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ALL PRINTED IN THE YEAR 1860.

EDUCATION IN INDIA.

A LETTER

**FROM THE EX-PRINCIPAL OF AN INDIAN
GOVERNMENT COLLEGE TO HIS
APPOINTED SUCCESSOR.**

BY EDWIN ARNOLD, M.A.

(OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, OXFORD, AND LATE PRINCIPAL, POONA COLLEGE,)

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OTHER POEMS;" "THE HITOPADESA," WITH MURATHI
AND ENGLISH VOCABULARY; "THE EUTERPE
OF HERODOTUS;" ETC.**

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PREFACE.

THE present Letter, intended at first for private hands only, seemed to touch (however lightly) on subjects of such importance, that the Author has thought it worth while in the interests of Indian Education to give it publicity.

E. A.

Framfield, Sussex,
Sept. 1860.

A LETTER FROM THE EX-PRINCIPAL OF AN
INDIAN GOVERNMENT COLLEGE TO
HIS APPOINTED SUCCESSOR.

Framfield, Sussex.

MY DEAR R——,

ELECTED to the Principalship of the Government College at ——, you have requested me, as your antecessor in the office, to set down something of my experience there; and to express the opinions I may have formed regarding Indian Education generally, and your own adopted part in it. I accede with pleasure; being not so modest as to believe that the labour of three years has left me no residuum of useful information, and well assured that what you gain thereby, however trifling, will by so much diminish the dividing stratum through which the Western Teacher must delve to get at the palæozoic period of Eastern minds. I congratulate the College and myself upon your election; and pass you the archididas-calic staff with confident hope that your annals will occupy a larger page than mine; certainly not surrendering my empire, as Augustus to Tiberius, *ut comparatione magis inlustris videretur*.

I suppose every thoughtful man reflects sometimes on the future destinies of India. Wedded to the Em-

pire now, for better or worse ; the one anomaly in a consistent Imperial system ; she is the Hagar of the household, and the little Ishmael, who is to be, will surely give us trouble. We had a great "tomasha" on the maidan of — to proclaim the Queen's assumption of Hindostan, and the crowds of bewildered and bewildering natives suggested curious historical parallels. Letting these pass, it is certain that we shall not always retain India, and equally certain that our business is to deal with her as honest tenants, who will render back their house in fair order to the great Landlord ; for you are Greek enough to believe in the Ζεὺς ἐπιμελητικός. In the late mutiny, the rebels, always improvident, were entered on a struggle which could have but one termination. With the harbours of Calcutta, Bombay, and Kurrachee filled with our floating homes, the survivors of the most extended massacre would have found refuge, and the breathing space necessary for an avenging return. But the time may come when Madagascar and the Red Sea ports will send the tricolor to Colaba, and a Russian fleet from the Amoor blockade the Hoogly ; and we should have the country in that day with us or against us, in proportion as we have utilized the intervening time. A likelier political issue, although further removed, is when, weary of a burden she can neither support nor repudiate, England will imitate Rome under Adrian, and, surrendering her trans-Euphratic appanage, mark the access of that weariness which precedes the decline of Empires. If India, no longer nursed, can in such a day stand alone, we shall have done our duty ; if she relapses into Hindoo regimes and traditions, or merges helplessly into the undistinguished mass of Russian rule, we shall not have done it, whatever our

efforts; but shall bear the blame of extinguishing the torch of civilization in the last round of the λαμπαδηφορία.

Of course we cannot impress our civilization on the natives, unless they permit us to remain with them—and you will be amply satisfied (having no financial interest therein) with the means adopted for securing that permission. The stations are raucous with guns and drums, and the native believes as a consequence that only two classes inhabit the distant and wonderful England, viz. Soldiers and Sahebs. He is quick enough at classifying the last, and has his own opinion of governors who hold that the best virtue for his practice is punctuality—in the payment of his “jum-mabundi.” Prepare yourself for such occasional satraps; prepare yourself to find them regarding everything as more important than Education, or rather Education for the native not important at all. They would eliminate from the purposes of our occupation of India the very one which justifies all others, and covers with the broad cloak of charity the spots in Anglo-Indian history. They disregard the *pars essentialis*. I recollect, on a Scotch tour, tasting some cottage dish, not wholly repulsive to a Southern stomach, and, desiring to know the basis of such a novelty, was informed by the gude-wife that she “pit kail intill’t,” and “salt intill’t,” and still questioned, “scones intill’t,” and again “kail intill’t:”—last and by chance I learned that honest meal was at the bottom of its edibility. Old Indians reluctantly recognize the inevitable educational meal. Interesting indeed to you will be the psychological study of them, and of the influence exercised by an autocratic atmosphere upon the English mind. The conservatism

which, wisely or not, formerly excluded from India all but officials, is by no means dead with "Company Bahadûr." It lives in the breast of many a worthy colonel and collector, and denies the *emollit mores* to the very face of Ovidius and Lord Stanley. When you dine at Doosidpore with the brigadier, be sure that he will ask you, "What (the enemy of mankind) is the good of teaching the niggers, sir? you taught Nana Saheb, you did, and he learned to read French novels, and to cut our throats."

Having his worthy deeds in your memory, you will easily forgive the gallant soldier's illicit conclusion from a particular premise. But you are an "unconvenanted" with nearly all educational officers; and, as the Aryan institution of caste finds its equivalent in most Indo-European races, you may expect a hearty English jealousy extending, for the sake of your craft, to you. One of the best results of the competitive system is that the new race of civilians are on the side of the books to which they owe their distinctions. I draw no comparison between them and the race that preceded them—among the last are men that would honour any country and redeem any service—but I have seen reason to be glad, as you will, that the young proconsuls of India are no longer only Englishmen, which is much, but thoughtful and well-read Englishmen, which is much more. It is impossible for such to refuse their adhesion to the recognized means for expanding native thought, and Education in India numbers them among her natural allies. It would indeed be a narrow definition which excluded their agency from what is understood by educating. The manners, the habits, the higher life, and the clearer judgment of a scholar, while increasing his capacity for service,

enlighten the dark circle of his dependants, and illustrate to them another phase of Western superiority, beside the undisputed one of strength.

Do not misconstrue me as relying much for the reform of Hindoo society on the example and influence of the English residents. We are not many enough, and, I am afraid, not good enough for much in that way. When the night falls the Indian city and the European lines are as distinct and isolated as though they were fifty leagues asunder,—and in the day the Hindoo will “buy with you, sell with you, talk with you, walk with you, and so following, but not eat with you, drink with you, or pray with you,” nor indeed implicitly trust you. The bitter feelings excited by the mutiny have not helped to lessen the instinctive antipathies of colour—and the ethnical separation is even completer than in the days when the “Beebeekhana,” and its dark mistress, taught the Saheb something of the thoughts and feelings of the subject people. The exclusive habits of the Hindoos repel advances, if their ways of life would permit them to be made. You may be very anxious to understand the inner existence of India, and yet wait a long time for very little knowledge. There are Brahman ladies in the Mahratta capital who have never set eyes upon an English face, and many English people without it whose acquirements, after a lustrum in the country, just suffice to order the carriage, or call for the ice. In the jungle (which you will come to know as the *non-infinitans* of “the stations”) the “koombi” or agriculturalist sees and feels next to nothing of Western influence. Once or twice a year it may come into contact with him, embodied in the assistant collector asking for his rent, or the educational inspector visiting his village school,

or he may have a sepoy brother, who comes on leave, and brings surprising stories of the Sahebs and their inscrutable ways. Their ignorance is matched at home by English misconceptions; and a year in India will show you that all who serve there must submit, more or less, to be *incomprises*. There is a passage in an article of noble inspiration, which appeared in a late "Westminster Review," under the well-known name of F. W. Newman. The writer is misled into calumny of a splendid soldier, and ascribes to Tantia Topee and his followers a virtue so unfortunately exotic that their vernaculars contain no name for it. Patriotism is as possible just now in India as a palm-tree in the Temple Gardens; and the *gallant* Tantia Topee was an unsuccessful "shroff" or money-changer—who should have lived for ever, if fighting and running away could have ensured his existence. He passed from usury into the service of Nana Saheb at Bithoor, borrowing on his journey, from my assistant professor, certain monies for the purchase of his betel-nut, which I am not at all sure that he ever returned. But such a blunder from such a pen illustrates our mutual misconceptions; we are clearly a transitory race in India, though we may make our influence permanent. Indeed nature herself forbids the amalgamation which between races less akin has been possible and powerful. The northern constitution endures rather than resists the unusual climatic influence of India—and it is commonly believed there that the power of reproduction ceases with the third generation of the mixed blood, while a moral degeneration seems to accompany the physical one. I think all these considerations, taking away the prospect of improvement by intercourse, increase the importance and

widen the province of Education in India. To bring back to her the embodied gains of the West in science and philosophy—to submit them in their simplicity to the emancipated Hindoo intellect—and to leave their assimilation to its aroused acquisitiveness, this seems the legitimate field and scope of Indian Education. Those who agree with me will be least disposed to embarrass the tradition of “the ascertained” with any watch-words of sectarianism. In proportion as they know India, they will value and employ those physical sciences and that literature which, presenting accepted results and standards, leads the Asiatic from his habitual Pyrrhonism to a new conception of possible verities.

This theory would be easier of reduction into practice if the Hindoo collegians were all “bec-jaunes,” waiting with open mouths for intellectual supplies. Banish that delusive hope! Your students regard learning as an extremely disagreeable means of obtaining a scanty livelihood. Without positively denying that the love of learning, *per se*, exists among them, I certainly never found its presence evidenced by the self-enjoined labour which so largely makes the English scholar. The bright eyes and open ears of an English class will not often encourage and anticipate you in the “dewan-khana” of your Mahratta College. Gently *suffering* instruction; passive Danaid-tubs, rejecting and retaining nothing, your Brahmans will mostly undergo the hard process of improvement with an incapacity and resignation which is wonderful. One cannot complain of a phenomenon so natural. They bring to their studies a traditional antipathy for them; the poorest and proudest of their countrymen, and forbidden to engage in other pursuits, they take

up with the English colleges as a *pis aller*. In their bountiful land the monthly stipend of seven or eight rupees is ample to obtain the daily "stomach-full" which exhausts the ambition of most Hindoos; and the distant prospect of a clerkship in some Government office helps to reconcile them to their destiny. At present there are about three paths in life open to the Brahman boy. He may become a bhut, or priest; and he may lend money on usury; or he may acquire English and an eventual subordinate appointment as clerk, or carkoon, thereby. The first profession will but give him existence on eleemosynary food, the second requires capital which he can seldom command, and there remains the third. A great majority of Brahmans accordingly enter our schools—certainly they are present in them in the general proportion of fifty per cent. and it would be idle to expect from these the energy of students who have exercised a free choice of *métier*. I need not mention the antecedent causes which have made the Brahmans a caste of beggars, and driven them to our schools. Their glory is departed before their pride, and they are left in the uncomfortable position of an unprovided and unregarded hierarchy; a Spirituality widowed of its Temporalities, and with no provision for the venerable relict. As a substitute for their old ascendancy they are now silently monopolizing Government Education, and their necessities are so much stronger than their prejudices, that they even throng the benches of the Missionary schools. In the capital of the Deccan there is a school of the Scotch Mission, which numbers its two or three hundred Brahman pupils. The Scotch *padre* who presides administers a severe course of Christian doctrines to each and every boy, and opens his gates on no

other condition ; but to obtain English, and thereby bread, the "twice-born" bears this *peine forte et dure*, and forgets, with anxious alacrity, his doctrinal acquirements so soon as the Executive Engineer or Civil Auditor finds for him an office-stool. The apprehensions about religious teachings, though just, are thus often based on an error. Let the Hindoo alone outside, and inside your school you may attach what conditions you like to the teaching imparted. The dogmata of Christianity commend themselves least to his mind for profit and probability, but he will go through with *them* even,—

"Græculus esuriens, si cælo jusseris, ibit."

You ought to be prepared to find this ancient hierocracy in disrepute corresponding to their condition. The successive regimes of Hindostan have been mainly against Brahmanism. Tippoo Saheb cut off the skin of the forehead from a number of those who declined to appear without the caste-mark there, and the milder British Government has seen it just to divert the state allowances for Deccanee Brahmans to purposes of educational utility. But they remain the unmistakeable aristocrats of India ; recalling by their lighter skin and lazy hauteur those Aryan progenitors of theirs who conquered Hindustan and peopled Europe. Other Indian races are inferior, or else not homogeneous. The Parsee, self-styled the Anglo-Saxon of India, is a trader, and has the quickened faculties of trade ; the Mussulman is a stranger in the land (as well as a danger), and the indigenous populations are the peaceful Oscans of India. I believe that some of those who control Indian Education, in recognizing this ancient aristocracy, contemplate its gradual restoration, and look complacently on the

Brahman monopoly of our schools as tending to establish an educated class, already naturally defined, between the governors and the governed. I speak against the prophetic instinct in dissenting from this complacency, for we appear committed to such a policy, and it is one that cannot be quickly changed; but the Brahman intellect, perhaps potentially larger, is certainly less active than that of other and wealthier classes, and it would be wiser to raise the race of scholars from the general population than so perpetuate the distinctions of caste. The Brahman is a beggar, and the *res angusta domi* checks his best efforts, while it is a necessary condition of the pride which forbids him to obtain a competence like the Parsee or the Banyan. When I joined the College, a large proportion of the boys attending the school attached to it were actually professional mendicants, or "bhikshooks." They had been permitted to come an hour after the opening of school, to give them time to carry round the town their "bhikshapátram," or "beggar's bowl," and to dispatch the fortuitous meal it might contain. You will find your Parsee students with well-furnished bookshelves, in comfortable homes; and, as a consequence, intelligent and cleanly, and at the head of their divisions. You will hear your Brahman boy beg to be excused from purchasing the text-book of his class, as the deduction from his monthly stipend would leave him no funds to procure the oil which illumines the dingy cow-dunged room, where "he can read his cousin's." Such irremediable poverty must be accompanied by degradation, and must induce contempt; and very little respect is accordingly entertained by other castes for the Brahmans. In the days of the dynasties of Solar and Lunar Kings, of the murder of women, cows, and Brahmans, the first was

easily expiable by fine, the second hardly, and the third not at all; and the Brahman priest dictated the royal actions as imperiously (and sometimes as blood-thirstily) as Samuel at Gilgal. Times are quite changed, and not many cows, nor even women, would now be sacrificed for a Brahman's sake. You are studying Murathi, and will appreciate an every-day illustration to which I can bear witness. A Brahman of position called upon an English gentleman, and finding him out, proposed to the low caste "puttee-walla" at the door to be allowed to enter and await his arrival. The servant demurred, and upon the Brahman saying, "What! do you think I should steal anything?" his ready answer was, "Toomtsa jât tusêts ahê." ("It would be just like your caste.") To condemn, of course, a whole class for poverty would be illiberal, if it were not self-imposed and accepted from no lofty sentiments of duty. The shloke of their own Hitopadésa explains the declension that it cannot justify—

Sêvêva mânamakhîlam jyolsnêva tamo jarêva lāvanyam
Harîharakatheva duritam gunasâtamapyarthitâ harati.

Vide page 50, ARNOLD'S "Hitopadésa."

(As Age doth banish beauty,
As moonlight dies in gloom,
As Slavery's menial duty
Is Honour's certain tomb;
As Hara and as Hari
Can purge thy sin away,
So Poverty can surely
A hundred virtues slay.)

That I do not overrate the extent of this monopoly on the part of the Brahman caste will be evident by the instance of the College over which you are elected to preside. When I left it, out of some fifty college students, three I think were Parsees, one a Purbhoo,

and the rest Brahmans ; and among the hundred and fifty college school-boys I recollect only one Jew, one Mussulman, and two or three Goanese Christians, while the rest were of the priestly caste. One may pause to notice the proud contempt with which the Mussulman everywhere stands apart from Government Education. No Mogul names occur even in the lists of the Medical College ; they condescend to learn accounts in the Bazaar schools, and there they leave us and our Education.* There can hardly be a subject that presses for consideration more than this contrasted action of the Brahman and Mussulman, with all which it presages. I have conceded to the first the claims of the “sangre azul ;” and it must be allowed in justice to them, that, on the establishment of an engineering school, they have followed the all-persuasive rupee into the forbidden regions of sawdust and stone-masonry. Higher motives may also conquer the obdurate respect of caste ; and I recollect with warm regard the Curator of my College museum, Mr. Venkutrao Ramchundra, who, although a Brahman, loved science too well to neglect one of his duties—even when the life of the lordly Nâg† was due to Minerva. Still your attention

* Mr. Russell, in his “Diary in India,” speaks observantly on this point:—“Our missionaries make no progress in the Mussulman districts ; our religious and educational movements are watched by the Moulvies with the greatest suspicion ; above all, the recollection of the days when the Mahommedans were paramount is more recent and active in their minds than the memory of Hindoo glory among the Brahmans. And,” he continues, “the Governor who shall find some healthy use for the energies of Mahommedan nobility and gentry will confer a great benefit upon India.”

† The Cobra.—At the foundation of the Museum, the Brahman students readily contributed live specimens for a Clarence-death in spirits ; though they declined themselves to kill them.

will be early drawn to the unsatisfactory status of Indian Education, and you will come to wish, I think, that cadets of the wealthier castes could be induced to constitute more largely the "commoners" of an educated class, in which the Brahmans might well continue to furnish the "scholars." The question is the more important, because the prizes of Education are at present subordinate clerkships in Government offices, so that very little of the imparted learning is diffused; and the Brahman adds to his other elements of exclusiveness that of a low bureaucracy.

It is worth while to tell you briefly how the machine of Education is made up in the presidency of which I am speaking. The villages or "gaums," which are very numerous, have for the most part a Government school, under a master who derives his pay either directly from the Government, or from local contributions to which Government makes an addition. There are loose screws at once discernible here in the low qualifications of the master, and the difficulty of obtaining the local contributions, which can only be alluded to. Those village schools, besides dispensing knowledge to the rural population, should feed the "central" or "high" schools established in the larger towns, which are in turn to be drawn upon for the vacant scholarships and free studentships of the two Government Colleges. Above, and including the Colleges, is the Presidency University, with a very sufficient apparatus of names for the most complete results. Degrees are conferred by it, and a staff of fellows provided for by the diversion of the Duxina fund to which I referred above. The Educational Inspectors make the tour of their several divisions, mainly employed in visiting and examining the central and village schools, aided in this

work by deputies. Whatever coherent design, or academic completeness the scheme possesses, is of new creation ; and due to the strong will, and clear intellect, to have served which to the best of my power is one of my Oriental recollections which is unmixed with regret.

In this machine you will have the honour to be one of those parts which bear the most wear and tear, and the least proportional gilding. Partly from its recent construction, partly from defects admitting more or less of remedy, it does not work altogether efficiently. The attendance at the village school is good, and might be made regular by fit masters ; but that essential condition is too often wanting. The Normal school in connection with the College supplies the majority of them to the Deccan, but under regulations which deter the best men from entering on so unpromising a line. The normal student (and future village master) has to sign a heavy bond in entering upon his three years' training ; and the average amount of the final appointments may be set at fifteen rupees. This is not enough to dignify the career, and it is accordingly sought by none who have higher hopes. Upon you devolves the selection of the village schoolmasters from such as have passed some kind of training ; and these circumstances compel you to nominate *ce qu'on a* rather than *ce qu'on veut*. The consequence is serious to the village schools, which properly conducted would yield in importance to no part of that system of which they are the basis ; and to increase their usefulness, by better provision and closer surveillance, is a reform within your province to press for, and urgently indicated by a first diagnosis. It results from the imperfect acquirements of the masters, that boys imperfectly prepared are passed to the central

schools, and that the central schools present imperfect candidates at the College entrance Examination, and consequently that the Colleges have to accept these, or to see their expensive machinery unemployed. It is the constant complaint of the Public Examiners that college students are deficient in the first requisite—an accurate grammatical knowledge of the medium of instruction. It is the constant answer that they must bring this at least to the Colleges, or the Colleges must abandon a too ambitious curriculum, and descend to the humbler duties of central schools. Two changes are called for—the pay of the masters should be increased to the point which will give good men, and the Inspectors should modify themselves into Travelling Examiners. The clean and regular village school, which elicits the Inspector's praise, is got up for his benefit, and reverts upon his departure into a village lounge, casually occupied by intermittent scholars. Educational work is not imponderable, and praise and pay should follow attested results. The Inspectors should examine each school by regulated standards, and pass boys from one rank to the next higher by printed certificates, increasing or diminishing the stipend of the master in regard to his half-yearly number of prepared pupils, and the capacities of his district. Such a plan was introduced by me into the College school to govern the promotion from class to class, and promised excellently when I resigned my office.

The College school is one attached to the College, and ranks among the "high" or "central" schools. It is recruited, like the Normal school, by periodical examinations of the candidates for entrance, who are drawn by circular notice from the city, and the surrounding districts ; and is officered by native teachers, with an

European head. No believer in the Mosaic cosmogony, the Indian schoolmaster yet adheres devoutly to the tenet that labour was the primal curse, and you must deal with the majority of them as men unencumbered with a conscience. That provided for, you may get good work from them, although the increased pay which I was successful in procuring them, not even now much above that of the native cavalry, does not tend to help them to a sense of its dignity.

All these teachers are also Brahmans, and I have said enough of them to prepare you to fear that Education in the Deccan, to use Lord Ellenborough's words, is "mainly creating a very discontented body of "poor persons, having, through the superior education "we have given them, a great power over the mass of "the people." Discontented with their inferior *status*, and exactly armed, and precisely placed for making their discontent eventually dangerous to the well-being of India. At present circumstances range them on the governing side, as the Director of Instruction has reported, (p. 30, Report, '57-'58) ; they have to seek the favour of government for livelihood, and the Neo-Brahmanicals are not yet elevated by time or number into a distinct caste. Turning, however, to the table in the Report above quoted, which gives the aggregate of each denomination attending the Deccan schools, one finds the Brahmans numbering 969 out of a total of 1464, the largest total of any other unmixed class being 57.* In Guzerat, where the Brahmans are not so numerous, Mr. Hope reports an attendance on their part of thirty-five per cent. which has of late a little diminished. Here then is clearly a tree growing up to

* The proposed transfer of the seat of the Bombay Government to the Brahmanic metropolis of Poona, doubles the force of these representations.

the exclusion or overshadowing of others, which may or may not be worthy of such exclusive cultivation. Certainly means should be provided to "make the tree good, or its fruit good."

Discharged from other obligations than loyal recollection of my service in India, I may permit myself to speak plainly before passing on to other phases of the work you have accepted. In the divine wisdom quoted above lies, I think, the choice of course. Either a class must be attracted to Education which will dignify it by their position and means of prosecuting it, or we must substantially elevate that class which circumstances, and something like inattention, have combined to educate exclusively hitherto. Eleemosynary Education is never an unmixed good, and least of all when it is accepted as a *pour manger*, and not to meet the aspirations of an indigent genius. In regard to the first alternative, it is true that the Jagheedar's College at Belgaum never received a Jagheedar; and the experiment is quoted as crucial and decisive against the willingness of the wealthy natives to accept an Education. That is no just conclusion! In Asia "it is indeed the privilege of the wealthy to be ignorant," and they will certainly not abandon the "bliss of ignorance" for the little learning which serves only to render them discontented with the sensual enjoyments of wealth. But the Asiatic loves place and power as much as ease, and in a fair and moderate apportionment of it to him lies the secret which will really obtain for us a refined and cultivated class. There is nothing at present open to the richer native which can be said in the least degree to invite sacrifice and trouble on his part. I know of only one Native employed under Government drawing more than 500 rupees monthly, and it seems tacitly understood that

this, or something near this is the official Rubicon of emolument and corresponding trust, which no indigenous talent shall be allowed to transgress. If the higher Governmental appointments were freely opened to native graduates; if a clear future of honour and profit lay beyond the acquisition of the new and ill-understood B.A., the Colleges would have their pick of the best men of all castes, and we should raise students to whom the future of India might be gradually confided. It is not necessary to the consistency of these suggestions to point out the particular offices which such men might fill. The new Municipal Commissions would each work better for an intelligent paid member, who should be in a position to communicate the sanitary measures of European cities; the railways will demand intelligent native inspectorates, and all the growing industries of India supply vacancies for cultivated and trustworthy men. Some offices must undoubtedly be withheld against a better moral development. I believe heartily in the absolute individual superiority of the English official, and I know that the natives mistrust their own magistrates, and do not willingly resort to them if an European court is open; but confidence begets the qualities which inspire it. Good degrees might wisely be declared as certain passports (moral qualifications ascertained) for Parsee, Purbhoo, Mussulman, or Brahman, to places of emolument and power. Unpopular to many ears must such a proposal sound; but we cannot educate, and preserve the present exclusion. The *Latinum nomen* must some day have their seats in the Roman Senate, though the *rogatio* to such an end shock a Consular from his proprieties.

Yet if, accepting circumstances, our modern "Gymno-sophistæ" are to retain the old monopoly of the last

half of that title, conceding only, to tiresome decorum, the cool and inexpensive toilet implied by the first (and this you will find them unwilling enough to do in the hot season), the same liberality will appear to be demanded. In the first place, an assured *métier*, at least, must be offered upon graduating to the persevering and successful student; and, antecedently to that, his poverty must be remembered, and his needs supplied while *in statu pupillari* with a much more open hand. I repeat that these considerations are by no means beyond your province, though they appear to trench on the *adytum* of the Civil Auditor. In your own interest, and that of the College, you must constantly be saying: "Give me masters and students of higher position, or elevate those which I have to the needful level of a scholar's independence." Turning to the Report for 1857-58, you will find that the total sum expended by Government on education for that year was about £39,000; and only £275* of this sum is set down under "Scholarship," that is, as paid to assist College students in their education. If "Ramchundra" recalled, by his modesty and devotedness to learning, the example of that Clerke of Oxenforde who

" — wold leiver have at hys bedde's hedde
 " A dozen bookes, bounde in blakke or redde,
 " Of Aristotle, and hys philosophie,
 " Than rebekke loude, or idle braverie,"

he might meditate the muse on the extremely slight straw now supplied to him. But this is not the case; he knows that his "rupees seven" are just enough to live upon, and he studies with just sufficient energy to be pretty sure of retaining them at the yearly examination.

* This grant has been slightly increased of late.

But quitting these generalities, let me take you from them to the immediate scene of your rule. In the heart of the native city is the ancient palace of the Peishwas, which is now occupied as the College. Curiously-carved horse-shoe arches, and a wilderness of dexterous wood-work, characterize the interior; and the exterior walls are brilliant with frescoes of Arjûn the hunter, the monkey-god Hunooman, and Luxumee of the lotus, the Lady of fair fortunes. In its quadrangles the banana, the custard-apple, and the sacred Toolsee growing, are strange enough to him that has walked with Pallas on the trim lawns and under the stately elms of Oxford. Leave the gate, where the paharikaris or watchmen hang the official shield and matchlock, and pass through three of these open courts. Over the entrance to each is carved the god Ganesá, with the elephant-head; transfer to him your allegiance, for he is the God of wisdom, and nothing prospers over which he waves not his propitious trunk. These eager-eyed and respectful boys are the pupils of the College school—their turbans of crimson, and purple, and rose-pink, bend to you; but not so low as those worn by their masters, who are scrutinizing their new Principal with a glance which would plumb the depths of his idiosyncrasy, if power equalled will. Submit yourself to the inevitable analysis, and be assured that, by some means or other, each dark dependant will, within a week, have formed his proper estimate of your strong and weak points, and with an instinctive accuracy that would make a graphiologist despair. You wonder to see three separate tanks of water in the farther quadrangle? The Brahman laved his holy lip at the centre one formerly, and meaner castes satisfied their vulgar thirst at the others; but *nous avons changé tout cela*, and you

may drink, low-caste that you are, from which you please. A crowd of blue pigeons make room for you with unfluttered composure, as you taste the spring that bubbles up from yonder Temple of Parvati; and you are struck by the charming tameness of animals among a graminivorous people. Pass through the class-rooms buzzing with quick Murathi, and stop to hear Narayen, son of the priest who serves the goddess, reading, with admirable fluency, about "The Tower of London." He does not understand a word of it; but that shall not diminish his seeming confidence in the awful presence of the Saheb, who will not discover, as his master must, that he retains the impression of having read successfully a *tour* through the streets of the capital of England. Say a kindly "busá," and leave them to seat themselves with a sigh of relief and suspended interest. These dark and narrow stairs (trodden many a time by princes and princesses of the Murathi dynasty—more than once by the Machiavel of the Deccan, Nana Furnavees) conduct you to the upper apartments; and this is the "Dewan-Khana," the *omphalos* of the Oriental College, and your lecture-room. The first College class salutes you there with the natural and graceful obeisance of the East—exact it, and repay it; a well accepted and administered salaam is mighty with the Orientals. You come again under the analytical process, and each has already formed his own theory of your weak side, and meditates an early attack upon it, to gain a disallowed rupee, or a despaired-of leave-of-absence. For you to attempt to cope with the Hindoo in his diplomatic approaches will be lost time; his dissimulation is perfect, profound, opaque; and there is, perhaps, no Englishman in India who is not in some degree deceived by it, and guided by the one native

who has found out his secret springs of action. The English bluntness, which hinders and irritates European diplomats, and the English reserve which accompanies it, are the natural shields to turn the fine edge of native plotting. While you speak your mind, and no more than you have a mind, and are so strangely constituted as to prefer justice to partiality, the Brahman schemer reluctantly leaves you as impracticable.

Before you then are your materials, and out of them you hope to manufacture scholars. They are mainly quick enough to encourage the hope, and have excellent memories; and their analytical turn serves them well in logic, philosophy, and the study of language. But they are destitute of inventive faculty and imagination to fill out the creative outline of poetry, or to make the history live as they peruse it. With the first they deal as they would do with prose, and the second they remember by verbal allocation, recalling words and sentences, rather than the series of facts. The music of the marriage and thread processions braying under your windows will explain to you how impossible it is for ears which tolerate it, to have much appreciation for the higher strains of poetical or instrumental rhythm. Their verbal memory will constantly astound and embarrass you. Unsupported by reflection it will rattle through fifty lines of uncomprehended text-book, or build facts upon isolated words in the most grotesque manner. One of the questions in the historical paper of a late College Examination was: "Give the leading events in the reign of Elizabeth." Out of the many curious answers returned, I recollect the following: "Queen Elizabeth *were* a *vergin*; but, in her old age, she became so *susep-*

“*tible* that she kept a *minion*, called Robert, Earl of “Leicester.”

Add to this want of taste, and want of invention, the want of sympathy, and you have your three worst obstacles before you. The splendid struggles of Greek and Roman history, and especially the stirring passages of our own chronicles, make partisans of English students; and they are staunch Carthaginians, or Spartans, or Royalists, as their lights guide them. But all these pass before the Indian collegian as a show that does not much amuse him, and with the issues of which he is quite unconcerned. Shivaji's successes in Mahratta annals rouse him a little; the robber chief lies so *very* skilfully, and the “wag-nûk,” the bloody “tiger-claw,” in the extended hand of friendship, is so dexterous a way of disembowelling an unsuspecting foe; but, as any way written for his benefit or instruction he ignores history. In like manner, while following admirably the arguments of Mill, or the thoughtful *résumés* of Lewes' “History of Philosophy,” he has not the least *à priori* opinion about the conclusions. He does not warmly believe in absolute truth, and, if he did, he sees no particular advantage in its discovery. He is indeed the Sophist of Asia, who has overlived the theology of his ancestors, and not yet encountered the Socrates of a new philosophical epoch. Socrates, abandoning physics (as not then explored), betook himself to the common instincts of our nature, and his own mastery over words, those lithe weapons of the sophists. The physical sciences are firmly handled now, and I commend them to you for use upon your Gymnosophists. The assured conclusions of chemistry and geology are just what is wanted to wean the native mind into a search

after truth, which may expand into a sympathy for all which promotes it, and is "of it." I am strongly inclined to regard in Faraday the Socrates of your Indian Academe.

Of course, nothing that I have said of the students extends to their literature and religious beliefs. Your good sense, and the insight you have gained into Sanskrit, has already inspired you, as I know, with respect for them. For myself I profess a real reverence of the antique wisdom to which the West owes so much; and which, ill-understood or corrupted by priestly additions, is still, as it reaches us, so respectable. I am persuaded that one should enter on Indian Education with such a spirit, and that such a spirit will soonest make possible the "mode of rendering Education really popular" which Sir George Clerk has desiderated in his memorandum (dated 29th March, 1858). At the risk of a previous perusal on your part I am tempted to copy paragraph 41 of that memorandum as just, and also useful. The present Governor of Bombay says there: "In the pride of power, or in the littleness of prejudice, or in the trusted efficacy of British bayonets, some superintendents of English Education in India are apt to err through their disdain to inquire, or their aversion to acknowledge, not only the degree in which the liberal arts and sciences flourished there several centuries ago, but the actual condition of the mental cultivation and intelligence of some of the natives in modern days. In fact, the signal mistake made in dealing with this important subject of Education in India has been, in my humble opinion, that self-complacent disregard of the real disposition of the native mind amongst their own educated classes, in

“ their reverence for their ancient literature, and in
 “ their tenacity to retain it.”

One must observe that the “ mental cultivation and intelligence of the natives ” is not striking, except where Western learning has been grafted upon the “ disposition of the native mind ; ” but it is incontestable that such grafting, and not a preliminary extirpation, is the course which the thoughtful labourer in the field of Education will wish to see adopted. The scientific treatises which Sanskrit contains are fresh with streams, which, however scanty, rose nevertheless near the sources of knowledge ; and the scriptural teachings of the Veds are too often like those most revered and received by ourselves to deserve any but a respectful consideration. No code of laws has inculcated charity, and family union, and self-abnegation more successfully than that of Mênû ; and the philosophic mind which accepts the blemishes of the Mosaic pandects, as accounted for by time and place, will not refuse the same concession in contemplating such Hindoo customs as an enlarged moral sense has shown to be no longer in the harmony of things. Many of them have happily disappeared, and many will yet disappear before the allied force of truth and reason, best exercised by an appreciative reformer. Suttee, and the refusal of a second marriage to the widow, had not only much to recommend them as customs of an Eastern people, but arose more or less directly from sentiments that challenge admiration. What was good in them has long ago been overlaid by priestly greed of power, money, and show ; and India is well-rid of a rite which however, with all its faults, was at least full of the “ love stronger than death ; ” and the like of which wins the eloquence of Livy, in the

death of the heroic Sophonisba. No narrow heart dictated those shlokes of the Sanskrit Hitopadésa,

“When the faithful wife, embracing tenderly her husband dead,
 “Mounts the blazing pile beside him, as it were the bridal bed;
 “Though his sins were twenty thousand, twenty-thousand times
 “o’er-told,
 “She shall bring his soul to splendour for her love so large and
 “bold.”

ARNOLD’S (MS.) Hitopadesh.

The thought passes naturally from this subject to the stormy question of religious teaching, and the share claimed by dogmatical religion in Indian Education. Here one truly treads the *suppositos cineres*—and we must walk tenderly. Not that much reticence is practised by the advocates of an uncompromising religious Education. I think I had not been in the College a fortnight before the strong terms which so readily supply the lack of argument were directed against me, in the execution of Government orders. As you cannot avoid an ultimate expression of your views, it may be useful to you to know the position of the question, and the convictions which some experience in the matter has forced upon, as I hope, a not very prejudiced mind.

And first condone my presumption if I profess the belief that both sides are guilty of a little want of candour. The programme of Exeter Hall may be taken as contained in the extract which Sir George Clerk has made in his memorandum from a Calcutta publication. It runs thus: “The camp has been
 “planted, and the position of the Christian army made
 “good. The battle has begun, and the various bodies
 “of troops have had their several positions assigned to
 “them. The translators with their heavy batteries of
 “Bible truth; the tract writers with their light-field

“ guns ; the active cavalry of itinerators ; the preaching battalions of foot, and the little band of Christian sepoys, are all engaged in subduing this vast continent to the obedience of Christ. If the work be carried on, what *must* be the end ? The Lord gave the word : great is the company of the preachers. Shall not kings of armies flee apace, while they that tarry at home divide the spoil and share the joy of victory ? ”

There is no mistaking this, and such manifestoes, for declarations of open war. The spear is flung by the fecial* heralds of Evangelism far over the borders of the enemy's country, and that it has been picked up, Cawnpore and Lucknow, and an alienated population, bear painful witness. The generals of this invading army profess to have the welfare of India at heart, and it would be illiberal to be credulous in the face of such zeal. Indeed, the real devotion and courage of many who are engaged to the enterprise is convincing of their excellence of purpose, and balances the low intellectual acquirements which characterize them as a class. These then allege that Government are the guardians of India—that they are bound to do the best they can for their ward—that they have nothing so good as Christianity—and that they ought consequently to encourage its teachers, and enforce it on India in every possible way. They indeed ask the Government to proselytize, and would in some cases bear to see the sword thrown into the scale ; pointing illogically to the murder of unoffending children and Christian women as a judgment upon a Gallio-like government. The policy of our present rulers has not accredited this *commando*, though its efforts have

* “ Fecialis—*A herald-at-arms who denounced war, and was of the order of priests.*”—MORELL'S Ainsworth's Dict.

the respect, and its indirect educational successes the thanks of all who dissent from their ultimate purposes. The Indian Bishops regard them with a gentle interest which does not descend from its episcopal pedestal—while the Chaplains have large flocks of their own, and the official crook is only designed to fit the legs of such white sheep as may wander.* Here and there an out-station colonel or a collector of strong Scotch extraction trenches on the declared neutrality of his Government, and a Mussal is perhaps baptized into Christianity and an assured continuance of his monthly stipend. How, in the face of the debasing customs of India, they ask, and with the general conviction of the power and efficacy of Christianity, is it thus set aside? One answer is that not Christianity, but an erroneous idea of it is that which is set aside. One answer is that the Missionary party does not wholly desire the secular amelioration of India, that they do not indeed greatly desire it without the adhesion of the country to an exact formula. They construe Christianity too narrowly, and disdain expediency even if recommended by justice. They are not in their hearts half so careful to guard the fords of the Educational Jordan against the unfit and undeserving, as against those who will not or cannot pronounce the Shibboleth. I recall an application made to me by a Brahman boy to admit him of the College school without the usual certificates of character, as these had been refused by his Missionary master upon the single ground of his desiring to join a Government institution. We had no alternative but the painful one of dispensing with such docu-

* I owe it to justice to name one, of several bright exceptions, in the junior Chaplain of Poona, the Rev. F. Gell, who gives his time to his duty,—his leisure to noble labour among his soldiers,—and his hour of repose to the natives.

ments in similar cases, and you will find that alternative still adopted. In the face of a partisanship, so little like St. Paul's that it will not work with Apollos, or even recognize congenial labours, you will not wonder at the prudence which reluctantly misdoubts it. You will comprehend by many such instances the policy of declining measures, which would have, among other important results, that of clearing off their promoters, and rendering impossible what they most desire.

But if there is a want of candour and liberality on one side, there is also a little insincerity on the other. The party of which I have been speaking maintain that "no system of education can be sound in principle, or prove beneficial in results, which exempts any portion of the pupils it admits into its schools from instruction in the inspired volumes," and they ask for regular lectures on the Bible in Indian schools and colleges. In one sense it is supremely impossible to teach English at all without instructing in the "inspired volumes." The English language is full of Hebraic phrases and idioms due to the Bible, English literature draws upon it for images and illustrations, English moral science sits with the multitude on the mount by Betulia, and repeats the divine wisdom of the sermon preached there; and English history is unintelligible to the Hindoo without a frequent reference to the Old and New Testament. Nor is there found the slightest objection on the part of the natives to study a volume so engaging. I mentioned that Brahman boys will consent to learn the much-coveted English through the medium of the manuals of the Scotch Church, and far more readily will the advanced collegian devote his attention to traditions so imposing and interesting

as those of the Israelites. When last year our classes commenced the perusal of the "Samson Agonistes," I found that most of them had fully read themselves up beforehand in the Bible history of the Jewish Hercules. The Bible indeed was constantly accessible for these or any purposes, nor would I have pretended to lecture to Easterns on morality or philosophy without its presence and authority. No Government order was ever meant to be construed into a direction to the contrary, and not many scholars, I should think, would profess themselves able to comply with it, if issued.

But that is not the sense in which the introduction of the Bible is demanded. What underlies the demand and the refusal is lightly touched on by an able writer on Education in the last "Westminster Review," where he says: "The great vice in our ordinary religious teaching is that it is doctrinal, rather than practical, sharpening the intellect, not moulding the character —helpful rather as a manual of controversy than as a rule of life. This blemish," he continues, "reaches its maximum in those districts where proselytism has been most active." It is, in point of fact, the doctrinal, or rather dogmatical part of Christianity, that the Evangelical party have the mission and the desire to enforce. Their envoy begins with it—the presence of hostile creeds provokes him to his battle-cries instead of making him turn to read his treaties of peace as befits a herald. Without previous study of character or antecedents he approaches the quick-witted Hindoo on the very side where he is impregnable,* he rolls the

* At the village fire after the day's shooting I have often conversed with the "Gaum-wallas" upon these things. Something like this would pass:—

SHIKASI. The Saheb missed the shingh-walla (the "horn-fellow"). Wah! it was destiny!

stone of ever-returning assertion with zeal as honest as it is ill-judged, and is angry with all others who will not take part in the Sisyphean labour. That man would be a hopeful one who, carefully regarding the mental diathesis of the Hindoos, the stages of their religious history, and their present spiritual needs, should predict that the people of India will ever be capable of receiving the unmodified dogmata of Christianity as extant now in the mouths of the Missionaries.* Already the divine moralities of the New

SAHEB. It was a bad shot, not destiny. Haven't you heard the German Padre-Saheb?

SHIKASI. Yes! he spoke at Alandi "two-three" days back.

SAHEB. What did he say?

BYSTANDING NATIVE. First he said "tumtsa bap mot' ahe" (your *father* is very fat).

(*Chorus of suppressed laughter from Gaum-nallas.*)

SAHEB. St. (A sharp *click* means "annoyance" in Murathi.) You know what he meant!

BRAHMAN CARKOON (*repressing them, with private delight*). Yes! yes! he meant "toomtsa pap" (your *sin* is great).

SAHEB. What else?

BYSTANDER. He said his Dev (God) gave a "burra khana" (big dinner) to a lakh of people, with a very few chupatties and "two-three" fish.

BRAHMAN. That's liké Krishna! he eat up a housefull of cakes while his nurse looked away.

(*Chorus of consentient "hoys," yes! yes!*)

BYSTANDER. Then he said the Dev walked on the "black water."

BRAHMAN. It was Shiva that drank it all up—that's "chumutkarik" (wonderful) now!

(*Renewed chorus of admiring "hoys."*)

SAHEB (*too tired to argue*). That'll do. You say take the dinner to my tent, Gunesh!—Bus!

(*Exeunt omnes.*)

* This opinion is based upon what Missionaries have themselves allowed to the writer. One of the ablest and most earnest of them

Testament are winning them ; already the gentle spirit of its doctrine arrests them, and with these walk the Art and Science of modern days. But dogmatical Christianity, intelligible, if at all, to its esoteric professors, is a weary thing to the over-dogmatized Asiatic. True Morality has its own divine credentials and power of persuasion ; Justice bears a brow which all the world knows at sight, and the voice of divine Love is intelligible and welcome to every ear. These the unthinking dogmatist neglects for the assertion of miraculous evidence which the Hindoo parallels adroitly from his own Poorans, or for doctrines to whose real sublimity he can claim for his ancestral faith an earlier title. Indeed the Missionary himself is quick in perceiving this, and occasionally abandons the unprofitable *rôle* for another of greater utility. Some now-a-days bear a cross very comfortably padded, and the Apostle who was tearfully “set apart” in the crowded kirk ;—ladies weeping, and throwing into the plate their bracelets and broaches, and “brethren” clinging about the neck they should embrace no more ;—that apostle hides a daily martyrdom under a dressing gown of Cashmere, and shakes off no dust of witness, unless it soil the daintily-worked slippers, wherein he pursues the light amusements of a literary *devôt*.

The refusal to countenance the contracted form of Christianisation that I have mentioned, by no means incompatible with warm adhesion to Christianity, is generally founded on the duty of neutrality on the part of Government, and the respect due to independence of conscience ; and here, I think, is the seeming

—an excellent Orientalist to boot—confessed that he could number the Scindian converts of many years’ work on one hand, and that he misdoubted all but one of those.

insincerity of which I spoke. It shocks a good Gooroo just as much, and violates neutrality between Christianity and his creed as harshly, to teach that the world is a globe, as to proclaim the humanity of Krishna; and his independence of opinion is as rudely disregarded when he is not permitted to arrange the suttee of his sister, as if you refused to teach his boys English except through the medium of the first seventeen verses of the 1st chapter of St. Matthew. In truth, the refusal might be based on grounds more rational, and not less tenable. It would be also more candid to express a conviction that "dogmata" change, that their defining limits are rearranged by succeeding generations, suffering expansion or contraction with the advance of knowledge. The supervisors of Education might inoffensively pronounce them "non-essentials," in an educational sense, and not in the nature of things to be *taught*, which imply reception by conviction. They might fairly enough quote the example of one, and ask their assailants to suppose that, thirty years ago, at the expense of a dozen decimated cities, Maharashtra had embraced the dogma of the verbal infallibility of the Scriptures. With what repose of conscience could its propagandists now witness a native perusing the latest Bampton Lecture, where the champion of the Church ponders whether the command to the sun to stand still over Gibeon "was not a poetical apostrophe?"* The Immaculate Conception is an instance of a dogma at which the Papal doctors have, after much vacillation, arrived,

* Similarly, in a letter to the Editor of the "Westminster Review" (April, 1860), signed by Mr. J. Macnaught, Incumbent of St. Chrysostom's, a passage occurs which, thirty years ago, would have cost that able writer his gown. "I believe," he says, "the Bible to be inspired, but not without error."

just as the Papal authority is passing into disregard, and the last of the Popes is reigning in the person of an African soldier. The cultivated native knows these things, and resents the insult which ignores his knowledge; he has listened, with the present age, in amused astonishment, while the question of the eternity of punishment was made to hang on the rendering of a Greek adjective; and it is to the cultivated (or cultivatable) native that Education must appeal. A curious fact, and one that suggests a discrimination which might go far to meet these objections, is recorded of the Japanese Buddhists of the sixteenth century, who received the inscrutable doctrine of the Trinity without difficulty, and welcomed the doctrine of a scheme of salvation; but demurred to, and rejected as inconsistent, the dogma of eternal condemnation. My mind recurs to that marvellous cathedral of Paganism, the cave-temple of Elephanta. We had crossed in Lord Elphinstone's barge (*multis ille quidem flebilis occidit!*) making our way over the splendid piazza of the wide blue harbour to the palm-tree porticoes of that island shrine. Our table was spread under the very eyes of the sculptured Trinity, whose colossal and majestic brows seemed bent on us with the same unchanging expression that had beamed on Buddhist, Jain, and Brahman, before our little day. Gazing on that divinely-conceived Tri-unity, I felt how noble might be the rôle of the large-hearted Missionary who, with St. Paul's example before him, should know how to declare to a great people the name of their "Unknown God."

But the subject is seducing me beyond the limits of the most expanded letter. I hasten, in concluding, to touch upon one fundamental point, which, although not so much under your control, will derive a great

aid and impulse from your advocacy. I mean Female Education ;—you think, as I know, with the Laureate, that

“ the mother makes us most ; ”

and you will find it painful to recognize the fact, that her formative share in the Indian student is mainly confined to the physical production of him. Not much natural influence is possible among a people who scarcely allow the negative praise of Pericles to the domestic virtues of their women. The Hindoo home is squalid and noisy, and the voluble tongue of his mother, when it is not employed on the favourite topics of “ paisa ” (money), and the “ pôt bhurula,” indulges too often in the coarse and graphic licences of Murathi slang. The steps hitherto taken to make better things possible, are but few. At Sassoor and Soopeh there are girls’ schools ; the first reported by the Educational Inspector, Captain Lester, to contain thirty-seven pupils ; and his eminent authority is altogether on the side of their extension. In Poona itself there are four private female schools, *started and supported by the natives*, and containing in 1858, as many as 205 girls ; and the other divisions furnish similar statistics. The Poona schools have declined latterly from want of energetic Government support, and from the prejudices which still place educated girls at such a discount in the marriage market, that in some instances they have descended to the degrading *ressort* of a *Lais*. I had proposed, before leaving, that scholarships should be established for the best pupils, as the Brahman would perhaps accept the drawback of a cultivated understanding in a wife if compensated for by the possession of a monthly stipend, to be continued for a year or two after marriage. To you come all these considera-

tions with your office, descending, I would hope, like the troublesome crown of Henry IV.

“ ——— with better quiet, L
Better opinion, better confirmation.”

Certainly, whatever you can do to advance Female Education in India, aiming at the very possible issues of good and modest mothers, and contented and decent homes, will be a stone in the foundation of the future happiness of the country, and by so much bring it nearer. One noble-spirited Hindoo lady (let me record her name, *Nek Namdar Shetanee Hurkoorbace*, as an ornament to my last page) has endowed a girls' school in Guzerat with 12,000 rupees, and placed it under the inspection of the Educational Department. But trained native female teachers are the great want for these schools; with such, wonderful results might be achieved. After all, Lord Macaulay's tiresome New Zealander, who, tattooed in the uttermost fashion of civilization, encounters one everywhere, the predicted Marius of our modern Carthage, is not more possible than the graduate of a Poona College of 3000 A.D., who shall beguile the labours of state by glancing up the long roll of his Principals in the library of an Indian Chamber of Deputies. How will he wonder that it could have been worth while for the Second on that list to have urged, or hard for the Third to have succeeded in advancing, the reforms which helped to give him a country, and his history a grateful record of its English masters!

Very sincerely yours,

EDWIN ARNOLD.

To W. A. R——, Esq., M.A.

SPEECH
OF THE
DUKE OF ARGYLL

ON THE
SECOND READING OF THE
EUROPEAN FORCES (INDIA) BILL,

AUGUST 10, 1860.

LONDON:
JAMES RIDGWAY, PICCADILLY, W.
1860.

(2)



EUROPEAN FORCES (INDIA) BILL.

THE Duke of ARGYLL said,—During the last few years questions of great importance in reference to the affairs of India have been brought with more than usual frequency under the attention of Parliament; and on almost all of those questions more or less difference of opinion has prevailed. But I think I may say with truth that on no subject has the difference of opinion been so great or so keenly contested as on the question which this Bill is intended to decide. In truth, my Lords, I believe that the amalgamation of the European forces of the late East India Company's service with the forces of the Line was long considered one of the main difficulties in the way of the transference of the government of India from the Company to the Crown. I well recollect that in the discussions in 1853, during the Administration of Lord Aberdeen, on the "renewal of the charter," when various alternatives were before us, it was considered that the difficulties in the way of an amalgamation of the two armies were among the most serious of those which precluded any proposal being at that time made for the transference of the government from the Company to the Crown. Nevertheless, after a few short years, the occurrence of intervening events and the progress of discussion,

has brought about such a change that a Bill has come up to effect that object, carried by an overwhelming majority in the other House—a majority not of a party nature, but, on the contrary, consisting of all the political parties into which that House is divided, and I should be guilty of affectation if I pretended to expect any serious probability of its being rejected by your Lordships. Yet, I am sure that it is the opinion of the House that this is not a motion which ought to be made as a mere matter of course. It affects too nearly the interests of the Indian Government; and, although I hope it does not affect the interests of any individuals, yet it affects too nearly the long-cherished convictions of a body of men of whom I may say with truth that England has every reason to be proud, to entitle the Government to deal with it in any stage without proving, as far as they can, that it has received due attention, and that every view of the subject has been carefully considered.

