

Report Concerning Qatar's Al Jazeera Media Network & The Foreign Agents Registration Act

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CONTENTS

I. Executive Summary	03
II. Author's Note	05
III. FARA Background.....	08
A. Relevant Statutory Definitions and Obligations	08
B. FARA Has Always Applied to Foreign Media Outlets.....	09
C. FARA is About Transparency, Not Censorship.....	10
D. FARA Has Broad Applicability.....	11
E. Seeking to Influence U.S. Public Opinion in the Interests of a Foreign Principal Triggers FARA	11
F. Disseminating Information in the Interests of a Foreign Principal Triggers FARA	11
IV. Background on Al Jazeera.....	12
A. Al Jazeera's Brands in the United States	12
B. Corporate and Ownership Structure.....	13
V. Qatar Owns, Funds, Directs, and Controls Al Jazeera.....	14
A. Qatar Owns Al Jazeera.....	15
B. Qatar Funds Al Jazeera	16
C. Qatar Directs Al Jazeera	16
D. Qatar Controls Al Jazeera	17
VI. Al Jazeera Amplifies Qatar's Foreign Policy Agenda	18
A. Qatar Uses Al Jazeera to Support Iran.....	19
B. Qatar Uses Al Jazeera to Promote Hamas.....	20
C. Qatar Uses Al Jazeera to Give Political Legitimacy to Other Terrorist and Extremist Groups	21
VII. Al Jazeera is Not an Independent Media Outlet.....	24
A. Al Jazeera is Not Free to Report Critically on Qatar's Leaders	24
B. Al Jazeera Does Not Provide Transparency or Accountability Around Its Editorial Decisions	26
VIII. Al Jazeera's AJ+ Seeks To Impact U.S. Elections	27
IX. Qatar Has Outsized Influence Through Al Jazeera	28
X. Al Jazeera Must Register Under FARA.....	29
XI. Table Of Exhibits.....	30

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report evaluates whether Al Jazeera is an “agent of a foreign principal” obligated to register with the Department of Justice (“DOJ” or “the Department”) pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”), 22 U.S.C. § 611 *et seq.*

Like Russia’s RT, China’s CGTN, and Turkey’s TRT media outlets, each of which the Department has required to register under FARA,¹ Al Jazeera is owned, funded, directed, and controlled by the Government of Qatar, and it engages in political activities and disseminates information in the United States that advances the interests of that foreign government. As of the date of this report, Al Jazeera has not registered under FARA.

This report provides evidence of the following facts from publicly available information, as further detailed and cited within the body of the report:

Qatar’s Ownership, Funding, Direction, and Control of Al Jazeera

- The ruler of Qatar, Emir Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, owns Al Jazeera.²
- Qatar’s Ministry of Finance controls Al Jazeera’s budget.³
- Qatari royal family members hold leadership and board positions within Al Jazeera.⁴
- Al Jazeera’s U.S. producers must send their content to “Doha” for approval.⁵
- Qatar has acknowledged its control over Al Jazeera in binding international agreements.⁶

Al Jazeera’s Amplification of Qatar’s Foreign Policy Agenda

- Al Jazeera personnel describe their jobs as advancing Qatar’s foreign policy views.⁷
- Qatari officials describe Al Jazeera as a “soft power” tool of Qatar and say that Al Jazeera plays “a defensive and offensive strategic role” for Qatar.⁸
- Al Jazeera’s content advances Qatar’s policies and interests, especially in relation to Iran, Hamas, and other terrorist and extremist groups.⁹
- Qatar measures Al Jazeera’s success in terms of its influence, not profit.¹⁰

1 United States Dep’t of Justice, National Security Division, “Obligation of RTTV America, Inc. to Register Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act,” August 17, 2017, <https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000160-79a9-d762-a374-7dfbebe30001>; United States Dep’t of Justice, National Security Division, “Obligation of CGTN America to Register Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act,” December 20, 2018, <https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/638-doj-letter-cgtn/b852f4eae0647820f27e/optimized/full.pdf#page=1>; United States Dep’t of Justice, National Security Division, “Obligation of Turkish Radio & Television Corporation to Register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act,” August 1, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/files/live/sites/almonitor/files/documents/2020/trt_world_justice_department_fara_determination_letter.pdf. In February 2020, the U.S. government designated five Chinese state-run media organizations, including CGTN, as foreign missions thereby imposing additional requirements on them. See United States Dep’t of State, “Senior State Department Officials On the Office of Foreign Mission’s Designation of Chinese Media Entities as Foreign Missions,” Office of the Spokesperson, February 18, 2020, <https://www.state.gov/senior-state-department-officials-on-the-office-of-foreign-missions-designation-of-chinese-media-entities-as-foreign-missions/>.

2 See Part V, page 15.

3 See Part V, page 16.

4 See Part V, pages 16-17.

5 See Part V, page 17.

6 See Part V, page 18.

7 See Part VI, page 18.

8 See Part VI, pages 18-19.

9 See Part VI, pages 19-24.

10 See Part VI, pages 18-19.

Al Jazeera's Lack of Independence and Editorial Transparency

- Qatar's media laws prohibit Al Jazeera from criticizing the Emir and other Qatari leaders.¹¹
- Qatar negotiates with interested parties over the publication of Al Jazeera content.¹²
- Al Jazeera does not provide transparency around credible reports of government involvement in editorial decision-making.¹³
- Al Jazeera's standards around transparency and accountability do not match those of public, taxpayer-funded broadcasters like the BBC.¹⁴

Al Jazeera's Reach Within the United States

- Al Jazeera's U.S.-based AJ+ has amassed over 10 billion views on Facebook alone and currently has 11 million followers.¹⁵
- Al Jazeera makes both its English- and Arabic-language digital content freely accessible in the United States through various distribution platforms.¹⁶
- Al Jazeera has over 100 U.S.-government credentialed staff and maintains branch offices across the country.¹⁷
- Al Jazeera's U.S. audience is estimated to be in the millions across its various platforms.¹⁸
- Al Jazeera targets U.S. youth and millennial audiences on AJ+ through social media.¹⁹

FARA was enacted by Congress to shed light on the kind of influence that Qatar maintains in the United States through Al Jazeera. Since FARA became law, media outlets acting as agents of a foreign government have been subject to registration so that the U.S. public can properly appraise the content that those outlets disseminate. Importantly, FARA does not limit the ability of covered foreign media outlets to report and publish in the United States or the substance of what they may report; rather, it merely requires that they disclose their relationship to a foreign government and operate transparently.

Based on the public record reviewed and assessed herein, Al Jazeera has operated in the United States for years as an agent of Qatar without registering under FARA. This report chronicles these findings and concludes that Al Jazeera must register with the DOJ and comply with FARA.

11 See Part VII, pages 24-26.

12 See Part VII, pages 26-27.

13 See Part VII, pages 26-27.

14 See Part VII, pages 26-27.

15 See Part IX, pages 28-29.

16 See Part IV, page 12.

17 See Part IV, page 12.

18 See Part IV, page 12.

19 See Part IV, page 12.

II. AUTHOR'S NOTE

I was engaged to represent the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”) as part of my work with Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP.²⁰ I am proud to support the UAE and to continue my close association with it because the UAE is a key strategic and economically of the United States. The UAE is the only Arab nation (and one of only three countries) to have participated with the United States in six military coalition actions over the last 20 years, including full-scale Special Forces operations in Afghanistan and multiple operations in the fight against Al-Qaeda. The UAE is the top U.S. export destination in the entire Middle East and North Africa (“MENA”) region, with U.S. exports to the UAE exceeding \$20 billion in 2019 alone.

I represented South Florida in the U.S. Congress for 30 years, and in that capacity, I had the privilege of learning in-depth about the importance of the U.S.-UAE partnership. I served as Chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa. Time and again, my colleagues and I found common cause with the UAE on almost every international crisis and problem that our nation sought to address, especially in the fight against terrorism and extremism.

I was one of many that came into office before fully appreciating the importance of the UAE to U.S. interests in the region – in fact, I was a skeptic and outspoken during the 2006 Dubai Ports World controversy. Thus, I was initially worried when the Bush Administration announced in 2008 that it intended to enter into a U.S.-UAE Agreement for Peaceful Civilian Nuclear Energy Cooperation in conjunction with the UAE’s plan to build a nuclear power plant. However, working with the Congress and relevant U.S. agencies, the UAE in 2009 voluntarily made the strongest non-proliferation commitments when it signed the agreement. In particular, the UAE committed to forego the ability to enrich and reprocess nuclear material. This is now called the “gold standard” for nuclear cooperation agreements. As I followed the UAE’s implementation of that agreement, I became a strong supporter of our partnership. In 2012, I invited the UAE Ambassador to the United States to the University of Miami to discuss the U.S.-UAE bilateral relationship and the role of the UAE as a key U.S. ally. That conversation left a lasting impression.

Unfortunately, not every partner in the region has proved to be such an ally. Qatar repeatedly undermines U.S. interests in the region by supporting extremist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Al-Qaeda, and Al-Nusrah. Qatar’s relationship with Iran raises serious questions regarding their vision for the region. Moreover, Qatar uses its state-owned, state-funded, state-directed and state-controlled Al Jazeera Media Network to project this vision to the U.S. public.

I have long had concerns about these issues with Qatar. In 2014, I told my former congressional colleagues in a hearing, “Qatar is a major benefactor of Hamas” that it “has been supporting terrorists and radicals all across the globe and offers them sanctuary.”²¹ In that same hearing, I described how Qatar “serves as Hamas’ mouthpiece through Al Jazeera, airing Hamas propaganda that then gets broadcast to the world.”²² In 2017, I noted in another hearing that “Qatar has been known to be a permissive environment for terror financing, reportedly funding U.S.

20 Earlier this year, I registered as a foreign agent on behalf of the UAE. See U.S. Department of Justice, Short Form Registration Statement, <https://efile.fara.gov/docs/3492-Short-Form-20200121-398.pdf>.

21 United States House of Representatives, One Hundred and Thirteenth Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, “Denouncing the Use of Civilians as Human Shields by Hamas and Other Terrorist Organizations in Violation of International Humanitarian Law; and Condemning the Murder of Israeli and Palestinian Children in Israel and the Ongoing and Escalating Violence in that Country,” July 24, 2014. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-113hrg88835/html/CHRG-113hrg88835.htm>.

22 *Id.*

designated foreign terrorist organizations, such as Hamas, as well as several extremist groups operating in Syria.”²³ In that hearing, I heeded the words of one of my Democratic Party colleagues, who cautioned, “Al Jazeera has given voice to clerics calling for suicide attacks against Americans and Israelis.”²⁴ Then in 2018, I warned that Qatar’s efforts have “actively undermined regional stability,” and I added: “To see how Qatar fuels extremist violence in the region, one need only look at its state-funded Al Jazeera.”²⁵

The following report gathers publicly available records of the relationship between Qatar and Al Jazeera in one place. The United States needs to take a hard look at its relationship with Qatar and to compel Al Jazeera – the media network that is owned, funded, directed, and controlled by the Qatari government – to register with the Department of Justice under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”).

To date, Al Jazeera has operated in the United States without registering under FARA. Indeed, Al Jazeera has hundreds of employees in the United States creating content here, in English, aimed at U.S. audiences (especially students and young adults), and attempting to influence U.S. policies and opinions. Al Jazeera has a massive reach in the United States, with millions of readers, viewers, and followers, and billions of “hits” on social media, dwarfing the U.S. impact of state-media outlets owned and controlled by China, Russia, and Turkey. But the American public does not know that Al Jazeera is owned by the Emir of Qatar and is a foreign policy tool of the Government of Qatar. In particular, the content produced by Al Jazeera’s AJ+ unit, which is based in the United States, does not disclose that it is part of Al Jazeera, let alone that it is owned by the Emir of Qatar. Unlike truly independent media, Al Jazeera does not criticize its home-country leaders or public officials. In fact, Qatari law prohibits Al Jazeera from criticizing the Emir. Qatari officials and even Al Jazeera’s own personnel admit that Al Jazeera strategically advances Qatar’s view of the world.

Al Jazeera must be held to the same standard and disclose the nature of its activities just like anyone else, myself included, that is seeking to influence U.S. policy and public opinion on behalf of a foreign principal. The fact that Qatar hosts the U.S. military at Al Udeid Air Base should not stand in the way of full disclosure of this foreign influence in the United States. As I said on multiple occasions while still in Congress, we cannot tolerate the kind of permissive environment for terrorist financing that Qatar has allowed, and we need to hold all to account when we detect support for groups like ISIS, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and countless other extremist groups – whether such support comes in the form of money or, in the case of Al Jazeera, a foreign state-supported platform for the dissemination of terrorist and extremist ideology and propaganda.

To be clear, registration under FARA is not a tool of censorship, but of transparency. In the current climate when foreign interference in U.S. politics is an unfortunate reality, scrutiny of that interference is more important than ever before, and we must hold foreign countries, state-owned media organizations, and other actors accountable. I would not support suppressing Al Jazeera’s ability to project its views, but I cannot sit by while the Qatari regime’s role is cloaked by a media conglomerate wholly owned by a foreign government. The U.S. public reads,

23 United States House of Representatives, One Hundred and Fifteenth Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, “Assessing the U.S.-Qatar Relationship,” July 26, 2017. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg26427/html/CHRG-115hhrg26427.htm>.

24 United States House of Representatives, One Hundred and Fifteenth Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, “Assessing the U.S.-Qatar Relationship,” July 26, 2017. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg26427/html/CHRG-115hhrg26427.htm>.

25 United States House of Representatives, One Hundred and Fifteenth Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, “Grading Counterterrorism Cooperation with the GCC States,” April 26, 2018. <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA18/20180426/108228/HHRG-115-FA18-Transcript-20180426.pdf>.

hears, and sees Al Jazeera stories and content every day, and Americans deserve to know that this organization serves as an agent for – and is owned, funded, directed, and controlled by – the Government of Qatar. This report discusses these issues in further detail. I urge you to read it closely.

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III. FARA BACKGROUND

The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (FARA) requires organizations and individuals who engage in certain kinds of activities in the United States, for or in the interests of a “foreign principal,” to publicly disclose their ties to that foreign principal. In particular, persons who engage in “political activities” or act as “publicity agents” or “information-service employees” for or in the interests of a “foreign principal” may be subject to FARA. The Act requires these persons to register with the DOJ and provide transparency with respect to their activities and relationship to the foreign principal.²⁶ In turn, the American public is able to evaluate the statements and actions of registered foreign agents with a clear understanding of their source.²⁷

A. Relevant Statutory Definitions and Obligations

The applicability of the various legal obligations under FARA turns on a number of defined terms, as noted above, including “foreign principal,” “agent of a foreign principal,” “political activities,” “publicity agent,” and/or “information-service employee.”

The term “foreign principal” includes both a “government of a foreign country” and “a partnership, association, corporation, organization, or other combination of persons organized under the laws of or having a principal place of business in a foreign country.”²⁸

The term “agent of a foreign principal” means, in relevant part: “any person who acts as an agent . . . or . . . in any other capacity at the order, request, or under the direction or control, of a foreign principal or of a person any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign principal” and “who directly or through any other person . . . engages within the United States in political activities for or in the interests of such foreign principal . . . [or] acts within the United States as a . . . publicity agent . . . [or] information-service employee . . . for or in the interests of such foreign principal.”²⁹

The term “political activities” means “any activity that the person engaging in believes will, or that the person intends to, in any way influence any agency or official of the Government of the United States or any section of the public within the United States with reference to formulating, adopting, or changing the domestic or foreign policies of the United States or with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party.”³⁰

A “publicity agent” refers to “any person who engages directly or indirectly in the publication or dissemination of oral, visual, graphic, written, or pictorial information or matter of any kind, including publication by means of . . . broadcasts, motion pictures, or otherwise.”³¹ An “information-service employee” includes any person “who is engaged in furnishing, disseminating, or publishing accounts, descriptions, information, or data with respect to the political, industrial, employment, economic, social, cultural, or other benefits, advantages, facts, or conditions of any country other than the United States or of any government of a foreign country or of a foreign political party

²⁶ 22 U.S.C §§ 612 & 614; see *also*, related implementing regulations at 28 C.F.R. § 5.

²⁷ See 56 Stat. 248-249 (Apr. 29, 1942).

²⁸ 22 U.S.C. § 611(b).

²⁹ 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1)(i)-(ii).

³⁰ 22 U.S.C. § 611(o).

³¹ 22 U.S.C. § 611(h).

or of a partnership, association, corporation, organization, or other combination of individuals organized under the laws of, or having its principal place of business in, a foreign country.”³²

If a person meets the definition of “agent of a foreign principal” under any of the possible rubrics based on the above definitions, then that person must comply with various requirements under the Act, including: (i) filing a detailed registration statement with the Attorney General; (ii) filing copies of informational materials transmitted in the United States with the Attorney General; and (iii) placing a conspicuous statement on any informational materials transmitted in the United States, disclosing that the informational materials are distributed by the agent on behalf of the foreign principal.³³

B. FARA Has Always Applied to Foreign Media Outlets

Since its inception, FARA has applied to foreign media outlets operating in the United States. Identifying such organizations and their specific ties to foreign governments was the main goal of FARA when enacted at the beginning of World War II. In 1934, a Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives began investigating Nazi propaganda efforts in the United States and in 1938 led the way to passing legislation to require “all publicity, propaganda, or public-relations agents or other agents or agencies, who represent in this country any foreign government” to disclose the relationship.³⁴

The first FARA enforcement actions targeted Nazi propaganda outlets operating in the United States, including the German Library of Information and Transocean News Service,³⁵ but FARA was by no means limited to agents of Nazi Germany. News services owned or controlled by other nations, including close U.S. allies, also registered under FARA. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) registered during the early 1940s, as did ANETA (the Netherlands Indies News Agency), the Royal Norwegian Broadcasting Service, and Inter-Continent News (a Soviet telegraph agency).³⁶

The U.S. Supreme Court has confirmed that FARA applies to agents of foreign governments regardless of whether those governments might be deemed to be a friend to the U.S. or foe. In *Meese v. Keene*, the Supreme Court found that FARA applies “equally to agents of friendly, neutral, and unfriendly governments” and to the dissemination of misleading materials and accurate ones alike.³⁷ To underscore this point, Congress amended FARA in 1995 to clarify its general applicability to “informational materials” disseminated by foreign agents in lieu of

³² 22 U.S.C. § 611(i).

³³ 22 U.S.C. § 612 and 614; see also, related implementing regulations at 28 C.F.R. § 5.

³⁴ *Viereck v. United States*, 318 U.S. 236, 244 (1943). See “How the United States Unmasked Foreign Agents in Our Midst,” U.S. Holocaust Museum, March 18, 2019, <https://medium.com/@HolocaustMuseum/how-the-united-states-unmasked-foreign-agents-in-our-midst-fa16bdf7e483>.

³⁵ H.R. Rep. No. 153 at 1, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). The committee was tasked with investigating Nazi propaganda activities specifically and “subversive propaganda” more generally, which it interpreted to include fascist and communist activities as well; see also *Attorney Gen. of U.S. v. Irish People, Inc.*, 684 F.2d 928, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“It was prompted by and first used extensively against Fascism and Naziism in the 1930s and then during World War II itself, was then aimed more toward the Soviet Union and its allies in the post-war period, and—apparently—today is being employed for disclosing links with international terrorists.”).

³⁶ U.S. Dep’t of Justice, *Report of the Attorney General to the Congress of the United States on the Administration of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as Amended for the Period from June 28, 1942 to December 31, 1944* 130, 132, 145, 158 (June 1945), <https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara/page/file/991971/download>. Furthermore, in 1960, the British Broadcasting Corporation, the French Broadcasting System in North America, and Radio Sweden were each registered under FARA. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, *Report of the Attorney General to the Congress of the United States on the Administration of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as Amended for the Calendar Year 1960* 62, 57, 98 (July 1961), <https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara/page/file/991866/download>. In 1985, even Minnesota Public Radio registered because it “marketed programs produced by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, *Report of the Attorney General to the Congress of the United States on the Administration of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as Amended, for the Calendar Year 1985* 97, <https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara/page/file/991811/download>

³⁷ *Meese v. Keene*, 481 U.S. 465, 469-470 (1987).

“political propaganda.”³⁸

Over the years, the purpose of FARA has not changed. Outlets that engage in political activities or disseminate information in the interests of foreign principals must comply with the Act so that the American people “may be informed of the identity of such persons and may apprise their statements and actions in light of their associations and activities.”³⁹ Today, media outlets registered under FARA include Turkish Radio & Television Corporation; CGTN America (part of China Central Television); China Daily Distribution Corporation; KBS America, Inc. (part of South Korea’s public broadcasting company); and NHK Cosmomedia America, Inc. (a company that re-broadcasts Japanese radio and television).⁴⁰ In 2017, T&R Productions, LLC, registered as an agent of ANO TV-Novosti, a Russian government entity responsible for the RT Network, and in 2018, RIA Global LLC registered as an agent of Rossiya Segodnya, a Russian government entity responsible for the Sputnik news agency.⁴¹

C. FARA is About Transparency, Not Censorship

FARA does not affect what an agent of a “foreign principal” may say. For purposes of FARA compliance, the content of a foreign media outlet’s reporting makes no difference. U.S. courts have repeatedly found that FARA does not conflict with the First Amendment,⁴² and it does not stop or limit speech.⁴³ Instead, it illuminates speech by adding important context.

In *Meese v. Keene*, the Supreme Court held that “the Act places no burden on protected expression,” rather, it simply requires foreign agents “to make additional disclosures that would better enable the public to evaluate the import of the propaganda.”⁴⁴ By requiring foreign agents to file a registration statement and disclose their activities, FARA ensures the American people are not “deceived by the belief that the [agent’s] information comes from a disinterested source.”⁴⁵ Such a purpose does not offend constitutional values—it supports them.⁴⁶ Accordingly,

38 See Pub. L. 104-65 § 9(1).

39 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, *Court Finds RM Broadcasting Must Register as a Foreign Agent*, (May 2019), <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/court-finds-rm-broadcasting-must-register-foreign-agent>.

40 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FARA Registration Unit, “Turkish Radio-Television Corporation Exhibit A,” (March 2020), <https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6780-Exhibit-AB-20200312-1.pdf>; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FARA Registration Unit, “CGTN America FARA Informational Materials,” (March 2020), <https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6780-Exhibit-AB-20200312-1.pdf>; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FARA Registration Unit, “China Daily Distribution Corp. Supplemental Statement,” (May 2011), <https://efile.fara.gov/docs/3457-Supplemental-Statement-20110531-13.pdf>; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FARA Registration Unit, “KBS America, Inc. Supplemental Statement,” (December 2019), <https://efile.fara.gov/docs/5684-Supplemental-Statement-20191224-29.pdf>; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FARA Registration Unit, “NHK Cosmomedia America, Inc. Supplemental Statement,” (April 2019), <https://efile.fara.gov/docs/4490-Supplemental-Statement-20190426-30.pdf>.

41 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FARA Registration Unit, “RIA Global LLC Supplemental Statement,” (March 2019), <https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6524-Supplemental-Statement-20190314-2.pdf>; see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, *Production Company Registers Under the Foreign Agent Registration Act as Agent for the Russian Government Entity Responsible for Broadcasting RT* (November 13, 2017), <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/production-company-registers-under-foreign-agent-registration-act-agent-russian-government>.

42 See *Attorney Gen. v. Irish People, Inc.*, 595 F. Supp. 114, 120-121 (D.D.C. 1984) (finding that FARA does not violate the First Amendment), *aff’d in part, rev’d in part*, 796 F.2d 520, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“[W]e note that the enforcement of the FARA for the purposes expressed in the statute does not infringe the exercise of constitutional rights.”); *Irish People, Inc.*, 684 F.2d at 936 (noting that “it is well settled that FARA is constitutional”); *Attorney Gen. of U.S. v. Irish N. Aid Comm.*, 530 F. Supp. 241, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (explaining that “[t]he facial validity of the Act has previously been upheld against first amendment challenge.”), *aff’d*, 668 F.2d at 159; *Attorney Gen. v. Irish N. Aid Comm.*, 346 F. Supp. 1384, 1390-1391 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (detailing why FARA does not violate the First Amendment), *aff’d without opinion*, 465 F.2d 1405 (2d Cir. 1972); *United States v. Peace Info. Ctr.*, 97 F. Supp. 255, 259-262 (D.D.C. 1951) (concluding that FARA is constitutional); see also *Viereck v. United States*, 318 U.S. 236, 251 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting) (“[FARA] ‘does not in any way impair the right of freedom of speech, or of a free press, or other constitutional rights.’”).

43 *Peace Info. Ctr.*, 97 F. Supp. at 262 (noting that “[FARA] does not regulate the expression of ideas”).

44 *Meese v. Keene*, 481 U.S. at 480.

45 *Id.*, at n. 15 (citing to *Viereck*, 318 U.S. at 251).

46 See *Irish People, Inc.*, 684 F.2d at 956 (Wald, J., concurring); *Viereck*, 318 U.S. at 251 (Black, J., dissenting).

U.S. courts have upheld FARA time and again.⁴⁷

D. FARA Has Broad Applicability

FARA's reach is broad.⁴⁸ As indicated by the statutory definitions noted above, it can apply to persons who take any action under the control, direction, or at the request of a foreign principal.⁴⁹ It can also apply to persons whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign principal.⁵⁰ In other words, entities that are merely financed by a foreign government, including media outlets, may be required to register under FARA.⁵¹ Specifically, they are required to register if they engage in any political activities or disseminate information in the United States for or in the interests of that foreign principal.

E. Seeking to Influence U.S. Public Opinion in the Interests of a Foreign Principal Triggers FARA

If a foreign media outlet that is owned, financed, directed, or controlled by a foreign principal engages in "political activities" in the United States, it must register under FARA. Political activities include any activity meant to influence the U.S. Government or the American people with respect to U.S. policy or the policy interests of a foreign government.⁵² Thus, trying to sway U.S. public opinion on matters of foreign or domestic policy is a political activity. When done in the interests of a foreign principal, FARA applies.

F. Disseminating Information in the Interests of a Foreign Principal Triggers FARA

Additionally, FARA applies when a foreign media outlet that is owned, financed, directed, or controlled by a foreign principal simply disseminates information for or in the interests of that foreign principal – regardless of whether that information has a nexus to a particular policy issue or calls for specific U.S. government action. For example, the legal obligations under FARA apply to such outlets who act as "publicity agents" by disseminating information "of any kind" for or in the interests of a foreign principal. The legal obligations also apply to such outlets who act as "information-service employees" by disseminating information "with respect to the political, industrial, employment, economic, social, cultural, or other benefits, advantages, facts, or conditions of any country other than the United States."

In sum, media outlets that are owned, financed, directed, or controlled by foreign governments can become subject to the public disclosure requirements of FARA whenever they, in the interests of their foreign sponsors, engage in political activities or disseminate information in the United States. As detailed below, Al Jazeera meets this test.

⁴⁷ See *supra*, n. 42.

⁴⁸ *RM Broad, LLC v. United States Dep't of Justice*, 379 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 1262 (S.D. Fla. 2019) ("This Court acknowledges, as have others, that the language of FARA is broad.")

⁴⁹ 22 U.S.C. § 611(c).

