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**VII. Suggestions in regard to Transmission and Distribution :**

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Proposed consignment, in case of war, of all stores, &c. to the Control Department, who should land them, and hand them over to the several departments to which they belonged, *Sir W. J. T. Power* 4486, 4487.

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*Subordinate Appointments.* See *Staff Appointments.*

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*Swanson, Colonel.* Letter from Colonel Swanson, Auditor of Commissariat Accounts, Bombay, dated 18th April 1859, upon the question of the provision of stores by the Commissariat Department, and the amount and cost of the establishment of the department, *App.* 439, 440.

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*Tanks.* Supply of tanks according to the recommendation of the Superintendent of Marine at Bombay, the cost having been about 142,500 *l.*; question hereon, whether this expenditure was not excessive, *Marriott* 3507-3519. 3596-3599—Higher price paid for tonnage at Bombay if the ships had to provide themselves with the required tanks, *ib.* 3648-3654—Reason for inferring that the supply of water tanks was greater than was required, *ib.* 3730, 3731—Circumstance of information not having been supplied by the Superintendent of Marine relative to the number and cost of tanks, *ib.* 3993-3998.

## TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION:

1. *Importance attached by Lord Napier and others to the Provision of Telegraphic Communication.*
2. *Offers made to the India Office, but not accepted.*
3. *Explanatory Statement by the late Secretary of State for India.*
4. *How far the Matter was considered by the Bombay Government.*
5. *Conclusion submitted in Draft Report by Chairman of the Committee.*

1. *Importance attached by Lord Napier and others to the Provision of Telegraphic Communication:*

Probable advantages if a submarine cable had been laid, as suggested by witness at the time, *Lord Napier* 160—If witness had had the power he would have ordered a cable the first thing, *ib.*—Further evidence on the question of a submarine cable from Bombay to Suez, and from Suez to Zulla; belief that it would have been laid in time to have rendered valuable service, *ib.* 355-361—It is difficult to name a point in which it would not have saved expenditure, *ib.* 355—Statement to the effect that witness would have a cable laid if the terms were in reason, and if it could have been laid in three months or so, *ib.* 502-505.

Great importance attached to telegraphic communication in time of war, *Osborn* 1920, 1921. 2062—Witness received private information from Bombay to the effect that Sir Robert Napier was anxious for telegraphic communication, *ib.* 1920.

Saving of some expenditure if there had been telegraphic communication between Suez and Annesley Bay, *Marriott* 3531, 3532—Great importance of a telegraphic communication between Zulla and England, *General Staveley* 5288, 5289.

Strong opinion expressed by General Merewether as to the importance of rapid telegraph communication from Zulla and Suez, *Beaumont* 5434—Conclusions arrived at by Colonel Stanton as to the great value of a telegraphic communication between Zulla and Suez, both in a pecuniary and a military point of view, *ib.* 5491-5494.

2. *Offers made to the India Office, but not accepted:*

Explanation relative to certain offers made by witness, on the part of the Telegraph Construction and Maintenance Company, in October and November 1867, to lay a cable between Massowah and Suez; comment upon the refusal of the Secretary of State for India to accept either of these offers, *Osborn* 1916-1938. 2016-2024. 2040-2042. 2062, 2063—Statement that had an order been given to witness's company by the 1st December, a permanent cable might have been laid by the 1st April, and a flying line by the 1st February, *ib.* 1918-1935. 1938. 2016-2024. 2040-2042—Cold water was thrown upon witness's proposal, so that nothing came of it, *ib.* 1924.

Particulars relative to the financial arrangements proposed by the Telegraph Construction and Maintenance Company, in their offers to Government; the result was that for 50,000 *l.* or 60,000 *l.*, the use of a cable during the Expedition might have been obtained, *Osborn* 1926-1937. 2021—Further statement on the question of a Red Sea telegraph; communication with Government on the subject in July and August 1867, but not with reference to the Abyssinian Expedition, *ib.* 2043-2047.

3 *Explanatory Statement by the late Secretary of State for India:*

Letter from witness to Captain Sherard Osborn, on the 2nd September 1867, upon the question of the Telegraph Construction and Maintenance Company being able at once to

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to lay a cable between Suez and Massowah, *Sir S. H. Northcote* 5849—Communication in reply from Captain Osborn, to the effect that a cable might be laid from Suez to Massowah by the 15th December, *ib.*

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Explanation as to the obstacles to utilization of the cable from Suez to Jubal in connection with the Expedition, the chief objection being that it could not be relied upon, *Sir S. H. Northcote* 5849. 5864–5866—Several steps taken by Government with a view to the provision of telegraphic communication, different schemes having been carefully weighed, *ib.* 5849. 5865.

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4. *How far the Matter was considered by the Bombay Government:*

Consideration given by the Bombay Government to the question of a telegraph line, *Marriott* 3533–3537—The Governor of Bombay endeavoured that it should be arranged with the Egyptian Government to continue the Egyptian line from Sowakim to Massowah, *ib.* 3534.

5. *Conclusion submitted in Draft Report by Chairman of the Committee:*

Comment by the Chairman of the Committee, in his Draft Report, upon the failure to provide telegraphic communication; importance of a telegraph on the score of economy, *Rep.* xxvi, xxvii.

**Termination of Expedition.** Circumstance of the last transport not having been paid off till the 4th September 1868, whilst the troops had not all returned to their proper stations in India till the end of October, *Rep.* iv.

**Territorial Acquisition.** Probability of the conduct of the Expedition having been somewhat hampered by political considerations, it having been important to avoid anything which looked like territorial conquest, *Marriott* 5926, 5927.

**Tigre.** Increased cost if it had been necessary to take Tigre, or to advance through the highlands by fighting, *Lord Napier* 754–758.

**Tonnage.** See *Transports*.

**Tramways.** Application made by witness on the 9th October, for four sets of tramways of one mile each for service on the beach, *Wilkins* 1234, 1235. 1285—Statement as to an estimate for a tramway at a cost of 3,200 l. a mile having been furnished by the Bombay Public Works Department; this was to be workable either by cattle or by locomotives, *Kennedy* 5677–5684. 5690–5693.

**Transport Animals and Land Transport.** See *Land Transport*. **Mules.**

**TRANSPORTS:**I. *Abyssinian Expedition:*

1. Appointment and Functions of Captain Tryon as Agent of Transports.
2. Terms of Engagement of Freight in India.
3. Aziziah Company.
4. Bombay and Bengal Steam Navigation Company.
5. British India Steam Navigation Company.
6. Mule Transports.
7. Fittings.
8. Disabled Transports.
9. Exceptions taken to the course pursued in engaging Freight, and to the Rates paid.
10. Detention and Employment at Annesley Bay.
11. Detentions at Aden, and Return thence to Bombay.
12. Discharge at Bombay; Difficulties and Expense on this score.
13. Estimates and Expenditure.
14. Other Details generally.
15. Papers and Returns laid before the Committee.
16. Conclusions submitted in Draft Report by Chairman.

II. *Transport System generally.*

## TRANSPORTS—continued.

I. *Abyssinian Expedition* :

## 1. Appointment and Functions of Captain Tryon as Agent of Transports :

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## 2. Terms of Engagement of Freight in India :

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## 3. Aziziah Company :

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Agreement entered into with the Aziziah Company for the use of certain steamers belonging to the company for the conveyance of troops and stores, *App.* 459, 460.

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## 4. Bombay and Bengal Steam Navigation Company :

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## 5. British India Steam Navigation Company :

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## 6. Mule Transports :

Engagement by the Admiralty of five ships for the transport of mules in the Mediterranean, *Sir W. J. T. Power* 2440-2442—Delay as regards the Admiralty ships, so that the War Office were led to contract for two transports at Marseilles and for two in England ; it was also considered that economy would result from the employment of French vessels as being close to the work, *ib.* 2443-2447—Arrangement also by the War Office for the conveyance of mules by certain ships from Malta and from Brindisi to Alexandria, *ib.* 2448.

Very low contract rates for the conveyance of mules from Malta, Cyprus, &c., on account of their nearness to Alexandria, *Sir W. J. T. Power* 2449, 2450, 2464, 2465—Contract rate of 8 *l.* and 7 *l.* 10 *s.* respectively for each mule carried by the two French ships and by the two English ships engaged by the Admiralty, *ib.* 2451-2453—Calculation that the cost per mule in the Admiralty transports was 28 *l.* 5 *s.*, *ib.* 2454-2457—Conclusion that the best and cheapest plan would have been to engage transports in the Mediterranean, *ib.* 2466, 2621.

Comparative loss of animals by casualties on board the War Office vessels and the Admiralty vessels, *Sir W. J. T. Power* 2610-2612—Statement in regard to preliminary inquiries not having been made upon the question of there being ample transport available in the Mediterranean for the mules, *ib.* 2620-2627—Necessary approval by the Admiralty before the War Office or the India Office could hire transports, *ib.* 2604-2608, 2628-2630, 2651—Further reference to the circumstances under which it was proposed that the War Office should take prompt steps for providing mule transports, *ib.* 2651.

Apparently extravagant rates paid for the "Venetia" and the "Empress" for the conveyance of mules, *Darke* 2930-2937—Considerable expense for transport, forage, &c., before the delivery of the mules in Abyssinia, these charges having more than doubled the cost, *Whingates* 3082-3090—Statement that whilst 3 *l.* per head was paid for the passage of mules from Smyrna to Alexandria, only 2 *l.* was received by the shipowners, *Beaumont* 6161.

Return showing the tonnage of each mule ship taken up by the Admiralty, the period in the service, place of discharge, and amount of hire, *App.* 368.

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## TRANSPORTS—continued.

I. *Abyssinian Expedition*—continued.

## 6. Mule Transports—continued.

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## 7. Fittings :

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## 8. Disabled Transports.

Practice generally when ships are chartered that pay ceases during any break-down or repairs, *Bright* 2147-2151. 2165-2172—Statement with respect to a return of vessels disabled when under charter, that ships chartered by the Admiralty are never paid if they become disabled, *Admiral Mends* 2695-2712.

Statement as to the solicitor to the Bombay Government having advised that under the charter-party a ship was not legally entitled to payment if disabled, *Marriott* 3305, 3306—Inability of witness to explain the circumstance of payment having been made for the time whilst ships were disabled; conclusion however that it was done on further legal advice, *ib.* 3305-3318.

Provision in regard to the vessels of the Aziziah Company not being entitled to pay in the event of disablement, *Willoughby* 4967, 4968. 4970-4974.

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## 9. Exceptions taken to the course pursued in engaging Freight, and to the Rates paid :

Evidence in disapproval of the course pursued in the rejection of the "Ottawa" and "Iron Age" whilst other ships were chartered at higher rates, *Darke* 2781-2825. 2872-2881. 2891-2899—Calculations as to the amount represented by the value of various other vessels chartered for the Expedition and by their freight, the latter amounting in the aggregate to a larger sum than the former; instance of this in the case of the "Punjaub," *ib.* 2843. 2881. 2904-2921.

Opinion that, instead of advertising for tenders or employing a broker for taking up vessels, it would have been better if the Admiralty had specified a rate, say, from 22 *s.* to 25 *s.*; this margin would have secured an ample amount of tonnage, *Darke* 2882-2887. 2925. 2938-2943—Advantage, if instead of giving higher rates for vessels discharged abroad, a certain extra time were paid for in which such vessels might be brought home, *ib.* 2888-2890.

Examination to the effect that witness is not prepared to find any fault in respect of the rates paid by the Government of India, *Darke* 2904-2922—Doubt also whether the comparatively high rates paid for the "Golden Fleece" and other vessels taken up in England could have been avoided, *ib.* 2922-2925.

With respect to the "City of Manchester," taken up at 35 *s.* per ton per month, if discharged at home, and at 45 *s.* if discharged abroad, the freight amounted to much more than the actual value of the vessel, *Darke* 2806-2812. 2827-2842—High rate of freight of the "Punjaub," this vessel having been engaged in India; enhanced rates there as compared with the rates in England, *ib.* 2878-2881. 2904-2921.

## 10. Detention and Employment at Annesley Bay :

Necessity, on several grounds, of retaining a large amount of sea transport off the coast, this being a cause of much excess of expenditure, *Lord Napier* 6—Great reluctance of witness to have sent away the transports, even though there had been a prospect of a prolongation of the Expedition, *ib.* 797-799.

Doubt as to there having been good reason for detaining the whole of the transport fleet in Annesley Bay, *General Jameson* 1444-1448—Explanation that witness disclaims all intention of finding fault with Lord Napier as to the course pursued in providing

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## TRANSPORTS—continued.

I. *Abyssinian Expedition*—continued.

## 10. Detention and Employment at Annesley Bay—continued.

such large supplies, or in keeping the transports in the Red Sea, *General Jameson* 1470-1484. 1503—Lord Napier was doubtless the best judge whether the fleet should be kept at Annesley Bay, *ib.* 1471-1473. 1483.

Information relative to the winds and currents in the Red Sea, witness contending that sailing ships can beat out of the Red Sea, and that it was not necessary to retain steamers at Annesley Bay in order to tow them out, *Osborn* 1958-1967. 1984-1987. 2055-2059. 2064. 2076-2084.

Convenience (irrespective of the cost) in keeping stores on board the transports at Annesley Bay until they were wanted up the country, *Marriott* 3899-3901—Probability of a vessel (the "Royal Edward") having been at Annesley Bay for three months with a cargo of hay untouched, *Holland* 4381-4384.

Return containing particulars of the detention of each transport at Annesley Bay, *App.* 486-524.

Statement by Capt. Tryon, as to the difficulty of sailing ships in beating out of the Red Sea; reference more especially to the "Czarewitch" and the "Hope," *App.* 585, 586.

Explanation by Capt. Tryon as to transports having been sent from Annesley Bay for more cargo, though they still had a portion of their previous cargo on board, *App.* 585, 586.

## 11. Detentions at Aden, and Return thence to Bombay:

Arrival of the "British Princess" at Aden on the 29th April 1868, where she stayed for four weeks without the cargo having been touched, and was then ordered to return to Bombay, *Stewart* 3215-3223—The fall of Magdala was not known at Aden till some time after witness arrived there on the 29th April 1868, though there were rumours that the war was over, *ib.* 3231. 3254-3258.

Doubt as to the resident at Aden having had authority to send back vessels, though he might have detained them until rumours of the fall of Magdala were confirmed, *Holland* 4385-4387.

Letter from Mr. Brebner, late deputy agent for transports, dated 8th April 1870, enclosing list of hired transports which called at Aden in 1867 and 1868, and showing their detention there, *App.* 476-483.

## 12. Discharge at Bombay; Difficulties and Expense on this score:

Great difficulty in discharging vessels in Bombay Harbour; question hereon whether the transports might not have been discharged with facility if they had been towed behind Butcher's Island, *Lord Napier* 531-544—Heavy charge for demurrage owing to detention in Bombay Harbour during the monsoon, *General Jameson*, 1305.

Evidence relative to the means of shelter in Bombay Harbour from the south-west monsoon, and the facilities generally for the discharge of the cargoes of the transports; conclusion as to the undue delay and unnecessary cost in this matter, *Osborn* 1976-1983. 1991-2015. 2051-2054. 2060, 2061. 2073-2075.

Detention of the "Alsager" in Bombay Harbour from the 14th June till the 7th August 1868, during which period 420 tons of hay were landed, *Bright* 2110. 2134. 2174, 2175—Arrangement as to the vessel being discharged on the 7th August, the hay on board being given to the firm; considerable saving of freight to Government if this arrangement had been made in June, *ib.* 2110-2137.

Particulars relative to the detention of the "Albertine" for about six weeks, at a great cost, in order to discharge some articles of very trifling value; similar course pursued as regards the "Royal Standard," and many other transports, *Mostyn* 2312-2337. 2354-2397.

Discharge of the cargo of the "British Princess" at Bombay on the 28th July, the vessel having arrived there on the 12th June, *Stewart* 3224-3226—Statement as to the obstacles to discharge at Bombay, more especially as to the scarcity of boats and lighters, *ib.* 3229 *et seq.*—Facility of discharge if the "British Princess" had arrived at Bombay a month sooner; longer passage, however, if she had started from Aden a month or a fortnight earlier, *ib.* 3229-3231. 3263-3281.

Evidence as to the difficulty in landing the returned stores at Bombay, so that the cost of freight was greatly enhanced; objections to their disembarkation at Hog Island or Butcher's Island, *Marriott* 3568-3583. 3600-3608—Belief as to the great difficulty of obtaining boats in order to land the stores; grounds for this conclusion considered, *ib.* 3582-3594—Several ships bound to discharge at Calcutta which came to Bombay after the Expedition, *ib.* 3865, 3866—Willingness of the Bombay Government to have facilitated night work in Bombay harbour in the discharge of the transports, *ib.* 3895-3897.

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## TRANSPORTS—continued.

I. *Abyssinian Expedition*—continued.

## 12. Discharge at Bombay; Difficulties and Expense on this score—continued.

Information as to the use made of the lighters and tugs of the Public Works Department in discharging cargoes on the return of the transports to Bombay, *Kennedy* 5730-5736. 5750-5762—Doubt as to the advantage of towing the transports in the harbour behind Butcher's Island and Hog Island with a view to discharging them, *ib.* 5750-5757—Explanation that the Public Works barges were out of commission and were hauled up, and that the tugs also were not available, at the time of return of the transport, *ib.* 5875-5883—Statement as to some native barges of a contractor employed in landing stores at Bombay having been totally different from the Public Works barges, *ib.* 5900-5903. 5905—Inadequate resources of Bombay harbour for meeting any great and sudden pressure as regards the discharge of ships, more especially during the monsoon, *ib.* 5906-5916.

Information supplied by Sir Seymour Fitzgerald as to the insuperable obstacles to the discharge of the transports and the landing of the stores at Hog Island or Butcher's Island, *App.* 582.

## 13. Estimates and Expenditure:

Belief that there was no unnecessary expenditure in respect of transports, *Lord Napier* 140, 141—Greatly enhanced expense for transports if the campaign had been prolonged, *ib.* 587, 588. 601. 636—Conclusion as to the prices paid for shipping at Bombay not having been too high, *ib.* 812-815.

Examination as to the excess of expenditure in respect of sea transport, the total payments amounting to 3,372,152 *l.* as compared with estimates amounting to 2,730,000 *l.*, *General Jameson*, 1305-1322—Large increase of the estimate owing to the additional vessels required for conveying transport animals, *ib.* 1305.

Difficulty previously to December 1867 of forming any estimate at Bombay of the rate of tonnage, *Marriott* 3683-3686.

Inability of witness to offer any opinion upon the question of cost of transport for the Expedition; he had nothing whatever to do with the arrangements, *Admiral Robinson*, 5613-5616.

Suggestion whether some of the excess of estimate might not have been avoided under the head of Transport, if the Government of India had directed the expedition, *Sir W. Mansfield* 6008. 6017. 6118-6120. 6122—There probably was some rivalry between the ports in procuring transports, which led to enhanced rates, *ib.* 6008. 6017. 6118—Every possible precaution was doubtless taken by the Bombay Government to obtain transports at the lowest rate, *ib.* 6119.

Enhanced rate paid for tonnage at Calcutta by reason of the vessels having been chartered for only three months, *Beaumont*, 6161.

Analysis by General Hannington of the estimate and expenditure for hire of transport, the result being that the monthly charge was 478,314 *l.*, instead of 400,000 *l.*, as estimated, *App.* 593, 594.

## 14. Other Details generally:

Strong approval of the promptitude with which steam Transports were sent out from England, *Lord Napier*, 307, 308—Witness made no inquiry as to the quantity of tonnage to be employed, which he considered a matter beyond his province, *ib.* 675-678—Advantage if line of battle ships had been employed in conveying troops to and from Annesley Bay, *Osborn* 2050—Statement as to the value per ton of colonial-built ships if bought outright instead of chartered, *Bright* 2138-2146.

Information supplied to the Home Government in August and September 1867, that 150,000 tons of shipping would be required for animals, and 90,000 for men and stores, *Marriott* 3402-3409—Inaccuracy of a statement in Captain Hozier's book, that undue economy and delay had been exercised by the Bombay Government in taking up transports in the first instance, *ib.* 3620—Ample quantity of tonnage engaged for the Expedition, *ib.* 3643-3645—Due consideration given at Bombay to the question of buying vessels, instead of chartering them, *ib.* 3824-3826.

## 15. Papers and Returns laid before the Committee:

List of Transports taken up by the Admiralty for the Abyssinian Expedition, showing in each case the tonnage, period in the service, where discharged, and amount of hire paid, *App.* 368.

Return of vessels tendered for service, in connection with the Abyssinian Expedition, but not accepted; reason for rejection in each case, *App.* 369-374.

Miscellaneous offers of vessels for hire for service in connection with the Expedition; cause of rejection in each case, *App.* 375.

**TRANSPORTS**—continued.**I. Abyssinian Expedition**—continued.**15. Papers and Returns laid before the Committee**—continued.

Statement showing the movements of the steam transports engaged in England for the Abyssinian Expedition; the troops, &c., and cargo conveyed; the period of service; and the amount of hire, *App.* 376-382.

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Return of arrivals and sailings at Suez of vessels engaged in the Expedition, showing in each case the date of arrival and of departure, *App.* 485.

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*Tryon, Captain George, R.N., C.B.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Complete record kept by witness (who had charge of the transports) of the services rendered by every ship; proposal for laying this document before the Committee, 201-205—Witness also hands in a copy of his instructions, as received from the Admiralty, 206.

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*"Venetia," The.* Information relative to the services of this transport in the conveyance of mules, *App.* 536.

*Vote of Credit.* Anticipation expressed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Disraeli) that a vote of 2,000,000 *l.* would be sufficient, if it were found that the mere landing of a force in Abyssinia would ensure the objects of the Expedition, *Rep.* iii.

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*"Wadali" Steam Barge.* Inability of witness to explain the circumstances under which the "Wadali" steam barge was not purchased till February 1868, though offered at the same price some months previously, *Marriott* 3641, 3642.

*War Office.* Estimate made in the War Office for a portion only of the mules, and for a small quantity of forage and of stores, the total amount not much exceeding 300,000 *l.*, *Sir W. J. T. Power* 2660-2663.

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*Warden, Lieutenant Colonel.* Statement as to Colonel Warden (now dead) having been nominated as director of the Transport Train by Lord Napier, and having been appointed contrary to the remonstrances of Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, who had reasons for considering him very unfit for the post, *Marriott* 5884. 5895, 5896—Belief that the death of Colonel Warden may be in part attributed to his labours in connection with the Transport Corps, *ib.* 5884—Primary responsibility of Colonel Warden as to the non-provision of subordinate superintendence, and as to any deficiencies in Bombay after the scheme of organisation had been decided, *ib.* 5884. 5924.

State of health of Colonel Warden in Abyssinia adverted to as not having interfered with the exercise of his duties, *Marriott* 5897-5899—Employment of Colonel Warden in the Transport Corps in the Crimea, *ib.* 5921—Circumstance of Colonel Phayre having strongly recommended Colonel Warden to Lord Napier, *ib.* 5922, 5923.

Report on the Transport Train by Lieutenant Colonel Warden, director of the train, *App.* 346-350.

Memorandum by Major Warden, as director of the Land Transport Corps, dated 15th August 1867, containing suggestions relative to the organisation of the corps, *App.* 551-556.

Testimony by Sir Robert Napier to the great and laudable exertions of Major Warden in collecting the Land Transport establishment, *App.* 565.

**WATER SUPPLY:**

1. *Steps taken in the Provision of Water-pipes.*
2. *Non-laying of the Pipes.*
3. *Character of the Supply available.*
4. *Condensing; heavy Expense on that Score.*
5. *Exceptions taken to the Course pursued.*

1. *Steps taken in the Provision of Water-pipes:*

Explanatory statement in detail relative to the available supplies of water at Weeah and Hcdeida, and the steps taken to utilise such supplies; particulars more especially as to the measures adopted, or contemplated, for providing pipes for the conveyance of this water, *Lord Napier* 479-491—Further explanations relative to the question of water supply, and the lapse of time before water-pipes were procured; witness does not admit that blame was involved in the non-laying of the pipes, *ib.* 654-663. 745. 759-762—Application made by witness for water-pipes, through fear of some calamity to the shipping, *ib.* 807.

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Examination as to the lapse of time, after the landing of witness, before he made requisitions for pipes, the water at Zulla having failed in the meantime; explanation that it was never anticipated that so large a force would remain at Zulla, nor for so long a time, *Wilkins* 933-981. 1039-1047—Circumstance of some piping having been sent for as early as October, though not to bring water from the Weeah or Koomayli; explanation as to these pipes not having been forwarded, *ib.* 950-959—Statement as to a portion only of the piping having been landed at Annesley Bay, and as to some of it having made one or two passages to Suez and back, *ib.* 1007-1014.

Consideration given by the Bombay Government to the question of laying water-pipes to Koomayli, *Marriott* 3424-3428—Explanation relative to an apparent delay in sending an order to England for water-pipes, *ib.* 3552-3555.

Statement of the views of General Merewether, as expressed in answer to witness's inquiries on the subject of the supply of water at Zulla, and the delay in the provision of pipes; great importance attached by General Merewether to such supply, *Beaumont* 5423-5426.

Supply of water-pipes ordered at Bombay by the Public Works Department on the 14th November 1867, a further supply having been asked for from England on the 24th December; no further steps were taken by the department between these dates, *Kennedy* 5740-5744—Explanation that the piping first ordered was for bringing the water from a point near Zulla, and that the second supply ordered was for bringing the water from Koomayli, *ib.* 5871-5874.

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2. *Non-laying of the Pipes:*

Probability that the labour of laying the water-pipes would have been great, *Lord Napier* 745.

Heavy works necessary, as in the construction of reservoirs, &c., in order to carry out the project for bringing water from the River Weeah or Koomayli to Zulla, *Wilkins* 845, 846. 855-861. 1161, 1162—Circumstance of these works not having been put in hand when the pipes were ordered, whilst the latter on arrival were never laid; explanation hereon in detail to the effect that the required labour was not available, *ib.* 847-849. 855, *et seq.*—Considerable time necessary in order to complete the works for the pipes, and to convey the pipes and lay them, even if carriage and labour had been available, *ib.* 855-863. 913. 914-917, 918.

Statement showing how far any steps were taken to provide labour for the work; no actual requisition was made on the subject, *Wilkins* 864-877. 899-907. 1004-1006. 1019-1022—Objections, on the score of climate and health, to the employment of European labour in laying the pipes or making reservoirs, *ib.* 864. 878-887. 895-897. 919-921. 1023-1038. 1048-1056. 1059-1063. 1121, 1122. 1214-1219—Several considerations by which witness was guided in suspending the laying of the pipes; he was in the act of commencing the work when Magdala was taken, *ib.* 922-930. 932. 1012-1018.

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Probability of a large increase of expense on the score of hospital accommodation and transport in respect of labour employed in laying the pipes, *Wilkins* 1031-1038. 1048-1057—Sacrifice of money in the case of the water pipes, the campaign having terminated so early that it was not necessary to lay them, *ib.* 1150, 1151—Doubt as to the cost necessary for laying the pipes, *ib.* 1152, 1153.

