleasure get clung to the influx of Karma, but the passionless are free. Not the pleasures of the moment nor even the greatest happiness of the greatest number are attractions to the truly pious, for, their ultimate end is to attain perfection and to lead other men to the path of righteousness. Yet the Jaina does not say that pleasure of the senses are to be completely avoided, specially for the lay disciple. And mortification of the body is equally one-sided. Rigorous asceticism for a monk is a means to an end and not an end in itself. For a lay follower, he may continue his occupation, earn money, live a family life and enjoy normal acceptable pleasures of life in good spirit according to the needs and status of an individual in society.

Jainism aims at self-realization, and the self to be realised is the transcendental and pure self. The empirical self is to be channelised in the direction of the attainment of the highest ideal of Moksa.

**SAMLEKHANA:** In the present political life of our country, fasting unto death for specific ends has been very common. The Manu Smriti mentions some traditional methods of fasting unto death in order to get back the loan that was once given. The Rajatarangini refers to the Brahmins restoring to fast in order to obtain justice or protest against the abuses. Religious suicide is occasionally commended by the Hindus. With a vow to some deity they starve themselves to death, enter fire and throw themselves down a precipice.

The Jainas were opposed to such forms of death. They called such death as unwise (bala-marana). It has no moral justification. The Uttaradhyayana Sutra condemns such practices and states that those who use
weapons, throw themselves into the fire and water, and use things not prescribed by the rules of conduct, are liable to be caught in the wheel of samsara. Such persons are caught in the maha-dharma. Fasting unto death for specific purposes has an element of coercion which is against the spirit of non-violence.

However, the Jainas have commended fasting as an important means to self-realization. Among the austerities, fasting is the most conspicuous; the jainas have developed it into a kind of art. They have reached a remarkable proficiency in it. The Jaina monks and the laymen have to fast at regular intervals for their spiritual progress. More important is fasting unto death. It is called Ssamlikhana. The Jainas have worked out a scientific analysis of Samlekhana.

Fasting unto death for specific purpose has raised moral problems. The question whether it would be a suicide and as such unjustifiable has been persistently asked with no relevant answer. The Jaina theory of Samlekhana has raised similar problems. It is a much misunderstood doctrine, both in its theory and practice. Radhakrishnan makes mention of it as a form of suicide. The Rev. Dr. A.C. Bouquet, Trinity College, Cambridge, states that the attitude of the Stoic towards his own death seems to be curious. He claims that one is instilled to do whatever one likes with one’s own life. Perhaps the Jaina, ‘if interrogated, might say the same thing.’ He gives an instance of Zeno who is said to have suffocated himself to death in his old age because he had damaged one of his hands. It can only be said that a better understanding of his hands. It can only be said that a better understanding of the Jaina theory of Samlekhana would dispel the misgivings about it as a form of suicide and as an act of disregard of life. It is, therefore, necessary to analyses the theory and practice of Samlekhana as the Jainas presented.

According to Jainas, the individual souls are pure and perfect in their real nature. They are substances distinct from matter. Through the incessant activity, the souls get infected with matter. The Karma, which is of eight types and which is material in nature accumulates and vitiates the soul from its purity. The souls get entangled in the wheel of Samsara. This is beginningless, though it has an end. The end to be achieved is the freedom from the bonds of this empirical life. It is to be achieved through the three ‘jewels’—right intuition, right knowledge and right action. The way to Moksa which is the final end, is long arduous. The moral codes of religious practices, which are regourous, gradually lead to self-realization. In the final phase of self-realisation, as also in emergencies, the Jaina devotee, a monk or a householder (sravaka) is enjoined to abstain from food and drink gradually and fast unto death. Death is not the final end and destruction of self. It is only casting off the body, freedom from the bonds of life. We are asked to accept a quiet death, as far as possible, within the limits of our capacity. This is Samlekhana.

Samlekhana is a step towards self-realization. It is meant to free oneself from the bonds of the body, which is no longer useful. It is described as the process of self-control by which senses, pleasures and passions are purged off and destroyed. It is called samadhi-marana or samnyasa-marana. For a Jaina, the final emancipation by Samlekhana is the ideal end to be devoutly wished for. If a pious man, self-controlled throughout his life were to die a common death, all his efforts as a spiritual progress would be wasted. He will no be free from the wheel of Samsara, because Samlekhana is the highest from of tapas.

But Samlekhana is not to be taken lightly. It is not to be universally practised without distinguishing individual capacity and motivation. Certain specific conditions are laid down, which are to be strictly followed if
one is to practise such fast unto death. Samlekhana is to be adopted in two cases: a) in cases of emergencies and b) as the end of a regular religious career. The two forms of Samlekhana are equally applicable to the monks and laymen.

(a) As an emergency measure, we are to fast unto death only when we are faced with terrible famine, when overpowered by foreign domination, at the time of spiritual calamities when it would be impossible for us to live a pious life and to do the duties as a good citizen. The same should be practised when we are in the grip of an incurable disease and when we are too old as not to be able to live normal righteous life. In these cases we have to depend on others. We become a burden to society without any possibility of reciprocating the good either for oneself or for others. Under such circumstances only should we decide to end this life by fasting unto death. If a monk falls ill and it is not possible for him to continue the practice of his vows and to lead their ascetic life, he should decide to take Samlekhana. In all these cases, however, one has perforce to take the permission of the teacher who will give permission to practise Samlekhana only after examining the capacity of the individual. One who has not the strength of will is forbidden to take Samlekhana.

(b) Samlekhana forms a regular religious career both for ascetics and householders. A householder (sravaka) has to go through a regular religious career through the gradual practice of eleven pratimas (stages of conduct). In the last stage, he becomes practically a monk. At the end of the period, he abstains from food and drink and devotes himself to self-mortification. He continues his fast, patiently waiting for death. In the case of the monk, the practice of Samlekhana may last twelve years. For the householder who has practically become a monk it would take twelve months. Firm faith in Jainism, observance of Vratas (vows) and Samlekhana according to rules at the time of death, constitute the duties of the householder. A Jaina monk must prepare himself by a course of graduated fasting lasting as long as twelve years. If however, he is sick and is unable to maintain the course of rigid self-discipline to which he is vowed he may fast unto death without any preliminary preparation. The Jaina tradition looks at Samlekhana as the highest end to be achieved in the course of spiritual struggle, and finds there no cause for tears. But it has to be noted that, even at this stage, such a course of death has to be adopted only with the permission of the teacher. The Acarange Sutra exhorts the monks to practise this great penance as the final end of the religious course to reach the triumphant end of spiritual struggle. In the Manu Smriti we get a similar instruction to the ascetics. They are asked to walk straight, fully determined in the north-rasterly direction, subsisting on water and air, until the body sinks to rest. This is the great journey (mahaprasthana) which ends in death. When the ascetic is incurably diseased or meets with a great misfortune he should accept voluntary death. It is taught in the Sastras; it is not opposed to the Vedic rules which forbid suicide. Buhler remarks that voluntary death by starvation was considered at that time to be a befitting conclusion of a hermit life. The antiquity and the general prevalence of the practice may be inferred from the fact that the Jaina ascetics too consider it particularly meritorious. Among the Maharashtra mystics we mention the name of Jnanesvara who gave up his life voluntarily, though it cannot be compared to the Jaina vow of Samlekhana. It is necessary to note that, according to the Jainas, Samlekhana is to be practised only when ordinarily death is felt imminent.

