

1332. You had, when you estimated in October, Lord Napier's requisitions before you, had you not?—No, I never saw them.

1333. Did you not know what animals he required?—I did not; I merely calculated on former experience. The 471,469*l.* appears as the actual charge. The 200,000*l.* is an estimate.

1334. Do you know what the European purchases amounted to?—I have no means of knowing that.

1335. In your first estimate of 200,000*l.* as the cost of the animals, I do not understand that that was set out as limited to the European purchases?—Entirely so; it came, I think, from the War Office.

1336. Then did you at that time make any addition to your estimate for the cost of the animals in India?—It was supposed that the force would not start until January; that there was a pioneer expedition which would go to Zulla and remain there; and that the animals would follow from India, or from Europe, as the case might be.

1337. It was understood that the force would land in Abyssinia by the beginning of January, was it not?—Yes. Then from January you will find that the calculation for baggage animals was exactly the same as in March. There is very little alteration between the January estimate and the March estimate, excepting the sea transport.

1338. If the Expedition had to advance in force in Abyssinia in January, as it did, the necessary transport animals would have to be purchased, and would be a subject of estimate and cost at the very outset of the Expedition, would they not?—Certainly; but at that time no estimate of the kind was required. The animals would come with the force in the transports.

1339. Not until they had been purchased?—They would be purchased.

1340. Then the cost of purchase would be a matter of estimate, would it not?—Yes.

1341. Then would not the 200,000*l.* include the whole of those purchases?—It would include merely the purchases made in Europe for the purpose of the Expedition. The whole of the Indian purchases were included in one sum in the January estimate, when the force was actually to take the field; and although some of the money might have been expended before, it was included in that 450,000*l.*, and its correctness is shown by the actual sum being 471,000*l.*

1342. If we have the cost of the Expedition up to the month of April, which we professedly have, it would necessarily follow, would it not, that the cost of all purchases of animals up to that time would be included in your October estimate?—You will find that it is so. In the estimate of October 1867, at page 150, there is "Mules (W.O.), Feeding, Stable-gear, Servants, &c." You will find in the same estimate, "Purchase of Pack Animals, 450,000*l.*" You will see that it is included in the October estimate; and then if you will turn to page 153, you will find that the War Office details there are "Estimate of possible amount of liabilities already incurred on account of the Abyssinian Expedition, from 13th September to 13th March, exclusive of charges as after shown, which will be incurred monthly from the date on which the

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Expedition embarks, assuming the estimate of the Admiralty ships, coals, and provisions to be correct."

1343. Then we have the fact proved that in the October estimate you had, say, 200,000*l.* for the purchase of animals in Europe, and 450,000*l.* for the purchase of animals in India?—Yes.

1344. Then, seemingly, on your evidence now, the excess of ultimate charge is not attributable to an excess of outlay in the purchase of pack animals?—It shows that if only 30,000 had been purchased, the estimate was a great deal too large, instead of being too small. They appear to have got 57,000 animals for the sum that was expended.

1345. But the excess of cost of the animals actually purchased seems only to have been 21,469*l.*?—As soon as I get the actual cost of the mules in Egypt and Constantinople, or wherever they were purchased, then of course that can be shown.

1346. It does not at present appear, however, does it, whether there is or is not any material excess in that item?—I should think that there can be no doubt that there must be. However, if there had been no excess in numbers, I must have estimated too largely.

1347. The facts, as known in a general way, will at once show the inadequacy of that estimate of 671,000*l.* inasmuch as it only gives about 12*l.* an animal; and we know, in point of fact, do we not, that they cost more than 20*l.* each, on an average, for instance?—Yes, but as far as I have seen (I speak with great diffidence) the camels and elephants would not add much to the average cost. There were so few that, in such a large number as 57,000 animals, dividing the amount among them all would add very little to each if you took the average of the whole.

1348. You would be able, if you had the accounts, to point out with some degree of accuracy the disproportion between this estimate and the actual cost, would you not?—I should think so.

1349. Respecting the rations for the men and cattle, what do you find?—I estimated that at 2*l.* per mensem for Europeans, and 1*l.* per mensem for natives. The expense of victualling the Madras Army in 1860 (paragraph 19 of a Report dated 30th April 1860, presented to Parliament, of the Military Finance Commission on Madras expenditure) was about 19*s.* 6*d.* for every European soldier per mensem. Taking even the most expensive rations at Rangoon, Thyetmou, Moolmain, and the Straits Settlements (*vide* same Report, paragraph 147, page 65), the sum which I allowed was in excess of that high rate, and there was this reason to believe that the estimate was ample, as it was understood that sheep and bullocks, to supply animal food, were procurable in Abyssinia at a very cheap rate. I need hardly quote extracts from the Papers laid before the honourable Committee, as I daresay they are well known. At page 3 of Further Abyssinian Papers, laid before Parliament, is Lord Napier's Despatch of the 3rd January: "The Deputy Commissary General states that cattle and sheep are plentiful on the coast;" and then Colonel Dillon, at page 56, says, "Grass has been found in considerable quantities on the highlands, and in some of the lateral valleys of the pass, and it is believed that sufficient forage will be here obtained to forage the pack animals engaged in the

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the transport of provisions to Senafé." Then Lord Napier, on the 14th of February, says: "At Undal, forage is brought in at the rate of 17,000 pounds a day." At page 51, the Quartermaster General's letter says, "Supplies at Senafé; forage and water at Senafé are abundant, and cattle, sheep, and goats may be had in large numbers."

1350. With regard to the 17,000 pounds a day of forage which was being brought into Undal, can you state how many animals that would feed?—I should think they would each require about 20 pounds a day of forage.

1351. Then, in round numbers, that would feed about 850 animals, would it not?—Yes; but according to the Quartermaster General's report, forage and water at Senafé were abundant.

1352. The 17,000 lbs. was at Undal only, was it not?—At Undal only.

1353. With regard to the rations for the troops, have you any remarks to make?—With regard to natives, I estimated rations at fully 100 per cent. above the usual cost in India (page 70, Article 110 of the Bombay Code). I estimated 1*l.* per mensem. The returns given by me at the time the estimate was made showed 12,424 combatants, and as it was understood that Lord Napier had, on the force advancing, reduced the number of followers to a minimum; the same number, or at the rate of one follower per man, was accordingly taken, and the monthly charge for rations was estimated at 28,000*l.*

1354. When you say that you reckoned the cost as double, or 100 per cent. more, do you mean the first cost of purchasing, exclusive of all transport charges, either by sea or by land?—The transport charges were included in the other part of the estimate.

1355. Do you conceive that having to purchase supplies for the troops at the very places where they would have been supplied had the troops never left India, you made an ample allowance when you added 100 per cent. more?—I should think so.

1356. Can you conceive any reason why there should be any material increase of the first cost of purchase?—I cannot; if I may be permitted, I would refer to a great authority, the Comptroller of Military Expenditure in Bengal, Colonel Broome: "The estimate has been framed," he says, "on the supposition that the bulk of the supplies will be provided in India; and the rate has been arrived at by doubling the ordinary average cost of rationing troops at each Presidency, exclusive of reserved stock; the doubling being intended to cover the value of reserved stock, damage, and loss, and also to meet the probable enhanced market rates resulting from a sudden large demand." He is on the spot, and this is his opinion.

1357. And you think that estimate very ample?—It certainly has not turned out to be so; but he seemed to go on former experience in the China Expedition.

1358. Does it occur to you how to account for the cost having been so very much in excess of double the normal prices?—No, I see nothing at present by which I can account for it.

1359. Would you not have supposed that the prices of provisions for the troops serving in Abyssinia, in the market where they were first purchased, should not have been very greatly in excess of what the cost would have been had

the troops never moved out of India?—That would be a natural supposition.

1360. I think you do not yet know what the prices or the quantities were?—No, except the aggregate amount of the charges.

1361-2. With regard to the forage for the animals, what do you find?—At the time the estimate was made, the latest returns given to me showed 29,995 baggage animals. I estimated for 30,000.

1363. When you speak of the estimate, do you mean the last estimate; the March estimate?—Yes; you will find them detailed there. Former experience (page 8, paragraph 13, Bombay Report of Military Finance Commission, 21st September 1859, which has also been presented to Parliament) would have induced me to assign 10 rupees, or 1*l.*, per mensem, for each animal, on an average, including the expense of muleteers, drivers, &c.; but making the fullest allowance for an unknown country, and the possibility of a scarcity of forage, I estimated 3*l.* per mensem for each animal, which is exactly 200 per cent. above what they would have been charged in India, or 30,000 animals at 3*l.*, making 90,000*l.* for the forage. Mr. Turner's account (numbers 12, 14, and 15, page 182) shows the amount of 1,343,092*l.*, less recoveries on credit 208,487*l.*; 1,134,605*l.* being the difference. My estimate for five months, at 118,000*l.* (that is 90,000*l.* for the animals, and 28,000*l.*) is 590,000*l.*, so that there is an excess over the estimate of 544,605*l.*

1364. You see that the accounts to which you are referring are Indian accounts only, and exclude European accounts?—Entirely; indeed at the time the Committee reported, there was no account before them, I think, of the European expenditure.

1365. Then to the actual charge of 1,134,000*l.* will have to be added the European charge for forage?—Certainly.

1366. And those two totals together will amount to how much?—Those totals together, the estimate being subtracted, will give the excess over the estimate.

1367. And you have nothing yet to show that?—Nothing.

1368. Your estimate was made out upon the assumption, was it not, that all the forage consumed in the Expedition would be conveyed to Abyssinia?—Not exactly so; that a great deal of it would necessarily be conveyed there, but that there would be a good deal of forage to be had there, and that by estimating three times the usual sum for forage and drivers I thought that I should be above the amount that would be required.

1369. Did you take into account some supplies of forage obtainable in Abyssinia?—Exactly so.

1370. Did you state that in figures?—No; I trebled the usual forage allowance, believing that there might be a good deal to be imported; and, of course, thinking that the country when they got above the passes would afford a large quantity of good forage for the animals there.

1371. In taking the unit of 1*l.*, had you in view the whole of the supply needed?—The 1*l.* in India would have been sufficient to furnish the cattle, the attendants, and the forage.

1372. And you multiplied that by three, did you not?—Yes.

1373. Have you left out of the account all reference

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reference to any purchases in Abyssinia?—If forage had been so abundant in Abyssinia that no compressed forage had been necessary, of course the estimate would have been a large one; but it is the quantity of compressed forage sent that has increased it.

1374. Did the estimate, which you submitted in figures, embrace threefold the amount of cost of all the forage necessary for the feed of all the animals in Abyssinia?—Threefold of what it would have been in India.

1375. Then any purchases in Abyssinia would go in reduction of the estimate, would they not?—Quite so. If there had been ample forage there, and no compressed forage had been required, the estimate would have been too large; that is to say, if they could have got as much forage there as they did in India, and if it was easily procurable in Abyssinia.

1376. But even if procured in Abyssinia, it would have to be paid for, would it not?—Certainly: but our belief was that it would not be more expensive than in India, for forage there is expensive enough.

1377. Then even on the imperfect figures before you, and excluding the cost of forage purchased in Europe, you find an excess of outlay over your estimate of upwards of half a million of money, do you not?—Half a million of money, at least.

1378. Have you any theory by which you can account for all that?—It is impossible without going into all the documents. There must be a perfectly easy way of accounting for it, but I have had nothing before me by which I can do so.

1379. What do you find to be the cost and quantities of coals as compared with your estimate?—It is very difficult to make any contrast of the coals from the accounts before me; however I have made a sort of comparison. My estimate was for a monthly consumption of 7,500 tons at 3*l.* 10*s.* per ton, or 26,250*l.* per mensem, or for five months, 37,500 tons, amounting to 131,250*l.* Captain Tryon states the total quantity of coals at 82,298 tons, and I presume that the reason for a great deal of the outlay may be found in the continuance of the employment of a large steam fleet under the circumstances so fully explained by Captain Tryon at Questions 1946 to 1949. He says this was not anticipated originally; and it certainly was not known to me when the estimate was framed, nor indeed till I received the Committee's Report in September. Mr. Turner, at page 184, of the Committee's Report, item 64, gives the price of coal at 382,641*l.*, which seems to imply an average cost of 4*l.* 13*s.* a ton.

1380. Does that account of Mr. Turner's set out the purchases made in India; does it embrace any more coals than those passing through the Indian accounts?—I believe not.

1381. Does it exclude all home purchases?—I should think so.

1382. But you estimated for the whole Expedition, did you not?—You will find that in addition to the estimate of which I am now talking, I estimated what you have already alluded to. Then taking Mr. Turner's estimate for this period at 382,641*l.*, and deducting my estimate, we have an excess of 251,391*l.*, and deducting a recovery for sale of surplus coals, of 46,262*l.*, there is a net excess over the estimate of 205,129*l.*

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1383. To which must be added the European purchases, I presume?—Quite so; the fact is that the information now given is very scanty.

1384. To your estimate must be added all the time the ships were employed and under steam, consuming coals over five months from the 1st of January?—Quite so.

1385. You estimate only up to the end of May, I think?—Only to the end of May.

1386. That is true also of the forage supplies, is it not?—Quite so.

1387. On your basis of 26,250*l.* per month the actual gross ultimate cost of coals purchased in India would have kept this fleet afloat for nearly five months, namely 26,250*l.* being the monthly estimate, and the total being 382,000*l.*, would not that have been so?—It would have been so, if the figures had been more minutely gone into. You cannot come to any reliable results on any of the heads without a more careful investigation of the actual amounts.

1388. So that you would have supposed that this 382,000*l.* would have kept the Expedition going until the middle of 1869, would you not?—Yes.

1389. Are there any other items as to which you would wish to give information to the Committee?—I think that as to the stores generally there is no information as to what has become of them. I dare say Mr. Turner will be able to give the Committee information upon that point.

