

Beyond the Outline

A Celebration of Fifty Years of Kripke on Truth

The Graduate Center, CUNY
Room 9205 (9th floor)

Thursday, November 20, 2025	10:00 am – 6:30 pm
Friday, November 21, 2025	10:00 am – 5:00 pm

Speakers:

- Eduardo Barrio (IIF-SADAF-CONICET/Buenos Aires)
- Hartry Field (NYU)
- Michael Glanzberg (Rutgers)
- Leon Horsten (Konstanz)
- Carlo Nicolai (KCL)
- Lavinia Picollo (NUS)
- Graham Priest (CUNY)
- Lorenzo Rossi (Turin)
- James Walsh (NYU)

Program

Thursday, November 20

Introduction	10:00 – 10:15 am
Talk 1. Fixed-point constructions and classicality	
<i>Eduardo Barrio</i>	10:15 – 11:30 am
<i>Break</i>	11:30 – 11:45 am
Talk 2. Ungroundedness in the orthodox framework	
<i>James Walsh</i>	11:45 – 1:00 pm
<i>Lunch</i>	1:00 - 2:15 pm
Talk 3. The theory of truth and definability	
<i>Michael Glanzberg</i>	2:15 - 3:30 pm
<i>Break</i>	3:30 – 3:45 pm
Talk 4. Reinhardt reflection	
<i>Leon Horsten</i>	3:45 – 5:00 pm
<i>Break</i>	5:00 – 5:15 pm
Talk 5. Two objections to a dialetheic solution to the semantic paradoxes	
<i>Graham Priest</i>	5:15– 6:30 pm

Friday, November 21

Talk 6. Are moderate inferentialists committed to quantifier indeterminacy?

Lavinia Picollo 10:00 – 11:15 am

Break 11:15 – 11:30 am

Talk 7. Supervaluational truth and quantifiers

Lorenzo Rossi 11:30 am – 12:45 pm

Lunch 12:45 – 2:00 pm

Talk 8. Kripkean determinateness meets classical compositionality

Carlo Nicolai 2:00 – 3:15 pm

Break 3:15 – 3:30 pm

Talk 9. The value of Kripke's construction for truth

Hartry Field 3:30 – 4:45 pm

Closing 4:45 – 5:00 pm

Abstracts

Fixed-point constructions and classicality

Eduardo Barrio, IIF-SADAF-CONICET/University of Buenos Aires

In *Outline of a Theory of Truth* (1975), Kripke developed a fixed-point semantics for languages containing their own truth predicate. By employing partial models with three values—true, false, and undefined—he offered a way to defuse the liar paradox without triviality. The guiding idea is that truth assignments can be iteratively extended through successive stages until a stable fixed point is obtained. This construction was highly original, as it provided the first rigorous and mathematically elegant framework for accommodating semantic paradoxes within a consistent theory of truth. The construction is monotonic, relying on repeated applications of the jump operator to guarantee the existence of fixed points. Importantly, Kripke insisted that his proposal does not require abandoning classical logic: the three-valued scheme is a technical device, and the third value should not be taken as a genuine truth value. Nevertheless, the framework seems to entail failures of the Law of Excluded Middle, raising questions about the precise status of classical principles within the construction. In this presentation, I will examine the relationship between many-valued valuation schemes and classical logic, focusing on strategies for preserving classicality, the role of consequence as a closure operator, and the apparent failures of excluded middle in Kripkean frameworks.

The value of Kripke's construction for truth

Hartry Field, NYU

Kripke's technical contribution to the logic of truth is huge, and has been an enormously positive influence on the field. At the same time, I think that his philosophical discussion of that contribution was thoroughly confused, and has had a quite negative influence. I'll mostly discuss the positive, and in particular will discuss some important ways in which his contribution can be extended. But I'll have something to say about the negative as well.

The theory of truth and definability

Michael Glanzberg, Rutgers

In recent years, Kripke’s seminal work on truth has been a key tool for a wide range of theories of truth based on non-classical logics. Kripke himself started this off, by considering how fixed points can be found for weak and strong Kleene logics and supervaluations. Subsequently, paraconsistent and strict-tolerant theories of truth driven by Kripke fixed points have been extensively developed. But notoriously, Kripke himself claimed he was not exploring non-classical logics (any more than, say, Kleene was when we wrote down the strong and weak tables). This paper examines this classical take on Kripke’s core results. They can be seen as exercises in the classical theory of inductive definitions, which Kripke was at the time exploring in other work as well. Seen in this light, non-classical logics are a notational convenience for generating fixed points, and not really a proposal about logics at all. The paper concludes by outlining the ways that the classical and non-classical uses of Kripke’s core insights open different avenues for theories of truth.

