JOINT STATEMENT

Renewing Old Promises and Exploring New Frontiers

The Japan-U.S. Alliance and the Liberal International Order

October 27, 2010

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Joint Statement

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Preface

This joint statement marks the culmination of a study group conducted by the Tokyo Foundation and the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). The study group initially convened because we feared that the 50th anniversary of the Japan-U.S. alliance might become a squandered opportunity. At the time, the alliance’s golden anniversary was overshadowed by a dispute over where to relocate Futenma, a U.S. Marine base on Okinawa. Since then, tensions within the alliance have receded, while China’s rise and growing assertiveness, and North Korea’s uncertain leadership transition, have demonstrated anew to Washington and Tokyo the value of their alliance. The publication of this joint statement thus comes at an opportune time for alliance renewal.

A few additional words on the study group are in order. We first met in April 2010 at a gathering in Washington. Japanese and U.S. participants then held a number of meetings in their respective capitals. Finally, the entire study group reconvened in Tokyo to lay out this joint statement. Throughout, we received generous support from the Potomac Foundation, for which we are grateful. This joint statement reflects the views of study group members rather than the views of any particular institution.

We, the chairman of the study group, hope this joint statement will inform our leaders as they move to strengthen an alliance that remains an irreplaceable asset to Japan, the United States and the world.

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I. Executive Summary

Defending a Liberal International Order

The Japan-U.S. alliance remains vital because it not only advances mutual interests in security and the economy but also because it serves as a pillar of a liberal international order sustained by common values such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. It was this order that facilitated economic growth and the development of democratic institutions in many Asian countries and also promoted regional cooperation. Furthermore, the liberal international order aided economic reform in China from the late 1970s onward and to this day has enabled China’s remarkable rise.

One key component of the liberal international order has been access to the global commons, i.e. the maritime, air, space, and cyber domains that connect the world. A new core role that the Japan-U.S. alliance should serve is to ensure that the global commons remain available to all nations in the world. To this end, the two allies should play a joint leadership role in further developing and creating international legal provisions governing the use of the global commons.

Another vital dimension of maintaining the liberal international order is an effective regional security architecture in Asia, comprised of both formal institutions and informal networks. Japan should contribute to this architecture by regularly conducting political and strategic dialogues with its Asian neighbors. Moreover, Japan and the United States should promote strengthened trilateral ties with likeminded countries such as South Korea, Australia, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Japan and the United States should also play a leading role in fostering greater regional cooperation on nontraditional security issues, including support for capacity building in Southeast Asian countries.

Renewing Old Promises

Traditional alliance functions or “old promises”—deterrence and crisis response—should be updated to reflect the security dynamics in Northeast Asia, including shifts in the balance of power caused by the rise of China and developments on the Korean Peninsula.
The pace and scope of China’s military buildup have been remarkable, prompting the United States to keep a close eye on China’s anti-access and area denial capability. Tokyo and Washington will henceforth need to make more effective use of their respective portfolios of alliances and partnerships in Asia. At the same time, a Japan-U.S.-China trilateral dialogue should be established to address the management of the global commons, among other issues.

With growing concern over the stability and long-term prospects of the regime in Pyongyang and the potential for a very fluid situation on the Korean Peninsula, close policy coordination among Japan, the United States, and South Korea is essential. In addition, Tokyo and Washington should adopt a bold approach of applying multilayered forms of pressure to significantly raise the cost of North Korea’s continuing nuclear ambitions. For this to work, China must be encouraged to join an effective sanctions regime.

One area where the alliance needs to be renewed is strengthening regional deterrence. With the United States deemphasizing the role of nuclear weapons, it is critical to reconfigure alliance roles, missions, and capability-sharing arrangements by conducting bilateral nuclear and conventional deterrence consultations. The steady implementation of the realignment initiatives articulated in the “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (May 1, 2006) will be vital, as this will help sustain and fortify the U.S. forward presence in the face of China’s growing anti-access and anti-denial capability. Also, it is important to diversify stationing options and to increase U.S. access to facilities throughout the Asia-Pacific region.

As China develops a blue water navy, it tends to apply principles of international law selectively in asserting its claims over maritime interests. In response, Japan and the United States should adopt a comprehensive strategy combining military, legal, and political approaches. The sea lines of communication stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific are of vital importance to the liberal international order. To maintain maritime security, Japan and the United States should cooperate with and promote naval capacity building among littoral countries in Southeast Asia.

**Exploring New Frontiers**
The alliance must also function effectively in dealing with security issues at “new frontiers,” where Japan can demonstrate its strength as a global civilian power. Of primary importance are humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. As shown in the case of the December 2004 tsunami, the U.S. Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) can provide rapid and much needed “strategic lift” in response to disaster and humanitarian crises. Japan and the United States should enhance their interoperability and engage in continuous exercises and exchanges.

There is room in both countries for further cooperation with the private sector, and U.S. forces and the JSDF should enhance their dialogue with civil society. Japan should also engage more broadly in civilian activities and coordinate its activities with Official Development Assistance (ODA) in order to enable an “All-Japan” response.

Japan and the United States should aspire to form a “green alliance” concerning climate change, energy, and natural resources. Such an alliance could contribute to establishing universal energy-efficient and energy-saving standards in the areas of lifestyle, industrial activities, and security activities. The two countries should lead the effort to formulate rules to prevent tensions among states from escalating over fishing rights and the acquisition of natural resources like oil and gas, water, and rare-earth minerals. They should also make efforts to diversify sources of supply and develop alternative technologies, and to unleash a “blue revolution” by sensitizing states in the Asia-Pacific region to cross-border water issues.