1390. With regard to medical stores and surgical instruments, have you any remark to make to the Committee?—As far as the report of the Committee shows, Mr. Turner's statement, No. 24, gives for medicines, instruments, &c., 51,171*l.* There is a recovery in the credits of 962*l.*, and then there are estimated recoveries (page 185) of 14,380*l.*, the total being 15,342*l.*, which shows an expenditure or loss by medicines of 35,829*l.* That would appear to be a very large expenditure, though I suppose that there may be some explanation of it.

1391. Have you in your experience ever known anything comparable to the cost of medicines and surgical instruments for this Expedition?—I should say not; if that is the actual expense I think it is beyond anything I have heard of; in addition to this, there are the hospital ships.

1392. Here, as in the other figures where you quote Mr. Turner, the statement is limited to the expense in India, is it not?—Yes.

1393. In addition to that, were not three hospital ships sent from England with larger supplies on board?—Yes; I suppose they were very fully equipped.

1394. Medical stores and medical instruments?—Yes.

1395. Have you any statement of that amount?—This does not include medical comforts at all; I think there is a separate commissariat charge for wines and different things of that kind: this, I suppose, is simply for medicines and instruments.

1396. And to get at the total cost you would have to add all that were sent from England, I presume?—Yes, all that were sent from England; perhaps Mr. Turner may give some further credits which would tend to reduce the loss; there is an estimate of Mr. Turner's of 11,000*l.*

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1397. Then,

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1397. Then, with regard to ordnance stores, have you compared those also?—Mr. Turner's statement is 209,267 *l.*, and the credits at page 183 are 105,014 *l.* There is a further credit at page 185, of 5,000 *l.* which leaves 99,253 *l.* unaccounted for; in addition to the ordnance stores charged in the Indian accounts (Mr. Turner's statement at page 183, No. 26), there was a large quantity sent out by the War Office; there is nothing to show whether the credit above afforded includes the price of any of the War Office stores, or merely those returned from the Indian supply charged in Mr. Turner's statement.

1398. Ordnance stores were also sent largely from England, I believe?—Yes.

1399. Have you anything to say to the Committee respecting the commissariat charges?—As far as I have documents before me, I cannot form any opinion as to the charges. It is quite impossible to discover in what items there has been an excess, although in proportion to the force they are very large in amount, but this may possibly be susceptible of explanation; I merely speak to the documents before me.

1400. Then how could those charges be examined?—They could be examined by tabulating minutely the accounts under each head of charge; they might be shown in brief, accounting for the total stores purchased; the estimated amount, and the sum by which it has exceeded the estimate, and this course might be adopted with regard to every commissariat supply, forage, ordnance stores, warm clothing, rations for the troops, railway, telegraph, in short all stores. The amount purchased, and the rates at which they were purchased, would form a very useful document; without this any comparison is of very little use.

1401. Could you, if those accounts were placed at your disposal, give a tabulated statement of this nature, showing first the items in detail of your estimate of October 1867; the same item in your estimate of 1868; and, corresponding with the divisions in your own estimate, the actual expenditure as revealed by the accounts?—No doubt it could be done; but with regard to the two estimates, you will find that they are all gathered up in the last one that was submitted to Parliament, dated the 12th of March.

1402. But, nevertheless, you could give the two estimates separately, could you not?—Certainly. You will find that there is a mistake in supposing that the one that was first submitted, of three millions and a half, differs from the estimate which was furnished on the 12th of March. It will be found, on comparison, that if you add the difference of the sea transport, which we had no idea of until we got the documents from India about that time, there is little difference between the two estimates, but that they agree very much together. The one that was first furnished, and the second one, are nearly, in most respects, identical. If you look at all the items, you will find that there is very little difference between the two.

1403. But you have them both, have you not?—Yes.

1404. Then you could tabulate them both?—Certainly.

1405. It would not add materially to the labour, would it?—I do not think so; but I hear from Mr. Turner that the accounts are most voluminous. Of course, of myself, I could hardly

be expected to do it. Mr. Turner told me that he thought it almost impossible to do so. However, I should be sincerely delighted to do anything that the Committee wish me to do, only that my occupations are very onerous at present, and if it was to be done, somebody would have to be appointed for the duty. I would labour in any way to meet the wishes of the Committee, only at present my hands are as full as they can well be. Mr. Turner told me that the existing accounts were of enormous extent, and that some of them may not be forthcoming; it has been stated that others went down in one of the ships.

1406. Of course the fact that they are of enormous extent is the strongest reason that could be offered for having them brought before the Committee in this tabulated form?—I am entirely at the service of the Committee in any way they think proper.

1407. You spoke of some accounts being lost, but were not the accounts sent home, either copies or originals, the originals or copies of which were left in India?—Yes, they could be procured; but the difficulty is the time that that would take.

1408. You have been kind enough to tell me privately that with a moderate staff placed at your disposal, you could in a moderate time submit this analysis of accounts revealing at one glance the exact point at which the excess has arisen?—I should think there would be no difficulty in doing so; but I would like you to hear what Mr. Turner says upon that subject, because I have not seen the accounts and he has. I should be sorry to promise anything that I could not perform. I really do not see the difficulty of getting what the Committee wish.

1409. At present you cannot conceive why there should be any difficulty?—There would be a great deal of labour, but as to the difficulty, I do not see that there would be any.

1410. What advantage do you recognise as likely to accrue from getting such a tabulated statement as you have mentioned?—I think that, seeing where all the different things were purchased, and the rates, and carefully ascertaining how all the supplies were procured, would be of very great assistance in any future war. Now the money is spent it would be of no consequence as far as the Abyssinian Expedition is concerned, but I believe that nothing would contribute so much to the public benefit as having well tabulated statistics of all expeditions carefully prepared; you would then be able to benefit by past experience should you go to war again. An estimate made after hostilities have commenced is really of very little use, because the object of submitting estimates to Parliament is to enable them to control expenditure. Supposing that in March, instead of an estimate of 5,000,000 *l.* one of 20,000,000 *l.* had been presented, with all the force in the field, Parliament could not help themselves; they would be obliged to go on, whatever it cost; the estimate could then have no effect in any way. But if you had a properly tabulated statement of former expeditions, not only in Abyssinia, but elsewhere; for instance, in Persia, China, and other expeditions, you would be in a position to calculate the cost very well before you commenced operations, and to form a reliable opinion as to what it would amount to. I think the great want now is some military statistics, so as to give the fullest information as to expeditions

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tions. It would be very useful in future, and I am sure it would amply repay any trouble that might be taken in preparing it.

1411. You very naturally regard this inquiry as of use, not for the purposes of correcting the waste, or of recovering excessive expenditure, but for the purpose of guiding us for the future?—Quite so.

1412. And you do not see that that can be accomplished in any more effective way than by having a complete analysis of these accounts?—I see no more effective way of accomplishing it than by having a complete analysis of these accounts. I would even go further; I would have an analysis of former expeditions as far as it could be got afterwards; but that of course would be unconnected with the matter before this Committee.

1413. Are there any other items of excess on which you would wish to make remarks?—There are a number of items which I cannot understand at all, though I dare say they may be susceptible of the fullest explanation. There are a number of things that could not have been estimated, though I dare say they may be fair and reasonable; for instance, materials and labour for field works, 18,179*l.*; railway and railway stocks, 61,893*l.* (that is at page 5 of Mr. Turner's account); pile piers and teak posts in Annesley Bay, 16,671*l.*; commissariat sheds and repairs to dépôt at Bombay, 8,420*l.*; commissariat sheds at Zoulla, 7,036*l.*; materials for general hospitals, hutting troops, &c., 15,654*l.*; temporary accommodation for troops on return from India, 6,239*l.*; steam cranes at Zoulla, sinking wells, ramps for embarkation of troops, 2,283*l.*; landing and shipping charges, 7,412*l.*; donation batta to the force, which was not authorised until long after the estimate was framed, 92,918*l.* That should amount to a much larger sum. I should think the amount payable in this country and in India should be at least 250,000*l.* However, I cannot tell exactly.

1414. You stated that these items could not be matters of estimate; did you not know at all events in March that landing piers had to be constructed?—No, I knew little about it. In the places that we have been in the habit of going to, there never has been any necessity for anything of the kind.

1415. The commissariat sheds would be an inevitability; could you not have anticipated that?—I should think not; it was a country where, before the month of June, there would be no rain or anything to spoil the stores. I do not think that we have ever had a charge of the kind before. The railway and telegraphs were avowedly excluded in the estimate, and I mentioned that I knew nothing about them.

1416. There are some further items here, are there not, upon which you wish to make some remarks?—There is the staff pay of the Commissariat and Land Transport Corps, about 40,700*l.* That is an item which I could not very well have imagined.

1417. What is there special about that?—It is large in amount, but I suppose it has been all quite right. I have not the slightest wish, I beg to say, to find fault with anybody. I am merely trying to show how careful we were to do the best we could in estimating, and that the expense has far outstripped anything that we could have imagined from former experience.

1418. You had nothing in previous wars from  
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which you could have inferred this 40,000*l.* of pay for staff officers?—I think not, because they got the whole of their ordinary pay from the Indian Government, and this was merely extra. Then there is a very large item that I cannot understand: "Land Carriage of Provisions, Forage and Stores in India, and by natives of Abyssinia, also pressing hay into bales," 316,872*l.*

1419. What do you infer this charge to be for, according to the statement in the account?—This is all the information that is given, just as I have read it.

1420. This one-third of a million of money was paid for land carriage of forage and stores in India, and by natives of Abyssinia?—Yes, those are the words which are used in the accounts. I do not know what it means exactly. It was, I presume, in addition to the transport of all kinds that was paid for. No. 20 is "Warm Clothing for gratuitous issue to Troops," 203,989*l.*, returned at 54 and 55, page 183, 21,119*l.* This leaves 182,870*l.* for the Indian charge. The warm clothing allowed for Europeans by the Bombay regulations are a blanket and two flannel banyans; occasionally woollen socks were also allowed, but I cannot find any further issue sanctioned of any other description of clothing for Europeans.

1421. Those articles were supplied largely also from Europe, in addition to this Indian supply, were they not?—Yes, for natives (General Orders, 2nd November 1865). A country blanket, two pairs of flannel drawers, two flannel banyans, a pair of shoes, and occasionally woollen socks have been specially allowed. Then the Europeans and natives, as a matter of course, had their own woollen coats, trowsers, and great coats, as part of their ordinary equipment, which would not be charged to the Expedition. Then, in addition to the Bombay charge, you will find by the Blue Books before Parliament, that there was a very large quantity of warm clothing sent out from England; 4,000 blue serge banyans, 4,000 flannel shirts, 4,000 neck comforters, 4,000 Jersey shirts, 4,000 pairs of worsted stockings, 4,000 night caps, 4,000 great coats, 12,000 blankets, 12,000 pairs of boots, 30,000 waterproof sheets (Parliamentary Blue Book, page 164). This, I should have considered sufficient warm clothing for whatever force might go beyond the passes, and at Annesley Bay I suppose that they would not require much in the shape of warm clothing.

1422. And the 200,000*l.* spent in Bombay was entirely in excess of that which you regard as sufficient?—I can hardly positively say that it was sufficient, but I conceive that it might have been sufficient.

1423. But it was in excess of all that, was it not?—Yes, because Mr. Turner cannot have taken that into his account.

1424. Have you any remark to make upon No. 18?—There is the "Loading, shipping, and landing of Provisions, Forage, and Stores," 105,822*l.*

1425. Would you not have anticipated that in your estimate?—It is a very large sum; it is ten lacs of rupees for landing and shipping provisions and forage.

1426. Does that appear as a charge in the accounts in excess of all the rations, and of all the pay to all the followers?—Yes, you will find it at No. 18.

1427. You have no means of knowing whence they

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they drew the men, have you; to whom it was paid?—I merely see it in Mr. Turner's accounts. It does not state to whom it was paid; that is all the information that is available at present.

1428. There is another large item, is there not?—Yes, for repairing and fitting of vessels hired as transports, 237,674 *l.* That gives a very large sum for each transport.

1429. Have you ever known it to be a charge in the accounts of any previous war to repair transports?—No, I have never heard of anything of the kind. The only fitting for transports is when they carry animals; of course there must be fittings for that, but for the shipment of stores and the duties in which the greater part of the transports were engaged, there would be very little expense of any kind, for the carrying of troops.

1430. The fittings would be a matter of charter, and they might or might not be a charge upon the vessel?—I presume you will find a positive charge here at page 184, "Repair and fitting of vessels hired as transports."

1431. But you have never known of any charge for repairing vessels hired as transports before?—Never.

1432. Do you apprehend that there will be any difficulty in setting out the actual charge incurred in the prosecution of this expedition up to the end of 1867?—I should think not. If the accounts are full, there will be no difficulty in doing that.

1433. Are you aware that there was an estimate of 2,000,000 *l.* for putting the expedition in force upon the soil of Abyssinia?—Yes; you will see exactly what was included in that.

1434. Do you recognise that as the pioneer force, or as the whole expedition in force on the soil of Abyssinia?—It was a rough estimate prepared of the expenditure that would be required up to the 31st of December. I believe that nothing more was intended by it.

1435. And for that it was expected that we should place the whole expedition on the soil of Abyssinia, was it not?—Hardly that.

1436. Will you look and see whether that is so, because I think you are wrong if you limit the statement in that way?—It is "Sundry expenses for the marching of troops, with commissariat, forage, and all extra charges, together with transport, coal, and miscellaneous payments to the port of embarkation."