Reinhardt reflection

Leon Horsten, Konstanz

KF (Kripke-Feferman) is the most popular axiomatic theory of type-free truth. It is well-known that KF cannot prove the significance (i.e., truth) of all of its theorems. This has been taken by many to be a serious objection to taking KF to be the “right” axiomatic theory of type-free truth. In a somewhat enigmatic footnote in his paper “Some remarks on interpreting and extending Kripke’s theory of truth” (1986)—footnote 12, to be precise—Reinhardt suggests that there is nonetheless a way in which KF might be able to recognize its own significance “pointwise” (but not globally). Reinhardt’s remarks on this issue have puzzled many truth theorists. Indeed, when taken at face value, Reinhardt’s suggestions seemingly do not hold water. We argue that, nonetheless, there is a deep insight behind Reinhardt’s suggestive and sometimes slightly wrong-headed remarks.

Kripkean determinateness meets classical compositionality

Carlo Nicolai, KCL

Kripke’s theory of truth includes a notion of determinateness: a sentence is determinate iff it is either classically true or classically false. For such sentences, the T-schema holds. *Prima facie*, this notion of determinateness is incompatible with principles that force a classically compositional truth predicate whose external and internal logics are both classical. We show that this is not the case. We present theories whose omega-models are precisely the classical closures of Kripkean fixed-point models, that is, structures interpreting the truth predicate as the sentences that are satisfied by a Kripkean closed-off fixed point model. The theories are comparable to recent theories proposed by Fujimoto and Halbach, featuring a (necessarily) primitive determinateness predicate. In the paper, we show that our theories entail all the principles of Fujimoto and Halbach’s theories and are proof-theoretically equivalent to Fujimoto and Halbach’s CD+. We also establish some negative results on Fujimoto and Halbach’s theories. Such results show that, unlike what happens in our theories, the primitive determinateness predicate prevents one from establishing clear connections with Kripkean determinacy.

Note: Joint work with Luca Castaldo (LMU, MCMP).

Are moderate inferentialists committed to quantifier indeterminacy?

Lavinia Picollo, NUS

Carnap showed that the ordinary inference rules for first-order quantifiers do not pin down the intended class of interpretations — the validity of the rules does not entail objectual truth-conditions for the quantifiers. Plausibly, as I have argued in previous work, no alternative calculus can supply rules that do the job either. At best, inference rules can secure sentential truth-conditions. These conditions do not single out a unique class of models but rather a class of classes of models — namely, the fixed points of a corresponding jump operator. One such fixed point is the class of ‘objectual’ models, but there are larger ones, including a maximal fixed point. In this talk, I explore whether the moderate inferentialist has any grounds to prefer one fixed point over another, or whether they must instead conclude that the class of interpretations is indeterminate among the fixed points.

Two objections to a dialethic solution to the semantic paradoxes

Graham Priest, CUNY

Saul Kripke's 1975 paper on truth marked a turning point in research on the semantic paradoxes towards languages which contain their own truth predicate. One such approach is a dialethic one. In my experience, the two most common objections to this (other than a blanket rejection of dialetheism) concern (a) Curry's paradox, and (b) the "truth-only" problem. I find neither of these persuasive. In this talk, I will explain why.

Supervaluational truth and quantifiers

Lorenzo Rossi, Turin

Quantification has long been both a stumbling block and a testing ground in semantics. Building on Frege, Tarski developed the modern model-theoretic semantics for first-order logic (FOL), but many quantifiers (because of the Compactness and Löwenheim–Skolem Theorems) cannot be expressed within FOL. Mostowski and Lindström extended Tarski's framework to capture quantifiers such as finitely many and most, giving rise to Generalized Quantifier Theory (GQT), now a standard tool in formal and natural language semantics. Still, challenges remain, especially where semantic indeterminacy arises. We focus on three sources of indeterminacy: (P) presupposition failure, (V) vagueness, and (L) semantic paradoxes. To address them, we propose a general framework for quantifier semantics in the presence of indeterminacy, and we develop two formal systems that (a) meet key desiderata for handling P, V, and L, and (b) recover a substantial fragment of GQT.

Note: Joint work with Johannes Stern (Bristol).

Ungroundedness in the orthodox framework

James Walsh, NYU

In *Outline of a Theory of Truth*, Kripke states that "the orthodox approach" to truth exemplified by Tarski's work "by no means obviously guarantees groundedness." He then presents two examples and asks whether they exhibit ungroundedness within the orthodox framework. Kripke wrote that he did not know "even quite how to state the problem here" and that "some substantial technical questions in this area are yet to be solved." Fifty years later, these questions have been answered. Curiously, the demystification of these examples deploys insights from Kripke's own work on the incompleteness theorems. I will explain Kripke's examples and survey the work that has clarified their status.