

	19	-	-	-	8 Feb.	"	Annesley Bay	-	64 followers, 2 non-commissioned officers, 102 mules and flocks, and 410 sheep.	15 Jan.	"	Berbera	-	-	
	" 3	-	-	-	16 Feb. 23 Feb.	"	Berbera Annesley Bay	- -	16 followers, 118 bullocks, 799 sheep, with Aden and Bombay Mails.	19 Jan. 28 Feb.	" "	Annesley Bay Berbera	- -	2 -	
	- 3	-	-	-	29 Feb. 7 Mar.	"	Berbera Annesley Bay	- -	ditto 148 followers, 109 mules, and 826 bundles straw, with Aden and Bombay Mails.	3 Mar. 10 Mar.	" "	Annesley Bay Aden	- -	4 2	
	4	-	-	-	15 Mar.	"	Aden	-	"	18 Mar.	"	Annesley Bay	-	2	
	5	-	-	-	24 Mar.	"	Annesley Bay	-	11 followers, 160 bullocks, 10 donkeys, 200 sheep.	28 Mar.	"	Aden	-	3	
	-	-	-	-	2 April	"	Aden	-	385 bundles matting	3 April	"	Berbera	-	-	
	-	-	-	-	4 April	"	Berbera	-	"	8 April	"	Annesley Bay	-	3	
	9	-	-	-	18 April	"	Annesley Bay	-	Mails and despatches	21 April	"	Aden	-	2	
	2	-	-	-	24 April	"	Aden	-	109 mules, 19 followers	27 April	"	Annesley Bay	-	2	
	18	-	-	-	16 May	"	Annesley Bay	-	80 mules, 2 horses, 124 followers and fighting men.	23 May	"	Aden	-	6	
	1	-	-	-	25 May	"	Aden	-	"	5 June	"	Bombay	-	-	
	7	-	-	-	13 June	"	-	-	"	18 June	"	- ditto	-	-	Cruising off the entrance to the harbour.
Steamer "Sattara"	10	-	-	-	8 Oct.	"	Bombay	-	-	No record	-	Aden	-	-	
	-	-	-	-	No record	-	Aden	-	Details unknown	6 Mar. 1868	-	Bombay	-	-	
	-	-	-	-	4 April 1868	-	Bombay	-	-	2 July	-	Bombay	-	-	14 Aug.
Steamer "Sultan," B/24	13	-	-	-	30 Oct. 1867	"	Bombay	-	7 officers, 35 women, 151 men, 40 followers, 21 women.	3 Nov. 1867	-	Kurrachee	-	3	
	22	-	-	-	26 Nov.	"	Kurrachee	-	5 officers and 1 battery of artillery.	5 Dec.	"	Aden	-	8	
	1	-	-	-	7 Dec.	"	Aden	-	118 men, 494 camel equipments.	10 Dec.	"	Annesley Bay	-	2	
	13	-	-	-	24 Dec.	"	Annesley Bay	-	"	4 Jan. 1868	-	Aden	-	10	
	2	-	-	-	7 Jan. 1868	"	Aden	-	"	19 Jan.	"	Bombay	-	11	
	12	-	-	-	1 Feb.	"	Bombay	-	5 officers and 118 men	2 Feb.	"	Vinjerla	-	-	
	-	-	-	-	3 Feb.	"	Vinjerla	-	2 officers and 11 invalids	4 Feb.	"	Bombay	-	-	
	4	-	-	-	9 Feb.	"	Bombay	-	2 officers, 68 followers, and 2 horses and 2,765 packages stores.	22 Feb.	"	Aden	-	12	
	-	-	-	-	22 Feb.	"	Aden	-	-	Mar.	"	Annesley Bay	-	-	
	-	-	-	-	9 Mar.	"	Annesley Bay	-	5 Europeans	11 Mar.	"	Aden	-	1	
	-	-	-	-	12 Mar.	"	Aden	-	2 Europeans, 77 followers, 408 ditto, and 1 gun.	22 Mar.	"	Bombay	-	9	
	16	-	-	-	8 April	"	Bombay	-	3 Europeans, and 16,515 packages stores.	21 April	"	Aden	-	12	
	1	-	-	-	23 April	"	Aden	-	73 followers	27 April	"	Annesley Bay	-	3	
	30	-	-	-	28 May	"	Annesley Bay	-	5 officers, 4,940 packages stores.	2 June	"	Aden	-	4	
	"	-	-	-	3 June	"	Aden	-	118 rank and file, 1 battery of artillery, and 38 followers.	12 June	"	Bombay	-	8	
	4	-	-	-	17 June	"	Bombay	-	4,940 packages stores on board.	3 July	"	Bombay	-	13	Employed on pilot service. Cruising outside light vessels.

RETURN of the Arrivals and Sailings at *Annesley Bay* of Vessels engaged in the Abyssinian Expedition—*continued.*

Name of Vessel.	Date of Engagement.	No. of Days in Port.	Special Cause of Detention, if any.	Departure.		Description of Troops, Followers, Animals, Cargo, &c., conveyed.	Arrival.		No. of Days on Passage.	Remarks regarding General Work done by each Vessel.	Date of Discharge.	Gross Amount Paid.
				Date.	From what Port.		Date.	At what Port.				
Steamer "Sultan," B/24— <i>continued.</i>	16 Oct. 1867	1	-	15 July 1868	Bombay	3 officers, 1 woman, 5 children, and 437 natives.	19 July 1868	Kurrachee	3			
		2	-	22 July "	Kurrachee	7 Europeans, 3 women, 3 children, 16 native men, 2 women, and 1 box.	25 July "	Bombay	2	-	11 Aug. 1868	
	22 Oct. "	8	-	31 Oct. 1867	Bombay	8 officers, 3 women, and 5 children, 210 rank and file, 30 women, 44 children, 2 warrant officers, and 41 native followers of Her Majesty's 109th Regiment.	3 Nov. "	Kurrachee	2			
Steamer "Sabbetto," No. B/25.		17	-	21 Nov. "	Kurrachee	11 officers, 27 non-commissioned officers, 242 rank and file, 1 warrant officer, and 29 native followers, forming detachment of Her Majesty's 33rd Regiment.	29 Nov. "	Aden	7			
		1	-	1 Dec. "	Aden		4 Dec. "	Annesley Bay	2			
		24	-	29 Dec. "	Annesley Bay		2 Jan. 1869	Aden	3			
Steamer "Sunda," No. 91 -		12	-	3 Jan. 1869	Aden		12 Jan. "	Bombay	8			
			-	21 Jan. "	Bombay	His Excellency the Governor of Bombay and suite, and 2 horses.	22 Jan. "	Veraval	8			
		14	-	22 Jan. "	Kurrachee	1 horse	24 Jan. "	Kurrachee	2			
	16 Nov. "	3	-	20 Nov. "	Bombay	None	10 Feb. 1868	Bombay	1	-	19 Feb. "	
		8	-	2 Dec. "	Kurrachee	10 officers, 5 ladies, 9 children, 66 rank and file, 6 women, and 5 children, of Her Majesty's 35th Regiment.	6 Dec. "	Bombay	3	Towed transports "Agamemnon" and "Zenobia" back to Kurrachee.		
		12	-	19 Dec. "	Bombay		24 Dec. "	Kurrachee	3	Towed transports "Agamemnon" and "Zenobia" back to Bombay.		
		1	-	26 Dec. "	Kurrachee	1 officer, 29 rank and file, 2 women, and 2 children.	28 Dec. "	Bombay	1	Towing transports "Defiance" and "Sophia Joakim" to Kurrachee.		
		22	-	30 Jan. "	Bombay	5 officers, 1 lady, 1 child, 8 rank and file, and 1 horse.	24 Jan. "	Kurrachee	3	Towed the "Windsor Castle,"		
		2	-	27 Jan. "	Kurrachee		31 Jan. "	Bombay	3	Towed "Windsor Castle," and "Zenobia" to Bombay.		

	10				11 Feb.		Bombay		3 officers, 20 Europeans, 277 followers, 14 horses, and 350 tons cargo.	20 Feb.		Aden		Towed conducting flat "Hydra-bad" to Annesley Bay.	
	2				25 Feb.		Aden			26 Feb.		Annesley Bay		2	
	75				12 May		Annesley Bay			19 May		Aden		6	
	13				20 May		Aden		4 followers	22 May		7-Fathom Patch		1	
	"				22 May		7-Fathom Patch			25 May		Aden		2	
	"				28 May		Aden		- ditto	30 May		Annesley Bay		1	
	13				13 June		Annesley Bay		5 officers, 5 warrant followers, 63 Chinese, 191 followers, 12 horses, and 40 tons cargo.	15 June		Aden		1	
	1				17 June		Aden		- ditto	26 June		Bombay		6	25 July 1866
Steamer "Sakura," No. 206	11				2 July 1867		Bombay		200 troops and 2 horses	5 July 1867		Kurrachee		2	
	2				8 July		Kurrachee		24 public followers, 1 European officer, 272 public followers.	10 July		Bombay		1	
	7				18 July		Bombay		2 officers and 2 horses	22 July		Kurrachee		3	
	4				27 July		Kurrachee			30 July		Bombay		2	5 Aug.
	22				4 Dec.		Bombay		189 followers, 2 bullocks, and railway iron.	13 Dec.		Aden		8	Steam barge "Clare" in tow.
Steamer "Tilly," 75	5				14 Dec.		Aden			16 Dec.		Annesley Bay		1	
	13				30 Dec.		Annesley Bay			31 Dec.		Jibbel Teer		"	
	"				1 Jan. 1868		Jibbel Teer			2 Jan.	1868	Annesley Bay		"	
	"				9 Jan.		Annesley Bay			10 Jan.		Jibbel Teer		"	
	"				16 Jan.		Jibbel Teer			17 Jan.		"		"	
	"				19 Jan.		Annesley Bay			21 Jan.		"		1	
	"				22 Jan.		Jibbel Teer			23 Jan.		Annesley Bay		"	
	"				30 Jan.		Annesley Bay			31 Jan.		Jibbel Teer		"	
	"				1 Feb.		Jibbel Teer			2 Feb.		Annesley Bay		"	
	"				13 Feb.		Annesley Bay			13 Feb.		Massowah		13	
	"				14 Feb.		Massowah			14 Feb.		Annesley Bay		"	
	"				27 Feb.		Annesley Bay			29 Feb.		Aden		"	
	"				1 Mar.		Aden			12 Mar.		Bombay		10	
	"				18 Mar.		Bombay			21 Mar.		Kurrachee		2	
	"				23 Mar.		Kurrachee			25 Mar.		Guador		1	
	"				25 Mar.		Guador			27 Mar.		Malcolm Inlet		1	
	"				2 April		Malcolm Inlet			4 April		Guador		1	
	"				4 April		Guador			6 April		Kurrachee		1	
	"				12 April		Kurrachee			13 April		Guador		"	
	"				13 April		Guador			15 April		Malcolm Inlet		1	
	"				15 April		Malcolm Inlet			17 April		Guador		1	
	"				21 April		Guador			22 April		Malcolm Inlet		1	
	"				22 April		Malcolm Inlet			24 April		Guador		1	
	"				25 April		Guador			27 April		Malcolm Inlet		1	
	"				30 April		Malcolm Inlet			1 May		Muscat		"	
	"				2 May		Muscat			4 May		Guador		1	
	"				7 May		Guador			9 May		Malcolm Inlet		1	
	"				9 May		Malcolm Inlet			11 May		Guador		1	
	"				12 May		Guador			14 May		Malcolm Inlet		1	
	"				16 May		Malcolm Inlet			18 May		Guador		1	
	"				21 May		Guador			28 May		Bombay		3	
	10				8 June		Bombay		1 non-commissioned officer and wife, and 6 natives, medical.	19 June		Nanakel		10	
	2				22 June		Nanakel			22 June		Cochin		-	
	26				19 July		Cochin			19 June		Nanakel		-	
	5				25 July		Nanakel			30 June		Bombay		4	4 Aug.
									</						

RETURN of the Arrivals and Sailings at *Annesley Bay* of Vessels engaged in the Abyssinian Expedition—*continued*.

Name of Vessel.	Date of Engagement.	No. of Days in Port.	Special Cause of Detention, if any.	Departure.		Description of Troops, Followers, Animals, Cargo, &c., conveyed.	Arrival.		No. of Days on Passage.	Remarks regarding General Work done by each Vessel.	Date of Discharge.	Gross Amount Paid.
				Date.	From what Port.		Date.	At what Port.				
Steamer "Thales" - - 25 Nov. 1867		23	-	19 Dec. 1867	Bombay -	-	No records	Aden -	-	-	3 Aug. 1868	
				No record	Aden -	-	5 Feb. 1868	Bombay -	-			
				18 Feb. 1867	Bombay -	-	No records	Aden and Annesley Bay.	-			
				No record	Annesley -	-	3 July 1868	Bombay -	-			
				13 April 1868	Bombay -	-	13 April	Vingorla -	-			
Steamer "Viscount Canning," No. 206. 10 April 1868		2	-	14 April	Vingorla -	-	16 April	Cannanore	-	-	-	
				16 April	Cannanore	-	16 April	Beyport -	-			
				17 April	Beyport	-	20 April	Bombay -	-			
				25 April	Bombay -	-	29 April	Kurrachee	-			
				7 May	Kurrachee	-	19 May	Aden -	-			
				28 May	Aden -	-	31 May	Annesley Bay -	-			
				7 June	Annesley Bay -	-	10 June	Aden -	-			
				11 June	Aden -	-	21 June	Bombay -	-			
				23 June	Bombay -	-	23 June	Butcher's Island	-			
				21 June	Butcher's Island	-	24 June	Bombay -	-			
				1 July	Bombay -	-	6 July	Kurrachee	-			
				9 July	Kurrachee	-	13 July	Bombay -	-			
				15 July	Bombay -	-	16 July	Butcher's Island	-			
		2	-	18 July	Butcher's Island	-	18 July	Bombay -	-	-	-	-
				23 July	Bombay -	-	29 July	Kurrachee	-			
				31 July	Kurrachee	-	3 Aug.	Bombay -	-			
						-			-			
						-			-			

Bombay Transport Office,
Her Majesty's Dockyard, 8 April 1868.James Brebner,
Late Deputy Agent for Transport, Abyssinian Expedition.

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Appendix, No. 20 A.

FURTHER RETURN handed in by Captain Tryon.

RETURN taken from the REPORTS of VESSELS, showing the approximate Quantity of WATER condensed and of the COALS consumed by STEAMERS specially employed to condense Water with their Main Engines in *Annesley Bay*.

App. No. 20 A.

Names.	Period Condensing.	Gallons of Water.	Coal Used.
			<i>Tons.</i>
England - - - -	Between January and May - -	459,410	602
Asia - - - -	21 days - - - -	216,590	253
	11 days - - - -	5,500	24
Queen - - - -	Chiefly in completing vessels for return voyage.	463,860	about 500
Satara - - - -	56 days - - - -	494,648	611½
Koina - - - -	54 days - - - -	485,700	478
Punjaub - - - -	From 14 February to 16 June - -	789,440	1,022
Simla - - - -	Chiefly completing vessels for return voyage.	235,000	268½
India - - - -	104 days - - - -	906,000	841
Oriental - - - -	19 days - - - -	193,490	235
Arabia - - - -	87 days - - - -	483,406	664½
Thales - - - -	70 days chiefly completing vessels for return.	385,760	582
Himalaya - - - -	2,590 hours - - - -	933,658	1,342
	TOTAL - - -	6,051,962	7,428½

The "Semiramis" and "Hydrabad" were fitted at Bombay as condensing vessels; the former arrived at Zoulla 2nd January 1868, the latter 26th February 1868; they condensed and supplied about 6,100 tons of water and burnt 1,355 tons of coal.

Thus by the means detailed above were condensed a total of 34,919 tons of water with a consumption of 8,728 tons of coal. This includes the coal used in moving vessels employed to condense, but does not include either the water supplied or the coal consumed in condensing it by Her Majesty's ships of war, or by vessels fitted with sea salt condensers, or by the several boilers and condensing apparatus erected on the pier end and on an artificial island made for the purpose of receiving the apparatus; nor does it include the water taken out of vessels on their arrival at Zoulla with a surplus on board.

(signed) G. Tryon, C.B., Captain R.N.

Appendix, No. 20 B.

PAPERS from Admiral *Mends*, handed in by the Chairman.

App. No. 20 B.

ESTIMATE of the TONNAGE required for Conveyance of TROOPS, &c. embarked at *Annesley Bay*, after the fall of *Magdala*.

	<i>Tons.</i>
37,276 Troops and followers, at $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons per man - - - -	93,190
2,141 Horses, at 6 tons per horse - - - - -	12,846
4,126 Mules and Ponies, at $4\frac{1}{2}$ tons per mule, and with muleteers -	18,567
40 Camels, at $8\frac{1}{2}$ tons per camel, with drivers - - - -	330
The tonnage required for removing the 39 elephants to <i>Annesley Bay</i> after the fall of <i>Magdala</i> , computed on the data furnished by the Superintendent of Marine at <i>Bombay</i> , viz., 30 tons per animal, is - - - - -	1,170
Estimated tonnage for removing the 1,075 bullocks, say, at 6 tons per bullock, is - - - - -	6,430
TOTAL TONS - - -	132,533

Admiralty, 5 July 1870.

W. R. Mends,
Director of Transports.

The extra tonnage for 555 officers at the rate of $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons per man would amount to 1,387 tons, but this was purposely excluded, because the $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons per private soldier or follower is found to be sufficient to provide for the proper proportion of officers; and therefore, to reckon in the officers would unnecessarily increase the estimate for tonnage.

If added, the gross total would amount to 136,090 tons.

STATEMENT of the Cost of Fitting the "Mauritius," "Queen of the South," and "Golden Fleece," Hospital Ships, employed in the Abyssinian Expedition.

	£.	s.	d.
"Mauritius" - - - - -	1,324	4	2
"Queen of the South" - - - - -	1,594	12	-
"Golden Fleece" - - - - -	1,680	12	9

Admiralty, 4 July 1870.

LETTER from Admiral *Mends* to Mr. *Stone*.

Sir,

Admiralty, 24 June 1870.

I HAVE to request that you will be pleased to lay before the Chairman of the Abyssinian Committee the enclosed papers.

G. Stone, Esq.,
Secretary to Abyssinian Committee,
House of Commons.

I am, &c.
(signed) *W. R. Mends*.

HAVING reference to the evidence of Sir W. J. T. Power, K.C.B., given on the 6th of May, I desire to lay before the Committee the following short statement:—

1. Ships are taken up by the Admiralty for the conveyance of troops, including cavalry, upon the receipt of requisitions from the Horse Guards, and are fitted under regulations, and in accordance with specifications which have been concurred in by the War Office and Horse Guards. On the completion of the fitting of each ship, and before the embarkation takes place, she is examined by an inspecting committee, consisting of the naval officer who has superintended the fitting, one officer of the Quartermaster General's Department, and one officer of the Army Medical Department, and this committee reports on the state of the ship.

As soon after as is practicable the embarkation takes place, and following the embarkation, and before sailing, a "final inspection" is held.

At the close of the service, a report is rendered by the officer commanding the troops; and this system has worked very satisfactorily for several years.

2. As regards the mule ships (Abyssinia) engaged by the Admiralty, and fitted in accordance with the system as above, application was made by the Admiralty that a military officer should attend daily during the process of fitting, and one did so attend, as well as a veterinary surgeon, in order that the details might be as nearly as possible in accord with their wishes; the absolute security of the fittings, such as the stalls, &c., resting entirely with the Shipping Inspector of the Admiralty (a skilled shipwright), and so strongly were they secured, that they could only break away with the breaking up of the ship.

The military officers who finally inspected the ships in the Thames, expressed themselves as fully satisfied.

A return is already before the Committee of the number of mules shipped and lost during each voyage.

4. Sir William Power attributes the heavy loss in two ships engaged by the agents of the War Office to exceptionally severe weather; but, after many years experience, I am bound to state that the weather is most capricious in the Mediterranean Sea, and I was not at all surprised to find gales prevailing throughout its length and breadth in the months of October and November.

The loss of mules in ships taken up by the War Office agents, as stated by Sir William Power, would, at 20 *l.* per head (that being the average sum paid), represent 6,500 *l.*; and the loss of 50 mules in transports engaged by the Admiralty would represent 1,000 *l.*

But I think there is some error in Sir William Power's evidence as to the numbers he has given in as lost in the War Office ships, as, by the return before the Committee, they amount (inclusive of some landed at Malta) to 246, representing 4,920 *l.*

5. With reference to Questions Nos. 2611 and 2612, I would remark as follows:—

The Admiralty transport "Empress" arrived at Alexandria on the 9th of November from Gibraltar, with a loss of four mules out of 151 shipped, having experienced bad weather on the 3rd and 4th of the month. The Admiralty transport "Corimoundouros," which left Gibraltar on the 7th of November, also met with bad weather, and lost 5 out of 232 mules.

The "Principe Tomaso" (War Office vessel) arrived on the 11th of November from Brindisi, with a loss of 55 out of 100. The "Bretagne" (also engaged by War Office) arrived on the same day from Alicante, with the loss of 161 out of 325, besides 22 left sick at Malta.

Doubtless these ships experienced the same weather, but in no instance did any of the fittings of the ships engaged by the Admiralty give way.

In looking to the log of the "Empress," I find this insertion on the 3rd of November, when on voyage from Gibraltar to Alexandria.

"Force of wind, 5 to 6; a cross, turbulent sea running, causing the mules to be much knocked about." Also a similar entry on the following day, with the addition, "One mule sick, No. 57" (speed of ship, 9 to 10 knots); "several of the muleteers sick."

6. Much of the injury to the mules on board the ships whilst on passage arose from the insufficiency of attendants, and the incompetency of those who did embark, which was further increased by their becoming helplessly sea-sick.

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3 x 2

Captain

App. No. 20 B.

Captain Commerell, who was in command of H.M.S. "Terrible," and stationed at Alexandria by order of the Admiralty, to supervise the transport service afloat, did his best to remedy this evil after the first voyage by apportioning some of his own crew to each hired ship solely to look after the mules, and with the best results.

7. With reference to the engagement of ships by the War Office to convey mules between the ports in the Mediterranean at a rate per head, as Sir W. Power called frequently at my office to press the equipment of the ships engaged by the Admiralty, I suggested the course to him as one likely to be attended with expedition and probable economy; but I was not prepared to take the responsibility of recommending a change in the plan of fitting, nor would I send any valuable animals over sea in ships that were not fitted with a single stall for each animal, unless in the hold of a ship on the ballast. The value of an animal at such a time is its value at the seat of war.

9. As regards Question No. 2491, no purchasing officer was sent out by the Admiralty that I am aware of.

10. As regards Question No. 2609, Captain Commerell, of the "Terrible," stationed at Alexandria, altered some of the stalls of the Admiralty transports, *i. e.*, he reduced them by lowering the breast and parting bars, to adapt them to the class of animals he found the War Office agents were shipping; but only in rare instances did he throw two stalls into one by taking away the parting bar, in order to stow three animals instead of two.

The most successful vessel of all has been the "Theban," employed to bring mules from the Levant and Syria (short coast voyages). She was temporarily fitted by the artificers of the "Terrible," and Captain Commerell placed on board her an officer and a number of his crew, solely to look after the mules (as muleteers, in fact), for he found the men who called themselves muleteers could hardly take care of themselves.

(signed) *W. R. Mends*, Rear Admiral,
Director of Transports.

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Appendix, No. 21.

PAPERS handed in by Mr. Candlish, M.P.

RATES of FREIGHT Current in Calcutta for London in 1867.

Appendix, No. 21.

	21 Sept.	22 October.	7 Nov.	22 Nov.	7 Dec.	15 Dec.
	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Rice - - -	2 10 -	4 5 -	4 5 -	3 10 -	3 12 6	3 17 6
Oilseeds - - -	3 10 -	Nominal	4 5 -	3 15 -	Nominal	4 10 -
Jute - - -	3 5 -	4 - -	3 17 6	3 10 -	3 12 6	4 - -

STATEMENT showing the Gross Quantity of COALS supplied to each Ship, the Places where supplied, and the Quantity supplied to each Ship at each Place, the Times when each Supply was made, and the Price per Ton charged for each Supply.

“S A M A N U N D.”

The Gross Quantity Supplied to each Ship.	The Places where Supplied.	The Quantity Supplied at each Place.	The Times when each Supply was made.	The Price per Ton Charged for each Supply.	Cost of Coal.	R E M A R K S.
<i>Tons cwt. qrs. lbs.</i>		<i>Tons cwt. qrs. lbs.</i>		<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	
2,184 3 3 0	Not known	306 0 0 0	Not known	37 15 2	11,612 5 4	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 22nd September 1867, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
		320 0 0 0		37 15 2	12,143 10 -	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 17th December 1867, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
		355 0 0 0		37 15 2	13,471 12 8	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 28th January 1868, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
		430 0 0 0		37 15 2	16,317 15 4	Included in receipt, without date, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
		375 0 0 0		37 15 2	14,230 14 -	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 30th April 1868, and passed by said captain.
		398 3 3 0		37 15 2	15,110 12 -	Included in receipt, without date, and passed by said captain.
		2,184 3 3 0*			82,887 5 4	

“H E D I E D A H.”

1,780 16 1 14	Not known -	243 16 1 14	Not known	37 15 2	9,252 10 -	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 22nd September 1867, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
	- ditto -	266 10 0 0		37 15 2	10,113 4 8	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 5th December 1867, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
	- ditto -	292 0 0 0		37 15 2	11,081 - 8	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 31st December 1867, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
	Store of the Egyptian Government at Suez.	300 0 0 0		53 15 5	16,195 6 -	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 30th January 1868, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
	Not known -	99 10 0 0		37 15 2	3,775 14 -	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 30th January 1868, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
	- ditto -	339 0 0 0		37 15 2	12,864 10 -	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 18th March 1868, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
	- ditto -	210 0 0 0		37 15 2	9,107 11 4	Included in receipt, without date, and passed by said captain.
		1,780 16 1 14*			72,390 8 8	

* This column only shows the supply made on each separate occasion.

STATEMENT showing the Gross Quantity of Coal supplied to each Ship, the Places where supplied, &c.—*continued.*

"PENGUIN."

The Gross Quantity Supplied to each Ship.	The Places where Supplied.	The Quantity Supplied at each Place.	The Times when each Supply was made.	The Price per Ton Charged for each Supply.	Cost of Coal.	REMARKS.
<i>Tons cwt. qrs. lbs.</i>		<i>Tons cwt. qrs. lbs.</i>		<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	
266 0 0 0	Not known	26 10 0 0	From 12 Oct. to 9 Nov. 1867.	37 15 2	1,005 10 -	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 22nd September 1867, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
		44 10 0 0	From 9 March to 7 April 1868.	37 15 2	1,688 11 4	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 8th April 1868, and passed by said captain.
		40 10 0 0	From 9 Nov. to 10 Dec. 1867.	37 15 2	1,536 14 8	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 17th December 1867, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
		42 0 0 0	From 10 Dec. 1867 to 8 Jan. 1868.	37 15 2	1,593 13 4	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 28th January 1868, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
		34 0 0 0	From 8 Feb. to 8 March 1868.	37 15 2	1,290 4 8	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 15th March 1868, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
		48 0 0 0	From 8 April to 12 May 1868.	37 15 2	1,821 8 8	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 16th May 1868, and passed by said captain.
		30 0 0 0	From 9 Jan. to 7 Feb. 1868.	37 15 2	1,157 7 4	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 19th February 1868, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
		266 0 0 0*			10,094 6 -	

"COSAIR."

1,123 0 0 0	Not known	257 10 0 0	Not known	37 15 2	9,771 12 8	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 5th December 1867, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
		298 10 0 0		37 15 2	11,327 11 4	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 18th April 1868, and passed by Major Stansfeld.
		277 0 0 0		37 15 2	10,511 13 4	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 19th February 1868, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
		290 0 0 0		37 15 2	11,005 2 -	Included in receipt, without date, and passed by said captain.
		1,123 0 0 0			42,616 7 4	

"SOWAKIM."

1,615 0 0 0	Not known	258 0 0 0	Not known	37 15 2	9,790 12 8	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 5th January 1868, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
		230 0 0 0		37 15 2	8,728 4 -	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 29th December 1867, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
		283 0 0 0		37 15 2	10,739 8 -	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 30th January 1868, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
		290 0 0 0		37 15 2	11,005 2 -	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 15th March 1868, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
		278 0 0 0		37 15 2	10,549 12 -	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 19th April 1868, and passed by said captain.
		276 0 0 0		37 15 2	10,473 14 -	Included in receipt, without date, and passed by said captain.
		1,615 0 0 0			61,287 4 8	

"HADGAZ."

393 0 0 0	Not known -	393 0 0 0	Not known -	37 15 2	14,913 14 -	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 17th December 1867, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
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* This column only shows the supply made on each separate occasion.

STATEMENT showing the Gross Quantity of Coal supplied to each Ship, the Places where supplied, &c.—continued.

“YAMBOO.”

The Gross Quantity Supplied to each Ship.	The Places where Supplied.	The Quantity Supplied at each Place.	The Times when each Supply was made.	The Price per Ton Charged for each Supply.	Cost of Coal.	REMARKS.
<i>Tons. cwt. qrs. lbs.</i>		<i>Tons. cwt. qrs. lbs.</i>		<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	
1,507 18 3 22	Not known -	242 1 0 0	Not known -	37 15 2	9,158 8 -	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 29th December 1867, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
	- ditto -	292 7 9 22		37 15 2	11,094 11 4	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 28th April 1868, and passed by said captain.
	From Egyptian Government at Suez.	250 0 0 0		53 15 5	15,496 2 8	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 19th February 1868, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
	Not known -	396 0 0 0		37 15 2	18 12 8	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 19th February 1868, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
	- ditto -	327 10 3 0		37 15 2	12,442 7 4	Included in receipt, without date, and passed by said captain.
		1,507 18 3 22			46,237 10 -	

“DESSOUK.”

1,202 0 0 0	Not known -	255 0 0 0	Not known	37 15 2	9,676 14 8	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 29th December 1867, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
	Egyptian Government Store at Suez.	235 0 0 0		53 15 5	12,686 6 8	Included in receipt, without date, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
	Not known -	112 0 0 0		37 15 2	4,250 4 -	Included in receipt, without date, and passed by H.E. Mustapha Bey.
	- ditto -	200 0 0 0		37 15 2	11,384 11 4	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 18th April 1868, and passed by Major Stansfeld.
	- ditto -	300 0 0 0		37 15 2	11,384 10 -	Included in receipt, dated Suez, 5th June 1868, and passed by said captain.
		1,202 0 0 0			49,382 14 8	

Poona, 27 January 1870.

J. Thacker, Lieut. Colonel,
Officiating Examiner of Commissariat Accounts.

Note.—In the Statement furnished with Memorandum, No. 6705, dated 6th December 1869, to the Controller of Military Accounts, headed “Abstract Statement, showing the Gross Amount of Freight paid for the hire of each of the Vessels of the Aziziah Company engaged for the Abyssinian Expedition,” the amounts shown in the column, “Supply of Coal,” &c., differ from those shown under the head “Cost of Coal” in the present Statement, because in the former Statement the column, “Coal, &c.,” included other expenses incurred on account of olive oil, grease, Nile water for animals, &c. The following were the amounts so incurred in each case:—

	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>a.</i>	<i>p.</i>
“Samanud”	22,786	7	8
“Hedaida”	2,168	12	4
“Penguin”	1,078	-	-
“Cossair”	5,933	5	8
“Sunakim”	1,522	14	4
“Hadjaz”	253	8	-
“Yamboe”	10,024	4	-
“Dessouk”	1,397	5	4
	Rs. 45,164	9	4

Appendix, No. 21.

(No. 215 of 1870.—Military Department.)

MEMORANDUM.

Bombay Castle, 2 April 1870.

No. 39, dated 24
Jan.; No. 1276,
dated 21st March.

THE undersigned presents compliments, and has the honour to forward to John Candlish, Esq., M.P., the accompanying copies of reports by the Superintendent of Marine and the Commissary General, furnishing information in regard to the services performed by the transports "Bethshan" and "Royal Edward," which were engaged in connection with the Abyssinian Expedition.

John Macdonald, Lieutenant Colonel,
Deputy Secretary to Government.

(No. 39 of 1870.—Military Department.)

To the Secretary to Government.

Superintendent's Office, Bombay,
24 January 1870.

Sir,

ADVERTING to the second paragraph of your Memorandum, No. 768, of the 29th November last, in the Military Department, I have the honour to inform you that the "Bethshan" was engaged on the 29th February 1868, and left Bombay laden with hay for the Abyssinian Expedition on the 31st March following, and subsequently returning to Bombay with hay, was discharged on the 3rd September 1868. There are no records in this office to show whether the vessel had on board the same cargo of hay on her return to Bombay as that with which she left that port.

2. As regards the "Royal Edward," she was engaged on the 27th December 1867, at Rs. 10. 12. 4. per registered ton; there are no records to show what number of bales of hay she carried. This information can, however, be obtained from the Commissariat Department. The "Royal Edward" left Bombay on the 10th January 1868, and subsequently returned laden with hay, a portion of which was made over to the owners, thus expediting the discharge of the vessel from the service of Government on the 19th August. The Accountant General's Department would be better able to furnish the information in respect to the whole sum paid for hire. I would also observe that the Abyssinian transports were not under the orders of this Department after leaving Bombay, their movements being entirely controlled by the principal transport officer in Annesley Bay.

I have, &c.
(signed) *G. T. Robinson*, Commander I.N.,
Superintendent of Marine.

(No. 1276 of 1869-70.—Military Department.)

REPORT.

Commissary General's Office, Bombay,
21 March 1870.

THE executive commissariat officer at the Presidency reports that the transport "Bethshan" left Bombay laden with 400 hogsheads porter, and portion of second reserve stock of provisions, and 1,428 bales, or 107,100 lbs., of hay.

2. She landed the whole of the sugar and ghee at Aden, and brought back the remaining articles of provisions, the porter and hay, which were landed at Bombay.

3. Eleven thousand four hundred and sixty-five bales, or 859,875 lbs., of hay were shipped at Bombay on board the "Royal Edward," out of which 8,447 bales were landed here, and the remaining 3,018 bales were presented as a gift to the commander.

(signed) *J. B. Dunsterville*, Colonel,
Commissary General of the Army.

EXTRACT of a LETTER, dated 27th September 1867, from Messrs. *Stearns, Hobart, & Co.*, Treasurers and Managers, Bombay and Bengal Steam Ship Company, Limited, to Captain *Young*, Superintendent of Marine, *Bombay*.

IN addition to the foregoing, we are prepared to undertake the carriage from this of 3,000 tons of store monthly, to such point as may be decided on by Government, during the continuation of the Expedition. A portion of our cargo room can also be made available in like manner from Suez.

The preceding paragraph is based upon the supposition that no unnecessary delay will arise in taking delivery of such cargoes; that Government will have barges enough, and ready to discharge the vessels immediately on arrival, or place them alongside some of their unemployed vessels, into which they can at once place their stores.

Should Government be disposed to favourably entertain this portion of our tender, we will at once name the rate at which we can undertake to do the work.

Our steamer "*Krishna*," leaving this about the 10th October, can be made available for Government purposes, for the carriage of troops, stores, &c., to Aden, or even to other ports, could such be definitely fixed upon before her departure. We could also allow her to take a sailing transport in tow as far as Aden.

(No. 176 of 1870.—Military Department.)

MEMORANDUM.

Bombay Castle, 19 March 1870.

THE undersigned presents compliments, and has the honour to forward to John Candlish, Esq., M.P., the accompanying Statement, furnished by the Superintendent of Marine, showing the number of troops the English steamers carried, in comparison with the numbers, in proportion to their tonnage, carried by the steamers engaged at Bombay, in connection with the Abyssinian Expedition.

John Candlish, Esq., M.P.

R. Hoskins, Captain R.A., for
Lieutenant Colonel,
Deputy Secretary to Government.

ABYSSINIAN EXPEDITION.

STATEMENT showing the Number of TROOPS the ENGLISH STEAMERS carried in comparison to the Numbers in proportion to their Tonnage carried by STEAMERS engaged at *Bombay*.

ENGAGED IN ENGLAND.	Tonnage.	Europeans.	ENGAGED IN BOMBAY.	Tonnage.	Europeans.
American - - - - -	1,831	287	Arabia - - - - -	1,027	210
City of Manchester - - -	1,906	346	Asia - - - - -	1,579	327
California - - - - -	1,831	364	Armenian - - - - -	944.37	305
England - - - - -	3,307	873	Bombay Castle - - - - -	823.25	143
Kangaroo - - - - -	1,719	318	Euphrates - - - - -	650.42	206
Peruvian - - - - -	2,245	252	Great Victoria - - - - -	2,308	432
Queen - - - - -	3,511	775	India - - - - -	1,010	293
West Indian - - - - -	1,807	329	John Bright - - - - -	1,022.63	152
City of Dublin* - - - -	—	—	Japan - - - - -	474.62	123
Queen of the South - - -	Hospital Ships.		Koima - - - - -	869.61	280
Golden Fleece - - - - -			Madras - - - - -	1,185	144
Mauritius - - - - -			Mula - - - - -	690.18	221
			Norma - - - - -	900	123
			Nada - - - - -	880.62	236
			Ottawa - - - - -	1,274	170
			Sattara - - - - -	1,230	290
			Sultan - - - - -	1,124	360
			Salsette - - - - -	1,491	360
			Sunda - - - - -	1,682	227
			Sakura - - - - -	847	227
			Thames - - - - -	1,153.78	316
			Viscount Canning - - -	781.96	197
			Punjaub† - - - - -	1,029.54	—

* No record in this department to show Number of European Troops for which there is accommodation.
† No records of this vessel's capacity. This vessel was taken up at Calcutta.