1437. Let me read to you the words of the Minister: "As far as we can calculate it will take exactly 2,000,000 *l.* to place our complete force upon the soil of Abyssinia. I think that General Napier may find himself with his army completely equipped and ready for action in Abyssinia at a cost of 2,000,000 *l.*;" do you see that?—I do not think this estimate exactly bears out that statement.

1438. At all events, this statement contemplates that the expedition will be placed in force, ready for the field, on the soil of Abyssinia, for 2,000,000 *l.*, does it not?—Yes.

1439. Can you gather from the accounts whether that estimate has been realised, or whether it has been exceeded, and if so, to what extent?—I should think it has been exceeded.

1440. Do you know to what extent supplies for the European troops were sent from England?—There is a statement in the Blue Book as to that; but I have not a sufficiently accurate statement to hand in. It would be better col-

lated from the accounts; but I should not have the least difficulty in ascertaining it. I may mention the things which were sent out without giving the quantities, because it is better to ascertain them minutely.

1441. There were commissariat stores, were there not?—There were commissariat stores sent out by the Admiralty and otherwise.

1442. How long would they maintain the troops, and what number of troops would they maintain?—I find here a very large quantity of salt beef and pork, and preserved potatoes.

1443. Are you aware that those stores were duplicated from Bombay?—I have never seen any return at all of stores, except what is before the Committee in their Blue Book.

1444. I see in an estimate which you made, that you anticipated that 53 vessels, amounting to 28,773 tons, should have been discharged from the service upon the delivery of their cargoes at Annesley Bay?—That is mentioned in the estimate.

1445. Can you conceive any reason why the whole of that fleet should have been detained in Annesley Bay?—I cannot conceive any reason, but I am very ill-informed upon the subject; but Captain Tryon has fully explained why a large portion was detained.

1446. It is not possible, is it, that the whole of that fleet would have been necessary to float off the men, stores, and provisions, that would have to be returned?—I should think not.

1447. Of course the provisions consumed had not to go back again?—The provisions consumed had not to go back again, and there was an enormous quantity of baggage animals that never did go back. There were 40,000 of them that never left the Abyssinian soil.

1448. Who was responsible for the detention of those vessels there?—I should conceive that the transport agent would act under the authority of the general officer.

1449. You say that expense was incurred by landing with the army, and sending far up the country an extra amount of reserve ammunition, much of which had to be destroyed; do you know how much ammunition was landed?—No; I have no returns of that.

1450. Do you know how far it was advanced up the country?—No.

1451. Do you know how much was destroyed?—I do not; it was so stated at that time, and I believe that it will be found to be correct.

1452. Do you conceive that being within one month of supplies from Egypt, and being within six or eight weeks of supplies from Bombay, anything would justify a surplus stock of stores to feed the expedition for six months?—I really cannot understand the enormous supply of stores, but at the same time it is difficult for me to offer any opinion; I cannot understand how it was necessary to have so many supplies; but at the same time I should be very sorry to make any reflection upon the arrangements that were made.

1453. I quite understand that; but I only wanted to obtain your professional opinion?—Well, I cannot understand it at all.

1454. Do you form any opinion as to whether or not an improved army organisation for the transaction of what I may call the business operations of the army is practicable; and if practicable, desirable?—It is a very wide question for me to reply to; it has been a matter of grave deliberation with many wise heads.

1455. I believe we shall get very few more distinguished

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distinguished authorities before us than yourself?—You are very kind to say so, but it is a very difficult thing to give an opinion upon.

1456. Having it in view that the benefits, if benefits are to arise at all from our inquiry, are rather for the future than for the correction of the past, I ask you that question?—I think that, perhaps, if the commissariat and other supply departments were more cognisant of the places where supplies were to be procured all over Europe and in India, and if the actual way in which they were to be purchased and got together when they were required, was more considered, great benefit would accrue from it.

1457. You will see by the Blue Book that the Administration, the War Department, and the Admiralty, in short the Government at home, were really uninformed as to the best market for the purchase of animals; would it not have been an advantage if there had been an army organisation in full possession of information as to the markets in which all the supplies necessary for the army (animals amongst other supplies) could have been purchased, and at what prices, without having to send up and down Europe, as we had to do?—Decidedly it would be most advantageous; there can be no doubt of that.

1458. Would there be any difficulty in having such an organisation?—I do not think there would.

1459. Is our Commissariat Department in any way trained to a knowledge of business?—Speaking of India (I know very little of the Commissariat Department in this country), they merely do the best they can on all emergencies to procure supplies either from the place, or from any part near; I do not think that there is any tabulated information.

1460. Do you think that if we had a department of the army charged with the duty of collecting year by year, and every year, full knowledge of the produce of such articles as our army should need in any part of the world, and that if we had that tabulated in the hands of the Government, or of the Commander in Chief, it would be of very great advantage, and would lead to very great economy?—It would be of the very greatest advantage.

1461. As to efficiency, and as to economy?—Both as to efficiency and as to economy, I have always been of opinion that one great thing wanting is tabulated information to be available on an emergency; I believe financial statistical information connected with army expenditure is totally wanting, and that if that was supplied and carefully kept up, it would be an immense advantage on going to war; and if you required any extra or larger supplies you would be at once able to put your finger on the very place that you could get them from.

1462. Would not such information, both as to the quantities, and the prices, be of the greatest value?—Yes; and even in this Abyssinian inquiry it would be valuable to see where all the things were purchased, and the rate at each place, and the amount purchased at each place, and how they were got.

1463. That is another reason in favour of the form of accounts which you were suggesting, is it not?—Quite so.

1464. You are aware, are you not, that an Expedition to Abyssinia was resolved upon in August?—Yes.

1465. That its base was Bombay, with ample  
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available tonnage; do you conceive it to be an unreasonable thing to expect that Expedition to be landed on the soil of Abyssinia deliberately, fully equipped, economically supplied, by the 1st of January?—I do not see why it should not.

1466. There were four or five months for preparation, were there not?—Yes.

1467. Would you think that an army of this magnitude, having that time to make preparations and to proceed to Abyssinia, over a 10 or 14 days' passage, could be said to be hurried in its preparation?—I think they were hurried, from the very absence of the information that you suggest as being very desirable. It was difficult to know where to look for or to get what was wanted; and there was a great deal of hurry, and you were obliged, perhaps, to send duplicate supplies and make duplicate arrangements in many ways that you would not have done if all the information that you suggest had been available.

1468. Then if the Army Department had been well informed, you think that the time which elapsed between the inception of the Expedition and taking the field in Abyssinia was very ample?—It was not very ample, but I think it was sufficient if they had been able to come exactly at what they wanted at once; I do not think it was, in any case, very ample.

1469. Then if we had had adequate army organisation for the conduct of the business, you think that the pleas that are put forward as justifying expense, viz., haste and want of time, would have been unfounded?—I can only repeat what I have said, that if we had known exactly where to get the supplies required, of course there would not have been such haste as there was; we did not know where to look for them.

1470. Colonel Barttelot.] I presume that many of the answers that you have given are merely your own private opinion?—I have distinctly stated, in every instance, that I have great difficulty in giving any opinion upon the subject; but so far as I am able to do so, I have given it as the Committee require me to do it; at the same time, I beg to say that I have not the slightest intention of finding fault with anybody or anything; I merely want to justify the conclusions at which we arrived as to the expense, and to show that it was carefully and well attended to; but still that the expenditure was such as we could not possibly have anticipated.

1471. For instance, with regard to the fleet that were kept in Annesley Bay, I suppose that if Lord Napier had not thought it necessary that that fleet should be kept there, a great portion of it would have been sent back to Bombay?—Certainly.

1472. Therefore, *à fortiori*, he thought it absolutely necessary to keep the fleet there?—Precisely.

1473. And he must necessarily have been the best judge as to whether the fleet ought to have been kept there or whether it ought not?—Certainly.

1474. Then, again, as to whether anything would justify the enormous amount of stores, namely, stores for six months, I presume that he was the best judge as to whether he should require those stores for six months or whether he would have trusted to a monthly supply from Egypt or from Bombay?—Certainly; he was entirely the judge of the matter.

1475. And, therefore, when an expedition was entrusted  
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entrusted to a man like Lord Napier, we must not hear cavil at what he thought was absolutely necessary for an expedition of that kind?—Of course his opinions are in every way entitled to the greatest respect, and I would not at all dispute his acting and doing everything for the very best; that is not at all a matter on which I could say anything.

1476. Supposing that you had been in command of that army, and that you had thought it necessary to have six months' stores, should you not have provided those six months' stores for the safety of your expedition?—Most certainly, if I thought it necessary.

1477. Any general on the spot would be much better able to judge of that than anybody at home, would he not?—I believe so, certainly.

1478. Supposing that you had been responsible for the success of that expedition, do you think that in a hostile country of that kind you would have rested satisfied with the chance of a monthly supply from Egypt, or from Bombay?—Of course the general on the spot must be the person to judge of what is necessary; but at the same time, when you are estimating the charges for an expedition, and find that they are greatly exceeded, you cannot at once understand how they were exceeded. Without doubting for a moment that the excess was unavoidable, all I wish to state is, that although Lord Napier thought it was so, yet our estimates were correct as far as we could judge at the time. Certain supplies were required which we never anticipated. As to this extra supply not being justifiable, or that Lord Napier did anything otherwise than nobly and well, I would not for a moment allow myself to think. The supply of provisions and other expenses were more than we could have possibly anticipated; but far be it from me to presume to find fault with Lord Napier's arrangements, and an inquiry of this nature does not imply any reflection on the general commanding.

1479. Must not any expedition of the nature of the Expedition to Abyssinia necessarily be one upon which we, here at home, could form no very accurate opinion as to the probable cost?—Most decidedly; we have held all along that we did the very best we could; but it was utterly impossible to form any accurate opinion.

1480. Particularly having nothing to refer to which would guide you as to the cost of the different articles when landed in Abyssinia?—Quite so; and having reference to the fact that there was no expedition at all like the Abyssinian Expedition that we had ever had, or are perhaps ever likely to have.

1481. Sir *James Elphinstone*.] Did you ever hear of an expedition so entirely dependent upon external supplies as the Abyssinian Expedition?—No doubt it was so, to a larger extent than any former expedition.

1482. If it had so happened that they had not caught Theodore, but that they had been detained in the high country during the rains, would you have thought that that provision of six months' stores was in excess of what was absolutely necessary to have carried the troops over that period?—It is a thing on which I can hardly be expected to give an opinion; the route to Egypt was open during the whole of the rains of course, and to Bombay it would have been closed.

1483. But was the route up to the high country

open, or would it not have been necessary to have accumulated large stores upon the top of the ghauts?—No doubt it would.

1484. With regard to Lord Napier's retaining the fleet, are you not aware that there is very great difficulty in getting sailing ships out of the Red Sea?—That is so, according to the evidence.

1485. *Lord Elcho*.] You have been asked whether it would not be very desirable that a proper system of supplies for the army should be established; the evidence which you have been giving refers to the state of matters existing as regards the supplies of the army in 1867 and 1868; I suppose you are aware that since that time a new system has been established, called the system of control, under the Controller General?—I am quite aware of that.

1486. So that it is quite possible that those points which have been referred to by the Chairman as being defective in 1867 and 1868, may have since been remedied, or may be in process of being remedied?—No doubt that may be the case; I was merely talking of the time when the Abyssinian Expedition commenced, when it would have been very desirable, if we had known, where to have procured everything.

1487. Can you yourself speak now as to the system at present in operation, or that is to be brought into operation, as regards the supplies of the army?—I cannot.

1488. So that it is very possible that those points referred to by the Chairman may be met, or may be being met?—Quite so; it may be possible.

1489. You yourself can give no direct evidence upon that subject?—Certainly not.

1490. Such evidence, if got at all, should be obtained from the Controller General or from some person in the War Office conversant with what is going on; the Controller General at this moment being Sir Henry Storks, with departments under him, one to supply the munitions of war, under Colonel Adie, and the other, which is commonly called the Commissariat Department, under Sir William Power, who has also the transport under him?—Quite so.

1491. *Mr. White*.] In fact, you know nothing about what that new system would do?—I know nothing about the working of it.

1492. Might it not break down, as all the arrangements they have made in the War Office have broken down, when you come to actual contest?—It would be presumption in me to say anything on the subject.

1493. *Lord Elcho*.] Do you know any human arrangement, either public or private, that is not liable to break down?—They may always break down.

1494. Either in commerce, trade, manufactures, or war?—Quite so.

1495. Sir *John Hay*.] With reference to that department on the special subject of Abyssinia, do you think that it would have been in the power of any department to have had any special information with regard to Abyssinia, looking to the amount of knowledge which existed at that time in reference to that country?—Certainly not; but it is not merely with regard to that country. There might have been a great deal of information in connection with the purchases that were made for the Expedition both in India and in England, which would have been extremely useful if they had been tabulated and ready for use.

1496. Would

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1496. Would it not be time, however, that so large a purchaser as an army in the field coming into those markets in the east, must have of necessity deranged them, and obviated any advantage based upon the normal condition of prices?—It would, to a certain extent, neutralise the advantage, but not entirely, because you would be able to come down on the very place where you required to purchase certain things.

1497. But it is not true that with regard to the purchase of animals every port on the coast of Arabia was ransacked for animals of every description?—If we had that information in short that we now have, I think it would not have been necessary to ransack so many ports, but that we should have done it much more easily, benefiting by the information that we have now got.

1498. Supposing that 40,000 baggage animals were wanted in the course of the next few weeks, is it your opinion that they could be obtained with the information we now have without deranging the markets?—Certainly not without deranging the markets, but we should be in a better position than we were in with regard to the Abyssinian Expedition. If we had all the information that the Chairman suggests, I think we could certainly come into the market better, and get things at a less expense perhaps, and organise the method of sending them to their destination better than was done at that time.

