



Assessing the US Capitol Police's Failure to Comply with Congressional Calls for Accountability

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DEMAND PROGRESS
EDUCATION FUND

Executive Summary

The United States Capitol Police (USCP) serves an essential mission: safeguarding the United States Capitol complex and protecting members of Congress, staff, press, and visitors. The Capitol Police has nearly 2,450 employees and its budget in FY 2023 was \$734.6 million. The agency is immediately overseen by a small Board, and the Capitol Police and its Board in turn are overseen by the House Administration and Senate Rules Committees.

The January 6, 2021 attack on the Capitol focused a spotlight on failures in the agency's leadership, security planning, training, and response, leading to calls for comprehensive reviews of its operations and accountability for its failures. The roots of these problems lie deep in an insular culture that routinely ignored warnings of deficient practices and resisted remedial efforts.

At the heart of effective agencies are feedback loops that surface problems and focus attention on reform processes. The Capitol Police, however, has worked diligently to undermine and avoid accountability to Congress, the press, and the public. In addition, the weak position of the agency's Inspector General means internal checks-and-balances are insufficient to the task.

This report examines congressional directives to the Capitol Police to reform its practices issued between FY 2019-2023 and reform recommendations issued by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) during that same period of time. It evaluates whether the Capitol Police has complied and whether it did so in a timely fashion. You can find a list of all publicly-available congressional directives and GAO recommendations in the appendix.

When it comes to evaluating reform at the USCP, the direction from Congress and reform recommendations issued by the GAO are only the tip of the iceberg and leave many areas unaddressed. Indeed, there are more than 100 recommendations issued by the US Capitol Police Inspector General (IG), but as was made clear at a July 2023 House Administration Committee hearing, it is not possible to trust the USCP IG's assessment of whether they have been properly closed.

In addition, we at Demand Progress Education Fund have made a number of recommendations for reform at the Capitol Police that began before the January 6th failures. The Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee in conjunction with the Senate Rules Committee made recommendations as well, as did General Honore on behalf of the House of Representatives. This report does not address those recommendations.

Key Findings

Responsiveness to Congressional Directives

Over the last few years, the Appropriations Committees incorporated nine instances of language directing and encouraging the Capitol Police to undertake a series of reforms. Overall we found full and timely compliance with three directives from Appropriators, full but belated compliance with two directives, and non-compliance and/or unclear compliance with four directives.

A breakdown of the directives is as follows:

The Capitol Police fully and timely complied with three directives from Appropriators. These directives concerned:




- Capitol Police Employee Overtime, Wellness, and Mental Health
- Risk-Based Protection for Members of Congress
- Diversity and Diversity Training

*The Capitol Police fully complied with two directives from Appropriators, but did **not** do so in a timely fashion. These directives concerned:*



- Capitol Police Arrest Records as Data
- USCP Public Information Office and Social Media

There is no public evidence the Capitol Police complied with the following two directives from Appropriators. These directives concerned:



- Creating a FOIA-like Process for USCP Records
- Capitol Police Inspector General Reports Public Availability

There is no clarity regarding whether the Capitol Police complied with the following two directives from Appropriators. These directives concerned:



- Body-Worn Camera Pilot Program
- Combating Bias in the Workforce

A complete list of Appropriations language directing and encouraging action by the Capitol Police is in the appendix.

Responsiveness to Government Accountability Office Recommendations

Since 2019, the Government Accountability Office has made 11 recommendations to the USCP and the USCP Board — three to the USCP and eight to the USCP Board. To date, the USCP and the USCP Board have only closed two of the GAO recommendations. Specifically, the USCP has closed zero of the three recommendations while the USCP Board has closed two of the eight recommendations. We note that there likely are older recommendations from the GAO that have not been closed.

According to the GAO, the USCP/Board have not satisfactorily addressed their recommendations concerning:

- corporate governance
- emergency preparedness
- information sharing
- department training

Many recommendations were made following the events of January 6, 2021. So long as these recommendations remain open, the Capitol Police is failing to address known factors that leave the United States Congress vulnerable and insecure.

A complete list of GAO recommendations to the Capitol Police is in the appendix.

Conclusion

In our view, transparency and accountability are essential for an agency to improve itself and adapt to new threats. The Capitol Police, including the Board, have an insular culture focused on evading transparency and accountability. This is made worse by the Capitol Police's position inside the Legislative branch, which does not have the benefit of most Executive branch transparency and accountability laws, whistleblower protections, and measures to provide for a more independent Inspector General.

Two-and-a-half years after the January 6th attack, the Capitol Police still has not resolved recent major recommendations concerning its operations. Instead, the USCP has shifted focus from its leadership and operational failures to funding. This is a red herring, as the USCP has always been well funded, and no amount of money can fix the problems at the top.

Congress must step in and reform the Capitol Police, from top to bottom. They must also reform how Congress oversees the Capitol Police. The following section summarizes some of our recommendations along these lines. The body of the report that follows analyzes in significant detail Capitol Police compliance with (1) congressional directives to the Capitol Police to reform their practices issued between FY 2019-2023, and (2) reform recommendations issued by the Government Accountability Office during that same period of time.

Recommendations

The US Capitol Police must be transformed into an effective security force. For that to happen, the agency must be accountable to internal stakeholders, to members of Congress, to journalists, to civil society, and to the public.

Security agencies throughout the government are subject to an array of accountability laws and practices, which should now be extended to the Capitol Police. These laws are intended to keep agencies focused on their missions and provide a feedback system to keep them on track. While these systems are imperfect, they would enable a marked improvement at the Capitol Police, which lacks a correcting mechanism for the Capitol Police and its Board.

Demand Progress Education Fund urges the relevant congressional stakeholders to direct the following steps to improve transparency and accountability and for the Capitol Police Board and for the Capitol Police Chief to properly and fully implement the following recommendations.



Establish a Freedom of Information Act-like process for the public to request information from the USCP, including regulations that govern the process, clearly stated timeframes by which the requests should be answered, public disclosure of the responses, and a mechanism to appeal denials of requests.



Release USCP Inspector General reports to the maximum extent possible and publish a list of all USCP IG reports.



Make the USCP Inspector General fully independent from the USCP Board and USCP Chief and have oversight over all aspects of behavior of the USCP, including its Board.



The proceedings of the Capitol Police Board should be made publicly available. Currently the USCP Board does not hold public meetings or release summaries of internal stakeholder meetings.



Establish an independent USCP Oversight Board, a.k.a. a civilian oversight board with representatives from the various stakeholders that oversee and comment upon the operations of the USCP and its Board.



Empower congressional committees by appropriating funds for them to hire permanent staff who are deeply experienced with policing and are funded through Capitol Police appropriations.



Highlight how the public may file complaints concerning the USCP and protect whistleblowers concerning USCP practices.



Reinforce public-facing efforts by the USCP public information office to contemporaneously inform the public regarding its activities.



Publish accurate and complete arrest records that include demographic data of the individuals arrested and sufficient location details. Include information arrests conducted by partner agencies. Include information about whether the arrests lead to prosecution and conviction.



Publish the FY 2021 *Combatting Bias* report on the USCP website.



Publish regular updates regarding the department's activities to promote workforce diversity, including partnering with organizations that focus on developing opportunities for minorities and women.



Publish more specific information regarding department complaints and lawsuits.



Reform the USCP Board and change its composition.



Close the remaining GAO recommendations for both the USCP and the USCP Board.



Fully address the directives from the congressional appropriations committees.

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Introduction

The United States Capitol Police has an important mission: ensuring that the US Capitol complex is safe for lawmakers to conduct government business and the public to communicate with their elected representatives. First established as part of the Public Building Appropriations Act of 1828, the USCP is a security-force/police-department hybrid with nearly 2,450 employees, of which about 2,000 of whom are sworn officers.¹ The USCP has primary jurisdiction over a small area stretching from H Street to Potomac Avenue SE and from Third Street SW to Seventh Street NE.

The Capitol Police operates differently from other security forces. For example, the USCP is not subject to public records requests. Additionally, the department has a Capitol Police Board, which is tasked with overseeing the operations of USCP to ensure the safety of the Capitol Complex. But unlike other police oversight bodies, the Board has an extraordinary level of involvement in the operations of USCP.

In furtherance of its mission, the USCP evaluates millions of Capitol campus visitors each year; prior to the pandemic, the Capitol was visited every year by an estimated 7-10 million people from around the world. The USCP also is charged with mitigating threats against members of Congress, which the department Chief says have increased 400% in recent years. However, the department only reported 217 cases to the US Attorney's office, and only 27 cases were pursued by prosecutors, according to a letter from House Administration Chair Zoe Lofgren to Chief Manger.² Without reliable data it is not possible to square the implication of Chief Manger's statement, i.e., that there's a huge number of threats to members of Congress, with the data that suggests only a small number of serious threats.

The events of January 6, 2021 raise important questions about whether the Capitol Police and the Capitol Police Board are adequately prepared to respond effectively and efficiently in the current threat environment.³ Congressional reports and investigations have indicated that USCP leadership had reason to believe that an attack on the Capitol was highly probable, as did other federal security forces, but failed to adequately plan for the event.⁴ As a result, officers were woefully unprepared for January 6, resulting in catastrophic consequences including the death of officers and civilians. Since the events of January 6th, there have been a slew of in-district violent attacks, including the attack on then-Speaker Pelosi's husband at their San Francisco home and an attack on Rep. Connolly's staff in his Northern Virginia district office.⁵

In light of the USCP's inability to protect the Capitol, despite the heroic efforts of its rank and file, and the subsequent attacks in members' district offices and homes, Demand

Progress reviewed the operations of the USCP and the agency's compliance with congressional directives that reflect concern for how it functions. Is the USCP adequately prepared to protect members as the 2024 election draws closer? Is the USCP deploying its resources and forces to maximally protect the Capitol complex, district offices, and lawmaker homes? Is the USCP prepared for another potential transfer of power?

Understandably, its preparedness and accountability have come under scrutiny by congressional appropriators and the GAO, particularly as the Capitol Police continues to request large funding increases year after year while it continues to falter in protecting the US Capitol complex, members of Congress, congressional staff, and lawmakers' families. As the hearing into the USCP has suggested, these look like management and oversight failures.

Contributing to this concern is how its oversight structure is inherently flawed and rife with conflicts of interest. Its Board meets in secret and the Capitol Police Chief is an ex-officio member. The department's IG lacks structural independence from its Chief and governing Board, who directed the IG's reports to be secret. The Board refuses to have all its members testify before a committee of jurisdiction in either chamber.

The following sections of this report:

- Provide a brief background of the Capitol Police
- Explain the methodology of this report
- Evaluate the Capitol Police's Compliance with Congressional Appropriations Directives
- Evaluate the Capitol Police and Capitol Police Board's Compliance with Government Accountability Office Recommendations
- Provide some concluding thoughts
- List Congressional Appropriations Directives (in the Appendix)



Photo by Alex Smith • Flickr Public Domain

About the US Capitol Police

Mission of the US Capitol Police

First established as part of the Public Building Appropriations Act of 1828, the US Capitol Police is the security-force/police-department hybrid tasked with keeping Congress safe and open for business.⁶ Its primary jurisdiction is the US Capitol grounds, but that has expanded to a nationwide jurisdiction following an increase in political violence and attacks against members of Congress on and off the Capitol complex during the 21st century.⁷

Role of the US Capitol Police Board

According to the USCP website, “The Capitol Police Board (USCP Board) oversees and supports the United States Capitol Police in its mission, and helps to advance coordination between the Department and the Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives and the Sergeant at Arms and Doorkeeper of the Senate, in their law enforcement capacities, and the Congress. Consistent with this purpose, the Capitol Police Board establishes general goals and objectives covering its major functions and operations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations.”⁸ The USCP Board is comprised of three official members: the House Sergeant at Arms, the Senate Sergeant at Arms, and the Architect of the Capitol. The USCP Chief also serves as an ex-officio non-voting member of the Board. The chairmanship alternates annually between the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms.

