MORE WILLING & ABLE: Charting China’s International Security Activism

By Ely Ratner, Elbridge Colby, Andrew Erickson, Zachary Hosford, and Alexander Sullivan
Foreword

Many friends have contributed immeasurably to our research over the past two years and to this culminating report. CNAS colleagues including Patrick Cronin, Shawn Brimley, Jeff Chism, Michèle Flournoy, Richard Fontaine, Jerry Hendrix, Van Jackson, JC Mock, Dafna Rand, Jacob Stokes, and Robert Work provided feedback and guidance throughout the process. We are also grateful to our expert external reviewers: Scott Harold, Evan Montgomery, John Schaus, and Christopher Yung. David Finkelstein and Bonnie Glaser lent their wisdom to workshops that greatly informed our subsequent efforts. The research team is indebted to the School of International Studies at Peking University, the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, China Institute for Contemporary International Relations, and China Foreign Affairs University for hosting discussions in Beijing. We were guided and assisted throughout by colleagues from the State Department, the Department of Defense, the White House, and the U.S. intelligence community. Kelley Sayler, Yanliang Li, Andrew Kwon, Nicole Yeo, Cecilia Zhou, and Hannah Suh provided key research, editing, and other support. The creativity of Melody Cook elevated the report and its original graphics. We are grateful as well for the assistance of Ellen McHugh and Ryan Nuanes.

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While many colleagues contributed to the research effort, the views herein are the authors’ alone, along with any errors of fact, omission, or interpretation.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

China’s external behavior has entered a period of profound evolution. The rapid expansion of Chinese economic, political, and security interests around the world, backed by greater capabilities to advance and defend those interests, is driving Beijing to become increasingly active in international security affairs. Although the ultimate character of China’s future foreign policy remains uncertain – including to leaders in Beijing – China has already begun deviating from long-standing foreign policy practices in ways that reflect its changing constellation of interests and capabilities.

Part I of this study considers what we assess to be the three most significant and transformative trends in Beijing’s international security activism. Taken together, these developments portend a China increasingly willing and able to play a prominent and decisive role in international security issues:

1. LOOSENING OF ITS POLICY OF NONINTERFERENCE IN OTHER COUNTRIES’ DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

   Although China’s noninterference principle continues to serve a variety of foreign policy goals, it is under considerable strain from demands to protect China’s growing overseas interests. We catalog how China is taking a more flexible approach to noninterference when key national interests are at stake, engaging in a range of economic, diplomatic, and military activities that depart from traditional definitions of noninterference.

2. DEEPENING SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS WITH COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD

   The globalization of China’s national security interests has also led Beijing to embark upon efforts to develop deeper security relations around the world. We describe how over the last decade China has enhanced its security ties across the spectrum of defense activities, including military diplomacy, combined training and exercises, and arms exports.

3. INCREASING POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITIES

   While still facing considerable limitations, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is becoming more sophisticated across the spectrum of power projection capabilities. In the next 10 to 15 years, we assess that China will likely be capable of carrying out a variety of overseas missions, including major international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation operations, securing of important assets overseas, defense of sea lanes, counterterrorism strikes, and stabilization operations.
The expanding scope and scale of China’s international security activism demand that Washington widen the aperture of its hedging policy toward China in several domains. Part II considers the implications for U.S. strategy and offers policy recommendations.

U.S. military-to-military engagement with China should continue focusing on developing operational safety and crisis management mechanisms, expanding existing agreements, and finding ways to ensure they will be used effectively when needed. The Department of Defense should also seek measures to reduce the likelihood of incidents and accidents between China and U.S. allies and partners.

U.S.-China security cooperation will continue to be limited by legal and political constraints, although there may be opportunities for cooperation on nontraditional security challenges and possibly new areas to include counterterrorism, maritime security, and arms control. Within existing engagements, the United States should pursue with China more interagency interactions, at lower levels and with third countries.

To shape the environment in which China’s international security activism occurs, the United States should seek to increase U.S. military access and presence in areas where the PLA is most likely to operate away from China’s shores, particularly in the Indian Ocean region. As China increasingly has both the political will and the military capability to serve as an important security partner, the United States should also take measures to sustain and deepen its alliances, as well as augment its diplomatic engagement on China-related issues with countries that could be strategically significant for Chinese power projection.

Supporting the development of more capable and effective multilateral institutions will also be critical to managing China’s international security activism in a number of regions, including Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, Central Asia, the Pacific Islands, and the Arctic. As part of these efforts, the United States should consider ways to engage and shape Chinese-led multilateral initiatives and organizations.

Maintaining a competitive military balance in the Western Pacific will be a crucial element of limiting the potentially destabilizing effects of the PLA’s expanding partnerships and power projection capabilities. Failing to do so would enable China to field greater capacity for extraregional power projection more quickly, render it able to focus more resources on deploying to a broader set of regions, and allow it to operate more effectively and decisively across a greater set of domains.

As a result, even as the United States and its allies and partners must take due account of the military challenges posed by a more globally active PLA, it still makes sense for Washington to concentrate on maintaining key advantages over Chinese military power at its leading edge in the Western Pacific. This argues against military strategies that cede the near seas and the airspace above them to China.

Finally, U.S. defense cooperation in areas of expected PLA activism should be geared in part to assist countries in developing their own defensive counterintervention capabilities. This should reduce China’s ability to project power in destabilizing ways by making such efforts more difficult and costly for Beijing.

These recommendations and more are discussed in greater detail herein.
Introduction

THE GLOBALIZATION OF CHINESE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
INTRODUCTION: THE GLOBALIZATION OF CHINESE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

For more than three decades, leaders in Beijing have sought to enhance the power and legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) through sustained economic growth, promotion of a stable regional security environment, and the safeguarding of Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity. China’s external behavior, official media, speeches, and government documents all reflect these enduring foreign policy priorities.

The principles through which China has pursued these aims were long equally persistent. Even after the opening of its economy to the world in the late 1970s, China’s external behavior has been relatively limited and ideological, reflecting an inward-looking country primarily concerned with domestic stability and economic development, lacking the means or interest to play a more active role on the global stage. If anything, China’s leaders eschewed international responsibility, seeking instead to defend the country from outside interference and rebuild China from within until it had sufficient power to reassume its rightful position as a great power – a long-standing goal that President Xi Jinping and his predecessors have called the “great renewal of the Chinese nation.”

But today, in important respects, China is finished hiding its strength and biding its time. A confluence of factors emerging over the last decade is compelling the People’s Republic of China to become active in global affairs as never before, with leaders in Beijing now pursuing a greater role for Chinese diplomacy and the People’s Liberation Army beyond China’s borders.

These efforts reflect the rapid expansion of Chinese economic, political, and security interests around the world, backed by greater capabilities to advance and defend those interests. Together, these trends are pulling at the seams of what the world had come to understand as the traditional fabric of Chinese foreign policy.

China’s remarkable economic rise is a well-known story. Clocking double-digit growth for three decades, it has become the world’s second-largest economy. This has resulted in growing connectivity between China and the outside world. According
China is increasingly dependent on the global economy. Its reliance on imported natural resources, such as oil, is creating new overseas interests and vulnerabilities.

China's Oil Imports by Origin, 2013

to official Chinese statistics, in 2013 China’s total trade in goods reached $4.2 trillion, an amount larger than the entire Chinese economy in 2007.\(^6\) Outward direct investment from the mainland has exploded as well, increasing fortyfold between 2002 and 2013, placing the PRC as the third-largest overseas investor, behind the United States and Japan.\(^7\)

This economic activity and its concomitant wealth creation have also led to a surge in Chinese citizens going abroad as businesspeople, laborers, students, and tourists. The numbers are staggering, with more than a million Chinese citizens employed around the globe in Chinese investment projects, almost 400,000 Chinese students studying abroad, and over 60 million Chinese tourists going overseas annually.\(^8\)

The tremendous growth of PRC equities in the world underscores China’s growing power and influence but has also created economic and political exigencies that are vastly increasing the complexity and scope of China’s national security agenda. As Xi has declared, “China’s dependence on the world and its involvement in international affairs are deepening, so are the world’s dependence on China and its impact on China.”\(^9\)

Managing and maintaining this interconnectedness with the world will shape Chinese foreign policy for decades to come.

China’s economic miracle, after all, has been predicated on interdependence with the rest of the world, which, according to the World Bank, provided “a supportive global environment that undoubtedly assisted and accommodated China’s rapid growth.”\(^10\) An open global system, especially among developed countries, has provided market access for Chinese goods, capital flows, transfers of technology and expertise, and access to critical resources such as energy – all enablers on which Beijing will continue to depend.

Similarly, open and secure shipping lanes are crucial for China given that nearly half of its economy depends on seaborne trade.\(^11\) Within that trade, China is heavily reliant on overseas natural resources to fuel its economy, which remains manufacturing-focused and energy-intensive. China imported more than half its oil in 2013, a figure the U.S. Energy Information Administration expects to grow to 66 percent by 2020 and 72 percent by 2040.\(^12\) This places a high value not only on the sea lanes themselves, but also upon the stability of key suppliers in the Middle East and Africa.

But Beijing’s increasingly outward orientation is about more than just moving goods to and from China. The presence of Chinese citizens, businesses, and investments overseas – many in dangerous, far-flung places – increases the salience for Beijing of regional and domestic stability outside its borders. As a result, transnational threats such as terrorism, extremism, and piracy are reverberating back on China in ways that challenge vital economic and political interests.

Finally, all of these vulnerabilities are magnified by rising domestic awareness and expectations among the Chinese public that Beijing will protect China’s interests wherever they lie. A more diverse and vibrant media landscape in China, including an explosion in social media, is placing additional pressure on China’s leaders – sometimes buoyed by the government’s own nationalist propaganda – to be sensitive and responsive to the country’s overseas interests.

Leaders in Beijing are clearly cognizant of these trends. The Chinese government’s official 2013 defense white paper noted that:

> “With the gradual integration of China’s economy into the world economic system, overseas interests have become an integral component of China’s national interests. Security issues are increasingly prominent, involving overseas energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and Chinese nationals and legal persons overseas. Vessel protection at sea, evacuation of Chinese nationals overseas, and emergency rescue have become important
ways and means for the PLA to safeguard national interests and fulfill China’s international obligations.”

At the same time, Beijing’s capacity to address these emergent challenges has grown considerably. For decades, China had few means to influence outcomes overseas; as with many weak states, ideology served as a convenient fig leaf for relative impotence. Now, however, China has growing geopolitical clout, an economy and military budget second only to that of the United States, and an increasingly sophisticated foreign policymaking and diplomatic apparatus. In short, it has more tools than ever with which to advance its international preferences through both inducements and coercion.

Without a doubt, China’s international activism still faces significant constraints. Much of its foreign policy remains a refraction of domestic and bureaucratic interests as leaders in Beijing wrestle with a bevy of internal issues, including environmental devastation, political instability, ethnic unrest, rising inequality, an aging population, corrupt institutions, and an uncertain economic future. These challenges demand substantial attention and resources, distort China’s foreign policy, and limit its ability to wield soft power. Moreover, China in many respects remains a “free rider,” a “partial power,” and even a “selfish superpower,” happy to let others carry the burden and often unable to do so itself regardless. Despite these constraints, dynamic changes in China’s rise are producing a country increasingly willing and able to play a more active role on defense and security matters around the world.

The resulting globalization of China’s national security interests will serve as one of the most consequential trends affecting the future of U.S. national security policy and strategy. However burdened by the weight of ideology, propaganda, and bureaucracy, China’s external behavior has entered a period of profound evolution. Although the ultimate character of China’s future foreign policy is uncertain – including to leaders in Beijing – China has already begun deviating from its long-standing foreign policy practice in ways that reflect its changing constellation of interests and capabilities. It should therefore come as no surprise that, as Michael Swaine has assessed, Xi is calling for “a more activist, involved, and security-oriented approach to Chinese diplomacy and foreign relations.” Moreover, the underlying trends driving Beijing’s deeper engagement with the outside world are likely to intensify rather than dissipate.

... dynamic changes in China’s rise are producing a country increasingly willing and able to play a more active role on defense and security matters around the world.

Although the most visible manifestations of these trends have mostly occurred in the economic realm, major changes are already underway reshaping China’s national security and defense policy. This study considers what we assess to be the most important of these evolutions out to approximately 2030, the current horizon of unclassified U.S. government documents. Three trends stand out as most likely and most significant from the perspective of the United States:

- The loosening of China’s policy of noninterference in other countries’ domestic affairs;
- China’s deepening security relationships with countries around the world; and
- The PLA’s increasing power projection capabilities.

Each of these trends is addressed in turn. The second half of the report considers the strategic implications for the United States and offers recommendations for U.S. policy.
PART 1

KEY TRENDS IN CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVISM

We assess three trends in China’s international security activism that are likely to have significant effects on global politics and U.S. interests:

1. Loosening of the noninterference principle;
2. Deepening security partnerships; and

Together, these trends augur a China increasingly willing and able to engage on international security issues.
Part 1A

LOOSENING OF THE NONINTERFERENCE PRINCIPLE

Key Takeaways:

- Although China’s noninterference principle continues to serve a variety of foreign policy interests, it has come under considerable strain from demands to protect China’s growing overseas interests.

- As a result, China is taking a more flexible approach to noninterference when its national security interests are at stake. Over the last decade it has increasingly engaged in economic, diplomatic, and military activities that exceed traditional definitions of noninterference.
Loosening of the Noninterference Principle
The policy of noninterference has been a core principle of China's foreign relations almost since the founding of the People's Republic, notwithstanding fluctuating adherence in practice, particularly in support of revolutionary movements in the 1960s and 1970s. The norm of noninterference was enshrined as one of the “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence,” codified in a 1954 treaty with India.18 From China's perspective, interference involves “purposefully constrain[ing] or violat[ing] another country’s domestic policy or political processes (including foreign policymaking processes).”19 For decades, China’s stated policy has been “mutual noninterference in domestic affairs,” meaning that it would not – and other states should not – meddle in the internal politics of other countries, based on “the right of each nation to autonomously choose its path of development.”20

This approach to noninterference has served a number of China’s national interests. Perhaps most importantly, Beijing seeks to limit the degree to which outside countries are able to take actions that foment instability or dissent in China, undermine the Communist Party's legitimacy, or otherwise constrain China's development. To that end, China has traditionally sought to perpetuate international norms and practices that privilege strict notions of sovereignty and push back against the liberal principle that the international community can and should protect the rights of individuals regardless of national boundaries.21 This is particularly important for Beijing given its domestic human rights record, as well as its concerns about international support for independence movements in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. A policy of noninterference also allows Beijing to shield friendly regimes from international pressure and condemnation, particularly those with whom China has important economic and resource equities.

A hard definition of sovereignty also contributes to Beijing’s international legitimacy and standing in parts of the developing world. Noninterference is often a rallying point for China’s bilateral and multilateral relations, including in organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the group of major emerging-economy nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) known as the BRICS. Noninterference also serves as a useful justification for China to avoid costly foreign entanglements while focusing instead on its own internal development. Beijing’s genuine skepticism of the efficacy of international intervention further supports its noninterference principle.

This complex interplay of factors has caused the PRC to use sovereignty and noninterference as, in the words of former Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun, “the axial tradition of [China’s] foreign policy.”22 Senior Chinese officials routinely assert the centrality of noninterference in categorical terms. During Xi’s first trip abroad as president, he underscored this in Moscow, saying, “Matters that fall within the sovereign rights of a country should be managed only by the government and people of that country.”23 Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and other senior officials continue to make similar statements reaffirming China’s opposition to international interference.24

Nevertheless, China’s growing overseas interests are pushing Beijing to take a less doctrinaire approach to issues of sovereignty and interference abroad. With more at stake in various military, economic, and diplomatic matters around the world, what happens inside other countries’ borders is increasingly important to Beijing. Key Chinese interests overseas are now vulnerable to civil war, domestic terrorism, state failure, anti-Chinese sentiment over environmental and labor concerns, and other sources of internal instability.

