U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, DC 20530

Supplemental Statement

Pursuant to Section 2 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended

OMB NO.1105-0002

For Six Month Period Ending March 31, 2005
(Insert date)

I - REGISTRANT

1. (a) Name of Registrant

The Harbour Group, LLC

(b) Registration No.

5478

(c) Business Address(es) of Registrant

3000 K Street, NW
Suite 105
Washington, DC 20007

2. Has there been a change in the information previously furnished in connection with the following:

(a)	If an individual:			
	(1) Residence address	Yes ☐	No ☐	
	(2) Citizenship	Yes ☐	No ☐	
	(3) Occupation	Yes ☐	No ☐	
(b)	If an organization:			
	(1) Name	Yes ☐	No ☑	
	(2) Ownership or control	Yes ☐	No ☑	
	(3) Branch offices	Yes ☐	No ☑	

(c) Explain fully all changes, if any, indicated in items (a) and (b) above.

N/A

2005 APR 27 PM 4:35
CRM/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT

IF THE REGISTRANT IS AN INDIVIDUAL, OMIT RESPONSE TO ITEMS 3, 4 AND 5(a).

3. If you have previously filed Exhibit C[1], state whether any changes therein have occurred during this 6 month reporting period.
Yes ☐ No ☑

If yes, have you filed an amendment to the Exhibit C? Yes ☐ No ☐

If no, please attach the required amendment.

1 The Exhibit C, for which no printed form is provided, consists of a true copy of the charter, articles of incorporation, association, and by laws of a registrant that is an organization. (A waiver of the requirement to file an Exhibit C may be obtained for good cause upon written application to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530.)

4. (a) Have any persons ceased acting as partners, officers, directors or similar officials of the registrant during this 6 month reporting period? Yes ☑ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Position	Date connection ended
Joel Johnson	Managing Director	12/31/04
Brett O'Brien	Vice President	12/31/04

(b) Have any persons become partners, officers, directors or similar officials during this 6 month reporting period? Yes ☑ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Residence address	Citizenship	Position	Date assumed
Thurgood Marshall, Jr.	5750 Little Falls Road, Arlington VA 22207	U.S.	Managing Director	1/01/05
Suzanne Spaulding	6506 W. Langley Lane, McLean VA 22101	U.S.	Managing Director	1/01/05

5. (a) Has any person named in item 4(b) rendered services directly in furtherance of the interests of any foreign principal? Yes ☐ No ☑

If yes, identify each such person and describe his service.

N/A

(b) Have any employees or individuals, who have filed a short form registration statement, terminated their employment or connection with the registrant during this 6 month reporting period? Yes ☑ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Position or connection	Date terminated
See attached.		

(c) During this 6 month reporting period, has the registrant hired as employees or in any other capacity, any persons who rendered or will render services to the registrant directly in furtherance of the interests of any foreign principal(s) in other than a clerical or secretarial, or in a related or similar capacity? Yes ☐ No ☑

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Residence address	Citizenship	Position	Date assumed
N/A				

6. Have short form registration statements been filed by all of the persons named in Items 5(a) and 5(c) of the supplemental statement? Yes ☑ No ☐

If no, list names of persons who have not filed the required statement.

N/A

II - FOREIGN PRINCIPAL

7. Has your connection with any foreign principal ended during this 6 month reporting period?
Yes ☑ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name of foreign principal	Date of termination
Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands (through the Alexander Strategy Group)	12/31/04
Government of Malaysia (through the Alexander Strategy Group)	12/31/04

8. Have you acquired any new foreign principal[2] during this 6 month reporting period?
Yes ☑ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name and address of foreign principal	Date acquired
Government of Malaysia (through the Alexander Strategy Group)	10/17/04

9. In addition to those named in Items 7 and 8, if any, list foreign principals[2] whom you continued to represent during the 6 month reporting period.

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

10. **EXHIBITS A AND B**

(a) Have you filed for each of the newly acquired foreign principals in Item 8 the following:

Exhibit A[3] Yes ☑ No ☐
Exhibit B[4] Yes ☑ No ☐

If no, please attach the required exhibit.

(b) Have there been any changes in the Exhibits A and B previously filed for any foreign principal whom you represented during the 6 month period? Yes ☑ No ☐

If yes, have you filed an amendment to these exhibits? Yes ☐ No ☑

If no, please attach the required amendment.

2 The term "foreign principal" includes, in addition to those defined in Section 1(b) of the Act, an individual organization any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign government, foreign political party, foreign organization or foreign individual. (See Rule 100(a) (9).) A registrant who represents more than one foreign principal is required to list in the statements he files under the Act only those principals for whom he is not entitled to claim exemption under Section 3 of the Act. (See Rule 208.)

3 The Exhibit A, which is filed on Form CRM-157 (Formerly OBD-67), sets forth the information required to be disclosed concerning each foreign principal.

4 The Exhibit B, which is filed on Form CRM-155 (Formerly OBD-65), sets forth the information concerning the agreement or understanding between the registrant and the foreign principal.

III - ACTIVITIES

11. During this 6 month reporting period, have you engaged in any activities for or rendered any services to any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement? Yes ☑ No ☐

If yes, identify each such foreign principal and describe in full detail your activities and services:

See attached sheets.

12. During this 6 month reporting period, have you on behalf of any foreign principal engaged in political activity[5] as defined below? Yes ☑ No ☐

If yes, identify each such foreign principal and describe in full detail all such political activity, indicating, among other things, the relations, interests and policies sought to be influenced and the means employed to achieve this purpose. If the registrant arranged, sponsored or delivered speeches, lectures or radio and TV broadcasts, give details as to dates and places of delivery, names of speakers and subject matter.

See attached sheets.

13. In addition to the above described activities, if any, have you engaged in activity on your own behalf which benefits any or all of your foreign principals? Yes ☐ No ☑

If yes, describe fully.

5 The term "political activities" means any activity that the person engaging in believes will, or that the person intends to, in any way influence any agency or official of the Government of the United States or any section of the public within the United States with reference to formulating, adopting or changing the domestic or foreign policies of the United States or with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party.

IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION

14 . (a) **RECEIPTS-MONIES**

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise? Yes ☑ No ☐

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies[6]

Date	From whom	Purpose	Amount
See attached.			

Total

(b) **RECEIPTS – FUND RAISING CAMPAIGN**

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fund raising campaign[7], any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement? Yes ☐ No ☑

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D[8] to your registration? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed. Date _____

(c) **RECEIPTS – THINGS OF VALUE**

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value[9] other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal? Yes ☐ No ☑

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name of foreign principal	Date received	Description of thing of value	Purpose
N/A			

6, 7 A registrant is required to file an Exhibit D if he collects or receives contributions, loans, money, or other things of value for a foreign principal, as part of a fund raising campaign. (See Rule 201(e).)

8 An Exhibit D, for which no printed form is provided, sets forth an account of money collected or received as a result of a fund raising campaign and transmitted for a foreign principal.

9 Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks," and the like.

15. (a) **DISBURSEMENTS – MONIES**

During this 6 month reporting period, have you

(1) disbursed or expended monies in connection with activity on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement? Yes ☑ No ☐

(2) transmitted monies to any such foreign principal? Yes ☐ No ☑

If no, explain in full detail why there were no disbursements made on behalf of any foreign principal.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies, including monies transmitted, if any, to each foreign principal.

Date	To whom	Purpose	Amount
See Attached.			

Total

(b) **DISBURSEMENTS – THINGS OF VALUE**

During this 6 month reporting period, have you disposed of anything of value[10] other than money in furtherance of or in connection with activities on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement?

Yes ☐ No ☑

If yes, furnish the following information:

Date disposed	Name of person to whom given	On behalf of what foreign principal	Description of thing of value	Purpose

(c) **DISBURSEMENTS – POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS**

During this 6 month reporting period, have you from your own funds and on your own behalf either directly or through any other person, made any contributions of money or other things of value[11] in connection with an election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election, convention, or caucus held to select candidates for political office?

Yes ☑ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

Date	Amount or thing of value	Name of political organization	Name of candidate

See attached.

10, 11 Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks" and the like.

V - INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS

16. During this 6 month reporting period, did you prepare, disseminate or cause to be disseminated any informational materials [12]?
Yes ☑ No ☐

IF YES, RESPOND TO THE REMAINING ITEMS IN SECTION V.

17. Identify each such foreign principal.

Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands (through the Alexander Strategy Group)

Embassy of Turkey

Please find all informational materials attached.

18. During this 6 month reporting period, has any foreign principal established a budget or allocated a specified sum of money to finance your activities in preparing or disseminating informational materials? Yes ☐ No ☑

If yes, identify each such foreign principal, specify amount, and indicate for what period of time.

19. During this 6 month reporting period, did your activities in preparing, disseminating or causing the dissemination of informational materials include the use of any of the following:

☐ Radio or TV broadcasts	☑ Magazine or newspaper articles	☐ Motion picture films	☑ Letters or telegrams
☐ Advertising campaigns	☑ Press releases	☑ Pamphlets or other publications	☑ Lectures or speeches
☐ Internet	☑ Other (specify) E-mails accompanying news articles		

20. During this 6 month reporting period, did you disseminate or cause to be disseminated informational materials among any of the following groups:

☑ Public Officials	☑ Newspapers	☐ Libraries
☑ Legislators	☑ Editors	☑ Educational institutions
☐ Government agencies	☑ Civic groups or associations	☑ Nationality groups
☑ Other (specify) public policy research groups		

21. What language was used in the informational materials:

☑ English ☐ Other (specify) _____

22. Did you file with the Registration Unit, U.S. Department of Justice a copy of each item of such informational materials disseminated or caused to be disseminated during this 6 month reporting period? Yes ☐ No ☑

23. Did you label each item of such informational materials with the statement required by Section 4(b) of the Act?
Yes ☑ No ☐

12 The term informational materials includes any oral, visual, graphic, written, or pictorial information or matter of any kind, including that published by means of advertising, books, periodicals, newspapers, lectures, broadcasts, motion pictures, or any means or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce or otherwise. Informational materials disseminated by an agent of a foreign principal as part of an activity in itself exempt from registration, or an activity which by itself would not require registration, need not be filed pursuant to Section 4(b) of the Act.

VI – EXECUTION

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. §1746, the undersigned swear(s) or affirm(s) under penalty of perjury that he/she has (they have) read the information set forth in this registration statement and the attached exhibits and that he/she is (they are) familiar with the contents thereof and that such contents are in their entirety true and accurate to the best of his/her (their) knowledge and belief, except that the undersigned make(s) no representation as to the truth or accuracy of the information contained in the attached Short Form Registration Statement(s), if any, insofar as such information is not within his/her (their) personal knowledge.

(Date of signature)	(Type or print name under each signature[13])
	Richard Marcus

2005 APR 27 PM 4:35
CRM/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT

13 This statement shall be signed by the individual agent, if the registrant is an individual or by a majority of those partners, officers, directors or persons performing similar functions, if the registrant is an organization, except that the organization can, by power of attorney, authorize one or more individuals to execute this statement on its behalf.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FARA REGISTRATION UNIT
CRIMINAL DIVISION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

NOTICE

Please answer the following questions and return this sheet in triplicate with your Supplemental Statement:

1. Is your answer to Item 16 of Section V (Informational Materials - page 8 of Form CRM-154, formerly Form OBD-64-Supplemental Statement):

YES ✓ or NO _____

(If your answer to question 1 is "yes" do not answer question 2 of this form.)

2. Do you disseminate any material in connection with your registration:

YES _____ or NO _____

(If your answer to question 2 is "yes" please forward for our review copies of all material including: films, film catalogs, posters, brochures, press releases, etc. which you have disseminated during the past six months.)

2005 APR 27 PM 4:35
CRM/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT

Signature

4/26/05
Date

RICHARD MARCUS
Please type or print name of signatory on the line above

MANAGING DIRECTOR
Title

ITEM 5(b) – Have any employees or individuals, who have filed a short form registration statement, terminated their employment or connection with the registrant during this 6 month reporting period? Yes. If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Position or connection	Date terminated
Joel Johnson	Managing Director	12/31/04
Brett O'Brien	Vice President	12/31/04
Marni Tomljanovic	Employee	12/31/04
Kimberly James Morgan	Employee	12/31/04
Erin Graefe	Employee	12/31/04
Leonard Davis	Subcontractor	3/30/05
Jason Epstein	Subcontractor	3/30/05

2005 APR 27 PM 4:35
CRM/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT

ITEM 11 – During this 6 month reporting period, have you engaged in any activities for or rendered any services to any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement? YES. If yes, identify each such foreign principal and describe in full detail your activities and services:

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey –
Registrant conducted daily monitoring of U.S. media outlets for news related to the Republic of Turkey. Registrant produced a daily compendium of relevant news clips for principal.

Registrant provided public relations counsel to principal regarding communications strategy in the United States.

Registrant compiled and distributed informational materials and commentaries to media and policy experts on behalf of principal.

Registrant contacted media outlets to encourage interviews of Ambassador and placement of written commentaries by Turkish government officials.

Registrant created a bi-weekly electronic newsletter sent to specific media, policy experts, and other individuals interested in U.S.-Turkish relations.

Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands (through the Alexander Strategy Group) -
Registrant provided advice and support to Republic of the Marshall Islands government officials relating to their contacts with members and staff of the U.S. Congress.

Government of Malaysia (through the Alexander Strategy Group) –
Registrant provided advice and support to Malaysian government officials relating to their relations with the U.S. Government.

ITEM 12 – During this 6 month reporting period, have you on behalf of any foreign principal engaged in political activity as defined below? YES. If yes, identify each such foreign principal and describe in full detail all such political activity, indicating, among other things, the relations, interests and policies sought to be influenced and the means employed to achieve this purpose. If the registrant arranged, sponsored or delivered speeches, lectures or radio and TV broadcasts, give details as to dates and places of delivery, names of speakers and subject matter.

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey-
Registrant contacted media outlets to provide background information and encourage interviews of Ambassador and placement of written commentaries by Turkish government officials. These activities, intended to generate a better understanding of Turkey's policies among the U.S. public, included arrangement of the following:

- October 1, 2004 email distribution of selected documents and commentary articles to members of the media (Associated Press, Bloomberg Business News, Boston Globe, British Broadcasting Corp., Business Week, Christian Science Monitor, CNN, Financial Times, Los Angeles Times, National Journal, National Review, New York Daily News, New York Times, Newsday, Reuters, Time Magazine, UPI, USA TODAY, Washington Post, Washington Times, Weekly Standard) and think tanks regarding Turkey's progress in meeting the Copenhagen Criteria.
- October 19, 2004 distribution of selected documents and commentary articles to media (Associated Press, Bloomberg Business News, Boston Globe, British Broadcasting Corp., Business Week, Christian Science Monitor, CNN, Financial Times, Los Angeles Times, National Journal, National Review, New York Daily News, New York Times, Newsday, Reuters, Time Magazine, UPI, USA TODAY, Washington Post, Washington Times, Weekly Standard) and think tanks regarding the recent EU report on Turkey's progress in meeting the Copenhagen Criteria.
- October 21, 2004 distribution of invitation to members of think tanks and Jewish organizations to attend the tribute to Turkish diplomat Selahattin Ulkumen at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum and subsequent reception at the Turkish Embassy.
- October 22, 2004 publication of letter to the editor in the *Washington Times*.
- October 25, 2004 distribution of invitation to members of think tanks and Jewish organizations to attend the tribute to Turkish diplomat Selahattin Ulkumen at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum and subsequent reception at the Turkish Embassy. Phone call to Representative Jim Gibbon's staffer Jim Drape to remind about the upcoming tribute to Turkish diplomat Selahattin Ulkumen at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. Phone call to Representative Bud Cramer's staffer Alex Igou to remind about the upcoming tribute to Turkish diplomat Selahattin Ulkumen at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum.
- November 1, 2004 distribution of *Jewish Telegraphic Agency's* article, Man Saved By Turkish Diplomat During War Meets His Rescuer's Son.
- November 6, 2004 publication of letter to the editor in the *International Herald Tribune*.
- December 3, 2004 alerted the media (Associated Press, Bloomberg Business News, Boston Globe, British Broadcasting Corp., Business Week, Christian Science Monitor,

CNN, Financial Times, Los Angeles Times, National Journal, National Review, New York Daily News, New York Times, Newsday, Reuters, Time Magazine, UPI, USA TODAY, Washington Post, Washington Times, Weekly Standard) to Turkish legislator Egemen Bagis' availability to speak with press.

- December 14, 2004 distribution of selected documents and commentary articles to media (Associated Press, Bloomberg Business News, Boston Globe, British Broadcasting Corp., Business Week, Christian Science Monitor, CNN, Financial Times, Los Angeles Times, National Journal, National Review, New York Daily News, New York Times, Newsday, Reuters, Time Magazine, UPI, USA TODAY, Washington Post, Washington Times, Weekly Standard) and think tanks regarding upcoming EU meeting on accession talks with Turkey.
- December 19, 2004 publication of letter to the editor in the *Los Angeles Times*.
- December 23, 2004 distribution of selected documents and commentary articles to media (Associated Press, Bloomberg Business News, Boston Globe, British Broadcasting Corp., Business Week, Christian Science Monitor, CNN, Financial Times, Los Angeles Times, National Journal, National Review, New York Daily News, New York Times, Newsday, Reuters, Time Magazine, UPI, USA TODAY, Washington Post, Washington Times, Weekly Standard) and think tanks regarding the EU's decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey.

Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands (through the Alexander Strategy Group) -

Registrant provided advice and support to Republic of the Marshall Islands government officials relating to their contacts with Members and staff of the U.S. Congress.

Telephone calls, meetings, and e-mails were made to and with the following Members' offices:

- October 14, 2004 phone call and email to House Resources Committee staffer Tony Babauta regarding Appropriations issues.
- October 15, 2004 phone call with House Resources Committee staffer Tony Babauta regarding Section 177 Health Care Program and Supplemental Education Grants Program.
- October 21, 2004 phone call and email to Michael Petrucelli, deputy director and chief of staff - Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, regarding RMI immigration issues.
- October 25, 20004 email to Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on the Interior staffer Peter Kiefhaber on RMI health care funding, and transmission of request relating to Interior Appropriations bill. Phone call and email to House Resources Committee staffer Tony Babauta regarding Section 177 Health Care Program, and transmission of request relating to Interior Appropriations bill.
- October 26, 2004 phone call and email to Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee staffer Allen Stayman regarding Section 177 Health Care Program and the Supplemental Education Grants Program, and transmission of request relating to Interior Appropriations bill.
- October 28, 2004 phone call and email to Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee staffer Allen Stayman regarding Section 177 Health Care Program and the Supplemental

Education Grants Program. Email to House Resources Committee staffer Chris Foster regarding Section 177 Health Care Program and the Supplemental Education Grants Program, and transmission of request relating to Interior Appropriations bill. Email to Michael Petrucelli, deputy director and chief of staff - Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, regarding RMI immigration issues.

- October 29, 2004 email to House Resources Committee staffer Chris Foster regarding Section 177 Health Care Program and the Supplemental Education Grants Program. Email to Michael Petrucelli, deputy director and chief of staff - Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, regarding RMI immigration issues. Phone call to Representative Bordallo staffer Jed Bullock regarding possible forestry bill.
- November 2, 2004 phone call and email to Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee staffer Allen Stayman regarding Section 177 Health Care Program and the Supplemental Education Grants Program.
- November 3, 2004 email to Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee staffer Allen Stayman regarding Supplemental Education Grants.
- November 9, 2004 email to House Appropriations staffer Susan Firth regarding Supplemental Education Grants. Phone call to Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee staffer Allen Stayman regarding pending appropriations issues. Working lunch with House International Relations Committee staffer David Abramowitz.
- November 10, 2004 email to Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on the Interior staffer Peter Kiefhaber regarding health care funding.
- November 11, 2004 email to Representative Bordallo staffer Jed Bullock regarding forestry bill for Freely Associated States.
- November 12, 2004 email to House Appropriations staffer Susan Firth regarding Supplemental Education Grants. Email and phone call to Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee staffer Allen Stayman regarding appropriations matters. Phone call to Congressman Faleomavaega's Chief of Staff Lisa Williams regarding appropriations matters.
- November 15, 2004 email to House Appropriations staffer Susan Firth regarding Supplemental Education Grants. Phone call to Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee staffer Kellie Donnelly regarding appropriations matters.
- November 16, 2004 working lunch with Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee staffer Allen Stayman and RMI Ambassador de Brum.
- November 17, 2004 email to House Appropriations staffer Susan First regarding Supplemental Education Grants. Email to Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee staffer Allen Stayman regarding Section 177 Health Care Program.
- November 19, 2004 email to Senate Energy & Natural Resource Committee staffer Allen Stayman regarding education eligibility. Email to House Appropriations staffer Susan Firth regarding final omnibus language.
- November 20, 2004 email to House Resources Committee staffer Tony Babauta regarding RMI healthcare. Email to Senate Energy & Natural Resource Committee staffer Allen Stayman regarding Energy and Water subcommittee.
- November 29, 2004 email to House Resources Committee staffer Chris Foster regarding the Changed Circumstances Petition briefing, and transmission of briefing papers on

Changed Circumstances in the Marshall Islands. Email to House International Relations Committee staffer Doug Anderson regarding the Changed Circumstances Petition briefing, and transmission of briefing papers on Changed Circumstances in the Marshall Islands. Email to Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee staffer Kellie Donnelly regarding the Changed Circumstances Petition briefing, and transmission of briefing papers on Changed Circumstances in the Marshall Islands. Email to House Resources Committee staffer Tony Babauta regarding the Changed Circumstances Petition briefing, and transmission of briefing papers on Changed Circumstances in the Marshall Islands. Email to Senate Energy & Natural Resource Committee staffer Allen Stayman regarding the Changed Circumstances Petition briefing, and transmission of briefing papers on Changed Circumstances in the Marshall Islands. Email to House International Relations Committee staffer Peter Yeo regarding the Changed Circumstances Petition briefing, and transmission of briefing papers on Changed Circumstances in the Marshall Islands. Email to Senator Akaka staffer Davelyn Kalipi regarding the Changed Circumstances Petition briefing, and transmission of briefing papers on Changed Circumstances in the Marshall Islands.

- November 30, 2004 phone call to House Resources Committee staffer Tony Babauta regarding the Changed Circumstances Petition briefing. Phone call to House International Relations Committee staffer Peter Yeo regarding the Changed Circumstances Petition briefing.
- December 1, 2004 phone call to Senate Energy & Natural Resource Committee staffer Allen Stayman regarding the Changed Circumstances Petition briefing.

Government of Malaysia (through the Alexander Strategy Group) –
November 16, 2004 meeting with State Department's Malaysia desk officer Michael Heath regarding status of U.S.-Malaysian relations.

ITEM 14(a) – During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise? YES. If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies.

Date	From Whom	Purpose	Amount
10/13/04	Alexander Strategy Group (for Marshall Islands)	Public Relations Services	$15,311.92
03/04/05	Alexander Strategy Group (for Marshall Islands)	Public Relations Services	$5,241.20
03/29/05	Alexander Strategy Group (for Marshall Islands)	Public Relations Services	$5,182.19

			Total $25,735.31

11/19/04 Embassy of the Republic of Turkey Public Relations Services $150,000

Total $150,000

12/10/04 Alexander Strategy Group (for Malaysia) Public Relations Services $40,000

Total $40,000

ITEM 15(a)- During this 6 month reporting period, have you: disbursed or expended monies in connection with activity on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement? If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies, including monies transmitted, if any, to each foreign principal.

Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands (through the Alexander Strategy Group):

10/1/04 – 3/31/05	Photocopying and printing	$90.38
10/1/04 – 3/31/05	Telephone	$57.29
10/1/04 – 3/31/05	Petty cash	$195.00
10/1/04 – 3/31/05	Courier	$7.93

Total $350.60

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey:

10/1/04 – 3/31/05	Photocopying and printing	64.15
10/1/04 – 3/31/05	Telephone	54.39
10/1/04 – 3/31/05	Petty cash	391.89
10/1/04 – 3/31/05	Courier	62.97

Total $573.40

Government of Malaysia (through the Alexander Strategy Group):

10/1/04 – 3/31/05	Photocopying and printing	$4.40
10/1/04 – 3/31/05	Telephone	$9.00
10/1/04 – 3/31/05	Petty cash	$76.14

Total $89.54

ITEM 15(c)- During this 6 month reporting period, have you from your own funds and on your own behalf either directly or through any other person, made any contributions of money or other things of value in connection with an election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election, convention, or caucus held to select candidates for political office? YES. If yes, furnish the following information: date, amount or thing of value, name of political organization, and name of candidate.

