John Locke on Property

TINK TINKER (WAZHAEZHE NATION)

Thus in the beginning all the world was America, and more so than that is now; for no such thing as money was any where known. Find out something that hath the use and value of money amongst his neighbours, you shall see the same man will begin presently to enlarge his possessions.

—John Locke

John Locke (1632–1704) was an English businessman and politician, a slave owner and international slave trader, who is perhaps best remembered as an ethicist for his brilliant justification of international land theft—stealing other people's property with a facade of utmost legal and moral propriety—and for his philosophical support for the unbridled accumulation of wealth. Locke is highly regarded by both eurowestern liberals and neoconservative pundits, as he seems to offer something for both ends of the contemporary dominant society’s political spectrum. Most important for Indian peoples of north America, however, he has come to be regarded as the foundation for eurowestern notions of the private

*My use of the lower case for such adjectives as "English," "Christian," "bible," etc., is intentional. While nouns naming religious groups might be capitalized out of respect for each Christian—as for each Muslim or Buddhist—using the lower case "Christian" or "bible" for adjectives allows readers to avoid unnecessary normativizing or universalizing of the principal institutional religious quotient of the eurowest. Likewise, I avoid capitalizing such national or regional adjectives as American, Amer-European, European, Eurowestern, etc. I also refer to North America. It is important to my argumentation that people recognize the historical artificiality of modern regional and nation-state social constructions. Quite paradoxically, I know, I insist on capitalizing White (adjective or noun) to indicate a clear cultural pattern invested in Whiteness that is all too often overlooked or even denied by American Whites. Moreover, this brings parity to the insistence of African Americans on the capitalization of the word Black in reference to their own community (in contra-distinction to the New York Times usage). Likewise, I always capitalize Indian and American Indian.
ownership of property. Moving beyond Descartes’ codification of the European cultural notion of radical individualism, Locke’s theory of private ownership of property has come to be known as *possessive individualism*. This put Locke’s colonial interests in a historical conflict with the indigenous cultures of those who were the target of English colonialism, a conflict that continues into the present. American Indians, for instance, continue to live a cultural system rooted firmly in community and a communitarian value system. Following Locke’s Puritan instincts and the earlier European church reformation, colonial missionaries are still attempting to replace this communitarian value system with a theology of individualism. This chapter will briefly summarize Locke’s philosophy from an ethics perspective, but it will focus more generally on what White interpreters (fans of Locke) call the “contradiction” inherent in Locke’s position on slavery and then more particularly on the anti-American Indian racism that is blatantly inherent in his theories on property and the accumulation of wealth.

**LOCKE AND LAND THEFT**

According to Locke, God wanted English folk to take over the vacant “waste” lands of North America. Yet they were not vacant at all. They were actually widely inhabited, but by Locke’s judgment they were inhabited by people who had failed to develop their lands adequately. So God wanted English agriculturalists, who were invested in a money economy that allowed for a much greater accumulation of wealth, and who could use their God-given superior culture to generate new wealth by stealing aboriginal Indian land (that is, for legitimate, legally justifiable, and under some divine command based on moral rationale, to take someone else’s land by conquest), remove those people from the land, and repopulate the land with Englishmen. Locke was one of the key euro-White philosophers and thinkers of the European seventeenth century. An obviously brilliant man, Locke was broadly educated. He served as a physician and medical researcher; as a highly placed political activist as well as a political theorist; as the business manager for a colonial landholding corporation with interests in North America; and as a scientist who became a friend of Isaac Newton and with Newton, the chemist Robert Boyle, and other early scientists founded the English Royal Society. Yet he is most remembered and still widely taught today as a philosopher and political theorist who continues to deeply influence the development of ethics and political theory and practice. At the same time, Locke was an early European exemplar of the racist White supremacist that was only then in the midst of emerging. Although he would not yet have called himself White, his philosophical argumentation and socioeconomic practice clearly place him in the context of burgeoning White European supremacist thinking.