1499. Do you think that so large and sudden a demand may be met by the ordinary arrangements in a department?—To a very considerable extent. A large demand will always derange a market, no doubt, whatever information you have; but still if you know all the different markets to go to you are in a better position.

1500. And they are known now, I suppose?—I think the Abyssinian Expedition has thrown a great deal of additional light on the mode of procuring supplies.

1501. Mr. *White*.] With regard to that large and sudden demand was not the estimate of the value of all articles doubled; and was not that supposed to be a sufficient margin to meet that sudden and unexpected demand which arose for those commodities?—There were circumstances of which we had no knowledge, and it was quite impossible for us to make any estimate.

1502. In fact, all antecedent experience proved to be valueless?—Yes, perfectly so; and we had very little experience to go by.

1503. Mr. *Seely*.] Do you know whether the stores supplied were in excess of Lord Napier's requisitions?—I do not know at all.

1504. Lord *Elcho*.] You mentioned as appearing too excessive, the charge for warm clothing; that warm clothing was intended for all the camp followers, as well as for the troops, was it not?—I presume only for those that went above the passes.

1505. But it was not confined to the armed men in the ranks, was it?—No; the whole of the followers would get a blanket, or something to keep them warm, of course, but the principal supply was, of course, to the combatants.

1506. I suppose the followers would be susceptible of cold equally with the combatants?—Certainly; I believe all that went above the passes had warm clothing.

1507. It would be as necessary for the sake of the combatants, I imagine, to supply the followers with warm clothing (otherwise they would have perished) as to supply the combatants themselves with warm clothing?—Quite so.

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1508. The climate was not only very varied, but the contrast between the heat at one time of the year and the cold at the other is perhaps as striking in Abyssinia as in any other part where we have ever conducted an expedition, if not more so, is not that the case?—Yes; that would account for a part of the charge, no doubt.

1509. As regards the charge for land carriage of provisions, forage, and stores in India, and by natives of Abyssinia, and also pressing hay in bales, 316,872*l.*, that seems to you excessive?—I beg to explain that in any of the amounts that I have stated, the excess may be mere imagination, but it is not certainly easily comprehensible in the absence of detail.

1510. You cannot by any means within your reach or knowledge, explain that large item of 316,872*l.* under those headings?—Certainly not. It appears an unaccountable item, but of course it may be susceptible of the fullest and most perfect explanation. I am not in a situation to condemn any of the items, but merely to say that I could not have imagined their amount with reference to former expeditions.

1511. Sir *John Hay*.] Do you happen to know whether any portion of this amount includes the purchases from the military chest?—I do not know anything more about it than that it is taken from the proceedings before this Committee. I have seen nothing but the Blue Book.

1512. Sir *James Elphinstone*.] Are you aware that there was a hay famine in Bombay in consequence of the quantity of hay that was bought up in Bombay for this Expedition?—Hay is always extremely scarce in Bombay, and very expensive even at any time.

1513. *Chairman*.] Your attention has been directed to the fact that the supplies were drawn mainly from outside the country where the operations had to be carried on, and you said that you had not known anything parallel to that; do you forget the Crimea?—I stated in my former evidence that I know very little about the Crimea; I have only seen what was stated in the newspapers; I was in India at the time.

1514. But are you aware that the army in the Crimea had to derive the whole of its supplies from over sea?—I was referring to Indian expeditions; I am not at all informed as to the Crimean Expedition.

1515. With regard to the animals in the estimate which you made in October 1867, you state that you cannot take much to account for animals left from the Expedition; your words are, "The cattle must die in great numbers, and when returned will sell for scarcely anything." Would you like to explain how you would harmonise that with your answer to a following question put by the honourable and gallant Member on my right (Sir John Hay): "As a matter of fact, 29,000 animals were lost for which you might have calculated that the Crown would have had to receive 40*l.* a piece. (A.) I would hardly say that; I would say 20*l.* a piece would have been the utmost, and perhaps not that"?—There was a little confusion there; at one time there were two gentlemen from the Mauritius who said that the mules might be sent there; you will find that also in my evidence.

1516. Then the failure to realise the price of the animals after the Expedition does not account for the increased cost of the Expedition, does it?—No.

1517. You never anticipated that the animals  
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would be marketable to any extent, did you?—I charged the whole sum in the estimate, reckoning almost no return; but from what I heard afterwards, I was in hopes that there would be some return. Those gentlemen said that in the Mauritius the planters would readily buy the mules for the cultivation of their estates, and that if arrangements were made they might be sent down there and sold.

1518. You would wish to correct that answer then would you not?—I think so.

1519. The failure to realise 20 *l.* apiece, did not affect the ultimate cost of the Expedition as estimated by you, did it?—Not in any way.

1520. Sir *James Elphinstone*.] But then those gentlemen did not stand to their offer, and they did not buy the mules?—There was no offer; I believe it will be found that the cattle estimate is a large one throughout because they had an immense number of animals. I do not know how many of the 57,000 were purchased in Abyssinia.

1521. *Chairman*.] Will you state to the Committee what course we must take to get this analysis of accounts which you have been kind enough to suggest?—If you would appoint somebody to the duty, it might be done.

1522. Are you aware that the Committee have no power of doing that?—I do not know how it is to be done. The headings would be those of the estimate, entering into as much of detail as is necessary. You would merely state the description of stores, and the articles and animals purchased at each place, and sum the total together; and then take the commissariat expenditure with a proper classification, and then compare that with the estimate. There is no use in preparing any form. The way in which it should be done is quite obvious; the only difficulty is that Mr. Turner seems to think that it would be almost an impossibility.

1523. The fact is, that such a table will go a long way to answer the question referred to this Committee, would it not?—It would go a long way to answer it, and I think it would be exceedingly useful. For instance, take the baggage cattle; you would say, so many furnished in India; price of elephants, camels, mules, bullocks, or whatever was sent up, and then you would go to all the different places in which the mules were purchased, and tabulate the rate at which they were purchased, and the expense of them thence to Suez; and then you might consider their transport to the port of debarkation. Then with the stores, you might see where all the different descriptions of grain and forage were purchased; how much in Bombay, how much in Egypt, how much in Abyssinia, and the rates in each place. I think it would put before the Committee a very valuable amount of information; but as to the difficulty of doing it I can hardly speak without seeing the whole of the accounts put together.

1524. Can you form an estimate of the cost?—I do not think the cost would be anything at all considerable.

1525. Lord *Elcho*.] In framing your own estimate did you proceed upon that principle?—Not at all; we proceeded on former experience. In short it was the very best we could imagine at the time. We had no information whatever of the sum that was likely to be disbursed. We could merely look to the Persian Expedition or to former military charges. We went into everything connected with Indian charges, and I

tried to put them together in the best way I could. We never attempted to say that it was a perfectly final and reliable estimate; but it was just the very best that we could make at the time.

1526. For instance, as to mules you had no actual data as to what mules would cost, had you?—We knew pretty well. We had bought mules before in India, and from the little information I could collect, we assumed a certain amount. However, you will find that that is the best part of the estimate, and that the purchase of cattle is as nearly correct as possible as far as the Blue Book shows.

1527. Sir *John Hay*.] The framework of your estimate, I suppose, and the mode in which you arranged the different headings would be the same framework in which you propose that the accounts should be arranged by Mr. Turner, for comparison with your estimate?—Quite so; only that I should perhaps enter a little more into detail.

1528. But that would be a guide to any gentleman who was employed for the purpose of arranging the accounts for the Committee, would it not?—Yes.

1529. Lord *Elcho*.] At that time did you know whether there was in any branch of our war administration any information of that kind, either in the Quartermaster General's department, or in Sir Henry James' department?—No; nothing of the kind, I merely took the documents that were furnished.

1530. You are not aware whether there is any record of that kind, as to the different countries where articles can best be got, and so forth?—No, I am not aware.

1531. Colonel *Barttelot*.] I presume that the estimate which you then made out was the estimate, more or less, that was furnished to Parliament at that time?—Yes, it is sent with a covering letter here from the Secretary of State, "The information available here for the preparation of our estimate of the expenditure on account of this Expedition is very insufficient, although repeated applications have been made to the Government of Bombay on the subject. An estimate has, however, been prepared in this office which must be regarded as approximate only, from which it appears that the charges in India and England to the end of May 1868, will probably amount to about 5,000,000 *l.* A copy of this estimate is forwarded herewith. That sum is considerably in excess of the amount shown in Mr. Turner's estimate to the end of April 1868, after allowing for the additional month's expenditure; but it is stated by Mr. Turner that his estimate is framed on incomplete data." That is on the spot.

1532. But what I wish to gather again from you is simply this: was the estimate which was given was the best that could be arrived at at the time?—It was the best that we could give after very serious and careful consideration; what I now intend is to prove that it was not a careless estimate, but that it was an impossible estimate.

1533. And that no Government, let them be what they might, could possibly have come to a more accurate estimate than you endeavoured to frame at that time?—The Government could have known very little about the matter. If the expenditure had been telegraphed from all quarters weekly or every two or three days; then the Government would have been much more able to state

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state to Parliament what the expense would be, but the fact is, that nothing was known.

1534. But with the information that was then before you, they could not have given perhaps a more accurate statement than they did?—From the information then before us, I may say that we did the very best possible.

1535. Lord *Elcho*.] Were not two data absolutely necessary for framing anything like an accurate estimate, one being the details as to the prices of the different things in different parts of the world?—We had that very partially; we knew the price very imperfectly of a mule in Persia.

1536. And you think that for the future it would be very desirable to have a record of that kind?—Yes.

1537. The other difficulty with which you had to contend was the want of any knowledge of the country to which this Expedition was going; is that so?—Very little was known about it.

1538. Do you recollect the articles that were written in public newspapers at the time, describing what was believed to be the state of the country, and the chances of the Expedition?—Quite so.

1539. Do you recollect a speech which was made in the House of Commons by a very distinguished person, who is now Chancellor of the Exchequer, giving a picture of what this army would have to encounter?—Yes.

1540. There was apparently at that time absolute ignorance even on the part of intelligent persons as to what the state of that country was, and the probability of the failure or success of the Expedition?—Quite so.

1541. Mr. *White*.] But with railways and telegraphic communication in every part of the world, could not the Government have obtained much more information to have formed a basis for a more correct calculation if it had taken the trouble to do it?—I can only say that Sir Stafford Northcote was most earnestly anxious to get all the information he could, as he has stated in his own evidence.

1542. Lord *Elcho*.] Was it not the case that this expedition was for the purpose of freeing from captivity in an unknown country those persons who alone might if they had been free have given information as to the internal state of that country?—I do not think that that is a question which I can answer.

1543. *Chairman*.] With respect to our knowledge of the country, are you not aware, indeed have you not quoted to-day, passages revealing a considerable amount of knowledge of the resources of the country?—At that date, but that was perhaps after they had arrived.

1544. Are you not aware that Lord Napier had from time to time communications from the imprisoned consul and his associates, as to the conditions under which war could be made in Abyssinia?—I believe the whole of them are in the Blue Book.

1545. And you have read them?—Yes; indeed there has been so much to read, that I do not bear them all in my memory.

1546. But we had a considerable amount of reliable information, had we not, as to the nature of the Abyssinian climate and geography, before the expedition started?—It was very unreliable. You will see in the articles, as one instance, that there was the tatze fly, that was to eat up the whole of the Expedition; and then they said that

you could not get this, and you could not get that; and the only reliable information was after the pioneer force went there.

1547. The pioneer force were there a considerable time before the Expedition went in force, were they not?—Yes.

1548. And the Commander in Chief had much information from that pioneer force before he himself landed on the soil of Abyssinia, had he not?—The whole of the information that he had is published in the Blue Book.

1549. To what extent did the specialities, under which we made war in Abyssinia, tend to increase the estimates?—It would be difficult for me to answer that question.

1550. The country was known to be mountainous, was it not?—Certainly.

1551. Was not the progress to Magdala known to be difficult?—Yes.

1552. Was not the extent to which we could draw supplies also known?—Very imperfectly.

1553. Your estimates were all framed on the basis of taking all your supplies from the ships, were they not?—Not at all. In my evidence, to-day, I have said that I calculated on rations to a great extent, as well as cattle and forage, and other things, being procurable in Abyssinia.

1554. But the supplies for the troops you provided in your estimate as being drawn from the ships, did you not?—To a great extent, certainly, but not altogether.

1555. Were the supplies found in Abyssinia also what you took into account when you formed your estimate?—I cannot state exactly what they were now until we get the accounts. I believe that nobody knows at this moment what supplies were got in Abyssinia.

1556. Then was not your answer to the noble Lord, that our ignorance of the conditions under which we made war in Abyssinia tended to increase the estimate, premature?—I did not understand that to be the purport of my answer.

1557. The difficulty which you experienced in making an estimate arose from your want of knowledge as to the state of things in Abyssinia, did it not?—Entirely.

1558. Can you now tell whether the supplies on which you counted from Abyssinia were or were not obtained?—I cannot tell to what extent they were obtained.

1559. Then how far that ignorance of the condition of Abyssinia, when you made your estimate, affected your estimate you cannot now tell?—Yes; for instance, I made the rations and the forage threefold, believing that there would be difficulties of some kind; instead of 10 rupees I made it 30 rupees.

1560. I understand that you multiplied your estimate of the amount of forage threefold beyond what you believed to be the necessities of the Expedition?—Yes.

1561. Then did you count upon nothing whatever as obtainable in Abyssinia in the nature of forage?—That might or might not be the case; I merely put down a sum which I thought would under any circumstances meet the wants of the army.

1562. Then, supposing that there had been any failure in Abyssinia, and supposing that a single ounce of forage had not been got, you would not have increased your estimate?—I should think not.

