P2N0

NEWS AND VIEWS ON THE DRIVE TOWARDS NET-ZERO GHG EMISSIONS

Welcome to **Edition 44** of **P_2N_0** covering the drive to avoid, reduce and remove greenhouse gas (**GHG**) emissions to progress to net-zero GHG emissions (**NZE**).

P_2N_0 covers significant news items globally, reporting on them in short form, focusing on policy settings and legal and regulatory matters, and project developments and trends. **P_2N_0** does not cover news items about M&A activity or that are negative.

This **Edition 44** covers significant news items from **April 1, 2026**, to **April 30, 2026**.

Access all previous editions of **P_2N_0** at bakerbotts.com.

KEY ITEMS ARISING FROM APRIL 1, 2026, TO APRIL 30, 2026

- **Iran War:**

  As with **Edition 43** of **P_2N_0**, this **Edition 44** does not go into detail on the **Iran War** and its implications. On a daily basis, there continues to be considerable coverage of the implications of the **Iran War**, and, given the changeability of events, we are not best placed to cover them.

  The **International Energy Agency** (**IEA**) continues to cover consistently the key facts on the **Iran War** (including arising from events in the Strait of Hormuz) and the implications it has for oil and gas markets. Also, on **March 12, 2026**, the **IEA** published its Oil Market Report (**OMR**) and Gas Market Report, Q2 2026 (**GMR**). (The **OMR** and **GMR** are monthly and quarterly publications from the **IEA**. For the time being, we will include them in each edition of **P_2N_0**.)

- **Legal implications of the Iran War**:

  Baker Botts has published a number of articles outlining matters that are relevant for those navigating the impact of the Iran War on transactions. Attached are links to those publications.

Chapter	Title	Authors
1	Force Majeure	Bill Kroger, Louie Layrisson and Emily Rohles
2	Critical Infrastructure Cyber Threats	Matthew R. Baker, Michelle Molner and Justin Bryant
3	Legal Implications of the Iran Conflict: Oil and Gas Trading	Evan Koster, David Applebaum, Michael Yuffee, Michael Loesch and Tiffany Means
4	War and Energy Emergencies	George Fibbe, Jeff Wood, Austin Echols, and Indya Woodfolk
5	Securities Litigation Risk in an Era of Armed Conflict	Amy Hefley, John Lawrence, Anthony Lucisano, and Kirstie Mellon
6	The Law of War – Force Majeure in Time of War (and Peace)	Michael Harrison, Alhassane Barry, and Richard Guit

  For a global perspective, the following graphic provides an overview of how oil is transported:


HOW IS OIL TRANSPORTED GLOBALLY?
Volume of crude oil and petroleum liquids transported through the world's chokepoints
104.4M barrels of crude oil & petroleum liquids were transported per day globally in the first half of 2025
Maritime oil trade - 79.8
Strait of Malacca
The Strait of Malacca links the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. It is the shortest sea route between Middle East oil and natural gas suppliers and growing markets in East and Southeast Asia. This strait is the primary chokepoint in Asia and Oceania
23.2
Strait of Hormuz
The Strait of Hormuz, located between Oman and Iran, connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. It is deep enough and wide enough to handle the world's largest crude oil tankers, and it is one of the world's most important oil chokepoints
20.9
Cape of Good Hope
9.1
All other maritime supply
6.6
Suez Canal and SUMED Pipeline
4.9
Danish Straits
4.9
Bab el-Mandeb
4.2
Turkish Straits
3.7
Panama Canal
2.3
Non-maritime trade - 24.6
All non-maritime oil trade
(includes oil transported through pipelines, land and rail and other non-maritime forms)
24.6
Chokepoints are narrow channels along widely used global sea routes that are critical to global energy trade and security because of the large volumes of petroleum and other liquids and liquified natural gas that pass through them.
vizualytiks
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

- **Global Wind Report 2026:** On **April 21, 2026**, the **Global Wind Energy Council** (**GWEC**) published its Global Wind Report 2026.

  The headlines from the report are as follows:

  - During 2025, **165 GW** of wind capacity was installed globally, a new record;
  - China installed **120 GW** of wind capacity during 2025;
  - China, the US and India led new wind capacity additions driven by high demand for onshore wind (**155.3GW**);
  - Globally, there is **1,299** GW of installed wind capacity; and
  - **138** countries worldwide have developed and deployed wind energy.

  The report is required reading.

- **International Energy Agency** (**IEA**) had a busy month during **April 2026** with a weight of publications dropping, including two flagship reports, the **Global Energy Review 2026** and **Key Questions of Energy and AI**. Given the subject matter of the **IEA** publications, we have included summaries of the conclusions and findings.

  Each of the key publications dropped by the **IEA** in **April 2026** is considered below.

  Given requests from some readers, consideration of each publication is more detailed than it has been in previous editions of P_2N0: folk have requested summaries of the essence of each publication.

  - Global Energy Review 2026, published on **April 20, 2026**:

    The **Global Energy Review 2026** (**GER**) is a flagship report of the **IEA**. Click through to links to previous Global Energy Review publications.

    The **GER** covers trends across the entire energy sector in 2025, with data on all fuels and technologies, all regions and major countries, and energy-related carbon emissions. Also, the **GER** provides estimates of energy demand by region and by source and fuel in 2025; developments in electrical energy demand and supply; deployment of selected energy technologies; and estimates of energy-related CO_2 emissions. Finally, the **GER** covers energy intensity and analyses the impact of factors on energy demand and emissions.