At the proper time, having taken the permission of Guru, one must prepare oneself for the practise of this type of end. It needs physical and mental preparation. Gradual development of self-control is to be effected; the passions have to be conquered, emotions subdued and the urges to be controlled and channelised to the fulfillment of the desired end. One as the highest end to be achieved in the course of spiritual struggle, and finds
there no cause for tears. But it has to be noted that, even at this stage, such a course of death has to be adopted only with the permission of the teacher. The Acaranga Sutra exhorts the monks to practise this great penance as the final end of the religious course to reach the triumphant end of spiritual struggle. In the Manu Smrti we get a similar instruction to the ascetics. They are asked to walk straight, fully determined in the north-easterly direction, subsisting on water and air, until the body sinks to rest. This is the great journey (mahapraṣṭhāṇa) which ends in death. When the ascetic is incurably diseased or meets with a great misfortune he should accept voluntary death. It is taught in the Sāstras; it is not opposed to the Vedic rules which forbid suicide. But the remark that voluntary death by starvation was considered at that time to be a befitting conclusion of a hermit life. The antiquity and the general prevalence of the practice may be inferred from the fact that the Jaina ascetics too consider it particularly meritorious. Among the Mahārastra mystics we mentioned the name of Jñānesvara who gave up his life voluntarily, though it cannot be compared to the Jaina vow of Samlekhana. It is necessary to note that, accordingly to the jainas, Samlekhana is to be practised only when ordinarily death is felt imminent.

At the proper time, having taken the permission of Guru, one must prepare oneself for the practice of this type of end. It needs physical and mental preparation. Gradual development of self-control is to be effected; the passions have to be conquered, emotions subdued and the urges to be controlled and channelised to the fulfillment of the desired end. One should contemplate on the importance of virtues. Having called relative and friends, one should seek their forgiveness for any transgressions in conduct – ‘should forgiveness give and take.’ With malice towards none and charity for all one should start the practice of Samlekhana. In the Ratnakarandaka Sravakacara, we get the description of mental preparation for the fast, we should conquer all emotional excitement, like fear, anger and grief. We should overcome love, attachment and hatred, with a peace of mind which is not possible by craving for anything empirical, we should reach the mental dignity and calm which is rarely possible in the turmoil of this world.

The gradual process of self-mortification is psychologically significant. It is not to be a slow death, nor is it meant to intensify the rigour of mortification. The primary motive is to make the person physically and mentally prepared to accept the inevitable end to lighten the burden of pain. It is very important to note that we are told not to desire for death nor for life during the practice of Samlekhana. We are not to be ruffled or agitated with hopes for life of fear of death. We have to be free from the memories of the friendly attachment and the anxiety for the heavenly bliss. Quickly reducing the flesh by increasing the pace of fasting may give rise to emotional excitement and morbid thoughts, which are harmful to the undisturbed spiritual end.

Fasting has, therefore, to be gradual without in any way disturbing the physical and the moral poise. We should first give up solid food and take liquid food like milk and butter milk. Then we should start taking only warm water. In the last stages, even the water has to be given up. We should wait for the end, reciting hymns (pancanamaskara-mantra). All this has to be done gradually and keeping in mind the capacity of the individual.

The analysis of the process of Samlekhana shows that it has two primary stages, which are sometimes referred to as of two types. The first requisite is the mental discipline and then comes the mortification of the body by fasting. Accordingly, a distinction has been made in the practice of Samlekhana as a) the mental discipline (kasaya – samlekhana) which consists in the control of the passions and the attainment of the perfect equanimity if mind; b) practice of fasting gradually which leads to the gradual mortification of the body (kaya-samlekhana).
The two are complementaries o each other, although the mental discipline is a necessary condition of the fast unto death.

A fundamental question whether Samlekhana is not to be described as a form of suicide and as such unjustifiable, has been raised by some. We referred to this doubt earlier. But, from the analysis of the theory and practice of Samlekhana cannot be described as suicide. It does not contain the elements to make it suicide. It cannot be called suicide because:

a) Destruction of life may be described as of three types:

i) Self-destruction (atmavadha), ii) destruction of others paravadha ; and iii) destruction of both (urbhaya-vadha).

But Samlekhana is neither f these. It is not motivated by any desire for killing. It is not filled with attachment or aversion. No passions envelop the person. It is free from any form of craving. Such is not the case in suicide or homicide. Pujyapada mentions that Samlekhana cannot be called suicide because there is no raga (excitement of passions) in it. He compares the layman taking Samlekhana to a householder who has stored goods in a ware-house. If there is danger he will try to save the whole building, but if that becomes impossible he does his best to preserve at least the goods. The ware-house is the body and the goods are the Vratas.

(b) One who practises Samlekhana must not be agitated by the desire for life nor for death. He should not, for a moment, feel that he would live for some more time; nor should he feel overpowered by the agony of the fast; he should get speedy death to free himself from the pain. Desire for life, fear of death, memories of the days that we spent, attachment to the relatives and friends and craving for the glories of the future happiness as a consequence of the practice of Samlekhana are transgressions of the vow of Samlekhana. They are to be avoided at any cost.

(c) It may also be noted that, according to the Jainas, the body is not to be considered as merely a prison-house to be discarded at the earliest possible moment. It is a means, a vehicle of attaining the highest end of perfection. We are reminded that it is rare to get a human life; it is rarer still that we get an opportunity of the possibility of spiritual progress. We should not wantonly cast away the human body that we have got, without making use of it for the struggle to reach the stages of self-realisation. This is possible by the control of mid and body for spiritual culture.

(d) Above all, the Jainas are the greatest champions of non-violence. Ahimsa is the creed of the Jaina religion. It is the first Mahavrata (the great vow). It would be inconsistent to believe that those who considered life as sacred and those who condemned himsa (injury of any type) should have no regard for life and preach self-destruction.

(e) It is for this reason that the Jaina considered wanton self-destruction by other methods like taking poison and falling down a precipice as a suicide bala-marana and as such unjustifiable.

The word suicide as employed includes all cases of self-destruction, irrespective of the mental conditions of the person committing the act. In its technical and legal sense, it means self-destruction by a sane person or
voluntary and intentional destruction of his own life by a person of sound mind, the further qualification being added by some definition that he must have attained years of discretion. In this sense Samlekhana would not be suicide, as it is not self destruction at all. There is gradual mortification of the flesh without causing any appreciable physical and mental disturbance. The self is to be freed from the bonds of the body. From the ultimate point of view (niscaya-naya), the self is pure and indestructible. The practice of Samlekhana is compared to cutting or operating a boil on the body, which cannot be called destruction of the body. In this sense Samlekhana is described as the final freedom of the soul from the bonds of life.

Whatever else may be the legal implications of suicide, we have to remember that Samlekhana is to be looked at from the spiritual point of view.

We are in a world where spiritual values have declined. The flesh is too much with us. We cannot look beyond and pine for what is not. Samlekhana if to be looked at as physical mortification, self-culture and spiritual salvation.

II. A Critique of Ahimsa: Ahimsa. Non-violence, has been an important principle in the history of human civilization. As a moral injunction it was universally applicable in the religious sphere. It has been accepted as a moral principle in Indian thought and religion. Ghandhiji has extended the principle of nonviolence to the social and political fields. For him non-violence was a creed. He developed a method and a technique of nonviolence for attaining social and political justice. Zimmer says that Ahimsa, non-violence or non-killing is the first principle in the Dharma of saints or sages by which they lift themselves out of the range of the normal human action.

In the history of Indian thought Ahimsa arose out of the needs of resisting the excesses of violence performed in the name of religion and for the sake of salvation at the time of sacrifices. Animal sacrifice was prevalent in the Vedic and to some extent in Upanisadic periods. However, a gradual awareness of undesirability of animal sacrifice was being felt at the time of Upanisada. In the Upanisada we get passages where the virtues of nonviolence have been upheld. In the Chandogya Upanisad life is described as a great festival in which qualities like tapas, self-renunciation and Ahimsa (non-violence) are expressed.

In the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad we are asked to meditate on horse sacrifice. Self-discipline, generosity, straightforwardness and ashimsa are the qualities that one should develop. Radhakrishnan writes that the authors of the Upanishads had a sufficient sense of the historic to know that their protest would become ineffective if it should demand a revolution in things. In the bhagavadgita we get a description of the qualities that we should possess in order to be perfect. Absolute non-injury is prescribed by the Yoga system. Himsa is the root of all evil. It should be avoided by all means. Non-injury is the root of all negative and positive virtues. The Samkhya, the Yoga, Buddhism and Jainism agree on this point.