It is essential that nuclear energy be promoted without increasing the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Japan and the United States should work together to establish universal norms for the international nuclear business and the transaction of sensitive nuclear technologies and materials. The two countries should also press for more effective enforcement mechanisms and sanction measures, while endeavoring to solve ongoing proliferation concerns involving North Korea and Iran. In addition, China, Russia, India, and other nuclear powers should be persuaded to cooperate more closely with nonproliferation efforts, including the campaign for a world without nuclear weapons. Japan can take the lead in this area as a nonnuclear country, as demonstrated by its joint initiative with Australia to launch a high-level meeting in September 2010 of 10 nonnuclear weapon states.
Japan and the United States play important roles in the area of assisting developing countries. Through ODA, as well as trade and investment, they contribute not only to economic growth, but also to enhancing social stability and thereby preventing failed and failing states from becoming hotbeds of international terrorism and criminal networks and sources of proliferation for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear-related materials and technologies. In order to coordinate mutual roles and bilateral cooperation, the Japanese and U.S. governments should launch a 2+2+2 working-level dialogue among foreign policy, defense, and aid agency officials.

**Reinforcing the Alliance’s Foundation**

The Japanese debate on the alliance should focus on real policy issues rather than delving into abstract arguments about “dependence” and “equality.” To prevent the alliance from becoming a source of partisan conflict, a central support base needs to be built and maintained.

Within the Japanese government, the prime minister’s leadership is a prerequisite for strong alliance management. The establishment of a national security office (NSO) could contribute toward this end, with outside experts joining career government officials to determine policy approaches. Alongside a new NSO, a solid intellectual base for security policy debate should be developed and a community of security policy experts cultivated.

An effective national security community requires good intelligence, and the need for a robust Japanese intelligence capability has been pointed out for some time. Japan should first streamline its intelligence collection and analysis processes so that the proposed NSO could function as the main consumer of intelligence. For the intelligence process to take root, a legal framework to protect sensitive information must be developed. Japan and the United States should also upgrade the interoperability of their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

The basic notions of where Japan stands and where it is headed should be shared by the Japanese people. Tokyo and Washington should interact with and more fully articulate the enduring values of the alliance to the Japanese public. The United States should take additional measures to defuse local tensions stemming from the presence of American troops in Japan, and, whenever feasible, U.S. bases should be co-located with Japanese
bases to ease local concerns. Needless to say, Japan and the United States should make additional efforts to redress the disproportionate basing burden borne by Okinawa in the postwar years.

The strength of the alliance will depend on the long-term fiscal health of both countries. Japan and the United States should promote growth strategies compatible with a “green alliance” while advancing free trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific region. The economic partnership between Japan and the United States is indispensable to maintaining and promoting the liberal international order.
II. Introduction

The Japan-U.S. alliance has helped sustain peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region for over five decades. Yet appreciation of this fact, much less a firm understanding of why and how the alliance ushered in an age of security and economic growth, has remained shaky in both Japan and the United States.

The liberal international order promoted by the Japan-U.S. alliance has provided a favorable environment in which many Asian countries have achieved economic wealth, democratic institutions and regional cooperation. Such an order in the Asia-Pacific has been sustained by open access to the global commons, i.e. the sea, air, space, and cyber domains that no nation exclusively owns.

Particularly after the dramatic Sino-American rapprochement in the early 1970s, China has benefited the most from the international order sustained by the United States and Japan. Access to international markets and financial institutions, which are key elements of the liberal international order, along with China’s own reform and open-door policies, has been indispensable to the impressive rise of China.

The reemergence of China, however, has caused a power shift in the international security landscape, to which the Japan-U.S. alliance must adjust. A favorable scenario is that China not only continues to share the benefits and public goods provided by the Japan-U.S. alliance but also helps to maintain and promote an evolving liberal international order. However, some inauspicious signs, evident in Chinese words and deeds call into question this promising forecast.

America’s engagement in the Asia-Pacific and the robust forward presence of U.S. military forces in Japan have provided the deterrence and the capabilities necessary for the maintenance of regional stability. Such decades-long “old promises” are the core components of the alliance, and they remain as valid today as in the past. The Japan-U.S. alliance should now be regarded as one of the essential public goods for regional and global security.

Yet, the security environment is becoming increasingly complex. Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continue to pose grave threats to the international community. Failing and failed states have not only hindered state-building
and economic development but have also become safe havens for transnational organized crime and terrorist organizations. Growing threats to the global commons could undermine the foundations of the world economy. In addition, climate change and competition over natural resources have emerged as new security challenges. The importance of such “new frontiers” compels Japan and the United States to upgrade their alliance to reflect today’s security environment. Japan, as an advanced democracy with a strong civil society, has the potential to play a robust role on such new frontiers.

To effectively renew old promises and explore new frontiers, Japan and the United States need to reinforce and, in some cases, reform the infrastructure for alliance management. For its part, Japan should establish a strong coordinating body for national security policy, enhance its intelligence capabilities, and develop a vibrant security policy community. Together, Tokyo and Washington should promote public support for the alliance in Japan.

The long-term health of the alliance depends upon a strong economic foundation for both partners. Japan and the United States should cooperate in ways that will boost economic growth, the ultimate solution to the looming budget squeeze.

The bilateral alliance already plays a major role in providing the public good of regional and global security, and the role is only heightened by the enduring and emerging challenges and opportunities on the horizon. Given the 50-year legacy of the 1960 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the leaders of the two countries should declare their commitment to strengthening the partnership.
III. Defending a Liberal International Order

Shared Objectives and Vision

The Japan-U.S. alliance has endured and remained vital for the two countries because it is based not only on mutual interests in security and healthy economies but also on common values and principles, such as democracy, human rights, free markets, freedom of navigation, and the rule of law. The two liberal economic powers have enjoyed prosperity under a stable international order in which human dignity is secured, the transport of goods and the transfer of money are predictable and safe, fair access to markets and resources is ensured, and disputes are peacefully settled without resorting to force.

Japan and the United States are not the only beneficiaries of this stable international environment. The postwar liberal international order has been accessible to any country, regardless of its economic system or political orientation vis-à-vis the United States and Japan. The rapid economic development and social modernization of East Asian countries, particularly China, was made possible due to sustained, open access to the liberal international order. The bilateral alliance has thus provided a sound basis for regional stability and prosperity.

The rise of China has begun to change the balance of power and the nature of politics in the region as well as in the global community. It may affect either positively or negatively the stability and prosperity of the region, depending on the course that China will take.