Although, therefore, I trust that it is an unopposed measure by the great majority of your Lordships, I think I am justified in laying before the House, in some detail, the grounds upon which the Government has proceeded. And inasmuch as many arguments urged against the amalgamation of the European local army with the army of the Line are derived not so much from the specific provisions of the Bill as from certain indirect consequences which it is assumed will follow it; let me

direct attention to what the Bill is, and to what it is not—to what it does, and to what it does not do.

In the first place then, although many arguments would lead us to suppose that it is so, this is not a Bill for the abolition of the local army of India. After its provisions have come into full operation there will still be a large local army, composed of the natives of various tribes, who are trained to our military service; and, although I do not deny that many changes will be the natural consequence of this measure, yet, if on other grounds it were considered advisable, you might continue the present system of management, and, to a large extent, the present system of officering the local army without the smallest interference as far as regards the provisions of this Bill. In the next place, it is not, properly speaking, a Bill for the abolition even of the European local army. The whole of the regiments of the late East India Company which have any historical recollections will preserve their identity, although the terms of service will be altered. They will retain their ancient names and banners, and the recollections of all their great achievements. The direct consequence of this Bill is simply this, that it will be out of the power of the Secretary of State for India to enlist for the future any European soldiers exclusively for the local service of that country, and thus, after a few years, all the corps which are now local will become corps for the general service of the empire, liable in their turn to all the exigencies and

requirements connected with the defence of Her Majesty's dominions.

Now, my Lords, I do not at all mean to depreciate the importance of the change which I have thus attempted to describe. At the same time I am prepared to argue that the importance and scope of that change has been very much exaggerated. A paper has been laid on your Lordships' table of great importance—no less than the protest of Sir J. Outram, who lately occupied the position of President of the Council of India. That distinguished officer describes the change in these words:—"It is "an organic change in that military system under "which India has been won and kept." I venture to say, in spite of the assent of my noble friend opposite to this assertion (the Earl of Ellenborough) that, so far as concerns either the provisions of this measure, or its necessary consequences, such language is chargeable with very great exaggeration. One would suppose from this language that India had been won and had been kept, if not entirely, at least in a main degree, by the European army of the East India Company. I venture to dispute that assertion altogether, and as it is a matter of some importance, I trust the House will allow me to direct attention for a few moments to some of the facts connected with the past history of the European force in India. Before doing so, allow me to say that whatever is the amount of change which this Bill effects, it is a change infinitely less organic than that which was

the only other alternative presented for the adoption of the Government. I beg the House to recollect that the maintenance of the *status quo* is not in question. None of the officers of the local army, and none of the public men who have espoused their views, contend for the maintenance of a small European local army. The question is not whether we should retain the army which existed, but whether we should create a new army very much increased in numbers and in many respects very differently composed. I think I shall be able to prove, having regard to the past history of India, that the institution of a great and powerful European force separated from the army of the Line would be a far greater change than that which we propose—viz., that the comparatively small army which has hitherto existed shall be amalgamated with the Line.

In the first charter of the East India Company, in the time of William III., no limitation was placed on the powers of the Company as to the number of European troops which they might raise. They were enabled to raise as many recruits as were found necessary for the “defence of their forts and possessions.” At that time I need hardly say, it was not foreseen that the East India Company, which was then a mere trading association, would one day become a great territorial power, and but little importance was consequently attached to their military proceedings; but the moment it was seen that they were likely to be that which they afterwards became,

the natural jealousy of the English Parliament and Government was aroused, and statutory limitations were soon placed upon the power of raising European troops. And even long before this precaution was considered necessary, another step practically even more important had been taken, which tended to the same effect. Very early in the history of India—in 1754, that is only four years after the famous defence of Arcot by Clive, the Crown resolved to send troops of the Line to that country, and a detachment of the 39th Regiment, which still bears upon its colours the motto "*Primus in Indis*," formed no inconsiderable portion of the small European force which fought at Plassy. In the year 1773, when the Company assumed avowed authority over the province of Lower Bengal, their European troops amounted in number to 11,468, which, so far as I have been able to ascertain, was the *maximum* which had been reached until the other day. In considering however the importance of this levy, we must look not only to quantity but also to quality. Now there is abundant evidence, that the East India Company and the Government of India attached but comparatively small importance to their European forces. The truth is, that, with the exception of the artillery corps, respecting which peculiar care was taken from the very earliest time, the European army was very ill organized, and in so inferior a state of discipline that the officers of the Company placed almost their entire reliance upon the Sepoy troops, under European

command, and upon the regiments of the Line. In 1773, Clive declared that our existence in India depended upon the Sepoys commanded by English officers, and that the defence of the country might be intrusted to them alone, supported by a corps of artillery, similarly commanded. In 1786 Lord Cornwallis gives this account of the European troops of the Company :—

“The King’s British regiments must not be parted with. We have in reality nothing else, except the corps of artillery, that deserves the name of an European force.”

Again he says, in the same year,

“The intense heat and unhealthiness of the climate are against all military discipline, yet I was astonished at the good appearance of the King’s troops. The Company’s artillery are very fine, but their European infantry, on whom the defence of these possessions may one day depend, are in a most wretched state.”

I leave your Lordships therefore to judge whether, as far as concerns the earlier contests conducted by Warren Hastings and Lord Clive, it is not clearly proved that at least the conquest of India was mainly effected by the power which was exhibited by the officers of the Company in the organization of native troops, and by the regiments of the Line which were sent from England to reinforce and support them.

Your Lordships will remember that the Board of Control was established by Mr. Pitt in the year 1784. One of its first acts was to insist upon a great reduction of the Company’s forces in India. But the view which was taken on this subject, and the

importance which was attached to it, is strikingly illustrated by a celebrated debate which took place in Parliament, a few years later. In the year 1788, when there was an alarm of a renewed contest with the French in that country and in Europe, and when it was determined to reinforce the garrison in India by a considerable force of European troops, the question arose whether that reinforcement should consist of regiments of the Line or of an addition to the local force. Thus the very question which we are now debating, was discussed for many days in both Houses of Parliament more than seventy years ago, and in that discussion Mr. Pitt laid it down as a principle, that ultimately the amalgamation of that army with the Line must be attempted, and said that he would not consent to the adoption of any measure which would render the attainment of that object more difficult. His words were:—

“Such a consolidation was undoubtedly to be wished for, and sooner or later it must be attempted. Of this he would shortly say more, and therefore in this place he would only suggest that Ministers, having this very object in view, had thought it more advisable to raise Royal regiments to serve in India than Company's regiments, because, if they had preferred the latter, they must have made the consolidation so much the more difficult.”

The Declaratory Act which Mr. Pitt then introduced, giving power to the Board of Control to send four new regiments of the Line to India, and to charge them on the revenues of the Company, was very keenly contested, and was carried with great reluctance and dislike on the part of a considerable

portion of the House of Commons. It is recorded in the journals of that day that it was carried by a majority of only 67—a majority which, however small it might be considered in the first triumphant Parliament of Mr. Pitt, is one which any Ministry would now accept with very tolerable satisfaction. In consequence of the decision then come to four King's regiments, instead of four Company's, were sent to India, and from that time the number of the Company's European troops steadily diminished, having never, until quite the other day, reached the limits fixed by the Act of 1788—viz., 12,000 men. In 1796 that army was reduced to two regiments of Infantry, or as those regiments consisted of only five companies, in point of fact to one regiment, in each Presidency; the formal change to that number in 1829 being only a matter of arrangement. That was the state of things down to the Affghan war. But I need go no further than the minute of the Governor-General, which has recently been laid upon your Lordships' table, to show that in the conquest and subsequent protection of India the European regiments of the Company have always been considered as playing a comparatively subordinate part. I do not mean to say that they have not always behaved with distinguished gallantry; that they have done; but I am showing the exaggeration of the language used by Indian officers, especially by Sir J. Outram. Lord Canning says:—

“It appears as if these troops, forming as they did a very small

portion of the Indian army, had been until lately almost overlooked by their successive commanders-in-chief."

That does not look as if they had been the main instruments "by which India had been won and kept." I need hardly remind your Lordships that in accordance with the declared opinion of the Government of Mr. Pitt, Lord Cornwallis, at the desire of Mr. Dundas, drew up in 1794 a detailed scheme for the amalgamation of the two armies. Owing to difficulties of detail it was not carried into effect, but both Mr. Pitt and Lord Cornwallis expressed the strongest opinions as to the expediency of the measure and the necessity for its ultimate adoption. I venture to maintain, therefore, that as there was no alternative for the Government except to adopt this measure which had so long been recommended, or to raise for the first time a large English army to be exclusively confined to India, the step which they have taken involves a change far less great, and far less formidable than the other.

In order to show your Lordships how great would have been the change produced by the adoption of the other course, I need only remind the House of the nature of the demand made by those who represent the views of the local force. I presume I may take the opinion of the Military Committee of the Council of India as fairly representing those views. Well, their demand is, that the whole of the artillery, three-fourths of the cavalry, and two-thirds of the infantry, should be exclusively local.

It is true that this opinion has been modified by various individual authorities, but the Governor-General says that the native force ought to be two-thirds of the whole army, and earnestly urges that on no consideration should it be less than one-half. Then, my Lords, I say that a Local European Army of such proportions would be entirely new. It is not the system under which our dominion in India was acquired, or has been maintained.

Why, then, should we adopt such a proposal? There are great mechanical difficulties, if I may call them so, in the way of carrying such a plan into effect. I cannot mention the name of the late Lord Elphinstone without expressing, what I am sure is the general feeling of the House, our deep and heartfelt sorrow at his loss. We had looked forward to having his counsel and his advice upon this subject, and I believe that we are all deeply convinced that among the distinguished men who exerted themselves during that terrible Indian mutiny, none better deserved the vote of thanks, which was moved in such eloquent terms by the noble Earl opposite, than did Lord Elphinstone. What does Lord Elphinstone say as to the mere mechanical difficulty of raising a great European army for India? He says:—

“If we are to have a local European army, we must, in fact, begin almost afresh. Is it worth while to do this? What reasonable prospect is there of a local force, under any circumstances, being equal to the regiments of the line? Above all,

what possible chance is there of such a result being obtained with the officers of the late Bengal army?"

The opinion of Lord Elphinstone clearly was, that the officers of the late Bengal army, in reference to whose interests, in a great measure, that plan has been urged, were not capable of organizing and maintaining the discipline of an European force. And what, upon this point, is the opinion of Lord Canning, who supports the project of a large local army? His evidence, contained in a minute on our table, is even more specific than that of Lord Elphinstone. He says, "Speedily to raise a European army for India, and to officer it efficiently from our present body of officers, is impossible." Now look at the project which Lord Canning lays down for the purpose of raising this force, and see the objections which present themselves against it. In the first place, with reference to the late Indian mutiny and the insufficient garrisoning of that country, it has been necessary to increase the troops of the Line there. Something like from 25 to 30 battalions were raised in order to meet that exigency. You have these 25 battalions of the Line in the highest state of organization and discipline. They add to the effective force of the empire, and are available for any other service they may be called on to perform. You would have to commence by disbanding these regiments of the Line. Is not that a very great and serious objection? And how are you to raise and officer the new regiments? Lord Canning says

it cannot be done by the old Indian officers whose interests have been so much urged. For this purpose, therefore, you are to borrow the services of officers of the Line; and when they have succeeded in raising regiments something equal to those which you have already got, but which you must now disband, these new regiments are to be sent out to India and placed under the control and guidance of those Sepoy officers who are declared to be unfit for such duties. Is not that a round-about scheme, and one open to grave objections in point of imperial policy? Again, there is one argument has been stated against the maintenance of a local force in India to which I own I have never attached much importance,—viz., that a large local force would enter into injurious competition with the Line in the recruiting market of this country. It had always appeared to me, if you are to have 80,000 Europeans in India, that it would be the same thing as regards the demand made upon the field of recruitment in England, whether the 80,000 were divided between a local and a Line force, or whether they all composed one army. But the objections taken on this ground have gained strength in my mind since I have seen the demand of Sir J. Outram on this subject. Sir J. Outram fully admits that a change of measures in regard to recruiting will be necessary if there is to be a large local army in India; and he has sent home an appendix to his minute, in which he proposes that arrangements

should be made to attract to the local force the picked men of the whole recruiting field in England. It surely cannot tend to promote the general interests of the empire, that the very best men who can be induced to enter the military profession should have special inducements to limit themselves to an exclusively local service. Surely this would be a needless embarrassment in the main object you have had in all those improvements in the condition of the soldier and in the recruiting system which have lately occupied so much attention.

I think, my Lords, I have now sufficiently proved—first, that the maintenance of such an army would be entirely new; secondly, that it would be very difficult; and I now venture to add, that it would be in the highest degree dangerous.

It is often said that too much stress has been laid on the late strike or mutiny in the local European force in India; and in some respects I am not sure that this may not be true. But be it observed that the argument derived from the danger of mutiny has not been confined to those who object to a local European force. On the contrary, one of the arguments over and over again repeated in the papers on our table by the officers of the East India Company, is that it would be advisable to divide the army into two portions, and that the Queen's troops would keep in order the local force, and the local force in turn would keep in order the Queen's troops. The danger of mutiny is therefore an argument common to both parties;

and the only question is—which system is least likely to expose us to the danger of serious insubordination and mutiny,—a large local force or an amalgamated army of the Line? The answer to that question must depend very much on the evidence we possess in regard to the discipline of the East India Company's former local army. I think it is clear that if the one force be inferior to the other in discipline, the danger of insubordination must be greater in the case of that one, than in the case of the other. I know that in speaking of the discipline of the European regiments of the late East India Company I am touching on extremely delicate ground, and I beg to draw a distinction between discipline in one sense and discipline in another. I believe it is the universal testimony of all Line officers who have served in India that, as far as regards the discipline and the gallantry necessary in the field, no regiments in the world could exceed, as none have exceeded, the services of the Company's regiments. There is ample evidence to the same effect in the papers now on our table. But I must say there is a general concurrence of opinion that, as regards discipline in a different sense, and with reference to the relations between the men and the officers, the regiments of the local force are decidedly inferior to the regiments of the Line. I have already adduced some evidence on this point from the earlier history of the East India Company. I now turn to a more recent period. In 1828 the Duke of Wellington gave evidence

before a committee upon public expenditure. It was proposed to him that, in order to save the heavy expense of frequent reliefs in regard to colonial service, a number of corps should be put on the footing of a local colonial force, in the same manner as the European regiments of the East India Company. What was the Duke of Wellington's reply to that suggestion? He says :—

“The difference in the state of the King's troops in the East Indies from that in which the Company's European infantry is known to be is conclusive against it (the colonial system of corps) in my opinion.”

The Duke goes on to say,—

“It is very extraordinary, and I can only attribute it to their being confined there for their lives, that it is so, but it is very extraordinary that the same description of officers, who form the Sepoys into remarkably good troops, cannot form the European infantry to be at all equal to the other troops.”

Evidence to the same effect as regards the condition of affairs at the present time, might be adduced in abundance. But I need not go farther than the last minute of the Governor-General. If it had been possible to maintain a contrary opinion, every thing in the argument urged by Lord Canning would have induced him to adopt it. But his admission is emphatic—that “in this respect (viz. perfection of military discipline) they were “much below the troops of the Line.”

It is also admitted by Sir J. Outram, in his protest against the proposed measure, that the discipline of the local force is inferior to that of the Line. He

gives reasons, indeed, for it. It has arisen, he says, from causes over which the officers themselves have had no control—viz., from mistakes on the part of the Government, alterations in the rules of discipline, in respect to the power exercised by commanding officers over the men, and especially from the system of staff employment. I am not now inquiring into the causes of this inferiority in discipline, but merely into the fact of its existence, and I believe it to be proved by the concurrent testimony of all who have written on the subject. I regret to observe a disposition on the part of the East India Company's officers to treat with some degree of depreciation what is called the more perfect discipline of the Queen's army. They say it is the mere discipline of parade ; that it does not in any way touch the efficiency of the force in the field, and is of no serious consequence. I am sure your Lordships will agree with me when I say, that we ought to watch with the greatest care and jealousy the operation of any cause which tends to affect, however slightly, the perfection of military discipline—any cause which tends to affect, even in the smallest degree, that sense of subordination and that principle of obedience which is the first duty of a soldier. After all, my Lords, what are we arguing about? Not about the efficiency of the local army in the field, but the danger of insubordination in the times of quiet and peace, when troops suffer the lassitude and inaction of long canton-

ment, and are not under the excitement of active service. The admission, then, of Lord Canning—the admissions of the late Company's officers themselves,—and the concurrent testimony of all former years, in respect to the high comparative perfection of military discipline in the Queen's army is, in my mind, conclusive against a large and almost predominant local force. Some of the causes of their inferiority which have been assigned by Sir J. Outram might probably be removed; but I do not believe they could be removed altogether. Look to the reason given by Lord Cornwallis for the inferiority of the Company's troops in discipline. He refers to the nature of the climate. Lord Canning also thinks this inferiority might to a certain extent be removed, but he says emphatically that “probably” “it would not have been possible to keep them up to” “the mark of their brother soldiers trained in England.” It is clear that Lord Canning does not expect the local force ever to reach or equal the perfect discipline of the army of the Line. Well, but surely as regards the garrisoning of India, this is a matter of primary importance. Perfect military discipline is of primary importance even here, where civil authority is paramount, and where every time the soldier quits his barrack he is reminded that he is nothing but a citizen of the State. But in India all is different. There he sees and feels that the authority of the civil Government rests to a great extent on his sword; every thing around him re-

minds him of his importance, and his power ; when he quits his barracks he sees a subject population — for although, I trust, we rule the people of India for their own good, it must be admitted, I fear, that we have hitherto kept India by the power of the sword. Therefore, I say, that a large local army feeling that the civil Government entirely depends on them, and in a state of comparatively inferior discipline, would be a source of perpetual anxiety ; and I feel sure that the institution of such a force would be an experiment which no English Government will venture to attempt.

Indeed, my Lords, with regard to this question of discipline, it appears to me that the very arguments used in favour of forming this great local army are a sufficient indication of the circumstances of strong temptation in which they would be placed. It is argued that they, as the local force, are to be the permanent garrison of India—the army of the Line being a variable, and comparatively accidental element. They are to be thus taught to believe, as, so to speak, one of the traditions of their birth, that India in an especial sense belongs to them, and that its Government rests on their courage and fidelity. Again, they are to understand that they are constituted with a special jealousy of the “ Horse Guards,” which I hold with reference to this subject is but another name for the authority of the Crown. They are therefore to watch with jealousy any interference of the imperial Government.

Again, I find it argued that special relations ought to exist between the local Europeans and the native army. And last, not least, for this is perhaps the most dangerous of all—it is one of the conditions on which much stress is laid, that they are to have what is called a fair share of the good things of India. But who are to judge of what is the fair share? Can a great body of armed men, with habits and feelings specially localised, be placed in a more dangerous predicament? Can a Government be placed in a more embarrassing position? I know this view may appear rather overstrained to some; but I have good reason to believe and know that within the last few months—within the course of last year—and I appeal to my noble and gallant friend, late Commander-in-Chief in India, whose accession to this House we are all proud of,—I would appeal to my noble and gallant friend whether, on some very recent occasions, it has not been found a source of serious embarrassment to him and the Government of India that there existed a necessity for dividing the number of commands in certain proportions, not with reference to the free choice of the Government of the fittest men, but with reference to the necessity of consulting the feeling of a divided army?

Then, why should we run all these risks? That there is some risk every Noble Lord must admit. Why should we incur the risk of insubordination and of jealous feeling between two great European forces in India? The main argument, which I know

carries peculiar force with some, is that without it we shall lose the school of officers hitherto so invaluable in India. Now, I do not deny that certain changes in regard to the officering of the army in India, and in regard to staff employments in India, will be the natural, though not the necessary consequences of this Bill. But what I venture to maintain is this, that these changes, and no other, are precisely the changes which have long been considered absolutely necessary by the confession and complaints of Indian officers themselves.

What does Sir James Outram say is the special value of this school of officers? He says it is "a school of officers intimately conversant with the workings of the native mind." Now, my Lords, I do not wish to make any undue use of the great mutiny of 1857. I sincerely think that state of things arose out of many causes, and the mismanagement perhaps of many preceding Governments, and it would be most unjust and ungenerous to lay the blame of that event on the European officers who commanded the Sepoy regiments. They unfortunately trusted their men with such perfect confidence that a very large number of them were massacred without a chance of escape, and those who did escape should be the objects of our perpetual honour, because they showed a degree of firmness of mind and heroism which casts upon them immortal honour as British soldiers. But surely it is neither unjust nor ungenerous to say that they were not a school

of officers who proved that they were intimately conversant with the workings of the Indian mind. The real truth is this, and it has been confessed over and over again—I heard it alluded to in very eloquent terms by the Noble Earl (of Ellenborough) opposite several years before the mutiny took place—that for many years there had been a growing change in the relations which once subsisted between the European officers and the Sepoy army; and I venture to appeal to him whether the events which took place in 1857 would have been possible in the earlier and better days of the army of the East India Company. The mutual confidence which then existed between the Sepoy soldier and his officer had for many years been broken down, along with the personal intercourse on which that confidence was founded. I am sorry to see that my noble friend (Lord Ellenborough) intimates dissent. But I have evidence on this point, the authority of which, I think, even he will be disposed to admit. I take one of the Company's most distinguished officers, who himself fell a victim to the mutiny, for he fell in the siege of Lucknow—I mean Sir Henry Lawrence. What does he say on the relations which had come to exist between the European officers and the men of the Sepoy regiments? Sir Henry Lawrence, like many officers in India, was in the habit of contributing to the periodical literature of the day, and he communicated to the *Calcutta Review* a series of articles, since published in

a separate volume, avowedly by him. Among these there are two most interesting articles on the reform of the Indian army, written in 1855-56, before the mutiny, and before his mind could be influenced by any considerations arising out of that event. Referring to various changes in the organization of the Sepoy troops, he says:—

“By removing native officers from corps professedly commanded and officered by Europeans, though too often really managed by havildar majors, opportunity would be given to the European officer to look into the interior economy of his regiment or company. *Seldom is anything of the kind done at present.* So long as all is smooth and quiet on the surface, few inquiries are made. All may be rotten below; the jog-trot is followed. *A mine may be ready to be sprung for all that nine-tenths of the officers would know.* Many do not know the very names of the men of their own company.”

Surely these are remarkable words, considering the date at which they were written. But I have further evidence. I would now quote the testimony of another distinguished Company's officer, who is happily still alive, and who occupies a distinguished position in India at the present moment. I mean Sir Patrick Grant. I find him saying, in one of the papers before Parliament:—

“Further, the officers are discontented, only looking forward to leave their regiment for some more pleasant employment, so that they perform, and unwillingly, the bare outline of their duty, *and never, as a general rule, mix or converse with their men*; but, on the contrary, too often refuse to listen to their complaints, at the best telling them to go to the adjutant, and, not unfrequently, ‘Go to —; don't bother me.’ The

consequence of this craving is utter indifference, not to say positive dislike towards the men, and the engendering of a restless, discontented disposition, which is, I doubt not, communicated to the soldier."

I ask your Lordships, do not these extracts from the testimony of such men substantiate what I said, that for some time there had been going on a deterioration in the relations that subsisted at an earlier period between the European officers and their men in India?

Now, what has been the remedy proposed, and loudly called for by many of the most distinguished officers of the Indian army? I have admitted that some changes will naturally follow this Bill; but it will be found that they are precisely such as would follow without it—namely, the formation of a separate Staff Corps, the abolition of the system which kept men on the strength of their regiments when in reality they were employed elsewhere, and other changes of a similar nature. Again, look at this matter in a somewhat different point of view. Is the present system of officering the local army, and the present system of appointment or of promotion in India, so very perfect, that the necessity of making some change in that system should fill us with alarm? Indian officers, when opposing this measure, would appear to think so; but I observe that when they have been writing or speaking without reference to this contested question, they always tell a very different story. Sir John Law-

rence is a great opponent of this measure. A higher authority, I admit, can hardly exist, or one more distinguished in every way. Indeed, so far as my own opinion is concerned, I differ from him almost with greater doubt and hesitation than from any man in regard to this question. Sir John Lawrence, in expressing his dread of the consequences of this measure, says—

“Were the civil and military appointments in India filled up from a general staff corps, its officers would, no doubt, obtain the ordinary and subordinate posts of the service; but such men would have little chance of high commands. They would never be brought forward, as has been the case under the old system, with all its faults.”

Well, but what do I find his own equally distinguished brother, Sir Henry Lawrence, saying in reference to the state of things which, previous to the mutiny, prevailed in India :—

“Let no officer obtain the command even of a company until he has proved his qualification. The present tests are altogether insufficient. . . . They should oblige each officer to evince moderate ability, and moderate application. All men are not intended by nature to be soldiers. The sooner incapables find out the mistake of their parents in having put them into the wrong line the better for themselves and for the service. In no army are higher qualifications required. Is it good that one single individual officer should be a laughing-stock to his men? They are nearly fifty to one of us.”

Such is the opinion of Sir Henry Lawrence in reference to the pre-existing state of the Indian army. And what, let me ask again, is the remedy

proposed ? “ There must be a staff corps,” says Sir Henry Lawrence, in the same paper ; “ whatever “ may be its inconveniences they will be less than “ those which now obtain.” Lord Canning expresses a strong opinion not only that the staff employments of India—that is to say, the military, political, and quasi-civil appointments, which are so largely filled in that country by military men, should be open to the Line, but he further urges that officers of the one service should be free to exchange into the other. Long before any question of the amalgamation of the two armies arose it was suggested, as due to the officers of the Line, that the Staff appointments in India should be open to them, and upon that point my noble friend opposite (the Earl of Ellenborough), among others, gave very strong evidence. In answer to questions which were put to him he said :—

“ The Queen’s officers will, equally with the local officers (not to the same number probably), be entitled to command the irregular native corps.”

Then the Noble Earl was asked,—

“ Would you throw it open ?—Certainly ; supposing them to be competent, from a knowledge of the language. I think that everything should be equal with regard to appointments between the two forces. I think it would be very unjust to the Queen’s army not to make it so.”

He was then asked whether the officers of the Line and those of the local army should be entitled to an equal share of those appointments. His reply was,—

"No, not an equal share in proportion to numbers; that would put an end altogether to my principle. My principle is, that the Governor-General should be at liberty to take the ablest men he could find anywhere; that they should be eligible, but have no rights.

"Lord Stanley.—You do not admit, in short, the right on the part of any set of men to say, 'Here is a certain proportion of these appointments to be set aside for us.'—No; it is contrary to reason."

Now, I venture to suggest, that if Staff appointments in India were to be open to officers of the Line as well as of the local army, without the formation of a Staff Corps, all the members of which should be equally eligible, you would have constant difficulty in considering the respective claims of those two bodies of men, and the Indian Government would be compelled to govern its appointments not solely with reference to individual qualifications, but in a large degree by the necessity of considering the jealousy of rival armies. Sir J. Outram, I may add, is a strong supporter of the establishment of a Staff Corps, to which officers of both armies should be eligible. This measure, then, which certainly is one natural consequence of the proposed amalgamation, is also, as I have now shown, a measure the adoption of which was recommended by some of the most distinguished officers of the late Company long before the present question had arisen.

I now come to what I regard to be the main question in the discussion of the present Bill—will you find officers of the Line willing to qualify themselves for Indian service, and devote themselves

to an Indian career, as Company's officers have hitherto done? This is a question which to some extent may be matter of speculation, but on which there are not wanting both facts and arguments sufficient to lead us to a very safe conclusion. The Noble Earl opposite (Ellenborough), in reply to a question which was put to him on the subject, said,—

“When a regiment is sent there certainly for ten years, or perhaps for a longer period, if an officer felt that by making himself acquainted with the native languages he would have an opportunity of obtaining some civil or political employment, I think that it is contrary to reason that those officers should not in a very great number of cases qualify themselves, because there is no very great difficulty in it.”

I find, moreover, that Lord Elphinstone expresses the strongest opinion that there would not be the smallest difficulty in procuring officers of the Line to undergo that peculiar education which would fit them to hold Staff employments in India. On this point I think my noble and gallant friend on the cross benches may be induced to give us the benefit of his long experience, and may be able to inform us whether it is not the fact that numbers of officers of the Line would have been glad, even under the old system, if they had been able to enter the Company's service. Indeed, as the Noble Earl opposite has truly said, it is “contrary to reason” to suppose that it should be otherwise, for there are few advantages in the military service at home at all.

equal to those conferred by the appointments in India, which are now to be open to any officer who chooses to qualify himself to hold them. The Indian career holds out the hopes of high emoluments and of opportunities of distinction such as are afforded to few officers of the Line in time of peace, either in this country or in the colonies. Why is it, then, I would ask, that we should not expect officers of the Line to qualify themselves in sufficient numbers for service in India? The fact I believe to be that there are at the present moment upwards of 150 of those officers employed in the discharge of duties which under the old system were almost exclusively confined to officers of the local force. I am moreover given to understand that in anticipation of the passing of this measure a very large number of young men belonging to the Queen's regiments are actually undergoing the process of an Indian education to qualify themselves for Staff appointments in that country. The fears upon this score which some persons entertain, I therefore conceive to be unfounded, or at least very much exaggerated.

I now come to an objection to the Bill on which great stress has been laid by many officers of the Company's service, and that is, the fear of what is called the interference of the Horse Guards. In the presence of the illustrious Duke on the cross benches, this is a point to which I address myself with some embarrassment; the more so, as having frequently

endeavoured to form a distinct conception of the idea which the "Horse Guards" presents to the mind of an Indian officer, I have always come to the conclusion that it is one pretty nearly synonymous with the origin of all evil. But be that as it may, there is nothing in this Bill which increases by one jot the authority that has hitherto been exercised by the Commander-in-Chief over that portion of the army located in India. In support of this opinion I again appeal to the views to which expression has been given by my noble friend opposite, (Lord Ellenborough) who says, in reply to the following question,—

"Q. What do you suppose that the power exercised by the Commander-in-Chief here over that portion of the army which has been located in India has been hitherto?—Nothing whatever. I am not aware of any sort of communication between them. I believe I had occasionally the opportunity of sending to the Horse Guards information with respect to the Queen's regiments with which they were not already provided."

The illustrious Duke on the cross benches will also, I believe, be able to bear his testimony to the fact that he neither intends nor wishes that his authority, so far as relates to the troops in India, should be in any respect altered by the passing of the present measure. The Governor-General of India will, as hitherto, possess supreme military, as well as civil and political power in India, and will be enabled, in conjunction with his own Commander-in-Chief, to confer any employments and commands which he may please on those officers of the Line, who then, as now, may be sent out to that country. This is a

subject on which Mr. Willoughby has expressed a very sensible opinion. He says:—

“ Because it is scarcely to be expected that the Horse Guards, overwhelmed with the business of superintending and controlling the Queen’s army stationed at home and in the colonies, can, in addition thereto, undertake the administration, in all its branches, of the military forces of an empire so remote and of such magnitude as India.”

Certainly not ; it is neither to be expected, nor is it to be desired, nor is it intended, nor is it rendered possible by the provisions of this measure. In future, exactly as heretofore, the Horse Guards will send to India such general officers as the Government is desirous of employing in connection with the European army of the Line ; but the disposal of commands, as well as the disposition of the troops will rest also, as heretofore, with the local Commander-in-Chief and the Government of India.

I have now only, my Lords, before sitting down, to enter my protest against the criticisms which have been passed on the conduct of the Government, both in Parliament and out of doors, in connexion with the course which they have taken upon this Bill. It has been said, that we have introduced this measure against the opinion and advice of all who could be considered authorities on the subject ; and at so late a period of the Session, that it has been impossible for Parliament to pay to its consideration adequate attention. I regret that the measure was brought so late before Parliament, but I trust that fact will at least be received as evidence of the sincere

desire of Her Majesty's Government to examine into the subject with the utmost care. I do not deny that the measure has been considered, not only with care, but with some anxiety by the Government. It was impossible to read declarations from such men as Sir J. Lawrence, Sir J. Outram, and others, that this measure would make an organic change in the system by which India has been won, and by which alone it can be kept, without feeling that it was absolutely necessary to sift the question thoroughly—to look at it in every possible point of view, and to see whether this amalgamation of the two European armies, is really fraught with the danger attributed to it. But I deny that the authorities, great as these undoubtedly are, have been altogether on one side; and I contend that we are entitled to exercise our own judgment, and to bring to the test of reason and of argument, the somewhat rhetorical terms in which Indian officers are accustomed to express themselves on the subject. And when they speak of the "system under which India has been won," I cannot forget, that the main features of that system have had very little to do with the small European army of the Company, and will remain wholly unchanged when that army is united to the Line. One main feature of the "system by which India has been won," has been in no way connected either with the Company or its army; viz., the employment of very eminent English statesmen in the Government of India. I can confidently affirm that

there is nothing in this measure to diminish the inducements which have led the English Government from time to time to send out to India—there to spend and too often to exhaust their powers—some of the very best and wisest of our public men. Neither is there anything which can tend to limit, but on the contrary, much which will tend to enlarge the field, from which young men of enterprise and ambition have been hitherto drawn to the service of India. There is nothing, in short, my Lords, in this measure, so far as we can see, which tends in the remotest degree to withdraw from India any portion of those powers of rule which, in connexion with the Government of that country, notwithstanding many errors, and I am afraid we must confess some crimes, have cast on our national character the lustre of an imperishable renown.

THE END.

A V O I C E
FROM THE
T O M B
OF THE LATE
EAST INDIA COMPANY.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE CONSORT.

BY
JOHN COOK, ESQ.,
A PROPRIETOR.

“ Let me not burst in ignorance ! but tell
Why thy canonized bones, hears'd in death,
Have burst their cerements ! why the sepulchre
Wherein we saw thee quietly inurn'd
Hath op'd his ponderous and marble jaws
To cast thee up again ! ”

LONDON:
RICHARDSON BROTHERS, 23, CORNHILL, E. C.
1860.

(3)



A VOICE, &c.

" Let me not burst in ignorance ! but tell
Why thy canonized bones, hears'd in death,
Have burst their cerements ! why the sepulchre
Wherein we saw thee quietly inurn'd
Hath op'd his ponderous and marble jaws
To cast thee up again ! "

" If thou art privy to thy country's fate,
Which happily foreknowing may avoid,
Oh speak ! "

Most gracious Prince,

I will—

When danger's pending o'er a country's fate,
A warning voice may not be, ~~now, too late.~~

THE question having been mooted in several quarters, and considered particularly in the " Times " of 11th of October, as well as that of November the 24th, 1859, whether (looking to future results) we should retrace our steps, and give up part of India to some of its native princes, and restore the national character of some of the provinces, (a proposition which a short time since would have been thought almost treason to hint at,) is one of the greatest gravity at this crisis for senators to employ their minds upon, and is one involving our future permanent hold of that great empire. There is one point which never ought to be lost sight of, as a foundation to build our discussions upon, and which is highly suggestive of caution in act, viz. that the natives of India

being by nature alone able to endure the enervating heats of the climate, and on whom you must depend, seems to give them a natural, and almost unalienable right to the soil, and if you gradually civilize them to the standard of the European, and they learn how to use the secret (pointed out by Mr. Russell, the "Times" correspondent) of their own strength, viz. to be still and remain aloof, and can, by any probability of uniting caste, bring about the unanimity to act upon it by a sort of coalition, like that which destroyed the first French empire—leaguings with Europe—you are lost in being parched up like a blasted leaf. To suppose that the successors of the ancient line of princes, whose existence dates back so long before you were a civilized people, and whose priests, the Brahmins, taught the arts to the ancient Egyptians, will ever be satisfied and quiescent under the loss of their nationality, is nothing but a pleasing dream that may still haunt the minds of the sanguine believers in the wisdom and benefit of her gracious Majesty's forced sway over the *whole* of India; but is in reality a supposition that, for its wisdom, common sense laughs and revolts at, as inimical to England's best interests, whose creed and glory is local government, and is only drawing a bill on the future (science having so greatly changed the face of the world) to be paid in non-acceptance, debt, loss, bloodshed, and continual trouble! What has been at the bottom of the trouble of Ireland for years and years past? What, but that also at the bottom of the troubles of Italy, of Poland, and of Greece—a yearning after lost nationality! Can England consistently fan the flame of returning nationality in Italy with one hand, and crush and smother it in India with the other?

“ Like smouldering gaseous fires closely pent,
Will burst their barriers and find a vent.”

The assumption of the sovereignty of the whole of India, and the dethronement and crushing of the native princes, so unwisely thrust upon the throne of England and her gracious Majesty by the sapient underminers and destroyers of the East India Company, and of their old policy, by the long series of acts through the secret or hidden action of the Board of Control, was only, it is to be feared, giving her gracious Majesty a coal for a treasure; placing a jewelled shell in the Crown that the sun may explode; or like the aerial gift of the Duke of Northumberland to Lady Jane Grey, as it seems, at present pregnant with mischief (the eyes of Europe being on every act); a non-paying concern of mooted rights, seriously proposed to be again given to the native rulers [see the "Times" paper November 24th, 1859]; the hot-bed of hatred, threatening without great care and wisdom, under the new aspect of the world's affairs, bankruptcy, disquiet, and disgrace in the distance; and, like the empty and shadowy title of that of King of France, as well as of Great Britain, will, perhaps, be obliged to be given up by this country as folly and presumption, [see the article at the end from the "Univers," "Times," 9th December, 1859.] Would it not be wise to stop the possibility of this denouement before it be too late, by every healing measure in your power? Your punishing the King of Oude for his imputed "incompetency, corruption, and tyranny," and private vices, by the loss of his kingdom (having been your admitted faithful ally), in breaking the treaty with him on ex-parte decision under these charges, was, it is to be feared (although he has now accepted an annuity) a breach of the law of nations, that according to Vattel, Grotius, and Puffendorf, might have been appealed against (and, perhaps, with effect) to the Court of the United Kingdoms of Europe. It is not necessary to crowd this summary with extracts from those writers on the rights of

Sovereigns, but I may remind the world of the maxim in equity, "those who seek or ask equity must do it." It is an universal principle, a truism not to be contradicted, that the affection of the people is the strength of the Crown, (not the sword, halter, canes, and cat-o'-nine-tails,) and the secret of all successful sovereignty ; but if hatred form the base of the cone of the social edifice (the first thing a conqueror looks for to second his arms), its canker will assuredly soon topple the apex in the dust. Let us avert so humiliating a position for the Crown. The awful and frightful massacre at Cawnpore was enough to rouse any people, not only to the total extirpation of its perpetrators, but of the whole race. Though where would you have been could you have done so ? Why, dried up for want of their daily and hourly succour ! That fearful heartrending act was an outburst of long pent-up wrath for long conceived wrongs ; a wicked devilish "coup d'état" of a barbarous, exasperated, and brutalized race (taking for a guide the principle of Kouli Khan's government, of striking terror into all by the most cruel executions), whom the light of civilization had not reached ; influenced by ferocious anger at the expected loss of their religion and empire, of rule and power, of hearth and home, by reason of the continual annexations and encroachments, and the late conceived galling breach of faith with regard to Oude—the last ounce that broke the camel's back ! too awfully, in some degree, followed by the Cooper transaction at Ujnalla ; and though the last may possibly have contributed much to save the empire, by striking a lesson of terror, and over which it may be wise to draw a veil.* Yet the memory of it will never pass from their minds while tradition and the press remain ; no more than that of the ever-to-be-

* They were trying moments. "Who can be wise, amazed, temperate, and furious, loyal and neutral in a moment ? No man."

lamented hateful and brutal Cawnpore one from yours. As laws are silent amid arms, so is, too often, reason amidst strife.

As long as the East India Company refrained from setting themselves up (by title) as princes, the native princes looked upon their acquirement of territory and of wealth comparatively, as it were, with an indifferent eye; but when, in 1833, you, in effect, transferred the territories of the Company to the Crown—the establishment of the Board of Control (the secret spring of a changed, subversive policy) having been the preliminary step—in order to open the way to direct dominion, and the India trading to the merchants in general—so clamoured for at every renewal of the charter—by making the Company trustees for the Crown, they saw in the distance, as reflected in a glass, in the Great Mogul's downfall, their own future destruction and annihilation; and seeing fall successively, in 1835, Mysore; in 1841, Kurnool; in 1845, the district belonging to Runjeet Sing; in 1848, Sattara; in 1849, the Punjaub; in 1852, Pegu; in 1853, Berar; and, lastly, Oude; the long-smothered, secret intrigue became rife for self preservation and regal existence, taking a palpable form at Meerut on the greased cartridges; and the loss of their religion was the Shibboleth industriously bruited about by the fallen princes and their priests (whose influence is so powerful) and friends, the symbol of concert being the wide distribution of cakes, in order to enlist all the sympathy and angry passions of the sepoys to exasperation and resistance in their cause. Sir John Lawrence says the fear of our religion being forced upon them was the cause of their rebellion; it was the strength of it, because it turned the scale of the native army's weight against you; but the cause lay deeper. And did he not remonstrate with Lord Dalhousie in the case of the annexation of Oude? It might be a cause,

but it was not the first cause,* but the second, or rather, the third cause of that rebellion; and to mistake the cause was, and is, to mistake and confound—as has been done—the remedy; and, in a crisis like this, he who thinks the cause has been mistaken is bound, as a loyal subject, to point out the error, be he right or wrong. The first cause, and which struck the spark of alarm, was your assuming the future sovereignty,—in making the Company trustees for the Crown: they saw in the *cestuique* trust (the Crown) their future dominant master. The second cause, your continual dethronements and annexations—all children of that man in the moon, the Board of Control, the latent worm at the root of the protecting gourd, which fell, not only without one lachrymose eye, but with universal joy, as a contaminating nuisance never to rise again: it was the child of an apprentice hand, the representative of a rotten borough, and had a rotten end. And, thirdly, the native mind having been secretly imbued with, to them, the bitter idea of the loss of their religion—the refusal of the troops at Meerut to use the greased cartridges being the first overt act—the bursting out of the flames took place, followed by acts ever to be deplored. And what has been the fruit of your unwise cupidity to the body politic? Not like that of the luscious fruits from the climate ye have been accustomed to bring home in your overladen vessels,—delicious to the taste and nutritious to the body, but a disastrous rebellion, wide spread as the land, which, although happily put down, leaves the bitterness of defeat, loss, and humiliation upon their minds; and almost overwhelming debt, bitter to to the national taste,—and, unless soothed, this very bitterness will be destructive in its effects to your land by

* From what cause was it that the Hon. Mountstewart Elphinstone was obliged to escape for his life on his horse, and with only what he had on his person?

sapping the fruits of your industry, and drawing off your military strength to put and keep it down; also endangering your capital in railroads and other improvements, although a gleam of sunshine has beamed forth; having alienated the native and foreign minds, while you are at the same time compelled to trust on, and keep in pay, 290,000 *native* troops!

Every European, civil and military, male and female, must have their native servants for drudgery; you must, for your very existence, ever depend on the help and arm of the natives; you cannot, like Kouli Khan, supplant the mass of them with your own race: if they are soured and against you,—as it is said they are inwardly, almost to a man,—can you hope for cordial and heartfelt assistance, civil or military, in the distressing hour of peril, when secret hatred reigns paramount in every bosom? See Garibaldi's sentiments with regard to Italy.*

It is greatly to be feared that you will find out, and that too late—although your financial hope has brightened—that you have made a mistake; are in a false position; and that it would be wise to back out in time, “*reculer un pas pour mieux sauter*,” while you command the coast, and before complications, threatening in the distance, arise—mixed up with European powers—to back a resistance that may possibly become overwhelming. Look at Russia with her lately acquired Indian territory on the other side of the Amoor River, her increasing navy, her bitter remembrance of Sebastopol, (now lying a ruinous heap,) so galling to imperial pride; look also at alleged Russian guns and assistance to the Chinese at the forts of Peiho; look again also at France, where some of the Oude

* “Were we,” Garibaldi says, “even all of us, to fall in the struggle, we will leave to future generations that heritage of hatred and revenge with which our foreign oppressors have inspired us; we will leave to our children, as heirlooms, a weapon and the consciousness of their right; and, by heaven, those who illtreat and trample on us shall enjoy no easy or tranquil slumber.”—“Times,” 4th December, 1859. Such are the sentiments of men!

family have found an asylum, if not a *friend*; the French remembrance of their reverses in Bengal; the siege of Pondicherry in 1847; and defeat at Chandenagore by Admirals Watson, Pocock, and Colonel Clive; at Trafalgar and Waterloo! Did not Louis Philippe, for a long time, deny the contemplated descent on Algiers, and was it not afterwards found to have been for many reigns the secret policy of the French Cabinet to plant their flag there? * Beware! Look at her mysterious warlike preparations, both naval and military, with a plethora of population bursting for want of outlet! Look at Roman Catholic wrath in the West and elsewhere! You may, for your own security, have stripped the natives of 1,449,000 weapons—a necessary corollary to your policy—which, however, from circumstances unforeseen, might possibly be replaced, through European friends, by some of a more modern and efficient character, and poured in as fast as rail and steam would carry them,—through following Lord Ellenborough's advice how to assist the Italians in their struggle [see his letter to Lord Brougham, "Times" paper, 10th November, 1859.] But you have left, as is alleged, a feeling of hatred to your rule that will be the canker-worm to your prosperity and to that rule, until you ameliorate it by some wise, liberal, and healing measure, as a balm to long inflicted wounds,—there being a tie of blood you cannot break. Remember Lord Clive, after the battle of Plassy, restoring Suraja ul Doula, or, as some versions have it, after his defeat, Jaffier Alli Cawn to his possessions, was said to do more (as Mr. Whiteside, quoting Lord Macaulay,† told the Parliament of 1858, in his memorable speech, 16th February,

* The measure was, it is said, effected through the "*entente cordiale*" and the liberal scattering of French *bonbons*; but, if the "*Univers*" is to be believed, the other will be effected by a very different kind of "*bomb's bon's*," and under an "*entente discordiale*."

† "He (*i.e.*, Clive) restored Ul Dowlah, who had been driven from his dominions by the military arm of Great Britain, to the rank of Vizier, and to

1858, which floored the whole of the arguments on the other side, particularly that of Sir C. Lewis, and which, indeed, one would have thought would have deterred his own from afterwards carrying the question; but what can reason avail against clamour and misrepresentation imbibed to the dregs; the cry was, "Let him be crucified!"—was said, I say, to do more to satisfy the native mind, to restore tranquillity, and strengthen our sway, than all the power of the sword could do. It is true you have struck down your antagonist, disarmed him, and his purse is at your command; but will that position—the aspect of the times considered—remain so?

What is the secret of Chinese resistance to your entry into their land but the fear lest, under the mask, as they think, of trading with them, you get a footing, as in India, and, step by step and inch by inch, by pursuing the same policy, you wrest their empire and kingdom from their sway! Recollect it is by the native army, which is greater than before, disciplined by you and armed to the teeth (though the other inhabitants have but the coulter and the file), that you rule, and which alone, unassisted, can endure the burning heats of the climate; and if the sword is wielded for you by an unwilling hand and a poisoned mind, you are ever on a volcano that may, under certain combinations, or by the aid of foreign assistance, burst in a moment least expected, and scatter your power and capital invested there to the four winds. If you rule by the sword, you must back your policy by keeping the natives in ignorance, for remember knowledge is power; and if you make them a civilized people, the odds, from their indigenous position and their

the dominion and territory of Oude. With a generosity that astonished all Asia, he reinstated this expelled enemy of his nation peaceably on his throne, and this act of politic generosity did more towards quieting the minds of the people of Asia than all the terror, great as it was, of the English arms. . . . If ever this nation stood in a situation of glory throughout Asia, it was at this moment."

opening connection with European nations, are in their favor, and, if not counteracted by wisdom's course, will turn the scale against you, and you will not be enabled to keep what is strictly and justly your own.

Be wise then in time before the dark day comes; though the cloud may not now be bigger than a man's hand—somewhat less visible from a transient gleam of sunshine—take a hint more strongly than ever from Lord Clive's policy; dare to be just, and honorable, and liberal before the eyes of Europe; make ye friends by withdrawing from the path of aggression, or the shadow of cruelty, and restore something like the semblance of nationality, here and there, in India, and of sovereign rule to some of the native princes, binding them by justice and mercy to your interest.* You will thereby retain the blessings you have received from on High and consolidate your power; you will improve your finances, tranquillize agitated, and bring back alienated, minds, disappoint your enemies, make hosts of friends, open up the hidden resources of the empire by native cheerful assistance in improvements and civilization, increase to boundlessness your trade; and one half of your swords may be sheathed, and the other beaten into pruning hooks: "*nihil est quod adhuc de republica putem dictum, et quo possim longius progredi, nisi sit confirmatum, non modo falsum esse illud, sine injuriâ non posse, sed hoc verissimum, sine summâ justitia rempublicam regi non posse.*" Cicero Frag., lib. ii. de Repub.

The undermining and destruction of the East India Company was a mistake, the charges against it false as "*dicers' oaths,*" [see Lord Derby's speech at the Mansion House, "*Times,*" April 16th, 1858, in which he says,

* "A righteous justice the great God above,
Expects from those who would retain His love,
Whether in smaller or in greater things,
To low-born subjects or to mighty kings."

"Yet, upon the whole, there never was a Government which, for so lengthened a period, displayed so much power, so much ability, made so admirable a choice of servants, who, in their turn, exhibited such distinguished talents; or which, upon the whole, conducted its affairs with such purity of motive, and so studied the interests of the people confided to their charge, as the Government of India. My Lord Mayor, I am bound to pay that tribute to the Government of the East India Company!!"] Was not this an answer to the maligners of the proprietary body as to their corrupt electing?

Also hear the Duke of Wellington:—"It was deceiving the people of England to affirm that a trading company (which, after nearly a century of constant wars, had acquired the sovereignty over a vast population and territory, yielding an income of £20,000,000, with a debt not exceeding £40,000,000) was *unfit* for the *functions of government*, or *unfit* for the *management of commerce*." The Duke's evidence before the House of Commons some years ago, [see Mr. Whiteside's speech in Parliament, "Times," 16th February, 1858,] this undermining and destruction of the Company was, I say, made under mistaken and corrupt views, in order to enlist a wide clamour for a change, ogling or viewing the loaves and fishes in the distance; but that, like all false steps, was fraught with unseen mischief, the beautiful and magnificent elevation of science is soon brought down by the pickaxe of ignorance, as said by Mr. Whiteside. The establishment of the Board of Control in 1773 neutralizing the opinions and hampering the decisions of twenty-four acute, talented, and honest minds, with that of the proprietary body, was the sandy foundation rather of a policy that must be greatly changed or retraced before the sunshine of prosperity can arise on the darkness and trouble of a mistaken course. When, among the

wonders of the times, you find out how to converge the brains of twenty-four enlightened and gifted men, sobered by the opinions and advice of larger numbers, into one head, then, after having patented the discovery in all lands, by all means give him a veto over their deliberations and decisions; shew Solomon to have been an idiot or fool, who held that "in the multitude of counsel there is wisdom;" you may then shut up the receptacles of bribery, corruption, intrigue, and lucre hunting, and proclaim to the world that wisdom is now found, at last, upon earth where Job had sought for her in vain.

