Who Shaves the Barber?

Michael Zigismund: Philosophy of Law | WSB #22

williamnava — Tue, 09 Jan 2018 07:00:00 -0400

What is the law? Is it simply what's to be found in legal statutes and government decrees? Or is it something broader, affected by and inseparable from both morality and custom?

This is one of the fundamental debates in philosophy of law. On one side stand the positivists, who propose a narrow view of the law as separate from ethics and other concerns outside of the direct commands of the state. On the other, we have natural rights theorists, who believe the law and morality are inseparable. Indeed, according to natural rights theorists, illegitimate laws aren't laws at all.

On what grounds may this debate be settled? And what's really at stake here? Is there more to this than a question of semantics? Legal expert Michael Zigismund guides us through this debate, and applies it to three areas: Nazi law, slavery, and gun ownership. He concludes with a summary of a "third way", which he argues takes the best of both while avoiding their pitfalls: the Hayekian view of law as emergent practice.

Visit http://williamnava.com for more info!

Special thanks to Jackie Blum for the podcast art, and The Tin Box for the theme music.

Why (I) Do Philosophy | WSB#21

williamnava — Tue, 02 Jan 2018 07:00:00 -0400

Philosophy's an odd practice. It can be abstract, technical, and complicated to the point of appearing incomprehensible; and the generality of the subject matter can make it seem like it isn't really about anything at all. It certainly doesn't seem to make a great deal of progress over time. So why the hell does anyone do it?

Here I propose three main reasons I think people do philosophy: competitive craftsmanship, scientific inquiry, and spirituality. The first breaks down into two subcategories - craftsmanship and competition - as does the second - curiosity and improving the world. Just how does philosophy satisfy each of these needs? Do people really pursue philosophy in order to satisfy them? And can they actually be satisfied by philosophy? I conclude with some words about how these apply to why I'm pursuing philosophy (eg, doing this podcast), and specifically why I'm not pursuing academic philosophy.

Next week: My Coherentist Loop

Visit http://williamnava.com for more info!

Special thanks to Jackie Blum for the podcast art, and The Tin Box for the theme music.

Tomasz Kaye, Pt. 3: Omniveillance | WSB #20

williamnava — Tue, 26 Dec 2017 07:00:00 -0400

The last 250 years have created an explosion in technological progress that has fundamentally changed human society. Can we expect the rate of technological improvement to accelerate even further? If so, how might those developments transform humanity? Might some of the changes be so fundamental as to render our ideas about social and political ethics moot?

After some musings on possible transhumanist developments, Tomasz and I zero in on one in particular: omniveillance. Omniveillance refers to a society in which everything is recorded and everyone has the ability to check what anyone else is doing. This would be the end of privacy as we know it. As scary as this outcome sounds, Tomasz explains the reasons we can expect it to happen even if no one wants it. We also discuss reasons it may not be as horrible as it initially sounds. We conclude with some thoughts on how the omniveillent society might exercise horizontal social control, in potentially good and bad ways.

Next week: Why (I) Do Philosophy

Visit http://williamnava.com for more info!

Special thanks to Jackie Blum for the podcast art, and The Tin Box for the theme music.

Sources:

"Neuralink and the Brain's Magical Future" by Tim Urban
"Mutually Assured Snooping" by Tomasz Kaye
The Transparent Society by David Brin

Tomasz Kaye, Pt. 2: Mechanics of Market Anarchism | WSB#19

williamnava — Tue, 19 Dec 2017 07:00:00 -0400

Last week, Tomasz laid his metaethical foundations for political philosophy. This week, we dive into his preferred political system proper. What are the necessary conditions for a political system to be considered "market anarchist"? Just how might a market anarchist society operate? How would disputes be resolved? Who deals with people in the society who simply refuse to cooperate? And how restrictive is market anarchism? Would it be possible to have a "market anarchism" that operates on socialist principles?

Next week: Tomasz Kaye, Pt. 3: Omniveillance

Visit http://williamnava.com for more info!

Special thanks to Jackie Blum for the podcast art, and The Tin Box for the theme music.