⁵⁰ *Id.*

⁵¹ *Irish N. Aid Comm.*, 530 F. Supp. at 257 (internal quotation marks omitted), *aff'd*, 668 F.2d at 159.

⁵² 22 U.S.C. § 611(o).

IV. BACKGROUND ON AL JAZEERA

Al Jazeera was launched in 1996 at the order of Qatar's Emir.⁵³ With its headquarters in Doha, Qatar, the network now reaches approximately 310 million households in over 100 countries.⁵⁴ It has a team of 3,000 people around the world.⁵⁵ In the United States, Al Jazeera has personnel in Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, New York, San Francisco, and Washington, DC.⁵⁶ In Washington, D.C., Al Jazeera has had over 100 staff credentialed for Congressional press galleries, rivaling that of most major news outlets.⁵⁷

A. Al Jazeera's Brands in the United States

Al Jazeera reaches American audiences through three main brands: *AJ+*, *Al Jazeera English*, and *Al Jazeera Arabic*.

AJ+ is a U.S.-based digital brand specifically aimed at youth and millennial audiences in the United States on social media.⁵⁸ *AJ+* produces short, curated content that is custom-tailored to Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and Instagram. Its content, which focuses on U.S. political issues, is freely accessible across each platform. *AJ+* Facebook videos have been viewed over 10 billion times since the launch of *AJ+* in 2014, and it has amassed over 11 million followers on Facebook.⁵⁹ *AJ+* formerly was headquartered in San Francisco, California, and is now based in Washington, D.C.⁶⁰

Al Jazeera English is Al Jazeera's English-language media channel. This content is freely accessible to viewers through *aljazeera.com*.⁶¹ Streaming and on-demand video content is available in the United States on most consumer platforms, including Amazon Fire TV, Android TV, Apple TV, iTunes, Google Play, Netflix, Roku, and the like.⁶² AOL, Apple News, Flipboard, Google Newsstand, MSN, and Yahoo also host *Al Jazeera English* content.⁶³ The brand extends to social media as well.

Al Jazeera Arabic is Al Jazeera's Arabic-language media channel. This content is freely accessible to U.S. viewers through *aljazeera.net*. The DISH Network carries *Al Jazeera Arabic* for U.S. subscribers.⁶⁴

53 Sultan Al Qassemi, "Breaking the Arab News," *Foreign Policy*, August 2, 2012, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/02/breaking-the-arab-news/>.

54 "About Us." Al Jazeera English. Accessed February 19, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/aboutus/>.

55 *Id.*

56 *Id.*; "Al Jazeera Media Network Homepage." Al Jazeera Media Network. Accessed February 19, 2020, <https://network.aljazeera.net/network>.

57 Radio & Television Correspondents Gallery, *2017-2018 Official Congressional Directory*, 115th United States Congress, Washington, D.C., <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CDIR-2018-10-29/pdf/CDIR-2018-10-29-STATISTICALINFORMATION-26.pdf>.

58 Peter Kovessy and Shabina S. Khatri, "Al Jazeera Launches Digital Channel AJ+ to Woo Younger Viewers," *Doha News*, Sept. 15, 2014, <https://dohanews.co/al-jazeera-launches-digital-channel-aj-bid-woo-younger-viewers/>.

59 Sadie Hale, "Video strategies for a visual world – with AJ+ and Awesomeness TV," *FIPP*, March 20, 2017, <https://www.fipp.com/news/features/video-strategies-for-a-visual-world>; "AJ+." Facebook. Accessed May 8, 2020, <https://www.facebook.com/ajplusenglish/>.

60 "AJ+." LinkedIn. Accessed April 24, 2020. <https://www.linkedin.com/company/ajplus/>; Trisha Thadani, "Al Jazeera to shut down San Francisco office, home of AJ+," *San Francisco Chronicle*, June 6, 2018, <https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Al-Jazeera-to-shut-down-San-Francisco-office-12970463.php>.

61 SimilarWeb, a company providing website traffic data, estimates that *aljazeera.com* received approximately 6.8 million visitors from the United States over the six months preceding February 1, 2018. See <https://www.similarweb.com/>.

62 "Al Jazeera English expands digital access to the US," *Al Jazeera*, Sept. 21, 2016, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/al-jazeera-english-expands-digital-access-160921140159439.html>.

63 *Id.*

64 "Satellite Frequencies: Find Aljazeera Near You." Al Jazeera Media Network. Accessed February 19, 2020, <http://sat.aljazeera.net/en/frequency-search/283/17>; "Al Jazeera (ALJAZ)." Mydish.com. Accessed February 18, 2020, <https://www.mydish.com/station/ALJAZ>.

B. Corporate and Ownership Structure

Al Jazeera's corporate structure includes the following entities: Qatar Media Corporation, Al Jazeera Media Network, and Al Jazeera International (USA) LLC. These entities are under the control of the Emir through the Council of Ministers. Qatar's Council of Ministers acts as a supreme executive body for all of Qatar's internal and external affairs.⁶⁵ Based on the publicly available information referenced herein, the following diagram portrays Al Jazeera's corporate and ownership structure:



Qatar Media Corporation ("QMC") is a corporation organized under the laws of Qatar, with its principal place of business located in Doha, Qatar.⁶⁶ QMC is the parent entity of Al Jazeera according to various news articles and corporate intelligence services.⁶⁷ For example, Bloomberg reports that "Al Jazeera Media Network operates as a subsidiary of Qatar Media Corporation."⁶⁸ According to its website, QMC "is the official broadcasting authority for the State of Qatar" and was established in 2009 to "oversee media services in numerous TV and Radio channels."⁶⁹ Qatar's national e-Government Portal further explains that QMC's responsibilities include "managing public radio and television stations, maintaining and enforcing broadcast standards and content guidelines, and developing

65 "The Government." State of Qatar Government Communications Office. Accessed May 18, 2020, <https://www.gco.gov.qa/en/about-qatar/the-government/>.

66 "Contact Us." Qatar Media Corporation. Accessed April 24, 2020, <http://www.qmc.qa/en/p/contact>. Listing only address as "P.O. Box 1836."

67 Peter Beaumont, "How Qatar is Taking on the World," *The Guardian*, July 7, 2012, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/07/qatar-takes-on-the-world> ("[t]hen there is the Doha-based Al-Jazeera television, considered the most important Arab news TV channel, owned by Qatar through the Qatar Media Corporation..."); Eli Epstein, "Here's How Qatar is Investing Its \$85 Billion Sovereign Wealth Fund," *Business Insider Australia*, July 11, 2012, <https://www.businessinsider.com.au/qatar-investments-2012-7#the-qatari-royal-family-owns-a-media-empire-1> ("[t]oday the station is owned by the Qatar Media Corporation...").

68 "Al Jazeera Media Network." PrivCo. Accessed April 24, 2020, <https://www.privco.com/private-company/al-jazeera>.

69 About Us." Qatar Media Corporation. Accessed April 24, 2020, <http://www.qmc.qa/en/p/about>.

programming that promotes Qatar's interests."⁷⁰

Qatar's General Secretariat for Development Planning has stated that QMC is under the control of the Emir through Qatar's Council of Ministers.⁷¹ PrivCo, a U.S.-based private company financial database, reports that QMC is "owned by the Qatari Royal Family."⁷² The Guardian reports that Al Jazeera is "owned by Qatar through the Qatar Media Corporation."⁷³ PrivCo also reports that Al Jazeera is "a 100% owned subsidiary of Qatar Media Corporation."⁷⁴ The European Commission's MAVISE database lists QMC as an "investor, holding or media group" having "direct, indirect, or partial control" of Al Jazeera.⁷⁵ Other researchers also have concluded that AJMN is owned by the State of Qatar through QMC.⁷⁶

Al Jazeera Media Network ("AJMN") is a corporation organized under the laws of Qatar, with its principal place of business located at Al Jazeera Media Network building, P.O. Box 23123, Doha, Qatar.⁷⁷ Prior to 2011, AJMN was known as Al Jazeera Satellite Network; and prior to 2006, it was known as Al Jazeera Satellite Channel.⁷⁸ In legal filings, AJMN has represented to a U.S. court that it is "the ultimate parent company of the well-known Al Jazeera brand and family of networks."⁷⁹

Al Jazeera International (USA) LLC ("Al Jazeera U.S.") is a limited liability company organized under the laws of Delaware.⁸⁰ This entity was formerly incorporated as "Al Jazeera International (USA), Inc."⁸¹ It changed its corporate status in Delaware to a limited liability company on or around February 28, 2017.⁸² This entity has been organized under Delaware law since August 30, 2005.⁸³ A U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia made a finding of fact in 2010 that Al Jazeera U.S. "is a division of [Al Jazeera Media Network], an entity organized under the laws of the Government of the State of Qatar which has its principal place of business in Doha, Qatar."⁸⁴

V. QATAR OWNS, FUNDS, DIRECTS, AND CONTROLS AL JAZEERA

The U.S. Government has repeatedly found that Qatar owns, controls, finances, or directs Al Jazeera. In a 2020 report on Qatar, the U.S. Congressional Research Service stated plainly that Qatar "owns and subsidizes" Al

70 "Topics: Media." Qatar e-Government. Accessed April 24, 2020, <http://portal.www.gov.qa/wps/portal/topics/Culture+Arts+and+Media/Media>.

71 Qatar General Secretariat for Development Planning, "Qatar National Development Strategy 2011-2016," Figure 7.1 at 243, March 2011, https://www.mdps.gov.qa/en/nds/Documents/Downloads/NDS_EN_0.pdf.

72 "Al Jazeera Media Network." PrivCo. Accessed April 24, 2020, <https://www.privco.com/private-company/al-jazeera>.

73 Peter Beaumont, "How Qatar is Taking on the World," *The Guardian*, July 7, 2012, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/07/qatar-takes-on-the-world> ("Then there is the Doha-based Al-Jazeera television, considered the most important Arab news TV channel, owned by Qatar through the Qatar Media Corporation...").

74 "Al Jazeera Media Network." PrivCo. Accessed April 24, 2020, <https://www.privco.com/private-company/al-jazeera>.

75 Company: QATAR MEDIA CORPORATION." MAVISE. Accessed April 24, 2020, <http://mavise.obs.coe.int/f/ondemand/advanced?serviceprovider=7228>.

76 Anne Geniets, *The Global News Challenge: Market Strategies of International Broadcasting*, (Routledge, 2013), 65; Nasser M. Beydoun & Jennifer Baum, *The Glass Palace: Illusions of Freedom and Democracy in Qatar*, (Algora Publishing, 2012), 43; Farhad Khosrokhavar, *New Arab Revolutions that Shook the World*, (Taylor & Francis, 2016), 156.

77 Complaint at 2, Dish Network L.L.C. v. Shava IPTV Network LLC (E.D.Va. 2015) (No. 1:15-cv-00706-TSE-IDD).

78 Complaint at 3, Al Jazeera Media Network v. Elsherif (N.D.Ca. 2015) (No. 5:15-cv-05139-LHK); "Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani." Al Jazeera Media Network. Accessed April 30, 2020, <https://network.aljazeera.net/about-us/management-profiles/sheikh-hamad-bin-thamer-al-thani>.

79 Complaint at 1, Al Jazeera Media Network v. Elsherif (N.D.Ca. 2015) (No. 5:15-cv-05139-LHK); Ryan W. Zimmerman v. Al Jazeera America, LLC, et al., (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 16-cv-0013-KBJ), Document 46 (Defendants' Answer to Complaint), page 2, para. 5 (Apr. 21, 2017).

80 State of Delaware, Dep't of State, Div. of Corporations, Entity Details, "Al Jazeera International (USA) LLC," file no. 4023160 (obtained on Nov. 28, 2017).

81 *Id.*

82 *Id.*

83 *Id.*

84 Winmar, Inc. v. Al Jazeera International, No. 06-1307 (GK), (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2010).

Jazeera.⁸⁵ In its 2018 and 2019 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, the U.S. State Department noted that “[t]he government owned and partially funded the Doha-based Al-Jazeera satellite television network, which carried regional, international, and theme-based programming.”⁸⁶ Elliot Abrams, a senior U.S. diplomat and scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations, explained how Qatar directs and controls Al Jazeera to advance Qatar’s interests:

*[A]l Jazeera is wholly owned by the Qatari royal family, whose interests it will pretty obviously protect. It is not, in that sense, a news channel, even if it broadcasts news. Here’s a simple test: is al Jazeera able to report candidly on events in Qatar? The answer is no.*⁸⁷

These are just a few of many examples evidencing that Qatar owns, funds, directs, and controls Al Jazeera. The following sections expand upon these findings in further detail.

A. Qatar Owns Al Jazeera

The ruler of Qatar, Emir Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, owns Al Jazeera. From 2008-2018, Al Jazeera self-reported in its corporate disclosures that “it is owned ‘by the emir of the State of Qatar’ and ‘by the State of Qatar.’”⁸⁸ These corporate disclosures, which Al Jazeera filed with the U.K. Government, said that “[t]he Emir is the sole shareholder and therefore the controlling party.”⁸⁹ Those disclosures said further that Al Jazeera “is indirectly owned by the Emir of the State of Qatar through the state broadcasting entity.”

Further, Al Jazeera’s ownership structure reveals that Qatar owns Al Jazeera.⁹⁰ As noted above, Al Jazeera U.S. is a division of Al Jazeera Media Network, which is governed by its parent company QMC, the official broadcasting authority of the State of Qatar. QMC is under the control of the Emir of Qatar through Qatar’s Council of Ministers.⁹¹

In response to the ongoing public debate over whether it should register under FARA, Al Jazeera recently attempted to cover-up Qatar-state ownership by arguing that it had filed erroneous corporate documents with foreign government regulators for over ten years and amending its filings to hide individual shareholdings to a shell company, “Al Jazeera Global Hubco Ltd.”⁹² On January 30, 2019, Al Jazeera International Ltd. (“AJI”) filed two new documents with the UK Companies House, the United Kingdom’s registrar for companies and an executive agency of the British Government. The first document claimed that, as of October 3, 2018, the Emir had ceased to

85 See Kenneth Katzman, “Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service (as updated March 11, 2020), <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44533.pdf>.

86 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Qatar,” <https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/qatar/>; U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Qatar,” <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/qatar/>.

87 Elliott Abrams, “Is Al-Jazeera a News Network?” *Council on Foreign Relations*, January 1, 2013, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/al-jazeera-news-network>.

88 Lachlan Markay, “Al Jazeera Says Its Own Admissions of State Ownership are False,” *Daily Beast*, July 18, 2019, <https://www.thedailybeast.com/al-jazeera-says-its-own-admissions-of-state-ownership-are-false>; Al Jazeera International Ltd., UK Companies House, “Notification of the Emir of the State of Qatar as a person with significant control on 11 July 2016,” July 31, 2017, <https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/05233333/filing-history>.

89 Lachlan Markay, “Al Jazeera Says Its Own Admissions of State Ownership are False,” *Daily Beast*, July 18, 2019, <https://www.thedailybeast.com/al-jazeera-says-its-own-admissions-of-state-ownership-are-false>.

90 See Section IV.B.

91 *Id.*

92 Lachlan Markay, “Al Jazeera Says Its Own Admissions of State Ownership are False,” *Daily Beast*, July 18, 2019, <https://www.thedailybeast.com/al-jazeera-says-its-own-admissions-of-state-ownership-are-false>; Al Jazeera International Ltd., UK Companies House, “Confirmation statement made on 27 June 2019,” July 17, 2019, <https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/05233333/filing-history>.

be a person with significant control over AJI.⁹³ The second document provided notice that, as of October 3, 2018, AJMN became a person with significant control over AJI.⁹⁴ On July 17, 2019, AJI filed a confirmation statement with the UK Companies House, which states that the Emir of Qatar previously held 50,000 ordinary shares in AJI, which were transferred on March 10, 2018, and now holds zero shares in AJI as of July 17, 2019.⁹⁵ The confirmation statement also states that Al Jazeera Global Hubco Ltd (“AJ-Hubco”) now holds 50,000 ordinary shares in AJI as of July 17, 2019.⁹⁶

B. Qatar Funds Al Jazeera

Qatar’s financing of Al Jazeera has been widely reported. The Columbia Journalism Review stated that “[t]he whole sprawling organization is underwritten by the government of Qatar.”⁹⁷ Al Jazeera itself concedes that it is funded by Qatar.⁹⁸ The Director General of Al Jazeera, Mostefa Souag, has explained how Qatar’s Ministry of Finance controls the network’s budget.⁹⁹ In October 2018, he said:

When [the budget] is approved [by the Board of Directors] they send it to the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance might agree and give us what we asked for [or] might say, ‘no, sorry, you have to cut it by 20% or 30% because we don’t have the money for you.’ . . . We get a budget that is very tight, that is very scrutinized¹⁰⁰.

The Qatari government has also granted Al Jazeera the legal status of “a private foundation for public benefit,” which allows it to receive “subsidies and in-kind privileges from the Council of Ministers.”¹⁰¹

C. Qatar Directs Al Jazeera

Al Jazeera’s Board of Directors is chaired by Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani (“HBT”), a member of Qatar’s ruling family.¹⁰² According to Al Jazeera’s website, HBT’s purview “encompasses all of the channels under the

93 Al Jazeera International Ltd., UK Companies House, “Cessation of The Emir of the State of Qatar as a person with significant control on 10 March 2018” (30 Jan 2019), accessible at <https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/05233333/filing-history>.

94 Al Jazeera International Ltd., UK Companies House, “Notification of Al Jazeera Media Network as a person with significant control on 10 March 2018” (30 Jan 2019), accessible at <https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/05233333/filing-history>.

95 Al Jazeera International Ltd., UK Companies House, “Confirmation statement made on 27 June 2019” (17 Jul 2019), accessible at <https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/05233333/filing-history>.

96 *Id.*

97 Dean Starkman, “Al Jazeera America Struggles to Get Off the Margins,” *Columbia Journalism Review*, August 20, 2014, http://archives.cjr.org/the_audit/al_jazeera_america_struggles_t.php.

98 “About Us.” Al Jazeera English. Accessed February 19, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/aboutus/>; Al Jazeera International Ltd., UK Companies House, “Full accounts made up to 31 December 2018,” June 28, 2019, <https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/05233333/filing-history>.

99 Dr. Mostefa Souag, “NPC Luncheon with Al Jazeera Director Dr. Mostefa Souag,” October 2, 2018, National Press Club, 1:05:16. www.press.org/news-multimedia/videos/npc-luncheon-al-jazeera-director-dr-mostefa-souag.

100 *Id.*, at timestamp 54:40.

101 International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, “QATAR Philanthropy Law Report,” 10, 24, https://mk0roffifiqa2w3u89nud.kinstacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/Qatar-Philanthropy-Law-Report-August-2018.pdf?_ga=2.195395500.1054067956.1587691487-453024262.1587691487; Lachlan Markay, “Al Jazeera Says Its Own Admissions of State Ownership are False,” *Daily Beast*, July 18, 2019, <https://www.thedailybeast.com/al-jazeera-says-its-own-admissions-of-state-ownership-are-false>.

102 “Leadership At Al Jazeera.” Al Jazeera Media Network. Accessed April 24, 2020, <https://network.aljazeera.net/about-us/leadership>.

Al Jazeera umbrella.”¹⁰³ HBT is understood to be a cousin of the former Emir of Qatar, and he concurrently holds the position of QMC’s Chairman.¹⁰⁴ Sheikh Abdulrahman bin Hamad Al Thani, another member of Qatar’s ruling family, is reported to be on Al Jazeera’s Board of Directors and is the current CEO of QMC.¹⁰⁵ Similarly, Sheikh Ahmed bin Jassim Al Thani, also a member of Qatar’s royal family, served as Director General of Al Jazeera from 2011-2013 and later became Minister of Economy and Commerce.¹⁰⁶

D. Qatar Controls Al Jazeera

Each of the above forms of influence – ownership, funding, and directors – provides a basis for Qatar to control Al Jazeera. Specific evidence of Qatar’s control over Al Jazeera is readily available. For example, U.S. agencies recognize that Al Jazeera personnel in the United States are ultimately supervised by and conduct their activities under the direction and control of foreign principals in Doha. In 2018, Al Jazeera was subject to a National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) proceeding regarding unionization of its U.S. workforce. In the course of that proceeding, and in its capacity of enforcing U.S. labor law, the NLRB made the following findings based on the administrative record:

*All [Al Jazeera] news department employees have common supervision regardless of location . . . News editors and deputy news editors are generally responsible for ensuring that stories of interest are not missed, and therefore work with news teams to produce content for stories by communicating Doha’s directives . . . Once the team has created an edited product, the producers send that product to Doha for approval and broadcast.*¹⁰⁷

In a civil lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Al Jazeera has also admitted the following facts about the managerial authority Al Jazeera Media Network (“AJMN”) has over personnel employed by Al Jazeera U.S.:

*AJMN and Al Jazeera U.S. maintain an Investigative Unit, and “members of the Al Jazeera Investigative Unit ultimately report to two AJMN employees.”¹⁰⁸ The Investigative Unit’s members include Al Jazeera U.S. employees in Washington, DC; and the Investigative Unit produces content “disseminated through AJMN media subsidiaries,” including in the United States.*¹⁰⁹

¹⁰³ “Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani.” Al Jazeera Media Network. Accessed April 24, 2020, <https://network.aljazeera.net/about-us/management-profiles/sheikh-hamad-bin-thamer-al-thani>.

¹⁰⁴ Sidi Mohamed, “Gulf crisis ‘has threatened the security and stability of GCC,’” *The Peninsula*, April 28, 2019, <https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/28/04/2019/Gulf-crisis-has-threatened-the-security-and-stability-of-GCC>; “Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani.” Al Jazeera Media Network. Accessed April 30, 2020, <https://network.aljazeera.net/about-us/management-profiles/sheikh-hamad-bin-thamer-al-thani>.

¹⁰⁵ “Doha Film Institute Announces Board of Trustees.” Doha Film Institute. November 29, 2016, <https://www.dohafilminstitute.com/press/doha-film-institute-announces-board-of-trustees>.

¹⁰⁶ Interview HE Sheikh Ahmed bin Jassim Al Thani. *The Business Year, Optimal & Prime*. 2015 <https://www.thebusinessyear.com/qatar-2015/optimal-prime/interview>.

¹⁰⁷ United States National Labor Relations Board, “Al Jazeera International USA, LLC Decision and Direction of Election,” September 28, 2018, <https://www.nlr.gov/case/05-RC-225958>.

¹⁰⁸ *Ryan W. Zimmerman v. Al Jazeera America, LLC, et al.*, (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 16-cv-0013-KBJ), Document 46 (Defendants’ Answer to Complaint), page 2, para. 4 (Apr. 21, 2017).

¹⁰⁹ *Id.*

As another example, Qatar has acknowledged its control over Al Jazeera in binding international agreements. In 2013 and 2014, the UAE and other Arab Gulf States made repeated efforts to persuade Qatar to cease provoking instability and violence in the MENA region. These diplomatic efforts led to a series of three binding U.N.-registered treaties known as the Riyadh Agreements in which each of the signatories, including Qatar, made commitments to stop supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and other terrorist and extremist groups and to stop using state-owned media outlets, including Al Jazeera, to provide a platform for these groups. In addition to making general pledges to stop using its state-owned media to support terrorists and extremists, Qatar specifically vowed that it would no longer allow Al Jazeera to be used as a platform for groups challenging the Egyptian government.¹¹⁰ This obligation was tied to a broader commitment of all signatories to support Egypt and contribute to its stability and security. As the leading state sponsor of the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar was the focal point of these commitments. After the final agreement was executed in November 2014, Al Jazeera suspended operations of its Egyptian channel – Al Jazeera Mubashir Misr. Qatar’s commitments in relation to Al Jazeera in the Riyadh Agreements demonstrate Qatar’s ability to exercise control over Al Jazeera.

VI. AL JAZEERA AMPLIFIES QATAR’S FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA

Qatar uses Al Jazeera strategically to advance its foreign policy objectives. According to Al Jazeera personnel, Qatar’s backing of Al Jazeera comes with a tacit quid pro quo:

The emir [of Qatar] expects something in return: support – subtle but clear – for his foreign policy objectives. One senior correspondent at Al Jazeera concedes: ‘We’re only 85 per cent independent. The other 15 per cent of the time we are helping to gently make the case for Qatar’s view of the region and the wider world.’ Another Al Jazeera editor adds: ‘My job is to make sure we are independent enough to be credible journalistically while also pleasing our paymasters.’¹¹¹

Qatari officials admit this, too. In December 2017, Qatari Ambassador Ahmed bin Saeed Al-Rumaihi wrote, “For more than two decades, the media represents an element of soft power for the State of Qatar[.]”¹¹² In June 2019, Abdulaziz bin Mohammed Al-Horr, Director of Qatar’s Diplomatic Institute within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wrote how Al Jazeera and other Qatari media channels have played “a defensive and offensive strategic role” for the country, describing in particular how Al Jazeera’s coverage of regional tensions has especially served Qatar’s interests.¹¹³

Moreover, Al Jazeera does not operate to generate profit – rather, Qatar sustains Al Jazeera for “prestige and influence.”¹¹⁴ As described by a former employee, “Doha” defines success “in terms of influence, rather than

110 United Nations Treaty Collection, *Riyadh Agreement*, November 24, 2013, <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/No%20Volume/55378/Part/I-55378-0800000280527ea2.pdf>.

111 John Arlidge, “Is This the End of Al Jazeera?” *Evening Standard*, June 22, 2017, <https://www.standard.co.uk/lifestyle/esmagazine/is-this-the-end-of-al-jazeera-a3569306.html>.

112 Ahmed bin Saeed Al-Rumaihi, “Media as One of Qatar Soft Power Elements,” *Al Diplomacy* 37, (December 2017), <http://en.calameo.com/read/0051217641e12ed91c1e0>.

113 Abdulaziz bin Mohammed Al-Horr, “The Gulf Crisis: Lessons in Crisis Management from Response to Sustainability,” *Al Diplomacy* 33, (2019) <https://www.calameo.com/books/005121764a2bc31da058a>.

114 “Al Jazeera to Close in America: The Future Will not be Broadcast,” *Conversation*, January 14, 2016, <https://theconversation.com/al-jazeera-to-close-in-america-the-future-will-not-be-broadcast-53214>.

profit.”¹¹⁵ Luciano Zaccara, Professor of Gulf Studies at Qatar University, explains, “From the beginning Al Jazeera helped promote Qatar’s influence... It put Qatar on the map.”¹¹⁶ Zaccara describes Al Jazeera as the most important tool Qatar has “to influence public opinion.”¹¹⁷ As shown below, Al Jazeera’s editorial agenda aligns with Qatar’s interests on every major foreign policy topic impacting Qatar’s relations with its regional neighbors and the United States – including Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, terrorism and extremism, or GCC relations.