God only, who compassionates the folly and weakness of man, can bring good out of evil, light out of darkness, order out of confusion, wisdom out of folly; let us pray that He will do so in this instance, as His wisdom is infinite, His ways unsearchable and past finding out. It, doubtless, may be that all these inscrutable things work together for the good of mankind at large, by opening a path, by railways and steam, to His glorious word, to interchange and civilization, by the means of your agency and wealth as well as that of others. One important lesson, at least, the Indians and their chiefs have learned, viz., that there is no help in the idols whom they worship and in whom they trusted, nor in their deceiving priests (and let them, the Indians, well weigh this), and that the God of strength and of battles, whom the Christians worship, hath given them over, as he did the idol-worshippers of old to rout, defeat, subjection, and loss.* This is enough to make them cry out, in the words of Dr. I. Watts,

" Our worship shall no more be paid,
To gods which mortal hands have made."

* And though the sword measure with sword in battle (the *ultima ratio regum*), let us always remember there is one greater than the sword, and at his will, not yours, turns the scale of victory, to subserve to his mighty purposes and ends.

May they add—

“ Angry with us ’tis thine Almighty hand,
Hath scatter’d like dust our every armed band,
Henceforth we’ll fall before thy awful throne,
And worship thee, thou glorious God, alone ! ”

But the door of mercy, however, is not shut against them, they may yet rise. And let us also pray that He will establish a diadem in righteousness that will not fade away ! And her gracious Majesty may then, in her splendid mirror, behold the glittering Indian diadem on her spotless brow without a dread, a sigh, or a pang.

There is yet a word more (before I again sink into the tomb) of great moment to be said, with regard to the dividends of the proprietors of India-stock, and the security fund on which they rest. The dividends are to be paid to them the first, out of any funds remitted to England (from the revenues of India “alone,” as the Act of the 21st and 22nd Victoria, cap. 106, clause 42, *after* the charges there *are* satisfied) to pay the charges in England ; and when there are no funds (as now according to the last public statement of the Indian Revenue) to remit, they are “ to be raised by sale, transfer, or deposit, by way of mortgage of a competent part of the security fund, according as the said directors, with the approbation of the said board), *i. e.* the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt, shall direct, 3 and 4 William IV., cap. 85, clause 15.” “ To be repaid with interest, as and when said remittances shall be received in England.”

Now, supposing an adverse state of financial affairs in India to continue—*i. e.* a balance against us—the commissioners may go on pledging and mortgaging the said funds, (now, after nearly thirty years, having reached, with the £2,000,000 paid in, but £5,063,131:16:4 Consols and Reduced Annuities towards the £12,000,000 the

proprietors are entitled to,) through the consent of a general court of proprietors (that by the new bye-laws being necessary*), so easily obtained, until it is swallowed up. Or suppose a more adverse state of things generally, where is then, in either case, your security? An imperial guarantee is repudiated by Parliament and the people of England!! Where is the justice, nay the common honesty of that? What! first thrust your management upon us, change our peaceful policy until wholesome government is undermined; then insist on our selling our estate to you for a price, and refuse to guarantee the payment of the "quid pro quo" or purchase-money out of the national purse. Why Ahab's terms to Naboth were more fair! India has been absorbed, or taken from the hands of the East India Company, as is alleged for the general welfare; it has been clamoured for by the nation, let the nation then be honest, and pledge the nation's faith to pay for the purchase, and not give a doubtful bill *in futuro*. The security fund is now not exactly in your hands to raise the dividends upon, as it is in the hands of separate directors, and cannot now, by a new bye-law, be pledged or mortgaged, except by the consent of a general court of proprietors; yet, any one who attends the court may see how easily a fixed-on project can be carried, and it may possibly, by such means, be fritted away, to stem the tide of adverse events! Why, you then, in effect, take from us our estate, our management—which built up the magnificent structure, the base of our security and our purchase-money, at one cunning and fell swoop; and although the dividends are found for the company, notwithstanding the deficit in the Indian revenue, you put yourself in the position of a trustee who pays the interest

* Does a bye-law of the proprietors neutralize two Acts of Parliament?

on a fund as long as he can, to ward off suspicion, while he has made away with the fund it ought to spring from, unless you guarantee the purchase-money by imperial decree ; and our death may be occasioned by want of sustenance through failure of the funds, instead of being effected by volleys of stones. If you, the people of England, will insist of having our birthright for the public good, it is but common honesty to pledge the faith, and even the lands of England, to the certain payment of the price agreed on ; or else you have been egging on the Government with hallooing and shouting to commit as great a wrong as can be found chronicled in the archives of jurisprudence or the annals of the world.

“ On England's 'scutcheon let there ne'er remain
A blot dishonorable, or injustice' stain,
But ever seeking His regard above,
Hold fast His favor, and retain His love.”

If you don't pursue, and that swiftly, the most healing course—great changes having taken place in the world—secret intrigue, the mother of all mischief, will still, more than ever, as India is now within speaking distance of Europe, naturally breed defection and revolt, trouble and disaster, debt and difficulty ; which will hedge up your way with thorns ; and India will be, instead of a precious valuable jewel, a mill-stone about your neck, that will sink you deep into the waters of affliction, of which all will partake, as well as into the abyss of remorse. But if you do take that healing course, and magnanimity, justice, and national equity mark your steps by some *noble* act, you will pacify her, and regain her affection, make her a civilized defensive ally, a source of strength in the dark hour of peril, instead of weakness ; and you will float down the stream of time, and be as heretofore ; and be handed down to posterity the glory, envy, and admiration of surrounding nations.

The late Durbar distributions of Lord Canning (of which we have been just advised) of land, seem a step in the right direction; but it may be justly questioned if, looking at the political horizon, it goes far enough—whether it will settle down that eager desire, now rife in the world, for nationality, and that of re-establishing approved fallen rights and dynasties. Those fallen rights will ever be looked upon as a plea for rebellion or a *casus belli*, should the opportunity spring up of asserting them give a fair chance of success. And that being the dominant idea and desire among the nations (now that they are within speaking distance of each other—the partition wall of distance being broken down) should be weighed with the solemn gravity the case demands. Suppose the King of Oude on his dying bed (or some other king) should leave his late kingdom by will to France, (as Edward the Confessor did his to the Duke of Normandy,) under the plea that his relinquishment of his late kingdom was made under a state of things amounting to duress, the legatee might choose to consider it in that light, and assert the claim by arms. Where would be your chance should a dissatisfied and hostile people join the assertor of the claim? What torrents of blood might flow from such an event? Be sure, England, that you are foremost in the field of propriety, generosity, and right!

“Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just,
And he but naked, though locked up in steel,
Whose conscience with injustice is corrupted.”

Mark well the article from the “Times,” Friday, 9th December, 1859, under foreign intelligence, from the “Univers,” on the Chinese expedition:—

“Between two nations, eager to attain the same object—the monopoly of the extreme East—what part ought France to take? Shall she form an alliance with Russia

to annihilate England? Or, shall she unite her forces with those of Great Britain to stop the advances of the Russians; if, indeed, that be possible? Or, shall she stand quietly by, as a disinterested spectatress, and content herself with accepting the *fait accompli*? Nothing of the kind, we think. If allies of the Russians, we ourselves establish their supremacy. That would be a fault. United with the English we should save their power, now seriously menaced. But what should we gain by that course? Glory, we shall be told. Very possibly; but no material advantage certainly. To merely watch the struggle when the stake is the continent of Asia, the result preponderance in the world, would be to abdicate. What then shall we do? The first thing is to remember that we are neither Russian nor English; that we have interests and a civilization of our own; and that those interests should alone decide our acts. But the first necessity for France is to maintain her rank and influence in the world. She would loose them if any one power were to possess Asia. What we want is, that the East shall remain open to all nations; that its riches shall not become the monopoly of any one; that our missionaries and merchants may each accomplish their task without fear or peril; that it shall be well known throughout those vast regions that, notwithstanding their distance, the arm of France will immediately avenge the wrong done to one of her sons. Lastly, we should throw our sword between the two champions to prevent Asia becoming exclusively English or Russian; and if possible, and even probable, events should bring about a partition of the Asiatic continent, let us be among the foremost to claim our share. Let us, therefore, go to China, not in the wake of the English; not to break down obstacles against which she is powerless; but on our own account. Let Russia and Great Britain know that a new champion

enters the lists, and that henceforth she must be consulted. If therefore the Chinese expedition is undertaken with a view to the future—if it is the first landmark planted by France to indicate her place on the confines of the East—let us not regret the money it will cost and the men who may perhaps fall on the field of honor, for that generous blood will not flow in vain.”

Ponder this—draw your own conclusions, and beware !

There now appears to be a coming storm !
 Let experience sage advise, and young men arm.
 Be ready for the crisis—come what may :
 “Be just,” cries Heaven, “and you shall win the day.”
 Then should Ambition dare to pass the wave,
 To humble England—bah ! ’twill find its grave.

With this advice, my kindred dust, I join,
 And bid adieu to you (great Prince) and mould’ring time ;
 Imploring God’s great blessing evermore
 May light on England’s Queen and England’s shore.

proceedings of the

EVIDENCE

OF

THE HON'BLE ASHLEY EDEN

Taken before the Indigo Commission

SITTING IN CALCUTTA.

RE-PRINTED FROM THE MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
INDIGO COMMISSION.

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1860.

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MINUTES OF EVIDENCE
TAKEN BEFORE
THE INDIGO COMMISSION
IN CALCUTTA.

Saturday, 21st July, 1860.

PRESENT:

W. S. Seton-Karr, Esq., c. s., *President.*

R. Temple, Esq., c. s.

W. F. Fergusson, Esq.

Members.

Reverend J. Sale.

Baboo Chunder Mohun Chatterjee.

The Hon'ble *Ashley Eden*, at present Magistrate, Collector, and Salt Agent, Cuttack.*

3571. *President.*] Will you state to the Commission the districts and appointments in which you have had experience?—I was first appointed Assistant Magistrate and Collector of Rajshahye, and, for a short time, had charge of the Sub-division of Nattore in that district; I was then appointed to the Sub-division of Aurungabad in the district of Moorshedabad; I was then employed on special duty, and then made Deputy Commissioner of the Sonthal Pergunnahs, and was next appointed to be Magistrate and Collector of Baraset. Then I officiated as Junior Secretary to the Board of Revenue, and this year I joined my appointment as Officiating Magistrate and Collector and Salt Agent of Cuttack.

* Mr. Eden has since been re-appointed Officiating Junior Secretary to the Board of Revenue.

3572. During the time you held these appointments, did you endeavour to mix familiarly with the people, and had you frequent opportunities of ascertaining the working of the Indigo system?—Yes, I always endeavour to mix as much as I could with the people, to ascertain their views upon all subjects, and, in the districts of Rajshahye, Moorshedabad, and Baraset, I had ample opportunities of ascertaining, both from the natives and the planters, the working of the system.

3573. Do you hold the opinion that that cultivation is the result of free agency on the part of the ryots, or that it is in a great measure compulsory?—My opinion is, that with the exception of factories which have a large extent of *chur* lands cultivated, it is in no instance the result of free agency, but that it is always compulsory.

3574. Will you state to the Commission as fully as you can, the facts, proofs, or reasons which have induced you to hold this belief?—*First*, I believe it to be unprofitable, and therefore I cannot believe that any ryot would consent to take up that cultivation, involving as it does serious pecuniary loss to himself; *secondly*, it involves an amount of harassing interference to which no free agent would subject himself; *thirdly*, from a consideration of the acts of violence to which the Planters have throughout been compelled to resort to keep up this cultivation as proved by the Criminal Records of Bengal; *fourthly*, from the admissions of the planters themselves that if the ryots were free agents, they would not cultivate Indigo; *fifthly*, the necessity under which the planters state themselves to be of spending large sums in the purchase of zemindaries and other descriptions of rights, giving them territorial influence and powers of compulsion, without which they would be unable to procure the cultivation of Indigo; *sixthly*, the statements of ryots and the people generally in the districts in which I have been; *seventhly*, the fact that, as soon as the ryots became aware of the fact that they were by law and practically free agents, they at once refused to continue the cultivation.

3575. Can you point to any particular records, printed or other, in support of your assertion regarding acts of violence?—I beg to hand in an abstract of forty-nine serious cases of murder, homicide, riot, arson, dacoity, plunder, and kidnapping, which have occurred from the year 1830 to 1859, some of which I have taken from records which came before me

during my incumbency ; others from printed Nizamut reports, and all from authenticated papers. I also give a file of heinous cases connected with the cultivation of Indigo, which occurred previous to the year 1810, with a view of showing, that on the commencement of the system of private trade in the interior of the country, these acts of violence were resorted to, and in consequence of those acts, five Europeans were punished, and deported from the country ; and the Government, in a Circular Order of the 20th July, 1810, considered it necessary to warn the Magistrates, to check the system of forcing the cultivation by means of advances on ryots. This last statement I have derived from a printed Parliamentary Report of 1820, on the occasion when the Directors of the Company were charged with impeding the settlement of Europeans. The great majority of the cases in the first list filed have occurred within the last ten years.

3576. Could you state how many of the above cases came under your personal observation as Magistrate ?—Under my own actual observation I only remember two cases of those noted in the list. One was the case of kidnapping in Shanpore Factory, Bansbarria, in the Rajshahye district, in which one man was confined and died in the godown, and his body was thrown by the factory servants, and sunk by means of bags of bricks, in a *jheel*. This I know from having been assistant to the Magistrate who tried the case, and being acquainted with the parties concerned in it. The native servants of the factory were punished by the Judge, but were released by the Nizamut who ruled, that although there was no doubt the man had met his death whilst confined in the godown, yet that there was no distinct proof of the precise means by which he met his death, and therefore they merely punished those who were engaged in concealing the body. Another case mentioned there which I myself investigated, was a case in which the servants of the Hobra Factory went with a large party of ploughmen and ploughs, and ploughed up about 125 beegahs of the ryots' cultivation, and sowed Indigo on the land. I imprisoned the factory people, and was reprimanded for leniency, and for having shown a prejudice in favour of the planters. Another case which I want to mention, which though within my own knowledge, is not contained in the list, was, that, when I went to the

Aurangabad sub-division, I found that it was the custom to carry off the cattle of the ryots who would not sow indigo. It having been brought to my notice that a great deal of suffering was occasioned to the ryots, by the sale of their cattle in the previous year, I instituted enquiries, and having ascertained one of the places in which the cattle were kept, I sent out a party of police, and released from one of the out-factories about two or three hundred head of cattle which even when brought to my own house, the ryots through fear of the planter were afraid, for several days, to come forward and claim.

3577. What was the distance of the Sub-division from the head quarters of the factory, and why was the Sub-division established there?—The Assistant Magistrate's residence was between fifty and one hundred yards from the factory, and the Sub-division was established partly on account of the disputes between Messrs. Lyon and White on the one part, and Mr. David Andrew on the other; and partly on account of the number of complaints which came from that quarter, of the oppression to which the people were subjected by the servants of the factories. On joining the Sub-division, the head-quarter house was not being yet erected, and not knowing the causes which led to the selection of that site, I recommended its removal to the town of Junghypore, which was the principal *entrepôt* of trade in that part of the country. On going to Aurangabad great objections were raised by the planters, however, to the selection of a site so close to the factory, on the grounds that the Magistrate's Court would interfere with the business of the factory. It is worthy of remark that it was the factories of these two firms, which were first attacked during these disturbances. In justice, however, to the Manager, Mr. McLeod, I wish to state that I always found him personally willing, so far as was consistent with the interests of his employer, to pay attention to the complaints of the people, and, to this, may, in a great measure, be attributed the fact that the factory was not then a paying concern. Since then the cultivation has greatly been increased, and I am of opinion that it was owing to that that the late disturbances took place in that concern.

3578. Mr. *Fergusson*.] In the forty-nine cases which you ferretted out, as having occurred during the last thirty years, is it not the

case that in more than half of them, Europeans have not been accused, or, if accused, have been acquitted?—There are scarcely any one of these cases, in which the European or principal manager of the concern has ever been put upon his trial, although in many of them, the Judges trying the cases have expressed strong opinions that such Europeans were themselves implicated in them; and it is to this importunity and freedom from responsibility that I attribute the constant recurrence of these violent outrages.

3579. In such instances as you have mentioned, was it not a gross dereliction of duty on the part of the Government not to prosecute the Europeans?—There certainly was a failure of justice which, in my opinion, may, to a certain extent, be attributed to the strong bias which the Governor and many of the officers of Government have always displayed in favour of those engaged in this particular cultivation; this may also partly have arisen from the difficulty which exists under the present law of obtaining a conviction against Europeans, as for instance in the case in which a planter named Dick *alias* Richard Aimes, was murdered by a European planter named Jones, a French planter named Pierre Aller, and some native servants, in which the Frenchman and the natives being amenable to the courts of the country, were imprisoned for life, whilst Yong, the European British subject, not being subject to the jurisdiction of the local court, was tried in Her Majesty's Supreme Court in Calcutta, and was acquitted on precisely the same evidence as was brought against the foreigners and natives who were convicted in the district court; the sentence being upheld by the Nizamut Adawlut.

3580. Then, you consider that in that case justice was obtained in the Mofussil Courts and denied in the Supreme Court?—I consider that the Judges of the Court of the Nizamut Adawlut are fully as competent to come to a decision on the evidence before them, as a Calcutta Petty Jury. I shall therefore consider that in this instance a failure of justice occurred in the Supreme Court.

3581. If I tell you, that I was in the Supreme Court during the whole of that trial and with a strong feeling against the prisoner, and that I, and most other gentlemen in Calcutta, considered it impossible to find him guilty on the evidence, would it alter your opinion in any manner?—No, as with those facts before them, and commenting on

those facts, the Sudder Court subsequently convicted the remainder of that party as accessories to the murder on that evidence ; the previous acquittal in the Supreme Court, and the distrust thrown upon the evidence having been urged by the defendant's counsel, and over-ruled. Moreover, if the murder was not committed, where is Dick *alias* Richard Aimes, who has never appeared since.

3582. In the other cases contained in your list in which no remarks are made by the Judges, is it merely your opinion that the Europeans among them were guilty parties, and should have been punished?— Having had very little conversation with any other parties on the merits of these cases, I am not prepared to state whether any other person has formed the same opinion, but in my own certainty, the European who organized an attack, who conceals the offence, and in one instance even allowed one of his servants who had murdered a ryot, to be concealed, whilst a third party was sentenced capitally, should be held liable to the same punishment as a native of this country would have in all probability been subjected to, if he committed the same offence. I allude to the case of Mr. Patrick Smith, of Dulleemulla Factory, in which a servant of his murdered a chowkidar who endeavoured to resist the carrying off of ryots who refused to take advances for the cultivation of Indigo. The man admitted the murder to Mr. Smith the same day. The actual murderer in that case was not apprehended, but another servant of the name of Ram Singh was capitally sentenced for that crime. Some months subsequently a second murder was committed by the same man, and a rumour spread that this man was really the murderer in the former case. On the representation of Mr. Hills, Dr. Archer, and others, Mr. Smith then appeared before the Sudder Court, and in consequence of the statement there made, the sentence of Ram Singh was commuted, and the real culprit was apprehended.

3583. Then in this instance, did not the Sessions Judge and the Sudder Nizamut convict and sentence to be hung the wrong man?— They convicted the accomplice who was present at the time, but who had not actually struck the fatal blow; instead of the principal who was concealed in the factory, where he was subsequently found by the Magistrate. This arose from the fact that the two men were up-country lattials, not natives of Bengal, in consequence of which some confusion

occurred in the identification of the principal and the accomplice by ignorant Bengali ryots. If the European planter had come forward, as disapproving of the crime, as he was bound to do before the Magistrate or the Sessions, this difficulty of identification would not have arisen. The conviction of the Courts was according to the evidence before them.

3584. *President.*] Is it not a very unusual thing for additional or supplementary evidence to be either offered or received before the Sudder Nizamut, such Court deciding only from the records?—I never heard of a similar course of proceeding; I believe the evidence to have been received at the instance of the two Messrs. Trevor, one of whom was Legal Remembrancer at the time.

3585. *Mr. Fergusson.*] In the course of enquiries, have you not come across similar cases in the Opium and Salt Departments.—No; I have not perused any records, nor have I any personal knowledge of such cases.

3586. Have you not heard of similar cases in one of the Salt Agencies in the Midnapore Zillah?—I have heard that some heinous offences occurred in some way connected with the Salt Department at Hidgelee last year. In what way these cases arose, or in what way they were connected with the Salt Department, I have no knowledge whatever; I believe them to have arisen from disputes between the preventive and manufacturing branches of the Salt Department; but my knowledge is entirely derived from general rumours. In the Opium Department I have never heard of any cases whatever.

3587. Do not any case similar to those in your list arise from disputes between rival native zemindars respecting lands, hauts, &c.?—Frequent affrays and kidnapping arise from such sources of dispute, but of late years they have nearly ceased in that part of the country of which I have special knowledge, and I believe generally throughout Bengal; they, however, more frequently take the form of disputes between two strong contending parties well able to cope with one another, and do not, as in the Indigo cases, show the strong continually preying on the weak, and disputes arising out of a false system of trade.

3588. Have you any reason to believe that the system carried on in the silk trade was different as regards ryots from that of the Indigo business?—I have no knowledge on the subject.

3589. Have the Indigo cases now ceased in Bengal together with the cessation of the same zemindary affrays, or do the former continue in any district while the latter have ceased?—I believe the establishment of the numerous Sub-divisions throughout Bengal has had the effect of decreasing violent open outrages of every description, such as affrays ; but the seizing of ryots and the confinement within the factory walls, has, in my opinion, increased as violent overt acts have decreased. The greatest increase, however, is in cases unconnected with Indigo on account of the fear which the zemindars have of these Sub-divisions, and the great facility which is afforded to the European planters of opposing the ryots in any way which does not involve any great publicity, such as would necessarily attract the attention of the higher authorities.

3590. Are kidnapping and imprisonment still carried on by zemindars as well as planters?—Yes, I believe they are in many instances ; but since the passing of Act X of 1859, I believe that they have greatly decreased.

3591. Then, has the increase of these offences to which you alluded solely occurred in Indigo Concerns?—Whether it is that there is an actual increase, or whether it is that the establishment of Sub-divisions have brought them to light, or whether it is that the punishment of several planters for this offence has given the ryots greater confidence to speak more openly of these things, I am not sure ; but I have certainly heard more of such cases within the last few years than before, and I believe that it may be attributed to the increased reluctance of the ryots to sow without such compulsion, and also to the check which has been given to such outrages.

3592. In case 18 you remark that the Europeans for whose benefit the crime was committed were not punished. Do you ground that opinion from the observations of the Judge or from what you read of the case?—To the best of my recollection the printed report of the case will show that the Judge, Mr. G. C. Cheap, remarks that the case was one in which great blame attached to Mr. Tripp, and said it was cause of great regret to him to put on record the commission of such violent outrages by Europeans, but that he was glad to state that Mr. Kenny, the proprietor of the concern, was on his way to England, and was not therefore responsible.

3593. In case 29 you remark that Mr. French was in the jail in which these men were confined at the time. Do you mean by your remarks on that case that Mr. French ought to have been brought to trial?—Judging from the evidence, as it appears in the printed report of the Sudder Court, I should, if I had been the Magistrate before whom that case came, have committed Mr. French to take his trial, as it appears that he compromised the case by giving compensation to the owner of the boat.

3594. In case 39 you observe the servants were imprisoned, but Mr. W. Collis, who was admitted by the Judge to give the order, was not put on trial, by virtue of his descent from European stock, on what is that remark founded?—It is my strong opinion derived from a perusal of the case. For the Judge stated that the order was given by Mr. W. Collis himself, and I can conceive no other possible reason, why, if the Judge considered Mr. Collis to have been guilty, he should not have taken steps to bring him to justice, and, judging from the practice of the courts, I feel convinced that had he been a native his trial would have been directed.

3595. On the whole, considering the number of districts and the number of Indigo concerns and of planters engaged, also the period of time over which these cases extend; considering also the state of society in the Mofussil, do you consider that these serious cases frequent, rare, or otherwise?—These cases do not *in any way* represent the total amount of such outrages that have been committed during the period embraced. The greater part of the selected cases of which an abstract has been given, are only those of so serious a nature as necessitated a reference to the Sudder Court either on account of the severity of the penalty involved, or in appeal on points of law. My own opinion is that not one tithe of the offences actually committed ever came before any court at all; of those which are actually brought up by the police, very many are disposed of by the Magistrate himself; and others of a more serious nature are decided by the Sessions Court without reference to the Nizamut. I have not had the means at my disposal to enable me to lay before the Committee any memorandum of such cases. The improved administration of the police arising from the increase of Subdivisions has decreased the number of violent crimes of late years, but it has, as a consequence, checked the cultivation of Indigo.

3596. *Mr. Temple.*] But, on the whole, do you consider that planters rarely resort to serious violence or frequently ; and do you believe that these deeds of violence are committed by a few planters or by the majority, or what ?—I believe that deeds of the violence of those noted in the abstract filed, are not frequent, but still they are such, as to keep up and perpetuate a feeling of terrorism without which, in my opinion, the cultivation of Indigo could not be carried on for one day. Any act of great violence, committed in any district, such for instance, as the attack of the village of Haut-dayal, in the district of Rajshahye, in the concern of Messrs. J. and R. Watson and Co., in which three villages were gutted, three cultivators killed, and six wounded, would be enough to strike terror into the hearts of the ryots, in that part of the country for many years to come, and it is only when the ryots have forgotten such acts as these, that any fresh violence of this sort is necessary. I believe that there are many planters who do all in their power to avoid having recourse to such expedients, but it will be found that one or two outrages of the most serious description have occurred within the remembrance of men in every district and with every concern.

3597. Have you known many planters, who would not under any circumstances, themselves order or authorize such proceedings ; and do you know, whether such things could or could not be done by the servant without the authority of the master ?—I know many planters who would neither authorize nor order such proceedings, but the system is such that they are frequently involved in such cases against their will ; that the system which they pursue, and the class of servants that they employ, force them to this ; the worst that can be said of such men is, that when they are so involved, they do not come forward as they should do, and publicly disown the acts of their servants and render assistance in bringing them to justice.

3598. You have mentioned generally that European planters are, practically, never punished for acts of violence ; is it that prosecutions are instituted by the Mofussil Authorities, and fail in the Supreme Court, or is it that prosecution is not attempted, and if the latter be the cause, what is the reason ?—Prosecutions are scarcely ever attempted. The reason of this is partly because Mofussil Magistrates know the difficulty of procuring a conviction in the Supreme Court, partly from

great unwillingness among prosecutors and witnesses to subject themselves to the liability to come to Calcutta to attend the Supreme Court and to a great extent to the bias in favour of the planters, which has been too frequently displayed by men in all positions from the highest officers of the Government down to the lowest.

3599. As an officer of Mofussil experience, what do you consider to be practically the difficulties of prosecuting the planters before the Supreme Court ; or how do these difficulties arise ?—It never fell to my lot to have to commit any planter, but judging from my experience as a Justice of the Peace, in obtaining convictions against Europeans, I consider that very great practical difficulties exist. For instance, I have committed Europeans to the Supreme Court, the bill has been thrown out by the grand jury under circumstances which led the Government to direct a re-committal on the same evidence. The evidence was described by the Advocate Général as being of the most clear and conclusive description. The parties were re-committed on precisely the same evidence, and were convicted and sentenced. In another case, I committed an officer for trial for manslaughter. The officer admitted before me having committed the assault which led to the man's death. The medical evidence showed that although the man was in bad health, yet his health had been hastened by the injuries he had received. The grand jury threw out the bill ; and it is in cases like these, that dishearten Mofussil Magistrates from committing Europeans to the Supreme Court.

3600. But as a Magistrate and Justice of the Peace, would you not commit an offender, if you believed him guilty on the evidence, irrespectively as to your opinion as to what might be the view taken by a Calcutta petty jury or grand jury ?—As a judicial officer, if the evidence was very clear in any case before me, I should commit, but, as an executive officer, I should hesitate to take up many cases against Europeans, which under the circumstances I should consider it incumbent on me to proceed with.

3601. *Mr. Fergusson.*] In this list I see eight names of persons whom I personally know to be foreigners, and parties liable to the Mofussil Court ; can you account for their not being proceeded against, if there were any good grounds for doing so ?—Of the evidence against the parties particularly alluded to in the cases you have mentioned, I

am not prepared to speak without a reference to the cases, but the exemption to which you allude was probably explained in my previous answer, in which I noticed the great bias which has always existed in favour of planters from the very beginning.

3602. Then do you consider that the Government officials have sacrificed justice to favour the planters?—I consider that it has frequently been the case, and I have stated so in official reports. I will go further and say, that as an young assistant, I confess I have favoured my own countrymen in several instances.

3603. Baboo *C. M. Chatterjee*.] Do you believe that if the European planters in the Mofussil were subject to equal laws and same punishment with the natives of the country, they would be deterred from committing the oppressions you have alluded to?—I believe that with the knowledge that they were subject to the Courts, and did not enjoy the perfect practical impunity which they now possess, the system of force which is known to all to have existed so long, would not have been continued by the planters.

3604. Is it not the case that if a Native gentleman and an European gentleman, a British subject, were found guilty of a similar offence before a Mofussil Magistrate, the former might be sentenced to imprisonment, whereas the latter might get off by paying a fine to the extent of 500 rupees?—If an English gentleman and a Native gentleman were placed side by side in the same case, I hardly think that any Magistrate could punish them in a different manner, but in similar but separate cases, I think that it would frequently happen that a Native gentleman would be imprisoned, whereas the European would only be fined, because the Magistrate has not, except in particular cases, the power of imprisoning an European.

3605. During the time the Indigo planters were vested with magisterial powers, did not some of them abuse their power, within your own knowledge, to serve their own interests?—There were no honorary Magistrates in my district.

3606. *Mr. Fergusson*.] In the present state of the Mofussil Courts and with the present Judges who preside in them, would you like to see any European friend tried in them?—I think that if the courts are good enough for the natives, they are good enough for Europeans. If they

are not good enough for natives, they are not fit to have any jurisdiction at all over any one. As far as I am myself concerned, I would sooner be tried, if innocent, in the local Sessions Court, with an appeal to the Nizamut, than in the Supreme Court. If guilty, I would prefer the Supreme Court and a Calcutta jury.

3607. *President.*] Several witnesses have either stated or admitted that Indigo cultivation is unprofitable and unpopular with the ryots, and you yourself have declared your belief that the cultivation for years has been compulsory; how do you reconcile those admissions and your belief with the fact, that the system has gone on for years without any change?—For many reasons: *first*, that the people of Bengal are naturally patient in enduring oppressions. Years of tyranny and oppression have taught them to bear every wrong without resistance. Their feelings have taken the form of sullen morose hate, rather than active opposition. These pent-up feelings have now for the first time found a vent; *secondly*, the Police Courts have, until the last four or five years, been out of their reach. The planter having the rights of a zemindar, has reigned over them with the powers of a despot. They dared not leave their homes to go and complain at a distant station; if they did so, they ran the risk of returning to find their cattle carried off, or a relative illegally confined. Even in cases in which, on these complaints, the police when deputed to hold an investigation, sometimes through fear of the planter, and sometimes corrupted by his money, nearly always influence by some means or other, reported the case against the ryot. The ryot would then be worse off than before, and his only hope of peace, lay in cultivating Indigo without opposition, but not as a free agent; *thirdly*, Bengalis have not usually that power of conjoint action which would enable them with any prospect of success to form a combination against the planters; *fourthly*, ryots, from whatever causes it may have arisen, have certainly all along believed that Government and Government officials were interested in the cultivation of Indigo, that they were so strongly prejudiced in favour of the planter, that it was useless to complain. The ryots were unable to understand, how a man living in terms of the greatest intimacy, and in daily communication with the planter, was capable of deciding cases justly; cases in which the interests of that planter were concerned. Whatever

may be the impartiality of the individual Magistrate, it would be difficult to persuade an uneducated native that intimacy of this description would not bias a Magistrate in his official acts. This intimacy has very often, it may be without the knowledge of the planter, been made use of by the factory servants as a means to accomplish their wishes. Again, facilities of complaint have been afforded to the Planters by the higher authorities from which the ryots are altogether excluded, and, I believe it to be the case that this privilege has been made use of to influence such higher authority against such of the local authorities as may have shown a disposition to do justice between man and man. And there are cases, in which the removal of officials has been attributed by the ryots to the influence brought to bear by those in the interests of the planters against such officials ; *fifthly*, I believe that the pressure of Indigo cultivation has never been so severely felt as during the present time, as although the ryots have always had to sacrifice a portion of their land and labour, the loss has never been so severe as at the present time, when the value of that land and labour has greatly increased ; formerly these lands gave them enough to live upon and pay their rents, but as there was no market for surplus produce, and but little stimulus to accumulate, it was not worth their while to grow any great amount of produce beyond what was necessary for their own consumption.

3608. Can you mention any cases within your knowledge, in which officials were either interfered with or censured or removed for alleged bias against planters?—Moulvee Abdool Latief was removed from Kalaroa for giving an order protecting the ryots against the forcible entry of the planter. My predecessor at Baraset was complained of for saying that it was optional for ryots to sow Indigo or not, and was censured by the late Lieutenant Governor. Of this last case I have no knowledge except what was derived from the planters themselves, and from the people who still believe him to have been removed for protecting them. In my own case, I was, on private representations made by planters, reprimanded and interfered with by the Commissioner. Representations were made to the Government for my removal, on the ground that I had told the ryots that the cultivation of Indigo was optional. And three petitions were

presented by parties of influence in Calcutta, within a few months, demanding my removal on this account, and I had considerable difficulty in defending my own position and upholding my independence as a Magistrate.

3609. Mr. *Fergusson*.] Are you aware that the cultivation of Indigo in the district of Nuddea does not occupy more than five per cent. of its area, and if so, how can it be so severe a pressure on the ryots, as you have stated it to be?—Admitting this calculation to be correct, you must first deduct from that area one-third of the whole as follows, wood, waste, village, and unculturable lands. You must next deduct one-third of this for those portions of the district in which Indigo cultivation is not carried on, and with which the planter has no connection. From the balance you must deduct a very large proportion of wet land suitable only for the cultivation of late rice, and then if you take the remainder, which is the most valuable land in the whole of the district and the most productive, you will find that the planters have thrown out of profitable cultivation a proportion of the best land, which must press with very great severity on those engaged in the cultivation of profitable crops in the part of the district where factories are situated.

3610. But the seed crops are cold weather crops, which can be grown equally with Indigo and early rice; and do you think that while grain crops, such as rice, can be taken continually off the same land, it would not be better to vary such crops occasionally with Indigo?—Provided that Indigo were as profitable as any other crop, I can understand that an occasional crop of that plant might be beneficial to the soil, but so long as it is a dead loss to the ryot, out of pocket, even the inferior rice crop is more remunerative to him. But, there are other crops, such as *jute*, *sugar-cane*, *chillies*, *ginger*, *turmeric*, *tobacco*, which afford the ryot a still greater profit than rice; but even supposing that this was not the case; the land is the land of the ryots, they are the best judges of their own interests, and so long as they object to the cultivation of Indigo for whatever reason, I can conceive no principle upon which it can be argued that it is justifiable for a third party to come in and insist upon a ryot sowing that to which he objects, although it may be in his opinion beneficial to the ryot.

3611. But if a ryot has made a contract and has received money to

sow Indigo, upon what principle has he a right to decline to do so?—If a ryot, being a free agent and acting without force, either actual or moral, voluntarily enters into a contract for the cultivation of any crop, he is of course bound to fulfil it, but the result of my experience and my enquiries on the subject convince me that in scarcely any instance does a ryot, being a free agent, enter into contracts or receive advances for the cultivation of Indigo, which is admitted by many competent authorities to involve a pecuniary loss upon the ryot. One of the main elements of the contract, to make it legal, must be that it has voluntarily been entered into by both parties. My own opinion is, that in no instances within the last six years at least, have ryots entered into legal contracts for the cultivation of this crop.

3612. *President.*] But will you state the precise nature of your experience as to how these contracts are first entered into?—From my own experience derived from conversations with both ryots and planters, and from the examination of the factory books, and from the inspection of the contracts themselves, and from constant enquiries and investigations for the last four years into the matter, I, still continue of opinion that the description of the mode as to how contracts are entered into, given in my letter No. 500, dated 19th June 1858, page 220 of the Blue Book, is a correct description of the manner in which advances are given and received.

3613. *Mr. Fergusson.*] Do you know that the land in the district of Baraset to which your experience and enquiries appear to have been limited, is unsuited for the cultivation of Indigo, and that it does not produce one-half of the plant which the lands in Kishnaghur and Jessore do?—I have always understood that the lands at Baraset were amongst the finest lands in Bengal, and as the district borders both on Jessore and Kishnaghur, much of the land is precisely of the same description as that of those districts.

3614. Do you not think that the occasional intimacy between the planters and officials is balanced by a similar intimacy between the ryots and darogah and the native officials of the district?—My own experience leads me to believe that fear of the planter's influence and fear of the representations he may make to their official superiors, render the police very apt to side with the planter's people when the opposite

party were poor natives. My great difficulty has always been to get the police to act boldly and straightforwardly in cases of this sort. I have frequently had to find fault with the police for displaying an unjustifiable bias in favour of the planter.

3615. *President.*] Have you reason to believe that any portion of that bias is due to illegal or improper influence, such as the payment of money, and if so, on what reasons do you ground that belief?—It has frequently been stated to me by planters, that unless they had recourse to these means, they would find it difficult to carry on their business. I generally believed that as a rule, the police have hitherto been so corrupt that there is reason to suspect that in very many cases they have been so influenced. Of late years, since constant enquiries have been made into the matter, and an educated and higher class of natives have been employed, and since the salary has been increased, there has been a most decided improvement in this respect.

3616. Then, it is your decided opinion that so far from the Magistrates having obstructed or impeded Indigo cultivation, they have not afforded to the ryot the support and protection he might fairly expect?—I think that if the law had been strictly administered by the Magistrates, and if they had at their disposal a staff of well qualified officers sufficient for them to carry out the law in all cases, the present system of cultivation could not have been continued as it has done. I believe that many Magistrates have been deterred from doing their duty in this respect, from a sensitive desire to avoid the ignominious reproach which has always been raised against them of being jealous of the non-official classes; and, in avoiding this reproach, they have allowed themselves to display a bias in favour of the planters, which has in many cases led to a failure of justice.

3617. *Mr. Sale.*] You mention as one reason, why the ryots, though unwilling, have been cultivating so long, that the police courts were out of their reach. Did you refer to the distance the ryots have to go to get justice, or to the difficulties arising out of the arrangements of the courts, or of the character of the *amla*, or to the difficulty arising out of the ryots' fear of the planter when he is also a zemindar?—I allude to the fact that in many districts ryots have to go some thirty or forty miles to the nearest Magistrate; and that, through fear of the planter,

who is a zemindar, he dares not leave his house for this purpose. I also alluded to the fact, that in one district with which I was acquainted, the power of one firm is so great, that the ryots used to come across in my district to complain to me, because they dared not go through their own district to reach the station at which their own Magistrate resided.

3618. Do you not think that a simple mode of administering justice, such as that adopted in the cutcherries of the planters, would be much more effective than the arrangements at present existing in most of the Mofussil Courts?—I have no personal knowledge of the system pursued in the planter's cutcherry, but I am not prepared to recommend that the system pursued in those courts, as I understand them to be, should be introduced into the constituted courts of the country. I have no doubt that in many cases a planter may dispose of cases with great justice when his interests are not antagonistic to those of the people themselves, but every thing in such a court must depend entirely upon the temper and ability of the individual presiding.

3619. Is not it often ruin to a ryot to leave his home, say at the sewing season, to make a complaint at any of the Mofussil Courts?—Until late years, it was doubtless impossible for ryots to leave their cultivation to go to a distant Court; but of late years, many district sub-divisional courts have been brought within a day's journey to every ryot in the district.

3620. You mentioned in a previous answer that planters have admitted to you that the ryots are not free agents; does this statement refer to any constraint put upon them, or does it refer to any relation which they supposed themselves to have as their zemindars?—The planters have undoubtedly a very mistaken notion of the right of interference with the ryot's crops and cultivation, which they consider themselves to possess as zemindars. They doubtless referred to force and constraint, which in their position as zemindars, they were able to exercise towards their ryots with practical impunity.

3621. *Mr. Fergusson.*] Have the native zemindars and *mahajams* equally mistaken notions of the rights of cultivation?—I never heard of a zemindar insisting upon a ryot sowing any particular crop, unless that zemindar was also an Indigo planter; neither have I ever heard of a

mahajan exercising any interference in the cultivation of the crop of a ryot indebted to him. I never heard from *mahajans* that they found it necessary to exercise any interference whatever with the ryots ; and I know cases in which ryots, who having given *jute* under advances from *mahajans* living at the distance of thirty or forty miles away, have scrupulously fulfilled their engagements with the *mahajans*, who had no *zemindary* rights in the district, and no power in any way of interfering with the cultivation. But I know so far of *zemindars* collecting a cess on particular descriptions of crops, which is of course illegal, but this interference on the part of the *zemindar* is not general, and does not extend to interference with the cultivation of crops.

3622. *President.*] Practically do not *gantidars*, *jotedars*, and other tenant-proprietors select their own crops, vary them; fence their own gardens, and plant them and reap the produce without any dictation or any interference on the part of the *zemindar*?—Always, within my knowledge.

3623. Is there not a great increase of date and sugar-cane cultivation in parts of Baraset, and if so, to whom do you attribute that cultivation? —In the eastern portion of the district there is an extensive cultivation of date, which is entirely grown by the more prosperous ryots, who have large *jotes*. And I also know several instances in which *zemindars* themselves purchase the ryots' lands, and made use of their own waste lands, by turning them into date gardens.

3624. *Baboo C. M. Chatterjee.*] Do you know that a kind of leather strap is kept in the factories for beating ryots?—I have heard from ryots that there is a stick with a leather attached to it, called "Sham Chand" or "Ram Kant," but this I merely heard from the Kishnaghur ryots.

3625. *Mr. Fergusson.*] Have you never heard that this was originally invented and used in the Hon'ble Company's Silk Filatures? —I have never known if this was the case, but I quite believe that such may have been the case in those days.

Commission adjourned at 6 P. M.

Monday, 23rd July, 1860.

PRESENT :

W. S. Seton-Karr, Esq., C. S., *President.*

Members :

W. F. Fergusson, Esq. | Reverend J. Sale.

Baboo Chunder Mohun Chatterjee.

The Hon'ble Ashley Eden's examination continued.

3626. *President.*] You had occasion to enter into correspondence with the Commissioner regarding the cultivation of Indigo, and to issue certain instructions to the police in 1859, and you are well aware of the refusal to cultivate Indigo on the part of the ryots during the present season ; to what causes mainly do you attribute that refusal ?—The refusal to cultivate Indigo is in Baraset nothing new. So long ago as the year 1855, a former Magistrate, Mr. Mangles, having expressed an opinion] (in certain cases connected with the cultivation of Indigo) that the ryots could not legally be compelled to take advances for the cultivation of that crop against their wishes, the result was, that the ryots having discovered this, at once threw up the cultivation, and the out-turn of the concern for that year was only sixty-five maunds. Complaints were made to Government by gentlemen at Calcutta connected with the Indigo trade, and it was stated by themselves, that Mr. Mangles was reprimanded for having told the ryots that the cultivation was optional ; whether this reprimand was actually administered or not, I cannot say ; but the result was, that on Mr. Mangles's leaving the district immediately afterwards, the ryots understood him to have been removed for affording them protection, and they again were afraid to resist the endeavours made by the planters to force this cultivation upon them, and sowed Indigo that year to a small extent. The subsequent year being the year of the mutiny, and there being strong reasons to believe that the natives of Baraset were impressed with a great dislike of planting, and as they had on a previous occasion (about 1832) actually attacked the factories under the leadership of Tito Mir, the planters on this occasion were afraid of similar attacks, and applied for, and obtained, a special guard,

for the protection of their lives and property ; the consequence of which was, that the ryots that year being afraid of being charged with intimidating and opposing the planter, sowed a moderate quantity of Indigo. In a subsequent year, however, a question having arisen as to the right of the planter on an *ex parte* allegation that ryots were under advances to him, to enter himself upon the lands of such planters and cultivate their Indigo, I expressed a strong opinion that the land being the property of the ryots and not of the planters, the planters had no right whatever on any such plea to take possession of the ryot's lands, and that the Magistrates were bound, in case of such trespass to protect the ryots in their possession. On that occasion my views were not upheld by the Commissioner, and I was directed to induce the ryots of Mr. Larmour to sow their Indigo. I went to the spot and the ryots sowed. Next year I was determined to bring the question to a practical issue, and a similar question having arisen, I again gave the same order to my subordinates to afford protection to the ryots in the event of the planters' servants entering violently into their lands to sow there a crop which the ryots objected to. My orders were again upset by the Commissioner (Mr. Larmour's case of 1858-59,) and I was reprimanded. I remonstrated, and the result was the correspondence in the Blue Book in which my order was finally upheld. Early in 1859, Mr. Prestwich and Mr. Warner having complained to me that their ryots refused to take advances to settle the accounts for the past year, and having requested me to use my influence to make them take advances, I stated my inability to do so, and told them the only way of inducing their ryots to sow or to enter into the cultivation, would be by offering them a remunerative price. Instead of doing this, they complained to the Lieutenant Governor, Mr. Halliday, and the result was an interview as described in the Lieutenant Governor's minute, page 151 of the Blue Book. After this I drew up a vernacular paper, or *rubakari*, which is given in page 156 of the Blue Book, and the ryots then learnt that it really was optional for them to enter into contracts or to refuse to do so. The fact that it was optional, spread generally throughout the district, and ryots came from Jessore and Kishnagur and took authenticated copies of my order, knowing that the effect of the intimation would be to spread gradually throughout Bengal,

a knowledge of the fact that it was optional with ryots to enter into the contracts or not, as they thought fit. I apprehend that the result of such knowledge would be to put a stop to the forced system then existing. I thought it necessary to obtain the sanction of the Commissioner previously to granting such copies. The *rubakari* was issued on the 20th February 1859. In the following season the question of the right of the planter was again discussed between myself and the Commissioner, and the final orders of the Government alluded to above were received, laying down a distinct principle on this point; this was subsequent to the issue of that *rubakari*. Copies of the Government Order were forwarded to the Sub-divisions for the information and guidance of the Deputy Magistrates in charge of those Sub-divisions, and by one of them a perwannah was issued, *viz.* : by the Deputy Magistrate of Kalaroa, which is said by the planters and their advocates to have been the cause of the ryots' refusal to sow. That perwannah was not issued with my knowledge, as explained in my letter to Government. A natural consequence of the ryots finding that they were really free agents, and that for the first time for a long period of years, there was an inclination displayed by the authorities to afford them that practical protection, which had all along been theirs by law and theory, was, that they refused to sow, and appealed to the authorities for protection from force. I do not believe that, as has been stated by the planters and others, the ryots ever believed that it was the wish of Government, that they should not sow Indigo, but I believe simply that they believed it to be optional. I may add, that I long foresaw that such a crisis was at hand, and in the late great rise in the price of all commodities and the labour market, nothing short of military force could have for any period compelled the ryots to continue the cultivation of the crop, which though always distasteful to them, had latterly involved a pecuniary loss, which they were unable to bear.

3627. Then, are we to understand that in your opinion, the compulsory character of the cultivation is the primary and original cause of the dislike; the late rise in prices, the additional cause; and the sudden knowledge that entering into contracts was purely optional with the ryots, was the approximate cause that set the whole thing in motion? —Yes, that is decidedly my opinion.

3628. Did you ever state to any planters that you foresaw the late crisis?—Yes, I did to Messrs. Forlong, Henry Deverell, Prestwich, and all with whom I had any conversation on the subject.

3629. Were there any peculiarities in the Baraset district which might make the ryots more keenly alive to their own rights, compared to the ryots of other districts, say for instance, Pubna and Moorshedabad, or even Jessore and Kishnaghur?—Baraset is a suburban district. The ryots are the most intelligent set of ryots that I have ever met with in any district. They have constant communication with the merchants in Calcutta, and know all that is going on in the neighbourhood; being *shara-wallas* (or Ferazees), they have a complete organization, and frequently meet together to interchange ideas. On account of the great influx of troops into the large military stations of Dum-Dum and Barrackpore, as well as in Calcutta, the value of the produce of their lands has greatly increased; a considerable manufacturing population has even sprung up in the district, for the purpose of supplying the demand for *gunny*, and irrespective therefore of the increased demand for export crops, they have also had to supply a surplus for the population labouring for wages in the manufacture of *gunny*, and on the rail-road which is being made in the district. It should be recollected that every two maunds of rice or seed exported from this country, requires a gunny bag, and they have therefore had a ready sale for the *jute* employed in making these bags. The rise in the labour and produce market has of course made it still more distasteful to the ryots to have to give up a portion of their land to unprofitable crops. In addition to this, Baraset, which is a small district, has three Sub-divisional Magistrate's Offices, in addition to the Sudder Magistrate's Office; it has therefore been easy to control the police, and the people have had to go but a short distance to get a hearing for their complaints. I believe that the manufacture of Indigo has never paid the planter in Baraset for the last eight or nine years.

3630. Mr. Fergusson.] Do you not perceive much difference between the language of your *rubakari* of February 1859, where you say the ryots are free to take advances, and your letter of the 17th August, in which you say that the ryots had liberty to sow any crop they liked, and do you not think it certain that the perwannah of Baboo Hemchunder Ker embodying terms of your letter, would be interpreted by the ryots

as to its being optional for them to evade their contracts?—My letter and my *rubakari* were on two entirely different subjects, and merely entered into the questions specially before me in each case. The *rubakari* had reference to the compulsory attendance of ryots at the factory to receive advances, and to be made to enter into contracts. The letter, however, merely gave cover to Government Order laying down the principle upon which a Magistrate should act in the event of a planter attempting to enter forcibly on the lands of ryots, on the allegation that the ryot was under advances to sow. There could not therefore be any great similarity between two letters relating to two such different subjects. I deny that the perwannah does embody the remarks contained in my letter, and I further am decidedly of opinion, from information derived from competent persons, official and non-official, that that perwannah had nothing whatever to do with the present position of the ryots, except so far as it further confirm them in the idea that they were at length about to receive protection from oppression, and I am satisfied that if that perwannah had never been written, the same reluctance to sow would have shown itself.

3631. How do you account for the Baraset Concern having sown a large portion of their cultivation this season, and subsequent to your leaving the district?—It is not for me to say how the ryots have been induced to do that which they all along objected to do, but I believe it to have arisen, partly from a rumour that was spread, that I had been under the displeasure of the Government for protecting the ryots, and had been transported out of Bengal into Orissa; and partly from the fact, that the new manager, Mr. Larmour, gained over many of the influential ryots, whom he had previously denounced as turbulent persons, by making them *dewans*, *naibs*, and *gomashtas* of the factories. These men, although they do not cultivate themselves, have sufficient influence over their own *Koorfa* ryots to make them sow, and after all, the sowings only amount, I believe to 5,641 beegahs and 6 cottahs, of which 819 beegahs and 11 cottahs belong to a new Factory not in the district.