For instance, as a result of China’s large investments in and growing dependence on energy imports from unstable and dangerous places, Beijing now has an abiding interest in the internal stability of countries in the Middle East and East Africa. This is true as well for places such as Myanmar, Pakistan, and parts of Central Asia.
that not only possess natural resources but can also provide alternative transportation routes away from potentially vulnerable maritime choke points. Pang Zhongying, a leading professor at Renmin University, has said, “Dependence on overseas resources, markets and energy will oblige China to adjust its foreign policy by, de facto, abandoning some of its ‘nos,’ such as ‘non-interference’ and ‘not taking the lead.’” Beyond resource questions, China has growing equities in stability in the Muslim world, including in Central Asia and the Middle East, as a result of its strong desire not to see the rise of extremist groups that could directly or indirectly support potentially violent separatist movements in western China.

For diplomatic reasons as well, China is growing more sensitive to the domestic policies and actions of its partners. In recent years, China has faced considerable international opprobrium for supporting or shielding oppressive and violent regimes. This occurred ahead of the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing when critics of China’s support for the regime in Sudan began speaking of China’s “Genocide Olympics.” Suddenly, a rogue regime halfway around the world was Beijing’s problem to solve. China has faced similar reputational costs for aligning itself with potential nuclear proliferator Iran and the former Burmese military junta.
Finally, the need to protect Chinese citizens abroad is also placing tremendous pressure on traditional notions of noninterference. According to official media reports, the Chinese government has conducted dozens of overseas evacuation operations over the last decade, rescuing tens of thousands of Chinese citizens. In particular, the 2011 evacuation of more than 35,000 Chinese nationals from Libya was a “wake-up call” for Beijing about the need to reassess its foreign policy principles and make good on its promise to protect Chinese citizens abroad. As a result of these emergent interests overseas, China is taking a more flexible approach and increasingly engaging in activities it has traditionally opposed under the rubric of noninterference, including political engagement with (sometimes violent) insurgents and opposition groups, security operations in and around other countries, and the use of economic sanctions as a coercive tool. This has occurred throughout the developing world, with recent examples in North Korea and Myanmar in Asia, Sudan and Libya in Africa, and Syria in the Middle East.

While by no means abandoning the principle of noninterference altogether, Beijing now appears to be taking more of a case-by-case approach in ways that account for the growing costs of inaction. As one European scholar aptly described, whereas once China was comfortable hiding behind the mantle of noninterference, it is now “caught between the risks of being an absentee landlord and the hard choices of exercising imperial power.” China’s noninterference policy is therefore evolving in ways that permit what Chinese academics are calling “creative” or “conditional” interference. But more than an effort to define a new and fixed set of criteria for action, this is better understood as an effort to reconcile China’s traditional foreign policy rhetoric with a new reality in which strict adherence to noninterference sometimes runs counter to China’s interests.

In doing so, China has adopted new diplomatic tools and leveraged existing ones in novel ways to engage more directly in the domestic affairs of foreign governments. This includes the use of special envoys and party-to-party relations that stand outside normal state-to-state diplomatic channels. China’s “special envoys” are tasked by the state with extraordinary powers to engage in discrete foreign policy activities. For decades, China has used this designation to send proxy attendees to ceremonial occasions in other countries. But recently the use of special envoys has decidedly shifted to “political” special envoys, empowered to deal with crises, express China’s voice on international hot spots, and represent China in important multilateral settings. For these positions, China has increasingly favored more senior diplomats with greater regional knowledge, relationships in the target country, and general sophistication. The emergence and systematization of special envoys has enabled more tailored approaches to complex political problems, maximizing China’s freedom of maneuver and contributing to “a more offensive diplomacy to better serve its interests.”

In recent years, special envoys have been prominent players in nearly every significant example of Chinese interference in the internal affairs of other countries, including in Sudan in 2007, Libya and Syria since 2011, Myanmar in 2013, and Afghanistan in 2014. As one scholar has written, “the Chinese government has chosen special envoy diplomacy as its diplomatic method for becoming involved in internal affairs of African countries.” The same has been true in the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.

Similarly, China has also deployed representatives from the Chinese Communist Party to influence the domestic affairs of other countries outside of normal diplomatic channels. Beijing has used this practice to hedge against regime change by building ties with opposition parties.
CHINESE INTERFERENCE IN PRACTICE

China’s engagement with Sudan over the last decade encapsulates both the pressures Beijing faces to get involved in the domestic affairs of foreign governments and the manner in which it has begun doing so. The genocide in Darfur and the secession of South Sudan both harbored the potential to undermine China’s sizable energy investments in Sudan, threaten the security of tens of thousands of its citizens living there, and damage its international reputation.35

After refusing for years to address the Darfur crisis that began in 2003, China finally exercised its leverage as Sudan’s largest oil and arms trade partner ahead of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. In 2007, Beijing dispatched special envoy Liu Guijin to Khartoum to lean on the government to accept a sizable African Union–United Nations peacekeeping force.36 This diplomacy was anchored by a state visit from Hu Jintao himself, who reportedly told Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, “Darfur is a part of Sudan and you have to resolve this problem.”37 In testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the U.S. special envoy to Sudan, Andrew Natsios, welcomed “China’s efforts to apply diplomatic pressure on the Government of Sudan,” and he noted that China was likely “the critical factor that led to the Sudanese reversing their position” on the U.N.-sponsored peace plan.38

With substantial investment and energy interests at risk, the PRC also played a prominent role in mediating the secession of South Sudan. Well before the January 2011 independence referendum that ultimately divided Sudan, Beijing had already initiated political contacts with members of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), the lead southern opposition group. Under the rubric of party-to-party relations, representatives from the CCP International Department managed to cultivate ties with the future leadership of South Sudan. The head of the SPLM visited Beijing twice in 2008.39 This direct involvement in Sudan’s domestic politics helped Beijing secure its energy equities during the subsequent partition of Sudan. In the ensuing years, Beijing repeatedly played the role of mediator between Sudan and South Sudan, leading one Chinese commentator to describe China’s actions there as a “reversal of China’s past low-key approach in international affairs.”40

Myanmar has also been the target of China’s newfound proclivity for greater involvement in the domestic politics of foreign countries. In addition to publicly cultivating ties to the opposition political party headed by longtime dissident Aung San Suu Kyi, China has openly mediated the ongoing peace process between Myanmar’s central government and the opposition Kachin Independence Organization in northern Kachin state, which abuts China. This has been in response to fears that civil war could threaten China’s resource interests in Myanmar and lead to a border and refugee crisis on China’s doorstep.41 In 2013, China played a leading role in the negotiations, providing a neutral venue for talks in China’s Yunnan province and guaranteeing the safety of the parties.42 During the talks, China’s team, led by Special Envoy for Asian Affairs Wang Yingfan, pressured participants into forsaking internationalization of the conflict (except, presumably, by China).43

Elsewhere in the world, Beijing is increasingly active in hedging against political risk: still investing heavily in relations with ruling elites in stable non-democratic regimes but also building ties to opposition groups where power shifts – through either orderly democratic processes or disorderly regime change – are possible.44 The instabilities associated with the Arab Spring, for instance, have led Beijing to take, in the words of Brookings Institution scholar Jonathan Pollack, “tentative but suggestive steps to modify China’s longstanding policy of noninterference.”45 Hedging against the potential fall of ruling regimes in North Africa and the Middle East, Beijing has worked to build ties with rebel groups in both Libya and Syria.46 As part of these efforts, the Chinese government has repeatedly hosted Syrian opposition groups in Beijing, sent a special envoy to meet with them in
Damascus, and subsequently called upon Bashar al-Assad’s regime to work with them toward a negotiated settlement. Chinese officials have also met with the Afghan Taliban and offered publicly to mediate a reconciliation agreement with the government in Kabul. The juxtaposition could not be starker with Beijing’s visceral invocations of the noninterference principle when foreign governments meet with prominent ethnic and religious figures from China such as the Dalai Lama or Uighur leader Rebiya Kadeer.

China has also begun engaging in defense and security deployments that test the conceptual limits of noninterference. While still well short of major military interventions, these actions nonetheless represent a significant change in China’s willingness to flex military muscle abroad to advance its national interests. On multiple occasions in recent years, substantial threats to Chinese citizens and workers overseas have provoked unprecedented responses from Beijing, including the large-scale noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) from Libya in 2011. The mission, which included one of the navy’s most modern warships, represented the PLA’s first operational deployment to Africa and the Mediterranean and its largest-ever NEO. Later that year, China engaged in another unprecedented overseas security operation when it launched patrols along the Mekong River in mainland Southeast Asia after 13 Chinese nationals were killed when Chinese cargo ships came under attack. The public outcry in China spurred the PRC government into action, and within months Chinese border police were commanding joint patrols with forces from Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand. The Chinese government also reportedly considered a lethal drone strike (with Naypyitaw’s approval) on the drug lord wanted for the murders, though it reconsidered in favor of capturing him alive.

In early 2015, reports surfaced that a draft antiterrorism law could create a framework for China’s military or security services to conduct counterterrorism operations on foreign soil. Although the law would reportedly require obtaining the host country’s permission, the creation of a formal structure indicates China believes it may have to intervene abroad in response to terror threats and desires a legal framework to do so in advance. Furthermore, although China has traditionally viewed international economic and trade policies as under the purview of mutual noninterference, now Beijing is using economic tools to influence other countries’ foreign policies. China has also been more willing to employ unilateral economic sanctions, or the threat thereof, to pressure foreign governments over key interests such as Taiwan, Tibet, human rights, and territorial disputes. This contrasts with much of the post-Cold War period, when China has opposed international sanctions on the grounds that they constitute a violation of state sovereignty. Under this logic, China exercised its veto at the U.N. Security Council to block sanctions against Sudan and Myanmar in 2007, Zimbabwe in 2008, and Syria since 2011. Nevertheless, consistent with the overall softening of China’s adherence to its noninterference principle, Beijing has shown an increasing willingness to use coercive economic sanctions to shape the internal decisions of other countries.
Beginning with North Korea in 2006, China agreed to participate in a slew of international sanctions regimes against Iran in 2010, Libya in 2011, North Korea again in 2013, and South Sudan in 2015. And rather than simply serving as a passive or unwilling accomplice, Beijing has at times led these multilateral efforts. In the 2013 push to punish Pyongyang for testing a nuclear weapon, Beijing played a key role in drafting the measures, which took direct aim at North Korea’s leadership with new sanctions on cash transfers and luxury items. Indicative of Beijing’s more nuanced calculus, a Foreign Ministry representative said in 2014 that, on the issue of new sanctions against South Sudan, “We will make a decision on our position in accordance with the pros and cons,” and indeed China approved a U.N. Security Council sanctions resolution against Juba in March 2015. While questions remain regarding the degree to which China has enforced sanctions – for example, on North Korea – its willingness to take the lead in crafting sanctions clearly signals a less doctrinaire approach in which adhering to the principle of noninterference may be a less decisive factor as compared with other material interests.

None of this is to suggest that the policy of noninterference will disappear overnight. It continues to serve a number of Chinese interests and, for now, remains a useful diplomatic tool. Nevertheless, the policy is under strain and Beijing is cautiously pursuing a more flexible approach as China increasingly involves itself in the political, economic, and security affairs of other countries. The ongoing expansion of Chinese interests and capabilities will only reinforce this trend.

*Indicative of Beijing’s more nuanced calculus, a Foreign Ministry representative said in 2014 that, on the issue of new sanctions against South Sudan, “We will make a decision on our position in accordance with the pros and cons,” and indeed China approved a U.N. Security Council sanctions resolution against Juba in March 2015.*
Part 1B

DEEPENING SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS

Key Takeaways:

- The globalization of China’s national interests has led Beijing to embark upon efforts to develop deeper security partnerships around the world.

- Over the last decade, China has enhanced its security ties across the spectrum of defense activities, including military diplomacy, combined training and exercises, and arms exports.
Deepening Security Partnerships

Despite more than three decades of reform and opening up, which has resulted in strong global economic ties with the world, China has assiduously eschewed entangling alliances and instead maintained a largely “independent and self-reliant” national security policy. Throughout its history, the PRC only twice established formal security alliances, with the Soviet Union in 1950 and North Korea in 1961, neither of which remains in effect today as a mutual security guarantee.

In addition to embracing a policy of nonalignment for itself, the Chinese government regularly denounces U.S. alliances in East Asia as relics of the Cold War. At a regional conference in May 2014, President Xi described alliances as “not conducive to common regional security.” Instead, Beijing has offered vague concepts of a “new regional security cooperation architecture” that would be more inclusive and not directed at potential adversaries.

As a result of this approach, however, China found itself emerging onto the world stage at the turn of the century as a “lonely superpower,” lacking the kinds of security partnerships it would need to defend, protect, and advance its rapidly multiplying overseas interests. Responding to its dearth of security ties, Beijing has worked over the last decade to narrow this strategic deficit, deepening its security partnerships as never before across the spectrum of defense activities, including military diplomacy, combined training and exercises, and arms exports.

These activities complement and reinforce China’s political and economic relationships by providing an additional mechanism through which Beijing can support friendly and strategically important regimes. Two principal forces are at work. First, an increasing number of overseas interests are compelling China to contribute to the regime survival and domestic stability of its partners; and second, greater wealth and capabilities are enhancing China’s ability to do so.

From the perspective of recipient nations, Beijing is an attractive security partner because it provides “no-strings-attached” military assistance, differentiating itself from Western countries that sometimes refuse to sell weapons to rogue regimes or gross violators of human rights. This has resulted in Beijing frequently serving as a key security partner to countries that otherwise have trouble finding international friends, including Sudan, Iran, and Venezuela.

For China, enhanced security partnerships support diverse strategic objectives, including balancing externally and internally and securing access to vital resources. As Scott Harold and Ali Nader have argued, China’s security partnerships are also emerging to serve traditional “geostrategic balancing against the United States” and other potential rivals. China has made common cause and engaged in large-scale military exercises with Russia under the rubric of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. More recently, China has also sought to dilute the U.S. alliance system in Asia by building closer partnerships with U.S. allies, including Thailand, Australia, and South Korea. Meanwhile, China’s historic “all-weather friendship” with Pakistan, as well as its burgeoning relations along the Indian Ocean littoral, serve, as Evan Feigenbaum has argued, to “bottle up India in the subcontinent, forestalling the emergence of a continental-sized rival and precluding more extensive Indian security activities in East Asia.”

China has also used military diplomacy – including specific bilateral military engagements with the United States – to reinforce its message of a peaceful rise, “assuage its neighbors’ concerns about the PLA’s growing military capabilities and intentions” and combat what it calls the “China threat theory.” Along its troubled periphery, China has also worked with partners, particularly in Central Asia, to strengthen the internal and border security of its partners and undermine what Beijing refers to as the “three evil forces of terrorism, extremism and separatism.”
China also uses its external security partnerships to advance its own military modernization and serve other domestic bureaucratic needs. Lacking major warfighting experience since the 1979 border war with Vietnam, the PLA relies on bilateral and multilateral exercises, overseas activities and patrols, and extended U.N. peacekeeping deployments to build much-needed operational experience. China further uses these engagements for purposes of intelligence gathering, as at the July 2014 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise when, invited to participate for the first time, China sent a spy vessel along with its larger group of ships to monitor the exercises.