Date	Amount	Organization	Candidate
Jennifer Thomas			
12/14/04	140.00	Friends of Hillary	Hillary Clinton
Joel Johnson			
10/07/04	200.00	America Coming Together	
10/15/04	500.00	Martin Frost Campaign Committee	Martin Frost
10/15/04	1,000.00	Dedicated Americans for the Senate & House PAC	
10/18/04	500.00	Matheson for Congress	Jim Matheson
12/31/04	2,000.00	Friends of Kent Conrad	Kent Conrad
Jason Epstein			
12/10/04	250.00	Burton for Congress	Dan Burton

2005 APR 27 PM 4:36
CRM/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT

-----Original Message-----
From: Thomas, Jennifer S.
Sent: Friday, October 01, 2004 4:50 PM
Subject: Letter from Turkish Embassy DCM and EU accession background information

Please find below a message from the Turkish Embassy regarding next week's European Union report on Turkey's progress in meeting standards for EU membership.

Best Regards,
The Harbour Group
This material is distributed by The Harbour Group, LLC on behalf of the Republic of Turkey. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

October 1, 2004

Dear Friend:

On October 6, the European Commission will release a report assessing Turkey's progress in meeting the "Copenhagen criteria," standards set by the European Union for nations aspiring to membership. These criteria cover a range of issues, from the stability of democratic institutions to the existence of a market economy.

As you monitor the European Commission's action next week and subsequent European Union deliberations on whether to initiate accession negotiations with Turkey, I would like to share with you some recent commentaries on Turkey's reform efforts. As you may know, Turkey has pursued, adopted, and implemented a wide range of ambitious reforms that span the political, economic, legal and social realms. As we continue our reform efforts, my country looks forward to a positive and constructive dialogue with the EU on our accession candidacy.

Please feel free to contact us at the Embassy should you have any questions or need additional information on these or other matters of importance to our nations.

With warmest regards,

Naci Saribas
Deputy Chief of Mission
Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

2005 APR 27 PM 4:06
CRM/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT

Attachments (in Word document below)

"Chronology-Turkey's Long And Winding Road Towards EU," *Reuters News,* 16 September 2004

"Turkey Revises Its Penal Code in Bid to Join the European Union," By Susan Sachs, *The New York Times*, 27 September 2004

"High Stakes For Turkey And The West," By Morton Abramowitz and Richard Burt, *The Washington Post*, 20 August 2004

"Will The EU Keep Faith With Turkey?," By Martti Ahtisaari and Albert Rohan, *The Jakarta Post*, 31 August 2004

"Rejecting Turkey, And The Future," By Fareed Zakaria, *The Washington Post*, 21 September 2004

"Turkey And The EU," *The Washington Times*, 16 September 2004

"The Case For Letting Turkey In," By Quentin Peel, *Financial Times*, 16 September 2004

"The Impossibility Of Saying No - Turkey And The European Union," *The Economist,* 18 September 2004

Attachment (in PDF below)

"Turkey's European Quest: The EU's Decision On Turkish Accession," By Philip Gordon and Omer Taspinar, *The Brookings Institution*, September 2004

<<EU Accession.doc>> <<Brookings Institution - Turkey's European Quest.pdf>>

2005 APR 27 PM 4:36
CRM/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

Chronology-Turkey's Long And Winding Road Towards EU
16 September 2004
Reuters News

Turkey Revises Its Penal Code in Bid to Join the European Union
By Susan Sachs
27 September 2004
The New York Times

High Stakes For Turkey And The West
By Morton Abramowitz and Richard Burt
20 August 2004
The Washington Post

Will The EU Keep Faith With Turkey?
By Martti Ahtisaari and Albert Rohan
31 August 2004
The Jakarta Post

Rejecting Turkey, And The Future
By Fareed Zakaria
21 September 2004
The Washington Post

Turkey And The EU
16 September 2004
The Washington Times

The Case For Letting Turkey In
By Quentin Peel
16 September 2004
Financial Times

The Impossibility Of Saying No - Turkey And The European Union
18 September 2004
The Economist

2005 APR 27 PM 4:36
CRM/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

Chronology-Turkey's Long And Winding Road Towards EU
16 September 2004
Reuters News

ANKARA, Sept 16 (Reuters) - Turkey, a Muslim country of 71 million people, expects the European Commission to give the green light next month for the launch of EU entry talks.

The 25 European Union leaders will take the final decision in December based on recommendations from the Commission in its Oct. 6 report on Turkey's political and human rights reforms.

Here are some key dates in Turkey's long and often turbulent relationship with Europe:

Sept 12, 1963 - Turkey seals an association agreement with the then-European Economic Community (EEC).

July 22, 1970 - Turkey and the EEC sign an accord foreseeing Turkey's eventual full membership in the bloc.

1978-79 - The EEC suggests Turkey apply for membership together with long-standing rival Greece. Ankara declines while Greece joins the wealthy bloc in 1981.

Sept 12, 1980 - The army topples the government and imposes military rule. Relations with the EEC are virtually frozen.

Nov 6, 1983 - Turkey holds parliamentary elections, ending military rule. Relations with Europe begin to normalise.

April 15, 1987 - Turkey applies for full EEC membership.

Dec 18, 1989 - The Commission endorses Turkey's eligibility for membership, but defers assessing its application.

Jan 1, 1996 - The Customs Union between the newly renamed European Union (EU) and Turkey enters into force.

Dec 13, 1997 - EU leaders deny Turkey candidate status. Dec 10, 1999 - An EU summit in Helsinki recognises Turkey as an applicant country but says it has many reforms to carry out.

Aug 3, 2002 - The Turkish parliament passes sweeping human rights reforms, including abolition of the death penalty.

Nov 3, 2002 - The conservative Justice and Development Party, which has Islamist roots, wins a general election.

June 19, 2003 - Turkey's parliament gives the green light to Kurdish broadcasts and removes other curbs on the language.

July 30, 2003 - The military-dominated National Security Council is stripped of executive powers in line with EU demands.

Dec 12, 2002 - The EU proposes a December 2004 review to set a date for accession talks if the outcome is positive.

Jan 16, 2004 - Romano Prodi, the first Commission president to visit since 1963, praises Turkey's progress on reforms.

May 7, 2004 - Parliament abolishes the state security courts used to try political and security-related crimes and changes constitution to ban discrimination on grounds of sex.

July 14, 2004 - An appeals court overturns the 1995 conviction of four Kurdish ex-lawmakers including former Nobel Peace Prize nominee Leyla Zana in a move hailed by the EU.

Sept 11, 2004 - EU Enlargement Commissioner Guenter Verheugen says Turkey will not join the EU before 2015, but also warmly praises its reform efforts.

Sept 16, 2004 - The Commission sends a team to Turkey to investigate allegations by a Turkish human rights group that torture remains systematic.

2005 APR 27 PM 4:36
CRM/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

Turkey Revises Its Penal Code in Bid to Join the European Union
By Susan Sachs
27 September 2004
The New York Times

ISTANBUL, Sept. 26 -- The Turkish Parliament on Sunday approved a sweeping revision of the country's penal code to bring it closer to European Union norms, a step aimed at enhancing the prospect of Turkish membership in the 25-nation bloc.

The package made no mention of criminalizing adultery, a proposal that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had initially supported but put aside after it appeared to undermine Turkey's longstanding efforts to enter the union.

Turkey has been a member of some European institutions for decades, but an official candidate for formal membership in the European Union only since 1999. On Oct. 6, the European Commission is expected to report whether Turkey has fulfilled the union's political criteria in the areas of human rights, democracy and commitment to a free-market economy, and formal talks on its membership can begin.

Mr. Erdogan, whose Justice and Development party took over the government nearly two years ago, has pushed through a major rewriting of Turkish laws aimed at winning a firm starting date for membership negotiations.

But, before receiving stern warnings from Brussels last week, he had also seemed willing to sacrifice the penal code for the adultery provision, which he described as a measure to protect families.

Gunter Verheugen, the European Union's enlargement commissioner, said failure to pass the penal code reforms would virtually eliminate any chance for Turkey to get a date for negotiations. Other European Union officials had also raised concerns about Turkey's fitness to join if it made adultery a crime.

The question of whether eventually to accept Turkey, a Muslim nation of 71 million people, has already set off a fierce debate in Western Europe.

European Union leaders, who are scheduled to meet in mid-December, have the final say on whether to set a timetable for starting talks with Turkey and whether to hold out the possibility of full membership.

The penal code was passed with overwhelming support from all political parties, although Mr. Erdogan's party, with a two-thirds majority in Parliament, was the crucial factor.

Before it becomes law, the bill must be signed by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer.

"The speed of our drive to full membership depends on our efforts," said Justice Minister Cemil Cicek, in an address to the Parliament. "No article in this new code can be used to limit rights and freedoms."

Women's groups in Turkey have said the legal changes represent a vast improvement but still do not go far enough to protect women from "honor killings," in which relatives murder a woman they consider to have shamed the family.

The reforms, however, did eliminate references to a female victim's marital status or virginity in determining the penalty for various crimes against women. For example, formerly a criminal who abused a virgin faced a tougher punishment than if he abused a nonvirgin.

Turkey's criminal laws were based in part on Italy's laws from the 1920's.

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

High Stakes For Turkey And The West
By Morton Abramowitz and Richard Burt
20 August 2004
The Washington Post

In December the Europeans must make a fateful decision: whether to give Turkey a definite date to begin negotiations to enter the European Union. That outcome remains uncertain. The United States has a profound interest in it, but no say; it can, however, have a voice. It must be an effective one.

Yes or no, the stakes are enormous -- for Turkey, Europe and the United States. In the case of Turkey, the accession process would transform the economy, society and political culture of a large, critically located country with enormous promise. Similarly, Turkey's accession would transform the European Union and what happens under its new constitution. For the United States, starting Turkish accession negotiations would fulfill a long-held strategic goal of placing a key ally in a prosperous and stable Europe while also contributing to reform in the greater Middle East. A "no" could push the Turkish economy into depression, undermine its surprising political stability and reverberate across the Muslim world.

Washington has been an enthusiastic advocate of Turkish membership since 1991 and has not been shy in making its views known. It played an important role in the European Union's establishment of a customs union with Turkey in 1995. Now Europeans -- including those in favor of Turkish accession -- are warning that a strong, public U.S. push in support of Turkey could backfire. This is not surprising. After all, Europeans would foot the bill for E.U. accession, not Americans.

The political sensitivity surrounding this issue in Europe is intense. This is not an easy topic for European leaders. Many European governments are prepared to begin the accession process in 2005 provided the European Commission finds that Turkey has met the necessary basic criteria. But large sections of European publics are opposed. French President Jacques Chirac supports beginning the accession process, but more than 60 percent of the French and even many senior figures in Chirac's own party remain opposed. Similarly, in Germany, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder is a firm advocate of Turkish accession, but his political opponents have urged an alternative, nonmember relationship for Turkey.

This year two factors make strong U.S. advocacy especially problematic. First, the debate within Turkey is fierce and treacherous because the right wing is using the issue to win broad support. Second, in the wake of the Iraq war, European public skepticism about U.S. motivations limits the ability of the United States to be an effective public advocate on many foreign policy issues.

If the United States is to have an impact, it has to pursue a differentiated, carefully targeted and (dare we say) nuanced approach, as we have proposed in a new study by the Atlantic Council of the United States. One, U.S. public advocacy of Turkish accession

should be directed at those E.U. states where it can make a difference, most notably the new members in Central Europe, such as Poland. In countries such as France and Germany -- where government leaders support Turkish accession but face strong domestic opposition -- the U.S. strategy should be one of quiet encouragement. America should studiously avoid anything that can make the jobs of those politicians even more difficult. The United States should also reach out to the human rights community and other key constituencies in Europe with the message that Ankara has come a long way and that accession helps address remaining concerns about building a civil society in Turkey.

Next, while only the European Union can judge whether Turkey has met its criteria for beginning talks, the United States can contribute to a more positive atmosphere. In particular, it should work to ensure that the continuing division of Cyprus is not an issue. It can encourage Turkey to keep making clear its determination to be constructive. It should also push the Greek Cypriots not to hold Turkey hostage to the Cyprus issue and to make clear that their opposition to the U.N. settlement plan in the April referendum was not indicative of any broader unwillingness to reach an agreement with the Turkish Cypriots.

Finally, and perhaps most important, the United States must stress to all countries the strategic dimensions to Turkish accession: It will anchor Turkey firmly in the camp of Western democracies, in contrast to Turkey's neighbors in the Middle East. In this way, the United States can add a valuable perspective to the European focus on the sensitive internal question of how to accommodate a big new member of the European Union. A strong, democratic and prosperous Turkey -- bordering Iraq, Syria and Iran -- will serve American and European interests alike and speak volumes about the inclusiveness of the West and its determination to say no to the clash of civilizations.

Morton Abramowitz, a senior fellow at the Century Foundation, was U.S. ambassador to Turkey from 1989 to 1991. Richard Burt is chairman of Diligence LLC and has served as assistant secretary of state for Europe and U.S. ambassador to Germany.

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

Will The EU Keep Faith With Turkey?
By Martti Ahtisaari and Albert Rohan
31 August 2004
The Jakarta Post

More than forty years ago, Turkey applied for associate membership of the European Economic Community. With the Association agreement of 1963, a special relationship was established, culminating in the customs union of 1996. During all these years, European governments consistently confirmed Turkey's eligibility for full membership, making accession dependent on compliance with membership criteria.

Turkey's formal recognition as a candidate state in 1999 led Turkey to undertake unprecedented reform efforts in the area of human and minority rights, including abolition of the death penalty, safeguards against torture, promotion of religious freedoms, gender equality, and restriction of the military's role in political life. Should the EU consider the accession criteria as having been fulfilled, it must decide to open negotiations in early 2005. Not to do so would mean to renege on political commitments and to severely damage the EU's credibility in the world.

In many parts of Europe, however, Turkey's admission to the EU is viewed with skepticism owing to its size, relatively poor economy, fears of massive immigration, and, above all, cultural and societal differences -- a euphemism for Islam. It would be foolish to deny that some of these factors represent serious challenges. However, they are often exaggerated and certainly not insurmountable. Negotiations with Turkey would be lengthy and accession may not occur before 2015. This period of time would offer both Turkey and the Union an opportunity to come to terms.

With 80 million people, Turkey would be one of the largest EU states. But the size of a country plays only a limited role in the EU's decision-making process, because political influence within the Union depends more on economic power. Moreover, for decades Turkey has been a responsible member of many European institutions, and there is no reason to believe that it would act differently in the EU.

Because of its weak economy, Turkey would be eligible for substantial EU assistance. The size of these transfers, however, would depend on the EU's financial policies at the time of admission, the outcome of accession negotiations, and economic developments in Turkey. In any case, the EU's practice of "capping" its budget would prevent an explosion in the financial costs entailed by Turkey's accession.

Immigration should not be a cause for undue concern, either. Human mobility is limited, and Turkey workers' would probably be allowed to move freely within the EU only after a long transition period, possibly not before 2025. Given the expected upswing of Turkey's economy and its declining birthrate, experts predict a figure of around 2.7 million immigrants by that point. Meanwhile, diminishing and aging populations in most of Europe will have made immigration a necessity. Among the countries from where

immigration to the EU is probable, Turkey has the best prospects for successful adaptation.

It is Turkey's Muslim population that creates the strongest emotions. Many feel that Turkey simply does not fit into a European society based on Christian traditions and culture. It is also feared that Islamists may one day turn Turkey into a fundamentalist state. Unlikely as it may be in view of Turkey's deeply rooted secularism, such a risk cannot be totally excluded. But the same is true for any other democracy, where radical groups could well misuse the democratic process for their purposes.

Surely, the best protection against such a calamity is to strengthen Turkey's democratic system, which can best be achieved by anchoring it firmly in a bloc of similarly democratic countries. As for the EU, it must decide whether it wants to be a closed "Christian club" or an open and inclusive society, drawing strength from cultural and religious diversity. Turkey's accession to the Union would give a powerful answer, one that would be heard with particular clarity in the Islamic world.

The need to refute arguments against Turkey's admission to the EU leaves the advantages rarely mentioned: Its unique geopolitical position at the crossroads of the Balkans, Southern Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East -- vitally important regions for Europe's security; its role as mayor transit country for energy supplies; its military capabilities at a time when the EU is developing its new European Defense Policy; and the great potential of the Turkish economy, with its young and dynamic labor force.

At the same time, the risks of rejecting Turkey must also be taken into account: The likelihood that the reform process would collapse, bringing radical currents to the fore and leading to instability and political unrest at the EU's doorsteps.

Turkish EU membership presents both opportunities and challenges. On balance, however, the advantages far outweigh the risks.

Martti Ahtisaari, Finland's former president, is chairman of the Independent Commission on Turkey. Albert Rohan is rapporteur of the Independent Commission on Turkey.

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

Rejecting Turkey, And The Future
By Fareed Zakaria
21 September 2004
The Washington Post

Here's a quiz: Over the past two years, which developing country has undertaken the most dramatic economic, political and social reforms in the world? Some hints: This country has deregulated its economy, simplified its tax code and put its fiscal house in order, resulting in 8.2 percent growth this year and a 10 percent rise in productivity. It has passed nine packages of major reforms that have reduced the military's influence in government, enshrined political dissent and religious pluralism, passed strict laws against torture, abolished the death penalty, and given substantial rights to a long-oppressed minority.

The answer is Turkey. Even if it were not a Muslim country situated in the Middle East (sort of), its performance would be stunning. And yet, thanks to events last week, its long quest to become a full member of the European Union may be thwarted.

The Turkish government's insistence on introducing a law making adultery a criminal offense may have derailed matters. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has angrily pointed out that the issue of adultery is not part of the criteria laid out by the European Union. He's right technically, but foolish politically. The reality is that there are many in Europe who want to keep Turkey out of the union because it is large, poor and, most important, because it is Muslim. The adultery law gives them a highly public issue to symbolize their fears.

But even if the adultery law passes, so what? European hysteria about this is absurd. Many are claiming that this represents the dangers of Islam in Europe. Have Europeans forgotten their own history? Adultery is banned in the Ten Commandments and was a criminal offense in almost every European country until recently. Ireland abolished such a law in 1981, France in 1975, Italy in 1969. In the United States, 23 states still have such laws on the books.

Don't get me wrong: I am opposed to the Turkish law. But to judge a developing country such as Turkey by the standards of postmodern Europe circa 2004 seems to miss the point. If Turkey were a fully modernized society, it wouldn't need E.U. membership. Besides, were Turkey to become an E.U. member, the adultery law would quickly be null and void, since the European courts would rule against it.

What is being lost in the uproar over adultery is that even last week, while debating this one relatively trivial issue, the Turkish parliament passed 218 laws that reform the penal code in accordance with the European Union's criteria. Turkey's record of reform is the equal of most previous candidates for E.U. membership. A distinguished group of Europeans, including former Finnish prime minister Martti Ahtisaari, released a report two weeks ago pointing out that Turkey compares well with two other E.U. applicants, Bulgaria and Romania.

And what is truly being lost is perhaps the most significant point: All these progressive, modernizing moves are being made by a ruling party that represents the people, unlike so many of the liberals in the Arab world, who are an unelected elite. The AK Party has shown that a devotion to Islam is compatible with liberalism, pluralism and democracy. For this reason it is the most powerful symbol of modern Islam in the world today, a symbol that could have resonance for the Middle East, Europe's own Muslim population and the entire Islamic world.

For decades people have held up Turkey as a model for Muslim politics. But as Graham Fuller points out in an insightful essay in the Washington Quarterly, this was a Western fantasy. Kemal Ataturk's hypersecular republic, allied to the United States and Israel, was never going to move the hearts of Muslims.

The AK Party has changed even that. By softening the edges of Turkey's secularism, by emphasizing clean government, by reaching out to the Middle East, it is becoming a more approachable model for Muslims. But to build this image it must be able to do things that reflect the concerns of the Muslim masses, not the elites.

That might include laws that reflect the deep concern in every Muslim country that as they modernize, they will become permissive and licentious. This concern is not uniquely Islamic. Every conservative movement and party in the Western world has worried deeply about this for the past 200 years.

In the end the European Union decision will not be about Turkey's performance, which has been better than anyone could have hoped. It will be made by a Europe that is either confident or scared of the future. The former would see that Turkey could help solve its labor shortages, help with its problems assimilating Muslim populations and send a powerful signal across the world. The latter is best symbolized by the leader of the German conservatives, Angela Merkl, a bitter opponent of Turkish membership who acknowledged these positive effects but said recently, "I look inward." Alas, there are too many European leaders today who look only inward.

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

Turkey And The EU
16 September 2004
The Washington Times

Turkey has denied Islamo-phobic Europeans an excuse to deny or delay its European Union entry talks. On Tuesday, Ankara decided to shelve a proposed law criminalizing adultery - a move which will make it more difficult for the EU to turn down Turkey. This is fortunate, since Turkey's admission is central to American and European interests.

Turkey has proposed a slew of laws to reform its 78-year-old penal code. The package includes stiffer punishment for crimes such as rape, sexual assault, human trafficking, torture and pedophilia. The legislation also recognizes rape in marriage and sexual harassment as crimes, and will make it easier to prosecute so- called honor killings. Before the government dropped the proposal, the package also included legislation criminalizing adultery - which caused a furor in Europe. That furor comes at a very bad time for Turkey. On Oct. 6, the European Commission is to decide whether to recommend a date for Turkey's EU accession.

That date, therefore, is broadly significant to the international community. Inasmuch as Turkey is a cultural and geographic bridge between East and West, it can serve as a bulwark against a potential clash of civilizations. Turkey's eventual entry into the European Union would mark a merger of predominantly Christian and Muslim worlds. This would help counter the growing concern that a large- scale clash between Christian and Muslim nations is inevitable. Also, Turkey, long a force for moderation in the Muslim world, would rise in prominence - a welcome prospect.

There is, however, widespread apprehension in Europe about Turkey eventually becoming an EU member - much of which is unadulterated ethnic bigotry. Much of the uproar over the Turkish adultery legislation appeared to have an ulterior motive: delaying the start of formal EU-accession talks with Turkey. Some of Europe's objections over Turkey, however, are clearly cultural. Many European countries are becoming fairly dogmatic about establishing sweeping secularism, even when it infringes on freedom of religious expression. But Europe is divided on the question of secularism, with more traditional countries keen on maintaining a Christian identity.

Much of Europe's criticism of the adultery law was heavy-handed, in particular charges it would lead to so-called honor killings. All the same, Ankara was wise to scrap the legislation. But given the fact that Turkey has been kept waiting at the EU altar for some time, Europe is obliged to go the extra mile to play fair.

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

The Case For Letting Turkey In
By Quentin Peel
16 September 2004
Financial Times

The timing could hardly have been worse. The proposal by the Turkish government to bring back prison sentences for adultery, less than a month before the European Commission is due to rule on Ankara's readiness to begin negotiations for European Union membership, looked like a disastrous own goal.

It played into the hands of all those who would argue that Turkey is too Islamic to be European. And it indicated that the ruling Justice and Development party (AKP) in Ankara, which would like to portray itself as an Islamic equivalent of Europe's Christian Democrats, is far from understanding the values of the European community it wants to join.

When the Turkish government backed down on Tuesday, Abdullah Gul, the foreign minister, suggested that the national interest had taken precedence over the ruling party's agenda. It was a demonstration of how critical the campaign for EU membership has become in Ankara.

The law on adultery is not a fundamental issue, of course, but rather a telling indicator. The country is required to demonstrate that it can guarantee the stability of its democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minority groups, as well as the existence of a functioning and competitive market economy. Those are the so-called Copenhagen criteria that Turkey must comply with before it can start membership negotiations.

A definitive ruling from the Commission is due on October 6, before the 25 EU member states decide in December whether they will give a firm date to start talks. After 41 years in the waiting room, Turkey's pro-EU campaigners believe they are in sight of their goal.

"It is like the last 100 metres of a marathon," says Volkan Bozkir, deputy under-secretary in Ankara's foreign ministry, responsible for negotiations with Brussels. "Everyone is cheering but after 42 kilometres one's physical condition is not the best. There might even be a stormier debate in coming months."

It is an extraordinary political moment in Turkey. The prospect of EU membership has succeeded in uniting the religious and secular forces that have divided the country for decades. The ruling AKP has embraced EU membership as a way of guaranteeing its own protection from the secular establishment, headed by the powerful Turkish military. The business community is strongly in favour because accession will provide predictability in a notoriously turbulent economy. And the army is committed to the Europeanisation of Turkey, both because it is part of the dream of Kemal Ataturk and because it would protect the country against any creeping Islamisation.

Crudely put, they all want EU membership for contrasting, even conflicting, reasons. But that coincidence has allowed the country to undergo a legal and constitutional transformation, including a drastic reduction in the interference of the military in civilian life.