3632. But does not the fact of 5,000 beegahs having been sown, nullify your previous statements as to the determination of the ryots not to sow, as to their superior intelligence, and as to their advantage in

proximity to Calcutta, and the possession of a greater proportion of subdivisions?—I believe that nearly two-thirds of this amount has been sown *nijabad* by the planter who has hired these lands for this year at a high rate. I believe further, that the Indigo cultivation enforcement law has created a panic throughout the country, and that the ryots have this year thought it better to prevent any collision with the factory, with this assurance that by next year they will receive full protection in their rights. I do not believe further, that the *Koorfs* (or dependant ryots) are free agents in this matter.

3633. Do you consider that the same reasons account for Mr. Larmour's having been able to sow all his Mulnath lands within the Baraset district?—I do not know that the Mulnath lands have been sown, and if so, I do not know under what circumstances they have been sown.

3634. Baboo C. M. Chatterjee.] Are you aware that some of the Magistrates issued perwannahs to the darogahs, enjoining them to allow the planters to sow any lands that they wished, and to prevent any ryots from objecting to the planters sowing their land?—I have heard that since I have been in Calcutta, but have no personal knowledge of it.

3635. Mr. Sale.] Did you find that your notification in Baraset, to the effect that the ryots are at liberty to sow what crop they pleased on their lands, had any prejudicial effect on any cultivation save that of Indigo, such as jute, sugar, tobacco, &c.?—Certainly not; it was complained of this having stopped the cultivation of Indigo, but of no other crop, many of which were grown in advances in the Baraset district, such as rice, tobacco, and jute.

3636. Did you ever meet with any instances in which the ryots tried to evade obligations arising from advances taken for crops, other than Indigo?—No, never; on the contrary, I have known ryots refuse to sell their jute at a high price to the Baraset Jail, because they were under advances to the mahajans living on the banks of the Hooghly.

3637. Can you state from your knowledge whether the persons making those advances, are in the habit of exercising a strict supervision over the ryots during the cultivation of the crops advanced for?—No, they exercise no supervision whatever, and have no means of exercising such supervision.

3638. Do you know whether the persons making those advances are

in the habit of fixing the prices of the produce, when the advances are made?—Yes, the bargain is always made at the time of giving the advance, according to the condition of the market. The same people do not always make the same bargain every year. A dealer making an advance would get the produce at a lower rate than if he bought in the market at the time; this is the object for which this accommodatin is given.

3639. Are many case instituted in the courts by producers, or by those making the advances?—As regards the Civil Courts, I have no accurate knowledge; but as regards the Criminal Courts, I have never had a case arising out of this question. The only complaints that I ever heard made, were in 1859; that year a large number of ryots came to me and said, that owing to the fear of a famine, mahajuns would not give them advances of grain, and that as they had sold all their grain to those mahajuns at the cutting of the crop, they would suffer great distress if advances were withheld.

3640. Mr. *Fergusson*.] Do you know if written agreements are taken on the occasion of such advances as you have mentioned?—Written agreements are taken in the case of rice, but I never had cause to ascertain whether the same system is pursued with regard to all other crops, but from my knowledge of them, and the way they manage business, I believe it would be taken, and that on stamp paper.

3641. Do such agreements generally stipulate that the whole of the ryot's crop shall be made over to the mahajun at the price fixed, or only a portion?—I never read the stipulation, but the condition, as I understood it, was, that the ryot for one maund of rice should pay back a maund and a quarter at the time of cutting the rice. In the case of rice for seed, he would have to pay back a maund and half.

3642. *President*.] In the case of rice, over the cultivation of which the mahajun exercises little or no supervision, would it not be more correct to say that the question is not one of advances at all, but that the ryot borrows a maund of rice to feed himself and his family when the market is high, and pays it back at twenty-five or fifty per cent. interest, when he has gathered in his crop, and that the mahajun finds it profitable to accumulate stores of grain and to lend them on the above terms?—That is perhaps a more correct description of the

transaction, but in practice the interest is not nearly twenty-five or fifty per cent., because a maund of rice at the season of advances is very nearly equal in value to a maund and quarter of rice in the harvest time, and the real object of the mahajun is not so much to obtain a high rate of interest from his regular constituents, as to insure a large stock of rice to sell in distant markets by keeping up two connections with a considerable body of ryots engaged in rice cultivation, and who would naturally deal with him.

3643. Baboo *C. M. Chatterjee*.] If a ryot were allowed to cultivate all his lands with rice and other crops of his own liking, do you not think he would be able to pay off his mahajun's debts, and in one year or two become independent?—It is within my own knowledge that within the last two years ryots have, owing to the high price of grain, been enable to pay off their debts to the mahajuns. And one of the largest mahajuns in Orissa told me that this year he had been obliged to modify the terms on which he lent rice, and it stands to reason that the more land a man has, affording a profit, the sooner he would be in a position to accumulate, and be independent of his mahajuns, provided he received sufficient protection.

3644. Mr. *Fergusson*.] Will not the landholder, as in all other countries, obtain a large portion of this rise in price of the produce of the land, or what portion of the land in Baraset do you estimate as held by ryots, whose rents cannot be enhanced?—I believe that nearly all the ryots of Baraset are permanent hereditary occupiers, whose rent cannot be enhanced. Many of them having *pottas* from the old Kishnaghur Rajahs. I allude to the *jotedars*, and not to the *koorfa* ryots, who of course cultivate a great portion of the district under these *jotedars*.

3645. Is not the system of advances, both for produce and work, almost universal in that district, and in Bengal?—I believe the system is very general, but I think in the present time that important works can be carried out without any advances, in support of which I beg to hand a letter which I have received from Captain Harris, the Superintending Engineer, Cuttack Circle, showing that on the spur which is being erected at the mouth of the Kedjuri River, as many as 1,500 coolies per diem were at work, none of whom had received a pice of advances. These men came from all parts of the country.

3646. *President.*] Have you any means of informing the Commission of the comparative cost of cultivating indigo, rice, and other crops, and of the respective produce of the same?—I beg to hand a statement showing that the cost of growing Indigo on tobacco land is rupees 13-6 a beegah, and the produce of twenty bundles per beegah would only be four rupees, entailing thereby a loss of rupees 9-6, and showing also that a crop of tobacco, according to the details of cultivation given in Major Smyth's statistical report, would amount to twenty-four rupees, and would produce a crop, according to my calculation, of seven maunds at five rupees, but according to Major Smyth's report thirteen maunds, giving the ryot a clear profit, according to my calculation, of eleven rupees. I may add that in 1857 tobacco was selling in Baraset at eighteen rupees a maund. I also hand in a comparative statement of a crop of Indigo and rice grown on the same land, by which it will appear that by Indigo the ryot loses one rupee fourteen annas, and by the rice he gets ten rupees seven annas, (filed accordingly.) This information I have derived from enquiries made from ryots at various periods during the last three years, and partly from the statistical reports of the Revenue Surveyor. My reason for giving the rent at three rupees is, that the land is required for the whole twelve months, and therefore I have given a full average rent. The rent of the rice land which I have given as one rupee, being of an unfair description, I have calculated the produce of the Indigo on the rice land as one-half of the out-turn of Indigo on tobacco land.

3647. Do you consider it indispensable to the cultivation of Indigo, that there should be a system of advances?—No, I do not think it indispensable that the planters should make any advances. The planters say, that the ryots are so dishonest, that they invariably take advances with intent to defraud. The ryots say "we don't want advances," and the real struggle always is, as proved by numerous cases, to get them to take advances to get them in the factory books; this being so, both parties should, according to their own statements, be satisfied by an abolition of the advance system. The planter would not run the risk of fraud, and the ryot would be allowed to please himself as to the parties from whom he would take accommodation, if even, therefore, it was admitted that the ryots had not even yet advanced

to that state of prosperity, at which they would be able to cultivate a crop without any advances at all, it would surely be better to allow the ryot to procure the necessary advance from some other source to which he has not the same objection. I believe that if a more remunerative price were offered, any amount of plant would be forthcoming without the planter's advances.

3648. Supposing the contract to be voluntary and the cultivation to be remunerative to the ryot, you would not ever recommend such a thing as advances?—No.

3649. *Mr. Fergusson.*] Can you say what you consider would be a remunerative price for the ryot, say in bundles per rupee?—This is a question which is almost impossible to answer, for we have no means of ascertaining the market price of a crop which has hitherto been grown under a system of small monopolies; the cost of production or material price would be considered in the case of tobacco lands by payments which would bring the price per beegah to rupees 13-6, *i. e.*, supposing the average to be fifteen bundles to one rupee per bundle; this, however, would give the ryot no profit whatever; on rice land this calculation would bring the price per beegah up to rupees 3-14, which would be the actual price of production without a profit, but you must take into consideration in fixing a fair price, the value of other crops which could be produced upon the same land. Why should ryots be made to sow for mere cost of production?

3650. Are you aware that in Rungpore lakhs of bundles of Indigo plant are produced and sold in the best market, not exceeding four bundles per rupee, and that the same takes place in Bancoorah and Beerbhoom?—I have no knowledge of this fact, neither have I any knowledge of the peculiarities of those districts, such as will enable me to account for this.

3651. *President.*] How do you reconcile the fact of advances being made by Government for the cultivation of the poppy and the manufacture of salt, with your opinion, that even under a voluntary system of Indigo cultivation, advances would not be necessary?—With reference to the salt, the explanation is as regards the Cuttack Agency, of which alone I have experience, that the lands on which the salt is made are unfit for any other purpose, and that the only crop which grows any

where in the neighbourhood of these lands is rice ; that the means of communication in that part of the country is so difficult, as almost to exclude these men from the large markets, and their rice is consequently of no great value, therefore they depend almost entirely upon their salt advances, to carry them through that part of the year when there is no rice cultivation going on. Indeed, by their own petitions and by the report of the Commissioner, Mr. A. J. Mills, it appears that without these advances they would starve ; to use the words of their petition " our circumstances are so unfavourable, had we not have been supplied for the last two years with rice for our advances, we should all have starved to death, and not a Molunghee would have survived to manufacture." In an article of excise it is necessary that the supervising officers should have that entire control and power of selection as to the men employed for the manufacture, which could hardly be obtained except under a system of advances. As to opium, judging from the measures which it was necessary to adopt in 1848 and 1850, with a view of decreasing the amount of cultivation, I consider that then or any other time when the profits of opium are as much in advance of the profits of other crops, as they were then, such system of advances would be unnecessary. To check the cultivation which was increasing too rapidly, it was necessary to issue positive restrictions ; and it appears to me, that if these advances had been withheld, there would have been no difficulty in getting opium without advances, since the cultivation was so popular. This is a question, however, the practical details of which I have had no opportunities of studying, and I know nothing of the condition of the people of the opium districts.

3652. Then, we are to understand that you would gladly see advances discontinued whenever possible in any kind of cultivation?—I believe the system to be very injurious, and would gladly see it abolished from every description of cultivation and work.

3653. Mr. *Fergusson*.] Do you believe that the Molunghees would manufacture salt, even at greatly enhanced rates to them ; if advances were withheld, and if compulsion were not used by Government in the same way in which it is said to be done by Indigo Planters?—I never heard of any compulsion being used in the Salt Department, and

I do not believe that in that part of the country which I have had an opportunity of making enquiries, viz. Cuttack, any system of compulsory manufacture exists. In 1845-46 the cost of manufacture and transport at Cuttack had the effect of raising the price of Cuttack salt above the price of salt of other agencies; it was considered desirable to decrease the amount of salt manufactured in that district, but for political reasons and on account of the great discontent which made itself known at the prospect of the cessation of the salt manufacture, the manufacture was continued on the earnest representation of the Commissioner Mr. Mills. It is probable that enhanced rates would bring in to the manufacture a richer class of people having sufficient capital to enable them to work without advances; but the people who now reside in that part of the country are, from local circumstances, so situated that their rice crop alone would not carry them through the year; and great portion of the year they live in a great measure on their advances. I put in a rough form of *kabulyot* for salt advances. No advances are made without proper security being given in the Salt Department.

3654. Do you know that the Indigo planters at Nuddea by supplying rice and making advances for Indigo have saved the people from starvation in 1838, or other years in the same way as it appears to have been done in Cuttack?—I never heard that such was the case, but I can understand that planters, who are also zemindars, would for the sake of keeping their own ryots, naturally expend large sums for this purpose. I can mention native zemindars who have done the same with the same object.

3655. Baboo C. M. Chatterjee.] Is it not the fact that almost every Molunghhee receives *fazil* after the manufacturing is closed?—The amount of the first advances in the Cuttack Agency in 1858-59, was 59,935, and the second advance 46,063, and the *fazil* was rupees 7,350-10-6: there were only outstanding balances at the end of the season of rupees 2,723-15-0, out of rupees 1,13,349-2-6. These outstanding balances were refunded by the Molunghhees themselves during the year.

3656. President.] Have you any knowledge of petitions being presented to the Board of Revenue by the poppy cultivators of Behar

complaining that the Agent would not allow them to cultivate?—I have in my hand a petition presented by eighteen cultivators complaining to the Board that “they have been cruelly deprived of the privilege of opium cultivation on which they and their families have solely depended.” I have also another petition from other ryots to the same effect. These petitions are dated March and June 1851. It has always been one of the most severe modes of punishment in the Opium Department to deprive a ryot of his license to cultivate, for smuggling or other misconduct. This was of course only a punishment so long as opium was a much more profitable crop than it is now; the rise of prices of other crops has made opium now less remunerative, and Government has been compelled to raise the price from rupees 3-4 to 4 per seer.

3657. Baboo *C. M. Chatterjee*.] Do you know that the planters assist the ryots with medicines when they are sick, and with loans when their houses are blown down, and that they establish schools for the education of the ryots' children, and do not the planters construct roads and offer other collateral advantages, which in some measure compensate for the want of direct profit to the ryots?—In the districts in which I have been, I have never seen schools or dispensaries or other establishments erected by planters, but I believe it is the habit of every planter as well as of every Englishman to have a family medicine chest, out of which he no doubt may give an occasional dose to a ryot, but from my knowledge of the ryot I am of opinion that a dose of medicine is considered as anything but a collateral advantage, and I cannot think that any amount of medicine would be considered by them as an equivalent for loss of liberty and money which the Indigo cultivation involves. I have heard that in Mulnath, Nischindipore, and Salgamoodia there are dispensaries kept up by planters, but even these would not compensate the ryots of Moorshebad and Malda for the losses which they sustained by the cultivation of Indigo. I have heard of occasional loans been given, without interest, on the loss of cattle and other accidents of that description, but they are always carried to the ryots' Indigo Account, and I knew of roads having been made by planters between their out-factories, and in such places as without such roads the plant could not have

been brought into the Factory, but I can call to my mind no single instance of a road being constructed for the public good. I have known planters who were useful members of the Ferry Fund Committee.

3658. *President.*] Do you not think the establishment of large Concerns causes a considerable circulation of money in a district?—I do not consider that the establishment of such concerns has the effect of bringing into any district any amount of capital, which would not find its way there, without such concerns. For instance, if a lac of rupees is sent up to carry on an Indigo Concern for one year, the amount which would find its way into the hands of the ryots would be at most 50,000 rupees, supposing every ryot received a full payment of two rupees per beegah, while I believe he seldom ever receives that amount; this would represent a cultivation of 25,000 beegahs, and it would be a sum which would not remunerate for the cost of cultivation. If on the other hand these 25,000 beegahs had been left in the hands of the ryots to produce a crop giving a profit of ten rupees a beegah, the amount brought into the district from the sale of that crop would be two lacs and 50,000 rupees, therefore so far from the Concern having done good by distributing in the district half a lac, it keeps two lacs out of the district, which would have come in, had the ryots had the use of their own lands.

3659. *Mr. Fergusson.*] Are you aware that this particular blue dye is the largest dyeing material used in the world, and one of the largest articles of sea-borne commerce in the world?—I believe it to be so.

3660. Are you aware that four-fifths of the whole of the Indigo produced in the world come from the territories of your late Hon'ble Masters?—I am aware that in the year 1600, Indigo was the main staple by which the E. I. Company made their profits, and that for many years they fostered the trade and made it what it is; but at one period it was found to grow better in the West Indies; and after carrying on the trade for a century, the East India Company gave up Indigo as an article of investment in favor of our West Indian Colonies; but in the West Indies, as now in this country, it was found to be less profitable than other crops, and was given up and again taken up by the East India Company, who having lost £80,000 in the year 1779 by contract, magnanimously made it over to their servants and to private traders.

The East India Agents being unable to advance money to enable the settlers to carry on the trade, the East India Company therefore with a view of fostering and encouraging the cultivation of Indigo in this country, advanced to the Indigo Planters at various times no less than a million of money, and in one year advanced no less than £137,000; it is to their special protection that the present trade in Indigo is to be attributed and not to private capitalists. I derive this information from the East India Company's memorandum on private trade dated 1806, published by order of Parliament.

3661. *President.*] Considering the great importance of the Indigo Trade, can you suggest any changes in the present system so that it should work well between planter and ryot?—The only changes I can suggest are that the trade should be a fair, open, and voluntary trade; and I believe that Indigo would then find its own value in the market as readily as any other article of trade; I believe that if it was left to competition, the plant would soon find its own price, and one which would remunerate both parties; if it cannot do this, then there is something special in the nature of the dye which makes it unsuitable to this country as an agricultural speculation. I certainly cannot recommend any *modification* of the present system, but that it should be entirely done away with, root and branch, and that real protection should be afforded to the ryots, who would then doubtless give it at a remunerative rate, without any necessity of special laws, or illegal compulsion. I do not, however, think that with the memory of the past, they will cultivate it on any terms for some years to come.

3662. Have you any objection to planters holding courts, provided that ryots attend voluntarily?—I believe it to be open to very great abuse, and I believe that a planter cannot help being prejudiced in favour of some ryot to the detriment of the others. But if any two ryots refer any question or dispute to the arbitration of the planter, I should think it would be very desirable that they should do so, but I strongly object to any planter being put in a position to give effect to a decision to which both parties do not agree.

3663. Do you think that the establishment of Indigo factories has the effect of diminishing crimes and felonies, and does it not increase affrays and agrarian outrages?—No; for I have observed that in some

districts where there are no factories whatever, there are comparatively few violent crimes. As regards dacoity, I believe that those who are principally engaged in dacoity, are men who have been brought up as *lattials*, and who first learnt violence and plunder in agrarian outrages ; and I believe that *lattials* are to be found in greater numbers in Indigo districts than in non-Indigo districts. Mr. Ricketts, the late Member of Council, officially expressed a strong opinion, that the establishment of Indigo factories increased rather than decreased violent crimes. In the province of Orissa, in which there are no Indigo concerns, burglary and theft are as constant occurrences as in any district in Bengal, but dacoity and affray are entirely unknown.

3664. *Mr. Fergusson.*] Then, you do not think that the residence of European gentlemen in the interior has improved either the physical or moral condition of the people?—Although I have no doubt, that there are many individuals who have done great good and rendered assistance to the authorities, yet, as a general rule, I do not think the residence of Indigo Planters has improved to any great extent the physical or moral condition of the people. I believe there are to be found more bad characters settled around Indigo factories, than in distant villages in which an European has never been seen. My remarks do not apply either to silk manufactories or rum distillers or Sunderbund settlers : of the latter of whom I had a great many in my district, but against whom I never had a single complaint. I allude only to the Indigo Planters who, as a rule, live in constant antagonism with the people around them—a state of things which cannot conduce to the peace of the country.

3665. *President.*] Have you ever known of cases in which a planter did not enhance rents in a putni or ijara on condition that the ryot should cultivate Indigo?—I believe the ryots always paid the full rents which a planter is legally entitled to collect, even in ijaras in which no special ijardarri fee is taken, but the general rule of planters who hold ijaras, is to collect a special fee of one or two annas per rupee in excess of the legal rents to repay the expense of the farm or the putni, as for instance, Mr. Larmour in my district took an ijardari fee of one-half anna per rupee.

3666. Had you any Missionaries in Baraset, or did the influence of

other Missionaries extend to Baraset?—With the exception of a native preacher in the town of Baraset, and with the exception of a gentleman once passing through the district in a boat, I never saw or heard of a Missionary the whole time I was in Baraset, and I am quite convinced, that no influence direct or indirect has been exercised by any Missionary over the ryots of Baraset.

3667. Do you know a substantial ryot named Amir Biswas of Baraset, who has tobacco lands, and sows Indigo?—I know him very well, he is one of the most influential and respectable ryots in the district of Baraset, he is a *jotedar* with large property.

3668. Mr. *Fergusson*.] Do you think that if you had issued a *parwana* embodying the words of Section XI of Act X, it would have the effect of inducing most ryots to withhold their rents, and what is your opinion as to the withdrawal of that power from the zemindar?—I do not think that if I had issued a *parwana* embodying that Section, that it would have had any such effect upon the ryot. For since the passing of that Act, I have done all in my power to make the ryots acquainted with the provisions of that Act, and when they have complained, I have speedily pointed out Section XI and it has not had the effect of inducing them to withhold their lawful rents. This refers to Cuttack. I was not in Baraset when the Act was brought into operation. I believe that Section is one of the greatest boons that has ever been granted to the ryots during the present century. It rescinds a law which was the main cause of half the oppression, which they as ryots have suffered ever since the date of the permanent settlement?

3669. Have you no doubts as to the effects of the withdrawal of that power from zemindars, and does it not appear to you likely that the consequences may be the forfeiture of many estates from ryots refusing or delaying to pay rents?—No, I apprehend no such results; it leaves in the hands of the zemindars full power to send over to demand the rent, and any other power beyond that with which it could be invested, would have the effect of again reducing the ryots to the practical serfdom in which they were before the passing of that Act. I have consulted several zemindars in Cuttack and elsewhere, who appear to apprehend no difficulty whatever of this description, and moreover since the passing of this Act, it would not appear that the landed property had been at all

depreciated in value: for a few weeks ago, I sold an estate for arrears of revenue, the sudder jumma of it was 814 rupees, and the surplus collections 462 rupees, for no less a sum than 24,000 rupees and this too in a non-permanently settled district. Had there been any such apprehension as that alluded to, no man would have invested his money in this way.

3670. *President.*] Have you ever had any personal difference with any European Planter?—Never of any sort or description, except in connection with the performance of my duties as Magistrate.

3671. Can you state if a new purchaser of a factory pays in full for the outstanding balances in addition to the buildings for the factory?—The Baraset Concern was purchased by Mr. Prestwich for 1,50,000 rupees. The outstanding balances were rupees 1,14,474-2-10, after deducting the value of block, stock, ijaras, and *dena pouna*, the price given for the outstanding Indigo balance must have been little more than nominal.

WHO SHALL BE THE NEXT GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA ?

A LETTER
TO THE
RIGHT HON. LORD PALMERSTON, M.P.,
FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY.

BY
ONE WHO HAS A STAKE IN THE COUNTRY.



LONDON:
LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, LONGMANS, & ROBERTS.

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TO THE
RIGHT HON. LORD PALMERSTON, M.P.,
FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY.

MY LORD,

In the course of official duty your Lordship, before long, will be called upon to advise the Crown in a matter closely affecting the strength and credit of the Empire.

Who shall succeed Lord Canning?

This is a question which the public will not now with indifference stand by to see answered as chance may turn. A few years ago it would have been regarded as chiefly interesting the East India Company, and the Candidates for a rich appointment. To day we all feel that it is a question for our firesides and counting-houses. A jangle of alarums and tocsins, clashing long in a dark stormy night-time, has left us painfully awake. We feel that India belongs to us ; a piece of fruitful and splendid, but disputed property :—we all feel it, most of us strongly, many sensitively, not a few, nervously.

The difference between trusting the reins of our grand Eastern Dominion to the amateur hand of

some respectable nobleman, and placing them in the mastering grasp of an ascertained ruler, seems to us now, a momentous one, pregnant with many differences:—to the Queen, that between struggling for the integrity of her dominions, and blessing with peace and good government more Asiatics than the united subjects of the other four great powers would sum up; to the Cabinet, that between national agonies, and ordinary state cares; to the Finances, that between drains, and replenishments; to Commerce, that between advancement into Markets practically unlimited, and disastrous checks; to the Church, that between the quiet progress of her Missions, and devastation of their fairest fields; and to the Families of England, that between security and insecurity for the living of brothers, the honour of sisters, the lives of nephews and grandchildren, the half-yearly dividends. Few families now but have some direct interest in India; for railways, canals, loans, the increase of the army, and the opening prospects of European adventure, have greatly increased our pecuniary and domestic relations with it in the last few years.

All plants bear fruit after their kind: one rebellion sows the soil with seeds of other rebellions, one mutiny with those of other mutinies, one animosity with those of other animosities. At this moment the sub-soil of Hindu population is thick-sown with seeds of rebellion, and the surface soil of European society, with those of animosity. These will not be detected by an unpractised eye, or kept down by an unskilled

hand. Besides, from village police up to state finances, all departments of Government have to be re-organized, and provision made for new and complex relations between English capital and native labour, between inexperienced settlers and jealous proprietors. The future is full of opportunities for a practised and masterly ruler; full of traps and pitfalls for one who does not know the ground. It is no time for unproved hands; no time for experimenting in the Viceroyalty, for building on hopes that Lord so and so, or the Duke so and so, may turn out a good Governor General.

The two communities, native and European, feel that solemn, not to say sacred, obligations bind those whose momentous trust it is at this moment to select a ruler for the greatest dependency held by any nation in the world, to put aside all ordinary modes of choice, and before persons are thought of, to mark down qualifications.

The new Governor General *must not be an ordinary man*. In ordinary times ordinary men may get through tolerably well (yet, we ought to know that ordinary times often, of a sudden, turn into extraordinary ones); but the present is a time of extraordinary difficulties, extraordinary anxieties, extraordinary conflicts, extraordinary enterprises, extraordinary recollections, extraordinary hopes and fears: it imperatively demands an extraordinary man.

He must not be *an inexperienced man*. Here is a point on which we of the public fear much; we

hear it said, we suspect it, we sometimes think that we see tokens of it, that professional politicians fancy themselves trained into such catholic aptitude, that, after a little special study, they are equal to any post in the world. My Lord, we do not believe it. We are often justly proud of the general knowledge and variously applicable power of our statesmen; but those of us who happen to have special knowledge on given points and interests of the empire, are often amazed, and sometimes amused, at the slenderness of information which suffices for discussions that are read by Empires, for posts that kings might be proud to fill.

Ability to make a speech on an Indian question that will pass in the House of Lords, is no proof of more knowledge than a clever man may gain easily, and exhibit fluently. The peer who knows rather more and speaks rather better on India than his neighbours, may yet know so little, that for the first two years in the country every native official would believe that he knew nothing, and every European one that he knew next to nothing; and thus his influence, whatever it might eventually become, would go at first to make all the officials feel the absence of that restraint to the bad, and that encouragement to the good, which would result from the belief that they had a Head who was acquainted with his business: would go, in fact, to reduce the value of every person in place, higher or lower.

The supposed facility of adaptation to such a post

is—pardon, my Lord, plain words—the result of ignorance. Will any statesman act upon it in a sphere that he understands? I put it to every public man in England, whether, if tomorrow it became necessary to appoint an ambassador to Paris, any of them would advise sending one who had never been in France in his life, and had never served in a diplomatic capacity. Members of your Lordship's cabinet would not propose a novice for Paris, because they know something of the post; but they would propose to send to Calcutta a man who never saw India, and to confide the Government of a people twofold that of all the Russias to a man who had never governed. My Lord, that bark is not one to intrust to a pilot who never steered; nor is it now sailing on waters where amateurs should command: think of all the lives and property on board!

Politicians are owned by the public as statesmen when they show themselves able to select, from the tried, the man for a great emergency: statesmen sink to the repute of politicians when they gift members of their own circle with great offices for which their fitness has never been proved.

“He may prove a first-rate Governor; I believe he will.” This is much to say in selecting for a post where disappointment would bring only small evils, or miss only small opportunities; but it is little to say in one where a failure may bring fatal convulsions, and let slip imperial advantages. The public will not rest under the hopeful, “He *may* prove a good Governor:”

it will require,—and justly or unjustly?—the surer testimony, He *has* proved a good Governor.

The first need of the Indian Government is a general elevation of the quality of public servants, native and European. As the appointment of one whose known inexperience would comfort the careless and discourage the able, would be a serious damage ; so that of one whose name would make every bad or indifferent official feel that he had a master, every able and good one that he had a patron, would, by its influence in raising the tone of all public officers, do a service to the state, even before the new Viceroy took the reins, greater than a man who went to prove whether he could govern or not, could possibly render in two or three years.

The new Governor General must be an *extraordinary man, with Indian experience.*

These two requirements are essential. An ordinary man with local experience might be the worst of choices ; an extraordinary man without it would have greater chances both of benefiting and imperilling the State. We may be unjust, but, my Lord, it is to be said plainly, that we common people out of doors, do not feel secure from having ordinary men, without Indian experience, forced upon your attention by some members of your cabinet. Surely all such recommendations will fall before the plain questions : Is he an extraordinary man ? Has he Indian experience ?

He must not be a man who has never Governed.

I am far from imagining that all kinds of Indian experience fit men for the high post in question. Official duty in some department at a Presidency, may be a better preparation, and probably is, than similar duty in a department in Downing Street. But it is a very uncertain qualification. It is not experience in administering a fully organised department that is in point; but experience in actually governing,—governing, with great stakes to play, great interests to reconcile, great complications to unravel, great crises to outride, great cares of state to support, great trials to convert into triumphs. Other experience than this will go for little with us who have our money, friends, or other interests affected by the choice; and ought it ever to weigh in appointments of such immeasurable responsibility?

“The Governor General must be a Peer.” By all means, if one be found with the needful qualifications; but if a better man be found outside the Peerage than in it, that order which, with all Englishmen who deserve the name, I desire to see perpetually flourish, will be more strengthened and adorned by lifting into Viceroyalty the fittest man, though a commoner, than by passing over the fittest man, to place infinite trusts in untried though noble hands.

It would be to the hurt of the Peerage, and of that public confidence in statesmen, which in our country is the breath of life to Governments, did a shadow of doubt cross the public mind that the appointment was given to a poor Lord, or

Duke, with a view to help in repairing diminished fortunes.

Nor must party considerations weigh a feather's weight. That party strengthens itself most which selects best, whether from friendly or opposing ranks. Lord Stanley justly won strength in the country by the choice he made for the post of Governor of Madras ; and the circumstance that Sir Charles Trevelyan, by his excessive zeal for what he believed to be public interests, deprived the public service of the benefit of his great knowledge and talents, does not at all abate the merit of the fact, or lessen its impression upon the public memory, that Lord Stanley took the man whose antecedents gave the best pledge of fitness, though not of his party. And does not Sir Charles's case add great weight to what has just been insisted upon—the need of previous experience in actually governing ? Who can doubt that had he before ever carried the burdens of a great country, he would have learned to reconcile strong personal protests with public co-operation ? Who can help feeling that only actual government can test what a man will do in the crises by which the vicissitudes of a huge empire are sure to try him ?

He must not be chosen by official preference running against well-earned reputation. It is the besetment of men in office, when only ordinary men, such as too generally are at the head of departments, to think that reputation, which they cannot manage to get, is a fallacious index of public

qualities. As a rule, men without a reputation pass by men with one, if they can and dare. Great men are safe under great men, but suffer under small ones. In the Crimean War, England twice had to seek a Commander-in-Chief; twice was the appointment made by official preference against reputation, and twice had the nation to blush. In the heat of the Sepoy Rebellion it became necessary to send out a Commander-in-Chief; well-earned reputation carried the appointment, and England added to her glories. It is not men like your Lordship, whose own position assures them that reputation, in a nation like ours, is not lightly won, nor lightly sustained, from whom we have to fear. But we do fear that respectable gentlemen, to whom we all give credit for making the best use of the gifts they have received, and who owe the headship of departments to your Lordship's patronage, or to family power, or to party ties, quite unconscious of the very small place they hold in the eye of the nation, and conscious of the large one they hold in its executive, may deem their own discernment so much superior to that of the public, that they may make it a point of honour to stand by their preferences, regardless of all out-door opinion.

If reputation does not disprove fitness, it does secure power. In a General, it increases the value of every battalion; in a Secretary of State, the efficiency of every office; in a Governor-General, the value of every soldier, policeman, and civilian. It is the mul-

tiplying lever of the governing forces, and he who throws it away deserves never to enjoy it.

Before any man is named at such a crisis as this, for the most prodigious trust the Cabinet has to confide, surely the points constituting qualification will be noted down, so much value set upon each, and men judged accordingly.

Party should count nothing ;

Nobility, nothing ;

Hopes and impressions that he will turn out a good Governor, nothing ;

Fluency in the Lords, nothing ;

A place in the Cabinet, nothing ;

Extraordinary ruling talent, Indian experience, success in governing, and reputation, each should count much. When these are put together, who is the man who unites them to the greatest degree in his own person ?

I do not pretend dogmatically to answer this question ; but I do feel that it is the question to put. Fuller knowledge of public men and public affairs than I can pretend to, may bring names to mind which would not rise before mine ; and what I feel sure of for myself, I feel equally sure of for the public, that if the name chosen by the Cabinet, though it may not be the one to which we should originally have looked, should prove to attach to itself the weightiest evidence of governing talent, Indian experience, success in actual rule, and well earned reputation, it will be cordially hailed, and will increase the nation's pride

in your Lordship, and your Lordship's marvellous influence over the nation.

Is there any man who meets these postulates? Any one whom all men who know him call, and cannot help calling, a Governor, made to do great works as a Governor? Any man who knows India, not by a quiet office life, but by various experience and vicissitude? Any man who has had to rule large and troubled regions, to tame fierce races, to balance delicate sensibilities, to pilot his country's cause through thick shoals and thundering surfs, and brought it happily to land? Any man whom India knows as a match for all England's foemen, as a tower of strength for all her defenders, and whom England knows as a guarantee of strong government and internal tranquillity for India?

Again I repeat, that my knowledge does not justify me in saying that there may not be two such men; but every sepoy in India, and every Indian fundholder or railway shareholder in England, can tell you there is one, SIR JOHN LAWRENCE.

He is not a peer. I know not of what party he is. He is not of "the families." He never was Postmaster General. He does not speak in Parliament; and at a dinner table, some of your Lordship's colleagues, who are well enough liked in the country, in their own small sphere, would display more Indian lore than he. But, my Lord, we common folk have, deep down in our hearts, one remembrance,—He saved India.

Doubtless, your Lordship has heard from some "old Indian" the question and answer, "Who saved India? The Sepoys—by breaking the telegraphic wires, and setting John Lawrence free, so that for five months he did not receive an order from Calcutta."

This is, perhaps, not just to Calcutta, but it expresses a deep feeling, that the critical battle was fought and won in that tract of India which was cut off, by a wide ocean of insurrection, from any reserves, counsels, or supplies; utterly cast upon the hands of one ruler, and of his memorable helpers from Peshawur to Delhi. I am far from wishing to blame Calcutta. Rather let us believe that all was there done which could be expected. But Calcutta had for its frontier the sea, an English Governor's unfailing reserve; Lahore, the boisterous hills of Affghanistan. Calcutta had for its home population our old and incomparably docile subjects the Bengalees; Lahore, the newly conquered fiery Sikhs. Calcutta had for reinforcement troops from Persia, Madras, China, the Cape, and, finally, England; Lahore had what tribes and Sikhs it could raise. Calcutta had months of respite before actual conflict came within hundreds of miles; Lahore was at once committed to mortal struggles with the main body of the rebellion. Calcutta had for exchequer the resources of the Empire; Lahore, the personal influence of a provincial Governor, not even called a Governor.

A vast tract of rebel ground isolated one from the

other so completely, that the Baltic and Black Sea fleets in the late war were not more separate; for not a man, a rupee, or a message, could Sir John Lawrence receive from England, China, Calcutta, or Madras: yet it was from his section of the country that the British Flag first emerged triumphant, with the safety of the Punjab assured, Delhi conquered, the vast region which severed the two armies victoriously overrun, and gigantic forces organized to complete the triumph. Calcutta, doubtless, did well; but if so, what were the deeds of Lahore!

My Lord, where a man is to be found who has governed in circumstances so exceptional, with results that made his country proud, any other man who may take the place for which most persons outside of official circles regard him as the Governor designated by his own deeds, will perhaps be enviable in point of fortune, but not in point of reputation.

Permit me one word more: In this great national election, in which the pride of your Queen, the standing of your country, and the happiness of two hundred millions of strangers are engaged,* remember that Lord Palmerston holds a place in the confidence of England far transcending what any of his colleagues, enjoy. Consult, my Lord, most of all, your own English instincts—those genuine national instincts which make you one with us and make us feel safe

* The Government returns and estimates, as yet, account only for One hundred and eighty millions in India, but there are not less than Two hundred millions.

with you, which are the secret of your strength, and the faintness of which, in proportion to their intellectual powers, is the secret of the comparative weakness of some able statesmen, both on your own and the opposite side of the House. This is a question on which the nation has a right to expect its First Minister to assume a special responsibility. By the coming appointment an empire may be made or marred.

It is hard to conceive of a graver duty, than to select, and set forth before the two countries, the man on whose head every eye in England and India will shed a ray of responsibility! And hard to conceive a deeper satisfaction than would result from the consciousness: "I have done the best that human knowledge pointed out to secure to two hundred millions of human beings the blessings of good government, and to give them an opportunity of new and fruitful developments."

My own connection with India has long ceased; I have neither kith nor kin there whose fortunes the frown or smile of a Governor General could affect; I have no interest in Sir John Lawrence beyond what every Briton has, and never was associated with him in service: but I have interests in the country, and for many years it has been my close study, and the happiness of its people my dearest object. May the Great Ruler guide your Lordship in a choice whereon depends the welfare of so large a number of His creatures!

OUR INDIAN ARMY.

MINUTE

OF THE HON.

LIEUT.-GEN. SIR JAMES OUTRAM,

BART., G.C.B.,

PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF INDIA,

IN

OPPOSITION TO THE PROPOSED AMALGAMATION

OF THE

EUROPEAN AND NATIVE FORCES.

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AMALGAMATION OF HER MAJESTY'S INDIAN FORCES WITH THE BRITISH ARMY,

MINUTE

BY THE

HON. LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR J. OUTRAM, BART., G.C.B.,

PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF INDIA.

THE information lately received from England, though not of a strictly official nature, leads me to apprehend that the amalgamation of Her Majesty's Indian Forces with the British Army is almost decided on.

2. Believing, as I do, that that measure, if carried out, will prove most injurious to this country, and that it will inflict grievous injustice on the servants of the East India Company, I have deemed it my duty to record a solemn protest against its adoption.

3. That my protest will influence the issue, I do not venture to hope; but for the ease of my conscience, I am desirous that it should be sent home while yet the question is under discussion.

4. The information received by the last few Mails, leads me to infer that public opinion in England, which at one time preponderated in favour of the maintenance of a local European Force in India, has begun to manifest an opposite tendency, and the explanation given of this change of sentiment is the so-called "Mutiny" of a portion of the European Troops who enlisted for the East India Company.

5. To cite the recent partial breaking up of the late East India Company's European Troops as an argument against the maintenance of a Local European Force in India, appears to me illogical, ungenerous—I had almost said disingenuous.

6. Addressing those who are conversant with all the facts of the case, I require not to point out the absurd and cruel exaggerations that have been propagated in reference to the conduct of our European remonstrants. These, however, have doubtless had considerable influence in effecting the change said to have recently taken place in the public mind of England on the question of the maintenance of a Local Army, and it is to be hoped that they will be most fully exposed by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, when the question comes to be discussed in Parliament, so that no Member of either House may give a vote to the prejudice of the existing institutions of India, under erroneous impressions regarding the language and the acts of those soldiers who have recently obtained their discharge.

7. But even had the behaviour of these men not been exaggerated, and all the fables related of them been true, common justice and common sense demand that the circumstances under which the men acted should be fairly represented to Parliament, and considerably reviewed by that august body.

8. That our soldiers had any legal right to the alternative of discharge or re-enlistment, I do not admit: that they had no such right has been authoritatively determined by the Law Officers of the Crown, and I myself do not allow that their claims possessed any very cogent moral validity. But it must be borne in mind that Counsel learned in the law have expressed opinions at variance with those of the Law Officers of the Crown; that in the opinion of a very large proportion of the public, both in this country and in England, their moral claims to the alternative demanded by them were so strong as almost to be irresistible; that long before their demand was mooted, while yet the transference of India to the direct management of the Crown was under discussion, the Nobleman who is now at the head of Her Majesty's Government enunciated, *as an obvious truism admitting of no doubt*, the proposition that, as a matter of course, the men would be offered the alternative of discharge or re-enlistment.

9. When the transfer was being carried out, Lord Palmerston had become Prime Minister. No hint was given that he had ceased to regard the late Company's European Troops as entitled to that alternative of discharge or re-enlistment which a few short months before he had represented to be their absolute moral right. It was simply intimated to the soldiers that the alternative would not be offered them, and, for justification of the refusal, they were referred to the opinions

of the Law Officers of the Crown, according to whose dictum the men could not enforce their claims at law.

10. Bear in mind how unspeakably great had been our recent obligations to the European Troops of the East India Company, as well as to their glorious comrades of the Royal Army, who had cheerfully laid down their lives to save an Empire that then appeared tottering to its fall. Think of the marvellous deeds of valour they had just performed, of the privations and hardships they had endured, and of the (to them) heavy losses which many of them had sustained beyond the destruction of that *kit* for which alone they could hope to obtain compensation. Remember that the Press had long teemed with denunciations of the Government on the ground that we were cruelly negligent of the claims of our own countrymen, while, as was alleged, we were needlessly caressing and enriching Natives who had but scant claims on our consideration. Recollect that for years past a painful conviction had pervaded the army that the Government had not behaved fairly to it in the matter of Prize—a conviction which led to the destruction, in Lucknow alone, of property to the extent of many tens of thousands of pounds; to the destruction, indeed, of all tangible property which could not be appropriated by the captors, who (and the men were not Company's soldiers) declared that "Government should make nothing by it." Keeping all these facts in view, let us place ourselves in the position of the Company's European soldiers, when informed that, owing to financial difficulties arising out of that mutiny which they had so zealously and successfully aided in subduing, they were—on what they regarded as a lawyer's quibble—to be deprived of that re-enlistment (with the bounty which re-enlistment implied) to which the Prime Minister of England had declared them fully entitled. And doing this, we must admit that some allowance should be made for their conduct.

11. But even were it otherwise, even had the conduct of a portion of the late East India Company's Troops been as bad as their bitterest enemies and most unscrupulous detractors would dare to paint it, even were there no extenuating considerations to urge in their behalf, what then? It was not because they were a *Local Force* that they misconducted themselves, but because they conceived themselves to have been treated with deliberate injustice and contumely. And will any advocate of amalgamation venture to insinuate that had Her Majesty's Regiments in India conceived themselves treated in the same fashion, they would not have behaved in precisely the same manner? Will any amalgamationist have the hardihood to maintain that—aye, even

within a comparatively recent period—soldiers and sailors of Her Majesty's service have not in more than one instance evinced very manifest symptoms of insubordination under a sense of neglect and injury? If so, then I take the liberty to declare that his information is decidedly imperfect, or his memory very treacherous.

12. It is simply impossible that were a Local Army maintained in India, the questions mooted by the late East India Company's Troops could ever again come under discussion, and it were easy so to frame, in future, the terms of enlistment for a Local Indian Force, that no questions of jurisdiction or of the nature or sphere of their duties should ever again occur. It is difficult to conceive that any circumstances could hereafter arise to produce disaffection in a Local Force which would not as easily arise amongst the Line Regiments of India, were India to be garrisoned by Line Regiments alone. And as it stands to reason that, were circumstances to arise calculated to excite disaffection amongst the European Soldiers of India, the area of the disaffection could be best limited, and its inconveniences best averted, by our having *two forces* in the country differing so far from each other in conditions of Service, and in traditions, as to give each a distinctive *esprit de corps*.

13. So far, then, from considering the recent occurrences in India as furnishing an argument against the maintenance of a Local European Force, I conceive that, candidly viewed and logically applied, they supply a very valid argument in favour of such an arrangement.

14. The other arguments adduced by the advocates of "Amalgamation," so far as I understand them, may be reduced to the following heads:—

- (1.) A double force is an anomaly.
- (2.) The efficiency of a Local Army must necessarily be inferior to that of a similar force borrowed from the Royal Army.
- (3.) The Local Force would be socially inferior to the Line Troops serving with them.
- (4.) It is desirable to give the whole of the Royal Army frequent opportunities of acquiring that familiarity with foreign and active service which can only be obtained in India.

15. To the first of these arguments, if it deserves the name, it has been well and sufficiently replied by the *Times* newspaper, that our British Empire in the East is an "anomaly," and that perilous indeed

is the position of that Empire if its legislation is to proceed on the principle of removing "anomalies."

16. To the second, it ought to be enough to reply that no one whose extensive experience in India, and whose successful Command of Troops in the Field, renders him an authority on the subject, has admitted the inferiority of the Company's European Troops to those of the Line, while many Officers of the Royal Army, dealing dispassionately with the subject, having borne generous and hearty support in an opposite sense. I feel assured that, even despite the natural disinclination of Officers of the Royal Army to hint an opinion not in favour at the Horse Guards—were an appeal now made to the whole of the Royal Regiments that served with Lord Clyde, they would, with one voice, declare that the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, and the 1st Madras Fusiliers, were in no single respect inferior to the most distinguished of the Royal Regiments serving with them, whether as regards bravery, discipline, internal economy, or steadiness and precision of manœuvre. And these Regiments lay no claim to higher Military efficiency than that possessed by other European Regiments of the late East India Company. And I believe that every Officer of the Royal Army, who has ever served with the Artillery of the late Company's Army, will testify to its being at least equal in efficiency to the Royal Artillery.

17. If there be any inferiority in the internal economy of the Local as compared with the Line Regiments, it must be attributed to other causes than to the fact of the Force being a Local one. The Horse Guards must bear a fair share of the blame, for none but Officers of the Royal Army, with the solitary exception of Sir P. Grant, have ever been entrusted with Command-in-Chief. Of Divisional Generalships, and Brigade Commands, the Royal Army has always had its fair share—the same regulations have been in force in both armies, and all recent Military history, and the testimony of all competent Military Judges, go to prove that if there is any difference in the special qualifications of the Staff Officers of all branches, the inferiority is not on the side of the Local Officers.

18. Why, then, it may be asked, should a Local service which produces Engineers and Artillery of all grades, and every class of Staff Officers, quite equal if not superior to those of the Royal Army, not be able to produce Infantry as highly disciplined as that of the Royal Army? If the fact of inferiority of discipline be, as asserted by the opponents of a Local Force, the cause must be sought elsewhere than

in the circumstance of localisation, which ought to affect Engineers, Artillery, and Staff, even more than it would Infantry; but as it does not so affect those branches of the Army, we must clearly seek for some other cause.

19. I believe that the practice of appointing the Lieutenant-Colonel of a Local European Regiment by seniority, without special regard to his fitness; of transferring him from Regiment to Regiment so as to prevent his ever being identified with the Corps he commands; and of abstracting all the best Officers and Men for Staff situations, would alone account for a much greater difference of internal discipline than is alleged to exist—and the only wonder is that any discipline at all is maintained.

20. I feel certain that any Officer of experience in Her Majesty's Line Regiments would pronounce it hopeless to preserve discipline where such causes were at work to impair it. But not one of them is in the most remote degree connected with the local character of the Army—they might one and all be removed to-morrow without amalgamation, and their removal ought to be tried not for a few months, but for a period sufficient to produce an effect on the discipline of every Regiment, before we resort to the desperate remedy of annihilating the Local Army under pretence of improving its discipline.

21. But it is alleged by the advocates of amalgamation, when occasion requires their ground to be shifted, that there is something in continued length of service in India which tends to destroy the efficiency and to relax discipline; that this is conspicuous even in Queen's Regiments that have served long in India, and that, *a fortiori*, it must be so in permanent Local corps. Now I am prepared to maintain—and if my opinion be questioned, the Regiments can be measured, weighed, and tested by various gymnastic exercises—that, corps for corps, a Company's European Regiment will turn out as great an amount of healthy thew and sinew, and present as few instances of worn-out men, as any average Royal corps that has served ten years in India. And what, for all practical purposes of efficiency, is a Queen's Regiment that has been ten or fifteen years in India better than a Local corps? with this disadvantage in the former, moreover, that many of the men have come out at an advanced period of life, and are therefore less qualified to stand the climate. In Local as in Line, in Line as in Local corps, men die, are invalided Home, or obtain their discharge; and their places are supplied by fresh recruits from England. If any difference exists between the two at any given time, the advantage is with the Local corps, for the reasons above stated.

22. But were it otherwise, with whom would the blame rest? I answer, with the Horse Guards;—for I have been informed by a Medical officer of the Warley Depôt, that he and his seniors were reprimanded for their extreme care in the selection of recruits! Men passed by Queen's Staff Surgeons in the districts, and sent up to Warley, were disproved of by the Warley officers, and rejected on the ground of deficient vital and muscular strength; sometimes for presenting traces of incipient visceral disease. But a Horse Guards' Memorandum stringently prohibited all rejections, unless the Recruit had contracted his defects subsequent to the first Medical examination, or unless some very glaring defect had escaped the notice of the District Staff Surgeon. I believe that a reference to the various Medical Board Offices of India, the India House, and Warley, would bring to light many prominent cases of this kind. Whether the remark was made officially or not I am not in a position to state, but I know that the late General Hax, the Commandant at Warley, was told that the Horse Guards could not allow the Indian Establishments to pick and choose all the best men.

23. I, of course, assume that, were a Local Army allowed to India, earnest endeavours would be made to ensure its success. I assume that, instead of being reprimanded for excessive care in the selection of Recruits, the Recruiting Medical Officers of the Local Force would be ordered to exercise excessive vigilance, so that, while the requisite number of Recruits were obtained, the greatest possible maximum of vigour should be secured.

24. By the adoption of a scheme prepared some time ago, and of which a rude draft forms Appendix A to this Minute, we should secure for our Local Force a body of men every way superior in *physique, intellectuelle, and morale*, to the average of those in the Royal Army; and we should, moreover, maintain them in a state of discipline and vigour far beyond what has ever been achieved even in the Royal Service. Supplement that scheme by the adoption, entire or partial, of Colonel Eyre's plan of Indian Garrison Battalions, and the Local Army of India—provided our Divisional Generals and Commanders-in-Chief did their duty—would be superior to any troops in the world.

