About this report

This report is part of an ongoing project undertaken by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). The project examines how the United States and its European allies can partner more closely with Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey to strengthen the international order.

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The authors are solely responsible for the views expressed herein.
Global Swing States
Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey and the Future of International Order

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GLOBAL SWING STATES: BRAZIL, INDIA, INDONESIA, TURKEY AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Daniel M. Kliman and Richard Fontaine
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

An interlocking web of global institutions, rules and relationships has fostered peace, prosperity and freedom for the past six decades. However, without proper stewardship, this international order is at risk. To defend and strengthen the international order that has served so many for so long, American leaders should pursue closer partnerships with four key nations – Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey. Together, these “global swing states” hold the potential to renew the international order on which they, the United States, and most other countries depend.1

The current international order confronts numerous challenges. Some of those challenges largely relate to the rise of China, such as outsized maritime claims and the bypassing of international financial institutions. Other challenges involve stagnating multilateral trade talks, a weakened global financial architecture, the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran and a retrenchment of democracy in some parts of the world. At the same time, a combination of fiscal and political pressures constrains the role of traditional supporters of the global order such as the United States and Europe. The United States should therefore seize the opportunity to enlarge the international order’s base of supporters to include Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey. These four nations each possess a large and growing economy, a strategic location in their region and a commitment to democratic institutions. And critically, each nation’s precise international role is now in flux.

In the American political context, swing states are those whose mixed political orientation gives them a greater impact than their population or economic output might warrant. Such states promise the greatest return on investment for U.S. presidential campaigns deciding where to allocate scarce time and resources. Likewise, in U.S. foreign policy, a focus on Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey can deliver a large geopolitical payoff, because their approach to the international order is more fluid.
and open than those of China or Russia. In addition, the choices that these four countries make – about whether to take on new global responsibilities, free ride on the efforts of established powers or complicate the solving of key challenges – may, together, decisively influence the trajectory of the current international order.

The concept of global swing states offers a new framework for thinking about these four powers. It describes their position in the international system; however, it does not suggest an emerging bloc. On the contrary, Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey are unlikely to act in concert. In most cases, U.S. efforts will focus on each nation separately rather than on the four of them collectively. Nevertheless, considering these countries through a common framework can clarify Washington’s foreign policy priorities and lead to new and more strategic approaches that go beyond simply managing four bilateral relationships.

America’s engagement with the global swing states should include four components:

• Capitalizing on areas where Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey have already taken on new global responsibilities;
• Addressing some of their demands for greater representation in international institutions;
• Helping the four countries strengthen their domestic capacity to more actively support the international order;
• Increasing the resources and attention that the U.S. government devotes to these nations to better match their rising strategic importance.

The stakes are high. If the United States, its allies and these rising democracies strengthen the international order, they are all more likely to thrive. If the global order fragments, they – and the broader world – will suffer the consequences.
II. INTRODUCTION

The rise of four powerful democracies – Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey – could bolster today’s international order. Yet this outcome is far from assured. The degree to which the four “global swing states,” as we call them, will defend and reform the global order remains uncertain. If they do, their rise presents an enormous opportunity for the United States and its allies. If they do not, they, the United States and countries across the globe will suffer the consequences. This report focuses primarily on how the United States can work with these four powers to renew the international order.

All four global swing states may come to actively support the main elements of the current international order. As their economies expand, they will have a greater stake in international arrangements that facilitate the growth of trade and investment. As democracies, they may be attracted to the open, stable, rules-based nature of the existing system, which has allowed representative government to take root in many regions. As their military strength increases and the geographic scope of their interests expands, they may also reap greater benefits from a system that helps to prevent war among the major powers.

All four nations remain skeptical, however, of elements of the existing international order. On top of this, domestic challenges in each country will compete for the resources and attention that a larger global role demands. America’s engagement with these four countries is critical and can influence their choices and enlarge their capacity to take on new responsibilities – but it remains a work in progress.

The United States has strived in recent years to build closer relations with each of these countries. Washington has invested heavily in a long-term strategic partnership with New Delhi; this investment has reaped near-term dividends on issues like nonproliferation but has led to little progress on efforts such as multilateral trade liberalization. The U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership officially launched in November 2010 remains more of an aspiration than a reality. Washington’s engagement with Brasilia has broadened to include joint naval exercises and limited collaboration in Africa, but cooperation between the two countries remains but a shadow of its full potential. Ankara’s unwillingness to back additional economic sanctions against Iran and its growing tensions with Israel temporarily strained U.S. relations with Turkey, but the Arab Spring has created new opportunities for cooperation even as the relationship remains riddled with potential flashpoints.

This report begins by reviewing new challenges to the international order and then lays out why Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey are particularly promising partners in its defense. It then examines the positions of each of the four nations regarding five central pillars of the global order: trade, finance, the maritime commons, nonproliferation and human rights. The report ultimately presents a series of detailed policy recommendations for how to partner with the global swing states to pursue an international order that will continue to promote prosperity, enhance peace, and advance human rights and democracy.
III. THE GLOBAL ORDER

Following World War II, the United States and its allies fashioned a new system, based on international rules and rooted in new institutions, that aimed to regulate the conduct of states. The United Nations was the order’s crown jewel – a “parliament of man” that aspired to prevent future wars among its members. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were established to promote economic development and financial stability, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the predecessor to the World Trade Organization (WTO), was founded to promote trade liberalization.

Although routinely referred to as a global order, this system never encompassed the entirety of the world. The Soviet bloc stood outside many of the new institutions or participated in them only indifferently; other bodies, such as NATO, were founded to maintain order precisely by opposing Soviet designs. The order also evolved over time in response to technological changes, a growing demand for natural resources and the trade imbalances that emerged as Western Europe and Japan recovered from wartime devastation.

Today, there are numerous elements of the international order, but five pillars are key:

1. The trade order advances the principles of commercial reciprocity and nondiscrimination. It is highly formalized, based on the GATT, and now embodied in the WTO and its web of rules and dispute resolution mechanisms. The Doha Round of global trade talks represents the current effort to extend this order in the direction of freer international commerce.

2. The financial order aims at monetary stability. It is rooted in flexible exchange rates, general currency convertibility and the U.S. dollar as the predominant international reserve currency. The IMF fills a role as a lender of last resort. The World Bank channels capital and strategic and technical advice to middle-income and poor nations to help spur economic development. Since 2008, the Group of 20 (G20) has emerged as a key institution that endeavors to guide the global financial order.

3. The maritime order is premised on territorial sovereignty and freedom of navigation. Many of the rules underpinning the maritime order have been formalized in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Although some countries (including the United States) have not ratified the convention, Washington and most major capitals recognize its key provisions as customary international law. U.S. naval power continues to backstop international law governing the use of the maritime domain.

4. The nonproliferation order seeks to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to reduce their testing. It is rooted in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which draws a strict distinction between recognized nuclear weapons states and all others. It also includes the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and multilateral export control regimes that attempt to limit the spread of particular weapons and delivery systems. Less-institutionalized elements of the nonproliferation order range from efforts such as the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to ad hoc multilateral coordination designed to stem proliferation financing and gather intelligence.

5. The human rights order is rooted in respect for fundamental liberties and the democratic process. It encompasses a range of widely recognized international norms relating to the basic rights and liberties of all individuals. These rights are enumerated in documents such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, along with the constitutions and laws of many democratic nations. A new and contested element of this order is emerging in the
“Responsibility to Protect,” a doctrine that elevates the protection of individuals against atrocities above the traditional sovereign norm against outside interference.5

The late 1990s may have marked the order’s apogee. Multiple challenges – some emanating from China’s rise and others from a diverse set of international developments – have emerged.

During the first five decades of its existence, the global order permitted the expansion of peace, prosperity and freedom. While by no means banishing war, the order facilitated the longest period of peace among great powers in modern times. The financial architecture that it established reduced both the frequency and the severity of global banking crises.6 Because of the economic stability and openness engendered by the global order, the world experienced a dramatic increase in trade and investment and a rise in per capita incomes unknown to an earlier age.7 The spread of nuclear weapons slowed, and some countries relinquished their nuclear capability or abandoned their weapon-state ambitions.8 Moreover, democracy took root in new areas of the world, including regions where dictatorship had long prevailed, enabling more than half of humanity to live under democratically elected governments.9

Looming Challenges
Since 2000, however, new challenges have put pressure on each pillar of the global order. During the 1990s, the consolidation of free-market democracies across Europe and elsewhere – together with the economic integration of developing countries that had long stood outside the global economy – led some analysts to predict the enduring triumph of the international order.10 The creation of the WTO and the indefinite extension of the NPT offered similar cause for optimism.11 In reality, the late 1990s may have marked the order’s apogee. Multiple challenges – some emanating from China’s rise and others from a diverse set of international developments – have emerged.

Elements of China’s ascendancy have put pressure on the existing international system. In trade, China’s globally competitive state-owned enterprises and push for indigenous innovation have revealed gaps in the WTO’s regulatory structure, which divides trade into actions by governments and actions by private companies. Unable to employ multilateral mechanisms, nations have responded to China’s behavior through ad hoc protectionist measures. In finance, China has bypassed the World Bank by lending bilaterally to developing countries and has started to transform the renminbi into a global currency, a move that may partly shift the international monetary system away from the U.S. dollar.12 Meanwhile, Beijing’s claims to virtually the entire South China Sea and attempts to limit freedom of navigation pose a challenge to the maritime order.