A. Qatar Uses Al Jazeera to Support Iran

Qatar claims to be a trustworthy ally to the United States, while simultaneously strengthening its relationship with Iran. Qatar opposed the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).¹¹⁸ Qatar’s Foreign Minister made this clear in 2018 when he stated, “Sanctions are not the way forward to solve a problem... We encourage the U.S. to come back to the negotiation and to have a diplomatic solution.”¹¹⁹ In July 2017, Iran’s state-owned media outlet, the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), announced that “Qatar’s Al Jazeera” and the IRNA seek to “enhance ties” and “develop cooperation” between the two media outlets.¹²⁰ This announcement was a prelude to Qatar’s ongoing development of stronger ties with Iran. In March 2018, the IRNA cited a spokesperson for the sanctioned IRGC as saying, “[The] [g]round is ready for development of cooperation with Qatar and we are doing our best to have stronger relations with Doha.”¹²¹ On August 26, 2018, the IRNA said that Qatar “is willing to develop all-out ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran,” according to the Qatari Emir.¹²²

In turn, Al Jazeera’s coverage of Iran and U.S.-Iran relations continues to align with and advance Qatar’s foreign policy towards Iran. Al Jazeera has published several articles that cast the IRGC and its former commander, Qassem Soleimani, in a positive light.¹²³ In July 2019, Al Jazeera published an article describing the “strong capabilities” of the IRGC, which does not hesitate “to shoot down American drones and detain British tankers.”¹²⁴ In January 2020, Al Jazeera published an article characterizing Soleimani as a “revered military figure” who according to Al Jazeera was “beloved in Iran, in stark contrast with the perception that was construed of him by Western media, which often portrayed him as a shadowy figure.”¹²⁵ In May 2020, Al Jazeera posted a video praising Soleimani and

115 Jessica Loudis, “What Did Al Jazeera Do?” *New Republic*, June 20, 2017, <https://newrepublic.com/article/143410/al-jazeera-do>.

116 Reese Erlich, “Inside Al Jazeera: Is the Pan-Arab Channel a Propaganda Outfit or an Essential Voice?” *PRI*, June 10, 2015, <https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-06-10/inside-al-jazeera-pan-arab-channel-propaganda-outfit-or-essential-voice>.

117 *Id.*

118 Mathias Bruggmann, “Foreign Minister of Qatar warns: ‘It threatens a nuclear arms race in the gulf,’” *Handelsblatt*, February 18, 2019, <https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/interview-aussenminister-von-katar-warnt-es-droht-ein-atomares-wettruesten-am-golf/24007860.html?ticket=ST-4935850-TMmPdGUPAr0zVsl5XycQ-ap1>.

119 “Qatar foreign minister: Iran sanctions not the way forward” *CNBC*, December 16, 2018, www.cnbcm.com/video/2018/12/16/qatar-foreign-minister-iran-sanctions-not-the-way-forward.html.

120 “Iranian News Agency, Qatar’s Al Jazeera to Enhance Ties,” *Islamic Republic News Agency*, July 25, 2017, www.irna.ir/en/News/82609696.

121 “Iran Supports Qatar Gov’t, People: Commander” *Islamic Republic News Agency*, March 13, 2018, www.irna.ir/en/News/82861686.

122 “Iran Stresses Development of Ties with Qatar,” *Islamic Republic News Agency*, August 26, 2018, www.irna.ir/en/News/83012622.

123 “Who was Qassem Soleimani, Iran’s IRGC’s Quds Force leader?” *Al Jazeera*, January 3, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/qassem-soleimani-iran-elite-quds-force-leader-200103033905377.html>; Fatima Ahmad Alsmadi, “The mystification of Qassem Soleimani,” *Al Jazeera*, January 26, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/mystification-qassem-soleimani-200126094859701.html>; Ali Younes, “US killing of Iran’s Qassem Soleimani ‘an act of war,’” *Al Jazeera*, January 3, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/killing-qassem-soleimani-act-war-analysts-200103075648358.html>.

124 “Follow the guide and challenge America by sea. Learn about the capabilities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard,” *Al Jazeera*, July 21, 2019, <https://bit.ly/3aQFeet>.

125 Ali Younes, “US killing of Iran’s Qassem Soleimani ‘an act of war,’” *Al Jazeera*, January 3, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/killing-qassem-soleimani-act-war-analysts-200103075648358.html>.

calling him a “warrior in the path of God.”¹²⁶ Qatar had ties to Suleimani, too, evidenced by the deal that it brokered with him in April 2017 – providing him with a USD 50 million ransom payment to return kidnapped Qatari nationals, including Qatari royal family members, from Iraq.¹²⁷

Al Jazeera has published numerous reports describing how the withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal was “strategically incoherent” and that it will “further isolate the U.S. from its European allies” and lead to “wider proliferation of nuclear weapons and regional tensions in the Middle East.”¹²⁸ On November 5, 2018, the day that U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA took full effect, Al Jazeera published a blueprint for evading U.S. sanctions on Iran titled “How Can Iran Bypass U.S. Sanctions?”¹²⁹ One week afterwards, Al Jazeera reported how the sanctioned Hezbollah group “[found] [a] way to beat U.S. sanctions.”¹³⁰

B. Qatar Uses Al Jazeera to Promote Hamas

Qatar has established itself as an indispensable ally to Hamas.¹³¹ Hamas is internationally designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, European Union, Canada, and Israel, among others, due to its indiscriminate acts of violence, which include suicide bombings against civilians.¹³² Qatar provides a base for Hamas’s operations and leadership – Qatar is home to Hamas’s political bureau,¹³³ its former leader Khalid Meshaal,¹³⁴ its military leader Salah Al-Arouf, and its spokesman Ezzat al-Rishq.¹³⁵ In January 2020, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, who is individually subject to U.S. sanctions as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, relocated to Qatar.¹³⁶ Qatar maintains the position that Hamas is a legitimate political organization: “Doha supports Hamas because it is a component of the Palestinian people, just like Fatah.”¹³⁷

In turn, Al Jazeera’s coverage of Hamas continues to align with and advance Qatar’s foreign policy. Al Ja-

126 Seth J. Frantzman, “Outrage after Al-Jazeera promotes, then deletes, Soleimani podcast video,” *Jerusalem Post*, May 13, 2020, <https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/outrage-after-al-jazeera-promotes-then-deletes-soleimani-podcast-video-627854>.

127 “Hacked Messages Show Qatar Appearing to Pay Hundreds of Millions to Free Hostages,” *Washington Post*, April 28, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/hacked-messages-show-qatar-appearing-to-pay-hundreds-of-millions-to-free-hostages/2018/04/27/46759ce2-3f41-11e8-974f-aacd97698cef_story.html.

128 William Roberts, “Analysis: Trump’s withdrawal from Iran nuclear deal isolates US,” *Al Jazeera*, May 9, 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/analysis-trump-withdrawal-iran-nuclear-deal-isolates-180509051651635.html>; “Iran nuclear deal stays alive after talks, avoids sanctions blow,” *Al Jazeera*, December 6, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/iran-nuclear-deal-stays-alive-talks-avoids-sanctions-blow-191206173410558.html>.

129 Ted Regencia, “How Can Iran Bypass U.S. Sanctions?” *Al Jazeera*, November 5, 2018, www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/iran-bypass-sanctions-181105052751998.html.

130 Zeina Khodr, “Hezbollah Funds: Group Finds Way to Beat U.S. Sanctions,” *Al Jazeera*, November 11, 2018, www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/hezbollah-funds-group-finds-beat-sanctions-18111115454472.html.

131 Jack Khoury, “For Arab World, Hamas Is ‘Legitimate Resistance Movement,’ Not Terror Group, Qatar Says,” *Haaretz*, June 10, 2017, <https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/qatar-hamas-is-legitimate-resistance-movement-1.5482546>.

132 “Profile: Hamas Palestinian movement,” *BBC*, May 12, 2017, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13331522>.

133 Mirren Gidda, “Hamas Still Has Some Friends Left,” *Time*, July 25, 2014, <https://time.com/3033681/hamas-gaza-palestine-israel-egypt/>.

134 See Israel Hayom, “Report: Hamas Strongman Khaled Mashaal Eyeing a Comeback,” *The Algemeiner*, December 26, 2019, <https://www.algemeiner.com/2019/12/26/report-hamas-strongman-khaled-mashaal-eyeing-a-comeback/>; Donna Rachel Edmunds, “Khaled Mashaal Set to Make Hamas Leadership Comeback, Backed by Qatar,” *Jerusalem Post*, December 27, 2019, <https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/khaled-mashaal-set-to-make-hamas-leadership-comeback-backed-by-qatar-612283>.

135 Kate Havard, “By Hosting Hamas, Qatar is Whitewashing Terror,” *Newsweek*, May 11, 2017, <https://www.newsweek.com/qatar-hosting-hamas-whitewashing-terror-606750>.

136 Khaled Abu Toameh, “Hamas leader Haniyeh decides to settle in Qatar – report,” *Jerusalem Post*, February 2, 2020, <https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Hamas-leader-Haniyeh-decides-to-settle-in-Qatar-report-616253>.

137 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Ambassador Al Emadi: Qatar Will not Let Go of Supporting Palestinian People,” (July 11, 2017), <https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/details/2017/07/11/ambassador-al-emadi-qatar-will-not-let-go-of-supporting-palestinian-people>.

zeera regularly features Hamas officials and gives credence to the group's objectives.¹³⁸ For example, Al Jazeera has provided Khalid Meshal, former Hamas leader, a platform to support Hamas's calls for jihad and martyrdom and to oppose peace between Israel and Palestine.¹³⁹ Additionally, as recent as last year, a blog on Al Jazeera's website praised Hamas's military camps for youth. The blog post explains that the aim of these camps is to raise a "generation that believes in the duty of jihad" and quotes a poem written by Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, urging Muslim nations to produce arms and fighters.¹⁴⁰

In providing a platform for Hamas, Al Jazeera focuses on conciliatory stories rather than the group's atrocities.¹⁴¹ The network champions the view that "[m]uch of the analysis of Islamist movements and their role in Arab societies in recent years reflects a chronic lack of contextualisation in favour of a simplistic approach," and must be understood in terms of "the history and evolution of Islamism."¹⁴² To this end, Al Jazeera instructs its U.S. audiences on the history of Hamas, various distinctions among Islamist groups, and the changing political affiliations of Islamist groups.¹⁴³ The effect of Al Jazeera's coverage is to sway its audience to see terrorist organizations like Hamas as legitimate political actors whose voices must be heard with sympathy on the global stage.

C. Qatar Uses Al Jazeera to Give Political Legitimacy to Other Terrorist and Extremist Groups

The highest levels of Qatar's leadership have openly supported leaders of terrorist and extremist groups. In fact, Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader, Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, who lives openly in Doha, has served in multiple leadership roles for Qatari government religious oversight bodies, secondary educational institutes, and various

- 138 "Hamas News." *Al Jazeera*. Accessed February 23, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/topics/organisations/hamas.html>; "Hamas: Mossad Assassinated Tunisian Drone-team Member," *Al Jazeera*, November 16, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/hamas-mossad-assassinated-tunisian-drone-maker-member-171116140932030.html>; *Al Jazeera English*, "Hamas Accepts Palestinian State with 1967 Borders," YouTube, May 1, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=InTh6748v9w>; *Al Jazeera English*, "US Puts Hamas Top Leader Ismail Haniya on 'Terror List,'" YouTube, January 31, 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bFs78py3A5M>; *Al Jazeera English*, "What Does the Qatar Crisis Mean for Hamas?" YouTube, June 7, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zlt80MnV6yA>; *Al Jazeera English*, "Palestine's Hamas to Revise Founding Charter," YouTube, May 1, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l7yTaXDUP1E>.
- 139 "Hamas Leader Khaled Mash'al Praises Sheik Yousef Al-Qaradawi for His Support of Suicide Operations and States: The Holocaust Was Exaggerated and Is Used to Extort Germany. Zionist Holocaust against Arabs Much Worse," MEMRI, July 16, 2007, <https://www.memri.org/reports/hamas-leader-khaled-mashal-praises-sheikh-yousef-al-qaradawi-his-support-suicide-operations>.
- 140 "Blog Post on Website of Qatar's Al-Jazeera Network Praises Hamas Summer Camps and Its Efforts To 'Raise A Generation That Believes in The Duty of Jihad,'" MEMRI, August 26, 2019, <https://www.memri.org/reports/blog-post-website-qatars-al-jazeera-network-praises-hamas-summer-camps-and-its-efforts-raise>.
- 141 *Al Jazeera English*, "Hamas Accepts Palestinian State with 1967 Borders," YouTube, May 1, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=InTh6748v9w>; *Al Jazeera English*, "Palestine's Hamas to Revise Founding Charter," YouTube, May 1, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l7yTaXDUP1E>; AJ+, "Hamas Says it Will Now Accept a Palestinian State Along the 1967 Border," Facebook, May 2, 2017, <https://www.facebook.com/ajplusenglish/videos/952619584879549/>; *Al Jazeera English*, "Hamas Official Discusses Palestinian Reconciliation Agreement," YouTube, October 12, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvQJqr7x2lo>; Linah Alsaafin, "Hamas Hands Over Gaza Border Crossings to PA," *Al Jazeera*, November 1, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/hamas-hands-gaza-border-crossings-pa-171031190038739.html>; Zena Tahhan, "Palestinian Official: Unity Deal Will Aid Peace Process," *Al Jazeera*, October 19, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/palestinian-official-unity-deal-aid-peace-process-171019082409066.html>.
- 142 Abdullah Al-Arian, "The Evolution of Islamists," *Al Jazeera*, September 3, 2016, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/evolution-islamists-160823111636222.html>.
- 143 "What is the Muslim Brotherhood?" *Al Jazeera*, June 18, 2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/muslim-brotherhood-explained-170608091709865.html>; AJ+, "Who is the Muslim Brotherhood," YouTube, December 19, 2014, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=INm6DufgrEk>; "Saudi and the Brotherhood: From Friends to Foes," *Al Jazeera*, June 23, 2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/saudi-brotherhood-friends-foes-170623093039202.html>; Zena Tahhan, "Hamas and Fatah: How are the Two Groups Different?" *Al Jazeera*, October 12, 2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/10/hamas-fatah-goal-approaches-171012064342008.html>; Ali Younes, "Jordan's Islamists Hopeful About Making Electoral Gains," *Al Jazeera*, September 20, 2016, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/jordan-islamists-hopeful-making-electoral-gains-160919063125053.html>.

religious institutes.¹⁴⁴ As recently as May 2019, the Qatari government publicised its support for Al-Qaradawi through publication of photographs showing him with Qatar's Head of State, Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, at a banquet hosted by the Emir.¹⁴⁵ The Muslim Brotherhood has been designated as a terrorist organization by Armenia, Bahrain, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.¹⁴⁶ The United States has designated parts of the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorists groups – including the 1997 designation of Hamas in Palestine and the 2018 designation of HASM and Liwa al-Thawra, both in Egypt.¹⁴⁷ Additionally, the United States and several European countries have banned Al-Qaradawi from entering their States, principally due to his role in spreading extremist rhetoric.¹⁴⁸

Internationally sanctioned Al-Qaeda fundraiser Abd Al-Rahman Al-Nu'aymi also remains close with the highest levels of Qatar's government, and was photographed as recently as April 2018 alongside Qatar's Prime Minister and Hamas's leader Mishaal at the wedding of Al-Nu'aymi's son's in Qatar.¹⁴⁹ These are just two of many examples of Qatar supporting leaders of terrorist and extremist groups.

Echoing the Qatari government's positions, Al Jazeera regularly features leaders and spokespersons of designated terrorist organizations other than Hamas, including Al-Qaeda's Syria branch, Al Nusra Front, and the Muslim Brotherhood, and it also promotes Qatar's policy interests with respect to these groups.¹⁵⁰ Al Jazeera regularly exaggerates the strength of pro-Brotherhood protests, including by zooming in on small crowds to make them

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- 144 Eric Trager, "The Muslim Brotherhood Is the Root of the Qatar Crisis," *The Atlantic*, July 2, 2017, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/muslim-brotherhood-qatar/532380/>; Magdi Abdelhadi, "Controversial preacher with 'star status'," BBC, July 7, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3874893.stm.
- 145 David Weinberg, "America Must Bring Up Incitement with Qatar's Emir," *ADL*, July 5, 2019, <https://www.adl.org/blog/america-must-bring-up-incitement-with-qatars-emir>; David Weinberg (@DavidWeinberg), "Here's #Qatar's ruler hugging hate preacher Yusuf al-Qaradawi last week, who authorized attacks vs Americans in #Iraq and called the Holocaust divine punishment of the Jews for which he wanted a second round..." Twitter, June 5, 2018, <https://twitter.com/DavidAWeinberg/status/1004005378986795008>.
- 146 Bahrain, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Minister of Foreign Affairs: Our Next Decisions Regarding Qatar Will Be Timely and Thoroughly Studied from All Aspects* (July 5, 2017), <https://www.mofa.gov.bh/Default.aspx?tabid=7824&language=en-US&ItemId=7612>; Shadia Nasralla, "Egypt Designates Muslim Brotherhood as Terrorist Group," *Reuters*, December 25, 2013, <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-egypt-explosion-brotherhood/egypt-designates-muslim-brotherhood-as-terrorist-group-idUKBRE9B008E20131225>; Republic of Kazakhstan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism in Kazakhstan* (January 30, 2013), <https://web.archive.org/web/20151114002653/http://mfa.gov.kz/index.php/en/foreign-policy/current-issues-of-kazakhstan-s-foreign-policy/counteraction-to-new-challenges/fight-against-terrorism-and-extremism-in-kazakhstan>; Russian Federation, Federal Security Services, *List of Organizations Recognized as Terrorist* (July 5, 2019) <http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/npd/terror.htm>; "Saudi Arabia Designates Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Group," *Reuters*, March 7 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-security/saudi-arabia-designates-muslim-brotherhood-terrorist-group-idUSBREA260SM20140307>; "UAE Lists Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist group," *Reuters*, November 15, 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uae-politics-brotherhood-idUSKCN0IZ00M20141115>.
- 147 U.S. Dep't of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Foreign Terrorist Organization Designations Table* (December 30, 2004), <https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2004/40945.htm>; U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, *Executive Order 13224 Terrorist Designations Under Amended Executive Order to Modernize Sanctions to Combat Terrorism* (September 23, 2001) <https://www.state.gov/executive-order-13224/>.
- 148 "Sarkozy Says Influential Cleric Qaradawi Not Welcome in France," *RFI*, March 26, 2012, <http://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20120326-sarkozy-says-influential-muslim-cleric-qaradawi-not-welcome-france>; "Muslim Cleric Not Allowed into UK," *BBC*, February 7, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/7232398.stm>.
- 149 David Weinberg, "Grading Counterterrorism Cooperation with the G.C.C. States," *ADL*, April 26, 2018, <https://www.adl.org/news/article/grading-counterterrorism-cooperation-with-the-gcc-states>; "The Qatari Regime's Doublespeak: Condemnation of Terrorism vs Social and Official Support for Terrorists," MEMRI, April 30, 2018, <https://www.memri.org/reports/qatari-regimes-doublespeak-condemnations-terrorism-vs-social-and-official-support-terrorists>.
- 150 See e.g., "Gulani: Hezbollah is Fleeting, Vendetta with Alawites, Without Bounds," *Al Jazeera*, May 25, 2015, <http://bit.ly/1BqthEF>; "Head of Qaeda's Syria Branch Says Does not Seek Rule in First TV Appearance," *Reuters*, December 18, 2013, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-qaeda/head-of-qaedas-syria-branch-says-does-not-seek-rule-in-first-tv-appearance-idUSBRE9BH17820131218>; "Khaled Meshaal: Struggle Is Against Israel, Not Jews," *Al Jazeera*, May 6, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2017/05/khaled-meshaal-struggle-israel-jews-170506082413309.html>; "Al-Nusra Leader Jolani Announces Split from al-Qaeda," *Al Jazeera*, July 29, 2016, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/al-nusra-leader-jolani-announces-split-al-qaeda-160728163725624.html>; Paul Farhi, "Al Jazeera faces criticism in Egypt over its coverage of Muslim Brotherhood," *Washington Post*, January 5, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/al-jazeera-faces-criticism-in-egypt-over-its-coverage-of-muslim-brotherhood/2014/01/05/04a397f4-74b3-11e3-9389-09ef9944065e_story.html; Milo Comerford, "Al-Qaeda's Long Game in Syria," *Tony Blair Institute for Global Change*, <https://institute.global/policy/al-qaedas-long-game>; Halim Shebaya, "Memo to Israel: Lebanon is not Hezbollah, Gaza is not Hamas," *Al Jazeera*, May 20, 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/memo-israel-lebanon-hezbollah-gaza-hamas-180520122815960.html?xif=v> (describing a Washington Post editorial as disgraceful for the way it criticized Hamas' activity in Gaza).

appear larger or by splitting the screen to suggest that multiple large protests are occurring simultaneously.¹⁵¹ It has been noted that Al Jazeera “defend[s] the Muslim Brotherhood in every possible way.”¹⁵² Journalists also echo these sentiments, calling Al Jazeera a “‘propaganda channel’ for the Brotherhood.”¹⁵³ Former employees of Al Jazeera have quit the company because it was “airing lies and misleading viewers” with regard to the Muslim Brotherhood, adding that “the [channel’s] management would instruct each staff member to favor the Muslim Brotherhood.”¹⁵⁴ Further, Al Jazeera hosted a television show featuring Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, in which he endorsed suicide attacks and promoted jihad, violence, and unrest in the region.¹⁵⁵ This show reached over 60 million viewers.¹⁵⁶ While international coverage of Al-Qaradawi is generally critical of him or, at minimum, highlights his controversial statements,¹⁵⁷ Al Jazeera’s coverage has consistently been positive and refers to him as a “scholar” and a “religious leader.”¹⁵⁸

As noted above, Al Jazeera has also featured leaders and spokespersons from Al-Nusra and has broadcast Al-Nusra’s messaging about its purported “split” from Al-Qaeda.¹⁵⁹ In fact, Al Jazeera featured an interview with Al-Nusra’s leader that was so favourable it was described as Qatar’s “infomercial” for the group,¹⁶⁰ and Al Jazeera featured an exclusive broadcast in July 2016 where Al-Nusra’s leader was able to reiterate his appreciation for Al-Qaeda’s leadership and support.¹⁶¹ Al Jazeera in August 2019 posted and then subsequently took down a video of a known member of Al-Nusra spreading propaganda, reflecting a recurring practice by Al Jazeera of posting hateful speech, allowing it to be seen widely, and then deleting it following international criticism and condemnation.¹⁶²

Al Jazeera has not only provided a platform for extremist ideologies, but Al Jazeera’s staff also propagate

151 Paul Farhi, “Al Jazeera faces criticism in Egypt over its coverage of Muslim Brotherhood,” *Washington Post*, January 5, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/al-jazeera-faces-criticism-in-egypt-over-its-coverage-of-muslim-brotherhood/2014/01/05/04a397f4-74b3-11e3-9389-09ef9944065e_story.html.

152 *Id.*

153 Bob Dreyfuss, “Al Jazeera’s Muslim Brotherhood Problem,” *The Nation*, July 10, 2013, <https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/al-jazeeras-muslim-brotherhood-problem/>.

154 “Al Jazeera staff resign,” *UPI*, July 10, 2013, https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2013/07/10/Al-Jazeera-staff-resign/45651373456029/.

155 “Sharia and Life—Program Archive.” Al Jazeera. 1998, <https://www.aljazeera.net/programsarchive?resourcesid=ecbb426-19b6-46a9-abcf-155819fb2912&year=1998>.

156 Alexander Smoltczyk, “Islam’s Spiritual ‘Dear Abby’: The Voice of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood,” *Spiegel International*, February 15, 2011, <https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islam-s-spiritual-dear-abby-the-voice-of-egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood-a-745526.html>.

157 “Yusuf Al-Qaradawi tells BBC Newsnight that Islam justifies suicide bombings,” *BBC*, July 7, 2004, http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2004/07_july/07/newnight.shtml; Ghanem Nuseibeh, “Qatar, FIFA and the 2022 World Cup,” *New York Times*, March 7, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/07/opinion/letters/qatar-fifa-2022-world-cup.html>; Jim Edwards, “F.C. Barcelona’s New Shirt Sponsor Linked to Controversial Muslim Cleric,” *CBS News*, December 18, 2010, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fc-barcelonas-new-shirt-sponsor-linked-to-controversial-muslim-cleric/>; Roula Khalaf, “Cleric’s stance plays into Assad’s and Hizbollah’s hands,” *Financial Times*, June 10, 2013, <https://www.ft.com/content/d876c894-d1c5-11e2-b17e-00144feab7de>.

158 See e.g. “Yusuf al-Qaradawi Removed from Interpol Wanted List,” *Al Jazeera*, September 10, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/yusuf-al-qaradawi-removed-interpol-wanted-list-170910150600972.html>; “Yusuf al-Qaradawi Sentenced to Life in Prison in Egypt,” *Al Jazeera*, January 18, 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/yusuf-al-qaradawi-sentenced-life-prison-egypt-180118065805129.html?xif=1/2>.

159 “Al-Nusra Leader Jolani Announces Split from al-Qaeda,” *Al Jazeera*, July 29, 2016, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/al-nusra-leader-jolani-announces-split-al-qaeda-160728163725624.html>.

160 “TSG Intelbrief: Al-Qaeda’s Long Game In Syria,” *The Soufan Center*, May 28, 2015, <https://thesoufancenter.org/tsg-intelbrief-al-qaedas-long-game-in-syria/>.

161 “Al-Nusra Leader Jolani Announces Split from al-Qaeda,” *Al Jazeera*, July 29, 2016, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/al-nusra-leader-jolani-announces-split-al-qaeda-160728163725624.html>.

162 “Al Jazeera publishes and deletes video of al-Nusra member, causing backlash,” *Al Arabiya English*, August 4, 2019, <https://english.alarabiya.net/en/features/2019/08/04/Al-Jazeera-publishes-and-deletes-video-of-al-Nusra-member-causing-backlash.html>; Natasha Fatah (@NatashaFatah), “Qatar-owned Al Jazeera publishes video of member of al-Qaeda’s al-Nusra front in Syria criticizing Saudi Arabia,” Twitter, Aug. 5, 2019, <https://twitter.com/NatashaFatah/status/1158495265856335873>.

extremist causes and sectarianism, without any adverse consequences from their leadership.¹⁶³ Its own programming actively engages in hate speech and instigation of violence.¹⁶⁴ For example, in May 2019, Al Jazeera broadcast a video claiming that Jews exaggerated the seriousness of the Holocaust and, again, took it down only after it was viewed more than one million times.¹⁶⁵ Most recently, an Al Jazeera anchor published discredited claims regarding Jewish ancestry origins.¹⁶⁶

VII. AL JAZEERA IS NOT AN INDEPENDENT MEDIA OUTLET

Qatar and Al Jazeera maintain that the network is like other State-funded international news organizations, such as the British Broadcasting Company (BBC), which have editorial independence from the state.¹⁶⁷ This is false. The BBC regularly covers and criticizes its home government and any Prime Minister currently holding office. Al Jazeera cannot report critically on the Emir of Qatar or Qatar's other leaders and their decisions. Equally important, Al Jazeera does not provide transparency or accountability around its editorial decisions.

A. Al Jazeera is Not Free to Report Critically on Qatar's Leaders

Qatar's strict media laws prohibit "any criticism" of the Emir.¹⁶⁸ Media outlets in Qatar also need government approval before reporting on a host of other topics, including Qatar's armed forces, official state communications, Qatar's banks, and judicial proceedings.¹⁶⁹ Media outlets and professionals in Qatar are subject to significant restrictions, and the overall landscape encourages a high level of self-censorship.