The economic and social development of China is welcome. Both Japan and the United States enjoy extensive trade and investment relations with China, to the great benefit of both their economies. Likewise, China needs Japan and the United States to sustain its economic growth. The common interests of not only Japan, the United States and China, but also the rest of the global community dictate that the liberal international order be maintained to facilitate trade and investment, the exchange of people and information, and the transfer of technology, in order to increase the welfare of all states. Japan, the United States and China also share common concerns over diverse risks and threats to stability and prosperity, such as the increasing risk of non-state actors’ illicit activities, including piracy or the smuggling of drugs, arms and people, and humanitarian
emergencies, including natural disasters. The three countries are expected to share the responsibility of coping with such risks and threats for themselves as well as for the region.

At this moment, a lack of transparency regarding China’s strategic capabilities, doctrine, and intentions produces anxiety over the possibility of Chinese adventurism. In light of China’s recent assertiveness in the East and South China Sea, it is unclear whether China will rise peacefully or seek regional military and political hegemony as it continues to gain power. Japan and the United States should attempt to shape China’s policy preferences so that it will choose to work with and defend the liberal international order in tackling the various challenges facing humankind.

**The Global Commons**

A new core role that the Japan-U.S. alliance should serve is to maintain the liberal international order by making sure that the global commons are available to all nations in the world and not allowing the commons to be exploited by those who do not abide by liberal international rules and norms. International legal provisions governing the use of the sea, air, space and cyber domains upon which Japan and the United States deeply depend remain works in progress or in some cases largely undeveloped.

The security of Japan and the United States depends on access to cyberspace and outer space. Credible and resilient communication and information networks in cyberspace are essential to sustain command and control of U.S.-deployed forces and the joint operation of Japanese and U.S. forces. Internet freedom is also a requisite for securing the liberal democratic values in which both Japan and the United States commonly believe. At the same time, cyberspace could be utilized by terrorists and other malicious actors to communicate. Proper security cooperation must be developed with partners beyond regional and political boundaries.

Management of the global commons involves power politics, and therefore entails not only military power but also legal and diplomatic efforts. Thus, in dealing with this challenge, a holistic approach integrating military, legal and diplomatic means must be established.

Norms and interpretation of international laws governing the sea and air are still
emerging, which partly explains the difficulty of settling disputes over maritime and air interests. Japan and the United States should play a leading role in establishing norms and rules to manage the global commons, while also working closely with emerging economies.

**Regional Security Architecture**

In coping with possible threats and potential challenges against the liberal international order, an effective regional security architecture in Asia, built on the foundations provided by the Japan-U.S. alliance, is vital. Specifically, the role of the Japan-U.S. alliance should be contemplated beyond the bilateral context, and Japan should acquire the habit of engaging in political and strategic dialogues with its Asian neighbors regarding their assessment of the regional security situation, as well as the roles of the United States and the Japan-U.S. alliance in sustaining and promoting the liberal international order.

In fact, there is growing awareness of the need to raise the quality of security cooperation among major Asia-Pacific countries. Japan, Australia, India and South Korea have intensified security cooperation across most of their bilateral relations over the past years. Japan’s security partnership with Australia, for example, is aimed at upgrading preparedness for humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. Furthermore, since the tsunami disaster, Cobra Gold exercises, which are held between U.S. forces and the Royal Thai Army, have functioned as multilateral regional exercises for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and peacekeeping. And since 2010, Japan has participated in the U.S.-led Pacific Partnership for medical activities and training with civil society.

Full-scale bilateral dialogue should be launched to create an inclusive regional security architecture embracing allies and other states with a common vision of security cooperation as well as cooperative formats that address specific policy needs. Japan and the United States should promote strengthened trilateral ties with countries espousing a common vision of the liberal international order, such as South Korea, Australia, India, Indonesia and the Philippines. For example, under a security partnership, Japan and Australia conduct a trilateral security dialogue with the United States, while India, Japan, and the United States have held two joint exercises off the Malabar Coast in 2007 and 2009. Such trilateral frameworks are effective because of their relatively small
membership and shared sense of mission and are unlikely to unnecessarily antagonize other countries. The partnership with India is important to secure maritime safety and sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean. It is important that in some cases the United States function as the catalyst for the other two countries in a trilateral framework. The best example of this is the Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral relationship. After the sinking of the South Korean ship Cheonan by North Korea, theretofore lukewarm trilateral cooperation gained considerable momentum. It is time the three governments began discussing the possibility of trilateral cooperation to preserve stability on the Korean Peninsula and even anticipate a possible unification of the two Koreas over the long run.

Japan and the United States have played a leading role in promoting greater regional cooperation on nontraditional security issues that have recently emerged in the Asia-Pacific region. This should be further advanced, particularly through a mechanism for government-wide dialogue — including law-enforcement authorities — to increase capacity-building support for Southeast Asian countries.

Japan and the United States must exercise leadership on pending regional security issues by promoting region-wide cooperation and regionalism. The invitation of the United States to the East Asia Summit and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus should be universally welcomed, and the ASEAN Regional Forum mechanism should be strengthened.
IV. Renewing Old Promises

Traditional alliance functions—deterrence and crisis response—should be continuously updated to accommodate the dynamics of security in Northeast Asia. Maintaining stability in the Asia-Pacific region requires continued vigilance and deterrence against provocative behavior by North Korea and China’s arms buildup. The United States and Japan need to upgrade their policy coordination for the full range of North Korean scenarios, particularly amid rising concerns over the regime resilience of a nuclear-armed Pyongyang. China’s growing military capability and political clout may increase its power and influence over the security order in Asia.

The Rise of China

The power balance in the Asia-Pacific region is undergoing dynamic change. The rise of China is the key component of such change, with China’s continued high annual economic growth enabling it to enhance its influence in regional and global affairs. If current trends continue for the foreseeable future, the configuration of power and influence over the security order in Asia will be determined increasingly by interactions with China and China’s own policy preferences. The pace and scope of China’s military buildup has also increased China’s options for using military force to gain diplomatic advantages or solve disputes in its favor.