The protests against animal sacrifice were more pronounced and vehement from the Buddhists and the Jainas. The Buddha was against animal sacrifice and the rituals. He described the priests as ‘tricksters’ and using holy words for pay. In the Maharaja we get description of the instruction the Buddha gave to the disciples regarding the acceptance of food. He asked his disciples not to injure any animal on a purpose or for sport. In Asoka’s edicts we get regulations for the protection of animals and birds; forests were not to be burnt, not even chaff containing living things. However, the protests from the Jainas were more vehement and explicit. In fact
non-violence is the cardinal principle of Jainism: Ahimsa paramo dharman. It has now been clear that non-violence has been preached by the Jainas much earlier than Mahavira. Uttaradhyayana Sutra gives the description of the meeting of Kesı, a disciple of Parsva, and Gautama, a disciple of Vardhamana, for a discussion regarding the agreement in the doctrines of the two Prophets. Parsva was the twenty-third Tirthankara who lived about two hundred and fifty years before Vardhamana. He preached four moral injunctions or Vratas. Ahimsa was one of them. Vardhamana carried the traditions of Parsva and added one more Vrata. It appears that ahimsa as a moral injunction must have been a pre-Aryan principle which was later assimilated in the Aryan was of life. the Jainas made non-violence the most fundamental principle of their religious life. They made a systematic analysis of the principle, almost to the point of making it a science. All other moral injunctions were subordinated to ahimsa.

The Jaina theory of ahimsa has influenced the way of Indian thought for centuries. Gandhi’s satyagraha has been built up on the analysis of non-violence by the Jainas. Gandhiji was influenced by the Jaina saints. Zimmer writes that Gandhi’s program of Satyagraha as an expression of Ahimsa is a serious, very brave and potentially vastly powerful modern experiment in the ancient Hindu science. Polka said that the first five of Gandhi’s vows were the code of Jaina monks during two thousand years. Gandhiji has himself started the he derived much benefit from the Jaina religious works as from the scriptures of their great faiths of the world.

But the Jaina theory and practice of ahimsa has often been misunderstood. Even eminent scholars have not been able to look at the practice of ahimsa in the right context. Some of the excesses of the practice of ahimsa have been mentioned with a view to showing that the principle is not self-consistent. Monier Williams, in his article on Jainism, mentioned that the Jainas outdo every other Indian sect in carrying he prohibition to the most preposterous extremes. The institution of Panjrapol, the hospital for diseased animals in Bombay, has been cited as an example. The Jainas and Vaisnavas help this institution liberally. Mrs. Stevenson said that the principle of ahimsa is scientifically impossible for a life motto, since it is contrary to the code of nature. Zimmer also mentions some of the curious excesses of the practice of non-violence by the Jainas in Bombay.

It is, therefore, necessary to see the Jaina view of ahimsa in its full perceptive and to see if it is really ‘scientifically impossible’ to take Ahimsa as a creed of one’s life, as Gandhiji did.

The Jaina theory of Ahimsa is based on the animistic conception of the universe. Jainism is dualistic. All things are divided into the living and the non-living. The Jainas believe in the plurality of the Jivas, living individuals. The Jivas in the phenomenal world, samsari jivas, are classified on the basis of various principle like the status and number of sense organs. There are the sthavara jivas, the immovable souls. This is a vegetable kingdom. There are one-sensed organisms, like earth-bodied, water – bodied and the plants. They possess the sense of touch. The animals with movements are called trasa jivas. They have more than one sense and up to five senses according to the degree of development.

The Jivas are possessed of pranas, the life forces. In the Jaina scriptures ten kinds of life forces are mentioned, like the five senses, mind, speech and body, respiration and the age force. The jivas possess different forces according to the degree of their perfection.
On the basis of this analysis of the living organisms and the life forces possessed by them, Ahimsa is non-injury or non-violence to any living individual or a life force of the individual by the three Yogas, activities, and three karanas. We are not to injure any living organism, however small it may be, or a life force of the organism directly with our own hands, by causing someone to do so on our behalf, or even giving consent to the act of injury caused by others. These are the three Yogas. For instance, we should not kill an animal. We should not mutilate a sense organ of the animal. We should not ourselves do this, we should not cause others to do this nor should we consent to injury caused by others. Practice of Himsa is further qualified by three Guptis they refer to three karanas. We are asked not to injure any Jiva or prana physically or in speech or in mind. We should not speak about injury nor should we harbour any thought of injuring an animal.

The consequences of violating the principal of non-violence are misery in this world and in the next. He who commits violence is always agitated and afflicted. He is actuated by animosity. He suffers physical and mental torture in this world. After death he is reborn taking a despicable life.

This gives a rigorous principal of Ahimsa to be practised by all. We are enjoined to abstain from Himsa very strictly, directly or indirectly, in body, mind and speech. In this sense the principal of Ahimsa would appear to be abstract and the practice impossible. Every moment we have to tread on lie, however minute it may be. In the struggle for existence, complete abstinence from injury would make life itself impossible, Movement of any sort in this world would be impossible.

The Jainas were of this difficulty. They were aware that it would be difficult to accept unqualified practice of non-violence in the sense presented so far. In fact, the Jaina scriptures did not preach the practice of such unqualified and abstract principal of Ahimsa. The principal of Ahimsa had to be fitted with the possible practice in this world. The right understanding of Ahimsa would be possible if we analyse the concept of Himsa or violence.

In the *Tattvartha Sutra* we read that himsa is injury or violence caused to the living organism due to carelessness and negligence, and actuated by passing like pride and prejudice, attachment and hatred. In Yasastilaka Somadeva defines himsa as injury to living beings through error of judgement. He says "yat syat pramadayogena pranisu pranhapanam" This definition of himsa has two elements; i) injury to life and ii) the motivation of causing injury. To injury another life is to cause pain to it, but mere injury may not be characterised as himsa. It has to be considered with reference to motive. It would be called himsa if it is impelled by passions and feelings like attachment, heat and prejudice, if it is due to negligence or carelessness. Such injury is contaminated with feelings. Similarly violence caused or induced with a specific and conscious purpose would be himsa. For instance, negligence brings sin; and the soul is defiled even though there may not be any actual injury to life. On the contrary a careful and a pious man who is not disturbed by passions and who is kind towards animals will not suffer the sin of violence even if by accident, injury is caused to life. We may call this motivation for violence "the mental set" for himsa. This analysis of himsa gives the emphasis on the motive theory of conduct in morality although consequences are not altogether ignored. The utilitarians emphasised that rightness of an action depends on the consequence of the action and not to be determined by the motive. The Jainas have, in a sense, combined the two views, from their Anekanta attitude one of the conditions of himsa is physical injury to life. But more important than the physical injury is the inner motive. Speaking harsh words is himsa; harbouring evil thoughts is also himsa. However, the inner motive for injury to life does bring its own consequence in the from of accumulation of karma and the defilement of the soul.
We are, thus, saved from the avoidable fear of defiling our souls due to violence for which we may not be really responsible nor even aware of.

The fear and the suffering due to fear of causing injury to living beings, are further reduced by the specific injunctions of the scriptures. According to the Jaina sastras the practice of the vow of Ahimsa is to be graded in two levels. On the higher level are the ascetics, men who have renounced the world. On the lower level are the persons who still pursue the things of this world.