As recently as January 2020, Qatar passed a censorship law to create criminal liability for spreading "fake news" online.¹⁷⁰ The new law does not define *who* determines what is fake news, *how* such a determination is made, or *what standards* inform such a determination; but journalists can go to jail if they run afoul of publishing anything that could "harm national interests" or "stir up public opinion."¹⁷¹

Against this backdrop, Al Jazeera does not publish any articles that criticize Qatar's Emir or government leaders. As the magazine *The Economist* has noted:

163 Al Jazeera Arabic, "The opposite direction - the fate of the Alawites in Syria after the rebels approached their areas," YouTube, June 3, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vieB07BsZM8>.

164 "Al Jazeera TV Poll finds that over 80% of viewers support ISIS victories," MEMRI, May 26, 2015, <https://www.memri.org/tv/al-jazeera-tv-poll-finds-over-80-viewers-support-isis-victories-swedish-based-iraqi-politician>; "Interview with Abu Mohamed Al Jolani Emir of the Al Nusra Front," Al Jazeera, May 27, 2015, <https://www.aljazeera.net/reportslibrary/pages/0ff4461d-72aa-4d5e-bb79-2c05ed15e559>; "Al Jazeera TV host incites to ethnic cleansing of Shi'ites in Sunni regions in Syria," MEMRI, September 12, 2016, <https://www.memri.org/tv/al-jazeera-tv-host-faisal-al-qassem-incites-ethnic-cleansing-shiites-sunni-regions-syria>.

165 "Al Jazeera Pulls Video Claiming Jews Inflated Numbers of Holocaust Victims," *The Forward*, May 20, 2019, <https://forward.com/fast-forward/424589/al-jazeera-anti-semitic-holocaust-twitter-video/>.

166 Josefin Dolsten, "Al Jazeera Anchor Promotes Antisemitic Conspiracy Theory on Twitter," *Jerusalem Post*, August 23, 2019, <https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/antisemitism/al-jazeera-anchor-promotes-antisemitic-conspiracy-theory-on-twitter-599459>.

167 Mostefa Souag, "Response: Al Jazeera is an independent media organization," *Washington Examiner*, January 27, 2020, <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/response-al-jazeera-is-an-independent-media-organization>.

168 Qatar Ministry of Justice, Al Meezan Qatar Legal Portal, Law No. 8 of 1979 on Publications and Publishing, Article 46, www.almeezan.qa/LawView.aspx?opt&LawID=414&language=en#.

169 *Id.* at Article 47.

170 "Qatar fake news law 'repressive' and 'vaguely worded': Amnesty," *Middle East Eye*, January 20, 2020, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/qatar-law-fake-news-five-years-jail>.

171 *Id.*

*Qatar has promoted itself as a beacon of openness in a repressive region . . . But its emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, is less tolerant of criticism directed at him . . . Al Jazeera is free to criticize other countries but never to criticize Qatar.*¹⁷²

The network tends to avoid coverage on Qatar altogether, but when it does report on Qatar, it seeks to cast Qatar's political leadership in a positive light. For instance, Al Jazeera features stories on Qatar's National Day every year to propagandize a sense of unity between the Qatari people and their government.¹⁷³ Even when Al Jazeera seemingly touches on negative press against Qatar, the network features the government's spin on the issue. When international human rights groups report on Qatar's severe labor issues related to the 2022 FIFA World Cup, Al Jazeera tilts its coverage toward the government's response with headlines reading, "*Qatar rebuts concerns over World Cup workers' safety*" and "*Qatar remains committed to labor reforms after Amnesty report.*"¹⁷⁴ To put this in stark perspective, Al Jazeera's coverage of the 2014 World Cup in Brazil read: "*World Cup workers struggle for basic rights.*"¹⁷⁵ Time and again, Al Jazeera steers clear of criticizing Qatar's political leadership.

In contrast with Al Jazeera, news outlets like the BBC are free to report critically on the political leaders in their home governments. The BBC publishes critical commentary on British policy and Britain's political leaders daily. Recent hard-hitting stories have reported on the British public's waning trust in the criminal justice system,¹⁷⁶ concerns about inadequate compensation to people wrongly targeted as illegal immigrants,¹⁷⁷ and, of course, regular critiques of the Prime Minister's leadership (regardless of who holds the title).¹⁷⁸ In fact, the BBC has come increasingly under fire by the Prime Minister for being overly critical of the British government.¹⁷⁹

172 "Qatar, the Gulf emirate famed for openness, is silencing critics," *The Economist*, February 13, 2020, <https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/02/15/qatar-the-gulf-emirate-famed-for-openness-is-silencing-critics>.

173 Sorin Furcoi & Showkat Shafi, "Qatar National Day 'Meaningful and Symbolic' Amid Siege," *Al Jazeera* December 19, 2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/qatar-national-day-meaningful-symbolic-siege-171218211730002.html>; "Qatar FM: National Day Sends Message to Siege Nations," *Al Jazeera*, December 18, 2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/qatar-fm-national-day-sends-message-siege-nations-171218072556915.html>; Saba Aziz, "Qatar Marks National Day Amid Gulf crisis," *Al Jazeera*, December 18, 2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/qatar-marks-national-day-gulf-crisis-171217114224447.html>; "Celebrating National Day in Qatar," *Al Jazeera*, December 18, 2015, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2015/12/celebrating-national-day-qatar-151218100707543.html>; "Culture at Core of Qatari National Day," *Al Jazeera*, December 18, 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/video/middleeast/2014/12/3949585631001-2014121872551541660.html>; This coverage aligns with Qatar's National Development Strategy ("NDS"), which says the country's "media resources" are to be used as instruments of cultural promotion and cultural democracy: "[t]he media will be more proactive by undergoing training for reporting on cultural issues so that reporters, producers and other media professionals will become better educated partners in cultural development. . . . The training activities and enhanced collaborative partnerships should lead to jointly created content that promotes Qatar's culture, such as special features on unique cultural activities like Qatar National Day or the Eid celebrations, as well as regular columns or documentaries in newspapers, magazines and online media formats." Qatar General Secretariat for Development Planning, *Qatar National Development Strategy 2011-2016*, 206, (March 2011), https://www.mdps.gov.qa/en/nds/Documents/Downloads/NDS_EN_0.pdf.

174 "Qatar rebuts concerns over World Cup workers' safety," *Al Jazeera*, September 28, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/qatar-rebuts-concerns-world-cup-workers-safety-170928092345395.html>; Faras Ghani, "Qatar remains 'committed' to labour reforms after Amnesty report," *Al Jazeera*, February 7, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/qatar-remains-committed-labour-reforms-amnesty-report-190207091424598.html>.

175 Ida Karlsson, "World Cup workers struggle for basic rights," *Al Jazeera*, July 3, 2014, <https://www.aljazeera.com/humanrights/2014/07/world-cup-workers-struggle-basic-rights-2014738261599591.html>.

176 "Crimes unreported as public lose faith in police," *BBC News*, February 7, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-51408921?intlink_from_url=https://www.bbc.com/news/uk&link_location=live-reporting-story.

177 "Windrush: Campaigners criticize 'paltry' payouts," *BBC News*, February 7, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-51408923?intlink_from_url=https://www.bbc.com/news/uk&link_location=live-reporting-story.

178 Laura Kuenssberg, "What can we expect from Johnson's cabinet reshuffle?" *BBC News*, February 12, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-51482376>.

179 Jack Arnholz, "BBC risks losing significant funding after Boris Johnson's crushing election victory," *ABC News*, December 17, 2019, <https://abcnews.go.com/International/bbc-risks-losing-significant-funding-boris-johnsons-crushing/story?id=67767469>.

B. Al Jazeera Does Not Provide Transparency or Accountability Around Its Editorial Decisions

In 2018, Al Jazeera's Investigative Unit sought to broadcast a documentary to "reveal how the Israel lobby in America works."¹⁸⁰ An Al Jazeera "undercover operative" attempted to infiltrate several U.S. political organizations under false pretenses.¹⁸¹ The documentary was slated to feature footage surreptitiously obtained by the undercover operative.¹⁸² However, through Qatar's Emir and other top Qatari officials, "Qatar agreed to cancel and not allow the release of [the] viciously anti-Semitic Al Jazeera 'undercover' film series."¹⁸³ Qatar's leaders "assured Jewish-American organizations that Al Jazeera's documentary on the Israel lobby in the United States will not be aired."¹⁸⁴

The head of Al Jazeera's Investigative Unit left the network after this incident. He wrote, "if [the] documentary does not air, it may well lend credibility to the claim...that Al Jazeera is indeed a foreign agent, at the direction and control of Qatar's government."¹⁸⁵ To this day, Al Jazeera has not run the documentary, and it has not provided an explanation for pulling the documentary.¹⁸⁶ This incident demonstrates Al Jazeera's lack of transparency and accountability in the face of compelling reports of Qatar's influence over editorial decisions.

In contrast, independent news organizations like the BBC offer full transparency and accountability to its viewers and the British taxpayers who fund the service. The BBC is governed by an independent board and overseen by the Office of Communications ("Ofcom"), a government-approved regulatory and competition authority for the broadcasting, telecommunications and postal industries of the United Kingdom, in accordance with a series of published protocols, policies, and other regulations designed to protect the network's independence.¹⁸⁷ The BBC regularly discloses information on its leadership, decision-making, and funding to provide clarity on editorial objectives.¹⁸⁸ The BBC discloses its commercial holdings.¹⁸⁹ It publishes its annual financial and strategic reports.¹⁹⁰ There is a clear mechanism for handling complaints.¹⁹¹ There is even an independent auditing process open for

180 Amir Tibon, "Al Jazeera Admits to Planting Undercover Reporter in U.S. Pro-Israel Organizations," *Haaretz*, October 11, 2017, <https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/1.816486>; See also, Daniel K. Eisenbud, "Al Jazeera Planted Undercover Reporter in U.S. Pro-Israel Groups," *Jerusalem Post*, October 10, 2017, <http://www.jpost.com/Diaspora/Al-Jazeera-planted-undercover-reporter-in-US-pro-Israel-groups-507138>; Armin Rosen, "Pro-Israel Hoaxer Hits DC," *Tablet*, January 20, 2017, <http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/222605/pro-israel-hoaxer-kleinfeld>.

181 *Id.*

182 Ali Abunimah (@AliAbunimah), "Clayton Swisher, Al Jazeera's Director of Investigative Journalism, admitted Al Jazeera's use of the undercover operative in the United States and intention of broadcasting the U.S. footage in an interview with Al Jazeera Arabic," Twitter, Oct. 9, 2017, <https://twitter.com/AliAbunimah/status/917419745292496896>. Al Jazeera's *The Lobby* series is accessible at <http://www.aljazeera.com/investigations/thelobby/>.

183 "ZOA/Mort Klein Convinced Qatar to Cancel Anti-Semitic Al Jazeera 'Jewish Lobby' Series," *Zionist Organization of America*, April 10, 2018, <https://zoa.org/2018/04/10377872-zoa-mort-klein-convinced-qatar-to-cancel-anti-semitic-al-jazeera-jewish-lobby-series/>.

184 Amir Tibon, "Qatar Promised U.S. Jewish Leaders: Al Jazeera Documentary on D.C. 'Israel Lobby' Won't Air," *Haaretz*, February 8, 2018, <https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/premium-qatar-to-u-s-jewish-leaders-al-jazeera-israel-lobby-film-won-t-air-1.5803936>.

185 Clayton Swisher, "We Made a Documentary Exposing the 'Israel Lobby.' Why Hasn't It Run?" *The Forward*, March 8, 2018, <https://forward.com/opinion/396203/we-made-a-documentary-exposing-the-israel-lobby-why-hasnt-it-run/>.

186 "Al Jazeera 'totally refutes' false claims by pro-Israel lobbyist," *Al Jazeera*, April 17, 2018, <https://network.aljazeera.net/pressroom/al-jazeera-%E2%80%9998totally-refutes%E2%80%9999-false-claims-pro-israel-lobbyist>; Asa Winstanley, "Al Jazeera denies Qatari emir censored Israel lobby film," *The Electronic Intifada*, October 10, 2018, <https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/asa-winstanley/al-jazeera-denies-qatari-emir-censored-israel-lobby-film>.

187 "About the BBC." BBC. Accessed April 30, 2020, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/>; "Ofcom becomes the first independent, external regulator of the BBC today." Ofcom. Accessed April 24, 2020, <https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/latest/media/media-releases/2017/ofcom-becomes-the-first-independent,-external-regulator-of-the-bbc-today>.

188 "Governance and Regulation." BBC. Accessed February 21, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/aboutthebbc/governance>; BBC, "BBC Annual Reports and Accounts 2016/17," Accessed February 21, 2020, <http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/insidethebbc/reports/pdf/bbc-annualreport-201617.pdf>.

189 "Commercial Holdings Board." BBC. Accessed February 21, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/aboutthebbc/whoweare/commercial>.

190 BBC, "BBC Annual Plan 2019/2020," Accessed February 21, 2020, http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annualplan_2019-20.pdf.

191 "Complaints." BBC. Accessed February 21, 2020, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/contact/complaints>.

public review.¹⁹² Al Jazeera does not meet these standards – it simply has no robust mechanisms for its audience to evaluate its purported editorial independence from the government of Qatar, yet the public record evidences clear editorial influence by Qatar’s leadership.

VIII. AL JAZEERA’S AJ+ SEEKS TO IMPACT U.S. ELECTIONS

The 2016 U.S. presidential election ushered in an unprecedented amount of foreign influence on social media platforms. Al Jazeera’s digital division, AJ+, actively engaged U.S. voters across various social media platforms (including Facebook and YouTube, for example) on specific candidates and policy issues throughout the 2016 election cycle.¹⁹³ Even further, AJ+ created and deployed a chat bot, called “Mila,” on Election Day in 2016 that directly communicated with voters.¹⁹⁴ As explained by one designer, “We created a chat bot that gave followers real-time updates sent to their Facebook messenger. . . . It was an emotional day, and using the chat bot really created a community between AJ+ and the audience.”¹⁹⁵ Another design manager explained that users could ask Mila about candidates running, specific elections issues, or for live updates on current race results.¹⁹⁶ One Product Manager at AJ+ explained how AJ+ staff were actually the ones responsible for fielding questions posed to “Mila” via Facebook Messenger, providing “context [and] empathy in real time.”¹⁹⁷

AJ+ routinely produces U.S. voter engagement videos, often taking a critical position on voting rights issues and voter turnout trends. During the 2014 midterms AJ+ released a video, “4 Reasons YOU Should Vote In The U.S. Midterm Elections.”¹⁹⁸ Ahead of Election Day in 2016, AJ+ published videos explaining the “antiquated” electoral college system with captions like “3 Ways To Steal An Election.”¹⁹⁹ The caption included with the video says, “The democratic process in the U.S. is looking less and less democratic, and that’s thanks to measures like gerrymandering, voter suppression and the rise of ‘dark money.’ So with a system so broken, how is anyone going to fix it?”²⁰⁰ Then on Election Day, AJ+ released a video, “Why your vote didn’t count.”²⁰¹ Other videos include, “Why is it still so hard to vote in the US?” and “Why Voting Rights Are Under Attack In America.”²⁰² In October 2018, AJ+ aired, “Why Next Month’s Midterms F*cking Matter.”²⁰³ In November 2018, they reported on “Why Aren’t Millennials Voting?”

192 “Audit Arrangements.” BBC. Accessed February 21, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/aboutthebbc/governance/audit>.

193 “Election 2016: Crashing the Party.” AJ+ Facebook Page. Facebook. Accessed April 28, 2020, <https://www.facebook.com/watch/ajplusenglish/1582969738620865/>.

194 Alexandra Ma, “11 Ways Digital Publishers Covered Election Night,” *Interhacktives*, November 23, 2016, <http://www.interhacktives.com/2016/11/23/11-ways-digital-publishers-covered-election-night/>.

195 “Personal stories from election day.” Kaity Hammerstein Blog. Accessed April 24, 2020, <https://kaityhammerstein.com/new-page-1>.

196 “Meet Mila from AJ+.” Facebook. Accessed May 8, 2020, <https://www.facebook.com/ajplusenglish/videos/831863146955194/>; Madalina Ciobanu, “AJ built a bot for the US election to crowdsource voter reactions and photos,” *Journalism.co.uk*, November 11, 2016, <https://www.journalism.co.uk/news/aj-built-a-bot-for-the-us-election-to-crowdsource-voter-reactions-and-photos/s2/a691163/>.

197 Hugh O’Conner, “AJ+ Mila Bot – Election Day,” Vimeo, January 20, 2019, 00:20-01:05, <https://vimeo.com/312370046>; Ryan Lindsay, “What AJ+ Is Learning About News Bots,” *MediaShift*, May 1, 2017, <http://mediashift.org/2017/05/aj-learning-news-bots/>.

198 AJ+, “4 Reasons YOU Should Vote In The U.S. Midterm Elections,” YouTube, October 10, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQgDjG_J1po.

199 AJ+, “3 Ways to Steal an Election,” YouTube, October 29, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pn-rLxADCws>.

200 *Id.*

201 AJ+, “Why Your Vote Didn’t Count,” YouTube, November 9, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b25h05qqDzU&t=28s>.

202 AJ+, “Why Is It Still So Hard to Vote in the US?” YouTube, June 27, 2014, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GEWf0yDLSk4>; AJ+, “Why Voting Rights Are Under Attack In America,” YouTube, June 20, 2014, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A0usewCQBkY>.

203 AJ+, “Why Next Month’s Midterms F*cking Matter,” Facebook, October 7, 2018, <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1953525821617898>.

and “Auntie Beachress Wants You to Vote.”²⁰⁴ In another instance, *AJ+* says frankly, “Americans suck at voting.”²⁰⁵ Despite these clear and numerous instances of *AJ+* engaging in political activities, they still do not disclose their ties to Al Jazeera yet alone Qatar.

Simply put, *AJ+* is owned and controlled by Al Jazeera, which in turn is owned by the Government of Qatar, yet it is located in the United States, its content is made in the United States, its content is in English, its content is directly aimed at U.S. politics and public opinion, and it disseminates this content for free and at a substantial cost to its owners. It is difficult to understand why a small nation in the Middle East, with a population of just a few hundred thousand people and whose native tongue is not English, spends millions of dollars on this type of operation in the United States if not as part of a “soft power” element of its foreign policy. Even if, as Qatar now contends, Al Jazeera is a “private foundation for public benefit,” it is difficult to see what other benefit the Qatari people might get from their government spending millions of dollars on a U.S.-based operation creating U.S.-targeted materials for U.S. social media platform users.

IX. QATAR HAS OUTSIZED INFLUENCE THROUGH AL JAZEERA

Qatar’s use of Al Jazeera to serve its foreign policy objectives should give pause to anyone concerned about foreign influence in the United States. To put things into perspective, on Facebook alone *Al Jazeera English* has 13.7 million followers and *AJ+* has over 11 million followers.²⁰⁶ This puts the reach of both of these English-language, U.S.-facing Al Jazeera brands among the ranks of major U.S. outlets like the New York Times (17 million followers), the Washington Post (6.5 million followers), CNN (35.5 million followers), and Fox News (20 million followers).²⁰⁷ In just the three months from November 2019 through January 2020, *Al Jazeera English* reached 174.5 million views on Facebook and *AJ+* reached 147.7 million views. By comparison, for example, Russia’s RT reached 38.5 million views.²⁰⁸ Even more astounding, as of May 2016, “[t]he number of [*AJ+*] views exceeded 5 billion . . . within the borders of the USA,” according to Al Jazeera.²⁰⁹ By 2020, *AJ+* content had exceeded 10 billion views on Facebook.²¹⁰

Al Jazeera’s reach does not stop within its own network, though. Al Jazeera enters into agreements with other major media outlets to expand its impact, including with outlets controlled by U.S. adversaries. For example, Al Jazeera and China’s Xinhua News Agency have had a cooperative relationship since at least March 2016.²¹¹ In December 2018, Xinhua News Agency announced the expansion of this “strategic cooperation” with Al Jazeera,

204 *AJ+*, “Why Aren’t Millennials Voting?” Facebook, November 5, 2018, <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=263127647721730>; *AJ+*, “Auntie Beachress Wants You To Vote,” Facebook, November 2, 2018, <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2543607028990585>.

205 *AJ+*, “3 Voting Practices the U.S. Could Learn From,” YouTube, November 4, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=go-fq0SvErY>.

206 “Al Jazeera English.” Facebook. Accessed April 24, 2020, <https://www.facebook.com/aljazeera/>.

207 “New York Times.” Facebook. Accessed April 24, 2020, <https://www.facebook.com/nytimes/>; “Washington Post.” Facebook. Accessed April 24, 2020, <https://www.facebook.com/washingtonpost/>; “CNN.” Facebook. Accessed April 24, 2020, <https://www.facebook.com/cnn/>; “Fox News.” Facebook. Accessed April 24, 2020, <https://www.facebook.com/FoxNews/>.

208 The information in this table comes from publicly available data sourced from Tubular Labs, Inc., which provides monthly cross-platform rankings of top video brands and publishers at <https://tubularlabs.com>. Refer to the “Monthly Views” data on Tubular Labs’ pages for each identified content creator, respectively.

209 “Al Jazeera officially launches *AJ+* Arabi,” *Al Jazeera*, May 30, 2016, <https://network.aljazeera.net/events/al-jazeera-officially-launches-aj-arabi>.

210 “Video strategies for a visual world – with *AJ+* and Awesomeness TV,” *FIPP*, March 20, 2017, <https://www.fipp.com/news/features/video-strategies-for-a-visual-world>.

211 “AJMN signs collaboration agreement with Xinhua,” *Al Jazeera*, March 29, 2016, <https://network.aljazeera.com/pressroom/ajmn-signs-collaboration-agreement-xinhua>.

describing the networks' joint intentions to "enhance communication and coordination" and "expand cooperation in think tanks, new media and other areas."²¹² The DOJ has ordered Xinhua News Agency to register under FARA,²¹³ and President Trump recently took decisive action against Xinhua News Agency and other Chinese outlets by designating them as arms of the Chinese government.²¹⁴ As another example, Iran's state-owned media outlet, Islamic Republic News Agency ("IRNA"), reported that "Qatar's Al Jazeera" and IRNA seek to "enhance ties" and "develop cooperation" between the two media outlets.²¹⁵

Former U.S. Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats has cautioned how "U.S. adversaries and strategic competitors almost certainly will use online influence operations to try to weaken democratic institutions, undermine U.S. alliances and partnerships, and shape policy outcomes in the United States and elsewhere."²¹⁶ In short, any conversation about foreign government media influence in the United States must include Qatar's Al Jazeera.

X. AL JAZEERA MUST REGISTER UNDER FARA

Al Jazeera needs to come into compliance with FARA so that American viewers can understand its relationship with Qatar and decide for themselves how that information affects their evaluation of the content Al Jazeera produces. Some Members of Congress have already recognized this. In 2018, Representatives Lee Zeldin (R-NY) and Josh Gottheimer (D-NJ), joined by seventeen of their colleagues in Congress, sent a letter to the Department of Justice demanding an investigation into Al Jazeera.²¹⁷ Their letter stated:

*For years, Qatar has used its state-controlled propaganda arm, Al Jazeera, to incite violence, glorify terrorist killers as 'martyrs,' and broadcast hateful, extremist content... Now more than ever, American citizens deserve to know the difference between foreign propaganda and independent media.*²¹⁸

*Al Jazeera's radical anti-American, anti-Semitic, and anti-Israel content is extraordinarily troubling and must be closely scrutinized to determine whether Al Jazeera is in violation of U.S. law... As a state-sponsored news organization that favorably covers foreign terrorist organizations, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and others, it is critical the United States takes action where laws are being broken and American interests are being undermined.*²¹⁹

212 "Xinhua Al-Jazeera Agree to Enhance Cooperation on Think Tanks, New Media," *XinhuaNet*, December 6, 2018, www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-12/06/c_137655750.htm.

213 Kate O'Keeffe and Aruna Viswanatha, "Justice Department Has Ordered Key Chinese State Media Firms to Register as Foreign Agents," *Wall Street Journal*, September 18, 2028, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-has-ordered-key-chinese-state-media-firms-to-register-as-foreign-agents-1537296756>.

214 Lara Jakes and Steven Lee Myers, "U.S. Designates China's Official Media as Operatives of the Communist State," *New York Times*, February 18, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/18/world/asia/china-media-trump.html>.

215 "Iranian News Agency, Qatar's Al Jazeera to Enhance Ties," *Islamic Republic News Agency*, July 25, 2017, www.irna.ir/en/News/82609696.

216 Daniel R. Coats, "Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community," Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, (January 29, 2019), <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf>. (Emphases added.)

217 Josh Gottheimer et al., Josh Gottheimer et al. to Attorney General Sessions (RTTV FARA), 118th United States Congress, Washington, D.C., March 6, 2018, https://zeldin.house.gov/sites/zeldin.house.gov/files/3.6_zeldin_gottheimer_cruz_letter_pdf.

218 "Zeldin, Gottheimer, Cruz, lead 19 Member Letter Demanding DOJ Investigation into Qatar's Al Jazeera Network," Congressman Lee Zeldin Press Releases, March 6, 2018, <https://zeldin.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/zeldin-gottheimer-cruz-lead-19-member-letter-demanding-doj-investigation>.

219 *Id.*

In 2019, Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA), joined by seven of his colleagues in the Senate, sent another letter to the Department of Justice seeking further information on the steps that the DOJ has taken with respect to Al Jazeera's FARA obligations.²²⁰ They said:

*When the available evidence is taken as a whole, it appears that Al Jazeera's broadcasts, including AJ+, mirror the policies and preferences of the Qatari government, which, together with the state funding and other indicia of agency, demonstrate that Al Jazeera and its media subsidiaries act as alter egos of the Qatari government in ensuring dissemination of the government's viewpoints.*²²¹

*'Congress passed FARA in 1938, intending to ensure that the American public and our lawmakers know the source of information that is provided at the behest of a foreign principal, where that information may be intended to influence U.S. public opinion, policy and laws.' Those statements apply equally to Al Jazeera, which is controlled by a foreign government, receives financial support therefrom, and engages in activity to influence the U.S. Government and public on behalf of foreign principals.*²²²

Indeed, even YouTube has acknowledged Qatar's control over Al Jazeera and is now placing a disclaimer on Al Jazeera videos that reads: "Al Jazeera is funded in whole or in part by the Qatari government."²²³

To date, Al Jazeera has continued to avoid its legal obligations under FARA. As the DOJ has said: "Americans have a right to know who is acting in the United States to influence the U.S. government or public on behalf of foreign principals," and "[DOJ] expects compliance with the law by all entities engaged in specified activities on behalf of any foreign principal, regardless of its nationality."²²⁴ It is time for Al Jazeera to register.

XI. TABLE OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit	Title
A	Al Jazeera Corporate Entity Information
B	Sample Index of Al Jazeera's Coverage Promoting Qatar's Policy Agenda
C	Al Jazeera's Lack of Independence and Editorial Transparency

220 Chuck Grassley et al., Chuck Grassley, et al. to William Barr (Al Jazeera FARA), 116th United States Congress, Washington, D.C., June 18, 2019, <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2019-06-18%20CEG%20et%20al%20to%20DOJ%20%28AI%20Jazeera%20FARA%29.pdf>.

221 *Id.*

222 *Id.*

223 "YouTube to label government and public-funded clips," *BBC News*, November 8, 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-46139189>.