Sources:

The Machinery of Freedom by David Friedman
"The Machinery of Freedom: Illustrated Summary" by Tomasz Kaye (video)
"The Most Dangerous Monopoly: When Caution Kills" by Tomasz Kaye (video)

Tomasz Kaye, Pt. 1: Foundations for Political Philosophy | WSB #18

williamnava — Tue, 12 Dec 2017 07:00:00 -0400

Tomasz Kaye is a market anarchist and creator of the popular animated video "George Ought to Help", which argues against the legitimacy of the state. Tomasz's approach to political philosophy is highly systematic. He begins with metaethical questions and, only after answering them, devises a political system that coheres with his metaethics. In this episode, we focus on those foundational questions. Tomasz is a "moral nihilist" - after explaining what that means and why he's convinced of it, we discuss the role that intuitions play in his ethics. We then explore his intuitions about property - both of one's body and of things - and what may logically follow from those intuitions.

Next week: Tomasz Kaye, Pt. 2: The Mechanics of Market Anarchism

Visit http://williamnava.com for more info!

Special thanks to Jackie Blum for the podcast art, and The Tin Box for the theme music.

Sources:

"George Ought to Help" by Tomasz Kaye
"How to Make Peace with Moral Nihilism" by Tomasz Kaye

Greg Restall: Objections to Logical Pluralism and the Preface and Liar Paradoxes | WSB #17

williamnava — Tue, 05 Dec 2017 07:00:00 -0400

In the first half of my interview with Professor Greg Restall, he laid out logical pluralism: the view that there is more than one correct logical consequence relation. In this second half, he responds to objections. Specifically, he explains why it makes sense to admit inconsistent situations even if one believes, as he does, that all possible worlds are consistent. He also touches on the relationship between notions of deductive validity and reasoning norms. We then take an extended detour into the Preface paradox, the Liar paradox, dialetheism, and the relationship between proof theory and philosophy.

Next week: Tomasz Kaye, Pt. 1: Foundations for Political Philosophy

Visit http://williamnava.com for more info!

Special thanks to Jackie Blum for the podcast art, and The Tin Box for the theme music.

Sources:

Logical Pluralism by Jc Beall and Greg Restall
consequently.org - Greg Restall's website
Proof Theory and Philosophy by Greg Restall (book manuscript in progress)
"The Liar Paradox from John Buridan to Thomas Bradwardine" by Stephen Read
"Models of Liars in Bradwardine's Theory of Truth" by Greg Restall
"Normativity of Logic and the Preface Paradox" by William Nava

Greg Restall: Logical Pluralism | WSB #16

williamnava — Tue, 28 Nov 2017 07:00:00 -0400

What is logical pluralism? Greg Restall, logician and Professor of Philosophy from the University of Melbourne joins me to answer this question.

When we study logic, we’re concerned with consequence or entailment: what follows from what. But what are the criteria for being “consequence”? Professor Restall says there are three: necessity, formality, and normativity. Given these criteria, he argues there is more than one relation worthy of the name “consequence”. In other words, there is more than one system of logic that correctly represents our informal grasp of necessary entailment. This is because logical rules operate differently depending on the sort of “case” they’re functioning in. Among various, Professor Restall highlights two types of cases: “possible worlds” and “situations”. The first fit classical logic, the second paraconsistent logic. Though they differ on what kinds of arguments are valid, they both correctly represent deductive reasoning. Professor Restall explains why this makes perfect sense.

Next week: Greg Restall: Objections to Logical Pluralism, and the Preface and Liar Paradoxes

Visit http://williamnava.com for more info!

Special thanks to Jackie Blum for the podcast art, and The Tin Box for the theme music.

Sources:

Logical Pluralism by Jc Beall and Greg Restall
consequently.org - Greg Restall's website (see his excellent and accessible recent series on "Twelve Things I Love about Philosophical Logic")

The Case for Anarchism, Pt. 2: Necessity and Strategy | WSB #15

williamnava — Tue, 21 Nov 2017 19:20:04 -0400

In part 1, I defined the state as a pattern of behaviors coupled with a collective interpretation of that pattern. In this second part, I move on to the case for anarchism proper. I begin by showing that the case for the state is inherently one from necessary evil. If I'm right, and it turns out that the state is not necessary after all, it follows that it is undesirable. This is what I argue in the first half of the episode. I conclude with an extended discussion of strategy. If the state is undesirable, then how should we go about getting rid of it? By analyzing what the state is, we see that both revolution and activism are unlikely to succeed. The only path forward with a real chance of success is agorism.

Next week: Greg Restall: Logical Pluralism

Visit http://williamnava.com for more info!

Special thanks to Jackie Blum for the podcast art, and The Tin Box for the theme music.