The rise of China is also changing the trilateral relationship among the United States, Japan, and China. Whereas the United States remains considerably stronger than China on every dimension of national power, the balance of power has been tilting toward China in the Sino-Japanese relationship. In the East China Sea, bilateral boundaries of air and sea superiority are constantly moving eastward with the rapid increase in the air and naval capability of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Since Japan’s relative capacity to deal with the rise of China unilaterally will increasingly decline, as will that of the United States, Tokyo and Washington will need to make more effective use of their respective portfolios of alliances and partnerships in Asia.

By the same token, Japan-U.S.-China trilateral dialogue should be promoted. By conducting a trilateral dialogue with China on an ongoing basis, it will be possible for Japan and the United States to not only strengthen ties with China but also to become
more alert to changes and create frameworks to deal with contingencies. The trilateral
dialogue should include the management of the global commons. China benefits
significantly from access to the global commons, particularly the air and maritime
domains. After all, without secure transportation links to foreign markets and sources of
raw materials, China’s economic growth would stall. In the context of a trilateral
dialogue, Tokyo and Washington should persuade Beijing that it has a vested stake in
sustaining the global commons as presently constituted.

**Korean Peninsula**

With emerging concerns over the current stability and long-term prospects of the regime
in Pyongyang, developments inside North Korea constitute a potential source of crisis.
The continued development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, the proliferation
of nuclear weapons to other states, sudden regime collapse, a military coup, civil war,
an outpouring of refugees, and humanitarian catastrophe are just some of the potential
developments. In order to minimize the instability caused by North Korea, it is essential
that there be tight policy coordination among the United States, Japan and South Korea,
along with other stakeholders, such as China and Russia.

During the fragile phase of North Korea’s leadership transition, Japan and the United
States should continue to encourage North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons
program and to become a constructive member in the region. While guiding Pyongyang
toward this path, Japan and the United States should emphasize a renewed bold
approach by combining multilayered forms of pressure to significantly raise the price of
North Korea’s continuing nuclear ambitions. Leverage should be sought by several
means, including: (1) a strengthened U.S. forward military presence in Northeast Asia,
(2) tightened conditionality on Chinese economic assistance to North Korea, (3)
ever-deeper economic and financial sanctions adopted through UN Security Council
resolutions and (4) rewards and compensations (for instance, security assurances,
normalized relations and energy assistance) agreed upon in the Six-Party Talks.

To encourage China to join an effective sanctions regime, it is essential to create a
framework designed to minimize the specific risks that China wishes to avoid: (1) an
extreme reaction from Pyongyang, leading to a military confrontation, (2) North Korean
refugees pouring over the border into China and (3) the collapse of the current regime
leading to U.S. forces occupying the entire Korean Peninsula and confronting China
along the Yalu River.

The key components of such a framework would include: (1) upgraded Japan-U.S.-Korea trilateral coordination, such as the Security Consultative Committee (2+2+2) for intelligence sharing and joint planning for contingencies, (2) multilateral cooperation for controlling borders and dealing with refugees if a mass exodus were to occur and (3) independent, parallel efforts by concerned parties to devise plans and systems for maintaining order, securing nuclear weapons and restoring government in the event that the current regime in Pyongyang collapses.

Crafting Tailored Regional Deterrence

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2010 called for reinforcing U.S. commitments to allies and partners with new tailored, regional deterrence architectures that combine U.S. forward presence, relevant conventional capabilities (including effective missile defenses and counter-WMD capabilities) and continued commitment of extended nuclear deterrence. As the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) claimed that the United States will de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons, non-nuclear capabilities will play a vital role for enhancing extended deterrence and reducing the regional scope of maintaining nonstrategic nuclear weapons. In this regard, it is important to renew the scope of the Japan-U.S. alliance by reconfiguring the roles, missions and capability-sharing between the two armed forces by conducting bilateral nuclear and conventional deterrence consultations.

Clear statements by the U.S. government about the scope of its alliance obligations also contribute to credible tailored deterrence. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s remarks that territories under the administration of Japan, such as the Senkaku Islands, are subject to Article 5 of the Mutual Security Treaty, which obligates the United States to protect Japan in the case of an armed attack, have helped to sustain deterrence in an area that has become a flashpoint between Tokyo and Beijing.

The steady implementation of the realignment initiatives articulated in the “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, May 1, 2006, reconfirmed in “Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee,” May 28, 2010) is of vital importance to maintaining the credibility of regional deterrence. The government of Japan needs
bipartisan consensus to maintain a stable and resilient U.S. presence in Japan while considering innovative solutions to reduce the burden on local communities. While reaffirming the foundations of U.S. bases in Japan, it is also important to diversify the stationing options and increase U.S. access to facilities throughout the Asia-Pacific region, including in South Korea, the Philippines and Guam. The regional networking of U.S. bases and facilities will enhance the flexibility of U.S. response in a crisis and foster the streamlining of regional supporting functions for the U.S. forward presence.

Japan’s indigenous military capability is also an essential component of the Japan-U.S. tailored deterrence. The SDF’s capability to deal with possible North Korean aggression and to contribute to a balance of power in the East China Sea reinforces the joint deterrent structure. Japan should rebalance the SDF’s force structure in order to augment such capabilities. The procurement of next generation maritime patrol aircraft and long-haul, unmanned aerial vehicles to improve Japan’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability is essential. So is Japan’s procurement of additional air/sea capabilities, including more diesel attack submarines, a near-term replacement for the F-4EJ fighter and naval mines. Japan-U.S. cooperation on procurement, industrial cooperation and next-generation technology, such as in outer space, should be further promoted. U.S.-Japan defense industrial cooperation covering the procurement of next-generation weapon systems, especially advanced missile defense and the F-35 fighter, will be critical.

The nuclear deterrence provided by the United States is the crux of its deterrent strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, and this should be maintained in the future. The United States and Japan should actively craft the regional deterrence architecture cited in the NPR. Should the United States advance deterrence talks with China for enhancing “strategic stability,” the newly initiated Japan-U.S. policy dialogue on nuclear deterrence should be fully utilized. The two allies should also discuss potential confidence-building measures they can implement vis-à-vis China with a view to advancing nuclear disarmament in Northeast Asia.