224 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, *Production Company Registers Under the Foreign Agent Registration Act as Agent for the Russian Government Entity Responsible for Broadcasting RT* (November 13, 2017), <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/production-company-registers-under-foreign-agent-registration-act-agent-russian-government>.

EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT A: AL JAZEERA CORPORATE ENTITY INFORMATION

Contents

State of Delaware, Dep't of State, Div. of Corporations, Entity Details, *Al Jazeera International (USA) LLC*, file no. 4023160 (obtained on Nov. 28, 2017)

State of Delaware, Dep't of State, Div. of Corporations, Entity Details, *Al Jazeera International (USA) HUBCO LP*, file no. 5350303 (obtained on Nov. 28, 2017)

United Kingdom, Companies House, Notification of the Emir of the State of Qatar as a Person with Significant Control on 11 July 2016, *Al Jazeera International Limited*, no. 05233333 (July 31, 2017)

United Kingdom, Companies House, Notification of the Emir of the State of Qatar Ceasing to be a Person with Significant Control on 10 March 2018, *Al Jazeera International Limited*, no. 05233333 (Jan 30, 2019)

United Kingdom, Companies House, Full Accounts Made Up to 31 December 2018, *Al Jazeera International Limited*, no. 05233333, (Jun. 28, 2019)

State Of Delaware

Entity Details

11/28/2017 1:45:14PM

File Number: 4023160 Incorporation Date / Formation Date: 8/30/2005
Entity Name: AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL (USA) LLC
Entity Kind: Limited Liability Company Entity Type: General
Residency: Domestic State: DELAWARE
Status: Good Standing Status Date: 2/28/2017

Registered Agent Information

Name: CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
Address: 251 LITTLE FALLS DRIVE
City: WILMINGTON Country:
State: DE Postal Code: 19808
Phone: 302-636-5401

Tax Information

Last Annual Report Filed: 2017 Tax Due: \$ 0
Annual Tax Assessment: \$475 Total Authorized Shares: 0

Filing History (Last 5 Filings)

Seq	Description	No of Pages	Filing Date mm/dd/yyyy	Filing Time	Effective Date mm/dd/yyyy
1	Merger [Survivor]	2	7/31/2017	11:17 AM	7/31/2017
2	Conversion AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL (USA)	2	2/28/2017	9:13 AM	2/28/2017
3	Formation AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL (USA),	1	2/28/2017	9:13 AM	2/28/2017
4	Renewal for Void 9000014	2	2/24/2017	12:04 PM	2/24/2017
5	Stock Corporation	2	8/30/2005	5:17 PM	8/30/2005

Delaware

PAGE 1


The First State

I, JEFFREY W. BULLOCK, SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, DO HEREBY CERTIFY "AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL (USA), INC." IS DULY INCORPORATED UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE AND IS IN GOOD STANDING AND HAS A LEGAL CORPORATE EXISTENCE SO FAR AS THE RECORDS OF THIS OFFICE SHOW, AS OF THE EIGHTH DAY OF JULY, A.D. 2011.

AND I DO HEREBY FURTHER CERTIFY THAT THE ANNUAL REPORTS HAVE BEEN FILED TO DATE.

AND I DO HEREBY FURTHER CERTIFY THAT THE FRANCHISE TAXES HAVE BEEN PAID TO DATE.


AND I DO HEREBY FURTHER CERTIFY THAT THE SAID "AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL (USA), INC." WAS INCORPORATED ON THE THIRTIETH DAY OF AUGUST, A.D. 2005.



4023160 8300

110803664

You may verify this certificate online at corp.delaware.gov/authver.shtml


Jeffrey W. Bullock, Secretary of State
AUTHENTICATION: 8889795

DATE: 07-08-11

State Of Delaware

Entity Details

11/28/2017 1:41:15PM

File Number: 5350303 Incorporation Date / Formation Date: 6/12/2013
Entity Name: AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL (USA) HUBCO LP
Entity Kind: Limited Partnership Entity Type: General
Residency: Domestic State: DELAWARE
Status: Good Standing Status Date: 6/18/2014

Registered Agent Information

Name: CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
Address: 251 LITTLE FALLS DRIVE
City: WILMINGTON Country:
State: DE Postal Code: 19808
Phone: 302-636-5401

Tax Information


Last Annual Report Filed: 0 Tax Due: \$ 0
Annual Tax Assessment: \$600 Total Authorized Shares:

Filing History (Last 5 Filings)

Seq	Description	No of Pages	Filing Date mm/dd/yyyy	Filing Time	Effective Date mm/dd/yyyy
1	Conversion AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL (USA)	2	2/28/2017	10:37 AM	2/28/2017
2	Formation AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL (USA) H	1	2/28/2017	10:37 AM	2/28/2017
3	LLC	1	6/12/2013	6:35 PM	6/12/2013



Companies House

PSC03(ef)**Notice of other registrable person
with significant control (PSC)**Company Name: **AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED**Company Number: **05233333**Received for filing in Electronic Format on the: **31/07/2017**

X6BU1Y1

Person detailsDate of becoming a
registrable person: **11/07/2016**Name: **THE EMIR OF THE STATE OF QATAR**Principal office address: **LEVEL 16, THE SHARD 32 LONDON BRIDGE STREET
LONDON
ENGLAND
SE1 9SG**Legal Form: **HEAD OF STATE**Governing Law: **QATARI LAW****Nature of control**

The other registrable person holds, directly or indirectly, 75% or more of the shares in the company.

Authorisation

Authenticated

This form was authorised by one of the following:

Director, Secretary, Person Authorised, Administrator, Administrative Receiver, Receiver, Receiver manager, Charity Commission Receiver and Manager, CIC Manager, Judicial Factor




Companies House

CS01 (ef)

Confirmation Statement

Company Name: **AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED**

Company Number: **05233333**



Received for filing in Electronic Format on the: **17/07/2019**

X89VCP4Z

Company Name: **AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED**

Company Number: **05233333**

Confirmation **27/06/2019**

Statement date:




Companies House

PSC07 (ef)

**Notice of ceasing to be a person
with significant control (PSC)**

Company Name: **AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED**

Company Number: **05233333**



Received for filing in Electronic Format on the: **30/01/2019**

X7Y8P62J

Cessation Details

Date ceased: **10/03/2018**

Name: **THE EMIR OF THE STATE OF QATAR**

Register entry date

Register entry date **11/03/2018**

Authorisation

Authenticated

This form was authorised by one of the following:

Director, Secretary, Person Authorised, Liquidator, Administrator, Administrative Receiver, Receiver, Receiver manager, Charity Commission Receiver and Manager, CIC Manager, Judicial Factor.

The details below relate to individuals/corporate bodies that were shareholders during the review period or that had ceased to be shareholders since the date of the previous confirmation statement.

Shareholder information for a non-traded company as at the confirmation statement date is shown below

Shareholding 1: **50000 transferred on 2018-03-10**
0 ORDINARY shares held as at the date of this confirmation statement
Name: **H E THE EMIR OF QATAR**

Shareholding 2: **50000 ORDINARY shares held as at the date of this confirmation statement**
Name: **AL JAZEERA GLOBAL HUBCO LIMITED**

Confirmation Statement

I confirm that all information required to be delivered by the company to the registrar in relation to the confirmation period concerned either has been delivered or is being delivered at the same time as the confirmation statement

Authorisation

Authenticated

This form was authorised by one of the following:

Director, Secretary, Person Authorised, Charity Commission Receiver and Manager, CIC Manager,
Judicial Factor

LONDON, UK

Level 16, The Shard
32 London Bridge Street
London SE1 9SG
TEL +44 (0)20 3480 7200
FAX +44 (0)20 3480 7320



ALJAZEERA INTERNATIONAL

AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
REPORT OF THE DIRECTORS AND
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
FOR THE YEAR ENDED
31 DECEMBER 2018



AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED

**CONTENTS OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
for the year ended 31 December 2018**

	Page
Company Information	1
Strategic Report	2
Directors' Report	4
Independent Auditors' Report	6
Statement of Profit or Loss	8
Statement of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income	9
Statement of Financial Position	10
Statement of Changes in Equity	11
Statement of Cash Flows	12
Notes to the Statement of Cash Flows	13
Notes to the Financial Statements	14
Income Statement Summaries	22

AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED

COMPANY INFORMATION

for the year ended 31 December 2018

DIRECTORS: Muftah Al Suwaidan
Khalid Abdulla M Al-Mulla

REGISTERED OFFICE: Premier Suite
4 Churchill Court
58 Station Road
North Harrow
Middlesex
HA2 7ST

BUSINESS ADDRESS: Level 16
The Shard
32 London Bridge Street
London
SE1 9SG

REGISTERED NUMBER: 05233333 (England and Wales)

INDEPENDENT AUDITORS : Chapmans Associates Limited, Chartered Accountants
Statutory Auditors
3 Coombe Road
London
NW10 0EB

BANKERS: Qatar National Bank
51 Grosvenor Street
London
W1K 3HH

AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED**STRATEGIC REPORT****for the year ended 31 December 2018**

The directors present their strategic report for the year ended 31 December 2018.

REVIEW OF BUSINESS

The company's principal activities during the year continued to be the provision of satellite broadcasting services including production of programmes for broadcasting.

The company is predominantly a service based organisation, established to provide a news and current affairs service to the general public worldwide, and is financed by the Qatari government. The profit shown in the financial statements relates to the mark-up of 5%/6% on costs charged by the company to Al Jazeera Media Network, Doha.

The key financial and other performance indicators during the year were as follows:

	2018	2017	2016	2015
Turnover	£30.3m	£31.3m	£32.4m	£33.8m
Gross profit	£14.9m	£15.9m	£15m	£15.2m
Net profit/(loss)	£1.73	£1.8m	£2.2m	£7.8m
Shareholders' funds	£35.5m	£33.8m	£31.8m	£29.5m
Number of employees	128	136	138	132

The results are in accordance with the company's long term objectives.

The Board expects the ensuing year to be in line with the 2018 results. The shareholders' funds have increased due to profit generated by the company for the year.

The company has assurances from related parties that they will continue their financial and operating support on the basis of which the Board has confirmed that it considers the company to be a going concern. Thus the financial statements have been prepared on a going concern basis.

PRINCIPAL RISKS AND UNCERTAINTIES

The company's business is exposed to a number of risks and uncertainties, which could, either on their own or in combination with others, potentially have a material adverse effect on the company's strategy, business, performance, results, financial or trading condition, and/or reputation.

One such risk is political risk. For instance, governments may alter fiscal or other terms governing broadcasting or media operations. To mitigate this risk the company conforms rigidly to Ofcom requirements and all other statutes relevant to the company's activities.

Another risk is cyber-attack leading to system denial or significant reputational damage, for example the ability to broadcast our programmes or personnel and sensitive data being compromised.

This risk is mitigated by employing sophisticated up to date internal security systems, running internal awareness campaigns and employing sophisticated disaster recovery management tools.

ABOUT THE COMPANY

The company is a limited liability company registered in England & Wales, and has its registered office address at 4 Churchill Court, 58 Station Road, North Harrow, HA2 7ST. The company's operational headquarters are based at Level 16, The Shard, 32 London Bridge Street, London SE1 9SG.

AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED

STRATEGIC REPORT

for the year ended 31 December 2018

KEY SERVICE POINTS

Several factors contribute to the effectiveness of our services, but the following key values are the foundations of the company.

People

The company's employees are its most important asset. Our human resources policy aims at a lasting relationship with our personnel. This allows us to develop processes for the benefit of our clients' development projects.

The company follows best practice employment policies, which espouses equal opportunities for all employees, irrespective of sex, race, colour, disability or marital status.

The company encourages employee involvement in policy decisions relating to the content produced and aired by the company by means of regular communication programmes, meetings and conferences

Integrity

A lot of emphasis is made on ethical values both with our suppliers as well as personnel which has ensured long term relationships which are essential to the growth of the company.

ON BEHALF OF THE BOARD:



.....
Muftah Al Suwaidan - Director

Date: 05 / 06 / 2019

AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED

DIRECTORS' REPORT for the year ended 31 December 2018

The directors present their report with the financial statements of the company for the year ended 31 December 2018.

PRINCIPAL ACTIVITY

The principal activity of the company in the year under review was that of satellite broadcasting services to a related company.

DIVIDENDS

No dividends will be distributed for the year ended 31 December 2018.

FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

No major developments are planned for the ensuing year.

DIRECTORS

The directors shown below have held office during the whole of the period from 1 January 2018 to the date of this report.

Muftah Al Suwaidan
Khalid Abdulla M Al-Mulla

PRINCIPAL RISKS AND UNCERTAINTIES

The company has established a risk and financial management framework whose primary objectives are to protect the company from events that hinder the achievement of the company's performance objectives.

The objectives aim to limit undue counterparty exposure, ensure sufficient working capital and monitor the management of risk at business unit level.

GOING CONCERN

After making enquiries, the directors have a reasonable expectation that the company has adequate resources to continue in operational existence for the foreseeable future. Accordingly, they continue to adopt the going concern basis in preparing the annual report and financial statements.

STATEMENT OF DIRECTORS' RESPONSIBILITIES

The directors are responsible for preparing the Strategic Report, the Directors' Report and the financial statements in accordance with applicable law and regulations.

Company law requires the directors to prepare financial statements for each financial year. Under that law the directors have elected to prepare the financial statements in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards as adopted by the European Union. Under company law the directors must not approve the financial statements unless they are satisfied that they give a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the company and of the profit or loss of the company for that period. In preparing these financial statements, the directors are required to:

- select suitable accounting policies and then apply them consistently;
- make judgements and accounting estimates that are reasonable and prudent;
- prepare the financial statements on the going concern basis unless it is inappropriate to presume that the company will continue in business.

The directors are responsible for keeping adequate accounting records that are sufficient to show and explain the company's transactions and disclose with reasonable accuracy at any time the financial position of the company and enable them to ensure that the financial statements comply with the Companies Act 2006. They are also responsible for safeguarding the assets of the company and hence for taking reasonable steps for the prevention and detection of fraud and other irregularities.

AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED

DIRECTORS' REPORT

for the year ended 31 December 2018

STATEMENT AS TO DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO AUDITORS

So far as each person currently serving as a director of the company at the date of approving this report is aware, there is no relevant audit information of which the company's auditors are unaware and each director hereby confirms that he or she has taken all the steps that he or she ought to have taken as a director in order to make himself or herself aware of any relevant audit information, and to establish that the company's auditors are aware of that information.

They have a general responsibility for taking such steps as are reasonably open to them to safeguard the assets of the company and to prevent and detect fraud and other irregularities.

AUDITORS

Chapmans Associates Limited, Chartered Accountants were appointed as auditors during the year in place of KPMG LLP who resigned. A resolution to re-appoint Chapmans Associates Limited, Chartered Accountants as auditors will be proposed at the forthcoming AGM.

ON BEHALF OF THE BOARD:


.....
Muftah Al Suwaidan - Director

Date: 05/06/2019

INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' REPORT TO THE MEMBERS OF AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED

Opinion

We have audited the financial statements of Al Jazeera International Limited (the 'company') for the year ended 31 December 2018 which comprise the Statement of Profit or Loss, the Statement of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income, the Statement of Financial Position, the Statement of Changes in Equity, the Statement of Cash Flows and Notes to the Statement of Cash Flows, Notes to the Financial Statements, including a summary of significant accounting policies. The financial reporting framework that has been applied in their preparation is applicable law and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) as adopted by the European Union.

In our opinion the financial statements:

- give a true and fair view of the state of the company's affairs as at 31 December 2018 and of its profit for the year then ended;
- have been properly prepared in accordance with IFRSs as adopted by the European Union; and
- have been prepared in accordance with the requirements of the Companies Act 2006.

Basis for opinion

We conducted our audit in accordance with International Standards on Auditing (UK) (ISAs (UK)) and applicable law. Our responsibilities under those standards are further described in the Auditors' responsibilities for the audit of the financial statements section of our report. We are independent of the company in accordance with the ethical requirements that are relevant to our audit of the financial statements in the UK, including the FRC's Ethical Standard, and we have fulfilled our other ethical responsibilities in accordance with these requirements. We believe that the audit evidence we have obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for our opinion.

Conclusions relating to going concern

We have nothing to report in respect of the following matters in relation to which the ISAs (UK) require us to report to you where:

- the directors' use of the going concern basis of accounting in the preparation of the financial statements is not appropriate; or
- the directors have not disclosed in the financial statements any identified material uncertainties that may cast significant doubt about the company's ability to continue to adopt the going concern basis of accounting for a period of at least twelve months from the date when the financial statements are authorised for issue.

Other information

The directors are responsible for the other information. The other information comprises the information in the Strategic Report and the Directors' Report, but does not include the financial statements and our Auditors' Report thereon.

Our opinion on the financial statements does not cover the other information and, except to the extent otherwise explicitly stated in our report, we do not express any form of assurance conclusion thereon.

In connection with our audit of the financial statements, our responsibility is to read the other information and, in doing so, consider whether the other information is materially inconsistent with the financial statements or our knowledge obtained in the audit or otherwise appears to be materially misstated. If we identify such material inconsistencies or apparent material misstatements, we are required to determine whether there is a material misstatement in the financial statements or a material misstatement of the other information. If, based on the work we have performed, we conclude that there is a material misstatement of this other information, we are required to report that fact. We have nothing to report in this regard.

Opinion on other matters prescribed by the Companies Act 2006

In our opinion, based on the work undertaken in the course of the audit:

- the information given in the Strategic Report and the Directors' Report for the financial year for which the financial statements are prepared is consistent with the financial statements; and
- the Strategic Report and the Directors' Report have been prepared in accordance with applicable legal requirements.

INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' REPORT TO THE MEMBERS OF AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED

Matters on which we are required to report by exception

In the light of the knowledge and understanding of the company and its environment obtained in the course of the audit, we have not identified material misstatements in the Strategic Report or the Directors' Report.

We have nothing to report in respect of the following matters where the Companies Act 2006 requires us to report to you if, in our opinion:

- adequate accounting records have not been kept, or returns adequate for our audit have not been received from branches not visited by us; or
- the financial statements are not in agreement with the accounting records and returns; or
- certain disclosures of directors' remuneration specified by law are not made; or
- we have not received all the information and explanations we require for our audit.

Responsibilities of directors

As explained more fully in the Statement of Directors' Responsibilities set out on page four, the directors are responsible for the preparation of the financial statements and for being satisfied that they give a true and fair view, and for such internal control as the directors determine necessary to enable the preparation of financial statements that are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error.

In preparing the financial statements, the directors are responsible for assessing the company's ability to continue as a going concern, disclosing, as applicable, matters related to going concern and using the going concern basis of accounting unless the directors either intend to liquidate the company or to cease operations, or have no realistic alternative but to do so.


Auditors' responsibilities for the audit of the financial statements

Our objectives are to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements as a whole are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error, and to issue an Auditors' Report that includes our opinion. Reasonable assurance is a high level of assurance, but is not a guarantee that an audit conducted in accordance with ISAs (UK) will always detect a material misstatement when it exists. Misstatements can arise from fraud or error and are considered material if, individually or in the aggregate, they could reasonably be expected to influence the economic decisions of users taken on the basis of these financial statements.

A further description of our responsibilities for the audit of the financial statements is located on the Financial Reporting Council's website at www.frc.org.uk/auditorsresponsibilities. This description forms part of our Auditors' Report.

Use of our report

This report is made solely to the company's members, as a body, in accordance with Chapter 3 of Part 16 of the Companies Act 2006. Our audit work has been undertaken so that we might state to the company's members those matters we are required to state to them in an Auditors' Report and for no other purpose. To the fullest extent permitted by law, we do not accept or assume responsibility to anyone other than the company and the company's members as a body, for our audit work, for this report, or for the opinions we have formed.



Praful Patel FCA (Senior Statutory Auditor)
for and on behalf of Chapmans Associates Limited, Chartered Accountants
Statutory Auditors
3 Coombe Road
London
NW10 0EB

Date: 12/6/2019

AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED**STATEMENT OF PROFIT OR LOSS**
for the year ended 31 December 2018

		2018 £	2017 £
CONTINUING OPERATIONS			
Revenue		30,370,272	31,308,232
Cost of sales		(15,387,369)	(15,912,474)
GROSS PROFIT		<u>14,982,903</u>	<u>15,395,758</u>
Other operating income		-	46,783
Administrative expenses		(13,257,872)	(13,676,193)
OPERATING PROFIT		<u>1,725,031</u>	<u>1,766,348</u>
Finance costs	4	-	(40)
Finance income	4	622	553
PROFIT BEFORE INCOME TAX	5	<u>1,725,653</u>	<u>1,766,861</u>
Income tax	6	-	-
PROFIT FOR THE YEAR		<u><u>1,725,653</u></u>	<u><u>1,766,861</u></u>

The notes on pages 14 to 21 form part of these financial statements

AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED**STATEMENT OF PROFIT OR LOSS AND OTHER COMPREHENSIVE INCOME
for the year ended 31 December 2018**

	2018 £	2017 £
PROFIT FOR THE YEAR	1,725,653	1,766,861
OTHER COMPREHENSIVE INCOME	-	-
TOTAL COMPREHENSIVE INCOME FOR THE YEAR	<u>1,725,653</u>	<u>1,766,861</u>

The notes on pages 14 to 21 form part of these financial statements

AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED (REGISTERED NUMBER: 05233333)**STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION****31 December 2018**

	Notes	2018 £	2017 £
ASSETS			
NON-CURRENT ASSETS			
Property, plant and equipment	8	5,589,544	12,119,103
Loans and other financial assets	9	567	567
		<u>5,590,111</u>	<u>12,119,670</u>
CURRENT ASSETS			
Inventories	10	66,432	156,277
Trade and other receivables	11	33,862,409	25,891,474
Cash and cash equivalents	12	1,314,036	1,419,225
		<u>35,242,877</u>	<u>27,466,976</u>
TOTAL ASSETS		<u><u>40,832,988</u></u>	<u><u>39,586,646</u></u>
EQUITY			
SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY			
Called up share capital	13	50,000	50,000
Capital contribution	14	38,292,794	38,292,794
Retained earnings	14	(2,818,287)	(4,543,940)
TOTAL EQUITY		<u>35,524,507</u>	<u>33,798,854</u>
LIABILITIES			
CURRENT LIABILITIES			
Trade and other payables	15	4,328,731	4,808,042
Provisions	17	979,750	979,750
		<u>5,308,481</u>	<u>5,787,792</u>
TOTAL LIABILITIES		<u>5,308,481</u>	<u>5,787,792</u>
TOTAL EQUITY AND LIABILITIES		<u><u>40,832,988</u></u>	<u><u>39,586,646</u></u>

The financial statements were approved by the Board of Directors on 05/06/2019 and were signed on its behalf by:



 Muftah Al Suwaidan - Director

The notes on pages 14 to 21 form part of these financial statements

AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED**STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN EQUITY
for the year ended 31 December 2018**

	Called up share capital £	Retained earnings £	Capital contribution £	Total equity £
Balance at 1 January 2017	50,000	(6,310,801)	38,089,104	31,828,303
Changes in equity				
Profit for the year	-	1,766,861	-	1,766,861
Other comprehensive income	-	-	203,690	203,690
Total comprehensive income	-	1,766,861	203,690	1,970,551
Balance at 31 December 2017	50,000	(4,543,940)	38,292,794	33,798,854
Changes in equity				
Profit for the year	-	1,725,653	-	1,725,653
Total comprehensive income	-	1,725,653	-	1,725,653
Balance at 31 December 2018	50,000	(2,818,287)	38,292,794	35,524,507

The notes on pages 14 to 21 form part of these financial statements

AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED**STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS
for the year ended 31 December 2018**

		2018 £	2017 £
Cash flows from operating activities			
Cash generated from operations	1	105,772	(429,373)
Interest paid		-	(40)
		<u>105,772</u>	<u>(429,413)</u>
Net cash from operating activities		<u>105,772</u>	<u>(429,413)</u>
Cash flows from investing activities			
Purchase of tangible fixed assets		(211,583)	(56,239)
Interest received		622	553
		<u>(210,961)</u>	<u>(55,686)</u>
Net cash from investing activities		<u>(210,961)</u>	<u>(55,686)</u>
Cash flows from financing activities			
Proceeds from capital contribution		-	203,690
		<u>-</u>	<u>203,690</u>
Net cash from financing activities		<u>-</u>	<u>203,690</u>
Decrease in cash and cash equivalents			
Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of year	2	1,419,225	1,700,634
		<u>1,314,036</u>	<u>1,419,225</u>
Cash and cash equivalents at end of year	2	<u>1,314,036</u>	<u>1,419,225</u>

The notes on pages 14 to 21 form part of these financial statements

AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED**NOTES TO THE STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS
for the year ended 31 December 2018****1. RECONCILIATION OF PROFIT BEFORE INCOME TAX TO CASH GENERATED FROM OPERATIONS**

	2018	2017
	£	£
Profit before income tax	1,725,653	1,766,861
Depreciation charges	6,741,144	8,041,453
Loss on disposal of fixed assets	-	3,709
Finance costs	-	40
Finance income	(622)	(553)
	<u>8,466,175</u>	<u>9,811,510</u>
Decrease in inventories	89,845	96,690
(Increase)/decrease in trade and other receivables	(7,970,936)	450,493
Decrease in trade and other payables	(479,312)	(10,788,066)
	<u>(7,360,403)</u>	<u>(10,240,883)</u>
Cash generated from operations	<u><u>105,772</u></u>	<u><u>(429,373)</u></u>

2. CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS

The amounts disclosed on the Statement of Cash Flows in respect of cash and cash equivalents are in respect of these Statement of Financial Position amounts:

Year ended 31 December 2018

	31.12.18	1.1.18
	£	£
Cash and cash equivalents	1,314,036	1,419,225
	<u><u>1,314,036</u></u>	<u><u>1,419,225</u></u>

Year ended 31 December 2017

	31.12.17	1.1.17
	£	£
Cash and cash equivalents	1,419,225	1,700,634
	<u><u>1,419,225</u></u>	<u><u>1,700,634</u></u>

The notes on pages 14 to 21 form part of these financial statements

AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED**NOTES TO THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS****for the year ended 31 December 2018****1. STATUTORY INFORMATION**

Al Jazeera International Limited is a private company, limited by shares, registered in England and Wales. The company's registered number and registered office address can be found on the Company Information page.

2. ACCOUNTING POLICIES**Basis of preparation**

These financial statements have been prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards and IFRIC interpretations and with those parts of the Companies Act 2006 applicable to companies reporting under IFRS. The financial statements have been prepared under the historical cost convention.

The accounting policies which follow set out those policies which apply in preparing the financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2018.

The financial statements are presented in Sterling and all values are rounded to the nearest pound except when otherwise indicated.

Revenue recognition

Revenue represents invoiced sales of services, including 5%/6% mark-up and excluding value added tax. Revenue is derived entirely from services provided to Al Jazeera Media Network based in the state of Qatar.

Property, plant and equipment

Depreciation is provided at the following annual rates in order to write off each asset over its estimated useful life.