However, China is not solely responsible for the mounting pressures on the international order. Because of objections from countries such as Brazil and India, movement on the Doha Round of talks has ceased, and there exists little discussion about advancing free trade at the global level. What has emerged is a patchwork of regional and bilateral deals, some of which fall short of actual free-trade agreements. The market turmoil of recent years has raised questions about the legitimacy of the financial order. In East Asia, powers that often compete have come together
The Global Order: Metrics of its Success

**FIGURE 1: WORLD GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT**

Source: World Bank World Development Indicators

**FIGURE 2: WORLD TRADE**

Source: World Trade Organization Statistics Database
### Figure 3: International Maritime Trade

![Graph showing international maritime trade from 1970 to 2010.](image)

*Source: U.N. Conference on Trade and Development*

### Figure 4: Battle-Related Deaths

![Pie chart showing battle-related deaths from 1900 to 2003.](image)

- **1900-1945**: 88%
- **1946-2003**: 12%

*Note: 2003 is the last available year.*

*Source: Correlates of War Inter-State War Data*

### Figure 5: Democracies in the World

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>ALL COUNTRIES</th>
<th>NUMBER OF DEMOCRACIES</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF DEMOCRACIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: Figures for 1989-2011 are from Freedom in the World 2012; the figure for 1974 is from Table 2.1 in Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy*

### Figure 6: Number of Nuclear Weapon States

![Graph showing the number of nuclear weapon states from 1945 to 2010.](image)

to expand the Chiang Mai Initiative, a shared currency pool that is becoming a regional alternative to the IMF.\(^\text{13}\) The maritime order is being challenged by Turkey’s outsized claims in the eastern Mediterranean, Russia’s extensive claims in the Arctic Ocean,\(^\text{14}\) and piracy, a threat that has waxed and waned in Southeast Asia, the Horn of Africa and now the Gulf of Guinea. Although sustained international vigilance has at times curbed piracy in specific regions, the total number of incidents after 2000 has remained high compared to the preceding period.\(^\text{15}\)

Nuclear pursuits by North Korea and Iran pose a profound challenge to the nonproliferation order. North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT, developed a nuclear weapons capability and tested missile delivery systems. International sanctions and covert measures notwithstanding, Iran’s nuclear program also continues to progress.\(^\text{16}\)

The human rights order, too, confronts new pressures. The wave of democratization that began in the 1970s has crested; the number of electoral democracies in the world dropped in 2010 to 115, the lowest level since 1995, and has rebounded only slightly.\(^\text{17}\) Countries in Latin America, Africa and the former Soviet Union have seen declines in democracy.\(^\text{18}\) Mixed regimes have emerged that feature the trappings of electoral rule but fail to grant citizens basic rights such as freedom of speech, blurring the distinction between democracy and other forms of government.

The debt crisis that has forced a new era of austerity on America and many of its European allies poses an additional challenge to the order. Current – if not necessarily long-term – fiscal pressures will likely reduce American military and foreign affairs spending in the coming years. Europe confronts an even bleaker fiscal landscape, and many European countries have already started to slash defense outlays and cut foreign aid.\(^\text{19}\) Because Western military and financial capabilities have long underwritten the global order, the advent of fiscal austerity puts further strain on the international system.

On balance, today’s global order is subject to growing pressures. Yet there is no single emerging alternative. Unlike the communist bloc after World War II, there are no countries today with both the power and ambition to construct a rival system. Although sometimes touted as the foundation of a new international order,\(^\text{20}\) the BRICS grouping – which brings together Brazil, Russia, China, India and South Africa – lacks the necessary unity of interests and ideological cohesion to fulfill this role. And whether the BRICS can expand to encompass other rising powers is in doubt. Indonesia and Turkey, for instance, prefer to engage the group’s members bilaterally.\(^\text{21}\)

In the future, the principles advanced by the international order may become less universally binding; different parts of the world may interpret and apply them based on local consensus or the desires of the regionally dominant power. For instance, freedom of navigation could retain its current meaning in the North Atlantic but apply only to commercial vessels in China’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In this future, institutions and arrangements that have successfully regulated key areas of state behavior may become less effective as they are replicated. The consolidation of the Chiang Mai Initiative into a potential regional alternative to the IMF is a harbinger of this. Such fragmentation would be deeply inimical to all countries that depend upon an open and stable world for their security and prosperity.
IV. PROMISING PARTNERS

The United States must seize the opportunity to preserve the international order by enlarging its circle of supporters. In this endeavor, Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey represent particularly promising partners. All possess large and rapidly growing economies. All occupy central positions in a region or stand at the hinge of multiple regions. All embrace democratic government at home, which endows them with the potential to fully support an order defined by liberal values and norms.22 Lastly, all are increasingly influential at the regional and global level, and although they desire changes to the international order, they do not seek to scrap it.

Brazil
Brazil’s future appears increasingly bright. Its gross domestic product (GDP) expanded by 3.5 percent per year from 2000 to 2011 and now totals more than $2 trillion (this and subsequent GDP figures are in terms of purchasing-power parity). In 2012, Brazil passed the United Kingdom to become the world’s sixth-largest economy.23 Geographically, Brazil dominates South America; it shares a border with every country on the continent except Chile and Ecuador. In addition, with a coastline that extends far into the South Atlantic, Brazil economically and culturally bridges South America and West Africa. Since the transition from military to civilian rule in 1985, democracy in Brazil has taken ever-deeper root.

Brazil has emerged as a regional leader and influential global power. Regionally, Brazil has expanded the Mercosur customs union beyond the original founding members, supported the creation of the Union of South American Nations, led the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Haiti and enhanced integration with its neighbors by funding infrastructure projects.24 Globally, Brazil has taken on a higher profile by holding a nonpermanent seat on the U.N. Security Council (UNSC), pressing for UNSC permanent membership, exhibiting leadership within the G20, increasing its activities in the WTO, engaging in nuclear talks with Iran and encouraging annual meetings for groups of emerging powers, such as the BRICS and the IBSA Forum (which comprises India, Brazil and South Africa).

Brazilian leaders express eagerness for the increased global recognition that they believe is Brazil’s due. For several years, Brazil’s foreign policy leaders have called for the United States to publicly support Brazil’s aspirations to permanent membership on the UNSC.25 As justification, Brazilians cite the need to rebalance the UNSC to include emerging-market interests, as well as their country’s recent success at reducing inequality while boosting economic growth, democracy, racial diversity and capacity to mediate international disputes. Brazilian leaders seek greater weight within the IMF and the World Bank as well.

In a 2011 IBSA communiqué, Brazil joined India and South Africa in calling for a “new world order,” one “whose political, economic and financial architecture is more inclusive, representative and legitimate.”26 This rhetoric stems more from Brazil’s desire to gain a more prominent role within the existing system – for itself and for other emerging countries – than from an interest in pursuing new rules and arrangements. As one Brazilian observer put it, “Brazil wants to expand its room in the house, not tear the house down.”27

India
India’s power has begun to catch up with its sheer size. Its GDP is roughly $4 trillion and grew at 7.4 percent annually between 2000 and 2011. By some measures, India is now the world’s third-largest economy.28 Sitting at the edge of the Middle East and East Asia, India occupies the majority of the South Asian landmass and has a land or maritime boundary with every state in the region, plus China, Burma, Indonesia and Thailand.
Democracy in India has endured with only a single brief interruption since independence.

Since its economic reforms of the early 1990s, India’s rising national wealth – together with the new military capabilities and diplomatic initiatives that greater wealth affords – have fueled India’s global influence. In the immediate region, New Delhi’s activism has included significant reconstruction aid for Afghanistan and the promotion of cooperation among Indian Ocean states. On the global stage, India is a member of the BRICS and boasts the largest emerging economy in the G20 after China. India also recently held a nonpermanent seat on the UNSC and has played a critical role in multilateral trade talks under the auspices of the WTO.

An overarching element of India’s foreign policy is its quest for greater international recognition and status, including permanent membership in an enlarged UNSC. From New Delhi’s perspective, the argument for an Indian seat is plain: The world’s foremost decisionmaking body must include a country that is both the most populous democracy and an incontrovertible example that electoral politics and economic growth can productively coexist on the road to development. The United States has reinforced India’s ambitions by issuing an unqualified endorsement of its pursuit of a Security Council seat – an unprecedented step that the United States has yet to take for any other emerging power. New Delhi also desires enhanced weight within other major international institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, in which India’s influence has not grown in parallel with its relative economic size.

Indian leaders have on occasion called for a new global order. In practice, however, they prefer to boost India’s representation in the institutions that exist. The real tension in New Delhi’s foreign policy is whether to pursue an international approach aimed at giving India the space to focus on internal development or to simultaneously pursue economic growth at home while taking on greater – and more costly – responsibilities abroad. It is currently unclear which argument will win out and just how active India will become in upholding the current system over the medium term.

Indonesia

Indonesia’s success is remarkable given that, little over a decade ago, it was caught up in economic and political disarray. Its political transition following the collapse of the Suharto dictatorship in 1998 resulted in sustained democratic rule. Indonesia’s economy, valued at about $1 trillion, increased by 5.3 percent each year from 2000 to 2011. Its status as the world’s most populous Muslim-majority democracy is a major soft-power asset. An archipelagic nation of more than 17,000 islands, Indonesia straddles two oceans and has maritime boundaries with most Southeast Asian nations, as well as Australia and India.

Indonesia’s economic rise has coincided with an enlargement of the country’s regional and global role. Long the demographic heavyweight in Southeast Asia, Indonesia has definitively emerged since 2000 as the political center of gravity as well. It successfully chaired the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2011 and continues to exercise a prominent voice within this regional grouping, which has become the cornerstone of many multilateral institutions in Asia. Beyond the region, Indonesia is a member of – although not always a dynamic participant in – several notable forums, including the G20, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and the 57-member Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

Compared with their Brazilian or Indian counterparts, Indonesian leaders are more circumspect in articulating their desire for enhanced global recognition. Pointing to its newly consolidated democracy and status as the world’s most populous Muslim-majority nation, Indonesia laid claim in
Since then, Jakarta has repeatedly called for reform of the Security Council to make the body more representative, but it has tended to eschew direct self-promotion, instead advocating a standing seat for a Muslim-majority nation or for more geographic diversity in the body’s membership.

Of the four global swing states, Indonesia remains the most focused on its own internal challenges and has the least capacity to engage on global issues. Whether Indonesia will decide to concentrate on internal development and retain a foreign policy that remains overwhelmingly regional in focus or go global and work with the United States, Europe and others to adapt and renew today’s international order remains uncertain.