    The key findings of the **GER** are as follows:

    - **All major energy fuels and technologies grew in 2025** at very different rates.

      Global energy demand growth rate slowed to **1.3%** year on year. This reflected slower economic growth, including in energy-intensive industries in some regions.

    - **Photovoltaic solar, the largest single source of growth, met more than 25% higher demand, followed by natural gas, which contributed 17%.**

      This was the first time on record that renewable sources contributed the largest share of global energy demand growth. Demand for coal, natural gas and oil all increased in 2025, but at a slower rate than in 2024. Lower, low emission and no emissions technologies combined contributed nearly 60% of the increase in global demand.

- **Demand growth in the US rose to its second highest level since 2000** (other than post-recession rebound years).

  The demand growth reflected increased demand from data centres, robust industrial growth and colder temperatures. In the US, the increased use of electrical energy by data centres accounted for 50% of the increased demand for electrical energy.

- **China accounted for the largest overall share of global energy demand growth at 1.7%.**

  This rate of demand growth has slowed due to the rapid growth of renewables and efficiency improvements.

- **Demand for electrical energy increased at twice the rate of energy demand**, reaffirming that the world has entered the **Age of Electricity**.

  Growth of nearly 3% remained above the average of 2.8% over the last decade. Electrical energy demand growth was driven by a wide range of end uses in buildings and industry. Although only contributing a small share of this total growth, demand from EVs and data centres increased rapidly.

- **The rate of oil demand growth slowed in 2025**, increasing by 0.65 million barrels per day (mb/d) or 0.7%, down from 2024's 0.75 mb/d of growth.

- **Gas demand growth slowed in 2025**, increasing by about 1%. Incremental demand arose in the US and European Union (resulting from colder winter weather), and in the Middle East (resulting from increased natural gas use in the power sector). In contrast, demand growth for natural gas across the Asia Pacific increased at its slowest pace since 2022.

- **Coal demand grew modestly in 2025**, increasing by around 0.4%. In the US, gas-to-coal switching and growth in demand for electrical energy resulted in a 10% increase in coal use. In China, demand was flat with ever-increasing renewable electrical energy capacity resulting in decreased use of coal for electrical energy generation. In India, demand for coal for electrical energy generation decreased, resulting from an early, long and strong monsoon season.

- **The increase in electrical energy generation from renewables and nuclear power in 2025 was greater than the growth in electrical energy supply**, with increased renewable electrical energy dominated by photovoltaic solar, with an increase of **600 terawatt-hours** dispatched being the largest-ever increase in electrical energy generation, by any source, in any year (other than post-crisis recovery periods). In the **European Union**, the share of photovoltaic solar and wind generated electrical energy reached 30%, greater than electrical energy generated by fossil fuels for the first time. Electrical energy generation from natural gas and nuclear power continued to grow at the global level in 2025.

- **Globally renewable electrical energy capacity increased by 800 gigawatts** (**GW**), **with photovoltaic solar contributing 75% of that increase**. **Battery energy storage systems** (**BESS**) were the fastest growing electrical energy technology, with **BESS** capacity increasing by around 40% in 2025, reaching around **110 GW**. Construction commenced in respect of an additional **12 GW** of nuclear power capacity.

- **Global growth in carbon dioxide (CO_2) emissions from electrical energy slowed in 2025**, increasing by about 0.4%. Emissions arising from the energy sector in China decreased reflecting the increase in renewable electrical energy capacity, structural declines in energy-intensive industry, and overall reduced growth in demand for electrical energy. In India, CO_2 emissions arising from the electrical energy sector were flat for the first time since the 1970s, resulting from the early, long and strong monsoon and the increased development and deployment of renewable electrical energy capacity. A colder winter and higher natural gas prices resulted in increased CO_2 emissions in advanced economies. Given these dynamics, CO_2 emissions from advanced economies increased at a higher rate (+0.5%) than that of emerging markets and developing economies (+0.3%) for the first time since the 1990s.
- **The rollout of clean energy technologies since 2019 resulted in the avoidance of more than 35 exajoules of annual fossil fuel use in 2025,** equivalent to around 7% of global fossil fuel use annually. Deployment of photovoltaic solar, wind, nuclear, electric cars and heat pumps since 2019 has avoided approximately 3 Giga-tonnes (3 billion metric tonnes) of CO_2 annually, or around 8% of total GHG emissions globally. Avoided coal demand (around 800 million metric tonnes of coal equivalent) equates to more than the entire coal use of India in 2025. Estimated avoided gas demand (over 260 billion cubic metres) is equivalent to almost half the global liquefied natural gas (**LNG**) market, i.e., around 200 million metric tonnes of LNG.

The **GER** is excellent, with the bound version of it ever-present in my carry-on.