Short leasehold	- 15 years
Plant and machinery	- 20% on cost
Fixtures and fittings	- 25% on cost
Motor vehicles	- 25% on cost
Computer equipment	- 33.3% on cost

Property, plant and equipment are stated at cost less accumulated depreciation and accumulated impairment losses. Cost comprises the aggregate amount paid and the fair value of any consideration given to acquire the asset and includes costs directly attributable to making the asset capable of operating as intended. Borrowing costs attributable to assets under construction are recognised as an expense.

The carrying values of property, plant, and equipment are reviewed for impairment if events or changes in circumstances indicate the carrying value may not be recoverable, and are written down immediately to their recoverable amount. Useful lives and residual values are reviewed annually and where adjustments are required these are made prospectively. An item of property, plant, and equipment is derecognised upon disposal or when no future economic benefits are expected to arise from the continued use of the asset. Any gain or loss arising on derecognition of the asset (calculated as the difference between the net disposal proceeds and the carrying amount of the item) is included in the statement of comprehensive income in the year the item is derecognised.

Derecognition of financial assets and liabilities

A financial asset or liability is generally derecognised when the contract that gives rise to it is settled, sold, cancelled or expires.

Where an existing financial liability is replaced by another from the same lender on substantially different terms, or the terms of an existing liability are substantially modified, such an exchange or modification is treated as a derecognition of the original liability and the recognition of a new liability, such that the difference in the respective carrying amounts together with any costs or fees incurred are recognised in profit or loss.

AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED**NOTES TO THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS - continued
for the year ended 31 December 2018****2. ACCOUNTING POLICIES - continued****Trade and other receivables**

Trade receivables, which are generally received from Al Jazeera Media Network, are recognised and carried at the lower of their original invoiced value and recoverable amount. Where the time value of money is material, receivables are carried at amortised cost. Provision is made when there is objective evidence the balances will not be recovered in full. Balances are written off when the probability of recovery is assessed as being remote.

Taxation

Current taxes are based on the results shown in the financial statements and are calculated according to transfer pricing provisions as applicable to the company.

Tax on the income or loss for the year comprises current and deferred tax. Income tax is charged or credited directly to the income statement.

Current tax assets and liabilities are measured at the amount expected to be recovered from or paid to the taxation authorities, based on tax rates enacted or substantively enacted at the statement of financial position date.

Deferred tax is recognised on all temporary differences between the tax bases of assets and liabilities and their carrying amounts in the financial statements with the exception of deferred income tax assets which are recognised only to the extent that it is probable that future taxable profit will be available against which the deductible temporary differences, carried forward tax credits or tax losses can be utilised.

The carrying amount of deferred tax assets is reviewed at each reporting date and reduced to the extent that it is no longer probable that sufficient taxable profit will be available to allow all or part of the deferred tax asset to be utilised. Unrecognised deferred tax assets are reassessed at each reporting date and are recognised to the extent that it has become probable that future taxable profits will allow the deferred tax asset to be recovered.

Deferred tax assets and deferred tax liabilities are offset only if a legally enforceable right exists to set off current tax assets against current income tax liabilities and the deferred taxes relate to the same taxable entity and the same taxation authority.

Deferred income tax assets and liabilities are measured on an undiscounted basis at the tax rates that are expected to apply when the related asset is realised or liability is settled, based on tax rates and laws enacted or substantively enacted at the statement of financial position date.

Pension costs and other post-retirement benefits

The company operates a defined contribution pension scheme. Contributions payable to the company's pension scheme are charged to profit or loss in the period to which they relate.

Foreign currencies

The functional and presentation currency of Al Jazeera International Limited is Sterling. Transactions in foreign currencies are initially recorded in the functional currency by applying the spot exchange rate ruling at the date of the transaction. Monetary assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currencies are retranslated at the functional currency rate of exchange ruling at the statement of financial position date. All differences arising on translation are taken to the income statement.

Non-monetary assets and liabilities that are measured in terms of historical cost in a foreign currency are translated using the exchange rates at the dates of the initial transactions.

Financial liabilities

Contributions are paid into the money purchase pension schemes held by certain employees. The assets of the scheme are held separately. The contributions are recognised in the income statement in the period in which they become payable.

AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED**NOTES TO THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS - continued
for the year ended 31 December 2018****2. ACCOUNTING POLICIES - continued**

The group operates a defined contribution pension scheme. Contributions payable to the group's pension scheme are charged to the income statement in the period to which they relate.

Contributions are paid into the money purchase pension schemes held by certain employees. The assets of the scheme are held separately. The contributions are recognised in the income statement in the period in which they become payable

Going concern

The financial statements have been prepared on a going concern basis which assumes that the company will continue receiving the financial support of Al Jazeera Media Network, Qatar.

The Board believes that this basis is appropriate and they are not aware of any reasons why the financial support should not continue in the near future.

Inventories

Inventories comprise of amounts expended on TV programmes which had not been transmitted at the balance sheet date, and are valued at cost less impairment, if any.

3. EMPLOYEES AND DIRECTORS

	2018	2017
	£	£
Wages and salaries	8,514,491	8,051,550
Social security costs	1,100,158	955,646
Other pension costs	874,631	756,430
	<u>10,489,280</u>	<u>9,763,626</u>

The average number of employees during the year was as follows:

	2018	2017
Production	108	115
Administration and finance	20	21
	<u>128</u>	<u>136</u>

The directors received no emoluments from the company during the year (2017 - Nil). The directors' emoluments are borne by a related party.

4. NET FINANCE INCOME

	2018	2017
	£	£
Finance income:		
Deposit account interest	470	553
Other income	152	-
	<u>622</u>	<u>553</u>

AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED**NOTES TO THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS - continued**
for the year ended 31 December 2018**4. NET FINANCE INCOME - continued**

	2018	2017
	£	£
Finance costs:		
Bank interest	-	40
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Net finance income	622	513
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

5. PROFIT BEFORE INCOME TAX

The profit before income tax is stated after charging:

	2018	2017
	£	£
Cost of inventories recognised as expense	15,387,369	15,912,474
Depreciation - owned assets	6,741,142	8,041,453
Loss on disposal of fixed assets	-	3,710
Auditors' remuneration	23,554	62,000
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

6. INCOME TAX**Analysis of tax expense**

No liability to UK corporation tax arose for the year ended 31 December 2018 nor for the year ended 31 December 2017.

Factors affecting the tax expense

The tax assessed for the year is lower than the standard rate of corporation tax in the UK. The difference is explained below:

	2018	2017
	£	£
Profit before income tax	1,725,653	1,766,861
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Profit multiplied by the standard rate of corporation tax in the UK of 19% (2017 - 19.246%)	327,874	340,050
Effects of:		
Tax effect of capital allowances	(625,446)	(738,353)
Tax effect of losses brought forward	(3,407,971)	(2,998,274)
Tax effect of losses carried forward	3,761,271	3,450,457
Tax effect of Transfer Pricing adjustment	(55,728)	(53,880)
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Tax expense	-	-
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

7. TOTAL COMPREHENSIVE INCOME

Total comprehensive income for this and the previous period is attributable to owners of Al Jazeera International Limited and arises from continuing operations.

AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED**NOTES TO THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS - continued**
for the year ended 31 December 2018**8. PROPERTY, PLANT AND EQUIPMENT**

	Short leasehold £	Plant and machinery £	Fixtures and fittings £
Cost			
At 1 January 2018	979,750	31,048,124	6,068,970
Additions	29,080	169,769	2,339
At 31 December 2018	<u>1,008,830</u>	<u>31,217,893</u>	<u>6,071,309</u>
Depreciation			
At 1 January 2018	261,267	20,754,257	5,007,246
Charge for year	66,331	5,627,605	1,018,961
At 31 December 2018	<u>327,598</u>	<u>26,381,862</u>	<u>6,026,207</u>
Net book value			
At 31 December 2018	<u>681,232</u>	<u>4,836,031</u>	<u>45,102</u>
At 31 December 2017	<u>718,483</u>	<u>10,293,867</u>	<u>1,061,724</u>
	Motor vehicles £	Computer equipment £	Totals £
Cost			
At 1 January 2018	43,699	1,287,401	39,427,944
Additions	-	10,395	211,583
At 31 December 2018	<u>43,699</u>	<u>1,297,796</u>	<u>39,639,527</u>
Depreciation			
At 1 January 2018	43,699	1,242,372	27,308,841
Charge for year	-	28,245	6,741,142
At 31 December 2018	<u>43,699</u>	<u>1,270,617</u>	<u>34,049,983</u>
Net book value			
At 31 December 2018	<u>-</u>	<u>27,179</u>	<u>5,589,544</u>
At 31 December 2017	<u>-</u>	<u>45,029</u>	<u>12,119,103</u>

9. LOANS AND OTHER FINANCIAL ASSETS

	2018 £	2017 £
1% shareholding in Al Jazeera Turk Channel, Turkey	<u>567</u>	<u>567</u>

AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED**NOTES TO THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS - continued
for the year ended 31 December 2018****10. INVENTORIES**

	2018	2017
	£	£
Work-in-progress	<u>66,432</u>	<u>156,277</u>

11. TRADE AND OTHER RECEIVABLES

	2018	2017
	£	£
Current:		
Other debtors	91,197	754
Amounts due from related parties	32,357,728	24,645,030
Staff Advances	105,121	9,996
Social security and other taxes	-	118,484
VAT	475,820	321,083
Called up share capital not paid	50,000	50,000
Prepayments and accrued income	782,543	746,127
	<u>33,862,409</u>	<u>25,891,474</u>

12. CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS

	2018	2017
	£	£
Cash in hand	76,185	86,942
Bank accounts	<u>1,237,851</u>	<u>1,332,283</u>
	<u>1,314,036</u>	<u>1,419,225</u>

13. CALLED UP SHARE CAPITAL

Allotted and issued:			2018	2017
Number:	Class:	Nominal value:	£	£
50,000	Ordinary £1 shares	£1	<u>50,000</u>	<u>50,000</u>

At the balance sheet date, the share capital called up but unpaid amounted to £50,000 (2017 - £50,000).

14. RESERVES

	Retained earnings £	Capital contribution £	Totals £
At 1 January 2018	(4,543,940)	38,292,794	33,748,854
Profit for the year	1,725,653	-	1,725,653
At 31 December 2018	<u>(2,818,287)</u>	<u>38,292,794</u>	<u>35,474,507</u>

AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED**NOTES TO THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS - continued
for the year ended 31 December 2018****14. RESERVES - continued**

	Retained earnings £	Capital contribution £	Totals £
At 1 January 2017	(6,310,801)	38,089,104	31,778,303
Profit for the year	1,766,861	-	1,766,861
Increase in capital contribution	-	203,690	203,690
At 31 December 2017	<u>(4,543,940)</u>	<u>38,292,794</u>	<u>33,748,854</u>

15. TRADE AND OTHER PAYABLES

	2018 £	2017 £
Current:		
Trade creditors	293,650	634,273
Employee salaries	142,315	142,315
Pension Contributions Payable	66,704	65,439
Deferred income	23,140	156,276
Accrued expenses	3,802,922	3,809,739
	<u>4,328,731</u>	<u>4,808,042</u>

16. LEASING AGREEMENTS

Minimum lease payments under non-cancellable operating leases fall due as follows:

	2018 £	2017 £
Within one year	1,389,050	1,389,050
Between one and five years	5,556,202	5,556,202
In more than five years	6,945,254	8,334,304
	<u>13,890,506</u>	<u>15,279,556</u>

Operating lease commitments

Commitments under operating leases relate primarily to the rental of office space. Minimum lease rentals payable under non-cancellable operating leases as at 31 December 2018 are as shown above

17. PROVISIONS

	2018 £	2017 £
Other provisions	<u>979,750</u>	<u>979,750</u>
Analysed as follows:		
Current	<u>979,750</u>	<u>979,750</u>

AL JAZEERA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED**NOTES TO THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS - continued**
for the year ended 31 December 2018**17. PROVISIONS - continued**

	2018	2017
	£	£
Provision for dilapidation brought forward	979,750	979,750
Movement during the year	-	-
Balance carried forward	<u>979,750</u>	<u>979,750</u>

The provision relates to the company's dilapidation obligations in respect of the main business premises at The Shard.

18. CONTINGENT LIABILITIES

The company is engaged in negotiations with HMRC on the matter of Transfer Pricing adjustment to the tax liability payable in the United Kingdom. Due to the impasse in the negotiations, it is likely that the matter will have to be pursued through the Tax Tribunal. In the event that the Tribunal decides against the company, the tax payable including interest would be approximately £8.2m.

19. RELATED PARTY DISCLOSURES

The details of related party transactions are as follows:

Related Party	Description	2018	2017
		£	£
Al Jazeera Media Network	Sales	30,077,563	31,145,573
Al Jazeera Satellite Channel Limited	Sales	191,487	162,659
		<u>30,269,050</u>	<u>31,308,232</u>

At the balance sheet date the amounts owed by related parties were as follows:

Related Party	£	£
Al Jazeera Media Network	32,311,384	24,999,360
Al Jazeera Washington	19,310	18,259
Al Jazeera Kuala Lumpur	8,339	-
	<u>32,339,033</u>	<u>25,017,619</u>

20. ULTIMATE CONTROLLING PARTY

The directors consider that with effect from 10 March 2018, Al Jazeera Network, the registered address of which is at Television Roundabout, PO Box 23123, Doha, Qatar is the ultimate controlling party. Prior to that H H Emir of Qatar was the ultimate controlling party.

EXHIBIT B: SAMPLE INDEX OF AL JAZEERA'S COVERAGE PROMOTING QATAR'S FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA

Contents

Iran

"Qatar foreign minister: Iran sanctions not the way forward," CNBC, December 16, 2018 (Video Transcript)

Ted Regencia, "How Can Iran Bypass U.S. Sanctions?" Al Jazeera, November 5, 2018

William Roberts, "Analysis: Trump's withdrawal from Iran nuclear deal isolates US," Al Jazeera, May 9, 2018

"US killing of Iran's Qassem Soleimani 'an act of war,'" Al Jazeera, January 3, 2020

Hamas

Mirren Gidda, "Hamas Still Has Some Friends Left," Time, July 25, 2014

Khaled Abu Toameh, "Hamas leader Haniyeh decides to settle in Qatar—report," Jerusalem Post, February 2, 2020

"Ismail Haniya Elected New Political Chief of Hamas," Al Jazeera, May 6, 2017

"Blog Post On Website Of Qatar's Al-Jazeera Network Praises Hamas Summer Camps And Its Efforts To 'Raise A Generation That Believes In The Duty Of Jihad,'" MEMRI, August 26, 2019

Other Terrorist and Extremist Groups

"America Must Bring Up Incitement with Qatar's Emir," ADL, May 13, 2019

David Weinberg (@DavidWeinberg), "Here's #Qatar's ruler hugging hate preacher Yusuf al-Qaradawi last week..." Twitter, June 5, 2018

"Controversial preacher with 'star status,'" BBC, July 7, 2004

Paul Farhi, "Al Jazeera faces criticism in Egypt over its coverage of Muslim Brotherhood," Washington Post, January 5, 2014

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IRAN



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Qatar foreign minister: Iran sanctions not the way forward

Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani discusses Washington's move to reinstate sanctions on Iran.

SUN, DEC 16 2018 • 7:10 AM EST

Video Transcript

Qatar Foreign Minister: Iran Sanctions Not the Way Forward, CNBC Dec. 16, 2018

Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani: Well, we are not encouraging the unilateral measures against any country. Sanctions are not the way forward to solve a problem. We see that Iran was under sanctions for 40 years also, but we reached an agreement that the international community—sorry—reached the agreement and the GCC was excluded from this agreement and this was part of our disagreement on the JCPOA. But, now, since this agreement has been reached, we have seen that any development of a nuclear weapon, whether it's in Iran or in any other country in the region, will put us in another nuclear race. We encourage the U.S.—

CNBC Interviewer: You're already in one. Because the Saudis have decided to start—

Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani: The Saudis, the Emiratis, they are deciding, and this is very very dangerous for our region. We have this agreement. It was many negotiations of years, took a long time. I think it was a good starting point to deescalate. We have other regional issues we need to be discussed with Iran. This is a separate issue and separate negotiation. We encourage the U.S. that—to come back to a negotiation and to have a diplomatic solution, because we cannot afford also another further escalation in our region. You can

imagine our situation in Qatar that we are between Iran and Saudi and both of them are rivalries—and also Iran and U.S. And U.S. has a very strong relation with Qatar and it's putting us under uncomfortable situation.

CNBC Interviewer: Have you been disappointed by the reaction that you've seen from Washington regarding the GCC crisis? Because you have Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, now you have Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. There was a lot of support coming from Tillerson in terms of moving these discussion along and finding a solution to the crisis. Have you seen the same level of engagement since his departure from the U.S.?

Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani: Well, the same momentum remains with the U.S. We still have the engagement of the U.S. administration on this matter.

CNBC Interviewer: But there's a limit to how much they can do, obviously?

Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani: Well, the President himself—he put himself on the phone, he sent letters to the blockading states, but unfortunately he was faced always with denial and rejection. Until now we see that the U.S. institutions are pushing and encouraging the blockading states to lift their blockade and to engage in a dialogue. But nothing moved yet. Any dialogue or any engagement which will not come genuinely from them with a good faith won't reach to a resolution. What we want, we want a genuine resolution. We don't want a fake resolution there just to please someone. We want them to be convinced that they were—what they have done to Qatar was a big mistake against Qatar, and we are convinced that if there is anything that we have done wrong with those countries they have to put it on the table and support it with evidence. They cannot throw accusations like this, going back and repeating the same stereotype that 'we did this for Qatar to fight the radicalization and to fight terrorism. No one is listening to that as long as they are just repeating it without putting something forward. What happened in the last year and a half, people start to realize that those countries are supporting terrorism in other places where they see it is fine for them because it justifies their means, like in Yemen when Al Qaeda had been paid to leave the place for them and to have a claimed victory. This is not a support for terrorism? It is a support for terrorism. Supporting the destabilization of Somalia, it is a support of terrorism.

CNBC Interviewer: You're saying there's a double standard?

Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani: It is. There is a double standard there.

CNBC Interviewer: Do you feel abandoned by your GCC brothers in all of this?

Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani: Well, it's not—we cannot put it as GCC. This is a problem with the three countries in the GCC. The GCC is six member. We have an excellent relationship and mutual understanding and respect for each other, as Kuwait with Oman. We have problem with the government in Saudi, in Bahrain, in UAE. We have problem with their mentality in dealing with the disagreement.



NEWS / IRAN

How can Iran bypass US sanctions?

US Secretary of State Pompeo said Trump administration 'fully prepared' to counter Iran's effort to circumvent hurdles.

by Ted Regencia

5 Nov 2018



Iran remains a signatory to the 2015 multilateral nuclear deal, which President Trump abandoned earlier this year [Essam al-Sudani/Reuters]

With the second round of sanctions against Iran, US President Donald Trump's threat to impose the "toughest ever" punitive measures against the Islamic Republic is in full force, a reversal from his predecessor Barack Obama's rapprochement towards Tehran.

In August, sanctions targeted Iran's aviation industry, currency and even carpets. Now, except for a few countries, the rest of the world is cut off from Iran's oil and gas market as well as its financial system.

Iran remains a signatory to the 2015 multilateral nuclear deal and UN inspectors say Tehran continues to adhere to its obligations. Trump unilaterally abandoned the agreement in May, paving the way for the imposition of US sanctions amid international opposition.

Now that the US sanctions are in place, experts said the two old adversaries would be engaged in a cat and mouse game, with Washington trying to enforce Trump's order as rigorously as it can, and Tehran finding creative ways to bypass it.

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo himself acknowledged that it would be "unsurprising" if Iran tried to bypass the sanctions.

Ali Sarzaeem, an economics adviser at the Center for Strategic Studies under the office of President Hassan Rouhani, said that there are several measures being considered to counter the US restrictions.

"The US is doing whatever it can to punish Iran, and we are doing whatever we can do to confront them," Sarzaeem, who teaches at Tehran's Allameh Tabataba'i University, told Al Jazeera.

So what steps can Iran take to bypass the US sanctions?

Waivers

Iran has continued to do some business with other countries in spite of the sanctions through waivers obtained by its trading partners.

On Monday, Pompeo named the countries granted waivers to buy Iranian oil and gas after November 5: China, India, Italy, Japan, Greece, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey.

Pompeo did not say how long the waivers will last but said they were granted to ensure oil prices are not destabilised if supply from Iran is abruptly removed from the international market.

In a press statement, the South Korean foreign ministry said the waiver is good for 180 days, with the possibility of renewal thereafter.



The US government announced on Monday the eight countries receiving sanctions waivers [AP]

Pompeo said that since Trump announced the sanctions in May, more than one million barrels of Iranian oil were removed from the market and that Tehran lost more than \$2.5bn in oil revenues.

Trump boasted he would drive Iran's revenue down to zero. But Iran said the granting of US waivers is a win for Tehran, as it allows it to sell oil beyond the deadline.

In September, Iran sold between 1.7 million and 1.9 million barrels per day of crude oil, according to a CNBC analysis. That number was down 800,000 bpd from May, when the sanctions were announced. But the loss in volume was partially offset by the rise in oil price.

Special Purpose Vehicle

On September 24, the European Union announced that it is setting up a new mechanism, the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV).

EU Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini said the SPV "will allow European companies to continue to trade with Iran in accordance with EU law and could be open to other partners in the world".

The EU, alongside the United Kingdom, Russia, Germany, France, China, the US and Iran were the original signatories of the 2015 deal, which is also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Europe's decision to create the SPV was seen as an act of defiance against Trump.

Essentially, the SPV acts as a clearinghouse, handling payments from European companies to and from Iran, while avoiding the US sanctions that prohibit direct payment through the regular payment system.

For example, if a European energy company buys oil and gas from Iran, the payments are directed to the SPV. In turn, Iran will use the payments deposited in the SPV to buy permitted items from Europe.

It is not yet clear how the final SPV structure will look. Whether or not European companies would avail it also remains a question. Many European corporations, such as Total, have profitable operations in the US and could get slapped with US sanctions if they insist on trading with Iran.

On Monday, Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Bahram Qassemi counselled patience in implementing the SPV, adding that the establishment of the new financial mechanism is "complicated and time-consuming".

The SPV is seen as another victory in Iran as it indicates Europe's willingness to stand up to Trump.

European blocking statute

In August, the EU also updated the Blocking Statute, thereby shielding European companies from Trump's sanctions, while allowing them to continue operating in Iran.

It also allows companies to recover damages arising from punitive sanctions, in this case, from the US.



The sale of US dollars and purchase of Iranian rials are also prohibited under US sanctions [Reuters]

The law also allows EU persons to not comply with such sanctions, protecting them from US penalties, which cannot be applied unless exceptionally authorised by the European Commission.

While it could work for small businesses with no links to the US, the statute could have limited use in Iran, particularly among major European companies with global operations. Those companies are automatically exposed to possible US sanctions in the event they deal with Iran.

Iran stock exchange trading

In late October, Iran announced that it had started offering oil for sale via its stock exchange, selling as much as 280,000 barrels of crude oil just minutes after the opening bell.

The idea of selling oil in the stock market first came up in 2000, during the previous sanctions, but is only being implemented now.

According to Tasnim news agency, 280,000 barrels were traded in the Iran Energy Exchange (IRENEX) at \$74.85 per barrel. On the first day of trading, a total of one million barrels of crude oil were eventually sold.

Essentially, private buyers from within Iran or abroad buy the crude oil. In turn, the buyers can sell the same product to the world market with less traceability.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) maintains a list of sanctioned companies and individuals linked to Iran. But a new company not listed by OFAC can "legally" buy oil from Iran.

'Unofficial' measures

Mohammad Eslami, a Tehran-based sanctions expert, said that there are other measures that the Iranian government is taking to circumvent the US sanctions.

Tehran is reluctant to discuss those measures openly as it does not want to compromise them, he said.

"All these structures that the Iranians have built to confront these new sanctions, are unofficial," said Eslami.

He noted that the measures included currency swaps with other countries, and even cryptocurrency trading, adding that some entities are "already using it".



Rouhani has denounced Trump for reimposing sanctions lifted after the 2015 nuclear deal [Anadolu]

Iran's partners, such as Russia and China, also "would not be willing to talk about the alternatives".

Russia, which has not been included in the US waiver, has denounced the sanctions, terming them "illegal". There have been suggestions that Moscow would help Tehran bypass the sanctions by buying Iranian oil, then reselling it in refined form to Europe.

Pompeo had already issued a warning, saying the Trump administration "is fully prepared to do all that we can" to prevent efforts to bypass the sanctions.

Trump's new sanctions would face more complexities now compared with the time of the Obama administration, said Eslami.

He said that while Trump's sanctions are "more measured", the US president failed to build a global consensus against Iran, as he "could not establish a powerful group of supporters for his policy".

"Gradually, the structure of sanctions will be less powerful."

SOURCE: AL JAZEERA NEWS



NEWS / UNITED STATES

Analysis: Trump's withdrawal from Iran nuclear deal isolates US

US president's decision to pull out of 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement raises uncertainties in post-JCPOA world.

by **William Roberts**

9 May 2018



Trump announced the US withdrawal from the landmark Iran nuclear accord on Tuesday [Evan Vucci/AP]

Washington, DC - US President Donald Trump's unilateral withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal - a move driven largely by domestic politics - will further isolate the US from its European allies and set in motion ripple effects that could lead to wider proliferation

of nuclear weapons and regional tensions in the Middle East, analysts say.

"The reality is that for reasons that have nothing to do with foreign policy, the president just took a highly flawed, but still functional accord, and scrapped it without an alternative," Aaron David Miller, a Middle East analyst at the Wilson Center, a think-tank in Washington, told Al Jazeera.

"Let's understand something; get ready to enter the post-JCPOA world with all of the uncertainties that those sets of circumstances are going to carry," he said.

In Washington, the president's Republican supporters in Congress voiced support for the move, decrying the so-called JCPOA, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as a "bad deal".

Democrats said Trump's move would alienate US allies internationally and risk progress that had been made with Iran under the 2015 agreement.

"We should have kept the agreement in place," Senator Chuck Schumer, the top Democrat in the US Senate told reporters on Capitol Hill.

"Unilateral sanctions don't work very well and I don't know where our allies will be after this," he said.

What is next?

Nuclear non-proliferation experts see two possible scenarios developing from here.

One is that Europe, China and Russia work with Iran to try to preserve the agreement by sustaining economic relations in the face of US sanctions pressure.

The alternative, weapons control experts fear, is that Iran's leadership is not able to remain in the deal and begins to renew its nuclear programme.

"In some sense, the clock is ticking now," Tom Z Collina, policy director of the Ploughshares Fund, an anti-nuclear proliferation advocacy group, told Al Jazeera.

"How long can the moderates in Iran hold out and keep the deal viable?" he said. "And if - ultimately - they can't, then what you've got is the worst possible situation where Iran begins to resume its nuclear activities."

It's somewhat unlikely that Iran's leadership can be convinced to re-engage in direct talks with the US after Trump's undoing of the deal, according to Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, a non-partisan group in Washington that advocates for nuclear weapons reductions.

"Trump believes the fantasy that has been told to him by his National Security Adviser John Bolton and new Secretary of State Mike Pompeo that by trying to re-impose sanctions we can force the Europeans to work with us to renegotiate a completely new agreement with the Iranians that's better for us and worse for the Iranians," Kimball told Al Jazeera. "That's just fantastical thinking."