While the Capitol Police Chief makes security recommendations, they do not have the authority to implement them. Additionally, the Board historically does not have a process for formally considering or making decisions on the recommendations. The Board does not hold public meetings or release summaries of those meetings. Until recently, the Board did not track decisions made by the Board and memorialize them in writing. Without a comprehensive, documented process, the USCP has no functional system in place to ensure it is properly performing its job to assess and mitigate potential security risks.

Role of the US Capitol Police Inspector General

The Capitol Police Inspector General (USCP IG) is charged with conducting audits, inspections, and investigations involving USCP programs, functions, systems, and operations. The USCP IG is appointed by the Capitol Police Board for a five-year term that may be renewed, may be removed by a unanimous vote of the Board, and is under the general supervision of the Board.

This hiring and reporting structure of the Capitol Police Board creates an inherent conflict of interest with respect to the independent operations of the USCP IG. The USCP IG is

intended to supervise and inspect all functions and operations of the Capitol Police, including the Capitol Police Chief, and yet reports (via the Board) to the Capitol Police Chief. The Board also provides “general supervision” of the USCP IG. That general supervision apparently extends to the Board directing the IG via a 2017 non-public letter to not make IG reports publicly available.⁹ It is unknown whether the USCP is still bound by this 2017 directive, but what we do know is the USCP has only released two USCP IG reports publicly.¹⁰ Further, the USCP IG has testified that his jurisdiction does not extend to oversight of the Capitol Police Board. A 2017 GAO report found that many committee stakeholders believe “the board does not operate in a transparent manner” and that they lacked insight into the Board’s decision making in the areas that the committees have responsibilities.¹¹ Furthermore, a 2022 Committee on House Administration report found that the USCP Board has resisted long-standing calls for reform.¹²


Funding

Every year, Congress appropriates funding so the USCP can carry out its critical mission of protecting the Capitol — lawmakers and their staff, employees, and visitors — so constitutionally mandated business can be conducted in a safe and open environment. As the USCP receives a large and growing share of the Legislative branch budget, it’s a matter of fiscal responsibility to ensure it is an effective steward of taxpayer dollars.

The size of the Capitol Police’s budget can compete with many major municipal police forces such as San Francisco, Baltimore, and Washington, DC.¹³ The department has a budget that exceeds \$734.6 million for FY 2023, as compared to total Legislative branch funding of \$6.9 billion total. This number jumps significantly when including the USCP building, grounds, and security, which is housed under the Architect of the Capitol’s budget.¹⁴ The department is authorized to have nearly 2,450 employees, around 2,000 of whom are sworn officers. USCP salaries and expenses alone have received an increase of more than \$308 million since FY 2020.

For FY 2024, the department proposed a budget of \$841 million, a \$106.3 million (14%) increase over current year funding. USCP Chief Tom Manger testified that the funding would help provide annualization for onboarding new offices, increase overtime funding to help with the upcoming national and political conventions, dispense a cost-of-living adjustment, and usher in security and cybersecurity upgrades.¹⁵ In May 2023, the draft House Legislative Branch Appropriations Subcommittee bill provided \$780.9 million, \$46.3 million more than FY23 but \$60.1 million less than the department’s request.¹⁶ In July 2023, the draft Senate Legislative Branch Appropriations Subcommittee bill provided \$792.5 million, a \$57.9 increase from FY23 but \$48.5 million less than the department’s request.¹⁷

Growth of US Capitol Police Funding, FY 2019-2024



Since FY 2019, the annual budget of the US Capitol Police has grown by about 72%

Congressional Action

There have been recent successful legislative efforts to impose some measure of transparency and accountability of the Capitol Police from the relevant committees that oversee and provide funding to the department. Among House and Senate Appropriations, the Committee on House Administration, and the Senate Rules and Administration Committee, there have been more than 20 hearings since 2019.¹⁸ (This report does not review the extent to which the January 6th Committee covered these matters.)

A full list of directives from appropriators may be found in the appendix, and a list of recommendations from GAO may be found later in this report. In the evaluation section, we review compliance with Congress’s directives and recount GAO’s assessment of USCP compliance.


Report Methodology

This report examines the Capitol Police Board's structure and disclosure practices to provide fact-based recommendations on improving the Board's accountability.

It also assesses whether the USCP has complied with myriad congressional directives, and measures the time taken between their issuance and USCP response. The methodology is based on requests or requirements that the Appropriations Committees have promulgated for the USCP since FY2019.


We can only judge what is publicly known.

Our Grading System:




Failed to Comply

No public indication the directive has begun by the department despite numerous requests from appropriators.



Compliant but Late

Fully completed, but took longer than mandated time frame.



Fully Compliant

Fully completed within the mandated time frame.



Compliance is Unknown

No public indication the directive has begun by the department and no information on the directive from appropriators.

The purpose of this schema is to highlight where the agency has demonstrated accountability — and where more action is required — to make it clear where more oversight is needed.

We note when the USCP has adhered to requests and requirements by Congress, and the speed of their action. We also note when the USCP has failed to take any action to comply with such directives.

This report focuses more on the kind of activities related to protecting Capitol security, rather than every request made (e.g., the use of Horse Mounted Units, reduction of plastic waste, etc.), but we included all requests to provide a central place for review.¹⁹

We examined the following congressional directives:

- Capitol Police Employee Overtime, Wellness, and Mental Health
- Risk-Based Protection for Members of Congress
- Capitol Police Arrest Records as Data
- Diversity and Diversity Training
- Combating Bias in the Workforce
- USCP Public Information Office and Social Media
- Creating a FOIA-like Process for USCP Records
- Capitol Police Inspector General Reports Public Availability
- Body-Worn Camera Pilot Program

We also asked GAO for information on compliance with their requests, which is noted in the appropriate section.

As discussed elsewhere, we did not include as part of the evaluation the joint reports from the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Senate Rules Committee, the recommendations from the Honore commission, USCP IG recommendations, or our own recommendations.

This methodology is informed by our years studying Legislative branch operations, including research specifically analyzing the USCP,²⁰ our testimony before Congress,²¹ and our efforts to educate the media.²²

For a list of all of the public resources available regarding USCP operations, see our website.²³



Evaluation



Evaluating the USCP's Compliance with Congressional Appropriations Directives

1. Employee Overtime, Wellness, and Mental Health

Overtime is required of USCP officers to ensure adequate staffing and security during critical events, emergencies, and unexpected situations that require immediate response and attention. Each year, USCP officers work a combined hundreds of thousands of hours of overtime.


After the events on January 6th, USCP morale was extremely low resulting in a staff exodus. In 2021 alone, 153 USCP officers resigned or retired and took with them decades of training, experience, and expertise.²⁴ We note, however, that overtime was common for USCP officers even before the January 6th attack, where many were forced to work mandatory overtime. USCP is generally appropriated \$50 to \$60 million in mandatory overtime for USCP employees.²⁵ In FY22, appropriators added a provision in the Legislative Branch Appropriations bill report fixing a longstanding problem that prevented USCP officers from using overtime pay as part of their retirement formula. According to the USCP Fraternal Order of Police, prior to this fix, mandatory overtime was often resented by officers.²⁶

Pre-January 6th, Congress appropriated emergency funding through the Emergency Supplemental to:

- provide hazardous duty pay and retention bonuses;
- increase staffing levels for the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division;
- formally establish an employee wellness center;
- onboard trauma-informed Employee Assistance Program and wellness specialists; and more.²⁷

Congress included funding and instructions in the FY23, FY22, and FY20 appropriations bills mandating the USCP develop and implement a holistic wellness and resiliency program for its workforce. This was to include its partnership with the House Wellness Center, the office that provides staff with programs on nutrition, fitness, general health, and stress management.

Status



During the May 2023 Committee on House Administration hearing, Chief Manger testified that the department continues to expand its wellness programs and trauma-informed services, including the continual hiring of new counselors. He mentioned that it's difficult for many police officers to want to seek help, mainly due to a common stigma around this practice within police departments — but reiterated his support that officers should feel confident about going and using the services.²⁸

Next Steps:



This work has been a significant step in the right direction over the past several years, especially after the events of January 6, 2021. The department should be encouraged to continue to provide these services and resources to its officers, including constant funding and adjustments for inflation over time.


2. Risk-Based Protection for Members of Congress

USCP Chief Manger testified that threats to members of Congress are up 400% over the past six years, and that the upcoming elections, the campaign activities that precede them, and the increasingly heated public political rhetoric further heighten the prospect of future security risks and challenges to the department.²⁹

Unfortunately, there is very little information to substantiate Manger's claims. Of the threats they are tracking, how many were investigated? How many investigations led to arrests? How many arrests led to prosecutions? How many prosecutions resulted in convictions? To what extent does the increasing number of identified threats arise from increasing tracking of threats made against members of Congress as opposed to an increase in the baseline in threats?

Congress included funding and instructions in the FY23, FY22, and FY19 appropriations bills, as well as in the draft FY24 bill, for USCP to continue working closely with the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms and local law enforcement partners in the National Capital Region (NCR) and educating member offices on the USCP strategy for members' protection within the NCR while outside the Capitol Grounds.

Status



During the May 2023 Committee on House Administration hearing, Chief Manger testified that the department continues to expand its wellness programs and trauma-informed services, including the continual hiring of new counselors. He mentioned that it's difficult for many police officers to want to seek help, mainly due to a common stigma around this practice within police departments — but reiterated his support that officers should feel confident about going and using the services.

Next Steps:



The USCP should actively encourage member offices to report threats, and provide guidance on how to report. The USCP Board should also provide solid metrics along the lines discussed above to help evaluate and prepare for threats against members, staff, and the Capitol complex.

3. Capitol Police Arrest Records as Data

On December 19, 2018, the US Capitol Police announced it would publish each week arrest summaries that had previously been distributed via email to select members of the press on an inconsistent basis.³⁰ This practice officially started on January 2, 2019.

Arrest summaries are an important oversight tool that contribute to public understanding of how the department allocates its resources. However, upon the release of these weekly arrest summaries online, the department's data publishing practices had significant flaws. At the time, the arrest summaries were posted weekly in a PDF format, with key information published as prose. The Capitol Police would remove hyperlinks from the website to where they published the summaries one year after publication. Among other information, the summaries included "the Capitol File Number (CFN); crime classification with any additional charges; offense date and time, and crime summary."³¹

In the summaries, criminal charges were formatted inconsistently; incident reports occasionally omitted critical information, such as the number of individuals arrested or a specific description of the location where the arrest took place; reports did not include demographic information; and more.


Demand Progress and Demand Progress Education Fund published two reports — one in February 2020 and the other in January 2021 — examining the arrest data and publicly-reported information to understand how the department spends its time and utilizes its resources.³² Both investigations found that nearly 50% of incidents reported are traffic stops and only roughly a third of arrests happened on the immediate Capitol campus, calling into question whether the USCP was adhering to its mission. These reports also were apparently incomplete and omitted information.

In March 2020, we testified before the House Legislative Branch Appropriations Committee about these arrest record disclosure shortcomings.³³ We urged the committee to require the USCP to publish arrest information online as a digital spreadsheet — in structured data format — that allows everyone to track arrests by date and time, arrest location, charges issued, number of individuals arrested, case file number, and more.

In response to our testimony, the Appropriations Committee took actions to address the arrest disclosure transparency issue to the USCP as part of the FY 2021 Legislative Branch Appropriations bill report.³⁴ Unfortunately, the USCP did not fully adhere to this appropriations request. In response, the Appropriations Committee once again included language in the FY 2023 Legislative Branch Appropriations bill report, directing the department to publish this information within 30 days of the publishing of that report.³⁵

In 2022, USCP began to publish arrest information as a digital spreadsheet that is embedded in its website, allowing everyone to better track arrest by data and time, arrest location, charges issues, number of individuals arrested, and case file number.³⁶ The website also enables users to search by charge, date, capitol file number, and crime summary.

Status



Compliant but Late

The USCP took longer than the initial one-year timeframe to implement since first requested by Congress.

We note, however, we have serious concerns about whether the information published by the USCP is complete. We suspect significant arrest information is redacted for “security” reasons.