1563. The climate of Abyssinia was known, was it not?—To a certain extent it was.

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1564. Then, must we not very much qualify your previous answer, that our ignorance of the state of things in Abyssinia tended to obscure and to render unreliable your estimate?—Then, there is another thing to be said: supposing that the people had been hostile during our advance, and had given no supplies at all, or had even cut off the supplies that we were sending up to the force, that of course would have increased the expense enormously.

1565. No doubt; but for that to be relevant to this inquiry, you must not have calculated upon their peaceful demeanour, but that they would have turned out hostile, contrary to the fact?—I could not calculate on the extent of hostility.

1566. Then your estimates were not affected by any condition of circumstances which was afterwards developed in Abyssinia?—No; nothing that we are aware of at all at present.

1567. Sir John Hay.] But it was not known, when the Expedition left, to what part of Abyssinia it was going, I believe?—We always understood that it was going to Magdala.

1568. So far as I have understood (having had something to do with it), the General was going to Debra Tabor at once, by the Pass of Lamalmon, as to which we were referred to certain information which had been collected in a scattered form, and which was generally derived from Mr. Bruce, the Abyssinian traveller; is not that so?—I do not recollect it.

1569. Are you then still of opinion that, at the time when the expedition was organised, and when it was not known whether it would land at Massowah or at Annesley Bay, or any of the other ports in the Red Sea, it was also determined to what part of Abyssinia it was to direct its course?—The estimate could have no reference to the part of Abyssinia to which the Expedition would go, but merely to the duration of the Expedition. What I thought of from the first was, to endeavour to establish a monthly rate, upon which we could depend as much as possible. We could not determine what the ultimate expense would be, but we endeavoured to arrive at what a proper monthly charge would be.

1570. But looking to the statement which has been made before this Committee by the General commanding the Expedition, that the protection of his communications, even to Magdala, occupied a very large amount of his force, would not any further distance have entailed greater expenditure, and a greater number of posts for the protection of his communications, and a longer carriage?—I presume that he would have had enough men to protect his posts even if he had gone further.

1571. Supposing that he had gone 600 miles instead of 400 miles, would not that have entailed an additional expense in the carriage of supplies which a hostile country would not afford?—I suppose that the Land Transport Corps should have been sufficient for everything that was necessary.

1572. But is it not a more expensive matter for a land transport corps to convey provisions 600 miles than 400 miles?—Very much would depend upon what they could get in the country; and of course it is not more expensive to convey provisions 600 miles than 400 miles, provided you have an ample establishment on pay to do it with, which they appear to have had.

1573. Have you read the evidence of the General given before this Committee?—Yes.

1574. Does he seem to think that he had a superfluity of transport corps?—He does not.

1575. Chairman.] The estimate was formed as a time estimate, was it not?—It was formed as a time estimate.

1576. If it cost more to take the army 600 miles, it would be because it took a longer time to do it, would it not?—No doubt.

1577. Was not the estimate formed on the assumption that the objects of the Expedition would be accomplished in April?—In May; and I think that if the Expedition had remained in Abyssinia for a few months longer, the 600,000 *l.* would have brought the estimate much nearer the truth than it was.

1578. Sir John Hay.] At what time had you made up your mind that the Expedition would terminate in April?—There was every sort of report about it at first. They said that Theodore was frightened, and that he would give up, and day by day there was something different said; but there seemed to be a general belief that it would not last long, but that somehow or other they would get hold of him.

1579. But looking to the fact that you had that belief, the General made preparations for continuing in Abyssinia for six months after the 31st of May, did he not?—He must have done that, of course, because it was quite impossible for him to know what the result would be.

1580. And, as a matter of fact, the Expedition did not terminate, as far as expenditure was concerned, until the end of July, I believe?—Not until after that.

1581. Therefore the supposition of those who imagined that the Expedition would be over by the end of April was a mistaken supposition, was it not?—It was.

1582. Chairman.] The Government Estimate was upon the basis of the objects of the Expedition being accomplished by the end of April for 3,500,000 *l.*, was it not?—Yes; but the estimates of 3,500,000 *l.* and of 5,000,000 *l.* are almost identical. If you compare the one with the other, there is not much difference between them. The fact is, that you should always assume the 5,000,000 *l.* as the estimate, because we had then heard of the enormous transport that was engaged in Bombay, and we immediately included that. We had no information before as to the number of ships. The first we received was in the "Bombay Times," which Mr. Turner accepted as reliable. If you strike off the pay of the troops, which was in the first estimate, you will find that the two estimates agree within a very small sum.

1583. Sir John Hay.] Would the 5,000,000 *l.* represent the amount which would have been necessary for the continuance of the Expedition until the 31st of May, supposing the objects of the Expedition to be gained?—Yes; we put another month on.

1584. Then was the additional time during June, July, and a portion of August included in that estimate?—I always stated that ours was a monthly estimate, and not a final estimate.

1585. And no final estimate was ever presented to Parliament?—Certainly, as I believe, none was; but there were statements made in the House of Commons which appeared to make it look like a final estimate.

1586. Chairman.] You know that the estimate was 3,500,000 *l.*, assuming the Expedition to have

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have accomplished its work during the month of April?—Yes.

1587. Then there was an estimate of 5,000,000*l.* to carry on the operations until the end of May? Yes.

1588. That is only a month longer?—Yes.

1589. Then it will hardly follow, will it, the increase being 1,500,000*l.* and the estimate being 600,000*l.* a month, that the estimates are identical?—If you compare them (and you will find that they are very easily compared) at page 153, you will find transport put down as 150,000*l.*, that means sea transport. Now in the estimate which was furnished in March you will find transport put down at 400,000*l.*; the difference between the two is 250,000*l.* a month. We were entirely out in the transport; even that estimate of 400,000*l.* was wrong, and I believe that Captain Tryon's estimate of 433,000*l.* will be very considerably below the actual amount; I believe that Admiral Mends is nearest the truth, although, still perhaps, on examination, the charge may be found to exceed this amount.

1590. Therefore the estimates are not identical, are they?—I said except the sea transport. If you deduct the pay of the troops, and add the sea transport, and make a little alteration in the coals and several other things, you will find them to be nearly similar.

1591. But the total estimate to the end of April being 3,500,000*l.*, the additional estimate at the rate of 600,000*l.* a month would be only 4,100,000*l.*?—We found that we were totally out in the transport. In the other items there was only a trifling difference.

1592. Captain *Beaumont*.] I wish to ask you one or two questions with a view to seeing whether certain opinions which I have formed from the evidence which you have given are correct; you were asked to prepare an estimate of the expenses for the Abyssinian Expedition; you made a statement, but you deny that it was an estimate in the proper acceptance of the term, and say that it was a guess only, and that it was made without even a knowledge of what the commanding officer's view of the requirements of the case might be; is that so?—I never said that it was a guess. If you look at the estimate you will see upon what it was framed. There is the allowance for rations, and the number of cattle and followers, the purchase of pack animals, the coals, and so on. There was nothing like a guess, but there was no information from which a correct estimate could be made.

1593. Then the word "guess" was not a correct word to use; but it was an estimate without sufficient data, was it not?—It was an estimate without sufficient data, and we avowedly said that from the first; I have always stated that.

1594. It was not your duty, I presume, to have prepared such an estimate?—Decidedly not. From my having considerable knowledge of military expenditure, and having been engaged in it all my life, it was thought perhaps that I could form a more correct estimate than some other people, and therefore I cheerfully did so; but it was not my duty, nor was it connected in any way with the duties in which I am employed in the India Office.

1595. Do you know of any one whose duty it would have been to have prepared such an estimate?—I should think that the proper person was the Controller General of India, in communication with the Controllers at Madras and Bombay, and then of course we in England should have been responsible for adding the expenditure that had been incurred in England up to the date of the receipt of those estimates from India.

1596. In point of fact, you think that the estimates should have been prepared in India, and not in England?—I think that it would have been much more desirable; there was an estimate prepared in India, which is upon the proceedings of the Committee.

1597. Assuming that India was not applied to, was there anybody here whose position would have enabled him to prepare an estimate better than yourself?—The authorities in India were applied to. I do not know of anybody who would be cognisant of the different charges; but it would be presumption on my part to say that many people could not have done it better.

1598. Under similar circumstances at present, is there any person to whom the Government could turn to prepare such an estimate officially?—I should think not; I believe that in the case of any expedition proceeding from India, and sent on any service, in future the estimate had better be prepared there. It might be revised and examined here, and the home charges might be added, but I think that the estimate should have come from India. I believe, however, that it was found almost impossible to get estimates either from Calcutta or from Bombay; you have the estimate of the Controller General, Colonel Broome, on the records of the proceedings of the Committee, and you will find that his is much smaller than mine; he estimates for six months at a very small figure.

1599 *Chairman*.] Had you ever any intimation from the Commander in Chief of his wants for the Expedition?—I had nothing whatever to do with the matter.

1600. Neither through the India Office nor through the War Office, had you any communications or statements of his wants?—None whatever.

*Tuesday, 3rd May 1870.*

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Colonel Barttelot.  
Captain Beaumont.  
Mr. Campbell.  
Mr. Candlish.  
Mr. Christopher Denison.  
Mr. Eastwick.

Lord Elcho.  
Sir James Elphinstone.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Howes.  
Mr. Seely.  
Mr. Charles Turner.

JOHN CANDLISH, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Mr. CLEMENTS MARKHAM, called in; and Examined.

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1601. *Chairman.*] You were officially connected with, and formed a part of, the Abyssinian Expedition, I believe?—I did.

1602. Will you state what your position was?—I was appointed as geographer by the Treasury.

1603. What were your duties?—I received no special instructions, but I suppose the duties to be the same as they would be in exploring any other unknown country; namely, to fix positions astronomically, take notes of the physical character of the country, and of the heights, and make a route map. I have here a paper of the distances which were chained by Colonel Phayre's people. They were the distances along the road.

1604. Will you hand that in?—I will (*handing in the same*).

1605. Will you state the distances from the leading stations?—The distance from Mulkutto to Senafé by the road is 60 miles.

1606. Senafé was the first station, was it not?—It was the first station.

1607. Will you supply the Committee with a map?—I will supply the Committee with my maps. From Senafé to Adigerat, the distance was about 36 miles 3 furlongs; from Adigerat to Agula, it was 43 miles 6 furlongs; from Agula to Antálo, it was 33 miles; from Antálo to Dildi, it was 79 miles 7 furlongs; from Dildi to Mágdala, is 76 miles 2 furlongs; making 329 miles 2 furlongs from the sea to Mágdala.

1608. Not 400 miles, as we have been led to believe?—No; 329 miles was the chained distance. The chain cut off angles, of course. It would be, perhaps, 350 miles by the road.

1609. Do you consider that your position in the army was such as to give you favourable opportunities of noting facts?—Yes, I think I had as good an opportunity as it was possible to have.

1610. From an early period it was your purpose to write a history of the Expedition, was it not?—It was my purpose to write an account of it for a magazine; but I had no intention of writing a history until I came back.

1611. That purpose would lead you to be more observant of facts than you might otherwise have been?—No. It would have been my duty as geographer, to collect all possible facts, I conceive.

1612. When did you land in Abyssinia?—On the 12th of December.

1613. You remained at the landing-place for eight days?—I remained at the landing-place for eight days.

1614. Had you any opportunity of observing the condition of the animals, and the arrangement for the well being of the animals and the troops?—Yes; I saw something of that.

1615. Did you note defects in the arrangements for the care and feeding of the animals at that time?—Yes.

1616. Can you describe them?—I found general sickness; a vast number of the animals were loose, and in the most fearful state, and wandering about over the plain without food. When I first landed there was a great difficulty about the water, which was better arranged afterwards. They had at first to crowd at a certain hour to a trough, and it was very difficult to get the water, but that was very much improved three or four days after I landed.

1617. Have you any means of knowing the extent to which animals were lost, and the causes of that loss?—I have no idea of the extent. I saw a great number of animals wandering about on the plain, some of them in a wounded state, limping, and apparently with their legs broken.

1618. Can you speak more definitely as to the number?—No.

1619. Were there hundreds or thousands in that state?—I cannot say; I may say that the reason, I believe, was, that the muleteers, or a great number of them, just at that time, ran away to Massowah. The Egyptians sent them back, I think.

1620. Do you know what was done to rectify that state of things?—Sir Charles Staveley ordered the soldiers of the 33rd Regiment to take charge of the mules.

1621. What was done to get over the difficulty resulting from the want of water?—The trough was enlarged, and a better system was adopted for the animals to come at particular times.

1622. From what was the trough supplied?—From the ships,

1623. You started for Senafé on the 20th of December, did you not?—Yes, on the 20th I went up with Sir Charles Staveley; and from that time I was at Senafé, until the 1st of February, I think.

1624. You

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1624. You were with head quarters, I think, from that time until you reached Mágdala?—I was in advance of the head quarters, with Sir William Merewether, until they reached Antálo, and afterwards with head quarters.

1625. You left Mágdala on your return to England on the 20th April, did you not?—Yes.

1626. Did you leave after the troops?—I left before the troops.

1627. After General Napier had left Mágdala, on his return?—Yes.

1628. You reached the coast on the 6th of May, and you sailed for Suez on the 8th of May, did you not?—Yes.

1629. Can you tell the Committee anything of the resources of the country, as to supplies for the army, such as food for the troops, and forage for the animals?—At Senafé we found that the two northernmost provinces through which we had passed had suffered from a blight caused by a failure of the crops, owing to the locusts; and at first there was a good deal of difficulty in getting any corn in the immediate neighbourhood, but afterwards, when the people at a greater distance heard that prices were regularly paid, they began to come in more rapidly.