**Turkey**

Over the past decade, Turkey has emerged as one of the world’s most dynamic powers. Turkey’s GDP expanded at an average rate of 4.3 percent from 2000 to 2011 and today stands at approximately $1 trillion. Lying at the juncture of Europe and Asia, Turkey borders many of the Middle East’s most volatile countries, as well as the Balkans and...
the Caucasus. It also shares maritime boundaries with Russia and Ukraine. Military coups no longer punctuate periods of civilian rule in Turkey; the coexistence of electoral democracy and a Muslim-majority population is a distinguishing characteristic of Turkish politics.

Buoyed by rapid economic growth, Turkey has moved decisively toward an ambitious regional and even global role in recent years. It belongs to a diverse set of international institutions, including NATO, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Council of Europe and the OIC; it is also an applicant for membership in the European Union (EU). Turkey actively participates in the G20 and recently occupied a nonpermanent seat on the UNSC.

Turkey aspires to a greater status in world affairs. This is particularly true within the Middle East, where Ankara has successfully advanced regional economic integration and, in the wake of the Arab Spring, has put itself forward as a democratic model. In Syria, Turkey has led the way in taking military action against the Bashar al-Asad regime. Turkey seeks an elevated profile within the U.N., and Turkish leaders have already begun to campaign for a new term on the Security Council, arguing that “Turkey will provide significant added value to global peace and security in an era of critical and rapid change in international affairs.” The government in Ankara sees the eventual enlargement of the Security Council as desirable and would likely put forward Turkey as a candidate for a permanent seat. In the IMF and the World Bank, Turkey also seeks greater influence, commensurate with its newfound economic clout.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has called for a “new global order” based on solidarity and trust rather than conflict. In practice, however, Turkey has yet to settle on any definitive vision for that new order beyond expanded representation in key forums.
V. MAPPING THE GLOBAL SWING STATES

This section examines the positions of each of the four global swing states toward key pillars of the international order: trade, finance, the maritime commons, nonproliferation and human rights.

Brazil

Brazil seeks to modify the trade, finance, maritime and human rights orders by working through existing institutions and arrangements. At the same time, it has started to take on new global responsibilities in development financing and maritime security.

TRADE ORDER

Brazil has at times worked to slow global trade liberalization, enacted protectionist policies within the scope allowed by the WTO and pressed for consideration of exchange rates as a trade issue.

In the Doha Round of multilateral talks, Brazil organized a coalition of emerging economies that helped bring the Cancun Ministerial to a halt in 2003. It subsequently refused to separate emerging market economies from underperforming developing countries, thereby contributing to the deadlock of these negotiations. Since the launch of the Doha Round, China's rise has further complicated the equation, given fears in Brazil that a global lowering of trade barriers would result in an influx of Chinese imports. Brazil has taken protectionist steps – such as its “Buy Brazil” government procurement policy, its “Bigger Brazil” industrial policy and the recent “temporary” increase to 25 percent of import tariffs on 100 goods – but it has done so within the scope of its WTO obligations.

Brazilian leaders object to the U.S. dollar’s status as the world’s predominant reserve currency.
Although concerned about China’s exchange rate manipulation, they regard the U.S. Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing as a more significant economic threat. Brazil’s current finance minister, Guido Mantega, has called for a “new monetary system” with special drawing rights from the IMF functioning as an additional reserve currency. Furthermore, Brasilia has moved to denominate its trade with Argentina and China in local currency rather than U.S. dollars. The currency swap agreement with China gives a boost to Beijing’s aspirations to transform the renminbi into a global reserve currency.

**MARITIME ORDER**

Brazil has tried to bend maritime rules to its advantage but has also started to make contributions to maritime security.

A signatory to UNCLOS, Brazil maintains that a provision of the treaty grants coastal states the right to regulate foreign militaries operating in their EEZs. Brazil, however, has not harassed foreign navies transiting its EEZ. Instead, Brazil has worked through UNCLOS to pursue its maritime ambitions. For instance, Brazil in 2008 proposed to expand the security zone around offshore installations allowed by maritime law. This unsuccessful gambit would have enabled Brazil to legally impede shipping by constructing chains of maritime platforms.

Brazil has taken modest steps toward supporting maritime security. It has helped to equip and train the Namibian navy and recently conducted counter-piracy training with the Nigerian navy. In the Western Hemisphere, Brazil joins the nearly 20 nations that participate in PANAMAX, a multinational exercise to promote interoperability among regional navies as they confront potential threats to the Panama Canal and its approaches.

**NONPROLIFERATION ORDER**

Brazil has reluctantly accepted most of the nonproliferation order’s legal elements while opposing new nonproliferation measures on the grounds of preserving sovereignty and attempting to broker a nuclear deal with Iran.

Brazil signed the NPT in 1998 and also ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Yet Brasilia continues to chafe at what it perceives as the unbalanced nature of the NPT and the failure of the nuclear weapon states to fulfill their commitment to disarm. Citing a lack of legitimacy in the NPT and the robustness of its bilateral inspection regime with Argentina, Brazil has refused to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol. Some Brazilian leaders have explained their country’s refusal as stemming from a desire to avoid strengthening the NPT in the hope that the treaty might someday be replaced with an international convention that bans the possession of nuclear weapons by all states.

The preservation of sovereignty has at times inclined Brasilia to oppose measures aimed at strengthening the nonproliferation order. Brazil regards access to uranium enrichment technology as not only a path to enhanced international recognition but also a necessity for continued industrial development. It therefore remains wary of international efforts to limit access to the nuclear fuel cycle, including for Iran. In addition, Brazil has remained outside the PSI because of the possibility...
that interdicting weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems could undermine sovereignty norms.63

Brazil’s most high-profile engagement with the nonproliferation order was a 2010 attempt to broker a nuclear agreement with Iran. Because Brazil and Turkey failed to fully coordinate their initiative with the permanent members of the UNSC, the deal they had negotiated was rejected. Stung by this response, Brazil and Turkey voted against further U.N. sanctions on Iran.64 Brasilia’s entry into nuclear negotiations with Iran was not a harbinger of its approach to future nuclear issues. To the contrary, many Brazilians today view this episode as a major foreign policy blunder.65

**HUMAN RIGHTS ORDER**

Brazil’s approach to this pillar of the global order has shifted in recent years from an almost exclusive focus on economic, social and cultural rights to greater – yet still limited – support for political and civil rights abroad.

Under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s presidency, Brazil opposed robust UNSC measures against human rights violators and offered political support to unsavory regimes. Lula’s successor, Rousseff, has pioneered a different approach on human rights issues, in great measure due to her personal experiences as a prisoner under the military regime. In 2011, for instance, Brazil voted at the U.N. Human Rights Council for the first time to support a special rapporteur for Iran.66 Brazilian officials spoke out against a 2012 military takeover in Guinea Bissau.67 Brazil has also cofounded the Open Government Partnership, an initiative that strengthens democracy by promoting transparent and accountable government among the group’s membership.

The use of military force to halt atrocities remains a red line for Brasilia, which prefers multilateral mediation and diplomatic consultation. This position has colored Brazil’s response to the Arab Spring. Brasilia preferred a negotiated settlement in Libya, did not support the UNSC resolution authorizing intervention and viewed the NATO-led military campaign as a gross distortion of the U.N. mandate.68 Regarding Syria, Brazil at first opposed sanctions against the Asad regime and initially refused in the UNSC to condemn the crackdown.69 Brasilia continues to seek a mediating role with Syria, with President Rousseff clearly stating in her opening U.N. General Assembly remarks in September 2012 that diplomacy, not force, is the only option for addressing Syria’s challenges.70 The one region where Brazil has inched toward military action in support of human rights is West Africa, where it backed the use of “all necessary means” by U.N. forces stationed in Côte d’Ivoire to defend civilians from post-election violence.71

Since the NATO-led campaign in Libya, Brasilia has made a concerted attempt to reshape the emerging norms governing humanitarian intervention by proposing its own concept, the “Responsibility While Protecting.”72 The Brazilian argument is that “the international community ought to codify standards and procedures to govern humanitarian intervention in the future” lest they become a pretext for geopolitical meddling.73

**India**

With the exception of trade, Indian policy has increasingly supported the main pillars of global order.

**TRADE ORDER**

India has at times worked to slow trade liberalization at the global level. A member of the WTO, India was initially critical of the Doha Round and – to an even greater extent than Brazil – objected to treating emerging-market economies differently from underperforming developing countries.74 By many accounts, India bears the largest responsibility for thwarting a potential breakthrough proposal that was put forward by
the WTO Director General to a select group of nations in 2008. Today, there is little domestic support within India for a successful conclusion of the Doha Round, in part because of fear that this would lead to an influx of Chinese imports. Furthermore, the business community has largely concluded that the benefits of Doha are unclear and that India should instead prioritize bilateral trade agreements. India has embraced another function of the WTO: dispute settlement. India has brought 20 cases against other WTO members and received complaints in 21 cases. In cases where it lost, India has complied – for example, by lifting import restrictions or removing local content laws.

**FINANCIAL ORDER**

India has invested in the IMF, become a foreign aid donor and accepted the U.S. dollar’s role at the center of the global financial system.

New Delhi has taken on greater responsibility for maintaining the worldwide financial architecture. It recently contributed $10 billion to buttress the IMF’s lending facility despite domestic blowback against a decision that was seen in some quarters as a poor nation helping to bail out wealthy spendthrifts. Long a recipient of foreign aid, India has in recent years become a donor, setting up a new Development Partnership Administration within its foreign ministry. In 2011, India distributed $1.5 billion in traditional development assistance; its concessional loans pledged that year were much larger still – $5 billion for Africa alone.

As a member of the BRICS, India has criticized the U.S. dollar’s reserve currency role as a source of financial instability. It has done so, however, half-heartedly; New Delhi appears content to see the U.S. dollar’s preeminence endure. With the rupee a long way from becoming a global currency, any meaningful effort to displace the U.S. dollar would only help India’s geopolitical rival, China, achieve its currency ambitions.

**MARITIME ORDER**

New Delhi has emerged as a maritime power that champions freedom of navigation, combats piracy and seeks to boost cooperation in the Indian Ocean region.