Indeed, there is a palpable change in the atmosphere in Turkey: less defensiveness and more self-confidence about the future. "This government was a breath of fresh air," one European ambassador said. Others say the jury is still out. Die-hard secularists brought up in the Ataturk tradition find it very hard to trust a party with Islamic roots.

Nevertheless, the benefit of seeking EU membership has been to enable Turkey to carry out economic, social and human rights reforms that its traditionally chaotic political process had prevented for years. The danger is that EU membership is coming to be seen as a panacea for Turkey's ills. Just getting a date to start negotiations is expected to trigger a surge of new investment. It may not happen unless Turkey can prove it will stick to the path of economic reform.

But can the EU members pluck up the courage to give Turkey the green light? Public opinion is certainly very hesitant about allowing such a huge, poor and above all Islamic country into the comfortable European club.

Recent critics of Turkish membership have made it pretty obvious that they are more concerned about the country's Islamic identity (in spite of its secular constitution) than they are about its size and relative poverty. Frits Bolkestein, the retiring Dutch single market commissioner in Brussels, has warned of the "Islamisation" of Europe, and his colleague Franz Fischler, the agriculture commissioner, has talked of "doubts as to Turkey's long-term secular and democratic credentials".

At least they are not hiding behind technical arguments for resisting Turkish membership. But the technical difficulties are real: Turkey would be as big as Germany in population terms by 2020, and one of the poorest EU members. The difference between its prosperous west and impoverished east is huge. And its borders with countries such as Iran, Iraq and Syria cannot easily be policed.

The Copenhagen criteria also say that "the Union's capacity to absorb new members" must be taken into consideration. Yet the technical challenges are manageable. The real challenges are cultural. Is Europe prepared to accept such a large Islamic country into its midst? Can Turkey accommodate European values? If the world is going to resist the present drive of fanatics and extremists to divide it into some disastrous clash of civilisations, we must hope that the answer to both questions is Yes.

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

The Impossibility Of Saying No - Turkey And The European Union
18 September 2004
The Economist

Why Turkey is likely to get a yes to the start of EU entry talks

Many European governments dislike the idea of Turkey joining the European Union—but they are still likely to agree in December to open membership talks

This is a tale of two countries that want to join the European Union. The first has been a stalwart member of NATO for over 50 years. It has a flourishing democracy, a lively free press and a stable government with a big parliamentary majority. Although most of its people are deeply religious, it is fiercely secular. Its economy is booming: over the past two years, GDP has grown by an annual average of 8.4%, and inflation has fallen by three-quarters, close to single figures. Unlike the current EU, it has a young and growing population. Its biggest city was a cradle of Christian (and European) civilisation. It sounds, in short, like a shoo-in for the EU.

The second country is quite different. It lies mostly in Asia, and it borders such troublesome places as Iraq, Syria and Iran. Its economy has been a basket-case for decades, its currency has been repeatedly devalued, many of its banks are ailing and it is one of the largest debtors to the IMF. It is far poorer than even the poorest of the ten countries that joined the EU in May. It has a history of military coups. Its dreadful human-rights record and its torture of prisoners are well documented. Its people are overwhelmingly Muslim, and it could soon be the EU's biggest member by population. In short, the EU should not touch it with a bargepole.

The question of which country the EU should admit is, of course, a trick one. For these are not two countries, but one: Turkey. This year the Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has become a familiar figure round Europe, pressing the case for starting membership talks. Now the moment of truth is at hand. In two weeks' time, the European Commission will publish its verdict on Turkey's readiness. And in December EU leaders must decide whether to say yes, and fix a date next year for the start of negotiations.

That it is possible, in our tale of two countries, to depict Turkey in such diametrically opposed ways shows why it presents such a poser for the EU. No other country's putative membership arouses such passions. It was a big issue in last June's European elections. This month, fresh controversy has broken out over a Turkish government proposal to criminalise adultery, which was hastily dropped after an outcry around Europe.

Several European commissioners have spoken out against Turkey's aspirations. Franz Fischler, the (Austrian) agriculture commissioner, has said that Turkey is more oriental than European. Frits Bolkestein, the (Dutch) single-market commissioner, declared that Turkish entry would mean that 1683 (when Turkish troops were thrown back from the

gates of Vienna) would have been in vain. And Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, a former French president, has said that Turkish entry would mean the end of Europe.

The question of Turkish membership of the European club has been around for four decades. Turkey was the second country to sign a European association agreement, normally seen as a prelude to membership, as long ago as 1963. It formally applied for membership only in 1987. The European Commission recommended against that application in 1989, but it remained on the table. Throughout the 1990s, even as they prepared to take in the eight central European countries that joined in May, European leaders trod gingerly around Turkey's hopes, though in 1996 an EU-Turkey customs union was formed. In 1997 an EU summit pointedly left the country off its list of candidates.

This evasiveness irritated the Turks. Turkish politicians continued to insist on the country's European vocation. Turkish generals began to mutter that they might have done better in Brussels had they spent 40 years in the Warsaw Pact, not NATO. Yet the truth is that Turkey's instability in the 1990s, culminating in the "soft coup" that ousted a mildly Islamist party from government in 1997, made talk of EU membership moot. So did its succession of economic crises, leading to near-default and an IMF bail-out in 2001. Turkey's brutal war on Kurdish PKK terrorists in the south-east, and its repeated human-rights violations, also disqualified it.

It was not until 1999 that an EU summit in Helsinki formally accepted Turkey as a candidate. In 2002 EU leaders went further, declaring that if, in December 2004, Turkey satisfied their "Copenhagen criteria", they would fix a date for opening negotiations. These criteria include having stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for minorities, a functioning market economy, the capacity to cope with competition within the EU and the ability to take on the obligations of membership.

The Justice and Development party, a mildly Islamist-leaning party that took office in November 2002 (though Mr Erdogan became prime minister only in March 2003), has pushed through a string of reforms to meet the Copenhagen criteria. So much so that few expect the European Commission to say no this time—although it could say "yes, but". It has become equally hard to see how the December EU summit can avoid offering a date, probably mid-2005, for the opening of entry talks.

Good marks and bad

How has Turkey got this far? The economy has stabilised after the horrors of 2001, thanks mainly to the IMF, but also to the economic policies of the Erdogan government. There are rocks ahead: the current-account deficit remains large, and Turkey's huge debt needs constant refinancing. Foreign investment remains feeble: last year Turkey took in a mere $1 billion, one-fifth of what went to Hungary. But fiscal policy is tight, and inflation is under control.

On the political front, the Erdogan government has used its thumping parliamentary majority to push through a series of substantial reforms, including three big packets of constitutional change. Civilian control of the army, and over its budget, has been reasserted. The notorious state security courts have been scrapped. The judiciary is undergoing reform. Efforts have been made to improve human rights. The death penalty has been abolished.

Progress in Turkey's largely Kurdish south-east has been remarkable. The war with the PKK (now renamed Kongra-Gel) had already subsided after the capture of the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in 1999. Earlier this year teaching in the Kurdish language, once proscribed, was permitted. In June Turkish state television began broadcasting in Kurdish for the first time. And a Turkish court freed Leyla Zana and three fellow Kurdish parliamentarians, who had languished in jail since 1994.

Mr Erdogan's culminating achievement has been to place Turkey on the moral high ground over Cyprus. Ever since 1974, Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots have been seen as the main obstacle to a peace settlement. The Turkish army wanted to hang on to northern Cyprus for strategic reasons; the veteran Turkish-Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, resisted all plans to reunite the island. So the EU decided it would in extremis admit the Greek-Cypriot republic on its own. But as the enlargement date of May 1st approached, one more chance was seized to revive a United Nations plan for a re-unified Cyprus, which was put to the vote in both parts of the island in April. Thanks partly to deft footwork by Mr Erdogan, the Turkish-Cypriots voted yes; this time it was the Greek-Cypriots who said no. That switch of role means that the Cyprus issue, long an obstacle to Turkish membership, is now an argument in favour.

Many people argue that these changes are not enough. The economy remains fragile. Human rights need more protection. A new penal code that has just been put to parliament includes positive measures such as tougher penalties for torturers. But, despite the climb-down over adultery, it does not improve women's rights much: for example, it is still not severe enough on "honour" killings.

On the Kurdish question, Kongra-Gel declared its ceasefire over on June 1st, because the government refuses to accept an amnesty for rebels. Some 35 soldiers and more than 70 guerrillas have since been killed. There is still local opposition to Kurdish rights. One school that planned to teach in Kurdish fell foul of a regulation about door widths. Troops have been turfing Kurds out of their homes again.

Religious freedom also remains circumscribed in Turkey. It is mysteriously hard to open a new Christian church. And the Greek Orthodox seminary on the island of Halki remains shut down. This means that no new orthodox preachers are being trained, even though the ecumenical patriarch is based in Istanbul.

Despite such failings, Günter Verheugen, the European commissioner for enlargement, who visited Ankara last week, is pleased with Turkey's progress. He has promised to treat Turkey in the same way as all other applicants, though he has placed particular stress on

implementation. It is one thing for a government to pass new laws; it is quite another for practice in local police stations, barracks and courtrooms to change.

Mr Erdogan concedes that "implementation is key". He also insists that his programme of reforms will continue even if EU leaders say no in December—he jokes that he would rename the criteria after Ankara, not Copenhagen. His foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, agrees that reforms are anyway needed to make Turkey a modern democratic state. He too stresses implementation, citing the example of torture, where the aim of zero tolerance will take time to achieve. But he insists that the EU must not apply double standards to Turkey. Other applicants with implementation problems have been deemed ready to start talks, and nobody expects Turkey actually to join the EU for at least ten years.

Unwritten criteria

If the decision in December were based solely on the Copenhagen criteria, it would be hard to say no. Indeed, in its economic, political and judicial reforms, Turkey is in many ways ahead of Romania, which is hoping to join in 2007. But this being Turkey, other factors come into play.

For the Europeans, most of these factors are negative. The easiest to dispose of is the claim that Turkey is not in Europe. At the north end of the bridge across the Bosporus a sign welcomes drivers to Europe. But most geographers would say that one-tenth of the country's land-mass is already in Europe, as is most of its biggest city. Cyprus, which has joined the EU, lies to the east of Turkey's main population centres. In the 19th century, Turkey was a European power (Nicholas I of Russia dubbed it the sick man of Europe, not of Asia). Anyway, the EU has accepted Turkey's candidacy—and its geography has not changed.

Then there is size. This is not a criterion for EU membership. Indeed, Turkey could re-balance a club that has become skewed to the small. The EU, which began with three big and three small countries, now has six big and 19 small. The addition of Turkey, after Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, would make it seven big and 22 small.

What really bothers existing members is that Turkey, which has 71m inhabitants and is growing, would be the biggest EU country, overtaking Germany in roughly 2020. Even so, its population would still be only about 15% of the EU total. Under the "double-majority" voting system in the draft EU constitution, it would have a weight equivalent to 14% of the total. That compares with Germany's weight, in an EU of 25, of 18%.

Turkey's poverty could pose other problems. One-third of the population is engaged in farming, which would be a big challenge for the EU's common agricultural policy. That, and its poverty, might mean big budgetary transfers from Brussels for many years—although most Turks say they are more interested in attracting foreign investment than in EU handouts.

But the biggest issue of all is Islam. Few people now insist that the EU is a Christian club, but the feeling that it should be is widespread, especially among Christian Democratic parties. September 11th, Iraq and the war on terror have all focused renewed attention on whether the EU is right to consider admitting a Muslim country. The arrival of the Justice and Development Party in government, so beneficial to Turkey's EU prospects in other ways, has not helped in this respect, for even within Turkey many suspect it of having a covertly Islamist agenda.

Mr Erdogan roundly rejects the label Islamist, yet his party has Islamist roots and its actions sometimes challenge Turkey's secularism. Mr Erdogan's first controversial target was rules that make it hard for graduates of religious training (imam hatip) schools to attend Turkish universities. In May he forced through a law giving all vocational-school graduates, including those from imam hatip schools, equal treatment with other graduates. The army chief of staff came out against the law, and the president duly vetoed it.

Mr Erdogan, who is himself an imam hatip graduate and whose four children also attend such schools, feels strongly that he is in the right. He says the army should not interfere with an issue that ought to be left to parliament; yet for now, he has dropped the law. He has acted similarly over the criminalisation of adultery. For weeks, he defended the plan, saying that the West was not "a model of perfection for everything". But he has now withdrawn the idea in the face of fierce protests.

The suggestion that Turkey could be kept out of the EU simply because of its religion is not really tenable. This is not least because the Union already has 12.5m Muslims, and two other potential candidates for membership—Albania and Bosnia—are partly or wholly Muslim. It is also because, in a broader sense, Islam can be read not as a negative, but a positive for Turkish entry.

Ever since September 11th, the West has been anxious to avoid a "clash of civilisations", and to show that democracy and liberal economics are compatible with Islam. One of the best ways to do this would be to admit Turkey to the EU. As one EU foreign minister puts it: "letting Turkey in would be like D-Day in the war on terror". By the same token, a no to Turkey would antagonise other Muslim countries, especially in the Arab world, who would see it as a slap in the face delivered by the West against Islam.

The naysayers

Despite these arguments, a strong body of opinion in Europe is against Turkish membership. The most negative attitudes are to be found in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Austria. Besides fretting about Islam, these countries worry about possible migration from Turkey and about cost.

In France, President Jacques Chirac's UMP party has come out against Turkish membership, though Mr Chirac has said he is in favour. In Germany the opposition Christian Democrats (CDU) and their allies in the Christian Socialist Union are against.

The CDU leader, Angela Merkel, visited Ankara earlier this year and offered Turkey a special associate status instead of full membership. Mr Erdogan is not interested in any such status. In any case the Social Democratic chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, has come out for Turkish entry. So have most other EU governments, even the Dutch.

Until a few years ago, Greece was seen as an insuperable opponent of Turkish membership. But after the rapprochement that followed the earthquakes in Turkey and Greece in 1999, that has turned round: Greece is now a strong supporter of Turkey's EU goal, and its prime minister, Costas Karamanlis, is a close ally of Mr Erdogan's. Cyprus is less predictable, but the Greek-Cypriot government, already in bad odour in Brussels, is unlikely to court further calumny by vetoing Turkey. Most of the ten new countries that joined the EU in May claim to support Turkey. It is the existing EU 15, not the new countries, that fret most over Turkish accession.

The biggest reassurance to naysayers will be a promise that Turkish negotiations will take many years. Turks themselves talk of ten years, with a target date of perhaps 2015 for actual entry. Others think it will be more like 15 or even 20 years. In some ways, it is the travelling towards membership that counts, not the arrival. That reassurance alone should be enough to win Turkey its promised date for opening entry negotiations in December.

Yet there will still be a doubt over their outcome. Turkey's entry needs to be approved unanimously by the existing members. A new CDU-led government in Germany could upset the apple-cart. A failure to ratify the draft EU constitution might be seized upon as a reason to stop any talks with Turkey. Or somebody, perhaps Mr Chirac, might promise a referendum on Turkish accession to draw the sting of political opposition. It is little wonder that, although three-quarters of Turks say they favour EU membership, half say they never expect it to happen. Yet they are closer to it than anybody would have thought possible a few years ago.

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036-2188
Tel: 202-797-6000 Fax: 202-797-6004
www.brookings.edu

U.S.-EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES
September 2004

Turkey's European Quest: The EU's Decision on Turkish Accession

Philip Gordon and Omer Taspinar

Center on the United States and Europe, The Brookings Institution

On October 6, 2004, the European Commission is scheduled to issue two reports on Turkey that will help determine that country's future relationship with the EU. The first is a "Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Toward Accession," an annual assessment of Turkey's efforts to meet the EU's "Copenhagen criteria" for membership—including stability of democratic institutions, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and a functioning market economy. In 2002, EU leaders pledged that if Turkey met those criteria by December 2004 the EU would begin accession negotiations with Ankara "without delay." The second report will assess the potential political, economic, and financial impact Turkish accession would have on the EU, including in sensitive areas such as agriculture. EU leaders will then consider the two reports and decide at their December summit whether, when, and under what conditions to begin the Turkish accession process.

The stakes surrounding the October report and the December decision could scarcely be higher for Turkey and its relations with the West. After decades of pursuing the dream of EU membership, and several years of a far-reaching domestic reform process, Turkish expectations are high. A positive signal from the EU would reward the Turkish government—led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of the Justice and Development Party (AKP)—for its ambitious reform program. It would also encourage Turkey to effectively implement some of the new measures on freedom of expression, human rights, and civilian control of the military. A rejection by the EU, on the other hand, could have a devastating effect on the Turkish reform process, economy, and relations with Europe. The AKP government would be discredited, the improving economy set back as foreign direct investment and the stock market fell, incentives for improving human rights reduced, and Turkish nationalists and Islamists emboldened. The message to Turks—and in many ways to the entire Muslim world—would be that the EU's word cannot be trusted, and Europeans are simply not prepared to allow a predominantly Muslim country into its ranks.

None of this is to say that Turkey has today fulfilled all of the political and economic criteria for EU membership or that much hard work—especially in terms of implementing some of the new legislation—is not still needed. Nor is it to overlook the real challenges actual Turkish

membership would entail for the EU. Turks must understand that even in the best of circumstances, accession talks—which are really not so much negotiations as the process of Turkey aligning its domestic rules and regulations with those already adopted by the EU—will go on for years. Still, the EU, in its October report and December decision, should acknowledge Turkey's progress, announce the start of accession talks for the spring of 2005, and begin the long and difficult process of preparing both Turkey and the EU for Turkey's eventual membership.

Turkish Reform and the EU Incentive

While EU membership for Turkey no doubt remains far off, the country's progress toward that goal over the past several years has been remarkable. As recently as December 1997, Turkey was not even acknowledged to be an official EU "candidate" and instead was put in a special category behind 12 other aspiring members, mostly from Central and Eastern Europe. In 1999, however, the EU reversed course, accepting Turkey as a candidate and declaring that Turkey would eventually be allowed to join the Union if it met the same criteria as the other candidates. Since then, a much more positive Turkey-EU dynamic has developed, whereby various Turkish governments have used the incentive of EU membership as leverage in pressing for otherwise very difficult domestic reforms.

The February 1999 capture of Kurdish separatist leader Abdullah Ocalan has also helped advance reform. The subsequent improvement in the security situation created a climate in which Turkish governments felt better able to implement the democracy and human rights policies demanded of them by the EU. After 1999, successive governments—starting with the coalition government of Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit and continuing under Erdogan and the AKP after November 2002—pursued these reforms with growing zeal. While more progress must still be made, the nine reform packages passed by these governments amount to progress toward democracy and human rights in Turkey beyond what most observers would have believed possible only a few years ago. Key areas include the following:

- **Civil-military relations**. The role of the powerful Turkish military in domestic politics has long been one of the greatest obstacles to Turkish entry in the EU. The military has intervened repeatedly in politics (including through military coups in 1960, 1971 and 1980 and the ouster of an Islamist government in 1997) and has exercised strong influence over civilian leaders through the National Security Council (NSC) established following the 1980 coup. Recent reforms have significantly reduced the military's role—at least on paper—in the name of satisfying EU demands. As of August 2004, a civilian, rather than a general, is now head of the NSC, whose meetings are now by law limited in number and no longer governed by draconian secrecy policies. New laws also now provide for greater transparency in the military budget process. Civilian control has also been enhanced by the removal of military representatives from the boards that oversee broadcasting, higher education, and new limits on the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians.

  These reforms will certainly strengthen Turkish democracy and the case for its EU membership. The key test of the military's willingness to play a lower-profile political

role, however, would come if the AKP government decided to push forward with sensitive legislation in areas such as religious education or the wearing of headscarves, or if the security situation in southeastern Turkey were to deteriorate.

- **Human rights.** The Erdogan government now stresses a "zero tolerance" policy on torture, and provisions on the rights of detainees and prisoners have been improved. Pretrial detention periods have been shortened and detainees are now guaranteed immediate access to an attorney. Recent legislation has also broadened freedom of expression, press, association, assembly and demonstration. The repeal of Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law, which prohibited the dissemination of separatist propaganda, has led to a significant reduction in the numbers of political prisoners being held.

  The key to the EU's reaction to these reforms will be implementation. For instance, while overt torture is declining, other abuses (such as sleep deprivation) appear to go on. There is also some evidence that human rights campaigners are still subject to intimidation and that the state still pursues court cases against people expressing opinions peacefully. In southeastern cities, even where emergency rule has been lifted, newspapers have been closed or fined for criticizing the military. So-called "honor killings" also appear to go on in parts of the country.

- **Cultural rights.** Ankara now acknowledges that Turkey has minorities based on "racial, religious, sectarian, cultural, or linguistic differences" and repealed laws curtailing the rights of such minorities. In a revolutionary measure, recent reform packages introduced the right of broadcasting, publication and instruction in languages other than Turkish, in effect officially liberalizing the use of Kurdish language. As of August 2004, even state-run radio and television has started limited broadcasts in Kurdish, Arabic, and other languages and dialects. Once again, however, implementation will be the critical issue. Kurdish language instruction is still strictly regulated, and classes limited in size and number, as is the time allocated for broadcasting in Kurdish on Turkish television.

- **Judicial reform.** The Turkish Judicial system has been significantly reformed—and Turkish Criminal and Anti-Terrorism Laws have been amended—in line with EU requirements. The death penalty was abolished in August 2002. Reforms also now allow for the retrial of legal cases that have been contradicted by the European Court of Human Rights. This particular alignment with EU law led to the June 9, 2004 release (pending a new trial) of four formerly imprisoned Kurdish members of Parliament, including well-known Kurdish human rights activist Leyla Zana. Most recently, the May 2004 reform package abolished the State Security Courts that had been set up following 1980 military coup to deal with "security offenses against the indivisible integrity of the State."

- **Economic reform.** Recent liberalization of the Turkish economy appears to be having an effect. After weathering the most severe economic crisis in its modern history in 2000-01 (when the economy shrunk by some 7.5%), Turkey is on a strong path of recovery. Inflation is down from over 70% in 2001 to 12 percent, interest rates are down, and growth is expected to be over 5% for 2004. The stock market is rising, a sign of investor confidence and in anticipation of a positive decision from the European Union.

The IMF and private rating agencies appear to be satisfied with the fiscal discipline of the AKP government.

- **Cyprus policy.** Turkish efforts to find a solution to the division of Cyprus were never made an explicit precondition for EU accession, but the political reality has always been that Turkish opposition to a Cyprus settlement would undermine its chances of joining the EU. Reversing the course of the hard-line Ecevit government that preceded it, the Erdogan government made a Cyprus settlement a high priority, largely in the name of removing the issue as an obstacle to Turkey's accession to the EU. Erdogan invested significant political capital and defied Turkish nationalists in urging Turkish Cypriots to approve a UN plan for political settlement. In the April 2004 referendum on the proposed UN plan, 65% of Turkish Cypriots supported the plan whereas 75% of Greek Cypriots rejected it. The Turkish government's strong support of the plan (in contrast to the Greek Cypriot leadership's opposition) earned it much political credit with the EU and has helped Turkey's case for membership.

The Difficult Path Ahead

Despite these far-reaching reforms, no one should overlook the obstacles that remain. First, the October Commission report will have to conclude that Turkey has substantially met the Copenhagen criteria and recommend that membership talks begin; that outcome is likely but not yet certain, given some of the enduring questions about implementation of Turkish reforms. Next, even if the Commission report is favorable to Turkey, EU leaders would have to agree—unanimously—at their summit in December to launch accession talks. Given the EU's commitments to Turkey, rejection of a positive Commission recommendation is unlikely, but a national veto could not be excluded. France, for example, might worry that a positive signal to Turkey in December would lead public opinion to reject the pending EU Constitution in referenda planned for next year. Finally, even if the Council does agree to start accession talks, that process will be long, and would only be completed if and when all EU members—and the EU parliament—were ready to take the revolutionary step of welcoming Turkey into the EU. The key challenges along this long path include the following:

- **European Public Opinion.** According to recent opinion polls, only around one-third of Europeans are in favor of Turkey's EU membership, whereas nearly half are against it. In key countries like France and Germany, nearly 60% of the population (according to February 2004 polls) opposes Turkish membership. Much of public opinion throughout Europe fears that Turkish entry could lead to an incoming wave of poor, Muslim immigrants, at a time when integration of immigrant communities is already proving extremely difficult. Such fears are easily exploited by far-right movements, which have been growing across Europe.

- **Institutional Issues.** With a growing population of nearly 70 million already, expected to rise to over 90 million over the next 20 years, Turkey could well be the EU's largest member state by the time it actually joined. Because the proposed new Constitution allocates political representation and voting weight in EU institutions according to population, Turkey would immediately upon entry become one of the most powerful

single actors in the Union—with the most votes on the European Council and the most members of the European Parliament, for example. This is not a palatable prospect for either big countries used to dominating like France and Germany or for small ones who already fear being dominated by coalitions of large states.