1630. Will you be a little more definite as to what you mean by "at first," and by "afterwards;" can you fix the time?—I found that from the 1st to the 14th of January the barley began to come in, in considerable quantities; previously to that much less or very little, I think, had come in; I only reached Senafé, I think, the day before Christmas day, the 24th. Between the 24th of December and the 1st of January, very little came in, and afterwards considerable quantities of barley came in, but there was always plenty of grass, which came in in great quantities throughout that time. There was a market on Thursdays near the camp, which was always attended by a Commissariat officer.

1631. From what sources were the animals fed at Senafé when you advanced there?—With the grass of the country.

1632. Had you not forage from the coast then?—I believe the grain was grain from the coast at first, until the barley began to come in, in the first and second weeks of January.

1633. Whence did the supplies which fed the troops then come?—From the coast.

1634. That was up to the early part of January?—And later.

1635. I have a fact from you, that during the first two weeks of January 60,000 lbs. of barley and 200,000 lbs. of grass were brought in, besides bullocks, sheep, and ghee; is that so?—That was the information that I received from Major Thacker, of the Commissariat.

1636. Lord *Elcho*.] When did you get those figures from the Commissariat officer?—On the 14th of January Major Thacker told me that.

1637. On the spot?—On the spot.

1638. Was it with a view to your article that you collected that information at the time?—No; in conversation. I used to ask the officers for any information that I could get upon those points, and take a note of any information that I received.

1639. *Chairman*.] The next station was 36 miles from Senafé to Adigerat, was it not?—Yes, that is about 36 miles.

1640. What supplies came there, to your knowledge?—There was a market on Mondays, at Adigerat, and a great quantity of grain came 0.46.

in; more, I should suppose, than was required for the place. It was a very thinly peopled valley, and apparently the grain was brought for the purpose of selling it to the troops; but I did not hear of more than 4,000 or 5,000 lbs. of grain in a day being bought. This grain came from the immediate neighbourhood, brought in by country people who frequented the market. I do not think that any steps had then been taken to induce the people to come in from greater distances. The troops had been at Adigerat too short a time, only three or four days.

1641. When did you advance from Senafé?—On the 1st of February, I think, I left Senafé.

1642. With whom?—By myself; but General Merewether overtook me at the first stage.

1643. Then were you in advance even of General Merewether?—Yes, one stage.

1644. And his object in going in advance was to clear the way and gather supplies, I presume?—Yes; and to make conventions for the native transport.

1645. How much was he in advance of the main body of the Expedition?—There was a brigade in advance of him, which we overtook at Adigerat, commanded by Brigadier Collings, but the head quarters were then behind; no one was in advance but Colonel Phayre.

1646. In a note for your examination, which you gave me, you say that supplies were obtainable along the road from Senafé to Adigerat?—Yes; grass and grain chiefly.

1647. Not so much food for the troops?—No; but there was generally plenty of fresh meat to be got everywhere.

1648. Are you aware if the troops were fed by meat from the coast?—I never heard of it.

1649. Lord *Elcho*.] When you say that there was plenty of meat; do you mean that there was food enough for man along the road, irrespectively of any other supplies, for all the soldiers and for all the camp followers, and all the men that were there?—I should think, certainly not along the road, but in a radius of 30 or 40 miles, there was.

1650. But when you say that there was plenty of meat, do you mean that there was enough for the consumption of the army and its followers?—I believe so.

1651. On what does that belief rest?—On general observation, seeing the beasts brought in, and the rations served out.

1652. But general observation is a very vague term; as regards the Commissariat you give some figures which you had received from some Commissariat officers; have you any information as definite as that, even in conversation, to justify you in saying that there was plenty of meat on the line of march for the support of the troops and camp followers, irrespectively of other supplies?—No figures.

1653. Then you cannot speak to that?—Not as to figures.

1654. As regards the grain and the forage, can you give the Committee any positive assurance that there was sufficient barley and sufficient grass for the consumption of the animals which accompanied the Expedition, to be drawn from the spot, irrespectively of other supplies?—I can give no positive information beyond the figures which I collected at one or two points.

1655. Could you put in any other figures?—Yes; when the supplies began to come in in larger quantities, I then got figures again at Antálo from Lieutenant Shewell.

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1656. But

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1656. But you say that you believe that there were supplies besides those along the road which could have been brought from a distance from some other part of the country; upon what does that belief rest?—Upon conversations with Abyssinians and with Mr. Munzinger, chiefly.

1657. You stated that no steps had been taken to secure those more distant supplies; how do you know that no steps had been taken?—I never made that statement. I heard of no steps being taken previous to my visits to the market at Adigerat.

1658. But did you inquire whether anything was being done?—Yes.

1659. Did you bring the fact, that the natives had told you of those distant supplies, before the Commissariat officers and the other authorities?—No.

1660. Then you cannot say whether they were aware that there were those other supplies, and you cannot say whether any steps were taken to get them?—Not positively.

1661. What steps do you think they could have taken, or ought to have taken, to have got those distant supplies further than the fact which you have stated as being well known, viz., that those supplies were being paid for, and that there was the "almighty dollar" on the line of march, which they might come and pick up?—My view would have been that the Commissariat officers should have been three weeks or a month in advance of the force, and that then the supplies would have come in from greater distances.

1662. But was not Colonel Phayre in advance of the force?—Only a few days; two or three days.

1663. There was a Commissariat officer with him, was there not?—Not during most of the time, Lieutenant Sewell was with him as far as Antâlo.

1664. Then who looked after the supplies for his force, and how was it supplied if there was no Commissariat officer with it?—It was a very small force indeed.

1665. *Chairman.*] Did he take his supplies with him?—He took his supplies with him, and he obtained what he could; probably he bought them himself, but I was not with him.

1666. *Lord Elcho.*] In short, upon all those points your information is very vague?—It is very vague with regard to the proceedings for getting supplies, of the force in advance, under Colonel Phayre.

1667. And as regard the force which you accompanied, with reference to those matters as to which you have just told the Committee, your information seems to be equally vague?—Except with reference to those figures which I have given.

1668. Which you obtained in conversation with Commissariat officers?—Yes.

1669. *Chairman.*] At Antâlo you state that during the first week of March 113,000 lbs. of grain and flour were bought, besides ghee, salt, hay, sheep and bullocks, tobacco and coffee; that is a specific fact which you have on authority, is it not?—Those figures were given to me by Lieutenant Shewell of the Commissariat.

1670. You also mentioned that there were 100,000 rations of flour in store on the 15th of March; was that at Antâlo?—That was at Antâlo. A great deal of that came from a considerable distance.

1671. Do you know from what distance it

came?—I was told by one or two men in Antâlo, through an interpreter, that some of it came from Tembyen and Salowe, which are provinces along the banks of the Takkazyé, a considerable distance off.

1672. At every station you had a supply of provisions brought in, had you not?—Yes, a market was established at every station, more or less.

1673. On nearing Mâgdala, did you find the provisions increase or fall off?—I should say they increased after reaching the great river Takkazyé. It was a great corn-growing country.

1674. The supplies of hay, flour, and meat, you say, were procurable on the whole line of march to Mâgdala from Senafé?—In small quantities in some places, and in large quantities in others, according to the district.

1675. On the plateau near Mâgdala you say that 40,000 lbs. of wheat, 30,000 lbs. of flour, and 100,000 lbs. of barley were brought in within a week?—Yes; that was on the Dalanta plateau, on April the 9th; that was within 10 days, I think.

1676. Is it your impression, or can you speak definitely to the fact, that the army from Senafé onwards was supplied with the fresh meat which it consumed from the country?—My information is quite vague about the matter. I have no figures beyond seeing the animals brought in.

1677. Bought and slaughtered?—I do not know that I ever saw them slaughtered.

1678. If the pioneer force had been longer in advance, say 10 or 14 days in advance of the main body of the Expedition, arranging for the purchase of provisions, have you an opinion as to whether or not provisions could have been procured in larger quantities, or in quantities sufficient for the wants of the whole Expedition?—There would have been much larger quantities procured, I believe, when we reached different points, because the news would have had time to spread over a larger circle; and the people appear to have come in very readily, directly they were certain that they would not be robbed, and that they would receive good prices.

1679. As the Expedition settled in stations and became permanent, did the supplies increase?—So I heard.

1680. On what authority?—On the authority of the officers who were in charge of the different posts. As to one particular station I got some facts; that is the station which was formed in the valley of the Takkazyé, before ascending to the plateaux; Lieutenant Shewell of the Commissariat told me that between the 1st and the 22nd of April, he got 200,000 lbs. of flour, 19,000 lbs. of barley, and 14,000 lbs. of other grain, that is to say, 330,000 lbs. of grain, and 16,000 lbs. of coffee, and that he was enabled to send nearly the whole of it up to the front by native carriage. He must have been there three weeks.

1681. Where was the purchase effected?—In the valley of the Takkazyé.

1682. What distance is that from Mâgdala?—That is about a week's march by the road we went. I may mention that there were difficulties owing to the attempts of the chief to extort transit duties at some points on the road, which checked the supply from coming up to the front.

1683. Where was that?—It was particularly at

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at a place called Alaji, and in consequence of that when we left Santara, which is just above the Takkazyé, there were only six days' provisions, and Colonel Grant was then sent back to arrange matters in the rear, and things were got right again within a week or a fortnight, I think.

1684. Whence did he derive his supplies at that time when a scarcity was apprehended?—We were then receiving the grain from the country.

1685. Was the scarcity made up by supplies from the base or from the country?—As soon as this was reported, the chief of Wadela was requested to order all the people round to send in grain, and it almost immediately began coming in from those plateaux; two marches afterwards it began coming in in large quantities.

1686. You make this statement: that there was a weekly market at Antálo, to which people came for miles round, selling grass, pottery, glass, tobacco, coffee, onions, drugs, clothes, cloths, corn, honey, butter, salt, hides, mules, and sheep?—Yes.

1687. Was that a matter of observation with yourself, or have you heard it from other people?—I saw the articles in the market, and I bought some of the small articles, the luxuries.

1688. You stated, I think, that beyond Antálo very few of the supplies came from the coast?—Yes.

1689. Can you be a little more definite about that; what supplies did pass Antálo?—I do not know what passed Antálo; I only know what reached the front; there was nothing in the rations after leaving Dildi but tea and compressed vegetables. Dildi is before you reach the Takkazyé.

1690. In this paper before me, you say that the distance from Dildi to Mágdala is 76 miles; over that line of 76 miles, do I rightly understand you to say that nothing but preserved vegetables and tea came from the coast?—There was nothing else in the rations which were served out.

1691. Did any forage from the coast reach you?—I never saw any forage from the base until just before I got to Senafé, coming back.

1692. How long were you south of Dildi?—I suppose about three weeks or more.

1693. Do you remember approximately what number of troops were south of Dildi?—Yes, there were about 4,000.

1694. How many followers were there?—I do not know how many muleteers there were; there were very few followers.

1695. Can you state to what extent that portion of the army were fed from the coast?—I have no knowledge beyond the rations which were served out.

1696. What were they?—I believe the only rations from the coast were the tea and the compressed vegetables.

1697. You tell the Committee that no rations passed Dildi, except tea and preserved vegetables, during the three weeks that the army of 5,000 men were in that position?—I believe so. I think that rum came up after I left head quarters, but not to the front, I believe; it came up as far as Yesendyé. There was no rum in the front except for medical comforts.

1698. All the supplies obtainable in the country would, of course, decrease the necessity for supplies from the coast, would they not?—Yes.

1699. On returning, where did you meet pro-  
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visions from the coast in larger quantities?—At Ashangi we met a quantity of supplies of shoes and rum, I think, and chocolate and other luxuries of that kind.

1700. Is that about 100 miles short of Mágdala?—I think it is about half-way between Antálo and Mágdala, or a little less than half-way. At Ashangi there were tolerably abundant supplies. As soon as we reached Antálo, the ordinary rations, such as were served out at the beginning of the Expedition, were to be had, and there were plentiful supplies beyond that point. At Senafé there was a bazaar.

1701. By whom was it established?—By a quantity of Parsee shopkeepers.

1702. Did they come over the sea or were they natives of the country?—They were Parsees from Bombay chiefly, and Greeks. There was a Greek who had a shop at Dalanta, near Mágdala.

1703. Did he advance with the Expedition?—Yes, he came to the front at Dalanta.

1704. And he established a shop there?—Yes.

1705. What did he sell?—Cheese, sardines, and candles.

1706. Were they brought by himself or bought in the country?—They were brought by himself from Egypt, I think.

1707. What means had he for getting into the country and up to the front?—I do not know; he probably bought mules in the country.

1708. Do you know by what ships those provisions were bought?—No, I know nothing about it.

1709. You do not know whether they were brought by ships chartered for the Expedition, or chartered as his own private adventure?—No.

1710. Have you anything to say as to the efficiency or otherwise of the transport train?—The fault of the transport train appeared to me to be the kind of pack saddle which was used, and the way in which the animals were loaded; I think that caused more deaths than anything else.

1711. Can you describe what the arrangements were, and wherein they were defective?—The saddles from India were what were called "pads," which were two pads with a canvas stitched tight across the mules back-bone, and there was no ventilation of any kind, and no means of securing the loads. The loads were put into what are called *sel-etats*, which are nets; but apparently the men did not understand the way to pass a lashing, and the loads were generally between the animals' legs, and caused them fearful suffering, from incessantly slipping down. The other saddle, which was sent from England, was called the Otago pattern, which was a saddle intended for riding as well, with a tree of wood and iron, and it was too small; it also constantly slipped, and the mules had sores on the hips and shoulders. All were exceedingly bad, and entirely unlike any saddle which I ever saw used for mules in other parts of the world where I have travelled.

1712. What experience have you had in managing and noticing pack animals?—I have had a great deal of experience in South America (in Peru); I have travelled a great deal with large troops of mules, and I have had 15 or 20 myself.