25. I have treated of the alleged inferiority of efficiency in a Local Force, as though the efficiency of an Army depended only on that of its Battalions; but I would respectfully, but earnestly, venture to express a very decided opinion that the Departments of the Indian

Army—that portion of the Army which has practically been removed from the control of the Horse Guards—are, to say the least of it, equal to those of the Royal Army. Contrast the performance of the Bengal Commissariat during the mutinies, when the whole Empire was in a state of dislocation, with those of the Royal Commissariat in the Crimea, when all the resources of Britain were being applied to the use of the Army under the eager gaze and daily comments of the British nation, and where a land transport of only seven miles was demanded of the Department! The Royal Commissariat is a beautiful machine, scientifically constructed, and ingeniously put together, yet how lamentably did it break down. The Indian Commissariat is a seemingly cumbrous conglomeration of “anomalies,” yet how gloriously has it worked in practice. Take again our Quartermaster-General’s Department, or our Intelligence (which is practically a diplomatic) Department, and say whether they do not contrast favourably with those of the Royal Service. And then let the advocates of amalgamation seriously consider how much of the efficiency of those Military Departments, on whose efficiency the success of an Army in the Field must depend, is due to the fact that they are guided and presided over by men whose ambition, from their boyhood upwards, it has been to know the native character, languages, usages, and habits of thought, and who have mingled freely with their Native fellow-subjects in social intercourse and in field sports. The tact and skill they bring to bear on their departmental duties, is the result of years of plodding labour, and unobtrusive devotion to a class of pursuits for which the officers of Queen’s Corps have rarely shown any inclination. And whether, in the event of amalgamation, the same class of men (not one in a hundred of whom possesses Horse Guards’ or Parliamentary interest) is likely to be sought out and promoted by the Horse Guards authorities, is a question which any man may decide for himself, according to his knowledge of human nature, and of the mode in which such things are and always have been managed here and in England.

26. Here, as everywhere else in the world, unworthy and unfit men are sometimes to be found in situations which, like those on the Staff, ought to be posts of selection. But no competent judge has ever denied that the average proportion of such men on the Staff of the Local Indian Army is singularly small; that the proportion of highly qualified and competent Staff Officers is as great, if not greater, than in any army in Europe, and greater than in the British Royal Army in time of peace; and that there is no Officer in the Local Army who is really eminently fit for Staff employ, who is not known, and sure sooner or

later to be employed without any special recommendations beyond his own personal fitness. I assert, as the result of many years of close observation and personal knowledge, that it is difficult to find any Officer of the Local Army who is known to his regimental comrades as eminently qualified for Staff employ, who has not had a chance of getting on the Staff. If such an Officer remains with his regiment, it is because he prefers, as many do, regimental duty, or is debarred by some infirmity well known to his comrades from availing himself of the chances otherwise open to him.

27. How different is the case in Her Majesty's Line Regiments, is well known to every one who is acquainted with the individual characters of the Officers of any one Corps, for I hardly know a Regiment which would not furnish an instance of an Officer eminently qualified for Staff employ, and against whom no objection whatever could be alleged, who was yet well aware that he must go through the service without a chance of Staff employment.

28. This, of course, would not be an objection, if such men were not selected simply because worthier than they had already been taken for Staff employ. But this is notoriously not the case. It is not pretended that the Staff of Her Majesty's Army in England are generally chosen for their absolute superiority to all other candidates; all that can be possibly alleged is that they are not incompetent for the several duties to which they have been appointed through interest.

29. It is this which makes the fundamental difference of the two systems. Selection of some sort there must be, and the general motive which influences the selection may, for want of a better word, be called "interest." But in the Indian Army, a man can and does create interest for himself, and superior fitness for Staff employ always has and does create it for him. But such is not the case in England. Influences, family, personal, or political—all quite irrespective of professional qualifications—have more to do with the selection than simple claims of professional merit, or if the latter be recognised, it is in consequence of some unusual departure from established custom, not, as in the Indian Army, a natural and inevitable result of the system.

30. I leave it to any one who is practically acquainted with both systems to decide what are likely to be the results to our Indian Staff, if Officers are selected not, as at present, frequently, if not habitually, from being the best men for the work required, but simply because they have personal, Parliamentary, or family interest at the Horse

Guards, have passed certain examinations, and cannot be said to be incompetent, their "interest" lying entirely in England, instead of being entirely created in this country.

31. The third argument urged by the advocates of amalgamation, viz., that a Local Force would occupy a social position inferior to that held by the Line Troops, is utterly undeserving of attention. Such could only occur by an inversion of the order of things which common sense and common justice would dictate in the event of a Local Force being maintained. If we *are* to have a Local Force, the Officers of that Force must have the same numerical preponderance over the Officers of the Royal Army that they ever had; and this preponderance being maintained, there would be no greater social inferiority than has from time immemorial existed with reference to the Company's Army. Under the system advocated by the supporters of a Local Army, the number of Line Regiments in India would continue to be just what they were prior to the mutinies. Whatever amount of Military Force beyond this was required for the control and defence of India, would be furnished by a Local Army, the relative proportion of whose European and Native elements would from time to time be determined by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. Hereafter, doubtless, as heretofore, Officers newly arrived in India, with little experience of any but the surface of Society in England or elsewhere, will occasionally be silly enough to affect contempt for the Officers of the Indian Local Army, for their families, society, and employments, and will, perhaps, use the same terms of contempt in speaking of them as we have heard in times gone by. It is not to be expected, or wished if it could be expected, that our Indian Officers should assimilate exactly, even in the externals, to those who live under different conditions, in a society where differences of fortune and rank are far greater and more artificial than in India; and we may well reconcile ourselves to the impossibility, by a consideration of the substantial advantages which service in India can confer—just as the country gentleman in England can smile at the pity with which his pursuits and amusements are regarded by his London cousin. Hereafter as heretofore Officers of Her Majesty's Royal Army who remain long in India, and whose good opinion is worth having, will not fail to recognise the many intrinsic excellences of the Local Service and of all connected with it, and there is little fear that as the members of that service become better known to their countrymen at home, the interest in, and appreciation of their services, lately felt by the Sovereign and people of England, will in any degree diminish, and more than this we need hardly desire.

32. But the bare supposition of such a thing is absurd; and by the adoption of the suggestions contained in Appendix B of this Minute, the officers of the Local Force would be placed in a position which would enable them proudly to challenge social rank with any officers of any Army in the world.

33. The fourth argument adduced by the advocates of amalgamation is based on the alleged desirableness of giving to Her Majesty's Regiments the advantage of a more extensive acquaintance with the Field, experience which is only or mainly to be acquired in India. What is this but an admission that Indian Regiments are in a better marching and fighting order than regiments serving at Home or in the other colonies; and on the amalgamationists does it devolve to reconcile this, their fundamental premise, with the alleged inferiority of Indian Local corps and of corps of the Line that have long served in India. But granting, as I readily do, that for all the purposes of real soldiership—for marching, bivouacking, roughing it in the field, and fighting—Indian Regiments are superior to those that have not had the like experience of the real and distinctive elements of military life, I cannot admit either the policy or the equity of upsetting the military system under which India was gained and has been maintained—dealing a grievous blow at our Eastern Empire—imposing vast burdens on our Eastern Native fellow-subjects—and inflicting cruel wrong on six thousand English gentlemen, who have well acquitted themselves of their duties, though unfortunately they have but little aristocratic interest, and no Parliamentary or Press influence, simply that an increased number of the regiments of Her Majesty's Line may acquire a greater practical knowledge of their profession.

34. If the real objects of the proposed amalgamation be merely to give Indian experience to a greater number of Royal regiments, let the twenty-four corps of the Line and four regiments of Cavalry which before the mutinies were found sufficient to supplement the Local Force, be relieved every ten, every seven, or if need be, every five, years, the Imperial Treasury bearing the additional cost. By such an arrangement the professed object of the Horse Guards would be effectually secured; their Regiments would be saved that deterioration which the advocates of amalgamation represent is inseparable from long service in India; and there would be less risk of the regular recurrence of that phenomenon to which we have so long been accustomed—the retirement from Corps ordered on Indian Service of the great majority of those Officers who can afford, by paying for exchange into Home stationed Regiments, to avoid acquiring that practical experience of

the rough realities of a soldier's life which their Military superiors deem of such importance.

35. True, the cost of these frequent reliefs would be considerable; but it would be considerably less to India than that which would result from maintaining a Force of some sixty, seventy, or eighty Line Regiments, and a proportional Force of Artillery, Engineers, Sappers and Miners, to be relieved every fifteen or twenty years. And, amalgamation once conceded, I feel confident that more frequent reliefs of the whole Force would speedily be demanded.

36. But more than this—unless India is to be denuded, in times of European trouble, of a large portion of the sixty, seventy, or eighty Regiments for the maintenance of which the people of India will be taxed, or unless these Regiments are, as I have hinted, to be favoured with such frequent reliefs as would add vastly to the financial burdens of India—there would absolutely be fewer India-seasoned Regiments at any one time in Britain and the other Colonies, than could be secured by retaining the Line Contingent supplied to India at its average strength of twenty-four Regiments, and granting its decennial or septennial reliefs.

37. I have, I think, considered every one of the pleas urged by the advocates of amalgamation. The first, I feel assured, is too exclusively a doctrinaire one to find weight with the practical people of England, whose entire constitution and public life is a series of "anomalies," but of anomalies that work admirably in practice.

38. The second is one which I sincerely believe rests on a misconception. Its fallacy is practically admitted in the fourth of the arguments adduced by the amalgamationists. If it were true, the real blame, as I have shown, would be mainly chargeable on the Central Military Authorities at the Horse Guards—and the natural and proper remedy would, therefore, consist, not in abolishing the Local Force, but in effecting a reform in the recruiting arrangements in England, as well as in that system of patronage under which Indian Commanders-in-Chief and Divisional Generals have hitherto been appointed. And, as I have said, Appendix A of this Minute details a scheme the adoption of which would render the Indian Local Army superior to any Army in the world.

39. The third plea of the amalgamationists I have proved to be utterly untenable.

40. And in respect of the fourth, I have, I think, shown *that* to involve a glaring fallacy.

41. In other words, I have endeavoured to show that there is no reason why any organic change should be made in that Military system (based on a large Local Army adequately supplemented by Regiments of the Line) under which India has been won and kept, and in doing so I have incidentally suggested grounds for apprehending that the organic change now proposed would operate injuriously on the Military interests of India. And I now beg to record my conviction, that the adoption of such a change would entail heavy burdens on the Indian finances—prove otherwise injurious to the best interests of the people of India—tend greatly to shake the stability of British power in the East—and inflict grievous injuries on some six thousand gentlemen who have long, ably, and successfully, laboured for the honour of their native land and the welfare of the land of their adoption.

42. It is a fact that the Local European Corps of India actually cost less than the Line Regiments supplied from England. The pay of officers and men is alike—their rations, clothing, &c., the same. But, partly owing to the costliness of the separate Dépôt system, two Companies of each Regiment being kept up in England—partly owing to the greater sickness to which, as a rule, they are subject for the first few years of their service—the fact is as I have stated it. The average number of Line Regiments coming out to India before the mutinies was $1\frac{3}{4}$ per annum—under the amalgamation system it would, even with reliefs only after fifteen or twenty years' service, be 5 or 6 per annum, involving a proportionably increased cost to the State.

43. But this is a mere trifle to the other expenses which amalgamation would entail.

44. The average transport charge* from Gravesend to India is 102 $\frac{1}{2}$.

* ESTIMATE OF TRANSPORT CHARGE.

ONE REGIMENT.	
	£
4 Field Officers, at 135 $\frac{1}{2}$ l.	54
12 Captains, at 110 $\frac{1}{2}$ l.	1,320
29 Subalterns, at 95 $\frac{1}{2}$ l.	2,755
	<hr/>
	4,615

per officer, and 14 $\frac{1}{2}$ per private. Assume 5 line regiments to be sent out annually of an average strength of 1,000 men and 45 officers, and 2 companies of Artillery, with each 6 officers and 212 men, and we shall have an average annual sum, including the passage of the return regiments, of 178,736 $\frac{1}{2}$. (a) besides the charges for occasional relief of Sappers, Engineers, &c., with which to debit the taxpayers of India, as a price of their exemption from the "anomaly" of a local corps.

45. Again, the average annual number of cadets of all arms sent out to meet casualties in the three local armies has, during the last twenty years, been 250. Now all these young gentlemen defray the cost of their own passage out. But if amalgamation be adopted, and unless a change takes place in the regulations of the Royal Army, all the young men sent out to fill up casualties in the Indian establishment will be pro-

	£	£
Brought forward	4,615	
1,000 Men, at 14 $\frac{1}{2}$	14,000	
	<u>18,615</u>	
5 Regiments		93,075
ONE COMPANY OF ARTILLERY.		
2 Captains, at 110 $\frac{1}{2}$	220	
4 Subalterns, at 95 $\frac{1}{2}$	380	
	<u>600</u>	
212 Men, at 14 $\frac{1}{2}$	2,968	
	<u>3,568</u>	
2 Companies.....		7,136
Total		<u>100,211</u>

PASSAGE MONEY OF RELIEVED CORPS.

2-5 AT 25 $\frac{1}{2}$ A MAN.

ONE REGIMENT.		
Officers as above	4,615	
400 Men at 25 $\frac{1}{2}$	10,000	
	<u>14,615</u>	
5 Regiments		73,075
ARTILLERY.		
Officers	600	
85 Men	2,125	
	<u>2,725</u>	
2 Companies		5,450
Total Return Passage		<u>78,525</u>
Outward Passage		<u>100,211</u>
Grand Total		<u>178,736</u>

vided with free passages at the cost of that "Bengal Ryot" on whose hard case India reformers are apt to be lachrymously eloquent, and who not only has no interest in amalgamation, but a very great personal interest in the continued maintenance of a local army, and the number of men sent out under amalgamation is not likely to be less than that required by existing arrangements. The charge under this head at 95% each would be 23,750%. (a)

46. Again, captains as well as subalterns of the Royal Army, under certain circumstances going home on sick certificate, and subalterns as also captains on returning from sick leave, are allowed passage money at Government expense; while only the subalterns of the local army are thus provided—and that only on their way home. Unless the Sick Leave Regulations of the whole Royal Army be altered, officers of the rank of captain will continue to be provided with free passages at the expense of the Indian tax-payers. The cost of passage money on this account is estimated at 24% per regiment, or for (say) seventy regiments 16,800%. (a) per annum.

47. A comparative statement of the cost of a Royal and of a Local regiment is given in appendix No. 53 of the Report of the Royal Commission on the Reorganisation of the Army. By this, if amalgamation is decided on, the cost of the European Infantry alone will be—say 70 regiments at 85,271%—5,968,970%; but if a local force be determined on

24 Line Regiments at £85,271	£2,046,504
46 Local Regiments at 75,567	3,476,082
	<u>£5,522,586</u>

or by having a local force, the cost will be 146,384% per annum less than if the whole Infantry Force were Line. And this is exclusive of the proportionately higher cost of the Cavalry and Artillery branches of the Line compared with Locals.

48. I have not even yet exhausted the items of increased financial embarrassments which amalgamation would entail on India; but I have said enough to show that the removal of the "anomaly" of the local Indian Army can only be purchased at a price which it would be very questionable policy, and as questionable morality, to impose on the Indian tax-payers. Some of my figures may be wrong, possibly all are.

(a) Total additional annual cost on the above items, 665,670%.

If so, let the errors be exposed; but I trust that my erroneous calculations may not be allowed to prejudice the considerations they have been produced to enforce. I have pointed out sources of increased expense inseparable from amalgamation. Let that expense be calculated by men with more accurate knowledge of the facts of the case than I possess. But let the calculation be made, and its results considered, before amalgamation is carried—not after.

49. I have said that amalgamation, besides entailing a heavy and unnecessary, and therefore an unjustifiable burden on the people of India, would be otherwise prejudicial to their interests.

50. Hitherto the Officers of the Local Army of India have been mainly derived from the middle classes of Great Britain. They have, as a rule, been the sons of clergymen, lawyers, physicians, merchants, and of the civil and military servants of India—themselves of middle class descent. They have belonged to a class accustomed to work hardly for their living, and to regard labour not merely as the only practicable, but as the only honourable road to wealth and social eminence—a class unaccustomed to, and unappreciative of, indolent or luxurious habits.

51. They have come out to India as boys—healthy, ingenuous, manly boys—ignorant of the enjoyments and dissipations of “life” in England, and full of eager expectations in respect of the country which is to be their home for the next twenty or thirty years. On their arrival they have been thrown into close contact with men who had resided long in India and had acquired a knowledge of its people, its languages, its religions, and its civil and military history. From these they have taken their tone—acquiring from them a vast fund of information not to be obtained in books, and practical maxims the result of the experience of many generations. Associating with such men they have early become “ambitious to emancipate themselves from Griffinhood,” in other words to acquire a thorough familiarity with the country, its customs and its concerns. Taking readily to field sports they have necessarily been thrown into intimate intercourse with the Natives, under circumstances which begot in them kindly feelings towards the latter. They have thus early learned to penetrate below the surface of the Native character, to admire its good features, and to understand and guard against its less amiable peculiarities. And thus did they acquire that knowledge of the workings of the Native mind which enabled them in after life to discharge, with efficiency and in kindness, the various Military, Political, Departmental, and

Administrative duties assigned to them. Such were the men—and such was the training of the men—who have hitherto commanded the Regular and Irregular Corps of the local army—who have been the private friends and official counsellors of the chiefs, and nobles, and gentry of India—who have managed and controlled those enormous commissariat and other military establishments through the working of which the Native masses are brought into contact with Europeans—who have wandered amongst the rural population, and been brought into intimate relations with it in the pursuit of sport, and when officially engaged in conducting surveys, adjudicating disputes, constructing bridges, roads, and tanks, suppressing violence, redressing wrongs, and performing those numberless miscellaneous duties that so constantly devolve on military officers in this country. Deeply interested in the people, such men were to be found sitting for hours under the shade of a village tree in earnest colloquy with the people—listening to their tales, answering their questions, clearing their minds of misapprehensions, giving them advice, and rendering them practical aid in many ways.

52. Through the personal influence of such men, schools, colleges, and dispensaries have been spread over the face of the country—cruel rites have been suppressed, and revolting ceremonies have been discarded, without exciting religious animosity or suspicions—sanitary reforms have been effected without awakening caste prejudices—charitable institutions have been established on unsectarian principles—the advantages of co-operation have been widely diffused—new arts have been taught, and improved methods introduced into those of traditional culture. In a word, the civilisation of the people of India has been advanced, their morals elevated, and their social welfare very extensively promoted by the individual action and personal influence of the men by whom the local army has hitherto been officered. Far be it from me to say that all, or even a majority of our officers, have actively exerted themselves in the cause of philanthropy and progress; but a very large proportion have undoubtedly done so, and rarely has it happened that any who have outlived their Griffinhood have been guilty of conduct culculated to alienate the Natives of the country. He who should wantonly outrage Native prejudices, or evince a contempt for Native habits of thought, would have been tabooed in Indian society.

53. By the aid of such men thus early sent to India, and from the first taught to regard it as their only field of employment, enjoyment, and distinction, has India been gradually won and marvellously

maintained and governed. Without the aid of such men, an army of two hundred thousand men could hardly have maintained the British power. They would assuredly have failed to hold it save by sheer physical force. And by the abolition of the local army the supply of such men will be cut off.

54. God forbid that I—many of whose most cherished friendships are with officers of the Royal Army—who have had the proud privilege of serving with and commanding some of the finest regiments in Her Majesty's service—and who owe to their valour and loyalty the high honour which my beloved and venerated Sovereign has bestowed on me far above my deserts—God forbid that I should say, or write, one word to the disparagement of such men. I say it not to their disparagement, but as a mere fact to which they themselves will bear willing testimony—that Queen's officers can never supply the place of the officers of the local army in respect of the qualities and qualifications, and beneficent agency I have so imperfectly succeeded in describing. And if such be the fact, surely I do not injuriously reflect on them when I affirm that, by substituting officers of Her Majesty's Line for the officers whom the local Indian Army has hitherto fostered, a gulph will be established between the governing and the governed classes of this country, which no administrative measures can bridge, and which must go on widening from year to year till at length the British rule become impossible, or, if possible, an absolute curse.

55. It is a fact well known to every one who has served in India that "Queen's officers" (with rare exceptions) have never assimilated themselves to the conditions of India. As a rule they do not attempt to acquire its languages, nor to conceal their contempt for all that especially pertains to it. A Native is to them a "nigger" or a "black fellow," whether he be a noble or a cooly,—a Mussulman or Hindoo, a Parsee or a Bhudist. And it is not difficult to understand how this occurs. The majority of the officers in a newly arrived Line Regiment vary in age from eight-and-twenty to eight-and-forty. They have got beyond that period of life when old habits can easily be discarded, or new tastes acquired—when the linguistic faculty is strong—when study affords pleasure—or when it is not difficult to acknowledge one's self ignorant of knowledge which is worth acquiring. All is new to them—much is paradoxical and perplexing. If they would seek enlightenment respecting the various races they meet, their religions, their customs, or their habits of thought, they must do so by much reading and inquiry, and as a preliminary step they must acquire one of the native languages. All this, to men of advanced years, is an

irksome task, more especially in an enervating climate. They shrink from the attempt, they learn to despise that which they have not the resolution to acquire. If they can afford to purchase an exchange into a Home Regiment they hasten to leave the country : those who remain are apt to think only of the time when, their exile over, they shall return to England. They make up their minds to endurance—enjoyment is out of the question. Finding that much of the conversation in local circles—both Civil and Military—turns on local affairs which they have despaired of comprehending, they keep very much to themselves, and by bearing each other in countenance intensify each other's contempt for India and all that is Indian. It is the seniors who give its tone to a regiment, and the youngsters of a line corps, who, if thrown amongst "locals," would be fired with the same zeal for acquiring a knowledge of India, with which the young officers of the local army are inspired, are discouraged from the attempt by the language and example of their seniors. This has been the *rule* as regards all line regiments in India from time immemorial, the perpetual "*griffinishness*" of whose officers is a standing theme for the jocularly of local officers. There are from time to time young officers of Queen's corps who study the Native languages and excel in them; but laudable as their efforts are to acquire a knowledge of India and its people, they are rarely successful, and still more rarely do they acquire a knowledge of the Native character. For they live and move and have their being in a circle where Natives rarely enter, and in which the country, the people, and its usages are abused and thoroughly misunderstood. Such was the case before the mutinies. Since the mutinies it has been more than ever the case. Hatred has, as a rule, taken the place of contempt in the minds of Line Officers, and every Native is regarded as a Pandey, and one who, if not an assassin, is not so merely because he has lacked the courage or the opportunity. I speak partly from my own observation, and partly on the observation of officers high in the Service, when I say that the most injurious consequences are likely to result from the rule which prescribes that cadets of the Local Army shall do duty for six months with Line Regiments. These youngsters who, under the old system, would in six months have mastered Hindostani, and have prided themselves in their knowledge and appreciation of the Native character, will now think it noble, and manly, and "*the correct thing*," to sneer at, decry, and vilify all that is native. As if still further to intensify this lamentable evil—as if still further to imbue the young men destined to be Sepoy Officers and to fill departmental posts, with a hatred and contempt for those with whom they are destined to be brought into intimate relations, it has been ordered that cadets shall be attached to Line Regiments in England.

56. If such be the state of matters now, what may we not anticipate when India is wholly garrisoned by the line, and when the present race of local officers has become extinct by death, or that retirement to which many of them will likely be driven in consequence of their wholesale supersession by "Queen's Officers?" Even while the local force still continues in existence supersession will take place, and Queen's officers, devoid of that thorough knowledge of the people and appreciation of their qualities, which is so necessary for advantageously controlling them, will be placed in positions involving functions of an administrative and controlling nature.

57. It may be said that when amalgamation takes place, India will be supplied as before with young men who, inspired by the prizes which the Staff and Departmental offices hold out, will exert themselves as earnestly and as successfully in the acquisition of local knowledge and experience as their predecessors of the local army. I reply—the thing is impossible. The lads may bring the same earnestness, but it is impossible they can achieve equal success. They will not be placed under those conditions of early association and local training to which much more than to formal study the success of their predecessors was due. Their tuition will at best be a head one—their affections will not be from the first enlisted in behalf of the country and the people, as was the case with the local officers—their associations will be in the main European, and with Europeans indifferent to, or prejudiced against, the country, their Native intercourse being principally with the disreputable class of Natives who, with rare exceptions alone hang about European barracks, and associate with their inmates. But even were it otherwise, the great majority of the officers of the line regiments will not be amongst those who aspire to qualify themselves for detached employment in India; many of them will have come out at an age when to do so would be an impossibility. From them many of the juniors afterwards joining will take their tone—one of indifference to and contempt for the country. And these men will take the place of those of the local service who, though still performing regimental duties, have identified themselves more or less with Native interests and Native progress, and have (to make us of Lord Ellenborough's words) "represented to the Natives the friendship as well as the power of the governing nation."

58. I have stated that the proposed amalgamation would inflict grievous and unmerited injuries on the six thousand gentlemen who now officer the local army, and a little consideration will prove that I am right.

59. These men entered the service on the *implied* understanding that they would succeed in order of seniority to regimental "off-reckonings," in periods ranging, according to individual good or ill luck, from thirty to forty-five years of service. *Will* faith be kept with them in this respect? *Can* faith be kept with them in this respect under the proposed amalgamation plan?

60. They entered the service on an implied guarantee that they should never be superseded in regimental or in line promotion, either by the introduction of the Purchase system, or by irregular promotion based on the principle of selection. Can faith possibly be kept with them in this respect under the proposed amalgamation plan?

61. All in the service have been allowed, authoritatively, to make arrangements for purchasing out their seniors, and these arrangements, and the retiring funds which have been established in consequence, though not actually sanctioned by the law, cannot justly be interfered with. Relying on this understanding, they have regularly subscribed to funds the object of which is to accelerate promotion by providing bonuses out of the common purse to officers willing to retire before they have earned their off-reckonings. And they have done so in the confident hope that when ill-health or other considerations should lead to their retirement, they would, as a matter of course, receive bonuses equal in amount to those paid to their predecessors. Will the regulations and whole machinery of the line be altered to meet the equitable claims of these men? or will their funds be broken up, and all the prospective advantages for which they have monthly made pecuniary sacrifices, be absolutely denied them?

62. If in none of these respects faith can be kept with them, who shall say that they will not be grievously wronged? Am I told that where the interests of a mighty Empire are at stake, individuals must suffer for the general weal—I reply, that the proposed change, the adoption of which would occasion such grievous individual wrong, far from being in the interests of the Indian Empire, is totally opposed to them. And the object of my Minute is earnestly to implore that this assertion be calmly and dispassionately argued before some competent tribunal ere a change is made, which, I feel assured, will be as injurious to the State as it cannot but be to individuals.

63. But the wrongs I have glanced at are only a fraction of the injuries which amalgamation would inflict on the officers of the local army. The advocates of amalgamation argue that a local force would be soci-

ally inferior to the line force by which it must be supplanted, and I have pointed out the glaring illogicality of the argument. But I must do more. Painful as the duty is, I must express my confident belief that *if amalgamation be carried, the gentlemen who now officer the local army will be made to occupy a position of painful inferiority to the officers originally nominated by the Horse Guards.* Already are they made to feel, keenly and humiliating, the loss they have sustained by the extended action of the Horse Guards in India. They find themselves put aside. A few men whose local knowledge and experience render them still indispensable retain their positions; but they (especially in the Bengal Army) labour under the conviction that they are being gradually shelved. The senior officers are unemployed, and they see Divisional and Brigade Commands, and the various non-regimental offices which are embraced under the term "Staff," day by day passing from their hands and conferred on others, as they will believe to their dying day, and as the non-military public believes, out of proportion to the relative experience, qualifications, and services of the two forces. They observe, moreover, or fancy they observe, that in the distribution of honours for actual services in the field rendered during the late mutiny, a marked difference has been made between "Queen's" and "Company's" officers. Their observation may be erroneous, and, if so, a careful and exact scrutiny will demonstrate the error. The local officers are, as at present constituted, as much Queen's officers as those of the line, and they at present possess a professional individuality, a distinctive prominence, and claims based on that generous sympathy which recent events might well be supposed to create in their favour, which would be entirely lost were they merged into "Second Battalions," or even new regiments of the line. They feel that they would then not only be swamped—not only go to swell the list of those men who, devoid of aristocratic or Parliamentary interest, and without the power of purchase, have no chance of stepping beyond the sphere of regimental service, but they would really occupy an inferior social position, be sneered at as quondam "local" men, probably assumed to be malcontents, and regarded as blemishes to be got rid of as speedily as possible.

64. Without endorsing all these gloomy forebodings, I may be allowed to express an opinion based on some knowledge of military life, that, on the whole, their position would be an unpleasant one—and, a very confident opinion, that their chance of Staff preferment would be scanty so soon as a sufficient number of "line" men had acquired that knowledge of one or two of the Indian languages, which I much fear would (after amalgamation) be deemed to imply the possession of all

those Indian qualifications most of which Company's officers necessarily possessed, but which it is simply impossible, from the very nature of their position and associations, that line officers can obtain, save in exceptional cases. For, as I have endeavoured to show elsewhere, line officers, though they may be able to read "Hindoostanee books," could not obtain a thorough comprehension of "Hindoostanee men," to quote one of General Jacob's happy distinctions.

65. In expressing an opinion that Staff appointments would soon be monopolised by those who had been originally line officers, I make no reflection on the conscientiousness or good feeling of the administrators of local patronage. For ere long the great majority of these would be themselves "Horse Guards" officers—with Horse Guards associations and sympathies—devoid of that intimate knowledge of the country, and that acquaintance with the native character, so essential for executive officers, whether regimental or departmental—unable in times of peace fully to appreciate the importance of these accomplishments, and incapable of testing them. Their intimate acquaintances and confidential referees would be men of their own service, most of whom they had known from youth upwards—men often as little capable as themselves of appreciating, amidst the quiet routine of Cantonment life, the value of special Indian qualifications, and as little capable of testing them. To such men a pass certificate in a Native language would seem an adequate guarantee of fitness, and their predilections would naturally be in favour of the men possessed of this qualification who had risen in their own regiments, or whom they had known in different Home or Colonial Garrisons, or who were the relations or protégées of their own military friends, of their country neighbours, or of their professional superiors.

66. I can conceive an advocate of amalgamation demanding of me whether, so long as the duties of an office are adequately performed, it matters whether the incumbent be one who entered the Service through the portals of the Horse Guards or those of Leadenhall-street. I reply that, assuming both classes of officers to be equally fitted for the command of Irregular Corps, or Staff and Departmental employment, which I do *not* admit—it matters very much indeed, as a question of common honesty, whether men who came out to India resolved to devote themselves to its service—who came out on the tacit understanding that a certain number of Staff appointments should be reserved for them—and who have by much labour thoroughly qualified themselves for these offices, shall see them transferred to others who have no such claims. And I affirm, that were this matter put clearly before

the people of England, they would, with one acclaim, support the view I have taken. It is a dangerous thing for one Service to avail itself of its political influence to do a wrong to another. The precedent it establishes to-day for its own benefit may be converted to its own prejudice to-morrow.

67. There is one class of officers in respect of whom I would fain make a special appeal on this score, as they are a class which, to our disgrace be it said, has been treated with singular harshness and illiberality alike by their military and civil superiors; I allude to the officers of the Medical Department, a body of men, who not only are unsurpassed by any other body in the service for professional zeal and skill, gallantry, and devotion to their duties, but have especially distinguished themselves by the success with which they have cultivated general science, and the earnestness with which they have applied themselves to the promotion of education and other philanthropic objects. These men, especially those of the Bombay Establishment, have been treated by us with such unfairness, that a late Physician-General of that Presidency, a man whose name is held in honour both in and out of his profession—I allude to Dr. MacLennan—felt himself authorised to assure the late Lord Frederick Fitz-Clarence, that had any officer treated his dog-boy in the manner in which the Court of Directors and Board of Control have treated the Medical Service, he would have been brought to a Court Martial, and cashiered for dishonourable breach of faith. The Physician-General's illustration was a strong one; but after explanation, its justice was admitted by that Commander-in-Chief, who thenceforth felt as warmly on the subject as the head of the Medical Department.

68. In behalf of this noble and *ill-used* Service, Lord Dalhousie made a generous interposition; and though his Lordship's efforts were at the time unsuccessful, his appeal was so forcible, and his general views have been so earnestly and ably supported by Lord Canning, that justice cannot long be denied them if the Army of India be kept a local one. But to the Medical Service amalgamation would be ruinous.

69. Than Dr. Alexander, the Director-General of Her Majesty's Medical Service, I am assured that no worthier or more honourable man exists. But he is only a man of finite knowledge and human feelings. He knows the officers of his own Service—he knows that many of them are eminently deserving of that promotion which at present it is not in his power to bestow, but for which amalgamation would afford an opportunity. And not knowing the men in the Local

Army, his partialities would needs be in favour of the men of his own Service. And even should he deem it his duty, on the first opportunity, to promote to higher grades those medical officers the Seniority Rules of whose Service prevented their obtaining promotion for the same services as secured promotion for their more fortunate brethren of the Royal Army—the very number of promotions that have recently been made to the grade of Deputy Inspector in the Royal Service would, for a considerable length of time, prevent him doing justice to those of the local service whose names had been honourably mentioned by the various Generals commanding in the field; and ere these arrears of promotion were disposed of, the claims of those, in whom as members of his own service he naturally feels more interested, would have again accumulated and pressed for favourable notice.

70. Amalgamation, then, would prove injurious to the moral claims and legitimate expectations of the military and medical officers of the local service to an extent which only very urgent public necessities could justify; and I have endeavoured to prove not only that no necessity has arisen for destroying the local character of the Indian Service, but that its destruction would, in many ways, be productive of injury to India. But I would not be understood as claiming for the officers of the Local Army any exclusive right to Staff employ, and in Appendix B to this Minute will be found a scheme, the adoption of which would secure for the various Staff and Departmental offices of the State an amount of general, professional, and special Indian qualification of very high order. Throw these appointments open to expectant officers of the Line equally with Local officers—and this probably would tend, more than any other possible arrangement, to make Indian Service popular with Line Regiments. The fullest and purest competition of a practical—not a pedantic—nature would be introduced, and the best men would be preferred to the best appointments. The efficiency of the whole Indian Service—Line and Local—would be increased; no new burdens would be imposed on the people of India that did not bring commensurate advantages, and no injustice would be done to these six thousand gallant and honourable gentlemen who have long and faithfully and successfully toiled in this land of exile.

71. Before concluding, I cannot but advert to another phase of the question I have been discussing.

72. It has been affirmed, both in Parliament and by the English press, that the real object of that amalgamation, in support of which

such feeble arguments have been adduced, and against which such weighty arguments are adducible, is, simply, to increase the European influence of the British Cabinet, by enabling Her Majesty's Ministers to maintain, at the cost of the people of India, a powerful army capable of being speedily brought into the field in any part of the world. I do not deny that the possession of such an available force would materially aid the diplomatic action of the British Government. It is not my province to inquire whether it is the wish, or for the interests of the British nation, that their Government should assume the position and tone which a vastly increased military strength might enable them to assume; but I do most earnestly deprecate the recognition of the European Army of India as a force available for European warfare, and I sincerely trust that the British Parliament will never sanction an arrangement which would be inequitable to the tax-payers of this country, and a source of danger to its Government. For many years to come an imposing European Force must be kept in India; for many years will elapse ere its public mind can be thoroughly tranquillised, and many years of strong but beneficent administration can alone suffice to conciliate away that impatience of the rule of the Feringhee which recent events have proved to be far spread and deeply-rooted. That a general impatience of our sway has been created, and a universal suspicion of our intentions awakened amongst our population, can no longer be doubted. This impatience and this suspicion has been excited by Mohammedan zealots, who have learned to cherish the belief that the Sovereignty of India may again be acquired by them; but there is reason to fear that the Mohammedans themselves are but tools of others animated by a more intelligent jealousy of our position in the East. And we could not more effectually play into the hands of hostile Powers than by weakening the strength of the European Garrison of India to meet emergencies in other parts of the world. Persia, a power wielded at will by Russia—Afghanistan, amenable to Russian counsels enforced by Russian gold—Nepaul and Siam—could and assuredly would be influenced to menace our frontiers in the event of an European war in which England should be involved. Thus menaced, we should find in the Punjaub—described by those who know it as ripe for revolt—a source of much danger, and with the Punjaub in revolt, the rest of India would be in a very perilous position, teeming, as I fear it does, with downright disloyalty on the part of the Mohammedan population, and with much passive disaffection amongst many of our Hindoo subjects. A second insurrection, inspired and guided by foreign influence, and occurring simultaneously with demonstrations along our Frontiers or on our Coasts, and at a time when our European Army had been weakened,

would be a more serious matter far than the revolt we have just suppressed.

73. I know it will be asked if I am insane enough to think that the Horse Guards would ever denude India of its European troops; and a similar question was asked by the Reorganisation Commissioners of General Vivian. His answer shall be mine. India *was* deprived of European troops to meet the necessities of the Crimean war, both by the removal of regiments and by the inability of the Government to maintain the strength of those remaining; and this to such an extent, that when—a necessity arising from the Persian expedition—a further and a legitimate demand was made on the Garrison of India, the mutinies found the country so denuded of British soldiers as to render our tenure of it for a while most precarious.

74. In conclusion, I desire to express my sincere hope that my allusion to the "Horse Guards" and Horse Guard Commanders may not be construed as, in the most remote degree, intended to reflect disrespectfully on the one or the other. I have used the word "Horse Guards" simply as a symbol to designate not only the administrative organisation of the Royal Army, but its traditional usages and rules of official action. And, in reference to the distinguished officers of the Royal Service who have held chief and Divisional Commands in India, all that I meant to imply was that, as "Queen's officers," they unavoidably failed to appreciate in times of peace those varied qualifications for Staff employ which only a residence in India and a knowledge of her people can bestow,—that had they appreciated them, they were unable to test them,—that they have been too apt to regard an ability to read, speak, or write a Native language as proof of the existence of a knowledge of Indian affairs,—and that, naturally, they were prejudiced in favour of their own service,—assertions which I am sure most of them will laughingly admit.

75. I wish this Minute to be sent home by next mail; but I am also desirous that it should be submitted to His Excellency the Viceroy, whose opinions on the subjects herein discussed are, I believe, somewhat similar to my own, and who will, I hope, in that case, do me the favour to supplement my arguments and supply their deficiencies; as well as to my honourable colleagues, from whom I would earnestly solicit the same favour.

J. OUTRAM.

2nd January, 1860.

THE following is taken from the Summary of News given in the same number of the *Bombay Times and Standard* from which we have extracted the foregoing Minute:—

“The event of the fortnight is the appearance in our columns of Sir James Outram’s protest against the amalgamation of the Local and Royal forces. We do not feel under any obligation to reveal the source whence we obtained this important document. It is sufficient that the public interests demanded its appearance. Unless the fine assurances of the Premier and the Indian Minister go for nothing, the appearance of the protest ought to end the discussion of this question. Sir James Outram has exhausted the dispute, and let England understand well that if she persevere in the decision supposed to have been taken, she is deliberately sacrificing this country to the pleasure of the Horse Guards.”

THE
ARMY OF INDIA
QUESTION.

BY
NEALE PORTER,

AUTHOR OF
A SCHEME FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF OUR EMPIRE IN INDIA,
'LIGHT CAVALRY FOR INDIA,' ETC.



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THE ARMY OF INDIA QUESTION.

THE Amalgamation of the English and Indian Armies, proposed by the Secretary of State for India, and sanctioned by an overwhelming majority of the House of Commons, is a measure of the greatest gravity, and one the wisdom of which is more than questioned by many of our most experienced and most distinguished Indian statesmen and soldiers.

It is emphatically condemned by Lord Canning, by Lord Ellenborough, by Sir John Lawrence, and by Sir James Outram; and the fifteen members of the Council of India are unanimous in their disapproval of it.

The discontented and insubordinate spirit evinced by the Local European troops, on finding themselves denied any voice or option as to whether they would continue under the Crown service which they had commenced under the East India Company, furnished the advocates of Amalgamation with an argument of which they have availed themselves to the utmost, and by the use of which they have succeeded in prevailing against the weight of authority

on Indian military and political affairs, which I have mentioned as strongly in favour of the maintenance of a special European force in India, distinct from the general British army, and, in connection with the Native armies of the three Presidencies, directly and exclusively at the disposal and under the orders of the Governor-General.

It must, I think, be admitted that the Amalgamation, or Horse Guards party, have pushed to an unfair extreme the argument afforded them by the mutiny or "strike," by which the Local Europeans withstood and foiled the paltry injustice of the Government; and have based on that unhappy event comparisons and conclusions alike invidious and illogical.

Under the régime of the East India Company, the soldiers in the ranks of the Local regiments having enlisted to serve the Company, probably did not feel themselves to be so thoroughly the soldiers and servants of the Queen and of the State, as if they had belonged to the Royal army; and their respect for the authority of their officers may have been weakened from the same cause. Moreover, it must be remembered that many of their best officers were always absent in civil, political, and staff employ; and the best non-commissioned officers were constantly and rapidly removed from the regiments, to be made conductors of ordnance, superintendents of roads, sergeant-majors and quartermaster-ser-

geants of native regiments ; and appointed to various responsible situations for which their services were required, and in which their circumstances were improved. Now, I do not think the operation of this system of draining a regiment of its best men has been sufficiently noticed or considered ; for, the impossibility of having a battalion in perfect order without intelligent, experienced, and steady non-commissioned officers is a military axiom.

Well, no doubt, the state of things I have described as existing under the Company's government tended to render the discipline of the local Europeans somewhat inferior to that of the majority of Queen's regiments serving in India, and, unfortunately, the Home Government rarely sent out a Commander-in-Chief with sufficient energy or ability, or with sufficient interest in the Company's troops to prompt or enable him to counteract or control the circumstances to which such inferiority of discipline was to be attributed.

But these circumstances no longer exist. The assumption by the Crown of the immediate government of India has changed everything. Every soldier in India is a royal soldier ; and as such, whether officer, non-commissioned officer or private feels that he is directly and entirely, and in the highest degree, the sworn soldier and servant of the Queen and of the State. It is no derogation from his military dignity or professional status, that he is

attached to a distinct Indian army, whose service is confined to the limits of our vast Eastern empire, because, for the safe government, for the military and political security of that empire, it is considered to be of the last importance, that there should be maintained a considerable force of English troops enlisted for exclusive and permanent service in India, and the officers of which force, with the officers of the great Native army, would afford, in the aggregate, a large number of men of special Indian training, and possessing peculiar acquaintance with the habits and customs, and consideration for the social and religious feelings and prejudices of the native population: having all come to India in early youth and knowing their active career will continue, and in all probability conclude in the country. At the same time, the abolition of the East India Company's Government has led to the admission of the officers and non-commissioned officers of the general British army serving in India, to a fair participation in the staff and civil appointments, which formerly were the exclusive monopoly of the Company's army. So, the drain from regiments of able, zealous and intelligent officers and non-commissioned officers is distributed over a larger area, and affects less seriously individual corps; and, the importance of this change is much enhanced, by the great addition which has been made to the strength of our forces in India.

It may be well here to remember, that when in

1857, we were surprised by a gigantic Sepoy mutiny, in combination with the wide spread disaffection and partial insurrection of the people of India, we found there were no troops shewed more vigour and valour, or did their work better than the Company's Europeans, whether at Allahabad, Cawnpore, Delhi, or elsewhere, and, the officers and men of that distinguished regiment the Madras Fusiliers, which under Neill, at a most anxious and critical juncture, was the first to close with, and signally defeat our numerous and bloodthirsty foes, must have read with pain those paragraphs in the Governor-General's recent despatch, dated Simla, 5th May, 1860—in which, while on political grounds urgently advocating the maintenance of a numerous Local European army; he reflects, in terms unduly disparaging, on the discipline, *i. e.* on the military character of regiments belonging to that army. They, perhaps, remember, with bitter pride, the day when, just arrived from Lucknow, they stood, clad in their Khakee campaigning dress and blue bounets, at the foot of the steps of Government House, and in the presence of all Calcutta, received from the lips of the Viceroy an acknowledgment of their great deeds, and the thanks of the government of India.

In the despatch referred to, Lord Canning urges powerful political, administrative and even military reasons for the establishment of a strong Local English force in connection with the Native troops, under the special control of the Governor-General, and it

is doubtful if Sir Charles Wood has paid due attention and respect to his representations. At the same time, it must be admitted that Lord Stanley, as the exponent and advocate in the House of Commons, of the opinions of the general body of distinguished and experienced men opposed to amalgamation did not shew that grasp of the question, or that confidence in his own judgment and knowledge of the subject, which was to be expected in a statesman so recently Secretary of State for India, and who probably pretends to serve Her Majesty again in that capacity.

The principal arguments against Amalgamation are :—

1st. That the despotic power and the prestige of the Governor-General, will be weakened to a degree incompatible with his proper influence and authority, if there cease to exist a relatively large European force, devoted specially and exclusively to service in India, forming with the native troops of the three Presidencies, an Indian army looking to the Governor-General alone for military control and patronage, as well as for political direction.

2. That to ensure the continued and constant existence in India of a sufficient number of Englishmen fit and available for the various civil, political, and irregular military situations and employments incidental to the government and administration of our great Eastern Empire, and requiring for the efficient performance of the varied and peculiar

duties they involve, great experience of native character and customs, knowledge of native languages, and a thorough devotion to an Indian career, it is desirable and necessary that there should be a large number of military officers receiving their first appointments in early youth to her Majesty's Indian forces ; to a special Indian army limited to service in India, and neither expecting, nor liable to serve elsewhere, but, reconciled and attached by necessity, habit, and interest to a country in which officers of the general British army seldom feel settled, and from which by exchanges and retirements they are constantly endeavouring to escape. On this point Lord Canning writes to the Secretary of State for India : " But I adhere to the opinion that the interests of India require that there should be an army devoted to India. I am confirmed in it by the experience which I have acquired, after much intercourse with officers of her Majesty's Regiments of the Line in India, of the unwillingness which appears to prevail amongst them to look to India as the scene of their profession for any considerable length of time. During the excitement of active service this feeling was not so perceptible, though even in 1858 the applications for leave to return to England were numerous ; but since the cessation of military operations it has become very strong, and it is not too much to say that it is a rare occurrence to meet with an officer of the Line who looks forward contentedly to a long stay in India."

"I do not think the unwillingness will be removed
 "by throwing open the door to their employment in
 "every kind of staff or irregular service. Making
 "every allowance for the events of the last three years,
 "for the disjointed and uncertain condition of
 "service in India, to which those events have led,
 "and for all the discomforts of frequent and unsea-
 "sonable movements of corps, and indifferent accom-
 "modation, the feeling is, I fear, likely to prove a
 "lasting one amongst those who are brought to India
 "only accidentally. I believe that there are very few
 "Englishmen indeed who will readily make up their
 "minds to devote themselves to a career in this
 "country unless they are trained to look to it, and are
 "bound to it from their youth."

"This does not apply to military officers alone.
 "Professional men, engineers, merchants, and others,
 "furnish frequent instances of distaste for the
 "country, overcoming pecuniary and all other in-
 "ducements to remain in it. No one would dream
 "of attempting to administer the civil affairs of
 "India through officers who were not attached to
 "the Government by some other tie than the receipt
 "of Indian salaries. And, inasmuch as the efficiency
 "of our military service, in those branches of it
 "which are of daily importance to the peace and
 "safety of the country, such as the management of
 "irregular regiments, or the conduct of the half po-
 "litical, half military operations on the frontiers, and
 "in Native states, depends mainly upon the applica-

“tion which the officer gives to his early training,
 “upon the heartiness with which he undertakes his
 “duty, and upon his persevering adherence to it,
 “I should greatly deplore seeing her Majesty’s army
 “in India officered entirely, or even in the greater
 “part, by men who are at liberty to cast themselves
 “loose from the country at their pleasure, and at an
 “insignificant sacrifice of their interests.”

The latest accounts from India do undoubtedly justify the views and statements of the Governor-General.

The ‘Bombay “Telegraph and Courier” of June 7, 1860, says :

“The exodus of the Local European soldiers last
 “year has been succeeded by an exodus of Royal
 “officers on urgent private affairs, and men of Her
 “Majesty’s service whose time has expired. The
 “distaste for Indian cantonment life is so great,
 “both amongst the officers and men, that were the
 “army here to be entirely a general service army
 “the expense of sending home the officers and men
 “would become a serious expense.

“Perhaps, one of the strongest arguments in
 “favour of retaining the local army might be drawn
 “from returns, shewing the number of time expired
 “men who have taken their discharge, and the
 “number who have re-enlisted in India. In some
 “regiments we know that the proportion of the
 “latter to the former is infinitesimally small.

“But, when we come to the officers, the general

“dislike to the country is still more apparent and loudly expressed. The applications for leave on sick certificate are numberless. Those who cannot get leave in one way or the other, and who have private means, independent of the service, resign or ‘chuck up’ as it is termed.”

Sir Charles Wood's reply to the strongly expressed opinions of Lord Canning and to the remonstrances of Sir John Lawrence, Sir James Outram, Colonel Durand, and others who oppose or rather protest against amalgamation, is that although formerly favourable to the existence of a distinct Local English army, he has recently been led by consideration of the subject, and by the force of events, to agree with His Royal Highness the General Commanding in Chief, Lord Clyde, General Peel, Sir Charles Trevelyan, and other advocates of Amalgamation, and has come to the conclusion that it is his duty to ask the House of Commons to give practical effect to this view of the question.

The principal arguments of this party are that the existence of British troops in India in the service of the Queen, yet under a military administration independent of that which governs Her Majesty's general army, is a great anomaly and a great inconvenience, and above all they urge that such an arrangement is inconsistent and incompatible with the maintenance of thorough and exact discipline in the Local army; it being absolutely necessary for the preservation of such discipline that

every regiment should have its regular turn of Home service, and come periodically under the eye of the great English military authorities, and under the influence of home associations, both military and national.

The truth of these principles has, they allege, been painfully but powerfully confirmed by the mutinous and insubordinate conduct of the Local Europeans in 1859, and by the readiness with which, subsequently, those soldiers availed themselves of the discharges offered to them.

Indeed, they rest their case almost entirely on the misconduct of the local regiments at the period referred to.

Now, it appears to me that the case of Sir Charles Wood is by no means so strong as the House of Commons by its recent vote has declared it to be. That any Company, trading or non-trading, should have had in its service military bodies, native or European, was indeed an anomaly: but, no such term can be applied in an objectionable sense, to an arrangement by which for the safe government, not of a mere Colony, but of a great Empire at an immense distance and peopled by many and various races, and nations of peculiar customs and religions, a certain force, European as well as Native, is devoted exclusively to military service in that empire. The great object and aim in maintaining such a force, distinct from the general army of the State, being to strengthen the hands and uphold the authority

of the Viceroy who rules the great distant dependency, and to enable him to have always at his disposal for the administration, organisation and control of the numerous great provinces for whose peace and security he is responsible, a sufficient number of officers peculiarly trained to, fitted for, and devoted to the career he marks out for them.

Then as to the question of discipline. Even under the unfavourable circumstances already mentioned as existing under the régime of the East India Company, the undiscipline of the Local European regiments was never such as to provoke special notice or censure; nor was it ever declared that those corps were practically greatly inferior in any respect to the regiments of the Royal army serving in India. One thing must be admitted—viz.: That on active service, and in action, they were always distinguished for great endurance and superb gallantry.