- Key Questions on Energy and AI, published on **April 16, 2026**:
  - The publication sets the scene clearly: "There is no AI without energy … At the same time, AI could transform how the energy industry operates if it is adopted at scale".
  - To date policy makers have not had the tools to analyse both sides of these dynamics.
  - The stated purpose of the publication is to provide "global and regional modelling and datasets, as well as extensive consultation with governments and regulators, the tech sector, the energy industry and international experts" to allow this analysis to be undertaken.
  - The publication includes estimates of how much electrical energy AI may use through 2035. Also, the publication analyses what increased use of AI may mean for, among other things, energy security and affordability.
  - The publication builds on the **IEA 2025 Energy and AI** report (published in **April 2025**, and covered by Edition 31 of **P_2N_0**):

    + The nexus between AI and energy continues to evolve rapidly:

      "**The largest technology companies are contributing to a surge in data centre investment, as their capital expenditure exceeded USD 400 billion in 2025 – and is expected to jump by another 75% in 2026.**"

    + Energy consumption for each AI query has decreased materially over the last 12 months:

"**If all conventional internet searches were performed with simple AI text queries, it would consume less than 4 terawatt-hours (TWh) of electricity annually, equivalent to less than 1% of total data centre consumption today.**

However, new energy-intensive AI applications are increasingly being launched and used, such as those for video generation, reasoning and agentic tasks.

The global electricity demand of data centres – the critical infrastructure for training and running AI models – grew by 17% in 2025, in line with IEA projections."

+ Across the AI value chain, there is a scramble for electrical energy, grid connections, manufacturing capacity, capital and chips;
+ The outlook for electrical energy demand indicates near-term bottlenecks but longer-term upside;
+ AI is pushing the power density of data centres to the limits of existing technologies:
+ In the context of current instability, the links between AI and energy security have tightened;

"**Over the past year, energy and technology supply chains have become further strained.**

AI has the potential to be an important tool to enhance energy security and sustainability.

With increasing deployment of AI-enabled robotics, automation and efficiency solutions, AI will be critical to industrial competitiveness."

+ Social concerns around AI have grown, focusing particularly on the environment and electricity prices … but with the right conditions, data centres do not necessarily raise electricity prices.

The publication is excellent.

- State of Energy Policy 2026, published on **April 10, 2026**.
  - The stated purpose of the publication is to review the progress made in 2025 across all energy sectors, and the contribution of the energy sector to nationally determined contributions and net zero. The publication considers energy security policy settings from 1973 to 2025, drawing on the information contained in the Global Energy Policies Hub (with 6,500 means of measurement, across 84 countries and 200 types of policy setting), and the Climate Pledges Explorer which contains the climate commitments of more than 190 countries.
  - The publication draws the following conclusions:
    + Governments are working in a complex environment, a sustained period of disruption and attendant risk, including Covid-19, the Ukraine Conflict, trade restrictions and sanctions, critical minerals and rare earth elements, the impact of heat on electrical energy systems, and latterly the Iran War. The result of this complex environment has been an ever-increasing concern about energy security. This does not mean that affordability and sustainability have been forgotten as key to policy settings.
    + The policy settings on energy security since the 1970s provide a foundation for the policy settings that are needed, although no country is shielded from disruption and the

attendant risks. For example, 60 countries have in place policy settings to manage natural gas and oil supply disruption, with countries accounting for around 95% of global oil imports having policy settings of this kind.

+ Since the 1970s, policy settings have diversified the energy mixes, energy suppliers and improved energy efficiency. For example, 150 countries have policy settings that address diversification, and more than 130 countries have energy efficiency policy settings.
+ Governments are taking action to address emerging risks in energy supply chains. The actions include the policy settings in respect of critical minerals and rare earth elements.
+ Government spending across energy sectors has doubled since 2019 and will remain elevated through 2030.
+ Governments face pressure to manage energy prices and economic competitiveness of industries, while at the same time seeking to manage fiscal constraints. To address these tensions, there has been a relaxation of policy settings, with the nationally determined contributions finalised during 2025 and early 2026 reflecting this dynamic.

The publication is well-worth a deep dive.

- Rare Earth Elements: Pathways to Secure and Diversified Supply Chains, published on **April 8, 2026**:

  The publication notes the importance and role of rare earth elements (**REE**) in strategic areas, ranging from energy technologies and advanced electronics to aerospace and defence systems. The concentrated nature of the supply chains for many **REE**, has emphasised a need to create and maintain secure supply chains.

  The publication provides an assessment of the current market for **REE**, assessing demand and supply dynamics and technologies defining that market, analysing the full value chain from mining to production, and evaluating vulnerabilities across supply chains. Based on these analyses, the report outlines **eight policy recommendations** that may create and maintain more secure **REE** supply chains, supply chains that are diversified and resilient.

  These **eight policy recommendations** are as follows:

  1. **Understand REE needs globally and risk exposure**: For these purposes, a clear picture of national demand outlooks is crucial to develop targets, to estimate investment needs and to calibrate policy interventions.
  2. **Increase preparedness for potential disruptions and establish buffers to mitigate short-term supply risks**: For these purposes, an effective emergency response system requires market monitoring to identify and to assess disruptions, with procedures to coordinate measures to address disruption caused by risk. Measures of this kind are most likely to be effective when developed in close collaboration with international partners.
  3. **Adopt a whole supply chain and system approach**: For these purposes, whole of supply chain and system approaches are not simply matters of developing an increased number of projects on the supply-side. **REE** supply chains rely on a range of technical processes, requiring equipment and machinery, human capital to produce outputs that conform to strict industry

specifications. Consistent with the concentration of the production of **REE** in China, there is a concentration of technology providers [1] and human capital in China, that needs to be developed outside China.