The Acaranga Sutra gives a detailed description of the rules to be followed by the homeless ascetics in the practice of the vow of non-violence. The ascetics have to practise five great vows, Mahavrata, in all their severity. Ahimsa is the first among the five great vows. The ascetic must try to avoid injuring any form of life including one-sensed organisms to the best of his ability and as far as it is humanly possible. For instance, he must walk carefully along the trodden path so as to detect the presence of insects; he must use gentle form of expression; and he should be careful as to the food given to him by others. The injunctions for the practice of non-violence by the Munis are very strict and severe. But, in the case of the householder, a more liberal view is taken in giving instructions for the practice of non-violence and other Vratas. Non-violence is one of the anuvrata. The householder is to see that he does not injury any living being as far as possible and intentionally. In the Ratnakarandaka svaakacara, the householder is enjoined not to cause injury himself or be an agent for such injury knowingly, samkalpat. He should be free from sthula-himsa. In his case the prohibition of himsa begins with two-sensed organisms, because it would be impossible for him to practise non-injury to one-sensed organisms, intentionally or unintentionally in the conduct of his daily life. He is, therefore, exempted from this restriction.

Even in this practice of non-violence, certain forms of injury are permitted as exceptional cases. For instance, it is recognized as a duty of Ksatriya, the warrior class, to defend the weak even with arms. In the Adipurena there is a description that Rsabha, the first Trithankara, gave training to his subjects in agriculture, in trade and in the use of arms. However, the householders are strictly forbidden to cause injury even in the lowest animals wantonly and on purpose. Himsa caused to animals while doing his duty, accidentally and unintentionally and while in the pursuit of just cause is not considered to be a sin. In the Yasastilaka, Somadeva forbids the Ksatriya to indulge in indiscrete killing even in battle.

We are reminded of Gandhiji’s words when he said that violence is preferred to cowardice. He exhorted the Indian women to resist the attacks of the gundas even with violence, if necessary. He said, “I do believe that where there is a choice between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence.” Hence it was that I took part in the Boer war, so-called Zulu Rebellion and the late war. But Gandhiji said that non-violence is infinitely superior to violence. Forgiveness adorns the soldiers. For the Jainas also, non-violence is not the policy of the weak. It needs self-control. A self-controlled man is free from fear, fear of doing injury or injustice. The bases of Ahimsa must be self-confidence and peace of mind. A coward has no moral strength to observe non-violence. One who stands courageous and undisturbed in the face of violence is a true follower of ahimsa. He looks at the enemy as a friend. Gandhiji said that a mouse hardly forgives a cat when it allows itself to be torn to pieces by her. He said non-violence is the law of our species, while violence is the law of the brute.
Non-violence is not mere non-injury in the negative sense. It has also a positive content. It implies the presence of cultivated and noble sentiments, like kindness and compassion for all living creatures. It also implies self-sacrifice. The Buddha renounced the pleasures of the world out of compassion for all living creatures. Jesus was filled with compassion when he said “whoever shall smite thee in the right cheek, turn to him the other also.” He demanded self-sacrifice. In the Yasastilaka, Somadeva enumerates qualities that should be cultivated to realise the ideal of ahimsa. The qualities are 1) maitri, a disposition not to cause any suffering to any living being in mind, body and speech, 2) pramoda, affection coupled with respect for men eminent for their virtues and religious austerities, 3) karunya, will to help the poor and 4) madhyasthya, an equitable attitude. Ahimsa is, thus, a positive virtue and it resolves itself into jiva-daya, compassion for living creatures.

It may be noted that the practice of ahimsa is primarily meant to save our souls. Himsa and Ahimsa relate only to one’s soul and not to those of others. Ahimsa is kindness to others, but it is kindness to the extent that we save others from the sin of violence. If we give pain to anyone we lower ourselves. Self-culture is the main problem in the practice of Ahimsa. In the Sutrakrtanga it is said that a person cause violence out of greed or if he supports such violence of others, he increases the enemies of his own soul.

In the Acaranga Sutra we are asked to consider ourselves to be in the position of the persons or animals to whom we want to cause injury. Gandhi said, “I believe in loving my enemies, I believe in non-violence as the only remedy open to Hindus and Muslims. I believe in the power of suffering to melt the stoniest heart.”

This is the content of the Jaina theory of ahimsa. It is possible to say that the doctrine of Ahimsa is not abstract nor inconsistent with the laws of nature. The practice of Ahimsa is not also impossible. It is true that there have been some excesses in the practice of ahimsa both in the injunctions of the sasttras and in the practice by enthusiastic devotees. However, these excesses can be properly understood if they are looked at in the historical perspective. Jainas developed polemic against animal sacrifice and violence caused to animals at the time of worship: their protests were vigorous. The excesses of practice necessity of saving the animals from the pitiless injuries caused to them. Them influence of the Jaina concept of ahimsa has been tremendous on the history of the religious practices in India. Animal sacrifices had to be given up to satisfy the demands of the Buddhists and primarily the Jainas.

That living beings live is no kindness, because they live according to their age of ayus – karma. That they die is no himsa because when the ayus-karma is complete beings die without any exterior cause. Natural death without any cause is not himsa. It is only those who kill or injure that are guilty of himsa, although it may be argued that the animal that is killed dies because its ayus-karma is complete. We should not be the cause of its death. Not to kill or injure any living beings is kindness. Ahimsa is beneficial to all beings, to the persons who practise ahimsa and those who are saved by ahimsa. In ahimsa there is a force of the soul. It destroys all anxiety, disorder and cowardice. Ahimsa can overcome and defeat the most cruel brute force. Gandhi has shown this by the Satyagraha movement against the mighty British Empire. Zimmer said that Gandhi’s Satyagraha confronted great Britain’s untruth with Indian truth. This is the battle waged on the colossal modern scale, and according to the principles from the text books not of the Royal Military College but of Brahman. The prasna Vyakarana Sutra gives sixty names ascribed to ahimsa and states that ahimsa does good to all. Gandhi said when Motilal Nehru and others were arrested that victory is complete if non-violence reigns supreme in spite
of the arrest; we are out to be killed without killing; by non-violence, non-co-operation we seek to conquer the English administrators and their supporters.

It is the sacred duty of every Indian to fight for the nation in this hour of difficulty. On this depends our honour and integrity. This is war, if it may be called so, not for the sake of war but for the sake of vindicating our right of existences as a free nation. Violence in self-defence is not to be considered as unjustified as long as we live and take interest in the activities of this life. And live we must; we must also take due share of the responsibility in social and political life in our country, although the consummation of the ideal would be renunciation. But universal renunciation is equally unjustified from the point of view of social good, unless one is a ‘heaven born prophet’ or an ascetic.

However, even in performing the duties of a citizen in defending our country we should see that we use the minimum of violence and sparingly. This is in keeping with the tradition of our country.

Still, this does not mean we have given up the significance of non-violence as a supreme principle of life and spirituality. We are now only to be aware of our imperfection and to adjust ourselves as best as we can in this imperfect life. We pursue the ends of this life, and moving on the wheel of life we have to see that our duty to others is also important in its own way. Considered rom the perspective of history and the present conditions of our society, it would appear strange that, we, in India, steeped in spirituality, should be disillusioned and now affirm the primacy of material progress; stranger still, that with our firm faith in non-violence, we should prepare ourselves for the inevitable war. But analysis of non-violence so far given shows that non-violence as preached by the Jainas would dispel our illusion about the impossibility of the practice of non-violence. We have tried to justify the ways of man to man in our preparedness for national defence, specially when we are threatened by the enemies at our frontiers.

Thus, the principle of non-violence is important in the context of the present political situation of the world. That will save the world from the feat of distress and war. Nonviolence as Gandhiji said is not meant only for saints. It is meat for the common people as well.