Finally, China’s military-industrial base benefits enormously from increased security engagement. The PLA has managed to acquire advanced technologies, in many cases dual-use, from abroad through deepened partnerships with advanced economies. As one commentator noted, “If the
People’s Liberation Army went to war tomorrow, it would field an arsenal bristling with hardware from some of America’s closest allies: Germany, France and Britain. China’s arms industry, which is engaged in an extended process of adaptation to market forces, gains both one-time economic rewards and overall commercial expertise by selling arms abroad. Weapons sales and joint development can also lock in partners who become reliant on parts and maintenance.

China has further used stronger security ties to support governments that can fill vital energy and natural resource demands, as well as those that lie along critical sea lanes. Such efforts have pushed the deepening of China’s security ties through Southeast Asia, South Asia, and into the Persian Gulf and East African littoral. As two Chinese scholars associated with the Ministry of State Security have written: “As China powers ahead, it has begun to worry about resource security, the protection of overseas interests and a stable regional order. The evolving considerations behind the conclusion of strategic partnerships reflect the changing requirements of sustaining China’s growth and its evolving global role.”

As with China’s policy of noninterference, its commitment to nonalignment is likely to come into ever-starker contradiction with the reality that it is deepening its partnerships in unprecedented ways across nearly every facet of the security cooperation continuum. Leading Chinese scholars are now proposing potential policy changes, such as Tsinghua University’s Yan Xuetong, who has argued that China “needs to develop more high-quality diplomatic and military relationships” that “may even extend to providing security guarantees to select countries.”

CHINA’S ENHANCED MILITARY DIPLOMACY

The rapid growth of China’s military diplomacy has been particularly notable in recent years, including the use of high-level visits, defense dialogues, and personnel exchanges. Much of this has occurred under the rubric of over a dozen different types of official “partnerships” that Beijing has established with foreign governments, including “cooperative partnerships,” “comprehensive cooperative partnerships,” “strategic partnerships,” and “comprehensive strategic partnerships.” These agreements vary in content but serve as both canopies for subsequent agreements and tools for Beijing to criticize unfavorable actions as counter to the spirit of the partnership. China’s relations
with roughly 60 countries now receive one such designation or another. Meanwhile, the PLA’s international engagements have expanded in number and scope, including military exchanges with more than 150 countries and approximately 400 annual military-to-military “contacts.” Additionally, between 2003 and 2010, China reportedly trained over 10,000 foreign military personnel in subjects ranging from high-level training for commanding officers, to technical courses in military medicine, engineering, and radar, to combat disciplines such as artillery and armor.

China’s military diplomacy has been particularly active in Asia. Beijing signed long-term cooperative framework agreements with all 10 countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1999 and 2000, with a defense cooperation clause included for six of them: Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Laos, and Brunei. China subsequently conducted security-related dialogues with a number of countries in the region, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, which leading analysts suggest “have proved to be useful venues to increase mutual security perceptions and advance bilateral military cooperation.” During Xi’s October 2013 trip to Indonesia, for example, the two countries agreed to upgrade bilateral relations to a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” including efforts to bolster security ties through “defense consultations and navy dialogues” and to commit to conducting combined military exercises and cooperate on maritime security.

In doing so, China has worked to weaken the influence of the United States. Beijing has sought to deepen its security partnership with Seoul, in part, according to the former national security advisor to South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, “to draw the Republic of Korea as far away as possible from Japan and the United States.” This approach is similar to – but exceeds – China’s effort to “wean Australia and New Zealand from their habit of close cooperation with the U.S. Navy” through repeated high-level engagements. In recent years, China and South Korea have instituted a bevy of security initiatives, including institutionalizing a bilateral defense ministers’ meeting, establishing hotlines between their navies and air forces (which set the stage for the establishment of one between defense chiefs), and agreeing in 2012 to increase military education exchanges.

China’s thirst for resources is further propelling military diplomacy with energy-exporting countries as well. As Iran’s top oil customer, Beijing has elevated its security partnership with Tehran. In October 2014, China’s defense minister visited Tehran, praising recent exchanges and training and stressing that “China is willing to work with Iran to further pragmatic cooperation and strengthen military-to-military ties.” This came on the heels of the first-ever visit by Chinese naval vessels to Iran, followed by a joint naval exercise in the Persian Gulf. China has similarly expanded its military outreach to other regional energy exporters, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as other Middle Eastern countries such as Lebanon and Turkey.

China became Saudi Arabia’s largest export market in 2009 in the context of growing political and defense ties. Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz’s first visit outside the Persian Gulf region after his accession was to China. High-level Saudi defense officials visited Beijing in 2013 and 2014 – including Crown Prince (now King) Salman – and senior PLA officials made reciprocal visits in 2014. In 2013, Xi called for upgrading military-to-military relations with Saudi Arabia. The same year saw the Saudi defense minister visit Beijing and declare that “Saudi Arabia is ready to enhance cooperation with China to protect peace, security and stability in the [Middle East] region.”

China’s military diplomacy has become truly global in nature, with Beijing actively forging security partnerships in Africa, Latin America, and the Pacific Islands as well. Security issues have assumed an increasingly prominent role in
China’s engagements with Africa over the past decade. China has participated in U.N. peacekeeping operations in more than 10 African countries. In the action plan resulting from the 2012 meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (a multilateral mechanism involving China, 50 African nations, and the African Union), China launched an initiative to provide financial assistance and capacity-building measures, such as personnel exchanges to the African Union, “to enhance cooperation with Africa on peace and security issues.” In 2015, official Chinese sources speculated that concrete actions in this vein could include assistance to the African Standby Force or rapid response forces through expanded training, exercising, and intelligence sharing to support peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and counterpiracy. Meanwhile, Beijing has high-level military dialogue with at least 11 African countries, and Chinese naval flotillas have begun making port calls to African partners as part of their counterpiracy missions in the Gulf of Aden, including stops in Angola, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tanzania in 2014.

China has also increased naval tours to the Pacific Islands, with two People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels paying a goodwill visit to the region in 2010, stopping in Tonga, Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea before heading to Australia and New Zealand. The hospital ship Peace Ark visited Tonga, Fiji, Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea in 2014. Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff Wang Guanzhong visited Fiji and Vanuatu in 2013 and 2014 respectively, in each case pledging to deepen military relations. These deployments allow the PLAN to practice long-distance operations on the high seas.

In Latin America, “(d)eference visits are coupled with a rise in military personnel exchanges, which build upon China’s objectives to establish goodwill.” China has welcomed officers from at least 18 Latin American countries to learn foreign languages and study military planning and strategy at several Chinese military academies. These activities are less robust than with Asian countries but have been increasing nonetheless.

**JOINT EXERCISES AND OPERATIONS**

Beyond high-level visits, port calls, and personnel exchanges, China’s security engagements have seen a substantial increase in bilateral and multilateral exercises. China did not conduct its first joint exercise with a foreign military until an October 2002 counterterrorism drill with Kyrgyzstan. Over the remainder of the decade China engaged in over 40 exercises with more than 20 countries, during which time the exercises grew in size and complexity.

Russia and Pakistan have been particularly important partners in this regard. Sino-Russian combined exercises as members of the SCO have provided the opportunity to engage in major military exercises under the rubric of a multilateral organization. The Peace Mission 2007 exercise in Russia marked China’s inaugural “out-of-country deployment of combat aircraft,” among other firsts, and during the 2014 version of the exercise, China conducted live missile firing trials from an armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Pakistan has also been a particularly pivotal partner for China. In a signal achievement, they partnered up for China’s first joint naval drill with a foreign counterpart off the coast of Shanghai in October 2003. The two countries now engage in combined air, sea, and ground exercises and since 2011 have regularly conducted the Shaheen air exercises that include offensive strike drills. The third iteration, in 2014, marked the first time that the Chinese J-10 fighter participated in an overseas exercise and also saw the Pakistan air force operating the jointly produced JF-17 fighter. These exercises provide China with opportunities to practice deploying air and naval assets in ways that would be required for effective power projection.

China is also more regularly engaging in military exercises with U.S. allies and partners in Asia. China has held search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), and naval maneuver exercises with Australia since
2004 and conducted its first live-fire exercise with the Australian navy in 2010. The Chinese and Indonesian militaries train together in special operations, and Indonesian pilots have trained on simulators in China, as both air forces operate Russian-made Sukhoi fighter jets. Farther afield in the Persian Gulf, China has started conducting exercises with oil and natural gas exporters as it seeks to secure access to energy. In addition to the September 2014 exercise with Iran, the PLAN’s increased presence in the Indian Ocean has boosted military interactions with Kuwait, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

The PLA is similarly more active in multilateral combined exercises. In 2014, China for the first time participated in the biennial U.S.-led RIMPAC drill, the world’s largest multilateral maritime exercise, sending a missile destroyer, a missile frigate, a supply ship, and the hospital ship Peace Ark. The United States has indicated it will invite China to the 2016 iteration as well. In 2014, China also participated for the first time in Khaan Quest, a multilateral U.N. peacekeeping exercise in Mongolia, and upgraded its participation in the 2014 Cobra Gold exercises in Thailand to “observer-plus” status, reflecting its expanded role.

ARMS SALES AND JOINT PRODUCTION
Arms sales and joint production have also served as key components of the rapid expansion and deepening of China’s security partnerships. According to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), China uses arms exports as "part of a multifaceted approach to promote trade, secure access to natural resources, and extend its influence in

In this May 24, 2014 photo, China’s Harbin (112) guided missile destroyer takes part in a week-long China-Russia “Joint Sea-2014” navy exercise at the East China Sea off Shanghai, China. Source: AP Images
the region," further noting that many developing countries "view China as a provider of low-cost weapons with fewer political strings attached compared to other international arms suppliers."\textsuperscript{117}

Over the last decade, China has increased the volume, value, quality, and geographic scope of its arms sales. From 2010 to 2014, China signed approximately $13.7 billion in conventional arms sales around the world, a 143 percent increase over the previous five-year period.\textsuperscript{118} Similarly, from 2010–2014, China sent major arms to 35 countries and increased its share of international arms exports to 5 percent, from 3 percent in the previous five-year period.\textsuperscript{119}

China now ranks among the world’s leading arms dealers. In 2012, China replaced the United Kingdom as the fifth-largest exporter in the world – the first time a non-Western country had ranked among the top five since the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{120} The following year China displaced France for fourth place.\textsuperscript{121} In 2014, China surpassed Germany as the world’s third-largest exporter, behind only Russia and the United States.\textsuperscript{122} It figures even more prominently in particular regions: In 2010, China became Africa’s primary supplier of weapons, with 25 percent market share.\textsuperscript{123}

Long regarded as an exporter of small arms and light weapons, China has matured into a source of sophisticated weapons systems and is now exporting major platforms such as fighter aircraft, submarines, surface ships, and ballistic and cruise missiles – and more recently, UAVs and air and missile defense systems.

Chinese fighter aircraft are now providing an alternative to Russian, European, and potentially U.S. designs. China has sought to sell J-10B fighters to Pakistan under a 2009 deal and has received inquiries from various Asian, African, and Latin American countries.\textsuperscript{124} Saudi Arabia has apparently also expressed interest to Islamabad in the joint Sino-Pakistani JF-17 Thunder fighter jet, despite being historically reliant on the United States for tactical fighters.\textsuperscript{125} The Chinese media have also indicated that the J-31, a reportedly low-observable fighter aircraft, is intended for export.\textsuperscript{126} Pakistan, which to date has not followed through on the deal to purchase J-10Bs despite strong signals in that direction, has reportedly approached Beijing to buy J-31 fighters.\textsuperscript{127}

Furthermore, China intends to provide submarines to international security partners, reportedly agreeing to sell six export versions of its Yuan-class diesel-electric attack submarines to Pakistan and two attack submarines to Bangladesh, bolstering Beijing’s already formidable surface ship exports with recent sales of frigates to Algeria, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Thailand.\textsuperscript{128}

In addition to China’s long history of providing ballistic missiles and associated technology to partners, including Pakistan, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, Beijing has more recently entered the air defense export business, marketing its wares to Turkey and Myanmar.\textsuperscript{129} This has sometimes occurred clandestinely, as uncovered by a 2013 joint U.S.-Yemeni interception of Chinese anti-aircraft missiles intended for Iran.\textsuperscript{130} China has also attempted to sell an export version of the HQ-9 air defense missile system to Turkey, which has since backed away from the deal due to economic and diplomatic concerns.\textsuperscript{131}

In part taking advantage of opportunities created by Washington’s export controls prior to February 2015, China has actively pursued the sale of UAVs.\textsuperscript{132} Saudi Arabia, long unable to procure American UAVs due to restrictions under the Missile Technology Control Regime, is reportedly purchasing China’s Wing Loong UAV, a similar design to the General Atomics Predator that is capable of firing air-to-ground missiles.\textsuperscript{133} Furthermore, China is reportedly selling similar UAVs to unspecified countries in the Persian Gulf, Africa, and Asia, possibly to include Algeria, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Uzbekistan, among others.\textsuperscript{134} In January 2015, an armed UAV appearing to be a Chinese-made CH-3 drone crashed in an area of Nigeria where government forces are fighting against the terrorist group Boko Haram.\textsuperscript{135}
Finally, in addition to arms sales, China has deepened its security partnerships through joint weapons production. For example, Pakistan made a “political decision” to join China in developing the JF-17 fourth-generation multirole combat aircraft. Similarly, China and Indonesia reached a defense industrial cooperation agreement in 2011. Under this framework, Beijing has proposed cooperation in defense electronics between Chinese and Indonesian firms and has transferred technology for its C-705 anti-ship missile to Jakarta for local production to serve the Indonesian navy. China is also partnering with Nigeria on offshore patrol vessels and with Argentina on light helicopters and potentially attack fighters, and Beijing regularly sends defense industry representatives to foreign countries to “explore the possibility of identifying joint or co-production projects.”

In all, China is rapidly deepening its security partnerships around the world, expanding its military diplomacy, enhancing its joint exercises, and becoming an increasingly important player in the global arms market. These security ties serve a variety of key national interests, suggesting that these dimensions of China’s overall foreign policy will only grow over time.
Key Takeaways

While still facing considerable limitations, the People’s Liberation Army is becoming more sophisticated across the spectrum of force projection capabilities.

In the next 10 to 15 years, China will likely be capable of carrying out a number of overseas missions, including major international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation operations, securing of important assets overseas, defense of sea lanes, counterterrorism strikes, and stabilization operations.
Growing Force Projection Capabilities

China’s rise has led to a host of new globe-spanning interests, and the ability to protect and advance them is increasingly linked to the Communist Party’s legitimacy. These new exigencies are driving the PLA to play a more active global role, enabled by an increasing ability to do so. In fact, China has already made progress in developing the capabilities necessary to exact limited global power projection, though significant challenges remain. A future expeditionary PLA will be of flexible utility for both cooperative and coercive purposes, and strategic intent may change as new capabilities come online.

China’s recent international security activism represents a growing departure from long-standing defense strategy and policy: The nation’s military has traditionally focused primarily on internal security, homeland defense, and protection of China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This latter goal was for many years narrowly defined to mean securing China’s land borders and achieving unification with Taiwan, although it was later expanded to encompass regionally disputed territories claimed by Beijing, including in the East and South China Seas. Not only was a broader military presence not a stated CCP leadership goal, it contravened both proximate priorities and several foreign policy dogmas, such as the abjuration of hegemony and interference in other countries’ affairs.

