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Iconoclast, n. A breaker of idols, the worshippers whereof are imperfectly gratified by the performance, and most strenuously protest that he unbuildeth but doth not redifieth, that he pulleth down but piletth not up. For the poor things would have other idols in place of those he thwacketh upon the mazzard and dispelleth. But the iconoclast saith: "Ye shall have none at all, for ye need them not; and if the rebuilder fooleth round hereabout, behold I will depress the head of him and sit thereon till he squawk it." (Ambrose Bierce)

The enlightenment of the human race is a process of discarding myths and replacing them with facts, as much a process of disillusionment as one of discovery. Thus the iconoclast or skeptic plays an important role in the liberation of the human mind when he "proves by his blasphemy that this or that idol is definitively convincing—that at least one visitor to the shrine is left full of doubts... The liberation of the human mind... has been furthered by gay fellows who heaved dead cats into sanctuaries and then went rioting down the highways of the world, proving to all men that doubt, after all, was safe..." (H. L. Mencken)

The perpetual human dilemma, "Where do we go from here?" cannot be answered without first considering where we are, where we are coming from, and how we got here. To learn from the past, we must learn what is the past and what are the myths.

George Orwell tells us in his novel, 1984, that he who controls the past, controls the future, and he who controls the present, controls the past. On a daily basis, our newspapers reveal new frauds that governments have been caught attempting to put over on their subjects. It comes as no surprise then to find myths abounding in what we think we know of the past, myths which obfuscate the real nature of the nation-states which foster them for their own self-perpetuation.

Historical revisionism is the establishment's competition in the industry of historical data. It is an attempt to get behind the myths, dispel the illusions and get at the truth. Ergo, nothing is sacred except the truth. This makes the revisionist historian an iconoclast and historical revisionism substantiated iconoclasm or heresy.

With this issue, REASON takes a special look at this heresy called historical revisionism and what it has to teach us.

In an original piece of scholarly research, Dr. James J. Martin examines the plight of an individual who became a victim of American justice when convicted of treason following World War II, in "The Framing of Tokyo Rose." In another World War II case study, we find that the supposedly surprise attack on Pearl Harbor which, so the story goes, dragged a reluctant, peace-loving America into World War II, might have been a surprise to the American people but certainly wasn't to their rulers. Percy Greaves, who was not only present but an instrumental part of the Senate Pearl Harbor Investigations, discusses the events surrounding what he calls "FDR's Watergate," in an article which no doubt will surprise a lot of REASON readers. Continuing with the Watergate analogy, Bruce Bartlett's article on the Pearl Harbor investigations reveals that, then as now, in the lexicon of the State, investigation equals cover-up. Watergate was nothing new. The Emperor still wears the same old clothes.

According to the advocate of the black and white theory of history there are only two sides to a dispute, the good guys and the bad guys, and no compromise between the two is possible. For the forces of righteousness to attempt to reason with or trust the forces of darkness is the utmost folly. Intimidation is the only thing the bad guys understand. The 1938 Munich Pact which transferred the area of Czechoslovakia containing the predominately Sudeten-German population to Germany, is usually equated with the shameful appeasement of the forces of darkness. This pact is reexamined by Dr. Austin J. App who concludes that rather than appeasement, it represented belated justice and self-determination for the Sudeten-Germans.

Gary North then analyzes World War II historical revisionism and the intellectual paradigm shift brought about by the U.S. government's recent crusade in Southeast Asia. While most Americans are now willing to admit that this crusade was a costly mistake, they see it as an isolated mistake motivated by the desire to contain communism rather than part of a continuing pattern of U.S. imperialism. William Marina looks at some parallels and contrasts between U.S. intervention in Vietnam and its 1898 intervention in the Philippines and concludes that there is a pattern which spells EMPIRE. Finally, Alan Fairgate examines "Non-Marxist Theories of Imperialism," and points out that since the days of Adam Smith, laissez-faire economic analysis has served in the vanguard of anti-imperialist movements. Fairgate lays the groundwork upon which to build a libertarian theory of imperialism.

"The public history of all countries, and all ages," according to John Quincy Adam Adams, "is but a mask, richly colored. The interior working of the machinery must be foul."

"History, in general," wrote Thomas Jefferson, "only informs us what bad government is."

Historical revisionism confirms these assessments.

To maintain the support of the mass of the citizenry, rulers are not able to be open and candid about things. Like any other product or service on the market that would be found lacking on its merits alone, the Nation-State must resort to a good public relations campaign (whitewash) based on false information (fraud). Any maverick brazen enough to point out such fraud can expect to be branded a blasphemer and a heretic. So it is that historical revisionism is labelled heresy.

This is not to say, however, that the works of anyone calling himself a revisionist should be accepted without question. People can get carried away by their theories (e.g. of conspiracy) and invent or distort facts accordingly. And other revisionists, while disclosing very useful facts, may offer theories whose validity is open to serious question (e.g. many of socialist Gabriel Kolko's facts support laissez-faire, despite his viewing them very differently).

Overall, though, there is much value in this heretical enterprise. The power of the State to control information is so great that historical revisionism provides a welcome, cleansing breath of fresh air.

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THE FRAMING OF TOKYO ROSE

James J. Martin

It is a very comforting feeling to imagine that there is no past and that the future begins with the present, but the future has a very awkward way of reminding us that our past will not down. Francis Neilson, The American Journal of Economics and Sociology (July 1949), p. 359.

World War II ended 30 years ago, but the unfinished business of this war threatens the planet. Unresolved political questions involving the territorial disposition of disputed regions have brought about the vicious Korean and Vietnam wars. The nearly 30 years of strife in the Mideast grows out of other aspects of unbalanced accounts of the war. The boundaries and structure of Germany are still as unsettled as they were three decades ago, and “war crimes” trials still go on there. For that matter, there still is no general peace treaty ending the war of 1939-1945.

On another level, there are many incidents which appear to be settled permanently, but are really in a kind of historical limbo, with the final word, if there ever will be one, far from forthcoming. One of these, the subject of this reappraisal, is the infamous treason trial of the woman known around the world three decades ago as “Tokyo Rose,” and which, despite accepted modern legendry, has never been resolved. We already have a generation which has only the haziest notions as to what this case was all about, if they have any understanding about it at all. And very few of those old enough to recall the case realize that the person found guilty in the trial of 1949 has never admitted any guilt, and furthermore, her attorneys sought for 25 years thereafter to establish not only that she was innocent, but that she should be pardoned and compensated for past indignities.

This amazing narrative must be started on a broad scale, however, if one is to understand how the whole sorry tale became part of the history of the times.

ANTI-JAPANESE PROPAGANDA

The attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese on December 7, 1941, brought the United States formally into World War II. Americans fought the Japanese in the Pacific for nearly four years, about twice as long as they eventually fought the Germans and Italians in Europe. It was a veritable race war (Norman Thomas once described World War II in the Pacific as “an organized race riot”), and accompanying U.S. propaganda was pitched at a level of racial venom which many involved never did repudiate.

Hatred of the Japanese was developed into a science by the war administration’s propaganda arm. On some levels it became so aggravated that one would have imagined Americans were fighting large insects in the Pacific Islands, so degraded did the enemy become on the evolutionary scale invented by the clever chaps fighting a psychological war on the home front. A cursory examination of the popular press of 1941-45 reveals substantial slanderous dehumanization of the enemy in Asia, but it was far worse on what might be called the vulgar or informal level.

The purpose here is not to dwell on this aspect of the war, but it is necessary to have some understanding of the state of mind in superheated postwar America. It was part of the emotional climate in which such trials as that of “Tokyo Rose” took place. It was many years before any headway was discernible in efforts to dissipate the ferocity of Japanophobia in the United States, and overtones of this clever and successful brainwashing are palpable to this day, thanks in part to the reappearance of war-time anti-Japanese movies on television.

Much balderdash had emanated from “experts” and even military and naval spokesmen in the decade before Pearl Harbor, to the effect that the Japanese could not put up a decent fight against Americans for six months, that an American fighting man was worth at least a half dozen Asians, and that any encounter in the Pacific – predicted by all manner of “seers” after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 – would be little more than an outing. It was soon realized in 1942, however, that the United States was confronted by a tough, resourceful, and intelligent enemy, that it was going to be a long and bitter struggle. A steady drumfire of verbal abuse of the enemy

James J. Martin received his M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Michigan. A leading revisionist historian, his books include the classic Men Against the State, American Liberalism and World Politics, and Revisionist Viewpoints. He is currently at work on a book dealing with U.S.-Soviet relations during World War II.
was a substitute for victories for a time, and nothing was neglected which might be employed to paint the adversary as a monster.

RADIO TOKYO'S ROSES

Beginning in 1942, American servicemen stationed in various parts of the Pacific began to receive on their radios continuous broadcasts of American music, that of the big dance bands which were at their peak of popularity. These recordings were accompanied by commentary by announcers, most of whom were English-speaking women. There were several of them, but the soldiers and sailors referred to them all as a single person, dubbed "Tokyo Rose," though no such name was ever used on Radio Tokyo, from which these broadcasts originated.

The exploits of this legendary disc jockey grew to wondrous proportions, and her fame spread in such a way that by the war's end there were few people in the United States who had not heard of her. Mothers imagined her as a purring, leering Lorelei who was undermining their clean-cut sons with all manner of unmentionable suggestions, especially encouraging them to believe wives and girl friends at

A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS

That she was still in Japan on December 7, 1941, was principally the fault of incompetent bureaucrats of two countries. She had left Los Angeles in such a hurry that she did not wait to obtain a passport, and was supplied only with what was called a "certificate of identification." When she tried to sail home on the Tatsu Maru in November 1941, the failure of the U.S. consul to have her passport ready and the inability of the Japanese monetary functionaries to expedite the exchange of her foreign funds caused her to miss the ship.

She tried to get back to the United States two more times on the Swedish ship Gripsholm, which was engaged during much of the early war carrying refugees back and forth from one belligerent to another. The first time was just before the war; she failed again in September 1942. By the latter date her parents were locked up in Arizona's Gila River concentration camp. (This and like camps are still described, in that exquisite hypocrisy Americans have inherited from their English tradition, as "relocation centers.") Under the circumstances, she was unable to get the money for the passage from

"The infamous treason trial of the woman known around the world as 'Tokyo Rose' has never been resolved."

home were "untrue." The press boiled with stories about this omnipresent woman, and radio blatherskites such as Walter Winchell and Drew Pearson were much exercised over it all.

With this brief background in mind, we may begin properly the historia calamitatum of Iva Ikuco Toguri. Born on July 4, 1916, of Japanese parents in Los Angeles, she graduated from U.C.L.A. in 1940. She was an outstanding premedical student there, as well as a talented pianist. The prewar decade being a time of poor opportunities for Nisei in the United States, she thought for a time of going to Japan to study medicine. But when she did go, in 1941, she went at the request of her parents to visit an ailing aunt; Iva's mother was too ill to undertake the visit herself.

It was while she was there at the home of her uncle that the Pearl Harbor attack took place, from which time her life became incredibly complicated. She later related the confusion that occurred because of her inability to speak Japanese and her unwillingness to believe at the start that such a thing had actually happened. It was two days after Pearl Harbor before she knew for sure that war had broken out.

them. Her mother later died in one of these camps.

But the troubles of Iva Toguri were just beginning. Her money soon ran out, and she became increasingly an object of suspicion, badgered by the Japanese police who could not understand why she did not renounce her U.S. citizenship. Matters were made worse by the breakdown in communication. She was denied a ration card, disowned by her uncle, and ended up wandering the streets of Tokyo for three months, following which she was admitted to a hospital, suffering from malnutrition.

Then began the job of survival in a strange land with which her own country was at war, as unfavorable a situation as one is likely to imagine. First she set out to learn some Japanese. Then she secured a job with the Domei News Agency (Japan's equivalent to the big national newsgathering enterprises such as Reuters) but apparently was too pro-American for her associates. She soon left there, taking part-time work as a typist with the Danish Legation and Radio Tokyo.

The latter place turned out to be a fateful one. There she came to the attention of an Australian prisoner of war, Major Charles E. Cousins. Cousins, along with an American of similar status, Major Wallace G. Ince, and Norman Reyes, a lieutenant in the Filipino army, all experienced broadcasters, were in charge of a POW-oriented program over Radio Tokyo, which became popularly known under the title Zero Hour. It was broadcast mainly by English-speaking women announcers, who accompanied the programs with casual chitchat virtually devoid of politics or propaganda, though there were other women who did read news and commentary on the war on several different programs. There was in the Zero Hour scripts, prepared under the direction of and mostly by the above-mentioned men, a theme which vaguely accented home and the comforts of noncombatant life. This could be and was construed as an effort to undermine the morale of Americans fighting a long distance from home in a very strange environment. It was originally the backbone of the Government's case against Iva Toguri that she had broadcast this kind of material, not that she had made political propaganda in behalf of Imperial Japan. It might be mentioned, however, that in a Pennsylvania State University history thesis by Rose Maria Fazio which sought to estimate the effects of these broadcasts during the war, 93 percent of the ex-service men who were sent questionnaires responded that hearing these broadcasts had a demoralizing effect on them.

Iva Toguri encountered Major Cousins for the first time in November 1943, a full year after Allied soldiers in the Pacific had started calling Radio Tokyo women announcers "Tokyo Rose." Cousins declared he selected her because she had demonstrated sympathy with POWs, and had secretly obtained food, clothing, and blankets for them. She was coached and helped on a voice test, and soon joined the team of women on the air with Zero Hour, at a time when the Pacific war was already over two years old.

The events of the period of her employment are not clear, and were made much muddier by the continuous contradictions voiced by a stream of witnesses during the 1949 trial. Some of this will be examined in the context of the trial. At this point we can proceed to the end of the war and reconstruct the time span from the late summer of 1945 to the spring of 1949.

THE PURSUIT OF " TokYO ROSE"

By 1945 Iva Toguri had acquired, theoretically, another nationality, through marriage to a Portuguese national, Felipe D'Aquino, and will hereafter be referred to by her married name. She was treated by American authorities as a U.S. national, however. The army occupation forces arrested her in Yokohama early in September 1945 and jailed her for six months, then gave her an unconditional clearance of treason charges. A separate
"A steady drumfire of verbal abuse of the enemy was a substitute for victories in 1942."

Department of Justice investigation of her on the same suspicion then resulted in a second detention, followed again by clearance and release. The government dropped the case on October 21, 1946, on the grounds that the appellation "Tokyo Rose" being a composite, it was impossible to isolate any such individual. But during these periods of imprisonment she was never allowed counsel, and her husband was allowed to visit her a grand total of 20 minutes a month. In the meantime, after originally being held incommunicado, she was treated as a circus freak, subjected to inviolability. Betrayals from all manner of people, even American Congressmen, and even while she was bathing, in order that these gawking bumpkins might have a glimpse of the woman alleged to be the notorious "Tokyo Rose."

On December 3, 1948, the FBI announced it was searching for witnesses against Mrs. D'Aquino, but she was not re-arrested, as ordered by the Justice Department, until August 16, 1948, under circumstances which suggest that her exploitation for headlines was principally to blame. The trying of Iva Toguri D'Aquino in the newspapers and via opinion generated by radio bawlers was to proceed for over a year before legal proceedings actually took place. This should have had professional liberal civil rights watchdogs baying around the clock, but these vigilant protectors of the legal prerogatives of hardened criminals, Communists, and related ideologues were strangely silent. Nor were their legions of journalist allies any more watchful of the sacred "civil rights and constitutional liberties" of a fellow American-born citizen, who was still unproven of having done anything, to anyone, anywhere.

Segments of the opulent establishment press convicted her nearly a year before her trial began. The scurrilous lead national affairs article in Time on August 30, 1948, flatly called her a "traitor," scoffed at her story of why she went to Japan in 1941, while implying that her treasonous motivation antedated the war. But this vicious attack concealed as "news" admitted that she had been just one of more than a half dozen English-speaking Japanese girls on Radio Tokyo, and that there was no evidence that American servicemen had been disturbed by the "Tokyo Rose" broadcasts. (A poll of veterans in 1948 might have revealed that "Tokyo Rose," in toto, had far more admirers among their ranks than detractors.) Some sectors of the American press devoted to the welfare of Alger Hiss used the reopening of the "Tokyo Rose" case as a welcome relief and diversion from their chores involved in defense of the former, whose investigation before Congress was at a full peak at that moment. Many socially and financially prominent superliberals were undergoing bloody sweats in behalf of Hiss, probably their most dearly loved pet protege in this century. A penniless and nearly friendless girl of Japanese ancestry made an easy punching bag.

Clark Lee (INS) and Harry T. Brundidge (Hearst Cosmopolitan), two of the most mischievous headline hunters that the newspaper world loosed on Japan at the end of hostilities, were significant contributors to her dolors. (One should not miss the blistering review of Lee's memoirs — One Last Look Around — by Capt. P.J. Searles, in the New York Herald Tribune Weekly Book Review, June 8, 1947). The claim of Brundidge and Lee that they had a "confession" from Mrs. D'Aquino made to them at war's end was a prime item in the scurrying around that preceded the reopening of her case. The ominous part these reporters played in the proceedings will be examined later.

The other main cause of her rearrest was the ineffable Walter Winchell, who broadcast to the land through nearly a thousand radio stations that she had been released by American authorities in Japan (which was hardly news) after he heard a belated complaint about this from a woman whose son had been killed in the Pacific fighting. What the loss of this woman's son had do do with the status of Mrs. D'Aquino is an utter mystery, but it provides an example of the scope of the perpetuation of wartime vindictiveness. And it provided Winchell, with his obnoxious peephole sensationalist modus operandi, another opportunity to elevate nothing into something.

Under the impact of such trashy bus station and supermarket "literary" gos-sip-mongering and exacerbation of wartime hatreds the whole sorry process of "Tokyo Rose" was again dragged across the nation's consciousness. The combination of the Brundidge-Lee and Winchell effusions (plus that of Kate Smith), in addition to Brundidge's "cooperation" with the Justice Department, led to the reopening of the case by Attorney General Tom C. Clark (father of Ramsey Clark, of recent Hanoi fame). Attorney General Clark ordered her rearrest by the U.S. Army occupiers in Tokyo and her transport to San Francisco.

**THE TRIAL BEGINS**

On October 8, 1948, a Federal grand jury indictment for treason (during which irregularities took place that should have caused its dismissal) led to a decision on the part of the government to prosecute. Iva Toguri D'Aquino was front page news again. At first the grand jury refused to indict unless the officers under whose names she had worked, and whose scripts she had read, were also indicted. They settled for the single indictment when informed that they had no authority to indict military officers; the latter could only be court-martialed. (Cousens, tried in Australia, was acquitted of treason charges and promoted. In the United States, Ione was similarly promoted, and, as Phil Jordan, one of the most knowable students of the case, observed tartly, "with no nonsense about a court martial.")

First scheduled for May 16, 1949, in Federal Court in San Francisco, the trial did not get under way until July 5, Judge Michael J. Roche presiding. The jury consisted of six men and six women, all white Californians, selected in just two hours. Stanton Delaplane, covering the event for the San Francisco Chronicle, called special attention (in the July 5 issue) to the prosecution's eliminating all non-Caucasian potential jurors, employing eight of its peremptory challenges to eliminate six blacks, a Chinese-American, and another person of mixed ethnic origins. Others also gave this unusual government tactic close scrutiny, and during the trial and long after there were charges of intentional racism, heatedly denied by government spokesmen. But it could not be missed by many that an all-white jury was trying a Japanese-American in a state long known for its Japanophobic outrages and persisting psychology and sentiment, gravely inflamed by the recently concluded war. (It might be pointed out that the government subsequently segregated

"Iva Toguri encountered Major Cousens a full year after Allied soldiers in the Pacific had started calling Radio Tokyo women announcers 'Tokyo Rose.' "

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*February 1976*
"During her imprisonment she was never allowed counsel, and her husband was allowed to visit her a grand total of 20 minutes a month."

its witnesses, the Caucasians in one room and the Japanese in another, while they waited to testify.)

The prosecution was headed by Thomas De Wolfe, special assistant to Attorney General Clark, assisted by U.S. attorneys Frank J. Hennessey and John B. Hogan. De Wolfe was a specialist in treason trials, having already acted in the successful prosecution of American journalists Robert H. Best and Douglas Chandler, convicted for making wartime broadcasts from Germany.

Defense counsel was headed by Wayne M. Collins, aided by Theodore Tamba and George Olshausen, San Francisco attorneys, who served the defendant without pay. The performance of Collins in particular caused the prosecution many unhappy and uneasy days. He achieved such success in cross-examination of prosecution witnesses that there were few observers who believed the government had a case by the time it went to the jury.

By the time the trial began Mrs. D'Aquino, following her arrest in Tokyo on August 25, 1948, had been in jail or its equivalent another year. (It was unfortunate that an NEA telephoto was published in the daily newspapers all over the land in the early days of the trial showing Mrs. D'Aquino being escorted into the courtroom by a government policeman under appearance which suggested she was almost being dragged, though it would seem that it was due to being shot at a bad angle; however, the malicious may have preferred to view it on the obvious superficial merits.)

COURTROOM IRRGULARITIES
Some poorly explained things transpired during the "Tokyo Rose" trial. The first was the judge's denial of a defense motion to subpoena 34 witnesses in Japan, including even General Douglas MacArthur, the veritable American consul whose prestige and status rivalled anything ever achieved by Caesar in the Roman Empire. The court allowed the collection of depositions from witnesses in Japan, but the posting of pieces of paper could never match in drama and effect a live witness, no matter how informational the deposition, and no matter how dull, obtuse, or mendacious the witness.

The government, on the other hand, utilized witnesses brought in from Germany and Japan, including 19 Japanese citizens who were flown in first class from Tokyo (at a cost of $23,000) and were paid $10 a day for the duration of the trial, which exceeded 12 weeks. It was the testimony of two of these Japanese nationals, unsupported by an American citizen, who led to the conviction of Mrs. D'Aquino on a single count of treason.

Ultimately the government, which rejected defense efforts to bring in witnesses from Japan on the grounds that it did not have the money to pay for this, spared little expense in its own behalf, spending upwards of three-fourths of a million dollars to send Iva Toguri D'Aquino to jail. In addition, it undoubtedly went well beyond the million dollar mark in keeping her in jail for 74 months and paying for the multifarious bureaucratic maneuvers and capers which have been engaged in for over a quarter of a century in its ferocious offensive against a solitary citizen.

The defense was guilty of one serious lapse, as attorney Tamba was to recall later, in failing to realize that Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby was right in San Francisco, based on the Presidio, at the time of the trial. General Willoughby was chief of intelligence for the U.S. occupation forces in Japan in 1945-46, and supervised the Defense Department investigation which had dismissed treason charges against Iva Toguri D'Aquino at that time. He might have been a formidable witness for the defense, if not the deciding factor in the trial.

The government prosecution started out anxious to prove that she had volunteered to broadcast on Radio Tokyo and that she had committed treasonous acts. On the first day a former serviceman witness testified that he had gotten her autograph in 1945. But the fireworks did not commence until the second day, when Yukio Ikeda, wartime personnel director of Radio Tokyo, and Shigetsugu Tsuneishi, who directed the POW broadcasts on Zero Hour, testified for the prosecution. The latter asserted that no POWs were forced to broadcast pro-Japanese propaganda. But under cross-examination Tsuneishi expressed doubt that the "Tokyo Rose" broadcast amounted to anything effective in the propaganda field anyway, and further supported the accused by admitting she had been under duress to broadcast on the famed program. This particular ploy turned out to be one which went on all during the trial. The prosecution's attempt to show that the defendant had not acted under duress, and the countering of the defense to demonstrate that she had, proved unfruitful, as the witnesses were hopelessly contradictory on that subject, and on most others as well, all during the trial.

Clark Lee, testifying on July 14, followed Tsuneishi, who was on the stand four days. Lee made some headway for the prosecution when he recounted things which allegedly had been said to him in his 1945 interview with the defendant. It was also his testimony, and that of one Leslie Nakashima, which disclosed the sinister sensationalism of the former's colleague, Brundidge. Lee and Brundidge came into Tokyo on the heels of the occupying U.S. Marines, and immediately smelled a journalistic coup in the making if they could be the first to locate and interview the universally discussed "Tokyo Rose."

They soon found out that there were several possible candidates here, and it was purely coincidental that they ended up with Iva Toguri D'Aquino. Seeking help from Nakashima, a Domei employee, they got none. But Nakashima went to Radio Tokyo and consulted John Kenkichi Oki, production supervisor of the Zero Hour. Nakashima, testifying early in the first week of September, declared that Oki told him there was no such person as "Tokyo Rose," that there were several women who had been on Radio Tokyo record shows, and then for some unknown reason gave him Mrs. D'Aquino's name.

Unbashed by these complications, Lee asked Nakashima to find her for him and Brundidge, and to offer her $2,000 for a story in which she would admit that she was the "Tokyo Rose." It was never made clear whether she got any money, but these two opportunist reporters got a five-hour interview with her, and Lee clung to his earlier declaration that she had admitted what they had tried to get her to say. Under cross-examination Lee admitted that they had omitted from their story everything that might have been in her favor.

"Professional liberal civil rights watchdogs should have been baying around the clock but they were strangely silent."
The singular aspect of this little discourse was that Brundige, who was listed as a witness by the prosecution, was never called to testify, nor was he subpoenaed by the defense as a possible hostile witness. But he did not emerge from the legal scuffle unscathed. Since he had gone to Japan after the war to gather evidence for the prosecution, the defense argued that he was a government agent at least in part. And he was deeply involved in allegations and testimony that he had bribed or sought to bribe at least two people to testify against Mrs. D’Aquino at the grand jury proceedings. Along with the Yagi case, to be mentioned later, was a deposition from Japan by an Associated Press reporter, Toshikatsu Kodairi, that Brundige also tried to bribe him to testify falsely against the defendant. (In conclusion, ironically, Brundidge’s employer had ultimately refused to print his laboriously obtained and fanciful narrative.)

THE PROSECUTION’S “EVIDENCE”
The most damaging witnesses against Mrs. D’Aquino, however, proved to be Oki, and his associate, George Mitsuhio, chief of the “Front Line” section of Radio Tokyo which produced Zero Hour. Testifying during the third week of July, both men stubbornly stuck to a declaration that they had seen or heard her broadcasting the false news report concerning the alleged American naval losses in the Leyte Gulf battle in October 1944, of which more will be said later. This was No. VI of the indictment, the only part on which she was convicted.

These two witnesses deserve extra attention. Oki, born in Sacramento, had played football at New York University and was married to one of the female broadcasters on Radio Tokyo, known during the war as the “Saturday night party girl.” Mitsuhio, born in San Francisco, had gone to Japan in the years before the war, like Oki. Both subsequently renounced their U.S. citizenship. It was an additional touch of irony that it was to be their testimony that brought about the conviction of a Japanese-American who did not renounce her U.S. citizenship.

Undoubtedly both were under tremendous pressure to testify the way the prosecution wished, and were surely subject at least to psychic intimidation by FBI investigators, since they could have been rung in on treason charges themselves through a little expert rigging. Their dogged maintenance that the fateful news cast had been uttered by the defendant made defense counsel suspicious. Collins pounded Mitsuhio especially, drawing an admission that the latter had memorized the indictment. At one time he supported seven of the eight counts thereon, but ultimately fell back on No. VI, which position he did not desert.

Mitsuhio’s mechanical repetition of the legalese of the indictment led to additional questioning from Collins, and eventually drew from him the admission that he had received a copy from the prosecutor, De Wolfe, two weeks before testifying, and that he had kept it until three days before taking the stand. The men further undermined each other’s credibility by giving contradictory testimony as to the ultimate purpose of the Zero Hour program, on which subject they were the experts. But the damage had been done.

The performance of Mitsuhio in particular smacked of witness-coaching, and other performances on the stand reinforced this defense contention. Shijiro Igarashi, a Radio Tokyo broadcaster who testified in the sixth week of the trial, had previously told defense counsel on April 22, 1949, in Japan that Mrs. D’Aquino had never made any statement on the air concerning alleged American naval sinkings at Leyte Gulf. But on the stand in San Francisco he reversed his statement. When challenged on this by Collins, Igarashi replied, “At that time my memory was confused,” to which Collins countered in cutting words, “And now it’s much better, isn’t it?” Harris Sugiyama, another prosecution witness, also admitted that his memory had been “refreshed” since he had arrived in San Francisco to testify.

An interesting footnote was later added to the story of Oki and Mitsuhio. Jordan, who along with retired U.S. Army Col. John Juji Hada, is probably the best informed man alive on the ramifications of the “Tokyo Rose” affair, related in the Pacific Citizen (December 21-28, 1973) that attorney Tamba had once told him of being approached during a noon recess by a witness brought to the court from Japan, but who was never allowed to testify, one Seizu Huga. Huga told Tamba that the two men testifying to the alleged treasonable act by Mrs. D’Aquino were lying, and that if called to the stand and cross-examined, he would say so, and present evidence in support of his charge which would make the prosecution’s case collapse. But Huga never made the stand; he was sent back to Japan a few hours after being seen talking to Tamba.

From then on it was downhill for prosecutor De Wolfe. His witnesses tended to go from bad to worse under cross-examination by Collins, especially when the government started calling Americans. Dale Kramer, a 1945 reporter for the service magazine Yank, testified that Mrs. D’Aquino did not use the name “Tokyo Rose” (but then, neither did anyone else). He did cite a script in which she called herself “Orphan Ann” (Cousens later explained that the “Ann” was short for “announcer,” and that the remainder was related to the popular song about this popular American comic strip in the daily newspapers.

Particularly damaging to the prosecution’s case was an FBI agent named Frederick Tillman, who, though a prosecution witness, told the court that the defendant had told him that she construed her purpose on Zero Hour to be one of making the program entertaining while reducing its effectiveness as propaganda. He further testified under cross-examination to the frantic efforts Mrs. D’Aquino had made to try to get back to the U.S. before the war broke out, information contained in the 12-page statement she had made for him in Sugamo Prison on April 30, 1946, prior to her second release by American authorities.

The bomb, however, was dropped by Tillman under cross-examination when he admitted that Hiromu Yagi, a Japan Travel Bureau agent and a government witness, had confessed to him that he was bribed to testify falsely against Mrs. D’Aquino before the grand jury which indicted her. (Even the New York Times published this sensational material, July 28, 1949, p. 4.)

“TREASONOUS” ACTS
The day before this damaging admission by Tillman, the prosecution had put on the stand two counterintelligence

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“A penniless and nearly friendless girl of Japanese ancestry made an easy punching bag.”
agents, one of them Maj. James T. Reitz, who had been a captain in the CIC in Tokyo in September 1945, but who had to be brought to San Francisco from his new assignment in Germany. Major Reitz identified a package of radio scripts which had been turned over to him by Sgt. Merritt Page, also of the CIC, in Tokyo. And Page, now employed with the Veterans' Administration in Pittsburgh, followed Reitz to the stand and declared that the scripts had been given to him by Mrs. D'Aquino in the Grand Hotel in Tokyo, at which time Page said she had told him that she did not believe she had done anything treasonous.

The proceedings here were not very supportive of the prosecution either, since it would have been strange behavior on the part of anyone believing themselves to be traitorous to volunteer the evidence upon which such a verdict might be secured. This would be self-incrimination of the most suspicious sort. The counter-intelligence sleuths were also helping out the defense.

A third witness that same day (July 26), another former reporter for Yank, James J. Keeney, supported the previous testimony of his colleague Kramer, declaring that the defendant had also confirmed to him the part of the Australian POW, Cousins, in getting her the job on Zero Hour. And under cross-examination by Collins, Keeney stated that Mrs. D'Aquino had denied that she ever broadcast to American servicemen that their wives and sweethearts were "going out with other men." (That they had done so could have been established on a grand scale; therefore, if Mrs. D'Aquino had made such a statement, how she could have been considered traitorously for simply reporting a common social fact of wartime American life is truly a mystery.)

Probably the most persuasive of the defense tactics was to emphasize that the government was trying to prove that the defendant was each of the several women broadcasters on Radio Tokyo during World War II, and was not interested in learning who they all were. The defense maintained Mrs. D'Aquino was a victim of mistaken identity, and being blamed for the words of others. There is no doubt that the testimony by the defendant and others — that there were several other women involved in the Zero Hour broadcasting, whom careless or malicious people had lumped together as a single person — had something to do with the change in approach by the prosecution. (The composite nature of "Tokyo Rose" had been generally admitted as far back as when Iva Toguri D'Aquino had originally been apprehended — see New York Times, September 1 and 6, 1945; October 22, 1946.)

Defense counsel made hash out of the prosecution's witnesses who testified to hearing Mrs. D'Aquino while stationed at widely separated geographical locations. Radio Tokyo had 20 transmitters, broadcasting from several places in Japan, and at the height of Japanese expansion in the South Pacific had some 200 radio outlets, covering parts of four time zones. Further complications grew out of the testimony of radio expert Kisamu Monotauka, who stated that a number of broadcasts were made, at the same time and on the same frequencies, from Tokyo and from transmitters located in other Far East cities, so it was possible to hear a number of women on the air at the same time.

Collins encouraged ex-servicemen to state categorically having heard Mrs. D'Aquino at a specific hour, and then would demonstrate that they had been located at a spot from one to three hours off from Tokyo time, and therefore could have heard the defendant.

"The defense suspected that the recordings were suppressed by the Government and provided evidence which would in fact prove the defendant innocent."
Ince, corroborating Cousins' stand, reiterated his distrust of all Japanese connected with the Zero Hour show, whether native or U.S.-born, resulting in his not allowing any information of any significance to get in their hands. Cousins was on the stand a long time, but despite De Wolfe's persistent effort to stick to his blanket denial that she had said any of the things the prosecution alleged.

The government had a little better luck with Reyes, the remaining member of the Zero Hour trio, who testified for four days in the eighth week of the trial. Reyes was now a student at Vanderbilt University. De Wolfe, who treated Reyes in a shabby and contemptuous way, succeeded in pointing out that in statements he had given the FBI in October 1948, he had contradicted in part what Cousins and Ince said previously. But Reyes insisted that he had been intimidated into signing these statements after 20 hours of questioning in four separate sessions. Reyes further observed that while being questioned he could see the dimensions of the case being built against Mrs. D'Aquino, and thought that, if established, he could be subjected to a similar trial if returned to the Philippines. He further asserted while on the stand that FBI interrogators had threatened to turn him over to Philippine counterintelligence.

There was a succession of other defense witnesses, including one J.F. Whitten who testified that he had heard "Tokyo Rose" in 1942, long before the employment of Mrs. D'Aquino, and the defendant's husband, Felipe D'Aquino, who declared that she had made public statements in Japan predicting Japanese defeat, or had lauded an American victory. Then Mrs. D'Aquino took the stand herself September 7, 8, and 9. On these three days she repeated many of the facts appearing at the start of this account, again denying ever making political commentary. She called attention once more to the other female announcers on Radio Tokyo, while restating her record of friendly and helpful association with the various prisoners of war.

Just prior to her testimony, depositions by persons in Japan were introduced, one from the defendant's landlady, Mrs. Funane Kido, which quoted Mrs. D'Aquino saying "Japan hasn't a chance in the world of winning the war" (the defendant lived with Mrs. Kido from October 1944, to September 1945), while one Ken Murayama declared that the scripts which "sought to create homesickness among Allied troops" had been written by him for Myrtle Liston, a Philippine national, who had been known as "Manila Rose."

Nethertheless, the prosecutor, De Wolfe, was described in an Associated Press story on September 14 as having subjected Mrs. D'Aquino to a "hammering crossfire," which went on for three days, seeking by this pounding to get her to admit that she had been employed to make American servicemen in the Pacific homesick. But he failed to get her to admit anything.

CROWNING IRREGULARITY

The defense made its final argument on September 21; the government's summation was completed on September 23. The jury was charged and began its deliberations, and after four days, on the evening of September 29, the Associated Press reported that "a somewhat reluctant Federal court jury" had found Iva Toguri D'Aquino guilty of treason on a single one of the eight counts. The jury foreman, John W. Mann of Oakland, was quoted as saying that the jury would have liked to acquit the defendant, but "we did the only thing we thought possible under the judge's instructions." To critics of the trial, these instructions were simply the crowning irregularity in a trial which blossomed with irregularities.

A private poll of the reporters covering the trial had resulted in a 9 to 1 vote for acquittal. When told this, Mann replied that the jury was of about the same sentiment. At one time it had only one flatly that the trial had "resulted in more instances of reversible error than any other trial in American judicial history."

The appeals court, however, ignored the cumulative effect of the errors cited, maintaining that no single one which was admitted to have taken place was sufficiently serious to warrant a reversal of the verdict.

So ended the longest and most expensive treason trial in U.S. history at that time, lasting over 12 weeks, totalling 56 courtroom days, and 40 hours of deliberation by the jury covering a period of four days. During the trial the prosecution had called up 46 witnesses, the defense, 25, and depositions had been filed from 19 witnesses who remained in Japan.

On October 1 the Alameda (California) Times Star editorially called for a new trial, on the grounds that the exclusion of nonwhites from the jury and the judge's pressure on the jury to come to a verdict were prejudicial. The logic of Judge Roche's position, it appeared to them, was that there was a price tag on justice.

Hada, who resumed his education after retiring from the Army, submitted a master's degree thesis to the history faculty at the University of San Francisco in May 1973 titled "The Indictment and Trial of Iva Ikuko Toguri D'Aquino — Tokyo Rose." It was 200 pages in length with appendices totalling another 200, and Hada concluded that the case had been "studded with bribery, perjury, kidnaping, unlawful imprisonment, destruction of records," and that the defendant was "a casualty of our judicial system which failed to protect her fundamental rights."

It was fitting that the "Tokyo Rose" trial should terminate a short while after Owen Cunningham, a Des Moines lawyer who had served as defense counsel to the Japanese ambassador to Germany, Oechima, in one of the lamentable "war crimes" trials, told a Lincoln, Nebraska Bar Association audience that Oechima's trial had been a "comedy of errors."

THE DAMNING EVIDENCE

The striking thing about the vast efforts and expenditures of the prosecution was the miserable tidbit of material it used to send Mrs. D'Aquino to jail for 10 years and fine her $10,000. Its vainglorious brandishing of 340 recordings, deflated to 18, then to 13, to 8, and finally to 6, was then pinched down to a mere 25 words allegedly uttered on a single one! This
ridiculous progression downward indicates the malicious zeal of the prosecution and the frantic clutching at anything to justify its sensational charges.

The words which were ultimately decided to be "treasonous" consisted of the following, spoken after the naval battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944:

"Now you fellows have lost all your ships. You are really orphans of the Pacific. How do you think you are going to get home?"

And it was on the say-so of Japanese nationals Oki and Mitsushio that they were credited to Mrs. D'Aquino. No one thought it strange that not a single U.S. citizen had presented evidence of treason that the court would accept.

In view of the outpourings of procommunist billingsgate issued by Americans from Hanoi during the Vietnam war which hardly drew a rebuke, what was used to send Iva Toguri D'Aquino to jail under heavy fine was a laughable travesty. (And for the government to maintain, and for any member of the jury to believe, that any American would take credence in a news broadcast to the effect that their entire fleet had been sunk was a towering insult to the intelligence of even the least gifted member of the entire American armed forces.) But in this manner was the government's brontosaurus reduced to the size of a gnat.

Prosecutor De Wolfe's smug dictum that the jury's verdict was "a just one for the United States" contained an overtone of panic. Obviously, there were people of high political rank who wanted this woman convicted, even on the flimsiest evidence, which turned out to be the case. That a jury should consider the 25 words on which their decision hinged "sufficiently damaging to American morale to constitute treason" was a rationalization of the weakest and most pathetic kind.

Why the government was so anxious to convict Mrs. D'Aquino is still puzzling, however. It might be laid to the motive of indulging in additional vengeance against a defeated enemy, which surely was behind most of the preposterous "war crimes" trials. But Mrs. D'Aquino was a native-born American, which the prosecution spent much time firmly planting on the record. The reasons for the persistent harrassment and repeated jailing of this woman, until a long and expensive trial could be engineered to lodge her in a cell even longer, may take much time to unravel.

"No one thought it strange that not a single U.S. citizen had presented evidence of treason that the court would accept."

FRUITLESS APPEALS

Attorney Collins denounced Mrs. D'Aquino's conviction as "absolutely erroneous -- unsupportable by any credible testimony." His efforts to undo this lamentable proceedings began immediately, and, to the surprise of many, his labors to gain for his client a full presidential pardon continued until his death on July 16, 1974. A reporter, interviewing him, his colleague Tamba (who preceded him in death, in December 1973), and Mrs. D'Aquino in San Francisco in the summer of 1973, related that her lawyers continue to stand by her after 23 years, and insist that she is innocent of treason. Moreover, they charge that she was and is the victim of public hysteria, racial discrimination, and political vengeance by postwar American officials. "Without any question," said Collins angrily, "she should be pardoned and compensated by Congress."

It was expected that the court would deny defense motions for a new trial. Following the sentencing, an appeal was filed and Mrs. D'Aquino's release on bail was sought. Federal District Court denied bail shortly after the appeal was filed. (Only convicted Stalinist spies such as Judith Coplon seemed to deserve release on bail.) Mrs. D'Aquino's sentence began November 3, 1949, and she was transferred from San Francisco on November 15 to start her prison term in the facility at Alderson, West Virginia.

"Judicial processes do not take place in a social void," cautioned Professor Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., in his introduction to Joughin's and Morgan's The Legacy of Sacco and Vanzetti. But at the time he wrote that, he and legions of his fellow liberals were part of a dominant climate of opinion which reflected little more than smug self-satisfaction at what was happening to Iva Toguri D'Aquino, for to protest on their part would have cast a shadow on a portion of the propaganda of what had been acclaimed boastfully by Stanley High as "The Liberals' War."

 Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, in February 1960, conceded that the issue of whether Mrs. D'Aquino had had a fair trial and been the beneficiary of proper legal guarantees was a debatable one, but in general the legal establishment supported the outcome of the 1949 trial. Mrs. D'Aquino appealed her conviction in September of that year, and the appeal was argued in March 1961. A U.S. Circuit Court upheld her conviction on October 10, 1961. When she asked the appeals court to reconsider her appeal rejection, a rehearing was denied December 17. When the case was taken to the Supreme Court, the appeal was rejected April 28, 1952, and on April 6, 1963, the Supreme Court barred any further review of the case.

TRAITOR OR ALIEN?

But the matter was not ended, nor were the travails of Mrs. D'Aquino over. On January 28, 1956, she was freed from Federal prison after serving more than six years of her original sentence. Justice Department officials literally met her on the steps of the prison and forced her to sign an alien registration card, informing her that she would be deported as an undesirable alien. (Only then did the American Civil Liberties Union begin to get into the act.) There was a basic contradiction here: an alien cannot be tried for treason, and a native-born American cannot be deported. The government wanted to scramble these: for the purposes of the treason trial, the prosecution had been tireless in its concentration on her U.S. citizenship, but after her conviction wished to view her as a deportable alien.

Now the Immigration Service appeared on the scene, announcing their decision to try to have her deported, though they admitted having no precedent for de-naturalizing and deporting a native-born citizen. There was a law passed in 1940 which stipulated that a U.S. national, whether by birth or naturalization, would be deprived of American nationality upon conviction for treason, but the geniuses who put this together did not make clear how a native-born person could be deported anywhere. Mrs. D'Aquino had not come from Japan. If she was to be sent there, then the Immigration Service was apparently going to invoke an ethnic clause of their own invention, which would imply immense consequences for the future.

"The 'Tokyo Rose' case, like all treason cases, is as much political as it is legal."

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The press was miffed that she showed "no repentance" upon release from prison, and reporters were not charmed by her pluck in her announced decision to fight deportation. She was now living in Chicago, and government authorities restricted her movement to a 50-mile radius of that city. By now there were people in the country who thought the government was rubbing things in and demonstrating malice beyond normal expectations. An American Legion post in Springfield, Ohio, a most unlikely source of support, even urged the President, now Mr. Eisen- hower, to pardon her. A month later the immigration authorities ordered her to leave the United States voluntarily within a month or face deportation, again not too sure where she could be sent.

Then the ice floe began to melt a bit. The following month, April 12, 1956, she was permitted to move to San Francisco again, where her deportation hearing was supposed to begin on April 26. But the hearing never took place. The matter dragged on and on for two years, the government finally dropping the deportation efforts on July 10, 1958.

But the threat of it being reopened remains. And if Mrs. D'Aquino were to leave the country voluntarily, there exists the possibility that she would not be allowed to return. The Federal bureaucracy still houses people who are embar-

rassed by the continuation of this case. And the venom has abated little in some circles 25 years after the trial. In an interview in the summer of 1973 published in the Christian Science Monitor, Mrs. D'Aquino remarked, "Everytime the case is recalled in the papers, I seem to hear from every maniac in the country—everything from marriage proposals to death threats."

Meanwhile, the pursuit of Iva Toguri D'Aquino has continued through six consecutive presidential administrations. Though the zealous government watchdogs who are supposed to save us from crime fail to apprehend thousands of murderers, and flagrant Mafia and syndicate goons and mobsters successfully evade prosecution and make off with billions, the former still have the energy, manpower, and resources to continue to vex and torment the principal in this sorry account. As late as the closing weeks of 1972, agents of the Nixon regime were busily at work attaching her wages to collect $5,255 she still owed as a result of the fine assessed against her in the summer of 1949. Her request for a hearing as a preliminary to getting Federal authorities to stop this continued looting of her income at the source was denied by an imperious panel of Federal judges in Chicago on November 15, 1972. It should be pointed out that deliberately neglecting to pay the fine in full was a defense counsel's tactic with which the defendant cooperated, solely for the objective of keeping the case open, which, incidentally, still happens to be the situation, as of the end of the summer of 1975.

The "Tokyo Rose" case, like all treason cases, is as much political as it is legal. It is one more illustration that the word "treason" is far more a political term than it is anything else, and is always subjectively defined and applied by whatever power element happens to be in control of the machinery of the State. In all cases they seek to interpret "treason" in harmony with their own interests while trying to conceal it all behind the majestic spook of "national interest." Looking back at the "Tokyo Rose" proceedings from the vantage point of a generation, it is obvious why the entire affair has become, in the minds of an increasing number, a circumstance in which, (1) the trial was a lamentable succession of events which cumulatively amounted to a glaring miscarriage of justice, and, (2) the whole proceedings of the government, beginning even before the grand jury indictment, was primarily a glittering press agent's spectacle aimed at trying the personification of a World War II soldier's legend, not a person with civil and constitutional rights, and was therefore little more than a grandiose technical frameup. ☐

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Reason 15
FDR's Watergate: Pearl Harbor

Percy L. Greaves Jr.

Watergate is now a synonym for political pollution. It symbolizes the corruption inherent in all distended political power. Nixon and his henchmen have been exposed. History will record their infamy. Franklin D. Roosevelt, his New Deal, and his war cabinet escaped such exposure. Unfortunately, there are still folks who consider these warmongering corrupters of the free society to be heroes who rescued us from a depression as well as from Hitler's national socialism. As a result, we are still treading further down the national socialist path toward the complete destruction of the economic freedom on which American greatness was built.

Political intervention and corruption certainly predated the New Deal. It was the New Dealers, however, who rewrote the Constitution so as to permit Washington to print unlimited quantities of paper money and issue endless regulations of our daily lives. F.D.R. was not one to admit failure. As each domestic New Deal intervention failed to produce the desired results, he would divert public attention with an announcement of some daring new intervention. With as many unemployed in 1939 as when he took office, he tried a new tack—intervention in international affairs. Like Hitler, F.D.R. decided to divert attention from his domestic failures by blaming some "foreign devils."

The complicities, duplicities and mendacities that took us into World War II are far more complex than those of Watergate. There are some similarities, however. In both cases the President surrounded himself with bright young men who became blind followers of the "great man" as well as some who were infused with a self-righteous lust for improving the world by imposing their ideas on those who did not agree with them. In their view, their leader had all the right answers and the opposition had to be squelched by any means available.

The 1945-46 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, with all its exhibits, ran to 45 volumes. There was much duplication and irrelevant petitfogery, while officialdom was successful in suppressing much that was highly relevant. Files could not be released. Key witnesses got sick and others were kept from appearing. For 30 years now, significant tidbits of pertinent data have emerged in private memoirs and foreign government releases. A full documented story would run to many volumes. Attempts to suppress the full truth would take many more.

It should be noted, however, that the wartime "coverup" was actually legitimate. The U.S. government could not let the Japanese know it was reading their codes. Actually, the Pacific war was largely won with the help of the decoded Japanese messages—their top admiral was thus shot down and U.S. attacks were concentrated on their revealed strag ships and weak spots. With V-J Day, all legitimate need for any further coverup vanished. Nevertheless, the administration remained adamant in its coverup efforts. With the majority of Congress and the press on its side, the administration was far more successful than Mr. Nixon and his loyal cohorts. There was then no TV to expose to the general public the details and evasions that became evident to the few spectators able to jam the Senate Caucus Room each day.

A short article cannot tell the whole story. It can only present a brief summary of what is now known. That should be...
sufficient to revise the common misconceptions of this calamity.

RUSSIA VS. JAPAN

Like other historical events, the Pearl Harbor story proceeds out of prior events. In this case, we must start with two little considered facts. The first is the long existing rivalry of Japan and Russia for economic dominance, if not total political control, of Manchuria and large areas of China. Russia desired warm water ports in areas capable of helping with her development of Siberia. Japan needed a source of raw materials, a market for her cheap mass-produced goods, and a larger land area for her growing population.

The second is that after 1917 this rivalry became a contest between a basically communist country and a relatively capitalist country. Japan, aping the United States, was being westernized and felt she had a sort of "Monroe Doctrine" over noncommunist Asia. In wars with China (1894-95) and Russia (1904-5), Japan won economic concessions in Manchuria and northern China. She had brought relative prosperity to those areas, while the bulk of China remained plagued with marauding war generals whose plundering activities made industrial development impossible and agricultural production rather risky.

Ever since the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1900), the Western powers had generally recognized that no existing Chinese government was capable of protecting foreign interests in China. The Western powers thus informally protected the lives and property of each other's citizens. Japan considered herself a member of this group. In this atmosphere, the "Commissaries" stirred up animosities against the capitalist-leaning Japanese. This inevitably led to the Manchurian incident of 1931. Japan sent troops to protect her interests. She fully expected the Western powers to be sympathetic to her cause. Undoubtedly, some Japanese Army hotheads went beyond acceptable standards in their attempts to quell the anti-Japanese and anticapitalistic feelings that the "Commissaries" had aroused.

STIMSON'S ROLE

At that time the U.S. Secretary of State was Henry L. Stimson, a man with a long and checkered career. He started out as a trustbusting district attorney under Teddy Roosevelt. Later, as Secretary of War under President Taft, he participated in an Army imbroglio. Then, under President Coolidge, he stirred up trouble in Nicaragua before being appointed Commissioner General of the Philippine Islands. At that time, he wrote a relative: "I am Governor General and an Oriental Potentate. All I have to do is express a wish and it is taken as the law of the Medes and Persians."

He considered himself a sort of godfather of the Filipinos. Feeling that they needed protection from Japan, he opposed their freedom from the United States. In 1929 he accepted President Hoover's appointment as Secretary of State, as a means to protect the Philippines and all of Asia from the nation he hated—Japan. When the Manchurian incident developed, he asked President Hoover to threaten Japan. The Secretary of War advised that this might mean war. President Hoover felt and stated that this country would not go to war over the Far East.

Secretary Stimson then turned his attention to the League of Nations, to which the U.S. did not belong. He persuaded the League to appoint the Lytton Commission to investigate the incident. He then placed one of his lackeys, Frank R. McCoy, on this Commission to dominate it. The Commission found Japan at fault in Manchuria and Stimson persuaded the League to adopt the report. Whereupon Japan, dismayed, walked out of the League. Thus, Mr. Stimson played a key role in opening the breach between Japan and the Western nations.

After the 1932 election of Franklin D. Roosevelt, there was considerable bitterness between the outgoing and incoming Presidents. Nevertheless, Stimson went to Hyde Park to sell Roosevelt his anti-Japanese policies. On March 4, 1933, Mr. Stimson ostensively retired to private life. He kept his Washington estate, however, visiting it frequently for intimate chats with the anti-Japanese clique he had placed in the State Department. He kept on very friendly terms with the new Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and had occasional lunches with the President. As late as May 1940, he lunched with F.D.R. to check on his anti-Japanese sympathies.

F.D.R.'S Duplicity

About this time, F.D.R. decided that this country and the world could not get along without his continuing leadership. He decided to break the two-term tradition. To win, he sought a unified country. He asked the 1936 Republican Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates to join his Cabinet. Mr. Landon refused, but Mr. Knox accepted and became F.D.R.'s Secretary of Navy.

While looking for a prominent Republican to replace his antia war Secretary of War, Mr. Roosevelt read in the New York Times of June 19, 1940, an account of a radio speech given by Mr. Stimson entitled "America's Interest in the British Fleet." That afternoon he phoned Mr. Stimson and invited him to join his Cabinet as Secretary of War. Before accepting, Stimson made sure that F.D.R. was in sympathy with his prowar policies. F.D.R. assured him he was. Shortly after Stimson's confirmation, an embargo was put on shipments of aviation gas to Japan. From then on, the United States rushed pell-mell into war, although for some months the voting public was told otherwise.

During the 1940 election campaign Mr. Roosevelt posed as the apostle of peace. Typical of his campaign speeches were such words as these on October 23, 1940:

To Republicans and Democrats, to every man, woman and child in the nation, I say this: Your President and your Secretary of State are following the road to peace.

We are arming ourselves not for any foreign war.

We are arming ourselves not for any purpose of conquest or intervention in foreign disputes. I repeat again that I stand on the Platform of our Party:

We will not participate in foreign wars and we will not send our army, naval or air forces to fight in foreign lands outside of the Americas except in case of attack.

It is for peace that I have labored; and it is for peace that I shall labor all the days of my life.

A week later he phrased it:

I give you one more assurance. I have said before, but I shall say it again and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.

In closing his campaign, the Saturday before election, he told the electorate: "Your President says this country is not going to war."

Meanwhile, behind closed doors, the British were being assured that help would come after the elections. The Government then operated on a "cash and carry" neutrality basis. The French had fallen and the British were running out of money. Without British orders, millions of Americans would lose their jobs. So in his first press conference after the election, F.D.R. proposed what was later known as Lend Lease. While Congress was debating and passing this legislation, British officers were secretly meeting in Washington with top U.S. military personnel to coordinate war plans. Secret unconstitutional agreements were reached which were later approved and put into effect.

ON OUR WAY

On May 27, 1941, F.D.R. proclaimed an unlimited national emergency. On June 22, Germany invaded Russia and shortly thereafter Lend Lease aid was extended to the U.S.'s newly-acquired "peace-loving" Communist allies. On July 7, the United States occupied Iceland.

After the fall of France, chaos broke...
"Unlike Nixon, Franklin D. Roosevelt, his New Deal, and his war cabal have escaped exposure."

out in French Indochina. Worried about her rice supply, Japan requested permission of the Vichy French to occupy that area. On July 21, the powerless French acquiesced. This infuriated Messrs. Hull, Stimson and Roosevelt. On July 25, the United States froze all Japanese assets in the United States and the following day the British followed suit.

That same day, July 26, F.D.R. initiated a new policy for the Far East. He nationalized the Philippine armed forces, and placed General MacArthur in charge of the Far East forces. Up until that time, it had been thought that a war in the Far East meant the loss of the Philippines. With the new four-engine B-17 bombers, however, Washington officials felt the U.S. could not only defend the Philippines against attack, but that it could also initiate a pincer movement against Japan if the Russians would permit American use of Vladivostock or Kamchatka airfields. It was thought that U.S. planes flying across Japan could knock her out in short order. This plan was assigned first call on all available B-17's. As new ones became available they were rushed to the Philippines along with those previously assigned to the Hawaiian islands.

Alarmed about events, F.D.R. asked Churchill to meet him off Argentina, Newfoundland. The British Prime Minister brought with him an ultimatum which he asked F.D.R. to send Japan. While this was the major subject of the conversations, a "coverup" of such collusion was considered necessary. Upon F.D.R.'s return, the American public was given pictures of Churchill and Roosevelt attending church on a battleship and was told the main business was the drafting of the "Atlantic Charter" and the Four Freedoms.

CONGRESS OPPOSED WAR

Official Australian papers now tell us:

In private conference, however, Roosevelt indicated to Churchill that because he was uncertain that he could carry Congress with him in a declaration of war, and because more time was needed to strengthen America's forces, he must seek to delay a break with Japan. He nevertheless agreed to issue a warning, also on the lines of a Churchill draft, that any further Japanese encroachment in the south-west Pacific would produce a situation in which the United States would be compelled to take counter-measures, even though these might lead to war. Though Churchill had hoped for more, he was well pleased.

Upon his return to Washington, Mr. Roosevelt summoned the Japanese Ambassador and then sent this secret message to Churchill:

On August 17, I sent for the Japanese Ambassador and the Secretary of State and I received him. I made to him a statement covering the position of this government with respect to the taking by Japan of further steps in the direction of military domination by force along the lines of the proposed statement such as you and I had discussed. The statement I made to him was no less vigorous than and was substantially similar to the statement we had discussed.

Meanwhile in both Japan and the United States there was an increasing debate between their respective "peace parties" and "war parties." The peace group was in power in Japan and they made every effort to come to amicable terms with the United States, which refused all their overtures. Their Prime Minister offered to meet with President Roosevelt. Messrs. Stimson and Hull were violently opposed to such a meeting. They were afraid Mr. Roosevelt might weaken and come to terms with Japan. So this attempt for an amicable settlement was squashed. This failure led to the fall of the Japanese Cabinet and the tide turned with their war Minister becoming Prime Minister.

In Washington, the economic squeeze was being tightened on Japan. F.D.R. was receiving regular visits from a Naval Intelligence officer with the latest estimates of Japan's supplies of vital materials. This officer, reading the Japanese equivalent of the Congressional Record, knew from the subsidies paid how much oil and other vital raw materials Japan had in storage. (After the war this officer checked and found that his estimate of Japan's oil was off by only about two percent.) From these data, he could advise F.D.R. how well his strangulation policy was working. He could also estimate how soon and in what direction Japan would have to move for her survival. In the fall of 1941, F.D.R. thus knew that Japan would soon have to strike out for the oil of the Dutch East Indies.

WASHINGTON READS JAPANESE SECRETS

With Japan considered the "enemy," U.S. cryptographers concentrated their efforts on breaking the top Japanese diplomatic code. In August 1940, they succeeded. From that time on, U.S. officials read all messages between Tokyo and Japanese diplomats all over the world. Early in 1941, over the objections of the Navy Department, this capacity was given to the British. Secretary Hull didn't find this out until some time later and was much provoked to learn that the British had been reading all the details of U.S. negotiations with the Japanese. It should be noted, however, that the British gave the U.S. Government access to some German codes in exchange.

The U.S. had been reading a lesser Japanese code, their Consular Code, for quite some time. On September 24, Tokyo requested the Japanese Consul in Honolulu to start reporting on the location of American warships in Pearl Harbor. This message was picked up in Hawaii and mailed to Washington, but was not decoded and read until October 9. Other messages in this series, known as the "bomb plot" messages, were similarly delayed. The November 29 message, read in Washington on December 5, said:

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

One sent on December 2 was not read until after the attack. It read:

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers and cruisers is of the utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons over Pearl Harbor or whether there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advice (sic) me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

None of this information was ever sent to the Hawaiian commanders, nor were their intelligence men asked to decode these messages. U.S. cryptographers in Hawaii were then actively trying to break the Japanese Navy code. Every day dozens of important messages were read in Washington, but little, if any, pertinent information was passed on to the Hawaiian commanders. There were some who felt this dereliction was purposeful.

NEEGLING JAPAN WITH THE FLEET

The Pacific Fleet had been sent out to Hawaii for its 1940 maneuvers, expecting
to return shortly to the west coast. F.D.R. kept it there. Adm. Jo Richardson returned to Washington twice, advising that the Fleet be brought back to the west coast. He informed F.D.R. that it wasn’t equipped for war, lacked adequate protection, and in case of war would have to return to the west coast to be properly fitted out. Admiral Richardson was relieved. All top Army and Navy officers were thus put on notice that their professional training and understanding must bow to the wishes of their amateur Commander in Chief who believed he was threatening the Japanese. Admiral Kimmel assumed command early in 1941. He spent all of 1941 training new men and requesting material needed for the defense of the Fleet. Needless to say he did not get it.

While the Fleet was in Pearl Harbor, it was the Army’s duty to protect it. General Short had this assignment. He, too, requested materiel time and time again for the protection of the Fleet and of the Islands. Those in Washington thought it more important to give available supplies to the British, the Chinese, and the Russian Communists. As a consequence, Hawaii lacked the radar, reconnaissance planes, and anti-aircraft guns it needed to protect the Fleet. The needs of others were considered more important than the safety of the needlessly exposed U.S. Fleet.

As November 1941 opened, Secretary of State Hull feared a tough stand with Japan might lead to war. He asked the advice of those in charge of the U.S. Army and Navy. Secretary of War Stimson, while anxious to go to war with Japan, wanted to put it off until at least February, by which time he thought he would have enough troops and planes in the Philippines to make short shrift of the Japanese, so he was willing to bid for time.

On November 3, 1941, the Joint Army and Navy Board, with 25 top Army, Navy, and Air Corps officers present, met behind closed doors. Its minutes show that it opened with a statement:

that on August 17th the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression. . . . Hull was of the opinion there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan, if we can’t back them up and he desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings by the State Department. . . . Admiral Ingersoll felt that the State Department was under the impression that Japan could be defeated in military action in a few weeks. General Marshall felt the information he had indicated the Japanese authorities might be expecting to decide upon the national policy by November 5th. He emphasized the danger of moving Army Air Forces away from the Philippines. . . . It was his belief that by the middle of December the Army Forces in the Philippines would be of an impressive strength and this of itself would have a deterrent effect on Japanese operations. . . . Until powerful U.S. forces had been built up in the Far East, it would take some very clever diplomacy to save the situation. . . . U.S. policy should be to make certain minor concessions which the Japanese could use in saving face. These concessions might be a relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar trade restrictions.

**MILITARY OPPOSES SECOND ULTIMATUM**

Following these discussions, the Board adopted a proposal that:

the War and Navy Departments prepare a memorandum for the President, as a reply to the State Department’s proposed policy in the Far Eastern situation. Among other things the memorandum would:

Oppose the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan. . . . Advocate State Department action to put off hostilities with Japan as long as possible.

Suggest agreements with Japan to tide the situation over for the next several months.

Point out the effect and cost of a United States-Japanese war in the Far East on defense aid to Great Britain and other nations being aided by the United States.

Emphasize the existing limitations on shipping and the inability of the United States to engage in a Far Eastern offensive operation without the transfer of the major portion of shipping facilities from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

The next day top U.S. officials in Washington read a Tokyo message to the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington. It read, in part:

Relations between Japan and the United States have reached the edge and our people are losing confidence in ever adjusting them. . . . Conditions . . . are so tense that no longer is procrastination possible, yet in our sincerity to maintain pacific relations . . . we have decided . . . to gamble once more . . . But this is our last effort. If we do not reach a quick accord . . . then, indeed will relations between our two nations be on the brink of chaos. I mean that the success or failure of the pending discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan. In fact, we gamble the fate of our land on the throw of this die.

Then on November 5, 1941, Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and Chief of Naval Operations Harold R. Stark sent the President a joint “Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation.” It read, in part:

The Secretary of State has requested advice as to the attitude this government should take toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma Road. . . . The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive military operations with U.S. forces against Japan to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations, however well-disguised, will lead to war. . . .

The United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. . . . To do so, it would have to be strengthened by withdrawing practically all naval vessels from the Atlantic. . . .

The current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct defensive war in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now being reinforced. The present combined naval, air and ground forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines will have become a positive threat to any Japanese operation south of Formosa. The U.S. Army air forces
in the Philippines will have reached the projected strength by February or March 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time, additional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived. The general defensive strength of the entire southern areas against possible Japanese operation will then have reached impressive proportions. . . .

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord with the following conclusions:

(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British staff conversations remain sound. . . .

(b) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East and until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:

(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth or the Netherlands East Indies;

(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100° East or 10° North; or into the Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

(c) If war with Japan cannot be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of existing war plans; i.e., military operations should be primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory and weakening Japan's economic position.

(d) A Japanese advance against Kunming, . . . or an attack on Russia, would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.

(e) All possible aid short of actual war should be extended to the Chinese Central Government.

(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth and the Netherlands East Indies.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff . . . based on the above . . . recommend:

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain and our own forces.

That aid to the American volunteer group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practical extent.

THAT NO ULTIMATUM BE DELIVERED TO JAPAN.

(Signed) G.C. Marshall, Chief of Staff
H.R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations

JAPANESE DEADLINES KNOWN

That same day top U.S. officials in Washington read a cable from Tokyo to their Washington representatives:

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-United States relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

Then on November 22, another message from Tokyo was cabled and translated. It stated:

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set . . . . You should know this. However, I know you are working hard. Stick to your fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out-twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands and in short if everything can be finished we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before.

JAPAN SHOULD SHOOT FIRST

A November 25 meeting at the White House was recorded in Mr. Stimson's diary as follows:

The President brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how should we maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition. . . . I pointed out to the President that he had already taken the first steps towards an ultimatum in notifying Japan way back last summer that if she crossed the border into Thailand she was violating our safety and that therefore we had only to point out (to Japan) that to follow any such expedition was a violation of a warning we had already given.

Meanwhile, U.S. officials had prepared a proposed modus vivendi which would allow Japan to import her needs for 90 days, without adding to her stockpiles while negotiations were continued. This modus vivendi was approved by the British, the Dutch, the Australians, the Canadians and by the top U.S. people in Washington. It was to be offered Japan with some hopes that they might accept it and give the United States time to be ready in the Philippines.

Just as it was to be sent, the Communists stepped into the picture. (See the author's "The Real Infamy of Pearl Harbor" in the December 1974 issue of Southern Libertian Review.) Owen Lattimore, then an advisor to Chiang Kai-shek, sent an objecting cable to Lauchlin Currie, a confidential advisor to Roosevelt. He apparently put similar pressure on Churchill and the Chinese Ambassador in Washington. The latter went to Harry Dexter White, who went to his chief, Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, who went to the White House with the story that this would be letting China
down. Secretary Hull was called to the White House and it was decided to discard the *modus vivendi* and send an ultimatum which everyone knew Japan could not accept.

THE ARMY AND NAVY TAKE OVER

Secretary Stimson's diary for November 27, 1941, reads:

A very tense long day. News is coming in of a concentration and movement south by the Japanese of a large expeditionary force moving south from Shanghai and evidently headed toward Indochina, with a possibility of going to the Philippines or to Burma, or to the Burma Road, or to the Dutch East Indies, but probably a concentration to move over to Thailand and to hold a position from which they can attack Singapore when the moment arrives.

The first thing in the morning I called up Hull to find out what his finale had been with the Japanese—whether he had handed them the new proposal which we passed on 2 or 3 days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday he would, he broke the whole matter off.... As he put it, "I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox—the Army and Navy." I then called up the President. The President gave me a little different view. He said they had ended up, but they had ended up with a magnificent statement prepared by Hull....

Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General Gerow. Marshall is down at the maneuvers today and I feel his absence very much. There was a tendency, not unnatural, on the part of Stark and Gerow to seek for more time. I said that I was glad to have time but I didn't want it at any cost of humility on the part of the United States or of reopening the thing which would show a weakness on our part. The main question has been over the message we shall send to MacArthur.

A message was drafted and sent to MacArthur over the signature of Marshall, who was out of town. A similar message was sent to General Short in Hawaii as well as the commanders at the Panama Canal and on the West Coast. The Navy also sent a November 27 war-warning message to their top officers in the Far East with a copy to the top U.S. Navy man in London. It stated, in part:

The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46. ...

The Army message directed General Short "to undertake such reconnaissance as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. ..."

PEARL HARBOR SITUATION

Upon its receipt, General Short called a meeting of his staff. They decided to go on the alert for sabotage. Accordingly he wired back to Washington:

REURAD 472 HAVE ALERTED FOR SABOTAGE LIAISON WITH THE NAVY.

This was received in Washington on the 27th and was initialed by both Stimson and Marshall. Under Army regulations then in effect, when an officer reported an action taken with which his superior was in disagreement, the superior officer was required to issue new orders. Marshall issued no further orders. Consequently Short remained on the sabotage alert right until the time of the attack. This called for bouncing the planes and hiding the ammunition.

On November 28, G-2 Washington sent a message to G-2 Hawaii to be on the alert for sabotage. The Air Force Command in Washington sent a similar sabotage warning message to the Air Force Command in Hawaii. General Short took these messages as a confirmation of his sabotage alert. On the matter of reconnaissance, all but six of Short's B-17's had been ordered to the Philippine Islands. Consequently, he was unable to undertake any reconnaissance. Short knew this was known to Marshall. Unfortunately Stimson had sent the message over Marshall's signature.

Meanwhile, the top Washington people read a November 28 Tokyo message to their Washington Ambassadors which said in part:

You two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the view of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific....

The following day Tokyo instructed their Washington representatives:

We wish you to make one more attempt verbally along the lines: The United States government has always taken a fair and judicial position and has formulated its policies in the full consideration of the claims of both sides.

However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead have made new proposals which ignore actual conditions in East Asia and which greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government.

So the Ambassadors made another trip to the White House. This was reported in the press. The officers in Hawaii were thus led to believe that negotiations had been resumed.

THE WARNINGS MULTIPLY

All sorts of important messages then began flowing in. Some dealt with the destruction of codes. Another indicated the war would be against the United States and Britain, but not against Russia. Everyone in Washington privy to the coded messages was on the alert for the Japanese answer to the U.S. ultimatum of the 26th. A special phone was put in so that it could be phoned immediately to the Secretary of State. On the morning of December 6, a message was picked up, decoded and translated. It read:

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a

"Every day dozens of important messages were read in Washington, but little, if any, pertinent information was passed on to the Hawaiian commanders."
memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message No. 902 in English).

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in 14 parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. ... The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you to please keep it secret for the time being.

3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will write you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

This “Pilot Message” was distributed to those entitled to see it shortly after noon. It is not exactly an invitation for responsible officers to disappear on normal weekend relaxations, as the public was later told they did.

Another message instructed the Japanese Washington Ambassadors:

Be absolute sure not to use a typist or any other person. Be most extremely cautious in preserving secrecy.

The first 13 parts of the 14-part message came in Saturday afternoon, December 6. The Navy men went right to work on them. By the middle of the afternoon Army decoders were called back to help. These parts being in English did not need to be translated. Copies were ready for distribution before 9 p.m.

FDR: “THIS MEANS WAR”

Top Naval officers were having a party that night. So a special young Navy lieutenant was detailed to the White House to deliver these messages to the President in a locked pouch immediately upon their arrival. When he did so he found the President waiting for him with Harry Hopkins.

At the time of the Congressional hearings this officer, then Comdr. Robert Schulz, was in the middle of the Pacific. He was flown back and was the only Navy witness the administration was unable to approach privately before his testimony. He testified in part:

The President read the papers which took perhaps ten minutes then he handed them to Mr. Hopkins. ... Mr. Hopkins then read the papers and handed them back to the President. The President then turned toward Mr. Hopkins and said in substance—“This means war.” Mr. Hopkins agreed, and they discussed then for perhaps 5 minutes the situation of the Japanese forces. ...

The President mentioned a message he had sent to the Japanese Emperor concerning the presence of Japanese troops in Indochina, in effect requesting their withdrawal.

Mr. Hopkins then expressed a view that since war was undoubtedly going to come at the convenience of the Japanese, it was too bad that we could not strike the first blow and prevent any sort of surprise. The President nodded and then said, in effect, “No, we can’t do that. We are a democracy and a peaceful people.” Then he raised his voice and said, “But we have a good record. . . .”

During this discussion there was no mention of Pearl Harbor. The only geographic name I recall was Indochina ... Then the President said that he believed he would talk to Admiral Stark. He started to get Admiral Stark on the telephone ... but I believe the White House operator told the President that Admiral Stark could be reached at the National Theatre. The President went on to state, in substance, that he would reach the Admiral later; that he did not want to cause public alarm by having the Admiral paged or otherwise when in the theater, where, I believe, the fact that he had a box reserved was mentioned and that if he left suddenly he would surely have been seen because of the position which he held and undue alarm might be caused, and the President did not wish that to happen because he could get him within perhaps another half hour in any case. His words were in effect that he would reach the Admiral later. ... The matter of his being another hour is my own observation based on the fact that the theater was eventually going to close that evening.

Later, when testifying, Admiral Stark could not remember that upon arrival home that night he had excused himself from the theater party, gone upstairs to return the President’s call. After his original testimony he had to be reminded of this by a member of the theater party.

THE DAY OF INFAMY

Early on the morning of December 7, the 14th part came in as well as the message telling them to deliver it at 1 p.m. Washington time, which was dawn at Pearl Harbor. Other messages thanked the Ambassadors for the job they had done and bid them goodbye.

The inside story of December 7 was recorded in the Stimson diary:

Today is the day that the Japanese are going to bring their answer to Hull and everything in MAGIC indicated that they had been keeping the time back until now in order to accomplish something hanging in the air. Knox and I arranged a conference with Hull at 10:30 and we talked the whole matter over. Hull is very certain that the Japs are planning some deviltry and we are all wondering where the blow will strike. We three stayed together in conference until lunch time, going over the plans for what should be said or done. ... Hull was to see the Japanese envoys at one o’clock but they were delayed. ... I returned to Woodley to lunch and just about 2 o’clock, while I was sitting at lunch, the President called me up on the telephone and in a rather excited voice asked me, “Have you heard the news?” I said, “Well, I have heard the telegrams which have been coming in about the Japanese advances in the Gulf of Siam.” He said, “Oh, no. I don’t mean that. They have attacked Hawaii. They are now bombarding Hawaii.” Well, that was an excitement indeed. The messages which we have been getting through Saturday and this morning are messages ... showing that large Japanese forces are moving up into Gulf of Siam. ... The British were very much excited about it and our efforts this morning in drawing our papers were to see whether or not we should all act together. The British will have to fight if they attack the Kra Peninsula. We three all thought that we must fight if the British fought. But now the Japs have solved the whole thing by attacking us directly in Hawaii.

As soon as I could finish my lunch, I returned to the office and began a long conference which lasted until 6 o’clock. The news coming in from Hawaii is very bad. They seem to have sprung a complete surprise...
upon our fleet and have caught the battleships inside the harbor and bombed them severely with losses. They have also hit our airfields there and destroyed a great many of our planes, evidently before they got off the ground. It has been staggering to see our people there, who have been warned long ago and were standing on the alert, should have been so caught by surprise.

When the news first came that Japan had attacked us my first feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and that a crisis had come in a way which would unite all our people. This continued to be my dominant feeling in spite of the news of catastrophes which quickly developed. For I feel that this country united has practically nothing to fear; while the apathy and diversion stirred up by unpatriotic men have been hitherto very discouraging.

**PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE ACCOUNTS**

The public was told that President Roosevelt was surprised while busy with his stamp collection that Sunday morning. The public was also led to believe that George Marshall was out horseback riding that fateful morning. Actually, a June 8, 1942, memorandum of his duty officer states:

"He arrived at the office at about 10:00 o'clock or shortly thereafter." A Naval officer also testified that Admiral Stark talked with him over the telephone about 9 o'clock and that shortly thereafter he joined a conference in Admiral Stark's office. After this conference, General Marshall returned to his office shortly before noon and sent a message to MacArthur in the Philippines with similar ones to Short in Hawaii as well as the commanding officers at the Panama Canal and on the west coast. The message read:

Japanese are present at 1 PM Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be alert accordingly. Inform Naval authorities of this communication.

**MARTIAL**

After Marshall refused the Navy's offer of its more powerful transmitter, the message to Short was sent to the Presidio in San Francisco. The Presidio was not able to raise Fort Shafter in Hawaii, so the message was sent downtown to RCA for transmission to Honolulu. A messenger was taking it to Fort Shafter when the attack came. It was not delivered until several hours after the attack.

"Papers were destroyed, witnesses died, key messages disappeared."

Immediately after war was declared on December 8, Secretary of Navy Knox flew out to Pearl Harbor for the first official investigation. On his return to Washing- ton, he handed his report to President Roosevelt on December 14. It said in part:

Neither Short nor Kimmel, at the time of the attack, had any knowledge of the plain intimations of some surprise move, made clear in Washing- ton, through the interception of Japanese instructions to Nomura, in which a surprise move of some kind was clearly indicated by the insist- ence upon the precise time of Nomura's reply to Hull, at one o'clock on Sunday. . . .

Neither the Army nor the Navy Commander expected an attack would be made by the Japanese while negotiations were still proceed- ing in Washington. Both felt that if any surprise attack was attempted, it would be made in the Far East. . . .

Of course, the best means of defense against air attack consists of fighter planes. Lack of an adequate number of this type of aircraft avail- able to the Army for the defense of the Island, is due to the diversion of this type before the outbreak of the war to the British, the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians. The next best weapon against air attack is adequate and well-disposed anti-aircraft artillery. There is a danger- ous shortage of guns of this type on the Island. This is through no fault of the Army Commander who has pressed consistently for these guns.

**LESSONS TO BE LEARNED**

The United States was now in the war, a war that sunk free enterprise even deeper than the New Deal had. Europe was made safe for socialism and Asia for communism. National unity required a suspension of any meaningful investiga- tion. Meanwhile, papers were destroyed, witnesses died, key messages disappeared, a carefully selected Roberts Commission (including Frank R. McCoy) exonerated those in Washington while making scape- goats of the innocent Hawaiian command- ers. Those who helped in the "coverup" went on to higher places, while those who told the truth remained unpromoted for the rest of their careers, even though Congress granted one of them $100,000 for his work in breaking the Japanese codes.

Perhaps one of the greatest anomalies of the Watergate-Pearl Harbor parallel is the roles played by Gerhard A. Gesell. As a bright young man, he was a devoted member of the New Deal bureaucracy. He was later rewarded with a coveted position with Dean Acheson's law firm. He took a leave from this firm to serve as Chief Assistant Counsel for the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investi- gation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. The original Chief Counsel was the elderly William D. Mitchell, but it was Gesell who was the administration's workhorse. The original whitewash plan was to limit the hearings to four weeks and prevent any serious investigation into areas the Demo- cratic administration thought should be kept secret.

These plans were foiled. Mr. Gesell resigned and the hearings were extended to about six months. Mr. Gesell was one of three members of the "coverup" team to be rewarded with a Federal judgeship. More recently in the Watergate affair, the same Gerhard Gesell has been on the other side of the fence. This time, as a Federal judge, he helped in the exposure of a miscreant Republican President, whereas before he had been a leader in attempting to suppress the perfiles of the Democratic President and his administra- tion responsible for Pearl Harbor. 

That we know any of the truth of Pearl Harbor is due largely to the courage and sagacity of the late John T. Flynn. His allegation that the administration was reading Japanese messages made necessary the Congressional investigation, which the administration rigged for a whitewash. The minority members, however, were able to spread many enlightening facts on the record. Unfortunately, the 45 official volumes are a maze that few will read and still fewer will be able to comprehend. Additional information has since been revealed in memoirs and official records. As with Watergate, there was a great disparity between what Americans were told and the realities behind the closed doors of officialdom. The full unbiased Pearl Harbor story remains to be written.

If our nation is to be revived, we must move rapidly in the direction of a free market society. We must also reduce the power of future presidents to suppress the truth of their antisocial actions. A politi- cally managed economy is not a free society.
In the post-Watergate world, attempts by an administration to block investigations of its conduct, to cover up embarrassing incidents and "lose" incriminating evidence, are taken for granted. Unfortunately, most of the public and academia

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are under the impression that what Nixon was accused of is somehow extraordinary in comparison to the conduct of past presidents. I would like to demonstrate the incorrectness of this assumption by examining an incident from recent history: Franklin Roosevelt's attempt to hide his own responsibility for not warning the Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii of the impending Pearl Harbor attack, though information about the Japanese surprise attack was available in Washington.

As Percy Greaves relates elsewhere in this issue of REASON, the United States was able to break Japan's top-secret diplomatic code in August 1940. The Army and Navy communications experts who achieved this feat were able to reconstruct the actual code machine itself and build duplicates. This meant that the United States could read the Japanese ambassador's messages from Tokyo as fast as, or even faster than, he himself could. Obviously the existence of this American code-breaking establishment and its ability to read the Japanese code was one of the most closely guarded secrets of all
times. Unfortunately, in their zealous effort to maintain the security of this intelligence source, it was decided to severely limit distribution of copies of intercepted Japanese messages. Distribution was generally confined to a small cadre of high government officials around the President, including Hull, the Secretary of State, Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, Stimson, the Secretary of War, and Knox, the Secretary of the Navy. Beyond these, only those military officers directly concerned with intercepting, translating, and evaluating this intelligence were even aware of the existence of these broken Japanese code messages. Thus the Army and Navy commanders at Pearl Harbor, General Short and Admiral Kimmel, were not privileged to judge the value of this intelligence themselves but were absolutely dependent on receiving the proper instructions from their superiors, Marshall and Stark, which would be based on the Japanese messages. As Greaves makes clear in his article, information warning of the imminent attack on Pearl Harbor, though known in Washington, did not reach Kimmel and Short until after the first bombs began to fall.

INVESTIGATION BEGINS

On December 8, the day after the attack, Roosevelt dispatched Secretary of the Navy Knox to Pearl Harbor to make a personal report on damages and responsibilities. His report was an unequivocal exoneration of Kimmel and Short. Knox said that they had never received the vital information which was available in Washington and that they had been denied the basic necessities for their defense. Consequently, Knox's report was not made public but was instead buried away, only to be discovered by accident years later by Senator Homer Ferguson.

In an effort to make scapegoats out of Kimmel and Short, Roosevelt proposed a new investigation, to be conducted by Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts. This report would be released to the public and was to be a complete whitewash of the administration. To insure this, the other members of the Roberts Commission were all Roosevelt supporters, and witnesses were ordered not to disclose any information whatsoever about the broken Japanese code or the intelligence derived from it. This could be done easily because the only people besides Roosevelt, Stimson, Knox, and Hull who knew about the broken code were military men subject to military discipline and already sworn to secrecy. Accordingly, Justice Roberts issued a lengthy report which condemned Kimmel and Short as solely responsible for the tragedy. Throughout the entire war this is what the general public believed. Kimmel and Short became two of the most hated men in America. (See Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel's Story (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1965), pp. 170-85.)

Another consequence of the Roberts Commission was that all of the incriminating documents gathered as evidence subsequently disappeared. One document in particular was the so-called "winds execute" message received by Naval Communications on December 4, which foretold, in "weather report" code, an attack upon the United States. Captain Laurence Safford of Naval Communications, one of the men primarily responsible for breaking the code, gave this message to the Director of Naval Communications on December 14 for use as evidence by the Roberts Commission. That was the last time anyone saw it. Even the radio station logs which recorded receipt of the message disappeared (Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, [1946] part 39, p. 225). All Safford could ever find was the empty file folder that had contained the message.

Additionally, all the intercepted messages ever received were nearly destroyed as well. It was only through a fortunate accident that one almost complete set was saved when the others were destroyed. During the time Knox was in Hawaii making his report, his assistant, James Forrestal, became Acting Secretary of the Navy. Although Forrestal had previously been mainly concerned with matters of procurement and was thus totally unaware that the Japanese code had been broken or that Knox had been receiving copies of the messages, he learned about this in the course of carrying out his new duties. To get the facts, he ordered Commander Alwin Kramer to assemble copies for his inspection. When all the other copies were destroyed, this set, except for the "winds execute," was thus saved. Years later this set was discovered accidentally by Captain Safford, who made copies of the messages and returned them to their proper files.

SHORT AND KIMMEL TRICKED

Immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack both Short and Kimmel were relieved of command and assured that they would soon be reasigned. While waiting at home for reassignment, General Short heard from his old friend, General Marshall. The Roberts Report, condemning him and Kimmel, had just been released and its conclusion had been entirely unexpected by Short. In a depressed state, Short asked Marshall whether he ought to resign for the good of the Army. Marshall told him to wait and only resign if absolutely necessary. Trusting his old friend, Short sent an undated resignation to Marshall with instructions to use it when he thought it best for the Army. Marshall immediately dated it and accepted it, then called Admiral Stark to inform him of what had happened. Stark in turn called Admiral Kimmel to tell him that Short had just resigned; Kimmel took this to mean that he too should resign, which he did. The effect of this was that while Kimmel and Short were still liable for court-martial, they could not demand one so as to clear their names.

There was little else which could be done at this point, so Kimmel and Short quietly left the services to which they had devoted most of their lives and tried to live down their disgrace. At this time neither of them had any knowledge of the broken code or the vast intelligence denied to them, they only knew that somehow they were innocent.

Then, in the fall of 1943, Captain Safford discovered for the first time that Kimmel had never received any of the Japanese messages, having assumed all along that Kimmel knew what he knew and was therefore irresponsible for not being prepared for the attack. While on a trip to New York, Safford secretly met with Kimmel to tell him what he had just discovered. Needless to say, Kimmel was astounded by the revelation and resolved to defend himself on that basis. He immediately engaged lawyers who proceeded to demand a new investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack. As a consequence, the Navy was persuaded to engage Admiral Thomas Hart to gather additional evidence lest it be lost through the deaths of key participants.

THE INVESTIGATION REOPENED

About this same time, some information was leaked by Kimmel's supporters to members of Congress in order to force a more thorough investigation. The result was a Congressional mandate establishing the Naval Court of Inquiry and the Army Pearl Harbor Board, each to independently investigate and report on the facts of the attack. At first these investigating bodies were forbidden to hear evidence about the Japanese code and witnesses were ordered to lie rather than disclose such information. Kimmel objected to this and was finally able to get the Navy to relent on this point. The Army investi-
"We know that Dewey's suspicions about the remaining value of the code were well-founded—the Japanese knew the United States was reading some of their messages."

...gators learned, through the grapevine, that the Navy had secret information about the broken Japanese code, and demanded that they too be allowed to hear such evidence. General Marshall gave his permission, and both bodies were thus empowered to conduct the fullest possible investigation of the denial of relevant intelligence to the commanders at Pearl Harbor.

Though not empowered to investigate the conduct of civilian officials, both the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Naval Court of Inquiry were highly critical of Secretaries Stimson and Knox in their conduct before the attack, as well as that of the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. The reports both exonerated Kimmel and Short, in stark contrast to the Roberts report.

Not to be outdone, the administration sought to have these critical reports discredited. Three more investigations were called for by Adm. Kent Hewitt and Cols. Carter W. Clark and Henry C. Clausen. It was the ostensible purpose of these officers to get additional evidence, but their true purpose was to discredit previous damaging evidence. During the course of these investigations many witnesses were induced to change previous sworn testimony. Thus the reports of these additional investigations once again absolved the administration of responsibility.

ENTER JOHN T. FLYNN

During the 1944 presidential election friends of Kimmel and Short leaked information about the broken code to John T. Flynn, who was then working for Thomas Dewey's campaign. It was decided that Dewey would make an important speech revealing the Roosevelt administration's culpability in allowing the attack on Pearl Harbor. Through an informant Marshall learned about Dewey's impending speech. On his own he sought to prevent this speech and sent a letter to Dewey with Colonel Clark as a personal messenger. The letter began by telling Dewey not to read on unless he promised not to reveal the information contained in the letter. Dewey quickly realized that this was simply a ploy to prevent him from telling what he already knew, he refused to read on, giving the letter back to Colonel Clark to be returned to Marshall. Marshall sent another letter to Dewey saying that the Army was still getting valuable intelligence from the Japanese through the broken code and begging Dewey not to reveal that the code was broken. Dewey suspected that this was not true, but rather than risk any American lives he decided to call off the speech.

It is open to speculation whether Dewey's speech would have given him the issue he needed to win the election, but at any rate we now know that Dewey's suspicions about the remaining value of the code were well founded. After the war, previously decoded Japanese messages were found which showed that the Japanese knew the United States was reading some of their coded messages. Admiral Wilkinson of Naval Intelligence knew this in October 1941. Apparently Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, read a message which foretold the German attack on Russia. Welles gave this message to the Russian Embassy, from which a German spy seems to have obtained the message and gotten it to the Japanese. Why the Japanese did not immediately scrap their code system I don't know. Probably they had such faith in the system that they thought that the United States had only broken a few messages but did not possess the entire code. In fact, after the war the Japanese maintained that it was impossible for the United States to have reconstructed their code machine without having stolen one. After Dewey's decision not to make his speech on Pearl Harbor, John T. Flynn wrote a long article for the Chicago Tribune called "The Truth About Pearl Harbor" in which he revealed a vast array of damaging facts about Roosevelt's responsibility for the attack, but did not mention the code. The article was reprinted as a pamphlet and was widely circulated. When the war seemed nearly over, Flynn prepared a new pamphlet called "The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor" which told for the first time how the Japanese code had been broken. He released it on V-J day, and in retrospect it is truly amazing how much of the full story Flynn was able to infer simply on the basis of some leaks from Kimmel's friends and Marshall's letter to Dewey.

CONGRESS INVESTIGATES

Soon thereafter bills were introduced in both houses of Congress for a full congressional investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack. The administration, now under Truman, realized it could not completely block an investigation, but because the Democrats controlled Congress, they would control the make-up of the investigating committee. The Joint Congressional Committee to Investigate the Pearl Harbor Attack came to have five Senators and five House members, three of each, including the chairman, being Democrats. Because they held the majority, the Democrats were able to appoint a counsel favorable to the administration and to block the Republicans' efforts to subpoena witnesses and documents.

No provision was made for providing the minority Republicans with any kind of counsel or research assistance. Nevertheless, since Democrats surely would have bottled up all the damaging evidence against Roosevelt, the full burden of investigating was placed upon the Republican members. Fortunately, John Flynn was able to raise private funds to pay a Republican research staff to help with the investigation. The chief of the minority staff was Percy L. Graves, who was then head of research for the Republican Party. He and his small staff worked tirelessly and it was largely through their efforts that Republican Senators Brewster and Ferguson were well armed with the facts needed to ferret out the truth from uncooperative witnesses. At one point the Democrats became so alarmed at their inability to cover up the truth in open hearings that an effort was made to get rid of Graves.

It seems that the committee would sit at a long table with House members on one side and Senators on the other, with the Democrats in the center and Republicans on each end. Graves would sit at the very end of the table next to the Senators and help them. One day Senator Brewster was away at a funeral, so Ferguson moved over into his seat and Graves sat in Ferguson's. At this point, the Democrats pretended to notice Graves for the first time. Chairman of the Committee, Senator Alben W. Barkley, remarked that, "He (Graves) has been sitting by the Senator from Michigan (Ferguson) during these whole hearings and apparently prompting the Senator in the interrogatories he has addressed to the witnesses." This led to something of a scandal. Ferguson knew that Graves was not officially supposed to be there so he said that Graves was...

..."Witnesses were ordered to lie rather than disclose information about the Japanese code."
actually Brewer's aide. Word was quickly gotten to Brewer who officially made Greaves his assistant for the duration of the investigation.

It is difficult to fully comprehend the strenuous efforts of the Democrats to bury as much damaging evidence as possible. In spite of this, the Republicans were successful in forcing the investigation to go on nearly five months longer than originally planned. The committee's first chief counsel, William Mitchel, had hoped to be finished by Christmas. By the time he was finally forced by his health to quit, poor Mitchel was close to a nervous breakdown from all the revelations of gross misconduct by people he respected.

Specific examples of important evidence being covered up would include the Democrats' refusal to subpoena the full diary of Secretary of War Stimson, although one portion of it was known to say that Roosevelt's plan was to maneuver the Japanese into firing the first shot (Hearings, part 11, p. 5433). Neither would they subpoena the diary of Joseph Grew, who had been the ambassador to Japan and who had consistently warned that Roosevelt's policies were forcing Japan into war. The administration also forced witnesses to change previous sworn testimony, which was particularly easy to do with those in the military who would have ruined their careers by revealing damaging facts. Those officers like Captain Safford, who steadfastly refused to change his testimony, did in fact find their service careers ended.

Then there was Truman's attempt to keep General Marshall off the witness stand by ordering him on a mission to China just before he was scheduled to testify. The Democrats hoped to have Marshall on and off the stand in one day, but penetrating questions by Brewster and Ferguson kept him there for several days. There was the mysterious disappearance of 25 pages from the copy of the Roberts Investigation given to the committee. And finally there was the extraordinary pressure put on Republican House members Gerhardt and Keefe to sign the majority report, which virtually absolved the Roosevelt administration of any responsibility for the tragedy. It should be noted in their defense, however, that the Republican Congressmen did extract concessions from the Democrats which modified some of the more blatant portions of the final report, and Keefe's "Additional Views" were attached to the report. The latter were highly critical of the administration, perhaps even more so than the minority report.

The printed hearings of this massive Congressional investigation ran into 45 volumes including transcripts of all the previous investigations. The truth is there if it can be sifted out from all the irrelevant information and contradictory statements. This is what was attempted by revisionist historians such as Charles A. Beard, Charles Callan Tansill and Harry Elme Roberts. But the Senate found blocks in their path when they tried to obtain documents from the government which were freely given to other writers, like Herbert Feis, who were more interested in apologizing for the administration's actions. Consequently, the story of Pearl Harbor is as muddled today as it was in 1946.

WATERGATE

By contrast, the Watergate investigation had a far better chance of getting at all the facts.

In the first place, Watergate was a criminal investigation intent upon prosecuting individuals for individual offenses. With Pearl Harbor, there was never any thought that those involved were criminally responsible. It was rather a political investigation fired by the partisan ambitions of the Republican Party, which could taste victory in the 1946 Congressional elections. Thus the entire emphasis was different.

The most important difference in the investigations, however, is the fact that Congress and the executive branch were controlled by the same party in 1945-46, whereas in 1974 the branches were controlled by different parties. The latter situation put the opponents of the administration in control of the key investigating committees, with their power of subpoena and of choosing committee counsel. In this case the press also acted as an auxiliary investigating force since most of the newspapers large enough to carry out a substantial investigation on their own were controlled by liberal Democrats and willing to devote substantial news space to publicizing Watergate revelations, no matter how inconsequential.

In addition, one should recognize that most of the key participants in the Pearl Harbor coverup were military men, subject to military discipline to maintain their secrecy and, more importantly, dependent for promotion on not embarrassing their boss, the President.

One need not carry on further with Watergate since its story can be read in numerous places. But it does have one important similarity with the Pearl Harbor investigation from which we can learn. In each case the ruling administration was attempting to cover up a past mistake. History tells us that the first priority of government is to perpetuate itself; the second, then, is to perpetuate those in control of that government. And, as Professor F. A. Hayek has shown (The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), pp. 134-52), it is always the worst members of society who get on top of the government apparatus. The point being that in each case it was not simply a matter of a few bad individuals being involved, or of some defect in our government which can be remedied by, for example, public financing of elections. Rather, it was government itself which dictated that those in power could never admit to a past mistake of the magnitude of Pearl Harbor or Watergate. With a vast party apparatus and government bureaucracy dependent upon him personally for its perpetuation, how could a president ever openly admit such a thing? In fact he could not.

Out of Watergate perhaps one healthy trend may finally emerge. With the publication of the tape transcripts, the President was virtually stripped naked of the cloak of official prestige which accompanies the office. We can see more clearly than ever before how the presidential decision-making process operates, and we see for ourselves that even the President makes decisions purely out of frivolous emotionalism. I am certain that if tapes existed of Roosevelt's conversations they would convey no less. Thus Nixon's claim that he was defending the Presidency is more true than realized. I believe Watergate has damaged the Presidency, and I applaud it. Every administration has had its Watergate, and Pearl Harbor was Roosevelt's. It is the historian's duty to make this fact known so that someday the lesson will be learned: as long as we have powerful government, it will always be the same.
Since 1938 politicians and journalists have equated a reference to the Munich Pact with shameful appeasement. On June 3, 1953, for example, President Eisenhower, referring to the debate about a Korean truce, said, “There’s going to be no new Munich.” The reference was to the Pact of September 30, 1938. Freda Utley, author of the best book on the occupation of Germany, The High Cost of Vengeance, showed in Human Events both the origin and the abuse of the Munich Pact as a symbol of appeasement:

Those who compare Panmunjon to Munich are also wrong. All that the much-abused Neville Chamberlain did was to agree to the self-determination of the people of the Sudetenland, which was a part of Czechoslovakia inhabited by Germans, which had formed part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and which would never have been awarded to the Czechs if Wilson’s Fourteen

Bohemia - Moravia - Austrian Silesia

white Inhabited by Sudeten Germans

black Inhabited by Czechs
Germanic tribes had advanced far into central and southern Germany. Germanic settlements had been established on both banks of the Rhine, in Bohemia, and along the Danube. . . . (Germany 2000 Years [Milwaukee: Bruce, 1950], p. 6)

As against this, the Slav immigration from the East intensified in 1918 became Czechoslovak territory, wrote Drs. Josef Starkbaum and Emanuel Reichenberger, "could at the earliest have begun at the end of the 6th century to the 9th at the latest." Almost certainly "the larger numbers of Slavs immigrated into Western Slovakia and the Sudeten area only in the 9th century" (Heimatt der Sudeten-deutschen: Widerlegung der tschechischen Kolonisationstheorie [Vienna: Volkstum-Verlag, 1967], p. 26). But owing to continuing immigration and superior birthrate the original Germans were pushed into the Sudeten mountain range and by the 10th century "we already find Slav princes as rulers in the Sudeten territory" (Starkbaum and Reichenberger, p. 26).

It conforms to historic precedent that native populations, in the face of a numerous invader, retreat into the hills and there maintain their language and culture, never the other way around. The Celts in the British Isles maintained themselves in Scotland, Wales, and Cornwall; the Basques, the most ancient aboriginals in Europe, in the Iberian mountains; and similarly the original German inhabitants of Bohemia in the Sudeten hills, from which in 1902 they got their present collective name.

**APPLYING THE HISTORIC PRINCIPLE**

If the historic principle were to apply—that an area should be subject to the nation that long controlled it—as against the principle of self-determination—that an area should be subject to the wish of the inhabitants long settled there—then Germany and Austria could claim all of Czechoslovakia. As early as 791 Charlemagne incorporated Bohemia formally into the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. And until 1918 it was always under German or Austrian sovereignty, even when Czech princes ruled over Bohemia as a province, under the Empire. Czechs and Germans fought side by side against the Magyars at Lechfield in 955. In 1348 King Charles IV (from German Luxembourg) established in Prague the first European university, Charles Uni-

versity, a cooperative enterprise of Germans and Czechs.

It is true, according to Dr. Kurt Glaser, that:

During the centuries which followed, the Czech rulers encouraged Germans to settle in Bohemia and Moravia. . . . The influx of Germans reached its peak in the thirteenth century, when Czech nobles competed to obtain settlers to populate their domains. (Czecho-Slovakia, A Critical Study. [Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton, 1961], p. 8)

In 1526, coincident with Archduke Ferdinand's initiating Hapsburg rule, a new and final wave of German settlers complemented the original Sudeten Germans who had been there since before the Christian era. In 1627 Bohemia was formally declared a Hapsburg crownland. Thus, even if the German immigrants of 1526 had been the first Germans in Czechoslovakia it would be stretching truth and plausibility to call them, as did the peace conference at St. Germain, settlers of "a relatively recent date." Such reasoning would make all the Pilgrim Fathers settlers of a recent date—and expendable!

Furthermore, historically, Bohemia and Moravia had been loosely under German rule since the time of Charlemagne in 791, and very formally under Austrian rule since 1526, and even more definitely since 1627. Thus the Sudeten Germans had been generally subject to German sovereignty for a thousand years when in 1918 the peace dictators denied them self-determination. And they very literally had been subjects of Austria for 290 years, when on March 4, 1919, the Czechs shot to death 54 and wounded 107 Sudeten Germans who were demonstrating for self-determination.

If any desire to be charged with treason for disloyalty, the Czechs for revolting against Austria in 1918 would be more liable than the Sudeten Germans who remained loyal to Austria and refused to join in the revolt! After the Czechs had proclaimed an independent Czechoslovakia on October 18, 1918, the Sudeten-German and Austrian deputies met in Vienna and resolved on allegiance to the Republic of Austria. When the official spokesman for the Sudeten Germans (Social Democrat Josef Seliger) was sent to Prague to present this wish of the Sudeten Germans, he was told, "We do..."
not negotiate with rebels.” And Prague proceeded to a military occupation of the Sudeten territory. The peaceful Sudeten demonstration against this caused the “massacre.” The Neue Zuericher Zeitung, on March 7, 1919, commented:

"... the acts of Czech brutality against the German Bohemian demonstrators ... who had assembled ... for entirely peaceful demonstrations for self-determination. ... has eradicated any possibility of understanding. ... the Czech government is wrong if it thinks it can break the resistance of three and one-half million German Bohemians with terrorist methods. (Glaser, pp. 23-24 n.)"

THE BREAKUP OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

From 1627 to 1848, Czechs and Germans in Bohemia and Moravia managed with little ethnic friction, both under German and Austrian rule. The revolutions in 1848 were less a struggle for ethnic or national independence than for more personal freedom, both among Czechs and Sudeten Germans. And again from 1848 to 1914, Czechs and Sudeten Germans, in spite of some understandable ethnic frictions, managed rather amicably; each kept its language and customs and ethnic complexion. During several decades before World War I, a tendency towards national autonomy was increasing. But until Wilson sloganized self-determination in order to disaffirm the minorities of Austria-Hungary, even such Czech leaders as Beneš and Masaryk inclined to support the celebrated judgment of František Palacky, who during the 1848 revolutions said of Austria-Hungary: “If it did not exist, we would have to invent it.” In general, Czechs “sought the development of Czech culture and fuller self-government within the empire” (Glaser, p. 13).

Even in World War I, almost to the very end, the various nationalities, including the Czechs, fought loyally under the Hapsburg banner, as they had for virtually 400 years. But not Beneš and Masaryk. They had gone to Paris, London, and Washington and formed the Czech-Slovak National Council which became the Czech government in exile. Even then they did not at first demand independent status for Czech-Slovakia.

Then, on January 10, 1917, the Allied Governments, in the fourth point of a note to Washington, demanded as a condition of peace “the liberation of Italians, of Slavs, of Roumanians and of Czech-Slovaks from foreign domination.” Beneš and Masaryk could interpret this as full Czech independence.

Giving further impetus to such an interpretation was No. 10 in Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points proclaimed on January 8, 1918: “The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.” Of course, Vienna was ready to grant the Czechs and all other minorities every opportunity for autonomous development. In the euphoria of approaching victory and under the poison of hate propaganda, however, “autonomy” was easily perverted into full Czech independence and a tragic breakup of the historic Dual Monarchy.

Even so, however, if this and Wilson’s other idealistic pronouncements had been honestly applied, the Sudeten Germans never could have been incorporated into the Czechoslovakia of 1918, and the Munich Pact of 1938 would not have been needed. In his Four Principles Speech to Congress on February 11, 1918, Wilson declared “That peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about,” and that “Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned.” Obviously, if the territory of the Sudeten Germans had been settled in accordance with their wishes, it would in 1918 have remained the part of Austria and Germany which in the Munich Pact it again became.

THE CZECHS LISTENED TO

On October 21, 1918, all the Austrian and Sudeten-German deputies met in Vienna as a Provisional National Assembly, accepted Wilson’s principle of self-determination, and claimed for the new German-Austrian state “the entire territory settled by German Austrians,” including those in the German parts of Bohemia and Moravia. In reply, Czech military forces occupied these parts, and as we have seen, when the Sudeten Germans on March 4, 1919, demonstrated in protest, they were fired upon. It was precisely to avoid this and similar bloodshed that Austria refrained from dispatching its own forces and trusted the promises and sense of justice of the peace-makers. They, however, kept the Austrian delegation at the peace conference behind barred wire, but kept their doors open to the Czech delegation. The latter, in the important Beneš Memoir III, “underestimated the number of Germans in Bohemia by one million and ‘proved’ the absence of contemptuous German settlements by means of a falsified map” (Glaser, p. 24).

The contradictions and falsifications with which the Czech spokesmen achieved the multinational state of Czechoslovakia is perfectly expressed by Professor A.C. Coolidge, chief of the field mission attached to the American delegation to the peace conference, in a memorandum of March 10, 1919:

"... the acts of Czech brutality against the German Bohemian demonstrators ... who had assembled ... for entirely peaceful demonstrations for self-determination. ... has eradicated any possibility of understanding. ... the Czech government is wrong if it thinks it can break the resistance of three and one-half million German Bohemians with terrorist methods. (Glaser, pp. 23-24 n.)"

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To such Czech chauvinism, and to Allied forswearing of its pledges to the vanquished, did Czechoslovakia owe its creation, and some 3½ million Sudeten Germans their loss of self-determination. Carl L. Becker comments:

In arranging the boundaries of Czechoslovakia, the conference departed rather far from the principle of self-determination in order to gratify the patriotic sentiment of the Czechs, or to safeguard their military and economic interests. (History of Modern Europe [Morristown, NJ: Silver Burdett Co., 1945], p. 199)

The conference included “within Czechoslovakia more than a million Magyars and Ruthenians” and “about 3,000,000 Germans who might properly be united with either Germany or Austria” (War Department Education Manual, EM 206, 1945, pp. 199-201).

The tragedy of Versailles and St. Germain—and the logically ensuing World War II—was not due to the principle of self-determination, but to the dishonesty with which it was applied. The victors used it wherever they could thus slice some land or people from Germany and Austria, and ignored it or, as in the case of the Sudeten Germans, perverted it whenever its application might have helped the vanquished and made the peace worthy of enduring. With this dishonest use of self-determination the victors broke up Austria-Hungary, which for over a hundred years had been a mainstay of order and relative peace in south-central Europe. The tragedy and the plunder of this ruthless destruction was belatedly attested to by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, when in 1963 it wanted to justify its support of Soviet Russian colonialism. In “Controlling the Police in a Disarmed World,” the agency declared:

Whether we admit it to ourselves or not, we benefit enormously from the capability of the Soviet System to keep law and order over the 200 odd

30 reason

February 1976
million people in the USSR and the many additional millions in the satellite states.

The breakup of the Russian Communist empire today would doubtless be conducive to freedom, but would be a good deal more catastrophic than was the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian empire in 1914. (Quoted in Lev E. Dobriansky, The Vulnerable Russians [New York: Pageant- Poseidon, 1967], p. 252)

Here, 45 years later, and after a frightful Second World War, one of the Big Four peace dictators of 1918 admits that the breakup of Austria-Hungary, which included the forcible subjection of over 3 million Sudeten Germans by the Czechs, was catastrophic! And it borders on sacrilege to compare the open-border, gentle Austria-Hungary to the barbed-wire enclosed, police-terror tyranny of Soviet Russia. It is this sort of perverted mentality and morality that produced the peace of 1918, a peace which was granted partial correction in the Munich Pact, and then climaxcd in one of the worst mass atrocities in history, the total robbery, expulsion, and decimation of the Sudeten Germans.

THE CZECHS IN POWER

Benes and Masaryk had tricked the peace dictators into approving the multinational state of Czechoslovakia by assuring them that they would create a new Switzerland. In it the Czechs (in 1918) were the most numerous, the Sudeten Germans were second, the Slovaks were third, and also included were Hungarians, Ruthenians, and Poles. Benes and Masaryk declared Czech the official language, required Slovak to be a mere dialect of Czech, and promised that “German shall be the second native language.”

With so many rival nationalities, even if the Czechs had been wise and had honestly tried, as they announced they would, to “satisfy the wishes of the population in practice and daily use,” a Swiss pattern would have been difficult. As Lord Runciman commented, it is a hard lot to be governed by an alien race as were the Sudeten Germans. But the Czechs were not wise; they kept harassing their Germans, infiltrated Czechs into administrative and managerial posts, and subtly and otherwise tried to de-Germanize them, making them justifiably feel like second-class citizens. Even an apostle for the Czechs, Radomir Luza, admits that there was a “reduction in the number of German schools” and “that German representation in public service was inadequate.” Some were “ousted, some retired, and thousands, unable to pass the Czech language tests made excessively too difficult for them, were dismissed. Their places were taken by Czechs who moved to the German areas.” (Luza, pp. 42, 43)

But the crucial point remains, namely, the Sudeten Germans wanted and had a clear right to be a part of Germany rather than Czechoslovakia. It was only natural, therefore, given those harassments in addition to the injustice, that the Sudeten Germans became more restive, and more and more insistent on autonomy. And as they saw that the Germans and Austrians under the leadership of Hitler corrected more and more of the injustices of Versailles and St. Germain, they hoped for the same for themselves. When their demands, after Austria had been allowed to join Germany in 1937, became critical, Britain sent Lord Runciman to Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1938, to mediate if possible, and to develop a practical policy. On September 18, 1938, he recommended to the British government what common sense, elementary justice, and the Wilsonian principle of self-determination ought to have been done in 1918. He recommended that in areas where the Sudeten Germans were in a clear majority they should immediately be given their right of self-determination. (See Hermann Raschofer, Die Sudeten Frage [Munich: Isar Verlag, 1953], pp. 164-170, for a good report on Lord Runciman’s epoch-making analysis.)

THE MUNICH PACT

In the face of Hitler’s evident determination to correct—by force if necessary—the wrong done to the Sudeten Germans in 1918, London and Paris informed Prague that they would not fight to help it retain the Sudeten areas in the event of German military action to free the Sudeten Germans. Under the circumstances, the Czech government acquiesced. Accordingly, on September 29 and 30, 1938, Chamberlain, Daladier, Mussolini, and Hitler signed the epoch-making Munich Pact. It outlined the three stages in which the territory with predominantly German population should be evacuated by the Czechs and transferred to Germany. “On the basis of the Munich agreement the Reich occupied an area of 28,896 sq. km. containing 2,822,899 Germans and 738,502 Czechs and Slovaks” (Luza, p. 158).

Against the assertion that Czechoslovakia was not legally bound by the Munich protocol because it was not a signatory, Dr. Kurt Glaser explains:

The Prague government did, however, agree specifically to the cession in notes to Great Britain and France on September 21 and again in notes to the British September 25 and 26. Nor can it be pleaded that the cession was invalid because made under duress: if this were true, then the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain would both be invalid. (Glaser, p. 40 n.)

The most cursory knowledge of history indicates that most of the international treaties, especially those after wars, were made under duress. To claim that whatever duress there was invalidated the Munich Pact is a perversion of all historical precedent.

Nor was the Munich Pact appeasement, in the logical meaning of the term, that is, a surrender of rights to another because of fear. The Munich Pact was not appeasement, but belated justice, to which every nation is bound, whether in the face of a weaker or a stronger opponent. The oft repeated cliche, “Not another Munich,” especially when used in negotiations with communists, can well suggest to them a Western determination not to allow what, like the self-determination for the Sude-
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"In spite of numerous criticisms, the Viet-Nam program has been cited both by official and by unofficial sources as a model of what American aid can achieve." — John D. Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid: American Experience in Southeast Asia

The term "revisionism" refers to an intellectual revision of previously accepted categories or interpretations. It can be attached to any such shift in perspective. Stalinists have for years referred to their opponents as revisionists—"liberal deviationists" who have departed from Marxism-Leninism as interpreted by Comrade Stalin. In American history, however, the term generally is attached to anti-interventionist historians in the two post-war periods in the 20th century. A few of these scholars gained their academic reputation as revisionists in the 1920's and 1930's, and they continued to be critical of Roosevelt's machinations favoring armed intervention in the late 1930's. Harry Elmer Barnes, the sociologist-historian, made his initial reputation with The Genesis of the World War (New York: Knopf, 1926). Barnes, an old-fashioned economic interventionist, later opposed Roosevelt's foreign policy because he believed that it would interfere with the New Deal's domestic reforms. Another scholar, Charles C. Tansill, established his academic credentials when he wrote what is probably the best book on the subject of our entry into World War I, America Goes to War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1938; Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, reprint of 1938 ed.). His outlook was conservative, anti-New Deal, and generally anti-British. Both men produced post-World War II revisionist studies, Tansill in Back Door to War (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), and Barnes in Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton, 1953). (Both books have been reprinted, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood.) Warren I. Cohen summarizes their contributions in The American Revisionists (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), and offers selections from revisionist writers, among others, in Intervention, 1917 (Englewood, New Jersey: Heath, 1966).

From the beginning, the revisionist camp has been made up of a constituency differing widely on other issues. Socialists, anarchists, pacifists, conservatives: all have found reasons to oppose this nation's entry into the European wars. But in the

Gary North received his Ph.D. in history from the University of California at Riverside. The author of several books and numerous articles on economics and history, Dr. North edits the biweekly Remnant Review (Box 5025, North Long Beach, CA 90805), a newsletter of economic commentary, and is commentator on the Gold and Inflation Report, a telephone advisory service.
20-year period after the end of the Second World War, the revisionists tended to be conservatives and anti-New Dealers who had broken with Roosevelt's domestic and foreign policies a decade earlier. Percy Greaves is the most notable example. He had been a conservative financial columnist, and was the Republican counsel for the Pearl Harbor hearings. He later became an expert student of Ludwig von Mises' economic theories. Most of the younger scholars on the "economics side" of the conservative and libertarian revival, such as Murray Rothbard, were (if anything) generally proponents of the revisionist critique of New Deal foreign policy.

REALIGNMENTS IN REVISIONISM
One of the less understood repercussions of entry into World War II by the United States was the silencing of conserva-tive politicians who maintained their isolationism of the 1930's. Those who had national reputations did not get "full and impartial" coverage by the major news media when they spoke out on foreign policy issues. Midwestern states continued to send isolationists to the Senate until the mid-1950's, but one would hardly know of their existence by a reading of textbooks and even monographs on postwar American foreign policy. The man of the hour, if we are to believe the textbooks, was Senator Arthur Vandenberg, the "responsible" Republican advocate of a truly bipartisan-interventionist-foreign policy. (For a typical panegyric on Vandenberg, see Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age. [Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1960], pp. 127-130.) He was still getting glowing praises from my New Deal, liberal Democratic professor of foreign policy as late as 1961.

Robert A. Taft, "Mr. Republican," as he was known, was a staunch isolationist throughout the period. For this he earned the wrath of the liberals and the embarrased silence of the cold war conservatives. Writing in response to a 1941 Nation essay by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who advised the Republican Party to intervene in Europe the way it had intervened in the South in 1861, Taft lowered the boom. (Has Schlesinger ever been right about anything, anytime?) The average Republican voter, argued Taft, was not an interventionist, but the big businessmen were:

The most conservative members of the party-the Wall Street bankers, the society group, nine-tenths of the plutocratic newspapers, and most of the party's financial contributors-are the ones who favor intervention in Europe. I have received thousands of letters on both sides of the question, and I should say without question that it is the average man and woman-the farmer, the workman, except for a few pro-British labor leaders, and the small business man-who are opposed to war. The war party is made up of the business community of the cities, the newspaper and magazine writers, the radio and movie commentators, the Communists, and the university intelligentsia. (Quoted in James J. Martin, American Liberalism and World Politics, 1931-1941 [New York: Devin-Adair, 1964], II, p. 1278)

Leonard Liggio has pointed out that when Taft later opposed Truman's intervention in Korea as unconstitutional-the President had not consulted Congress, Taft argued, which was a far-out line of reasoning in 1950-Joseph Alsop, The Nation, and The New Republic all jumped on him as (get this!) a tool of the Communists. The remaining isolationists who were still running for office were also charged with being Communist dupes. By 1955 the American conservative movement, now spoken for by the newly created National Review, was clearly in the cold war interventionist camp. Thus, writes Liggio:

[Those] battered isolationists were the last carriers of a great American tradition, and constituted the last centers of total opposition to expanding and swelling American global imperialism. It was precisely these liberals, moreover, whom the historian William Appleman Williams has brilliantly termed "the corporate liberals", who have provided the major ideological and demagogic rationale for World War II and post-war American imperialism. ("Isolationism: Old and New," Left and Right, Winter 1966, p. 31)

The implicit division within the right-wing movement of the 1955-65 period broke out in the mid-1960's. Libertarians, as complete antistatists, were opposed to the cold war policies favored by the anticomunist conservatives. Ed Fæoy's article in the Summer 1961 issue of New Individualist Review spelled out the operating libertarian policy of "collaboration":

Still, individualists merge with the conservatives in urging a strict adherence to the Constitution in the United States. This is a tactical ma-

neuer. It is the strategy of individualists to work a Fabianism in reverse until one by one the parts of the political structure, beginning with the most absurd, are up-ended and continuing until nothing is left. The Constitution, strictly interpreted, aids in this process. (p. 25)

Obviously, the coming of the war in Vietnam shattered this alliance, as did the advent of the counter-culture, with its deep involvement in the drug scene. The antiwar movement and the victimless crimes movement fused, drawing an almost unbridgeable line between formerly cooperating YAFers or ISers. New Leftists replaced the ranks in the libertarian camp, at least insofar as drugs and Vietnam were concerned. The economic issues could be temporarily played down, especially since New Leftists seemed more vulnerable to libertarian economic arguments than vice versa.

Robert Lefevre's now defunct Rampart Journal combined, after 1965, the strands of libertarianism: state-less economics, World War II revisionism, and cold war revisionism. But with the demise of that journal in 1968, and with the winding down of the Vietnam war in 1972, the old interest in revisionism among younger conservatives and libertarians has tended to wane. This has not been true, however, among New Left historians. They have been dragged by their own researches, kicking and screaming, back into the revisionism of the pre-1965 period. They do not quote Tansill, Barnes, or Greaves, but their hostility to L.B.J.'s Gulf of Tonkin hanky panky has led them to a unique revelation: maybe, just maybe, F.D.R., pulled off something similar in 1941. In short, cold war revisionism and Vietnam criticism stand together as the so-called watershed, with libertarian and pacifist revisionists of the World Wars marching forward undaunted into cold war revisionism (leaving conservative anti-communists behind), and with New Left historians being pulled backward from Vietnam into the unrespectable world of New Deal foreign policy revisionism. Even
object of study in their own right. For example, Thomas Kuhn has produced a very useful and influential study of the way in which established academic guilds police their members (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962, rev. 1969]). Kuhn describes the history of physics and chemistry in modern times, arguing that the major breakthroughs have been primarily conceptual, forced upon younger scholars and skilled amateurs outside the guilds by newly observed facts—anomalies—that do not fit the established presuppositions (paradigms). Older, self-certified persons in the field cling to the established positions, usually until they die. Paradigm shifts do not normally come as a result of mass conversions; they come by attrition and retirement.

Not surprisingly, Kuhn's book became a standard footnote in the multiple revisions by younger scholars after 1965, irrespective of the academic discipline involved. It is a classic in the sociology of knowledge, having relativized the natural sciences as successfully as Karl Mannheim relativized the social sciences in the 1930's and Charles Beard and Carl Becker relativized the study of history. Their relativism should not obscure their fundamental point: scholarship is not neutral. If you ask the wrong questions, or start answering old ones with new and unrequested methods of inquiry, you will find yourself in very hot water in your discipline—untutored water, I might add.

THE MUNICH PARADIGM

If the Vietnam war has, a la Kuhn, brought on a paradigm shift, what was the paradigm which has been discarded?

Establishment liberalism brought on the war in Vietnam. (Conservative anti-communists just did not have the votes, nor did they dominate the State Department's hierarchy.) Wilsonian ideals were to be extended into every nook and cranny of every tribe on earth. The old progressive optimism was still intact in 1964. American know-how and military might could bring democracy into full bloom everywhere. Democracy—America's only national religion—was still the creed of liberals everywhere. Bruce Kuklick writes:

There are few who would deny the triumph of Wilson's views after World War II, and the intellectual rationale which justified policy decisions became increasingly rich in the postwar period. It is only at this time that it becomes appropriate to speak of a Wilsonian paradigm. ("History as a Way of Learning," American Quarterly, Fall 1970, p. 614)

As the Vietnam war escalated and the draft calls went up, the intensity of antiwar sentiment increased. The liberal paradigm in foreign policy began to shift; a Kuhn-like "scientific revolution" took place. The conduct of foreign policy, argues Kuklick, had been conducted after 1945 in terms of a "Munich syndrome," itself a paradigm shift:

Prior to both World Wars, diplomats have believed that the United States attempted to avoid international commitments; it need not or would not act in concert with other powers when an "aggressor" threatened international stability. By 1945 the United States had been "twice burned," and Americans had to alter their behavior. Policy-makers acted, so they believed, to avoid the catastrophes of 1917 and 1941; 1941 must not recur as 1917 had. This goal meant specifically that the United States had directly to intervene if it appeared that someone was seriously challenging world peace and order. There were to be no more Munichs. In effect "normal paradigmatic change" took place after World War II as American diplomats "solved" recurring problems by applying this model. Problems were in fact problems because they were significant in terms of the paradigm. Indeed, as policy-makers judged the twenty years of diplomacy after World War II in terms of the history that preceded it, they could agree that the Wilsonian disciplinary matrix worked. The horrible wars crucial to the development of the paradigm were avoided. Americans had resolved the crises which gave birth to the new paradigm. (p. 620)

During the Eugene McCarthy bid for the Presidency, an incredible piece of campaign literature appeared. It was a full-page picture of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, and on the corner of the sheet, this quote from the general appeared: "Anybody who commits the land power of the United States on the Continent of Asia ought to have his head examined." Here was the ultimate reversal: using MacArthur, the nemesis of all good liberals, to challenge their policies in Vietnam!

ABOUT-FACE

Walter Lippman, probably the most respected of all liberal commentators, has taken positions favorable to almost every ideology at one stage or another of his career. After 1965 he became a chief intellectual spokesman for "neo-isolationism." Ironically, it had been Lippmann's columns, 1915-17, that had argued that the United States should enter World War I—not to "make the world safe for democracy," but because national self-interest was involved. What was the national self-interest? World peace through world law, basically—some new form of internationalism. In 1914 he had written: "We do not think the United States should have gone to war. We alone cannot undertake to police the world." (Early Writings [New York: Liveright, 1970], p. 15) Then, in 1916, Lippmann penned one of the most stirring defenses of internationalism ever written:

Mr. Wilson deserves the gratitude of all decent men for having announced that America is ready to use its force for this civilized end. The whole preparedness agitation, which has been running wild of late by piling jingoism on hysteria, is given a new turn. It becomes our contribution to the world's peace, the only kind of peace in which we can find our own safety. Mr. Wilson has broken with the tradition of American isolation in the only way which offers any hope to men. Not only has he broken with isolation, he has ended the pernicious doctrine of neutrality, and has declared that in the future we cannot be neutral between the aggressor and the victim. That is one of the greatest advances ever made in the development of international morality. His speech means that America is ready to act on the belief that war is no longer a matter between two "sovereign" states, but a common world-problem of law and order in which every nation is immediately concerned. There is something intensely inspiring to Americans in the thought that when they surrender their isolation they do it not to engage in diplomatic intrigue but to internationalize world politics. They will surrender it for that, though they would have resisted bitterly a mere entanglement in the maneuvers which prepare new wars. (p. 39)

The wave of revulsion toward the First
World War which swept over the United States in the mid-1920's buried such thoughts as these. The isolationist reaction to League of Nations idea had torpedoed Wilson's dreams and his political party in 1920; after 1925 a whole series of "revisionist" books appeared, arguing that Germany was not exclusively responsible for the war—S. B. Fay, Harry Elmer Barnes—and that Wilson had maneuvered us into the war—Barnes, Charles C. Tansill, Walter Millis, C. H. Grattan. (See Cohen, The American Revisionists, and my review of his book in Rampart Journal, Winter 1967.) As Cohen shows, however, after 1939 Roosevelt's foreign policy in favor of intervention in Europe began to lead scholars back into the Wilsonian ideology. Persons who had supported revisionist arguments were increasingly suspect in the academic community. Barnes, heretofore a respected scholar, was fired from a teaching job in the obscurant Eastern Washington College of Education summer school in June 1941—a classic case of guild control in Kuhn's terms.

After World War II, sentiments like Lippmann's were once again in the ascendency, so much so that the 1946 Annual Report of the Rockefeller Foundation announced: "The Committee on Studies of the Council on Foreign Relations is concerned that the debunking journalistic campaign following World War I should not be repeated," and it went on to allocate a subsidy of $139,000 for the preparation of more respectable studies of the Second World War. (A critical comment on this decision can be found in the Saturday Evening Post, Oct. 1947.) Revisionist scholars of the post-World War period—Charles A. Beard, Tansill, Barnes, George Morgenstern, Frederic Sanborn, Percy Greaves—simply could not get a fair hearing in the academic guilds, and only Beard's great prestige was able to get Yale University Press to publish President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War (1948), and it won many enemies for Yale's editor, Eugene Davidson.

NEO-ISOLATIONISM

In 1963 Robert E. Osgood published what was to become a standard foreign policy study, Ideals and Self-Interest in American Foreign Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). It followed Lippmann's lead: America's self-interest is in extending her entangling alliances in the theater of world democracy. My guess is that fewer students will believe this thesis, and fewer professors assign the book (unless they use it for target practice), than was true in 1960. The paradigm has shifted, and with it went much of the prestige of pre-1965 liberalism. Neo-isolationism is here, if not to stay, then at least to take a long-term lease.

There is even a small flurry of interest in revisionism concerning World War II. Old Hamilton Fish, Roosevelt's Republican, isolationist critic in the House of Representatives, finds that his speeches on Roosevelt's malevolent prewar maneuvers are receiving far more favorable response from young people than ever before (according to Richard Hanks, from a 1970 interview with Fish). As Walter Goodman remarks:

Of course, one's timing may be off. The premature revisionists who sought to persuade us before Pearl Harbor that President Roosevelt was bent on drawing the nation into a foreign war could make a plausible case—but they found small welcome. That was not what most of us wanted to hear in 1940. ('Revisionism Revisited,' The New Leader, March 20, 1972, pp. 12-13.)

Or in 1960, it should be mentioned. The crowning blow to the old paradigm, as of 1972, may well have been a simple newspaper article in, of all places, the New York Times (Jan. 2, 1972, p. 7):

LONDON, Jan. 1 (AP)—Formerly top secret British Government papers made public today said that President Franklin D. Roosevelt told Prime Minister Winston Churchill in August, 1941, that he was looking for an incident to justify opening hostilities against Nazi Germany.

The account of the Roosevelt-Churchill talks was contained in 950 volumes of British War Cabinet papers made public for the first time.

The papers covered the period from January, 1941, to July, 1945, the largest collection of formerly secret British records ever released at one time.

Churchill's account of Roosevelt's attitude toward the war was contained in the minutes of that Cabinet meeting. The minutes, quoting Churchill indirectly, said: "He [Roosevelt] obviously was determined that they should come in."

"If he were to put the issue of peace and war to Congress, they would debate it for months," the Cabinet minutes added.

"The President had said he would wage war but not declare it and that he would become more and more provocative. If the Germans did not like it, they could attack American forces."

Somehow, I do not believe that the Times would have published this story in 1960, let alone in 1945. Apparently, once people came to the realization that a President could manipulate the facts in order to encourage military hostilities—which antirwar people believe was the case in President Johnson's Gulf of Tonkin maneuvers—F.D.R. could be fair game for criticism. I imagine that New Deal liberals will have to alter their position: before, no decent person could believe such a thing of Roosevelt; now, we must understand that these deceptions were necessary for world order, etc.

BALANCE OF POWER?

Emmet John Hughes, one of the most widely respected liberal columnists of the 1950's and 1960's, a speechwriter for President Eisenhower, and now a professor of politics at Rutgers University, granted an interview to newsmen in mid-1973. Some of his remarks were quoted by Robert J. Donovan in a Los Angeles Times column (Sept. 27, 1973):

People like me assumed from the days of F.D.R. on that the Presidency was the unique source of creative and progressive leadership and that the Congress was the resisting, conservative, negative force—the citadel of reaction. This was the typical liberal vision of the Presidency, and it wasn't until the middle of the 1960's that liberals began to question their assumption. As a result, you had this extraordinary reversal of roles. All of a sudden the liberals began to worry about presidential power.

Senator Fulbright illustrates this shift. In a speech in 1961, even after the Bay of Pigs, he suggested that the President should be given even greater power in foreign affairs than he possessed. Ten years later Fulbright made another speech saying that 30 years of war, cold war and crisis have propelled the American political system far along the road to an executive despotism, at least in the conduct of foreign relations and the making of war... It was the whole tragedy of Vietnam rather than the Watergate revelations that forced the liberals to realize that they had terribly underestimated the impor-
tance of the restraining power of the Congress and had terribly exaggerated the innate wisdom of the White House.

It is not surprising that Richard Neustadt's *Presidential Power*, once reputed to be John F. Kennedy's bible, and assigned so enthusiastically by liberal professors in 1961, is now assigned as a primary source relating to "the mess we are in" today.

AN EYE-OPENER FOR LIBERALS

This has been a lengthy digression within the framework of my original hypothesis: Kuhn's analysis holds up as well for recent political science or historiography as it does for 18th century science. It took a major disruption of the "facts"—Vietnam—to undermine the old liberal paradigm concerning America's participation in world diplomacy. Nixon's trips to China and Russia, attempting to soften the cold war hostilities, broke with a 1945-70 tradition, and the silence of Congressional conservatives in the face of these trips indicates that the conservative paradigm on the cold war is weakening. President Johnson operated in terms of a


Halberstam chronicles this ancient Greek process of *hubris*.

THE LAST BASTION

One topic—the ultimate litmus test of hardballer's credo—World War II revisionism—has generally been skirted: Hitler. Was he a madman, diplomatically speaking? Was he exclusively responsible for the Second World War? The respected British historian, A. J. P. Taylor, a Laborite and a critic of the Germans, produced an explosive book in 1961, *The Origins of the Second World War* (London: H. Hamilton, 1961; New York: Atheneum, 1962). It produced (to borrow language from World War II and Watergate) a firestorm of protest. Taylor concluded that Hitler was not really trying to conquer the world, or even Western Europe. He pushed a bit here, and a bit there, and time after time Western politicians and diplomats capitulated. Taylor's view of Hitler's foreign policy made Hitler look like some 1960s' teenager trying to score with his "chick" on successive dates. She just couldn't say no. Hitler was evil, but not mad, Taylor concluded. Whether or not Taylor's non-

with all such guides, however, check out the sources before you make any final conclusions. If you read that Professor So and So says such and such, go check it out. When dealing with any brand of revisionism, accept nothing crucial on faith.)

PLACING THE BLAME

Hoggan's thesis regarding the origins of the Second World War are straightforward, and completely unorthodox. The primary villain was not Hitler; it was Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary. By threatening to resign from the Tory cabinet, Halifax had secretly seized control of British foreign policy from peace-loving Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in October, 1938, ... During more than ten months which followed, Halifax conducted a single-minded campaign to plunge Germany into war, and in such a way as to make Germany appear to be the guilty party. His ingenious scheme was carried out against the wishes of the majority of the top English experts on Germany ... (The Myth of the "New History," p. 5)

What were his motives? The support of the traditional British view of the *balance of power*—one of Hoggan's favorite whipping boys (for good reasons). Hoggan pulls no punches:

Halifax was prompted by the conviction that the power and prestige of Hitler's Germany must on no account be allowed to overshadow the traditionally prominent position of Great Britain in Western Europe. It was for this British prestige, and not because of any military threat to Britain, that millions were destined to die in Europe and throughout the world. The documentary record has long since revealed that in 1939 it was Hitler's utmost desire to enjoy peaceful and friendly relations, and if possible even alliances, with both Great Britain and Poland. (p.5)

Well, yes and no. Yes, he wanted peaceful relations, but on his own terms. His was a socialist regime, messianic in nature, and expansionist to the core. Hitler wanted peaceful relations with the Soviet Union, too—for a while. Then he invaded. It is instructive to quote from Hoggan's own Ph.D. dissertation (Harvard, 1948) in this regard. He admits that one of the causes of the outbreak of World War II was the Germans' "highly nationalistic regime, their air of challenge and defiance to foreign countries ..." (p. 397). The West was also to blame, given their unwillingness to revise the Treaty of

"It was Pearl Harbor which became the primary apologetic technique for the creation of the CIA."
It is interesting to note his assessment of the Soviet Union’s role, especially with respect to his list of what nations were most responsible: “Their actual responsibility for the events that led to war was certainly less than that of Germany, Great Britain, France, and Poland. The Italian role was also secondary.” (p. 399) Most of all, his dissertation maintained, it was Poland which was responsible. The crucial passage regarding Great Britain’s role is his conclusion:

Nothing that the British did in 1939 can give them a primary responsibility for the war that broke out between Germany and Poland. British responsibility here enters only indirectly with the Versailles settlement, and in this instance the British were the least to blame of all the great powers for the Versailles solution of the German-Polish question. (1949)

I cite these passages in order to clear up a 15-year-old argument between Hoggan (backed up by the late Harry Elmer Barnes) and Hoggan’s dissertation advisor, William Langer. Langer maintains that Hoggan changed his thesis entirely with respect to the assessment of responsibility when he published Der erzogene Kreig in 1961. Hoggan insists that he only strengthened his original point (personal communication, 1963). After reading the original dissertation, I must support Langer’s position. But, as I said, when getting involved in revisionist historiography, check out the primary sources whenever possible.

Probably the most far-out materials on World War II revisionism have been the seemingly scholarly studies of the supposed execution of 6 million Jews by Hitler. The anonymous author of The Myth of the Six Million (whose writing style and use of footnotes internal to the text resembles Hoggan’s The Myth of the “New History” to a remarkable extent) has presented a solid case against the Establishment’s favorite horror story—the supposed moral justification for our entry into the War. (The Myth of the Six Million. [Hollywood: New Christian Crusade Church, 1969])

The untranslated books by the former Buchenwald inmate, Prof. Paul Rassinier, have seriously challenged the story: Le Mansonge d’Ulysse (1949), Ulysse trahi par les siens (1960), Le Veritable Proces Eichmann (1962), and Le Drame des Juifs Europeens (1964).

A recent and very inexpensive book in magazine form, Did Six Million Really Die?, appeared in 1973, written by Richard Harwood. (Surrey, England: Historical Review Press) One thing is certain: 6 million executions or not, we did not intervene when the Soviet Union executed millions of kulaks—the private owners of small farms, prior to their expropriation and liquidation by Stalin in the late 1920’s and early 1930’s. The kulaks, unfortunately for them, had no supporters writing editorials in the New York Times.

THE CHICKEN’S COME HOME TO ROOST

One other consideration also amuses me. The primary justification for the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, which the American press bought, was that we had been taken by surprise at Pearl Harbor, and it must not be allowed to happen again. The irony should be apparent. First and foremost, the regular military intelligence experts had cracked the Japanese code, and transmissions were being monitored prior to Pearl Harbor. David Kahn’s The Codebreakers (New York: Macmillan, 1967) devotes many pages to the story of how the code was broken. Second, there are only three excuses for our Commander in Chief not to have taken action, at least by warning the military authorities at Pearl Harbor and in the South Pacific of the impending attack: 1) there was so much information coming in that the experts overlooked the significant communica-

“Histories written by the victorious participants in a messianic crusade will not, in the long run, prove definitive.”

He won his acclaim by whitewashing his own recommendations and the recommendations of his State Department colleagues! This is the “objectivity” of the historical profession with respect to the New Deal.

Moreover, Feis had carte blanche in the State Department files—no other American historian has had comparable access, at least not one did in the 1950’s, when Feis was pouring out his defenses. Historians have a whole new world to reconstruct—the world which has been lost in the sealed files of the State Department and Pentagon. It does not require a conspiracy view of history to convince rational people that histories written by the victorious participants in a messianic crusade will not, in the long run, prove definitive.

What we need is a dedicated generation of younger scholars who are not dazzled, as the tenured Establishment historians are dazzled, by Roosevelt’s rhetoric. The collapse of isolationism, whether conspiratorial or not, was a national disaster from which this nation has not yet recovered. Fortress America may not have the old Madison Avenue ring to it, but it sure beats making the so-called Free World safe for the New York Times. 

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What is apparent is that the nature of the American government is gradually changing in its fundamental reality. Under the traditional labels of Republican and Democrat, with no innovation other than the contingent circumstances of place and character, the republic is becoming plutocratic and imperialistic.—José Martí, 1889 (in Philip Foner, A History of Cuba; and its Relations with the United States, p. 453)

Daniel Ellsberg, famous for his role in the release of the “Pentagon Papers,” recounts an incident which, from the perspective of American intervention in Vietnam, had given him pause for later reflection. It involved a disagreement with a fellow Harvard graduate student, a German who as a youth had served briefly in the Wehrmacht in the closing days of World War II, about atrocities committed at Lidice and other places. To Ellsberg’s objections to the latter, “He immediately replied, ‘That’s because you’ve never fought guerrillas. That’s the way you have to fight guerrillas.’ And I said, ‘Well, I don’t believe that’s a justification; there are other ways of fighting guerrillas, as a matter of fact, and I don’t believe we would do that.’” (Papers on the War [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972], pp. 287-88)

The war in Vietnam, especially the revelations of atrocities such as at My Lai, demonstrated that Americans were not as unique as Ellsberg had imagined. We could, and did, “do that.” Despite Ellsberg’s argument, no one has found another way to fight a guerrilla war, and there have been none in history in which the guerrillas had any degree of support among the population or that did not result in reprisals and atrocities against the civilian population identified with the guerrillas.

As the revelations of Watergate and

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domestic spying, the repeated falsification of information by the Central Intelligence Agency, and many such abuses of power by government officials accumulate, one word has continued to appear as an "explanation" of these developments—"aberration." Such an explanation suggests that these are isolated events, and should not be perceived as part of a pattern or process. But how many "aberrations" can be accepted before one is forced to conclude that the repetition of these events reveals the growth of an American Empire, if by that term is meant the centralization of government and abuse of power which some Americans, such as John Adams in 1775, have recognized as central to a definition of empire? (See Adams' Novanglus Letters.)

Ellisberg's retort reflected a view held by many Americans, who do not consider this nation an "imperial power" either in the sense of an arbitrary, centralized bureaucracy at home or of military interventionism abroad. His answer also assumed, in addition to a faith that Americans would not commit atrocities, that the United States had not yet become engaged in a guerrilla war. That he could do so indicated a shocking ignorance of American history in one of those Harvard educated "best and the brightest" who was later to lend his analytical abilities to the American intervention in Vietnam.

SOME "LITTLE" ABERRATIONS?

Yet quite early in the Indian wars, especially those against the Indians of the Great Plains late in the 19th century, Americans developed counterinsurgency tactics, including punishment of the population harboring insurgents and reservations to separate them from the warriors. The United States became a leader in the 20th century in intervening to put down insurgencies around the world and in developing tactics to defeat the insurgents (as in Nicaragua in the 1920's, where the Marines introduced the auto-gyro—the forerunner of the helicopter—as a counter-insurgency weapon).

In the numerous interventions prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, "anticommunism" could not be used as a rationale. Admitted imperialists such as Theodore Roosevelt seldom justified their actions before critics beyond referring to "the white man's burden" or the need for "world order." The primary means used in the more than three decades of intervention in the early 20th century was the Marine Corps, an elite group of highly trained volunteers. Since most of the insurgencies were rather small, the Marines were not conscripted, and few were the sons of upper middle class America, there were relatively few protests against such interventions. And little news of the internal dynamics of these "pacifications" filtered back to the American people.

Once in a while someone revealed what was going on—Gen. Smedley D. Butler (the only two-time Medal of Honor winner in combat, who had risen to second in command of the Corps) did so in the 1930's in War is a Racket, detailing the number of interventions in which he had participated and comparing the Marines to Al Capone's gangsters. Of course a denial of empire could be maintained simply by dismissing Butler as another of those "aberrations." (On Butler, see Jules Archer, The Plot to Seize the White House [New York: Hawthorn, 1973], pp. 132-33, 219-35.)

If Vietnam is to be viewed as another of these "aberrations" then it relegates to second place among American "aberrations" the first guerrilla war against Asians, the Philippine Insurrection, which involved the Army for some years, especially from 1899 to 1902. The Philippine intervention, once called "The Great Aberration of 1888" (S. F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States [Toronto: Holt, many ed.]), did cause a great protest against annexation of those islands to the United States. The protest focused around the Anti-Imperial question of empire. On the one hand there is the anti-interventionism which joins together revisionists, whether Marxists, some liberals, or the libertarians of the Old Right. At the other extreme are those few Americans, the view of which are sometimes found in the pages of National Review, who defend the notion of an American Empire. (See, for example, J. Bernard Burnham in National Review, Jan. 26, 1971, pp. 77-80.) This article is primarily intended for those Americans, the majority in the middle, who believe that such interventions as Vietnam are mistakes or "aberrations," the result of an effort to "contain" communism and not part of a larger process of empire.

At this point most concerned Americans are very much aware of the repeated deceptions of the public that characterized the whole U.S. involvement in Vietnam. One way to approach the question of whether American interventions have been "aberrations" or part of a growth of empire, is to compare that other "great aberration," the intervention in the Philippines beginning in 1898, with what is known about the involvement in Vietnam.

"There have been no guerrilla wars in history that did not result in reprisals and atrocities against the civilian population."

League and was led by a number of prominent Americans. One key to understanding the views of revisionists and anti-interventionists such as Charles A. Beard, Oswald Garrison Villard, and Harry Elmer Barnes is to recognize that as young men Beard and Villard were active in the opposition to American policy in the Philippines and Barnes later served as general editor of a whole series of volumes on American Imperialism.

REVISIONISM AND THE EMPIRE DEBATE

In the last decade revisionist historians have played an important role in reopening a debate closed off since the early years of the cold war—the question of the existence and nature of an American Empire. Revisionists are discovering that it is not sufficient to focus on specific incidents, even ones as large as American involvement in two world wars or the cold war. The key that links these events and debates together is the growth of empire. That important point was understood by some of the Old Right critics of American "globalism" such as Garet Garrett (The People's Potage [Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton, 1958]).

Americans fall into three groups on the if the same pattern of governmental deception, lies, and brutalization of American soldiers and the native population is evident, then it would appear difficult to continue to hold the "aberrationist" thesis. If this is not evidence for the growth of an imperial America, what kind of a society is it? What is the nature of its character and the sources of its conduct, that it finds itself enmeshed in such "great aberrations" within less than half a century?

THE CRISIS OF THE 1890's

Even before involvement in the Philippines, the counterrevolutionary posture of the U.S. government was evident in its policy toward the revolution in Cuba, which erupted again in 1895 after a breathing spell of some 17 years. While opinion among the American people seemed to favor an independent Cuba, the administrations of Grover Cleveland and then William McKinley made clear that a degree of Cuban autonomy under continued Spanish rule was preferable. José Martí's letters indicate that he renewed the conflict before the Cuban forces were ready because he feared the United States might soon attempt to annex the island. Some historians believe that the Cubans
"Admitted imperialists such as Theodore Roosevelt seldom justified their actions beyond referring to 'the white man's burden' or the need for 'world order.'"

would have won anyway, without American intervention, and that the United States intervened precisely because such a victory was probable.

McKinley's approach to war supports that view. A number of Congressmen criticized his war message as "weak" because it made no promise of Cuban independence. The Senate tried to pass such a resolution but the President brought all his power to bear to defeat it. The Teller Amendment which finally was passed promised only that the United States would not annex Cuba. That left open the door for the kind of protectorate which was formalized in the Platt Amendment in 1902. It would not be unfair to say that a "credibility gap" was created between McKinley's motives for opting for war and the reasons for which Congress and the public thought the country was going to war.

The first great victory in the war was not in Cuba, but in the Philippines, where on May 1 Admiral Dewey's ships destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. The administration was not as surprised by the action as some pretended. The Filipino revolutionists, led by Emilio Aguinaldo, had asked for American aid a year earlier. Long before Theodore Roosevelt became Assistant Secretary, the Navy Department had a battle plan for action in the Philippines (John A. S. Grenville and George B. Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917 [New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1966], Chapter XI. Dewey had met with Aguinaldo, and the Filipinos cooperated with the Americans.

The Filipinos began to express concern about American intentions when an expeditionary force was ordered to the islands on May 19. Under the armistice terms, signed August 12, American troops occupied Manila, but Filipino soldiers were forced to remain outside the city.

In the meantime some segments of the American press had begun to talk of annexing the Philippines. Though later historians have not always done so, Americans at the time distinguished between "expansionism" and "imperialism" (Marina, Opponents of Empire: An Interpretation of American Anti-Imperialism, 1898-1921 [doctoral dissertation, U. of Denver, 1968], Chapter III). Hawaiian annexation was considered "expansion" even by its opponents. The Hawaiian government, though established in 1893 with some American help, had sustained itself for five years. While a plebiscite would have been the best method of annexation, the government had acquired a certain legitimacy through the passage of time. Opposition to annexation by joint resolution was extensive, but contrary to the views of some historians such as J. W. Pratt (Expansionists of 1898 [Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1936]), the Spanish-American War probably delayed rather than speeded up the taking of Hawaii. In the case of the Philippines, where annexation contradicted the idea of self-determination for the Filipinos, opponents of acquisition from the very first termed it an example of imperialism.

BRINGING ON WAR

Meanwhile, McKinley continued, even after the armistice, to send American troops to the islands. His tough instructions to their commanders, softened in some cases before being posted, only served to heighten the suspicions of the Filipinos. Like Patrick Henry in 1765, with a war just having been concluded, the Filipinos must have wondered what enemy existed in that quarter of the world that 10,000 additional troops were necessary. The President urged the Filipinos to trust him, but their representative, Felipe Agoncillo, was unable to obtain a hearing with American officials either in Washington or at the peace conference in Paris.

In the face of these actions by the administration, and given the momentous issue before the country, a number of leaders in American society called a National Conference on the Foreign Policy of the United States which met at Saratoga, New York, on August 19 and 20, 1898. On the whole the Conference accepted the need for commercial expansion but rejected a policy of imperialism, and so instructed a delegation which, as we shall see, was sent to consult with McKinley. (For the story outlined here see Marina, Chapter III.)

Historians, who for years accepted Teddy Roosevelt's description of McKinley as having "the backbone of a chocolate eclair," have suggested that the President made up his mind to take the Philippines after testing public sentiment on his trip through the Midwest early in October. (See, for example, Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit [New York: Literary Guild, 1931], p. 382.) It seems more likely, however, that he had already made a decision on the question and used the trip to develop public sympathy to that end.

On September 15, the same day he issued instructions to the delegation headed for Paris, McKinley met with representatives from the Saratoga conference. A report of that meeting, not heretofore cited in studies on these events, is revealing. George McAneny wrote to Carl Schurz, who was unable to attend the meeting because of illness, that the President wished to take at least Manila, and probably all of Luzon. When the delegation would not express itself favorably on this idea, the President sought to persuade them. It did not appear he was asking advice but building a rationale for a policy already decided upon. (Sept. 17, 1898, in Carl Schurz Papers, Library of Congress)

The opposition organized as it became apparent that McKinley intended to annex the islands. An Anti-Imperialist League was formed and meetings were held throughout the country. Those held in the universities, where a number of teachers spoke out against the policy of imperialism, closely resembled the teach-ins held over half a century later. These meetings increased in intensity after fighting broke out in the Philippines early in 1899.

Early in December the Senate began to debate the peace treaty negotiated in Paris. The major point at issue was the annexation of the Philippines. At the final vote on February 6, 1899, it was openly acknowledged that the administration had bought votes through political favors. Even with this enormous pressure the vote was close, aided by the fighting which broke out in the islands the night before. The attack was launched by Aguinaldo, who had become convinced by McKinley's actions that the United States not only intended to annex the Islands, but that the Filipinos would not be consulted with respect to any plans for the future. It seemed better to attack at once rather than to wait until the American force had grown even larger. (Philippine Insurgent Records, microfilm reel file 77-1280, National Archives, Washington, D.C.)

Thus the United States found itself at war in Asia, engaged in the first counter-

"The Filipinos must have wondered what enemy existed in that quarter of the world that 10,000 additional troops were necessary."
revolutionary effort of the 20th century. While the war continued the American government sent the first of several Commissions which would make the long journey to the islands. Led by Jacob Gould Schurman, the President of Cornell University, who considered himself a "reluctant imperialist" and later moved toward an anti-imperialist view, the Commission soon developed contact with the conservative elements in Philippine society which had long cooperated with the Spanish. The revolutionists, though not all groups were represented, were more representative of Philippine society, and had a heavy Chinese influence among the leaders. (John R. M. Taylor, "The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States," galley proofs, National Archives)

McKINLEY'S DECISION

McKinley's use of the power of the executive effectively excluded both the American people and the Congress from any real debate or role in the alternative chosen by the President. Tyler Dennett, himself active in the State Department, many years ago noted that McKinley "created a situation . . . which had the effect of coercing the Senate" (Americans in Eastern Asia [New York: Macmillan, 1922], p. 631). It is difficult to disagree with that assessment.

The President never framed all of the possible alternatives available in a way that could be understood by the public. Many textbooks recount the story which he later related to some religious leaders about how he worried about what to do with the islands: America could not give them back to Spain, nor let another power take them, nor leave them to the Filipinos. He fell on his knees in prayer, and later that night it came to him that the United States must take the islands and Christianize and uplift the people. The President, or—if one follows the logic of his story—God, failed to mention one alternative that was pushed by the anti-imperialists and which had been communicated to him by George S. Boutwell, the President of the Anti-Imperialist League: seek a treaty among the powers guaranteeing the neutralization of the islands. (See also Edward Atkinson to William McKinley, Jan. 26, 1899, in McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.)

This alternative was clearly understood by some of the leaders in 1898. McKinley chose to ignore it, probably because he wanted complete freedom of action. Such an alternative would have fit in well with the Filipinos' own fears of either German or Japanese intervention, a concern shared by McKinley and probably the single most important factor affecting his decision. Had the United States gone to the Hague Peace Conference in 1899 with such a proposal the whole tone of that Conference might have been changed. (See Calvin D. Davis, The United States at the First Hague Peace Conference [Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962].)

The Philippine Insurgency, as it came to be called by the United States, turned out to be a far more costly adventure in men and money than the "splendid little war" of 1898. After initial success, the U.S. Army encountered considerable difficulty as the Filipinos began to resort to guerrilla warfare. In the end the United States, with its program of "benevolent pacification," as it was called, had to build the same concentration points for the population—"Reconcentrados"—for which it had criticized the Spanish in Cuba. This led to a war of attrition and destruction in which thousands died. Few prisoners were taken, and the water torture was employed to gain information from captured Filipinos. On their side the guerrillas dealt with collaborators with the Americans by slicing off their lips so that they might never talk again. (Richard E. Welch, Jr., "American Atrocities in the Philippines: The Indictment and the Response," Pacific Historical Review, May 1974, pp. 233-53)

The War Department's own statistics suggest that one-sixth of the people on Luzon—about 616,000 persons—were killed or died of disease within the first two years of fighting. Although anti-imperialists protested the atrocities, few American soldiers were ever brought to trial. The American people did not become as troubled as they did later with Vietnam, probably because the American soldiers who were getting killed were volunteers, not the conscripted sons of middle class America.

APATHY AT HOME

The U.S. Army, composed in many cases of immigrants and blacks, had been fighting counterinsurgency war for years in the Indian wars of the Great Plains. Many of these same troops and their commanders were sent to the Philippines. It is ironic that even the Army has omitted studying the history of its intervention in the Philippines. While Algeria and other counterinsurgencies have been studied, Capt. John R. M. Taylor's multi-volume study of the Philippine Insurrection, in galley proofs, lies buried in the National Archives. (The irony here is that Taylor tried repeatedly, into the 20th century, to get the study published because he felt it might someday be of value to the Army. The letters on this story are in the National Archives. See also John T. Farrell, "An Abandoned Approach to Philippine History: John R. M. Taylor and the Philippine Insurrection Records," The Catholic Historical Review, Jan. 1954, pp. 385-407.)

How was the American army able to win in the Philippines what was denied it in Vietnam? Despite the protests of the anti-imperialists, the average middle class American was relatively isolated from the tragedy of the war, which received much less coverage in the press, magazines, or books. Philippine nationalism was in its infancy so that the Filipinos suffered both ideologically and organizationally. Finally, unlike North Vietnam, the Filipinos were deprived of the aid of another power. The Japanese at first sold them guns and sent advisers, but the latter were withdrawn in the face of American pressure. (Philippine Insurgent Records, microfilm collection 719, reel 8, National Archives.) It seems clear that guerrilla wars by their very nature must lead to reprisals against the population in which the guerrillas operate. Any nation which prides itself on a belief in the right of self-determination must ask itself whether or not such interventions inherently contradict this value.

HUSHING THE OPPOSITION

The government consistently harassed opponents of the war in the Philippines. Reporters were ejected from the islands and the mails were tampered with. The War Department kept files on groups protesting the government's actions, e.g., the Bureau of Insular Affairs kept track anti-imperialists (file No. 14086, National Archives). (This has never been noted in previous studies of the anti-imperialists.) That opponents of the war could only be labeled "disloyal" rather than sympathet-

"At the final vote on the peace treaty it was openly acknowledged that the administration had literally bought votes through political favors."
ic to communism made the protest of the 1890's different from the witch hunts which have accompanied other protests of 20th century American foreign policy.

The American people never did have a chance to make a clear choice about the policy of imperialism. In that sense the election of 1900 resembled that of 1964. William Jennings Bryan did not explore the issue in 1900 and find it "stale," as one historian has suggested (Thomas A. Bailey, "Was the Presidential Election of 1900 a Mandate for Imperialism?" Mississippi Valley Historical Review, June 1937, pp. 43-52). He gave only one real speech on the subject, the purpose of which was to secure the votes of the independent anti-imperialists. Much of the speech was written by Erving Winslow of the Anti-Imperialist League, and Bryan read it in a monotone so that reporters had to ask him to speak up (The New York Times, Aug. 9, 1900). It is impossible to say whether Bryan could have won in 1900 had he made the issue imperialism rather than Free Silver. Possibly it would have made little difference. On the other hand, judging from the response of the many young delegates at the Democratic convention, imperialism was not the stale issue it was thought to have been. Bryan apparently stressed it only long enough to secure the votes of the independents who met in August and, on the basis of that speech, endorsed the Nebraskan.

The minimal program of the anti-imperialists had always been to secure a promise by the Government that the Filipinos would be given their independence some time in the not too distant future. Had Bryan really pressed the issue of empire, it is possible that McKinley might have decided to make such a promise so as to undercut the appeal of the Democrats. The President did mention to his Secretary, George Cortelyou, that he had such a plan in mind should he need to use it. Bryan's failure to stress the issue more vigorously once again made it possible for McKinley to hold all the policy options and to hold back from making a promise of independence.

The anti-imperialist protest was made up of more than just the older Republicans of the Mugwump tradition. A number of young progressive leaders such as Senator John F. Shafroth of Colorado were members of the Anti-Imperialist League. Some of them, working in the Congress, were instrumental in pushing through legislation in the years after 1900 which greatly liberalized American colonialism in the Philippines and Puerto Rico. The fact that these men in the Congress had been members of the earlier protest has not generally been acknowledged by historians. It is true that some anti-imperialists, such as Senator Ben Tillman of South Carolina, based part of their opposition to acquisition of the Philippines on an antipathy to black people in this country. On the other hand, Moorfield Storey, the president of the League during most of its existence, was one of the founders of the NAACP. Carl Schurz and others thought democracy impossible in the tropics, but that was a geographical, and not a racist argument.

HISTORIANS AND THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS

The main reason that 20th century liberal historiography has not found the anti-imperialists as "relevant" as one might have expected is probably that many of the "aunties" were laissez-fairists who coupled their protest against imperialism, as did William Graham Sumner, with a much larger general critique of statism. That approach has little appeal for those who hope to increase the power of the State.

A real dividing line in the anti-imperialist opposition to empire came in the atrocity investigations held by the Senate in 1902. Those who pushed that issue, such as Carl Schurz and Moorfield Storey, realized that they had cut themselves off from dialogue because they were viewed as "extremists." For the "national honor"'s sake, it was not nice to get into the investigation of mass graves and killings. Later on, a number of "front" groups were used to get the message across, groups such as the Philippine Independence Society, headed by a more "respectable" anti-imperialist, President Charles Eliot of Harvard. (See Marina, Chapter V, for anti-imperialist activities after 1900.)

It is certainly true that there was a large overlap between the anti-imperialist and peace movements. For some, however, such as Andrew Carnegie, it was a way to avoid the hard confrontation of the atrocity question. To satisfy some Republicans he withdrew his $5,000 financial support of the atrocity investigation. The peace movement was a much safer proposition! It was like motherhood; no one could be against it.

It used to be commonplace for liberal historians to comment upon the excessive gloom of the anti-imperialists. In the light of what has happened in the last decade or so, it is not so certain that the anti-imperialists were wrong in their assessment. Consider the observation of Moorfield Story:

When Rome began her career of conquest, the Roman Republic began to decay. ... Let us once govern any considerable body of men without their consent, and it is a question of time how soon this republic shares the fate of Rome. (Quoted in Maria C. Lanzar, "The Anti-Imperialist League," Philippine Social Science Review, 1930, p. 9)

THE GROWTH OF EMPIRE

The parallels between U.S. interventions in the Philippines and Vietnam suggest that such actions have not been temporary aberrations, but rather part of the organic growth of an American Empire. The numerous interventions of the 20th century simply provide additional evidence for that interpretation.

Elsewhere I have suggested that the internal process of empire, the growth of a centralized, bureaucratic State, is even more fundamental than imperialism, the oftentimes foreign policy of empire (Marina, Egalitarianism and Empire [Menlo Park, California: Institute for Humane Studies, 1975]). The problem of the origins of empire and imperialism reveal the stress points and the limitations within which libertarians can have a dialogue or cooperate with some parts of the radical left. Such radicals see imperialism as the inevitable result of capitalism. They have a profound dislike of the free market, and their solution to the crisis of empire is a neomercantilist or socialist state. Libertarians view the process of empire as developing out of a growing statism, both internally and in foreign policy. The libertarian solution is, therefore, the opposite of that of the radical left—to curtail the power of the State and to expand the area of the free market. Such a widely divergent analysis of the problem, and of the alternative solutions, suggests that any real dialogue or cooperation with the radical left, beyond a criticism of the existing corporate syndicalist structure,
must, for libertarians, be very limited. We do need, however, to develop a theory of imperialism and empire consistent with the parameters of our paradigm. That the Marxists long ago did so, and have constantly updated it, is one explanation of the strength they have shown, particularly in the undeveloped world where such an explanation of imperialism has great appeal. (See Clinton Rossiter, Marxism: The View from America [New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1960].)

The United States has found the cost of intervention in Southeast Asia more than the American people wished to pay, either in men or money. That belated recognition is not going to bring back the Americans and Vietnamese who paid with their lives for that arrogance of power. It is still not too late, however, to begin a restoration of republican principles in American government. In the form of inflation, that blunder will also be passed on to generations of Americans as the real wealth of the country is exported abroad to help pay the costs of that war.

Decades of American rule and influence in the Philippines have not brought that nation any closer to the ideals of a free society. On the contrary, those islands are in a chaotic condition. Insofar as such interventions help to destroy the more progressive leadership in those societies, they make the eventual triumph of communism, or some other variant of statism, an even stronger eventuality. In the light of the failure to bring democracy to the Philippines since 1898, with so much in our favor as compared to Vietnam, involvement in the latter made no sense at all. In the final analysis, it is not communism to which we have opposed ourselves, but an Asian nationalism determined to oust Western domination from that area.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ADDENDUM


There is a certain moral myopia shown by those few historians who have dealt with the atrocity question, apparently in an effort to maintain their “objectivity.” Frank Freidel, in Samuel Eliot Morison, et al., Dissent in Three American Wars (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 90, attempts to denigrate the anti-imperialist charges. Welch, in “Atrocities,” does list “fifty-seven verifiable instances when American soldiers committed atrocities” (p. 234), but the anti-imperialist study “Marked Sensibilities,” in the pages of the 195-page analysis seeking to show also the total context of what in Vietnam was called counterinsurgency warfare and pacification. (In the Philippines it was “benevolent pacification.” In that approach you burned over and destroyed the land until it could support nothing.) There is also Henry F. Graff, (ed.) American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection: Testimony Taken from Hearings on Affairs in the Philippine Islands before the Senate Committee on the Philippines (Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown, 1969).

None of these studies details the tremendous efforts of the anti-imperialists simply to have hearings held at all, or that an imperialist, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, was chairman of the committee. (Recall how difficult it was to hold hearings on Vietnam even when the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator J. William Fulbright, was sympathetic to an investigation. For the problems of the anti-imperialists in pushing the investigation in 1920 see Marina, 1968, Chapter IV.


The view that progressivism and imperialism are linked was most influentially expressed in William E. Leuchtenburg, “Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive Movement and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1916,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Dec. 1952, pp. 483-504. A correction in one area, but not mentioning men such as Shafroth and other active, younger anti-imperialists, is Barton J. Bernstein and Franklin A. Leib, “Progressive Republican Senators and American Imperialism, 1898-1916: A Reappraisal,” Mid-America, July 1968, pp. 163-205. Actually, the Leuchtenburg piece rests on extremely shaky ground. It is obvious from a cursory reading that he deals only slightly with the Philippines, surely the major example of imperialism in those years. He is also quite selective in the progressives he discusses. A large number of anti-imperialist progressives can also be cited. See Marina, 1968, Chapter V.

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Non-Marxist Theories of Imperialism

Alan Fairgate

"Empire-building is done not by 'nations' but by men. The problem before us is to discover the men, the active, interested minorities in each nation, who are directly interested in imperialism, and then to analyze the reasons why the majorities pay the expenses and fight the wars necessitated by imperialist expansion."—Parker T. Moon, Imperialism and World Politics, 1926

"...we must name the system that creates and sustains the war in Vietnam—name it, describe it, analyze it, understand it and change it."—Carl Oglesby, "Trapped in a System," speech delivered at the October 1965 antiwar march on Washington

One of the most encouraging aspects of the emergence of the libertarian movement during the late 1960's and early 1970's has been the growing receptivity within that movement toward revisionist historical scholarship—both within the areas of domestic political history and foreign diplomatic history. Not only are such revisionist classics as Harry Elmer Barnes' Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton, 1953; Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, reprint of 1953 ed.) receiving wider attention, but increased interest has also been focused on the works of such "New Left" revisionist historians as Gabriel Kolko, William Appleman Williams, and Lloyd C. Gardner on the origins of the cold war. (Perhaps the most comprehensive bibliography of the works available on World Wars I and II revisionism is Harry Elmer Barnes' pamphlet "Select Bibliography of Revisionist Books Dealing with the Two World Wars and Their Aftermath," available in Barnes, ed., The Rightwing Tradition in America [New York: Arno, 1972].)

As a consequence of their exposure to revisionist works, libertarians have acquired a more sophisticated awareness of the historical continuity underlying America's expansionist foreign policy and of the economic factors that have been important in shaping it. In particular, historical revisionism has played a vital role in penetrating the veil of anticommmunist ideology which has served to justify America's interventionist role in world affairs during the post-1945 period.

Unfortunately, however, the response thus far to the work of revisionist historians has largely been restricted to passive acceptance or, in some cases, active cheering. Very few have undertaken the more difficult task of elaborating a theoretical framework capable of "explaining" the nature and evolution of U.S. foreign policy in terms of a solid free market analysis. Historical revisionism and Austrian economics have been largely compartmentalized areas of scholarship and little effort has been made to systematically integrate these two disciplines. A few, such as Murray Rothbard, Leonard Liggio, and Walter Grinder, are important exceptions to this generalization and some of their work will be discussed later.

A major reason for this failure has been the lingering taint attached to theories of imperialism by those who continue to view them as necessarily the product of a (fundamentally flawed) Marxist economic analysis. Such an attitude, however, overlooks non-Marxist theories of imperialism. The latter group encompasses economic analyses which are highly uneven in quality, but nevertheless contain useful insights
for the elaboration of an authentically libertarian theory of imperialism.

ANTI-IMPERIALISM AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE

Ever since the emergence of systematic laissez-faire economic analysis in England in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, advocates of laissez-faire economic doctrines have served in the forefront of anti-imperialist movements. While early critiques of England's colonial foreign policy had focused primarily on political and moral objections, Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations presented the first comprehensive economic refutation of the mercantilist doctrines which had been used to justify the acquisition of colonies. Upholding the virtues of division of labor, economic specialization, and freedom of trade, Smith persuasively argued that protectionism and regulation of commerce would hamper, rather than promote, economic growth and welfare.

The insights of Adam Smith were later amplified by the two leading representatives of the Manchester School, Richard Cobden and John Bright, who vigorously campaigned on behalf of a strict noninterventionist foreign policy for England. While most people are probably aware that Cobden and Bright led the struggle to repeal the Corn Laws—as oppressive interference with free trade—relatively few are aware of their extensive involvement in the peace movement in England or, in particular, their outspoken opposition to England's involvement in the Crimean War. This had been an extremely popular war in England and both Cobden and Bright suffered widespread vilification as "peace at any price" men. Their active role as critics of England's foreign policy is discussed in Donald Read's Cobden and Bright (London: Edward Arnold, 1967), William Dawson's Richard Cobden and Foreign Policy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1926) and J. A. Hobson's Richard Cobden: The International Man (London: Ernest Benn, 1919, 1968).

Neither man was a pacifist but both were acutely aware of the necessary connection between laissez-faire economic policies and noninterventionism abroad. The first pamphlets written by Cobden, "England, Ireland and America" and "Russia," advanced a theme which he and Bright reiterated often in later years: war and intervention abroad are parasitic and destructive activities which sap the strength of the domestic economy and ruin trade. Such a foreign policy is necessarily accompanied by heavy national debt and oppressive taxation, which handicap industry, trade, and agriculture. Furthermore, the political consequences would inevitably be a strong executive government progressively restricting the role of Parliament, using the pretext of the need for secrecy in diplomatic activi-

The extent of Cobden's opposition to England's interventionist foreign policy is indicated by the following:

I am opposed to any armed intervention in the affairs of other countries. I am against any interference by the Government of one country in the affairs of another nation, even if it be confined to moral suasion. Nay, I go further, and disapprove of the formation of a society or organization of any kind in England for the purpose of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. (Quoted in Dawson, p. 108)

Cobden had perceived that England's aristocratic class was the major antagonist of free trade and, similarly, that the landed aristocracy was the strongest supporter of an interventionist foreign policy: "Wars have ever been but another aristocratic mode of plundering and oppressing commerce" (Quoted in Dawson, p. 122). Cobden's unrelenting hostility to the foreign policy of Lord Palmerston is best summarized in the following excerpt from one of his letters:

[W]e shall do no good until we can bring home to the conviction and consciences of men the fact that, as in the slave-trade we had surpassed in guilt the whole world, so in foreign wars we have been the most aggres-

sive, quarrelsome, warlike and bloody nation under the sun. (Quoted in Dawson, p. 122)

ANTl-IMPERIALISM IN AMERICA

Across the Atlantic, America's first tentative efforts to annex overseas territories at the end of the 19th century prompted the emergence of a broad anti-imperialist movement. The Anti-Imperialist League founded in 1898 served as the leading organizational embodiment of the movement and, with few exceptions, the organizers of the League were firm adherents of laissez-faire economic doctrines. Like the Manchester School of Cobden and Bright (which strongly influenced the anti-imperialist movement in the United States), these individuals perceived that free trade and anti-imperialism are inextricably bound together. Historical accounts of the movement at the turn of the century are available in E. Berkeley Tompkins, Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890-1920 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970) and Robert L. Beisner, Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperi-


phy of one of the leaders of the Anti-Imperialist League. Atkinson had been active in the abolitionist movement, raising funds to supply John Brown's guerillas in Kansas with weapons and ammunition, and had campaigned vigorously for an end to tariffs and government-backed banking and currency. (The biography discusses Atkinson's great respect for the economic analysis of Frederic Bastiat.)

William Graham Sumner's essay "The Contest of the United States by Spain" (Chicago: Gateway/Regency) provides an excellent introduction to the main elements of the anti-imperialist critique of American foreign policy. Sumner explained the title of the essay in the following manner: "We have beaten Spain in a military conflict, but we are submitting to be conquered by her on the field of ideas and policies. Expansionism and imperialism are nothing but the old philosophies of national prosperity which brought Spain to where she now is." (p. 139)

Sumner went on to develop the theme that republic and empire are antithetical concepts and that interventionism abroad would require the abandonment of America's traditional isolationist policies as well as her anticolonial heritage. Moreover, he argued, annexing overseas territories is morally wrong, violating such fundamen-

tal principles as liberty, democracy, equality, and self-government. Sumner stressed that the values of militarism and "industrialism" are inherently antagonistic, and that imperialism would result in the triumph of militarism. On a purely practical level, he challenged the assumption that the United States could effectively administer a farflung colonial empire embracing people of different backgrounds and cultures, and charged that the colonies would become a serious drain on American economic resources.

The isolationist movement prior to World War II provides another example of an anti-interventionist movement which mobilized the support of a large number of adherents of classical liberalism (although the movement as a whole encompassed a broad spectrum of political views). A detailed bibliography covering this field is available in Justus Doenecke's "The Literature of Isolationism: A Guide to Non-Interventionist Scholarship, 1930-1972" (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, 1972). In addition, a penetrating analysis of the origins and development of the isolationist movement is provided in Leonard Liggio's essays in Left and Right ("Why the Futile Crusade?" Spring 1965, pp. 4-22, "Isolationism: Old and New," Winter 1966, pp. 19-35; "Early Anti-

"The isolationist movement prior to World War II mobilized the support of a large number of classical liberals."

Spring-Summer 1967, pp. 56-61.

Liggio’s model of “Paleface”-“Redskin” tensions within American society (Autumn 1966) offers an original and valuable framework for analysis of the isolationist movement. The Redskin category encompasses the mass of American people who fled statist oppression in Old World feudal systems and who instinctively recognize that their real enemy is their own government rather than the “official” enemies abroad used to divert attention from domestic problems. The “Palefaces,” on the other hand, are those who seek to implant the feudal structures of the Old World in American society, transforming the contractual relationships of a market economic system into the static status relationships of feudalism. Liggio argued that the isolationist movement is a manifestation of the underlying hostility between the Redskin and Paleface in American society.

More recently Ronald Radosh has written a major new study Prophets on the Right: Profiles of Conservative Critics of American Globalism (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975) which analyzes in detail five of the leading Old Right isolationists. This book is particularly significant because it was written by a prominent “New Left” revisionist historian and offers a highly favorable evaluation of the isolationist heritage.

THE NEW DEAL AND IMPERIALISM
John T. Flynn’s As We Go Marching (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1944; New York: Free Life, 1973) remains one of the most brilliant analyses of the New Deal to have emerged from that period. Flynn—leader of the militant New York chapter of the America First Committee—traced the emergence of fascist economic systems in Germany and Italy and then noted their close similarities to the economic policies adopted by the United States during the New Deal. He defined “fascism” as:

...a system of social organization in which the political state is a dictatorship supported by a political elite and in which the economic society is an autarchial capitalism, enclosed and planned, in which the government assumes responsibility for creating adequate purchasing power through the instrumentation of national debt and in which militarism is adopted as a great economic project for creating work as well as a great romantic project in the service of the imperialist state. (p. 161, 2nd ed.)

Flynn’s analysis stressed the inevitable autarchic dimension of Keynesian demand-management policies. He argued persuasively that imperialism and militarism constitute essential elements of fascist economic systems since they provide the only channels for massive government expenditures that will command the enthusiastic support of conservative economic interests. Thus, while the primary focus of the book is the domestic economic policies of the New Deal, he set out to demonstrate that such domestic policies have clear implications for foreign policy. He arrived at the important theoretical insight that domestic and foreign policies in a “state capitalist” system are inextricably linked, so that neither can be fully understood in isolation.

The work of Lawrence Dennis provides a useful complement to Flynn’s study. Like Flynn, Dennis anticipated the emergence in the United States of a regimented corporate state which would attempt to plan consumption patterns, maintain expenditures to keep full employment, and protect the economy through high tariffs. Dennis was far from an advocate of laissez-faire economic policies, however. He was an adherent of Frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier thesis, believing that America’s expanding frontier had provided a necessary outlet for the domestic economy and that the end of the continental frontier confronted American policymakers with a choice between fascism and communism.

Unlike Flynn, Dennis appeared to believe that a strong authoritarian state might be able to implement an isolationist foreign policy. While his analysis is marred by the assumption that capitalist systems are inherently vulnerable to crises of overproduction, Dennis provided an illuminating study of the emergence of fascist economic institutions, a study which continues to have considerable relevance for contemporary social analysis. His three most important works are: Is Capitalism Doomed? (New York: Harper, 1932), The Coming American Fascism (New York: Harper, 1936) and The Dynamics of War and Revolution (New York: Weekly Foreign Letter, 1940). Justus Doenecke has traced the evolution of Dennis’ thought in “Lawrence Dennis: The Continuity of Isolationism” (Libertarian Analysis, Winter 1970, pp. 36-63).

Garet Garrett is another prominent representative of the isolationist movement who recognized the important links between domestic economic policies of the New Deal and interventionist foreign policies adopted during World War II and the postwar period. In a series of three essays published in 1953 as The People’s Pottage (Boston: Western Islands, 1965), Garrett traced the “revolution within the form” that occurred during the New Deal period and resulted in a concentration of power within the executive branch of government, the adoption of systematic deficit financing, and dramatically increased governmental control of the allocation of investment through such agencies as the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Arguing that war had become an instrument of domestic policy designed to prolong an inflationary “boom” period, Garrett concluded that “we have crossed the boundary that lies between Republic and Empire.” (p. 93).

Among the fundamental characteristics of Empire Garrett listed: a strong executive power, subordination of domestic to foreign policy, ascendency of the military over the civilian mind, a dominant psychological sense of constant fear, and a “vast system of entanglement” which would automatically involve the United States in any conflict that erupted in any part of the world. Garrett’s essay on the “Age of Empire” vigorously attacked U.S. involvement in Korea, characterizing that country as an example of the “satellite nations” which had become increasingly dependent on U.S. military and economic aid and which were “scattered all over the body of the sick world like festers” (p. 120). (A complementary work by Garrett is The American Story [Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1956].)

THE LEARNED CRUSADER
Harry Elmer Barnes is well known for his important contributions to revisionist scholarship on both World War I and World War II. Among his most prominent works are The Genesis of World War (New York: Knopf, 1929), In Quest of Truth and Justice (Chicago: National Historical Society, 1928; Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, 1972), and an edited volume, Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton, 1953; Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, reprint of 1953 ed.). In addition, Barnes wrote an important series of pamphlets which were privately printed and therefore are not readily accessible: “Shall the United States Become the New Byzantine Empire?” (1947), “The Struggle against the Historical Blackout” (1947, 1962), “The Court Historians versus Revisionism” (1952), “The Chickens of the Interventionist Liberals Have Come Home to Roost” (1954), “Blasting the Historical Blackout” (1962), and “Revisionism and Brainwash-
ing: A Survey of the War-Guilt Question in Germany after Two World Wars" (1962).

Barnes' theoretical contributions to an understanding of postwar foreign policy are comparatively less well known than his earlier work. Murray Rothbard, in "Harry Elmer Barnes as Revisionist of the Cold War" (in Arthur A. Goddard ed.), Harry Elmer Barnes, Learned Crusader (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, 1968), focused on Barnes' use of George Orwell's 1984 as a model for understanding the emergence of "military state capitalism" in the United States. While this theme was raised in Barnes' Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, it was most extensively developed by him in an unpublished manuscript, "How 'Nineteen Eighty-Four' Trends Threaten Peace, Freedom and Prosperity."

Barnes believed that U.S. postwar economic prosperity could be largely attributed to military expenditures and a permanent war economy. Perpetual war against an ever-changing external enemy served to justify massive military expenditures which increasingly politicized the domestic economy and stifled dissent. Barnes particularly criticized the increasing invasion of civil liberties and the cooptation of "court" intellectuals within the educational system who became skilled in Orwellian semantics and double-think. As in Orwell's 1984, war had indeed become an economic and political necessity.

Another early critic of the permanent war economy was Arthur A. Ekirch in The Decline of American Liberalism (New York: Longmans, Green, 1955) and The Civilians and the Military (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956). In these books Ekirch traced the decline of classical liberalism and of the antimilitarist spirit in the United States, culminating in an unprecedented peacetime militarization of both government and economy. Considerably ahead of the New Left critics of the 1960's, Ekirch pinpointed the emergence and consolidation of a vast military-industrial complex which required a progressive abandonment of laissez-faire economic policies.

Perceiving the permanent war economy as a system designed to maintain economic prosperity and to avoid another depression, Ekirch analyzed the postwar foreign aid program as a system of subsidies to expand American export markets. Like Barnes, Ekirch stressed the close connection between the garrison state and the police state, and criticized the intimate ties evolving between the state and the educational system. As an adherent of classical liberalism, Ekirch understood better than most the profound antagonism between a free market economy and the military state capitalism that is required to maintain an interventionist foreign policy.

It should be noted that the five critical themes of America's interventionist foreign policies discussed above were consistent in their criticism of both U.S. involvement in World War II and foreign policy in the cold war. They were unanimous in denouncing the vast system of "entangling alliances" which U.S. policymakers had constructed in the postwar period and, in particular, they vigorously criticized the U.S. role in the Korean War. In contrast, many other isolationists abandoned their earlier position in favor of active support for U.S. cold war foreign policies. This shift has been analyzed by Murray Rothbard in "The Transformation of the American Right" (Continuum, Vol. II, 1964, pp. 220-231) and "Confessions of a Right Wing liberal" (Ramparts, June 15, 1968, pp. 47-52). Leonard Liggio has also stressed the key role that the domestic China Lobby played in stifling the development of isolationist opposition to U.S. interventionist policies in Asia during the early years of the cold war ("Isolationism: Old and New").

**EARLY SHORTCOMINGS**

Isolationist critics of U.S. foreign policy have generally demonstrated a more perceptive understanding of the dynamics of imperialism than many earlier critics. For the most part the Manchester School led by Cobden and Bright in England and the anti-imperialists in the United States at the end of the last century focused on their critique of imperialism on the pernicious consequences which they argued necessarily result from interventionist policies abroad. Using the doctrines of free trade, these critics persuasively demonstrated that the anticipated economic benefits of imperialism are illusory and that, in fact, imperialism would result in the increasing debilitation of economic activity. They also stressed the undesirable political consequences, and eloquently stated the moral objections to the statist oppression, both foreign and domestic, which imperialism entails.

Nevertheless, very few of these early critics sought to explore in any systematic fashion the causal factors underlying imperialism. Cobden's insight that the aristocratic class constituted the supporting bulwark of England's interventionist foreign policies was extremely important, but he never articulated a systematic analysis of the tensions between England's feudal class structure and expanding market system. Such an analysis would be particularly essential for a proper understanding of the incomplete capitalist revolution in England and the eventual collaboration which developed between England's emergent bourgeoisie and the remnants of its feudal aristocratic class.

U.S. isolationists of the Old Right, while adopting many of the themes raised by earlier critics of imperialism, displayed a more sustained concern with identifying the roots of the expansionist urge in American foreign policy. Perhaps their most important contribution was the recognition, at least on an explicit level, that American domestic and foreign policies are related and that one cannot understand interventionism abroad without reference to the domestic economy. In particular, these critics perceived that the Keynesian economic policies adopted in an effort to promote recovery from the Depression were an important factor in the subsequent growth and consolidation of a vast military-industrial complex, as well as in the systematic intervention abroad which characterized U.S. foreign policy in the cold war period. Unswayed by the rhetoric of anti-communist ideology, they pointed out that military and foreign aid expenditures constitute a significant form of state intervention in the market process which benefits and protects well-defined economic interests.

While the Marxist-Leninist theory of imperialism is undoubtedly the best known, there are a number of non-Marxist theories which should receive attention from those interested in achieving a theoretical understanding of foreign expansionism. Most of these were developed either during, or in response to, the sudden burst of colonial annexations by European governments in the 40 years preceding World War I. As a result, the theories are generally not addressed to the more indirect forms of political and economic control which evolved at a later date.

**A NON-MARXIST THEORY**

The earliest attempt to develop a systematic theory was J. A. Hobson's Imperialism (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972, orig. pub. 1902). This work proved extremely influential in subsequent efforts in the field. In particular, Hobson's analysis had a major impact on European Marxists who had begun to formulate their own theories of imperialism from within the Marxist tradition. And Lenin, in Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, explicitly acknowledg-
edged the influence of Hobson.

Hobson, who considered himself a true heir to Richard Cobden's critique of British foreign policy, wrote *Imperialism* in the aftermath of his disillusionment with British involvement in the Boer War. The book offers a detailed presentation of his view that capitalist economic systems are characterized by inherent expansionist tendencies resulting from a "mal-distribution of consuming power" which encourages "excess saving." Excess saving culminates in reckless overproduction, forcing prices down and precipitating economic collapse.

Hobson believed that this instability within the capitalist system explained the widespread emergence of trusts which sought to achieve price stability via regulation of output. While successful in this aim, the formation of trusts merely raises the problem of excess saving to a higher level, since regulation of output severely restricts domestic outlets for the excess savings (which are already increased by monopoly profits). Thus, according to Hobson's theory, the real impetus underlying imperialist expansion was not the search for overseas markets, although this may have played an important role in the early stages. Rather, the most important fact was an intensified search for investment outlets.

Hobson stressed that imperialism could not be justified at the aggregate economic level:

It has indeed been proved that recent annexations of tropical countries, procured at great expense, have furnished poor and precarious markets, that our aggregate trade with our colonial possessions is virtually stationary, and that our most profitable and progressive trade is with rival industrial nations, whose territories we have no desire to annex, whose markets we cannot force, and whose active antagonism we are provoking by our expansive policy. (p. 71)

He pointed out, however, that "although the new Imperialism has been bad business for the nation, it has been good business for certain classes and certain trades within the nation" (p. 46). He singled out manufacturers in export-oriented industries, shipbuilders, and armaments manufacturers as prominent beneficiaries of imperialist policies. Describing these special interests as "economic parasites of imperialism," Hobson provided a detailed and illuminating analysis of the various devices, particularly in the area of fiscal policy, designed to socialize the costs associated with overseas business activities.

Hobson's focus on the crucial role of overseas investment outlets naturally brought him to emphasize the strategic position of international bankers ("the central ganglion of international capitalism") in formulating imperialist policies:

... it is true that the motor-power of Imperialism is not chiefly financial: finance is rather the governor of the imperial engine, directing the energy and determining its work: it does not constitute the fuel of the engine, nor does it directly generate the power. Finance manipulates the patriotic forces which politicians, soldiers, philanthropists, and traders generate; the enthusiasm for expansion which issues from these sources, though strong and genuine, is irregular and blind; the financial interest has those qualities of concentration and clear-sighted calculation which are needed to set Imperialism to work. (p. 59)

Hobson did not consider himself a socialist, but he argued forcefully that the survival of capitalism would require social reform to alter the distribution of income and terminate the "excess saving" at the root of imperialist expansion. He believed that the maldistribution of income which he observed in capitalist systems was the consequence of imperfect equality in bargaining power among participants in the market economy. It is unclear whether Hobson regarded such inequality as endemic to a market economy or as a consequence of various forms of government privilege. In either case, a more equitable distribution of income would raise the level of domestic consumption and thereby provide an adequate outlet for domestic production without precipitating either cartelization of industry or foreign expansion.

Hobson's theory of imperialism is thus essentially dependent on the familiar "overproduction/underconsumption" thesis which pervades both the orthodox Keynesian and Marxist critiques of laissez-faire economic systems. Because of Hobson's considerable influence on later writers in this field, the vulnerability of capitalism to overproduction emerges as a recurring theme in many non-Marxist theories of imperialism.

**HOBSON'S INFLUENCE**

For example, Parker T. Moon, in *Imperialism and World Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1926), placed great emphasis on "the economic pressure which imperialism seeks to relieve—the pressure of surplus goods and surplus capital on a temporarily saturated market" (p. 519). Although his study included a detailed descriptive account of the surge in colonial annexations during the last decades of the 19th century, it also provided an extremely valuable elaboration of Hobson's insight that imperialism must be analyzed at the level of individual economic interests rather than at the level of the economy as a whole, since some interests profit more from state-subsidized overseas expansion.

Moon's analysis focused on the powerful, well-organized, and active business interests which shaped the nation's foreign policy and profited from the annexation of overseas territories. Government and military officials were seen as the "allies" of these interests rather than the primary impetus behind imperialist expansion. Like Hobson, Moon attributed particular importance to the role of bankers: "The most influential of all business groups, the bankers, may be said not only to have a direct interest in imperialism, through colonial investments, but to represent indirectly all the above-mentioned interests, for banks have financial fingers in every industrial pie" (p. 61).

Recognizing that these business interests constitute a distinct minority within any country and that the overwhelming majority of the people have no direct interest in imperialist expansion, Moon then analyzed the ideas that are influential in activating the majority to actively support the imperialist minority. "It requires ideas, attuned to instinctive emotions, to make modern nations fight" (p. 67). While business interests take the initiative in promoting overseas expansion, the necessary support for this activity is achieved through the manipulation of ideas. This line of analysis led Moon to the conclusion that "imperialism, nay, all history, is made by the dynamic alliance of interests and ideas" (p. 74).

Hobson's notion that overproduction in the domestic economy constitutes the source of the expansionist urge abroad received strong reinforcement within American historical scholarship from Frederick Jackson Turner's widely known "frontier" thesis, which held that America's westward expansion had provided a valuable outlet for a growing domestic economy. Once this expansion had reached its continental limits, however, many concluded that economic prosperity could only be maintained through overseas expansion. For an analysis of Turner's importance see William Appleman Williams, "The Frontier Thesis and American Foreign Policy" in *History as a Way of Learning* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1973).

Charles A. Beard was another leading American historian who adopted a variant of the overproduction thesis. In two books, *The Idea of National Interest* (New York: Macmillan, 1934) and *The Open Door at Home* (New York: Macmillan, 1935), Beard developed his view that two parallel conceptions of the national interest, both assuming that outward expansion and exports are necessary conditions of domestic prosperity, had guided the formation of American foreign policy
since independence, Beard argued that the economic collapse of 1929 challenged the assumptions underlying both conceptions and, in terms very reminiscent of Hobson's proposals for a redistribution of income, he proposed an "open door at home" policy as a solution to the crisis of capitalism. Such a policy would be based on the central idea that "by domestic planning and control the American economic machine may be kept running at a high tempo supplying the intranational market, without relying primarily upon foreign outlets for 'surpluses' of goods and capital!" (The Idea of International Interest, p. 552). Beard's analysis has had considerable influence on that of William Appleman Williams and other "New Left" revisionist historians during the past several decades.

From these brief examples, it is clear that the overproduction dissertation elaborated by Hobson has been a common element in many attempts to explain American continental and overseas expansion. In fact, the overproduction/underconsumption critique pervades an astonishing variety of theoretical analyses of contemporary capitalism, ranging from the orthodox Keynesian models to the Paul Baran/Paul Sweezy studies within the Marxist tradition. As one author surveying theories of imperialism has noted:

The idea of surpluses seeking outlets—indeed, the whole problem of effective demand, of which such ideas are the center—seems to arise spontaneously in the minds of a great many students of economics seeking the reasons for capitalism's failure to maintain an equilibrium between productive and consumption. (Earle M. Winslow, The Pattern of Imperialism [New York: Columbia University Press, 1948], p. 104)

Moreover, considerable historical evidence indicates that U.S. policymakers have been guided by a fundamental consensus, often explicitly acknowledged, concerning expansion of America's export markets as a necessary condition of preserving domestic prosperity. Franklin D. Roosevelt said in 1935 that "foreign markets must be regained if America's producers are to rebuild a full and enduring domestic prosperity for our people. There is no other way if we would avoid painful economic dislocations, social readjustments, and unemployment." This view was also reflected in Dean Acheson's conclusion, expressed in November 1944, that "we cannot have full employment and prosperity in the United States without the foreign markets." (Roosevelt and Acheson are quoted in William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy [New York: Dell, 1959, pp. 202-203 and p. 162, respectively.)

OVERPRODUCTION REFUTED

Those with a background in Austrian economics should be well acquainted with the classic statement of Say's Law of Markets and the logic behind the contention that a situation of absolute or general overproduction (or underconsumption) cannot emerge in the free market. The economist Benjamin M. Anderson offers the following concise summary of Say's Law:

Supply and demand in the aggregate are . . . not merely equal, but they are identical, since every commodity may be looked upon either as supply of its own kind or as demand for other things. (Economics and the Public Welfare [New York: Van Nostrand, 1949])


The widespread popularity of some variant of the overproduction thesis should not be dismissed merely as an example of popular error on a massive scale. The fact that otherwise perceptive social analysts from fundamentally different theoretical perspectives agree on the importance of the overproduction thesis and, more importantly, that this agreement is shared by prominent and politically active members of American society, suggests the possibility that this thesis is not entirely mistaken. It may represent an attempt, however imperfect, to describe certain "real world" phenomena which are the product of state intervention in the market process. The analyst untrained in Austrian business cycle theory might interpret the resulting distortions in the market process as a natural consequence of the market.

In view of this possibility, it might be desirable for those with a firm grasp of Austrian economic theory (and particularly business cycle theory) to critically evaluate the overproduction thesis. Such an analysis should be an essential element in any effort to formulate a systematic libertarian theory of imperialism. Joseph Stromberg, in "The Political Economy of Liberal Corporatism" (Individualist, May 1972, pp. 2-11) and in a subsequent paper, "American Monopoly Statism and the Rise of Empire" (delivered to the first Libertarian Scholars Conference, New York, October 1972), has made an important initial effort in this direction. While his economic analysis may be challenged, Stromberg's work remains essential reading for those interested in this field, since it is a sophisticated attempt to trace the relationship between domestic economic intervention and military intervention abroad.

CAPITALISM'S "INEVITABLE" CONSEQUENCES

Stromberg's analysis is strongly influenced by Joseph Schumpeter, who sought to formulate a non-Marxist theory of imperialism in his essay "Imperialism" (New York: Meridian, 1965, orig. publ. 1919). Schumpeter's model of "export dependent monopoly capitalism" included a variant of the overproduction thesis. It was a distinct advance on Hobson's earlier model, however, since it explicitly and forcefully contended that neither cartelization nor overproduction are natural attributes of the market process: "export monopolism does not grow from the inherent laws of capitalist development" (p. 88, emphasis in original). Rather, they are the consequence of intervention in the market. "[I]f t is a basic fallacy to describe imperialism as a necessary phase of capitalism, or even to speak of the development of capitalism into imperialism" (p. 89).

Schumpeter focused especially on the role of protectionism in facilitating the formation of cartels and trusts in the domestic economy and on the resulting distortions. His analysis stressed the inti-
mate ties between bankers and the cartel organizers and noted that the two may often be identical. These state-fostered monopolies maximize their profits by restricting output on the domestic market and resort to "dumping" in foreign markets as a means of exploiting economies of scale. Protectionism and "dumping" intensify the conflict of interest among nations, and precipitate a process of forcible expansion abroad.

Schumpeter repeatedly stressed the "atavistic" nature of imperialism, and argued that a capitalist system is inherently anti-imperialist: "We must expect that anti-imperialist tendencies will show themselves wherever capitalism penetrates the economy and, through the economy, the mind of modern nations" (pp. 69-70). Schumpeter perceptively recognized, however, that the capitalist transformation of society had nowhere been permitted to achieve its completion; instead, social formations from the feudal period persisted and, as a consequence, imperialist attitudes were "suppressed" rather than eliminated, leaving open the possibility of a subsidiary alliance of feudal interests with other economic interests. "The social pyramid of the present age has been formed, not by the substance and laws of capitalism alone, but by two different substances, and by the laws of two different epochs" (p. 92).

THEORIES OF IMPERIALISM

For those interested in the theoretical literature on imperialism, Earle M. Winslow's The Pattern of Imperialism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948) provides an extremely valuable survey of the field. He traced the intellectual history of imperialism from the early blasts at mercantilism by Adam Smith and concluded with an attempt to formulate a new critique of imperialism, focusing on its essential nature as a "political phenomenon." Winslow categorized earlier theories under two broad headings: those which consider imperialism a necessary outgrowth of capitalist economies (the "stage" doctrines) and those which consider it a phenomenon neither restricted to capitalist economies or necessarily an outgrowth of such economies (the "politics" doctrine).

His analysis of the evolution of Marxist theories of imperialism—from the sketchy and ambivalent formulations in Marx's own writings to Lenin's and Luxemburg's theories—is especially valuable. In view of Winslow's praise of Rudolf Hilferding's classic work Das Finanzkapital, the fact that this seminal work has remained untranslated for more than 50 years proves particularly frustrating. Hilferding challenged the assumption that imperialism is a necessary stage in the development of capitalist economies and, instead, focused on the strategic role of the banks who control the monetary and banking structures. He contended that the policies adopted in this sector introduce major distortions in the price mechanism, thereby disrupting its equilibrating function and consolidating the domination of the "production process" by the "circulation process." These developments, in Hilferding's analysis, are the key to a full understanding of the transition from laissez-faire and free trade to the imperialist outlook characteristic of finance capital. While Hilferding was hardly an adherent of laissez-faire economics, the compatibility between certain elements of his theory and aspects of the Austrian theory of the business cycle remain striking.

Winslow's own analysis of imperialism is valuable for its persistent focus on the possibility that expansionist tendencies in capitalist societies might have some relationship to the business cycle and that this possibility requires a detailed analysis of the role of banking institutions and credit creation in generating economic instability. Unfortunately Winslow's analysis is marred by his argument that the credit creation underlying the business cycle is the outcome of unrestrained competition among banks rather than state-enforced cartelization of the banking sector.

Winslow's book is also useful for its chapter on "Imperialism and War as Political Phenomena," in which he sought to develop the distinction between "economic" and "non-economic" competition (or "economic power" and "naked power"). While this is an essential distinction for any theoretical analysis of imperialism, Winslow was not fully successful in elaborating its implications. A much more fruitful and systematic analysis is Franz Oppenheimer's discussion of "political means" and "economic means" in The State (New York: Free Life Editions, 1975, orig. publ. 1914). Another illumina-
ing analysis is offered by Albert Jay Nock in his comparison of "social power" and "State power" in Our Enemy, the State (New York: Free Life Editions, 1973).

In more recent years, a number of brilliant insights into certain dimensions of imperialism have been presented in articles by Murray Rothbard and Leonard Liggio in Left and Right. The seminal article, "Left and Right: The Prospects for Liberty" (Spring 1965) by Murray Rothbard focused on the revolutionary implications of the capitalist transformation of society in Europe and England but at the same time suggested that this transformation was not complete; feudal social structures were not entirely uprooted. Liggio proceeded in his Left and Right article, "Why the Futile Crusade?", to develop the implications of such an analysis for an understanding of contemporary imperialism in the Third World:

Instead of the radical reorientation of society implicit in capitalism, the application of capitalism was circumscribed within a narrow range by the pre-capitalist institutional instruments of exploitation which continued in force. Thus, not only was the capitalist revolution thwarted in Western Europe and America, but their ruling classes were able to exploit the feudal conditions existing in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America through the system of imperialism. The imperialist power of the Western countries protected the overthrow of feudalism by capitalist revolutions in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America and imposed on the world's peoples a double or reinforced system of exploitative imperialism—by which the power of the Western governments maintains the local ruling class in exchange for the opportunity to superimpose Western exploitation upon existing exploitation by the local ruling states. Imperialism or double exploitation has caused the twentieth century struggles against imperialism and for progress to take a form different from the earlier Western European struggle against feudalism. (p. 24)

This analysis of the impact of imperialism could be usefully supplemented by Stanislav Andreski's discussion of domestic class structures in Latin America in Parasitism and Subversion (New York: Pantheon, 1986). Andreski's work was greatly influenced by the class analysis of the French laissez-faire theorist, Charles Comte, and his concept of "parasitism" bears a close resemblance to Oppenheimer's concept of "political means." Andreski analyzed in detail the various institutional forms of parasitism endemic to the semi-feudal societies of Latin America, and focused on the characteristic "parasitic involution" of capitalism. While he tended to dismiss the role of external intervention in reinforcing such parasitic structures, his work nevertheless complements Liggo's focus on imperialism as the imposition of a double layer of exploitation.

Studies are now needed which will systematically analyze, from an explicitly libertarian perspective, the more sophisticated and subtle political means that have tended to replace colonial annexation at the international level, particularly focusing on the impact of such intergovernmental institutions as the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Hopefully, this brief and highly selective survey of some non-Marxist theoretical approaches to imperialism will serve to stimulate greater interest in this field. [1]
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THE UNITED STATES AND THE THIRD WORLD

Last fall an ominous development occurred at the United Nations. By a unanimous vote the General Assembly adopted a declaration of a "new international economic order." Known as Global 1, the new order calls for a redistribution of global wealth by establishing mechanisms for the automatic transfer of funds to the have-not countries. Among these mechanisms is the proposal—objected to by the U.S. delegation—for the rich countries to give a minimum of 0.7 percent of their GNP each year to the poor countries by 1980. The new order also calls for the expanded use of cartels to fix the prices of raw materials produced by poor countries (following the OPEC model), and recognition of each country's "right" to nationalize any and all foreign-owned properties, with or without compensation.

The adoption of this declaration signals the triumph of what U.S. Ambassador Daniel Moynihan has termed the "British revolution," i.e. the Fabian socialist doctrine of redistribution as opposed to production of wealth, bequeathed by Great Britain to 47 former colonies which are now voting U.N. members. As Moynihan pointed out last March in Commentary ("The United States and the New World Society"), the largest percentage of the world's population now lives under the rule of Fabian socialist, non-communist regimes. It is these regimes' anti-American, anti-capitalist policies which have finally been enshrined in Global 1, after nearly a decade of propagandizing. The process began in 1967 with the formation of the Group of 77—a bloc of Third World governments which has since grown to 100 of the U.N.'s 141 members. The basic concepts of Global 1 were aired at various U.N. conferences over the past decade and enshrined in the General Assembly's December 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (opposed at that time by the United States, Japan, and West Germany).

Over the past year, however, the Kissinger-led State Department apparently decided to switch rather than fight, in hopes of "moderating" the demands of the Third World socialists. Indeed, in a major address (written by Kissinger) read by Moynihan shortly before the unanimous adoption of the "new order" declaration, the U.S. delegation laid out a blueprint for a Marshall Plan-type program that incorporated most of the points proposed by the socialists, including expanded cartels and increased financial aid. Reaction to the speech was generally favorable, indicating the delegates' understanding that Kissinger agreed in principle with their demands, and was merely haggling over the details.

The Kissinger policy succeeded in avoiding a confrontation, but has laid the basis for an unprecedented, permanent rip-off of the producers (taxpayers) of the developed countries. For the U.N.'s new economic order establishes inter-nation welfare as a matter of "right." No longer is foreign aid looked on as a matter of charity or as a response to emergencies. The developing countries, through their own Welfare Rights Organization (the Group of 77), have succeeded in gaining unanimous governmental acceptance of the concept of "reparations"—payments by the developed countries because they are successful to the developing countries because they are unsuccessful. Although U.S. foreign economic aid today accounts for only about 0.28 percent of the GNP, there is nothing to stop this minimum from being increased, year after year. After all, if the poor countries have a "right" to 0.7 percent of our annual production, why not 3 percent, or 5 percent, or 10 percent?

Free market economists have long since demonstrated that redistribution of wealth provides no long-term solution to poverty. What is desperately needed by the poor countries of the Third World is true economic development: the build-up of capital through domestic and foreign investment so as to create the tools necessary for increased production of goods and services. Such investment will only occur in a climate of economic freedom, in which property rights are respected and investors have a reasonable chance to earn a profit. Such conditions are precisely the opposite of those created by most of the Third World's socialist governments. And programs such as the U.N.'s Global 1, far from improving the situation, increase the hold of such regimes, both by bailing them out financially and by endorsing their mistaken economic precepts.

What could the U.S. government do if it wanted to help the people of the Third World without ripping off American taxpayers? First of all, it should recognize the one valid complaint of the Third World: U.S. tariffs and other barriers to importation of their products. As quickly as possible the United States should abolish all tariffs and nontariff barriers, especially those affecting the developing countries. It is absurd to preach free trade and free enterprise and then restrict trade with those countries which most need to learn the benefits of capitalism. The Ford administration took an important step in this direction in November by eliminating tariffs on 2724 categories of imports from 98 developing countries and 39 dependent territories.

Second, U.S. representatives should reject absolutely and on principle the idea of redistribution of wealth as a matter of right. Past U.S. aid, it should be explained, was given simply as charity, was often wasted (or ended up lining the pockets of bureaucrats), and was given against the wishes of many of those who paid the bills. All future U.S. aid should come only from private organizations, on whatever terms their donors and administrators choose.

Third, the United States should steadfastly refuse to join any international cartels and should exert all possible diplomatic efforts to encourage the natural and inevitable instabilities of such anti-market arrangements. All such cartels should be forcefully denounced as trade barriers, and their disadvantages to all nations in their role as consumers should be emphasized.

Finally, although the United States should quit the U.N., so long as it remains a member, its representatives should abandon compromise and appeasement and should take the offensive, as Ambassador Moynihan has begun doing. The vast majority of U.N. member governments not only are socialist but are police states as well. Their disregard for human rights and the disastrous failure of their socialist economic policies should be zealously denounced. The success of the developed countries and of such Third World models as Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Costa Rica, where both economic and civil liberties are generally respected, should be highlighted by contrast.

Fundamentally, it is ideas rather than money that will make the difference for the Third World. If there is any proper role for the U.S. government in the international arena, surely it is to make the case for freedom.

ROBERT POOLE, JR.
DUBAI: AN EXERCISE IN ECONOMIC LAISSEZ-FAIRE

Dubai, U.A.E. This little “Pearl of the Gulf,” as it is sometimes called, is a state within a state, which occupies a unique position among the third-world countries. Dubai practices a nearly laissez-faire economy insofar as there are no personal income taxes, no business profit taxes and minimal interference in the market system. With hardly any natural resources to speak of, Dubai, once a small coastal town on the lower Arabian Gulf, in a matter of a few years, has transformed itself into a thriving metropolis. Dubai does have a little oil, which, however, plays only a minor role in what has been happening over here. Dubai was on its way up before the discovery of oil in 1969 and if and when the oil is depleted, little will really change around here.

It is free trade and free economy that have brought about a phenomenal and an almost explosive growth in this most unlikely of places, where, as soon as one is out of the city one sees a spread of sand as far as one’s eyes can reach. It is unbelievable.

It is also saddening. For one is almost certain to ask: will it last? A public relations brochure issued by the city hall states: “...Dubai provides an excellent example of enlightened direct rule where individual and property rights are protected by law and by the character of the Ruler himself.” (Italics mine)

One may conclude that this little “miracle” that Dubai has managed to achieve is perhaps just a matter of historical accident or convenience or both. What will guarantee its continuity? Surrounded by a world hostile to the concept of freedom, and lacking a sound libertarian philosophy, it is indeed extremely hard to evaluate the future of this land.

It was in 1971 that Dubai and six other sheikdoms flanking the desert just northeast of Saudi Arabia decided to form a federation called the United Arab Emirates in order to have a stable, organized, and unified government with a common foreign policy and defense system. With the exception of Abu Dhabi, the other six Emirates occupy very small territories. Dubai follows Abu Dhabi in terms of economic activity and has traditionally been more of a glamorous place for merchants and traders from abroad. Because of its free market it has also come to be dubbed a “smuggler’s paradise” for those who have been smuggling precious metals and other goods into and out of India, Pakistan, and other countries with restricted import policies.

Until the British influence arrived in the early 19th century, the lower Gulf area was often termed “the Pirate Coast” for attacks on shipping vessels and acts of piracy that originated from this area. Since then the British power in the region grew, supported by truces with the local tribes. Even though the United Arab Emirates is now an independent state, the British influence continues to be felt in the way of life, economic activity, and even in the government where several Britishers act as advisers.

Dubai has a population of nearly 150,000, of which nearly 60 percent are foreigners including Americans, Britshers, Europeans, Indians, Iranians, Lebanese, Pakistanis and Palestinians. Attracted by the prosperity, job opportunities and liberal trade conditions, people have flocked into this place from all over the world and there has been a continuous flow of capital as evidenced by the number of new banks that have been opening here and their ever-increasing assets.

To start a business here requires either a financial guarantee of Dirhams 100,000 (about U.S. $25,000) or a guarantee from a Dubai citizen possessing real estate to the value of at least Dirhams 100,000. The government encourages new entrants to take up a prominent local citizen as a partner or a participant in any business venture. Though the prospects for major industries are low, a number of small and medium scale industries are already in operation or in the process of forming. The one inescapable sight for every visitor to Dubai is the booming construction industry. The Ruler of Dubai, Sheik Rashid Bin Said-al-Maktoum, is probably the biggest investor in this industry.

Dubai has one of the most modernly equipped airports and one of the best port facilities in the Middle-East. A vast drydock complex is under construction.

Since there are few restrictions on banking, several foreign banks have opened offices and branches in Dubai as well as in the other Emirates. There are no exchange controls and one will notice numerous private money exchangers on the streets, frequently offering better rates than the banks. The local currency, however, has been pegged to the U.S. dollar at approximately Dirham 4 = one U.S. dollar, by the U.A.E. Currency Board. Nor are there any restrictions on the free flow of precious metals and stones.

The very few taxes levied by the government are: 3 percent on most imported goods, with 30 percent on alcoholic beverages, 10 percent on the rent paid for commercial property by the tenant, 5 percent on the rent paid for residential property by the tenant, and 6 percent municipal tax charged in hotels and restaurants.

Free medical service, road construction, educational projects and several other services are paid for by the nominal taxes collected by the government as well as from the personal income of the Ruler.

On the political front, no political parties exist. The closest classification of the existing system would be a sort of “tribal democracy” with the ultimate authority being in the hands of the leader of the tribe. This position is occupied by the present Ruler, whose administration likes to emphasize the tolerant nature of his rule, which one can certainly appreciate when one looks around at falling democracies and diminishing freedoms.

Nevertheless, the publication of independent, editorialized newspapers is discouraged. Those that are published are issued by the government. The one that comes closest to resembling an independent newspaper is a stapled, loose-leaf bulletin with news directly from the wire services, in addition to the regular advertisements and other information of local interest.

The judiciary functions through an Islamic Court as well as through a recently established Civil Court, which covers statutes that are not covered by the Islamic Law. When neither is appropriate in a particular case then decisions are based upon precedents set in other countries and “in line with natural justice.”

As far as social freedoms are concerned, officially only foreign nationals are permitted to purchase alcoholic beverages from the stores, after obtaining a license. These restrictions do not apply in such public places as hotels, bars, and restaurants except that the owners of these places must obtain a license first in order to serve alcohol. Sale of pornographic literature and nudity in movies is prohibited. However, the government is contemplating construction of a massive complex for entertainment, including casinos.

In short, Dubai is no libertarian paradise but its climate of economic laissez-faire offers several interesting economic advantages.

PRAKASH ASWANI
REVISIONISM, LIBERTARIANISM AND IMPERIALISM

Many libertarians are historians and most of them would class themselves as revisionists. In recent months, I have been reading several papers by such libertarian revisionist historians (or students of history). My attention has been drawn to something related to the approach many of these individuals take to the issue of imperialism. Quite plainly, several papers start with a reprimand of those libertarians who supposedly accept a simple reading of history, one in which the United States is supposed to come off as the embodiment of virtue while the Nazis and the Soviets carry the total burden of aggressive responsibility. In short, many libertarian revisionists claim that other libertarians are wrong about the essentials of recent history.

Well, I am not an historian, revisionist or otherwise. Moreover, I have few fixed opinions about the responsibility of various parties for various disastrous events throughout the world. I believe some stories to be true, others to be false. But these are not often well-founded opinions, not to mention something I would claim to know.

Still, I suspect that I am among those libertarians constantly admonished by revisionists about their narrow-mindedness. For indeed I tend to think that on the whole the Nazis were worse than the Americans or allied nations, and that the Soviet Union is a more vicious government, even in international affairs, than is the U.S. government. This does not mean, emphatically, that I believe FDR to have been an angel during World War II, or Wilson to have been the paragon of diplomatic and political virtue in World War I.

What I do think, though I do not know, is that when all the pluses and minuses are calculated, the United States comes off better than the others—not in each individual instance, but on the whole. To me, this is something like the belief that on the whole Al Capone was very likely a worse fellow than, say, Pope Pius XII—while, of course, I consider both to be characters far from worthy of emulation.

Am I wrong? Since I cannot get involved in the details of history, the question of moral and criminal responsibility, I am left with the above impressionistic viewpoint. Is this wrong?

One additional question bugs me as I encounter the revisionist literature. There is a lot of talk about imperialism. I have never found a careful, well defended definition of this term in the same literature. Is this only because I haven’t read enough? I hope so!

Consider the following case—hypothetical but hopefully realistic enough to illustrate my point. We have this American businessman who sees a great opportunity to dig for oil in some foreign country. He goes there with the idea and discovers that he can only deal with the government. He hasn’t read Rothbard, Rand, and the rest, so he makes the simple move of entering into a contract with said government and begins to dig. For a while things go fine but then the natives get restless and oppose the government holding the contract. A new regime comes to the fore and our businessman is threatened with expulsion, nationalization, etc., unless he can come up with some help to the stability of the new regime.

Now the trouble begins. He goes to Washington and talks to the Department of State about the matter. He expresses his desire for help; he talks up the importance of its activities for national security. Much of it is bull, but they buy it. So a treaty is formed. Business continues but then some country close to the place of his business decides to help the resistance movement against the local government. The U.S. government now rises to the occasion—and soon all hell breaks loose.

I assume that the above characterizes at least some cases of imperialism. But who is at fault? Some libertarian revisionists seem to think that the type of imperialism is explainable by reference to American economic interests. Well, the idea that riches are better than poverty explains a good deal of human conduct, admittedly. But in our case can we really hold that imperialism came about because our businessman wanted to make a buck?

On the face of it this is not how the situation appears. Without the kind of laws permitting government to enter into treaties of foreign aid, without Senators, Congressman, academicians, citizens at large buying the premise, the bit would have failed to get off the ground, greed or no greed! Consider, too, that doing business abroad could be motivated by feelings of missionary zeal, ideological conviction, the desire for adventure, etc. Economics is not always motivated by economics.

At any rate, I think these matters deserve attention from our libertarian revisionists.

TIBOR R. MACHAN

Tibor Machan teaches philosophy at SUNY-Fredonia. Dr. Machan’s viewpoint appears in this column every third month, alternating with the viewpoints of Murray N. Rothbard and David Brudnoy.

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Deregulating Trucks and Buses

The long-awaited Motor Carrier Reform Act was submitted to Congress in November. It would significantly reduce ICC controls on interstate trucking and bus line operations (see “Deregulating Trucking,” REASON, July 1975). If passed, the bill would accomplish the following:

- End the prohibition on carrying cargo on return trips, thereby eliminating wasteful “empty backhauls.”
- End the antitrust immunity of the trucking cartel’s rate-making bureaus.
- Adopt a widening “zone of reasonableness” within which truckers would be free to set rates without ICC approval: up or down by 7 percent the first year, 12 percent the second year, and 15 percent the third year. Thereafter rates could be raised up to 15 percent each year and lowered without limit.
- Remove many restrictions on areas of service and on private carriers.
- Allow new carriers to enter the market without having to show that existing service was inadequate.

As with the recent Aviation Act of 1975 proposal (see “Trends,” Jan. 1976), reaction to the deregulation bill was largely predictable. The American Trucking Associations, Inc. called it “the ultimate in governmental irresponsibility” and claimed it would destroy industry stability and lead to economic chaos. Similar views were expressed by the Teamsters Union. Support for the bill is strong, however, among conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats, both of whom are increasingly sensitive to the cost of government regulation to consumers. (Thomas Gale Moore of Stanford University estimates the cost of ICC trucking regulations as from $4 to $16 billion per year.) The Motor Carrier Reform Act was strongly supported by Business Week, which called it “a rational approach to an area where rationality is badly needed.” The magazine’s only criticism of the bill was that it does not go far enough, pointing out that “unrestricted entry would be a still better answer” to the problem of insufficient competition.

Like the CAB, the ICC has been attempting to stave off deregulation by quietly easing some of its regulations. It has proposed new rate flexibility, made some changes to reduce gateway restrictions, and limited the power of rate bureaus. Hopefully, Congress will not be dissuaded by these cosmetic efforts and will proceed to pass the proposed Act, or abolish the ICC altogether.

Contract Public Services

In the wake of New York’s fiscal breakdown and exposure of that city’s grossly inefficient public services, increased attention is being focused on the idea of contracting with private companies for public services. A recent U.S. News & World Report interview with management consultant John Diebold highlighted a number of areas in which this approach is successfully being applied. Deputy editor Norman Macrae of The Economist recently urged the use of performance contracts, by means of which citizens can regularly vote for the private contractors that best deliver the various public services. He also called for entire local governments run on contracts by businesses, as one of a variety of new types of communities which should be available to people.

Among the areas in which private enterprise is currently active are the following:

- **Police:** Lexington, KY hires private companies to patrol such difficult, high-crime areas as housing projects on a 24-hour basis; in one such case the company received a merit award because crimes dropped to zero after it took over the policing. St. Petersburg, FL has used a private firm to patrol city parks. In such cities as New York, the number of private guards is larger than the number of city police. Hired private police forces are also booming in Bavaria. The city of Munich has hired private firms to patrol such high-crime areas as the subway stations, Olympic Park grounds, university sports arenas, and a huge suburban mental hospital.
- **Fire:** The Rural/Metro Fire Department, Inc. provides fire protection for 13 Arizona communities and will soon be expanding its operations into California. The company’s services cost less than one-third the national average (see “Spotlight,” REASON, Oct. 1975).
- **Paramedic:** A number of California cities and counties contract with private ambulance firms for paramedic services, including Santa Barbara County. Recently the city of Glendale decided to drop its government-run paramedics (operated by the Fire Department) in favor of a contract with two private companies. Under the Fire Department’s plan, the net annual cost for citywide service would have been $408,000, compared with a total contract cost of $96,000.
- **Schools:** There have been 40 different experiments in educational performance contracts over the past year, according to Diebold. Three companies are competing in Grand Rapids, MI under a contract in which they do not get paid unless they can demonstrate improvement in student achievement. At present, the companies are making 50 to 75 percent of the maximum possible under the contract.

The conclusion from all such cases is inescapable: private enterprise has the profit incentive to figure out how to perform public services efficiently. No city administration that seriously wants to cut costs can afford to ignore this lesson.

**Costly Government Medicine**

Some indication of how costly a national health insurance scheme could be has been provided by a General Accounting Office (GAO) study of Medicare costs. GAO compared the performance of government employees and private insurance companies in processing Medicare forms. The results are devastating to those who think that the government is more efficient because it need not make a profit. It costs the government almost twice as much ($12.39 vs. $6.45) to process the average claim. This is due to two factors. First, the Federal workers process only 2500 claims per year, while private workers process from 3900 to 6600. Second, for doing their meager amount of work, the Federal workers receive substantially higher pay. For example, Federal claims examiners make $11,600 compared with the private firms’ average of $7900. And government registered nurses make $13,600 compared with $11,700 in the private firms. Once again, we have a dramatic example of the superior efficiency of private enterprise over government. Is anybody in the national health insurance debate listening?

**Source:**

**Competition for Lawyers**

The various laws by which groups terming themselves “professions” restrict the number of their members and reduce or eliminate competition are coming under increasing attack. The type of restriction undergoing the strongest attack is the ban on advertising, especially price advertising. In two landmark cases last June, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled (1) that the "learned
people can more easily afford their services. The American Bar Association itself is being sued by Consumers Union, which contends that the ABA's code of professional responsibility, which bans advertising, is anti-consumer and unconstitutional.

Due to all this ferment, newspapers and advertising agencies are looking seriously at the dollar potential of this new market. Foote, Cone, and Belding recently prepared a series of hard-hitting sample ads for an article in the ABA Journal, to show how such advertising could work. The Newspaper Advertising Bureau estimates that total lawyer advertising in the United States could amount to $250 million per year if legal bars are lifted. Thanks to last year's Supreme Court rulings, that looks like a good bet.

SOURCES:
• "Ruling Allowing 'Divorce Clinic' Ads Overturned," Los Angeles Times, Nov. 4, 1975.
• "Two Lawyers Lose Round in Battle Over Legal Clinic," Ibid.
• "Closing In on the Professions," Business Week, Oct. 27, 1975, p. 106.

AIRLINE DEREGULATION SUPPORT
According to Aviation Week, editorial opinion regarding airline deregulation is running somewhere between 2:1 and 100:1 in favor of the idea. The magazine notes: "Liberal appetites are whetted for lower fares. Businessmen, fed up with government agency incursion into their affairs, believe it's time to cut loose the airlines from Federal apron strings." The magazine editorially chides airline management for their total hostility to deregulation, urging them to work for a reasonable loosening of CAB regulations—a stance it calls "re-regulation."

Meanwhile, an advisory committee set up by the Senate Government Operations Committee to provide expert advice on Federal regulatory reform has concluded that strong arguments can be made to get the government out of economic regulation of competitive industry, and that congressional priority should be given to reform of regulations governing airlines, railroads, trucking, and natural gas.

Most significant of all is an editorial in Business Week charging that the administration's deregulation bill does not go far enough. Stated the magazine:

The answer therefore should be deregulation—not the halfway relaxation President Ford has proposed but complete removal of government controls on everything except safety.

The government should abolish the

NON-COERCIVE GOVERNMENT

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**CAB** and allow each airline to set its own fares, serve the cities it chooses, drop others it does not want, and offer a level of service it can justify . . . (emphasis added)

Are you listening, Congress?

**SOURCES:**

**MARIJUANA UPDATE**

While the trend towards decriminalization of marijuana possession continues, the latest FBI figures show that not only are marijuana arrests still increasing, they are becoming an ever-greater percentage of all drug arrests—up from 45 percent in 1970 to 69 percent in 1974. Total marijuana arrests reached an all-time high of 446,000 in 1974, compared with 189,000 in 1970 and 19,000 in 1965. Thus, despite all the rhetoric about shifts in priorities toward hard drugs, more and more resources are being spent on pot busts, while real crime continues to soar out of control.

The new FBI figures do not include 1975, the year in which all but one of six state decriminalization actions took place, so it is too early to gauge their effects on law enforcement resource allocation. One California city has made an explicit shift in its police procedures manual; under new regulations which take effect early this year, San Francisco's explicit police priorities will be violent crimes first, followed in order by property crimes, organized crime, and finally "vice, drugs, and other social problems."

Meanwhile, the National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) has filed suit in Los Angeles and San Francisco seeking to have the state's laws on possession, cultivation, and use of marijuana declared unconstitutional. NORML's case is based on the right to privacy argument put forth by the Alaska Supreme Court last year in declaring that state's pot laws unconstitutional.

**SOURCES:**

**MILESTONES**

- **Bonds.** November's elections provided a solid indication of the extent to which taxpayers are fed up with bloated government budgets. Voters across the country turned down $5.87 out of $6.33 billion in bond proposals—93 percent of the requested amounts. The biggest taxpayer victory occurred in Ohio, where a heavily-promoted $4.5 billion bond package failed to carry a single county and lost by as much as four to one in some counties. Major bond issues were also defeated in New York and New Jersey. (Source: "Tough Off-Year Voters Say No." Time, Nov. 17, 1975.)
- **Energy.** Members of the public are ahead of their Congressmen in understanding key energy issues, according to a recent Harris poll. Some 55 percent recognize that natural gas is in short supply, as do 65 percent regarding oil. Some 61 percent think that decontrol of oil and gas prices would "give oil companies an incentive to develop new oil and natural gas production," while only 17 percent disagree. And by a 44 to 26 percent margin they do in fact favor decontrol of domestic oil and natural gas prices over a three-year period. (Source: "Poll Says Oil Decontrol Favored," AP (New York), Nov. 21, 1975)
- **Ocean Mining.** The Federal government's highest level advisory committee on ocean affairs has reversed its longstanding opposition to unilateral action by U.S. companies to mine the deep seabed. The National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere (NACOA) has gotten fed up with the inability of the U.N. Law of the Sea conferences to reach any agreement over the issue (see "The Seabed Power Struggle," REASON, July 1974). NACOA now recommends pass-

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**Have You Seen...**

**FEBRUARY 1973**

$1.00

This issue features an exclusive interview with libertarian revisionist historian Leonard Liggio and economist Murray Rothbard. The subject is "The New Isolationism." Liggio and Rothbard discuss American foreign policy from the Revolutionary War to the present, focusing especially on the isolationist Old Right. Also in the issue is an account of the Pakhtun tribesmen of Pakistan who have lived for centuries without formal government, and Douglas Den Uyl's discussion of the relationship between knowledge, control, and ownership.

• Competition. One of the most anti-competitive Federal laws, the Robinson-Patman Act, is coming under strong criticism within the administration. The 1936 statute prohibits manufacturers and wholesalers from offering quantity discounts, and has been shown to substantially reduce price competition. The White House Domestic Council therefore invited a group of economists, lawyers, and businessmen to attend an intensive review of the law’s effects on Dec. 8-10. The reconsideration of Robinson-Patman is part of the administration’s ongoing drive to reduce costly government regulation.

This column reports trends in the advancement of individual liberty and the rediscovery of economic freedom. Readers are invited to submit material of potential interest.

book review


Reviewed by Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

“War is the health of the state” reads one libertarian button, and that statement contains more than simply a modicum of truth. Every war in which the U.S. government has engaged, without exception, has been a catastrophic disaster for liberty. Fortunately, prior to 1860, U.S. wars were only temporary setbacks in the general, overall trend toward increasing freedom and decreasing state power. It was not until the War Between the States that this trend was reversed and America started its retreat from the goal of liberty and its descent into statism. More than any other event the Civil War, with its introduction of conscription and income taxation, with Lincoln’s widespread suppression of civil liberties in the North, and with the first really intimate contact between America’s nascent industries and government, can be identified as the turning point in American history. Every war since has merely accelerated the growth of state power. But if the War Between the States was the turning point, World War I, as Murray Rothbard has pointed out in his excellent essay, “War Collectivism in World War I,” (in A New History of Levithan) was “the model, the precedent, and the inspiration for state corporate-capitalism for the remainder of the twentieth century.”

Because “war is the health of the state,” because governments, when they wage war on foreign powers, always concurrently wage war on their own citizens, we should be acutely interested in the work of the revisionist historians who seek to discredit and expose official explanations that “justify” participating in war. Until now, the most thorough revisionist account of the United States’ entry into World War I has been Charles Callan Tansill’s America Goes to War, but the recent publication of Colin Simpson’s The Lusitania has greatly supplemented that previous work. The Lusitania, of course, was a British liner which on May 7, 1915, was torpedoed by a German submarine. Non-combatants numbering 1,201, including 128 Americans, lost their lives. At the time, the sinking of an unarmed passenger liner without any warning was viewed in this country as a shocking case of German bestiality, and this greatly assisted the Wilson administration in its efforts to propel the United States into the war. Tansill and other revisionists have pointed out that Americans should have known that a certain degree of risk was entailed in traveling on belligerent vessels, especially since the German Embassy had published a warning in New York newspapers just prior to the Lusitania’s embarkation. However, Simpson has contributed a well-researched and scholarly investigation that uncovers government perfidy even unsuspected by Tansill.

Simpson touches upon topics that range from the design and construction of the Lusitania to the operations of British intelligence in the United States. His most relevant conclusions, however, can be briefly summarized as follows: (a) the Lusitania was an auxiliary of the British navy; (2) it carried munitions and contraband; (3) it was armed; (4) negligence on the part of the British Admiralty was partially responsible for its loss, and that negligence was probably deliberate and premeditated; and (5) Captain Turner, the Lusitania’s master, was the innocent victim of a British Government attempt to frame him as responsible for the disaster.

The first of these points is not new and has long been known by historians. The Lusitania was built by Cunard Company with subsidies from the British Government, according to government specifications, and was subject to transfer for government wartime use. With the opening of World War I, the ship fell under Admiralty instructions authorizing the subterfuge of flying the U.S. flag and requiring an attempt to ram any German submarine which, in accordance with the Cruiser Rules, had surfaced. The Cruiser Rules required warships to warn unarmed merchant vessels prior to sinking or capsizing and were the basis of the British and U.S. position that the British surface blockade of Germany was legal and moral, while the German submarine blockade of England was illegal and wicked.

The second point, concerning the nature of the Lusitania’s cargo, has also been known, at least since October 1935 when Thomas Bailey revealed in an article appearing in the American Historical Review that the Lusitania’s final manifest indicated she was carrying over 4,000 cases of rifle cartridges. Simpson, however, goes much deeper, examining closely the huge British purchasing operation run in the United States through Cunard and J. P. Morgan, with the countenance of the collector of the Port of New York, Dudley Field Malone. He reveals that the Lusitania was also carrying 1,248 cases of 3-inch shrapnel shells and other shipments variously labelled as furs, butter, and cheese, but undoubtedly munitions. Simpson also presents evidence that it was carrying large quantities of pyroxyline (guncotton), a substance that causes an explosion upon contact with sea water, although the evidence is not totally conclusive, mostly because the crucial private papers of Captains Hall and Gaunt of Naval Intelligence have still not been declassified by the British government.

Part of the importance of establishing the nature of the cargo stems from the fact that the Lusitania sank in 18 minutes, one of the reasons for the huge loss of life. German torpedoes were notoriously unreliable. The submarine which attacked it, the U-20, had earlier failed to sink the steamer Candidate with a torpedo and had to use the deck gun. The same day the U-20 fired two torpedoes, one at point-blank range, into the Candidate’s sister ship, the Centurion, and she took one hour and 20 minutes to go under, with no loss of life. Most survivors of the Lusitania remembered two explosions, and popular and official opinion in Britain and the United States attributed that to a second and possibly a third torpedo. That explanation was discredited, however, when the diary of Captain Schweiger,
commander of the U-20, was reprinted in the *Journal of Modern History* (September 1936), establishing that only one torpedo was fired and hit the *Lusitania*. One of the services rendered by Simpson is his detailed reconstruction of the pattern of flooding in the *Lusitania*, based on his intimate knowledge of her design coupled with his conclusion that the torpedo detonated the munitions.

A final matter deserves treatment under the question of contraband. The Germans charged that the liner was being used to transport troops, but that charge has never been given much credence. Simpson notes that along with a last minute transfer from the *Queen Margaret* to the *Lusitania* of 2,000 cases of ammunition never appearing on the final manifest, there was also a contingent of soldiers from the 8th Winnipeg Rifles dressed in civilian clothes.

More important than munitions is the question of whether or not the *Lusitania* was armed. It has been known that it was designed to carry 12 six-inch quick-firing guns, giving her a more lethal broadside than even *Bacchante* class cruisers. Two British publications which were standard issue on all German submarines, *Jane’s Fighting Ships 1914* and *The Naval Annual 1914*, listed the *Lusitania* as armed. The fact that the Admiral-ty never employed it as a cruiser as originally envisaged, however, has been cited as proof that the guns were never mounted. Simpson, by inspecting the Cunard records, discovered that between May 21 and July 21, 1913, the liner was drydocked for modifications, including the addition of 12 gun rings hidden below trap doors on the deck. After the war began, between August 8 and September 17, 1914, the ship was again detached, and the Admiralty closed off a large portion of the shelter (Q) deck and installed the actual guns.

Of all Simpson’s allegations, obviously the most startling is that of Admiralty complicity in the sinking. In support, Simpson reveals that Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, commissioned a study by Commander Kenworthy of Naval Intelligence on the results of a liner being sunk with Americans on board. Two days before the *Lusitania*’s sinking, the *Juno*, which had been assigned the duty of escorting the *Lusitania* upon her arrival off the southern coast of Ireland, was ordered to Queenstown by the Admiralty for reasons unknown. This action was taken despite the fact that the British had broken the German naval code, were consequently able to determine the approximate location of every German submarine, and knew that the *Lusitania* was heading on a course that would take her directly into the path of the U-20. Furthermore, Captain Turner on the *Lusitania* was not advised of this decision and was still expecting rendezvous with the *Juno* when the torpedo struck. No official explanation for this action exists. For years the Admiralty denied it had taken place, and the Admiralty War Diary stops short just before the point at which the decision was made. As Simpson charges: “It was an incredible decision by any standards and can only be explained on two grounds: that both Churchill and Fisher were so preoccupied with the Dardanelles and their personal problems that they failed to appreciate it; or that it was the pinnacle of Churchill’s higher strategy of embroiling the U-boats with a neutral power.” (p. 130)

Moreover, the *Juno* recall has an even more incredible sequel that emerges in the account of the actual sinking. Simpson’s journalistic training and talent keep the reader engrossed and horrified as he describes the confusion and mayhem aboard the *Lusitania* after the torpedo struck. Immediately her bow dipped into the water and she listed to the starboard. Because of her faulty design, the list made the lifeboats difficult to launch. Those on the starboard side hung too far out away from the deck; those on the port side hung inboard. Captain Turner desperately attempted to supervise the launching of
the boats from the navigation bridge, but soon the stern of the ship was looming well over his head. No. 2 lifeboat on the port side was filled with passengers when it went out of control and crashed into the bow end of the boat deck, smashing those persons in its way up against the bridge. The same fate occurred to lifeboats Nos. 4, 6, 8, and 10, creating a huge wreckage of crushed passengers and boats. The lifeboats on the starboard side fell into the water on top of each other or capsized in the turbulence caused by the liner's rapid sinking. Of her 48 lifeboats, only six ended up carrying survivors, and those soon became overloaded. The sea was filled with debris and dead and living bodies. In answer to the Lusitania's SOS, Admiral Coke, commander at Queenstown, ordered everything afloat to the rescue. This included the Juno, which was the first vessel to arrive in sight of the survivors. No one can read without outrage that before the Juno closed with the survivors, the Admiralty countermanded Coke's instructions and ordered it back to Queenstown. Almost another two hours elapsed before other vessels arrived on the scene.

Even more ominous than the actual sinking was the Admiralty coverup conducted through a Court of Inquiry under Lord Mersey. Captain Turner was selected as a scapegoat. Evidence was tailored to fit the case, and that which didn't fit was ignored or suppressed. Lord Mersey, to his credit, refused to be a party to the framing of Captain Turner, whom he exonerated, but he did acquiesce in the blackout of facts concerning munitions and armaments on the Lusitania. Joseph Marichal, one survivor who refused to be silenced and insisted on testifying as to munitions aboard, was viciously slandered with lies about his background circulated by the government to the papers. The Wilson administration also cooperated in the Admiralty coverup. Gustav Stahl, a German operative testifying in the United States about the Lusitania's armaments, was immediately arrested on a charge of perjury for that very statement and held in prison without trial for three months. When he finally did stand trial the only evidence against him was a written deposition from Malone, collector of the Port of New York. Nevertheless, Stahl spent several years in jail, although in 1924 he was quietly awarded $20,000 damages by the U.S. government. Dr. Ritter von Retteg, a British-Austro-Hungarian double agent who provided some evidence concerning the possibility of the cargo containing gun cotton, was tried in camera and sent to Cleveland Penitentiary. His trial record is still classified secret by the Department of Justice.

The Lusitania incident stands revealed as a clear case of government treachery. Its use to bring America nearer to war deserves close study. The only criticism I have of Simpson's book is that it is too short. Three hundred pages is simply not enough space to adequately treat all of the subjects which Simpson covers. As a result, he is frustratingly consistent in his refusal to stray from the presentation of data to interpretation, even when doing so would certainly make his narrative more lucid. It is too often left to the reader to draw conclusions and piece together evidence. Nevertheless, The Lusitania is a convincing and readable book, documented by massive research. It should be studied by all those interested in the relationship between war and the state. 


Jeffrey Rogers Hummel received his B.A. in History from Grove City College in 1971. After several years in the Army, he enrolled at the University of Texas at Austin, where he is doing graduate work in history. His review of Operation Keelhaul appeared in REASON's November 1974 issue.

LUCIFER'S LEXICON
by L. A. Rollins

proverb, n. A saying that condenses the wisdom of experience into a half-truth. Half a truth is, I suppose, better than no truth at all. Following are some comparatively worthy proverbs: 1. Presents make the heart grow fonder. 2. People who live in glass houses shouldn't get stoned. 3. Two heads are better than none. 4. One man's meat is another man's sacred cow. 5. The carrot is mightier than the stick.

tender, adj. Readily yielding to blade or teeth: said of food, such as the tender hearts of Christian missionaries or the tender feet of the Donner party.

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COMING NEXT MONTH

REASON's March issue features an in-depth analysis of the politics of milk in today's mixed economy, demonstrating that, as far as politics is concerned, milk has something for everybody. Some of the more ominous new links between the Federal government and business are exposed in Charlotte Twight's "Congress Heads Toward Fascism," an excerpt from her just-published book America's Emerging Fascist Economy. Attorney Donald Feder, head of the National Association of Libertarian Lawyers, examines and demolishes liberal arguments for gun control. And economist/historian Gary North returns to entertain us with his "Midnight Money Analysis."

Also in the issue will be reviews of Percy Greaves' Mises Made Easier and Robert Pirsig's Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance plus David Brudnoy's Viewpoint, John Pierce's Science Fiction column, and all of REASON's regular features.
ONE FLEW OVER THE CUCKOO’S NEST is detonating across the country like a 20-megaton ideological bomb. Not that it’s a “message” film; its lack of preachiness makes it all the more devastating. The parallels between the movie’s mental ward and society at large are simply too obvious to miss. The story centers around a classic confrontation in a state mental institution, with Jack Nicholson as a lively, rebellious nonconformist who finds himself pitted against an unlikely but deadly authority figure, Nurse Ratched (Louise Fletcher). His presence is like a tonic on the other patients, rousing them from drug-induced lethargy into bursts of self-assertion that threaten to break down the conformist, servile discipline imposed by the hospital staff. Nicholson leads the patients on incredible escapades, goads them into standing up for rights they never even knew they possessed, and forces the staff to fall back on brute force to fight the rising rebellion. The patients are portrayed as remarkably similar to their everyday counterparts, but whose sanity is stifled by a destructive system of “therapy” that feeds on their neuroses. Millions of people who see the movie will gain their first exposure to a world whose sophisticated methods of control run the gauntlet from intimidation to isolation to shock treatment to lobotomy. The film could have the beneficial effect of jolting public and legal opinion into recognition of the civil rights of patients in mental institutions. In addition, more thoughtful viewers will recognize the movie’s mental ward as a microcosm of the relationship between the current government and those of us who are its unwilling inmates. Rated “R.”—Charles F. Barr

On May 6, 1937 the giant passenger Zeppelin and the great symbol of Nazi power, the Hindenburg, exploded at Lakehurst, New Jersey moments before completing the first Atlantic crossing of its second season. The official investigation of the explosion was finally unable to choose among possible causes: structural failure, static electricity, sabotage, Hitler, who either could not or would not admit the possibility of an anti-Nazi plot, went to the ironic extreme of labeling the explosion an act of God. The Universal production of THE HINDENBURG, directed by Robert Wise, opts for sabotage, thereby supplying a modicum of suspense to shore up an otherwise creaky plot. But the cause, as well as the plot, is cinematically irrelevant. The sole excuse for the film is the holocaust that it builds towards, and here it must be admitted that Universal and Robert Wise have created the ultimate disaster film, one that will forever relegate to well-deserved obscurity the likes of Earthquake and The Towering Inferno. Like its predecessors, The Hindenburg is a formula film, with a star-studded cast engaged in a series of Grand Hotel vignettes. George C. Scott turns in a strong performance as a career German Air Force officer assigned to the Hindenburg as special security officer in response to an apparent crank letter forecasting its destruction. Scott is the good Nazi, a loyal but soul-searching citizen who is sickened by his country’s participation in the Guernica bombings. Roy Thinnes is the bad Nazi, a Gestapo officer placed on the ship to keep an eye on Scott. Anne Bancroft contributes little and is somewhat annoying as the listless, posturing aristocrat whose family lands have been recently confiscated by the government for some nefarious purpose. It is all rather trite, and there is barely enough going on to hold your interest, notwithstanding the technical fascination of observing the inner workings of a Zeppelin. These criticisms pale to insignificance, however, with the sensational explosion that brings the film to a close. It is literally stunning in its impact, at once spectacular and horrible, and finally, a little maudlin. It is a remarkable feat of movie-making, and for sheer film pyrotechnics, one imagines that it will be a long time before it is surpassed. Rated "PG."—James F. Carey

At the opposite end of the spectrum from The Hindenburg stands Lina Wertmuller’s SWEEP AWAY BY AN UNUSUAL DESTINY IN THE BLUE SEA OF AUGUST, a delightful, literate and somewhat troubling film. As in her two previous films distributed in this country (The Seduction of Mimi and Love and Anarchy), the fine cast of her third American release is headed by the brilliant Mariangela Melato and the engaging Giancarlo Giannini. In Sweep Away, Ms. Wertmuller spins a Marxist tale involving a group of wealthy Italian intellectuals vacationing on a yacht in the Mediterranean. Melato dominates the first half of the film as a vulnerable woman constantly chattering and giving vent to her habitual dissatisfaction. When she is not railing at the Communists, she is carping at Giannini, one of the crew members, for overcooking the pasta, failing to offer her fresh coffee and not changing his T-shirts as often as she thinks he should. The rugged Giannini’s marvelous facial expressions reveal his exasperation and barely-concealed outrage at her verbal sniping, but the dialogue is witty, crisp and frequently very funny, and the tone of the exchanges hardly rises to that of class warfare. When a turn of events finds Melato and Giannini stranded on an uninhabited island, she barely notices the changed circumstances as she attempts to continue lording it over him. But Giannini is very much aware that he now has the upper hand, and at this point the tone of the film changes abruptly. He becomes cruel and brutal, avenging himself by beating her into physical and sexual submission while lecturing her on the evils of capitalism. To her great surprise (and that of the audience), she begins to love this rough treatment. Their idyllic relationship is

The Hindenburg explodes and begins sinking to the ground at her mooring mast in Lakehurst, N.J.
spotlight

The investment letter business is generally very profitable. Consequently, it's more than a little unusual to see a successful investment letter close down. It's even more unusual to hear an investment advisor say, "I've said all I need to say about economics and investment. It's all in my book. I won't waste my time, or your patience, saying it over and over again. I have other more important fish to fry."

Yet this is exactly what Rene Baxter told startled readers of The Rene Baxter Letter last September, as he announced its demise... and the beginning of a completely new venture, The Freedom Fighter, "dedicated to the restoration of our American constitutional liberties." Baxter had concluded that today's political/economic situation was leading inexorably to runaway inflation, to be followed most likely by dictatorship. And he decided to devote his full-time efforts to an activist fight to prevent that from occurring.

What is it that turns a well-heeled, successful investment advisor into a full-time freedom fighter? In Baxter's case, it was taxes. He had built up a successful gold and silver coin brokerage business, after spotting the coming climb in gold in 1970. He then branched out into the newsletter business, converting his in-house The Coinletter into the fortnightly Rene Baxter Letter. With the success of the newsletter came a number of speaking engagements at investment conferences, leading to further growth of both the brokerage and newsletter.

One result was a whopping $35,000 income tax bill for 1974. To raise the money Baxter sold his house, airplane, second car, and some furniture, and still had to borrow $10,000. "On April 15th," he explains, "I was in a terrible state. I couldn't pay it; I had to pay it. I didn't want to pay it; I was afraid not to pay it. I've never been in such a turmoil in my life... filled with rage on the one hand and nearly paralyzed by fear on the other." He ended up paying, but simultaneously resolved to arrange his affairs so he would never again pay taxes—a state he now claims to have achieved.

Baxter's grounding in libertarian writings (Rand, von Mises, Hazlitt), combined with his traumatic encounter with the IRS, led to his decision to become what he terms a freedom fighter. Freedom fighters, as he defines them, "are out there on the streets fighting for their rights and for what they believe in; and they're in the courts risking fines, jail sentences, and worse to accomplish a goal they believe is important."

A major element in the freedom fighter campaign is tax revolt—Baxter's newsletter details several specific methods of tax resistance and provides frequent updates on court decisions and actions taken by—or against—well-known tax rebels. But it also covers such areas as protection against search and seizure, the right to bear arms, and various due process rights, many of which arise in connection with tax resistance cases but have far wider implications. Baxter himself is involved in a lawsuit against the SEC which he thinks "may well turn out to be the Fourth Amendment what the Miranda decision was to the Fifth Amendment.

Rene Baxter's activities involve several different enterprises. His consulting firm, Rene Baxter Investment Services, publishes The Freedom Fighter; Arizona Liberty, the monthly newsletter of the Arizona Libertarian Party; and a new (more modest) weekly precious metal and coin newsletter. His RB Press is a book service offering books and pamphlets on economics, investment, and tax revolt. And his brokerage firm, Rene Baxter & Co., continues to make investments in precious metals and coins for clients. In his "spare time," Baxter recently helped found a new magazine, Freedom Today, which focuses on various methods of self-liberation.

Rene Baxter was born in 1937 in St. Helena, California and was educated at the University of Colorado, Arizona State University, and the University of California at San Diego. He is an avid pilot and belongs to the Committee for Monetary Research and Education, the American Numismatic Association, and the International Investment Letter Association. He and his wife, Elizabeth, make their home in Phoenix, Arizona.

Baxter has very strong ideas about both the rightness and the success potential of his freedom fight. By his analysis, of the 80 million nominal taxpayers in the United States, half in some way derive their income from government, and aren't really net taxpayers. Of the 40 million true taxpayers, the IRS admits that over 5 million failed to file a proper return in 1973, and, he claims, "another 5 or 6 million filed under protest... All together, that's about 10 million people, maybe more, out of 40 million." Baxter takes this as significant evidence that "Atlas is already shrugging," and he and his group are doing all they can to accelerate the process. "I have never in my life been involved in anything which was growing so fast," he adds.

By taking this kind of forthright stand, and aggressively taking on the likes of the IRS, the SEC, and government bureaucracy in general, Rene Baxter is putting his life squarely on the line. He knows it. "Freedom is worth what it costs," he wrote in the final issue of The Rene Baxter Letter. "If we fight now while we still have the law and the odds in our favor, the cost can be surprisingly low. But if we wait long enough, the odds may worsen, and our chances of success decline. We may then find ourselves fighting hopelessly, simply because it's better to fight and die than live as a slave."

Readers are invited to nominate persons to be featured in this column. Send details to Spotlight, c/o REASON, Box 6151, Santa Barbara, CA 93111.

MOVIES

(continued from preceding page)

short-lived, however, for rescue forces them to return to the social constraints of their former roles, she silent and saddened to her intellectual husband, he to his lumpish wife. Wertmüller's parable of the uninhibited joys of natural man liberated from the distortions of civilization and therefore free to exercise unrestrained force on his vic-
FROM THE PEOPLE WHO BROUGHT YOU THE MONKEY TRIAL

Inflation, of either the single or multiple digit variety, is merely one of the numerous uncertainties of economic life for which the free market—through the price mechanism—will automatically and optionally adjust.

But lest we take too much comfort in the resourcefulness of the unfettered free market, we should remember that, while our minds may dwell in the ethereal realms of free trade, our bodies must exist in our present quasi-fascist environment.