'Serious mistake'

Speaking in Brussels, EU High Representative Federica Mogherini, said Europe would work with other parties to preserve the agreement.

"As we have always said, the nuclear deal is not a bilateral agreement and it is not in the hands of any single country to terminate it unilaterally," Mogherini said in a statement.

"As long as Iran continues to implement its nuclear-related commitments, as it is doing so far, the European Union will remain committed to the continued full and effective implementation of the nuclear deal," she added.

Iran Foreign Minister Javed Zarif, who negotiated the agreement with former Secretary of State John Kerry, said the US would be violating the deal by seeking to impose sanctions and the only way forward is US compliance, not appeasement.

Zarif said in a tweet he will spearhead a diplomatic effort to examine whether remaining parties to the deal can ensure its full benefits for Iran.

The "outcome will determine our response," Zarif said.

Former President Barack Obama issued a statement on Trump's announcement, saying "the decision to put the JCPOA at risk without any Iranian violation of the deal is a serious mistake".

Obama's statement was a rare move by a former president to comment directly and critically on actions by a successor.

Trump has prided himself on delivering on campaign promises undoing the Obama legacy.

He campaigned on a promise of tearing up the Iran deal on day one of his administration but was talked out of doing so by former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and former National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster.

Now with Pompeo and Bolton, Trump has surrounded himself with advisers who will support his go-it-alone instincts.

US: Obama policies overturned in Trump era



Secretary of Defence James Mattis is on record testifying to Congress that the deal is in the US interest and Iran is complying and remains a voice of reason within the Trump administration.

"It took Trump having to change his entire staff, save Mattis, to get to this point," Collina said.

"And you saw our best and closest allies having to come to Washington to personally lobby Trump not to do this and he did it anyway and so the only international ally that Trump has on this is Israel Prime Minister Netanyahu," he added.

"It is disappointing the administration was unable to reach an agreement with our allies, specifically remedy the sunset provisions that allow Tehran to significantly ramp up nuclear enrichment activity less than a decade from now," Senator Bob Corker, the Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said in a statement.

"However, based on conversations I have had in recent days, it is my sense that the administration will move quickly to work toward a better deal."

But with Trump in the White House, the US government may not have the political and economic leverage with European allies and competitors China and Russia that would be required to impose unilateral sanctions as Obama did from 2010 to 2015 to bring Iran to the negotiating table.

Those sanctions, enforced by the US Treasury Department, presented foreign banks and corporations with a stark, airtight choice: "You can do business with the US banking system or do business with Iran, but not both".

"The Europeans, the Asians, a lot of people, are really tired of US sanctions policy just across the board. The last seven, eight years, it's been a lot of US sanctions," Kim Wallace, managing director for Eurasia Group and former Obama Treasury Department official, told Al Jazeera.

Leaders of the UK, France and Germany who had travelled to the White House to personally lobby Trump against pulling out of the deal will be less inclined to cooperate because "they feel there was never really an open ear to a different path," Wallace said.

"Macron wasted his time and Merkel knew it within two minutes of coming over here."

Follow William Roberts on Twitter: @BillRoberts3

SOURCE: AL JAZEERA NEWS



NEWS / IRAQ

US killing of Iran's Qassem Soleimani 'an act of war'

Iran's reaction to US killing of top commander is unpredictable amid risk of further escalation, analysts say.

by Ali Younes

3 Jan 2020



The United States killing of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani has changed the rules of engagement between Iran and the US, Iranian analysts say.

Soleimani, who for 20 years was the face of Iranian militarised foreign policy in the Middle East, was killed in a US air raid in Iraq at Baghdad's international airport in the early morning hours of Friday.

He was the head of Iran's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force and the architect of its military and political power.

Soleimani died alongside Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the deputy commander of Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilisation Forces, PMF), an umbrella of Iraqi militias. While the PMF has been legally integrated into Iraq's formal security forces, critics say some of the factions still operate independently of Baghdad and that some are funded and armed through the IRGC.

The White House and the Pentagon confirmed the killing of Soleimani in Iraq, saying the attack was carried out at the direction of US President Donald Trump and was aimed at deterring future attacks allegedly being planned by Iran.

Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said in a statement carried by Iranian state television that "harsh revenge" awaited the "criminals" who killed Soleimani.

Iranian political analyst Mohammad Marandi told Al Jazeera that the US would regret the killings, which he described as an "act of war" against Iran and Iraq.

Marandi said the US has "changed the rules of engagement with Iran in killing such a high profile Iranian military and government official". He said the killing has practically "united Iran and Iraq's hands to attack the US soldiers and other westerners in Iraq".

Soleimani was a revered military figure in Iran because of his role in unifying Iraqi and Iranian-backed militias that rolled back the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS) group gains in Iraq in 2015. He "was instrumental in their ultimate defeat", Foad Izadi of Tehran University told Al Jazeera.

Marandi said Soleimani was beloved in Iran, in stark contrast with the perception that was constructed of him by Western media, which often portrayed him as a "shadowy figure".

"He was not shadowy at all. He was very well known to the public and was often seen giving public speeches on national occasions," Marandi said.

Iranian analyst Abas Aslani told Al Jazeera that Soleimani was an influential personality in Iranian society and played a major role in Iran's foreign policy.

He said the killing will usher a "new chapter" in Iran's political and military behaviour in the Middle East.

"This killing will not deter Iran from keeping up with its foreign policy strategies in the region," he added.

'Mistake'

Former CIA intelligence officer Bob Baer said the killing of Soleimani was a major "mistake" on the part of the US, adding that Tehran's reaction could escalate US-Iran tensions very quickly.

"The CIA has no real intelligence operations inside Iran and no one in the Trump administration understands the Iranian mentality", Baer said.

He added that the killing has put US troops and US citizens in Iraq and in the region at great risk, especially since the US has no combat troops in Iraq and the Iraqi army is too weak to defend the US embassy or other US interests in Iraq.

"Because of this, no one can predict how the blowback to this operation will unfold," Baer told Al Jazeera.

Gulf impact

Marandi, the analyst, said the US's Gulf allies, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), may end up "paying for the US action because they have been part of the US alliance to attack Iran".

Although the UAE has strong commercial and economic ties with Iran, it has for years, along with Saudi Arabia, lobbied the US to confront Iran's assertive geopolitical policies in the Gulf and in the region.

Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have been fighting a war in Yemen against Houthi rebels.

Saudi Arabia has no diplomatic ties with Iran and has often urged US policymakers to respond to Iran's regional military involvements more aggressively.

Follow Ali Younes on Twitter: [@ali_reports](#)

SOURCE: AL JAZEERA

HAMAS

TIME

Hamas Still Has Some Friends Left



Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses his supporters at parliament wearing a Palestinian key chain, in Ankara, July 22, 2014. Burhan Ozbilici—AP

BY **MIRREN GIDDA**

JULY 25, 2014 2:03 PM EDT

With the fighting in Gaza intensifying daily, the ruling militant group Hamas is finding itself pushed to the limit. Trying to match Israel's vast military might is an impossible task, and even finding the resources to launch rocket attacks against Israeli targets could only be achieved by heavy foreign investment.

But which country wants to invest in Hamas? The West certainly doesn't. The militant Palestinian organization has been a firm fixture on the United States' Foreign Terrorist Organizations **list** since 1997. Hamas' only hope is its neighbors in the Arab world.

Hamas has two clear allies, according to Middle East experts: Qatar and Turkey. Both have given Hamas their public support and financial assistance estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars.

“Qatar also hosts Hamas' political bureau which includes Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal,” says Shashank Joshi, Senior Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. “Qatar has a long history of providing shelter to Islamist groups, amongst them the Muslim Brotherhood and the Taliban.”

Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party, which came to power in 2002, supports what Joshi calls “other neo-Islamist allies.” Though the Turkish government explicitly rejects the label “Islamist”, their social conservatism is inspired by an Islamic ideology that Hamas shares. Last year, Meshaal **visited** Turkey and met with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan for several hours.

Both Qatar — one of the world's richest states — and Turkey are powerful allies to have, but Hamas might wish for more support given the breadth of the Arab world. It once had it, too. Hamas used to be strongly allied with both Iran and Syria, with the former giving Hamas an **estimated** \$13-15 million a month as recently as 2011, as well as long-range missiles. Hamas' political bureau used to be based in the Syrian capital of Damascus before its move to Qatar in 2012.

But relations cooled dramatically with Iran and Syria amid sectarian divisions following the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. Iran, a Shia-majority country, backed the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad whose Alawite faith is a branch of Shia Islam. Hezbollah, a powerful Shia Islamist group based in Lebanon, also took Assad's side.

However Hamas, a Sunni-led faction, sided, as most of the Arab world did, with the rebels. Cue Tehran cutting their allowance, Hezbollah allegedly ordering Hamas members out of Lebanon, and Hamas packing their bags for Qatar.

“Iran’s relationship with Hamas was always problematic,” says Chris Doyle, director of the Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding. “Hamas is a Palestinian Sunni group and Iran is Shia. Nevertheless, Hamas was their entry into the issue of Palestine.”

Seeking to regain its influence over this issue, Iran has attempted to foster a reconciliation with Hamas over the last 18 months. Farwaz Gerges, professor on the Middle East at the London School of Economics says the conflict in Gaza is the reason. “The current crisis has brought a kind of rapprochement between Iranian leaders and Hamas.”

Hezbollah too, Gerges notes, has invited Hamas back into the fold. On Monday, the Hezbollah-owned television channel Al Manar **reported** that Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, praised Meshaal for “the persistence of the Hamas resistance.” The TV station added he “strongly supported their rightful demands to end the current battle.”

Gerges is quick to point out that this doesn’t signal “a return to the warm days of the Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas leaders.” However he adds: “Out of this particular crisis, a new realignment might happen.” That may sound like good news for Hamas, but there’s another Arab country that is of late vehemently opposed to it. That would be Egypt, the largest and most influential country in the Arab world and the one responsible for drafting a potential cease-fire.

From 2012 to 2013, Hamas enjoyed Egypt’s munificence under the leadership of former President Mohamed Morsi, a longtime member of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood of which Hamas is an offshoot. When Morsi was ousted last year and replaced with Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, Hamas knew the good times were over.

“The most devastating thing that has happened to Hamas is the ousting of Mohamed Morsi,” comments Gerges. Sisi, whose government has orchestrated a

violent crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, destroyed Hamas' tunnel network into Egypt and closed the border crossing at Rafah, devastating Hamas' finances. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, two of Egypt's financial backers, are also hostile to Hamas. Like Egypt, they view the Muslim Brotherhood as a clear domestic threat — and Hamas is guilty by association.

But perhaps Hamas doesn't need Egypt. As the death toll continues to rise in Gaza, there is a groundswell of public sympathy across the Arab world for the group.

“Hamas in terms of people on the street is at the height of its political power in every single Arab country with the exception of Egypt,” says Gerges. “The longer the conflict continues, the more they gain in popularity. And for Hamas, what really matters is the public pulse.”

THE JERUSALEM POST

[Jerusalem Post](#) [Middle East](#)

Hamis leader Haniyeh decides to settle in Qatar - report

Senior Hamas official Khalil al-Hayya confirmed last week that Haniyeh will remain outside the Gaza Strip for at least six months.

By [KHALED ABU TOAMEH](#) FEBRUARY 2, 2020 21:30



Hamis chief Ismail Haniyeh next to his destroyed office (REUTERS/Handout)
(photo credit: HANDOUT/REUTERS)

Hamis leader Ismail Haniyeh has decided to remain outside the Gaza Strip for a lengthy period of time, Hamas officials told the London-based Saudi newspaper Asharq al-Awsat.

Haniyeh, who left the Gaza Strip in December 2019, could remain away until the end of this year, the officials said. "The decision is related to internal arrangements in Hamas and complications connected to travel to and from the Gaza Strip," an official was quoted as saying.

The officials denied that Egypt has banned Haniyeh from returning to the Gaza Strip and said the Hamas leader has decided not to return home at this stage.

Haniyeh has decided to settle in Qatar at this phase, and it is not known whether his family will join him, the officials said.

The report about Haniyeh's purported decision not to return to the Gaza Strip is believed to be linked to Egypt's dissatisfaction over his recent visit to Iran.

Haniyeh visited Iran to attend the funeral of Quds Force commander [Qasem Soleimani](#), who was assassinated by the US in Iraq last month. Unconfirmed reports said Egypt has decided to punish Haniyeh by preventing him from returning to the Gaza Strip through the Rafah border crossing.

Hamas officials initially confirmed that the Egyptians were upset with Haniyeh for visiting Iran. However, the officials later said the crisis between Hamas and Egypt had been resolved.

Haniyeh, who left the Gaza Strip on December 2, 2019, has visited Egypt, Turkey, Oman, Qatar and Malaysia, in addition to Iran. He is also expected to visit Lebanon, Mauritania, Russia and Kuwait.

Last weekend, Haniyeh met again in Istanbul with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. It was the second meeting between the two since Haniyeh left the Gaza Strip.

Senior Hamas official Khalil al-Hayya confirmed last week that Haniyeh will remain outside the Gaza Strip for at least six months.

Haniyeh's tour aims to "end several internal issues and strengthen Hamas's relations with some countries," he said.

Haniyeh will continue to manage the affairs of Hamas during his stay abroad and will visit any country that wishes to receive him, Hayya said.

Although the Egyptians were unhappy with Haniyeh's visit to Iran, relations between the two sides have not been affected, he said.



NEWS / PALESTINE

Ismail Haniya elected new political chief of Hamas

Khaled Meshaal, who preceded Haniya as leader of the political bureau, confirms transition to Al Jazeera.

6 May 2017



Ismail Haniya has been elected as the new leader of Hamas' political bureau, according to the Palestinian movement's news agency.

The announcement on Saturday came just days after Hamas unveiled a more moderate stance towards Israel.

Khaled Meshaal, who preceded Haniya as leader of the movement's political wing, confirmed the transition of power to Al Jazeera.

"I would like to announce that this new council has elected Abu al-Abed, my brother Ismail Haniya, the president of the political bureau of the movement," Meshaal, who had been in charge of the political wing for the past 10 years, said in a statement.

"The new leadership will announce any other names in the appropriate time. The movement blesses this election which came in a consultative, democratic way that is homogenous with the lists and that shows the unity of the movement."

Haniya, 54, is expected to remain in the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian enclave run by Hamas since 2007, unlike Meshaal who lives in exile in Qatar's capital, Doha, and has completed the maximum two terms in office.

Osama Hamdan, a senior spokesman for Hamas, told Al Jazeera that the timing of the change was in accordance with Hamas' internal rules that limits the terms of leaders of its political bureau.

"The change is not due to a failure in the leadership," he said.

Hamdan said he was hopeful that Haniya could "repair and reform the situation" and his election can "help the reconciliation agreement [with Hamas' main Palestinian rival Fatah, which is in control of the West Bank] implemented on the ground", as Haniya resides in Gaza.

Azzam Tamimi, author of "Hamas: Unwritten Chapters", described the new leader as a "charismatic" and experienced political figure - Haniya was the group's deputy leader and served as prime minister of Gaza between 2007 and 2014.

"He ascended in the ranks of the leadership over so many years - he knows his role and duty," he told Al Jazeera. "Yet, if circumstances can't help, he will not be able to make miracles."

Tamimi said Hamas does not function in a vacuum and is subject to regional pressures.

"Therefore, it's not just a question of who leads, it's a question of the context and the circumstances in which a new leader leads."

According to Tamimi, there is no sign that Israel and the West will change their critical stance towards Hamas in light of Haniya's election.

"But I think Hamas has made a gesture and Ismail Haniya is an open person, he is willing to talk and meet."

Regional impact

Bclal Shobaki, head of the political science department at Hebron University, told Al Jazeera that Haniya's election shows that Hamas' centre of influence has moved to Gaza.

"This means that it will be impossible for states in the region to reach an understanding with Hamas without finding a comprehensive solution to the Gaza crisis," said Shobaki.

"Some regional powers, especially Iran, will need to change their rhetoric toward Hamas. Iran, for example, recently blamed Meshaal for its problems with Hamas," he added.

On Monday, Hamas unveiled a new policy document easing its stance on Israel after having long called for its destruction.

The document notably accepts the idea of a Palestinian state in territories occupied by Israel in the war of 1967.

It also says its struggle is not against Jews because of their religion but against Israel as an occupier.

However, Hamas officials said the document in no way amounts to recognition of Israel as demanded by the international community.

Shobaki said that Hamas' policy of rotating authority, along with its new document, could increase its popularity among Palestinians, and that Haniya's relatively "moderate" personality could make it easier for Fatah to deal with him.

"However, Fatah's position on Hamas is essentially unrelated to who leads Hamas; rather, it is concerned with Hamas' position on Fatah's political programme," said Shobaki.

"Hamas' new document confirms that the personal dimension of Hamas' leadership does not significantly influence the movement's action, which means that Hamas will not change much in the era of Haniya," he added.

"Thus, Fatah's reaction will be based on a different foundation - the form of its relationship with the occupation."



Haniya served as prime minister for seven years [File: EPA]

SOURCE: AL JAZEERA NEWS



August 26, 2019

Special Dispatch No. 8242

Blog Post On Website Of Qatar's Al-Jazeera Network Praises Hamas Summer Camps And Its Efforts To 'Raise A Generation That Believes In The Duty Of Jihad'

In an August 4, 2019 blog post on the website of the Qatari Al-Jazeera network, Palestinian blogger Ahmad Samir Qannita praised the summer camps held by Hamas's military wing, the 'Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades,[1] and commended Hamas for instilling the values of jihad and resistance in the Gazan youth and raising a "generation that believes in the duty of jihad." He noted that Hamas devotes all its resources, including its official institutions, media and education system, to this goal and that the summer camps for children and teens are an example of this. He noted further that the camps offer the participants – junior high and high school students from all over the Gaza Strip – a comprehensive military training program conducted by professional Al-Qassam fighters and "similar in its intensity to [the training] received by the Palestinian resistance fighters." The program includes the maintenance and use of machine guns and other weapons, live ammunition practice, urban warfare, and the crossing of enemy lines by means of attack tunnels.

The blogger also quoted lines from a militant poem by Sheikh Yousuf Al-Qaradawi, a major ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood who lives in Qatar and is close to the Qatari regime, which urges the Arab and Muslim nation to produce arms and fighters for the sake of Islam.[2]

The following are excerpts from Qannita's blog post:[3]



2019 Hamas summer camp (source: "Tlae3Camps" Telegram channel)

"Gaza is not like it was in previous decades, when the jihad activity there was limited to small armed groups that acted in secret, [striving] to carry out high-quality operations against the Zionist occupation forces in

complicated security conditions. [Such was the situation] after, in 1996, the Oslo authorities [an epithet for the Palestinian Authority] delivered harsh blows to the armed Palestinian factions, led by Hamas, and persecuted and arrested anyone leaning towards the idea of resistance. The [Palestinian] Authority's security apparatuses even established an army of informers who were tasked with spying and collecting information on young jihad fighters, so as to arrest them and incarcerate them in dungeons, to deter them from fighting the Zionist occupation...

"With the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2001, the Palestinian factions reorganized their ranks and managed to attract many young Palestinians who were yearning to fight the enemy, liberate their land and purge their holy places. The factions carried out high-quality operations that shook the foundations of the Zionist entity and shattered the myth of its [invincible] security and military apparatuses with an ongoing series of martyrdom [i.e., suicide] operations, as well as shootings and bombings... [This continued] until 2006, when Hamas achieved a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections, and Fatah, [including] its armed factions and security apparatuses, refused to accept the election outcome and hand the government over to Hamas. This led to the day of military victory in Gaza, on which Hamas and the Al-Qassam Brigades took over the entire Gaza Strip after expelling the gangs of enemy spies, the murder and abduction groups and the death squads affiliated with Fatah and its military apparatuses...

"Following these bloody events, Fatah's authorities in Ramallah launched large-scale security operations against Hamas's supporters, members and leaders and against the armed factions and jihad fighters in the occupied [West] Bank, outlawed all Hamas activity there... seized the weapons of the jihad fighters, persecuted the resistance fighters, defined jihad as a crime, banned resistance, and instilled values of humiliation and surrender – [values] that the have not stopped despite all the actions of the enemy and his servants.

"In complete contrast [to the situation in the West Bank], Gaza spent the same period laying the foundations for a new phase of the Palestinian struggle by instilling the ideal of jihad and spreading the culture of resistance [among the Gazans], at all levels and in all spheres, by means of the official government [web]sites, both civil and military, as well as the education facilities and services and even some civil society organizations, municipalities, etc. There was no choice but to found respectable security apparatuses to pursue the enemy's collaborators and spies [in order to] defend the resistance, as well as a media apparatus that would adopt the discourse of jihad and resistance, direct the public to support and cultivate the jihad fighters, and elevate their cause and their status in Palestinian society. [Hamas also] created a generation unique in its knowledge of the Quran... who believes in the duty of jihad and yearns to enter the battlefields of the heroes.

"Dr. Yousuf Al-Qaradawi was right when he wrote [in his poem 'Oh My Nation, The Struggle Has Become Obligatory']: 'There is no escape from producing men, as well as producing arms; The making of heroes is a science that was made clear in our tradition; Heroes can only be made in our mosques, in the garden of the Quran, and in the shade of the true Prophetic traditions; A people without faith is like a leaf drifting in the wind; Those who betray the call to prayer, betray as well the call to struggle.'

"Accordingly, in the recent years the 'Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades made sure to [formulate] an intensive training program for Palestinian junior high and high school students from all parts of Gaza, called the Liberation Vanguard Camps – Marching on Jerusalem,' and opened their military camps to [the teens] during the summer vacation... The Al-Qassam [Brigades] command announced the opening of the summer camps and invited the Palestinian teens to enroll. The Brigades placed all of their capabilities, training teams and military and logistical resources at the disposal of this great jihad program. They understood that the liberation enterprise must involve the entire people and nation, not only organizations and parties...

"Tens of thousands of Palestinian children and youths, from all [political] and ideological camps, answered the Al-Qassam Brigades' call, joined the ranks of the heroes and took part in the unique training activity... For the

young people are the [human] capital of the nation and the resistance, and it is on them that the enterprise of liberation and return depends.

"The teens who join the camps enjoy a varied curriculum of Islam, values and morals, civil defense, first aid, and various lectures aimed at strengthening them... spiritually, ideologically and militarily, through an intensive activity program supervised by expert and talented counselors, members of the Al-Qassam training teams. The teens receive military and scout training, similar in intensity to [the training] undergone by the Palestinian resistance fighters, [which includes] the use of various types of weapons and machine guns, practical training in urban warfare, simulated operations behind enemy lines involving attack tunnels... and an introduction to personal weapons, their assembly, maintenance and use with live ammunition. [This is aimed at] accustoming them to the use of firearms and overcoming their fear of them...

"The great demand for the camps, and the families' encouragement of their sons [to enter] the arenas of courage and fame despite the pain, siege, poverty and want, are our Palestinian nation's response to the Zionist enemy, its servants and its supporters, who want to expunge the Palestinian cause by means of the so-called Deal of the Century... It is also further proof of our people's adherence to its rights and principles, its eternal yearning to purge its holy places, and its great faith in the leadership of the resistance and in the liberation enterprise, [which will continue] until the last of the Zionist usurpers is driven out of our sacred land and the flag is Islam flies above the mosques of Jerusalem and Palestine."

[1] On Hamas's summer camps see: MEMRI JTTM report, Hamas Military Wing 'Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades Launches Facebook Page For Its 'Liberation Vanguard' Military Summer Camps, July 22, 2019; Special Dispatch No. 7046, Motto Of Hamas Summer Camps This Year: 'Marching On Jerusalem'; Their Goal: To Train The Generation That Will Liberate Palestine, Jerusalem, August 8, 2017; Special Dispatch No. 6560, Al-Quds Intifada Summer Camps In Gaza Offer Training In Stabbing, Firearms, Tunnel Combat, August 8, 2016; Special Dispatch No. 6093, Intense Campaign By Hamas's Military Wing To Recruit Youths For Its Summer Camps, July 6, 2015; Special Dispatch No. 5778, Hamas Summer Camps: Liberating Palestine With Rockets, Rifles, And Pistols, June 24, 2014.


[2] It should be mentioned that Qatar has directly funded Hamas schools in Gaza, which likewise provide pupils with military training. See MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis No. 1428, For Years, Qatar Funded Hamas Schools In Gaza Where Children Receive Weapons Training, December 19, 2018.

[3] Blogs.aljazeera.net, August 4, 2019.

**OTHER TERRORIST AND
EXTREMIST GROUPS**



America Must Bring Up Incitement with Qatar's Emir



*Qatar's ruler Emir Tamim and hate preacher Yousef al-Qaradawi on May 13, 2019 (Source: **Qatar News Agency**)*

Qatar's ruler Emir Tamim is scheduled to visit President Trump on Tuesday and will also be meeting with senior Members of Congress in Washington. According to the White House, the two leaders **are expected** to discuss regional developments, bilateral security cooperation, and counterterrorism issues, but U.S. officials would be well-advised to also bring up tolerance and incitement issues with the

Qatari Emir, which is an area where his government has chronically fallen short.

Such incitement often targets Jewish people, whether in Israel or around the world, but it often also is aimed at other vulnerable communities as well, including Christians, Shi'ite Muslims, women, or LGBTQ people.

Qatar's conduct in this regard is sometimes so disturbing that even some of its oldest friends are concerned. Tim Sebastian is a onetime BBC journalist who **founded and chaired** the Qatar Foundation's Doha Debates. This past month he interviewed the spokesperson for Qatar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a European network, and he confronted her about hate preachers at official Qatari venues.

Sebastian **cited** ADL's **discovery** that in December 2017 a preacher named Muhammed al-Muraikhi delivered a sermon promoted and broadcast by the Qatari government that included the incitement of hatred against Jewish people. Sebastian noted that Muraikhi's sermon "told Muslims that Jews have 'enmity and hatred toward you in their blood and their veins.' He described the Jewish people as 'your deceitful, lying, treacherous, fornicating, intransigent enemy' who 'has despoiled, corrupted, ruined and killed and will not stop.' And he called on all Muslims to 'cleanse' al-Aqsa from the 'filth' of the Jews."

Sebastian also **pointed out** that the Qatari government provides guidance for their Friday sermons and reserves the right to punish clerics who break the rules. The Qatari spokesperson **replied** that "any

description of any group in such terms is absolutely not acceptable, it's discrimination, and we don't approve of it."

Yet as Sebastian noted, Muraikhi's sermon was broadcast on state TV at the time and promoted by the Qatari government's Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs. He had a long record of inciting anti-Semitism and other forms of intolerance long before that appearance, and he remains to this day one of the two main preachers who deliver Friday sermons every week at the Qatari state's Grand Mosque, which has capacity for 30,000 worshippers. The government regularly advertises his sermons in advance and continues to broadcast them on state TV. He was even the host of a daily program on moral and religious guidance for Ramadan this year on not one but two Qatari state television stations.

Unfortunately, this is but one example of the numerous ways in which Qatar's government continues to propagate or provide a platform for intolerant preachers and hateful messages, including toward Jewish people. For example, ADL and the Middle East Media Research Institute each **discovered** virulently anti-Semitic passages in Qatari state textbooks this year, including the slander that Jewish people are treacherous, seek to conquer the world, and follow a perverted, invalid religion. The books also **contained** numerous examples of anti-Christian bigotry as well as incitement against the West.