But over the past decade, as China’s leaders have grown both more confident and more aware of the threats attending globalization, they have redefined the scope of China’s strategic interests and the PLA’s place in realizing them. In 2004, then-President Hu Jintao issued the “new historic missions” for the PLA, a set of unprecedented strategic planning directions that included two drivers for a more global presence: the need for the PLA to safeguard Chinese interests overseas and the need to support China’s international influence. China’s 2009 defense white paper cited specific tasks that flow from the new historic missions, including counterterrorism, stability maintenance, emergency rescue, and international peacekeeping.

Subsequent top-level guidance has reinforced this push for a more extroverted military. Shortly after assuming the reins of government, Xi Jinping articulated the goal of building China into a “maritime power,” linking it to the country’s future security and prosperity. Furthermore, China’s 2013 defense white paper mentioned as a key concern that “security risks to China’s overseas interests are on the rise” and that the PLA would step up to protect them. The white paper devoted an entire chapter to the PLA’s participation in image-burnishing cooperative security activities through which “China earnestly fulfills its international responsibilities and obligations.” All of these concepts are part of a broader interpretation of China’s interests that is inseparable from the world beyond China’s shores or even the Asia-Pacific writ large.

As a result, Chinese security forces have become increasingly active in global affairs, participating in counterpiracy operations alongside an international coalition in the Gulf of Aden since 2009 and in the emergency joint noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) that rescued 35,000 Chinese citizens from a rapidly collapsing Libya in 2011. Chinese forces also have had a significantly stepped-up role in United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKO), including a more than twenty-fold increase in troops deployed between 2000 and 2014. China has also escorted Syrian chemical weapons to their destruction in the Mediterranean. In March 2015, a Chinese frigate evacuated nearly 500 Chinese nationals from Yemen.

While these overseas operations may seem small compared with U.S. global military activity, if measured against China’s old baseline of virtually no security actions beyond its borders they are big and bold. Moreover, these are likely first forays in what is a growing trend, especially as current operations yield gains in experience and comfort operating abroad. While the PLA remains significantly behind the standard set by the U.S. military,
so does the rest of the world. This does not mean that the PLA's growing capabilities are irrelevant. As one leading analyst has argued, the “Chinese military will be neither hollow nor a juggernaut. It will be neither a third-rate force confined to its region nor one that will embark on large-scale overseas combat adventures.” Despite important limitations, China is building capabilities across a wide spectrum that will enable it to do more in the world in ways that will have increasing impact on the international security environment in the decades ahead.

CHINA’S GROWING FORCE PROJECTION CAPABILITIES, ATTRIBUTES, AND MISSIONS

Political rhetoric and tentative forays into global expeditionary operations indicate that China is moving toward building a PLA that can deploy not only in China’s immediate periphery, but also through Asia and ultimately around the globe. But executing this goal is a formidable challenge, as China lacks many of the foundational elements of previous global military powers: sustained overseas basing and presence, a robust inventory of force projection platforms, and doctrine and training honed through operational experience. China’s military by the mid-1980s had accumulated large numbers of obsolete platforms. By the mid-1990s, concerted PLA modernization efforts began their replacement with smaller numbers of new, more modern, and sophisticated platforms knitted together with networked command and control.

Today, as China’s military inches closer to a force structure that can support warfighting objectives for a Taiwan or near-seas contingency and China’s shipbuilding and aviation industries have demonstrated capability to consistently produce advanced products, an effort is underway to gradually increase numbers of some of the more successful platforms that could be useful for distant operations. China is also developing new power projection capabilities with obvious expeditionary relevance, its inchoate aircraft carrier program being a prominent example. Along with greater air- and space-based systems to coordinate their use and experience gleaned from deployments such as the Gulf of Aden task force, China’s existing and future assets could provide the foundation of a fledgling global expeditionary force.

It is unlikely (given CCP priorities if nothing else), that China in the next 20 years will have the capability to deploy large belligerent armadas or launch full-scale invasions of distant lands if opposed by a capable force. But this is not the sole metric of military power and influence. In the short to medium term, the PLA will likely be increasingly capable of conducting operations along a spectrum of global activities that support various strategic goals. These include simple but diplomatically significant ship visits, humanitarian missions in remote countries, more complex and contested versions of its 2011 Libya evacuation, and finally various types of coercion, pressure, and even aggression against non-state actors and weaker states.

We assess China’s present and future capabilities across five major attributes of a globally potent military: force projection, sustainment, capacity, command and control, and force protection.
**Force Projection**

Force projection is the ability to deploy the military instrument of national power beyond one’s territory in response to requirements for military operations. While this is an expansive term, here we refer specifically to expeditionary capabilities, naval and air platforms that can operate at and deliver effects over long ranges.

Projecting power at a distance is one of the most difficult tasks a military can undertake, generally requiring capabilities of a completely different kind than do operations that take place close to one’s shores under the cover of friendly land-based airpower. The distances involved in many putative PLA global operations are, moreover, immense.

Certain platforms and systems are particularly relevant for distant operations. Carriers and large-deck amphibious vessels are useful mainly for power projection ashore, though they can perform humanitarian missions as a lesser-included case, albeit imperfectly. Aircraft carriers can project power ashore through the air and are especially good for strike. China’s well-known first carrier, the Liaoning, while of dubious operational utility at present, is serving as a training platform for a burgeoning program.

For its future carrier air wings, China is developing its twin-seat J-15 fighter aircraft, a derivative of the Russian SU-33 Flanker, which has apparently passed prototyping and entered service as an operational training aircraft. Catapults, flattop decks, and possibly nuclear propulsion will be key indicators of progress. The first carrier is an experimental platform; it is what, and how many, China builds next that will matter.

Deck-borne aviation is useful not only for striking ashore by creating a protective screen of maritime supremacy around a task force so that it can conduct strike and other expeditionary operations, but also for gaining domain awareness and projecting power across wide swaths of ocean. To this end, in addition to future carrier-borne fighter aircraft, the PLAN has increased helicopter deployment and use, with each of the PLAN’s large modern surface combatants capable of embarking at least one helicopter.

Meanwhile, China is also developing large amphibious vessels that are specifically useful for Taiwan contingencies, but also potentially for projecting ground power. In recent years, according to a U.S. senior intelligence officer, China’s “amphibious acquisition has shifted decisively towards larger, high-end, ships,” which has “signaled the PLA(N)’s emerging interest in expeditionary warfare.” Since 2007, China has produced three amphibious landing platform docks comparable in size to the previous generation of the U.S. Navy’s equivalent, the San Antonio-class. China is also reportedly working on an amphibious assault ship. Amphibious ships, as their name implies, can facilitate ship-to-shore movement of forces, whether in the context of a ground invasion or a lower-intensity NEO.

China is also developing a number of critical supporting capabilities that to date have kept it from achieving the range necessary for expeditionary operations. A key capability in this regard is the Y-20 heavy-lift jet transport, which began flight-testing in January 2013. In addition to furnishing mobility and strategic lift, the Y-20 could be outfitted with an airborne warning and control system (AWACS), which is used to choreograph long-range air operations at great distances. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s (PLAAF’s) tankers remain limited in number and capability, although this could change rapidly if prioritized.

A wide range of potential force projection operations – an evacuation operation in a nonpermissive environment being perhaps the best example – would have a significant ground force component as well. For contingencies against non-state actors, China could draw on skills honed by PLA ground forces and PLAN marines during Sichuan Earthquake relief operations in 2008, by special forces in Gulf of Aden anti-piracy operations, and even by Chinese participants in U.N. peacekeeping forces. China has trained for years to conduct an amphibious landing on Taiwan or on various East
and South China Sea islets, and those skills could be transferrable to more remote shores if supported with larger, longer-range platforms.\textsuperscript{162}

Long-range ballistic and cruise missiles – which China deploys in large quantities and are the key to its Asia-Pacific anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) approach – are also relevant to power projection, as they can hold adversary targets at risk to deter or compel.\textsuperscript{163} With improvements in space architecture, over-the-horizon targeting, and adaptation to existing sea-based launch platforms, such missiles could be repurposed to constitute a potent, if narrowly focused, force projection tool. Chinese nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), which have already reportedly ventured as far afield as the Persian Gulf, could be particularly formidable launch platforms given their high cruising speed, endurance, and potential for concealment.\textsuperscript{164}

China’s growing capabilities in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum can also facilitate a broad array of military operations, including “extended-range power projection.”\textsuperscript{165}

Many of the force projection platforms China currently fields or will in the near future are, while not competitive with the United States, qualitatively more advanced than most observers expected a decade ago and sufficient in numbers to give the United States pause in certain contingencies even if U.S. capabilities retain the advantage on a ship-to-ship basis. While still small in number, with significant resources they could provide a respectable force suited to a range of possible contingencies.

\textbf{Sustainment}

Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment.\textsuperscript{166} It often implies the ability to remain on station for as long as required and to be supported independent of land bases. Sustaining missions of extended duration is difficult under the best of circumstances, but becomes more so the farther a military gets from its shores. Driven in part by its repeated deployments of task forces to the Gulf of Aden – 19 and counting – China is already pursuing several enablers for a far-seas logistics chain. The ability to replenish at sea, to conduct remote repairs, and to have reliable access to friendly port facilities are critical determinants of success in conducting extended expeditionary operations, as are the infrastructure and access agreements needed to conduct equivalent air operations from a forward airfield.

Supplies and replenishment underway have progressed rapidly since the first anti-piracy task force prepared to leave China in late 2008. In foreign ports, China is able to draw upon its state-owned China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) for replenishment. The PLAN has also made great progress in perishables preservation and potable water generation.\textsuperscript{167} Its auxiliary fleet is expanding, particularly with long-range, high-speed oilers and replenishment ships. Supporting more than limited long-range operations will require additional replenishment ships, which China’s capable shipbuilding industry has already started to build and has the capacity to build far more of, relatively rapidly if requested.\textsuperscript{168}

To better support extended operations, China must also develop the ability to conduct sophisticated ship and aircraft maintenance and repairs remotely, either through tenders or overseas repair facilities. Both ships and aircraft require depot-level maintenance after a certain number of hours. While the PLAN has reportedly made “significant steps toward establishing the maintenance culture that marks professional navies,”\textsuperscript{169} there is no evidence of regularly scheduled independent inspections mandated by an outside authority, a regimen that the U.S. Navy prioritizes. In the future, China’s military will not need tenders if it has access to technologically sophisticated port facilities or the ability to bring technicians abroad. However, tenders will be necessary for true independence, should neutral ports be closed off in the event of hostilities. At-sea repair is not only a logistics and supply factor, but also an indicator
of a top-class professional force (one that Russia’s navy, for instance, never mastered). Access to neutral repair facilities in peacetime is not particularly controversial; Pakistan has already offered such services in Karachi. A more significant question is the caliber of venues and services available. Progress is being made in medical care overseas, with land-based partnerships under development.

Extended operations overseas are extremely difficult without reliable access to facilities abroad to undertake equipping, servicing, and other support beyond replenishment. As a result, China is pursuing neutral port access to supply the PLAN in waterways in which it operates, such as the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden, albeit with political costs and the risk of operational vulnerability.

In order for the PLA to expand coverage while fulfilling existing missions of much greater importance, China must increase its overall capacity, which defines the sophistication and scale at which a military can operate, in turn impacting that military’s ability to execute a given mission set. In this context, capacity encompasses both requisite amounts of human and material assets and the organizational processes to generate military power effectively.

For China, at a basic level, this means upping ship and aircraft production. Qualitative improvement has already been unexpectedly rapid. Establishment of new, modern shipyards dedicated to military ship production or expansion of military areas in co-production yards would greatly facilitate quantitative buildup. Similar requirements apply to aircraft of all kinds, space assets, and other primary and enabling platforms. Supporting such a buildup requires a large logistics and support infrastructure.

In addition to having the hardware, the PLA needs significant improvements in operational experience and readiness. Hands-on training both seasons military personnel and refines concepts of operation and other processes by which a military functions. Gradually increasing force deployment to distant areas, as through the Gulf of Aden missions, is slowly raising familiarity and readiness.
Much more will be needed if the PLA is to operate confidently far from its shores.

Finally, formal processes need to be developed that can organize, train, and equip forces capable of undertaking expeditionary operations. This entails establishing appropriate commands to coordinate efforts and changing service cultures and exercises to simulate truly realistic, joint operations. One cannot learn to manage the uncertainties of expeditionary activities without challenging assumptions and boundaries in training. Lack of these habits remains a significant challenge for today’s PLA.¹⁷⁶

Command and Control
Command and control systems are the facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned and attached forces pursuant to the missions assigned.¹⁷⁷ The PLA has recognized the necessity of being able to orient and control assets through sophisticated command and control systems. This is especially true at great distances, yet those distances dramatically increase the difficulty of supplying the requisite command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). To detect, report, and direct activities over the Pacific and Indian Oceans, China is thus developing an increasingly complete, integrated surface C4ISR network: It maintains the world’s second-largest fleet of intelligence-gathering, surveying, and space event support ships. Survey vessels, which typically precede naval operations, are studying relevant routes in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans.¹⁷⁸

Space-based systems with expanded geographic coverage are especially important to support expeditionary operations farther afield, for which few alternatives are available. China is rapidly developing a constellation of remote sensing, communications, and data relay satellites impressive in number and scope and growing in capability. According to a report by Taiwan’s ministry of defense, China’s on-orbit military satellites are already “capable of supporting operation command and control of PLA forces west of the first island chain.”¹⁷⁹ Its Beidou/Compass positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) satellite constellation achieved regional coverage by the end of 2013 and is on track to become only the third or fourth network to provide global coverage by 2020. As part of its Digital Earth initiative, Beijing plans to significantly enhance its land- and space-based remote sensing architecture, to include polar facilities. Having only four overseas ground stations currently, China plans to establish “network nodes” at the North and South Poles and in Brazil as part of a “Digital Earth Scientific Platform” by 2030.¹⁸⁰ China will almost certainly achieve enhanced open-ocean surveillance capabilities, a critical piece for a military ranging far and wide or responding to contingencies where accurate information is at a premium.

Despite this ambitious hardware buildout, there is currently very little delegation to field commanders when it comes to overseas operations. Evolution of organization, command, and coordination will be essential to supporting operations of increased scope and scale.

Force Protection
Force protection comprises preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against personnel, resources, facilities, and critical information.¹⁸¹ Deploying large numbers of assets farther away from China imposes vulnerabilities on those units that increase with distance, at least to a point. Especially in a scenario of confrontation or conflict with another major military power, PLA assets plying distant waters would be under threat of attack by the adversary’s forces. To address this, China will have to develop open-ocean anti-submarine warfare (ASW), currently an area of critical weakness. This involves increasingly quiet long-range nuclear submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, and helicopters. China currently deploys at least three dozen relatively quiet conventionally powered attack submarines, with plans for at least a dozen more.¹⁸² Future generations of nuclear-powered
attack submarines already contemplated may both provide “generational” technological upgrades and free up current boats to roam beyond the Western Pacific. Moreover, China is thought to be developing deck-borne maritime patrol aircraft specifically for deep-water ASW.

Additionally, as the PLAN ranges farther from China’s robust layers of land-based and coastal defense systems, further development of area air defense will be critical to protect vital assets. Advanced surface vessels with long-range air defense systems, such as Luyang-II and -III destroyers – which have 3-D radars superficially similar to SPY-1 radar aboard U.S. Aegis destroyers, albeit likely less powerful – can strengthen expeditionary capabilities. By 2017, China is expected to possess 14 hulls spread over these two classes, of which 13 were commissioned in 2013 or later. In the words of the senior China analyst in the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, “These modern, high-end combatants will likely provide increased weapons stores and overall flexibility as surface action groups venture more frequently into blue water in the coming years.”

