Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill
Speaker of the House
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

In view of my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods, I became greatly concerned by the proliferation of highly sensitive intelligence collected and maintained within systems of compartmentation. I initiated a review within the Executive Branch to reassess the justification for existing clearances and to limit issuing future clearances based on the strictest application of need-to-know.

This same concern extends to the Legislative Branch. As you know, staff personnel of our Congressional oversight committees have been granted access to highly sensitive compartmented intelligence information. However, due to the broadening of interest in foreign intelligence within the Congress, access has been extended to staffs of other committees. It is imperative that a review, similar to that underway within the Executive Branch, be undertaken within the Legislative Branch to assure that current and future access to highly sensitive intelligence information is clearly justifiable.

Accordingly, I have designated my Legislative Counsel to serve as the focal point to review all requests for such access for Congressional staff personnel. His office will contact the chairmen and staff directors of those committees concerned to assess the justification of existing clearances and to establish agreed-upon guidelines to assess critically the need-to-know for future clearances. I do not intend in any way to impede or impair the work of any committee which requires access to sensitive intelligence. It is my concern, however, that the need-to-know be shown to be clearly warranted. In this regard, experience has shown that most congressional requirements for substantive intelligence can be satisfied without access to highly sensitive sources and methods information.

Where there is a clearly justifiable need, Members of Congress are given access to sensitive intelligence information. Personal staff of Members, however, have been denied such access and I have reaffirmed this policy. The only exception, which I am initiating at this time, is to grant selected key staff members serving in the offices of the Leadership

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of the Congress access since their principals receive sensitive intelligence on a regular basis and require staff assistance. This will include designated personal staff members from the staffs of your offices, the President Pro-Tempore of the Senate, and Majority and Minority Leaders of both the Senate and the House. My Legislative Counsel will be contacting your offices to determine which staff personnel you have designated for such access. I recently received a letter signed jointly by Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd and Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker submitting a request for staff access which will be honored and handled directly with their offices.

It is my firm belief that these procedures will not interfere with the proper flow of intelligence to the Congress, but will serve to enhance the protection of highly sensitive intelligence sources and methods by limiting access to an absolute need-to-know. I would welcome your support to facilitate acceptance of these procedures by committee chairmen in any way that you deem appropriate.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Stansfield Turner

STANFIELD TURNER

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - D/OS
1 - Executive Secretary, Security Committee
1 - OLC Subject
1 - OLC Chron
August 7, 1978

Honorable Stansfield Turner
The Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Admiral:

Thank you for your letter of July 21 detailing the procedures you have implemented within the CIA for the control of Legislative Branch access to compartmented intelligence information.

As you know, the President recently expressed strong concern to the leadership of the Congress over the numbers of Congressional employees with such access. I agree with him that the greater the numbers of individuals with such access, the larger the risk of unauthorized disclosure of sensitive intelligence information. I have pledged my support to the President in limiting access to sensitive intelligence information wherever possible and in whatever other steps which the House can take to safeguard such information. One such step -- the creation of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence -- has already occurred. I believe you will agree that arrangements for access with this Committee have worked well. Information in the hands of the Committee Members and its staff has been properly safeguarded while the Committee has exercised its various budget, legislative and oversight activities.

I should add that the arrangement for access to compartmented intelligence information reached by you and the Committee is a worthy model. In it the Legislative Branch's authority to grant access to such information after consulting the DCI is clearly defined. I feel that delineation to be an important one and I am pleased that your memorandum of understanding with the Committee confirms it.
In closing, I would like to respond to your specific request concerning staff access to sensitive information by designating the following Leadership staff members as necessary assistants to the Leadership in foreign policy and intelligence matters:

Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.
Gary G. Hymel, Administrative Assistant
L. Kirk O'Donnell, General Counsel

Democratic Steering and Policy Committee
Irvine H. Sprague, Executive Director

Majority Leader James C. Wright, Jr.
Craig Raupe, Executive Assistant
Marshall L. Lynam, Administrative Assistant

Majority Whip John Brademas
James P. Mooney, Assistant

Deputy Majority Whip Dan Rostenkowski
James C. Healey, Administrative Assistant

Sincerely,

Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.
The Speaker

O/bgl

cc: Honorable Edward P. Boland, Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Security Clearances for Congressional Staff

Our review of security clearances granted to Congressional staffers indicates that there are presently 431 staffers, including GAO, who have compartmented security clearances recognized by DoD. These all have collateral Top Secret clearances. In addition, there are 591 staffers, including the Library of Congress and Congressional Budget Office, who have Top Secret or Secret clearances recognized by the Department. We believe these burgeoning numbers require some follow-on steps to your letter of July 21, 1978, to Speaker O'Neill and the guidelines for the issuance of compartmented procedures that accompanied the letter.