The effect of Turkish membership on EU institutions should not be exaggerated. Even if Turkey's population growth outpaces other Europeans in the coming decade as projected, even by 2015 it would still only be around 15% of the total. The EU, moreover, is likely to become more flexible over the years, allowing different levels of integration precisely to accommodate members like Turkey that might not want or be able to proceed with some aspects of integration.

- **Economic Challenges.** Despite Turkey's improving economy, membership would pose at least two major challenges—adapting both the EU's system of agricultural support and its program of regional aid, known as structural funds, to Turkey's large agricultural sector and its many poor regions. About 38% of Turks still live in rural areas with low productivity in agriculture. And with an average GDP of less than $4,000 per capita, Turkey would be eligible for significant structural funding, which provides support for any region with a GDP per capita below 75% of the EU average. Under these circumstances, Turkish accession to the European Union could cost as much as 15 billion euros per year.

  But there would also be economic advantages to Europe of Turkish entry. With its dynamic private sector and flexible labor markets, Turkey in the EU—like Ireland and Spain before it—has the potential to take-off economically and provide an attractive market for European goods and capital. Moreover, while Turkish immigration poses problems, the realities of European demographics and generous social welfare states mean that importing foreign labor will be necessary, and a European Turkey could be the best option for providing it. As for the structural funds and the costs of subsidizing Turkish agriculture, by the time Turkey actually joins the EU, both the Common Agricultural Policy and the structural funds system will likely be significantly revised.

- **Geopolitical issues.** Turkey's borders with Iraq, Iran, Syria, Armenia, and Georgia may prove problematic for the European Union on many fronts. Many Europeans worry about taking in a country that is geographically largely outside of Europe and situated in a region plagued with conflict, instability, and terrorism. They also wonder where the EU's borders would eventually end. Yet Turkey's geopolitical situation could be an opportunity as well as a challenge. Turkey's economic weight, military strength, good relations with both Israelis and Palestinians, and potential influence in the Muslim world could be useful to a Europe in search of a more strategic role in this critical region.

Moving Forward

The EU should start accession negotiations with Ankara in the spring of 2005. Given Turkey's essential compliance with the Copenhagen criteria, its progress toward liberal democracy, and positive efforts in Cyprus, the right strategy for the EU now is to reward Turkish reform while

clearly communicating with Ankara about what progress must still be made and how long the process may take.

Prospective EU membership has indisputably been the strongest catalyst of democratic reform in Turkey. Without it much of the recent progress would not have been made. While this could argue for continuing to dangle the prospect of accession talks in front of the Turks without actually delivering it, that process cannot go on indefinitely. An EU failing to deliver on its word now, given what Turkey has done, could undermine supporters of democratic reform within Turkey and strengthen nationalists or Islamists who want to move the country in a different direction. The EU can and should make clear that the accession process will take time—probably at least 10 years—and that Turkey still has work to do, but it also needs to indicate clearly that the process is moving forward.

To make accession realistic in the longer term, responsible EU leaders will have to start making the case for Turkey's inclusion to their own public opinion—as a number of them, including German Foreign Minister Josckha Fischer and British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, already are. The most convincing point is that a stable, prosperous and democratic Turkey on the inside of the EU will be better for Europe than an unstable and poor one on the outside. Europeans should also emphasize the long-term strategic, cultural, economic and security benefits from the inclusion of a democratic, secular, pro-Western, and moderately Muslim country to the Union.

Turkish leaders—in addition to ensuring full implementation of the recent reforms—also have to engage with both their own and EU public opinion. At home, the risk is unrealistic expectations about a fast track to full membership. While making the case for EU entry, Turkish leaders need to let their public know that Europe's caution on the issue is legitimate and understandable, rather than an affront to Turks or to Islam. Turkey should also launch a public relations campaign designed to convince Europeans about the changes taking place. Stronger interaction with European journalists, students, civil society, and the business community would help demonstrate Turkey's changing nature and overcome many existing prejudices.

Finally, the United States should maintain its strong support for Turkey—and Turkey's EU membership—but quietly. Washington's support for Turkish membership in the late 1990s was useful in getting the EU to hold out the incentive of membership, but in the current transatlantic climate, overt U.S. lobbying would probably be counterproductive. Given the very positive signals coming out of Brussels and EU capitals on the issue of late, moreover, it is probably unnecessary. Contrary to pessimists' expectations over the past several years, Turkey has held up its end of the Turkey-EU bargain. Barring unexpected setbacks, the EU should do the same.

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036-2188
Tel: 202-797-6000 Fax: 202-797-6004
www.brookings.edu

U.S.-EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES
September 2004

Turkey's European Quest: The EU's Decision on Turkish Accession

Philip Gordon and Omer Taspinar

Center on the United States and Europe, The Brookings Institution

On October 6, 2004, the European Commission is scheduled to issue two reports on Turkey that will help determine that country's future relationship with the EU. The first is a "Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Toward Accession," an annual assessment of Turkey's efforts to meet the EU's "Copenhagen criteria" for membership—including stability of democratic institutions, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and a functioning market economy. In 2002, EU leaders pledged that if Turkey met those criteria by December 2004 the EU would begin accession negotiations with Ankara "without delay." The second report will assess the potential political, economic, and financial impact Turkish accession would have on the EU, including in sensitive areas such as agriculture. EU leaders will then consider the two reports and decide at their December summit whether, when, and under what conditions to begin the Turkish accession process.

The stakes surrounding the October report and the December decision could scarcely be higher for Turkey and its relations with the West. After decades of pursuing the dream of EU membership, and several years of a far-reaching domestic reform process, Turkish expectations are high. A positive signal from the EU would reward the Turkish government—led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of the Justice and Development Party (AKP)—for its ambitious reform program. It would also encourage Turkey to effectively implement some of the new measures on freedom of expression, human rights, and civilian control of the military. A rejection by the EU, on the other hand, could have a devastating effect on the Turkish reform process, economy, and relations with Europe. The AKP government would be discredited, the improving economy set back as foreign direct investment and the stock market fell, incentives for improving human rights reduced, and Turkish nationalists and Islamists emboldened. The message to Turks—and in many ways to the entire Muslim world—would be that the EU's word cannot be trusted, and Europeans are simply not prepared to allow a predominantly Muslim country into its ranks.

None of this is to say that Turkey has today fulfilled all of the political and economic criteria for EU membership or that much hard work—especially in terms of implementing some of the new legislation—is not still needed. Nor is it to overlook the real challenges actual Turkish

membership would entail for the EU. Turks must understand that even in the best of circumstances, accession talks—which are really not so much negotiations as the process of Turkey aligning its domestic rules and regulations with those already adopted by the EU—will go on for years. Still, the EU, in its October report and December decision, should acknowledge Turkey's progress, announce the start of accession talks for the spring of 2005, and begin the long and difficult process of preparing both Turkey and the EU for Turkey's eventual membership.

Turkish Reform and the EU Incentive

While EU membership for Turkey no doubt remains far off, the country's progress toward that goal over the past several years has been remarkable. As recently as December 1997, Turkey was not even acknowledged to be an official EU "candidate" and instead was put in a special category behind 12 other aspiring members, mostly from Central and Eastern Europe. In 1999, however, the EU reversed course, accepting Turkey as a candidate and declaring that Turkey would eventually be allowed to join the Union if it met the same criteria as the other candidates. Since then, a much more positive Turkey-EU dynamic has developed, whereby various Turkish governments have used the incentive of EU membership as leverage in pressing for otherwise very difficult domestic reforms.

The February 1999 capture of Kurdish separatist leader Abdullah Ocalan has also helped advance reform. The subsequent improvement in the security situation created a climate in which Turkish governments felt better able to implement the democracy and human rights policies demanded of them by the EU. After 1999, successive governments—starting with the coalition government of Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit and continuing under Erdogan and the AKP after November 2002—pursued these reforms with growing zeal. While more progress must still be made, the nine reform packages passed by these governments amount to progress toward democracy and human rights in Turkey beyond what most observers would have believed possible only a few years ago. Key areas include the following:

- **Civil-military relations**. The role of the powerful Turkish military in domestic politics has long been one of the greatest obstacles to Turkish entry in the EU. The military has intervened repeatedly in politics (including through military coups in 1960, 1971 and 1980 and the ouster of an Islamist government in 1997) and has exercised strong influence over civilian leaders through the National Security Council (NSC) established following the 1980 coup. Recent reforms have significantly reduced the military's role—at least on paper—in the name of satisfying EU demands. As of August 2004, a civilian, rather than a general, is now head of the NSC, whose meetings are now by law limited in number and no longer governed by draconian secrecy policies. New laws also now provide for greater transparency in the military budget process. Civilian control has also been enhanced by the removal of military representatives from the boards that oversee broadcasting, higher education, and new limits on the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians.

  These reforms will certainly strengthen Turkish democracy and the case for its EU membership. The key test of the military's willingness to play a lower-profile political

role, however, would come if the AKP government decided to push forward with sensitive legislation in areas such as religious education or the wearing of headscarves, or if the security situation in southeastern Turkey were to deteriorate.

- **Human rights.** The Erdogan government now stresses a "zero tolerance" policy on torture, and provisions on the rights of detainees and prisoners have been improved. Pretrial detention periods have been shortened and detainees are now guaranteed immediate access to an attorney. Recent legislation has also broadened freedom of expression, press, association, assembly and demonstration. The repeal of Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law, which prohibited the dissemination of separatist propaganda, has led to a significant reduction in the numbers of political prisoners being held.

  The key to the EU's reaction to these reforms will be implementation. For instance, while overt torture is declining, other abuses (such as sleep deprivation) appear to go on. There is also some evidence that human rights campaigners are still subject to intimidation and that the state still pursues court cases against people expressing opinions peacefully. In southeastern cities, even where emergency rule has been lifted, newspapers have been closed or fined for criticizing the military. So-called "honor killings" also appear to go on in parts of the country.

- **Cultural rights.** Ankara now acknowledges that Turkey has minorities based on "racial, religious, sectarian, cultural, or linguistic differences" and repealed laws curtailing the rights of such minorities. In a revolutionary measure, recent reform packages introduced the right of broadcasting, publication and instruction in languages other than Turkish, in effect officially liberalizing the use of Kurdish language. As of August 2004, even state-run radio and television has started limited broadcasts in Kurdish, Arabic, and other languages and dialects. Once again, however, implementation will be the critical issue. Kurdish language instruction is still strictly regulated, and classes limited in size and number, as is the time allocated for broadcasting in Kurdish on Turkish television.

- **Judicial reform.** The Turkish Judicial system has been significantly reformed—and Turkish Criminal and Anti-Terrorism Laws have been amended—in line with EU requirements. The death penalty was abolished in August 2002. Reforms also now allow for the retrial of legal cases that have been contradicted by the European Court of Human Rights. This particular alignment with EU law led to the June 9, 2004 release (pending a new trial) of four formerly imprisoned Kurdish members of Parliament, including well-known Kurdish human rights activist Leyla Zana. Most recently, the May 2004 reform package abolished the State Security Courts that had been set up following 1980 military coup to deal with "security offenses against the indivisible integrity of the State."

- **Economic reform.** Recent liberalization of the Turkish economy appears to be having an effect. After weathering the most severe economic crisis in its modern history in 2000-01 (when the economy shrunk by some 7.5%), Turkey is on a strong path of recovery. Inflation is down from over 70% in 2001 to 12 percent, interest rates are down, and growth is expected to be over 5% for 2004. The stock market is rising, a sign of investor confidence and in anticipation of a positive decision from the European Union.

The IMF and private rating agencies appear to be satisfied with the fiscal discipline of the AKP government.

- **Cyprus policy.** Turkish efforts to find a solution to the division of Cyprus were never made an explicit precondition for EU accession, but the political reality has always been that Turkish opposition to a Cyprus settlement would undermine its chances of joining the EU. Reversing the course of the hard-line Ecevit government that preceded it, the Erdogan government made a Cyprus settlement a high priority, largely in the name of removing the issue as an obstacle to Turkey's accession to the EU. Erdogan invested significant political capital and defied Turkish nationalists in urging Turkish Cypriots to approve a UN plan for political settlement. In the April 2004 referendum on the proposed UN plan, 65% of Turkish Cypriots supported the plan whereas 75% of Greek Cypriots rejected it. The Turkish government's strong support of the plan (in contrast to the Greek Cypriot leadership's opposition) earned it much political credit with the EU and has helped Turkey's case for membership.

The Difficult Path Ahead

Despite these far-reaching reforms, no one should overlook the obstacles that remain. First, the October Commission report will have to conclude that Turkey has substantially met the Copenhagen criteria and recommend that membership talks begin; that outcome is likely but not yet certain, given some of the enduring questions about implementation of Turkish reforms. Next, even if the Commission report is favorable to Turkey, EU leaders would have to agree—unanimously—at their summit in December to launch accession talks. Given the EU's commitments to Turkey, rejection of a positive Commission recommendation is unlikely, but a national veto could not be excluded. France, for example, might worry that a positive signal to Turkey in December would lead public opinion to reject the pending EU Constitution in referenda planned for next year. Finally, even if the Council does agree to start accession talks, that process will be long, and would only be completed if and when all EU members—and the EU parliament—were ready to take the revolutionary step of welcoming Turkey into the EU. The key challenges along this long path include the following:

- **European Public Opinion.** According to recent opinion polls, only around one-third of Europeans are in favor of Turkey's EU membership, whereas nearly half are against it. In key countries like France and Germany, nearly 60% of the population (according to February 2004 polls) opposes Turkish membership. Much of public opinion throughout Europe fears that Turkish entry could lead to an incoming wave of poor, Muslim immigrants, at a time when integration of immigrant communities is already proving extremely difficult. Such fears are easily exploited by far-right movements, which have been growing across Europe.

- **Institutional Issues.** With a growing population of nearly 70 million already, expected to rise to over 90 million over the next 20 years, Turkey could well be the EU's largest member state by the time it actually joined. Because the proposed new Constitution allocates political representation and voting weight in EU institutions according to population, Turkey would immediately upon entry become one of the most powerful

single actors in the Union—with the most votes on the European Council and the most members of the European Parliament, for example. This is not a palatable prospect for either big countries used to dominating like France and Germany or for small ones who already fear being dominated by coalitions of large states.

The effect of Turkish membership on EU institutions should not be exaggerated. Even if Turkey's population growth outpaces other Europeans in the coming decade as projected, even by 2015 it would still only be around 15% of the total. The EU, moreover, is likely to become more flexible over the years, allowing different levels of integration precisely to accommodate members like Turkey that might not want or be able to proceed with some aspects of integration.

- **Economic Challenges.** Despite Turkey's improving economy, membership would pose at least two major challenges—adapting both the EU's system of agricultural support and its program of regional aid, known as structural funds, to Turkey's large agricultural sector and its many poor regions. About 38% of Turks still live in rural areas with low productivity in agriculture. And with an average GDP of less than $4,000 per capita, Turkey would be eligible for significant structural funding, which provides support for any region with a GDP per capita below 75% of the EU average. Under these circumstances, Turkish accession to the European Union could cost as much as 15 billion euros per year.

  But there would also be economic advantages to Europe of Turkish entry. With its dynamic private sector and flexible labor markets, Turkey in the EU—like Ireland and Spain before it—has the potential to take-off economically and provide an attractive market for European goods and capital. Moreover, while Turkish immigration poses problems, the realities of European demographics and generous social welfare states mean that importing foreign labor will be necessary, and a European Turkey could be the best option for providing it. As for the structural funds and the costs of subsidizing Turkish agriculture, by the time Turkey actually joins the EU, both the Common Agricultural Policy and the structural funds system will likely be significantly revised.

- **Geopolitical issues.** Turkey's borders with Iraq, Iran, Syria, Armenia, and Georgia may prove problematic for the European Union on many fronts. Many Europeans worry about taking in a country that is geographically largely outside of Europe and situated in a region plagued with conflict, instability, and terrorism. They also wonder where the EU's borders would eventually end. Yet Turkey's geopolitical situation could be an opportunity as well as a challenge. Turkey's economic weight, military strength, good relations with both Israelis and Palestinians, and potential influence in the Muslim world could be useful to a Europe in search of a more strategic role in this critical region.

Moving Forward

The EU should start accession negotiations with Ankara in the spring of 2005. Given Turkey's essential compliance with the Copenhagen criteria, its progress toward liberal democracy, and positive efforts in Cyprus, the right strategy for the EU now is to reward Turkish reform while

clearly communicating with Ankara about what progress must still be made and how long the process may take.

Prospective EU membership has indisputably been the strongest catalyst of democratic reform in Turkey. Without it much of the recent progress would not have been made. While this could argue for continuing to dangle the prospect of accession talks in front of the Turks without actually delivering it, that process cannot go on indefinitely. An EU failing to deliver on its word now, given what Turkey has done, could undermine supporters of democratic reform within Turkey and strengthen nationalists or Islamists who want to move the country in a different direction. The EU can and should make clear that the accession process will take time—probably at least 10 years—and that Turkey still has work to do, but it also needs to indicate clearly that the process is moving forward.

To make accession realistic in the longer term, responsible EU leaders will have to start making the case for Turkey's inclusion to their own public opinion—as a number of them, including German Foreign Minister Josckha Fischer and British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, already are. The most convincing point is that a stable, prosperous and democratic Turkey on the inside of the EU will be better for Europe than an unstable and poor one on the outside. Europeans should also emphasize the long-term strategic, cultural, economic and security benefits from the inclusion of a democratic, secular, pro-Western, and moderately Muslim country to the Union.

Turkish leaders—in addition to ensuring full implementation of the recent reforms—also have to engage with both their own and EU public opinion. At home, the risk is unrealistic expectations about a fast track to full membership. While making the case for EU entry, Turkish leaders need to let their public know that Europe's caution on the issue is legitimate and understandable, rather than an affront to Turks or to Islam. Turkey should also launch a public relations campaign designed to convince Europeans about the changes taking place. Stronger interaction with European journalists, students, civil society, and the business community would help demonstrate Turkey's changing nature and overcome many existing prejudices.

Finally, the United States should maintain its strong support for Turkey—and Turkey's EU membership—but quietly. Washington's support for Turkish membership in the late 1990s was useful in getting the EU to hold out the incentive of membership, but in the current transatlantic climate, overt U.S. lobbying would probably be counterproductive. Given the very positive signals coming out of Brussels and EU capitals on the issue of late, moreover, it is probably unnecessary. Contrary to pessimists' expectations over the past several years, Turkey has held up its end of the Turkey-EU bargain. Barring unexpected setbacks, the EU should do the same.

-----Original Message-----
From: O'Brien, Brett W.
Sent: Tuesday, October 19, 2004 6:44 PM
Subject: Turkey and the EU -- selected documents and commentary articles

Dear Friend --

We thought you might find useful the attached selection of documents and commentary articles regarding the recent European Union report on Turkey's progress in meeting standards for EU membership.

Best Regards,
Brett O'Brien
The Harbour Group

This material is distributed by The Harbour Group, LLC on behalf of the Republic of Turkey. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

Attachments in Word document below -

European Commission Statements

"The Commission's Report And Recommendation On Turkey's Application," *European Parliament,* 6 October 2004

"Highlights From The Commission Report On Turkey," *Associated Press Newswires*, 6 October 2004

Commentaries

"Long-Awaited Step For Turkey," *The New York Times*, 8 October 2004

"Turkey's Route To Empowerment," By James Abrahamson, Mansoor Ijaz and Alfred von Liechtenstein, *Financial Times*, 6 October 2004

"Unlocking a Christian Club ," Los Angeles Times, 15 October 2004

"Sour Delight," *The Wall Street Journal Europe*, 8 October 2004

"Turkey's Continental Drift," *The Washington Times*, 10 October 2004

"Turkey, EU: The Twain Can Meet," *Christian Science Monitor*, 5 October 2004

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

The Commission's Report And Recommendation On Turkey's Application
6 October 2004
European Parliament

Highlights From The Commission Report On Turkey
6 October 2004
Associated Press Newswires

Long-Awaited Step For Turkey
8 October 2004
The New York Times

Turkey's Route To Empowerment
By James Abrahamson, Mansoor Ijaz and Alfred von Liechtenstein
6 October 2004
Financial Times

Unlocking a Christian Club
15 October 2004
Los Angeles Times

Sour Delight
8 October 2004
The Wall Street Journal Europe

Turkey's Continental Drift
10 October 2004
The Washington Times

Turkey, EU: The Twain Can Meet
5 October 2004
Christian Science Monitor

The Commission's Report And Recommendation On Turkey's Application
6 October 2004
European Parliament

Ladies and gentlemen,

It is an honour for me, together with Günter Verheugen, to present before you the Recommendation and Report on Turkey's application, which the Copenhagen European Council of December 2002 asked the Commission to draw up in readiness for examination by the European Council in December 2004. As Parliament wished, these documents are accompanied by a preliminary appraisal of the main issues arising in

connection with the prospect of Turkey's accession, with particular regard to EU policies and the Community budget.

The Commission has just adopted these documents after several exploratory debates on the subject and following a long preparatory period which concludes with today's debate. It is a natural part of our democratic process for us to present these results to you at the same time as we inform the Council.

As you know, the first task allotted to us by the Copenhagen European Council was to draw up a report on the extent to which Turkey meets the Copenhagen political criteria and to put forward a recommendation. However, I should like to stress that it is, of course, the European Council itself - as it made abundantly clear in its December 2002 decision - to decide whether the criteria are being met and whether to open negotiations with Turkey.

The Commission's task was thus to analyse, as objectively and precisely as possible, Turkey's state of progress with regard to these criteria, and to draw up a recommendation to the Council on the basis of this analysis and any other relevant factors, including the impact study requested by Parliament.

The Commission's response today is YES. That is to say, its response as regards compliance with the criteria is positive, and it recommends opening negotiations.

However, it is a QUALIFIED YES that is accompanied by a large number of recommendations on following up and monitoring the situation in Turkey, and some specific recommendations on the conduct of negotiations.

I want to draw your attention to these two aspects, which are inseparably linked as far as we are concerned. In all sincerity, I appeal to the European public, Parliament, the Council, and to our Turkish partners – the people of Turkey and the Turkish Government – not to separate these two aspects: on the one hand our response, which is positive overall, and on the other the provisos that form the essential key to the success of the whole process of integrating Turkey into the European Union.

How has the Commission come up with this response?

Firstly, as regards Turkey's compliance with the Copenhagen criteria, the Commission has, as I have already noted, tried to present as objective and precise a picture as possible. Nothing has been concealed, covered up or distorted, neither the positive nor the negative aspects. On the positive side, the whole of Turkish society has been committed to a very far-reaching reform process, particularly over the last few years. In short, as regards the essential documents on the organisation of democracy in Turkey – the Constitution itself, all the internal laws and Turkey's accession to the various international conventions, whose primacy over its domestic laws it now recognises – Turkey has reached the level required by European standards in such matters – or will do so once the new Criminal Code recently adopted by its Parliament enters into force.

All these instruments are already having a strong impact on public life and behaviour in Turkey. Two examples are the abolition of the death penalty and the recent review of Leila Zana's trial and her release. However, much remains to be done to implement these texts in full and to bring actual reality in Turkey closer to practices in the countries of the European Union. The report draws attention to the situation as regards torture, women's rights, trade union rights, religious freedom and relations between civil and military authorities. A great deal has been achieved in these areas and progress is clearly visible – especially over the last few years. Nonetheless, much remains to be done.

This accounts for our position, which is positive, but at the same time cautious. Looking at today's snapshot, we have to admit there are still some blurred areas. If we consider the long-term picture, however, we see an increasingly active Turkish civil society and institutions that clearly project their desire to move towards our democratic values and standards and which are, indeed, making rapid progress in this direction. This is what prompts us to say YES. But at the same time, we have to ensure that these developments really are irreversible and that they will be pursued to completion. We must take the time needed to make sure that all the important reforms adopted become day-to-day reality for Turkish citizens, both men and women. And we must also tell our Turkish partners clearly and calmly that any breakdown in this progress towards democracy, human rights, fundamental rights and the rule of law as practised in the European Union will automatically bring negotiations to a halt.

To take an entirely different angle, our impact study indicates that the overall balance is positive. Taking all the relevant factors into account, we believe that Turkey's accession to the EU may make a positive contribution to the Union. However, the country's size, geographical position and traditions as a regional power, its defence capacity, population and demographic growth, its current level of development, the disparities between its regions, its infrastructure and the size of its rural and farming population call for profound reflection and clear precautions in conducting accession negotiations, so as to prevent Turkey's integration from weakening the structure we have been building for over 50 years.