1713. You speak rather strongly as to the character of the muleteers, and the way in which the  
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the animals were managed. You attribute, as I understand, the greater part of the loss of the animals to the unsuitable kind of saddle, and to the bad management of the muleteers?—The bad loading.

1714. What remedy would you have suggested; have you any better pattern of saddle?—They should have used the regular mule pack-saddle, the *aparejo*, the same saddle which is used in all parts of the world where mules are the chief mode of transit; in South America, and California, and elsewhere.

1715. Do you know why this saddle was not used?—No, I do not.

1716. Would the use of those saddles have saved the animals from this suffering, which you have indicated?—Certainly, I should think so.

1717. The phrase which you use is, that the transport train was an entire break-down, and that the General had to have recourse to the transport of the country. That phrase is a very general one; can you describe, more in detail, what you sum up as a general break-down?—What I mean is, that the force could not have reached Mágdala without the assistance of native carriage, and that, therefore, the Government transport was a break-down.

1718. It was General Merewether who made this arrangement, I believe?—General Merewether and M. Munzinger.

1719. Do you know to what extent he made arrangements for native transports, native animals, and native muleteers?—The arrangement consisted of a series of conventions with the people to deliver bags at such a rate at such a place. They carried them in any way they pleased, and they used their daughters, or wives, or donkeys, or bullocks, or anything of the kind to put them on.

1720. You state that General Merewether concluded a convention with the people of Senafé, by which they were to be paid one dollar and a half for every bag of 75 lbs. of grain or flour delivered at Adigerat; 1,400 bullock loads started in a few days. He made a similar convention with the Adigerat people, to carry it onwards, and in a few days the Adigerat people delivered 63,600 lbs. at Agula; where is that?—It is half-way to Antálo.

1721. And so along the line of March that continued all way, did it?—It continued all the way.

1722. Do you know what number of imported mules passed Antálo for pack purposes?—I do not.

1723. You mentioned that in the middle of February, 10,019 mules only were found in Abyssinia and in work, for the purposes of the Expedition; on what authority do you make that statement?—I have taken that, I presume, from one of the Blue Books. The report of Captain Hand, if I recollect rightly, makes that statement.

1724. Do you know what number of animals at that time, when you say 10,019 only were available, had been landed in Abyssinia?—No, those figures, I should have got from official reports in the Blue Book.

1725. You say "that more than nine-tenths of the provisions for the troops were brought to the front by means of General Merewether's system of native transport, the Government mules conveying the other fraction"; can you fix the places to which that applies?—That applies from the Takkazyé river.

1726. Does that apply to the last 76 miles on the way to Mágdala; it was past Dildi, I presume?—Yes, to beyond the river.

1727. To the same part of the march you apply this language, "all necessities of life were brought to the camp by native transport mainly, and were the produce of the country"?—Yes, from the same distance.

1728. That the people were friendly was known to General Merewether from the first, was it not?—So I understood from his reports of the information which he had received when he was on the coast.

1729. Was that in the early part of 1867?—Yes; it was in the summer that he was visiting those ports.

1730. Did he not explore before the advance of the pioneer force?—Yes, long before; in June and July, I think.

1731. And you say that he then knew of the friendly disposition of the people?—Yes.

1732. You also speak of the climate, and the words which you use are, "that the climate was the most delightful in the world" when you got up to the high lands; that was known beforehand, was it not?—Yes.

1733. Was it known to General Merewether (I mention him inasmuch as you were with him on the march for a considerable distance) what force Theodore could command, and how they were armed?—He received reports and letters from the captives, and subsequently letters from Mr. Munzinger when he joined the camp of Gobazyé.

1734. When was it that Mr. Munzinger pierced into the country; that was early in 1867, was it not?—He never went into Abyssinia proper then; he only explored up to the frontiers.

1735. You say that there was no idea of danger on the road, as proved by Mr. Munzinger having been sent ahead alone to the camp of our ally, Gobazyé from Antálo, his camp being within sight of Mágdala?—Yes.

1736. And all along the line of march the friendly disposition of the people was known to General Merewether?—His reports were all to that effect.

1737. With one single exception which, I think, you mention?—It was not hostility to us, so much as impeding the march in order to extort money for transit duties.

1738. Mr. Seely.] I think you said that in three or four days after you landed the supply of water was very much better?—The arrangement was improved, not with regard to the supply, but with regard to the method of bringing the animals to the troughs; there was less crowding.

1739. How long had the arrangements when you landed been in force?—I do not know exactly; from the time, probably, when the first mules were landed they must have adopted the system of supplying them with water by this trough.

1740. The means of getting water for the animals were very deficient, was it not?—The system was very bad.

1741. And in consequence of that, did any animals die?—That must have been a part of the reason of their falling out of condition.

1742. Mr. Christopher Denison.] With regard to the Commissariat, do I understand you that the general conclusion of your observation is that much greater reliance might have been placed originally

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originally upon the resources of the country than was done by the authorities of Bombay?—I should doubt that, because their means of knowing the quantity which could be obtained, would be small.

1743. But I was led to believe from what you said, that great expense might have been saved by drawing much more largely upon the resources of Abyssinia itself?—No doubt; but the information was deficient with regard to the supplies.

1744. Would it have been safe for the general commanding the force, to have relied on any information as to the resources of the country, before he left Bombay?—No.

1745. With regard to the mules, have you any personal knowledge of the mules which went from the Punjaub, and were attached to the mountain guns?—The mountain guns arrived first.

1746. But had they not a corps of mules attached to them?—Yes.

1747. Were those mules differently saddled from the other mules?—I never saw that battery travelling; the steel guns from England were fitted on the Otago saddles.

1748. You had no knowledge of the Punjaub mules?—The mountain guns from India were not taken on; they remained at Senafé, I think.

1749. Mr. Eastwick.] How many day's march was it altogether from the place where you landed up to Mágdala?—The marches varied; I cannot say offhand, how many day's march there were; sometimes it was four miles, and sometimes it was eight miles.

1750. But supposing that you had been able to go on day after day, how many marches would it have taken?—I left on the 20th, and reached the coast on the 6th, a fortnight.

1751. It would have been simply a fortnight from the place where you landed, to Mágdala?—Yes, riding long stages.

1752. You yourself went on in advance, one or two stages; when you marched were you protected by any cavalry?—Not about Senafé; we rode about Senafé without any escort.

1753. When you took observations, and were employed on your duty as geographer, were you escorted by cavalry?—I never had permission on the march to leave the line. I took observations along the line of march, but not leaving the camp for any distance.

1754. You did not go off the road to any distance?—Not for any distance beyond a day's excursion.

1755. When you did go off the road, and generally on the road itself, did you see herds of cattle, or did you see crops?—Yes; quantities of green crops in many places covering the hills.

1756. And cattle also?—I do not remember seeing large herds of cattle.

1757. Do you recollect seeing any herds of cattle at all?—I do not, except being brought in in droves; I have seen droves coming in.

1758. Were they very large droves?—No; small droves coming in.

1759. Ten or 20?—Ten or 20 together; they generally came in small quantities.

1760. Did you hear of any attacks being made anywhere upon small parties of armed men, or upon our provisions?—I have no personal knowledge of anything of the kind. I heard that the stragglers were attacked on the march back to the coast after I had left.

1761. Did you see any bodies of armed natives?—Yes, everybody is armed.

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1762. But, at the villages, did you see bodies of armed soldiers?—I never saw soldiers, except with the chiefs on one or two occasions.

1763. What number of men were there with the chiefs?—There was a force of perhaps a few hundred cavalry, which I saw at Santara.

1764. Were there never more than a few hundred?—That is the only force I ever saw, I think, as far as I recollect. I did not see the army of Kassa.

1765. What sort of troops did they seem to be; did they seem to be equal to our Indian cavalry?—No.

1766. Were they badly mounted?—They were mounted on little strong ponies; they were wonderful ponies for going down the rocky hills.

1767. And they were not very well armed; I suppose they were armed with matchlocks?—With matchlocks chiefly, and spears. They most of them had spears.

1768. What was the nature of the country; was it more difficult than Peru or the Neilghories?—Not so difficult as Peru, certainly. There was no road in Abyssinia so bad as some of the ghauts in India. There was no road in Abyssinia so bad as the old Tambracherry Ghaut from Wynaad to Malabar.

1769. And not so bad as Peru either?—Not nearly.

1770. You do not think that the difficulties which the army had to surmount were equal to the difficulties which a force would have to surmount in invading Peru?—They are not to be compared with them.

1771. Did you see the hill fort of Mágdala?—Yes.

1772. What did you think of its strength?—It was naturally almost impregnable.

1773. There at all events the country was very difficult, was it not?—No, there we had a beautiful made road, which the King had made.

1774. Near the river I suppose, where you descended, the road was very difficult?—The roads down the Jidda and Beshilo ravines were tolerably good made roads. In the ascent from the Takkazyé the track had been used immemorially I should think; there were two long zig-zags up an almost perpendicular cliff to the top of the plateau.

1775. In regard to the mule saddle, have you heard that the Peruvian saddle is something like that used in Persia?—So I was told by Lieutenant St. John, of the telegraph department.

1776. And that, you think, would have been the proper saddle to have used?—I think so.

1777. Colonel Barttelot.] Did you start with the Expedition, from Bombay?—I came from England.

1778. Where did you land?—I landed at Mulkutto.

1779. The first you saw or heard of the Expedition was at Zulla, I presume?—That was the first I saw of it.

1780. Was the General there, Lord Napier?—No.

1781. He had not arrived?—He had not arrived.

1782. Was only the expeditionary force the advanced force there?—Only the advanced brigade.

1783. Under whose command was that?—The advanced brigade had arrived, and also the troops from Kurrachee. It was under Sir Charles Staveley when I arrived.

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1784. Did

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1784. Did you stay at Zulla, or did you go up the country with the advanced force?—I went up with Sir Charles Staveley; he went up with me, his aide-de-camp, and two other officers, to inspect.

1785. But somebody went with you, I suppose?—Only Sir Charles Staveley and three officers.

1786. And no force?—No.

1787. At what date was that?—On the 20th of December I think we left.

1788. How far did you go?—To Senafé.

1789. Did Sir Charles Staveley make a report as to the condition of the country?—I do not know; I suppose so.

1790. Did he go to see whether there were any supplies, or to see which was the best route?—He went merely, I believe, to inspect the troops, and to ascertain, I suppose, the position of affairs.

1791. At that time did it appear to you that there was an abundant supply in the country for such a force as was about to arrive?—No.

1792. Therefore it would have been utterly impossible, and in fact a most dangerous course, would it not, for any General not to have taken the precaution that he should have a sufficient supply from other places than the country?—Yes.

1793. Was not all that you have said about what you saw afterwards, and what might have been obtained in the country, simply founded upon observation made after the Expedition was in course of progress?—Yes; I had not been in the country before.

1794. And therefore it would have been a most impolitic and unwise thing, would it not, considering whom they had to attack, and the sort of country that they were going through, not to have been provided with a six months' supply of provisions?—They were not provided. The original intention was (but it was found impracticable afterwards) to establish six months' provisions at Senafé before the march commenced.

1795. But not at Annesley Bay?—I believe there were six months' provisions at Annesley Bay, but I do not know it of my own knowledge.

1796. Still that was in the country. Supposing that Theodore had retired, and that the campaign had not been concluded in the way in which it was concluded, do you not think that it was quite right that that six months' provision should have been provided at Annesley Bay?—Yes, with so large a force in the country.

1797. I think you said that after you had proceeded up the country a certain distance our transport corps almost entirely failed. You described it to a certain extent, but you did not state precisely in what way it failed, because you have simply said that it failed from the pack-saddles not being quite what they should have been; could not those pack-saddles have been altered if they were not what they ought to have been?—No.

1798. Then do you mean to say that simply because the pack-saddles were so bad the mules could not get up that country?—No; I said that I thought that was one of the principal reasons for the deaths and illness of the mules. The other reasons were the exposure at night, I think, and want of food, and of course over work.

1799. Do you think that any organised transport corps could have got up that country?—Yes.

1800. Organised in what way?—Organised with men who thoroughly understood how to load them, and with proper pack-saddles.

1801. Do you think that if it had been a military organisation it would have been better?—I believe it was a strictly military organisation on the high lands, and it was most important that it should be so.

1802. And it was so, was it not?—It was so under Captain Hand, certainly.

1803. Did that fail?—No, it was by far the best in an expedition of that kind. It is absolutely necessary, I should say.

1804. To bring up the quantity of provisions that were necessary?—What I mean by the transport breaking down is that we were dependant in the last part of the march to Mágdala on native carriage.

1805. For the supply of the whole force?—To enable us to advance with so large a portion of it. We could not have advanced without the aid of native carriage.

1806. But there must have been a considerable quantity of grain brought up by our own transport, otherwise the grain which you mentioned would not have been nearly sufficient for the army that was there?—That was also brought up to a great extent by native carriage for the last few marches. I have not mentioned all the grain that was bought. Only that respecting which I obtained returns.

1807. How far did our transport get?—A portion of it came the whole way.

1808. I should like to know a little more clearly about the supplies of the country, because I think I understood you to say, in answer to an honourable Member, that you never saw more than 10 bullocks at a time; did I understand you correctly?—I never saw many large droves.

1809. If there had been any large droves they would have been all out in the open air, would they not; they are not housed, I presume?—No, never, I should think.

1810. When you were on those highlands you must have seen them if they had been there, must you not?—If they had been within my vision.

1811. And not being within your vision, or anywhere very handy, do you think they could have been brought up in sufficient quantities, and in sufficient time, to have supplied the army?—Yes. Fresh meat was procured in sufficient quantities, and in sufficient time; but not all other stores.

1812. Therefore it was quite necessary, was it not, that we should have something to fall back upon besides native stores?—Yes, I think so, with so large a force.