In an attempt to preserve the value of contracts in the face of irresponsible governmental monetary policy, a good deal of attention has been paid to the use of indexed contracts. Under these arrangements either the price to be paid or, in the case of a loan, the amount of the interest or principal is indexed to some nonmonetary value, such as the price of gold or the Consumer Price Index.

But as we saw in earlier discussions of the use of gold clauses [see "Gold Clauses," REASON, Dec. 1974, p. 35], there is a danger that a court will refuse to recognize the right of freedom of contract and strike down these indexed provisions as usurious.

In what may be the first such case since the 1930's, a court has had occasion to rule on an indexed loan. In a case decided October 27th, the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that a loan agreement whose principal amount was indexed to the Consumer Price Index was a usurious contract and not enforceable for the additional amount called for by the index clause. They held that the additional amount of principal called for by the adjustment for inflation constituted interest and, since Tennessee has a 10 percent usury ceiling, the total interest charged under the agreement violated the law and could not be enforced.

The case was brought by Union Planters Bank in an attempt to get around the 105-year-old usury provision of the Tennessee constitution. They made a $50,000 one-month loan to a Memphis developer, Aztec Properties, at the 10 percent ceiling rate, subject to a principal adjustment to reflect any change (upward or downward) in the Consumer Price Index. When the loan was repaid there had been a one percent change in the CPI and the Bank sued for the additional $500 inflation adjustment to the principal.

The Tennessee court rejected arguments based on "exchange of money" cases, which involved payment of obligations in different currencies, and stated that it found no case which did not view the intentional increase in the face amount of the principal to be interest. The court took the position that, since interest had traditionally been used to offset inflation, that a device such as this, which had the same intent, could reasonably be considered interest. Since the interest thus calculated exceeded the 10 percent interest ceiling, the court held the index clause to violate the law.

Since at the time this loan was made the largest banks in Tennessee were having to pay 11 1/2 to 12 percent for their money, the effect of this ruling, should interest rates heat up again, should be apparent. Money will be diverted to loans that are exempt from usury ceilings or made only to the most creditworthy (i.e., rich) borrowers. If a bank has a choice of putting its money into loans to poor people at an 8 or 10 percent usury ceiling, or loaning it to General Motors or some other "unprotected" borrower at 11 percent, it requires no abstruse Marxist class analysis to predict the results.

** * * *

The usury law is a relic of that long and deplorable epoch of man's history when he was denied the freedom to control his own life and property. We know that formal laws limiting the payment of interest existed at least as early as the Babylonians. Scriptural authority is found in the Bible which states (Deuteronomy 23:19) "Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother," and again (Luke 6:35) " . . . lend freely, hoping nothing thereby." Aristotle considered money to be sterile, and that the breeding of money from money was unnatural. The medieval church was of the same opinion. It is interesting to speculate how much of the poverty and suffering of that period is attributable to this restriction on the movement of capital.

The expansion of personal freedom during the Renaissance was accompanied by changes in the attitude toward the charging of interest. In the 15th century Luther conceded that creditors could take interest and during the 16th century John Calvin rejected the scriptural basis of the prohibition, but still advocated some form of control. In the following centuries pressure continued against the restrictions on the taking of interest until they were finally repealed in England in the mid-19th century. The United States, however, has largely retained these restrictions from colonial days. These restrictions on interest rates are embodied in both state constitutions and legislative acts, and frequently set the maximum rate chargeable at 8 percent, although the laws provide for a wide variety of exemptions.

The principal pressure for interest rate ceilings today comes from two sources. On one hand certain parties, both lenders and borrowers, have a vested interest in the market distortion produced by the usury. The other, more visible source are the consumerists, who hold as an article of faith that it is better for their clients to be denied credit because of a usury law than to obtain credit at the market rate.

Illustrations of this effect are common. A few years ago the consumer protectors in the state of Washington decided that the masses were being oppressed by the 18 percent interest charge of the credit card companies, so they got a law passed limiting the rate to 12 percent. As any fool should know, when you lower a price below the market rate you will have more demand than supply and the seller must ration on some basis other than price. The obvious alternative was to offer credit only to the lower risk borrowers. The people who got the consumerists' bargain credit were the most creditworthy—those with good jobs, property, etc. The losers were not the profit-gouging usurers but the welfare mothers, students, elderly, etc. who didn't qualify for the cheap credit and weren't permitted to bargain for a loan reflecting their creditworthiness. The invisible hand strikes again!

** * * *

Lest you think the only villain is the usury law, it should be mentioned that the Tennessee court also declared that the index clause violated the Joint Congressional Resolution of June 5, 1933, by which the New Deal Congress declared unenforceable the gold clauses in private contracts.

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Davis Keeler's Money column alternates monthly in REASON with John J. Pierce's Science Fiction column.

66 reason

february 1976
• REASON READER SURVEY: Last August, we mailed questionnaires to a ten percent random sample of our 12,000 subscribers (we’re now over 14,000). 501 valid responses were received (a 42% return). Based on the survey, we learned the following: REASON subscribers are 87% male and their mean age is 38 years. 57% are married, and 72% have no children, with 59% owning their own home and 67% having incomes of $15,000 or more. 69% have college degrees, 91% buy hardback books (average of 16 each year) and 96% buy paperback books (average of 27 per year). 94% took trips last year, with 36% reporting foreign travel. Over 66% identified their political orientation as libertarian. 34% are registered as Republicans, 20% as Libertarian Party, and 36% are not registered in any political party.

Over 65% have been reading REASON for more than one year, and 40% of them for 2 years. 69% of subscribers report that their copy of REASON is read by one or more people (besides themselves) and over 39% read each issue of REASON cover to cover, regardless of the time required.

We asked readers to rate each REASON feature during the past year on a scale of 1 ("very poor") to 5 ("excellent"). Highest rated features were main articles (7.5) and interviews (7.5), Editorials (7.4), Trends (7.3), and Viewpoint (7.2). Next came Money (6.6) and Publisher’s Notes (6.6), Book Reviews (6.5), Letters (6.4), Frontlines (6.4), Foreign Correspondents (6.3), Rudebarbs (6.2), Reason Profile (6.1), and Movies (5.9). Lowest rated features were Science Fiction (5.6), Classifieds (5.5) and Poetry (5.9).

We were pleased at the many favorable comments included on the questionnaires. A sampling: "All in all I would say REASON is a fine publication and I never miss an opportunity to try and sell a subscription to a friend. REASON should be read by everyone!" "It is one of the high points of my month when REASON arrives in the mail." "You will have a subscription from me as long as you choose to remain in business." "You’re doing a tremendous job. Keep it up!" "The money I spend for REASON is without doubt the best investment in periodicals I make." "Still, by far, the best libertarian journal of our time." "My only request is that the very high standards of quality and integrity be maintained. I have enjoyed every issue and hope to continue doing so." "On the whole, I think your magazine is fantastic—excellent format and fair presentation of all facets of libertarianism." "Yours is my favorite magazine. It deserves its name." "I enjoy your magazine immensely." "I love you!"

We specifically asked readers what they’d like to see REASON add or delete, or other ways in which the magazine could be improved. In response, no one comment was mentioned by more than 4% of subscribers. Items which some readers would like more of include philosophical articles and articles on basic principles, trends and current events, more psychological aspects of freedom and psychology in general. Readers also mentioned that they would like to see more practical, "how-to" information on making changes. Items mentioned which some would like to see deleted or curtailed include poetry and science fiction. Some readers asked for stronger libertarian interpretation of movie reviews, or for better reviews generally. Other comments included some complaints about the length of articles or quality of writing, and the smallness of the typeface.

REASON’s editors have analyzed the responses and we are in the process of taking steps to further strengthen the quality of REASON. Since our survey, we have introduced the Spotlight column, to replace Profile. In coming months, we intend to introduce a new layout, and we are planning to replace poetry with increased use of News Briefs, opinion columns (one rotating devilish definitions) and choice quotations. We are extremely grateful for the excellent response to our questionnaire and for the many nice comments. One of the best ways that readers can help REASON–SON’S voice be heard is to have their business associates or friends become subscribers. We’re proud to have such loyal subscribers as we do, and we’d like your help in making REASON grow.

• MIGRANT LABOR: The Illinois Migrant’s Council has the goal of getting migrant workers out of agriculture and into permanent jobs in industry. A major part of its more than $1 million budget, which comes primarily from the federal government, goes to adult education classes and job placement. A Council counselor, Jose Sosa, who deals with Spanish-speaking migrants of Mexican heritage, stated in the Chicago Sun-Times that "I have to tell them that there is no future in the fields for them or their children." Instead, the Council offers migrants the chance of regular jobs as machinists or drill-press operators at $4 an hour, 40 hours a week. Most of the migrant workers the Council deals with have permanent homes in the Southwest, and many are not attracted by the idea of a steady job in a big city. Some say they like the freedom of moving on the road and working when they need money. According to Sosa, "They think they are making money in the fields and even think they have a good life. Sometimes we have to make them aware of the conditions they live in."

We naturally don’t approve of this baleful use of our tax dollars, but we can’t help wondering what kind of success the Council might have if it tried its hand at relocating politicians into another field.
ELECTION ACHIEVEMENTS

Reviewing the election results from the recent November Libertarian Party efforts around the country, it is not obvious that progress is being made. The evaluation depends entirely upon your relative perspective. In the San Francisco race for mayor, Ray Cunningham received slightly over 1,000 votes (about one half of one percent) for Mayor and Lloyd Taylor received almost 11,000 votes (about five percent of the voters included him among their six options). In Poughkeepsie, New York, Carole Cohen received under 500 votes (approximately five percent) and Ellen Davis received about 150 votes (approximately six percent). The basic response of conservatives, Republicans, and drop-outs would be, “Ha Ha, see how useless the whole effort is; you didn’t win; you didn’t even come close.”

According to Eric Garris, who has been very much praised by the San Francisco candidates for his management talent in their behalf, the biggest problem the campaign faced was the fact that “fiscal conservative” incumbent politician John Barbagelata looked like he had a chance to win the mayor’s race. A large number of voters who told campaign workers face to face that they supported Cunningham also told the workers that they would not vote for him because “he hasn’t got a chance.” Barbagelata came in second and subsequently lost the run-off election on Dec. 11 to George Moscone, the candidate of the public employee unions and other bigwigs of the public sow. In retrospect, we might ask whether Barbagelata ever really had a chance to win. According to Lloyd Taylor, whose own campaign for the Board of Supervisors of San Francisco heavily emphasized civil liberties and tax cuts, Moscone received the support of liberals because of his social issues and Barbagelata threw away this issue because of his conservative, as opposed to libertarian, perspective. If the Libertarian Party has a future it is because it presents a new “package deal” with the best issues of the liberals and the conservatives, and rids itself of the historical baggage which both former positions carry around like red badges of courage.

On the other hand, the San Francisco campaign did make an impact in a more fundamental way. Every electoral effort has both a purpose and a meta-purpose: the purpose is to “win,” of course—and most people can’t see beyond this short-range goal; the meta-purpose is to make contact with voters, with opinion makers, and to lay the groundwork for a permanent political challenge to the government and to the ideal of collectivism. In San Francisco, Libertarian Party registration has more than tripled and a large number of additional activists has been recruited for future electoral campaigns. The number of “hard core” workers required to take over a political structure (whether it be a union, a neighborhood club, or a city government) is amazingly small compared to the number of voters involved.

In New York, Carole Cohen received enough votes to make the difference between the man who won and the man whom the pollsters thought would win. Ellen Davis came within 15 votes of achieving a similar “spoil.” This sort of marginal effect has a much larger impact than the absolute number of votes would suggest, because politics is a “winner take all” zero-sum game. The next time around, the major party candidates will define their issues in terms of this marginal bloc of votes—and issues, not personalities, is what the Libertarian Party is all about. To some extent this phenomenon is already occurring. Marco Caviglia was elected to the Duchess County, NY, legislature as a Republican with the endorsement of the Free Libertarian Party. His campaign slogan was “Join the Tax Revolt.” Caviglia’s campaign was an excellent example of what libertarians can accomplish within the rotten shell structure of the Big Two. The Libertarian Republican Alliance, 1811 East 34th St., Brooklyn, NY 11234 is very active in identifying Republicans who are strong philosophically and yet not convinced that the Libertarian Party is the way to go.

REAGAN VS. MAC BRIDE

The developments in San Francisco suggest that the MacBride Campaign, 1516 P Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20005 might be in real trouble. The effect of Ronald Reagan’s campaign for the GOP nomination will be to hypnotize libertarian Republicans, because “he has a chance” and MacBride doesn’t. Just as with Ray Cunningham, many voters will move in the old circles in the hope that finally a victory may result. The attempt in San Francisco following the Cunningham campaign to persuade silent supporters to change their registrations from Republican to Libertarian, to meet a minimum statutory Party registration quota with the chance to obtain ballot status in 1976 via court action, has met with the response, “But I want to vote for Reagan against Ford in the Republican primary.” If this tactic is to be pursued, the smart libertarian voter should vote for Ford, not Reagan, because if Reagan loses the GOP nomination this would alienate all of those closet libertarians from the Republican Party, and the Libertarian Party would be on its way to major party status if they could be recruited. An insider from the Reagan campaign has advised this writer that the Reagan people are all fiercely ideological (i.e. pro-capitalist), and fierce activists never forgive a betrayal. Already many libertarian kids who have been screwed by the political machinations of groups such as YAF are among the most active and resourceful libertarian partisans. Prior to the August convention in Kansas City, however, fierce pro-capitalists might want to contact.
INTERNATIONAL LIBERTARIAN CONSPIRACY

In Australia, the new libertarian Workers Party has made an impressive showing in its first electoral contest, a by-election in the State of Western Australia. Geoff McNiel of Perth achieved 13 percent of the vote, compared to 45 percent for the Liberals, 27 percent for the conservative Country Party, and 14 percent for the Labour Party. This by-election should be a good indication of what to expect from the general elections (which we regret are not known as of this column’s deadline). For continuing news about developments down under, contact the Workers Party, Box 686, Darlinghurst, Sydney, N.S.W. By the time you read this, general elections in Australia will have occurred.

POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES

The decision by the Federal Election Commission in November that Sun Oil Company could legally set up a committee to collect money from employees and stockholders to support candidates and issues, just as the AFL-CIO’s COPE has done for years, represents a major new important development for libertarian candidates. The key provision is that corporate funds may be used to cover administrative expenses—and this would include office space, phones, Xerox, etc. The number of corporate political action committees which might be formed, and the reasonable possibility that management might be disposed in favor of libertarian candidates, could put the Libertarian Party into major contention in every State in 1976. Copies of the SUNPAC Proposal (AOR 1975–23) and the FEC’s favorable opinion can be obtained by writing the Federal Election Commission, Washington, DC 20463. Instructions for setting up a corporate PAC are available from the National Association of Manufacturers, 1776 F Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20006. Under the new election law, a political committee may give no more than $5,000 to a candidate per primary or general election, and candidate spending is restricted as well. Even if the Supreme Court declares the Federal Election Commission and its statute unconstitutional, the momentum generated and the precedent set by the FEC decision can only be helpful to the Libertarian Party.

THE FIRST LIBERTARIAN REVOLUTION

The bicentennial itself could be one of the best vehicles for promoting libertarian ideas, and the Libertarian Bicentennial Center, 2216 40th Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20007 can be useful in that direction. It will be an information center and provide assistance in coordination of libertarian efforts around the bicentennial. Students and faculty should request that their college’s bicentennial program or lecture series include a libertarian historian who will speak on the American Revolution, et al., highlighting the libertarian nature of the struggle.

This column is concerned with activities out on the “frontlines” of the battle for freedom, and with the people who are the strategists, tacticians, and troops. Please send material for inclusion in FRONTLINES to Joe Cobb, Box 1776, Chicago, IL 60690.

rudebarbs

WITHOUT STATE AID, OPERA CAN BARELY SURVIVE - WHILE POPULAR TRASH THRIVES!

SO INSTEAD OF SUPPORTING THE OPERA THIS YEAR . . . SEND YOUR CHECKS TO OPERA LOBBY!

WHAT'S THIS, SENATOR? MY TAX MONEY IS GOING TO SUPPORT THIS . . . THIS...

IT IS MORE DEMOCRATIC! MORE VOTERS PREFER THIS MUSIC!

AND THE MUSIC COMMISSIONER IS A POLITICAL APPOINTMENT.

WELL HE KNOWS ABOUT AS MUCH ABOUT MUSIC AS...

SPLENDIDO!

SUCCESS! THE STATE'S BUILDING US A NEW OPERA HOUSE, AND THERE'S A STATE COMMISSIONER OF MUSIC AND...

...AS YOU KNOW ABOUT POLITICS?

RANDALL K HYLKEMA

reason 69
ARMED RESISTANCE
It is exasperating to think that libertarians need to fortify themselves by premedita-
ting violence against government employ-
ees. I am referring to Morgan Norval’s arti-
cle and Robert Miller’s letter in the Octo-
ber REASON.

The notion of armed resistance or insur-
rection is more futile than wise. Few per-
sions today would have the motive or cour-
age necessary to raise arms against the
government. Those of them that raised
arms would find themselves outnumbered
thousands-to-one, at the mercy of a very
efficient and ruthless police system. At
best, insurrectionists might produce a
momentary period of social chaos before
they would be exterminated or im-
prisoned.

Apart from the futility of armed resis-
tance, there is the stronger criticism that
the path of insurrection would lead to the
loss of innocent lives. This is almost in-
evitable, granted Norval’s class concept of
who our “enemies” are. It is far too easy
to single out a class of persons (govern-
ment employees) as those wholly respon-
sible for the plight of society—and against
whom no reprisal is too great. If com-
plexity is calculated on an all-or-nothing
basis, how am I supposed to have any con-
fidence in the moral discretion of self-
styled libertarian insurrectionists? If
Miller can look forward to snuffing out a
bumbling IRS clerk, how can that be
viewed as a sane approach to social free-
dom?

By no means am I denying the importance
of firearms as weapons of defense. But,
by the same token, I cannot go along with
the hysteria connected with possible gun
control; there are more ways than that to
defend oneself, if the need arises. We can-
not afford to waste time with violence
fantasies. They offer no way out, as his-
tory has shown. Better to spend our en-
ergies in demonstrating the efficacy of open
and autonomous human relationships, in-
stead of submitting to the futility of vio-
 lent revenue.

It is 200 years too late for violence to
liberate us. Today, there is less freedom
and (paradoxically) more wealth than at
the time of the Revolution—a condition
that the population does not question or
criticize. If freedom is to prevail in such
an environment, it will only be through
the appeal to spiritual values—not through
the bloodbath and destruction of
righteous revenge.

Mike Dunn
Seattle, WA

FIGHTING INFLATION
The Libertarian Party’s “position paper”
on inflation blames the Federal Reserve
for inflation. That is like blaming inter-
course for syphilis, when it’s merely the
transmitter. The Party’s position is dou-
ly ineffective. It blames an entity that is
Dullesville to most voters, and it complete-
ly misses the real culprit, the political
target, the Congressman who votes for
inflation. Their strategy is totally lacking
while mine is the one that could help
them eliminate most of the Congressmen
 currently in office.

Inflation is caused by printing excess
money. But that cannot be done except to
finance federal deficits, which can be
imposed only by your Congressman, indi-
vidually, voting with the majority.

If, every time a Congressman voted to
spend more, or cut income taxes, the
Party published a small local ad stating
that “On Sept. _______, Congressman
_____ voted for INFLATION, AGAIN
by voting for _______. Send $1 to P.O.
Box ___ for details,” within a few weeks,
the Party would have thousands of in-
quiries, (including disguised ones from
the Congressman,) and within weeks, he
would suddenly proclaim himself pure,
voting only for a balanced budget. Then
would be the time to send a list of his
previous votes to all inquirers, to prevent
his changed spots from fooling anyone.
The average voter needs somebody to
hate. It might as well be the incumbent
Congressman.

In the next primaries, if he hadn’t already
“retired,” he would be replaced by his
own party, in the primaries, or wired out
by the opposition in the finals. It is very
nice to dream about a Libertarian Con-
gress, but do we want to win power, or
cut others? If the latter, we don’t care
who replaces the resident bandit, as long
as it is done, and we’ll get our share
 eventually.

The inflation of 1974 of 12% destroyed
half a trillion dollars of the buying power
of our nation’s capital of something over
four billion. The inflation of 1977, based
on a sixty billion dollar 1975 deficit, will
be 25 percent or higher. Where today the
Treasury has been grabbing 65 percent of
the money in the market at high interest
rates, in 1977-8, it will take 80 percent,
at much higher interest rates. Construc-
tion will disappear, even though buyers
have cash, with the flood Congress puts
out.

Today’s brutal inflation came from your
Congressman’s vote for an income tax cut
in December 1969. Nixon fought it be-
cause IT WOULD BE INFLATIONARY,
but 98 percent, all but ten Congressmen
voted for it, so 98 percent of Congress,
knowingly, voted for our destruction
through inflation. Which makes them
immensely vulnerable to an informed at-
tack by a splinter party, once it straight-
en out its economic facts.

Thomas S. Booz
Plantation, FL

ROLLERBALL RE-REVIEWED
Never have I read a movie review that I
felt was further from the mark than James
F. Carey’s review of Rollerball [Septem-
ber]. It seems to me that Carey reviewed
the film makers’ intents and not their fin-
ished product. For the film Rollerball is
nothing less than an Anthem-like paean
to the triumph of the individual ego.

Make no mistake about it, Jonathan E.—
the film’s protagonist, played superbly by
James Caan—is a hero of truly Randian
proportions. In a projected future of grey
hued “WE’s”, he stands practically alone
as a blood spattered “I”. In a “corporate”
society of faceless executive decision mak-
ing and complex but nebulous interde-
pendencies, Jonathan is capable of acting
alone as Judge, Jury and Executioner for
the retaliatory use of force on an oppo-
nent who has maimed one of his team-
 mates.

Throughout the film, Jonathan never re-
quests the sanction of any other person
for any of his decisions. HE decides, HE
acts and HE triumphs. His triumphs are
supreme gut-stirring experiences, at least
as powerful emotionally as the rediscovery
of the word “EGO” in the aforemen-
tioned Anthem.

Reviewer Carey is right in that the game
is played within a flimsy anti-capitalist
setting, but this is mere cross—easily dis-
card ed. Despite what the film makers
attempted, Rollerball is the story of the
supreme triumph of an individual. An
individual who triumphs over his peers,
his superiors and the whole fabric of his
existence.

This movie is not to be missed.

Joseph L. Gentili
Brooklyn, NY

AN EXPLANATION
I am, of course, very pleased by Marty
Zupan’s favorable review of my book
“Eco-Hysteries and the Technophobes”
[November], and her comment “If you
can get your hands on Beckmann’s book,
it is the most refreshing.” The reason why the book is out of print is that rather than prepare a new edition of the book in this constantly and rapidly changing field, I decided to publish a monthly newsletter, which is now in its third year. It is Access to Energy, Box 2298, Boulder, CO 80302, $6/year. If you “can’t get your hands on the book,” there is more, and on more topical subjects, in the newsletter.

Petr Beckmann
Boulder, CO

ATHEISM COMMENTS
My thanks to REASON for publishing the two reviews of my book, Atheism: The Case Against God [November]. David Bryant’s review, however, contained several errors which I would like to correct.

First, Dr. Bryant says repeatedly that my defense of atheism “rests on a multitude of standard libertarian principles” and that I offer “a staunchly libertarian critique of Christianity.” Evidently Dr. Bryant is unaware that libertarianism is a political theory and has nothing directly to say on the issue of theism versus atheism, or on any epistemological issue, for that matter. I have never tied atheism to libertarianism; Dr. Bryant’s juxtaposition of these two distinct spheres is his error, not mine.

Second, Dr. Bryant seems disturbed by my definition of atheism, in the basic sense, as “the absence of theistic belief,” rather than as the outright denial of theism. Because this runs counter to “ordinary parlance” and to some (though, Dr. Bryant neglects to mention, not all) dictionary definitions, my definition is tagged as a “redefinition”—more specifically, as a “persuasive definition.” Dr. Bryant is apparently of the opinion that my definition of atheism is somehow novel or peculiar to me.

It is a sad fact that many philosophers who discuss atheism are abysmally ignorant of its history. With due respect to “ordinary parlance,” prominent atheists have defended for many years the view that an atheist is primarily a person who lacks theistic belief. Baron D’Holbach, the famous atheist and materialist, took this approach when he argued (as I did) that “All children are atheists—they have no idea of God.” (Le Bons Sens, 1772.) Charles Bradlaugh, perhaps the most important crusader for atheism of the 19th century, adopted a similar stance: noting that “no position is more continuously and more persistently misrepresented” than atheism, he stated, “Atheism is without God. It does not assert no God.” (The Freethinker’s Text-Book, 1876.) Bradlaugh was followed in this regard by

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Consider, the following price chart. All are actual prices, including commissions, quoted by telephone during the first week of December of 1975.

U.S Silver Coins [per $1,000 face]

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Austrian 100 Coronas [price for 20 coins]

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300 Frandor Ave. Lansing, Michigan 48912

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other prominent atheists, including Annie Besant during her pre-theosophical days.

Moving forward in time, Joseph McCabe, author of hundreds of books and articles pertaining to atheism, defines atheism as "the absence of theistic belief." (A Rationalist Encyclopedia, 1950.) The same idea was put forcefully by Chapman Cohen, third president of the National Secular Society of Britain and one of the most prolific writers on atheism of this century: "If one believes in a god, then one is a Theist. If one does not believe in a god, then one is an A-theist—he is without that belief. The distinction between atheism and theism is entirely, exclusively, that of whether one has or has not a belief in God." (Primitive Survivals in Modern Thought, 1935.)

Lest it be thought that only atheists view atheism in this manner, one of the ablest of theistic defenders, Robert Flint, wrote as follows: "The word atheist is a thoroughly honest, unambiguous term. It means one who does not believe in God, and it means neither more nor less." (Agnosticism, 1903)

Of course, historical precedents alone cannot resolve the problem of a correct definition, especially when we are dealing with a word that has been used in a variety of ways. There are crucial epistemological considerations we must take into account, some of which I discussed in my book, such as the burden of proof. But the foregoing sources will hopefully underline the importance of looking to atheists for what they have said, rather than to unformed commentators hostile to atheism, who never tire of telling us what atheists should have said. If ever there has been an instance of "persuasive redefinition," this is it.

George H. Smith
Hollywood, CA

MACHAN ON CHOICE
I would like to clear up some problems John Nelson spots in my book The Pseudo-Science of B. F. Skinner [November].

Nelson thinks I identify human nature with the freedom of the will: "[1] in all strictness, what Machan would seem to mean by 'humanity' is the capacity to choose or not to think—in other words, 'freedom.'" He derives this understanding from my alleged identification of "the capacity of human beings to regulate their consciousness" and "focus[ing] one's consciousness."

I do not identify the capacity to regulate with focusing one's consciousness, appear-

aces to the contrary notwithstanding. The former pertains to a basic option we have to initiate or not to initiate our conscious-ness, the latter to the act (or the initiation of the act) of regulating conscious-ness. Because of the misunderstanding, Nelson finds fault with my distinction between being a human being (possessing the capacity) and being a good human being (sustaining the focus).

But even when Nelson accepts the qualification—as indeed, my book would indicate that we must—he raises a two part objection. First he counters that "unless I first had the thought of thinking I could not have willed to think" and "unless I am already thinking how do I rationally decide to initiate a process of thought?" Let me just indicate the cor-

cet reply to this objection—it is well answered, I believe, in Nathaniel Branden's The Psychology of Self-Esteem.

Essentially the answer is that the choice to begin to think is a primary, genuine choice, a cause, not, as Nelson seems to view it, a kind of selection between alternatives of which one must not be aware, something computers perform, too. One's own thinking activity does not stand outside a person to be selected or rejected by him—it does not exist unless one initiates it. If, as I argue, conceptual thought implies the existence of the freedom to choose, it is the possibility of this sort of choice that is implied, not the sort we would perhaps more appropriately call "selection."

As his second objection Nelson believes he has given a realistic case of human conduct which is irrational yet not immoral. He is thus alleging a lack of comprehensiveness in the theory I support. He says:

...Take the case of a person at the bottom of a dungeon. He knows that any sound he makes can be heard by no one and can only result in a painful throat. Having initiated this process of thought he nonetheless screams and continues screaming. In this he is being much more irrational than a person who reasons that he can acquire wealth and other things which he desires by murdering his father. Thus, according to Machan's looser theory, we must conclude that the poor wretch screaming at the bottom of a dungeon is not only im-

oral but he is much more immoral than the cold-blooded parricide! But this is absurd!

With no disrespect intended, I believe Nel-

son is unfair—he could have tried to see how my view would handle this sort of case. To help him, and those impressed by the example, I will simply point out that the example is utterly unrealistic—

how on earth would this person know that the sounds he makes can be heard by no one? Believing and acting on that sup-

position would be the irrational thing—
given that he could lose his life remaining silent but might attract attention screaming (even with the minor inconvenience of an impending sore throat as a considera-
tion before him). Or, alternatively, screaming does at times relieve emotional stress, so even in hopeless distress it can make life mentally more tolerable than repressing the agony in silence. When, by good common sense and perhaps even philosophical understanding, one ac-

knowledges the value of one's life, a bit of "last resort" screaming is surely one of the rational things to be done in such a situation.

I hope the above indicates at least the way to answer Nelson's objections to the positive theory I defend in my book.

Tibor R. Machan
Palo Alto, CA

Prof. Nelson replies: It would appear that Tibor Machan and I both agree that if choice involves the consideration of alter-

 natives then there cannot be a choice to begin to think. Machan, however, wants to maintain that one chooses to begin to think. He says "The choice to begin to think is a primary, genuine choice, a first cause, not, as Nelson maintains, one of the alternatives, a kind of selection between alternatives." Quite rightly he points out, in this con-

nection, that "one's own thinking activity does not stand outside a person to be selected or rejected by him—it does not exist unless one initiates it." But all the last point argues for is what has already been granted in the first sentence of this paragraph. It does not argue for the claim that there is a choice to begin to think which is a primary, genuine choice, a first cause—a choice that does not involve alternatives.

The trouble with the latter is: Why should we call this a choice? What would be the difference, for example, between my simply beginning to think about eating lunch when I had not been thinking of anything at all antecedently and, in Machan's purported sense of 'choice' which involves the consideration of no alternatives, my choosing to begin to think about eating lunch? What is described by the last expression that is not described by the first and shorter one? I fail to see that anything is. But then a host of philosophical principles—Occam's razor, Wittgenstein's principle of the use-

lessly spinning wheel, Leibnitz's principle of identity—would seem to all combine to dictate that, in such cases, we say that we begin to think and not that we choose to begin to think.

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Once thinking, of course, we can choose not to think or to continue to think—having weighed the alternatives of thinking or not thinking. Perhaps (I suggest with diffidence) here should be located the starting point of choice, not in the initiation of thought itself—J.O.N.

INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT

November 1975 "Trends" praises the recent Supreme Court decision declaring that a person cannot be confined against his will without treatment. "Trends" declares that "the decision's impact may be significant."

From a practical viewpoint, let me say that I have not heard of a single, solitary inmate whose release has been brought about by this decision. Furthermore, of all the complaints I've heard about mental hospitals—and I hear them every week—I've never heard an ex-patient complain about not being treated. One and all, they fear and resent the treatments themselves. To think that a decision encouraging the treatment of mental patients will help them is like thinking that a decision to "treat" Jews in a concentration camp will help them. The "treatment" is precisely the thing that everyone wishes to avoid once he is put against his will into a mental hospital.

Thomas Szasz gets to the heart of the matter when he points out that the Court in its first decision in regard to the rights of mental patients in fact put its imprimatur upon the classification of certain individuals as involuntary patients. By stiffening the criteria for this classification, the Court did more to legitimize involuntary treatment than to discredit it. At the present time, 90 percent or more of state mental hospital patients are already being "treated" with mind-stifling and body cramping drugs called tranquilizers. If psychiatrists need to justify incarcerating the others, they only need to give them drugs as well—or electroshock, or psychosurgery, or group therapy, or occupational therapy—or any of the barbarous and absurd "therapies" perpetrated upon patients. A rational mental patient will be afraid to appeal for his release on the grounds that he is not being treated, for he will know that the psychiatrists will immediately begin treating him!

Since its inception, psychiatry has justified its abuse of patients on the grounds that it is treating them. The Supreme Court has now made this the law of the land.

Peter Breggin
Bethesda, MD

Mr. Poole replies: Opinion is obviously divided about the ultimate effects of O'Connor v. Donaldson. Civil liberties lawyer Bruce J. Ennis, who argued the case and is on record in favor of total abolition of involuntary confinement, considers the case a clearcut victory for the rights of mental patients. Because mental hospital resources are limited, many authorities expect the decision to result in large-scale release of nondangerous inmates. It should also be noted that the decision left undecided the crucial issue of the right to refuse treatment, which is being pursued by Ennis and his colleagues in the Mental Health Law Project.—R.P.

Reasons Letter of the Month

The letter below, by subscriber Ben L. Olson, appeared in the October 7, 1975 issue of the Des Moines Register:

END FEDERAL GRAIN INSPECTION

In 1795, James Madison commented on an interesting phenomenon which he described as "the old trick of turning every contingency into a resource for accumulating force in government." The Register's editors really have the trick down pat by giving us the "More of the Same" editorial Sept. 27 (concerning grain inspection).

When the combination of federal inspector-private inspection agencies seems to be failing, The Register blames private enterprise and calls for more government intervention.

In keeping with The Register's statement that the "free market is fine when it is free," perhaps it would be better to advocate less government intervention—or even none at all.

What would happen if the federal and state governments completely phased out their intervention in free market enterprise? Would the export market turn into utter chaos? Would buyer and seller fail to find a rational basis for achieving grading standards without the "omnipotent" government inspector? Would there be no demand for honest sales? Would foreign buyers neglect to hire the service of a private inspection company guaranteeing its product?

In short, given a little time and no government intervention, would not rational people find rational means for conducting their business? Or do government bureaucrats have a natural monopoly on rationality?

Ben L. Olson
Pocahontas, la.

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classifieds

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WILL YOU SURVIVE BEYOND 1985? Do you like to know more about stopping aggressive wars than starting them? Do you want to learn about the Libertarian defence potential? Are you aware that nuclear weapons are cheap extermination camp packages, waiting for you, that they are altogether useless without collectivist territorial targets, that everything is prepared for nuclear war and nothing for its prevention, that only full realization of individual liberty could prevent it, or have you bet your life and those of your family on your opinion that nuclear war will not occur? If you want to prevent the coming genocide and
I BELIEVE that economic illiteracy flourishes because libertarians have never conclusively refuted "liberal" spokesmen in systematic, written debate, tenaciously pursued to an explicit con- ception. Would appreciate leads to any such effort, or assistance in initiating same. D. A. Williamson, 868 Moana Court, Palo Alto, CA 94306.


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