The impact study we are presenting today is modest in its claims. It does not seek to be exhaustive or to predict the future while essential parameters such as economic growth in Turkey and the Union remain uncertain. Nonetheless, it does already draw attention to various sectors that will require lengthy periods of preparation and adjustment in Turkey's policies, notably rural and farming policy. Long transition periods will be needed, and sometimes, as with the free movement of persons, permanent safeguard clauses could prove necessary.

An estimate has been made of the impact of Turkey's accession on the budget. Bearing in mind all the methodological precautions that are needed when it comes to interpreting such figures, which depend on parameters that are, as I said, uncertain, the main political lesson to be drawn from this estimate is that Turkish integration cannot be included in the 2007-2013 budgetary perspective on which negotiations have started on the basis of

proposals put forward by the Commission some months ago. This means that negotiations on the chapters of the Turkish accession treaty that have financial implications can only be started on the basis of the financial perspective for the following period. This is consistent with the prudent pace of negotiations to which I referred earlier.

Finally, as with all negotiation processes, particularly those that are as complex as our study indicates, we must stress that the outcome is not a foregone conclusion. There are risks that we must take on board, and that we also ask Turkey to take on board. However, we cannot imagine a future for Europe in which Turkey is not firmly anchored.

Honourable Members, this is the main burden of the message I wanted to convey to you today on behalf of the Commission, to which Günter Verheugen will add further details. We are ready to reply to all your questions, but firstly I would like to conclude by addressing myself to Turkey and then, through you, to the European public.

I want to send a message of confidence to Turkey, its people and its government. In responding positively today, the Commission is acknowledging your historic aspiration, in which Atatürk stands as a landmark, to share fully in the destiny and values of Europe. Likewise, it acknowledges the extent of the efforts made over the last few years to translate this aspiration into the organisation and operation of your democracy. Nonetheless, much ground remains to be covered before this objective can be fully attained, and I appeal to you to show the same determination in pursuing further reforms and wisely conducting an accession process which, like all the others, will display both periods of progress and moments of tension and unavoidable difficulties.

I want to call on the European public to demonstrate equal perseverance. A Europe with self-confidence and a Constitution, strong institutions and well-established policies, which is in the process of recovering economic growth and is underpinned by its model of peace, prosperity and solidarity, has nothing to fear from Turkey's accession. The integration of Turkey is only one of the many challenges facing us. The biggest of these challenges are internal ones. We must also consider the opportunities that Turkey's integration will bring us in terms of growth and prosperity. We must, above all, bear in mind the message of the founding fathers of our Europe and the project of disseminating the values of peace, security, democracy and cooperation throughout our continent and among our peoples and nations.

Highlights From The Commission Report On Turkey
6 October 2004
Associated Press Newswires

BRUSSELS, Belgium (AP) - Selected highlights from the European Commission's recommendation on Turkey's progress on the way to opening European Union membership negotiations.

"The Commission considers that Turkey sufficiently fulfills the political criteria and recommends that accession negotiations be opened."

"The irreversibility of the reform process, its implementation, in particular with regard to fundamental freedoms, will need to be confirmed over a longer period of time."

"The necessary preparations for accession will last well into the next decade."

"With over 3 million, Turks constitute by far the largest group of third-country nationals legally residing in today's EU. Available studies give varying estimates of expected additional migration following Turkey's accession. Long transition periods and a permanent safeguard clause can be considered to avoid serious disturbances on the EU labor market."

"In the case of free movement of persons permanent safeguards can be considered."

"The Commission will recommend the suspension of the negotiations in the case of a serious and persistent breach of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union is founded."

Long-Awaited Step for Turkey
8 October 2004
The New York Times

After 45 years, the wait is almost over. In 1959, the government of Turkey first sought an association agreement with the European Economic Community, the predecessor of the European Union. This week, the European Commission, the union's executive body, announced that Turkey had met the bloc's political criteria to begin formal entry talks. Now it is up to Europe's leaders, who will meet in December, to endorse the commission's findings and set a date for starting negotiations.

If the leaders balk, they will squander a historic opportunity. By embracing Turkey, Europe has the chance to prove that international human rights - the essence of the union's membership criteria and the focus of numerous reforms in Turkey over the past few years - are central to what it means to be European, not ethnicity or religion.

Turkey's role in Europe's destiny has never been more important. A NATO member since 1952, Turkey provided crucial protection throughout the cold war for Europe's eastern flank. After the cold war, Europe had the luxury, for a time, of imagining that it could move into the future as a federation organized around a few large core states. Then came the new age of international terrorism by Islamic extremists, which has threatened not only the continent's safety but also the bedrock values of Europe.

Turkey, a predominantly Muslim nation that has a secular democracy, is uniquely qualified to confront this challenge. Situated on the landmass linking Europe and Asia, it

has military experience as the bulwark against threats from the East, diplomatic experience as the bridge between East and West, and religious and ethnic ties to Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia.

Most important of all, Turkey is proof that Islam and democracy can be compatible. Its example - made all the more formidable by its ever closer association with the European Union - is a far stronger challenge to Middle Eastern autocrats than the United States's current misadventure in Iraq. Turkey's successful integration into the European Union would demonstrate to the rest of the world that Muslims and Westerners, bound by common principles, can live and work together for the benefit of both.

There are sizable practical risks. Turkey is poor and populous, raising European concerns about Turkish migration across the continent and the cost of subsidizing Turkish membership. Turkey also has a history of military coups, human rights violations and economic crises. It has enacted reforms, but more are needed. The membership negotiations are expected to take at least 10 years, plenty of time to resolve problems and ensure that real change has come about.

More ominous are the political obstacles. Anti-Muslim and anti-immigration forces, notably in Austria, France and the Netherlands, are hostile to Turkish accession. European leaders have no greater challenge over the next decade than converting, or at least neutralizing, that opposition.

Turkey's Route To Empowerment
By James Abrahamson, Mansoor Ijaz and Alfred von Liechtenstein
6 October 2004
Financial Times

Today, the European Commission presents its case on whether Turkey has made enough progress in meeting the "Copenhagen criteria" - the standards that need to be fulfilled to become a member of the European Union. The outcome will determine whether or not the country will be granted an early date for EU admission talks.

The debate over Turkish accession has aroused strong passions on both sides. Proponents argue that a modern and market-oriented Muslim democracy could provide a much-needed physical and political buffer between Europe and many of the Islamic world's authoritarian regimes, which are breeding and bleeding extremism.

But opponents fear Turkey's entry would shift Europe's centre of gravity too far to the east, thereby lowering its economic and political standards and diluting its historical secular Christian identity and value system.

Whether the EU commissioners decide to recommend Turkey's accession or not, all sides agree that the overriding strategic objective is to strengthen the country's democracy and move it even further towards a market-based economy.

A new framework should be made ready to fill the policy vacuum that an EU "No" decision would create. Such a plan should move towards securing Turkey's long-term potential away from mostly military and strategic objectives and towards developing strong macro-economic, judicial and social institutions suited to the modern era. But this modernisation process must seek to avoid confrontations with Europe over which identity - secular and European or traditionalist and Islamic - Turkey ultimately chooses.

Nato could be central to the country's development through the use of its existing military and security co-operation agreements. A Nato framework, constructed properly, could also help heal transatlantic wounds left over from disagreements about the war in Iraq.

For example, US technological assistance to the Turkish army, which is 500,000 strong and bigger than any army in Europe, would boost the EU's military capabilities and enable it to send peacekeeping forces into troubled spots where a US military presence is not always welcome.

It would also enable Turkey to act as a primary force for improving European counter-terrorism efforts in areas such as narcotics, illegal weapons and weapons of mass destruction as well as border security.

Turkish Nato training schools, for example, could become home to a hybrid version of the international military and education training programmes run by the Pentagon over the past three decades to modernise and secularise armies in troubled countries.

Equally important will be supporting growth in Turkey's secular democratic institutions. Absolute guarantees for human rights and women's rights, not yet enshrined in the Turkish constitution, could be imported from Canada's judicial and parliamentary systems without creating partisan rancor among European politicians who complain about Washington's undue influence over Ankara.

Turkish ethnicity together with the country's underlying Islamic practices need not be compromised by remote EU demands to change its existing democratic institutions. Turkey's withdrawal of proposed punitive adultery laws last month to appease certain EU member states is a case in point where Turkey's local Islamic traditions clashed with Europe's social culture and legal norms.

The US, Canada and Europe's wealthier nations must join together to offer Turkey increased trade opportunities and long-term structural debt relief to boost its ailing economy. The dollars paid to service the country's debt would be much better spent on social welfare, education and environmental protection programmes.

Examples of this type of co-operation between non-EU countries already exist. The "Barcelona Process", which is creating the world's largest free trade zone, and the "Mediterranean Dialogue", which is enabling Mediterranean states to fight illegal trade in drugs and weapons and improve maritime security, are but two examples.

One could even envision a Nafta-2, or North Atlantic (as opposed to American) Free Trade Agreement, that would enable Turkey and other European states such as Norway to enjoy the benefits of free trade without the political headaches of European membership.

Turkey is not perfect. But it is the world's best example of democracy co-existing with Islam. An empowered Turkey can serve to refute the extremists' argument that power over wealth distribution is the exclusive domain of western societies, and that in order to equalise the widening income gap they must tear the west down.

Prince Alfred von Liechtenstein, Mansoor Ijaz and Lt Gen James Abrahamson (USAF retired) jointly serve on the advisory board of Crescent Investment Management in New York.

Unlocking a Christian Club
15 October 2004
Los Angeles Times

Firmly anchoring Turkey to a democratic Europe that is not a club of Christian nations is a historical imperative. So it was an important moment last week when Turkey's bid to join the European Union moved forward with the European Commission's recommendation that talks be launched on the terms of that nation's ascension.

It's now up to the 25 EU nations to sign off in December on such talks, and things may yet get sticky. This has always been a wary courtship, and its expectations will have to be deftly managed on all sides. The transparency that Europeans increasingly demand from EU institutions, and the democratization that the EU demands of Turkey, will only make the negotiations more difficult.

Public opinion in Europe has not embraced the idea of Turkish membership, and a referendum in any one of the member nations could scuttle the project. The challenge for political leaders across the EU is to sell the merits of Turkish membership and resist seizing on the issue to stir up anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant sentiment for short-term political gain.

In Turkey too the politics will be tricky. The strengthening of democracy there has brought to the fore political parties that question modern Turkey's rigorous secularism. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan will be walking a fine line in meeting conditions imposed by the EU while placating his own Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party, whose members are not all enthralled with the idea of becoming culturally European. Recent aborted efforts by Turkey's parliament to criminalize adultery, over European objections, served as a foreshadowing of potential tensions.

Europe should enter the talks in good faith. Though poorer than the European mean, Turkey offers European companies an immense and growing market, and the need of

aging European societies for immigrant Turkish laborers will only become more acute. The grander strategic reasons for folding the old Byzantium into Europe are compelling -- pushing a multicultural Europe's borders to Syria, Iraq and Iran, following in NATO's footsteps.

It is no secret why the Bush administration has been lobbying on behalf of Turkey's bid. A prosperous, democratic Turkey tied to the West would be a model for the Islamic world, and a statement that Muslim and Christian civilizations are not in conflict.

Sour Delight
8 October 2004
The Wall Street Journal Europe

Success makes Europe dizzy. In one of its finest moments, the EU has guided Turkey, a proud and traditional Muslim nation, through tortuous changes and onto its doorstep. So why are EU leaders so busy plotting to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory?

Even before the Commission gave its "qualified yes" to start accession talks, doubts and threats were thick in the air. Some EU states hinted, contrary to firm promises, that a green light this week didn't assure one at its December summit. The Commission put in enough asterisks to handicap the negotiations from the start. We suppose it's incredible enough the EU got even this far.

Turkish leaders thankfully focused on the bigger picture. After 80 years of effort, Turkey moved closer to planting itself in the Western world. The reforms of recent years make Turkey a better place regardless of what the EU's feckless leaders decide in the end.

The transformation, by any measure, is revolutionary. Two major constitutional reforms and eight legislative packages put Turkey on a modernizing course. The powerful military can't meddle as much in political life; a civilian chairs the National Security Council -- a first -- and elected leaders oversee defense spending. The ban on the use of Kurdish is gone and other minority rights are strengthened. The "zero tolerance" policy on torture makes its "Midnight Express" reputation outdated. This year, no prisoners have died in custody, compared with 45 a decade ago. "Turkey is now ahead of some EU member states in its legal protections for detainees," says Jonathan Sugden, the researcher who covers Turkey for Human Rights Watch.

Need Turkey stop? Not by a long stretch. Laws alone don't change ingrained cultural mindsets; that'll take years. Civic society and institutions need to be stronger. Human Rights Watch, among others, found that unlawful detention, restrictions on freedom of expression, and ill-treatment and -- yes -- torture in police custody remain a problem. If Turkey were judged on its merits today, it wouldn't pass the EU test. But the Turks and the Europeans have a long decade before them before actual admission to the EU is likely.

The economic case against Turkey equally doesn't hold water. Three years after a financial crisis, growth approaches double digits and inflation heads toward single. Turks are poor, compared to the EU average, but no more so than Bulgarians or Romanians. Since 1995, the Turkish economy grew 28%, three times the rate for those two nearby countries, who'll probably join the EU in 2007, long before the Turks.

Former minister of economic affairs Kemal Dervis says that banks, which were at the root of past problems, still need to be cleaned up. Turkey spends too little on education -- 3.9% of GDP -- shortchanging its people. But most economists forecast investment-led growth in the next 10 years that'll outstrip the poorer EU nations. Its large market and its dynamic companies, competing already in the customs union, are a great asset for Europe.

So why all the nattering negativism? The founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, once said: "The West has always been prejudiced against the Turks, but we Turks have always consistently moved toward the West." The Europeans still take Turkey for granted.

This attitude came through in the Commission's otherwise upbeat assessment. Here's the fine print: The negotiations will be "an open-ended process," an "emergency brake" clause would let the EU unilaterally suspend talks, and "long transition periods and a permanent safeguard clause can be considered to avoid serious disturbances on the EU labor market." This is the first time that the EU has set these conditions for anyone. The first two mean that Turkey will have a far more difficult road to travel in negotiations. The presence of the Greek Cypriots at every turn -- alas, even the tiniest nation with an obvious ax to grind gets a veto -- may slow things down further. The threat to forbid Turks from moving freely in the EU forever would be the end of the common market -- and a guarantee that Turkey would be a second-class citizen.

Of course, EU diplomats quietly say these measures are meant to reassure skeptical publics in France, Germany and Austria. But those publics are negative mainly because their leaders choose to turn populist on Turkey. Why not instead paint the scenarios for a European rejection of Turkey: Instability on the EU's southeastern flank, a Kurdish uprising, a revival of Islam. The sky's the limit. That's why the Turks' traditional enemies -- the Greeks -- are such enthusiastic supporters of Turkey in the EU.

Ironically, the nation most bearish on Turkey -- France -- is the one that drones on about a stronger EU role in the world. With Turkey, the EU, for a change, proved that its "soft power" works. Membership is the EU's best, and arguably only, effective foreign policy tool. Turkey can make the EU -- now going through another bout of self-doubt and anxiety -- a strategic, economic and cultural powerhouse. Far from a danger, Turkey could be the EU's salvation.

Turkey's Continental Drift
10 October 2004

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

The Washington Times

Turkey seemed to shift geographically Westward on Wednesday, after the European Commission opened the way for it to become a full member of the European Union. A Turkish accession would bring Europe's borders to the Middle East and pave the way for a groundbreaking merger of civilizations.

The European Commission found that Turkey had fulfilled reform criteria in areas including human rights and democratization, and that the country now merits formal accession talks with the European Union.

"The choice was very clear. Turkey was simply too good ...[its] progress was too good" to turn it down, said Guenter Verhuegen, EU enlargement commissioner. The commission's recommendation was a qualified rather than absolute affirmation of Turkey's reform progress. It requires that Turkey continue to carry out improvements in its human-rights treatment of minorities. Turkey is also required to institute safeguards to prevent the military from exercising undue influence over civilian leadership.

Turkey has been a beacon of tolerance and democratic reform in the Middle East since the legendary Mustafa Kemal Ataturk put the country on the path to secular democracy in the early 1900s. And under the Muslim Ottoman Empire, which was based in Istanbul, a relatively high level of tolerance for Christians and Jews generally prevailed. And Turkey does, in some respects, have a European heritage, sharing Greek, Roman and Byzantine history. Turkey became an associate EU member in 1963. In 2002, EU leaders pledged to decide by the end of this year whether to open talks on Turkish entry into the organization.

The European Commission's decision, while not binding, is expected to give Turkey a needed boost when the EU leaders vote on whether to begin entry talks at a December 17-18 summit in Brussels. Entry talks, if they begin as expected next year, could take anywhere from 10 to 15 years. There is much popular opposition in European countries to Turkey's entry on economic and cultural grounds. French President Jacques Chirac has called for an eventual referendum on Turkey's membership - a move which could ultimately foil Turkey's accession.

The governments of Britain and Sweden, though, have been solidly behind Turkish membership. British Foreign Minister Jack Straw said this week that Turkey had made an "extraordinary achievement" in winning the commission's support for enlargement which "none should take away." Mr. Straw added that Ankara's membership talks should begin "without delay."

EU leaders do face challenges in bringing Turkey, with its overwhelmingly Muslim population of 71 million people, into the customs union. By 2025, Turkey is projected to have the largest population in the EU. Europe would probably be protected from an influx of Turkish workers, whose per capita income is about $4,000, a fraction of the EU average. The European Commission recommended a so-called safeguard clause that

could be invoked to restrict the numbers of Turkish migrants in times of economic difficulty. Still, a study prepared for the European Commission found that Turkey could receive between $20.2 billion and $34.2 billion in annual subsidies starting in 2025 if it were to join the EU.

However, that same study also made a critical point - that Turkish membership "would give clear evidence to the Muslim world that their religious beliefs are compatible with EU values including democracy, the rule of law and the respect of fundamental rights." While some of Europe's concerns about Turkish membership in the EU are pragmatic, others are based on prejudice. It would be a shame for such bigotry to prevail.

Turkey's role as a cultural and physical bridge between East and West would be enhanced as a result of EU membership. The nation's clout would rise with its accession to the EU, as would its ability to act as a mediator between the Christian and Muslim worlds. Turkish immigrants could also help moderate Muslim communities already in Europe, particularly in France and Britain, through their broad recognition of the benefits of secular democracy.

While these principles may seem abstract in comparison with the billions in subsidies that EU countries would be delivering to Turkey, they are immeasurably important. Turkey could become one of Europe's most prized additions.

Turkey, EU: The Twain Can Meet
5 October 2004
Christian Science Monitor

Four decades is a long time to wait. Since 1963, Turkey has been eligible to apply for membership to the European Union. It formally sought entry to the club 15 years ago, was turned down, but didn't give up. Ten years later, EU leaders pointedly excluded the NATO member - and Muslim giant - from its list of candidates. In May, Turkey watched from the sidelines as 10 newcomers, mostly from Eastern Europe, jumped ahead of it.

Now, Turkey's catching its first glimpse of light on the other side of the Bosporus.

Wednesday, the EU Commission, the union's executive body, is expected to issue a report recommending formal membership negotiations with Ankara. EU heads of state would have to agree, as well as set a date for starting talks. But the Commission's positive report card on Turkey's readiness should go a long way in pushing the leaders to a historic "yes" when they meet at a summit in December.

Historic not just because of the buildup to this moment, but because it would be an opportunity to prove that Christian and Muslim civilizations can share common democratic values in an open- market framework. This is especially important in the post-9/11 era, when terrorist jihadists are trying to convince Muslims that neither coexistence nor cooperation with the West and its values is possible or desirable.

The commission's expected recommendation, however, is no guarantee that Turkey will join the club. Member states could erect roadblocks. French President Jacques Chirac for instance, wants lawmakers in his country, which has the largest Muslim population in the EU, to change the Constitution so that new EU members must be approved by national referendum. A recent poll showed the majority of French opposed to Turkish entry in the near term. And powerful politicians in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria strongly oppose a seat for Turkey at the EU table.

Turkey may have one foot on the European continent, but as a Muslim country, very poor, very big, and bordering Syria, Iraq, and Iran, it frightens many Europeans. In trying to convince Brussels that it's a good fit, Ankara's secular government has made great strides in economic, judicial, and military reform in recent years. But the EU report, while supposedly endorsing membership talks, points out that Turkey still needs to work on implementing reforms, especially in the area of human rights.

The expected negotiation process of at least 10 years would be time enough for Turkey to satisfy Europeans' practical concerns.

But their wariness of Muslim influence is another matter. "Do we want the river of Islam to enter the riverbed of secularism?" French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin posed last month. France is famous for its separation of church and state.

Defusing such concerns will require consistent effort from EU leaders. They can start that work now.

-----Original Message-----
From: Thomas, Jennifer S.
Sent: Thursday, October 21, 2004 3:53 PM
To:
Subject: Follow-up on 10/26 Holocaust Museum event honoring Selahattin Ulkumen

I just wanted to follow-up with you on an invitation you should have received to attend an event at the Holocaust Museum, honoring Turkish diplomat Selahattin Ulkumen for his heroic rescue efforts during the Holocaust. I've attached the media advisory for your consideration.

The event at the Museum will be followed immediately by an informal reception at the Turkish Embassy and we hope that you might be available to attend that event, as well.

You may either RSVP directly to the Museum or to me or my colleague, Jason Epstein (his contact information is included in the media advisory).

We hope to see you on Tuesday.

Regards,

The Harbour Group, LLC
3000 K Street, N.W., Suite 105
Washington D.C. 20007
(202) 295-8790

This material is distributed by The Harbour Group, LLC on behalf of the Republic of Turkey. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

<<Ulkumen media advisory 10-04.doc>>

UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM

10 YEARS

EDUCATION REMEMBRANCE CONSCIENCE

PRESS RELEASE

MEDIA ADVISORY

WASHINGTON, DC, Oct. 13 – The **United States Holocaust Memorial Museum**, with support from the Turkish Embassy, will pay tribute to the memory of diplomat **Selahattin Ulkumen**, the Turkish Consul on the Nazi-occupied island of Rhodes in 1944, whose courageous acts saved 50 Jews from being sent to a death camp. The program on the morning of October 26, 2004 will include a brief video interview with Ulkumen and personal reflections from his son.

WHAT: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum memorial commemoration for Turkish diplomat and rescuer **Selahattin Ulkumen**

WHO: Speakers will include:
Mehmet Ufuk Ulkumen (Ulkumen's son), Chief of Protocol at the United Nations in Geneva
O. Faruk Logoglu, Turkey's Ambassador to the United States
Sara Bloomfield, Museum Director
Severin Hochberg, Museum Historian

WHEN: October 26, 2004
8:45 to 10:00 am
(8:30 am for members of the media with video equipment)

WHERE: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Testimony Theater
100 Raoul Wallenberg Place, SW (15th Street entrance)
Washington, DC
Metro: Smithsonian (Blue/Orange Lines)
(No on-site parking available)

BACKGROUND: The Jewish population of Rhodes – the largest of the Dodecanese islands in the Aegean Sea – consisted mostly of descendants of refugees from the Spanish Inquisition. For hundreds of years, the Jewish population lived harmoniously under Ottoman rule and, after 1912, under Italian occupation. However, following the ouster of Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, the Nazis took control of Rhodes, and the island's 1,700 Jews were rounded up for transport to the Auschwitz-Birkenau death camp in Poland. Thirty-year-old Turkish Consul Selahattin Ulkumen went to the Nazi authorities and insisted that by treaty between Germany and Turkey, Turkish citizens and their spouses could not be deported. The Nazi commander finally gave in to Ulkumen's demands and set free 50 Jews. Probably in retaliation, Nazi planes bombed the Turkish Consulate building, mortally injuring Ulkumen's pregnant wife, Mihrinissa. Before she died, she gave birth to a son, Mehmet, who will speak at the ceremony on October 26.

- CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE -

Ulkumen was honored in 1990 as a Righteous Gentile by Israel's Yad Vashem, where a tree was planted in his name. He was the first non-Christian to receive such recognition. Ulkumen died in June, 2003 at the age of 89.

NOTE: Immediately following the October 26 tribute, buses will transport guests to the Turkish Embassy for a reception hosted by Ambassador O. Faruk Logoglu.

Media should RSVP to Andy Hollinger of the Holocaust Museum at 202.488.6133 (ahollinger@ushmm.org), Jason Epstein of Southfive Strategies at 202.463.8467 (epstein@southfive.com), or Jennifer Thomas of the Harbour Group at 202.295.8790 (Jennifer.Thomas@harbourgrp.com).