Next Steps:



While the USCP has worked to comply with publishing arrest records as data, its website still does not provide enough information to be properly analyzed (e.g., incident reports often omit critical information like the number of individuals arrested or sufficient location details).



Also, the USCP should release aggregate demographic data on those arrested. We note that information published by the USCP may be incomplete in that not all arrests are being published. Some information may be redacted for “security” or other purposes, although it is not noted when such a redaction occurs, so we cannot evaluate its frequency or scope.



The USCP should continue to publish arrest summaries on at least a weekly basis, and the links to the summaries should be permanently available on the USCP arrest summary page.



Furthermore, USCP should summarize all arrests made by the USCP, those which occur in partnership with the USCP, or that relate to Capitol security, and should further track and publicly report on whether the arrest resulted in prosecution and conviction, in addition to reporting the aggregate demographic data of individuals arrested.



The USCP should also disclose the total number of weekly arrests and its guidance on which charges are included and excluded from the arrest summaries.

4. Diversity in the USCP and Diversity Training

USCP officers and employees have often raised concerns that the agency has a discriminatory culture and a glass ceiling. The Capitol Police, historically, has had discrimination complaints, and minorities have experienced trouble advancing to the top tiers of management. In 2010, the department hired a diversity officer after a 2008 oversight hearing where then-Capitol Police IG Carl Hoecker told members that the department lacked a formal diversity program or an Equal Employment Office function.³⁷

Fast forward to January 2021, when *ProPublica* released a jarring report finding that since 2001, more than 250 Black USCP officers had sued the department for racial discrimination, some alleging that white officers called Black colleagues slurs. One officer found a hangman’s noose in their locker.³⁸


Language was included in the FY23, FY22, FY21, and FY20 appropriations bills and reports to include diversity training as a part of the current USCP training sessions. Furthermore, the FY 22 Appropriations report requested the department provide a report on the breadth of training programs employed by USCP, as well as the number of sworn officers who have participated in the training.³⁹ This report is publicly available on the department's website.

The FY 2021 appropriations bill requested the USCP provide a report concurrent with the budget submissions that details⁴⁰:

1. the number of activities to try to promote workforce diversity, including partnering with organizations that focus on developing opportunities for minorities and women;
2. the steps taken to attract and retain a diverse workforce; and
3. a breakout of USCP positions sworn and civilian by race and gender.

In March 2022, Chief Manger hired Vilma Alejandro to serve as USCP’s Chief Diversity Officer and Director of IDEA; Alejandro previously led the department’s office of Diversity and Inclusion. The department has made available online its Equity and Inclusion Plan FY23-FY26, which provides information on programs and strategies that USCP is implementing on DEI initiatives, including how the department plans to promote diversity, steps taken to attract and retain a diverse workforce, and a breakdown of USCP positions by race and gender.⁴¹ This report complies with the FY 2021 appropriations request regarding its diversity report.



Status



We note that compliance with report language does not mean the problem has been resolved.

Next Steps:

While we commend the department for its compliance with these congressional directives and the increased attention to these issues, it does not mean the discriminatory issues within the USCP have been satisfactorily resolved. We ask for the department to:

-  Submit regular updates regarding the department’s activities to promote workforce diversity, including partnering with organizations that focus on developing opportunities for minorities and women.
-  Regularly publish more specific information regarding department complaints and lawsuits.

5. Combating Bias

The USCP has faced longstanding concerns and scrutiny regarding issues of bias within its ranks. These concerns have come to the forefront due to incidents, policies, and practices that have raised questions about the agency's commitment to fairness, equal treatment, and accountability. Given its crucial responsibilities, it is essential that the USCP operates with utmost professionalism, fairness, and adherence to the principles of equality and justice. According to the USCP Equity and Inclusion Strategic Plan, roughly 53% of sworn Capitol Police officers are white, in contrast to the DC police, where just 36% of sworn officers are white, and the senior command staff of the Capitol Police is even more skewed toward white men.⁴²

The department has had issues with racial bias in the past, including an incident in 2016 where Senator Tim Scott was targeted by police because of the color of his skin.⁴³ Additionally, the department has investigated dozens of its officers for their involvement in the January 6 attack on the Capitol.⁴⁴ Furthermore, a former USCP officer was found guilty of obstructing an investigation of the January 6 attack.⁴⁵


The issue of bias within the United States Capitol Police is a complex and multifaceted challenge, but for years the USCP has not publicly addressed how it is looking to combat these issues. Addressing these concerns requires a comprehensive and sustained effort from the agency's leadership, policymakers, and the broader law enforcement community.

Appropriators have asked for years — FY21, FY22, and FY23 — for the USCP to participate in the Attorney General's program implementing evidence-based training programs on de-escalation and the use-of force, as well as on police-community relations, and to report back to the Appropriations Committee on its efforts. The public has no knowledge whether the USCP department has been complying with these directives.

Additionally, the Appropriations Committee requested a report in FY21 outlining what policies and procedures are in place at the academy to eliminate unconscious bias and racial profiling and more. In FY22, appropriators wrote in the committee report that it was concerned that the racial profiling report was not completed by the department, and requested USCP to provide the report immediately. In FY23, appropriators commended the department for its detailed response on current efforts to combat bias, and noted its continued interest in the work that USCP does around preventing internal bias.

The department has not made publicly available the FY 2021 report outlining what policies and procedures are in place at the academy to eliminate unconscious bias and racial profiling during training; what steps the USCP has taken to eliminate existing practices that permit or encourage racial profiling; and arrest information disaggregated by race, ethnicity, and gender. We encourage the department to release this report.

Status



Compliance is Unknown

No public indication the directive has begun by the department and no information on the directive from appropriators.

According to appropriators, the USCP took longer than the initial one-year timeframe to implement since first requested by Congress. The Combating Bias report remains private. Additionally, there is no public information around whether or not the USCP is participating in the Attorney General's program implementing evidence-based training programs on de-escalation and the use-of force.

6. Body-Worn Camera Pilot Program

The use of body-worn cameras gained significant attention and momentum across the United States following several high-profile cases of alleged police misconduct and officer-involved shootings. The January 6, 2021 insurrection at the Capitol also prompted calls for a thorough examination of law enforcement response and tactics, leading to discussions about the potential benefits of body-worn cameras for Capitol Police officers.

Congressional appropriators have asked the department to provide the Appropriations Committee with an interim report on the pilot program within 180 days following full implementation of the body-worn camera pilot program that will include the states of the implementation process, challenges and recommended solutions experienced during the pilot implementation and lessons learned to date that may inform additional applications for the body-worn camera program.



Photo by Utility, Inc. • Flickr Creative Commons

Little is publicly known about the status of the body-worn camera pilot program. The USCP director of communications stated in July 2023 that the department does not currently use body-worn cameras but “the USCP is in the very early stages of planning for a pilot program that would be tailored to the unique considerations of the legislative branch.”⁴⁶

Status



Compliance is Unknown

Little is publicly disclosed about the status of the body-worn camera pilot program.

7. USCP Public Information Office and Social Media

Prior to the attack on the Capitol, the department's communication office was well known for its dismissiveness towards requests from reporters and the general public, and did not hold any public press conferences. The Capitol Police offered no press conference about the Capitol siege and officers' roles in it in the days immediately following the attack, prompting appropriators to urge the department to interact with the media.⁴⁷ Moreover, the department did a poor job providing press releases on its website.


USCP public communication is vital to provide accurate and timely information to members and their staff, employees, and the public that often visits the Capitol Hill complex. The USCP has been faulted for not keeping members and staff informed, although that behavior is improving. With respect to everyone else, the Appropriations Committee has said in the past that it is concerned that the public is often not aware of severe weather events and security incidents while on the complex grounds.

Up until February 5, 2021, nearly a month after the attack on January 6, the USCP public Twitter account had never been updated.⁴⁸ While the account has been more proactive with updates for congressional security and arrest disclosures, it was dormant for years, making it difficult for stakeholders and the public to be up to date with USCP activities. To our knowledge, the department also posts on Facebook, but does not use other platforms such as Instagram, TikTok, etc.

The FY 2021 appropriations bill requested the USCP to submit a report to the Committee on Appropriations detailing the creation of a community notification system to keep the general public better informed.⁴⁹

The USCP did not comply with the FY21 directive within the first year, so identical language was included in the FY22 appropriations bill report that directed the USCP to employ a community notification system that can be utilized by visitors and community members to allow a larger audience to receive USCP notifications.⁵⁰ On October 28, 2021, Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton announced that District of Columbia residents can now receive security alerts from the USCP through AlertDC.⁵¹

Status



Compliance is Unknown

No public indication the directive has begun by the department and no information on the directive from appropriators.

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Status



Compliant but Late
The USCP took longer than the initial one-year timeframe to implement since first requested by Congress in FY21.

The FY23 appropriations bill report stated that the Committee appreciated the detailed report on the progress made by the USCP Public Information Office that was requested in FY22 Legislative Branch Appropriations bill report, which may suggest the USCP complied with the directive, although that is unclear.⁵² Since October 2021, the department has been sending security alerts through AlertDC.

Next Steps:



The USCP must look to continue to maximize the availability of its Public Information Office and continue to use its social media accounts and AlertDC notifications to proactively inform the public of relevant information.



Also, the department should continue holding regular press conferences and being responsive to press requests for information.

8. Creating a FOIA-like Process for USCP Records

Most federal law enforcement agencies are located in the Executive branch and are, therefore, subject to an array of rules concerning transparency, accountability, and oversight. The Capitol Police, however, as a Legislative branch agency, is solely responsible to answer to Congress. That means traditional accountability mechanisms, such as the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), do not apply.

While Congress is not subject to the FOIA, some Legislative branch agencies and offices make information publicly available in a number of ways. First, they proactively disclose significant amounts of information in a structured data format, second, they in response to requests from the public they will disclose important information, and finally some follow a FOIA-like process to respond to requests for information.⁵³ The USCP does not proactively disclose much information, makes it difficult to figure out whom to contact, and does not have formal processes in place to respond to requests.

In 2019, Congress requested the USCP to create a process through which members of the public can request USCP records, predating the events of January 6, 2021.⁵⁴ The agency was instructed to “develop a policy and procedure for the sharing of information that follows the spirit of the Freedom of Information Act.”

Demand Progress Education Fund consulted with FOIA and congressional experts to inform the creation of Model Public Records Request Regulations for the US Capitol Police released in December 2021, drawing heavily from comparable regulations issued by the Government Accountability Office and the Library of Congress.⁵⁵

We commend the Appropriations Committee's efforts to increase US Capitol Police transparency in committee report language in the FY 2021⁵⁶ and FY 2022⁵⁷ appropriations bill reports.

Should the Capitol Police not comply with the request to create a FOIA-like process, Congress should extend the application of the FOIA to the US Capitol Police.

Status



The creation of a FOIA-like process has been directed by congressional appropriators for the last few fiscal years, but the Capitol Police still has not brought that program to fruition or consulted with members of civil society who are expert on FOIA and can offer guidance and model regulations.

In addition, the Board routinely asserts that USCP materials are classified or law-enforcement sensitive, yet the Board lacks the authority to classify materials. When everything is deemed “law enforcement sensitive,” it is clear that the term is inappropriate and being misapplied. Instead, materials so deemed should be reviewed by an outside body with expertise with respect to public records, such as a FOIA professional, and released on an expedited basis.

While the Capitol Police has not promulgated an information-sharing policy pursuant to this direction, during the May 2023 Committee on House Administration hearing, USCP Chief Manger did not object to — but did not endorse — having a FOIA-like process for department records. He deferred on his authority to implement the policy change.⁵⁸

Next Steps:

It is our belief that the Chief can set the policy to create a FOIA-like process. He can follow the lead of other Legislative branch agencies who have these processes and create such a FOIA-like process for the USCP, if he so chooses.