4. **Strengthen financial and policy support to strategic projects through supply-side and demand-side measures**: This recommendation recognises that diversifying **REE** supply chains requires coordinated policy and market mechanisms that reduce investment risk, support project viability and ensure demand for diversified supply. On the supply-side, governments can support projects through targeted public finance, for example, equity investment, grants, concession loans or loan guarantees. Also, governments can consider complementary measures to reduce price risks (for example, contracts for differences or price cap and price floor mechanisms) or provide a degree of volume certainty (for example, offtake backstops). On the demand-side, governments can help generate predictable demand by introducing policies that encourage or require diversified sourcing, enabling projects to secure long-term offtake agreements and investment.

   These measures need to be supported by key enablers, including a broader pool of accessible financing, streamlined permitting, international public-private partnerships and enhanced supply chain traceability.

5. **Promote supply-side technology innovation**: Across mining, separation, refining and production, innovation is emerging as an essential element for diversification. A number of promising innovation opportunities are emerging, for example, smart mining, novel separation and refining technologies, and new recovery pathways from unconventional or secondary sources. However, the transition from laboratory innovation to commercial operation remains a major hurdle.

   Public support mechanisms – including grants, loan guarantees and support for shared testing facilities may be used with the aim of accelerating commercialisation.

6. **Embrace demand-side technology innovation**: Demand-side innovation is needed to complement supply-side innovation, including to alleviate supply constraints and geopolitical risks.

   Demand-side innovation can take three distinct forms:

   - reducing the amount of heavy rare earth elements (**HREEs**) required;
   - substituting one **HREE** for another that is less supply-constrained; and
   - developing new technologies to minimise or to eliminate use of **REE**.

[1] The publication identifies a number of technologies, with a focus on magnets: including stainless steel cells for separation processes, alloy strip casters, electrolysis cells for metallisation, and magnet production equipment such as alignment pressers and grain boundary diffusion equipment. In addition, the publication notes key knowledge gaps.

Co-ordinated action across the supply chains may accelerate both reduction and substitution strategies. Collaboration among end users and public authorities is regarded as an effective means of overcoming technical barriers.

7. **Develop targeted policies to unlock the full potential of recycling**: For these purposes, the publication states the key measures needed are boosting collection and sorting, especially for **EV** motors and wind turbines; harmonising extended producer responsibility schemes; and introducing **REE** recovery and labelling requirements.

   De-risking investment in recycling infrastructure through grants, feedstock-access programs and recycled-content incentives is essential to scale recyclers and technologies. Industrial clustering, integration with refining capacity and waste regulations may assist in the development of circular supply chains and reinforce long-term resilience.

   The two **IEA** publications considered below feed into these themes – **Critical Mineral Traceability for Energy and Economic Security** and **Battery Circularity**

8. **Accelerate efforts to enhance price transparency**: There is limited price definition and transparency in the REE market, which makes it more difficult for market participants (supply and demand-side) to manage long-term contracts and hedge price risks.

   Governments can seek to promote price definition and transparency through a range of measures, including to facilitate market development.

   It should be noted however that these measures should be regarded as secondary or tertiary to the primary objective of developing supply and demand-side certainty as to price and mass!

- Critical Mineral Traceability for Energy and Economic Security published on **April 22, 2026**:

  This publication and Rare Earth Elements should be read together. Rare Earth Elements covers the need to develop whole supply chains for **REE**. In this context, in particular in the context of funding from governments to develop supply-side and demand-side, the integrity of each supply chain needs to be assured by tracking the origin of minerals, their processing, refining and production along each supply chain, including developing a chain of custody and title.

  This publication outlines findings and insights from what is described as "a first-of-its kind" survey on traceability. More than 80 respondent corporations and other organizations across supply chains for five critical minerals (copper, lithium, nickel, cobalt, and graphite) and **REE** provided information between October and December 2025.

  Based on the information provided, the publication assesses the current state of traceability practices, examines how governments are deploying traceability, and identifies key barriers to wider adoption of traceability, including implementation costs, interoperability across systems and challenges in sharing information along complex and geographically concentrated supply chains.

  The publication identified **five actions** for consideration by policymakers, being actions intended to support increased deployment of traceability systems.

The **five actions** are as follows:

1. Strengthen incentives for collecting and sharing data across supply chains, combining regulatory and financial or market-based measures.
2. Provide financial support for traceability infrastructure, lowering establishment and operational costs.
3. Collaborate at an international level to harmonise traceability standards, improving interoperability and comparability across market actors and jurisdictions.
4. Enhance co-operation and integrity between upstream and downstream jurisdictions, including through technical assistance and shared platforms.
5. Adopt a pragmatic approach focusing on less complex supply chains and an initial set of core data elements, scaling up to more complex supply chains and additional data fields over time.

- Battery Circularity, published on **April 29, 2026**:

  This report outlines technological innovation trends related to recycling batteries. The innovation trends identified are based on patent databases and the insights of the **IEA** in respect of key battery technology issues.

  To provide a sense of the size and shape of the developing market for recycling of batteries, more than 25% of cars sold globally in 2025 were EVs reliant on batteries. Around 1.2 million EV batteries could reach the end of life in 2030 and 14 million in 2040. The supply chains for minerals used in batteries are concentrated, and recycling of batteries offers a distinct supply chain, together with reuse of batteries and repurposing of batteries.

  As will be apparent from previous editions of **P_2N_0**, there is rising interest in recycling, re-use and repurposing of batteries, including from governments and economic blocs, and the private sector.

  The report notes that patenting activity increased by 42% a year on average from 2017 to 2023, across technology categories, including collection and sorting of used batteries, mechanical processing, and treatments to recover valuable metals such as lithium, nickel, cobalt and copper from end-of-life batteries.