In sum, Japan, the United States and China are now deepening their economic and strategic interdependence. However, the modalities of the relationship are still under development. The unstable state of the alliance over the past year may have encouraged China to take a bold action. Therefore, what the allies should do, in order not to continue encouraging assertiveness is to renew the alliance to fit the new realities of
changing global and regional strategic dynamics. The task is not only to build appropriate physical capabilities for deterrence and construct a new deterrence architecture consisting of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces and diplomatic (legal and developmental) efforts, but also to develop a stable, well-coordinated alliance management mechanism between Japan and the United States with a shared vision for the peace and stability of the region.

Ensuring Maritime Security

What China claims as its core national interest is expanding. This can be explained by China’s growing confidence in its modernized military capability. China is rapidly developing a blue-water navy. It has also built up anti-access and area-denial capabilities along its coastal areas and beyond. China has indicated that the South China Sea is a core national interest—and the fact that China has used the same expression with respect to Taiwan and Tibet indicates the priority it now assigns to the South China Sea, raising concerns among some countries in the region.

In the settlement of oceanic border issues, China appears to apply principles of international law selectively. China insists on the theory of the natural prolongation of the continental shelf in the oceanic boundary demarcation with Japan, but when demarcating an oceanic boundary with Vietnam, China agreed to draw a median with equal areas on both sides. China also employs different principles in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Such inconsistent use of different legal principles suggests that China is employing international law as a tool to unilaterally pursue its maritime rights and interests.

China’s increasing naval power and continued arbitrary interpretation of international law could come to obstruct the freedom to operate on the high seas in the Western Pacific. This situation requires Japan and the United States to construct a comprehensive strategy, combining military, legal and political engagement approaches. Sustained multilateral dialogue is vital to helping to resolve disputes before they erupt into conflict.

In terms of maritime routes, the sea lines of communication stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific are of vital importance to the global economy. To maintain the freedom of navigation, Japan and the United States should not only take measures,
but also promote naval capacity-building among littoral countries in Southeast Asia. The United States Congress should ratify the United Nations (U.N.) Convention on the Law of Sea, given the tremendous stake the United States has in a rules-based system and the possibility that down the road newly risen powers may wish to rewrite international law altogether.

Multilateral cooperation in East Asia and the Pacific is creating significant maritime networks, reinforced through efforts by the United States and Japan. The Proliferation Security Initiative, for example, was proposed by the United States with Japan as one of the core members. Japan has contributed to this mechanism by participating in and hosting the joint exercises, and hosting outreach activities in Asia. The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) is an example of a Japanese initiative to promote functional cooperation in the maritime domain, and it contributes to safe navigation in the region.

With regard to competing sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, Japan and the United States can promote peaceful dialogue among countries involved in the dispute and encourage ASEAN and China to make progress on confidence building measures (CBMs) that were part of a 2002 voluntary code of conduct; those CBMs have thus far only languished and some view the declaration itself as in some jeopardy. Also, both governments can start discussions with New Delhi on cooperation in the Indian Ocean under the umbrella of a formal U.S.-Japan-India trilateral dialogue.
V. Exploring New Frontiers

The alliance must also function effectively at “new frontiers.” New frontiers include the growing threat posed by vulnerable and failed states, as well as their impact on international security; the provision of humanitarian assistance and responses to natural disasters and infectious diseases; piracy countermeasures; WMD nonproliferation and disarmament; and peace-building and nation-building efforts. The areas where Japan’s global civilian power can play an important role are expanding. Thus, both countries should pursue new roles for Japan. With a high sense of mission and interoperability based on experience, Japan-U.S. cooperation can function as the core foundation on which to secure human dignity, peace and prosperity in this region. As the building blocks for regional and global security, there is no substitute.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

Victims of natural disasters around the world are concentrated in Asia, and the frequency of such disasters are only likely to increase in the years ahead. Consequently, providing security against natural disasters is a priority issue in the region. According to the White Paper on Disaster Management of the Japanese government, from 1978 to 2007 Asia accounted for about 37 percent of natural disaster events, 89 percent of disaster victims and 59 percent of disaster deaths.

Both Japan and the United States have long provided core assets for humanitarian assistance and coping with disasters. As shown in the case of December 2004 tsunami, the capabilities of the U.S. Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) can contribute to “strategic lift” in responding rapidly to disaster and humanitarian crises. Japan-U.S. bilateral security cooperation can form the core infrastructure with its high interoperability and continuous exercises and exchanges. This role in mitigating and responding to natural disasters will continue to be important in the future.

The need for U.S. involvement is especially great given that most new security challenges in Asia have a maritime component, and the United States is the most effective naval peacekeeper. Put simply, to have a security groupings that do not include the most efficient available naval assets does not make sense. U.S. forces in Japan, the
SDF and related agencies of the Japanese government should enhance their dialogue on contingency scenarios in Japanese territory and surrounding regions.

There is room in both countries for further cooperation with the private sector, and Japan’s participation in the U.S.-led Pacific Partnership from 2010 is welcome. U.S. forces and the SDF should enhance their dialogue with civil society. Japan should improve the legal grounds and operations of the SDF so it can participate more broadly in civilian activities, such as repairing schools and providing vocational training. Coordination with Official Development Assistance (ODA) should be enhanced to enable an “All-Japan” response.

A seamless response capability involving both the military and civil society is crucial. Japanese experience in humanitarian and disaster relief constitutes an important asset for the two countries in contributing to human dignity in East Asia and the Pacific. For example, Japan has succeeded in preparing a platform for contingency scenarios through a cross-sectoral approach involving private businesses and central and municipal governments. This pooled expertise includes ex-ante coordination and simulation, post-disaster rapid investigation, logistics and need-based care. Such experience is now being transplanted to other East and Southeast Asian countries through collaboration among civil societies. This network of platforms would enhance the region’s crisis-response capability. Japanese civil society can serve as the core foundation for such an East Asian crisis-response network. Some institutions have already registered with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to contribute to U.S. disaster relief efforts in this region. Also, Japan has extensive experience in dealing with floods, drought and earthquakes, and the technologies it has developed can be of great benefit to the United States as well. The Japanese and U.S. governments should explore the possibility of utilizing such expertise in the event of a natural disaster in the United States.