- ✓ We urge the committees — both the House Administration Committee and the Appropriations Committee — to direct the Capitol Police to issue information-sharing regulations by a date certain.
- ✓ The committees should likewise require the Capitol Police to consult with civil society, governmental FOIA experts, and peer congressional agencies.
- ✓ They should direct the USCP to review the Model Public Records Request Regulations issued by Demand Progress Education Fund.
- ✓ Furthermore, the committees should prompt the USCP to engage in a notice-and-comment rulemaking process.
- ✓ Should the USCP fail to do so, Congress should extend the FOIA to the agency, as has been recommended by a National Archives advisory committee.

9. Capitol Police Inspector General Reports Public Availability

The USCP IG provides independent, professional, and nonpartisan oversight over the US Capitol Police’s operations. Unfortunately, the USCP IG does not make its reports available to the public. It has only released two reports in the past three years despite numerous congressional directives — undermining public accountability and congressional oversight. By comparison, federal inspectors general routinely release their reports.

A fully independent and empowered IG is an essential accountability mechanism for the Capitol Police and its Board. So too is the publication of the IG’s findings. Rebecca Jones, then with the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), testified before the House Legislative Branch Appropriations Committee in April 2019 on the undue limitations placed upon the Capitol Police Inspector General.



Under the Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016, most IGs are required to publish on their website any audit, inspection, or evaluation report they create within three days of sending it to the head of the agency involved. By publishing these reports, IGs keep the public, including groups like POGO, informed of waste, fraud, and abuse within an agency. This allows the public to call out wasteful or illegal practices and to increase pressure for swift change. In effect, publication greatly increases the influence of IGs’ work. But not all IGs are subject to these reporting requirements. Two such IGs are those of the House of Representatives and the Capitol Police. While these watchdogs provide independent, nonpartisan oversight of the operations of both entities, they do not make their reports, findings, and recommendations readily available for public consumption. In fact, hardly any of their reports are available on their websites, and therefore are not easily available even to Congressional staff who could find themselves looking for information ultimately contained in these reports years after publication with no idea that the reports even exist.



We note the Capitol Police Board is located inside the Legislative branch and is unable to classify material, so the only properly classified material it holds would be that which is classified elsewhere.

Status



After three years of no compliance, the USCP posted four IG reports on its website in 2023, but still has not instituted procedures to make reports publicly available whenever practicable nor has it published reports on its website despite numerous congressional directives instructing it to do so. The House Legislative Branch Appropriations Committee has directed the IG — in FY 2021,⁵⁹ FY 2022,⁶⁰ and FY 2023⁶¹ — to release reports as a remedy to ensure that IG reports have a maximum effect. Unfortunately, after years of requests, the IG still has not complied.

The latest House report accompanying the draft FY 2024 House Legislative Branch Appropriations bill contained the following language: “As included in previous House Reports 117–80 and 117–389, the Committee again requests that the Inspector General institute procedures to make its reports publicly available whenever practicable, and to begin publishing reports on its website. The Committee is aware of the process initiated by the Office of the Inspector General to gain approval for the public posting of its reports and directs the Capitol Police Board to further these efforts to expedite the process.”⁶²

During a May 2023 Committee on House Administration hearing, lawmakers pressed Chief Manger about making USCP IG reports public; he offered no objection to the Board doing so as Congress has asked, but said it ultimately would be the IG’s call, even though he’s on the Board. In fact, the Capitol Police Board had issued a non-public letter telling the IG that it could not make the reports available. Notably, on May 17, 2023, the day after the committee hearing, the USCP IG office made two reports public.⁶³ Chair Bryan Steil rightly hailed this as a “huge win” as a result of the hearing.⁶⁴ That said, it shouldn’t take a hearing to spur disclosure of IG reports.

Next Steps:



The relevant committees should statutorily require the USCP to take action to publish these IG reports.



Additionally, they ought to continue to press the USCP IG on what regulations prohibit it from making more, if not all, of these reports public despite congressional requests.



While the US Capitol Police may be permitted to review the final reports, it should be unable to halt or deny their publication. The best practice is for the USCP to have an opportunity to provide a letter to be released with the USCP IG report but not to otherwise change, delay, or approve its content.



Final IG reports should be made publicly available no later than two weeks after their transmission to the relevant committees of jurisdiction. They should be published on the USCP IG website — which should be managed separately from the USCP website — and on oversight.gov, the federal Inspectors General web portal maintained by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. This is the practice for the nearly 80 federal Inspectors General.



In circumstances where the USCP IG determines the full report cannot be released on the basis of a specific articulable reason that would undermine an ongoing criminal matter or would provide specific details concerning congressional security the disclosure of which would cause a specifically articulable threat to the safety of Congress, the USCP IG should strive to release relevant portions of the report. If nothing can be released, a summary of the report findings should be made publicly available. In the unusual circumstance where a report contains classified material, the IG should follow the best practices demonstrated by the GAO on its website with respect to classified matters.



Reports must not be kept indefinitely as “draft” to avoid public disclosure.



In addition, already issued IG reports should be published online immediately.

Such a shift to proactive transparency would build trust with the public, ensure investigations are accessible so that course corrections can be made when necessary, and would also reduce resources needed to address public and congressional requests for information.



Photo from House.gov




Evaluating USCP and USCP Board Compliance with GAO Recommendations

Background

Since 2019, there have been five GAO reports that examine the Capitol Police and the Board. Each of these reports contain recommendations for the department to strengthen its workforce, security and preparedness, leadership structure, and more. For the purposes of clarity, we will list the reports since 2019, outline the recommendations, and highlight the outstanding and unresolved recommendations. Those GAO reports include:

- Capitol Attack: Federal Agencies Identified Some Threats, but Did Not Fully Process and Share Information Prior to January 6, 2021 (February 28, 2023)
- Capitol Attack: Additional Actions Needed to Better Prepare Capitol Police Officers for Violent Demonstrations (March 7, 2022)
- Capitol Attack: The Capitol Police Need Clearer Emergency Procedures and a Comprehensive Security Risk Assessment Process (February 17, 2022)
- Capitol Police: Applying Effective Practices to Address Recommendations Will Improve Oversight and Management (June 14, 2021)
- Capitol Police: Potential Effects of Raising the Mandatory Retirement Age (December 18, 2019)

Status



Within these five reports, GAO has made a total of 11 recommendations to the USCP and the USCP Board — three to the USCP and eight to the USCP Board. To date, the USCP and the USCP Board has only closed two of the GAO recommendations — the USCP has closed zero of the three recommendations while the USCP Board has closed two of the eight recommendations.

Total Recommendations Pertaining to the Capitol Police: Three

Open Recommendations: Three

- The Chief of Capitol Police should establish policies for sharing threat-related information agency-wide.
- The Chief of the Capitol Police should finalize and document its procedures for obtaining outside assistance in an emergency that, for example, clearly detail roles and responsibilities.
- The Chief of the Capitol Police should finalize the development of a comprehensive, documented risk management process that includes elements called for by the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) standard, such as clearly assessing the risk of each applicable undesirable event and considering a comprehensive list of countermeasures.

Closed Recommendations: Zero

Total Recommendations Pertaining to the Capitol Police Board: Eight

Open Recommendations: Six

- The Chief of the US Capitol Police should make changes, as appropriate, to policy, guidance, and training to address findings from actions taken to better understand officers' comprehension of the department's expectations and policies related to the use of force.
- The Chief of the US Capitol Police should take actions to provide more refresher crowd control training to prepare all officers, including those who are not part of the Civil Disturbance Unit, for large-scale and potentially violent demonstrations.
- The Chief of the US Capitol Police should identify underlying factors related to employees' concerns with the department following the January 6 attack and develop an action plan to address these issues.
- The Capitol Police Board should finalize and document its procedures for obtaining outside assistance in an emergency that, for example, clearly detail roles and responsibilities.
- The Capitol Police Board should finalize and document its procedures for considering recommended countermeasures from the Capitol Police's security surveys, including documenting the rationale for accepting risk when recommendations are not implemented.
- The Capitol Police Board must revise its Manual of Procedures to fully incorporate leading practices.

Closed Recommendations: Two

- The Chief of the US Capitol Police should take actions to provide officers with more realistic training, such as in person and hands-on training.
- The Chief of the US Capitol Police should take additional actions to better understand officers' comprehension of the department's expectations and policies related to the use of force, including identifying underlying causes related to potential officer hesitancy to use force.



Capitol Attack: Federal Agencies Identified Some Threats, but Did Not Fully Process and Share Information Prior to January 6, 2021

Recommendations pertaining to USCP: One

Recommendation Language: The Chief of Capitol Police should establish policies for sharing threat-related information agency-wide.

Status of recommendation: Closed - Implemented

- **GAO Language:** In March 2023, US Capitol Police updated its information-sharing standard operating procedures to, among other things, ensure the appropriate distribution of intelligence to officers in instances where there are potential operational or safety impacts. In addition, Capitol Police officials have implemented a process to disseminate intelligence information, such as incident action plans and intelligence reports, to all Capitol Police personnel through an application installed on all personnel's Department-issued cell phones and have provided guidance to personnel on how to use the application. Establishing these procedures for sharing threat-related information agency-wide can help ensure all relevant personnel have the information they need to perform their duties. We consider this recommendation closed as implemented.



Capitol Attack: Additional Actions Needed to Better Prepare Capitol Police Officers for Violent Demonstrations

Recommendations pertaining to USCP Board: Five

Status of recommendations: Two Closed; Three Open

Recommendation 1 Language: The Chief of Capitol Police should establish policies for sharing threat-related information agency-wide.

Status of recommendation: Closed - Implemented

- **GAO Language:** The US Capitol Police (Capitol Police) have taken actions to address our recommendation to better understand officers' comprehension of the department's expectations and policies related to the use of force. Since we closed our survey of Capitol Police officers in September 2021, Capitol Police has issued four bulletins related to use of force. For example, Capitol Police issued a bulletin in late February 2022 in advance of an anticipated truck convoy event to remind officers of some important components of the department's use of force policy. Further, Capitol Police issued a bulletin in early March 2022 reminding officers of various aspects of the department's use of force policy. According to Capitol Police officials in September 2022, these bulletins, which are both read at roll call and posted on bulletin boards in each division, often engender discussion among officers about use of force, and one of the bulletins contained real-life scenarios specifically meant to spark discussions on use of force issues. In September 2022, Capitol Police officials stated that the department is planning voluntary quarterly use of force discussions to begin in the fall of 2022. For example, the department held discussions in October 2022 and January 2023, and has scheduled additional quarterly sessions through the end of calendar year 2023. Capitol Police's efforts to clarify policy through bulletins and offer opportunities for officers to discuss use of force issues has helped to ensure that its officers have a clear understanding of the agency's use of force policy.

Recommendation 2 Language: The Chief of the US Capitol Police should make changes, as appropriate, to policy, guidance, and training to address findings from actions taken to better understand officers' comprehension of the department's expectations and policies related to the use of force.

Status of Recommendation: Open

- **GAO Language:** As of September 2022, US Capitol Police officials stated that the department was in the process of finalizing its updated use of force policy. According to officials, the updates are to better reflect the tenets of modern policing such as requiring de-escalation, adding a duty to report any improper uses of force by fellow officers and an explicit ban on chokeholds. The officials added the policy was updated in part to make sure the policy was easily understood. As of February 2023, the policy was under review by the department's executive team. We will continue to monitor Capitol Police's efforts to update its use of force policy.

Recommendation 3 Language: The Chief of the US Capitol Police should take actions to provide more refresher crowd control training to prepare all officers, including those who are not part of the Civil Disturbance Unit, for large-scale and potentially violent demonstrations.

Status of Recommendation: Open - Partially Addressed

- **GAO Language:** The US Capitol Police (Capitol Police) has taken actions to provide additional crowd control training to some, but not all, of its officers. Specifically, in August 2022, Capitol Police created the Civil Disturbance Unit (CDU) specialty pay assignment, which requires CDU officers to apply to be part of the unit and take required annual advanced CDU refresher training. However, while the department trained some non-CDU officers in refresher civil disturbance and crowd management courses prior to the creation of the CDU specialty pay assignment, Capitol Police officials stated that the department does not plan to provide such refresher training to non-CDU officers in the future. We have requested additional information from the Capitol Police on efforts to fully address our recommendation, such as how, if at all, the department plans to provide refresher crowd control training to non-CDU officers who may be called upon to assist crowd control operations during large-scale demonstrations.

Recommendation 4 Language: The Chief of the US Capitol Police should take actions to provide officers with more realistic training, such as in person and hands-on training.

Status of Recommendation: Closed - Implemented

- **GAO Language:** US Capitol Police (Capitol Police) has taken several actions to provide officers with more realistic training since the January 6, 2021 attack on the Capitol. These actions include the addition of scenario-based training, incorporation of roles players, and training on Capitol grounds. The department also acquired and is implementing a virtual simulator program, which Capitol Police officials stated will provide realistic judgmental use of force simulator and de-escalation scenario training for officers in various scenarios. These actions--intending to provide more realistic training to Capitol Police officer--will help ensure that all officers are better prepared in the future.

Recommendation 5 Language: The Chief of the US Capitol Police should identify underlying factors related to employees' concerns with the department following the January 6 attack and develop an action plan to address these issues.

Status of Recommendation: Open - Partially Addressed

- **GAO Language:** US Capitol Police (Capitol Police) has taken some actions to address employee concerns following the January 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol, but has not yet fully analyzed its employee feedback survey results. Capitol Police officials stated in September 2022 that based on GAO's report and the department's ongoing internal discussions with officers and employees, the department identified several broad areas of employee concerns arising out of the January 6 attack, including:
 1. lack of preparation for an event of the magnitude of the attack;
 2. lack of guidance before and during the event;
 3. misunderstandings regarding the permissible use of force;

4. additional training and equipment;
5. concerns about department leadership, and
6. the effective delivery of actionable intelligence to the department.

Capitol Police officials described various actions to address these areas. For example, Capitol Police officials noted that the single biggest issue expressed by officers that affected morale after the January 6 attack was staffing. The officials added that the department was short staffed before the attack, and retirements and resignations afterwards exacerbated the problem. To address this problem, the department reported taking several steps, including increasing recruitment and hiring a marketing/branding firm; increasing starting and existing salaries; paying retention bonuses totaling over \$11,000; and making promotions. However, as of February 2023, Capitol Police has not yet finished its analysis of its 2022 employee survey. The survey, which was deployed December 2021 through February 2022, was the first employee survey following the January 6 attack and included questions regarding specific workplace matters related to the events of the attack. Capitol Police officials stated that the department had not yet completed the analysis due to the resignation of the department's Chief Administrative Officer. As of February 2023, Capitol Police officials stated that the department intended to complete the analysis in early 2023. We will continue to monitor the department's efforts to identify underlying factors related to employees' concerns with the department following the January 6 attack, including the analysis of the 2022 employee survey.



Capitol Attack: The Capitol Police Need Clearer Emergency Procedures and a Comprehensive Security Risk Assessment Process⁶⁶

Recommendations pertaining to USCP & USCP Board USCP Board: Four
(Two Board, Two USCP)

Status of recommendations: Four Open

Recommendation 1 Language: The Capitol Police Board should finalize and document its procedures for obtaining outside assistance in an emergency that, for example, clearly detail roles and responsibilities.

Status of recommendation: Open

- **GAO Language:** In March 2023, the Capitol Police Board informed us that updates to its Manual of Procedures—which were made in December 2021 prior to our report's issuance—addressed both of our recommendations. However, as we reported in February 2022, the updated manual did not identify clearly detailed procedures for obtaining outside assistance in an emergency. We will continue to monitor the Capitol Police Board's efforts to address this recommendation.

Recommendation 2 Language: The Capitol Police Board should finalize and document its procedures for considering recommended countermeasures from the Capitol Police's security surveys, including documenting the rationale for accepting risk when recommendations are not implemented.

Status of recommendation: Open

- **GAO Language:** In March 2023, the Capitol Police Board informed us that updates to its Manual of Procedures—which were made in December 2021 prior to our report's issuance—addressed both of our recommendations. However, as we reported in February 2022, the updated manual does not include procedures to document when the Board chooses to not implement countermeasures and the rationale for accepting the risk of that decision, as called for by the Interagency Security Committee standard. We will continue to monitor the Capitol Police Board's efforts to address this recommendation.

Recommendation 3 Language: The Chief of the Capitol Police should finalize and document its procedures for obtaining outside assistance in an emergency that, for example, clearly detail roles and responsibilities.

Status of recommendation: Open

- **GAO Language:** As of March 2023, the Capitol Police informed GAO that it has developed a framework to enhance and codify all emergency procedures under a recently proposed "Emergency Operations Plan." This plan will also include annual training and testing requirements. Once finalized, we will review the plan to determine if it is responsive to our recommendation.

Recommendation 4 Language: The Chief of the Capitol Police should finalize the development of a comprehensive, documented risk management process that includes elements called for by the ISC standard, such as clearly assessing the risk of each applicable undesirable event and considering a comprehensive list of countermeasures.

Status of recommendation: Open

- **GAO Language:** As of March 2023, the Capitol Police informed GAO that the department is continuing to develop a comprehensive risk management process aligned with the Interagency Security Committee standard. For example, the department has developed requirements necessary to update relevant standard operating procedure documents. The Capitol Police has also developed a draft schedule for conducting future security assessments of congressional facilities that aligns with the ISC standard. Further, the department is continuing work to procure a new assessment tool that will incorporate Interagency Security Committee standards. We will review the department's actions once they are finalized to determine if they are responsive to our recommendation.

Capitol Police: Applying Effective Practices to Address Recommendations Will Improve Oversight and Management

- GAO did not make any new recommendations in this report. However, GAO previously made a recommendation in February 2017 that the Board revise its manual to fully incorporate leading practices, which remains **open**.

Capitol Police: Potential Effects of Raising the Mandatory Retirement Age

- GAO did not make any new recommendations in this report.

Next Steps:

For years, the USCP and the Board have failed to address long-standing GAO recommendations that stem from concerns about a lack of operational transparency and accountability.



The department and the Board must be more publicly open about why these GAO recommendations have not been closed, where each recommendation is in the process of completion, and a timeline for when they expect each to be closed.



USCP IG Ron Russo Testifies Before Committee on House Administration

Conclusion

Congress is where the aspirations of American democracy are turned into concrete action. The public, advocates, staff, journalists, visitors, neighbors, and members of Congress must feel and be safe on Capitol Hill. The Capitol Police has an essential role in keeping the Capitol complex safe and open to the public. As is true with any large investment, Congress must ensure that the taxpayer dollars funding the Capitol Police are being used efficiently and effectively.

When the USCP is acting in a law enforcement capacity, it should be held to similar standards as other law enforcement agencies. When it acts like a federal agency, it should be held to account like all federal agencies. To help mitigate the risk of another attack on the Capitol is to significantly overhaul the congressional security structures and the mechanisms by which they are overseen and held accountable. Following practical and achievable transparency-related practices similar to other police forces around the country helps to support that mission.

————— P P —————
To help mitigate the risk of another attack on the Capitol is to significantly overhaul the congressional security structures and the mechanisms by which they are overseen and held accountable.
————— Q Q —————

While there are still many outstanding congressional requests that the United States Capitol Police must adhere to, there have been progress in several areas, including the publication of some USCP IG reports, greater arrest record transparency data, and more risk-based assessments for members of Congress. Despite these improvements, much is still needed to be done, including further examination of USCP Board reforms, adherence to creating a FOIA-like process for the public to request information, and more.

The failures of the Capitol Police to prepare for and respond to the January 6 attack, as outlined in numerous USCP IG reports, GAO investigations, and committee findings are undeniably a failure of oversight and direction from the Board that oversees the Capitol Police. Additionally, the decades-long defiance by the USCP Board to reform its structures must end. Congress must look to reform the structure of this entity to ensure operational transparency and accountability. Until then, the seat of our democracy remains at risk.

Endnotes

1. [1] See “Bill Establishing the United States Capitol Police” History, Art, and Archives of the House of Representatives, https://history.house.gov/HouseRecord/Detail/25769816242?current_search_qs=%3FPreviousSearch%3DSearch%252cAll%252c%252c%252cTitle%26CurrentPage%3D1%26SortOrder%3DTitle%26Command%3DNext and [2] See “Our Mission” United States Capitol Police <https://www.uscp.gov/the-department/our-mission>
2. Letter from Committee on House Administration Chair Zoe Lofgren to Capitol Police Chief Manger (Nov. 1, 2022), <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/23258027-lofgren-letter>
3. For a more detailed description on the leadership and intelligence failures leading up to the January 6, 2021 attack on the Capitol, see “Insurrection’s Eve: Inside the Capitol Police’s Intelligence Dysfunction Leading Up to January 6” Nick Schwellenbach, Project On Government Oversight, April 27, 2023 <https://www.pogo.org/investigation/2023/04/insurrections-eve>
4. For additional information, see “Examining the U.S. Capitol Attack: A Review of the Security, Planning, and Response Failures on January 6” Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Senate Committee on Rules and Administration https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/HSGAC&RulesFullReport_ExaminingU.S.CapitolAttack.pdf
5. [1] See, “Man Charged with Assault and Attempted Kidnapping Following Breaking and Entering of Pelosi Residence” Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, October 31, 2022 <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/man-charged-assault-and-attempted-kidnapping-following-breaking-and-entering-pelosi-residence> and [2] See, “Statement from Congressman Gerry Connolly on District Office Attack” Representative Gerry Connolly, May 15, 2023 <https://connolly.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=4759>
6. See “Bill Establishing the United States Capitol Police” History, Art, and Archives of the House of Representatives, https://history.house.gov/HouseRecord/Detail/25769816242?current_search_qs=%3FPreviousSearch%3DSearch%252cAll%252c%252c%252cTitle%26CurrentPage%3D1%26SortOrder%3DTitle%26Command%3DNext and [2] See “Our Mission” United States Capitol Police <https://www.uscp.gov/the-department/our-mission>
7. For more information regarding U.S. Capitol Police jurisdiction, see “The Long Arm of the Capitol Police” Daniel Schuman, The First Branch Forecast, August 7, 2019, <https://firstbranchforecast.com/2019/08/07/the-long-arm-of-the-u-s-capitol-police/>
8. See “Capitol Police Board” United States Capitol Police <https://www.uscp.gov/the-department/oversight/capitol-police-board>
9. See “Capitol Police Board Order 17.16: Office of the Inspector General Information” United States Capitol Police Board, December 2017 <https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.227866/gov.uscourts.dcd.227866.19.4.pdf>
10. See “OIG Reports” United States Capitol Police Office of the Inspector General <https://www.uscp.gov/oig-reports>

11. See “Capitol Police Board: Fully Incorporating Leading Governance Practices Would Help Enhance Accountability, Transparency, and External Communication” Government Accountability Office, February 2017, p. 34
12. See “Report of Investigation: Security Failures at the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021” Committee on House Administration Republicans, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23492671/final_report_of_investigation_republicans.pdf
13. For examples of police spending in major cities, see “What Policing Costs: A Look at Spending in America’s Biggest Cities” Vera Institute of Justice <https://www.vera.org/publications/what-policing-costs-in-americas-biggest-cities>
14. USCP buildings, grounds, and security — which is housed under Architect of the Capitol funding — received a \$340,517,267 increase (a whopping 545.8%) from the \$62,389,733 received in FY 2022 to \$402.9 million in FY 2023. See, Public Law No: 117-328, p. 470 <https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/hr2617/BILLS-117hr2617enr.pdf#page=470>
15. See “Formal Statement of J. Thomas Manger, Chief, United States Capitol Police For the United States Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch” April 25, 2023 <https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/USCP%20FY%2024%20Budget%20Request%20Testimony%20-%20SAC%20-%20FINAL1.pdf>
16. See “FY 2024 House Legislative Branch Appropriations Draft Bill” <https://appropriations.house.gov/sites/republicans.appropriations.house.gov/files/documents/FY24%20Legislative%20Branch%20-%20Subcommittee%20Mark.pdf#page=13>
17. See “S. 2302 - FY 2024 Senate Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill” https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/fy24_legislative_branch_bill_text.pdf#page=14
18. For a complete list of relevant Capitol Police hearings, see “Resources on the U.S. Capitol Police” GitHub <https://github.com/DanielSchuman/Policy/wiki/Capitol-Police#hearings>
19. See “United States Capitol Police Appropriations Requests: FY19-FY24” Demand Progress Education Fund https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1rbUYV91UC47otTf2q3msre_Y7dKGVGReN59eROCocTE/edit#gid=1187376756
20. A list of our articles and research can be found at <https://github.com/DanielSchuman/Policy/wiki/Capitol-Police>
21. <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HA/HA00/20220217/114404/HHRG-117-HA00-Wstate-SchumanD-20220217.pdf>
22. <https://www.npr.org/2021/05/07/994320154/the-worst-ive-seen-capitol-police-face-scrutiny-for-lack-of-transparency>
23. For more information, see “Capitol Police: Resources on the U.S. Capitol Police” Github <https://github.com/DanielSchuman/Policy/wiki/Capitol-Police>

24. See “US Capitol Police chief: 153 officers have left force since Jan. 6; hiring is imperative” USA Today, January 5, 2022 <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2022/01/05/capitol-police-officers-left-since-jan-6/9104403002/>

25. See H.R.2617 (117th Congress) <https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/hr2617/BILLS-117hr2617enr.pdf#page=467>

26. See “Capitol Police Union Welcomes Retirement Fix” United States Capitol Police Labor Committee, June 30, 2021 <https://uscp-fop.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Capital-Police-Union-Welcomes-Retirement-Fix-June-30-2021.pdf>

27. See Public Law 117-31 (117th Congress) <https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ31/PLAW-117publ31.pdf>

28. See “Looking Ahead Series: Oversight of the United States Capitol Police” Committee on House Administration, May 16, 2023 <https://cha.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/looking-ahead-series-oversight-united-states-capitol-police>

29. See “Formal Statement of J. Thomas Manger, Chief, United States Capitol Police For the United States Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch” April 25, 2023 <https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/USCP%20FY%2024%20Budget%20Request%20Testimony%20-%20SAC%20-%20FINAL1.pdf>

30. See “United States Capitol Police Weekly Arrest Summary to be Posted on USCP.gov” United States Capitol Police, December 19, 2018 <https://www.uscp.gov/media-center/press-releases/united-states-capitol-police-weekly-arrest-summary-be-posted-uscpgov>

31. Ibid.

32. See [1] “The U.S. Capitol Police: What A Year Of Data Tells Us About The Congressional Police Force” Demand Progress Education Fund, February 2020 https://s3.amazonaws.com/demandprogress/reports/US_Capitol_Police_February_2020_Report.pdf and [2] “A Primer on the Capitol Police: What We Know From Two Years of Research” Demand Progress Education Fund, January 6, 2021 <https://firstbranchforecast.com/2021/01/06/a-primer-on-the-capitol-police-what-we-know-from-two-years-of-research/>

33. See “Hearing: Public Witnesses testifying on FY21 Budget” House Legislative Branch Appropriations Subcommittee, March 4, 2020 <https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=110517>

34. The House report accompanying the FY 2021 Legislative Branch Appropriations bill report (H. Rept. 116-447, p. 22) contained the following language: “The Committee is aware that the Capitol Police does publicly share its arrest data, however, it is not available in a user-friendly format that is searchable, sortable, and downloadable, and is made available on a cumulative basis. The Committee directs USCP report to the Committees as soon as practicable, but no later than 180 days after enactment of this Act on a timetable for deploying a system that can meet these requirements.” <https://www.congress.gov/116/crpt/hrpt447/CRPT-116hrpt447.pdf#page=22>

35. The FY 2023 Legislative Branch Appropriations bill committee report (H. Rept. 117-389, p. 23) contained the following language: “The Committee commends the USCP for their progress toward compliance with a directive to post arrest summary information in a user-friendly format that is searchable, sortable, downloadable, and is available on a cumulative basis. The Committee reminds the Department of the importance of this directive and directs the Department to provide a briefing on their ongoing efforts to publish this information within 30 days of the official posting of this report. Furthermore, the Department is directed to submit a report of arrests made both on the Capitol complex and the surrounding Capitol Hill community on a quarterly basis to the Committee.” <https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt389/CRPT-117hrpt389.pdf#page=23>

36. See “Arrest Summary Report” United States Capitol Police <https://www.uscp.gov/daily-arrests>

37. See “Capitol Police Hire Diversity Officer” Emily Yehle, Roll Call, February 2, 2010 <https://rollcall.com/2010/02/02/capitol-police-hire-diversity-officer/>

38. See ““No One Took Us Seriously”: Black Cops Warned About Racist Capitol Police Officers for Years” Joshua Kaplan and Joaquin Sapien, ProPublica, January 14, 2021

39. The House report accompanying the FY 2022 Legislative Branch Appropriations bill (H. Rept. 117-80, p. 24) contained the following language: “Capitol Police officers interact with thousands of domestic and international visitors every day. Visitors have varying cultural and social needs, including but not limited to individuals with limited English proficiency, diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds, and disabilities. The Committee recognizes the USCP for including diversity training as a part of the current Capitol Police training sessions and encourages the Capitol Police to continue strengthening its curriculum to ensure service is provided to all visitors in a culturally competent manner. The Committee supports vigorous action to improve training for the USCP sworn officers on racial profiling, implicit bias, procedural justice, the use of force, and the duty for officers to intervene when witnessing the use of excessive force against civilians. The Committee directs the USCP to report to the Committees not later than 60 days after enactment of this Act the on breadth of training programs employed by the Department that focus on racial profiling, implicit bias, procedural justice, use of force, preventing use of excessive force. Such report shall include the number of sworn officers who have participated in training and the types of training programs.” <https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt80/CRPT-117hrpt80.pdf#page=24>

40. The House report accompanying the FY 2022 Legislative Branch Appropriations bill (H. Rept. 116-447, p. 21) <https://www.congress.gov/116/crpt/hrpt447/CRPT-116hrpt447.pdf#page=21>

41. See “United States Capitol Police Equity and Inclusion Strategic Plan FY23-FY26” https://www.uscp.gov/sites/uscapitolpolice.house.gov/files/USCP%20Equity%20Inclusion%20Strategic%20Plan_Final%20May%202011.pdf

42. See “United States Capitol Police Equity and Inclusion Strategic Plan FY23-FY26” https://www.uscp.gov/sites/uscapitolpolice.house.gov/files/USCP%20Equity%20Inclusion%20Strategic%20Plan_Final%20May%202011.pdf and [2] “A Cultural Assessment of the MPD Workplace” Police Executive Research Forum Metropolitan Police Washington D.C., March 2023 https://mpdc.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/mpdc/publication/attachments/PERF%20MPD%20Cultural%20Assessment_032923.pdf

43. See “Sen. Tim Scott reveals incidents of being targeted by Capitol Police” Louis Nelson, Politico, July 13, 2016 <https://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/tim-scott-capitol-racism-senate-225507>

44. See “6 Capitol Police officers facing discipline for Jan. 6 actions, dozens absolved” Kyle Cheney, Politico, September 11, 2021 <https://www.politico.com/news/2021/09/11/capitol-police-officers-discipline-jan-6-511352>

45. See “Former U.S. Capitol Police Officer Found Guilty of Obstruction Charge Involving Investigation of Jan. 6 Capitol Breach” Department of Justice U.S. Attorney’s Office, October 28, 2022 <https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/former-us-capitol-police-officer-found-guilty-obstruction-charge-involving-investigation>

46. See “US Capitol Police in ‘very early stages’ of body-worn camera pilot” Rebecca Heilweil, FedScoop, July 7, 2023 <https://fedscoop.com/us-capitol-police-in-early-stages-of-body-worn-camera-pilot/>

47. See “Appropriators pressure Capitol Police to make Jan. 6 IG report public, hold press briefings” Katherine Tully-McManus, Roll Call, March 29, 2021 <https://rollcall.com/2021/03/29/appropriators-pressure-capitol-police-to-make-jan-6-ig-report-public-hold-press-briefings/> and [2] “Capitol Police overhauls, once an afterthought, now at the forefront after riot” Chris Marquette, Roll Call, January 8, 2021 <https://rollcall.com/2021/01/08/capitol-police-overhauls-once-an-afterthought-now-at-the-forefront-after-riot/>

48. See United States Capitol Police, Twitter, February 5, 2021 <https://twitter.com/CapitolPolice/status/1357834113651253248>

49. The House report accompanying the FY 2021 Legislative Branch Appropriations bill (H. Rept. 116-447, p. 22) contained the following language: “USCP communication is vital to provide accurate and timely information to Members and staff, as well as the general public that often visits the Capitol Hill Complex. While the USCP does an excellent job of keeping Members and staff informed, the Committee is concerned that the general public is often not aware of severe weather events and security incidents while on the complex grounds. The Committee directs the USCP to establish a community notification system that can be utilized by visitors and community members to allow a larger audience to receive USCP notifications. The USCP may leverage social platforms to meet this goal. The Committee further directs the USCP to provide a report no later than 90 days after the enactment of this Act on its progress to meet this directive.” <https://www.congress.gov/116/crpt/hrpt447/CRPT-116hrpt447.pdf#page=21>

50. The House report accompanying the FY 2022 Legislative Branch Appropriations bill (H. Rept. 117-80, p. 26) contained the following language: “USCP communication is vital to provide accurate and timely information to Members and staff, as well as the public that often visits the Capitol Hill Complex. While the USCP does an excellent job of keeping Members and staff informed, the Committee is concerned that the public is often not aware of severe weather events and security incidents while on the complex grounds. The Committee directs the USCP to employ a community notification system that can be utilized by visitors and community members to allow a larger audience to receive USCP notifications. The Committee further directs the USCP to brief the Committees no later than 90 days after the enactment of this Act on its progress to meet this directive.” <https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt80/CRPT-117hrpt80.pdf#page=26>

51. See “Norton Announces that D.C. Residents Can Receive Capitol Security Alerts” Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton, October 28, 2021 <https://norton.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/norton-announces-that-dc-residents-can-receive-capitol-security-alerts>

52. The House report accompanying the FY 2023 Legislative Branch Appropriations bill (H. Rept. 117-389, p. 25) contained the following language: “The Committee appreciates the detailed report as requested in House

Report 117–80 regarding a community notification system that may be utilized by visitors and community members. The Committee remains concerned that the public is not often alerted to significant events such as security incidents impacting the Capitol Complex. The Committee encourages the Department to continue exploring ways to keep the Capitol Hill community and visitors informed.”

<https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt389/CRPT-117hrpt389.pdf#page=25>

53. For instance, the Office of the Clerk is a shining example of how a given entity can disclose across many types of records through a modern website but not publish administrative or performance data about the office and its staff itself. (It’s worth noting, however, that the Office of the Clerk is not an agency.)

<https://clerk.house.gov/>

54. The House report accompanying the FY 2021 Legislative Branch Appropriations bill (H. Rept. 116-447, p. 22) contained the following language: “While the USCP is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 USC 552), the Committee encourages the USCP to develop a policy and procedure for the sharing of information that follows the spirit of the Freedom of Information Act. This policy should be consistent with, and not interfere with, USCP’s primary function of protecting the Congress.”

<https://www.congress.gov/116/crpt/hrpt447/CRPT-116hrpt447.pdf#page=22>

55. See “Model Public Records Request Regulations For the U.S. Capitol Police” Demand Progress Education Fund, December 3, 2021

https://s3.amazonaws.com/demandprogress/reports/Model_USCP_Public_Records_Regulations_2021-12.pdf

56. Ibid.

57. The House report accompanying the FY 2022 Legislative Branch Appropriations bill (H. Rept. 117-80, p. 26) contained the following language: “While the USCP is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 USC 552), the Committee directs the USCP to develop a policy and procedure for the sharing of information that follows the spirit of the Freedom of Information Act. This policy should be consistent with, and not interfere with, USCP’s primary function of protecting the Congress.”