Superintendent's Office, Bombay, }
5 March 1870.

(signed) G. T. Robinson, Commander I. N.,
Superintendent of Marine.

EXTRACTS from our MARKET REPORTS, furnished by *Nichol & Co.,* Karruchee.

9th October 1867.—Gram—The demand for Abyssinian requirements continues active, a large business has been done and prices have advanced, we quote, 25 rupees and *Rs. 25. 8.* per candy, with an upward tendency.

24th October 1867.—Gram—The extraordinary demand for Abyssinia having been met, and as there is no shipment in progress for Mauritius, prices have fallen to 24 rupees per candy. Early in the fortnight a European firm bought two parcels shipped for Mauritius, per "*Alettria*," at *Rs. 25. 8.* and 26 rupees per candy, paying all charges of shipment, &c.

9th November 1867.—A renewal of demand for the Abyssinian Expedition has caused gram again to advance, and a considerable business has been done at 26 rupees and *Rs. 26. 4.* per candy. Supplies on the spot are scanty, but there is a large quantity on the river.

23rd November 1867.—Prices of gram have receded to 25 rupees and *Rs. 25. 4.* per candy.

9th December 1867.—A good inquiry for gram for shipment to Bombay has been experienced, and a large business has been done, prices having run up to *Rs. 29. 8.* per candy, and still tending higher.

24th December 1867.—A large business was done early in the fortnight, for Bombay, but latterly, the market has been quiet, and prices have drooped to *Rs. 28. 8.* for gram, sales, for delivery in six weeks, having been made at 27 rupees per candy.

9th January 1868.—Prices of gram are unchanged, at 28 rupees and *Rs. 28. 8.* per candy.

24th January 1868.—Prices of gram have receded, owing to the absence of demand for the Commissariat, and we quote to-day *Rs. 23. 8.* and 24 rupees per candy, with little doing.

8th February 1868.—Prices of gram have further given way, and business to some extent has been done at *Rs. 22. 8.* and *Rs. 22. 12.* per candy.

24th February 1868.—Government contractors have bought old gram at 22 rupees and *Rs. 22. 12.* per candy, but the feeling is easier now. Contracts for new gram, four months' delivery, have been made at *Rs. 23. 8.* per candy.

10th March 1868.—Prices of old gram have receded to 19 rupees per candy, and there are large stocks in dealers' hands. New crop has changed hands at 23 rupees per candy, six months' delivery.

25th March 1868.—Gram is quiet at 19 rupees for old, with large stocks. New crop is maintained at *Rs. 22. 8.* and 23 rupees per candy, six months' delivery.

PAPERS handed in by Sir *William Power*.

RETURN of CASUALTIES among the PACK ANIMALS on board Steamers hired by the War Office, or by Agents of the War Office.

Name of Steamer Conveyed In.	VOYAGE		Number of Deaths on Board.	REMARKS.
	From	To		
Touraine - - -	Alicante -	Alexandria -	2	
Bretagne - - -	- Ditto -	- Ditto -	161	"153 were killed at once, during a violent gale, when the vessel was unmanageable." Eight died afterwards; 22 landed injured at Malta.
Principe Tommaso -	Brindisi -	- Ditto -	55	
Touraine - - -	Gibraltar -	- Ditto -	3	Killed during a severe storm.
Elmo - - -	Smyrna -	- Ditto -	1	
T. Snowden - - -	Valencia -	- Ditto -	1	
Achilles - - -	- Ditto -	- Ditto -	1	
	TOTAL - -		224	

War Office, March 1868.

PARTICULARS of the SHIPMENTS of PACK ANIMALS.

In STEAM TRANSPORTS Hired by the ADMIRALTY.

NAME AND NUMBER OF TRANSPORT.	Draft of Water.	Number of Mules originally fitted to Carry.	Departure from	PURCHASING PORT.					Number of Animals Died on each Passage.	ALEXANDRIA.			REMARKS			
				Name of Port.	Date of Arrival.	Number of Days on Passage.	Number of Animals Shipped.	Date of Departure.		Date of Arrival.	Number of Days on Passage.	Number of Animals Landed.				
"Bolivar" - (No. 17.)	Ft. in. 15 0	192	(Cost of Freight, see below.)													
			1867:			1867:			1867:			1867:				
			The Thames, 25 Sept. -	Alicante -	6 Oct. -	12	131	15 Oct. -	3	19 Oct. -	10	128	Fittings altered to carry more animals.			
			Alexandria, 20 Oct. -	Scanderoon	Not given	-	225	24 Oct. -	-	27 Oct. -	4	225				
			Alexandria, 28 Oct. -	Gibraltar -	Not given	-	131	10 Nov. -	-	20 Nov. -	11	131				
"Counmoundouros" - (No. 16.)	16 6	188	The Thames, 30 Sept. -	Alicante -	9 Oct. -	10	170	15 Oct. -	12	22 Oct. -	8	158	Fittings altered to carry more animals.			
			Alexandria, 24 Oct. -	Gibraltar -	5 Nov. -	13	233	6 Nov. -	6	15 Nov. -	10	227				
			Alexandria, 17 Nov. -	Brindisi -	Not given	-	190	23 Nov. -	15	30 Nov. -	8	175				
			"Empress" - (No. 14.)	15 0	101	The Thames, 30 Sept. -	Alicante -	8 Oct. -	9	112	12 Oct. -	1	20 Oct. -	9	111	Fittings altered to carry more animals.
						Alexandria, 21 Oct. -	Gibraltar -	29 Oct. -	9	151	31 Oct. -	4	9 Nov. -	10	147	
Alexandria, 11 Nov. -	Gibraltar -	21 Nov. -				11	101	22 Nov. -	-	3 Dec. -	12	101				
"Parana" - (No. 15.)	17 6	260	The Thames, 25 Sept. -	Valencia -	6 Oct. -	12	247	12 Oct. -	3	24 Oct. -	13	244				
			Alexandria, 25 Oct. -	Gibraltar -	Not given	-	254	10 Nov. -	1	22 Nov. -	13	253				
"Venetia" - (No. 18.)	16 6	124	The Thames, 26 Sept. -	Alicante -	4 Oct. -	9	114	8 Oct. -	6	16 Oct. -	9	108	Fittings altered to carry more animals.			
			Alexandria, 17 Oct. -	Beyrout -	20 Oct. -	4	204	20 Oct. -	-	22 Oct. -	3	204				
			Alexandria, 23 Oct. -	Smyrna -	27 Oct. -	5	185	28 Oct. -	-	2 Nov. -	6	185				
			Alexandria, 4 Nov. -	Gibraltar -	15 Nov. -	12	119	18 Nov. -	-	28 Nov. -	11	119				

* (7,678—Mules—25.)

Estimated by Admiralty that if each of the above five steamers carry 270 mules each, and make three trips, the cost of freight will be 171 10s each mule.

	£.	s.	d.
"Bolivar" -	6,177	12	9
"Counmoundouros" -	4,835	19	5
"Empress" -	3,510	-	-
"Parana" -	5,004	4	11
"Venetia" -	5,013	14	8
TOTAL -	£. 24,541	11	9

PARTICULARS of the SHIPMENTS of PACK ANIMALS.

IN STEAMERS Hired by the WAR OFFICE or by AGENTS of the WAR OFFICE.

NAME OF STEAMER.	Draft of Water	Number of Mules fitted to Carry.	PURCHASING PORT.			Number of Animals Died on each Passage.	ALEXANDRIA.			REMARKS, showing Rate of Freight, &c.
			Name of Port.	Number of Animals Shipped.	Date of Departure.		Date of Arrival.	Number of Days on Passage.	Number of Animals Landed.	
"T. Snowden"	Ft. in. 13 6	300 to 320	Valencia	109	1867 : 29 Oct.	1	1867 : 7 Nov.	10	198	7 l. 10 s. each animal conveyed.
"Achilles"	14 0	400 to 450	Alicante	240	7 Nov.	-	18 Nov.	12	240	
			Valencia (called here to take up).	65	9 Nov.	1	18 Nov.	10	64	
"Touraine"	15 0	300	Alicante	313	22 Oct.	2	31 Oct.	10	311	8 l. each animal conveyed.
			Gibraltar*	311	21 Nov.	3	4 Dec.	14	308	
"Bretagne"	15 0	300	Alicante	325	26 Oct.	161 and 22 landed injured at Malta.	11 Nov.†	17	142	
"Atlantic"	-	-	Malta	300	15 Oct.	-	25 Oct.	6	300	3 l. each animal conveyed; muleteers 1 l. each. 15 s. each animal conveyed; muleteers 2 l. each.
			Scanderson	100	8 Nov.	-	11 Nov.	4	100	
"Carlo"	-	-	Brindisi	73	30 Sept.	-	4 Oct.	5	73	Adriatic and Oriental Steam Navigation Com- pany, 80 francs each animal conveyed.
			Ditto	80	14 Oct.	-	18 Oct.	5	80	
			Ditto	87	30 Oct.	-	3 Nov.	5	87	
			Ditto	87	14 Nov.	-	18 Nov.	5	87	
"Principe Tommaso"	-	-	Brindisi	80	7 Oct.	-	11 Oct.	5	80	500 l. the trip at 2 l. 18 s. 1 d. each animal conveyed.
			Ditto	103	22 Oct.	-	26 Oct.	5	108	
			Ditto	100	7 Nov.*	55	11 Nov.	5	45	
"Eerno"	-	-	Smyrna	172	30 Oct.	1	4 Nov.	6	171	2 l. 15 s. each animal con- veyed.
"Therian"	-	-	Smyrna	200	7 Nov.	-	11 Nov.	5	200	
"Marie Antonette"	-	-	Beyrout	225	28 Oct.	-	30 Oct.	3	225	2 l. each animal conveyed.
			Ditto	152	14 Nov.	-	16 Nov.	3	152	
"Minia"	-	-	Beyrout	368	6 Nov.	-	7 Nov.	2	368	2 l. each animal conveyed, and gratuity of 20 l. to the captain.
"Minieh"	-	-	Smyrna	382	3 Nov.	-	7 Nov.	5	382	3 l. per mule. 4 l. per horse.
"Persian"	-	-	Smyrna	162	Not given	-	6 Dec.	-	162	3 l. each animal conveyed.
"Theban"	-	-	Smyrna	218	17 Oct.	-	20 Oct.	4	218	3 l. each animal conveyed. 2,500 l. for the entire ser- vice; 4 trips equal to about 2 l. 4 s. 2 d. each animal conveyed.
			Cyprus	324	27 Oct.	-	29 Oct.	3	324	
			Scanderson	321	4 Nov.	-	7 Nov.	4	321	
			Cyprus	250	11 Nov.	-	19 Nov.	3	350	
			Ditto	136	18 Nov.	-	20 Nov.	3	135	

* For this voyage the "Touraine" was relieved at Alexandria.

† Killed on board during severe gales.

This Sheet contains all the information that can be given regarding these vessels.

Information regarding draft of water, and number of animals fitted to carry, was received only as regards the first four named steamers.

Gratuities as undermentioned were awarded to the masters of the vessels named for services rendered to the safe conveyance of the animals :-
"Atlantic," 10 l.; "Eerno," 10 l.; "Minia," 20 l.; and "Theban," 20 l.

MULES (including Pack Horses).

(Supplied by Contract marked C.) Purchased at	Numbers Purchased.		Average Prices of (including Sums paid for Commission on Purchases).		Relative Adaptation to the Service (from Reports Received from)	
	Mules.	Pack Horses.	Mules.	Pack Horses.	Alexandria.	Suez.
	7,678—Mules—185.				7,678 Alexandria 146	7,678 Alexandria 128
			£. s. d.	£. s. d.		
Cyprus - - - - - (See also special sheet for Cyprus.)	810	- -	20 16 -	- - -	1st Class -	1st Class.
Brindisi .. - - - - -	800	- -	19 8 -	- - -	2nd „ -	2nd „
Smyrna (C.) - - - - - {	*800	- -	22 10 -	- - -	3rd „ -	5th „
	- -	500	- - -	15 - -		
Aleppo and Scanderoon - - - {	500	- -	19 15 6	- - -	4th „ -	10th† „
	- -	250	- - -	11 5 6		
Egypt - - - - -	‡478		13 15 4		- -	4th „
Beyrout, Syria - - - - - {	653	- -	18 3 -	- - -	5th „ -	11th† „
	- -	298	- - -	9 10 5		
Malta - - - - -	300	- -	22 - -	- - -	6th „ -	3rd „
Spain :						
Gibraltar - - - - -	§1,319	- -	23 7 -	- - -	7th „ -	6th „
Alicante - - - - -	512	- -	16 19 4	- - -	8th „ -	7th „
Valencia (C.) - - - - -	500	- -	22 18 4	- - -		8th „
Barcelona - - - - -	14	- -	20 16 8	- - -		
Supplied by Wetherell & Co. (C.)	1,100	- -	29 6 -	- - -		9th „

* It would appear that 1,320 animals were purchased at Smyrna, but reports received from there show, that only 1,300 were purchased by contract.

† It is principally the poor class of horses from these places that has made classes 10 and 11 so low.

Letter to D. C. G. Watt. Artillery mules not required, but pack mules 14 hands high, from four to nine years old, 18 September 1867. 7678—Gibraltar—1.

‡ A. C. G. Robinson's return in 7,678—mules—185, shews only 478 animals to have been purchased. Major Shervinton in 1—175, returns 552.

§ 1,323 purchased, but four were transferred to local establishment. 7,678—Gibraltar—119.

|| Wetherell's mules 15 per cent. inferior to those purchased at Gibraltar, and 10 per cent. to those purchased at Valencia and Alicante. Gibraltar mules considered much superior in quality to Valencia mules; the mules purchased by the Commission at Alicante coming between the two former. 7678—Alicante—257.

L. T. Alonso, 3 Felipe Vo. Madrid, who states that he purchased mules for the English Government during the Crimean War, writes to say, that he does not recommend the larger mules for pack purposes; they should be 14 hands high, above 15 hands they are only fit for slow draught.

RETURN showing the Numbers of PACK ANIMALS purchased for the ABYSSINIAN EXPEDITION, the Casualties among them, the Numbers landed at *Alexandria*, and the Numbers handed over to the Bombay Government (also the Loss per Cent.).

	Stations where the Animals were Purchased.	Number of Animals Purchased.	Casualties. (See Note *.)	Numbers Landed at Alexandria.	REMARKS.
		<u>7,678</u> Mules <u>185</u>		<u>7,678</u> Mules <u>175</u>	
For Aleppo, see Scanderoon					* The casualties include deaths at the Stations, sales by auction of un-serviceable animals, deaths on passage to Alexandria, 22 landed at Malta from Alicante, four transferred at Gibraltar to local transport establishment, and animals destroyed on account of injuries received or diseases contracted.
512 purchased at the Station, and 1,100 furnished by Wetherell & Co.	Alicante - - -	1,612	414	1,198	
	Brindisi - - -	800	70	730	
For Barcelona, see Valencia.					
	Cyprus - - -	810	1	809	
For Beyrout, see Syria.					
	Gibraltar - - -	1,323	37	1,286	
For Egypt, see below.					
	Malta - - -	300	-	300	
	Scanderoon and Aleppo -	750	14	736	
	Smyrna - - -	1,320†	2	1,318	† 1,320 appear to have been purchased, but we received reports accounting for only 1,300. 1,318 purchased at Smyrna.
	Syria, Beyrout - -	951	2	949	
	Valencia - - -	514‡	8	506	
		8,380	548	7,832	‡ Includes 14 from Barcelona where they were purchased. One reported dead at that station.
	Egypt - - -	552	-	552	
	TOTALS - -	8,932	548	8,384	

and below

<u>7,678</u> Mules <u>175</u>	Handed over to Bombay Government at Suez - - -	8,167§	8,384	Total Number purchased - - -	8,932
	Died at Alexandria - - -	55		Casualties - - -	765
	Died at Suez - - -	74			
	Lost at Suez - - -	8		Handed over to Bombay Government -	8,167
	Lost in transit by railway from Alexandria - - -	5			
	Sold at Alexandria - - -	20			
	Sold at Suez - - -	55		Loss 8½ per cent.	

§ Captain Morrison, who commanded the mule depôt at Suez, told me that 8,167 is the correct number.
W. B.

PAPER prepared by General *Jameson*, and handed in by the Chairman.PATENT COMPRESSED FORAGE, packed in Canvas, supplied by Mr. *E. J. Davis*, of Mile End.

Authority.	Quantity.	Price.
	<i>Tons.</i>	<i>£. s. d.</i>
*Supply approved by Secretary of State for India in Council, 22nd August 1867	500	13 - - per Ton.
*Supply approved by Secretary of State for India in Council, 3rd October 1867	393	13 15 - "
Supply requested by telegram from Captain Willoughby, Bombay Army, dated Suez, 27th January 1868; approved by Secretary of State for India in Council, 6th February - - - - -	1,000	13 15 - "
Supply requested by telegram of 17th February (Suez) from Captain Willoughby; approved by Secretary of State for India in Council, 5th March - - -	3,000	14 - - "
TOTAL Quantity - - -	4,893	

* These supplies were requested by a telegram from Bombay, and were subsequently alluded to in a Memo. by the Commissary General, Bombay.

The SUPPLIES were as follows:—

Date of Bill.	Quantity.	Price.	Amount.	Date of Payment.	Number of Voucher sent to the Treasury.
	<i>Tons. cwt. qrs. lbs.</i>	<i>£. s. d.</i>	<i>£. s. d.</i>		
11 September 1867	75 5 2 24	13 - - per Ton	978 14 4	30 September 1867	2
21 September "	150 0 0 0	13 - - "	1,950 - -	2 October "	7
11 October "	177 14 1 4	13 - - "	2,310 5 9	22 October "	25
1 November "	97 8 2 8	13 - - "	1,266 11 6	15 November "	41
23 November "	394 6 1 0	13 15 - "	5,421 18 5	20 December "	154
" "	Storing and relighting 140 tons at 5s.		35 - -		
20 February 1868	150 0 0 0	13 15 - per Ton	2,062 10 -	6 March 1868	332
25 February "	200 0 0 0	13 15 - "	2,750 - -	10 March "	345
11 March "	211 7 3 12	13 15 - "	2,906 13 1	21 March "	357
14 March "	35 7 0 10	13 15 - "	486 3 3	2 April "	396
26 March "	312 15 0 0	13 15 - "	4,300 6 3	13 April "	403
13 April "	91 0 0 0	13 15 - "	1,251 5 -	21 April "	405
13 April "	215 0 0 0	14 - - "	3,010 - -		
25 April "	326 6 1 20	14 - - "	4,568 10 -	8 May "	444
Total Quantity supplied	2,436 11 1 0				
Compensation granted for cancelling order for compressed forage unsupplied, approved by Secretary of State for India in Council, 14th May 1868 - - - - -			10,000 - -	16 June "	466
TOTAL Amount paid - - - £.			43,297 17 7		

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Appendix, No. 21.

PACKSADDLES COMPLETE.

Supply of 5,000 approved by the Secretary of State in Council, 12th August 1867.

4,000 supplied by Messrs. Oastler & Palmer at 5 *l.* 8 *s.* 6 *d.* each,

	£.	s.	d.	
For which they were paid -	21,700	-	-	30th October 1867, Vo. 34,
And for a supply of extra hair, approved by Secretary of State for India in Council, 24th October 1867	637	10	-	14th November 1867, Vo. 40.
	£. 22,337	10	-	

1,000 supplied by Messrs. Overton & Tebbitt at 4 *l.* 15 *s.* 9 *d.* each,

	£.	s.	d.	
For which they were paid -	3,875	-	-	8th November 1867, Vo. 36.
and -	912	10	-	17th February 1868, Vo. 247.
	£. 4,787	10	-	

N. B.—There were also 12 packsaddles supplied by the War Office, as part equipment of a mountain battery, and five of Lieutenant M'Mahon's patent, for which Lieutenant M'Mahon was paid, 40 *l.* 18 *s.*, 27th January 1868, Vo. 207.

Appendix, No. 21A.

RETURNS handed in by Mr. *Candlish*, from *W. H. Roberts*, Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company's Agent at *Alexandria*.

ALEXANDRIA.

MEMORANDUM for *John Candlish*, Esq., M.P.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
19 October 1869.

THE coal supplies by the Company to the transports of the Abyssinian Expedition in this country appear by our coal account books to be approximately as follows:—

	SUEZ:	Tons.	Tons.
November 1867	- - - - -	970	
December "	- - - - -	2,727	
January - 1868	- - - - -	2,340	
February "	- - - - -	1,559	
March "	- - - - -	1,997	
April - "	- - - - -	4,799	
May - - "	- - - - -	150	
June - - "	- - - - -	1,980	
July - - "	- - - - -	1,030	
August - "	- - - - -	227	
			17,779
	ALEXANDRIA:		
October - 1867	- - - - -	770	
November "	- - - - -	441	
			1,211
	GRAND TOTAL - - -	Tons.	18,990

W. H. Roberts, Agent.

Mr. Roberts also informed Messrs. Candlish and Beaumont that the price of North Country and Welsh coals in Alexandria ranged from 28 *s.* to 33 *s.* per ton, and no other quality was supplied to the Expedition; and that the railway rate for conveying coals from Alexandria to Suez was 20 *s.* per ton.

Appendix, No. 22.

PAPER delivered in by Admiral *Mends*.

INDIA.—OVERLAND TROOP SERVICE.

RETURN of the Dates of the Arrivals and Sailings of each INDIAN RELIEF TROOP SHIP, and of the carrying the same TROOPS from and

O U T W A R D S.

N A M E OF S H I P.	Left Portsmouth.	Arrived at Queenstown.	Left Queenstown.	Arrived at Alexandria.	Troops Transferred to.	Left Suez.	Arrived at Calcutta.	Arrived at Bombay.
Crocodile -	11 Sept. 1867	12 Sept. 1867	15 Sept. 1867	27 Sept. 1867	Euphrates -	6 Oct. 1867	27 Oct. 1867	-
Serapis -	16 Oct. "	-	-	29 Oct. "	Malabar -	8 Nov. "	-	24 Nov. 18
Crocodile -	4 Dec. "	7 Dec. 1867	8 Dec. 1867	20 Dec. "	Jumna -	23 Dec. "	-	10 Jan. 18
Serapis -	14 Dec. "	-	-	28 Dec. "	Euphrates -	1 Jan. 1868	-	16 Jan. "
Crocodile -	21 Jan. 1868	24 Jan. 1868	26 Jan. 1868	8 Feb. 1868	Malabar -	10 Feb. "	-	26 Feb. "
Serapis -	26 Jan. "	28 Jan. "	30 Jan. "	13 Feb. "	Jumna -	21 Feb. "	-	10 Mar. "
Crocodile -	10 Mar. "	-	-	23 Mar. "	Euphrates -	27 Mar. "	-	10 April "
Serapis -	15 Mar. "	-	-	30 Mar. "	Malabar -	4 April "	-	20 April "

TOTAL conveyed Outwards -

H O M E W A R D S.

N A M E OF S H I P.	Left Calcutta.	Left Bombay.	Arrived at Suez.	Troops Transferred to.	Left Alexandria.	Arrived at Portsmouth.
Jumna -	3 Oct. 1867	-	30 Oct. 1867	Crocodile -	2 Nov. 1867	22 Nov. 1867
Malabar -	-	18 Oct. 1867	1 Nov. "	Serapis -	8 Nov. "	22 Nov. "
Euphrates -	16 Nov. 1867	-	6 Dec. "	Crocodile -	28 Dec. "	11 Jan. 1868
Malabar -	-	10 Dec. 1867	26 Dec. "	Serapis -	3 Jan. 1868	17 Jan. "
Jumna -	-	24 Jan. 1868	9 Feb. 1868	Crocodile -	12 Feb. "	26 Feb. "
Euphrates -	-	1 Feb. "	15 Feb. "	Serapis -	18 Feb. "	3 Mar. "
Malabar -	-	14 Mar. "	29 Mar. "	Crocodile -	1 April "	15 April "
Jumna -	-	24 Mar. "	10 April "	Serapis -	13 April "	27 April "

TOTAL conveyed Homewards -

Appendix, No. 22.

PAPER delivered in by Admiral *Mends*.

INDIA.—OVERLAND TROOP SERVICE.

Numbers of TROOPS carried each Voyage during the Season 1867–68, with an ESTIMATE of the COST of to *England* by the ordinary means.

O U T W A R D S.

N U M B E R S C O N V E Y E D.

Military or Naval.	Officers and their Families.			Second Class Passengers.			Staff Serjeants and their Families.			Troops, Third Class Passengers, and their Families.			TOTAL.	
	Officers, &c.	Wives, and Daughters of 16 Years and upwards.	Children.	Men.	Women.	Children.	Men.	Women.	Children.	Men.	Women.	Children.	Individuals.	(Equal to) Adults.
Military	52	11	13	-	-	-	11	8	10	895	94	73	1,167	1,119
Naval	3	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	6	5
Military	62	13	14	-	1	4	19	16	34	921	92	97	1,273	1,199
Naval	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	7	7
Military	61	12	7	-	-	-	8	5	5	912	104	81	1,192	1,145
Naval	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23	-	-	31	31
Military	58	13	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	935	121	141	1,278	1,203
Naval	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	55	-	-	58	58
Military	64	11	4	-	-	-	9	5	8	923	105	121	1,250	1,183
Naval	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	-	-	14	14
Military	54	11	6	-	1	-	11	8	9	888	123	114	1,225	1,161
Naval	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	4	4
Military	61	8	2	-	-	-	3	3	5	900	68	54	1,104	1,073
Naval	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	5	5
Military	44	5	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	919	78	66	1,114	1,081
Naval	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	-	-	17	17
Military	456	84	56	-	2	4	61	46	72	7,293	782	747	9,603	9,164
Naval	29	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	111	-	-	141	141

H O M E W A R D S.

N U M B E R S C O N V E Y E D.

Military or Naval.	Officers and their Families.			Second Class Passengers.			Staff Serjeants and their Families.			Troops, Third Class Passengers, and their Families.			TOTAL.	
	Officers, &c.	Wives, and Daughters of 16 Years and upwards.	Children.	Men.	Women.	Children.	Men.	Women.	Children.	Men.	Women.	Children.	Individuals.	(Equal to) Adults.
Military	46	15	25	2	1	1	29	15	33	881	30	51	1,129	1,074
Naval	9	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	65	-	-	75	75
Military	24	20	22	1	2	7	13	9	15	551	56	86	806	741
Naval	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	44	-	-	46	46
Military	51	11	16	-	-	-	17	8	23	882	52	101	1,161	1,091
Naval	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	-	-	17	17
Military	48	20	27	-	-	-	12	10	19	951	74	123	1,284	1,200
Naval	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	-	-	20	20
Military	46	18	23	-	1	4	4	3	12	911	43	66	1,131	1,078
Naval	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	-	-	22	22
Military	35	17	21	-	-	-	6	3	6	897	60	105	1,150	1,084
Naval	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	3	3
Military	32	19	23	-	1	2	6	5	6	718	39	62	913	867
Naval	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18	-	-	24	24
Military	22	5	5	1	1	-	8	7	17	443	112	214	835	717
Naval	10	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	39	-	-	50	50
Military	304	125	162	4	6	14	95	60	131	6,234	466	808	8,409	7,852
Naval	34	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	221	-	-	257	257

Appendix, No. 22.

ABSTRACT OF NUMBERS CONVEYED.

TOTAL NUMBER of TROOPS Conveyed during SEASON.

	OUT.	HOMR.	TOTAL	
Officers - - - -	456	304	760	} Exclusive of a small number of troops conveyed for Imperial Service.
Ladies - - - -	84	125	209	
Children - - - -	56	162	218	
2nd Class Passengers :				
Male - - - -	-	4	4	
Female - - - -	2	6	8	
Children - - - -	4	14	18	
Staff Serjeants - - - -	61	95	156	
Women - - - -	46	60	106	
Children - - - -	72	131	203	
Troops - - - -	7,293	6,234	13,527	
Women - - - -	782	466	1,248	
Children - - - -	747	808	1,555	
TOTAL Individuals - -	9,603	8,409	18,012	

Equivalent to 17,016 adults.

THE Cost of carrying the same number of Officers, Troops, &c., between *England* and *India*, by the ordinary means, would be, according to *the rates paid* for Officers, Troops, &c. conveyed by Troop Freight Ships during the Year 1867-68, as follows, viz. :

	£.
On 9,164 adults conveyed outwards, at the average rate of 22 l. 15 s. 2 d. each -	208,557
On 7,852 „ „ homewards „ „ 43 l. 6 s. 9 d. „ -	340,286
<u>17,016</u>	
TOTAL Estimated Cost - - - £.	<u>548,843</u>

Note.—The numbers so conveyed by ordinary means, in 1867-68, were—

Outwards - - - - 2,328 adults.

Homewards - - - - 2,605 „

TOTAL - - - 4,933 adults.

Admiralty, 17 June 1870.

W. N. Mends,
Director of Transport Services.

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Appendix, No. 23.

PAPERS connected with the Formation of the TRANSPORTS CORPS, ABYSSINIAN
FIELD FORCE.

Appendix, No. 23.

(Forwarded to the Secretary of State, 9 June 1868.)

I AM led to infer from the questions put to some of the witnesses lately examined by the members of the Committee, that the collection of papers in reference to the formation of the Transport Train which were sent home by this Government in 1868 have not been placed before them.

I desire now to draw attention to them, in order to correct the erroneous impression which appears to exist in reference to two points :—

1st. As to the length of time occupied in the consideration of the proposed organisation of the Transport Train.

2nd. As to the delay produced by the discussion.

It will be seen, by a reference to the dates of the annexed papers—

1st. That Colonel Phayre's first letter on the subject is dated August 22nd, but I am in a position to say that it did not come before me till a week after that date, or on August 29th.

2nd. My Minute thereon is dated August 31st, and the Minutes of Mr. Ellis and Mr. Mansfield, members of Council, are dated on September 2nd.

So that the opinion of the Council was obtained in five days.

As the majority of the Council were opposed to the proposals of Major Warden and Colonel Phayre, which had been adopted by the Commander in Chief, the papers were again submitted to him, and on the 9th (one week after) his Excellency suggested that the question should be referred to a committee. As this for obvious reasons was thought unadvisable, his Excellency in a Minute, dated September 11th, requested that the definite plan, when prepared, should be submitted to him for his opinion. This was at once assented to, and a Resolution of Government drawn up on the following day, September 12th, with a paragraph specially added by the military secretary to Government, to secure compliance with his Excellency's wish.

Thus the whole discussion, as far as the members of the Government were concerned, may be taken to have occupied one fortnight.

It would be further pointed out that the definite plan thus drawn up by the Commissary General was in general accordance with the views of his Excellency, and not with the opinions of the rest of his colleagues. I infer that this was the result of the direction specially added to the Government Resolution by the secretary, Colonel Marriott. The plan was at once accepted.

2. As to the delay, the collection of men and animals, and the provision of equipments, went on daily without reference to the question of the organisation of the train. It will be seen from the letter of the Commissary General of September 20th, that by that date eight European officers had been already appointed; that he had commenced the collection at Poona of 5,000 bullocks and ponies; 3,400 drivers, and equipments for 10,000 animals, and at Kurrachee and other stations of 4,000 camel equipments, and nearly 700 drivers.

It can scarcely be said that any delay in the formation of the train was caused by the discussion of the important points considered by the Government when all this was done in anticipation of a final decision.

(signed) *W. R. Seymour V. FitzGerald.*

Poona, 18 June 1870.

Appendix, No. 23.

LAND TRANSPORT PAPERS.

No. 59, of 1868.—Military Department.

To the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for India, London.

Right Honourable Sir,

Bombay, Castle, 9 June 1868.

With 8 Enclosures. **WE** have observed that considerable misapprehension exists as to the course pursued by us with reference to the establishment of a Transport Corps in connection with the Abyssinian Expedition. We have also reason to think that the letter of the Comptroller of Supply and Transport, No. 2, dated 11th October 1867, on which the final decision of the Government on this subject was passed, was inadvertently omitted to be sent to you. We have therefore directed the accompanying documents to be printed together in their proper sequence, in order that you may be succinctly informed of the position of this Government in respect of this matter.

We have, &c.
(signed) *W. R. Seymour FitzGerald.*
B. H. Ellis.
S. Mansfield.

Enclosure No. 1.

(No. 2,298.)

From the Quartermaster General of the Army to the Secretary to Government.—
Military Department.

Sir,

Head Quarters, Poona, 15 August 1867.

IN connection with the preparatory measures ordered by his Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor for procuring cattle for the land Land Transport of the Abyssinian Expedition, in anticipation of such being ordered to take place, I am desired by his Excellency the Commander in Chief to bring to the notice of Government, that as the Commissary General has received orders direct from his Excellency the Governor to purchase and collect cattle from the other Presidencies, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and ports on the East African coast, his Excellency Sir Robert Napier, on the 11th instant, nominated Major Warden, of the 24th N. I., to act as Director of Land Transport of the proposed force, subject to the approval of his Excellency in Council, and such final orders, connected with the organisation of a Land Transport Corps, as may hereafter be issued by Government.

2. The establishments that will be eventually required on this account will in a few days be submitted to Government in a scheme now under consideration in this Department.

3. In the interim orders have been given to Major Warden—

1st. That he and the officers who may be placed under his orders will have to receive charge of and tend such animals as may be made over to them by the Commissary General.

2nd. That the animals will be fed by the Commissariat Department on requisitions signed by the Director of Land Transport or his officers.

3rd. That all purchases will be made under the arrangements and orders of the Commissary General, either by commissariat agency or by Land Transport officers, as the Commissariat General may find most convenient.

4. The Commissary General has now intimated that he requires four officers for the following duty, viz. :—

Two to accompany Major Mignon, Assistant Commissary General, to the Red Sea, for the purpose of taking charge of such animals as may be purchased in that quarter.

Two to be in readiness to send to the Persian Gulf in connection with requisitions that have been made on the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia.

5. Sanction is therefore solicited to the appointment of Major Warden and the four officers, as requested by the Commissariat General.

I have, &c.
(signed) *R. Phayre*, Lieutenant Colonel,
Quartermaster General.

Enclosure No. 2.

(No. 3164 of 1867-68.)

From the Commissary General of the Army, to the Secretary to Government.

Office of the Commissary General of the Army,
Poona, 19 August 1867.

Sir,
I HAVE the honour to submit, for the information of his Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, the accompanying copy of my letter* to the address of Major R. P. Warden, placed at my disposal for the purpose of organising a Land Transport Corps for service with the force that may be sent into "Abyssinia," and also transcript of my letter No. 3128A, of 18th instant, to the address of the Quartermaster General of the Army, requesting that the instructions conveyed in the former communication may be considered as cancelled. * No. 3,057, of 1 instant.

I have, &c.
(signed) J. B. Dunsterville, Lieutenant Colonel,
Commissary General of the Army.

(No. 3,057 of 1867-68.)

From the Commissary General of the Army, to Major R. P. Warden; Special Duty.

Office of the Commissary General of the Army.
Poona, 15 August 1867.

Sir,
HAVING applied to Government to place your services at my disposal for employment as director of the proposed Land Transport Train, and their Excellencies the Right Honourable the Governor and the Commander in Chief having acceded to my proposal, I have the honour to request that you will be good enough, under orders from the Quartermaster General of the Army, to commence with the work of organising the Transport Corps at once.

2. It is in contemplation to recommend to Government that purchases of baggage animals (in addition to mules and draught bullocks to be selected by me from the field column carriage, &c., in this Presidency for being placed at your disposal) should be made, if possible, through the agency of political officers, consuls, &c., or any other officer who may be deputed to that duty.

3. The officers of the Transport Corps are not intended to be disbursing officers; grain and forage for the cattle will be provided for by the Commissariat Department in the usual way.

4. The equipments for the carriage animals are to be provided by you, and I request that you will be good enough, in communication with the executive Commissariat officers at Bombay and Poona, to make arrangements for the same, also for the construction of 100 waggons for mule draft, and 500 carts for bullocks.

5. The waggons and carts, though light, should be strong, and of so simple construction as to admit of their being taken to pieces and put together easily. A cart has been constructed under orders of the private secretary to the Right Honourable the Governor, in the yard of the executive engineer of the Poona districts, and it may serve for your guidance, and you should communicate with the officer on the subject.

6. Bills for supplies to be prepared under your orders will be paid by the Commissariat Department.

7. You must understand that the Land Transport Corps is to be quite distinct from the Commissariat Department in the field; this, however, does not render it independent of my control in all matters appertaining to the efficiency of the carriage that may be procured from any source and placed under your orders for employment in the Transport Corps; and you should be prepared to detach officers to such places as I may direct you, for the purpose of taking charge of such animals as may be collected under my orders.