A signatory to UNCLOS, India advances an interpretation of the convention that would require foreign navies to obtain coastal state consent before operating in EEZs. Indian domestic law also stipulates that foreign warships must offer notification prior to transiting Indian territorial waters. However, these positions appear to be holdovers from an earlier era before India emerged as a rising naval power. India has refrained from deploying ships to harass foreign navies in its EEZ and, at most, has lodged infrequent diplomatic protests. Indeed, New Delhi has started to champion freedom of navigation. At the 2012 ASEAN Regional Forum Summit in Phnom Penh, it joined other Asian capitals in pressing Beijing to abide by international law in the South China Sea.

India is increasingly committed to deploying its new naval assets to defend the maritime commons. It has dispatched ships to engage in counter-piracy operations off East Africa, and it participates in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. Critically, India is shaping the naval environment by helping nations in the region to strengthen their maritime capabilities. It is working with the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Mauritius to set up a coastal radar network; conducts joint patrols with Mozambique; and trains and equips the security forces of the Seychelles. India also convenes the Milan Exercise, which brings together 14 navies from the Asia-Pacific region for counter-piracy, counterterrorism and search-and-rescue training.

New Delhi also established the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium to underpin maritime security in the region. Launched in 2008, the symposium now encompasses 35 member countries and convenes
a flagship biannual conference and smaller workshops. Although still modest in scope, it has the potential to become a platform for greater regional cooperation in the years ahead.88

NONPROLIFERATION ORDER
India has moved closer to key elements of the nonproliferation order while remaining ambivalent about the use of economic coercion against Iran.

India is one of the few states to remain outside the framework of the NPT. New Delhi first detonated a nuclear device in 1974 and then surprised the world in 1998 by engaging in a series of underground nuclear tests. Since then, it has produced an estimated 80 to 100 nuclear warheads and successfully developed long-range missile delivery systems.89 India has never transferred nuclear weapons technology or fissile material to other countries, actions that would have amounted to a frontal assault on the nonproliferation order.

The U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement inked in 2008 has paved the way for Indian integration into the nonproliferation regime. India has pledged to put civilian nuclear reactors under IAEA safeguards and has moved closer to harmonizing its policies and practices with the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). New Delhi now seeks membership in the NSG and the other major multilateral export control regimes and also supports the multilateral negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty – all indications of India’s growing support for the nonproliferation order.86 India, however, has shown less inclination to integrate into a less-formalized element of the nonproliferation order, the PSI.

Regarding Iran, India has a mixed track record. In multilateral forums, it has backed efforts to pressure Tehran to clarify the nature of its nuclear program. In 2006, India was among the 26 members of the IAEA to vote to refer Iran to the UNSC.92 Five years later, during its tenure as a nonpermanent member of the UNSC, New Delhi publicly called for the full implementation of multilateral sanctions against Tehran.93 However, unlike their American and European counterparts, Indian leaders have refrained from unilaterally cutting off trade and investment ties with Iran. They have continued to push commercial relations even as they have reduced India’s imports of Iranian oil.93 Top Indian officials continue to express doubts about the efficacy of sanctions on Iran.

HUMAN RIGHTS ORDER
India has actively promoted the consolidation of democracy in transitional states but has generally avoided singling out regimes for human-rights violations and has eschewed supporting armed interventions to protect civilians.

India is a co-founder of, and leading contributor to, the U.N. Democracy Fund, which provides financial resources to civil society organizations operating in countries experiencing political transitions. New Delhi is also one of 10 founding members of the Community of Democracies, an intergovernmental coalition of democratic nations that works to promote the rule of law and good governance.94 Yet this readiness to help states as they move away from authoritarianism has not coincided with a new willingness to name and shame individual nations in multilateral institutions. At the U.N. Human Rights Council, India has rarely supported country-specific resolutions.95

India has made concrete efforts to bolster democratic institutions within its region. Through its donations to Afghanistan, New Delhi has trained civil servants, constructed the national parliament and supported the holding of elections.96 India coordinated with the United States and Europe to urge constitutional reforms in Nepal.97 Between 2000 and 2012, mounting strategic competition with China led India to overlook the Burmese military’s human rights abuses and provide the regime...
with aid and investment. Yet with the recent political opening in Burma, New Delhi has pivoted to offering democracy support.98

The Arab Spring has highlighted the limits of India’s current stance on human rights. As popular uprisings burst forth across the Middle East and North Africa, India’s external affairs minister remarked: “India does not believe in interfering in the affairs of another country. We will take the cue at an appropriate time depending on how they want India to help.”99 Sitting on the UNSC as the revolution in Libya unfolded, New Delhi approved a resolution directing sanctions against individual officials in the Moammar Gadhafi regime but abstained from a later resolution authorizing the use of force to protect civilians.100 India’s approach to the turmoil in Syria shifted from censuring all sides to support for U.N. sanctions, but New Delhi remains opposed to any external military intervention.101

**Indonesia**

Indonesia has taken positions that generally reinforce the international order’s finance, maritime, nonproliferation and human rights pillars.

**TRADE ORDER**

Indonesia has remained relatively passive with respect to the global trade architecture. In the WTO, Indonesia has demanded preferential tariff cuts from the world’s established economies but has generally opted to follow rather than lead throughout the course of Doha Round negotiations. Unlike Brazil and India, Indonesia did not torpedo a new multilateral agreement. It has brought only five cases against other nations at the WTO and received four complaints.102

Indonesia’s economic growth after 2000 set a positive example for what market opening and liberalization can accomplish. Its economic expansion was based not on a mercantilist export strategy but rather on trade with China, rising commodity prices, domestic consumption and a rising middle class.103 However, the Indonesian government has recently erected new barriers to foreign investment and moved to regulate mineral exports. These steps threaten to diminish the open economic model that Indonesia has provided for the region.104

**FINANCIAL ORDER**

Indonesia has supported key financial institutions while simultaneously promoting a move away from the U.S. dollar and facilitating the emergence of an Asian alternative to the IMF.

Despite IMF-imposed “structural adjustments” during the 1990s that proved economically and politically disruptive, Jakarta pledged $1 billion in mid-2012 to bolster the IMF’s reserves, with a senior government official noting: “This move is to show our commitment as part of the global community to strengthen world financial institutions.”105 Indonesia has played a role in the World Bank’s leadership – former finance minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati now holds the number-two post there. In the G20, Indonesia has navigated between the emerging-economy and established-economy blocs and has tried to exercise a voice on behalf of developing countries that are not represented. Indonesia has also put its influence behind efforts to improve economic governance, and it co-chaired the G20’s Anti-Corruption Working Group.106

Indonesia’s central bank has expressed support for diversification away from international dependence on the U.S. dollar as a global reserve currency.107 More recently, Indonesia has begun to diversify its own foreign currency reserves by purchasing renminbi-denominated bonds and has concluded currency swap agreements with Beijing – both actions chip away at the margins of the U.S. dollar’s predominance in international finance.108 An action with more far-reaching repercussions is Jakarta’s promotion of the transformation of the Chiang Mai Initiative from a collection of bilateral currency swaps into a multilateral reserve pool.
This moves the arrangement one step closer toward becoming a regional monetary authority with potential to supplant the IMF in Asia.\textsuperscript{109}

\textbf{MARITIME ORDER}

Despite serious constraints on its naval capability, Indonesia has upheld the maritime order by using the law of the sea in its diplomatic relations, pushing back against Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea and combating piracy in the Strait of Malacca.

Indonesia departs from accepted interpretation of UNCLOS by requesting that noncommercial vessels give notification prior to entering its territorial waters and objecting to foreign navies operating in its EEZ. In practice, however, Jakarta has not interfered with freedom of navigation.\textsuperscript{110} Critically, Indonesia has embraced the law of the sea to define the extent of its maritime claims and manage potential boundary disputes. In 2010, Indonesia delineated part of its maritime border with Singapore; negotiations based on UNCLOS remain ongoing with Singapore, Australia and Malaysia.\textsuperscript{111} Jakarta has also acted as a responsible steward of the Strait of Malacca. It backed an accord facilitated by the International Maritime Organization that brought together states bordering the strait and nations dependent on the international waterway – the first such agreement concluded in accordance with UNCLOS.\textsuperscript{112}

Once hesitant to intervene in South China Sea territorial disputes, Jakarta has in recent years challenged Beijing’s extensive claims. In 2010, the Indonesian government submitted a letter to the U.N. Secretary General maintaining that China’s assertion of sovereignty over virtually the entire body of water “clearly lacks international legal basis and is tantamount to upset the UNCLOS 1982.”\textsuperscript{113}

When divisions within ASEAN over the South China Sea prevented the organization from issuing a joint communiqué in mid-2012, Jakarta went on a diplomatic offensive and succeeded in restoring unity, paving the way for an ASEAN statement that called for peaceful resolution of maritime disputes.\textsuperscript{114} Indonesia’s new willingness to reinforce ASEAN cohesion has limited Beijing’s room to maneuver in the South China Sea. Furthermore, it represents a real contribution to the maritime order and signals a growing appetite for regional leadership.

Although possessing limited naval capabilities, Jakarta has successfully curbed maritime-based transnational threats.\textsuperscript{115} Along with Malaysia and Singapore, Indonesia initiated coordinated tri-lateral patrols in the Strait of Malacca in 2004. Indonesia subsequently invited Thai participation, and in 2005, all four nations launched a combined aerial surveillance program.\textsuperscript{116} These efforts have largely eradicated piracy in the Strait of Malacca, securing the waterway which carries some 40 percent of the world’s commerce.\textsuperscript{117}

\textbf{NONPROLIFERATION ORDER}

Indonesia has embraced the legal elements of the nonproliferation order but remains wary of enforcement measures such as maritime interdiction and economic sanctions.