- 30 -

From: O'Brien, Brett W.
Sent: Monday, October 25, 2004 3:11 PM
Subject: Reminder -- Turkish Embassy reception following 10/26 Holocaust Museum tribute to Selahattin Ulkumen

Dear Friend --

Thank you for your interest in attending the tribute to Turkish diplomat Selahattin Ulkumen at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum tomorrow morning. We look forward to seeing your there for this special event.

I would also like to remind you that Turkish Ambassador O. Faruk Logoglu will be hosting a reception immediately following the tribute at the Turkish Embassy (2525 Massachusetts Ave, NW). Bus transportation will be provided from the Holocaust Museum to the Embassy, and will return guests to the museum at the conclusion of the reception (about 11:30am). We hope you will be able to join us for this reception; below is a formal invitation for your reference.

Best regards,
Brett O'Brien
The Harbour Group
On behalf of the Embassy of Turkey

TURKISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Please Join

Ambassador Logoglu, Mehmet Ulkumen

And Other Special Guests

For A Reception

At The Turkish Embassy

Immediately Following This Tribute

2525 Massachusetts Avenue, NW

PLEASE NOTE: *Bus service will be provided both to the Turkish Embassy and back to the Holocaust Museum at the conclusion of the reception. Please exit the 15th Street side of the Museum at the end of the tribute.*

This material is distributed by The Harbour Group, LLC on behalf of the Republic of Turkey. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

-----Original Message-----
From: O'Brien, Brett W.
Sent: Monday, November 01, 2004 12:07 PM
Subject: JTA story on Holocaust Museum's tribute to Selahattin Ulkumen

Dear Friend --

I thought you would be interested in the following story on last week's tribute to Turkish diplomat Selahattin Ulkumen at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, written by Ron Kampeas of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency .

Best regards,
Brett O'Brien
The Harbour Group

Man saved by Turkish diplomat during war meets his rescuer's son
By Ron Kampeas

WASHINGTON, Oct. 31 (JTA) — The risks Selahattin Ulkumen took to save Jews during World War II led to his wife's death.
The Turkish diplomat's confrontation with the Nazi occupiers of Rhodes saved 42 members of the Greek island's Jewish community, including Bernard Turiel and his parents.

When, within weeks of Ulkumen's intervention, the Nazis bombed the consular residence in retaliation, it cost him his wife — the mother of his son, Mehmet.

Sixty years later, Turiel and Ulkumen's son, Mehmet, met in Washington for the first time at a U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum commemoration for the diplomat and shared their vast admiration for Selahattin Ulkumen.

"Mr. Ulkumen was responsible for four generations," said Turiel, who attended last week's dedication with his wife, daughter and newborn granddaughter. His 95-year-old mother, Mathilde, was too frail to travel from New York.

Mehmet Ulkumen said he struggled for years with the consequences of what his father did. After Nazi planes strafed the consular residence, his pregnant mother lived long enough to give birth to him — and then died within days. His grandmother, hearing of her daughter's death, killed herself.

He was brought up by his father's mother while his father continued his career in the Turkish diplomatic corps. He remembers asking his father often, as a child and a young man, whether it was worth losing his wife, his mother-in-law — almost losing his only child.

"'Son,' he would say," the younger Ulkumen recalled "'in Islam, it is like in Judaism: to save one life is to save humanity. I know your mother was very proud of me and I would do exactly the same again.'"

Selahattin Ulkumen, then just 30, arrived in Rhodes with his pregnant wife, Mihrinissa, a mathematics professor, in early 1944, just months after the Nazis assumed control of Rhodes following fascist Italy's surrender to the allies.

The Germans were still hoping to revive the World War I Turkish-German alliance, or at least keep Turkey neutral — Turkey eventually joined the Allies — and they allowed the Turks to maintain a consulate on the island to serve Turkish nationals.

The island had been an Italian holding since 1942, but the 1,800 Jews there — a community dating back to the 16th century and the Spanish expulsion — had remained relatively untouched throughout the war.

By 1944, however, the Nazis registered the Jews and ordered them to report once a month. Selahattin Ulkumen immediately understood the gravity of the situation and he and his wife discussed ways of protecting the Jews.

The Jews of Rhodes were then part of a relatively homogenous Sephardi community that maintained ties with Turkish Jews. They shared traditions and a language, Ladino, and cross-border family ties. Young suitors frequently sought brides in its far-flung towns even after territories were redrawn and the Jewish communities answered to different sovereigns.

That was how Bernard Turiel's father, Daniel, an Italian citizen from Rhodes, met and fell in love with Mathilde, a Turkish woman from Izmir.

On July 19, 1944, the Nazis rounded up the Jewish men for deportation. The women and children were told to report within 48 hours.

That's when Selahattin Ulkumen went into action. He insisted on responsibility for the Turkish-born Jews among the deportees. Not only that, he said truthfully, their offspring were also considered Turkish nationals. He finagled a little and told the Germans that spouses were also considered Turkish.

A day layer, Bernard Turiel, then 10 years old, was standing in line with his mother and brother to be registered at the detention center.

Ulkumen, who recognized Mathilde from a desperate meeting the day before, came running: "Go home," he said, "I'm going to get your husband out."

The 11th-hour rescue was almost too much for a little boy. "It was terrifying," said Turiel, now 70 and living in Westfield, N.J.

The Nazis, apparently still hoping to keep the Turks on their side, gave in. But the local Nazi leadership on the island was furious with Ulkumen, especially with his persistent efforts to save the island's Jews — by paying fishermen to smuggle them to Turkey and by fashioning connections with Turkey to grant them diplomatic protection.

"The authorities told him he would pay dearly if he did not stop," Mehmet Ulkumen said.

The Nazi commanders invited Selahattin Ulkumen to join a hunting party, but local Jews warned him not to go □ the plan was to stage a "hunting accident" that would solve the Nazis' Ulkumen problem.

Some mornings, Ulkumen's mother opened the consulate's door to find a mutilated body — a local person who had crossed the Nazis.

Finally, one night in August, Nazi planes strafed the consulate — the residences were on the top floor. Mihrinissa Ulkumen was mortally wounded, but lived long enough to give birth to Mehmet.

His sacrifice made Selahattin Ulkumen the first non-Christian to be declared a Righteous Gentile by Yad Vashem, Israel's Holocaust memorial, in 1990; Mehmet said the visit to Jerusalem to plant a tree was a highlight for his father, who died last year at 92.

Ulkumen was not the only Turkish diplomat to strive to save European Jews from the Nazis.

"During the Second World War, many Turkish diplomats and individuals acted to help European Jews find refuge from persecution," O. Faruk Logoglu, Turkey's ambassador to the United States, said at the Oct. 26 Washington ceremony.

But no one lost so much in the effort. Mehmet, who took his son Altug to last week's memorial, followed his father into a diplomatic career and is now chief of protocol at the United Nations office in Geneva.

His father's example guides him, he says. "Behind the scenes, I try to be the devil's advocate," he said. "Always challenge the powerful and stand up for the underdog."

He has made peace with the decision that cost him his mother.

"My father would tell me an old Turkish saying," he said: "Do a good deed and throw it into the sea; If the fish do not recognize it, God will."

This material is distributed by The Harbour Group, LLC on behalf of the Republic of Turkey. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

From: O'Brien, Brett W.
Sent: Tuesday, December 14, 2004 4:45 PM
Subject: This week's EU meeting on accession talks with Turkey

Dear Friend --

As you know, European Union leaders will meet at the end of this week to determine whether to open accession negotiations with Turkey. In anticipation of this important meeting, we thought you would be interested in a short selection of documents and commentary articles on this subject, including coverage of Turkey's progress in meeting the standards for EU membership.

For your information, Turkish Embassy officials will be available both before and after the EU decision if you would like to discuss this subject or have any questions. If you or one of your colleagues would like to speak with the relevant Embassy official, please feel free to contact me (202-295-8783) or my colleague Jennifer Thomas (202-295-8790).

Best Regards,
Brett O'Brien
The Harbour Group

Attachments in Word document below -

News Features

"Turkey's Long March Towards European Membership," *Agence France Presse,* 8 December 2004

"Monday Interview: Recep Tayyip Erdogan Prime Minister Of Turkey: "Taking Part In The EU Will Bring Harmony Of Civilisations - It Is The Project Of The Century,"" By Stephen Castle, *The Independent*, 13 December 2004

"EU Officials Back Full Membership For Muslim Turkey," By Dan Bilefsky, *The Wall Street Journal*, 9 December 2004

"Younger Turks Favor Joining EU As Way To Better Nation; Country Forced To Make Reforms," By Catherine Collins, *Chicago Tribune*, 28 November 2004

Commentaries

"Turkey's Moment Has Arrived," *Financial Times*, 13 December 2004

"Bridging East And West," By Deborah Jerome-Cohen, *The Star-Ledger (New Jersey)*, 12 December 2004

"Europe's Stake In Turkey," By H.D.S. Greenway, *The Boston Globe*, 3 December 2004

"Why Europe Needs Turkey," By Soner Cagaptay, *Middle East Roundtable - BitterLemons International*, 4 November 2004

Dec 17 EU packet FINAL.doc (94...

This material is distributed by The Harbour Group, LLC on behalf of the Republic of Turkey. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

NEWS FEATURES

Turkey's Long March Towards European Membership
8 December 2004
Agence France Presse

Monday Interview: Recep Tayyip Erdogan Prime Minister Of Turkey: "Taking Part In The EU Will Bring Harmony Of Civilisations - It Is The Project Of The Century"
By Stephen Castle
13 December 2004
The Independent

EU Official Backs Full Membership For Muslim Turkey
By Dan Bilefsky
9 December 2004
The Wall Street Journal

Younger Turks Favor Joining EU As Way To Better Nation; Country Forced To Make Reforms
By Catherine Collins
28 November 2004
Chicago Tribune

COMMENTARIES

Turkey's Moment Has Arrived
13 December 2004
Financial Times

Bridging East And West
By Deborah Jerome-Cohen
12 December 2004
The Star-Ledger (New Jersey)

Europe's Stake In Turkey
By H.D.S. Greenway
3 December 2004
The Boston Globe

Why Europe Needs Turkey
By Soner Cagaptay
4 November 2004
Middle East Roundtable - BitterLemons International

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

Turkey's Long March Towards European Membership
8 December 2004
Agence France Presse

BRUSSELS - European Union leaders will decide next Thursday whether to launch entry talks with Turkey. The following is a chronology of the ups and downs in Turkey's four-decade-long march towards EU membership:

- September 1963: Turkey signs an association agreement with the European Economic Community with provisions for a gradual lowering of customs barriers as a preliminary to full membership of the EEC, the precursor of the European Union.

- 1980-1986: The association agreement is suspended following a military coup in Turkey.

- April 1987: Turkey applies for EU membership.

- December 1989: The European Commission, the EU's executive arm, rejects Turkey's application, citing economic and political difficulties.

- March 1995: Ankara and Brussels sign an agreement on a customs union, providing for the removal of import duties and closer economic cooperation. The customs union, which comes into effect in January 1996, encounters financial difficulties, largely because of reservations by Athens.

- July 1997: The European Commission recommends opening membership talks with five eastern European countries and Cyprus but excluding Turkey. Ankara's human rights record is considered a major obstacle to membership.

- December 12-13, 1997: The 15 EU leaders confirm their decision to enlarge the Union to several eastern European countries and Cyprus, but persist in excluding Turkey.

- December 14, 1997: Ankara breaks off political dialogue with the EU, in particular over issues relating to Greece and Cyprus.

- October 1999: The European Commission recommends including Turkey in the list of candidate members, which is extended to six eastern European countries and Malta, but without a start date for membership negotiations.

- December 1999: Turkey is granted candidate status at an EU summit in the Finnish capital Helsinki. But the EU says negotiations will not begin until Turkey meets certain democracy and human rights conditions.

- Turkey is in the meantime invited as an observer to EU summits, and also takes part in discussions to draft a first-ever EU constitution, designed as a framework for avoiding institutional paralysis in the expanding bloc.

- December 2002: EU leaders meeting in Copenhagen pledge to take a decision in December 2004 on whether to start EU accession negotiations with Ankara. If approved, the talks would start "without delay," they said. They agree to base their decision on European Commission recommendations.

- October 6, 2004: The European Commission recommends that membership talks start, but sets a series of tough conditions and warns that the process could be suspended if Ankara is guilty of serious and persistent breaches of basic EU standards on democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

Monday Interview: Recep Tayyip Erdogan Prime Minister Of Turkey: "Taking Part In The EU Will Bring Harmony Of Civilisations - It Is The Project Of The Century"
By Stephen Castle
13 December 2004
The Independent

THE OPENING of Istanbul"s new modern art museum may not seem the obvious place for Turkey"s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to talk about his country"s European Union ambitions, but the venue has been chosen to make a point.

Mr Erdogan, 50, leads an Islamic-rooted political party and once served a prison sentence for reciting a religious verse but this week he needs to project an image of his country similar to that of the pristine new Istanbul Modern gallery: progressive, western-leaning and, above all, European.

Europe"s leaders will decide on Thursday whether to set a date to start EU membership negotiations with Ankara, and preparations for the summit are marked by tension. But in an airy, whitewashed hall on Saturday, upstairs and away from the crowds thronging the building for a reception, Mr Erdogan is showing no signs of stress even though he has recently returned from a hectic round of meetings in Brussels.

Mr Erdogan knows his strongest card is that a failure to start talks would send a negative signal to the Islamic world - something that Europe is desperate to avoid. Speaking through an interpreter, he says that with Turkish accession "we will be contributing to the reconciliation of civilisations and the EU will prove that it is not a Christian club".

Just as Tony Blair sees Britain linking Europe and the US, Mr Erdogan sees Turkey as the answer to the clash of civilisations, a theory advanced by Samuel Huntingdon, a Harvard University professor.

Mr Erdogan takes such a prospect seriously. "Huntingdon declares that there might be a conflict of civilisations. Turkey is a catalyst to make sure we have harmony of civilisations. It is a bridge between the Islamic world and the rest of the world," he says.

"[To have] a country like Turkey, where the cultures of Islam and democracy have merged together, taking part in such an institution as the EU, will bring harmony of civilisations. That is why we think it is the project of the century. We are there as a guarantee of an entente between the civilisations. The countries that want to exclude us from Europe are not playing their roles in history.

"If Turkey is not taken in then everyone will have to continue with the status quo. This is a danger we have right now." It is more than 40 years since Turkey"s first attempt to join the western European club and few would have foreseen Mr Erdogan as the man to lead the country into EU negotiations.

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

His father was a coastguard in Rize, a town on Turkey"s Black Sea coast. He was 13 when the family moved to Istanbul and as a teenager sold lemonade and sesame buns on the street to earn extra cash.

A career as a professional footballer gave way to one as an administrator. But as a devout Muslim who does not drink or smoke, he has been in conflict with the secular Turkish state. In 1980, Mr Erdogan (by then a member of the Islamic National Salvation Party) had to quit a transport authority job after refusing to shave his moustache, a symbol of piety.

Having made his name as Mayor of Istanbul (his administration banned alcohol in city cafes) he was jailed in 1998 for publicly reading an Islamic poem that declared: the "mosques are our barracks". Tens of thousands of supporters escorted him to prison where he served four months of a 10-month sentence.

As premier, he avoids issues such as the ban on women wearing headscarves in official buildings; his wife, who wears a headscarf, does not attend formal functions and his daughters are educated abroad. But Turkey"s EU membership prospects were nearly derailed this year when Mr Erdogan"s Justice and Development Party (AKP) unsuccessfully tried to criminalise adultery.

Mr Erdogan insists he is no fanatic. "I am Muslim, I am Turkish, I am a democrat and my government is a secular government," he says. "Everything else that you hear is speculation. I have proved this during four-and- a-half years of my mayorship in this city. I have proved it in the two years of my prime ministership. My agenda is clear, it is transparent."

Negotiations with Turkey on EU membership will take at least a decade but this week"s decision is a turning point because no country that has begun accession talks has ever been denied. However Turkey, with its geographical position straddling two continents, its large Muslim population and its relative poverty, would change the EU fundamentally.

With immigration a hot issue, public opinion in Germany, France and Austria is hostile to Turkish membership. Projections show that, by 2025, Turkey would be the EU"s most populous country, and so would have the largest vote under the proposed EU constitution.

Given all that, Austria is pressing for the summit text to include an alternative to EU membership for Turkey, a "privileged partnership".

France, the biggest hitter among the sceptics, says it wants a declaration that negotiations are open-ended. Though Paris supports the objective of Turkish membership, it wants recognition that failure of negotiations might lead to some sort of unspecified alternative relationship - Paris does not use the term "privileged partnership". Michel Barnier, its Foreign Minister, refers to a "third way".

Some nations want to soothe domestic anxieties about immigration by having the right to bar Turkish workers from their labour markets indefinitely. The current summit draft text says that might be considered.

And Cyprus, which joined the EU as a Greek-Cypriot entity earlier this year, is pressing Turkey to recognise its existence. The draft does not go that far but suggests implicit recognition by asking the Turks to extend a customs union to "the 10 new member states".

Calmly, Mr Erdogan stakes out Turkey"s position, in an unemotional voice. He cites the European Commission advice that Turkey, which once had a poor record on human rights abuses including torture and discrimination against minorities, has made rapid progress. Ankara had, it said, met enough of the "Copenhagen criteria" on human rights to begin talks.

Mr Erdogan argues: "I am a statesman. I am not gambling here. I"m conducting politics. Certain criteria have been put on the table for us and Turkey has fulfilled all of those criteria.

"When the European Commission has announced that Turkey has fulfilled the criteria, Turkey has done her homework. Now we want our European colleagues to pass the examination successfully."

He rejects the idea of "privileged partnership" as "a status that does not exist in the EU", adding: "Turkey is a country whose candidature was accepted at the summit of Helsinki [in 1999]. Twenty-five countries, and now some more, have not had to deal with this status of privileged partnership, therefore we cannot accept it for Turkey."

But having staked so much on starting EU membership talks, can Turkey really say "no", even to tough terms? Mr Erdogan does not answer the question directly but lays out what he needs from the deal, hinting he will be unable to sign up to anything less.

"We are expecting four important things," he says. "One is unconditional full membership talks. Two is having the exact date of the start of negotiations without having the need to have a second meeting to get that.

"Three and four go together: no political criteria that are not included in the Copenhagen political criteria should be pressed upon Turkey. These are permanent limitations [on areas such as the free movement of workers], [recognition of] Cyprus, other things. There can be some temporary limitations [on workers] but having permanent limitations is against the [EU law]."

Turkey is particularly sensitive to pressure over Cyprus since it was the Greek Cypriots who voted earlier this year against a plan to reunite the island proposed by the UN secretary general, Kofi Annan.

Mr Erdogan argues: "The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has already said "yes" to the Annan plan and this was the desire of the EU countries. However, southern Cypriots have said "no" to the demands of the EU and voted against the Annan plan. And the southern Cypriots, with their border problems, have been included within the EU. Bringing the Cyprus issue as a pre-requisite for European Union negotiations for Turkey is a major mistake."

The Turkish premier adds: "It is not possible for us to accept any pressure on any issue that is not included in the Copenhagen political criteria. We are not coming out with any conditions, we are just expressing our outrage at the extraordinary conditions that are being used to try to pressure us. The rules of the game should not be changed while the game is going on."

But behind the tough rhetoric are signs that the Turks are ready to accept some compromise. Asked specifically whether he can accept extension of the customs union to Cyprus, Mr Erdogan replies: "Our guys are working on that, analysing it."

And he seems resigned to open-ended negotiations. He says he does not want a form of words suggesting talks will fail, after all "if you want to make an investment you expect a result". But he concedes that membership of the EU will not automatically be the result of the negotiations. "If perhaps we do certain things our European friends can say "we are stopping negotiations". Perhaps Turkey could do the same thing."

In a recent speech the former French president Valery Giscard d"Estaing argued against Turkish membership of the EU, pointing out that only 5 per cent of the country"s territory and 8 per cent of its population live in Europe, the rest being in Asia.

So does Turkey belong in the EU? Mr Erdogan smiles: "During the last days of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey was called the sick man of Europe, never the sick man of Asia. We were Europeans even at our worst."

Then it is downstairs to the museum inauguration, where Mr Erdogan sweeps up to the podium and declares that, in both politics and the arts, "Turkey is entering a completely new era". So, barring hitches, is the EU.

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

EU Official Backs Full Membership For Muslim Turkey
By Dan Bilefsky
9 December 2004
The Wall Street Journal

BRUSSELS -- Just 10 days before the European Union's 25 countries decide whether to open entry talks with Turkey, the EU official in charge of expansion warned that imposing any new conditions on the predominantly Muslim country's entry risks breaking a crucial bridge between the West and the Islamic world.

Olli Rehn, the EU's Finnish commissioner, rejected the prospect of offering Turkey anything less than full membership. "If a coach tells his football team that it must always remain in the second division and has no prospect of getting into the first division, then that coach should be sacked," he said.

Mr. Rehn's warning comes as several countries have been pushing for a "plan B" in which Turkey could be offered a special partnership that falls short of full EU membership. France, Austria and Denmark are considering setting additional conditions on membership beyond the unprecedented set Turkey accepted in October.

EU countries -- with strong U.S. support -- are expected to vote at a Dec. 17 EU summit to open membership talks. But deep skepticism among their constituencies has prompted some to question the wisdom of admitting a poor, agrarian nation of 70 million that still has serious human-rights issues to resolve. That in turn has prompted Turkey and the EU to issue clear signals of their concern ahead of the vote.

French President Jacques Chirac, for instance, personally supports Turkish membership but faces stiff domestic opposition to that aim. He has called for new caveats on the talks, including the prospect of offering less than full membership if the negotiations fail. Cyprus -- the island divided into Greek and Turkish ethnic enclaves -- also risks casting a shadow over the summit: A draft summit document urges Turkey to improve ties with the island's Greek side.

But Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul yesterday dismissed the possibility of formal recognition of Greek Cyprus before the island is reunited through an internationally mandated agreement.

Mr. Rehn said conditions already imposed by the commission on Turkey -- including a safeguard against migration by Turks and a mechanism by which the EU could halt negotiations at any time -- are more than sufficient.

Emphasizing that Turkey is an important bridge between Europe and the Muslim world, Mr. Rehn said Europe faces a greater risk from Islamic fundamentalism than the U.S. does because of its geographic proximity to the Middle East. But he added that integrating Turkey into the EU wouldn't be easy, and that talks could last 15 years. Mr. Rehn said one of the biggest remaining stumbling blocks remains Turkey's treatment of religious minorities and women.

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

Younger Turks Favor Joining EU As Way To Better Nation; Country Forced To Make Reforms
By Catherine Collins
28 November 2004
Chicago Tribune

ISTANBUL - Nearly a century after a cabal of young Turks engineered the downfall of the Ottoman Empire, a new generation of young Turks is embracing the start of another kind of revolution.

Although many Europeans have doubts about admitting Turkey to the European Union, the prospect of Turkey's joining has been greeted eagerly across this country--and particularly among its vast young population.

In their enthusiasm, Turks under 30 seem undaunted by the remaining EU membership hurdles. Instead, many say they understand that their country must make further progress in areas such as education and must solidify human-rights and political reforms before it can join Europe's club.

"I support Turkey's membership in the EU, although I don't think we are ready for it yet," said Arif Budak, 25, a student who works full time as a trainer at an upscale health club in Istanbul. "If we join too soon, it won't be good for the EU, but it will be bad for Turkey also."

EU leaders are to meet Dec. 17 to decide whether to give the green light to starting membership talks with Turkey. They are expected to say yes, but the expectation is equally strong that the talks will last a decade or longer.

Assuming the talks are approved, one of the biggest tasks confronting Turkey will be improving its education system to meet European standards.

The low education level of large numbers of young people is the single greatest concern to Europeans, Daniel Gros, director of the Center for European Policy Studies, said at a recent Istanbul conference co-sponsored by the Economics and Foreign Policy Forum of Istanbul.

"It is up to a candidate country to say, `Do we want more roads and airports, or do we want more schools?'" Gros said. "This country needs more schools and better schools and in all parts of the country."

To many of the country's young people, who stand to reap the long-term benefits of EU membership, getting a date to start talks would mark the end of one journey and the start of another.

"The process itself has been important," Ayca Bayraktaroglu, 23, said during a break from her studies at Bosporus University in Istanbul. "Without the EU as a target, I doubt that Turkey would have been able to achieve as many reforms in recent years."

The expectations of the country's young people cross social and educational boundaries. From unemployed young men to students at Bosporus, an elite school, these Turks see the EU as anchoring Turkey in a stable part of the world and insulating it from the political winds that have swept across its region.

Turkey's population is young. Almost 30 percent of its nearly 70 million people are younger than 15, and three-quarters are under 40.

They could offer an important labor source for the economies of an aging Europe.