8. The Transport Corps, although distinct from the Commissariat Department in the field, its duties are intimately connected with that Department; I have therefore to request that a cordial co-operation between these departments may always be maintained.

I have, &c.
(signed) J. B. Dunsterville, Lieutenant Colonel,
Commissary General of the Army.

Appendix, No. 23.

Enclosure No. 3.

(No. 2412.)

From the Quartermaster General of the Bombay Army to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

Sir,

Head Quarters, Poona, 22 August 1867.

IN continuation of my letter No. 2298, dated 15th instant, I have the honour, by desire of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, to submit, for the consideration and orders of Government, proposals of the organisation for a Land Transport Corps for foreign service in Abyssinia.

1. It will be in the recollection of Government that about 11 years ago a similar corps was raised for foreign service in Persia, and that on the return of the Expedition in 1857 its field organisation was broken up, as too expensive for home service, and the cattle were distributed at certain stations of this presidency where field columns are ordered to be held in readiness for immediate service.

2. I am careful to note this distinction between home arrangements in peace and those for foreign service in an enemy's country, because in the latter case combination of transport under one head, and its administration under one uniform system, are indispensable.

3. It is requisite therefore to bear in mind that all the proposals which may now or hereafter be made with regard to the Land Transport Corps for Abyssinia have sole reference to its existence as part of the army destined to carry out military operations in that country. Thus any arrangements for purchasing and collecting cattle or equipments that may now be resorted to as a matter of economy, and indeed of necessity, in India, will not be held as binding in Abyssinia, where the officers, men, and cattle of the proposed corps will be under the same rules of discipline and organisation as apply to our artillery and other mounted corps.

4. Each brigade of the force will have its transport attached of the kind and quantity suited to its want; and each section of the Commissariat Department in Abyssinia will be similarly provided for as circumstances at the time being may require, but the relation of the Land Transport Corps to regiments and departments will be similar to that of any other department of supply belonging to the force, the employment of its resources being subject to the orders of the officer in chief command, conveyed through his quartermaster general.

5. The first section of the proposed corps now submitted was drawn up by Major Warden in accordance with the system of organisation adopted in the original Land Transport Corps (now the Military Train), which Government may be aware, forms a component part of the permanent establishment of the British army.

6. It treats of the number of European and native officers, men and establishments, required for the efficient performance of the duties of the corps.

7. In order to enable a comparison being drawn between the scale now proposed and what was sanctioned for Persia, I have had two separate statements drawn up, Nos. 1 and 2 attached, which give the requisite information.

8. It will be seen that there is a difference of expense amounting to Rs. 123 per 100 mules per mensem in favour of the Abyssinian prospectus.

9. The permanent charges in the latter will be as follows:—

Head quarter staff of the corps, Director's pay and Office	Rs.
Establishment, per mensem - - - - -	2,520
Pay of his staff officer or adjutant - - - - -	600
Pay and office establishment of the second in command - - - - -	1,388
Pay of a veterinary surgeon - - - - -	400

MONTHLY COST of each DIVISION of MULES.

Establishment of one Division.

- 1 Field officer or captain commanding.
- 2 Lieutenants.
- 4 Subedars.
- 4 Jemedars.
- 16 Havildars.
- 16 Naiques.
- 100 Privates.
- 1,040 Syces.
- 1 Serjeant-major.
- 1 Quartermaster serjeant.
- Artificers' establishment.
- Veterinary ,,
- Office

Each Division, including European and native commissioned, non-commissioned, rank and file, syces, veterinary, and artificers' establishments, Rs. 20,210-0-0.

10. A division

Memo. dated 15th August 1867. Raised for service in the Crimea.

Statements showing the establishments proposed for Abyssinia, and those sanctioned in 1856 for Persia.

10. A division is composed of,—

Squads.—Each 1 private, 12 syces, 25 mules.*Sections*.—Each 1 naique, 5 privates, 65 syces, 125 mules.*Troops*.—Each 2 native officers, 4 havildars, 4 naiques, 20 privates, 260 syces, 500 mules.

A brigade of the corps is two troops, 1,000 mules. Each brigade is commanded by a subaltern. Two brigades are included in a division. The division being commanded by a captain or field officer, as the case may be.

11. The weight of baggage carried by a division of mules is about 180 tons, and in a mountainous country like Abyssinia it would be requisite to have at least half the transport of the army in mules and ponies, which, with a corps of coolies, could alone accompany the troops across country in any direction that field operations might render necessary. Thus, his Excellency the Commander in Chief recommends that at least 10,000 mules and a corps of 3,000 coolies be procured, four coolies being estimated as equal to one mule. 10,000 mules required, 3,000 coolies.

12. A division of camels would be subjected to similar organisation, but as camels usually carry 400 lbs. each on field service, or double the burthen of a mule, the immediate expenses would be considerably lessened by their use. Taking, however, into consideration all the casualties of a campaign, the cost price of camels, and the great loss of life that occurs amongst them, the mules are by many pronounced the cheaper transport in the end; but, whether or no, they are the only reliable transport for a long campaign across a difficult mountainous country without roads; and they will remain at work for years afterwards, which camels do not, as we know from the fearful mortality amongst those animals which took place when the Bombay columns proceeded through Sind to Afghanistan in 1838 and 1840. Camels.

13. His Excellency Sir Robert Napier recommends that a corps of coolies be sanctioned (as raised in China) to work as pioneers and porters; but his Excellency is of opinion that this corps should be distinct from the Land Transport Corps under report. Its organisation, therefore, will be treated of separately. Corps of coolies.

14. The main line of communication between the base at the port of debarkation and the advanced posts of the army having been fairly established and cleared for the passage of artillery, with depôts of supply at stated intervals, an immense saving of expense would be effected by the use of wheeled conveyances along that line; but it must not be lost sight of that their use will be confined to that line, prior to the existence of which they would not be of the least use in so uninterruptedly mountainous a country as Abyssinia. The clearance of such line must therefore be preliminary to the introduction of this kind of transport. A pattern waggon and a pattern cart are under construction at Poona, and his Excellency the Governor having resolved to construct 100 waggons and 500 light carts—the former for mule or horse draught, the latter for bullocks—his Excellency the Commander in Chief recommends that the construction of these vehicles be contracted for in the Ordnance Department under the orders of the Inspector General of Ordnance, and that they be passed into the service by select committees of officers. Wheeled transports between depôts on the main line of communication.

As draught for the waggons referred to, I am to suggest for the consideration of Government the expediency of using any available aged artillery horses of the field batteries in garrison in this presidency, their places being filled by remounts purchased during the approaching season. Harness should be provided by the Ordnance Department. Waggons and carts.

15. It will be the duty of the European and Native commissioned and non-commissioned rank and file to supervise the feeding and cleaning of the cattle, and to have charge of grain, forage, and equipments; to see that the latter are always kept in good order by the artificers, and that the syces take proper care of the mules and other animals under their charge. Select committees of officers.

They are responsible that the animals are not ill-treated or overladen; being only in the proportion of one private to 25 mules, as above detailed, they cannot themselves assist in loading and packing. This has to be done by the troops themselves, aided by the syces. Horse draught for waggons, those likely to be cast in 1867-68. This aid, however small, will be of use.

In the cases of the commissariat, field, general hospital, engineer, and ordnance parks, &c., baggage must be laden by the public followers attached, such as doolie bearers, store and tent lascars, coolies, &c. Duties of the commissioned and non-commissioned ranks, &c.

16. A second section of the Land Transport Corps is also submitted, in which the question of equipments is treated of with reference especially to the carriage of ammunition. Pattern pack-saddles and cradles for this purpose are under preparation, and, when approved, I am to recommend that 2,000 be ordered to be made up by the Ordnance Department under the orders of the Inspector General of Ordnance, and that they be fitted to mule, and passed into the service by committees in the usual way. Equipments, pack-saddles with saddles, common baggage pack-saddle, sulleetas, &c. 2,000 pack-saddles and cradles.

For baggage, the common native khogeer, now in use with the mules attached to the Commissariat Department, appears to be suitable. 8,000 of these, with sulleetas, &c., complete, his Excellency recommends being made up under the orders of the Commissary General for present purposes.

17. It is proposed at once to organise the head quarters of the corps and a mule division
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Appendix, No. 3. to the following extent, for which the sanction of his Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor in Council is urgently solicited.

1 Commandant or Director General.	4 Subedars.
1 Staff Officer.	4 Jemedars.
1 Second in command.	16 Havildars.
1 Commandant of Division (Field Officer or Captain, as the case may be).	16 Naiques.
2 Subalterns of Divisions.	100 Privates.
	1,040 Syces.

18. The native commissioned, non-commissioned, rank and file will be drawn by volunteering from the native regiments of infantry in the presidency, and his Excellency proposes to arm them with a short sword, or a shield and spear, as may be decided on hereafter.

19. Syces may be entertained to the extent of 1,040, according as drafts of mules and ponies are received or known to have been purchased in India or by the officers who have just left for the Persian Gulf, or by those who may be shortly dispatched to the Red Sea and East African coast.

20. I may here remark, with reference to what may appear a large office establishment for the Director, that the duty that devolves on his office is considerable. He keeps registers of all animals, of the various kinds of equipments, stores, material for workshops, pay and advances to the corps and establishments, general and regimental returns, and a large current correspondence; it is essential, therefore, in order to organise and to put everything into shape before taking the field, that he should at once entertain the following establishment, leaving the remainder to be filled up hereafter:—

- 1 Head Clerk.
- 3 Subordinate clerks.
- 2 Peons.

21. As regards the pay of the Director's Office, it will be seen from accompaniment No. 1, that 720 rupees per mensem was allowed for the Persian Land Transport Corps. Major Warden states that a competent head clerk, who was formerly employed in that corps and afterwards in the Pay Department in Poona, is willing to accompany him to Abyssinia, as head clerk, provided his pay is equal to that of a commissariat clerk holding a corresponding position. This may be as much as 300 rupees per mensem, but Major Warden proposes to meet any excess of this kind by keeping the aggregate expense of his office establishment within the 720 rupees per mensem allowed to the Director of the Persian Land Transport.

22. With reference to the employment of European commissioned officers, a large number have either volunteered or are willing to join the corps; amongst whom the following may be named, some only of whom are likely to be available:

Major Briggs, 96th Foot.	Lieutenant Lefroy, 45th Foot.
„ Griffin, 45th Foot.	„ Sturt, Assistant Engineer, P. W. D.
Captain Kennedy, Adjutant, 3rd N.I.	Ensign D. Barr, 33rd Foot.
„ Moore, 3rd Light Cavalry.	Lieutenant Hennell, Quartermaster, 18th N. I.
„ Boyle, 96th Foot.	Ensign Strettell, 109th Foot.
Lieut. Hobson (already employed).	„ Durand, 96th Foot.
„ Gunton, Adjutant 96th Regiment.	Lieutenant Henslowe, 1st Belooch Regiment.
„ Luckhardt, 109th Foot.	
Ensign Gardiner.	
Lieutenant Durrant, 33rd Foot.	

23. As the work of organisation progresses, selections will be made from the army for the various branches of the corps for which officers may be required.

Thus the mules, bullocks, and ponies, the camels, the elephants, and the wheeled transport will all be subjected to the kind of organisation adapted to each, but included under the one general head of Transport Corps.

Standing orders for the guidance of the corps will be drawn up as soon as possible, and submitted to his Excellency the Commander in Chief for approval.

24. On the subject of sick carriage, our main reliance must be on the established proportion of doolies allowed to regiments, namely, 5 per cent. for European troops, and 1 per cent. for Natives.

25. A proportion of ambulance carts might accompany the force, as useful for the main line of communication before referred to. As regards the mule cacolet used by the French, a pattern of which is in the Poona Arsenal, it may be said that even in the plains it is a precarious and unsatisfactory kind of transport for a sick man, but in a mountainous country, where the road is narrow, and treads its way among precipices and defiles, it may be pronounced too dangerous. When camels can be used, it would be better to provide riding camels, carrying two men, than expose the sick to the danger of using the cacolet in the mountains; riding saddles, with supports for the back, might be made up on this account to the extent of 400. (See next para.)

26. We have in store a large number of iron camel chairs, which in an open country are very useful, if good animals be selected for them; they would be very dangerous on narrow mountain

Sick carriage from
35 to 40 doolies per
European Infantry
Regiment.

Ambulance carts
and kujawabs.

Iron camel chairs.

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1

mountain roads, owing to their liability to come in contact with projecting rocks and trees, Appendix, No. 23. &c.

27. The proportion of doolies for the force proposed by his Excellency Sir Robert Napier, is, at 5 per cent. for European troops, 177, with 1,082 bearers, and for the Native troops, at 1 per cent., 83 with 498; total, 260 doolies, and 1,560 bearers.

The pack sick transport for the same force at 5 per cent. for Europeans, and 7 per cent. for Natives, will be as follows:—

Spare mules are generally available for the conveyance of a few sick.

For Europeans, 90 camels, each carrying two men.

For Natives, 290 camels, each carrying two men.

His Excellency the Commander in Chief would suggest that the report of the Inspector General, Indian Medical Department, be invited on the subject of pack sick transport by riding camels, as above proposed.

I have, &c.
(signed) R. Phayre, Lieut. Colonel,
Quartermaster General.

MEMORANDA by Major Warden, Land Transport Corps.

Section I.—Officers and Men.

1. I HAVE, as suggested by you, taken up the organisation of the Persian Transport Corps to help me in this work.

2. I would, however, at the outset, remind you that the stability of this organisation or its efficiency was never sufficiently tested, in consequence of the Persian War coming so speedily to an end.

3. But I have not adhered to it much, as it is altogether so different (and, if I may be allowed to say so, inferior) to the corps raised for the Crimean War, in which I held the command of a division, that in most cases I have made the latter my guide, avoiding those errors in it which after-experience brought to light.

4. I have taken as a basis the construction of one division, allotting to it a minimum of strength of 2,140 mules; of course if camels or elephants constituted the division the number of individuals would be reduced in ratio.

5. In the annexed statement, marked A, I give the distribution of a mule division.

6. I have included in statement marked B, artificers and veterinary establishment, taking as a guide the rates of pay given for the Persian Expedition.

7. You will observe that I have ignored all such persons as "muccadums," and given the supervision of these squads to native soldiers and non-commissioned officers, either from the cavalry or infantry branch of the army, and I will explain why.

8. Dearly bought experience in the Crimea taught us how little we could depend on this class when it came to actual service, for if punished for neglect or offended in the slightest degree they not only absconded, but carried off the men under them, revenging themselves by sowing the seeds of mistrust and discontent among all the muleteers, and if detached with a convoy of mules on any duty (no matter how few in number) it was necessary to send a soldier in charge.

9. I would here notice that from 10 to 15 men, with a non-commissioned officer, were detached from each regiment in a division, and placed under the orders of the captain of a division of the land transport in charge of the squads, and right well they worked; they answered admirably; proud of being selected from the regiment for this work, they seemed to vie one with the other as to whose animals should be in the best order; and this is the reason why I would now so strongly urge the employment of native soldiers for the charge of squads instead of muccadums. You will observe that in my distribution I have placed native officers in charge of "troops."

10. I attached so much importance to having sepoy, non-commissioned officers, and native officers in charge of "squads," "sections," and "troops" respectively, that I have taken them up first, for the whole effectual working of the corps depends on the state of efficiency in which each squad of mules and their equipments are kept up.

11. Before leaving this subject, I would add that I propose filling up the vacancies in non-commissioned officers of sections by promoting the best men in charge of squads, and filling up vacancies in the latter by calling for volunteers from the native branches of the army.

12. I now pass on to the officers; no one will deny that their work will be most arduous, and to be performed efficiently will require bodily health, energy, and ability of no common order; even subalterns will have great individual responsibility, for their charge consists of 1,000 mules with their equipments, and 1,200 men of all ranks and classes.

13. Moreover, they are likely to be frequently detached with their brigades as convoys.

14. The captain of a division will have, of course, the command of two brigades, *vide* Statement marked A, and to the usual responsibility of such a charge the pay of all classes

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under

Appendix, No. 23. under his command will devolve, and he in his turn will be responsible for the correctness of his accounts to the paymaster of the corps, of whom I have treated separately.

15. The second in command should, I think, be a field officer, and, in the absence of the Commandant (or Director General) on duty to any distant point, the whole responsibility will devolve on him.

16. At other times he would be required to visit the different divisions, and see personally that everything was in good working order.

17. A staff officer of ability, method, and knowledge of duty in all its details is necessary, for whatever efforts may be made to reduce correspondence and paper work to the smallest proportion possible (and certainly if this rests with me it shall be the case), yet registers of men, animals, equipment, and stores must be kept.

18. The next officer is a paymaster to the corps. I propose that the captain of division should be his own paymaster, and he submits his accounts to the paymaster of the corps who must, at starting, have a good establishment, so that after the campaign little or no difficulty should be found in closing the accounts of the corps, if necessary; for it is well known that the real difficulty of this department only commences with its adjustments, and I purpose, in consultation with Colonel Bar and Major Chitty, to give the subject my most serious consideration, and to devise a concise and clear method of keeping the accounts.

19. No complication should be allowed in the accounts required from the captain of a division; it should be a simple matter of debit and credit; the voucher in its simplest form, and some degree of trust placed in this officer.

20. As regards the pay and position of officers. The officers of the Land Transport Corps in the Crimea (I speak of myself and other captains of divisions) held the same position as the Assistant Quartermaster General of the division of the army, and were paid accordingly. Colonel W. Napier was the second in command, and Colonel McMurdo, the Director General, whose position was the same as Deputy Adjutant General or Deputy Quartermaster General of the army, and I would respectfully suggest that this corps be placed on the same footing.

21. In closing this section, I ask permission most respectfully to point out how careful should be the selection of others, European and Native, for the work of a Land Transport Corps to be done at all must be done well.

22. There must be no delays, no shortcomings, for in a country like Abyssinia there will be no remedy or help to fall back on; if it fails, it fails; on the efficiency and success of the transport the very existence of the army depends.

Poona, 15 August 1867.

(signed) *R. Warden,*
Major, on special duty.

LAND TRANSPORT CORPS.

Section II.—*Mule Equipments.*

I would divide this section under two heads; the first for the ordinary baggage and camp equipage of the army; the second, and most important, for the conveyance of ammunition.

The first is easily disposed of; for the ordinary pack-saddle, or khogeer, will meet every requirement, only it must be made of the best material and workmanship.

The second, for the conveyance of ammunition, requires as much lightness as is compatible with strength, and Captain Swanson, Commissary of Ordnance, Poona, has been good enough to undertake the preparation of a pattern one for the inspection of his Excellency the Commander in Chief as soon as possible, and which I will proceed to describe.

It is a strong pack-saddle with trees; hooks are fixed on each side where the front and back trees cross.

An open cradle made of flat iron bands, with a ring at each end of one side, which is hung on the hooks.

This cradle is open at the top, and its dimensions are sufficient for containing either a box of ammunition or a barrel of powder, which are simply placed in the cradle without any further trouble, a tarpaulin cover being thrown over the whole, if necessary. The bottoms of the cradle are attached to each other by a broad leather band or girth passing under the belly of the mule, and keeps them from swinging about.

I should wish to know as soon as possible whether I may enter into contracts for the supply of khogees, other mule equipments, and gear, and, if so, for what number of mules.

Contracts will also require to be entered into for mule saddles for the animals employed in draught.

I purpose laying every article before a committee for approval prior to its being received into the corps.

Poona, 20 August 1868.

(signed) *Robert Warden,*
Major, on special duty.

No. 1.—STATEMENT showing the Monthly Expense of One Division and Head Quarters of the proposed
LAND TRANSPORT CORPS for *Abyssinia*.

Strength - - - - - 2,140 Mules.

No.		Staff Corps Pay.	Batta.	Horse Money.	Ration Money.	Staff Pay.	TOTAL.	GRAND TOTAL.
		<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
1	Director or Commandant, Major	640 14 6	228	60	60	800*	1,788 14 6	—
1	2nd in Command, Major - -	640 14 6	228	60	60	400†	1,388 14 6	—
1	Staff Officer, Lieutenant - -	225 12 -	30	60	60	200‡	575 12 -	3,752 9 -
1	Veterinary Surgeon, if above 10 years.	414 - 4	-	-	60	-	474 - 4	474 - 4
EACH DIVISION.								
1	Captain in Command, Paymaster	374 1 -	41	60	60 {	300§ 100	935 1 -	935 1 -
2	Subalterns - - - -	225 12 -	30	60	60 {	200‡	575 12 -	1,151 8 -
Carried forward - - - <i>Rs.</i>								6,318 2 4

* Assistant Commissary General, 1st Class.

† As Deputy Assistant Commissary General, 2nd Class.

‡ As Sub-Assistant Commissary General, 2nd Class.

§ As Sub-Assistant Commissary General, 1st Class.

|| As Paymaster.

Number.		Pay.	Batta.	Total of Each.	Total.	GRAND TOTAL.
		<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
	Brought forward - - -	-	-	-	-	6,313 2 4
4	Subedars { Two 1st Class - -	100 - -	15 - -	115 - -	230 - -	
	Two 2nd Class - -	80 - -	15 - -	95 - -	190 - -	
4	Jemedars { Two 1st Class - -	35 - -	7 8 -	42 8 -	85 - -	
	Two 2nd Class - -	30 - -	7 8 -	37 8 -	75 - -	
16	Havildars - - - -	*17 - -	5 - -	22 - -	352 - -	
16	Naiques - - - -	*13 8 -	5 - -	18 8 -	296 - -	
100	Privates - - - -	*12 - -	†3 - -	15 - -	1,500 - -	
1040	Syces - - - -	*10 - -	‡3 - -	13 - -	13,520 - -	
VETERINARY ESTABLISHMENT.						16,248 - -
1	Farrier Major, European -	\$60 - -	-	-	60 - -	
1	Native Farrier - - - -	40 - -	-	-	40 - -	
6	Cattle Doctors, 1st Class -	30 - -	-	30 - -	180 - -	
2	Ditto - - 2nd Class - -	12 - -	-	12 - -	24 - -	
4	Assistant Nalbunds, 1st Class -	33 - -	-	33 - -	132 - -	
4	Ditto - ditto 2nd Class -	23 - -	-	23 - -	92 - -	
						528 - -
NATIVE ARTIFICERS.¶						
1	Head Smith - - - -	40 - -	5 - -	45 - -	45 - -	
8	Smiths - - - -	19 8 -	3 - -	22 8 -	180 - -	
1	Head Carpenter - - - -	40 - -	5 - -	45 - -	45 - -	
8	Carpenters - - - -	19 8 -	3 - -	22 8 -	180 - -	
1	Head Mochees - - - -	20 - -	5 - -	25 - -	25 - -	
12	Mochees - - - -	19 8 -	3 - -	22 8 -	270 - -	
1	Head Ropemaker - - - -	40 - -	5 - -	45 - -	45 - -	
8	Ropemakers - - - -	19 8 -	3 - -	22 8 -	180 - -	
8	Bellows Boys - - - -	6 - -	3 - -	9 - -	72 - -	
8	Hammermen - - - -	10 - -	3 - -	13 - -	104 - -	
10	Puckaulies with bullocks -	21 - -	3 - -	24 - -	240 - -	
						1,386 - -
OFFICE ESTABLISHMENT.						
Director's Office.						
1	Head Clerk - - - -	250 - -	-	250 - -	250 - -	
1	Clerk - - - -	100 - -	-	100 - -	100 - -	
2	Ditto - - - -	80 - -	-	80 - -	160 - -	
1	Ditto - - - -	60 - -	-	60 - -	60 - -	
1	Ditto - - - -	50 - -	-	50 - -	50 - -	
1	Ditto - - - -	25 - -	-	25 - -	25 - -	
						645 - -
Carried forward - - - <i>Rs.</i>						25,120 2 4

* Special rates; the pay of these ranks in a regiment of Native Infantry being, havildars, 14 rupees; naiques, 12 rupees; privates, 7 rupees; syces, 6 rupees.

† The extra batta of a private is 1½ rupees.

‡ The extra batta of a syce is 2 rupees.

§ Consolidated, will be rationed by the Commissariat Department.

|| Special rates.

¶ Ordinary rates of batta.

Appendix, No. 23.

Monthly Expenses of One Division of proposed Land Transport Corps, &c.—continued.

Number.		Pay.	Total of each.	Total.
		<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
	Brought forward - - -	- - -	- - -	25,120 2 4
3	Dragomen or Moonshies - - -	25 - -	75 - -	75 - -
	<i>Second in Command Office.</i>			
1	Clerk - - - - -	120 - -	120 - -	
2	Moonshies - - - - -	30 - -	60 - -	
1	Peon - - - - -	8 - -	8 - -	188 - -
	<i>Divisional Captain's Office.</i>			
2	Clerks - - - - -	70 - -	140 - -	
3	Peons - - - - -	10 8 -	31 8 -	171 8 -
			<i>Rs.</i>	25,554 10 4

No. 2.—STATEMENT of Monthly Expenses of Head Quarters and One Division.
Persian Land Transport Corps.

Strength - - - - - 1,500 Mules.

Poona, 19 August 1867.

Number.		Pay.	Total of each.	Total.
		<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
	OFFICERS.			
1	Director - - - - -	1,187 - -	1,187 - -	
1	Assistant Naval Officer - - - - -	600 - -	600 - -	
1	Ditto Infantry Captain - - - - -	736 - -	736 - -	
1	Lieutenant Staff Officer - - - - -	805 - -	805 - -	
1	Veterinary Surgeon - - - - -	220 14 -	220 14 -	8,548 14 -
	OFFICE ESTABLISHMENTS.			
	<i>Director's Office.</i>			
1	Head Clerk - - - - -	250 - -	250 - -	
1	Clerk - - - - -	100 - -	100 - -	
2	Ditto - - - - -	80 - -	160 - -	
1	Ditto - - - - -	60 - -	60 - -	
1	Ditto - - - - -	50 - -	50 - -	
1	Ditto - - - - -	25 - -	25 - -	
3	Dragomen, or Moonshies - - - - -	25 - -	75 - -	720 - -
	<i>Second in Command's Office.</i>			
1	Clerk - - - - -	120 - -	120 - -	
2	Moonshies - - - - -	30 - -	60 - -	
1	Peon - - - - -	8 - -	8 - -	188 - -
	<i>Monthly Divisional Expenses.</i>			
2	Assistant Lieutenants - - - - -	515 - -	1,030 - -	
3	Ditto ditto - - - - -	445 - -	1,335 - -	2,365 - -
	<i>European Non-Commissioned Officers.</i>			
1	Conductor - - - - -	200 - -	200 - -	
2	Ditto - - - - -	150 - -	300 - -	
5	Sub-Conductors - - - - -	100 - -	500 - -	
6	First Class Serjeants, including Com- pensation for ration - - - - -	66 5 4	398 - -	
21	Ditto - ditto - ditto - - - - -	51 5 4	1,078 - -	
1	Farrier Major - - - - -	60 - -	60 - -	2,536 - -

Monthly Expenses of One Division of Persian Land Transport Corps—continued.

Number.		Pay.	Total of each.	TOTAL.
	<i>Natives.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
2	Havildars - - - - -	35 - -	70 - -	
64	" 2nd Class - - - - -	28 - -	1,792 - -	
1	Farrier Major - - - - -	40 - -	40 - -	
120	Syces and Muleteers - - - - -	14 5 8	1,722 8 -	
3	Muccadums or peons - - - - -	13 - -	39 - -	
3	Dhobies - - - - -	10 8 -	31 8 -	
3	Sweepers - - - - -	10 8 -	31 8 -	
7	Cattle Doctors - - - - -	28 11 4	200 15 4	
2	Ditto - - - - -	11 13 5	23 14 10	
10	Puckaulees with bullocks - - - - -	24 - -	240 - -	
8	1st Class Nalbunds - - - - -	32 8 -	260 - -	
16	2nd Class ditto - - - - -	22 8 -	360 - -	
1	Head Smith - - - - -	45 - -	45 - -	
8	Smiths - - - - -	22 9 -	180 - -	
1	Head Carpenter - - - - -	45 - -	45 - -	
6	Carpenters - - - - -	22 8 -	135 - -	
1	Head Mochee - - - - -	25 - -	25 - -	
10	Mochees - - - - -	22 8 -	225 - -	
1	Head Ropemaker - - - - -	45 - -	45 - -	
6	Ropemakers - - - - -	22 8 -	135 - -	
8	Bellows boys - - - - -	9 - -	72 - -	
8	Hammermen - - - - -	13 - -	104 - -	
2	Head Muccadums - - - - -	14 8 -	29 - -	
10	Muccadums - - - - -	12 8 -	125 - -	
511	Drivers - - - - -	10 8 -	5,365 - -	
			<i>Rs.</i>	20,699 12 0

Average expense per 100 mules for the Persian Transport Corps - - -	<i>Rs.</i>	1,380
Average expense per 100 mules for the Abyssinian Transport Corps - - -		1,277
Difference - - -	<i>Rs.</i>	122

A.—STRENGTH of a Division of a LAND TRANSPORT.

No.		Captain.	Subalterns.	Subedars.	Jemedars.	Havildars.	Naikes.	Privates.	Syces.	Mules.
1	Squad to consist of - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	12	25
5	Sections each " - - -	-	-	-	-	-	1	5	65	125
4	Troops " " - - -	-	-	1	1	4	4	20	260	500
2	Brigades " " - - -	-	1	2	2	8	8	40	520	1,000
1	Division " " - - -	1	2	4	4	16	16	80	1,040	2,000
	Spare Sepoys - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	-	-
	Ditto Mules - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	140

B.—ESTIMATE of Pay and Allowance for One Division LAND TRANSPORT.

Number.		Total of Each.	TOTAL.
		<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
1	Commandant or Director General - - -	-	-
1	Second in Command (say a Major in the Staff Corps, holding a Wing, which in itself is nearly 1,000 rupees per mensem) - - -	1,200 - -	1,200 - -
1	Staff Officer if a Subaltern - - -	600 - -	500 - -
	Ditto - - Captain - - -	750 - -	750 - -

Appendix. No. 23.

B.—ESTIMATE of Pay and Allowance for One Division Land Transport—*continued.*

Number.		Total of each.			TOTAL.		
		Rs.	a.	p.	Rs.	a.	p.
1	Captain - - - - -	800	-	-	800	-	-
2	Lieutenants - - - - -	525	-	-	1,050	-	-
4	Subedars - - - - -	100	-	-	400	-	-
4	Jemedars - - - - -	50	-	-	200	-	-
16	Havildars - - - - -	22	-	-	352	-	-
16	Naïques - - - - -	18	8	-	196	-	-
100	Privates - - - - -	15	-	-	1,500	-	-
1,040	Syces - - - - -	13	-	-	13,520	-	-
	Waggon drivers - - - - -	12	-	-		-	-
1	Serjeant Major - - - - -	60	-	-	60	-	-
1	Quartermaster Serjeant - - - - -	60	-	-	60	-	-
VETERINARY ESTABLISHMENT FOR ONE DIVISION OF 2,140 MULES.							
1	FARRIER Major (European) - - - - -	60	-	-	60	-	-
1	Ditto - - (Native) - - - - -	40	-	-	40	-	-
6	Cattle Doctors - - - - -	28	11	4	172	4	-
2	Ditto, 2nd Class - - - - -	11	15	5	23	14	10
4	1st Assistant Nalbunds - - - - -	32	8	-	130	-	-
4	2nd - - ditto - - - - -	22	8	-	90	-	-
OFFICE ESTABLISHMENTS.							
<i>Commandant or Director General's Office.</i>							
1	Head Clerk - - - - -	250	-	-	250	-	-
1	Clerk - - - - -	100	-	-	100	-	-
2	Ditto, at 80 rupees - - - - -	80	-	-	160	-	-
1	Ditto - - - - -	60	-	-	60	-	-
1	Ditto - - - - -	50	-	-	50	-	-
1	Ditto - - - - -	25	-	-	25	-	-
3	Dragomen, or Moonshees, at 25 rupees - - - - -	25	-	-	75	-	-
<i>Office Establishment of 2nd in Command.</i>							
1	Clerk - - - - -	120	-	-	120	-	-
2	Moonshees - - - - -	30	-	-	60	-	-
1	Peon - - - - -	8	-	-	8	-	-
<i>Office Establishment of a Divisional Captain.</i>							
2	Clerks - - - - -	70	-	-	140	-	-
3	Peons - - - - -	10	8	-	31	8	-
<i>Artificers (Natives).</i>							
1	Head Smith - - - - -	45	-	-	45	-	-
8	Smiths - - - - -	22	8	-	180	-	-
1	Head Carpenter - - - - -	45	-	-	45	-	-
8	Carpenters - - - - -	22	8	-	180	-	-
1	Head Moches - - - - -	25	-	-	25	-	-
12	Moches - - - - -	22	8	-	270	-	-
1	Head Ropemaker - - - - -	45	-	-	45	-	-
8	Ropemakers - - - - -	22	8	-	180	-	-
8	Bellows boys - - - - -	9	-	-	72	-	-
8	Hammermen - - - - -	13	-	-	104	-	-
12	Puckaulees, with bullocks - - - - -	24	-	-	240	-	-

N.B.—I have omitted the pay of the Director and Veterinary Surgeon.

R. Warden,
Major on special duty.

Enclosure No. 4.

MINUTES OF COUNCIL.

MINUTE by His Excellency the Governor, dated 31st August 1867.

THERE are several questions of great importance raised by these proposals for the organisation of a Land Transport Corps on the footing suggested by Major Warden.

The first and chief question is, whether it is desirable to establish the corps on an independent basis, or subordinate to the Quartermaster General's Department, or to leave the Transport Department as it has been hitherto, under the control and direction of the Commissariat.

I have looked carefully into the proceedings of Government when a similar proposal was made by Colonel Phayre in 1859, and I have also read with attention the report of and the evidence given before the Committee on the Administration of the Transport and Supply Departments of the Army, presided over by Lord Strathnairn; and the result upon my mind is the conviction that the change now proposed would be most impolitic.

It is true that the Committee propose that the existing system should be changed in so far as that they suggest the appointment of an officer who shall be the head of the Administrative Departments of the Army, and be responsible for and control all departments of supply, including besides the Purveyor's, Military Stores, and Barrack Departments (as regards fuel, light, and straw), the Commissariat and Transport Departments; but this is not the question now, nor if it were should I be disposed to sanction so radical a change in our army administration at the moment of entering into the field.

The question now raised is the separation of the Transport Service from the Commissariat, and as to this the Committee emphatically say that army transport should be placed under one direction and control, to be vested in the officer responsible for the supply of the army, and under existing arrangements that officer is the Commissary General. Report, p. 2, para. 4.
Report, p. 2, para. 5.

I would particularly refer His Excellency the Commander in Chief and my colleagues to the evidence of Commissary General Drake (1), Deputy Commissaries General Fonblanque (2), and Bailey (3), the opinion of Sir J. Hope Grant (4), the Memorandum of Colonel McMurdo (5), of Sir J. Michel (6), and of Commissary General Power (7), and to Sir H. Rose's (now Lord Strathnairn's) reports on the French system of transport, referred to by Lord Elphinstone in a Minute* dissenting from a similar proposal to the present made by the Quartermaster General in 1859. The present Commander in Chief in India in another Minute† written shortly after expressed his pleasure that Colonel Phayre's proposal for a Transport Department, apart from and separate from the Commissariat, had been "upset by the resolution of Lord Elphinstone's Government and the reasoning of Sir Hugh Rose."

(1) p. 119, answers 1854-55.

(2) p. 151, answers 2,265.

(3) p. 305.

(4) *ibid.* in the foot note.

(5) p. 387.

(6) p. 313.

(7) p. 415, paras. 67, 68, 69.

* In vol. of Government proceedings, p. 39.

† *ibid.*, page 265.

I have no difficulty, therefore, in adhering to an opinion which recommends itself to my own mind, and is supported by such a weight of authority.

It may be hereafter a proper subject for consideration, and I think it will be, whether a system such as that recommended by the Committee should not be adopted in our army. There may, on the other hand, be reasons which would make its introduction into India inadvisable, though it may be advantageous elsewhere. On this I do not now wish to express an opinion. For the present I should decline to consent to a change, the merits or demerits of which will have to be immediately tested in an expedition, the success of which will probably depend far more on the facilities of transport and supply than is ordinarily the case with an army operating in an enemy's country.

A further question, however, arises as to the organisation of the Land Transport Service, assuming that it is left, as I think it must, under the direction and control of the Commissariat. What the amount and character of organisation ought to be is a most difficult question; but I must confess that it appears to me that the scheme proposed by Major Warden is more elaborate and more complicated than is required, or indeed than is advisable. I believe that just such an organisation under special officers as shall suffice to secure that, for whatever service the Commissariat may require them, there shall always be forthcoming a sufficient strength of healthy animals, well cared for and well equipped, with proper attendants to drive them, feed them, take care of them and their equipments, with packers, &c., to load them, is what we want, and any more complete and elaborate organisation will tend only to establish it as an independent service, which is exactly what I desire to avoid, and to remove it from the direction and control of the Commissariat.