Sources:

Pressing the Button - database of alternatives to government-provided services
"Market Anarchism as Constitutionalism" by Roderick Long
"Hayekian Anarchism" by Edward Stringham and Todd Zywicki
The Evolution of Cooperation by Robert Axelrod
The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State by Bruce Benson

The Case for Anarchism, Pt. 1: Social Ontology | WSB #14

williamnava — Tue, 14 Nov 2017 16:31:03 -0400

What does the Stanford Prison Experiment have to do with a case for anarchism?

In this episode, I argue for a certain view of the state. Piggybacking off Max Weber's definition of the state as a "human community that successfully claims the monopoly over the use of physical force within a given territory", I propose a similar but broader definition. Whereas Weber's definition is a political one, based on power analysis, my definition purports to be sociological, and therefore less morally charged than Weber's. Crucial to my take on the state is the concept of a Collective Interpretive Framework (CIF) - a shared lens through which we interpret reality. I argue that the state is a function of a particular CIF; in other words, it is a certain CIF we share that causes reality to manifest governments. This view of the state as a "self-fulfilling prophecy" and "shared hallucination" sets the stage for the case for anarchism coming in part 2.

Next week: The Case for Anarchism, Pt. 2: Necessity and Strategy

Visit http://williamnava.com for more info!

Special thanks to Jackie Blum for the podcast art, and The Tin Box for the theme music.

Sources:

"Stanford Prison Experiment" by Philip Zimbardo (website)
"Politics as a Vocation" by Max Weber
"Would You Press the Button?" by William Nava

Against Certainty, Pt. 2: Logic | WSB #13

williamnava — Tue, 07 Nov 2017 07:00:00 -0400

What about 2+2=4? Can we be 100% sure of that?

In this second part of my case against 100% certainty, I tackle claims to logical certainty. These include appeals to the three fundamental laws of logic: the Law of Excluded Middle, the Law of Non-Contradiction, and the Law of Identity. To call excluded middle into doubt, I discuss non-referring terms, vagueness, fuzzy logic, and Aristotle's problem of future contingents. For contradiction, the topics are legal contradictions, the Liar paradox, and Zeno's Arrow. To argue against certainty of the law of identity, I cover Theseus's ship, problems with time, problems of mereology, and the universe of symmetrical spheres. I then argue that even claims like "2+2=4" and "bachelors are bachelors" can't be fully foolproof. Finally, a quick barrage of skeptical concerns - concerns that, while they may not be enough to justify a self-defeating view like skepticism, are enough to block claims to 100% certainty.

Next week: The Case for Anarchism, Pt. 1: Social Ontology

Special thanks for Jackie Blum for the podcast art, and The Tin Box for the theme music.

Against Certainty, Pt. 1: Knowledge and Experience | WSB #12

williamnava — Tue, 31 Oct 2017 07:00:00 -0400

How old are you? Are you sure? How sure? 100% sure?

I'm here to argue that there's is nothing we can be fully, 100% sure of. Yes, that includes the fact that there is nothing we can be fully, 100% sure of. That doesn't mean we can't know anything - I think we can. But knowledge comes in degrees of certainty, and nothing meets the requirement of full certainty: knowledge that it is logically or metaphysically impossible to be wrong about.

To establish my case, I explain the difference between knowledge and certainty. I then discuss regress issues about certainty of certainty of certainty, followed by the Agrippan trilemma and Quine and Plantinga's naturalized epistemology. Finally, I address claims to certainty of knowledge of immediate experience.

To address these, I argue that Descartes's famous cogito is flawed, that there is no such thing as the present, and that raw perceptual experience must go through a translation process before it can be understood and therefore known.

Mentioned during the episode: the interview w/ Professor Jim Slagle about Plantinga's naturalized epistemology, and the interview with Professor Graham Priest about the sorites paradox.

Next week: Against Certainty, Pt. 2: Logic

Visit http://williamnava.com for more info!

Special thanks for Jackie Blum for the podcast art, and The Tin Box for the theme music.

Brian Nuckols on Dreams, Pt. 3: Techniques | WSB #11

williamnava — Tue, 24 Oct 2017 07:00:00 -0400

In this final installment of our interview, Brian Nuckols begins by explaining the metaphysical and social implications of dreams within dreams and recurring dreams. We then pass through a fascinating digression on how falsifiability applies to psychoanalysis and on the politics surrounding therapeutic modalities. We conclude with Brian's actionable suggestions for the curious listener, divided into three parts: remembering our dreams, interpreting our dreams, and lucid dreaming.