His philosophical writings helped to rationalize (and ultimately to legalize) the theft of lands from aboriginal landowners by White English invaders based on his own understanding of the superiority of English culture and English ways. Particularly important to this process was his essay “On Property,” chapter 5 in his *Second Treatise of Government*. It is in this essay that Locke so carefully builds a fictional narrative about Native Peoples in order to justify grand larceny in the minds of good Christian folk in Europe. Ultimately, it is this essay that so heavily shapes the legal and philosophical basis for all property ownership and property laws in the United States today, and it does so by creating a legal logic for engaging in colonial occupation and coercive control of Native peoples. Indeed, it is Locke’s notion of the social contract that creates the modern notion of the “rule of law,” and the control of another people’s property is the first order of business for Locke’s rule of law. He begins by very creatively inventing a way for moral Christian (White) folk to decide that the other folk in question (American Indians) never really owned the property in the first place— even though they may have lived on the land from time immemorial.

In the *Two Treatises* Locke argues vehemently against slavery. Already in his opening words to the *First Treatise of Government*, Locke voices his abhorrence of slavery in general with the condemnation that slavery “is so vile and miserable an Estate of Man, and so distinctly opposite to the generous Temper and Courage of our Nation; that it is hardly to be conceived, that an Englishman, much less a Gentleman, should plead for’t.” Locke then returns to his refutation of slavery in chapter 4 of the *Second Treatise*. Yet if we read the *Two Treatises* carefully, it is clear that Locke never intended to include African peoples in his tirade against slavery. Indeed, his condemnation of slavery has nothing at all to do with the slave trade in which he was himself so deeply invested. Rather, it had more to do with the nature of civil government in England and his political dispute with an ardent royalist political writer. As attested by his personal financial investments in two companies, the Bahamian Adventurers and the Royal Africa Company, Locke must have all too easily differentiated (ethically and morally) between the enslavement of White people and the enslavement of African Blacks. The Bahamian Adventurers ran plantations in the Bahamas on the basis of the coerced and nonremunerated labor of some four to five thousand African slaves. The Royal Africa Company was a business venture trading in kidnapped Blacks off the Atlantic coast of Africa, supplying among others the very plantation enterprises in the Bahamas of which Locke was an owner. Through the advice of his patron Ashley Cooper, Locke invested rather heavily in both of these companies in 1672, becoming a part owner of each.

A close and contextual reading of the *Two Treatises* underscores that the slavery Locke opposed so vehemently in the *Two Treatises* was a slavery of the English people themselves: White people, in a political system of absolute monarchy. His antislavery rhetoric is precisely intended to counter Robert Filmer’s defense of absolute monarchy, characterizing it as an enslavement of the people. Locke’s vociferous outburst against slavery, then, is about English people and explicitly about the English political system of governance. Locke never even considered and certainly never intended extending his principle of slavery to non-White (meaning non-English) peoples.
INTERPRETATION OF LOCKE

To understand who John Locke was and his continuing importance, we need to briefly characterize his theoretical and methodological position. Locke was first of all an empiricist, building his political theory on experience and sense perceptions of reality. It is this empiricism that derives from Locke’s early and long involvement in the physical sciences as a student and close associate of Robert Boyle and others. He was engaged in medical research at the time he was hired by a wealthy English politician and businessman as the gentleman’s personal physician. This commitment to the physical sciences made empiricism a natural methodological choice.

Second, Locke was a proponent of a social contract theory. According to this view, human civilization emerged as a result of some conscious communal decision to build a form of community governance in which people would give up what he describes as the absolute and unencumbered freedom experienced by every individual in an original state of nature, where no one was constrained by anyone else. In return, people would have a community-contructed rule of law that would allow for the (legally protected) ownership of property and the accumulation of personal wealth, as well as a greater degree of personal safety. This contractarian modality was certainly not new with Locke, but Locke pushes beyond Thomas Hobbes and in a quite different direction.

Third, to pursue his social contract idea, Locke argues a natural law theory. What he calls the “State of nature” was not merely for Locke an edenic fantasy of some human past—even if we might today accuse him of creating a fictive narrative of that past. Rather, it served Locke’s purpose of justifying the need for a social contract leading to civil government—and ultimately allows for social choices in creating governing structures. If the governing structure is socially contracted, then it is not itself a natural (or divinely constituted) event. Here Locke is again countering the divine right of monarchy as a naturally occurring structure for ruling a people. We can add one more important piece of the puzzle. In his development of early modern notions of property, Locke builds on the foundational idea of individualism already rampant in European praxis since the European renaissance and ecclesial reformation periods. The radical euwestern notion of individualism has become entrenched in euwestern cultures. Locke’s expansion of the idea, however, which has become a simplistic favorite of neoclassical (so-called neoliberal) economics (especially those associated with the excesses of the Milton Friedman / free market school of capitalism), is the notion of “possessive individualism,” already mentioned above.