Romain Rolland said that the Rsis who discovered the law of non-violence I the midst of violence were greater greniouses than Newton, greater warriors than Wellington. He said, with Gandhiji, that non-violence is the law of our species as violence is the law of the brute.118 Non-violence would be a panacea for the ills of life. It would bring lasting peace on earth

Chapter- 8 : MEN OR GODS

1.Nature of Divinity in Jaina Philosophy: Religion as a way of life and not merely as an institution, has been natural to man. It is man's reaction to the totality of things as he apprehends it. It implies an interpretation of nature and the meaning of the universe. It seeks to go beyond the veil of visible things and finds an inexhaustible fund of spiritual power to help him in life’s struggle in this life. The ways of god to ma and man I his struggles in this life. The ways of the gods have been rich and varied. It may be, as Prof. Leuba pointed out, that fear was the first of the emotions to become organised in human life, and out of this fear God was born. Perhaps love and gratitude are just as natural, as much integral parts of the constitution of man, as fear; and gods were friendly beings it is still
possible that men have looked at gods with leaving sense of kinship and not with the vague fear of the unknown powers.1 We do not know. But o etching is certain that in higher religions fear is sublimated by love into an adoring reverence.2 From the fear of the Lord in *the old Testament* to the worship of God’ with godly fear ad awe’ is not a far cry.

In the Vedic period, we find a movement of thought from polytheism to monotheism and then to monism. The poetic souls contemplated the beauties of nature and the Indo-Irala gods, like Deus, Varuna, Usas and Mitra were products of this age. Other gods like Indra were Created to meet the needs of the social and political adjustments. Many gods were worshipped. Then a weariness towards the many gods began to be felt as they didi not know to what god they should offer oblations. Then a theistic conception of God as a creator of the universe was developed out of this struggle for the search of a divine being. In ancient Greece, Xenophanes was against the polytheism of his time. Socrates had to drink hemlock as he was charged of denying the national gods. He distinguished between many gods and the one God who is the creator of the universe.

2. The Jaina Arguments against God: but the Jaias were against gods in general and even the God as creator. They presented several arguments against the theistic conception of God. They deny the existence of a creator God and refute the theistic arguments of the Naiyayikas.

3. i) It is difficult to understand the nature of the world as an effect:

   a) if effect is to mean that which is made of parts (*sacayva*) then even space is to be regarded as effect;

   b) if it means coherence of a cause of a thing which was previously nonexistent, in that case one cannot speak of the world as effect as atoms are eternal;

   c) if it means that which is liable to change, then God would also be liable to change’ and he would need a creator to create him and another and so on and infinitum. This leads to infinite regress.

   ii) Even supposing that the world as a whole is an effect ad eeds a cause, the cause need not Abe ans. intelligent one God because:

   a) if he is intelligent as the huma being is then he would be full of imperfectios, as human intelligence is not perfect;

   b) if his intelligence is not of the type of human intelligence but similar to it, then it would not guarantee inference of the existence of God on similarity, as we cannot infer the existence of fire o the ground of seeing steam which is simulate to smoke;

   c) we are led to a vicious circle of argument if we can say that the word is such that we have a sense that some one made it, as we have to infer the sense for the fact of being created by God.
iii) If an agent had created the world, he must have a body. For we have never seen an intelligent agent without a body. If a god is to produce an intelligence and will, this is also not possible without embodied intelligence.

iv) Even supposing a non-embodied being were to create the world by his intelligence, will and activity, there must be some motivation:

a) if the motive is just a personal whim, then there would be no natural law or order in the world;

b) if it is according to the moral actions of me, then he is governed by moral order and is not independent;

c) if it is through mercy, there should have been a perfect world full of happiness;

d) if men are to suffer by the effects of past actions (adestā) the adrsta would take the place of God, but, if God were to create the world without any motive but only for sport it would be ‘moveless malignity.

v) God’s omnipresence and omniscience cannot also be accepted, because:

a) if he is everywhere he absorbs into himself everything into his won self, leaving nothing to exist outside him:

b) his omniscience would make him experience hell, as he would know everything and his knowledge would be direct experience.

vi) It is not possible to accept the Naiyayika contention that without the supposition of God, the variety of the world would be inexplicable because we can very well posit other alternatives like (I) the existence of the natural order and (ii) a society of gods to explain the universe.

But if a society of gods were to quarrel and fan out as it is sometimes contended, then the nature of gods would be quite so unreliable if not vicious that we cannot expect elementary co-operation that we find in ants and bees.

The best way, therefore, is to dispense with God altogether.

We find similar objections against the acceptance of a theistic God in Buddhism also. The Buddha was opposed to the conception of Iscara as a creator of the universe. If the world were to be thus created, there should be no change nor destruction nor sorrow or calamity.

If Isvara were to act with a purpose, he would not be perfect that would limit his perfection. But if he were to act without a purpose his actions would be meaningless like a child’s play.

There is nothing superior to the law of Karma. The sufferings of the world are intelligible only on the basis of the law of Karma. Though the Buddha admits the existent of the gods like Indra and Varuna they are also involved in the wheel of Samsara.
We have so far seen that the Jainas, as also the Buddhists, were against the theistic conception of God. God as a creator is not necessary to explain the universe. We have not to seek God there in the world outside, nor is God to be found in the dark lonely corner of a temple with doors all shut. He is there witching us. He is there with the tiller tilling the ground and the pathmaker breaking stone', in the sense that each individual soul is to be considered as God as he is essentially divine in nature. Each soul when it is perfect is god.

3. The Jainas sought the divine in man and established the essential divinity of man. This conception has been developed in specific directions in Jaina philosophy.

As we have seen, the existence of the soul is a presupposition in the Jaina philosophy. Proofs are not necessary. If there are any proofs are not necessary. If there are any Proofs we can say that all the pramasca establish the existence of the soul. It is described from the phenomena and the noumena points of view. From the phenomenal point of view, it possesses pranas, is the lord (prabhu), doer (karata,) enjoyed (bhokta) limited to his body (dehamatra), still incorporeal and is ordinarily found with Karma. From the numeral pint of view, soul is described in its pure form. It is pure and perfect. It is pure consciousness. It is unbound, untouched and not other that itself. The joys and sorrows that the soul experiences are due to the fruits of karma which it accumulated due to the continuous activity that it is having, these entanglement is beginnings, but it has an end. The deliverance of the soul from the wheel of samasara is possible by voluntary means. By the more and spiritual efforts involving samvara and nirjara, the Karma is removed, the soul soul is removed. When al Karma is theremoved, the soul becomes pure and perfect, free from the wheel of Samasara. Being free with its upward motion it attains liberation or Moksa. There is nothing other which is as perfect. There is not other God. The freed souls are divine in nature, as they are perfect and omniscient.

For the Jaina it is not necessary to surrender to any higher being, not to ask for any divine favor for the individual to reach the highest goal of perfection. There is no place for divine grace, nor is one to depend on the capricious whims of a superior deity for the sake of attaining the highest idea. There is emphasis on individual efforts in moral and spiritual struggle for self-realization. One has to go through the fourteen stages of spiritual development before one reaches the final goal in the ayogakevali stage.

However the struggle for perfection is long and arduous. Few reached perfection; and perhaps as tradition would say, none would become perfect in this age. Among those who have reached omniscience and perfection are the Tirthankaras, the prophets, who have been the beacon lights of Jaina religion and culture they have preached the truth and have helped men to cross the ocean of this worldly existence. They led men, like kindly light, to the path of spiritual progress.

Therefore, they need to be worshipped, the Jainas worship the Tirthankaras not because they are gods not because they are powerful in any other way, but because they are human and yet divine, as every one is divine, in his essential nature. The worship so the Tirthankaras is to remind us that they are to be kept as deals before us in our journey to selfrealization. No fervors are to be sought by means of worship, nor are they camouflet to bestow favors on the devotees. The main motive of worship f the Tirthankaras, therefore is to emulate the example of the perfect beings if possible, at least to remind us
that the way to perfection lies in the way they have shown us. Even this worship of Tirthankaras arose out of the exigencies of social and religious existence and survival and possibly as a psychological necessity. We find a few temples of Gandhiji today; perhaps, there would be many more. The Buddha has been deified.