**Climate Change, Energy and Natural Resources**

Dialogue to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, deal with the effects of climate change and use Japan’s environmental expertise to realize a more energy-efficient world should be strengthened through technological cooperation. The bilateral relationship should function as a “green alliance” for the global good.
The two governments should work together to establish universal energy-efficient and energy-saving standards in the areas of lifestyle, industrial activities and security activities. Moreover, development assistance can be jointly implemented to establish a kind of model “green” economy for relatively small states with more energy-efficient, eco-friendly economic activities (including introduction of smart grids, renewable energy and other technologies).

Japan and the United States need to prevent tensions among states from escalating over the acquisition of natural resources like fuels, materials and rare-earth minerals. There is also a need to ensure that competition for the acquisition of such resources will not threaten international peace and prosperity. China’s current corner on the market for rare-earth minerals poses a challenge to Japan, the United States, and the larger international community. Efforts should be made by both Japan and the United States to diversify sources of supply and develop alternative technologies. Another major component of managing minerals issues is forming good relationships and sharing information with private businesses. This seems to happen much more fluidly in Japan. A bilateral dialogue encompassing Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japanese corporations and their American public- and private-sector counterparts is in order.

With water scarcity looming across Asia, Japan and the United States should work together to unleash a “blue revolution.” To begin, they should sensitize the states in the region to cross-border water issues, which today remain a low priority for them.

**Nuclear Nonproliferation**

It is essential that nuclear energy be promoted without increasing the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. The two countries should therefore work together to solve ongoing proliferation problems, including those involving North Korea and Iran. Universal norms should be established for the international nuclear business and the transaction of sensitive nuclear technology and materials along with effective enforcement mechanisms and sanction measures. A “proliferation-resistant” market should be established for the nuclear industry by introducing criteria for transactions based on the “3S” concept of safety, security and safeguards.

China, Russia, India and other major players should be persuaded to cooperate with the
same norms and “codes of conduct” for solving proliferation problems and containing future proliferation risks. In doing so, Japan and the United States need to bear in mind that such a coalition should not undermine the effectiveness of countermeasures against proliferators, such as sanctions.

The goal of a “world without nuclear weapons” needs to be promoted by reducing nuclear threats of all kinds while establishing and maintaining a stable strategic relationship among the major powers. It cannot be achieved only through American initiative or unilateral action by the United States. The two allies must make efforts to keep nuclear threats from rising in Asia by preventing the buildup of nuclear and missile capabilities. As China becomes a key player in regional and global nonproliferation and disarmament efforts, it is critical that the allies involve China in establishing a globally cohesive approach toward the objectives of nuclear nonproliferation and a world without nuclear weapons. It is also important to consider cross-regional relations. In this respect, containing the nuclear arms race in South Asia is critical to East Asia, as China may be prompted to counter the rise of India’s nuclear capability.

Although the goal of a nuclear-free world is not achievable in the near future, leveraging this objective can help set the stage for achieving stability with a reduced nuclear threat rather than tempting other nuclear-weapon states to seek nuclear parity vis-à-vis the United States. To pursue this goal, it is essential to involve all the nuclear-weapon states and to give careful attention to the establishment of stable strategic relationships. In addition, the joint initiative by Japan and Australia to launch a high-level meeting in September 2010 of 10 non-nuclear weapon states should be given due attention. This initiative could help establish a global consensus on a balanced approach to maintaining a stable international security environment and reducing the role of nuclear weapons. Efforts by Japan and the United States must be complementary in order to achieve a safer world with fewer nuclear weapons.

**Development and Aid Policy**

Japan and the United States are huge providers of ODA for the world, though they have often not received credit for their efforts to counter poverty and create sustainable economic growth. Rejuvenated development programs in each country can contribute to the Millennium Development Goals while also addressing some of the most difficult challenges—such as those relating to fragile states, climate change, and infectious
diseases—emerging from the developing world. For instance, failed and failing states can become hotbeds of international terrorism and criminal networks and also sources of the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear-related materials and technologies. It is important during peacetime and post-conflict and post-crisis periods for the international community to engage in bringing social stability to and restoring economic growth in these states. Japan and the United States should share their perspectives on development and strategically coordinate their funding for development projects.

The Japanese and U.S. governments should launch a 2+2+2 working-level dialogue among foreign policy, defense and aid agency officials. Of ongoing importance will be capacity building in the domain of law enforcement, such as security sector reform and efforts to shore up maritime safety. The Japanese government should expand the scope of the ODA Charter to enable the implementation of development assistance that contributes to the above objectives and examines a broad range of support measures for law enforcement and public security. Such efforts will strengthen the liberal international order.
VI. Reinforcing the Alliance’s Foundation

In light of the changing political landscape, Japan needs to establish alliance management institutions that can withstand the turbulence of a change in government. Such mechanisms must be able to preserve a certain degree of continuity and be flexible enough to accommodate new ideas.

Different policy outlooks in a two-party system are precisely what make the system dynamic. The issue of the alliance will naturally be part of the debate. However, the debate should focus on real policy issues rather than delving into abstract arguments about whether Japan and the United States are “equal partners.” The alliance is too important for it to become a subject of partisan fighting solely for the purpose of political gains.

In order for Japan to have a lively debate on national security and alliance-related matters, a central support base for the alliance needs to be built and maintained. An institution is needed to foster a bipartisan consensus. Despite the existence of many good ideas regarding Japan’s national security, the will to implement these ideas is lacking.

Strengthening alliance management institutions should be part of a larger effort to reinforce the alliance’s foundation. This effort should include cultivating a more vibrant security policy community in Japan, enhancing intelligence capabilities, promoting Japanese public support for the alliance, and restoring fiscal health.

Establishing a National Security Office

In order for the prime minister of Japan to exert leadership, he or she will need support from a formal national security institution that he or she feels relatively comfortable with. The Security Council that exists now under the Cabinet is too rigid and formal and unable to function as a policy-generating institution. Launching a strong national security coordinating body would create the natural platform for this effort. The proposed national security office (NSO) could serve both as an agent for continuity and change where outside experts could join with experts in government to determine a policy approach. This would anchor the outside experts firmly to reality while at the same time exposing governmental experts to new sources of ideas. The establishment of
the NSO will hopefully foster a national-security-conscious leader—possibly the most important side effect.