Indonesia is a longstanding member of the NPT and has signed the IAEA’s Additional Protocol. At first unwilling to ratify the CTBT until Washington did so, Jakarta has changed course and became a party to the treaty in 2011.\textsuperscript{118} Indonesia has contributed to the Nuclear Security Summit by leading a working group focused on moving forward the ratification of nuclear-related treaties and conventions. As Indonesia continues to develop its plans for a domestic nuclear power industry, it has scrupulously followed international safety and security practices, earning the IAEA’s commendation.\textsuperscript{119}

Although increasingly supportive of the legal component of the nonproliferation order, Jakarta has been less eager to embrace enforcement mechanisms. Indonesia has avoided participation in
the PSI, citing legal and sovereignty concerns.\footnote{120}
At the UNSC, the government of Indonesia supported a 2007 resolution on Iran but abstained from a subsequent resolution in 2008, noting that “Indonesia remains to be convinced of the efficacy of adopting additional sanctions at this juncture.”\footnote{121} Jakarta continues to see the IAEA as the appropriate forum for dealing with Iran’s nuclear program; it has refrained from imposing unilateral economic sanctions and has self-consciously preserved a position as a potential mediator with Tehran.\footnote{122}

**HUMAN RIGHTS ORDER**

Although Indonesia remains somewhat wary of humanitarian intervention, its support for the human rights order has come to include the sharing of experience, the construction of regional norms and the naming and shaming of human rights abusers.

The post-1998 transition from dictatorship to democracy convinced Indonesian leaders that their country’s foreign policy should reflect its domestic principles. They take pride in the nation’s new democratic identity and see that “Indonesia can be a model where Islam and democracy exist hand in hand, with no contradiction between the two.”\footnote{123} Indonesia has begun underscoring the benefits of democracy to its neighbors in a way that avoids lecturing and acknowledges the challenges that accompany political transitions.\footnote{124} In addition, Jakarta has played a key role in efforts to enshrine human rights within ASEAN.\footnote{125} Never keen to sanction Burma, Indonesia nonetheless blocked Burma’s quest to chair ASEAN until it adopted reforms and has worked to consolidate the political opening there by dispatching experts to help the government set up a human rights institution.\footnote{126}

The Bali Democracy Forum, launched in 2008, is an initiative with no parallel in the human rights policies of the other global swing states. It brings together Asian and Middle Eastern countries with the goal of fostering “political development, through dialogue and sharing of experience, aiming at strengthening democratic institutions.”\footnote{127} Since its inception, the Bali Democracy Forum has grown in profile, attracting participants from as far away as Europe and even China.

The Arab Spring has tested Indonesia’s commitment to supporting human rights abroad with favorable, if delayed, results. Although it was not a member of the UNSC at the time, Jakarta was wary of military action against the Gadhafi regime. Indonesia originally hesitated to voice its outrage about the situation in Syria but then departed from a longstanding tradition of not supporting country-specific resolutions at the U.N. Human Rights Council. Thus far, Jakarta, like some other OIC members, has backed multiple resolutions concerning Syria and has even called for the entry of U.N. peacekeepers into Syria to halt the violence.\footnote{128}

**Turkey**

On balance, Turkish policies have strengthened the trade, financial and nonproliferation pillars of the international order. Its human rights policy has rapidly evolved from noninterference to limited interventionism. Meanwhile, in the maritime domain, Turkey has adopted positions that countervail existing global arrangements.

**TRADE ORDER**

Turkey has remained relatively inactive within the WTO and – through the success of its free market reforms – has set a powerful example for the Middle East.

Except for spearheading a coalition of countries that fought for extending quotas on textile imports, Turkey has avoided taking on a leadership role within the WTO. It was not a member of the small group of nations that came together on several occasions to attempt to revive the stalemated Doha Round negotiations. Turkey’s engagement with
the WTO dispute settlement system also remains limited. It has initiated two cases and received only a handful of complaints.  

Turkey has served as an example of how free-market reforms can yield significant – and balanced – economic growth. Membership in the European Customs Union has locked Turkey’s domestic economic policy into upholding the principles of commercial reciprocity and nondiscrimination that underlie the world trade order. There is currently little prospect of Turkey backtracking from the course of trade liberalization that has made it a regional model.

FINANCIAL ORDER

Turkey has supported the global financial system by contributing to the IMF, becoming a development lender and embracing the G20.

Turkish leaders perceive an interest in reinforcing the principles advanced by the IMF and the World Bank, and in June 2012, they pledged $5 billion to bolster the IMF’s lending facility. Ankara has made significant strides as a financier of development assistance – the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency now has an annual budget of nearly $750 million.

Turkey has embraced the G20 as a new platform for exerting influence. It has tried to champion the interests of the world’s least-developed countries, and officials in Ankara eagerly anticipate Turkey’s assumption of the G20 presidency in 2015. On global currency issues, Turkey has generally adopted a passive approach. In early 2012, Ankara and Beijing negotiated a currency swap that will enable them to conduct a portion of their commerce without converting their local currencies into U.S. dollars.

MARITIME ORDER

Turkey has continued to reject the legal foundation of the maritime order and has asserted extensive claims in the eastern Mediterranean, even as it has become a major contributor to counter-piracy efforts.

Ankara refrained from signing UNCLOS in 1982 and has remained outside the formal legal framework ever since. Unlike another non-signatory – the United States – Turkey does not treat most clauses of UNCLOS as customary international law; on the contrary, Turkey objects to provisions such as the 12-mile international water line because of fears that maritime disputes with Greece in the Aegean Sea would be adjudicated to its disadvantage.

Beyond rejecting UNCLOS, Turkey has advanced its own theory for delineating EEZs in the eastern Mediterranean that extends its EEZ to Egypt’s northernmost waters. Without the discovery of energy deposits in the eastern Mediterranean, Ankara’s claims would have few ramifications for the maritime order, but the rush to exploit newfound gas fields in these waters has transformed a legal dispute into a political flashpoint involving Turkey, Cyprus, Lebanon and Israel. Ankara has not hesitated to back its claims with strong rhetoric. In 2012, the Turkish government warned states to refrain from bidding on oil and gas concessions around Cyprus.
Turkey has made significant counter-piracy contributions. Ankara was a founding member of the Contact Group on Somali Piracy and was quick to dispatch ships to fight this reemerging threat to vital shipping lanes. In 2009, Turkey became the second country to command a multinational naval task force engaged in counter-piracy – a significant step given Turkey’s traditionally limited maritime role. More recently, Turkey headed Operation Shield, the NATO effort to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa. Bilaterally, Turkey has engaged in counter-piracy cooperation with the United Arab Emirates and Egypt.

Turkey has upheld the nonproliferation order’s legal components but at times has complicated international efforts to pressure Iran.

Turkey has never pursued nuclear weapons and has embraced the legal elements of the nonproliferation order without reservation. It is a party to the NPT, a signatory of the CTBT and a member of the NSG and the other major multilateral export control regimes. Turkey has also approved the IAEA Additional Protocol, opening its nuclear facilities to a high level of international scrutiny. It has also shown less aversion than the other global swing states to countering proliferation through ad hoc measures. Unlike Brazil, India and Indonesia, Turkey has joined the PSI. Although not a “core member,” it hosted a large-scale interdiction exercise in May 2006 and remains actively engaged.

At the same time, Ankara opposes international efforts aimed at limiting access to civilian nuclear technologies that could facilitate a country’s military ambitions. Turkey maintains that all NPT signatories are entitled to obtain nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes and that the world’s nuclear suppliers should not impose conditions beyond what the NPT stipulates. Within the NSG, Turkey has blocked new guidelines for nuclear trade that would have taken into account the recipient state’s “stability and security.”

Turkey has sometimes hindered multilateral efforts to prevent Iran’s progress toward a nuclear capability. Along with Brasilia, Ankara in 2010 attempted to broker a deal enabling Tehran to enrich uranium abroad. However, this diplomatic foray occurred without the UNSC’s blessing, resulted in frustration all around and culminated with Turkey opposing a new round of U.N. sanctions against Iran. Since mid-2012, Turkey has moved to reduce its oil imports from Iran.

**HUMAN RIGHTS ORDER**

Turkey’s approach has evolved from a residual attachment to noninterference to a willingness to intervene politically, and even militarily, to uphold human rights in its part of the world.

Representing a multiethnic, Muslim-majority country on the edge of the Middle East that has successfully transitioned from military-dominated politics to electoral democracy, Turkey is unsurprisingly viewed by its leaders as a model for others in the region. Long before the Arab Spring, Turkey was already urging that Middle Eastern autocracies embark on a path of gradual reform and political opening. Speaking at Harvard University in January 2003, Prime Minister Erdogan said, “Democratization in the Middle East is an outcome that must be attained.”

Turkey’s actions have not always measured up to such high-sounding rhetoric. The pursuit of trade and energy interests has thus far rendered Ankara silent on Tehran’s treatment of its population. Turkey has avoided lending its support to U.N. General Assembly resolutions criticizing Iran’s human rights record and soft-pedaled Iran’s crushing of the Green Movement.
instead concentrated on building economic and diplomatic ties.

As the Arab Spring has unfolded, Turkish human rights policy has exhibited considerable variation. In the case of Egypt, Prime Minister Erdogan made a dramatic public intervention, first telling President Hosni Mubarak to heed the protest movement’s demands and then, a day later, calling for the Egyptian leader’s immediate resignation. On Libya, the Turkish government initially opposed the UNSC resolution authorizing the use of force and the NATO intervention that followed, only to then back the campaign and even help finance the Libyan rebels fighting to topple Gadafi’s government. Having forged a close relationship with the Asad regime, the Turkish government at first sought to facilitate top-down democratic reforms in Syria. As the crackdown in Syria has worsened, however, Ankara has gravitated toward an increasingly hard-line position – imposing sanctions, severing diplomatic ties, giving material aid to the Syrian rebels and taking direct military action against the regime’s forces.
VI. TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT

There is significant opportunity for Washington to build closer partnerships with each of the global swing states to bolster key elements of the international order. American engagement should capitalize on areas where Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey have already taken on new global responsibilities. Yet this is not enough; to set the right tone in relations with the four global swing states, American leaders should at least partially address the desire of those nations for greater recognition in key international institutions. Furthermore, without a parallel effort to assist the four countries in strengthening their domestic capacity to more actively support the international order, American engagement will fall short. Finally, it is critical that Washington look inward and ensure that the attention and resources allocated to the four nations reflects their rising strategic importance.