But, as a Royal Local army, not insignificant in numbers, but of about the same strength as the portion of the general British army serving in India; and, in conjunction with the Native troops, constituting a grand Indian army, styled Her Majesty's Indian Forces, there is no reason why the Local English regiments should not be as high in spirit, as good in tone, and as perfect in discipline as any troops in the world. But, to ensure this, Indian commands must not be given as they have been, to worn out and inefficient officers, lacking both energy

and zeal, and seeking the appointment of Major-general on Staff, or Commander-in-chief of a Presidency in India, to make a purse in their old age, and a provision for their families. That up to the time of the Sepoy mutiny, this was too much the state of things prevailing in India, no one can deny; but I trust that henceforth we shall be wiser, and that whatever system of organization be ultimately adopted, we shall take care that all responsible and important military commands in India are held by officers with something more than age and long service to recommend them. They must be men of physical and mental vigour, of firmness, energy, and zeal, and devoid of narrow professional prejudices. If general officers are capable and conscientious, *i. e.* devoted to their duty, and possessing moral courage to perform it, we shall have good commanding officers, and highly disciplined battalions. As regards the loyalty and national feeling of the local troops of Her Majesty's service, why such sentiments must always be strong: distance from home gives them intensity; and there would always exist between the soldiers of the Indian and general British army an emulation in every way to prove their devotion to their Queen and Country.

I now come to the consideration of an event upon which so much has been made to hinge—the alleged mutiny of the Local Europeans in 1859.

Every one is alive to a truth, in examples of which

the history of our military and naval services abounds; viz.: That British soldiers and sailors while instinctively submitting to an iron discipline, and cheerfully undergoing the severest hardships, and fearless of all odds, facing the greatest dangers, resist and resent stubbornly and strongly any attack on their established rights, or any attempt to take advantage of them in matters of pay, allowances, or service. This is so well understood, that justice to the private soldier, jealous and suspicious care that he gets what is due to him, is one of the cardinal principles of our military system. An officer watches the delivery by the contractor and the quartermaster, of the bread and meat which constitute his daily ration, and, moreover, visits the breakfasts and dinners to ask if there are any complaints. The soldier receives his pay daily in the presence of an officer of his company, and a board of his officers inspect and report upon his clothing before it is issued to him. Our military authorities know that these precautions are necessary to ensure not only the physical efficiency, but the subordination and discipline of the private soldier.

Now, let us be just to the soldiers of the European regiments of the Indian army, who have been denounced as mutineers, and branded as traitors. I mean the old regiments of infantry and the artillery, not the crowds of raw lads hurried out to India in 1858, without officers and without organization.

These men had enlisted in the service of the East

India Company, in preference to taking the Queen's shilling ; for particular reasons, or from fancy, they had resolved to be specially soldiers in India, and to be specially soldiers of the East India Company. The motive which governed a large proportion of them—many of whom, were men of considerable ability and education, who by misfortune or by misconduct had been cast adrift from respectable occupations and positions in this country—was the attraction offered by the Company's service, in the great number of openings it gave to civil and extra military situations of responsibility and emolument.

When in 1858, the Crown and Parliament undertook the direct and immediate government of India, the East India Company's service ceased to exist. The officers of the civil and military branches of that service, although not generally anxious for any change, could not well object to any arrangement, which secured to them the continuance of their employments, and the maintenance of their emoluments and pensions.

But, every one perceived that with reference to the rank and file of the European portion of the Company's army, the transfer of services and engagements was not so simple a matter, and Lord Palmerston, whose practical sagacity and sense of justice enabled him to see and appreciate the importance of the point, stated distinctly when introducing the original India bill of his government, that those soldiers who declined to transfer their

services to the Imperial Government would be entitled to and would receive their discharge. The men themselves considered that the extinction of the East India Company absolved them from their engagements, and that although it might be urged, that the change of régime did not materially affect the nature of their service, and that as soldiers of the Company, or as soldiers of the Crown, they were alike soldiers of the State, they were entitled to the option of declining or agreeing to continue under one system, the service they had commenced under another; and they naturally expected that if they consented to the transfer, the renewal of their service would be marked by some form of re-enlistment and by a bounty in money. At the same time, no doubt, many of the men tired of the soldier's trade, and of exile from home and kindred, hailed the extraordinary measure which destroyed their old master John Company, as a lucky event, by which they became once more free. And it is right here to remark, that the abolition of the East India Company's government was a contingency, the probable occurrence of which, had been for years past discussed by the rank and file, as well as by the officers of the Company's army, and the men, although as a body, not dissatisfied with their condition, when speculating on such an event, always associated with it the questions of fresh bounty or a free discharge.

Well, the event occurred, and how did the authorities deal with these Company's Europeans who had

contributed in no small degree to the salvation of our Indian Empire? When the great danger was past, these men, finding themselves, by a stroke of a pen, placed on the establishment of Her Majesty's forces in India, without the opportunity or option being afforded to them, of declaring whether they were or were not disposed to be handed over from one employer to another, considered that an advantage had been taken of them, and that they had been cheated of their fair right to a discharge and just expectation of a gratuity on re-enlistment. And here let me remark, that with proper management this cause of dissatisfaction would never have occurred. As soon as the abolition of the Company's government was decided on, a general order should have been issued, announcing the assumption by the Queen of the direct government of India, referring in stirring language to the brilliant exploits of the Company's Europeans, and stating that Her Majesty was desirous of enrolling such good soldiers in Her Indian army, and that she had ordered a gratuity of fifty rupees to be given to every man willing to continue his service. But, as we have seen, this obvious course was not adopted, and the men disappointed and angry, began to grumble. Lord Clyde, familiar with the feelings and prejudices of soldiers, and knowing the danger and impolicy of leaving troops under the impression that they had been unjustly treated, told them to be orderly and patient, and to wait quietly the decision of the Go-

vernment on their case. At the same time he wrote to the Governor General, strongly recommending him to take a liberal view of the matter, and to concede the point of bounty, and thereby secure the reenlistment of the great majority of the men. But unfortunately, Lord Canning knew nothing of soldiers, and was too ready to listen to those counsellors, who, like himself, took a harsh, narrow view of the question; and the Company's Europeans were informed that the legal advisers of the Government had decided that their claim was inadmissible, and therefore, it could not be recognized.

Supported by the strongly expressed sympathy of their fellow soldiers of the British army, and by the opinion of the Anglo-Indian community and press, the Local troops received this decision in a defiant spirit. They protested against being required to do military duty, and in some corps declared themselves to be civilians, and refused to attend parade.

The Commander-in-Chief, feeling how great would be the danger and scandal of attempting to coerce these men by force of arms, and thinking, probably, that they were acting under considerable provocation, acted with the greatest possible tact, prudence, and humanity. Meanwhile, the Governor-General applied for instructions to the Home Government, and finding the Company's troops persisted in refusing to serve, he ordered that all who wished should receive a discharge and free passage to England. It is well known how generally and eagerly this

offer was accepted, and how dearly we have paid for that unhappy and miserable misunderstanding between good and gallant soldiers and an obstinate and illiberal Government.

I believe I have given a fair sketch of the history of the mutiny of the Local European troops. I have not dwelt on the audacious contempt of authority exhibited by some of the ringleaders, as such individuals always come to the surface when masses of men are discontented.

I think the result of an impartial consideration of this untoward event must be an opinion that it affords no just argument against the maintenance of a Local European army constituting, in connection with the Native army, a Royal Indian army, distinct from the general British army.

Alluding to the view taken by the advocates of amalgamation, Lord Canning, while adhering to his original judgment of the conduct of his old antagonists, the old soldiers of the Company's service, says in the despatch already quoted :—

“ I would, within safe bounds, give up something
 “ of perfection in discipline for the sake of keeping
 “ up an Indian spirit amongst the many officers
 “ whom, be the arrangement what it may, we must
 “ strive by some means or other, to bind to India for
 “ all the best years of their manhood.”

“ Moreover, if the opinion to which I have re-
 “ ferred had been founded very much upon recent
 “ events in the Local European army, I doubt whether

"due allowance has been made for the very excep-
 "tional circumstances which attended them. I have
 "already spoken of the imperfect training of the
 "officers to whose care some of the European troops
 "were unavoidably entrusted. This is obviously ca-
 "pable of remedy, but the men themselves were at a
 "disadvantage. A body of raw lads, strange to each
 "other, and to their officers, undrilled, unused to
 "obey, landed in India, and immediately marched to
 "the central provinces, where, with little hope of
 "sharing in the campaign, they were put to severe
 "regimental training in the hottest part of the year.
 "Such were many of the young soldiers who in 1858
 "and 1859 forgot their duty, and although there
 "were other older soldiers whose misconduct was a
 "much more serious imputation upon the discipline
 "of the Local European Army in Bengal, I do not
 "think that the occurrences to which I refer furnish
 "grounds for abolishing that army as incapable of
 "being brought into order."

"It is to be desired that the importance and dignity
 "of a Local Army of the Crown should be sustained,
 "and this will not be easy if it becomes essentially
 "a Sepoy army."

In this review of the question of the organization
 and constitution of our European military forces in
 India, I have endeavoured to state as fully as pos-
 sible within the limits of a short paper, what are the
 main points involved.

I think I have shewn that, although the Amalga-

mation plan is recommended by the Horse Guards, and approved by a large majority of the House of Commons, there may be doubts as to its wisdom ; that it is supported by arguments which are not well founded, and is in opposition to the opinions and representations of those who have the greatest experience and knowledge of the mixed civil, military, and political character of the government, and who are most familiar with the peculiar difficulties attending the administration of our great Eastern Empire.

July, 1860.

THE END.

UNIVERSITY EDUCATION
IN ENGLAND
FOR
NATIVES OF INDIA.

CONSIDERED WITH
A VIEW TO QUALIFY THEM FOR THE LEARNED
PROFESSIONS OR THE PUBLIC SERVICE;

AND
TO CREATE A CLASS WHO SHALL MEDIATE BETWEEN
THE INDIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR ENGLISH RULERS.

BY HODGSON PRATT,
BENGAL CIVIL SERVICE.

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UNIVERSITY EDUCATION IN ENGLAND

FOR

NATIVES OF INDIA.

THERE is an important question connected with the future administration of India which was brought into prominent notice during the discussions on the Rebellion in 1857, but which is in danger of being lost sight of in the onward march of events. I am anxious to recal attention to this subject, and to connect with it a definite proposal and practical scheme, which I have long had under consideration. The subject I refer to is the importance of having *increased resort to native agency in the civil administration of India.*

Neither justice nor true policy will permit us to overlook the wide-spread discontent which has been occasioned by the levelling system of our rule and the monopoly of place, authority, and social rank practically secured to our own countrymen. It was the prominent topic put forward in the manifesto of the King of Delhi—the complaint that we had destroyed the native aristocracy, that we had deprived the able and the well-born of all worthy

objects of ambition ; that there were no great prizes of life, no high social position to which the natives of India could attain. " It is not a secret thing," said this proclamation, " that under the British Government, natives employed in the civil and military services have little respect, low pay, and no manner of influence ; and that all the posts of dignity and emolument in both the departments are exclusively bestowed upon Englishmen." I believe there is no one who has associated with the natives of India, so as to know their true feelings, who will not agree with me, that there is a wide and deep-felt dissatisfaction on this ground. I have lived among the most loyal and the least self-dependent of the Indian populations, that of Lower Bengal. Here more than elsewhere the native population are alive to the advantages of our rule, in the security which it gives to property, and in the impulse which it gives to trade. Here almost alone we have preserved the landed aristocracy from destruction, and here, more than elsewhere, have educated men received some share in the honours and emoluments of the public service. But, even here, I know that there is a very general discontent at the narrow bounds within which we have confined the natural ambition of the able and the well-born—at the utter hopelessness of rising, by any amount of distinguished service or high attainments, beyond a certain rank in the public service—and that rank below what any young English civilian of five years' standing may

generally attain.* Is this feeling likely to diminish among the growing generation in whom we rightly take such pains to awaken a sympathy with the best lessons of history—with the glory of national freedom, independence, and self-government? Is the feeling likely to diminish under a system which has now enabled the youth of India to take degrees in Arts at properly constituted Universities, and to obtain high diplomas in Law and Medicine? It is obvious that unless we intended to associate the natives with us in the administration of their country to a far greater extent than we have yet done, our educational institutions must be regarded as a most dangerous mistake. We should have taken care not to arouse any of those great sentiments which the study of our national history, an acquaintance with the

* An English covenanted civil servant commences his career with £480. a year, and hardly ever terminates his period of service until he has for some years drawn an income of £3000. a year. I do not believe that the Indian civil service can be kept up at its present high standard of education, social standing, character, and efficiency, at a lower rate of remuneration. But what is the scale of remuneration to natives? It has been said, with perfect truth, that a less sum than £360. a year will not enable a native to maintain the status and dignity of a gentleman in his own sphere. Yet throughout the province of Lower Bengal, having a population of thirty-five millions, the number of offices in which the emoluments are of this or greater amount, do not, I believe, exceed *one hundred and twenty*; and in the North-West Provinces, with a population of thirty-three millions, only *thirty-one* persons receive £360. a year, and upwards.

events and heroes of classical antiquity must necessarily awaken. We ought to have discouraged all education of a free and elevating kind ; we ought to have carefully put an end to anything like a native press ; and, in fact, to have cribbed, cabined, and confined the national mind after the fashion of an Austrian or Papal Government.

But of course our sense of duty to the people of India—of the sacred trust we have to discharge towards them, has prevented us from following any such course. And we must accept the consequences. Is it not in every way right, natural, and praiseworthy that the educated and upper classes of native society should keenly desire places of higher dignity in the social scale, and some share in directing the government and legislation of their own country? Would it not be most unnatural and contemptible if they were to acquiesce in seeing a foreign race monopolize all power, authority, and influence in the conduct of their national affairs? Could there be any fact which would more discourage us in our attempts to raise the moral and intellectual character of the people? Our educational efforts in India have met with a degree of success which is most remarkable. Nowhere have a people become more rapidly alive to the advantages of education, or shewn a greater aptitude for proficiency in every branch of learning that has been opened to them. Nowhere has education been followed by a more rapid improvement in moral character, social habits, and

intellectual strength. What, however, is all education but the means of preparing for a sphere of action? What is it, in fact, but a means to an end? It is now our plain and most pressing duty to put that end within reach of the people we have educated for it; to see that we do not deprive them of the object which we have indirectly held out as an encouragement to exertion. To deprive them of it would be to tempt them to pervert the weapons we have put into their hands to our and their injury, to inflict upon them a cruel wrong, to damage irretrievably our character for justice and right-doing, to deprive the people of India of the most certain means of moral and mental growth.

Under a foreign Government, a people can never rise above a certain amount of material prosperity, and but to a very low point in mental and moral character. The essential conditions of the highest growth, viz., self-government, independence, and patriotism,—the strongest motives to exertion,—are denied them. To my countrymen, so deeply interested in the liberation of foreign nations, oppressed by alien Governments (though infinitely more allied by race and religion than Hindoos and Englishmen), I need say no more on this head. I am far from alleging that the people of India are as yet fit for self-government, or that, if left to themselves from this time forth, the higher civilization now inaugurated would not be utterly lost and general anarchy inevitably result. But I

do say, that without a larger share in the administration of their country, the natives of India never can become fit for self-government; that the responsibilities of office and administration are essential to the higher education of a nation, to the proper growth of all that is noble and elevating in national character

This duty of gradually training the people of India for their own self-government has been wisely and frankly acknowledged by statesmen at home and in India.* It will be sufficient here to quote from the evidence given before the House of Commons in 1853, by Sir Frederick Halliday, late Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal:—" I go the full length of saying that I believe our mission in India is to qualify them for governing themselves; I say also that the measures of the Government for a number of years past have been advisedly directed to so qualifying them, without the slightest reference to any remote consequences upon our administration."

The abstract injustice of the policy of exclusion, and the indirect dangers thence arising, are by no means the only arguments against it. The Government of an immense empire by a handful of foreigners whose home is 7,000 miles distant, alien in blood, religion, and speech, is an anomaly necessarily involving much danger, difficulty, and mis-

* See Appendix.

government. No amount of superiority in wisdom, virtue, or civilization, can obviate the evils that arise out of such an arrangement. Rulers so placed must always be liable to fall into grievous errors and to commit cruel wrongs, simply from ignorance and misinformation.

English officials in India, arduously engaged for many years in working for the benefit of the people, occupied with details of administration conceived in the most beneficent spirit, are apt to overrate the importance of what they have done, and cannot see from the point of view occupied by the masses. They forget how very differently these latter view their experiments, and how very little real progress has been effected. Their efforts being depreciated and assailed with violent and indiscriminating abuse, they are the less able to judge impartially of the real character of our rule. They may think it an exaggeration to speak of our rule in India as necessarily involving serious wrong and error. If so, let them call to mind the degraded condition of the Madras rural population, produced by the land settlement of that Presidency; the widespread alienation of feeling produced by the treatment of the talookdars in the North-West Provinces; the defects in the perpetual settlement of Lower Bengal; the practical denial of justice arising out of the expense and delay attending all suits in the civil courts; the objectionable mode of taking and recording evidence in our criminal courts; and

the infamous state of the police. Let them remember how utterly ignorant we have always been of the real state of feeling among the population previous to the terrible outbreaks that have from time to time taken place; and how little we were aware of the grievances which led to those movements. We do not know the people and they do not know us.

The insurrection of 1857 was a terrible warning of the results which may at any time arise out of such an anomaly in administration as the government of 170,000,000 by a few thousand foreigners. Nor is it to be supposed that the catastrophe of 1857 is the only instance in which our rule has been endangered. The history of British India is the history of ever present danger, and of conspiracies suppressed. Notwithstanding that our best and wisest men have, for more than half a century, endeavoured to make this anomalous administration as good as possible; notwithstanding that the British Government, both here and in India, have most ardently desired to do justice to the natives—has even incurred the charge of treating with injustice their own countrymen—the English settlers in India—in their desire to consult the welfare of the people;—notwithstanding that we have given them the best civil service in the world, statesmen of the first class from our own Senate,—the Sepoy mutiny and rebellion of the population in the North-Western Provinces shewed but too clearly the failure of the experiment. Notwithstanding our schools, our mission-

aries, our newspapers, our good intentions, and our proclamations, the native army, according to Sir John Lawrence,* so little understood the character, motives, or policy of the Government, that, long before the mutiny, a belief had grown up that it was our intention to destroy their caste and religion by violence or fraud !

The great difficulty of our position, indeed, is to be found in the wide gulf between the rulers and the ruled ; so that the former are ignorant of the true wants and condition of the latter, and the latter are ignorant of the true motives and character of the former. The great problem is how to create a sympathy in aims and feelings between the rulers and the ruled, for this is the absolute condition of any real or extended benefit to the people—of any permanent security for ourselves. How to bridge over this terrible chasm is the question which it is the duty of the British Government to solve as soon and as thoroughly as possible. I see no means of accomplishing this object so efficacious, as the creation of a class in India who shall act as “ interpreters ” between the people and the Government—a class who, while bound by ties of birth, language, and kindred to India, shall, by education and by intimate association with Englishmen, acquire a hearty sympathy with England. The growth of an educated class of natives, holding a high social posi-

* See his Report on the causes of the mutiny in connection with the trial of the King of Delhi, dated Lahore, 29th April, 1858.

tion, and admitted to an equal footing with our English civil service in India, is essential to our security and their welfare, to good government, progress, and peace. The evidence given by Mr. Raikes, the Judge of the Chief Court of Agra, agrees with that of every one who witnessed the troubles of 1857. He says:—"I found it to be a general rule, that "where you had an official well educated at our "English Colleges, and conversant with our "English tongue, there you had a friend, upon "whom reliance could be placed."* It was well said by the *Times*, that "the sympathising natives "have rescued our empire; with more of them, perhaps it would never have been jeopardized. No "empire has ever been established without the admission of the conquered to high rank and office. "It must be admitted that, with more natives in "our confidence, and in the confidence of their own "countrymen, we should have had a better chance "of escaping the late calamity." An eminent missionary in Calcutta, writing to me on the subject of the scheme I am now about to put forward, says:—"We need a native aristocracy in India, both an "intellectual one and one of rank; we need a class "of men who will serve as "buffers" to their "countrymen against the insolence of the Europeans."

The growth of a class who should owe their ele-

* Notes on the Revolt in the North-Western Provinces of India, by C. Raikes.

vation in the social scale, and a high position in the administration, to their intellectual attainments and moral worth, would gradually lead the whole people insensibly to give to education and character the respect they now pay to caste ; it would act as a most powerful incentive on the wealthy and highly-born to keep up their position with Government and the masses by submitting to the unavoidable conditions of education and good citizenship, just as in the case of our own aristocracy. Their increased social intercourse with Europeans, and the elevation of their tastes and habits resulting from this state of things, would create an ever-increasing demand for European productions. Wealth would be spent in improvement, taste, philanthropy, and literature, instead of in superstitious observances and sensual grossness.* This middle class of educated men, whether engaged in mercantile undertakings or in the service of Government, would act as a centre of moral progress, which would extend itself alike below and above, among the lower and the upper classes.

Inseparably connected with this subject is another of very great and pressing importance. I allude to the great cost of civil expenditure in India. There has been every desire to reduce still further the scale of salaries in the Indian civil service, but it is generally admitted by every one who has gone into

* See chapter on "Employment of Natives," in Captain Evans Bell's work on "The English in India."

the subject, that nothing more can be done in this direction without seriously impairing its present efficiency and high character. As Lord Stanley remarked, in his financial statement of 14th February, 1859, "even with appointments in the well paid civil service, thrown open to competition, there has not been that eagerness to compete which might have been expected. You can hardly get professional men who are doing well in this country to go to India, unless they have the inducement of a double rate of remuneration." On the other hand, when Mr. Ricketts, a member of the Indian Council, was commissioned a short time since to draw up a scheme having the double object of reducing civil salaries, and of improving the administration, he found that to effect the latter object a large aggregate increase of expenditure would be inevitable, notwithstanding a reduction of individual allowances. Indeed, it is notorious that the numerical insufficiency of the various departments is a constant source of weakness. On every side, reforms of the most urgent kind have been demanded for years, alike by the public and the authorities, but have been denied, because they involved increased agency. Every conscientious officer in India is hopelessly overwhelmed with work. He has not merely to discharge certain defined duties, or to attend for a certain number of prescribed hours at his office: from morning until late at night, in office or out of office, the people of his district have claims upon his

exertions. He must seek to correct the corrupt evidence which comes before him in court by lengthened and careful inquiries in the interior. He must make personal acquaintance with every locality, with every person of influence. He must pass much time in the villages and fields if he is to understand the true nature of the cases that come before him for decision. The people depend upon him to assist in the decision of disputes between rival landowners by friendly arbitration,—to promote their welfare by advice and assistance in the construction of public works, hospitals, and schools. Able to rely on none of his lower subordinates, surrounded by fraud on every hand, he must be ready to hear every complaint, to receive every kind of intelligence, however conveyed to him, to anticipate disturbances and highway robberies, so far as he can; to enquire into charges against his own police and immediate instruments. For some years I never retired to rest at the close of the day without feeling that there were opportunities which ought if possible to have been taken up, but for which there was no time, and which would have to be left for still more pressing duties on the morrow. There is hardly a civil officer in India who does not find his hands tied at every step by the want of more subordinates of a high class, men sufficiently well paid and placed to be trustworthy and intelligent. In a country where the English officers are surrounded by difficulties of every kind, by fraud and perjury, corrupt and ill-

paid subordinates, and the worst police in the world, —the extent of their jurisdiction is at least ten times greater than what would be considered manageable in Europe. In almost every district there are many thousands who are so situated with reference to the few and widely separated courts, that if they have a complaint to make, or a suit to prefer, it must be at a cost of several days' journey, perhaps a week there and back. There is only one mode of meeting this double difficulty,—the enormous cost of European agency, and the insufficient number of European employés. *We must resort more and more to native agency.* But now comes the important question, "Can this be done consistently with the paramount object of all Government—efficiency in the administration?" I have endeavoured to shew what great evils must necessarily be occasioned by excluding the natives from a larger share than they at present hold in the administration of their country—the injustice and the impolicy of such exclusion. But I now hasten to declare that I do not think the Government in India has been at all blind to their duty in this respect. I do not think they could have advanced farther or faster than they have done. The feeling on the part of the Government in India has been, that, however qualified the natives may gradually become, under the influence of religion and education, for the highest offices of trust in the public service, they are not so yet. By the liberal provision made for English schools and colleges, and by

the influence of individual Englishmen, a higher sense of honour is growing up; but we must wait until principles of conduct are more fixed, and character more stable, before any large proportion of the more important offices can be placed in the hands of natives. I do not mean that we have to contend with prevalent and gross corruption, but that the native employés are still too much under the influence of personal bias, party feelings, the fear of offending persons of rank, and the dread of public clamour. There is as yet too little strength of character,—a want of self-reliance and fertility of resource in unexpected difficulties,—and an inability to act where no rule or order has been prescribed beforehand. As I have already said, I most cordially admit the immense progress that has taken place in the character and tone of feeling in the native judicial service, and among the educated classes generally; but I think that the Government in India has shewn itself alive to that progress, and most anxious to keep pace with that growing fitness by introducing distinguished native servants from time to time to posts of dignity and trust which were before exclusively filled by Englishmen. Even some of the offices formerly reserved for members of the civil service have been lately thrown open to natives.* We are, then, in

* I would not, however, be supposed to assert that the allowances assigned to native officials are adequate. I speak only of the question of admitting them to offices not at present held by them,

this dilemma. There are the most urgent reasons for throwing open the public service more widely to natives of rank and education; the administration is suffering because we do not more largely employ this economical agency; our own popularity with the people is suffering, and the policy of exclusion is full of danger. Yet, on the other hand, we have gone as far as is consistent with administrative efficiency. We cannot place in the hands of natives posts of higher responsibility than those they now occupy, without a certain degree of risk. The offices at present filled by natives are such as admit of constant and minute control and supervision. It is felt that there are very few natives who could be implicitly trusted to carry on duties of a more difficult nature, in a position where they would have to be left much to themselves, to their own sense of what was right and necessary,—in a position of independence and self-reliance. Then what is to be done? Are we to wait until these schools, colleges, and universities, have had the effect of gradually bringing into existence a higher type of character than we have yet obtained, notwithstanding all the progress actually effected? I believe not. I believe there is a limit to what we can bring out by such educational agency as we

which involve a greater share of *power* and *responsibility*. The native judges and the clerks in the Courts of Law are notoriously underpaid—an opinion for which I have the authority of all Indian statesmen.

have in India. I believe that influences of a kind different from any yet tried must be brought to bear upon the upper and educated classes of Hindostan, in order to produce the growth we desire. We want something higher than mere scholastic influences and the teaching of books. These last are too faint to bring out strength of *character*, to produce a vigorous mental and moral constitution, especially when the scholars and students live habitually in a social atmosphere which counteracts the work of the school and class room. What would our English boys and young men be if all the moral and mental influence they received were confined to the class room ;—while at home, in the play-ground, in society and the world, they dwelt amid the traditional customs and habits of thought of a corrupt and decaying civilisation? We all know that the best part of the education of an English youth is what he derives from his home, his play-ground, the cricket field, the debating club, the healthful society in which he moves after his college days are over,—the vigorous, high-toned, free and generous life of England. Englishmen in India complain that the educated natives, however superior to their predecessors, are conceited, shallow and pedantic, unable to carry out the higher principles they bring from college when placed in the way of temptation, mere copyists of English modes of thought, without a spark of originality or creative talent, without resource in difficulty, or moral

courage in danger. There may be exaggeration here, but, granting it to the full, could we expect any other result when we look at the circumstances in which they are placed? Can a few years of Shakespere and Milton taught in the school-room neutralize the inheritance of generations,—caste, polytheism, practical atheism, corrupt and degrading social customs, physical weakness, the habits of servitude, social and political inferiority? It will be asked, perhaps, whether the educated young men of India do not already possess the benefit of English society on the spot, whether our countrymen in India do not take them by the hand and make them feel what home-life is among Englishmen, by inviting them to their houses, by directing, advising, and befriending those who shew promise of character and ability. Alas, the habits of Indian life are against it. Too many Englishmen look with undisguised contempt upon the inferior race among whom they live, and neither care nor hope for their improvement. Those most fitted, and most inclined to associate with young natives for the purpose of friendly guidance, are the best men of the official class, but they are overwhelmed with work, and never having an hour's leisure until night. They are then too wearied to bear the irksome task of conversing with young men who, while too often conceited and affected, can have but few ideas or interests in common with them. There is much less community of thought and feeling between them than there would be between a

number of mechanics and highly educated gentlemen in England.

What then is to be done? I propose that measures should be adopted for bringing to this country every year a small number of young natives of superior capacity, for the purpose of giving them a university education and the influences of English life and society. They would be men who had already completed the rudimentary part of their education in our Indian schools and colleges, and who would be ready at once to enter upon the special studies requisite for the learned Professions, the Bar, Medicine, or Divinity, as well as for Civil Engineering, while some might devote their time to the study of Commerce and Manufactures. They would, before leaving India, have received such an education as would enable them at once, on their arrival in England, to derive benefit from cultivated English society and from travel, as well as from lectures and public institutions. It will be said by objectors that there are already Universities in India by which the natives are enabled to enter upon the profession of medicine, law, or civil engineering. That is true, but what I desire to point out is that education in India is merely the education of the lecture room, and what I want is the education of English life out of the lecture room. In England natives of India would have not only a higher kind of competition than in their own country, where their class-fellows are men of their own race and standing, not only the higher teaching of an English

University as compared with that of a Colony ; not only the higher standard of attainment so requisite ; but,—what I would chiefly lay stress upon,—the free association with professors and fellow students, with the first minds in the world. Besides, many may like to associate themselves for a time with mercantile houses and commercial undertakings, and in other ways to obtain experience and knowledge altogether beyond the sphere of a University.

It is a constant complaint in India, that although the native students learn quickly and accurately every thing we teach them, and pass the most carefully conducted examinations with credit, and although the standard of instruction has been raised so high as to admit of the establishment of a University with power to confer degrees in Arts, yet, with all this, the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake is almost unknown. It is complained that books and study are almost wholly neglected by the most distinguished students when the college is left, and the degree is once obtained ; that there is a singular want of original power and creative talent ; that the Arts and Sciences have not yet taken such a root as to yield their proper fruit in their influence on the minds of the growing generation ; that the knowledge imparted at the colleges does not appear to possess a living vitality, leading men to develope and apply it as if it were a real power. Even the ablest students, it is said, can do little more than repeat what they have gained from books, almost

in the very words of the books ; and never use their knowledge as an instrument of thought and action. I cannot gainsay this assertion, and I attribute it, in part, to the fact that there is nothing in the daily life of these students to keep up an interest in their studies ; they have no one outside the college gate to lead their minds onwards to the highest self-culture ; they see in actual life no application of the facts they have acquired ; they have none of the advantages which come from associating with minds superior to their own, which might keep alive and cultivate the knowledge they have acquired. Their studies are a thing wholly apart from their daily experience and the world in which they live. It is just as if one were to be engaged for ever in learning the mere rules of arithmetic or formulæ of mathematics without ever having an opportunity of seeing their application. As regards the great mass of the population, we can extemporize no remedy for this state of things : we must trust to the gradual progress of the native mind during a long course of time ; but we can greatly hasten that progress by raising a class of pioneers, a mental aristocracy, a body of social reformers, from among the most promising minds, by some such scheme as that I now desire to propose. That their studies may have vitality and be imbued with their true meaning, not an exotic artificially stuck on outside their minds, but grafted upon them—my desire is that a select number of these young men should come to Europe, the fountain

head of modern science. There alone will the veil which must ever hang before their eyes in India be torn aside. They will see clearly the value and the application of what they have learnt; they will see how each department of knowledge is connected with every other, by an endless chain, will see how the character of our daily life and civilisation is affected by the subjects of their college studies.

I purposely say nothing as to Religion. These will be men who can judge for themselves and will occupy a position which should secure them from any impertinent attempts at propagandism. People who would resort to interference in this respect can have but little faith in God, or in the indirect testimony to the origin of our religion, which is afforded by the whole aspect of European society as contrasted with that of the East. Any misplaced and short-sighted interference in this matter would probably deter others from coming and neutralise the whole scheme. It should be considered a point of honour to leave these men to be perfectly free agents in the formation of their own conclusions on this as well as on all other points.

Of course, one great object which the Hindoos, in their present state of feeling, would most eagerly look forward to, would be preparation for the competitive examinations for the Indian Civil Service. There is no object of ambition so keenly and increasingly desired by the youth of India as admission into this highly honoured and privileged official

Guild, and only by coming to England, is the object attainable. Here alone, by some such plan as that now proposed, have we the means of making the Queen's Proclamation something more than an empty word, which the natives bitterly complain that it is at present: "And it is our further will that so far as " may be; our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be " freely and impartially admitted to office in our " service, the duties of which they may be qualified, " by their education, ability, and integrity, duly to " discharge." To which effect also, Act 3 and 4 of William IV. "No native shall by reason of " birth, religion, descent, or colour, be disabled from " holding any place or office, or employment under " the Crown." I believe that a few appointments so gained in the Indian Civil Service would act like an electric shock upon the national character. It might be many years before a native civil servant became Judge of the Chief Court of Appeal, or a member of the Supreme Council, but it would be *within reach*. Why do thousands of able men in England willingly enter the Church and the Bar, who could find better remuneration elsewhere than in the lower ranks of those professions, but for the hope that each has that one of the few great prizes may be his? This gives life, energy, and character, to the whole body. So will it be in India when there is the possibility of attaining the highest honours in the gift of the Crown to stir every man to exertion, something *to hope for*, when now there is so very little worth hoping for.

I believe that the arrival in India, every year, of even four or five natives who have had the advantage of three years of such education and such influences, as they would thus receive, would give a valuable impetus to native society. In time these men would form a powerful class, the pioneers of all progress, affording a higher standard of life, and gradually changing the whole social aspect of native society.

It will very likely be imagined by persons in England not well acquainted with the great change in ideas which has taken place of late years among the higher and educated classes, that it will be difficult to find persons willing to come to England, on account of the loss of caste which such a visit would involve. Those however, who are well acquainted with the state of feeling prevalent among the class I speak of, will know how very general a desire exists among the young men to visit this country,—how little any supposed difficulties on the subject of caste would interfere with the object: During the last three years, four native gentlemen have come from Calcutta to this country, and at their own expense, for the purpose of completing their education, and many others have expressed to me their desire to adopt the same course, but have been kept back by the expense—the want of friends in England who would receive them, and enable them to prosecute their objects,—and the vague assumption of difficulty which necessarily, in their imagination, surrounds such an undertaking. Some time ago I wrote to a

native gentleman, asking him for information on this question of caste, in reference to a residence in England. He is a Hindoo holding a very high and responsible situation in the Educational Department, one who has not adopted the social habits of the "Young Bengal" class, but has preserved his caste, and knows intimately the feelings of the orthodox as well as of the radical party among his countrymen. His accurate habits of mind, his high culture and fine character, enable me to place the fullest confidence in the value of any opinion on a subject such as that I am now considering. His reply was :—" As for your main question, whether young men of family and education in this country will be found in sufficient number willing to avail themselves of the opportunity for self-improvement to be thus afforded them, I think there will scarcely be any difficulty in the beginning, and increasing facility every succeeding year. The ties of caste are strong. To renounce caste is not only to renounce a system of effete idolatry, but also to break asunder the tenderest ties by which human beings are united to one another. Still I believe, and the enquiries I have been able to make prove to me beyond the shadow of a doubt, that young men less scrupulous or more courageous, will not be found wanting in our colleges who will gladly avail themselves of the opportunity you propose to open for them, of starting in the career of ambition from that advanced stage to

“ which Europeans owe their present superiority.” So convinced is this gentleman of the value and importance of the scheme which I am now proposing, that he has offered to give a donation of fifty pounds towards the object, though his own income is little more than three hundred a year.

There is an impression in some quarters, that so far as the experiment has been tried of educating natives of India in England, it has been a failure. I do not think that this can be said. The facts are as follows :—About fifteen years ago the native students of the Medical College at Calcutta were informed that four students would be sent to England, and their professional education completed in this country, free of all expense, and volunteers were invited to offer themselves. At that time prejudices were much stronger than they are now, and the Government was obliged to take those who came forward rather than those who were the most likely to do credit to the experiment. Two of the four thus selected turned out badly ; two turned out well ; and one of these latter, Dr. Dwarkanath Chuckerbutty, obtained, five years ago, on the occasion of a second visit to England, an appointment in the Indian Medical Service, at the competitive examination. More recently, others have visited this country at their own expense, for the purpose of obtaining the advantages of a professional education, and have, I understand, distinguished themselves in their own country.

This is not the place for detail. My object is now to invite opinions and suggestions from those who agree with the importance of the scheme generally, and are inclined to assist me in working it out. I ask all such to favour me with an intimation that they are willing to co-operate for the purpose, and to form an association for this express object. When I have received such intimation from a sufficient number of persons, I propose to ask them to fix a day for meeting to organise a society, and to take such measures as may seem desirable for the accomplishment of the object in view.

At present, my idea is that when an association has been fairly organised in England for this purpose, the natives and such Europeans as are interested in their progress at the Presidency towns of India should be invited to co-operate with us. I believe that if the Society in England were to raise by subscription one half of the necessary expenses, the parents and friends of promising young men in India, and persons interested in the progress of their country, would raise the other half. As the progress of ideas advanced, and as the scheme produced its proper fruits, an increasingly larger support might be expected from India, until the Society in England would have to do little more than superintend the expenditure of the funds remitted to them, appoint proper persons to the charge of the young men, and generally see that their interests were advanced.

But, at first, while the experiment is a new one, a large share of the expense must be met here. Considering the great public and national importance of the object, perhaps it is not altogether out of the question to hope that in some shape the Government itself will afford aid to the undertaking. I purposely abstain now from entering on the question as to the University or College which may be found best suited to the position and requirements of these young men. It may be thought that the constitution of the University of London is the one best adapted for Hindu or Mahomedan students. I believe that arrangements might be made for their residence in London at an expense not exceeding £200. a year, including board, lodging, and college fees, &c. To this must be added the expense of the voyage to and from India.

I conclude with commending this proposal to the best consideration and earnest support of that large portion of the English public, which is animated by a hearty desire to see England fulfilling her highest duties to the people of India. I trust that I may receive early assurances that there are many who are ready to take an active part in promoting the undertaking, if placed in the hands of men whose names and character shall be a guarantee for its success.

ORIENTAL CLUB : *June, 1860.*

APPENDIX.

Opinions of eminent public men on the subject of employing the Natives of India in the administration of that country.

"His Lordship cannot contemplate the arrival of a period at which it will be safe or wise to place the great executive and administrative powers in the hands of any other than British officers. At the same time, it is a cause of constant regret that there do not exist in the public service some offices of large emolument and high position, to which native gentlemen of ability and character might rise, so that the office and the pay of Principal Sudder Ameen should no longer be the boundary of a native gentleman's ambition in the British service."—(The Marquis of Dalhousie.)

"All that we can give the natives without endangering our own ascendancy should be given. All real military power must be kept in our own hands, but they might with advantage hereafter be made eligible to every civil office under that of a member of government. The change should be gradual because they are not yet fit to discharge properly the duties of a high civil employment, according to our ideas, but the sphere of their employment should be extended in proportion as we find that they become capable of filling properly higher situations."—(Sir Thos. Monro, 1821.)

"Various measures might be suggested which might in all probability be more or less useful to improve their character, but no one appears to me so well calculated to insure success as that of endeavouring to give them a higher opinion of themselves by placing more confidence in them, by placing them in important situations, and perhaps by rendering them eligible to almost every office under government."—(Sir Thos. Monro, 1824.)

"We ought to look forward to the time when natives may be employed in almost every office however high, and we ought to prepare them gradually for such a change by

entrusting them with higher duties from time to time, in proportion as experience may prove them to be qualified to discharge them.”—(Sir Thos. Monro, 1827.)

“I regret as deeply as you or any man can, that there is no opening for natives. The system of depression becomes more alarming as our power extends, but the remedy is not in raising to rank or influence our servants, moonshees, &c. however good. We must, or we cannot last, contrive to associate the natives with us in the task of rule, and in the benefits and gratifications which accrue from it.”—(Sir John Malcolm.)

Mr. A. J. M. Mills, late a Member of the Legislative Council of India, states in his evidence before the Committee on Indian Colonization, that the character of the native Judges had very much improved of late years, in consequence of their higher education and better remuneration. “They are extremely acute in their reasoning as Judges: I think the native character has improved, and is improving, and as you pay them higher, it will improve still further. I was specially appointed to ascertain the fitness of the natives for the offices they hold, and to see how they administered justice. I visited every court that I could. I examined the proceedings; sat with the native Judge, and made him decide cases in my presence. I was on the whole very much satisfied with the quality of the work done.”

Sir C. Trevelyan, in his evidence before the Committee on Indian Territories (1853): “I used to take great pleasure in conversing with the natives of all ranks and classes; and I used to dilate, perhaps in too boastful a spirit, upon the superior civilisation of the European; our navy, our superior military discipline, our manufactures, our steam-boats and so forth: and I observed to my surprise, that they gave me a cold and indifferent hearing, and they often ended by making an observation something of this sort: ‘Yes, you are a wonderful people; you speak the truth; you keep to your word; when you have promised a thing, however injurious it may be to you, you observe it; you hold by it generation after generation:’ and by degrees, I discovered that the object of their admiration was neither our arts, our arms, nor our science, but our moral qualities; and that to speak the truth from the heart, to promise even to our own hurt and not to disappoint was the real

object of their respect. It is this superior morality which enables every young Writer, although very inferior to many of the natives both in point of experience and intelligence, to command attention and confidence in his decisions. It is the absence of this quality which unfits the native at present from taking part in the actual government of India; I mean in the capacity of Member of Council. The government of India requires a standard of elevation and disinterestedness and single-mindedness which is rare even among Europeans, and would be still more difficult to find among natives. * * But the natives have very considerable administrative qualities; they have great patience, great industry, great acuteness, and intelligence. They have a perfect knowledge of the country and of the people, and acting under European superintendence they acquit themselves extremely well. Native agency and European superintendence should therefore be fully established as the principle of our Government in India. This principle was first officially recognised and established by Lord Wm. Bentinck, and since which time it has been continually growing and extending. This is proved by the fact that notwithstanding the growth of our territory, the number of the civil servants has decreased."

"The European civil service and the native civil service are divided by an elastic impalpable line, which is continually extending, as the natives shew themselves more fit for responsible employment."

"Two things are necessary to the success of the plan of employing natives: one is that they shall be properly educated, first by an adequate system of general education, vernacular and English, and next by a special professional education adapted to their future employment; and the other thing is that they shall be sufficiently paid."

"I contemplate ultimately the almost entire supersession of Europeans in the judicial and revenue departments. When our dominion ceases to be of advantage to the natives, it ought to end; but if it terminates in the way I contemplate, it will end in a manner extremely happy and beneficial for both parties."

"The satisfactory manner in which on the whole they have acquitted themselves [in the judicial department] is a decided support of the opinion which I entertain of their capacity for office."

"It is not my opinion that the intellectual faculties of the natives decay after a certain age: we take the native youths from the midst of a very inferior and corrupt state of society; we introduce them to a pure and elevated literature, and after they leave our schools they return to their old state of society." "The main thing is to open up to them a proper field of mental and moral activity in after-life."—(Sir C. Trevelyan)

"Native agency has been adopted in every department with the greatest success."—(W. Wilberforce Bird).

"The admission of the natives of India to the highest offices of state is simply a question of time."—(W. Kaye).

(Evidence of Sir Frederick Halliday, late Lieut.-Governor of Bengal, before the Committee of the House of Commons on Indian Territories, 1853.)

Mr. Cobden. "I gather from your answers that you do not despair but that with proper encouragement and judicious treatment, the natives may at some future time be rendered capable of filling any offices of trust."

Mr. Halliday. "I do not in the least despair. I go the full length of saying that I believe OUR MISSION IN INDIA IS TO QUALIFY THEM FOR GOVERNING THEMSELVES; I say also that the measures of the Government for a number of years past have been advisedly directed to so qualifying them, without the slightest reference to any remote consequences upon our administration."

"I think the admission of natives to high judicial functions would be a great means of attaching the intellect of the country to our rule. I think we should make friends of them, instead of giving their intellect an incentive to spread into disaffection. I would wish to see them more extensively employed. I think their morality to be highly improved by contact with us and by education."—Sir Erskine Perry.)

"The new race of men would make independent judges when sitting with Europeans;—they would have perhaps even too strong an opinion of their own. * * At the time of our assuming the administration, the native Zemindars, who were armed with police or magisterial powers, were entirely broken down in that respect, and deprived of their authority. They naturally felt this, as they were thereby humiliated in the eyes of their dependents, and the

change tended to drive them into various lawless courses."

* * "The natives do at times not unreasonably feel it to be a grievance that laws are passed affecting their interests without their being sufficiently consulted upon them. In the judicial department, the natives have shewn very great aptitude, and ultimately I believe there would be found natives who would be fit to occupy any position, even the highest, not only in that but in every department. To a fair share of these higher offices the natives on every ground of equity and true policy are fully entitled, in proportion as they prove themselves to be thoroughly qualified for them, not only by talents and attainments but also by integrity of character."—(Dr. Duff, Free Church of Scotland Missionary.)

"I would observe how very easily the natives all acquire the requisite qualifications for the duties which we are pleased to entrust to them. I would ask who can doubt that they would very shortly, if not depressed and dispirited, become at least equal to the functions they performed before we came among them. I confess it is my wish, though possibly I may be blamed for expressing it, not only to have the authority of the native judges extended, but to see them, if possible, enjoy important and confidential situations in other departments of the state."—(Sir Henry Strachey, 1802.)

"Another effect of our system, was the disgust which it gave to the higher classes of natives in the loss of all prospects of respectable provision under the economical scale of our native establishments. The door to official emoluments, and to stations of dignity, was necessarily closed against the natives by the exclusive employment of the covenanted servants of Government."—(Lord Moira, 1815.)

"It must otherwise probably be a source of disquiet and intrigue among the community, for unless Government shall open some door for the employment of the talents which their own liberality has, in many instances, elicited, and, to a certain extent, fostered, by making natives of education and respectability of character eligible to higher grades of the public service than are at present open to their fair and honourable ambition, the gift of superior knowledge, with whatever other advantages attended, can scarcely fail to aggravate the discontent of the educated classes."—(Lord Amherst, 1826.)

"It has frequently been objected to the employment of the natives of India in judicial offices, that they cannot safely be trusted with the administration of justice. To this objection it might, perhaps, be a sufficient answer to say that they are already so trusted. But one principal reason for noticing the objection is, that we may impart to you our decided conviction, that when we place the natives of India in situations of trust and confidence, we are bound under every consideration of justice and policy, to grant them adequate allowances; we have no right to calculate on their resisting temptations to which the generality of mankind in the same circumstances would yield."—(The Court of Directors of the East India Company, 1824.)

"In many respects the Mahometans surpassed our rule. They settled in the countries which they conquered; they intermixed and intermarried with the natives, they admitted them to all privileges; the interests and sympathies of the conquerors and conquered became identified. Our policy, on the contrary, has been the reverse of this, cold, selfish, and unfeeling: the iron hand of power on the one side, monopoly and exclusion on the other."—(Lord Wm. Bentinck.)

"The ancient Hindoo aristocracy, who felt both pride and pleasure in promoting native arts, and encouraging native learning, having nearly dwindled and vanished wherever the British have planted their rule in Hindostan, as the inevitable result of a system which excludes the children of the soil from all high offices of trust and emolument in the State which formerly belonged to them, the Brahmins lost the patrons who enabled them to maintain the many thousands of schools which provided gratuitous education to the poor."—(Dukhina Runjun Mookerjee, a loyal and distinguished native, rewarded by Government for his services in 1857.)

"However rich or powerful or ambitious a native in our dominions may be, there is no sphere of action for him, except plotting against the Bengal Government. If he is on our side there is nothing for him to do. All we ask of him is to sit quiet, to grow rich, to be in fact, a fatted hog."—(*Friend of India*, 1859.)

THE EAST INDIAN

AND OTHER

GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES

ON

RAILWAYS.

(Reprinted from "The Money Market Review.")



RAILWAY ENTERPRISE IN INDIA.

(Reprinted from Official and other Sources.)

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THE CONDITIONS OF INDIAN RAILWAY INVESTMENTS.

(From "*The Money Market Review*.")

At the Special Meeting of the Scinde Railway Company, held on the 29th of August, the able and energetic Chairman, Mr. W. P. Andrew, (as reported in the *Money Market Review* of the 1st of September) proffered some interesting remarks upon several points bearing upon the conditions of Indian Railway Guarantees, respecting which misconception prevails in many quarters. Mr. Andrew mentioned that he had been specially requested to say a few words upon the subject. His remarks related more particularly to an essential point wherein Indian Railway Guarantees differ from those accorded by other Governments, whether foreign or colonial. In the case of all other guarantees, a limit is fixed to the amount of capital, and there is always some degree of uncertainty as to whether that amount will be sufficient for the pur-

poses of the undertaking. Should it be exceeded, the government that has granted the guarantee is under no responsibility in respect to the capital expended in excess of the original agreement. It stipulated to pay a certain rate of interest upon a certain sum, and the limitation was accepted as an essential condition of the enterprise by the capitalists or association who took it in hand. Should the original estimates prove erroneous, and the capital be exceeded—and in the majority of railways, both at home and abroad, this has been the case—the guarantee becomes delusive, for its amount will be reduced. This is the main reason why the public have always refused to attach the same value to a Railway Guarantee as to a State Bond. The conditions of the latter are certain, and clearly defined, whilst those of the former are not so. Various plans have been resorted to in order to obviate the uncertainty. A guarantee has, in some cases, been granted upon an amount of capital largely in excess of the estimates, and yet the actual cost has exceeded, or bids fair to exceed, the enlarged sum fixed. In other instances “responsible contractors,” as the phrase runs, have been bound down in large penalties to complete the work for a sum within the capital guaranteed. An arrangement of this character has usually been attended with one or other of the following unsatisfactory results:—

1. The railway and other works have been constructed within the estimate, it is true, but in an

unsubstantial manner. By this means the obligation entered into by every party to the bargain is nominally fulfilled, but the shareholders find themselves subjected to a large annual expenditure for repairs and renewals, which materially affects the remunerative capacity of the enterprise, for in nearly every instance the terms of the guarantee do not do more than oblige the Government to pay a *maximum* sum, sufficient for the stipulated rate of interest upon the fixed amount of capital. Should heavy repairs and renewals become necessary hereafter, the position of the shareholders may be seriously imperilled.

2. The second of the unsatisfactory results to which we have alluded is, either a quarrel and lawsuit between the Company and the contractor who has been bound down, or his insolvency. This explains the numerous cases that have arisen of late years, wherein railway companies and contractors prolong a wearying litigation, frequently carrying the struggle from court to court.

From uncertainties of the character above described, Indian railways are completely exempt, and in this important particular they enjoy an advantage over every other class of railway undertakings. The guarantee of the Indian Government is not limited to a particular sum, but applies to *any sum that the railway may cost*. In this instance, therefore, the guarantee is a real one, and exempt from risk.

Another very important point in favour of the

Indian railways was alluded to with equal clearness by Mr. Andrew. He pointed out that foreign and colonial governments exercise only a very general control over the construction of their railways, and take no responsibility in respect of the expenditure or the execution of the engineering works, the result being that disputes often arise after a long period upon points which may seriously affect the interests of the Company. But the control which the Indian Government exercises in these matters, Mr. Andrew remarked, "is very stringent, and not a step can be taken, or a shilling expended, without its special sanction." This precludes the possibility of dispute, and defines the position of Indian railway investments with the greatest possible degree of clearness. In the same way, there is a decisive assurance that no danger can arise to the interests of the companies from any possible delay in the progress of the works, originating, perhaps, in causes over which the directors have no control. There is, in fact, no arbitrary period whatever fixed for the completion of the Indian railways. The Government is represented by one of its own officers, an *ex-officio* director, at the board of each of the companies, and thus may be said to stamp with official sanction each step in their progress. We know how different is the position of other railways—colonial and foreign. Their completion is imperative, within a specified time, under severe penalties, which even provide, in some instances, for

the entire forfeiture of the whole undertaking by its proprietors.