Next week: Against Certainty, Pt. 1: Knowledge and Experience

Special thanks for Jackie Blum for the podcast art, and The Tin Box for the theme music.

Sources:
"An Overview of Lucid Dreaming Tech" by Brian Nuckols
"Kicking Anima Possession for Fun and Profit" by Brian Nuckols

Brian Nuckols on Dreams, Pt. 2: Freud and Jung | WSB #10

williamnava — Tue, 17 Oct 2017 07:00:00 -0400

In this second part of our interview, Brian Nuckols explains the Freudian and Jungian pictures of the psyche. While doing so, he digs into concepts such as depth-psychology, projection, shadow, and anima/animus. Among other issues, Brian explains how Freud's and Jung's outlooks differ, what role culture plays for Freud, and just what the ontological status of Jung's archetypes is.

Next week: Brian Nuckols on Dreams, Pt. 3: Techniques

Visit http://williamnava.com for more info!

Special thanks for Jackie Blum for the podcast art, and The Tin Box for the theme music.

Sources:
Brian's map of the psyche
Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious by Carl Jung

Brian Nuckols: Ontology of Dreams, Pt. 1 | WSB #9

williamnava — Tue, 10 Oct 2017 07:00:00 -0400

What are dreams? A popular contemporary view says there isn't much to them - they must be something like the brain's defragmenting of the day's loose associations. Whatever the merits of this deflationary view, there's no question that they feel like much more - like events we undergo in some other realm, perhaps some different layer of reality. After a powerful personal experience with lucid dreaming, Brian Nuckols became fascinated by the many theories of the ontology of dreams. In this first part of this interview, Brian recounts how dream analysis and lucid dreaming affected his own life. He then dives deep into the interpretation of dreams held by the Runa - indigenous people living in the forests of Peru. Finally, he takes us through a survey of the history of major theories of the ontology of dreams - from the pre-Socratics all the way through to Nietzsche.

Next week: Brian Nuckols on Dreams, Pt. 2: Freud and Jung

Visit http://williamnava.com for more info!

Special thanks for Jackie Blum for the podcast art, and The Tin Box for the theme music.

Sources:
How Forests Think: Toward an Anthropology beyond the Human by Eduardo Kohn

Graham Priest: Sorites Paradox | WSB #8

williamnava — Tue, 03 Oct 2017 07:00:00 -0400

The Sorites Paradox: one grain of sand is not a heap. Add one grain, you will still not have a heap. In fact, for any number of grains of sand you have, adding one more grain will never make the difference between non-heap and heap. This latter claim is called the tolerance principle, and it seems to be undeniably true of most predicates that are in some sense vague. But if this is true, then we can keep adding one grain, over and over again, and each time appeal to the tolerance principle to show that we still don't have a heap. The paradoxical conclusion is that by the time we've reached 10,000 grains of sand, we still don't have a heap. This problem, which at first appears trivial, is one of the toughest problems facing contemporary logic. In this interview, Professor Graham Priest explains the paradox, how it relates to other paradoxes (including the Liar, via the Inclosure Schema), what makes it so difficult, and gives an outline of his own dialetheist solution to the paradox. We conclude with some words about the continental/analytic split and the relationship between Buddhist ethics and radical leftist political philosophy.

Next week: Brian Nuckols on the Ontology of Dreams

Visit http://williamnava.com for more info!

Special thanks for Jackie Blum for the podcast art, and The Tin Box for the theme music.

Graham Priest: Unity and Regress | WSB#7

williamnava — Tue, 26 Sep 2017 07:00:00 -0400

An interview with Graham Priest about Bradley's Regress and the Unity of the Proposition. Consider the statement "Socrates is sitting." It seems to be composed of an object - "Socrates" - and a predicate - "is sitting". But the statement isn't merely a list of an object and a predicate. It hangs together as a unified statement. What accounts for that unity? What makes the statement "Socrates is sitting" say something, as opposed to simply listing out a thing and a property? The obvious answer is that there's a property - instantiation - that connects the object and the predicate. But then a regress arises: how does the property of instantiation hang together with Socrates and the property of sitting? This problem isn't just about statements. As British idealist F.H. Bradley pointed out, this regress shows up with all property instantiations. After laying out the problem, professor Priest explains his own unique solution to it.

Next week: Graham Priest: Sorites Paradox

Visit http://williamnava.com for more info!