The following recommendations are not exhaustive; they represent a menu from which policymakers might choose. This report sets forth both large-scale initiatives and small-scale programs because the opportunities vary by country and area of cooperation. However, these diverse recommendations have a single unifying objective: to partner more closely with the four global swing states in the pursuit of international order.

Trade Order

The United States should seek to expand and reinforce the rules-based trading system and energize domestic groups within each country that could emerge as influential voices for the trade order. Washington should take the following actions:

1. **Work with the global swing states to define and address unfair commercial practices by state-owned enterprises.** Just as in the United States, firms in Brazil, India and Indonesia face growing pressure from Chinese companies that receive government backing, while in Turkey, leading businesses see similar pressure looming on the horizon. The United States should emphasize the treatment of state-owned enterprises in its economic dialogues with all four powers. It should also urge the Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) of the OECD to establish a policy group dedicated to exploring this issue. (Of the global swing states, Turkey is the only member of the OECD, but business associations from Brazil, India and Indonesia all have observer status at the BIAC and could contribute to a new policy group.) If the United States can forge a consensus with these four powers, it might be possible to craft a multilateral solution to the rise of state-owned enterprises rather than allowing ad hoc remedies to undermine the trade order.

2. **Seek free-trade agreements with the global swing states.** A free-trade agreement with any of the four nations remains aspirational. In Washington and in the capitals of the four global swing states, free-trade legislation would today encounter substantial – if not insurmountable – domestic opposition. In Brazil’s case, even a double taxation treaty has thus far proven unobtainable, and the United States and India do not yet have a bilateral investment treaty. However, the United States should persist in pursuing economic accords even if the road ahead is long and frustrating. Voicing support for free-trade agreements could reinforce proponents of further trade liberalization within each country.

3. **Convene the Global Entrepreneurship Summit in all four countries by 2020.** The summit – which brings together innovators, investors, academics and government officials – was initially conceived as a tool for engaging the Muslim world and was first held in Turkey. Convening the summit in the other global swing states could help to galvanize technology startups, creating new voices in support of domestic and international safeguards of intellectual property.
Financial Order
There is potential for U.S. cooperation with global swing states on several components of the financial order. Washington should take the following actions:

Partner with India, Brazil and Turkey to establish a model for development in Africa. These three nations’ development activities in Africa could become a robust alternative to China’s bilateral lending that prioritizes physical infrastructure over political institutions. Washington should help the three countries to expand their presence in Africa. With Indian companies playing a major role in Africa, the State Department should work to catalyze deeper U.S-India private-sector cooperation there. Washington should join with Brasilia to encourage West African participation in the Open Government Partnership and should task the U.S. Agency for International Development to work with its Turkish counterpart to identify new joint projects in East Africa.

Establish a bilateral G20 working group with Turkey. The G20 has received high marks inside Turkey, and Turkish leaders regard their country’s upcoming presidency of the organization as an opportunity to exert intellectual leadership. However, by many accounts, the G20 has yet to live up to its potential as a steering committee for the global economy. The White House should propose a G20 working group with Turkey that would convene biannually – either independently or on the sidelines of existing bilateral dialogues – and identify ways in which the United States can partner with Turkey during its G20 presidency to strengthen this institution. If effective, the working group could serve as a model for U.S. initiatives with other countries as their rotation to the G20 presidency nears.

Maritime Order
With the global swing states becoming increasingly reliant on seaborne trade and already taking actions to secure the maritime domain, there is considerable scope for new American initiatives in this area. Working with these countries, the United States can address challenges to the maritime order related to both non-state threats and China’s rise. Washington should take the following actions:

Reduce existing barriers to transfers of military technology to Brazil, increase the frequency of joint naval exercises and explore a regional maritime initiative. Brazil already trains and equips some West African fleets and could play a much larger role in combating the growing threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea as its naval capabilities expand. Washington should help to accelerate Brazil’s maritime emergence by providing training and equipment. Looking farther out, the defense establishments of both countries should begin to evaluate the feasibility of a Brazilian-led, U.S.-backed South Atlantic Initiative that would bring together regional navies and coast guards to address drug trafficking, human smuggling, piracy and other forms of maritime-based transnational crime.

Expand maritime planning with India and joint naval exercises. Washington should back New Delhi’s aspirations for maritime leadership in the Indian Ocean. Policy planning staff from the U.S. State Department and the Indian Ministry of External Affairs should explore together how existing Indian Ocean institutions – the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium and the Indian Ocean Association for Regional Cooperation – could be more effectively linked. At the same time, the U.S. Navy should boost exercises and training with its Indian counterpart.

Launch an initiative with India and Indonesia to develop an affordable, long-range unmanned system for maritime domain awareness. With both nations looking to build up their domestic defense industries and concerned about maritime-based threats, this initiative may hold significant appeal. If successful, a long-range unmanned
system would expand these nations’ capability to defend the maritime commons and could be mass-produced for other Indian Ocean navies and coast guards, allowing regional states to more actively combat transnational threats such as piracy, human smuggling and drug trafficking.

Partner with the Indonesian government in mobilizing corporate stakeholders to lobby claimant governments for a binding code of conduct in the South China Sea. Although national governments have taken the lead in addressing the complex territorial disputes in the South China Sea, they are not the only stakeholders. Corporations that rely on this waterway for transit or look to exploit its natural wealth also have a vested interest in the peaceful management of current frictions. As non-claimant states, the United States and Indonesia are uniquely positioned to facilitate a South China Sea Corporate Caucus.

Nonproliferation Order
To a significant extent, the global swing states have accepted multilateral nonproliferation regimes, and the partial holdouts are unlikely to change their positions soon. American engagement should aim to ensure that the four nations support – or at least do not complicate – efforts to counter existing proliferation threats. Washington should take the following actions:

Continue to work with New Delhi to address and minimize differences over Iran’s nuclear development. India remains one of Iran’s top oil export destinations and rejects any sanctions beyond those agreed to within the UNSC. Given India’s importance to Iran and the issue’s significance in the U.S.-India bilateral relationship, American leaders should prioritize the Washington-New Delhi dialogue on Iran.

Encourage Jakarta’s aspirations to become a regional and global leader on nonproliferation issues. The United States should support Indonesia’s apparent ambition to see every ASEAN member sign and ratify the IAEA’s additional protocol. The IAEA has recognized Indonesia as a model for the peaceful use of nuclear technology, and Washington should fund Indonesian sharing of best practices with other Southeast Asian nations that have contracts out for new reactors (such as Vietnam). In addition, the United States should seek to extend the Nuclear Security Summit to 2016 and advocate that it convene in Jakarta; this would both recognize and enhance Indonesia’s nonproliferation leadership.

Human Rights Order
Several of the global swing states are positioned to help Washington strengthen the human rights order by advancing political openings in the Middle East and Asia. The willingness of three of these four nations to actively support democracy in nations experiencing political transitions suggests that this could constitute a fruitful avenue for engagement. Washington should take the following actions:

Cooperate with India and Indonesia to seize the opportunity afforded by the political opening in Burma. Both global swing states have a geopolitical interest in seeing a more democratic and independent government in Naypyidaw. The U.S. National Endowment for Democracy could partner with the Indian International Institute of Democracy and Election Management to strengthen Burma’s capacity to hold free and fair elections. Washington could also work with New Delhi to promote reform of the security sector in Burma. Nongovernmental human rights organizations in Indonesia are well organized and wish to assist Burma’s political transition; what they lack is funding. Washington should work with the Indonesian government to locate resources for a Burma initiative from each country’s private foundations and corporate sector.

Work with Turkey to professionalize security forces in Arab countries that have recently
experienced political transitions. The U.S. Department of Defense and the Turkish Ministry of National Defense should establish an Institute for Security Sector Reform at the U.S. base in Incirlik, with American and Turkish military officers and civilian defense officials jointly serving as faculty. Preparing Arab militaries to operate under more-democratic governments could be important, particularly because even in post-revolutionary states, the military often remains the most influential societal actor.

Representation in International Institutions
Each global swing state seeks greater recognition in multilateral forums, but rebalancing international institutions remains a Sisyphean task on which U.S. action can make only limited headway. Although Washington should focus chiefly on building up cooperation with these four powers in concrete areas, it should not ignore their demands for more voice in global governance. As American leaders continue to emphasize the link between representation and burden sharing, they should take the following actions:

Affirm the need to reform the UNSC and publicly observe that an enlarged body is ultimately desirable. The United States should continue to acknowledge the obvious: The composition of the Security Council does not reflect the contemporary power distribution. American leaders should also recognize the difficulty in reaching real Security Council reform and seek ways to work closely with the global swing states during their temporary terms on the council.

Continue to press for the implementation of the quota and voting share changes approved by the IMF Executive Board in 2010 and support further efforts to rebalance the IMF’s governance to reflect today’s realities. Given the growing economic clout of Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey, rebalancing the IMF will increase the weight of all four nations within the institution. Greater representation may diminish the temptation to duplicate existing international structures and, at a minimum, according the global swing states a larger voice can help their leaders justify more robust external engagement, as was recently evidenced in their contributions to the IMF lending facility.

Partner Capacity
To varying degrees, the capacity of governmental institutions in the four global swing states has not kept pace with their rise. While remaining mindful of domestic sensitivities, the United States can partner with each nation to help build capacity to actively support the international order. Washington should take the following actions:

Increase International Military Education and Training (IMET) budgets for Brazil, India and Indonesia to the nearly $4 million that Turkey currently receives. Since 2000, U.S. security cooperation with most of the global swing states has intensified. This is particularly true of India and Indonesia, where the lifting of legal restrictions has enabled new defense sales, technology transfers and military exercises. However, with the exception of NATO ally Turkey, the level of IMET funding does not reflect the potential of these countries to contribute to the global order.

Support annual fellowships that embed foreign policy professionals from these countries in U.S. congressional offices. Legislatures in these rising democracies play an important – and often expanding – role in their global engagement. In many cases, however, the quality of parliamentary staff is mixed. Congressional offices already host a limited number of institutionally sponsored scholars from abroad, so a clear model for this program already exists.