**Broadening the Intellectual Basis for Security Policy**

As we recommend the establishment of an NSO, we do recognize that, as of now, Japan lacks a policy culture and infrastructure to enable outside experts to participate in such an institution as formal members.

Japan has only a limited number of experts who specialize in national security issues and policy. Their mobility is low, and too many of them see their career as being static. They are dispersed across universities, think tanks, the media, political parties and private enterprises. A sense of community among these people should be cultivated, as this would contribute to policy-generating discussions and help promote a bipartisan consensus on Japan’s national security policy as well as U.S.-Japan security policy. It will be difficult to expect this community to evolve into a pool of potential NSO staffers overnight. However, without the broadening of the intellectual basis for security policy, smooth transitions of government in Japan will be quite difficult.

**Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities**

The need for a robust Japanese intelligence capability has been pointed out for some time. Although the need for such a capability should be continuously emphasized, Japan should first streamline its intelligence collection and analysis processes so that the NSO could function as the main consumer of intelligence. Japan already collects vast amounts of unprocessed intelligence and tactical intelligence. However, this intelligence is not fully utilized in the context of broader national security decision-making. For the culture of intelligence to take root, a legal framework to protect sensitive information has to be developed as well.

While intelligence is no doubt at the heart of the alliance, cooperation in this field is not sufficient. As the nature of the threat both allies face becomes more fluid, upgrading the interoperability of ISR becomes ever more critical. Furthermore, beefed-up ISR cooperation could boost the level of trust between Japan and the United States and will no doubt enhance interoperability in other areas.
Promoting Domestic Support for the Alliance

Japan has avoided robust public discussion on the alliance and national security matters for some time, leaving the issue to bureaucrats and a handful of experts. In many other democracies as well, the core of national security discussions and day-to-day management of national security issues are handled by career government officials. However, the basic notion of where the country stands and the direction of where the country is going are shared by the people and those who are actually making policy. In the case of Japan, the chasm between the two groups is quite wide.

The dispute over where to relocate Futenma, a U.S. Marine base on Okinawa, became so explosive in the first year of DPJ rule in part because of a lack of domestic dialogue on security issues. Tokyo and Washington are entering an era in which engagement with the Japanese public, as well as greater public accountability, is becoming essential to alliance management.

As a starting point, both governments need to articulate unequivocally the enduring value of the alliance. While both governments retain the right to consider changes to the shape of U.S. forces in Japan, they should make abundantly clear that a long-term military presence is a core value of the alliance.

The United States must take additional measures to defuse local tensions stemming from the presence of American troops in Japan. It can encourage support for U.S. bases (or at least reduce resentment) by granting local Japanese governments the right to conduct environmental inspections of American military facilities, an idea broached by the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee in May 2010.

Whenever feasible, U.S. military bases should be co-located with Japanese bases to ease local concerns. Co-location has already occurred in Yokota with the groundbreaking establishment of a bilateral joint operations and coordination center. Co-locating bases not only carries political advantages; it will also contribute to greater interoperability between the U.S. military and the JSDF.

Japan and the United States can help redress the inordinately heavy burden borne by Okinawa in the postwar years by cooperating on the vitalization of the Okinawan economy and society. This should be premised on a recognition of the burden Okinawa
has shouldered, something the broader Japanese public should more fully discuss. To
develop the island’s economy, the two governments should scale up an experimental
“smart grid” in Okinawa into a Green Okinawa initiative. This would entail making
further investments to improve the island’s energy efficiency and promote the use of
renewable power sources like solar and wind, and eventually provide a sound
infrastructure for sustainable economic growth of the prefecture.

Restoring Fiscal Health and Deepening the Economic Partnership

Over the long term, the strength of the alliance will depend on the fiscal health of both
countries. Japan’s declining and aging population, coupled with a national debt
approaching 200 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), will likely reduce its
potential to cooperate with the United States on a range of regional and global
challenges and create pressure to reduce the amount of host nation support Japan
provides. Fiscal constraints could also limit America’s capacity and willingness to
contribute to the alliance. With a mushrooming national debt and demands for more and
more social spending, the United States may diminish its foreign commitments,
including the military capabilities it brings to the alliance.

Consequently, implementing policies to brighten the respective fiscal outlooks of both
Japan and the United States is essential to the future health of the alliance. The two
countries can cooperate in ways that will boost economic growth, the ultimate solution
to the looming budget squeeze.

Japan and the United States remain world leaders in clean energy and already have a
program of cooperation under the moniker of a “green alliance.” Existing initiatives
such as “smart grid” cooperation and energy conservation can be expanded and new
ones launched, such as cooperation on safer ways to process nuclear waste. In the health
care field, Japan and the United States can partner in areas such as pharmaceuticals,
medical devices and diagnostic instruments.

Another sector that could deliver economic growth to both countries is the building of
“green infrastructure.” Japan, for instance, can help bring the United States into the 21st
century by partnering with it to improve public transportation. Japan and the United
States should accelerate consideration of public infrastructure projects, which would
create jobs in both countries, enhance the overall competitiveness of the American
economy and renew the bonds of affection that undergird the alliance.

Trade remains a key avenue for achieving sustained economic growth. Japan and the United States should cooperate to expand export opportunities in emerging markets. There is also a need to reinforce trade rules and ensure a fair trading system in light of the “new mercantilism” that has emerged following the global financial crisis.

Both countries should take the lead in further establishing free-trade agreements (FTAs) and economic partnership agreements (EPAs) in the Asia-Pacific. More specifically, Japan should participate in and join the United States in promoting the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and thus make progress on the FTAAP (Free Trade Agreement of the Asia-Pacific), as was agreed upon by APEC. The proposed free-trade agreement between the United States and South Korea should be finalized, and a Japan–South Korea free-trade agreement should also be established. These arrangements would serve as the economic foundations of the liberal international order.