Special thanks for Jackie Blum for the podcast art, and The Tin Box for the theme music.

Sources:
One: Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the Singular Object which is Nothingness by Graham Priest

Kripke’s Naming and Necessity | WSB #6

williamnava — Tue, 19 Sep 2017 07:00:00 -0400

A name, one might think, simply stands in for the thing it names. But, if it's really as simple as that, why is a statement like "Chris Wallace is Biggie Smalls" informative? Why isn't it a tautology, of the form A is A? Starting from this simple problem, Saul Kripke's 1980 book Naming and Necessity covers the history of theories of naming before proposing a radically new theory. The book revolutionized philosophy like few books have. Aside from challenging how we think about names and identity, it also clarified the notions of "a priori" and "necessary." Famously, Kripke showed why "Water is H2O" is actually a necessary fact, though not a priori. In this episode, I summarize Kripke's arguments and propose some criticisms to his theory.

Next week: Graham Priest: Unity and Regress

Visit http://williamnava.com for more info!

Special thanks for Jackie Blum for the podcast art, and The Tin Box for the theme music.

Sources:

"The Causal Theory of Names" by Gareth Evans
Naming and Necessity by Saul Kripke

Jim Slagle’s Epistemological Skyhook, Part 2: Skepticism, Theism, Mind | WSB# 5

williamnava — Tue, 12 Sep 2017 07:00:00 -0400

In part 2 of this interview with epistemologist Jim Slagle, we continue to discuss his Epistemological Skyhook: the argument that naturalism and determinism are epistemically self-defeating. Whereas for the first part we focused on the work of Alvin Plantinga, this time we take a broader view and discuss the roles of theism, mind, and the Agrippan trilemma in the argument; Thomas Nagel's version of the argument; the possibility of biting the skeptical bullet; an existentialist approach to skepticism; broadly "continental" versions of the argument; where the name "Skyhook" came from; and Slagle's own history with theism, Christianity, and religious experience.

Next week: Kripke's Naming and Necessity

Visit http://williamnava.com for more info!

Special thanks for Jackie Blum for the podcast art, and The Tin Box for the theme music.

Sources:

The Epistemological Skyhook: Determinism, Naturalism, and Self-Defeat by Jim Slagle

Jim Slagle’s Epistemological Skyhook, Part 1: Plantinga | WSB #4

williamnava — Tue, 05 Sep 2017 07:00:00 -0400

In this interview with epistemologist Jim Slagle, we discuss the Epistemological Skyhook. That is, the argument that certain philosophical positions (such as naturalism and determinism) give us a reason to believe in skepticism, which in turn, gives us a reason to doubt the reasoning that got us to the position in the first place. If the argument is correct, then while it is possible that naturalism or determinism might be true, it is impossible for us to believe in them. In this first part of our two-part discussion, we focus on Alvin Plantinga's version of the argument.

Next week: The Epistemological Skyhook w/ Prof. Jim Slagle, Part 2: Skepticism, Theism, Mind

Visit http://williamnava.com for more info!

Special thanks for Jackie Blum for the podcast art, and The Tin Box for the theme music.

Sources:

The Epistemological Skyhook: Determinism, Naturalism, and Self-Defeat by Jim Slagle

Intro to the Liar, Part 2: Structure and the Inclosure Schema | WSB #3

williamnava — Tue, 29 Aug 2017 07:00:00 -0400

How can we tell if a paradox is really of the Liar family? Bertrand Russell proposed a structure that Graham Priest has called the "inclosure schema" - a mechanism meant to identify what drives self-referential paradoxes like the Liar and Russell's. In this episode, I break down the technical details of the inclosure schema to show how it fits the paradoxes in question and allows us to tell apart Liar-type paradoxes from those that aren't. I also look at some problems with the schema and how they might be solved. I conclude with an overview of a solution to the Liar: one favored by C.S. Peirce.

Next week: The Epistemological Skyhook w/ Prof. Jim Slagle, Pt. 1: Plantinga

Visit http://williamnava.com for more info!

Special thanks for Jackie Blum for the podcast art, and The Tin Box for the theme music.

Sources:

"The Structure of the Paradoxes of Self-Reference" by Graham Priest

"Dialetheic Vagueness" by Graham Priest

"This Proposition Is Not True: C.S. Peirce and the Liar Paradox" by Richard Kenneth Atkins

Paradoxes by R. M Sainsbury