Apart from the worship of Tirthankaras, we find a pantheon of gods who are worshipped and from whom favors are sought. The let of the Yaksini worship and of other attendant gods may be cited as examples. This type of worship is often attended by the occult practices ad the tantric ceremoialism. Dr p. B. Desai shows that in Tamiland Yakasii was allotted an independent status and raised to a superior position which was almost equal to the of the Jina. in some instances the worship of Yaksini appears to have supercedes even that of Jina. 10 Padmavati, Yakasini of Paravantha, has been elevated to the status of a superior deity with all the ceremonial worship, in Pombucapura in M'sore area. These forms of worship must have arisen out of the connate with other competing faiths as with the purpose of popularizing the Jaina faith in the context of the social and religious competition. The cult of Jvalalamalini with its Tantric accompaniments may be mentioned as another example of this form of worship. The promulgator of this cult was perhaps, helecarya of Ponnur According to the prevailing belief at that time mastery over spells or Mantravidya was coidered as a qualification for superiority. The Jaiana Aaryas clamed to be master Mantra vadins.11 Jainism had to compete with the other Hindu creeds Yaksi form of worship must have bee introduced in order to attract the common men towards Jainism, by appealing to the popular forms of worship.

However, such forms of worship are goreig to the Jaina region. They do not form a organic and constituent features of the Jaina worship. These tendencies have been absorbed and assimilated in the struggle for existence and survival. We may here fever to the iconeivable changes the Buddhist forms of worship have undergone in the various countries of the world, like the Tantric forms of worship in Tibeta Lamaism.

We have still some gods in Jaina cosmogony. They are the deva, the gods living in heaves like the Bhavanavasi, Vyantaraasi, Jyotiska, ad Kalapavasi. But they are a part of the Samasara and not really gods in the sees of superior divine beings. They are just more fortunate begs than men because of their accumulated god Karma. They enjoy better empirical existence than men. But we, humans, can pride ourselves in that the ‘gods’ in these worlds cannot reach moksa unless they are reborn as human beings. They are not objects of worship. It is therefore, necessary for us to know the true nature of man and his place in society in which he lives, moves and has his being.

**NATURE OF MAN**

1.Dignity and freedom of the huma individual has been a common principle for all philosophies and faiths, except perhaps for Nietzshoe. Marx emphasized the potentiality of man by denying God. Kant exhorted us to treat every human individual as a end in himself and never as a means. Democracies are based o the equality ad dignity of every human individual. In the *Mahabharata* to the Jainas, the individual soul, in its pure form its its elf divie, and man can attain divinity by his own efforts.
2. In India, the aim of philosophy was atom *vidya Atmanam viddhi* was the cardinal injunction of the Upanishads. Yajnyavalkya explains that all worldly objects are of no value apart from the self. Today we have a new Humanism where we are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of ma in this word. Philosophical interest has shifted from nature to god and from God to man. Even the claim of absolute value for science is being questioned. Man and his values are primary, their primacy has to be acknowledge by any philosophy.

But with all these philosophical interests, the real nature of ma has been eluding us. Attempts have been made to kwon him. But there has to been an agreed conception of man easily to be understood and accepted by the common man.

There were philosophers like protagoras who reduced man to mere sensations. The Itheaettus describes the Sophist conception of the individual as a complex of changes interacting with other orces, and seeking to satisfy the desires. In English empiricism, Hume denied everything including the human soul, except impressions and ideas. The Human tendency was recently revived by the Cambridge philosophers who brought philosophy to the brink of extinction. Perennial problems of philosophy including the conceptions of soul were dismissed as non-sense. Like the men chained against the walls of the cave in *the republic* the empiricists refused to see beyond what they would like to affirm. In ancient Indian thought, Carvakas led us to similar conclusions. It is said that the Buddhists deiced a permanent soul. The Buddha was silent about the metaphysical problems. His disciples analyzed soul as a aggregate of matter, feelings and sensations. Men is a psychological personality, and when it is analyzed away *sunya* is realised.

However soul of ma has emerged as permanent and eternal principle imperishable in batter. Socrates, Plato and Aristote accepted soul as a pure eternal and imperishable principle. Plato talked of the immortality of the soul. In India, the outlook in the Ireveda Is empirical. The gods were invoked to time cows and property in this world. The idea of a permanent soul has yet to be evolved. In the Upanishads the conception of a permanent soul gained predominance. In the Dialogue between Prajapati and Indra we get a progressive development of the definition of the soul in four stages- as 1) bodily, 2) empirical, 3) transcendental and 4) the absolute. The next step was to identify the self with the absolute. As Radhakrsishanan says, we may not understand the truth of the saying’ that thou are’ *tatt vam asi*, but that does not give us a sufficient right to deny it.

The idea of the self has been a fundamental caption in Jaina philosophy. The existence of the soul is a presupposition. The soul is described from the phenomenal and the nominal points of view. All things in this world are divided into living ad non-living. From the phenomenal point of view, the soul is described as possessing impartial qualities. It is possessed of four *pranas*. It is the lord, the doer, and the enjoyed of the fruit of Karma. As a potter considers himself a maker and enjoyer of the clay pot, so the mundane soul is the doer of things and the enjoyer of the fruits of Karma. From the numeral point of view, soul is pure and perfect. It is pure consciousness. It is unbound, untouched and not other than itself. Man is the *jiva* bound by matter and it assumes gross physical body. Through the operation of Karma the soul gets entangled in the wheel of Samasara. Whe it is embodied it is affected by the environment- physical, social and spiritual in different ways. Then it identifies itself with the various
functions of the bodily ad social environment. William James distinguishes between the self as known or
the I. On the same basis, distinction between the states of the soul as Bahairathman has been made.

3. Apart from the read nature of man it would be necessary to know him as an individual in his
physical and social environ meant. As an empirical individual man lives in this life and is influence by the
environment. To some extent he is a product of the environment, at the same time shaping the other
selves, man cannot be separated from nature. He is a part and parcel of the interacting forces in nature.
In this sense, individual men including the heaven born prophets are products of environment and social
heritage. They also contribute to the development of the social life this universe is a vale of soul making’
thoraces a cosmic purpose in the incessant struggle of the individuals in this world. The purpose as
translated in human efforts, is the perfection of men.

We have seen that for the attainment of this end we need not depend on higher entity called
God efforts of individual men are more important than the forces that work outside man. This brings us
to the problem of the human ideals.

4. As a social being development of man depends o the ends that he places before himself and
the means used for attainment of those ends. The Greeks, as also the edit Aryans, were full of zeal for
life and its beauties. The consummation of life’s end was to perfect life. Truth beauty and goodness were
the highest human alues. Subjectivism of protagoras would have led him to ethical relativism. What is
good for one man may not be the same for the other. But protagoras was a teacher of cirutes and was
accepted as a wise man. Still the earlier Sophists expressed nihilistic views. Polls, a disciple of Gorigis,
admired political power in a tyrant, though evil it may be. Thrasymahus sneered at conventions justice
as mere obedience to thewisheds of those in power. The tyrant is the happiest man. So was the
philosophy Nietzsche fascinated by power. He parched the philosophy of power. There were others, like
Airstrips who aimed at pleasures as the highest end in life. Pleasure was to be sought by the Carvakas
in ancient Indian thought. Greatest happiness of the greatest number was a modified version of this end.

However from pleasure to virtue is a long way. Socratic formulate that virtue is knowledge
expressed the basic insight into the synthesis of theory and practice, justice and wisdom. Aristotle
distinguished virtues into the practical and the intellectual virtues. both are necessary for the
development of man.

In ancient Indian thought four cardinal human values have been mentioned. Iartha Karma,
Dharma and Moska are to be realised by man. They represent a hierarchy o human values. The ultimate
ideal is Moksa. It is freedom from the bonds of life. Mokasa as a release from the wheel of Samasara ad
in its positive aspect as oneness with the Highest was becoming gradually clear in the Upanishads. The
state of perfection need not be attained only after shedding off this bodily existence. It is possible to
attain such a state in this life only. The conception of Jivanmukati has played an important part in the
ancient thought. Samkara admits the possibility of Karamamukti. Apart from the highest ideal of Moksa
other ideals are to be progressively realised at various levels of life. Over emphasis of one ideal will lead
to a partial development of civilizations. All the values are true and need each other. This is the synoptic point of view.