Create a human rights fellowship program for journalists from Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey. Within each of the four global swing
states, populations often remain largely uninformed of human rights challenges unfolding in distant corners of the world and of their government’s approach to human rights issues abroad. The National Endowment for Democracy hosts a fellowship program that brings journalists (as well as other professionals) to the United States from aspiring and emerging democracies. However, because Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey have completed their democratic transitions, their journalists are underrepresented. To deepen a culture linking human rights at home with human rights abroad, the National Endowment for Democracy should establish a separate exchange program for journalists from global swing states.

**U.S. Attention and Resources**

To ensure the attention and resources allocated to the four global swing states match their rising strategic importance, Washington should take the following actions:

**Appropriate additional resources to U.S. agencies seeking to expand engagement with global swing states.** At a time of fiscal austerity, U.S. foreign affairs spending tops the list for budget cutters in Congress. The White House and the State Department should make the case to Congress for providing resources for these four relationships. As Congress wrestles with how to balance revenues and spending, it should increase the level of funding for programs involving these nations.

**Establish a quarterly interagency meeting at the Deputy level and a monthly working-level Interagency Policy Committee to review progress made, share lessons learned, identify roadblocks and map out the next steps for U.S. policy toward these four nations.** With responsibility for Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey spread across regional bureaus and diverse government agencies, those charged with managing these critical relationships rarely communicate. On top of this, the interagency process tends to channel the attention of decisionmakers toward short-term crises rather than medium- to long-term opportunities.

**Develop the capacity to track the U.S. government’s investments in language training and other educational opportunities related to the global swing states.** Without this capacity, it will be impossible to effectively use available expertise and make intelligent human resource allocations.

**Launch a program to immerse American officials in the politics and economics of each global swing state.** One element of such a program might be modeled on the Mansfield Fellowship, which currently provides U.S. federal employees with a year of Japanese language training followed by an assignment with the Japanese government. Although some of the four global swing states may not be receptive to such a program today, this initiative is worth exploring. The U.S. government’s expertise on the four global swing states remains limited, particularly compared with the intellectual capital on established European and Asian powers. 165

**Increase congressional delegations to the four nations.** The U.S. Congress plays an important role in American relations with the four countries, yet legislative ties remain thin. It is essential to invigorate legislative exchanges, and each country should be a priority for congressional and staff delegations. American ambassadors in Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey should underscore to their respective host governments the importance of these exchanges.
U.S. allies in Europe and Asia have for decades played a vital role in supporting the international order. As Washington looks to build closer partnerships with the global swing states, its allies should as well. In Asia, this process is already well under way. Japan, South Korea and Australia have deepened cooperation with India and Indonesia, in part because of their concerns about China’s rise and in part because of the economic opportunities the two countries present. The growth of trilateral cooperation involving Washington, its Asian allies and New Delhi is also notable. However, vast distances – and in some cases, immediate security concerns – limit the attention and resources that U.S. allies in Asia dedicate to Brazil and Turkey.

By comparison, there is more scope for Europe to undertake new initiatives with the global swing states. Although the ongoing financial crisis has reduced Europe’s hard and soft power, the EU and its member states retain significant influence over key pillars of the international order. In addition, Europe has extensive political, economic and cultural ties with Turkey, historic and linguistic linkages to Brazil and significant trade and investment relations with India and Indonesia. European leaders could adopt – and adapt as needed – many of the recommendations that we have laid out for their American counterparts. As the EU and its member states chart an approach toward the four global swing states, the following initiatives would reinforce U.S. engagement:

**Establish an annual dialogue involving the European External Action Service, the foreign ministries of interested European powers and the U.S. Department of State.** Bringing together policy planning directors or their equivalents, the dialogue would serve as a mechanism for coordinating U.S. and European engagement of the global swing states. It would also help to ensure that, in pursuing closer partnerships with these key countries, the United States and Europe pull together rather than apart.

**Recognize Turkey’s emergence and work to expedite its EU membership.** In the past, the prospect of joining the EU has served as an effective tool for encouraging Turkey to move toward the trade, finance and human rights pillars of the international order. In recent years, however, the EU has put Turkey’s accession on the back burner due to opposition from some member states.

**Work with the global swing states to define and address unfair commercial practices by state-owned enterprises.** In parallel with American efforts, Europe should seek to forge a common vision with the four nations on how the trade order might evolve to regulate state-owned enterprises. In dialogues with them, the EU and its member nations should place greater emphasis on this issue. European countries, which collectively make up a majority of the OECD, should press the BIAC to establish a policy group on the treatment of state-owned enterprises within the multilateral trading system.

**Partner with India, Brazil and Turkey to promote a model for development in Africa.** Despite recent budget cuts, Europe remains the largest single provider of traditional development aid to Africa. As such, there are considerable opportunities for trilateral development partnerships between Europe and the three global swing states that have become increasingly active there.

**Expand European government and foundation support for human rights organizations in each of the four countries.** In some cases, European support may be better received by civil society groups than American assistance. By empowering these organizations, Europe can strengthen voices that already champion an active approach to upholding human rights abroad.
VII. CONCLUSION

A systematic and sustained effort to forge closer partnerships with global swing states in the pursuit of international order represents a new thrust for American foreign policy. In pursuing such partnerships, the United States can secure its interests and ideals across the major axes of uncertainty that obscure the future.

One axis of uncertainty is how China’s growing power will affect the international order. Although elements of China’s ascendancy have undermined the global order, Beijing has not moved to directly challenge the existing system. Whether an authoritarian China will accept the entirety of the current order, which enshrines rule of law and democratic values, remains unknown. China’s political system may predispose it to oppose the global order as its power expands. Alternatively, China may find that it has an interest in accepting many of the prevailing institutions and arrangements, even if it rejects those related to democracy. Either way, it is critical that Washington work with the global swing states to reinforce the international order. In the best case scenario, a strong global order will channel China’s growing strength in a constructive direction to the benefit of all countries. In the worst case scenario, a renewed international order will withstand Chinese pressure and continue to underpin a stable world.

The other axis of uncertainty is the future path of American power. Some observers predict a decline, pointing to high growth rates in many emerging market economies, an increase in military expenditures in the developing world and America’s current fiscal challenges. Others point to America’s extraordinary military dominance, its unparalleled soft power and status as the world’s economic and monetary leader, and its sprawling network of alliances. If the United States retains its overwhelming predominance, forming closer connections with the global swing states will reinforce the international order at a time of mounting challenges. If America's pre-eminent position is eroding, this strategy will reinforce the web of security alliances and partnerships, global institutions and robust world trade and financial architecture through which the United States can pursue collaboration or organize opposition.

As American leaders look to partner with the global swing states in pursuit of international order, the stakes are high. The current order advances the security, prosperity and values of the United States and much of the world. If new challenges eventually fragment the order, Washington and the four rising democracies will suffer the consequences more than most. With the global swing states still formulating their roles on the international stage, it is critical for Washington to act now. American decisions today will influence whether Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey contribute to the global order tomorrow.
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With the global swing states still formulating their roles on the international stage, it is critical for Washington to act now. American decisions today will influence whether Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey contribute to the global order tomorrow.
APPENDIX A: GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Representation in International Institutions
- Affirm the need to reform the UNSC and publicly observe that an enlarged body is ultimately desirable.
- Continue to press for the implementation of the quota and voting share changes approved by the IMF Executive Board in 2010 and support further efforts to rebalance the IMF’s governance to reflect today’s realities.

U.S. Attention and Resources
- Establish a quarterly interagency meeting at the Deputy level and a monthly working-level Interagency Policy Committee to review progress made, share lessons learned, identify roadblocks and map out the next steps for U.S. policy toward these four nations.
APPENDIX B: BRAZIL RECOMMENDATIONS

Trade Order
• Work with Brazil to define and address unfair commercial practices by state-owned enterprises.
• Seek a free-trade agreement with Brazil.
• Convene the Global Entrepreneurship Summit in Brazil by 2020.

Financial Order
• Partner with Brazil to establish a model for development in Africa.

Maritime Order
• Reduce existing barriers to transfers of military technology to Brazil, increase the frequency of joint naval exercise and explore a regional maritime initiative.

Partner Capacity
• Increase International Military Education and Training budgets for Brazil to the nearly $4 million that Turkey currently receives.
• Support an annual fellowship that embeds foreign policy professionals from Brazil in U.S. congressional offices.
• Create a human rights fellowship program for journalists from Brazil.

U.S. Attention and Resources
• Appropriate additional resources to U.S. agencies seeking to expand engagement with Brazil.
• Develop the capacity to track the U.S. government’s investments in Portuguese language training and other educational opportunities related to Brazil.
• Launch a program to immerse American officials in the politics and economics of Brazil.
• Increase congressional delegations to Brazil.
APPENDIX C: INDIA RECOMMENDATIONS

**Trade Order**
- Work with India to define and address unfair commercial practices by state-owned enterprises.
- Seek a free-trade agreement with India.
- Convene the Global Entrepreneurship Summit in India by 2020.

**Financial Order**
- Partner with India to establish a model for development in Africa.

**Maritime Order**
- Expand maritime planning with India and joint naval exercises.
- Launch an initiative with India (and Indonesia) to develop an affordable, long-range unmanned system for maritime domain awareness.

**Nonproliferation Order**
- Continue to work with New Delhi to address and minimize differences over Iran’s nuclear development.

**Human Rights Order**
- Cooperate with India (and Indonesia) to seize the opportunity afforded by the political opening in Burma.

**Partner Capacity**
- Increase International Military Education and Training budgets for India to the nearly $4 million that Turkey currently receives.
- Support an annual fellowship that embeds foreign policy professionals from India in U.S. congressional offices.
- Create a human rights fellowship program for journalists from India.

