

4231. There was only one road into the highlands, was there?—There was only one road for our heavy traffic, but there were other bye-paths.

4232. That road became a mountain torrent in the monsoon, did it not?—Yes.

4233. There was no other means of access, was there?—There were bye-paths; and I am not prepared to say that they could not have

been made practicable for the carriage of small portions of provisions.

4234. Then the force would never have been cut off from the coast altogether, would it?—I am not speaking as an authority, but I am simply saying that we could not make any calculation, that after a certain time, which we supposed to be the closing of the season, nothing more could be sent up.

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Friday, 27th May 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Colonel Barttelot.
Captain Beaumont.
Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Candlish.
Mr. Eastwick.

Lord Elcho.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Sir John Hay.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Mr. Seely.

JOHN CANDLISH, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Colonel WILLIAM FREDERICK MARRIOTT, called in ; and further Examined.

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4235. *Chairman.*] Do you wish to put in some further statement?—I do; the statement is one which was desired by the Committee at their last meeting. It is a statement of the number of troops actually embarked; and it contains the representation of the Adjutant General at Bombay, to which I adverted, as mentioning the increase of the European infantry being by the desire of the Horse Guards; but on looking into it, I have noticed that it does not include the Company of Royal Engineers from England, nor the Naval Brigade, which was, practically, an addition to the land forces. The statement of gross numbers, 14,410, which I gave in answer to Questions 3354, 3355, was taken from this return; and therefore to get the actual military force in Abyssinia, there must be added about 80 men

for the Corps of Royal Engineers, and nearly 200 for the Naval Brigade, making altogether, nearly 14,700.

4236. Were there not some men told off for Abyssinia who never embarked at all?—The statement does not include any who never embarked; but it does include some who sailed, but never landed.

4237. Were there not some told off for embarkation at Bombay, who never embarked?—There was a troop of Horse Artillery, originally warned for Abyssinia, which after Lord Napier reached that country, he determined to do without.

4238. Was tonnage engaged for it?—No.

4239. Were any expenses incurred on that account?—Nothing worth mentioning, but I could not absolutely say that there was nothing.

Colonel HENRY WILLIAM HOLLAND, called in ; and further Examined.

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4240. *Chairman.*] You furnished other reports than those which you have handed in on the condition of the Transport Train, and generally in the discharge of your duties to the Government of Bombay from time to time, did you not?—I did.

4241. Have you those reports with you?—I have not; my reports with reference to the Land Transport Corps were more favourable.

4242. Where are those reports?—They would be in the office of the Secretary to the Government, Military Department.

4243. Were they numerous?—They were not; I cannot say exactly, but I do not think there were more than two others.

4244. Have you in your possession a letter accompanying your first report to Lord Napier, and his reply thereto?—Yes; I have got my letter forwarding on to Government Lord Napier's reply to my report on the Transport Corps.

4245. Will you put in that letter?—I will. (*The same was delivered in, vide Appendix.*)

4246. Are there any statements in the evidence which you gave to the Committee at its last meeting, which you in any way wish to correct or qualify?—With the permission of the Committee, I would wish to correct a statement which I made on Tuesday, under a misconception of the question asked me. The Question is No. 4197.

I was asked if I was responsible afterwards for the working of the Land Transport to which I replied, that I was not responsible. In giving that answer, I had understood that the question referred to my responsibility before I landed in Abyssinia; and the previous question as to whether I was in any way responsible for the organisation of the corps in the first instance, misled me as to the application of the following one. With reference to that answer, I now beg to explain that the duties of my office commenced on my arrival at Zulla, from which date the responsibility of the working of the Commissariat and Land Transport Corps rested on me under the orders of Lord Napier. With the organisation of the Land Transport Corps, or the arrangements for collecting supplies in India, and forwarding them to Abyssinia, I had nothing to do; my nomination to the office so early as the middle of October, was at the desire of Lord Napier, by whom, up to the date of his departure from Bombay, I was employed in obtaining information as to the progress made by the different departments in their preparations for the equipment of the force; but I had no power to interfere in any direction. With reference to the Land Transport Corps, the scheme for its organisation was, as the Committee are aware, settled between the Government

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ment and Lord Napier, and up to the departure of the latter for Abyssinia. The details were carried out by the Director, Colonel Warden, under the general supervision of the Commissary General. In mentioning that the Commissariat officer at Zulla had charge of some of the transport animals on their first arrival, I speak entirely from memory; recollecting that I had seen a representation from Colonel Mignon to the Commissary General, setting forth his difficulties in looking after those animals without the requisite establishments. The circumstances under which he was placed in that position, I do not exactly remember, but it would be probably, under some order issued by the officer commanding the Pioneer force, to which Colonel Mignon was attached.

4247. Is Colonel Mignon in England?—He is not.

4248. Where is he?—In India. With reference to the administrative duties of my office, I would beg to state that I was required by Lord Napier to see that the wants of the force were supplied, both with regard to the commissariat and land transport, to the extent of his requirements, regularly communicated to me from time to time; and I am satisfied that the calculation for those supplies, including forage for animals, was in strict accordance with his requirements, and that in no particular was provision made in excess of those requirements.

4249. Then I might infer from that, might I not, that you were rather an executive officer than a responsible officer?—I was not an executive officer.

4250. The requisitions proceeded from Lord Napier direct, and you gave effect to his requirements; was not that so?—Yes, through the departments under my control.

4251. You were not responsible for any requisition in any way whatever, but the requisitions were at his instance?—I do not understand exactly how you apply the fact of responsibility. I accept all the responsibility of my position there without any demur whatever.

4252. Was it the case that Lord Napier indicated the time for which he wanted supplies, and the number of troops and animals for which he wanted supplies, and that you determined the quantities?—That was so.

4253. If you refer to Question 4176 of your evidence, you will see that that has reference to numbers; my question there is, "How many men, including both combatants and followers, did you then reckon?" and your answer is, "I cannot give that information, but I can get that from the officer who made it out;" have you got that?—I have not got it.

4254. Have you taken steps to get it?—I have not; I understood that in all probability the executive officer at Zulla would be here, who would give information on points of this nature.

4255. Who is that officer?—Major Hawks.

4256. Will you undertake to supply this evidence, for it really seems to me to fall within the scope of your duties, and it points to facts of which you should be officially cognisant?—I will endeavour to obtain it.

4257. In reply to Question 4164, you say, relative to the supplies, "I had a confidential memorandum from the Assistant Quartermaster General, dated the 13th of February;" is that in your possession now, and will you put it in?—It is not in my possession, but I have seen it. It

is with other papers, from which it could not very well be separated, but I will produce a copy of it, and hand it in.

4258. You see that there is further information alluded to in your answer to Question 4173; can you obtain and supply to the Committee the information to which you there refer?—This information could only be correctly obtained from Bombay. I had no idea of the line of evidence which would be required from me, otherwise I could have obtained all this beforehand.

4259. You said in your answer on Tuesday, "I can get that information from an officer who is in this country, who was at that time in charge of the Zulla office, and who kept all the statements and returns;" will you undertake to procure that for the Committee?—Yes, I will try.

4260. Did you, at the end of February, or the beginning of March, send forward requisitions for compressed forage to England?—Yes, about that time.

4261. Do you remember at what date that was?—I cannot remember.

4262. The purchase was made in England at the beginning of March; it would be shortly before that I presume?—Yes, it would be about that time.

4263. The request would be by telegraph from Suez on the 17th of February; that would be at your instance from Annesley Bay?—Yes, it may have been so.

4264. Was that for 3,000 tons of compressed forage?—Yes, I think so.

4265. Was that your own view of the necessities of the Expedition, or was it at the request of the Commander in Chief?—It was in apprehension of the wants of the force.

4266. Was it your own apprehension, or Lord Napier's?—That actually was my own; in part of what was required to fulfil the instructions received.

4267. Did you give orders for those 3,000 tons in execution of the requisition to you, to provide complete supplies up to the end of October?—That is the impression upon my mind.

4268. Will you explain how you happen to put forward a requisition for that enormous amount of forage, with the very vast supplies which you had at that moment in Annesley Bay, on ship board?—I cannot remember now the quantities which were actually in Annesley Bay; but that indent for compressed forage was no doubt required to meet our wants, calculated according to what we had, and the probable time at which it would arrive.

4269. Had you before you, at that time, an account of the forage afloat?—Yes; I knew what forage was in Annesley Bay.

4270. Did you know what was on its way?—I cannot exactly say that I knew what was on its way, because we were rather anxious for accurate information as to what was on its way at that time, and we had some anxiety as to the probable period to expect it.

4271. Can you tell me what you had in Annesley Bay at that time?—I cannot, without documents to refer to.

4272. Should you not have known that upwards of 20,000 tons of forage was in Annesley Bay, or on its way to Abyssinia at that time?—All the information that I had in my possession was duly taken into consideration at that time; but I cannot remember what that information was at this moment.

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4273. It being the fact that the quantity which I have mentioned was at that time in Annesley Bay, or on its way, how do you account for this indent of 3,000 tons of this expensive forage from England?—Everything at that time was duly considered in forwarding that order, and I was satisfied of the desirability of having that when it was ordered.

4274. I am lost in bewilderment at the facts as indicated by the returns, namely, that throughout the whole of the expedition only 4,000 tons of the forage was landed; and reckoning that 4,000 tons to represent a supply for six months, that you, with 20,000 tons there or on its way, could regard those 3,000 tons as then necessary?—I have already pointed out that I very much dispute the accuracy of that statement, that only 4,000 tons of hay were landed at that time.

4275. Then we must not receive the return to which I have referred, and which was handed in by Colonel Marriott, as true?—I do not offer an opinion upon that, but I consider it possible there may be some inaccuracy in it.

4276. You have seen the returns; do those returns profess to show the whole of the forage shipped for the purposes of the Expedition from every quarter?—I have simply looked at the returns alluded to casually.

4277. Might we not expect that a return, the accuracy of which you deny, would have obtained your very careful attention, before you dispute its accuracy?—I may be wrong, but I think it is very unlikely. One thing which I would beg to remark is, that that return may in all probability be based on a statement of what was actually returned after the Expedition was over.

4278. Is it not therefore the more likely to be complete and accurate?—It is impossible to know correctly what was returned, because it was not all brought to account. Quantities of it were destroyed, and never landed, of which I do not see the possibility of returning any proper account. Quantities were given away, and allowed to be taken away in the ships. Ships were half emptied in some instances, and perhaps a smaller portion was left in others.

4279. You, or the department of which you were the chief, would be responsible for the figures on which this return is made out, would you not?—Certainly, to a certain extent.

4280. Would not the requisitions for forage which went to Egypt, also come through your hands?—Yes.

4281. Are you aware that 10,000 *l.* worth of forage was bought in Egypt on the 1st of April, and that another large quantity was bought in March?—Yes; I know there was a large quantity bought altogether.

4282. Were those purchases made at your request?—Yes.

4283. Would the requisitions for tonnage, also come through you?—No, not for troops.

4284. What are the Committee to understand from paragraph 3 in your instructions: "The Controller will be the agent of the Commander in Chief in the field, for all that concerns supply, transport, provisions, and clothing not supplied direct from the clothing department, and for communication with the Marine authorities, in respect of requisitions touching Sea Transports"?—That would apply to tonnage that might be required for supplies; so I understand it, and so I understood it; but I had no interference with the

Marine authorities as to providing tonnage for the troops.

4285. Are you aware that requisitions for tonnage were ever sent from Abyssinia after the fall of Magdala?—No fresh tonnage was required for Abyssinia after the fall of Magdala, to my knowledge.

4286. Part of your duties was to look after the unregulated expenditure; what is meant by "unregulated expenditure"?—Expenditure not appertaining to any organised department, as it were.

4287. I presume that you never had any opportunity of carrying out the duty indicated in paragraph 10 in your instructions: "The Controller will report to Government all extraordinary sanction of expenditure of money and stores, laying copies of his reports to Government before the Commander in Chief;" you had no means of reporting the extraordinary expenditure, had you?—My separation from head quarters prevented that, to a certain extent.

4288. Amongst the general directions given to you, is that you should report clearly to Government the reasons for all expenditure; have you those reports, and if so, will you lay them before the Committee?—Reports of all purchases ordered, were made for the information and approval of Government; and in those reports, the reasons for those purchases were specified.

4289. It does not occur to me that you would be able to report very completely when you had really no personal knowledge of the purchases made; how would that be?—I am speaking of purchases made by my orders.

4290. But purchases were made, and to a large extent in Abyssinia; you could not, I apprehend, have any control whatever, or any knowledge of the purchases which were going on up the country?—I was alluding to purchases made by my orders in Egypt, and other places on the coast.

4291. You would have then no knowledge of the Abyssinian purchases?—Yes, I think I answered that question, and said that statements were received at Zulla periodically of purchases made at different stations.

4292. In answer to Question 4149 you stated that the number of animals for which you made provision was 28,000; have you reason to correct that?—Yes, I wish to explain with regard to that, that the number of animals in Abyssinia, for which provision was made in Bombay, was, I think, 28,000. The subsequent impression was made, as I said, calculating that we could not supply forage, to the animals beyond Senafé, and as well as I recollect, we calculated for 12,000 animals. In our subsequent requirements on receipt of orders for further supplies, I said in my previous answer to a question of a similar nature, that I know that we had only calculated on feeding animals as far as Senafé, that we did not take into calculation that we could feed animals beyond that; but that I could not at that time give any answer with reference to the number of animals. Now I am almost certain that it was 12,000 animals for which we calculated in our supplementary requirements for forage.

4293. The number for which you first sent on supplies from Bombay was 32,000, was it not?—I do not think so.

4294. Looking at that return (*handing to the Witness a Return put in by Colonel Marriott*); can you state for what number of animals supplies were

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were at first sent from Bombay?—That was for 32,000 animals, from the 1st of January to the 31st of October.

4295. Seeing that, have you reason to believe that the statement is incorrect?—I have no reason to believe that that statement is incorrect, but they are for different periods.

4296. Was it known to you what provisions were coming from England for the European troops?—It was.

4297. Notwithstanding that knowledge, the supplies were forwarded for the entire force, were they not?—I cannot answer that question. I had nothing to do with the supplies prepared for the force in India.

4298. Do you know what was the organisation of the Transport Train which came from the Panjáb?—It was very much the same as the Commissariat organisation with Mucaddams and native superintendents.

4299. Was it not the fact that the troops which came from the Panjáb had their own Transport Train, and carried forward all their own supplies; that they were organised completely in themselves, both for fighting purposes and for marching requirements, and that they depended upon nothing outside their own organisation?—The regiments from the Panjáb came equipped with transport, in most cases sufficient to carry their own necessities; but only in one instance do I know of a regiment having anything in excess of their actual regimental requirements. That instance is the 23rd Pioneers. They had a greater proportion of animals than the other regiments; and I remember that owing to this, Colonel Chamberlaine, who commanded that regiment, undertook to proceed with his regiment by forced marches, to overtake the commander in chief, his carriage being in such a very efficient state.

4300. Were there not two infantry regiments which brought their transport animals, and all their means of moving along with them?—They brought all their means of moving; but they were not able to carry their own food; they did not come equipped in that way.

4301. They were from Bengal, were they not?—They were; they came equipped to carry their own tents, ammunition, and baggage.

4302. Could the same thing have been done by the regiments from Bombay, if they had been so organised before they started?—It was an organisation of which we had no experience in Bombay, before the Abyssinian campaign.

4303. Would not such an organisation have obviated a vast number of the difficulties and hindrances which you encountered?—It would if we had had time to organise it properly; as a new introduction, it is difficult to say positively, what the actual result would have been. Those regiments had had that organisation for years, and had brought it to perfection.

4304. What hindered you at Bombay from having the same organisation?—I do not know.

4305. They brought their pack-saddles and everything of that sort with them, did they not?—They did.

4306. You receiving as you did, from time to time, an account of the supplies issued to the force on the march; can you give us a return of the supplies from the coast which went south of Antalo?—I cannot.

4307. Is it true, within your knowledge, that nothing except tea and preserved vegetables went to the front, or further than within about 70 miles
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of Magdala, and nearly all the supplies which the army received beyond that were procured from the country?—I am aware that the Commissariat supplies were in a very reduced condition at that time, but to what extent supplies were received from the country I am not at this moment prepared to say.

4308. Are you aware that only tea and preserved vegetables reached Magdala from the coast, or advanced beyond Dildi?—It may be so, but I was not aware that there were no other commissariat supplies than those articles.

4309. As controller of supply and transport I presume that it would come to your knowledge?—All facts came to my knowledge at the time, and it may have been the case that those were the only articles for a few days; but I cannot say with any degree of accuracy at this moment what the state of things was,

4310. It has just been mentioned to me that the return shows the quantity of forage consumed to be 7,000 tons instead of 4,000. Assuming it to be 7,000 tons, it will still follow, will it not, 25,000 or upwards of 26,000 tons having been shipped, that little more than one-fourth of the quantity shipped was consumed?—If the assumption is correct that would be so.

4311. You will see by another return handed in by Colonel Marriott, that the weight of a native food ration per day was 2 lbs. 5 oz., is that correct?—Yes, it appears so.

4312. The European ration being 2 lbs. 12 oz., the average ration for the Expedition would be about 2½ lbs. per man, would it not?—Yes.

4813. Have you seen the report of the evidence taken before the Committee last Session?—Yes; I have seen a portion of it.

4314. Do you see that there were 33,636 tons of shipping sent to Berbera?—Yes.

4315. If each man in the Expedition consumed 2½ lbs. per day, that would be half-a-ton in 12 months, would it not?—That may be correct.

4316. And then a ton would feed a man for two years, would it not?—Assuming it to be so, that would be correct.

4317. It would follow, would it not, that 33,000 tons of provision would feed a force of 33,000 men for two years?—I assume that you have made the calculation correctly.

4318. Then that tonnage sent to Berbera, if representing provisions, would have been sufficient to have fed the force in Abyssinia for two years?—If the tonnage you mentioned was employed for the purpose which you state, and the calculation is, as I assume, right, that would follow.

4319. The tonnage was sent to Berbera only, to bring provisions of some kind, was it not?—No; large numbers of animals were fetched from Berbera.

4320. I presume that this return handed in by Major Chitty, may be taken as correct; will you read those figures?—2,121 bullocks (I beg to explain that the bullocks were for transport purposes also), 154 donkeys, three tatus, 9,117 sheep, 2,228 ditto, 10 bullocks.

4321. That is the return of what was brought by the 33,600 tons of shipping which went to Berbera, is it not?—Yes, as far as I can understand from what I see there; I do not dispute the correctness of that return.

4322. You stated, did you not, that you knew nothing about the price of provisions purchased for the Expedition, as compared with the price current at the time?—I do not.

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4323. In the case of the animals mentioned as having been brought from Berbera, a portion of the bullocks would be for food, and a portion, I presume, for transport?—Yes.

4324. Do you know what would be the proportions?—I cannot state.

4325. Mr. Seely.] I think that you have stated that you knew from time to time, the quantity of provisions which were purchased in Abyssinia?—Yes.

4326. Were you furnished from time to time periodically (say daily, or weekly) with an account of the provisions which were landed in Abyssinia, from all the various ports, such as from Bombay and Suez, and so on?—Yes, I received regular information of the arrival of supplies; but of the quantities landed daily, I was not furnished with statements.

4327. Did you get no account of the quantities which had arrived?—I did.

4328. Then, of course, you were able to calculate what quantity you had in hand at any particular time?—Certainly.

4329. Were you furnished from time to time with the returns of expenditure upon the provisions?—Yes.

4330. Did that occur frequently?—Frequently.

4331. Then, of course, you knew at any time what was the store of provisions that you had to supply the troops with?—Yes.

4332. Are you aware what was the number of months' forage and provisions in store when the Expedition left Annesley Bay in May and June?—I am not aware.

4333. Do you know what quantity was left in Abyssinia?—I do not.

4334. Do you know what quantity was sent away in ships?—I do not.

4335. Can you tell the Committee what was the excess, from time to time, of the six months' supply of provisions which Lord Napier required?—I cannot answer that question.

4336. Can you give the Committee some idea of what was the excess?—The information could be furnished accurately if required, but it would take some time to get it.

4337. Cannot you give the Committee a rough idea of what the excess was?—I cannot.

4338. You knew, from time to time, what was the quantity in store in Abyssinia, and what was on board the ships in Annesley Bay, did you not?—Yes.

4339. Therefore, knowing, as you must have done roughly, what was the average consumption daily, you must have known what provisions you had, and the time during which you would be able to feed the troops with those provisions?—I certainly knew that at the time.

4340. But you do not remember now?—No.

4341. Did you forward, from time to time, to Bombay an account of the supplies which reached Abyssinia from abroad, and of the provisions purchased in the country, and the expenditure?—Yes.

4342. Are you aware of what the charges were for the Persian Expedition for the commissariat department?—I do not remember at this moment.

4343. You are not able then to give the Committee an idea of whether they were more moderate than the charges for the Abyssinian Expedition?—I am not; I am under the impression

that they were more moderate, but I do not speak as an authority upon the subject.

4344. Do you think that any part of the Abyssinian expenditure may be attributed to a want of concentration of the control of the expenditure?—The control of the expenditure was concentrated in one office to some extent.

4345. What was the nature of the control of the expenditure that you exercised?—The wants of both the Commissariat and Land Transport to the extent of the requirements specified by Lord Napier, and communicated from time to time, would be met by me by directing purchases wherever such supplies could be had to the best advantage.

4346. And you directed where the purchases were to be made, did you not?—Exactly.

4347. Did you also direct who was to be employed to make them?—Officers were appointed at different places for this purpose, and they received their instructions or orders from me.

4348. Do you know what portion of the Transport Train went beyond Senafé?—I could not tell you exactly without seeing the returns of the Transport Train, but a very large portion of it did.

4349. Did you find any difficulty in getting provisions and animals landed when the ships arrived at Annesley Bay?—There was considerable difficulty at first, owing to the want of piers.

4350. When was that difficulty obviated?—When the second or commissariat pier was finished, it proved of the very greatest convenience.

4351. Do you remember when that pier was finished?—To the best of my recollection, it was finished about a fortnight or three weeks before the fall of Magdala.

4352. Are you aware that Lord Napier in September called the attention of the authorities to having proper facilities given for the landing of provisions?—I believe he did, but I have no authority to speak on the matter.

4353. Can you tell the Committee whether or not there was a surgeon appointed to attend to the 280 Europeans and 18,000 native drivers?—There was no surgeon attached to the Land Transport Corps at all to the best of my belief. The followers were received at the different hospitals, and those hospitals had medical officers attached to them.

4354. Colonel Barttelot.] When you first went to Abyssinia, I presume that you knew nothing about the quantity of provisions that would be required?—It was settled beforehand what quantity of provisions were required.

4355. For six months?—Yes; we had no idea when we arrived in Abyssinia what our further requirements would be.

4356. And you hardly knew from day to day, I suppose, what they would be?—Yes, we had instructions to arrange for a further supply up to a specified date, the 31st of October.

4357. But you did not know, did you, whether you would be able to procure the additional supplies which you required in Abyssinia, or whether you would not?—We trusted to getting nothing in Abyssinia; what we did get was a sort of god-send, and what we did get, of course, was brought into account, but we could look a-head for nothing with certainty.

4358. Would it not have been dangerous to have trusted in any way to the resources of Abyssinia?—Most certainly.

4359. Therefore

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4359. Therefore the Expedition was bound to be provided with supplies from elsewhere?—That was fully recognised, and that was the reason that arrangements were made for supplying it in the way in which it was supplied.

4360. And, of course, all the arrangements were made looking to the possibility of a long stay in Abyssinia?—Yes.

4361. Sir John Hay.] With regard to the subject of tonnage, I think that none of the 33,000 tons of shipping which were sent to Berbera for the purposes of the Expedition were sent for forage?—There was no forage brought from Berbera.

4362. And although the amount of tonnage appears to have been considerable, the class of animals (such as camels) which were brought from Berbera, of course, entailed a large amount of tonnage in proportion to the number conveyed?—Certainly; but in that return which was just now laid before me I see no allusion to camels; a fact which confused me at the time, that tonnage appears to be calculated for bullocks and sheep only. I know that we did get from Berbera in that way large supplies of animals, and I supposed that there was some mistake in dividing the tonnage between what was actually taken up for the transport animals and what was taken up for the live stock for feeding troops.

4363. But as a matter of fact what did happen, as I understand it was this: that it was found that after the mule epidemic, and after the organisation in Abyssinia of the Land Transport Corps, that camels would be very serviceable in larger numbers than had originally been contemplated, and that in consequence of that, vessels which had been calculated upon for the purpose of conveying animals (but calculated, of course, looking to the ordinary draught of the carriage animals of the campaign, and not of camels) were sent to Berbera to convey camels, although their tonnage remained, calculated as though they were going to bring draught bullocks, or tattús, or mules, or whatever animals for which the ordinary calculation of tonnage was conceived, is not that so?—It is so.

4364. Therefore the 33,000 tons of shipping which you stated to have been employed, and which appear to have been in excess of the amount of animals landed, as compared with the amount of animals which they were calculated to carry, may be explained by the fact that the animals which they did convey were camels, an exceptional kind of animal, which of course occupied a larger amount of space than the animals which were calculated for in the return?—Certainly, camels require a very considerable space as compared with mules and bullocks and tattús.

4365. And not only do they take up more space themselves, but their combative instincts require them to be kept separate, I believe?—Decidedly.

4366. It is suggested that the return is not correct, I suppose that in one sense the return is correct, that is to say, that the tonnage is called for upon the ordinary requirements of the campaign, but that when exceptional circumstances occur, owing to the exigencies of war, of course those who are in charge do not alter the returns which exist, but they avail themselves of the tonnage which they possess, in order to fulfil the requirements of the general commanding the force?—I think it is quite competent to them to do so.

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4367. Therefore, in one sense it is correct, but in another sense it is incorrect; that is to say, it is incorrect literally and accurately as to what happened; but it is correct according to the ordinary formula which are submitted; and it performed the duty which the General required it to perform?—That is how I understand it.

4368. Chairman.] The return of which I am speaking is a return of the animals received from Berbera, and not of the tonnage, is that return correct?—I have no reason to assume that that return is not correct, and I do not dispute the correctness or accuracy of that return in any way. There was a great deal of tonnage supplied for Berbera for the conveyance of transport animals, as well as for the conveyance of live stock to feed the troops. I do not know at all the proportion of one to the other, but that would be answered in full, I have no doubt, by Captain Tryon.

4369. Sir John Hay.] As a matter of fact, when large animals, such as elephants and so forth, are conveyed in India, it very frequently happens, does it not, that a certain amount of tonnage is appropriated, as if to so many horses for the conveyance of one elephant?—Exactly so; and in the same way with a camel.

4370. Chairman.] Is it correct that you derived other animals from Berbera than are set out in this return?—Certainly.

4371. What were they?—Thousands of camels.

4372. Can you mention the exact number of camels which you received from Berbera?—We received on the whole from Berbera between 7,000 and 8,000 camels.

4373. Then this return is not correct, as it sets out no camels?—That return may be correct as far as regards the animals there, but we had quantities of more animals than that return shows.

4374. It is an incomplete return then, is it not?—I presume so.

4375. You see that it is not restricted to animals for feeding the troops?—I am aware of that; I noticed that particularly.

4376. The troops would not eat the tattús, donkeys, and so forth?—Certainly not. Some portion of the camels that came to Berbera, came in the early part of the campaign in native boats. That means of conveying them failed, and we were obliged to have recourse to steamers.

4377. Can you account for Major Chitty's omitting them from his return?—No, I do not understand it.

4378. What proportion came in native boats?—I would simply answer that from memory; I should say not more than 3,000 at the outside.

4379. But you cannot give an accurate statement?—I cannot give an accurate statement, but I have no doubt that Captain Tryon could give you the number of camels that were conveyed from Berbera in ships and steamers.

4380. Do you know what forage you had at Aden, that never reached Abyssinia at all?—I know that there was forage that did not proceed further than Aden, but I cannot answer that question exactly at present.

4381. Do you remember a ship named the "Royal Edward"?—I remember the name, but I can give you no information about her.

4382. Do you know that she was laden with hay, exclusively?—She may have been.

4383. Do you know that her cargo was never touched?—That may be so.

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4384. Do

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4384. Do you know that she lay three months at Annesley Bay with her cargo untouched?—I do not, never having heard so.

4385. Sir *James Elphinstone*.] When did the orders come down from Magdala to break up the Expedition, and to begin sending away the transports?—I am at a disadvantage about dates, but Captain Tryon could tell you.

4386. The resident at Aden had no authority I suppose from Lord Napier, to send back any transports that happened to be at Aden, and that had come forward on their way to Annesley Bay,

until he received direct orders to do so?—I do not think he had; but I cannot tell you what action was taken by him in the matter.

4387. Is it not quite possible that when rumours of the fall of Magdala reached Aden, ships might have been on their way to Annesley Bay, and might have been detained at Aden to hear the result of these rumours, and that the resident had no power to dispose of those ships until orders came to him from the General as to how to dispose of them?—Yes, I presume it was so.

Sir WILLIAM JAMES TYRONE POWER, K.C.B., re-called; and further Examined.

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4388. Lord *Elcho*.] SINCE the Abyssinian Expedition was first started, has not a new department been established, called the Control Department?—There has been.

4389. What is your exact position in that new Control Organisation?—Hitherto I have been Commissary General in Chief, and as the Control Department has been gradually organised I have taken charge of the Hospital Department, formerly in charge of the Purveyor in Chief, and of the Barrack Department, formerly in charge of the Superintendent of Barracks, together with control duties, and assisting in the organisation of that department. In fact, I have been acting generally as assistant to the Controller in Chief, and I am doing so at the present moment.

4390. Is the organisation at present complete?—It is in the first stage; it is not complete yet.

4391. The relative position of the different offices is not clearly defined yet, is it?—Not in the War Office.

4392. You have under you, have you not, the charge of all that relates to food and transport?—Land transport and inland water transport abroad.

4393. And food for man and beast?—Yes, and food for man and beast.

4394. With sea transport you have nothing to do, I believe?—Nothing whatever.

4395. From your knowledge of what took place in the Abyssinian Expedition, and looking to the present organisation, or what is intended shortly to be the complete organisation of this new control department, do you think that there will be a complete knowledge on the part of the War Office, and those conducting an expedition, of the places where all that is required in the way of food and land transport, can be best and most cheaply obtained in any part of the world?—I think there will be considerable improvement in that respect; that is to say, that in one department will be collected the knowledge which formerly was scattered over four or five departments; and it is to be hoped and expected, that with that concentration there will be greater knowledge at the disposal of that department, and that it will be more easily directed by one head.

4396. Then you will know, I presume, the cheapest market where all those things are to be found, and the cheapest way of getting the cheapest things out of that market?—It is to be hoped so.

4397. So that with regard to purchasing mules, you would know where to go for mules, and the best way of getting them from the cheapest markets?—I think that was pretty well known to

the War Office at all times; but as no special department was charged with that duty, it probably was initiated by those who had not that knowledge.

4398. But that knowledge being fully obtained by one department, the system will come into improved action, and there will be no bidding by one set of persons against another set of persons, and those who are sent to purchase will have a thorough knowledge of their business?—I think so; because one officer will be responsible for the whole now, and he will be able to have all the knowledge that exists, and to know where the supply exists.

4399. Will that be the case with reference to all matters of land transport generally?—Undoubtedly.

4400. So that you think that the present improved organisation will lead to economy and efficiency in the purchase of land transport, and in the purchase of food, provisions, forage, fuel, light, and everything that is necessary for an army in the field?—Undoubtedly, because the War Office will have at its command much larger resources than it used to have; the military train, which comprised about 90 officers, was formerly under the Horse Guards, and none of those officers were available without the Horse Guards selection; and the War Office had no intimate knowledge of those officers, and of their characters and qualifications; any officer could be appointed to the Military Train, or could purchase into it, whereas now the Land Transport Corps will be specially maintained for transport purposes, and care will be taken that qualified officers are selected for the purpose, and are thoroughly trained in their business.

4401. Besides having charge of the transport, and of the provisions for man and beast, you will also have charge, will you not, of the general transport of the army for other purposes, whether it be for pontoon trains, or what is commonly called munitions of war?—Transport of every description will be under the Control Department; it will be one organised corps under one direction; that, in fact, was the essence of the recommendation of Lord Strathnairn's Committee.

4402. That is to say the Land Transport and the Inland Water Transport?—Exactly.

4403. At the present moment, then, I gather from the replies which you have just made to my questions, that the sea transport is entirely beyond the control (which is the word that you represent) of the War Office?—Undoubtedly, because the whole of the funds available for that service are taken in the Admiralty Vote, and none

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none of that money can be expended except by their agency and under their authority.

4404. You have had naturally, as Commissary General, and more recently in your new position, an opportunity of observing the working of the present system, and of the late system under which the sea transport is supplied for military purposes?—Yes, I have had a great deal of experience of it.

4405. You had experience of it in the Crimean War, had you not?—Yes.

4406. Was that the first war in which you had experience of the sea transport?—I had seen a good deal of it; first of all in China, and subsequently during the war in New Zealand; and then at the Cape of Good Hope; and then came the Crimea, since then China again, the Trent business, and Abyssinia.

4407. Had you anything to do with the troops which were sent out to India at the time of the mutiny?—Nothing whatever; that came entirely under the India Office and the Horse Guards.

4408. Do you consider that the system of military sea transport is at the present moment satisfactory?—I do not.

4409. On what occasions, within your own knowledge, has the system worked ill?—I may say, that during the Crimean War there was a good deal of complaint of the transshipment of supplies from one vessel to the other. There was difficulty and delay complained of by the War Office and its agents in shipping supplies from England; and after a great deal of negotiation and difficulty on the subject, it was arranged that the War Office, in order to get this business into its own hands, should, in all contracts into which it entered for supplies for the Crimea, agree with the contractors, not only that they should deliver the supplies at a port for embarkation, but that they should deliver at Constantinople or Balaklava, as might be required. Under that system at first no doubt some extra expense was caused.

4410. How late in the war was that?—It was after the first great difficulties had commenced, when the pressure began to be very heavy in England, and when there was great excitement as to the sending out of supplies, and a great desire that there should be no delay or obstruction anywhere, and every department was naturally anxious to secure its own share of responsibility from blame. Then the War Office agents arranged with the contractors to deliver the stores, for which they contracted, at the seat of war, the result of which was, that from that time forward no hitch or difficulty occurred. There were regularly two ships sent off from Liverpool, two from London, one from Bristol, and one from a Welsh port in every week.

4411. With the different provisions and requirements of the army?—Yes; mainly forage.

4412. Did those ships to which you refer, which were sent off weekly, and which the contractors had to deliver on the spot, contain munitions of war and “provisions of mouth,” as the French call it?—No; they were mainly forage supplies. At the seat of war some difficulties also arose from the transshipment of supplies from one ship to another; so that the difficulties that have so often been remarked upon, of ships going about with stores in them, continually occurred; the result was that people ceased to know where the supplies were, and a vessel that came out with one kind of supplies frequently had three or four, or five or six different descriptions put on board.

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The same difficulty arose with the shipment of supplies from Deptford, where the stores were not sufficient to load a vessel completely. The stores were delivered at the dockyard, and were shipped as was found convenient, some in one vessel and some in another, a lot here, and a lot there; so that, in point of fact, the War Office and its agents, after a little while, knew very little as to what ships had taken out their supplies, and they had naturally great difficulty in informing their agents at the seat of war of the vessels in which they were to expect their consignments.

4413. That is to say, the stores were supplied through the War Office, and were then handed over to the Admiralty, who shipped them in any way they thought proper; and they appear, by your account, to have been shipped in such a way that the War Office were unable to write to their agents abroad, and say, “You may expect such-and-such a consignment by such-and-such a ship”?—Yes, exactly. I should be glad if, on this point, you would take the evidence of the officer who was employed on that service, Mr. Julyan, who is now agent for the Crown Colonies, and who was then a commissariat officer employed by the War Office in superintending the purchase of supplies, and their shipment.

4414. You referred a short time since to the War Office having contracted with certain persons to deliver whatever the subject of their contract was in the Crimea; and to the fact that ships so chartered started for certain places; was that a direct contract and charter on the part of the War Office, or was it done through the Admiralty?—This was an arrangement by the War Office by which they paid for the freight in the price of the supplies, and therefore there was no question of chartering a vessel at all.

4415. The freight was included in the cost of the article?—The freight was included in the cost of the article, the contract was for delivery on the spot.

4416. It was handed over, then, to your officers, who were responsible for its carriage to the front and no more?—Yes.

4417. Do you believe that much of the inconvenience, or that any portion of the inconvenience, which was suffered by the troops from the want of supplies, arose from the sea transport at the time of the commencement of the Crimean War and during the War not being in the hands of the War Office?—There were many complaints made by the Commissary General of the difficulty which he experienced from the want of sufficient command over transport, but I am disposed to think that that was perhaps not the fault of the system, but that it arose rather from the insufficiency of the transport actually procurable out there after the tremendous hurricane in November, which disabled and destroyed many vessels. But there was one instance in which I think a great deal of difficulty was directly traceable to the double system. On the 25th November 1854, a large steamer, the “Jason,” was sent to Constantinople to bring up horses, for after the hurricane the roads were broken up and wheel transport ceased to be of any use, and the transport required of course very heavy reinforcing; it took about four pack-horses to do what had previously been done by one draught-horse. A steamer was sent down to fetch up horses, for which there was a great pressure, but the Admiral Superintendent at Constantinople conceived that

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the steamer had suffered in the hurricane, and that it was more important to refit her than to send her back immediately; I consider that the fortnight during which that vessel was detained was the culminating period of our distress in the Crimea, and that had she come back immediately with the 300 horses, which she could have carried, we should have tided over that fortnight with very little of the difficulties that attended it. In fact, when she did return and brought us a supply of horses, the great difficulties were over; we had no severe suffering after that; there was suffering from climate and exposure, and over-work; but there was always sufficient transport from that time forward to bring what was necessary for the troops up to the front. In fact, in my own division I think the period of suffering was comprised within four or five days, and it was very largely owing to my representations that the Commissary General went to Lord Raglan and impressed upon him the necessity of this vessel being sent back at once with horses, and Lord Raglan sent his own little despatch-boat (the "Caradoc," I think, was her name), to Constantinople, and then the "Jason" was returned immediately with the horses.

4418. The instance which you have just given to the Committee of the want of control by the War Office over sea transport tells very much, does it not, upon the land transport of which you have control, and for which you are responsible?—Entirely so; our base of operations was on the sea shore, nothing could come to us except by the sea, and without command of vessels, we were really in a position almost of a force that was beleaguered, for the Crimea could supply us with nothing; I do not wish to ascribe any fault to the Admiral, he could not have foreseen, and I do not think that any one could have foreseen what would have arisen from the short detention of a vessel which needed repair, but it did happen that the one thing above all others for which everything should have been sacrificed, even the safety of the vessel itself, was left undone. It was like sending men into a breach; the risk might be great, but the vessel should have been sent at all risk.

4419. You hold that it is absolutely essential to any complete system of transport, that it should be free from friction (to use a very mild term), and that it should be under one head?—Undoubtedly. I think that if a general officer is to be held responsible for the success of an expedition, every means essential to the success of that expedition must be at his whole and sole control, otherwise if any difficulties occur at the point at which another responsibility intervenes, it is impossible to ascribe the disasters which may occur to one or to the other.

4420. So much for the Crimea; can you state other instances of the evil working of the then system (and apparently of the present system) of the sea transport not being under the War Office in China in the last war?—The very same thing occurred there, though of course on a smaller scale, and to a certain extent it was less important. I find the following statements in an official paper, a report of the Commissary General who was in charge of the operations there: "The Japan mission for collecting transport animals did not turn out so favourably, owing to the difficulties and obstacles experienced by the head of the department in procuring shipping from the navy. It was

generally understood that the naval authorities were of opinion no land operations to any extent would be necessary, and consequently that no land transport would be required. After the landing of the troops at Tah-lien-whan, however, and before the capture of the Taku Forts, it was admitted that these animals collected at Japan were wanted, and vessels were sent by the admiral at once for their transport, but as the forts were so speedily taken, a steamer was dispatched to recall the shipping. Thus the commissariat officers, with their horses numbering 2,000 or 3,000, after the great expenditure of public money, and the remonstrance from themselves and the head of the department, were left to their fate in Japan, two ship loads only of animals reaching China. A fast screw steamer, the "Thunder," was chartered in England for and consigned to the senior commissariat officer, a master of the Royal Navy having been sent out in her as naval agent. This officer did not, on arrival, consider himself in any way responsible to the commissariat, but to the senior naval officer, and the captain of the ship stated that he was under the orders of the naval agent. It seemed, therefore, at first there was no prospect of the vessel being of any service to the department, not being under its direction or control. It was not till after some correspondence that the vessel was placed by the admiral under the control of the commissariat, and then only could the necessary directions be given for her being fitted up as a cattle ship, and as she, with the "Powerful," were the only vessels under commissariat control, so they were the only vessels the department could depend on to convey a supply of live stock with the force to the north. The "Thunder" and the "Powerful" comprised all the sea transport permanently attached to the commissariat, but to which must be added a very much larger amount of sea transport while the troops were ashore at Tah-lien-whan. This latter, however, was not adapted or fitted for the conveyance of cattle, for which purpose it was required; moreover, when the troops re-embarked, the vessels were wanted by the navy for their original purposes. It has been omitted to be noticed earlier, that in loading the supply ships at Hong Kong, before the starting of the Expedition, the head of the commissariat failed in his endeavours to have the ships laden in the manner he thought most convenient to the service. The inconvenience was soon felt when the cargoes were required, and although the store accountant had bills of lading, and lists of ships and cargoes prepared, they were soon of little use. Hence great confusion arose, for the ships were anchored wherever the naval officers pleased, often at inconvenient distances, and whenever it was thought necessary by them, they directed the contents of such ships to be discharged, without the knowledge or consent of the department being previously obtained; thus valuable stores to a great extent, which were not required to be landed, were thrown on the open beach, and left at the mercy of the weather and the depredation of the troops and followers, while some particular articles in demand could not be procured, because the vessel containing them was anchored elsewhere, and not easy of access. Moreover cargoes, and portions of cargoes, of vessels were transferred from one to another without intimation to the store accountant, whose arrangements were thus consequently

quently confused and upset. The commissariat, as the department on which a force depends for its supplies, is useless without its transport, whether by land or sea, and the disadvantages of the department not having full command of both kinds of transport, have been exemplified in nearly every war we have engaged in, at much cost to the Government and much risk to the success of our arms. If the Deputy Commissary General had had under his orders at the outset an adequate amount of transport, much anxiety to the department, and risk and loss, would have been avoided; much expense also would have been saved to the Government by timely reduction of the cattle and horses collected at the depôts, where numbers died from too long detention, or were sold at ruinous sacrifice, while others were being purchased to supply immediate wants at the scene of operations. Happily, as the fortuitous issue of events proved, owing to the speedy success of the military operations, the difficulties encountered by the commissariat did not ultimately result in any serious inconvenience to the army." That is the report from the Commissary General in China.

4421. What is his name?—Mr. Turner.

4422. Had he had much experience?—Very great experience.

4423. Was he in the Crimea?—He was not in the Crimea; he was in Constantinople throughout the war.

4424. Then that is the report of a man who knew what he was speaking about from the experience of former wars?—Yes, he was a very able and experienced officer.

4425. Do you wish to cite any case in New Zealand or the Cape, with both of which you are acquainted?—The only difficulty which occurred in New Zealand was in connexion with the want of inland water transport; there was no less than seven changes in the transport between Auckland and Waikato, from water to land and from land to water. In some part of the operations the assistance of the navy was obtained, and the difficulty experienced then was that in the case of all losses of supplies which occurred, and which must have occurred under any circumstances, it became impossible to bring them home to any person or department, because the navy disclaimed any responsibility for them, and would give no receipts, but would simply take them into their boats and give them over to others, and it was impossible to say what loss might have occurred during the transit.

4426. But was this transit on fresh water?—It was on fresh water.

4427. I thought I understood that all fresh water transport was under the War Office?—This was an exception. There was no want of zeal on the part of those officers, but they thought, and very properly, that they were never intended to be store agents, and therefore they refused to give receipts for the supplies; but this invalidated the whole system of consignments from head quarters, and therefore it was found more advantageous to the service to replace the naval crews by crews hired by the Commissariat.

4428. In that case there were two distinct sets of people employed in the transport, although one only was responsible?—Yes.

4429. And from one of those which helped not being under the authority of the other, all this

confusion arose?—The confusion arose not from want of zeal or of desire to assist, but simply from the fact that they did not belong to the same service, and were not responsible to the same people, and although probably the Commissariat boatmen did not take more care of the stores, yet the one set of people could be made responsible for the whole, and were made responsible.

4430. Was there any instance of evils arising from this state of the sea-transport service at the Cape?—None that I am aware of at the Cape, because it was chiefly a coast service between port and port; it was managed by the local military and naval officers with a great deal of energy and ability, I believe.

4431. What are the arrangements and what is the course pursued when transport for bodies of troops is supplied?—For the transport of bodies of troops there are no less than eight processes gone through. First, the Military Secretary asks the Secretary of State's sanction; secondly, the Secretary of State conveys his sanction; thirdly, the Horse Guards takes the Queen's pleasure; fourthly, the Horse Guards informs the War Office that the Queen has signified her pleasure; fifthly, the War Office informs the Quartermaster General that the Admiralty may be requested to provide tonnage; sixthly, the Quartermaster General makes the requisition upon the Admiralty; seventhly, the Admiralty informs the Horse Guards of the ship which has been allotted for the service; eighthly, the Horse Guards informs the War Office, and the information is circulated.

4432. Up to that time there have been eight courses, that is to say, eight letters at least, I presume?—Yes, supposing that no hitch occurs.

4433. Assuming the most favourable circumstances, from the date of the first letter in the usual course to the final answer, what would be the time occupied?—I should not be prepared to state that.

4434. Would a month do it?—Yes; I think, perhaps, less than a month.

4435. Would a fortnight do it?—Under favourable circumstances I should think less than a fortnight; but that does not include, of course, the taking up of vessels. Part of this includes the taking up of the vessels, and, including that, I should think a month would be sufficient.

4436. Is there any such term applied at the War Office to this process as "going through the mill"?—This is what would be called going regularly "through the mill." This might be shortened, of course, under extraordinary circumstances by not going through the mill.

4437. This assumes that the machinery is well oiled and in good working order, and that no hitch occurs; do hitches often occur?—I trust not.

4438. Have you known hitches occur?—Such things have occurred, but I do not think they often occur where the movement of troops is concerned.

4439. If they do occur, where is the friction; what are the difficult points in that course which sometimes lead to hitches?—The only point at which I can conceive that a difficulty could arise under this arrangement, beyond the delay, is regarding the fitting and appropriation of the vessel in which, although it is not mentioned here, between the sixth and the seventh processes, the Quartermaster General employs an officer of his department and a medical officer to inspect

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4440. What is done by the Admiralty?—The fittings and appropriation are arranged by the Admiralty, and they are approved and inspected by an officer of the Quartermaster General's Department, and a medical officer. Of course, on their inspection, difficulties may arise as regards the accommodation, the cubic space, the sufficiency of air, the quality or description of fittings and of food, whether more or less of anything is required, which might lead, of course, to correspondence and difference of opinion between the two departments.

4441. The responsibility as to the class of vessel, except as to the question of fitting, rests, I presume, with the Admiralty?—Yes, that would depend upon the number of troops to be carried.

4442. *Chairman.*] If more departments were concerned, as was the case in the Abyssinian Expedition, there would be much more correspondence, would there not?—Undoubtedly.

4443. The India Office is a new element, I presume, in the conduct of the Abyssinian Expedition?—The India Office would have been consulted.

4444. And the Foreign Office was a new element in the Abyssinian Expedition, was it not?—Only as regards the employment of consuls or other persons under the direction of the Foreign Office, but the India Office would have been reported to on all the leading points during the carrying of them out.

4445. The war, as in the case of the Abyssinian Expedition, being rather the war of the India Office, I presume the correspondence would be very much amplified?—It was amplified, undoubtedly, by the necessity of keeping the India Office informed of every step we took, because they informed the India Government and the general officer commanding abroad, of what we did.

4446. The case which you have given in answer to the noble Lord's question, is an abstract case; could you, with the same facility, give us the concrete, the actuality in the case of the Abyssinian Expedition?—No, because this is a question of transport of troops; we did not send any troops during the Abyssinian War, or, at least, nothing to speak of; we sent a few artillery men by the Peninsular and Oriental Company's vessels, but the transport of troops was managed from India.

4447. Lord *Elcho.*] Do you know anything about the movement of Indian troops?—Nothing at all. I have been in India, but only as a traveller. The hire of vessels for the transport of troops to the Colonies, or elsewhere, involves the surveying, engaging, and fitting of vessels of a certain class, as well as the supply of provisions, stores, furniture, and fittings. This business requires the assistance of professional men, but I should consider that such assistance might easily be afforded to the War Office by the Admiralty without throwing upon that department the responsibility which belongs to the Secretary of State for War for the efficient and regular supply of reliefs, and for the proper accommodation of the troops. Even as it is, this responsibility is divided, as the fittings, stores, and appropriation of the vessels, though provided by the Admiralty, are finally surveyed and approved by an officer of the

Quartermaster General's Department and a medical officer. I do not consider that there should be any difficulty whatever in the War Department becoming directly responsible for the hire of vessels; but it might be very advisable to have in the War Department an officer of the naval or mercantile marine to assist and advise in the duty, and to be the branch for transport duty (instead of the Store Branch recently, and the several branches now employed). It need not cost more in time of peace, and during war such a branch would be invaluable as a responsible practical agency for the Secretary of State. It would keep a record of fittings for all purposes and of all data on the subject of transport; would prepare advertisements, notices, and charter-parties, and would initiate all action for breach of engagement, delay, or loss of stores. As it became known to brokers and the trade, the nature and extent of the wants, and the method of conducting business would soon be generally known and would facilitate the work. I would beg it to be understood, at the same time, that I do not underrate the value of Admiralty assistance, nor do I question the readiness with which it would be afforded; I would merely advocate the giving to the Secretary of State the duties and the means of performing them both in money and in material assistance, which would really enable him to be responsible for so important a branch of military service. That, in a few words, is what I wish to explain.

4448. The state of things which you have just described is what you wish to see established, not what is established at the present moment?—It is not what is established.

4449. Is it in process of being established?—There is some simplification proposed in consequence of the establishment of the control department, by which these eight processes will be reduced in number; but still the intervention of the Horse Guards and of the Admiralty will be necessary. What I should be glad to see, would be an application made by the Horse Guards to the War Office for a movement of troops, and the War Office, through its own naval agent in the building, at once making the arrangements, and informing the Horse Guards when and where and how the troops are to be embarked.

4450. That is to say, that in all matters of transport, whether by sea or by land, the War Office should be supreme, getting what assistance might be required from the Navy?—Undoubtedly, and taking in its own estimate the vote for the sum.

4451. In France the system of land transport is broken up, the commissariat (or the *munitions de bouche* as they call them) and the munitions of war being separate; for instance the Artillery are responsible for the conveyance of their stores, and the Engineers, I believe, likewise have their own separate transport, and so have the *intendance*, which is equivalent to our old commissariat; that is so, is it not?—I think not; I think the *intendance* in the French army do the whole of the land transport, but the *munitions de guerre*, properly speaking, are under the Artillery, and the Artillery is furnished by the *intendance* with whatever transport is necessary for the carriage of those munitions; and as long as those munitions are required to be carried the transport is at the sole disposal of the head of the Artillery, who is responsible for them. The Pontoon Train is the property of the Engineers, and the horses

horses and conveyances necessary for it are supplied by the *intendance*, and remain under the direction of the Engineers so long as that pontoon train requires to be moved. Of course in going into winter quarters, or any thing of that sort, the whole of the transport reverts to the *intendance*, and it is useful for the whole army.

4452. That is to say, that the *intendance* has the whole of the transport of the army, and they hand over to the Artillery what they require, and to the Engineers what they require, and after that those corps are responsible for their own transport?—Yes, after that they are responsible to bring up their supplies.

4453. Will that be the system in the English army?—It will not; the munitions of war, I am sorry to say, are to be under the Controller, so that you will have the *intendance* of our army not only responsible for the food, clothing, transport, money, and supplies of every description for the troops for their personal comforts, but you will also have in its hands the supply of all the munitions of war, the muskets, cannon, and all the heavy material of war.

4454. And also everything which is required by the engineers?—Everything which is required by the engineers in the way of stores, but not the pontoon train. That is part of their equipment; like the guns to the artillery.

4455. Then do you think that the present proposed system is defective by putting too much upon your department?—It puts on the department duties which I think no one department, or no one set of individuals would be competent to perform in the field.

4456. And even supposing that in the time of peace it worked with tolerable ease, it would probably break down in time of war?—I cannot conceive its working with ease even in time of peace.

4457. If it works with friction in time of peace, it must infallibly break down in time of war, must it not?—I think that if war came the necessity for division would be very obvious, but it is a bad time for doing it.

4458. Do you know at all what the French system of sea transport is, and whether it is entirely under the *Ministère de la guerre*?—I cannot answer the question; as regards the initiatory arrangements to supply the transport, it is done on a very different footing from our system; but at the seat of war all the transport is at the command of the general officer commanding. During the Crimean War the whole of the sea transport attached to the army was at the disposition, in every shape and way, of the general officer commanding, and through him of the *intendant*, who had the means of despatching it whenever he required to do so for his supplies.

4459. You mean naval transport as well as land transport?—I believe that the whole was so in the Crimea.

4460. You have stated to us what are the arrangements in this country with regard to the sea transport of troops in bodies; what are the arrangements under which passages for individual officers are supplied?—There are seven processes under the normal state of things for the passage of officers, with four additional ones in exceptional cases. First, the Adjutant General places the officer under orders for foreign service, and sends a memorandum to the military secretary, asking for a passage. Secondly, the

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military secretary requests the War Office to sanction the passage, stating the circumstances under which the officer is proceeding abroad. Thirdly, the War Office authorises the Quarter Master General to provide the passage, and if the expense is chargeable to the predecessor, asks that the Admiralty may be requested to inform the Secretary of State of the cost. Fourthly, the Quarter Master General makes his requisition upon the Admiralty. Fifthly, the Admiralty either allot the passage in a troop or freight ship, or write to a shipping company, ordering the passage. Sixthly, the Admiralty informs the Quarter Master General. Seventhly, the Quarter Master General gives the officer his embarkation order, and in the case of a departmental officer informs the War Office, so that the head of his department may know his movements; and the account branch make the advance of pay (when combatant officers embark, their advances of pay are made by the agents on the production of their embarkation orders). In addition to the foregoing the following further letters are written, when an officer's passage is payable by his predecessor.

4461. Are these the four additional processes?—Yes, these are the four additional processes. First, if the War Office, on receipt of the requisition, informs the military secretary of the predecessor's liability. Secondly, the Admiralty informs the War Office of the cost of the passage. Thirdly, the War Office requests the military secretary to cause the amount to be recovered from the proceeds of the commission. Fourthly, The military secretary informs the War Office that the amount has been recovered, and will be credited by the agents.

4462. *Chairman.*] Is that also "going through the mill"?—That also is "going through the mill."

4463. *Lord Elcho.*] What is the average length of that process?—Probably a week.

4464. Without the four additional processes?—Without the four additional ones.

4465. Have you any remarks which you would wish to make upon that?—Yes. The individual passages of officers, and to a certain extent of small detachments, are now very generally provided for by contract with the various large steamship companies, which have regular passenger steamers to most of the colonies. The rates are the ordinary passenger rates. Sometimes, perhaps, a small abatement upon them. These might as easily be agreed for by the War Department as by the Admiralty, and a great number of references to procure passages, and subsequently for the settlement of them would be avoided. In connection with this latter, then arise questions regarding claims for extra baggage, messing, boat hire, which cause a vast mass of correspondence; the Admiralty rejecting, and the War Office pressing that such charges should be made against the amount (£35,000 l. in 1868–69) taken in the Naval Votes for the service.

4465*. You say that there are difficulties arising from the two departments from part of the duty being performed by one, and part by the other; in the case of an officer going to Gibraltar, would his passage from London to Gibraltar be entirely a War Office matter, or would it be partly an Admiralty matter. The Admiralty, I suppose, would be responsible for the sea part, and you would

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would be responsible for the land part?—Yes; but even in that many circumstances would arise.

4466. In so simple a matter as the transfer of an officer on duty from his quarters in England to his quarters in Gibraltar, would you state what difficulties would arise?—He would go from London to Southampton by railway, of course. He would embark there for Gibraltar. If he embarked there in a boat, that would be charged against the Admiralty. His passage from Southampton to Gibraltar would be at the contract rate and settled by the Admiralty, but there would be a reclamation of 3 s. 6 d. per day against the War Office by the Admiralty, and against the officer by the War Office, for every day that officer messed on board the ship, which sometimes causes a great deal of dispute. An officer, for instance, may land for a day at Vigo, and during that time the 3 s. 6 d. per day is not to be deducted. Again, on arriving at Gibraltar he has to land in a boat chargeable to the Admiralty. It is a fertile subject of dispute whether he has more baggage than he ought to carry, and whether the War Office or the officer himself, or the Admiralty, shall be charged with the excess of baggage. Again the vessel perhaps only allows each passenger a certain quantity of baggage, say, a hundredweight, and the regulations may allow the officer four hundredweight. He consequently makes a claim for the excess on the War Office, the War Office makes it on the Admiralty, and out of that there frequently arises a great deal of correspondence. Then the officer perhaps pays a porter to carry up his baggage, and includes it in his travelling account, and it comes to the War Office with these various liabilities for land and water transport or for messing, so that in settling the account, excepting the passage from Southampton to Gibraltar, there is an opportunity for a good deal of difficulty.

4467. Have you known a good many letters pass upon such a subject?—A good many.

4468. How many have you known in the case of one officer?—I think that the chief auditor could tell you more exactly than I can; but I know that it does occur, because it has arisen in the case of my own officers.

4469. Let us take the case of an officer going to India; would that be still more complicated?—Yes; there is a good deal of difficulty with the Peninsular and Oriental Company with regard to baggage, the allowance, particularly overland, being very small as compared with what an officer is allowed by the Regulation; and it is a fertile subject of difficulty between the two departments to settle the claims which arise under that head. The War Office does not like to pay those officers out of its own votes, because it is not provided for, and it considers that the sum taken by the Admiralty covers that expense. The Admiralty naturally defends its vote, and is desirous of not having anything put upon it which it may, in many instances, fairly dispute.

4470. But in both those cases if your proposal were to become law, and were acted upon, would not a fertile source of correspondence be done away with, and efficiency and economy both be promoted?—I think so; and it would be very easy, because it is a pure matter of contract with well-known steamers at rates with which every one is well acquainted. The War Office could enter into the contract as easily as the Admiralty, and they could settle all accounts under that

contract if they simply had to order the passage instead of applying to the Horse Guards to apply to the Admiralty to do it.

4471. Of course the same remarks would apply to a greater extent to the transport of small detachments?—Yes.

4472. What is the present system of supplying freight for munitions of war?—That is rather a long business; we have just changed our system, and I am afraid it will be for the worse. I find that under an arrangement which has just been made, the applications to the Admiralty for freight, which were formerly made by one branch of the War Office are now made by six branches. The estimated cost of freight for army stores in 1869-70 was 57,250*l*. Under the former system: First, Requisitions for tonnage were forwarded to the War Office from the Controller, Woolwich; Storekeeper, Tower; Storekeeper, Pimlico; Director of Works, Commissariat Department, Army Medical, Purveyor in Chief, once a fortnight: Secondly, the above requisitions were concentrated into one demand by the Store Branch for transmission to the Admiralty to provide tonnage: Thirdly, the letters of notice, with cargo notes, were received in the Store Branch from the Admiralty, and distributed by that branch to the several departments concerned: Fourthly, when the ship was ready to receive stores, the Admiralty sent notice to the depôts shipping the stores through the resident transport officer at Deptford, that the vessel was ready to receive stores, and until that notice was received no action was taken as to sending them to the ship: Fifthly, shipping notes in duplicate were forwarded with each shipment by boat or lighter, one of which was signed by the officer in charge on board the vessel and returned to the lighterman as a voucher for receipt; the other was detained on board the vessel: Sixthly, the shipping note retained by the ship's officer was sent by him to the brokers of the vessel for comparison with the bills of lading: Seventhly, bills of lading in triplicate were made out on completion of the shipment and were signed by the master of the vessel; one bill was sent to the consignee, one was retained by the captain of the ship, upon which he obtained the receipt for the stores by the consignee, and one bill was kept by the consignor: Eighthly, the consignee's bill was returned to the War Office as a voucher with his accounts. The master's bill was sent by him to the agents of the ship in England for transmission to the War Office in order that a tonnage certificate might be granted: Ninthly, Certificates of tonnage were issued by the Store Department to the Admiralty in advance, when the freight was under 10*l*., but when it was in excess of that sum, not until the brokers had forwarded to the War Office the bills of lading (master's), duly receipted by the consignee, to the effect that the stores were received in good order and condition: Tenthly, on receipt of the aforesaid bills of lading, the actual tonnage, heavy and light, was calculated, and concentrated into one certificate for all the departments concerned, whether there was one bill or 20, and a counterpart was at the same time sent to the brokers, upon receipt of which they sent in their claim to the Admiralty for the freight due, in accordance with the measurements given thereon, and the transaction was closed: Eleventhly, in the event of the stores being damaged

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damaged or lost, the consignee noted the fact on his receipt, and a claim was made upon the brokers of the ship for the amount, to which was added a charge of 15 per cent. for departmental expenses. In no case was the tonnage certificate issued until the claim was settled. That was the system which existed up to within, I think, the last week or two. The present system differs from it in one or two points.

4473. Was that the system at the time of the Abyssinian Expedition?—Yes.

4474. And was that system acted upon, so far as the War Office had anything to do with it?—Yes.

4475. Will you state whether any change has been made in this system?—In the first process, instead of several requisitions for tonnage being sent from different departments to one branch of the War Office, requisitions for tonnage are now sent direct to the Admiralty by the Controller, Woolwich; Storekeeper, Tower; Storekeeper, Pimlico; Director of Works; Commissariat Department, Pall Mall; Director of Contracts, &c., each department making a separate requisition for tonnage. Instead of the concentration of the requisition, which was formerly made by the Store Branch, it is now done separately. Then there are agents employed now (Messrs Hogg & Robinson) who engage the freight, and who notify the engagement to the Transport Department, which notifies it to the shipping departments concerned. The office of resident transport officer at Deptford is now abolished, and Messrs. Hogg & Robinson communicate with the brokers and Government depôts in regard to shipping notes. Those are the only changes; in fact, the main features are the requisitions being made by six branches of the War Office separately in the Admiralty, instead of by one, and therefore I am afraid increasing the probability of confusion occurring between the two departments. Formerly they were concentrated in the Store Branch, and by that branch a fortnightly requisition was made as to the whole of the transport requirements. What I should like to see substituted for it would be a sea transport branch in the War Office, which would do the duty which was formerly done by the Admiralty Transport Office, and by the Store Branch under the Secretary of State for War, with a naval officer at the head of it, to do precisely the same duty (and probably not requiring more persons to do it) as was done by the Store Branch, and that the branch of the War Office should make its own arrangements with Messrs. Hogg & Robinson, or with any other agents whom it might select, without employing the Admiralty, but taking the sum into its own Vote, and being of course responsible for the economical use of it.

4476. Then do you believe that in the transport of munitions of war there is still room, notwithstanding the changes which have been made, for considerable improvement, and that if those improvements were made, the delays, and expenses, and misunderstandings which have arisen in the Abyssinian and in other military expeditions would be obviated?—I think there would be very great advantage and economy to the public service, and above all (which seems to me to be more important than anything else), the responsibility would be fixed upon some one department and upon some one officer, for the proper performance of the duty connected with the

movement of troops and the supply of the troops.

4477. And without this fixing of responsibility, you can hardly hope for either efficiency or economy?—No doubt everyone is desirous to be as economical as possible; but I do not think that the system itself tends to economy. When you employ two persons, one to do the duty and the other to spend the money, the one will naturally be actuated by a lesser desire for economy than the other.

4478. The great desideratum being in all these cases to know whom to hang?—Undoubtedly.

4479. And you think that the difficulty is in so arranging all transport matters, whether of live or dead things, *munitions de guerre* or *munitions de bouche*, that you can centre responsibility in one individual?—I think the necessity for hanging would cease then. When every man knew his business, and had the means at his power of doing his business, the business would be properly done.

4480. *Chairman.*] You would hang the system to save the men?—Undoubtedly; that is what I should prefer to see done.

4481. *Lord Elcho.*] Would there be any insuperable difficulty in the War Office procuring transport, and paying for it?—None whatever; I think that the Admiralty largely employ brokers, and they would be equally at the disposal of the War Office. At present they employ Messrs. Hogg & Robinson as agents; and those or similar agents could be at the disposal of the War Office. If a transport branch existed at the War Office, with properly qualified persons in it, either naval or commercial, there would be at the command of the Secretary of State the amplest means of knowing what freight could be procured in the market. The brokers and others would make their offers readily on hearing that troops were going to move; but between the two departments, they sometimes find a difficulty in knowing when and where, and how the movement is to take place. The brokers in the Abyssinian business were directed to us; but of course it was difficult to make the whole broker world acquainted with the fact that a change of system was contemplated, and the more so as it was not an entire change, but only a partial adaptation of the means at command.

4482. Are there not a certain number of transports belonging to the Navy that are employed entirely for the purposes of army transport?—Yes, they are very valuable vessels.

4483. Do you know the number of them?—I do not; there are 10, I believe.

4484. Do you think it desirable, that instead of the Admiralty taking up shipping for the purpose, the nation should have a certain number of transports always on hand belonging to the nation for those purposes?—I attach the utmost importance to having vessels for that purpose, but only to the extent to which they can be profitably employed during a time of peace. We can calculate the average number of troops to be moved, and the average number of miles to be traversed, and it would be easy on that basis to ascertain the number of vessels that could be permanently and profitably employed in the public service, and they would be a nucleus for those which would be required during a time of war. They should be fitted in the best way, as a model for all others.

4485. You stated that you thought that if the whole

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whole of the transport of all munitions, whether *munitions de bouche*, or what are commonly called munitions of war, were under one department, the thing would break down in war on land: I presume that with reference to the shipment of all stores of all kinds as regards sea transport, you would have them all under one department?—Undoubtedly. The sea transport should be under one branch at the War Office.

4486. The arrangement of the stores, deciding what the ship is to take out, carefully noting and indexing where all the things are to be found, and communicating that to the officer who is to receive them, must all necessarily be under one head, must they not?—Yes.

4487. But when once the stores arrive, you would have them handed over to the different officers, who would then be responsible for them?—I would have them landed by the Control Department, the Control Department being the sole agent for transport of all kinds; and therefore I would consign the vessel and its stores to the Control Department; but when the stores were landed, the Control Department should be responsible to hand over to the special department, for munitions of war, whatever belonged to them; to the Royal Engineers, whatever belonged to them; to the Medical Department, the drugs and medicines, and whatever belonged to them; to the chaplains, the Bibles and Prayer-books, and whatever belonged to them; from which time they should be responsible for their care, and the proper application of them.

4488. And, together with that, would you follow the French system, and hand to each of those departments a sufficient amount of baggage, animals or carts, to transport them?—I will not say a sufficient amount, because my own experience is, that no amount of land transport that ever can be collected will be sufficient for an army; they will always want more; but each department should, I think, have a fair proportion of what is obtainable.

4489. They then becoming responsible for the custody of those animals?—The animals should be in charge also of transport drivers, responsible to the Controller for their good order and keeping; and he should send and inspect them from time to time, and see that they were taken care of.

4490. Then your experience would lead you to the conclusion that army transport should be procured entirely by the War Office, whether by sea or by land?—It would assuredly do so.

4491. And that all sea transports for army purposes which should be consigned to and attached to the army in the field should be at the sole disposal of the general officer commanding?—Undoubtedly, with the assistance, of course, of such naval officers as could be appointed for the purpose, and who would no doubt co-operate with him on all occasions; in fact, I should consider that to be of so much importance that I think an army in the field should never be without such assistance; you have always rivers to cross and pontooning to do in which sailors are perhaps more handy than any other men in the world, and, I think, no army in the field should be without a sort of naval brigade attached to it.

4492. You think that Jack would get them out of any difficulties?—I think he would get them out of a great many difficulties; I have seen a great deal of the working of sailors, and nothing can be more satisfactory; but, of course,

they should be attached to the army, and at the sole disposal of the general commanding; they should be entirely under his command for the time being.

4493. Being told off for the service from the navy?—Yes; being borrowed, as it were, from the navy for that purpose, in the same way as the army would, if necessary, lend assistance to the navy; I have myself seen many operations in which the assistance of a body of trained seamen was of the utmost value to the army.

4494. Captain Peel and his heavy guns did good service in India, did they not?—Exactly, that was an instance; I had at one time a body of trained seamen attached to me when I was in charge of the surf boats at Buffalo Mouth, at the Cape, who rendered the greatest possible assistance in managing the surf boats; we had a number of long-shore men whom we had picked up anywhere, and the presence of naval officers and seamen was of great assistance in carrying out the service when those men would break out in excesses.

4495. Is there any further remark, either with regard to the past or the future conduct of the transport as to which you wish to make any remark?—I think not.

4496. *Chairman.*] I think, when you were last before the Committee, you concurred in a suggestion that in time of war each department concerned in the conduct of the war might advantageously be represented at a board specially constituted for war purposes?—I think it would be very desirable indeed in any service in which the various departments have to co-operate, as they usually have, that there should be a meeting such as you describe, not only for the purpose of laying down the preliminary arrangements, but meeting periodically to see how the details were carried out, and to remedy, by personal communication, anything that might require mending in the course of the business.

4497. Would not such meetings obviate all the correspondence to which you have referred?—They would not obviate it all, because you must have records kept of the various steps of public business; but it would, no doubt, obviate a great delay and expense and difficulty which arise in the course of business.

4498. Would not the minutes of the proceedings of this board when it met, be a record of all the operations carried on?—Rather of the general directions than of the details, which are so vast in all these businesses, as you may gather from my description of the various processes.

4499. Would you supplement, by an arrangement of that kind, what you have already suggested in answer to questions by the noble Lord?—I think it would be very desirable; it is generally said that it is difficult for a board to work; but I think in a case of this sort that should not be so.

4500. How would you constitute such a board?—I think the heads of each department should be present, accompanied by the leading member of the branch in each case to which the business in hand referred.

4501. That which now takes weeks to arrange might thus be arranged in an hour, might it not?—It might be, but I think that hour should be repeated periodically, say, once a week; they should meet from time to time as circumstances might render it necessary, in order to see what had occurred during the intervening period.

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4502. Have the facts that have come out in the conduct of this Expedition, suggested to you any improvement in the organisation of our war departments?—We have made, I hope, a great improvement under the control system, which will obviate a good many of the difficulties which were encountered in the Abyssinian Expedition, and the sea transport arrangements which I have now suggested would also, I think, remove other difficulties; there are other matters also which we shall go on improving, I trust.

4503. You stated, did you not, in supplying the army in the Crimea you had a weekly dispatch of vessels from England?—Yes; six vessels a week was the number dispatched at one period; but the number varied, of course.

4504. A continuous supply of that sort would be an improvement upon the arrangements during the Abyssinian Expedition, would it not, rather than rushing off six months' supplies at once?—The Abyssinian Expedition was a very exceptional business; it was undertaken in a great hurry, and it had to be pushed through in great haste; in fact, dispatch was the essence of the whole transaction, and everything was sacrificed, I think, to accomplish that.

4505. Inasmuch as the supplies consumed would necessarily be a regular weekly quantity, would not that have led one to suppose that it was desirable to send out a continual weekly supply, of course keeping amply in advance of any necessities?—In establishing depôts and pushing supplies to the depôts in the front, and all that business in preparing for the movement of troops, it becomes necessary to lay in a very considerable stock of supplies at the commencement; in fact, one of the first rules of military administration, is to lay in sufficient supplies to enable an army to count with certainty upon them for a certain period, and it was the more necessary in Abyssinia, on account of the great heats that were anticipated, and of the heavy rains which would probably have blocked up all means of communication, and left the force to depend upon whatever it had collected at its depôts.

4506. But if either the supplies could not be advanced to the highlands, or the troops could not come back upon their supplies at Zulla, would you see any reason for large supplies being gathered there?—It was necessary to collect large supplies at Zulla; I do not mean to say that with what we know now, the supplies might not have been less; but at that period it was very hard for anyone to judge what might be the extent of that war, and whether we should be fortunate enough to capture Theodore at Magdala.

4507. Lord *Elcho*.] You have just made a remark as to what we know now; if that applied through life, whether to public matters or to private matters, it might materially alter everything, might it not?—Yes, especially as regards everything that requires preparation. It is the uncertainty in war that is the most dangerous element, and that you must always provide against; it is the possibility of what may occur; it is the uncertain and almost the impossible that you have to provide against.

4508. *Chairman*.] If the roads from the lowlands to the highlands in Abyssinia became destroyed by mountain torrents, and the provisions could not be got up, nor the troops got down, would you see any need for six months' supply on the coast?—If the war had continued,

the six months' supply would have been essential, and the supplies must have been got up or the troops must have got down to them, or they would have perished, because the country produced very little, and when the mountain torrents made the communication very difficult, they would have had to depend upon the supplies which had been collected into the depôts.

4509. And those supplies on the coast would have been useful only in so far as they could have been got up to the highlands, would they not?—Or the troops have got down to them, besides at intervals they might have been got up at the worst times.

4510. Inasmuch as you could have had a daily supply almost on the coast of Abyssinia, certainly a monthly supply, would you still have furnished yourself with six months' supply and kept the ships lying as store-ships for the purpose of keeping supplies there?—That was done, possibly, from the difficulty of landing them, or the contingency of their being required at a port lower down the coast. In all probability, if King Theodore had not been captured at Magdala, a port considerably to the southward would have been opened, and then the supplies in the store-ships would have been invaluable. They would have gone there and opened a new base of operations, and that was a very possible contingency at one period.

4511. Lord *Elcho*.] The Crimean Expedition was almost the reverse of this; was not the army sent there with the expectation that it would have very little to do?—Quite so; it was like a buccaneering raid in fact.

4512. Have you ever heard that the coffee was sent out green on the supposition that the soldiers would have nothing to do but to waste it?—I am not aware of that fact; in the first winter of the Crimean war the men were enormously over fatigued; 12 hours and more out of the 24, were commonly spent in the trenches; and the consequence was that there was no time for roasting and grinding coffee. Everything that could have been thought of for them, ought to have been done, even to supplying them with turtle soup and champagne if required, but no one anticipated that we were to spend the winter there; and six months' supplies were not provided.

4513. You have said that when the army went to the Crimea it was not anticipated that they would have a siege to encounter, such as that of Sebastopol?—Yes; and with such a small number of men, that they had no time available for such purposes as grinding coffee, barely for cooking food.

4514. And the provisions sent were very inadequate to the campaign that was before them, as it turned out?—Undoubtedly; everything was inadequate under the circumstances.

4515. Do you not think it possible, that with the knowledge of the waste, and the experience of the Crimea staring the authorities in the face when such an expedition as the Abyssinian Expedition was before them, they were influenced in their preparations by that knowledge and experience, so that at any rate they should not fall into the error which had been committed in the Crimea of providing deficient means?—I think partly that, and partly the desire to find out somebody to hang, has determined everybody not to be hanged for lack of sufficiency, as that was the failing on that occasion. I think on future occasions

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occasions the failing is likely to be on the other side.

4516. Supposing this Expedition (which, as I have said, was the reverse of the Crimean one, inasmuch as it was abundantly supplied, and was signally successful in a much shorter time than was anticipated) had turned out to be a lengthened Expedition, and if the troops had suffered, and the munitions of war had been wanting, do you not think that there would have been quite as great an outcry made against the authorities as was made in the case of the Crimean war?—I think even greater, because it would have been a repetition which our recent experience would have rendered inexcusable.

4517. *Chairman.*] That is if all that the question describes had happened?—Yes, and I am afraid that if the Gallas had not closed up in the rear of Theodore that might have happened.

4518. Lord *Elcho.*] Do you think that any general going into such a country as that where everything was unknown and problematical, would have been justified in making preparations on the assumption that it was a trifling expedition, and not likely to last?—I do not think that any general commanding an expedition would be likely to act on such an assumption; the greatest preparations that were ever made were made by the Emperor Napoleon for his campaign in Russia, and yet they broke down, and the army starved.

4519. Would you think that any general would have been justified in undertaking such an expedition unless he was fully assured that he had ample means at his command?—I should think not; but whether he considered them more than ample or less than ample I have no means of judging.

4520. Would you as Commissary General have undertaken such an expedition without what you considered to be ample means at your command?—I should have been very sorry to have undertaken it without the amplest means, because there were so many contingencies that no one could have anticipated; the most improbable thing, in fact, was the catching of Theodore.

4521. *Chairman.*] And what would have determined you in judging what means were ample would have been the facts of the case, I presume?—It was practically a *terra incognita* in every way; more unknown, perhaps, than any country in the whole globe; even more so than the Red River, where we are now sending an expedition, and which I trust will be well provided, and successfully carried out.

4522. But the time in which the supplies could be delivered from Egypt or Bombay was well known, was it not?—Yes; but it took a considerable period to collect and direct things to that focus.

4523. And the time that it would take to collect them was well known both in Egypt and in India, was it not?—The collection does not seem to have been too early.

4524. From what do you infer that the general in command could not calculate the time necessary to get his supplies?—I do not infer that he could not calculate it.

4525. The time necessary to get his supplies collected, and the time necessary to get his supplies to Abyssinia, were all well-known quantities, were they not?—Yes; and the time was well calculated, because the mules were actually

delivered at the very time and place where it was intended they should be delivered, and none of our arrangements admitted of their earlier delivery.

4526. Lord *Elcho.*] Then I gather that, assuming the want of knowledge of the state of things likely to be found in Abyssinia, and the utter want of knowledge that there must have been as to the time the Expedition would last, together with the Crimean experience staring the authorities and the general in the face, you do not think that they would have been justified in having less than six months' supplies of provisions?—I think that six months' supplies of provisions were not too much; had the change of the base of the operations taken place, which might have been possibly anticipated, whatever was ashore at that time would have been, for a period at any rate, abandoned, and what remained on board ship, or what might have been easily embarked, would have had to be at once directed on the new point with which communication could be opened; so that had that war continued, whatever was on shore at Zulla would have been available for only a small portion of the force during a succeeding period of the campaign.

4527. Whilst taking this, as you have done, as an ample preparation for the possible contingencies of such an uncertain war, I do not gather from your evidence that you defend the system which then prevailed as regards supplies and transport?—I do not; nor do I wish to defend any part of the arrangements in detail; I only generally support the idea that a sufficiency of supplies should be maintained; but I have not myself sufficient knowledge of Abyssinia to pronounce any judgment as to that sufficiency.

4528. But we may gather from your evidence that the state of things in those respects, in regard to the control of the transport and supply of armies in the field in time of war, and in time of peace, has improved on what it was during the Abyssinian Expedition?—I think it is much improved and it is still improving.

4529. If this memorandum which you have read, and the views which you have generally expressed, were given effect to, is it your opinion that the improvement would be such that as far as it is humanly possible the wasteful expenditure would be prevented, and efficiency and economy in military expeditions would be attained?—I think so, and I think that when one head can combine those arrangements there is less likely to be an excess or wastefulness in the expenditure and supplies, than when several have to be employed, and where there is always a risk of some one of the various agencies breaking down, and to provide against that, I have no doubt that more animals and more supplies were obtained, and that more shipping was taken up than might otherwise have been strictly necessary.

4530. But when all is done that human mind and human power can effect in warlike expeditions, whether they are at a distance or whether they are near, will not contingencies always arise, and events take place which could not have been foreseen, which lead to expenditure which could not be provided for or guarded against?—Undoubtedly; war is a chapter of accidents, and the great thing is by good organisation, and thorough experience in all branches of military business to provide for, or guard against those accidents as much as possible.

4531. You

4531. You may always reckon, with all the possible foresight of which man is capable, that accidents will occur, even with so good an organisation as the Control Department in this country as you wish to see it established?—I fear they will happen, although I hope they will be reduced to a minimum.

4532. That is to say, that instead of killing a man at a cost of 2,000 *l.*, as was the case in one campaign, you may kill him for 400 *l.*, as was the case in another?—Yes. The only thing is that the fewer you kill the larger the amount of money per man will be; that is to say, the average will be reduced in proportion to the number which were killed.

4533. Sir John Hay.] When you have provided for every contingency, which by anticipation can possibly arise, there will possibly be some other contingency, will there not?—Undoubtedly, human foresight is limited.

4534. Is it not very desirable to provide for a great number of contingencies which do not actually arise?—Yes, and to do that systematically.

4535. Sir James Elphinstone.] With regard to

those six months' provisions, you are aware that there is a south-west monsoon?—Undoubtedly.

4536. Is it not reasonable to suppose that Lord Napier was extremely anxious to get his six months' supplies landed in Abyssinia before the setting in of the south-west monsoon, which would have prevented him from getting any supplies at all?—No doubt it must have had very great influence upon his calculations.

4537. Sir Patrick O'Brien.] In the few questions which I asked you on a previous day, I did not perhaps fully convey my meaning to you. The information which I wished to derive from you was, whether, in the selection of officers for the purchase of mules in Europe, regard was had to their experience, to their length of service, and their knowledge of languages, or whether I should be right in stating that inexperienced persons were in some instances employed, who were junior in the service, who had no knowledge of foreign languages?—I think you were quite right; there were such officers employed.

4538. Did they exceed one or two?—There were three or more whom I could name.

4539. Do they come within the category which I have described?—Yes.

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Colonel CHARLES SHERVINTON, called in; and Examined

4540. Chairman.] You were sent out by the War Office to purchase mules for the Abyssinian Expedition, in the Mediterranean, were you not?—I was.

4541. Where were you sent to?—To Egypt.

4542. Where did you land?—At Alexandria.

4543. What did you do?—I went out as a staff officer, with Colonel Clark Kennedy, the head of the transport out there; and from there I went to Cairo, where I purchased several animals for the Expedition. I was recalled by telegram, and proceeded to Cyprus the same evening that I arrived at Alexandria.

4544. Will you describe your proceedings in Cyprus?—On arriving in Cyprus the gentleman to whom I was referred as the individual who had made an agreement with, or rather a proposition to Colonel Clark Kennedy, came to see me, and asked me to stop at his house.

4545. What was his name?—Zeno Pierides. Of course I declined.

4546. Was he the agent of a man named Grierson?—Yes.

4547. The contract was with Mr. Grierson, was it not?—I do not know that there was a contract at all; there was a proposition made which I have in writing, but there was no regular contract, because that, if unfulfilled, would imply a forfeiture of guarantees, which was not the case.

4548. What was the engagement with Mr. Grierson?—There was a proposition made by Zeno Pierides, through Mr. Grierson, to provide 300 mules at 21 *l.* per head. I went to Cyprus, and, having declined to accept his hospitality (I had been directed to go about the island and to do nothing, while he was making his arrangements), he came to me in a day or two, and said that he was utterly without funds, and that he required an advance of 2,000 *l.* to enable him to complete his agreement at all; I naturally refused to give him the amount he desired, inasmuch as any animal which he chose to buy was the only return which the public could get for the

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money which he might possibly have been foolishly dissipating by purchasing indifferent beasts.

4549. How did the matter end with him?—He sent in his statement that he was utterly unable to comply with the agreement.

4550. Did that send you upon another course?—That left me to decide whether I should stop in the island, endeavouring to procure animals on my own responsibility and on my own judgment, or else start back to Alexandria at once.

4551. What did you do?—I went to the consul, Mr. Sandwith, and told him exactly my case.

4552. How long was this after you arrived?—Two or three days. I arrived on the 14th of October, and about the 15th Mr. Zeno Pierides declined to follow out the agreement. Then Mr. Sandwith was good enough to say that he would do what he possibly could to assist me, and I advanced, personally, some little money which I had to Mr. Zeno Pierides. Mr. Sandwith, I think, advanced 600 *l.* or 700 *l.* of his own, and I went to Mr. Lang, as well as to two or three other people, and, eventually, I succeeded in getting 800 and odd animals.

4553. I believe you soon brought your operations with this native of Cyprus and Mr. Grierson to a close?—Yes; on the 15th he was unable to provide the animals, as I would not find him the money. I advanced him out of my own pocket, I think, about 80 *l.*, and the veterinary surgeon who was with me gave him some more. He got about 160 *l.*, and he brought us nine mules.

4554. Your transactions with him were very immaterial, were they not?—I do not know that; I bought a great many from him; I think I bought about 300 of him.

4555. Lord Elcho.] Were you selected by the Horse Guards?—I was telegraphed for to come up to the War Office, as the senior staff officer of the Military Train during Colonel Kennedy's absence,

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sence, and I was cognisant of the whole arrangements with regard to the selection of the officers of the corps to which I myself belonged, proceeding to the East to purchase animals.

4556. Had you been in the East yourself?—Yes, all through the Crimean War.

4557. Had you much experience in purchasing mules?—I had experience in the Crimea of the mules necessary for an eastern country; and as I had purchased the horses of the corps in England and Canada, I think that few people have had greater experience.

4558. Were mules much used by your corps in the Crimea?—I was only a short time attached to the transport of the army in the Crimea; I belonged to one of the line regiments there, but it was clear to me that the best animal out there was the Syrian mule; in fact it was the only animal which would stand the heat of the climate, the want of water, and the severity of pack-saddle labour, and I consequently opposed the purchase of all Spanish mules, as I knew they were without heart, and soft; and the result was precisely what I expected.

4559. *Chairman.*] You had a veterinary surgeon with you in Cyprus?—Yes.

4560. Had you any knowledge of the languages?—No, I had my dragoman; there were five different languages spoken.

4561. *Lord Elcho.*] Were all the other officers who were selected to purchase mules, officers of your Train?—No, there were several officers of artillery, and one of engineers.

4562. Were they selected by the Horse Guards?—Yes.

4563. *Chairman.*] Some were sent by the War Office, and some by the Horse Guards, I believe?

4564. How long were you in Cyprus?—I left Cyprus on 19th November.

4565. On the 2nd of November you had all your supplies completed, had you not?—About that time, I should think.

4566. You were there for about a fortnight completing your supplies; you got them in very promptly, did you not?—Yes, very successfully indeed.

4567. You got some through the natives there, and the larger proportion through Mr. Lang, Mr. Lang being an Englishman there, and a mercantile man?—Yes.

4568. The price you paid, I think, was about 19 *l.* 10 *s.*?—Yes, on an average, which was 1 *l.* 10 *s.* under the original agreement with Mr. Pierides, and 2 *l.* 10 *s.* under the price I was authorised to go to in case of difficulties.

4569. *Sir P. O'Brien.*] In short, you got a better article than the Spanish mule at a lower price?—At a very much lower price.

4570. *Chairman.*] You paid 20 *l.* to Mr. Lang, did you not?—For the greater number, yes.

4571. They were shipped very promptly in a locally procured ship, were they not; were they shipped before you left the island?—Yes; they were embarked in ships engaged at Alexandria.

4572. I suppose you will subscribe to the correctness of this statement: "Nothing could exceed the activity of Major Shervinton, to which entirely it was owing that in 13 days 800 animals were purchased and passed;" that was given to me by Mr. Lang; did you complete your purchase there?—Yes, I purchased 810 mules.

4573. You had instructions from the War Office for your guidance; amongst other things, were you authorised to allow a commission to the

consuls aiding you in the purchase, not exceeding five per cent.?—Yes.

4574. The purchase of those 810 animals came to upwards of 16,000 *l.*, did it not?—Yes.

4575. Did you give bills for them, or how did you pay?—Money was consigned to the consul in the island, and he was the responsible agent for the payment.

4576. Would you state what were the special services rendered by the consul, which you regarded as authorising you to pay him 5 *l.* per cent.; you paid him 5 *l.* per cent., did you not?—I paid him 5 *l.* per cent.; I informed him that I would pay him 5 *l.* per cent.

4577. That came to 810 *l.*, did it not?—It would do so at 5 *l.* per cent.

4578. And the whole period was 13 days, was it not?—Yes.

4579. Will you explain what circumstances you considered justified you in making that payment?—The price at which the mules were purchased through the assistance of Mr. Sandwith, the consul there, was, as I tell you, taken over all, 2 *l.* 10 *s.* per head less than I was authorised to pay; in point of fact, a saving of two thousand and odd pounds accrued to the public through his instrumentality.

4580. But did you buy mules cheaper there than the average price that was paid in Syria?—I do not recollect what was paid in Syria; we paid 19 *l.* 10 *s.* per animal on an average in Cyprus; some were 17 *l.* and some were 20 *l.*

4581. And some were above 20 *l.*?—If you charge shoeing and the things that were put on board you will increase it, no doubt; but the average sum of money which I paid for the animals was, I think, 19 *l.* 10 *s.* or 19 *l.* 15 *s.*; it was under 20 *l.*

4582. You satisfied Mr. Lang in the matter of price, did you not?—Yes, he was satisfied.

4583. And are you aware that he made a very fair profit by it?—I have no doubt he would not have purchased if he was not content with his bargain.

4584. Would you have been justified in paying him any more?—I think not.

4585. What were the special circumstances under which you inferred that the consul was entitled to 810 *l.*?—He was entitled to the five per cent. in consequence of the assistance which he gave me in purchasing the animals; for instance, he was charged with the safe custody and administration of somewhere about 17,000 *l.*; I had no responsibility regarding it; with other missions there was a financial agent (a commissariat officer) attached to each military officer in conducting the purchases of animals.

4586. Who was that officer?—There were many, but there was none with me.

4587. You had the veterinary surgeon with you, had you not?—Yes; but he looked at the horse's mouth; he did not interfere with the money; Mr. Sandwith was the financial agent, and had the charge of the 17,000 *l.*, and he was responsible in every way for its distribution and administration; he had to correspond with the various agents, and I do not know whom he employed.

4588. Was Mr. Lang the only person of whom you purchased, except this native?—I purchased 80 or 90 mules in Limesol from Mr. Meirides, which, as the honourable Member is aware, is 16 hours distant.

4589. Was

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4589. Was the consul ever there?—He was not there with me.

4590. Did he ever leave Larnaca?—He did; he went to Nicosia.

4591. How far is that?—I think it is about 12 hours.

4592. There and back?—I think it is about 12 hours there. You generally stop at Athena, half way.

4593. Was he ever out of Larnaca except on that occasion?—I do not think he was except to Pyla.

4594. Then the whole of his services were comprised within two weeks?—No; until the sailing of the last ship on the 19th of November he was actively employed.

4595. He was paid 5 per cent. on the whole money expended, was he not?—He had to enrol the muleteers, and he had to recommend those men whom he considered most desirable to look after them. He had to open an account with each individual muleteer whom he engaged and put on board.

4596. What does that mean?—He had to give the man a fortnight's advance of money to induce him to go at all.

4597. That is to say he disbursed the money entrusted to him for that purpose?—Yes, those are the various duties which devolved upon him, and which necessitated his constantly remaining in Larnaca. Then he had to arrange for the subsistence of this fellow's family, and a variety of those sort of minor duties. He had to arrange with the mudir as to whether the muleteers might be permitted to go at all, which eventually took him to visit the Pasha at Nicosia.

4598. Do you seriously mean to tell this Committee that the responsibility of the consul extended to the maintenance of the man's family while he was away?—A man would not leave the island unless he was satisfied that some arrangement was made for his family during his absence, and the consul had to make an arrangement so that a certain amount of the payment should be remitted to him and through him, for the maintenance of the muleteer's family.

4599. Lord *Elcho*.] How many muleteers were there?—I think there were somewhere about 80. Then a number of men absconded from there, and there were a number of men subject to the *redif*, the conscription, and a great number of difficulties perpetually cropped up.

4600. *Chairman*.] For those services you paid him three years' salary?—I have no knowledge of what his salary is; I had nothing to do with that.

4601. Lord *Elcho*.] Was this 5 per cent. authorised from England, or was it in your discretion to take any steps which you thought desirable to obtain those mules, and did you consider that one of the necessary steps?—The printed regulations which I received from the War Office authorised me to pay 5 per cent. where I found that the interests of the service rendered it necessary. "You are also authorised to employ the consuls or other persons to purchase mules, and to allow such officers, either at a fixed sum or otherwise, not exceeding 5 per cent., on approved purchases as may be agreed upon."

4602. Did you settle with the consul as soon as you arrived, that he was to receive this percentage, or was it afterwards, when you returned?—No; instantly.

4603. *Chairman*.] The consul stated to me 0.46.

that you volunteered the payment of 5 per cent., was that so?—I did so; he could not know anything about my printed instructions.

4604. Sir *Patrick O'Brien*.] Did you do that preliminary to any purchases being made at all to stimulate him?—Yes; on the 15th of October, the very day that Mr. Pierides declined to fulfil the agreement. This is an extract from the correspondence which I forwarded to Colonel Clark Kennedy on that date: "But two courses are left open to me, either at once to return to Alexandria, or seek for what assistance I could obtain from the British consul, Mr. Sandwith, and I think with his help, and that of his friends, I may be able to purchase a large portion, if not the whole of the number required from this island. I have, as a matter of course, promised Mr. Sandwith the 5 per cent. referred to in the third page of the printed regulations, and considering everything, I fancy it little enough for the trouble necessarily entailed upon that gentleman." That was the day after I arrived in the island.

4605. *Chairman*.] Did you purchase animals anywhere else than at Cyprus?—Excepting Cairo, no.

4606. Was any other consul allowed a commission of 5 per cent., except this consul?—I think every one.

4607. Are you speaking from knowledge?—I have not got it officially; but I know from the correspondence which has passed through my hands since, that consuls have claimed it and got it.

4608. Do you know that there is only one single instance except this? There is one then at any rate.

4609. How many consuls were employed in aiding in the purchase?—I do not know.

4610. You do not know that there was one, do you?—I do not know that there was one regularly engaged in the purchase. I think they all got a per-centage on purchases made through their instrumentality. I had nothing to do with them, but this gentleman was specially recognised by having the money remitted to him. The other agencies had financial officers attached to them for this special duty.

4611. You say that you think that nearly all the other consuls got 5 per cent.; do you know anything more about the money arrangements than you know about the commission?—I know that since my return to England I have received communications from the War Office respecting the services of different consuls who had claimed various amounts for their services to the Expedition.

4612. Were they submitted for your adjudication?—No for my opinion *pro* or *con*.

4613. Had you to advise whether they should be paid or not?—Yes.

4614. Have you in any case advised 5 per cent.?—I do not think that I have actually mentioned the per-centage, but I have written to say whether the services rendered were deserving of reward or not.

4615. With that knowledge, will you explain how it was that you said just now that you believed that all or nearly all the consuls had got 5 per cent.?—They got a per-centage; but I do not know the actual amount. I do not know anything of it officially, but I have heard that they have had it.

4616. The fact is this, that for the services rendered

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rendered at Laruaca you thought it your duty to allow the maximum commission authorised by the War Office?—Yes; otherwise I should have gone home from inability to obtain the animals.

4617. Sir *Patrick O'Brien*.] Do you mean to say that you conceived it to be necessary to make the consul a promise of giving him the full amount of per-centage, otherwise his services would not have been so useful?—Certainly they would not, unless you held out some inducement.

4618. *Chairman*.] You did not think it necessary to refer to the Foreign Office?—Certainly not; I had my instructions from the War Office.

4619. If he had not been there, would you have been able to buy mules of Mr. Lang?—I did not know Mr. Lang; I never heard his name before we arrived there.

4620. But you did not know the consul, did you?—I knew the one by repute, from his position in Her Majesty's service; but the other I did not know at all.

4621. As a matter of business, you had not so much access to Mr. Lang as you had to Mr. Sandwith?—Quite as much; Mr. Lang was as much a friend of mine, and not more a friend of mine than Mr. Sandwith.

4622. In going to Cyprus you would otherwise, in all probability, have been unable to buy mules?—I should have returned by the next boat if Mr. Sandwith had not held out hopes of my getting mules.

4623. Sir *Patrick O'Brien*.] As a matter of fact, you did the work well and quickly in Cyprus, paying 5 per cent.?—Yes; I obtained all I wanted in the shortest possible time.

4624. Lord *Elcho*.] That is to say, you do not profess to be a business man, but you were selected as a soldier to do a certain thing; you had instructions given you with certain powers, and in the interest, as you believed, of the service you exercised those powers in the way that you thought the most advantageous to the service?—Most certainly.

4625. And your impression is that, had you not had this power and exercised it, you would not have succeeded in your mission to purchase mules, as you succeeded in doing, at a price below that at which they were calculated?—Yes.

4626. And as regards getting assistance in Cyprus, when you were buying those mules you looked upon it as most desirable to have official assistance, and you went to the consul in preference to going to a merchant?—I did so because I was first of all handed over to the consul, who had the money sent out to him in a box, so many thousand sovereigns, which were shipped with me on board as freight, over which I had no control whatever.

4627. Sir *Patrick O'Brien*.] Were your directions to hand it over to the consul?—No; I had nothing to do with the money.

4628. Lord *Elcho*.] Were you in charge of the money?—No; it was in charge of the captain of the ship, whoever he was.

4629. That paragraph which you read specially refers to consuls, does it not?—Yes; and I went direct to the consul.

4630. As it happened, whether through the assistance of the consul, or through your own intelligence, or from any other causes, you were very successful in the purchase of mules, and you purchased a considerable number?—Yes.

4631. And they were very good mules, were they not?—Yes.

4632. The payment of the consul was a per-centage?—Yes.

4633. As it turned out, owing to the sum expended either in the purchase of mules or in shipping them, or upon those drivers or other causes, it came to a sum, I think, of 810*l.*; but that same per-centage, if the purchases had been less successful, would have been naturally a great deal smaller; if you had only bought 10 mules it would have been 50 *l.*; do you consider that, taking all the chances of the thing, 5 per cent. was an extravagant per-centage?—I think it was well earned, and I think it was only justly paid.

4634. Did you offer him less at first?—I did not; it was hopeless; there was no chance in all the world of my getting mules.

4635. But do you think the consul would have helped you for less than 5 per cent.?—He might have done so, and no doubt he would.

4636. Five per cent. being the sum named as the maximum in dealing with a consul, you considered it the right thing to offer him what was a reasonable sum?—I thought so.

4637. You do not consider 5 per cent., viewing of the matter as a whole, an unreasonable charge?—If I had been sent to the island direct, I should think that 5 per cent. was too much; I should think that 2½ per cent. would have been ample; but under the circumstances of my going to complete an arrangement which had been already made, and which had fallen through, and considering the absolute necessity of bringing those animals up to the post by the 29th of October, and the hope that I had of purchasing those animals for less, keeping in view the agreement which had been entered into, and which I was to carry out, I thought that a per-centage of 5 per cent. was well paid by the public, and the result was, that the saving through the purchase came to 2,025 *l.*

4638. With the experience which you have, if you had to do the thing over again, would you act differently?—For the good of the public service I would do it again.

4639. *Chairman*.] The 2,025 *l.* which you say you saved, would have been spent, if you had given 2,025 *l.* more for them, that is all, is it not?—Yes.

4640. And you did not pay below the average price at which they were purchased in Syria?—I do not know what they cost in Syria, but these were better mules.

4641. Then how can you say that you saved 2,000 *l.*?—I was ordered to pay 22 *l.* per head; I was told if this man (*Pierides*) breaks down at 21 *l.* per head, you are authorised to go to 22 *l.* per head.

4642. Sir *Patrick O'Brien*.] Through the consul's assistance, you got those mules at 2,000*l.* less, did you not?—£. 2,025 less.

4643. Lord *Elcho*.] You were authorised to give 22 *l.* per mule?—Yes.

4644. Whether or not it was through the intervention of the consul that you get them for less, you will not positively say, but you do not think that you would have got them at all without him?—I do not think I should have got them at all.

4645. At any rate he assisted you, and got them, and not only got them, but got them at 2,000*l.* less than the maximum to which you were

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were empowered to go?—That is so; I could not have done the work but for Mr. Sandwith.

4646. *Chairman.*] If you had not paid him, would he have done the work?—Any man might have been blind enough to his interest, and good natured enough to do it without payment.

4647. Was it not a part of his duty as consul?—Certainly not.

4648. Is it not his duty to promote the interest of the British Government by every means in his power?—Yes, but the making of purchases does not come within the category of his duties as consul.

4649. Do you know anything about purchases made there afterwards, by an Indian officer who went out?—I have no official knowledge of that.

4650. Do you know that he bought animals there afterwards without the intervention of the consul?—I believe he did, through Mr. Grierson, the same individual who broke down with me.

4651. Lord *Elcho.*] On what account did he break down?—Because his agent, Pierides, wanted me to advance him 2,000*l.*, and I could not do it, because any animals which he gave me in return for that 2,000*l.* I must have accepted, bad or good. It was the only return for the public money which I could have received from a man without funds of his own.

4652. This man broke down in purchasing for you, because you would not advance him 2,000*l.*, taking any trash which he might give you?—Yes.

4653. Then you go to the consul, and with the consul's assistance you are perfectly successful.

Another officer comes, and he goes to the person who broke down with you, and he succeeds; is it not probable that the success with the person who failed with you was owing to the course which you took in showing your independence of this individual?—It may be so indirectly, but this second contract, although made in Egypt, yet money was sent from Egypt to enable them to carry that contract out, or a more responsible local agent was employed, it is possible they thought that by throwing up the contract they would put me into a hole, and I should be obliged to take any animals at any price.

4654. *Chairman.*] Are you not aware that this same Mr. Lang supplied the animals to this Egyptian contract?—He did, through Mr. Grierson.

4655. The same man supplied the animals to the Indian officer, as supplied them to you?—He did a great many of them.

4656. Sir *Patrick O'Brien.*] The contract broke down with you, because you would not give 2,000 *l.* to this man, Pierides, but the reason you were successful with the consul was, that he had 17,000 *l.*?—Yes; he had not object but to get as many mules as would please me, and at my price. He then paid for them on my written authority.

4657. Therefore, if this money had been in the hands of Mr. Grierson, as well as in the hands of the consul, there would have been no reason for his not procuring the mules as well as the consul?—Just so. We would have the mules. He paid 21 *l.* for each, not 19 *l.* 10 *s.*

Friday, 10th June 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Colonel Barttelot.
Captain Beaumont.
Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Candlish.

Mr. Eastwick.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Sir John Hay.

JOHN CANDLISH, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Mr. HENRY EDMONDS, called in; and Examined.

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4658. *Chairman.*] You hold an appointment in the War Office, do you not?—Yes.

4659. What is your position there?—I am a first-class clerk of the second section.

4660. Did not the account of the hay purchased of Mr. Davies, of Mile End, come into your hands?—Yes.

4661. That account contained a proposal to pay 10,000*l.* as compensation for a breach of agreement, did it not?—Yes.

4662. Will you state the course of procedure in reference to that account; whence it came, and where it went?—Mr. Davis's account was paid, in the first instance, by the India Office, and that department subsequently claimed repayment of the amount from the Imperial Exchequer. When that account, amongst others, was forwarded to the War Office, the special payment of 10,000*l.* for compensation was found to be unsupported by any documents explanatory of the charge, and the Indian authorities were therefore called upon to report the particulars which led to the payment in question. Copies of the correspondence which had arisen upon this transaction were accordingly furnished to the War Office, and thence transmitted by the direction of the Secretary of State for the consideration of the Lords of the Treasury. Under the special circumstances of the case, their Lordships were of opinion that no objection could be taken to the arrangements sanctioned by the Secretary of State for India, and the claim was allowed accordingly.

4663. How did it come to the War Department at all?—It was forwarded to the Treasury, and thence to the War Office, in support of the India Office claim for repayment.

4664. What is the value of the inspection if the War Office knew nothing whatever of the transaction?—The accounts required investiga-

tion in the War Office, as the expenditure was ultimately charged against the Votes for Army Service.

4665. For what purpose?—For the purpose of ascertaining that every item charged was properly debitable against the Expedition, and to classify the expenditure under the correct Votes.

4666. It was an expenditure by the India Office, was it not?—Yes, on behalf of the Imperial Government.

4667. And the payment was made on the authority of the India Office?—Yes.

4668. And after all that it comes to the War Office for what you call inspection?—Yes.

4669. What was the object of that inspection after the whole transaction had been finally disposed of as a matter of business between the India Office and the contractor?—The Treasury Minute directed that proper vouchers were to be produced to Her Majesty's Imperial Government before repayment was made to the Indian Exchequer of sums provided for in the first instance out of the funds of that Government. The object of the inspection was to see that this was fulfilled.

4670. Where would that sum be ultimately charged?—In the books of the War Office, and thence passed into the Appropriation Account submitted to Parliament.

4671. Having been first paid by the India Office?—Yes.

4672. Then who will give us information as to the transaction between Mr. Davies and the Government in that purchase, with regard to its ultimate settlement?—I presume that the Director General of Stores at the India Office, or an officer of the account branch, could give that information.

Major MICHAEL WEEKES WILLOUGHBY, called in; and Examined.

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4673. *Chairman.*] You were sent to Egypt, I believe, to purchase animals for the Abyssinian Expedition?—I was sent to Egypt, in the first place, to purchase transport animals. Those were the original instructions which I received.

4674. When was that?—I left India on the 31st of August 1867.

4675. Did you go on direct to Suez?—I went on direct to Suez, and arrived there on the 22nd of September, as far as my memory serves me.

4676. With

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4676. With instructions to purchase animals?—I had instructions to purchase animals to the extent to which they were procurable; but as I had a limited credit, of course my purchases were limited to that extent.

4677. Your instructions were afterwards extended to the purchase of stores and provisions, were they not?—They were afterwards extended to the purchase of stores and provisions, so far as I received directions to purchase. I received no detailed instructions.

4678. Did you receive those instructions from the Commander in Chief?—I received letters of instruction from the Secretary to Government in Bombay, from the Commissary General, from Colonel Merewether, who was at first in command at Zulla, and subsequently from the Commander in Chief himself at times; so that I was in communication with a great number of people on the subject of purchasing.

4679. Were those instructions generally to provide animals?—Those instructions were specific, and relating to a certain want which was then felt and expressed to me in the orders I received.

4680. Did those instructions define the articles which you had to purchase, and the quantities which you had to purchase?—Yes, in most cases.

4681. How long did you remain in Egypt?—I remained in Egypt from the 22nd of September to the 6th of January, when I proceeded to Zulla under orders from the Bombay Government; but on arriving there, I found that the Commander in Chief wanted me back in Egypt; and in consequence I was sent back to Egypt on the 19th or 20th of January, and arrived there on the 26th of January.

4682. You were ordered to Abyssinia by the Bombay Government, and not by the Commander in Chief, I believe?—I was ordered to Abyssinia by the Bombay Government.

4683. And on arriving there you were sent immediately back by the Commander in Chief, were you not?—Yes, I was sent back by the Commander in Chief immediately.

4684. Do you know how the cross purpose between the Bombay Government and the Commander in Chief, as to where you should be, arose?—I do not know anything about that.

4685. Will you state what experience you have had in matters of business?—I was then an officer of some 18 or 19 years' service, during a considerable portion of which I had been employed in the Commissariat, and I had been employed in that capacity in the Persian Expedition of 1857.

4686. Your duties in Egypt were entirely of a business character, were they not?—My duties in Egypt were of such a mixed character that I think I should find it very difficult to define them.

4687. They were not in any sense military, were they?—They were to a certain extent, I consider, military.

4688. Had you anything more to do than to buy for the wants of the Expedition?—I had to arrange for the passage of officers and troops down to Zulla, and that I look upon as at any rate a semi-military duty.

4689. Is not that rather more business work than military work?—No, that is, generally speaking, in the Quartermaster General's Department.

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4690. Had you any letters of introduction to Egypt on coming from Bombay?—I had, I think, a letter to the Consul General, Colonel Staunton, and I also had a letter to Mr. Reade, the Consul at Cairo; but I am not perfectly certain whether I had those letters in my possession or not, or whether they were sent independently of me.

4691. Had you not also a letter of introduction to Messrs. Peele & Company of Alexandria?—I had not.

4692. Then if we have been informed to that effect, have we been misinformed?—If you have been informed to that effect, I think you have been misinformed.

4693. Did you confer with Colonel Staunton, or with any of the consuls in Egypt, as to your course of procedure in the execution of the duties to which you had been appointed?—When I arrived in Egypt, Colonel Staunton was not there; Mr. Reade, the consul at Cairo, was acting for him. Immediately after I had landed at Suez I went over to Alexandria, where Mr. Consul Reade was; I am now speaking from memory, but I believe myself to be quite exact when I say that I showed him my letter of instructions, and told him what I had come to do, and had a general talk with him about the matter.

4694. You had not had any previous knowledge of Egypt, had you?—I had no previous knowledge of Egypt beyond passing through; and being there for a few days at a time when passing through.

4695. Had you any conference with, or did you seek any advice from, Mr. Reade or Mr. Stanley, of Alexandria, or Mr. West, of Suez?—Mr. Stanley was not at Alexandria when I went there.

4696. Mr. Calvert was there, was he not?—Mr. Calvert was there, and I saw Mr. Calvert, but I do not recollect consulting him on any particular point.

4697. Nor Mr. Reade?—Mr. Reade I consulted frequently.

4698. Did you consult him on your procedure?—I consulted him on points on which I considered his advice and assistance would be of use to me.

4699. Did you consult Mr. West?—I do not recollect having asked Mr. West anything in particular, though he was a person whom I frequently saw, and with whom I may have had conversation; but I certainly did not ask him as to my duties.

4700. The gentlemen whom I have mentioned were all in the consular service, and had all been a long time in Egypt, had they not?—I do not know how long they had been in Egypt; Mr. West, I believe, had been a long time in Egypt.

4701. Do you concur in the statements which have been made to us, that you did not consult Colonel Staunton or the consuls of Egypt, either at Alexandria or at Suez, with respect to your proceedings?—I do not entirely admit that; I have already said that I consider that I did consult them on occasions when I thought their advice would be of service to me.

4702. Would you give the Committee instances of that?—When I first was put into communication with the Azziziah Company about their ships, I was taken by Mr. Reade to Sherim Pacha, who was a director of that company; I was introduced to him by Mr. Reade, and Mr. Reade remained with me whilst we had a conversation upon the subject

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subject of taking up those ships, and three times, I recollect, at Cairo I went with Mr. Reade to the director of this company about those ships. In addition to that I have gone with Mr. Reade to the director of the railway, Kourschid Pacha, upon one if not on more occasions; and I have also been with him to the War Minister and to the Prime Minister on different subjects connected with my duties.

4703. Did you consult him as to any purchases which you made in Egypt?—I did not consult him as to the purchases which I made at first.

4704. Nor any other of the consuls in Egypt?—I have already given you the best answer I can to that question.

4705. Did you consult Mr. Reade or any other of the consuls in Egypt as to any of the purchases which you made?—I know that on one occasion, if not on more than one occasion, I so far consulted them as to send notices of tenders to them and request their assistance in having notices translated and in receiving the tenders at the consulate.

4706. Would you regard that as consulting them as to the proceedings which you should take in effecting purchases?—No, I did not.

4707. You made Suez your purchasing headquarters, did you not?—Suez was my headquarters, because the nature of my duties necessitated my living there.

4708. From Suez you sometimes issued invitations for tenders?—On some few occasions I did so.

4709. At Suez you also made purchases without competition?—At Suez I made purchases without competition.

4710. How far is Suez from the cultivated portion of Egypt?—Roughly, I should think it is about 100 miles.

4711. In point of fact, Suez is in the Desert, is it not?—Yes.

4712. Within about 100 miles of the produce of the country?—It is within 100 miles of the produce of the country.

4713. Is there any bazaar or market in Suez for the articles which you were purchasing?—I have no recollection of purchasing things absolutely in the Suez market, excepting on one or two occasions under great urgency, and to a small extent.

4714. Is there any market or bazaar in Suez, for the supply of the articles which you were purchasing?—In one instance that I recollect there was.

4715. Will you state the instance?—I purchased a quantity of salt at Suez.

4716. Had you frequently to buy salt?—That was the only occasion when I bought it.

4717. Did you buy that for Abyssinia?—I bought it for Abyssinia.

4718. Did you send salt from Suez to Abyssinia?—I sent salt from Suez to Abyssinia.

4719. Was that in pursuance of instructions from Abyssinia?—That was in pursuance of instructions given to me by the Deputy Commissary General in Abyssinia under the orders of the Commander in Chief.

4720. Was that Colonel Lucas?—That was Colonel Lucas.

4721. To what extent did you send it; I ask you rather particularly, inasmuch as we all know that Abyssinia abounds with salt, and that in point of fact salt is its currency?—Roughly speaking, I should say something over 40 tons.

4722. Is salt a product of Suez?—Salt is obtainable at Suez.

4723. Is it manufactured there, or how is it obtained?—I can hardly tell you how it is manufactured; I believe that there is a Government monopoly of salt in Egypt, something like the monopoly of salt in India; but it is a point upon which I am not perfectly clear.

4724. Is it condensed from the sea water?—I am not prepared to give a distinct answer as to that.

4725. What was the value of the purchase which you made?—The value of the purchase was about 450 *l*.

4726. With that exception did you purchase nothing in Suez?—I do not say that; I said that that was an article of which there was a market there.

4727. What did you purchase in Suez besides salt?—Besides salt I purchased at Suez flour, potatoes, and onions.

4728. Did you purchase those articles in the market of Suez?—No, not in the market of Suez.

4729. My question was confined to the market produce of Suez?—I stated that I had made purchases at Suez which were not obtainable in the market there, that I was aware of. This one article of salt, I believe, was absolutely obtained at Suez, and, so far as I know, that is the only one.

4730. Were there any merchants located in Suez whose business it was to supply the articles which you were purchasing in large quantities for the use of the Expedition?—There were no merchants that I know of; but Mr. Hare, the proprietor of the hotel, was a purveyor to the navy, and was a man who was prepared to supply large quantities.

4731. Then was I right in concluding that there were no articles which you were purchasing produced there, and that there were no merchants whose duty it was to supply those articles resident there?—There was also a Mr. Kirton there who sent me tenders.

4732. Was Mr. Hare a merchant in Suez?—He was the proprietor of the hotel at Suez, as I have already stated.

4733. Had he been in the hotel only a short period, having been previously a steward on board one of the Peninsular and Oriental boats?—So I was told.

4734. He was an hotelkeeper, was he not, and not a merchant?—He was an hotelkeeper, but he was also, as I have stated, a purveyor of supplies to the navy there.

4735. To what navy?—To the Overland Troop Service.

4736. Do you know what he supplied to them?—He supplied them all round, I believe; but here I beg to state that I do not wish to speak of that with certainty. I understood him to be the purveyor to the Overland Troop Service.

4737. But you would not like to say that the whole of the supplies for the Overland Troop Service in Egypt are not obtained in Alexandria?—I should not like to say anything about it. I believe that Mr. Hare is the purveyor, but I do not for an instant say that they are obtained at Suez.

4738. Is not Captain Willoughby the head of that service?—Captain Willoughby is the head of that service.

4739. Does

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4739. Does not he purchase everything for it?—Captain Willoughby purchases everything for it.

4740. You mentioned Mr. Kirton too; is he a merchant in Suez?—I believe that Mr. Kirton is in the Peninsular and Oriental Service.

4741. He is the Superintendent of their shipping there, is he not?—I presume that he must consider himself in a position to supply, as I had a tender from him.

4742. Did you regard him as a merchant at Suez dealing in the articles which you were buying?—I have merely mentioned him as a person who, living in Suez, was prepared to deal in the articles which I was buying.

4743. But you did not mention anyone as a merchant in Suez whose business it was to supply those articles?—I did not.

4744. Is not Cairo the central dépôt for the merchandise of Egypt?—Cairo is undoubtedly the place where supplies may be purchased.

4745. All the produce of Upper Egypt passes Cairo, does it not?—It passes Cairo, but I myself believe that the great bulk of the produce of Upper Egypt goes to Alexandria, and that Alexandria is the great mart for grain and supplies in Egypt.

4746. Are you aware that most of the articles for which you contracted in Alexandria, with Alexandrian houses, were supplied to you, not from Alexandria, but from Cairo?—I am not aware of anything of the sort.

4747. Are you aware to the contrary, that that was not so?—I am aware to the contrary, that that was not so.

4748. You bought of Mr. Schultz in Alexandria, did you not?—Towards the end of the Expedition I had one transaction with Mr. Schultz.

4749. What was that for?—That was for a limited supply of 25,000 rations of barley for the animals which the Commander in Chief had then ordered to be purchased, and which I took from Mr. Schultz, because he had been the contractor to the War Department for the dépôt at Suez, and I thought it better to have a supply through him than to buy a stock and put it in store.

4750. Did not those rations come to Suez from Cairo?—Those may have come from Cairo; I do not know where those came from, but those were not the purchases to which I was alluding. I did not look upon that as a purchase; I looked upon that as a contract for the supply.

4751. Would you say then that we had been misinformed if we had been informed that the main portion of the supplies obtained by the officers of the Indian service in Alexandria, were supplied from Cairo?—I consider that you were misinformed as far as my purchases were concerned.

4752. You will not speak for Major Stansfeld's purchases?—I will not speak for Major Stansfeld's purchases, because I believe that all his purchases were made at Cairo.

4753. Are you aware that it is not correct that all his purchases were made at Cairo?—If you will show me that I am not correct, of course I will admit it; I say that to the best of my belief they were; and I think the probabilities are nearly as good as any assertion which you may have to the contrary.

4754. But if I put these accounts of his purchases into your hands (*handing a bundle of accounts to the Witness*), you would, perhaps,

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change your view?—Even then I might be able to explain them.

4755. Where does Henry Schultz live?—Henry Schultz lives in Alexandria.

4756. Do not these accounts bear out the statement that they were purchased in Alexandria?—Not in the least. A man may live in Alexandria and yet he may make his purchases elsewhere.

4757. My inquiry was, not where Henry Schultz received the animals from; my inquiry was where the Indian officers purchased them. Do you believe that the purchases were made in the right place?—Certainly I do. Those purchases I do not consider were made in Alexandria. Those purchases were made at Cairo. Major Stansfeld probably was perfectly well aware that the purchases would be made at Cairo.

4758. Had Mr. Schultz an establishment at Cairo?—I know that he had a man purchasing there.

4759. Is not his place of business in Alexandria?—His place of business is in Alexandria.

4760. Were not those things purchased at Alexandria by Major Stansfeld?—I consider that they were purchased at Cairo.

4761. Do you mean anything more than that they were drawn from Cairo by the contractor?—Exactly so.

4762. The purchasing officer purchased them at Alexandria?—I am not certain about that. There are beans and barley, and those articles I believe also to have been purchased at Cairo.

4763. Purchased by whom at Cairo?—Purchased by the contractors at Cairo.

4764. Where were they purchased by Major Stansfeld?—Major Stansfeld was living at Suez. I do not know whether he went to Cairo or to Alexandria to receive those tenders, or whether those tenders were received by the Consulate and forwarded to him. What I wished to explain was this: that I have no doubt in my own mind that Major Stansfeld knew exactly the place to draw the supplies from; but as a matter of necessity, because the agents of mercantile houses and the people who did the business lived in Alexandria, he was obliged to issue his notices there.

4765. Do not all those accounts show that the supplies were drawn from Alexandria?—They show that they were supplied by Alexandrian houses, but I do not think they show that they were drawn from Alexandria.

4766. Your belief is, that the Alexandrian houses got the articles in Cairo, or from Upper Egypt?—I think so. Although the nature of our duties obliged myself, in the first instance, and afterwards Major Stansfeld, to live at Suez, still we knew the proper place from which to draw the supplies, and we knew perfectly well where they came from. We did not sit down at Suez, and suppose that we could get the things there.

4767. What were the special duties which made it obligatory upon you to live at Suez?—I had to receive all the transport animals as they were embarked; I had to make all the arrangements for the transports, and their passage down the Red Sea.

4768. The dépôt at Suez was provided by the Home Government, was it not?—Yes; and their duties ceased on the beach at Suez.

4769. That is to say, when the animals went

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on board ship?—No; their duties ceased before the animals went on board ship. My duties were to receive the animals on board the ships.

4770. And everything that came through?—And everything that came through.

4771. What assistance had you?—I had with me when I first went to Egypt two military officers and a veterinary surgeon, and a staff of three or four clerks and inspectors, natives of India.

4772. In addition to purchasing in Egypt, your duties were merely those of a forwarding officer, were they not?—My duties were those of a forwarding officer. I also had to arrange all the details connected with the coaling, watering, and supplies of every kind required for the whole of the transports between Annesley Bay and Suez; and I had other constant duties cropping up of all sorts connected with those and with other matters which it would be difficult to put into words.

4773. Were Major Stansfeld and you there together?—Major Stansfeld was sent to relieve me in the month of December 1867, to enable me to go down to join the force.

4774. On his coming then, would he supersede you?—No; he would not supersede me, because, although Major Stansfeld was senior to me in military rank, I was of longer service in the Commissariat Department, and my departmental rank was superior to his.

4775. In your absence, however, I presume that the duties would be discharged by him on his own responsibility, independently of you?—Entirely on his own responsibility, and independently of me.

4776. When did you finally leave Egypt?—I finally left Egypt on the 27th of February.

4777. Then you had nothing whatever to do with the after realisation of the surplus stores, I presume?—No; I know nothing about it after the 27th of February.

4778. Did you regard your duties as an officer placed there to forward animals as paramount to the purchasing duties assigned to you?—I would wish it to be understood that I had not any distinct instructions that such and such quantities of things were required during the whole period of my stay in Egypt. The orders that I got in respect of supplies were quite sudden; the first order that I got was some time towards the end of September. A few days after my arrival in Egypt I got a telegram from the Secretary to Government in Bombay asking for the rate of certain supplies in Egypt; I sent him back by telegraph the rates, as I ascertained them; in the course of two or three days I received instructions from him to buy those supplies, and I bought them; after that I made no large purchases for upwards of a month; I had to make small purchases connected with the rations for muleteers, and arrangements of that sort, but I made no large purchases. The whole of my large purchases may be lumped in six or seven arrangements.

4779. There were officers of the Overland Transport Service in Suez, were there not?—Yes; there was Captain Chitty and Major Clerk.

4780. Did they undertake, in some degree, the work of shipping animals and stores?—Major Clerk did not that I am aware of; Captain Chitty had the duty of shipping.

4781. Would not Captain Chitty have been competent for the work of forwarding all supplies

coming into Suez for Abyssinia?—That is a question to which I do not feel myself competent to give a reply.

4782. Would you have had any doubt in your mind as to the propriety, if you had had any discretion of leaving that work in his hands?—I did frequently leave Suez when I considered that I ought to do so. On such occasions, the executive duties at Suez were performed by one of the officers subordinate to me.

4783. You stated that you did not make many purchases; can you state how many purchases you made, and their money value?—I think I can; I first purchased supplies early in October 1867; in October I made a purchase of beans, barley, wheat, and straw, to be delivered at Suez, at certain rates; and the total value of those supplies was about 26,000*l*.

4784. Of whom was that purchase made?—That purchase was made through Mr. Frederickson, on a commission as regards barley, wheat, and beans. The straw was taken at a fixed price.

4785. Of what did the purchase consist?—Of about 446 tons of barley, and about the same quantity of wheat and beans, and about 2,200 tons of straw.

4786. Was that by public competition?—That was not by public competition.

4787. Who is Mr. Frederickson?—Mr. Frederickson is a commission agent in Alexandria.

4788. Do you know his business standing there in the special business which he follows?—He, I believe, deals generally in machinery, but he at times also undertakes shipments.

4789. Do you know if he had any transactions in any of these articles previously to this transaction with you?—I understand that he had.

4790. Are you aware that he was, or was professing, at that time to be an architect?—I do not know that he was professing to be an architect.

4791. Are you aware that he was employed by the Government in superintending the erection of the sanatorium at Suez?—I believe that he was so employed, but I do not think that his duties had commenced at that time.

4792. Was not that building then in progress?—I can hardly recollect whether it had been commenced. It was commenced either then or very shortly afterwards.

4793. Was it not nearly finished?—Certainly not to my knowledge.

4794. You do not know that it was?—I do not think it was nearly finished, because I saw it growing up under my own eyes in Suez afterwards.

4795. But you know that he was in the employment and pay of the Government at that time as an architect, and was superintending the building of that structure?—Yes; I think I may say that I did know that he was.

4796. Would you explain how on such an important purchase as 26,000*l*. you had recourse to a gentleman who was not specially in the business, and who was himself professionally engaged as an architect, and in the pay of the Government?—I think that I have stated that I thought that he was in business. I was led to understand that he had made shipments.

4797. Before you made such an important engagement, did you not inform yourself as to the antecedents of Mr. Frederickson?—So far I did generally. I believed him to be a man of business,

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ness, and to be a person of position and respectability.

4798. What inquiries did you make respecting him, and what guarantee had you for his carrying through the contract?—I had a guarantee of 10 per cent. on the amount of the contract from Messrs. Oppenheim and Company, the bankers.

4799. Had you a guarantee of 2,600 l.?—Yes.

4800. Are you aware whether Oppenheim and Company had any other interest in the contract than merely such an interest as a banker would have?—I do not think they had.

4801. What inquiries did you make as to Mr. Frederickson's antecedents and respectability?—I do not recollect making any further inquiries than that.

4802. Looking at the matter now, do you not think that it would have been a very much better course if you had had recourse to Cairo and Alexandria, and invited tenders for those very large supplies?—Looking at the matter now (and I have looked it over very carefully at times), I cannot myself see that I could have purchased those supplies on more reasonable terms than I did through Mr. Frederickson.

4803. Were the prices which you paid to him then such as those at which the supplies were afterwards offered to you by tender?—With the permission of the Committee, in reply to that question, I will read the Report which I wrote about the transaction at the time, which explains the whole transaction.

4804. Was the transaction ever called in question?—Never.

4805. Then how does it happen that you had to account for the transaction?—I accounted for every transaction which I entered into. I wrote a Report every mail of everything which I did. When I received the telegram in the first instance asking me for the rates, I ascertained the rates as well as I could from the rates published in the papers, and from one source and another.

4806. But without consulting Mr. West?—This was at Alexandria, but Mr. West was at Suez.

4807. Without consulting Mr. Calvert?—I will explain the thing as it goes on. I received a telegram asking me for rates, and I reported those rates. My reply was based on the then current rates of the day, and I allowed a certain margin for contingencies in case there should be any jump in price or anything of that sort. As soon as I had sent that report I went to Assistant Commissary General Robinson, C.B., who was the senior commissariat officer under Colonel Kennedy, sent out by the War Office, and who had to arrange for the supply of forage and barley for the mules in Egypt, and I asked him to show me what he had done in respect to his supplies. He then showed me his schedule of tenders which he had invited. He had invited public tenders for the supply of forage and barley for the mules. I got a copy of that tender, and I ascertained that the lowest prices tendered were somewhat higher than the rates that I had ascertained from the market, and therefore I thought that I should be doing better to make my purchases quietly through an agent, than to invite public tenders, which I considered would certainly have the effect of raising the price. As it was, there had been an increase of nearly five per cent. in the price between the time when I

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received the first telegram and the date of my concluding the purchase.

4808. You proposed to read a letter which gives an account of the operation; will you read it?—This is a letter addressed to the Commissary General of the Army at Bombay, Colonel Dunsterville. I say, "Sir,—With reference to your letter to my address, No. 2421, dated 28th August last, desiring me to report the prices at which certain articles of provisions, &c., are procurable in Egypt, and to subsequent telegrams which have passed between his Excellency the Governor of Bombay, Colonel Marriott, and myself regarding rates, I have now the honour to report that, acting on the orders received in Colonel Marriott's telegram of the 30th ultimo, I have arranged to buy the quantities of barley, wheat, beans, and straw, as therein ordered at the following rates:—Wheat per quarter of 480 lbs., 53 s. 10½ d., barley per quarter of 480 lbs. at 45 s. 3¼ d., beans per quarter of 480 lbs. at 40 s. 10½ d., straw per ton of 2,240 lbs. at 106 s. all delivered in sacks on board ship at Suez, at the expense of the vendor."

4809. Can you state what those rates are per ton?—Roughly, it would be about 10 l. 11 s. per ton for the barley delivered on board ship at Suez.

4810. What were the beans per ton?—The beans were about 9 l. 10 s. -¾ d. per ton. I then said, "In my telegrams of the 26th and 27th ultimo, to the address of Colonel Marriott, I gave the rates of wheat, barley, beans, and straw, as per margin, exclusive of sacks, export duty, and shipping expenses at Suez" (those rates have not been furnished to me in this country); "and these calculations were based on the then current rates, allowing a liberal margin for advance of prices and contingencies. After despatching the telegram, I consulted the British Commissariat officer here, Assistant Commissary General Robinson, C.B., and he produced his schedule of tenders, copy of which I enclose, from which you will observe that he has contracted for the supply of forage for the mules, whether at Alexandria, Cairo, and Suez, at a shilling a ration (6 lbs. barley, and 8 lbs. straw), and that the lowest safe tender for barley and straw in bulk, is 10 s. per 100 lbs. for the former, and 5 s. 3 d. per 100 lbs. for the latter delivered on the quay at Suez" (those prices are for delivery at Suez, and not on board ship at Suez as contrasted with my prices), "exclusive of sacks, shipping, and duty."

4811. Was this 1 s. per ration for barley and straw, the price paid by Mr. Robinson under Colonel Kennedy?—Yes: "Mr. Robinson explains that the contractor's rate of barley and straw in bulk is somewhat higher than the ration rate, because he naturally expects to issue a proportion of the rations here and at Cairo, and will therefore be saved railway carriage upon them. Seeing that the lowest offers obtained by Assistant Commissary General Robinson on public tenders were much higher than the rates that I had reported and which I had satisfied myself were safe, and as the rates of grain had advanced considerably since Mr. Robinson received his tenders and were still advancing, I determined to make my purchases by private agency through a gentleman of known position and respectability in Alexandria, Mr. A. D. Frederickson, allowing him a small per-centage on his purchases, and I have concluded the purchases at the rates mentioned

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tioned in paragraph 1, and which include cost of sacks and all charges on board ship at Suez." Then I go on to say that if I had not ships ready we must put the grain and straw on board the "Precursor" hulk at Suez. Then I say: "Mr. Frederickson has furnished me with a banker's guarantee to the extent of 2,400 £, say 10 per cent. on the amount of the invoice, to be held as a guarantee for the fulfilment of his engagement." I go on to say, "I had such a good guide by the rate offered to Assistant Commissary General Robinson, and the markets were moreover so excited from telegrams from London announcing a rise in prices of grain, that I considered a public announcement that I required large supplies would inevitably cause a still further advance in rates, and therefore it appeared to me very much to the interests of Government that I should make the purchases quietly through a trustworthy agent." "In the present instance, I calculate that I have saved Government about 3,600 £. by making the purchases in the manner I have described, taking Mr. Robinson's rates as a basis of calculation; but as prices have advanced very considerably since he received his tenders, I do not think I am wrong in stating that any rates tendered within the last few days would have been very much higher than Mr. Robinson's rates, and consequently that the saving may be put down at a higher figure than I have reckoned." Then I go on to say that the barley, wheat, and beans, I have purchased are of the best quality obtainable.

4812. That would be after the harvest of 1867, would it not?—That would be after the harvest of 1867. Then in the last paragraph I say, "I enclose extracts from the 'Trombetta,' a daily paper, which gives the prices current in order to show you the rise in rates between the 26th September, date of telegram, and present time."

4813. Did you allow Mr. Frederickson a percentage upon this purchase?—Two per cent. included in those prices.

4814. Covered by the 26,000 £.?—Covered by the 26,000 £.

4815. Did he produce to you his purchasing accounts?—I think so; I think that his purchasing accounts, if I mistake not, have gone to India with my account.

4816. Did he purchase through a man named Grierson?—I think not.

4817. Do you remember whether his purchasing accounts, amounting as they did ultimately to 26,000 £., were produced to you, and whether you paid him exactly what he paid *plus* 2 per cent. commission?—No; I say that the 26,000 £. there includes the whole cost of those articles, and includes the commission also.

4818. Did he produce the accounts to you?—Yes, I think so.

4819. And you paid him the net amount of those accounts, *plus* two per cent.?—No, I have already said that I purchased those things from him; those rates were made up of several items; first of all the actual purchase at Alexandria, and put on rails at Alexandria; then the railway charge from Alexandria to Suez; then the portage for taking the things off at Suez; then the lighterage and portage for loading; and in addition to that there was the commission; all of that is included in the 45 s. 3½ d.

4820. Would all those items be set out in the accounts?—All those items would be set out in the accounts.

4821. Supplied to you?—Supplied to me by him.

4822. And you paid him that net amount *plus* 2 per cent.?—I paid him the exact amounts of those things; it came to a little under 45 s.; it included the 2 per cent.; those different amounts at which he purchased included his 2 per cent. commission.

4823. Among the items of Mr. Frederickson's outlay there would be, first, the original cost, then the cost of transit to Suez, and other charges, such as portage thereon; did Mr. Frederickson give you those several accounts, setting out what he paid under each head?—Yes, I think so; but the answer to a question like that would be ascertained at once by referring to the accounts.

4824. Do you know where they are?—The accounts are at Poonah, I believe.

4825. Do you know whether they have been sent to England, or not?—I have been to the offices in London, and as far as I can understand they have not come to England.

4826. Sir J. Hay.] Can you mention when you last saw them, and what you did with them?—I left my accounts in Egypt when I went down to Abyssinia on the 27th of February; when I returned to India at the conclusion of the Expedition, the officers who were employed in Egypt had not then returned, but they subsequently returned to Poonah, and they brought with them all those accounts; those accounts were submitted month by month; they all passed through audit, and I replied to all the objections upon them.

4827. Chairman.] When you got those accounts and saw the amount, did you add 2 per cent. for agency?—I wish it to be understood that I am speaking now from memory, but I believe that what I say will be nearly exactly correct; I believe that Mr. Frederickson gave me an invoice showing, first of all, the first cost, then the railway charges, then the cost of sacks, then the cost of portage, then the cost of shipping, then the commission, total so much, and that the whole of those items added together came within this sum which I give you here.

4828. Was that his account, or did you see the accounts furnished to him by the persons from whom he purchased, and to whom he paid money?—Those accounts were supported, I believe, by the different vouchers; first by the outset purchase, then by the railway charges; and of course the lighterage and portage was his own account, and he paid it and arranged it.

4829. Your impression is, that upon that transaction his total profit was a commission of 2 per cent.?—His total profit was, I believe, his commission of 2 per cent. on the transaction for barley, wheat, and beans.

4830. You made other purchases; what was your next purchase?—My next purchase was a small purchase of corrugated iron.

4831. Was that of small amount?—The amount would be about 800 £., I think.

4832. Was that by competition?—That was not by competition.

4833. Of whom did you purchase that?—I purchased that from Mr. Frederickson himself.

4834. What was the purpose?—I can give you an exact account of that transaction. I received an emergent requisition from Sir William Meredith from Zulla, saying that he required this iron immediately. I knew that Mr. Frederickson dealt in those matters, and I asked him if he could

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could put me in the way of getting it at once. He said, "I have five tons here on the spot. You want 20 tons altogether. The remaining 15 tons I can order from England, and the cost will be about so much." I telegraphed to the Secretary of the Bombay Government to say, "20 tons of iron are wanted, and I can get it at this price; shall I buy it?"; and the answer was to buy it, and I bought it.

4835. The price was about 40*l.* per ton, was it not?—About 40*l.* per ton.

4836. What was your next purchase?—My next purchase would be, I think, a quantity of Trieste flour from Mr. Hare at Suez.

4837. What was the total amount of it?—The total amount of it was 6,700*l.* in round numbers.

4838. Was that by public competition?—That was by direct purchase. The circumstances connected with that were that I received either a letter or telegram, saying that this quantity of flour was wanted within a given time in Abyssinia, to form part of a reserve stock on the highlands. It was a matter of the greatest importance that it should get there within a certain time. I was then at Suez, and I sent for Mr. Hare, knowing him to be the purveyor to the Navy, and to have the means of putting a supply of this sort in hand at once. I said to him, "What can you do flour for?" He said, "I am supplying at such-and-such a price, but I don't know what I should be able to do your sudden order for; I will telegraph at once to Trieste." He telegraphed at once to Trieste, giving the quantities required and the time, and he got an answer back. He showed me that answer, and said, "Here is the price they will charge me at Trieste, and my expenses will be so much; I can do it at 29*s.* per barrel of 100 lbs. packed for mule transit." I telegraphed that price to Bombay, and I received the next day an order to buy the flour, and I bought the flour straight out at that price.

4839. Did you pay him a commission upon the transaction?—None whatever; that was the total price.

4840. Did you purchase at the price he paid?—I purchased at that price of 29*s.* I have explained that he showed me the price that he was charged at Trieste; he showed me what his charges were, and what his margin was for profit. I accepted that price, having previously reported it to Bombay.

4841. Sir J. Hay.] Was the profit anything unusual?—I should say that it was very moderate. As far as I could make out, it was about 5 per cent., and as he had to take the whole of the risk and trouble I did not think it too much.

4842. Chairman.] I suppose that the Bombay telegrams which you speak of will be with the accounts?—The Bombay telegrams will certainly be with the accounts if they are extant.

4843. What was your next transaction?—I arranged with Mr. Hare for the rations required for the muleteers going down on board the ships, but I have no memorandum with me of the rate that I paid to him. The rate which I paid to him I reported, as I perfectly well recollect, to the Commissary General, and it is down in black and white.

4844. Was that by competition?—It was not by competition.

4845. What was the amount of that transaction?—The amount of that transaction I can hardly tell you, but I put it down roughly at about 500*l.* The muleteers received in Egypt 0.46.

9*d.* per day in lieu of rations; and as they were a different class of men to the Indians whom we generally embarked I had to arrange a special class of rations for those men; and to the best of my recollection the cost of that ration was something less than the 9*d.* per day which they were allowed on shore.

4846. Sir J. Hay.] Those arrangements were made before Colonel Kennedy died, I suppose. The arrangement as to the 9*d.* per day was made when we first commenced.

4847. Chairman.] Will you detail the remaining contracts?—I purchased some potatoes and onions from Mr. Hare, at Suez. Those were also on emergent requisitions from Abyssinia.

4848. From Colonel Lucas?—From Major Mignon before Colonel Lucas went there. I bought about 35,000 lbs. of potatoes at 14*s.* 4*d.*, and about 35,000 lbs. onions at 16*s.* 8*d.* The total amount of the transaction would be about 550*l.*

4849. You had no competition in that case, had you?—There was no competition in that case. I had no opportunity for competition, and even if I had I do not know that I should have benefited by it.

4850. But is not the bazar at Suez pretty well supplied with vegetables?—The bazar at Suez is not supplied with potatoes at all; the potatoes are imported from Trieste, from Marseilles, and from Malta.

4851. What vegetables have they there?—It depends upon the time of the year, but the potatoes and onions were the only vegetables I bought. Towards the end of the Expedition there were more vegetables at Suez, because certain people had bought them up.

4852. Had you any more purchases?—I bought afterwards, on my second return to Egypt in February, 500 sets of clothing.

4853. With regard to a considerable purchase of hay in December, you have not mentioned that, I think?—No, for this reason; sometimes about the middle of December, or a little later, I received orders from Bombay to invite tenders for the supply of 2,200 tons of compressed hay, or thereabouts, and to report the result; here is the letter dated the 21st of December. "Sir, I have been directed by the Commissary General of the Bombay Army to invite tenders for the supply in Egypt of about 2,200 tons of pressed hay for the use of the Abyssinian Expedition, and to report the result of the offers to him; I therefore do myself the honour to enclose a notice calling for tenders, which I shall feel extremely obliged if you will have translated into Italian, and published in the daily papers at Alexandria, until date fixed for receiving offers." This is addressed to Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at Alexandria.

4854. Do you know when that advertisement appeared in Alexandria?—I have not a copy of the tender, and I can hardly tell you, but up to the 6th of January, when I left, I had received no intimation regarding the receipt of those tenders, and therefore I presume they were received afterwards.

4855. Then you never adjudicated upon those tenders?—No, I did not.

4856. You posted an invitation for tenders at Suez, did you not?—I may probably have put an invitation at Suez as well. I do not remember whether I did so at Cairo or not, but that is the

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the one I sent to Alexandria, as being the principal place where the principal merchants are.

4857. Are you aware that it was not published in the Alexandria until either the 26th or 27th of December?—It may have been; I do not know what the date was.

4858. It required that tenders should be sent in by the 1st of January, did it not?—If it did, then I cannot account for my not having them by the 6th.

4859. Do you remember whether it did, or did not?—I do not remember, and unfortunately I have not a copy of the notice. They have given me a copy of my letter, but not a copy of the notice, and therefore I am not able to speak with certainty as to that; but on the 6th of January I left Suez for Annesley Bay, and at that time I had not got the tenders.

4860. The contract was not then concluded?—No.

4861. And you do not know who got it?—Of course I do not know anything about it; I had not got the tenders up to the 6th of January.

4862. Sir J. Hay.] Who was your successor?—Major Stansfeld.

4863. Chairman.] Do you know who ultimately got the contract?—I believe that Mr. Grierson ultimately got the contract.

4864. At what price did he get it?—I do not know. My responsibility ended entirely, and Major Stansfeld's did also, because he must have reported the result of the tenders, and then received his orders from India.

4865. Sir J. Hay.] Your services were wanted at the seat of war, I presume?—My services were wanted at the seat of war.

4866. Chairman.] What steps he took after your departure you do not know?—I have merely stated generally what he would do.

4867. Sir J. Hay.] You have no official knowledge of what happened after your departure?—I have no official knowledge.

4868. Chairman.] If the tenders had to be sent in by the 1st of January, can you account for their not coming into your possession previously to the 6th of January?—I have stated that I have not a copy of the notice, and that I do not know.

4869. Putting it hypothetically, could you account for their not coming into your possession, if they were returnable, on the 1st of January?—I cannot account for it at all. If they were sent to the Consulate, it is hardly to be supposed that they would be detained there.

4870. Would you think that if the advertisement did not appear until the 26th or 27th of December for 2,200 tons of European hay, adequate time had been given to parties likely to supply it?—All I can say about that, is this: that if I sent my letter with the notice to the Consulate on the 21st of December, as I did, which should have reached him on the 22nd, there was no reason in my mind why the notice should not have appeared in the papers the next day, so that there would have been a week's notice.

4871. So that if there was any neglect at all, it was not yours?—No..

4872. Do you know that Mr. Grierson and Mr. Frederickson were united in that contract?—I know nothing whatever about that contract.

4873. Was it a condition of the contract that the hay might be rejected by you at Suez?—I have not a copy of that notice, but I should think

certainly, as I should be the person responsible for the quality and for the supply, that I should have taken the precaution of having the power to reject it.

4874. Did it seem to you a reasonable thing that contractors should send their hay to Suez, before they were informed whether or not it would be accepted?—As the contractor had in point of fact to get his hay from Trieste or from Marseilles, or anywhere else, I do not think it made any difference to him, unless I could have sent a person to inspect it at the place where it was bought, which I could not do.

4875. Would not even that have been very much cheaper than the additional price which you would have to pay for the tremendous risk to the contractor of having to bring hay from France or Trieste to Suez, with the chance of rejection on its arrival at Suez?—I consider that the chances of rejection might have been reduced by the contractor to a minimum. If he supplied a good article he might have been perfectly certain that there was no chance of its being rejected.

4876. Sir J. Hay.] I suppose the urgency of the circumstances was so great that it was hardly possible to contemplate rejection, and that you would rather have contemplated the acceptance of a large quantity of hay than have allowed the army to starve for the want of it?—Certainly.

4877. Chairman.] But would you not expect that the chance of rejection at Suez would very largely enhance the risk of the contractor, and therefore very largely enhance the price at which he would tender?—I must confess that it had not presented itself to me in that light.

4878. Sir J. Hay.] You looked at it as a military and not as a commercial transaction, I suppose?—I looked upon it as hardly that. It was in accordance with the usual terms of our contracts that the receiving officer, being the responsible person, should have the power of rejection.

4879. Chairman.] Would there have been any difficulty in inspecting, and accepting or rejecting at Alexandria?—I think that very probably inspecting, and accepting or rejecting at Alexandria, might have increased the price; but I do not know that there would have been any difficulty about it.

4880. Do you think that there would have been no difficulty in inspecting, and accepting or rejecting it at Alexandria?—I thought that it was more convenient to the public service to have it inspected at Suez.

4881. Sir J. Hay.] I suppose that you could not have been in two places at once?—I could not have been in two places at once.

4882. Chairman.] Had you not a very large staff?—I had not a very large staff; I had a staff which was barely sufficient to carry on the work which was put upon us.

4883. You had Captain Willoughby of the Transport Service, had you not?—Captain Willoughby was in no sense connected with me.

4884. If there had been the means of inspecting, and accepting or rejecting at Alexandria, would not that have been a more economical procedure and have involved less risk to the contractor, and, therefore, probably a less price?—I am not prepared to say that it would.

4885. He would have saved the carriage to Suez, at all events, would he not?—The contractor would have been saved that.

4886. And he would have been saved the carriage

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riage back again if it had been rejected, would he not?—He would have been saved the carriage back.

4887. Do you know the rate of carriage from Suez to Alexandria?—I am not quite sure whether I know the rate; the rate varied.

4888. Do you know the distance?—The distance is about 200 miles.

4889. Is it not 225 or 226 miles?—I do not think so. I think it is rather under 200 miles than over, but perhaps the new way is longer.

4890. You stated, did you not, that you paid 11*l.* 6*s.* 6*d.* for barley, and 10*l.* 4*s.* for beans?—I gave you the rate in the smaller quantities, but I have not worked it out.

4891. Had you any beans offered to you at 9*l.*, delivered at Suez?—I am not prepared to say that I had.

4892. But I think, from the catalogue you have given, that you in no case invited competition except in this matter of hay?—Except in the matter of hay, and except in a matter of some 400 or 500 tons of barley; I cannot find the notice, but I know for a fact that there was a public tender for about 400 or 500 tons of barley some time, I think, in December or January; I know also that the lowest tender was that of Mr. Hare; that was another of those instances where the rates were first referred to Bombay; the telegraph broke down, and it took 10 days before we got the answer; and Mr. Hare called upon me in Cairo to say that in the 10 days the price of barley had gone up to such an extent that he would be at a loss, and he asked to be relieved, and I said, "No; he could not be relieved," and accordingly he made the supply.

4893. Colonel *Barttelot*.] What was the price of the barley on that occasion?—Unfortunately, I have not got the papers.

4894. *Chairman*.] You have also stated, I think, that the price of beans went up?—Between the 26th of September and the 7th of October (the date on which I wrote my report), there was an advance of prices in all those articles of produce; wheat, barley, and beans; and in support of that statement I sent to India the "*Trombetta*" daily paper, which gives the rates of the sales of each day, as got from the bankers and brokers, and which is the most reliable information you can get.

4895. Sir *J. Hay*.] The prices current?—The prices current; that will at once prove the correctness or otherwise of my assertion.

4896. *Chairman*.] If you do not remember having received an offer of beans at 9*l.*, I need not ask you from whom it was?—I do not remember about it; but when I returned from Annesley Bay, on the 26th of January, I had a good many things to do, which necessitated my attendance at Cairo and Alexandria, and generally in Egypt; and therefore I left Major Stansfeld to arrange at Suez; I brought up with me an order to supply a certain quantity of beans, 10 lacs of pounds; I told Major Stansfeld that he had better invite public tenders for them, and he did so, and he can give evidence as to that; but I do not know that he received an offer as low as 9*l.*

4897. Did you receive an offer from a merchant in Cairo named Masih, through Mr. Reade, the consul there?—I did.

4898. Was not that at a price lower than the prices at which you had been purchasing beans, and straw, and barley?—The straw and barley
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were somewhat below the prices that I had been paying, but the beans were higher than the rates which I had paid, absolutely shipped at Suez.

4899. You rejected the straw and barley, did you not?—I had no want for them, and I had no instructions to purchase at that time.

4900. Were not those tenders in reply to advertisements?—Not at all; I was inundated with tenders at all times; whenever anybody had anything that he thought he would like to get rid of, he sent me a tender.

4901. Sir *J. Hay*.] They were not tenders but offers?—They were offers.

4902. *Chairman*.] Are we misinformed that these offers of Masih of beans, straw, and barley were in reply to advertisements?—You are entirely misinformed.

4903. Did you advise Mr. Reade of that fact?—I did not advise Mr. Reade of that fact, but Mr. Reade knew as well as I did that I did not at that time want anything; here is a letter I wrote to him dated the 12th of November: "I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt yesterday evening of your demi-official communication of the 10th instant, forwarding a letter of the 4th idem from Mr. Wilkinson and Antim Yusuf Abdel Masih, offering to supply barley, beans, and straw at certain rates; and in reply beg you will be good enough to inform the tenderers that I have completed the purchases of grain and forage required for the Abyssinian Expedition, and that I am not aware that any further quantity will be required."

4904. Had that purchase been completed before this tender was sent in?—That purchase had been completed before this tender was sent in.

4905. Then were we wrongly informed also, when we were informed that he sent in his tender at the time specified in the advertisement?—If you are alluding to the barley, straw, and beans, you have been entirely misinformed.

4906. That was in November, was it not?—I am speaking of November.

4907. Did you make any more purchases of beans, straw, or barley before you left?—I made no purchases of barley or straw, but I bought some beans in the month of February myself direct from the market in Cairo.

4908. Without advertisement?—Without advertisement.

4909. What price did you then pay?—I paid 32*s.* 6*d.* per *ardeb* of 320 lbs., delivered at Suez in sacks of 75 lbs.

4910. That will be about 11*l.* 7*s.* 6*d.* per ton, will it not?—Yes, but you must bear in mind that those beans were crushed beans, and that the difference in price would be owing, in the first instance, to the cost of crushing them, and in the second instance to my requiring a great many more sacks than I did at first. My first purchases were in the sacks of the country, *ardeb* sacks of 320 lbs., and therefore I only charged about 2*s.* 6*d.* to the quarter, but afterwards when I wanted sacks of 75 lbs. each, I required about six or eight sacks, and the price of sacks went up to about 1*s.* 7*d.* a sack.

4911. Was not the price which this man Masih, of whom I have been speaking, asked for his beans 9*l.*?—His price for beans I have not got here, but I have stated here, in my letter of 12th November, to address Mr. Consul Reade, that "I am perfectly aware that barley can be obtained at Cairo at lower rates than at Alexandria,
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but the quality is not such as I could receive." There are many descriptions of barley. Then I say, "as regards beans, the rate quoted in the tender is considerably higher than the price I paid for the same article on board ship at Suez."

4912. Did you buy any gear, halters and horse clothes for the mules?—I bought in the first instance 500 saddles for mules through Colonel Staunton; I wrote to him and asked him to supply them for me, and he sent in his bills; I do not know what the amount was.

4913. Did you buy any other fittings for the animals?—I find also that I bought 1,000 headstalls and 1,000 set of shoes.

4914. Was that in February?—That was in February, and I may perhaps have purchased something else.

4915. Were those direct purchases without competition?—Those were direct purchases; Colonel Kennedy had been purchasing those articles before I went there, and I purchased them, I think at about his rate, or a little less.

4916. Was that of a man named Stahlberg in Alexandria?—I think not.

4917. Respecting Grierson, who and what was he?—I can hardly tell you who Grierson was; I believe Grierson was a generally useful man in Alexandria. He was a man who had been employed when Colonel Kennedy was at Alexandria, for various duties, and he had been a good deal associated with them, and when they were leaving, Mr. Robinson said, "If you want anything done, here is Mr. Grierson, who is a very useful man."

4918. Sir J. Hay.] Was he under the Egyptian Government?—I do not know whether he was or not; I knew nothing about him until I went back in February.

4919. Chairman.] Is "generally useful" another phrase for living by his wits?—I do not know; I suppose we all live by our wits as far as we can.

4920. Did you make a contract with Mr. Grierson?—I made a contract with him for a number of mules.

4921. Did you make any other contract with him?—I do not think I made any other contract.

4922. The price you paid was 26 l. 10 s., delivered at Suez, was it not?—It was 26 l. 10 s., delivered at Suez.

4923. He got them from Cyprus, did he not?—He got them from Cyprus.

4924. Sir J. Hay.] With reference to his business, so far as you knew him, he was a contractor?—He was a contractor, and he was a general agent.

4925. Chairman.] You had a guarantee for the fulfilment of the contract, I believe?—I had a guarantee for the fulfilment of the contract.

4926. Was that from Mr. Frederickson?—I think not, but I cannot tell you. I find here in my letter that I requested him to hand me a banker's guarantee for the fulfilment of the contract, and he did give me one, but I cannot tell you from whom it was.

4927. Are you aware that he had had a previous contract for the delivery of mules, which he had failed in carrying through?—I was not aware until I heard the evidence the last time I was here. I may mention, with regard to that purchase of beans which I made at Cairo direct from the market, that I was then purchasing camels; I found that the camels that I was buying were fed upon beans, and it was very

necessary, I thought, that they should go down with a supply of those crushed beans with them. If I had gone through the formality of inviting tenders I should have lost a fortnight's time.

4928. Staying at Suez, you were compelled to stay at Hare's Hotel, I presume?—I was compelled to stay at Hare's Hotel because there was no other place.

4929. Did you ever have any complaints from other competitors who felt themselves barred from personal access to yourself by Mr. Hare and others about you?—I never heard any complaints from anybody on that subject. The people in Egypt seemed to consider that they had a right of personal access to me at all times, and even in my tub I was not safe from their inroads.

4930. You felt the discomfort of that sometimes, I suppose?—I felt the discomfort of it very much. I was obliged to be very particular. Unless a man had some business, I declined to see him. The general thing was for a man to send up his card and to come in; he would come in, and I would say, "To what am I to attribute the pleasure of your visit?" and he would then try to pump me, to see if he could supply me with anything, no matter what, a church or an iron house, or anything. Nothing was too extravagant for them to offer. I believe I have been offered a church to send to Abyssinia.

4931. Sir J. Hay.] Were you the guest of Mr. Frederickson at Alexandria?—I was never the guest of Mr. Frederickson, to the best of my recollection, although I believe I was once in his house on an occasion very shortly after my going to Egypt (within 15 or 20 days), when I had received a sudden order to go down and join the force in Abyssinia.

4932. Then any assertion that you were constantly the guest of the contractor would be entirely false?—Such an assertion would be entirely false. I was at the hotel before going, and my uncle, Captain Willoughby, said, "Come out and dine with me there," and I did so, and slept there.

4933. Chairman.] Do you know if any protest was sent in at the time when tenders were invited for these 2,200 tons of European hay, by any merchant of Alexandria, that it was impossible for merchants to calculate and to inform themselves of the circumstances under which they could supply within the time?—I have stated that up to the time I left, on the 6th of January, I had heard nothing whatever about those tenders.

4934. You have stated that you had heard nothing about the tender, but my question was whether you had received any letters containing complaints?—I did not receive any.

4935. Sir J. Hay.] Do you know who did?—I do not know that any were sent of my own knowledge.

4936. Chairman.] Do you know anything as to the price at which rations for the animals were supplied at Beyrout?—I know nothing about them.

4937. Do you know that there was an offer made to supply 12 lbs. of chopped straw and 8 lbs. of barley at 6½ d. per ration, delivered at Alexandria?—I do not know; I never heard of it.

4938. The ordinary ration of a mule is 8 lbs. of straw and 6 lbs. of barley, is it not?—That was the ration that they gave them.

4939. And

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4939. And for that you paid 1s., did you not?
—For that the commissariat officer, acting under Colonel Kennedy's instructions, paid 1s.; I did not pay 1s.

4940. What was your price?—I only contracted for Barley, and I paid 7d.

4941. For 6 lbs. of barley you paid 7d.?—Yes.

4942. And 8 lbs. of barley and 12 lbs. of straw for 6½d. would not be much more than half that price, would it?—I have already told you that I never heard of that tender, or of any such offer.

4943. You chartered those ships of the Aziziah Company, did you not?—I did.

4944. Do you remember at what rate per ton they were chartered?—The rate was not a rate per ton.

4945. What does it come to per ton per month?
—The vessels taken up were eight, including a little despatch or tug steamer that I had. This company would not fix a rate per ton. I had the greatest difficulty in coming to terms with them at all; and it will be recollected, I hope, that they were the only people who were in possession of any tonnage to let in the Red Sea at that time, and that their ships were absolutely necessary. It was not a question of whether we should take them or leave them, but we were bound to have them. The price per ton is 1l. 17s. 10½d.

4946. Have you a copy of the charter party?
—I have.

4947. Will you hand one in?—I will. (*The same was handed in, vide Appendix.*)

4948. Sir J. Hay.] You did not make that bargain alone, I think?—In the first instance, I went to the head of the Aziziah Company with Mr. Reade, to be introduced to them, and to make them understand that I was an officer who had the power to enter into an agreement of this sort; but with regard to the taking up of ships, I was very much guided by the assistance and advice of my uncle, Captain James Willoughby, the principal transport officer in Egypt.

4949. But did you not wait upon Sherin Pacha with Mr. Reade, on the 8th, 9th, and 10th of October, and make the arrangement with Sherin Pacha?—Yes; I have not the exact dates here, but I have no doubt that it would be about that time.

4950. *Chairman.*] It must be gratifying to you to know that, so far as we know, those ships were chartered at a lower rate than those taken at Calcutta. What arrangements did you make for coaling those vessels?—The company themselves were to supply the coal.

4951. At a defined price?—At a defined price. The price was 370 piastres per ton, that was 3l. 15s. 10d. per ton, put on board ship at Suez.

4952. Was there any price defined for the supply elsewhere?—I was not aware that there was any price defined, and the inquiries that I made on the spot, from the Peninsular and Oriental people, led me to suppose that they were charging, or would be charging, about 4l. a ton at that time.

4953. Do you know now what they did charge?—I do know, but I believe that I am not at liberty to say; I do not say that that sum was paid; I only say that I was led to suppose that that would be paid.

4954. I suppose you have since learned that the price was about 3l. 10s.?—The average price may have come to that; I know the price, but as it was given to me privately, I hope I may

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not be pressed as to that; I make out on the whole transaction that, supposing that the ships were kept in charter for six months, and that they burnt 20 days' coal each month according to their estimated consumption, the cost of the coal at that rate would be about 68,000l. against about 64,600l. at the Peninsular and Oriental Company's price, so that there would be a difference against the Azziziah Company of about 3,400l. But against that I take the saving of the lesser rate of hire; I took those ships up at so much less than the lowest rates paid at Bombay, that the difference in cost between the Bombay rate and the Egypt rate covered the excess in cost of coal.

4955. What arrangements did you make for ascertaining the quantity that they took?—The only arrangement that I could make in that respect was to get it off their books. On their books they had got down the consumption of coal of each of those ships; each of them burnt so much coal per diem, and I was obliged to go by that, and when they sent in their bills I checked them by that.

4956. You took those data?—I took those data.

4957. And was that adhered to?—That was adhered to. If I found that any ship had come in and had burnt more than that quantity, I immediately called upon them for an explanation, and the explanation given was that they had been condensing water at Suez, or something of that kind.

4958. Sir J. Hay.] I suppose that a considerable difference was made in reference to the ordinary duty which they would have to perform in the carriage of pilgrims?—Yes, I had great difficulty with regard to the arrangements of that company.

4959. They conveyed down to Abyssinia all the stores purchased in Egypt by the Commissariat Department, and also about 11,000 mules, camels, and donkeys, did they not?—I cannot tell you the exact number, but they carried a large number of animals, and they performed their services with great regularity.

4960. *Chairman.*] It was part of your duty to see to the shipment of mules and stores from Suez; did you find ships coming back from Annesley Bay again and again with the cargoes which they had taken still on board and undischarged?—No.

4961. Was that the case to any extent?—No.

4962. That was up to the 26th of February?—I am speaking up to the 26th of February, with one break of 21 days when I was away; I know exactly what those ships brought back.

4963. Was that the case not merely with regard to those ships, but with regard to any ships which came to Suez?—I know one instance in which there was some wheat on board my largest mule ship; the wheat was not absolutely wanted down there at the time, but the ship was wanted very much to carry the animals, and therefore they sent her back with the stuff in her; it did for ballast.

4964. Did not water-pipes go backwards and forwards twice?—I have no knowledge of that.

4965. Sir J. Elphinstone.] If they had gone backwards and forwards it would have been better than for them to lie on the shore at Zoulla, I presume?—Yes.

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4966. *Chairman.*]

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4966. *Chairman.*] Is there a condition of the charter-party setting out where those ships should be discharged from pay?—They were to be discharged in the port of Suez at one day's notice.

4967. Is there a condition entitling the owners to payment for ships on disablement?—There was a condition entitling them to receive no pay on disablement over 24 hours.

4968. Were any of them disabled?—Not to my knowledge.

4969. *Sir J. Hay.*] As a matter of fact, they were discharged at Suez immediately on their return from Annesley Bay, were they not?—I do not know about their discharge, but that was the condition, and the probability is that it was acted up to.

4970. *Chairman.*] Who put forward the charter party; you or the company?—In the first instance they drew up certain terms, and I drew up certain terms, and we had a great deal of difficulty in making those terms meet.

4971. In the terms which they submitted to you was there a clause disentitling them to pay if the ships were disabled from working?—No; I introduced that myself in consequence of a quibble which they made, but I forget what the quibble was.

4972. You were rather astonished to find that that clause was not in the Bombay charter-party, were you not?—I had not a copy of the Bombay charter-party when I made the charter-party.

4973. Had you a copy of the English charter-party?—I had no copy of any charter-party.

4974. In that matter were you aided a good deal by Captain James Willoughby?—Not merely as regards the charter-party, but as regards the hiring. He went there with me, and helped me to fight the battle with those people, but as regards the drawing up of the paper, I did that myself; I daresay I showed it to him.

4975. Captain Willoughby states that he disbursed 685,000 *l.* in Egypt, and as I understood him it was on account of the purchases made by the Indian officers; would that be the fact?—I could not give an answer to that without seeing the accounts which I have not got.

4976. Would you expect so much as 685,000 *l.* to have been disbursed by the Indian officers in Egypt?—I certainly cannot account for it myself.

4977. *Sir John Hay.*] Are you authorised by your relative Captain Willoughby to give evidence on his behalf?—Not at all; I am speaking entirely of purchases made by myself. I do not know what the amount was.

4978. *Chairman.*] He states that it was at your instance that he did advance money, is that correct?—He aided me with money.

4979. *Sir James Elphinstone.*] How far is it from Suez to the nearest part of the productive districts in the valley of the Nile?—I said that it was 100 miles roughly; I should think it is about 90 miles; It is 90 odd miles from Suez to Cairo.

4980. To Zagazig?—Zagazig is a little nearer perhaps.

4981. Then there is a railway the whole way, is there not?—There is a railway the whole way. The railway when I was there did not go by Zagazig, it went to Cairo. The other line was not completed.

4982. *Sir J. Hay.*] I suppose that you had a general option as to whether you made your head-quarters, when you were in charge in Egypt, at

Alexandria, at Cairo, or at Suez, as you pleased?—My head-quarters were really at Suez, but I had the power of moving about whenever I thought it was necessary, and I constantly exercised that power.

4983. Were you instructed to proceed to Suez, and then to conduct business in Egypt, or were you at liberty to have fixed your head quarters at Alexandria if you had thought it more convenient?—I conceive that I might have done so, but, on the whole, I did not think that I could have been of the same use at Alexandria as at Suez.

4984. Do you conceive that the port of embarkation was a better place for you to establish your head-quarters at with reference merely to the purchase of animals than any other place, the main object of your duty being to hurry forward the supplies of the army, not *coûte qui coûte*, but at as reasonable a price as you could conveniently obtain them at?—Promptitude was the first order of the day.

4985. The Abyssinian Expedition had to be done to time, had it not?—The Abyssinian Expedition had to be done to time.

4986. And would not a very considerable outlay have been involved had it been extended over the rest of the year?—No doubt.

4987. That, I suppose, weighed on your mind, and your object was to hurry forward, so as to prevent that extension of time which otherwise would inevitably have followed?—Exactly so; and there was another thing. What made us deal, to a great extent, as if we were working with a rope round our necks, in Egypt, was that if at any time an epidemic had broken out at Zoulla there is a body of sanitary officers in Egypt entirely independent of the Viceroy's jurisdiction, who would have put the place in quarantine, and enforced the most rigorous quarantine. Therefore one felt that whatever the order might be, one must carry it out at once.

4988. Looking at that difficulty and also at the peculiar character of the Egyptian people and of their government, you, having always in view the necessity of saving time above all things, perhaps did not feel justified in wasting time in inquiries where you were able promptly to meet the demand at what appeared to you to be reasonable terms and reasonable prices?—Precisely.

4989. Had you anything to do with the disbursements of treasure in Egypt?—I paid for my supplies and I paid for my ships.

4990. Was there any truth in the statement that considerable sums of money were made by the exchange of gold in the bazaars?—No such report ever came to my knowledge.

4991. Do you happen to know the name of Outridge?—I know that there was such a man in Government employment.

4992. Would it be true that he was in the habit of receiving large sums of gold and profiting by the exchange at the bazaar?—I should think that it is very improbable. I have no knowledge upon the subject.

4993. You never heard of any such transaction?—I never heard of any such transaction.

4994. Do you know anything of the character of Mr. Outridge?—Mr. Outridge I believe to be a man of bad character, who was discharged in consequence of misbehaviour.

4995. Then his statements are not very reliable, I presume?—I should suppose not.

4996. Captain

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4996. Captain *Beaumont*.] Do the accounts which were rendered of the payments which were made for petty cash show the rate at which the gold was exchanged or not?—I think so, certainly. They ought to have done so, and I believe they did.

4997. And if accounts had been rendered crediting the sovereign at 25 francs as charged in the bazaar, those accounts ought not to have been correct because the sovereign was worth more than the 25 francs; would that be so?—My accounts were not kept in francs at all; my purchases were all made in Egypt where the current coin is the piastre. There are two piastres: the piastre tarif, which is fixed by the Government at 97½ piastres to the sovereign, and the piastre current, which is a fluctuating and varying rate of exchange. At the time I was there it went from 178 to 180 to the 1 l. Large purchases were made in the piastre tarif, which is the custom of the country; the smaller purchases were made in the piastre current, and therefore all my expenditure would be shewn that way, in so many sovereigns, at such and such rates of exchange.

4998. Sir *John Hay*.] All the accounts were turned into rupees afterwards, were they not?—All the accounts were turned into rupees afterwards, but still the rate of exchange was shown.

4999. In all those matters, was the sovereign taken at 10 rupees?—In all those matters the sovereign was taken at 10 rupees; I have not my accounts here now, but my accounts were rendered in rupees; the totals appeared in rupees, but the details of the transaction showed the rate of exchange either in piastres current or piastres tarif.

5000. Captain *Beaumont*.] Did you not receive consignments of bullion in the shape of sovereigns from the English Treasury?—Yes; I got my money from the English Treasury in sovereigns.

5001. Then it came in sovereigns, and not in rupees?—It came in sovereigns.

5002. And the sovereigns ought to have been converted; and in your accounts they were converted at the rate of exchange of the day?—At the rate of exchange of the day.

5003. And, therefore, if the accounts of some other disbursing officers showed the sovereign valued at 25 francs, when in reality its value was more, and it was changed in the bazaar at more, would those accounts be rendered in what you, as an accountant, would consider to be a satisfactory way?—It might have been quite as correct as mine; there was no doubt a tarif rate of so many francs for a rupee, but I merely speak for my own accounts, and I say that mine were rendered in rupees, but my purchases were made in piastres.

5004. Sir *J. Hay*.] Occasionally, I suppose, when small change was wanted for petty cash, a sovereign may have been changed at the bazaar?—Yes, no doubt.

5005. But were any large sums changed in the bazaar?—No large sums were changed in the bazaar.

5006. Is it not true that as a rule, all the silver was obtained, both by yourself and by Major Stansfeld, from the Suez Hotel, at 10 rupees to the sovereign?—I cannot speak as to Major Stansfeld, nor for myself, without my papers. That may have been the rate, but it is a point I cannot recollect. I think it may have been at 0.46.

that rate, but the rate of the piastres is impressed upon my mind, because I had several transactions in those coins, and I could not at the present moment tell you what rate I got for my money for the petty expenditure at Suez. I frequently had to pay coolies in rupees, and I had to pay small demands for boat hire in rupees, and therefore I must have got rupees for my sovereigns sometimes; but I cannot tell at what rate I got them.

5007. Captain *Beaumont*.] The sovereign is worth more than 25 francs, and therefore when it is changed, the accounts should show that extra value if it was worth more; is not that a correct statement?—I know that as regards francs, the rate varied in reference to my personal expenditure and my private purchases, but I cannot carry it in my head.

5008. But ought not the accounts to show that variation of rate, whatever it was?—I suppose they ought, certainly; but, as I say, I do not recollect.

5009. Colonel *Barttelot*.] Was the sovereign ever worth more than 25 francs there?—I could not speak with certainty about that, because I should be speaking at hazard; and without my papers I could not answer that question correctly.

5010. Sir *J. Elphinstone*.] Has that Board of Health, of which you speak, been established entirely distinct from the Pasha's Government?—I believe it is a national Board of Health; a European one; I can hardly tell you who the members of it are, but I was informed of the existence of it by Colonel Staunton shortly after I saw him.

5011. They have the arbitrary powers of enforcing quarantine, have they not?—They have the arbitrary power of enforcing quarantine.

5012. Have you reason to suppose that their attention was directed to Abyssinia while you were there?—No doubt; we were in a great state of alarm on one occasion because there was a ship load of coolies coming round from Madras, and they had cholera, and I recollect that Colonel Staunton was in a great state of mind about it.

5013. Therefore it was entirely in their power at any time to destroy Aden as the basis of our operations?—They might have enforced such a strict quarantine that it would have interfered most materially with drawing supplies from it; if it had come to a question of time, it might have very seriously impeded the Expedition.

5014. Supposing that a large accumulation of stores had not been massed in Abyssinia before the south-west monsoon had set in, and that such an occurrence as that had taken place in Egypt, would not the army have been placed in a most hazardous position in Abyssinia, seeing that you could draw no supplies from Bombay on the one hand, and that your base of supply in Egypt on the other would have been stopped?—No doubt it would have been partially paralysed.

5015. Therefore, I suppose you agree with Lord Napier of Magdala, that it was only a necessary precaution for him to accumulate six months' stores in Abyssinia?—I have no doubt that the precaution was a wise one.

5016. Captain *Beaumont*.] If I understood you rightly, you said that Mr. Outridge was a man of bad character?—So I have understood.

5017. The following testimonial was given to us signed by "A. W. Chitty, Commander, Royal Transport Officer. This is to certify that Mr.

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R. Outridge served the British Transport Department at Suez as checking clerk from September 1867 to July 1868, during the Abyssinian Expedition; in addition to these duties, Mr. Outridge assisted as clerk and accountant in the office, and carried out these duties with great punctuality and correctness; Mr. Outridge was discharged, his services not being longer required." Mr. Outridge having received this certificate from his commanding officer, would you still think it consistent with justice to say that he was a man of bad character?—I was not aware of the existence of that certificate, but I think it very possible that circumstances may have transpired to alter the opinion of his commanding officer.

5018. Sir John Hay.] Do you happen to know the opinion entertained of Mr. Outridge, by Captain Willoughby of the Royal Navy?—I do.

5019. Is it the same as Mr. Chitty's?—Not at all.

5020. Chairman.] Are you aware that Mr. Outridge had an action at law against Her Majesty's Government out there, in which he was beaten?—I knew that he had had an action.

5021. And Captain Willoughby had to defend it, had he not?—He was the defendant, I believe, in that action.

5022. Captain Beaumont.] Are you aware that Commander Chitty was under Captain Willoughby?—Yes, perfectly.

5023. And consequently when there was a difference of opinion, Captain Willoughby held one opinion, while his subordinate, Commander Chitty, under whom Mr. Outridge was, held apparently a very different one?—I have no doubt that Captain Willoughby had very good grounds for arriving at the conclusion at which he arrived as to the man's character.

5024. Chairman.] Do you know what those grounds were?—I happen to know the grounds, because Captain Willoughby mentioned them to me; but I forget what they were.

5025. Had you ever any relations with Mr. Outridge?—Personally I had no relations with him.

5026. You have had no means personally of knowing his character?—I formed my opinion of his character from what I have heard of him since.

5027. I think, from a reference to the accounts, it appears that really more purchases would be made in Egypt by Major Stansfeld than by yourself?—I think to a greater amount probably; I have given you, as far as I can gather from the papers which have been sent to me, an account of all the purchases which I made.

5028. Is it not also correct that the main portion of the supplies drawn from Egypt would be for animals' forage?—There was this supply of flour which I have mentioned.

5029. With that exception, I think, it is pretty nearly altogether for animals, is it not?—With that exception, it is pretty nearly all for animals.

5030. You mentioned that you bought 25,000 rations of barley of 6 lbs. each; and inasmuch as 200,000 rations, or nearly 1,200,000 lbs., were bought at the same price by Major Stansfeld, it is quite clear that you had only bought personally a comparatively small quantity?—A very small quantity. That rate was, as I understood, the rate which had been previously fixed under Colonel Kennedy's arrangement, and we continued it, thinking it was, perhaps, under

all circumstances, the best arrangement we could make.

5031. It has been stated that the agent of an Electric Telegraph Company came from Alexandria to Suez to see you with a view to arrangements for a telegraphic communication, and that he waited all day without being able to see you at Suez, and had to go back to Alexandria without seeing you, what explanation can be given of that?—You take me rather by surprise. I suppose this is one of the gentlemen who wanted to force himself upon me without saying what he wanted.

5032. Do you remember Mr. Virnhard, agent for Reuter's Telegram Company at Alexandria, calling upon you?—I recollect that he came to see me, and sent his card up, without saying what he wanted to see me for. I looked upon him as one of those people who wanted to take up my time needlessly, and it was a day when I was very busy indeed, and had not time to turn round at all. I said that I was very sorry that I could not see him, and I sent him a message to that effect. Afterwards, Lieutenant Leuckhardt said to me, "Here is a man I once knew, named Virnhard, who was once in the German Legion with me," and I saw him afterwards in the courtyard of the hotel, and said, "I am very sorry that I could not see you to-day," and he did not say a word about business.

5033. Captain Beaumont.] But he did see you?—I did not see him at the time he came to see me, but in the course of the evening I met him in the courtyard of the hotel, and I got Lieutenant Leuckhardt, who was under my orders, to introduce him to me, and he certainly made no statement about business.

5034. Chairman.] He did not introduce his business to you in the evening?—Certainly not.

5035. Sir J. Hay.] Could he have had any special business with you?—My impression of the matter was, that he just wanted to tout me to get some information about what was going on with the Expedition to send it to England as a private speculation of his.

5036. Is he the agent of Reuter's Telegram Company?—He is the agent of Reuter's Telegram Company.

5037. And his business was to collect notes of the Expedition, I presume?—His business was to collect notes of the Expedition.

5038. And he went to you, I presume, with the object of getting the news and transmitting such news as he could get?—Certainly. Such is my impression.

5039. And you did not give him any?—I did not give him any.

5040. Chairman.] Another statement is that the feeling in Alexandria was that the Indian officers were unapproachable, except by the very few gentlemen who surrounded them, was that so?—I have stated how pestered I was. If that was the case I am unable to account for it. They did not appear to me to show any shyness. It was with the greatest difficulty that I could get any time to myself at all.

5041. Sir John Hay.] Is there any further statement that you would like to make to the Committee?—I would wish to say this. At the commencement of my examination the Chairman asked me about Mr. Fredericksen, and what inquiries I had made. I do not know whether I said in my answer then that I considered

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considered that the recommendation of Mr. Frederickson from Mr. Oppenheim, who was a notoriously big banker in Alexandria, was quite a sufficient guarantee to me as to his credit and respectability, and it was upon the information which I received from him, and from my knowing that Mr. Frederickson was associated with other gentlemen through whom I had heard of his capabilities for business, that I employed him, and I certainly had afterwards no reason whatever to regret having done so. I consider that the purchases which I made through him were made as economically as any.

5042. As a matter of fact, it is not of much use having transactions in Egypt without having recourse to persons who are supposed to have the ear of the government, is it?—I believe so.

5043. And Mr. Oppenheim is supposed to have the ear of the government, is he not?—Mr. Oppenheim is supposed to have the ear of the

government, and is a man whom I looked upon as a most satisfactory guarantee.

5044. And you knew that with Mr. Oppenheim's support, the government would throw no impediment in the way of your getting your things done at the time, or with regard to the quality of them?—Quite so.

5045. *Chairman.*] With regard to quarantine do you know what time vessels are kept in quarantine, supposing the necessity for quarantine should arise?—I have not known vessels kept in quarantine more than 10 days, but Colonel Staunton, when he told me about the Sanitary Commission, said that they would put on a long quarantine, which would be a most disastrous thing. He it was who mentioned the circumstance to me in reference to the supplies which were being furnished.

5046. Did you ever know a quarantine longer than 10 days in Egypt?—No; I am not aware of any quarantine having been established.

Tuesday, 14th June 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Colonel Barttelot.
Mr. Baxter.
Captain Beaumont.
Mr. Candlish.
Mr. Eastwick.
Lord Elcho.

Sir James Elphinstone.
Sir John Hay.
Sir Stafford Northcote.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. Charles Turner.

JOHN CANDLISH, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Major General Sir CHARLES WILLIAM DUNBAR STAVELEY, K.C.B., called in; and Examined.

Maj. Gen.
Sir C. W. D.
Staveley,
K.C.B.
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5047. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE you had a command in the Abyssinian Expedition?—Yes.

5048. You were second in command to the Commander in Chief, were you not?—I was second in command, and I commanded the first division.

5049. Had you anything to do with the preparations in Bombay?—Nothing more than being president of a committee to decide upon the number of regimental followers; and I consulted with Lord Napier as to the proportion of men to occupy each tent; also as to the description of tents to be employed. I think that was about all.

5050. Was not the number of followers originally contemplated by Lord Napier, ultimately increased?—I do not know. We had not the same number of followers as we should have had if it had been an expedition in India. The regimental followers were reduced as low as we thought practicable.

5051. What other followers besides regimental followers were there?—There were the transport train, with the organisation of which I have nothing to do.

5052. What was the number of regimental followers?—I could not tell that. You will find it all, I think, in Captain Holland's book.

5053. Could you state to this Committee the object of the committee on which you served, and which determined the number of followers?—It was to reduce the number of regimental followers to as low a number as we thought was absolutely necessary.

5054. Did you reduce it?—We did.

5055. By what number?—I do not remember.

5056. Do you remember the original number intended by Lord Napier to be taken?—No, I do not.

5057. When did you receive your appointment to the command which you held in the Expedition?—I was gazetted on the 25th of September 1867.

5058. When did you sail from Bombay?—I forget the date of sailing; but I arrived on the 6th of December.

5059. Who was in command in Abyssinia before your arrival there?—Colonel Field was the executive commanding officer. The day before I arrived, or two days before I arrived, Brigadier General Collins had arrived at Zulla; but he had not had time to do anything at Zulla itself. Colonel Field, with the reconnoitring party, was up at Senafé.

5060. Colonel Field was supreme until Brigadier General Collins arrived, and then you superseded both as chief in command; was that so?—Colonel Field acted under the orders of Brigadier General Merewether.

5061–2. Will you describe to the Committee the state of matters on your arrival, and what called for your special attention; what you found amiss, and especially what you found bearing upon the inquiry of this Committee; namely, the large expense of the Expedition, as compared with the original estimate submitted to Parliament?—The principal thing was that the mules arrived before the muleteers, and there was nobody to take charge of them. There was also a want of water; that is to say, the want of men to water the animals and take charge of them.

5063–4. To what extent did you find the state of things which you mention; what number of mules, for instance, were there, and what was being done towards their care?—The mules were all over the place dying for the want of water and forage, and for the want of being looked after.

5065. Do you know when the first mules arrived?—No.

5066. Do you know what number had then arrived?—No.

5067. Could you state approximately what number had arrived?—I could not say approximately; I had the numbers on paper, but have not got them here.

5068. Should we be right in assuming 10,000 as the number?—No, not so many.

5069. Then was there no provision for the care of the mules on your arrival?—There were not men enough to take care of them; but simultaneously, with my arrival, a number of troops arrived, and I ordered the troops to take charge of the mules. I sent skirmishing parties all about the country to catch them, and to take charge of them; to act as muleteers, in fact.

5070. What number of troops had preceded you in Abyssinia?—I do not remember the number, but it was the advanced brigade, Colonel Field's brigade, which numbered about 1,000 men, or under.

5071. Who was responsible for the state of things which you found when you arrived there?—The senior officer.

5072. Would that be Colonel Field?—Colonel Field would act a good deal upon what General Merewether

Merewether ordered or required him to do, because General Merewether was the diplomatic head of the Expedition.

5073. I presume we are not to understand you to say that the care of those animals was the work of the diplomatic head; it would rather be the work of the military head, would it not?—The advanced brigade with Colonel Phayre, the Quartermaster General, General Merewether (or Colonel Merewether, as he was then), and the senior officer, Colonel Field, all went up to the highlands, and there was hardly any responsible head at Zulla, that I could see.

5074. Was it not a mistake on the part of the officer in command to quit Zulla, without leaving behind him an adequate controlling power, with due responsibility for the executive work necessary under the circumstances?—I thought it was a mistake and that one of the superior officers ought to have remained behind there.

5075. Do you know how long the state of things which you found at Annesley Bay had continued?—I should say that it would be from the time when the advanced brigade went up to the highlands, but I do not remember the time. I do not know how long that would be.

5076. Do you think it was a month?—I could not tell you. It was before I arrived.

5077. Will you more particularly describe the state of things which you had to remedy when you arrived there?—I employed a number of men to catch the mules first, and told them off to take care of them, to feed them, and to water them. I appointed sanitary officers at Zulla and in the pass to hire Shohos to burn all the dead animals, for I was afraid of an epidemic.

5078. Could you appraise the damage done through the want of supervision and the neglect of which you speak?—No, I could not say how many mules died.

5079. Was it thousands?—I could not say how many had died before I arrived; I should think a thousand at least had died, but how many more I do not know.

5080. You had an epidemic amongst the animals upon which I think you reported?—There was an epidemic amongst the animals upon which I reported.

5081. Did you attribute the epidemic to neglect, or to what other cause?—I should attribute the deaths both to neglect and to the epidemic.

5082. But to what should you attribute the epidemic?—It was an epidemic, as I ascertained from the chief of the place there, which occurred always during certain months.

5083. Did the epidemic succeed your arrival, or did you find it prevalent on your arrival?—It succeeded my arrival.

5084. Then the deaths of which you have spoken, and the evils incident thereto of animals remaining exposed and unburied, all occurred before the epidemic, did they not?—Yes.

5085. And although there may have been an epidemic indigenous so to speak, yet you also attribute, as I understand, its occurrence then to the deaths of which you have spoken?—I forget when the epidemic began, but the first cause was the want of men to look after the animals.

5086. Sir J. Hay.] As soon as you arrived you obtained persons to look after the animals; had a superior officer been there, would he have been able, as you were, to obtain that labour, or did that labour arrive with you?—That labour arrived with me.

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5087. So that you had additional means of providing for the care of the mules to those which the officer had who had been in charge before your arrival?—Yes.

5088. *Chairman.*] I suppose the means you had were the soldiers that went with you?—Yes.

5089. If the soldiers who advanced with a responsible officer in command had, instead of advancing, remained on the coast, that responsible officer would have had similar means to those which you had of taking care of the animals, would he not?—No, because the troops which he had all went up to the highlands.

5090. But I put the hypothesis, if they had not gone up, but had remained on the coast whilst the animals needed their care, he would have had the same means of caring for the animals which you had, if the officer had remained on the coast?—Yes.

5091. Or if he had left a sufficient number of troops on the coast?—Yes.

5092. He had troops enough with him to have taken care of the animals had they remained on the coast, had he not?—Yes.

5093. Mr. *Seely.*] May I ask if the officer advanced in accordance with Lord Napier's instructions?—My belief is that Lord Napier did not intend the advanced brigade to advance to the highlands when they did.

5094. Is there not reason to believe that it was in opposition to Lord Napier's wishes?—Lord Napier did not anticipate that brigade going up to the highlands at all; I was to have gone up to the highlands with my brigade.

5095. In consequence of the troops going up so early, was there not more difficulty in getting them supplies?—Of course there was.

5096. *Chairman.*] Do you know what number advanced to the highlands with the officer in command?—I do not remember the exact number, but there were from 600 to 1,000 men up there.

5097. Who was the officer in command when that advance was made?—Colonel Field was the commanding officer under General Merewether.

5098. Lord *Elcho.*] Was he the officer responsible for the premature advance?—He was the executive commanding officer. I visited Senafé when I was in command, to see how matters lay, and I held Colonel Field responsible for the safety of the force up there.

5099. *Chairman.*] Did you complain to Colonel Field of the state of things which you found on your arrival?—No; the reconnoitring party, so called, was ordered by Lord Napier to be broken up on my arrival.

5100. Did you intimate to Colonel Field that you held him responsible?—Responsible merely for the protection of the force by means of outposts, and so on, at Senafé.

5101. Did you hold him responsible for the state of things which you found on your arrival?—No.

5102. Can you tell the Committee what number of men there were on your arrival tending those animals: they would not be altogether left to their own sweet will, would they?—A good number of animals had been taken away up to the highlands, and were continually employed going backwards and forwards carrying the supplies for the advance. The troops would otherwise have starved.

5103. There would be some officer, if only of a subordinate

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subordinate rank, I presume, in charge of the mules upon the coast; what officer was there?—There was a captain of the military train, Captain Twentyman.

5104. Do you know the number of men under him?—I do not.

5105. Was the number very limited?—Yes; as fast as men were available they were marched away with mules, and they took them away and used them, in fact.

5106. Do I rightly understand this to be your description of the state of things as regards the mules, that they were unattended; that they were roaming at large over the plain between the coast and the highlands, or, as you said, "all over the place;" and, by "the place," do you mean the district of low land between the coast and the mountains?—Within a morning's ride.

5107. Did that apply to all the animals not at work, but carrying on supplies to the advance?—Every mule for which we could find a muleteer was employed.

5108. And all the rest were at large; should I be right in supposing that there were 5,000 mules at large?—I could not state the numbers.

5109. Could you give us an approximate idea of the number employed?—I think you will find the number employed at that time in the book recently published by Major Holland. It is so long ago that it is impossible to remember all these details.

5110. Then those at large would be the number landed less the number employed, would they not?—Yes, and less the number that had died.

5111. I presume that this state of things would be remedied before Lord Napier arrived?—Yes, it was very soon remedied.

5112. When did the epidemic among the animals set in?—I do not remember. It was before Lord Napier's arrival.

5113. It was after your arrival, and before Lord Napier's arrival, was it not?—Yes.

5114. Have you any knowledge of the cost of an animal imported into Abyssinia, say, from the Mediterranean?—None.

5115. When did you advance from the coast?—I do not remember the date, but it was after Lord Napier arrived.

5116. You went in advance of Lord Napier, did you not?—I arrived in advance, but I left Zulla a considerable time after he left. He left me in charge there when he advanced.

5117. He remained some time on the coast after his arrival, did he not, organising the transport train?—He did.

5118. Did you find anything at all that you could call by the name of a Transport Train on your arrival?—Hardly.

5119. Did you take with you men for the purpose of working the Transport Train?—No; I went in a ship without followers.

5120. Then the troops which you found on the coast would not be able to advance in the absence of a Transport Train, I presume?—No; they could not advance.

5021. How long do you consider that the lack of a Transport Train detained you there?—I do not remember.

5122. But you had not been able to organise it on the arrival of Lord Napier a month after you?—No.

5123. It had been a part of your duty, I presume, during that month, to organise the Transport Train?—To do what I could.

5124. Had the materials for its organisation reached you when you arrived?—No.

5125. Did they come in bit by bit?—Yes.

5126. Did they come in along with the troops?—No; they came by dribblets.

5127. If you had planned, arranged, and organised a Transport Train before leaving India, would not that have added very materially to the facilities of your advance?—Yes; but there was not time, I fancy; I do not know what the arrangements were.

5128. The Expedition was resolved upon in August, was it not?—Yes.

5129. When would you say that it went to Abyssinia in force?—The commencement of the arrival in force was when I arrived there.

5130. And you left Bombay in the latter part of November, did you not, three months after the Expedition was resolved upon?—Yes.

5131. Had that intermediate time been utilised in organising a Transport Train, would there not have been time to have brought it up to a state of efficiency?—The muleteers had to be brought from different parts of the world, and they must have been assembled somewhere to organise them.

5132. Did not a considerable portion of the Transport Train proceed from Bombay?—I believe some did; I think that those men who went from Bombay had all charge of animals, but I am not certain.

5133. Had the three months been used for organising such materials of the train as you had there, and teaching them their duty, would it not have been an advantage on their arrival in Abyssinia?—They did what they could in that way.

5134. Are you aware as to that?—I am not aware.

5135. What were the difficulties in the way of the Transport Train in Abyssinia?—Want of organisation.

5136. Were there not special difficulties in the way of organising it?—One difficulty was that the people did not understand what was said to them.

5137. The officers did not understand the men and the men did not understand the officers; that was so, I believe, to a large extent?—Yes; but that was remedied afterwards when the Persians and Egyptians were exchanged for Indians.

5138. Then one defect in the preparations would be, as I understand you now, in not sending an adequate number of muleteers with the first shipments of mules?—Yes.

5139. Did not a very large number of muleteers come from Egypt?—Yes, but they were worthless.

5140. Did they come with the mules?—I do not remember.

5141. Would it not have been the duty of the transporting officer to have taken care that the proportion was maintained between mules and muleteers in every shipment?—I do not know what the arrangements were. It depends upon what his orders were.

5142. You cannot conceive, I presume, that he would have orders adverse to an arrangement such as I have mentioned; if you had been the officer responsible, you would not have sent on mules without sending on muleteers, would you?—I might have had muleteers ready to receive them.

5143. Do I understand you to say that the officer

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officer shipping from Egypt would expect muleteers from some other quarter to receive the animals on their arrival in Abyssinia?—The officer in charge in Egypt might have had orders to purchase the mules and send them off as fast as possible, without any orders as to who was to take care of them when they got there; but I do not know how that was.

5144. Then the authority giving them that order would also be bound, would he not, to make provision for their reception in Abyssinia?—That is self-evident.

5145. Would not that follow inevitably?—Yes.

5146. Who was responsible for the purchases in Egypt, and for the arrangements in the first instance?—I do not know.

5147. Would it be the Government of Bombay or the Commander in Chief?—I do not know.

5148. Would it be the one or the other?—I know nothing about it.

5149. The state of things which you describe was remedied on the arrival of the Panjáb muleteers, was it not?—It was remedied by employing the troops in doing the muleteers' work, to look after and water the animals.

5150. You stated, did you not, that the muleteers who came from Egypt were worthless when they came?—Yes.

5151. Do you apply that generally, or do you make any reservation; was that universally so?—Generally, with regard to the Egyptians and Persians, it was so. We got work out of them, but it was very unsatisfactory work. They would only take charge of three mules, and they insisted on riding one, and do what we would we could not get them off them.

5152. And you found them so inefficient and mutinous, I believe, that very early you found it necessary to send back some thousands of them?—I urged Lord Napier to send them back as fast as ever he could get them replaced by Indians.

5153. Did you succeed in getting supplies of Indians?—Yes.

5154. And had that course been pursued earlier, would you not have been saved the loss, and delay, and destruction which you had to endure through the worthlessness of those men?—Yes, provided the Indians had arrived in time.

5155. Sir P. O'Brien.] There would have been no difficulty in organising a cooly corps in Bombay, would there?—I do not know.

5156. Mr. Seely.] I think it has been stated to the Committee, that many of the mules from India died in consequence of the bad form of the pack saddles; are you aware of this?—Some of the pack saddles were bad and some were good.

5157. They were not of one uniform pattern, were they?—No; they were of different patterns.

5158. Were the greater part of the pack-saddles of a good pattern?—Yes; a large number were good, especially the English ones.

5159. Were the English pack-saddles all of the same pattern?—I think so.

5160. Sir S. Northcote.] What they had is called the Otago pattern?—Yes.

5161. Mr. Seely.] And that answered very well, did it not?—Yes; but even the Otago saddle would injure a mule's back if he was in bad condition. An animal, if in bad condition, would suffer from any saddle.

5162. But were the Otago saddles, in your
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opinion, as good as any which could have been sent out?—Yes.

5163. *Chairman.*] Throughout the campaign there was a very large expenditure of mules, was there not?—Yes; there was an expenditure of mules.

5164. Are you aware that some 55,000 animals were landed in Abyssinia, and that only 7,000 odd left Abyssinia?—I could not account for that.

5165. You would call that loss excessive, would you not, seven-eighths of the whole number being lost?—Yes.

5166. In general terms, to what would you attribute that very large loss of mules?—To neglect in the first instance, hard work, insufficient food, and the epidemic.

5167. And want of attendance, I think; you never got them thoroughly attended to, as you would have wished, throughout the campaign, did you?—No.

5168. Do you know what number the epidemic carried off?—No.

5169. Lord Elcho.] Do you mean want of food in consequence of the absence of food, or from the want of people and attendants to give them food on the spot?—Frequently from the actual want of food.

5170. Did it also arise from the other cause?—It arose principally from the want of food.

5171. *Chairman.*] And that want of food would be the consequence of an imperfect transport train, would it not?—No; because you could not take food all the way to Magdala for your animals.

5172. It was not for want of food on the coast, was it?—It was not from want of food on the coast.

5173. Sir J. Hay.] A mule, I suppose, would have eaten his load before he got to Magdala?—The mule would have eaten his load long before he got there.

5174. *Chairman.*] Consequently you had to depend upon the food of the country for the animals, to a very large extent, had you not?—Yes; I do not think that any Expedition ever had to provide food for its own animals on the march.

5175. How far do you think the animals were fed by food from the coast?—As far as Senafé.

5176. Beyond Senafé, were they in the main fed by the produce of the country?—Yes.

5177. Senafé is about one-fifth of the distance to Magdala, is it not?—Yes, it is between 60 and 70 miles.

5178. So that along four-fifths of the march the animals were fed in the main by the food of the country?—Yes, as far as regards grain.

5179. Lord Elcho.] But I understood you to say that that was the part where food was deficient, and that they were not fed, and that they died in consequence?—That was so everywhere; but before Senafé, even in the Pass, there was a difficulty in carrying forage for the animals.

5180. *Chairman.*] Had the animals been tolerably fed up to Senafé?—I do not say that, because of the difficulty of carrying forage for the animals. It was bad enough to have to carry supplies for the troops, without having to carry supplies for the animals that carried the food for the troops.

5181. Beyond Senafé, that is to say along four-fifths of the march to Magdala, such food as the animals received was, in the main, received from the country, was it not?—Yes.

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5182. Sir J. Hay.] Did the country produce it abundantly?—No, not abundantly; insufficiently; sometimes we had not a feed for the animals at all.

5183. Then, as I gather from your answers, the country did not supply sufficient food, and it was too far to carry it from the base of supplies?—Yes.

5184. And therefore, as regards the insufficiency of food, you do not attribute blame to any person?—No.

5185. It was one of the characteristics of the Expedition, was it?—Exactly.

5186. Mr. Eastwick.] Lord Napier stated that it was owing to the carts that he was able to advance at all, and that had he not had carts, the advance of the whole force would have been impossible. I suppose the carts were able to carry sufficient food to feed the animals and to give something over?—The carts carried a great deal more than the mules could carry in proportion; two mules drew what it would take perhaps 10 or 12 mules to carry.

5187. Chairman.] With regard to the feeding of the troops, did the supplies for the troops come, in the main, along the whole line of march from the coast, or were they drawn to any material extent at any point of the march from the country?—We got a good deal from the country.

5188. Speaking in general terms (as I presume you cannot define it very accurately), how far would you say that the troops were fed from the coast?—We received supplies both from the coast and from the country all the way up.

5189. Do you think that you received supplies from the coast to any extent beyond Dildi, the last central station?—I could not answer that question; whether it was coast produce or country produce after passing Dildi, I do not remember.

5190. Magdala itself stood upon the summit of a rock, did it not?—Yes.

5191. And it might be held to be almost inaccessible, might it not?—Yes.

5192. If its supplies had been sufficiently large, it might have held out, if defended, against a heavy attack for almost any length of time, and might have been made nearly impregnable, might it not?—With European troops it would have been so, I think.

5193. Are you aware whether it had any water supply within itself?—Nothing to signify.

5194. The water was derived from a gorge, or a plain below, was it not?—Yes; but the water was on both sides.

5195. Would you have had any difficulty in cutting off its water supply?—If we had had troops enough to surround the place there would have been no difficulty.

5196. Is it correct that there was more than one source of water supply?—Yes.

5197. Do you remember how many there were?—There was a source of water supply on the side where we were, and also on the opposite side.

5198. Did they draw their supplies from both?—From both, I think.

5199. Sir J. Hay.] Speaking of Magdala being held by European troops, or troops which might be compared with Europeans, the investment of such a fortress would have required a very large army, would it not?—It would have required a great number of men.

5200. Can you say roughly how many men it

would have taken to invest Magdala if it had been held by respectable troops?—It depends upon the exits from Magdala, the means of getting out of it. You would require two forces, one on one side and one on the other, at least.

5201. You would have required for that purpose a much larger force than you had up there, would you not?—That depends upon what enemy was likely to attack you.

5202. I was asking you as a matter of information, because the question of the amount of troops taken up has been one which has been before this Committee, and we should like to have your military opinion as to the investment of Magdala, which naturally arises upon the question whether the water supply on both sides could have been cut off if Magdala had been held by respectable troops: supposing that Magdala had been held by respectable troops, European troops, how many men would you have required to invest it?—That depends upon how many men there was a chance of their being able to sally against me. It would depend upon the force that was inside or outside.

5203. Had the force which held Magdala been composed of European troops instead of being composed of Abyssinian troops, how many men in that case would you have required to invest it, so as to cut off their water supply and starve them out?—That depends upon the strength of the force inside Magdala.

5204. Chairman.] You knew that there were not any European troops to meet you there under Theodore's command, did you not?—But we did not know how many men Theodore might bring against us from the outside.

5205. You knew that he could not bring any Europeans, did you not?—Yes.

5206. You knew beforehand very much the state of things at Magdala through the communications with the prisoners there, did you not?—Yes.

5207. You knew the geographical characteristics, too, did you not?—We had been there some days, and we could see pretty well from the opposite side of the ravine.

5208. Before you left Bombay, the geographical features of Abyssinia were in some degree known, were they not?—In some degree.

5209. Did you know the state of things as regards the water supply?—No.

5210. You knew also from time to time, approximately, the force which Theodore had under his command, did you not?—No.

5211. Was not that known to the Commander in Chief?—I think not.

5212. Sir S. Northcote.] With reference to the question which was put to you just now as to the command of the force, will you allow me to direct your attention to the Papers which are to be found at pages 439 to 443 in the Blue Book, presented to Parliament in 1867, with regard to the Expedition force; you will observe that in those Papers instructions are given for the dispatch of an expeditionary force; what is the date of the first of those Papers?—Fifth of September 1867. It is a communication from the Quartermaster General of the Bombay army to the Political Resident at Aden.

5213. That was Sir William Merewether, as you are perhaps aware?—Yes.

5214. Those instructions which are there given provide for the constitution of an expeditionary force, which was to make certain inquiries and preparations

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preparations for landing; under whose command was that force placed?—According to this Paper, General Merewether commanded that force.

5215. Perhaps you are aware that local rank had been given to Colonel Merewether (as he was then) for the express purpose of enabling him to take such a position as might be assigned to him in the Expedition?—Yes; but he always acted in the diplomatic line.

5216. Subsequently to your arrival in Abyssinia he did so; but previously to your arrival, or, at all events, at the time of the dispatch of that expeditionary force, was he not in command of that portion of the force?—It appears by these Papers that he was so.

5217. Do you find that in one passage, which I have marked, that the officers belonging to the force are desired to follow his instructions, and that he is held responsible for the guidance of that party?—Yes.

5218. Looking at one or two passages which I have marked with regard to the objects of that force, do you observe that it was for the purpose of selecting a place of landing and exploring the vicinity in order to find the best road up to the highlands?—I have read that.

5219. So long as that force continued under the command of Colonel Merewether, was he not responsible for prosecuting both those objects, taking care that neither was unduly sacrificed to the other; I mean the objects of making preparations for debarkation and of exploring the country?—He was the responsible person, according to the instructions which you have laid before me.

5220. Colonel Field was not a member of that expeditionary force, was he?—He was the executive commanding officer.

5221. Was Colonel Field with this force which went with Colonel Merewether in September?—Not in the first instance: General Merewether went with a very small party, about a company strong.

5222. When Colonel Field went subsequently, did his authority supersede that of Colonel Merewether, Colonel Merewether, as I have reminded you, holding the local rank of brigadier general?—He, as a brigadier general, was the senior, and of course was responsible for the command.

5223. His responsibility, then, was not removed by the arrival of Colonel Field, was it?—No.

5224. Then, up to the time of your arrival, Colonel Merewether was practically the officer responsible for the arrangements, was he not?—Yes.

5225. And, as I have already observed, he had a twofold duty to perform; the important duty of preparing for the reception of the force, and the equally important duty of exploring the country and ascertaining what was the best route into the highlands and negotiating with the chiefs?—Yes.

5226. A reference, I observe, has been made in former evidence to the question of the employment of local transport, and it has been stated (by Mr. Markham, I think) that our system of transport broke down because we had recourse to native transport; amongst the points referred to in the Memorandum communicated to Colonel Merewether on the 14th of September, was he not desired to obtain information as to the arrangements that were practicable for securing the transport of supplies by local carriage from the coast for such distance inland as might be safe for such description of carriage?—It appears

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that that was so by the Papers published in the Blue Book.

5227. Therefore it appears, does it not, that from an early date it was contemplated that we should have local transport, and that our arrangements were made with reference to that?—It would appear so.

5228. Mr. Eastwick.] With regard to the water at Magdala, did you yourself see the sources from which the water was got?—I saw two sources, but not both sides; I saw two sources on this side, and I was informed that they got their water from the other side also.

5229. Most likely from several sources in a similar position?—I suppose so.

5230. Supposing that there had been really a warlike enemy in the fort, could they not have protected those sources by rifle pits, or by some sort of earthwork, if they had been hard pressed and invested?—Of course they would have taken the best means they could of protecting the water supplies.

5231. A European force could, I suppose, to a certain extent, have protected those sources by rifle pits?—It depends upon the position in which the water was. If the sources were down in a hollow, you would have to take possession of the heights which surrounded the hollow.

5232. You saw where they were, and you therefore would be able to judge, would you not, whether there were means of protecting them by the garrison?—The garrison would have had to have portions of troops detached from the fort to protect them.

5233. Do you think that could have been done from the garrison?—It is a question which requires more consideration than I have time to give to it at the present moment.

5234. Lord Elcho.] You have said that two mules in carts could draw what 10 mules would have been able to carry; what description of cart was used?—Maltese carts.

5235. What weight were they adapted to carry?—Ten hundredweight.

5236. Were they sent out from this country or from India, or were they made at Zulla?—They were sent from Woolwich.

5237. Is that the cart which is now generally used in the army for transport purposes?—No; I think they were made on purpose for the Expedition.

5238. Is it a good pattern?—Very good, for a rough country.

5239. So that in rough countries or in smooth countries, the transport ought to be by carts rather than on packs?—Where roads are available, certainly.

5240. The saddle, you said, was the Otago saddle?—There were several patterns of saddles.

5241. Which do you consider the best pattern?—The Otago or English saddle.

5242. Sir J. Elphinstone.] There was a very large accumulation of stores, was there not, at Annesley Bay, in anticipation of the campaign proving a protracted operation?—I believe so, but I do not know what the amount was.

5243. Do you think that there was an excessive amount of stores accumulated there, taking all contingencies into view?—We did not know how long we might have to stay there, and it was very necessary to have a very abundant supply.

5244. Do you consider that the supply was in any degree more than in due prudence, with regard to the contingencies of the Expedition, ought

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ought to have been accumulated?—It never struck me that it was so.

5245. Are you aware that the Bombay Presidency was ransacked for muleteers, and that everybody was sent forward in that capacity whom they could get?—I know nothing about it of my own knowledge.

5246. Had the campaign been protracted, in the event of any epidemic breaking out in Abyssinia, so as to induce Egyptians to shut their ports against you, there was a great risk, was there not, of your having to fall back entirely upon India for supplies?—I know nothing for certain of those matters.

5247. Captain Beaumont.] Did I rightly understand you to state that, in your opinion, the scale of the Expedition was not larger than it ought to have been, in the first place, with reference to the number of fighting men?—I have not expressed any opinion upon it as yet, but I do not think that it was larger than it ought to have been. I think that the larger the Expedition was, provided you could feed the men, the more certain was it to succeed.

5248. You make rather an important proviso in saying, "provided you could feed the men"; do you think that the result of the Expedition showed that that number of men could have been satisfactorily fed, only a very small proportion of the whole having succeeded in reaching Magdala?—We did feed them, and that was all that was required.

5249. Did the men receive full rations; I speak especially with reference to the advanced force?—They were on a reduced ration for a time.

5250. Were the arrangements such as to enable Lord Napier to have looked upon that difficulty of feeding the men as only temporary; or, had Magdala not fallen, would there not have been a very grave apprehension of the force being (perhaps "starved" would be a strong word) put upon short commons?—I commanded a separate column from Lord Napier, and I knew very little of what was going on at the last as regards the rationing of the troops. We were separated, and it was necessary that we should be separated on account of the difficulty of watering men and animals. I mean that on arriving at a spring, of course it would be more difficult to water a large force than it would be to water a small one.

5251. Did not your position enable you to know practically what was going on at the front?—In a degree it did.

5252. Would you be good enough to give me your opinion as to whether there was any probability of the troops being short of provisions had the war been protracted?—We were on short commons at one time. There was uneasiness on the part of the Commander in Chief as to supplies coming up; but the uneasiness was caused more on account of the interruption of the supplies coming up by the native chieftains and people.

5253. But supposing that Magdala had not fallen at the time when it did fall, and that Lord Napier had been obliged to remain before the place for, say, two or three months; or supposing that another contingency had arisen, and that Theodore had not retreated upon Magdala, but had left Magdala in his rear, would there not then have been a very grave apprehension of the end of the Expedition being defeated owing to a want of provisions?—I could not tell you.

5254. Would you give me your opinion as a

military man upon that point?—It would have been a very serious thing if we had been obliged to remain there for some time.

5255. And therefore it was almost necessary, was it not, for the happy conclusion of the Expedition which was arrived at, that Magdala should be taken by a *coup de main*, and that Theodore should have acted in the fortuitous way for us that he did?—Yes, it all turned out very luckily for us, as it happened.

5256. Supposing that Theodore had acted in any other way except that, should we not have been placed, even with the force which we had, in very great difficulties?—My idea is, that the want of supplies, if there had been a want of supplies would have arisen from their being interfered with in coming up by the hostile chiefs, and from jealousy on the part of some of the people in carrying the transport for us.

5257. Have you formed any opinion as to whether a flying column, which cut itself off from the sea, was a reasonable way of looking at the question, speaking from an earlier date, when the Expedition was organised?—I think it would have been a very risky measure.

5258. Why do you think so?—On account of the difficulty of supplies and of the contingencies which might arise.

5259. From your previous answers, I gather that there was a very serious difficulty in the way of the Expedition as it was organised, owing to the difficulty of obtaining a sufficient amount of supplies; in the face of that difficulty, it would appear to be a natural sequence that it would have been a wise policy to have reduced, rather than to have increased, the number of mouths that had to be fed; is it not the fact that there was no opposition which could reasonably have been anticipated from the natives, which a couple or three regiments of English troops could not have overcome?—I think that there was no opposition simply because we were in such force that they did not dare to show any opposition.

5260. Would not a smaller number than you had have enabled you to take up a similar position with regard to them?—I do not think so, considering that we had 37 posts of communication to keep open and command all the way up.

5261. I am assuming that the force cut itself off from its base of supplies, and subsisted upon the country; and I would ask you to bear in mind that the supplies for a small number of men like 2,000 or 3,000 without followers, are a very different matter from the supplies necessary for an army of 13,000 or 14,000 with followers, and on the scale on which this army was sent out?—Yes; but if you had only a small force the natives might have withheld their supplies; it was our strength, I think, which induced the natives to come in and assist us.

5262. Would you say that the reason why a flying column should not have been used, would be that it would not be in sufficient force to enable you to draw supplies from the country, and that you could not have obtained them by force?—Exactly. The Naib of Arkiko, in the neighbourhood of the town of Zulla, asked me why we had not sent a larger force to command the respect of the natives upon the high lands. I adduced this as a proof of the necessity of having a large force to gain respect from the natives.

5263. Do you consider that the scale on which the Expedition was organised was such as practically to have ensured success; or was not success rather

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rather commanded by the want of strategical knowledge on the part of the Emperor Theodore, and the extremely happy arrangements which we found that we were able to make with the tribes on the line of march?—I think that the strength of the force was what it ought to have been; and, at the same time, that everything turned out very fortunately.

5264. Had we had against us such an enemy as the Sikhs, for instance, do you think it would have been possible for the force, organised and numerically as it was sent, to have taken Magdala; that is to say, if there had been a reasonable military opposition, would it have been possible, with a force organised as our force was, to have reached Magdala in the time it did?—I would ask the honourable gentleman whether he is asking the question on the supposition that the whole country, from the place of our debarkation up to Magdala, was occupied by Sikhs?

5265. Would it have been possible to have marched 400 miles through that country under the circumstances which subsisted there, against any reasonable, or against the mildest, military opposition; it is not a fact, that they might have picked out on the 400 miles, say, 50 places where a handful of 50 or 100 resolute men might have stopped the Expedition?—No doubt. If the whole country had been occupied by Sikhs, we could not have advanced with the force we had.

5266. And against a reasonable military opposition you could not have advanced?—Yes.

5267. Am I to gather that, to sum up, it is your opinion that the scale of the Expedition was not too large, either with respect to supplies or with respect to men or followers; but that generally speaking, the size of the Expedition was warranted by the circumstances of the case?—It was not too large as to troops. Had we known that we could have got on, we might have gone with less followers; but as to the supplies, I do not know.

5268. Have you no opinion to offer as regards supplies?—Not as regards supplies.

5269. I do not, of course, wish to press you for an opinion; but I should like to have one, because you rather give me the impression that the supplies were on an unusually large scale?—I do not know what the supplies were; I do not know what supplies arrived or were taken away again. Being continually in command of a column separated from headquarters, I had not the opportunity of knowing what was doing in the way of supplies at the base of operations.

5270. With respect to the followers, were they on a large scale?—There were more than were necessary, and we sent them back to India when we found we could do without them.

5271. In point of fact, the scale on which the Expedition was organised with respect to followers was reduced; and the reduced scale was in accord with your idea of what should have been adopted from the first; was that so?—It was reduced to the least number that we could possibly get on with.

5272. Could it have been foreseen from the first that such a reduction would be necessary?—I think not.

5273. Lord *Elcho*.] I think you stated, with reference to the followers, that you yourself had been a member of the committee which fixed the scale of regimental followers before the starting of the Expedition?—Yes.

5274. That scale you fixed at less than the

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Indian scale, did you not?—Yes, we fixed it at what we thought they could just get on with as regards efficiency.

5275. Did you find that you had fixed the regimental scale higher than was necessary when you arrived in Abyssinia?—We found that we could not get on, and it became a matter of serious moment to get on somehow, and we sacrificed convenience for what we could just get on with.

5276. If you were going on a similar expedition again to any country, as far as you knew, similarly conditioned, do you think that you would fix a different scale from what you fixed in this instance from Bombay?—It would depend upon what sort of expedition it was. I should certainly give an officer his native servant if I could, whereas we sent all the officers' servants back, and made them do the best they could with the soldier servant, who was a fighting soldier in the ranks. It was a very inconvenient arrangement, but we did it.

5277. Looking to all that has taken place, do you think that you fixed the scale of regimental followers too high originally?—No, we did what we thought was for the best.

5278. Sir *J. Hay*.] With regard to the question of the servants, would not the ordinary conditions of an ordinary campaign have afforded the services of servants to the officers and of other followers to the army which the army might have fairly calculated upon receiving?—Yes, in India.

5279. But under the very special circumstances, where everybody saw the advantage of sacrificing those conveniences, the army gladly made that sacrifice, did it not?—Exactly.

5280. In ordinary circumstances, and before those exceptional circumstances arose, would you, as an officer commanding an army, have expected that sacrifice to be made as good humouredly as it was unless under the very exceptional circumstances which showed to everybody that it was necessary?—Exactly.

5281. And therefore, under those very exceptional circumstances which were proved to the army at that time by the actual facts before them, you called upon them to make a sacrifice, which you would not have contemplated in the original plan of the campaign?—Exactly; everybody was most anxious to succeed, and they would have put up with anything rather than that anything should prevent them from getting on.

5282. But it was not an ordinary sacrifice which you would call upon troops to make in a campaign, was it?—No; I mention officers' servants as one item.

5283. You speak of grass cutters, and all the various persons who are attached to an Indian army, I presume?—Yes.

5284. Lord *Elcho*.] With reference to the taking of Magdala and the liberation of the prisoners, by means of a flying column instead of an Expedition organised as this was, and of similar strength, I would put this question to you: with the knowledge which you had, and which anybody had of the country, and of what had to be done, do you think that any person connected with this Expedition, either in ordering it or in conducting it, would have been justified in undertaking such an Expedition in the way that has been suggested, namely, through the means of a flying column?—I think not.

5285. Mr. *Eastwick*.] Do you think that the want of opposition on the part of the natives was owing

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owing to their utterly unwarlike character, or more to their being impressed with the efficiency of our force?—They were impressed with the efficiency of our force.

5286. Captain *Beaumont*.] With regard to the future rather than the past, you found the railway, I believe, of very great service, did you not?—Yes.

5287. And you would consider, perhaps, that it would be very desirable indeed, with a view to future operations, that the plan and general scheme with reference to a railway for military purposes should be cut and dried so as to have it on hand the moment it was required, in place of having, as was the case with reference to the Abyssian Expedition, to get the plan from where we could?—Yes.

5288. With reference to the telegraph, have you any opinion as to whether it would or would not have been a matter of very great importance to have had Zulla in direct telegraphic communication with London?—Certainly.

5289. Do you feel very strongly, from a military point of view, that that would have been a matter of very great importance?—No doubt.

5290. *Chairman*.] You are aware that a million of money was spent in Abyssinia; could you give the Committee any general information as to how and why such a large sum was spent?—Shohos were employed in making a road from Zulla to Weeah and Hadodah, watering-places for mules, under Mr. Dufton, and they received so much a day for their work. The burning of mules came under my knowledge, and we hired Shohos to bring in brushwood, and so on, to burn them with. The whole of the animals from Senafé forward were entirely fed by barley from the country, and grass from the country, all of which was brought in by natives, and paid for by us. Large quantities of the supplies for the troops were carried forward by native carriers, each of whom received so much for each trip; I think a dollar for one march. There were presents made to different chieftains. A number of boats were employed to bring stones for making the pier; there was not a stone to be found in Zulla, and it was all brought from an island about 10 or 14 miles off; all those boats had to be paid for, and the men who worked them. A number of mules and camels were purchased in the country, and all the beef and mutton for the use of the troops was supplied from the country. A number of bullocks were hired to carry transport backwards and forwards. Those are all the sources of expense that occur to me at this moment.

5291. Does not it surprise you that so large a sum as a million was spent there, taking into account the fact that everything that the Expedition was supposed to need, and everything that could be anticipated as necessary, were supplied to it, and conveyed with it to the country?—I think you will find that all these matters which I have stated come to a large amount of money; but whether they come to a million or not I cannot tell you.

5292. But you have learned that so large an amount was spent in Abyssinia?—You tell me so.

5293. When did you leave Abyssinia?—On the 4th or 5th of June 1868.

5294. Did you anticipate that such a long time would elapse before the force could leave the country, Magdala having been taken on the

13th of April?—I think we left in very reasonable time.

5295. There were ample supplies on the coast, were there not?—I do not know what were the supplies on the coast.

5296. You had reason to believe that there were ample supplies on the coast?—I did not know for certain.

5297. Had you at that time an impression that the rations failed to come to the front through the inability of the Transport Train to bring them in sufficient quantities?—The direct interruption of supplies was caused by the interference of the natives, because at that time the transport was coming up a good deal by native carriage as well as by the Transport Train.

5298. When you speak of interruption by the natives, do you not mean rather failure of the natives employed in the Transport Train?—No, I mean interference on the part of the natives of one tribe against another.

5299. Do you remember what tribe that was, and where it was, because I do not think that the Committee have had that in evidence before?—All I know is that General Merewether and another officer of the Diplomatic Service were sent back to arrange matters with the natives to get on our supplies.

5300. Was that a continued interruption or a temporary one only?—A temporary one only.

5301. How long did that continue?—A very short time.

5302. Do you remember where it was?—It was where we were halted before we attacked Magdala, on this side of the Batchilo.

5303. Did you ever suffer any inconvenience from the hostility of the native princes?—No, except interruptions of this nature.

5304. Was it a formidable interruption?—The feeding of the troops depended upon it.

5305. The feeding of the troops would depend upon the supplies coming up, I presume?—Yes.

5306. Was it possible to have stored any very large quantity of provisions at Senafé during the spring of 1868 before the rain set in?—It depended upon the means of transport.

5307. But, with the means at your disposal, was it possible to have stored any very large quantity of provisions there?—I do not know what the means were behind after I advanced from Zulla.

5308. The troops in the highlands would have always had access to Senafé, and could always have fallen back upon Senafé, I suppose?—Yes.

5309. They might not have been able to have fallen back upon the coast?—Exactly; on account of the Pass being filled with water.

5310. Are you able to speak of the extent to which provisions might have been stored at Senafé with the Transport Train that you had?—I have stated before that I do not know what was the strength of the Transport Train between Senafé and Zulla.

5311. According to the plan of the Commander in Chief in the conduct of the Expedition, a very large quantity of stores, viz., a six months' supply, was necessary at Senafé?—He wished to have a large store there.

5312. Do you know how long it was possible that you might have been cut off from the coast by the rains?—I do not know for certain.

5313. Did the rains set in before you left?—The Pass had been filled and our road destroyed before the force returned. There was one flood.

5314. Any

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5314. Any stores accumulated on the coast would have been useless for feeding the army in the highlands during the time that that road was interrupted, I presume?—The road might have been only temporarily interrupted, or you might have got supplies up by another road.

5315. Was there any other access to the highlands than the one which you used?—Yes; there was a road by the Haddas Pass; but that might have been stopped up by the rains also, for aught I know.

5316. Was not that subject to exactly the same conditions as those which operated in the case of the other pass?—Probably.

5317. Besides those two passes was there any other?—I expect that the natives could get backwards and forwards without going up and down that pass, but I do not know.

5318. Was it not reported by General Meredith that these two passes alone were available for the army to reach the highlands?—Yes.

5319. Sir J. Hay.] I suppose that if the army had been at Senafé, on the highlands, you would rather have had the provisions at Zulla than in India, and you would have devised some means for feeding the army, even though the Pass was occasionally blocked with water?—I should think the natives had pathways down the sides of the mountains to get to Zulla.

5320. You mean that provisions would have been brought up to the army, although the army could not have been marched down to the provisions?—Quite so.

5321. Chairman.] You would suppose that possible?—I should suppose it possible.

5322. Sir J. Hay.] That is one of the difficulties which I suppose a general would endeavour to overcome, and probably successfully?—Yes.

5323. Chairman.] But if the communications had been cut off it would have made very little difference whether the stores were at Zulla or at Bombay, would it?—If you could not possibly get at them, it would not have made any difference.

5324. Sir J. Hay.] But you did not contemplate that it would have been impossible to get at them, and you would rather have had them at Zulla than at Bombay, I presume?—Quite so.

5325. Colonel Barttelot.] It is not a question whether you would rather have them at Zulla or at Bombay; but it was absolutely necessary, was it not, that they should be at Zulla for the safety of the army?—Quite so; the nearer the supplies were to the army the better, of course.

5326. But was it not the bounden duty of those in authority to see that there was a sufficient store of supplies at Zulla for the army in case it was detained, whether the roads were washed away or not?—Quite so.

5327. Chairman.] In sufficient quantity?—In abundant quantity.

5328. With regard to the fittings for the animals, the halters and tethers that came on from Egypt, did not the animals eat them all, and was not that one of the reasons why they got all astray?—They gnawed them, and they got astray.

5329. What were these halters made of?—I do not remember now, but I only know that they were not made of chain.

5330. Were they not very defective and unsuitable?—They were made of rope of some kind.

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5331. Not of leather?—I never heard of their being made of leather.

5332. If they had been made of leather, would the losses have resulted which did result from the strain?—I am sure I do not know.

5333. Colonel Barttelot.] When you entered upon this Expedition you, of course, had not the slightest idea when you would be able to return?—No.

5334. Therefore it was absolutely necessary, was it not, that you should be provided with sufficient provisions?—Yes.

5335. Do you know what was considered to be the amount of provisions that ought to be at Zulla?—I believe Sir Robert Napier wanted to have six months' provision in advance always there.

5336. Therefore, with that requisition it was absolutely essential that those provisions should be found and sent there, was it not?—Yes.

5337. Supposing that those provisions had not been sent and had not been there, and that you had been detained in Abyssinia, would not the Government of Bombay, and those who were responsible, have been in a very awkward and difficult position?—Certainly.

5338. Would not the people of this country have been excessively angry and indignant that the chance of any failure should arise because there were not sufficient provisions for the army?—Certainly.

5339. And therefore it was the bounden duty of the authorities to comply with that requirement, and to have six months' provisions there, was it not?—Yes.

5340. With regard to one or two questions that were asked by my honourable and gallant friend opposite, I think you stated that, considering the nature of the Expedition, you could not have done with a smaller force than you took to Abyssinia?—I think it was a proper force to send there.

5341. Of course when you went there you knew little or nothing of the country, or of the force that you would have to contend with?—We knew very little what was going to happen.

5342. And I presume that you considered that the force which you did take was sufficient, even supposing that you had met an enemy who would have opposed you?—Such an enemy as we expected.

5343. I think the questions of my honourable and gallant friend rather went to show that if there had been any opposition you could not have succeeded; what is your view as to that?—It depends on the respectability of the force that we went to attack. Had they been an army like the Sikhs, as the honourable and gallant Member said, of course we would have required a larger force.

5344. But from all the calculations, and from all the knowledge and information that you had been able to obtain, you considered, and Lord Napier considered, that the force that you then took was the right force to take for the Expedition?—Quite so; I fully concur in Lord Napier's idea of the force.

5345. Do you not also think that, in a country like that, it would have been a very dangerous and unwise proceeding to have detached a small force, either to take Magdala or to advance far alone into a country such as that?—Yes; we might also have had to detach a force from the main body.

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5346. Had

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5346. Had you not also to consider that it was a very changeable and extraordinary climate, and that you might have had to be there upwards of six months?—Had we been there during the rains we should have lost a great many men, I believe, from dysentery, which is the prevailing disease of the country during the rains.

5347. And therefore, in an uncertain expedition like that, you were bound to be provided with a sufficient number of fighting men, were you not?—Yes.

5348. Lord *Elcho*.] So that even now, with the wisdom that comes after events, you see no reason for believing that the Expedition, either as to number of men or as to the supply of provisions, was on an excessive scale?—Not in regard to the number of fighting men, although, with the knowledge that we now have after the event, we might have gone with fewer followers, because we reduced them afterwards.

5349. But you still think that the army was not in excess, and that what Lord Napier wished, which was six months' provisions, was not in excess of the supply of provisions required for that army under the circumstances?—No; I think it was better to be over-supplied than to be under-supplied.

5350. Captain *Beaumont*.] Judging after the event, with the army of strength of which it was, had the circumstances, which might very reasonable have been looked for, necessitated the remaining of the force for six months before Magdala, they would have starved in all probability, would they not?—I do not know what the arrangements were for supplying.

5351. *Chairman*.] You say that six months' supplies was a reasonable quantity to have in store at Zulla, do you not?—Yes.

5352. Would not that depend upon the time necessary to get fresh supplies to Zulla?—If we were to be there during all the rains, it was necessary that we should have supplies up there to feed the troops while they were on the highlands.

5353. But would not the true basis upon which to estimate the necessary quantity be the time in which you could get the necessary supplies to Zulla, either from Egypt or from Bombay, as the case might be?—But you could not get the supplies up there during the rains.

5354. Would not the quantity of stores necessary at Zulla depend upon how long it would take to bring fresh supplies to Zulla?—If you had six months' supplies at Senafé, I would not care what was at Zulla.

5355. On what ground do you say that six months is the right time?—On account of the duration of the rains.

5356. But supposing that you could not get the supplies into the high lands, and that you had to come to Zulla for them, in that case on what ground do you suppose six months' supplies to be necessary?—I think that you require six months' supplies ahead for any force.

5357. Although you might be within a month of fresh supplies for any quantity?—Nobody could tell how long we should be there; but six months, I think, was a very moderate time to anticipate that the force would have to remain there.

5358. Although you might, by way of hypothesis, be within a month of any quantity of fresh supplies?—We never could tell that we were within a month of our supplies. I should like to have the supplies actually in the country if I commanded a force.

Captain FREDERICK EDWARD BLACKETT BEAUMONT, R.E., a Member of the Committee;
Examined.

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5359. *Chairman*.] You are an Officer of the Royal Engineers, a Member of this House, and a Member of this Committee?—Yes.

5360. You and I went to the Mediterranean and India together, where we gathered facts concerning the Abyssinian Expedition?—Yes.

5361. You desire now to give some evidence obtained during that journey, do you not?—I do. In submitting the information which the honourable Chairman and myself obtained during our recent visit to India, I am anxious to state that I do not offer it as evidence; and that where it would appear to be condemnatory of any person or procedure, I, as a Member of this Committee, should be unwilling that it should be accepted as evidence without the Committee having the opportunity of hearing what might be said in justification. I offer it solely with a view to enabling the Committee to judge whether they can report satisfactorily without further increasing the scope of their inquiry.

5362. You saw Mr. Macdonald, of the firm of Sir Charles Forbes & Company, bankers, at Bombay, and you had a conversation with Mr. Macdonald as to the supply of money to the Bombay Government for the uses of the Abyssinian Expedition, had you not?—I had.

5363. What was the nature of the statement which he submitted to you in answer to the inquiries which you put to him?—He told me that, on behalf of his firm, as representing several

wealthy native capitalists and themselves, on hearing that the Indian Government wanted temporary accommodation (it was then supposed about a crore of rupees), he saw the Accountant General, and proposed finding the necessary funds at 5 per cent. in exchange for promissory notes of the Government. He said that, after some conversation on the subject, the Accountant General asked him if he could not negotiate a loan at a less rate, to which he replied that, looking to the abundance of money, he might probably succeed at $4\frac{1}{2}$, if not 4 per cent. Mr. Macdonald informed me that, before leaving, he was led to believe, from the conversation that passed, that the Government had already arranged with the Bank of Bengal; that he knew that the directors of the Bank of Bombay had been applied to, but the bank being then on the verge of liquidation, the directors were unable to supply the wants of the Government. He said that the offer was verbally made, and that its date was about September 1867.

5364. Was he prepared to advance the money at once?—Not all the amount. He told the Accountant General that he should want three or four days to make arrangements. For a long date he informed me that he should not have thought of trying to negotiate the loan at 4 or $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., and that the accommodation was believed to be required for a few months only.

5365. Would he have objected to a shorter period


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period than four or five months?—He informed me that the intention was to employ money, which at that period of the year, and for some months afterwards, is always, as a rule, plentiful.

5366. Would he have objected to a month's loan?—He was afraid that a month's loan would have been objected to. He would have hesitated undertaking the negotiation of the loan for any period less than two months. He was not certain as to the rate at which the Government borrowed money from the Bank of Bengal; but his impression was that it was at the rate of 6 per cent. The time at which I questioned him, was after the date when the transactions to which he referred took place. He informed me that the conclusion at which he had arrived, as to the arrangement for the advance having been already made by the Government with the Bank of Bengal, was founded upon the conversation generally, of which, at that distance of time, he could not give the particulars; but that he felt very strongly, that the refusal of his offer to negotiate the loan was based on the matter having been stated to have been previously arranged with the Bank of Bengal.

5367. Did you ascertain from him the condition of the Bombay market as to the supply of money?—I did; and he informed me that money was decidedly plentiful. He gave me copies of Sir Charles Forbes & Co. Commercial Circular, Nos. 40 to 50, dated from the 24th of August 1867 to 29th January 1868, from which it appeared that the money market was very easy. On the 9th September and afterwards, the nominal rate on loans secured by Government paper was 6 per cent; but money was easily obtained on this security at 4 per cent. He said that he knew of no reason which would account for the Government paying 6 per cent. for money wanted under the circumstances that obtained during the latter part of 1867.

5368. Sir J. Elphinstone.] Did this gentleman know the terms upon which the Government borrowed the money eventually?—I cannot say whether he did of his own knowledge; but it was a matter which was patent in Bombay, and I should feel every confidence in stating that it was known.

5369. Sir J. Hay.] It could be easily obtained from the Indian Office, I suppose?—Quite easily. I think that the rate at which the money was obtained was known in the market.

5370. Chairman.] You saw Captain Darrah, of the Royal Engineers, Bombay Army, at Poonah, did you not?—I did.

5371. You had some information from him respecting the steps taken to construct a railway in Abyssinia, and as to the character of the railway, had you not?—The arrangements for supplying the plant were all made in Bombay. Captain Darrah was the engineer charged with the construction of the line in Abyssinia.

5372. And from him you received information as to the character of the plant sent out there, and the difficulties which he had in dealing with it, did you not?—I did.

5373. Sir P. O'Brien.] He had nothing to do with the supply of the plant, had he?—He had nothing to do with the supply of the plant, and he did not know until he got to Abyssinia that he was to be employed in the construction of the line.

5374. Chairman.] What was the nature of the ground?—The nature of the ground was ascer-

tained by a survey made under his orders, which was completed by the end of December, having been begun about a month before. The line was not then laid out, and the earthworks were begun about the beginning of December. He informed me that it was all flat ground for the first six miles, with hardly any earthwork to do. The rails were begun to be laid on that part in the end of December, and the six miles were complete in about two months, that is towards the end of February. The line was completed up to as near Kumeli as it got by the first week in April. With reference to the completion of the first portion, he said that the delays were owing to various causes, such as the plant not having arrived, and it having occasionally been stowed at the bottom of a ship full of other stores. Through a portion of the necessary plant having been wrecked in the Red Sea (he remembered especially some half-inch augers and spikenails); to having to straighten bent rails; also to the fact of the description of rails and fastenings being various. Furthermore, in some cases he said the holes in the fishplates and rails did not agree.

5375. Did that result in a stoppage in the work and inconvenience in carrying it on?—No doubt; because they had no time to re-drill the fishplates, but they sorted the rails and plates as best they could to make them suit; nor could they always get their material as quickly as they required it, owing to the landing pier being wanted for other purposes.

5376. What number of men did he inform you that he had employed?—He had at his disposal between 300 and 400 men of the Army Works Corps, consisting of coolies collected in Bombay; amongst them there were native platelayers from the railways.

5377. Did they come properly equipped for their work?—They arrived without tools, and the whole of their rationing was, in the first instance, controlled by officers who should have been on the line. This resulted from a want of commissariat arrangement. The work was delayed also on account of the occasional want of drinking water, the scarcity of which sometimes interfered with the gangs getting to their work. A great part of the work, he informed me, was done by a wing of the 23rd Panjabis, who worked well, and by practice attained considerable facility. They were ordered to the front, and the work was proportionally delayed. Their average speed was one mile a week; the working force on the line was a wing of a native regiment and 300 or 400 of the Army Works Corps.

5378. Did you receive from Captain Darrah any information with respect to the nature of the plant sent?—I did. There were various descriptions of rails sent, namely, 30-lb. rails, 45, 50, and 65-lb. rails. The gauge was $5\frac{1}{2}$ feet, which was, in his opinion, unsuited to the requirements of the case; that is to say, he thought you would get a much quicker result, and for army purposes a better result, by using a diminished gauge. The limiting radius was 300 yards, which he considered was necessary, as the wheel base of the rolling stock was so long. The limiting gradient, he informed me, was fixed at 1 in 60, owing to the imperfect condition of the locomotives. He said that the gradient of 1 in 60 and the curves were settled by Lieutenant Willans and himself, and that the question of curves and gradients did not arise till, by previous working over the flat, they

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they had had some experience of the capabilities of the rolling stock. The Committee will remember that the first six miles of the railway was over the flat, and that the difficulty of gradients and curves would occur when they got off the flat on to the higher land.

5379. What was the character of the engine power?—Captain Darrah stated that the engines weighed 20 tons, and were not powerful enough for the heavy gradients necessary at the end of the line. The tubes of the locomotives, he said, had constantly to be taken out; the boilers, too, were frequently burnt, from the men letting the water get too low. He stated that the locomotives were towards the end of the Expedition in such bad order that after three or four days' running, they regularly required to go into the shop for repair; the brasses and journals were very much worn from the dust, and he said it would have been of immense importance if any protection could have been afforded them.

5380. I believe you had it from another source that the length of railway required up to Kumelí was about 13 miles; have you understood that the quantity of rails sent was for a much longer distance?—Yes; 20 miles of railway was sent (counting the plant of different patterns). There was, therefore, plenty of material to have gone to Kumelí in place of stopping some distance short, but the line was not carried on as in the first place, by the road it was some half or three-quarters of a mile to Kumelí, while by the railway it would have been one mile and a-half, and the rolling stock was getting in such a state that, bearing in mind the fact that the gradient was 1 in 60, only a very moderate load could have been carried to the terminus. At the end of the Expedition an engine could only take seven truck loads up to the terminus, which, after leaving the flats embraced some mile and a-half of 1 in 60 gradient. Of course there were other minor gradients. Captain Darrah informed me that the sizes of the cylinders of the locomotives were 15 inches. He also told me that when one of the engines arrived, a pair of its wheels was found to be out of gauge, and a spare pair had to be put on. I would submit to the Committee that the gist of this evidence with reference to the locomotives and plant supplied is to the effect that they were eminently unsatisfactory; and no doubt had precautions been taken to supply proper locomotives and plant, the line might have been taken up to Koomaylee, a very much greater amount of work might have been performed, and the line might have been in working order much earlier.

5381. You have given us some information respecting the rails, and respecting the engines; have you any further information respecting the waggons and rolling stock generally?—Yes, Captain Darrah reports that the axles were worn a great deal from working in iron boxes; as they came from Bombay, the greater part of the wagon axles were working iron on iron. Some spare boxes of a proper pattern were sent afterwards, enough for all the plant which was in use. There was not at first a sufficient number of waggons, which proved, till additional ones came, a great source of delay, as we had not enough to keep the engines employed. There were four engines landed, two at first and two subsequently. Captain Darrah thought another was sent, but it was never unshipped. One of these locomotives he informed me was a six-wheeled coupled

engine, which he kept exclusively for the flat part of the road. They tried it once on the curves and gradients; passed the first six miles, and then it got off the line. This, he said, was not a peculiarity of its action on the curves only, as this engine frequently got off the line on the straight parts, and it was never quite right even to the end. The wheels were reported by the locomotive superintendent to be too rigid in their bearings. He stated that the performance of this engine on the incline was such as to make it useless otherwise than to the six-miles station, which would be the end of the flat portion of the line.

5382. Did he indicate to you a different character of railway which would have been more useful?—His opinion was, that if rolling stock had been supplied capable of going round a curve of 50 yards radius, and with engine power to work up a 1 in 40 gradient, they could have got to Kumelí and done the work in less than half the time. He further informed me that a lot of old rails had been sent, which had been used in the Karáchí harbour works, and which had been destroyed by the salt water, and had to be taken up a month or two after they had been put down, the flanges actually dropping off.

5383. With regard to the railway chairs, did he give you any information?—With reference to the chairs, he said there were two kinds of joint chairs, one of cast iron and one of wrought iron, the one of wrought iron being so badly made that it had to be adjusted by spiking; the 65-lb. rail he said had to be fixed in its place by means of the ordinary cast-iron chair.

5384. He told you that water pipes were brought to the country, did he not?—He did; he said that the water was supplied from wells and that it was such as could be drunk, but that it left a very thick deposit in the boilers. The pipes which ought to have been used for carrying water to Zulla from Kumelí, did not arrive till nearly the end of the Expedition. He told me that they were stacked near Zulla and never taken to Kumelí, or laid, but that he did not know why they were not taken to the front. The pipes are what were known technically as cast iron with spigot and socket turned joints, and they could have been laid down almost at any speed.

5385. What was his view as to the pier accommodation?—He thought that there was a great want of pier accommodation, especially at first.

5386. Did he regard it as a loss and inconvenience that they had failed to complete the line to Kumelí?—He thought that had there been locomotive power sufficient it would have been decidedly of advantage to have taken the line on to Kumelí; and that there would have been no danger of its being carried away by water from the torrents, as they could have selected ground which the water could not have touched; but at the same time, he stated that his duties were such, that he never had time to go up to Lower Suru, and so he could not speak of the difficulties which the ground would have presented between that point and Kumelí; but he was of opinion that the line could be carried further had a narrow gauge and proper rolling stock been supplied.

5387. Did you ascertain from him the cost of the railway?—Not from Captain Darrah, because he would not be in a position to know it. The cost


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cost was got from Colonel Kennedy, and it is proposed to call him; but we have a return of expenditure which will be submitted to the Committee.

5388. Have you that return?—I have.

5389. Will you put it in?—I will. (*The same was delivered in, vide Appendix.*)

5390. Lord *Elcho*.] Had Captain Darrah personally much experience in railways, before he was intrusted with this one as engineer on the spot?—I think not, and I think that was a very great mistake which was made. The Government ought to have sent some person who was conversant with the laying and the working of a railway. The haphazard choice of an officer who happened to be available, for so important a duty as that, was a mistake, in my humble judgment.

5391. To that Captain Darrah was, as far as you know, selected, not in consequence of any previous experience which he had had, either in the management of railways or in the laying of rails, but simply because he happened to be the engineer officer on the spot available for such a service?—That is my impression, but I could not speak quite positively.

5392. Would not that fact, to a certain extent, invalidate his evidence, as to the state of the rails and what was necessary, and the condition of the plant, and so forth, as he probably had not any very accurate standard of comparison, in his own mind, or knowledge of what was best under the circumstances?—With due deference to the noble lord, I would venture to submit that any officer of engineers could undoubtedly give an opinion as to whether the plant was in serviceable order or not; and on such a broad point as that I hope that there is not such a thing as an engineer officer who could not speak with perfect confidence. The working of the line and the laying of it down is another matter; but as to whether the plant was or was not good, I fancy that any engineer officer of any standing would be able to give an opinion.

5393. Do you think that Captain Darrah was at all aware, or are you aware of the sources of supply in the way of plant for railways which were at the disposal of the authorities?—I do not; I doubt Captain Darrah's being aware of it, but I think that I am aware to a certain extent.

5394. Did you inquire into those points, as to whether better plant than that which was sent was available at short notice?—I did; and I should like to put in some information which I obtained from Mr. King, which bears upon that point.

5395. Who is Mr. King?—Mr. King is the acting storekeeper to the Great Indian Peninsular Railway, which is the largest railway undertaking, certainly in Bombay, and I think in India.

5396. And you saw this gentleman?—I saw this gentleman.

5397. Did Mr. King give you any information as to the amount of railway plant which was available at Bombay?—He did not, as regards Bombay, because he could not speak with reference to Bombay generally, but he spoke with reference to what his company, of which he was the storekeeper, had. He informed me that the Great Indian Peninsular Railway Company could have supplied at the time of the fitting out of the Abyssinian Expedition, say, 20 miles of perma-

nent way, materials complete; that they had that amount in their workshops, and that it would not have seriously delayed their work to have complied with the requisition to that amount, as they could have replaced it in sufficient time to have prevented their feeling the want of it; they had then a large stock on hand.

5398. *Chairman*.] Did you ascertain from him what his idea of the permanent-way materials was?—I did, and he said he had rails all of one pattern, double headed, 68 lbs. to the yard, fish plates, ready for fixing; bolts, spikes, and chains with wooden keys and sleepers, also points, crossings, and signals. In fact, he told me that the Great Indian Peninsular Railway Company could have furnished the whole line complete, but without rolling stock.

5399. Was all that material immediately available?—So he informed me.

5400. Would they have supplied the rolling stock?—With a certain amount of inconvenience it could have been supplied, assuming that it was the 5 feet 6 inch gauge, which was the Indian gauge, and that was the gauge of the railway which was sent.

5401. So that the gauge for which they could have supplied rolling stock was the actual gauge which was adopted in Abyssinia?—It was. He further said that if a similar gauge had been chosen, all the permanent-way material would have been available without alteration, except the sleepers, and that even the sleepers would not require cutting unless objection was taken to the extra length. I put that question to him because I think that it is worth consideration whether the rolling stock should not have been purchased from England, the permanent-way materials and all that which was necessary for the completion of the fixed part of the line, being obtained in the quickest way, which, doubtless, was from Bombay. It would have been necessary, in order to carry out that idea, to have had some rolling stock sufficient to have enabled them to go on with the completion of the line, and therefore I asked Mr. King whether he could not have supplied some narrow-gauge trucks or waggons sufficient to have enabled the formation of the line to go on, waiting receipt of rolling stock from England. He told me that by stopping their own work, which would only have been a question of money, they could have turned out 53 waggons in the first month, and that they could have turned them out afterwards at the rate of 200 waggons a month. I wanted further to find out from him how long it would have taken him to supply the smaller number of waggons which would have been necessary to enable the first portion of the line to be made. Assuming that 12 waggons would have been necessary to have started the construction of the line with, he informed me that the 12 waggons might have been supplied, six in the first week, and the remaining six in three or four days afterwards, so that I judged from that, that practically there would have been no delay owing to the difference of the gauge of the waggons being supplied between 5 feet 6 inches, and the reduced gauge.

5402. Speaking on your own professional view of the case, have you formed an opinion as to whether or not it would not have been a great economy, and have led to the formation of the railway at a much earlier period if it had been drawn from England?—I think it would, decidedly; but before giving an answer as to the amount

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amount of economy in point of time, which would have been effected, I think that it would be necessary to make some inquiries of the leading manufacturers, to whom Messrs. Brassey, or the other firms who offered to undertake the work, would have applied.

5403. Sir J. Elphinstone.] Are you aware that the Great Indian Peninsular Railway Company was under a contract to finish their works within a certain period?—No, I am not aware of it.

5404. Do you not suppose that if they had drawn the Government into such a bargain as this they would have made them pay very severely for it?—I have no doubt that they would have had to pay severely; but I have equally no doubt that the amount of money that they would have been called upon to pay would have been insignificant as compared with the benefit rendered.

5405. Chairman.] From Bombay you went up to Karáchi, did you not?—I did.

5406. Whence did you proceed then?—I went up to Hyderabad, and there I saw General Merewether. I returned with him to Karáchi, and I had a great many opportunities of conversation with him. He gave me his views most freely, and I was very much indebted to him for the open way in which he answered all the questions I put to him.

5407. Will you state what information you received from him, of which you took memoranda, relative to our inquiry?—I asked him to give me his idea with reference to the size of the Expedition, confining my question, in the first place, to the number of fighting men. He informed me that the original proposition which he made was for a force of 10,000 men; but that this he was afterwards induced to modify to a force of 6,000 men to be actually engaged in Abyssinia proper, with a weak brigade of native infantry, as a reserve on the coast, and to assist in keeping up communications. He said he was still of opinion that that force would have been sufficient, and that he thought a careful investigation of the distribution of the troops sent to Abyssinia would prove that little more than that force actually commanded a success. I asked him what was the strength of the native brigade which he proposed; and he said he proposed three regiments of infantry, amounting in the aggregate, to 2,000 men, which would make a total of 8,000 fighting men; and that those numbers were on the supposition that there was ample time allowed to carry out the operations in one season, which could only have been insured by their being commenced directly the fine season opened in October.

5408. Did you not gather from him that, inasmuch as it did not commence in October, therefore the larger force might have been necessary?—I did, and the larger force which he considered necessary was the 10,000 men. He said that this extra 2,000 men would, according to his view, represent the increase necessary to the force consequent on the delay on the part of the Government in deciding on the Expedition on the 14th of August in place of in May, and he said that those extra men would have been required in consequence of the operation being confined within a more limited time than would otherwise have been the case, being of opinion, of course, that the quicker an operation of that nature could be carried on, the more men it would require, and he gave as a reason for that, that the general

would have been compelled to leave more connecting detachments, and to employ larger escorts than would have been necessary if longer time could have been allowed.

5409. That concurs, does it not, with the evidence given by the general who gave evidence to-day, that it would not have been practicable for a small force to have cut themselves off from their base of supplies and rushed on Magdala?—In answer to a question from me General Merewether said that he thought that a force of 2,000 men cut off from the sea coast would not have been a reasonably practical way of solving the difficulty, and he gave as a reason that a body of such a size entering a country totally unknown, and about the feelings of the residents of which we were only partially informed, would almost be tempting the masses of the inhabitants to turn against the force to check its progress, and so defeat the object which it had in view; I wished to get his opinion as to whether 2,000 men could, in open fight, consider themselves practically safe against any number of natives, and if that was the case how it would come about that the check to which he referred in his answer to a previous question would result; and he said that the 2,000 men could, in open fight, consider themselves practically safe against any number of natives, but that if once such a force were to fall into hostilities the whole country would be turned against them, and that a succession of combats would result, materially interfering with their progress through the country; and that the collisions so occurring would deprive them of the provisions which they might otherwise obtain from the country, and without which they could not advance. He meant by that reply that a very weak body might reasonably be considered to court attack. I wanted to get distinctly from him whether 2,000 men could have subsisted themselves in the country, and he thought that they could quite well have done so; that is to say that 2,000 men cut off from their base of operations could have provisioned themselves in the country, but only so long as they were in accord with the people of the country, and so long as they were well supplied with funds to purchase provisions.

5410. With regard to the size of the force actually sent, did you obtain any information from General Merewether?—I asked General Merewether's opinion as to the size of the force of about 14,000 men which was landed in Abyssinia, and the only answer I got from him was that it was what the Commander in Chief considered was necessary to ensure certain success. He thought at the same time (though he was not certain of it) that the demands grew a little from those which were first made. He was not able to say whether this increase was owing to information which was received from Abyssinia or not, but, at any rate, he knew of no altered circumstances.

5411. Did you get his view as to the number and organisation of the force, and whether or not he was consulted on the subject?—I did; and he informed me that the general arrangement as to the number and the plan of the campaign was formed before either he himself or Lord Napier had left Bombay, and that it was the result of a general consultation at Poona between the Commander in Chief and the Bombay Government, based on such information as they were in possession of, and that so far from his not having been

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been consulted, he was called from Aden for that special purpose. He agreed generally, he told me, with the scheme, with the exception of the number and the composition of the forces. I pointed out to him that out of the 14,000 men only 4,707 reached Magdala, and I asked him whether that was in accordance with any pre-arranged plan, and whether the scheme of the campaign, as carried out, was settled previously to the force landing at Zulla, alluding to the proposed distribution of the troops, either for keeping open communication, garrisoning posts, or for the actual attack on Magdala; and he informed me that the general plan of operations had been discussed, but that it was not settled at the time that he left Poona, and that the general plan which was proposed was the occupation of a secure base on the coast, the holding of an eligible position on the highlands of Abyssinia, and, as the force advanced, the leaving of strong depôts at intermediate points between the post on the highlands and Magdala. It was then, he thought, contemplated that the strong intermediate depôts should be two in number.

5412. He had an objection to the number of the force, and to the composition of the force; you have told us his objection on the point of numbers, what was his objection as to its composition?—He would have preferred to have taken native cavalry in place of dragoons. He further said that, as matters turned out, the field battery was not actually required, but that, had it been necessary to have stormed Fahla and Semlajee, the presence of their guns would have been of great advantage.

5413. Why did he prefer native cavalry to English cavalry?—I put the question to him, pointing out to him that the difficulty of transporting rations for a native is greater than for an Englishman, since the English eat meat, which is a produce of the country. He said, with respect to the first point, that the great difference of weight between the English dragoon and the native trooper, was a matter of considerable importance when working in a country in which supplies were scanty; and that the native trooper in India more easily helps himself than the English dragoon, who is taught to consider that he must always be taken care of. As regards the latter point, he said the cavalry consisted chiefly of Mussulmen, enjoying their bread and meat as much as their Anglo-Saxon brethren, and requiring it.

5414. Did he say that there was ever any reason to apprehend from the people of the country anything like an organised resistance, even putting the mildest interpretation upon the term?—No; he told me, on the contrary, that they had every reason to believe that they would have the cordial co-operation of the whole of Abyssinia to rid them of a tyrant of whom, as expressed to him by an intelligent Roman Catholic priest long resident in Abyssinia, the country was fatigued; and that it was holding this conviction strongly, that made him argue in favour of a moderate and well-equipped force, and of its power to command success in one working season of six months. He said that had not this been the case, it would have taken several seasons to have forced their way through such a difficult country, even with a greater number than actually went.

5415. Did you ask him his opinion as to his idea of the English Government on the point

that a force, such as would be sent, could accomplish this object in one or two seasons?—I did; and he informed me, that with the force sent, or even a greater one, had there been an organised opposition, the object could not possibly have been obtained in one season, and that they might possibly have been in the country now with an expenditure of more than 30 millions. I had asked him whether it was not plain to anyone conversant with the country, that success could not be reckoned upon, if any serious opposition on the part of the natives were met with.

5416. Did you ask him with respect to the scale on which the followers were sent?—I did. The camp followers were generally sent on the Indian scale. He considered that the reduction which was made when the camp followers were sent back, as alluded to by Sir Robert Napier at page 111 of the Blue Book, in his despatch, was greater than was compatible with efficiency, especially with respect to the grass-cutters of the cavalry, the want of whom was severely felt, but owing to the necessity of the occasion, and to the uncertainty which still attached to the possibility of obtaining a sufficiency of supplies on a-head, it was considered advisable to risk injury to the cavalry rather than take more mouths on; fortunately, he stated, the active services of the cavalry were not required, but he said that he would not recommend such a risk ever being run again.

5417. Did you speak to him with reference to the climate of Abyssinia, because if it was European in its character, it would not appear how the dragoons were differently circumstanced in Abyssinia without syces, from what they would have been if employed in Europe, where they would have to shift for themselves?—I put that question to him, and he answered that the circumstances were not, he thought, clearly understood. Though the climate was European, the people of the country were exactly similar to all Asiatics. Their hay was not stacked in neat farm yards, from which the Europeans could go and purchase it, but it was scattered on the hill sides, from which it could only be obtained by means of grass cutters, or by a lengthy arrangement with the people of the country to bring it in, which had to be made after the troops had arrived on the encamping ground. The dragoon, or native trooper, having no syce, could not possibly clean his horse, do his guard duty, and go and cut grass besides.

5418. Did you draw his attention to the fact that, according to this view, European cavalry, without attendants, would be inoperative out of Europe?—I did, and he agreed with that view.

5419. Did you ask him any question with reference to the number of camp followers landed at Zulla, and whether the number was, in his opinion, in excess of the requirements, this view being supported by the fact of the return of so large a number of camp followers as was sent back?—I spoke to General Merewether, especially with reference to this point, and he told me that he did not think that the number of followers actually sent back was largely in excess of the requirements; he was decidedly not of opinion that you could carry on lengthened operations with the limited number of followers that accompanied the force from Antalo, and that although success was commanded by means of the admirable self-denial of every person concerned, officer and soldier, still

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still that it was at the risk of sickness and consequent weakening of the force which would render it dangerous to lay down such a course as a precedent.

5420. Did you ask him any questions as to the climate?—Yes, he informed me that the climate of the highlands was more European than Indian, and that that was foreseen as well as could possibly be the case. He thought that the provisions for the cold weather were tolerably complete, and that if the means for meeting the cold weather could have been carried the whole distance, the suffering which the native followers underwent would not have occurred.

5421. Did you ask him further about the supplies in Abyssinia?—I did; and he was strongly of opinion that the force on first landing should have been fully provisioned, and that they

should not in any way trust to what might or might not be got out of the country. The real base of supply he considered to be Bombay, transferred by means of shipping to Zulla.

5422. He spoke of the first landing of the Expedition; did he give you his view as to the provisions necessary for its after maintenance?—He did. With reference to the supplies which could be looked for from the country itself, he said that the information which he got was so doubtful that until they reached the highlands they could form no reliable judgment, and that all their knowledge was supplied by travellers who knew nothing of what the requirements of an army would be. He did not think generally that the scale on which the commissariat supplies of the army were made was in excess of what prudence would demand.

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MEMBERS PRESENT:

Colonel Barttelot.
Mr. Baxter.
Captain Beaumont.
Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Candlish.
Mr. Grant Duff.
Mr. Eastwick.

Sir James Elphinstone.
Sir John Hay.
Sir Stafford Northcote.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. Charles Turner.

JOHN CANDLISH, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Captain FREDERICK EDWARD BLACKETT BEAUMONT, R.E., a Member of the Committee,
further Examined.

5423. *Chairman.*] IN continuation of your evidence at the last meeting of the Committee, did you speak to General Merewether with reference to the arrangements for the supply of water at Zulla?—I did; and I pointed out to him that from the reports which had been sent from the Commanding Royal Engineer, and the Quartermaster General's Department, it would appear to be a fact that running water was available in plenty within about 16 miles of the camp; I asked him what steps were taken or suggested by the officers of the pioneer force for getting over the difficulty of a want of supply at Zulla, and whether they proposed to bring the water in by pipes, or whether they suggested the use of condensers; he replied that condensers were suggested as an immediate remedy, but that the supply of pipes was at once urged, and that he was not aware of the cause of the delay in the latter being forwarded. I further asked him whether the engineers, whom he had with him, gave a professional opinion as to the time within which water could be brought to Zulla in pipes, or whether they specified the particular description of pipes it was desirable to use; he replied that he had a perfect recollection that Colonel Wilkins, the Commanding Royal Engineer, who accompanied the reconnoitering party, drew up a statement, showing the advisability of providing pipes to bring water in from Adoda, Wah, or Kumeli; he stated that he was unaware of the degree of detail in which the proposal was submitted, but that he believed it was with all necessary particulars; he further remarked that the subject was certainly discussed between Colonel Wilkins and himself, and that the necessity of a speedy supply of pipes was recognised before their departure from the plains of Zulla; he referred to a letter of the 12th or 13th of November, pointing out the general requirements. He said that he was of opinion that if wrought-iron pipes could have been supplied from England in, say six weeks from the date of the order at the outside (as I thought they could have been if they had been ordered by him direct), which would have brought them on the ground towards the end of December, such an

arrangement would have rendered the use of condensers unnecessary, and he was further of opinion that it was difficult to over-estimate the extreme advantage to the force which a plentiful supply of water by pipes would have given, as distinct from the somewhat uncertain supply which could be obtained from condensers.

5424. Did he state that he was advised that the pipes might be laid at the rate of two or three miles a day?—He did.

5425. Did he also state that the bulk of the outlay for condensing water was incurred after the 1st of January?—After the 1st of January.

5426. He was of opinion, was he not, that there would have been other advantages than the mere money saved, in the greater supply to the troops and animals?—Clearly.

5427. Did you gather from General Merewether his views relative to the laying down of a railway for transport purposes?—Yes; in the letter from Colonel Wilkins, the Commanding Royal Engineer, No. 34, dated the 8th of October 1867, a demand was made for the supply of a railway, which was limited in its application to pier and camp purposes. General Merewether said that the necessity for a railway on a more extended scale was recognised so soon as the Senafé route by Kumeli had been decided upon. This was early in November; and that a strong recommendation was made on the subject to the Bombay Government, when the matter passed out of his hands. I further asked him, with a view of substantiating his opinion as to the desirableness of a railway, whether he from the first recognised that it was of the greatest importance to have a railway supplied early; and I gathered from him that he had no doubt as to the advisableness of such a course.

5428. But he did not conceive that it would have been well to have laid it beyond Kumeli?—He was a little bit doubtful, not on the ground of the desirableness of the railway, but simply from an engineering point of view, as to whether the railway could have been kept open. Captain Darrah's opinion to me on that point, I think, would be of more weight than General Merewether's, and he was, as I think I have said in

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my previous evidence, of opinion that ground might have been chosen had a narrow gauge railway been employed, which would have enabled the line to be taken round sharp curves; and which would have enabled the railway to have been kept permanently open.

5429. How far?—As far as the bottom of the Suru Pass, which is past Kumelí.

5430. How far past Kumelí is it?—I could not say offhand, but I think it is three or four miles past Kumelí. Under those circumstances I feel certain that General Merewether would have been the first to recognise the desirableness of such a course.

5431. I understand you to state that General Merewether had a very strong view as to the extreme importance and advantage of as much railway accommodation being provided as was possible?—No doubt; and so has every officer with whom I have had an opportunity of speaking.

5432. With reference to the storing of the stores on the beach, I think that one witness has stated to the Committee that the flatness of the land exposed the stores deposited at Zulla, and rendered them liable to the inundation of the sea; did you ask General Merewether whether it was so or not?—I did, and his opinion was rather that the ground a little more inland would have removed the depôt from the possibility of being flooded by water. He said he yielded, however, to the opinion of the commissariat officer, who thought that the advantage of having the depôt close to the shore outweighed other considerations. General Merewether informed me that the depôt at Kumelí was safe from the action of floods.

5433. Did you ask him any questions with reference to the supply of barges for landing purposes?—I spoke to him with reference to the supply of barges for landing purposes, and he said that there was a considerable delay in consequence of the want of supply; but that he believed that the Bombay Government were anxious that barges should have been provided, and he could not say why their intentions were not carried out. The means of debarkation which were at the disposal of the force at first consisted of country boats collected by General Merewether from the ports of the Red Sea and from Aden, and one decked barge from Aden. Those means, he stated, were supplemented afterwards by other decked barges from Bombay, such as General Merewether thought should have been sent up at first.

5434. Did you speak to General Merewether with reference to the desirableness of establishing rapid telegraphic communication between Zulla and Suez?—I did; and he was of opinion that it was a matter of primary importance whether it was viewed either from an economical or from a strategical point of view; and he strongly urged the matter upon the Bombay Government from the first.

5435. Did you ask General Merewether's opinion with reference to the question, whether the distribution of the returned stores amongst different ports was considered with a view of realising their value to the best advantage?—I questioned General Merewether upon this point, and he informed me that some of the returned stores were sent to Aden, and some to Karáchí; and that he concluded that the reason of their

not being sent to other ports was owing to the season of the year and the south-west monsoon. I pointed out to him that Madras being on a weather shore, when the wind was from the westward it was peculiarly favourably situated for debarkation during the south-west monsoon. His objection to using Madras as a port of debarkation rested on the difficulty of getting ships there during the monsoon, which he concluded was the reason why the attempt was not made to send stores to Madras. He said that he had no direct knowledge of the fact, whether the question of distributing the stores amongst the different ports was considered, with the view of realising their value, to the best advantage.

5436. Did he give you his view as to the organisation of the Land Transport Train?—He did. I had a good deal of conversation with him on the subject. In the first place he recognised that the Land Transport Train was not in a proper state of efficiency when it was landed at Zulla, pointing out to me that it was wanting in these respects: that there had not been sufficient time to organise it properly, and that owing to the unfortunate employment of the worst muleteers from the Levant ports and Persia, the mules were greatly neglected, and it was almost impossible to keep the necessary order amongst the muleteers. I was anxious to obtain his opinion as to whether the deficiencies were the result of the want of time to organise, or whether they were due to the nature of the organisation which was attempted. With reference to this point he said that the deficiencies were chiefly due to the want of time; and that if there had been sufficient time to admit of it, undoubtedly, a well-arranged transport corps, formed in a similar manner to that of the mule trains of the Panjáb, would have been most excellent; but, that as time did not allow of this, the next best arrangement should have been adopted, which, in his opinion, was that the muleteers should have been provided entirely from India, with their own system of supervision, the head men being responsible for the people under them, and, especially, that no muleteers should have been taken from the Levant and Egypt. He said that at Zulla, after experiencing the difficulties with regard to the Levantine, Egyptian, and Persian muleteers, he applied for assistance in the shape of native soldiers to be temporarily given from the regiments remaining in India, to assist in keeping discipline amongst these disorderly characters. In accordance with his application a few soldiers were sent from Aden, but afterwards, on the arrival of Sir Charles Staveley, that officer used men from the ranks of the Abyssinian army, Europeans chiefly.

5437. Did he indicate the especial defects of the Land Transport Corps?—He allowed that the officers who were employed with him did their utmost; but he said that, owing to the want of sufficient establishments with them, and the utterly unruly conduct of the muleteers, the officers were unable to carry out properly the measures necessary for the care and well-being of the mules. From that answer, I gathered that the chief cause of the ill result obtained would appear to have been the want of subordinate staff. This, General Merewether acknowledged, together with the fact of the bad material which they had to work with. He was alluding to the circumstances which occurred on the first arrival of the mules at Zulla, but he could not tell me whether

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the corps was supposed to be organised when it left Bombay.

5438. He was of opinion, was he not, that it would not have been necessary to bring the Egyptian and Persian muleteers there at all, except merely for the care of the animals during the transport?—He said that he thought that that would have been a better course.

5439. Had he any knowledge as to why they were brought there?—I do not think he had. Those arrangements were beyond his province.

5440. Did you speak to General Merewether with reference to how far the military character which it was proposed to give to the land transport in India, acted prejudicially with regard to obtaining muleteers?—He said that, not having been in Bombay at the time, he could only speak to the point from general knowledge.

5441. I believe that he attributed to the bad character of the muleteers the necessity for the change in the organisation which was afterwards made at Zulla?—Yes, he said that he thought that many of the arrangements were changed after arriving at Zulla, and necessarily so in consequence of the bad material which had to be worked with. I asked him whether it was not reasonable to presume that those difficulties could have been foreseen, as the character of such Levantines and Persians as would enlist for army mule service was pretty well known. He said that no doubt it was known, but that his impression was that those men were not to be employed, and that had Indians only been engaged, a simple organisation would have answered all the purposes that were required. I asked him whether by "simple organisation," he meant that which goes by the name of "Mukaddam," which used to subsist in the Indian transport corps when under the Commissariat, or what is usually known as a military organisation. His answer was, that the Mukaddam arrangement could have been more quickly carried out than the military organization, for which latter there appeared to him to be no time to complete properly the arrangements; though had there been that organisation, would have been preferable for a campaign in a new country. He described the difference between the Mukaddam and the military organisations, a point upon which the Committee have already received information. He also informed me distinctly, that on the assumption that they had such a heterogeneous mass of rascals as appeared to have formed the materials out of which the transport train had to be organised (alluding especially to the Persians and the Egyptians), the Mukaddam system of organisation was not practicable, and that a military system of organisation was the only one which could have been employed with a chance of success. He did not know what were the circumstances which led to the employment of the Persian and Egyptian muleteers, or when it was settled to engage them.

5442. You asked further about the forage provisions and rations for the animals and their attendants, did you not?—I did, and I wished to get his opinion with reference to the fact of there being any deficiency of forage or stores necessary for the well being of the mules on their arrival at Zulla. He informed me that the mules were sent down from Egypt with the usual head gear, but that, for some reason which was not clearly explainable, this head gear was found quite insufficient, the mules invariably eating it; so that, until chain tackle was provided from Bombay,

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the mules suffered greatly from not being kept properly to their pickets; he was not himself aware of chains ever having been required before, nor was he aware whether this remarkable peculiarity on the part of the mules was owing to a want of forage, as he was assured that the ships which brought the mules down were fully supplied with grain and forage, but he was not certain whether the subordinate superintendence was sufficient to ensure the mules getting a proper supply of rations.

5443. Were you at the time when you saw General Merewether under the impression that he was the responsible commander at Zulla at the very time to which reference was made when the mules were suffering in this way from want of forage?—As long as he was in command of the Pioneer Force, no doubt he would be responsible for making the best arrangements possible with the means which were at his disposition; but he would have no control over that which took place off the shores of the Red Sea.

5444. When you saw General Merewether, were you aware that he was in command until the arrival of Sir Charles Staveley?—Yes.

5445. Did you question him as to how this neglect of the animals occurred, seeing that he would be the responsible officer for arranging for their proper care?—As I said before, he would be responsible only for making the best of such means as there were at his disposal, and that, I believe, he did.

5446. Did you question him upon the point at all?—I did not.

5447. But you heard on Tuesday from General Staveley, did you not, that the neglect of the mules resulted from the troops who had landed having been passed up to the highlands; whereas had they remained on the coast they could have tended the mules, and the loss would have been averted?—I presume that the troops must have been required in the highlands, but I did not ask him about it.

5448. We heard on Tuesday that thousands of animals were straying and starving and dying for want of attendants and forage on the arrival of Sir Charles Staveley, on the 5th or 6th of December; did General Merewether give you any information upon that point?—I apprehend that General Merewether's duties would take him into the interior; he would be in command, but he would be hardly the responsible person for superintending the detail of the arrangements on the shore.

5449. Was he not the Commander in Chief of the whole of the force up to that time?—Yes.

5450. And was he not responsible for it?—He was responsible to do the best with the means which were at his disposal.

5451. But you are not answering on his authority upon this point; for I think I understand that you did not question him as to that?—Certainly not on his authority.

5452. Did you speak to General Merewether with reference to the difficulty of obtaining a return of the efficiency of the Land Transport Train, as evidenced by the amount of work which it did?—I did. I was anxious to obtain, if possible, the amount of goods transported between each two stations, and the number of animals employed; I required only an approximate average, and I informed General Merewether that I had been told that it was impossible to make such a return with any approach to accuracy; I wished

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to have his opinion as a practical officer, as to whether he would have anticipated such a difficulty in affording the information which was asked for; he told me that the establishments, such as they were, were fully occupied with the out-door work, so that the keeping of elaborate records was an impossibility, and that, had it been attempted, injurious delay would have been the result. I was anxious on the same subject to ask him, under whom the transport of the country was organised; that is to say, whether the service was carried out under the Land Transport department. He informed me that the country transport was arranged under the orders of the Commander in Chief through himself, and that it was started entirely by the assistance of the consul at Massowah, Mr. Munzinger, without whose help this very important point in the success of the Expedition could never have been established; and he said that it assisted the transport of stores even as far as Magdala. He recognised the fact, that to the native carriage the force was very greatly indebted, and that from Senafé itself as well as at first from Zulla. He was also of opinion, that without the aid of the country carriage, the force could not have reached Magdala in the time that it did. He said, that from the first native carriage was hoped for, and that Sir Robert Napier, in a demi-official letter to him, pointed to the advantage of obtaining the aid of the Kafilas to pass between the sea and the highlands. This, he said, was carried out and further expanded throughout the march to Magdala by the help of Mr. Munzinger, whose local experience and influence enabled him to carry out what otherwise could not have been attempted. He informed me that Mr. Munzinger's services had received at that time no substantial reward.

5453. Sir *S. Northcote*.] Did you ask him what he meant by a substantial reward, or what did you understand by that expression?—I understood that General Merewether considered at the time that the force had been very much indebted to Mr. Munzinger, and that beyond being mentioned in the Commander in Chief's despatches he had received no reward, in the shape of money, which was commensurate with the services which he had rendered.

5454. Did you understand him to imply that Mr. Munzinger was not paid for his services during the time he was employed?—I could not answer distinctly upon that point; but General Merewether considered that Mr. Munzinger had been insufficiently rewarded, and for that reason he asked me to make the notes which I have just read to the Committee.

5455. Are you aware what remuneration Mr. Munzinger actually received for his services during the period of the expedition?—I am not. I only wish to give General Merewether's opinion at the time when I saw him.

5456. *Chairman*.] Did General Merewether make any suggestions with reference to procuring supplies and arranging for native carriage in future operations of a similar nature?—He did; he said that much difficulty was experienced from the want of a sufficiency of officers to apply to this particular purpose, and that on any similar occasion he would recommend that a considerable body of officers should be placed at the disposal of the Commander in Chief, to be employed as occasion required in the duties of procuring and organising native supply and transport during

the Abyssinian Expedition; this, he said, was partly managed by the intelligence department, but more officers were required. To sum up General Merewether's opinion on the question of the Land Transport, I asked him whether, assuming the country to be as it was, and that no native transport could have been organised, which would have been the case had the natives been hostile, it would appear to be proved that the Land Transport would not have enabled the army to reach Magdala without serious delay; and he was of opinion that that was a correct view of the case; he was further of opinion that if the Land Transport Train had been perfectly organised from the first, it would have sufficed to meet the requirements of an army at 400 miles from its base of operations under circumstances as regards numbers, roads, &c. &c., similar to those which subsisted in Abyssinia; he allowed that no army was ever before sent on service so well provided with stores as the Abyssinian Expeditionary force.

5457. Sir *S. Northcote*.] I understand that the evidence which you have just been giving is a summary of a conversation which you had with General Merewether during your recent visit to India?—It is.

5458. May I ask you, considering this question, as you would necessarily do, by the light of the evidence which you had received as a member of this Committee, and also by the light of your own experience and knowledge as a military man, what was the impression which you derived from the statement of General Merewether with regard to any faults in the constitution of the Land Transport Service?—I think that the evidence which I have given now nearly answers the question; all that I could say would be to recapitulate the heads of the conversation which I have just put in.

5459. Did you understand that General Merewether considered that the Land Transport Train might, under the circumstances, have been differently constituted from the mode in which it was constituted?—Yes, I did. He agreed that a military organisation was that which was the best calculated to meet the requirements of a transport train acting generally away from India; but that if the transport train was considered on the Indian system, then that which is known as the "Mukaddam" organisation would have answered.

5460. I understand you to say that, looking at this question as one of a general character, General Merewether, whose opinion upon such a question would be extremely valuable, holds that it is desirable in distant expeditions that the Land Transport Corps should be placed under a military organisation; but, that he considers that where the circumstances admit of it, as, for instance, in expeditions conducted in India, the "Mukaddam" system may answer, and that it has some advantages?—Quite so; but where you have time to organise on a military system, I think General Merewether's opinion is, that the military system, under all circumstances, ought to be used. The circumstances which subsisted in this case were somewhat peculiar; and bearing in mind the extreme necessity which existed for speed, he thought that if the muleteers could have been drawn entirely from India, possibly the "Mukaddam" system might have succeeded.

5461. You did not understand him to say that he


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he thought. under the circumstances, that it would have been possible to have drawn all the muleteers from India; I do not understand that he expressed an opinion upon that point?—I gathered from him that he thought that a greater number might decidedly have been drawn from India, but whether he was of opinion that all that were necessary could have been got from India I could not say.

5462. Did he not inform you that he was not at Bombay at the time of the organisation, and that he was unable to say what causes prevented the system which he would have liked from being carried out?—He did.

5463. Therefore, we must not take the evidence which you have given us from General Merewether as positive evidence on his part, that he considered that the best had not been done that could have been done under the circumstances?—Not as positive evidence; but it is evidence that in his mind the proper use had not been made of India with reference to the supply of muleteers; and I feel clear that I am not going outside of what I should be justified in stating as his opinion, when I say that the Levant, and Egypt, and Suez were not places from which a supply of muleteers should have been got.

5464. Is it your own opinion also that they should not have been got from those quarters?—That is my own opinion decidedly.

5465. Do you suppose from the evidence which you have collected altogether, that it would have been possible to have obtained a sufficient number of muleteers from India?—My impression is that it would have been possible; but I think that it is quite likely that the military organisation would have operated against the probability of obtaining a sufficient amount; and I think that we have received evidence to the effect that India as a source of supply for muleteers, depended to a considerable extent upon the Mukaddam system being adopted.

5466. Sir J. Elphinstone.] Are you aware that endeavours were made in every direction to obtain men for transport service in India; and that bounties were offered, and that every effort was used to get Sídís and Bilúchís, but without effect?—No; and my impression is, that it was not so.

5467. Do you know of your own knowledge that it was not so?—No; I only know from general rumour that it was so.

5468. But supposing that Sir Seymour Fitzgerald states it to be the fact, would that alter your opinion?—Very decidedly.

5469. I will read to you Sir Seymour Fitzgerald's words: "Endeavours were made in every direction to obtain men for transport service in India; bounties were offered, and every effort used to get Sídís and Bilúchís, but in vain. All this went on while the discussion as to organisation went on, although we were then driven to get Egyptians, Persians, and Arabs"?—May I ask whether that was not in face of the military organization?

5470. No, that was for the formation of the land transport corps?—But was not the military organisation in contemplation at the time?

5471. That I cannot tell?—The impression upon my mind certainly is that his Excellency Sir Seymour Fitzgerald was of opinion that the military organisation which was contemplated by the Commander-in-Chief was the very fact which

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stood in the way of getting muleteers, and that the difficulty which he represents as subsisting was a consequence of the military organisation. I am diffident again in speaking from memory, but my impression is that Sir Seymour Fitzgerald himself is in favour of a military organisation under any circumstances where there is time to organise such a system.

5472. Are you aware that when the Bombay Government found that they could not get men in time, they telegraphed to secure men in Egypt and Persia?—I have no official knowledge to that effect, but I have no doubt that they did so, by the result which was obtained.

5473. Do you know the period which elapsed from the time the Expedition was begun to be organised until the transport train sailed from Bombay?—I think evidence has been given to the Committee upon that point.

5474. You are aware, are you not, that on December the 5th Sir Charles Stavely arrived and assumed the command?—I believe so.

5475. And that immediately on his arrival he placed the organisation of the transport corps in military hands, employing European soldiers to attend to the mules?—He re-organised it, as I understand it, placing it on a more strictly military footing than it had been on before.

5476. The muleteers who were sent down from Egypt came down in charge of the animals, did they not?—Yes.

5477. And when they were found to be unfit for the work for which they were engaged they were sent back, were they not?—So I understand.

5478. Did you ever see mules in Egypt fastened with chain tackle?—No; I should think it would be most unusual.

5479. Do you suppose that it would have been possible to obtain chain tackle for them, and to have sent it down in the limited time that there was for sending the mules down from Suez?—I think it might have been done if the point had been foreseen; but it is so entirely exceptional that certainly I should never dream of sending chain tackle if I were sending mules again, except in the face of what has happened in the present instance.

5480. It has been brought forward as a point of criticism against the Expedition that those animals were fastened with cotton ropes; is it not the universal practice in Egypt to halter mules with cotton ropes?—I think it is, and I attach no importance whatever to the fact of the chains not having been sent.

5481. You do not consider that a point of any importance?—I think not at all.

5482. Chairman.] In the month of October 1869, you and I together had an interview with Colonel Stanton, Her Majesty's Consul General in Egypt?—That was so; he informed me that he did not return to Egypt from leave till the 12th of November, and that he knew nothing of the proceedings up to that date. Mr. Reade, who was then Consul at Cairo, but who was afterwards sent to Cadiz, acted during Colonel Stanton's absence as Consul General, and managed the earlier matters referred to the consulate in connection with the Abyssinian Expedition. I spoke to Colonel Stanton with reference to any application having been made by the Home Government for sea transport in the Mediterranean. He said that he was not aware that any such application had been made, and that if it

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had been made it would have been made to his predecessor. He said that he would have anticipated no difficulty in obtaining local tonnage to meet the requirements for mule transport in the Mediterranean, and that there would be no doubt that in Alexandria Harbour there would have been at that time a considerable amount of tonnage available. He said that a telegram to the Consul would have enabled the Government to have been fully informed upon this point. He pointed out at the same time that possibly the more legitimate mode of obtaining information upon that point would have been to have telegraphed to the superintendent of the Overland Troop Service, a naval officer.

5483. Did you speak to Colonel Stanton with reference to the forage?—I did, and he informed me that forage to any amount was obtainable at Cairo, and in the vicinity, viz., barley and chopped straw, together with beans to any extent, and that that was the food of the cattle of the country; he said that a good deal of forage was purchased at Cairo, but that as far as he recollected, it was not by open competition; he spoke with reference to the purchases made by the Indian Government. He said that he could see no reason why animals fed at Suez and Alexandria, should not have been fed from the forage of the country, and that it would be only a matter of price where the forage was obtained from.

5484. Did you speak to Colonel Stanton with reference to the surplus stores?—I did; I asked him whether he had been consulted upon the point, and he said that so far as he was aware, he had never been consulted as to the disposal of the stores, and that his opinion was that unless a fair price had been obtained, he ought to have been consulted as to the disposal of the stores on the conclusion of the Expedition, as his knowledge of the country would have enabled him to give advice which would have resulted in their being realised to better advantage. He stated that Mr. Stanley, the Consul at Alexandria, had not been consulted, and as far as Colonel Stanton knew, no one in the consulate was appealed to. He certainly was asked, as he told me, certain questions as to formalities and the payment of auction dues, but these matters had nothing to do with the way in which the stores were disposed of. The bulk of the purchases on behalf of the Indian Government, he said, were made by Captain Michael Willoughby and Major Stansfeld, mostly the former. Captain Willoughby did not consult him as to the policy of the steps taken with reference to the contract for hay made towards the end of 1867. Colonel Stanton said that he was consulted on one or two mule contracts, and that he bought also at Cairo sundry articles to a small value, say under 600 *l.*, but that with that exception, he was not consulted on the general system on which the purchases were conducted. He said that those made by the War Office were under the control of Colonel Kennedy.

5485. You learned from Colonel Stanton, did you not, that he was authorised to make purchases of mules in the month of February, and that he found a difficulty in obtaining them at his price in consequence of higher prices being paid by the Indian officials?—Yes, there was a difficulty on that head, owing to a contract being open at the same time, entered into with a Mr. Zimmerman, of Cairo, by the Indian officials, at a higher price than that which Colonel Stanton

was giving. This, he thought, produced a clashing of interests prejudicial to the service. He believed that had he been commissioned at first to purchase animals in Egypt for the Abyssinian Expedition, he could have done so at a much less price than Zimmerman's contract, which he fancied was 26 *l.* a head.

5486. Is Colonel Stanton well informed as to the state of things in Egypt?—Yes, I should think that you could not appeal to a better authority.

5487. As to the condition of the markets there, and as to what animals are and ought to be, is he well informed?—I should think that he would be perfectly informed on those points.

5488. You learned something from him also, did you not, with respect to a contract made at Damascus?—Yes; he told me that a contract was made with an Arab merchant, through Mr. Rogers, the consul at Damascus, by Major Arbuthnot, aide-de-camp to Lord Napier, for, he thought, 500 mules; that he fancied the price was 25 *l.* a mule, to be passed at Suez; and that 12,650 *l.* was paid for 500 mules and horses. Other purchases, he said, were made through Mr. Rogers, bringing the total payment up to 14,311 *l.*, on which Mr. Rogers charged a commission of 5 *l.* per cent., 715 *l.* He said there were great complaints made by the veterinary surgeons at Suez, as to quality, and 22 horses and 67 mules were rejected. The terms of the contract referred every dispute to Colonel Stanton; a reference was made to him, and he sent Mr. Reade to Suez to act for him, and Mr. Reade confirmed the rejections of the veterinary surgeon. It appeared that Mr. Rogers had previously paid the Arab the amount of his contract, less 500 *l.* before acceptance of the animals at Suez, and the rejection resulted in a deduction of about 1,832 *l.* Having given his decision, he said that the matter was out of his hands.

5489. Had you reason to believe that the amount of the money involved there has been lost?—I could not give an opinion upon that point, but it can be easily ascertained.

5490. Did you speak to Colonel Stanton with reference to forming an opinion as to the way in which he was consulted by the Indian officials?—I did, and his opinion was that the Indian officials were decidedly shy of consulting the consuls, and objected particularly to anything like interference, and he thought the results showed themselves in the mistakes that were made in the contracts.

5491. What was Colonel Stanton's opinion as to the advantages which would have resulted to the Expedition had telegraphic communication subsisted between Zulla and Suez?—I asked Colonel Stanton with reference to that point, and he said that he considered that it would have been of the greatest utility, as, although a quick mail steamer would run the distance in about five days, the ordinary time was 10 or 11 days. It was difficult, he thought, to estimate the money value of telegraphic communication, as purchases were going on in Egypt up to the last moment, and might, of course, have been earlier stopped. In the same way, it would have been of great value in the case of mules which were ordered after the Expedition started. Had the telegraph been in existence, he said that their services would have been available so much sooner, and that, in a military point of view also, it would have been of the greatest value.

5492. Sir

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5492. Sir S. Northcote.] Did he explain what he meant with regard to the pecuniary value of the telegraph?—Not in detail; but what he meant was that orders could have been transmitted so many days sooner from Zulla, and, consequently, that the money value which would be represented by the mules arriving sooner at their destination, would have been saved. In the same way with reference to the stoppage of the purchase of stores, if the purchase of stores was going on at a certain rate per day, had the telegraph existed, it would have saved an amount, represented by multiplying the number of days a steamer takes in going from Annesley Bay to Suez by the dock expenditure.

5493. Did you understand him to say that there would have been a very great amount of saving by the use of the telegraph in the latter part of the Expedition, or was he speaking of an imaginary telegraph existing throughout the whole period?—He was speaking with reference to a telegraph existing, say two months after the Expedition had been started; I should be sorry to give that date precisely, but I fix it in this way; because I had heard that an offer had been made to lay down a telegraphic communication, and I explained it to Colonel Stanton with a view to giving him an idea of the reason with which I put the question.

5494. Chairman.] When you say two months after the Expedition started, what date do you assign to that period?—The date is intended to be the date at which Captain Sherard Osborn said that the Telegraph Construction and Maintenance Company would have been willing to have undertaken to complete the telegraph, and two months is a guess which I make now from memory only.

5495. Did you learn from Colonel Stanton that complaints had been made by the merchants at Cairo, for not having had opportunities of tendering and competing for the supplies wanted for the Abyssinian Expedition?—Yes, I gathered from him that he had heard very substantial rumours to the effect that dissatisfaction prevailed at the close way in which the contracts for stores were given out by the Indian officials.

5496. Did you learn from Colonel Stanton that complaints had been made?—Yes, that complaints had been made by merchants at Cairo.

5497. Did you get his opinion as to the character of the purchases made by the Indian purchasing officers?—Yes, he said with respect to the War Office contracts that they had been made before he came, and that he knew nothing of them; but with respect to the Indian contracts he thought they were improvident, as very large sums of money were said to have been made out of them; and he believed the contracts could have been got on better terms, which he decidedly attributes to sufficient publicity not having been given.

5498. Sir S. Northcote.] Want of sufficient publicity given by whom?—By the Indian officials who were charged with making the contracts.

5499. Were those officials Captain Willoughby and others?—That would refer to Captain Willoughby and Major Stansfeld principally.

5500. Did you communicate with Captain Willoughby, the transport agent, while you were in Egypt upon the matter?—I communicated with Captain Willoughby, the transport agent, but he had very little to do with the contracting.

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It was Captain Michael Willoughby to whom I referred as the purchasing officer.

5501. Chairman.] Did Colonel Stanton think that sufficient publicity was not given where competition was invited?—That was his impression.

5502. He did not approve of purchasing by competition in every case, did he?—No; he decidedly thought that contracting for the purchase of stores was a mistaken way of buying them where the nature of the article was exceptional, that is, did not, in the required quantities form matter of ordinary supply and demand. In such cases the best way, he thought, was to purchase through respectable merchants, giving them a commission. He had no doubt that the commissariat officers' work might have been as well done by the consulate.

5503. Where the article was a common one in the market he thought that competition was best, but when it was exceptional he thought private arrangement was best?—That is what I gather, and I certainly should myself agree with that view.

5504. You learned from him, did you not, that some special arrangement was made with respect to shoeing the animals, and the farriers' work to be done for the Expedition?—I did. He stated that the mule transport service was unfurnished with shoes or farriers, and that hence it became necessary to provide for this service by special contract. Colonel Stanton was not aware of the actual circumstances that led to the contract, but he believed that it was suggested by the contractor himself. He was of opinion that the state of the transport service necessitating such a contract could not be satisfactory, but with the contract itself he saw no fault to find. He meant to say, that the fact of the transport service being so organised as to necessitate depending upon private contractors for the shoeing of the mules showed a very decided deficiency.

5505. I believe that, unasked, he volunteered an opinion as to the sort of animal which was best suited for the work of the Expedition in Abyssinia?—Yes; he stated to me that he believed that a mistake was made in selecting the mules as the principal beasts of burthen. He thought that horses and donkeys would have done the work at a much lower price. Donkeys especially, as they required much less attendance, less than half, while they will carry more than half the load of mules, probably three-fourths; and he believed that a donkey carrying its own forage would subsist longer on its load than a mule. The price of donkeys, he said, would be 7*l.* or 8*l.*, and he thought they were more handy than mules.

5506. The pack animal in Egypt is the donkey to a very large extent, is it not?—To a very large extent.

5507. Colonel Stanton has a full knowledge of the character of the Egyptian donkey, I presume?—I think very full indeed.

5508. You had a military opinion, I think, from Colonel Stanton; would you wish to put that in?—I think it would be desirable to have Colonel Stanton's opinion shortly upon the number of men which it would have been desirable to employ. He informed me he thought that at the time the Abyssinian War was undertaken (and that he was still of the same opinion), that the force should have consisted of 7,000 men, 5,000 being moveable and 2,000 in two entrenched

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trenched positions, to keep open communications. In his opinion, 3,000 of them might have detached themselves from the coast and made their way as a flying column to Magdala. He had no hesitation in expressing the opinion that 3,000 men could have marched anywhere in Abyssinia, subject to the question of a sufficient supply of provisions, meaning that there would be no actual danger of being beaten in open fighting. Judging from the results of experience gained by the Expedition, such a force as 3,000 men, he thought, could have sustained themselves after they were in the interior of Abyssinia. Of course, the supplies required to enable such a force to reach the interior would be insignificant compared with the arrangement as regarded supplies sent to meet the requirements of the increased scale of the Expedition. The accounts, he said, which were received previously to the war were such as to leave no reasonable doubt that in the interior of the country cattle and grain were obtainable in sufficient quantities for a small force, say 3,000 men; the climate from Zulla through the mountain passes, he said, was very bad; but in the interior, and on the high lands it might have been known that the temperature was moderate; his impression was, that a flying column used as a tentative measure would have rendered the subsequent great expedition unnecessary; I would point out to the Committee that there is a somewhat curious analogy between the opinion held by Colonel Stanton, and that held by General Merewether.

5509. Sir S. Northcote.] Do you consider that the value of Colonel Stanton's opinion upon that point is as high or higher than the value of the opinions of Lord Napier and Sir Charles Staveland?—No; but I think it is the opinion of a military officer of high standing, to which it is worth while to attach some value.

5510. Are you aware that it is directly opposed to the convictions of those general officers at the present time, after the experience which they

have had?—In one sense it would be so; but I think that if those who held opinions like General Merewether and Colonel Stanton were brought to discuss the matter face to face, with officers who hold the opinion that Lord Napier and Sir Charles Staveland hold, perhaps, the differences which would appear at first to subsist between them would not be so great as might be anticipated.

5511. Chairman.] You learned from Colonel Stanton the contract price for shoeing animals for the Expedition, did you not?—I did; the contract for shoeing mules for the Abyssinian Expedition was made as follows:—mules shod in Egypt, one dollar per head per month; mules shod in Abyssinia 4s. 6d. per head per month, up to 5,000, above which number it was 5s. per head; the regular price per month in Egypt is one dollar per animal, the dollar meaning five francs, or equal to 3s. 11d. 15–39ths; whereas the contract was paid at one dollar of 20 Egyptian piastres, or equal to 4s. 1d. 3 13ths, from the fact of its not having been distinctly mentioned what the dollar meant.

5512. Sir J. Elphinstone.] Were those questions and answers written down in the presence of Colonel Stanton, or were they simply notes taken from memory afterwards?—They were questions and answers written down by myself and literally transcribed from my notes in full, and verified by him afterwards.

5513. Chairman.] Were those notes written out in full by you, and afterwards submitted to Colonel Stanton (as you learned from me) for his perusal and correction; and were his corrections made upon them, and do they stand as corrected in the paper which you have before you?—That is so.

5514. Do you wish to add anything to what you have stated with regard to what you heard from Colonel Stanton?—Not with reference to Colonel Stanton's statements.

Vice-Admiral Sir ROBERT SPENCER ROBINSON, K.C.B., F.R.S., called in; and Examined.

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5515. Sir J. Hay.] You were Controller of the Navy at the time of the Abyssinian Expedition, were you not?—I was.

5516. And you now hold the same post, and are a member of the Board of Admiralty, I believe?—Yes.

5517. Captain Sherard Osborn, an officer, as you know, of some reputation, has appeared as a witness before this Committee, and has given certain evidence; and he has also, in addition to the evidence, written a letter explanatory of the evidence which he gave, which, I think, you have in your hand?—I have; it is a Paper sent to me from the Committee.

5518. You are probably aware, from the Abyssinian Papers, that three hospital ships were sent out from this country to take part in that expedition?—I was not aware of it, but I know it now, since this discussion has arisen.

5519. Certain ships, the "Revenge," the "Donegal," the "Duncan," the "Frederick William," and the three-decker, the "Duke of Wellington," are named in the letter of Captain Osborn, which you hold in your hand, as being ships eminently fitted for the purpose of having been sent to Abyssinia as hospital ships to assist that Expedition; would you state to the Commit-

tee whether, in your opinion, those ships were fitted for the purpose suggested at that time?—The "Duke of Wellington" was lying in Portsmouth Harbour with her screw removed, owing to the weakness in her stern frame, which rendered it inadvisable to repair the ship. She was a guard ship very usefully employed, from her great size, and she could not have been sent under any circumstances to Abyssinia, without very considerable delay, and without a very large expenditure. The "Duke of Wellington" was no longer at that time on the category of sea-going ships; she was a harbour ship. The other ships which you have named: the "Revenge," the "Donegal," the "Duncan," and the "Frederick William," were ships in the coast-guard service, and had, during the course of the year, undergone such caulking and refit as enabled them to take their months', or six weeks' cruise at sea; and they were ships which could have been sent to any part of the world if they had been manned, and if their place in the work which they were doing could have been filled by other ships.

5520. Supposing that on the 27th of August, which was the time at which the India Office applied to the Admiralty to send hospital ships out, it had been decided that three of those ships should

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should be taken for the purpose, how soon could they have been fitted for hospital ships, taking the "Princess Royal" or any line-of-battle ship as an instance, looking to the work in the dockyards, and the general course of business?—In the first place, the dockyards were required for general purposes. We were engaged at that time in building 6,820 tons of iron-clad shipping in the dockyards, and of unarmoured ships 1,624 tons, making a total of 8,444 tons. That was our programme for the year, and the artificers were employed upon that. Had we taken those three ships to fit them as hospital ships, the first thing that I must have asked would have been what fittings were considered necessary for a ship which was to be in a torrid and tropical climate like that of Annesley Bay. The next thing we should have had to consider was, how to get the ships there. But in answer to the question as to the time and expense requisite to fit those ships as hospital ships, one really has not the information, because the first thing would have been to consult the Medical Director General as to the fittings which would be indispensably necessary, and no suggestion was made to us what the ships would require, and therefore no questions were asked. Judging by some of the ships which we had fitted as hospital ships, the expense of fitting the ships in question as hospital ships would have been very considerable. The medical officers object to the arrangement of the hatchways in a ship of war; they object to the latrine accommodation; they object to the cooking arrangements, and it would have been no doubt impossible to use those ships as hospital ships without making some considerable alterations in their stowage and in their ventilation. We did fit a hospital ship, the "Meáni," for the War Department, between the 5th of August and the 1st of October, 1867. She was to go to Hong Kong. We fitted that ship at the request of the War Department, and the cost of doing so was 14,493 *l.* That was the cost of the ship as we altered her for the War Department purposes, to be used as a hospital and store ship at Hong Kong. That, I think, is the best answer I can give, because the question was never put to us, what it would cost to fit those ships as hospital ships, and we were at that time in total ignorance of what the Medical Department would ask us to do.

5521. But the fitting of the "Meáni" occupied nearly two months, and cost upwards of 14,000 *l.*, did it not?—Yes.

5522. Is it not reasonable to suppose that, taking one ship with another of the ships here named, about the same time would have been occupied with their fittings?—Yes, if the same work were required to be done.

5523. I suppose that all those ships were performing some duty?—The ships which you have named were all on the coastguard, and were at that time, or immediately before it, taking their autumnal cruise.

5524. They had the crews and the persons who would have to be provided with accommodation on board some other ships, I presume?—Yes, the whole of the coastguard ships' crews which were not liable to serve out of England, would have had to remain on shore.

5525. Then the fitting of those ships would have compelled the Admiralty to undertake the fitting and repairing of some other ships, would it not?—I should say so.

5526. Looking at the list of ships given at the

foot of the letter, in addition to those named in the letter, were there any of those ships which were in a more forward state of preparation for hospital ships, and which would have been more available, without disturbing the crews and persons on board the ships which are named in the body of the letter?—No; several of the ships named in that list were ships that had long ago been condemned as unfit for sea purposes. A very strong recommendation from myself for many years previously had been in the hands of the Admiralty, that instead of allowing those ships to accumulate in our harbours, and to be a nominal defence, misleading the country, they should be sold or otherwise got rid of. The chief difficulty in the way of my suggestion being carried out was the very low price which we could get for the ships, and there were certain difficulties in the Store Act, which has since been repealed. A great many of those ships to which Captain Sherard Osborn has affixed an asterisk have been sold since, for the very reason which I have given the Committee.

5527. As a matter of fact, were not those ships only continued at the home ports to perform the specific duty of coastguard ships and so forth, until iron-clad ships could be got ready to take their places?—Precisely.

5528. And they were in course of preparation for that purpose, were they not?—The ironclads were being got ready, with the intention that as soon as there were a sufficient number of them ready, the old wooden ships should be withdrawn from the coastguard stations, and ironclad ships sent in their places.

5529. And that would be a reason, I presume, why sufficient attention was not paid to their repairs?—The ships which were on the coastguard stations, those ships which Captain Sherard Osborn has quoted and some others: the "St. George," the "Revenge," the "Donegal," the "Duncan," the "Lion," the "Irresistible," the "Frederick William," and the Royal George," were, as I tell you, in a fit state if they had been wanted to make a voyage to Abyssinia. They had received their caulking, and they had been docked, and they had been sufficiently put to rights to do that; but they were not fit to receive, in addition to their crews, a great number of sick people, or any number of sick people; they were not fitted in any way as hospital ships. Most of the other ships to which Captain Sherard Osborn refers (I will not say all, because some of them are still kept as a reserve), were ships as to the state of which the Admiralty were aware; and being aware that wooden line-of-battle ships were no longer very potent engines of war, they had resolved to do as little as possible to them until ironclads could be got forward to take their places; in fact, in the year 1867 there was a very strong belief that the only ships of war upon which this country could rely were ironclad ships, and that all wooden vessels, except for interrupting an enemy's trade, or defending our own trade, were out of date as war ships.

5530. Looking at the fact that at the date of the commencement of the Expedition it was considered desirable that the three hospital ships should reach Annesley Bay before the end of December, and looking at the fact that it is probable that it would have occupied nearly two months from the 27th of August before they would have been able to start for the station, which would have brought the time to about the

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end of October, would it have been possible to have had those line-of-battle-ships so fitted, and at Annesley Bay, in time for the purposes of the Expedition, by the 1st of December?—No, I think not, certainly.

5531. Had they the power of steaming the whole distance, as the other hospital ships had?—No; no line-of-battle ships in those days, even at a moderate rate of five or six knots, had any power of steaming for more than ten or twelve days together, at the outside; and that only in a calm.

5532. Looking at the fact that it is a voyage of 100 days under sail, might you not take the time of their arrival there at the ordinary 100 days, and not calculate much upon their steam-power for expediting the voyage?—The steam-power, no doubt, would have been useful in getting in and out of harbour, and crossing the line, and getting out of a calm during the trade winds; and, I think, that it would be a very handsome allowance to say that the steam-power might have shortened the voyage by 10 or 12 days.

5533. Then it would have occupied about 90 days for those vessels, would it not?—I should have put it rather at 75 days; but that is a question about which, off-hand, I should not like to be perfectly sure, until I had looked into it again, because there are trade winds, and certain monsoons, and things of that kind to be considered.

5534. That would have brought it on into January, and much later than the time specified, would it not?—Yes.

5535. *Chairman.*] The coastguard ships in commission, I suppose, are presumed to be ready for any warlike service?—Coast guard ships in commission, if manned, would be ready for any warlike service.

5536. On what is called the active list?—There is no such term or calling that I am aware of; but the coastguard ships have always been considered as ships that if called upon, could go on active service when manned.

5537. I understand you to have mentioned some of the ships in this list at the foot of the page to be unfit for going anywhere upon active service?—Yes, the greater part of them; but not the coastguard ships.

5538. Then there will not be very much exaggeration in the words of Captain Sherard Osborn: "I can only reply, that in that case they were utterly unfit to be called men-of-war in commission, and a vile imposition upon the public." Omitting the epithet "vile," I suppose you would subscribe to all the words that are there used?—Not the least in the world. I should say that it was exactly contrary to the truth. The coastguard ships whose names I will give you, the "St. George," the "Revenge," the "Donegal," the "Duncan," the "Lion," the "Frederick William," the "Irresistible," and the "Royal George," are ships which are perfectly fit to go on any warlike service. They were coastguard ships, and were ships in commission. I have already told you that the "Duke of Wellington" was a harbour ship, with her screw out; and that, although she was in commission, she was considered as a receiving ship, only adapted for harbour service, and had been long removed from the list of ships which were fit for anything like warlike service. The "Agamemnon," the "Albion," and the "Algers," were ships already condemned as only fit

for harbour service. The "Anson," the "Atlas," and the "Bulwark," were ships that were to be retained in the event of line-of-battle ships proving themselves still to be fit for the purposes of war; and moderate caulking and certain expenses were still to be incurred about those ships. They had never been fully completed for sea, and a great delay of money and considerable time would have been necessary to complete those ships for sea. The "Cæsar," the "Centurion," and the "Conqueror," were ships reserved in the same way, though they had been completed for sea. The "Defiance" never had been completed for sea. The "Exmouth," the "Gibraltar," the "Goliath," the "Hannibal," the "Hero," the "Hood," and a ship called the "Horne," which should be the "Howe," were ships very much in the same category. Two or three of them had been in commission before, and were in a dilapidated state. Those were ships, with regard to which it had been suggested to the Admiralty that the greater part of them were so far useless as ships of war, owing to the modern improvements in the art of destruction, that it would be desirable, as soon as convenient opportunities arose, to get rid of them, and to rest the strength of our naval defences entirely upon ironclads.

5539. Then in figuring as ships of war, to use the language to which exception has been taken, they were figuring in the sense in which a figure-head figures on a ship, they were really dummies for purposes of war, were they not?—I do not think that anybody who understood the subject, and, still less, a captain in the Navy, if he were an intelligent man, could have had the smallest idea that those ships were fit for the purposes of modern warfare; but those ships remained on the official list of the Navy as a necessity of the case. They were public property, and until the nation gets rid of its property an account must be given in the Navy list of them as public property; but no naval officer, if gifted with the smallest amount of intelligence, could for one moment suppose that all the 600 ships in the Navy list could in any way be considered as very fit instruments for naval warfare.

5540. Still there were several of them, were there not, which would have been fit for the voyage round the Cape?—Yes; those six ships that I have told you of.

5541. Even in the second list?—None without repair and equipment; with repair and equipment there are several.

5542. Then the facts are as Captain Sherard Osborn says; but whether his observations on the facts are correct is a matter of opinion?—I cannot answer for anything that Captain Sherard Osborn says. The facts are as I have told you.

5543. Were they unfit to go round the Cape of Good Hope without repairs?—What I say is quite correct, but I cannot answer for Captain Sherard Osborn's correctness.

5544. You say that it would have taken a considerable time to fit them as hospital ships, but you did not define the time?—No, because the work has not been defined to me.

5545. Do you draw the inference that it would have taken two months inasmuch as a ship once fitted as a hospital ship once took two months?—I presume it would; less fittings might have been required, and therefore less time might have been required; it all depends upon the work.

5546. Would you tell the Committee that one of

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of those ships could have been as rapidly fitted as a hospital ship as the merchant ships that were used were fitted?—No, I should think the difference in the amount of fittings required would have been greater.

5547. In what respect would that difference consist?—The alterations in passenger and freight ships would not, I should think, be as great as the alterations required in a man-of-war to make it a good hospital ship.

5548. Then the difference of time required would have been merely caused in the extra work, I presume?—It would have been merely in the extra work for those six ships.

5549. Had it been needful you could have had them fitted as the merchant ships were fitted outside the dockyards, could you not?—I do not think that follows at all; you see I am still answering your questions rather in the dark, because I do not know what amount of change in the internal economy of a ship of war would have been required to fit her as a hospital ship.

5550. You know what those ships are, and you know what the merchant ships engaged were, do you not?—In regard to that point, I am in the dark also; I never happened to see either of those ships that were taken up, so that I am really not competent to speak upon that point.

5551. Would you anticipate that the ventilation to which you have made reference, would be likely to be less in a ship of war, having to carry a large crew for war purposes, than in merchant ships?—Ventilation is given in ships of war by large port holes, and by immense masses of air, and that also is a subject which a medical man makes the most objection to when ships are fitted for sanitary purposes. We have to alter the hatches, and close those port holes, and do various things which appear to me to cost a great deal of money.

5552. Ships of war have port holes, and merchant ships have none, therefore the former would have more ventilation, would they not?—They would have a great deal too much air according to the medical view of the case; a man lives in a perpetual draught in a ship of war.

5553. The port holes could be closed in five minutes, and the draught could be excluded, could it not?—And then there is no ventilation.

5554. Could they not be closed either wholly or partially?—You cannot close them wholly.

5555. When the port holes are closed, is there not the same amount of ventilation in a ship of war as in a merchant ship?—I fancy not.

5556. But what were the particular facts of the case you are not personally informed?—I do not know.

5557. But you allege that you could do the work as quickly as it could be done outside the dockyards?—I should think the work on ships of war in a naval port, could be done quite as quickly as work in the river and merchant yards. I think that the question points to this: whether if you had to send a ship out of one of the Royal dockyards to a river, or to a private builder to be fitted as a hospital ship, you would not do it as quickly as it would be done in a dockyard, but if we did it in our own ports, I think we should do it as quickly.

5558. Where were those ships that are named, the "Donegal," and the "Duncan," and others?—Round the coast; some were at Liverpool, some off Ireland, some at Harwich, and some at Greenock; they were all round the coast.

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5559. Liverpool and Greenock are amply supplied with labour, and with such labour and skill as would have been necessary to fit those ships as hospital ships, are they not?—Certainly; and the ships that were there could have been fitted there if it had been thought advisable.

5560. Do you know where the ships that were chartered were fitted?—In the River Thames.

5561. Then your ship at Liverpool could have been fitted as quickly, could she not, as those ships were fitted in the Thames?—Clearly. If for instance no more work had to be done to the "Donegal" (supposing that it was the "Donegal" that was in the Mersey), to make her fit for a hospital ship than had to be done to the "Golden Fleece" to make her fit for a hospital ship, the one could have been done as quickly as the other.

5562. Sir J. Hay.] You would have had, I suppose, to send a ship to take the people out of her?—Certainly.

5563. Chairman.] You are only assuming that the requisitions would not have been different in the two cases?—Yes; but I do not know how that would have been.

5564. Were you ever asked the question by the Admiralty as to whether you could or could not fit those ships of war as hospital ships?—No; that question never arose, to my knowledge.

5565. So far as you know, could they have been fitted as quickly and as cheaply as the merchant ships?—Yes, as far as I know.

5566. Sir J. Hay.] You are aware that the merchant ships were fitted and sailed within one month; and I think I gathered from you that, looking to the ordinary fitting of a line-of-battle ship, it would have taken two months?—Yes; but these facts are all new to me.

5567. Chairman.] The ordinary fittings of a line-of-battle ship fitted as a hospital ship, cost 14,490 l. done in a dockyard, that is the amount to which you referred, is it not?—Yes; not ordinary fittings, but hospital fittings to order. In the case of the "Meani," a scale and pattern were given to us to which we were ordered to work; but there was no pressure in point of time, and we did not interrupt, to any extent, the work upon which we were engaged. With the resources at our dockyards, if we had stopped all other work and said, "Do this as quickly as you can," the time would have been very much less, of course.

5568. At Liverpool you would have had to have recourse to the private trade, and the ordinary resources of the private trade would have been at your service, would they not?—Of course, if it had been thought desirable to do so.

5569. You did not know what was wanted?—We did not know what was wanted.

5570. And you were never asked?—We were never asked.

5571. And the Admiralty were never officially informed?—The Admiralty, I suspect, were officially informed; but you must remember that I was only the servant of the Admiralty, the Controller of the Navy who did as he was told.

5572. The crews would have to be taken out of those ships you have sent; what crews were on board of them?—I am not very well able to tell you what their complements would be, but they would be what are called the complements of Coastguard ships.

5573. How many would that be?—I might be very

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very wrong; but I should not think there were 200 men in each of those ships.

5574. They would require a crew to take them to Annesley Bay, of course?—A large crew.

5575. Would it not have been very good exercise and training for those crews, supposing that you had had to take them all, to have taken them to Annesley Bay?—It would have been a very good thing indeed for the officers and men to have done it. Of course you are aware that the difference between the daily expense of 700 men, and the daily expense of 200 men, is very great.

5576. But what crew would have been necessary to take those ships to Annesley Bay?—That is the point. The larger ships would have required 600 men, and the smaller ships 500 men.

5577. Then, in point of fact, you would have had to call for other men from other places, would you not?—The 200 and odd men who are in a coastguard ship are for revenue purposes, and for purposes connected with the protection of the coast. All those questions should go to the Admiralty and not to me; because really I am outside of all that, and I was at that time completely outside of all that. A coastguard crew has certain duties to perform, and can only be spared from those duties for a very limited time.

5578. Would not any of the other ships which are set out in this second list have been available for revenue purposes at all events?—A great many of them would.

5579. And for war purposes so far as war was coming, or was likely to come to our coasts?—A great many of those ships might have been used as depôts for the coastguard men; but you would have had first to complete certain portions of the equipments which were left incomplete.

5580. How many ships would have had to be got to do their work?—If you had sent six or seven coastguard ships to Abyssinia, you would have had to take from your list of ships six or seven other ships to replace those ships, or you would have had to give up the coastguard duties altogether for a time.

5581. But assuming it to be essential that the coastguard duties should be continued unbroken, could you not have got seven ships to replace those ships?—You could.

5582. You say, as I understand, that they could not carry coals in their bunkers to steam more than 10 or 12 days?—Not more than that.

5583. But they have ample hold capacity, have they not?—No; on the contrary, the hold capacity or stowage of those ships we are speaking of, the ships that were originally intended as line-of-battle ships, is small. The quantity of provisions and water they stow is extremely limited, and their coal bunkers are not large; and the space that used to be occupied by stores and provisions in former days is now occupied by the engines.

5584. Do I understand you to state to the Committee, that with the exception of the space for coals for 10 or 12 days steaming, those vessels could not carry more coals on board?—If you put the full complement of men on board they could not stow more coal than that in their bunkers. If you reduced the complement of those men on board, you might occupy some portion of the 'tween-decks by coals in bags, but the supply would not be very large.

5585. You mean with a crew for fighting purposes?—Yes.

5586. But putting a crew for navigation purposes only on board, would there not be ample

space for a very large supply of coals in addition to the 12 days supply?—I should very much doubt, if you would be able to put on board a very large additional supply, because the reduction of the crews of those ships from their full war complement could not be large; for instance, if the complement of the "Donegal" was 780 men, you would send her out certainly with 650 men merely to navigate her. You have the large sails and heavy spars and heavy rigging, and the men are not accustomed to deal with those things except in masses.

5587. Then would you tell us that such a ship would not pass under steam all the way from coaling station to coaling station?—She could not do it, certainly.

5588. What is the first coaling station on the passage to Abyssinia?—I should think the first coaling station would be Madeira, but it must depend upon the wind; if there was a foul wind she could not steam to Madeira; those heavy masts and yards would stop her.

5589. Not by adding to the bunker coals, all the coals that could be stowed elsewhere?—If a line-of-battle ship met with a west or south-west gale in any part of the passage between England and Maderia, she could not steam all the way with her coals, even utilising all the space you could put coal into.

5590. Would not that be equally true of any merchant ship that could be sent out in that way if she met with such a gale as you speak of?—No; merchant ships are in the habit of making passages under steam, and carrying coals for 15, 16, and 20 days, and they would steam where a man-of-war would not steam, because the merchant ships have no spars, comparatively speaking, and no top hamper, comparatively speaking; a merchant ship is low in the water, but a ship of war is 30 or 40 feet out of the water, with great masts and yards, and a tremendous mass of rigging, so that in a calm you can get something out of a ship of war, but when the wind is blowing hard you can get very little out of her.

5591. Then those ships, as steamships, are almost what this letter describes as an imposition without a prefix, are they not?—That is not my conclusion. If you mean that an old line-of-battle ship is a very clumsy instrument for propulsion, I should agree with you, and I believe that is a general opinion.

5592. I understand the conclusion that you come to to be this, on your view of the facts, that none of those ships were available as hospital ships to go to Abyssinia, and that England had to have recourse to its mercantile marine to get ships available for that purpose, inasmuch as it had none of its own to use for the purpose?—That is not the conclusion to which I should come to. If this case had been put to me in August 1867, and if I had been asked whether there were any ships that were available for hospital ships for the Abyssinian War, I should have informed myself as to the requirements of those hospital ships. I should have known precisely the state of each ship in the Navy at that moment, and I could have answered the question then satisfactorily. At the present moment, four years have elapsed since then, and I could not answer the question satisfactorily, because to this day I do not know what the requirements of the hospital ships might have been. It would not be difficult, I think, to make you understand what I mean.

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mean. If you have an axe and a plane, you cannot expect the axe to do the work of the plane; and if the work required of the merchant ship is entirely different from the work for which a man-of-war is adapted, it would follow, as you say, that in that case having no ships fit to do the work of the plane, you are obliged to ask the mercantile marine to supply that want.

5593. But, needing both axes and planes, you would supply yourself with both; and, in point of fact, you did so, for you supplied yourself with one hospital ship at the cost of 14,400*l.*, did you not?—We did, at the request of the War Department.

5594. Sir *J. Elphinstone*.] She was a store ship also, was she not?—She was a store ship also.

5595. Mr. *Seely*.] How many coastguard ships did you say there were employed at that time?—Eight.

5596. *Chairman*.] This list is perfectly correct, is it not?—I take this statement to be perfectly correct up to the case of the “Duke of Wellington;” we had the “St. George,” the “Revenge,” the “Donegal,” the “Duncan,” the “Lion,” the “Irresistible,” the “Frederick William,” and the “Royal George.”

5597. The first list is correct and complete, is it not?—Yes, up to the “Duke of Wellington.”

5598. Mr. *Seely*.] Is it your opinion that it is necessary for the public revenue to have eight coastguard ships employed?—That is a great question of naval administration; my views of naval administration have been given in this room two years ago, and have been given to the Admiralty before and since that date, and it seems to me that it is hard upon me to ask me to go over all that again.

5599. I think you have stated that 14,493 *l.* was expended in fitting up a ship to go to Hong Kong as a hospital ship?—As a hospital ship and a store ship.

5600. But that 14,493 *l.* was expended in the dockyard, was it not?—It was expended at Sheerness and Chatham.

5601. If the same amount of work had been done in a private yard, is it your opinion according to what has passed that the amount would have been reduced, speaking now of 1867?—I believe that the work done in the dockyards was always a certain per-centage dearer than work in private establishments.

5602. Do you think that that per-centage would amount to something like 50 per cent.?—No; because the sum that I have given you is for the labour and materials, and does not include any incidental establishment charges; I must tell you perhaps, though, that we did urge upon the War Department that this vessel should be repaired by private hands and not by the dockyards, and that they deliberately, knowing all our iniquities, chose to have it done by us.

5603. May I ask you how long the hospital ships which were engaged took to fit?—Just a month.

5604. Do you know when they reached Annesley Bay?—On the 10th of December.

5605. *Chairman*.] If those ships had sailed at the same time that the hospital ships sailed, they would have arrived in Annesley Bay, according to your calculation of 75 days, towards the latter part of December, would they not?—I suppose that would have been so, but I have not made the calculation.

5606. Captain *Beaumont*.] You stated, I think, that a merchant ship is more likely to answer, in your opinion, as a hospital ship than a man-of-war; but is it not worthy of consideration that the reverse is rather the case when you bear in mind the open decks that a man-of-war has, and the fact that a merchant ship, generally speaking, has her passenger cabins divided off, and has to separate her cargo space, and that altogether there is less ventilation in a merchant ship than there is in a man-of-war?—To that I can only reply, that when we have been in communication with the medical directors, whose requisitions we follow as to the fitting of ships of war for hospital ships, the alterations required are exceedingly large and very expensive; and that it appears to me, though I have never had an opportunity of seeing exactly how that would work in a merchant ship not having seen the requisitions that were made to a merchant vessel, that passenger ships carrying a light cargo would have greater facilities for becoming hospital ships than men-of-war; but that is an opinion only founded upon what I may call a one-sided knowledge; that is to say, I know what very large requisitions are made on ships of war to be altered for hospital ships, but I do not know what requisitions would be made upon a merchant ship for the same purpose.

5607. Speaking with reference to the employment that was contemplated for those ships, is it not a fact that in the Indian seas you cannot get too much ventilation, and that you would like, if you could, to get a ship all deck and no sides at all, and that therefore the difficulty as to shutting up the ports almost vanishes?—I was not told, and I do not know, what the medical people would have required for those ships; but I know what they asked us to do in Hong Kong, which is a very hot and tropical climate, and there the expense was very considerable.

5608. But you would not say, would you, that any analogy subsisted between the expense that was incurred then, and the expense that would have been likely to be incurred in fitting a hospital ship for service in the Red Sea?—Supposing that the requisition made by the proper authority upon us had been to alter one of these ships as extensively as we altered the “*Meáni*,” the expense would have been similar, I presume.

5609. But you cannot anticipate that that would have been the case, the service being different?—I think that, generally speaking, medical men have their ships and establishments fitted regardless of any expense; they do not care much about what it costs, as long as the country pays for it.

5610. And regardless of the place to which they are going?—No; I think they are much too clever for that. The probability is that some things that we never dreamt of, things which the climate required, would have been necessary, which might have led us to much greater expense than was incurred as regards Hong Kong.

5611. I should be much obliged if you would inform the Committee what is the nature of the fittings which are so expensive in India; because, as far as I understand, we consider that the very simplest accommodation, and the openest and the cheapest, is that which answers the purpose best?—I daresay I should be of the same opinion; but if I was a public servant, and a requisition was made upon me to do certain things, I should do those things, and I should say, if I was asked,

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it would cost so much. If I differed entirely in opinion from the Medical Director General as to the requirements for the fittings of a hospital ship, I should have executed his views under the orders of the Admiralty, and not my own. The Blue Book gives information as to hospital equipments, provisions, and stores; but that does not tell me what alteration the Medical Director would have required in the ship itself. Supposing that he had required no alteration whatever in the ship, and had said that the ship should go as she was, I should have said, "Very well."

5612. Do you know of your own knowledge that there would have been any very extensive alterations required?—Certainly not, because I never was told what those alterations were to be.

5613. Had you anything to do with the arrangements that were made?—Nothing whatever.

5614. From what you have subsequently heard, do you think that the transport arrangements might have been more economically made?—I have never read a single word of the evidence that has been taken before this Committee, or anything, excepting some speeches made in Parliament last year, on the subject of the excess of expenditure over estimate, so that I really do not know, and I have heard nothing.

5615. You would not like to offer an opinion as to whether the transport arrangements might, or might not, have been more economically made?—I could offer no opinion without going into the subject and examining those questions, which I have not done.

5616. With regard to those hospital transports, do you know whether the whole ships might not have been bought out-and-out, for the amount paid for their hire?—I do not; I have no knowledge upon the subject; I do not know what the ships cost; I do not know what the hire of the ships was; I do not know what the market price of the ships at that time was; I do not know the bargains that were made, and I do not know the bargains that could have been made; so that I can give no opinion upon that subject.

5617. Sir J. Hay.] I suppose the 14,000 *l.* that was necessary to equip the "Meáni" would represent a good deal more than her market price?—We should not have got 14,000 *l.* for the "Meáni."

5618. Therefore the fitting and cost of equipment of a ship is no guide to her market price, is it?—No.

5619. Mr. Seely.] May I ask you whether you made a present to the War Office of the incidental expenses?—No; the War Office repaid us.

5620. For the incidental expenses?—No.

5621. Then you made a present to the War Office of the incidental expenses?—Yes.

5622. Sir J. Elphinstone.] Supposing that you had required simply to take the guns out of those ships, and to have given them as much coal as possible, it would have required a considerable time under any circumstances to have sent them to sea for an Indian voyage, would it not?—I think they were all quite fit; we kept them in that state of readiness, that though there might have been a ship that would have required, before she went, to be in dock, most of them had been docked that year; and I think they were perfectly fit for a voyage anywhere.

5623. I think you stated that you would have required 650 men as the complement of those ships; can you give the Committee any idea of

what would be the cost of a line-of-battle ship per month?—That is not exactly in my way, but the wages of an able seaman are 1 *l.* 14 *s.* per month; the victualling comes to about 22 *s.* per man per month, and then there are all the expenses of the officers; I could not make the calculation mentally, but that is about what it would be.

5624. The expenses would be about 3,000 *l.* per month for one of those line-of-battle ships; then the Expedition lasted for nine or ten months, did it not, so that you could not have recalled your hospital ships under a year?—Yes.

5625. Then each of those ships would have cost 36,000 *l.*, would it not, at any rate?—Yes, if you have done the sum right, but I am not responsible for the figures.

5626. When the ships came home, they would have required a refit, I suppose?—Certainly; you have not added, I think, a very important item; namely, the cost of the coal, because we should have burnt a good deal of coal.

5627. How much coal do you suppose it would have required to take them out there?—I think, taking every advantage of coaling everywhere, coaling at Madeira, at Cape de Verde Islands, at the Mauritius, and at the Cape of Good Hope, they would have required no more coal till they got to Aden.

5628. What would be the cost of the coal?—They would burn 600 tons of coal between each of those stations, no doubt, and I have named the other four stations.

5629. That is 2,400 tons of coal out and 2,400 tons of coal home, is it not?—They might have come under sail, probably.

5630. Then you would have had to pay your men all the longer, would you not?—You would have had to pay the men all the longer.

5631. So that you had better bring them home under steam; therefore, according to those figures, it would have cost 40,800 *l.* for each of those ships, besides the refit of the ship again when she came home?—Assuming your figures to be correct, that is so.

5632. Sir J. Hay.] In the second clause of Captain Sherard Osborn's letter it is stated, with reference to me, that Captain Osborn fully anticipates "official evidence to be forthcoming, as usual, to show that these ships could not have been used as hospital ships;" I hope you will state to the Committee that I have made no previous arrangement with you as to the evidence which should be given?—I never heard a word about this.

5633-4. Chairman.] You think now that they were not fit, so that the anticipation was correct, was it not?—I think that they were not fit, unless you had been prepared to spend the money to make them so.

5635. Sir J. Hay.] Does it follow because the ships were utterly unfit to be used as hospital ships that they were utterly unfit to be called men-of-war?—No, the two things are utterly incompatible.

5636. Mr. Seely.] You have been asked how much coal would have been consumed in going to Annesley Bay and in coming back again, and you have stated it at 2,400 tons or thereabouts each way; but are you aware of what was the quantity of coal consumed by those hospital ships in going there and in coming back?—Not at all.

5637. Have you any idea whether it would be more or less?—I should think it would be considerably

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derably less. I should think that merchant ships would perform that for one-third less, or I should be very much surprised if they did not do so.

5638. *Chairman.*] A great many of the men you would have to pay in working those ships out to Annesley Bay would be in the pay of the Admiralty at any rate, would they not?—If you had sent three hospital ships to Annesley Bay you would have had to increase the number of sailors borne by, I should say, at least 1,500 men, because all our men were in ships. You only get so many men voted for the Navy as man your ships; if, therefore, you manned three additional ships, including the coastguard, which is still maintained on the books, you would have had to increase your Navy by 1,500 men, or 500 men for each vessel.

5639. You are aware when a quotation is made to you as to the amount paid to those hospital ships, that, to that sum in order to get to the entire cost, must be added the cost of coal which they consumed out and home?—You are speaking, knowing everything that has passed, and you are speaking to a person who knows nothing that has passed.

5640. But you have had a calculation of the cost of sending those ships out, and bringing them home as hospital ships?—Yes.

5641. Was there in that calculation the price of the coals that they would consume out and home?—Yes.

5642. Do you know that in stating the cost of the other ships, the coals were excluded?—I did not know that.

5643. *Sir S. Northcote.*] Is it your impression as a general matter, that it would be desirable in the future in the case of any expedition to a distance, in which hospital ships might be required to hire them from the merchant service, or to adapt ships of war?—My opinion is that nothing is so bad as adapting a tool that is well fitted for one purpose to another. I have always found that to be the most expensive mode of proceeding; and, therefore, if I could find any ships in the merchant trade at all likely to make good hospital ships, I should prefer hiring them very much indeed to adapting men-of-war.

5644. *Chairman.*] But you would require to know the particular facts of each case?—Cer-

tainly. I am saying all along that I am answering these questions in the dark, because I do not know the facts.

5645. *Captain Beaumont.*] Is it not equally an adaptation in the case of a merchant ship, as in the case of a man-of-war?—I should like to see the merchant ship; I have always found a greater adaptability in merchant vessels for work required to be done, than in a ship of war built for a certain given and limited purpose.

5646. *Chairman.*] If you were told that the bulb of the thermometer at Annesley Bay when put into your mouth came down, would you not infer that the more ports there were in a hospital ship the better?—I should.

5647. *Sir S. Northcote.*] Would you infer that the hotter a ship was, the more air you should let in?—In a hot sirocco wind in Malta for instance, you would carefully exclude every atom of air; you would hang blankets against the windows, and you would be a great deal cooler than if you let the air in.

5648. *Mr. Eastwick.*] May I ask when the "Meani" was fitted as a hospital ship?—In 1867; that was the year I believe of the Abyssinian Expedition.

5649. Was she fitted then with the same fittings as were required for these vessels?—No; I only say that if the same fittings had been asked for as were asked for by the War Department, the cost would have been probably similar, but I have no means of knowing what fittings would have been required.

5650. It has been stated in evidence here by Admiral Mends, that the fittings required by the medical officers were very unusual, and that they were almost exacting at the time as to the fittings of that; we had no example of a hospital ship properly fitted at all, until those ships were fitted up, so that according to that statement, the fittings would have required a very considerable time?—Certainly they would. I hope I have made myself understood that in answering these questions, I was not aware of the fittings that would be required, and that therefore my answers must be subject to that diminution; I cannot say positively what anything would cost until I know what was wanted, and as I do not know what was wanted, I could not say what the cost would be.

Rear Admiral GEORGE HENRY RICHARDS, F.R.S., called in; and Examined.

5651. *Sir J. Hay.*] ARE you the Hydrographer of the Navy?—I am.

5652. Supposing that it had been decided to send steam line-of-battle ships as hospital ships to Annesley Bay at the end of September 1867, which was the earliest date at which they could have been got ready under steam and sail, how long do you suppose that they would have been in performing the duty which was performed by the hospital ships "Mauritius," "Golden Fleece," and "Queen of the South"?—I should say that an average passage would be 100 days.

5653. Then supposing those ships to have been

fitted as quickly as the merchant ships, viz., by the 26th of September they could not have arrived before the month of January?—I should think not; I should consider 100 days a fair passage.

5654. *Chairman.*] Are you speaking of sailing out in that time, or of steaming out?—Of getting out as quickly as possible using the steam which they had at their command.

5655. How does it fall within the scope of your professional duties to determine the probable limit of a passage; is it not partly an engineering question?—No; it is a seaman's question; I am constantly referred to as to those points.

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Rear Admiral WILLIAM ROBERT MENDS, C.B., re-called; and further Examined.

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5656. Sir *J. Hay*.] THE demand which was sent to the Admiralty by the War Office, by the authority of the India Office, which requested that three hospital ships should be fitted for the Abyssinian War reached you on the 27th of August, I believe?—Yes.

5657. Are you of opinion that at that time it would have been sufficiently rapid for the service, if, instead of applying yourself to obtain the "Mauritius," the "Golden Fleece," and the "Queen of the South," steam line-of-battle ships had been taken for the purpose?—I was under the impression until I heard what I heard to-day that steam line-of-battle ships could have been fitted as rapidly as those ships.

5658. Supposing that they had been fitted as rapidly, would they have been as useful for the purpose as those ships?—It would have been a question for me whether they would have reached Annesley Bay at the time that they were required, but I think also, from what we know now, that it is proved that it could have been done.

5659. Do you think that they could have reached Annesley Bay by the end of December?—I think they could have reached Annesley Bay by the end of December.

5660. If they had been there would they have been as available for the purpose with their crews on board as the ships that were fitted and dispatched by you?—Looking back to that time, I should not have considered that they were so locomotive; that is to say, so well adapted for knocking about in narrow waters as the ships we selected.

5661. As one of the duties which the "Mauritius," the "Golden Fleece," and the "Queen of the South" were called upon to be ready to perform was, as the sick came on board, to convey them to Mauritius, Bombay, or Suez, whichever place might be selected by the medical authorities, would line-of-battle ships, with the power which wooden line-of-battle ships have, have been so convenient for the purpose of conveying the sick to their destination, as the ships which you selected?—I think that they would have proved so for hospital purposes, and that with the full power of canvass which they had, and auxiliary screw power, they would have answered the purpose as effectually if they had been there.

5662. But is it your impression that they would have been there in time?—The idea at the time, had the question been raised, would probably have been that they could not, but I think it is now proved that they could have been there.

5663. With the knowledge that you had at the time, do you think that your choice of ships was correct?—Of course, carrying one's mind back to what was then done, and considering what we now know to be the result, I cannot but form a different opinion. I think now that it would have been better to have sent ships of the line, if we had had them, and that they could have been fitted within the time and would have been quite as useful as the ships which we sent; and certainly the cost would have been very much less.

5664. In case of another expedition, would you prefer to send line-of-battle ships for that purpose?—I would, if we had them, rather than incur the expense of hiring ships, now that we know the result. I think that the medical officers were very exacting in their requirements. The absolute fitting of a hospital ship has been somewhat over-estimated. It really resolved itself into certain drying rooms and lavatories, and latrines and special arrangements for cots, with very superior ventilation. I cannot think why the work should not be done in the dock-yards as rapidly as we did it in the Thames, and no doubt if we look at the figures there is no blinking the question, that it would have cost much less.

5665. Do you know what the cost of fitting of the "Mauritius," the "Golden Fleece," or the "Queen of the South" was?—I think the total hire was 49,000 l.

5666. But what was the cost of fitting?—I can get it, but I have not it now. The cost of fitting a line-of-battle ship as a hospital ship, such as Sir Spencer Robinson has described, with a crew, and jury-rigged, suitable to go round the cape, certainly would be less than what we had to pay for the transports engaged.

5667. If they could have been there in time?—I think they ought to have been there by the end of December, that is about 90 days.

Colonel MICHAEL KAVANAGH KENNEDY, called in; and Examined.

Colonel
Kennedy.

5668. Captain *Beaumont*.] YOU are Secretary to the Public Works Department of the Government of Bombay, are you not?—Yes.

5669. I think I had the pleasure of meeting you in India, and of asking you certain questions on the 23rd of January 1870?—Yes.

5670. I propose to put to you the same questions again, and I shall be obliged if you will read the answers which you then gave to them, making any additions which you may think desirable; had you the control of the expenditure in the Public Works Department, on account of the Abyssinian war?—I was the organ of the Government in the Public Works Department.

5671. Were all the questions respecting the arrangement and supply of railway plant, water pipes, and of engineering matters generally, un-

der your control?—All the matters relating to engineering were under my control.

5672. When did the question of employing a railway in connection with the Abyssinian Expedition first come before your Government?—It was discussed in October, and finally determined on in November 1867, on the receipt of the report of the reconnoitring party.

5673. Were the details at that time settled?—Yes.

5674. What steps were then taken to arrange for the supply of suitable plant and materials?—The plant and materials were collected from wherever obtainable, and from Government stores.

5675. Was the question of gauge considered?—It was.

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5676. I presume the five-foot six-inch gauge was adopted solely to suit the plant in existence?—Quite so.

5677. Telegram No. 621, page 305 of the Blue Book, gives an estimate for light rail, &c., &c.; on what information was it based; I presume it came through you?—Yes, it came through me, and it was the result of inquiries made in the market as regards the light rails only.

5678. Did you submit any written memorandum to the Government on the subject, and if so, will you furnish me with a copy of it?—Government called for an estimate for a tramway to be worked by mules or horses, with the rails just referred to. The estimate was furnished, and, after correction, amounted to about 3,200 *l.* a mile, exclusive of cuttings or embankments.

5679. But with reference to the special telegram, No. 621, in which the Secretary of State for India acted in placing the matter in the hands of the Bombay Government, was any written statement submitted by your department to Government in support of that estimate; and, if so, was the information in such a shape as to have enabled the Bombay Government to inform the India Office of the total probable cost of such a line?—No regular estimate for the whole railway had been submitted on the date of the telegram.

5680. Was the information contained in telegram No. 621, meant to refer to a locomotive line?—No, but for a tramway to be worked by horses or mules.

5681. Then when telegram No. 683, which authorised the Government of Bombay to go on, and which I believe to have been based on the information contained in Telegram No. 621, was sent, the Secretary of State for India was acting under a wrong impression, if he took such estimate as an indication of the total cost of supplying a locomotive railway from India?—I have no means of proving upon what information Telegram No. 683 was based, but the figures given in Telegram 621 were not sufficient for a locomotion railway.

5682. Sir *S. Northcote.*] Have you noticed that in Telegram 621 it was expressly stated that the tramway was to be worked by horse-power?—I have not the telegram before me now, and I do not know.

5683. Will you look at the terms of Telegram 621?—Having referred to the telegram as given in the Blue Book I find that it was expressly stated that the light rails were sufficient for a tramway to be worked by horses or mules.

5684. Captain *Beaumont.*] Did you inform the Government of what you thought a locomotive railway would cost?—Yes, I estimated it roughly at about 5,000 *l.* a mile. This estimate was, however, made in the absence of all knowledge of the country to be passed over.

5685. I presume this sum would include expenses of all kinds?—I calculated for the completed railway.

5686. Will you please give me the date when you submitted that opinion to Government?—On the 5th of October, in the shape of a rough memorandum.

5687. Referring to the Blue Book, I see the following letters from engineers on the subject of a railway for Abyssinia, which should be capable of being rapidly laid down, and should necessitate a minimum of cutting and embankments: From Sir John McNeill, No. 177, of the 0.46.

2nd of September; from Mr. Brassey, No. 252, of the 7th of September; from General Simmons, No. 561, of the 25th of September. They all concur in the desirableness of a light railway and a narrow gauge; were those letters submitted to the Public Works Department by your Government?—Those letters are not in the records of the Public Works Department, but I think I saw them, with the exception of that written by General Simmons, which, so far as I remember, I did not see.

5688. Were they submitted to you as guides on which to form your opinion as to the course best to be taken in the matter of the railway, or did they come only casually before you?—They were submitted to me for consideration when the question of the railway was under discussion.

5689. Will you tell me on what date, and if they were in time for you to have acted on them had you concurred in the course therein indicated?—I cannot exactly remember the date, but it was certainly towards the end of October, and the suggestions could not have been acted on without, in my opinion, involving considerable delay.

5690. Was any definite estimate or scheme for the railway plant submitted to your Government besides the general memorandum referred to previously before the work was put in hand?—An estimate for a light railway was submitted and has been above referred to; it amounted to 3,200 *l.* per mile, and it was previously intended to be worked by cattle, but it would have been available for locomotives at an enhanced cost for rolling stock.

5691. Was this the estimate on which the work was actually undertaken subject to the above remark as regards rolling stock?—There was no other estimate.

5692. Will you give me a copy of the one you refer to?—I said that I would forward it to England, and I think you have received it; I think it was forwarded to you.

5693. *Chairman.*] Could you get a copy of it in England?—No, I could not.

5694. Captain *Beaumont.*] Telegram No. 741, of the 15th of October, asks what gauge Mr. Brassey would recommend; four feet being preferred, was that telegram sent at your request, and if so, I presume, you had not at that date settled the course as to gauge which you proposed to pursue?—The telegram was not sent at my request, and at that time the question of gauge was not finally determined.

5695. On what date was the estimate sent in which is referred to as the one on which the plant was supplied?—On the 7th of October.

5696. And no other estimate or written proposition was submitted to the Government?—That was the only one.

5697. Then do I understand rightly that though your department, which acted as the responsible adviser to Government on the question of the railway, had submitted on the 7th the only estimate on the subject, on the 15th of October, the question of the gauge to be employed was still an open one?—I have already said that the question of the gauge had not been finally determined, and was under consideration by the Government in the Public Works Department.

5698. Will you give the date when the question of gauge was finally settled and the work put in hand?—The final orders in regard to the provision of the railway on the 5-ft. 6-in. gauge were

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were given on the 8th of November, and the work put in hand at once.

5699. Nothing had been purchased before that, I presume, or, if so, it would have been trifling in amount?—I am not quite certain, but some few rails might have been purchased before that date in anticipation of the requirements.

5700. Was the action of the Bombay Government in the matter of the railway hampered to any extent, either by orders or a want of orders from England?—Not that I am aware of; certainly not in the Public Works Department of the Government.

5701. Was information ever given to the Indian Government in England on the following points: the probable cost of the railway with the nature of the plant it was proposed to use (that is, either new or old), and the gauge, together with the time that it would take in general terms to supply the whole of the material?—No report on the subject was made in the Public Works Department of the Government to the Secretary of State.

5702. Had the contents of the letters referred to above as having been received by the Secretary of State for India been made known to you, not in the ordinary course of post, but by telegram immediately on their receipt, would they have modified your views as to the best steps to be taken in the matter?—No; the propositions were made, in my opinion, at too late a date to have been adopted as regards the Abyssinian railway with advantage. I should still have preferred, time being the object in view, to have made the best arrangement possible in Bombay. Had the propositions been received, say, six months previously, it would have been a great relief to us in Bombay to have availed ourselves of them.

5703. You put it entirely as a question of time, and I presume you doubt the possibility of new plant being obtained from England in the same time in which you supplied plant from Bombay?—Yes; it is entirely a question of time. It was considered that by sending forward the plant and materials that we had on the spot, there was less risk of delay than there would have been had we accepted any arrangement in England.

5704. Will you accept as approximately correct the following dates and facts which I have obtained from Captain Darrah, the officer in charge of the line at Annesley Bay, that the line was stopped short of Kumelí principally owing to the different condition of the rolling stock, and that the foot of the pass did not begin till some few miles beyond Kumelí; that the date of the first use of the railway was the end of February; and that the date of completion up to as near as Kumelí as the line got, was the first week in April?—As regards the dates, I have no objection to accept Captain Darrah's statement. As regards his opinions in reference to the state of the plant, I have received no corroborative evidence on the point.

5705. Do I understand you that you doubt the correctness of the evidence, or have you any report to which you could refer which would put a different light upon the subject?—I think Captain Darrah, from what I have since heard, exaggerated the state of the plant as regards its defects.

5706. Have you read that which is now on the Minutes of this Committee as evidence given by me on the subject of the conversation I had with

Captain Darrah?—I have not; but I have read the letter.

5707. Do you accept the statement made by Captain Darrah as correct respecting the quality of the plant which was sent?—No doubt some of the rails were bent; no doubt some of the holes for fish plates did not correspond; but I do not think that any appreciable delay was created thereby.

5708. Therefore, do you consider that that letter is an exaggeration?—I think it is an exaggeration.

5709. Have you any documentary evidence which you could bring, or any argument, beyond your own expression of opinion to that effect?—My opinion is formed in a negative way; no complaints that would bear out Captain Darrah's statements reached me from the Expedition at that time.

5710. But you are not aware of the existence of any report or official communication which would invalidate this statement?—I am not aware of any official report which would substantiate them other than Captain Darrah's statement, which is not official.

5711. *Chairman.*] You have had no report of any kind either one way or the other?—No; no complaints were made at the time with reference to the state of the rails, to the best of my belief.

5712. And have you had no further information upon the subject?—No further information that would substantiate Captain Darrah's statement, in the sense that the state of the plant materially retarded the work.

5713. *Captain Beaumont.*] The facts in that letter you would accept, I presume, but you would doubt the inference which is drawn from them as to the delay which took place in consequence?—I would accept them to a certain extent. No doubt some of the rails in embarking and disembarking may have become bent, and required straightening; that would be the case with all plant shipped to that distance. Some of the rails would require sorting, of course, so as to make them correspond.

5714. As a matter of fact, do you not know that there were five different descriptions of rails sent?—Four or five.

5715. As a matter of fact, do you not believe that two descriptions of chairs were sent?—Yes, I believe they were.

5716. As a matter of fact, do you not believe that old rails were sent from the Karáchí Harbour Works?—Yes, undoubtedly. All the rails were old, or very nearly all.

5717. As a matter of fact, was not a six-wheel locomotive sent?—A six-wheel locomotive was sent undoubtedly.

5718. Was that a class of engine which should have been sent for sharp curves?—When that was sent we did not know what the gradients or curves would be; we sent what we could.

5719. In Sir John McNeill's letter of the 2nd of September he submitted that a railway 50 miles long might be put down in three months from date. If this had been accomplished it would have been obviously a better result than that obtained; I presume that you considered that no reliance could be placed on the figures as regards time?—We considered, when we determined to send the railway, that we could lay it quite as quickly as any contractor or private individual could have done. As regards Sir John McNeill's specific proposition, he was quite unacquainted

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quainted with the country he would have had to have dealt with, and his assertion that 50 miles of railway could have been laid down in three months, as applied to the country that was the actual scene of operations, was altogether too sanguine, and would only have failed if it had been acted upon.

5720. Of course the remarks of Sir John McNeill would not refer to such work as would be involved in carrying a line up the Suru Pass, but only to that part of the road on the plains?—Probably not; but he does not so qualify his assertion.

5721. Would you not give him credit for meaning that as a sensible man?—I do not look upon his offer as a tender to execute at all; it was merely, I consider, a communication with a view to bring on discussion.

5722. But assuming that he was prepared to act up to the letter of his statement, you would think that offer would have been a very desirable one, would you not, for the Secretary of State for India to have accepted?—If the Secretary of State for India could have insured the completion of it, it would have been so undoubtedly, but I do not think that the Secretary of State, or any other person, could have insured it; I think that it was altogether an illusory offer.

5723. But still, when the object to be obtained was of such great importance, you would have thought it wise, would you not, to have substantiated the offer in some way, and to have found out whether it was or not altogether illusory, because Sir John McNeill is a man of very considerable position, and it is treating him in a somewhat cavalier fashion to assume that an offer which he makes in sober earnestness, on a matter of considerable importance to the country, is illusory?—No; the responsibility rested in Bombay; if we had wasted time by discussing the impossible offer of Sir John McNeill, we should possibly have perilled the success of the Expedition.

5724. I am not speaking of your position, because from Bombay you could not have made the inquiries; I am merely asking your opinion as a professional man, whether, with the means of substantiating that statement in the course of two or three days, it would not have been a wise provision on the part of those in authority here to have done so, and to have communicated the result of that inquiry to you in Bombay, who were charged with the executive administration of the railway?—Probably it would have been a wise thing, but I cannot answer for the authorities in England.

5725. Are you quite clear that, supposing Sir John McNeill not to have spoken in an illusory sense, the value of doing that which he proposed to have done would have been very great, and would have relieved the Bombay Government of a very considerable source of anxiety?—Undoubtedly; if we could have procured a railway in six weeks, it would have been very much to our advantage.

5726. In the event of its having been decided to lay a narrow gauge railway, was not the following course practicable, and would it not have resulted in a saving in point of time to have prepared and sent from Bombay the sleepers, rails, points, &c., to have drawn the narrow gauge rolling stock from England, with the exception of the trollies necessary for the construction of the line, pending the arrival of the regular waggons,

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which former could have been made in Bombay by the time the other plant, to be supplied from there, was ready for embarkation; you will notice that in putting the question I, of course, assume that the rolling stock could have been supplied, and consequently the statements that Sir John McNeill and others have made were not in that sense illusory?—That question has reference to the rolling stock only.

5727. The question has reference not to the rolling stock only, but to the whole construction of the line; by that course you would have drawn from Bombay, which was the quickest source of supply, the fixed plant; you would have obtained the advantage of a narrow gauge line, which most engineering authorities agree is best for army purposes generally, and where a line is to be rapidly constructed through a difficult country, and you would have obtained also the advantage of the rolling stock, best adapted for the purpose, from England?—As we had the rolling stock in Bombay, and had determined to adopt the 5 feet 6 inches gauge, we thought it better to send the thing complete from there; it was quite obvious, such being the case, that the rolling stock could have been delivered quicker from Bombay than from England.

5728. That would, again, be on the assumption that the offers which were contained, as to the time, in the letters to which I referred, could not have been acted upon?—No; because Zulla was 10 days from Bombay, and it is, at the very least, 20 days from England.

5729. Was application made to the great Indian Peninsular Railway Company, or to the Bombay and Baroda Company, with a view to getting, if possible, a complete set of railway plant from one place, and so avoiding the ills that might arise from a difference in patterns of plant, and the use of second-hand materials?—No; it was considered that the permanent way and rolling stock of the Great Indian Peninsular and the other company in Bombay, was of too heavy a description to send, and endeavours were made to obtain a lighter description of stock.

5730. Were the Public Works lighters and vessels used in loading the stores for the Abyssinian Expedition?—Yes, they were; and it was found that the plant could be embarked quicker by this means.

5731. Were the same means employed in unloading?—Most of the engineer plant did not return to Bombay, part being kept in Zulla, and part being left at Aden. There were therefore very few engineer stores to disembark in Bombay, and there was no necessity to employ Public Works barges.

5732. For the discharge of the general stores were the Public Works Department applied to for assistance in the shape of boats?—No, they were not.

5733. Had they been asked to supply boats, with a moderate amount of inconvenience, could the Public Works Department have arranged to have afforded assistance in unloading?—The Public Works Department could have afforded assistance, and, in point of fact, they did so, their tugs being engaged all the early part of the monsoon in towing in Abyssinian transports.

5734. Your answer to a previous question will refer to unloading only, and the supply of barges for so doing, which were available, had they been asked for?—My answer referred to discharging cargo, for which barges would be available, had they

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they been applied for, but not tugs, as they were already employed as stated above.

5735. Were the tugs so employed till the close of the affair; that is to say, after the ships had come into harbour and were awaiting discharge, did the tugs render any assistance in discharging them?—The tugs were employed at the mouth of the harbour, picking up, and towing in vessels as they arrived, which service extended over a considerable period during the early part of the monsoon.

5736. In fact, then, the tugs were available for the Expedition as long as they were required, and their services were only asked for for towing in vessels, and not to assist in unloading?—The tugs were only used for towing in vessels.

5737. Do you know the circumstances under which the railway plant was left at Aden?—It was left by order of Lord Napier, with a view to its utilization in the construction of a railway between the camp at Aden and Steamer Point.

5738. Is Lord Napier solely responsible for the course taken, or was it done with the concurrence of the Bombay Government?—It was done by Lord Napier in anticipation of the approval of the Government.

5739. Was it proposed to lay the railway at Aden solely with a view to military requirements?—Yes, but of course, if constructed, it would have been available for other purposes.

5740. By the reports from the reconnoitring force, the fact of the want of water at Zulla was recognised, as also the fact of there being running water within 16 miles of Zulla. A demand was made by the commanding engineer for pipes; when was that demand received, and what steps were taken in the matter?—The order was received in the Public Works Department on the 14th of November to supply a total length of three miles and 804 yards of 3-inch and 4-inch piping; this was all that could be had in Bombay, and was obtainable from the gas company; subsequently, 15 miles of piping were asked for from England by telegraph, dated the 24th of December, in the Military Department.

5741. Was that the first reference to England on the subject, and can you give me a copy of the telegram?—As far as I know, it was; and a copy of the telegram will be found in the Military Department.

5742. Was the order to the gas company countermanded?—Yes.

5743. Do you know whether the Bombay Government took any steps in the matter of the supply of pipes between the 14th of November and the 24th of December, or what was the cause of the delay in demanding them from England when it appears it was known that a sufficient quantity of pipes was not procurable in Bombay; the matter of delay in the supply of these pipes was of considerable importance, as they could have been laid, when on the ground, at the rate of three or four miles a day, and would have resulted in doing away with the expense of condensing at Zulla, together with affording the great advantage of a plentiful supply of water?—Between the dates mentioned no steps were taken by the Government in the Public Works Department; whether any were taken in the Military Department I do not know.

5744. The pipes were not actually on the ground till so late as to be of no use, and they were not laid; I presume you do not know why this was the case, and it will rest with the autho-

rities here to afford an explanation?—I do not know, as the Public Works Department of the Bombay Government were not concerned in the supply.

5745. Was it in contemplation from the first to put the construction of the line in the hands of a Royal Engineer officer?—I am under the impression that it was, such officer being assisted by a competent staff of railway engineers.

5746. I fancy I have gathered, from looking over some official correspondence, that a railway engineer was looked for, and that the post of chief engineer to the railway, at a salary of 1,500 rupees per month, was refused by one or more civilians when it was decided to employ a Royal Engineer from among the officers in Abyssinia; was this the case?—Yes, efforts were made to obtain the assistance of a railway engineer; but, as far as my knowledge goes, it was never contemplated to place the entire direction of the railway construction and management in his hands; he was merely to assist the Royal Engineers, the work being a military one.

5747. Was it possible to send out an engineer in charge who had superintended personally the preparation of the plant and its shipment?—No; subject to the circumstances under which the Abyssinian railway plant was collected, it would not have been practicable to have adopted such a course.

5748. What sum stands to the debit of the Public Works Department, in the office of the Accountant General, on account of expenditure for the Abyssinian Expedition?—I believe a memorandum of this account was forwarded to you from Bombay, but I have no records here with me.

5749. Was it put under different heads, distinguishing the railway expenditure from that incurred under other heads, so that we can compare the total expenditure, as given by you in detail, in the returns rendered to me, with the corresponding sum returned by the Accountant General?—I am not certain upon that point, and I cannot tell without reference to the papers.

5750. You are thoroughly acquainted, I believe, with the Bombay Harbour?—Yes.

5751. Would it have been a practicable course, in place of letting the ships lie as long as they did, waiting to be unloaded, to have towed them behind Butcher's Island and Hog Island, where they would have been in comparatively still water, and free from the difficulties which the monsoon put in the way of discharging them?—It would have been quite practicable to have towed them to the places you have mentioned.

5752. Would there have been any reason against it other than that, which was a financial question, depending upon the value which the stores might have in the two cases; in the one case on the mainland, where they would have been more readily available for sale, and in the other case on those islands where no preparations were made for receiving them, and where, no doubt, they would have been subject to a certain amount of deterioration?—I do not quite see the object of towing them; you could not land the stores from them at Butcher's Island, or at Hog Island.

5753. The object is this, that the ships were retained on time charter at a cost of 7,000*l.* per day; if the value of the stores when landed, either on Hog Island or on the mainland, was only a tithe of that, would it not appear to be an arrangement

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arrangement conducive to economy to have taken the readiest means of discharging the ships?—But you could not discharge the ships so quickly there, in my opinion, from the want of landing appliances, such as wharves and cranes.

5754. But could not the small boats have been beached?—That would have involved throwing the goods into the water.

5755. But they were worth next to nothing on shore, were they?—Then you might at once have thrown them into the water without taking them to Hog Island.

5756. Do you therefore think that there is any excuse for the ships remaining the length of time which they did remain in Bombay Harbour undischarged?—The excuse I imagine to have been the want of landing appliances; but I speak only as a matter of opinion, as I have no knowledge of the facts.

5757. Is that a valid excuse when the stores which they had on board were not worth the money expended on time charter?—I have no means of knowing what the comparative value of the stores was.

5758. *Chairman.*] How many barges had you in your department?—I do not recollect the exact number, but probably 50 or 60.

5759. What was the tonnage of each?—They varied from about 20 tons, up to 100 tons.

5760. Were they unused for landing purposes?—They were unused in this sense, that they were laid up for the monsoon.

5761. How many tugs had you?—We had two tugs in working order, I think.

5762. After the ships had arrived they would have been useful in towing the barges to the Bunders, would they not?—They would have been useful undoubtedly.

Tuesday, 21st June 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Colonel Barttelot.
Captain Beaumont.
Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Candlish.
Mr. Christopher Denison.
Mr. Eastwick.
Lord Elcho.

Sir James Elphinstone.
Sir John Hay.
Sir Stafford Northcote.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. White.

JOHN CANDLISH, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Mr. JAMES WILKIE ADAMSON, called in ; and Examined.

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5763. Mr. *Campbell*.] You are engaged in business in the City, are you not?—I am.

5764. The name of your firm is Adamson and Ronaldson, I believe?—Yes.

5765. What is the nature of your business?—We are principally ship-owners and ship-brokers, and exporters of coal occasionally ; that is one of the branches of our business.

5766. In 1868, during the period of the Abyssinian Expedition, had you any transactions with, or did you offer any transactions to, the Admiralty, for the supply of coal in the Eastern seas?—Yes ; in the Red Sea.

5767. You wrote to the Secretary to the Admiralty on the 3rd of February 1868, I think?—That was the first date, I think, on which we had any communication with him.

5768. And then you made him an offer, did you not?—We then made an offer to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

5769. Of what nature was the offer?—To deliver a cargo of steam coal at Annesley Bay.

5770. Was it a specified vessel?—It was.

5771. What was the name of the vessel?—The name of the vessel was the "Palm Tree," 1,470 tons register.

5772. What were the terms on which you offered to deliver the coal at Annesley Bay?—At 78 s. per ton delivered there ; 20 days for discharging the vessel, and an option on the part of the Government to detain the ship on time hire, at the rate of 10 rupees per ton per month.

5773. Was the ship well fitted for transport?—She was particularly well fitted for transport.

5774. Did you confine your offer to the delivery of the coals at Annesley Bay?—No ; we gave them the option, if they desired it, of taking delivery of the whole or any part of the coal at Aden.

5775. Was that the nature of the first offer?—Yes.

5776. When did you receive a reply?—The date of the first reply from the Admiralty was the 18th of February.

5777. What kind of coal was it that you offered to deliver?—The best Cardiff steam coal.

5778. What was the substance of that reply?—I will read it, with the permission of the Com-

mittee ; this is signed by "W. G. Romaine," and addressed to my firm : "Gentlemen,—With reference to your letter of the 3rd instant, offering a cargo of best Cardiff steam coal at the rate of 78 s. per ton delivered at Annesley Bay, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you that they are not prepared to accept this offer."

5779. Was no reason given?—None, whatever.

5780. Did you take any steps to ascertain what was the reason of the refusal?—Before getting his reply we had been told verbally at the office of the Admiralty that we had better send in an application also to the Council of India, which we did.

5781. To that did you receive a reply?—We received a reply the day before we received the reply from the Admiralty ; the letter from the India Office was dated the 17th of February, and it run in these terms : "I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date, enclosing one for the Secretary of State. The application already made by you has been submitted for orders that will be duly communicated to you, and I am under the necessity of returning your enclosure, which should be sent direct by you.—*Sir Stafford Northcote*." That enclosure, I may explain, was a letter of introduction to Sir Stafford Northcote from some personal friend of his (I forget whom now), testifying to our respectability, and our liability in the case of any offer of ours being accepted.

5782. Did you receive any further information as to the reason why your offer was rejected?—Not at that time.

5783. What was your next communication with either of those public offices?—Our next communication was made to the Council of India on the same day that we received their letter on the 17th of February.

5784. What was the nature of that communication?—I was wrong in saying that the introduction came in the previous letter. I see that we wrote two letters at very close dates to the Council of India, and it was the second letter in which we enclosed the letter of introduction. We addressed this letter to the Honourable Gerald

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Gerald C. Talbot, Store Department, India Office. "Dear Sir,—In putting our application before the Secretary of State for India, will you at same time kindly include the enclosed letter of introduction in favour of our co-owner, Mr. Richard Gibbs? If you have already sent forward the application will you have the goodness to forward the enclosed as soon as possible? Now, when saving money to the Expedition will be the order of the day, we hope our proposal will meet with a favourable consideration. If it is desired to keep the thing quiet, that can easily be done, as we will be entered on the Customs List as shippers of the coals, and we will clear the ship out for Aden, off which place she will call in case the agent of the Government have any orders for her. We are negotiating for a steam engine and condenser to be put on board, and to make everything work comfortably we also re-copper the ship. Apologising for giving you so much trouble, We remain, &c."

5785. What was the nature of the reply which you ultimately received as to that offer?—I have already read the reply which we received, dated the 17th of February.

5786. Then did you never get any reason for the rejection of your offer?—Ultimately, the only reason given us was, that they had made an arrangement with the Peninsular and Oriental Company for the supply of coals to the Expedition.

5787. On the 20th February I think you renewed and repeated the offer?—Yes, we did.

5788. Was that repeated offer of a somewhat different nature, and not confined to a single cargo, but involving a certain amount of coal?—Yes.

5789. What were the terms of that offer?—This is the letter: "We duly received your letter of 18th instant, by which we note that it is not at present considered expedient to accept our proposal. We regret this, as it is so very plain it would effect a very large saving, and we cannot believe the Government will allow a little formality to stand in the way of such a result."

5790. By "little formality" did you mean the etiquette or arrangement with the Peninsular and Oriental Company?—No; we had a sort of feeling that they had a certain roundabout way of doing these things, which took a considerable time.

5791. Official etiquette, or something of that sort?—Perhaps that is the more proper way of describing it.

5792. Will you go on with the letter?—"Perhaps it is not considered worth while to go into the transaction for the sake of one cargo, and we therefore now beg to offer to deliver at Annesley Bay 5,000 tons (same to be increased, if desired by the Government), at the price already named, 78s. per ton, with the option on your part of taking them at Aden at 70s. Now, we know that the Government have arranged with the Peninsular and Oriental Company for large supplies both at Aden and Bombay, for which they pay 72s. per ton. No coals have been sent to Annesley Bay direct, but some of the above lots will have to go there at very great extra expense. Of this we have had some little experience, for we offered some time ago for the Red Sea a cargo of coals at 80s. per ton; this was declined, but ultimately Government did buy the cargo at Bombay at 40 rupees (equal to 80s.),

and then took the ship up on time pay to go and deliver the coals in the Red Sea. She has now been there three months on pay doing this service, and although only getting a low rate of 10 rupees per ton per month, you can easily calculate what price that brings the coals up to at Annesley Bay."

5793. *Chairman.*] How long was that ship on time charter altogether?—I should think about nine months, so far as my memory would serve me.

5794. Was she a sailing ship?—She was a sailing ship.

5795. What was her name?—The "Scotland."

5796. What was her tonnage?—1,170 tons register.

5797. How much coal had she on board?—About 1,780 tons.

5798. Have you a record of what work she did?—Not by me.

5799. Have you it in London?—I have it in London.

5800. Do you remember off-hand approximately what she did?—Yes; she went to Abyssinia with those coals, delivered them, went on to Suez, took another cargo of coals, went down and delivered them, went to Bombay, and I think she went once more to Bombay, and took a cargo from Bombay back to Annesley Bay.

5801. Have you her papers showing the dates?—Yes; but I was not aware that I should be called upon to answer any questions about her; I will put those papers in, showing exactly what voyages she made and what she did.

5802. *Mr. Campbell.*] The price of the coal at Bombay was 40 rupees or 80s., was it not?—The price paid by the Government was 40 rupees, but we did not receive 40 rupees.

5803. Were not the coals taken up by the Government at Bombay, and 40 rupees paid?—Yes; I think we got 72s. from some native dealer who speculated in the coals and sold them to the Government.

5804. *Chairman.*] Did you make any effort to sell the coals to the Government at Bombay?—No.

5805. *Mr. Campbell.*] But before the vessel started you offered to deliver that very cargo of coals at Annesley Bay at 78s. per ton, did you not?—While the ship was on her passage, we did.

5806. And that offer was refused?—Yes; but I cannot give any specific evidence as to that offer, because it went through two or three hands, and I cannot speak, from personal knowledge, of the offer having been made to the Government and refused; I was informed so, and I believe it to have been the case.

5807. As a matter of fact, the offer was not accepted?—As a matter of fact, the offer was not accepted.

5808. *Chairman.*] Through what channel was the offer made to the Government?—I was informed that it was made through the Peninsular and Oriental Company; but that, so far as I am concerned, was only a matter of hearsay.

5809. Was the cargo yours?—Yes.

5810. Do you know how it came on the market, and was available for the Government?—It was offered through different sources. It eventually found its way, as I believe, into the hands of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, who offered it to the Government.

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5811. To whom did you offer it?—I cannot give any direct evidence upon this, and I am very unwilling to say anything that I do not know personally.

5812. I was asking you to whom you offered it?—I would rather not drag in the names of others who really had nothing to do with this, and who, perhaps, do not wish to appear in the matter.

5813. I do not want you to give any evidence which would be disagreeable to you in any way, but I think I may ask you this, to which probably there will be no objection on your part: to whom did you make an offer of the cargo?—It was to an Indian firm.

5814. What firm was that?—I would rather you did not press that question.

5815. Sir S. Northcote.] Was it any firm connected in any way with the Indian Government?—Not in any way.

5816. Chairman.] What was the date of the offer?—I have not the date of the offer by me.

5817. When was the cargo of the "Scotland" shipped?—It was shipped some time in 1867.

5818. Do you remember in what month it was shipped?—I think about June 1867.

5819. Had you heard of the arrival of the ship when the cargo was offered here for sale?—No, the ship had not arrived then.

5820. Should we be right in assuming that it would be about August or September that the offer was made?—It was just at the time when the war broke out, and when it was known that an expedition would be sent. I was not a party in direct communication at all with any Government official in offering the cargo of the "Scotland."

5821. You believe that it was offered through the Peninsular and Oriental Company?—I believe so.

5822. Mr. Seely.] Did you fix any date for the delivery of your first offer of the 18th of February?—We fixed the date of one cargo by specifying what ship we should ship it by, and when that ship should be dispatched. Further than that we could not fix the date.

5823. You did not fix any date when the coals were to be delivered at Annesley Bay?—We could not fix any precise date when the coals were to arrive there.

5824. How long would that ship have taken?—About four months. She was a very fast ship.

5825. That would be about the 18th of June, in all probability, would it not?—It would have been about say the end of June before the coals would have arrived at Annesley Bay.

5826. And that was your first definite offer?—Yes.

5827. Sir J. Elphinstone.] At what time did the "Scotland" sail from Bombay?—She was not there many days. I am not posted up in the matter of the "Scotland" sailing, because I was not aware that that was going to be a primary subject of examination.

5828. Chairman.] You have been kind enough to say that you would give us the dates?—Certainly.

5829. Mr. Campbell.] How long would it take for a ship such as the "Scotland" to go from Bombay to Annesley Bay?—That is a very difficult question to answer. At certain seasons of the year she might run down very quickly,

but at other seasons she might take a very long time indeed to get there.

5830. You do not know, as a matter of fact, how long she did take?—I do not, but I could give the precise dates of her arrival at and departure from every place; in fact, the ship's log-book, if we had it, would, I presume, be the best evidence of that. I can supply that information.

5831. Will you proceed with the letter which you were reading?—Referring to the "Scotland," it says, "She has now been there three months on pay doing this service, and although only getting a low rate of 10 rupees per ton per month, you can easily calculate what price that brings the coals up to at Annesley Bay. If you add to the 72s. the price of the Peninsular and Oriental Company at Aden and Bombay, the additional cost of sending the ships up to the Red Sea, we beg to repeat that, by accepting our offer, an enormous saving would be effected by the country; and although staunch supporters of the present Government, as taxpayers we do not think it fair that the Peninsular and Oriental Company should have a monopoly of this business at such rates. If our application cannot be entertained without approval from India, we are quite willing to bear the expense of a telegram and reply to same, if such be sent off at once, stating our offer, and comparing the same with present cost of coals at Annesley Bay, and asking leave to close with us."

5832. What was the date of the answer which you received to that letter, and what was its nature?—We did not apparently receive it for some considerable time until we wrote two or three times again. We had a letter from them on the 21st, but that was acknowledging the receipt of a letter which I had written to Mr. Talbot upon the business; but marked "private." It was merely acknowledging the receipt, and saying that he could not receive any private communications upon public business; but they did not officially answer that letter, I think, until the 29th of the month.

5833. What was their reply?—They acknowledged the receipt on the 28th. In continuation they say: "I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th instant, in continuation of your previous communication relative to the supply of coals in the Red Sea." That was all. They simply politely acknowledged the letter.

5834. What was the nature of your communication on the 28th, in continuation of the letter of the 20th?—The letter was as follows: "Referring to our letter to you of the 20th instant, offering 5,000 tons, more or less, of coals for delivery in Annesley Bay, and to which we have received no reply, we wish now to repeat that offer, as well as show the great saving to the Government, by adopting this course, and enclose a comparison of results for your information. No doubt the expenses attendant on the Abyssinian Expedition will be a matter of considerable discussion during the present session of Parliament, and we think it will be desirable to show that (although on a small scale) care had been taken to follow the most economical course possible in supplying the requirements incident thereon."

5835. Did you send a statement showing what would be the saving?—We sent a statement showing what we thought would be the saving which, according to our view, would be effected.

5836. Will

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5836. Will you put that in?—I have a copy of it here, and I will put it in. (*The same was handed in, see Appendix.*)

5837. Did you make any further offers, or were you discouraged by your past experience?—We made no further offer, but we repeated the application with regard to the same transaction. We persevered, in the hope of being able to convince them.

5838. To go back to the "Palm Tree;" what became of the "Palm Tree" and its cargo?—We sent the cargo to Manilla on ship's account.

5839. She did not go in the direction of Abyssinia at all?—No, not at all.

5840. Sir S. Northcote.] Do you remember from whom that letter of introduction to myself came?—I do not know; I would have taken the means of ascertaining, but the gentleman in whose favour it was given, Mr. Gibbs, has unfortunately been poorly, and on going over those documents yesterday, for the first time, I discovered that that was a thing as to what I might be asked; and on calling upon Mr. Gibbs yesterday, to endeavour to obtain the information, I found that he was out of town.

5841. *Chairman.*] I think I can assist you as to the dates of the "Scotland's" engagement; from a paper before me, she appears to have been engaged at Bombay on the 13th of November 1867; I presume that to be correct?—Supposing

the vessel to have sailed (as was my impression) about June, and giving four months, which is a fair voyage for a good ship, that would be about the date.

5842. From a paper before me, I see that she left Annesley Bay on another trip on the 17th of March; that would be upwards of four months, during which she would be under engagement with the coals?—Yes, for that individual cargo.

5843. She was 1,170 tons register, was she not?—1,170 tons.

5844. That would be 4,680 *l.* freight during that period, would it not?—Yes.

5845. Mr. Campbell.] She was engaged at 10 rupees a month, was she not?—Yes.

5846. So that that would be 80 *s.* plus the 80 *s.* which were paid at Bombay?—Yes, so far as the Government were concerned, but not so far as we were concerned. That would be the cost of the coals delivered.

5847. *Chairman.*] In point of fact, the coals must have cost 8 *l.* a ton in Annesley Bay, must they not?—Not so much as 8 *l.*; because the ship carries nearly 50 per cent. more coals than the registered tonnage.

5848. However, what she received for hire up to the time at which the coals were discharged was the sum paid in excess of what the coals were here offered to the Government for, delivered in Annesley Bay?—In excess of the sum at which I was led to believe they were offered.

The Right Honourable Sir STAFFORD HENRY NORTHCOTE, Bart., a Member of the Committee; Examined.

5849. *Chairman.*] Do you desire to make a statement to the Committee?—I am anxious, with the permission of the Committee, to make an observation with reference to some evidence given by Captain Sherard Osborn on the 3rd May, and especially to his answers to questions 1920–1925 on the subject of the proposed cable between Suez and Annesley Bay, which I have only seen since my return to England. I think it desirable to mention to the Committee what the circumstances of the negotiation with Captain Osborn really were, and to point out that Captain Osborn has, no doubt inadvertently, given a false colour to the action of the Government. The first communication which took place was as early as the 2nd September 1867. It proceeded, not from Captain Osborn, but from myself. The following is a copy of a note which I wrote to him: "India Office, 2nd September 1867.—Dear Sir,—We are anxious, if possible, to establish telegraphic communication between Suez and Massowah during the Abyssinian Expedition. Does it so happen that your company have any spare cable which they could at once lay down for that purpose? If so we should be happy to come to an arrangement with you. You will of course understand that this proposal has no connection with that which you have lately made to us, and which is now under consideration.—I remain, &c., *Stafford H. Northcote.*" In consequence of this communication Captain Osborn called on me either on the 2nd or the 3rd, when it appeared that the company had not any quantity of cable actually ready, but that they could proceed rapidly with its manufacture, and could lay a line from Suez to Massowah by the end of December. Upon this I requested the

representatives of the Treasury, the Admiralty, and the War Office, to come to the India Office for a consultation. I laid before them the following memorandum which Captain Osborn had placed in my hands, together with a private note in which he said that he thought the line might, if began at once, be laid by the 15th of December. After very careful consideration the meeting came to the conclusion that it was not desirable to incur the expense of the proposed line, and I so informed Captain Osborn, on the 4th of September. The memorandum was as follows:—

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Bart., M.P.

"MEMORANDUM.

"THE shortest and most direct route between Suez and Massowah would, allowing for slack, require 1,000 miles of cable, and cost 300,000 *l.* This north route, however, is not the one I would recommend.

"The longer but safer route between the two points, which I will call the southern route, would require 1,238 miles of cable, and cost 372,000 *l.*

"In either case telegraphic communication could be established from Massowah *viâ* Suez to England by 1st January 1868.

"If the southern route is adopted, I should be prepared on the part of this company to undertake, at the expiration of the Abyssinian Expedition, to lease from Government the cable on the same terms as we now hold the Malta and Alexandria cable from Her Majesty's Treasury, viz.: at an annual rental of 3½ per cent. on the cost price, and I would suggest that this is the best guarantee the Telegraph Construction and Maintenance

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tenance Company could give that the cable would be a good one, and that the work would be thoroughly well done.

"I have merely to add that we have from 300 to 400 miles of core ready; that we could make about 200 miles of cable per week, but that the completion of the contract within the time specified is entirely dependent upon the promptitude with which the order is given by Government.

(signed) *Sherard Osborn,*
Captain Royal Navy, Managing Director
of the Telegraph Construction Company,
54, Old Broad-street, City.

To the Right Hon.
Sir Stafford Northcote, Bart., M.P.,
H. M. Secretary of State,
India Office.

The question of telegraphic communication was not however laid aside. On the 6th September I find I was in correspondence with Mr. Hamilton, Secretary to the Treasury, as to the utilization of the cable from Suez to Jubal, to which Captain Osborn refers in answer to Question 1936; but this idea was afterwards abandoned, partly on account of the difficulty of maintaining a dispatch boat service from Jubal, and partly because the Telegraph Construction and Maintenance Company informed the Government that the cable could not be relied on to work for a month. We communicated also with Colonel Stanton, as to the possibility of our assisting in the completion of the Egyptian line to Souakin; and somewhat later we employed Colonel Robinson, an officer in the Indian telegraph service, to visit Egypt, and to report to us on the feasibility of constructing a land line along the coast. In November, and subsequently, communications were re-opened by Captain Osborn and Lord John Hay on the part of the Telegraph Construction and Maintenance Company, and although the reasons which had weighed with us in September still had weight with us, we reconsidered the whole question, and came to the same conclusion. Whether the Government would have done better to accept the proposal of the company may be matter of opinion. I retain my own opinion that we were right to decline it; but it is wholly untrue that we "threw cold water" upon the scheme, if by that expression is meant that we did not give it the most careful and respectful consideration. I was anxious to make that statement, and to have it upon the evidence, because possibly some cross-examination might be raised upon that in a convenient form.

5850. I think the declining was on the part of the Government, at a meeting of the departments?—Yes.

5851. Do you remember the grounds on which the offer was declined?—Yes, the question was one which involved a good many considerations. Our idea in suggesting to Captain Osborn and his company the laying of the cable was, that we thought it would be useful during the preparations for the Expedition, and if a cable could have been laid at once we should have thought it well worth while to incur the expense for the purpose of effecting a saving in making the preparations. When we found that it could not be laid sooner than, at the earliest, the 15th of December, and probably not until the 1st of January,

we saw that we should gain little or nothing in the preparations for the landing of the Expedition. We considered then whether it was right to incur the expense, which would have been a considerable expense, and which might be wholly useless as regarded the purposes of the Expedition. When we raised that objection, it was represented to us that at all events what we should do would be very advantageous for the establishment of telegraphic communication by way of the Red Sea, between England and India. That was a proposal which had been under consideration for more than 12 months; and for reasons with which I need not trouble the Committee, we had come to the conclusion that the Indian Government, at all events, ought not to give a guarantee for such an undertaking. And we had reason to look carefully at this proposal lest it should prove to be a proposal for drawing us into a large undertaking through the medium of a smaller one. At that time we had great hopes that the Expedition might attain its object by the simple landing of the force, and that there would be very little advantage to be gained by telegraphic communication after the force was once landed. We felt also that it was undesirable when the force should once have been landed, that we should attempt in any way to control or direct, or embarrass the Commander in Chief in the operations which he might carry on; and therefore, supposing that the whole Expedition would be landed complete in point of supplies before the cable could be laid, we thought that there would be very little advantage in shortening by five or six days the communications between the Home Government and the Commander in Chief, who when once landed we considered had better be left alone, unless he had reason to communicate with us; we calculated very carefully what the probability was of his wishing to communicate with us, and the time which would be occupied in doing so; and we found that by sending dispatch boats from Annesley Bay (or whatever the point might be) to Suez, and using the telegraph from Suez, he could practically get such information or such directions as he was likely to require, with the loss of a very few days indeed. It, therefore, did not appear to us that with reference to the direction of the Expedition much would be gained by the laying down of this telegraphic cable. Having ascertained that it could not be of use for the preparations, and that it would not be of much use for the direction afterwards, the point was brought before us that it would be satisfactory, at all events, for the British public to know quickly how matters were going on. We considered whether that was a sufficient reason for incurring this considerable expense, and upon the whole we decided against it. That is, generally speaking, the outline of the reasons which we had.

5852. You have, no doubt, seen the evidence of Lord Napier upon the point; and are you aware that several witnesses have spoken to the great utility that a telegraph cable would have been to the Expedition?—We had never any doubt whatever of the immense utility that a cable would have been to the Expedition if we could have had it during the time that the preparations were going on.

5853. But the evidence given was not limited, I think, to the matter of time in that way?—Subsequently we communicated with Lord Napier, and we asked his opinion upon the subject;

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ject; and I received a letter from Lord Napier, which I quoted afterwards in the House of Commons, saying that, as far as the Expedition was concerned, he did not think that the cable, at the time I was writing to him, would be of any service, but that he strongly advocated it, with a view to the general promotion of telegraphic communication *via* the Red Sea to India.

5854. Would not the laying of that telegraph cable in the autumn of 1867 have not merely connected the scene of the Expedition with England, but also with India, and with Bombay especially, the place from which the Expedition was drawing its supplies?—Of course it would; but I confess that even with the light of subsequent experience (and we were, of course, acting without that light), I fail to see where the saving would have been effected.

5855. You estimate the saving at five or six days, do you not?—Something of the kind.

5856. You are speaking of the communication with England, I presume?—Yes.

5857. What would have been the saving in communicating with Bombay?—Not much more; in sending round by England it could not have been more than a day more, but they could have telegraphed from Suez by way of a line through Syria, which was placed at our disposal; I do not think that much saving would have been effected.

5858. I suppose that, speaking roughly, it is true that the Expedition cost a million a month?—Perhaps it did; I do not know.

5859. Of course there is a difficulty in defining when it began and when it terminated?—Yes.

5860. Would not the telegraph have saved the continued expenditure by the time by which it would have expedited the communications?—I do not think it would; I do not see where any great saving could have taken place. With regard to the large quantity of supplies which was sent in towards the end of the Expedition, and which proved to be useless, I do not think that any important proportion of those supplies would have been delayed if we had had a telegraph.

5861. Do you think that it might not have altered the plan of the Commander in Chief, and that his having the means of calling for supplies promptly might not have induced him to dispense with the full supplies which he laid in towards the close of the Expedition?—Sir Robert Napier never could tell what the course of the Expedition would be until the action took place at Magdala on the 11th and 13th April. He would not have felt justified in delaying to order supplies up to that date. All that could have been done would have been to countermand rather more quickly after that had taken place any supplies which were then on their way. The news of the taking of Magdala on the 13th of April reached me, I think, on the 27th April, and everything then was stopped immediately. That included the necessity of communicating from Magdala, their furthest point, to the coast, and communicating to London, and the difference of six or seven days, which was, I think, nearly all that we could have expected, would not have

made any very material difference with regard to the supplies. Those large supplies had been ordered before the fall of Magdala.

5862. But if Lord Napier had had, within his own control, prompt means of communication, might he not have contented himself with ordering forward supplies for a shorter period from Bombay or from Egypt or from England?—I do not think he would have done so, because he was pressed by the considerations of the monsoon. We were getting very close to the end of the fine season, and I think Lord Napier, as a matter of precaution, would have given the orders when he did, even if he had had the telegraph; but that is a matter of opinion, of course.

5863. Sir J. Elphinstone.] No rapidity of communication could have affected the monsoons which guided his conduct with regard to supplies?—No.

5864. Mr. Eastwick.] I think that in the statement which you have made you used the expression, that communication could not have been given through the cable by the month; does that mean within a month?—No; what we were told was, that if we made use of the portion of the cable to which Captain Osborn refers as actually remaining at the bottom of the Red Sea between Suez and Jubal, we could not rely from month to month on that cable not getting out of working order; and it was because it was so uncertain that we felt it to be impossible to reckon upon it.

5865. Chairman.] The proposal was to carry it from Suez to Massowah, was it not?—That was the great proposal, but Captain Osborn also refers to a minor point, and it was one which was carefully considered; my whole object is to show that the whole matter was carefully considered.

5866. Mr. Eastwick.] It was stated to me that that cable was altogether unreliable from the first, was that so?—Just so; that was what we understood.

5867. Chairman.] Captain Osborn gave the Committee terms and prices; are they substantially correct?—I think they are, and the memorandum which I have handed in will show that they were correct.

5868. May I ask when you first heard from India of the large increase in the number of combatants for the Expedition, as compared with the number first sent out of 12,000?—I cannot answer that question off-hand; but I think I shall be able to answer it at the next meeting of the Committee, if they will allow me; I have a memorandum upon the subject.

5869. Was it in the spring?—It was early in the campaign; I think it was in December. In looking over my letter book, with reference to this subject, I saw a letter of mine to Lord Napier, which I think is dated in December, in which I said to him that I had heard with some uneasiness of the probability of the increase of the force; and that I trusted that he was not going to take more than the 12,000 which had been named.

5870. Do you remember the numbers which were then sent out as probably intended?—If the Committee will allow me, I will bring the memorandum down with me on the next occasion, and answer that question.

Colonel WILLIAM FREDERICK MARRIOTT, and Colonel MICHAEL KAVANAGH KENNEDY,
re-called; and further Examined.

Colonel
Marriott,
and
Colonel
Kennedy.

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5871. *Chairman* (to Colonel *Kennedy*).] You communicated to me this morning that you wished to explain or correct some portions of the evidence which you gave to the Committee at its last meeting; will you state what corrections or explanations you desire to make?—Yes. I wished to explain that the piping, which is mentioned at Question 5740, and that which was ordered, in the first instance, was totally distinct from that which was ordered in the second instance; the piping which was first ordered was for a smaller supply near the port of Zulla, and the piping which was ordered afterwards was to bring water from Kumeli. The first piping was quite unsuitable for the second purpose.

5872. Of which piping do you speak in your answer to Question 5740?—That is the piping which was ordered for bringing the water from a short distance from the landing-place at Zulla.

5873. In answer to the same question, you speak of 15 miles asked for on the 24th of December, what was that for?—The 15 miles asked for on the 24th of December was for bringing water from Kumeli, or from some distant point.

5874. The first piping for the minor work was ordered on the 14th of November, and the second piping for the major work was ordered on the 24th of December, was that so?—Yes; I wish to make it clear that the two sets of piping were not for the same object, but that the second set of piping was for a totally different object, and had nothing to do with the first.

5875. Have you any further explanation to give?—I also wish to explain, in reference to Question 5760, with regard to the public works barges, that they could not be used at that particular time for two reasons: one was, that they were out of commission, that is to say, that they were laid up for the monsoon, and the second was that the tugs were on other duty, and were not available for towing them.

5876. You gave the Committee some information about the tugs, is not that correct?—Quite correct; but I wished to make it clear, as there seemed to be some doubt upon it. The public works tugs were employed up to a certain time, and the barges up to that time would have been of no use without the tugs.

5877. What do you mean by their not being in commission?—Not having their crews and their stores. In fact, they were laid up for the monsoon, most of them.

5878. Using your words, when would they go out of commission?—About the middle of May.

5879. But the ships from Abyssinia would be returning to Bombay before that period, would they not?—I am speaking of the ships which arrived after the commencement of the monsoon, as most of them did, I believe.

5880. At the time that those barges were put out of commission, the ships of the Expedition would be returning to Bombay Harbour, would they not?—Possibly some of them might have been, but I do not know.

5881. Was there any urgent reason why they should be put out of commission?—They always are put out of commission at that time, because

the works on which they are employed are not carried on in the monsoon.

5882. Was there any other reason than that?—There was no other reason than that.

5883. Is there anything else as to which you wish to offer any explanation to the Committee?—No.

5884. (To Colonel *Marriott*.) On a previous occasion, when, in relation to the early deficiencies of the transport train, you were asked why the subordinate superintendence common to the scheme of organisation, both as at first adopted and as afterwards modified, was not provided, you replied that Colonel Holland could speak better to that point than yourself. It so happens that the point has been omitted in Colonel Holland's examination; are you willing, being now present, to reply upon that point so far as you can?—The question to which the Chairman adverts arose out of my assertion that the modification in the scheme of superintendence which was made at Lord Napier's request early in October, must have been utterly inappreciable in relation to the question whether the defective condition of the train at an early period of the expedition at Zulla was aggravated for want of that particular class of superintendence. I said that the superintendence which was common to both schemes would have sufficed to alleviate, so far as it was possible that effective superintendence could alleviate, those evils; and you asked why that subordinate superintendence was not provided. Before directly replying, I would advert to the evidence which the Committee have since had from Major General Sir Charles Staveley, as, I think, strongly corroborating my assertion, because he shows that the want at that time was principally of muleteers; and, so far as he asked for superintendence, it was rather for the mukaddams, who were superseded by that last modification of the scheme. I must also add a circumstance which I have hitherto avoided to mention, viz., the selection of the director of the train; I have avoided it hitherto because that officer, Colonel Warden, is now dead, and I believe his death may be in part attributed to his labours in connection with that Transport Corps; but I now think it right to state the circumstances, which were, that Lord Napier nominated that officer to his Excellency Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, who had strong reasons, founded on the concurrent advice of several persons, for regarding that officer as very unfit for the post. His Excellency urged those objections to Lord Napier, who, nevertheless, thought it right to maintain the nomination, and Sir Seymour Fitzgerald thought it right to accede to it; and I would remark, in passing, that Lord Napier, who, in relation to this very Transport Corps, recorded it as his opinion that he attached much more importance to the persons who were to work the system than to the system itself, thereby asserted (and Sir Seymour Fitzgerald conceded to Lord Napier) a predominant voice, and consequently a predominant responsibility in the organisation of the train. That fact alone seems to me to be a complete and absolute answer to all allegations that the Government took the responsibility of that

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that matter out of Lord Napier's hands. The significance of that fact, with regard to what I am about to add, will appear. Although owing to the connection of the transport with the commissariat, the orders of Government were that the train should be organised by the director, Colonel Warden, under the general direction of the Commissary General, yet Colonel Warden very naturally, and very properly, desired to have the matter left, as much as possible, in his own hands, and not to be interfered with by the Commissary General; and the Commissary General, as naturally and as properly, desired to leave it in Colonel Warden's hands; and therefore it was only when Colonel Warden came to the Commissary General, and the Commissary General to Government for assistance, such as in procuring muleteers, that the Government, from that time forward, that is to say, from the time when the scheme was settled with Lord Napier's concurrence, took any active part in the organisation. Consequently, in reply to the question as to why the subordinate superintendence was not provided (and I will take the liberty to suppose that question to be put in a larger sense, namely, as to why anything which ought to have been done in Bombay, if practicable, was not done), my answer must be that Colonel Warden was immediately responsible, and that nobody else can fully answer; and he, I regret to say, is dead. From this statement of the circumstances I think it will be seen that Colonel Warden was the officer immediately responsible (and I use the word "responsible" in its accurate sense, not necessarily implying blame, unless the defects were avoidable), and that in distributing the remoter responsibility between the Commissary General, the civil government, and Lord Napier, by far the largest share must be apportioned to Lord Napier.

5885. Have you ever known any war in which the means of transport have so lamentably failed as they failed in Abyssinia?—It was only a failure at first; there was no ultimate failure. I have so little knowledge of the details of other expeditions that I cannot draw comparisons, but I have every reason to believe that there was at times just as bad a state of things in the Crimea.

5886. Lord *Elcho*.] Do you know with what kind of arabas they started from Eupatoria?—I do not.

5887. Do you know what was the whole transport of the army which first landed against Sebastopol in the Crimea?—I do not know.

5888. Should you be surprised if you were told that it consisted of a few arabas, or native carts?—I should be certainly surprised, except that I have reason to believe that it was so defective at one time, that I should not be surprised at anything.

5889. Were not the sufferings in the Crimea greatly owing to the difficulty of getting supplies up to the lines in front?—So it has been understood.

5890. And it was necessary to send for a railway to England for that purpose, was it not?—Yes.

5891. Are you aware that, when once the transport was organised and the railway established, the troops, comparatively speaking, ceased to suffer in regard to the sufficiency of supplies, though there was always a deficiency of men?—Yes, I believe that was the case.

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5892. Mr. *Eastwick*.] There was no breakdown of the transport in Abyssinia at all when once the supplies began to be sent up, and there was no suffering on the part of the troops; they were only once threatened with being placed on half rations, I think?—I believe there were times when they did not get as abundant rations as might be desired, but I do not admit that the Abyssinian transport, speaking generally, was a failure. That there were great defects at the first outset is of course admitted.

5893. Lord *Elcho*.] In the course of the Abyssinian War, notwithstanding the waste of money which may have arisen from deficient transport organisation, and deficiency in the men to look after the transport, was there such a thing, that you are aware of, as soldiers not receiving rations except as stated on the very last day, I think, before Magdala?—I think there is no doubt that they were adequately supplied throughout. By using the word "adequately," I do not mean to exclude a case of rather less rations for a time than might be desirable, but I mean that there was no deficiency seriously affecting their health.

5894. *Chairman*.] You are speaking of the troops, and not of the animals, I presume?—I do not speak of the animals; the animals were starved.

5895. Sir *J. Elphinstone*.] Lord Napier was entirely and solely responsible for the appointment of Colonel Warden, was he not?—Entirely, in the most absolute sense.

5896. And he appointed Colonel Warden against the remonstrances of Sir Seymour Fitzgerald and the Bombay Government, did he not?—Against the remonstrances of Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, but I am not aware that the Bombay Government collectively remonstrated.

5897. At the time of Colonel Warden's appointment, do I correctly understand you to state that his health was in such a state that it was physically impossible for him to do the duties which were imposed upon him?—I did not mean to imply anything of that kind.

5898. But did not his health break down at a very early period in Abyssinia?—I do not know that.

5899. Was he in good health when he returned?—He was in effective health. Judging by the event, I suppose that he was not in good health, but he was in health which did not interfere with the exercise of his duties.

5900. *Chairman* (to Colonel *Kennedy*). At the time when your barges were put out of commission and laid up, the contractors' boats were in work discharging the vessels arriving from Abyssinia, were they not?—There was no public works contractor.

5901. Was there not a contractor for the discharge of ships returning from Abyssinia?—A commissariat contractor, probably. I have no personal knowledge as to that, but I have no doubt that it was so.

5902. But do you know, in point of fact, that barges were employed in discharging ships?—Those were native barges, quite distinct from our barges, which were of European construction, such as saddle-back barges.

5903. Was there not a contract entered into with a native for the discharge of stores between June and July?—I do not know.

5904. (To Colonel *Marriott*). There was a native boat contractor who had his boats employed in

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in discharging stores for the commissariat during the months of June and July, was there not?—Yes.

5905. (To Colonel *Kennedy*). Was that at the time that the Works Department had their barges out of commission, and laid by?—Yes; the public works barges are of a totally different construction, the contractor's barges (if there was such a person) being probably only the native craft of the harbour. Our barges were of European construction, saddle-back barges, iron barges, sailing barges, wooden barges, just as you would see in the Mersey or anywhere else.

5906. Sir *J. Elphinstone*.] Is there a very large redundancy of means in Bombay Harbour for discharging ships in a period of emergency, such as the return of 150 ships from Abyssinia?—No, I should say not, most certainly.

5907. What are the resources of the harbour?—The resources of the harbour are sufficient to meet its ordinary wants, but not to meet any great or sudden pressure.

5908. Not to meet such a pressure as that?—No.

5909. The season was particularly boisterous, was it not, being in the south-west monsoon?—Yes, it was in the early part of the monsoon that most of the ships returned, as far as I remember, when it is usually boisterous.

5910. Are you acquainted with Bombay Harbour?—Yes, I am acquainted with Bombay Harbour.

5911. There is a difficulty, is there not, at any time, in discharging ships during that period?—Not at any time; during the lulls there is not; but ordinarily, there is a great deal more difficulty than there is at any other time.

5912. And consequently the arrival of such an enormous number of ships created a pressure upon the means of the port, which it could not possibly have supplied, I presume?—Quite so.

5913. *Chairman*.] Do you know anything of any efforts having been made to get any more boats than were supplied?—I have no knowledge of it whatever.

5914. Mr. *Eastwick*.] Could you state when the troops, on their return, finally reached their proper stations?—No, I have no knowledge whatever. It was in the early part of the monsoon, so far as I remember, but I have no personal knowledge of it.

5915. Sir *J. Elphinstone*.] Was there any plan from which you could have got boats, supposing that you had wished to increase the number?—No, because it is the native practice all through Western India to haul their boats up in the creeks, high and dry, before the monsoon, in the latter end of May, and no boats are available, except by very special arrangements.

5916. *Chairman*.] But this man having the charge of those vessels did not lay up his boats, did he?—I understood the question alluded to other ports than Bombay; to the subsidiary ports.

5917. Mr. *Eastwick* (to Colonel *Marriott*).] It has been stated rather indefinitely that the troops returned after the rains, but I wish to know when, for instance, the Panjáb Pioneers, and the Bengal troops, and the whole force, got back to their stations?—I am afraid of blundering in any attempt to answer that question.

5918. I suppose that the Panjáb Pioneers

would be the last?—No, the last regiment was a regiment of Bengal cavalry, which was kept in the Bombay Presidency until the rains were over, and therefore was a much longer time than any other portion of the force in returning to its permanent station.

5919. It probably would not arrive before November, then, I presume?—Not before early in November, but all other troops would arrive before that time. The Panjáb Pioneers were sent up to the Panjáb through Sindh.

5920. When were they sent up?—I should think they must have arrived in the Panjáb before the end of August, but I really feel very uncertain about the dates.

5921. Mr. *Seely*.] Had Colonel Warden no peculiar qualifications which were likely to recommend him for the post of director of transports?—Colonel Warden had had experience of the Transport Corps in the Crimea. He was employed in the Transport Corps in the Crimea.

5922. Was he recommended to Lord Napier by any one?—Yes; I think I may state with certainty that the Quartermaster General of the Bombay army, Colonel Phayre, very strongly recommended him to Lord Napier.

5923. As fit for the office of director of the transport train?—Yes.

5924. Sir *S. Northcote*.] But on looking back upon matters as they have happened, are you of opinion that if Colonel Warden had been still alive, he would have been the officer on whom we should have called for explanations of many of those difficulties which arose?—Yes; for everything which was apparently defective in the arrangements at Bombay, after the scheme had once been settled between the Commander in Chief and the Government.

5925. Captain *Beaumont*.] Does the experience of the Abyssinian Expedition suggest to you any points for guidance in reference to arrangements for future military expeditions?—Undoubtedly the experience of such an Expedition suggests some points useful for permanent guidance. The principal problem is to make the experience of each expedition minimize the points of doubt and uncertainty in future cases. It seems to me that there is a fault somewhere, if, as was the case in the Abyssinian Expedition, after the orders for its dispatch had been given, and every day was of importance, the Commander in Chief should be occupied, as Lord Napier was, in experimenting on, altering and discarding pack-saddles for animals which had been in use as pack animals for years past. It seems to me that there is a fault somewhere, if under similar circumstances, as happened in this Expedition, a question is raised, not on a matter of detail, but on a fundamental question, such as to what great department of the army the transport should pertain. I am only echoing the suggestions made by the honourable and gallant Member's own questions, in saying that this Expedition gives additional evidence of the probability that on future occasions railways for short distances will form a part of military material, and that therefore it is probably advisable that the pattern, and every other detail should be determined, and that the mode of laying railways should form a point of instruction to engineer soldiers. I have no doubt that in every department, whether the Naval Transport, the Medical Department, the Ordnance Department, or what not, a judicial consultation of

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of the departmental officers might rescue some portion of the valuable experience which is gained in such cases from the oblivion which so quickly overtakes it, and might record it in a manner which might make it available to a future generation of officers. In the matter of accounts, which though of very inferior importance to other matters more directly connected with the military operations, yet are still not unimportant, I think that the experience of the Abyssinian Expedition might be used to guide arrangements for any future occasion, so as to secure a more prompt and perfect rendering of the accounts; for though I believe the accounts of this Expedition were rendered more promptly than those of any previous Expedition, yet I know that complaints have been made both of delay and of want of intelligibility. I think the experience of this Expedition showed (although only negatively) the advantage of the appointment of a head of the civil administrative staff, such as was intended by the appointment of a controller of supply and transport, in exact accordance with the views recorded by the commission of which Lord Strathnairn was President. I say negatively, because the circumstances in which the officer to whom I refer was placed by Lord Napier, did not allow of the fulfilment of his duties according to the intention of the original appointment; but I would notice how very largely the purposes of this Committee would have been met by the fulfilment, according to the intentions of the Government, of the duties of that post. In conclusion, I draw one general inference from the experience of this expedition, and that is to be exceedingly sceptical about the common allegations by military men of the hindrances imposed by the action of the representatives of the Civil Government. Unless the Treasury had been placed at Lord Napier's disposal, and every officer of the Government had been placed under his orders, it would have been difficult for the commander of the Expedition to have had more prompt command of all the resources of the Civil Government than Lord Napier had, and yet we have the same old story. The fact is, that to the admiring circle of staff officers round a commander in chief in the field, to whom they look for honours and promotion, the Civil Government are the absent, who, according to the French proverb, are always in the wrong; and this very naturally finds expression by the military historians in a distribution of the successes to the military, and of the defects to the civilians, which has a simplicity attractive to the critics. So far as the action of the Governor, Sir Seymour Fitzgerald is a question of fact, there is no man who is in a better position to testify to it than myself; and I know that no man connected with that Expedition served Lord Napier (I use the word "served" deliberately) more actively, and more industriously than Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, and as Sir Seymour Fitzgerald carried in his own person the whole weight and influence of the Government, there was no man who served Lord Napier so effectually; I am not speaking of the more general action of the Civil Government, which was shared by him and by others; I mean the way in which he personally and individually devoted himself to furthering all the preparations of the Expedition; I have thought these latter remarks not out of place in respect to guidance on future occasions (may they be distant) of military operations.

5926. Sir S. Northcote.] You are acquainted
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with the greater part of the proceedings in connection with the preparations for the Expedition; was it within your knowledge that the Government were very much hampered by peculiar political considerations, since, in the first place, this was not an Expedition made after a declaration of war, or for the purposes of conquest; but an Expedition to support a demand which was made for the delivery of certain persons who were supposed to be detained in captivity under some misapprehension?—Yes.

5927. Are you aware that in consequence of that the preparations of the Government were continually hampered by considerations as to how far certain steps which, in a military sense, would have been the proper steps, might politically have a prejudicial effect upon their proceedings; for instance, that it was most important to avoid anything which looked like an attempt at the conquest or subjugation of the country?—I am aware, of course, that those considerations had to be borne in mind; but I am not aware, and more than that, I do not think, that they influenced the action of the Government in the dispatch of the Expedition, after it had once been determined to dispatch it, excepting to a certain extent in the instructions given as to the choice of a landing-place.

5928. With reference to one point, to which you referred just now in regard to the construction of a railway, are you not aware that it was an element in the question whether the construction of a railway might not give an idea that we intended a more permanent occupation of the country than was intended?—Of course, when speaking of the action of the Government, I confine myself to the Bombay Government.

5929. But are you aware that Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, in a letter which he wrote to me on this question of the construction of a railway, adverted to that point as one which ought to be taken into consideration?—At this moment I can only say that I do not remember having been shown or told of such a letter.

5930. Was it within your cognizance what the reasons were why the Government at home did not send out the materials of a railway?—No.

5931. You were not aware that one of the considerations was an unwillingness to choke the railway through the Isthmus of Suez with the materials for the construction of a railway which it was thought might more easily be sent from India?—No. If the reasons for the hesitation of the English Government were sent, they were not shown to me.

5932. *Chairman* (to Colonel Kennedy).] Do you remember what was the weight of the railway plant?—I cannot say; but there were 20 miles of railway; light rails.

5933. Can you give an approximation to the weight of it?—I think it would be between 2,000 and 3,000 tons, including the rolling stock and the fixed plant.

5934. Lord Elcho (to Colonel Marriott).] Sir William Power, who is at the head of the Control Department in England, as you are probably aware, gave evidence to the effect that he considered that no system of transport would in future be perfect unless the transport, whether by sea or by land, was under one head; do you agree with that view?—So far as I have considered the subject (and I have considered it to a considerable extent), I agree with his view of that matter.

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General Sir WILLIAM ROSE MANSFIELD, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., called in ; and Examined.

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5935. *Chairman.*] At the time of the Abyssinian Expedition in 1867-8, you were the Commander in Chief in India, and a member of the council of the Governor General, were you not?—I was.

5936. There were differences of views between the Government of India and Lord Napier, I believe, as to the organisation of the Land Transport Train?—I do not think that the Government of India had anything to say to the Land Transport Train. Whatever difference there may have been, I take it, existed between the Government of Bombay and Lord Napier, as the prospective Commander in Chief of the Expedition, and Commander in Chief of the Bombay Army. What came before us as the Government of India, were the papers relative to those differences, upon which we had ourselves to give no opinion, owing to the manner in which the direction of the preparation for the Expedition was ordered from home.

5937. I think that it appears in the Blue Book that the Government of India was quoted in the dispute which arose as to the organisation of the Land Transport Train?—To answer that question fairly, I believe I must go back for some time. It was not the Government of India that was quoted, to the best of my recollection, but it was an opinion of my own. Just about the time when I was assuming the command of the Bombay Army, the late Lord Elphinstone was the Governor in Bombay. And the first thing which his Lordship required of me was to give a written opinion upon certain proposals which had been made during the time of my predecessor, Lord Strathnairn, by the Quartermaster General of the Bombay Army, Colonel Phayre. It was to this opinion, given by me in the year 1860, that Sir Seymour Fitzgerald apparently referred in his discussion with Lord Napier.

5938. What were those proceedings on the part of the Home Government which, as you allege, deterred you from intervening in this discussion as to the mode of organising the Land Transport Train?—The orders received from the Secretary of State for India placed the Bombay Government and the commander of the forces under the Bombay Government for the first time in a separate position as regarded the starting of an Expedition from the Indian shores. So far as my experience goes, it was the first time that such a step was taken by the Government at home. Until then, the Government of India had always been invested, so far as I know, with the responsibility of preparation, and, under directions from home, with the responsibility of instructions to the commander of an Expedition; and no minor presidency or minor administration was invested with duties which it must be believed are of an imperial character. The Government at home has from time to time been pleased to entrust those imperial duties to the Government of India; but for the first time, as I understand, they were intrusted to a minor administration. That being so, the Government of India could only give counsel and make suggestions, but it could give no orders.

5939. In your view, did that which you regard as a change of procedure on the part of the Home Government superseding the Government of India

in any way interfere with the efficiency of the organisation?—It appears to me that that was the first great mistake, probably the only mistake, which was made in the organisation and arrangement of the affairs connected with the Abyssinian Expedition. My reasons for saying this are as follows: The Government of India are able to take a general survey of all the resources of the country, while a minor government knows nothing of the resources of the country except those which may exist in the provinces under that minor government. Consequently, the advantage of the general knowledge which is in the possession of the Government of India was, in my opinion, sacrificed by the proceeding which was sanctioned by the Government at home.

5940. Would not the proximity of Bombay to the scene of operations be a fact from which would arise facilities for the conduct of the Expedition compensating largely for any disadvantages in not giving the supreme direction to the Government of India, situated, as that Government was, 1,500 miles farther away from the scene of operations?—I think it makes no difference whatever. We have our telegraphs in India, which, for Government purposes, are as efficient as the telegraph of England. We have a post which takes letters from Simla to Bombay or from Simla to Calcutta in three or four days. Whatever the resources of the country may be, in all its parts must be thoroughly known to the great departments under the Government of India; whereas, as I said before, the smaller departments under a province can only be acquainted with the resources which belong to that province.

5941. I think you were about to give the Committee some illustration of the disadvantages to which you were referring, as resulting from the proceeding of the Home Government in vesting the supreme direction in the Government of Bombay?—In the first place there were a great many experienced officers under my own command with whose antecedents and career I was personally acquainted; I believe that the experience of those officers might have been very profitably used if they had been nominated to situations in the Abyssinian Expedition. As it was, we did not get demands from the Bombay Government, or from the Commander of the Expedition, to send a given number of officers for such-and-such duties, but such officers as the Commander of the Expedition might require were recruited, as it were, according to such private information as he might be able to gain, or as might be furnished to him by his friends. That appears to me to be a very faulty mode of organising a great expedition. What should have been done, in my opinion, was that the Government of Bombay, after communicating with the Commander of the Expedition, should have said to the Government of India, "We want so many men for such-and-such duties," and should have thrown upon the Government of India the responsibility of providing the most experienced and the most fitting instruments for the purposes named. That precaution was not taken. I cannot say, for I have no personal knowledge, whether or not the staff duties of the Abyssinian Expedition were well performed; but I do say that the greatest

greatest precaution to insure those duties being well performed was not taken; and I consider that that follows directly from the cause which I have mentioned, namely, the responsibility of the Government of India being abrogated for that Expedition.

5942. Have you ever known an expedition of this size, with such a large number of general officers, and such a large staff as this Expedition had?—Yes. When I was chief of the staff under Lord Clyde, in 1859 and 1860, I think I am right in stating that Lord Clyde received orders from home, through the Government of India, to organise the staff for the Chinese Expedition of the latter year, and otherwise to arrange the larger details which it would be necessary to settle before the Expedition was to be handed over to the commander who was to conduct it. The necessary orders were then given by the Government of India, in accordance with the suggestions made by Lord Clyde, who actually named the commanders of divisions and supplied officers for various staff appointments; and as I have said, in answer to a previous question, applied the resources of the country generally.

5943. I think there were nine or ten general officers on this Expedition?—I cannot say how many there were.

5944. Wherein do you suppose that the proceedings which were taken in regard to the Abyssinian Expedition, as opposed to the proceedings which you have indicated, tended to increase the cost, for that is especially the view of the Expedition which comes before this Committee?—It is impossible for me to say whether owing to this cause a greater cost was incurred. I can only say that it appears to me that there was a want of due precaution in getting the most experienced men to fill subordinate situations.

5945. By "subordinate situations," what do you intend to convey to the Committee?—I mean all those numerous staff appointments by which the administration of the army moves, including the Commissariat, the Land Transport, and so on. A few commissariat officers were asked for, if I recollect rightly; but generally the people were taken as I have mentioned. Those are the things to which I refer. Every day the wants of the Expedition became greater and greater in this respect; and at last, about the month of April or May, in fact, just before Magdala was taken, I was obliged, as Commander in Chief in India, to represent to the Government that we had exhausted our resources, that we could spare no more men, and that they must look to fill vacancies in transport trains, and things of that sort, to England and not to India.

5946. Do you see how the difficulties, and lamentable deficiencies of the transport train, could have been avoided; would the lack of reference to the Indian Government, to which you have adverted, account for those deficiencies?—I have myself very fixed ideas with regard to the organisation of transport trains for such purposes; and, therefore, I may naturally suppose that, if those ideas are not complied with, success would not follow. My notion is that the transport trains of the Abyssinian army should have been organised before they left the Bombay shores, according to the manner in which under my orders the transport of the Bengal Brigade was arranged

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and settled. In consequence of the arrangements made under those orders for the Bengal Brigade, every regiment for that brigade left Calcutta with its own transport complete. The consequence was, that when those regiments which went from the Bengal Presidency landed in Abyssinia, they were at once competent to march, and they did march, on the day of their landing, precisely the same as if they had been in this country. I have not any official report of it, but I have always understood that the people who saw the result of that particular organisation, admitted that it was in what came before their eyes as good as it well could be.

5947. Will you describe that in comparison or in contrast with the organisation which was adopted?—There I am obliged, of course, to lean on hearsay, because I can only speak according to what I have seen in print as to the confusion which is said to have arisen at Zulla. As to whether it arose at Zulla, I do not know.

5948. Have you seen the official report of Colonel Holland, the Controller of Supply and Transport?—I have not. If such confusion did arise, I can only say that it was because the transport was not divided off according to the separate corps and departments before it left Bombay, so far as it could be; instead of which it had to be divided and organised when they were at Zulla, and under great difficulties. My view is that everything which can be done in the way of organisation and division and definition of duties, should be done before an expedition starts; and that appears to me to be a maxim of war which should never be departed from.

5949. As you did in the case of the corps which went from Bengal?—I give that as an illustration.

5950. Will you state what was the organisation of the Bengal Brigade, as regards land transport?—The organisation is this: that to each corps, either of cavalry, or of artillery, or of infantry, as the case may be, a certain number of mules and drivers are apportioned. Those animals are then given over to the commander of the corps concerned, and the men, whether they are enlisted followers or not enlisted, come under the orders of the regimental commanding officer concerned. The commanding officer is then just as responsible for the animals and equipment handed over to him, as the cavalry officer of a regiment is for his horses, his saddles, and so forth. Thus it is that every motive exists in the mind of that commanding officer to keep those animals in a state of efficiency; and directly he arrives at the point of debarkation, or if he has already disembarked, directly he is ordered to commence a military operation, he is in a position to do so without going to a big department. Then, afterwards, if the animals die, or if any deficiency occurs from various causes, it would be for the central department, the commissariat, or what not, to replace the animals lost; but the central department has nothing to do beyond that.

5951. If you had to give a name to that system, would you call it a military organisation?—You may call it a military organisation or not. It is military so far as it is under the commanding officer of the corps or department concerned, but there is no reason whatever why the followers should be military men. On the other hand, I believe that that which I am describing is merely

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the old system which we have always followed in India. Those followers are not military men; they are men gathered for the purpose, working in gangs under their head men, and they fall perfectly into regimental organisation, and never give any trouble whatever. But the great advantage is that those head men are under the commanding officer concerned, and work just like any other servants without any difficulty.

5952. Do you see in the facts of which you are now cognisant any difficulty in the way of that course having been taken in the Bombay Presidency?—I am not sufficiently acquainted with all the circumstances to be able to form an opinion as to that.

5953. Lord *Elcho*.] That corps, then, I imagine, is hired as a whole by the commissariat, or some such body, and allotted to the different regiments according to their needs; is that the case?—It is either hired or bought, according to their needs.

5954. Is it the regimental officer who buys it?—No, it is not the regimental officer. The Central Department first gets the animals for the service in India, and in that case it would probably be done by hiring, but for service beyond the seas the animals would be bought.

5955. Have you in India a department answering to what is commonly called the Commissariat Department in this country, which is also charged with the transports?—The Commissariat Department would generally arrange for all transport in so far as it provides the means, but having given the means to the corps, or to the departments concerned, its responsibility ceases, except in so far as it may be required to replace or to receive back carts and animals, or to supply deficiencies.

5956. Then supposing that an expedition was organised from India to China, or on any coast service where sea transport would enter into the question as well as land transport, is that sea transport also organised by the same Commissariat Department as you have just informed the Committee organises the land transport?—No; the sea transport, I rather think, would be organised by certain marine authorities in the sea-ports, who would act according to such requisitions as they might get from the departments concerned or from the Government. Probably the orders would be given by the Government, after having come to an understanding with their several departments.

5957. But in the case to which we are referring, you have not combined sea and land transport under one responsible head?—No.

5958. Would you think it desirable that they should be so combined?—I should think not; it is so very seldom that we require sea transport, that I should think it would be better to leave a problem of that sort to be determined by the exigencies of the time.

5959. *Chairman*.] Having in view the fact that the larger portion of this Expedition was drawn from the Bombay Presidency, do you see that any difficulties would have been in the way of organising a system of transport in Bombay before the Expedition started, as you organised one in Bengal before you sent out your contribution to the Expedition?—That, of course, would depend upon the means at the disposal of the Government of Bombay; the Government of Bombay sent up requisitions to the Government of India, and I believe also to the Government

of Madras, for animals, and followers, and so on; what was possible, was done; but I am given to understand that the number of animals that were supplied in India was not sufficient for the total of the service which was about to take place; and, consequently, demands and requisitions in various forms, according to such information as I have seen, came to be made upon the Home Government, who sent officers to buy animals in various parts of the world, and also to recruit drivers for them. Therefore as regards so much of the transport of the Expedition as had, owing to this necessity, to be gathered from parts other than India, it was necessary, of course, that the organisation affecting that part of the transport should take place on the Abyssinian coast, but I can see no reason why such an organisation, apportioning off the animals and the drivers to separate corps and separate departments, as far as the means went, should not have taken place in Bombay, just as well as we could do it in Calcutta.

5960. It did not so take place?—It did not take place in Bombay, so far as I am informed; but I can see no reason why it should not have been so. If I had been connected with the Government of Bombay, I should certainly have recommended that, so far as the means went, that division of the means of transport should take place there.

5961. Still, inasmuch as I presume it was a necessity that animals and drivers should be drawn from different parts, some confusion or inefficiency must necessarily have resulted on their being gathered together at one centre at Zulla, from the want of previous organisation and training?—That would probably depend upon the experience of the officers charged with the direction. I do not see why there should have been any outrageous confusion if those charged with the direction were competent officers, and had had some experience of the business before them.

5962. And you think that India contained and could have provided officers of the experience you desiderate?—I should say so, certainly; their numbers are becoming fewer every day, but we have a great number of perhaps the most experienced officers in the world, in the Indian armies.

5963. Had the Government of India been appealed to in the matter, is it your view that they could have supplied the necessary officers?—I think that if the Government of India had been supreme in the matter, it would have been in their power to have given the means of an organisation which, in all probability, would have avoided the confusion which is reported to have existed.

5964. From what you know, and from what you have read, do you attribute the failure of the transport corps in Abyssinia to the want of experience on the part of the officers?—That is a question to which I should rather not reply, as I have no personal knowledge upon the subject; as I said before, I really cannot say whether or not the reports that we have heard of the alleged confusion at Zulla were correct or not; my knowledge of military matters, extending over rather a long career, goes to show that such reports are apt generally to be very much exaggerated.

5965. Assuming those reports to be correct, would you attribute that confusion to want of experience

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experience on the part of the officers?—I should say that that must be a very large element, of course.

5966. Mr. *White*.] You say that the Governor General in Council was not supreme in these matters; then do I understand from you that, although the Bombay Government is subordinate to the Governor in Council, yet your experience and judgment as Commander in Chief of the Army in India were not available so as to direct how an expedition of this magnitude and importance should be organised?—According to the instructions communicated to the Government of India, the Government of Bombay, as we understood (or certainly as I understood) those instructions, for the time being, superseded the Government of India; and I, as the Commander in Chief in India, excepting in some very small points affecting the British troops, had no voice in the counsels followed in Bombay, and in fact had nothing to do with the Expedition, except in starting the little brigade from Bengal.

5967. Then are the Committee to understand that owing to the orders which came from the home Government, all the experience and knowledge which you had, and the high position which you occupied, were ignored in consequence of the orders which came from the home Government?—Perhaps it would be wrong to say that they were ignored, because the Government of India, from time to time, offered counsel and suggestions; but the fact exists that for the time being, with regard to this expedition to Abyssinia, the Bombay Government superseded the Government of India.

5968. *Chairman*.] In point of fact, then, had the Government of India no power whatever to affect the arrangements, and the organisation, and the movements of the Government of Bombay in their preparations for this expedition?—No; what we did do was to meet every possible requisition that came before us, and to give assistance, either directly or indirectly, as it might be in our power.

5969. You were, in fact, the executive under the Government of Bombay; is that so?—That is really the case.

5970. I believe it has been stated before this Committee that the increase in the number of Native combatants dispatched from India over the proportion which went, the 12,000 originally indicated by Lord Napier, was at the instance of the Government of India; was that statement correct?—That is correct; and what is more, I believe that I was the person who first made the suggestion; our Native Indian regiments were at a very low peace establishment; they stood, including everybody, at 600 private soldiers per regiment, which is a very small number with which to undertake a warlike expedition; and I pointed out that a very slight mishap in the way of sickness, or what not, might render those bodies dangerously small, and therefore we added, I think, 80 men to each regiment.

5971. To what extent did you increase the numbers originally indicated by Lord Napier?—I really do not know; I believe he originally indicated 12,000 men. I think there were seven Native regiments; that would be 500 men in the infantry; and there was an analogous increase to the cavalry, I suppose.

5972. Would you explain how that comports with the view to which expression is given by the Indian Government in the Blue Book at a very

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early period, that the Expedition would be strong enough for its purpose if it comprised 7,000 odd, with a reserve of some 2,000?—All those estimates of number are more or less guess work; and such estimate as was given by the Government of India at that time was not an authority on which to place much reliance. We were called upon in council, suddenly, to give opinions with regard to a hostile expedition into a country of which practically we knew nothing. We did know that there were great mountains to be traversed, and great rivers to be crossed; but as to what the nature of the enemy was to be, and what the resources of the country might be, we really had no information whatever. That being so, it was really quite impossible to give anything like a reliable opinion. As the thing developed, and one had time to think it out, I certainly myself came to the conclusion that Lord Napier's demand for 12,000 men was a very moderate one; and I myself was extremely glad when the Government of India accepted the numbers which he proposed as the minimum with which to undertake so very difficult an affair as that was.

5973. You do not attach much weight to the first suggestion put forward by the Government of India?—No, I attach very little weight indeed to that.

5974. You say that the information about Abyssinia was very scanty?—Very scanty indeed.

5975. But, in point of fact, was there not a good deal of information available?—Information may be available in London, but if you are in India, at an immense distance from this country, it is not always to be got at. Then there is another thing to be considered. We had afterwards to weigh very carefully the great differences that appeared in the accounts given by the prisoners. I speak from recollection only, and my memory may be very defective, but I think it will be found in some of the earlier despatches, that Mr. Rassam, before he became a prisoner, talked of the armies of Theodore as having a very imposing array. I think he described their manœuvres, and their marching and their equipments, in terms which might make a distant observer believe that those armies really had a very considerable importance. Afterwards, if I recollect rightly, not only Mr. Rassam, but many of the other prisoners, wrote in a contrary sense, and declared that those soldiers of Theodore's were very miserable troops, and so on. One can quite understand a different view occurring to a man who is ardently desirous of being released from captivity from that which occurred to a man who was writing as a diplomatic envoy, before he had incurred any risk; but still this only showed (at all events, to myself, and I had great responsibility in the way of advising the Government of India) that we were in a state of positive uncertainty in regard to everything as regards real information; and therefore in meeting any suggestions which might come from Lord Napier with reference to the strength that he had to take with him, or with respect to reserves, my view was, that in justice to a man who was undertaking such a very difficult business, of which the conditions were so little known, we should rather exceed his demands than diminish them.

5976. Would you apply in the main similar remarks to the followers that accompanied the combatants?—The question of followers is again rather

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rather a difficult matter. I believe that I started the only brigade, with which I had anything to do, with a smaller complement of followers than was deemed advisable in Bombay. Some correspondence took place early in the day, when we were organising these Bengal regiments for the service; and I rather think that my figures were slightly less than they were in Bombay; but I attach very little importance to that, because until they got into Abyssinia, and found out what the climate was, and really what was to be got there, there was really but little to be made out of it.

5977. Could you give to the Committee your views as to the relative responsibilities you would assign to the Civil Government on the one side, and of the military commander on the other, in the promotion of a warlike expedition?—It appears to me that a Civil Government should exactly indicate in its instructions the scope of an expedition which is in prospect. The object of the Expedition should be fairly stated, and the officer who is in charge should be consulted on the means of exertion; it is by no means necessary that he should decide, but I think it right that he should be consulted as to what means might be necessary to ensure the object being attained. Then I think that everything in the way of preparation should be made by the Government, and that the responsibilities, when it is possible, of the commander of the expedition should begin as little as may be until he leaves the territory of the Government under which he is serving. Until that takes place he is an executive officer, and he should act as an executive officer; but it appears to me that there is considerable danger in investing an executive military commander with all the great functions of Government, and at the same time throwing upon him the ultimate responsibility with regard to any suggestions which he may make with reference to imperfect information. That alone belongs to the responsibility which I think Government should take.

5978. How would you apply the principles which you are enunciating to the case before the Committee; how would you define and assign to the respective powers, military and civil, their respective duties?—As I have before stated, I think it was unfortunate that the Government of India was not the directing power, according to old custom. That being so, the commander of the forces for the Expedition having been named by the Home Government, it would then have been for the Government of India to detail the constituents of the forces, and to indicate from what part of India they should be drawn, and through its own great departments to provide the *matériel*, and so forth, in the various proportions which are required for the execution of a service.

5979. All the materials of a war, including provisions?—Yes. That being done, the commander of the expedition would be required to take notes of the preparations that had been made. Then it would again be for the Government, as the responsible authority, to decide such a question as that which has been the subject of examination, namely, the organisation of a land transport corps. In this particular instance it was unfortunate that one view should have prevailed in Bengal, and that another view should have prevailed in Bombay.

5980. Were not the views the same, so far as regards these respective Governments, but different as regards the Commander in Chief only?—That

came afterwards. As regards the point to which have referred, namely, the regimental organisation I do not think that that was discussed between the Governor of Bombay and Lord Napier. It appears to me, from my recollection of the papers, that it was the larger point as to whether the organisation should be what is called military, that is to say, under non-commissioned officers, and so on, or civil, that is to say, under the head men of the drivers. Then the stores, and ordnance, and provisions, and so on, having been all arranged, it would be for the Government to indicate the chief officers to organise the departments, that is to say, the chief staff officers are always named by the supreme authority which starts the expedition, *i. e.*, the Government, or, assisted by any military advisers that they may have, they would probably take counsel with the commander of the expedition; but still the responsibility of choosing those staff officers should rest, and must rest, with the Government, which has much greater means of choice than a military commander can possibly have.

5981. Would you assign to the civil power the duty and responsibility of defining what provisions were needed for an expedition of that kind; I mean as regards the time for which supplies should be forwarded?—Those considerations must be very much governed by the conditions special and peculiar to the service concerned. Thus, if it were necessary for us to send an army into Belgium we should trust to Belgium to feed that army; we should pay for the provisions of that army; and we should probably send nothing to Belgium except what might be required for hospitals, and so on. On the other hand, if you undertake an expeditionary operation to a very inhospitable shore where the people are barbarous, and where the resources of the country are of a very slender description, it is clear that you must send stores of every description in very large quantities. Then it is for the commander of the expedition to be consulted, and to say, with regard to the object of the expedition which has before been explained to him, what he would require as a minimum of stores in order to establish himself in the country at first.

5982. Having in view this Expedition, and remembering that Zulla was within a very few weeks of the source of supplies, namely, Bombay on the one side and Suez on the other, have you an opinion as to the length of time for which stores should be provided in Abyssinia?—I should think that of certain classes of stores there should be a supply of about six months. It is to be recollected that at particular seasons of the year only very powerful steamers can communicate between Bombay and the Red Sea; and that at all seasons of the year sailing vessels unassisted by steam are certain to make a very long passage either one way or the other.

5983. You used the expression "certain classes of stores"; do you particularise any of those classes?—Under that head, I mean medical stores and grain, and so on; and those things which are prime necessities of life; that is on the assumption that the country supplies nothing.

5984. Would you under that head, or in that class, place all provisions for the troops and followers?—I should place stores which you have no possibility of getting in the country in that class; assuming that for 60 or 70 miles from the coast

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coast there is great difficulty in getting grain, I should put grain in that class; I should also put medical stores of every description, just as I should put ordinance stores, because it is impossible to get them in the country; on the other hand it appears to me to be a great mistake when you are going to make a long journey into the interior of a country, to send hay, as I understand hay was sent into this country; there it appears that the old notion of the Balaklava difficulties sprung up again; and that because hay was sent to Balaklava, where there was no possibility of getting grass, it was supposed that there was to be no grass in Abyssinia.

5985. Then, in general terms, you would have stored in Abyssinia tolerably full supplies of provisions for the troops, but you would not have depended upon your ships for forage for the animals?—There, of course, one must be guarded; it was necessary to depend upon the ships for forage for animals until the highlands were reached; I think it might have been safely assumed that so soon as the highlands were reached, a force moving on would find forage at all events of some sort on its way; I believe that what was found was very scanty, but still, I believe, it is quite impossible to carry hay or anything else of that kind, for those enormous distances; on the coast itself, of course, it would have been necessary to have a few transports with hay on board.

5986. Keeping in view the animals necessary for the Expedition, you would have regarded it as pretty nearly impossible to feed them from the coast?—I should think it would have been quite impossible.

5987. Have you any knowledge of the forage which was sent?—I have no knowledge of the forage sent or of that country; but, I think, we have this knowledge of all movements; that if you attempted to carry forage across a desert, we will say of 200 miles long, where no forage was to be found, every animal would eat up all the forage he carried long before he got to the other end of the desert.

5988. What view would you take of the fact which I may mention, that at the end of the Expedition it was found that five times as much forage was left as had been consumed throughout its entire duration?—Of course it must be said that with regard to the early termination of the Expedition, a great miscalculation had been made; but on the other hand it must also be said, that great good fortune attended our arms, in such an early termination taking place; and if that early ending of the difficulty had not occurred and there had been a large depôt of animals, either at Zulla or at Senafé, without food, or indeed if there had been an absence of stores of whatever kind, for any part of the Expedition, I think that the public of this country would have blamed the supply officers of that Expedition, and I think, they would have blamed them very justly; therefore, the supply officers of the Expedition, whether they were in Bombay or whether they were in the force, under Lord Napier, alike had the duty of providing for an unfavourable emergency, a great deal more than for the extraordinary contingency of the undertaking being finished in the month of April, as it was.

5989. The measure of the supplies, however, would be governed by considerations of reason
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and common sense, I presume?—That I suppose.

5990. If we infer that the Expedition was a seven months' expedition, and if the forage left at its termination was five times what was consumed during those seven months, so that we would have very nearly three years' supply of forage, would your view be that that supply was out of all calculation?—It would seem to be excessive, of course.

5991. Lord *Elcho*.] Was not the forage found to a great extent in the highlands?—Yes, I believe so.

5992. Supposing as you said that the Expedition had been less successful, supposing that it had even been driven back, and that it had had to start afresh, they would have been driven to the coast, and they would have been dependent upon this hay on the coast, would they not?—Yes. As I understand the honourable Chairman, the question which he puts is this: not that there should not be a reasonable depôt of supplies at Zulla or whatever place might be chosen, but whether or not such an amount of reserved supply as three years was not excessive. It seems to me that it is excessive when put in that form; but there is of course still the second consideration, which I think ought not to be altogether banished from the minds of the Committee, that if there had been an unfavourable turn out in the month of June instead of a conclusion of the Expedition, we should certainly have had to send reinforcements of a very considerable kind; and in that way this forage would not have come amiss. It appears to me that we should not forget that probably such a consideration was not absent from the minds of the commissariat officers when they had to consider all the bearings of the case.

5993. *Chairman*.] But would not the time that was necessary to land a reinforcement in Abyssinia have been sufficient to have landed anything to supply the wants of that reinforcement?—I am not quite clear even about that; I really do not know where these supplies came from, but I rather suspect that, for the most part, they came from Europe; at all events I am quite able to state that there would be very great difficulty in sending supplies of this bulky nature from India at certain seasons of the year, such for instance, as the period of the monsoon.

5994. But not from Suez?—Not from Suez itself.

5995. Nor from the Mediterranean?—Nor from the Mediterranean; but even there it would be enormously expensive, because you must not believe that sea transport is an easy thing in the Red Sea. The Red Sea is a sea in which steam alone is of any use; and any sailing vessel attempting, at any time of the year, to carry supplies in a hurry from Suez to Zulla, or to Aden, would disappoint the authorities.

5996. Do you know the measure of the steam power that we had in that Expedition?—I believe it was very large.

5997. On finding that the country to which the Expedition was sent was supplying forage, food, or anything else in any appreciable degree, would you not have regulated your supplies from India, or wherever they were drawn from, in accordance with what you found in the country?—I think that would be a reasonable thing to do.

5998. The general question which I should like to ask you, is in terms that which has been referred
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ferred to this Committee; what is the reason, in your view, why the gross expense of the Expedition was so much in excess of what was anticipated?—It appears to me that in answering that question, it is necessary to take into consideration the conditions which affect an expedition landing on a very inhospitable coast, as distinguished from a civilised country, and that I really believe to contain all the reasons why it is impossible to make an estimate of expenditure in such a matter; it is very true that we can make an estimate of the pay of a certain number of men; we can estimate what will be the amount of stores that they will probably consume; and we can also estimate what the cost of the transport may probably be; but when we have done that we have quite got to the end of it, and even there we are dealing only with wide probabilities and with nothing certain; but there is an element in all this which I think has generally escaped attention, and that is, that an expedition which lands on a coast destitute of resources is very much in the position of a new colony. All those expenses which are incurred by colonists, and which invariably ruin new settlers, when it comes to a warlike expedition, such as that which we are alluding to, fall upon the Government. It entirely escapes estimate. The conditions of life on such terms are not known, and are not foreseen. That being so, it is clearly impossible to estimate expenditure, the conditions of which are utterly unknown and unpredicted. That I take to have been the case in the great instance of the Crimea when the position of Balaklava had been taken up, and it was again seen in Abyssinia. Directly Lord Napier got to Abyssinia, he found the necessity of a telegraph; he found the necessity of railways; in fact, all that which comes in civil life under the head of fixed capital had to be established, and that was exactly what was not estimated or predicted.

5999. Do you not recognise as correct the statement, that the inhospitable nature of the shore on which the Expedition had to land, and, indeed, all the circumstances which you have enumerated, were clearly foreseen and known beforehand, and should have been provided for in any estimate submitted of the cost of that Expedition?—The only way to have estimated it would have been to say, "We shall probably want three or four millions more than those expenses about which we can possibly form any estimate at all." It would have been impossible in anything like exact terms to lay down an estimate for conditions which were so little known.

6000. Then the uncertainty being so certain, would you not have felt it your duty in estimating for such an expedition to have frankly and fully stated the contingencies, namely, that a very large excess of expenditure would be incurred?—I should think that any prudent person would do that.

6001. And any failure to do that would be, in your opinion, to adopt your expression, a matter of imprudence?—Certainly; so far as I am concerned, if I had been required to estimate, I should have said that a very large margin was required to meet any contingencies of that kind.

6002. Could not any one with any information as to the conditions under which such an Expedition should be undertaken have given the Committee that statement?—It is hardly fair to commit anybody to a censure of that sort, because, as I say, of the very uncertainty of those con-

ditions. It might have happened that those who preceded Lord Napier in the *reconnaissance* of the coast and so on might have reported that the means of the country were better than they actually turned out to be. Any facilities which were discovered in providing the means of the country would have been, *pro tanto*, a diminution of the charge of the Expedition.

6003. But any estimate lacking that wide margin of uncertainty, and an indication of the possibilities within that margin, would be unreliable?—I should think so; in fact, it is one of those things in which an estimate is almost impossible.

6004. You have probably read, and you know something of the heavy destruction of animals which occurred before the arrival of Lord Napier, and the want of provision for carrying provisions for them on the arrival of the animals in Abyssinia?—Yes, I have read newspaper accounts of that.

6005. You are aware that thousands of animals were lost in that way; would you regard that as a very great miscalculation as to the necessities of the case in the matter of attendance?—I really know nothing about the arrangements on the Abyssinian coast; but it appears to me, as I have said before, that that loss might possibly have been less if there had been more experience, and if such an arrangement had been made before leaving Bombay as that which I indicated with regard to the Bengal force.

6006. In other words, you would have had attendants to receive the animals on their arrival?—More than that; I would have given every animal to a particular corps or department, and I would have made that corps or department sail with the animal.

6007. Mr. Seely.] I do not know whether I correctly understood you to state that the main causes of the excess of the expenditure over estimate may be attributed to the expenditure on what you term fixed capital, such as railways; was I correct in that?—The way in which I put it was that I drew an analogy between the expenditure, as incurred by this Expedition, and beside the ordinary military business, and that which affects a settlement of colonists, such as took place, we will say, at Canterbury, New Zealand. We all know that when a settlement of that sort takes place, unfortunately for the settlers, in 99 cases out of 100, their estimates are entirely wrong, and they are invariably exceeded by the reality, and almost as invariably the first settlers are ruined. I take it that the same difficulty which attends settlers attended the Government which started this Expedition, and that the result of the apparently excessive expenditure may be attributed to that.

6008. The excess of expenditure over estimate, as you are aware, is from three to four millions; do you conceive that you have given reasons which would account for that enormous difference?—I have given what appears to me one element of uncertainty. I cannot give an opinion as to whether money was not wasted in the organisation of the sea transport by competition between Bombay and Calcutta, and so on. Those are the things to which, amongst others, I was alluding when I pointed out, as I conceive, the inexpediency of depriving the Government of India of its old and original place of supremacy in the organisation of such matters.

6009. Have you the least idea what proportion that

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that fixed capital to which you have alluded bears to the total expenditure?—No, I have no idea of that.

6010. Might it not be possible that going to an uncivilised country such as Abyssinia, though it had certain disadvantages, had certain very great advantages, inasmuch as there were no clever military operations to contend with?—I am not sufficiently acquainted with the history of the Expedition to give a reliable answer upon that point; but I have always understood that such difficulties as the Expedition had to meet were for the most part overcome by the expenditure of money which probably had not been included in any estimate. Thus Lord Napier's advance was facilitated, as I am told, by subsidising certain chiefs. Whether that is so or not I really cannot tell, but that which I believe is perfectly well known to all the world is, that the people were made extremely favourable to our cause by the very handsome remuneration they got as carriers, and also for their supplies; what the amount may have been that was distributed amongst the tribes and the population at large, in the General's advance to Magdala, I really do not know, but that must have been a very considerable element of expense, and I can quite believe that that element of expense did not enter into any estimate that was framed before the Expedition left India.

6011. Do you think that you are justified in saying that that would be a very considerable element of expense, looking at the total expenditure?—I really do not know what it was, but it may have been 500,000 £. or 600,000 £.

6012. The expenses that were incurred for railways and other things which would come under the head of fixed capital, I should suppose would have been foreseen, would they not?—There again we may be at issue, because if it was the intention (as I believe it was the intention) of the Government at home that this should be an Expedition which should grasp its object with the greatest possible haste, and having grasped that object retire from Abyssinia immediately, it is questionable whether any railway was required. If the Commander of the Forces, on arriving in Abyssinia, determined that an economy was to result from having a few miles of railway, he could be the only judge of that, and it was really a matter of pounds, shillings and pence whether to lay down a rail or to have so many more animals, and so on. I really do not know what was in the minds of Government, but if the Government believed when they started that Expedition that they would have it out of Abyssinia again in the course of six months, I cannot conceive that they contemplated the laying down of a railway.

6013. An expedition could not go to any country whatever without the expenditure of some money within that country being anticipated, I presume?—Quite so.

6014. If the country were ever so well provided and ever so civilised some expenditure would be necessary, would it not?—Yes.

6015. Then would not the excess in going to an uncivilised country be the difference between what was expended there and what would have been necessary if the country had been civilised?—Yes.

6016. The total expenditure in Abyssinia being about one million of money, from that, under any circumstances, you would deduct the inevitable outlay, had the country been never so

well provided with the necessaries of the army, and never so civilised, and the remainder would be the sum representing what you would call the cost incident to going to an unknown country, would it not?—It is really almost the difference between settling in dwellings and on roads prepared by yourself, and having the use, without paying for it, of the roads that you found in a civilised country.

6017. One million of money being the whole money expended in Abyssinia, would cover the whole of the outlay incident to its being an unknown and uncivilised country; then this million, supposing it to be all attributable to that cause, will not account for the enormous excess; there are yet a good many millions to be accounted for, are there not?—I pointed out that I cannot tell what would be the result of rivalry between the different ports: but one thing to which I did allude was that I think that some of this emulation between the different ports might have been avoided if the Government of India had directed the Expedition, from the first, instead of its being done from one province of the empire.

6018. Captain *Beaumont*.] If I understood you rightly, you stated that it would rest with the Commander in Chief to judge whether it was or was not desirable to send a railway to Abyssinia, and that you could quite understand that the Government were in doubt as to whether it would or would not have been an economical course to take to supply the Expedition with a railway; am I correct in that?—Yes, I think so.

6019. As a matter of fact we have had it, I think, clearly in evidence that the railway was of the greatest possible utility; we have also had it stated that the Expedition was fully supplied with stores; still, bearing in mind the amount of stores that was in contemplation for the Government to send, would it not have been a very simple thing to calculate the cost of transporting those stores by land-transport animals as against the cost of transporting them by railway?—That of course would depend very much upon the length of the rail. If a rail is only eight or ten miles long, I do not think very much is gained from it; if on the other hand it extends to 20 or 30, or 100 miles, then the gain from the use of a railway is enormously increased.

6020. In the case of the Abyssinian railway, the length was, I think, 13 miles. On all hands, and from all the evidence that we have had, it appears that it was really of the greatest use. Do you not think that the Government had before them sufficient evidence to have decided that that railway was likely to be of use?—That is really a very difficult thing to answer, because it would depend so much upon the resources at the disposal of the commander of the forces. If the commander of the forces had found a very ably-organised train of carts and animals, and so forth, to carry all that he required, in the view that he would have to retire from that country four or five months afterwards, a railway of that length would, in my opinion, not have been of very much use. If, on the other hand, it was believed that the Expedition would have to assume the form of occupation, and that the railway would be carried on further, then it would become a matter of the utmost importance, I should think.

6021. Do you not think that the railway was a matter of the utmost importance as the Expedition turned out?—I am not in possession of know-

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ledge which would enable me to give an opinion upon that subject; but I should be quite disposed to believe implicitly in the opinion of the commander of the forces upon that point; he alone would be able to judge, and I should rather not give an opinion upon that, even if I had every sort of paper before me; I think that it is a point upon which only those who have the responsibility of execution can possibly give an opinion worth having.

6022. It would hardly seem to me to be a difficult point upon which to give an opinion, seeing the amount of stores that had to be carried there, the value of the animals, and the consequent cost per ton of conveying a certain amount in one way and in another?—Of course, as I say, it depends upon the resources at the disposal of the commander of the forces when he decided upon having the railway; I presume that he was satisfied that he would effect not only a great saving of money, but also a considerable saving of time in the transport of those stores by the use of the railway; but I really cannot tell whether his perception was correct or not.

6023. Do you not think that under similar circumstances occurring again, it should be the first duty of the Government to provide every expeditionary force with railway transport as a rule?—That depends again, I think, very much upon what your object is, and upon the country to which you go; if, for instance, you got a civilised country, you at once seize a great city or fortress, and you make that your base of operations.

6024. I did not mean where a railway existed before; but no army as a rule can advance now far into the interior of a country where there are no railways; is not that an axiom which may fairly be laid down from the light of recent experience in warlike matters?—I think that is a point which will have to be decided hereafter by improvements in machinery and in locomotion over common roads, of which we have as yet but slender experience.

6025. You do not consider that that point is decided already?—It is so far from being decided that at present steamers are being made, and are now very much in use in Scotland, and in other parts of the world, which would militate in exactly the contrary direction; that is to say, that there are locomotives capable of dragging very great weights over countries which are not even provided with made roads, in fact, over everything except a rugged mountain. Those steamers are now in operation, and I have no doubt that hereafter those particular steamers, or improvements upon them, will form a part of the equipment of every regular army; but I cannot myself believe that it will be always necessary to lay down railways except under such circumstances as occur in America, and so on where the country provides great facilities; but to carry rails half way round the world, merely for the purpose of laying a rail for 10 or 20 miles, which is to be used two or three months, I do not think will enter into a military equipment.

6026. With due deference to what you have said, it seems to me that road steamers, if they do come into use, which is quite likely, will simply supersede a railway, so that that is not an answer to my question whether railways are not a necessity; but bearing in mind matters as they exist at present, does not that necessity exist?—

Even as they exist at present, the existence of these very road steamers shows that there is something already at our disposal which is more available for the purposes of an army which has to move at once directly it lands than a railway could be; I have hardly any doubt in my own mind that if those road steamers had been thoroughly well known three years ago they would have been used instead of laying down rails, because they could have been used directly they were taken out of the ship, whereas the laying down of a railway is a very long operation.

6027. But with the light which is at the disposal of the Government, ought they not at once to have decided that, bearing in mind the amount of transport which they had to provide, and the fact that a railway would have enabled them to save money and time to a very great extent, to take immediate steps to send out a railway; and was not there reasonable ground for the Government to have held that view at the time that the preparations for the Expedition were being made?—I do not think that I can answer that question.

6028. I think you stated that part of the Transport Corps, when it landed in Abyssinia, was in efficient order, and answered its purpose well, whereas a portion of it did not answer its purpose?—I think I guarded myself by saying that that was so according to such reports as I had seen, because I have no personal knowledge of these matters, and I wish it to be particularly understood that it is a most invidious position for me, considering the position which I held in India, to be a critic of an affair which was extremely well done, on the whole, in a military point of view; I should be extremely sorry to be considered, either directly or by implication, as attributing blame to those who conducted or carried out the operations.

6029. One part of the transport organisation was entirely fit for service, and did its duty well, and another portion of the transport service entirely broke down; is not that the inference from your opinion?—I do not know anything about the matter further, as I have said, than that from the personal reports which have reached me, but not from official ones; I was led to believe that the regiments which were organised according to the regimental idea as regards baggage, answered; and that is really all that I know upon the subject.

6030. But the inference that I have drawn would follow from the opinions which you have submitted to the Committee, would it not?—The inference which may be drawn from what I have said, is that I hold very strongly to a particular form of organisation in these matters; where I had a chance I followed out those ideas which I have held for a great many years, and have seen adopted in various forces; and as I have been informed they succeeded on this occasion.

6031. Do you consider that there is a recognised form of transport train at present which is generally approved for warlike purposes; or in the event of this country being at war, do you not think that a similar state of uncertainty to that which existed in this case would arise again?—I think that we have plenty of information on which to make a proper organisation, but as to whether such organisation now exists in England I really do not know.

6032. Will you give the Committee your opinion,

opinion, as to whether it does or does not exist; my own opinion being that such an organization does exist?—I have very recently returned to England, and I have no exact knowledge about the establishments in this country.

6033. With reference to India, it would be tolerably conclusive from what you have stated, that a proper organization for land transport corps did not then, and does not now exist?—I have always held a very strong opinion, that without what may be called technical organization, we have in the arrangements of the commissariat in India very sufficient means for moving the forces in whatever service they may be required; at all events, so far as the limits of India are concerned, and the conterminous countries which are not beyond the sea.

6034. Might not the organization of a transport train be very perfect for acting within the country to which the transport train belongs, or indeed outside that country in certain cases, and yet be altogether defective for general purposes?—Yes. India is so very large a country, that what is considered sufficient for India, may be called, at all events, so far as the Indian Empire is concerned, general purposes. A little Expedition, such as that of Abyssinia, is a very exceptional affair indeed. I should say that the general purposes, as far as regards India, are those which we contemplate in India, and with regard to countries conterminous with it; and, it would hardly be right for India to have expensive establishments, with reference to most exceptional expeditions, which very rarely take place.

6035. Would you not consider it very desirable that a fixed pattern of railway should be approved for use, in case of necessity, so that when it was required, it should not be a matter of inquiry and experiment, as to what was the best form to take, and that the Government should have at their command instructed men of the engineers to work it, and a means by which they could have the plant constructed rapidly in time of need?—In theory all those things sound very well; but I think, in practice, we must admit that the improvement in machinery of every kind in this country is so rapid that it would be very inexpedient to bind the Government or any establishment down to particular forms. Now, it is only within the last six or eight months that the question of light railways and very narrow gauges has come to be entertained by nearly every country in the world. Those very light railways and narrow gauges were practically not known a few years ago, except, I believe, from something that took place in Hungary. That being so, it seems to me that it would be a great mistake for the Government to go to any expense or to bind itself to anything now. What is really required when you have a particular service to organize, is that a few men of common sense should get together, and make use of what the country supplies, and go through it accordingly; but not to go to the great expense which attends the organization of establishments, and the aggregation of stores, and so on, which probably may never be used, and which may be declared obsolete when the service takes place.

6036. I think you have said, rather in accordance with what I meant, that you would have an establishment pattern of article, and contracts made with responsible firms, for turning the articles, in the event of their being required. The

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point that I think is objectionable in our present system, is that there is no means of turning to any recognised pattern for obtaining information as to what is required. I quite agree with you, that it was quite undesirable to tie the Government to any particular form, but do you not think that they should have their arrangements in such a state, as that they can avail themselves readily of the best means that the country can afford at a moment's notice?—I should presume that that ought to be the business of the great departments in this country, and that they should be able to turn to great engineers and contractors, and so on, and get those things turned out according to any pattern they might think best, just as would be done in any other undertaking. I cannot conceive that, in providing materials of that sort, the Government is in a different position from any great private establishment.

6037. Then if there is no doubt about that, how came it that the Government were undecided as to the gauge of the railway which was to be employed, and that three distinct letters were addressed to them with reference to the particular form of railway which it was proposed to send to Abyssinia?—I have really no acquaintance with the details on that subject.

6038. Lord *Elcho*.] You are not here, as I apprehend, to give opinions upon such matters as that, but to give your opinion, speaking generally, with reference to military matters?—Quite so.

6039. Captain *Beaumont*.] With reference to the scale of the Expedition, was that, in your opinion, such as to ensure a reasonable prospect of success, if there had been anything like a military opposition?—I think that if there had been anything like a military opposition, the Expedition would have probably lasted two or three years instead of six months; and it would have probably required a large reinforcement.

6040. That is to say, that in the face of anything like a military opposition, even the number of men and the scale generally of the Expedition would have been insufficient to have commanded success in the time it did?—Yes; certainly in the time, and being so ignorant as to what the possibility of military opposition might be, I was anxious that the native regiments should be added to in strength.

6041. Have you any general suggestion to make with reference to future war operations from the light which has been thrown upon such matters by the Abyssinian Expedition?—Every war has special conditions of its own. It is very true that certain experience may have been gained in the Abyssinian Expedition, and it is possible that that might be useful hereafter, but I do not think that we can build too much upon that. I think it is quite certain that no two wars have similar conditions. For instance, in Abyssinia we found that we had to import everything in the way of transport and labour for the army. On the other hand, the people are not very warlike. At the Cape of Good Hope, where the expeditions carried on by the British forces have not been very dissimilar in object from that which we saw in Abyssinia, being, that is to say, for the purpose of coercion, rather than that of occupation, we found that the conditions were quite dissimilar; that is to say, that the colonists provided carriages of every description, and the forests provided timber, and therefore there was

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great economy to be found actually in the country. On the other hand, whilst there was economy in that direction, the generals who had to meet the Kaffirs, and so on, found a very much more serious enemy than we are now led to believe existed in Abyssinia; and, further, I do not think that it would do at all, on any account whatever, to lay down a general proposition that the special experience gained in a given campaign will be of any particular use in another campaign, beyond this, that everything which conduces to draw out the energy and the intellect in a practical form of the officers concerned is, *pro tanto*, a gain to the country. I do not think it goes much beyond that.

6042. Mr. C. Denison.] Besides the sense of inconvenience and loss of efficiency in the organisation of the force, was there not also some feeling of wounded dignity on the part of the Government of India in finding their high authority made subordinate to that of Bombay for the purposes of this Expedition?—I think that the Government of India may be said to be above such a feeling as that.

6043. You were, before being Commander in Chief in India, also Commander in Chief in Bombay, and a general officer also in the Bengal Presidency, were you not?—Yes.

6044. And Lord Napier was also a general officer in the Bengal Presidency, as well as a military member of the Government of India, I believe?—Yes.

6045. Therefore the Committee may assume, that in any recommendation which either of you as officers of high rank gave, there would be no prejudice in favour of one army over the other?—I should say so, certainly.

6046. But it is a fact, is it not, that in the three armies of India there is a certain amount of professional emulation and rivalry, I will not call it jealousy, which crops out on occasions when they come to take the field together?—Yes, I should say that it does not crop out, when they come to take the field together, because I think that the comradeship of the field, gets over all such miserable feelings; but it is seen in a very marked manner, between the several Presidencies of India in time of peace.

6047. You were in favour, were you not of the Expedition being composed of brigades or corps from each of the three armies?—I was in favour of a larger portion coming from the army of Bengal, because, I was so very uncertain as to what might be the nature of the opposition which Lord Napier might have to meet; before the thing was settled, I wrote privately to him to remind him of the more warlike qualities possessed by the northern tribes, who fill our Bengal regiments since 1857; and we were so ignorant of Abyssinia, and with regard to what I mentioned affecting Mr. Rassam's first opinions, that it appeared to me to be extremely dangerous to trust for warlike operations in a mountainous country, to men who were recruited in Southern India; I am well acquainted with one of the armies of Southern India, and I know the officers of it very well, and I also know the regiments; and nothing can exceed the high discipline of that army; but it appeared to me, that a commander undertaking a business of that sort, not knowing what might be the combative qualities of the enemy whom he was about to meet, should take care in justice to himself and to this country, to have the best constituents that

he could lay his hands upon in the force to be engaged; and that was the proposition which I placed before Lord Napier.

6048. Had that plan been adopted the nomination and appointment of the superior staff officers would have rested in a very much larger measure with yourself as Commander in Chief, would they not?—As I have explained before, I think there was a certain sacrifice of precaution. As things turned out, it has all answered extremely well; but I think there was a sacrifice of precaution in the Government in India not exercising that general supervision, and control and nomination, which had always belonged to it on previous occasions. As things have turned out, no harm has ensued; but it did appear to me at that time, and I still hold the opinion that this country would have had a greater security if the old plan had been adhered to.

6049. I do not wish to ask you any question which would bring you in conflict with Lord Napier; but he told the Committee that he attached very great importance to having a homogeneous force composed of one army, with the staff officers dependent upon himself for their appointments; do you think that there was not a good deal of weight in that?—I have read that opinion of Lord Napier's but I do not attach the same importance to it. During my Indian career, I have been associated with the forces belonging to the different armies in the same force. I have seen them together, or at other times I have heard of their doings together, in campaigns in which I have not had a part; and that difficulty which was assumed to be possible, owing to the force not being homogeneous, I must say I have never seen come out in service, and all I can say is, that if such a difficulty were to show itself, I think that anybody who had the character which Lord Napier is known to possess, would have put it down.

6050. You do not think that there was much in the suggestion that the Native infantry regiments being composed of different tribes and classes, might not have amalgamated so well in service across the ocean?—I think not; the only question about the Native force is whether the men who had actually to meet the enemy were physically equal to the duty; and I think that if Lord Napier had had to meet Kaffirs instead of Abyssinians, he might have found that the men recruited in Southern India would not have been able to do it; I do not mean to say that they would not have been, but I think it is just possible that he might have found that they were physically unequal to the duty.

6051. With regard to the Transport Corps: you are cognizant of all those proceedings, as you have told the Committee; and no doubt you remember a letter of Colonel Phayre's, dated the 22nd of August 1867, on the subject of the organization of the Transport Corps?—Yes.

6052. The second, third, and fourth paragraphs of that letter I will take the liberty of reading to you: "I am careful to note this distinction between home arrangements in peace, and those for foreign service in an enemy's country, because, in the latter case, combination of transport under one head, and its administration under one uniform system, are indispensable. It is requisite therefore to bear in mind that all the proposals which may now or hereafter be made with regard to the Land Transport Corps for Abyssinia, have sole reference to its existence as part of the army destined

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destined to carry out military operations in that country. Thus, any arrangements for purchasing and collecting cattle or equipments, that may now be resorted to as a matter of economy, and indeed of necessity in India, will not be held as binding in Abyssinia, where the officers, men, and cattle, of the proposed corps will be under the same rules of discipline and organization as apply to our artillery and other mounted corps. Each brigade of the force will have its transport attached, of the kind and quantity suited to its wants, and each section of the Commissariat Department in Abyssinia will be similarly provided for as circumstances at the time being may require; but the relation of the Land Transport Corps to regiments and departments will be similar to that of any other department of supply belonging to the force; the employment of its resources being subject to the orders of the officer in chief command conveyed through his Quartermaster General." Does not that meet the suggestion which you made with regard to the commissariat of the Bengal Army, and although each corps or each brigade might not, at the moment of its quitting the shores of India, have its separate transport assigned to it, yet at the moment of landing in Abyssinia, would it not have its separate transport?—The question is whether those orders were carried out, and upon that I cannot give an opinion. There is an important point to which I should like to draw attention, because it really is the great difficulty which has existed between Lord Napier and the Government of Bombay, and that is, that in that very sentence it is laid down that those transport trains and so on were to be under the Quartermaster General, involving much additional administrative staff, instead of under the Department of Supply. That, I take it, was the exact point of difference which existed between the Government of Bombay and Lord Napier. My view was that the Department of Supply, the department of the Commissary General, quite irrespective of the Quartermaster General, that is to say, of another department which had had hitherto nothing to say to the provision of transport trains, should supply the corps and other departments with their trains, and that then those corps and departments should take care of themselves, without a great central authority to come between them again and the Department of Supply.

6053. Should you regard the scheme of land transport as actually sanctioned in pursuance of the orders of Government given on the 12th of September, as in accordance with the views of Lord Napier, or with those of the Civil Government, except in so far as Lord Napier accepted the view that the transport should be under the Commissary Department?—It appears to me that Lord Napier's views were fairly carried out. That is the impression left on my mind by the papers.

6054. Looking to the extent to which Lord Napier's views were adopted in this scheme as first sanctioned, do you think that the delay to the 7th of October in making the last modification could so far have hindered the general organisation of the train as to have appreciably delayed the progress of the Expedition in Abyssinia?—That includes many considerations. It would be impossible to say that any particular condition delayed the progress of the Expedition. I rather think that Lord Napier did not arrive in Abyssinia until long after that date; and

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there are various other matters, such as the arrival of particular descriptions of troops, munitions of war, and so forth, on the coast. I am not in a position to say whether any one condition affecting the force delayed its progress more than another. All that I can say, as a man of some experience in these matters, is that the Expedition went forward in a very rapid manner, and whatever may have been the difficulties, or the expense, or the disappointments, with regard to the ultimate gross expenditure, the business itself went forward very rapidly.

6055. Therefore the Committee may assume that the discussion of the merits of the scheme did not really cause any appreciable delay?—I think not.

6056. You say that you carry this in your memory; do you recognise the views expressed in Colonel Phayre's letter as those which had been submitted by him to Lord Elphinstone's Government, and after much consideration rejected?—I think that in the first part of my evidence I referred to that as the very paper from which I dissented, as Commander in Chief at Bombay.

6057. With reference to the Bengal transport, would not the separate apportionment of field transport to each regiment or corps lead to complication in matters of ocean transport, since, for instance, ships fitted up for troops are very rarely fitted up to convey large numbers of baggage animals?—We so arranged with that particular brigade (which was not a large force) that they should take all their transport animals with them. Of course, if it had been a very much larger force there might have been a difficulty about that, but even then it would have been better to have made the division, and to have detailed the transport just the same as we detailed regiments before the start, and to leave as little as possible as regards the process of organisation to be done after a very difficult coast was reached. I take it that the first principle of military organisation is that everything of that sort, so far as you can calculate it, ought to take place before you enter the enemy's country. Everything, so far as you can possibly arrange by human foresight and execution, should be preliminary to your arrival, and not after you come to the country, where you have plenty of other difficulties to meet.

6058. I think you expressed your approbation of the general excellence of the Panjáb mule transport?—I do not think that I have given any opinion about it. The truth is, that the Panjáb train shows how very amenable to discipline, and how docile the Indian population is. This so-called train really consisted of a certain number of mules, hundreds or thousands, or whatever it may have been, to which were attached, I think, two officers, and those officers marched from the Panjáb to Karáchi, a distance of some 1,000 or 1,200 miles, and during this journey they made themselves acquainted, so far as I am able to learn, with the head men, and so on; and that was all the organisation. It was just gathered as they went along. There was a minimum of European superintendence, as we call it, but it was just done by a couple of experienced men bringing their knowledge of the natives to bear, and treating them well on their journey down. This, which was called an organisation, when it reached Abyssinia was simply the most natural process which can be conceived.

6059. Was that organisation in accordance with the views of the civil Government, or of the military Government of Bombay?—We were requested

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requested by the Bombay Government to send as many mules as we could get hold of; and as they were purchased they were forwarded on in this manner, and this organisation sprang up of itself, so far as I have ever been able to learn.

6060. Mr. *Eastwick*.] I think you stated that it is possible that it may have been in the mind of Sir Robert Napier that supplies would be necessary for reinforcements coming from India. Lord Napier has put in a letter, of which I will just read these lines: "So convinced is the Governor General in Council of the necessity to throw a fresh force into Abyssinia," and so on. That would show, would it not, that it was in his mind?—What was really done was this: we considered in India that it was impossible to say when the object of this Expedition would be achieved; and that at the same time we had to consider that we had parted with a considerable body of men from different parts of the country. We are always liable to be called upon to meet hostile tribes in different parts of our very extended frontier. This being so, with regard to the expediency of having some sort of reserve in hand, if more men were required for Abyssinia, and also with regard to being able to meet what might possibly happen within our own responsibility, the Governor General of India ordered the regiments of the native armies of Bombay and Bengal to be increased, up to the same amount as the regiments which had proceeded to Abyssinia.

6061. I quite understand that, but Lord Napier having quoted the letter in which the throwing of a fresh force into Abyssinia is spoken of, would not that imply that he had before his mind the prospect or the probability, or the possibility, of the force being required?—He may have had it before his mind, but I could conceive nobody undertaking an expedition involving such uncertainty as piercing an unknown country for 300 or 400 miles, in which at any time a hostile tribe might have impeded his communications, without taking into his calculations the possible contingency of a disappointment.

6062. Supposing Theodore to have moved out from Magdala, and to have gone to some other part of the country, might it not have been necessary to have established a new series of depôts, and in that case would not this superabundance of supplies have come in very advantageously? That would have depended, of course, upon the nature of the supplies. If it was hay, which was down on the coast, it would have been quite useless 300 miles from the coast. On the other hand, all the ordnance and medical stores, and so on, would have been of course of the greatest service.

6063. With regard to the hay; I believe it has been stated that although there was grass in the highlands, yet that the villagers repeatedly burned large tracts of grass on the advance of our troops, so that there was a danger of losing supplies in that way?—Yes; but still I think we must be aware that it is impossible to carry hay for the consumption of an army, unless the cavalry be very small indeed; unless you had a railway extending over the whole length of the advance, you could not possibly, I should imagine, convey such very bulky stores as hay for the use of an advancing force.

6064. But the carts conveyed 336 lbs., and the animals which drew the carts ate 40 lbs., I think, in getting up to Senafé; I am not quite

sure as to the exact amount, but, at all events, there was a very large proportion of the supplies over in the cart, so that even hay might have been brought up by cart, and there would have been the grain for the animal?—Senafé was only the first station; I think Senafé is about 60 or 70 miles from the coast; and from the commencement of the question we must assume that the head of the expeditionary force, that is to say, the bulk of it, must have been close to Magdala, or upwards of 200 miles beyond Senafé.

6065. But in the case of a disaster, the troops would probably have retreated upon Senafé, would they not?—That of course would have been a matter of discretion for the commander of the forces; the chances are that they would have had to get nearer to their base at the sea; but that again would have depended a great deal upon what he found in the country; the difficulties presented by the mountain ranges and the rivers. So far as I can gather, the people at Senafé would have been almost shut off from the sea during the heavy rains.

6066. With regard to the Bengal troops, simply having reference to economy, would it not have been rather economical had not the whole force been sent from the Bombay army, Madras or Bengal troops being in that case pushed in to supply their places?—I do not think it makes any difference, because the men draw the same pay wherever they are; and certainly the difference, if it is a difference, would be almost infinitesimal, because the long marches in India had to be made by men who had to go from one part of India to another to take the place of the Bombay troops at their stations; some took posts in certain Bombay stations in central India, others again came from Madras and occupied Poonah and Belgau, and so on; but I do not think that there is any appreciable difference to be found in that.

6067. Might I ask if you recollect when the Bengal Brigade and the Panjáb Pioneers returned to their stations from the Expedition?—The infantry got back to the Panjáb, I think, about the month of July or August. We actually used one of those regiments very shortly afterwards in support of the Hazára business. Those were the two infantry regiments, and the cavalry were unhorsed, and they remained in the Bombay Presidency, I think, until the autumn.

6068. Was that until October?—Until October or November, or somewhere about that time.

6069. There was a Chinese cooly corps, was there not, which did good service at the forts at Pekin?—Yes; I was not there, but I believe there was a cooly corps organised there. That was organised among the Chinamen themselves.

6070. Do you think that a similar force could have been organised at Bombay?—I should think it might have been.

6071. Could you have got sufficient men for the purpose in the Bombay Presidency?—I should think that we should have gone to Bengal, because you can get labour so much cheaper in Bengal, and you can get bigger men.

6072. Do you think that you could have organised a corps of 3,000 coolies?—It might have been done, though it would have required a little time. In Bombay itself, it would have been extremely expensive, I should think, and not very satisfactory in the end, because the population of Bombay get such very high wages.

6073. I suppose that a regularly organised transport corps would be armed so that in a country

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country like Abyssinia, where the natives were not very formidable, that would do away with the duty of escorts?—I do not think that you should unite the two things. I think that the fighting should all be done by soldiers. If your muleteers are to have to fight their way, I think you will have very unsatisfactory results. It is very useful for them to have a sword by their side, as I believe they had to protect themselves against robbers and so on in the defiles, but that they should exercise anything like military action, I think would be a very dangerous precedent.

6074. I think a question has been put as to the comparative loss in the transport in different expeditions; I do not know whether you were in the first expedition to Kabul under Sir John Keane?—I was not.

6075. Are you aware of the losses of camels there?—No; I know that there was a very heavy loss, of course.

6076. In that case there was a regularly organised army from Bombay, was there not, and the Bombay commander took command of the whole army?—Yes; he took the command of the whole army when the whole of the forces got together.

6077. Lord *Elcho*.] What is the exact position of the Commander in Chief in the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras in relation to the Commander in Chief in India; is it the same relative position as a General at Aldershot or the Curragh bears to the Commander in Chief in this country?—The position is this: the Commander in Chief in India is a real Commander in Chief as regards Her Majesty's British forces. He also confirms the courts martial which may cashier officers in the minor Presidencies, but he does not confirm other general courts martial in the minor Presidencies, where there is a less punishment than cashiering inflicted. This affects all the British officers of the local army as well as the British regiments of the British army. On the other hand, as regards the local forces and the relations to the Governments of Bombay and Madras, the officers respectively commanding the forces in Bombay and Madras are real Commanders in Chief, and they in no way report to the Commander in Chief in India.

6078. By whom are the staff appointments in those Presidencies, as a rule, made?—The staff appointments in the minor Presidencies are made by the respective governments at the recommendations of the respective Commanders in Chief.

6079. In your evidence you have spoken of precedent, that precedent being that in India expeditions were organised through the officer holding your position of Commander in Chief of the whole army. The expedition to Sindh under Sir Charles Napier was a Bombay expedition, was it not?—That was a Bombay expedition.

6080. By whom was that organised?—I take it that that was entirely ordered by Lord Ellenborough. I speak under correction, because it is such a very long time ago, but I think the Blue Books will show that the correspondence was direct between Sir Charles Napier and Lord Ellenborough. The Governor of Bombay of that day, Sir George Arthur, not having anything to say to that.

6081. Who was Commander in Chief in India at that time?—Sir Jasper Nichols, I think; it was before Lord Gough's time, I believe.

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6082. Were the troops drawn entirely from the Bombay Presidency?—I think that the troops were drawn entirely from the Bombay Presidency; they were a very small body at that time in Sindh; it was only after Sindh was annexed, to the best of my belief, that the force was much developed in Sindh; in the actual campaign of Meeanee, I do not think that Sir Charles Napier had more than 4,000 men under him.

6083. Sir *P. O'Brien*.] Only one British regiment?—Only one British regiment.

6084. Lord *Elcho*.] Although that Expedition was organised by Lord Ellenborough, and although Sir Charles Napier, as you say, corresponded directly with Lord Ellenborough, are you aware whether the military portion of the organisation was left to Sir Charles Napier, or whether Sir Jasper Nichols had the control of it, assuming Sir Jasper Nichols to have been the Commander in Chief then?—That would not have been under Sir Jasper Nichols, because Sir Charles Napier would have been there operating merely as a Major General on the establishment of the Bombay Army; that was his position at that time, and therefore except through the channel of the Government of India, or unless the Commander in Chief in India was especially asked by Lord Ellenborough for his opinions, the matter would not have travelled to him; Sir Charles Napier must have been detached to Sindh as a Major General on the Bombay establishment, and it was not anticipated I believe when he first went there that it would be anything but a peaceful occupation.

6085. Is there any precedent except this (if it is at all analogous to the case of the Abyssinian Expedition) for an expedition organised in one of the presidencies, irrespectively of Bengal?—The Persian Expedition must have sailed from Bombay; Sir James Outram was put in command of it, and the chief of the staff was sent round by the Government of India to serve under Sir James Outram, and that chief of the staff was Sir Edward Lugard; as to how that Expedition was formed, I really do not know, but it must have sailed, I presume, under the orders of the Government of India. The Bombay Government I presume executed the orders of the Government of India, but that is an assumption, because I have no real knowledge of the facts.

6086. Mr. *White*.] The China Expedition was conducted in the same way, I suppose?—The last China Expedition started from the three presidency towns, to the best of my recollection. One portion of it sailed from Calcutta, another portion from Madras, and a third from Bombay, the general orders being given by the Government of India, and the details being worked out under their orders by the subordinate administrations.

6087. Lord *Elcho*.] In the case of Sir James Outram and the Expedition to Persia, and in the case of the Expeditions to China, by whom were the appointments on the general staff made?—I do not know anything about the Persian Expedition; in the China Expedition the staff appointments were suggested by Lord Clyde for the most part, and generally approved afterwards from England; but some of them were disapproved from England as being more than was required; but they were generally arranged by Lord Clyde, and then approved at home.

6088. To what extent had the General in command

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command of the Expedition a voice in those appointments?—I do not suppose that he had any voice at all in the great staff appointments, such as the command of the divisions and the posts of Adjutant General and Quartermaster General, and Inspector General of Hospitals, and so on. Probably, although I cannot fix my memory with it, the inferior posts of Assistant Adjutant General and Brigade Major, and the like, were left to him when he had got his force together. That is generally the courtesy which is exercised in such matters.

6089. You have stated that the strength of the regiments at the time the Expedition was ordered was on a peace footing of 600 men, and that you considered that insufficient; what, on an average in India, taking the strength of a regiment at 600, is the number of men fit for duty in time of peace?—I should say about 550 when the men are not on furlough.

6090. Is that including sickness?—That is including sickness, but also including recruits, because the recruits are not in excess of that number, and it may happen that there are very few recruits in a battalion.

6091. Then you would consider, and indeed you did consider, that an addition to the strength of the regiments was absolutely essential, considering the nature of the service and the nature of the climate?—I think so.

6092. Was it not probable that the wear and tear, if there had been much fighting, or any delay in the Expedition, would have been very great?—Yes.

6093. With regard to the system of regimental transport to which you have referred, of course you would necessarily give the artillery their own transport?—I should give to every battery of artillery its own animals, just the same as I should give to a regiment. Then the ordnance parks would have their trains under themselves; and, according to the principles which I advocate in this matter, every corps, or department, of whatever kind, should have not only the charge, but the absolute responsibility for these animals and drivers committed to their keeping, just as in the case of horses of the cavalry regiments.

6094. The system which you propose is something equivalent to the system in France, is it not?—I have been so long away from Europe that I cannot speak to the system in France; but I believe that I am correct in saying that it is exactly the system which was pursued by General Crawford in the Peninsula. I have very often conversed about these things with my late lamented commander, Lord Clyde, and when I speak of my opinions they are based upon his opinions, which were formed in the Peninsula. Nothing that I have done in India has any originality in it. It is simply working out his views, which I have heard Lord Clyde dilate upon very often, and which have been generally successful, as I believe; and he always used to go back to the famous light brigade of the Peninsula as the most successful of all with this particular organization as regards baggage. I put the question to him when I met him in the Crimea, as to what was the reason of the change which I observed going on there, and how it was that those views which I had heard from his lips so often were not carried out. His answer was, "We did carry it out in Bulgaria, but we were ordered to leave our animals behind us, and from that time we got into a fixed position, and, perhaps, a different

system was required." In my answer I merely mention that to show the source of these ideas.

6095. In Bulgaria they were organising this system, but when they landed in the Crimea they were without any transport at all, were they not?—They landed in the Crimea without any transport at all, as it was, and they got into a fixed position at Balaklava.

6096. The English system of transport hitherto has been organised by the Commissariat, has it not?—I really cannot say, for I have so very little practical knowledge of the English system; but I believe that it has been under the Commissariat generally.

6097. Has not the system gone upon this principle, that the transport was, after an expedition landed, mainly looked for in the country itself?—That, of course, would depend upon the country; in a civilised country you can find transport and in an uncivilised country you cannot.

6098. Then, would you apply your system only to uncivilised countries, or in landing, say, in Belgium, would you land an expedition with all its transport complete?—There, again, you see we get into very different conditions of warfare; if we landed in Belgium, the chances are that we should at once seize the railways, and we should, quite irrespective of individual convenience, throw whatever force we had, by means of railways or by means of wheeled conveyance, upon the point which we wanted to attack; and then we should trust to the bivouac, and to such means as we had for feeding the army. That is quite a different problem from landing on a coast where they were entirely without those means of locomotion which have, to a very great extent, affected the art of war. Directly you get into an uncivilised country, such as Spain used to be described (and when I say "an uncivilised country," that is not a proper expression; but I mean a country in which you have not those means of locomotion which you have in a very rich country, such as England or Belgium), then you are thrown on an organisation of that sort. There is the old story which came down from Lord Peterborough, about a large army starving and a weak one being beaten in Spain, and so on. That is because you have not got the roads which you have in civilized countries, but if you have them, then you must arrange your transport according to what you find.

6099. I imagine from what you have stated, that you do not think it probable that a system of transport and supply would work well, which has the supply of all descriptions of munitions and provisions for an army, both as regards the artillery, and for the ordinary consumption of such an army, one person alone being responsible for it?—That of course would have to be taken with very great caution; my own view is that as far as possible, you should separate the charge, and that wherever charge is involved, you should not, if you can help it, throw it upon a great central department. I believe that it was the attempt to throw all this upon one department in the Crimea, which led to the enormous expenditure which took place, and about which I believe no account has ever yet been settled. This principle I think we must always look to; that if you divide the charge amongst the separate corps and departments which are to use the stores or the animals, as the case may be, you have in ordinary human motives the greatest chance of care being taken of them; but if you divest those corps or departments

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departments of responsibility in these matters, and say that a great central department is responsible, then those corps and departments will not do anything in the matter. It is like a corporation, and nobody is responsible.

6100. Speaking of the Expedition generally, I think you have stated that you considered that the affair was extremely well done upon the whole, and that you would not have thought it wise to undertake such an expedition with a smaller force than that with which it was undertaken; is that your opinion?—Yes, that is my opinion. With regard to the grass having been burnt, to which reference has been made, I have no doubt that that is a fact which is perfectly well *constaté*; but at the same time, that fact would not justify attempting to carry a very bulky thing like hay 200 or 300 miles. I have no doubt that it is better to have rather a superfluity of stores than not; but the point put to me has been whether, supposing that the supply when the troops embarked was found to be more than they could have consumed in three years, that was unreasonable or not. All that I can venture to give in the way of evidence as to that, is that on such a statement of facts that result, seems to me unreasonable, and I beg particularly not to be understood to say more than that.

6101. Mr. C. Denison.] I think you implied an opinion that the transport organisation which you would recommend, and which was, in fact, adopted in respect to the portion sent from the Bengal Presidency, was rather like what was proposed by the Bombay Government than what was proposed by Lord Napier, excepting the regimental distribution, which was a point not entertained by either of those authorities in the discussion; was that the precise opinion which you intended to convey to the Committee?—I do not think that the Bombay Government went into the point which I have urged with regard to what I have called the regimental organisation of the transport; and when I call it "regimental," it really affects departments as well as regiments; what I wished to allude to was that the point of difference between the Bombay Government and Lord Napier was, whether the old mode of supply, that is to say, the old mode of affording the means of transport should be followed, that is by using a commissariat or supply department, or whether a new department should be called into existence under the Quartermaster General, which should stand between the supply department, and the people who were to use the animals. The Bombay Government, as I think, very judiciously, quite apart from any question of the best mode of organisation, gave an opinion that they considered that the moment of organising an expedition for active service was not the exact time to make a great change of that sort; that appeared to me to be reasonable; that position was put before Lord Napier, and when he was made aware of the opinions of the Bombay Government, and also of the discussion which had taken place in 1860, to which I have alluded, when the Bombay Government had determined in consequence, I believe, of opinions gained from various military officers, that Colonel Phayre's proposals were not expedient, he said that he would not have proposed his scheme to the Government if he had been aware of the previous discussion and resolution.

6102. Sir J. Elphinstone.] Sir Robert Napier made a requisition on February 13th for eight or 0.46.

nine months' supplies; do you think that that was a larger supply than, under the circumstances of the case, it was prudent for him to anticipate, might have been required, taking all the contingencies of the campaign into consideration?—It seems a large supply; I can only suppose that Lord Napier, or rather his Commissariat officer, committed himself to a requisition of that amount, because of the anticipation of rough weather and so on, when it would have been impossible to have supplemented supplies perhaps for several months in consequence of the south-west monsoon. I should imagine that was the reason.

6103. I have before me a letter from the Deputy Commissary General at Zulla, to the Commissary General at Bombay, dated the 3rd February, in which I find the following passage: "Adverting to the statement compiled in the Executive Commissariat Office, on the 15th December last, of provisions under preparation for the Abyssinian Field Expedition, I have the honor to inform you that as yet I have only intimation of two months of the ~~six~~ months reserved for public and private followers' cattle of the transport train, &c., having been ordered, and as the forage and grain is arriving so very slowly, it will not be possible for the Bombay Commissariat to complete the shipment of the full six months' supply of forage prior to the close of the fair season"; does not that show that the Bombay Government anticipated some difficulty in getting it on before the fair season concluded; the point which I wish to make being that in consequence of the monsoon it was now necessary to have that accumulation of stores?—I see that in this paper Lord Napier anticipates that grass will be procurable from the country for the cattle transport in the Highlands.

6104. He anticipates the difficulties if the supplies do not come forward during the fair weather of getting the supplies on during the south west monsoon?—Yes, I think so.

6105. Seeing that the troops arrived in Abyssinia from one direction, and the bulk of the animals from the other, was it not impossible that the organisation to which you have pointed could take place until the troops met the animals in Abyssinia?—I think that what I said was, that so far as it was possible it would have been well for this organisation to have taken place; I think I guarded myself as to that.

6106. It is a fact, is it not, that the transport train which went on from India, (I mean the Panjáb transport and the transport under Captain Griffiths), which was in point of fact but a small portion of the general transport, numerically speaking, never broke down, but was always in good order, while the temporary break down, as I understand it, was in the animals which were accumulated from the Egyptian quarter?—Yes.

6107. Colonel Barttelot.] I think you are aware that Lord Napier was anxious to have an increase of regiments, but not an increase of the number of men in each regiment?—No.

6108. He preferred the smaller regiments, with a full complement of officers, as being, as he said, more elastic than the larger number of men and a smaller number of regiments; but your opinion is that a larger number of men and a smaller number of regiments would be more effective in time of war?—It is really a question of economy. If you say that you have 5,000 men who are organised, we will say in five regiments,

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ments, and you have the same 5,000 men organised in 10 regiments; then you have the difference of the establishments of five regiments in excess, those establishments including that which in an Indian army, that is to say, the Native army of India, is the most expensive part of it, viz.: the European officers and the Native officers. My own opinion is, that 1,000 men for Native troops is rather unwieldy with regard to the number of British officers; but I think that the war complement should never be less than 800. In that way a very small "rule of three" sum shows, that in a given number of regiments we save so many establishments, and that, when you come to operate with large armies, makes a very considerable difference, and so thoroughly is that recognised in Europe that the unit has been always considered the battalion of 1,000 men at starting.

6109. Then, as I understand you, you think that a European regiment should be 1,000 strong?—If I were beginning a campaign to-morrow, as a colonel of a regiment I should not like to begin it with less than 1,000 men, because, if you are meeting a difficult enemy, and in a country in which there is a great deal of hardship to undergo, your waste is so great, that if you begin with a less number your regiment sinks to nothing.

6110. Are you aware that the regiments at home are now 500 strong?—I am aware of that.

6111. Should you, as an experienced officer, like to have regiments to take out to active service with you which were only 500 strong of old soldiers and 500 raw recruits, making up your 1,000?—That depends upon what "raw" means. If those recruits had gone through a three months' instruction, and knew the use of their arms and so on, I should not mind beginning with a battalion composed in that way. It would be rather a dangerous thing to take men actually from the plough; but even that, as we know from the great campaigns of Napoleon, has been done not without success. It depends a great deal upon what the commander is able to do, and how he nurses his young troops; in fact, there are a hundred conditions, such as leaving the young troops in the rear and bringing up the old ones, and so on, all of which forms a part of the A B C of the profession, which is very long to detail; but I do not think that a battalion would be at all badly formed which had 500 thoroughly instructed soldiers and 500 young ones.

6112. When I said "raw recruits," I meant men who had either enlisted for a very short time or had come from the militia?—I think that would be very safe.

6113. With regard to men from this country in India, how long do you think that a private, either in the cavalry or in the infantry keeps up his strength and activity as a soldier under an Indian climate?—In the old days of long service in India I paid particular attention to the way in which the regiment which I commanded for a long time in India was affected. Those were days when the service was of 21 years' duration, and when discharge was not nearly so easily obtained by the soldier as it is now. Desertion is a thing which is beginning to be a crime in India now, but in those days it was not known. From such data as I could collect, with regard to my own regiment, I found that it had actually

changed in eight years, that change resulting from the facts of death, discharge by purchase, invaliding, and those who had completed their service and could claim their pensions.

6114. What do you think was the average service of each of the men of your regiment?—The average would, according to that, have come to about eight years; but that included, besides invaliding and death, a considerable number who were discharged by purchase, and a certain number transferred to other regiments, and so on.

6114*. I wish to ask you one question with regard to any future expedition which might be organised in India. From your experience of the different Governments of India you are, I think, of opinion that the organisation should be from each one of the Presidencies; that is to say, that if you were going to send an expedition to China you would organise part in Bombay, part in Madras, and part in Calcutta?—Yes, if all the conditions with regard to the several Presidencies are authoritatively laid down by the one superintending authority of the Government of India.

6115. And you are strongly of opinion that the Governor General of India, with his commander in chief, should be that authority?—Yes.

6116. And that it should not be relegated to any one of the Presidencies?—I am clearly of that opinion; and, perhaps, I should supplement my answer by adverting to a condition which has affected this Expedition, and which distinguishes it from all other expeditions; and, perhaps, I might say, from all other warlike operations in which not only India but England was ever concerned. The distinction is this: In the case of former expeditions, you had in England either a Colonial Department or a War Department carrying on the war and controlled by the Treasury, that is by the House of Commons. In India you had a war carried on by the Government of India and controlled by the Home Authority; and the Government of India which carried on the war was at the same time the authority which had to raise the ways and means, and which therefore had the greatest possible inducement to economy. On this occasion, on the contrary, the ways and means had to be found by the Treasury at home. The chief authority with regard to the organisation of the Expedition was relegated to a Provincial Government. The Government of India, which had had the practice of exercising a sort of imperial authority in delegation from the Home Government, no longer exercised that authority, and therefore could not possibly, whether there was extravagance or not, check such extravagance or exercise that sort of supervision or control without which any management must be vicious, and must lead to great disappointment hereafter. That is the point which, I think, distinguishes this Abyssinian question from all others in which any British Government or any Indian Government has ever had a share.

6117. I presume that the Government at home thought that the Expedition would be less expensively carried on if the troops came as far as possible from Bombay?—That was a perfectly legitimate conclusion to arrive at, and there is a great deal to be said in favour of it. I do not myself think, as I said before, that there was any difference to be found which was not of a very great

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infinitesimal character as regards expense from whatever part India the troops might be drawn. It appeared to me, in the advice which I ventured to tender to Lord Napier, that the question was not a little point of expense on that account, but rather whether they were the troops who could be best trusted to meet an enemy under conditions of which we were ignorant. The question of expense was a different one, and the conclusion as to where the troops were to be drawn from was not affected by it; but wherever they were drawn from, the control and the criticism of the Government of India with regard to all arrangements involving expenditure should never have been lost sight of.

6118. Can you specify any particular instances where you think expense could have been saved, supposing that the Government of India had had the supervision?—I am not in a position to say anything with authority in that matter, because we remained really in such ignorance of all the arrangements, with the exception of arranging that little Bengal Brigade, and of my being aware that certain requisitions came to the Commissariat Department from Bombay to assist them. I probably knew more at the time, but the thing has very much faded from my memory, and whatever I might say would be very inexact; but I should think that the point where expense might have been saved would have been in the sea transport. I imagine that there was a certain rivalry, that is to say, that the different departments in the service of the Government were bidding as it were against one another. I do not know that that was the case, but I think it was very likely to have been the case, because I have seen the same thing occur half-a-dozen times before. There is no doubt that the charges on account of the sea transport were very large indeed; and I take it that they were just as much open to hostile analysis as those of the Land Transport, and perhaps even more so; but I think that the facts are impossible to get at.

6119. But looking at the position of the Government of Bombay at that moment, do you think that they could have taken up their transport cheaper than they did?—I should think not. My own recollection of the Government of Bombay, of which I was a member for a long time before I went up to Calcutta, convinces me that no precaution which could have been taken by the departments would have been omitted; and I think that we may fairly assume that no such precaution was omitted.

6120. But the Government of India being in a superior position, having the key, as it were, of the different positions where the transport could be procured, were likely to obtain it more cheaply than the Government of one Presidency asking the two other Presidencies for assistance; is that your view?—That is exactly what I meant. They were more likely to do it, and they had a better chance of doing it.

6121. The Honourable Chairman in putting a question to you, asked whether you would not consider it a matter of imprudence on the part of the Government not to make a calculation of three, or four, or five millions more (put it at whatever sum you please) than they absolutely knew that they would be obliged to expend; I will put the question to you in this sort of way; that might be an error in judgment, but it would

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have been very unwise, would it not, to have come down to the House of Commons, and to have said, we shall certainly spend three or four millions, but probably we shall spend eight or nine millions; do you think that a Government could have made such a statement to the House of Commons?—That is hardly a question for a military man to answer.

6122. *Chairman.*] In speaking of what you think may have been excessive expenditure on sea transport, do you refer to the prices paid or to the amount of tonnage employed?—I should probably say both; but, as I tell you, it is a pure assumption; I have no facts to go upon. I think that if the thing had had to be arranged by one central and, at the same time, controlling authority, perhaps some of the excess of stores which occurred at Zulla, as apart from the hay question, might not have taken place; for instance, if it had been under the Government of India, I myself should have been quite ready as Commander in Chief in India to have said to the Government—If you will put the means at my disposal I will insure the presence of a reserve of stores for that army as well as of a reserve of men if the means are ready when such reserves will be required. But since Lord Napier was in practice made personally responsible for all those matters, I really do not see how he could pursue any other course than he did. If you say to a military commander, You are to have the entire responsibility of this matter, that military commander is justified in saying, If I am to have the entire and sole responsibility, I must guard myself in every possible manner.

6123. Do you think that that responsibility should have been placed on the Government of India?—If that responsibility had been placed on the Government of India, then we should have been able to say to Lord Napier, You say that so-and-so is necessary; a very large expenditure is required to heap up those depôts of stores; we do not exactly know how long this affair is going to last, but at all events, do not be in alarm about it; we are responsible if you run short. I do not say that economy would have ensued in that way, but it might have ensued.

6124. You have talked of the difficulty of getting stores from Bombay to Abyssinia during the south-west monsoon; are you aware that the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamers run constantly against the south-west monsoon once a week?—I am.

6125. Are you aware that the Bombay and Bengal Company and the British India Company also run vessels to Suez, or, at any rate, that steamers are running constantly all the year round, with great regularity?—Yes.

6126. Are you also aware that the Government of Bombay had those very steamers chartered for the uses of the Expedition?—I know that there were a great many ships waiting in Zulla Bay, but I do not know much more than that.

6127. The steamers which were running for mercantile purposes against the south-west monsoon would have been able to run for the purposes of this Expedition under the same circumstances, would they not?—Yes.

6128. You spoke of the expense of engaging followers in Bombay, I think, and you said that men procurable in Bombay would be expensive men; do you think that the mere personal pay to men of that kind, if you can get efficiency,

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keeping in view the enormous expense with which they were planted in Abyssinia, is of the slightest moment?—I do not think it is of much consequence; it is a long time since I have been in Bombay, but when I was there, labour was of very great value indeed, and to induce men to go at all, they must be paid much more highly than they are in their own country.

6129. Efficiency in Abyssinia was worth nearly anything, was it not?—It was worth nearly anything; the great thing to ensure was certainty, and getting the Expedition out of Abyssinia as soon as possible.

6130. You spoke also, I think, of the expense

of constructing a railway as being a hindrance to its construction; but would not the expense of a railway be more than compensated for by the saving in the cost of animal transport?—I should think that that would depend a good deal upon the means that were really at hand in the shape of animal transport.

6131. Are you aware that we were very much pressed throughout the whole campaign for want of animal transport?—Yes; it would also depend upon the number of miles of rail which they were able to lay down.

6132. At all events there would be a saving, would there not?—There would be a saving.

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MEMBERS PRESENT.

Colonel Barttelot.
 Captain Beaumont.
 Mr. Candlish.
 Mr. Eastwick.
 Lord Elcho.

Sir James Elphinstone.
 Sir John Hay.
 Sir Stafford Northcote.
 Mr. Seely.
 Mr. Charles Turner.

JOHN CANDLISH, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

The Right Honourable SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE, Bart., a Member of the Committee;
 further Examined.

6133. *Chairman.*] AT the last meeting of the Committee you were asked when you first knew of the increase of the force from 12,000 to 15,000, the number ultimately sent, and in the absence of your memoranda you were unable to answer the question; have you since looked to the facts? —I see that I must have known it somewhere about the middle of November 1867, for I have here a memorandum by General Jameson, the gist of which is as follows: "The discrepancy between the statements of the number of the Abyssinian force given by the Governor and Sir Robert Napier, is easily reconcilable. The former has evidently taken the established strength, the latter the effective strength, of regiments; by taking the former, the strength is exactly 15,000 men. (signed) G. Jameson. 25th of November 1867." I see also that in a letter which I wrote to Sir Robert Napier on the 1st of December following, I said to him, "I am rather uneasy at hearing of the growth of the force; I do not think that you should take more fighting men than the 12,000 originally proposed. It may be well to have a good reserve at Bombay, but I hope you will not carry more men to Zulla than are absolutely necessary. I have just signed a draft despatch, calling on you for periodical returns of the state of your force; I hope they will not give you much trouble." I therefore infer, although I am sorry to say that I have not looked over all my letters very closely, that it must have been in one of Sir Seymour Fitzgerald's letters that he had used the expression which alarmed me, and led to my asking for that explanation. In Sir Robert Napier's letter, in answer to mine,

which is dated the 12th of January following, he simply says, "You may be sure that I will not take a soldier more than is necessary, but we must be strong enough to repel any interruption without being delayed in pursuing our ultimate object."

Rt. Hon. Sir
S. Northcote,
 Bart., M.P.

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6134. Then it will follow, that the knowledge of that increase was before the Government when they submitted the final estimate in April 1868? —Yes.

6135. Did that increase form a part of that estimate?—I remember on more than one occasion, in conversations with General Jameson, asking him whether he thought we ought to make any additional allowance on account of what we understood to be the increase of the force, and he was of opinion from the state of the returns, that although the force allotted for the Expedition was evidently more than the 12,000, yet that the number landed would not be beyond that number, and that it would not disturb the calculation.

6136. You have since ascertained, I think, that the number embarked was upwards of 14,000?—Yes.

6137. You have seen it in the evidence of Colonel Marriott, I think, that in his judgment that increase of force would proportionately increase the estimate?—Yes.

6138. Nevertheless you did not think it needful, on the advice of General Jameson, to give any increased amount for that increase of force?—No, he did not think it necessary.

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE then took the Chair.

JOHN CANDLISH, Esq., Chairman of the Committee, Examined; and CAPTAIN FREDERICK EDWARD BLACKETT BEAUMONT, R.E., a Member of the Committee, further Examined.

6139. Sir *S. Northcote* (to Mr. *Candlish*).]—I think that you took the opportunity afforded by the recess of visiting, in company with the Honourable Member for Durham, some parts of

the East with reference to the inquiry of this Committee; will you kindly inform the Committee, without going into particulars, what were the objects of the inquiries which you there made?

J. Candlish,
 Esq., M.P.,
 and Captain
Beaumont,
 R.E., M.P.

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J. Candlish,
Esq., M.P.,
and Captain
Beaumont,
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—We inquired into the steps taken by the agents of the British Government to purchase mules, the prices paid for them, and into the circumstances under which those purchases were effected.

6140. Did it appear to you that there were circumstances connected with those purchases which required investigation?—Yes, at Constantinople to some degree, but more especially at Smyrna.

6141. Would it be possible to obtain before this Committee direct and complete evidence with regard to this matter?—Not without the lapse of time and much expense; only two courses, I think, would be open; one would be to bring the witnesses from those parts, and the other, to send out an examining authority.

6142. You also visited some places where you took evidence with regard to the supply of coals I think?—Yes.

6143. Are you of opinion that it is important to obtain further information with regard to the details of the purchase of coals?—Very important, inasmuch as it appeared to me from statements made to me at Calcutta, that the circumstances under which purchases of coals were made were altogether irregular and such as to demand inquiry.

6144. I presume that any information that you could lay before the Committee upon the details of those purchases, would involve reflections upon, or charges against, gentlemen who are not now in this country, and who could not be called speedily to explain circumstances?—Quite so, both as to animals, coals, and other stores. That would also be true of some other purchases, I think, made elsewhere than in India. I find from an official return that as much as 5 *l.* 7 *s.* per ton was paid to the Egyptian Government for coals supplied at Suez, whilst on the statement of the Peninsular and Oriental Company's agent at Alexandria, the price of coals at Alexandria was about 30 *s.*, and it cost 20 *s.* to convey them to Suez, bringing the Suez price to, say, 3 *l.*, with a good profit; 75 *s.*, I think, was the price paid for the whole of the purchases of coals made of the Azziziah Steam Shipping Company, who coaled their own vessels, chartered for the uses of the Expedition. Both at Aden and Bombay, I think, purchases of coals were made in an irregular way; and on the facts communicated to us it seems to me that it would be impossible to do justice to the parties concerned in those purchases without their being called before the Committee, or having an opportunity of giving evidence in some other way.

6145. Were there any other details of the expenditure besides the expenditure on mules and on coals to which your attention was drawn, or upon which you obtained information?—At Bombay the statements were very prevalent that the contractors for the Bombay Government, for the purposes of the Abyssinian Expedition, used means to obtain from the Government higher prices than the normal and ordinary prices of the articles in the open market.

6146. (To Captain Beaumont.) In so far as the facts which have now been stated to us by the Chairman have come within your cognisance, do you agree with the statements which he has made?—Yes, I do. I should like, however, to suspend my judgment with reference to the desir-

ableness of further inquiries as to the purchase of mules at Constantinople and Smyrna, until Captain Webber has had an opportunity of stating to the Committee his opinion on the facts which the honourable Member for Sunderland and myself have collected.

6147. Captain Webber being the officer employed in making purchases?—Just so.

6148. (To Mr. Candlish.) Are there any other points (without mentioning names) to which you think attention should be directed, or which you would like to mention?—In Egypt we learnt that an advertisement was issued from Suez, inviting tenders for the supply of 2,200 tons of European hay; but from information communicated to us in Alexandria, and substantiated by the "Manifesto Giornaliero," which I produce, it appears that this announcement was not public in Alexandria until the 28th of December; or, at least, that is the first paper in which it could be found, and the tenders had to be delivered to the Consulate by the 1st of January. The European merchants in Alexandria had been accustomed to supply hay for Egypt in consequence of a murrain amongst the cattle just previously to this date, and they were anxious to compete; but European firms of undoubted position in Alexandria complained to us that it was impossible to compete, as no time was given to communicate with Europe. One firm sent a telegram to Trieste, which was not understood, and on having a reply, the time for further correspondence had expired. Another firm, instead of tendering, sent in a written complaint of the proceedings. This was a purchase involving a large sum of money. From the consular authorities we obtained a confirmation of the opinion held by the merchants of a want of publicity being generally given to the contracts in the interests of the public service.

6149. Sir J. Hay.] Is the transaction with regard to hay, about which you have just given evidence to the Committee, the same transaction in reference to which we had evidence from Major Michael Willoughby, on the 10th of June?—Yes.

6150. Sir S. Northcote.] Is there anything that you wish to say with regard to the contract for camels?—Yes; I find that on the 27th of April a contract for the supply of 250 camels was signed at Suez, the intelligence of the fall of Magdala having reached Suez on the 26th, the day before. Delivery was afterwards accepted, and they were sold by auction at Suez, as I am told. On the 1st of April a contract, we understand, was made for 1,000 tons of hay, at 10 *l.* 12 *s.* 6 *d.* per ton; no portion of that was delivered, but on the 3rd of May an agreement was concluded with the contractor to accept 8 *l.* 10 *s.* per ton, or 8500 *l.*, as compensation or indemnity for breach of contract.

6151. Had you an opportunity of ascertaining from the officer who was responsible for those contracts what explanation could be given of them?—No, he being at Madras we have had no explanation. Then again on the 22nd of April a question was asked by the purchasing officer at Suez, at what price 223 tons of beans could be supplied; there is no evidence of any agreement having been concluded, but 5 *l.* per ton was paid as an indemnity for their non-delivery,

as shown by accounts laid before us, and by a letter dated Suez, the 2nd of May.

6152. Were you not informed that the officer, as soon as he heard of the fall of Magdala, communicated with the contractor to know what, in the event of no more beans being required, would be the terms he would propose?—Yes; on the 27th of April that question was addressed to the contractor, and, from a letter on the 2nd of May, a reply seems to have been written, on the 29th of April, offering to take 5 *l.*, or 50 per cent., at which rate the transaction was concluded.

6153. Did you ascertain whether there was any further contract?—I could obtain no intelligence of any contract for the purchase of these beans, and I draw the inference that there was not, inasmuch as the inquiry was dated the 22nd of April, and the stoppage is made on the 27th of April; and then a question is asked as to the terms upon which the stoppage might be made; on the 2nd of May the matter is concluded, and 50 per cent. compensation is paid for a breach of contract that it seems never existed.

6154. The letter of the 27th of April referred to a former letter, which had fixed the conditions upon which the beans were to be supplied, and inquired whether more could be supplied on the same terms, did it not?—Yes; this was an inquiry merely as to whether or not more could be supplied; of the 446 tons 197 tons had been delivered.

6155. Are you of opinion that the information which you received inculpated in any way, subject to any answers or explanations which might be given, any of the officers of the Government?—I could not say that it inculpated them, but it appears to me most obvious that the circumstances are of so very remarkable a character, as to require explanation.

6156. With a view to clear the characters of officers of the Government?—The facts are so unusual as to seem to point to an inference that there had been mismanagement of some kind, but whether inculpatory I cannot tell. I put in correspondence and accounts which set out all these transactions.

6157. Sir J. Hay.] Do you mean charges of a criminal character?—That is rather a strong phrase; I am hardly prepared for that, but generally those are circumstances which require full investigation and explanation.

6158. Sir S. Northcote.] We do not understand, of course, that you bring forward any charges except of mismanagement, but we were anxious to know whether, so far as the impression upon your mind went, there were circumstances inculpating the officers in anything of a corrupt character?—I cannot account for the facts as detailed in the documents before me.

6159. Lord Elcho.] You would not say whether the impression on your own mind is, that there have been corrupt practices on the part of public servants?—I am utterly unable to account for the facts which I have detailed to the Committee. There was great improvidence, but whether it was due to fraud, or to mismanagement, it is not in my power to answer.

6160. Sir J. Elphinstone.] Have you had any experience in the operation of previous wars which enables you to judge as to the deficiencies which you considered to have existed in this case, 0.46.

or to induce you to suppose that the circumstances were different?—I have had no experience of any previous wars, nor any knowledge of any of the circumstances connected with them.

6161. (To Captain Beaumont.) Do you consider that to form an opinion upon such mercantile transactions as these, it was necessary to have any notion of warlike arrangements at all?—I should think not. I have had very much experience in business, and nothing comparable to this ever came under my cognizance. In my opinion, also, very much investigation and explanation are necessary as to the manner in which the surplus stores were disposed of in Egypt, after the termination of the war. For instance, 440 tons of compressed forage which cost from 13 *l.* to 14 *l.* in England, was sold for 31 *s.* in Alexandria; sent home on a freight of 17 *s.* 6 *d.* per ton, and sold at Liverpool at 6 *l.* to 7 *l.* per ton, at a time when the Indian troop ships were passing between Alexandria and Liverpool. That is merely an example. Again, 400 tons of surplus hay was sold at 6 *s.* per ton at Suez, and instantly, and on the spot the purchaser re-sold it at 16 *s.* per ton, and made 200 *l.* by the transaction. I should wish to put in returns furnished by the Indian Government of the prices paid for coals to the Azziziah Company. In the case of another ship, the "Scotland," laden with 1,776 tons of coal. Her cargo was bought on board at Bombay, at 40 rupees, and the vessel was sent to Annesley Bay at 10 rupees per ton per month. The cargo of the "Peerless" was 1,320 tons, was purchased at Bombay, and she was put on charter at 10 rupees per ton per month, to carry it to Annesley Bay. The "Napier's" cargo of 1,800 tons, was purchased at Galle, at 36 rupees, and she was put on time charter, at 10 rupees per month, to carry it to Annesley Bay. The cargo of the "Calcutta," 1,753 tons of coals, was purchased at 36 rupees per ton, and she was put on time charter for four months certain at 10 rupees per ton per month, to carry it to Annesley Bay. The "Sidney Dacre," with 1,800 tons of coals, was put on time charter at nine rupees per ton per month. The "David Malcolmson," with 1,666 tons of coals, was put on charter at Bombay, at 10 rupees per ton per month, and the "Bruce," with 1,400 tons, was also put on time charter to take coals to Annesley Bay at 10 rupees per ton per month. Other coals were purchased at Bombay, the ships containing them being put on time charter. At this time the agent of the Peninsular and Oriental Company was sending coals forward from Aden to Bombay at 15 *s.* per ton freight upon the coals.

I produce a return from the War Office of the casualties among the pack animals on board steamers, the freight arrangements for conveying mules in the Mediterranean to Alexandria, and the prices paid, from which it appears in connection with information received at Alexandria, that whilst 3 *l.* per head was paid for conveying animals from Smyrna, 2 *l.* only was received by the shipowner, 1 *l.* being appropriated by somebody in its passage to the shipowner.

The "Royal Edward," 1,508 tons, was chartered at Bombay, and she took on board 11,425 bales of hay. She was chartered on the 27th of December, she sailed on the 10th of January to Zulla, she returned to Bombay on the 23rd of June, she was paid off on the 19th of August, and she brought the hay back untouched. After lying at

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at Bombay from the 23rd of June to the 19th of August, she accepted about one-third of her cargo, and took her discharge, that one-third of her cargo being undischarged. For that service she received 12,602 *l.*, or 3½ *d.* per lb. on the cargo of hay which she took to Annesley Bay, and brought back again to Bombay untouched. I have here an official statement in confirmation of that fact.

The "Himalaya" steamer, belonging to the British India Steam Navigation Company, was chartered at Bombay at 24 rupees per ton per month, and subsequently the same ship was chartered at Calcutta at 27½ rupees per ton per month, the agent of the Company at Calcutta repudiating the authority of the agent who chartered at the lower rate at Bombay; and the other rate was given. The captain superintendent at Cal-

cutta told me that they paid a very much higher rate for their tonnage in consequence of first having advertised for ships only for three months, instead of advertising for them for six months, the time they would certainly be employed; they had to pay a higher rate for the shorter time. I have very much evidence yet to offer, but if the Committee are of opinion that it would be expedient rather than to report fully upon these facts, to recommend the matter to the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, with a view to further inquiry; it will obviate the necessity of my enlarging this evidence. If that is not the view of the Committee, I should ask the Committee to permit me to resume my evidence on a future occasion.

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A P P E N D I X.

Appendix, No. 1.

PAPERS handed in by Captain *Tryon*, 3 March 1870.The Secretary to the Admiralty to Captain *Tryon*.

Appendix, No. 1.

Sir,

Admiralty, 16 September 1867.

My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having been pleased to appoint you Principal Agent for Transports for the Abyssinian Expedition, it is their Lordships' directions that you proceed to Bombay and take upon yourself the duties of the office as prescribed in the accompanying instructions from the Director of Transport Services, making such arrangements for the due performance of the services required from time to time by the General in Command of the Expedition, and the Commodore in Command of the Station, who has been instructed to afford you every assistance.

In the discharge of the duties, you may move from ship to ship such of the agents as you may consider expedient for the benefit of the service; and you are to report to their Lordships, by every opportunity, your proceedings and all matters connected with the Transport Service under your superintendence.

Captain Tryon,
&c. &c. &c.

I am, &c.
(signed) *W. G. Romaine.*

The Director of Transport Services to Captain *Tryon*.

Admiralty, Somerset House, W.C.,
14 September 1867.

Sir,

In pursuance of their Lordships' orders you are to proceed by the next mail, *via* Marseilles, to Bombay, to report yourself to Commodore Heath, and take charge of the duties of the Transport Service afloat in connection with the Expedition preparing for Abyssinia; subject at all times to such further orders as you may from time to time receive from the Commodore, or other your superior officer.

Having inspected the ships fitting in this country, you are aware of their capabilities, and you will be furnished with a list of the provisions and stores they are conveying.

It will be your duty to make yourself conversant with the terms of engagement or charter-parties of all hired ships; those taken up by the Government of Bombay, as well as those engaged by this Department; and, whilst looking to the best interests of the service in the efficiency of the ships, you will make it your duty to study economy, and represent, when necessary, the expediency or otherwise of discharging any particular ship or ships.

Coal has been provided at the Cape of Good Hope and Simon's Bay; also at Bombay by the Government of India; and at Aden you will draw such supplies as may be necessary from the stores of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, who have undertaken to supply it.

A steamer will be provided by the Bombay Government for yourself and staff, from which vessel you will conduct all your duties, complying with the printed instructions of their Lordships, copies of which have been furnished to you, as well as copies of the Instructions to Masters of Transports, and copies of the Regulations for Her Majesty's Transport Service, with such other forms and documents as are necessary to you in the performance of your duties.

Captain Tryon, R.N.

(signed) *W. R. Mends,*
Director of Transport Services.

Appendix, No. 1.

Abyssinian Expedition,—Marine Arrangements,—Captain Tryon's Duties defined.

(Military Department, No. 10).

Bombay Castle, 3 January 1868.

LETTER from the Secretary of State for *India*, No. 154, dated 30th November 1867.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for the information of your Excellency, a copy of a correspondence regarding the instructions addressed, by direction of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, to the Naval Commander in Chief at Bombay, respecting the duties of Captain Tryon, as Agent of Transports in connection with the Abyssinian Expedition.

2. I have expressed my approval of these instructions, subject to the concurrence of your Government.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Stafford H. Northcote.*

ENCLOSURES.

Sir,

Admiralty, 25 November 1867.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, the enclosed copy of a letter which has been addressed to the Naval Commander in Chief at Bombay, in regard to the duties of Captain Tryon, Agent of Transports in connection with the Abyssinian Expedition.

I am, &c.
(signed) *Henry G. Lennox.*

The Under Secretary of State for India.

(Enclosure.)

Sir,

Admiralty, 25 November 1867.

WITH reference to recent correspondence from yourself and Captain Tryon, relative to the duties of the latter officer in regard to the Transport Service (Naval) on the Indian seas in connection with the Abyssinian Expedition, as well as to the relative duties of Captain Tryon and the Superintendent of Marine at Bombay, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you that Captain Tryon and his staff are to be placed on board the "Vigilant," or some other steamer of war, pending the provision by the Indian Government of a suitable vessel for his head quarters afloat for the conduct of transport business at the seat of operations.

With the concurrence of the Government of Bombay, you are, in pursuance of former orders, to place the whole of the detail, duties, and accounts of the transport service afloat in the entire charge of Captain Tryon, subject, of course, to such general supervision and directions as you, as Commodore Commanding in Chief, may think it necessary to give from time to time in the interests and for the efficiency and economy of the public service, observing that Captain Tryon has been instructed to cause all accounts and claims relative to the transports engaged by the Admiralty to be sent to England for settlement, and to leave the expenditure on account of transports engaged in India to be defrayed by the Bombay Government.

The duties of Captain Tryon will comprehend the entire organisation and charge of the whole of the transports afloat; the transport officers appointed by their Lordships are under his immediate directions; all expenditure incurred by him in the discharge of this service is to be reported, as regards the ships engaged by the Admiralty, direct to the Transport Department. Captain Tryon will in no way interfere with the Superintendent of Marine at Bombay, but will confer with him whilst at that port, and communicate with him when absent, relative to such engagements as may be made under the authority of the Bombay Government, it being clearly understood that Captain Tryon does not interfere in making such engagements at that or other Indian ports, to which Indian officers have been sent to take up freight, but he will accept such engagements, make himself acquainted with the terms thereof, and take the charge of the ships when equipped.

I am, &c.
(signed) *Henry G. Lennox.*

P.S.—Instructions have this day been forwarded to you by telegraph, to place the "Vigilant," or some other steamer, at Captain Tryon's disposal, with orders for him to proceed to the port of debarkation without delay, in order to make the necessary arrangements for landing stores and provisions and disembarking the troops and animals.

The Secretary, Admiralty.

Sir,

India Office, 29 November 1867.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th instant, and to acquaint you in reply that, subject to the concurrence of the Government of Bombay, he approves of the instructions addressed to the Naval Commander in Chief at Bombay, respecting the duties of Captain Tryon as Agent of Transports in connection with the Abyssinian Expedition.

2. I am to suggest, however, that the 3rd para. of the instructions to Captain Tryon should run thus:—The duties of Captain Tryon will comprehend the entire organisation and charge of the whole of the transports afloat, subject to the general control of the Government of Bombay, or the Commander in Chief of the Abyssinian Expedition.

3. A copy of this correspondence will be forwarded for the information of the Government of Bombay.

I have, &c.
(signed) *L. L. Pears*, Major General.

Resolution—Copies to be communicated to—

Commodore Heath, C.B.

The Deputy Quartermaster General, A.F.F.

The Superintendent of Marine.

The Controller of Supply and Transport.

Major,

Deputy Secretary to Government.

To Commodore Heath, C.B.

The Deputy Quartermaster General, A.F.F.

The Superintendent of Marine.

The Controller of Supply and Transport.

CIRCULAR, No. 2.—S.

(Regulations for Her Majesty's Transport Service on Foreign Stations.)

Admiralty, 9 January 1868.

It being considered necessary, with reference to the Regulations for Her Majesty's Transport Service, and to the Instructions for Transport Officers, that the accounts and correspondence relating to the Transport Service should be preserved in one channel, and that Commanders in Chief should not be burdened with the details thereof in addition to their other high and important duties, my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are pleased to direct, that when transports are employed within the ordinary limits of a naval command, they are to be under the entire charge of such officer as their Lordships may deem it expedient to appoint, with the title of Principal Transport Officer Afloat, or, if on shore, with that of Resident Transport Officer, who is to be held directly responsible for the conduct of that important branch of the Service, and for the expenditure connected therewith, as the recognised head of the Transport Service Afloat; the transport officers and masters in command of the several transports being under his immediate control. The Principal Transport Officer, when appointed afloat, will on all occasions be provided with a suitable vessel, with steam power if possible, having the requisite accommodation for himself and staff, such vessel to be either a hired transport or such other vessel as the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty may direct.

All orders respecting the movements of the ships (transports), their appropriation, and discipline, are to be issued, when practicable, through the Principal Transport Officer, who is to be considered for the time being in the light of an officer in command of a separate squadron placed under the general orders of the Commander in Chief for special service.

It will be the duty of the Principal Transport Officer, and all others under his control, to carry out, to the best of their ability, the orders which they may receive from the Naval Commander in Chief or senior officer present (as laid down in the printed Instructions for Transport Officers and Masters), to furnish such returns as that officer may from time to time direct; to decide, with his approval, upon the positions to be taken up by the transports in the various ports or anchorages, and to appeal to that officer for aid in maintaining discipline, or in carrying out any important service, whenever it may be considered necessary; to regulate under the authority of the Commander in Chief or senior Naval Officer, and, in concert with the military authorities, the loading and unloading of ships, the embarkations and disembarkations of troops, inclusive of sick and wounded, the sea conveyance of supplies of provisions, water, forage, &c., &c., for the Army, reporting from time to time to the Commander in Chief, when he may require material or assistance beyond what can be afforded by the transports, to enable the Service to be carried out efficiently.

It will also be his duty to watch over the sanitary condition of the crews of the transports.

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Finally,

App. No. 1.

Finally, he is to render direct to the Accountant General of the Navy and the Director of Transports respectively by every reliable opportunity, all accounts, documents, and returns, in relation to the service entrusted to his charge, in accordance with the special instructions he may receive, and with the Regulations for Her Majesty's Transport Service, and the Instructions to Transport Officers and Masters, furnishing such copies thereof to the Commander in Chief or senior officer as he may desire.

By command of their Lordships,

(signed) *Henry G. Lennox.*

To all Commanders in Chief, Captains, Commanders,
and Commanding Officers of Her Majesty's ships
and vessels.

Appendix, No. 2.

App. No. 2.

LETTERS and ACCOUNTS handed in by Mr. *Candlish.*

The following copies of Letters were procured at our request, and handed to us by Mr. *Calvert*, of the British Consulate, Alexandria, 19 October 1870.

Sir,

Cairo, 24 February 1868.

WITH reference to your letter of the 21st instant, in which you agree to supply 25,000 (twenty-five thousand) rations of barley at Suez, at the rate of seven-pence (7 *d.*) per ration of six (6) pounds, and state your willingness to supply any further quantity that may be required at the same rate, I request you will be good enough to have the 25,000 rations of barley at Suez within the next six days, ready for delivery as called for. Should any further quantity be required, you will receive timely notice from Major Stansfeld. I beg you will hand Major Stansfeld, by return post, a bankers' guarantee for 70*l.* (seventy pounds) to be held as a security for the performance of your agreement.

I remain, &c.

(signed) *Michael W. Willoughby,*
Captain Bombay Staff Corps.

To Mr. Henry G. Schutz, Alexandria.

All further communications to be addressed Suez.

(No. 659.)

From Major *T. W. Stansfeld*, Madras Staff Corps, on Special Duty, Deputy Assistant Commissary General, to *Henry Schutz*, Esq., Alexandria.

Sir,

Suez, 11 March 1868.

I HAVE the honour to request your attendance as soon as convenient at Suez, for the purpose of signing the contract for the supply of beans.

The amount of security or bankers' guarantee to be deposited at the same time is 470 *l.*

I have, &c.

(signed) *T. W. Stansfeld*, Major,
Madras Staff Corps, on Special Duty in Egypt,
Deputy Assistant Commissary General.

(No. 760, of 1867-68.)

From Major *T. W. Stansfeld*, Madras Staff Corps, on Special Duty in Egypt, Deputy Assistant Commissary General, to Mr. *Henry G. Schutz*, Suez.

Sir,

Suez, 31 March 1868.

WITH reference to your verbal offer of yesterday's date, I request that you will be good enough to supply to me at Suez, free of all expense for carriage, &c. ten lacs pounds, say 446 tons, of beans at the rate offered, viz., ten pounds sterling (10 *l.*) per ton.

The beans to be in strong bags of 75 lbs. weight each, and the whole quantity to be delivered at Suez before the 10th of May 1868.

I am, &c.

(signed) *T. W. Stansfeld*,
Madras Staff Corps, &c.

(No. 761, of 1867-68.)

From Major *T. W. Stansfeld*, Madras Staff Corps, on Special Duty in Egypt, Deputy Assistant Commissary General, to Mr. *Henry G. Schutz*, Suez.

Sir,

Suez, 1 April 1868.

WITH reference to your letter of to-day's date, I hereby accept your offer of compressed hay for the Abyssinian Expedition, to the extent of 1,000 tons, on the following conditions:

The hay to be of good sound quality, well compressed into bales of 75 lbs. weight, each bale to be fastened securely with three iron bands.

Two hundred tons to be delivered in Suez by the 3rd of May 1868, the remainder in instalments before the 3rd of July 1868.

The hay to be paid for on delivery, and after due examination of bills (which are to be presented in duplicate), at the rate of 10 *l.* 12 *s.* 6 *d.* per ton, all expenses included.

I am, &c.

(signed) *T. W. Stansfeld*, Major,
Madras Staff Corps, on Special Duty in Egypt,
Deputy Assistant Commissary General.

(On the 26th April, Major Stansfeld wrote, stopping this delivery, and on the 3rd May, he agreed to pay 8 *l.* 10 *s.* per ton compensation, or 8,500 *l.* for failing to receive a delivery worth 10,631 *l.*—*J. C.*)

(No. 72.)

From Major *T. W. Stansfeld*, Madras Staff Corps, on Special Duty in Egypt, Deputy Assistant Commissary General, to *H. G. Schutz*, Esq., Alexandria.

Sir,

Suez, 22 April 1868.

REFERRING to my letter, No. 760, of 31st March, and your reply thereto, I shall be glad to know if you are prepared to supply five lacs pounds (say 223 tons) more beans on the same conditions.

If so, will you be good enough to state the time of delivery?

I am, &c.

(signed) *T. W. Stansfeld*, Major,
&c. &c. &c.

(On the 26th April, if not earlier, it was known that Magdala had fallen. *There is no order or contract here, and no delivery, and yet Major Stansfeld paid 5 *l.* per ton, or 1,115 *l.* compensation.*—*J. C.*)

(No. 103.)

From Major *T. W. Stansfeld*, Madras Staff Corps, on Special Duty, Egypt, to *H. G. Schutz*, Esq.

Sir,

Suez, 26 April 1868.

WITH reference to the 1,000 tons of hay which you have engaged to supply for the Abyssinian Expedition, I have the honour to request that you will at once stop, as far as possible, the shipment of it; and mention to me, as soon as possible, the terms you would be willing to accept, in the event of the agreement being cancelled.

I have, &c.

(signed) *T. W. Stansfeld*, Major,
&c. &c. &c.

Required

20 days' rations for 500 camels (split beans).

 $20 \times 8 \times 500 = \text{lbs. } 80,000 \text{ lbs.}$

Suez, }
26 April 1868. }

(signed) *T. W. Stansfeld*.

(Written on the half of a sheet of note paper, apparently in an informal manner.—*J. C.*)

TERMS of AGREEMENT entered into between Major *T. W. Stansfeld*, of Her Majesty's Madras Staff Corps, on the part of the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for India on the one hand, and *Henry Schutz*, of Alexandria, on the other, for the supply of 250 Camels required for the Abyssinian Expedition.

THE Contractor binds himself, his heirs, executors, and administrators, to supply at Suez 250 of the best description of baggage camels. The whole number to be supplied within 15 days from the date of signing this contract.

Each camel to leave Cairo with at least one ardel (300 lbs.) of crushed beans, the balance of such beans

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App. No. 2. beans to be handed over on arrival at Suez, at the market rate, to the officer representing the Indian Government at that place.

Each camel to be provided with a pack saddle, bridle, picketing rope, and iron peg, at 17s. per set.

The cost of each camel delivered at Suez to be 17 l. 10 s. Camel men to be engaged by the Contractor to proceed to Abyssinia, at the same rate and on the same conditions upon which muleteers are at present engaged by Government; one man to every five camels, and one shekh to every 20 men.

The pay of these men to commence from date of engagement; the said date to be filled up in their cards by the Contractor.

Each man's name and number to be distinctly entered on this card. Camels and equipments to be accepted or rejected finally by the officer representing the Indian Government at Suez.

Payment to be made on each delivery after due examination of bills, which are to be presented in duplicate.

Signed by the two contracting parties, at Suez, this 27th day of April 1868.

(signed) *Henry G. Schutz.*

In presence of,

W. Luckhardt,
S. A. C. General.

S. Leigh Hunt, Lieut.,
S. A. C. General.

(No. 102.)

From Major *T. W. Stansfeld*, Madras Staff Corps, on Special Duty, Suez, to *H. G. Schutz*, Esq.

Sir,

Suez, 27 April 1868.

WITH reference to the beans now in course of delivery by you, I have the honour to request that you will as far as possible stop the supply, and inform me what terms you would propose to indemnify you in the event of no more beans than those actually delivered being required for the Abyssinian Expedition.

I am, &c.
(signed) *T. W. Stansfeld,*
Madras Staff Corps.

(No. 133, of 1868-69.)

From Major *T. W. Stansfeld*, Madras Staff Corps, on Special Duty in Egypt, Deputy Assistant Commissary General, to *Henry G. Schutz*, Esq.

Sir,

Suez, 2 May 1869.

WITH reference to your letter of 29th April 1868, regarding the cancelling of your contract for beans, I have the honour to inform you that I agree to pay you at the rate of 50 per cent. of the contract price for such amount of the beans as have not been actually delivered at Suez.

I am, &c.
(signed) *T. W. Stansfeld,*
Madras Staff Corps, on Special Duty in Egypt,
Deputy Assistant Commissary General.

(No. 134, of 1868-69.)

From Major *T. W. Stansfeld*, Madras Staff Corps, on Special Duty in Egypt, Deputy Assistant Commissary General, to *Henry G. Schutz*, Esq.

Sir,

Suez, 3 May 1868.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 29th ultimo, regarding the stopping of the supplies of hay lately contracted for by you.

I am prepared to accept your terms, viz., to pay you at the rate of 8 l. 10 s. per ton for the whole (1,000 tons) quantity of the hay (none being delivered as yet at Suez).

I am, &c.
(signed) *T. W. Stansfeld,*
Madras Staff Corps, on Special Duty in Egypt,
Deputy Assistant Commissary General.

(No. 139, of 1868-69.)

From Major *T. W. Stansfeld*, Madras Staff Corps, Deputy Assistant Commissary General, to
H. G. Schutz, Esq., Suez.

Sir,

Suez, 5 May 1868.

In reply to the offer contained in your letter of to-day's date, I accept the terms therein mentioned to the extent of 100 tons of the beans, that is to say: of the quantity at present at Suez, delivered and paid for, you engage to receive 100 tons and to replace this quantity by a similar quantity of split beans of unexceptionable quality by the 17th instant, on consideration of your receiving 5 l. per ton. A reply as to the remainder will be sent to you hereafter.

I am, &c.

(signed) *T. W. Stansfeld*,
Deputy Assistant Commissary General.

(No. 167.)

To Mr. *H. G. Schutz*, from *S. Leigh Hunt*, Lieutenant, Staff Assistant Commissary General.

Sir,

UNDER instructions received from Major *T. W. Stansfeld*, I have the honour to request that the supply of camels for which you have contracted may at once be stopped.

By Order.

I have, &c.

(signed) *S. Leigh Hunt*, Lieut.,
Staff Assistant Commissary General.

Suez, 9 May 1868, 11 a.m.

Monsieur,

Alexandrie, 28 Mai 1868.

JE prends la liberté de vous adresser ces deux mots dans le but de me rappeler à votre bon souvenir, et vous prier de me dire ce que vous avez décidé pour le restant des fèves que je m'étais engagé à vous remplacer par des fèves *broyées*, par ma lettre du 5 courant.

En vous priant, Monsieur, de m'honorer d'une réponse.

Je suis, &c.

(signé) *Henry G. Schutz*.

Major *Stansfeld*, Suez.

(Copy.)

I have much pleasure in certifying that Mr. *Henry G. Schutz*, of Alexandria, has given me the most perfect satisfaction in the manner in which he has carried out the various contracts which he has entered into for the supply of both animals and stores required for the Abyssinian Expedition.

From his intimate knowledge of the resources of the country, and from his invariable punctuality, I have always had the greatest confidence in him, feeling sure that whatever he had undertaken to supply would be delivered at the time appointed, and would be equal in quality to the samples decided upon.

(signed) *T. W. Stansfeld*,

Madras Staff Corps, on Special Duty, Egypt.

Alexandria, 9 July 1868.

I HEREBY certify the foregoing to be a true and correct copy of the original presented and withdrawn by Mr. *Henry G. Schutz*.

H. B. M. Consulate, Alexandria, 10 July 1869.

(L.S.) *Henry H. Calvert*, Consul.

THE following ACCOUNT of SUPPLIES, on ACCOUNT of the EXPEDITION, was handed in by Mr. Calvert, of the British Consulate, Alexandria.

Weight and Number.		S P E C I E S.	The Amount.	TOTAL.
Order.	Supplied.			
<i>Tons.</i>	<i>Tons. cwt. qrs. lbs.</i>	BEANS :	<i>£. s. d.</i>	<i>£. s. d.</i>
500	499 19 3 0	By Contract, 19th March 1868, at 9 l. 9 s. 6 d. per ton - - - - -	4,737 7 6	
446	197 2 0 18	„ Letter, 31st March 1868, at 10 l. per ton - - - - -	1,971 1 8	
223	- - -	„ Letter, 22nd April 1868, at 10 l. per ton (not supplied).		
		Indemnity at 5 l. per ton, as per Letter, 2nd May 1868 :		
		<i>Tons. cwt. qrs. lbs.</i>		
		248 17 3 10 Completion order of 446 tons, at 5 l. - - - - -	1,244 9 2	
		223 0 0 0 Ditto - ditto 223 tons, at 5 l. - - - - -	1,115 - -	
1,169	677 1 3 18	471 17 3 10		9,067 18 4
<i>Lbs.</i>	<i>Lbs.</i>	SPLIT BEANS :		
80,000	80,000	By Letter, 26th April 1868, at 32 s. 6 d. per 300 lbs. - - - - -	433 - -	
<i>Tons.</i>	- - -	„ Letter, 5th May 1868, at 5 l. per ton of compensation - - - - -	502 4 7	935 4 1
100	- - -			
<i>Nos.</i>	<i>Nos.</i>	CAMELS, EQUIPMENT, AND SPLIT BEANS :		
300	300	By Contract, 20th March 1868, at 18 l. per camel, 17 s. per 'equipment, and 23 s. 6 d. per 295 lbs. of split beans - - - - -	6,012 12 3	
250	250	„ Contract, 27th April 1868, at 17 l. 10 s. per camel, 17 s. per equipment, and 23 s. 6 d. per 295 lbs. of split beans - - - - -	5,091 9 10	11,104 2 1
<i>Lbs.</i>	<i>Lbs.</i>	FLOUR :		
150,000	150,000	By Verbal Order of Major Stansfeld, at 19 s. per 100 lbs. - - - - -	- - -	1,425 - -
<i>Lbs.</i>	<i>Lbs.</i>	BARLEY :		
-	1,164,750	By Letter, Captain Willoughby, 24th February 1868 ; and Verbal Order, Major Stansfeld, at 7 d. per ration of 6 lbs. - - - - -	- - -	5,661 19 2
<i>Nos.</i>	<i>Nos.</i>	FLAX HEEB-ROPES :		
500	500	By Verbal Order of Major Stansfeld, in March 1868, at 3 s. each - - - - -	- - -	75 - -
<i>Tons.</i>		HAY :		
1,000	- - -	By Letter of Major Stansfeld, 1st April 1868, at 10 l. 12 s. 6 d. per ton.		
		1,000 tons not delivered, but accepting indemnity of 8 l. 10 s. per ton, by letter, Major Stansfeld, 3rd May 1868 - - - - -	- - -	8,500 - -
		Camel-man, as per contract, 20th March and 27th April 1868, and my invoice, 28th May 1868 - - - - -	- - -	72 12 3
		TOTAL - - - £.		36,841 16 5

Alexandria, 25 October 1869.

Henry G. Schutz.

Appendix, No. 2 A.

PAPERS handed in by Colonel *Marriott*, 20 May 1870.

(A).

MAJOR. CHITTY'S RETURNS.

STATEMENT showing the Sums of Money received by the Agent of the Government of India, in *Egypt*, on account of the Sale of COMPRESSED FORAGE.

	£.	s.	d.
13th July 1868.—Sold by auction 2,800 bales - - - - - (And credited to Government in July's Account).	102	12	10
4th August 1868.—Sold 12,404 bales - - - - - Sold 2,969 bales - - - - - (And credited to Government in August's Account).	686	13	-
	58	-	4
30th Sept. 1868.—Sold 8,360 bales - - - - - (And credited to Government in September's Account).	746	3	3
TOTAL - - - £.	1,588	9	5

These several sums have been credited to Government in my cash account with the Secretary of State for India, for July, August, and September 1868.

(signed) *James B. Willoughby*, Captain, R.N.,
Principal Transport Officer and Agent, Government of India, in Egypt.
(True Copy.)
J. Thucker, Lieutenant Colonel,
Officiating Examiner, Commissariat Accounts.

BALANCE SHEET of COMPRESSED FORAGE at *Alexandria*, originally intended for the Abyssinian Expedition.

Dr.						Cr.					
Date.	How Received.	Number of Bales.		Total Number of Bales.	Weight.	Date.	How Expended.	Number of Bales.	Weight.		
		Good.	Bad.								
1867:					Tons. cwt. qrs. lbs.	1868:			Tons. cwt. qrs. lbs.		
3rd Dec.	Received, ex steam ship "Leath"	-	4	4	0 2 3 12	June -	Supplied to ships returning to England with troops from Abyssinia (for officers' horses)	*140	5 0 0 0		
1868:						2nd Aug.	Sold by auction - - -	2,800	100 0 0 0		
1st April	- ditto - "Leena"	-	397	397	14 3 2 8		Sold by Tender:				
21st "	- ditto - "Vialka"	-	230	230	8 4 1 4		On opening the stores, found bales in good condition; and delivered as such - -	12,404	443 0 0 0		
8th May	- ditto - "Livonia"	8,568	-	8,568	306 0 0 0		Bales in bad condition, and delivered as such - -	2,969	196 0 2 24		
20th "	- ditto - "Ashford"	8,821	293	9,114	325 10 0 0						
	Total Debit - - -	-	-	18,313	654 0 2 24		Total Credit - - -	18,313	654 0 2 24		

* Supplied Her Majesty's Ship "Crocodile" with 60 bales of compressed forage.
" " "Serapis" " 17 " "
" " "Urgent" " 50 " "
" " "Simoom" " 13 " "
Total Number supplied - - - 140 Bales compressed forage.

James B. Willoughby, Captain, R.N.,
Principal Transport Officer and Agent, Government of India, in Egypt.
(True Copy.)
J. Thucker, Lieutenant Colonel,
Officiating Examiner, Commissariat Accounts.

My dear Captain Beaumont,
I HAVE looked through the papers we have, and can give no other explanation than this.
"The Balance Sheet of Compressed Forage at Alexandria," and the "Statement showing the Sums of Money received by the Agent of the Government of India, in Egypt," are two separate papers, made out apparently at different times; the former you will see only embraced transactions to August 1868, whilst the latter accounts for 8,360 bales sold on the 30th September 1868, and which would not, therefore, be brought into the former; but it will doubtless be found in Captain Willoughby's account with the Secretary of State for September, which we have not got.

To Captain Beaumont, R.E., M.P.

0.46.

Believe me, &c.
W. T. Chitt