And the United Nations predicts Turkey's population will reach 91 million by 2030, which would make it by far Europe's most populous country.

But the young Turks don't see immigrating to Germany, France or Britain as a certainty--or even as the biggest potential benefit of EU membership.

Muhammed Yilmaz, 21, a clerk at a McDonald's restaurant, sees a chance for economic stability and an opportunity to move out of his menial job. "Whether or not Turks go to Europe, membership will bring economic stability to Turkey."

Muhammed Yilmaz, 21, a clerk at a McDonald's restaurant, sees a chance for economic stability and an opportunity to move out of his menial job.

"Whether or not Turks go to Europe, membership will bring economic stability to Turkey," he said.

Ece Uskuplu, 22, an international trade student at Bosporous University, doesn't think Europeans need to worry about a Turkish invasion.

"I don't think that there will be a flood of Turkish immigrants to Europe," she said. "Turks may have a tendency to act on the vague hope that life will be better elsewhere, but I think in the long run they will return home."

She illustrated her point with the Turkish version of the "grass is always greener," saying, "Your neighbor's chicken is always a goose."

Havva Yakup's dreams are more concrete and definitely closer to home. She wants to see more religious freedom in this predominantly Muslim country, including a change in the Turkish law that prohibits wearing head scarves in universities and government buildings.

"I hope Turkey becomes a member because if it does, it will make it possible for me to continue my education regardless of whether or not I wear a head scarf," said Yakup, who is 15 and attends a religious high school.

Today's young Turks would be the first generation to feel the full effect of membership in the EU. Their numbers are large and the test for them, and the country, will be to convince Europe that what some might think is a demographic weakness is potentially a strength.

"The Turkish challenge is how to turn this into a demographic advantage--a gift--rather than a threat to our European neighbors," said Ustun Erguder, a political science professor and director of the Istanbul Policy Center at Sabanci University in Istanbul.

The key to the transformation, said Erguder and others, is getting the Turkish education system into shape before a courtship with Europe would end, in 10 or 15 years.

There are signs that the government recognizes the importance of improving an education system that often has 40 or 50 students in a single classroom and suffers from enormous disparities from region to region.

This fiscal year, for the first time in decades, Turkey will spend more for education than for its military.

"Education expenditures are increasing and military expenditures are decreasing," said Hakan Altinay, executive director of the Open Society Institute in Turkey. "Turkey is beginning to take on the aura of normalcy. Maybe we can stop talking about torture and freedom of expression and start talking how to upgrade our public education system."

Budak, the trainer, agreed that education is the key to open Europe's door for Turks. But he also said the country needs the next decade to make improvements, so they blend in and don't stand out as foreigners.

"I have a Turkish friend who lives in Germany," he said. "In Germany, they call her a Turk. In Turkey, they call her a German. If we join the EU too soon, we will always be foreigners."

This story is a composite of the versions published in the various editions.

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

Turkey's Moment Has Arrived: The EU Must Deliver On Its Pledge To Open Entry Talks
13 December 2004
Financial Times

One need not go quite as far as Joschka Fischer, Germany's foreign minister, who a few weeks ago said Turkey's entry to the European Union would be as important in Europe's history as the D-Day invasion 60 years ago. But unquestionably EU leaders at their summit this week are faced with a strategic decision of historic importance.

Getting it right means giving Ankara a firm date to start accession negotiations, probably in the second half of next year. To retreat from that offer of membership, made at Helsinki five years ago, would be to fail to seize a huge geopolitical opportunity to demonstrate the efficacy of EU "soft power" and to confront head-on the poisonous historical narrative of the "clash of civilisations" peddled by Christian and Muslim extremists.

Embracing Turkey, a democratic, secular republic with a Muslim majority and an advancing economy, would come to rank with the EU's highest achievements. The European project not only devised a new formula for the rational pursuit of national interest after centuries of intra-European bloodletting but, with its post-war expansion, cleared away the residue of fascist dictatorship in south Europe and the Stalinist regimes of east Europe. Today's opportunity to help bridge the chasm between Islam and the west - through a country embedded in the history of Europe and Christendom as well as Islam - is a challenge of equal magnitude.

Turkey is a poor and populous country. Yet actual entry would not take place for at least 10 years, and previous enlargements suggest Turkey can in that time attract streams of inward investment and accelerate its modernisation. The spectre of hordes of Turks pouring into EU countries is scaremongering: a clear perspective of EU membership would exponentially increase job opportunities at home.

Of course, the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan must fully implement the democratic and minority rights reforms it has recently enacted. Probably, it should also make some gesture of recognition of (Greek) Cyprus, even though de facto it already has: through its existing customs union with the EU, and by supporting the United Nations plan to reunite the island that the Greek Cypriots voted down.

But some in the EU, especially on the French, German and Austrian right, want talks not on accession but on a "privileged partnership" short of membership. That would be an act of dubious legality and transparent bad faith.

Federalist fears are also misplaced. The old integrationist model has been superseded by "variable geometry" in which Turkey, for instance, would play a core role in a future common foreign and defence policy, whereas Austria, say, would not. Those who are really concerned to construct a more integrated and coherent Union should concentrate less on the EU's "soul" and more on the plumbing, the wiring, and the volatile chemistry that makes the European project work.

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

Bridging East And West
By Deborah Jerome-Cohen
12 December 2004
The Star-Ledger

At the NATO summit in Istanbul in June, President Bush raised hackles when he urged the European Union to accept Turkey as a member. French President Jacques Chirac huffily informed the president that it was none of his business. Not that this rattled Bush, who had other items on his spread-democracy-in-the-Middle-East agenda. That same long weekend, he celebrated the transfer of sovereignty in Iraq, scrawling self-consciously on a note announcing the transfer, "let freedom reign."

Chirac's umbrage was partly justified: It is Europe's call, and one that it's likely to make, halfheartedly, in Turkey's favor when EU leaders meet in Brussels on Thursday and Friday to decide whether to back membership talks between Turkey and the EU. But Chirac was wrong to suggest that the EU's decision has no implications for the rest of the world.

Turkey, the former "sick man of Europe," could well be among the best opportunities to heal the rift between Islam and the West. It could also be an opportunity for Europe to understand that its own strength as a world power might depend less on positioning itself in opposition to the United States - Chirac's own favorite cause - and more on leading the way, with the United States, to bring the remnants of the Ottoman Empire into the 21st century. The more that can be done, the better the prospects for security and prosperity everywhere.

"EU membership would anchor Turkey in the West, fortify it as a firewall against terrorism, and help make it a model of democracy for the Muslim world. Rejection, on the other hand, would set back domestic reforms and radicalize religious extremists," writes David L. Phillips in a recent issue of Foreign Affairs. While that may be overstated, it's not far off.

For years, Turkey, geographically poised between Europe and Asia, has been striving to prove that Islam and democracy are compatible. It's a predominantly Muslim country and a secular democracy, albeit an imperfect one. It has a free-market economy that has grown by 8.2 percent this year, though it remains a poor country. It has a prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has worked doggedly to implement the reforms Europe has insisted on as necessary for EU consideration: Over the past couple of years, Turkey has passed laws against torture, abolished the death penalty, given greater rights to the long-repressed Kurdish minority, and, most recently, backed down on introducing a law to make adultery a criminal offense.

Why, then, would the EU hesitate to embrace Turkey? The country, a firm Cold War ally, has been a longtime member of NATO and has been waiting more than 40 years for membership talks with Europe to begin. It has remained stubbornly secular since the days of Kemal Ataturk and has delivered on reform. Yet both Germany and France have been equivocating, suggesting that Turkey might have to accept some kind of special status rather than full membership. An EU draft statement on Turkey is setting additional conditions, much to Turkey's aggravation.

One not inconsiderable reason for their temporizing is fear. Muslims in some European countries now comprise nearly 10 percent of the total population, and polls suggest that voters in most EU countries are leery of Turkish entry. The Muslim birthrate in Europe is three times higher than the non-Muslim one, which means the Muslim population could nearly double by 2015 while the non-Muslim population will likely shrink by 3.5 percent.

These Muslim populations are almost always ghettoized, poor and aggrieved; anyone who has been to Paris has been struck by the teeming immigrant poverty on its outskirts. Many of the 9/11 attackers had spent time in Europe, which is struggling to crack down on Islamist radicals and has broken up al Qaeda cells from Italy to Germany. As Turks would be quick to point out, it was Arabs, not Turks, who were the attackers. But that is a point likely lost on Europeans both suspicious of non-Christians among them and fearful of possibly fueling more terrorism.

From that perspective, it's understandable that the notion of adding another 70 or so million more Muslims - in the form of Turkey - has limited appeal. In 15 years - about the time when Turkey would finally have membership - it will overtake Germany as the EU's largest member. Additionally, many more Turks may pour into France and Germany looking for work. If they join the ranks of Europe's disaffected Muslims, the problems of Islamist terrorism in the EU could make the Madrid train bombing in March look like child's play.

The backlash against Muslims in Europe started awhile ago and has fed the growth of xenophobic right-wing political parties in France, Germany and Holland. Long seen as Europe's most tolerant society, Holland erupted last month when Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh was gunned down and then stabbed to death in Amsterdam, allegedly by an Islamist extremist miffed about an admittedly inflammatory film van Gogh had made about the oppression of Muslim women.

Another European concern is Turkey's poverty - although given its recent reforms and burgeoning growth, that is less likely to be a problem a decade or so from now. The EU's latest expansion added 10 countries, most of which are much poorer than the rest of Europe. Some worry that these countries might be a burden on Brussels, rather than a boon to regional economic growth. Again, this is unlikely. The combination of free-market and other reforms these countries have undertaken will likely help offset aging populations and sluggish growth in "old" Europe.

Finally, there is the issue of how Turkish accession might affect Europe's role in the world. France in general, and Chirac in particular, has been eager for the EU to be a counterweight to the United States. The fantasy is an EU that speaks in chorus, with France conducting. The Iraq war punctured that particular balloon. Even though Europeans generally were opposed to it, most of their leaders from the new EU countries, notably Poland, agreed to be part of the "coalition of the willing." There seems no inclination among the new members to line up docilely behind the French standard. Should Turkey eventually become a member, it would likely show the same kind of independent spirit that allowed it to forge its own political way in the Muslim world.

These are, from the European viewpoint, the risks of Turkish accession. It seems worth those risks, given the possible upside. Turkey, as a member of the EU, could send a strong signal of

Western acceptance to Muslims worldwide and demonstrate that the West's quarrel is with Islamist terrorism, not with Islam. Turkey's democratic and human rights reforms could be validated and seen as a model by other Muslim countries. As a bridge between East and West, Turkey has long diplomatic experience.

The EU leadership has the power to set this in motion, to the benefit of Europe and the rest of the world. As a contribution to curbing terrorism and moving forward the liberalization of the Middle East, there is little else the EU could do that would have more impact.

Deborah Jerome-Cohen is deputy edi torial page editor of The Star-Ledger.

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

Europe's Stake In Turkey
By H.D.S. Greenway
3 December 2004
The Boston Globe

Istanbul - More than 100 years ago Czar Nicholas I of Russia dubbed Turkey "the sick man of Europe" because the ailing Ottoman Empire seemed at death's door. Today Turks say, "we may have been sick, but at least we were considered part of Europe." On Dec. 17 the 25 members of the European Union will decide whether Turkey can formally begin the long process of joining their club - and Europe is divided.

Austria's commissioner, Franz Fischler, for example, said that Turkey is "far more oriental than European." Former French president Valery Giscard d'Estaing said that admitting Turkey would be "the end of Europe." French prime minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin asked: "Do we want the river of Islam to enter the riverbed of secularism?" And Frits Bolkestein of the Netherlands said that if Turkey joined the EU, the victory over the Turks at the gates of Vienna in 1683 would "have been in vain."

To be sure, other European leaders have been supportive, but even in the most secular of continents Christendom still harbors old- folk fears of the "Terrible Turk," as if his armies were still encamped on the Danube. My oldest friend on the continent of Europe told me in all seriousness recently that the reason the Americans favor Turkish entry into the EU is because they want Europe to be weak.

"Let's be clear about this," said Holland's foreign minister, Ben Bot, recently. "The member states decide," and the decision must be unanimous. Bot called upon the Turks, even at this late hour, to initiate and implement further reforms.

Not that Turkey hasn't been turning reform somersaults to suit the Europeans: overhauling its laws, abolishing the death penalty, improving human rights, and asserting civilian control over the military - all of this by a nominally Islamist government. "It used to be the army that would boss us around, but now it is the EU," said Vuslat Dogan Sabanci, CEO of Istanbul's newspaper Hurriyet.

While it may be true that many Turks are tired of jumping over ever-higher bars to please the Europeans, others see the pressure to join Europe as advantageous to bringing badly needed reforms for Turkey's own sake. For them the journey to Europe - which even if accession talks begin could still take a decade or more - is as important as the arrival. "While American hard power is destroying Iraq," said professor and journalist Sahin Alpay, "European soft power is transforming Turkey."

And this can be only to the good of the world. A stable and secular Islamic country of some 71 million in the Middle East and bordering on the Turkic speaking peoples of Central Asia can be an invaluable strategic asset to the Western world - a beacon of democracy and free markets and a bulwark against the rise of Islamic fanaticism. As Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan put it to a group of visiting journalists here: "We believe that a Europe that will include Turkey will

not be a Christian club but the only venue where civilizations meet through a historic compromise."

No doubt Europe is being asked to swallow a big pill. Turkey is poor and will probably surpass Germany in population during the next decade or two. Most of Turkey is in Asia, as critics like to point out, but Turkey has a bigger population living on the European side of the Bosphorus - 8 million - than 11 of the 25 countries already in the EU.

Yes, the dominant religion in Turkey is Islam. But since Kamel Ataturk wrenched Turkey into secularism 80 years ago, the separation of mosque and state has remained strong. Turks note with irony that France followed Turkey's lead in banning head scarves in state schools. And with some 15 million Muslims already living in EU countries, more than 3 million of them Turks, the union already has more Muslims in its midst than the populations of all but seven of its member states. The gates of Vienna have already been breached.

If the EU had remained the tidy grouping of six industrial countries in Western Europe, one could better sympathize with the contention that Turkey doesn't belong. But with the admission of former communist countries, as well as divided Cyprus and minuscule Malta, into the club, it would be grotesque to keep Turkey out.

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

Why Europe Needs Turkey
By Soner Cagaptay
4 November 2004
Middle East Roundtable - BitterLemons International

On October 6, the European Union issued its much anticipated report evaluating Turkey's accession prospects. The report said that Ankara satisfies the union's membership rules sufficiently to begin accession talks. However, the report also suggested a special track for talks with Turkey, one with no promise of membership. This sets Turkey apart from all other candidate countries for which accession talks have been close ended.

Most Europeans would not find this attitude troublesome. After all, common wisdom is that the EU does not need Ankara. Turkey is undesirable because it is large and Muslim. Nothing could be more short-sighted: Europe needs Turkey precisely for these reasons. With its young, secular-minded population, the Turkish democracy offers a solution to Europe's twin dilemmas, an aging population and a restless immigrant community of mostly Arab, radical Muslims whose numbers are growing exponentially. For its own sake, the EU needs to bring Ankara into the union.

So far, the Turks have put forth a brave face toward the EU's treatment of them. Europe's recent decision, for instance, has been hailed a diplomatic victory in Ankara. Yet, Turkey's EU accession is by no means a done deal. First, there is the possibility that the union's final decision in December, which will take into account the recent report, will create a separate accession track for Ankara, along with a laundry list of Turkey-specific reform requirements.

To be sure, there is room for continued political reform in Turkey. Yet, even European bureaucrats admit that Ankara satisfies the EU's accession rules, "existence of rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights," at least as much as some of the EU countries. Sooner or later, most Turks will catch up with the fact that Brussels expects Ankara to become perfect, while it is sufficient for other countries to simply be good to join the EU. Brussels will find glitches in Turkey as long as it keeps looking for them, which only increases the chances of anti-EU backlash in Turkey once the current euphoria dies down and the EU's wavering attitude falls onto the Turks' radar screen.

A second impediment ahead of Turkey's membership is internal European politics. Although the governments in France and Germany, the two most powerful nations in the EU, are supportive of Ankara's bid, today there is powerful opposition in both countries against Turkey's accession. This is fed first and foremost by a backlash toward Muslim immigrants. It is unfortunate that many Europeans fail to see that Turks are "western Muslims" who better acclimatize to Europe than most other Muslim immigrants.

A comparison between France, whose Muslim community is mostly North African, and Germany, whose Muslim community is mostly Turkish, makes this case. The heavily disenfranchised North African Muslim community in France is the hotbed of radical Islam in the EU. Meanwhile, though the Turks in Germany are not quite fully assimilated into mainstream society, fundamentalist Islam has failed to take roots among them.

Another concern that feeds opposition to Turkish membership is a fear that this will bring Europe closer to the turmoil of the Middle East. The fact is the EU will become a true actor in Middle East politics, and have a say in shaping the peace, only after it takes in a country from that region. Another benefit of Turkey's accession is that this would give the EU access to the rich energy resources in the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia. Without Turkey, the EU is at best a regional club. With Turkey, it is in the running to become a powerful global player.

For sure, many Europeans will continue to have difficulty in seeing the strategic wisdom of Turkey's membership. After all, most Europeans would rather stay away from the Middle East, but the fact is that sooner or later Europeans will need to take a closer look at their Middle Eastern neighbors. Birthrates are so low in Europe that the EU population, currently at 455 million, will shrink by at least 25 million by 2050. What is worse, the EU will age dramatically: in 2050 nearly one third of Europeans will be dependant population over 65, siphoning off funds from European welfare states. On the other hand the Turkish population, which is at 70 million today, will jump to 97 million in 2050. More importantly, this will be a young population, with a low dependency rate of 10-15 percent.

Turkey's membership is the panacea for Europe's demographic demise and the impending failure of the famed welfare states. It is also Europe's best investment in "western Islam." The sooner the Europeans come to these conclusions, the easier it will become for them to think about a European Turkey. Europe might well survive without Ankara, but with Turkey in its ranks, it has a chance to excel.-

Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

-----Original Message-----
From: Thomas, Jennifer S.
Sent: Thursday, December 23, 2004 11:08 AM
Subject: Selection of Commentary on EU Decision to Open Accession Talks with Turkey in 2005

Dear Friend --

As you know, last week European Union leaders decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey beginning on Oct. 3, 2005. Knowing of your interest in Turkey and U.S.-Turkish relations, we thought you might be interested in this short selection of official reaction and commentary on this significant development.

Best regards and Happy Holidays,

Jennifer S. Thomas
Director
The Harbour Group, LLC
3000 K Street, N.W., Suite 105
Washington D.C. 20007
(202) 295-8790

Post Dec 17
decision packet FI...

This material is distributed by The Harbour Group, LLC on behalf of the Republic of Turkey. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

OFFICIAL REACTIONS TO EU DECISION

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's Statement On Agreement On Start Of Accession Talks Between Turkey And The European Union
17 December 2004
U.S. Department of State

Israel Welcomes Turkey's EU Membership Prospect
20 December 2004
Agence France Presse

COMMENTARY ON EU DECISION

Europe's New Frontier
20 December 2004
The Boston Globe

The Turks Accede
20 December 2004
The New York Times

The Europe Question
20 December 2004
The Wall Street Journal Europe

Turkey's EU Moment
18 December 2004
The Washington Times

A Date With Turkey: What The EU Has Done Is Of Historic Importance
18 December 2004
Financial Times

Soccer May Help Turkey Meet Its Goal
20 December 2004
The Philadelphia Inquirer

OFFICIAL REACTION TO EU DECISION

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's Statement On Agreement On Start Of Accession Talks Between Turkey And The European Union
17 December 2004
U.S. Department of State

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

The United States welcomes today's decision by the European Union to begin accession negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005. We congratulate both the European Union and Turkey on this historic day. Today's positive decision reflects Turkey's impressive reform accomplishments and is a great success for both Turkey and the European Union. We are confident that the accession process, and Turkey's eventual membership in the European Union, will bring great benefits to Turkey and to the European Union. The Turkish people have much to look forward to. A Turkey that is firmly anchored in Europe and sharing European values will be a positive force for prosperity and democracy. This is good for Turkey, for the broader European region, and for the United States, and that is why successive U.S. Administrations have consistently supported Turkey's European aspirations.

Israel Welcomes Turkey's EU Membership Prospect
20 December 2004
Agence France Presse

ANKARA - Israel on Monday congratulated Turkey for the green light it received last week to start membership talks with the European Union.

"Israel congratulated the Turkish government and people on the European Councils decision to start accession talks," a statement released by the Israeli embassy here said.

"Israel sees in the EUs enlargement and Turkeys accession to the EU a contribution to strengthening regional stability, democracy, cooperation and socio-economic prosperity," the statement said.

Turkey has been Israel's chief regional ally since the two countries struck a military cooperation deal in 1996, much to the anger of Arab states and Iran.

Bilateral ties, however, have chilled since Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party came to power in November 2002, often lashing out at the Jewish state for its heavy-handed policies against the Palestinians.

COMMENTARY ON EU DECISION

Europe's New Frontier
20 December 2004
The Boston Globe

The agreement struck Friday between Turkey and the European Union represents an artful evasion of the basic question haunting both parties: Will populous, poor, agrarian, Islamic Turkey be accepted as a full-fledged member of the European democratic club? The compromises forged at an EU summit in Brussels hold out hope that Turkey will

complete its transformation into a democracy fully respecting human rights. If so, countries such as France, Austria, and Denmark - the principal opponents of Turkish membership - may come to see Turkey's addition to the EU more as a benefit than a peril.

Cyprus was the issue that nearly prevented an agreement to begin accession talks next October. With the southern Greek side of the island having become one of the 10 newest members of the EU, there had to be a face-saving way of allowing Turkey to accept the Greek sector of Cyprus as an EU member without also recognizing it as the sovereign representative of the entire island.

The knot was untied by having Turkey extend its previous customs agreement with the first 15 members of the EU to the 10 new states that joined last May, including Greek Cyprus. This compromise hardly resolves the Cyprus dispute. However, it does enable Turkey to enter into what the summit's concluding statement called "open-ended talks" about membership.

One of the most evident benefits of the process that led to EU acceptance of Central European states such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is that they were required to settle old territorial disputes with neighbors before they could join the EU fraternity. If something similar occurs in Cyprus, the EU's code of conduct will have enlarged its peace-preserving influence to a crucial flashpoint.

During the planned accession talks, Cyprus is likely to be less of a long-term problem than issues that threaten the economic, social, and demographic interests of key European countries. This reality is recognized implicitly in the EU's insistence that the talks be open-ended - meaning they may not necessarily end with Turkey's gaining full membership rather than some unique partnership agreement. And 2015 is the earliest date by which Turkey could join the EU.

By that time Turkey's population is expected to be over 80 million. As the biggest country in the EU, it could expect to have the greatest say when EU members cast their weighted votes. So there are European fears that Turkey's agricultural products and its poor agrarian workers seeking economic opportunity elsewhere in Europe will confront the EU with difficult choices.

Both sides will need time and patience to work out what could be a historic reconceiving of the European idea.

The Turks Accede
20 December 2004
The New York Times

An agreement to open official membership negotiations for Turkey to join the European Union is a welcome and important step -- for Turkey, for Europe and for other countries

that want to build a world in which identity is based primarily on shared respect for human rights, not ethnicity or religion.

True, the agreement is marred by some unfortunate omissions and references. These may, justifiably, pique the Turks, who first sought entry into the European Economic Community, the precursor to the European Union, 45 years ago. For one, there is no end date for negotiations. Also, the agreement states that negotiations may be stopped if Turkey backslides in its reforms, a tenet that is implicit in the talks and thus did not need to be made explicit.

Such conditions might satisfy a growing resistance to Turkish membership in the European public, but it could also feed Turkish suspicions that some European leaders are looking for ways to hold Turkey at bay.

It will be up to the Turks to overlook these slights, and for Turkish and European leaders to make the powerful arguments for Turkey's membership. Turkey's prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has not flinched from the goal of making the Turkish republic a secular democratic state -- the primary criterion for union membership.

In return, the Europeans, by accepting the predominantly Muslim country, show that Islam does not preclude embracing European values. Indeed, as an associate member of the European community since 1963 and a NATO member since 1952, Turkey has as strong a claim to a place in Europe and the West as the new east European Union members.

The negotiations are expected to take about 10 years -- plenty of time to resolve existing issues. Along the way, the Turks should be given annual progress reports that close in on a specific end date, so they are not required to be endlessly patient. Forty-five years is already long enough.