<https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt80/CRPT-117hrpt80.pdf#page=26>

58. See “Looking Ahead Series: Oversight of the United States Capitol Police” Committee on House Administration, May 16, 2023 <https://cha.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/looking-ahead-series-oversight-united-states-capitol-police>

59. In the House report accompanying the FY 2021 Legislative Branch Appropriations bill (H. Rept. 116-447), lawmakers requested that the Capitol Police Inspector General publicly release IG reports if they do not compromise law enforcement activities, national security, or congressional security and processes without redaction. The committee requested the USCP IG review all issued reports from the previous three years to determine which could have been made public is commendable; the USCP IG review was due March 27, 2021.

<https://www.congress.gov/116/crpt/hrpt447/CRPT-116hrpt447.pdf#page=22>

60. The House report accompanying the FY 2022 Legislative Branch Appropriations bill (H. Rept. 117-80, p. 26), the committee instructed “the Inspector General to institute a process to make reports publicly available whenever practicable and to begin publishing reports on its website.”

<https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt80/CRPT-117hrpt80.pdf#page=26>

61. The House report accompanying the FY 2023 Legislative Branch Appropriations bill (H. Rept. 117-389, p. 25), contained the following language: “USCP Office of the Inspector General Reports: The Committee is aware that the public does not have access to reports issued by the Capitol Police Office of Inspector General. While the Committee understands that these reports can be sensitive to law enforcement actions and Congressional security, the Committee is interested in what reports can be shared with the general public. The Committee believes that the Inspector General should try to make appropriate reports public if they do not compromise law enforcement activities, national security, or Congressional security and processes without redaction. The Committee instructs the Inspector General to institute procedures to make reports publicly available whenever practicable and to begin publishing reports on its website.”
<https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt389/CRPT-117hrpt389.pdf#page=25>

62. See “Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2024, Report 118-120” p. 16
<https://www.congress.gov/118/crpt/hrpt120/CRPT-118hrpt120.pdf#page=16>

63. See “Audits” United States Capitol Police Office of the Inspector General <https://www.uscp.gov/the-department/office-inspector-general/audits-investigations>

64. See “Chairman Steil Statement on USCP OIG Publicly Releasing Reports” Committee on House Administration, May 18, 2023 <https://cha.house.gov/media/press-releases/chairman-steil-statement-uscp-oig-publicly-releasing-reports>

65. For more information on the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, see “About the IGs” Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency <https://www.ignet.gov/content/about-igs>

66. GAO, Capitol Attack: The Capitol Police Need Clearer Emergency Procedures and a Comprehensive Security Risk Assessment Process (Feb. 17, 2022), <https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105001>

67. See “Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2023, Report 117-389” p. 23
<https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt389/CRPT-117hrpt389.pdf#page=23>

68. See “Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2022, Report 117-80” p. 24
<https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt80/CRPT-117hrpt80.pdf#page=24>

69. See “Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2020, Report 116-64” p. 15
<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-116hrpt64/pdf/CRPT-116hrpt64.pdf#page=15>

70. See “Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2023, Report 117-389” p. 22-23
<https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt389/CRPT-117hrpt389.pdf#page=22>

71. See “Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2022, Report 117-80” p. 23
<https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt80/CRPT-117hrpt80.pdf#page=23>

72. See “Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2023, Report 117-389” p. 22-23
<https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt389/CRPT-117hrpt389.pdf#page=22>

73. See “Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2021, Report 116-447” p. 22
<https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt80/CRPT-117hrpt80.pdf#page=22>

74. See “Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2023, Report 117-389” p. 24
<https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt389/CRPT-117hrpt389.pdf#page=24>

75. See “Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2022, Report 117-80” p. 24-25
<https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt80/CRPT-117hrpt80.pdf#page=24>

76. See “Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2021, Report 116-447” p. 20
<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-116hrpt447/pdf/CRPT-116hrpt447.pdf#page=20>

77. Ibid, p. 21

78. See “Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2020, Report 116-64” p. 15-16
<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-116hrpt64/pdf/CRPT-116hrpt64.pdf#page=15>

79. See “Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2023, Report 117-389” p. 24
<https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt389/CRPT-117hrpt389.pdf#page=24>

80. See “Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2023, Report 117-389” p. 4
<https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt389/CRPT-117hrpt389.pdf#page=4>

81. See “Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2022, Report 117-80” p. 25
<https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt80/CRPT-117hrpt80.pdf#page=25>

82. The House report accompanying the FY 2022 Legislative Branch Appropriations bill (H. Rept. 116-447, p. 4) contained the following language: “The Committee notes that the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2021 directs the Attorney General to establish a training program to cover the use of force and de-escalation, racial profiling, implicit bias, and procedural justice, to include training on the duty of Federal law enforcement officers to intervene in cases where another law enforcement officer is using excessive force, and make such training a requirement for Federal law enforcement officers. The Committee further notes that several Departments and agencies funded by this Act employ Federal law enforcement officers and are Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers partner organizations. The Committee directs such Departments and agencies to adopt and follow the training program established by the Attorney General, and to make such training a requirement for its Federal law enforcement officers. The Committee further directs such Departments and agencies to brief the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations on their efforts relating to training no later than 90 days after the Attorney General has established such a training program.” <https://www.congress.gov/116/crpt/hrpt447/CRPT-116hrpt447.pdf#page=4>

83. The House report accompanying the FY 2021 Legislative Branch Appropriations bill (H. Rept. 116-447, p. 21) <https://www.congress.gov/116/crpt/hrpt447/CRPT-116hrpt447.pdf#page=21>

84. The House report accompanying the FY 2021 Legislative Branch Appropriations bill (H. Rept. 116-64, p. 4) contained the following language: “The Committee notes that the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2021 directs the Attorney General to establish a training program to cover the use of force and de-escalation, racial profiling, implicit bias, and procedural justice, to include training on the duty of Federal law enforcement officers to intervene in cases where another law enforcement officer is using excessive force, and make such training a requirement for Federal law enforcement officers. The Committee further notes that several Departments and agencies funded by this Act employ Federal law enforcement officers and are Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers partner organizations. The Committee directs such Departments and agencies to adopt and follow the training program established by the Attorney General, and to make such training a requirement for its Federal law enforcement officers. The Committee further directs such Departments and agencies to brief the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations on their efforts relating to training no later than 90 days after the Attorney General has established such a training program.” <https://www.congress.gov/116/crpt/hrpt447/CRPT-116hrpt447.pdf#page=4>

85. See “Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2023, Report 117-389” p. 25
<https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt389/CRPT-117hrpt389.pdf#page=25>

86. See “Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2022, Report 117-80” p. 26
<https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt80/CRPT-117hrpt80.pdf#page=26>

87. See “Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2021, Report 116-447” p. 22
<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-116hrpt447/pdf/CRPT-116hrpt447.pdf#page=22>

88. See “Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2022, Report 117-80” p. 26
<https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt80/CRPT-117hrpt80.pdf#page=26>

89. See “Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2021, Report 116-447” p. 22
<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-116hrpt447/pdf/CRPT-116hrpt447.pdf#page=22>

90. See “Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2023, Report 117-389” p. 25
<https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt389/CRPT-117hrpt389.pdf#page=25>

91. See “Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2022, Report 117-80” p. 26
<https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt80/CRPT-117hrpt80.pdf#page=26>

92. See “Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2021, Report 116-447” p. 22
<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-116hrpt447/pdf/CRPT-116hrpt447.pdf#page=22>

Appendix

The following is a compilation of congressional directives concerning the US Capitol Police for 2019-2023.

Employee Overtime, Wellness, and Mental Health

Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2023, Report 117-389: *Wellness Programs for Law Enforcement:* The Committee appreciates the efforts undertaken by the United States Capitol Police to develop and implement a holistic wellness and resiliency program for its workforce, to include its partnership with the House Wellness Center. The Committee recognizes the importance that mindfulness plays in having a first responder workforce that is holistically balanced and resilient.⁶⁷

Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2022, Report 117-80: *Wellness Programs for Law Enforcement:* The Committee appreciates the efforts undertaken by the United States Capitol Police to develop and implement a holistic wellness and resiliency program for its workforce, to include its partnership with the House Wellness Center. The Committee recognizes the importance that mindfulness plays in having a first responder workforce that is holistically balanced and resilient. The Committee is pleased that the new United States Capitol Police structure includes a dedicated FTE to this program. Therefore, the Committee directs the United States Capitol Police to continue this effort and to continue to collaborate with the Department of Homeland Security's Federal Law Enforcement Training Center to expand this initiative through a pilot program, so it may be reviewed and considered for full implementation across all aspects of Federal law enforcement.⁶⁸

Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2020, Report 116-64: *Wellness Programs for Law Enforcement:* The Committee appreciates the efforts undertaken by the United States Capitol Police to develop and implement a holistic wellness and resiliency program for its workforce, to include its partnership with the House Wellness Center. The Committee recognizes the importance that mindfulness plays in having a first responder workforce that is holistically balanced and resilient. Therefore, the Committee directs the United States Capitol Police to continue this effort and to closely collaborate with the Department of Homeland Security's Federal Law Enforcement Training Center to expand this initiative through a pilot program, so it may be reviewed and considered for full implementation across all aspects of Federal law enforcement.⁶⁹

Risk-Based Protection for Members of Congress

Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2023, Report 117-389: In light of this year's 107% increase in threats against Congress, the Committee continues to find that ensuring the continuity of government must include protecting the physical security of Members of Congress. The recommendation provides \$2,000,000 for the Department to enhance Member security outside of the Capitol campus in the National Capital Region (NCR), as warranted by risk-based analyses. As laid out in the December 2018 report detailing the Department's plans to enhance off-campus Member security in the NCR, the Committee expects the USCP to continue working closely with the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms and local law enforcement partners in the NCR and educating Member offices on the USCP strategy for Members' protection within the NCR while outside the Capitol Grounds. The Committee instructs USCP to coordinate with the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms to direct patrols to buildings or locations where the Members tend to congregate in order to fulfill its mission under 2 U.S.C. 1966.⁷⁰

Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2022, Report 117-80: Risk-Based Protections for Members of Congress: Provided this year's 107% increase in threats against Congress, the Committee continues to find that ensuring the continuity of government must include protecting the physical security of Members of Congress. The recommendation provides \$2,000,000 for the Department to enhance Member security outside of the Capitol campus in the NCR, as warranted by risk-based analyses. As laid out in the December 2018 report detailing the Department's plans to enhance off-campus Member security in the NCR, the Committee expects the USCP to continue working closely with the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms and local law enforcement partners in the NCR and educating Member Offices on the USCP strategy for Members' protection within the NCR while outside the Capitol Grounds. The Committee instructs USCP to coordinate with the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms to direct patrols to buildings or locations where the Members tend to congregate in order to fulfill its mission under 2 U.S.C. 1966.⁷¹

Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2019, Report 115-696: As highlighted by the 2017 shooting in Alexandria, Virginia, evolving threats to Congress include the physical targeting of Members of Congress. In addition to securing the Capitol campus, the Committee finds that ensuring the continuity of government must include protecting the physical security of Members. The bill includes \$1,000,000 to enhance Member security outside of the Capitol campus in the National Capital Region, as warranted by risk-based analyses. Such funds may be used to reimburse local law enforcement and/or support additional dignitary protection teams to be assigned on a flexible and dynamic basis. The Committee further expects the USCP to adopt Inspector General recommendations on improving the effectiveness of USCP units, including those other than the Uniformed

Services Bureau, to better position the USCP to expand offcampus security for Members. The USCP is directed to report to the Committee within 90 days of enactment on plans for utilizing the increased funding for off-campus Member security in the National Capital Region, including cost estimates for expanding such efforts. The USCP is also directed to include in such report a recommendation to the Committee on specific features of such events that may warrant a threat assessment. Such recommendations should be made in a format that could better inform Members and staff of events that may need to be alerted to the USCP.