While ASW remains a weakness, the PLA’s progress in other areas such as area air defense has given observers pause and could presage a more rapid trajectory for generating capabilities that could safeguard and enable other kinds of expeditionary activities abroad. Moreover, leading analysts assess that the PLA intends on making these capabilities expeditionary. During training with the Liaoning, for instance, according to one leading U.S. analyst, the PLA has assembled “group[s] of vessels more closely resembling a combined expeditionary strike group than just a carrier group.”

Finally, particularly in approaching shore and landing, contending with naval mines and land-based threats such as missiles may become necessary. Ashore, counterterrorism and disabling of improvised explosive devices may be required.

### OPPosed INTERVENTION

Operating in a hostile foreign environment far from safe havens represents the pinnacle of expeditionary military activities. It could implicate nearly all of the aforementioned categories, but it bears special emphasis because it depends in part on opponent capabilities and will remain one of the PLA’s most difficult challenges. Enablers for high-intensity opposed operations are likely very far in the future, and the PLA’s capability to act in opposition to major militaries will take decades to develop. Meanwhile, much of China’s overseas activities and presence will be “lower-end” in nature.

### DISTANT OPERATIONS CAPABILITY SPECTRUM

Force projection spans a continuum, from the basic ability to defend ones shores to sustaining high-intensity combat under increasingly contested conditions at great distances from mainland China. The table on the next page (“Increasingly Expeditionary PLA Missions and Force Postures”) delineates categories of force projection capability and describes each in terms of its purpose along with our assessment of the PLA’s current status in achieving it.

In a sense, China is prepared for relatively complex operations on its periphery and fairly basic tasks at a distance. The PLA already possesses formidable near-coast defense and near-seas active defense. It has also developed a low-end limited expeditionary capability that allows China to engage in peacetime and low-intensity operations around the world.

The first three layers, up through extended blue-water counterintervention, constitute the expansion of China’s existing A2/AD capabilities to cover a wider geographic zone. The PLA could graduate to possess such capabilities by 2020, and this would, among other things, limit the U.S. military’s freedom of maneuver within the first island chain. It is not an expeditionary capability per se but provides an important baseline for present efforts. These missions are exquisite but relatively “thin” in terms of the variety and quantity of systems required.
### Increasingly Expeditionary PLA Missions and Force Postures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Near-Coast Defense</td>
<td>Delay enemy invasion of waters/airspace up to ~12 nautical miles from China’s coastline and ~300 miles inland.</td>
<td>Developed from 1949–1980s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near-Seas Active Defense</td>
<td>Achieve sea/air control for a certain time in certain area(s) of near seas, first island chain, and its inner and outer rims.</td>
<td>Pursued 1987–present; already achieved.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended Blue-Water Counterintervention</td>
<td>Ability to “deny” access by holding opposing forces at risk throughout China’s periphery and all approaches thereto to a distance of 1,000+ nm from territorial waters/airspace.</td>
<td>Achievable in theory by 2020.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Expeditionary</td>
<td>All of the above, and ability to conduct maritime interdiction operations and high-level NEO, when necessary, in/above far seas.</td>
<td>Achievable in theory by 2030. Low end already achieved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue-Water Expeditionary</td>
<td>All of the above, some form of global presence even if thin, and ability to surge combat-ready forces in/above core strategic far-oceans areas (e.g., Persian Gulf). Ability to seize, attempt to hold small features.</td>
<td>In progress. Post-2030 at earliest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Expeditionary</td>
<td>All of the above and the robust presence of combat-ready naval/air forces in all major strategic regions of world.</td>
<td>Indeterminate; several decades away if at all.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* China has major capabilities to support, although this does not guarantee that it can overcome evolving U.S./allied countermeasures.
The next three layers are far more complex, or “thick.” Given sufficient Chinese prioritization, the PLA could attain a limited-expeditionary capability by 2030, able to conduct contingency operations at greater distance. With such a force structure, China could conduct opposed NEOs, as well as limited maritime interdiction operations in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. At a minimum, such a force would be capable of distant low-intensity conflict, freedom of navigation operations, carrier operations, distant ASW, anti-surface warfare, and anti-air warfare. Supporting airpower operations could include aerial refueling, over-water flight, extended-duration maritime patrol and intelligence collection, anti-ship missile strike, and strategic bombing. Landing and land power operations could require mine countermeasures and point defense against cruise missiles.

It is also possible to imagine that China could, with even limited success in enablers, conduct operations that are “thin” (in that they do not implicate a massive or diverse expeditionary force) but distant. Examples could include limited precision strike or uncontested special operations forces (SOF) raids, such as a NEO or counterterror strike off a distant shore.

Most ambitious would be a blue-water or even global expeditionary posture (the latter being the term PLAN planners use to categorize today’s U.S. Navy) and air operations to go with it. Chinese sources show no conclusive evidence of aspiration to such capabilities by 2030 or even for some years after, although some interpret former PLAN commander Liu Huaqing’s writings as calling for such a navy by 2050.190

Beyond all aforementioned capabilities, a blue-water expeditionary posture (the global expeditionary low end) would require some form of global presence by forces of at least limited numbers and capability and the ability to surge combat-ready forces into core strategic areas. A full global expeditionary posture, maximal in scope and intensity, would require all this and also the robust presence of combat-ready air and naval forces in all major strategic regions of world. The ability to engage in major combat operations presupposes comprehensive capability to contest for supremacy in all domains and engage in distant joint forcible-entry operations and amphibious assault. Given these tremendous requirements, this benchmark remains too far in China’s future to merit serious consideration at this stage.

MISSION SCENARIOS

The PLA has been making progress, however slight in some cases, on all components of a more robust global capability. China is not just buying equipment, but learning how to project power by maintaining hardware and training to use it. Based on its expanding military and growing overseas interests, China in the next 10 to 15 years could possess the capability to execute at least six major overseas missions of unprecedented scope and intensity, listed here in rough ascending order of difficulty: major international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; NEO; securing of important assets overseas; defense of sea lanes; counterterrorism strikes; and stabilization operations.

The PLA is highly likely to participate in a major international HA/DR operation in the coming years in the aftermath of a nontraditional security disaster, such as a typhoon, cyclone, earthquake, or tsunami. China has seen the reputational windfall that the United States has gained from relief efforts after disasters in places such as the Indian Ocean in 2004, Haiti in 2010, Japan in 2011, and the Philippines in 2013, and Beijing was stung by its inability to contribute militarily to the 2004 Asian tsunami response.

Already stepping out in this domain, China has begun deploying its hospital ship, the Peace Ark, to international relief zones.191 Future applications of its aircraft carriers or amphibious vessels could provide needed capacity in disaster areas. Even where China may not have interests or citizens at risk, it is possible that Beijing will participate in humanitarian operations around the globe in an effort to provide the world and Washington with
CHINA IS INCREASINGLY ABLE TO PROJECT POWER BEYOND ITS BORDERS

This map depicts notional overseas missions the PLA will be capable of performing in 2030. It is not intended to make concrete predictions.

- Mediterranean
- Persian Gulf
- Pakistan
- Central Asia
- South China Sea
- Indian Ocean
- Strait of Malacca
- Sudan/S.Sudan
- N. Korea
- Indian Ocean
- Myanmar
- South China Sea

Major humanitarian assistance/disaster relief
Noncombatant evacuation operation
Securing high-value assets
Defense of sea lanes
Counterterrorism strike
Stabilization operations
evidence of its peaceful rise. Without foreign opposition or opposed entry, the PLA could already dispatch the hospital ships, aircraft, and field hospitals required to make a major international contribution.

Given the increase in Chinese citizens abroad, NEO is a second likely major mission for the PLA. Although the 2011 evacuation of Chinese workers from Libya was a qualified success, Beijing cannot afford to fail in protecting Chinese citizens abroad from large-scale violence or in the event of a state collapse. China is thus likely to devote significant resources to be able to respond flexibly, and the attention devoted to the Libya operation in the 2013 defense white paper indicates that the PLA feels similarly. As a result, the large-scale evacuation of thousands of Chinese, potentially in an environment too dangerous for the usual Ministry of Foreign Affairs chartering of civilian vehicles, ships, and aircraft, will be needed.

In the event of a major NEO, Chinese forces could already get ashore and handle most threats to its people, whether from anti-Chinese riots or broader instability – with sufficient advanced planning. For evacuation of citizens stranded inland during complicated, rapidly evolving situations, additional capabilities and experience may be needed: improved intelligence coordination with diplomatic and other local assets, selecting among landing craft, helicopters, and other hardware.

Civilian and existing military assets are useful for certain scenarios. Assuming they can be diverted from more proximate concerns, amphibious vessels and other surface combatants with airborne or surface ship-to-shore connectors can secure a landing zone and flow special operations forces or other troops and materiel ashore. Other aspects of these operations will remain more difficult for now. Airlift requires significant numbers of aircraft, and China has yet to develop a substantial cargo aircraft fleet. To support coastal NEOs and have some capacity to intervene farther inland, China would benefit greatly from being able to quickly dispatch one to two brigades of rapid deployment troops, similar to a U.S. Marine expeditionary unit. Chinese special forces might well be too small to render the kind of large-scale, long-term protection provided by the U.S. Marine Corps’ rapid response force (about 1,000 Marines, albeit not all necessarily deployed simultaneously).

Based on its expanding military and growing overseas interests, China in the next 10 to 15 years could possess the capability to execute at least six major overseas missions of unprecedented scope and intensity, listed here in rough ascending order of difficulty: major international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; NEO; securing of important assets overseas; defense of sea lanes; counterterrorism strikes; and stabilization operations.

The PLA could also lead a third overseas mission of securing high-value assets, of which an increasing number are in Chinese hands around the world. In fact, in many cases they are owned by state-owned or closely government-linked enterprises. Examples of this type of operation include recovery of shipping vessels taken by pirates or energy infrastructure seized by local subnational forces. This would implicate many of the same capabilities as an opposed NEO, although it is likely to be more tailored, perhaps with greater involvement from special forces. A more intensive variant of securing important assets would be a mission to neutralize weapons of mass destruction (WMD). A potential
contingency in this regard would be ensuring that China could be a decisive first mover in North Korea in the event of regime collapse and ensuing unsecured nuclear weapons and material.

Three additional missions would likely be more complex and difficult to execute, particularly if there were actual opposition or even a lack of support from key countries concerned.

The PLAN could potentially be equipped to move toward a fourth, probably protracted, mission of sea lane protection and defense. This is of critical salience for China, which in 2040 is expected to import nearly two-thirds as much oil as the United States consumes today overall, of which two-thirds will be seaborne and over half will come through the Strait of Malacca. China can already defend vessels against non-state actors such as pirates and terrorists, but opposing another major navy is far more difficult, and PLA strategists fear that the United States could close critical economic lifelines in a crisis.

The PLA will likely spend years building on previous capabilities to protect critical waterways against disruption by non-state actors, including off the Gulf of Aden and, potentially, in the Strait of Malacca. China will also gradually increase its own SLOC disruption capabilities, which would provide it with a powerful lever to coerce smaller states, many of whom have weak or nonexistent navies. Finally, the PLAN could work toward achieving some capability to comprehensively protect its own ships from attack by a capable adversary, a difficult challenge surmountable by only the world’s most sophisticated and experienced navies. Nothing short of a robust blue-water carrier strike and battle group capability answers this threat.

Counterterrorism and counterterror strike comprise a fifth set of missions, including basic counterterrorism, partnership capacity-building, and security force assistance. High-end operations could include direct action against terrorist training camps to destroy an Islamic State-like group’s infrastructure, thereby pre-empting or retaliating against groups that may support violent separatists within China. Such a challenge could emerge in failed states or ungoverned spaces in Afghanistan or other Central and Southwest Asian countries, a problem that could worsen if Western militaries largely disengage. Should the threat of radicalization or terrorist violence in Xinjiang intensify, it would place substantial pressure on the leadership to devote high-end resources to meet it, including aviation and unmanned aerial vehicles. Beijing has also undertaken considerable security cooperation with countries in Central Asia that suffer from extremist elements. In a not-so-distant future in which the PLA has developed advanced special operations or other capabilities that are globally scarce, it is not difficult to imagine Beijing undertaking direct action against a terrorist threat inside a foreign country, particularly if at that government’s behest. China is reportedly drafting an anti-terrorism law that would provide the legal framework to do just that.

Finally, a sixth mission could be some form of stability operations in a friendly or strategically important country. China’s increased U.N. peacekeeping activities are preparing the PLA for this type of operation. The Ministry of Defense announced in September 2014 that China, for the first time, would be sending a battalion to a peacekeeping mission, in this instance to South Sudan. With an increasing number of security partners and a wide array of overseas interests, there are any number of circumstances in which Beijing would want to assist a country with defense against both foreign and domestic sources of instability. With Chinese lives and critical equities at stake, Beijing could very well be under substantial domestic pressure to act.

In sum, China has growing capabilities – it has increased the amount and quality of its military hardware dramatically in the last decade and is working on doctrine and training to match its steel. The leadership appears committed to investing in critical enabling capabilities to expand
the effective range of China’s military might. In different combinations and contexts, a panoply of these capabilities could allow China to undertake a range of military activities outside its immediate environs. Some of these, such as the ongoing counterpiracy deployments to the Gulf of Aden or increased HA/DR cooperation, would likely find a congenial international reception. Others might be more controversial.

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PART 2

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY AND POLICY

For at least two decades, the United States has maintained a relatively consistent hedging policy toward China, seeking to build a cooperative and stable relationship with Beijing while also preparing for the potential that the relationship will become more competitive and confrontational. This policy has three principal elements: first, engagement with China to deepen mutual understanding, enhance areas of cooperation, and manage areas of disagreement; second, a shaping component that seeks to induce and integrate China into an institutionalized and rules-based international order; and third, a balancing component that strengthens U.S. military power, as well as U.S. alliances and partnerships, to deter and if necessary defeat Chinese aggression.

A China that is more willing and able to be an active player in international security affairs will have implications for all three dimensions of Washington’s China policy, creating new opportunities for cooperation and sharpening areas of competition. The core strategic insight of this paper is a simple one: The expanding scope and scale of China’s international security activism demands that Washington widen the aperture of its hedging policy toward China in several domains. The remainder of this report discusses the strategic implications for the United States and offers recommendations for U.S. policy.
Part 2A

ENGAGEMENT: SEIZING THE BENEFITS OF A MORE ACTIVE CHINA
**Engagement: Seizing the benefits of a more active China**

In addition to appreciating the limits of Chinese power, U.S. strategists should avoid knee-jerk reactions that invariably view increased Chinese activism as a threat to U.S. interests. In fact, China’s more global activism has already at times comported with U.S. interests, including Beijing’s applying greater pressure on North Korea, helping to manage political crises in Sudan, and contributing to anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. While serious challenges will no doubt emerge, greater Chinese capabilities and political will to participate in world affairs will increase opportunities for the United States and China to work together to manage major international problems.

China may also take on regional and global responsibilities on its own that redound to the benefit of the United States, even if not done for any reason approximating American conceptions of “responsible stakeholding” or an altruistic contribution to global public goods. In pursuit of its own international interests and security, China may therefore assume the kind of burden-sharing role it has traditionally eschewed.

There is also, of course, the possibility that greater Chinese international security and defense activism could be largely irrelevant to the United States, in places where U.S. interests are not at stake. In this vein, even if not a net positive, more Chinese activism should not be viewed with concern.

Against this backdrop, there may be new, albeit limited, opportunities for enhanced U.S.-China security cooperation as the PRC develops greater military capabilities and is engaged in more places on more issues.

**PURPOSE OF COOPERATING WITH CHINA**

U.S. security cooperation with China seeks to achieve multiple aims, many of which could grow increasingly important as the PLA is ever more present and active in international security affairs.