Finally, Mr. Andrew remarked, "Another important peculiarity of the Indian guarantee was this—the companies might have all their money returned if they found, after the line was constructed, that the dividends did not equal their expectations." This stipulation is of so extraordinarily favourable a character that an investor might well be excused for demanding the strictest evidence of its accuracy. There is, however, not the slightest doubt upon the point. Mr. Andrew's assurance needs no corroboration; but we may cite here a paragraph from Mr. Juland Danvers's Official Report on the Indian Railways, addressed to the Government of India (to which reference was made in the *Money Market Review* of the 16th of June), describing the conditions of the Government guarantee. Mr. Danvers observes: "The railway companies have the power of surrendering the works at any time after any portion of the line has been opened for a period of three months, upon giving six months' notice to the Government, who would have to repay the whole amount that has been expended, with their sanction, on the undertaking."

We know of no other railway undertakings which present such signal advantages. The shareholders have to deal with a perfectly solvent Government—with, in fact, the servants of the British Crown—which guarantees to them a hand-

some minimum rate of interest upon the capital employed, fixes no limit to the amount of capital, or to the period for the accomplishment of the undertaking, identifies itself with the management at every step, and, finally, binds itself to take the railway and works into its own hands, and to repay the capital expended in the event of the Company finding, at any time during the period of the concession (ninety-nine years), that the return does not equal their expectations.

RAILWAY ENTERPRISE IN INDIA.

(From "The Friend of India.")

When, for the first time, Indian legislation is retrogressive, and when the absence of government threatens the extinction of half the European capital in Bengal, we derive new confidence from the two facts that it is non-official energy which has doubled the trade of the country, and created a vast railway system in ten years. Since 1850 eight companies have been formed in England to carry out ten separate railway projects in a country in which no finished material and no skilled labour exist, to which

800,000 tons of iron and 700 European engineers and workmen have been sent. These projects involve a capital of nearly £53,000,000 sterling, of which not one million has been raised in the country to be benefitted by their execution. These companies have undertaken the gigantic task of opening 4,917 miles of communication at a cost comparatively as low as that of the cheap American lines, through districts rich with the virgin wealth of centuries, but hitherto separated by the impassable barriers of distance. In ten years they have completed a fifth of the work undertaken, and have so forwarded the rest that it will be finished in four years more. Engineering difficulties have been encountered unknown in Europe, miles of quicksand and river have been bridged, and the steep ascents of mountain ranges have been climbed by the iron way. Science has triumphed over nature, and that in a land to which she was a foreigner, under a sky which to her votaries has too often been disease and death. Living as we do on the spot, looking only at local delays and official obstructions, remembering rash promises that were made in the infancy of Indian railways, and sad disasters which would have been averted in 1857 had these promises been fulfilled, we have a tendency to undervalue the extent of railway enterprise in the East. But, if we look at the picture of it, as a whole, drawn by Mr. Danvers, the Secre-

tary to the Railway Department of the India Office, we shall be astonished at its magnitude, and congratulate ourselves on its present results. As we read his pages of figures and accurate statements of facts, imagination fails to grasp the full extent of the benefit which these £53,000,000 of English capital will confer on India. And when we remember that this capital is to be applied almost exclusively to trunk lines, that when they are completed branches will run out from them into every district, that there is no spot in the plains of India where a line will not pay, we may well pray for peace, that knowledge may be allowed thus to run to and fro and cover the whole land. The basis of trade as of the military security of India is a complete railway system. We have so often described the progress of each railway that we shall draw on Mr. Danvers only for a few of the more striking facts. His report is a complete history of railways in India up to the close of last year. Notwithstanding the delays and destruction of material caused by the Santhal raids and the mutinies; in spite of the distance of India from England, the loss of materials on the way, the mortality among the European servants of the companies, and the difficulty in many cases of securing labour; and in the face of the obstruction caused by the supervision and interference of Government, a Committee of the House of Commons declared in 1858 that

the construction of the Indian lines will bear favourable comparison with that of the English. The same remark is true of the cost of construction and the expense of working. The Indian companies have had no legal and Parliamentary expenses, while they have paid nothing for the land. The eight companies at present in the field having guarantees as to the interest on their capital are :—

	Finished.	Total.
East Indian, from Calcutta to Delhi, with line to Jubbulpore	376½	1,338
Great Indian Peninsular, from Bombay to Jubbulpore (with branch to Nagpore) on the north, and to Moodgul on the south	298½	1,266
Madras to Beypore on the south-west, and to Moodgul on the north	137	850
Scinde and Punjaub, from Kurrachee to Kotree, and from Mooltan to Umritsir .	—	364
Bombay, Baroda, and Central India, from Bombay through Surat and Broach to Ahmedabad	40	309½
Eastern Bengal, from Calcutta to the Ganges at Kooshtee	—	109½
Great Southern of India, from Negapatam to Trichinopoly	—	80
Calcutta and South-Eastern, to the Moolah River	—	29
Miles	852	4,917

In addition to these actually sanctioned, lines are being surveyed in Oude, and from Umritsir to Delhi.

Lines are contemplated from Kooshtee to Dacca and Darjeeling, from Delhi to Meerut and Mozuffernugger, from Nagpore to Madras, from the Trichinopoly to the Madras line, and in Rohilcund and Kumaon. The capital estimated as required by the eight Companies is £52,430,000. On £34,133,300 of this interest has been guaranteed, and of that amount £27,079,712 had been actually raised last December. Though shares can be registered here as well as in England, only £625,971 has been subscribed in India. The sum of £3,840,790 had been paid as guaranteed interest to the end of 1859, of which the three working Companies had received almost the whole. Up to June last they had repaid £562,633. It is a most gratifying fact that while the East Indian had opened a section representing only £1,716,000, and had received interest on £13,000,000, its profits amounted to one-fifth of the sum paid for the guarantee upon that whole. Reckoning the dividend of the three railways at $7\frac{1}{2}$ for the East Indian, 6 for the Great Indian Peninsular, and 3 for the Madras line, both Government and the shareholders will be gainers. On the East Indian, for instance, the former will gain $1\frac{1}{4}$ per cent., and the latter $6\frac{1}{4}$, instead of 5, the guaranteed *minimum*. As soon as Government has been repaid the whole of its money, with simple interest, the shareholders will receive the full $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., or whatever is the amount. The whole number of

English shareholders is about 15,000. The cheapness and vastness of Indian railways will be seen from a comparison with any of those in England, say the London and North-Western. The direct line from Calcutta to Delhi is just 1,120 miles, and will cost for a double line of rails £17,480 per mile. The railway which begins at Euston-square is 686½ miles, each of which cost £50,000, or three times that of the former. As to speed in construction, the line of 121 miles from Calcutta to Raneeungee, the distance of the Great Western from London to Bristol, occupied just four years. As to engineering works, the waterway of the Jumna, Tonse, Keeul, and Hullohur bridges is 9,150 feet, or twice that of all the Thames bridges from London to Westminster inclusive. There are no railway works out of America to compare with the Soane, the Jumna, the Taptee, and the Nerbudda bridges, nor with the inclines up the Bhore and Thull ghauts. The total number of *employés* on all the three working railways is 737 Europeans and Christians, and 7,708 natives. To the Indian Government, as to the public, the question of greatest interest is, when will these 4,917 miles of railway be completed. The political, commercial, and social interests involved in their termination are vast. A mutiny becomes impossible, the existing trade of India is doubled, civilization is advanced a century, and England brought nearer Calcutta a week. This

report promises that the whole railway system will be complete in 1863. We do not expect it till the cold weather of 1864. We shall be content if the line from Rajmahal to Allahabad and Jubbulpore is ready in the cold weather of 1863, and from Cawnpore to Delhi in that of 1861; if overland passengers from Calcutta can go *viâ* Madras and Beypore to Suez eighteen months hence, and *viâ* Jubbulpore and Bombay in three years and a half.

SCINDE RAILWAY—INDUS STEAM FLOTILLA—PUNJAUB RAILWAY.

The great object contemplated in these combined undertakings is the establishment of a sure and speedy means of communication between the port of Kurrachee in Scinde, and the Punjab; as well as the connexion of Lahore and the North-West frontier of India, with Calcutta on the one side, and the Western Coast on the other.—*Report of Secretary Rail. Dept., India Office.*

SCINDE RAILWAY.—Should the expectation be realized of having it (the Scinde Railway), completed and opened throughout for traffic about the expiration of the current year, there appears every

prospect of its being the first completed line, having its capital account closed, and one of the first railways in India, likely to pay a dividend on the capital expended on its construction.—*Directors' Report.*

INDUS STEAM FLOTILLA.—During the season of 1858, the rate of freightage had risen so high, that the profits on a single trip from Pind Dadan Khan on the Jhelum, to Roree on the Indus, a distance of about 430 miles, repaid the cost of the boat, the result of this state of things being, that none but the more valuable kinds of produce, as sugar, saltpetre, &c., could bear this high cost of transit; corn, wool, and cotton being almost entirely excluded; indeed the latter article has almost wholly ceased to be grown for export, although it can be produced on the banks of the Jhelum, and of good quality for a penny a pound.—*Report to Sir Charles Wood, by Mr. W. Purdon, Executive Engineer, Punjaub.*

PUNJAUB RAILWAY.—The Punjaub may well be considered the most important portion of Asia, south of the Himalaya, not only in its political, but also in its commercial relations. From its position it has ever exercised an important influence on the military affairs of India; this is at once apparent when regard is had to its geographical situation, communicating on the east with the Valley of the Ganges, commanding on the west the passes into Persia and Affghanistan. The physical features of the country adapt it for military operations; the

natural richness of the soil and variety of its own productions, render it independent of external resources, and hence we find that from the earliest times the Punjab has been to India what the Netherlands have been to Europe.

The Chief Commissioner for the Punjab, in his report for the years 1854-56, estimates the surplus production of cereals at nearly half a million of tons annually, and the quantity of unreclaimed land capable of cultivation at six millions of acres.

“Let means of export” (observes Sir John Lawrence), “the grand desideratum, be once supplied, everything will follow. There is a population, prolific to increase, hardy and industrious to labour. There are vast supplies of water in the rivers, and facilities for excavating canals. Then money will be abundant, prices will recover their standard, and the land revenue will flourish.”

The selection of this route (from Mooltan to Lahore and Umritsir) for a railway is unquestionably advantageous, giving a first-class communication where it was most required, and where a cheaper mode to enter into competition with it is not practicable.

The remarkably favourable nature of the country over which this line is to run, and its low cost as compared with other lines in India, will enable it to carry at much lower rates than elsewhere.

So great is the passenger traffic over this line of country, it will probably be found as much as the railway can deal with.—*Report to Sir Charles Wood, by Mr. W. Purdon, Executive Engineer, Punjaub.*

Mr. Macleod, the Financial Commissioner of the Punjaub, stated at the last Annual General Meeting of the Scinde and Punjaub Proprietors, that:—"Besides wool, cotton, and flax, there were many other articles of small bulk and great commercial value, which could be grown in the Punjaub with great advantage. One of these was tea, which grew admirably on the skirts of the Himalayas. There was a fertility in the soil, and a power of production which amounted to an absolute surfeit, and cereals had been produced until they had ceased to be remunerative. Let the Railway be established, and the whole trade of the country would be attracted by it."

DELHI LINE.—On the 27th January, 1859, in accordance with the recommendation of the Government of India, the construction of a line to connect the Punjaub with Delhi, was granted to the Scinde and Punjaub Railway Company, with 5 per cent. guaranteed on the requisite capital, on the usual terms. Engineers have been already engaged in surveying two routes, one from Lahore *via* Ferozepore, and the other from Umritser *via* Loodianna and Umballa, along the line of the

Grand Trunk Road. It is expected that the detailed plans and estimates of the route approved by Government will shortly arrive in England.—
Report of Secretary Rail. Dept., India Office.

LONDON TO LAHORE.

(From an Indian Paper).

The magnificent design emanating from, and matured by, the genius of the chairman of the Scinde Railway Company, for linking London with Lahore by one continuous and direct chain of communication, is no longer looked upon by practical men as chimerical or Utopian. Step by step has the gigantic plan been developed; and whether we contemplate the grandeur of the whole in one general view, or descend to inquire into the specialities of each individual section, it must be acknowledged that the minutest scrutiny proves that the original conception was based on the surest data. The line by rail and steamer between Great Britain and the Levant has long been an established fact. From Southampton, Marseilles, and Trieste, steamers are constantly plying to and from the eastern ports of the Mediterranean. To continue this line by the most direct and economical route to Western India and the Punjaub is the object of Mr. Andrew and his numerous influential supporters. Sir John M'Neill and General Chesney had selected a spot in the im-

mediate vicinity of the old port of Seleucia, which presented every facility for forming a harbour. From that point to the Euphrates they had surveyed the whole country; and so favourable was it for the construction of a railway, that it was calculated the line might be laid down at £9000 per mile, which, if compared with similar works in Europe and America, will be admitted to be very moderate indeed. The local traffic is found to be immense, and the existing rates of carriage very high.*

At a period when our relations on the north-western frontier are in a most precarious state, and when complications may arise demanding the movement of large bodies of troops in that direc-

* With reference to the extension of commerce in these countries, I may cite that of Mossul—which is not included in the preceding returns. In 1844, £32,000 duty were paid by the Pasha of Mossul on goods valued at more than one million sterling. Our consul at that place, Mr. Rassem (who cultivates cotton rather extensively, and is now introducing the Sea Island plant), assures me that if the means of transport could be procured, there would be at least 300,000 camel loads annually of cotton, wool, wheat, barley, madder-roots, tobacco, &c., sent from Mossul for exportation. But this is only the increase that may be expected in one instance. A proportionately great one is likely to be the consequence of facility of transport elsewhere. Cotton, silk, and grain will, without any doubt, be more largely cultivated on the plains between Suedia and the river Euphrates. In fact, nothing is wanted but an outlet and moderate protection, to develop the resources of this large tract of country,—superior in fertility to Egypt,—and to produce an enormous commerce in Mesopotamia and Babylonia in cotton, wool, wheat, indigo, sugar, copper, tobacco, valonia, red and yellow berries, &c.—*Report on the Euphrates Valley Railway, by Major-General Chesney, R.A., F.R.S. Smith, Elder and Co., Cornhill, 1857.*

tion, it must be evident that increased facilities for their transit are not only expedient but indispensable. At the present moment, with the means government have at their disposal, it would take months to assemble an army for defence or invasion on our frontier; whereas, with the (the Euphrates and Indus) lines completed that we have spoken of, 50,000 men might be conveyed in a shorter space of time from England to Affghanistan.

“When it is considered that the proposed Euphrates Railway will not only supply all the facilities demanded (for commerce), but is to shorten the journey to India by almost one-half, the changes impending in the destinies of this region, the early prospect of which is one among the salutary results of the war, will appear to claim greater attention, commercially and politically, than any at present to be looked for in other quarters of the Globe.”—
“Times,” City Article.

FINANCIAL MEASURES FOR INDIA.

S P E E C H

OF THE

RIGHT HON. JAMES WILSON,

DELIVERED BEFORE THE

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF CALCUTTA.

ON THE

18TH FEBRUARY, 1860.

LONDON:

W^t H. ALLEN & CO., 7, LEADENHALL STREET.

1860.

(10)



S P E E C H

OF THE

RIGHT HON. JAMES WILSON.

MR. PRESIDENT,—Sir, I feel that the ground over which it will be my duty to travel before I sit down will be so extensive, that the fear of taxing your patience and my own powers will deter me from making any lengthened introductory remarks which may add to that danger. Yet, sir, I cannot but feel sensible that I owe some explanation, if not indeed apology, for the position in which I now find myself. A year ago nothing could have appeared more beyond the range of probability than that I should now be addressing the Legislative Council of India, so much so that since that time I have undergone two elections to the Imperial Parliament. It was not till near the close of the last session when, as a member of the Government, it was proposed to me to undertake the honourable but arduous and responsible—perhaps the more honourable because so arduous—duties which I have now to discharge. Sir, if for a moment I felt some reluctance in occupying so responsible an office, I trust I may say it was from no consideration of a selfish or personal kind. I cannot deny that it was not without the greatest regret that I voluntarily renounced a career, for a time at least, it may be for ever, in the greatest representative assembly in the world, to enter upon a sphere of public duty altogether new; but these are considerations which, however natural, ought not to decide the course of any one who has embraced the service of the State. No, sir, if I hesitated, it was from a doubt in my own knowledge and capacity to cope with the gigantic difficulties which I was called upon to encounter—difficulties which in a great measure had arisen from circumstances which no one could control, and the real origin of which is to this day unexplained, if not unexplainable. And if, sir, I overcame this reluctance, it was because I had so often witnessed public proofs, and indeed in my own person had experienced them, that when a public man applied himself with earnestness and zeal to a difficult task, he could always rely with confidence that the most generous construction would be

placed upon his actions, whatever might be the result. And now, sir, let me assure this Council, that if I bring no other qualities to the task which, in accordance with the notice I gave a fortnight since, I have this day before me, I can conscientiously say that I have been influenced by no other motive than to propose what I believe to be best for the interests of all classes, and essential for the prosperity of our magnificent Indian empire. And here permit me to say, once for all, that, in the proposals which I shall have the honour to make, in the principles of policy which I shall announce as those which will guide her Majesty's Indian Government, I have the fullest, the amplest concurrence of the noble Earl the Governor-general, and of my other colleagues in Council; and I doubt not we shall experience a generous support from her Majesty's Government and the Council of India at home. And, sir, I should not be doing justice to my own feelings, nor to the merits of others, if I did not bear witness to the valuable assistance which I have up to this time received from my colleagues in Council, from the heads of all the departments I have had to consult, from numerous members of the civil service, and from the leading commercial gentlemen with whom I have had the good fortune to communicate. I must also add that I have received valuable aid from many distinguished members of the native community. Wherever I believed sound and useful information could be obtained I have freely applied for it, and I must express my gratitude for the ungrudging and willing response to my applications. But, sir, there is one gentleman in particular to whom my thanks are due. My honourable friend the member for the North-west Provinces introduced a Bill in the month of August last for licensing trades. That Bill was introduced before it could have been known that her Majesty's Government had even decided upon my appointment. When I arrived in Calcutta that Bill had passed a second reading, and had been referred to a committee, and I feel it my duty to state that on my arrival my honourable friend took the earliest opportunity of begging that I would in no way feel flattered by the existence of that Bill, but that it was his wish that I should act in every way with regard to it as best suited my own wishes and views. Nothing could be more cordial or frank than my honourable friend's conduct. And now that the Government has decided that, in the shape in which that Bill now stands, it would be better to abandon it and introduce new measures, I am bound to say that we feel very sensible of the great advantages which have resulted from the discussions which have taken place upon that Bill. We cannot doubt that they will tend very much to aid both the Government and the public in arriving at a wise and correct conclusion; and, sir, for this assistance I tender my cordial thanks to my honourable friend.

Unhappily, sir, the tragic events which have happened in British India within the last three years have been too extensively and too severely felt to be soon forgotten.

But severe as was the storm, and numerous as were the wrecks strewed over the land, it is now restored to complete tranquillity, and the Indian political atmosphere was probably never at any former time so settled and clear. But though this is undoubtedly the case, though by the power of our arms and the courage of our civil administration a well-founded feeling of greater security pervades India than at any former time, yet it is, unfortunately, no State secret that an evil of the greatest magnitude is corroding the very core of our political existence. Sir, if we have surmounted one class of difficulties we have still to grapple with another class, which, if not so exciting and alarming, is still of the most pressing and urgent character. It would be in vain that we could boast of the success of our arms, of the restoration of peace and tranquillity, if we could see no end to that financial disorder which so notoriously prevails at this moment. That our situation is serious, that it is even worse than we expected, I am bound to admit. Sir, we have difficulties to face; the first essential step to take is to understand their full extent, their utmost magnitude. It will be my duty, therefore, to lay before you, without suppression on the one hand and without exaggeration on the other, the exact state of our financial position as I find it. The Government desires to exercise no reserve. We think that our safest course—for rely upon it, if in matters involving the credit of a State there is a well-founded impression that something is held back, that the whole truth is not known, that the public may be exposed to a disagreeable surprise, it is the Government itself that suffers most from such a state of uncertainty. The money market understands how to discount uncertainties and contingencies. We consider, therefore, that the greatest frankness is not only a line of our duty, as it is of our inclination, but that it is our best policy. We are of opinion also that under present circumstances especially we are bound to be frank, when we are about to appeal to you to aid us in our efforts to retrieve the position in which we now stand. If we call upon the public to bear new burdens, and to make new sacrifices, however slight, we feel that we are at least bound to explain fully their necessity; and we are confident that if we can enlist public opinion in our favour at all it is by pursuing such a course. Sir, it is true we have no representative assembly to satisfy, and it would be only idle to speculate upon the time when India might have such institutions; but, sir, we have a public opinion, an enlightened public opinion, both native and European, and above all we have a free press and free discussion; and we are of opinion that nothing but good can be derived from those useful—I

would say necessary—elements of a prosperous social structure, by frankness on our part. It is by such a course that we believe we can best perform our duty to this Council, and by which we can best enlist the sympathies and aid of the public in the heavy task which for the public benefit of India we are prepared to undertake, and in the success of which we have the utmost confidence, if we have only that fair share of support which we trust our proposals will command.

What, then, is our position? The last authentic public exposition of the financial position of India was made by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State in the House of Commons on the 1st day of August last. In that statement my right honourable friend computed the deficiency of income as against the expenditure of the current year ending on the 30th of April next at 10,250,000*l*. That was including the whole of the Indian and Home charges. But now, sir, it is my duty to ask the indulgence of the Council while I allude to what will appear a considerable discrepancy in the state of our accounts as they stand at the present time. In the month of September, the month following the statement to which I have referred, a financial balance-sheet was drawn up in Calcutta, which seems to have been published in the public prints. It is the special desire of those who were then members of the Indian Government that I should be full and explicit upon this subject. According to that statement, the deficiency in India was stated for the current year to be 2,651,431*l*., and, including the Home charges, 6,499,981*l*. But let us bear in mind that this was only an estimate, though founded on the best information which was then at the command of the Government. As might naturally have been expected, the publication in England of so sudden an improvement in the state of Indian finances as that statement exhibited, when compared with the statement made so short a time before by the Secretary of State, produced an impression very favourable. But if, sir, it shall appear as I proceed in my statement that this impression was not well founded, I shall at least be able to show that the discrepancies proceed from causes over which the authorities in Calcutta at the time had no control.

Well then, sir, I hold in my hand the final estimate of the income and expenditure of the current year, as corrected up to the present time, and a copy of which I will lay upon the table. According to this estimate, the income of the year will be 37,706,209*l*., and the charges, including the stores from England, will amount to 41,770,008*l*., leaving a deficiency in India alone of 4,063,809*l*.; but from this amount we have to deduct the railway traffic receipts paid into the public treasury. Sir, it is a most gratifying fact, and one which augurs well for the future, that those receipts in the present year amount to no less a sum

than 553,920*l.* From this, however, we must deduct 223,220*l.* for working expenses, which leaves a net return from traffic of 330,700*l.* But then from this we must further deduct a sum of 50,000*l.*, payable in India as guaranteed interest to shareholders, leaving a balance of 280,200*l.* to be deducted from the deficit of 4,063,809*l.*, and reducing it to 3,783,109*l.* Then, sir, according to the last accounts which I have received from the Secretary of State, the Home charges, exclusive of the stores furnished to India, which I have already included, but including the sum of 1,114,000*l.* to be paid for guaranteed interest to railway companies, will amount to 5,507,020*l.*, which, added to the deficit in India, will raise it to 9,290,129*l.* These figures show an increase upon those of September to the extent of 1,417,378*l.* upon the deficit of India, and, including the Home charges, of no less than 2,790,148*l.* Well, the explanation of this large discrepancy will, I am sure, show, what I feel confident no one can suspect, that there was no desire or intention of misleading the public by that statement.

In the first place, then, the letter which accompanied the statement showed distinctly that in the receipts were included an estimate of 775,000*l.* as the receipts from new taxes then proposed for the adoption of this Council. Sir, I fear if that expectation has entirely failed that I may be considered partly responsible for the failure; but at least the reasons are well known to you and the public. Then again, sir, only very recently it was discovered that in furnishing the accounts from Bombay of the military expenditure an error had been made of nearly 600,000*l.*, and in those from Madras an unexpected increase in the commissariat department took place to the extent of 300,000*l.* In the public works department also an unexpected increase of a considerable amount has taken place. Then, again, the September account was furnished without any reference to railway advances for interest on the one hand, or receipts from traffic on the other, which makes a difference of 833,300*l.*; and, lastly, the Home charges show an increase of 640,490*l.*

Now these items, amounting to upwards of 3,000,000*l.*, sufficiently explain the great discrepancy which must appear between the figures stated in September and those corrected to this date. Sir, I do not offer this explanation as a justification of a system under which such uncertainty prevails as to render such discrepancies possible; in this respect I would rather offer it as a proof of the absolute necessity for some immediate extension and radical change of such a system. But what I am anxious to do is to show that those who issued the September statement did so in good faith, and in the *bona fide* belief in its accuracy—should there indeed be any one who

could possibly harbour a different opinion. Well, sir, but the really important use that we are called upon to-day to make of the facts to which I have referred is this: that the pleasing illusion which had to some extent been entertained that we had made some considerable progress out of our difficulties, is but an illusion. I am told that it has been said in England upon the strength of that statement, that "the neck of our financial difficulties had been broken." It would indeed, sir, be a gratifying fact to those who are now responsible for the finances of India if such were the case; but if it is not so, if our difficulties remain to the full undiminished—if, indeed, every day that we postpone a remedy they are only becoming aggravated, then, sir, I say that such an illusion to be entertained is highly dangerous, inasmuch as it is calculated to slacken our efforts, and to weaken our determination to meet those difficulties, to submit to those sacrifices which are necessary to overcome them. Sir, if we permit ourselves to be seduced into a false belief that we are already rapidly improving, and thereby are less earnest in our endeavours to arrest this serious evil, it will be most unfortunate for ourselves and the country.

Without exaggerating anything, let us look everything fairly in the face: if we would really rise to the magnitude of the crisis in which we are placed, and be found equal to it, we must take a broad and unprejudiced view of our position; we must look at things not as we could wish them to be, but as they really are. Well, I have already shown you that our deficiency for the present year, up to the 30th of April, as nearly as it can be estimated, is 9,290,129*l.*: our deficiency in the year ending the 30th April last was 13,393,137*l.*, and for the year preceding, ending the 30th of April, 1858, it was 7,864,222*l.* Thus, in three years since the commencement of the mutiny, the net deficiency of income, as compared with expenditure, amounts to no less a sum than 30,547,488*l.* And what is our prospect for the next year? After the way in which we have been deceived by estimates, you will understand with how much diffidence I must regard any estimate that can be made. But we can only, in looking into the future, take the best means within our reach. I have a special dislike to prospective budgets—they baffle and deceive the ablest financier. However correct calculations may be, a change of circumstances often upsets them all. Well, but availing myself of the best information at my command as things now stand, allowing for a reduction of 1,000,000*l.*, which will appear in the accounts of the present year as compensation for losses, allowing for a decrease in the military charges of 1,240,000*l.*, for which arrangements have up to this time been made, and allowing, too, for an increase of income from salt duties, for which the necessary sanction has been obtained, of

410,000*l.*, I cannot, even with all these allowances, reduce the deficit of next year below 6,500,000*l.*, which would swell the deficiency for the four years into a sum of 37,000,000*l.*

But, sir, what has this state of our finances brought about? Our deficiencies have been supplied by loans in England and in India; and what has been the result? And here I claim the special attention of everyone, native and European, who feels a real interest in India. What was the state of our debt before the mutiny? what is it now? and, let me ask, what will it soon be, if we are to resort to the miserable, the disreputable expedient of continuing to borrow in time of peace? Loans may be justified in time of war, and as the consequence of wars for a year after; but even then they should not be exclusively relied upon. But the theory of borrowing during wars involves the necessity of some effort to reduce debt in time of peace; but if, instead of this, we are to continue to rely upon loans still in time of peace, what will our debt soon be? Where will be our credit? I hold in my hand a statement showing the amount of the debt due by the Government of India, in India and in England, in every year since 1834. All these papers shall be laid on the table of the Council for the use of members, and I hope will be printed for the use of the public, who are deeply interested in a correct understanding of these matters.

Well, sir, on the 30th of April, 1857, just before the mutiny commenced, the capital of the public debt in India was 55,546,652*l.*, and in England it was 3,894,400*l.*, and the interest payable upon the whole was 2,525,375*l.* Sir, I need not trouble you by quoting the intermediate years, but on the 30th April this year—indeed, at the present moment—the debt in India has been increased to a sum of 71,202,807*l.*, and in London to a sum of 26,649,000*l.*, making together 97,851,807*l.*, and the annual charge on both is now 4,461,029*l.* Thus, in three years, the debt of India has increased by no less a sum than 38,410,755*l.*, involving an annual increase of interest to the amount of 1,935,654*l.* Sir, I am fearful of wearying you with these details, but they involve great facts which must be understood. We have not been engaged in any foreign war; we have not had to defend ourselves from foreign aggression; we, ourselves, have attempted no war of conquest;—but internal mutiny alone has produced this result. Sir, it cannot be too widely made known throughout India that the late mutiny has cost the Indian public—I say the Indian public, because I cannot separate them from the Indian exchequer, and also because sooner or later the pressure must fall upon them in one shape or another,—sir, it cannot be too widely made known that the late mutiny has cost the people of India, in a direct public charge, independent of all other losses and sacrifices, the sum of 38,410,755*l.*, and has incurred an annual charge in

respect of it of no less than 1,935,654*l.*, for, I fear, many years to come. Sir, if nations could only understand and appreciate the personal interest they had in enforcing obedience to the law, the duties of the executive and the cost of government would indeed be greatly diminished.

Well, but this is our present condition. We have a deficit in the last three years of 30,547,488*l.*; we have a prospective deficit in the next year of 6,500,000*l.*; we have already added to our debt 38,410,755*l.*; and with these facts before us, it is for us to take a fair—I will say a bold—view, but tempered with caution and prudence, of our position, to rise to the magnitude of our difficulties, and with firm resolve determine to leave nothing undone which lies within our reach to remedy so crying an evil. Sir, shall it ever be said that the prowess and heroism of English soldiers, and of English civilians—I may even add of English ladies—were sufficient, even in their disproportionate numbers, to quell the fiercest mutiny that is recorded in history, and that English administrative capacity failed in governing a country so kept—I had almost said so reclaimed? Sir, I am sure, if it lies within the power of the members of the Supreme Government of India, if it lies within the means of the action of this Council, if the European population in India can assist, if the millions of well-disposed natives can aid in preventing so disgraceful a catastrophe, one and all will render their best assistance in the task. At least it will be my duty, on behalf of my colleagues and myself, having laid before you the necessities of the case, to propose measures for your adoption, which we deem absolutely necessary, and not more than adequate to the occasion; and which we shall deem it to be our highest duty to India, in the responsible position we fill, to use all the means we possess, with moderation and temperance, but with firmness, to enforce. It is in the true interest of India, and of the Indian Empire, that we are called upon to act; do not let us deceive ourselves or lull ourselves into composure by the fact so often referred to, that there have been financial difficulties before: that without any very extraordinary effort or sacrifices they have been surmounted.

It is common to refer to the laudable and successful efforts made by Lord Amherst to retrieve the financial difficulties which arose out of the Nepaul and Mahratta wars; to the vigorous administration of Lord William Bentinck in retrieving the disorders which arose out of the first Burmese war. Now, sir, if I refer to the acts of those two distinguished noblemen I need not assure you that it is not for the purpose of depreciating them, nor of detracting from their high merits. If I compare their position with ours, it is only for the purpose of showing that our case is so incomparably worse that it would

be only deceiving ourselves to set them up as an example in any way applicable to the present time. For the purpose of understanding our own position better, let us see how those two cases stood. The Nepaul war began in 1814 and continued till 1816; the Mahratta war began in 1817 and ended in 1819. Lord Amherst became Governor-general in August, 1823. During the war, from 1814 to 1819, there were six years of deficiency, the whole amounting to 5,445,931*l.*, and when Lord Amherst arrived there had been three years of surplus, amounting to 2,461,099*l.*, making a deficiency of something less than 3,000,000*l.* From 1814 to 1823 the debt of India increased only by 2,300,000*l.* Again, the Burmese war began in 1824 and ended in 1826; Lord William Bentinck became Governor-general in July, 1828. No doubt he had a more serious difficulty to deal with. In the preceding five years the total deficit of revenue amounted to 14,300,000*l.*, and the Indian debt had increased by 12,000,000*l.* But neither of these cases is to be compared in intensity with our present position. Lord Amherst had to meet an accumulated deficiency of nine years, amounting to 3,000,000*l.* Lord William Bentinck had to cope with a deficiency of five years amounting to 14,300,000*l.* We have to deal with a deficit of four years, amounting to 37,000,000*l.*, and amounting in the present year to upwards of nine millions. I say, I wish only to impress upon you the magnitude of the difficulty we have to meet.

Again, let us compare our present position with that in which Sir Robert Peel found himself in 1842, when he felt himself bound to resort to remedies of no ordinary kind, and, I will venture to say, as much against the popular feeling in England at the time as anything we are likely to propose can be in antagonism to the popular feeling in India. When Sir Robert Peel succeeded to the government in 1842, the first thing he had to deal with was a financial deficiency—a deficiency which in full may be said to have contributed mainly to the downfall of the preceding Government. Well, what was the extent of that deficit? Sir Robert Peel was the greatest master in making a statement that this age has witnessed. But, with all his dexterity, the whole amount which he was able to show to justify his bold, but wise measure, was a deficiency for five years, from 1837-38 to 1841-42, of 7,500,000*l.*, and including a prospective deficiency for the following year, he could only make up a total of 10,070,000*l.*; and this, be it remembered again, in the comparison is to be put against our deficiency of 37,000,000*l.* in four years, while his prospective deficiency for the coming year was 2,570,000*l.* against ours of 6,500,000*l.* Sir, I again repeat that the practical use which I wish to draw from these comparisons is to enable us to understand the real dimension of the task we have in hand, and above all to induce us to

determine once and for all to reject all mere palliatives, and to brace our nerves up to the full extent of our duty. Whatever we do, let it be effectual for its purpose.

Again, sir, I find by a return to Parliament in the last Session, that of the fifty-nine years which have elapsed in the present century, in no fewer than forty-four of those years have considerable, often large additions been made to the Indian debt, while in fifteen only have diminutions taken place ; so that the normal state of Indian finance may be said to be deficiency of income and addition to debt. Shall I ask if that is a satisfactory state in which the finances of a great empire should remain ? Is that a condition to which we should be content to return ? Sir, all who have the honour, dignity, and future security of India and of her teeming population at heart, will emphatically answer—No. Well, but is there no other source of uneasiness in what may be termed the normal condition of our finances ? I fear there is at least one. Sir, I cannot forget that we derive about five millions net a year from the sale of opium. Now perhaps this is one of the most unique facts that the history of finance affords, that a Government, without calling upon its people to make any sacrifice whatever, or on the country by affording a profitable cultivation to a large class, should be able to derive a revenue for the benefit of the State of so large a sum. But what security have we that this will always continue ? It is the only instance I remember at the moment of one country having succeeded in raising a large revenue from the subjects of another. No doubt the demand has recently continued good and the prices high, but that I am disposed to regard rather as a source of danger than otherwise. I have no doubt our true policy is to keep up the supply to the full demand, and to obtain moderate prices for a large quantity, rather than large prices for a small quantity. High prices always lead to increased competition, and are particularly likely to do so in this case ; and it appears, therefore, that steps have been taken to effect this object. But still, at the best, what security have we that at some time or other this unusual source of revenue may not to some extent fail us ? It seems to me that it is impossible not to regard it less or more as somewhat precarious.

Again, sir, there is another evil, of no slight kind, which has resulted from the fact that we have hitherto relied so exclusively upon the land for our revenue. As I have already shown you, the finances of India have been almost always in difficulty. Deficits seem to have been their normal condition. But efforts have always been made to raise the income, and I fear that those efforts, having been mainly directed to improving the land revenue, have resulted in something bordering upon oppression on the ryots, and not leading in the long run really to the improvement of the revenue. Of the evils of over assess-

ment we have recently had a striking proof in Madras, much to the honour of Lord Harris, the late Governor of that Presidency. His careful attention was directed to that subject, and so successfully had he applied the principle of revision, that my honourable friend, the present General Sir Charles Trevelyan, who has followed up the good work, informs me that, by reductions of assessments made under that revision, the land revenue of Madras, in consequence of extended cultivation, will be increased in the present year by a sum of no less than 500,000*l.*, or thereabouts. Sir, our best thanks are due to Lord Harris, who, with so little ostentation, has instituted so marked a reform—a reform which enriches the people and the public treasury at the same time. I ask, then, sir, is it wise for a great empire to rely so exclusively upon one source of revenue as we do in India, and to press our charges upon it so much that, while we run a risk of oppressing the people, we are certain, if we do so, to impoverish the exchequer?

Sir, I am fearful of wearying the Council with all these details, but I trust you will bear with me. We have a grave conjunction of affairs to deal with. I think you will already begin to perceive that the evil is deeper and broader than at first it appeared. I think you will begin to see that our task will be heavier, and must extend to great questions of administrative reform, as well as to immediate questions of finance. You will, therefore, I am sure, pardon me if I feel it to be my duty, to the best of my ability, to unbare before you the whole extent of the evils as they present themselves to my mind. Sir, I sincerely trust that in the free observations which I feel compelled in the performance of my duty to make I shall be understood not to reflect unfavourably either upon any individual or upon any class. It is to the system, and the system alone, that I refer. Nay, I will say more. It has been a matter of surprise to me that, with so defective a system, greater evils have not arisen, and that they have not I attribute only to individual zeal and care. It is, sir, with that system we shall have to deal, with a system under which, in thirty-three years out of forty-six, we have suffered a deficiency in our finances at the rate of 5,500,000*l.* a year, and amounting in the whole to 72,195,416*l.*; under which we have now a deficit in the present year of upwards of 9,000,000*l.*, and a prospective deficit in the next year of about 6,500,000*l.*; under which our debt has increased in three years by upwards of 38,000,000*l.*, and the annual charge upon it by about 2,000,000*l.* That is the price the mutiny has cost the people of India. It cannot be repeated too often. But, sir, bad as our case may be, and even worse than we expected, is there any ground for despair? Sir, in my opinion, if we are only prepared to do our duty to our country and our Sovereign, I say there is none. On the contrary, gloomy as

may be the picture I have drawn, and not more gloomy than justice demands, I will freely express my own most confident opinion that, if we are only true to ourselves, and I will add to the weighty obligations we have undertaken towards India, not only are all these evils capable of solution, but I will say further, that we may, with the blessing of a higher power, aid in creating a future of brilliant prosperity. Sir, at this moment everything favours our noble enterprise, if we will undertake it. Nay, the very crisis through which we have recently passed at such a sacrifice greatly favours us. While yet I was in England, upon more than one occasion I expressed my unbounded confidence in the resources of India. I did so from having watched the progress of its trade, and having studied the character of the country at a distance ; but, sir, if I had confidence in the resources of India while yet I had not seen it, I must say that it has been greatly increased by what I have had the privilege of witnessing since my arrival.

It may appear almost presumptuous in one who has been in the country little more than two months to allude to his experience or to opinions based upon personal observation. But, sir, I have had advantages during that short interval which do not often fall to the lot of men who pass even many years in the country. As you are aware, a fortunate accident led to my visiting the Upper Provinces immediately after my arrival. I have travelled from Calcutta to Lahore, and from Lahore back to Calcutta. I have visited every town and city of importance over that extensive tract. I have had the advantage, and a rare one I must acknowledge it to have been, of freely discussing all matters of public interest with the civil servants of the Crown at every station. At every important town I have had free intercourse in public and in private with the native merchants and bankers, and of these I will say, that in enterprise, in knowledge, and sagacity, they would well compare with some of the most enlightened classes in Europe. The impression produced upon my mind with regard to the resources of the country and the capacity of the people to develop them was most favourable. A richer soil, a finer climate, a more industrious, active, and frugal, and I will add docile population, it would be difficult to find anywhere. Sir, it would be difficult to imagine anything more intensely interesting. I have seen many European countries, but I have seen none at once so striking, so wonderful, so interesting. The nearest comparison I could make would be Belgium upon an immensely enlarged scale. You have the same ancient, magnificent cities, with their narrow streets, their thronged population, their splendid public buildings, the relics of decayed dynasties, and the active bustle of trade at every corner ; but what is more important and more to our present purpose, you have the same expansive plains, with huge

mountains in the far distance, large rivers, and magnificent canals irrigating the countries,—the same careful husbandry with cultivation up to the roadside, and the same teeming population, all bent on active and profitable pursuits,—you have the same thrifty and economical habits.

Sir, I am told that all these symptoms have increased since the mutiny. Considering what we had before been told of India, I must say that the impression produced on my mind, both from what I saw and what I heard in conversation, was as if the people of all classes had been roused into a new activity by the great crisis which had shaken the whole country. On all hands I was told by European officers that the change since the mutiny was so great that people seemed as if they had been awakened from a state of lethargy to a state of intense activity; that the whole character and tone of the people was so much altered for the better, since the signal proofs they had received first of our power and next of our justice, moderation, and magnanimity, that those who had been absent but for a short time could hardly be fair judges of the present state of India. Such was the change, I must think, to my mind. I never saw greater signs of industrial vitality, all full of promise for the future prosperity of India. When I had the good fortune, as Secretary to the India Board, in 1819, to pass the two first Bills through Parliament for railways in India, I was told, and that by those who had had long experience in India, that the natives would not use them. We have only on this side of India two extensive pieces of line open, from here to Raneegunge, and from Allahabad to Cawnpore. Those who have seen the rush of third-class passengers on a holiday in Belgium can form the best idea of the use made of these lines of railways. What we require is, the completion of those lines at any cost, but quickly, and we shall see a result for which the most sanguine is not prepared.

But, sir, there is another element of secure prosperity which India especially enjoys. Almost everything she produces is in constant and boundless demand in Europe, and almost every article of importance required in Europe is to be found increasing in India, so varied are her products. Sir, in this fact there is great security for the future. Let cultivation be extended and improved ever so much, there is no fear of the want of a market. But let me appeal from mere opinions to facts, to show the condition in which India is now placed. Sir, it is undoubted that, at the present time, India enjoys a prosperity far beyond comparison with any former times; and what is most satisfactory is, that the evidences of that prosperity have been for some years past steady and accumulative. It is not, sir, a mere transitory excitement. As proof of this, sir, let me refer to our exports and imports. I hold in my hand official returns,

which exhibit the amount of our exports and imports in each year since 1834. Sir, I now speak of merchandise only, leaving out of question for the present our large transactions in treasure. Well, sir, in 1834-5, the total amount of our exports to all parts was only 7,993,420*l.*; in 1858-59 it was no less than 26,986,000*l.*; and in the present year it will be considerably more. Again, sir, in 1834-35 the value of our imports into India was only 4,261,106*l.*; in 1858-59, it was no less than 21,366,447*l.*; and in the present year will exceed 24,000,000*l.*; and this is independent of treasure, to the average amount in the last five years of no less than 11,223,107*l.* yearly. Sir, I have had these returns divided into periods of five years, showing the average of each period, for convenience. This division gives the following results:—

IMPORTS.

Average of five years.	Merchandise.	Treasure.
	£	£
1834 to 1839 . average	4,970,000	2,345,000
1839 " 1844 "	7,691,428	2,762,164
1844 " 1849 "	9,131,612	3,073,249
1849 " 1854 "	10,756,134	4,474,107
1854 " 1859 "	15,365,934	11,223,107

EXPORTS.

Average of five years.	Merchandise.	Treasure.
	£	£
1834 to 1839 . average	11,071,520	251,069
1839 " 1844 "	13,789,769	462,795
1844 " 1849 "	15,675,044	1,320,503
1849 " 1854 "	14,899,594	646,469
1854 " 1859 "	22,187,736	800,605

Taking the exports and imports of merchandise and treasure—and there is really no distinction between the two—we find that the trade of India has grown up during the period embraced in these tables from a total sum (exports and imports together) of 13,847,289*l.* in 1833-34, to one of 60,219,660*l.* in 1858-59. Can we desire a stronger proof of the steady prosperity of the country? So much for our external trade; but I have proofs no less conclusive of the improvement of our internal condition, to which I would claim the attention of the Council, and especially as they touch the interests of a body of gentlemen to whom I shall have hereafter to refer. It is notorious how much the price of all country produce has increased of late years, in consequence of this great demand for exportation. Now, sir, what has been the effect produced upon the interests of the cultivators of the soil by this enlarged trade? I hold in my hand a return showing the number of estates in the permanent settled districts brought to sale in each year since 1834-35 to the present time, for default of rent. In the first year of the period, estates representing an annual rental of 481,400 rupees,

or 48,140*l.*, were sold for rent ; in the next year, 1835-36, the sales represented an annual rent of 950,608 rupees, or 95,060*l.*, and this average of seven years old at that time represented a rental of 56,751*l.* What is the case now ? In the last year, 1858-59, the sales represented a rental of only 14,493 rupees, or 1,449*l.*, while the average of the last seven years shows a rental of only 65,326 rupees, or 6,532*l.*, being little more than a ninth of the former average. Again, if I refer to the arrears of land revenue at the end of each year, I find that from a sum of upwards of four crores (4,000,000*l.*) in 1834, they have now dwindled down to a mere nominal sum.

Sir, I am not forgetful of the share which an improved administration may have had in producing these results ; but undoubtedly they are also in great degree, if not mainly, to be referred to the increased demand for the produce of the land occasioned by our extending commerce, and the unusual prosperity which has resulted therefrom. But, sir, another result has flowed from these causes, more important and more interesting than any, because it affects directly the great masses of people individually so helpless. Sir, I am thankful to know that the benefits thus conferred by our commerce upon the land have extended, and in no slight degree, to the labourer. It is no exaggeration to say that such has been the increased demand for providing labour, that the rate of wages has risen in many districts twofold, and in some threefold, during the last few years. In the face of evidence of this kind, can any one doubt that all classes in India are in a state of prosperity unparalleled at any former time ? It is indeed, sir, I believe, a fact which is undisputed. Well, sir, let us pause for a moment and consider what it is I have shown you. I have shown from statements and facts only too well known to every one, and beyond dispute, that the finances of the State are in a condition of unparalleled disorder and deficit ; and I have shown, by proofs equally conclusive, that under the protection of that Government, by the peace and good order which it maintains, by the commerce and enterprise which it succours, every class of the community is in a condition of unparalleled prosperity. Could there be a greater contrast than that which it has been my duty to draw to-day, between the condition of the Government, all powerful in its executive character, and that of the people ? But, sir, there is such a sympathy between the credit of a government, the finances of the State, and the commerce and trade of a country, that it would be contrary to all history that such an anomaly should continue. Depend upon it it is for the interest of the commerce of India, for the interest of the land of India, for the interest of the labourers of India, that this anomaly should be cured as quickly as possible. It is not only the duty, but it is the direct interest of all classes to contribute

their fair share to restore the financial position of the State; and above all it is the first duty of the Government to take steps in the public interest to that end. Sir, the Government of India, representing the interests of the Crown of England, stands in a peculiar position towards India. England does not exact, and never has exacted, tribute from India. Every rupee of taxes raised in India is devoted strictly to Indian purposes. If England expects or desires advantage from India, it is only in a way entirely consistent with the true interests of India—it is by a reciprocal exchange of products, which constitutes that commerce which I have shown you has showered so many blessings on India, to the full, I admit, reciprocated by England. If, then, sir, it be our duty to urge upon India to make new efforts to place the finances of the Government in a condition consistent with the public interest, it is for the benefit of India mainly that we do so. In so doing, we shall only be performing the first duty which a State owes to the people over whom it governs.

Now we fully admit that, in our endeavours to restore the equilibrium between income and expenditure, our first duty is to use every effort to reduce all expenditure to the lowest point consistent with security and good government, and to make all those administrative reforms which are so essential in order to secure economy; and I hope before I sit down to show you that the Government is not unmindful of its duty in this respect. But, sir, I submit that there is a point below which the interests of the country, in preserving that peace and security which are so essential in order to maintain that prosperity which the country now enjoys, forbid us to cause reductions. This point has been carefully considered, and it is the opinion of the Government, that in the interests of India it must have recourse to some new sources of taxation to resist present deficiency, and to place our finances in a more permanently secure position for the future. But if we are about to call upon our fellow-subjects in India to submit to some further contribution to the State, I may be permitted to point out how very small is the sum in the shape of taxes which they at present pay. I believe it to be undoubted that India is, and will remain, the lightest taxed country in the world, in proportion to the good government which it enjoys. Sir, the sum total of receipts for the current year is 37,706,208*l*. But that includes land revenue, which no one will deny can only be regarded as rent, the proprietary right of the Government to a share of the rent having never been disputed, and which, if not paid to the Government, would undoubtedly be paid to the zemindar, or other proprietor. It also includes the receipts from opium, which in no sense can be called a tax; it includes other receipts of a like kind, which, on the whole,

amount to no less than 28,678,235*l.* The balance, amounting to 9,027,973*l.*, can alone be termed taxation in the sense in which that term is used in Europe. The receipts from the Crown lands of England would certainly never be called taxes. This sum of 9,027,973*l.* consists of customs'-duties, excise, sayar, abkaree, moturpha, trade-taxes, salt, and stamps. Strictly speaking, these are all the taxes now levied in India. The population of British India, by the last return to Parliament, was 132,202,000, giving an average of one shilling and fourpence, or of little more than ten annas a head; while in England the rate per head of taxation, strictly speaking, is 2*l.* 3*s.* In India, even including land revenue, the rate would be considerably under 5*s.* a-head.

Having, then, I trust, shown fully the necessities of the Government, having given you the best proofs of the prospects and ability of the country to contribute the necessary cost of good government, and, having, I trust, satisfied you that the burdens of taxation in India are at the present time light in comparison with other countries, it is my duty now to proceed to explain the measures which we think it our duty to take in order to place the finance of the country in a sound and satisfactory condition. In doing so it will be our endeavour to propose measures adequate for the purpose, for we are of opinion that no greater mistake could be made than to propose measures insufficient in themselves, and which could only lead to the necessity of having recourse to further measures hereafter. Sir, it is our wish to deal with the difficulty once and for all, and not to render it needful again to disturb the public mind in the course of transactions by having recourse to further measures hereafter. In proposing these measures, there are two great principles which have guided the Government in their adoption; the first is, that whatever measures are proposed they shall at least be based upon perfect equality and justice to every class of the community; the next is, that they shall be in conformity with sound financial and commercial policy; and the last is, that in this, as in all other matters in the government of India, we will scrupulously endeavour to avoid anything that would offend the religious views and rights of our native fellow-subjects. Sir, I have heard so much upon the latter subject, so much upon this tax being contrary to native custom, and that being in accordance with native custom, that I have considered it to be my duty to look carefully into the recognised authorities upon this subject. Sir, I have consulted the ancient sacred authority of Menu; and the version of the ancient Hindoo law, upon the best authority at my command, is as follows:—

The Revenue Law laid down in the Menu:—

“The revenue (says the writer) consists of a share of grain, and of all

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other agricultural produce ; taxes on commerce, a very small annual imposition on petty traders and shopkeepers, and a forced service of a day in each month by handicraftsmen.