5. In this age of scientific development, we are giving exclusive emphasis on the material ends of life. *Artha* and *karma* have become important. Exclusive importance on one or the other of the human values is likely to lead to a partial development of human personality. We may either go the way of mechanizing the human or divinising the man. Western civilization has advanced in scientific development throughout the democracy of intellect. Life in India has gone the way of overspiritualising the human, and we lost footing on earth. It is true that the ideal of life is Moksa but it is also true that few of us can attain it in this life. We have therefore, to reorientate our moral concepts so as to lead us to perfection through the progressive realization of the ideal of emancipation in the context of human life and limitations.

We have seen the Jainas have given gradations of moral practice for the realisation of the end of perfection. There are two levels of ethical codes I) one for the aymen (*sravakadhrama*) and ii) the other for the spiritually advanced who have given up the attachment of Samara it is the *munis* - *mdharama*. The moral practice for them is more rigorous than for the common man. It would be worth analyzing these gradations of moral life in the context of the moral structure of present day society.

I think it would be possible to work out a synthesis of ‘the way of all flesh and spirit’ and find out a proper place for man in this universe. We can only say that with the advancement of science and technology for the sake of man, in our struggle to find out man we have lost him.

6. And to find out man we have to reassert the ideal of spiritual perfection without in any way disparaging the aims of empirical life. This is the Anekanta attitude. All have aimed at Moksa, but few have attained it. Yet it is imperative on the part of us, humans, to know the real nature of the highest perfection as presented in the ideal of Moksa.

III. Moksa as an Ideal 1. The idea of release of the soul from the wheel of Samasara was common in Indian philosophy except with the Carvaka. *tattvajnana* was not merely an academic pursuit but it had a practical aim of the attainment of Moksa. The ancient Indians did not stop at the discovery of truth but strove to realize it in their own experiences. They followed up *tattvajnana* by strenuous efforts to attain Moksa or liberation.

But the conception of Moksa was not in the spirit of the medic Aryans, as they were profoundly interested in the happiness in this life. The *Rgveda* Samhita largely presents the invocations of the gods for the promotion of happiness in this life. *Rgveda* Samhita largely presents the invocations of the gods for the promotion of happiness in this life. Awareness of emancipation as such is not present in the earliest recorded expression in the Vedas. Moksa as a release from the wheel of Samasara and its positive aspect as oneness with the Highest, was becoming gradually clear in the Upasais. In the *chhandogya Upasad* describes the release as freedom from death day or night of waxing and waning and waxing of the moon; in the later *Upasad* like the *maitrayani* we find new ideas jolting against old ones’.
It is therefore possible to say that the conception of Moksa or release from the bonds of empirical life is pre-Aryan. It was prevalent in India before the Aryans settled here. Indian philosophy is the synthesis of two currents of thought, the Aryan and the pre-Aryan. The Jaina and Buddhist thoughts were original and pre-Aryan. They were assimilated in the subsequent Hindu philosophy through the Upanishads. The Dravidian contribution to the development of Indian philosophy was no less important. The influence of forest life, the emergence of female gods, and the conception of Avatarache largely due to the Dravidian influence. And so was the conception of Moksa brought from the pre-Aryan thought and developed in the Upanishads and subsequent philosophy.

Jaina religion is very ancient and pre-Aryan. It prevailed even before Parsva and Vardhamana, the last two Tirthankaras. The Iyajurveda mentions Rsabha, Ajita, and Aristaemi as Tirthankaras. Jainism reflects the cosmology and anthropology of a much older pre-Aryan upper class of North-Eastern India. Jacobu has traced Jainism to early primitive current of metaphysical speculation.

2. For a Jaina, the highest ideal is Moksa, freedom from the wheel of Samsara. It is to be attained through right intuition, right knowledge, and right conduct.

Due to the activity, the soul gets entangled in the wheel of Samsara. This process of entanglement is beginningless but has an end. The soul gets entangled in the Samsara and embodied through the operation of Karma. It gets various forms due to the materially use conditions (upadhi), is involved in the cycle of birth and death.

But the Jainas believe in the inherent capacity of the soul for self-realization. The deliverance of the soul from this wheel of Samsara is possible by voluntary efforts on the part of the individual. The evil of Karma has to be removed. This is possible when the individual soul makes efforts to stop the influx of Karma by samvara and remove the actuated Karma by Nirjara. When all the obstacles are removed, the soul becomes pure and perfect and free from the wheel of Samsara. Being free with its upward motion, it attains liberation or Moksa.

However, the journey of the soul to freedom is long and arduous, because the removal of Karma involves a long moral and spiritual discipline. The journey has to be through fourteen stages of self-realization called Gunasthana. The soul has gradually to remove the five conditions of bondage—mithyatva (perversity), avirati (lack of control), pramada (spiritual inertia), kasaya (passion), and triyoga (threefold activity of body, speech, and mind). In the highest stage of spiritual realization, the soul reaches the stage of perfection and omniscience. This is the consummation of the struggle.

Radhakrsihanan says that it is not possible to give a positive description of the liberated soul. The state of perfection is passively described as freedom from action and desires, a stage of utter and absolute acquiescence. It is a state of unaffected peace since energy of past Karma is extinguished. In this state, the soul is ‘itself’ and no other. It is the perfect liberation. Zimmer says that after it slippage of innumerable existence in the various inferiors stratifications the lie monad rises to the cranial zone of the microscopic being purged of the weight of the subtle Karmic practices that formerly held it down. Nothing can happen to it any more, for it has put aside the treats of ignorance, those heavy evils of
individuality that are the precipitating causes of biographical events. In the higher stage of perfection, the individuality, the masks the formal personal features are distilled away. “sterilized of colloguing, flour ad weight the sublime crystals now are absolutely pure like the drops of rain that descend from a clear sky, tasteless and emasculate.

This state is the Siddha state. The liberated soul has no empirical adjuncts. It is neither long nor small, nor black nor blue, nor bitter nor pungent. It is without body and without rebirth. He perceives and he knows all. There is no analogy to describe the condition of the liberated soul. It is difficult to give a positive description of the freed soul. It is the state in which there is freedom from action and desire, a state of rest, a passionless ineffable peace. However in terms of positive description, we are told that the liberated state has infinite consciousness, pure understanding, absolute freedom and eternal bliss. It lives in this state of eternity. The free soul has beginning but no end, while the soul in the Samasara has no noumenal point of view. The greed soul is the absolutely unconditioned.

It is difficult to give a clear and graphic description of the liberated soul as language is an inadequate instrument for such description. Attempts have, therefore, been made in various ways to present a picture of the state of Moksa in different systems in Indian philosophy. The Buddhist have been include to give a negative description as the extinction of every trace of individuality. It is a state of nothingness. But, some Buddhists have repudiated the negative conception of the liberated state, Nirvana. The madhyamaiksa concider this stage as inexpressible. Nirvana is not an end (bhava) or abhava (oneness). It is abandonment of all such consideration of the real. The Madhyamika conception of Nirvana comes very close to the Advaita notion of jmukti as Brahmanubhava. Nirvana is the transcendent life of the spirit. But Moksa according to Advaita, is the absolutely unconditioned and is characterised by infinite bliss. But for Madhyamika, Nirvana is inexpressible and cannot be identified with the Good or Bliss. According to the Naiyayikas, Moksa is a state of pure existence to which a liberated soul attains and is compared to a dreamless sleep. The critic feels that the Moksa of the Naiyayikas is a sword without meaning. Sleep without dream is a state of torpor, and we may as well say that a stone is enjoying supreme felicity in a sound sleep without disturbing dreams. For the Samkhya salatio is phenomenal as bondage does not belong to Purusa. When Purusa is free from the defilement of Prakriti it passes beyond the bondage of the Guna and shines forth in its pure intelligence. There is no bliss nor happiness in the state of Mukti as all feeling belongs to Prakrti. Jaimini and sabraa did not face the problem of ultimate release. For prabakara, Moksa is a state in which there is absolute cessation of all dreams. It is a simple natural form of the soul. Kumarial stated that it it a state of Adman in itself free from All pain some refer it as a bliss of Atman. For Samkara Moksa is a state of direct realization of something which existed from eternity. When the limitations are removed the soul is liberated. It is the state of absolute peace and eternal bliss. When Avdiya vanishes, the true soul stands self- reel free form the impurities, as the star shies in a cloudless ight. The nature of the liberated soul is a set of oneness with Brahman Mokasa is described negatively as the state of freedom where there is neither day not ightk where the stream of time has stopped and where the sun and the stars are no longer seen.