I think it would be sufficient, therefore, to put the Transport Service under one officer, who should be the Director General (in the present instance Major Warden), who would be assisted by a sufficient staff in the proportion of not less than one staff officer to every 2,000 mules, or equivalent of 2,000 mules, besides a small establishment for returns, correspondence, &c. The establishment of divisions appears to me unnecessary, and likely to produce difficulties and confusion where fractions of divisions may have to be employed. The whole force should be divided into troops of 100 mules (or their equivalent of camels or other animals as employed) under the command of a native officer, and a superior native officer should have the inspection of every five troops or 500 mules. Under this system the head

Appendix, No. 23. of the Commissariat will indicate what transport he requires for any service, and the Director General will see that the necessary transport under its proper officers is provided; but when provided, the direction and command of it will rest with the Assistant Commissariat officer appointed for the particular service by the Commissary General, and who will be responsible to him for the custody, delivery, storage, or distribution of the stores or supplies entrusted to him.

A question is raised by Major Warden as to the employment of muccadums, in whose place he suggests that we should employ privates of the native army. He says that bitter experience in the Crimea has convinced him that it is desirable to substitute some other class for the muccadums. I do not know whether he refers to a failure in the service of Indian followers in the Crimea if any such were employed, or only to men holding a similar position. Be that as it may, I fancy that the facilities for desertion in Abyssinia will not be great. A more formidable objection to Major Warden's proposal is the doubt expressed by those who have had much experience of this class of men and of Commissariat Service in India, whether the syces will be found to take service willingly, except under the system with which they are acquainted, which places them under muccadums whom they know, and who understand them. Of the validity of this objection I am unable myself to judge, but in this particular also I am fully convinced that it is not desirable to hazard a change at the very moment of commencing a campaign, and thus risking the efficiency of our land transport, on which our whole success may depend.

A further question arises as to the propriety or necessity of enlisting the men employed in the Land Transport Corps, and on this subject I find Sir William Mansfield expresses a strong opinion, that in case of an Anglo-Indian force being sent for operations on land out of India, "a military transport train organised for the special purpose, and composed of enlisted men, under regimental officers, should be put on foot by the Commissariat." He adds, "such an organisation should be a *sine qua non* of a foreign expedition."

I am aware that an opinion is entertained by experienced officers that it would be found that the class of men required for these duties would be found unwilling to enlist; and that the proposal is therefore impracticable. But I cannot but think that the promise of an adequate and liberal pension, in case of death, or being incapacitated while on service, would be found a sufficient inducement for the men to enlist temporarily for the expedition, and to enlist them longer I do not think would be desirable. A greater difficulty may, perhaps, be found in its being necessary to obtain the sanction of the Government of India, or of the Secretary of State, to an enlistment on such conditions. I will only add that the question whether the men are enlisted or not, is one of secondary importance.

As regards the equipment of the corps, this is a matter so entirely departmental, that I have only to say that, subject to the opinion of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, as to the best form, &c. of the equipments, no time should be lost in providing them. The Director General should immediately obtain authorised patterns of the saddles, harness, packs, carts, &c. An estimate of the quantity required should be submitted for sanction, and tenders invited by the Commissary General, or their construction commenced in the Government Departments forthwith.

W. R. Seymour V. Fitz Gerald

MINUTE by the Honourable B. H. Ellis, dated 2nd September 1867.

I REMEMBER well the discussion which took place in 1859, and which ended in the decision that it would be highly inexpedient to sever the connexion between the departments of supply and transport. The opinion of high authorities expressed since the date of the resolution of Lord Elphinstone's government is in favour of the same view. Sir W. Mansfield and Sir Hugh Rose, with their Indian experience, and the Home Commission, all add their testimony to the correctness of the decision arrived at. I do not know how far his Excellency the Commander in Chief concurs in Colonel Phayre's views, but it would require very strong arguments in addition to the weight attaching to his Excellency's opinion to induce me to abandon my conviction on this point. I confess I should be very sorry to see the connection of the Commissariat and Transport Departments severed in order to place the latter under the Quartermaster General.

When a force is about to proceed to an enemy's country, in which the means of transport are, if not absolutely wanting, at least exceptionally deficient, it is clearly necessary to organise a special body for transport purposes, and there is no reason whatever why such a body should not be under the head of the Commissariat Department, as a separate branch, with a director, specially charged with the organisation and control of the means of transport.

An organisation such as is approved by the Right Honourable the Governor, would, probably, best secure effective discipline, without complicating the service too much. An over-refined organisation is quite as likely to produce confusion (and it will certainly cause more delay) as the want of proper discipline.

I believe that, in the present case, the question of enlistment is of minor importance. One great object of enlistment is to secure, in a time of war, the services of men trained in a time of peace, and thus check desertions at a critical moment. But those who will now form the bulk of the transport servants will be engaged for this special service. The terms offered, whether of enlistment or otherwise, must be sufficiently liberal to secure the service of

of efficient men. But once engaged and embarked on the service, the men are not likely to have the opportunity, even if they had the will, to desert; and, on the other hand, the enlistment would be only for a limited period, as the Government would not desire to be burdened with the cost of supporting a number of men after the work for which they were required has been concluded. At any rate I would deprecate proposals to employ European subordinate agency in place of the muccadums or native agency, by whatever name called, to which the great mass of mule drivers, camel drivers, and the like are accustomed.

Whether the men are enlisted or not, some places of superior pay must be open to them, pension or compassionate allowance to their families in case of death should be promised, and a supply of clothing suitable to the climate must be offered in addition to liberal pay.

With these essentials attended to, I do not think it of much consequence to enlist for this special service. The only difficulty is in regard to pensions. I presume it would be incumbent on the Home Government to grant them as a charge on the general, and not on the Indian revenues; and, therefore, it may be necessary to restrict the grant of pensions to cases in which pensions would be granted by the Indian Government to their own servants.

With regard to the other points discussed in the Minute of the Right Honourable the Governor, it is sufficient to express my concurrence, as they have been fully treated by his Excellency.

B. H. Ellis.

MINUTE by the Honourable *S. Mansfield*, dated 2nd September 1867.

THE highest authorities in England and in India have agreed that it is undesirable to remove the control of the transport service of an army from the Commissariat, and I think the revival of the discussion of this question at the present moment peculiarly inopportune, when so little time is left at our disposal, and the introduction of so radical a change as is proposed might seriously compromise the safety of the troops, and the success of the expedition.

A transport service, as roughly sketched by the Right Honourable the Governor, would be, in my opinion, the best adapted for the requirements of the force.

On the question of enlistment, I fully concur in the remarks of the Honourable Mr. Ellis.

S. Mansfield.

MINUTE by Sir *Robert Napier*, dated 9th September 1867.

I do not think the time is appropriate for any discussion as to the department under which the Land Transport should be placed, and I accept without hesitation his Excellency's decision to place it under the Commissariat.

I believe that the success of systems depend more on the men who work them than on the systems themselves.

But I cannot accept without protest a decision to throw such a body of men as the drivers of our transport animals will be, if we get them, on an expedition in a foreign country, without a very complete organisation, to secure order and discipline.

There may be Egyptians, Arabs, Persians, and Hindustanis, or Abyssinians, mixed up together, and without more organisation than the ordinary one in the Commissariat Department nothing but confusion would ensue, the people of the country would be plundered and ill-treated, and all our efforts at conciliation defeated.

The Commissariat Department have had but a small quantity of their own carriage to manage; the greater portion has been hired carriage, managed under a kind of social organisation peculiar to itself, which has existed from time immemorial, and which goes on somehow, one hardly knows how; but this is very different from the large body of drivers who must now be engaged, and for whom a regular system of control must be instituted.

I understand the scale of establishment proposed by Major Warden and the Quartermaster General, resembles generally that which was formerly instituted in the Presidency for the Persian Expedition. Admitting that the numbers are very great, I shall be prepared to try any reasonable reduction which may be proposed by a committee composed of Lieutenant Colonel Holland, Deputy Commissary General, Major Warden, and any other officer appointed by Government to consider the question.

R. Napier.

Appendix, No. 23.

MINUTE by His Excellency the Governor, dated 9th September 1867.

His Excellency is under a misapprehension if he supposes that I should wish the organisation to be nothing more than the ordinary one in the Commissariat Department. I expressly said that Major Warden should have a sufficient staff of officers under him, and, if the proportion of one to each 2,000 mules is not enough, I am quite willing that it should be increased. I should think that the appointment of one European officer to each 1,000 would be ample, but on this I am quite willing to waive my own opinion. There are two things only to which I feel a great objection; 1st. That the force should be organised in a shape that shall make it an independent corps, instead of being a corps subordinate to the Commissariat; and, 2nd. To devolve on a committee the decision of a point which we can very well settle without the intervention of any such body.

W. R. S. V. FitzGerald.

(No. 93A.—POONA, 12th September 1868).

DRAFT RESOLUTION.—There are several questions of great importance raised by these proposals for the organisation of the Land Transport for the Abyssinian Expedition.

The first and chief question is, whether it is desirable to establish the corps on an independent basis, or subordinate to the Quartermaster General's Department, or to leave the Transport Department, as it has been hitherto, under the control and direction of the Commissariat.

His Excellency in Council has reviewed carefully the proceedings connected with a similar proposal made by the Quartermaster General in 1859, and the opinion of the Government was expressed in Resolutions of No. 4696 of 30th September 1859, and No. 2065 of 9th June 1860. His Excellency in Council has also had the advantage of perusing the evidence given before the Committee on the Administration of the Transport and Supply Departments of the Army, presided over by Lord Strathnairn. That evidence is uniformly confirmatory of the previous decision of this Government on the question now again raised of the separation of the transport service from the Commissariat. The Committee emphatically say that army transport should be placed under one direction and control, to be vested in the officer responsible for the supply of the army, and under existing arrangements that officer is the Commissary General.

Sir William Mansfield, in 1860, expressed his pleasure that the proposal for a Transport Department, apart from, and separate from, the Commissariat, had been "upset by the resolution of Lord Elphinstone's Government, and the reasoning of Sir Hugh Rose."

His Excellency in Council has, therefore, no hesitation in deciding that the transport shall be under the same general direction as the Department of Supply.

The 5th to the 12th paragraphs of the Quarter Master General's letter treat of the internal organisation of the Transport Corps, and his Excellency in Council thinks that the scheme proposed by Major Warden is more elaborate and complicated than is desirable. He conceives that it would suffice to place the transport under one officer as director (in the present instance Major Warden), who would be assisted by a sufficient staff, with a suitable establishment of clerks. A proportion of one European commissioned officer to 1,000 mules (or their equivalent) will probably be sufficient at first. The whole transport force might perhaps be advantageously divided from the first into troops of 100 mules (or their equivalent), under the command of a native officer, and a superior native officer should have the inspection of, say, five troops, or 500 mules; but at present the more complicated organisation in divisions appears unnecessary, and likely to produce difficulty and confusion where fractions of divisions may have to be employed, and it would seem preferable to leave the further development of internal organisation to be made as circumstances and experience may indicate. Under this system the head of the Commissariat will indicate what transport he requires for any service, and the Director General will see that the necessary transport, under its proper officers, is provided; but, when provided, the direction and command of it will rest with the Assistant Commissariat Officer appointed for the particular service by the Commissary General, and who will be responsible to him for the custody, delivery, storage, or distribution of the stores or supplies entrusted to him.

A question is raised by Major Warden as to the employment of muccadums, in whose place he suggests the employment of privates of the Native Army. He says that experience in the Crimea has convinced him that it is desirable to substitute some other class for the muccadums. Major Warden particularly mentions that the muccadums in the Crimea, on small provocation, deserted with the men under them. The facilities for desertion will not be great in Abyssinia, and the existing system seems to be approved by many who have had much experience, and his Excellency in Council thinks it inadvisable to hazard such a change at the moment of commencing a campaign.

The 13th paragraph of the Quarter Master General's letter relates to the entertainment of a Cooly Corps, which it has since been determined to obtain from Bengal.

The 14th paragraph relates to draught transport, and the remarks on this subject have been superseded by separate action.

The 16th paragraph refers to equipments. Subject to the opinion of his Excellency the Commander

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Commander in Chief as to the best form, &c. ; of these no time should be lost in providing them. Appendix, No. 23.

The 17th to 22nd paragraphs refer to the immediate organisation of the Head Quarter Transport Establishment, which should now be undertaken without further delay by Major Warden under the general direction of the Commissary General, in accordance to the views above expressed. The Commissary General will keep his Excellency the Commander in Chief informed of the detailed arrangements made under these orders.

The Commissary General should consult the Inspector General Medical Department, on the subject of sick carriage, as noticed in the last part of the Quarter Master General's letter.

*W. F. Marriott, Colonel,
Secretary to Government.*

To the Quarter Master General.

The Commissary General.

(With copy of Quarter Master General's letter.)

The Controller of Military Accounts.

MINUTE by the Honourable *B. H. Ellis*, dated 10th September 1868.

In regard to paragraph 3, has it been sufficiently considered what is the value of a Bengal cooley as compared with those who may be obtained near Aden—the Seedeas and Somalees?

B. H. Ellis.

MINUTE by His Excellency Sir *Robert Napier*, dated 11th September 1867.

As his Excellency the Governor objects to the appointment of a committee to prepare a scale of Establishment for the Land Transport, I conclude that his Excellency will appoint some officer or other person to do so.

I have, therefore, only to request that when any definite form of establishment is resolved on, I may be favoured with an opportunity of offering an opinion upon it, which, considering how large a share I shall have in the use of it, and how much the credit of this Government will be affected by its success or failure, His Excellency in Council may think desirable.

It may be as well to note that I was quite unaware that the question of the department to which the Land Transport should belong had already been discussed in this Presidency, and that the official traditions of the Government were adverse to the Quarter Master General's Department having charge of it—had I been informed of this I should not have permitted the proposal to be made in that form. The superintendence mentioned in the Government Resolution does not appear to me to meet the requirements of the case as far as I can judge from it.

R. Napier.

MEMORANDUM by Secretary Colonel *Marriott*.

I HAVE added a sentence to meet his Excellency the Commander in Chief's wishes as to the opportunity of offering an opinion on the Transport organisation as it proceeds under these orders.

W. F. Marriott, Colonel.

Enclosure No. 5.

(No. 4278 of 1867-68.)

From the Commissary General of the Army, to the Secretary to Government.

Office of the Commissary General of the Army,
Poona, 20 September 1867.

Sir,
WITH reference to paragraph 3 of Government Resolution No. 93A, of 12th instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of his Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor

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Appendix, No. 23. Governor in Council, that, after due consideration, I am of opinion that the following establishment is necessary for every 2,000 animals, viz :—

Non-commissioned officers, European, if possible.
8 ditto Native non-commissioned officers.
One to every 250.
16, 1 to every 125.
23 September.

W. R. S. V. F.

1 Captain,
2 Subalterns,
4 Chief Inspectors, 1 to every 500 animals,
4 Second " " "
20 Head Muccadums " 100 "
80 Second " " 25 "
1 Driver to every 2 animals,
2 Weighingmen,
4 Biggaries.

If the number of animals with the force amount to, say :—

20,000 Mules or pack bullocks,
8,000 Camels,

the following number of officers will be required, viz :—

14 Captains,
28 Subalterns ;—

of this number, the following have been appointed and are employed as follows :—

Captain F. P. Bartholomew, Bombay Staff Corps, Egypt,
" C. Griffith, Bombay Staff Corps, Head Quarters, Poona,
Lieutenant H. A. Hobson, 22nd N. I., Persian Gulf,
" J. B. Hennell, Bombay Staff Corps, Mussowa,
" F. J. Mortimer, R. H. A., Mussowa,
" C. S. Sturt, Bombay Staff Corps, Sholapoor,
" W. Luckhardt, H. M.'s 109th Regiment, Egypt,
" F. Caldecott, R. H. A., Ahmednuggur.

2. I require at this present moment for duty, the services of three Captains and four Subalterns, as they are urgently wanted to relieve the Commissariat Officers at the Presidency and out-stations of the duty now imposed on them in collecting animals, followers and equipments, appertaining to the Transport Train.

3. It is very desirable that an experienced Captain should be sent up to Mussowa with the force about to embark on or about the 4th proximo. He will take with him the establishment above set forth, and, with the assistance of Lieutenants Hennell and Mortimer commence placing such animals and followers as may be brought there into something like order.

4. The undermentioned animals and followers are being collected, and the following equipments are being made up, viz :—

<i>Poona Division.</i>		<i>At Mhow.</i>	
1,000 Tattoos,		1,500 Camel equipments.	
4,000 Pack bullocks,			
1,800 Muleteers,		<i>At Deesa.</i>	
1,600 Camel drivers,		100 Camelmen,	
560 Dooley bearers,		30 Muleteers,	
3,600 Camel equipments,		200 Dooley bearers,	
3,000 Mule and tattoo equipments,			
4,000 Pack bullock equipments,		<i>At Belgaum.</i>	
100 Camel pucks,		50 Muleteers,	
300 Mule "		100 Dooley bearers.	
<i>At Kurrachee.</i>			
2,500 Camel equipments and		<i>At Bombay.</i>	
200 Dooley bearers.		300 Camelmen,	
		200 Muleteers.	

From Madras Presidency 500 Dooley bearers are expected.

5. I have fixed the following rate of pay with warm clothing, free rations on leaving India, and return passage, viz :—

	Rs.
Chief Inspectors at - - - - -	120 per month.
Second " - - - - -	80 "
Weighingmen at - - - - -	30 "
Head Muccadums at - - - - -	15 "
Second " - - - - -	12 "
Camel Drivers - - - - -	} at 10 Rs. each per month.
Muleteers - - - - -	
Pack and draft bullock drivers - - - - -	
Tattoo wallas - - - - -	
Syces - - - - -	
Dooley Bearers - - - - -	
Biggaries - - - - -	
Peons - - - - -	

6. As it is absolutely necessary, I have sanctioned the entertainment of two sets of artificers' establishments, each of the following strength, one to proceed with the force about to embark on or about the 4th proximo to Mussowa, and one to remain at Poona for the present, viz. :—

					Rs.
8 1st Assistant Nalbunds, at	-	-	-	-	38 each per month.
18 2nd " "	-	-	-	-	22 "
1 Head Smith, at	-	-	-	-	45 "
8 Smiths, at	-	-	-	-	22 "
1 Head Carpenter, at	-	-	-	-	45 "
6 Carpenters, at	-	-	-	-	22 "
1 Head Moochee, at	-	-	-	-	25 "
10 Moochees, at	-	-	-	-	22 "
1 Head Rope Maker, at	-	-	-	-	45 "
6 Rope Makers, at	-	-	-	-	22 "
8 Bellows Boys, at	-	-	-	-	9 "
8 Hammermen, at	-	-	-	-	13 "

7. With such a large number of cattle, a veterinary establishment is necessary, and is under consideration.

8. I have authorised the Director of Transport Train entertaining the following office establishment, viz. :—

					Rs.
1 Head Clerk, at	-	-	-	-	250 per month.
2nd Clerk, at	-	-	-	-	150 "
3rd " "	-	-	-	-	100 "
4th " "	-	-	-	-	80 "
5th " "	-	-	-	-	60 "
1 Moonshee, at	-	-	-	-	50 "
1 Naique of Peons, at	-	-	-	-	12 "
4 Peons, at	-	-	-	-	10 each per month,

but considering the very liberal staff allowance of the officers under Major Warden, and the nature of the duties to be entrusted to them, I do not consider it at all necessary allowing them any office establishment, as in field service the correspondence ought to be as little as possible, and, whatever there may be, must be conducted by the officers themselves.

9. The payment of the followers to be made in the presence of officer, the acquittance rolls being prepared by their inspectors, but which acquittance rolls is to be initialled by the officer before whom the payment may be made.

10. It must be admitted that amongst such a mass of followers collected from all parts of the world and of various creeds and castes, some organisation is indispensable, and it is a matter of serious import, considering the peculiar service, and in a comparatively unknown country, far distant from India, as to how this is to be accomplished.

11. I am convinced that placing this heterogenous mass entirely under military organisation, as was attempted with the late Persian Land Transport Corps, would not answer; but I do think that by a careful selection of the officers and subordinates, allowing the followers (be they camelmen, muleteers, &c.) to choose their own second muccadums, and above all, by kind treatment, combined with firmness, will in the end prove efficacious.

12. I beg to add that calling the various commands of 2,000 animals as they are formed by the term "division" is merely a matter of convenience, and will not, I consider, be likely to produce either difficulty or confusion, any more than would be met in detaching details from regiments; the officers would not be permanently posted to any particular number of animals, but be ready to move whenever or wherever ordered with any quota of animals, &c.

13. As it is of great importance that the formation of the Transport Train should be permitted to proceed with the utmost expedition in accordance with paragraph 9 of the Government resolution under reference, more especially as there is some prospect of the main portion of the force leaving India between 15th November and 1st December next, I beg that the officers who have been, or may hereafter be applied for, may be placed at my disposal with the least possible delay.

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14. I trust

Appendix, No. 23. 14. I trust the above arrangements will meet with the approval of his Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor in Council.

I have, &c.
(signed) *J. B. Dunsterville*, Lieutenant Colonel,
Commissary General of the Army.

Seen by his Excellency the Commander in Chief.

W. F. Marriott.

Sanctioned.
23rd September.
27th September.
27th September.

W. R. S. V. F.

H. B. E.

S. M.

(No. 144 A.—Poona, 23 September 1867.)

RESOLUTION.—Sanctioned with the following slight modifications.

THE Chief Inspectors to every 500 animals should, if practicable, be European non-commissioned officers.

In place of four second inspectors there should be eight (Native non-commissioned officers if practicable), one to every 250 animals; and in place of 20 head muccadums, only 16, or one to every 125 animals.

W. F. Marriott, Colonel,
Secretary to Government.

To The Commissary General.
The Controller of Military Accounts.
(With copy of Commissary General's letter).
The Deputy Quartermaster General.
(With copy of Commissary General's letter).

Enclosure No. 6.

LETTER from his Excellency the Governor to the Commissary General.

My dear Colonel Dunsterville,

Gunnesh Kind, 28 September 1867.

SIR ROBERT appears still not quite satisfied with your plan of the Land Transport Corps, though I do not understand exactly what the modifications are he wishes.

My only object must be the same as his, to secure an efficient Land Transport Corps. My objections to the military organisation I have already to a great extent waived, and must, I suppose, give up altogether, though I am sure the result will be that in this Presidency at least, we shall not find any one to take service. I wish you would see him and learn his wishes.

Yours, &c.
(signed) *W. R. S. Fitz Gerald.*

Enclosure No. 7.

To his Excellency the Right Honourable *W. Seymour Fitz Gerald*, Governor, &c. &c.,
Gunnesh Khind.

My dear Mr. Fitz Gerald,

Bombay, 7 October 1867.

I HAVE now gone very carefully into the details of the Land Transport, and would propose for your Excellency's consideration the following modification of the establishment, which I have discussed with Colonel Dunsterville and Major Warden.

Instead of the amended establishment of—

4 Head Inspectors,
8 Second Inspectors,
16 Head Muccadums,

I would propose—

2,000	{	4 Head Inspectors	-	-	-	-	-	120
		4 Second Inspectors	-	-	-	-	-	80
		200 10 Third Inspectors	-	-	-	-	-	40
		100 20 Head Muccadums	-	-	-	-	-	20

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The cavalry should be most looked to to supply these men, as they would bring with them a knowledge of tending and managing cattle; but any men found with such qualifications would be taken from any branch of the army, and they would serve to teach others, who must now come, in many cases, quite ignorant of duty, but if properly taught, may make very good drivers.

The soldiers will still remain soldiers, and return to their regiments hereafter. Their service and regimental characters are guarantees for good behaviour, which are wanting in many cases now.

I attach very great value to the superintendents of 200 and 100 mules, as they will have many opportunities of doing good or harm when detached, as they must often be. When in detached parties the opportunities of appropriating the food of the mules, of overloading with their own accumulations, &c., will be very frequent, and I attach more value to these classes than to the second inspectors even.

It is desirable to have a portion of spare men in case of sickness, and desirable that some kind of clothing should be given, a jacket of some sort which should be of uniform colour, that a muleteer may be distinguished at once.

I am quite satisfied that Major Warden requires a second, and under any name that may be considered suitable, but the extent of his charge requires that he should have some one to carry on his work in case of temporary disability.

I give great credit to Colonel Dunsterville and Major Warden for their exertions in collecting the establishment. Their exertions have been very great and laudable. It requires that the establishment be seen to fully appreciate the absolute need of complete supervision and organisation to render of real value the expenditure incurred.

Yours very sincerely,
R. Napier.

Enclosure No. 8.

(No. 2 of 1867-68.)

From the Controller of Supply and Transport, Abyssinian Force, to the Secretary to Government, Military Department.

Sir,

Poona, 11 October 1867.

WITH reference to Government Resolution, Military Department, dated 28th September, No. 144 A, and accompaniment, his Excellency the Commander in Chief, after due consideration of Colonel Dunsterville's proposals for proceeding in the formation of the Land Transport Establishment, and after a careful inspection of the portion of the establishment already embarked, begs to recommend the following establishment for a division of 2,000 mules:—

2. Instead of that previously proposed of, viz. :—					Rs.
4 Head Inspectors at	-	-	-	-	120 each.
8 Second „	-	-	-	-	80 „
16 Head Muccadums.	-	-	-	-	15 „
His Excellency recommends—					
4 Head Inspectors	-	-	-	-	120 „
4 Second „	-	-	-	-	80 „
10 Third „	-	-	-	-	40 „
20 Head Muccadums	-	-	-	-	20 „

3. The Commander in Chief has stated his reasons for these proposals in his demi-official letters to his Excellency the Governor of the 5th and 7th of October; and his Excellency desires me to say that he considers that the addition of these grades, under any denomination that his Excellency the Governor may prefer, is indispensable to the efficiency of the Land Transport.

4. The Commander in Chief begs to refer to the third Article of the decision of Lord Strathnairn's Commission, in which it says "the whole of the Army Transport organised by the Government should be of a military character under military subordination, but all the officers should have military command limited to their own corps, and should not be employed on any duty unconnected with Transport."

5. The muccadam, regarding whom his Excellency the Governor relies on Colonel Dunsterville's long experience, is a valuable person when he is procurable, is the result of the Indian patriarchal constitution of carriers of all descriptions; and by virtue of his connections, or the possession of a large share in the ownership of the animals he employs, he obtains sufficient influence to ensure the fidelity and obedience of his working fellows, and often has means of giving compensation if they fail.

6. But such a class of muccadums who could be relied upon to see to the care of the animals when detached is not to be found amongst the new establishment.

The drivers and the head muccadums are collected from different quarters, and are disconnected with each other.

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Appendix, No. 23. The guarantee for good service which is to be found with the soldier, from his hopes of pension and his regimental character, are wanting; as is also the principle of strict obedience to orders.

7. The establishment which has been engaged will, no doubt, prove very valuable when instructed in their work and under proper superintendence, but without the addition which is recommended the greatest confusion and misfortune may be anticipated.

8. An officer who served in Bhotan, writes as follows:—

“At the last moment (the moment when it was most necessary to strike a blow) we could not have moved, because our carriage transport broke down; the attendance with them was insufficient.”

On receiving the sanction of his Excellency the Governor in Council, his Excellency the Commander in Chief will at once cause the necessary military subordinates to be drawn from the ranks of the British and Native army, taking them as much as possible from the cavalry branch to secure a knowledge of the care and equipment of the transport animals, in which they will be able to instruct the untrained subordinates who must necessarily form part of the establishment raised under such an emergency.

I have, &c.

(signed) *H. W. Holland*, Lieut. Colonel,
Controller of Supply and Transport, Abyssinian Force.

(No. 225 A.—Poona, 15th October 1867.)

RESOLUTION.—Sanctioned.

To the Quartermaster General.

The Commissary General.

The Controller of Military Accounts.

The Controller of Supply and Transport, Abyssinian Expedition.

W. F. Marriott, Colonel,
Secretary to Government.

Enclosure No 9.

MINUTE of His Excellency the Governor.

WHEN the scheme of Major Warden for the establishment of the transport train was submitted to Government, there were two points on which, in common with my colleagues, I expressed a difference of opinion from the Commander in Chief.

First, with regard to the propriety of putting the transport of the army under the Quartermaster General instead of under the Commissariat. With reference to this, I expressed a strong opinion, in which Mr. Ellis and Mr. Mansfield concurred, that the Department of Supply should have the control of the transport, and gave the reasons which induced me to form that opinion. I had no reason since to doubt the soundness of that view, and Sir Robert Napier said he unhesitatingly withdrew that proposal, which, he added, he should never have allowed to be made had he been aware that the Government of Lord Elphinstone had already expressed an adverse opinion on the subject.

The second point on which I differed from Sir Robert Napier was with reference to the Transport Train being put under a military organisation.

I expressed the opinion, which was shared by the other members of the Government, that it was not wise to attempt a novel organisation to which the class in the Presidency whom we wished to employ were unaccustomed at the commencement of a campaign, when there would be no time or opportunity of maturing the details such an organisation required; and, secondly, I expressed a fear that the belief entertained by many officers well acquainted with the class referred to, viz., that we should not find them willing to take such a semi-military service, would be found to be well-grounded.

I was of opinion that the muleteers from Egypt, Persia, and elsewhere, whom we probably should have to employ, and who, at any rate, would come in charge of the mules, would easily fall into their places in a corps which was already in existence, and to a certain extent organised; whereas, if, from the repugnance of the natives of this Presidency to take service in a corps that was organised on a military footing, a transport train was not formed here in the first instance, nothing but confusion could arise where officers from India without men, and men from Egypt and elsewhere without officers, met for the first time on the shore at Zoulla.

Sir Robert Napier, on the other hand, was of opinion that with men from many different countries of wild undisciplined habits and prone to violence, it was necessary to have a complete military organisation. It was obvious that, apart from the high authority of Sir Robert Napier, there was much to be urged in support of such a view.

In the public discussions on this subject it has been assumed that because I expressed an opinion

opinion adverse to the adoption of a military organisation that opinion was adhered to. The exact reverse is the fact. In deference to the opinion of Sir Robert Napier, the Government waived its own opinion, and an organisation was proposed by the Commissary General entirely differing from that I had originally sketched out; and subsequently, upon a renewed expression on the part of Sir Robert Napier of his opinion that the organisation proposed by Colonel Dunsterville was insufficient, that officer was again directed to ascertain precisely Sir Robert's wishes, and in the end a modified plan proposed by Sir Robert himself was adopted by Government without any alteration whatever.

It can scarcely, therefore, be said with truth that the failures of the Transport Train have arisen from an obstinate adherence on the part of myself and my colleagues to a plan adopted by Government in preference to one proposed by Sir Robert Napier. The Government desired an organisation well understood in the country under muccadums, and that proposal was abandoned. Sir Robert Napier proposed a military organisation, and in deference to him it was adopted.

It may be said that the number of officers whose employment was sanctioned by the Government has been found utterly insufficient, and that Sir Robert Napier, to obtain efficiency, has been obliged largely to increase them. This is true; but, first, the number sanctioned was the number named by Sir Robert Napier; and, secondly, the number employed is equally largely in excess of the number proposed originally by Major Warden.

In attempting to make it clear that the miscarriage of the Transport Train is not due to the decision of the Bombay Government overruling Sir Robert Napier, I must equally not be understood as attributing it to the adoption of his views. I have already said that, apart from the weight of his authority, there was much to be urged in their favour. The failure of the transport at the commencement of the campaign arose from a combination of circumstances: there were, practically speaking, neither mules nor muleteers, to be obtained here. Officers totally new to their work, acquainted only with the languages of this country, and ignorant of Arabic, Persian, or any of the languages spoken by their men, accustomed to the more docile and subservient races of Hindostan, met for the first time on the shore at Zoulla men of more independent races, utterly unable to comprehend a word addressed to them by those put over them, and who found themselves placed under a military discipline for which they had never engaged themselves. It is not to be wondered at that the first found themselves unable to command, or that the latter were not found willing to obey.

If it be said that the same difficulty would have occurred, the same want of understanding would have been felt if the organisation had been non-military, I reply that in my opinion if a military system had not been adopted we should have had no difficulty in obtaining men in our own Presidency, and embodying a nucleus for a Transport Train to which the foreign muleteers would have readily attached themselves, and so fallen in with the system on which it was established.

There are two circumstances which have occurred connected with the Transport Train which seem to me to justify the opinion I first expressed as to the organisation required, and to which I would draw attention.

In the early days of the Expedition continual and loud complaints were made of the turbulence and violence of the men engaged from Egypt and elsewhere, severe punishments were unsparingly resorted to, the lash was seldom at rest, the men were sent back to Suez, and in some cases were returned immediately on their arrival without trial. It afterwards appeared that some of these men were among the best of those who had been employed by the British agents in Egypt, were recognised on their return as intelligent and willing men, and were at once re-employed. Even if nothing more had happened to prove the fact, it would seem not unfair to infer that the fault lay not with the men, but the system under which they were placed. Later, however, in the Expedition, the Commander in Chief found it necessary to put a portion of the train under the exclusive control of the Commissariat officer at Zoulla, and for this a large detachment of camels from Egypt, with Egyptian camel-men, were placed at his disposal. Colonel Lucas reverted to the organisation under muccadums, who were selected from the men on the principle well known in this country, and originally proposed for adoption by the Government. The men were found to be docile, intelligent, and contented; the portion of the trains so organised was found to be efficient in a most marked degree, and I am inclined to agree with Colonel Lucas in his opinion that the same happy result would have been generally obtained throughout the train if the same system had been pursued.

The second fact to which attention should be called is that the Punjab Mule Train has been from the commencement of the campaign noted for its efficiency. It is fair to ask if this has been secured by a military organisation. The reply is that no such organisation was adopted. The number of commissioned officers in command is no greater than that which I was seeking to adopt; the train has had no large staff of non-commissioned officers drawn from European, or of subordinate non-commissioned officers selected from Native regiments. It is, in fact, just such a corps as would without difficulty have been raised in our own Presidency if the men had not been deterred from engaging in what they considered a military service, and I see no reason why such a corps raised in Bombay should not have been as efficient and have done as good service as one raised on similar principles in another part of India.

Mahableshwar, 18 April 1868.

W. R. Seymour V. FitzGerald.

Appendix, No 24.

Appendix, No. 24. **MEMORANDUM** by Sir *Seymour Fitzgerald* on Portions of the EVIDENCE taken before the COMMITTEE on the EXPENDITURE in the ABYSSINIAN EXPEDITION.

By the courtesy of the Chairman of the Committee appointed to inquire into the expenditure of the Abyssinian Expedition, I have received from time to time copies of the evidence taken in the course of their investigation. It appeared at one time not impossible that the Committee, in order to make their inquiry complete, might have considered it necessary to take evidence from myself, through whose hands every detail of the Expedition, so far as regards the bulk of the expenditure, necessarily passed. Furthermore, it was evident that the investigations of the Committee must, to a certain extent, refer to my own proceedings and responsibility in reference to the subject before them. It is a matter of notoriety that upon at least one important point there existed a difference of opinion between the Government and the Commander in Chief of the Expedition; and it has been erroneously assumed that the views of the Government were acted upon in preference to, and to exclusion of, those of his Excellency. It has been represented that embarrassment and increased expenditure ensued therefrom. On such a point it would appear but just that the views of this Government should be stated. But the Session of Parliament is now so far advanced that there seems no probability of my having the opportunity which I have desired of correcting the misapprehension which exists upon this as well as other points connected with the Expedition. I have every confidence that the members of the Committee, to many of whom I have been long known, will hesitate to pass an authoritative judgment on matters in controversy, as to which I am debarred from being heard. There are, however, in the evidence given by his Excellency Lord Napier of Magdala so many points, both of statement and inference, the accuracy of which I am bound to dispute, that I think it necessary shortly to state them, and to make the observations that occur to me, in the hope that the Committee, or some members of it, will, before their inquiry is brought to a close, direct their examination of the witnesses from Bombay, who will be called before them, to these particular points, and elicit not opinion, but a clear and exact statement of facts.

Many of the proceedings of this Government during the course of the Expedition have been called in question by writers in the press anonymously and otherwise, and many inaccurate and unfounded statements have been made, which I have been content to let pass without reply; but the evidence of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, given before a Committee of the House of Commons, stands on a different footing. I am necessarily desirous that my conduct and views in reference to the Expedition may not, either by inadvertence or forgetfulness, be incorrectly represented; and I feel sure I only do justice to Lord Napier in believing that he would be the first to desire that any statement or opinion of his that may appear to reflect unjustly on another should meet with correction and reply.

I cannot but remember also that the proceedings of the Committee will be the materials for future history; and humbly as is the part I took in the events which are the subject of the inquiry, the Committee will, I feel sure, be as anxious as myself that both sides of any disputed question should be heard.

It would exceed the limits of a memorandum such as this, were I to advert to the many points of more or less importance, such as the engagement of tonnage, the detention of ships in the Red Sea, and their discharge here, the provision of supplies, &c., and the engagement of native transport in Abyssinia, as to which the evidence before the Committee, so far as it has reached me, appears to me incomplete. I shall therefore only refer to those portions of the evidence of the Commander in Chief of the Expedition to which I take exception, quoting textually the questions put, and his Excellency's replies, with such corrections as seem to be necessary.