Locke’s move toward the private ownership of property is authorized under this notion of natural law. Thus the origin of private property is part of the natural law for Locke and not just a condition that begins under the social contract of what he calls political life. The latter (commonly called today the “rule of law”) is invoked in Lockean doctrine as part of the set of needs that results in the social contract as an agreement among people to help regulate the ownership of property.

Locke can be seen to articulate two paradoxically different perspectives with regard to wealth: an egalitarian position that seems to be supportive of the poorest members of society; and a clear defense of individual wealth and the disproportionate distribution of wealth. At the same time he is widely regarded as perhaps the key founder of modern notions of democracy and liberal republican state government that captivated political processes in Europe and north America and have been increasingly imposed on the rest of the human population of the world (Iraq and Afghanistan being just the most acute examples of the moment). Notions of liberty and freedom that became so important to the french revolution a century after Locke and especially for the rebellion of the english colonies in north America find their initial modern formulation in Locke. Locke did not begin the process that led to ending the european notion of the divine right of monarchy and absolute rule. Rather, Locke’s social thought was the next step in presssing the antifeudalism that had generated the (puritan) english civil war of the 1640s, the generation before Locke’s adulthood. It should be added here that in the context of his natural law argumentation, Locke also formulated a conception of natural rights, the beginnings of what has become contemporary euwestern human rights theory, a discourse wholly founded on the emergent notion of european individualism. Indeed, Locke’s pervasive individualism continues at its deepest theoretical essence to stain the whole of modern human rights discourse, a discourse that regularly disallows the voice of indigenous communal wholes.

Thus it has become a commonplace to report that as a theorist and a political agitator, Locke was a staunch opponent of tyranny, especially the tyranny he saw inherent in the absolute power exercised in monarchy. Locke was the favorite theorist of the radical Whig party in their movement and became a key player in the english “Glorious Revolution” of 1688, which deposed Charles II from the throne of England and installed a new monarch who was much more subordinate to the rule of the english Parliament. It was this revolution, rather than the french revolution more than a century later, that shaped the beginning of european democracy as we see it today. His Two Treatises of Government, written in the ferment that led to this revolution, was a theoretical attempt first of all to establish a basis for civil government. Yet it was equally focused on legitimizing the english colonial projects in the Americas (including the Caribbean) and Africa, projects in which Locke was himself heavily invested, financially as well as politically.

Locke’s more-romantic liberal defenders want to claim the egalitarian Locke as the modern liberal hero of egalitarian democracy and personal freedom. At the same time, they prefer to dismiss the upper-class slave-owner unbridled-accumulation-of-wealth Locke as an aberration of his basic principles. In promoting an alternative interpretation of the Treatises, for example, legal scholar Jeremy Waldron argues that Locke would allow the poorest to share in the “surplusage” of the production of those who are wealthier and even to take surplus goods. Indeed, Waldron goes on to propose, “Lockean government may have
to be continually interfering to redistribute surplus goods from the rich to the most needy.6 But this is not the Locke who was so deeply invested, politically and financially, in the beginnings of English colonialism.

Waldron argues that Locke surreptitiously sneaked a Lockean idea into the Carolina Constitution, allowing slaves in the Carolina territory to have freedom of religion (paragraph 107). In other words, as long as you remember you are a slave and have to obey your master, you can have freedom of religion; believe what you will; just do exactly as you are told otherwise. Waldron then wrongly connects this passage in the Carolina Constitution to Locke’s condemnation of slavery in general in the First Treatise.7 Yet it becomes painfully clear that in condemning slavery, Locke had no intention whatsoever of including the African slaves of his own investments. Here is the quote from Carolina Constitution:

Since charity obliges us to wish well to the souls of all men, and religion ought to alter nothing in any man’s civil estate or right, it shall be lawful for slaves, as well as others, to enter themselves, and be of what church or profession any of them shall think best, and, therefore, be as fully members as any freeman. But yet no slave shall hereby be exempted from that civil dominion his master hath over him, but be in all things in the same state and condition he was in before. . . . [From par. 107 we skip down to par. 110.] Every freeman of Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over his negro slaves, of what opinion or religion soever.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In 1666 Locke became acquainted with politician Anthony Ashley Cooper (aka “lord” Ashley or “lord” Shaftesbury in the now antiquated English caste system). Cooper, one of the wealthiest persons in England, first sought out Locke for medical advice. Early the next year Locke moved into Cooper’s mansion to serve as his personal physician, live-in scholar, business manager, and political consultant. Among the important duties Cooper gave over to Locke was the secretariat of two important aspects of Cooper’s financial empire. He was very early made secretary to the Lords Proprietors of the Carolina Corporation (1669–75) and then secretary of the Board of Trade and Plantations (1673–74).8 The latter was a colonial institution, a government agency designed to manage England’s growing colonial enterprises in the Americas and Africa and to oversee local colonial governments. By 1660, when Cooper was a member of the king’s privy council, he had resurrected this privy council subcommittee. One Lockean scholar describes the Board of Trade and Plantations as “the body which administered the United States before the American revolution.”9 So it was natural that Cooper, as a key power politician on the privy council, would elevate his young protegé John Locke to provide oversight of the Board in 1673.

The other secretariat to which Cooper advanced Locke was a business venture, Cooper’s principal economic venture in the colonial enterprise. The business was a corporation chartered by the English king (Charles II) in 1663 for holding (and retailing) a huge chunk of American Indian lands in north America (the future North and South Carolinas).10 Cooper was one of the eight “lords proprietors” of the corporation, all of whom were high-ranking and very influential English politicians. It was Locke, then, who was called upon to draft the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina for the corporation in 1669, and he was again involved in the thorough revision completed in August 1682.11

In these two capacities in particular (as secretary of these two boards), Locke was “one of just half a dozen men who created and supervised both the colonies and their inquisitorial systems of servitude.”12 Indeed, Locke’s political activism, his political influence, and his economic participation in the English colonial project continued to the end of his career. Years after his first secretariat of the Board of Trade, the new king, William of Orange, appointed Locke to the newly restructured Board, a position that he held from 1696 to 1700, at the end of his public career. He is reported to have been its most influential member. In all of these capacities, Locke became the genius behind the legitimizing of White theft of (legally, speaking in colonizer language, “ownership of and immigration into”) Indian properties.

As one of the principal authors of the Carolina Constitution, Locke developed a political structure far different from the one he helped install in his own England as a result of the so-called Glorious Revolution. The Carolina territories, or plantations, were to be ruled by a feudal aristocracy in order to generate the greatest wealth for the investors in England. The context in colonial north America (and thus in Carolina) was one in which the racial shift to distinguish White indentured servants from African servants had just begun to be institutionalized in colonial law. From 1654 onward, beginning in Virginia,13 African servants were no longer to be treated like White indentured servants; rather, their (short-term) servanthood was suddenly interpreted in the (White-cum-racially-based) social contract of the colonies as a perpetual slavery. More important, the numbers of African persons imported as slaves then began to multiply; Carolina, like Virginia, had quickly become dependent on slave labor, so that the Carolina Company functioned in a context where profit (the accumulation of wealth) was largely generated by slave labor. In this context, then, Locke created a constitution for managing the Carolina territory in which a master was to be granted absolute legal “authority and power over his negro slaves.”

It becomes all the more apparent that this is colonial hegemonic discourse when we become aware that in 1671 the “lords proprietors” of the Carolina Corporation elevated Locke himself to the status of nobility in the Carolina territory with the title of landgrave. This position of colonial nobility, by regulation in the Carolina Constitutions, which were drafted by Locke a couple of years earlier, was accompanied with a grant of 48,000 acres of Indian land. Thus Locke became an actual owner rather than a merely a bright colonialist bureaucrat on the payroll. With a minority share in the Carolina Province also came a seat in the colonial legislature of the Carolina territory. Like many of the English elites who were appointed to this title, Locke never actually came to Carolina to take up
LAND AS PRIVATE PROPERTY