ADL also **found** numerous anti-Semitic books being promoted in late 2018 by Qatar's state-run book fair. Such notoriously anti-Semitic books included Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, Henry Ford's *The International*

Jew, and David Duke's anti-Semitic tract exaggerating and slandering Jewish influence in the United States, as well as other books titled *The al-Aqsa Mosque and the Purported Temple*, *The Myth of the Nazi Gas Chambers*, and *Talmud of Secrets: Facts Exposing the Jewish Schemes to Control the World*.

Thankfully, the U.S. Embassy **raised concerns** with the Qatari Ministry of Culture about providing a platform for these books. Some of the titles were then removed from the book fair's website, but others still **remained**.

In addition to carrying preachers with a record of intolerance on Qatari state TV, the **state-owned** international network *Al Jazeera* broadcasts intolerant messages from Qatar around the world. As ADL **noted** in August 2018, Al Jazeera remains "a major exporter of hateful content against the Jewish people". **Examples** include blaming Jews for worldwide corruption, repeated cases of Holocaust distortion or denial, constantly glorifying terrorists as "martyrs" so long as they target Israelis, providing an unquestioning platform for terrorist propaganda, and publishing messages that dehumanize or advocate genocide against Jews in the Land of Israel.

Qatar's government **funds** the intolerant International Union of Muslim Scholars, whose current secretary general has **advocated** Holocaust distortion or denial as recently as May 2019. The IUMS's previous secretary general, Yousef al-Qaradawi, was **kissed** by Emir Tamim and given the best seat in the house ahead of all other preachers at the ruler's Ramadan *iftar* this May for at least the fifth year in a row.

Qaradawi has justified terrorism and called for genocide against the Jewish people, and he continued to **spread dehumanizing message about Jesus** within a day of his embrace by the Emir.

As recently as this Ramadan, ADL documented that Qatar's government continues to advertise, host, and broadcast sermons at state-controlled mosques by preachers who have had longstanding past records of encouraging bigotry or even violence. This has **occurred** not just at the Qatari Grand Mosque but **also** at Qatar's **Education City Mosque**, which services the Qatar Foundation's entire Education City campus, including the satellite campuses of six prestigious U.S. colleges: Cornell, Georgetown, Carnegie Mellon, Texas A&M, Northwestern, and Virginia Commonwealth Universities.

The mosque at Education City has **hosted** preachers with a past record of intolerance from the very first day of its operations in 2013. One **sermon** delivered at the mosque since then featured the message "kill the infidels... Count them in number and do not spare one." Another, by a preacher who had previously wished that Hitler had "finished off" the Jews, similarly **condemned** "the aggressor Zionists," urging God to "count them in number and kill them completely; do not spare [a single] one."

Lastly, one would be remiss not to address Qatar's ongoing and systematic support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which ADL has **shown** is a hateful extremist group that frequently propagates bigotry toward Jews and Israel. For example, Qatar continues to be aligned with Hamas, which is arguably the Brotherhood's most violent and anti-

Semitic country-specific offshoot. Regardless of ongoing debates in the U.S. about whether or not the Muslim Brotherhood and its branches may be engaged in terrorist activities, it is hard for anybody to persuasively contest that these groups are often a source of bigotry, especially but not exclusively toward Jewish people.

To be fair, Qatar's record is not one of uniformly promoting hatred. Some of its **laws**, rhetoric, **dialogue summits**, **educational programs** and seem to be attempts at addressing some real problems of intolerance or extremism.

But Qatar's simultaneous enabling of so many extremist messages would seem to nullify any of its activities to counter hate and is inconsistent with the values the U.S. should expect its allies to uphold. Having occurred so many different times in so many different areas makes this problem seem systematic and willful rather than a simple oversight, which is why U.S. officials must raise tolerance and incitement issues with Emir Tamim when he visits Washington.

David Weinberg is ADL's Washington Director for International Affairs.



David A. Weinberg ✓
@DavidAWeinberg



Here's [#Qatar](#)'s ruler hugging hate preacher Yusuf al-Qaradawi last week, who authorized attacks vs Americans in [#Iraq](#) and called the Holocaust divine punishment of the Jews for which he wanted a second round: thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/31/05/...



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Controversial preacher with 'star status'

By Magdi Abdelhadi
BBC Arab Affairs Analyst

The arrival in Britain of the Islamic preacher, Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, to take part in a conference has sparked a row because of his controversial views on suicide bombings.

Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi achieved a star status with the emergence of the Qatari satellite channel, Al-Jazeera, several years ago.



The sheikh has done TV phone-ins on religious programmes in the Arab world

Thanks to his weekly appearance on the religious phone-in programme Al-Shariaa wa Al-Haya (Islamic Law and Life) he has become a household name for many Arabic-speaking Muslim communities.

He is an articulate preacher and a good communicator.

The subtext of the programme, and indeed that of Sheikh Al-Qaradawi's responses to all the issues raised throughout the broadcast, is that Islam has an answer to all of life's problems.

That is essentially the ideology of Islamist movements across the region.

According to an Arabic language website dedicated to Sheikh Al-Qaradawi he was born in a small village in the Nile Delta in 1926.

He studied Islamic theology at the Al-Azhar university in Cairo, from where he graduated in 1953.

Twenty years later he was awarded a PhD for his thesis on how Zakat (Islamic alms) can contribute to solving social problems.

Muslim Brotherhood

He has written extensively on Islam and is regarded as a respected scholar.

His website describes him as the most prominent voice of moderation in Islam (wasatiyya), building bridges between traditionalists and modernisers.

It is his involvement with the outlawed Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood that has landed him in trouble.

The group, founded in the 1920s, is one of the largest and most influential Islamist organisations in the region.

It has a history of violence, but now says it is committed to peaceful means to create an Islamic state.

Sheikh Al-Qaradawi has been jailed several times in Egypt.

But he has lived and worked in the Gulf State Qatar since 1963 where he now heads an Islamic research centre.

Suicide bombings

It is particularly his views on suicide bombings that has courted controversy, but mainly in the West.

He has distanced himself from suicide attacks in the West but he has consistently defended Palestinian suicide attacks against Israelis.

Recently he told Al-Jazeera that he was not alone in believing that suicide bombings in Palestinian territories were a legitimate form of self defence for people who have no aircraft or tanks.

He said hundreds of other Islamic scholars are of the same opinion. In this respect, he is very much in tune with what the vast majority of people in the Arab world believe.

Defending suicide bombings that target Israeli civilians Sheikh A-Qaradawi told the BBC programme Newsnight that "an Israeli woman is not like women in our societies, because she is a soldier.

"I consider this type of martyrdom operation as an evidence of God's justice.

"Allah Almighty is just; through his infinite wisdom he has given the weak a weapon the strong do not have and that is their ability to turn their bodies into bombs as Palestinians do".

Despite his popularity, Sheikh Al-Qaradawi is not without his critics in the Arab world.

Some see his regular preaching on Al-Jazeera as an uncritical regurgitation of Islamic dogma out of touch with the modern world.

The Washington Post

Style

Al Jazeera faces criticism in Egypt over its coverage of Muslim Brotherhood

By Paul Farhi

January 5, 2014

Ever since the military's ouster of Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi in July, Al Jazeera, the pioneering Arab-language news broadcaster, hasn't shrunk from calling his removal something the American government won't: a coup.

That highly loaded declaration, as well as its relentless and, critics say, sympathetic coverage of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood movement, has turned Al Jazeera into a virtual enemy of the state in Egypt. Its journalists have been harassed and banned, and five remain in custody, including three who were arrested last week for allegedly harming national security. Al Jazeera's local TV studios in Egypt, though not its transnational satellite transmissions, have been shut down, forcing its few remaining Egyptian journalists to work from makeshift facilities, such as a Cairo hotel room.

The network's pariah status in Egypt represents an abrupt reversal of fortune for a news organization often lionized for challenging the media monopoly of authoritarian governments throughout the Middle East. Only three years ago, Al Jazeera was celebrated for its role in the downfall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Crowds in Cairo's Tahrir Square watched its coverage of Egypt's Arab Spring uprisings on giant TV screens. "Al Jazeera was a hero in Egypt," said Mohammed el-Nawawy, a professor at Queens University of Charlotte who has studied the network.

Since then, Egyptian authorities and Al Jazeera's critics — including some of the network's own employees — have accused it of being a mouthpiece for Morsi and the now-outlawed Muslim Brotherhood.

"Al Jazeera has given a lot support to the Muslim Brotherhood. There's no doubt about that," said Hugh Miles, a freelance journalist in Cairo and the author of ["Al-Jazeera: The Inside Story of the Arab News Channel That Is Challenging the West."](#)

The network "regularly" exaggerates the strength of pro-Brotherhood protests by zooming in on small crowds to make them appear larger, or by splitting the screen to suggest that multiple large protests are occurring simultaneously, said Yigal Carmon, president of the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), a Washington-based organization that tracks Arabic media and describes itself as nonpartisan. "They attack the military in every way possible and defend the Muslim Brotherhood in every possible way."

Just days after Morsi was removed by forces loyal to Gen. Abdel Fatah al-Sissi this past summer, 22 employees of the network resigned en masse. Several accused [the network of slanting its coverage](#) in favor of Morsi and the Brotherhood in the months leading up to his ouster. Al Jazeera has repeatedly dismissed that idea, saying in a statement Sunday that the individuals were freelancers who quit because of “security and safety concerns” amid “a systematic campaign to undermine [the network’s] credibility” by Egyptian authorities.

Qatar’s influence

More broadly, Al Jazeera has for years battled criticism that it is a tool of its patron, the tiny, gas-rich Persian Gulf state of Qatar. Qatar’s emir, the royal head of state, has bankrolled the network since its inception in 1996 and recently funded its expansion in the United States via a new domestic news network, Al Jazeera America, based in New York. American diplomats privately grumbled about Qatar’s influence over Doha-based Al Jazeera in cables that were disclosed in 2010 by WikiLeaks, the organization that has exposed leaked government and corporate documents.

Although the Qatari government has openly supported the Muslim Brotherhood and pledged funds to Morsi’s government, Al Jazeera maintains there is no connection and that it is fully independent.

Egyptian authorities “have resorted to fabricating stories about Al Jazeera’s alleged links to the Muslim Brotherhood, but we absolutely have no link whatsoever,” the network said in an e-mailed response to questions Sunday, attributing its comments to Bernard Smith, a correspondent for Al Jazeera English. “Everything that has been said about this is false. As always, Al Jazeera reports on events in Egypt from different perspectives just as any professional media outlet would do.”

That’s not how it looks to a number of Western observers, however.

El-Nawawy — the co-author of “[Al-Jazeera: The Story of the Network That Is Rattling Governments and Redefining Modern Journalism](#)” — contends that the network “has adopted a very clear-cut line” since Morsi was removed from power. “Its premise has been that this [Morsi’s government] was a democratically elected regime and that the military should not intervene. When you have a country that is so polarized along ideological lines, that side is very controversial.”

Focus on protesters

But rather than present all sides of the story, much of the coverage on Al Jazeera’s two Egypt-only satellite channels these days is devoted to anti-government demonstrations, Miles said. Given the government-imposed crackdown, the network must improvise; its news programming largely consists of grainy footage of protests that has been posted on social-media sites.

In addition, the channels have aired many interviews with survivors of the [Rabaa al-Adawiya mosque massacre](#) in July in which hundreds of Brotherhood supporters were killed by government troops. They have also carried interviews with the few Islamist leaders who haven't yet been arrested. "It definitely makes them different from all the other channels," Miles said, somewhat wryly. "It's the only channel that delivers the other point of view."

Indeed, it often does so in unmistakable terms.


One of the main network's signature personalities is Sheik Yusef Qaradawi, a Sunni preacher and himself an Egyptian exile. On his Friday talk show, Qaradawi has repeatedly urged Egyptians to defy Sissi; [in one broadcast from late July](#), he said Christians participated in the military's crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood supporters in which hundreds were killed, according to MEMRI.

Another Al Jazeera commentator, a former Muslim Brotherhood official named Gamal Nassar, [asserted in an August broadcast](#) that Sissi has Jewish heritage and that he is implementing a Zionist plan to divide Egypt, according to MEMRI's translation.

Carmon says Americans see a very different face of Al Jazeera through Al Jazeera America, a network that is stocked with accomplished Western journalists such as Ali Velshi, Joie Chen, Soledad O'Brien and John Seigenthaler and a network that strives to play the news in a very straightforward fashion.

"There are two Al Jazeeras," he said. "It is talking with a forked tongue in two languages."

Paul Farhi

Paul Farhi is The Washington Post's media reporter. He started at The Post in 1988 and has been a financial reporter, a political reporter and a Style reporter. [Follow](#) 



April 30, 2018

Special Dispatch No. 7449

The Qatari Regime's Doublespeak: Condemnations Of Terrorism vs Social And Official Support For Terrorists

Since June 2017, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, and Bahrain have maintained a comprehensive boycott of Qatar, claiming that it supports and finances global terrorism.[1] Qatar, for its part, rejects these claims, and its senior officials constantly reiterate that they oppose terrorism and are committed to international agreements for fighting it. However, it is evident that despite its declarations condemning terrorism, Qatar continues to maintain ties with top terror operatives.

For example, two weeks ago, it was reported that Qatari Prime Minister Abdullah Bin Nasser Bin Khalifa Al-Thani attended the wedding of the son of Qatari terrorist Abd Al-Rahman Bin 'Umayr Al-Jabbar Al-Nu'aymi, who has been sanctioned by the U.S., the U.N. Security Council, and the U.K. as a major financier of Al-Qaeda.

This report reviews Qatar's anti-terrorism declarations, the Qatari prime minister's presence at wedding of Al-Nu'aymi's son, and the sanctioning of Al-Nu'aymi.

Qatar Condemns Terror, Publishes List Of Wanted Terrorists

To counter the claims of the Arab states that boycott it, Qatar makes an effort to project an image of a country that fights terrorism and its financing in every way. Thus, for example, at his April 10, 2018 meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump at the White House, Qatari Emir and Foreign Minister Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani declared his willingness to cooperate with the U.S. in this matter, and stressed, "We do not and we will not tolerate with people who fund terrorism. We've been cooperating with the United States of America to stop funding terrorism around the region." President Trump himself said that the countries that are stopping terrorism funding include the "UAE, it includes Saudi Arabia, it includes Qatar and others." [2] The previous week, in a telephone conversation with the Emir, President Trump praised Qatar's efforts in the struggle to end the financing of terror. [3]

Similarly, 'Abd Al-'Aziz 'Abdallah Al-Ansari, chairman of Qatar's National Committee to Combat Terrorism, which is affiliated with the Qatari Interior Ministry, stated on April 1, 2018 that "Qatar is most resolutely contending with the terror phenomenon via legislation for combatting it and via strengthening security cooperation in this direction." He said that the country had always emphasized its opposition to all forms of terrorism and extremism, and has joined many international agreements pertaining to the matter. He also noted that Qatar is cooperating with

the committees for fighting terrorism that were established by UN Security Council resolutions.
[4]

To prove that it is resolute in its attempts to fight terror, Qatar has signed several international agreements. For example, in July 2017, Qatar and the U.S. signed a Memorandum of Understanding about combatting terror. At a joint press conference with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al-Thani said: "Today, the state of Qatar was the first to sign the executive program with the United States to fight terrorism financing." [5]

Additionally, the Joint Statement of the Inaugural United States-Qatar Strategic Dialogue on January 20, 2018, in Washington, D.C., which highlighted "the strength of their bilateral relationship" and stated that "the two countries discussed specific areas of partnership, including defense, counterterrorism, combating extremism, and trade and investment. As those conversations continue, both the United States and Qatar believe their continued mutual cooperation will benefit the interests of both countries, as well as the security and stability of the Gulf region." and that Qatar and the U.S. "intend to begin the Anti-Terrorism Assistance training program as soon as possible...; the program will focus on key areas such as aviation security, terrorism investigations, and the protection of soft targets." [6]

Further, as part of Qatar's attempts to prove that it opposes terror in both theory and practice, on March 22, 2018, its National Committee for Combatting Terrorism, published a list of 19 terror operatives and eight terror organizations, with Abd Al-Rahman Bin 'Umayr Al-Nu'aymi topping the list. [7]

Qatari Prime Minister, Prominent Journalist Attend Wedding Of Son Of Top Terrorist Al-Nu'aymi; Official Qatari Media Publish Announcement And Congratulations

However, it is evident that despite Qatari officials' anti-terrorism statements and Qatar's dialogue with the U.S. and other Western countries about fighting terrorism, it continues to maintain ties with senior terror operatives.

For example, as noted, about two weeks ago the Qatari Prime Minister and a senior Qatari journalist attended the wedding of the son of top Al-Qaeda financier and terrorist Abd Al-Rahman bin 'Umayr Al-Nu'aymi. On April 14, 2018, the Saudi Alarabiya.net reported that Prime Minister Abdullah bin Nasser bin Khalifa Al-Thani had attended the wedding, and published a photo of him at the event.



Qatari Prime Minister Abdullah bin Nasser bin Khalifa Al-Thani (left), at the wedding of Al-Nu'aymi's son (Al-Nu'aymi is circled in red) (Source: Alarabiya.net, April 18, 2018)

Qatari journalist 'Abdallah Al-Sulaiti, formerly editor-in-chief of the official Qatari daily *Al-Sharq* who now writes for the official Qatari daily *Al-Raya*, posted photos of himself at the wedding on his Instagram account.[8]



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اللهم بارك له و أرزقه الذرية الصالحة

1 HOUR AGO · SEE TRANSLATION

Photo posted on journalist 'Abdallah Al-Sulaiti's Instagram account, taken at the wedding (Source: Alarabiya.net, April 18, 2018)

The senior Qatari figures' presence at the wedding, particularly that of the prime minister, is proof that official elements in Qatar continue to maintain relations with terror operatives – operatives whom Qatar itself has declared wanted men – and provides them with tacit social backing.

Likewise, on April 11, 2018, the official Qatari daily *Al-Raya* published an announcement stating: "Dr. Abd Al-Rahman bin 'Umayr Al-Nu'aymi will this evening celebrate the wedding of his son 'Abdallah... A thousand congratulations." [9]



The Al-Raya announcement of the wedding, and congratulations (Source: Al-Raya, Qatar, April 11, 2018)

Who Is 'Abd Al-Rahman Bin 'Umayr Al-Jabbar Al-Nu'aymi?

As part of the boycott of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, and Bahrain because of its ties to terrorism, these four countries published lists of terrorism-linked individuals and organizations that included Qataris.[10]

No. 11 on the first list, published in early June 2017, is Dr. Abd Al-Rahman Bin 'Umayr Al-Nu'aymi, a Qatari national and a former advisor to the Qatari government. Earlier, in 2013, Al-Nu'aymi was added to the U.S. Treasury Department list of terror operatives for his financing of Al-Qaeda terrorist activity in Syria, Iraq, Somalia, and Yemen; in 2014, he was placed on the list of the UN Security Council ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee, and also that year he was added to the list of terrorist suspects and groups targeted with financial sanctions in Britain; according to UK media, he had been accused of sending over £1.25 million a month to Al-Qaeda operatives in Iraq.[11]

At a 2013 press conference immediately following his inclusion in the U.S. Treasury Department list, Al-Nu'aymi denied that he had helped finance Al-Qaeda, stating that the only financing he had done outside of Qatar was on behalf of the Geneva-based NGO Al-Karama that he himself headed. According to him, Al-Karama focuses on documenting human rights violations in the Arab world – for example, the Egyptian security forces' crackdown on the summer 2013 Rabaa Al-Adawiya Square sit-down strike by Muslim Brotherhood members, in which hundreds were killed.[12]



Abd Al-Rahman Bin 'Umayr Al-Nu'aymi (Image: Al-Sharq, Qatar, December 23, 2013)

[1] See MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis No. 1315, Uproar In The Gulf Following Alleged Statements By Qatari Emir Condemning Gulf States, Praising Iran, Hizbullah, Muslim Brotherhood And Hamas, May 25, 2017.

[2] CBSnews.com, April 10, 2018.

[3] *Al Quds Al-Arabi* (London), April 11, 2018.

[4] *Al-Watan* (Qatar), April 2, 2018.

[5] Reuters.com, July 10, 2017.

[6] State.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/01/277776.htm, January 30, 2018.

[7] *Al-Arabi Al-Jadid* (London), March 22, 2018.

[8] Alarabiya.net, April 15, 2018.

[9] *Al-Raya* (Qatar), April 11, 2018.

[10] On these terror lists, see *Al-Riyadh* (Saudi Arabia), June 9, 2017; *'Okaz* (Saudi Arabia), July 25, 2017; *Al-Masri Al-Yawm* (Egypt), November 23, 2017.

[11] Treasury.gov, December 18, 2013; Un.org, February 2, 2017; Telegraph.co.uk, October 18, 2014.

[12] *Al-Sharq* (Qatar), December 23, 2013. For more information about the Rabba Al-Adawiya events, see MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 5407, Pro-MB Columnist On The Dispersal Of Pro-Morsi Sit-Ins In Cairo: The Coup Regime Is Following The Path Of Hitler's Final Solution; Anti-MB Columnist: The MB 'Wants To Subject The Homeland And The People To The Law Of The Jungle And The Rule Of Terror', August 14, 2013.



NEWS / MIDDLE EAST

Al-Nusra leader Jolani announces split from al-Qaeda

Al Jazeera obtains exclusive video of Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, saying group's name has changed to Jabhat Fath al Sham.

29 Jul 2016

Al Jazeera has obtained exclusive video of the former leader of al-Nusra Front confirming the Syria-based armed group's split from al-Qaeda.

Abu Mohammed al-Jolani appeared in camera for the first time to announce his group's name has also changed to Jabhat Fath al Sham, or The Front for liberation of al Sham.

"We declare the complete cancellation of all operations under the name of Jabhat al-Nusra, and the formation of a new group operating under the name 'Jabhat Fath al-Sham', noting that this new organisation has no affiliation to any external entity," Jolani said.

The release of the video on Thursday followed earlier reports that the leader of al-Qaeda had approved the split, so the Nusra forces could concentrate on their fight against the Syrian government and other rebel groups.

'We look at it with relief'

Al-Nusra first surfaced on the internet in early 2012 to claim responsibility for suicide bombings in Aleppo and Damascus.

The well-armed group, with highly trained fighters, has since staged numerous attacks on security forces - as well as on other armed groups in the country.

It is sanctioned by the UN Security Council and listed as a "terrorist" group by the US and Russia.

In February, the US and Russia excluded the group, as well as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS) from a cessation of hostilities deal aimed at ending the fighting in Syria.

Reacting to Jolani's declaration, Farah al-Atassi, a spokeswoman for the High Negotiations Committee, the Syrian opposition's main negotiating bloc, said it was still "very premature" to predict the full consequences of the split from al-Qaeda.

Atassi added, however, that she was hopeful that the move would rid powers such as Russia of their reasoning for bombing Syria.

"We look at it with relief," she told Al Jazeera from Washington DC, minutes after Jolani's announcement.

"This will reflect somehow positively on the Free Syrian Army (FSA) who has been fighting ISIL and al-Nusra for the past six months, because Russia is bombing and hitting FSA positions and civilian neighbourhoods with the excuse that they are hitting al-Nusra."

'Mixed reaction'

Al Jazeera's Mohamed Jamjoom, reporting from Gaziantep on the Turkish side of the Syrian-Turkish border, said the initial reaction from members of the opposition within Syria was "decidedly mixed."

"All the opposition activists we've spoken with inside Syria told us they were not surprised by the announcement; there had been mounting speculation in the last few days that this was going to happen," Jamjoom said.

"A few told us they believed that by al-Nusra separating itself formally from al-Qaeda and

changing its name, as well as by speaking about unifying in the fight in Syria, that that meant that the US and others would no longer consider al-Nusra to be a terrorist organisation; that more international backers would be behind rebel groups."

However, most of the activists in Aleppo did not "really believe what Jolani is saying; they don't trust the motivations," Jamjoom added.

"Some of them wondered whether this was some kind of publicity stunt to get more support from the international community, with many wondering whether this was going to have any practical impact."

View from Washington

Later on Thursday, the White House said its assessment of al-Nusra had not changed, despite the announcement that that the group was cutting its ties with al-Qaeda.

"There continues to be increasing concern about Nusra Front's growing capacity for external operations that could threaten both the United States and Europe," White House spokesman Josh Earnest told reporters at a briefing.

"We certainly see no reasons to believe that their actions or their objectives are any different," US State Department spokesman John Kirby said.

"They are still considered a foreign terrorist organisation," Kirby said. "We judge a group by what they do, not by what they call themselves."

Al Jazeera's Rosiland Jordan, reporting from Washington DC, said the White House "considered Nusra a security threat" to the US and its interests.

"When the US made the decision to declare Nusra a terrorist organisation [in 2014], there was a lot of criticism, notably coming from members of the Syrian opposition who said Nusra had the best trained, most effective fighters in their efforts to topple the government of [Syrian President] Bashar al-Assad," Jordan said.

"But the US government was not moved, saying that they considered its [Nusra's] de facto ties to al-Qaeda to be a very serious problem."

SOURCE: AL JAZEERA

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Al Jazeera Pulls Video Claiming Jews Inflated Numbers Of Holocaust Victims

May 20, 2019 | By [Haaretz](#)

Al-Jazeera's AJ+ Arabic channel pulled a video it posted to its social media channels Friday night that claimed Jews exploit the Holocaust and that Israel is the genocide's "greatest beneficiary." Two journalists who created the video were later suspended.

The seven minute-long, Arabic-language video asserted that though the Holocaust did occur, "it's different from how the Jews tell it," Israeli media reported.

AJ+ Arabic, the youth-focused, online current-events channel of Qatar's official Al Jazeera Media Network, posted the video on its social media platforms with the caption "The gas chambers killed millions of Jews...So the story says. How true is the #Holocaust and how did the Zionists benefit from it?"



Before its removal from the platforms on Saturday, the post reportedly gained 1.1 million views on Facebook and Twitter. After it was deleted, Al Jazeera said the piece violated the network's editorial standards.

"The Jews weren't the only targets of the Nazis, but also Gypsies [Roma], the disabled, homosexuals, and Arabs and Christians, too," the video's presenter, Muna Hawwa, said. "In all, the Nazis killed 20 million people during the Holocaust and the Final Solution, and the Jews were just a part of that. Then why does the world focus so much on Jews?"

According to the video, pre-war Europe's Jews were able to emphasize their suffering because they were wealthy and controlled media companies. In addition, it claims, the "statistics were inflated by the Zionist movement to help them establish Israel."

In fact, Israel's Channel 13 notes, the video says "the establishment of the State of Israel itself is derived from the national ideology of the Nazis."

The video asks "How did Israel gain from the Holocaust?" and goes on to discuss the 1933 Transfer Agreement, in which Zionist groups in Mandatory Palestine negotiated with the Nazis to allow 60,000 German Jews to leave for Palestine and take some of their assets with them.

The Jews "exploited the Holocaust for their agenda and made the whole world focus on their murders and forget the other victims," in order to receive money from Germany, it claims, adding that "six decades after the Holocaust," and compared to other countries that were affected by it – "the reparations that Israel received were disproportionate."