The first is to build cooperative capacity to address international problems. Opportunities for collective problem-solving will increase as China gains more experience and capacity, particularly on transnational issues such as piracy, illegal fishing, organized crime, and nontraditional threats such as natural disasters and humanitarian crises. U.S. officials have repeatedly expressed the desire to deepen cooperation with China on global issues. Vice President Joe Biden expressed this aspiration in August 2011 in Beijing, saying that “a rising China will fuel economic growth and prosperity and it will bring to the fore a new partner with whom we can meet global challenges together.”

In addition to appreciating the limits of Chinese power, U.S. strategists should avoid knee-jerk reactions that invariably view increased Chinese activism as a threat to U.S. interests.

U.S.-China security ties also harbor the potential to stabilize bilateral relations through dialogues and mechanisms that reduce miscommunication, misunderstanding, and miscalculation. This is important for operational safety as U.S. and Chinese forces increasingly operate in close proximity to each other. It is also vital for crisis management, given the potential for incidents and accidents to occur in multiple theaters across the globe. In this regard, the two confidence-building measures (CBMs) signed during President Barack Obama’s trip to Beijing in November 2014 and the multilateral Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) that was agreed upon at the 2014 annual Western Pacific Naval Symposium may contribute to avoiding potential crises.
At a more strategic level, engaging China on defense and security issues can provide deterrent value by offering opportunities for the United States to communicate its political will, intentions, and capabilities. The United States further aims to glean a better understanding of the PLA's doctrine, training, plans, and capabilities. As an ancillary effect, U.S. security cooperation with China tends to facilitate U.S. cooperation with other regional partners, particularly in Southeast Asia. In the current security environment, few countries want to be seen as choosing sides between Washington and Beijing, and most therefore find it easier to cooperate with Washington on security matters when relations between the two powers are relatively stable. Military cooperation with China can therefore send an important signal to the rest of the region that countries can work with Washington without compromising their relationship with Beijing.

LIMITS ON COOPERATION
Despite these goals, there are substantial limitations on the extent to which the United States and China can and will engage in security cooperation. Perhaps most importantly, the United States and China often either have competing goals on international security issues or, even when they share similar aims, want to pursue differing approaches.

In addition, the U.S. Congress placed legal limits on certain types of security cooperation through the 1990 Foreign Relations Authorization Act and the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act, which restrict U.S. arms sales to China and activities that would result in "inappropriate exposure" of certain operational areas to the PLA, respectively.

These are designed to prevent U.S.-China military-to-military cooperation from offering the PLA excessive insight into U.S. technology, doctrine, capabilities, training, and vulnerabilities that would contribute to its warfighting capability. Moreover, the Department of Defense has also noted that "PLA participation or observer status in military training exercises of nations in possession of U.S. military equipment, systems, and weapons may, in certain circumstances, have unintended consequences that could result in the unauthorized disclosure of defense articles, technical, data or defense services to China."

In addition to these legal and military operational concerns, there are political considerations on the U.S. side that limit the nature of security cooperation with China. These result in part from the United States' not wanting to provide capabilities or training that China might use against its own people. For instance, although counterterrorism cooperation with China may make sense when facing common threats, it is difficult to ensure that China does not turn these skills on its own citizens to suppress political movements in areas such as Xinjiang and Tibet. In addition, U.S. officials have expressed concerns about China transferring military technologies or capabilities to rogue regimes and state sponsors of terrorism.

A final impediment to future security cooperation could be the potential for a consensus to grow in either Washington or Beijing that the existing military-to-military contacts and exercises were failing to have their intended effects. This could occur if U.S. officials determined that PLA reciprocity and transparency were ultimately insufficient, PLA behavior was excessively unprofessional and assertive, or China was refusing to use institutions and mechanisms put in place to manage instability and crises. Of course, China could similarly cancel security cooperation, as it has done several times before, if it believed that U.S. policies were unacceptably violating its core interests.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE COOPERATION
The U.S.-China relationship is relatively well-institutionalized to engage on the broader set of issues that are likely to accompany a more active Chinese foreign policy. Senior-level engagements and dialogues are frequent and occur among the leaderships and across regional and functional issues. As a result, Washington and Beijing are already discussing a wide variety of global foreign policy and national security issues. In this sense, there is no pressing need for new major dialogues or additional leader-level mechanisms.
Likewise, the existing architecture of U.S.-China military-to-military cooperation provides a solid foundation upon which to build: It includes frequent senior-level exchanges and military diplomacy; regular defense bureaucracy engagements, including the Defense Consultative Talks, the Defense Policy Coordination Talks, and the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement; functional and regional dialogues, including contacts between high-level military and diplomatic officials; communication mechanisms and confidence-building measures such as hotlines; and now bilateral and multilateral exercises. U.S. officials should design these engagements at least in part to better understand China’s overseas intentions and force projection capabilities. In addition, the United States should continue pursuing dialogues with China on issues where engagement remains underdeveloped, including strategic missiles and nuclear weapons, space, and cyber.

With Chinese and U.S. forces increasingly coming into contact overseas, U.S. officials should prioritize operational safety and crisis management in their military-to-military engagements with China, focusing on institutional mechanisms to avoid conflict and regulate behavior during crises. The CBMs signed in November 2014 were an important start but must be built upon through additional annexes, as provided for by the agreements. It will be important, for instance, to conclude at the earliest possible date an aerial counterpart to the maritime rules of the road already agreed upon and ultimately to expand the rules of engagement in unexpected encounters to include coast guard, not just naval, vessels. In addition, the United States should continue pressing for notification of ballistic missile launches, which represent a key area of both Chinese opacity and potential threat to U.S. forces and facilities.

It will be particularly important to ensure that communication lines, often referred to as hotlines, are open and reliable. To date, U.S. and Chinese officials have used hotlines on at least five occasions, but never on an impromptu basis or during a crisis – precisely the purposes for which they are intended, and needed most. Implementation of the new CBMs will be critical, and U.S. officials may want to consider ways to test China’s willingness to actually use hotlines through unannounced calls during peacetime or in another nonprovocative fashion. In this sense, Washington should stress-test these mechanisms to increase the likelihood that they are available when truly needed.

The United States should, to the extent possible, pursue interagency dialogues that break down bureaucratic silos on both sides. This is helpful on the U.S. side to ensure that military engagements are coordinated across political, diplomatic, and intelligence channels. Even more important, however, is to bring together various agencies in the Chinese system, which lacks an agency analogous to the U.S. National Security Council to coordinate policy between departments. For instance, future engagements on maritime issues with the PLA Navy should also include representatives from the Chinese Coast Guard, Foreign Ministry, and fisheries agencies.

The United States should also seek to enhance engagements below senior levels. This will widen the breadth of bilateral engagement and help to build working relationships among future leaders. It is also the case that lower-level military engagements can provide unique insights into professional competence, as well as equipment and training at operational and tactical levels.

As a matter of practice, the United States should also pursue trilateral and multilateral cooperation with China. This can help eschew concerns in Asia that the two leading powers have designs on establishing a G-2 condominium to manage regional security without input from the rest of the region. It can also soften concerns that cooperation with the United States means picking sides against China. In this context, U.S. officials should revive the idea of a U.S.-China-India trilateral dialogue. The United States should also consider trilateral dialogues with China and key U.S. allies in Asia and NATO.
Given legitimate concerns about not wanting to strengthen the capabilities of the PLA, the United States should avoid cooperating with China for cooperation’s sake and should instead engage in international security cooperation only when China can make a meaningful contribution to U.S. national interests. In that context, the United States and China are likely to find that it will be easier to cooperate on security matters outside of Asia, where the competitive elements of the relationship are less acute. For instance, joint capacity-building and operations to combat rising piracy in the Gulf of Guinea hold more promise than similar activities in the South China Sea. At the same time, U.S. officials should not be seduced by the idea that Chinese cooperation and adherence to international norms overseas will refract back to its behavior in the near seas. With that in mind, Chinese cooperation in distant seas or the Arctic may be a good thing in and of itself but is unlikely to suffice as a strategy for encouraging similar behavior in East Asia.

In terms of particular cooperative activities, congressional restrictions will prevent the United States and China from collaborating at higher levels of the conflict spectrum, even as the PLA
grows more capable of doing so. This will continue to limit cooperation mostly to softer, nontraditional missions such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, search and rescue, military medicine, pandemic control, and counterpiracy. Taking into consideration critical political and operational hazards, the United States should explore potential opportunities to cooperate with the PLA on counterterrorism or stability operations.

Nonproliferation and arms control may also be an issue area where the countries can do more together in ways that would be acceptable and advantageous to both sides. As the PLA’s capabilities improve and its presence is felt more widely around the world, China could come under increasing international pressure to join arms control regimes. Similarly, as China’s overseas security interests continue to expand, Beijing may see greater value in limiting the proliferation of dangerous weapons and materials. This could lead to opportunities for the United States and China to cooperate on existing arrangements, for instance if Beijing decided to join the Proliferation Security Initiative.

Finally, the PLAN is gaining the ability to patrol and protect critical SLOCs. This is likely to occur first in East Asia and then in the Indian Ocean covering key transit routes from East Africa and the Persian Gulf. For purposes of transparency and coordination, the United States should encourage China to expand its maritime contributions within multilateral frameworks. The United States should explore holding discussions with partners from the Gulf of Aden anti-piracy patrols, for example during ongoing Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings in Bahrain, to consider how those operations might be more closely integrated and broadened in scope and geography farther into the Indian Ocean.

Taken together, a more global and activist China will open up new opportunities for the United States and China to deepen security cooperation, particularly on nontraditional security threats. A better understanding of China’s intentions and activities will be increasingly necessary as the PLA and the U.S. military find themselves operating in similar places. That said, significant legal and political constraints will remain. In this context, the United States should focus on crisis management and improving the quality of dialogue on key areas of competition, as well as finding potential opportunities for cooperation on softer security issues and the possible provision of global public goods.

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PART 2B

SHAPING: BUILDING THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORDER
Shaping: Building the International Security Order

To best manage the effects of increasing Chinese international security activism, the United States should proactively support a rules-based regional and international security order. To this end, the United States should step up efforts in three domains: increasing U.S. military access and presence in areas where the PLA is most likely to operate away from China’s shores; sustaining and deepening U.S. security cooperation with key allies and partners; and supporting the development of more capable and effective regional and multilateral institutions. We address each of these in turn.

INCREASING U.S. MILITARY ACCESS AND PRESENCE IN LIKELY AREAS OF PLA ACTIVISM

Geopolitics abhors a vacuum. As the PLA develops more sophisticated force projection capabilities and maintains greater military presence overseas, the United States should accelerate and expand existing efforts to develop additional and more widely distributed access and presence arrangements. This should include deepening cooperation with countries in Southeast Asia and along sea lanes that will see the projection of Chinese naval power, particularly in the Indian Ocean region (IOR). This will permit the United States to capitalize on opportunities for cooperation while managing potential instabilities posed by more frequent overseas Chinese military activities.

The strategic and operational advantages of a more diversified force presence are many. Greater dispersal of U.S. forces can provide wider reach into Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, regions that are emerging as convergence points in 21st-century geopolitics and international economics.211 With the East and South China Seas remaining dangerous flashpoints in the region, new arrangements for U.S. access and presence would permit the United States to respond more rapidly to possible crises and conflicts over disputed territories and resource exploitation. Such arrangements could also provide more frequent and better-quality intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations in the South China Sea and into the IOR with which the United States could improve its own situational awareness, as well as that of its allies and partners.

Furthermore, both as a deterrent in peacetime and a means of escalation control in the event of crisis or war, the ability of the United States to operate out of multiple, diverse locations throughout Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Persian Gulf will help to reduce the effectiveness and attractiveness to Beijing of coercion and aggression. Additional transit points for naval combatant vessels and U.S. bomber and fighter aircraft would also augment the ability of the United States to amplify the signaling and deterrent power of its military presence, as well as to disperse in the event that China’s precision-guided weapons decrease the attractiveness of massing forces in few locations, particularly in Northeast Asia. With forward-deployed troops and pre-positioned equipment, the United States would also have surge capacity in ways that significantly enable U.S. power projection.212 Taken together, these effects of a more diversified U.S. military presence would contribute to the overarching U.S. goal of preventing regional conflicts. This can be done, in part, through a “places not bases” approach in which
the United States seeks access agreements to local military and commercial facilities.

In addition to deterring Chinese coercion against allies and partners, a more dispersed U.S. presence throughout the Indian Ocean region would help to address potential challenges by China to the global commons. The United States has a substantial interest in protecting increasingly important sea lanes, which serve as the lifeblood of global commerce. As a subset of this, American forward-deployed naval forces help to ensure that potential choke points, notably the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz and critical sea lanes in the East and South China Seas, remain open to maritime traffic. Enhanced U.S. military presence throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific region will allow the United States to continue making substantial contributions to the maintenance of stability, free trade, and open access to the global commons.213 These locations could also provide opportunities for sea control over critical choke points if necessary, thereby providing further deterrent power over a China that will remain dependent on overseas energy and resources.

Finally, U.S. overseas military presence also provides critical opportunities for building partner capacity and enhancing interoperability with allies and partners, which can be called upon to supplement or in some instances replace operational roles of the U.S. military.214 Here the U.S. Army could draw on its strengths in languages, cultural knowledge, and partner engagement and training to play a useful role in the Asia-Pacific rebalance even as the Air Force and Navy bear greater responsibility for high-end operational capabilities.

This approach is consistent with U.S. defense strategy over the last decade.215 The George W. Bush administration sought a more diversified overseas U.S. military presence in response to the uncertainties associated with efforts to combat and disrupt transnational terrorist networks. The 2004 Global Defense Posture Review described a strategy of eschewing the establishment of new major operating bases in favor of smaller rotational access agreements, which had the advantages of being less expensive, less vulnerable in aggregate to local or long-range attack, and more politically viable and versatile.216

Today, the United States is pursuing a similar strategy in East Asia, albeit in response to a different set of security challenges. In the context of China’s growing anti-access capabilities, which have increased the vulnerability of U.S. bases in the Asia Pacific, particularly in Japan, the Obama administration has sought to develop a military presence in the region that is “more geographically distributed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable.”217 U.S. policymakers have begun operationalizing this strategy by securing new presence agreements in Australia, the Philippines, and Singapore, while continuing to explore additional opportunities for enhanced training and access in Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and elsewhere.

The United States should extend this approach to key regions where the PLAN is expanding its presence and where the effects of China’s overseas military activities will be most pronounced. Although Obama administration officials have addressed this as an aspirational goal, it should receive renewed focus in the face of China’s increasing global security role.218 Outside of East Asia, particular attention should be paid to the Indian Ocean region, where China has been deepening its partnerships with littoral countries as part of its nascent “Maritime Silk Road.”219

A number of island locations could support a distributed and episodic U.S. presence throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific. U.S. officials should explore the financial viability, political sustainability, and military utility of several candidate sites, including Australia’s Cocos Islands and Christmas Island; India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands; Britain’s Diego Garcia (where the U.S. Navy and Air Force already operate facilities, but more could be done); and the Maldives, Seychelles, and Comoros, where France maintains a small military presence. In the Western Pacific, the United States should explore
further access and facilities development in what Chinese strategists term the second island chain, including in the U.S. Northern Marianas (beyond Guam), various Japanese islands, and Palau.