To understand the complexity of Locke's chapter "On Property," we need to begin by understanding the fiction that Locke creates to describe Indians as non-owners of their own land. This mythic fiction is rooted in Locke's imagination of the beginnings of human existence, something he calls the "state of nature." Indians belong to this "state of nature." In this state the whole world belonged to all people as a commons, and all were free to use whatever they could in order to sustain their lives. No one owned any part of it (as a private property), but all have equal access to the whole of it as a "commons" and are free to hunt or gather as they please. This only changes when someone "improves" a piece of land (agriculturally) through the use of one's own labor. In Locke's argument, then, what sets any property aside as an individual's private property is labor. The labor of one's own hands takes a piece of property out of the realm of the common by marking the property. However, we know that English property owners in north America included, as Locke would also insist, the labor of one's owned human slaves. The evidence of this labor is English-style agriculture. It is by working the land, and working it agriculturally, that one marks it as one's own and establishes the right to claim a piece of land as private property. The basics of his argument are readily apparent in an oft-quoted text:

God and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth, i.e., improve it for the benefit of life, and therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his labour. He that in obedience to this command of God, subdued, tilled and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it something that was his property, which another had no title to, nor could without injury take from him.

Locke had never been to America but had financially invested himself in the Carolina Company, was highly placed politically in the English government, and was involved in establishing colonial policy. He continued the development of an English narrative that deprecitated the value of indigenous peoples in north America and invalidated their own ownership of property in their own land on a legal technicality that he devised himself. Conveniently for Locke (who was by now the fictitious—but entirely legal—landowner in the Carolinas), Indians failed to actually own land as property. By his definition they were merely hunters and gatherers on the land, nomads and not agriculturalists. Living off the wild produce of the earth, Indians failed to figure out how to enclose property for agricultural purposes, he claimed. As long as Indians were hunting in a forest, the only property marked by an Indian person's labor would be a deer killed for food or fruits gathered from unplanted trees. Only when the land is tilled agriculturally and planted does the earth itself (meaning a particular cleared plot) become marked by labor and thus some person's private land.

The lie is an ethnographic (and ethnocidal) fabrication. To sustain this lie, Locke and others had to ignore the intense farming of corn in north America even though these agricultural sites were the first places claimed by the colonial invaders. With this notion Locke not only builds the foundation for the private ownership of property in England, but also canonizes the legal fiction to justify stealing indigenous lands from aboriginal owners throughout the various empires of Europe in succeeding centuries. That legal fiction continues to function in U.S. courts to this day and in courts around the world. For this empirical scientist and brilliant philosopher to engage in the mere creation of a fiction about Native Peoples is curious enough. But that fiction first of all about American Indians becomes ultimately about other indigenous folk in Africa, Asia, the Pacific Islands, Australia, Aotearoa/New Zealand, and even the north of Europe (e.g., Samiland).

CONCLUSION

To identify Locke as a White supremacist can be seen as a bit of a curiosity in one regard. First of all, European peoples had only begun to differentiate themselves in racialized terms as different from other peoples in the world. Locke tends to identify himself, for instance, as an Englishman and not as a White person. Yet it is clear that by Locke's time, color did matter and distinctions were beginning to be made more and more clearly. Locke is writing in England at precisely that moment in north American colonial history when the enslavement of African peoples was being separated from the indentured-servant status of Europeans, exactly at that moment when slavery on the basis of black skin color was being transitioned into "perpetual" slavery. As England's colonial magistrate, as secretary for the Board of Trade, in charge of colonial administration in north America, Locke would have been fully informed on this transition in the state of Black slaves.

While one might argue lamely for some ambiguity in Locke's understanding of slavery, there is certainly no ambiguity when we turn to his exploitative writing about America and its Native Peoples. Locke's language, however, of anti-Indian racism and White supremacy is not new to Locke himself. Locke was merely continuing a discourse that had been long developed in Europe in order
to justify European colonialism, the conquest of Native Peoples, and the theft of their lands. This insight is not intended to excuse Locke's crass and self-serving abjection of Native Peoples but merely to explain how such destructive thinking and acting could find easy expression in Locke's writing. Because of his influence, Locke's reinforcement of White supremacy became a vital contribution not only to the developing racism of his day but also for the centuries of European and Amer-European empires that were to follow.