Capitol Police Arrest Record as Data

Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2023, Report 117-389: Arrest Summary Data: The Committee commends the USCP for their progress toward compliance with a directive to post arrest summary information in a user-friendly format that is searchable, sortable, downloadable, and is available on a cumulative basis. The Committee reminds the Department of the importance of this directive and directs the Department to provide a briefing on their ongoing efforts to publish this information within 30 days of the official posting of this report. Furthermore, the Department is directed to submit a report of arrests made both on the Capitol complex and the surrounding Capitol Hill community on a quarterly basis to the Committee.⁷²

Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2021, Report 116-447: Arrest Summary Data: The Committee is aware that the U.S. Capitol Police does publicly share its arrest data, however, it is not available in a user-friendly format that is searchable, sortable, and downloadable, and is made available on a cumulative basis. The Committee directs the U.S. Capitol Police to explore the potential of developing a system that can meet these requirements and provide the Committees a report of the cost of such a system no later than 180 days after enactment of this Act.⁷³

Diversity in the USCP and Diversity Training

Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2023, Report 117-389: Diversity Training: The Committee commends the USCP for including diversity training as a part of the current Capitol Police training sessions and encourages the Capitol Police to continue strengthening its curriculum to ensure service is provided to all visitors in a culturally competent manner. The Committee supports continued vigorous action to improve training for the USCP sworn officers on racial profiling, implicit bias, procedural justice, the use of force, and the duty for officers to intervene when witnessing the use of excessive force against civilians.⁷⁴

Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2022, Report 117-80: Diversity Training: Capitol Police officers interact with thousands of domestic and international visitors every day. Visitors have varying cultural and social needs, including but not limited to individuals with limited English proficiency, diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds, and disabilities. The Committee recognizes the USCP for including diversity training as a part of the current Capitol Police training sessions and encourages the Capitol Police to continue strengthening its curriculum to ensure service is provided to all visitors in a culturally competent manner. The Committee supports vigorous action to improve training for the USCP sworn officers on racial profiling, implicit bias, procedural justice, the use of force, and the duty for officers to intervene when witnessing the use of excessive force against civilians. The Committee directs the USCP to report to the Committees not later than 60 days after enactment of this Act the breadth of training programs employed by the Department that focus on racial profiling, implicit bias, procedural justice, use of force, preventing use of excessive force. Such report shall include the number of sworn officers who have participated in training and the types of training programs.⁷⁵

Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2021, Report 116-447: Diversity Training: Capitol Police officers interact with thousands of domestic and international visitors every day. Visitors have varying cultural and social needs, including but not limited to individuals with limited English proficiency, diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds, and disabilities. The Committee recognizes the U.S. Capitol Police for including diversity training as a part of the current Capitol Police training sessions and encourages the Capitol police to continue strengthening its curriculum to ensure service is provided to all visitors in a culturally competent manner.⁷⁶

Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2021, Report 116-447: Diversity in the USCP: The goal of any organization should be to build a workforce with people from diverse backgrounds. The Committee believes that hiring more officers from underrepresented groups in the U.S. should be a critical priority for the USCP. Therefore, the Committee directs the USCP to provide a report concurrent with the budget submissions that details: 1) the number of activities to try to promote workforce diversity, including partnering with organizations that focus on developing opportunities for minorities and women; 2) the steps taken to attract and retain a diverse workforce, and; 3) a breakout of USCP positions, sworn and civilian, by race and gender.⁷⁷

Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2020, Report 116-64: Diversity Training: Capitol Police officers interact with thousands of domestic and international visitors every day. Visitors have varying cultural and social needs, including but not limited to individuals with limited English proficiency, diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds,

and disabilities. The Committee recognizes the U.S. Capitol Police for including diversity training as a part of the current Capitol Police training sessions and encourages the Capitol Police to continue strengthening its curriculum to ensure service is provided to all visitors in a culturally competent manner.⁷⁸

Combating Bias

Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2023, Report 117-389: Combating Bias: The Committee commends the Department for their detailed response on current efforts to combat bias within the USCP workforce. The Committee continues to restate the importance of combating bias and remains interested in ongoing programming, hiring, and education to prevent bias within the Department.⁷⁹

Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2023, Report 117-389: Federal Law Enforcement: The explanatory statement that accompanied the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2022 directed the Attorney General to ensure implementation of evidence based training programs on de-escalation, the use-of force, and the protection of civil rights, that are broadly applicable and scalable to all Federal law enforcement agencies. Several agencies funded by this Act employ Federal law enforcement officers and are Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers partner organizations. These agencies are again directed to consult with the Attorney General regarding the implementation of these programs for their law enforcement officers. The Committee further directs such agencies to submit a report to the Committee on their efforts relating to such implementation not later than 90 days after consultation with the Attorney General. In addition, the Committee continues to direct such agencies to the extent that they are not already participating, to consult with the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI regarding participation in the National Use-of-Force Data Collection. The Committee further directs such agencies to submit a report to the Committee not later than 180 days after enactment of this Act on their efforts to so participate.⁸⁰

Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2022, Report 117-80: Racial Profiling: The Committee is concerned that the report on Racial Profiling has not been completed as directed in House Report 116-447. The Committee repeats the text in the following paragraph, which is identical to that carried on page 21 of House Report 116-447 from July 14, 2020 and directs the Capitol Police to provide this report immediately after the official posting of this report.⁸¹

The Committee is interested in what programs and training methods and procedures USCP use to eliminate racial profiling. The Committee directs the USCP to provide a report to the

Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on House Administration detailing: (1) what policies and procedures are in place at the academy to eliminate unconscious bias and racial profiling during training; (2) what steps the USCP has taken to eliminate existing practices that permit or encourage racial profiling; and (3) arrest information disaggregated by race, ethnicity, and gender.

The FY 2022 appropriations bill report requested the USCP participate in the Attorney General's program implementing evidence-based training programs on de-escalation and the use-of force, as well as on police-community relations, and to report back to the Committees on Appropriations on their efforts within 90 days of consulting with the AG.⁸²

Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2021, Report 116-447: Racial Profiling: The Committee is interested in what programs and training methods and procedures USCP use to eliminate racial profiling. The Committee directs the USCP to provide a report to the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on House Administration detailing: 1) what policies and procedures are in place at the academy to eliminate unconscious bias and racial profiling during training; 2) what steps the USCP has taken to eliminate existing practices that permit or encourage racial profiling; and 3) arrest information disaggregated by race, ethnicity, and gender.⁸³

The FY 2021 appropriations bill report also requested the USCP participate in the Attorney General's program implementing evidence-based training programs on de-escalation and the use-of force, as well as on police-community relations, and to report back to the Committees on Appropriations on their efforts within 90 days of consulting with the AG.⁸⁴

Body-Worn Camera Pilot Program

Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2023, Report 117-389: Body Worn Camera Pilot Program: The Committee commends the Department's ongoing efforts for greater transparency while balancing the protection of life and safety on the Capitol Complex. The Committee believes that the Department's request for funding to implement a pilot body worn camera program is an important step in this effort. The Committee understands that the Department's pilot program will be limited to patrol and exterior sworn activities where services are being provided directly to the public. In order to ensure that the Congress can undertake its constitutional responsibilities regarding speech or debate, the Committee understands that this pilot will not be implemented for interior locations on the Capitol Complex, during protection detail activities, or other activities involving direct interactions with Members of Congress. Further, the Committee understands that the Department's pilot program will be limited to patrol and exterior sworn activities where services are being provided directly to the public. In order to ensure

that the Congress can undertake its constitutional responsibilities regarding speech or debate, the Committee understands that this pilot will not be implemented for interior locations on the Capitol Complex, during protection detail activities, or other activities involving direct interactions with Members of Congress. Further, the Committee understands the importance of protecting critical law enforcement-sensitive Member protection information that may be adversely impacted by the release of camera footage captured by a body worn camera. The Committee expects the Department to continue to carefully balance the restriction of access to this information with the transparency expected by the public, while ensuring that the Congress can carry out its constitutional responsibilities in a safe and open environment. The Department shall provide the Committee with an interim report on the pilot program within 180 days following full implementation of the body worn camera pilot program. This report shall include the status of the implementation process, challenges and recommended solutions experienced during the pilot implementation, and lessons learned to date that may inform additional applications for the body worn camera program.

USCP Public Information Office and Social Media

Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2023, Report 117-389: USCP Public Information Office: The Committee appreciates the detailed report as requested in House Report 117–80 regarding a community notification system that may be utilized by visitors and community members. The Committee remains concerned that the public is not often alerted to significant events such as security incidents impacting the Capitol Complex. The Committee encourages the Department to continue exploring ways to keep the Capitol Hill community and visitors informed.⁸⁵

Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2022, Report 117-80: USCP Public Information Office: USCP communication is vital to provide accurate and timely information to Members and staff, as well as the public that often visits the Capitol Hill Complex. While the USCP does an excellent job of keeping Members and staff informed, the Committee is concerned that the public is often not aware of severe weather events and security incidents while on the complex grounds. The Committee directs the USCP to employ a community notification system that can be utilized by visitors and community members to allow a larger audience to receive USCP notifications. The Committee further directs the USCP to brief the Committees no later than 90 days after the enactment of this Act on its progress to meet this directive.⁸⁶

Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2021, Report 116-447: USCP Public Information Office: USCP communication is vital to provide accurate and timely information to Members and staff, as well as the general public that often visits the Capitol

Hill Complex. While the USCP does an excellent job of keeping Members and staff informed, the Committee is concerned that the general public is often not aware of severe weather events and security incidents while on the complex grounds. The Committee directs the USCP to establish a community notification system that can be utilized by visitors and community members to allow a larger audience to receive USCP notifications. The USCP may leverage social platforms to meet this goal. The Committee further directs the USCP to provide a report no later than 90 days after the enactment of this Act on its progress to meet this directive.⁸⁷

Creating a FOIA-like Process for USCP Records

Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2022, Report 117-80: While the USCP is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 USC 552), the Committee encourages the USCP to develop a policy and procedure for the sharing of information that follows the spirit of the Freedom of Information Act. This policy should be consistent with, and not interfere with, USCP's primary function of protecting the Congress.⁸⁸

Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2021, Report 116-447: USCP Information Sharing: While the USCP is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 USC 552), the Committee encourages the USCP to develop a policy and procedure for the sharing of information that follows the spirit of the Freedom of Information Act. This policy should be consistent with, and not interfere with, USCP's primary function of protecting the Congress.⁸⁹

Capitol Police Inspector General Reports Public Availability

Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2023, Report 117-389: USCP Office of Inspector General Reports: The Committee is aware that the public does not have access to reports issued by the Capitol Police Office of Inspector General. While the Committee understands that these reports can be sensitive to law enforcement actions and Congressional security, the Committee is interested in what reports can be shared with the general public. The Committee believes that the Inspector General should try to make appropriate reports public if they do not compromise law enforcement activities, national security, or Congressional security and processes without redaction. The Committee instructs the Inspector General to institute procedures to make reports publicly available whenever practicable and to begin publishing reports on its website.⁹⁰


Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2022, Report 117-80: USCP Inspector General Reports: The Committee is aware that the public does not have access to reports issued by the Capitol Police Office of Inspector General. While the Committee understands

that these reports can be sensitive to law enforcement actions and Congressional security, the Committee is interested in what reports can be shared with the general public. The Committee believes that the Inspector General should try to make appropriate reports public if they do not compromise law enforcement activities, national security, or Congressional security and processes without redaction. The Committee instructs the Inspector General to institute procedures to make reports publicly available whenever practicable and to begin publishing reports on its website.⁹¹

Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, FY 2021, Report 116-447: USCP Inspector General Reports: The Committee is aware that the public does not have access to reports issued by the Capitol Police Office of Inspector General. While the Committee understands that these reports can be sensitive to law enforcement actions and Congressional security, the Committee is interested in what reports can be shared with the general public. The Committee believes that the Inspector General should make an effort to make appropriate reports public if they do not compromise law enforcement activities, national security, or Congressional security and processes without redaction. Therefore, no later than 90 days after the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General is directed to conduct a review of all issued reports within the previous 3 years and provide to the Committees a report listing which reports could have been made public.⁹²



Photo from USCP Instagram @uscppio



Capitol Alert: Assessing the US Capitol Police's Failure to Comply with Congressional Calls for Accountability

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