Additional comprehensive access agreements and mega-bases of the traditional variety may be neither forthcoming nor even desirable from a political or financial perspective. The key will be to bolster existing key nodes such as Guam and Diego Garcia, supported by an evolving portfolio of additional locations to supplement logistics, training, and operations; and to augment capacity and disperse vulnerable assets during tensions or crisis.220

Guam and Diego Garcia themselves would benefit from several improvements. Guam could profit in particular from increased military aviation platforms, facilities, and support resources.221 Further improvements in Guam’s civilian infrastructure and power generation would better support the influx of Japanese personnel training there and of U.S. personnel and their families associated with recent increases in platforms based there, including the pending home-porting of an additional nuclear-powered attack submarine.222 Pier enlargement and facilities upgrades to improve electrical capacity, sewage treatment, and water supply could enable Diego Garcia to support additional Indian Ocean operations.223

SUSTAINING AND DEEPENING SECURITY COOPERATION WITH KEY ALLIES AND PARTNERS

China increasingly has both the political will and the military capability to serve as an important security partner for countries not only in Asia, but outside the region as well. Although this does not inherently create competitive dynamics with the United States, Washington will, in some instances, have to work harder to sustain its relationships with governments that may regard – or come to regard – China as an alternative or more attractive source of arms, assistance, and even the provision of regional security.

As a result, U.S. officials will have to determine which security partnerships will require additional attention and resources, especially those that are indispensable but potentially at risk from being undermined by China. Given the importance of America’s alliance architecture in the region, special attention should be given to ensuring that closer ties with China do not significantly compromise Washington’s alliances. This is particularly true insofar as Chinese scholars have articulated a strategy of seeking to strengthen ties with U.S. allies such as South Korea, Thailand, and Australia with the explicit intent of weakening America’s alliance architecture.224

Previous CNAS research has underscored that a strategy of enhancing the political sustainability of U.S. defense relationships needs to create an affirmative rationale for security cooperation with the United States combined with actions that insulate that cooperation from any number of potential political challenges.225 These include those associated with political liberalization and regime turnover, external pressure, accidents and incidents, and changes in the regional security environment. U.S. policymakers should not...
assume that this kind of shared sense of purpose is well-developed between the United States and its allies. This is true even where countries have a shared history and common values with the United States and even where public support for the alliance is strong. To manage potential perception gaps, the United States should establish or institutionalize, as it already has with certain close partners, dialogues to address China-related issues.

Of course, China’s increased international activism has implications beyond U.S. treaty allies. There is an important subset of countries that deserve particular U.S. attention given their strategic importance to managing the expansion of Chinese defense activities, including India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Vietnam in South and Southeast Asia and key littoral East African states including Kenya, Mauritius, Madagascar, and Comoros. The United States should also aim to deepen its engagement on China-related issues with countries that are expanding their security cooperation with Beijing and may consider hosting PLA forces, including Djibouti, Pakistan, and the Seychelles. The goal throughout these engagements should be to enhance U.S. partnerships and gain greater situational awareness, not to undermine China’s relationships with these countries, which would be both difficult and counterproductive.

As the United States deepens its security partnerships throughout the Indian Ocean region, the potential for China to serve as an alternative security partner should shape the degree to which governance or human rights concerns, in Myanmar or Thailand, for example, constrain the scope and pace of U.S. defense cooperation. U.S. disengagement will have less influence and be more detrimental in cases in which China, or perhaps another country such as India, could backfill the security role of the United States.

The United States will also have to re-examine the costs and benefits of its export control policies as China emerges as an alternative supplier of higher-end capabilities. To preserve the U.S. defense industrial base amid austerity and maintain influence and security partnerships amid rising Chinese competition, Washington will have to weigh competing objectives in a fashion that other leading arms producers have long had to do and in at least some cases will need to reduce restrictions on U.S. defense contractors’ foreign sales. This is particularly the case with such systems as UAVs, where China may be on the cusp of benefiting tremendously from U.S. self-restriction. Washington can shore up its influence with important security partners without necessarily releasing top-level technology.

Meanwhile, it is critical to ensure that U.S. policymaking, negotiations, and engagement on security cooperation are done within the broader context of bilateral relations. The deepening of security ties in these countries will be closely connected to political relationships insofar as both are derivative of and feed back into the overall health of bilateral ties. Security cooperation should not be viewed in strictly military terms and should be designed within the context of active diplomacy and alliance management. Security cooperation, when appropriate, should therefore occur outside of narrow military-to-military realms. Joint bilateral dialogues with State Department and Department of Defense officials drive policy coordination in Washington and ensure that both military and political interests are represented from partner countries.

Finally, security cooperation should also be developed in concert with broader engagement strategies that include robust economic initiatives. For the long-term sustainability of U.S. partnerships, it is critical to take actions that undermine the oft-heard notion of the dichotomy of the United States as the vital security provider and China as the leading economic partner. This heightens the degree to which countries may see a contradiction between their security cooperation with the United States and their broader economic interests.
Marrying defense initiatives with economic endeavors can alleviate these concerns and instead build an alternative narrative that security and economics are complementary. Initiatives such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and free-trade activities more broadly, should therefore be treated as strategic opportunities to enhance U.S. and regional security.

**ADVANCING REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION**

U.S. cooperation with allies and partners to build a more robust regional and international order can help to establish the rules, norms, and institutions in which China’s increasing activism occurs. This will only go so far in shaping Chinese behavior, but it can help set the diplomatic context such that a broader collective of states can recognize and react to potentially destabilizing behavior. Multilateral institutions can also create opportunities for U.S.-China cooperation and China’s integration into cooperative activities that might not occur otherwise.

In addition to providing a forum for regional states to bind together to balance China’s hefty influence, regional institutions can also work to prevent disputes by moving burgeoning crises – over maritime rights and resource competition, for instance – from the military domain to one of legal and diplomatic wrangling. These institutions also provide forums to manage U.S.-China competition. By creating a diplomatic cushion between the United States and China, regional institutions can attract both sides to engage in discussions and activities that might be more difficult if one capital or the other were perceived as being the primary leader or beneficiary of the effort. Multilateral institutions also provide safe diplomatic platforms for countries to cooperate with the United States when governments might be reluctant to participate in similar activities on a purely bilateral basis.

Multilateral institutions can also create avenues to weave China more closely into the regional security architecture, building habits of cooperation and reinforcing norms of behavior. This has been a driving rationale for greater U.S. engagement with regional institutions in Southeast Asia. The inclusiveness of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+) sends important signals that the door is open for a China willing to contribute to a rules-based system. If U.S. forces are supporting these regional initiatives, it can also reduce the effectiveness of accusations from Beijing that the United States is seeking to contain China and that countries should therefore limit their security cooperation with the United States. Furthermore, as the United States participates in multilateral discussions and activities, it is critical to continue contributing to areas clearly outside the domain of geopolitics. Most regional states will grow wary of U.S. engagement if they perceive it as focused primarily on potentially sensitive and contentious issues related to China’s rise.

The value of consistent engagement cannot be overstated, particularly in the context of growing perceptions abroad of U.S. retrenchment, defense cuts, partisanship in Washington, and war fatigue among the American people. U.S. officials should therefore commit, whenever possible, to a reliable engagement calendar if they expect partner governments to make costly and at times politically risky decisions to deepen security cooperation with the United States. U.S. officials should articulate a baseline set of activities in key regions in which the United States will participate at appropriate levels regardless of political parties and election cycles in the United States. Examples in Asia include U.S. secretary of defense attendance at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore and the biennial ADMM+ ministerial, as well as high-level participation in the ARF, East Asia Summit, Pacific Islands Forum, and Arctic Council.

As the United States seeks to support the construction of a rules-based regional order in Asia and beyond, it is incumbent upon allies and partners to participate and at times lead in this process. Partners such as Singapore and India, as well as allies such as Australia and in Europe,
The United States should advance cooperation with leading regional institutions

- **ASEAN**
  Association of Southeast Asian Nations
  Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar

- **ARCTIC COUNCIL**
  Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, United States

- **EAC**
  East African Community
  Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda

- **IORA**
  Indian Ocean Rim Association
  Australia, Bangladesh, Comoros, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Seychelles, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, Yemen

- **PIF**
  Pacific Islands Forum
  Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

- **SAARC**
  South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
  Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka

- **SCO**
  Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
  China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
have regional influence that extends well beyond aggregate population or military power. The ability to strengthen norms and institutions is often more about political will and legitimacy than defense budgets and military forces. U.S. allies and partners also have distinct comparative advantages that can be leveraged, such as European experience running regional institutions.

Over the last several years, the United States has significantly deepened its engagement with ASEAN and ASEAN-centered institutions and meetings. This has generated critical opportunities for regional discussions and produced unprecedented forms of regional security cooperation, particularly in the ADMM+ mechanism. As China’s military reach extends, so too should U.S. efforts to strengthen the role and legitimacy of regional institutions beyond East Asia. The counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (formerly known as the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation), which the United States joined as a Dialogue Partner in 2013, all provide existing institutional mechanisms that can be bolstered to address emerging regional security issues associated with the rise of China. In this context, U.S. policy toward a variety of multilateral institutions, including the Arctic Council and the Pacific Islands Forum, should also be closely integrated with U.S. strategy toward China.

As the United States seeks to deepen its engagement with regional institutions in Southeast Asia and beyond, a particular focus for multilateral cooperation should be the development of multilateral maritime domain awareness architectures, also known as common operating pictures (COPs). The United States should consider working with allies and partners to build a COP in Southeast Asia as a template for similar information-sharing regimes in other key maritime regions, including the Indian Ocean and the Arctic.

As China’s overseas military presence increases, the United States should also pursue multilateral measures to reduce the likelihood that crises between China and U.S. allies and partners occur because of accidents, incidents, or miscalculation. Minimizing the probability of entrapment and unwanted conflict puts a priority on risk reduction mechanisms between China and other regional militaries. The United States can contribute to the development of multilateral confidence-building measures such as crisis hotlines and incidents-at-sea agreements by expanding the November 2014 U.S.-China CBMs and the April 2014 CUES agreement.

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include developing a similar code with a smaller grouping of willing countries or working with ASEAN on an “early harvest” of the CoC in which countries in the region could identify and immediately implement specific initiatives for which there was strong consensus.

Although Washington should work to advance open and inclusive institutions, the United States should not permit China to undermine the development of liberal institutions that support America’s economic and political aims. Rather than deferring to global agreements, this will mean at times building coalitions of like-minded countries to advance multilateral efforts in areas as diverse as trade, climate, and cyber. U.S. officials should not succumb to the oft-cited but misguided notion that major transnational issues cannot be managed without Sino-American cooperation, which implicitly gives Beijing a veto on U.S. initiatives. In fact, China has often shown a greater willingness to cooperate precisely when the United States has demonstrated the ability to move forward without Beijing. The Trans-Pacific Partnership is an excellent example of how a “minilateral” approach is more likely to succeed than a broad-based global agreement, including in ways that remain open to eventual Chinese participation.

Finally, the United States should also watch carefully China’s efforts to strengthen and establish multilateral institutions that exclude the United States. The United States should seek to engage these organizations in some capacity, to better understand their activities and help to shape their agendas and rule-making. Specifically, the United States should seek observer status at the SCO.

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Balancing: The Military Challenge

Greater Chinese activism in international security affairs will generate a variety of political quandaries for the United States, but at its core it will also be a significant military development in Asia and beyond. And even as this more active PLA provides opportunities for collaboration in addressing problems of mutual concern, it will also pose potential challenges to the interests of the United States and its partners.

The PLA is still several decades away, at best, from being able to fight a major war outside the Asia-Pacific region, much less against the United States. But this does not mean that greater Chinese force projection capabilities, however limited, will not be able to undermine U.S. interests globally or confront U.S. forces closer to China. China is already “showing the flag” in areas beyond its traditional horizon in the Western Pacific and, over time, will be able to use force more effectively in these regions. Greater overseas presence and capability will present Beijing with a widening array of options for using its newfound power in ways that are inimical to the United States and the values it seeks to promote, including coercion against weaker countries, collaboration with potential U.S. adversaries, and disruptive measures in the global commons. And in the event of conflict between the United States and the PRC, China will also have the ability to hold at risk more U.S. interests than has historically been the case.

This raises the question of how the United States should adapt its defense strategy and posture to respond to a China that has greater will and capability to use its military farther from China’s shores. At the most general level, the United States and its allies and partners will want military capabilities to dissuade, deter, and defeat any plausible scenario involving a military challenge by China in the Western Pacific.232 More specifically, the United States should pursue three goals simultaneously: First, strive to maintain a favorable balance of power in the Western Pacific; second, ensure the ability to hold Chinese assets at risk outside of the region in order to limit damage from these capabilities and impose costs on the PRC; and third, help allies and partners develop effective counterintervention capabilities and strategies—in other words, to possess independent deterrent capabilities that include, if possible, indigenous A2/AD envelopes to hamper the PRC’s ability and desire to project military power in coercive or destabilizing fashion.

Somewhat paradoxically, maintaining a favorable or at least competitive military balance in the Western Pacific will be the most crucial element to limit the potentially destabilizing effects of the PLA’s expanding partnerships and power projection capabilities. This is where the PRC is focusing its efforts and the United States should do what it can to keep it that way. Despite China’s growing capacity for extraregional power projection, attaining military superiority in maritime Asia appears to be the PLA’s primary aim in the foreseeable future.233 China’s military modernization will likely remain principally focused on Taiwan and other disputed areas within the first island chain and subsequently, over the medium term, outward to the second island chain.234

To the extent that the PRC is able to secure military dominance in these zones, it will represent a dramatic change in the strategic landscape of the Asia-Pacific and set the stage for the PLA to turn a greater proportion of its efforts and resources toward improving its capabilities for effective power projection beyond the region. Doing so would enable China to field greater capacity for extraregional power projection more quickly, render it able to deploy to a broader set of regions, and enable it to operate across a greater set of domains. Moreover, these forces would be less constrained operationally, as greater Chinese presence and influence over key access routes in the South China Sea and the first and second island chains would facilitate PLA power projection.235 These factors, in turn, would create more opportunities for China to assert itself beyond the Western Pacific and jeopardize a wider array of U.S. interests.
Therefore, even as the United States and its allies and partners must take due account of the military challenges posed by a more globally active PLA, it nonetheless still makes sense for Washington to concentrate on maintaining key advantages over Chinese military power at its leading edge in the Western Pacific. In addition to preventing the creation of a zone of Chinese military dominance, with all its strategic ramifications, successfully doing so will tend to localize and confine the impact of China’s growing military power. If the PLA cannot effectively project and sustain its military forces into the Western Pacific, any operations beyond that area will ultimately be of limited effect. Note that this is an additional argument against pursuing strategies of “offshore balancing” and “offshore control” that cede the near seas to China.

The problem, however, is that achieving the goal of effectively deterring and, if necessary, defeating the PLA in East Asia will not be easy due to its growing professionalism and technological sophistication, China’s increasingly cutting-edge defense industrial base, and the PRC’s expanding pool of resources available to invest in its military. Long-standing U.S. national strategy rests upon the ability to deploy a military that can project power effectively and ultimately decisively around the globe. This ability in turn is predicated on the United States’ fielding a military able to best any challenger in areas of particular concern to Washington, including East Asia. But Washington’s satisfaction of these criteria is under increasing pressure from China’s development of an increasingly formidable A2/AD system and its growing capacity to project force within the Western Pacific. In fact, in the coming decades it is very likely that the military balance in the Western Pacific between the United States and China will be considerably more competitive than it is today.

In response, the United States should focus on developing new doctrine and strategies designed to gain access, conduct suppressive strikes, and ensure freedom of military action against an opponent, particularly a highly capable adversary such as China. Accordingly, the Department of Defense and other relevant elements of the U.S. government, including Congress, need to sustain and redouble their focus on adapting the U.S. military to prepare for operations against highly capable adversaries, including the PRC. Although it is beyond the scope of this report to recommend specific programs and systems, candidate focus areas should include developing and maintaining U.S. and allied advantages in C4ISR, including electromagnetic and cyberwarfare; extending U.S. and allied supremacy in the undersea domain; maintaining the ability to strike effectively against defended targets with long-range anti-ship, air-to-air, and anti-surface missiles; hardening select U.S. facilities; and developing more advanced missile defenses.