While Locke, the great defender of freedom, ironically found the state of perfect freedom in the state of nature to be onerous, American Indians continue to think back on our traditional life on the land as an ideal way of being. Indeed, we might like to find our way back to that state. Turning Locke against himself, my Shawnee colleague and political science scholar Glenn Morris often refers to October 11, 1492, as "the last day of perfect freedom."[9]

Notes
2. See, e.g., Barbara Arnell, *John Locke and America: The Defense of English Colonialism* (Broadbridge, UK: Clarendon Press, 1996), 2. By analyzing Locke's repeated references to America in the Second Treatise, Arnell argues that the document as a whole (*Two Treatises of Government*) was written as a defense of England's colonial policies in North America. "In particular...the famous chapter on property...was written to justify the seventeenth-century dispossession of the aboriginal peoples of their land, through a vigorous defense of England's 'superior' claims to proprietorship."
4. For American thinkers in 1776 like Thomas Jefferson, Locke was the canonical source for their revolution against their rightful ruler, the English king, see Arnell, *John Locke and America*, chap. 7, "Locke, Jefferson, and the Amerindian," 168–200.
5. Locke, a noncombatant intellectual, was actually in exile in France at the moment of the revolution's denouement, but he accompanied the wife of the new monarch (William of Orange) across the Channel back to England after victory was secure.
7. Ibid., 199, 205.
8. The formal title of the Board of Trade was and is "The Lords of the Committee of Privy Council appointed for the consideration of all matters relating to Trade and Foreign Plantations." It was first established by the English king called James I in 1621. By the mid-nineteenth century the board's control of colonial matters passed into the hands of the "Colonial Office," a new and powerful bureaucracy of the British government, but the Board of Trade continued in one fashion or another. In 1966 civil aviation came under its purview; by 1974 it was reshaped as the Board of Trade and Industry. Colonial institutions have a way of enduring, but their spirit continues long after the institution itself is gone. See the British government's description of the history of the Board: http://www.berr.gov.uk/aboutus/corporate/history/oulines/DT-1970-1974/page13920.html. Accessed 03-08-2011.
10. Cooper made his first move into the colonial venture as early as 1646 when he invested financially in a Barbados plantation. By 1660 he was a member of the English king Charles II's Privy Council. It was in this capacity that he helped to reorganize the Privy Council's Committee on Trade and Plantations. And it was as an important politician and businessman that he was made one of the "lords proprietors" of the Carolina Company in 1663, appointed so by the king. Charles II. See Tim Harris, "Cooper, Anthony Ashley, First Earl of Shaftesbury (1621–1683)," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford University Press, September 2004); online edition, subscription required, http://www.oxforddnb.com.bicanca.penlib.du.edu/view/article/6208.
14. Locke, *Two Treatises*, II: v. 27.
15. Ibid., v. 32.
16. Thus a later American Lockean, Andrew Jackson, in his annual message to Congress in December 1835, could easily dismiss any Indian claims to ownership of their land as mere "usufructuary rights," which they ceded to the whites. Luther Hill, *A History of the State of Oklahoma*, vol. 1 (1908), 77, http://www.usgeonet.org/usa/topic/historical/ok_10.htm. The speech was in part a rationale for Indian Removal.
18. The fiction was already an established part of the colonial rationale, going back at least to John Cotton and his celebrated sermon to the puritan group in London as they were set to leave on the Arbella to establish the Boston colony in 1630.
19. Morris is at the University of Colorado Denver. He has been the key organizer for the Colorado chapter of the American Indian Movement. His comment has been made at more than one event protesting the celebration of this thing called Columbus day.


BEYOND THE PALE

Reading Ethics from the Margins

Edited by
Stacey M. Floyd-Thomas and Miguel A. De La Torre

© 2011 Westminster John Knox Press

First edition
Published by Westminster John Knox Press
Louisville, Kentucky

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20—10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Westminster John Knox Press, 100 Witherspoon Street, Louisville, Kentucky 40202-1396. Or contact us online at www.wjkbooks.com.

Portions of chapter 24 (“Stanley Hauerwas on Church”) appeared previously in Latinola Social Justice: Moving Beyond Eurocentric Moral Thinking, by Miguel A. De La Torre, and are used here by permission of Baylor University Press.

Book design by Sharon Adams
Cover design by Lisa Buckley
Cover illustration © Ekeley/Netta Collection/Getty Images

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Beyond the pale. Reading ethics from the margins / Miguel A. De La Torre and Stacey M. Floyd-Thomas, editors.—1st ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references (p.).
BJ1275.B49 2011
241—dc23
2011023666