CUNY Logic Workshop

Friday, April 17, 2026, 1:00—6:30 pm

CUNY GC, Room 8400

1:00—2:15 pm: Graham Priest (CUNY)

2:15—2:20 pm: Interim

2:20—3:35 pm: Rashed Ahmad (Kuwait)

3:35—3:55 pm: Break

3:55—5:10 pm: Marcus Rossberg (UConn)

5:10—5:15 pm: Interim

5:15—6:30 pm: Marko Malink (NYU)

Cooper's logic of ordinary discourse (Graham Priest, CUNY)

In 1968 William Cooper published a paper, 'The Propositional Logic of Ordinary Discourse'. The paper received virtually no uptake at the time—unjustly so, since it contains a number of significant ideas. It is now starting to receive some of the recognition it deserves. This talk reviews the paper and its ideas. It has three parts. In the first, I will describe the central contents of Cooper's paper. In the second I will comment on the significant ideas it contains. In the third, I will discuss some shortcomings of the ideas (or at least, the way that they are executed).

Overinternalization issues: ω-inconsistency (Rashed Ahmad, Kuwait)

The principle of uniform solution–same kind of problem calls for a same kind of solution–is often invoked when dealing with the same family of semantic paradoxes. The semantic paradoxes, however, are just instances of a particular kind of problem: Overinternalization (or expressive unsoundness). Other than semantic paradoxes, overinternalization issues include crude overinternalization of semantic notions (e.g., overinternalizing validity) and ω-inconsistency. In *Classical Logic of Paradox* (forthcoming), Jonathan Erenfryd and I show that a theory of truth built on the propositional logic *CLP* can avoid semantic paradoxes, including revenge and metainferential paradoxes, and can avoid crude overinternalization issues in a theory of validity. Given the principle of uniform solution, we must also show how *CLP* handles ω-inconsistency. In this paper, we build a theory of arithmetical truth on top of a first-order *CLP*. We show how the theory can express standard arithmetical truths while being ω-consistent. We rehash three methods of reaching ω-inconsistency in classical and other non-classical settings–via Yablo's construction, via McGee's construction, and via inconsistencies–and how they cannot be applied to *CLP*. In fact,

there is a general proof of why *CLP* cannot be ω-inconsistent. Furthermore, we present an arguably inconsistent yet ω-consistent version of *CLP* and compare our solution with other ω-inconsistent inconsistent theories of arithmetical truth built on logics such as *ST* and *LP*; even if such theories attend to the standard model of arithmetic, they are infested with internalization issues.

A general framework for free logics and trilateralism (Marcus Rossberg, UConn)

Classical quantificational logic famously has trouble denying the existence of, e.g., Pegasus. Free logics allow us to improve this situation. They provide a variety of systems and semantics for rigorous reasoning with statements that contain non-referring terms; most importantly, negative, positive, and neutral free logics. Neutral free logics are "no input / no output" logics (Lehmann): no quantifier- or existence-predicate-free sentence that contains a non-referring term comes out true or false. (The natural propositional fragment of neutral free logic is Weak Kleene.) But the so-called "free" logics have much wider use than that: we can, e.g., provide theories of "infectious" vocabulary like slurs (as Ferguson demonstrated for the propositional fragment). I present a three-sided sequent calculus that is adequate for first-order neutral free logic (joint work with Gratzl, Parisi, and Ripley) and sound for second-order neutral free logic (and complete too for Henkin semantics). I will present a new bounds semantics for the calculus — a trilateralist semantics building on Restall's bilateralism. Positions in this bounds semantics contain not just assertions and denials, but a third category. Paradigmatically, I will take the third category in a position to be intentional silence. Crucially, what we are or ought to be silent about is independent of what is true or false. Intentional silence can contain e.g. slurs, or just topics to be avoided for whatever reason. Natural manipulations of the structural rules of sequence calculus will deliver calculi adequate for positive and negative free logic, as well as two hitherto undescribed free logics: dual negative logic and one more that doesn't have a fitting name yet.

The origins of propositional logic: Theophrastus on hypothetical syllogisms (Marko Malink, NYU)

Theophrastus, Aristotle's pupil and eventual successor as head of the Peripatos, developed a theory of hypothetical syllogisms in which he sought to reduce various modes of propositional reasoning to categorical syllogisms. Jonathan Barnes has argued that Theophrastus' attempted reduction of propositional to categorical logic is incoherent and "doomed to failure". Others have gone still further, denying that Theophrastus' hypothetical syllogistic constitutes any sort of contribution to the study of propositional logic at all. The present paper offers, in place of such negative assessments, an alternative view of what we shall argue are, in fact, significant and noteworthy achievements on Theophrastus' part in the field of propositional logic. We reconstruct Theophrastus' calculus and show that it gives rise to a coherent and natural system of propositional logic (namely, first-degree intensional linear logic). This system captures exactly the early Peripatetic theories of wholly and mixed hypothetical syllogisms. Theophrastus' calculus also underwrites Aristotle's rule of *reductio ad impossibile* and his commitment to the connexive law that no proposition entails its own negation. This is joint work with Anubav Vasudevan (University of Chicago).