I recommend that a small interagency group, perhaps in the SCC structure, be convened to discuss follow-on measures. We think a quota system under which each Congressional committee whose jurisdiction is directly relevant to intelligence would have an assigned number of clearances should be explored. We doubt that the Congress will legislate such a system, but we believe there might be acquiescence in a system proposed by the Executive Branch if properly presented and negotiated with the leadership. We also think additional avenues should be explored: restricting the number of committees which may request and/or store intelligence; application of the disclosure provisions of the intelligence committees' resolutions to Congress as a whole; and restricting the dissemination of intelligence beyond the committees authorized to receive it.

I believe it would be useful to do the necessary groundwork for changes in the current system during the coming Congressional adjournment.

Daniel J. Murphy
Admiral, USN (Ret)
Deputy
14 SEP 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Executive Officer, DDA

FROM: Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security

SUBJECT: Security Clearances for Congressional Staff

1. The following are my comments for Mr. Blake in connection with the DCI's request as to whether the DDA sees any problem with the DCI's response to Admiral Murphy on this subject.

2. We agree that the DCI would be well advised to elevate the question of Congressional clearances to a small interagency group, preferably in the SCC structure. Our feeling that this would be an appropriate move is premised on the fact that to have members of the Intelligence Community at the Security Committee level engage in a dialogue on this matter, or to attack it in less than a Community-wide forum, would have questionable results.

3. I certainly agree that the DoD should make every effort to reduce the number of clearances now credited to them. I agree further with the DCI that we must set an example within the Executive Branch before we can insist that the Legislative Branch reduce their clearances.
Security Clearances for Congressional Staff

John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration
7D 24 Hqs

5454

15 September 1978

Stan:

I endorse Mr. Gambino's comments on your proposed reply to Admiral Murphy.

/s/ Jack Blake

John F. Blake

Atts

Distribution:
Orig RS - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
- DDA Subj
1 - DDA Chrono
1 - JFB Chrono
DDA:JFBlake:kmg (15 Sep 78)
Atts: Memo dtd 14 Sep 78 to AEO/DDA fr D/Sec, subj: Security Clearances for Congressional Staff
--Proposed ltr fr DCI to ADM Murphy on same subj
MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, USN (Ret.)
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: Security Clearances for Congressional Staff

1. I have your memo of 5 September on security clearances for Congressional staff. I appreciate the initiative. I am anxious to proceed in the general directions you suggest and will do so.

2. At the same time, we will be knocking our head against a tree if we attempt to curtail these relatively modest numbers of Congressional staff clearances while continually increasing clearances in the Executive Branch (I have requests pending on my desk for many thousands of additional clearances within DoD). As our overall review of security procedures proceeds, I hope, and anticipate, that it will include appropriate steps for sizeable reductions in codeword clearances throughout the Executive Branch. I'd be grateful, however, if you would anticipate such action by initiating reviews within DoD to reduce the number of clearances.

/s/ Stansfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Sensitive Compartmented Information Accesses

Your memorandum of 19 September indicated intentions to go ahead with procedures to stabilize the number of Congressional staff personnel who have access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) along the lines I suggested in my memorandum of 5 September. Simultaneously, you again expressed concern that Executive Branch accesses continue to rise as evidenced by the pending Department of Defense request for an increase of more than 7000 accesses.

In keeping with your hope that accesses can be reduced, the Department of Defense continues to take a hard look at the problem. The Director, DIA, has tasked the Military Departments to carefully scrutinize current accesses and any requests for additional accesses to ensure that there is no other way to proceed. Valid justification of need is required in support of all requests but we are conscious, also, that the current SCI structure envelops such a wide spectrum of research and development, operational, management and intelligence functions that arbitrary curtailment of accesses can cause delays which could place operations or program development in peril.

Under the auspices of DIA, an SCI industrial security conference has been scheduled to emphasize our concern. In addition, I have directed the formation of a DOD Working Group to examine the entire scope of problems associated with Special Access programs.

We are studying the Vogt Report with the hope that by evolutionary implementation, it will result in a significant increase in the unimpeded flow of intelligence and make access to sensitive material less necessary for most personnel. I believe our cooperative efforts in this area will be beneficial to all concerned.

Daniel J. Murphy
Admiral, USN (Ret.)
Deputy