"The merchants are to be taxed on a consideration of the prime cost of their commodities, the expense of travelling, and their net profits.

"The following are the rates of taxation :—

"On cattle, gems, gold, and silver, added each year to the capital stock, one-fiftieth ; which in the time of war or invasion may be increased to one-twentieth.

"On grain, one-twelfth, one-eighth, one-sixth, according to the soil and the labour necessary to cultivate it. This, also, may be raised, in cases of emergency, even as far as one-fourth ; and must always have been the most important item in public revenue.

"On the clear annual increase of trees, flesh meat, honey, perfumes, and several other natural productions and manufactures, one-sixth.

"The king is also entitled to 20 per cent. on the profit of all sales. Escheats, for want of heirs, have been mentioned as being his, and so also is all property to which no owners appear within three years after proclamation. Besides possessing mines of his own, he is entitled to half of the precious minerals in the earth."

Now, sir, I must say that there is latitude enough here for the most needy exchequer and for the most voracious minister : —a twenty per cent. income-tax upon profits ; a tax varying from two to five per cent. upon accumulated capital ; a share of almost every article produced ; an annual tax on trades ; half the produce of mines, besides other means, certainly presenting a sufficiently wide field for taxation to satisfy any one either as to amount or as to kind. The choice is ample,—the extent not unduly restricted. I should imagine the revenue laws of the ancient Hindoos must have been contributed to the sacred compiler by some very needy finance minister of the day.

Well, then, the first part of our proposals to which I wish to call the attention of the Council will have relation to our present customs law, with a view to propose some not unimportant modifications, though not leading to any very great financial results. It will be remembered that the present tariff was passed last year under a very pressing emergency, and in a somewhat hurried manner. Sir, experience, and further reflection, have convinced us that there may be some considerable improvements made in it, which would contribute greatly to the public advantage ; and these we propose to make, even at some temporary loss upon some articles. Sir, upon the whole, the changes in the tariff of last year have proved most successful. The trade has continued rapidly to increase, and a large revenue has been received. We have not yet completed the full year ; but taking the portion of the year expired, that is, up to the 31st of January, I find that the net receipts into the Treasury, in the present year, have been for Calcutta alone 1,646,829*l.* against 1,213,566*l.* in the corresponding period of the previous year : results equally favour-

able have been experienced at the other ports. Upon the whole, the customs in the present years are expected to yield 3,430,000*l.* as compared with 2,073,000*l.* the years preceding ; as a whole, therefore, the change is working well. But it has been my duty closely to analyse these receipts in their different classes, and I regret to say that I find one class of duties which is not answering the expectation formed of them. It will be remembered that in framing the last tariff a considerable number of articles which formerly bore a duty of five per cent. were raised to twenty per cent. Sir, I fear it will appear, when we closely examine our customs return in detail, that that increase was too great. I hold in my hand three returns in relation to the entire class of goods which are subject to twenty per cent. The first return shows the quantity of those goods imported upon an average of three years before the change of duty took place. This average represents a sum of 609,636*l.*, but it must be borne in mind that those years included the years of the mutiny, and the one immediately succeeding it. The second return shows the quantity of those goods imported in the year immediately preceding the new duties. The amount was 700,638*l.*; the last return is of the quantity of the same goods imported from the 12th of March last year, when the new duties took effect, to the 31st of January, and with an addition by estimate for the six weeks to complete the year.

The amount together is only 450,647*l.* Here then, sir, we have a falling off as compared with the average of three years of 25 per cent., and as compared with the year immediately preceding of more than 35 per cent. Sir, this is surely a premonitory symptom, and a warning to retrace our steps. Sir, we accept the warning, and have decided to reduce the duty upon all the articles in the tariff, for every one of them shares in the decline, which now bear a duty of 20 per cent., to 10 per cent., tobacco only excepted, and to which I shall advert hereafter. Even as a matter of policy there are many considerations which, in the views of Government, render this a desirable step. Assuming, which I think we may, looking to other articles of trade, that the reduction from 20 to 10 per cent. could raise the imports again to the rate they stood at in 1858, then the loss of revenue could not exceed 20,000*l.* in Calcutta, and a loss of 10,000*l.* in Bombay and Madras, making a total of 30,000*l.* Sir, there are some other reductions which we are bold enough to propose. We wish to take a broad view of the interests of the country and of the best means of retrieving our position. We are desirous to give every opportunity for the produce of the country to increase, and for commercial intercourse to be enlarged ; and where impediments stand in the way, we are desirous of removing them as far as our pre-

sent means will justify; and especially when we can recover ourselves in a still less objectionable way. Sir, it must be evident that, as a general rule, when the products of our soil have to find a foreign market, and in cases in which they enter into competition with those of other countries, the direct effect of export duties must be to place our products in those countries at a disadvantage with their foreign competitors: in point of fact, it cannot be denied, that in such cases an export duty falls chiefly upon the producer who cultivates it.

But, again, we have some articles of raw material which merely pass through our territory for shipment at our ports. The article of sheep's wool is one of these. A large quantity is imported into Bombay from Cutch, and from the countries beyond the Indus chiefly, and exported to England. At present that wool is charged with an impost, I should rather say a transit duty, of no less than 10 per cent. Wool produced in our own territory pays an export duty of 3 per cent. This Government is of opinion, that a bulky article of this kind, that has to encounter a fierce competition with the wool of Australia, South America, the Cape, and other places, should be released from any impediment of this kind. We believe it to be of the utmost importance, even in a political point of view, to encourage this rising trade on the part of the hill tribes which skirt our north-west frontier. Already the exports of wool from India are as important as they were from Australia only fifteen years ago; in the last two years they have, however, shown some tendency to decline, and I fear our heavy transit and export duties have been the cause. From the inquiries which I made upon the subject at Umritsur and Lahore, I am inclined to believe that a large trade in wool will soon be developed from our frontier hills, as soon as the transit down the Indus is improved and the railway is finished to Mooltan. Of that I have no doubt; and we shall reap a good revenue from the imposts which are received in return. The transit and export duty on wool, which we thus relinquish, is equal to about 17,000*l.* a year, by placing it in the free list.

Then, sir, there are two articles of considerable export, which arose chiefly in consequence of the Russian war,—I mean the articles of hemp and hides: the competition which these have to bear in the home markets with the products of other countries makes the export duty bear heavily upon them, and they are both articles of trade which, for many reasons, we are especially interested in encouraging. We propose to place them also in the free list. The duty which they yield at present is a little over 16,000*l.* Then, again, the article of jute is in the same category; it is one of the great raw materials used in England, which competes with the coarse hemp of Russia, and the production of which it is much our interest to promote.

This also will be placed in the free list: the duty is 15,000%. We also propose to place flax in the free list, in order to give every encouragement to the incipient efforts to make that an important article of produce in the Punjab, which I doubt not will ultimately be successful.

Then, again, sir, there is an article which is engaging, and justly so, much interest in India,—I mean the cultivation of tea. The experiment made by the Government, at a great cost, of introducing it as an article of cultivation on our high land, has proved eminently successful; so much so that steps are being taken to hand it over entirely to private enterprise. It is one of the few means which we have in India of attracting European capital and European sellers. Sir, we ought to extend to it every encouragement in our power, and it certainly seems in the highest degree inconsistent that we should be spending public money to encourage the cultivation of this plant and then to place an export duty upon it at our ports whence it has to be shipped to find a market in competition with the produce of our next-door neighbours in China. The duty upon the export of tea is only 2,500%, and it also will be placed in the free list. There is still one other class of articles which we think ought to be free of duty. Books are already free, and we think that prints, maps, and works of art should be included; the duty they give now is very trivial, little over 1,000%. The reductions, therefore, which we propose in our present tariff for the reasons I have explained are:—

	£
1. Loss on 20 per cent. duties	30,000
2. Wool, free	17,000
3. Hides and hemp, free	16,000
4. Jute, free	15,000
5. Flax, free	
6. Tea, free	2,500
7. Prints, maps, &c., free	1,500
Total	<u>£82,000</u>

making a total loss of 82,000%.

But, sir, we have some *per contra* proposals to make in respect to the customs duties. In the first place, there is one article which is produced almost exclusively in India, and which bears a large price and a high profit—I mean saltpetre. This article can scarcely be said to stand in the same position as many other articles which are produced by the cultivators of the soil. It is, in point of fact, a manufacture from earth. It has been represented to me, both at home and here, that this article would bear a duty of 10% a ton, without any danger of its being interfered with by foreign competition. It has long been under consideration in the North-western Provinces,

where it was proposed to impose an excise duty upon it. Sir, I prefer an additional export customs duty. I do not, however, go the length of the rate suggested. We are content to try the experiment with a duty of two rupees a maund, which will be about 5*l.* 10*s.* a ton. The quantity exported from Calcutta is about 800,000 maunds, and from Bombay about 100,000 maunds, making a total of 900,000 maunds, which will give 180,000*l.*, or an increase of 164,200*l.* I should mention that we propose to give an advantage not hitherto enjoyed by the saltpetre refiners, by allowing them, subject to paying the duty, to turn to profit the salt which is necessarily made in the process, and which hitherto has been wasted. I have fully discussed these arrangements with the revenue board at Allahabad. Then, sir, we propose to raise the duty upon unmanufactured tobacco to 8 annas the seer, and manufactured tobacco to 1 rupee the seer. The special bearing of this proposal I shall explain hereafter. This will give us 25,000*l.*

And now I come to mention the last change which we propose in the tariff, and it is the only one which I make with regret. But necessity has no law. I must own that, after due consideration, we can discover no good reason why cotton yarn and twist should be imported at a lower rate of duty than cotton piece goods. I know it is said that it is in an earlier stage of manufacture; but may the same not be said of grey cloth, as compared with bleached and dyed cloth and printed cloth? If we are to have an average duty, it should be an average throughout; nor do I attach much importance to the argument that a low duty on yarn and a higher duty on cloth encourage native weaving. I could find those who complain that their labour in spinning fine yarn by hand is interfered with by a lower duty on yarn. If I were to attach much importance to that class of arguments, I believe that the same duty of ten per cent. may be placed on yarns as is charged on goods, without any material injury to the trade. The trade in both articles appears to be progressing rapidly. By the last Mail we received the official accounts of the trade for the eleven months of 1859. According to those returns, the exports of cotton piece goods to India had reached the large amount of 11,041,000*l.* in 1859, against 8,497,000*l.* the year before, and 5,147,000*l.* in 1857. So, in the case of yarn, the exports in 1859 were 2,806,000*l.*, against 1,763,000*l.* in 1858, and 994,000*l.* in 1857. I wish, indeed, it had been in our power to reduce all to the limit of five per cent., but that is impossible at present, whatever may be the case hereafter. I wish, however, to say, in reference to this increase of the duty upon cotton twist and yarns, that, inasmuch as it is sometimes the practice to sell by contracts for future delivery, that in all cases in which it can be shown to the satisfaction of the customs authorities that twist that has actually

been shipped at this time, or that has arrived, has been sold subject to the existing duty, such goods will be admitted at the present rate of five per cent. The practice, no doubt, in England is to levy the duty from the moment of its enactment, giving the seller the power to recover from the buyer; but it may be borne in mind that when duties are raised in England they generally affect articles like tea and sugar, of which stocks in bond exist equal to many months' consumption, if not for a whole year. In the case of cotton twist, the concession which we make, we are aware, can only at most affect a small quantity; nor is this course without precedent. When the tea duties were equalised, all the Bohea quality proved to have been shipped up to a given date was admitted at the lower duty of 1s. 6d. the pound.

By these changes we shall have a tariff imposing one single uniform *ad valorem* duty of ten per cent. on all articles subject to duty, except beer, spirits, and wines, which will continue subject to the same specific duties as they are at present. We compute the gain upon these three articles at 233,700*l.*, cotton twist giving an additional revenue of 67,461*l.*

I would here wish to call your attention to a very important distinction, a distinction which ought never to be lost sight of by statesmen, between the incidence and consequence of import and of export duties. With regard to an import duty, all that you can generally say is, that it adds to the cost, and is a tax on the consumer. No doubt, if unduly high, it may limit trade, as has been the case with our twenty per cent. articles. But with regard to export duties on articles which have to compete with the products of similar articles from other countries in neutral markets, the first effect, no doubt, is that the export duty acts to that extent as a reduction of the price paid to the producer, and is a special tax and discouragement to him as a producer; but a further and serious danger is, that your duty excludes the article from the foreign market altogether, acts as a prohibition, and thus puts an end to, or greatly limits, the production and the demand for labour. Sir, it is this obvious distinction that has made us so desirous to retrieve our exports as the best means of improving our internal resources. And, sir, when we reflected that England had thrown open her ports to the free admission of these articles from every part of the globe, that there is some reason for believing that France is about to follow the same wise policy, and the articles with which we have dealt are the raw materials of the great manufactures of Europe, and therefore capable of unlimited extension, we believed we could not in any way better contribute to our own interest than by taking this course. Sir, we repeal duties giving 82,000*l.*, but we recover by other duties, in a way unobjectionable, 233,700*l.*

There is another source from which we look for an increased income. The valuations upon which the duties have been paid have hitherto been notoriously too low. They are now being revised, and the result, I expect, will be, that the revenue will be improved by at least 150,000*l*. When this revision is completed the Government intend to take steps to apply a uniform valuation to all India. We pass the same tariff of duties for every port; but if, as has been, and is still the case, the valuations to which the *ad valorem* duties are applied are different at every port, it results, in point of fact, in different duties in every port; and the competition between the merchants of one port and those of another is thus rendered unfair in the interior markets. Sir, I do not think that I shall overestimate the gain to the revenue by these revised valuations as a whole if I take it at 200,000*l*. If this be correct, then we shall have an increase of customs upon the whole of 433,700*l*., subject to a deduction of 82,000*l*., giving a net gain of 351,700*l*. after releasing from export duty almost all articles which constitute the raw materials of our manufacturing industry at home, and which, as such, have to struggle against the competition of other countries. In all these cases the articles are included both in the free import and export list, in order to allow them to pass through from native States without duty to the port of shipment. Sir, I believe it will be found that in these charges we have made only timely concessions to the monopolies of trade, and that they will re-act most beneficially upon the interests of the cultivators of India.

Sir, it has often been suggested to us that a large export duty might be laid upon indigo, upon the same principle that we have applied to saltpetre, because it was exclusively produced in India. Sir, that is an error. There has always been a rival production in Mexico, and that production, I observe, has greatly increased in the last few years. But were it otherwise I should doubt the policy of increasing it; like tea, it is one of the few cultivations in India which attract British capital and skill to direct native labour. That is the kind of industry which, above all others, the Government would wish to encourage, and on that account alone they would feel precluded from placing any impediment in the way of its extension. It would be more in consonance with our views to remove what little duty there now is, as soon as circumstances will permit. The value of the influence of European gentlemen settled in our country districts cannot, in our opinion, be overestimated, and it will be the steadfast policy of the Government to encourage it in any fair way we can. Sir, I propose to move the suspension of the standing orders before I sit down, in order to enable me to introduce a Bill to-day to effect these objects; for it is obviously desirable

that no interval shall be allowed to elapse before the changes take effect, and as they are mostly concessions, that course will be to the clear advantage of the merchant.

Sir, we do not propose these measures so much as a means of meeting our difficulties as of laying the foundation for increased prosperity in the future by relieving agriculture, as well as commerce, from restrictions and imposts which, while they give but little to the exchequer, may prove serious impediments to our future progress. At a time when, as I have before said, all these articles have been admitted free of all duty to the English market, when there is good reason for believing that the French Government contemplates a similar policy, it would indeed be unjustifiable in us if we were to exclude our producers and our merchants from sharing in common with all other nations in these advantages, by retaining export duties on those articles which have to compete with the products of all the world.

Now, sir, I have to recall your attention to the main object of the measures which I, on the part of the Government, shall have to propose. I must remind you that the proposals I have made, and the measures I have explained, however valuable in themselves, and however much we may fairly hope they will conduce indirectly to the fruitfulness of the revenue in other ways hereafter, will do but little to meet our present emergencies. Sir, I must remind you that we have still to deal with a present deficit of about nine millions, and a prospective deficit, after making allowance for considerable reductions, of upwards of six millions. I must remind you also that I have shown you that it is not only with this great and accidental difficulty that we have to deal, but that the normal condition of the finances of India is one which is not creditable to a government; that in by far the great majority of years during the whole of this century we have been creating deficiencies and adding to debt, and we call upon you and upon the public to aid us to correct this state of things. We will do our best to reduce expenditure and to improve administration, but when all that is done it will not be enough. We are, sir, therefore reluctantly compelled to propose to increase the revenue by the imposition of more taxes; and these we propose to be of two classes—the one we shall propose to enact only for a limited period, with a view to the present emergency—the other we propose to ask you to pass without limit of time.

But, sir, in making these comparisons of the expenditure in the last three years with that of the years to which I have referred, we cannot but be forcibly struck with the greatly increased cost upon the recent occasion. Sir, in one respect I must own that I find in this one of the few redeeming points to reconcile us to the financial difficulty in which we now find

ourselves. The future historian of India, when recounting the occurrences of the last three years, if he be a man of fine discrimination, will dwell with pride upon the fact that at that moment India was governed by an English nobleman, who, in the midst of the greatest peril, never for one moment allowed his judgment to be swayed by passion, or his fine sense of honour and justice to be tarnished by even a passing feeling of revenge. For perhaps the first time in any Asiatic war Lord Canning adopted throughout the whole of this campaign the most scrupulous principle of integrity. Whatever services were performed, whatever provisions were supplied, were strictly paid for; and when, under his vigorous administration of the Punjab, money contributions were exacted, the obligations have been all acknowledged and faithfully repaid. Sir, rely upon it, however much such a mode of conducting a campaign may add to present expense, the statesman who pursues it is far more than repaid in the permanent stability which he thus gives to an empire; and, sir, I cannot avoid this opportunity of saying, that however much some may have differed with the policy which the Governor-general pursued, yet the time is not very distant when even they, and I am sure the public at large, will do justice to the calm and dispassionate but truly courageous discrimination which the noble earl has exhibited throughout these trying occurrences, and I cannot but believe that we are already reaping the benefits of it in the great repose which has already spread itself over India, and which I am convinced will enable us the more effectually to deal with our present financial difficulties.

Well, sir, I have pointed out to you without the slightest reserve the predicament in which we stand at this moment. I have shown you how infinitely worse it is than any similar occasion which we have recorded in India, or than the most pecuniary modern crisis in England. I have confined my observations to the period that has elapsed since May, 1857. Are we to take that as a standard to which we should aim to arrive? Even if we could do so with regard to the army you must bear in mind that I have already shown you that, in the last three years, the interest of the debt has increased in round numbers by 2,000,000*l.*; and there are other increases which are beyond our control. But even were this otherwise, and were it possible that we should be able to regain the standard of 1857, would that be wholly satisfactory? We have a deficiency of upwards of 30,000,000*l.* in three years, but is that a new state of things? Sir, I hold in my hand a return showing the deficits and surpluses of Indian revenue as a whole in India and at home since 1814, down to 1860, and what is the result? The period

embraces forty-six years ; of that number we had a surplus in thirteen years amounting in the whole to 8,895,437*l.*, a sum not equal to the deficit of the present year, and we had deficits in the remaining thirty-three years amounting in the whole to the large aggregate sum of 72,195,416*l.*—thirteen years of surplus at an average of only 684,264*l.* a year, thirty-three years of deficit at an average of 5,540,000*l.* a year. Nor was this state of things peculiar to the earlier part of the period to which I have referred. Taking the return only from 1834, when the management of India became purely governmental, we have a period of twenty-six years : of these the finances of India were in surplus only for seven years, while in the remaining nineteen years they exhibited large deficiencies.

In soliciting new sources of revenue, the Government are very much impressed with the fact that hitherto almost all the revenue has been derived from land, and that the practice of revising the assessments periodically has at least had the effect of keeping the actual cultivator always at a rack rent. We therefore think that whatever new taxes we impose, the incidence should fall mainly upon other classes. There is no doubt that merchants and bankers and others can hardly be said to have borne their full share of the burdens of the State heretofore. Many discussions have taken place as to the best form in which new taxes can be imposed ; much has been said as to the native aversion to taxes. Sir, all people are averse to taxes. Burke said in the House of Commons, "It is as difficult to tax and to please as it is to love and be wise." I do not believe in the popularity of any tax. I do believe in the preference which the wealthy trading classes give to those taxes which they can shift on to the shoulders of others. If we are to consider the natives, which we ought, then I have shown you that their writing gives us ample latitude of choice. But, sir, we must at once resist and reject a return to the old system of internal and transit duties, when every zemindar had a custom-house at the entrance to his own village. Sir, we cannot consent to allow all the efforts which have been used to abolish so prejudicial a system to go for nothing, and to revert to it, as we have been advised, because it is an easy mode, and in accordance with ancient usage. No, sir, whatever we do, whether our success be great or little, whatever our progress may be, at least let it be in the right direction. Sir, my honourable friend opposite introduced in August last a Bill for imposing a licence duty upon all trades. The difficulty of my honourable friend's proposal soon became apparent. If he had confined his demand to a small uniform licence, which could alone be paid by small dealers, then not only was the amount of revenue to be derived from such a tax entirely inadequate to the demands of the State, but it was evident that the great

wealthy traders and bankers who have so chiefly benefited by our rule, and by the order and security we have maintained at so much cost, would contribute nothing in proportion to the exigencies of the State.

To cure this, it was proposed to graduate the tax, and to charge it in proportion to the gains of traders; but then, sir, it was evident to my honourable friend, and he pointed out the difficulty at the time, that as soon as that plan was adopted, he was landed in all the difficulties and intricacies of Schedule D of the income-tax. Not only was this so, but another difficulty presented itself: if the licence duty were small and of uniform amount traders would not have complained of it; but as soon as it was made proportionate to their incomes, then they not unnaturally complained that they were selected as the only class to be taxed; and my honourable friend, yielding to the force of their representations, consented to introduce other classes; but still there were some classes excluded, and who could not, in fact, be included. Sir, I have had many and very frank communications with my honourable friend, and I again tender him my best thanks for his ready advice upon all occasions; but I believe I may say that he entirely concurs in the decision at which the Government has arrived, that the objects embraced in that Bill will best be dealt with separately, and that they should be the matter of two separate Bills. Sir, it is the opinion of the Government that an income-tax, to be just, ought to be universal and equal in its application, and to all alike, within a certain limit of income. We could not justify such a tax upon any other conditions. But while we say within a limit, we do not mean that the pressure of taxation should not be as wide as possible. In England the lower classes are subject to heavy indirect taxes almost unknown in India. Upon tea, sugar, tobacco, spirits, malt, and other articles consumed in a great degree by the working classes, the English Government collects a revenue nearly if not quite equal to the entire present revenue of India. We are of opinion, therefore, that a small and almost uniform licence duty should be imposed upon traders of every class, high and low, but without any attempt at graduation. In a great majority of cases it will operate rather as a registration tax, and only by the lowest classes, who will be exempted from income-tax by reason of their small incomes, will it be really felt as a tax. I have here a list of the licence duties on trades collected in England. They mention in all no fewer than one hundred and sixteen different rates; some of them are as high as 78*l.*, and some as low as a few shillings. I find that our class of brewers pay 78*l.* 15*s.*, that bankers pay 30*l.*, attorneys 9*l.*, pawnbrokers 15*l.*, auctioneers 10*l.*; and other classes various other sums; and all this in addition to income-tax. Sir, we shall be comparatively very moderate in our demands.

With one exception, to which I shall presently refer, these are the taxes which we feel called upon to propose to you: the licence duty to be passed without limit of time, the income-tax to be taken only for a few years. The licence duty we propose to be extremely moderate. It will consist of three rates—one rate of one rupee a year on artisans, including weavers, leather workers, and similar trades, but excluding the agricultural menial classes in village communities who are attached to them, and are generally paid in grain; four rupees a year on retail shopkeepers and small manufacturers, who work for local retail sale; and ten rupees on wholesale traders, bankers, manufacturers, and professions. These rates of one, four, and ten rupees will be uniform, and apply to all of each class, without any discrimination as to incomes or extent of business.

These licences will be taken out at the beginning of each year, and thus a complete register will exist of trades, as we have at present of the occupiers of the land; and this will be a considerable check against evasion under the income-tax: for let me remark that whenever such evasion takes place, it forms an act of injustice to the rest of the community, and it is our special duty to take security against fraud of any kind. Then, sir, with regard to the income-tax measure—we propose that it shall apply to all incomes above 200 rupees a year. Sir, the wider you can spread the incidence of your taxation, so long as a fair proportion is maintained as to the means of different persons, the more just it is as a whole. The security of the Government extends to all classes; from the richest capitalist to the humblest labourer, as I have already shown you to-day, have shared, and must share, in the prosperity which good order and security can alone insure. But, sir, we propose that incomes from 200 to 500 rupees shall be taxed at a somewhat lower rate. This we do because, if at the same rate, the double action of the licence duty and of the income-tax upon this class of incomes would be rather more severe than in other cases; we put incomes from 200 to 500 rupees at two per cent. Sir, while we are mindful of the wants of the Central Government, we are not forgetful of the many pressing demands throughout India for local improvements. There is nothing that strikes a stranger so much as the great advantage which a little outlay would be in improving localities, and to this the trading facilities in Calcutta show no exception. On incomes above 500 rupees we propose a tax at the rate of 3 per cent. for the public treasury, and of 1 per cent. to be appropriated strictly to local purposes, and in regard to the appropriation of which where municipalities exist, they will have a voice; the charge will be very small, and the good to be derived from such a contribution may be very great. In the United States, which

boast of the finest government in the world, a property-tax is collected by the Government of each State of a considerable amount, and applied in part to general, and in part to local and municipal purposes.

Sir, when I introduce the Bill I will explain its provisions in detail ; but in the mean time there are certain broad principles in it which I think I ought now to refer to. It will consist of four schedules. No. 1 will include income derived from real property ; No. 2, income from trades and professions ; No. 3, income from the public funds ; and No. 4, income from public salaries. The English Act contains five schedules in place of four : the fifth, that is schedule B, being applicable to farmers, a class which cannot be said to exist in India, for no one would dream of applying an income-tax to the ryots ; first, because there is no one who would not come within the exemption ; and, next, because, by periodical revisions, their payment to Government is kept at a rack-rate. Otherwise, sir, there is no exemption whatever of any class. I am aware, sir, that much discussion has taken place from time to time as to the right to tax the zemindars and other intermediate proprietors under the perpetual land settlement. Sir, the Government have given their most attentive consideration to this claim of exemption ; and I must say, the more I have looked into it the more I am convinced that a more illusive claim could not be set up. But, sir, in a matter in which the good faith of Government is concerned, it behoves us to be scrupulous, and to show at least the grounds for our decision. On what, sir, does this claim chiefly rest ? As far as I can discover, on little more than an incidental expression in a despatch from the Court of Directors to the Government of India in 1792, enjoining economy on the latter, because the land revenue, described as "the great and now almost the only source of revenue," had been fixed. Now, sir, no one has ever denied, and, I am sure, ever will deny, that so far as the rent of those lands goes, that is fixed and unalterable, as long as the conditions are complied with. But was it ever in the mind of Lord Cornwallis when he proposed and made that settlement that the fortunate owners of that part of India should be exempted from any general tax that the necessities of the State required ? I will show you in his own words that the very contrary was his intention. The settlement, as first made by Lord Cornwallis, differed in no respect from an ordinary settlement of land, except that it was made for ten years in place of being annual, as it was then the practice. The Court of Directors approved that it should be made permanent, and Lord Cornwallis issued a proclamation, fixing the ten years' settlement for ever. There is not one word as to exemption from taxes. No one can read the luminous minutes of Lord Cornwallis upon the subject of this settlement with-

out seeing that the only object he had at heart was to get rid of the uncertainty and insecurity which attended the tenure of the land, as held from year to year, or in short periods. This, and this alone, runs through every passage of that remarkable and able controversy, if I may be allowed the expression, which took place between his lordship and his most astute colleague, Mr. Shore. But that his lordship never confounded what he was doing with a liability of the zemindar to be taxed for State purposes, and that he regarded these two as entirely distinct questions, may be gathered from his minute of the 3rd of July, 1790, in which he says:—

“23 Geo. II. c. 16, s. 4.—And it is hereby enacted by the authority aforesaid, that all and every contributor and contributors upon this Act, duly paying the consideration or purchase-money at the rate aforesaid, at or before the respective days or times in this Act before limited in that behalf, for such annuity or annuities as aforesaid, or such as he or they may appoint, his, her or their respective executors, administrators, successors, or assigns, shall have, receive, and enjoy, and be entitled by virtue of this Act, to have, receive and enjoy the respective annuity and annuities so to be purchased out of the moneys by this Act appropriated or appointed for payment thereof as aforesaid, and shall have good and sure estates and interest therein for ever, subject only to the proviso or condition of redemption, in this Act afterwards contained, concerning the same; and that all the said annuities to be purchased on this Act, and the principal moneys paid for the same, and every of them, during the continuance thereof, shall be free from all taxes, charges, and impositions whatsoever.”

To my mind nothing can be more explicit as to his intention and meaning. He distinctly refers with approval to those countries where the taxes are levied in proportion to the income which each enjoys, as being preferably consistent with a fixed valuation of the land on which they are valued. He could hardly have stated in more precise general terms that his assessment of rent must be fixed, but he must contribute an income-tax levied on that land in proportion to his income, if general, on the means of all others. Those who hold the same opinion that I do with regard to this subject have very properly referred to the land-tax in England, which has long been collected for a fixed rate, and in many cases redeemed; but no one ever dreamt of claiming exemption from the income-tax on the score that it was indirectly a charge upon the land, because it was assessed upon the rents. But, sir, we have a far stronger case of analyzing in England. In every loan Act by which the huge national debt has been contracted, there is the following distinct provision, that is, it is inserted in the 23 Geo. II. c. 16, and imported into every subsequent Act, down to the loans for the Russian war:—

“The supreme power in every State must possess the right of taxing the subject, agreeably to certain rules; but the practice which has prevailed in this country for some time past of making frequent valuations of the lands, and where one person's estate has improved, and another's declined, of ap-

appropriating the increased produce of the former, to supply the deficiencies in the latter, is not taxation, but, in fact, a declaration that the property of the landholder is at the absolute disposal of Government. Every man who is acquainted with the causes which operate to impoverish or enrich a country must be sensible that our Indian territories must continue to decline as long as the practice is adhered to.

"The maxim that equality in taxation is an object of the greatest importance, and that in justice all the subjects of State should contribute as nearly as possible in proportion to the income which they enjoy under its protection, does not prove the expediency of varying the demand of Government upon the lands. On the contrary, we shall find that, in countries in which this maxim is one of the leading principles in the imposition of taxes, the valuation of the land on which they are levied is never varied."

He afterwards adds :—

"It is evident, therefore, that varying the assessment on the lands is not the mode of carrying into practice the maxim that all the subjects of State ought to contribute to the public exigencies, in proportion to their incomes ; and that other means must be employed for effecting this object."—*Minute* 3rd February, 1790.

When Mr. Pitt first introduced his income tax, and upon a subsequent occasion, there was a great discussion as to the exemption of the funds under this clause. But, sir, it was ruled that, in a general tax upon income, the exemption did not apply, however applicable it might be to any special tax upon the funds. Sir, the case of the Bengal zemindar is not near so strong: he had no promise of exemption whatever ; yet to him I apply the same principle as was applied to the fundholder in England. I hold him to be exempt from any special charge upon his land, but to be liable to any general tax that applies to all others. And, sir, I contend for this view as one of high and paramount policy, as well as of strict right. India has a great future before it, under the firm but just administration of the Crown of England. The only nobility which India now has, or is likely to have, must chiefly be these bulky owners of permanently settled estates, the whole improved value of which must go exclusively to them, while in all other parts the Government, on the part of the public, will share it. Well, but, sir, are we to base a policy upon the exemption from taxation of the richest and only privileged classes in India? Let anyone read that wonderful volume by my late lamented friend M. de Tocqueville, as to the causes of the French Revolution, and he will understand how dangerous is such a policy. Let us, sir, once and for all, determine this groundless claim upon which so much controversy has existed, and let us lay down and adhere to the sound maxims laid down by Lord Cornwallis himself, "that all who enjoy the protection of the State must pay for it in accordance with their means." Sir, that is the only policy of the Government. But, again, some have, I am aware, also contended for an exemption on behalf of the fundholder. Now, I am at a

loss to understand on what ground that claim can be put forward in India. There is no stipulation such as I have quoted as applying in England, and yet there is no exemption allowed. I certainly would never consent to be a party to place a special tax on the funds, because indirectly that would be reducing the obligation of the State; but in the case of a general tax no such argument applies: and, sir, when I reflect that the great object of the effort that we are now making is to improve the credit of the State, and, as a consequence, to raise the value of the securities held by the public, I must say, sir, that, as a class, the fundholders ought to accept this tax more cheerfully than any others.

Well, but, sir, I have yet to notice one further claim which has been made for exemption, so utterly untenable that I should not have even alluded to it, unless I had seen it cropping out in official documents as being encouraged by gentlemen of influence. Sir, I refer to this with the deepest regret. But it is my duty to do so. Sir, our fellow-subjects in Madras and Bombay claim exemption from increased taxation. And on what ground? It seems incredible. Because they say our financial difficulties have been occasioned by the mutiny; the mutiny took place in Bengal, and therefore we in Madras and Bombay are not liable for its consequences. Sir, are we all one people, one united dependency under our gracious Queen, or are we not? Was the Sepoy army maintained for local or for imperial purposes? What would be said in England if, unfortunately, a portion of the British army had mutinied in Ireland, had encouraged and led to insurrection; had caused great cost to the imperial exchequer; and when Parliament was applied to for means of discharging it, the members from Scotland had objected and claimed exemption for themselves, on the ground that the cost was incurred in Ireland? Let us ask our friends in Madras and Bombay to consider to what logical conclusion their argument would lead? If they are to be exempt, are those only to be subjected to the penalty who, unfortunately, living near the scene of these occurrences, had not all their earthly property destroyed by fire, but who suffered more serious losses by the sword? Surely not. But who then? The guilty Sepoys alone. That is the logic—a logic which, if applied to Government, would show that the whole cost of the criminal law should be defrayed by the convicts which fill our jails. Sir, I sincerely trust we shall not again be met with this argument. The Supreme Government of India is as much the government of Bombay and the government of Madras as it is the government of Bengal. Our duty, and that of this Council, is the same to all alike. We want greater combination and unity, not greater severance—that is the end to which we direct our aim. But, sir, if all this were

not so—if we were to settle accounts on nothing but arithmetical rule—how stands the case? Notwithstanding the fact, that from the Calcutta treasury is paid the whole of the interest of the debt, and many other imperial charges, yet what do I find? I have told you that the Indian deficit of the present year is 4,063,809/. How is that distributed? In round figures the sum of 1,500,000/. applies to Bengal, and that of 2,500,000/. to Bombay and Madras. Again, if I compare the increase of military charges alone, in the three presidencies, at the present moment, as compared with 1856-7, the increase in Madras and Bombay, is as great as it is in Bengal. And if I compare the number of troops according to a return recently furnished to me in 1857, and at the close of 1859, in the different presidencies, I find the increase in Bengal barely five per cent., while in Madras it is fifty per cent., and in Bombay, thirty per cent. But I should say these returns do not include the military police in Bengal, nor the new police in Madras: they are confined to the troops under the Commander-in-Chief of the three presidencies. But, sir, I am ashamed to argue this question upon such small and sectional grounds. We are one united great dependency of the same sovereign, and we have one clear duty before us—to unite with all our efforts and all our means in maintaining her empire prosperous and inviolate. The bane of India has been these sectional principles and pretensions. Let us see an end to them, and feel that we are all one, for weal or for woe.

But, returning to the Bill, I wish to make one remark as to the mode in which we propose to charge the zemindars who are subject to periodical revisions. We desire in every way to make the operation of the Bill as simple as possible; as a rule, the whole of the North-west Provinces have been settled in the proportion of sixty-six per cent. to the Government, and of thirty-four per cent. to the zemindar: that is the old rule. The new rule, which has scarcely yet come into operation, is fifty per cent. to each. But, taking the actual proportions of sixty-six and thirty-four per cent., we propose to assess the zemindars at one half the rent they pay to the Government as their profits in respect of land. By this arrangement, simple and easy in its application, all zemindars who do not pay to Government 400rs. a-year will be exempt. We are quite aware that in practice very few zemindars in the north-west will pay income-tax; and when we consider that their relation to the land, or that their payments are always subject to revision, we think their exemption falling under a fair and general rule is not to be regretted. But the same measure of profits will obviously not apply to the perpetual settlement. As to the general provisions of the Bill, I would say that our aim has been to make it as nearly the same as that of England, as the difference of circum-

stances would permit. In this I have had the valuable aid of our most able and learned Judge Advocate. I have carefully gone over the English Bill, and the regulations by which it is carried out, clause by clause, with Mr. Ritchie, to whom I beg to express my warmest acknowledgments, and adopted our scheme as nearly as possible to it. We have been most careful to preserve all the checks in favour of secrecy; we impose the same oaths for that purpose upon all our officers. We furnish a special commission, to whom traders may apply to be assessed without their returns going through the general commission and public office. There is not one protection which the English Bill affords which will not be found in ours. But, sir, there is an entirely new provision, and one of the utmost importance. As you know, the great difficulty in respect to an income-tax in India is in relation to the traders in the native towns. We are desirous in any way of avoiding inquisitorial practices; we wish to avoid the necessity of exhibiting accounts and books. Our general provision in the Bill for assessing profits is the same as the English Bill, by voluntary return made by the trade to the commissioners to their satisfaction. But we propose to allow the Government to approve of any other method of assessment which may be proposed by the commissioners of any district as more in accordance with the habits and wishes of the communities, provided always they are satisfied that the result will be fair. By this means we hope to shape the practical working of the tax through the aid of Panchyets, and by using largely the instrumentality of the heads of towns and trades under the supervision of our own officers, so as to be of comparatively easy operation. All that I need say is, that every possible means will be used to avoid undue interference in any way whatever.

The only other tax that we propose is a duty on home-grown tobacco, to an amount as nearly corresponding with the import duty as possible. I am aware there has been much discussion in respect to this duty; I am aware that opinion is not altogether unanimous upon the subject, but it is very nearly so; and the objections of those who have opposed it have been confined chiefly, I think, to the difficulty of levying it. Sir, when a minister in England complains of the difficulty of a task, he is not unfrequently told that he occupies his high office for the purpose of overcoming difficulties—let us accept the same obligation. I hope, within a short time, when my hands are less full, to offer a measure to this Council, which it will approve, for this purpose. But here, again, I must offer an observation with reference to the pretensions set up by the perpetual settlement landholders. It is said on their behalf that you cannot tax tobacco in its cultivation, because that would indirectly be increasing the rent of land. Sir, whether

this is the best mode of levying the tax I do not stop now to inquire, but at least I cannot accept this argument against it. What would be said in England if a farmer who held Crown land at a fixed rent for thirty years—and if the argument is good at all, it would equally apply in this case—were to seek exemption from the tax on barley malted, because it indirectly raised his rent? Sir, I entirely agree with the able minutes of the distinguished Lieutenant-governor of Bengal (Mr. Grant) upon this subject, as to the matter of right, and I hope that now and for ever all these pretensions on behalf of that fortunate class will cease.

These, sir, are all the taxes the Government propose, and I trust I may say that they cannot at least be found fault with, as in any way infringing any of the rules which I laid down for our guidance. I hope I may say that they are equitable and just to all alike; that they infringe no principle of wise legislation; that they offer no impediment to future development. I hope, upon the whole, that we may rather take credit for removing some existing impediments to industry and trade. But, sir, moderate as our proposals may be, and based as they are upon perfect equity and upon undoubted necessity, we cannot expect them to be received without some opposition, some may even think of risk and danger. But even though this were the case, in the apprehension of which I do not share, it is our duty to incur it; certain it is, that as we are, we are incurring the greatest danger from the deranged state of our finances, and we should be shrinking from the imperative duty we owe to the State and to the people of India if we did not use any means in our power to apply an adequate remedy; and, sir, I cannot help thinking that when the case is well understood, when the perfect equity of our proposals is known, when it is understood that every public servant of the Crown, from the Governor-general downward, will contribute equally his share to these taxes, and when—if I may presume to take so great a liberty—from the liberal manner in which her Majesty the Queen acted in respect to the income-tax in England—if even her Majesty does not contribute, it is only because she, unlike any other sovereign who ever reigned over India, does not exact from her subjects one single rupee for her own uses. Sir, I say, when all this is considered, I would fain hope that our proposals may prove as acceptable as we can ever expect taxes to be.

Sir, for your sake and my own I wish I could now conclude, but there are two points upon which it was imperative I should make some observation. First, I shall fairly be asked what we expect to receive as the result of these taxes, and how far they will succeed in repairing our financial position. Sir, fortunately for India, but unfortunately for my present purpose,

there is absolutely no data upon which any reliable calculation can be made. So entirely exempt has India hitherto been from taxation, that we have no means of making a computation. But this I will say, that we are not sanguine enough to expect that these taxes alone will cover our deficiency:—for, we should indeed think that we failed in our duty if for that purpose we had relied exclusively upon new taxes:—we shall still have left a large margin, for which we must rely upon the economy which we can secure by retrenchment of expenditure and administrative reform, for both of which we admit that there is ample room.

Sir, in considering the sources where we may look for reduction of expenditure, I am bound to say that we do not see any ground for expecting much with respect to the civil administration of India. When it is considered that the imperial expenditure of India for their purposes includes much, if not all, of the whole local Government of India, which in other countries is usually defrayed from local funds, I believe it will be found that in no country in this world is civil administration conducted at so small a cost: we do not believe that this part of our Government can be reduced in cost. We rather incline to think that it is more likely to be increased by improved Courts of India, by means for education, and by a stronger administration in the country as local interests become developed. We believe that great improvements may be made in the many constitutions of our officers, and many anomalies even in the existing scale of remuneration; but on the whole we look for no reduction on this score. What we want is an organisation which will give a more efficient development to the great talent which undoubtedly does abound in the Indian Civil Service at this time.

But, sir, if we turn to our military departments, we are sanguine that a great reduction can be made, not indeed in the pay and emoluments of either the officers or the men, but in a great reduction of numerical strength, by a better distribution of our forces, by contracting our commissariat and military expenditure, which at present as a whole is weak and diffuse; and by reducing our army finance to order. Sir, I may only refer to the entire uncertainty which at the present time prevails as to the present or future expenditure under these heads. I may even say of part expenditure for a year or two after the time, to show you how imperatively this reform is demanded. Sir, we believe that the first thing to be done as the great foundation of military reform is to relieve the army of all ordinary civil duties, such as person guards, treasure guards, and treasure escorts, and this can only be effected by the establishment upon a sound principle of a general police force, sufficiently flexible to be adequate for all the *quasi* military duties to which I have just

referred, to be able to act in small masses, to quell disturbance within their own districts—and to act generally in small detached bodies throughout their districts for purely civil ordinary police purposes—and all under the direct control of European officers, but the whole subject to the civil power as the police now is, and to contain within it the picked men set apart for detective purposes. Sir, with such a police established, nearly such as Lord Harris began to establish before he left Madras, and which Sir C. Trevelyan is now organising, I believe the numerical force of the whole army may be quickly reduced, and especially that of our native army.

Sir, there never was before a period at which I believe the army could with perfect security be so much reduced, if we only can dispense with whatever may yet be doubtful among our native troops. Our frontiers are now all well defined, and of themselves, with slight exception, offer a natural barrier. The native States within India are not only on the best terms with us, but their interests are so much now bound up with our own that we have perfect security there. The people themselves are peaceful and tranquil, and only wish to be permitted to follow their calling in security. They have obtained a terrible lesson from the anarchy which prevailed wherever, for however short a time, British authority was suspended; and, lastly, sir, the sepoy army, which so long has been our real danger in India—which so long has been, if not a standing menace, at least a standing source of apprehension to our far-seeing statesmen—has at last dissolved itself: an army petted and spoiled by indulgences inconsistent with discipline—a close body, self-recruited by the men themselves, with brothers, and cousins, and relatives, of which many understood the danger, but which none had the boldness to incur the risk of dealing with; that army has disappeared, and is blotted out. Sir, this Frankenstein, which at one time was only alluded to with bated breath and in a whisper, when it was discussed as a source of insecurity, has committed suicide, and can be spoken of openly, and all its errors exposed. I hope the example it has set, and the experience it has given us, will never be forgotten. Our local European army also is gone. Sir, I fear that, however able and gallant many of our local officers have proved themselves, however much they may have entitled themselves to the gratitude and admiration of their country, I fear, sir, we must own that the Government of India has been as unfortunate in its military as it has been in its financial system. To go into the question of the army as it affects at present our finances, would be a subject so large that it would occupy me nearly, if not quite, as long to do justice to it as I have now already detained you.

But, sir, there is one point upon which I must remark. Until we have our central point of responsible control of army

finances, as of others, established, it will be in vain to expect great reduction. Our first course must be to consider carefully what force is sufficient, and not more than sufficient. Our next point must be to have carefully-revised estimates, what is here improperly called a budget system, for military and all other charges, submitted to the Supreme Government annually as they are in England to Parliament to sanction only what is necessary, and to keep every province and every department strictly within their limits. Till you have this central, financial, and revenue control, it is in vain to look for economy—when you have it you may safely give much greater exclusive responsibility to local affairs. Sir, in England there is more local government than in any country in the world; but there is no country where the central authority and control of the Government itself is so strong. And, sir, I will add, that it will be in vain that we make improvements and reforms in our finances if these administrative reforms do not take place. You must rely upon a sound system if you will have permanency, and not upon any individual, especially in a country where individuals change so rapidly. Sir, this is nothing new. You have finance commissioners over and over again. What have they done? In looking over the archives of the Government of India, I must say, sir, the minutes left on record of no Governor-general have struck me with so much force as those of Lord Ellenborough, and have induced me to regret that his stay in India had not been longer. That noble lord is a distinguished member of a great party, always opposed to that with which I have had the honour of acting, and my testimony may therefore be regarded as impartial. Sir, that noble lord saw and understood the evil; he warned the Court of Directors of it. On the 7th of August, 1842, he wrote as follows:—

“But I cannot withhold from the honourable court the expression of my decided and long formed opinion, that whatever diminution may be made by my exertions in the amount of expenditure will only be of a temporary character, without an entire change in the financial department, and some very material modification of the system of carrying on the government. There is now no one officer charged with the duty of viewing the expenditure of the State as a whole, and of considering every proposed or existing item of charge, not by itself only, but with reference to the total charge upon the revenue.

“Without this concentration of duty and authority in a really responsible officer I have no hope of giving permanence to the influence of economical principles in the financial administration of India, or of even dealing satisfactorily with the details of expenditure.”

Sir, this is exactly what I would say now. No doubt an attempt was made, but most feebly, to supply a remedy. A financial department was created, I think in 1843 or 1844, but without any real power or responsibility. Sir, you cannot exact responsibility without giving power, and you ought not

to give power without exacting responsibility. Will it be credited that the officer who had to administer the finances was confined to the disbursement of public money, without either power or even cognisance in any shape of the revenues by which the treasury was to be supplied? Sir, we are now engaged in applying a remedial to this anomaly. To ascertain how much our army expenditure is capable of reduction I have only to compare the expenditure of the current year with that of 1856-57, for army, military, police, new levies, police and military brigades. The cost in the last four years for all India, was :—

						£
1856 to 1857	.	.	.	.	.	1,08,58,963
1857 „ 1858	.	.	.	.	.	1,47,46,737
1858 „ 1859	.	.	.	.	.	1,98,78,935
1859 „ 1860	.	.	.	.	.	1,64,32,775

Sir, I have been pressed to urge upon the Home Government the propriety of giving us an imperial guarantee for an Indian debt as a means of reducing our Indian expenditure. This is a request which I could not conveniently advise you to make, it is one which I could not advise the Home Government to accede to. With nations, as with individuals, the measure of the credit is no question of arithmetical calculation. It lies far deeper. It is a measure of their prudence, of their good management—it acts as a check upon improvidence, and often induces to great reforms, which but for necessity would be neglected. Sir, I have said that England has never exacted tribute from India as a dependency. I think she ought not to be asked to pledge the credit of her exchequer for us; for if for us, why not for Canada, which has a six per cent. debt?—why not for Australia, which has a six per cent. debt?—why not for the Cape?—why not for all our Colonies? Sir, I sincerely believe that we shall best consult the real interests of India, that we shall be more likely to recover a good position and to maintain it, if we keep our finances altogether from those of the Home Government.

Sir, I have been asked, as I said before, what result we expect from our increased taxes, and from our reduced expenditure. Sir, we hope in the course of time to make both ends meet; our aim of course is to produce an equilibrium; but I must remind you that sometimes the question of a year must elapse before our taxes can become fruitful, and before our reduction of expenditure and reformed systems can begin to tell. In the meantime, however, our balances in the exchequer are large; larger than they have been since 1853; and larger by upwards of six millions than on the 30th of April last year. In India and at Home I expect our balances on the 30th April next will be about 19,600,000*l.* against 13,398,000*l.* last

year, and, therefore, even though our new taxes should be dilatory in coming in, and the reductions of expenditure some time before they are felt, I trust we may be able to go on without any further resort to borrowing, at least for a time; and I hope that, if we continue to be blessed with peace when these measures are carried into full effect, that we may be saved the necessity of having resort so constantly to the money market, as unfortunately in the past has been the case.

Sir, I offer you a deep apology for the unusual time that I have occupied your attention; but the subjects were so vast, the topics so important, the interests at stake so grave, the measures proposed so novel in this Council, that I should not have done my duty if I had not used all the means within my reach, inadequate as they are, to recommend them to you and the public, whom they chiefly concern. Sir, what we have proposed has been after the gravest consideration—prompted by the best motives, and the most earnest desire to promote the lasting welfare of India, and of our native fellow-subjects; and having done this in the conscientious performance of our public duty, in the high and responsible offices we hold, it will rest with us, should we receive your support, to exert all our executive ability and power to give effect to them. We shall be patient to hear and to weigh objections to detail; we shall be anxious to give our best consideration to all suggestions for improving our plans; but, in the main, we think that the crisis is so serious, that the time for argument and discussion has passed, and that the time for energetic action has come. Sir, we wish scrupulously to regard the strict rights of every man. Whatever we do shall be based upon the strictest equality between class and class, whether Europeans or natives, whether official or non-official; and trusting to a firm administration upon these principles, relying upon the support of all lovers of good order, we trust through your assistance, and by the aid of the public, in whom we have now shown unreserved confidence, that we may be the humble instruments in the hands of a higher power to restore to India that security for future prosperity and happiness which she can hardly be said to possess at this moment.