**U.S. Attention and Resources**
- Appropriate additional resources to U.S. agencies seeking to expand engagement with India.
- Launch a program to immerse American officials in the politics and economics of India.
- Increase congressional delegations to India.
APPENDIX D: INDONESIA RECOMMENDATIONS

**Trade Order**
- Work with Indonesia to define and address unfair commercial practices by state-owned enterprises.
- Seek a free-trade agreement with Indonesia.
- Convene the Global Entrepreneurship Summit in Indonesia by 2020.

**Maritime Order**
- Launch an initiative with Indonesia (and India) to develop an affordable, long-range unmanned system for maritime domain awareness.
- Partner with the Indonesian government in mobilizing corporate stakeholders to lobby claimant governments for a binding code of conduct in the South China Sea.

**Nonproliferation Order**
- Encourage Jakarta’s aspirations to become a regional and global leader on nonproliferation issues.

**Human Rights Order**
- Cooperate with Indonesia (and India) to seize the opportunity afforded by the political opening in Burma.

**Partner Capacity**
- Increase International Military Education and Training budgets for Indonesia to the nearly $4 million that Turkey currently receives.
- Support an annual fellowship that embeds foreign policy professionals from Indonesia in U.S. congressional offices.
- Create a human rights fellowship program for journalists from Indonesia.

**U.S. Attention and Resources**
- Appropriate additional resources to U.S. agencies seeking to expand engagement with Indonesia.
- Develop the capacity to track the U.S. government’s investments in Bahasa Indonesian language training and other educational opportunities related to Indonesia.
- Launch a program to immerse American officials in the politics and economics of Indonesia.
- Increase congressional delegations to Indonesia.
APPENDIX E: TURKEY RECOMMENDATIONS

Trade Order
• Work with Turkey to define and address unfair commercial practices by state-owned enterprises.
• Seek a free-trade agreement with Turkey.

Financial Order
• Partner with Turkey to establish a model for development in Africa.
• Establish a bilateral G20 working group with Turkey.

Human Rights Order
• Work with Turkey to professionalize security forces in Arab countries that have recently experienced political transitions.

Partner Capacity
• Support an annual fellowship that embeds foreign policy professionals from Turkey in U.S. congressional offices.
• Create a human rights fellowship program for journalists from Turkey.

U.S. Attention and Resources
• Appropriate additional resources to U.S. agencies seeking to expand engagement with Turkey.
• Develop the capacity to track the U.S. government’s investments in Turkish language training and other educational opportunities related to Turkey.
• Launch a program to immerse American officials in the politics and economics of Turkey.
• Increase congressional delegations to Turkey.
ENDNOTES

1. We are not the first to use the term “swing state” outside a domestic American context, but the application of the term to these four countries and their relationship to the international order is new. For other uses, see John Lee, “Becoming Asia’s Swing State,” “The Washington Times,” May 20, 2009; Parag Khanna, “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony,” The New York Times, January 27, 2008; C. Raja Mohan, “India and the Balance of Power,” Foreign Affairs, 85 no. 4 (July/August 2006); and Ashley J. Tellis, “India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 30.


4. Beyond these five pillars, other elements include law enforcement and the governance of the use of air and space. An environmental order remains nascent in the absence of an international agreement that requires both developed nations and emerging-market economies to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases.


11. The World Trade Organization was created by the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations and established on January 1, 1995.


21. Interview with a Turkish official, April 2012; and interview with an Indonesian official, July 2012.


23. Average annual growth rate calculations for all global swing states are based on GDP purchasing-power parity (constant 2005 international dollar) figures from the World Bank's World Development Indicators Database. “Brazil Overtakes UK’s Economy,” BBC News, March 6, 2012.


25. Interviews with senior Brazilian policymakers, August 2012; and interview with a Brazilian journalist, August 2012.


27. Interview with Adriana Abdenur, general coordinator at the BRICS Policy Center, Rio de Janeiro, August 2012.


31. International Monetary Fund, “Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development Communiqué” (October 11, 2012).

32. “IBSA Ministerial Joint Statement.”

33. Interviews with Indian strategic thinkers, July 2012.


38. Interview with a Turkish business representative, April 2012.

39. Turkey has already received additional influence within the IMF. Ian Tannley, “Turkey, Poland to Get IMF Board Seats,” The Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2012; and interview with a Turkish official, April 2012.


43. Hillman, “Global Swing States and the Trade Order.”


47. “Brazil Pays First Donation into Haiti Quake Fund,” Reuters, May 12, 2010; and “Brazil’s Foreign-Aid Programme: Speak Softly and Carry a Blank Cheque,” The Economist, July 15, 2010.

48. Richard Blackden, “Brazil President Dilma Rousseff Blasts Western QE as ‘Monetary Tsunami,’” The Telegraph, April 10, 2012; and interview with Brazilian corporate manager, August 2012.


50. Interview with a Brazilian academic, August 2012.


55. Kraska, “Global Swing States and the Maritime Order.”

57. Interview with a Brazilian nuclear specialist, August 2012.


61. Interview with senior U.S. official, August 2012.


63. Interview with a Brazilian nuclear expert, August 2012.


65. Interviews with Brazilian strategic thinkers, August 2012.

66. “Brazil’s UN Vote on Iran Marks First Real Difference between Dilma and Lula da Silva,” Merrapress, March 26, 2011.


68. Interview with Brazilian strategic thinkers, August 2012; United Nations Department of Public Information, “Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ Over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, By Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions,” March 17, 2011.


70. Interview with a Brazilian journalist, August 2012; and statement by Dilma Rousseff at the 67th U.N. General Assembly, September 25, 2012.


73. Matias Spektor, “Humanitarian Intervention Brazilian Style?” Americas Quarterly (Summer 2012).


76. Interview with two Indian business representatives, July 2012.

77. Hillman, “Global Swing States and the Trade Order.”

78. In government and business circles, the IMF commitment was regarded in a different light: the price of global leadership. Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, “India to Add $10 bn to Aid in Europe,” The Hindustan Times, June 19, 2012; interview with an Indian journalist, July 2012; and interview with Indian business representatives, July 2012.


81. Interview with an Indian strategic thinker, July 2012.


85. Kraska, “Global Swing States and the Maritime Order.”


95. New Delhi was slow to give its vote to a resolution condemning Syria’s crackdown and, by most accounts, backed a resolution criticizing Sri Lanka largely because a domestically influential ethnic group demanded it. On Belarus, Burma, Iran, North Korea and (with only one exception) Syria, India has either voted negatively or abstained on resolutions brought to the table at the U.N. Human Rights Council. “India Votes Against Sri Lanka, UN Resolution on War Crimes Adopted,” The Times of India, March 22, 2012; interview with an Indian strategic thinker, July 2012; and author analysis of Indian voting behavior in the U.N. Human Rights Council.


97. C. Raja Mohan, “Balancing Interests and Values: India’s Struggle with Democracy Promotion,” The Washington Quarterly, 30 no. 2 (Summer 2007), 110; and Piccone, “Global Swing States and the Human Rights and Democracy Order.”


102. Hillman, “Global Swing States and the Trade Order.”


110. Kraska, “Global Swing States and the Maritime Order.”


112. Kraska, “Global Swing States and the Maritime Order.”


115. According to a prominent Indonesian strategic thinker, this is the main security threat identified by the Indonesian military.


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120. Huang, “Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia – Outsiders Not Welcome?”

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126. Roundtable with representatives from Indonesian nongovernmental organizations, July 2012.


129. Hillman, “Global Swing States and the Trade Order.”

130. Interview with a Turkish strategic thinker, April 2012.

131. Interview with a Turkish business representative, April 2012; and interview with a Turkish economist, April 2012.

132. “PM Erdoğan Pledges $5 Billion for IMF Fund at G20 Summit,” Today’s Zaman, June 19, 2012; and interview with a Turkish official, April 2012.


134. Dries Lasage and Yusuf Kacar, “Turkey’s Profile in the G20: Emerging Economy, Medium Power and Bridge-BUILDER,” Studia Diplomatica, 63 no. 2 (2010), 125-140; interview with Turkish strategic thinkers, April 2012; and interview with a Turkish business representative, April 2012; and interview with a Turkish official, April 2012.


145. For a thorough examination of this episode, see Megan Garcia, “Global Swing States and the Nonproliferation Order”; and Aylin Gürzel, “Turkey’s Role in Defusing the Iranian Nuclear Issue,” The Washington Quarterly, 35 no.3 (Summer 2012), 141-152.

146. Piccone, “Global Swing States and the Human Rights and Democracy Order.”


153. Interview with an Indian business representative, July 2012; and interview with a Turkish business representative, April 2012.


156. USAID has already started to leverage the Indian private sector on general development cooperation initiatives. See the U.S.-India Millennium Alliance, http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/pr071012.html.

157. Ghana and Liberia have expressed an intention to participate but are still developing their commitments. No other West African nations have joined the Open Government Partnership. With Brazilian businesses investing heavily in West Africa, achieving stable investment frameworks has become a major item of concern. Interview with a Brazilian business representative, August 2012.


159. Here, we reaffirm and elaborate on a recommendation in Michael J. Green and Andrew Shearer, “Defining U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy,” The Washington Quarterly, 35 no. 2 (Spring 2012), 175-189.

160. This is Indonesia’s next nonproliferation target according to a senior Indonesian government official we interviewed in July 2012.


163. In fiscal year 2011, Turkey received almost $4 million in IMET funding, compared with $631,000 for Brazil, $1.6 million for India and $1.8 million for Indonesia. U.S. Department of State, FY 2013 Congressional Budget Justification, Vol. 2: Foreign Operations (April 2012), 493-497.

164. The America-Australian Association’s sponsoring of an APSA Fellowship could serve as one model. See http://www.apsanet.org/content_3160.cfm.


168. We are indebted to Alex Lennon for bringing this point to our attention.
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Production Notes

Paper recycling is reprocessing waste paper fibers back into a usable paper product.

Soy ink is a helpful component in paper recycling. It helps in this process because the soy ink can be removed more easily than regular ink and can be taken out of paper during the de-inking process of recycling. This allows the recycled paper to have less damage to its paper fibers and have a brighter appearance. The waste that is left from the soy ink during the de-inking process is not hazardous and it can be treated easily through the development of modern processes.