These efforts should be coordinated with nascent initiatives at the Pentagon to design a “new offset” strategy for the 21st century. Such an approach is geared, as former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has said, to develop “game-changing” technologies and wed them with new operational concepts. Particularly ripe areas of focus include directed-energy weapons,
robotics, miniaturization, big data, and advanced manufacturing. At the same time, the United States should directly address the PLA’s growing capability for extraregional power projection as a subsidiary but important objective, since such capabilities could be used to considerable effect in the event of conflict. For instance, long-range nuclear-powered attack submarines (which China is currently building) could be used in a “commerce raider” effort to harass and reduce U.S. supply efforts. Such efforts have generated benefits well above their costs in the past, for example in the Civil War and both world wars.

Moreover, the mere presence of the PLA, even if not capable of conducting major war, could have strategic effects on U.S. behavior during crises and conflicts. The presence of the Soviet navy in the Mediterranean, including repeated surge deployments of ships and aircraft during regional crises such as the 1967 Six-Day War and 1973 October War, complicated U.S. policymakers’ calculations and raised the possibility of escalation. Even where China is not party to a conflict, PLA presence beyond the Western Pacific could raise similar quandaries during contingencies outside of Asia, such as in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. Going forward, the Pentagon should therefore assess the effects of potentially destabilizing active and passive PLA presence in its war games and plans outside the Asian theater.

Finally, the United States must also plan for the possibility that its efforts to maintain a favorable military balance in the Western Pacific will prove insufficient and thus that the arena for military competition will shift increasingly beyond the near seas. Should this undesirable eventuality come to pass, the United States cannot afford to have neglected preparing for it in advance.

Fortunately, the capabilities needed to compete in the Western Pacific are not mutually exclusive of those required for dealing with an extraregionally deploying PLA. U.S. and allied capabilities designed to help penetrate China’s formidable A2/AD umbrella in the Western Pacific and to identify and strike at key targets will also likely be readily available for use against Chinese extraregional power projection assets or the capabilities designed to support them. This is particularly so because in both cases the arena of Sino-American military competition will primarily take place in the maritime, aerospace, and cyberspace/electromagnetic domains rather than in that of land warfare. Just as the United States’ primary strategic concern in East Asia will be the PLA’s ability to project power into the Western Pacific, so too its leading concern beyond that immediate region will be China’s ability to project power into the Indian Ocean, and to a lesser degree in the Arctic and the South Pacific. Conversely, the United States will be less directly concerned about China’s ability to act across its land borders, for instance into Central Asia.

This defense effort should not be unilateral on the part of the United States. Rather, the United States should seek to enlist the cooperation and assistance of its allies and partners in raising the costs and risks to China of behavior hostile to U.S. and allied interests. In particular, U.S. defense cooperation geared to respond to China’s military
modernization and expansion could profitably take the form of encouraging states to adopt their own defensive A2/AD capabilities to deter China’s ability to project power in destabilizing ways, both within and outside the Western Pacific region – what has been termed a “hedgehog” or “porcupine” approach. This is attractive for a number of reasons. First, A2/AD is clearly a promising focus of military investment. An A2/AD capability can significantly raise the costs and risks of projecting power into the network’s zone and usually does so in a cost-favorable way.

Second, U.S. allies and partners may be less willing or able to take on the difficult mission of strikes against defended Chinese targets. Doing so would be too contentious politically and too demanding in terms of military requirements. Focusing their efforts on strategies of defense, delay, and interruption, particularly in their own environs, is therefore more realistic both from political and capability perspectives. In addition, such concentration would enable specialization in these roles, likely generating superior capabilities to what would be produced if these states were to invest their resources with less focus.

Last, but by no means least, enlisting the aid of allies and partners to deter and stem Chinese coercion can relieve the United States of some of the political and military burden of defending them while simultaneously strengthening the credibility of the deterrent. Armed with effective A2/AD capabilities of their own, many regional states will be able to handle lower-level Chinese provocations without needing recourse to direct American involvement (even if that involvement remains an implicit threat and thus a deterrent to Chinese escalation). In this way, the United States can avoid being cast as the principal protagonist in every act of Chinese belligerence. It is not in America’s strategic interest to have Chinese provocations against third parties invariably be a test of U.S. credibility and commitment.

Accordingly, U.S. defense engagement with its allies and partners in the Western Pacific and in zones where it is expected that the PLA will be able to operate should increasingly focus on promoting these states’ abilities to field capable A2/AD networks. As Jim Thomas and Evan Montgomery have argued, where possible, Washington should “encourage and enable its allies and partners to field serious military capabilities that will allow them to assert their sovereignty over territorial waters, land borders, and airspace, limiting China’s ability to project power beyond its immediate periphery.” In concrete terms, the United States should pursue this effort through a variety of direct and indirect avenues, including arms sales, training, defense industrial cooperation, and strategic engagement, as well as through more shaping initiatives designed to facilitate collaboration among allies and partners.

Needless to say, this cooperation will have to be tailored to reflect the intensity of the partners’ threat perception, their extant capacity, and the degree to which it is politically viable for them to engage in these activities with the United States. Nonetheless, the United States can help provide for direct defense of their sovereign terrestrial, maritime, and aerial space, for instance through the sale of sufficiently capable anti-ship, anti-air, and counterinvasion weapons and their associated battle management and integration systems. Key areas for consideration include short-range air defenses, missile defense, unmanned aerial vehicles, naval mines, mobile launchers, anti-ship cruise missiles, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.

Theater campaign plans and their associated exercises should be revised in part to reflect these capacity-building priorities. As part of this, a more integrated theater-level approach should be developed to outline the division of labor between the services. Although the Asia theater is largely considered an air and naval domain, U.S. ground forces can contribute to these efforts through training and working with U.S. allied and partner militaries, particularly to improve their capacity for defense of their territory.
CONCLUSION: SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS

A principal goal of this report is to underscore that profound changes are underway in Chinese foreign policy that portend greater willingness and ability to engage in international security affairs in the 21st century. The key trends cited in the report – loosening of the noninterference principle, deepening security partnerships, and increasing force projection capabilities – together call for the United States to widen the aperture of its hedging policy to seize the benefits and manage potential instabilities associated with a more active China. In this context, we offer the following key insights and recommendations for U.S. policy.

The U.S.-China relationship is relatively well-institutionalized to engage on the broader set of issues that are likely to accompany a more active Chinese foreign policy.

- There is no pressing need for new major dialogues or additional leader-level mechanisms. The United States can use existing mechanisms to communicate its political will, intentions, and capabilities, as well as glean a better understanding of Chinese civilian leaders’ policy goals and the PLA’s force projection doctrine, training, plans, and capabilities. In addition to more substantive interagency dialogues and greater lower-level contacts, Washington should pursue more minilateral arrangements, including a U.S.-China-India trilateral dialogue.

As China gains additional experience and capacity, opportunities for collective problem-solving may increase, particularly on transnational issues such as piracy, illegal fishing, human trafficking, and drug smuggling, and nontraditional threats such as natural disasters and humanitarian crises.

- Taking into consideration critical political and operational hazards, the United States should explore opportunities to cooperate with the PLA on counterterrorism, stability operations, nonproliferation and arms control, and SLOC protection. When possible, this cooperation should be embedded in multilateral mechanisms.

U.S.-China security engagements should focus on operational safety and crisis management mechanisms, including the implementation and expansion of existing CBMs.

- U.S. officials should consider ways to test China’s willingness to use hotlines through unannounced calls during peacetime or through other nonprovocative means.

- Additional annexes to existing CBMs should include an aerial counterpart to the maritime rules of the road. Rules of engagement in unexpected encounters should also be expanded to include coast guard and other government-controlled platforms, not just military vessels. And the United States should continue pressing for reciprocal notification of ballistic missile launches.

To help build a more stable security environment in which China’s security activism occurs, the United States should increase U.S. military access and presence in areas where the PLA is most likely to operate away from China’s shores.

- Pursuing an approach of “places not bases,” the United States should accelerate existing efforts to develop additional and more widely distributed access and presence arrangements. This should include deepening cooperation with countries in Southeast Asia and along sea lanes that will see the projection of Chinese naval power. In particular, U.S. officials should explore the financial viability, political sustainability, and military utility of establishing or expanding U.S. military use of several candidate sites in the Indian Ocean region, including Australia’s Cocos Islands and Christmas Island; India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands; Britain’s Diego Garcia; and the Maldives, the Seychelles, and Comoros.

As China is increasingly able to serve as an alternative supplier of arms, assistance, and regional security, the United States will have to do more to sustain and deepen its security cooperation with
key allies and emerging partners.

- Special attention should be given to nurturing ties with U.S. treaty allies. There is also an important subset of countries that deserve particular U.S. focus given their strategic importance to managing the expansion of Chinese defense activities, including India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Vietnam in South and Southeast Asia and key littoral East African states including Kenya, Mauritius, Madagascar, and Comoros. The United States should also aim to deepen its engagement on China-related issues with countries that may consider hosting PLA forces, including Djibouti, Pakistan, and the Seychelles.

- To help strengthen ties with these key countries, the United States should institutionalize dialogues to address China-related issues or at the very least ensure that China is addressed sufficiently in existing diplomatic channels. When possible, this diplomacy should include officials from both the State Department and Department of Defense. Security cooperation should also be developed in concert with broader engagement strategies that include robust economic initiatives.

- Furthermore, as China emerges as an alternative supplier of higher-end military capabilities, the United States should re-examine the costs and benefits of its arms export control policies.

To establish the rules, norms, and institutions around which China’s international security activism occurs, the United States should seek to build more capable and effective multilateral organizations and regional institutions.

- In addition to continued focus on ASEAN and ASEAN-centered institutions, U.S. officials should ensure regular, high-level engagement in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, the Indian Ocean Rim Association, the Arctic Council, and the Pacific Islands Forum.

- Particular focus and resources should be devoted to the development of multilateral maritime domain awareness architectures, also known as common operating pictures (COPs). The United States should first work with allies and partners to build a COP in Southeast Asia as a template for similar information-sharing regimes in other key maritime regions, including the Indian Ocean.

- The United States should also pursue multilateral confidence-building measures to reduce the likelihood of crises between China and U.S. allies and partners. To this end, Washington should consider multilateralizing components of the November 2014 U.S.-China CBMs to key countries in Southeast Asia, including notification of exercises and the maritime code of conduct, so that similar mechanisms are in place between China and other regional countries.

- While still supporting the China-ASEAN Code of Conduct process, the United States should also pursue additional means to develop rules of the road for the South China Sea. Options include developing a similar code with a smaller grouping of willing countries or working with ASEAN on an “early harvest” of the CoC in which countries in the region could move more quickly on specific widely accepted initiatives that could be implemented immediately.

- The United States should seek ways to engage with Chinese-led institutions that otherwise exclude the United States, including the BRICS mechanism, CICA, the AIIB, and the SCO. Specifically, the United States should seek observer status at the SCO.

Maintaining a competitive military balance in the Western Pacific will be a crucial element to limiting the potentially destabilizing effects of the PLA’s expanding security partnerships and power projection capabilities.

- Although it is beyond this report’s scope to recommend specific programs and systems,
candidate focus areas should include developing and maintaining U.S. and allied advantages in C4ISR, including electromagnetic and cyberwarfare; extending U.S. and allied supremacy in the undersea domain; developing significant offensive naval mining capabilities; maintaining the ability to strike effectively against defended targets with weapons such as long-range anti-ship, air-to-air, and anti-surface missiles; developing more advanced missile defenses; and hardening select U.S. facilities.

Meanwhile, the United States should directly address the PLA’s growing capability for extra-regional power projection as a subsidiary but important objective.

- This effort will not necessarily require unique capabilities, but the Pentagon should continue taking steps to assess the effects of active and passive PLA presence in its war games and contingency plans outside the Asian theater.

This defense approach should be far more than just a U.S. effort.

- U.S. defense cooperation should encourage states to adopt a “hedgehog” or “porcupine” approach to deter and defang Chinese projection of power in destabilizing ways. Key areas meriting consideration include electronic countermeasures, short-range air defenses, missile defense, unmanned aerial vehicles, naval mines, anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities. To this end, theater campaign plans and their associated exercises should be revised in part to reflect these capacity-building priorities and a more integrated theater-level approach should be developed to outline the division of labor among services.
Endnotes
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17. Most prominently the National Intelligence Council’s quadrennial Global Trends reports. It is within this period that China’s interests and capabilities can be assessed with some confidence.


35. Rafferty, “China’s Doctrine of Non-Interference Challenged by Sudan’s Referendum.”
43. Sun, “China, the United States and the Kachin Conflict.”


55. China’s recalitrance is sharpened by the PRC’s own experience as a target of international sanctions following the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacres. Pang Zhongying, “China’s Non-Intervention Question,” Foreign Policy Commentary [Zhongguo renwu jingji zhicai: Mubiao yu zhengce yiti], Zhongguo duiwai jingji zhicai: Mubiao yu zhengce yiti (October-November 2012), 129.

56. Reilly, “China’s Unilateral Sanctions”.


60. Feng Zhang, “China’s New Thinking on Alliances,” Survival, 54 no. 5 (October-November 2012), 129.


68. Authors’ conversation with Chinese scholars and strategists, November 2013.


76. Feng Zhongping and Huang Jing, “China’s strategic partnership diplomacy: engaging with a changing world,” European Strategic Partnerships Observatory Working Paper No. 8 (Egmont Institute, June 2014), 11.


81. Shambaugh, China Goes Global, 299.

82. Shambaugh, China Goes Global, 301.


91. Harsh V. Pant, “Saudi Arabia Woos China and India,” Middle East Quarterly (Fall 2006), 45-52.


122. Robert Wall and Doug Cameron, “China Overtakes Germany as World’s Third-Largest Arms Exporter.”


strengthen-defense-cooperation.html.


145. The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces.

146. Ibid.


149. Mastro, “China’s Military is about to Go Global.”


156. Ibid., 5. The larger the amphibious ship, the greater the sea state it can handle comfortably and the more supplies it can transport—hence, the greater the intended range.


158. Ibid., 32-33.


166. Adapted from DOD Dictionary of Military Terms.


177. Adapted from DOD Dictionary of Military Terms.


181. Adapted from DOD Dictionary of Military Terms.


185. O’Rourke, China’s Naval Modernization Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities, 27.


188. These are not PLA-defined benchmarks. Note also that these are notional categories with substantial overlap between them. Furthermore, they do not progress perfectly along a single continuum, as there are at least two vectors of distance and difficulty.


210. Harold, “Expanding Contacts to Enhance Durability”


224. Authors’ conversation with Chinese scholars, November 2013.


227. For an example of excessively restrictive thinking in this regard, see Micah Zenko and Sarah E. Kreps, “Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation,” Special


247. Amphibious and highly mobile ground forces that are adjuncts of power projection forces — akin to U.S. Marines and airborne forces — present a different and more troubling capability.


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Production Notes

Paper recycling is reprocessing waste paper fibers back into a usable paper product.

Soy ink is a helpful component in paper recycling. It helps in this process because the soy ink can be removed more easily than regular ink and can be taken out of paper during the de-inking process of recycling. This allows the recycled paper to have less damage to its paper fibers and have a brighter appearance. The waste that is left from the soy ink during the de-inking process is not hazardous and it can be treated easily through the development of modern processes.