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Information relative to the quantity and quality of the water procurable from Koomayli and the River Weeah; witness cannot admit that a supply from these sources would have rendered the Expedition independent of the condensing steamers, *Wilkins* 834. 837, 838. 908-912. 915, 916. 961, 962. 1042-1044. 1123-1128—Sufficiency, after a time, of the supply of water at Zulla, *ib.* 908, 909.

4. *Condensing ; heavy Expense on this Score :*

Great and unforeseen difficulty as to water supply, and great expense in providing such supply, this being one cause of the excess of expenditure over estimate, *Lord Napier* 6—Contingencies in connection with the supply of water from Weeah and Koomayli, so that witness would not have been prepared to dispense with condensers, *ib.* 799-763—Importance of the use of condensed water on the score of health, *ib.* 778. 782.

Sundry details on the subject of the water supply, with reference more especially to the failure to procure a supply from the River Weeah or from Koomayli, and the necessary recourse to condensing, *Wilkins* 833 *et seq.*—Great cost of condensing adverted to; it was never anticipated so large a quantity of water would be required, *ib.* 970-983. 1129, 1133. 1154-1156.

Excellent quality of the water supplied by the condensing vessels, *Wilkins* 1123, 1124—Approval generally of relying upon condensing apparatus for supplying expeditions, unless sources of supply on shore are a certainty, *ib.* 1125-1128. 1220-1223—Liability of the pipes to be interfered with or destroyed by the natives, so that it would not have been prudent to rely upon them exclusively of condensing arrangements, *ib.* 1156-1160.

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*Webber, Captain.* Suggestion as regards Captain Webber offering explanations on the subject of the purchase of mules, *Beaumont* 6146, 6147.

*Wetherell & Co.* Particulars relative to a contract made by the Director of Contracts with Messrs. Wetherell & Co. for the purchase of mules in Spain on commission; very exceptional terms of this contract, which was disgracefully carried out, the mules procured under it having been the worst sent to Abyssinia, *Sir W. J. T. Power* 2469, 2470. 2471-2520. 2648-2650.

Details in connection with the contract of the War Office with Messrs. Wetherell & Co. for a supply of mules at a price not exceeding 30 *l.* a head, there being also a commission to the contractors of from 8 *l.* to 9 *l.* a head, *Whinyates* 2952-2957. 3043-3046. 3099-3102.

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*Whinyates, Captain, R.H.A.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Was sent by the War Office to Spain in August 1867 to buy mules, and to embark mules bought in the interior; after arrival at Alicante was instructed not to give more than 22*l.* per mule, 2944-2951. 3004, 3005. 3020, 3022—Association of a Commissariat officer and veterinary surgeon with witness, and also with the officers sent to Valentia and Barcelona for the same purpose, 2948. 2981-2983—Contract of the War Office with Messrs. Wetherell & Co. for a supply of mules at a price not exceeding 30*l.* a head, there being also a commission to the contractors of from 8*l.* to 9*l.* a head, 2952-2957. 3043-3045. 3099-3102.

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Demand made by witness for seventeen miles of five-inch piping, which was calculated to convey 200 tons of water daily, 836-838—Heavy works necessary, as in the construction of reservoirs, &c., in order to carry out the project for bringing water from the River Weeah or Koomayli to Zulla, 845, 846. 855-861. 1161, 1162—Circumstance of these works not having been put in hand when the pipes were ordered, whilst the latter on arrival were never laid; explanation hereon in detail to the effect that the required labour was not available, 847-849. 855 *et seq.*

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R E P O R T

4/39

FROM THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

ON

A R M Y (C O L O N E L S) ;

TOGETHER WITH THE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE,

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE,

AND APPENDIX.

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*Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,*  
*26 July 1870.*

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*Tuesday, 28th June 1870.*

*Ordered*, THAT a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into complaints of hardships urged on behalf of the Colonels of the British Army in consequence of their supersession by the Colonels of the Indian Army.

*Wednesday, 6th July 1870.*

Select Committee nominated :—

Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.  
Sir Percy Herbert.  
Mr. Grant Duff.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Brand.  
Sir Rainald Knightley.  
Mr. Kirkman Hodgson.  
Mr. Clay.

Mr. Slater-Booth.  
Sir Edward Colebrooke.  
Mr. Goldney.  
Sir Charles Wingfield.  
Mr. Bourke.  
Mr. West.  
Major Anson.

*Ordered*, THAT the Committee have power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.

*Ordered*, THAT Five be the quorum of the Committee.

*Tuesday, 26th July 1870.*

*Ordered*, THAT the Committee have power to report their observations, together with the Minutes of Evidence taken before them, to The House.

|                              |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |        |
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4/41

## R E P O R T.

**THE SELECT COMMITTEE** appointed to inquire into the Complaints of Hardships urged on behalf of the **COLONELS** of the **BRITISH ARMY** in consequence of their **SUPERSESSION** by the **COLONELS** of the **INDIAN ARMY**;—**HAVE** considered the matters to them referred, and have agreed to the following **REPORT**:

1. **YOUR Committee** have inquired into the complaints preferred on behalf of the colonels of the British army, of their supersession as major generals by colonels of the Indian army junior to them.

2. They find that at the present time colonels of 1866 of the Indian Army have been promoted to be major generals, while colonels of 1858 of the British list are still unpromoted.

3. They find that the last Indian colonel promoted superseded about 279 colonels of the British list senior to himself.

4. They find that colonels of the British army, who commanded brigades and independent columns in India during the mutiny, have been superseded in the rank of major general by Indian officers who, in the rank of captain, major, or lieutenant colonel, actually served under their orders.

5. This state of things has arisen partly from the Warrant of 1854.

6. Partly from the exceptional promotion in the upper ranks of the Indian army, caused by the special pensions given by the Indian Government as an inducement to their officers to retire, since 1858.

7. Partly by the Warrant of 1864 rescinding the Warrant of 1862.

8. Previous to 1854, with the exception of promotion for distinguished service, all promotions from the rank of lieutenant colonel to colonel, and subsequently to major general, were strictly by seniority in both armies.

9. In 1854 a fixed establishment of general officers was given to each army.

10. In fixing the number of the respective lists, it appears to have escaped consideration that, in the British army, there are a considerable number of colonels on half-pay who have to fill all staff appointments for that rank (by the Queen's regulations no officer of that rank on full-pay being allowed to hold staff appointments), while there are no officers on the Indian list corresponding to them.

11. Again, while all officers of the Indian army, after serving 22 years, are enabled to retire on a liberal scale of pension, without limit to their number, very few British officers are permitted to retire even on a lower scale of pension and after a longer service.

12. It thus arises that the number of colonels of the Indian army is far smaller in proportion to the number of general officers on the Indian list than the number of British colonels is to the generals on the British list.

13. Hence arises that which a reference to the Army List will show: that of two officers who attained the rank of colonel in 1866, the one being an Indian officer,

officer, and the other a British officer, the Indian colonel will be made a major general about 1870, while the British colonel will not be made a major general until about 1880.

14. Your Committee think it advisable that such a state of things should no longer exist, and they therefore recommend that the action of the Warrant of 1864, so far as it affects the promotion to the rank of major general, should cease from this date, and that an amalgamated list of colonels be at once formed from the British, the Staff corps, and Indian local lists, from which amalgamated list promotions to the rank of major general shall be made by seniority, according to the dates of colonels' commissions.

15. It has been argued that this arrangement would be a breach of the Parliamentary guarantee of 1858, which provides that all officers of the late East India Company's Services "shall be entitled to the like pay, pensions, allowances, and privileges, and the like advantages as regards promotion and otherwise, as if they had continued in the service of the Company."

16. It was in consequence of the interpretation of this clause by the Royal Commission of 1864, over which Lord Cranworth presided, that the alterations were made in the Warrant of 1862; and your Committee would call attention to a few facts with regard to those alterations.

17. Although the Royal Commission of 1864 was appointed to consider the previous complaints of the Indian officers, as represented in their memorials to both Houses of Parliament, it is worthy of remark that in the Report of that Commission no reference is made to any memorial complaining of the action of the Warrant of 1862 as regarded the promotion of the Indian officers to the rank of major general.

18. Lord Cranworth's Commission, however, considered that the operation of the Warrant of 1862 would be a breach of the Parliamentary guarantee, but in the conclusions at which they arrived, and in the recommendations they made, the manner in which the British army would be affected appears to have escaped their consideration.

19. Your Committee have ascertained that, under the rule of the East India Company, supersessions of British officers by Indian officers was not permitted, and were carefully guarded against up to 1854. Correspondence establishing this, between the Duke of Wellington and Lord Hill on the one hand, and the then Presidents of the Board of Control on the other, has been laid before your Committee.

20. Your Committee are convinced that, had the Government of the East India Company still existed, no such supersession would have taken place; and they are of opinion that such measures as may be necessary to prevent it for the future would not be any breach of the Parliamentary guarantee.

21. Your Committee are further of opinion that your Honourable House, in giving that guarantee to the officers of the Honourable East India Company's Service in 1858, had no intention of giving to them any advantage over the officers of the British army which they had not up to that time enjoyed.

22. While on this subject your Committee wish to point out that one of the proposals agreed to by the Secretary of State for War, and by the Secretary of State for India, viz., the limitation of the rank of the Indian officers eastward of the Cape, might just as well be considered a breach of the guarantee as the proposal for forming an amalgamated list of colonels at once. It, however, does not amend the grievance, and is an insufficient and unsatisfactory remedy, as the Indian officers will continue to hold their ranks in the very country where the interests of the two services clash.

23. The proposals of your Committee have only dealt with the future, and, if accepted, will prevent any further grievance in the shape of supersession.

24. Your Committee have had the advantage of hearing the evidence of Lieutenant General Sir William Mansfield, late Commander in Chief in India. They learned from it that the grievance complained of is not by any means an  
imaginary

imaginary or trifling character. Sir William Mansfield recommends that an amalgamated list should be formed of the colonels of the two armies, that no further supersession should be allowed, and that the list of major generals should be corrected from 1865, like arrangements being made for the Artillery and Engineers. Sir William Mansfield further informed your Committee that a still more serious supersession of the British officers is taking place in consequence of the rules of promotion in the India Staff Corps. As this is not strictly within the order of reference, your Committee make no further remark upon it than that the case appears, as stated by Sir William Mansfield, to be worthy of the attention of Her Majesty's Government.

26 July 1870.

## PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE.

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*Friday, 8th July 1870.*

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Major Anson.  
Mr. Clay.  
Mr. West.  
Mr. Slater-Booth.  
Mr. Bourke.  
Mr. Goldney.

Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.  
Mr. Brand.  
Sir Percy Herbert.  
Sir Charles Wingfield.  
Mr. Grant Duff.

Major *Anson* was called to the Chair.

The Committee deliberated, and

[Adjourned till Thursday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

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*Thursday, 14th July 1870*

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MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major ANSON in the Chair.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer.  
Sir Rainald Knightley.  
Mr. Grant Duff.  
Sir Charles Wingfield.  
Mr. West.  
Mr. Brand.  
Mr. Bourke.

Sir Percy Herbert.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Clay.  
Sir Edward Colebrooke.  
Mr. Goldney.  
Mr. Slater-Booth.

Colonel *Egerton* and Major General *Pears* were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Monday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

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*Monday, 18th July 1870.*

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MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major ANSON in the Chair.

Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Brand.  
Sir Charles Wingfield  
Mr. Clay.  
Mr. West.

Sir Percy Herbert.  
The Chancellor of the Exchequer.  
Mr. Slater-Booth.  
Mr. Grant Duff.  
Sir Edward Colebrooke.

Lieutenant General Sir *W. Mansfield* and Major General *Pears*, were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Friday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

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*Friday, 22nd July 1870.*

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major ANSON in the Chair.

Mr. West.  
Sir John Hay.  
Sir Percy Herbert.  
Sir Edward Colebrooke.  
Sir Charles Wingfield.  
The Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Mr. Clay.  
Mr. Grant Duff.  
Sir Rainald Knightley.  
Mr. Goldney.  
Mr. Bourke.  
Mr. Selater-Booth.

DRAFT REPORT proposed by the *Chairman* brought up, and read first time, as follows:—

“1. Your Committee have inquired into the complaints preferred on behalf of the colonels of the British army, of their supersession as major generals by colonels of the Indian army junior to them.

“2. They find that at the present time colonels of 1866 of the Indian army have been promoted to be major generals, while colonels of 1858 of the British list are still unpromoted.

“3. They find that the last Indian colonel promoted superseded no less than 279 colonels of the British list senior to himself.

“4. They find that colonels of the British army promoted to that rank for distinguished service in the field, who commanded brigades and independent columns in India during the mutiny, have been superseded in the rank of major general by Indian officers, who in the rank of captain, major, or lieutenant colonel, actually served under their own orders.

“5. This state of things has arisen partly from the Warrant of 1854.

“6. Partly from the exceptional promotion in the upper ranks of the Indian army, caused by the special pensions given by the Indian Government as an inducement to their officers to retire, since 1858.

“7. Partly by a departure from the principles laid down by the Warrant of 1862.

“8. Previous to 1854, all promotions from the rank of lieutenant colonel to colonel and subsequently to major general, was strictly by seniority, in both armies, with the exception of promotion for distinguished service.

“9. In 1854 a fixed establishment of general officers was given to each army, the intention no doubt being to give even promotion to each.

“10. In fixing the number of the respective lists, it appears to have escaped consideration, that in the British army there are a considerable number of colonels on half-pay, who have to fill all staff appointments for that rank (by the Queen's regulations no officer of that rank on full-pay being allowed to hold staff appointments), while there are no officers on the Indian list corresponding to them.

“11. Again, while all officers of the Indian army, after serving 22 years are enabled to retire on a liberal scale of pension, without limit to their number, very few British officers are permitted to retire even on a lower scale of pension and after a longer service.

“12. It thus arises that the number of colonels of the Indian army is far smaller in proportion to the number of general officers on the Indian list than the number of British colonels is to the generals on the British list.

“13. Hence arises that which a reference to the Army List will show; that two officers who attained the rank of colonel in 1866, the one an Indian officer, the other a British officer, the Indian colonel will be made a major general in 1870, while the British colonel will not be made a major general until 1880.

“14. Your Committee think it advisable that such a state of things should no longer exist, and they therefore recommend that the action of the Warrant of 1864, so far as it effects the promotion to the rank of major general, should cease from this date, and an amalgamated list of colonels be at once formed from the British, the staff corps and Indian local lists, from which list promotions to the rank of major general shall be made by seniority, according to the dates of colonels' commissions.

" 15. It has been argued that this arrangement would be a breach of the Parliamentary guarantee of 1858, which provides that all officers of the late East India Company's Services 'shall be entitled to the like pay, pensions, allowances, and privileges, and the like advantages as regards promotion and otherwise, as if they had continued in the service of the Company.'

" 16. It was in consequence of the interpretation of this clause by the Royal Commission of 1864, over which Lord Cranworth presided, that the alterations were made in the Warrant of 1862; and your Committee would call attention to a few facts with regard to those alterations.

" 17. Although the Royal Commission of 1864 was appointed to consider the previous complaints of the Indian officers as represented in their memorials to both Houses of Parliament, it is worthy of remark that in the report of that Commission no reference is made to any memorial complaining of the action of the Warrant of 1862 as regarded the promotion of the Indian officers to the rank of major general. This of itself would seem to point out that this portion of the Warrant of 1862 was not considered by the Indian officers as a breach of the Parliamentary guarantee.

" 18. It was, however, so regarded by Lord Cranworth's Commission; but in the conclusions they arrived at, and in the recommendations they made, the manner in which the British army would be affected appears to have escaped their consideration.

" 19. Your Committee have ascertained that under the rule of the East India Company, supersessions of King's officers by Indian officers was not permitted, and was carefully guarded against. Correspondence establishing this, between the Duke of Wellington and Lord Hill on the one hand, and the then President of the Board of Control on the other, have been laid before your Committee.

" 20. Your Committee are convinced that had the Government of the East India Company still existed, no supersession would have taken place; and they are of opinion that such measures as may be necessary to prevent it for the future would not be any breach of the Parliamentary guarantee.

" 21. Your Committee are further of opinion that your Honourable House, in giving that guarantee to the officers of the Honourable East India Company's Service in 1858, had no intention of securing to them any advantage over the officers of the British army which they had not up to that time enjoyed, still less of doing an injustice and an injury to the British officers by securing special and unwonted advantages to the Indian officers.

" 22. While on this subject your Committee wish to point out that one of the proposals agreed to by the Secretary of State for War, and by the Secretary of State for India, viz., the limitation of the rank of the Indian officers eastward of the Cape, might just as well be considered a breach of the guarantee as the proposal for forming an amalgamated list of colonels at once, it, however, does not amend the grievance, and is an insufficient and unsatisfactory remedy, as the Indian officers will continue to hold their ranks in the very country where the interests of the two services clash.

" 23. Your Committee therefore recommend that the proposed limitation of rank should be rescinded.

" 24. The proposals of your Committee have only dealt with the future, and, if accepted, will prevent any further grievance in the shape of supersession."

**DRAFT REPORT** proposed by Mr. *Grant Duff* brought up, and read the first time, as follows:—

" YOUR Committee has considered the evidence which has been laid before it with reference to the complaints of the colonels of the British army who have been superseded in the rank of major general by colonels of the Indian army junior to them.

" 2. Your Committee finds that the supersession complained of has arisen chiefly from the exceptional promotion in the higher ranks of the Indian army, caused by the special pensions given by the Indian Government in 1861, and partly by the operation of the Royal Warrant of 1864, in so far as it relates to the removal of the general officers of Artillery from the Indian list.

" 3. Your Committee finds, further, that supersession of this nature on one side or the other was inevitable, inasmuch as, while the establishment of general officers was fixed in both branches of Her Majesty's service, there was no fixed establishment of Colonels in either army; but it appears that, while the promotion of the Indian officers has, doubtless, been expedited by these exceptional measures, that of the British colonels has still gone on under the regulations of their own service, precisely as it did before.

" 4. Your Committee finds that the Secretary of State for India in Council and the Secretary of State for War, after most anxious consideration of the difficulties that beset this

this question, and of the proposals of the Committee appointed to consider the matter, under the presidency of Vice Chancellor Sir William James, have agreed to the following arrangements :

"(1.) That all major generals of the British army, who have been promoted to that grade since the 6th of March 1868, be granted commissions in that rank, dated on that day ; and that in future all British colonels, on being promoted to the rank of major general, be granted commissions bearing such a date as will retain them in the same position, relatively to officers of the Indian army, which they held as colonels ; the commissions of the major generals of Artillery, Engineers, and Marines, being likewise so dated as to place them immediately above the colonel of the Guards or Line who is first promoted after them to the rank of major general, and that position being retained by them so long as they respectively remain in that grade.

"(2.) That the rank of major general on the Indian list be made local only, in the case of all promotions dated after a notification to that effect, which was issued on the 3rd of May 1870, the rank being made general as then dated, as soon as the colonel of next senior date on the British list becomes a major general.

"(3.) That in the case of a major general of the British army, serving in India, thinking it right to decline a command, owing to the necessity, if he were to accept it, of his serving under an officer of the Indian army, whose rank as colonel was junior to his own, the circumstances be taken into consideration with a view to such compensation being given as may seem to be called for.

"(4.) That the Royal Warrant of the 15th of June 1864 be so modified as to keep within due limits the promotion to the rank of major general, of the surviving local Indian officers, after the removal, from the Indian list, of the names of all officers of the Staff Corps.

"5. It does not appear from the Evidence which has been laid before your Committee, that any substantial grievance, either pecuniary or professional, has occurred to individual officers.

"6. Your Committee has further ascertained that the amalgamation of the colonels of the several Indian Staff Corps with the British list of colonels will soon be completed, there being only six more officers of the former class to be promoted on the Indian list, and under the Indian rules ; and the effect of that amalgamation will be greatly beneficial to the British officers, giving to the British list between 40 and 50 additional major generals, in lieu of an equal number of those officers who, under the old Indian rules, would have enjoyed the promotion due to those vacancies.

"7. With regard to the officers of the late East India Company's army who did not elect to join the Staff Corps, it has been distinctly declared by the Royal Commission over which Lord Cranworth presided, that their amalgamation with the British list, according to date of rank, which was an essential feature of the Royal Warrant of the 1st of January 1862, would involve an infringement of the Parliamentary Guarantee contained in the Acts 21 & 22 Vict. c. 106, s. 56, and 23 & 24 Vict. c. 100. After stating the effect of such a proceeding, the Commission reported their opinion in the following words (paragraph 80):—"Should this arrangement be carried into operation, it appears to us that it will cause injury of by no means an imaginary character. It will be felt less and less by officers, as they are further and further removed from the rank of colonel. But the new rule must cause to many officers great delay in their promotion, without any countervailing advantage ; and we, therefore, feel bound to express our opinion that, in this respect, the Parliamentary assurance has not been fulfilled."

"8. The number of these officers who will be promoted yearly is relatively small ; the local service itself is dying out ; and your Committee has every reason to believe that the measures explained by Major General Pears, in his evidence, will have a marked effect in removing the inconveniences now complained of, so far as those officers are concerned.

"9. Your Committee do not, under these circumstances, recommend that Her Majesty's Government should run the risk of placing itself in direct antagonism to the Parliamentary Guarantee, or of raising fresh agitation in the Indian army. It, therefore, cannot advise the adoption of any measures, beyond those which have been already agreed to by the Secretary of State for War, and the Secretary of State for India in Council ; and it desires to express its opinion that inconveniences, such as those which have formed the subject of this inquiry, should be removed rather by such careful modification of existing rules as has been already sanctioned in this case, than by violent changes, the exact result of which it is impossible to foresee, but which cannot fail to lead to renewed controversy."

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Draft Report, proposed by the Chairman, be now read the second time paragraph by paragraph—(The Chairman).—Amendment proposed, to leave out the words "The Chairman," and insert the words "Mr. Grant Duff"—(Mr. Grant

*Grant Duff*),—instead thereof.—Question put, That the words “The Chairman” stand part of the Question.—The Committee divided :

Ayes, 8.  
Mr. West.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Lowe.  
Sir Percy Herbert.  
Mr. Clay.  
Sir Edward Colebrooke.  
Sir Rainald Knightley.  
Mr. Goldney.

Noes, 2.  
Sir Charles Wingfield.  
Mr. Grant Duff.

Draft Report proposed by the Chairman read a second time and considered, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1—13, amended, and *agreed to*.

Paragraph 14—Amendments made.—Question put, That this paragraph, as amended, stand part of the proposed Report.—The Committee divided :

Ayes, 7.  
Mr. West.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Lowe.  
Sir Percy Herbert.  
Mr. Clay.  
Sir Rainald Knightley.  
Mr. Goldney.

Noes, 3.  
Sir Charles Wingfield.  
Mr. Grant Duff.  
Sir Edward Colebrooke.

Paragraphs 15 and 16, *agreed to*.

Paragraph 17—Amendments made.—Question put, That this paragraph, as amended, stand part of the proposed Report.—The Committee divided :

Ayes, 7.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Lowe.  
Sir Percy Herbert.  
Mr. Clay.  
Sir Edward Colebrooke.  
Sir Rainald Knightley.  
Mr. Goldney.

Noes, 3.  
Mr. West.  
Sir Charles Wingfield.  
Mr. Grant Duff.

Paragraphs 18 and 19, amended, and *agreed to*.

Paragraph 20—An Amendment made.—Question put, That this paragraph, as amended, stand part of the proposed Report.—The Committee divided :

Ayes, 8.  
Mr. West.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Lowe.  
Sir Percy Herbert.  
Mr. Clay.  
Sir Edward Colebrooke.  
Sir Rainald Knightley.  
Mr. Goldney.

Noes, 2.  
Mr. Grant Duff.  
Sir Charles Wingfield.

Paragraph 21, amended, and *agreed to*.

Paragraph 22.—Question put, That this paragraph stand part of the proposed Report.—The Committee divided :

Ayes, 6.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Lowe.  
Sir Percy Herbert.  
Mr. Clay.  
Sir Rainald Knightley.  
Mr. Goldney.

Noes, 3.  
Sir Charles Wingfield.  
Mr. Grant Duff.  
Sir Edward Colebrooke.

Paragraph 23, *disagreed to*.

Paragraph 24, amended, and *agreed to*.

Amendment proposed at the end of the proposed Report, to add the following paragraph : “Your Committee have had the advantage of hearing the evidence of Lieutenant General

General Sir William Mansfield, late Commander in Chief in India. They learned from it that the grievance complained of is not by any means of an imaginary or trifling character. Sir William Mansfield recommends that an amalgamated list should be formed of the colonels of the two armies; that no further supersession should be allowed; and that the list of major generals should be corrected from 1865; like arrangements being made for the Artillery and Engineers. Sir William Mansfield further informed your Committee that a still more serious supersession of the British officers is taking place, in consequence of the rules of promotion in the India Staff Corps. As this is not strictly within the order of reference, your Committee make no further remark upon it, than that the case appears, as stated by Sir William Mansfield, to be worthy of the attention of Her Majesty's Government."—(Sir *Percy Herbert*.)

Question put, That this paragraph be added to the proposed Report.—The Committee divided :

Ayes, 6.

Mr. West.  
Sir John Hay.  
Sir Percy Herbert.  
Mr. Clay.  
Sir Rainald Knightley.  
Mr. Goldney.

Noes, 3.

Sir Charles Wingfield.  
Mr. Grant Duff.  
Sir Edward Colebrooke.

Question, That this Report, as amended, be the Report of the Committee to the House, put, and *agreed to*.

*Ordered*, To Report, together with the Minutes of Evidence and an Appendix.

# LIST OF WITNESSES. ---

*Thursday, 14th July 1870.*

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*Monday, 18th July 1870.*

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# MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

*Thursday, 14th July 1870.*

## MEMBERS PRESENT :

Major Anson.  
Mr. Bourke.  
Mr. Brand.  
Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.  
Mr. Clay.  
Sir Edward Colebrooke.  
Mr. Grant Duff.

Mr. Goldney.  
Sir John Hay.  
Sir Percy Herbert.  
Sir Rainald Knightley.  
Mr. Sclater-Booth.  
Mr. West.  
Sir Charles Wingfield.

MAJOR ANSON, IN THE CHAIR.

Colonel CALEDON EGERTON, called in ; and Examined.

1. *Chairman.*] You are Deputy Adjutant General at the Horse Guards?—Yes, I am.

2. You sat as Chairman of a Committee to consider the question of the supersession of British colonels by colonels of the Indian army, a short time ago?—Yes, I did.

3. Will you shortly state to the Committee what you consider to be the case of the British colonels, and how this supersession has arisen?—I do not think I can state the case of the British colonels more clearly than has been done in the Reports of the previous Committees, but I will point out the salient points of their case. I will begin by showing that from the first occupation of India, and the employment of British troops in that country, as an auxiliary to the army of the East India Company, the principle of equal promotion from the rank of lieutenant colonel to that of colonel, and subsequently to that of major general, has always obtained. This principle was laid down by the Duke of Wellington, and afterwards by Lord Hill; and in the constant changes that have taken place in the regulations of promotion in the Indian army, this principle has always been kept in view. The Committee which lately sat, presided over by Sir William James, confirmed this principle. In the late arrangements for promotion, this principle has been largely departed from, and the colonels of the British army, to the number of some 270, have been passed over by junior colonels of Her Majesty's Indian army. In tracing the course of this supersession we must refer back to the Royal Warrant of October 1854. Under that Warrant a fixed establishment of general officers was given to the two armies. The proportion of that establishment was regulated with reference to the

number of combatant officers on full pay in each army, giving as nearly as possible one general to every 28 combatant officers. In that arrangement, however, it does not appear to have been considered that in the Indian army there is no half pay, but that many officers in the higher ranks retire upon full pay or to pension, a liberal rate of pension, before they attain the rank of major general, whereas in the English service there is no such retirement, or rather no adequate one (for there is a small retirement to full pay), and that, therefore, the only resource for the British colonels is to remain on half pay until they succeed to an adequate retirement by becoming major generals. In fixing the establishment of the two armies, that does not appear to have been considered. The first effect of the new Warrant was that the British generals consisted of more than the establishment given them, and the supernumeraries had to be absorbed. On the other hand the generals of the Indian army were considerably below the new establishment, and, I believe, as many as 95 colonels were promoted to the rank of major general, in one day, giving that army an advantage of seven years at the outset in their promotion over the British army.

4. That was in consequence of the Warrant of 1854?—Yes. The British army at that time was engaged in the Crimean War, and the casualties produced by that war, and the promotions consequent upon it, brought back the British colonels nearly to an equality, though not entirely.

5. In 1855 the rank of Indian officers was made general?—In 1855 the rank of Indian officers was made general; previously it had only

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run to the eastward of the Cape; from that time the Indian officers took rank with the British officers in all parts of the world. The second cause of the supersession was the extra inducements given to colonels of the Indian army to retire subsequently to the Indian Mutiny.

6. In what year did that retirement take place?—At the close of 1861. Paragraph 35 of the Report of Sir William James's Committee alludes to it.

7. What was the next step?—The next step causing supersession was the cancelling of the Royal Warrant of the 1st of January 1862 by the Royal Warrant of the 15th of June 1864.

8. Will you shortly state the effect of the Warrant of 1862, as it affected the promotion of the colonels?—The Royal Warrant of the 1st of January 1862 provided that, "All colonels of either army who attained that rank on or prior to the 17th of February 1861 were to be continued on separate lists, and to succeed on separate lists to the rank of general officer; but if all on one of those lists should have become major generals, while some on the others were unpromoted, these colonels should have the benefit of vacancies occurring in the list of generals in either army." I can now show the Committee what the effect of that would have been. The date on which this provision would have had effect was on the promotion of Major General Whistler, on the 6th of March 1868. From that date, under the Warrant of 1862, all vacancies in either army would have been promoted to, from the top of the British list, with the exception of those vacancies to which colonels of the Indian local army would have succeeded. The result of that would have been that about 43 of the colonels now standing at the head of the British list would have been promoted at the present moment to be major generals. But the Commission, presided over by Lord Cranworth, recommended the cancelling of the Warrant of 1862 and the substitution of that of 1864. The result of that was, that in lieu of the 43 steps of promotion going to the colonels of 1854, 1855, and 1857 of the British list, Colonel Birdwood, whose date as a colonel was the 9th of April 1861, was promoted over their heads, and from that time the supersession has continued down to the last colonel promoted with general army rank, dated the 14th November 1865, the senior colonel on the British list at present unpromoted dating 9th March 1858.

9. Will you read the terms of the alteration of the Warrant of 1862?—The provision of the Royal Warrant of the 15th of June 1864, under which this supersession took place, was to this effect: "The officers of cavalry and infantry of Her Majesty's Indian army are to remain on the Indian general list, and to rise on that list to the rank of general officer; officers of the several Indian Staff Corps, who had attained the rank of lieutenant colonel prior to the 18th February 1861 are to be promoted under Indian regulations to the rank of major general on the Indian list. Those who had not attained the rank of lieutenant colonel previous to the 18th February 1861, as they respectively attained the rank of colonel, are to be placed according to the dates of their commissions on the general list of colonels of the British army, and to rise on that list, according to seniority, to the rank of general officer."

10. The alteration of the Warrant of 1862

was made in consequence of the Report of Lord Cranworth's Commission to inquire into certain grievances complained of by officers of the Indian army?—It was.

11. In the list of petitions and grievances laid before that Royal Commission, are you aware that there was not a single petition from any single officer of the Indian army complaining of the operation of the Warrant of 1862?—No, I was not aware of that.

12. Sir C. Wingfield.] The Warrant of 1862 had not come into operation then?—It never came into operation.

13. Chairman.] Do you consider that the Royal Warrant of 1862 was a breach of the Parliamentary guarantee that was given to the officers of Her Majesty's Indian army?—Certainly not; the guarantee only guarantees to the officers of the Indian army the promotion they would have had had they remained under the East India Company. We have seen, from the action taken by the Duke of Wellington and Lord Hill all through, that had they remained under the East India Company, it is probable it would not have been allowed that one British colonel should have been superseded by them. I may further point out, that had they done so, the extraordinary bonuses, which led very much to supersession, would not have been given either.

14. And therefore the officers of the Indian army have really had much more rapid promotion?—The officers of the Indian army have had much more rapid promotion than if they had remained under the former regulations.

15. In all cases previous to the amalgamation of the two armies, whenever a case of supersession occurred measures were immediately taken to put a stop to it?—Yes.

16. And therefore the supersession of colonels of the British army would never have taken place under any circumstances under the old Indian army?—No.

17. Sir C. Wingfield.] When the general establishment was fixed in 1854, the system of giving the brevet rank of major general to a certain number of British officers who had been superseded by Indian officers was abandoned?—The system of giving "Fane" brevets was abandoned after the Warrant of 1854.

18. Chairman.] Can you show to the Committee any substantial injury that has been inflicted upon the colonels of the British army by the supersession?—The most substantial injury that a soldier can suffer has been inflicted upon them. The supersession of any officer by a junior may prevent his having an opportunity of commanding an army and obtaining distinction, and so going down to history. There is no putting any limit to what it may deprive a man of. An officer's rank is always most jealously guarded, and officers are naturally most sensitive about it. I will mention one case to the Committee. Sir Charles Staveley was selected to be second in command of the Abyssinian Expedition, but while in performance of that duty in the field he would have been superseded by a colonel, very far junior to him, of the Indian army, had there not been an electric telegraph existing which enabled the matter to be corrected by giving Sir Charles Staveley the seniority which he was intended to have. A colonel of the Indian army who was promoted got his promotion while in the field, and went over Sir Charles Staveley's head.

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19. Sir *C. Wingfield*.] The remedy applied in that case is always applicable, is it not?—It might be applicable; but if there had been no electric telegraph that supersession, of Sir Charles Staveley by that other officer, might have upset all the arrangements that had been made with respect to Sir Charles Staveley.

20. Mr. *Grant Duff*.] The electric telegraph would be available in all similar cases, would it not?—It does not exist in all parts of the world; and, as I submit, the position of an officer should not be left to the chances of the electric telegraph.

21. The same remedy which was applied in the case of Sir Charles Staveley could be applied in any other case if it was thought right?—It might, wherever an electric telegraph existed.

22. Mr. *Clay*.] Do you consider it right that if a grievance exists it should be allowed to continue, because there may be an accidental remedy for it?—Certainly not.

23. Mr. *West*.] Could not the authorities have foreseen the promotion of that officer over Sir Charles Staveley?—I rather think that it was foreseen, and it was stopped; but had there not been an electric telegraph, Sir Charles Staveley would have been superseded for the time.

24. Mr. *Clay*.] Did I rightly understand you to say, that under the old system, when an Indian officer had reached the grade of lieutenant colonel, his further advancement to the rank of colonel, major general, and so forth, was by general brevet from the Queen?—Yes.

25. Sir *P. Herbert*.] As to the case of Sir Charles Staveley, he had served as a brigadier in India, had he not?—Yes.

26. And he had commanded a brigade in the field throughout the Chinese War?—Yes.

27. He was left in sole command of the British troops after the withdrawal of the main army in the neighbourhood of Pekin?—Yes.

28. And he was appointed to the command of a division of the army in Abyssinia?—Yes.

29. There was a colonel of the Indian army some years junior to himself employed with the same army, who, by the action of the Warrant of 1864, which you complain of, was promoted over his head as a major general?—I am not prepared to say that he was promoted, but he would have been promoted if it had not been stopped in the way I have described.

30. I mean, he attained the rank of major general in the ordinary way before Sir Charles Staveley did?—Yes.

31. The injury to Sir Charles Staveley was remedied by giving him what is called local rank?—Yes, the rank of major general in Abyssinia.

32. And that rank has been since confirmed for distinguished service?—Yes.

33. *Chairman*.] Have you yourself been superseded by colonels of the Indian army?—I have been very largely superseded by colonels of the Indian army.

34. Then, judging from your own feelings, you think you can represent what the feelings of the officers of the British army are upon the matter?—Yes; I was a lieutenant colonel throughout the Crimean War, and commanded a regiment part of the time, and I think officers who were not even captains at that time have gone over my head, and who entered the service many years after me; but, at any rate, a number have gone over my head who were juniors to me as colonel. I am a colonel in the British army of the date  
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of April 1858, and I see one officer, who was only a lieutenant in 1858 has passed over my head.

35. Sir *C. Wingfield*.] Were not those officers promoted for distinguished services in the field during the Indian mutinies?—Some of them were, this very one to whom I refer was promoted, I fancy for distinguished services, but he could not have been promoted from lieutenant to major general.

36. You would not object to promotion on the ground of distinguished service?—Certainly not; the officers of the British army have never complained of promotion on the ground of distinguished service, but there are dozens who have been promoted over their seniors not on that ground.

37. Mr. *Bourke*.] Have you been superseded by colonels who have been promoted not on account of services in the field?—Yes, by many.

38. Sir *P. Herbert*.] Has any one of those officers who have been so promoted over your head, from the rank of colonel, in which rank they were junior to you, to the rank of major general, been promoted for distinguished service in the field?—No, certainly not.

39. They may have been promoted up to their rank of colonel for distinguished service, but the grievance is that they have been promoted over you and other officers not for distinguished service in the field?—Yes, that is the grievance.

40. *Chairman*.] A great number of the colonels of the Royal army are officers who have distinguished themselves in active service, both in the Crimea and in the Indian Mutiny?—Yes, many of them.

41. Sir Edward Greathead, who was lieutenant colonel commanding the 8th Regiment at the siege of Delhi, and Sir John Jones, who was major and brevet lieutenant colonel of the 60th Rifles at the same siege, have been superseded by officers of the Indian army who served at the siege of Delhi as subalterns?—Yes; I will read out some names to the Committee that were passed over at the time of the promotion of General Birdwood, who ought to have gone up under the old Warrant: Sir Alfred Horsford, a distinguished officer and K.C.B.; Major Generals Carey, C.B.; Sir Percy Herbert, K.C.B.; Edwards, C.B.; Lord Mark Kerr, C.B., who commanded a column in the Indian Mutiny; Haythorne, C.B.; Adjutant General of the army in India; Norcott, C.B., an officer who distinguished himself in the Crimea; the Earl of Longford, K.C.B.; Sir Edward Wetherall, K.C.S.I., K.C.B., who commanded a field force in India; Sir John Jones, K.C.B., who commanded a field force in India; Sir Richard Kelly, K.C.B., and many others.

42. Mr. *Brand*.] You spoke of 43 colonels of the Queen's army being superseded through the Warrant of 1862 being cancelled?—Not exactly superseded from that, but those officers would now have been major generals under the Warrant of 1862, whereas they remain colonels, and 43 colonels of the Indian army have been promoted in their place; the names of the officers I have just read out being the names of some of the officers who were passed over by Colonel Birdwood, many years their junior.

43. *Chairman*.] How many colonels of the English army have been superseded by the promotion of the last major generals from the Indian list?—I think 270; Colonel Patterson was the last officer superseded; he is a colonel of the date  
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date of 12th of November 1865; he was passed over by Major General Barwell.

44. Mr. *West*.] Are not some of those 270 officers, however, on retired full pay, and who would therefore not rise to the rank of major general?—No; those on retired full pay are not counted.

45. Every one of the 270 will, in the course of time, rise to the rank of major general?—Yes, if they do not sell out or become non-effective.

46. Sir *P. Herbert*.] With reference to the case of Sir David Wood; Sir David Wood, I believe, served as a lieutenant colonel of artillery in the Crimea?—Yes.

47. Commanding the artillery attached to one division of the army?—Yes.

48. He was in 1855 promoted to the rank of colonel for distinguished service in the Crimea?—Yes.

49-50. He proceeded to India, and in 1857 and 1858 he was employed as brigadier in command of the whole of the field artillery belonging to the army of Lord Clyde which attacked Lucknow?—I believe he was.

51. Under his orders were two officers commanding batteries of artillery, one, Captain and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Tombs, and the other, Captain and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Turner, of the India service?—I do not speak of my own knowledge to that fact; but I have heard that stated.

52. At any rate you can speak from your own knowledge to this; those two officers are now above Sir David Wood on the list of major generals of the Royal Artillery?—Yes, they are.

53.—*Chairman*.] There has been a memorandum issued lately making certain concessions, in order to do away with the injustice that has been inflicted upon colonels; will you state what that memorandum is?—The terms that have been conceded to the British colonels are these: a rectification of dates to the 6th of March 1868, to enable colonels who have been superseded to take the same relative position with the Indian colonels as they would have taken under the warrant of 1862.

54. Mr. *Clay*.] In the rank of colonel?—In the rank of major general; where that remedy naturally fails to be satisfactory to the British colonels is, that justice will be deferred for a considerable time to all, and to the juniors of those passed over for probably 12 or 13 years, which time it would take, at the present average rate, to promote Colonel Patterson.

55. *Chairman*.] There is also another provision in that memorandum, is there not?—There is another provision which deprives the Indian officers, promoted in future, of general army rank until the next British colonel senior to them has obtained his promotion.

56. Mr. *West*.] Are you speaking of the Memorandum of the 3rd of May 1870?—Yes; that concession fails to be satisfactory, inasmuch as it does not relieve the colonels of the British army employed in India, where the supersession is most felt, of that supersession. The third provision is that, "in the case of a colonel of the British army serving in India thinking it right to decline a command, owing to the necessity, if he were to accept it, of his serving under an officer of the Indian army, whose rank as colonel was junior to his own, the Duke of Argyle will be prepared to consider the circumstances with a

view to such compensation being given as may seem to be called for."

57. *Chairman*.] A proposal very much of the same nature was made some time ago, in 1834, I think?—Yes, when Lord Hill was Commander in Chief.

58. Lord Hill, in a Minute of that date, made some very strong remarks on such a proposal, did he not?—Yes, he did; he says: "There is one point in the propositions in each of the projects which must, however, be first adverted to, as it cannot be passed over without a more particular notice, and this is, that in which it is proposed to give a colonel of the King's army a pecuniary consideration on his being withdrawn from active duty, to avoid a collision; or, in other words, to pay him for the endurance of a military degradation. In all that has been said throughout the voluminous discussions which have taken place upon the subject of military promotions in India since 1786, the ruling principle has been to uphold the position of the King's officers, that they might not suffer in any collision of interests with the officers of the Company's army in their character or military dignity, and thus to maintain them in the enjoyment of their full share of just and reasonable professional emoluments and advantages; but it never could be contemplated that the personal, pecuniary, and private interests of any individual should be sustained at the expense of the general and infinitely more important interests of the King's military service; and were this proposition to be adopted, that a colonel of the King's army could be withdrawn from active duty in favour of a junior colonel in the Company's army, and a sum of money paid to him as a compensation, the transaction could bear no other construction, in a professional sense, than that he had by such act consented to compromise the prospects of military honour and reputation for the immediate enjoyment of pecuniary advantage, and instead of tending to uphold the character of the King's officers, it must have a direct tendency to the contrary, and to deteriorate them individually and collectively in the estimation of their profession and of their country."

59. Do you agree with the opinion expressed by Lord Hill on that subject?—Yes, I do.

60. And do you consider that most of the officers of the army, certainly those whom you consider to be the best soldiers in the army, would hold that same view?—That is my opinion.

61. Sir *P. Herbert*.] I believe the system of promotion in the English army is regimental up to the rank of lieutenant colonel?—Yes.

62. One regiment may have fast promotion and another slow promotion, but they all take their luck of regimental promotion up to the rank of lieutenant colonel?—Just so.

63. Since the arrangement of 1854 the rank of colonel has been conferred upon lieutenant colonels holding certain posts or commands?—Yes, with the exception of the Queen's aides-de-camp and officers promoted for distinguished service.

64. Prior to 1854, the promotion from the rank of lieutenant colonel to the rank of colonel, and thence to the rank of major general, was by strict seniority, with the single exception of appointments as aides-de-camp to the Queen for distinguished service?—Yes.

65. That

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65. That was common to the Indian army and to the Queen's army?—Yes.

66. The regimental promotion of the Indian army was, I believe, regimental up to the point of major, was it not?—Yes, I believe it was. General Pears will be able to speak to that better than I can.

67. The promotion from the rank of major to that of lieutenant colonel was on one general list for each Presidency army?—I never served in India, and I cannot speak to that.

68. What is claimed now by the colonels of the British army is, that having attained the rank of full colonel, they shall not be superseded by anybody who is junior to them in that rank?—Except by officers promoted for distinguished service in the field.

69. No objection is raised to promotion for distinguished service?—None whatever.

70. The Sovereign has entire power, and it is the practice, is it not, to select officers for commands, irrespective of rank?—Yes.

71. What is complained of is not promotion for distinguished service in the field, but supersession by men who may be no more distinguished than the person who is superseded?—Quite so.

72. All that is asked for as regards the Indian army is, that the British officers should have equal promotion?—Equal promotion; nothing more is asked.

73. The British officers make no demand upon the Government for quick promotion?—No.

74. They would leave it to the Government to regulate whether it should be quick or slow, but what they do claim is, that it shall be dealt out with an even hand to both armies?—They claim that.

75. *Chairman.*] In the Report of the Committee over which you presided at the War Office, you recommended that 45 additional major generals should be created?—We did.

76. Will you explain to the Committee the grounds upon which you made that recommendation?—The Committee made that recommendation as some compensation to the British colonels for the abnormal promotion given to the Indian colonels by the system of bonuses. That recommendation was viewed rather as a compromise than as an act of substantial justice, and the Committee recommended that promotion, as it would not eventually increase the British establishment of general officers, inasmuch as the establishment would be increased by 45 generals on account of the Indian Staff Corps in the course of the next four or five years.

77. That promotion of 45 major generals would not ultimately increase the permanent list of general officers?—No.

78. It is merely discounting promotion that is expected to take place hereafter?—That is all; it would have been a larger measure of satisfaction to the British colonels if it had been granted at the time it was recommended, as a much longer period would have elapsed before the 45 colonels commenced to be absorbed; but now the absorption would commence next year on the promotion of Colonel Shakespeare. After that event all the Staff Corps generals come upon the British list, to the number of about 50, and all the vacancies to which Staff Corps colonels would after that have been promoted will be promoted from the British list to the number, on the average, of about eight annually, until the Staff

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Corps Establishment is completed, which will amount, in all, to from 95 to 100 generals, by which number the British list will be increased.

79. Would the promotion of those 45 colonels to the rank of major general entail any very large expenditure; I see you say in your report, that the expense of each colonel promoted would amount, on the average, to 14 s. 5 d. a day, and that the credit from the Indian Government for each general officer added to the British Establishment on account of the Indian Staff Corps would be 25 s. a day; will you explain to the Committee how you account for that?—The generals added to the British Establishment on account of the Indian Staff Corps would be paid for by the Indian finances at the rate of 25 s. a day. The charge for the British generals, comprised in Vote 18 of the Army Estimates, is 17. 5 s. per diem. The half-pay of a colonel, under Vote 19 of the Army Estimates, is 11 s. a day. The pay of the half-pay colonel, under Vote 19, would be saved to the Imperial funds, and therefore that amount would go to the credit of the forestalling of those 45 generals. I have made a calculation by which I show that the total expense of promoting 45 colonels to the rank of generals at once, will be entirely recovered by the War Office by about the year 1881, and some 7,000 l. over and above it. So that the expense to the Imperial funds would not, in the end, be anything.

80. *Mr. West.*] What would be the present annual charge to the Indian fund?—I presume the charge, which is 11,800 l., would at first fall, for the first two years, till the 45 colonels began to be absorbed at the rate of eight annually, upon the Imperial funds; then in 1872, or the autumn of next year, I fancy Colonel Shakespeare would be promoted, and then the Staff Corps generals would begin to come over to the British list. It is a very complicated question, and it is not easy to explain it.

81. *Sir C. Wingfield.*] If I understand it rightly the British Government will gain by the difference between what the Indian Government are to pay and the half-pay?—In consequence of British colonels heading the list for many years, and all the promotions going to them, the British Government will save the half-pay of those colonels on their being promoted to staff corps vacancies paid for by the Indian finances.

82. *Chairman.*] You have written a memorandum on the subject, for the information of his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge?—Yes; I did write one for his private information.

83. Could you produce that memorandum and put it in?—With the permission of his Royal Highness I will put it in.

84. *Mr. West.*] You have made a calculation of the ultimate gain to the English Exchequer which would be, as I understand, at the expense of the Indian Exchequer. I want to know what would be the loss to the Indian Exchequer to be set off against the gain to the British Exchequer?—There would be no loss to the Indian Exchequer. The charge of a general officer is 17. 5 s. a day, but the British finances will save the half-pay of those officers who are promoted. Where an Indian officer is promoted the British finances will not save anything, but where a half-pay English officer is promoted, his half-pay is saved.

85. I understood you to say that the British Exchequer was to save, so that the Indian Exchequer

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chequer must suffer?—No; the Indian Exchequer will only pay for the Staff Corps generals at the rate of 1 l. 5 s. a day.

86. Sir P. Herbert.] Does not the case stand thus: there is a fixed list of major generals borne by the Indian Exchequer?—Yes.

87. The vacancies in a list of about 90 generals are to go to the English army?—Yes; they are to go to the amalgamated list of British and Indian colonels.

88. The expense of those 90 officers will be borne by the Indian Exchequer?—Yes.

89. Therefore, whether an Indian officer is promoted to that list, or whether an English officer is promoted to it, will make no difference to the Indian Exchequer; it will be a fixed list of general officers?—Yes.

90. But if an English officer is promoted to that list, the Home Government will save his half-pay as lieutenant colonel?—Yes.

91. A vacancy will have occurred by the death of an Indian general?—Yes.

92. To the Indian Government the state of things will remain the same, they paying the English officer instead of the Indian officer, but the Home Government will gain by the saving of the half-pay of that officer, which he received as lieutenant colonel?—Yes.

93. Mr. Clay.] As regards the Indian Government, all that they do is to fill up the vacancy; it does not matter to them whether they pay a British officer or an Indian officer?—No; there is the amalgamated list of the English and Indian colonels (*producing it*). That would com-

mence with the promotion of Colonel Shakespeare. On this system under which all the vacancies will go to whoever is senior on the amalgamated list, all the promotions will be from British officers for a course of years, and the British Government will save the half pay of those officers who will draw the full pay of a general from the Indian finances; that is to say, those who are promoted to Staff Corps vacancies.

94. It seems to me to be very important to clear up this point, because at first sight it would appear, that if there is anything to be paid somebody must pay it, and as it has been shown that the Imperial Exchequer will not pay it, it is to be assumed that the Indian Exchequer will have to pay it. The exact point I want to understand is, will the Indian Exchequer suffer from it, or is the Indian Exchequer doing nothing more than filling up the vacancy?—The Indian Exchequer will not suffer from it. The Indian Exchequer will pay to the Imperial Exchequer for the number of generals in excess of the present British establishment, who are to be added to it on account of the Indian Staff Corps, but the senior colonel on the list, whether an Indian or a British colonel, will be promoted to each vacancy as it occurs, and for a series of years the English colonels head the list.

95. The Indian Exchequer will not suffer if this proposal of your Committee is adopted?—Certainly not.

96. Sir P. Herbert.] They will only be filling up a vacancy?—Yes; by a British officer instead of an Indian officer.

Major Gen. THOMAS T. PEARSON, C.B., called in; and Examined.

Major-Gen.  
Pearson, C.B.

97. Mr. Grant Duff.] You have heard the evidence given by Colonel Egerton, will you state your views about his proposal with regard to the 45 generals, and especially with regard to the pecuniary calculations which he has made?—I think Colonel Egerton has made a mistake in supposing that the Indian Government could be called upon to pay the entire pay of each of those major generals on their promotion. It will be observed, that on the occasion of each British colonel being promoted to succeed to a Staff Corps vacancy, a Staff Corps colonel who would otherwise have been promoted is not promoted, therefore we do not gain by the promotion of a colonel; we retain all our colonels in pay; whereas the War Department gain to the extent of a colonel's pay. We should therefore only pay them the difference between the colonel's and major general's pay, to which extent they would otherwise be losers. For instance, if a senior colonel on the list is promoted to the rank of major general in consequence of a Staff Corps vacancy, the War Office would have, instead of paying him a lieutenant colonel's half-pay, to pay him 25 s. a day; we, at the same time, should not gain anything; we have all our colonels still to pay, so we could only pay the difference between the colonel's half-pay and the major-general's unattached pay.

98. Sir P. Herbert.] Paying now the major general and the colonel, your list of major generals is not to be diminished on a vacancy occurring?—No, but our list of colonels would not be diminished by one, we keep them all on pay, instead of getting rid of one by promotion to the

rank of major general; you, on the other hand, get rid of one colonel.

99. A colonel of the Indian army would be employed?—It does not matter whether he is employed or not; we must take him as a colonel on our pay, and we should not gain by his promotion to the rank of major general.

100. Is not the arrangement of the Indian Government to maintain a certain proportion of general officers, and to pay them unattached pay?—It is arranged that that shall be done. It becomes a nice question who shall be chargeable for the pay of the 90 or 100 major generals due to the Staff Corps. It will happen for some time to come that there will be less than the full number of the Staff Corps officers, and the others would be British; and, therefore, we must decide whether each department is to pay for the individual as he comes up to the rank of major general, according as he may belong to the one service or the other, or whether we shall pay by a sort of contract agreement for the 90 or 100 major generals, whatever service they may belong to. The reasonable and natural plan would seem to be for each party to pay for colonels of their own branch as they came to be major generals; but the War Office will not agree to that, because for four or five years to come a large number of the new major generals will be British officers.

101. If that were carried out, would not it be the case that in a very few years the Indian Government would have no general officers at all, and that the English Government would bear them all?—It would be sometimes on one side and

and sometimes the other; perhaps out of the 360 generals, or whatever the number is, we might have only 50 at one time and 150 at another.

102. At present there is a certain fixed list of 250 general officers of the English army?—Yes.

103. And there is a list of 90 for the Staff Corps, which are to be added to the English list next year?—Yes.

104. It has been generally understood that the vacancies occurring in those 90 generals when transferred, were to be given to seniors at the top of the amalgamated list, and that the unattached pay for those 90 was to be borne by the revenues of India?—It is not fair to put that on the revenues of India.

105. Are not you paying for those 90 general officers now?—Yes.

106. Is there any reason why the Indian Government should be relieved from paying for those 90 next year?—They would not be relieved from paying for them; but, in each case, instead of a major general, they will retain a colonel.

107. Not instead of a major general because they have the colonel?—They would not have him if they made him a major general.

108. They have now the colonel and the major general?—Yes.

109. Then they will be called on for no increased expenditure; they will not get any relief, but they will be subjected to no increased expenditure by being called upon to pay for the whole of the 90 officers?—But you call upon them to pay not only all the colonels, but also in each case one major general unattached drawn from the British list; that would be an extra expenditure.

110. They are paying for the colonels now and for the major generals?—They are paying for a certain number of major generals, and a certain number of colonels; they will have the same number of the former; they have now 173, which includes the 90. According to the arrangement Colonel Egerton proposes they would have to pay the same number of major generals as before, with an additional colonel.

111. Where is the additional colonel to come from?—From our own list; because we do not promote him.

112. He is there now; you do not make an additional colonel; on a vacancy occurring in the existing list I promote a man to be major general on that list; there is no addition to the cost to the Indian Government by that arrangement, is there?—Clearly there is.

113. You have a fixed number of general offi-

cers, namely, 173: when a man on that list dies, and his vacancy is filled up, is that an increased expenditure?—Not if it is filled up from our own list.

114. No matter where it is filled up from; is it an increased expenditure?—Certainly it would be an increased expenditure to us if it were filled up in this unusual way, by taking a man from another list.

115. That is to say, it is not an increased expenditure; it is the loss of a saving?—It is an increased expenditure.

116. It is the loss of a saving, is it not; there are 173 general officers paid now; when one dies you fill up that vacancy; there would be 173 officers to pay then; how do you make out that it would be an increase?—Because you make up the 173 from another list, instead of making it up by drawing from colonels of your own list.

117. How would it be an increased expenditure?—Say that we have 200 colonels now, and 173 generals; if one of those generals were to die we should promote a colonel, and we should then have only 199 colonels.

118. *Chairman.*] Do not you promote a colonel in his place?—No.

119. *Mr. Clay.*] If your colonel was promoted you would save a colonel?—Yes; and we should have the cost of the major general still, whereas if you bring in a colonel from your list we have not gained anything by the absorption of a colonel.

120. *Sir P. Herbert.*] But you are not liable to pay a shilling more than you were before?—No; we lose what we should have gained by the colonel being promoted.

121. You lose a gain, but you are not subjected to any additional expense?—I do not think I should express it quite correctly if I said we lost a gain. We lose, because having lost on one side we do not gain on the other; but it is not losing a gain.

122. *Mr. West.*] I understood Colonel Egerton to conclude that there would be a saving somewhere in the British revenue in this proposed scheme of his; is there any source from which that saving can come except the Indian revenue or the pay of Indian officers?—As I understand it, that gain to the British Government would be exactly what I have been trying to explain, would be the loss to the Indian Government.

123. Is there any other source from which it can be obtained except from the Indian exchequer or from the pay to Indian officers?—Not that I am aware of.

Colonel CALEDON EGERTON, called in; and further Examined.

124. *Mr. Clay.*] I have heard it said, in fact it appears from some of the printed matter on this subject, that the warrant of 1864 improved the financial position of the War Office as compared to that in which it was under the warrant of 1862; is that so?—Yes; that is so.

125. Will you explain in what way their financial position is improved?—If I am correct in assuming that the additions made to the British establishment of general officers on account of the Indians are paid for by India, and that there is a saving upon Vote 19 for the half-pay of

British officers, the War Office is in a better position, because they would have begun paying Indian officers, and not making anything by the transaction, many years sooner than they will now. Under the Warrant of 1862 the Indian officers would have commenced to be amalgamated with the British officers from the 9th of April 1861, at least from colonels of the date of 9th April 1861. Under the Warrant of 1864 the Indian officers do not commence to be amalgamated with the British officers till you come to colonels of the 18th of February 1866, and therefore

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therefore the Imperial funds are benefited, if I am correct in my assumption, by deferring the payment to Indian officers, who will take the full 25 s. for some years.

126. *Chairman.*] Have you made any estimate of what that saving is?—No.

127. *Mr. West.*] Whatever that saving is, that will come from the pay to be given to Indian officers, will it not?—I do not think so; it will be merely a saving on the half-pay vote.

128. Out of the half-pay given to Indian officers, or to English officers?—The half-pay to English officers; it will be a saving on the half-pay vote, with which the Indian officers have nothing to do; the general officers to which our establishment is increased are on another vote.

129. *Mr. Clay.*] This plan which your committee recommended, viz., the creation of 45 generals, I understand you to say is not considered by the committee as a full satisfaction of the grievance, but as a compromise?—Yes, as a compromise.

130. You have paid, no doubt, a great deal of attention to this subject. Have you also been in frequent communication with a considerable number of the officers who have suffered by this supersession?—Yes.

131. Have you reason to believe that that compromise would be satisfactory to them?—Yes, I have reason to believe that that, with one or two other points that have been referred to, namely, ante-dating, and some means whereby further supersession by the local army may be checked, would be so.

132. In fact, the compromise recommended by your committee?—Yes.

133. *Chairman.*] That does not deal with the future; this supersession will go on, notwithstanding the appointment of 45 major generals. Supposing such a thing were to be carried out, the supersession of English officers by Indian officers would still go on in the future?—By the local Indian army; that would not be checked by the creation of those major generals.

134. *Sir C. Wingfield.*] But that arrangement would operate as a remedy in the English army?—To a certain extent. We calculated that the creation of 45 major generals would increase the promotion of British colonels by about three years, and that the Staff Corps, having come over at that time with another 50 generals, we should promote to the increased establishment of 100 generals, which would expedite our promotion to a considerable extent, so that it would go far towards raising us in a series of years; but that does not affect the local Indian army, who still will supersede us, unless they are made to pivot upon Colonel Salmon and keep their places.

135. *Mr. West.*] How many generals are there in the two services?—Five hundred and forty-seven.

136. Do you think that that number is a sufficient number for the service?—Yes, I do.

137. *Sir C. Wingfield.*] The commands in India are distributed in fixed proportions between the officers of the two armies, are they not?—Yes.

138. No Indian colonel, by being promoted earlier to the rank of major general than a British colonel, can deprive a British officer of a command belonging to his branch of the service?—No,

he cannot, but a British officer may, nevertheless, be commanded by his junior.

139. You are aware, perhaps, that the Duke of Argyle says that the Government will endeavour to make such arrangements in the distribution of the troops as will prevent a British colonel being employed under a major general who was junior to him as colonel?—That would hardly be possible; but if it were possible in time of peace it would not be possible when any large force was got together for any purpose of war. Of course, at that time, when distinctions are to be gained, an officer is more jealous of his rank than at any other time.

140. Would not it be possible, in brigading the troops, to avoid placing the one officer under the other?—It would not be possible.

141. Of those 274 officers, I suppose not above half are on full pay?—No.

142. Probably of that half not above a third have served in India?—Probably not.

143. So that the number that would come into contact with major generals who had been their juniors would be very limited?—Yes, except that, if a war broke out now, Indian officers would be employed, and they would be brought into contact with the British officers.

144. I apprehend, in the event of a war breaking out again, such as the war in the Crimea, that would be cured by giving local rank?—It might be, but I do not think it is just that we should have our interests dependent upon such contingencies.

145. If an Indian officer was employed in a European war along with British troops, it would be for some special qualification he possessed, and in that case, if it was thought desirable to give him command, he would be given local rank at once?—No one ever objected to men of proved ability or distinguished service being employed in that way, but the complaint now made is that the supersession by junior officers is a chronic affair; whether the officer has ability or not, or whether he is a good officer or a bad one, it is all the same, he goes over the heads of officers who have served years and years longer than he has.

146. Provided the British colonel was not required to serve under an Indian major general who was his junior in the list of colonels, then the grievance would cease altogether, would it not?—I cannot say that it would cease, it would be dormant for the moment, but when any large force got together the thing must constantly recur.

147. If you could ensure an officer should never serve under another officer who had been junior to him as colonel, it would merely become a question of social precedence, would it not?—If you could provide that they never should meet on military duty it would be only a social grievance; I do not see why men who were lieutenants only when I became colonel, are even to go out of a room before me, much less take a command before me.

148. *Chairman.*] If the case of the two armies was reversed, and instead of the English colonels being superseded by Indian colonels, the Indian colonels were superseded by English colonels, do not you think they would have very much the same sort of feeling in the Indian army as they have in the English army?—Yes; it is a feeling you cannot suppress.

149. *Sir C. Wingfield.*] The service of an Indian general officer used in former days to be 20 years

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20 years longer than in the Queen's service; a man never got to be major general till he was very old formerly?—Yes; the Queen's are the older officers now.

150. According to the tables appended to the Report of Sir William James's Committee showing promotions at five different epochs, it seems at one time the British, and at another time the Indian, colonels got their promotion after a longer or shorter time of military service?—Yes, taking their whole service.

151. When the Warrant of 1854 was issued, do not you think it must have been foreseen that there would be inequality in promotion?—No; I do not think it was foreseen, or it would have been provided against.

152. Do not you think that they must have looked at the list of colonels, and at the existing list of general officers, and seen that those extensive promotions of 95 colonels in one day would have been made; that could hardly have escaped their observation, could it?—It ought not to have escaped their observation.

153. At the same time, the system of "Fane" Brevets which had before corrected inequalities of promotion was abandoned?—Yes.

154. Therefore, it would seem that the principle laid down by Lord Hill, on which so much stress is laid, was given up in 1854?—No, I cannot think that.

155. The practice of giving "Fane" Brevets was abandoned?—It took place at the time the Crimean war was going on; the British army was fully occupied about other matters; it was not till afterwards that the shoe began to pinch.

156. That was the reason why at that time the British officers made no complaints?—Yes; I account for it in that way.

157. The effect of this Warrant of 1854, was to carry the promotion of Indian colonels seven years in advance of the British colonels?—Yes.

158. So that, in fact, it must have been known that that would cause very extensive supersession?—Yes, it would appear so.

159. And yet no complaint was made at the time?—No.

160. The supersession is not a new thing?—It dates from 1854.

161. I can well understand that this plan of making 45 major generals in anticipation of the additions that would be made to the British list will content those at the top; but as the supersession will go on in India, will not the same complaint be made a few years hence?—The grant of 45 generals is not the same measure of satisfaction now that it would have been at the time it was recommended; at the time it was recommended we calculated that it would affect every officer advantageously who had been superseded, and that they would all get some benefit, but now it has been deferred for a year, and it will only be about October next year, according to average calculations when the 45 will begin to work off again; eight generals every year of that 45 will have to be absorbed, which will check the promotion before every junior on the list, taking them as they stand now, could be affected; but I think if the deaths and the retirements that take place are considered, even now it may reach the junior officers advantageously to a certain extent.

162. You do not apprehend that we shall have the same grievance to deal with a few years hence that we are having now?—No, I think

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not; if measures are taken to regulate promotion for the future.

163. The measures that have been taken will prevent any supersession in England by making the rank local, but they will not prevent supersession in India?—Yes; we think that some measures should be taken to prevent the supersession, not by the Staff Corps, because that will right itself ultimately, but by the local generals, whose promotion will go on.

164. The promotion of these 45 major generals will not in itself, and standing alone, be accepted as a settlement; it must be coupled with some measure for preventing Indian major generals from commanding British colonels?—Yes, and also a rectification of dates is required.

165. The rectification of dates is proposed to be carried back to 1868?—Yes.

166. Would you advocate its being carried back further?—We recommended that it should commence from 1854.

167. The Indian Government expressed themselves willing to carry it back to 1854?—I believe they did; but there was a difficulty in arranging the dates of the Indian artillery officers. I believe, ultimately, it was arranged that each Ordnance officer in the British list should go up with the next colonel to him; but I think I am right in saying that it could not be arranged with the Indian Ordnance officers, as, if they went up in the same way with the next line colonel to them, they would then supersede Indian officers.

167\*. The main grievance is, that in serving in India a British colonel may have to serve under a major general who is his junior?—In India or elsewhere.

168. Do you think the Warrant of 1864 could be modified in any way so as to retard the promotion of Indian generals?—Yes, I do not see that it could not. We did not recommend it, because we thought at that time it would bear very hardly on the Indian officers, and create a good deal of feeling of discontent, which we were anxious to avoid; but as to the question whether it could be done, I think it might be done.

169. Inasmuch as that warrant was issued to repair the breach of the guarantee which was found by Lord Cranworth's Commission to have been caused by the Warrant of 1862, to rescind that Warrant now would be to commit a breach of the guarantee, would it not?—There is a great difference of opinion about the guarantee.

170. Mr. *Clay*.] Or rather would it not be to commit a breach of the guarantee according to Lord Cranworth's interpretation?—Yes.

171. Sir *P. Herbert*.] It is precisely the action of the Warrant of 1864 that is complained of?—Yes.

172. Reverting to the amalgamated list, as it stood under the Warrant of 1862, would be accepted as a fair solution of the difficulty from the British officer's view of the question?—Certainly, but the mischief has been done.

173. Reverting to the amalgamated list as it stood in 1861, would be a remedy for the grievance as regards the future?—Yes, it would.

174. Is not the object of an amalgamated list to prevent supersession?—Yes.

175. In fact, the first supersession took place in the year 1865, did not it?—The first supersession under the Warrant of 1864 took place on the 6th of March 1868, by the promotion of General Birdwood.

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176. Several

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176. Several supersessions took place before that?—Yes.

177. But by the Warrant of 1862, the amalgamated list began with colonels of the date of 1861?—Yes, April 1861.

178. Reverting to that list would be to some degree a satisfactory remedy?—Yes, I think it would.

179. The honourable Member for Gravesend asked you whether local rank could not be given to British officers when serving in the field alongside of Indian officers to prevent their being superseded, and you said that it could; could not local rank be given to Indian officers in like manner in the event of their being selected for command?—Certainly.

180. Then the complaint of the English officers of being superseded by the natural run of promotion in the Indian Army, is in no way affected by the fact that if they were superseded by Indian officers in the field they might be protected against it by the special action of the Crown in giving them local rank?—In no way whatever.

181. Mr. *Grant Duff*.] All promotion in the Queen's Army is regulated, is it not, by Royal Warrant?—By Royal Warrant.

182. Was it ever the custom in the British Army before the amalgamation, for an officer to refuse to serve, or would he think himself aggrieved by serving under an officer who was his superior in rank by virtue of the operation of a Royal Warrant?—The case could not occur, because from the rank of lieutenant colonel promotion was by seniority, by brevet, except in the case of distinguished officers.

183. You answer that question in the negative?—Yes, certainly.

184. You say that an officer would not have refused to serve under those circumstances?—Yes; but the case could not occur.

185. Promotion in the Queen's Army goes on, does it not, on different lists?—Yes.

186. For instance, you have a list for the Line and Guards; you have a list for the Artillery; you have a list for the Engineers; you have an Indian list, and so forth?—Yes.

187. If it so happens that a colonel in the Artillery finds that a man in the Line and Guards who became a colonel later than he did, becomes a major general before him, does he consider himself aggrieved?—No, he does not.

188. If he considered himself aggrieved, the army would not side with him?—The Artillery have their just relative proportion of generals with the Line, and sometimes one is superseded, and sometimes the other. It is give and take; it is not always on one side.

189. No officer in either branch of the service would consider himself injured by being superseded by an officer in the other branch?—No; but if the Artillery always went over us, and we did not get our fair promotion, or we always went over them, it would not be an equitable state of things.

190. If a colonel of the Line and Guards finds that a man in the Indian list who became a colonel later than he did, becomes a general before him, he considers he has a grievance, and the opinion you represent sides with him?—Yes.

191. Will you explain the reason why, both owing their promotion to the operation of Royal Warrants, any colonel in the Line and Guards should object to serve under any major general

in the Indian list, when he would not object to serve under any major general in the Artillery list?—I am not surprised at the feeling at all. The Royal Warrant of 1862, which would have promoted the British colonel, was cancelled and another Royal Warrant established, which has caused very large supersession, and I cannot be surprised at that feeling existing. It is not a give and take matter at all; it is a case of increasing force. Every promotion goes over the head of so many more. It is not that an Indian officer should go over my head one day, and I should get my chance another, but the Indian officers go as a rule over British officers. Every man who is promoted goes over so many more British officers, and it has gone on to such an extent that the junior British officer superseded will not be promoted for the next 12 years, he is so low down.

192. Is this grievance, which is felt by the officers whom you represent, a grievance that will last for ever, or is it, after all, a temporary grievance?—It is a grievance that will last for ever, unless some remedy is applied, because it gets worse and worse every day. If it remains as it is, we cannot see the end of it; in fact, we shall be an inferior service altogether.

193. Shall you be in as bad a position 20 years hence as you are now?—Yes, we shall.

194. Supposing a man, say in the Line and Guards' list, finds that some one who was an ensign when he was a lieutenant becomes a captain before him, would he consider that he was superseded, and that he had a legitimate grievance?—No, we promote purely regimentally to the rank of lieutenant colonel, and that, again, is subject to the chances of the service; a man may go over my head as a lieutenant, and I may go over his head as a captain; it is the chances of war; the advantage is not always on one side.

195. Will you explain the reason why this peculiar sanctity, if I may use the term, attaches to the rank of colonel, and not to any of the ranks below it?—It is the custom of the service, and has been for years.

196. It is purely an arbitrary custom; there is no reason why the same sanctity should not attach to captain or to major; it is purely arbitrary, is it not?—There is the difference between regimental and army rank; in regimental rank they take rank only in the regiment, according to the date at which they go into the regiment; an officer senior in army rank may be at the bottom of the lieutenants, having exchanged into a regiment, and he would be regimentally junior to a number of officers who had been longer in the regiment; but army rank is a different matter; a man takes his army rank from the date of the commission he holds.

197. *Chairman*.] It is the fact, is it not, that a captain in a regiment might command a brigade over the head of the colonel of his regiment?—Yes; if he were a senior in army rank.

198. That shows the difference that exists between army rank and regimental rank?—Yes.

199. Mr. *Grant Duff*.] Under the concessions that have lately been made by the Secretary of State for India, supposing one of the officers whom you represent finds himself in India under the command of a man who was junior to him as a colonel, but who now commands him as a major general, it is arranged, is it not, that it shall be permitted to that colonel to withdraw for a time

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to any part of India he pleases, to draw during the whole time his full regimental pay and allowance, and then to return to the command of his regiment as soon as that regiment happens to pass out of the command of the obnoxious Indian major general who has so superseded him?—Yes.

200. Do you not consider that that is a very considerable concession?—I consider it no concession at all; I consider it is rather adding insult to injury, that a man is to give up his military position, and retire to the hills, or anywhere else, when probably military operations may be going on, and when he may lose what he has served all his life for, namely, the opportunity of command and distinction.

201. If military operations were going on, is not that just the kind of case in which the remedy that was applied in the case of Sir Charles Staveley in Abyssinia would be applied?—I think it is a very false position to put an officer of the British Army in, that a special remedy is to be applied on occasions of that sort; that they are not to have what is their birthright, their just promotion.

202. Will you just explain the exact remedy which was applied in the case of Sir Charles Staveley?—Sir Charles Staveley had local rank telegraphed out to him.

203. And as long as the electric telegraph continues, that same remedy could be applied at any moment if the War Office and the Indian Office agreed that it was right that it should be applied?—Certainly it could.

204. You said something about a social grievance; what does the social grievance amount to; in India, I understand, the social grievance even would not necessarily arise, because an aggrieved officer would be permitted to go away?—Yes.

205. Would the social grievance be anything more than this, that if those two officers happened to meet in London, one of them would walk out of the room before the other?—No, I do not suppose it would.

206. That is the whole grievance?—Perhaps so.

207. Those two grievances that I have just been stating; the grievance of the man who thinks he has not received enough by receiving permission to retire, and to return when his regiment ceased to be commanded by the obnoxious major general, and this social grievance of the possibility of the one man in London walking out of the room before the other, are the whole of the grievances that remain after the concessions made by the Secretary of State?—They are grievances of considerable magnitude.

208. Is there any other grievance except, perhaps, the consciousness on the part of a man who is living quietly in England, that another man who is serving in India, who had once been his junior is now his superior in rank; beyond those three grievances, is there any grievance left unredressed by the recent concession of the Secretary of State?—I do not consider that anything is redressed by the recent concession, except in the case of those officers who have become major generals; there are some of the officers who will not be major generals for years and years.

209. What is the actual grievance which is left unredressed?—That all my military opportunities of rank, and opportunities of command, may be taken from me by an officer who has not

served a quarter the time I have. I mentioned an officer just now who was only a lieutenant when I was a colonel. I was captain 20 years before he was a captain, and I served through the whole of the Crimean war. Why should that man go over my head?

210. As long as the authorities have the power at any moment of placing you in a position superior to that officer, as they did Sir Charles Staveley, what possible grievance have you?—Why are what I consider to be my rights to be taken away, and to be at the disposal of anybody who may or may not think fit to do me justice.

211. Are you of opinion that there is anything in the Warrants of 1858 and 1859 to show that it was the intention of their framers to make the date of rank as colonel the standard for regulating on the Indian list, and on the other lists, promotion to the rank of major general?—As I understand those Warrants, they merely extended the time to qualify for the rank of colonel from three years to five years. The Warrant says “that the rank of colonel be given to officers after serving for five years with the rank of lieutenant colonel, in the actual command of regiments, or for the same period as second lieutenant colonels of regiments, or as major and lieutenant colonel or major in the household cavalry, or as mounted officers of the foot guards, or on the staff, in the following situations, viz., deputy adjutant general,” and so it goes on naming certain staff positions. I think it is to be implied that the rank of colonel should be the starting point. It provides specially for selecting colonels to have rank as major generals for special commands, and that is the only provision it makes for any man being taken out of his order of seniority.

212. Sir P. Herbert.] Do you think that if the officers of the army did not think it a serious professional injury which they complained of, and that it was merely a social question, such as who should go first out of a room, they would have taken the trouble to ask for this Committee, or that any military officer in the House of Commons would ever have asked the House of Commons for this Committee?—Certainly not.

213. Mr. Clay.] With reference to this proposed concession by the Secretary of State for India, by which, supposing military operations are about to take place, and an officer finds that he will be commanded by a man much junior to himself, he has an opportunity if he likes of getting out of the way, what would be thought in the British army of a man who took advantage of that opportunity?—I think he would lose his character.

214. In fact he would have the choice of serving under a junior, and losing a legitimate opportunity of distinction, or being a disgraced man?—Yes.

215. Having turned your attention a good deal to the subject, can you imagine any other reasonable remedy for the present state of things than this creation of generals which your committee proposed?—No, I cannot; it seems to me that the evil has been done, and the remedy proposed is only a compromise; but anything to afford perfect relief must go further than that.

216. Mr. Brand.] Did I rightly understand you to say in answer to a question some time ago, that though you were of opinion at the time you made the recommendation, that the addition of 45 major generals would be satisfactory, you do not now consider that that proposition would be

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be satisfactory to the officers of the army?—I did not say that quite. I said it was not as large a measure of rectification now as at the time it was proposed.

217. What is the measure of rectification you yourself propose?—I have made no proposition.

218. Mr. Clay.] You do not go beyond the recommendation of your committee?—No; I think it would be satisfactory as a compromise.

219. Sir R. Knightley.] It is not so satisfactory now as when you recommended it two or three years ago?—No; because next year there would be about eight vacancies; of that 45 that will have to be absorbed to meet the 45, it is not an addition to the establishment, it is merely anticipating the promotion. Two years ago, when it was recommended first, there would have been about three years' promotions to run before any portion of the 45 had to be absorbed; now the absorption will commence next year, and the supersession has gone much farther than when the committee sat.

220. Sir P. Herbert.] Amalgamating the present lists of colonels as they stand, and promoting every colonel in succession according to the date of his commission, would be justice for the future?—Pure justice for the future.

221. That would delay promotion in the present Indian list by about eight years?—

222. Those who would be promoted now would not have been promoted for another eight years if the amalgamated list had been held to?—No.

223. Sir C. Wingfield.] Are we to understand that this proposal for anticipating the promotion of 45 major generals would not alone be acceptable as a compromise; that it must be coupled with some other arrangements?—Yes; under the Warrant of 1862, 43 or 44 of those would have already been promoted.

224. Mr. West.] What other arrangements besides the creation of 45 major generals would meet the complaints of the British officers?—A rectification of dates as far as possible, and some prevention of the local major generals continuing this supersession. There is a letter of General Pears which refers to that; but I cannot understand that the proposal in his letter does check the promotion of the local major generals.

225. What would be a satisfactory supplemental change besides the promotion of the 45 generals?—Rectification of dates and recurrence to the Warrant of 1862 would have the effect I point out. I do not mean to propose it, but a recurrence to the Warrant of 1862 would have the effect of what is required, which is to prevent further supersession by the local major generals.

226. Have you sufficiently considered the matter to be able to tell us the scheme you would propose in order to prevent the future supersession of English colonels?—Stopping all further supersession would have that effect; but I have not considered any further means of doing it than what was recommended by the committee of which I was president. I was summoned here, I believe, as chairman of that committee.

227. Sir J. Hay.] You adhere to the recommendation of your committee?—Yes, I adhere to the recommendation of the committee. An entire rectification of dates up to 1854 has been found not to be very easily carried out; we recommended that in the committee; but since that it has been further ventilated.

228. Sir P. Herbert.] You did not, as chairman of that committee, think yourself justified in recommending the abrogation of the Royal Warrant?—Certainly not; we said in our report we would not recommend the abrogation of the Royal Warrant; but we recommended a compromise.

#### Major General THOMAS PEARS, C.B., further Examined.

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229. Mr. Grant Duff.] You are head of the Military Department of the India Office?—I am Secretary in the Military Department.

230. You have been consulted by the Secretary of State in Council all through these negotiations?—I have.

231. Can you say of your own knowledge that it has been the wish of the Secretary of State in Council to meet the views of officers who have considered themselves aggrieved by the rapid promotion of certain officers in the Indian list as far as he possibly could?—Certainly.

232. The Secretary of State had of course two difficulties to avoid; the first of those difficulties was the danger of doing anything to contravene the well-known Parliamentary guarantee, and so to commit an illegal act; and the second danger was, by conceding something that might not be directly protected by the Parliamentary guarantee, but to which the Indian officers might attach very great importance, to raise up a new crop of Indian grievances, and agitations of which we have had so many since the amalgamation?—Exactly so.

233. Colonel Egerton has stated the various proposals that have been made by the Secretary of State in Council lately for the settlement of this question?—I heard his evidence.

234. Colonel Egerton did not seem to regard

those as concessions; but from our point of view, the Indian point of view, we consider them, do we not, as very great concessions indeed?—I understood Colonel Egerton to consider them as concessions, but as insufficient concessions.

235. We consider them very great and serious concessions?—We do; more particularly that one with regard to local rank, which we may reasonably apprehend will give some dissatisfaction in India.

236. Did Colonel Egerton go quite through the list of proposals that we have made?—I do not think he touched on our last proposal.

237. With regard to that it is proposed, is it not, to introduce a measure which is now under the consideration of the Government of India, under which it is expected that promotion to the rank of major general of the few officers who may survive and remain on the list of the local army till the attainment of that rank, will be regulated and kept within due limits?—Yes.

238. Will you explain the nature of that measure somewhat further to the Committee?—I will endeavour to do so. We propose that we shall adopt, with regard to the general list for army promotion of a local Indian army, the same sort of measures that we adopted in regard to the cadres promotions of the Indian army when the Staff Corps officers were removed from them; that

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that is to say, that on the occasion of the Staff Corps major generals, and, in fact, all the Staff Corps officers, being removed, under the terms of the Royal Warrant of 1864, on to the British list, we shall retain their names on the Indian list exactly as they are now or would otherwise be, in italics, with a view to regulating the promotion of the few local officers that remain. By way of illustration I will allude to the name of Colonel Salmon; he stands first on the list of colonels to be transferred on to the amalgamated list. Under our plan he would be so transferred, but his name would remain on the Indian list until retirement or death, and would be moved up through the various grades of major general, lieutenant general, and full general, as if he were a substance instead of a shadow. The same course would be followed with all other Staff Corps officers' names, and thus the promotion of the few local officers who remained would be, as we conceive, fairly and equitably regulated.

239. *Chairman.*] The first name of a local officer junior to Colonel Salmon is Colonel John Barrot; will that officer ever supersede Colonel Salmon under this proposed arrangement?—Certainly he will; because Colonel Salmon will not get, on the Indian list, actual promotion; his name will be there, but he will get his promotion as a Staff Corps officer on the British list.

240. Then I understand the supersession of your own Staff Corps officers will go on by the Indian local officers?—They will be liable to it, but the chance of it will be very much reduced, and in a few years I believe it will disappear altogether.

241. It will take 20 years?—No, I think not; as I have shown in a statement in the Parliamentary Paper before the Committee, I think 10 years will see it all out; in fact, I have no doubt of it.

242. *Mr. Grant Duff.*] Were all the other proposals of the Secretary of State mentioned with sufficient fullness and clearness by Colonel Egerton, or would you like to add anything to what he said?—To the best of my recollection he mentioned them all.

243. You heard Colonel Egerton's objections to the first of our proposals; have you any remarks to make about it. I will read the proposal, "All officers on the Imperial list promoted to the rank of major general since the 6th March 1868, have now their commissions ante-dated so as to place them in the same relative position in point of seniority with the major generals on the Indian lists as they held as colonels." I understood Colonel Egerton to make various objections to that?—I understood him to say that that rectified the grievance as far as regarded the officers who had been promoted to the rank of major general, or when they are promoted, but that it does not rectify the grievance of the supersession of existing colonels, which it does not. They do not get their proper place till they get promoted to the rank of major general.

244. Have you any further observations to make on Colonel Egerton's objections to these proposals?—There are many things that Colonel Egerton remarked that I do not quite agree with. He seemed to trace a great deal of the evil to the Warrant of 1854; I did not understand what Colonel Egerton meant when he said that Indian officers had seven years' advantage of British officers; I do not think he meant to say that at that time colonels of the Indian

service, who were seven years junior to colonels of the British service, were promoted to the rank of major general before them. The fact is that they started at that day very much on a level; the senior colonels in both services were very much of the same date, and it will be found that the Indian colonels of 1854 were not worked out until 1865, while the British colonels of 1854 were worked out in 1868; and I believe that three years difference is due almost entirely to so many Indian colonels having been bought out by the annuities in 1861. I think it will be found too that the junior major general of the Indian service in 1861 had been seven years a colonel, or thereabouts, while the junior major general of the British service of 1861 had been about seven and a half years a colonel, so that up to that date there appears to have been no very serious difference between the two rates of promotion.

245. Have we anything to say against Colonel Egerton's proposal with regard to the 45 generals, provided we are not called on in any way to pay for it?—Nothing whatever.

246. But his further proposals, to which he alluded just before leaving the chair, would bring us in contact with the Parliamentary guarantee, would they not?—I did not understand that he made any proposals beyond what his own Committee made, and the only two of his suggestions that are not carried out are the rectification of dates so far back as 1854, and the reverting to the system of "Fane" major generals, but I think it has been satisfactorily shown that that would be attended with far greater inconvenience than would be likely to result from a continuance of the present system.

247. Do you believe in practice, supposing warlike operations were about to take place, that an officer of any merit would be put in the disagreeable position of having either to take a holiday in the hills, or to serve under an officer who superseded him?—When you say an officer of any merit, merit in those cases is a relative term; a man might be a very excellent officer, and yet another officer, who might be a junior colonel to him, might be selected to a higher command.

248. Supposing this case were to occur, that one of the officers, whose case Colonel Egerton represented, found himself under the command of a major general in India who had been his junior as colonel, and if warlike operations were about to commence—do you believe that, unless the major general were a person of such very conspicuous merit that his place would have to be maintained—the British colonel would not be treated precisely in the manner in which Sir Charles Staveley was treated?—Sir Charles Staveley's case was peculiar; it was not that he or the other officer was selected for command; both were selected for command of a division respectively. Sir Charles Staveley was then named as second in command, an office that had no special duties, but which pointed to him as the one to succeed, in the case of any casualty in the chief command, to that command; therefore it was necessary that no other officer in the force holding a division should be senior to him, because he would take his place as second in command; and with the view of preventing that, Sir Charles Staveley was made a local major general. But in the case of the army taking the field in India, it would be necessary to select officers for the command of the different divisions who would be

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major generals; and, no doubt, it might happen that a man selected for his good service and his great abilities might be appointed to command a division in which there would be one or two British regiments under the command of officers who had been his seniors before he was made a major general.

249. He would be a man selected for his special qualities?—Yes.

250. And therefore would come under the exception to which Colonel Egerton drew our attention more than once?—Yes, and I should think that any colonel commanding a British regiment under those circumstances would unhesitatingly serve under him in active service.

251. In fact, do you believe that the case put by the honourable Member for Hull is anything other than a most violently improbable contingency, viz., that any British colonel, on military operations being about to commence, should be put in the position of either serving under a junior who was not a man of very distinguished service, or leaving his regiment and becoming a disgraced man?—I think it is a very improbable contingency.

252. I understand that the Secretary of State and the Government of India are pledged, if the arrangement suggested by them is accepted, to do everything they possibly can to prevent hard cases occurring?—Yes, certainly; but that refers more to the ordinary military arrangements in time of peace.

253. I put this question to Colonel Egerton, and I would like to put it to you; are you of opinion that there is anything in the Warrants of 1858 and 1859 to show that it was the intention of their framers to make the date of rank as colonel the standard for regulating on the Indian list and the other list, promotion to the rank of major general?—I should say certainly not; if they had wished that, the only way of doing it would have been to have had a fixed establishment of generals (which they have), and to have had a fixed establishment of colonels (which they have not), and then they would have arranged that those two establishments should be in the same proportion in both services; but they did nothing of the kind, and as Colonel Egerton shows, they rather regulated the establishment of general officers with reference to the whole body of combatant officers; and one would conclude from that, that they looked rather at the whole length of a man's service as regulating his succession to a general's rank than to his service in the grade of colonel. At the very outset, under the operation of the Warrant of 1854, the proportion existing between colonels and general officers on the British list was very different from that on the Indian list; and as long as that is the case, it is quite certain that the rate of promotion through the one grade to the other cannot be the same.

254. You have considered this question very carefully in all its bearings; do you see any possible thing that the Secretary of State for India in Council can do in the nature of making further concessions without either coming into contact with the Parliamentary guarantee, or else raising up dangerous agitation in the Indian army?—I fear we have incurred the risk of raising up a little dissatisfaction already; but another impediment to further concession is the Parliamentary guarantee.

255. Will you read the words of the Parliamentary guarantee?—The 56th clause of the Act

for the better Government of India assures to the forces which now belong to Her Majesty's Indian army, "the like pay, pensions, allowances, and privileges, and like advantages as regards promotion and otherwise, as if they had continued in the service of the said Company."

256. In the interest of the discipline of the Indian army you would think it very undesirable for the Secretary of State to make any further concession, even if it were not a concession that would bring him in contact with the Parliamentary guarantee?—I cannot think of any other concession that would not bring him in contact with the Parliamentary guarantee, otherwise I should myself be prepared to propose anything that would not substantially injure the officers of the Indian army, in order to satisfy the complaints of the officers of the British army.

257. You think that everything that would substantially injure the officers of the Indian army that we could now concede, would also bring us in contact with the Parliamentary guarantee?—I think so.

258. So we should at once have the danger of raising great additional dissatisfaction in India, and the danger of doing a distinctly illegal act?—Yes.

259. Mr. *Sclater-Booth*.] Would the addition of 45 generals, as has been suggested, be in your opinion a thing that would come in collision with the Parliamentary guarantee?—No, not at all.

260. Is there any objection that occurs to your mind to that proposal, except the question of expense?—None whatever.

261. Would not it have the effect of delaying promotion in the Indian army?—Not at all.

262. It is not a permanent net addition of 45 generals, but only a temporary addition, and they are to be absorbed?—They are to be absorbed, not by withholding promotion from Indian officers, but by withholding promotion from Staff Corps officers in the way provided already by the Royal Warrant.

263. Mr. *Grant Duff*.] Was Colonel Egerton right in asserting that if no remedy is applied, this supersession grievance will go on eternally, or is it not more or less a temporary grievance?—I consider it quite a temporary grievance; we cannot apply the word "eternity" to it, I think, for there are only 750 officers left on the local service to which he was alluding.

264. Sir *P. Herbert*.] It would be temporary so long as they lived?—Seven hundred and fifty are all that remain of the whole local army; 350 belong to the list of young officers appointed on the condition that they would accept any regulation that might be made. When their turn comes we can do what we like with them if we find they are promoted too rapidly; there are 350 to be promoted in the next 25 years.

265. *Chairman*.] Might not the Secretary of State, if he wished to increase promotion, pursue exactly the same policy as that pursued in 1861, viz., give a large number of retirements which might accelerate the rate of promotion from the Indian list very considerably?—I do not see any chance of his doing that. If he did, it would fall on the Staff Corps, who are amalgamated with the British list. I may say when those annuities were granted in 1861 it is to be regretted that the effect on the general army promotion was overlooked. We took precautions against making it irregular in the Indian army, but we lost sight

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sight altogether of the effect it would produce on promotion to the rank of general. If we had kept the names in italics in the list to regulate promotion, we would not have heard anything of this kind.

266. Sir *P. Herbert*.] The effect of it on the British army was overlooked?—Yes.

267. *Chairman*.] With regard to the question of the Parliamentary guarantee, if the Company's army had been existing at the present moment, and there had been no mutiny and no amalgamation of the armies, do you think any supersession of English colonels by Indian colonels would have been permitted for a moment?—I do not suppose it would have been noticed if there had been supersession, which would have been inevitable on one side or the other, unless it were in a very great degree. Some supersession is inevitable on one side or the other.

268. The question of supersession has been attempted to be looked on as merely a social grievance, but whenever the question of the supersession of English colonels by colonels of the Indian army has arisen in former times it has called forth the very strongest protest from the Duke of Wellington and from Lord Hill, I believe?—Yes.

269. Who most strongly objected to it, not merely on social grounds, but on every military consideration?—Yes.

270. Mr. *Grant Duff*.] Was not that at the time when there was very great jealousy between the Company's army and the army of the Crown?—I do not know that it originated in any feeling of jealousy of that kind, but I must observe it was dependent entirely on the regulations of the service for the time being, because in the days of the Duke of Wellington and Lord Hill it was the rank of lieutenant colonel, not that of colonel. Those high authorities spoke of a lieutenant colonel not being superseded; now he is superseded every day in his own service by the operation of the new rules; at the present time it is the question of the colonels being superseded. It is a matter of regulation, not a point of honour or conscience in any way.

271. Sir *P. Herbert*.] You say a lieutenant colonel is superseded every day, but that is not the case with a lieutenant colonel commanding a regiment?—No; I mean in army rank.

272. The case the Duke of Wellington put was a lieutenant colonel commanding a regiment?—Yes; all those questions were referred in those days to the rank of lieutenant colonel.

273. Mr. *Clay*.] Will you give me your reasons, as these supersessions are so numerous, for saying that there is any "violent improbability" of this supersession and its inconvenient consequences taking place in the field; why should there be any "violent improbability" in it?—I think the question put to me implied that it was an improbability, not that a supersession should take place, but that a supersession should take place, except in the case of an officer selected for distinguished service.

274. Mr. *Grant Duff*.] And that it should take place without a remedy being immediately applied, as was applied in Sir Charles Staveley's case?—The same remedy could not be applied at least to the satisfaction of an officer commanding a regiment in the case of active service. If he were promoted, he must be removed unless selected for active command; if a British officer were at the head of a regiment, and a major

general of the Indian service were selected to command a division of the army proceeding on foreign service, then the British officer, if it were necessary to give him rank as major general, must go away because there would be no command for him; but the British officer would no doubt elect to remain where he was.

275. Sir *P. Herbert*.] If you, as the military adviser of the Secretary of State for India, are choosing an officer for command of a division, you naturally refer to your general officer's list first?—Yes.

276. If you pass through that list and find you have not got one whom you consider satisfactory, you begin at the list of colonels, and go through that list till you find one?—Yes.

277. A man who was in the major general's list, would be likely to come to the notice of the Secretary of State, before one in the colonel's list?—Certainly.

278. Then, if there are two officers of the same standing, one having been promoted to the list of major generals of the Indian service and the other remaining still low down in the list of colonels of the British service, the Commander in Chief and the Governor General of India are likely to look first to the man in the list of major generals in the Indian service rather than to the man low down in the colonel's list for selection to the command of a brigade or division, in the case of war?—Yes; but, I believe, in all those cases there is another point to be considered, and that is, a fair division of the commands between the two services; that was the case in Abyssinia, and would be at all times; the authorities would endeavour to give to each service a fair share of the command in the field.

279. You would admit, no doubt, that a man in the major general's list, having the rank of major general, would have a better chance of being selected for the appointment than a man low down in the list of colonels?—Yes.

280. Therefore, the fact of the promotion of a man to the rank of major general upon that list is a serious injury to a man of the same standing who stands low down on the list of colonels in the British service?—I do know an instance where an Indian officer was selected to a command in consequence of his seniority of rank over a British officer; they always divide the commands in India between the two services.

281. Do you think that it is a fair arrangement, that however much you induce officers to retire from the upper ranks of the Indian army, junior officers of the Indian army should be appointed to command major generals, solely for the purpose of giving a certain proportion of commands to the Indian army?—It is a fair arrangement that there should be two separate lists for those two services; I do not think it would be fair unless it was carried out on both sides.

282. Till 1854 it was absolutely the case, was it not, that colonels were promoted to the rank of major-general strictly by the date of their colonel commissions?—Yes, by general brevet.

283. Whether by general brevet, or by succession to vacancies, would make no difference; the question would be whether one man could supersede another in that rank?—The question is now whether you will adhere to the old regulations, or violently break through them, and deprive the Indian army of the privileges they have under those regulations.

284. Would

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284. Would not the term "violently breaking through the regulations," apply as much to the cancelling of the Warrant of 1862 as to any modification we might make in the Warrant of 1864?—No, because the Warrant of 1862 was not made with a view to the interests of the British army; it was entirely with a view to the amalgamation: it affected chiefly Indian officers, and it was pronounced to be inconsistent with the law; therefore if you abolish the Warrant of 1864, you must pass by that of 1862, and must fall back upon the old state of things for the Indian army; we have no right to look on the Warrant of 1862 as a thing that can be resorted to now.

285. That would bring us back to the Warrant of 1854?—Yes.

286. The Warrant of 1854 was given during the East India Company's time?—Yes.

287. That was given by the prerogative of the Crown?—Yes.

288. If the East India Company had been existing in 1870, the prerogative of the Crown could equally have dealt with that Warrant?—Yes.

289. Therefore as regards the guarantee, the power of the Crown to deal with it now is just the same as it was then?—We take the interpretation of the guarantee as given by Lord Cranworth's commission.

290. As a question of principle, any Warrant given under the prerogative of the Crown in 1854, could, if the Company still existed, be reconsidered and altered in the year 1870?—Certainly, if there was no Parliamentary guarantee.

291. The power that the Crown had then would exist just the same now?—Quite so, I should think.

292. Therefore any re-consideration of the Warrant of 1854 would not be precluded by the Parliamentary guarantee?—That I cannot say; I think the Parliamentary guarantee would override the prerogative of the Crown.

293. The guarantee is "the like promotion as if the East India Company had existed"?—Yes; or words to that effect.

294. In 1870, taking the hypothesis of the Company existing, the Crown would have the right to withdraw or modify any grant made by it in behalf of the Indian army?—But in that case, if it is held that in spite of the Parliamentary guarantee the Crown can do what it likes with a Warrant, fixing the promotion of Indian officers, I do not see what the use of the guarantee was; I think Parliament would have something to say to that.

295. Parliament guarantee that they shall have the same rights as under the rules and regulations of the East India Company?—Yes.

296. But the East India Company had no power to make the Queen maintain that Warrant; she surely had the right to alter the Warrant?—I think the Parliamentary guarantee would prohibit the exercise of that right.

297. The guarantee would not guarantee to the officers more than the rights that they had when under the East India Company?—It gives them the right they enjoyed under the East India Company, and that would preclude the possibility of the Crown by the exercise of its prerogative infringing those rights.

298. Mr. Clay.] You know the interpretation Lord Cranworth gives to that guarantee; would you go the whole length to which he goes?—I

do not remember the terms in which his commission speak of the guarantee; I only remember what they say on this present point about promotion to the rank of general officer; I cannot remember what view they take of the meaning of the guarantee, it has been very much disputed.

299. Sir P. Herbert.] Are you aware that up to 1854 no colonel of either service could supersede another as a general officer?—Yes.

300. Do you think that was a fair rule?—Yes, I think it was in those days.

301. If it is found that the arrangement of 1854, made in perfect good faith, tends very largely to the advantage of one branch of Her Majesty's united army, is not it reasonable for those who are injured to complain of that arrangement, and ask for a re-consideration of it?—I think it depends on how the promotion up to the rank of colonel was arranged in those days. I think there were different regulations then from what there are now. The officers of the Indian army obtained the rank of colonel regimentally; they do not do that now. What we have to do with now is the adherence or non-adherence to the rules on which officers have been getting their promotion for the last 15 years.

302. You think it a reasonable and fair arrangement, and one that ought not to be reconsidered, that one branch of the army gets promotion from the rank of colonel to that of major general in eight or ten years less time than another?—I do not attach importance to that particular step; if it had been so important surely the service would not have been divided into all those different lists of colonels for promotion to the rank of major general.

303. It is not till an officer arrives at the rank of colonel that, as a general rule, he gets any general command other than that of his regiment?—No.

304. When a force is collected in the field he has then officers belonging to other regiments serving under him either as captains, majors, or lieutenant colonels?—Yes.

305. Then if those captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels are liable to supersede him in the rank of major general, and command him in a division, he remaining all the time in the rank of colonel, can you see nothing there to the prejudice of that officer, or to the prejudice of military discipline and the public service?—Not, certainly, to the prejudice of the public service. I cannot see the difference between a man serving under a major general who was a colonel after him and serving under a major general who was a lieutenant colonel after him.

306. There is no difference between a man serving under a man as a major general who had previously served under him as a captain and serving under a major general who had been always his senior?—The same thing applies in the junior ranks.

307. I am taking the case of an officer in the rank of colonel; he has an officer not belonging to his own regiment, belonging to another regiment, thrown under his orders, and serving under him in the rank of captain or major, and that in a few years' time he finds that officer with the rank of major general commanding him in a division, he remaining all this time in the rank he held previously, namely, that of colonel?—No doubt it would be mortifying to an officer, but

but not more so, except as a question of degree, than seeing a man who had been a captain under him a colonel before him.

308. It might be prejudicial to military discipline, might it not?—I do not see why it should.

309. He might have had to find fault with that officer; he might have had to reprimand him for some neglect of duty, and yet he might find that officer a few years afterwards commanding a division?—In the regiment itself the same state of things might occur. I only mean to say, that I do not see the reason for attaching so much importance to that one step, and if there had been that importance in it, I think in all those different Warrants, establishing six or seven different lines of promotion, there would have been some measure taken to secure the colonels of the several lines against superseding each other.

310. May we not fairly consider that the point did escape the framers of those arrangements, and that such an inequality of promotion as exists now would never have been recommended by them if they had had it before their eyes?—I do not see anything in the framing of the Warrant to show that they thought of it at all. I rather think, by their regulating the establishment of general officers by the total number of combatant officers, they wished the total length of service of a man in the army to be the standard for regulating his succession to the rank of major general and not the length of his service as colonel. They did not say, we will have so many generals in proportion to the colonels, but so many generals in proportion to the aggregate number of officers in the army.

311. If so, it was a new principle, was it not?—I do not think there was any principle before them.

312. If they looked at the date of a man's first commission as regulating his promotion, it was a new principle?—Yes.

313. If it was a new principle, there would be a right to reconsider the action of that new principle 15 years afterwards?—It is always right to reconsider a thing that appears to work badly.

314. Mr. *Bourke*.] With respect to the guarantee, the Warrant of 1854 had this effect amongst others; it added 95 names to the list of major generals?—Yes, I do not know how many.

315. That, of course, was a great advantage to the Indian army?—As a matter of promotion.

316. Is it your opinion that that was one of the advantages that were guaranteed to the Indian army, subsequently to the Warrant of 1854, by the Act of 1859?—I should say that the retention of the Establishment as existing at the time of the guarantee must be looked on as one of the advantages; I mean the retention of the system of promotion by seniority to an establishment. The addition of that number, 95, was an accomplished fact that could not be interfered with.

317. That was an advantage that was gained by the Warrant of 1854?—Yes; but there did not appear to have been any particular advantages gained before that time; there was a great lack of general officers in the Indian service, they could not get them for commands even, and they were merely determined to promote a considerable number of old colonels, giving a fair establishment of general officers in proportion to the strength of the army. In doing so they had to promote a large number of colonels who did not derive any permanent benefit from that. I do

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not believe that would have led to the supersession now complained of, and I think, as I have said before, but for the measures since the amalgamation, the two services would have gone on on a tolerably equal footing.

318. Mr. *Brand*.] With regard to the proposal to promote 45 colonels to be major generals, I understand you to say that that proceeding would not be disapproved of by the Indian Government, provided it entailed no cost upon the Indian Exchequer?—Yes.

319. How would it be viewed by the Indian army?—I do not think they would object to it.

320. What would be the cost of such a proceeding?—Colonel Egerton's Committee estimated it at about 11,000 *l.* a year.

321. For how long?—It would be gradually diminished; its diminution would begin about two years hence, when the Royal Warrant of 1864 comes into operation, and we should begin to pay a portion of the pay of each of those men so promoted.

322. The maximum cost, therefore, would be 11,000 *l.*?—Yes.

323. Mr. *Cloy*.] For how long?—I suppose it would go on undergoing diminution every year for four or five years.

324. *Chairman*.] Can you, upon consideration, state what would be the exact cost to the Indian Government of such promotion?—It would not cost the Indian Government anything.

325. It would be made by the Queen; you say the Indian Government would not object to the promotion, provided it were no charge upon the Indian Exchequer?—Just so.

326. Sir *P. Herbert*.] You mean that you would only have a financial objection to it?—Yes.

327. Mr. *West*.] The promotion of 45 English colonels to the rank of major general would occasion no charge upon the Indian finances at all?—No; but there has been a question raised as to who shall pay for the proposed promotion, and some hints have been thrown out that the Indian Government should pay for it.

328. The simple fact of promoting 45 colonels to the rank of major general would not charge the Indian exchequer with anything?—No.

329. Sir *P. Herbert*.] If it were shown that the present state of things had arisen owing to the Indian Government having overlooked the interests of the British army, there might be a claim on the part of the War Department on the Indian Government to provide the means, might there not?—It is a question whether, under any circumstances, the payment could be made, whether it would be legal; the Act of the Government of India declares that all payments out of the revenues of India shall be for Indian purposes alone. You cannot call the pay of 45 English generals Indian purposes, therefore, it would be out of the power of the Indian Government to make the payment, if they wished to do it.

330. Mr. *Brand*.] In your letter of the 4th of March 1870 to the War Department, you say the Secretary of State would propose "that in every case of a colonel of Her Majesty's army serving in India, who might be brought into a position of official subordination to a general officer of the Indian army junior to him as a colonel, should be specially considered and dealt with, by granting some compensation for the temporary loss of regimental command, should he be

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indisposed to serve under the other's command." What is the character of the compensation you advert to?—During the time of the "Fane" major general's system it was understood that an officer so situated might, if he wished, withdraw for a time from his command, receiving the full pay and allowances of his rank as an unemployed officer for the time; and, I believe, in some cases the officers availed themselves of that privilege.

331. What do you mean by "withdrawing"?—Taking leave. In fact it is a clumsy and not very agreeable remedy, but that was adopted on a former occasion, and I think it will be found that there were officers who availed themselves of the privilege.

332. Sir *P. Herbert*.] Do not you think the process was accurately described by the Duke of Wellington?—I do not think it was; there are many cases where for the convenience of the public service a man is removed from command, and there then arises a case for compensation.

333. Mr. *West*.] As to the guarantee, the Act of 1860 limited the prerogative of the Crown with regard to future Warrants, did not it?—I should suppose so.

334. The object of the guarantee clause was to limit the prerogative of the Crown, to restrict the Crown from issuing a Warrant which would deprive Indian officers of any privileges they had got under former Warrants?—Yes.

335. Then a wide distinction exists between the Warrant of 1862, and the Warrant of 1854, inasmuch as the latter has Parliamentary sanction, while the former has not?—Exactly so.

336. Colonel Egerton said that in order to satisfy the English colonels, besides the creation of 45 major generals, there should be a rectification of dates; can you see your way to any rectification of dates, which would correct this injustice which appears to be done to English officers?—Nothing beyond what has been already agreed to; that is, that every colonel on attaining the rank of major general should have his rank antedated, so that he should have the same relative position with the Indian officers that he held as colonel; that is, as regards all those officers, no doubt completely satisfactory.

337. Sir *C. Wingfield*.] Would this proposed arrangement for regulating the promotion of the remaining officers of the Indian list operate in the same way as keeping the names of the staff corps in the regimental cadres?—The principle is the same.

338. Would it have a very undesirable effect in retarding promotion?—No doubt it would.

339. Do you think it would be possible to carry out such arrangements in the distribution of regiments in India, that no British colonel should serve under a major general, junior to him, as colonel?—There are other ways of making arrangements with that view, besides the distribution of regiments; those who had the selection of officers for the command of divisions might see that they did not select very young officers till all this Indian grievance had gone by. There are only seven major generals of the Indian army in India who command divisions throughout the whole country.

340. And five British?—Yes; and each of those seven holds his command for five years, so that the number of vacancies likely to happen before this supersession question has righted itself would be very small; therefore, it is not only in the distribution of regiments, but in the

selection of officers for commands, that the Government of India might take such measures as would almost wholly prevent any unpleasant collisions of the kind referred to.

341. A good deal has been said about special pensions having stimulated the rapid advancement of Indian colonels, and, as that measure was adopted for the financial benefit of the Indian Government, to relieve a number of Indian officers who could not find employment, it has therefore been argued, if the remedy that is adopted involves any charge, that charge may fairly be debited to the Indian Government; but, on the other hand, may it not be said that the necessity for giving those special pensions arose entirely from the amalgamation of the armies which was the act of Her Majesty's Government?—Entirely so.

342. And not the act of the Indian Government?—Yes.

343. If the Indian Government had had its own way, it would have established a local army of Europeans?—I believe so.

344. That was Lord Canning's recommendation?—Yes.

345. And then if it had had a local army of Europeans it would have found employment for all its officers?—Yes.

346. Therefore there would have been no necessity for giving special pensions?—No.

347. The necessity for giving special pensions followed from an Act which was forced upon the Indian Government by Her Majesty's Government?—Certainly.

348. Therefore the responsibility of that step cannot fairly be laid at the door of the Indian Government?—Certainly not.

349. Sir *P. Herbert*.] Do you consider that any alteration of the arrangement under the 1864 Warrant would be a breach of the guarantee?—It depends on what the alterations were.

350. Anything that would lessen the promotion of Indian officers under that Warrant?—I am afraid after the interpretation we have seen put upon the guarantee by Lord Cranworth's Commission it would be so considered.

351. Anything that would diminish that promotion you think would be considered as a breach of the guarantee?—Yes.

352. In your letter of the 29th of May 1870, you recommend a pretty considerable alteration of the Warrant of 1864, do you not?—Not with the view of interfering with the promotion which the officers would have had under the old system.

353. Materially limiting the promotion they would have had under the Warrant of 1864; you say, "the proposed modification of the Royal Warrant of the 15th of June 1864, with the view of keeping within due limits the promotion to the rank of major general of the surviving local Indian officers after the removal from the Indian lists of the names of all officers of the Staff Corps, will be dealt with"?—That is, "with the view of keeping within due limits."

354. "Due limits" involves altering?—It involves altering, but without the infringement of the guarantee.

355. Any alteration that would be asked for by the British officers to make things fair with them would be a breach of the guarantee; but an alteration to economise the funds of the Indian Government would not be a breach of the guarantee?—This is not with a view of economising the funds of the Indian Government; this is solely

solely with the view of meeting the grievance of the British officers.

356. If it does it in some degree, at any rate it must affect the guarantee equally with the demand made with the British officers?—No; this is a measure which we can carry out to meet the grievances of the British officers without an infringement of the guarantee.

357. *Chairman.*] The Commission of 1864 sat in consequence of a great number of Indian officers presenting petitions to the Houses of Lords and Commons, complaining of certain grievances.

358. And certain breaches of the Parliamentary guarantee of 1858?—Yes.

359. Is not it the case that among the whole of the petitions presented either to the House of Lords or the House of Commons, or to the Secretary of State for India, or to the Commander in Chief, or the authorities in India, there was not a single petition that complained of the way in which the promotion to the rank of major general was arranged by the Warrant of 1862, and, therefore, there was not a single officer in the Indian army who considered that the Warrant of 1862 was a breach of the Parliamentary

guarantee of 1858?—I do not think that we can safely assume that they would not have been satisfied when the Warrant came into operation.

360. Is not it the case that that Commission was appointed solely on the ground of the enormous number of petitions presented by Indian officers, and that everything which they felt was a grievance they petitioned about in the freest possible way?—I do not know why the Commission took up the question of the Warrant of 1862, as affected by the Parliamentary guarantee of 1858, but they took up the question and considered it, and pronounced on it.

361. At all events, it is not on the records of the Commission that a single Indian officer considered the Warrant of 1862 as acting harshly or unfairly?—I do not recollect the fact; but, from what you say, no doubt it is the fact that there were none. I do not know that that bears much on the opinion given by Lord Cranworth's Commission. I suppose they felt themselves bound to give their view of the operation of the Warrant of 1862 and the guarantee of 1858, though there were no memorials upon the matter.

Major Gen.  
Peters, C.B.

14 July  
1870.

*Monday, 18th July 1870.*

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.  
Mr. Brand.  
Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.  
Mr. Clay.  
Sir Edward Colebrooke.  
Mr. Grant Duff.

Sir John Hay.  
Sir Percy Herbert.  
Mr. Sclater-Booth.  
Mr. West.  
Sir Charles Wingfield.

MAJOR ANSON, IN THE CHAIR.

Lieutenant General Sir WILLIAM R. MANSFIELD, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., called in; and Examined.

Lieut.-Gen.  
Sir W. R.  
Mansfield,  
G.C.B., G.C.S.I.

18 July  
1870.

362. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE you were Commander in Chief in India at the time of the issuing of the Warrant of 1864?—No; I commanded in Bombay at the time that that warrant was issued, I think.

363. At what date did you become Commander in Chief in India?—On the 23rd of March 1865.

364. Shortly after you became Commander in Chief in India, I believe you wrote a very strong Minute to the authorities at home, calling their attention to the injustice that the operation of that warrant would inflict upon the officers of the British army?—Yes; I addressed a letter to the military secretary at the Horse Guards, on the 15th August 1865, on the supersession of colonels in the British army, resulting from measures which had been taken previously under the orders of the Government at home.

365. You pointed out also the consequences that would ensue from the Warrant of 1864 in the future, I believe?—This letter to which I have alluded explained the position of the officers of the British service in respect of the supersession, and it also shadowed out that the supersession would go on owing to the causes alluded to in that letter. I find that subsequently, in a letter I addressed to the military secretary, dated the 6th of October 1866 (page 28 of Blue Book), I requested an answer to my previous communication, and in the last sentences of that second letter I showed very briefly that that which had been anticipated had taken place, to a great extent, by that date.

366. Do you consider that that supersession which has taken place inflicts any very great injury upon the officers of the Royal army from a military point of view?—The officers who appealed to me (I believe it was rather in the form of a private appeal than a public one) certainly felt their supersession as a very great grievance.

367. Do you consider that the officers of the Indian army have ever complained of like grievances upon social grounds?—There is no doubt that up to 1855, which I believe was the date when the rank of what are called Indian officers was made good all over the world, there was no single thing which was felt so acutely by officers of the Indian army, as the notion that they, being military officers on the east of the Cape, lost their rank, and merely were titular officers when they were in England and other parts of the world.

368. You were present, I think, during the examination of Colonel Egerton and General Pears on Thursday last?—I heard, I believe, the whole of the examination of Colonel Egerton; but only so much of the examination of General Pears as was interposed in the examination of Colonel Egerton.

369. Have you read what is generally referred to as the Parliamentary guarantee of 1858?—I think I know generally the conditions of that matter.

370. Do you consider that that Parliamentary guarantee of 1858 justifies the supersession of the English colonels by the colonels of the Indian army?—I consider that the Parliamentary guarantee of 1858, that which was popularly known as the guarantee under the Henley Clause, goes as far as this, namely, that what are called the Indian officers shall in nowise suffer or be put in a worse position than they were before the measures following on the re-organisation of the Indian armies, and of the amalgamation of those Indian armies with those of the Crown; that is to say, the amalgamation of the armies of the late East India Company with the army of the Queen; that the officers of the Indian army were not in any manner to be put in a worse position; but it could never be the intention of any guarantee that they should be put in a better position than those officers holding analogous positions in the army of the Queen. This supersession of English officers by Indian officers does put the Indian officers in a better position; therefore I consider that that supersession is in excess of the guarantee.

371. Had no amalgamation taken place between the two armies, such supersession, judging from the previous history of the two armies, would never have been allowed to take place?—This particular point of supersession, after the rank of colonel had been reached, had been guarded in every possible manner by measures taken conjointly by the Ministers of the Crown and the East India Company. It was argued at great length by the Duke of Wellington in 1827, in a Memorandum dated 18th of September 1827; and again by Lord Hill, in a letter to the President of the then Board of Control (Mr. Grant), in a letter dated the 25th of March 1834. It was never desired, so far as I have been able to understand those Papers, that any advantage should be taken of the officers of the East India Company, either by the Duke of Wellington or by

by the late Commander in Chief, Lord Hill; but what they did desire was very much what is now being requested by the officers of the British army; that is to say, that while justice was done to the one service, the other should not be prejudiced. This position, as far as we can judge from the Papers, was completely accepted by the Board of Control and the East India Company of those days.

372. The jealousy between the two armies with regard to supersession is confined to what may be called army rank; there is no jealousy between officers who rise regimentally to higher rank in their respective regiments?—The original question of supersession was limited entirely to the so-called army rank after it had attained the position of colonel; the reason of that was as follows: that in all the different branches of the service there were different systems of regimental rise. In the British service, or what used to be called the King's service, as distinguished from the service of the East India Company, it was partly by purchase and partly by seniority. In the service of the East India Company it was in the regiment, up to the rank of major, entirely by seniority, and after the rank of major was attained (I think that was the point) promotion followed according to what was called the line; that is to say, the whole of the field officers of the East India Company's service were lumped in one list.

373. Sir P. Herbert.] For each Presidency?—Yes, each Presidency had its own line. Then in our own artillery and engineers it was a seniority service in the regiment. Whether it was a regiment of artillery or a regiment of engineers, they all rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel, and then I believe they had a list of their own of general officers, but I am not so clear about that. In the Marines the seniority system was pursued: the consequence of all this was, that there were certain differences in reaching the position of lieutenant colonel; that is to say, an officer who was able to purchase in the King's service reached the rank of lieutenant colonel, if he was fortunate, more rapidly than an officer in the other branches of the public service, where there was solely a seniority system. On the other hand, in the purchasing branches of the army there was a very considerable section of officers of whose grievances we have heard a great deal from time to time who were longer in reaching the coveted rank of lieutenant colonel than those in the other branches of the army. The consequence was that it came to be adopted as a principle, that up to the rank of colonel the regimental rise as affecting the individual was considered to be his good or bad fortune. It was not considered that a man was in any way prejudiced because he rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel in one branch of the service quicker than he did in another branch of the service; but the rank of lieutenant colonel having been reached, as we are aware, under the old system of brevets, the promotion to the rank of colonel first and subsequently to the rank of general officer was included in the system of brevet, and therefore it was quite impossible under that brevet system for any chance to occur of what has been called lately the leapfrog system, that is to say one branch of the service going over the heads of another branch.

374. Chairman.] The question was asked on Thursday last, I think by the Under Secretary  
0.126.

of State for India, whether there was no supersession between scientific corps and the line and the cavalry; are the two cases precisely analogous?—I find that that point was answered by the Duke of Wellington in the Memorandum to which I have referred; and as the same thing exists now as was pointed out by his Grace, perhaps it may be well that I should quote the words of the Duke of Wellington; he says, "The anonymous writer, however, is not possibly aware, and at all events has not mentioned, that the officers of the artillery and engineers are prevented by custom, if not by positive regulation, from being employed in the general command of his Majesty's troops; their services are confined exclusively to their own arm. It happens but seldom that a sufficient body of engineers or artillery is employed to give occasion for the active employment of an officer of the rank of colonel. If the body of artillery or of engineers is large, the nature of the service of those arms, the horses, and the material which must be sent with such body generally, require the employment of a general officer of those arms; and in all probability the service of such bodies of artillery and engineers would be with an army with which there would be general officers of all ranks." I believe I am right in stating that what was laid down as part of the system of the British army by the Duke of Wellington in 1827 exists at present in the British part of the service. There is, however, one difference which has occurred since, and that is this: under the rules of the East India Company, officers of the artillery and the engineers had always been allowed to hold what we call divisional and general command in India. When the forces came to be amalgamated, it was felt in all quarters, and certainly by myself, as being an authority in India, that it would have been extremely wrong to divest what are called the scientific arms of those privileges which they had held in India, merely because they became part of the amalgamated regiments at home; and accordingly the officers of the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers, which are now the titles of the amalgamated regiments, have that privilege continued to them in India, though it has not been accorded them in other parts of Her Majesty's dominions, of holding divisional and brigade commands, and at this present moment Lord Napier of Magdala is an instance of an officer holding command under that rule.

375. Those are only exceptional cases, I presume, where the officers so appointed are very greatly distinguished for their services?—No; in India they come upon the roster for command. The only thing which is done generally, at least it was done by myself when holding command in that country, is to keep a certain proportion between the various branches of the service; that is to say, if there were a great number of senior officers of artillery in India, it did not appear to me to be right that the whole of the commands should be held by officers of artillery because they happened to be seniors, and I tried to keep a certain proportion between the branches of the service. The first desideratum I considered was efficiency, then seniority, and thirdly, a proportion between the three arms.

376. At all events, any supersession that may take place between the colonels of the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers, and the colonels

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colonels of the Line and the Guards, is a very different supersession from that which takes place between the Indian and English services?—That supersession which takes place between the separate arms of Her Majesty's service is hardly recognised as a supersession.

377. Sir P. Herbert.] The supersession in the Royal Army between one branch and another of the service has not been very serious, has it?—No, I believe not.

378. Chairman.] In the Under Secretary of State's examination of General Pears, he asked the following question: "The Secretary of State had, of course, two difficulties to avoid; the first of those difficulties was the danger of doing anything to contravene the well-known Parliamentary guarantee, and so to commit an illegal act; and the second danger was by conceding something that might not be directly protected by the Parliamentary guarantee, but to which the Indian officers might attach very great importance to raise up a new crop of Indian grievances and agitations, of which we have had so many since the amalgamation;" I wish to ask you if you do not consider that the interests of officers of the Royal army serving in India are just as worthy of consideration as the interests of Indian officers, and that it is just as important to deprive them of any just ground of complaint, as it is to deprive the officers of the Indian army of any such ground of complaint?—Undoubtedly; but I would add that it is not merely a question of the interests of the Royal army serving in India, but it is a question of the interests of the Royal army serving all over the world.

379. You have seen the proposals put forward as some sort of concession on the part of the Indian authorities, with the view of doing away with the injustice complained of by the English officers?—When I first read this letter of the 27th of May 1870 from the Military Secretary, India Office, to the Under Secretary of State for War, I made a great mistake; I had imagined that that which was admitted by the India Office to be a way out of the puzzle had been really sanctioned. However, I found that I had made a very great mistake, and I had attributed final sanction to what was really only a preliminary proposal of the Duke of Argyll, and which was afterwards negatived, and in this correspondence finally set aside; that which I allude to is giving local rank to the general officers of the British service whenever they come in contact, or were superseded, in point of fact, by officers of the Indian service. That, however, I find has not been done, therefore I cannot consider that these concessions are altogether satisfactory. My own recommendation was made so long ago as 1865, and nothing that I have as yet seen convinces me that there was anything in that recommendation that might not have been accepted. However, it is right to say at the same time, that when I made that recommendation I was the Commander in Chief in India, and it did not appear to me, as Commander in Chief in India, that I could recommend the setting aside of a Royal Warrant which had very recently received the approval of the Crown, and therefore, when I made my recommendations in 1865, I went as far as an officer in the position of Commander in Chief could go, but I was precluded by that very position from going any further; at the same time, the very proposals which I then ventured to make, having that responsibility upon me, have not met

with approval here, and these arrangements do not go so far, in fact, as I wished them to go in 1865.

380. If you had been left to yourself entirely, and you could have felt yourself justified in recommending such a strong measure as the reversal of the Royal Warrant, you would have done so?—I think I should have done so; but it is difficult for me to say that; it would have required to be examined from other points of view; in point of fact, as I think is shown by the letters which I sent to England, my letters were for the purpose of really raising the question and having it fairly argued upon the merits.

381. Supposing the Warrant of 1864 was reversed and we went back again to the Warrant of 1862, it would at once put a stop to all future supersession, would it not?—Perhaps if you were to go back to the position in which you stood in 1862 you might get into another difficulty: without giving the lists of the different services that sort of careful examination which I am not in a position to do, I am not able to say whether or not you might not be going the other way and improperly superseding some of the officers of the Indian service; but it appears to me that if you look at this matter broadly, there is a certain point indicated where the real amalgamation of the lists of colonels should commence, and that is the exact point where the supersession commences. The original Warrant of 1862, and the correcting Warrant of 1864, if I understand them at all, were for the purpose of putting the officers of the respective services exactly in their relative positions according to fairness. There was a disappointment apparently with regard to the Warrant of 1862, and a remedy was attempted in 1864. Now we have been convinced in the most complete manner that the remedy went a great deal further than the disease, and that whilst you were rectifying what was considered an inequality or an injustice to the one side, you were producing a very great injustice to the other side; if there is anything in that, it seems to me that the whole thing lies in a nutshell, and that is that the particular point where the supersession began, which was at the date I pointed out, 1865, is the exact point where the amalgamation should begin; and if that had been arranged at the time, the whole of this business would never have been heard of. I think Colonel Egerton made a little mistake in his evidence the other day; he seemed to think that no supersession had taken place till 1868, but it is very clearly pointed out in my letter that it began in 1865; instances are given in a note to that letter in which actual supersession took place. It is very true that those officers have since been promoted, or some of them have become non-effective altogether; but the supersession actually dates from the year 1865, and it has been going on in an accelerated ratio ever since.

382. Would it be possible now to go back to the date of 1865 to remedy the grievance?—The Warrant of 1864 was framed to remedy what was believed to be an injustice in the Warrant of 1862, and the very proposals made by the Duke of Argyll, and accepted by His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, are an invalidation of the Warrant of 1864; therefore if it is possible to correct and amend the warrant in the one case, I cannot see that there can be any difficulty in correcting and amending it in the other.

383. Sir P. Herbert.] Are the Committee to understand

understand that you are of opinion that any supersession that took place in 1865, and since, has been an injustice and an injury to the British army?—I think that, from the point of view in which these things are generally regarded by British officers of whatever service, there has been a prejudice caused to them. Of course it must depend a great deal upon the idiosyncrasy of the individual as to whether he cares about that sort of thing or not; but, no doubt, according to the notions in the midst of which British officers are trained, it does not matter to what service he belongs; he objects very much to a supersession which does not depend upon distinguished service, but which depends upon the operations of regulations which were not in existence when he entered the army. It is not too much to say that nine-tenths, perhaps I might say a great deal more, but certainly nine-tenths of the agitation which has taken place with regard to the East India Company's service since the year 1858, almost up to the present date, has followed from such causes; that is to say, Indian officers feared, in the first instance, that they were going to be prejudiced; and, secondly, when certain measures had been taken to retain the ground which they had won, they were very naturally unwilling to relinquish that ground. But the fact of the agitation, and the fact of this view being taken by all the officers of that service, shows very clearly that that which is now put forward by the officers of the British army is not confined to one section of the army, but that it is a notion running through the entire army.

384. It is no social grievance that is complained of, but the officers apprehend that they will sustain serious professional injury?—I think that, again, must depend a great deal upon circumstances, and upon what a man thinks himself. To a vast number of those gentlemen the matter is merely a social one; to others, again, it is a question of very considerable importance as a professional matter; but I am myself inclined to think that the important points affecting this question begin much lower down than in the ranks of the general officers, and that the results to which I allude ultimately affect very seriously those very lists of general officers. I think in this question which is being considered by the Committee, that is to say, the question of the supersession of the colonels, you do not hit the principle from which the whole thing starts.

385. There have been some new rules, have there not, with regard to the promotion of officers now on the staff corps?—Yes; that would bring me very much to what I allude to. Perhaps, before answering that question, I may allude to a point which is dwelt upon by Lord Hill and the Duke of Wellington. Both those authorities lay down that what in their time was the King's army in India was merely an auxiliary force of the Company's army; and they dwell particularly upon this auxiliary condition as affecting the King's officers when compared with the officers of the Indian army. They then go on to reason that notwithstanding the auxiliary condition of the King's forces in India, it is very necessary to guard the dignity and the *esprit de corps* animating those forces, and that therefore, as regards the position of the officers, they must not be put in a position which would be worse for them than for the officers of the armies with which they were associated. Now I would desire to point out to the Committee that, owing to the

very large changes which have been operating in the forces of the Crown in India since 1858, this so-called auxiliary character of a part of the army in India no longer exists. The real army in India is now the army of the Crown, and if there is any portion of it which may be called auxiliary, it is the Native army, or so-called local army of each of the Presidencies. The way we arrive at such a conclusion is this: the whole of the force now in India is amalgamated under the Crown; there is no separate authority of the East India Company as there was in former days; the commissions held by the officers are those of the Crown, and are not signed by the East India Company. The great feature in the re-modelling of the armies of India was the construction of what was called the Staff Corps, from which body are to be taken, and now are taken, all officers, for whatever situation, civil or military, in which military officers in India are employed. Those officers of the Staff Corps are recruited, as it were, from the ranks of the British regiments. When a vacancy takes place in the Staff Corps, an application is made to the Commander in Chief of the Presidency concerned to supply a young officer from one of Her Majesty's regiments. This officer then, under certain rules of probation and what not, is transferred from one of the regiments of the Crown to one of the Presidency Staff Corps, but being in the Presidency Staff Corps he still remains just as much an officer of the Crown as he was before, when he was in one of Her Majesty's regiments. In fact, the Staff Corps comes to be what we should call in this country an unattached list, and the officers belonging to that Staff Corps are, as regards the application of the Mutiny Act, their obligations to the Crown, and all purposes for which officers are under discipline, precisely in the same position as their comrades whom they have left in the British regiments. That being so, an officer when transferred to the Staff Corps comes under a new principle as regards promotion; he gets promotion not according to the principle of seniority, as was the case in the old Company's army, not according to the principle of purchase, such as we know exists in the British army, but according to a principle which hitherto had been quite unknown in the English service; that is to say, he receives his promotion for fixed periods of service in the Staff Corps. After he has been 12 years in the army he attains the rank of captain; after 21 years he attains the rank of major, and so on; that being so, we have to compare the condition of the officer thus promoted with that of the officers whom he left behind in one of the British regiments. Some of those officers, as we know, are promoted by purchase, and some are promoted without purchase; in the artillery and engineers they are altogether promoted without purchase, that is to say, by the system of seniority. When we compare these several systems, we find that the officers who have thus been transferred to the Staff Corps have the advantage of a promotion which is more rapid than that of the officers they have left behind them in their regiments; that is to say, the officers who are not able to purchase, of whom there are a very great number in the regiments in India. I do not think I exaggerate when I say that so liberal are the rates of promotion for the Staff Corps, that on the whole it will not be found that an officer who attains the rank of colonel in the British army,

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purchasing all his steps, will have been a much shorter time in the service than one who has risen to the rank of colonel in the Staff Corps without purchase at all; but if we survey the cases of officers who have risen in the British regiments without purchase, we shall find that the officers in the Staff Corps have outstripped them enormously. This came to be put very practically by the officers of the British army a few years ago, and after certain representations it was admitted by the Government at Home and in India that that which I had described as likely to take place had actually taken place, and that in the several degrees under the rank of colonel there were a vast number of officers in the British regiments serving in India who had been so far prejudiced as to find themselves superseded by their comrades serving in the Staff Corps in India without any fault of their own, and without there being any reason to assume that the officers of the so-called Staff Corps were better or more efficient than those serving in the regiments. That comes to be a very serious thing, when you consider that the Staff Corps is now recruited from the British regiments, and that Ensign A., who remains in the regiment, will be a lieutenant colonel a great many years later than Ensign B., who gets himself transferred to the Staff Corps. This was rectified in India by an order from the Secretary of State, according to which local rank was given to the officers in the respective conditions below the rank of colonel; that is to say, they were given local rank in India according to the rates of service regulating service in the Staff Corps; in other words, that an officer who has been 12 years a subaltern in the regiment is now made a local captain in India; and in the case of an officer who has been in the army the number of years which would, if he were in the Staff Corps, make him a major in the Staff Corps, he receives an analogous local promotion in India, and so on. But there is this to be recollected, that the promotion in the Staff Corps is real and substantive; it is good all over the world, and it leads to further promotion. The other promotion, according to its terms, is merely local and temporary, and ceases when the officers leave India. The consequence is, that the officers who have risen in the Staff Corps are all going on to this rank of colonel and general, whereas, in the case of their comrades who have been doing precisely the same duty as local field officers in India, when they leave India their services as field officers is lost, and when they come across their Indian comrades again they will probably be of comparatively low rank, while their Indian comrades are major generals, therefore I say that the whole of that subject has a great bearing upon the one which is now being considered by this Committee.

386. You think it is one that deserves the very serious consideration of the Government?—I venture to think that what I have described is of greatly more importance to the officers of the British Army than this one which is immediately before the Committee. I would exemplify it in this way: during the time that I was Commander in Chief in India, I suppose many hundreds of officers of the British Army in India received this local rank to put them locally on a par with the officers of the Staff Corps; when I say many hundreds I may be exaggerating, but certainly there were a good many; and to show how it acts, I am quite safe in saying that no regi-

ment lands in India without having to require that certain of its officers shall be promoted to put them on a par with the Staff Corps officers.

387. Mr. *West*.] On what principle are the officers selected for the Staff Corps?—The officers of the Staff Corps are selected according to certain rules; an officer having been two years in the army is allowed to apply for a vacancy on the Staff Corps; he then has to pass in Hindostanee to enable him to serve with the native troops, and he passes a year of probation; if at the end of that year of probation his new commanding officer says he has acquitted himself well, he is then at once transferred to the Staff Corps, this year's probation being counted as part of his Staff Corps service; if, on the other hand, he has misconducted himself, or shown that he is not fit for the service in any way, he is returned to his regiment.

388. Sir *P. Herbert*.] Are you aware as regards the question that is immediately before the Committee, that the Staff Corps officers now holding the rank of colonel will in a very short time be superseded, together with the British officers, by the colonels on the Indian list?—Yes.

389. Therefore, when that point is reached, which will be very shortly, they will have the same grievance to complain of that the British officers have?—Yes; the reason of that is tolerably plain; the old East India Company's services were, as I explained in answer to a previous question, constituted on a plan of line promotion after the position of field officer had been reached. It was ruled in the India Office after a great argument and a great agitation which prevailed for a very long time, that it was necessary with regard to the Henley clause to adhere strictly to that old rule of promotion, but in the meantime those officers who are called local, to whom you have alluded, had gained an immense advantage on account of the transfer of a great many others to the Staff Corps; and therefore they got the benefit of all the steps which had been caused by the transfer of their comrades to the Staff Corps.

390. You are aware of the case of Sir David Wood, Major General of the Royal Artillery, who served as lieutenant colonel of artillery in the Crimea, who was promoted for distinguished service to the rank of colonel, who joined the army under Lord Clyde's command in India, and commanded the whole of the field artillery in the army with which you were serving, which attacked Lucknow?—Yes.

391. I believe there was a force of nine batteries of field artillery under his orders?—I should think about that.

392. You are probably aware that commanding two of those batteries were Captain and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Tombs, and Captain and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Turner, of the Indian artillery?—That was their position. I recollect Lieutenant Colonel Turner. I am not clear about Lieutenant Colonel Tombs being at Lucknow; but that was the position of those officers.

393. They were commanding batteries?—Commanding batteries either at Lucknow or somewhere else. I am not quite certain whether or not Lieutenant Colonel Turner was then promoted.

394. At any rate, he was commanding a battery?

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tery?—Yes, he had been commanding a battery in that campaign, certainly.

395. Colonel Wood was commanding that field artillery with the rank of brigadier?—I suppose with the rank of brigadier; he was certainly commanding the field artillery; I presume with the rank of brigadier.

396. And both those officers have, by the arrangements which have been lately made, superseded him in the rank of major general in the Royal Artillery?—By the "Army List" that appears to be the case.

397. A supersession of that nature can hardly fail to give dissatisfaction to an officer who is anxious for distinction?—I should think it would be unsatisfactory.

398. In your opinion, the point to which the ante-dating ought to go back, would be to 1865, when the supersession first commenced?—That is the view I have taken of it. I see no reason why that should not be done. As I have been answering questions about artillery officers, I may say that I am not sure how it would affect the case of the artillery officer. I have not considered that, but was directing my observations to the case of the line officers.

399. It must be desirable to rectify the relative position of the artillery officers as well as of the line officers?—I should think there ought to be no difficulty about it.

400. You are aware that of late years the British artillery has gained rather in promotion upon the infantry and cavalry officers?—I am not quite clear about that. It appears to me that the principle to adopt would be something like this, that in the several lines of promotion, whether the infantry, the cavalry, the artillery, or the engineers, we should take care in reconstructing the lists that the rank of colonel having been achieved, and there being no promotion for distinguished service in the field; that is to say, the rank of colonel having been achieved *ceteris paribus*, there is to be no game of leapfrog in any list at all. And it appears to me that that can be done perfectly well while preserving that principle which, so far as I understand, is advocated by the Horse Guards, of keeping entirely separate lists for the different arms of the service.

401. So long as there are separate lists, the one list must gain a little over the other from time to time?—Yes; but it is not shown in this army list to be of much consequence.

402. At any rate, if the rectification of the individual lists required that there should be a slight rectification of the joint lists, as they came on to the rank of major general, you see no objection to that?—I see no objection to it; but I should think it would be better to keep the lists entirely separate, to be satisfied with the rectification of the lists, as regards the lines of promotion in the several arms of the service; that is to say, that the guards, the cavalry, and the infantry should be one list; that there should be another list for the artillery, and a third for the engineers, and so on; and then that a reconstruction of those lists should take place on the principle that, *ceteris paribus*, the rank of colonel having been achieved, there shall be no unfair advantage given to any man of whatever service he belonged to.

403. The point is this, that if you ante-dated the commissions to rectify every supersession in the individual lists, it would involve a rectifica-

tion in the general list on account of the interlacing of the names in the general list?—I do not see that it would.

404. Do you think there would be any injustice, inasmuch as the artillery have gained a few steps of late years over the infantry and the cavalry, in putting them back in the general list?—It becomes a question of expediency, which probably would be better answered by an expert in the office, but I should myself be inclined to think that no particular advantage would follow from that, and that you would gain everything that was really desirable in the rectification of the several lists, as I have pointed out.

405. May we not assume that the object of making the separate lists was to secure that there should be a certain number of general officers of each branch of the service?—I presume that was the object; then there is another thing to be said, which possibly may have weighed with the authorities (but of course I am not in a position to assign reasons for what they have done), that in the artillery an officer rises *per saltum* from the position of captain to that of lieutenant colonel; the rank of major is saved; that, at all events, as regards the rank of lieutenant colonel, gives the artillery an advantage, and if all things were equal, the artillery officer would probably reach the rank of lieutenant colonel earlier than the officer in the line would. Then, on the other hand, in the line there is the system of purchase, which to a certain extent does away with the difference.

406. I believe, on the average, the officers of artillery get the rank of lieutenant colonel quite as soon as officers of the line?—It is owing to that cause probably, because they avoid one step.

407. *Chairman.*] Are you aware that last year, as appears by Appendix C. of the Blue Book, there were no less than 18 colonels of the British army either commanding regiments or commanding brigades in India, who had been superseded in the rank of major general by officers of the Indian army?—I cannot myself speak to the number, but that appears to be the case. I believe that is correct.

408. *Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.*] What is the remedy which you propose; you say you would keep in each branch of the service a distinct stream of promotion?—Yes.

409. And then, having done so, you would take care that no unfairness or injustice was done?—Yes.

410. Will you explain exactly what means you would take to prevent any unfairness or injustice; would you make any retrospective arrangement?—I should take all those officers who have been promoted up to the present date, and who are now major generals, and I should look back to the dates of their colonels' commissions, and I should re-arrange their places in the major generals' list, exactly as I found them in the colonels' list.

411. Suppose I am a superseded colonel, you would re-arrange the major generals *inter se*; that would not help me, the superseded colonel, would it?—That is another question.

412. Do you propose to deal with that part of the question?—I propose to deal with that part of the question by making the Warrant of 1862 operative from the year 1865.

413. That is, to restore the Warrant of 1862?

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—Yes;

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—Yes; but to let its operation commence in 1865, when this supersession which I pointed out in my letter of 1865 began.

414. So far your measure would be retrospective?—So far it would be retrospective.

415. What would be the prospective arrangement which you would propose?—The prospective arrangement that I would propose would be to take the rectified list of major generals who have been promoted, and to put them in a fresh list exactly according to their dates of achieving the rank of colonel, as distinguished from that of major general.

416. You have considered, no doubt, the objection taken to this course by Sir William James's Committee. They say, "It has been suggested that all these officers should at once be promoted to be major generals, with the necessary ante-dates of their commissions" (that would not be exactly what you propose, but it would be something like it, because you say you would let the Warrant of 1862 operate from the year 1865), "but without receiving the unattached pay of the rank, and be allowed to hold appointments and commands open to them now as colonels; and that the generals and colonels of both armies should then be placed on an amalgamated list, from which all promotions to the higher rank, according to seniority, should be made;" and then they go on to point out the objection to that course?—That is not my proposal at all.

417. Will you explain what your proposal is?—The first thing to do is to reconstruct the lists, which is evidently what was in the mind of the India Office and the War Office when they mutually consented to ante-date the general officers whose names we saw in the "Gazette" the other day. Then the next point is to rehabilitate the officers who have been superseded.

418. Men who are now colonels whose juniors have been put over their heads?—It is quite clear that no Government could be asked to promote 279 officers to the rank of general officers all at once, in order to meet a difficulty of that sort; but I think a good deal would be done towards meeting the difficulty without expense, if we could consider, as I say, this Warrant of 1862 as being operative from the year 1865; but we are so far from 1865, that we cannot well declare that now, and the next best thing is to declare that the amalgamated list begins from to-day for the purpose of rectifying this injustice to the 279 colonels as far as we can.

419. (*Chairman*.) There are only four colonels of the Indian army of the date of 1865 that have been promoted as yet?—I do not think that would make any difference; the case is this, I believe there are 279 men belonging to the Colonels' List of the British Army, who it is alleged have been superseded by officers of the Indian Army. Then, any man who is now promoted from the Indian List aggravates that grievance, that is to say, the next general officer in the Indian service who dies, will occasion the promotion of a 280th man. There are 279 colonels who have been superseded by junior colonels, therefore if the promotion goes on in the Indian services you must add to those 279, and there would be still more superseded. Then, my proposal is this, to revert to the Warrant of 1862, and to say that the amalgamated list, as declared by the Warrant of 1864, did not begin soon enough. If the amalgamated list began in 1865

instead of 1872, or whatever may be the date when it reaches Colonel Salmon, we should not have heard of this discussion, because the supersession would not have taken place. And, therefore, my proposal would be this: we cannot do anything with 1865 now without unpromoting a great many gentlemen who have been promoted, and that would be a very grievous thing to do, and a very unwise thing to do, but you might do this, though you would not unpromote the officers of the Indian service, who have all of them superseded the 279 colonels, still you might declare that from this date the amalgamated list shall commence, which, under present arrangements, would not commence as regards the general officers for two years' time.

420. *Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.*] Your proposal substantially is to return to what was the case in 1862, only substituting 1870 for 1862?—It is really to declare that what was done in 1864 has been shown to be by experience prejudicial to the British service; and so far as we can, after the difficulties produced by lapse of time, to rectify that inequality.

421. It is to set up what was the case in 1862 again?—It is not quite the same, because I take it if that had been done in 1862, that at that particular time some supersession of the other service would have taken place.

422. I am not speaking of the effects but of the principle; you would re-enact in 1870 the rule that was in force in 1862?—So far the principle is the same in both the Warrants of 1862 and 1864; but the application of that principle was retarded very much by the action of the Warrant of 1864.

423. There were eight years before the Warrant of 1862 would come into effect?—And during that time the supersession took place.

424. The effect would be practically to restore us to where we were in 1862, to do away with the eight years' interregnum?—It would not do away with it altogether, because in the meantime so many of those officers have been promoted. My proposal is not to undo what has taken place during the first five years, but not to continue the prejudice by allowing the faulty results to continue, which have shown themselves in such a practical manner.

425. That, of course, involves a reversal in fact to a certain extent of what was recommended by Lord Cranworth's Commission?—A reversal of what was done in 1864.

426. That was done under the recommendations of that Commission; have you considered the report of that Commission?—I believe I read it at the time.

427. I should like to know your opinion as to the soundness of the principles of that report; you are aware that it laid down that the Indian officers were entitled to the same promotion and the same pay as they had before; that they could not be taken from them, in fact?—That is quite true, as I explained in answer to a former question. Whilst it is quite right that the Indian officers should have whatever promotion comes fairly to them, it is not right that they should obtain advantages which put them in a very superior position, and which were never contemplated by either their predecessors or themselves.

428. Do you go so far as to hold that the guarantee guaranteed to Indian officers their existing pay and promotion?—The guarantee of the Act of Parliament in 1858 guaranteed or was a voucher

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a voucher to the position and to the emolument of the officers as they existed before 1857. But this voucher or guarantee does not go to the extent of putting them in a better position than they occupied before. I am able to say, with the greatest authority, that with reference to promotion there is hardly an officer in the Indian service who, either as regards emolument or position, has not had his lot ameliorated by all that has been done; and, therefore, both as regards emoluments and as regards position, what has been done for Indian officers goes far beyond the guarantee.

429. Suppose the East India Company had continued and it had seen fit to reduce its number of generals, that would have retarded the promotion of the colonels?—Yes.

430. Would it have been incompetent for the East India Company to have done that, or would it have been unfair to its army?—It would have been decidedly within its power to do so.

431. Supposing the Home Government had chosen to do that, would that have been a breach of the guarantee?—I am afraid it would have been to that generation of officers, considering the words of the Act of Parliament.

432. You put a strict construction upon that?—Yes.

433. I will read you the opinion of the law officers of the Crown on the subject, at page 50 of Lord Cranworth's Report, because this is not a strict question of law, but a question upon which your opinion is highly important; their opinion is, "That the officers of the Indian army stood in the same relation to the Crown as that in which they had stood to the East India Company, and that those officers who did not voluntarily adopt other terms of service should not be subjected on the part of the Crown to any change or regulation to which they might not have been subjected on the part of the East India Company;" that is a much looser construction than you are putting upon the guarantee?—I incline to the construction I have put upon it on this ground, because I think it will be found by reference to certain warrants or orders of 1854. I am not speaking with any great accuracy; but I think it will be found that in order to put, as was believed, the officers of the Indian army in a position of analogy towards those of the Royal army, a certain proportion of generals should be conceded to them at the time that a certain proportion was laid down for the British army when the system of promotion was changed in 1854. Therefore, with regard to this particular question of general officers, it seems to me that an Indian officer might fairly say, you agreed to give us this proportion of general officers, or in other words a certain quantum of promotion to this high rank so long as we were servants of the East India Company, but now that we are servants of the Crown you are taking that away from us. I think they might fairly argue that if not a right, at all events a very important privilege would have been attacked by that.

434. In the year 1855 the officers of the Indian army were given rank everywhere all over the world?—Yes.

435. That is proposed now to be restricted by the recent proposal of the Government?—Yes.

436. Do you think that would be a breach of 0.126.

the guarantee?—I should myself be very sorry to see that done.

437. With reference to this question of the guarantee, do you think it would be a breach of that guarantee?—It has not occurred to me to consider it from that point of view, but I should be inclined to think that that would be a breach of the guarantee.

438. Do the officers who are superseded sustain any pecuniary damage apart from professional damage? Yes; they do in this way; if the Warrant of 1862 had not been changed, those 279 officers would all have been promoted; at least a great number of them would have been promoted, instead of a large proportion of the officers of the East India Company who have received promotion. An officer who is promoted to the unattached list of general officers receives 450 *l.* a year, whereas a lieutenant colonel on half-pay gets only 200 *l.* a year. It is a curious thing with regard to the two services, that whereas a British officer is prejudiced by not being promoted, an Indian officer does not receive a prejudice on the same account.

439. *Chairman.*] It is rather a loss to an Indian officer to be promoted than otherwise?—This very promotion, which is the cause of the contention, has been a very great sacrifice.

440. *Mr. West.*] In what particulars do the present concessions that are offered fall short of your recommendations in 1865?—I pointed out in 1865 the prudence of reverting to what was done in former days, to put the colonels of the British army on a par with the colonels of the Indian army; that is to say, that they should have the local rank of general in India wherever they were superseded by an officer of the Indian service, and *vice versa*, if an Indian officer was superseded irregularly by a British officer, that he was to get his brevet rank.

441. Is not that carried out by the present proposal?—No, it is not; that is the very thing in which it fails. It was put forth by the Duke of Argyll, and I had supposed that it was to be carried out, but afterwards it was objected to, I think, by the War Department.

442. That is the particular in which I understand you to think the present offers fall short of your recommendations?—Yes.

443. *Sir C. Wingfield.*] Will not the number of those colonels who have been superseded be very much diminished about a year hence, when the 12th clause of the Warrant comes into operation, and the vacancies that would have gone to the Staff Corps are filled by Royal officers?—The rectification will then commence.

444. That will lead to some considerable number of British colonels being promoted to the rank of major general during five years?—I suppose, owing to the fact of this very large supersession, as indicated by the figure 279, for a long time to come it must happen that the officers on the list of British colonels will fill all the vacancies on the amalgamated list.

445. What do you think of the proposal to make 45 major generals, in anticipation of the additions that will be made?—I do not know how it would operate; I have never examined it carefully. It is not a proposal I should myself have made. I should have preferred the plan which I have recommended, which would have commenced the rectification a few years sooner, which will take place under the Warrant of 1864.

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446. In fact you would bring the amalgamated list into operation immediately?—That is what I should propose to do. The consequence would be that during the next year the promotion of the British army would be doubled, whereas the promotion of the army which has superseded the other one, would be stopped, and it would be stopped until the inequality had been rectified in the course of a few years.

447. That amalgamated list will come into operation as it is next year, will it not?—That I cannot tell; the sooner that takes place the sooner the rectification will commence.

448. There are 10 or 12 Indian major generals, who were appointed colonels prior to 1861, remaining to be promoted now, are there not?—That I cannot tell.

449. Do you think, as regards supersession, there is any difference between the case of those Staff Corps major generals, who next year will be brought into the British list of major generals and regularly fused into it, and those generals who remain on the local lists?—I do not see any difference; one general officer is as good as another.

450. One gets into the general list, and another is on the local list in a separate service, one may say?—It appears to me all to hinge on the liability of those gentlemen to be employed. It is said that this liability is much more imaginary than real, and it is also said that if that is assumed to be true, there is very little difference after all between those lists; but on the other hand, I think we have to take a much larger view of the question. You may recollect that in the Crimean War there was a force formed called the Turkish Contingent. This Turkish Contingent was commanded by an officer of the Madras army. It was officered by gentlemen, the greater proportion of whom belonged to the Indian armies, but a great number of whom belonged to the British army. Many of those officers had local rank given to them, so that the divisions of the Turkish Contingent were commanded by local major generals, and the regiments were commanded by local lieutenant colonels, and so on. It happened to me to be deputed in 1855 by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to urge upon the Commander in Chief of the British army, Sir James Simpson, the employment of this Turkish Contingent. As I have just explained, the officers of the Turkish Contingent had local advantages of rank given to them, and the Commander in Chief of the British army declined to have the Turkish Contingent at the head quarters of his army. There is no official record of that refusal, but I could only take the words he used to me to be a direct refusal to employ the Turkish Contingent. The result was, that at the very time that they would have been of the greatest possible use in the lines before Sebastopol, they were left to do nothing in the Bosphorus. I had the firmest conviction that this misapplication of a large force was solely owing to a question of relative rank between the officers of the two services; that is to say, the officers of the Turkish Contingent and the officers of the British army. Whether he was right or wrong, I believe that Sir James Simpson attributed the greatest importance to this question, and there is no doubt, that if those regiments of the Turkish Contingent had come to be brigaded with English regiments, and it was found that, owing to this local attri-

bution of rank of the officers of the Turkish Contingent, though they had not actually participated in the early part of the war, were in a position to command the officers with whom they were brigaded, there would have been a very real and serious dissatisfaction. Therefore, though I deplored Sir James Simpson's determination, I could not but see that there was a good deal in what I believed to be the real cause of that determination.

451. Was this local rank given to them in order to give them a certain position in the Turkish army, or to regulate the difference between the Queen's officers and the East Indian officers?—It was to give them a certain position in the army; that is to say, the divisions being commanded by English colonels, some belonging to the Indian service and some to the service of the Crown; they alike had the rank of major general given them on being put in command of the divisions. That case illustrates how disadvantageously to the public service all those distinctions operate. There you had the distinction caused merely by the attribution of local rank, which is now perpetuated in India by this arrangement, which is at present going on, and which is sought to be got rid of by this amalgamated list.

452. Are you not aware that in the Peninsular War, where Portuguese regiments were commanded by British officers, who were given local rank, no inconvenience arose?—I do not know whether any inconvenience arose in that case, but the way in which it might work is shown by the following anecdote: The Duke of Wellington had a great regard for the late Sir Alexander Dixon, of the Artillery, and he being only a captain of artillery, the Duke of Wellington gave him rank in the Portuguese army which enabled him to command all the artillery of the British army in the Peninsula, and it is a positive fact, that this same officer having been in command of all the artillery in the Peninsula, reverted to the command of his troop at the battle of Waterloo, and he was taken from his troop by the Duke of Wellington and put on his personal staff, on personal grounds, at the battle of Waterloo.

453. You think local rank altogether objectionable?—I think the giving of any rank which goes to disorganise the cadres of the army, any rank which is given exceptionally without its being the result of distinguished conduct; in fact, unless it be given as a reward and for the advancement of the public service, is a positive disadvantage to the administration of the army, and it is on that ground that really I think we ought to step in to put a stop to all such things, and not so much on any individual ground as regards officers.

454. Do you think it would be possible for the Indian Government to do as the Secretary of State says it will endeavour to do, viz., make such arrangements in the distribution of the army as will prevent a British colonel serving under an Indian major general who was junior to him in the rank of colonel?—I should say it would be impossible to do that; it is quite out of the question to move a regiment 200 or 300 miles, and put the State to the great expense entailed by that movement, merely to get rid of the question of seniority between two officers.

455. Even in time of peace?—Even in time of peace; I, myself, often, in order to avoid the difficulty

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difficulty when arranging the relief of regiments, have considered this very question. Suppose it comes to a man's turn to be appointed to a brigade, and by the rules of the service the man is declared to be fit for the appointment, I am obliged to put him in command of a brigade; I must give him that, because it is his right: if he is thoroughly fit and capable, I cannot pass him over; that being so, I cannot possibly remove a regiment to another station merely to get rid of the question of supersession; it would be jobbing the service in a shameful manner, and entailing a great expense for a paltry object.

456. Have you known any instances in your time of British colonels serving in India under major generals who were junior to them as colonels?—That has often happened; the other day at Peshawur, the second in command at that station was greatly senior to the senior in command, and yet this officer, who was second in command, was a distinguished man, having been in campaigns all over the world; it was his business to comply with the regulations of the service, and he did so with perfect good temper, but still the thing occurred.

457. In the year 1854, when the establishment of general officers was fixed for both armies, the system of Fane Brevets was put a stop to?—I believe somewhere about that time.

458. It was in consequence of having a fixed establishment that the Fane Brevets were discontinued?—I do not carry in my mind by whose authority the system was discontinued, I suppose by Lord Hardinge.

459. Therefore, may we not hold that the principle laid down by Lord Hill and the Duke of Wellington, on which a great deal of stress has been laid, that no British colonel should be superseded by an Indian colonel, was then abandoned?—No, I do not think so; the authorities may have seen some reason or other for doing away with that particular system of Fane Brevets, but it could never be accepted by any British authority that one officer had a right to supersede another without any fault of his own, such a thing has never been heard of.

460. It is supersession in a different service, not supersession in the same service?—All I can say is, that I revert again to what I alluded to at the early part of my examination, the outcry made by officers of the sister service when they merely felt that something was going to happen to them before it actually did happen.

461. During all this time major generals on the Indian list have been superseded in the rank of lieutenant general very largely by officers in the Queen's army, owing to the proportion of lieutenant generals in the fixed establishment of the Indian army being much smaller than that of the royal army; and I do not think they even made any complaint?—I do not know anything about that; Indian officers never held a command as lieutenant general.

462. The supersession took a social form?—Yes.

463. When the Warrant of 1854 was issued, and 95 colonels were promoted in one day, do not you think it must have been foreseen that that rapid advancement, and that rapid promotion would give a great impulse to Indian officers going over the heads of English officers?—My experience of measures of this kind is somewhat to this effect, that there is always some great condition which is not foreseen, and that after everything has been done by a commission to

settle a very difficult question, you find that some omission has taken place in the consideration of it, which has left a particular interest forgotten, and so I should assume it was not foreseen.

464. At that time the supersession of the British colonels began?—I can only answer that question by saying that till I set to work to find out for myself what was the cause of this supersession, I never could get anybody to tell me; it never occurred to anybody to tell me that which I found out from reading the "Army List," that is to say, that the immense extent of the unattached list of the British army, caused entirely different conditions of promotion as compared with the Indian army, which has no unattached list, the result being that whereas it is extremely difficult to count the English colonels, the Indian colonels, till very recently, were only half the number of their general officers.

465. With reference to what I asked you about the operation of the Warrant of 1854 having been foreseen, have you noticed paragraph 102 in Sir William James's Report, in which he says, "Every officer who has obtained his grade in the India list, and his consequent relative position in the whole army, has obtained it by the operation of general rules, which were carefully considered, and were deliberately framed with the knowledge that there would be distinct and unequal promotions from the rank of lieutenant colonel; and that was done in some degree to counterbalance the distinct and unequal promotions up to that grade in different portions of the army"?—I do not know on what grounds that opinion rests; I do not myself hold that opinion; I do not think it is correct.

466. Seeing that under the Warrant of 1854, before the amalgamation, supersession did take place, when the promotion of Indian colonels was brought down several years in advance of the British, is it quite correct to say that there would have been no supersession but for the amalgamation?—To anyone who looked at the lists it must have been perfectly clear that promotion following strictly on succession by death, or by becoming non-effective, and in other ways, must be much more rapid in a service which has not got a very long half-pay list, than in a service which had a long half-pay list; that is the very point which seems to have entirely escaped notice. If it had occurred to those who considered the question in 1854, that whereas there were several hundreds of British colonels in the British list, there were only a number of colonels on the Indian list, who were equal to about half of the establishment of general officers; I cannot conceive that they would have made the mistake of giving such an establishment of general officers as they did accord to the Indian service, because it would have been so obvious that they were about to commit an act which would lead to the very difficulties against which the Duke of Wellington and Lord Hill, and the court of directors of the day were always trying to guard. It is so obviously unfair and unwise, that I think we have the right to attribute it to oversight, and not to anything else.

467. You said just now that your view of the guarantee was, that Indian officers should not be put in a worse position than they were in before the amalgamation, but you did not think that they should be put in a better position to the prejudice of the British officer?—Yes.

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468: You

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468. You remarked that the alteration of the Warrant of 1864, proposed by the Duke of Argyll, with the view of regulating the promotion of the remaining local officers was an interference with the Warrant of 1864, and you thought, if it might be interfered with in one respect, it might in another. But then this departure from the Warrant of 1864, proposed by the Duke of Argyll, does not deprive the Indian officers of any privileges, rights, or advantages which they enjoyed before the amalgamation; its intention, as I understand it, is to prevent their getting more rapid promotion than they would have had, had the armies not been amalgamated?—That is the very thing for which we are arguing. All that has been suggested, so far as I can understand it, is, that superior advantages should not be given to those officers to the prejudice of the others, to which advantages they were not entitled before the change in their constitution.

469. If the guarantee is maintained in that spirit, I do not see that any injustice would be done?—That is the very thing which is done. That is the very thing which has taken place.

470. Lord Cranworth's Commission decided that the Warrant of 1862 infringed the privileges and expectations of the Indian officers, and put them in a worse position?—I do not carry the Report of Lord Cranworth's Commission in my head, but if Lord Cranworth's Commission decided that the Indian officers had been prejudiced, all I can say is, that the execution of the measures following on the decision of that Commission shows that the Commission was wrong, as the prejudice has now taken place exactly the other way.

471. It would show that you may have gone too far in the opposite extreme, but it does not show that injustice was not done by the Warrant of 1862?—That is just what I said at the commencement of my examination. I said, probably in 1862 it was found that some prejudice might operate to the disadvantage of the Indian officers, but that it was shown by the facts resulting in 1865, that whatever might have been the case in 1862, the date had arrived when the prejudice was operating in the other direction.

472. Mr. West.] Was not it the operation of the Warrant of 1862 rather than the principle of it which worked this injustice to the Indian officers?—I am not aware of any injustice to the Indian officers. I am only putting the thing hypothetically that it is possible when they made their outcry, subsequently to 1862, that they really did believe they were going to be superseded in a considerable manner by officers of the British army. I understood that it was in consequence of that outcry that Lord Cranworth's Commission sat, and then decided that this amalgamated list should commence at a date several years later than was originally determined on; and that having been done, it is now found out that that has been deferred a great deal too long, which has resulted in the supersession of the 279 officers.

473. Sir J. Hay.] What the Indian officers felt at the beginning of this arrangement was, that in consequence of the arrangements resulting from the disorganisation of the Indian army, after the mutiny, they would not have the same amount of promotion that they had before?—I believe they had some notion of that sort in their heads; they were in a state of the utmost uncer-

tainty. In 1857 the question was put to me, amongst others, by the late Governor General, Lord Canning, what was to be done. They found they had an army of which the regiments had disappeared, and they had all the officers upon their hands; and the question was seriously put as to whether a half-pay list should not be organised after the model of this country. That was set aside; but from that time till about 1861 commissions were sitting both in India and in England, and there was the greatest possible uncertainty in the minds of all the officers concerned as to what was to be their fate. This was going on before my own eyes, and it was impossible to conceive a more painful spectacle than that of these men really not knowing what was to become of them. It led to a great deal of agitation, of course, and finally, when the measures were announced, I think at the end of 1861, these officers considered that they had been prejudiced, and there was a very great agitation. I think Committees used to sit in London, and it finally ended in a reconsideration of the question by people who were unconnected with the services, and I think, without exception, they all said that they really could not understand what the fears of those officers were, or what it was they were agitating about. There was, no doubt, both with the Government of India and also with the Government in this country, a desire to do everything that was right and proper towards them.

474. Then the result of the re-arrangements consequent on that agitation has been not only to give the same amount of promotion (I do not speak of relative promotion, but the same rapidity of promotion) in the Indian army as would have happened had the Indian army remained without the effects of the Mutiny, but to increase the promotion even more rapidly than before?—Greatly more so. Men have been promoted in a few years to the rank of general officers, who would have been hardly beyond the rank of lieutenant colonel under the old *régime* before 1857.

475. And *pari passu* with that the English army has remained at the ordinary rate of promotion?—I speak under correction, because I have not been able to watch the operation of the rules of the English army so carefully; but I believe of late years, owing to the large lists of officers created by the Crimean war, I believe that the promotion to the highest ranks of the English army is much slower than it used to be.

476. While promotion has been more rapid in the Indian army, it has been slower in the English army?—Yes; the promotion between the grades of colonel and major general, whilst it has become slower in the British portion of the service, has become more rapid in the Indian portion of the service.

477. Those who agitated in the Indian army, very naturally, to take care that they did not lose, have not only not lost, but have gained?—That is my impression.

478. They have gained absolutely, and they have gained relatively?—Yes.

479. They have gained relatively from the greater slowness of promotion in the British army?—Yes.

480. With reference to the answer you gave to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the subject of the promotion of the 279 colonels of the English army, who are at present prejudiced by

by the more rapid promotion to the Indian army, is it your proposal that promotion should stop entirely in the Indian army till the 279 colonels in the English army have been promoted to be colonels, and as they are promoted to be colonels that they should be inserted into the list of major generals, in the position which they would have occupied had they been promoted in their turn relatively to their colonel's commission?—My proposal is merely to anticipate the conditions which are declared to come into existence so soon as we reach the name of Colonel Salmon in the "Army List." I do not propose anything new in respect to the 279 colonels, but I merely propose that this so-called amalgamated list shall begin at once. If it had begun in 1865, the promotion of the Indian army would not have been altogether stopped, because it would have taken the two lists according to the seniority of the respective officers. It so happens now, in consequence of what has been done, that for a long time to come the seniors must all be in the British list; that would be equally so, only still more strongly so, when we come to the name of Colonel Salmon; that would be a year and a-half hence.

481. To get absolute justice, as I gathered from the opinions you expressed in your evidence, 279 gentlemen whom you do not propose to make major generals at once, ought at last to obtain the rank of major general, and in obtaining that rank, to be put in their relative position with reference to their position as colonel on their list of major generals before any other Indian colonel is promoted to be major general?—If, with regard to casualties and so on, before those men are all exhausted, no Indian colonel senior to them turns up.

482. Some one senior to them might turn up?—Yes; 279 is a large number; in five or six years a great number of those men might become non-effective; we cannot tell what might take place; but towards the end of this list, owing to casualties and retirement, and so on, it might happen that the seniority of the Indian colonels who are now below the 279, would be beginning to make itself tell.

483. Subject to alterations due to time and casualties, that may occur before the whole of this absorption, you think that absolute justice would be obtained by the stoppage of promotion on the Indian list till the 279 colonels, if all are alive and well, take their positions as major general as vacancies occur in the list of major generals?—This is exactly what is intended when the amalgamated list is reached. When the amalgamated list is reached, that is to say, when a colonel of the Indian service, senior to Colonel Salmon, has been promoted to the rank of major general, then the colonels of the British list and of the Indian list come into one list, and promotion goes to the senior of the two lists.

484. Will they be adjusted according to seniority?—The readjustment according to seniority is a subsequent arrangement; that does not affect the point about the promotion stopping in the Indian army. We do not propose to unmake the generals who have received their actual promotion; the only thing is to prevent, so far as we can, the injustice being added to.

485. As I understand you, as those 279 gentlemen are promoted to be major generals, though they are not to be promoted to be major generals before vacancies take place, when they do become

major generals they are to go over the heads of those major generals who have already superseded them?—Yes, and so to retake their places; my view is that ultimately every man should take his position on the list according to the position he held as colonel.

486. Will you give your view on the answer of Major General Pears, to Question 238?—Considering that the officers of the Staff Corps, &c., are to be placed on an amalgamated list with the British officers from a certain date, I have considerable doubts whether it is expedient that another system should be organised for the purpose of disposing of that class of officers who come under the head of local officers in the Indian army. I should prefer some such measure as this: namely, that so soon as the amalgamated list is fairly in operation, all officers belonging to the local service, having the rank of colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major, should be placed respectively in the amalgamated list according to their dates of rank. It appears to me, but I speak under correction, that in this simple manner, the local officers would obtain everything that they would have been entitled to according to the principle of line promotion, which existed prior to the breakdown of 1858, and that the chance of their superseding improperly officers either of the British army or of the Indian Staff Corps would be obliterated.

487. With regard to the proposal for the promotion of 45 colonels to the rank of major general, with the view of expediting their promotion to the rank of which they have been unjustly deprived; I think I gather from you that you had not considered that proposal favourably: was that merely on financial grounds?—On two grounds; one was the financial ground; the other one was, that I think it is *prima facie* inexpedient to add to the lists of officers, who, for the most part, do not intend serving again. It does not appear to me that the business of the War Department, and of the Commander in Chief in England, will be facilitated by having longer lists of men who may not be all intended to serve; that is the principle that operates with me.

488. It is not with any reference to its practical bearing on the subject under discussion with regard to promotion?—No; it is with reference to the convenience of the State really.

489. With reference to the subject of officers serving in the Turkish Contingent, and officers who go from our army to serve in armies of our allies, is not it usually the case, that in order to tempt officers to take service under a foreign State, they are given a step in rank?—I believe it is very often done.

490. That was the arrangement with regard to the army in Portugal under the Duke of Wellington?—Yes, I believe so; I do not know the exact rules regulating that army. I told that anecdote about Sir Alexander Dixon merely to show how such a system might operate in causing an officer, if the Commander in Chief so pleased, to supersede all his fellows, as Sir Alexander Dixon actually did.

491. Sir Alexander Dixon was a captain of artillery, he was made a lieutenant colonel in the Portuguese service, and then made a brigadier?—Yes, they gave him everything they could; in fact, he commanded the artillery of the whole army.

492. With reference to the Turkish Contingent, was not it necessary to give the officers

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a step in rank to entice them to serve in the Turkish Contingent?—I do not think it was at all necessary to entice them to serve; but it is the fact that this local rank was given them, and colonels put in commands of divisions were dubbed major generals, and majors who commanded regiments were called lieutenant colonels, and so on.

493. And what happened in the case of the Turkish Contingent shows, according to your view, that a natural and very just professional jealousy is likely to prevail in India between officers of the British army and officers of the Indian army, unless some adjustment of the ranks is made?—Yes, I think so; in the lower ranks it has already been done. In every rank junior to that of colonel it is actually done; that is to say, local rank is given to all the officers concerned, to put them on a par with officers of the Staff Corps; and in my letters of 1865 I pointed that out, and asked the question why, as it had been considered necessary to do it in the subordinate ranks, it should stop short of the rank of general officer.

494. Does not your argument rather point to this: that instead of having special lists of general officers for the various scientific corps, there ought to be one amalgamated list for the whole army?—I believe that would be a very great improvement, but I am told that difficulties exist about it; I believe it would be a sound thing to do; I believe that not only would it be sound, but that we ought to lay down the principle that all officers are available for command in whatever branch of the service they may rise, as has always been the case in India.

495. As is now the case; as, for instance, in the case of Lord Napier of Magdala, who was selected to command the army in Abyssinia?—He is a good instance of it.

496. Mr. *Grant Duff*.] In reply to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, about the pecuniary losses of these superseded officers, were you not comparing British officers on the half-pay list with Indian officers on the full-pay list?—No; the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as I understood him, asked me whether the officers who had been superseded had, as a consequence of that supersession, suffered a pecuniary disadvantage. My answer to that is this; that if that amalgamated list had commenced earlier, a great number of those officers who have been promoted would have been promoted much earlier; and otherwise that a great many who have not been promoted would have been promoted some years ago. During those years they would have received 450*l.* as major general, instead of the unattached pay of a lieutenant colonel, which is 200*l.* a year.

497. Is not it a positive loss to a British officer to be promoted to the rank of major general; he cannot sell his commission, can he?—An officer who makes the army his profession, deliberately abandons the price of his commission, supposing he has purchased it; he being on half-pay, you may say he has already taken that step; he has determined to abide by the profession and to rise into the rank of general officer, with the view of holding a command. An officer, having thus abandoned the price of his commission, is subsisting, so far as his military emoluments are concerned, on half-pay of 200*l.* a year, which is not probably more than the common interest of his money, which he would have got in the public funds.

498. You can hardly say in that case he has suffered pecuniary loss?—I was going to add to that, that on being promoted the half-pay of 200*l.* a year becomes 450*l.*; therefore anything which retards his promotion does, *pro tanto*, deprive him, during the period of retardation, of 250*l.*

499. At the same time the whole of the capital which he has sunk is gone?—That is one of the painful things attending on the military profession, and one which we feel very acutely.

500. With reference to the professional injury to officers, you quoted a case as having occurred at Peshawur; that Peshawur case had nothing to do with this particular grievance which we are now investigating, had it?—If I recollect rightly, that illustration sprang from a question put to me as to the expediency or otherwise of following out some arrangements suggested by the Secretary of State, according to which officers could be saved from serving under officers who were practically their juniors. I pointed out that on the whole, or rather I should say generally, that as a matter of State economy, would be impossible, and I then instanced the case of an officer, and a very distinguished officer he is, who though he was considerably junior to one of the officers commanding Her Majesty's regiments at Peshawur, was, in virtue of his position on the Indian list, sent to that Peshawur district, he being the junior of the officers commanding the British regiments who were serving under him, and who had probably gone through the same wars as himself.

501. That was not a case of a professional loss accruing to an officer from the particular grievance which this Committee is investigating?—It is the same thing really. This very officer became a major general very shortly afterwards; he actually, under the operation of all this promotion, according to the rules of the Indian army did supersede those two gentlemen, or one of those two who were at Peshawur; very shortly afterwards he became a major general, and he is one of those who has superseded the 279.

502. Surely nothing is commoner than for a major general to become a brigadier, and then to command colonels who were senior to him as colonels?—It has come to be common in India, owing to the operation of this very grievance which we are considering, namely, the more rapid promotion of officers to the rank of colonel in the one service than takes place in the other service; it never takes place in this country.

503. There is nothing in the Regulations of the service to prevent its taking place?—So far as the custom in the army is concerned, I do not think the Duke of Cambridge would send a junior to command a senior officer, unless he had been actually promoted by the Queen's brevet on account of distinguished service in the field.

504. You speak of time of peace, there is no such thing as time of peace in India, in the same sense as we have time of peace in this country; the whole system of things in India is a medium between a war footing and a peace footing, is it not?—I do not think it would be correct to say that. It is very true that there are one or two districts where we are very particular in choosing our brigadier generals; Peshawur, for instance, and one or two others; but on the whole, the state of peace in India, in the great majority of stations, is quite as profound, and quite as settled an affair as in England itself.

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505. Can you mention any case within your own knowledge, of an officer having suffered in his professional position and prospects up to this time from the precise grievance which we are investigating?—There was one case in which the grievance was rectified as was stated by a previous witness, namely, the case of Sir Charles Staveley, in the case of the Abyssinian War.

506. Has any man up to this time suffered by the particular grievance which we are investigating in his professional position and prospects?—I think it must be called suffering, if a man is put in the position either of saying, “I prefer to serve under a junior officer,” or, “I accept the pecuniary compensation,” and go away.

507. Has that happened yet?—I can only say in former days I know major generals were in that position.

508. Has it happened within your own knowledge, from the operation of this particular grievance?—It has not happened as yet, I believe; I cannot speak with regard to the Presidency of Bombay or of Madras, but in the Presidency which I immediately commanded myself, I took very good care whilst looking at the efficiency of the officers, that they had a seniority which should make such a thing unlikely, but of those senior officers there are now two or three whose turn of command will very soon expire, and as soon as those vacancies occur, I think Lord Napier of Magdala will be obliged to appoint officers who were juniors to the officers whom they will find under their orders, both as brigadier generals and as colonels commanding regiments.

509. Looking at that paragraph of General Pears’ letter (*handing the same to the Witness*), do you think that Lord Napier would be obliged to do so?—That involves a very invidious answer from me, because it involves my giving an opinion which I would rather not do, now that I am no longer in command, upon the merits of officers. So long as I was in command, I was prepared to take the responsibility of saying whether or not an officer was fit to hold a given position of command, and I superseded him myself if I did not consider him fit. It is very true that the number of junior officers so employed is very small, but I may remind the Committee that during the time of Sir Bartle Frere, and subsequently, during, I believe, the Governorship of Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, both these governors were obliged, owing to the small number of officers in the country, or those who were in the country being incompetent, to appoint brigadier generals to command divisions. You have very often to make great leaps in the list of general officers before you come to a man who, with regard to health or

other causes, is competent to take an important command; the higher you get in the list of officers, that is to say, the older the grade of the men to whom you have to refer, the more likely are those long leaps in the list to be. Therefore, though it is very true that there are only senior officers in the Presidency of Bengal at present who hold divisions, still I hold to my previous proposition, that I think it is extremely likely when the terms of the present general officers lapse, Lord Napier will find himself under the necessity of going far down the list, or at all events, he will be very likely to make choice of men, who are considerably junior to many colonels now serving on that command, and it is his duty to do so; it is his duty as Commander in Chief in India to take care, not only that all of the officers in high command are efficient, but that generally speaking they are the most efficient that present themselves.

510. But then the officers whom he will appoint will be officers whose distinction will be so great that the whole army will agree that they are the proper men to be appointed?—I am not clear about that. The generation of officers who attracted great attention 15 years ago, have disappeared very much from the scene, and those coming forward now as general officers were then in subordinate positions. I do not see that those Indian officers are likely to possess better qualifications for command than those colonels of the British service who would be serving under them.

511. Is it really true that promotion is quicker in the Staff Corps?—I believe if you compare the careers of the men who rise in the British service without purchase with the careers now worked out so exactly for officers in the Staff Corps, there can be no sort of doubt that the Staff Corps have a great advantage. I think you would find that they would be able to give you a return in the India Office, with a very little trouble, which would show the number of officers promoted to local rank in the British regiments to put them on a par with the officers in the Staff Corps, and I suspect you would find the list would be considerable. During the last year or two of my command, I observed in my own orders that officers were being promoted by local rank to positions which they did not hold regimentally, in order to put them on a par with the Staff Corps officers. Of course, without a certain amount of preparation I could not give you a list, but those things were constantly attracting my notice; it was so completely a matter of routine, that it did not require any reference to me; if it was found that A. had 31 years’ service he was at once made a colonel in local rank, and so on.

Major General THOMAS T. PEARS, C.B., called in; and further Examined.

512–13. Mr. Grant Duff.] You have heard Sir William Mansfield’s last answer; his experience is very different from ours, is not it?—I cannot speak of experience; my impression is from what I have observed, that promotion to local rank of officers of the line in India is much smaller than one would have anticipated. I have not looked at it fully, so as to take an account of it, but I

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have been surprised at the small amount of that promotion. (Sir W. Mansfield.) If a single promotion takes place, it proves the case so far as the fact is concerned, but it would be easy to get a return from General Forster, of the Horse Guards, showing exactly what does occur in that respect.

514. Sir P. Herbert.] The supersession of English

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C.B.

Sir W.  
Mansfield.

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Mansfield.  
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English officers by Indian officers, as regards the rank of major general, was strictly guarded against during the time of the East India Company; certainly prior to 1854?—Yes.

515. You do not understand that the Parliamentary guarantee could ever have been intended to guarantee to Indian officers the right to supersede British officers in attaining the rank of major general?—No.

516. I gather from you that your recommendation with reference to the Warrant of 1862 and 1864 amounts to this, that you would make one amalgamated list from the present day, containing all colonels in the British list, all colonels of the Indian Staff Corps, and all colonels on what is called the Indian list?—Yes.

517. You would have them in that amalgamated list according to the dates of their colonels' commissions; and for promotion in both armies you would take the senior on that joint list?—Yes.

518. Mr. Clay.] I understand from that that the commission of major general would be antedated?—As to the exact means to be taken, I do not think it is of so much consequence. It appears to me that the most convenient mode would be to take the lists of colonels, and that those lists of colonels should really represent the lists of major generals from the date of correction.

519. Sir P. Herbert.] You would re-adjust the list, so that they would stand in the list of major generals as they stood in the amalgamated list of colonels?—Yes.

520. That would not involve any increased expenditure to either Exchequer?—No. Referring to Mr. Grant Duff's questions, I should like to add, that in one of my letters of 1865, I proposed what I believed to be a necessary remedy for that supersession in the junior ranks of the army, whether it is as large as I believe it to be, or whether it is much more moderate; still, even, if one case takes place, the grievance must be said to exist. As I stated before, those officers who get local rank and perform the duties, and have the responsibilities attaching to such duties as being consonant with their local rank, directly they leave the shores of India find that they have lost that rank, and that the officers with whom they were put upon a par in the Indian service, having subsequently remained in the Staff Corps, are going on to be general officers, whereas exactly the reverse takes place with British officers. Therefore, to prevent the whole business reverting to the same disagreeable point at which we now are,

when a Staff Corps officer had risen to the rank of general, I would suggest the remedy which I pointed out as feasible and possible in one of my letters in 1865, and that is, that this change should be made in the British army at large, that for periods of service such as those indicated in the Staff Corps rules, brevet rank should be given to officers of the British army; not only local rank in India, but that it should be good all over the world, thus applying to officers of the British army, wherever serving. If this were done, we should get rid of all the difficulties now affecting the two services. It must have been extremely disagreeable I think to the officers who went out to Abyssinia from England, to find themselves suddenly superseded by men in the Staff Corps of India; there is no reason why they should have been. Yet, though local rank may be given in India, and though local rank may be easily given to a few officers of very high position, such as General Sir John Staveley, and so on, you cannot give it to the cadres of the whole army. Those include the very people who are affected much more prejudicially than the general officers themselves, because, as we know by the alteration of the system in 1854, any officer of the rank of colonel may be chosen for any position in the army; but the officers in the inferior degrees do not perform their duties on the principle of selection such as operates with respect to a general officer in command of a division; they go to their duties whether in garrison or in the field, as all soldiers know, according to the principle of roster and turn and routine, and so on; those officers, therefore, are likely to find themselves prejudiced at every turn with regard to the considerations I have mentioned. What I propose, then, is a measure which, while it would put them on a complete footing of equality with the officers of the Staff Corps with reference to obtaining promotion for given periods of service, should be good all over the world, and then what they had done in India, or their relatively equal service elsewhere would not be lost in comparison with the Indian officers; and, at the same time, those officers who would be likely to meet Indian officers hereafter, but who might not be serving in India themselves, would meet them on a footing of equality wherever they were, and you would then get rid of this difficulty, which will never be got rid of so long as you rely on such patching resources as local rank, and so forth.

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A P P E N D I X.

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## LIST OF APPENDIX.

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### Appendix, No. 1.

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• Paper handed in by Colonel Egerton, 14 July 1870:

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# A P P E N D I X.

## Appendix, No. 1.

PAPER handed in by Colonel *Egerton*, 14th July 1870.

Appendix, No. 1.

### MEMORANDUM.

#### SUPERSESSION of BRITISH by INDIAN COLONELS.

THE object of this Memorandum is to point out, in as few words as possible, the working of the Royal Warrant of 15th June 1864, and the financial bearing of the recommendation based upon it by the War Office Committee, of which I was president.

MEMO.—When all the colonels on the Indian gradation list senior to Colonel Salmon (who heads the amalgamated list) have become major generals, the generals of the Indian Staff Corps will come over to the British list.

There are now 13 colonels on the Indian list senior to Colonel Salmon unpromoted, which, at the average rate of promotion, will give about the 1st October 1871, as the period when the staff corps will come on the British list.

The British list will then be augmented by 50 generals, and the generals of the staff corps will take position according to their dates of commissions as major generals with the major generals of the British army.

Then, unless some remedy is in the meantime applied, the grievous injury of the supersession will be apparent.

The case has hitherto not been fully appreciated or understood, then it will be a visible and patent injustice. Men who were lieutenants and captains in 1854, 1855, and 1856, will be found to take precedence on the British list of major generals, of those who, as colonels and lieutenant colonels, commanded British regiments at the Alma, at Inkermann, and at Balaklava; and what will be even more striking, will be the fact that Indian officers who served during the Mutiny in subordinate ranks, will take seniority of the British colonels who, as brigadiers or brigadier generals in India, commanded field forces.

After the staff corps has passed to the British list, all vacancies on the Indian list to which staff corps colonels would have been promoted had they remained on the Indian list, will be promoted to from the top of the British list, and one general will be taken from the Indian establishment and added to the British establishment on each promotion.

The average promotion by this means will be eight steps per annum until they amount in all to 45 or thereabouts, which, with the 50 staff corps generals to come over in 1871, will complete the British establishment to the quota to which it is to be increased under the Warrant of 15th July 1864, when the staff corps is fully amalgamated with it. It was proposed by the War Office Committee, to mitigate the supersession so much complained of, by anticipating these 45 steps and promoting colonels from the British list at once to that extent.

The expense of such a measure would, for the first two years, be, in round numbers, 11,800 *l.* per annum, to be borne by Imperial funds.

After the 1st October 1871, or thereabouts, when the staff corps has come over to the British establishment, the War Office would begin to recover from Indian finances a portion of this outlay; and inasmuch as the India Office would pay for each general promoted to a staff corps vacancy the full pay of 25 *s.* per diem, the cost to the War Office being only, as a rule, the difference between that amount and that of a lieutenant-colonel's half-pay (*viz.*, 14 *s.* per diem), the charge against Imperial funds will be very rapidly cleared away, and in the year 1875-76, will cease altogether.

From that time until Colonel Salmon becomes first for promotion (which if the 45 major-generals are granted will probably occur in 1881), the War Office will receive a large and increasing sum annually over and above the amount it would be required to pay.

The calculation would be as follows—(make no count of the first six months, from 1st October 1871 to 1st April 1872, after the staff corps comes over, in order to meet the broken periods of the next year, for which I have taken full pay of eight generals):—

Appendix, No. 1.

| Financial Years.       | War Office<br>to Pay. | India Office<br>to Pay. | —      |
|------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|--------|
|                        | £.                    | £.                      | £.     |
| 1870-71 - - - -        | 11,800                | - - -                   | 11,800 |
| 1871-72 - - - -        | 11,800                | - - -                   | 11,800 |
| 1872-73 - - - -        | 8,150                 | 3,650                   | 11,800 |
| 1873-74 - - - -        | 4,500                 | 7,300                   | 11,800 |
| 1874-75 - - - -        | 850                   | 10,950                  | 11,800 |
| War Office to Pay - £. | 37,100                |                         |        |

  

|                 | War Office<br>to Receive. |                          |          |
|-----------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|----------|
|                 | £.                        | £.                       | £.       |
| 1875-76 - - - - | 2,800                     | from 14,600              | = 11,800 |
| 1876-77 - - - - | 6,450                     | „ 18,250                 | = 11,800 |
| 1877-78 - - - - | 8,731                     | „ 20,531                 | = 11,800 |
| 1878-79 - - - - | 8,731                     | „ 20,531                 | = 11,800 |
| 1879-80 - - - - | 8,731                     | „ 20,531                 | = 11,800 |
| 1880-81 - - - - | 8,731                     | „ 20,531                 | = 11,800 |
|                 | 44,174                    |                          |          |
| Balance - - £.  | 7,074                     | in favour of War Office. |          |

It will be seen that, on the total account, if 45 generals are promoted now, as proposed, the War Office will not be losers.

But, it has been objected, the War Office already occupy the exceptionally advantageous financial position referred to, with regard to the promotions under the Warrant of 1864, and is under no obligation to abandon the advantage by promoting 45 generals.

It is true it is so, but carry the inquiry further—

Why is it so? Because 268 superseded colonels stand at the head of the list, and are not intersected by even one staff corps officer.

Under the Warrant of 1862 the case would have been very different: 43 of the colonels at the head of the list would now be major generals, and the amalgamated list would have begun with colonels of 1861 instead of 1866.

It does not seem, under the circumstances I have endeavoured to explain, unreasonable to ask that the British colonels should, by an immediate promotion, be placed in as favourable a position as they occupied under the Warrant of 1862, and that a rectification of dates shall take place from 6th March 1868, the head of the amalgamated list under that warrant.

Justice would seem to demand no less, and no less a concession would be satisfactory to the British army.

Horse Guards, 30 March 1870.

(signed) C. R. Egerton,  
Deputy Adjutant General.

4/19

## Appendix, No. 2.

LETTER from Colonel *Pattle* to Sir *Percy Herbert*.

Appendix, No. 2.

Dear Sir Percy Herbert,

21 July 1870.

In 1860 I was a full Colonel in the Army, and commanded the whole of the Cavalry in China, with the rank of Brigadier. Colonel Probyn, then a Captain and Brevet Major, commanded a Regiment of Irregular Horse in my Brigade. I made favourable reports of him in all my despatches to the General commanding the Expedition after the various actions in which we were engaged, and in February 1861, Captain and Brevet Major Probyn received the rank of Lieutenant Colonel for his services in China. He is now a full Colonel, of 15th February 1866, and the first for promotion to the rank of Major General on the Indian List, and may obtain that rank to-morrow, he will then, of course, supersede me. At the present rate of promotion, I shall not obtain the rank of Major General for from 3½ to 4 years.

I remain, &amp;c.

(signed) · *T. Pattle*,

Colonel, late 1st Dragoon Guards.

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