In this light, Japan and the United States should also coordinate their efforts so that China will abide by the principles of free and fair trade and adhere to the World Trade Organization’s principles and rules. They should also cooperate to counter Beijing’s attempt to extract technology from foreign firms as the price for operating in the Chinese market and step up pressure for a revaluation of the renminbi by rallying other members of the G-20.
VII. Conclusion

Enhancing the Alliance’s Network Effect to Strengthen the Liberal International Order

Over the past 50 years, the Japan-U.S. alliance has transformed World War II foes—one victorious and the other defeated—into genuine friends, enabled both to emerge triumphant from the Cold War, and ushered in a number of “economic miracles” in the Asia-Pacific region by serving as a stabilizing force.

But the alliance was not always free from internal discord; it experienced rough patches on a number of occasions. Looking across the past five decades, these include the protest movement of 1960, the “Nixon shock” of 1971, a series of bilateral trade disputes from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, the Gulf War of 1990–1991, the rape of a 12-year-old schoolgirl by a U.S. serviceman, the North Korean missile crisis in the mid-1990s, and most recently, tensions over the relocation of the Marine Air Station at Futenma following the rise of the Democratic Party of Japan to power in 2009.

The alliance persevered despite these difficult periods, and overall, the trend has been a deepening of cooperation and trust between U.S. forces and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces. The postwar Japan-U.S. alliance should be regarded as one of the most notable “success stories” in the history of alliances. However, it is likely to come under even more severe tests in the 21st century.

Destabilizing factors have emerged in Asia in the shadow of the region’s economic growth. The expansion of the region’s economy has been accompanied by a military buildup that is beginning to threaten the stability and safety of the maritime commons. A future vision for the regional order, notably in the Korean Peninsula, remains hazy. The Japan-U.S. alliance will need to lend even greater stability and deterrence to the Asia-Pacific region than ever before.

The international security climate is undergoing rapid change, as China moves toward superpower status, emerging economies gain greater clout, and international relations increasingly multipolar. The world must also adapt to ongoing globalization, climate change and natural resource competition, the prevalence of failed states and terrorism, and the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Threats to the
international community are diversifying and becoming more diffuse, and both military and nonmilitary responses are needed to meet such challenges. The bilateral alliance, too, must quickly adapt to meet the needs of a changing world.

The most important role of the alliance in the 21st century will be to maintain the liberal international order and open new horizons. In this context, China must more fully share the responsibility for maintaining and building this order as a partner rather than simply enjoying its fruits. Prompting China to take such action will require that the alliance remain strong and that further cooperation be promoted with other Asian countries.

For example, the Japan-U.S. alliance will need to be expanded to incorporate policy dialogues with South Korea, Australia, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and China. Such dialogues can be likened to enhancing the network effect of the alliance for the purpose of maintaining the liberal international order. Such an enhanced alliance will be better able to deal with and overcome the diversifying challenges in the global community.

We have termed these areas the “new frontiers” which Japan and the United States can explore. By bringing together each country’s respective strengths, Japan and the United States will be better able to maximize their contributions to and roles within the alliance. For instance, Japan can contribute its expertise as a global civilian power in such areas as development assistance and peace-building, achievement of a low-carbon society and water resource management, disaster and humanitarian relief, and nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.

Leveraging comparative strengths does not entail an absolute division of labor; we recognize that the bilateral alliance is, in essence, a military alliance. We are not recommending that the allies passively respond to a changing external environment but that they actively seek a peaceful and prosperous world by engaging more closely and working together with other countries.

Polls show that the public in both Japan and the United States broadly supports the alliance. A 2009 Japanese Cabinet Office survey revealed that nearly 80% of respondents believed that the security treaty with the United States contributes to Japan’s peace and safety. And a 2010 survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs showed that Americans viewed Japan in the third most favorable light
among 22 key countries, behind only Britain and Germany. Such support is indispensable for the continuation of the alliance. But understanding and support must also be sought for missions and roles that will keep the alliance viable in the 21st century—namely, the renewed “old promises” and the “new frontiers.” Not enough has been done to solicit popular support for cooperation in these areas.

What is important now is to exercise greater political will and leadership over national security and alliance policies, both in Japan and the United States. The durability of the bilateral alliance in the 21st century will hinge on the will of political leaders to deepen the relationship and to achieve bipartisan support for it through vigorous political leadership. A supporting mechanism to provide the necessary information for appropriate decision-making and to accumulate specialized expertise is necessary on the Japanese side.

This joint statement does not make any direct recommendations regarding the Futenma relocation issue. This is not because we consider Futenma merely to be a “local issue” that has no place in discussions of the strategic dimensions of the alliance. Indeed, we believe that Futenma is strategically linked to questions about the very nature of the alliance and how it should evolve. We are concerned about the inordinate burden Okinawa is being asked to bear in maintaining the alliance due to the island’s geopolitical and strategic importance. Alleviating this heavy burden is both a bilateral issue and one to be addressed by Japan on its own.

The study group wanted to avoid, however, falling into the trap of suggesting a replacement site for Futenma, whether it be elsewhere in Japan or somewhere abroad. Proposing specific recommendations on Futenma would have been unhelpful to both governments and would have focused attention away from the rest of the joint statement.

Former Secretary of Defense William Perry once remarked to an aide that the Japan-U.S. alliance has “a structure like a reverse pyramid,” as symbolized by the concentration of U.S. bases in Okinawa. Such pyramids have substance but are very precarious, resting on their tiniest, thinnest, and most precarious point. As Perry said, “There has to be a whole team of people on both sides of the Pacific . . . holding and steadying the pyramid.” The key to simultaneously maintaining deterrence and reducing the impact of U.S. bases on local residents will be alliance management that enables the
reinforcement of alliance functions with the broad understanding of the public and that is accompanied by persistent efforts, both bilaterally and domestically, to reduce Okinawa’s burden.

This joint statement is not a fanciful “wish list” of actions that we hope the two governments will implement. Rather, it contains realistic policy recommendations generated by the U.S.-Japan study group conducted by the Tokyo Foundation and the Center for a New American Security. If, as the statement urges, the leaders of the two countries renew the alliance’s “old promises,” broaden the alliance’s scope to encompass “new frontiers,” and strengthen the alliance’s foundation, the alliance between Japan and the United States will continue to constitute a major pillar of the liberal international order and will no doubt serve as a guiding light for the international community of the 21st century.
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