The Europe Question
20 December 2004
The Wall Street Journal Europe

Forty years is a long time for anyone to wait for a commitment from a would-be partner. But Turkey's four decades of patience finally paid off -- sort of -- Friday night, when the EU set Oct. 3, 2005, as the date for the start of negotiations with Turkey on joining the bloc.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan came to Brussels last week determined to fight for a date certain, and he got one, 40 years to the month after Turkey's association agreement with the EU came into effect. Even that date came with caveats; it is contingent on Turkey's recognizing the Greek Cypriot government, which is currently holding up the process of reunifying the northern and southern sides of the island. And

supposing that wrinkle can be worked out, a decade or more of negotiations awaits the Turks.

This would bring the full length of the EU's Turkish dalliance to the half-century mark. But even concluding negotiations won't guarantee Turkey a seat at the table in Brussels, as at least two countries -- France and Austria -- have threatened to hold referendums on Turkish membership at the end of the process. This, as the Turks have pointed out, is a kind of "sentence first, verdict afterward" inversion of the process; once a country has satisfied the considerable demands placed on it in terms of red-tape adoption and law changes -- 80,000 pages' worth in the EU's acquis communautaire -- it should not then be subjected to an uncertain vote in one or several countries of the EU on its membership. No country should be expected to pay the price for admission without assurance of membership.

But the fact that the roadblocks keep multiplying even as the goal recedes should not surprise anyone. The Turkey Question has never been only about whether the Turks would embrace Western ideals; they've been headed this way since Kemal Ataturk reoriented the nation four score and one years ago. Rather, it's very much about whether Europeans are ready for Turkey.

That question remains unanswered. For all its talk of inclusiveness, Europe's ambivalence about the Muslims inside the EU and on its borders remains acute. And while the EU offers rhetoric about the need for peace in the Middle East, the thought of bringing the EU's borders to the edge of Syria and Iraq remains disquieting to some. Meanwhile, Europe's secularists and some of its Christians, including some in the Vatican, have found a sort of unity through their mutual mistrust of the thought of a large Muslim nation being admitted to the European tent.

Many of the EU heads of state who came to Brussels to nail down the agreement face stiff opposition back home to admitting Turkey into the Union. French President Jacques Chirac personally supported beginning accession talks with Turkey, but polls show two-thirds of his constituents oppose him. "The worst possible outcome of the negotiations," writes the Center for European Reform's Heather Grabbe, "would be a deal between Turkey and the EU that the governments accept and the people reject."

That's what the Turkish prime minister was getting at in a recent reference to a "clear and present danger" should the EU decide "that it can live with being simply a Christian club." While those comments were interpreted in some quarters as a threat, they're more likely a realist's way of saying that Europe's words about multilateral, diplomatic engagements with the Middle East will be for naught if it acts by closing its doors to a Muslim-majority nation.

Nothing is guaranteed in accession talks, and the EU and Turkey could spend the better part of two decades taking a final measure of one another. Along the way, the EU will demand that Turkey do some necessary things, such as shoring up minority rights, as well as some onerous ones, such as adopting EU environmental and worker-protection laws.

But now that negotiations are to officially begin next year, the EU owes Turkey the certainty that should those negotiations conclude positively, it will be the last hurdle the country will have to clear. Anything less would turn a four-decade tease into a farce.

Turkey's EU Moment
18 December 2004
The Washington Times

The European Union made the historic decision to in effect allow Turkey to become a bonafide member. That decision will be felt far beyond the borders of Europe.

At an EU summit in Brussels, European leaders set Oct. 3 to start formal entry talks, which would pave the way for membership. Up until now, Turkey has been brought close to, but not quite inside, the European fold. In 1963, Turkey signed an association agreement with the European Union's precursor, the European Community. That deal, broadly recognized as a glorified trade deal, appeared to imply the possibility of eventual full membership. As it turned out, that possibility would come only much, much later. In 1996, Turkey forged a "customs union" with the European Union and only in 1999 was Turkey accepted as an official candidate for EU membership.

The challenges for Europe in integrating Turkey are material, cultural and symbolic, as are the benefits. Turkey, with its population of about 72 million, is projected by 2025 to have the largest population in the union. That, combined with its relative poverty, means it would be a net recipient of EU subsidies. The per capita income in Turkey is about $4,000, a fraction of the EU average. A study prepared for the European Commission found that, as an EU member, Turkey could receive between $20.2 billion and $34.2 billion in annual subsidies starting in 2025.

Then there are the social issues. The Turks who move into EU countries will at times collide on cultural and religious terms with other Europeans, as has already been the case. The cold-blooded slaying in Holland of film director Theo van Gogh by radical Muslim terrorists in Holland has brought those concerns to the fore.

Europe, though, will probably be protected from a massive influx of Turkish workers, because a safegaurd clause would restrict the numbers of Turkish migrants in times of economic difficulty. Turkey has also been steadily improving economically since its 2001 crisis. Since then, it has had annual growth rates of 5 to 8 percent and its exports have more than doubled since 2000. Its national debt has fallen from 94 percent of GDP to 70 percent.

It is also clear that the prospect of EU membership has pushed Turkey forward. Although the legendary Mustafa Kemal Ataturk put the country on the path to secular democracy in the early 1900s, its difficult to believe Turkey would have made the democratic and human- rights strides it has made in recent years without an EU carrot. Europe is expected to continue to change Turkey. That expected reform will take place on Iraq's,

Iran's and Syria's borders. The start of formal talks may illustrate to the Middle East and beyond the benefits of democratic progress.

Accession negotiations with Turkey will likely last at least 10 years. By setting a date for talks, the process has already begun, and the world will be watching.

A Date With Turkey: What The EU Has Done Is Of Historic Importance.
18 December 2004
Financial Times

The European Union has an excellent record of enlargement - of spreading stability, democracy and prosperity to the countries it admits into its club. Unfortunately it also has a record of reducing moments of real history to bathos. So it nearly proved with yesterday's graceless embrace of Turkey even if, at the end, history won the day.

After 41 years in Europe's ante-room, Turkey finally got a date (October 3 next year) to start accession negotiations, and these would be for full membership and not some second-class "privileged partnership" as advocated by opponents of Turkish entry.

That truly is historic. Ankara's membership would change the EU and transform Turkey. The union will need to reform its farm and regional aid policies if it is to absorb this much poorer and more populous agrarian country. Turkey's entry would also accelerate the trend towards "variable geometry", whereby like-minded members form inner core groups such as the euro; Turkey would probably be a very late entry to the single currency but, with its big army and Nato membership, an early participant in a common foreign and defence policy.

Most important of all, the EU is strengthening a bridge to a democratic secular republic with a Muslim majority, at a time of gathering conflict between Islam and the west that looks set to last at least a generation. At a time when Muslims around the world rage at the US and its allies because of their policies, above all towards Iraq and Palestine, this use of the EU's "soft power" is of inestimable value.

For all that, this week's EU summit provided a foretaste of how difficult the negotiations, likely to stretch out over a decade or more, are going to be. It nearly came to grief over an EU demand that Turkey recognise Greek Cyprus. This would have been a humiliation for Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey's prime minister. Last April, after all, Turkey and Turkish Cyprus supported a United Nations compromise to reunify the divided island that the Greek Cypriots - already guaranteed membership by a politically maladroit EU - rejected in a referendum. But the issue was fudged by a formula whereby Turkey signs a modified

protocol extending its customs union with the EU to the new member states that entered in May, including Cyprus.

It is possible EU diplomats chose the Cyprus issue to appease opponents - especially in France, Germany and Austria - with more fundamental objections to Turkey's entry. This initial skirmish at any rate highlights the amount of fudge and firm nerves that are going to be needed on both sides.

Membership requires Turkey to implement human, minority and democratic rights reforms specified in the so-called Copenhagen criteria. All that will engender controversy. But the fourth of those criteria highlights the question of the EU's capacity to absorb new members. This is where the rejectionists are building their defences. Even though a Turkey with its candidacy confirmed will see transforming benefits to its economy, including new inward investment and a reduced cost of financing its Dollars 200bn-plus (Pounds 103.5bn) debt, it will still be significantly poorer than the rest of the union.

Yet the Christian Democrats leading the group trying to keep Turkey out might do better to see in Mr Erdogan's Justice and Development party a mirror image of part of their own history: the party has evolved from Islamist roots into a sort of Muslim Democrats movement of the centre-right - precisely the type of evolution this bridge to the Muslim world is all about.

Soccer May Help Turkey Meet Its Goal
20 December 2004
The Philadelphia Inquirer

Last week marked the beginning of a process in Europe that could eventually lead to the admission of Turkey to the European Union. The admission of Turkey is an enormously controversial issue: Many Europeans don't want the pluralist but predominantly Muslim nation of about 70 million people in the EU because they feel that it isn't really a "European" country.

Several years ago, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the French head of the EU's constitutional convention, said that if Turkey were to join the EU, it would be "the end of European union." Turkey, he said, had "a different culture, a different approach, a different way of life."

A lot of factors will go into determining whether Turkey is eventually allowed to join the EU. But few may be as important as Turkey's progress on the soccer field.

Soccer is one of the principal ways in which Europeans interact with one another and learn about other cultures. It is an obsession almost everywhere. National teams play each other all the time, as do club teams from all over the continent.

Moreover, to the extent that there is resistance to the notion that Europe should become a super-state with open borders, soccer has demonstrated how the ideal New Europe might look like as its stars, such as England's David Beckham and Michael Owen, now ply their trade in Spain. And vice versa.

A decade ago, soccer fans had reason to question whether Turkey belonged in Europe. The Turkish national team had never done anything to distinguish itself in the World Cup, and it had never even qualified for the European Championship.

But in recent years, at least in soccer terms, the Turks have become, well, Europeanized. Galatasaray of Istanbul won the UEFA Cup - the second-biggest club prize - in 2000. In 2002, the Turks finished third in the World Cup. The national team's stars now play for some of the premier clubs of Europe, such as Inter Milan.

All of this has had a profound effect on the image of Turkey, both home and abroad.

"I think 20 years ago, Turkish people were afraid and didn't like Europe too much," one Turkish journalist told a reporter recently.

"Nowadays, by facing football, they've come to know Europe and are really familiar with Europe. Now they like to be in Europe as part of the game, not only the football game but also the social game."

Turkish soccer fans are among the world's most enthusiastic. They "see themselves not as passive spectators but an active component in the whole event," reads one soccer guide. Lighting smoke bombs and flares, tossing objects onto the field, and even firing celebratory guns outside the stadium are all part of the spectacle of Turkish soccer.

If anything, the links between soccer and politics may be stronger in Turkey than elsewhere. A series of laws passed in the 1980s outlawing violence at political demonstrations had the unintended effect of driving nationalist sentiment into soccer stadiums, where it still remains.

Thus, the nation's efforts in European sports competitions are often seen as surrogates for its struggles to prove its worthiness to the outside world. Then, too, the prime minister is a huge fan of Fenerbahce - Galatasaray's rival in Istanbul - cementing the sports-politics link.

Diplomatic correspondents will spend the coming months and years poring over treaties and parsing the remarks of heads of state in an effort to determine how Turkey's efforts to join the EU are proceeding.

They'd be better off watching the Turkish national team as it tries to qualify for World Cup 2006 and beyond. As those efforts go, so may go the nation.

Steven Stark is a freelance writer based in England.

REQUEST FOR LANGUAGE CHANGE IN
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND RELATED AGENCIES
APPROPRIATIONS BILL FOR FY 2005

SUBMITTED BY THE EMBASSY OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS
OCTOBER 20, 2004

BACKGROUND: The *Territorial Assistance* section of Senate Report 108-341 (to the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill for FY 2005) designates $1 million to continue health care programs under Article II, Section 1, of the Agreement between the U.S. Government and the Government of the Marshall Islands for the implementation of Section 177 of the Compact of Free Association.

This section also dictates that "[t]hese funds shall be used to ensure continued medical programs and services to members of the Enewetak, Bikini, Rongelap and Utrik communities, born prior to 1960, who currently reside on islands, such as Enewetak, Kili, Mejetto, and Utrik, that otherwise do not have medical services available."

IMPACT OF SENATE LANGUAGE: The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) very much appreciates the U.S. Senate's willingness to provide critical funding for the Section 177 program, albeit at a reduced level. However, the RMI believes that the restrictions established by Senate Report No. 341, if enacted, would have the following negative consequences:

- Deny adequate health care to individuals from the four atolls who were born after 1960 on islands that continued to possess high levels of radiation, such as Rongelap and Bikini. The U.S. Government prematurely resettled populations on these atolls – populations that were subsequently evacuated a second time from their home islands because they ingested dangerous levels of radiation from their environment.

- Deny adequate health care to individuals from the four atolls born after 1960 who were employed by the U.S. Government to clean-up the ground zero test sites of Enewetak and Bikini. These employees participated in occupational activities such as bulldozing and ground clearing that resuspended plutonium in the air.

- Deny adequate health care to individuals from the four atolls who now live in the main population centers of Majuro and Ebeye. While RMI does maintain health care facilities in these population centers, they lack the capability to address the highly specialized medical needs of individuals exposed to radiation. In fact, there are no oncologists or mammography units in the entire RMI. As a result, many individuals requiring radiation-related care would be denied necessary medical programs and services under the proposed Senate language.

- Deny available health care services to many atoll residents. Given the unique geographical and public health challenges associated with serving those affected by the U.S. nuclear testing program, the Section 177 health care service provider has established single-doctor medical clinics on a number of the atolls. In most cases, these doctors are the only health care providers on their respective islands. As a result, they have an opportunity to serve individuals born both before and after 1960, as well as individuals with health care needs not directly resulting from radiation exposure. The restrictions imposed by the Senate language would prohibit them from providing such services, leaving a significant percentage of each island's population without any health care.

SUGGESTED MODOFICATION TO SENATE LANGUAGE: In light of the above-described consequences of the proposed Senate language restricting eligibility for Section 177 services, the RMI respectfully suggests that this language be eliminated from the final version of the legislation. If elimination of this language is not possible, the RMI recommends that the language be modified to state the following:

> "These funds shall be used to ensure continued medical programs and services to members of the Enewetak, Bikini, Rongelap and Utrik communities who currently reside on islands that otherwise do not have medical services available to treat individuals exposed to radiation."

This material is distributed by The Harbour Group, LLC on behalf of the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

Briefing Paper: Changed Circumstances

Public Law 99-239 enacted as federal law both the Compact of Free Association and a nuclear claims settlement ("Section 177 Agreement") between the United States and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI). In so doing, Congress provided that the purpose of the Agreement was to "create and maintain, in perpetuity, a means to address past, present, and future consequences of the nuclear testing program." The U.S. recognized at the time of Compact approval that the full extent of injuries to persons and damage to property was not yet known, or not available to the public due to national security classification, and that the initial damage assessments were limited to a "best effort" at that time.

As part of the Compact, Congress appropriated $150 million to address known consequences of the U.S. nuclear weapons testing program in the RMI. It also established a process for continuing to address the legacy of the nuclear tests, including any future claims based on new information or damages. The $150 million appropriation was recognized as a "downpayment" that was not intended to represent a comprehensive assessment of damages, a legally adjudicated settlement, or a monetary damages award.

Since 1985, it has become clear that the cumulative levels of radiation to which the RMI was exposed caused substantially greater injury to people and property (land, reefs, etc.) than was previously known or made public. The Nuclear Claims Tribunal, which was created to settle claims as an alternative to judicial means, has been awarding claims for personal injury and property damages, including $72.6 million in personal injury claims, as well as over $386 million to the inhabitants of the Enewetak Atoll and over $563 million to the people of Bikini to compensate for the loss of their land, restoration of the atolls, and hardship endured during 33 years of forced resettlement. All of the Tribunal's funding has been used to pay for personal injury awards (although payments are made on a pro rata basis and 45% of claimants die without receiving their full award). The Tribunal does not have the funding necessary to make full awards for personal injury or to make awards for already adjudicated property claims. The Tribunal also lacks funding for expected future personal or property claims—including pending land claims from Rongelap, Utrik, and Ailuk.

In the Compact legislation, Congress authorized a process under which the RMI could petition Congress for additional funds to cover the full cost of damages and injuries if new information rendered the initial $150 million payment manifestly inadequate. Within the framework of the Section 177 Agreement, Congress authorized a petition for continuation of measures and remedies where there exists new and additional information about the radiological effects of U.S. nuclear weapons testing programs on the lands and people of the RMI, not known when the nuclear claims settlement was negotiated and ratified by both parties, and where this new information renders the provisions of the Section 177 Agreement manifestly inadequate to address the full scope of damages resulting from the testing program, including payment of awards by the Nuclear Claims Tribunal.

In 2000, President Kessai Note established an Advisory Committee on Changed Circumstances (ACCC) consisting of representatives from the atolls most affected by the weapons testing program (Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, Utrik and Ailuk) and a team of medical, scientific, and legal advisors. In September, 2000, the RMI submitted a *Petition To The Congress Regarding Changed Circumstances Arising from U.S. Nuclear Testing in the Marshall Islands* ("Changed Circumstances Petition"), a consensus document drafted by the ACCC. President Kessai Note resubmitted this petition to Congress in November 2001. The RMI government has been waiting for a response to the Petition for more than three years.

SUMMARY OF THE PETITION

The petition covers four broad areas, as summarized below.

1. New and Additional Information Not Available At The Time of Negotiation and Agreement: In 1993, the U.S. Government declassified thousands of documents pertaining to the testing program that demonstrated that the atolls of the RMI received far more radiation from multiple tests than previously thought. In addition, scientific and medical advancements have shown that much lower doses of radiation are more harmful than the levels thought to be dangerous at the time of the Compact.

2. Personal Injury Awards: The Nuclear Claims Tribunal has awarded over $72.6 million for personal injuries to more than 1,600 individuals, all of whom had medical conditions directly linked to the nuclear testing program. More than 600 awardees have died without receiving full compensation. Because of the severity of the claims, and the sheer number of individuals harmed, the Tribunal has awarded over $26.9 million more than the total available for payment during the Compact period. The Changed Circumstances Petition asks Congress to authorize and appropriate funds so that the Tribunal can make full payments to those still living and to the estates of those already deceased.

3. Property Damage Awards: Two communities, Enewetak and Bikini, have adjudicated claims with the Tribunal and have been awarded money to compensate them for damages. Due to a shortfall in the Nuclear Claims Trust Fund, the Tribunal is unable to disperse the awards. The Changed Circumstances Petition asks Congress to authorize and appropriate funds to settle the two adjudicated claims, as well as to settle forthcoming claims based on the criteria used in the Tribunal's first two decisions.

4. Medical Care: The Compact envisioned that the unique health needs of the RMI would be addressed through a health care program for the affected populations and awardees of personal injury claims from the Tribunal. Unfortunately, the current program has proven manifestly inadequate. The program was expected to deliver care through the RMI health infrastructure, which was not prepared or equipped to deliver the necessary level of care. The funding provided has also proven grossly inadequate, with only $2 million appropriated annually and an average per patient expenditure of less than $12 per month. (This compares with an average U.S. expenditure of $230 per person per month for similar services.)

To adequately address the actual medical costs associated with the nuclear testing program, the Changed Circumstances Petition asks Congress to: (1) authorize and appropriate funds to cover the initial capital costs to build and supply a medical infrastructure that can provide adequate primary and secondary care to the affected populations; (2) authorize and appropriate sufficient funds annually for the next 50 years to provide an adequate health care program for the affected communities and awardees of personal injury claims; and (3) extend the U.S. Department of Energy's medical monitoring program for exposed populations to any groups that can demonstrate high levels of radiation exposure.

This material is distributed by The Harbour Group, LLC on behalf of the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

INVENTORY OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

In 1986, the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) and the United States signed the Compact of Free Association (U.S. Public Law 99-239), which included a nuclear testing claims settlement under Section 177 of the Compact. Since the agreement, the consequences of the nuclear testing program have been studied in-depth and it has become apparent that the circumstances affecting the Marshallese people and their homelands have changed drastically. In accordance with Section 177, the RMI has submitted a Changed Circumstances Petition (CCP) to the United States Congress, based on new factual, legal, medical and scientific knowledge not available in 1986 when the Compact and Section 177 claims settlement entered into force, including:

Revised Scientific Understanding of Radiation and Its Effects

- The technical basis for the Section 177 claims settlement was the 1978 Northern Marshall Islands Radiological Survey[1], which based the health risks assessment related to radiation at the time of the agreement on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR) I Report issued in 1972.

- BEIR I used early data from the health and mortality rates of Japanese A-bomb survivors, but continuing data from expanding disease and mortality rates of those survivors has led to scientific recognition that the risk of cancer and other radiation-induced health effects is about nine-times greater than thought at the time of the Section 177 settlement. These are the most recent scientific findings of the BEIR V Committee, which could have been neither predicted nor foreseen in 1986.

- Recently published data identifies additional radiation-induced health effects that had not been identified at the time of the Agreement.

- Since the signing of the Agreement, the acceptable level of radiation has been substantially lowered, which has increased loss of use damages and costs associated with cleanup efforts.

- The EPA lowered the ceiling of acceptable public exposure to radiation from 500-mrems per year[2] to the 15-mrem current level[3]. This represents over a 30-fold decrease in acceptable public exposure revealing a far greater degree of unacceptable exposure for RMI citizens. This decrease also dramatically increases the cleanup costs for the affected areas.

- At the time of the agreement very little, if any, data existed that could have provided a credible basis for estimating cleanup costs. Only with the enactment of Superfund did a comprehensive process develop that would formalize specific protocols and permit the derivation of remediation.

- In 2000, the Department of Energy estimated that cleanup costs for the continental United States would range between $203 - $247 billion over the life cycle of the program. Thus, eleven domestic U.S. sites will cost more than $1 billion each. Yet, the continental United States hosted only 1%[4] of nuclear tests. By contrast,

---

[1] *The Meaning of Radiation for those Atolls in the Northern Part of the Marshall Islands that Were Surveyed in 1978*, United States Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., November 1982.

[2] Ibid. p. 29

[3] *Establishment of Cleanup Levels for CERCLA Sites with Radioactive Contamination*, OSWER No. 9200.4-18, August 22, 1997.; *Radiation Risk Assessment at CERCLA Sites: Q&A*, Directive 9200.4-13P, EPA 540/R/99/006, December 1999.

[4] Represents the "Percentage of Total Yield of Mega-tons of TNT" detonated in atmospheric nuclear in the continental United States. The equivalent of 1.38 Mega-tons of TNT were detonated in the Continental United States, as opposed to 107 mega-tons of testing in the Marshall Islands.

the RMI was the location of 77% of U.S. nuclear testing, with at least four high-level contamination sites. But the RMI only received a fraction of the amount allocated for each of those 11 domestic sites.

New Evidence of Increased Exposure to RMI Citizens

- After the effective date of the Compact and the Section 177 settlement, additional populations of RMI citizens were identified as having been exposed to potentially deleterious doses of radiation. The subsequently identified populations include RMI citizens:
  1) involved with nuclear waste cleanup;
  2) prematurely resettled to Bikini Atoll;
  3) prematurely resettled to Rongelap Atoll;
  4) living on the atolls affected by the Castle series of tests; and
  5) living downwind of the Bravo test.

- A recent study shows that:
  1) past estimates of thyroid doses to residents of Rongelap and Utrik have been underestimated by 10- to 20-fold;
  2) whole body doses from external radiation are more than two-fold higher than previously estimated; and
  3) internal exposure to tissues other than the thyroid that were previously dismissed as "insignificant" resulted in doses of hundreds of rads.

- DOE did not inform Marshallese citizens until 1999 that the Nuclear Testing Program used "external tracer chemicals" in conjunction with the detonation of nuclear weapons. Several of the elements used are radioactive and/or chemically toxic and all we know is the quantity used over the duration of the program. DOE has not produced any additional data that says when or where these chemicals were used.

- No attempt has ever been made to measure the impacts of these tracers on the people or the environment of the RMI. For example, one of the tracers is thallium, a chemical used in rodenticide and insecticide. A lethal human dose is approximately 1 gram, and lower doses cause symptoms including vomiting, diarrhea, and temporary hair loss. According to the Department of Energy, 155,000 grams of thallium were released into the atmosphere during the nuclear tests.

No revised determination has ever been attempted, in light of the dramatic revisions to the scientific understanding of radiation and the new evidence of Marshallese exposure, to reassess the adequacy of the amounts provided under Section 177 or other measures for claims relating to loss or damage to property and persons during the nuclear testing program. Also, no scientific analysis has ever been undertaken by the U.S. Government to project, assess, and quantify future radiation health effects that might be expected from exposure.

INVENTORY OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

This new information about the effects of radiation and the exposure of Marshallese constitutes changed circumstances and requires Congress to determine what additional measures need to me adopted to address the needs of the RMI arising from the nuclear testing program.

This material is distributed by The Harbour Group, LLC on behalf of the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

2005 APR 27 PM 4:37
CRM/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT