



# UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

March 31, 2021

INSPECTOR GENERAL

## MEMORANDUM

**TO:** Yogananda D. Pittman  
Acting Chief of Police

**FROM:** Michael A. Bolton   
Inspector General

**SUBJECT:** *Review of the Events Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol Flash Report: Civil Disturbance Unit and Intelligence*  
(Investigative Number 2021-I-0003-B)

The subject report is attached for your review and action.

Please provide your response to the report and information on actions taken or planned on each of the recommendations directed within 45 days of the date of this memorandum. Actions taken or planned are subject to OIG follow-up and reporting in accordance with the attached resolution procedures.

I would like to express my appreciation for the cooperation and assistance provided by USCP staff during this effort. If you have any questions, regarding this report, please call me at (202) 593-4800.

### Attachments:

1. Report Number: 2021-I-0003-B
2. OIG Resolution Procedures

cc: Ms. Salley Wood, Acting Chief of Staff  
Assistant Chief Chad Thomas, Uniformed Operations  
Acting Assistant Chief Sean Gallagher, Protective and Intelligence Operations  
Mr. Richard Braddock, Chief Administrative Officer  
Thomas A. DiBiase, General Counsel  
Dominic A. Storelli, Deputy Chief Administrative Officer  
Ms. Carol Absher, Audit Liaison  
Ms. Kerry Edwards, Executive Assistant



# UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

## **AUDIT RESOLUTION PROCESS AND TERMINOLOGY**

### ***Management Decision occurs when:***

- the office assigned action for a recommendation informs OIG that it concurs with the recommendation;
- the office assigned action for a recommendation informs OIG that it disagrees with the recommendation in whole or in part, and OIG accepts the support or basis for disagreement and informs the office that implementation in whole or in part is not required; or
- disagreement between the designated action office and OIG on compliance with the recommendation has been resolved by the impasse official (Chief of Police or designee).

### ***Final Action occurs as follows:***

- The designated action office has concurred in a recommendation and has presented satisfactory evidence that it has implemented the recommendation or has completed an alternative measure that meets the intent of the recommendation.
- The designated action office disagrees with the recommendation and OIG accepts the basis for disagreement and informs the action office that further action on the recommendation is not required (closed, acceptable noncompliance).
- The designated action office disagrees with part of the recommendation, OIG accepts the basis for disagreement, and the action office presents satisfactory evidence that the remainder of the recommendation has been implemented.
- The impasse official has instructed: the action office to comply, and the office presents satisfactory evidence of compliance; or has informed OIG that the Department disagrees with the recommendation and that compliance will not occur.

### **Recommendation Tracking Terminology:**

Recommendations are considered unresolved, resolved, or closed. Each of these categories is defined below.

**Unresolved** - A recommendation is considered unresolved when the designated action office has:

- not responded to the recommendation or failed to obtain clearance of its response by the offices identified by OIG as participants in the compliance process;
- failed to address the recommendation in a manner satisfactory to OIG; or
- indicated its disagreement with the recommendation in whole or, in part, and an impasse decision has not been issued.

**Resolved, pending further action** - A recommendation is considered resolved when the:

- designated action office agrees with the recommendation but has not presented satisfactory documentation that it has implemented the recommendation or some other acceptable course of action that satisfies the intent of the recommendation;
- action office informs OIG that it disagrees with all or part of the recommendation and OIG agrees to accept partial compliance or noncompliance; or
- impasse process has led to a positive or negative final management decision.

**Closed** - A recommendation is closed when:

- OIG acknowledges that the designated action office has provided satisfactory evidence that the recommendation has been implemented;
- OIG acknowledges to the action office that an alternative course of action to that proposed in the recommendation will satisfy the intent of the recommendation, and satisfactory evidence showing the alternative action has been completed is provided to OIG;
- OIG agrees that partial implementation is acceptable and has been completed or that noncompliance is acceptable;

The IG Act defines the term "questioned cost" as a cost that is questioned by OIG because of:

- an alleged violation of a provision of law, regulation, contract, or other agreement or document governing the expenditure of funds;
- a finding that, at the time of the audit, such cost is not supported by adequate documentation; or
- a finding that the expenditure of funds for the intended purpose is unnecessary or unreasonable.

The IG Act defines the term "recommendation that funds be put to better use" as funds that could be used more efficiently if management took actions to implement and complete the recommendations, including:

- reductions in outlays;
- deobligation of funds from programs or operations;
- withdrawal of interest subsidy costs on loans or loan guarantees, insurance, or bonds;
- costs not incurred by implementing recommended improvements related to Department operations or a contract or grant;
- avoidance of unnecessary expenditures noted in pre-award reviews of contracts or agreements; or
- any other savings that are specifically identified.



# UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

## *Review of the Events Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol*

### *Flash Report: Civil Disturbance Unit and Intelligence*

Investigative Number 2021-I-0003-B

March 2021

### ***Report Restriction Language***

#### **Distribution of this Document is Restricted**

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*UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20003*



*INSPECTOR GENERAL*

**PREFACE**

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) prepared this report pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. It is one of a series of audits, reviews, and investigative and special reports OIG prepares periodically as part of its oversight responsibility with respect to the United States Capitol Police (USCP) to identify and prevent fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.

This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office or function under review. Our work was based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.

We developed our recommendations based on the best knowledge available to OIG. Because this is a flash report, we did not discuss the draft findings with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that the recommendations will result in more effective, efficient, and/or economical operations.

I express my appreciation to those contributing to the preparation of this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'M. A. Bolton', with a horizontal line extending to the right.

Michael A. Bolton  
Inspector General

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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

Bottom Line Up Front	BLUF
Civil Disturbance Unit	CDU
Containment and Emergency Response Team	CERT
Dignitary Protection Division	DPD
Federal Bureau of Investigation	FBI
Government Accountability Office	GAO
Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division	IICD
Intelligence Operations Section	IOS
Intelligence Priorities Framework	IPF
Investigations Division	ID
Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia	MPD
Office of the Director of National Intelligence	ODNI
Office of Inspector General	OIG
Oleoresin Capsicum	OC
Operational Services Bureau	OSB
Property and Asset Management Division	PAMD
Protective Services Bureau	PSB
Recruit Officer Class	ROC
Security Services Bureau	SSB
Special Operations Division	SOD
Standard Operating Procedure	SOP
Task Force Officer	TFO
Technical Countermeasures Division	TCD
Threat Assessment Section	TAS
Uniformed Services Bureau	USB
United States Capitol Police	USCP or Department

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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On January 6, 2021, a physical breach of U.S. Capitol Building security occurred during a Joint Session of Congress to certify the Electoral College vote. See Appendix A for the United States Capitol Police's (USCP or Department) official timeline of events leading up to and during the physical security breach.

In accordance with our statutory authority Public Law (P.L.) 109-55, the USCP Office of Inspector General (OIG) began a review of the events surrounding the takeover of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Our objectives for this review were to determine if the Department (1) established adequate measures for ensuring the safety and security of the Capitol Complex as well as Members of Congress, (2) established adequate internal controls and processes for ensuring compliance with Department policies, and (3) complied with applicable policies and procedures as well as applicable laws and regulations. The scope included controls, processes, and operations surrounding the security measures prior to the planned demonstrations and response during the takeover of the Capitol building.

We produced this flash report to communicate deficiencies with the Department's Civil Disturbance Unit (CDU) and intelligence operations. As part of our on-going work, OIG also conducted a follow-up analysis of the Department's implementation of recommendations contained in *Follow-up Analysis of the United States Capitol Police Intelligence Analysis Division*, Investigative Number 2018-I-0008, dated March 2019, to confirm the Department took the corrective actions in implementing the recommendations.

USCP did not have adequate policies and procedures for CDU defining its responsibilities, duties, composition, equipment, and training. CDU was operating at a decreased level of readiness as a result of a lack of standards for equipment, deficiencies noted from the events of January 6, 2021, a lapse in certain certifications, an inaccurate CDU roster, staffing concerns for the unit, quarterly audits that were not performed, and property inventories not in compliance with guidance.

The Department should implement detailed policies and procedures that address several aspects of CDU and its operations. Implementation of the Department's formal training guidance, requirements, and lesson plans is crucial to its mission. Formalizing and implementing equipment standards will provide officers with proper functioning equipment. Additionally, the Department should require that all types of weapon systems classified as less lethal are staged prior to large events as well as ensure that additional CDU Grenadiers are trained and certified.

Ensuring that the Department conducts periodic safety inspections would prevent expired munitions from being deployed and used. Also, a formal process is needed for management within CDU to ensure that when munitions do expire they are exchanged appropriately with the Property and Asset Management Division for proper disposal in a timely manner. Further, USCP should store its riot shields in the proper temperature-stable climate to prevent compromise of the riot shield's life span.

USCP Directive 2055.001, *Specialty Pay Program*, effective August 1, 2019, states that “the Chief of Police is authorized to establish and determine positions within the USCP as specialty assignments or requiring certain proficiencies eligible for additional compensation.” Exploring options for incentivizing the CDU Program would go a long way toward increasing participation because of its hazardous nature. As well, holding management accountable for incomplete CDU audits would enforce controls.

Based on our follow-up analysis, a condition identified in two previous reports, the Department's failure to update and document evaluations of its intelligence priorities, reemerged. We also identified intelligence related deficiencies with the Department's organizational structure, training, professional standards, internal controls, and capability to effectively collect, process, and disseminate intelligence information.

To increase the efficiency of its intelligence resources, the Department should consider reorganizing its intelligence functions into a single intelligence bureau. A formal Intelligence Training Program is a must, otherwise the Department cannot ensure the proper training of its intelligence employees or ensure that they are up to date on policies and procedures related to Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division (IICD) personnel duties. Furthermore, implementing additional formal guidance that applies to USCP's collection, processing, and reporting of information would improve its ability to effectively disseminate intelligence throughout the Department. Lastly, the Department should address gaps in meeting the intelligence needs of its operational stakeholders; the lack of training, certification, or professional standards for its intelligence analysts; and determine the necessary staffing, security clearances, and technology IICD needs to accomplish its mission. See Appendix B for a complete list of recommendations.

This is the second in a series of flash reports OIG is producing as part of its ongoing review of the events surrounding the takeover of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Therefore, we may still perform additional, in-depth work related to those areas during our review. We anticipate that our next flash report will focus on threat assessment and counter-surveillance.

## **BACKGROUND**

On January 6, 2021, a physical breach of U.S. Capitol security occurred during a Joint Session of Congress to certify the Electoral College vote. See Appendix A for the United States Capitol

Police's (USCP or Department) official timeline of events leading up to and during the physical security breach.

The Department's Protective Services Bureau (PSB) and Security Services Bureau (SSB) are two operational bureaus that report to the Assistant Chief of Police for Protective and Intelligence Operations. According to PoliceNet,<sup>1</sup> PSB's mission is to "provide safety and security to the Capitol, Members of Congress, Officers of Congress, and their immediate family." PSB has a Dignitary Protection Division (DPD), Investigations Division (ID), and Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division (IICD).

The PSB Investigations Division has three sections: the Criminal Investigations Section, the Threat Assessment Section (TAS), and the Intelligence Operations Section (IOS).

PoliceNet states that IOS:

- Provides overt and covert patrol of the Congressional Community to identify and disrupt individuals or groups intent on engaging in illegal activity directed at the Congressional Community and its legislative process.
- Provides an investigative response to identified or reported suspicious activity to determine any nexus to terrorism or other criminal activity.
- Conducts protective intelligence operations to support Department operations related to Member Protection, Threat Assessment, and Intelligence Collection.
- Coordinates law enforcement operations with local, state and federal law enforcement agencies to support Congressional events and/or serve as a liaison for a wide spectrum of issues that impact USCP interests.

PoliceNet states that IICD is responsible for:

- Coordinating with the intelligence and law enforcement community at the federal, state, local, and tribal levels to increase the collection and sharing of intelligence information.
- Maximizing the collection and analysis of all source information and intelligence.
- Identifying potential threats, from both domestic and foreign entities or groups, to the federal Legislative Branch, statutory protectees, Congressional facilities, Congressional employees, and the visiting public.
- Briefing and advising the USCP Executive Team, Executive Management Team, Senior Management Team, Capitol Police Board, and other members of the Department regarding emerging tactics and threats posed by various terrorist groups or individuals.

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<sup>1</sup> PoliceNet is the Department's intranet.

- Analyzing and disseminating products and reports on international and domestic events and incidents that are of interest to, or may impact, the U.S. Capitol, the Legislative process, and our statutory protectees.
- Serving as the principal point of contact within the Intelligence Community for all domestic and foreign intelligence (and threat-related matters) impacting the security of the U.S. Congress.
- Maintaining the USCP Intelligence Priority Framework, identifying gaps in information, and determining the most suitable entity or entities to collect the information.

According to PoliceNet, SSB is divided into a Physical Security Division and Technical Countermeasures Division (TCD). TCD provides Technical Security Countermeasures services for the legislative branch such as preventing technical eavesdropping and surveillance and providing Congress with a secure environment to discuss classified information.

The Department's Command and Coordination Bureau, Uniformed Services Bureau (USB), and Operational Services Bureau (OSB) are the three operational bureaus reporting to the Assistant Chief of Police for Uniformed Operations.

According to PoliceNet, USB is divided into the Capitol Division, Senate Division, House Division, and Library Division. USB's responsibilities include providing police services and security for the Capitol Building and Grounds, Senate Office Buildings, House Office Buildings, and Library of Congress.

PoliceNet states the mission of OSB is to "provide specialized and emergency response to support the Department's operational needs. This is accomplished in the form of specialized training, enforcement, coordination, planning, equipment, and response policy development." The divisions within OSB are the Hazardous Incident Response Division and the Special Operations Division (SOD).

SOD provides police services on the Capitol Grounds and other areas through motorized, bicycle, and foot patrols; canine operations; prisoner processing and transportation; drug and alcohol enforcement; crime scene search; and the Containment and Emergency Response Team (CERT). According to USCP Directive 1057.001, *Utilization of the Containment and Emergency Response Team (CERT)*, dated May 28, 2012, "the Department provides ready response for situations requiring special weapons and tactics by maintaining CERT."

The Department's Civil Disturbance Unit (CDU) is an *ad hoc* unit within SOD. According to draft *USCP Training Services Bureau In-Service Training Lesson Plan, Basic Civil Disturbance Unit Training*, dated February 2, 2021, CDU's mission is to "ensure the legislative functions of Congress are not disrupted by civil unrest or protest activity, while respecting the Civil Rights of all citizens."

In a previous report—the *Evaluation of the United States Capitol Police Division of Intelligence and Information Analysis*,<sup>2</sup> Report Number OIG-2016-04, dated March 2016—the Office of Inspector General (OIG) found IICD did not establish adequate internal controls and processes for ensuring the integrity of its program. We made six recommendations, which the Department agreed to implement. As of May 21, 2018, OIG had closed all six of the recommendations based on comments and documentation the Department provided.

In *Follow-up Analysis of the United States Capitol Police Intelligence Analysis Division*, Investigative Number 2018-I-0008, dated March 2019, OIG conducted a follow-up analysis of the Department’s implementation of recommendations contained in Report Number OIG-2016-04. Based on that analysis, two conditions identified in the previous report reemerged. Guidance related to on-call schedules was outdated and did not reflect IICD procedures. Additionally, the Department could not provide documentation supporting that it had a mechanism by which it could evaluate and modify its intelligence-related workforce activities. As a result, OIG issued new recommendations that the Department update its guidance for IICD on-call schedules and document evaluations of its intelligence priorities.

During the March 2019 follow-up work, OIG cited opportunities for the Department to improve its collection, analysis, and communication of intelligence. Improvements included increased staffing for IICD, security clearances for sworn and operational civilian employees, and USCP participation in a cyber-intelligence task force. OIG, therefore, issued new recommendations that the Department consider implementing the improvements.

## **OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY**

In accordance with our statutory authority Public Law (P.L.) 109-55, OIG began a review of the events surrounding the takeover of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Our objectives were to determine if the Department (1) established adequate measures for ensuring the safety and security of the U.S. Capitol Complex as well as Members of Congress, (2) established adequate internal controls and processes for ensuring compliance with Department policies, and (3) complied with applicable policies and procedures as well as applicable laws and regulations. The scope of this review included controls, processes, and operations surrounding the security measures prior to the planned demonstrations and response during the takeover of the U.S. Capitol. Based on this ongoing work, we produced this flash report to communicate deficiencies with the Department’s operational planning and intelligence for planned demonstrations on January 6, 2021.

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<sup>2</sup> USCP changed the name of the Division of Intelligence and Information Analysis to the Intelligence Analysis Division during a Department reorganization effective on January 1, 2018. USCP changed the name of the Intelligence Analysis Division to the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division during a Department reorganization effective on October 20, 2019.

Our work included interviews with Department officials. We also reviewed documentation related to CDU and intelligence operations. Additionally, we researched Department guidance related to CDU and intelligence. To research best practices, OIG consulted with a former Deputy Assistant Director for Special Intelligence and Information for the U.S. Secret Service, a former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Unit Chief, and reviewed guidance from the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Furthermore, we reviewed Report Numbers OIG-2016-04 and 2018-I-0008 as well as correspondence between OIG and USCP related to closure of the recommendations contained in Report Number 2018-I-0008.

This flash report is based on work OIG conducted in Washington, D.C., from January through March 2021. We did not conduct an audit, the objective of which would be the expression of an opinion on Department programs. Accordingly, we did not express such an opinion. Had we performed additional procedures, other issues might have come to our attention that we would have reported. This report is intended solely for the information and use of the Department, the Capitol Police Board, and the USCP Oversight Committees and should not be used by anyone other than the specified parties.

This is the second in a series of flash reports OIG will produce as part of our ongoing review of the events surrounding the takeover of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Therefore, we may still perform additional, in-depth work related to those areas during our review. We anticipate that our next flash report will focus on threat assessment and counter-surveillance.

## RESULTS

We produced this flash report to communicate deficiencies with the Department's CDU and intelligence operations. USCP did not have adequate policies and procedures for CDU that clearly defined its responsibilities, duties, composition, equipment, and training. CDU was operating at a decreased level of readiness as a result of a lack of standards for equipment, deficiencies noted from the events of January 6, 2021, a lapse in certain certifications, an inaccurate CDU roster, staffing concerns for the unit, quarterly audits that were not performed, and property inventories not in compliance with guidance.

As part of our on-going work, OIG conducted a follow-up analysis of the Department's implementation of recommendations contained in Report Number 2018-I-0008 to confirm the Department took the corrective actions in implementing the recommendations. Based on our analysis, a condition identified in two previous reports reemerged. We also identified intelligence-related deficiencies with the Department's organizational structure, training, professional standards, internal controls, and capability to effectively collect, process, and disseminate intelligence information.

## Civil Disturbance Unit Policies and Procedures

USCP did not have adequate policies and procedures for the CDU defining its responsibilities, duties, composition, equipment, and training.

### Lack of Formal Policies and Procedures for CDU

CDU did not have adequate formal policies or procedures clearly defining and communicating its mission, objectives, responsibilities, and roles. GAO *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*, dated September 2014, state, “Management communicates to personnel the policies and procedures so that personnel can implement the control activities for their assigned responsibilities.” Although there are two policies related to CDU, Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) OS-140-01, *Civil Disturbance Unit’s Quarterly Assessment of Assigned Personnel*, dated August 25, 2009, and SOP OS-140-02, *Use of the PepperBall System*,<sup>3</sup> dated October 30, 2019, the Department did not have established policies identifying areas such as the process for activating CDU, responsibilities of CDU officers, issuance of gear to CDU officers, tactics used when CDU is activated, and the command structure within CDU. Furthermore, USCP had unofficial policies that the Department did not formally establish as written directives or SOPs. For example, a Department official stated that officers receive training every 3 years in order to be eligible to carry a PR-24<sup>4</sup> baton due to manufacturer requirements; however, USCP has not established a formal directive or SOP actually stating the requirement.

Additionally, GAO’s *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government* also state, “Management periodically reviews policies, procedures, and related control activities for continued relevance and effectiveness in achieving the entity’s objectives or addressing related risks.” However, USCP did not have up-to-date policies and procedures related to CDU. Specifically, the Department last updated SOP OS-140-01 in August 2009. The memorandum included as part of CDU’s quarterly audit dated July 2020 states that “Due to the SOP being outdated and many changes to the entities that are now involved with maintaining training, equipment, certifications, etc., this SOP will be rescinded and a new SOP will be presented for Bureau review 30 days from the date of this Quarterly Review.” As of March 2021, the Department had not updated the SOP. According to a CDU official, SOP OS-140-02 contains PepperBall training requirements that are outdated and no longer used by the Department.

The Department did not have adequate, formal procedures defining CDU’s roles and responsibilities. The SOPs in place were not current and CDU was following informal procedures. Because CDU is an *ad hoc* unit within SOD without dedicated full-time staffing,

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<sup>3</sup> The PepperBall System is a chemical agent delivery capability comprised of a PepperBall Launcher, air tank, hopper, and PepperBalls that are collectively utilized to deliver oleo capsicum and a small kinetic impact to a subject at a distance.

<sup>4</sup> The PR-24 is a 24-inch long side-handle police baton with a short side handle at a right angle to the shaft, about 6 inches from one end.

administration of CDU is an ancillary responsibility. The lack of policies and procedures for CDU creates ambiguity and lack of accountability and coordination among the various offices and bureaus involved in the deployment of CDU and continuing to maintain such a structure could impede the effectiveness of CDU responses to future events requiring deployment. In fact, its outdated policies and procedures actually increased inefficiencies in the unit, resulting in the ineffective operation of the CDU Program.

### **Lack of Guidance for Civil Disturbance Unit Training**

The USCP's SOP OS-140-01, *Civil Disturbance Unit's Quarterly Assessment of Assigned Personnel*, dated August 25, 2009, states its purpose is "[t]o outline the procedures for assessing personnel assigned to the Civil Disturbance Unit (CDU) on a quarterly basis." Under the Procedures section, the SOP provides that each Recruit Officer Class (ROC) will receive a CDU Basic Class of Instruction prior to graduation from the Training Academy. Section 6e of the SOP requires a quarterly audit of all CDU personnel to include the "[s]tatus of each individual's last date of CDU refresher training."

Recruit officers participate in the Uniformed Police Training Program conducted by the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center located in Glynco, Georgia. While enrolled in the training program, recruits are introduced to CDU tactics and operations. In addition, USCP provides each recruit officer with 40 hours of Civil Disturbance training during their entry-level academy at Cheltenham, Maryland. A Department official stated that ROC training classes 205 through 210 did not complete the usual required 40 hours of training during the entry-level academy because of concerns with COVID-19 pandemic. CDU is rescheduling that training for those recruits.

Department officials stated that Civil Disturbance officers required to use hard protective gear are required to complete annual refresher training that ranges from 16 to 24 hours. The majority of officers, however, have not completed the training during the past few years. The refresher training is only provided to CDU officers required to use hard protective gear and consists of tactics, formations, and other functions. Additionally, the Department did not have formal training standards and lesson plans for its CDU refresher training.

Department officials stated that no leadership development training exists for CDU officers. Officials stated that sergeants and lieutenants train with CDU as a whole but separate individual instruction is not provided for responding to fluid situations and commanding platoons. Some responsibilities for CDU commanders include creating unit lines and moving unit formations effectively in response to a violent crowd. Assistant Chief of Police for Uniformed Operations Chad Thomas stated that the Department has plans for training CDU officers with the U.S. Secret Service at its Beltsville, Maryland training facility. However, as of the preparation of this report, CDU officials stated that had not yet occurred.

## Conclusions

USCP should have implemented detailed policies and procedures that addressed and identified the process for activating CDU, responsibilities of CDU officers, issuance of equipment to CDU officers, tactics utilized when CDU is activated, command structure within CDU, and any other paramount operational aspect. The Department should implement formal training guidance, requirements, and lesson plans pertaining to standards officers must meet to effectively complete their mission. Formalized lessons are important for ensuring that the aims and objectives of the course are being taught to the students. They also ensure that the planned lesson is understandable and allow for assessments to ensure a student's comprehension of the topic. Therefore, OIG makes the following recommendations.

**Recommendation 1:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police develop policies and procedures that identify and formalize the Civil Disturbance Unit's mission, objectives, roles, and responsibilities.

**Recommendation 2:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police update Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) OS-140-01, *Civil Disturbance Unit's Quarterly Assessment of Assigned Personnel*, dated August 25, 2009, SOP OS-140-02, *Use of the PepperBall System*, dated October 30, 2019, and SOP OS-100-71, *Deployment and Storage of FN 303 Less Lethal Impact Launcher*, dated August 14, 2013, to reflect current practices.

**Recommendation 3:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police develop policies and procedures that identify and formalize the Civil Disturbance Unit's training standards, requirements, and responsibilities.

**Recommendation 4:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police develop a Leadership Civil Disturbance Unit training program that focuses on command tactics and responsibilities.

## Civil Disturbance Unit Operational Readiness and Preparedness

*GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government; Documentation of Responsibilities through Policies*, GAO-14-704G, dated September 2014, state:

Effective management of an entity's workforce, its human capital, is essential to achieving results and an important part of internal control. Only when the right personnel for the job are on board and are provided the right training, tools, structure, incentives, and responsibilities is operational success possible.

CDU operated at a decreased level of readiness and preparedness because it failed to develop standards for CDU equipment. In addition, deficiencies OIG noted in the unit from the events of January 6, 2021, included incomplete certifications for less lethal weapon systems, an inaccurate roster, staffing concerns, quarterly audits not performed, and property inventories not in compliance with guidance.

### **Lack of Standards for Civil Disturbance Unit Equipment**

The Department lacked adequate guidance for determining standards and life cycles for equipment. During interviews with several Department officials, concerns were voiced pertaining to the life-cycle expectancy of CDU hard protective gear, riot shields, Nomex fire resistant suits, weapons classified as less lethal, and other CDU-related equipment. Department officials stated they followed British Standard 7971, *Protective Clothing and Equipment for Use in Violent Situations and Training*, dated 2001, but no Department policies or procedures were in place referencing that British standard for CDU equipment.

Interviews with the Property and Asset Management Division (PAMD) revealed the age of hard protective gear and Nomex fire resistant suits was at least 20 years or older. In addition, Department officials stated the hard protective gear is cumbersome, which decreases an officer's ability to maneuver and the Department should consider other options for replacing the current gear. The life cycle of Nomex fire resistant suits is based on the number of washes the clothing is subjected to, and the Department did not have any information pertaining to the deterioration of the material over time. Recently, the Department began procuring new helmets, but standards were not available pertaining to the life cycle or deterioration of helmets used prior to the planned procurement. PAMD had been procuring new riot shields in small quantities since 2018 and to its knowledge the outdated shields were destroyed. PAMD did not have records of the quantity of riot shields prior to 2018 because the shields were under CDU's purview and PAMD was not responsible for the tracking of riot shields prior to 2018. Department officials stated during the events of January 6, 2021, they witnessed riot shields shattering upon impact. Officials interviewed attributed the shattering to either improper storage or the age of the shield.

Riot shields are made of polycarbonate plastic, which is exceptionally strong and resistant to impact as long as proper handling and storage instructions are followed. Interviews with CDU officers informed us that USCP stores the riot shields in the CDU trailer as well as at various locations around the Capitol Complex. The CDU trailer is not a climate-controlled trailer. The manufacturer's leaflet pertaining to storage and operational use of the polycarbonate riot shields state that the shields should avoid exposure to petrol, diesel, solvents, chemicals, exhaust fumes, and direct sunlight and suggest storing the shields in temperature-stable conditions. A lifespan of around 2 to 3 years should be expected from normal operational use when stored in the suggested conditions. As previously cited, officers witnessed riot shields shattering upon impact. Without the proper storage of the shields in temperature-stable conditions, the polycarbonate is at risk for damage and failure when subjected to blows, impact, and penetration.

OIG inquired about the use of the 37mm single launcher less-lethal weapon during the January 6, 2021, takeover of the Capitol. A CDU official stated that the 37mm weapon was not used because of its age. The official stated that the weapon was obsolete and he was not comfortable using the weapon or asking any member within CDU to handle the weapon. The official also stated that he believed that using the weapon was a risk because of its age and questioned proper functionality. The official stated that he did not know the last time the 37mm single launcher less-lethal weapon had a safety inspection and preferred that the Department acquire a newer 37mm weapon for the unit.

### **Lack of Internal Controls for Civil Disturbance Unit Equipment**

The Department did not have adequate inventory standards and controls for the CDU armory. CDU maintains in its armory an inventory of less-lethal weapons and munitions that are deployed during crowd control events. CDU officials stated that the Department did not have controls in place for signing out munitions and weapons from the armory, for disposing of expired munitions, and for tracking of used munitions.

Interviews with officers in CDU revealed some munitions stocked in the armory were beyond their expiration date. Without proper internal controls, CDU was holding munitions that were beyond their expiration date until a management CDU official approved returning the expired munitions to PAMD for proper disposal. Because there was no formal process for periodic review, it could take months to process the expired munitions.

CDU officers stated that during its initial deployment of officers during the January 6, 2021, event, grenadier teams did not deploy with 40 mm weapons and munitions. After the crowd dispersed, however, and officers were preparing for a second wave of violence, the 40 mm weapons and munitions were deployed, but not used.

The expired munitions OIG reviewed included:

- 4230 – 40MM CS Smoke Projectile – an aluminum single projectile round emitting smoke and irritant agents via rapid burning. Located on the munition is a statement “shelf life 5 years after date of manufacture” and a sticker on the munition listed the manufacture date as “MFG 2014.”
- 4558 – 40MM Sting-Ball Smokeless .60CAL Rubber Pellet. Located on the munition is a statement “shelf life 5 years after date of manufacture” and a sticker on the munition listed the manufacture date as “MFG 2014.”
- 4640 – 40MM Riot OC Powder Muzzle Blast – an aluminum single projectile round. Located on the munition is a statement “shelf life 5 years after date of manufacture” and a sticker on the munition listed the manufacture date as “MFG 2014.”
- 6230 – Riot CS Smoke Grenade – emits smoke through multiple emission ports. Located on the munition is a statement “shelf life 5 years after date of manufacture” and a sticker on the munition listed the manufacture date as “MFG 2014.”

- 6230R – Riot CS Red Smoke Grenade – emits smoke through multiple emission ports. Located on the munition is a statement “shelf life 5 years after date of manufacture” and a sticker on the munition listed the manufacture date as “MFG 2014.”
- 6231 – Riot CS Smoke grenade Triple Phaser

Expired munitions listed on the CDU inventory sheet included:

- 4210 – 40MM Outdoor White Smoke Long Range Projectile that is an aluminum single projectile round emitting smoke and irritant agents via rapid burning. Located on the munition is a statement “shelf life 5 years after date of manufacture” and noted on the inventory list is the manufacture date of “MFG 2014.”
- 4553 – 40MM Sting-Ball Smokeless .31CAL Rubber Pellets. Located on the munition is a statement “shelf life 5 years of manufacture” and noted in the inventory list is a manufacture date of “MFG 2014.”
- 5230B – CS Baffled Riot CS Smoke Grenade designed for indoor use emitting irritant smoke through multiple rooms with a minimal risk of fire. Located on the munition is a statement “shelf life 5 years after date of manufacture” and noted on the inventory list is the manufacture date of “MFG 2014.”
- 6210 – White Smoke Canister Grenade used for obscuring tactical movement. Located on the munition is a statement “shelf life 5 years after date of manufacture” and noted on the inventory list is the manufacture date of “MFG 2012” and “MFG 2014.”
- 6340 – OC Vapor Grenade that delivers an invisible Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) vapor and renders an intense respiratory effect. Located on the munition is a statement “shelf life 5 years after date of manufacture” and noted on the inventory list is the manufacture date of “MFG 2012.”
- 9230 – CS Jet-Lite Rubber Ball Grenade that discharges a high volume of chemical agents through emission ports. Located on the munition is a statement “shelf life 5 years after date of manufacture” and noted on the inventory list is the manufacture date of “MFG 2014” and “MFG 2012.”

### **Deficiencies during the Events of January 6, 2021**

CDU did not utilize all available less-lethal weapon systems and did not stage less-lethal weapons with munitions prior to or during the day of January 6, 2021. Concerns were raised about CDU’s limited use of less-lethal weapon systems due to the events of January 6, 2021. Department officials stated heavier less-lethal weapons and corresponding munitions that included the 40mm grenade launcher, 37mm grenade launcher, and Sting Ball grenades were not used that day because of orders from leadership. The less-lethal weapons systems cited have the capability to disperse large crowds due to the use of a variety of munitions., Department officials on duty on January 6, 2021, stated the heavier less-lethal weapon systems may have enhanced CDU’s ability to push back the rioters due to its capabilities.

According to the *CDU Operational Plan for January 6, 2021 (CDU Plan)*, dated January 5, 2021 (Appendix C), CDU deployed eight less-lethal grenadiers. A Department official stated there are currently approximately 10 grenadiers within the CDU and the unit's less-lethal ability is hampered by its limited number of trained and certified grenadiers. CDU grenadiers are not attached to individual platoons and are individually assigned as their own group. A Department official stated that on January 6, 2021, while commanding a CDU platoon of hard protective gear officers, he was unable to summon grenadiers for support while fighting off the crowd. The official stated the use of weapons that fired Sting Ball pellets by the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia's (MPD) CDU were particularly effective in neutralizing and removing combative individuals.

Although the Department had a limited variety of Sting Ball munitions, it did not use them on January 6, 2021. The official interviewed stated the use of flashbangs by the Virginia State Police were effective in dispersing a violent crowd, but USCP does not utilize those types of munitions for crowd control.

The official stated the use of flashbangs by the Virginia State Police and weapons that fired Sting Ball pellets by the MPD CDU were particularly effective in neutralizing and removing combative individuals.

Department officials stated officers experienced supply constraints during the events of January 6, 2021. Many officers expelled their less-lethal OC—commonly referred to as pepper spray—and required replenishment. Civilian employees from PAMD were deployed to deliver OC spray to officers but were hindered by the aggressive crowd. Fearing for their safety, the civilian employees departed their vehicle, secured the vehicle south of the Capitol building, and retreated to the nearest group of MPD and USCP officers. Those civilians were not escorted by armed officers. Afterward, USCP Dispatch requested a supply of bottled water to decontaminate officers from chemical irritants delivered by the same civilian employees. No pre-staged decontamination sites were available for officers to retreat and decontaminate themselves.

On January 6th, 2021, Department riot shields were stationed on a deployment bus away from one of the CDU platoons. When the crowd became unruly, that CDU platoon attempted to access the bus to distribute the shields but were unable because the door was locked. This particular CDU platoon was consequently required to respond to the crowd without the protection of their riot shields.

### **PepperBall Operator Certification Not Performed on a Semi-Annual Basis**

PepperBall grenadiers did not complete semi-annual training and qualification on the PepperBall system throughout 2018 and 2020, as SOP OS-140-02, *Use of PepperBall System*, dated October 30, 2019, requires. SOP No. OS-140-02 states:

Training: 1. All sworn employees who successfully complete PepperBall training to include a written test and a qualification course may handle, carry, and deploy the system. Trained sworn

employees will be referred to as *grenadiers*. 2. Grenadiers must complete a semi-annual training and qualification in order to maintain certification on the PepperBall System.

The Department had 10 PepperBall grenadiers as of January 6, 2021. Of those 10 grenadiers, zero received the required semiannual training. The Department did provide evidence that each grenadier received PepperBall training once during the 3-year period OIG tested. A Department official stated that the SOP was out of date and the semi-annual certification was no longer performed because SOP OS-140-02 is under revision to reflect manufacture recommendations of certification every 2 years. Prior to the training Department grenadiers received in 2020, it had been more than 2 years since any of the grenadiers received training.

The Department did not monitor training to ensure that grenadiers received training in compliance with SOP OS-140-02 or within the frequency the manufacturers recommended. Because it did not provide the training required for personnel, the Department could not ensure that its grenadiers were properly trained and up to date on the most current equipment and procedures related to the duties of a PepperBall grenadier.

### **Inaccurate CDU Roster**

Interviews with USCP officials revealed that the USCP consists of approximately 1,900 sworn officers. Roughly 1,200 of those officers are members of USB. The Department initially only had a “soft” CDU—in place since 1996 or earlier. The soft CDU provided directions and monitored peaceful crowds while the “hard” CDU was designed to control violent crowds. In about 2015, USCP added a hard CDU force consisting of officers equipped with a gas mask, helmet, shield, PR-24 baton, and hard armor to protect the chest, legs, and arms. Under that concept, the soft CDU officers were only equipped with their official soft uniforms to include regular duty batons. Every officer in the Uniformed Services Division is a part of the CDU, either the soft or hard component. USCP reported that as of January 6, 2021, it had 187 officers in its hard CDU.

The Department did not have an accurate listing of which employees were in CDU. GAO *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government* state, “Management should use quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives.” The Department provided a listing of the 187 CDU employees as of January 6, 2021, however, two of the employees on the list separated from the Department prior to January 6, 2021. One of the employees separated on October 24, 2020, and the other employee on December 27, 2020. Additionally, one of the sergeants on CDU’s listing sent an email on December 11, 2020, in which he copied the Assistant Commander of CDU stating he turned in his CDU equipment and was no longer in CDU. While the list of CDU employees provided by the Department contained 187 employees, Acting Chief of Police Yogananda D. Pittman testified before the House Appropriation Committee that 276 CDU officers were active on January 6, 2021.

Additionally, CDU’s listing of PepperBall grenadiers was also not accurate. The Department provided a listing of PepperBall grenadiers that included 12 individuals. As part of the

Department's response to OIG follow-up inquires, the Department later responded that two of the individuals identified as PepperBall grenadiers were not currently grenadiers.

### **CDU Staffing Concerns**

Department officials stated that many officers view the CDU as an unwanted responsibility and would proceed to obtain shaving waivers or answer incorrectly on the online respirator survey to deter being assigned to a hard-gearcd CDU detail. All hard-gearcd CDU members are required the ability to utilize a respirator. In order for an effective and adequate seal with a respirator, an individual must be free of facial hair between the skin and sealing surface. In addition, the hard-gearcd CDU has a reputation as an undesired assignment. Such a reputation of that type of culture within the Department certainly decreases CDU's operational readiness. As previously stated, the unit operates without dedicated full-time staffing. The composition of CDU mainly comprises members assigned to USB. CDU members from USB are alleviated from their assignments to serve in the CDU.

### **CDU Quarterly Audits not Appropriately Performed**

The Department did not consistently perform complete quarterly audits of CDU personnel as SOP OS-140-01, *Civil Disturbance Unit's Quarterly Assessment of Assigned Personnel*, dated August 25, 2009, requires. SOP OS-140-01 states,

“Ensure a quarterly audit is conducted of all CDU personnel assigned to the Division. CDU Audits are to commence each year on October 1st, January 1st, April 1st, and July 1st. Audits are to be completed by the last day of each of these months and forwarded to the CDU Commander for quarterly review and assessment. Audits are to include the following: a. CDU assigned manpower identified via platoon rosters. See attachment B. b. Status of each individual's medical evaluation/examination. c. Status of each individual's Respirator FIT test. d. Status of each individual's Respirator use training. e. Status of each individual's last date of CDU refresher training. f. Status of each individual's PR-24 certification. g. Status of each individual's *oleoresin capsicum* pepper spray. h. Status of any outstanding personnel/equipment issues.”

The Department could not provide any of the six quarterly audit reports that OIG requested; however, they did provide one audit report for a quarter that was not requested. That audit report was for the period ending July 2020 and missing numerous required elements. For example, the report did not include the status of the individual's respirator use training, the last date of CDU refresher training, the status of each individual's PR-24 certification, the status of each individual's pepper spray, or CDU assigned manpower identified by platoon rosters.

CDU liaisons did not ensure quarterly audits were performed as SOP OS-140-01 requires. Without CDU properly completing quarterly audits, the Department could not ensure that CDU officers were properly prepared for events that require a response from the CDU.

## **CDU Property Inventories Not in Compliance with Directive**

The Department did not have an effective process in place for ensuring that CDU complied with property inventory and reconciliation procedures outlined in USCP Directive 2093.001, *Property and Asset Management* dated October 2, 2017. USCP Directive 2093.001 requires completion of a physical inventory annually and further requires reconciliation of any discrepancies noted on the physical inventory. Although the policy specifies an annual inventory requirement, a Department official stated that starting in FY 2018, PAMD conducted semi-annual inventories of the CDU munitions. During OIG testing of CDU inventory and reconciliations performed during 2018 through 2020, we noted that three of the semi-annual inventories had unresolved discrepancies. We also noted that one inventory was signed; however, there was no indication that the inventory or reconciliation procedures were performed and the Department could not confirm.

The Department did not have an effective process in place for complying with Directive 2093.001 regarding CDU physical inventories and reconciliations. Department officials stated that PAMD assumed control of the CDU bunker and munitions in 2016 and 2017. A CDU sergeant informed PAMD that discrepancies in counts during that time period were the result of items CDU provided to CERT. CDU and CERT did not maintain appropriate records, and PAMD could not verify the transfers. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2019, PAMD began completing Form CP-564s, *Missing/Damaged/Condemned/Clothing and Equipment*, for missing items; however, final updated inventory listings were not sent to the CDU Commander. Additionally, an FY 2018 inventory was signed by CDU officials without an indication the inventory or reconciliation procedures were performed. PAMD could not locate the working papers for this inventory, and the Range Inventory Management Specialist conducting the inventory had since left the Department and could not be reached. Without a process for ensuring that CDU inventory and reconciliation procedures were followed, the Department risked non-compliance with Directive 2053.003, which could have not only resulted in assets not being accounted for and available when and where they were needed but also misappropriation of assets, including munitions.

## **Conclusions**

USCP should formalize and implement standards for CDU equipment that would provide officers with equipment that functioned properly. Additionally, the Department should require that all types of less-lethal weapon systems are staged prior to large crowd events as well as train and certify additional CDU grenadiers.

The Department should update procedures relating to the use of the PepperBall system and create procedures for implementing inventory controls within the armory, including a Check In/Out Log Book for weapons and munitions approved by a supervisor. In addition, safety inspections for preventing deployment and utilization of expired munitions should be conducted regularly. A formal process is also needed for management within CDU to approve the exchange of

expired munitions to PAMD for proper disposal in a timely manner. To prevent compromise of the riot shield's life span, riot shields should be stored based on the recommendations of the manufacturer.

The Department should either retire the 37mm less-lethal weapon system or update the system to meet current standards. As of March 2021, the 37mm less-lethal weapon system was included in the certification program for weapon systems designated as heavy less-lethal systems.

The Department should update procedures for ensuring an accurate CDU list of employees. USCP Directive 2055.001, *Specialty Pay Program*, effective August 1, 2019, states "the Chief of Police is authorized to establish and determine positions within the USCP as specialty assignments or requiring certain proficiencies eligible for additional compensation." USCP should explore options for incentivizing the CDU Program to increase participation due to its hazardous nature. The Department should hold parties accountable for incomplete CDU audits. Additionally, USCP must ensure that Directive 2053.003 is followed. Therefore, OIG makes the following recommendations:

**Recommendation 5:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police develop policies and procedures for Civil Disturbance Unit equipment standards and life-cycle management.

**Recommendation 6:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police store riot shields in a temperature-stable area with conditions designed to maximize the life of the shield, and the Civil Disturbance Unit should create a process for reporting when the shields are not stored within the guidelines of the manufacturer such as but not limited to direct sunlight, temperature-stable environment and when they have been exposed to petrol, diesel, solvents, and exhaust fumes.

**Recommendation 7:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police develop policies and procedures for outlining the deploying and/or staging all available types of less-lethal weapon systems during Civil Disturbance Unit operations.

**Recommendation 8:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police increase its number of less-lethal weapon systems and explore additional less lethal options.

**Recommendation 9:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police train and certify additional Civil Disturbance Unit grenadiers.

**Recommendation 10:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police prepare and stage necessary operational equipment for events.

**Recommendation 11:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police immediately update SOP No. OS-140-02, *Use of PepperBall System*, dated

October 30, 2019, to reflect current manufacturer recommendations and requirements and ensure that grenadiers received the training within the frequency specified in the updated policy.

**Recommendation 12:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police develop a Standard Operating Procedure that identifies and formalizes the roles, responsibilities, and reporting requirements for employee listings for the Civil Disturbance Unit.

**Recommendation 13:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police explore incentivizing the Civil Disturbance Unit program.

**Recommendation 14:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police ensure that Civil Disturbance Unit liaisons are accountable for properly completing the Civil Disturbance Unit audit each quarter and providing it to the Commander of the Civil Disturbance Unit.

**Recommendation 15:** We recommend the United States Capitol Police implement a process that will ensure that procedures for Civil Disturbance Unit inventory and reconciliation, required by Directive 2053.003, *Property and Asset Management*, dated October 2, 2017, are fully functioning and operating as required. Specifically, the Civil Disturbance Unit must conduct physical inventories annually, perform reconciliations, resolve discrepancies, and provide an updated listing to the property custodian.

**Recommendation 16:** We recommend the United States Capitol Police implement an inventory control for the armory and also recommend a Check-In/Out Log Book that requires approval by a supervisor for munitions and weapons. A safety inspection check performed during a check-out would prevent the Civil Disturbance Unit from deploying expired munitions.

**Recommendation 17:** We recommend the United States Capitol Police either acquire an updated version of the 37mm less-lethal weapon or retire the weapon entirely because the current training for the 37mm weapon system is included in the certification process grenade launcher type weapon systems.

## **Intelligence**

As part of our on-going work, OIG conducted a follow-up analysis of the Department's implementation of recommendations contained in Report Number 2018-I-0008 to confirm the Department took the corrective actions in implementing the recommendations. Based on our follow-up, the same condition was identified as in two previous reports. We also identified

intelligence-related deficiencies with the Department's organizational structure, training, professional standards, internal controls, and capability to effectively collect, process, and disseminate intelligence information

### **Status of Previous Recommendations**

In a previous report, Report Number OIG-2016-04, IICD did not establish adequate internal controls and processes for ensuring the integrity of its program. OIG made six recommendations, which the Department agreed to implement. As of May 21, 2018, OIG had closed all six of the recommendations based on comments and documentation the Department provided. In Report Number 2018-I-0008, dated March 2019, OIG conducted a follow-up analysis of the Department's implementation of recommendations contained in Report Number OIG-2016-04. Based on that follow-up work, two conditions identified in the previous report reemerged. Guidance related to on-call schedules was outdated and did not reflect IICD procedures. Additionally, the Department could not provide documentation supporting that it had a mechanism by which it could evaluate and modify its intelligence-related workforce activities. As a result, OIG issued new recommendations that the Department update its guidance for IICD on-call schedules and document evaluations of its intelligence priorities.

During that follow-up work, opportunities for the Department to improve its collection, analysis, and communication of intelligence came to our attention. Improvements included increased staffing for IICD, security clearances for sworn and operational civilian employees, and USCP participation in a cyber-intelligence task force. OIG, therefore, issued new recommendations that the Department consider implementing the improvements. In Report Number 2018-I-0008, OIG made five recommendations. As of May 3, 2019, OIG had closed all five of the recommendations based on comments and documentation the Department provided.

As part of our on-going work, OIG conducted a follow-up analysis of the Department's implementation of recommendations contained in Report Number 2018-I-0008 to confirm the Department took the corrective actions in implementing the recommendations. Based on our follow-up, a condition identified in the previous two reports reemerged. See the prior recommendations along with their status below:

**Previous Recommendation 1: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police revise Standard Operating Procedure PS-602-02 to reflect any changes in processes for the Intelligence Analysis Division.**

According to Department responses to recommendations in Report Number 2018-I-0008, the Department published and implemented revised SOP PS-602-02, *On-Call Intelligence Research Specialist Responsibilities and Duties*, on April 11, 2019, to reflect the current on-call procedures within IICD.

We obtained and reviewed SOP PS-602-02. We requested documentation to support that IICD distributed the monthly on-call schedule for January 2021 to the PSB Commander, the Command and Coordination Bureau Commander, the DPD Commander, and the ID Commander, as SOP PS-602-02 requires. A Department official responded that because IICD was operating on an enhanced 24/7 posture, there was no overnight gap in coverage necessitating an on-call analyst. Therefore, an on-call schedule was not distributed. The IICD Assistant Director stated that IICD had been operating in a 24/7 posture since November 2020 and had not yet determined whether it was a permanent change.

**Previous Recommendation 2: We recommend that the Intelligence Analysis Division document its periodic evaluations of the United States Capitol Police Intelligence Priorities Framework.**

According to Department responses to recommendations in Report Number 2018-I-0008, as of May 1, 2019, it had updated its Intelligence Priorities Framework (IPF) for fiscal year 2019 and documentation of the most recent IPF quarterly review dated March 20, 2019, had been updated as well.

The Department did not update the IPF on an annual basis or review and evaluate the IPF on a quarterly basis as SOP No. PS-602-11 *Intelligence Priorities Framework* dated February 11, 2018, requires. The SOP states that the Director must “[r]enew the IPF on an annual basis, and submit the updated version for approval from the Chief of Police.” The Department stated that the final approved IPF for fiscal year 2020 did not exist.

The SOP additionally states that the Director must “[r]eview and evaluate the IPF on a quarterly basis and provide a report of the evaluation to the PSB Commander.” The Department stated that none of the quarterly evaluations of the IPF existed for 2018 through 2020.

IICD did not renew the IPF annually or review it quarterly as the SOP requires. Without an IPF that is approved by the Chief of Police on an annual basis and reviewed quarterly, IICDs intelligence priorities may be outdated or not match the priorities of the Department’s leadership. See new recommendation.

**Previous Recommendation 3: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police consider increasing Intelligence Analysis Division staffing to a level that would allow it to achieve operations for 24 hours a day and 7 days a week.**

According to Department responses to recommendations in Report Number 2018-I-0008, as of May 1, 2019, the Department had considered increasing its staffing level within IICD to allow for a 24/7 operation and submitted a gap analysis during the Fiscal Year 2021 Force Development Process for consideration. The responses stated that at that time, IICD would continue to operate as is with available personnel on-call during the weekend.

As previously noted, the IICD Assistant Director stated that IICD had been operating in a 24/7 posture since November 2020 and IICD had not yet determined whether it was a permanent change or not.

**Previous Recommendation 4: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police consider requiring that new sworn recruits and operational civilian employees obtain a security clearance and provide current employees the opportunity to obtain a security clearance.**

According to Department responses to recommendations in Report Number 2018-I-0008, as of May 1, 2019, the Department agreed with the recommendation but at that time would not be pursuing security clearances for all employees. The responses stated that the Department would engage counsel and PSB in the future to develop protocols in establishing a Secret-level clearance program.

In our previous report, *Review of the Events Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report: Operational Planning and Intelligence*, Investigative Number: 2021-I-0003-A, dated February 2021, OIG recommended that in order to disseminate the maximum amount of real-time, up-to-date intelligence to its personnel, the Department should require that its sworn and operational civilian employees obtain a Top Secret clearance and require that administrative civilian employees obtain a minimum of a Secret clearance.

**Previous Recommendation 5: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police consider participating in a cyber-intelligence task force.**

According to Department responses to recommendations in Report Number 2018-I-0008, as of May 1, 2019, the Department had considered this recommendation and although IICD did not maintain any Task Force Officers (TFOs) on a specialized cyber-intelligence task force, ID maintained two full-time sworn TFOs on task forces that specialize in cyber-centric investigations and intelligence. The responses stated one TFO from TAS was embedded with the U.S. Secret Service Electronic Crimes Task Force and another TFO from the ID Criminal Investigations Section was embedded with the FBI Cyber-Crimes Task Force.

OIG inquired with the IICD Assistant Director whether IICD receives benefit from the U.S. Secret Service Electronic Crimes Task Force and FBI Cyber-Crimes Task Force TFOs. The Assistant Director stated that IICD does benefit from those taskforces and receives useful information from those partners daily and as needed.

## **Organizational Structure**

In Report Number OIG-2016-04, OIG found USCP's intelligence framework and component analysis planning process did not function as intended. Specifically, the Department had decentralized intelligence resources throughout several USCP Bureaus and Divisions. While the

responsibilities of IICD are primarily intelligence related, other divisions within the Department regularly interacted with or could have benefited from increased interaction with IICD on intelligence-related matters. To increase the efficiency of its intelligence resources, we stated the Department should consider reorganizing those redundant functions into a single intelligence bureau.

TAS and IOS<sup>5</sup> regularly interact with IICD on intelligence-related matters. TAS investigates threats to Congress and Directions of Interest. IICD refers threats and Directions of Interest to TAS and supports TAS with social media research. IOS conducts both surveillance detection and counter-surveillance activities as well as investigates suspicious activity for any nexus to terrorism. IOS is the “boots on the ground” during demonstrations. During demonstrations, IOS agents report to IICD what they are seeing in the field, and IICD pushes their reports along with what is being generated on social media out to Department commanders. Additionally, IICD, TAS, and IOS all have personnel assigned to task forces with intelligence-related responsibilities. Furthermore, TAS and IOS provide the personnel for the protective intelligence teams supporting leadership details and large congressional delegations.

In Report Number OIG-2016-04, OIG also found TCD within SSB could have benefited from increased interaction with IICD on intelligence-related matters. TCD provides technical countermeasures for the Capitol Complex and the legislative branch, including congressional offices, congressional leadership, sensitive committees, and any Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities on the Complex. TCD searches for listening devices, devices planted in computers or telephones, and devices planted in phone lines as well as cameras. TCD also performs vehicle searches for the congressional leadership. An SSB official stated it would be helpful if TCD could receive technical countermeasures intelligence information directly from the intelligence community. Reorganization and consolidation of these intelligence elements would increase the efficiency of its intelligence resources.

In a July 10, 2015, memorandum approved by the Capitol Police Board, the Department proposed separating IICD from PSB and creating a new Bureau/Office-level element entitled the Office of Intelligence Analysis. The memorandum stated that the reorganization would allow for more robust intelligence collection and analysis, enhance interconnectivity with the Intelligence Community, and develop more synergy throughout the Department. The Department did not, however, include all intelligence-related elements within the proposed USCP reorganization or implement the change as part of reorganizations effective January 1, 2018, or October 20, 2019. In its reorganization effective January 1, 2018, USCP changed the name of the Division of Intelligence and Information Analysis to the Intelligence Analysis Division. In its reorganization effective October 20, 2019, USCP realigned the PSB and SSB to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Police for Protective and Intelligence Operations and changed the name of the Intelligence Analysis Division to the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division.

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<sup>5</sup> Intelligence Section - Investigations was a past name for the Intelligence Operations Section.

Integrating all of its intelligence-related elements such as the TAS, IOS, as well as TCD, into a single bureau would achieve greater collaboration and utilization of its intelligence resources.

### **Intelligence Training Program Not Established**

The IICD Commander did not maintain an intelligence training program for all IICD employees, as SOP PS-602-03, *Intelligence Analysis Division Commander Responsibilities*, dated August 11, 2019, requires. SOP PS-602-03 states: “The Commander will be responsible for all activities of the IAD, to include the following: Review and maintain the Intelligence Training Program for all IAD employees.” During our testing, we requested support demonstrating that the IICD Commander reviewed and maintained the Intelligence Training Program for 2018 – 2020 as SOP PS-602-03 requires. The Department responded stating that prior to the Assistant Director and Director of IICD coming onboard in late October and early November 2020, respectively, IICD did not have a codified, formal intelligence training program.

Without a formally established Intelligence Training Program, the Department cannot ensure the proper training of all intelligence employees and ensure that they are up to date on the most recent policies and procedures related to IICD personnel duties.

### **Lack of Guidance for Intelligence Dissemination**

USCP did not clearly document channels for the distribution of intelligence up to the Chief of Police, down to the line officers, and across departmental entities. We reviewed Department guidance related to intelligence for information related to intelligence sharing. Although, some policies include vague language regarding the communication of information throughout the Department, there is no clear channel for the distribution of intelligence information up to the Chief and down to the line officers and across departmental entities. The IICD Director described guidance related to IICD information sharing as “very ambiguous.” For example, SOP PS-602-03 states that the IICD Commander is responsible for “[e]nsuring all intelligence information is collected, processed, and disseminated in the most efficient manner possible.” Clearly documented channels for sharing intelligence within USCP would enhance the Department’s ability to disseminate information efficiently and effectively.

### **Lack of Comprehensive Open Source Policies and Procedures**

IICD lacks comprehensive policies and procedures related to their open source intelligence gathering efforts. GAO’s *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government* state, “Management documents in policies for each unit its responsibility for an operational process’s objectives and related risks, and control activity design, implementation, and operating effectiveness.” IICD prepared a draft SOP titled *Open Source Guidance for Protest Tracking and Communication*. The purpose of the draft SOP was to create procedures for the tracking and reporting of protests/demonstrations impacting or having the potential to impact interests on Capitol Hill.

The Department has not reviewed and updated IICD's policies to ensure they incorporate prevailing IICD practices. Without official policies and procedures related to open source intelligence, IICD analysts may not be aware of the proper methods of conducting open source intelligence work. Additionally, the Department risks failing to identify and appropriately communicate critical open source intelligence.

### **Lack of Comprehensive Reporting**

IICD did not always include past reporting into later assessments. IICD Special Event Assessment 21-A-0468 v.3, *Joint Session of Congress – Electoral College Vote Certification*, dated January 3, 2021 (Appendix D), was IICD's final special event assessment for planned events on January 6, 2021. However, IICD did not directly incorporate or reference past IICD reporting. Through interviews with Department officials, another IICD report related to January 6, 2021, came to our attention. The report, *Investigative Research and Analysis Report*, IICD Case #: 21-TD-159, dated December 21, 2020, states that on December 21, 2020, the Department of Homeland Security notified the Department of a blog referencing tunnels on U.S. Capitol grounds used by Members of Congress and research of the website identified four "threads/blog topics containing comments of concern." The report identifies the website as <https://thedonald.win> and includes several pages of comments posted to the website. OIG attached the report in its entirety in Appendix E.

In our previous report, Investigative Number 2021-I-0003-A, we reported that on January 5, 2021, at approximately 7 p.m. to 8 p.m., a USCP task force agent embedded with the FBI emailed IOS a memorandum from the FBI Norfolk Division providing additional details regarding the January 6, 2021, event. OIG attached the memorandum in its entirety in Appendix F. An ID official stated that the FBI Norfolk memorandum contained similar information to what the Department had already been hearing and cited *Investigative Research and Analysis Report*, IICD Case #: 21-TD-159, as evidence.

The IICD Assistant Director stated they didn't know if IICD included specifics of IICD Case #: 21-TD-159 in future reporting. The IICD Assistant Director recalled discussions with PSB officials about the tunnels and the context of the report and stated that IICD mentioned "donald.win" in its special event assessment but didn't mention tunnels. The IICD Assistant Director thought that may be because they were not contemplating anyone breaking into the tunnels. The IICD Assistant Director stated that the special event assessment did mention Congress was going to be targeted and it would be dangerous for law enforcement. Our review of Special Event Assessment 21-A-0468 v.3, January 3, 2020, revealed no references to <https://thedonald.win> or IICD Case #: 21-TD-159 and neither of them are listed as a source. Because the Department plans event security and relies on IICD documents for event intelligence, IICD analytical statements or reporting should be carried uniformly from one IICD document to another.

## Limited Consideration of Operational Impact

In our previous report, Investigative Number 2021-I-0003-A, we note media reports revealed that some USCP officers believed the Department failed to provide them with adequate intelligence leading up to the events that occurred on January 6, 2021. Our review of IICD reports revealed that they include information on Capitol Hill events to include permits, possible attendee numbers, member activities, street closures, event history or purpose and may include an analyst assessment of those events based on IICD sourcing. While the information is beneficial to the reader, the reports contain pages of non-analytical reporting about events without operational impact and analytical assessment. For example, IICD Special Event Assessment 21-A-0468 v.3 devotes all or parts of three pages to listing traffic cuts and street closures. Less emphasis on IICD reporting of what events will occur on Capitol Hill to include corresponding street closures, and increased emphasis on threat analysis, assessments of trends, threat aggregation and investigation; all through the lens of operational outcomes and member security, would enhance the quality of the information that USCP provides to its officers.

## Inconsistent Reporting

IICD analyst assessments and document summaries did not always match. In IICD Special Event Assessment 21-A-0468 v.3, the analyst assessments and IICD Overall Analysis are not carried forward into the document summary located on the first page of the assessment titled “Bottom Line Up Front” (BLUF). IICD Special Event Assessment 21-A-0468 v.3 contains a BLUF that states:

The Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division is currently tracking several protests slated to take place on Capitol grounds and elsewhere in Washington, DC, on January [sic] 5, 2021, and January 6, 2021, and some protesters have indicated they plan to be armed. There is also indication that white supremacist groups may be attending the protests.

However, the “IICD Overall Analysis” section located on the thirteenth page of the assessment contains more alarming language and states:

Due to the tense political environment following the 2020 election, the threat of disruptive actions or violence cannot be ruled out. **Supporters of the current president see January 6, 2021, as the last opportunity to overturn the results of the presidential election. This sense of desperation and disappointment may lead to more of an incentive to become violent.** [Emphasis Added] Unlike previous post-election protests, the targets of the pro-Trump supporters are not necessarily the counter-protesters as they were previously, but rather **Congress itself is the target on the 6th.** [Emphasis Added] As outlined above, there has been a **worrisome call for protesters to come to these events armed and there is the possibility that protesters may be inclined to become violent.** [Emphasis Added] Further, unlike the events on November 14, 2020, and December 12, 2020, there are several more protests scheduled on January 6, 2021, and the majority of them will be on Capitol grounds. The two protests expected to be the largest of the day—the Women for America First protest at the Ellipse and the Stop the Steal protest in Areas 8 and 9—may draw thousands of participants and both have been promoted by President Trump himself. The Stop the Steal protest in particular does not have a permit, but several high profile speakers, including

Members of Congress are expected to speak at the event. This combined with **Stop the Steal's propensity to attract white supremacists, militia members, and others who actively promote violence, may lead to a significantly dangerous situation for law enforcement and the general public alike.** [Emphasis Added]

In IICD Special Event Assessment 21-A-0468 v.3, the BLUF does not adequately summarize the analyst's findings. The BLUF should align with IICD analyst comments. If a reader's belief is that the BLUF summarizes the document and does not read the document in its entirety, they could draw an inaccurate conclusion since the BLUF is not consistent with the rest of the document.

### **Intelligence Capabilities Need Improvement**

Our ongoing work revealed several areas USCP should address to improve the Department's capability to effectively collect, process, and disseminate intelligence information. The areas included gaps in meeting the intelligence needs of its operational stakeholders, lack of training, certification, or professional standards for intelligence analysts, staffing, security clearances, and technology. IICD intelligence products may not always meet the needs of its operational stakeholders. For example, a DPD official stated that the Department's intelligence gathering and dissemination process needed to work better for DPD. The official stated the process needed to be more streamlined and that IICD could better support DPD's mission with dedicated analysts, briefings, and daily products. A gap analysis would allow IICD to identify the needs of its operational stakeholders.

The Department did not establish training, certification, or professional standards for its intelligence analysts. Acting Assistant Chief of Police for Protective and Intelligence Operations Sean Gallagher stated IICD training was an ongoing issue and he and Acting Chief Pittman identified opportunities for improvement in 2019. Acting Assistant Chief Gallagher stated there were numerous discussions with the previous and current IICD Directors about training for IICD. Acting Assistant Chief Gallagher stated IICD and PSB in general, did not receive funding for analyst training, and as a result he and Acting Chief Pittman solicited other agencies to include the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), for gratis training. In addition, Acting Assistant Chief Gallagher stated he directed the previous and current IICD Directors to create on-boarding training for new analysts. Acting Assistant Chief Gallagher stated in early 2020, IICD identified additional training at other agencies including ODNI basic analyst trainings but, due to COVID-19 that training was canceled. Acting Assistant Chief Gallagher stated in addition to training, IICD analyst position descriptions were under review by the current Director and Assistant Director to align them with leadership expectations.

The IICD Director stated professional development for IICD staff was virtually nonexistent when they joined USCP. The IICD Director stated there appeared to be limited investment in human capital, with IICD personnel trying to find training opportunities on their own and training lacking a routine basis. The IICD Director stated it was a huge gap, and they have been

pushing people to attend training. The IICD Director stated IICD has asked for a training budget and will look at a training plan but in order to develop training standards they need to understand the baseline of IICD staff and what their expectations should be. The IICD Director stated they had recently provided performance reviews to IICD personnel with the goal of establishing expectations for each IICD member. Established training, certification, and professional standards for its intelligence analysts would help the Department to ensure that it staffs IICD with capable and qualified personnel.

Both the IICD Director and Assistant Director indicated they identified personnel and structural challenges upon joining IICD in the fall of 2020. The IICD Assistant Director stated that IICD analysts were not meeting the demands of the Department and made changes to the IICD organizational structure to better meet the needs of the Department. Additionally, IICD leadership consists of the Director and Assistant Director responsible for the final approval of IICD products. However, IICD personnel have disseminated inaccurate products in the past without supervisory approval. The IICD Director stated it was very complicated deciding if you can you trust analysts with sharing intelligence and how to do it without a single point of failure. The Department should determine the adequate staffing level and organizational structure for IICD to effectively collect, process, and disseminate intelligence information, to include establishing group leader or middle management positions that would expand supervisory coverage within IICD.

The Department did not establish minimum security clearance standards for its intelligence analysts. Not all personnel assigned to IICD had a Top Secret and Sensitive Compartmented Information clearance. Failure to establish minimum security clearance standards for its intelligence analysts could have resulted in the Department mishandling classified information. The IICD Assistant Director stated that IICD is in the process of obtaining courier cards for transporting classified information, previously IICD used a “letter.” The IICD Assistant Director stated they had been working with the IICD Director to develop guidance addressing the transport of classified information, the Department should ensure it finalizes that guidance. The Department should also require its intelligence personnel to maintain a Top Secret and Sensitive Compartmented Information clearance. Our research into best practices revealed that the U.S. Secret Service and FBI require intelligence personnel to have both a Top Secret and Sensitive Compartmented Information clearance.

The IICD Director stated IICD faced technological challenges—mainly technology related to the open source environment. The IICD Director stated that going forward, because the USCP mission is unique, IICD made a budget request to obtain private industry collection technology because that technology can better focus on dark web information and Capitol Hill-related products. The IICD Director should identify any technology and/or tools that would enhance the Department’s capability to effectively collect, process, and disseminate intelligence information.

## Conclusions

During the review, a condition identified in two previous reports, the Department's failure to update and document evaluations of its intelligence priorities, reemerged. To increase the efficiency of its intelligence resources, the Department should consider reorganizing its intelligence functions into a single intelligence bureau. Additionally, without a formally established Intelligence Training Program, the Department cannot ensure the proper training of all intelligence employees and ensure that they are up to date on the most current policies and procedures related to IICD personnel duties. Furthermore, implementing additional formal guidance that applies to USCP's collection, processing, and reporting of information would improve its ability to effectively disseminate intelligence throughout the Department. Lastly, USCP should address gaps in meeting the intelligence needs of its operational stakeholders, a lack of training, certification, or professional standards for its intelligence analysts, and determine the necessary staffing, security clearances, and technology IICD needs to accomplish its mission. Therefore, OIG makes the following recommendations.

**Recommendation 18:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police immediately enforce USCP SOP PS-602-11, *Intelligence Priorities Framework*, dated February 11, 2018, requiring that its Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division prepare an Intelligence Priorities Framework annually and subsequently review the Intelligence Priorities Framework quarterly.

**Recommendation 19:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police seek approval from the Capitol Police Board and its Congressional Oversight Committees to elevate and reorganize its intelligence resources into a Bureau level entity.

**Recommendation 20:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police immediately codify a formal intelligence training program and enforce Standard Operating Procedure PS-602-03, *Intelligence Analysis Division Commander Responsibilities*, dated August 11, 2019, requiring that the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division (IICD) Commander review and maintain the Intelligence Training Program for all IICD employees.

**Recommendation 21:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police develop guidance that clearly documents channels for efficiently and effectively disseminating intelligence information to all of its personnel.

**Recommendation 22:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police review the draft Standard Operating Procedure titled, *Open Source Guidance for Protest Tracking and Communication*, determine if the draft Standard Operating Procedure includes all required elements related to the

**Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division’s open source intelligence work, and implement a comprehensive policy that covers open source intelligence efforts.**

**Recommendation 23: We recommend the United States Capitol Police implement formal guidance that will ensure consistent and unified operational reporting across all intelligence and event planning documents.**

**Recommendation 24: We recommend the United States Capitol Police refine document reporting that better captures operational impact to include improbable outcomes based on intelligence, trend data, threats to members, and information analysis.**

**Recommendation 25: We recommend the United States Capitol Police implement guidance that will ensure consistency between analyst assessments and document summaries within its intelligence products.**

**Recommendation 26: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police require the Director of the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division develop an action plan within 45 calendar days to improve the Department’s capability to effectively collect, process, and disseminate intelligence information. The action plan should include at a minimum:**

- a. A gap analysis to identify the intelligence needs of the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division’s operational stakeholders.**
- b. Certification and professional standards for intelligence analysts.**
- c. Training standards for intelligence analysts.**
- d. Adequate staffing level and organizational structure for the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division, to include establishing group leader or middle management positions that would expand supervisory coverage.**
- e. Requirements for intelligence personnel to maintain a Top Secret and Sensitive Compartmented Information clearance.**
- f. Identification of any technology or tools that could enhance Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division capabilities.**

# APPENDICES

**DEPARTMENT TIMELINE**  
**UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE**  
**TIMELINE OF EVENTS FOR JANUARY 6, 2021 ATTACK**

This document memorializes critical events leading up to and during the January 6, 2021 attack at the U.S. Capitol.

The timeline is as follows:

**WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 16, 2020**

- The United States Capitol Police (USCP) learns that different groups of protesters are organizing demonstrations on U.S. Capitol grounds related to the January 6, 2021 joint session to certify the electoral vote count.
- Special Event Assessment issued for January 6, 2021 demonstrations.
  - Initial assessment indicates two groups of demonstrators – a group called “Donald, You’re Fired,” an anti-Trump group, and a group called “Patriots United March,” a pro-Trump group.
  - Initial assessment finds “no information regarding specific disruptions or acts of civil disobedience targeting this function.”

**FRIDAY, DECEMBER 18, 2020**

- The USCP begins developing Civil Disturbance Unit (CDU) action plan for January 6, 2021 event.

**TUESDAY, DECEMBER 22, 2020**

- Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) hosts first multi-agency teleconference in which agencies share intelligence and initial planning for the January 6, 2021 event. The following agencies are represented:
  - MPD
  - United States Park Police (USPP)
  - Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA)
  - Federal Bureau Investigation Washington Field Office (FBI WFO)
  - Federal Bureau Investigation Headquarters (FBI HQ)
  - Supreme Court Police
  - United States Secret Service (USSS)
  - DC Fire & Emergency Medical Services (FEMS)

**WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 23, 2020**

- Revised Special Event Assessment issues for January 6, 2021 demonstrations.

## DEPARTMENT TIMELINE

- Revised assessment includes that on December 19, 2020, POTUS called for supporters to come to Washington, DC on January 6, 2021, for a big protest called “Be There, Will Be Wild.”
- Revised assessment identifies four pro-Trump groups holding protests at the US Capitol: (1) Women for America First; (2) Stop the Steal; (3) Women for a Great America; and (4) The One Nation Under God Foundation.
- Revised assessment identifies three counter-protester groups: (1) They/Them Collective; (2) DC Youth Liberation Front; and (3) Shutdown DC; Refuse Fascism DC
- Revised assessment indicates: “The protests/rallies are expected to be similar to the previous Million MAGA March rallies in November and December 2020, which drew tens of thousands of participants. It is also expected that members of the Proud Boys, Antifa, and other extremist groups will rally on January 6, 2021.”
- Revised assessment finds “no information regarding specific disruptions or acts of civil disobedience targeting this function. Due to the tense political environment following the 2020 election, the threat of disruptive actions or violence cannot be ruled out.”
- Initial draft of USCP CDU Operational Plan issues to Assistant Chief Chad Thomas, Uniformed Operations, and is approved.
  - Initial CDU Plan proposes perimeter fencing to secure Union Square, along Constitution Avenue between First Street NW and First Street NE, and perimeter fencing along First Street NE between Constitution Avenue and Independence Avenue.
  - Initial CDU Plan proposes deployment of four CDU platoons of officers in riot gear (Hard Platoons).
  - Initial CDU Plan proposes deployment of eight Grenadiers, including two with each Hard Platoon, equipped with chemical munitions.
  - Initial CDU Plan proposes deployment of USCP SWAT Teams to provide tactical response and counter-sniper over-watch.

### MONDAY, DECEMBER 28, 2020

- Chief of Police Steven Sund participates in MPD-hosted bi-weekly law enforcement partners meeting in which intelligence and planning for January 6, 2021 event discussed. Law enforcement partners participating in the bi-weekly meeting include:
  - MPD
  - USPP
  - USSS (Uniformed and non-uniformed)
  - Amtrak Police Department
  - WMATA
  - Federal Air Marshalls

**DEPARTMENT TIMELINE****TUESDAY, DECEMBER 29, 2020**

- USCP personnel attend multi-agency teleconference hosted by MPD in which agencies briefed on intelligence and planning for the January 6, 2021 event.
- Joint Session Perimeter Plan issues to Assistant Chief Thomas and is approved.

**WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 30, 2020**

- Revised Special Event Assessment issues for January 6, 2021 event.
  - Revised assessment indicates that “[a] number of individuals and groups are calling for their supporters to travel to Washington, DC, on or before January 6, 2021, to show support for POTUS and for overturning the election results. The protests/rallies are expected to be similar to the previous Million MAGA March rallies in November and December 2020.”
  - Revised assessment indicates that “Stop the Steal has posted a webpage entitled ‘wildprotest.com’ that includes a map of the Capitol grounds indicating they will be gathering on the Senate East Front Grassy Area 9 on January 6, 2021. The webpage states ‘We the People must take to the U.S. Capitol lawn and steps . . . [.]’ They plan to show support for the Members of Congress who are expected to file objections to the certification of the electoral vote.”
  - Revised assessment indicates that a Member of Congress is confirmed as a speaker in the “Stop the Steal” event.
  - Revised assessment indicates that “there have been several social media posts encouraging protesters to be armed.”
  - Revised assessment found “no information regarding specific disruptions or acts of civil disobedience targeting this function. Due to the tense political environment following the 2020 election, the threat of disruptive actions or violence cannot be ruled out.”
- Deputy Chief Timothy Bowen, Uniformed Services Bureau (USB), directs USB division commanders to bring in ALL available personnel for the joint session and demonstrations on January 6, 2021.
- USCP cancels “Ready Reserve” assignments for January 6, 2021.

**THURSDAY, DECEMBER 31, 2020**

- USCP Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division (IICD) holds an internal briefing to review the December 30, 2020 Special Event Assessment with officials at the rank of Captain and above.

**DEPARTMENT TIMELINE****SATURDAY, JANUARY 2, 2021**

- Carol Corbin (DOD) texts USCP Deputy Chief Sean Gallagher, Protective Service Bureau, to determine whether USCP is considering a request for National Guard soldiers for January 6, 2021 event.

**SUNDAY, JANUARY 3, 2021**

- USCP Deputy Chief Gallagher replies to DOD via text that a request for National Guard support is not forthcoming at this time after consultation with COP Sund.
- Revised Special Event Assessment for January 6, 2021 event issues to USCP Executive Team and Deputies to both the Senate Sergeant at Arms and House Sergeant at Arms.
  - Revised assessment indicates that approximately six Members expected to speak at demonstration events scheduled on Capitol Grounds.
  - Revised assessment indicates that “some of militia members who are participating in this event and staying in Virginia, plan to march into Washington, DC on January 5th, while armed.”
  - Revised assessment indicates “[t]here is also indication that white supremacist groups may be attending the protests.”
  - Revised assessment states:

Due to the tense political environment following the 2020 election, the threat of disruptive actions or violence cannot be ruled out. Supporters of the current president see January 6, 2021, as the last opportunity to overturn the results of the presidential election. This sense of desperation and disappointment may lead to more of an incentive to become violent. Unlike previous post-election protests, the targets of the pro-Trump supporters are not necessarily the counter-protesters as they were previously, but rather Congress itself is the target on the 6th. As outlined above, there has been a worrisome call for protesters to come to these events armed and there is the possibility that protesters may be inclined to become violent. Further, unlike the events on November 14, 2020, and December 12, 2020, there are several more protests scheduled on January 6, 2021, and the majority of them will be on Capitol grounds. The two protests expected to be the largest of the day—the Women for America First protest at the Ellipse and the Stop the Steal protest in Areas 8 and 9—may draw thousands of participants and both have been promoted by President Trump himself. The Stop the Steal protest in particular does not have a permit, but several high profile speakers, including Members of Congress are expected to speak at the event. This combined with Stop the Steal’s propensity to attract white supremacists, militia members, and

## DEPARTMENT TIMELINE

others who actively promote violence, may lead to a significantly dangerous situation for law enforcement and the general public alike.

- USCP increases the size of Dignitary Protection details for Members with four agents to six agents during the week of January 3, 2021.
- USCP extends coverage for Dignitary Protection details to 24/7 coverage.
- USCP posts Dignitary Protection Agents at the residence of certain Congressional Leaders due to open source intelligence.
- USCP mandates that each Dignitary Protection detail include MP7 or M4 assault weapons.
- USCP Investigations Division and IICD extend coverage to 24/7 operations during the week of January 3, 2021.
- USCP embeds an analyst from the National Capitol Region Threat Intelligence Consortium (NTIC) with the IICD analysts during the week of January 3, 2021.

### MONDAY, JANUARY 4, 2021

- USCP IICD holds internal briefing to review the January 3, 2021 Special Event Assessment with officials at the rank of Captain and above.
- USCP IICD issues the January 3, 2021 Special Event Assessment to all USCP officials at the rank of Sergeant and above.
- USCP personnel attend multi-agency teleconference hosted by MPD in which agencies brief on intelligence and planning for the January 6, 2021 event.
- COP Sund attends briefing for the January 6, 2021 event with law enforcement partners, including the following agencies:
  - MPD
  - DC National Guard
  - HSAA
  - SSAA
  - Architect of the Capitol
  - USSS (uniformed and non-uniformed)
  - FBI (Washington Field Office and HQ)
  - USPP
  - Metro
  - Amtrak
  - US Army Military District
- COP Sund asks Senate Sergeant at Arms (SSAA) Michael Stenger and House Sergeant at Arms (HSAA) Paul Irving for authority to have National Guard to assist with security for the January

## DEPARTMENT TIMELINE

6, 2021 event based on briefing with law enforcement partners and revised intelligence assessment.

- COP Sund's request is denied. SSAA and HSAA tells COP Sund to contact General Walker at DC National Guard to discuss the guard's ability to support a request if needed.
- COP Sund notifies General Walker of DC National Guard, indicating that the USCP may need DC National Guard support for the January 6, 2021, but does not have the authority to request at this time.
- General Walker advises COP Sund that in the event of an authorized request, DC National Guard could quickly repurpose 125 troops helping to provide DC with COVID-related assistance. Troops would need to be sworn in as USCP.
- Revised Joint Session Perimeter Plan issues based on request by the SSAA and HSAA to change existing perimeter.
- SSAA notifies USCP that access to the Senate side of the Capitol is to be restricted to Senators and staff with offices in the Capitol.
- USCP issues "USB Operational Posture for the Joint Session of Congress on January 6, 2021," which provides for the following activities beyond routine in-session staffing:
  - Pre-screener officers at each Member/Staff building entrance for House and Senate Office buildings;
  - Increased exterior patrols;
  - West Front is closed for Inaugural preparations;
  - East Front Plaza access is restricted to Members/Staff;
  - Additional Officers posted at the North and South Barricades to facilitate access;
  - Additional Officers posted at the subways to monitor access to the Capitol;
  - House Wing of the building restricted to Members and staff with offices in the Capitol; and
  - 271 officers and officials assigned to CDU platoons.
- USCP personnel investigate threat to fly a plane into the U.S. Capitol to avenge the death of Qasem Soleimani on January 6, 2021.

### TUESDAY, JANUARY 5, 2021

- USCP issues new CDU helmets to CDU "Soft" Platoons 1, 3, 4.

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- USCP IICD begins issuing demonstration updates with information about activity related to the January 6th demonstration that are occurring in the DC Metropolitan area.
- COP Sund holds joint task force briefing to discuss January 6, 2021 event and Inaugural events with police chiefs in the National Capitol Region, the HSAA and SSAA, USSS, FBI, and DC National Guard.
- COP Sund, Assistant Chief Yogananda Pittman, Protective and Intelligence Operations, and Assistant Chief Thomas tour the outer perimeter.
- Final Joint Session Perimeter Plan revised based on feedback from SSAA and HSAA to restrict access to the Capitol Square using bike rack with USCP CDU personnel. HSAA approves the revised plan.
- ACOP Pittman coordinates movement of physical barriers with Security Services Bureau and Architect of the Capitol to conform to new plan.
- COP Sund informs SSAA and HSAA in separate discussions about the DC National Guard ability to provide 125 troops if necessary.
- Final CDU Operational Plan for the January 6, 2021 event issues.
  - Final CDU Plan includes seven CDU platoons, including four Hard Platoons, totaling 276 sworn employees.
  - Final CDU Plan includes the use of less lethal munitions by Grenadiers, including the pepper ball launcher systems and FN-303.
  - Final CDU Plan indicates that CDU platoons are scheduled to report at three distinct reporting times; 0800 hours, 1000 hours, and 1200 hours. This ensures CDU coverage from 0800 hours on January 6, 2021, through 0400 hours on January 7, 2021.
  - Final CDU Plan includes deployment of USCP SWAT teams to act as counter-assault ground teams and provide counter-sniper support.
  - Final CDU Plan indicates that counter-sniper teams must monitor for protesters open carrying or concealing firearms.
  - Final CDU Plan indicates that officers will not independently employ force without command authorization unless exigent circumstances justify immediate action.
  - Final CDU Plan indicates that projectiles will not be fired indiscriminately into crowds.
  - Final CDU Plan indicates that “[i]n the event the protest group size exceeds [USCP] capability to obtain compliance, motors and scouts will create a “box” around the mobile protest group and will block approaching traffic to mitigate any vehicle pedestrian collision.”

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- At approximately 1900 to 2000 hours, USCP task force agent embedded with the FBI emails Intelligence Operations Section a memorandum from the FBI Norfolk office providing additional details regarding the January 6, 2021 event.
- USCP assigns two DPD agents each to the House Floor and the Senate Floor on January 6, 2021. A DPD Sergeant is assigned to manage the agents.
- USCP assigns DPD team of agents and officials to the Ellipse event on January 6, 2021, due to Members attending the event.

### WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 6, 2021

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 6, 2021	
TIME	EVENT DESCRIPTION
Approximately 0600 hours	USCP deploys counter surveillance agents to monitor and report back on demonstrators at the Ellipse, at metro stations in the area, and around Capitol and Supreme Court grounds, including numbers, their attire, packages or equipment they are carrying, directions from which they are coming or going, any gathering locations, and any suspicious activity.
	USCP deploys DPD agents to the Ellipse as protection for Members in the event of any threats.
	USCP assigns agents to all emergency evacuation vehicles for Congressional Leadership in the House Garages.
0743 hours	USCP begins releasing demonstration updates related to the January 6, 2021 event.
0823 hours	The Department receives intelligence regarding the radio frequency that some of the demonstrators are using to communicate. The Department intercepts the frequency and assigns an intelligence analyst to monitor the frequency and protester activity.
0845 hours	75 to 100 demonstrators walk up Constitution Avenue near North Barricade.
0926 hours	Approximately 50-60 people on the House Egg.
1000 hours	Metro transit personnel investigates suspicious package at Capitol South Metro. USCP personnel respond to assist.

## DEPARTMENT TIMELINE

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 6, 2021	
TIME	EVENT DESCRIPTION
1002 hours	Suspicious package at Capitol South Metro is cleared.
1022 hours	USCP demonstration update indicates that unconfirmed count put crowd size at 25-30k at the rally on the Ellipse. Update also indicates that organizers of the Ellipse event planning a march to the Capitol after POTUS speech.
1048 hours	USCP demonstration update indicates that large crowd of protesters gathered on East Front remain peaceful.
1051 hours	One group originally permitted for Senate East Front Grassy Area 9 will no longer be demonstrating.
1058 hours	Demonstration group gathers in the Senate Park on the C Street side of the Russell Senate Office Building. Also steady flow of demonstrators walking along Louisiana and Constitution heading west.
1058 hours	USCP learns that another agency has recovered two firearms from an unattended vehicle in Northwest, DC and reports it over the radio for situational awareness.
1059 hours	Approximately 200 Proud Boys gather near Garfield Circle move toward Senate Egg.
1109 hours	Approximately 400 demonstrators on the East Front stretching from Senate Plaza to House Plaza.
1111 hours	USCP demonstration update indicates that MPD found a vehicle with a rifle and scope in plain view at L'Enfant Plaza.
1114 hours	USCP personnel investigate suspicious package at the Supreme Court of the United States ("SCOTUS"), 100 block of East Capitol Street.
1115 hours	JEMNS alert sent: The USCP is continuing to investigate a Suspicious Package at the Unit Block of Second Street NE. Staff and other personnel are directed to AVOID THIS AREA until further notice.
1124 hours	USCP personnel monitors 3-4 counter demonstrators setting up "props" on 3 <sup>rd</sup> Street and Pennsylvania Southeast.

## DEPARTMENT TIMELINE

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 6, 2021	
TIME	EVENT DESCRIPTION
1126 hours	USCP investigates a twitter posting indicating that a militia was being formed on Capitol Hill by the Silver Arm Band. Allegedly a man was handed a flyer near the U.S. Capitol that states that a national militia is being organized on Capitol Hill to defend the Constitution and the Republic and that members must wear silver armbands signifying that they are lawful combatants.
1135 hours	Additional demonstrators arrive on the Capitol Square.
1139 hours	JEMNS alert sent: The USCP is continuing to investigate a Suspicious Package at the Unit Block of Second Street NE. Staff and other personnel are directed to AVOID THIS AREA until further notice.
1144 hours	Approximately 100-150 demonstrators walking up Delaware Avenue from Union Station.
1151 hours	USCP demonstration update indicates that MPD is responding to reports of a man with a rifle at 15 <sup>th</sup> & Constitution Avenue NW.
1151 hours	USCP demonstration update indicates that DHS is investigating two handguns found in a vehicle during a security check at 550 12th Street SW.
Approximately 1157 hours	POTUS Trump begins speech at the Ellipse.
1204 hours	USCP clears suspicious package at SCOTUS.
1215 hours	JEMNS alert sent: The USCP has cleared the incident with the Suspicious Package at the Unit Block of Second Street NE.
1229 hours	USCP personnel reports hearing the sound of a Taser at the Senate Egg. USCP personnel advised for situational awareness and officer safety.
1230 hours	Very large group reported as heading to the U.S. Capitol from eastbound on Pennsylvania Avenue at approximately 7 <sup>th</sup> Street.
1233 hours	USCP demonstration update indicates that USPP have detained a person armed with a rifle at 17 <sup>th</sup> Street near the WWII memorial.

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WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 6, 2021	
TIME	EVENT DESCRIPTION
Approximately 1236 hours	USCP personnel and USSS escort VPOTUS Pence into the U.S. Capitol.
1239 hours	JEMNS alert sent: Due to Demonstration Activity, the following road closures are in effect: First Street between Constitution and Louisiana Avenues NW and Constitution Avenue between First and Third Streets NW.
Approximately 1244 hours	USCP personnel investigate explosive device at RNC headquarters.
1245 hours	D.C. police camera captures what looks like a wall of people suddenly arriving about a block west of the Capitol.
1246 hours	USCP personnel shut down Constitution Avenue due to approach of large group of demonstrators.
1248 hours	JEMNS alert sent: The USCP is responding to suspicious package at the 300 Block of First Street SE.
1249 hours	USCP K-9 units sweep Command Post at 1 <sup>st</sup> and D Streets SE and conduct additional sweeps on 1 <sup>st</sup> Street.
1252 hours	USCP deploy additional personnel to begin clearing residences and businesses near RNC Headquarters.
Approximately 1253 hours	Insurrectionists at the front of the large group amassing near the Capitol Reflecting Pool pick up a metal barrier and push it into USCP officers. A crowd begins to press onto the restricted Capitol grounds.
1255 hours	USCP directs all available USCP units to respond to the West Front of the Capitol to assist with breaches along the perimeter. USCP personnel instructed to lock Lower West Terrace door and south side.
1256 hours	USCP directs units to respond to Upper West Terrace area to contain insurrectionists.
1256 hours	USCP personnel evacuate construction workers.
1258 hours	COP Sund asks for and receives assistance from Acting Chief Contee MPD.

## DEPARTMENT TIMELINE

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 6, 2021	
TIME	EVENT DESCRIPTION
1300 hours	USCP personnel advise Metro to have trains bypass Capitol South metro station due to explosive device.
1300 hours	CDU Hard Platoon forms line at Upper West Terrace and less lethal Grenadiers prepare to launch from inauguration stage area.
1301 hours	COP Sund asks for and receives assistance from Chief Thomas Sullivan USSS/UD.
1301 hours	USCP personnel evacuates Madison Building due to explosive device at RNC headquarters.
1303 hours	USCP personnel finds vehicle with explosive chemicals (eleven Molotov cocktails) and a firearm.
1304 hours	COP Sund asks SSAA for declaration of emergency for National Guard support.
1305 hours	Prisoner transport staged on House side plaza.
1306 hours	USCP Grenadiers directed to launch chemical munitions.
Approximately 1306 hours	USCP personnel go door to door to notify residents in the vicinity of the explosive device to evacuate.
1307 hours	USCP personnel investigate explosive device at DNC Headquarters.
1308 hours	USCP personnel deploy OC Spray on Upper West Terrace.
1309 hours	COP Sund asks HSAA for declaration of emergency for National Guard support.
1309 hours	USCP personnel closes the following roadways due to explosive devices at RNC headquarters and 300 block of first street:  First Street between C and D Streets SE  New Jersey Avenue between Ivy and D Streets SE

## DEPARTMENT TIMELINE

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 6, 2021	
TIME	EVENT DESCRIPTION
	D Street between New Jersey Avenue and Second Street SE
1309 hours	JEMNS alert set: The USCP is continuing to investigate a Suspicious Package in the 300 Block of First Street SE. Staff and other personnel are directed to AVOID THIS AREA until further notice.
1310 hours	POTUS Trump speech ends.
1310 hours	MPD units respond to South Side Upper West Terrace. <sup>1</sup>
1311 hours	USCP personnel evacuates Cannon Building directing staff to leave underground through the Longworth Building due to explosive devices at RNC and DNC headquarters.
Approximately 1314 hours	USCP personnel raise all south barricades.
Approximately 1314 hours	USCP personnel and USSS evacuate protectee at DNC headquarters.
1315 hours	The following PA/Annunciator message sent: "Evacuate, evacuate, evacuate the Cannon House Office Building immediately due to a suspicious package and internally relocate to the Longworth House Office Building. I repeat evacuate, evacuate, evacuate, the Cannon House Office Building immediately due to a suspicious package and internally relocate to the Longworth House Office Building."
1321 hours	Additional MPD units respond to U.S. Capitol Building.
1322 hours	JEMNS alert sent: The USCP is evacuating the following building due to police activity: Cannon.
1322 hours	COP Sund reiterates request to HSAA for emergency declaration for National Guard support.
1323 hours	USCP personnel arrest two insurrectionists for unlawful conduct at the Upper West Terrace south.

<sup>1</sup> Timeline is not a comprehensive account of all LE partners' arrivals or participation.

## DEPARTMENT TIMELINE

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 6, 2021	
TIME	EVENT DESCRIPTION
1325 hours	USCP personnel arrest an insurrectionist for unlawful conduct at the Upper West Terrace north.
1330 hours	USCP personnel advise DNC security and Fairchild Building security to have occupants shelter in place.
1334 hours	CDU units report to Lower West Terrace.
Approximately 1335 hours	USCP relocates DPD Leadership Limos from the Senate and House side of Capitol Plaza to the Loading Dock and Rayburn Garage respectively.
1339 hours	JEMNS alert sent: The Cannon Building is executing internal relocation due to police activity. All other staff should remain inside their building until further guidance is received from USCP. If you are outside a building on Capitol Hill follow the direction of law enforcement officers. If you are in the Cannon Building, take visitors, escape hoods, and go kits and report to the South Tunnel connecting to the Longworth, further information will be provided as it becomes available.
1340 hours	COP Sund requests and receives confirmation of support from Ashan Benedict, ATF.
1342 hours	Insurrectionists breach Lower West Terrace fence line and scaffolding.
1345 hours	Insurrectionists breach East Plaza fence by the skylights.
1348 hours	JEMNS alert sent: All CLEAR. The evacuation of the Cannon has been cleared, and any associated road closures will clear momentarily.
Approximately 1348 hours	Insurrectionists breach the Upper West Terrace.
1349 hours	COP Sund requests National Guard Support from General Walker. Advises General Walker that a CPB emergency declaration is forthcoming.
1351 hours	COP Sund calls Metropolitan Washington Consortium of Governments to activate LE mutual aid within the National Capitol Region.

## DEPARTMENT TIMELINE

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 6, 2021	
TIME	EVENT DESCRIPTION
1353 hours	USCP Library Division deploys 12 officers to respond to Upper West Terrace.
1354 hours	Insurrectionists breach the Inauguration Stage and begin tearing things down.
1357 hours	MPD Hard Platoons respond to Lower West Terrace door.
1359 hours	Insurrectionists breach a barrier at the north side of the plaza.
1359 hours	CDU lines form on Senate Steps and Center Steps of East Plaza. Less lethal munitions deployed to Center Steps.
1400 hours	Assistant COP Pittman orders lockdown of U.S. Capitol Building.
1402 hours	JEMNS alert sent: Due to Police Activity, all personnel are advised to relocate from the Cannon House Office Building to the Rayburn and Longworth House Office Buildings through the underground tunnels. Do not evacuate outside the buildings. All personnel should shelter in place in the Rayburn and Longworth House Office Buildings.
1403 hours	COP Sund reiterates to HSAA request for emergency declaration for National Guard support.
1405 hours	The following Annunciator message is sent: Due to an external security threat, no entry or exit is permitted at this time in the U.S. Capitol Building. You may move throughout the buildings but stay away from exterior windows and doors.
1406 hours	Insurrectionists breach Rotunda steps. USCP deploys 10 units with shields up to the Rotunda door to hold the line.
1406 hours	JEMNs alert sent: The USCP is preparing to disrupt a Suspicious package in the 400 Block of Canal Street SE. A loud bang may be heard in the area. There is no cause for alarm, and no action needs to be taken by Congressional Staff.
1408 hours	Insurrectionists breach House Plaza coming from the south side of the U.S. Capitol building.

## DEPARTMENT TIMELINE

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 6, 2021	
TIME	EVENT DESCRIPTION
1408 hours	Assistant Chief Pittman orders Capitol Complex wide lockdown.
1410 hours	CPB issues verbal emergency declaration and gives authority for National Guard deployment.
1410 hours	JEMNS alert sent: Due to an external security threat located on the West Front of the U.S. Capitol building. No entry or exist is permitted at this time. You may move throughout the building(s) but stay away from exterior windows and doors. If you are outside seek cover.
1410 hours	The following PA/Annunciator message is sent: "Due to an external security threat, no entry or exit is permitted at this time in any building of the Capitol Complex. You may move throughout the buildings but stay away from exterior windows and doors."
Approximately 1410 hours	USCP personnel arrest rioter for kicking in a window on the center steps of the east plaza.
1411 hours	USCP personnel and USSS escort VP Pence from Senate Chambers.
Approximately 1415 hours	USCP DPD units evacuate House and Senate Leadership.
1415 hours	Second floor of the Capitol breached. USCP units directed to respond to Senate chambers.
1415 hours	USCP units directed to respond to the Rotunda, Senate side, first level. USCP orders lockdown of House and Senate Chambers.
1417 hours	The following PA/Annunciator message is sent: Security threat, security threat, security threat. Due to a security threat inside the building, immediately seek shelter inside the nearest office. Take visitors and emergency equipment. Lock all doors if able. If shelter is unavailable, seek cover or concealment. Remain quiet and await further direction.
1418 hours	JEMNS alert sent: Capitol Staff: Due to a security threat inside the building, immediately: move inside your office or the nearest office. Take emergency equipment and visitors. Close, lock, and stay away from external doors and windows. If you are in a public space, find a place to hide or seek cover.

## DEPARTMENT TIMELINE

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 6, 2021	
TIME	EVENT DESCRIPTION
	Remain quiet and silence electronics. Once you are in a safe location, immediately check in with your OEC. No one will be permitted to enter or exit the building until directed by USCP. If you are in a building outside of the affected area, remain clear of the police activity, await further direction.
1418 hours	USCP personnel barricade Senate Chamber.
1419 hours	Approximately 200 insurrectionists breach Rotunda. USCP Hard Platoon deployed to Rotunda.
1420 hours	Insurrectionists breach Senate door and north side door of the Upper West Terrace.
1422 hours	CDU Platoons 1 through 3 deployed to House side of U.S. Capitol; CDU Platoons 4, 6, 7, and 8 deployed to Rotunda.
1424 hours	JEMNS alert sent: The USCP is preparing to disrupt a Suspicious Package in the 300 Block of First Street SE. A loud bank may be heard in the area. There is no cause for alarm, and no action needs to be taken by Congressional Staff.
Approximately 1426 hours	COP Sund urgently request National Guard support during teleconference with Christopher Rodriguez, DC Homeland Security, Chief Contee, MPD; General Walker, DC National Guard; Muriel Bowser, DC Mayor; Lieutenant General Walter E. Piatt, Army Staff Secretary. COP Sund is advised by the Army Staff Secretary that "we don't like the optics of the National Guard standing a line at the Capitol" and that his recommendation to the Secretary of the Army will be not to support the request.
1428 hours	Remaining Members evacuated from Senate floor.
1430 hours	Per DC National Guard's request USCP drafts a formal written request to Department of Defense for National Guard support.
1432 hours	USCP personnel deployed to extract Members in office. <sup>2</sup>
1434 hours	Upper West Terrace breached.

<sup>2</sup> Timeline is not a comprehensive account of all Member or staff extractions.

## DEPARTMENT TIMELINE

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 6, 2021	
TIME	EVENT DESCRIPTION
1437 hours	Corridor to House Chamber breached.
1439 hours	USCP personnel begin evacuating Members inside the House Chamber.
1440 hours	FBI personnel investigate an explosive device in the 600 Block of Independence Avenue.
1443 hours	USCP personnel shoots insurrectionist attempting to breach area outside of House Floor.
1444 hours	Assistant COP Pittman orders USCP SWAT team to respond to House Floor.
1444 hours	Officers barricade in third floor gallery of House floor with 12 to 15 members and staff ordered to shelter in place.
Approximately 1445 Hours	USCP Inspector meets with evacuated Congressional Leadership at alternate site to brief them on the situation.
1450 hours	Senate Chamber breached.
1450 hours	USCP SWAT team deployed to extract Members in offices.
1451 hours	USCP SWAT team holds insurrectionists at gun point at the House Chamber door.
Approximately 1451 hours	USCP personnel and LE partners deployed to extract Members and staff from offices.
1457 hours	USCP personnel arrest a rioter in possession of two knives.
1457 hours	Evacuation of Members on House Floor completed.
1457 hours	USCP personnel extract Members in offices.
1504 hours	USCP deploys additional CDU Hard Platoon to Rotunda.
1507 hours	Approximately 20 ATF and FBI personnel arrive at speaker's lobby.
1509 hours	Montgomery County PD through checkpoint 7 heading to North Barricade.

## DEPARTMENT TIMELINE

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 6, 2021	
TIME	EVENT DESCRIPTION
1518 hours	USCP personnel extract Member and staff from office.
1526 hours	USCP deploys K9 unit for sweep at New Jersey and Independence Avenue to assist DC Fire.
Approximately 1532 hours	USCP and LE partners clear Senate Floor, second floor, Rotunda, and South Wing of the first floor of unauthorized persons.
Approximately 1532 hours	A Hard Platoon of about 40 DHS officers deployed.
1533 hours	Explosive device at RNC headquarters is cleared.
1541 hours	JEMNS alert sent: Capitol Staff: Due to a security threat inside the building, immediately: move inside your office or the nearest office. Take emergency equipment and visitors. Close, lock and stay away from external doors and windows. If you are in a public space, find a place to hide or seek cover. Remain quiet and silence electronics. Once you are in a safe location, immediately check in with your OEC.
1543 hours	USCP personnel extract Members from office.
1547 hours	USCP personnel clear Rotunda and secure broken Rotunda door.
1551 hours	Armed squad of Arlington County Police arrive and deploy to Lower West Terrace.
1554 hours	USCP personnel extract staff who called for assistance.
1559 hours	USCP personnel arrest an insurrectionist near the Hart loading dock.
Approximately 1601 hours	USCP personnel extract staff from office.
1607 hours	USCP personnel extract staff from office.
Approximately 1608 hours	Fairfax Police Department and Virginia State Troopers arrive.

## DEPARTMENT TIMELINE

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 6, 2021	
TIME	EVENT DESCRIPTION
1609 hours	JEMNS alert sent: All buildings within the Capitol Complex Staff: Due to a security threat inside the building, immediately move inside your office or the nearest office. Take emergency equipment and visitors. Close, lock and stay away from external doors and windows. If you are in a public space, find a place to hide or seek cover. Remain quiet and silence electronics. Once you are in a safe location, immediately check in with your OEC.
Approximately 1611 hours	SSAA requests USCP extraction team respond to Senate offices in the U.S. Capitol.
Approximately 1613 hours	USCP arrests insurrectionists who jumped through a window in the hallway.
1615 hours	COP Sund teleconference with VPOTUS Pence.
Approximately 1615 hours	USCP personnel extract Member from Lincoln room.
Approximately 1619 hours	Senate Chambers cleared.
1621 hours	JEMNS alert sent: The USCP has cleared the incident with the Suspicious Package in the 400 Block of Canal Street SE.
1628 hours	USCP confirms basement, subways, first floor, and crypt of both wings secure. Also officers reinforcing every access point to include the windows that were shattered. Further second floor, Rotunda, and wings are clear. House chamber is secure.
1628 hours	USCP personnel extract staff barricaded in Senate offices.
1636 hours	Suspicious package at DNC cleared.
1645 hours	USCP personnel deploy munitions at Rotunda door where insurrectionists pushing in doors and breaking windows.
Approximately 1648 hours	USCP personnel and LE partners move insurrectionists off the West Front Terrace.

## DEPARTMENT TIMELINE

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 6, 2021	
TIME	EVENT DESCRIPTION
1648 hours	USCP deploys chemical munitions on Lower West Terrace to disperse insurrectionists.
1652 hours	USCP arrests two insurrectionists in the Rotunda.
1709 hours	USCP personnel extract staff barricaded in Senate offices.
Approximately 1720 hours	USCP deploys K-9 teams to sweep House and Senate Chambers.
Approximately 1720 hours	USCP arrests one insurrectionist at the staff wing, north side, west front stairs and one insurrectionist north stairs.
1730 hours	USCP and LE partners clear media tower on the West Front.
1736 hours	USCP and LE partners clear West Front, Lower West Terrace and the House and Senate Steps of all unauthorized occupants.
1736 hours	COP Sund meets with VPOTUS Pence and teleconference with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to brief them on the security posture. Advised that the building could be safely re-occupied by 1930 hours.
Approximately 1738 hours	USCP and LE partners push invaders away from the U.S. Capitol building on the West Front.
1745 hours	PA announcement internal and external: There is a curfew in effect at 1800 hours until 0600 hours tomorrow. All individuals are required to leave Capitol Hill or be subject to arrest.
1746 hours	USCP deploys HDS to sweep Senate floor.
1747 hours	Seven National Guard buses headed to north barricade.
1750 hours	USCP and LE partners push insurrectionists off West Front grassy areas to First Street.
1752 hours	USCP and LE partners push insurrectionists off of East Front Plaza.
1756 hours	Fifteen Airport Police Officers arrive and deployed to center deck.

## DEPARTMENT TIMELINE

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 6, 2021	
TIME	EVENT DESCRIPTION
1801 hours	USCP and LE Partners sweep East Plaza. Confirm clear.
1806 hours	USCP investigates suspicious package at First Street from Constitution Avenue to East Capitol.
Approximately 1807 hours	USCP personnel extract Member and staff.
1813 hours	USCP clears suspicious package at First Street and Constitution Avenue.
Approximately 1825 hours	USCP, National Guard, and LE partners move insurrectionists back to Third Street.
Approximately 1825 hours	COP Sund briefs Senators Schumer and McConnell, and Representative Clyburn over the telephone on the current security posture of the Capitol and the ability of the House and Senate to reconvene in their respective Chambers.
1826 hours	USCP personnel and LE partners confirm that area around the southeast drive has been swept with negative results.
1834 hours	USCP personnel and LE partners confirm that House Chamber is swept, cleared, and negative results in the gallery.
Approximately 1837 hours	USCP and LE partners sweep East Front completed at 1936 hours.
1838 hours	USCP confirms that Senate Floor and Galleries have been swept and are hazard free.
1844 hours	JEMNS alert sent: All buildings within the Capitol Complex staff: Due to a security threat inside the building, immediately: move inside your office or the nearest office. Take emergency equipment and visitors. Close, lock and stay away from external doors and windows. If you are in a public space, find a place to hide or seek cover. Remain quiet and silence electronics. Once you are in a safe location, immediately check in with your OEC.

## DEPARTMENT TIMELINE

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 6, 2021	
TIME	EVENT DESCRIPTION
1920 hours	USCP and LE partners sweep Third and Fourth Floor of Senate Chambers and confirm clear.
1924 hours	JEMNS alert sent: All buildings within the Capitol Complex staff: Update police activity related to the report of an internal security threat is ongoing. While we encourage Members and staff to remain in the buildings, if anyone must leave:  House Personnel: The Longworth South Capitol Door is open for departure only.  Senate Personnel: The Northwest Door of the Dirksen is open for departure only.
1925 hours	USCP personnel arrest insurrectionists.
1931 hours	USCP and LE partners sweep Speakers Office.
1936 hours	USCP and LE partners sweep West Front of the Capitol, including Upper West Terrace, West Terrace Areas, outward to First Street, Independence and Constitution.
1938 hours	USCP and LE partners complete sweep of House 2 <sup>nd</sup> Floor and confirm all clear except for broken window.
1940 hours	USCP personnel arrest an insurrectionist at Inaugural Stage.
1945 hours	USCP personnel investigate suspicious package at Lower West Terrace doors.
1957 hours	USCP clear suspicious package.
2005 hours	USCP personnel investigate suspicious package at Peace Circle reflecting pool.
2012 hours	USCP clear suspicious package.
2031 hours	USCP and LE partners complete sweep of entire Capitol Square, including the Inaugural Stage, and the entire West Front and confirm it is clear.

**DEPARTMENT TIMELINE**

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 6, 2021	
TIME	EVENT DESCRIPTION
2115 hours	<p>JEMNS alert sent: Police activity related to the report of an internal security threat is ongoing. While we encourage Members and staff to remain in the buildings, if anyone must leave:</p> <p>Senate Personnel: The Northwest door of the Dirksen is open for departure only.</p> <p>Additionally, the Hart Senate Office Building is now open for egress only.</p>

## *Listing of Recommendations*

**Recommendation 1:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police develop policies and procedures that identify and formalize the Civil Disturbance Unit's mission, objectives, roles, and responsibilities.

**Recommendation 2:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police update Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) OS-140-01, *Civil Disturbance Unit's Quarterly Assessment of Assigned Personnel*, dated August 25, 2009, SOP OS-140-02, *Use of the PepperBall System*, dated October 30, 2019, and SOP OS-100-71, *Deployment and Storage of FN 303 Less Lethal Impact Launcher*, dated August 14, 2013, to reflect current practices.

**Recommendation 3:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police develop policies and procedures that identify and formalize the Civil Disturbance Unit's training standards, requirements, and responsibilities.

**Recommendation 4:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police develop a Leadership Civil Disturbance Unit training program that focuses on command tactics and responsibilities.

**Recommendation 5:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police develop policies and procedures for Civil Disturbance Unit equipment standards and life-cycle management.

**Recommendation 6:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police store riot shields in a temperature-stable area with conditions designed to maximize the life of the shield, and the Civil Disturbance Unit should create a process for reporting when the shields are not stored within the guidelines of the manufacturer such as but not limited to direct sunlight, temperature-stable environment and when they have been exposed to petrol, diesel, solvents, and exhaust fumes.

**Recommendation 7:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police develop policies and procedures for outlining the deploying and/or staging all available types of less-lethal weapon systems during Civil Disturbance Unit operations.

**Recommendation 8:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police increase its number of less-lethal weapon systems and explore additional less lethal options.

**Recommendation 9:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police train and certify additional Civil Disturbance Unit grenadiers.

## *Listing of Recommendations*

**Recommendation 10:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police prepare and stage necessary operational equipment for events.

**Recommendation 11:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police immediately update SOP No. OS-140-02, *Use of PepperBall System*, dated October 30, 2019, to reflect current manufacturer recommendations and requirements and ensure that grenadiers received the training within the frequency specified in the updated policy.

**Recommendation 12:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police develop a Standard Operating Procedure that identifies and formalizes the roles, responsibilities, and reporting requirements for employee listings for the Civil Disturbance Unit.

**Recommendation 13:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police explore incentivizing the Civil Disturbance Unit program.

**Recommendation 14:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police ensure that Civil Disturbance Unit liaisons are accountable for properly completing the Civil Disturbance Unit audit each quarter and providing it to the Commander of the Civil Disturbance Unit.

**Recommendation 15:** We recommend the United States Capitol Police implement a process that will ensure that procedures for Civil Disturbance Unit inventory and reconciliation, required by Directive 2053.003, *Property and Asset Management*, dated October 2, 2017, are fully functioning and operating as required. Specifically, the Civil Disturbance Unit must conduct physical inventories annually, perform reconciliations, resolve discrepancies, and provide an updated listing to the property custodian.

**Recommendation 16:** We recommend the United States Capitol Police implement an inventory control for the armory and also recommend a Check-In/Out Log Book that requires approval by a supervisor for munitions and weapons. A safety inspection check performed during a check-out would prevent the Civil Disturbance Unit from deploying expired munitions.

**Recommendation 17:** We recommend the United States Capitol Police either acquire an updated version of the 37mm less-lethal weapon or retire the weapon entirely because the current training for the 37mm weapon system is included in the certification process grenade launcher type weapon systems.

## *Listing of Recommendations*

**Recommendation 18:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police immediately enforce USCP SOP PS-602-11, *Intelligence Priorities Framework*, dated February 11, 2018, requiring that its Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division prepare an Intelligence Priorities Framework annually and subsequently review the Intelligence Priorities Framework quarterly.

**Recommendation 19:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police seek approval from the Capitol Police Board and its Congressional Oversight Committees to elevate and reorganize its intelligence resources into a Bureau level entity.

**Recommendation 20:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police immediately codify a formal intelligence training program and enforce Standard Operating Procedure PS-602-03, *Intelligence Analysis Division Commander Responsibilities*, dated August 11, 2019, requiring that the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division (IICD) Commander review and maintain the Intelligence Training Program for all IICD employees.

**Recommendation 21:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police develop guidance that clearly documents channels for efficiently and effectively disseminating intelligence information to all of its personnel.

**Recommendation 22:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police review the draft Standard Operating Procedure titled, *Open Source Guidance for Protest Tracking and Communication*, determine if the draft Standard Operating Procedure includes all required elements related to the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division's open source intelligence work, and implement a comprehensive policy that covers open source intelligence efforts.

**Recommendation 23:** We recommend the United States Capitol Police implement formal guidance that will ensure consistent and unified operational reporting across all intelligence and event planning documents.

**Recommendation 24:** We recommend the United States Capitol Police refine document reporting that better captures operational impact to include improbable outcomes based on intelligence, trend data, threats to members, and information analysis.

## *Listing of Recommendations*

**Recommendation 25:** We recommend the United States Capitol Police implement guidance that will ensure consistency between analyst assessments and document summaries within its intelligence products.

**Recommendation 26:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police require the Director of the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division develop an action plan within 45 calendar days to improve the Department's capability to effectively collect, process, and disseminate intelligence information. The action plan should include at a minimum:

- a. A gap analysis to identify the intelligence needs of the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division's operational stakeholders.
- b. Certification and professional standards for intelligence analysts.
- c. Training standards for intelligence analysts.
- d. Adequate staffing level and organizational structure for the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division, to include establishing group leader or middle management positions that would expand supervisory coverage.
- e. Requirements for intelligence personnel to maintain a Top Secret and Sensitive Compartmented Information clearance.
- f. Identification of any technology or tools that could enhance Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division capabilities.

*CDU Operational Plan*

210043

*CDU Operational Plan*

UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7218

January 5, 2021

**Event:** Joint Session of Congress-Electoral College Vote Certification

**Operational Period:** Sunday, January 3, 2021 through Saturday, January 9, 2021

**Overview:** (Special Event Assessment; 21-A-0468 v3 January 3, 2021 Final)

On Wednesday, January 6, 2021, the 117th United State Congress will gather for a joint session in the chamber of the House of Representatives to certify the counting of the electoral votes. The President of the Senate, Vice President of the United States (VPOTUS) Michael Pence, is the presiding officer. If a senator and a representative jointly submit an objection, each would retire to its chamber to consider it. The President and Vice President must achieve a majority of electoral votes (i.e., at least 270 votes) to be elected. In the absence of a majority, the House selects the President, and the Senate selects the Vice President.

**Expected Protests Overview:**

A number of individuals and groups are calling for their supporters to travel to Washington, DC, on or before January 6, 2021, to show support for POTUS and for overturning the election results. The protests/rallies are expected to be similar to the previous Million MAGA March rallies in November and December 2020, which drew tens of thousands of participants. It is also expected that members of the Proud Boys (who intend to wear plainclothes and not their traditional yellow and black clothing)<sup>13</sup>, white supremacist groups,<sup>14</sup> Antifa, and other extremist groups will rally on January 6, 2021. Multiple arrests were made as a result of clashes between pro-Trump and opposing groups during each of the November and December rallies. Charges included assault with a dangerous weapon, assault on police, simple assault, weapons violations, riotous acts, and destruction of property, disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and crossing a police line. A number of law enforcement officers were injured in the skirmishes. Many of the confrontations occurred after the rallies ended.

**Threat Analysis:**

Member Threats:

At this time there are no specific known threats related to the Joint Session of Congress – Electoral College Vote Certification.

CDU Action Plan: Joint Session-Electoral College Vote Certification

***CDU Operational Plan***

210043

**Current Permitted Events for this operational period:****Donald, You're Fired March on DC**

Location: U.S. Capitol to White House

Date: January 6, 2021

Time: 1200 – 1500 hours

Organizer: I Approve This Message

Attendance: Unknown

Description: On January 6th, 2021, at 12:00 p.m. Eastern Time, We, the People will convene at the steps of the United States Capitol to witness this momentous occasion. Upon the declaration the results of the 2020 elections, held on November 3rd, 2020, We the People will proceed, peacefully and safely, from the Capitol Building to the White House to deliver the message to Mr. Trump, "Donald, You're Fired!"

**Patriots United March**

Location: U.S. Capitol (exact location TBD)

Date: January 6, 2021

Time: 1200 hours

Organizer: Patriot Party and Pat King

Attendance: Unknown (approximately 350 going or interested in going)

Description: Congress meets this day to confirm the electoral votes from the states. They must know that We, the People will not sit idly by without a full accounting for every legal vote cast on November 3rd. March for Election Integrity. March for the Constitution. March to Save America. Come to Washington and meet us at the base of the Capitol.

Women for America First have submitted permit applications with the USCP, MPD and the National Park Service.

**NPS: Freedom Plaza and Lincoln Memorial (proposed locations); est 5,000 participants:**

January 5, 2021- 1200-1800 hrs

January 6, 2021- 1200-1700 hrs

January 7, 2021- 0600-1000 hrs

**MPD Application for Parade Permit; est 50 participant:**

January 6, 2021; Rally Area Freedom Plaza 1200 hrs; dispersal area US Capitol; disband 1400 hrs.

Route-Freedom Plaza-Pennsylvania Ave-Constitution Ave-US Capitol

No planned Civil Disobedience or Arrests

**USCP Permit Application; 50 participants:**

January 6, 2021; March/Rally for Election integrity 0800-1500 hrs; march from Freedom Plaza with Area 15 Union Square as the US Capitol destination

**Command/Control:**

Deputy Chief Waldow will serve as the Incident Commander Unit 6 202.369.9244

Captain Newell will serve as the Field Force Commander Unit 100 202.384.7198

CDU Action Plan: Joint Session-Electoral College Vote Certification

## *CDU Operational Plan*

210043

The on-duty Field Force commander will direct all actions related to CDU to include the donning of helmets, shields, and other appropriate PPE

Duty Deputy week of December 7, 2020 is Deputy Chief Bowen 202.631.4055

JOCC Operational TBD

### Communications:

Main Ops 2

### Mission Objectives:

1. To provide an environment in which lawful first amendment activity can be safely demonstrated.
2. To prevent any adverse impact to the legislative process associated with unlawful demonstration activity.
3. To effectively mitigate actions associated with civil disorder; safely respond to crimes of violence and destruction/defacing of property.
4. To safeguard and prevent any property damage directed at the US Capitol, West Front Inaugural Platform, and all Congressional buildings.
5. Establish and maintain a fixed march route while excluding access to counter-protestors to minimize potential for violent interactions.

Deployment strategies for CDU assets will include monitoring demonstration/protest activity and providing timely response to address and mitigate any threats posed. CDU Requirements; 4 Hard Platoons; less than lethal options to be deployed will include FN-303 and the PepperBall launcher systems; each provide chemical irritant capability and impact energy to address crowd dispersal requirements and/or to address violent offenders behavior.

### Legislative Considerations:

The Department has not received formal notification of any Leadership, Members or Senators participating in protest activity. Any participating member is subject to similar enforcement action prescribed to all participants; information is provided for protective operations and Member security as outlined in USCP mission.

Actions taken by Congressional members inside of the Congressional buildings may be considered part of their official duties; as such, the on scene supervisor will consult with the Field Force Commander and the OGC before taking any enforcement actions.

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The US Senate is expected to be in session during this operational period (excluding Sunday). DPD will provide information related to Senate Leadership that may require CDU consideration.

The US House is expected to be in session during this operational period (excluding Sunday). DPD will provide information related to House Leadership that may require CDU consideration.

**USCP Legal Team:** The OGC poc is Mr. Tad DiBiase; 202.631.4532; OGC will be on-call for this event on Sunday and on site as needed. Mr. Aaron Wilensky will be on site with an SOD commander for January 6, 2021 events.

COVID Precautions as outlined by the Pandemic Working Group (PWG):

- Most importantly mask should/must be worn at all times. They may be removed if actively eating or drinking, but this should occur socially distant. Officers should be encouraged to not eat/take breaks in groups where masks are off and social distance is difficult (restaurants, break rooms, etc).
- The Squad Sergeants should ensure all members of their squad have all of the proper PPE...masks, gloves, sanitizer. Identify the Officers with N95 masks in case sick arrestees are encountered.
- All briefings related to these operations, roll call or otherwise, should be held virtually or by squad. Grouping everyone together should be avoided when possible, especially for staging or administrative reasons. We realize CDU operations in the field on the "line" must occur, which is why isolating by squads helps is contain potential exposures to a smaller group.
- While officers are staged, social distancing will need to be strictly enforced and masks should be worn at all times unless the officers are actively eating or drinking.
- **All COVID procedures for medically screening 61D detainees and/or custodial arrests need to be followed.** In regards to exterior pens/interview lines for 61D arrests, to the extent possible, there should be enough space to allow for 6 feet of space between prisoners during each stage of the process. Prisoners will be given a mask and directed to don it if they are not in possession of a mask.
- If buses are used to transport and stage officers during CDU operations, occupancy should be limited to 1 squad at a time. The bus driver should be supplied with antiseptic wipes that can be distributed to officers as they board so they can sanitize their seating areas. Masks should be worn at all times unless actively eating or drinking.
- It is very important that processing prisoners through the 61 D process eliminates the need for prisoner transports and the need for subsequent disinfection of transport vehicles. This will save time and reduce exposure to the public and employees
- If 67 K is used to house prisoners and their numbers do not allow for adequate social distancing within the garage, they may need to be staged in pens outside (similar to the 61D process). Masks, hand sanitizer, and other appropriate PPE should be readily available.
- If USCP HQ is used to house prisoners, only 5 of them could be held in prisoner processing at one time. The remaining prisoners would need to be staged in pens outside

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of USCP HQ (similar to the 61D process) or elsewhere within the building to allow for adequate social distancing. Masks, hand sanitizer, and other appropriate PPE should be readily available. (Bike racks are available at HQ)

- SOD has coordinating with PAMD to ensure sufficient PPE and hand sanitizer remain available. **SOD TO ENSURE TEMPGUN IS DEPLOYED WITH TRANSPORT VEHICLES DURING THIS EVENT.**

### Staffing Plan

CDU Field Force Commander: Captain Newell Unit 100

SOD Support Branch	Supervisor	Radio	Cell
SOD CDU Documentation CSS Team	Sgt. Gallagher	122G	202.834.3420
SOD Traffic Branch Supervisor	Sgt. Ford	122F	202.631.3992
SOD Less Than Lethal Supervisor	Sgt. Sprifke	122S	202.891.8218
SOD Mass Arrest Supervisor	Sgt. Ewing	122E	202.369.0944

Less Than Lethal Grenadiers	System	Platoon Attachment	Radio	Pre-Stage Location
Sgt. DesCamp	FN-303	1	CDU 90	East Front/First Street
Ofc. Kerkhoff	PepperBall	1	CDU 91	East Front/First Street
Sgt. Breen	FN-303	2	CDU 92	Response/Area 15/Avenues
Ofc. Buhaj	PepperBall	2	CDU 93	Response/Area 15/Avenues
Sgt. Cobert	FN-303	3	CDU 94	South Barricade/Indp. Ave.
Officer Sorrell	PepperBall	3	CDU 95	South Barricade/Indp. Ave.
Sgt. Flood	FN-303	4	CDU 96	North Barricade/Conn Ave.
Sgt. Sprifke	PepperBall	4	CDU 97	North Barricade/Conn Ave.

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CDU report times and staffing numbers are current as of January 5, 2021 at 1300 hours. A final staffing report is to be completed by the platoon commanders and the roll call status sent to the IC/Field Force Commander and the Operations email account after they have completed roll calls.

Platoon	Posture	Reporting Time	#officers	#officials	Area of Responsibility
1	Hard	0800 hrs.	22	Lt. Brooks + 2 Sgts and 2 Acting Sgts	East Front/First Street NE/SE
2	Hard	0800 hrs.	37	Lt. Kelly D +3 Sgts. And 1 Acting Sgt	Response; monitor Area 15 and Avenues; refer to map to support bike rack placement as needed
3	Soft/Hard Combo	1000	Squads 1/3 soft (20) Squads 2/4 hard (20)	Lt. Vias + 4 Sgts	South Barricade/Indp. Ave; ensure bike rack is in place at all cutouts
4	Hard	1000	40	Lt. Orquiza	North Barricade/Constitution Ave.; ensure bike rack is in place at all cutouts
5	Returned to CD				
6	Soft	0800	40	Lt. Kelley J.P + 4 Sgts.	Plaza
7	Soft	1200	35	Lt. Mohammad +2 Acting Sgts.	North Barricade/Constitution Ave; ensure bike rack is in place at all cutouts
8	Soft	1200	31	Lt. Wilson +2 Sgts	Monitor for any march activity; deploy to any known counter- groups; restage Senate Plaza/Area 9
			245 Officers	6 Lts.; 12 Sgts.; 15 Acting Sgts;5	

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### Tactical Response/Counter-Sniper Over-watch

CERT will deploy an 8-person counter-assault ground team and will stage on elevated platforms to provide counter-sniper operations; likely posts include US Capitol Dome; east and west sides.

Team Leader Sgt. Gallery: Intelligence note; numerous social media posts include promoting attending protest activity armed. CS teams will be monitoring for participants open carry and potentially concealed.

HIRD CDU Support Branch: HAZMAT/IED Event Commander: Cpt. Pickett Unit 600

HIRD Support Branch	Supervisor	Radio	Cell
HMRT Force Decon	Commander Sprifke	630	631-4316
HDS Response Team	Sgt. Gutierrez	622G	631.4494

### Cut/Extraction Team:

Event site commander will assess incident and determine if within USCP capabilities; otherwise, DC Fire/EMS will be notified in the event protestors link themselves together or to fixed objects with chains. USCP will attempt to address any subjects who zip-tie themselves or handcuff themselves to another person(s) or item.

DC Department of Public Works will be contacted for relocating any vehicles that pose a risk or adversely impact this event; notification through the JOCC or direct line 202.737.4404; USCP will need to ticket vehicle.

### Use of Force (USCP Directive 1020.004)

All officers and supervisors will follow the Department's Use of Force policy. Unless exigent circumstances justify immediate action, officers will not independently make arrests or employ force without command authorization.

For this event the CDU Field Force Commander will have the primary responsibility to authorize less than lethal options; exigent circumstances will dictate other lawful deployment of less than lethal options. Observed illegal actions will be documented over the radio, an announcement of a declared unlawful assembly with civil disorder will be announced and notification to officers will be provided of the pending deployments.

Impact projectiles will not be fired indiscriminately into crowds.

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Reporting requirements for Use of Force events will be completed by employees and USCP witnesses prior to release for their tour of duty; as in all cases, the Watch Commander will be notified upon each use of force event.

Platoon Commanders will immediately notify the Field Force Commander of any Use of Force events as they occur.

In any circumstance in which an officer physically controls any participants (marchers or counter-protestors) use of force protocol will be initiated.

### Medical Care (USCP Directive 1020.004 Use of Force)

DC Fire will not be pre-staged on the Capitol Grounds for this event. FEMS has a command post set up with USPP at District 1. Notification through the USCP dispatch will be initiated for a medical response. However, if warnings are initiated for chemical munition deployment DC Fire is to be notified for response and staging. Additionally, the DC National Guard will stage a HAZMAT response team in the area of Washington Monument.

The attending physician's office will not be initiated for medical calls related to demonstration activity for this event.

Officers and supervisors are required to obtain appropriate medical aid as soon as possible or practical for individuals:

- a. Who show signs of any injury as a result of use of force
- b. Who complain of an injury as a result of use of force
- c. Who become unconscious either during or following any use of force
- d. When the officer or supervisor believes an individual is in need of medical evaluation as a result of use of force

Appropriate medical aid may include increased observation to detect obvious changes in condition, flushing OC spray from the eyes, applying first aid, evaluation by paramedics, or for more serious or life-threatening incidents, immediate aid by medical professionals.

HMRT will be available for officer rehabilitation and related medical monitoring. HMRT will manage mobile field force decontamination capabilities.

### Crowd Management:

Each shift a designated SOD official will monitor for crowd surges or movements associated with protest activity and will assign motors and scouts to allow for the safe passage of pedestrians. USCP will take appropriate measures to obtain compliance with the protestors with regards to using sidewalks and remaining off of the roadway to the extent possible. In the event the protest group size exceeds our capability to obtain compliance, motors and scouts will create

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a "box" around the mobile protest group and will block approaching traffic to mitigate any vehicle pedestrian collision.

SOD will initiate traffic cuts along the march facilitating access into Area 15 Union Square from 3<sup>rd</sup> Street NW (Intelligence notes indicate there are no planned marches. However, we should anticipate participants marching from the Ellipse and National Mall at the conclusion of those events).

As platoons come in service they will respond to their designated areas of responsibility and sweep areas for hazards to include construction material and other potentially dangerous potential projectiles (ie bricks, stones, bottles, large branches, etc). Additionally, assigned platoons will ensure the bike rack along Constitution Ave. and Independence Ave. are in place correctly; to include pedestrian cutouts along the drives (bike rack is staged in those locations).

All counter-protestors will be relocated outside of the march perimeter (refer to map).

As counter-protestors traverse Capitol Grounds, SOD motors will trail the respective groups. Additionally, as they engage physical barriers (bike racks); Platoon Commanders will direct additional resources from their platoons as needed; SOD to support maintaining the integrity of the perimeter. Platoon Commanders need to be mindful of locations without bike rack or building structures serving as fixed barrier; counter-protestors will be expected to attempt to gain access by entering shrubbery and other natural fixtures. **Platoon commanders will rapidly deploy officers to stop and provide verbal direction for them to exit the perimeter and physically remove counter-protestors as needed.** Platoon commanders will update USCP communications on actions and observations related to crossing established barriers/police lines. **Warnings will be initiated prior to arrests.**

**Bike Rack:**

- Map attached for reference

**Heavy Block Vehicles:** Not requested for this operational period.

**SOD Block Vehicles:** For march arrival; supplement MPD on 3<sup>rd</sup> Street SW and NW as needed

Barricades A,B,C and D to be posted by SOD. Authorized permit holders allowed access onto Maryland Ave. SW, Pennsylvania Ave. NW and First Street SW/NW. Assigned officers will restrict pedestrian access to outside of the bike rack perimeter. CDU to support as requested based on crowd convergence. Assigned platoons will ensure the bike rack is put in place to reinforce restricted access leading to the West Front; bike rack is staged outside Maryland Ave. walkway and Pennsylvania Ave. walkway.

**Emergency No Parking Request:** Not requested for this operational period.

For this event it is anticipated that a march will likely progress into the Capitol Grounds from the NW with an MPD escort. USCP SOD will coordinate the hand-off at Third Street and will continue to provide a box around the march participants. Designated CDU platoons will move

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with the marchers; if counter-protest groups are present the CDU teams will mirror the counter-protest groups movements and will enforce a denial of entry into the designated march route and destination (Area 15) the USCP is facilitating; SOD motors will support any march as well. For this event we will NOT facilitate a march around the US Capitol. Women For America will be directed to assemble in Area 15. If an attempt to march continues CDU and SOD will initiate a wall and redirect onto sidewalks and park areas, with temporary traffic closures as needed to ensure pedestrian safety. Platoon commanders will discuss with event marshals their intended destination and provide alternate options around the avenues.

In the event the protestors implement a road closure tactic the CDU commander will direct sufficient CDU resources to establish a perimeter and monitor the crowd while attempts to ascertain intent from event organizers is initiated by the assigned or responsible Platoon commander. Arrests for incommoding and blocking passage will be determined by the IC in consultation with the Field Force commander.

The CDU truck will remain operational and in-service during this operational period. Based on intelligence and observed actions a need to pre-stage shields at strategic locations will be made.

### Deployment Strategy:

Hard Platoons will pre-stage their protective gear in proximity to their staging locations (busses). Hard platoon members and OSB CDU support will have access to their laser eyewear protection on their person. The primary focus will be to maintain the security perimeter of the United States Capitol and the security perimeter established for the march route entering US Capitol Grounds from the NW with an arrival destination to the Area 15.

A determination to don hard gear will be made daily; depending on the presence of counter-groups and the reported interactions between the opposing groups.

Each platoon will have an arrest kit immediately available. Platoon commanders will have bull-horns or vehicle pa systems immediately available to provide warnings, give direction and to facilitate crowd movement and egress.

The IC will record over the USCP radio documenting the establishment of any police lines.

SOD patrols will manage US Capitol monument/grounds security operations; for example The Grant Memorial, Peace Memorial, Garfield Memorial, Taft Memorial, and surrounding Congressional parks and gardens. SOD will have approximately 20 officers supporting operations and routine.

CSS will be pre-deployed and ready to document as needed.

CERT will have deploy counter-sniper teams capable of monitoring events on the West and East Front.

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If the intended destination of the Women for America First is Area 15 Union Square. In the event of an attempted or anticipated West Front action; CDU squads will be deployed to establish a police line using the excess bike rack at the west end of each walk-way. A police line will be established prior to the walk-ways in order to utilize the existing Olmstead Wall as an additional physical barrier to manage the crowd convergence. **The line will be held and access will be denied to the West Front.**

Squads assigned to the Plaza will be mindful of demonstration activity such as banner hanging and will prevent attempts and/or direct the removal of existing banners/signage (not including hand-held).

Platoons assigned to the East Front will monitor the crowd for criminal activity, ie open carry firearms, concealed carry, assaults, etc. Members of Congress are expected to speak at events in area 8 and 9. CDU will support the safe movements of the Members of Congress and work directly with DPD in the event any leadership participate.

Additionally, less than lethal grenadiers will be pre-positioned to address crowd dispersal requirements in the event of an attempted breach of the East and West Front restricted area poses an immediate risk to officers on the police line and the demonstrated potential for violence and damage to property; in particular the Inaugural Platform.

The CDU Truck will pre-stage shields at key locations as determined on a daily basis.

### Crowd Dispersal

Before ordering forced dispersal of a civil disturbance, the IC will consider lesser alternatives to achieve order, ie containment and dialogue with event organizers.

Prior to forced dispersal the IC will ensure all potentially necessary law enforcement, fire and EMS equipment and personnel are on hand to successfully carry out the tactical operation. Additionally, the IC will announce on the USCP radio observed behaviors and will request the CSS Documentation Team and will request the WC fix the security cameras on their location prior to forced dispersal operations.

Crowd dispersal methodology will include verbal commands using amplification methods (ie bull horn/PA system). In the event violent agitators are observed; and or a riot is declared the CDU commander will notify communications as such and will initiate a warning to the violent crowd; thereafter if compliance has not been achieved and the violence continues an order to utilize the Pepperball and FN-303 systems may be issued. Non-direct and direct-fired munitions from the systems will be deployed to disperse the crowd and to support efforts to effect arrests of the violent agitator(s).

Violent agitators will be addressed with either the Pepper Ball system or the FN-303 for purposes of immediately stopping their violent actions and for marking purposes for safe apprehension attempts most likely by a designated armored-up arrest team. Officers equipped with personal-carry Saber Red will utilize in accordance with Use of Force policy.

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**Mass Arrest:** Arrests are not anticipated for this event; as such mass arrests remains on standby but all attempts to process arrestees in an exterior location will be made. Note, supervisors should anticipate reports of assault and be prepared to assign officers to take the police report.

At this time, the city has not identified any specific facility or location designed or designated to secure a large number of arrestees outside of our normal arrest processing procedure.

**Medical Plan:**

DC Fire/EMS will not be staged on the Capitol Grounds for this event. Request for medical services will be managed through USCP communications.

**Field Force Protection/Rehabilitation:**

USCP HMRT will remain operational and available for force decontamination, medical health/welfare and responder rehabilitation to the extent possible. DC Fire/EMS will remain the primary medical health care provider.

On January 6, 2021, PAMD will pre-stage 20 cases of water on the north side of the north skylight on the Plaza 0800 hrs. Platoons will secure cases of water as they take their posts; additional to be stored on their respective busses/vehicle platforms.

**Weather:**

Wednesday January 6, 2021

Sunrise 0726 hours  
Mostly Sunny 46 degrees F  
Winds 10-20 MPH NW  
6% chance of rain

Sunset 1701 hours  
Partly Cloudy 30 degrees F  
Winds 10-15 MPH NNW  
4% chance of rain

**Facilities and Logistics:** (Director Tom Madigan is the designated poc 202.369.2531-on-call for Sunday)

67 Kst will serve as the mass arrest location for more than 20 prisoners; absent a 61D process

USCP HQ will serve as the prisoner processing location for less than 20 prisoners

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VMD has provided light towers; 1 at each skylight on the Plaza and 1 on the south portion of the West Front and 1 on the north portion of the West Front.

VMD operational 0600-1700 hrs.  
PAMD operational 0600-1700 hrs.  
OFL operational 0900-1700 hrs.

### Mutual Aid:

Internal support for intelligence dissemination will continue through the Protective Service Bureau. Pin color for the week of January 3 is WHITE. Plainclothes officers will be operations and will be serving in an intelligence collection capacity. Plainclothes officers may also alert USCP communications of observed criminal activity requiring uniformed officers to initiate stops/contacts/preliminary investigations/arrests.

Intelligence Section POC Captain Mitchell 202.384.8720

No request for outside support has been made for this event. USCP LNO's will provide situational reports from outside agencies such as MPD and US Park.

### Permitted Demonstration Activity:

APPROVED – 10,000 Small Business Voices, Collin Radix-Carter, Bryan Lewis, Rock Ministries Church International  
PENDING – Women for a Great America, Moms for America, Jesus Lives (Jo Reitkopp), Virginia Freedom Keepers, One Nation Under God

### Monday, January 4, 2021

#### 1) Area 10 – East Front

- a. Women for a Great America – **PENDING** (This demo is scheduled for 1/4/2021-1/10/2021)
- b. 0700-1600 hours
- c. 30 participants
- d. The spokesperson advises the purpose of the event is to “pray and worship for our nation.”
- e. Actual event time is 0700-1600 hours

#### 2) Area 10 – East Front

- a. 10,000 Small Business Voices - APPROVED
- b. 2100-2030 hours (Overnight)
- c. 30 participants
- d. The spokesperson advises the purpose of the event is “small business owners from across the country are requesting action from the U.S. Congress.”
- e. Actual event time will be Tuesday, January 5, 2021 (0500 – 1700 hours).

#### 3) Area 14 – Between S. Cap. St./NJ Ave & C St./D St., SE

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- a. Collin Radix-Carter - APPROVED
- b. 0900-1200 hours
- c. 50 participants
- d. The spokesperson advises the purpose of the event is "to encourage the progressive caucus of Congress to #ForceTheVote on Medicare for All."
- e. Actual event time is 0900-1200 hours

### Tuesday, January 5, 2021

- 1) Area 9 – East Front
  - a. Moms for America – PENDING
  - b. 0900-1800 hours
  - c. 50 participants
  - d. The spokesperson advises participants are gathering "to support election integrity."
  - e. Actual event time is 1100-1600 hours
- 2) Area 10 – East Front
  - a. 10,000 Small Business Voices - APPROVED
  - b. 2100 (Monday)-2030 (Tuesday) hours
  - c. 30 participants
  - d. The spokesperson advises the purpose of the event is "small business owners from across the country are requesting action from the U.S. Congress."
  - e. Actual event time will be Tuesday, January 5, 2021 (0500 – 1700 hours).
- 3) Area 11 – East Front
  - a. Women for a Great America – PENDING (This demo is scheduled for 1/4/2021-1/10/2021)
  - b. 0700-2220 hours
  - c. 50 participants
  - d. The spokesperson advises the purpose of the event is to "pray and worship for our nation."
  - e. Actual event time is 0700-2200 hours
- 4) Area 1 – West Lawn (Area 15 on Wed, 1/6/2021)
  - a. Jesus Lives (Jo Reitkopp) - PENDING
  - b. 0900-1900 hours
  - c. 50 participants
  - d. The spokesperson advises it's a "Christian prayer event praying for our country with Christian Music and possibly pastors speaking. Also we want to pray for the people who need prayer."
  - e. Actual event time is 1200 – 1700 hours

### Wednesday, January 6, 2021

- 1) Area 7 - Between First St./Del Ave & C St./D St., NE
  - a. Virginia Freedom Keepers - PENDING
  - b. 0600-1800 hours
  - c. 50 participants

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- d. The spokesperson advised that this event is in regard to "First Amendment rights in association with informed consent for health and vaccination."
  - e. Actual event time will be 1000 - 1600 hours.
- 2) Area 8 – East Front
- a. One Nation Under God - **PENDING**
  - b. 0800-1800 hours
  - c. 50 participants
  - d. The spokesperson advises this is a "First Amendment protest demonstration with different speakers from Congress and Political Organizations."
  - e. Actual event time is TBD.
- 3) Area 9 – East Front
- a. Bryan Lewis - **APPROVED**
  - b. 0830-1700 hours
  - c. 50 participants
  - d. The spokesperson advises participants are gathering to "urge Congress to nullify votes from states that made illegal changes to voting rules during their elections."
  - e. Actual event time will be 0830 – 1700 hours.
- 4) Area 10 – East Front
- a. Women for a Great America - **PENDING**
  - b. 0700-2200 hours
  - c. 50 participants
  - d. The spokesperson advises this is a "First Amendment platform – prayer and worship for our nation."
  - e. Actual event time is TBD
- 5) Area 11 – East Front
- a. Rock Ministries Church International - **APPROVED**
  - b. 1200-1900 hours
  - c. 50 participants
  - d. The spokesperson advises participants are gathering for a "prayer campaign encouraging pastors, leaders and citizens to pray for the United States."
  - e. Actual event time is 1200 – 1900 hours
- 6) Area 13 – Union Square
- a. Jesus Lives (Jo Reitkopp) - **PENDING**
  - b. 1000-1900 hours
  - c. 50 participants
  - d. The spokesperson advises it's a "Christian prayer event praying for our country with Christian Music and possibly pastors speaking. Also we want to pray for the people who need prayer."
  - e. Actual event time is 1200 – 1700 hours

### CDU Staffing Plan:

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
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The Resource Tool has been populated by the USB divisions; Platoon commanders will provide the field force commander a daily roll call sheet providing accountability of those assigned to their platoons soon after completion of roll call. Those failing to report for their CDU assignment should be documented in accordance with existing procedure.

**Demobilization:** The CDU field force commander will release the platoons back to their divisions at the conclusion of the protest activity. This operation may include a 6 hour period of operation for each CDU platoon; the Field Force Commander will and/or Watch Commander will determine the release of activated units.

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## *Special Event Assessment*



### Joint Session of Congress – Electoral College Vote Certification

#### Bottom Line Up Front:

- On Wednesday, January 6, 2021, the 117<sup>th</sup> United States Congress will gather for a joint session in the chamber of the House of Representatives to certify the counting of the electoral votes.
- There are some representatives and senators who plan to challenge the votes during this session, which will allow the objection to move forward.<sup>1 2</sup>
- The Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division is currently tracking several protests slated to take place on Capitol grounds and elsewhere in Washington, DC, on January 5, 2021, and January 6, 2021, and some protesters have indicated they plan to be armed. There is also indication that white supremacist groups may be attending the protests.<sup>3</sup>
- Detailed information concerning potential counter-protest activity is limited.

#### Event Summary:

On Wednesday, January 6, 2021, the 117<sup>th</sup> United States Congress will gather for a joint session in the chamber of the House of Representatives to certify the counting of the electoral votes. The President of the Senate, Vice President of the United States (VPOTUS) Michael Pence, is the presiding officer. If a senator and a representative jointly submit an objection, each would retire to its chamber to consider it. The President and Vice President must achieve a majority of electoral votes (i.e., at least 270 votes) to be elected. In the absence of a majority, the House selects the President, and the Senate selects the Vice President.<sup>4</sup> If neither candidate achieves the required 270 vote minimum, the House then decides the election in accordance with the 12th Amendment of the Constitution. Each state would get one vote with a minimum of 26 votes deciding the winner.

- *Analyst Comment: Several representatives plan to challenge the Electoral College votes when Congress officially certifies Joe Biden's victory on January 6, 2021, as long as a Senate Republican joins them in the long-shot effort.<sup>5 6</sup> Approximately twelve senators have indicated they will join the representatives in objecting to the Electoral College results;<sup>7</sup> however, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) has warned the Senate of taking such an action.<sup>8</sup>*

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## *Special Event Assessment*

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*It should be noted that all 538 electors met Monday, December 14, 2020, in their respective states to cast their votes for president based on the election results that were certified by all 50 states and Washington, D.C.<sup>9</sup>*

*On Tuesday, December 15, 2020, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) officially recognized Joseph Biden as the President-Elect, the day after the Electoral College certified the votes.<sup>10</sup>*

*On Friday, January 1, 2021, U.S. District Court Judge Jeremy Kenedy, who was appointed by President Donald Trump, dismissed a lawsuit filed by Representative Louie Gohmert (R-TX) and 11 Arizona Republicans that attempted to give Vice President Mike Pence the ability to overturn the results of the November presidential election won by Joe Biden. The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the same lawsuit down on Saturday, January 2, 2021.<sup>11</sup>*

*In an interview Friday evening on pro-Trump news network Newsmax, Representative Gohmert claimed that letting the will of the voters stand would "mean the end of our republic, the end of the experiment in self-government." Representative Gohmert then seemed to encourage violence as a means to this end. "But bottom line is, the court is saying, 'We're not going to touch this. You have no remedy—basically, in effect, the ruling would be that you gotta go to the streets and be as violent as Antifa and BLM."<sup>12</sup>*

#### **Expected Protests Overview:**

A number of individuals and groups are calling for their supporters to travel to Washington, DC, on or before January 6, 2021, to show support for POTUS and for overturning the election results. The protests/rallies are expected to be similar to the previous Million MAGA March rallies in November and December 2020, which drew tens of thousands of participants. It is also expected that members of the Proud Boys (who intend to wear plainclothes and not their traditional yellow and black clothing)<sup>13</sup>, white supremacist groups,<sup>14</sup> Antifa, and other extremist groups will rally on January 6, 2021. Multiple arrests were made as a result of clashes between pro-Trump and opposing groups during each of the November and December rallies. Charges included assault with a dangerous weapon, assault on police, simple assault, weapons violations, riotous acts, and destruction of property, disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and crossing a police line. A number of law enforcement officers were injured in the skirmishes. Many of the confrontations occurred after the rallies ended.

#### **Pro-Trump Protests:**

Women for America First (WAF) is organizing another bus tour that began on December 27, 2020, in Ventura, CA, and will be arriving in Washington, DC, on January 6, 2021, for a rally<sup>15</sup>. A banner on the webpage states, "The President is calling for us to come back to Washington on January 6<sup>th</sup> for a big protest – 'Be There, Will Be Wild.'" WAF filed a permit with the U.S. Park Service for 5,000 participants for January 6, 2021, to gather at the Ellipse (southern quadrants). POTUS will be speaking at the Ellipse event and the White House is actively participating in the planning of this event. Several Members of Congress have been invited to attend, but being that Congress will be in session on that day, they may not be able to participate. No members have confirmed participation in this event at the time of the writing of this assessment.

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Freedom Plaza will be used for a prayer service at 0900 hours. The USCP Special Events Section (SES) advised that WAF filed a permit request for Union Square (Area 15) for 50 participants, but later withdrew that request.

No groups are expected to march and all are planning to stay in their designated areas.

Analyst Comment: *Cindy Chafian, who had been the organizer with Women for America First, has since been removed by the organization. The new point of contact is Kylie Kremer. Ms. Chafian is currently planning a separate protest at the Freedom Plaza location on January 5, 2020. Ms. Chafian now says she is part of the "Eighty Percent Coalition". The organization's website indicates it will be protesting on January 5, 2021, on Freedom Plaza.<sup>16</sup>*

Confirmed speakers for this event are:

*Alex Jones (InfoWars)  
George Papadopoulos (Former Member of President Trump's Foreign Policy Advisory Panel)  
Roger Stone (Conservative Political Consultant)  
Bernard Kerik (40<sup>th</sup> NYC Police Commissioner)  
Pastor Mark Burns*

"Stop the Steal" has posted a webpage entitled "wildprotest.com" that includes a map of the Capitol grounds indicating they will be gathering on the Senate East Front Grassy Area 8 on January 6, 2021.

Analyst Comment: *Permits for Areas 8 and 9 have been requested by One Nation Under God (Area 8) and private citizen Bryan Lewis (Area 9) and there is some speculation they are being used as proxies for Stop the Steal. Both permit requesters indicate they will have 50 participants each at their protests.*

*Stop the Steal has a website <http://www.wildprotest.com> that instructs its followers to gather in/around Area 8 on Capitol grounds on 1/6. A map is included on the website showing the exact location where protesters should gather.<sup>17</sup> It also lists several speakers and many of those speakers are the same as the flyer provided to USCP by One Nation Under God, including Members of Congress. One Nation Under God, when IICD spoke to the organizer to do our assessment, said they were incorporated as an organization for this event only.*

The Stop the Steal/Wild Protest webpage states "We the People must take to the U.S. Capitol lawn and steps . . ." They plan to show support for the Members of Congress who are expected to file objections to the certification of the electoral vote. This protests has also been promoted by POTUS. They list the following speakers as confirmed to participate in this event:

*Rep. Paul Gosar (R-AZ)  
Alex Bruesewitz (Journalist)  
Megan Barth (Political Commentator)  
All Alexander (Head of Stop the Steal)*

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Scott Presler (Conservative Activist)  
 Jenny Beth Martin (Tea Party Patriots Founder)  
 Vernon Jones (Former Democratic Georgia State Representative)  
 Brandon Straka (Leader of the WalkAway Campaign)  
 State Rep. Mark Finchem (R-AZ)  
 State Senator Doug Mastriano (R-NJ)  
 Shemeka Michelle (Author and Activist)  
 Ed Martin (Political Commentator)  
 CJ Pearson (Conservative Activist)  
 Rose Tennet (Host of *Rose Unplugged*)  
 Michael Coudrey (Businessman)  
 Kimberly Fletcher (Founder of Moms for America)  
 Melissa Tate (Social Media Influencer)

The webpage also lists several hotels including the Holiday Inn Washington Capitol (550 C St. SW), Washington Marriott at Metro Center (775 12<sup>th</sup> St NW), and the Holiday Inn Alexandria at Carlyle (Alexandria, VA). MPD has also reported generally that hotels in the DC area are reporting a significant increase in the number of bookings on/around January 6, 2021. According to MPD officials, area hotels are reporting a 60%-100% increase in bookings compared to bookings for the weekend of December 12, 2020. On December 29, 2020, Hotel Harrington, a hotel popular with members of the Proud Boys and white supremacists, announced plans to be closed January 4-6, 2021.<sup>18</sup> Harry's Pub, located within Hotel Harrington, had previously announced it would be closed January 5-6, 2021.<sup>19</sup>

The "wildprotest.com" website also promotes "Patriot Caravans for 45,"<sup>20</sup> which is organizing ridesharing to Washington, DC, for the January 6, 2021 protests/rallies. They are also organizing protests at state capitols and city halls throughout the country. As of January 3, 2020, there are nearly 1,500 posts requesting/offering rides or to caravan from states as far away as Washington and Oregon. This site is being widely shared on social media.

There are also several other permit requests pending with the USCP for this day. SES advised a number of people contacted them regarding filing permits for January 6, 2021, for Capitol Grounds. Bryan Lewis filed for the Senate East Front Grassy Area 9 for 50 participants and Women For a Great America (WFGA)/50+ Days of Blessings filed for the House East Front Grassy Area 10 for 50 participants for January 4, 6, 7, 8, and Area 11 on January 5, 2021. The New York Apostolic Prayer Network (NYAPN) filed an application for January 4 – 10, 2021, for 50 participants. The location of the event is still being worked through with SES as of this writing. The One Nation Under God Foundation filed an application for January 6, 2021, for Area 8 between 0830 and 1800 hrs. Virginia Freedom Keepers filed an application for January 6, 2021, for 50 participants for Area 7 from 0600-1800 hrs. SES advised the applications are in process and should be moving forward soon.

Analyst Comment: The previously reported Patriots United March for Congress has been deleted and the Patriots United website no longer contains any information about this event; therefore, this event has been removed from the list of protests scheduled for January 6, 2021.

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There have been several social media posts encouraging protesters to be armed.<sup>21-23</sup> Sam Andrews from the Freedom Center USA recently appeared on *The Hagmann Report* podcast calling for armed individuals to assemble in Washington, DC, beginning on January 4, 2021, to demand answers on election fraud. He advised listeners to travel in large, armed groups to discourage law enforcement action against armed individuals. When asked by the moderator if Andrews was organizing this event, Andrews replied he is not organizing anything and is just encouraging "concerned Americans to travel to DC" to exercise their first and second amendment rights. Andrews goes on to say if 500,000 armed citizens are in Washington, the police would "have a whole different attitude" and would not be able to attack the armed citizens.<sup>23</sup>

*Analyst Comment:* On January 1, 2021, Arlington County (Virginia) Police arrested Moses Gerl M/W/38 of Weedsport, New York for several firearms offenses.<sup>24</sup> At the time of his arrest, he reportedly said he traveled from New York State to "protect Donald Trump on January 6<sup>th</sup>". Mr. Gerl is incarcerated awaiting a court hearing on January 5, 2021. USCP has prepared a BOLO in the event Mr. Gerl is released on that date. A search of the name through USCP-WebRMS were negative.

On December 31, 2020, a posting on Parler by Lochlan Simmons (@Lochlansimmons)<sup>25</sup> is encouraging protestors that are coming to Washington, D.C on January 6<sup>th</sup> to come armed with rifles that are equivalent to a .300 Winchester Magnum and up, bring gas masks, and wear plate carriers. The author believes there will be confrontations between demonstrators and law enforcement and that "gas" will be used against the protestors and helicopters will be brought in to control the crowds. Therefore, having a gas mask and at least a .300 Winchester Magnum, shots can be fired at the helicopters to make them retreat.

*Analyst Comment:* A review of the posting has one comment by an individual that states that he has reported the author to the FBI on January 1, 2021. A search of the name through USCP-WebRMS were negative. A search of the name on other social media accounts were negative.

IICD has identified more than forty social media postings promoting protests on January 6, 2021. The number of people who indicate they are going to the event listed on these social media postings is relatively low. It is expected the majority of these postings are promoting the protests already listed in this report and IICD, therefore, did not list each social media posting as a separate event.

#### Expected Protests (Pro-Biden):

The They/Them Collective posted to their Instagram account a message<sup>26</sup> about the MAGA rallies in January. No specific details were published at this time about a protest location or time. Shutdown DC also posted to social media about the MAGA rallies on January 6, 2021, asking for donations "to help us defend democracy."<sup>27</sup> Refuse Fascism is also promoting a protest on this same day.<sup>28</sup> While the groups have not indicated where they intend to gather, in the past they have demonstrated in the BLM Plaza area.

The group "I Approve this Message" is also planning a march entitled "Donald, You're Fired! March on DC" for January 6, 2021.<sup>29</sup> They have indicated they would gather in the Union Square area, however, as of the date of this publication, they have not requested a permit for that area. Interest is also relatively low based on the Facebook post.

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**Protests:**

At this time there are twenty known protests as it relates to this joint congressional session, the following are the details:

#### Pro-Trump Events-January 5

**Jesus Lives<sup>30</sup>**

Location: Grassy Area 1 (January 5, 2021)  
Union Square Area 15 (January 6, 2021)

Time: 0900 – 1900 hours

Organizer: Jo Reitkopp

Attendance: USCP Permit 50

Description: Prayer event for our country

**MAGA Calvary<sup>31</sup>**

Location: Nationwide

Date: January 3 – 6, 2021

Time: 1600 - 2100 hours (Arrive DC: Jan 5<sup>th</sup>) / 0900 – 1030 hours (Arrive DC: Jan 6<sup>th</sup>)

Organizer: Drag The Interstate

Attendance: TBD

Description: This is a nationwide vehicular and charter bus caravan calling all "Patriots" to meet in Washington DC to support the President and participate in Stop the Steal/Wild Protest on Capitol Grounds<sup>32 33</sup>.

- > Analyst Comment: USCP-IOS Agent stated that a subject of a current investigation, revealed that some militia members who are participating in this event and staying in Virginia, plan to march into Washington, DC on January 5<sup>th</sup>, while armed. USCP-IOS is in coordination with local law enforcement and will provide relevant information as it becomes available. During the two previous MAGA Marches, participants of those events were arrested for weapons offenses, so this occurring on the 5<sup>th</sup> as well as the 6<sup>th</sup> is a strong possibility.

**Moms for America<sup>34</sup>**

Location: Grassy Area 10

Date: January 5, 2021

Time: 0900 - 1800

Organizer: Women for a Great America

Attendance: 50

Description: Participants will let the Members of Congress know they object to the certification of the Electoral College votes.

**Rally To Revival<sup>35</sup>**

Location: Freedom Plaza

Date: January 5, 2021

Time: 1700 – 2000 hours

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Organizer: Eighty Percent Coalition (Cindy Chafan)

Attendance: 5,000 (Based on permit application)

Description: Rally to support President Trump

- Analyst Comment: No marches are scheduled for this event. Members of Congress may be in attendance, however, at this time it is unconfirmed who may attend.

#### **The Silent Majority<sup>36</sup>**

Location: National Mall (3<sup>rd</sup> Street to Washington Monument)

Date: January 5-6, 2021

Time: 1000-1700

Organizer: The Silent Majority

Attendance: 250-500 per NPS permit application

Description: Participants will gather to support the First Amendment.

#### **Virginia Women For Trump<sup>37</sup>**

Location: Supreme Court

Date: January 5, 2021

Time: 1400 – 1700 hours

Organizer: Virginia Women For Trump, Stop The Steal, AmericanPhoenix.org, Jericho March

Attendance: TBD

Description: Candle light vigil to make Congress aware of their responsibility to preserve our Constitution and the principles of our founding Fathers.

- Analyst Comment: Roger Stone (Conservative Political Consultant) is expected to speak at this event.

#### **Women for a Great America**

Location: Grassy Area 19

Date: January 4-10, 2021

Time: 0700-2200

Organizer: Women for a Great America

Attendance: 50

Description: Participants will let the Members of Congress know they object to the certification of the Electoral College votes.

### Pro-Trump Events-January 6

#### **Electoral College Protest<sup>38</sup>**

Location: Senate East Front Area 9

Date: January 6, 2021

Time: 0830 – 1700 hours

Organizer- Bryan Lewis

Attendance: USCP Permit 50

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Description: Urge congress to nullify electoral votes from swing states that made illegal changes to their elections.

#### **MAGA Calvary<sup>39</sup>**

Location: Nationwide

Date: January 3 – 6, 2021

Time: 1600 - 2100 hours (Arrive DC: Jan 5<sup>th</sup>) / 0900 – 1030 hours (Arrive DC: Jan 6<sup>th</sup>)

Organizer: Drag The Interstate

Attendance: TBD

Description: This is a nationwide vehicular and charter bus caravan calling all "Patriots" to meet in Washington DC to support the President and participate in Stop the Steal/Wild Protest on Capitol Grounds<sup>40 41</sup>.

- > Analyst Comment: USCP-IOS Agent stated that a subject of a current investigation, revealed that some militia members who are participating in this event and staying in Virginia, plan to march into Washington, DC on January 5<sup>th</sup>, while armed. USCP-IOS is in coordination with local law enforcement and will provide relevant information as it becomes available. During the two previous MAGA Marches, participants of those events were arrested for weapons offenses, so this occurring on the 5<sup>th</sup> as well as the 6<sup>th</sup> is a strong possibility.

#### **March for Trump<sup>42</sup>**

Location: Ellipse

Date: January 6, 2021

Time: 0900 - 1700 hours

Organizer: Women for America First

Attendance: 5,000 per NPS permit application

Description: Participants will gather at the Ellipse and march to the US Capitol in support of President Trump. The event will occur during the Joint Session of Congress to confirm the electoral votes.

- > Analyst Comment: Members of Congress may be in attendance, at this time it is unconfirmed who will be attending however Leadership will not be attending.
- > President Trump will be speaking at this event.

#### **New York Apostolic Prayer Network<sup>43</sup>**

Location: Senate East Front Grassy Area 9 - 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th and on the 6th- Location TBD

Date: January 4 through January 10, 2021

Time: 0700 – 2200 hours (Daily)

Organizer- New York Apostolic Prayer Network

Attendance: 50

Description: Prayer and worship for the country.

#### **One Nation Under God**

Location: Grassy Area 8

Time: 0830-1800 hours

Organizer: The One Nation Under God Foundation

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Attendance: 50

Description: Battle against the government's efforts to eradicate its free exercise of faith.<sup>44</sup>

- > Analyst Comment: The following is a list of potential speakers: Arizona State Representative Anthony Kern, Arizona State Representative Mark Finchem, Georgia State Representative Vernon Jones, Pennsylvania State Senator Doug Mastriano, Congressman Lance Gooden (TX), Congressman Andy Biggs (AZ) Congressman Dr. Paul Gosar (AZ) Congressman Jody Hice (GA) Congressman Mo Brooks (AL) Congressman Ted Budd (NC), Congresswoman-Elect Lauren Boebert (CO) and Congresswoman-Elect Marjorie Greene (GA)

#### **Stop the Steal/Willd Protest<sup>45</sup>**

Location: Grassy Area 8

Time: 1000-1700 hours

Organizer: Stop the Steal

Attendance: Unknown

Description: Participants will let the Members of Congress know they object to the certification of the Electoral College votes.

- > Analyst Comment: There is no permit for this event.

#### **Rock Ministries International<sup>46</sup>**

Location: Grassy Area 11

Time: 1200 – 1900 hours

Organizer: Belton Platt

Attendance: USCP Permit 50

Description: A prayer campaign encouraging pastors, leaders and citizens to pray for the United States.

#### **Virginia Freedom Keepers**

Location: Area 7

Time: 0600-1800 hours

Organizer: Virginia Freedom Keepers

Attendance: 50

Description: Rally for health reform.

#### **Women for a Great America**

Location: Grassy Area 19

Date: January 4-10, 2021

Time: 0700-2200

Organizer: Women for a Great America

Attendance: 50

Description: Participants will let the Members of Congress know they object to the certification of the Electoral College votes.

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### **Pro-Biden Events-January 6**

Note: There are no known organized pro-Biden protests scheduled for January 5, 2021.

#### **Donald, You're Fired March on DC<sup>47</sup>**

Location: U.S. Capitol to White House

Date: January 6, 2021

Time: 1200 – 1500 hours

Organizer: I Approve This Message

Attendance: Facebook lists approximately 20

Description: On January 6th, 2021, at 12:00 p.m. Eastern Time, We, the People will convene at the steps of the United States Capitol to witness this momentous occasion. Upon the declaration the results of the 2020 elections, held on November 3rd, 2020, We the People will proceed, peacefully and safely, from the Capitol Building to the White House to deliver the message to Mr. Trump, "Donald, You're Fired!"

#### **Refuse Fascism<sup>48</sup>**

Location: TBD

Date: January 6, 2021

Time: 1700

Attendance: Unknown

Organizer: Refuse Fascism DC

Description: Refuse Fascism DC has acknowledged the "Million MAGA March" on their social media accounts but has not detailed specific plans for a counter-protest<sup>49</sup> other than to say, "at 5pm in DC, bang pots and pans to drown out the fascist voices descending on their city."<sup>50</sup>

- Analyst Comment: Refuse Fascism DC is a small group with a history of non-violent civil disobedience and risking arrest. During previous "MAGA March" protests, Refuse Fascism DC organized counter-protests at Black Lives Matter Plaza but did not intentionally confront the "Proud Boys" and pro-Trump protesters like "They/Them Collective."<sup>51 52</sup>

#### **Shutdown DC**

Location: TBD

Date: January 6, 2021

Time: TBD

Attendance: 25-50 (based on December 12 attendance)

Organizer: Shutdown DC

Description: Shutdown DC has acknowledged the "Million MAGA March" on their social media accounts but has not detailed specific plans for a counter-protest.

#### **They/Them Collective**

Location: TBD

Date: January 6, 2021

Time: TBD

Attendance: Approximately 200-300 (based on December 12 attendance)

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Organizer: They/Them Collective, DC Youth Liberation Front, FAAN1312

Description: "They/Them Collective" posted about the January 6 "Million MAGA March" event on their social media accounts, however they have not publicized any specific plans for counter-protests.<sup>53</sup>

### Protest Locations:



### Traffic Cuts<sup>54</sup>:

On Tuesday, January 5, 2021, beginning at 0600 hours, through Thursday, January 7, 2021, ending at 2359 hours, there will be several First Amendment Activities that will take place throughout the District of Columbia. The Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) has advised that there will be extensive parking restrictions and potential street closures that motorists should take into consideration.

The following streets will be posted as Emergency No Parking from Tuesday, January 5, 2021 at 0600 hours through Thursday, January 7, 2021 at 2359 hours:

- H Street from 15th Street, NW to 17th Street, NW
- I Street from 15th Street, NW to 17th Street, NW
- Connecticut Avenue from H Street, NW to L Street, NW
- Vermont Avenue from H Street, NW to L Street, NW
- 15th Street from I Street to K Street, NW (west side of McPherson Square)
- 17th Street from I Street to K Street, NW (east side of Farragut Square)

The following streets will be posted as Emergency No Parking on Tuesday, January 5, 2021 and Wednesday, January 6, 2021 at 0001 to 2359 hours:

- Constitution Avenue from Pennsylvania Avenue, NW to 18th Street, NW
- Pennsylvania Avenue from 3rd Street, NW to 18th Street, NW
- E Street from 9th Street, NW to 15th Street, NW
- F Street from 12th Street, NW to 15th Street, NW
- G Street from 12th Street, NW to 15th Street, NW
- I Street from 9th Street, NW to 15th Street, NW

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- I Street from 17th Street, NW to 18th Street, NW
- H Street from 9th Street, NW to 15th Street, NW
- H Street from 17th Street, NW to 18th Street, NW
- K Street from 9th Street, NW to 18th Street, NW
- New York Avenue from 9th Street, NW to 15th Street, NW
- 17th Street from Constitution Avenue, NW to L Street, NW (west side of Farragut Square)
- 15th Street from Constitution Avenue, NW to L Street, NW
- 16th Street from K Street, NW to O Street, NW
- 14th Street from Independence Avenue, SW to L Street, NW
- 13th Street from Pennsylvania Avenue, NW to L Street, NW
- 12th Street from Constitution Avenue, NW to E Street, NW
- 11th Street from Pennsylvania Avenue, NW to E Street, NW
- 10th Street from Constitution Avenue, NW to E Street, NW
- 9th Street from Constitution Avenue, NW to Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
- 7th Street from Independence Avenue, SW to E Street, NW
- 6th Street from Constitution Avenue, NW to E Street, NW
- 4th Street from Independence Avenue, SW to Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
- 3rd Street from Independence Avenue, SW to Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
- New York Avenue from 18th Street, NW to 17th Street, NW
- C Street from 18th Street, NW to 17th Street, NW
- D Street from 18th Street, NW to 17th Street, NW
- Madison Drive from 3rd Street, NW to 15th Street, NW
- Jefferson Drive from 3rd Street, SW to 15th Street, SW

The following streets will be restricted to vehicular traffic on Tuesday, January 5, 2021 and Wednesday, January 6, 2021 from approximately 0600 hours to 2359 hours (The decision to restrict vehicles will be based upon public safety and if safe to do so, vehicles will be allowed to enter the restricted area if they are on essential business or travelling to-and-from their residence):

- Constitution Avenue from Pennsylvania Avenue to 18th Street, NW
- K Street from 9th Street, NW to 18th Street, NW
- I Street from 9th Street, NW to 18th Street, NW
- H Street from 9th Street, NW to 18th Street, NW
- New York Avenue from 9th Street, NW to 15th Street, NW
- New York Avenue from 17th Street, NW to 18th Street, NW
- G Street from 9th Street, NW to 15th Street, NW
- G Street from 12th Street, NW to 15th Street, NW
- G Street from 17th Street, NW to 18th Street, NW
- F Street from 9th Street, NW to 15th Street, NW
- F Street from 12th Street, NW to 15th Street, NW
- F Street from 17th Street, NW to 18th Street, NW
- E Street from 9th Street, NW to 15th Street, NW
- E Street from 17th Street, NW to 18th Street, NW
- D Street from 5th Street, NW to 9th Street, NW
- D Street from 17th Street, NW to 18th Street, NW
- C Street from 3rd Street, NW to 6th Street, NW
- C Street from 17th Street, NW to 18th Street, NW

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- Pennsylvania Avenue, NW from 3rd Street, NW to 15th Street, NW
- Pennsylvania Avenue, NW from 17th Street, NW to 18th Street, NW
- Indiana Avenue from 3rd Street to 5th Street, NW
- 3rd Street from Independence Avenue, SW to D Street, NW
- 4th Street from Independence Avenue, SW to Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
- 4th Street from Indiana Avenue, NW to E Street, NW
- 5th Street from Indiana Avenue, NW to E Street, NW
- 6th Street from Constitution Avenue, NW to E Street, NW
- 7th Street from Independence Avenue, SW to E Street, NW
- 9th Street from Constitution Avenue, NW to E Street, NW
- 10th Street from Constitution Avenue, NW to L Street, NW
- 11th Street from Pennsylvania Avenue, NW to L Street, NW
- 12th Street from Constitution Avenue, NW to L Street, NW
- 13th Street from Pennsylvania Avenue, NW to L Street, NW
- 14th Street from Independence Avenue, SW to L Street, NW
- 15th Street from Independence Avenue, SW to L Street, NW
- 16th Street from H Street, NW to L Street, NW
- Vermont Avenue from H Street, NW to L Street, NW
- Connecticut Avenue from H Street, NW to L Street, NW
- 17th Street from Independence Avenue, SW to L Street, NW
- Madison Drive from 3rd Street, NW to 15th Street, NW
- Jefferson Drive from 3rd Street, SW to 15th Street, SW
- 12th Street Tunnel
- 9th Street Tunnel

#### ICD Overall Analysis:

Due to the tense political environment following the 2020 election, the threat of disruptive actions or violence cannot be ruled out. Supporters of the current president see January 6, 2021, as the last opportunity to overturn the results of the presidential election. This sense of desperation and disappointment may lead to more of an incentive to become violent. Unlike previous post-election protests, the targets of the pro-Trump supporters are not necessarily the counter-protesters as they were previously, but rather Congress itself is the target on the 6<sup>th</sup>. As outlined above, there has been a worrisome call for protesters to come to these events armed and there is the possibility that protesters may be inclined to become violent. Further, unlike the events on November 14, 2020, and December 12, 2020, there are several more protests scheduled on January 6, 2021, and the majority of them will be on Capitol grounds. The two protests expected to be the largest of the day—the Women for America First protest at the Ellipse and the Stop the Steal protest in Areas 8 and 9—may draw thousands of participants and both have been promoted by President Trump himself. The Stop the Steal protest in particular does not have a permit, but several high profile speakers, including Members of Congress are expected to speak at the event. This combined with Stop the Steal's propensity to attract white supremacists, militia members, and others who actively promote violence, may lead to a significantly dangerous situation for law enforcement and the general public alike.

Information Current as of 3 January 2021 @ 1500 hours

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IICD will continue to monitor the situation, identify information gaps, and provide updates as needed.

For comments or questions related to the content or dissemination of this document, please contact the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division by phone at 202-224-9700.

#### Sources:

- <sup>1</sup> <https://abc13.com/what-happens-between-now-and-inauguration-day-2021-is-always-january-20-electoral-college-2020/7871286/>
- <sup>2</sup> <https://www.thedailybeast.com/these-gop-senators-plan-to-join-josh-lawler-in-rejecting-electoral-vote-for-biden>
- <sup>3</sup> Information relayed to USCP-IICD AD Faruqi via the National Capitol Regional Threat Intelligence Consortium
- <sup>4</sup> <https://www.archives.gov/files/electoral-college/state-officials/presidential-election-brochure.pdf>
- <sup>5</sup> <https://www.politico.com/newsletters/middle/2020/12/02/the-gops-electoral-mischief-491033>
- <sup>6</sup> [https://www.thepoettimes.com/number-of-congress-members-planning-to-challenge-election-results-expected-to-grow\\_3610050.html](https://www.thepoettimes.com/number-of-congress-members-planning-to-challenge-election-results-expected-to-grow_3610050.html)
- <sup>7</sup> <https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/02/politics/senate-republicans-electoral-college/index.html>
- <sup>8</sup> <https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/15/mccormack-gop-election-results-445524>
- <sup>9</sup> <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/electoral-college-set-vote-make-biden-s-2020-victory-official-n1251076>
- <sup>10</sup> [https://justthefacts.com/politics-policy/elections/senate-majority-leader-mitch-mccormack-acknowledges-biden-victory/?utm\\_source=justthefacts.com&utm\\_medium=feed&utm\\_campaign=external-news-aggregators](https://justthefacts.com/politics-policy/elections/senate-majority-leader-mitch-mccormack-acknowledges-biden-victory/?utm_source=justthefacts.com&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=external-news-aggregators)
- <sup>11</sup> <https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/01/politics/read-golmsert-peace-law-suit-dismissal-electoral-college/index.html>
- <sup>12</sup> <https://www.thedailybeast.com/lonis-polmsert-calls-for-street-violence-as-peace-law-suit-loss-sends-wave-world-spinning>
- <sup>13</sup> <https://www.businessinsider.com/proud-boys-attend-january-6-dc-rally-in-cognito-all-black-2021-1>
- <sup>14</sup> [https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/washington-dc-protests/2021/01/01/dc-743c20-4a68-11eb-839a-c84ba7b7c48c\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/washington-dc-protests/2021/01/01/dc-743c20-4a68-11eb-839a-c84ba7b7c48c_story.html)
- <sup>15</sup> March for Trump bus tour webpage, <https://trumpmarch.com/>
- <sup>16</sup> <https://eightypercentcoalition.com/>
- <sup>17</sup> <https://wildprotest.com/>
- <sup>18</sup> <https://www.hotel-harrington.com/>
- <sup>19</sup> <https://harrysaloon.com/>
- <sup>20</sup> Patriot Caravans for 45 blog post, <https://g.cloudfunder.com/group/patriot-caravans-for-45>
- <sup>21</sup> [https://www.tiktok.com/@rabid420saints/video/6908993375274290438?\\_d=secCgYIASAHKAE5MgouMUcxabb3dF9ODu4ZoQFz1z6Zlsv2i291kDk2NRZMfjpT81RasVb5aJ%2FaeLta23OGzA5%3D&language=en&preview\\_pb=0&sec\\_user\\_id=MS4wLjABAAAAW\\_6yDHSelnkz3s5n4RNIJdXqWNvW78HmY2NGCSYkzWwYXnlzm7gl191y7NR7N4v&share\\_id=6908993375274290438&share\\_link\\_id=9513A345-9749-4D8E-BAF0-5075A5A98C73&timestamp=1608743358&utm\\_from=copy&utm\\_code=daF4g3e0h9am5&user\\_id=6786105903063008261&utm\\_campaign=client\\_share&utm\\_medium=ios&utm\\_source=copy&source=h5\\_m](https://www.tiktok.com/@rabid420saints/video/6908993375274290438?_d=secCgYIASAHKAE5MgouMUcxabb3dF9ODu4ZoQFz1z6Zlsv2i291kDk2NRZMfjpT81RasVb5aJ%2FaeLta23OGzA5%3D&language=en&preview_pb=0&sec_user_id=MS4wLjABAAAAW_6yDHSelnkz3s5n4RNIJdXqWNvW78HmY2NGCSYkzWwYXnlzm7gl191y7NR7N4v&share_id=6908993375274290438&share_link_id=9513A345-9749-4D8E-BAF0-5075A5A98C73&timestamp=1608743358&utm_from=copy&utm_code=daF4g3e0h9am5&user_id=6786105903063008261&utm_campaign=client_share&utm_medium=ios&utm_source=copy&source=h5_m)
- <sup>22</sup> <https://sourcefeedr.site/intelgroup.com/accounts/login/?next=/sourcefeed/5tam/18128/>
- <sup>23</sup> <https://rumble.com/vbyjmy-dont-just-talk-like-an-american-act-like-one-hagmann-report-12152020.html>
- <sup>24</sup> Arlington County Police field case report #2021-01010031
- <sup>25</sup> <https://parler.com/post/673f75cb6e6f489c929a32544158ae91>
- <sup>26</sup> They/Them Collective Instagram post re: January MAGA rallies, <https://www.instagram.com/p/CJCoDu3hP1U/>
- <sup>27</sup> [https://twitter.com/shutdown\\_dc?lang=en](https://twitter.com/shutdown_dc?lang=en)
- <sup>28</sup> <https://m.facebook.com/RefuseFascismDC/>
- <sup>29</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/events/washington-dc-capitol-building/donalds-yours-fired-march-on-dc/367108367838395/>
- <sup>30</sup> USCP-SEU Permit 20-12-32
- <sup>31</sup> <https://www.miamdragtheinterstate.com/#viewer-f4v1>
- <sup>32</sup> <https://www.instagram.com/p/CJFzERUgd7i/>
- <sup>33</sup> <https://www.miamdragtheinterstate.com/#viewer-f4v1>
- <sup>34</sup> USCP-SEU Permit 20-12-24
- <sup>35</sup> <https://eightypercentcoalition.com/>
- <sup>36</sup> Demonstration Report for December 28, 2020. MPD Homeland Security Bureau.

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*Special Event Assessment*

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<sup>37</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/VirginiaWomenForTrump/><sup>38</sup> USCP SEU Permit 20-12-21<sup>39</sup> See *Supra* note 30<sup>40</sup> <https://www.instagram.com/p/CJFsERUgd7s/><sup>41</sup> <https://www.magnatrapcheinternational.com/en/news-fichs/><sup>42</sup> <https://www.trumpmarch.com/><sup>43</sup> USCP SEU Permit 20-12-22<sup>44</sup> <https://onemiderngod.us/><sup>45</sup> <https://wildprotest.com/><sup>46</sup> USCP – SEU Permit 20-12-30<sup>47</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/events/367108367838395/><sup>48</sup> <https://anchor.fm/refuse-fascism/episodes/Eric-Boehlert-Trump-plots-martial-law-from-White-House-the-press-shrugs-ocgpus><sup>49</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/RefuseFascismDC/><sup>50</sup> <https://refusefascism.org/><sup>51</sup> USCP-IICD Situation Reports, December 12, 2020.<sup>52</sup> USCP-IICD Situation Reports, November 14, 2020.<sup>53</sup> <https://www.instagram.com/p/CJCoDn3hPiU/><sup>54</sup> USCP-SES Traffic Advisory 20-12-37

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## Investigative Research and Analysis Report

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### Investigative Research and Analysis Report

IICD Case #: 21-TD-159  
December 21, 2020

On December 21, 2020, DHS notified USCP of a blog referencing tunnels on US Capitol grounds used by members of Congress. The discussion is posted to a website for supporters of President Trump.

<https://thedonald.win>

\*\* User profile's for comments are anonymous and do not contain identifying information.

\*\* The website cannot be viewed on USCP network computers and the following information was obtained by websites saved using Google cache. The full websites were preserved as PDF and attached to this report for safe viewing.

\*\* Research of the website identified four (4) threads/blog topics containing comments of concern.


\*\* IICD will continue to monitor the website and update the report as appropriate.

I.

**"There are tunnels connected to the Capitol Building! Legislators use them to avoid the press, among other things! Take note."**

posted 13 hours ago by CommunismSucks +3258 / -1

<https://thedonald.win/p/11R4uehwuL/there-are-tunnels-connected-to-t/c/>  
<https://thedonald.win/u/CommunismSucks/>



The map posted to the blog and subsequent comments contain open-source information that is available to the public.

Several comments posted to the thread reference a pro-Trump rally in Washington, DC scheduled for January 6, 2021. Several comments promote confronting members of Congress and carrying firearms during the protest.

Review of the comments are negative for specific threats or specific plans of action. See screen captures below for comments of concern.

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## Investigative Research and Analysis Report

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### Investigative Research and Analysis Report

IICD Case #: 21-TD-159  
December 21, 2020

**tapoo** 6 hours ago +5 / -0

Exactly, forget the tunnels. Get into Capitol building, stand outside congress. Be in the room next to them. They wont have time tp run if they play dumb.

parent permalink save report block reply

**CornandSoybeans** 6 hours ago +8 / -1

Fuck that we should just go to there houses and be sitting at their kitchen table with there wife and kids. Less security i would imagine

parent permalink save report block reply

**CommunismSucks** [S] 13 hours ago +51 / -1

If they do a zoom call i vote to just straight up burn down Pelosi's & McConnell's DC homes  
Gotta put it to a vote though lol

parent permalink save report block reply

**goodbeerbetreviews2** 12 hours ago +45 / -1

44 Burn the fucking Supreme Court down. It's useless anyways

parent permalink save report block reply

**Prader** [R] 11 hours ago +25 / -2

Deploy Capital Police to restrict movement.

Anyone going armed needs to be mentally prepared to draw down on LEOs. Let them shoot first, but make sure they know what happens if they do.

parent permalink save report block reply

deleted 6 hours ago +1 / -0

**nomac** 12 hours ago +20 / -11

Nerve gas. That is all.

permalink save report block reply

**freespirit\_omega** 12 hours ago +8 / -0

Bring shovels

permalink save report block reply

**CommunismSucks** [S] 12 hours ago +10 / -1

And guns

parent permalink save report block reply

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## Investigative Research and Analysis Report

IICD Case #: 21-TD-159  
December 21, 2020

CommandSoybeans 8 hours ago +3 / -0 (edited)

Got to have power going into that building somehow be a damn shame if something happened to the grid. I don't know like taking a .308 and just start blowing holes in electrical transformers. Backup generators make considerable noise and noticeable steam out the exhaust tube wherever it comes to daylight. Plug exhaust and parties over.

permalink save report block reply

RedPillDispenser 4 hours ago +1 / -0

Time to play..

### WHACK-A-MOLE

Surround every building with a tunnel entrance/exit. They better dig a tunnel all the way to China if they want to escape.

permalink save report block reply



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# Investigative Research and Analysis Report

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## Investigative Research and Analysis Report

IICD Case #: 21-TD-159  
December 21, 2020

II.

**"CONGRESS MUST VOTE IN PERSON JAN 6th. They Cannot Phone It In! Pelosi's RULE Does NOT AMEND THE CONSITUTION!"**

posted 1 hour ago by RussianBot9000 +221 / -0

<https://thedonald.win/p/11R4uej3Eh/congress-must-vote-in-person-jan/c/>  
<https://thedonald.win/u/RussianBot9000/>



CONGRESS MUST VOTE IN PERSON JAN 6th. They Cannot Phone It In! Pelosi's RULE Does NOT AMEND THE CONSITUTION!

221

posted 1 hour ago by RussianBot9000 +221 / -0

If they don't show up, we enter the Capitol as the Third Continental Congress and certify the Trump Electors.

9 comments share save hide report block hide child comments



CONGRESS MUST VOTE IN PERSON JAN 6th. They Cannot Phone It In! Pelosi's RULE Does NOT AMEND THE CONSITUTION!

221

posted 1 hour ago by RussianBot9000 +221 / -0

If they don't show up, we enter the Capitol as the Third Continental Congress and certify the Trump Electors.

9 comments share save hide report block hide child comments

Comments (9)

sorted by: top



DeplorableSpic 1 hour ago +6 / -0



Pence presides the meeting ... thank god

permalink save report block reply



poprockeyum 1 hour ago +7 / -0



Let the democrats stay home. In a contingent election if the dem delegation doesn't show up even better. We may need that with some of the rino's who will be afraid to support the president.

permalink save report block reply



ClementYip 35 minutes ago +6 / -0



May be millions of protesters could simply block all the Dems from showing up to the Congress. Block all the tunnel entrance.

If Dems could block GOP Electors in Michigan to enter building, then Patriots can block Dems from entering Congress building.

permalink save report block reply



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## *Investigative Research and Analysis Report*

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### Investigative Research and Analysis Report

IICD Case #: 21-TD-159  
December 21, 2020

III.

**"THERE IS NO WAY I'M FLYING TO DC FOR NOVEMBER 6TH"**

posted 13 hours ago by vovchykbratyk +7740 / -2

<https://thedonald.win/p/11R4udZYee/there-is-no-way-im-flying-to-dc/>

<https://thedonald.win/u/vovchykbratyk/>



**THERE IS NO WAY I'M FLYING TO DC FOR JANUARY 6TH**

7738

posted 13 hours ago by vovchykbratyk +7740 / -2

because I'm close enough to drive

492 comments share save hide report block hide child comments

Comments (492)

▲ mesetheliona 13 hours ago +567 / -19

538

Bring guns. It's now or never.

permalink save report block reply

▲ CuomoisaMassMurderer 11 hours ago +64 / -0

64

We need to clog the streets so nothing can move 1/4 - 1/20. We shouldn't call it CHAZ but we definitely need guard duty and etc.

Free men don't ask permission

parent permalink save report block reply

▲ CuomoisaMassMurderer 8 hours ago +3 / -0

3

We may be able to block off streets and camp on them. Need to post guards and keep cops at bay. There will be a confrontation no matter how we go about it, and we have to have this all thoroughly planned out. Our own restroom accommodations are easier to plan all that, whether buckets or camping toilet or RV or ...

parent permalink save report block reply

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### Investigative Research and Analysis Report

IICD Case #: 21-TD-159  
December 21, 2020

▲ **Harl\_Selden** 12 hours ago +17 / -0

17 If they read today's TDW, there's no way they'd show up at the Senate IRL.

parent permalink save report block reply

▲ **BeatingAccident** 10 hours ago +8 / -0

3 eye and crazy nancy is no dummy

parent permalink save report block reply

▲ **CuomoisaMassMurderer** 8 hours ago +1 / -0

1 I hope to be all up in her face before she can get to that meeting.

parent permalink save report block reply

▲ **marshiben** 10 hours ago +8 / -0

5 They're not going to let anyone near the box the votes come in or the electors in DC, sadly.

You have to remember, that DC has entire underground network that spans the entire city. They can come and go right below our feet and we'd never know it. They don't have to walk in the doors when they tunnels. Sucks, but that's the way it is.

parent permalink save report block reply

▲ **CuomoisaMassMurderer** 8 hours ago +1 / -0

1 Ok so we need to take that over. Or stop them before they get that far.

parent permalink save report block reply

**nateyboy** @h 13 hours ago +103 / -4 (edited)

Absolutely bring your gun. Sling it over your back and wear a big puffy coat over it if you have to. The world is watching. This is where we do that thing that'll have the whole world still talking about The United States of America in 1000 years.

"Justice will be served and the battle will rage, this big dog will fight when you rattle his cage, you'll be sorry you messed with the US of A, BECAUSE WE'LL PUT A BOOT IN UR ASS, IT'S THE AMERICAN WAY"

parent permalink save report block reply

**PM\_ME\_UR\_VIVIAN** 11 hours ago +14 / -2

If a million patriots show up bristling with AR's, just how brave do you think they'll be when it comes to enforcing their unconstitutional laws?

Don't cuck out. This is do or die. Bring your guns.

parent permalink save report block reply

**CuomoisaMassMurderer** 8 hours ago +2 / -0

We need to clog the streets so nothing can move 1/4 - 1/20. That takes quite a bit of planning.

parent permalink save report block reply

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### Investigative Research and Analysis Report

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December 21, 2020

**WokenBroke** 8 hours ago +9 / -1

Open carry is illegal in DC. I wonder how that will play out? If enough people break the law together they might decide to not enforce it that day.

parent [permalink](#) [save](#) [report](#) [block](#) [reply](#)

**MittRomney** 7 hours ago +13 / -0

We can't give them a choice. Overwhelming armed numbers is our only chance

parent [permalink](#) [save](#) [report](#) [block](#) [reply](#)

**MichelleChewbacca** 5 hours ago +3 / -0

Fun Fact: Flamethrowers aren't considered firearms.

parent [permalink](#) [save](#) [report](#) [block](#) [reply](#)

**Mr\_Mike** 4 hours ago +3 / -0

Anyone have an air rifle? They aren't considered a "firearm" and are just as capable of slinging some lead.

parent [permalink](#) [save](#) [report](#) [block](#) [reply](#)

**Bigglou** 10 hours ago +13 / -2

Where should Patriots bringing full kit and rifles stay the night before? What hotel? We can coordinate on the morning of the 6th to March to the Capitol together. I'm not familiar with the swamp.

[permalink](#) [save](#) [report](#) [block](#) [reply](#)

**Han9000** 9 hours ago +10 / -0

Bring guns and don't let any Patriot get arrested at any cost... this is not a protest - it's a show of force

[permalink](#) [save](#) [report](#) [block](#) [reply](#)

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## *Investigative Research and Analysis Report*

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### Investigative Research and Analysis Report

IICD Case #: 21-TD-159  
December 21, 2020

#### IV.

"I see a lot of people talking about organizing and not knowing how  
or where to do it. **HERE**"

posted 3 days ago by Red\_Shifts\_Matter (edited) +467 / -0

<https://thedonald.win/p/11R4gzpdy/i-see-a-lot-of-people-talking-ab/>  
[https://thedonald.win/u/Red\\_Shifts\\_Matter/](https://thedonald.win/u/Red_Shifts_Matter/)

All patriots will begin assembling in DC around the Capitol Building on January 6th for the electoral college vote count! Some will begin showing up as early as the 4th.

<https://rumble.com/vbwjmv-dont-just-talk-like-an-american-act-like-one-hagmann-report-12152020.html>

Hagmann Report: the speaker in this video promotes armed conflict in DC on January 6, 2021. A copy of the video will be provided in a separate email for safe viewing.

- 🇺🇸 PATRIOT ORGANIZATIONS: 🇺🇸

- 1) <https://proudboysusa.com/> (men only/fraternity)
- 2) <https://oathkeepers.org/>
- 3) <https://gibsonforfreedom.com/> (Patriot Prayer)
- 4) <https://americancontingency.com/>
- 5) <https://stopthesteal.us/> (use website for rally tracking information, but be aware of Ali's past before fundraising with them)
- 6) <https://wethepeopleconvention.org/>
- 7) <https://www.thethreepercenters.org/>
- 8) <https://americafirst1st.wixsite.com/americans> (For Texans)
- 9) <https://www.magadragtheinterstate.com/>
- 10) <https://trumpmarch.com/>
- 11) <https://donaldwon.com/>
- 12) <https://www.bikersfortrumpac2020.com/>

- 📱 SECURE COMMUNICATIONS: 📱

- 1) Signal (encrypted private messenger)
- 2) wickr.me <https://wickr.com/>

Kylie Jane Kremer  
TrumpMarch.com  
Parler: @Kylie  
twitter: @KylieJaneKremer

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## FBI SITUATIONAL INFORMATION REPORT

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**SITUATIONAL INFORMATION REPORT  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

**Potential Activity Alert**

NORFOLK DIVISION

Approved for Release: 05 January 2021

SIR Number: SIR-00340015234

**(U//LES) Potential for Violence in Washington, D.C. Area in Connection with Planned 'StopTheSteal' Protest on 6 January 2021**

SOURCE: (U//FOUO) A collaborative source.

FBI Norfolk is releasing this Situational Information Report to raise law enforcement awareness regarding the potential for violence in the Washington D.C. area in connection with a planned 'StopTheSteal' protest on 6 January 2021.

(U//LES) As of 5 January 2021, FBI Norfolk received information indicating calls for violence in response to

**(U) LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE: The information marked (U//LES) in this document is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and may be distributed within the federal government (and its contractors), US intelligence, law enforcement, public safety or protection officials and individuals with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without FBI authorization is prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. Information bearing the LES caveat may not be used in legal proceedings without first receiving authorization from the originating agency. Recipients are prohibited from subsequently posting the information marked LES on a website on an unclassified network without first obtaining FBI approval.**

**(U) Warning: This is an information report, not finally evaluated intelligence. It is being shared for informational purposes but has not been fully evaluated, integrated with other information, interpreted or analyzed. Receiving agencies are requested not to take action based on this raw reporting without prior coordination with the FBI.**

*(U) Note: This product reflects the views of the NORFOLK Division.*

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**FBI SITUATIONAL INFORMATION REPORT**

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'unlawful lockdowns' to begin on 6 January 2021 in Washington, D.C. An online thread discussed specific calls for violence to include stating 'Be ready to fight. Congress needs to hear glass breaking, doors being kicked in, and blood from their BLM and Pantifa slave soldiers being spilled. Get violent...stop calling this a march, or rally, or a protest. Go there ready for war. We get our President or we die. NOTHING else will achieve this goal.'

(U//LES) One posted commented, 'if Antifa or BLM get violent, leave them dead in the street'.

(U//LES) Another individual commented that they needed people on standby to provide supplies, including water and medical, to the front lines. The individual also discussed the need to evacuate noncombatants and wounded to medical care (NFI).

(U//LES) Additionally, perimeter maps and caravan pictures were posted. Rally points were identified in Figure 1. A perimeter was designated around various capitol buildings identified in Figure 2. (FBI Comment. The caravans in Figure 1 had the same colors as the sections of the perimeter in Figure 2.)

(U//LES) Figure 1.

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# FBI SITUATIONAL INFORMATION REPORT

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


(U//LES) Figure 2.

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## FBI SITUATIONAL INFORMATION REPORT

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(U//LES) FBI Comment. BLM likely refers to Black Lives Matter. Pantifa likely refers to Antifa.

(U//FOUO) FBI Comment. Individuals/Organizations named in this SIR have been identified as participating in activities that are protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Their inclusion here is not intended to associate the protected activity with criminality or a threat to national security, or to infer that such protected activity itself violates federal law. However, based on known intelligence and/or specific historical observations, it is possible the protected activity could invite a violent reaction towards the subject individual or others in retaliation or with the goal of stopping the protected activity from occurring in the first instance. In the event no violent reaction occurs, FBI policy and federal law dictates that no further record be made of the protected activity.

(U) This report has been prepared by the NORFOLK Division of the FBI. Comments and queries may be addressed to the NORFOLK Division at 757-455-0100.

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**FBI SITUATIONAL INFORMATION REPORT**

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Distribution

Local Law Enforcement entities in the Washington Field Office area of operations  
Virginia State Fusion Center

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**FBI SITUATIONAL INFORMATION REPORT**

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Please take a moment to complete this survey and help evaluate the quality, value, and relevance of our product. Your response will help us serve you more effectively and efficiently in the future. Thank you for your cooperation and assistance. Please return to:

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 NORFOLK DIVISION  
 509 Resource Row  
 Chesapeake, VA 23325  
 Fax: 757-609-2647

**Customer and Product Information**

SIR Tracking ID: SIR-00340015234

Product Title: (U//LES) Potential for Violence in Washington, D.C. Area in Connection with Planned 'StopTheSteal' Protest on 6 January 2021

Dated: \_\_\_\_\_

Customer Agency: \_\_\_\_\_

**Relevance to Your Intelligence Needs**

1. The product increased my knowledge of an issue or topic. (Check one)
5. Strongly Agree
4. Somewhat Agree
3. Neither Agree or Disagree
2. Somewhat Disagree
1. Strongly Disagree

**Actionable Value**

2. The product helped me decide on a course of action. (Check one)
5. Strongly Agree
4. Somewhat Agree
3. Neither Agree or Disagree
2. Somewhat Disagree
1. Strongly Disagree

**Timeliness Value**

3. The product was timely to my needs. (Check one)
5. Strongly Agree
4. Somewhat Agree

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- 3. Neither Agree or Disagree
- 2. Somewhat Disagree
- 1. Strongly Disagree

Comments (please use reverse or attach separate page if needed):

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Source: Document provided by a USCP official.

## CONTACTING THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Success of the OIG mission to prevent fraud, waste, abuse, or mismanagement depends on the cooperation of employees and the public. There are several ways to report questionable activity.

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Call us at 202-593-3868 or toll-free at 866-906-2446. A confidential or anonymous message can be left 24 hours a day/7 days a week.



Toll-Free  
1-866-906-2446

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Write us – we are located at:  
*United States Capitol Police*  
*Attn: Office of Inspector General, Investigations*  
*119 D Street, NE*  
*Washington, DC 20510*



Or visit us – we are located at:  
*499 South Capitol Street, SW, Suite 345*  
*Washington, DC 20003*



You can also contact us by email at: [OIG@USCP.GOV](mailto:OIG@USCP.GOV)

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**When making a report, convey as much information as possible such as:  
Who? What? Where? When? Why? Complaints may be made anonymously or you may request confidentiality.**

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### Additional Information and Copies:

To obtain additional copies of this report, call OIG at 202-593-4201.