ORGANISATION OF THE EXPEDITION.

Lord Napier in his answer to Question 239, says, "My answer in a certain sense has bearing against his Excellency the Governor of Bombay. I believe (and the Right honourable Baronet, the Member for Devon, will correct me if I am wrong) that the first intention was to place the organisation of the Expedition entirely in my hands. I believe that there arose in this country (I suppose I am not called upon to say where) a cry that that was an abdication of the power of the civil government; I speak now from opinion. I believe that the reflection of that cry reached Bombay, and that the result of it was the desire of his Excellency the Governor of Bombay to resume that function of civil government, which, according to the impression here, had been abdicated, by giving me the complete control of the organisation of the Expedition. Therefore, I believe that his Excellency the Governor was probably influenced by the feelings at home in wishing to exercise more control than had perhaps been originally intended.

Question 240. From economical motives?—*Answer.* Entirely from economical motives; and I desire to say distinctly that in any points in which there was a difference of opinion between his Excellency the Governor of Bombay and myself, his Excellency was guided by a view of economy. The difference of opinion was of course on the point of what economy was, whether it was economical to withhold expenditure at that time or incur it. That was the point upon which we differed; but I am quite certain that his Excellency's motive in everything was that of economy; and that his desire was to meet the views, or supposed views, of this country. If I assume anything of his Excellency which is wrong, I must submit to be corrected by his Excellency, but I can only give my opinion."

In reply to Question 327, "With regard to official correspondence, there was in fact no official communication made directly to you which intimated that you were placed in a different position from that which you afterwards occupied, was there?" Lord Napier replies, "I received no official communication directly from the Home Government, although I received demi-official letters from yourself; speaking from memory, the impression which I gathered from your first letter was that you looked to me to be responsible for everything; that is to say, that you trusted to me to provide everything; that you left, in fact, the conduct of the Expedition in my hands." And in answer to Question 354, "Do you consider that it would have been possible in prudence for the Government of England to have given to them (the Bombay Government) less authority in this matter than they did give?" Lord Napier says, "I consider that they (the Government of Bombay) should have had the full authority which you gave them, and that they should not have been interfered with by the Government of India; but I think that, understanding from you that you left me the entire preparation of the Expedition, they should have followed up your desire by leaving it to me; that is to say, that the requisitions which I made should have been attended to at once."

I cannot sufficiently express the astonishment with which I first read the above replies of Lord Napier. At no time have I had the slightest reason to suppose that it was, or ever had been, contemplated to place the organisation of the Expedition in his Lordship's hands; and, consequently, the desire he attributes to me to resume the functions of civil government, which, according to an impression at home, had been abdicated by giving his Excellency complete control, is mere imagination. His Lordship's statement is even now the only intimation of the fact that I have received. By telegram and by letter the duty and responsibility was officially placed on the Government of which I am the head; all preparatory measures were left to our discretion; and in the letters I received from the Secretary of State not a word appeared to vary or modify those official instructions. On the contrary, I was told that the Government relied upon me to enforce, to the utmost, economy consistently with efficiency; nor is there the slightest hint or intimation from which it could be inferred that the Secretary of State had at any time desired to confide to Lord Napier the entire preparation of the Expedition, which, in Lord Napier's opinion, the Government ought on that account to have left in his hands.

In Question 338 Sir Stafford Northcote asks, "Do you not think that it might have been reasonably supposed by the Government at home in issuing those orders for the preparation of the Expedition, and at the same time in informing the Government of Bombay that Her Majesty's Government having great confidence in Sir R. Napier, desires to place the whole conduct of the negotiations, as well as the military direction of the armed force, in his hands, that you would be consulted in all matters that affected the preparations and the conduct of the Expedition, so far as it appeared necessary to consult you?" To this Lord Napier replies, "No doubt." In this reply I entirely concur, and will only venture to add that Lord Napier was invariably so consulted, and that even in matters where it might not appear necessary to refer to him, as in executive details unconnected with the Military Department, every proceeding was, by an arrangement made between Lord Napier and the Secretary to Government in the Military Department, communicated to him for his information, and for remark if he thought fit.

Appendix, No. 24.

It is necessary that I should further distinctly say that at no time did Lord Napier give me the slightest reason to suppose that he had received any intimation, officially or informally, either from the Secretary of State or any other source, inconsistent with the official instructions which he knew that I had received; but on the contrary, from the first moment that I communicated to him the Secretary of State's telegram of the 14th August, by which a clear distinction is made between the military measures which were left to Lord Napier and the preparatory measures which were left to my discretion, all his communications with me were made on the recognised basis that the responsibility of the organisation was on me, as the head of the Government, and not on himself.

Lord Napier is of opinion that there would have been less delay if the whole organisation of the Expedition had been left in his hands; I am possessed by a conviction that the result would have been the exact reverse of this.

To obtain promptly the requisite animals and provisions it was necessary to put in motion all the resources of the Civil Government. The assistance of all the revenue and police authorities, of the officers of Government in the districts in all departments, was required; and unless the Civil Government was wholly set aside, and a military authority empowered to issue orders to all civil officers, and even to the Government itself, substituted in its place, this concurrence of all the powers of Government under the control of the Commander in Chief was manifestly impossible. But even if this was not so, Lord Napier's anticipation that by such an arrangement greater economy would have been secured, seems inconsistent with his declaration that it was no part of his duty to consider the cost of the Expedition, beyond a desire to incur no expenditure that was unnecessary; and with his opinion that if a general were to embarrass himself in the first instance with the question of cost, the probability is that he would never carry out the objects for which he is employed. (Answer to Question 135.) As I reminded Lord Napier, when addressing him publicly on the eve of his departure from India, he had more than once told me that it was his duty to ask for everything he thought the soldier might require, it was mine to refuse if the necessity for it was not shown. It appears to me that the combination of these two functions in the same hands would have made the economy desired by the Home Government somewhat illusory.

It is necessary only that I should add in the most emphatic manner that, though it was my duty to enforce every reasonable economy, and every day proved how necessary it was that a watchful eye should be kept on the expenditure, I never for one moment sacrificed efficiency to a desire to lessen the expenditure; and I invite Lord Napier to cite a single instance where this was the case. Indeed, I cannot call to mind any instances in which I declined to sanction any expenditure recommended by Lord Napier, except the construction of a railway up the passes to Senafé, a work which would probably have required more than a year to complete, and have cost a million sterling, and the instant purchase of 10,000 bullocks in this Presidency, before it was known whether an adequate number of mules and camels could be obtained elsewhere. Practically the control exercised was not so much by the refusal of sanction as by making it clearly understood and felt that all expenditure was narrowly examined before it was sanctioned. I have a strong belief that but for this the expenditure proposed would have been much larger and less considered. To adopt his Excellency's words: "If I assume anything of his Excellency which is wrong, I must submit to be corrected by his Excellency, but I can only give my opinion."

It was hoped that the appointment of a Controller of Supply and Transport, through whom all unauthorised expenditure should be reported to Government, might similarly secure care if not economy in Abyssinia, but the circumstances were different and the result was not satisfactory.

LAND TRANSPORT.

Question 228. Did not the Government of Bombay want to retain the Land Transport in the hands of the Commissariat, your Lordship wishing to have a distinct military organisation for that express purpose?—*Answer.* Yes.

Q. 229. Was the consequence of that difference of opinion to delay an efficient organisation before the Expedition started?—*A.* Undoubtedly.

Q. 230. And that inefficiency was experienced on your landing at Annesley Bay, was it not?—*A.* Certainly.

Q. 231. That particular deficiency detained you on the coast for some three or four weeks, did it not?—*A.* I am not prepared to say that my detention there was solely due to that particular fact.

Q. 232. Was your delay there in some material degree consequent upon the defective organisation of the Land Transport Corps?—*A.* In some degree it was; but it arose generally from the quantity of carriage anticipated not having been furnished.

Q. 233. Had your proposal for a separate organisation been accepted by the Government of Bombay at the time it was proposed, would the Land Transport Corps have been in a more efficient condition, and could they have advanced more promptly on your arrival on the coast?—*A.* I believe that they would have been in a much more efficient condition, and that considerable loss of animals would have been saved by their being sent to receive them when they arrived on the coast; but I should be sorry to assert positively that any delay on the coast was owing entirely to the incompetency of the Land Transport.

Q. 234. I did not put the question in that absolute way; but did the defective organisation of the Land Transport delay you?—*A.* No doubt the defective organisation was a cause of delay.

Q. 237. Were

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Q. 237. Were you not detained on account of the inability to bring on provisions for the army?—A. I was.

Q. 238. Would not that detention have been at all events lessened if your Lordship's views as to organisation had been accepted?—A. No doubt, generally, the hesitation to comply with my requisition at first was a cause of delay.

Q. 239. You just said that time was of much consequence, and that the objects of the Expedition were jeopardised in some degree by waste of time; did not this particular element of the defective organisation of the Land Transport Corps in some degree jeopardise the results of the Expedition by the delay which it occasioned?—A. No doubt it did.

I had hoped that the papers forwarded by the Government of Bombay, together with my Minute of 18th April 1868, would have been sufficient to correct the continued misconceptions with reference to the circumstances attending the formation of the Transport Corps. The questions of the Chairman of the Committee above quoted, and the replies of Lord Napier, make it necessary that I should again revert to the subject. I do not anticipate that on a subject upon which there has been so much difference of opinion, that the Committee will pass an opinion based on the representations of one of the parties to the discussion, and in the absence of the person whose conduct, as it would appear by the expressions used by the Chairman, would be so seriously called in question. The charge of jeopardising the success of the Expedition is no light one, and the statement that a course so blameable was taken "from economical motives" detracts nothing from its gravity. The proceedings of the Committee will remain on record, and without the judgment of the Committee being expressed, the imputation of an error so reprehensible, confirmed to a certain extent by the evident tendency of the questions put by its Chairman, would remain without contradiction, and would be repeated as being either proved or admitted in every future history of these transactions.

Question 288, put by the honourable Chairman of the Committee, slightly misapprehends the difference of opinion which existed between me and the Commander in Chief. Two questions arose on the proposal of the Quartermaster General, Colonel Phayre: 1st, whether the train should be placed under the Commissary General or the Quartermaster General, as to which I preferred the recommendation of Lord Strathnairn's Committee, and the overwhelming evidence in favour of the direction of the transport being left in the hand of the Department of Supply; and, 2nd, as to the nature of the organisation required. The two questions were entirely separate and distinct, and not in the nature of an alternative, as the honourable Chairman evidently supposes.

I may observe also that the word organisation is used in two senses in the course of the evidence, which leads to a fallacy. It is taken to mean the system on which the train was to be organised, as when the question is asked whether there was not a difference as to the organisation of the train. It is also used as meaning the actual embodying and training of the corps under its officers, as when the Chairman asks whether the difference of opinion referred to delayed an efficient organisation before the Expedition started.

As regards the latter, I desire to say, that the difference of opinion in no way delayed the organisation of the train before the Expedition started, nor is it nor could it be the case that the Transport Corps would have been in a more efficient state on Lord Napier's arrival on the coast, if his proposal had been accepted.

It was the desire of the Government, as far as possible, to obtain the services of men from our own Presidency. In this we succeeded to a very limited extent; a certain number, principally Pathans and Sindees were embodied, of whom a large number were sent to Abyssinia under Captain Griffiths at the very commencement of the Expedition, where they rendered excellent service, and were perhaps the most efficient division in the whole train. There was no delay as to these, for they were on the coast at the outset of the campaign.

Failing to obtain the number required from our own Presidency, we were obliged to have recourse to the services of foreign muleteers, Egyptians, Persians, and Levantines, who came in charge of the mules, and remained to serve in the train. For these it was necessary to send officers from India, and as regards this portion of the train, it is difficult to understand how the officers being in India and the men in Abyssinia, it was possible to organise it before the Expedition started—(Question 229).

In his letter of the 11th of October, the Controller of Supply and Transport writes: "On receiving the sanction of his Excellency the Governor in Council, his Excellency the Commander in Chief will at once cause the necessary military subordinates to be drawn from the ranks of the British and Native Army, taking them as much as possible from the cavalry branch, to secure a knowledge of the care and equipment of the transport animals, in which they will be able to instruct the untrained subordinates who must necessarily form part of the establishment raised under such an emergency."

Sanction was demi-officially given on the following day after this letter was received, and the official sanction is contained in the Resolution of Government of the 15th of October.

The first batch of mules from Suez arrived at Annesley Bay with their muleteers at the end of the month. A reference to para. 3 of the Commissary General's letter, sanctioned by Government on the 23rd of September, will show that the necessity for sending officers with the necessary establishment for bringing into order the animals and followers that might arrive was early foreseen, and if the statement made in the letter of the Controller of

Appendix, No. 24. Supply and Transport above quoted, viz., that the necessary military subordinates for the superintendence of the later levies would be at once selected, had been acted upon, other officers would have arrived at Zoulla as soon as the men who subsequently came from Persia and elsewhere, and the organisation of the train have proceeded. Whereas, in point of fact, the men who volunteered for the subordinate commands when called for, did not amount to anything like the number required, and a large part even of these instead of being immediately sent on to Abyssinia, were detained in India during the two or three following months in the vain hope of muleteers and others being found there to take service. As we had been warned would be the case, these were not, even with the offer of a heavy bounty, to be obtained.

Three things are clear from this statement :—

1st. That as far as was possible portions of the train were organised here, and were most efficient.

2nd. As regards the muleteers obtained elsewhere, a proper organisation was impossible before the Expedition started, and could only be obtained in Abyssinia; and,

3rd. That it rested with the military authorities to call for and dispatch as many officers as were required, so as to arrive at Zoulla as soon as the men of whom they were to have charge. This, I believe, was done to a certain extent, but if there was any delay, it did not rest with the Government.

Still less did it rest with the Government that the director of the train, with whom the whole responsibility lay of bringing the heterogeneous mass of transport followers into a state of discipline and efficiency, remained in Bombay till the middle of December, and in fact, only arrived in Annesley Bay two days before Lord Napier himself. The scheme was a novel one. Major Warden, who proposed it, was the only officer who had any experience of its working in the Crimea, and was on that account selected by Lord Napier to organise and establish it; and Major Warden was detained in Bombay during the whole of the critical time when his services were required in Abyssinia.

To the difference of opinion that existed between Lord Napier and myself as to the organisation of the train, in the first meaning of that term indicated above, I have already adverted in a former minute. I have said that the real causes of the early failure of the train are to be found in the exceptional difficulties with which we had to contend, and which were beyond the control alike of the Government and the Commander in Chief. But when it is alleged that these difficulties might have been surmounted, if certain recommendations made by Lord Napier had been adopted, I can only reply, first, that as I have already pointed out, Lord Napier's recommendations were adopted in ample time to have been acted on; and, secondly, that now with a full knowledge of the facts, I still adhere to the objections I then expressed to Major Warden's proposals;* and, although I do not attribute the failure of the train to the adoption of the plan to which I was opposed, yet, I do believe, that the difficulties which in fact caused that failure were in consequence greatly aggravated, and the probability of failure greatly increased. The proposal was one which was entirely new to our officers, no one, except Major Warden, had any experience of its working, and the general impression was certainly that it had been a failure in the Crimea, where he had served for a short period in command of a division. On the other hand, the opinion of all the officers who had hitherto had an experience of the system under which the transport of our army is conducted, was, that the plan was unsuited to the classes who would have to be employed, and that it would be found that they would not take service under the arrangements proposed.

Colonel Dunsterville, who had charge of the Commissariat Department in the Persian War, and had seen the working of a Transport Train established on somewhat similar principles during that expedition, emphatically gave it as his conviction that an organisation, such as was then attempted, would not answer, and his long experience in all questions of transport and supply was entitled to the greatest weight. But even if the advantages of the system had been clearly proved elsewhere, I should have thought that the attempt to introduce a system (the advantages of which had not been tested with an Indian force) on the eve of a campaign, or rather which could only be commenced after the campaign had begun, in a country practically unknown, and under circumstances as regards supplies exceptionally difficult, was perilous and unwise.

Beyond this I consider that the organisation proposed was itself such that failure was almost certain or at least that the difficulties and embarrassment would at the outset certainly be such for many months, that the prospect of finishing the Expedition in one campaign would be, unless under very favourable circumstances on which no one could count, almost hopeless.

At a very early period it was pointed out that we should be forced to engage the services of men from other countries besides India, and in his reply to my first memo. on the subject, Lord Napier adverts to this necessity. The men thus collected came from Persia,

* I purposely call them Major Warden's proposals, as that officer himself informed me that they originated with himself in consultation with Colonel Phayre, and were never seen or considered by Lord Napier till a week before their submission.

Persia, Egypt, Afghanistan, and the Levant, Greeks, Syrians, and Turks, men from Italy, Spain, Hungary, Algeria; in fact half the races and dialects of Europe and Asia may be said to have been represented there.

Each division of the train was officered by European officers, not seldom unable to converse in or understand Hindustani, under whom were European non-commissioned officers with a similar ignorance of the vernacular languages of the presidency or of any Indian dialect. Under these officers were again native non-commissioned officers, mostly Mah-rattas, with a sprinkling of other Indian races, speaking each their own tongue, and last came the rank and file of the train such as I have described, all utterly unable to comprehend a word addressed to them by the officers over them, whether European or Native, or even to comprehend each other. The result may be easily imagined, confusion, misunderstanding, insubordination, repeated and severe punishment, and desertion. To such a pitch were things brought in the early days of the Expedition, that it was determined to send back to Suez not only the men who were insubordinate or had attempted to desert, but every muleteer who arrived thence, without trial or inquiry. Yet these very men on their return were recognised, many of them by the officers at the Dépôt, as among the best and most trustworthy servants they possessed, were taken back immediately into service, and remained in service till the close of the war. What would be thought of a proposal to establish a force, say, for police purposes, where the privates should be all French, the inspectors Germans, and the superintendents English, each unable to communicate with the other? Yet a result such as this was the inevitable consequence of a proposal that drove away from the ranks of the train the natives of the presidency who should have formed the bulk and mainstay of the corps, and which compelled us to employ Arabs, Egyptians, and others under officers partly Europeans and partly natives obtained from the Indian armies.

Note.—Upwards of 2,000 were thus dismissed.

I have referred to the very limited number of men whom it was found possible to engage for service in the Transport Train. They have been termed, I think, the refuse and sweepings of the streets of Bombay. This is simply and inexcusably inaccurate. The bulk of the men formed Captain Griffiths' division notably the most efficient or equal to the most efficient corps during the whole of the Expedition. The remainder were mostly of a superior class: commissariat inspectors and others with some experience of army transport. Of course there may have been exceptions, as there must always be where large bodies of men are suddenly and rapidly collected together. At the same time such was at one time the emergent need of men, that I am not sure but that the description given to the Train might not have been correct if only the men had been forthcoming. As it was, the sweepings of the streets refused to serve.

In connection with this latter point, there are portions of Lord Napier's evidence which require special remark. He says, in answer to Question 553, "I think that in the first instance it was intended to enlist all the muleteers in Hindostan."

"Question 554. Would not that have been the best arrangement?—Answer. That certainly would have been the best arrangement.

"Q. 555. Was it ever tried, or how came it that a scheme should have been considered for the enlistment in India of all the men required for the Land Transport, and that it should not have been carried out?—A. There was an opinion that the men could not be had, and that it would require increased rates of payment. It involved considerable exertion and inquiry. It is natural that on the first proposal of such a thing, a Government should demur a little. Seeing the very high prices acquired, they would naturally pause to be satisfied of the urgency of the occasion before raising the prices, and that is a matter which, from my experience in war and military preparations would retard the Government very much.

"Q. 556. Then, if I understand your Lordship rightly, everybody being of opinion that India was the best field for recruiting the men of the Land Transport Corps, the proposition was abandoned, not after an attempt so to enlist them, but simply because it was thought that a mistake had been made in considering that that course was possible, and it was abandoned without actual trial?—A. Yes; the scheme proposed was not accepted, and the formation was placed in the hands of the Commissary General. The Commissary General was put into communication with me, but he was not at all subject to my orders. In fact, my scheme, the Quartermaster General's scheme, was not accepted, and the Commissary General's proposals were accepted.

"Q. 558. Then on the Commissary General would devolve the responsibility of taking no steps with reference to this course, which everybody would agree was desirable, of looking upon India as the field of enlistment, rather than going elsewhere to the ports of the Levant, and obtaining a class of men to deal with, which is known by past experience to be almost useless?—A. I do not think that you can say that the commissariat is responsible. The commissariat is responsible for the advice they give to the Government, but the Government is responsible for not having prepared an efficient transport. The Government were advised to prepare one, and they did not prepare one."

And on a subsequent day the question (722) is put to his Lordship:

"The muleteers were of every language and kindred and people and tongue, were they not?—A. Yes.

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" Q. 724. Do you apprehend that if adequate remuneration had been offered to coolies you could not have got them from the Bombay Presidency?—A. I do not know that we could have got them from the Bombay Presidency alone, but we could have got them from all India.

" Q. 725. Speaking the Hindco language?—Speaking a dialect of India.

" Q. 727. Although you might have to pay more for such a corps, do you apprehend that it would have been cheaper in the ultimate amount?—A. Certainly.

" Q. 728. You expect the only difficulty of getting men of a common tongue was the failure to offer them pay enough?—A. Yes. I would not say that you could get experienced muleteers in India, but you could have got such a class of men as we did get."

From these replies it would appear:—

1. That Lord Napier was always of opinion that the men from the train should be drawn from India, though he would not have excluded others.
2. But that it was considered that such a course would cause increased expenditure, to which the Government "naturally demurred."
3. That it was therefore abandoned without trial, without exertion and inquiry.
4. That the responsibility of taking no steps with reference to looking upon India as the field of enlistment, rather than going elsewhere to the ports of the Levant, and obtaining a class of men which is known to be useless, rested with the Government.
5. That if adequate remuneration had been offered, the men could have been obtained in India, and that the difficulty of getting men of a common tongue was the failure to offer them pay enough.

The following are the facts of the case:—

The first intimation as to the probable employment of foreign muleteers is contained in Lord Napier's first Minute on the formation of the Transport Train, in which, before any steps towards that formation were taken, describing the body of men such as the drivers of our transport animals would be, says there may be Egyptians, Arabs, Persians and Hindostanies or Abyssinians mixed up together. (See Sir Robert Napier's Minute, 9th September 1867.) It may be hence inferred that his Lordship contemplated from the very first the employment of other races than the natives of India.

Note.— It was about 8½ per day or I believe more than the pay of a European private.

40 per cent.

The question of the extra cost of employing Hindostanies was *never raised by anyone in any form on any occasion*. The amount of pay to be given was fixed by Colonel Dunster-ville with warm clothing, free rations on leaving India, and return passage, and was approved by his Excellency. It was considerably higher than that suggested by the Government of India who, in consequence to avoid inequality, were obliged to raise their rate to that allowed in Bombay. I state unequivocally that if extra pay would have brought natives of India into our service it would have been given; that from the first, to use Lord Napier's phrase, we looked to "all India" to supply us with men, that at a very early date the engagement of muleteers from the Punjab was solicited by us from the Government of India, who accordingly embodied two complete divisions from that province, and that similar applications were made both to Bengal and Madras, but without success. From the very commencement of our preparations no efforts were spared to obtain them in our own presidency, though with very limited success, and *those efforts were never relaxed even to the very close of the war*. I must further remind Lord Napier that, with his concurrence, a considerable bounty was offered for every muleteer who joined, which subsequently I doubled on my own responsibility, and further, that Government placed a large sum at the disposal of an agent, who was sanguine that he could, by proceeding himself into the districts, raise a considerable number of men for this service. The result, however, was that, after much "exertion and inquiry," he was unable to produce a single man. The officers who have been lately summoned to give evidence before the Committee can satisfy them of the accuracy of these facts, which I apprehend, satisfactorily disposes of the statement that the Government are responsible for the failure to procure men from India for service in the train by demurring to give them a rate of remuneration which would, without doubt, have obtained them. Why all our efforts to obtain them failed, may be a matter of some controversy. I have myself no doubt that it was, in a great measure, the knowledge early obtained that the train was constituted as a military corps under subordinate officers drawn from the army. As stated in my Minute of 31st September 1867, we were at the outset warned by many who had had experience of this class of men that the syces would not be found to take service willingly except under the system with which they were acquainted. I cannot at this moment call to mind any direct report in the earlier days of the Expedition, that this, in point of fact, was the reason of our failure to obtain natives from our own presidency, but at a later period when we desired to obtain men from our Sind frontier, Sir H. Green reported that the Beloochees had heard what service in the train was, and that it was useless to make the attempt.

Before concluding my observations as to the land transport, it is necessary that I should point out in what the difference consisted between the organisation proposed by the Government

ment and that desired by Lord Napier. From the course of the evidence as shown in the questions and replies to which I have referred above, as well as from the discussion on the subject which has otherwise taken place, it might be inferred that the plan of the Government did not contemplate the men of the train being placed under a strict quasi military discipline. But this is an entire misapprehension. The difference of opinion which existed was not as to the necessity of a discipline similar to what must be necessary in every force employed in military operations, but as to the class and training of the men by whom that discipline was to be maintained. It was in this sense only that a military organisation was objected to, as may be gathered from the fact that the question of enlisting the men was discussed and not objected to by the Government. The difference, in fact, was simply that Lord Napier desired that the subordinate officers should be taken from the ranks of the European and native armies, whereas by the plan proposed by Colonel Dunsterville the subordinate officers were taken from the men themselves either by election or appointment. The objections to the former course, and the difficulties almost insuperable that resulted therefrom, when it was found necessary to employ foreigners in the place of natives of India, I have already pointed out.

In reference to this subject it is necessary to observe that his Excellency the Commander in Chief seems to be under an entire misconception as to the character of the men designated as muccadums. His Excellency says, in the letter of the Comptroller of Supply and Transport, "The muccadum, regarding whom his Excellency the Governor relies on Colonel Dunsterville's long experience, as a valuable person where he is procurable, is the result of the Indian patriarchal constitution of carriers of all descriptions, and by virtue of his connections or the possession of a large share in the ownership of the animals he employs, he obtains sufficient influence to ensure the fidelity and obedience of his working fellows, and often has means of giving compensation if they fail. But such a class of muccadums who could be relied on to see to the care of the animals, when detached, is not to be found amongst the new establishment. The drivers and muccadums are collected from different quarters and are disconnected with each other."

In reply to the observation thus quoted, I beg to say that the muccadums it was proposed to employ were exactly those that were found in the new establishment organised by Colonel Dunsterville, men coming often from the service, often from a different quarter; sometimes connected with, often disconnected with, the drivers, but *men of the same class and training, understood and understood by their men, and selected, if not elected, from them*. Men, such as I have described, are not found among the class of carriers only, as Lord Napier would seem to suppose, but among every class and description of labourer throughout India. They are, in fact, overseers. If you employ men in constructing a road, or building a house or what not, if you do not name a muccadum or overseer over the gang or gangs, they will elect one themselves, who has and exerts full authority over them, and whose orders are obeyed without question. The overseer goes by different names in different parts of India and according to the nature of the labour. In fact what was proposed by the Government was exactly that which was established by the Punjab divisions of the train so highly eulogised by Lord Napier, in which the subordinate officers, there called mates, were taken from the men themselves, whether by election or appointment, I am unable to say. In place of these, Major Warden's plan, as approved by the Commander in Chief, substituted non-commissioned officers and privates of the army, with fixed ideas of drill and words of command, knowing nothing of the service in which they were employed, or of the habits and wishes of the men over whom they were placed.

To show how well understood and general is this employment of muccadums or overseers, by whatever name they were called, is among the labouring class in the East, I would call to mind that when the Commissariat Camel Train was established by Colonel Lucas in Abyssinia on a separate basis from the rest of the train, it was organised under superior officers like the rest of the train, but under muccadums for subordinate officers, and was found by Lord Napier's testimony to be most efficient in every respect.

I have referred in an earlier part of this paper to the number of muleteers who were sent back to Egypt, many without trial. Upwards of 2,000 were thus dismissed at the very time when every letter from Zoulla complained of the insufficiency of the number of followers to take charge of the animals. It is not unfair to ask what would have been the condition of the transport if these men had been placed under muccadums who spoke the same language, and who understood their habits and their wants? Might they not have been like their fellows in the train established by Colonel Lucas, who were described by him as an efficient body of intelligent, docile, and contented men?

I must further guard against it being supposed that the organisation sanctioned by the Government materially differed as to the number of the subordinate officers from that approved by Lord Napier.

The number of subordinate officers for each division approved by Lord Napier, and sanctioned by Government, was 118. The number proposed by Colonel Dunsterville, and approved in the first instance by Government, was 108.

The number employed in the Punjab train was 120, but the organisation of that corps had the great advantage of simplicity, there being only two classes of native officers in place of five, as proposed by Major Warden.

INCREASE OF FORCE.

Coolie Corps.

In reply to Question 38, Lord Napier says: "In the first proposal of troops to be taken, I mentioned one regiment of Sikh pioneers and two companies of sappers; but I mentioned also a corps of 3,000 coolies. The 3,000 coolies were not procured, and were not at the moment procurable, so that I was obliged to increase the working part of the Force: and I added, I think, four companies of sappers, two from Madras, and two from Bombay. I took one company from Aden, which I retained, one additional company from Bombay, and two from Madras."

"Question 39. But was the increase of force your own proposal, or did it result incidentally from an increase of the regiments having been effected through the action of the Viceroy and the Commander in Chief in India?—A. It arose from both causes; it arose from the increase to the number of men in the regiments which were ordered to be made up to a certain strength, and it arose from the increase of the number of labourers; because the number of coolie labourers whom I expected to get, and whom I mentioned in the estimate as 3,000, were not procured."

"Q. 40. Then, were the 3,000 coolies included, in the first instance in excess of the 12,000 combatants; and is it your Lordship's view that, in point of fact, the Force was not increased when you took the 15,000 combatants to Abyssinia?—The Force would have been 12,000 combatants and 3,000 labourers, similar to the coolie corps which we had in China."

It is to be inferred from these replies that the increase of the Force from 12,000 to 15,000 men was caused, in Lord Napier's opinion, by his not having the coolie corps of 3,000 men for which he applied. This was a novel suggestion, and appears to me quite inconsistent with the views expressed by his Excellency, as well as with the intentions and understanding of Government at the time that the formation of the coolie corps was sanctioned. His Lordship admits that a large number of coolies were sent to Abyssinia; but suggests that they were not of the class he required, inasmuch as the 3,000 men asked for were to be labourers, and not men to carry burdens. But Lord Napier, in a Minute dated 23rd July, writes: "It would be of great advantage if a corps of 3,000 *porters*, such as the Chinese coolie corps, can be formed of such races as will not fraternise with the Abyssinians." In the Quartermaster General's letter of 22nd August, they are certainly spoken of as "pioneers and porters;" and some of them doubtless might be expected to assist in the removal of obstructions to the advance, as in the cutting or removing of trees or other obstacles, and making themselves, in the language of the Government of India, useful in a variety of ways. But they were asked for and sanctioned solely as auxiliary to the animal transport, and not for the construction of works or roads. In the letter of the Quartermaster General, of 22nd August (No. 4 in the Transport Papers), the 11th paragraph runs thus: "The weight of baggage carried by a division of mules is about 180 tons, and in a mountainous country like Abyssinia it would be requisite to have at least half the transport of the Army on mules and ponies, which, with a corps of coolies, could alone accompany the troops across the country in any direction that field operations might render necessary. Thus his Excellency (Lord Napier) recommends that *at least 10,000 mules and a corps of 3,000 coolies be procured, four coolies being estimated as equal to one mule.*" That this was also the understanding of the Government of India may be seen from the letter of their secretary, Military Department, dated Simla, 25th August, in which he writes: "Everything should be carried by baggage animals, save the guns and a portion of the ammunition, the coolies being used to supplement the animals, and to make themselves useful in a variety of ways." (Lord Napier's Examination, 3rd March, page 8, line 58.)

It must be added, that the number of coolies sent from India considerably exceeded 2,000, and that it was intended that the number required should be completed by the employment of Somalies, an African race who perform all the heavy labour at Aden.

As regards this corps, the Government of India write through the Secretary to Government Military Department, dated 4th October: "I am again to point out the extreme advisability of endeavouring to form a coolie corps at or near the point of debarkation of people accustomed to the country, and am to convey a warning that no reliance can be placed on a corps of coolies or Natives sent from Bengal, who, it is to be feared, will suffer from disease, and rapidly become useless, or nearly so." It was in consequence of the above warning from the Government of India that it was thought advisable that the full number required should be completed by the engagement of Africans, of whom it was believed, after inquiry, that as large a number as might be needed could be obtained without difficulty.

I have thought it necessary thus to correct the evidence of his Excellency, lest it should be assumed that the Government had failed to comply with his requisition, and had thus caused, by their default, an increased expenditure by an addition to the Force. I must add that, until I read the evidence given by his Excellency before the Committee, I never heard even suggested that the increased force of sappers was taken to supply the place of a coolie corps. Such a reason would not, in point of fact, have justified the addition; as on the suggestion of Major Blakeney, who afterwards commanded them, I had before sanctioned the addition of an "Army Works Corps" of 1,000 men. This number was over and above the 2,000 coolies sent from India, and, together, the two corps considerably exceeded the 3,000 coolies Lord Napier had demanded.

INCREASE OF FORCE.

Additions to Regiments.

To Question 66, Lord Napier replies: "The increase of the number of men in each European Regiment was objected to by me very briefly, on the ground that I wanted a flexible force with a great deal of organisation; and that the greatest strength of a regiment would not be of so much use to me as a regiment complete in its organisation but of smaller numbers." It might be inferred from this reply that his Excellency objected to an increase of the force he at first demanded as unnecessary or costly. The facts are these: The Government of India were of opinion that four strong regiments were better than five weak ones, and urged that taking what might be termed skeletons of regiments was hazardous. Lord Napier preferred the latter, as being the more flexible force. The Government of India, or the military authorities at home, I am uncertain which, then, acting on the opinion that it was dangerous to take weak regiments into the field, decided on the increase, as to which Lord Napier wrote to me: "If they decide on giving me more men, all I can say is I can have no objection; and in his reply to the letter of the Government of India deprecating the use of weak regiments, he himself suggests that the deficiency in strength should be made good by volunteers. (Lord Napier's examination, 3rd March, page 6, line 8.) The above remarks apply only to the increase of the European Force.

As regards the Native regiments, I have not the proceedings of Government at hand to refer to; but my impression is, that the increase to the strength of the Native Infantry was made on the requisition of Lord Napier himself; and this, I observe, is confirmed by Colonel Marriott in the evidence he gave to the honourable chairman of the committee at Poona, in which he states the fact to have been such, and that the Government sanction was given as on the 7th September.

RAILWAY.

On this subject the reported evidence of Lord Napier, to which I would call attention, is as follows:—

Q. 494. Were you of opinion from the first that it was extremely desirable that a railway should be supplied, and that it should be supplied in such a condition that it could be laid down with the greatest possible rapidity?—A. I was of that opinion. I should like to place on record a memorandum which I submitted to the Government of Bombay on the 12th September. On that date I say: "Sir R. Napier believes that a tramway of the lightest description procurable would be most valuable, and recommends that the materials first should be forwarded to the coast with the Expedition. The rails might be laid quickly for a few miles towards post No. 1, and would be found of much assistance in the removal of materials, stores, and baggage from the landing places." Subsequently there came from the Secretary of State an offer by Messrs. Brassey & Co. to lay a 3-foot 6-inch railway at, I think, 2,500 £. or 3,000 £. a mile. Our knowledge of the ground was not very great, but I was inclined to recommend that the risk should be run of ordering this railway from the coast to the highland; however, I did not consider it so urgent as to press it upon the Governor as a requisition upon which I rested. I laid the matter before his Excellency the Governor, and his Excellency, considering all the circumstances, did not feel inclined to incur the responsibility of making a requisition for this railway.

Q. 495. On account of the expense I suppose?—A. Yes.

Q. 496. A railway was supplied; and I am right, in stating that it was the five-foot-six gauge, the Indian gauge; that it was composed of second-hand materials to a great extent, if not entirely; that those materials were sent more or less worn out; that the engines were not in a satisfactory condition; and that the materials and the patterns of the chairs and fastenings were so diverse that it was a source of considerable delay in laying down the line. At the same time I believe that the expense will be found, when it is fairly compared, to be equal to that at which Mr. Brassey offered to lay down the line. Under these circumstances, it was the Bombay Government that decided alone to take that course with reference to the railway?—A. Yes.

Q. 497. Had you been consulted, would your Lordship, as an engineer, have suggested the advisability of sending a five-foot-six gauge railway to be laid down in a country of that nature, bearing in mind the necessity for speed that existed; or would you rather have preferred to have had the plant sent from England, which would be complete in itself and of the smaller gauge, which I believe I am right in saying that engineers generally consider as the best for military purposes?—A. I was inclined to accept the offer of Messrs. Brassey & Co. They offered to lay 30 or 50 miles of railway, I think, or any amount that was required. There was a good deal to be said on both sides. If it had been left to me to decide, I should have decided upon calling for the railway; but I did not consider the case sufficiently clear to induce me to press it upon his Excellency the Governor.