The state of perfection of Moksa need not be attained only after shedding off this bodily existence. It is possible to attain such a state in this life only. The conception of Jivankukata has,
therefore played an important part in the ancietthought. Samkara admits the possibility *kramamukkti* (gradual liberation). He says that the mediation of ‘Om’ leads one to the Brahmaloka where one gradually attains perfect knowledge.37 . He also admits the possibility of reflection and freedom from pain eve I this life. As the potter’s wheel continues for a time to revolve eve after the vessels has been copiloted, so also life continues even after liberation sometime. In this stage the perfect being does ot acquire new karma. The Buddhists have also made a distinction between *upadhisesanirvana* and *anupadhisesa –irvana*. The former comes nearer to the conception of Jivanmuki. Similarly the distinction corresponds to *nirvana ad pamirvana*. In the state of *upadhises nirvana*, there is the total cessation of ignorance and of passions, thought the body and the mind continue to function but without passions.33 This state corresponds to the Jivanmukti of Samkhya and the Vedaanta The Mahayanists added on more type of Nirvana in *apratishtira nirvana*, the state of Bodhisattve who does not accept the final release alsothough he is entitled for it . he decides to serve humanity of compassion.

According to the Jainass in the thirteenth stage of Gunassthanas called *sayoga-kevali* all the passions ad the four types of Ghati karmas are destroyed. One is free for the bondage of *mithyatva pramada* ad passions. Haowver, it is not free from yoga and empirical activity and is still not free form embodied existence, as the out types of non-obscurring Karma, like *vedaniya* which produces feelig, *ayu* which determines the spa of life, *nama* determining the physical structure ad the *gotra* responsible for one’s status in life are still operating. One is not free from bodily existence, because the *ayu* karma is still to be exhausted. But there is no influx of Karma. In this sage we find omniscient beings like the Tirthakaras, the Ganadhras ad the Samanya kecalils. They attain the enlightenment, but still lien this world preaching the truth that they have seen. This stage may be compared to the Jivanmuki described by the Samkhya and Vedanta systems of thought. It is like the *upadhiseasa-nirvana* of the Buddhists. It may also be likened to the *apratis-thita- of the Mahayanists. Such a perfect being may appear to be active in this shown is merely a illusion of the senses . he is unaffected by all that happens.39 whe Gautma, the Buddha, attainedenlightntmment, he wanted his enlightenment not to be known to others. But Brahma inspired the Buddha to be the teacher of mankind this is the stage of *sayoga kevalin or jivan mukta*. So did the Trithankaras, Ganadhras and Samanya-kealins preach the sublime knowledge to the people of this world. Zimmer copperas this attitude of the Kevalins to the function of a lamp. Just as the lamp lights the roamed still remaings unconcerned with what is going on in the room, so the self enact the role of lighting the phenomenal expersonality solely for the maintenance of the body, not for pursuit of any god, any gratification of sense nor any kindly goal.

In the fourteenth stage of Gunasthansa called Ayoga Kevali, te self has attained peaceful perfection. The influx of karma is completely stopped and the self is free from all Karmic dust.41 This state lasts only for period of time required ot pronounce five syllables. At the end of this periods the soul attains disembodied liberation . being now free with its upward motion the soul attains the liberation or Mokasa.

The liberated souls live in perfect peace and prutiy in *siddhasila* which is the abroad of the omniscient souls. In the *Tiloyaapannatti* we get the description of the *siddhasila*, which is also caled the
moksasthana or nirvansthana. These freed souls enjoy ‘a kind of interpenetrating existence on account of their oneness of status’ their soul substance has special power by which an infinity of souls could exist without mutual exclusion. The identity of the saved is determined But the living rhythm retaining the form of the last physical life and by the knowledge of the past.42 the conception of the liberated soul ad the abode of the souls in siddhasila where they live with all their individuality, is a logical possibility and psychologically significant.

Epilogue 1. We may not attain Moksa; we do not need to we can still keep the ideal of perfection before us and look the perfect souls, as ideals to guide us like the kindly light in this life.

2. Struggle for perfection is a necessary factor in life. Sorrow and imperfection are a flavor to the sauce. They are necessary for onward journey in the spiritual struggle. The efforts for self-realization will have meaning only when this world becomes a vale of the soul making ad the life real fight in which something is eternally gained.43 Life is to be considered as a struggle towards perfection and not merely an amusing pantomime of infallible marionettes. We should realise that ‘man’ is not complete, he is yet to be in what he is he is small. He is hungering for something which is more than what he can get. It this struggle for perfection man need not depend on God or any superior being or gacours, for he “rolls imperteltly as you or I ‘Man has depend on his own self- effort the Jaina attitude is meliroistic.

3. The synoptic view is the very foundation of Jaina outlook. A Jaina looks at the soul from the nominal and the phenomenal points of view it is simple, perfect, eternal from the nominee point of view, but not eternal from the yet divisible and its divisibility is a spontaneous feature. Reality is complex like a many corrode dome and ca be predicated from many points of view. I the analysis knowledge Jainas admit levels of experience. Sense experience is impartial in nature and content and cannot yield the noume nal reality, although the phenomena can be apprehend by it. Supersenwsusou experience including omniscience is direct and gives syno0tic picture of nominee ad the phenomena words. Draya-karma and the Bhaava- Karma are two aspects of the after effects our action. Above all in their analysis of the way f life Jainas have emphasized the synoptic outlook by introducting the gradations of moral codes as muni dharama and sravaka-dharama. This distention is unique in Indian thought and it substantially confutbutes to the understanding of human nature and its capabilities for the attainment of perfection. The analysis in this sense is psychologically important Jainas have neither denied the reality of empirical world not have they given exclusive emphasis on this word and our life. In understanding life ad experience we have see everything with reference to its l) substance (dryaya, ) ii) nature (rua ) , iii) place (desa) and iv) time (kala). What is true of a thing in specific conditions at a specific time may not be true if it were in a different context, and to ginger this is to commit the faccace of here say This is the spirit of Anekata. It expresses a catholic outlook, the spirit of intellectual non-violence.

The conditions of society in the present-day world demand that we ado0t such a catholic outlook or else we perish. We are in the midst of a life where hatred injustice and intolerance reign supreme. A new orientation of values would be necessary for us to destroy the inverted values and then’rebuild’ to our heart’$desire’ what we needs today is live and sympathy and not prejudice and pomp. We need understanding and a sense of fellowship between the peoples of the world. And Anekanta would give us a ‘Weltancshaung’ and a scientific interrelation of things we will then learn to love our neighbors of
things. We will then learn to love our neighbors as ourselves. “And we can still cherish the hope when power becomes ashamed to occupy it throne” sand ‘when the morning comes cleansing the bloodstained steps of the nation” 44. We shall be called upon to bring the spirit of Anekanta or sweeten the prutity of human destiny.

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