

MAR 31 1994

For Six Month Period Ending _____
(Insert date)

Name of Registrant **DAVID A. KORN**

Registration No. **04773**

Business Address of Registrant **3601 Connecticut Ave NW (#210)
Washington, DC 20008**

I-REGISTRANT

1. Has there been a change in the information previously furnished in connection with the following:

(a) If an individual:

- | | | |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|--|
| (1) Residence address | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| (2) Citizenship | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| (3) Occupation | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |

(b) If an organization:

- | | | |
|--------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| (1) Name | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (2) Ownership or control | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (3) Branch offices | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> |

2. Explain fully all changes, if any, indicated in item 1.

NONE

IF THE REGISTRANT IS AN INDIVIDUAL, OMIT RESPONSE TO ITEMS 3, 4, and 5.

3. Have any persons ceased acting as partners, officers, directors or similar officials of the registrant during this 6 month reporting period? Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name

Position

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4. Have any persons become partners, officers, directors or similar officials during this 6 month reporting period?
Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

<i>Name</i>	<i>Residence Address</i>	<i>Citizenship</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Date Assumed</i>
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5. Has any person named in Item 4 rendered services directly in furtherance of the interests of any foreign principal?
Yes No

If yes, identify each such person and describe his services.

6. Have any employees or individuals other than officials, who have filed a short form registration statement, terminated their employment or connection with the registrant during this 6 month reporting period? Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

<i>Name</i>	<i>Position or connection</i>	<i>Date terminated</i>
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7. During this 6 month reporting period, have any persons been hired as employees or in any other capacity by the registrant who rendered services to the registrant directly in furtherance of the interests of any foreign principal in other than a clerical or secretarial, or in a related or similar capacity? Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

<i>Name</i>	<i>Residence Address</i>	<i>Position or connection</i>	<i>Date connection began</i>
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II—FOREIGN PRINCIPAL

(PAGE 3)

8. Has your connection with any foreign principal ended during this 6 month reporting period? Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name of foreign principal

Date of Termination

9. Have you acquired any new foreign principal¹ during this 6 month reporting period? Yes No

If yes, furnish following information:

Name and address of foreign principal

Date acquired

10. In addition to those named in Items 8 and 9, if any, list the foreign principals¹ whom you continued to represent during the 6 month reporting period.

NONE

III—ACTIVITIES

11. During this 6 month reporting period, have you engaged in any activities for or rendered any services to any foreign principal named in Items 8, 9, and 10 of this statement? Yes No

If yes, identify each such foreign principal and describe in full detail your activities and services:

Foreign Principal = Barham Salih, Representative of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.

Activities & Services = Limited exclusively to writing drafts of letters, speeches, press releases, articles & memoranda for the consideration and possible use of Mr. Salih. No lobbying and no materials disseminated to any other person.

¹The term "foreign principal" includes, in addition to those defined in section 1(b) of the Act, an individual or organization any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign government, foreign political party, foreign organization or foreign individual. (See Rule 100(a)(9)).

A registrant who represents more than one foreign principal is required to list in the statements he files under the Act only those foreign principals for whom he is not entitled to claim exemption under Section 3 of the Act. (See Rule 208.)

12. During this 6 month reporting period, have you on behalf of any foreign principal engaged in political activity² as defined below?
 Yes No

Only as stated in 11 above.

If yes, identify each such foreign principal and describe in full detail all such political activity, indicating, among other things, the relations, interests and policies sought to be influenced and the means employed to achieve this purpose. If the registrant arranged, sponsored or delivered speeches, lectures or radio and TV broadcasts, give details as to dates, places of delivery, names of speakers and subject matter.

13. In addition to the above described activities, if any, have you engaged in activity on your own behalf which benefits any or all of your foreign principals? Yes No

If yes, describe fully.

*Article entitled "The Middle East = Moment of Hope, or Illusion?"
 published in Freedom Review, January 1994 issue, copy
 enclosed.*

²The term "political activities" means the dissemination of political propaganda and any other activity which the person engaging therein believes will, or which he intends to, prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, persuade, or in any other way influence any agency or official of the Government of the United States or any section of the public within the United States with reference to formulating, adopting, or changing the domestic or foreign policies of the United States or with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party.

IV—FINANCIAL INFORMATION

14. (a) RECEIPTS—MONIES

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 8, 9 and 10 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise? Yes No

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies.³

<i>Date</i>	<i>From Whom</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Amount</i>
March 1994	Barham Selih	Payment for services & reimbursement of registration fee.	\$ 605.00
			<u>\$ 605.00</u>
			Total

(b) RECEIPTS—THINGS OF VALUE

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value⁴ other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 8, 9 and 10 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal? Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

<i>Name of foreign principal</i>	<i>Date received</i>	<i>Description of thing of value</i>	<i>Purpose</i>
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³A registrant is required to file an Exhibit D if he collects or receives contributions, loans, money, or other things of value for a foreign principal, as part of a fund raising campaign. See Rule 201(e).
⁴Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks," and the like.

15. (a) **DISBURSEMENTS—MONIES**

During this 6 month reporting period, have you

(1) disbursed or expended monies in connection with activity on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 8, 9 and 10 of this statement? Yes No

(2) transmitted monies to any such foreign principal? Yes No

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies, including monies transmitted, if any, to each foreign principal.

<i>Date</i>	<i>To Whom</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Amount</i>
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Total

15. (b) DISBURSEMENTS—THINGS OF VALUE

During this 6 month reporting period, have you disposed of anything of value⁵ other than money in furtherance of or in connection with activities on behalf of any foreign principal named in items 8, 9 and 10 of this statement?

Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

<i>Date disposed</i>	<i>Name of person to whom given</i>	<i>On behalf of what foreign principal</i>	<i>Description of thing of value</i>	<i>Purpose</i>
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(c) DISBURSEMENTS—POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

During this 6 month reporting period, have you from your own funds and on your own behalf either directly or through any other person, made any contributions of money or other things of value⁵ in connection with an election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election, convention, or caucus held to select candidates for political office?

Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

<i>Date</i>	<i>Amount or thing of value</i>	<i>Name of political organization</i>	<i>Name of candidate</i>
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V—POLITICAL PROPAGANDA

(Section 1(j) of the Act defines "political propaganda" as including any oral, visual, graphic, written, pictorial, or other communication or expression by any person (1) which is reasonably adapted to, or which the person disseminating the same believes will, or which he intends to, prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, or in any other way influence a recipient or any section of the public within the United States with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party or with reference to the foreign policies of the United States or promote in the United States racial, religious, or social dissensions, or (2) which advocates, advises, instigates, or promotes any racial, social, political, or religious disorder, civil riot, or other conflict involving the use of force or violence in any other American republic or the overthrow of any government or political subdivision of any other American republic by any means involving the use of force or violence.)

16. During this 6 month reporting period, did you prepare, disseminate or cause to be disseminated any political propaganda as defined above? Yes No

Only as described in III (11.) above, i.e. exclusively to the foreign principal, Barham Salih

IF YES, RESPOND TO THE REMAINING ITEMS IN THIS SECTION V.

17. Identify each such foreign principal. *Barham Salih, Representative of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan*

⁵Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks," and the like.

18. During this 6 month reporting period, has any foreign principal established a budget or allocated a specified sum of money to finance your activities in preparing or disseminating political propaganda? Yes No

If yes, identify each such foreign principal, specify amount, and indicate for what period of time.

19. During this 6 month reporting period, did your activities in preparing, disseminating or causing the dissemination of political propaganda include the use of any of the following:

- Radio or TV broadcasts
- Magazine or newspaper articles
- Motion picture films
- Letters or telegrams
- Advertising campaigns
- Press releases
- Pamphlets or other publications
- Lectures or speeches
- Other (specify) _____

20. During this 6 month reporting period, did you disseminate or cause to be disseminated political propaganda among any of the following groups:

- Public Officials
- Newspapers
- Libraries
- Legislators
- Editors
- Educational institutions
- Government agencies
- Civic groups or associations
- Nationality groups
- Other (specify) _____

21. What language was used in this political propaganda:

- English
- Other (specify) _____

22. Did you file with the Registration Section, U.S. Department of Justice, two copies of each item of political propaganda material disseminated or caused to be disseminated during this 6 month reporting period? Yes No

23. Did you label each item of such political propaganda material with the statement required by Section 4(b) of the Act? Yes No

24. Did you file with the Registration Section, U.S. Department of Justice, a Dissemination Report for each item of such political propaganda material as required by Rule 401 under the Act? Yes No

VI—EXHIBITS AND ATTACHMENTS

25. EXHIBITS A AND B

(a) Have you filed for each of the newly acquired foreign principals in Item 9 the following:

- Exhibit A⁶ Yes No
- Exhibit B⁷ Yes No

NONE NEWLY ACQUIRED.

If no, please attach the required exhibit.

(b) Have there been any changes in the Exhibits A and B previously filed for any foreign principal whom you represented during this six month period? Yes No

If yes, have you filed an amendment to these exhibits? Yes No

If no, please attach the required amendment.

⁶The Exhibit A, which is filed on Form CRM-157 (Formerly OBD-67) sets forth the information required to be disclosed concerning each foreign principal.

⁷The Exhibit B, which is filed on Form CRM-155 (Formerly OBD-65) sets forth the information concerning the agreement or understanding between the registrant and the foreign principal.

26. EXHIBIT C

If you have previously filed an Exhibit C⁸, state whether any changes therein have occurred during this 6 month reporting period. Yes No

If yes, have you filed an amendment to the Exhibit C? Yes No

If no, please attach the required amendment.

27. SHORT FORM REGISTRATION STATEMENT

Have short form registration statements been filed by all of the persons named in Items 5 and / of the supplemental statement? Yes No

If no, list names of persons who have not filed the required statement.

The undersigned swear(s) or affirm(s) that he has (they have) read the information set forth in this registration statement and the attached exhibits and that he is (they are) familiar with the contents thereof and that such contents are in their entirety true and accurate to the best of his (their) knowledge and belief, except that the undersigned make(s) no representation as to the truth or accuracy of the information contained in attached Short Form Registration Statement, if any, insofar as such information is not within his (their) personal knowledge.

(Type or print name under each signature)

(Both copies of this statement shall be signed and sworn to before a notary public or other person authorized to administer oaths by the agent, if the registrant is an individual, or by a majority of those partners, officers, directors or persons performing similar functions who are in the United States, if the registrant is an organization.)

David A. Korn

DAVID A. KORN

Subscribed and sworn to before me at DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

this 31ST day of MARCH, 19 94

[Signature]
(Signature of notary or other officer)

NY COMMISSION EXPIRES MAY 31, 1994

⁸The Exhibit C, for which no printed form is provided, consists of a true copy of the charter, articles of incorporation, association, constitution, and bylaws of a registrant that is an organization. (A waiver of the requirement to file an Exhibit C may be obtained for good cause upon written application to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Internal Security Section, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530.)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
REGISTRATION UNIT
CRIMINAL DIVISION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

NOTICE

Please answer the following questions and return this sheet in triplicate with your supplemental statement:

1. IS your answer to Item 16 of Section V (Political Propaganda - page 7 of Form CRM-154, formerly Form OBD-64--- Supplemental Statement):

Yes Exclusively to the foreign principal - to no others. OR NO _____

(If your answer to question 1 is "yes" do not answer question 2 of this form.)

2. Do you disseminate any material in connection with your registration:

Yes _____ OR NO _____

(If your answer to question 2 is "yes" please forward for our review copies of all such material including: films, film catalogs, posters, brochures, press releases, etc. which you have disseminated during the past six months.)

David A. Korn

Signature

March 31, 1954

Date

DAVID A. KORN

Please type or print name of signatory on the line above

Title

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Moment of Hope, or Illusion?

David A. Korn

“The Government of Israel and the PLO team, representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of conflict and confrontation, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security....”

With these startling words in preamble unimaginable even a few weeks earlier Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat put their signatures, on 13 September 1993, to a plan to achieve an “historic reconciliation through the agreed political processes.” A plan to end more than a quarter of a century of Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and cede those territories to Palestinian administration and eventually (as the Palestinians insist and as Rabin’s supporters do not deny) statehood. And not just a plan, but a timetable for its implementation:

- 13 December 1993: Agreement to be reached on “an accelerated schedule” for Israeli military withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho. A five year “interim period” to begin.
- 13 April 1994: Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho to be completed and agreement to be reached on “the structure, numbers of members, powers and responsibilities of an elected Palestinian authority.”
- 13 July 1994: Election of a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority to administer the West Bank and Gaza with power over education and culture, health, social welfare, taxation, tourism and internal security.

And so on until 13 December 1998, when the interim period ends and agreement is to be reached on the “final status” of the West Bank and Gaza.

Historical inevitability?

It all came with such dizzying suddenness. At first it seemed a dream, not daytime fact but middle of the night hallucination: that handshake between Rabin and Arafat, the meeting in Cairo a little later between Arafat and American Jewish leaders. Yet hardly had the pundits recovered from their own astonishment before they began explaining that it had been all but inevitable. There had been ten rounds of talks between Israel and a delegation of West Bank and Gaza notables. They had produced virtually nothing; by the summer of 1993 the two sides were hardly closer to agreement than when the peace conference convened in Madrid in October 1991. Time was running out for everyone. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had come to office in June of 1992 promising peace and prosperity. If he could not deliver peace, there would be no prosperity either, for the continuation of Israel’s economic boom was dependent on foreign investment which would take

flight at the breakdown of diplomacy. So if Rabin wanted to leave his mark on history or, of more immediate concern, to win reelection for the Labor Party in 1996, he had to have an agreement.

The circumstances were perhaps even more compelling for the PLO. Since the Gulf War, it had lost the financial backing of Saudi Arabia and the oil rich Persian Gulf states. Its resources were fast running dry. Its followers were defecting to the Islamic fundamentalist Hamas in droves. Yasir Arafat and the men around him in Tunis stood in danger of becoming anachronisms, as inef-

For the school of thought that contends that history is made not by individuals but by sweeping political and economic currents, the agreement between Israel and the PLO must seem an embarrassing anomaly.

factual and pitiable as exiled royalty, and they knew it. Israel stood in danger of having to face a Palestinian movement taken over by fanatics who made the PLO seem tame. What, then, could have been more natural than that the two sides should come to terms? Had they not, after all, been carrying on furtive talks for quite some long time?

Except, of course, that there was no inevitability at all about it. For the school of thought that contends that history is made not by individuals but by sweeping political and economic currents, the September 1993 agreement between Israel and the PLO must seem an embarrassing anomaly. To be sure, the conditions offered inducements to both sides. But the actual coming together of enemies so long dedicated to one another’s destruction required more than shrewd calculation. It called upon resources of courage, vision and daring on both sides; absent these qualities, there would have been no agreement.

For both the PLO and Israel faced wrenching decisions. For Arafat and his associates it came down to accepting a compromise that fell far short of their long stated demands, one that would leave them open to accusations of betrayal and vicious attack by their large array of Palestinian rivals. For Israeli leaders, it meant agreeing to concessions that would almost without fail—whether or not one wished to acknowledge it—open the way toward the Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza that they had vowed never to accept.

Credit must go in the first instance to Rabin and to Arafat. But the hero of the piece has to be Israel’s Foreign Minister Shimon Peres who seized the initiative to hammer out an agreement in

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months of secret talks with senior PLO officials. Rabin, whose relationship with Peres has often been that of rival, graciously acknowledged Peres' achievement in the statement he made after signing his letter to Arafat on 10 September. "I want to thank you, Shimon," Rabin said turning toward Peres, "for your efforts to bring about a success." At seventy, Peres is nearing the end of a long and brilliant career which, however, never led him to his goal of being prime minister in his own right. His detractors, some of them prominent American diplomats, dismissed him as shallow and opportunistic. Peres' accomplishment in bringing off a dramatic change of course in Israel's relations with its Arab neighbors refutes those judgments. It assures him a better place in history than any office could confer upon him.

A trusted intermediary was also a necessary ingredient for success. It appeared in the persons of Norway's able Foreign Minister, Jorgen Holst, and of its energetic young State Secretary, Jan Egeland. Holst and Egeland provided the secret channel, and the meeting place, for talks between Peres and Mahmoud Abbas, Arafat's foreign affairs advisor. The channel was established by Egeland and Peres' deputy, Yossi Beilin, in a meeting in Jerusalem on 10 September 1992. It bore fruit exactly one year later.

American diplomacy, which prided itself not a little arrogantly on being the indispensable go-between in Arab-Israeli negotiations, this time found itself stuck in the role of red-faced cuckold. The Israeli-Palestinian talks were carried on behind the back and, until very near the end, without the knowledge of even the most senior American officials. The U.S. contribution, if such it may be called, consisted principally in the dogged pursuit of a negotiating strategy that excluded the PLO and that Peres had the acuity to understand could only be doomed to failure.

And yet it was American diplomacy, not of 1993, but of the late 1970s, that made it all possible. The "Framework for the Interim Period" signed by Rabin and Arafat is lifted straight from the document hammered out in two grueling weeks of negotiations at Camp David in September 1978 by President Jimmy Carter. Only two elements were missing from the Camp David text: mutual recognition by Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and the PLO's agreement to accept a gradual and peaceful evolution toward statehood. They came fifteen years later to crown Carter's labor with success.

Not yet the beginning of the end

But anyone who thought the 13 September agreement had essentially resolved the Arab-Israeli dispute was dreaming. As one Israeli observer put it, "this may be the beginning of the end, but it is not yet the end of the beginning." Indeed, by the close of 1993 there were grounds for wondering if it was even that. December 13, the deadline for agreement to be reached on the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza and Jericho, passed with no agreement. What happened was typical of Arab-Israeli negotiations. To reach



Demonstrating against continuing terrorism, Algerians hold aloft a portrait of President Mohammad Boudiaf, murdered in June 1992.

agreement in September, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators had to leave unresolved a number of key issues: how big would the autonomous Jericho district be? How much of Gaza would Israel continue to occupy to protect its settlements there? Who would control the border between the territories and Jordan and Egypt? How would the Israeli army operate to protect Israeli settlers inside the territories? How many Palestinian prisoners would be freed by Israel, and when?

It was assumed or at least hoped that the good will and the momentum generated by the 13 September agreement would propel the parties over these remaining obstacles. And yet, no sooner was the agreement signed than a counter-momentum began to develop, put into play by opponents on both sides—Palestinian extremists who vehemently rejected any compromise with Israel, and Israeli settlers and right-wingers who just as vehemently rejected any concessions to the Palestinians. Hamas and other Palestinian rejectionists began killing Israelis, and Israeli settlers and other right-wingers began attacking Palestinians; and overly zealous Israeli security forces added to the mayhem by pursuing their

campaign against leaders of the Palestinian intifada as though nothing at all had changed. As a result, public support for the 13 September agreement was soon undermined on both sides. At the negotiating table Palestinians and Israelis sought to shore up their domestic positions by standing tough on the critical issues. And doubts began to emerge about the ability of Arafat and the PLO, after all these years in exile, actually to set themselves to the task of governing the West Bank and Gaza.

Even more daunting obstacles lie ahead. The agenda that Israeli and Palestinian negotiators will ultimately be charged with settling is a kind of diplomatic mission impossible. What powers will the Palestinian Authority have during the interim period? Who will control water resources? How will the return of Palestinian refugees from the 1967 war be accomplished? How will the security of Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza and of Israeli settlements be assured during the five year interim period? And what in particular of Jerusalem? Any one of these or a dozen other issues could bring the entire process to the point of collapse.

Peace breaking out all over?

Amid the euphoria of the September events, for a moment it seemed that peace might break out in the Middle East in 1993 every bit as fast as communism fell in Eastern Europe two years earlier. Syria and Jordan would join the Palestinians in settling their disputes with Israel, and the rejectionist camp would be reduced to those two international outlaws, Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Muammar Qadhafi's Libya.

Jordan is an obvious candidate for a peace treaty with Israel, if only because there are no territorial issues to be settled (King Hussein gave up his claim to the West Bank and Gaza in favor of the PLO in 1988). Shortly after the Israeli-PLO signing ceremony, Israeli and Jordanian officials released to the press the text of an agenda for peace treaty negotiations. Foreign Minister Peres sped off to Amman at the beginning of November for talks with Hussein. Peres returned with an economic agreement but no peace treaty. Senior PLO officials say they want a Jordanian-Israeli treaty, to back up their own agreement with Israel, but not too soon, not until they are assured that theirs is working.

King Hussein's hand for peace was strengthened in November when Islamic fundamentalists suffered a setback in Jordan's parliamentary elections. Still, for Hussein to go to the signing table with Israel independently of Syria and in advance of a green light from the PLO would be a risky business. One out of two Jordanians is Palestinian or of Palestinian origin, and in Hafez al Assad Hussein has a mean and dangerous neighbor. At the same time, however, Hussein doesn't want to be left empty handed while the Palestinians scurry off with a cornucopia of international aid. So he keeps a wary eye out in all directions. He wants the economic benefits of peace with Israel but, as always, fears the political consequences of moving too fast. At year's end he seemed more interested in giving the impression he was on the verge of peace than in actually getting there.

And what will Syria do? For over two years, rumors promoted by American and Israeli diplomatic insiders have been rife that Syria and Israel are on the point of the big breakthrough. Yet so far nothing has come of it. Hafez al Assad was outraged that the

PLO struck a deal with Israel without first asking and getting his approval (which he very likely would have withheld). He sulked after the 13 September celebration and balked at returning to the negotiating table. He continues to harbor in Damascus some of the fiercest Palestinian opponents of the Israeli-PLO agreement.

American diplomacy has nonetheless rightly recognized peace between Israel and Syria to be the key to a broader Middle East peace settlement. That is why at year's end Secretary of State Warren Christopher made yet another push to bring the governments in Damascus and Jerusalem together. The problem that Christopher and the Israeli and Syrian negotiators face is to reconcile Syria's demand for return of the Golan Heights with Israel's requirement for security. It is not insurmountable, and Christopher is said to have dangled before the Israelis the incentive of stationing U.S. forces on the Golan Heights during an interim withdrawal period. But the prevailing sentiment in Israel favors

It is still unclear whether Syria's Assad is truly interested in peace with Israel or is merely scheming to get back the Golan Heights. Those who know his history may be excused for thinking the latter.

caution. Both the Israeli public and many in the Israeli government are reluctant to commit the country to a second territorial pullback before knowing whether and how the first will work out. At the moment Rabin can hardly afford more political daring. His government's existence hangs on the narrowest of majorities. And it is still unclear whether Assad, a crafty tactician, is truly ready to make peace with Israel or is merely scheming to get back the Golan Heights. Those who know his history may be excused for suspecting the latter.

That peace has not yet broken out was made abundantly clear also when Arab delegates met in Damascus in October, a bare month after the signing of the Israeli-PLO accord, and refused to revoke or even modify the boycott of Israel; and not only that but talked of strengthening it.

An enterprise fraught with risk but rich in potential reward

The September 1993 agreement undeniably could turn to disaster. The combined force of Palestinian rejectionist and Israeli settler opposition could stall implementation and bring the agreement to collapse. Or Israeli military withdrawal from Gaza and the West Bank could be followed by raging civil war, with an irredentist Palestinian regime emerging from the ruins.

Yet even in the worst of circumstances, stepping back from the agreement is likely to be more dangerous than moving forward with it. The enterprise is fraught with risk, but it also holds enormous potential for the advancement of freedom and democracy. For the first time in their history, the Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza *could* enjoy democratic self government. Israel *could* be freed from the debilitating burden of maintaining military occupation over a people of a different language and culture, and

from the opprobrium that attaches thereto and that has steadily sapped its international standing. An Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation would inevitably entrain peace treaties between Israel and Syria and Jordan, no matter how reluctant their leaders, and very likely with other Arab states of the Near East and North Africa as well. The reduction of tensions and the opening of borders that would follow could launch the Middle East into an era of unprecedented prosperity, giving hope to millions and expanding the frontiers of freedom throughout the region. It could even circumscribe the appeal of militant political Islam, now clearly the major threat to freedom and democracy in the Middle East.

The fundamentalist wave

Militant political Islamic fundamentalism is not a single movement but it does have a single purpose: to gain power, dismantle the secular state and annul its laws and install a state based on religious dogma—as interpreted by whomever does the installing. To put it plainly, militant political Islamic fundamentalism is totalitarianism disguised in the garb of religion. Like other totalitarianisms before it, it is as ready to use the ballot box as the gun in its quest for power.

This absence of scruple in exploiting the processes of democracy to destroy democracy poses a fundamental dilemma for all those who value—or aspire to—the democratic state. It is an unspoken assumption of democracy that a people that has gained the right freely to elect its own government will never knowingly give its vote to a party or an individual who would deprive it of that right. But what if this assumption should prove untrue? Must the verdict of the ballot box be respected at all cost? To what extent might a government be entitled to annul the popular verdict and curtail basic liberties in the face of a challenge from a group whose intentions are clearly inimical to democracy and to secular government? In short, is it justifiable to subvert democracy in the name of saving it?

Neither the government of Egypt nor that of Algeria had attained the condition of democracy at the moment it had to face these questions, but both seemed headed in that direction. Algeria put itself in transition from one party rule to democracy in 1988. Municipal elections were to be the first step down that road. They were held in June 1990, and they were swept by the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), a militant Islamic fundamentalist group whose proclaimed aim is to do away with the secular state and its freedoms and install in Algeria a theocratic Islamic state. When the FIS repeated its sweep in the first round of parliamentary elections in December 1991, the Algerian army, a secularist bastion, took over, declared martial law, arrested and tried the FIS leaders and banned the party. The arrests and the ban set off a carnage that has brought Algeria to the brink of civil war. The security forces hunt down and kill, or arrest and torture, members of the FIS, while FIS squads murder government officials, police and army officers, western trained intellectuals and anyone else who happens to get in their way. The killings have become daily events and have reached lows of cruelty rarely attained even in Algeria's war of independence. One of the most shocking took place on 22 June this past year when an FIS squad seized Muhammad Boukhobza, the director of Algeria's National Institute for Global Strategy, a foreign policy think tank, and cut his throat in his

home under the eyes of his wife and children. In the fall of 1993 FIS militants began targeting the foreign—mainly French—community, kidnapping and killing several foreigners and warning all to leave or face death. A mass exodus ensued. This is sure to compound Algeria's economic difficulties, and that obviously is the fundamentalists' goal. Algeria has little tourism but its important oil and gas industries employ a number of foreign technicians, and French citizens also play an important role in the business community.

A new government headed by Rehda Malek, former Algerian ambassador to the United States and former foreign minister, is said to be pursuing contacts with the opposition to find a way out of the impasse. Even in the best of circumstances, however, Algeria's road back toward democracy will not be an easy one; and an eventual takeover by Islamic militants is not to be excluded. The issue in Algeria is not solely secularism versus theocracy. It is massive unemployment and poverty, and a record of corruption and ineptitude on the part of the secular Front de Liberation National that governed Algeria from 1962, when the country became independent, until the January 1992 military takeover. The advocates of secular democracy face the difficult challenge of showing that they have more to offer the Algerian people than do those of theocratic totalitarianism.

Militant political Islamic fundamentalism is totalitarianism disguised in the garb of religion.

Egypt emerged in 1993 as the other major battleground between militant political Islam and secular government. Until the Islamist terror campaign began in late 1990, Egypt had seemed safely headed toward gradual democratization. The single party system installed under Nasser in 1953 was dismantled in 1976. By the late 1980s thirteen political parties had been authorized and had competed more or less freely in parliamentary elections. Opposition parties were exercising their right to criticize the government, and the press enjoyed greater freedom than at any time in decades. To be sure, power remained concentrated in the hands of President Husni Mubarak, and Mubarak's National Democratic Party kept a comfortable parliamentary majority through means that were not always in the best traditions of democracy. Mubarak, however, was under pressure from the United States, his major ally, to loosen his grip, and he seemed to understand the need to do so. His government's major failing was its inability to make more than a small dent in the poverty in which the great majority of Egyptians live. Steps to relieve the government of crushing subsidies and to dismantle the Egyptian economy's sclerotic state sector have brought higher prices for bread and other staples, and the threat of greater unemployment—all without significant compensating benefit for the average Egyptian. The rise concurrently with economic liberalization of a new moneyed class that flaunts its affluence without offering any redeeming social merit also has not helped. And as if all this were not enough, the Egyptian government's ponderous bureaucracy has proven itself incapable of attending speedily to the needs of the people.

It was a setting ripe for exploitation. Islamic fundamentalists deftly seized the opportunity, bringing in their own neighborhood clinics, schools and charitable organizations. When an earthquake struck Cairo this past July, the "Islamists" were on the scene providing food, shelter and medical care to the survivors long before government services arrived. Nothing could more effectively have dramatized the government's ineptitude and the Islamic fundamentalists' claim to be the true friend of the people. Barred from running candidates in public elections, the fundamentalists have targeted trade unions and professional associations. By taking advantage of the dispersion of secular votes and of low membership turnout, they have won control of a great many, even the scientific and legal ones. They even boast of having a "liberated district" of half a million people in Cairo.

Algerian advocates of secular democracy face the challenge of showing that they have more to offer the Algerian people than do those of theocratic totalitarianism.

The dark side of the fundamentalist program is its harsh intolerance, and its vicious attacks on Egypt's Coptic Christian minority and on secular Muslim intellectuals. In its effort to bring down the Egyptian state, the militant fundamentalist Islamic Group has targeted not only police and high government officials but secular intellectuals, and the country's most lucrative foreign exchange earner, the tourism trade, killing and wounding tourists in Cairo and at antiquity sites around the country. President Mubarak has responded by invoking emergency powers, curtailing press and private freedoms, giving his security forces free rein to hunt down members and sympathizers of the Islamic Group and turning those arrested over to military courts for trial. The military courts have issued what for Egypt is an unprecedented number of death sentences—thirty-nine in all since December 1992 when terrorism cases were first referred to them. An unprecedented number of executions—eighteen since the summer of 1993—have been carried out, and allegations of widespread torture of suspects held in Egyptian prisons appear to have ample foundation.

Egyptian officials claim that Mubarak's iron fist policy is working. Periodically the government has announced that it has broken the back of Islamic fundamentalist opposition. But each announcement has been followed by more attacks on police, high government officials and tourists, and by more government raids on Islamic group strongholds. A booming Egyptian birth rate and a low economic growth rate have combined, it appears, to produce for the fundamentalists an almost unlimited supply of young men ready to risk their lives to kill a policeman, a government minister, a secular intellectual or a foreign tourist.

Without question, the fundamentalist cause draws its main strength from Egypt's domestic ills. This does not mean, in Egypt's case at least, that foreign subversion is of no consequence. The Islamic fundamentalist regimes in Iran and Sudan have provided substantial aid to Islamic Group terrorists in Egypt, in money, in

training and in arms. Egypt is a prime target for takeover by militant Islamic fundamentalism, first of all because it is the key country in the Arab Middle East but also because of its government's close ties with the United States, its peace treaty with Israel and its efforts to promote peace between Israel and the Arabs. Egypt is the cornerstone of the network of relationships that underpin U.S. interests in the Middle East and of the Arab-Israeli peace effort. If an Islamic fundamentalist regime were to come to power there, the reverberations would bring both tumbling down in very short order.

Few who know the Egyptian scene think a fundamentalist takeover likely anytime soon. Still, the standoff between the government and the fundamentalists basically favors the latter. It deprives the government of badly needed revenues from tourism, frightens off foreign investment and dims prospects for a return to democratization and for remedying the social ills from which the fundamentalists draw their strength. In much the same way as Yeltsin in Russia, Mubarak's struggle with the fundamentalists has forced him into ever greater reliance on the army. So long as he enjoys its backing, there is no force in Egypt that can oust him. Should he be assassinated or lose the army's favor, he would very likely be replaced by a military regime. Western analysts believe—or is it merely a hope?—that a military regime would not differ greatly in orientation from Mubarak's government; for where would Egypt get its arms, not to speak of its food, if it turned against the U.S.? Still, no one contends that a military regime would not be a serious step backward for Egypt.

The bright spots for freedom...

The retrogression in Algeria and Egypt notwithstanding, there were bright spots for freedom in the Arab and Islamic Middle East during 1993.

In Morocco important advances were made already in 1992 when, on the proposal of King Hassan, a new constitution was adopted that enlarged the powers of the parliament and placed limits on those of the monarch. Parliamentary elections were held in June 1993. The government coalition won 116 of the 222 seats in contest. The four major opposition parties claimed that the rules prejudiced them, but overall the elections were deemed to have been free and fair. Apparently owing largely to King Hassan's traditional—and carefully cultivated—role as national spiritual leader, political Islamic fundamentalism has not been able to gain a significant foothold in Morocco.

Although Hassan retains broad powers, he deserves recognition for impelling his country along the path toward freedom and democracy. He continues, however, to stall on holding the U.N. mandated referendum (to which he has agreed in principle) to determine the future status of the Western Sahara.

No less credit should go to King Hussein of Jordan where major progress was registered in 1993. If Hussein has been cautious when it comes to concluding a formal peace treaty with Israel, he has moved decisively to liberalize government within Jordan. The liberalization movement was launched in 1989 with parliamentary elections—the first since 1956—and has continued ever since. In January and February 1993 the Jordanian government licensed seven additional political parties and authorized

the establishment in Amman of a center for the study of human rights. In May the parliament passed a law that rescinded the government's unlimited authority to penalize newspapers and that gave journalists the right to due process.

The liberalization appears to be working. Islamic fundamentalists and their sympathizers, who seemed set possibly to catapult to power in Jordan through the ballot box after the 1989 parliamentary elections, suffered a major setback in elections held in November 1993. The fundamentalists and their allies fell from 32 seats to 18 in the eighty member Jordanian legislature. Even before that, in May, secular members of Jordan's parliament blocked a bill introduced by fundamentalists that would have required segregation of the sexes in high schools and colleges.

Perhaps the major threat today to the democratic process in Jordan, and to the country's stability, is the declining health of the monarch. Hussein was operated for cancer last year. His physicians have since reportedly declared him free of the disease but in his public appearances he has not looked well. It is unclear whether his brother and designated successor Hassan, long waiting in the wings, has the stature to hold the country together in the face of pressures that could be exerted by the rise of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in Gaza.

The Iraqi Kurdish experiment in democracy stands as a beacon, indeed as an inspiration, to the other peoples of Iraq and neighboring countries where despotism reigns.

Freedom and democracy also advanced, during 1993, in Yemen, in the southwestern corner of the Arabian peninsula. Unification of the north and south was followed, in April, by parliamentary elections for which some 95 percent of eligible voters are said to have turned out. For the first time, women took part in the balloting. The campaign was marred by minor violence and international observers noted some irregularities at the polls but did not judge these serious enough to affect the overall results. Considering the turbulent history of the two Yemens over the past three decades, and the still rather chaotic nature of the newly unified country, this is quite remarkable.

But the brightest spot of all for freedom and democracy in the Islamic Middle East, this past year as during the previous one, was the Kurdish region of Iraq. Saddam Hussein's war on the Kurds, in the spring of 1991, left their northeastern highland territory in ruins. After a time of uncertainty following the Iraqi army's withdrawal, the Kurds decided that their best hope for survival lay in building the full gamut of institutions of democracy. The process was put in motion by the election of a parliament in May 1992. These were the first free and fair elections—certified as such by observers from the U.S., Western Europe and Latin America—in the entire history of the Kurdish people. They produced a 100 member legislature which in its turn selected an executive. Freedom of speech and the press flourished right from the start, even before laws were passed to protect them, with doz-

ens of newspapers springing up and several competing television channels coming on the air. By the spring of 1993 civil administration was fully functioning, an independent albeit still fledgling judiciary was in place, and civil and political rights were being protected to an extent unknown in earlier times.

This Kurdish foray into democratic self government has caused deep heartburn to Arabists in the State Department's Middle East bureau whose devotion to the unity of the Iraqi state matches their earlier dogged dedication to the notion that Saddam Hussein was an asset for peace and progress. No matter that the promotion of democracy is a key plank in the Clinton administration foreign policy, officials at State responsible for the Middle East have done as little as possible to advance the Kurdish effort. They have listened gravely to the Kurds urgent pleas for lifting U.N. economic sanctions against their region (the sanctions, voted in 1990 to punish Saddam Hussein's government for its seizure of Kuwait, paradoxically have ended up punishing not only Saddam but his victims) but the sanctions have continued unabated. It is difficult to escape the impression that some in the State Department's Middle East bureau would view the failure of the Iraqi Kurdish experiment in democracy with a distinct absence of regret.

And there is a real danger of failure. Not because of any lack of enthusiasm for democracy on the part of Iraqi Kurds or effort to make it work. The threat comes from the severe economic hardship imposed by the Baghdad and Tehran governments' blockade of the Kurdish region and by the continuing U.N. economic sanctions. It comes perhaps even more from the repeated border attacks on the Kurds by the Iraqi and Iranian armies, designed to instill fear and disrupt normal life; and from Turkey's ambivalent attitude toward the Kurdish experiment and uncertainty over whether Ankara will continue to allow basing on its soil of the allied air umbrella that protects the Kurds from all-out assault by Saddam Hussein's army.

The Iraqi Kurdish experiment in democracy stands as a beacon, indeed as an inspiration, to the other peoples of Iraq and neighboring countries where despotism reigns. Should the great Western democracies, misled by a false realpolitik, allow it to be crushed, the message will reverberate throughout the region.

...and the grim ones

Until the untimely death of President Turgut Ozal in May of last year, Turkey seemed on the road to bringing its large Kurdish minority to full citizenship and participation in the country's democratic processes. With Ozal's demise, however, the partisans of repression again got the upper hand. Well before the end of the year, the entire southeastern region of Turkey had become a war zone, with martial law imposed, arbitrary arrest, torture and execution common, and the Turkish army burning entire Kurdish villages in a repeat of its scorched earth policies against the Kurds of the 1920s and 1930s. American diplomats, fearful of alienating an ally in the struggle for influence in Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union, have done little to influence the Turkish government toward a more enlightened policy. This is a dangerous mistake. Turkey will not survive as a democracy—and may

ultimately not even be able to maintain the integrity of its borders—if it fails to offer equal cultural, linguistic and political rights to its Kurdish citizens. Kurds currently comprise between 15 and 20 percent of the Turkish population and their numbers proportionate to ethnic Turks are projected to rise substantially in the next century.

Western visitors to Iran report that the government has been attentive to the needs of the urban poor, who in general appear better off now than before the revolution. That is almost certainly the best that can be said for the Tehran regime, which may be a democracy for the mullahs but remains a dictatorship for everyone else, and a threat to freedom of religion and free expression everywhere. The Islamic regime's shameful repression of Iran's small Bahai minority—solely on grounds of religion—continues unabated. Over the past decade more than 200 Iranian Bahais have been executed, several thousand imprisoned and the remaining hundreds of thousands denied education and employment. As for free expression, this past year the Islamic regime doubled its bounty

Evidently the totalitarian affinities of the Tehran and Baghdad regimes have now come to outweigh the antagonisms of eight years of savage warfare.

on Salman Rushdie to over 2 million dollars while its clerics renewed their fatwah calling for Rushdie's murder. Iranian security services have been found to be responsible for a series of political murders in Europe during recent years. The U.S. government this past year branded Iran "the world's most dangerous state sponsor of terrorism."

Iran has also become the major foreign friend and collaborator of the outlaw Saddam Hussein regime. The Iranian government openly flouts the U.N. prohibition on trade with Iraq. It serves as a channel for the procurement of spare parts, machinery and chemicals that the Baghdad regime would otherwise be unable to obtain. And it helps Saddam Hussein keep himself in foreign currency by allowing use of its ports for the transshipment and export of Iraqi oil, in violation of the U.N. embargo. Evidently the totalitarian affinities of the Tehran and Baghdad regimes have now come to outweigh the antagonisms of eight years of savage warfare.

The situation in Iraq remains unrelievedly grim. Three years after his resounding defeat in the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein is still firmly entrenched in Baghdad. His survival—when almost everyone thought him finished—is a lesson in the power of an efficient police state that enjoys the loyalty (bought, it is true) of a substantial minority of the population, i.e. Iraq's Sunni Muslims. Owing to the U.N.'s persistence, Saddam has had to sacrifice those elements of his nuclear weapons and chemical warfare industries that he could not hide. Conventional weapons manufacturing capacity, however, is said to have been restored to 80 percent of its pre-war level. Saddam has carefully eschewed major challenge to the Kurds and their allied protectors in the north but he has proceeded brutally to suppress Shiite dissidence in the

south. Over the past year, the Iraqi army has pursued a savage campaign against Shiite dissidents who took refuge in the vast marshes of southeastern Iraq, using artillery, tanks and, allegedly, even chemical weapons. Concurrently, Iraqi military engineers have drained large areas of the southern marshes, making a desert where there was once a thriving Marsh Arabs culture, under pretext of development. In draining the Iraqi marshes, Saddam Hussein adds ecological crime to his many other crimes against humanity.

Next door to Iraq, Syria is a somewhat less grimly purposeful police state. There is absolutely no sign that Hafez al Asad's regime is prepared to take steps toward democratization, but with the collapse of its Soviet patron it has recently sought to make certain cosmetic improvements on the human rights side. It has released some political prisoners and, for the first time, has allowed entry of representatives of Amnesty International. Still, the record is far from good. A report issued by the United States National Academy of Sciences in 1993 named Syria the world's largest jailer of scientific personnel. This unsavory distinction arises from mass arrests in 1980 and 1981 of members of the Syrian engineering and medical associations, many of whom were kept in prison for over a decade without trial and some of whom were tortured and died there. These and similarly objectionable Syrian government practices have drawn almost no U.S. government expressions of opprobrium, apparently owing to State Department hopes that Syria will at last join in earnest in peace negotiations with Israel.

In Kuwait, opposition efforts to curb the powers of the ruling Sabah family and introduce a greater measure of democracy appear stalled for the time being. In Saudi Arabia, the "reforms" enacted by decree in 1992—providing for a system of local governance and the appointment of a "consultative council"—have brought no discernible liberalization. Paradoxically, the Saudi state, ruled by the strict precepts of Islam, finds itself locked in a struggle with militant political Islam. Thus far the Saudi "Islamists" have not resorted to violence; their tactic, which they have pursued with only partial success, has been to try to insinuate themselves into key positions in Saudi institutions.

Domestic peace is kept in Saudi Arabia by vast distributions of money to the major segments of society. However, these handouts, together with mammoth arms purchases and payoffs to foreign governments, have depleted the once seemingly inexhaustible Saudi treasury. Some experts worry that a prospective cut-back in domestic subsidies could undermine stability in Saudi Arabia. With or without such a development, liberalization is clearly not in the offing.

The year ahead

A year ago in this column we predicted that 1993 would be critical for the Middle East peace talks, and that the Palestinian question—the future of the West Bank and Gaza—would be the central issue.

We venture now to predict that 1994 will be the decisive year in the Middle East. It will tell whether the agreement between Israel and the PLO can be made to work. It will tell whether the end of

Israel's occupation, assuming it in fact occurs, will bring democratic self government, or dictatorship, or simply chaos, to the West Bank and Gaza. And whether greater harmony or greater strife will be the lot of Israelis, Palestinians and other Arabs. The test will be the elections that are planned for July 1994. Arafat has promised the people of the West Bank and Gaza "democracy, democracy and more democracy." If Israeli and Palestinian negotiators manage to surmount the obstacles in their path, and if Arafat can deliver on his promise of democracy and reconcilia-

tion, a broader peace will inevitably ensue and a new era will truly open for the Middle East.

Whether any or all of this will come to pass should be known by the time the next *Survey of Freedom* reaches your desk. **FR**

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The Map of Freedom—1994

(Numbers refer to the map, pages 40-41)

This Map of Freedom is based on data developed by Freedom House's Comparative Survey of Freedom. The Survey analyzes factors such as the degree to which fair and competitive elections occur, individual and group freedoms are guaranteed in practice, and press freedom exists. More detailed and up-to-date Survey information may be obtained from Freedom House.

FREE STATES

Andorra
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bahamas
Barbados
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bolivia
Botswana

Bulgaria
Canada
Cape Verde
Chile
Costa Rica
Cyprus (G)
Czech Republic
Denmark
Dominica
Ecuador
Estonia
Finland
France

The Gambia
Germany
Greece
Grenada
Guyana
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Kiribati

Korea (S)
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Mali
Malta
Marshall Islands
Mauritius
Micronesia
Monaco
Mongolia
Namibia
Nauru

Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
St. Kitts-Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines
San Marino
Sao Tome & Principe
Slovenia
Solomon Isls.

Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Trinidad & Tobago
Tuvalu
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Vanuatu
Western Samoa

FREE RELATED TERRITORIES

Aland Isls. (Fin.)
Amer. Samoa (US)
Anguilla (UK)
Aruba (Ne)
Azores (Port)
Bermuda (UK)

Br. Vir. Is. (UK)
Canary Isls. (Sp)
Cayman Isls. (UK)
Ceuta (Sp)
Channel Isls. (UK)
Christmas Is. (Austral.)
Cocos (Keeling Isls.) (Austral.)
Cook Isls. (NZ)

Faeroe Isls. (Den)
Falkland Is. (UK)
French Guiana (Fr)
French Polynesia (Fr)
Gibraltar (UK)
Greenland (Den)
Guadeloupe (Fr)
Guam (US)
Isle of Man (UK)

Madeira (Port)
Mahore (Mayotte) (Fr)
Martinique (Fr)
Melilla (Sp)
Montserrat (UK)
Ne. Antilles (Ne)
New Caledonia (Fr)
Niue (NZ)
Norfolk Is. (Austral.)

No. Marianas (US)
Palau (US)
Pitcairn Islands (UK)
Puerto Rico (US)
Rapanui (Easter Is.) (Chile)
Reunion (Fr)
St. Helena and Dependencies (UK)
Ascension
Tristan da Cunha

St. Pierre-Mq. (Fr)
Svalbard (Norway)
Tokelau (NZ)
Turks & Caicos Isls. (UK)
Virgin Isls. (US)
Wallis & Futuna Isls. (Fr)

PARTLY FREE STATES

Albania
Antigua & Barbuda
Armenia
Bangladesh
Belarus
Brazil
Burkina Faso
Cambodia
Central African Republic
Colombia

Comoros
Congo
Croatia
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Fiji
Gabon
Georgia
Ghana
Guatemala
Guinea-Bissau
Honduras
India

Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kuwait
Kyrgyz Republic
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malaysia
Mexico
Moldova
Morocco

Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Romania
Russia
Senegal

Seychelles
Singapore
Slovakia
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Suriname
Taiwan (China)
Thailand
Tonga
Turkey
Ukraine
Venezuela
Yemen

Zambia
Zimbabwe

PARTLY FREE RELATED TERRITORIES

Cyprus (T)
Hong Kong (UK)
Kurdistan (Iraq)
Macao (Port)
Northern Ireland (UK)

NOT FREE STATES

Afghanistan
Algeria
Angola
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Bhutan
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Brunei
Burma (Myanmar)
Burundi
Cameroon

Chad
China (PRC)
Cuba
Djibouti
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Guinea
Haiti
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq

Ivory Coast
Kenya
Korea (N)
Laos
Liberia
Libya
Malawi
Maldives
Mauritania
Mozambique
Nigeria
Oman
Qatar

Rwanda
Saudi Arabia
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Swaziland
Syria
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Turkmenistan
Uganda

United Arab Emirates
Uzbekistan
Vietnam
Yugoslavia
Zaire

NOT FREE RELATED TERRITORIES
Bophuthatswana (SA)
Ciskei (SA)
East Timor (Indo.)

Irian Jaya (Indo.)
Kashmir (India)
Kosovo (Yugo.)
Nagorno-Karabakh (Armenia/Azerbaijan)
Occupied Territories (Isr.)
Tibet (China)
Transkei (SA)
Venda (SA)
Vojvodina (Yugo.)
Western Sahara (Mor.)