  As a secondary supply of critical metals and materials for battery production, battery recycling will complement (some say compete with) primary supply of metals and minerals.

  The report outlines **five key findings**:

  1. Battery circularity innovation has been growing faster than other battery technology fields;
  2. Asian companies lead innovation across the whole value chain of battery recycling;
  3. China has become the dominant player in battery circularity and refining of critical metals for batteries;
  4. Increasingly, Chinese technology corporations are seeking to obtain international patent protection; and
  5. European innovation is concentrated on collection and pre-processing of batteries.

The author has to confess to a particular interest in this sector, and the net-zero waste sector, having worked for participants in the mining and resources and waste and recycling sectors for over 30 years.

By way of reminder:

- **Edition 43** of **P_2N_0** reported (under **Energy Technology Perspectives 2026**) that "On **March 26, 2026**, the **IEA** published Energy Technology Perspectives 2026. The publication does not hide its key finding "under a bushel": "Strengthening supply chains can improve resilience and reduce economic security risks for key energy infrastructure". To reach this key finding, the publication considers demand-side for energy technologies and supply-side, and the key dynamics in each. This publication (the 20th in the **IEA** series) appears to place particular emphasis on the "faults and failings" in supply chains for energy technology. Sitting beneath the key finding are the following key observations:
  - Despite headwinds for each energy technology supply chain, the chains and associated fuel supply are expanding rapidly;
  - There is measurable means of progress across each energy technology supply chain, with each energy technology supply at different stages of development;
  - The energy technology supply chains, manufacturing and trade, are showing signs of resilience to changes in industrial and trade policy;
  - The concentration of manufacturing capacity and trade in the clean energy technology sector remains a source of actual and prospective market and trade vulnerability;
  - Policy settings need to be cognisant of the need for industrial competitiveness, both for energy technological development and supply security.
- **Edition 42** of **P_2N_0** reported (under **Electricity 2026, Analysis and forecast to 2030**) that: "On **February 6, 2026**, the **IEA** published Electricity 2026, Analysis and forecast to 2030. The key points made in the Executive Summary of the publication are as follows:
  - Emerging economies continue to drive demand growth, and will account for around 60% of the increase in demand through 2030, including to respond to increased electrification and increased population growth and urbanisation;
  - Demand for electrical energy is increasing, indeed it is accelerating in developed economies, after 15 years of stagnation in increased demand;
  - By 2030, it is forecasted that half of the world's demand for electrical energy will be matched by nuclear and renewable energy capacity;
  - Electrical energy output from nuclear energy generation capacity set a record in 2025, and output is expected to continue to increase through 2030, for the most part with the increase to come from emerging economies;
  - While the generation of electrical energy from coal-fired power generation will continue to fall as a percentage of output, through 2030 it will remain the largest source of electrical energy generation;

- Through 2030, for the most part the increased demand for electrical energy is expected to be met by the development of increased renewables, natural gas and nuclear power generation capacity;
- With the increased demand for electrical energy and the increased development of generation to match it, the need for investment in grid infrastructure augmentation and development has come into ever sharper focus; and
- The development of BESS capacity provides a significant source of short-term system flexibility.

Looking beyond 2030, **IEA** anticipated that GHG emissions from the generation of electrical energy will plateau at around 13.5 giga-tonnes of CO_2-e."



Americas

- **Oracle data center secures funding**: On **April 26, 2026**, **Business Insider** (at businessinsider.com, under **A massive Oracle date center planned for rural Michigan secures $16 billion in funding**) reported that **Oracle** is to secure data center capacity at the **1 GW** Saline Township campus, in the US State of Michigan. As reported, the developer of the data center, **Related Digital**, working with **Blackstone** and **PIMCO**, has secured **USD 16 billion** in funding for the development.
- **US Department of Energy (DOE) set to maintain funding for carbon removal capture projects**: On **April 18, 2026**, it was reported widely that the US **DOE** had signalled that it intends to fund the development of two direct air capture (**DAC**) projects – **Project Cypress**, in the US State of Louisiana and the **South Texas DAC Hub**, and other **CO_2** removal projects.
- **Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approves operating licence extension for California's last nuclear power plant**: On **April 3, 2026**, it was reported widely that the **NRC** approved an extension to the operating license of the **Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant**, on the central coast of the US State of California. The extension allows the **Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant** to continue to operate through 2045, although to operate after 2030 the law of the State of California will have to be amended.

  By way of background: The **California Energy Commission** estimates that the demand for electrical energy in the State of California will increase by **20 GWs** by **2045**.

  By way of a reminder: Edition 43 of **P_2N_0** reported (**TerraPower set to turn earth**) that:

  "On **March 6, 2026**, it was reported widely that the United States **Nuclear Regulatory Commission** (**NRC**) had approved the development of the **345 MW TerraPower sodium cooled nuclear reactor** to be located in **Kemmerer**, in the US State of Wyoming. As reported in previous editions of **P_2N_0**, the nuclear reactor will use low-enriched uranium and a **1 GWh** molten sodium storage system. As reported, the approval is the first given in eight years, and the first using sodium cooled nuclear reactor technology.

As a general statement, previous approvals given by the **NRC** have been in respect of water cooled and neutron moderator technologies."