Q. 500. Am I right in understanding, then, that the Bombay Government were responsible for the course which was eventually taken?—A. Entirely. The Bombay Government were fully possessed of my opinion that a railway was desirable.

On a subsequent day, in answer to Question 804, Lord Napier says: That leads me to a correction of a statement which I made in a former reply regarding the adoption of Brassey's railway. I think that the purport of my reply was that the subject was placed before the Governor; and that I did not feel sufficiently confident to press it, but that if I had decided

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entirely myself I would have taken it; but on referring to a letter of mine addressed to Sir Seymour Fitz-Gerald, dated 14th of December, before I left Bombay, I find this: "I send a memorandum which I think you would like to make use of" (I do not remember what that was now, but it was something to assist the Governor, by referring to an opinion given to him).* "The gradient of the Koomaylee Pass is one in 41. There may be a few places steeper, but I cannot say what they would be. I think we could cut the railway out of the rock in many places in narrow bits, so as to be out of the way of floods. I am sorry that we did not see our way to recommend the acceptance of Brassey's offer when made." Therefore, from this I infer that if I had an inclination in favour of the railway, yet that I did not put it in such a way as to induce the Governor to adopt it; and I think that, perhaps, my former reply may have led to the inference that the responsibility of not adopting the railway was the Governor's. I have no doubt that his Excellency would not shrink from a responsibility of that kind; but I thought it well to correct what might appear to be not quite right. I see that I evidently could not have advocated it in any way so as to lead to its adoption. I dare say my memorandum would explain something, but I have not it at hand. I think it was a memorandum connected with the railway; in case the Governor might have thought it desirable to order the railway, and showing, perhaps, how it might be useful, or something of that kind; but I see that Brassey's offer arrived some time previously to this; and that when it at first came under view we did not consider it expedient to accept it."

It is unnecessary to refer to the misapprehension contained in the earlier answers of Lord Napier here quoted, as his Lordship at a later period of his examination, in his answer to Question 804, in some measure rectified his mistake. It is sufficient to say that, so far from pressing on me the construction of a line between the port and the highlands, his Lordship concurred in, if he did not suggest, the propriety of awaiting further information as to the nature of the country which the railway would traverse; and at his request a letter requiring information, and giving instructions for such an examination as might be sufficient, without a detailed survey and plans, for which there was not time, was addressed to the officer commanding in Abyssinia. A short statement of the dates and facts connected with the supply of a railway will show what was the action of the Government in this matter.

At a very early period I was impressed with the importance of providing a tramway, and on the 7th of September I directed inquiries to be made, both in the presidency and at Kurrachee and Calcutta, as to the quantity of light rails that were available. On the 12th September Lord Napier addressed to me a minute in which he stated his opinion that a light tramway would be of great use, to which the reply was given that his Excellency's suggestion had been anticipated, and that inquiries were in progress. It was not till the first week in October that the required information was in our possession; and on the 5th I telegraphed to the Secretary of State that if the ground between the coast and the highland should be found favourable, it might be advisable to construct such a tramway, but that it was desirable first to ascertain what the features of the country might be.

On the 6th of the same month a report was received from the Secretary to Government Public Works Department, dated the 5th, giving an estimate of 3,200 £. per mile for a line worked by horse-power.

On the 10th the Secretary of State replies that the construction of a railway is left to my discretion; and on the 15th I telegraphed to the Secretary of State as follows: "I shall not purchase tramway till I hear from Massowah, but will have materials ready, so as to be able to dispatch everything in 10 days. I shall want from England 100 light waggons, to put together on arrival; if not wheels and axles, what gauge would Brassey recommend? Four feet proposed." It will be seen from this that up to this time I proposed to have a railway of the lightest description, with a gauge of four feet. I may say that I myself contemplated a narrower gauge, but that it was objected to by the engineers.

I believe it was on the 25th of October that I received the letter of the Secretary of State (No. 540), dated the 30th of September, enclosing Mr. Brassey and Sir John McNeill's proposals for the construction of a railway. It certainly did not reach me at an earlier date, as I find a store list dated 3rd October is enclosed in the same Despatch, and the quickest passage of 21 days would only bring it to Bombay on the 24th. In the same letter the Secretary of State writes, "I have determined, at any rate for the present, to take no steps respecting the laying down of a railway from the point of disembarkation." This of course had reference to the proposals of Messrs. Brassey and others which were enclosed. It therefore devolved on the Government here to provide the railway themselves, if they were of opinion that it was desirable to do so; and, accordingly, by a Government resolution dated the 8th, the construction of a line on a gauge of 5'6" was directed.

The reasons that induced me to come to that decision were,—

No information had been received from Abyssinia as to the nature of the country between the coast and the highland; and although it was unlikely, yet it was quite possible, that the country being broken by nullahs and water-courses, or other causes, the construction of a railway might be impracticable. In fact, no suggestion had been received at that time from the officers in Abyssinia, that a railway was either possible or desirable. Under such circumstances, a requisition on the Secretary of State, even if it were likely to be

* Note.—The Memorandum here referred to was one which his Excellency had just received from Annesley Bay giving details as to the proposed railway.

be complied with after the intimation contained in the letter of 30th September, for a line to be constructed by contract at a large expense, would have been precipitate and ill-advised. On the other hand, a large portion of the plant was already in the possession of Government in connection with works in progress, which might at once be utilised without the risk of incurring a large cost for its purchase. The responsibility of acting without sufficient information was great, but the great advantage that might be derived from a railway were so manifest that I thought it well worth while to run the risk of dispatching the plant we had supplemented by such purchases as were necessary, even before any report or survey had been received. The locomotives (small tank engines) and waggons thus available necessitated the adoption of a gauge of 5'6", which otherwise would not have been considered desirable.

2. It seemed very improbable, after the intimation so recently conveyed to us, that, for the present at least, the Secretary of State had decided not to take any steps as to the construction of a railway, that any application by this Government on this subject would be successful in the absence of any fresh circumstances which would be a fair ground for a reconsideration of that decision.

3. From the information we even at that time possessed, as to the pressing demands on the tonnage we had, or were likely to have in the Red Sea, it appeared probable that after the Secretary of State had sanctioned the supply of railway material, weeks would have elapsed before it could have been dispatched from Suez. Carriage from England to Alexandria would have been easy, as was carriage from Bombay; but was difficult and doubtful from Suez to Annesley Bay. In the case of the water-pipes, which were advised as to arrive on the 5th of February, the month of March had commenced before they began to arrive at Zoulla; and such was the pressure for tonnage, that a portion of them after arriving at their destination were not landed, in consequence of the vessel being required for other service. Yet the shipment and dispatch of 700 or 800 tons of piping was a simple matter, as compared with the dispatch of railway plant for 20 miles, with trucks, locomotives, and the necessary accessories.

4. Time was everything, and I believed then, and am convinced now, that great delay was avoided by the dispatch from Bombay, of the material that we had at hand. The resources and energy of Messrs. Brassey are indeed well known; but, inasmuch as the memorandum as to the country proposed to be traversed by the railway was only forwarded to me on the 14th December (it was received I believe by his Excellency on the 12th), I am under the impression that with the utmost dispatch no plant sent from England could have arrived by the middle of February, by which time the railway was working to a point within four miles of Koomaylee.

It was of course known that a portion of the plant provided had already been in use. Somewhat more than half the rails were altogether new, and the remainder reported in good condition. The locomotives were put into perfect working order in the workshops of the Baroda Company, and carefully examined by our engineers before they were sent; and of those returned I am informed that two were re-purchased by the company, and have been in daily use.

Some inconvenience and delay might, no doubt, have been felt from the fact that the plant was obtained from different sources, and a very insignificant proportion of the whole might have been in a defective condition; yet the result of its being dispatched was the early construction of a line which was invaluable. By the 24th of February it was completed, with several girder-bridges, to a point between six and seven miles from the camp, which was moreover traversed by lines and sidings from the piers to the sheds and depôts in every direction. The commissariat stores commenced to be forwarded on the 27th, from which date trains were running throughout every day during the continuance of the Expedition; and at its close it would have been impossible to have embarked the troops with the regularity and punctuality which were observed, if it had not been for the assistance of the railway. I would refer the Committee to Captain Tyron on this point. As was observed to me by one of the officers superintending the embarkation, the hour of arrival of each regiment or detachment was printed in the orders of the day, and the men were embarked with as much precision as if they had been at Portsmouth or Liverpool.

We had to do the best we could, and I confidently affirm that the best was done. No doubt it would have been, as the Chairman (Question 661) suggests, of great advantage if the railway had been in operation on the arrival of Lord Napier. But I would point out that to effect this we should have had to send out the material with the pioneer force: that is before we knew where the landing was to be made, and to have begun collecting it the very day the Expedition was first sanctioned from home. As it was, the railway was constructed in less than half the time proposed, and at less than half the cost required for the line, of about the same length, lately made by the Government of India in the Berars.

The above remarks do not apply to the tramway as first laid down in the camp, the complete materials for which I find, from the report of the executive engineer at Bombay, submitted by General Tremenhare, dated 30th October, had been at that time shipped; that is, at the date we first received any intimation of the proposal made by Messrs. Brassey; and I observe that in a Despatch of 1st November, General Merewether speaks of the tramway as being at that time in the course of being laid down.

PIPING.

It is not necessary to say much on this head, further than to rectify the misapprehension under which some questions were asked by the Committee of Lord Napier and Colonel Wilkins, and by the honourable Member for South Durham of Colonel Kennedy at Poona.

The importance attached by the honourable Member to this matter may be understood from the following questions which he put on the occasion adverted to (p. 87, Papers handed in by Captain Beaumont, M.P.)

“*Question.* By the reports from the reconnoitring force the fact of the want of water was recognised, as also the fact of there being running water within 16 miles of Zoulla; a demand was made by the commanding engineer for pipes; when was that demand received, and what steps were taken in the matter?—*Answer.* The order was received in the Public Works Department on the 14th November, to supply a total length of 3 miles and 804 yards of 3 and 4-inch piping. This was all that could be had in Bombay, and was obtainable from the gas company. Subsequently 15 miles of piping were asked for from England by telegraph, dated 24th December, in the Military Department.

“*Q.* Was that the first reference to England on the subject, and can you give me a copy of the telegram?—*A.* As far as I know, it was; and a copy of the telegram will be found in the Military Department.

“*Q.* Was the order to the gas company countermanded?—*A.* Yes.

“*Q.* Do you know whether the Bombay Government took any steps in the matter of the supply of pipes between the 14th November and the 24th December, or what was the cause of the delay in demanding them from England, when it appears it was known that a sufficient quantity of pipes was not procurable in Bombay; *the matter of delay in the supply of these pipes was of considerable importance*, as they could have been laid down on the ground at the rate of three or four miles a day, and would have resulted in doing away with the expense of condensing at Zoulla, together with affording the great advantage of a plentiful supply of water?—*A.* Between the dates mentioned no steps were taken by the Government in the Public Works Department; whether any were taken in the Military Department, I do not know.”

Lord Napier's impression as to the facts of the case appear to have been on the whole correct, judging from his replies before the Committee, though he did not apparently quite clearly recall them. The facts were as follows:—

We received early in November (I believe on the 10th) information from the reconnoitring party that it probably would be found expedient to establish a landing place at a point lower down the bay, to which water could be brought from a cascade at Arafali, distant about four miles, and a requisition was made for four miles of piping. On receipt of this information, I, on the same day, caused application to be made to the Municipal Commissioner of Bombay, to ascertain whether any piping of the kind was procurable from the municipal stores, but none could be obtained. Application was then made for the only other available piping of the desired dimensions which was in the possession of the Gas Company, and on the 14th orders were issued to the Public Works Department to buy all that could be procured. It was immediately purchased and shipped, when a further Despatch was received from General Merewether reporting that the route by Arafali was given up, and attention would now be given to the Koomaylee route. The Despatch concludes “The iron pipes for Arafali will not be required now.” The exact date of the receipt of this Despatch I cannot give, but as it is dated Mulkutto, 1st November, it could only have been a day or two after the purchase. As Lord Napier, however, states, the pipes were on board the steamer, and were removed to make room for other stores. They must have been ready for despatch within a week of the demand.

Subsequently to this, Lord Napier, on receipt of the report on the Koomaylee route, brought the subject under my notice again by his memorandum of the 3rd December, and came to see me personally on the subject. From the difficulty arising from our ignorance of the levels, and consequently of the kind of pipe required, as also from the probable necessity for the construction of a reservoir or tanks, his Lordship suggested the propriety of instructing Colonel Wilkins to make his requisition direct on the Secretary of State, which was done by the then out-going mail.

Afterwards, the day before his departure, I suggested to his Excellency the advisability of a demand direct by telegraph, which was accordingly made on the 24th. I believe there was in this a delay of four or five days, on account, if I recollect right, of a temporary interruption of the telegraph line. But it will be seen that there was no delay in promptly meeting the need, which was immediately recognised; and that in the case of the first supply, the piping was provided within a week of the time when the want was first known. Until the arrival of the Despatch upon which Lord Napier's memo. of the 3rd December was written, though it was known that water was found at Koomaylee, it was not clear that it was sufficient both for the watering place there and for a supply by pipes to the camp at Zoulla.

PIERS.

I observe that some very pertinent and important questions are put to Colonel Wilkins, by the Honourable Member for South Durham, with reference to the construction of piers at Annesley Bay, and the possible superiority of floating to pile piers. It, therefore, is as well that I should shortly indicate what passed on this subject.

On

On his visit to Poona, before taking the command of the reconnoitring force, Colonel Merewether mentioned to me that, as far as his information went, the shore of Annesley Bay, to which our attention was then directed as one of the possible points of debarkation, was very shallow to some distance from the shore, and that Massowah was in that particular the preferable, if not the only, point where troops and stores could be conveniently landed. The objection to Massowah as the point of debarkation was obvious on political grounds, and, as similar reports had reached us from other quarters, I directed immediate inquiries to be made in anticipation, by telegraph and otherwise, as to the means available for the construction of floating piers.

Telegrams were sent to Suez to ascertain whether a number of iron barges of light draught, which had been purchased at Bombay the year before by the Canal Company, could be procured, but it was found that they could not be purchased. Subsequently we were informed by the Consul there that a number of boats fit for the purpose could be obtained from the Nile; but on report it was considered that they were unsuited for the purpose from their draught of water, the extreme diversity of size, and other reasons; besides which, the expense of altering and fitting the very large number required to enable them to make the sea voyage in tow of vessels would be very large, and the operation would require much time. The possibility of using pontoons was then considered, but the difficulty of bringing from England a sufficient number for the construction of three piers, each 350 yards long, as was then contemplated, and of the size required for a double line of roadway, was so obvious that the idea was abandoned. Ultimately the report of the engineer satisfied me that in view of the formation of a tramway to the head of the piers, and the occurrence at certain times of violent gales from the N. and S.E., which were spoken of, a fixed pier of timber, which could be prepared in Bombay, would be preferable.

I find the first report as to the preparation of a pile pier is dated the 29th September, or two days before the arrival of the reconnoitring party at Zoulla. Sawm material for two piers was immediately put in hand on receipt of Colonel Merewether's report, and dispatched with Chinese carpenters, pile-driving engines, and all necessary plant; but before they could arrive, the energy of Colonel Wilkins had constructed a stone pier to a considerable distance from shore. Ultimately the demand upon the available labour was such that the construction of only two piers, including that formed of stone, was found possible, a number which, as at first anticipated, was found insufficient for the requirements of the camp.

DELAY IN THE SUPPLY OF TRANSPORT ANIMALS.

"*Question 274.* Did you, when in Abyssinia, order any mules to be bought?—*Answer.* Yes. I ordered all officers in authority to buy them wherever they could; and I requested officers, who were not in authority, to buy them as a matter of private obligation, and said that they should be repaid from the public funds.

"*Q. 275.* At that time, of course, you were deficient in mules?—*A.* Yes.

"*Q. 276.* Are you aware whether any mules and pack bullocks were at Bombay at that time?—*A.* There were some at that time.

"*Q. 277.* Were there 2,000 pack bullocks at that time in Bombay?—*A.* I believe there were 4,000. At any rate, there were a considerable number.

"*Q. 278.* Then can you tell us what was the reason those bullocks were not in Abyssinia?—*A.* I believe they were not sent from want of transport. I am more able to answer whether I had them or had them not than as to the reasons why they were not sent; but I have no doubt that in the first instance there may have been hesitation to incur the great expense of sending them before it should appear that they were absolutely necessary, and I apprehend that subsequently they may not have been sent from deficiency of carriage; but no doubt any point of that kind would be subject to correction by his Excellency the Governor of Bombay, or by anyone conversant with the correspondence. On the 17th December I have a memorandum which is official. 'I desire to bring under the consideration of his Excellency the Governor in Council the position of the land transport for the Abyssinian Expedition. Colonel Merewether reports that many mules at Annesley Bay are without drivers, and many had died from want of care. The evils were caused apparently by having an insufficient number of drivers in the first instance, and increased by refractory muleteers being sent back to Egypt and Persia, instead of being brought to order under military law. I am aware that the Government of India has been addressed by telegram to engage more muleteers, and it is hoped that some may be supplied from that quarter. There are about 2,000 mules fully equipped with drivers at Kurrachee waiting for transport. In and near Bombay there are about 3,700 pack bullocks, and draft bullocks 240, for which carts have been sent to Abyssinia. There are also 1,000 baggage ponies with their establishments complete, and only requiring equipment. The monthly cost of this establishment is probably much over a lakh of rupees, and it appears necessary to utilise it.'"

It might be inferred from the above evidence that there was delay on the part of the Government in forwarding these animals, and that Lord Napier was consequently obliged to buy additional animals at the very time that this large number were at Bombay doing nothing.

I am not aware of the date at which Lord Napier first gave directions for the purchase of mules in Abyssinia, but from the context it can be gathered that it could only have been

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after the Army had commenced the advance, or in the early part of February. It is not understood how the reply, that 4,000 animals were "at that time" in Bombay, is borne out by a memorandum referring to transport said to be available there *in the middle of December*.

As to which I beg to state the following facts, which must have been known in the office of the Quartermaster General, and were certainly accessible to Lord Napier himself:—

1. That at the time Lord Napier wrote, one steamer and two first-class ships had been sent to Kurrachee for the Punjab mules, which commenced to arrive there in the first week of that month.

2. That the steamer had been loaded and dispatched from Kurrachee eight days before.

3. That five other ships were fitting in Bombay harbour for the conveyance of the Punjab mules.

4. That it has escaped Lord Napier's recollection that an immediate reply was given to his memorandum to this effect.

5. That the latter ships proceeded to Kurrachee in a few days afterwards, and that by the end of the first week in January 1,602 mules (the whole number then at that port) and 1,385 drivers had been sent off to Annesley Bay.

6. As regards the 3,700 bullocks, they had been detained in the first instance not from any hesitation as to expense, because they were known to be wanted, but at *Lord Napier's suggestion*, as no drivers were forthcoming for them, and it was considered that as the deficiency of men to attend the animals was one of the main difficulties represented by Colonel Merewether, it would only add to the embarrassment to send more animals without drivers. They were subsequently, when additional men from the Punjab were obtained, sent as rapidly as tonnage could be procured, and a portion, at Lord Napier's request, in native craft.

7. As regards the ponies, they had, it is true, drivers, but no pack saddles; a very large number having been supplied (5,000, I think) on Lord Napier's demand, on a plan invented or suggested by Major Warden, which were found absolutely useless when tried. A few, I believe, were altered, but to no advantage.

8. As regards the insufficiency of drivers felt in Abyssinia, I would add that the number of men sent with the mules was at first one man to every two animals,—a proportion much larger than is usually allowed, or is customary in the countries from which the mules were drawn,—and that when they turned refractory the attempt to "bring them into order by military law" was vigorously made, the severest punishments were had recourse to, but in vain; the men continued to desert by hundreds, and at last were sent back without trial. The proportion of men to animals sent from Suez was in consequence subsequently reduced.

LANDING THE STORES ON THE RETURN OF THE EXPEDITION.

I observe it is suggested by the honourable Member for South Durham that the discharge of the ships might have been more expeditiously effected if they had been taken into the calm water between the Island of Elephanta and Hog Island, and the stores landed at the latter spot.

Hog Island has been lately acquired by Government, for the purpose of erecting there a hydraulic lift. At the time of the Expedition a small portion of it was occupied with a wretched native village, with no pier or landing-place for the debarkation of stores, while the shore is for the most part a swamp, partly covered at high water, and with a wide strip of deep mud left exposed when the tide goes down. There were of course no buildings of any sort for the reception of the stores, and the labour necessary for the depositing and storing them, over and above the men employed in the lighters, must have been brought daily from Bombay.

The distance is eight miles, and the time consumed in going and returning during the stormy weather, as well as the risk, would have precluded such an attempt altogether. If, on the other hand, the men and crews were to be kept at Hog Island, there were no quarters to cover them, and no bazaar to feed them. The suggestion is one which seems practicable to a stranger, but from my knowledge of the locality I can say that it would have been found utterly impossible, although I must candidly add, at the same time, that it never occurred to us. A part of the shore has been since reclaimed, and a small pier built for the works connected with the lift, in which state it probably was seen by the honourable Member for South Durham in November last.

I find it stated in the course of the investigation that there are warehouses in Butcher's Island. This is an error; there are quarters for the troops that may be temporarily detained on their arrival at Bombay, but no buildings for the storage of goods, or that could be adapted for that purpose.

I have no doubt that there are many other points with regard to which the Committee might desire some explanation, and as to which I observe that they are far from possessing complete

complete information. But it is impossible for me to anticipate what their inquiries might have been, had I been examined before them and to meet those inquiries now, and equally impossible to lay the whole case before them in a written memorandum as clearly and satisfactorily as I could have done by oral testimony. Moreover, observations such as I have now offered appearing in print are not likely to attract the same attention, or have the same weight, as if made *vis à voce* before the Committee, subject to the questions that its members may think fit to put with a view to amplification, or explanation. But unless I am content to accept the evidence already given as it stands, I am obliged to place my remarks before the Committee in the form I have here adopted.

I am sensible of many shortcomings, and do not doubt that some expenditure might have been avoided if our preparations could have been made with more deliberation; but the pressure for time, the necessity of dispatching the Expedition, so that its objects might be obtained in one campaign, compelled immediate and incessant action in every department. I sincerely trust I may never have similar labour again. Lord Napier (answer to Q. 731) says that he would have undertaken the whole of the duty of supplying everything which the army might need,—the supply of tonnage, the supply of animals, the supply of provisions and clothing—if he had had a competent officer placed at his disposal, and had had full discretion to use him. I shall be acquitted, I hope, of attempting to put myself in competition with the experience and ability of Lord Napier, but I had not the military organisation to attend to, or the varied military duties that fell upon him. I had besides the assistance not of one, but of many able officers, each most competent and experienced in his own department; many of whom were day by day for months engaged in the duties that fell upon them from daylight till night. One of them died in harness, resisting all entreaty to repose for a time, and hand over to others the labour that was beyond his strength; and his widow was denied the petty addition of 50*l.* to the scanty pension which his length of service had earned for her. Another was obliged to leave India, and was not expected to reach Aden; and a third, I fear, then laid the seeds of ill-health which has compelled him now to seek its restoration at home. There are others whose services in their own departments I cannot sufficiently acknowledge.

I have earnestly desired that the investigations of the Committee might be complete and searching, in order that much misapprehension, which had been sedulously encouraged in the public mind, might be removed. I believe a more important result will be obtained if its researches lead to the adoption of improvements in the organisation of the departments of supply and the other departments concerned with the equipment and dispatch of military expeditions, as well as of other practical measures which have been suggested in the course of the inquiry. Questions have been put by some of the members of the Committee tending to this end, which are of the utmost importance and value. I shall still more rejoice that the Committee was appointed, and has devoted itself so sedulously to the investigations with which they were charged, if it leads to a more just appreciation of the labours of the able officers of this Government in their various departments, whose time and labour were for months at the command of the Commander in Chief, as they were at the disposal of the Civil Government, and whose zeal and self-sacrifice, which so largely contributed to the success and early termination of the campaign, have never yet received the slightest acknowledgment.

9 June 1870.

W. R. Seymour V. Fitz-Gerald.

There are two other points as to which I feel it necessary to make some remark; these are with reference to the supply of lighters and the supply of wheeled carriage at Annesley Bay.

As regards the first I feel it necessary to refer to it because the work of Captain Hozier, in which the misrepresentation occurs, is more than once referred to by the Chairman of the Committee in a manner which shows that he considers it a work of authority, and because of the persistence with which the inaccuracy is, in spite of continued correction, repeated.

The statement made is that I refused to provide the necessary lighters, as I considered that the boats and vessels of the country would suffice, that when an officer in Bombay, not named, had purchased some without sanction, he was told that he would be held personally responsible for the amount.

A similar representation was first made in some letters written by Captain Hozier as correspondent of the "Times" newspaper at the seat of war. Before sending the letter home it was shown, to ensure accuracy, to Captain Tryon as being the officer best acquainted with all the circumstances connected with the Marine Transport, and that gallant officer at once told Captain Hozier that the statement was totally incorrect; that I had always shown the utmost readiness to provide whatever he (Captain Tryon) had suggested, and that the subject of lighters had from the first particularly engaged my attention. Captain Tryon was thanked by Captain Hozier for his correction of a misapprehension which he should have regretted; but, notwithstanding, the letter containing the unfounded statement was dispatched and published.

On the publication of the letter Sir Leopold Heath wrote to its author, and informed him that the statements it contained in reference to this point were contrary to the fact, and, I believe, he added that some lighters which I had obtained were not sent in consequence of his, Sir Leopold's, opinion that they were too large, and other boats were consequently substituted.

Appendix, No. 24.

In Captain Hozier's late publication the statement is repeated with greater detail and circumstance.

The facts are these, from the very earliest period of the Expedition the provision of lighters and steam tugs had been carefully considered. It was one of the points about which I was most anxious and most urgent. I communicated with our consul at Suez on the subject, with Carwar and Kurrachee. At Bombay the lighterage is singularly defective, and those obtainable were of a large class, which required very powerful tugs to tow them. As it was, what with tugs, steam barges, barges, and lighters, the number supplied was very large, amounting, I believe, to more than 20 in all. It is a fact that four were not sent at Sir R. Napier's and Sir Leopold Heath's request, though subsequently, as they were found most useful in Bombay, four others were, notwithstanding, afterwards dispatched. The story of the officer who was threatened that he should be made to pay for those he purchased, is a mere invention, for which there is not the slightest foundation.

The second statement is also contained in a history of the Expedition, the author of which, in speaking of the great assistance derived from the use of carts, informs his readers that the Governor of Bombay had in the first instance declined to sanction the purchase, as he declared they could be of no use.

The fact being that Colonel Merewether had reported that they would be useless in the country, from the entire want of roads and the nature of the soil.

That Sir R. Napier who had at first desired to have them supplied, withdrew his recommendation in consequence of Colonel Merewether's opinion and experience.

That notwithstanding, I urged their adoption, and to meet Colonel Merewether's objections had a model constructed upon my own plan, which could be taken to pieces in four minutes, so as to be transported over rocks on a mule, or other difficult places, and put together again in six minutes when the country adapted for wheeled traffic was reached. This model is now in the Arsenal at Poona.

That Lord Napier subsequently reconsidered his opinion, and applied for a supply of carts, which I immediately sanctioned.

These two instances of want of information or mis-statement are not strictly connected with the evidence given before the Committee. I have referred to them only to illustrate the disadvantage at which I am placed by not being permitted an opportunity, by personal explanation, of removing the misapprehension caused by publications which have been extensively read, which I have no doubt are believed, and which hitherto I have not been enabled to contradict.

W. R. Seymour V. FitzGerald.

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Appendix, No. 25.

PAPER handed in by the *Chairman*.ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE given by Captain *Tryon* concerning the ABYSSINIAN EXPEDITION.

July 4, 1870.

Appendix, No. 25.

THE "Czarewitch" is said to have beat out of the Red Sea, and that other vessels could have done the same. This is an error, and is likely to mislead. The facts as to the "Czarewitch" are, that she sailed out of the Red Sea, carrying with her a strong fair wind, and that during the time she contended against a foul wind she lost ground.

This vessel, owned by the Indian Government, with an active captain, and a crew of 89 men, which is a large one compared with that carried by ordinary vessels, was sent by me from Zoulla to Dissee Island, to embark stone for ballast, and thus she was placed in a condition favourable for sailing, and her people were anxious to get out of the Red Sea. When she was ready, she was towed from Dissee, clear of Adjuse; during her further passage she met with variable light and favourable winds during part of two days; then she experienced a strong adverse wind, against which she carried a press of canvas, in the hopes of making way, but without success, as she lost within 12 hours 30 miles out of the 50 made good on the previous day. Then the wind veered to the northward, and it carried her out of the Red Sea. This fair wind lasted but a short time on 22nd February 1868, and a vessel called the "Hope," which was not in Government employ, got out at the same time, as well as a number of native dhows that had been waiting.

The "Hope" had been trying to get out of the Red Sea since November 18th 1867, and a detailed account of her is appended, marked (A.) On his arrival at Aden, Mr. E. G. Wells wrote me an able letter, describing the circumstances encountered by his vessel, the "Czarewitch," and, previous to his leaving Dissee Island, he wrote to report that his vessel was ready to proceed, but he added, he wished to place on record that in the face of so many previous failures, he feared that he would be unable to carry out my orders to proceed out of the Red Sea under sail, &c., on return to Calcutta.

Till February the 22nd, I have no record that the wind had been on that season blown down and out of the Red Sea, and the prevailing wind was into it from the south; and during its continuance the surface current was so considerable that no vessel had got out under sail against it, and many steamers had been much delayed. I may add, I received almost daily, and at times still more frequently, reports showing the state of the weather in different parts of the Red Sea during the period from January 1868 to June 20th, and I am well acquainted with that experienced from the previous November.

The evidence afforded by the experience of Her Majesty's ships, and of the vessels on board of which were placed naval officers, conclusively proves that during the season we were in the Red Sea some less powerful steamers could tow vessels out from Zoulla, and that for a lengthened time there was no certainty that they would succeed, except by persevering a long time, and at an enormous expenditure of fuel.

It is stated in general terms that transports purposely delayed on their voyage, and that time-chartered vessels require looking after, inferring by this that they were not. It can be abundantly proved that the transports under my charge were thoroughly looked after in every respect, if the Committee have a doubt on the subject; though I presume the Committee are satisfied on this score, as no questions have been asked since the assertion was made to disprove it, or to substantiate it, unsupported as it is by any fact before them.

The books I have placed before the Committee give a complete history in detail of every vessel employed by Government on the Abyssinian Expedition, except of Her Majesty's ships of war. The attention of the Committee is drawn to the fact that, if the time occupied by vessels sailing under similar circumstances to the same port, and starting at the same time, is examined, it will be found from the fair average of passages made, that the Government was not badly served by those in command of the vessels on the whole, particularly if the report received from the ordinary transports is checked with those received from Her Majesty's vessels, with those of the Indian navy, and with those received from Her Majesty's naval officers serving on board transports, who were personally responsible for the proceedings of the vessel flying their pendant.

The transports were also well looked after by the agents at Suez and at Aden, who reported to me at Zoulla.

It has been stated that vessels were sent from Annesley Bay for more cargo, though they still had a portion of their previous load on board.

This is just so far true, that it was done in a few instances after careful deliberation, and the circumstances attached to each case can be given by me.

Appendix, No. 25. To give one instance, it was done on the receipt of the following letter to me from headquarters :—

24 February 1868.—From Colonel *Dillon*, the Military Secretary, to his Excellency the Commander in Chief.

“SIR ROBERT wants shipping for Berbera camels, and he wants them brought in numbers, not by driblets; driblets are absorbed in losses, and do not give much assistance to our main wants; numbers do this, and numbers Sir Robert needs, and urges most strongly. We have been here several days; we want provisions up.”

To meet this, it became necessary to increase at once the amount of tonnage already sent to and returning from Berbera, and we had no empty vessels at Zoulla to send (indeed, no empty vessels were ever kept there at all), our piers were not completed, and vessels could not be emptied without great delay. After consulting with the general in command at Zoulla, the Controller of Supply and Transport, and the principal executive Commissariat officer, I decided on sending vessels to Berbera, cleared so far that the remaining cargo did not interfere with their carrying a full load of animals, and this course entailed no disadvantage; the cargo they took with them could be spared for the time they were away, and it kept the vessels in good trim, it entailed no additional cost, and it was the only means by which we could immediately comply with a pressing requisition; and the other cases of vessels sent away before they were cleared are precisely similar.

It has been implied that the tonnage sent to Berbera was excessive in quantity; but it does not appear in evidence what it brought to Zoulla; this information I supply, and it will be found to furnish a sufficient reply. It is taken from the returns of cargo brought by each vessel to Zoulla.

Number of animals sent to Zoulla from Berbera—

Camels	-	-	-	4,708	Of these camels, 960 were brought in “Beylas,” and 240 in the “Hope,” vessels not in Government employ.
Horses	-	-	-	25	
Bullocks	-	-	-	1,989	
Donkeys	-	-	-	314	
Sheep	-	-	-	11,366	
TOTAL	-	-	-	18,402	Animals conveyed in 33,385 tons of shipping.

The same tonnage also conveyed 160 mules from Aden.

It has been suggested that line-of-battle ships ought to have been employed as hospital ships; but it appears that at the time when it was necessary to decide on hospital ships, all that was known was, that it would be most unwise to place a fixed floating hospital at any port in the Red Sea that might be selected as the point for landing, and it was known that Bombay was to be the base of operations against Abyssinia, and that line-of-battle ships are not suited to make passages against the monsoon, which blows over the track to and from Bombay, and therefore they would not be generally available for the purposes of the Expedition.

G. Tryon, C.B.,
Captain, R. N.

(A.)

STATEMENT showing what is known of the “Hope,” a sailing vessel which was not in Government employ during the Abyssinian Expedition, which came to Zoulla, and subsequently sailed out of the Red Sea.

Arrived at Zoulla, 13 November 1867, with 240 camels.

Left Zoulla for Aden, 18 November 1867, in tow of steamship “Punjaub,” hawsers parted, and “Hope” put back. “Punjaub” had “Calcutta” in tow besides the “Hope.”

Returned to Zoulla, 20 November 1867, to get further assistance.

Left Zoulla for Aden, 15 December 1867, in tow of Her Majesty’s ship “Vigilant,” by order of Commodore Heath, to be towed to Babel Mandel; but she met with no success, and had to put back again to Zoulla after the expiration of 46 days.

Returned to Zoulla, 30 January 1868, to refit, &c.

Left Zoulla for Aden, 10 February 1868, under sail, and tried to work out; a fair wind was soon to be shortly expected, and she got out of the Red Sea in company with the “Czarewitch,” 22 February 1868, with a favourable wind.

G. Tryon, C.B.,
Captain, R. N.

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Appendix, No. 26.

CORRESPONDENCE handed in by Mr. *Adamson*, in addition to the Letters read by him in Evidence, 21 June 1870. Appendix, No. 26.

The Director General of Stores to Messrs. *Adamson & Ronaldson*.

India Office, Store Department, Westminster, S.W.,
18 February 1868.

Gentlemen,

IN reply to your letter of the 15th instant, I am directed to inform you that arrangements have been made by the Admiralty for the supply of coal, monthly, at Bombay and Annesley Bay, for the service of the Abyssinian Expedition, and that pending the receipt of any further demands, either from India, or from the naval authorities at Annesley Bay, it is not considered expedient to accept the offer made by you in your letter under reply.

I am, &c.
(signed) *Gerald C. Talbot*,
Director General.

Messrs *Adamson & Ronaldson*.

Messrs. *Adamson & Ronaldson* to the Director General of Stores.

Sir,

1, Leadenhall-street, E.C., 25 February 1868.

REFERRING to our respects of 20th instant, containing an amended offer for delivering coals at Annesley Bay, we trust the same is receiving your favourable consideration.

We have one vessel ready and fitted with steam engine for discharging cargo, and also a large condenser.

If you cannot see the immense saving we propose to effect, we shall be happy to wait upon you with our figures, &c.; and, waiting your reply,

We are, &c.
(signed) *Adamson & Ronaldson*.

To the Director General of Stores,
India Office, Westminster.

The Director General of Stores to Messrs. *Adamson & Ronaldson*.

India Office, Westminster, S.W.,
9 March 1868.

Gentlemen,

IN reply to your letter of the 20th ultimo, offering to supply steam coal at Annesley Bay, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to acquaint you that complete arrangements have been made for coal for the service of the Abyssinian Expedition, and your proposal is therefore declined.

I am, &c.
(signed) *Gerald Talbot*,
Director General.

Messrs. *Adamson & Ronaldson*,
1, Leadenhall-street, E.C.

STATEMENT in Explanation of Question 5,799.

SHIP "SCOTLAND."

9th November 1867.—Arrived at Bombay.
 15th November 1867.—Sailed for Red Sea.
 2nd December 1867.—Arrived at Annesley Bay.
 26th March 1868.—Arrived at Suez.
 21st June 1868.—Arrived at Annesley Bay.
 5th July 1868.—Arrived at Bombay.
 19th August 1868.—Paid off Government employ.

Admiral *Mends* to Messrs *Adamson & Ronaldson*.

Gentleman,
 WITH reference to your letter of the 10th instant, I beg to acquaint you that their Lordships are not desirous of changing the present arrangements for the supply of coals to the Abyssinian Expedition.

Messrs. Adamson & Ronaldson,
 1, Leadenhall-street, E.C.

Admiralty, Somerset House,
 28 March 1868.

I am, &c.
 (signed) *W. R. Mends*.

Mr. *W. G. Romaine* to Messrs. *Adamson & Ronaldson*.

Gentlemen,
 WITH reference to your letter of the 10th instant, offering to supply coals in Annesley Bay for 78 s. per ton, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you that they are not prepared to make any change in the present arrangements for the supply of coals to the Abyssinian Expedition.

Messrs. Adamson & Ronaldson,
 1, Leadenhall-street, E. C.

I am, &c.
 (signed) *W. G. Romaine*.

Messrs. *Adamson & Ronaldson* to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

Sir,
 WE have drawn the serious attention of the India Office to the immense saving to be effected by the adoption of our offer of coals to Annesley Bay.

We understand the above authorities have forwarded all the papers and correspondence to you, and we now beg your serious consideration to the enclosed calculation, clearly showing that the Government is now paying about 7 l. per ton, in Annesley Bay, for coal, whereas we undertake to deliver it there for 78 s., or about one-half.

This calculation is not based upon fancy, but upon facts which have actually come under our own knowledge.

One vessel of our own was taken up at Bombay to carry on her original cargo of coal to Annesley Bay; she was taken up for six months certain, and, according to advices received from our captain, the time occupied in getting to Annesley Bay, discharging her cargo, getting ballast, and sailing back to Bombay, will occupy from four to five months, thus increasing the cost upon this one cargo to 4,800 l. or more, over and above the original cost at Bombay.

Our offer to deliver coals at Annesley Bay is only six shillings (6 s.) per ton over what you are paying at Bombay, and upon the above-named cargo would have been 531 l. against 4,800 l. as above.

This is only one instance; we know of many others in the same way, and, doubtless, your own advices will report arrivals of coal ships at Annesley Bay from time to time, all of which have, we know, gone on from Bombay (after costing 72 s. there) on time hire, and that for a period of not less than four months; and as no direct shipments have yet been made to Annesley Bay, the supplies required there must continue to be fed in the same expensive way, unless you adopt some such plan as ours.

Even if the war were over in a few weeks, which few are sanguine enough to expect, steam will be required at Annesley Bay, for months, to take away troops, baggage, stores, &c.,

&c., and, of course, steamers must have supplies of coal, to say nothing of the requirements for distilling purposes. Appendix, No. 26.

To the Secretary of the Admiralty.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Adamson & Ronaldson.*

P.S. Since writing the above, we have seen a letter from the captain of a ship at Annesley Bay, stating that by the time he gets rid of his coal cargo, and arrives back in Bombay, his six months' time will have expired, so that, upon that calculation, the cargo alluded to above will cost 7,200 *l.* extra against 531 *l.*

A. & R.

STATEMENT referred to in Question 5836, and again referred to in Letter to Secretary of Admiralty, 10 March 1868.

COMPARATIVE COST of 5,000 tons Coals to Government in connection with the Abyssinian Expedition.

	£.		£.
Price paid to Peninsular and Oriental Company at Bombay, say 5,000 tons at 72 <i>s.</i> per ton - - - - -	18,000	Adamson and Ronaldson offer to deliver in Annesley Bay, say 5,000 tons at 78 <i>s.</i> per ton, on same terms of payment as that of the Peninsular and Oriental Company -	19,500
5,000 tons weight involves the employment of at least 36,000 register tons of shipping, which, from experience, cannot possibly be obtained in open market, or in any other manner, for a less period than four months, the present rate for which is 14 rupees per ton per month, and such tonnage to be paid off at Bombay.		And in this case Adamson and Ronaldson are prepared to give 20 to 30 days to discharge each ship from date of arrival, which is ample, considering that they could be placed alongside any of the regular coal transports with only part cargo on board, and be relieved forthwith of their coals without a fraction of time hire being incurred. And further, the ships when so discharged are thrown upon their own resources, whereas all the transports are upon pay by the Government until their return to Bombay, which in most cases will exceed four months.	
Say 3,600 tons at 14 rupees = 28 <i>s.</i> per ton per month for four months - - - -	20,160		
TOTAL - - - £.	38,160	TOTAL - - - £.	19,500
		Shewing an actual saving of 18,660 in favour of Adamson and Ronaldson's offer upon every 5,000 tons supplied in the manner they propose, or at about <i>one-half</i> of the cost under present system.	

1, Leadenhall-street, E.C., 28 February 1868.

COPY of CORRESPONDENCE between Government and Messrs. *Adamson & Ronaldson*, relative to Coals for Abyssinia.

Messrs. *Adamson & Ronaldson* to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

1, Leadenhall-street, London, E. C.,
3 February 1868.

Sir

WE beg leave to offer to supply Her Majesty's Government, cost, freight, and insurance at Annesley Bay, a cargo of best Cardiff steam coal, at the rate of seventy-eight shillings (78 *s.*) per ton.

Twenty days for discharging the vessel, and the option on part of the Government to retain the ship on time hire, at the low rate of 10 rupees per ton per month.

We would give the option of stopping the ship at Aden, either to discharge whole or part of the cargo, if so desired.

The vessel we should send is the "Palm Tree," 1,470 tons register, a magnificent A 1 and powerful ship, and nearly new, having only made one voyage. She has splendid roomy tween decks, laid right fore and aft; and in the event of her services being required as a transport, her qualifications for such a purpose are certainly unsurpassed by any ship afloat.

The rates at which we have offered, we respectfully submit, will compare most favourably with what have been and are being paid in India; and if there is any other point upon which we could meet the convenience of Her Majesty's Government we will gladly try and do so.

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We

Appendix, No. 26. We shall feel obliged by an early reply, because in the event of this business being entertained, and although the vessel has only made one voyage on her present metal, we will at once put her in dock and re-copper her.

To the Secretary of the Admiralty.

We remain, &c.
(signed) *Adamson & Ronaldson.*

Messrs. *Adamson & Ronaldson* to the Director General, Store Department.

Sir,

1, Leadenhall-street, E.C., 13 February 1868.

KNOWING that a large quantity of coal is required still to be shipped for Aden and Bombay, a portion of which will doubtless have to be sent on to Annesley Bay, we beg respectfully to offer you a cargo of best steam coal for Annesley Bay direct, on the following terms, to be shipped by the powerful A 1 ship "Palm Tree."

Price, seventy eight shillings (78s.) per ton, including cost, freight, and insurance at Annesley Bay, but if desired by the Government the vessel would call at Aden, in case by any chance the coals, or any portion of them, might be required there.

If the whole cargo be taken delivery of at Aden the price to be reduced to seventy shillings (70s.) per ton.

The "Palm Tree" is a very fine vessel, nearly new (only made one voyage), 1,473 tons register, and we expect would make a very fast run out.

She has splendid roomy 'tween decks, laid right fore and aft, and is admirably adapted or a transport, should her services in that capacity be required; and in such event we would give you the option of keeping the vessel on at the low rate of 10 rupees per ton per month.

We need hardly beg your attention to the immense saving that would thus be effected, not only in the event of this option being exercised (say 10 rupees against 14, the rate now being paid in Bombay), but mainly in the price of the coal itself, showing a saving upon this cargo of 3,000 l. to 4,000 l.

We are aware that it has not been usual to purchase cargo in this way, but at an exceptional time like the present, we presume the customary routine is sometimes dispensed with; in fact, we believe a steamer was taken up the other day in a similar way to convey stores, and with the certainty of such a saving as above alluded to, we would respectfully submit that the slight departure from the usual form would require no further justification. It is to the detriment of no one; but, on the contrary, to the benefit and saving of all.

We beg to remind you that while Government orders for coal are being now executed for shipment, both to Bombay and Aden, not a ton (so far as we can learn) has been sent to Annesley Bay, so it is sure to be wanted there.

The Director General,
Store Department, India Office.

We are, &c.
(signed) *Adamson & Ronaldson.*

P.S.— In the event of our offer being accepted, we will provide the vessel with a steam-engine and condenser.

(signed) *A. & R.*

Appendix, No. 27.

PAPERS handed in by Mr. *Candlish*.

Appendix, No. 27.

LETTER from Captain *Osborn* to *J. Candlish*, Esq., M.P.

119, Gloucester-terrace, Hyde Park, W.

5 May 1870.

Dear Sir,

WITH reference to my evidence yesterday before the Abyssinian Committee, on the question of the number of screw line-of-battle ships which were available as hospital vessels for that Expedition, I now beg to hand you an extract made by me from the Official Navy List, 1st October 1867.

By it, you will observe that there were in commission in the Home parts at that time no less than nine line-of-battle ships, forming, as it were, the first reserved fleet of our Navy. If I mistake not, the majority of them had been at sea during that summer, and five of them, namely, the "*Revenge*," "*Donegal*," "*Duncan*," "*Frederick William*," and the three-decker "*Duke of Wellington*," were eminently fitted for the purpose suggested; and that I am right in supposing these ships could have been so used, with very light expenditure, is proved by the present Administration having subsequently employed the "*Revenge*" and "*Donegal*," for carrying Naval reliefs to China and the West Indies. From what dropped at the Committee, from Sir James D. Hay, who was in the Board of Admiralty in 1867, I fully anticipate official evidence to be forthcoming, as usual, to show that these ships could not have been used as hospital ships. I can only reply that in that case, they were utterly unfit to be called Men-of-War in Commission, and a vile imposition on the public.

The second list shows you the number of steam line-of-battle ships at that time in the reserves in our dockyards, and figuring as available men-of-war in the event of hostilities. They were, as you see, 34 in number; those with an asterisk before them had already been in commission in the fleet, and their spars and equipment must have existed. If all had been allowed to go out of repair to such an extent as to be unseaworthy, I maintain they should never have been kept on what is called the Active List; and bad as I believe to have been the condition of our Navy under the Conservative Administration, it will be worse than I could have conceived to have been possible if the Controller of the Navy admits that all these vessels and the nine in the Coast Guard were in such a lamentable condition that none of them were fit, in such an emergency, to make a summer voyage round the Cape of Good Hope to the Red Sea.

Yours, &c.
(signed) *Sherard Osborn*,
Captain.

J. Candlish, Esq., M.P.

OFFICIAL NAVY LIST, 1st October 1867.

RECEIVING SHIPS for Spare Seamen, and COAST GUARD SHIPS in Commission, at
Ports in *Great Britain*.

	Guns.	Tonnage.	Horse Power.
H.M.S. <i>St. George</i> - - - - -	72	2,864	500
H.M.S. <i>Revenge</i> - - - - -	73	3,322	800
H.M.S. <i>Donegal</i> - - - - -	81	3,245	800
H.M.S. <i>Duncan</i> - - - - -	81	3,727	800
H.M.S. <i>Lion</i> - - - - -	60	2,611	400
H.M.S. <i>Irresistible</i> - - - - -	60	2,642	400
H.M.S. <i>Frederick William</i> - - - - -	74	3,241	500
H.M.S. <i>Royal George</i> - - - - -	72	2,616	400
H.M.S. <i>Duke of Wellington</i> - - - - -	- - -	3,771	700

Appendix, No. 27.

In the RESERVE were the following Screw Line-of-Battle Ships :—

	Horse Power.		Horse Power.
*Agamemnon - - - -	600	*James Watt - - - -	600
*Albion - - - -	400	London - - - -	500
*Algiers - - - -	600	*Marlborough - - - -	800
Anson - - - -	800	Mars - - - -	400
Atlas - - - -	800	Nelson - - - -	500
Bulwark - - - -	800	Neptune - - - -	500
*Cæsar - - - -	400	Nile - - - -	500
*Centurion - - - -	400	Prince Regent - - - -	500
Conqueror - - - -	500	*Princess Royal - - - -	400
Defiance - - - -	800	Renown - - - -	800
Exmouth - - - -	400	*Royal Albert - - - -	500
Gibraltar - - - -	800	Royal William - - - -	500
Goliath - - - -	400	*St. Jean D'Acre - - - -	600
*Hannibal - - - -	450	*Trafalgar - - - -	500
Hero - - - -	600	*Victor Emanuel - - - -	600
Hood - - - -	600	Victoria - - - -	1,000
Horne - - - -	1,000	Windsor Castle - - - -	500

The Total Number of Line-of-Battle Ships in Reserve, and figuring as if for active service, were, therefore, 34.

London, 5 May 1870.

(signed) *S. Osborn*, Captain.LETTER from Colonel *Marriott* to *J. Candlish*, Esq., M.P.

My dear Mr. Candlish,

7 June 1870.

WHEN I gave you a memo. of nearly 7,000 tons of forage landed at Zoola (according to the returns), I did not deduct the 481,920 lbs. abandoned there; after deducting this the quantity shown as used on shore is 6,668 tons.

The quantity demanded to supply the force from 1st January to 31st October, was the quantity which would be needed to supply 32,050 animals for six months, which is equivalent to supplying 19,230 animals for ten months. This was "profuse" enough.

That quantity so demanded was 31,540 tons.

I suspect that even more was actually supplied, because there were—

	<i>Lbs.</i>
Shipped at Bombay, but not landed - - - -	3,43,47,591
Ditto, and landed - - - -	1,02,41,363
Shipped at Suez, but not landed - - - -	4,54,329
Ditto, and landed - - - -	51,77,476
Quantity contracted for at Suez and Alexandria - - - -	2,40,82,810
Deduct Shipped at Suez - - - -	56,31,805
	<hr/> 1,84,51,005
	<hr/> 6,86,71,764
	<hr/> = 30,657 tons.

And I think the 13,000 tons which were asked for from England were, so far as supplied, in addition to the above.

Yours, &c.
(signed) *W. F. Marriott*.

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Appendix, No. 28.

PAPER prepared by General Hannington.

Appendix, No. 28.

ABYSSINIAN WAR EXPENDITURE.

THE following analysis is made from the original abstracts in which the several heads of account are not sufficiently discriminative. It is not possible, without reference to the vouchers, to unravel the complications that in many cases rise from the absence of necessary details. If a complete exposition be desired, the records are available, and the information they contain would, if well arranged and digested, be very useful.

Under the classification adopted in Mr. Turner's statement, page 182 of the former Report, the account, nearly final, would be thus :—

I. Staff and Regimental Charges	-	-	-	-	-	£.	280,801
II. Commissariat and Land Transport	-	-	-	-	-		2,807,788
III. Clothing	-	-	-	-	-		229,760
IV. Judge Advocate General	-	-	-	-	-		1,048
V. Ecclesiastical	-	-	-	-	-		1,242
VI. Medical	-	-	-	-	-		79,683
VII. Ordnance and Ordnance Stores	-	-	-	-	-		277,411
VIII. Political and Miscellaneous	-	-	-	-	-		60,512
IX. Administrative	-	-	-	-	-		4,997
X. Public Works Department	-	-	-	-	-		191,755
XI. Sea Transport, including Coals	-	-	-	-	-		4,895,985
XII. Treasury Expedition Account	-	-	-	-	-		6,877
						£.	8,837,359

This exhibits the actual outlay, from which some amount of recoveries may be deducted ; but for comparison with Estimates it is necessary to exhibit the full sum of money paid out of purse.

The more noticeable items are—

1. Hire of Transport - - - - - £. 3,449,310

This is obtained from the Parliamentary Paper, No. 71, dated 23 February 1870, from which Paper further particulars may be deduced, viz. :—

Where Engaged.	Number.	Tonnage.	Hire per Ton per Month.	Time Employed.
STEAMERS.			£. s. d.	Mos. days.
England - - - - -	18	34,282	2 2 5	8 15
Bombay - - - - -	32	30,854	2 7 5	7 21
Calcutta - - - - -	19	17,197	2 17 3	7 18
TOTALS - - - - -	69	82,333		
SAILING VESSELS.				
Bombay - - - - -	180	179,726	1 2 6	6 26
Calcutta - - - - -	24	28,787	1 12 10	7 22
TOTALS - - - - -	204	208,463		
Average { Steamers - - - - -	-	-	2 6 8	7 26
{ Ships - - - - -	-	-	1 4 2	7 -
General Average - - - - -	-	290,796	1 11 2½	7 6

Appendix, No. 28. It thus appears that the whole Expedition was virtually afloat for more than seven months, at a monthly cost of 478,314 *l.* The estimated charge was 400,000 *l.* a month.

2. Coals (nett) from Admiralty Return - - - - £. 835,480

The total quantity purchased was 246,281 tons; of this it appears that 13,360 tons have been sold, and hence the average cost per ton may be nearly stated as $\frac{835480}{232921} = 3\text{ }l. 11\text{ }s. 9\text{ }d.$ per ton. The actual price has varied between 12 *s.* in England to 11 *l.* 9 *s.* 6 *d.* at Jedda, where 41½ tons were procured at the latter rate. A statement obtained from the Admiralty Office is hereto annexed.

The estimate for coals was 316,250 *l.*, which has been largely exceeded, the difference amounting to 519,230 *l.*

3. Fittings of transports - - - - - £. 241,040

Such a charge as this was not anticipated, and was not brought into any estimate.

4. Freight of stores, troops, and treasure - - - £. 547,092

The estimate for such charges in England was 151,000 *l.*; the excess over this is 397,092 *l.*

							£.
5. Purchase of pack animals	-	-	-	-	-	-	435,579
„ gear, &c.	-	-	-	-	-	-	170,659
							<u>£. 606,238</u>

The estimate for these two items was 650,000 *l.*, which has not been exceeded.

6. Forage - - - - - £. 516,722

The estimate for this head was 450,000 *l.*, besides portions, not estimable, in the preceding item. The difference between the estimate and the facts is considerable, as appears from the next item.

							£.
7. Land carriage	-	-	-	-	-	-	339,262
Land Transport Train	-	-	-	-	-	-	177,224
							<u>£. 516,486</u>

For this large item no provision was made in any estimate, because it was supposed to be included in the purchase of animals, forage, and the pay and feed of army followers. The sum of the items 6 and 7 is 1,033,208 *l.*, and by deducting 450,000 *l.*, the estimate fell short by 583,208 *l.* Much of this is no doubt attributable to the excessive supply of forage.

8. Commissariat Staff, &c. - - - - - £. 119,720

This item is mixed up with and is partly additive to the Land Transport. It need not be more particularly noticed.

9. Provisions and stores - - - - - £. 641,637

The estimate under this head was 140,000 *l.*; the excess is 501,637 *l.*, which appears to be owing to the great accumulation of stores in advance of present need.

10. Public Works Department - - - - - £. 191,755

This includes railway, telegraph, pier, &c., which were specially excluded from the estimate.

The foregoing remarks may serve to show that in a few of the greater heads of account an excess of 2½ millions over the most liberal estimate is discoverable, and, in fact, the whole of the difference is justly assignable to causes that could not have been foreseen.

ABYSSINIAN EXPEDITION.

COAL PURCHASED, &c.

Where.	From Whom.	Quantity.	Rates.	Service.
		<i>Tons.</i>		
England - -	On board Transport - - -	4,225	12 s. to 23 s. -	Supplied direct to Transports
	Contractors - - -	18,253	14 s. 10 d. to 25 s. 6 d.	
	Admiralty - - -	445	17 s. -	
	Contractors, &c. &c. - - -	1,605	24 s. 9 d. to 28 s. 10 d.	
Gibraltar - -	Admiralty - - -	1,051	33 s. 9 d. -	ditto - - - ditto.
Malta - - -	Contractors - - -	445	46 s. 1 d. -	ditto - - - ditto.
Alicante - -	- ditto - - -	4,247½	49 s. -	ditto - - - ditto.
Cape de Verds - -	Admiralty - - -	5,796	5 l. to 5 l. 4 s. -	ditto - - - ditto.
Cape - - -	Contractors - - -	2,320	58 s. 6 d. -	ditto - - - ditto.
Mauritius - -	Peninsular and Oriental Company	4,048	4 l. 10 s. -	ditto - - - ditto.
Galle - - -	From various parties - - -	1,248	4 l. 10 s. to 5 l. -	
	Ditto - - -	8,307	34 s. to 4 l. 10 s. -	For Stock.
Madras - - -	Supplied - - -	86	3 l. -	Supplied direct to Transport.
Calcutta - -	Government, and various parties -	13,190	2 l. to 3 l. 4 s. -	ditto - - - ditto.
Suez - - -	Aziziah Company - - -	785	5 l. 8 s. -	Consumed in Transport.
	Ditto - - -	8,367	3 l. 16 s. -	Engaged from Company.
	Peninsular and Oriental Company	11,642	3 l. 15 s. at first -	Supplied direct to Transports.
	(payment in England).		3 l. 10 s. after -	
	Ditto - - ditto - - -	5,768	3 l. 12 s. 6 d. -	ditto - - - ditto.
	(payment in India).			
Alexandria - -	Peninsular and Oriental Company	1,211	2 l. 5 s. -	ditto - - - ditto.
	(payment in England).			
Aden - - -	Ditto - - ditto - - -	43,926	4 l. 10 s. at first -	ditto - - - ditto.
	(payment in England).		3 l. 13 s. after -	
	Ditto - - ditto - - -	5,469	3 l. 13 s. -	
	(payment in India).			
Aden and Annesley Bay.	Parties at Bombay - - -	18,194	3 l. 6 s. to 4 l. 10 s.	
	Parties at Aden - - -	9,684	5 l. to 7 l.	
	Peninsular and Oriental Company, Aden (payment in England).	7,026	3 l. 13 s.	
	Peninsular and Oriental Company Suez (payment in England).	1,700	3 l. 10 s.	
	Differences of quantity in Peninsular and Oriental's supplies.	173		
	TOTAL - - -	36,777		
	Supplies to Transports, &c. &c. -	34,046		
		2,731*		
Bombay - - -	Contractor for vessels, &c. - - -	2,310	3 l. 3 s. to 5 l. -	Consumed, &c. in Transport.
	Government, &c. - - -	2,027	3 l. 10 s. to 4 l. 19 s. and 11 l. 9 s. 6 d. (The latter rate for purchases at Jeddah, 41½ tons	Consumed in ships of Indian Navy.
	Ditto - - -	10,554	3 l. 10 s. and 5 p'ct.	Supplied to Transports.
	Peninsular and Oriental Company (payment in England).	44,889	3 l. 10 s. 6 d.	
	Returned from Transports - - -	2,194		
		47,083		
	Issued to Transports, &c. - - -	23,514		
		23,569†		
Kurrachee - -	Government - - -	2,763	4 l. and 5 p' cent.	Supplied direct to Transports.
Muscat - - -	- ditto - - -	1,896	- ditto - - -	ditto - - - ditto.
Marghil - - -	- ditto - - -	40	- ditto - - -	ditto - - - ditto.
Bassadore - -	- ditto - - -	65	- ditto - - -	ditto - - - ditto.
Kidderpore - -	- ditto - - -	225	3 l. 10 s. & 2 l. 11 s.	ditto - - - ditto.
Jeddah - - -	Purchased from parties - - -	80	7 l. 15 s. to 8 l. 4 s.	ditto - - - ditto.
Berbera - - -	- ditto - - ditto - - -	27	5 l. 10 s. -	ditto - - - ditto.
	TOTAL - - -	246,281½		

* 2,360½ tons credited at 3 l. 10 s. to 4 l. 19 s. per ton. 371 tons recoverable from Egyptian Government.

† 1,100 tons taken by Indian Government, at 2 l. 10 s. 6 d. and 5 per cent., and 12,299 to be sold; 269 tons coal dust.

4 G 3

Appendix, No. 28.

EXPENDITURE FOR MULES AND HORSES.

	Mules.	Horses.	Cost.	Commission.
			£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Alexandria - - - - - H. Robinson, C. B., A. C. G.	1,006	301	23,663 8 -	5,356 10 7
Aleppo - - - - - H. Maule, A. C. G.	500	520	12,624 7 8	652 5 -
Alicante - - - - - R. Cumming, A. C. G.	1,612 19 l. 10 s. each.	- -	31,498 14 7 Messrs. Wetherell, on 1,100 mules - }	229 10 10 9,550 - -
Barcelona - - - - - R. Wingfield, D. A. C. G.	14 20 l. 16 s. each.	- -	291 13 4	344 15 2
Cyprus - - - - -	50	-	-	-
Beyrout - - - - - — Downs, A. C. G.	653	298	15,659 - -	649 6 6
Brindisi - - - - - — A. Baines, A. C. G.	800 20 l. 12 s. each.	- -	1480 - -	1,042 3 1
Gibraltar - - - - - — Watt, A. C. G.	1,323 25 l. 1 s. each.	- -	33,152 3 6	881 11 5
Malta - - - - - — Ibbetson, A. C. G.	300 22 l. each.	- -	6,600 - -	38 6 10
Smyrna - - - - - P. Furse, D. A. C. G.	800	518	25,860 - -	560 16 4
Suez - - - - - R. Stanes, D. A. C. G.	- - -	5	43 - -	2,142 17 9
Valentia - - - - - — Irvine, A. C. G.	500 22 l. 8 s. each.	- -	11,458 - -	613 16 5
	7,558	1,372	177,340 7 1	12,512 - -

Note.—Including the sum paid to Messrs. Wetherell, the total is 22,062 l.

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Appendix, No. 29.

PAPER from the Treasury, handed in by Mr. *Candlish*, M.P.

ABYSSINIAN EXPEDITION.

			£.
The Total Cost of the Abyssinian Expedition reported to date is - - - - -			8,687,000
The probable Amount of Expenditure yet to be reported in final Accounts from India, is estimated at -			113,000
			£. 8,800,000
Expended by Home Government - - { War Office - - £. 479,100 }			1,687,600
- - { Admiralty - - 1,208,500 }			
Expended by Indian Government in England - - - - -			234,000
			1,921,600
Calcutta, Madras, and Punjaub Presidencies (Marine and Army Charges) - - -	£. 1,200,000	Expenditure as reported to date, as paid in India, Abyssinia, and Egypt - - - - £. 6,765,357	
Abyssinia—by Commissariat, Land Transport, and other Departments of the Field Force - - - - -	1,300,000	Estimated to complete - - 113,043*	6,878,400
Bombay, Kurrachee, Aden, and other Stations in India, also in Egypt, viz. :—			
Marine and Civil - £. 2,700,000 }	4,378,400		
Army Services - - 1,678,400 }			
£.	6,878,400*	£.	8,800,000

* *Note*.—These proportions are partly estimated, as the precise sums paid at the several Stations were not completely specified in the Monthly Accounts consolidated at Bombay.

Treasury, 1 July 1870.

I N D E X.

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2. *Contracts or Purchases generally in Egypt.*
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8. Summary by the Committee, and Conclusions arrived at :

Statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Disraeli) in asking, on the 26th November 1867, for a vote of credit for 2,000,000 *l.* on account of the Expedition, that the estimates though "rough" were "not careless," and were submitted with a confidence "by no means slight," *Rep.* iii—Necessarily hypothetical circumstances on which the estimates were based, *ib.*—Anticipation expressed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Disraeli) that a vote of 2,000,000 *l.* would be sufficient, if it were found that the mere landing of a force in Abyssinia would ensure the objects of the Expedition, *ib.*—Statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer that the necessary expenditure would be 3,600,000 *l.* or, under certain eventualities, 3,800,000 *l.* if the war had to be carried on to the

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the end of April, *Rep.* iii.—In no case did Government contemplate the possibility of an expenditure of more than 4,000,000 *l.* to the end of April, *ib.*

Statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the 12th February 1868, that “he had no reason to believe that the estimates had been exceeded,” *Rep.* iii.—Quotation of extract from private letter from the Governor of Bombay, dated 12th December 1867, warning the Home Government that the cost would be enormous if the Expedition were not promptly brought to an end, *ib.* iii, iv.—Conclusion that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had omitted, when making his statement of 12th February 1868, to inform himself of facts within his reach, showing liabilities up to the end of 1867 involving a probable cost of 5,000,000 *l.*, *ib.* iv.

New estimate submitted by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Ward Hunt) on 23rd April 1868, in which a liability of 2,000,000 *l.* up to the 1st January was taken as a starting point, the subsequent expenditure being estimated at 600,000 *l.* a month, *Rep.* iv.—Total estimate of 5,000,000 *l.* on the supposition that the Expedition left Abyssinia by the end of May, *ib.*—Concurrence of the Secretary of State for India, on the 23rd April 1868, in the view that 5,000,000 *l.* would cover the cost of the Expedition, *ib.*

Excess of 5,300,000 *l.* beyond the first estimate, and of 3,500,000 *l.* beyond the second estimate, *Rep.* v.—Evidence of General Jameson adverted to by the Committee as explaining that the word “estimate” had been improperly used, *ib.*—Similar statement to the foregoing, made by Mr. Seccombe, *ib.*—Statement by General Jameson that no military authority could have made even an approximate estimate of the expenses, *ib.*

Concurrence of Lord Napier, Sir William Mansfield, and of the military authorities generally, in the conclusion that the nature of the work, and the peculiar circumstances under which the war was made, rendered even an approximate estimate of the cost utterly impossible, *Rep.* v.

See also Accounts. Camp Followers. Coals. Contingent Expenses. Expenditure. Forage. Land Transport, II., 14. Local Inquiry. Mules. Number of Troops. Provisions. Stores. Transports.

European Regiments. Belief that the Horse Guards had nothing to do with the increase in the strength of the European regiments taken from India, *Lord Napier* 64–66. 197, 198 —Further statement as to the increase of the strength of the European regiments having been at the instance of the Government of India, and not of the Horse Guards, *ib.* 207, 208. 211, 212—Statement showing that there was a permissive letter from the Horse Guards relative to the increase of the strength of the European regiments, *ib.* 820, 821—Conclusion that such increase was however in accordance with the convictions and expressed views of the Government of India, *ib.* 821.

Sanction by the Bombay Government of an increase of the European regiments in the belief that the Horse Guards desired such increase, *Marriott* 3360–3366 —Doubt as to the Indian Government having wished for an increase in the number of Europeans, *ib.* 3367–3373.

Further explanation relative to the increase made in the European British regiments, the same having been effected without any specific sanction from the Bombay Government, *Marriott* 3622–3624—Documents adverted to as showing that the increase in the European regiments was at the instance of the Horse Guards, *ib.* 3963.

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Explanation by Sir Seymour Fitzgerald on the subject of the increase of the European regiments, and of the native troops, respectively, *App.* 577.

EXPENDITURE:

1. *Aggregate Expenditure in England and India.*
2. *Analysis by General Hannington of Expenditure as compared with Estimates.*
3. *Specific Sources of Excess of Expenditure.*
4. *Views of Lord Napier: economical considerations by which the Governor of Bombay was guided.*
5. *Explanatory statements on the part of the Bombay Government and of Sir Seymour Fitzgerald.*
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7. *Probable Economy if the Control had been vested in the Government of India.*
8. *Responsibility for Expenditure after the Landing of the Expedition.*
9. *Review by the Chairman of the Committee in Draft Report.*
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1. *Aggregate Expenditure in England and India:*

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EXPENDITURE—continued.1. *Aggregate Expenditure in England and India*—continued.

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2. *Analysis by General Hannington of Expenditure as compared with Estimates :*

Paper prepared by General Hannington containing an analysis of the expenditure under different heads, as compared with the estimates, and showing an excess of 2½ millions in a few of the greater heads of accounts, *App.* 593, 594—Conclusion that the whole of the difference is justly assignable to causes that could not have been foreseen, *ib.* 594.

3. *Specific Sources of Excess of Expenditure :*

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Exceedingly heavy loss incurred in respect of baggage animals; difficulty in arriving at the actual expenditure and loss from the accounts before witness, *General Jameson* 1323–1348—Actual charge of 471,000 *l.* in India for baggage animals, as audited by Mr. Turner, *ib.* 1324–1329—The Indian estimate of witness for land transport was 450,000 *l.*; *ib.* 1325.

Statement to the effect that witness estimated the forage at three times the usual sum, and that there was nevertheless an excess of about half a million, *General Jameson* 1361–1378—Difficulty of witness giving information, from the accounts before him, as to the cost of coals in comparison with his estimate; great excess, however, under this head, *ib.* 1379–1389—Reference to the sum for staff pay of the Land Transport Corps as an expenditure that could not well have been estimated, *ib.* 1416–1418—Information required as regards a large item for “land carriage of provisions,” &c., *ib.* 1418–1420. 1509–1512.

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Great extravagance if steamers were detained in Annesley Bay expressly for condensing water, *Osborn* 1968–1975. 2048, 2049. 2071, 2072—Summary of causes which led to the purchase of unsuitable animals, and to the great excess of cost for land transport, *Mostyn* 2437.

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Belief as to the expenditure of a considerable sum, not included in the estimates, in subsidies to native chiefs, *Sir W. Mansfield* 6010, 6011.

Explanation as to the final estimate in April 1868 not having included any increased charge in respect of the increase beyond the 12,000 men previously decided on, *Sir S. Northcote* 6134–6138—It was stated by General Jameson that the number landed would not exceed 12,000, and that the calculation would not be disturbed, *ib.* 6135.

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Expenditure

EXPENDITURE—continued.

3. *Specific Sources of Excess of Expenditure*—continued.

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Admission as to the want of a proper transport train, the want of provisions, of a railway, of water-pipes, and the great mortality of mules, having each been a cause of cost, amounting in the aggregate to a considerable sum, *Lord Napier*, 742–750—Justification of the expenditure in the highlands, as well as in the landing of stores, &c., *ib.* 787–790—Witness adheres to former statement, that the excess of expenditure was not great, nor worthy of consideration in the direction of expressing blame, *ib.* 791—Due regard had by witness to economical considerations, though he did not concern himself with any calculations as to cost, *ib.* 800–802.

5. *Explanatory Statements on the part of the Bombay Government and of Sir Seymour Fitzgerald:*

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Reluctance of witness to state in detail the points in which he considers that the requirements of Lord Napier involved an expenditure that might have been curtailed, *Marriott* 4026–4029. 4051—Witness repeats that the demands for the Expedition were conceived in a profuse spirit, and with disregard to pecuniary cost, but he offers no opinion whether such disregard was censurable, *ib.* 4026. 4051–4058—Statement to the effect that though the cost of the Expedition was determined, on the whole, by the general demands made, the Civil Government, rather than the Commander-in-Chief, exercised control as to the prices paid, *ib.* 4059–4069.

Emphatic statement by Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, that though it was his duty to enforce every reasonable economy, he never for one moment sacrificed efficiency to a desire to lessen the expenditure, *App.* 570.

EXPENDITURE—continued.**6. Large Increase of Expense if the Campaign had been prolonged:**

Great increase of cost by an extension of the campaign; the expense would probably have increased twofold, if the time had been doubled, *Lord Napier* 574—Admission that in certain respects the expense would not have doubled if the campaign had lasted double the time, *ib.* 584–601. 636–639—Greatly enhanced expense for transports if the campaign had been prolonged, *ib.* 587, 588. 601. 636—Large increase of expenditure if Theodore had not acted just as was desired, *ib.* 751–753.

7. Probable Economy if the Control had been vested in the Government of India:

Both as regards sea transport and stores, and probably in other respects, economy might have resulted if the control of the Expedition had been with the Government of India, *Sir W. Munsfield* 6008. 6017. 6116–6120. 6122, 6123.

8. Responsibility for Expenditure after the Landing of the Expedition:

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9. Review by the Chairman of the Committee in Draft Report:

Detailed review by the Chairman of the Committee, in his Draft Report, of the amount of excess of expenditure under different heads, *Rep.* xiii–xxix.

10. Summary by the Committee as to the Excess of Expenditure:

Aggregate of 8,800,000 *l.* as the total net cost of the Expedition, so far as the exact fact had been ascertained by the Treasury, up to the 1st July 1870, *Rep.* iv, v.

Total of 1,921,600 *l.* spent by the Home Government, of 5,578,400 *l.* spent in India, and of 1,360,000 *l.* spent in Abyssinia, *ib.* v—Excess of 5,300,000 *l.* beyond the first estimate, and of 3,500,000 *l.* beyond the second estimate, *ib.*

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F.

Field, Colonel. Statement as to Colonel Field having been at first the executive commanding officer at Zulla, under General Merewether, *General Staveley* 5057–5060—Great want of arrangements at this period for the care of the mules; conclusion that Colonel Field was not chiefly responsible, *ib.* 5061 *et seq.*

Fittings of Transports. Information required in respect of a charge of 237,674 *l.* for repair and fitting of vessels hired as transports, *General Jameson*, 1428–1431—Different ways in which the mule transports taken up by the War Office and by the Admiralty were fitted, this being a chief cause of the less expense of the former vessels, *Sir W. J. T. Power* 2609—Circumstance of the vessels taken up by the Admiralty having been fitted in accordance with the regulations of the Horse Guards, *ib.* 2613–2619.—Disapproval of fitting up vessels to carry troops on the Orlop docks in India, *Marriott* 3827–3829.

Expenditure of 241,040 *l.* for fittings of transports, for which there was no estimate, *App.* 594.

FITZGERALD, THE RIGHT HON. SIR W. R. S. V.:

Memorandum by Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, in August 1867, relative to the amount of force; suggestion therein whether the force proposed by witness might not be reduced, *Lord Napier* 35.

Belief that the Governor of Bombay was influenced by the feeling in England, in the direction of economy, and that his motive in everything was that of economy, *Lord Napier*, 239, 240—In any points of difference between the Governor of Bombay and witness, the former was guided by a view of economy, *ib.* 240.

Circumstance of the Governor of Bombay having been specially warned, or requested, by the Secretary of State for India, to keep down the expenditure as much as possible, *Marriott* 3957. 3959–3962.

Peculiar opportunities of witness for testifying to the fact that no man connected with the Expedition served *Lord Napier* more actively and more industriously than Sir Seymour Fitzgerald: nor did anyone serve him so effectually, *Marriott* 5925.

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FITZGERALD, THE RIGHT HON. SIR W. R. S. V.—continued.

Letters from Sir Seymour Fitzgerald to Mr. Candlish, in November 1869 and February 1870, relative to the inquiry in India by the latter and Capt. Beaumont, and the facilities given, or to be given, thereto by the Bombay Government, *App.* 362, 364, 366.—Letter from Sir Seymour Fitzgerald to Colonel Marriott, dated 13th November 1869, as to the facilities to be afforded to Mr. Candlish in his conduct of the inquiry into the cost of the Expedition, *ib.* 367.

Memoranda by Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, in explanation and justification of the course pursued at Bombay in the purchase of coals, *App.* 447-450.

Suggestion by Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, dated 20th September 1867, relative to the amount of supplies to be maintained, *App.* 463.

Memorandum by Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, dated 18th June 1870, as to the length of time occupied in the consideration of the proposed organisation of the Transport Train, and as to the delay produced by the discussion, *App.* 545.

Minute by the Governor of Bombay, dated 31st August 1867, relative to the organisation of the Land Transport Corps; arguments opposed to the scheme for removing the department from under the control and direction of the Commissariat, *App.* 557, 558.

Minute by Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, dated 18th April 1868, reviewing and justifying the course adopted by the Bombay Government as to the organisation of the Land Transport, and explaining that Sir R. Napier's proposal for a military organisation was adopted, *App.* 566, 567.

Memorandum by Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, dated 9th June 1870, on portions of the evidence of Sir Robert Napier; counter evidence submitted as to the inaccuracy of several statements by Sir Robert Napier, or of the inferences drawn therefrom, *App.* 568-583.

Explanatory statement by Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, dated 9th June 1870, relative to the organisation of the Expedition, to the effect that Lord Napier is in error on the subject, *App.* 569, 570.—Responsibility assumed by Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, in respect of the preparation and organisation of the Expedition, *ib.*—Statement that increased delay would have resulted, if the whole organisation had been with Sir Robert Napier, *ib.* 570.

Emphatic statement by Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, that though it was his duty to enforce every reasonable economy, he never for one moment sacrificed efficiency to a desire to lessen the expenditure, *App.* 570.

Further explanatory statement, dated 9th June 1870, in order to remove misconception as to the circumstances attending the formation of the Transport Corps, *App.* 571-575.

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Flour. Explanation relative to the purchase of some Trieste flour for the Expedition through Mr. Hare, of Suez; moderate profit of the latter, *Willoughby* 4836-4842.

Flying Column. Belief that had the smaller force recommended by Colonel Merewether been adopted, and had such force attempted to capture Magdala by assault, not a man would have returned, *Lord Napier* 172—Grounds for concluding that a flying column, as a means of effecting the liberation of the prisoners, would have been a very risky measure, *General Staveley* 5257-5262. 5284—Disapproval by General Merewether of the employment of so small a force as 2,000 men, *Beaumont* 5409.

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FORAGE:

1. *Generally as to the Requisitions for Forage, and as to the immense Supplies shipped for Abyssinia.*
2. *Purchases in Egypt.*
3. *Supplies obtainable in Abyssinia.*
4. *Contracts with Mr. Davis for Compressed Forage.*
5. *Chopped Straw.*
6. *Statistics of the Supplies shipped and landed respectively, and of the Prices paid.*
7. *Disposal of Surplus Supplies.*
8. *Large Excess of Cost beyond the Estimate.*

1. *Generally as to the Requisitions for Forage, and as to the immense Supplies shipped for Abyssinia:*

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Responsibility thrown by witness on the Commissariat officer in the matter of forage; purchase made in Egypt adverted to hereon, *Lord Napier* 408-415. 430—Information relative to the time required to communicate between Abyssinia and Bombay, and to obtain or to countermand forage from India in accordance with orders from Abyssinia; difficulties and uncertainty on this score, *ib.* 426-329. 450-453. 464—Great anxiety at one period of the march in regard to the supplies of forage and of food, *ib.* 455—Uncertainty as to the time of the return of the Expedition, so that it was essential to keep a large supply of hay at Annelev Bay, *ib.* 472, 473—Advantage if a larger quantity of the unlanded forage had been left at Aden, *ib.* 526—Necessary discharge of transports at Bombay, so that it was deemed advisable they should return with the forage on board, *ib.* 526-534.

Statement on the subject of requisitions for forage for 28,000 animals have been made on Bombay, &c., irrespectively of any supplies in Abyssinia, *Holland* 4145-4162—Although so many as 28,000 animals were never accumulated, it was not known what increased numbers would be provided, *ib.* 4150-4161—With regard to certain returns purporting to show that when the Expedition closed there was a supply of two years' forage afloat, witness questions the accuracy of these returns so far as hay is concerned, *ib.* 4180-4190.

Requisition sent by witness to England, about the end of February, for 3,000 tons of compressed forage; witness duly considered at the time the amount of forage in Annesley Bay and on its way thither, *Holland* 4260-4273—Doubt as to the accuracy of a return purporting to show that only 4,000 tons of forage were landed, whereas witness deemed it necessary to order 3,000 tons of compressed hay, in addition to the large amount not landed, *ib.* 4274-4279.

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2. *Purchases*

FORAGE—continued.**2. Purchases in Egypt:**

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3. Supplies obtainable in Abyssinia:

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4. Contracts with Mr. Davis for Compressed Forage:

Statement in defence of a contract made by the War Office with Mr. Davis for compressed forage, *Sir W. J. T. Power* 2536-2543. 2566—Reference to some contracts made by the India Office with Mr. Davis, and explanation as to the latter having been paid 10,000 l. for breach of contract, *ib.* 2544-2548. 2562-2565.

On the part of the War Office witness supplies information relative to an account of hay purchased from Mr. Davis, of Mile End, payment having been made by the India Office before the account came to the War Office for inspection, *Edmunds* 4658-4672.

Return containing particulars relative to the patent compressed forage supplied by Mr. Davis, of Mile End; total of 43,297 l. as the amount paid, including 10,000 l. compensation, *App.* 540.

5. Chopped Straw:

Decided objection to supplies of chopped straw, on account of the difficulties of transport, *Sir W. J. T. Power* 2573-2578.

6. Statistics of the Supplies shipped and landed respectively, and of the Prices paid:

Return of hay, straw, and kirbee, contracted for at Bombay, for the Abyssinian Expedition, with the quantity actually shipped, *App.* 336—Statement exhibiting the quantity of forage purchased at Bombay, and received from other stations for shipment to Zulla; also, the rate and amount of each batch, *ib.* 337.

Return of chopped straw, compressed forage, and compressed hay, contracted for at Suez, with the quantity actually shipped, *App.* 338—Statement showing the quantity of forage actually contracted for at Suez by the Commissariat officer; also, the rate at which it was paid for, *ib.*

Return of the quantity of hay, straw, and kirbee, shipped at Bombay and landed at Zulla, and the quantity left there at the termination of the campaign, together with the quantity shipped but not landed, *App.* 359—Similar return as regards the quantity shipped at Suez, *ib.*

Estimate of the quantity of grain and hay, respectively, required for the force from 1st January to 31st October 1868, *App.* 344, 345.

7. Disposal of Surplus Supplies.

Doubt whether it would have been expedient to bring back to England for sale, the large quantity of compressed forage not required, and sold at Alexandria at a great sacrifice, *Sir W. J. T. Power* 2549-2561.

FORAGE—continued.7. *Disposal of Surplus Supplies*—continued.

Explanation required as regards the sale at Alexandria, at a great sacrifice, of 440 tons of compressed forage which cost from 13 l. to 14 l. per ton in England, *Beaumont* 6161—Instance of 400 tons of surplus hay having been sold at Suez for 6 s. per ton, which the purchaser instantly resold for 16 s., *ib.*

Statement showing the sums received by the agent of the Government of India in Egypt, on account of the sale of compressed forage, *App.* 333—Balance sheet of compressed forage at Alexandria, originally intended for the Abyssinian Expedition, *ib.*

8. *Large Excess of Cost beyond the Estimate.*

Statement to the effect that witness estimated the forage at three times the usual sum, and that there was nevertheless an excess of about half a million, *General Jameson* 1361-1378.

Foster, Morgan H., c.B. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Is principal financial officer of the Treasury, 1901—Explains that the Treasury looked to the India Office for an estimate of the expenditure of the Expedition, and communicated also with the War Office and Admiralty on the subject, 1902-1911—The Treasury had no means of forming an estimate, and was obliged to depend upon the several departments, 1912—Certain Indian accounts of expenditure are now at the War Office, where they are being examined by a joint committee of the War Office and Admiralty, 1913, 1914.

Freight. See *Transports.*

French Army. System in the French Army by which the sea transport at the seat of war is all under the general commanding, *Sir W. J. T. Power* 4458, 4459.

See also *Control Department.*

Fresh Levies (India). See *Bombay Army.* *Native Troops.*

Future Expeditions. Valuable information prepared by the Scientific Departments as a guide to future expeditions, *Lord Napier* 376—Importance of tabulated accounts, in the case of all future expeditions, *General Jameson* 1410-1412. 1461-1463—Suggestion that in the case of future expeditions from India the estimates be prepared there, and be revised in England, where the home charges should be added, *ib.* 1595, 1596. 1598.

Very important advantages anticipated in future military operations from the concentration of knowledge, of functions, and of responsibility in one department, under one head, *Sir W. J. T. Power* 4395-4400. 4502. 4528-4532.

Suggestion, based on the experience of the Abyssinian Expedition, for guidance on various points in future military operations, *Marriott* 5925—Expediency of a prompt rendering of accounts on future occasions, *ib.*

Opinion that in the case of expeditions generally the Civil Government should make the preparations in consultation with the officer commanding, and that the action and responsibility of the latter should not commence until his departure with the Expedition, *Sir W. Mansfield* 5977-5981—Exceptional character and conditions of the Abyssinian campaign, so that the experience gained in it may not be reliable or useful as regards future campaigns, *ib.* 6041—Witness contends that it would be well to draw any future expedition from India out of the three Presidencies, *ib.* 6042-6050. 6114*.

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"*Golden Fleece*," *The.* See *Hospital Ships*, 1.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA:

Examination relative to the actual authority vested in the Government of India, in the Government of Bombay, and in witness, respectively, as to the organisation and conduct of the Expedition; respects in which greater promptitude and efficiency might have resulted, had witness been vested with absolute plenary authority, *Lord Napier* 326 *et seq.*—Conclusion as to the great advantage of the course taken in giving enlarged powers of action to the Bombay Government, instead of referring matters to the Government of India, *ib.* 333-335.

Witness explains that the Government of India had nothing to do with the Land Transport Train or its organisation, the whole conduct of the Expedition having been left by the Home Government to the Government of Bombay and Lord Napier, *Sir W. Mansfield* 5936-5938—The Government of India was, in fact, placed for the first time under the Bombay Government, and instead of giving orders could only make suggestions, *ib.* 5938. 5966-5969—Great mistake in superseding the action of the Government of India

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India, its knowledge of the resources of India being far greater than that possessed by the minor Governments, *Sir W. Mansfield* 5939, 5940.

Grounds for the opinion that there was a certain sacrifice of precaution in the Government of India not exercising the same control and power of nomination as on former occasions, *Sir W. Mansfield* 5942. 5980. 6048, 6049. 6077-6088—Beneficial action of the Government of India in the matter of the organisation of the staff for the Chinese expedition, *ib.* 5942.

Very scanty information as to Abyssinia upon which the Government of India suggested in the first instance that a force of 9,000 men would be sufficient, *Sir W. Mansfield* 5972-5975.

Evidence in further support of the conclusion that it was unfortunate that the organisation and the directing power of the Abyssinian Expedition was not entrusted to the Governor General and Commander in Chief in India; precedents for this course, *Sir W. Mansfield* 5978-5981. 6077-6088—Suggestion whether some of the excess of estimate might not have been avoided under the head of transport, if the Government of India had directed the Expedition, *ib.* 6008. 6017. 6118-6120. 6122.

Statement as to the Bombay expedition to Scinde under Sir Charles Napier having been arranged by the Government of India, *Sir W. Mansfield* 6079-6084—Control by the Government of India in the case of the Persian expedition from Bombay, *ib.* 6085—Supervision also of the China expedition by the Government of India, the general in command not making the chief staff appointments, *ib.* 6086-6088.

Witness repeats that the direction of any future expedition should rest with the Government of India, instead of being relegated to one of the presidencies, *Sir W. Mansfield* 6115, 6116—Both as regards sea transport and stores, and probably in other respects, economy might have resulted if the control of the Abyssinian Expedition had been with the Government of India, *ib.* 6116-6120. 6122, 6123.

Gram. Extracts from market reports furnished by Nichol & Co., of Kurrachee, showing the prices of gram between October 1867 and March 1868, *App.* 534.

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Hand, Captain. Report by Captain Hand, sub-director of the Land Transport Train, upon the transport service in the Highlands, *App.* 350, 351—Report by Captain Hand on the different patterns of pack saddles, *ib.* 352.

Hannington, General. Paper prepared by General Hannington containing an analysis of the expenditure under different heads, as compared with the estimates, and showing an excess of two and a half millions in a few of the greater heads of account, *App.* 593, 594—Conclusion that the whole of the difference is justly assignable to causes that could not have been foreseen, *ib.* 594.

Hay. See *Forage.* *Transports*, I, 12.

Heads of Departments. Saving of much time and trouble if representatives from the departments had met together as an executive board, *Sir W. J. T. Power*, 2671, 2672—Advantages anticipated from the periodical meeting of heads of departments in time of war, as facilitating the dispatch of business by obviating correspondence, *ib.* 4496-4500—Expediency of a system of consultation of departmental officers, and of a record of valuable information, *Marriott* 5925.

"Himalaya," The. Explanation in regard to the "Himalaya," belonging to the Bombay and Bengal Steam Navigation Company, having been tendered and accepted at Bombay at 24 rupees per ton per month, and having been subsequently accepted at Calcutta at 27½ rupees, at which price she was paid, *Marriott* 3794-3804—Comment upon the increased rate at which the "Himalaya" was finally chartered at Calcutta, beyond the rate at which previously chartered at Bombay, *Beaumont* 6161.

Holland, Colonel William Henry. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Was Controller of Supply and Transport in Abyssinia; arrived at Annesley Bay on the 18th January 1868, 3910-3912—On the 27th January made a report on the condition of the transport train; submits a copy of this report and of the reply of the Commander in Chief, 3913-3916.

[Second Examination.]—Instructions issued to witness by the Bombay Government in explanation of his functions and responsibilities as Controller of Supply and Transport in Abyssinia, 4105-4110—Separation of witness from head quarters as he did not advance into the interior; effect thereof in increasing his responsibility to the Commander in Chief, 4111-4125—Circumstance of witness not having provided himself, when leaving Bombay, with official documents in order to verify details and dates, 4114-4119. 4128-4130.

Holland, Colonel William Henry. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

Explanation as to the purchases made in Abyssinia not having been superintended by witness, though the records were subsequently submitted to him, the accounts having been afterwards sent to Bombay, 4126-4144—Statement on the subject of requisitions for forage for 28,000 animals having been made on Bombay, &c., irrespective of any supplies in Abyssinia, 4145-4162.

Confidential memorandum received by witness from the assistant quartermaster general in February 1868, in accordance with which steps were taken to provide supplies for eight or nine months, or till the end of October, 4163-4179—With regard to certain returns purporting to show that when the expedition closed there was a supply of two years' forage afloat; witness questions the accuracy of these returns so far as hay is concerned, 4180-4190.

Statement that witness was not responsible for the scale on which supplies or animals were first ordered for Abyssinia, 4191-4196—Nor was he responsible for the working of the land transport in the first instance, and the deficiency of arrangements, he not having arrived at Zulla until some time after the commander in chief, 4197-4201. 4212-4215—Difficulty in fixing the responsibility in respect of the arrangements for the reception and care of the mules first landed at Annesley Bay; mention of Colonel Mignon of the Commissariat as responsible to some extent, 4202-4211.

Very inconsiderable amount of supplies obtained in Abyssinia; doubt as to any large supply of cattle having been obtainable, 4216, 4217—Great uncertainty as to the movements of Theodore, the abundant supplies having been calculated with direct reference to such uncertainty, 4218-4220—Excessive difficulty, amounting almost to impossibility, in making perfect arrangements for the animals first landed, 4221-4223.

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[Third Examination.]—Reference to certain other reports and documents relative to the transport train, in addition to those already furnished to the Committee, 4242-4245.

Explanation as regards the responsibility of witness, that it commenced on the day of his arrival at Zulla, 4246—Responsibility of Colonel Mignon further adverted to, 4246-4248—Communication of the requisitions of Lord Napier to witness from time to time, the commissariat supplies and the forage having been calculated and ordered in strict accordance with such requisitions, 4248-4252.

Requisition sent by witness to England, about the end of February, for 3,000 tons of compressed forage; witness duly considered at the time the amount of forage in Annesley Bay, and on its way thither, 4260-4273—Doubt as to the accuracy of a return purporting to show that only 4,000 tons of forage were landed, whereas witness deemed it necessary to order 3,000 tons of compressed hay, in addition to the large amount not landed, 4274-4279.

Purchase of a considerable quantity of forage in Egypt in March and April on the orders of witness, 4280-4282—Duty of witness to attend to requisitions for tonnage for supplies, but not for troops, 4283-4285—Further statement as to the duty of witness in regard to reporting upon expenditure and purchases, 4286-4291.

Explanation as regards the supplementary provision of forage for eight or nine months, that this had reference to only 12,000 animals, the number for which supplies were at first sent from Bombay having been 32,000; 4292-4295—Statement as to certain regiments from India having come equipped with transport; obstacle to an extension of this organisation to all the regiments, 4298-4305—Doubt whether nothing but tea and preserved provisions reached Magdala from the coast, 4306-4309—Apparently small consumption of forage as compared with the quantity shipped, 4310.

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Concentration of control of the expenditure after the landing of the Expedition, all purchases of supplies and forage having been directed by witness, under orders from Lord Napier, 4340-4347—A large portion of the Transport Train went beyond Senafé, 4348—Great difficulty in landing supplies at Annesley Bay until the second pier was completed, 4349-4352—Medical treatment of the Land Transport Corps in the hospitals, there having been no surgeon attached to the corps, 4353.

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Holland, Colonel William Henry. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

Further statement as to the great uncertainty of supplies in Abyssinia, so that it was deemed essential to make provision elsewhere, 4354-4360—Circumstance of some forage not having proceeded beyond Aden, 4380—Probability of a vessel (the "Royal Edward") having been at Annesley Bay for three months with a cargo of hay untouched, 4381-4384—Doubt as to the resident at Aden having had authority to send back vessels, though he might have detained them until rumours of the fall of Magdala were confirmed, 4385-4387.

Holland, Colonel W. H. Memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel Holland, as Controller of Supply and Transport, for the information of Sir Robert Napier, dated 27th January 1868, on the subject more especially of the Land Transport Train and its defects, *App.* 454—Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Holland to Colonel Marriott, dated Zulla, 15th February 1868, with further reference to the deficiencies of the Land Transport arrangements, *ib.* 456, 457.

Home Government. Valuable promptitude shown by the Home authorities in anticipating the wants of the Expedition, *Lord Napier* 330, 331.

Conclusion as to the impolicy of the arrangement by which the responsibility and conduct of the Expedition were transferred from England to India, whilst the expenditure was repaid to India by the Imperial Government, *Sir W. J. T. Power* 2664-2669.

Total of 1,687,600*l.* expended by the Home Government in respect of the Expedition, *App.* 597.

Comment by the Chairman or the Committee, in his Draft Report, upon the abdication of all administrative control by the Home Government, *Rep.* xxix.

Horse Artillery. Intention at first to send a troop of Horse Artillery with the Expedition, this idea having been abandoned before tonnage was engaged for the troop, or any appreciable expense incurred, *Marriott* 4236-4239.

HOSPITAL SHIPS:

1. *As to the Ships Employed.*

2. *As to the Question of Employing Coast Guard Ships or old Line-of-Battle Ships.*

1. *As to the Ships Employed ;*

Great advantage of the early arrival of the hospital ships sent out from England, *Lord Napier* 508, 509—Examination as to the "Golden Fleece," "Mauritius," "Queen of the South," and "Hydaspes" having cost much more for freight than they might have been bought for; admission as to the merits of these vessels for hospital purposes, *Darke* 2843-2856. 2895-2903. 2922-2929.

Return showing the tonnage of the "Golden Fleece," "Mauritius," and "Queen of the South," respectively, the period in the service, place of discharge, and amount of hire paid, *App.* 368—Statement of the cost of fitting the "Mauritius," "Queen of the South," and "Golden Fleece," *ib.* 526.

2. *As to the Question of Employing Coast Guard Ships or old Line-of-Battle Ships :*

Doubt whether, in lieu of the hospital ships sent from England, it would have been better to use the ships laid up in ordinary; question whether the latter could have arrived in time, *Lord Napier* 506, 507—Advantage of sailing men-of-war over steamers for hospital purposes, *ib.*

Grounds for the conclusion that instead of hiring and fitting up the transports for hospital ships, it would have been far better, on the score both of efficiency and economy, if some of the coast guard ships or uncommissioned line-of-battle ships had been employed for hospital purposes, *Oshorn* 1939-1957. 1988-1990. 2025-2039. 2067-2070—There must have been many old line-of-battle ships available, some of which were simply rotting in the dockyards, *ib.* 1939, 1940. 1943-1948. 2025-2027—Statement to the effect that the "Donegal" and similar ships could have been got ready in a week, and could have gone from England to Aden in sixty or seventy days, *ib.* 1941, 1942. 1951-1954. 1988-1990. 2028-2039.

Examination on the subject of hospital ships to the effect that there were certain objections to the employment of steam line-of-battle ships or coast guard ships for this purpose, but that economy would have resulted from such employment; difficulty chiefly as to the time in which they could have reached Annesley Bay, *Admiral Mends* 2720 *et seq.*—Witness is not aware whether the question of employing ships of the line was considered by the Admiralty, *ib.* 2776-2778.

Witness submits sundry details at variance with a certain letter from Captain Sherard Osborn as to the fitness of certain coast guard ships and men-of-war for hospital ships for the Abyssinian Expedition, and as to the economy and dispatch to be secured by their

HOSPITAL SHIPS—continued.2. *As to the Question of employing Coast Guard Ships, &c.*—continued.

their employment, *Admiral Robinson* 5517 *et seq.*—Great delay and large expenditure before the “Duke of Wellington” could have been fitted as a hospital ship and sent to Abyssinia, *ib.* 5519. 5538.

Explanation that the “Revenge,” “Donegal,” and certain other ships employed in the coast guard in August 1867 were in a proper state to go at once to any part of the world, but their fitting up as hospital ships would have interfered with dockyard work, and would have involved much time and expense, *Admiral Robinson* 5520–5525. 5529. 5535 *et seq.* 5622—Statement as to the fitting of the “Meanee” in 1867 as a hospital ship for service at Hong Kong having occupied nearly two months, and having cost 14,493 *l.*, or more than her market price, *ib.* 5520–5522. 5567. 5599–5602. 5607–5610. 5617–5621. 5648, 5649.

Inability of witness to state the expense or time necessary for fitting coast guard ships or old men-of-war for hospital ships in Annesley Bay, inasmuch as he was never informed what fittings were required, *Admiral Robinson* 5520. 5544–5549. 5592–5594. 5606–5612. 5648–5650—Explanation that a considerable number of wooden ships of war which appeared on the official list of the Navy in 1867 were not in a fit state for active service abroad, and that these ships, as obsolete, have long been waiting displacement from the Navy, *ib.* 5526–5529. 5537–5543. 5632–5635.

Consideration of the probable time from the end of August 1867, in which line-of-battle ships could have been fitted as hospital ships, and could have reached Annesley Bay; inadequate stowage for coal to enable them to steam all the way, *Admiral Robinson* 5530–5534. 5544–5491. 5603–5605. 5623–5631. 5636–5642—Longer time required to fit a man-of-war than a merchant vessel as a hospital ship, inasmuch as the former would require more alteration in the way of ventilation, &c. *ib.* 5546–5571. 5606, 5607. 5643–5647.

Very expensive character of the alterations required by the medical authorities when men-of-war have been fitted as hospital ships; doubt, however, as to the alterations necessary in the present case, 5606–5612. 5648–5650.

Witness considers that it would have required about 100 days for a man-of-war, fitted as a hospital ship, and leaving England at the end of September 1867, to reach Annesley Bay, *Admiral Richards* 5651–5655.

Witness considers that steam line-of-battle ships could have been fitted as rapidly as merchant ships for hospital purposes, that they would have been quite as effectual, and might have reached Annesley Bay by the end of December 1867, *Admiral Mends* 5656–5667—Much economy would have resulted from fitting and employing men-of-war as hospital ships, instead of hiring the “Mauritius,” “Golden Fleece,” and “Queen of the South,” *ib.* 5663–5666—Steam men-of-war ought to perform the passage in about ninety days, *ib.* 5667.

Statement of Captain Tryon as to the objections to employing line-of-battle ships as hospitals in the Red Sea, *App.* 586.

Letter from Captain Osborn, dated 5th May 1870, submitting an extract from the official Navy List, of 1st October 1867, and further commenting upon the alleged obstacles to the employment of certain line-of-battle ships for hospital purposes, *App.* 591, 592.

Comment by the Chairman of the Committee, in his Draft Report, upon the inaction of the authorities upon the question of employing coast guard ships or line-of-battle ships in reserve, *Rep.* xxv.

Hozier, Captain. Evidence as to the inaccuracy of a passage in Captain Hozier’s book relative to the deficient supply of cranes and lighters for Annesley Bay, *Marriott* 3620, 3621. 3645–3647—Inaccuracy also of a statement in Captain Hozier’s book that undue economy and delay had been exercised by the Bombay Government in taking up transports in the first instance, *ib.* 3620.

Concurrence in certain statements by Captain Hozier as to the energy with which the disembarkation was carried out, *Marriott* 3655, 3656—Concurrence also in Captain Hozier’s views as to the singularly unfavourable circumstances under which the operations generally were carried out, *ib.* 3656—Inaccuracy of a statement in Captain Hozier’s book as to the Bombay Government not having taken energetic action, and provided supplies sufficiently early, *ib.* 3704–3706.

Comment by Sir Seymour Fitzgerald upon a misrepresentation by Captain Hozier on the subject of the supply of lighters at Annesley Bay, *App.* 583, 584.

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Increase of Force. See Number of Troops.

India. Office. Statement as to the Governor of Bombay having been specially warned or requested by the Secretary of State for India to keep down the expenditure as much as possible, *Marriott* 3957-3962.

See also *Bombay Government. Estimates, 2. Home Government. Telegraphic Communication, 2, 3.*

Indian Troop-ships. Obstacles to the use of the Indian troop-ships in the Abyssinian service, as unduly interfering with the relief of troops from India, *Lord Napier* 510-521 — Examination with further reference to the non-employment of the Indian troop-ships, though they would doubtless have rendered excellent service; serious inconvenience, however, as regards the Indian reliefs, *ib.* 679-698.

Great inconvenience as regards the Indian reliefs if the Indian troop-ships had been used for the Expedition, these vessels, however, having large capacities, and Sir Seymour Fitzgerald having suggested their employment, *Marriott* 3830-3842. 3849-3854 — Explanation relative to the non-employment of the Indian relief ships in bringing the Expedition back, the Bombay Government having, however, ordered one of these ships to be got ready in spite of certain objections thereto, *ib.* 4005-4025.

Return of the dates of the arrivals and sailings of each Indian relief troop-ship, and of the numbers of troops carried each voyage during the season 1867-68, with an estimate of the cost of carrying the troops from and to England by the ordinary means, *App.* 542, 543 — Abstract showing the total number of troops conveyed during the season, *ib.* 544 — Cost of carrying the same number of officers, troops, &c., between England and India by the ordinary means, *ib.*

Comment by the Chairman of the Committee upon the non-employment of the Indian troop-ships, *Rep.* xxv.

Indian Troops. See Native Troops.

"*Iron Age.*" *The.* Sundry particulars relative to the "*Iron Age*" and "*Ottawa*," as tendered by witness's firm to the Admiralty for the Abyssinian Expedition; rejection of these vessels whilst others were chartered at higher rates, *Darke* 2781-2825. 2872-2881. 2891-2899 — The "*Iron Age*" was tendered at 24 s. 6 d. if discharged at home, and at 29 s. 6 d. if discharged abroad. *ib.* 2818.

Explanation in letter from Admiral Mends relative to the rejection of this vessel, *App.* 383.

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Jameson, Major General, G. J. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Witness has examined certain accounts of expenditure, as they appear in the Committee's Report of last Session, in comparison with his estimates; he has never seen the accounts sent to the Admiralty and War Office, 1301-1303. 1320. 1330 — Circumstance of the force having been increased by nearly 3,000 men beyond witness's estimate of March 1868, 1303, 1304 — Examination as to the excess of expenditure in respect of sea transport, the total payments amounting to 3,372,152 l., as compared with estimates amounting to 2,730,000 l., 1305-1322.

Exceedingly heavy loss incurred in respect of baggage animals; difficulty in arriving at the actual expenditure and loss from the accounts before witness, 1323-1348 — Estimate by witness of the rations for the men at 2 l. per month for Europeans and 1 l. per month for natives; difficulty in accounting for the great excess on this score, 1349. 1353-1360 — Reference to the quantity of forage procurable in Abyssinia for the baggage animals; this was taken into account in witness's estimate, 1349-1352. 1368-1376 — Statement to the effect that witness estimated the forage at three times the usual sum, and that there was nevertheless an excess of about half a million, 1361-1378.

Difficulty of witness in giving information from the accounts before him, as to the cost of coals in comparison with his estimate; great excess, however, under this head, 1379-1389 — Want of information as to the stores generally, and as to what has become of them, 1389. 1440-1443. 1452, 1453 — Very large expenditure for medical stores and instruments, 1389-1396 — Considerable amount unaccounted for in respect of ordnance stores, further details being required, 1397, 1398 — Very large amount of the Commissariat charges in proportion to the force, 1399.

Grounds for the conclusion that it would be a great public advantage if the accounts were tabulated, with reference to the estimates; suggestions as to the mode of preparing such accounts, 1400-1412. 1460-1469. 1495-1500. 1521-1528 — Concurrence in the

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Jameson, Major General G. J.—(Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

main between witness's estimates of October 1867 and March 1868; 1401, 1402—Opinion of Mr. Turner as to the immense labour required to tabulate the accounts; doubt as to there being any difficulty on other grounds: 1405-1409. 1521-1524.

Importance of tabulated financial statistics of all expeditions as a means of supplying valuable information on future occasions, 1410-1412. 1461-1463—Mention of several items of expenditure, amounting to a large aggregate, which could not have been estimated, 1413-1420—Information required as regards a large item for "land carriage of provisions," &c., 1418-1420. 1509-1512.

Large excess of expenditure in respect of warm clothing for the troops, and over and above the extensive supply sent from England, 1420-1423. 1504-1508—Further information required as regards an item of 105,822 l. for the loading, shipping, and landing of stores, &c., 1424-1427—Information wanted also in respect of a charge of 237,674 l. for repair and fitting of vessels hired as transports, 1428-1431.

Conclusion as to there having been an excess of the estimate of two millions as the cost of placing the Expedition upon the soil of Abyssinia, 1432-1439—Doubt as to there having been good reason for detaining the whole of the transport fleet in Annesley Bay, 1444-1448—Inability of witness to understand the immense supply of stores landed in the country and sent up with the army, 1449-1453.

Importance of an improved military organisation which should collect information, to be always available, as to the markets for obtaining animals and supplies, 1454-1469. 1485-1500. 1529, 1530—Explanation that witness disclaims all intention of finding fault with Lord Napier as to the course pursued in providing such large supplies, or in keeping the transports in the Red Sea, 1470-1484. 1503—Peculiar character of the Expedition, and scanty information as to the country, so that it was utterly impossible to form an accurate estimate of the expenditure, 1470. 1478-1480. 1501, 1502. 1513, 1514. 1525. 1531-1566. 1592, 1593.

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L.

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II. *Abyssinian Expedition*—continued.

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II. *Abyssinian Expedition*—continued.

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LANDING OF STORES, &c.:

1. *Annesley Bay.*
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1. Annesley Bay:

Obstacles to the provisions of pier accommodation, so as to obviate the necessity and expense of lighterage, *Lord Napier* 664-673—Inability of the Home Government anticipating the want of piers, *ib.* 805.

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Further statement on the question of a Red Sea Telegraph; communication with Government on the subject in July and August 1867, but not with reference to the Abyssinian Expedition, 2043-2047—Advantage if line-of-battle ships had been employed in conveying troops to and from Annesley Bay, 2050—Approval of the employment of the steamers in condensing, if necessary to keep them in Annesley Bay as a reserve, 2087-2089.

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“*Principe Tommaso*,” *The.* Return showing the services of this transport, and the rate of freight, *App.* 537.

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RAILWAY:

1. *Statement by Lord Napier: Importance attached to the Provision of a Railway.*
2. *Explanation on the part of the Bombay Government, and of Sir Seymour Fitzgerald.*
3. *Particulars supplied on the part of the Public Works Department, Bombay.*
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5. *Information obtained as the Result of Inquiry by Captain Beaumont.*
6. *Views of Sir W. Mansfield on the Question of Cost.*
7. *Suggestions with reference to future Expeditions.*
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1. *Statement by Lord Napier: Importance attached to the Provision of a Railway:*

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2. *Explanation*

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2. *Explanation on the part of the Bombay Government, and of Sir Seymour Fitzgerald:*

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3. *Particulars supplied on the part of the Public Works Department, Bombay:*

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4. *Statement by the Head of the Engineer Department in Abyssinia:*

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5. *Information obtained as the Result of Inquiry by Captain Beaumont:*

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Stewart, Captain George. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Is captain of the "British Princess," which was chartered at Bombay for the Abyssinian Expedition, and was loaded with stores for Aden and Annesley Bay, 3210-3214—Arrival of the "British Princess" at Aden on the 29th April 1868, where she stayed for four weeks without the cargo having been touched, and was then ordered to return to Bombay, 3215-3223—Discharge of the cargo at Bombay on the 28th of July, the vessel having arrived there on the 12th of June, 3224-3226.

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STORES:

I. *As to the Quantity of Stores or Supplies provided:*

1. Explanations by Lord Napier in connection with his Requisitions for Stores.
2. Explanations by the Controller of Supply.
3. Explanations on the part of the Bombay Government, and Sir Seymour Fitzgerald.
4. Views of General Jameson, Sir William Mansfield, and others.
5. Returns and Statistics in Detail.

II. *Supplies obtainable or obtained in Abyssinia.*

III. *Obsolete Stores.*

IV. *Estimates and Expenditure.*

V. *Cost of Loading and Landing.*

VI. *Disposal of Surplus Stores.*

VII. *Suggestions in regard to Transmission and Distribution.*

I. *As to the Quantity of Stores or Supplies provided:*

- * 1. Explanations by Lord Napier in connection with his Requisitions for Stores:

Reference to a memorandum by witness in September to the effect that six months' supplies should be always in hand, *Lord Napier* 386-392—Requisition made by witness to the Commissary General that supplies for 9,500 men for six months should be collected at Senafe before the main body of the troops arrived there, *ib.* 386. 395—Evidence as to witness having acted from the first as though he could not rely on procuring forage or other supplies in Abyssinia; precarious character of such supply, *ib.* 396-400. 431-449. 454. 469-475—Liability to great disaster if witness had not accumulated abundant supplies, *ib.* 461-463—Obstacles to the prompt shipment of supplies from Bombay, *ib.* 464-467.

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I. As to the Quantity of Stores or Supplies provided—continued.

1. Explanations by Lord Napier, &c.—continued.

magnificent and unprecedented scale, *Lord Napier* 567-569—Further statement as to its having been intended to have six months' supply in hand, and a continuous supply every three months, *ib.* 646, 647—When in the highlands there never was anything like six months' supply in hand, *ib.* 647.

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2. Explanations by the Controller of Supply :

Confidential Memorandum received by witness from the Assistant Quartermaster General, in February 1868, in accordance with which steps were taken to provide supplies for eight or nine months, or till the end of October, *Holland* 4136-4179—This memorandum was dated the 13th February, and was received by witness about the 17th February, *ib.* 4164, 4165, 4224—Statement that witness was not responsible for the scale on which supplies or animals were first ordered for Abyssinia, *ib.* 4191-4196.

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3. Explanations on the part of the Bombay Government, and Sir Seymour Fitzgerald :

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4. Views of General Jameson, Sir William Mansfield, and others—continued.

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