Africa

- **Funding for critical minerals rail project**: On **April 24, 2026**, it was reported by **Mining.Com** (at www.mining.com, under Funders commit $1.3 billion to Zambia critical minerals rail) that the African Finance Corporation and the African Development Bank each committed USD 500 million, and Italy committed USD 320 million, to provide funding to allow the development of 830 km rail infrastructure to transport copper from Zambia to the Port of Lobito in Angola (as part of the **Lobito Corridor** project).

Europe and the UK

- **CEZ signs early works contract with Rolls Royce SMR**: On **April 27, 2026**, **world nuclear news** (at **world-nuclear-news.org**, under **Czech SMR project – early works contract signed**) reported that Czech nuclear operator **ČEZ** and **Rolls Royce SMR** had signed an early works contract for the planned development of small modular reactor at Temelín, in Czechia. In addition, it is understood that Rolls Royce SMR is in discussions with Sweden for the development of a small modular reactor.
- **Germany positioning to encourage 2 GW of hydrogen ready gas-fired power plant capacity**: On **April 27, 2026**, **HydrogenInsight** (at hydrogeninsight.com, under Germany plans to introduce incentives this year to convert gas-fired power plants to hydrogen) reported that a leaked draft of the **Electricity Supply Security and Capacity Act** provides for the provision of incentives "to encourage 2 GW of new gas-fired power plant capacity to switch to hydrogen by 2040, with a further 2 GW to switch by 2043".
- **Shell's Holland Hydrogen 1 project nears completion**: On **April 23, 2026**, it was reported widely that the **200 MW Holland Hydrogen 1** project in the **Port of Rotterdam** is close to completion.
- **Poland allocates €500 million to hydrogen production projects**: On **April 23, 2026**, it was reported widely that **Poland** has allocated **€500 million** to support the development of five renewable fuels of non-biological origin projects.
- **European Commission (EC) to review RFNBO Regulation**: On **April 22, 2026**, it was reported widely that the EC is to undertake a review of Renewable Fuels of Non-Biological Origin (**RFNBO**) for the purposes of the EU Renewable Energy Directive in context of AccelerateEU.

Taken with the review of the **EU ETS**, it is clear that the **EC** is seeking to renew the active management of the energy trilemma.

The President of the EC is quoted as having said:

> "The choices we make today will shape our ability to face the challenges of today and crises of tomorrow. Our AccelerateEU strategy will bring both immediate and more structural relief measures to European citizens and businesses. We must accelerate the shift to homegrown, clean energies. This will give us energy independence and security, and mean we are better able to weather geopolitical storms".

- **Shell faces action seeking end to investments in natural gas and oil projects**: On **April 21, 2026**, it was reported widely that Friends of the Earth Netherlands had filed an action against Shell.

  Edition 20 of P_2N_0 reported on the outcome of an earlier case brought against Shell as follows:

  > **"Shell wins appeal**: On **November 12, 2024**, the **Court of Appeal** in **The Hague** ruled in favour of **Royal Dutch Shell** (**Shell**) in the appeal against the decision in **Milieudefensie at al** v. **Royal Dutch Shell**. As noted in **Edition** 12 of P_2N_0, **Shell** appealed against the decision of the **District Court of The Hague**: the decision required **Shell** to reduce the net CO_2 emission of the Shell by at least 45% by 2030, compared to 2019 levels.
  >
  > While the Court of Appeal found that corporations have a duty under the law of the Netherlands to mitigate climate change through a reduction in GHG emissions, the obligation of **Shell** is not an absolute obligation to reduce its GHG emissions globally by 45% by 2030, compared to 2019 levels.
  >
  > As noted by the author at the time of the decision in first instance, it is for the legislature to set and to implement policy settings in respect of GHG reductions rather than the courts. While it is not usual for the author to provide editorial comment, the decision of the Court of Appeal represents a clear basis for orderly regulation of GHG emissions.
  >
  > **Attached** is a link to the decision of the Court of Appeal."

- **Swiss solar plans**: On **April 10, 2026**, it was reported widely that **Swiss Grid**, working with electrical energy corporations, is to integrate up to **40 GW** of photovoltaic solar by 2050. As reported, as at the end of 2025 Switzerland had around **9.62 GW** of installed photovoltaic capacity.

- **Tender for 12 GW of renewable energy goes live in France**: On **April 2, 2026**, it was reported widely that the French Finance Minister had announced tenders for the development of **seven offshore wind farm** projects to provide **10 GW** of renewable electrical energy. A further **2 GW** of renewable electrical energy will be tendered, including photovoltaic solar capacity and onshore wind farms.

- **Renewable energy at record levels in the UK**: On **April 2, 2026**, it was reported widely that **52.5%** of electrical energy generated in 2025 was generated by renewable electrical energy. As might be expected, **GHG** emissions fell by **2%** during 2025.

- **EU proposes carbon market stabilization**: On **April 1, 2026**, a Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council amending (EU) 2015/1814 as regards ceasing the invalidation of allowances in the market stability reserve was published. The **market stability reserve** (**MSR**) is designed to be used to bring stability to the operation of the carbon market by the release of

additional emission allowances. The **Proposal** is intended "to improve the EU ETS market liquidity, stability and predictability".

- **Italy defers closure of coal-fired generation capacity**: On **March 31, 2026**, a bill passed the lower house of the Italian Parliament providing for the deferment of closure of coal-fired generation capacity through 2038. This marks continued pragmatism balancing energy security and progress to net zero.
- **ENTSO-E Publishes Expert Panel Final Report on April 28, 2025, Iberian Peninsula Power outage**: On **March 20, 2026**, the 49 members of the Expert Panel of ENTSO-E published their findings and recommendations arising from the **April 28, 2025**, 16-hour **Iberian Peninsula Power outage**. The findings and recommendations are in 28 April 2025 Blackout.

  The report found that the power outage resulted from a combination of many factors, including frequency oscillations, gaps in voltage and reactive power, differences in voltage regulation practices, rapid output reductions and generator disconnections in Spain, and uneven stabilisation capabilities. The factors resulted in fast increases in voltage and cascading disconnections in Spain, and, as a consequence, the power outage across Spain and Portugal. The recommendations of the Expert Panel include strengthening operational practices, improved monitoring and exchange of data and information among system operators.

  The report identifies the need for legislative and regulatory regimes to adapt to respond to, and support in, the evolving nature of distribution and transmission systems.

  On **April 17, 2026**, it was reported widely that the **National Commission on Markets and Competition** (**CNMC**) in Spain had opened formal investigations in light of evidence that some legislative and regulatory requirements of the existing regime had been breached. While the CNMC must discharge its regulatory duties, it is hoped that the focus will be on the recommendations from ENTSO-E. For the author, the key issue arising is the need to review voltage control, and to ensure appropriate standards across all generation capacity. It is noted that Spain has updated its network code to achieve this.

Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia

- **India ahead of renewable energy installation target**: On **April 30, 2026**, **Gulf News** (at **gulfnews.com** under India hits milestone: Renewable energy ramps – 5 years ahead of Paris Agreement target) reported that India had "achieved over 50% of its installed electricity capacity from non-fossil fuel sources" with 274.7 GW of renewable electrical energy installed capacity and 8.8 GW of nuclear, out of 520 GW of installed capacity. This does not equate to 50% of the dispatched electrical energy because renewable electrical energy does not generate electrical energy with the same efficiency as non-renewable energy, nevertheless this is wonderful progress.

- **India approves 58 corporations under critical minerals recycling program**: On **April 30, 2026**, it was reported widely the Indian Ministry of Mines had approved the participation of 58 corporations in the National Critical Minerals Mission. This program is intended to develop recycling capacity within India.
- **Bangladesh fuels its first nuclear power station**: On **April 28, 2026**, it was reported widely that Bangladesh was loading uranium in preparation for the commencement of operation of the first nuclear power station in the country. As reported, the **2.4 GW** nuclear power station will generate around 10% of the demand for electrical energy in Bangladesh.
- **TotalEnergies to develop 1 GW onshore wind farm in Kazakhstan**: On **April 24, 2026**, it was reported that **TotalEnergies**, **KazMunayGas** and **Samruk Energy** are to develop the **USD 1.2 billion 1 GW and 300 / 600 MWh BESS Mirny project**. As reported, the project is to be financed by a bank group comprising China Construction Bank, DBK, DEG, EBRD, Proparco, QNB Group, Société Générale and Standard Chartered.
- **India continues to progress renewable energy capacity installation**: On **April 10, 2026**, it was reported that during the fiscal year April 1, 2025, to March 31, 2026, India installed an additional **44.6 GW** of photovoltaic solar capacity and **6 GW** of wind capacity. As of March 31, 2026, 275 GW of renewable electrical energy capacity had been installed across India, with photovoltaic solar accounting for 55% (or 150.26 GW) of installed renewable electrical energy capacity (with 20% wind, hydro 21% and biomass at 4%).
- **Kalai-II hydroelectric project approved**: On **April 8, 2026**, the Government of India Cabinet Committee of Economic Affairs (chaired by Prime Minister Modi) had approved the development of the **1.2 GW Kalai-II Hydro Electric Project** in Arunachal Pradesh.

  It is understood that the Project will be developed by the Government of Arunachal Pradesh and TDHC India Limited, and will take 78 months to develop, comprising 6 units of 190 MW and 1 unit of 60 MW.

APAC

- **Singapore's EMA tenders for further hydrogen ready power plants**: On **April 29, 2026**, it was reported widely that the **Energy Market Authority** of Singapore is tendering for up to a further three hydrogen ready power plants. As with previous tenders, the hydrogen ready power plants are to have capacity of 600 MW and will be developed using the build, own, operate model. As reported, one power plant is to be operational by 2031, with the other power plants to be operational by 2032.
- **China progresses to 1 million metric tonnes of green hydrogen production capacity**: On **April 27, 2026**, **HydrogenInsight** reported that, as at the end of **March 2026**, China has installed or has under development **1 million metric tonnes** of green hydrogen production capacity.

- **Fortescue to develop green power grids to supply data centres**: On **April 24, 2026**, **RenewEconomy** (at reneweconomy.com.au under **"Cheaper and faster:" Fortescue to create a $1 billion grid to power data centres**) reported that Fortescue has announced plans to invest "USD 680 million to develop a new off-grid renewable electrical energy system to meet growing demand for fossil-free power from data centres and other" industries.
- **AirTrunk asset-backed bond financing**: On **April 22, 2026**, **The Business Times** (at **businesstimes.com.sg**, under **Blackstone's AirTrunk plans its first data centre-backed bond**) reported that **AirTrunk** is "looking to raise at least **AUD 500 million** through asset-backed bonds".
- **Ember reports on record export month for China**: The good folk at **Ember** reported that during March 2026, across the "**three new industries**", **batteries**, **EVs** and **photovoltaic solar**, the value of total exports was **USD 21.9 billion**. As reported, this is a 70% increase year-on-year.
- **TotalEnergies, PETRONAS and Mitsui CCS joint venture** in **reported to be progressing**: On **April 19, 2026**, it was reported that the joint venture among **TotalEnergies**, **PETRONAS** and **Mitsui & Co Ltd** is progressing to a positive final investment decision in respect of their CCS project during 2027. As reported, CO_2 will be transported for injection and storage in the **Duyong field**.
- **Australia progresses green hydrogen project**: On **April 10, 2026**, it was reported widely that the **1.5 GW Murchison Green Hydrogen** project in **Western Australia** is to receive **AUD 814 million** in funding support.
- **Singapore progresses photovoltaic solar installation**: On **April 9, 2026**, the **Energy Market Authority** of Singapore reported that during 2025 **504 MW** of **photovoltaic solar capacity** had been deployed. As reported, Singapore has installed a little over **2 GW** of photovoltaic capacity.

  By way of reminder: Singapore intends to install 3 GW of photovoltaic solar capacity by 2030.
- **Digital Realty prepares to invest $7 billion in Singapore**: On **April 10, 2026**, **Channel News Asia** (at www.channelnewsasia.com, under Digital Realty deepens Singapore investment as AI enters next phase) reported that Digital Realty is planning to invest up to $7 billion in Singapore as a hub for AI inference in Asia Pacific. As reported, **$4.3 billion** will be committed to the development of new data centres.
- **NextDC 100-year funding**: On **April 7, 2026**, it was reported widely that **NextDC** is to issue a 100-year bond to raise **AUD 1 billion** for the development of data centres across Australia.
- **Banpu mulling investment in US data centre market**: On **April 7, 2026**, **The Business Times** (at businesstimes.com.sg, under Thai energy company Banpu plans US$1.5 billion US power investment on data centre boom) reported that Banpu, through BKV, is considering the acquisition and development of **1 GW** of **gas-fired generation capacity**. As reported, the focus of the investment will be the US State of Texas.
- **Asian Development Bank (ADB) leans forward:**
  - On **April 11, 2026**, it was reported widely that the ADB was supporting the implementation of the Strategy 2030 Finance Sector Directional Guide **and** Asean Community Vision 2045, including the **Asean Catalytic Green Finance Facility**, comprising a pipeline of projects from 2026 to 2030 with development costs of up to USD 19.4 billion.

- On **April 6, 2026**, it was reported widely that the **ADB** had established a multi-partner fund to allow an increase in the rate of progress of the **ASEAN Power Grid** (**APG**). As reported, funding of USD 25 million has been committed to the **Regional Connectivity Fund** (**RFC**). Funding from the **RFC** will allow early-stage development of the **APG**.

By way of reminder: Edition 43 of P_2N_0 (under **Financing the ASEAN Power Grid**) reported that:

"On **March 10, 2026**, the **IEA** published Financing the ASEAN Power Grid. The idea of an **APG** is not new. In fact, it has been the subject of discussion for decades. The publication provides a sense that the idea is developing into a reality, and that it is needed: since 1990 demand for electrical energy across ASEAN has increased nine-fold, and the rate of growth is estimated to continue at a rate of 3 to 4% a year through 2040.

The publication makes the following key observations:

- Interconnectors are critical to the development of the **APG**;
- A regional trade in electrical energy will deliver an affordable, reliable and secure energy transition;
- The regional trade is nascent currently;
- Currently there is strong momentum for the development of the **APG**;
- **USD 27 billion** of investment in interconnector capacity is needed by 2040 to realise the ambitions of the **APG**, and while the nature of investment in interconnectors is not straight-forward this level of investment and development is possible; and
- This said, the scale and size of the investment required is challenging for current business and financing models.

- **Masdar and TotalEnergies join forces**: On **April 2, 2026**, it was reported widely that **Masdar** and **TotalEnergies** are to join forces in a joint venture with a headline valuation of **USD 2.2 billion**. As reported, the joint venturers will contribute 3 GW of capacity and to develop new photovoltaic solar and wind electrical energy generating capacity, and battery energy storage systems across the following Asian jurisdictions, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore and South Korea, and Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

HELPFUL PUBLICATIONS AND DATABASES

In addition to publications covered elsewhere in this edition of **P_2N_0**, the most noteworthy publications read by the author during the period from **April 1, 2026**, to **April 30, 2026**, were:

- The **IEA** Financing CCUS at Scale. The publication identifies the current dynamics in the development of CCS / CCUS projects globally, and what is required to scale up the development of CCS / CCUS. Critical to the development of CCS / CCUS to the required levels for the purposes of progress to net-zero is the development of new models that can be financed. The publication is well-worth a read.
- The **Ministry of Mines and Energy**, et al, An Overview of Critical and Strategic Minerals Potential of Brazil, 2026 Edition. The publication provides a detailed assessment of the minerals produced from resources in Brazil. The publication is excellent.

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* Michael Harrison is the primary author of P_2N_0, and editor. Any error is Michael's. P_2N_0 is written early each Saturday morning. In writing P_2N_0, Michael sources from original material. If a news item is covered broadly, the words **reported widely** connote that at least three sources have covered that news item and **reported** connotes at least two sources. If there is only one source that is not the original material, that source is named.

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