1813. You say that other arrangements were made; what other arrangements could have been made?—To have had a small force in advance for a much longer time.

1814. Would that have been safe?—Yes, quite.

1815. Do you think that it was known that it would have been safe beforehand?—Not to a certainty, because nothing is certain in this world.

1816. Nothing is certain, but did you not state that it was known beforehand that it was safe?—I said there was every reason to think it was quite safe.

1817. Then your own conclusion is that the army is a great deal too large, and that a very much

much smaller force would have been sufficient?—Yes.

1818. Did you think that before you went up the country?—Yes.

1819. On what did you ground your opinion?—On the official reports I had read by General Merewether, principally.

1820. Still that is merely an opinion of yours, and you put it in contradistinction to the General's opinion, who thought it would be wiser to take a much larger force?—It is worth nothing, except as simply my private opinion.

1821. You said something about the climate on the hills; although the climate may be delightful on the high lands at times, yet it is very bad in the wet season, is it not?—I was not there in the wet seasons.

1822. But you seem to have made inquiries about most things, and did you not find from inquiry that there was a bad climate as well as a good climate?—It would be dangerous to people unhoused, but not a bad climate to people housed. In tents during the rains, it would be most dangerous, I should think.

1823. What was the difference of the thermometer by day and by night?—There was a considerable difference.

1824. But do you know at all what the difference was?—I kept a meteorological journal.

1825. Can you give the maximum and the minimum?—I could put it in.

1826. How long did you remain with the Expedition?—I was in Abyssinia five months, I think.

1827. Did you leave with the army, or before the army?—Before. I left head-quarters on the 20th of April, when they were at Dalanta, just after the fall of Magdala.

1828. Sir James Elphinstone.] I think you stated that Colonel Merewether reported upon Abyssinia in June; was that so?—No. He was, I think, in June and July, examining the ports of the Red Sea, and collecting information.

1829. He did not examine the passes then, did he?—I think he examined one pass near Massowah.

1830. It appears, I think, that the reconnoitring party sailed from Bombay on the 16th of September, did they not?—I believe so.

1831. But you do not know it of your own knowledge?—I know nothing of the Bombay part of it.

1832. You stated that you thought that the commissariat officers ought to have gone on in advance of the army; are you aware that in November Colonel Merewether undertook a thorough survey of the Koomayli Pass, and reached a point about nine miles from Senafé, but that further he could not penetrate, as for political reasons it was undesirable that as yet he should enter Abyssinian territory, or come in contact with Abyssinian people?—I am aware of the order that he was not to advance.

1833. Then how could the commissariat officers have gone up; with respect to the supplies along the line of march, I would recall to you Question 454 of Lord Napier's examination (*the question and answer were read to the Witness*); does this view correspond with your opinion as to the supplies on the line of march?—Almost.

1834. Are you aware that Captain Hozier has written an account of the Expedition?—Yes.

1835. Does it correspond with yours?—I have not read his book, but this evidence does not

quite correspond with mine. I see that it is stated that there were no supplies except sheep and cattle at Adigerat and at Senafé. There was also grain and grass. He should have stated that there was not so much as there was further south.

1836. I wish to direct your attention to the reply to that question by Lord Napier?—The poverty at Senafé I do not put down to civil war; I do not think there had been any there; but I attribute it to the failure of the harvest in that immediate neighbourhood.

1837. Then you disagree with Lord Napier upon that point?—Partially.

1838. Then Question 471 is asked by the honourable Member for Penryn and Falmouth (*the question and answer were read to the Witness*): do you agree with that statement of Lord Napier's, in answer to that question?—Quite so; up to Senafé.

1839. With respect to the climate, what was the climate in the low country; what were the extremes of heat and cold?—I believe it was intensely hot.

1840. Do you agree with Lord Napier when he says that at Zoolah, if you put the bulb of a thermometer into your mouth, it would fall 10 degrees to come down to blood heat?—Possibly; I was not there.

1841. Lord Elcho.] You have attributed the break-down of the transport to the badness of the pack-saddles, the way in which the animals were loaded, and to two other reasons, one of which was exposure at night; could that exposure at night have been avoided by any means, with an army on the march?—Yes.

1842. How could it have been avoided?—By doing as they do in South America, putting proper clothing upon the animals.

1843. Had the animals no clothing?—There was none with the Otago saddles.

1844. What is the clothing that they carry in South America?—What they call *sudaderos*, or sweating cloths, which are put under the pack-saddle, and which are spread over the animal at night.

1845. You said also that they suffered from a want of food; I thought you stated that there was abundance of food for the animals?—The food was not always ready at the halting places. But the want of food was most felt when the mules first came up the pass; they came up in a wretched state very often.

1846. In what part of the line was that?—At the beginning.

1847. Was it only at the beginning?—It was worst at the beginning, and I should think the mules suffered from very seldom getting grain.

1848. Was the break down at the beginning, or was it later?—There was a terrible break down at the beginning; of course, that was the worst part of all.

1849. You stated that when you first landed you found those animals crowding about the troughs, and wandering about; that was explained, was it not, by the fact which you subsequently stated, that the muleteers had all bolted?—Yes, and the mules were gnawing their tethers.

1850. You stated, did you not, that that evil was subsequently remedied, by handing the mules over to the custody of soldiers told off for the purpose by Sir Charles Staveley?—Yes, and things improved very rapidly.

1851. You stated that all along the line of march

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march the natives were friendly; are you aware that Lord Napier in his evidence states that his force was very much reduced by having to leave escorts for provisions, and persons going from post to post in consequence of the chances of the natives becoming unfriendly?—I believe escorts were sometimes given on the return, but not I think on the advance.

1852. Do you speak of your own knowledge as regards that?—Merely of my own knowledge of people I knew, who, like myself, went backwards and forwards without thinking of an escort.

1853. But are you aware that all along the line of march there were troops stationed at regular distance as military posts for the protection of the line?—Yes.

1854. And if the natives had been thoroughly trusted, and if as you say it was perfectly safe all along the line, there would have been no occasion for those escorts and those posts, would there?—None whatever, except to protect the stores.

1855. Do you think that it would have been prudent to have done without them?—Quite so, as regards the protection of travellers, though not as regards the protection of stores.

1856. Do you think that they would have been unnecessary with a view to the economy of provisions and supplies?—They would have been quite necessary to protect stores of all kinds.

1857. *Chairman.*] At page 210 of your book you say there that on the arrival of Lord Napier, early in January, owing to starvation and cruelty the mules had dwindled down to less than 5,000 and the camels to 1,100. On the following page there is a foot note which states, as I understand, the number of mules landed up to that time to be 16,022, was that so?—Yes.

1858. I understand then from your book that only 5,000 of the 16,000 were then remaining in the beginning of January, when Lord Napier landed?—Yes.

1859. I think the number of camels landed at that time was 5,700?—That is the total number altogether, I think.

1860. Then at that time there seems to have been 11,000 mules and 4,600 camels destroyed or lost, is that so?—I suppose so; I got those returns from the Blue Book.

1861. You obtained those figures from official documents?—Yes.

1862. You state that the total number of transport animals, in February, was 10,019; from what have you that statement?—That is in the "Gazette." Major Warden's report.

1863. From official documents you state that 10,019 animals only were available in the middle of February?—Yes.

1864. You are not a soldier, and I presume that you have no military experience?—I have had experience in the navy, but I have been asked several questions that were strictly military.

1865. I asked you no professional questions, although you have been asked some professional questions; but you do not profess to be an authority upon these points at all?—Not at all.

1866. You say that you did not see herds of cattle upon the line of March; I presume it is a well established practice amongst native combatants in Abyssinia that they help themselves as they march?—Yes.

1867. The native apprehensions would probably be that the English would do the same?—Probably, till they knew us, they would think so.

1868. Then, except for the purpose of sale, they would be likely to keep their herds as far as they could off the line of march, would they not?—Very likely. In the Shumazano valley they were requested to do so, that the grass near the camp might be kept for our mules and horses.

1869. You have been asked a military question as to the impregnability of Mágdala; was water available in Mágdala?—Not on the Amba. There was water on the plateau below the Amba and it was brought up every day to the garrison.

1870. Was that plateau accessible to our troops?—It was occupied before the place was stormed.

1871. We being in possession of their water supply, you would not regard the place as impregnable, would you?—No, it could not have held out more than 48 hours; but there were two other wells, I heard, which must also have been occupied to entirely stop their supply of water, one of which was at the bottom of the Kulkulla ravine.

1872. Then old women could not have stopped us from taking possession of their wells, could they?—The wells could be commanded by the guns, of course.

1873. Of course, without water the fortress could not have held out?—No.

1874. Were there inside Mágdala any provisions for storing water?—No; there were very large jars in the King's palace, and they were all full of beer or tej, but not sufficient for the army; the cellar containing the beer was a place about the size of this room; there were large jars about six feet deep, all full of beer; but it was all gone when I got there.

1875. You explored Mágdala after its fall, did you not?—Yes.

1876. What provision was there in Mágdala for storing water?—None that I saw.

1877. Was it possible that there could have been the means of storing water for more than a week?—Certainly not, I should think.

1878. Colonel *Barttelot.*] What sized place was Mágdala?—About three-quarters of a mile by half-a-mile.

1879. What sort of huts were they in Mágdala?—They were wretched little circular huts.

1880. What was the palace like?—It was a compound, with three or four huts in it; one with an upper storey, and this cellar.

1881. Were there any gates or defences to the town?—No.

1882. It was merely on the top of the plateau?—There was merely the defence of the gates; the road up to them was very steep.

1883. What was the population of Mágdala?—It was difficult for us to tell, from the number of strangers in it; but I should think about 2,000 people lived up there.

1884. Mr. *Eastwick.*] With regard to this water, do you think that we could have very easily cut off the supply of water?—I think so.

1885. Simply by our guns?—I think so; we occupied the wells at Islamgyé, the ordinary source of supply.

1886. Do you think that Theodore and his men were in any distress for water?—No; he never was up in Mágdala at all until the last few hours.

1887. Was there no water in Mágdala?—It was brought up every day in skins.

1888. Supposing that we had been able to cut off

off the water, the garrison could have easily retreated, I suppose; Theodore could have moved off into some other place, could he not?—I suppose so, if the place were not surrounded. His son went away without hindrance from the Gallas, who were asserted to be blockading the other side of the fortress.

1889. So that we could not have captured him?—Unless the place had been blockaded he would have gone away.

1890. Sir *James Elphinstone*.] You stated that you thought that the force was too large; I should like to ask you whether you agree with Lord Napier in the statement which he makes at Question 570. Lord Napier says, "The accounts which I had of the country represented very large bodies of men in arms, and we knew at the time that on our flank in Tigre, Kassai had a force of 10,000 men extremely well armed; those whom I saw when we met were very well armed; a large proportion of them had good double-barrelled percussion guns, and there was a certain amount of rude discipline among them which rendered them not by any means despicable. Then we knew that Gobaze, who was in rebellion against Theodore, had a very large force; of course it was exaggerated, but by some people it was estimated at 30,000 or 40,000 men; we knew that he had a large body of cavalry; he sent one of his officers who came to call upon me with 1,000 horse, such as they were; they were much better cavalry for acting in that mountainous country than our horses of the plains, because they crowned the hills like light infantry; those cavalry soldiers upon the ponies of the country swarmed over the steep hills as infantry would have done; they were quite a formidable enemy in such a country as that. Then Theodore's force was quite uncertain, and we did not know what quantity he might have. The histories of Abyssinia represented also that the Gallas were a nation of cavalry, so that I quite contemplated the possibility of having a very large combination against me, and I calculated my force with reference to that, as well as to keeping up the communication"; do you agree with Lord Napier in that statement?—My opinion can be of no possible value in a military point of view, but I agree with that statement as to the facts.

1891. Lord *Elcho*.] You say that you agree with it as to the facts; but you do not agree in Lord Napier's conclusion as to the necessity for a large force?—No.

1892. Then upon what do you rest your opinion that Lord Napier had too large a force, agreeing with him as you do as to the facts?—I think the enemy were quite contemptible in comparison with us.

1893. Did you form that opinion during the Expedition, or have you formed it since?—Both; I was confirmed in it when I saw the impossibility of their guns coming within range of our infantry at Arogyé.

1894. Sir *James Elphinstone*.] At Question 171 Lord Napier is asked this: "Supposing that your Lordship had been ordered to conduct an expedition against a fort as difficult of access as Magdala, at an equal distance from the base of operations, into the Affghan county, for example, do you think that you could have taken with you

a lesser number of troops"? To that Question Lord Napier answered: "I should have been very sorry to have planned an expedition to capture a fortress as difficult as that at the same distance, with a lesser number of men in any country; I think the natural difficulties of the fortress were greater than those of any position which I have ever seen; it was absolutely unapproachable, except by one line, which was entirely commanded by a prominent hill or natural bastion; the only means of approach ran round the sides of this hill, and if simply old women had been on the top, and hiding themselves behind the brow, had thrown down stones they would have caused any force a very serious loss; had Theodore not thrown away his position by launching his army against us we could not have taken the position from him, except at a very serious loss." Do you agree with Lord Napier in that statement?—It would have been a very serious thing to have stormed Magdala, with a large force opposed to us, well armed. Many of our men would have been mown down.

1895. If Lord Napier had appeared before that fortress with a small force, as you suggest, and had Theodore not thrown away his position by launching his army against us, that contingency might have taken place, might it not?—The place must either have been taken by storm, or else blockaded.

1896. And we should probably have been repulsed instead of carrying our point in the triumphant manner that we did?—I think not.

1897. *Chairman*.] Would you have attempted to take Magdala by storm, knowing that it had no water, or would you have besieged it?—I should have blockaded it; but it does not much signify what I should have done.

1898. Mr. *Campbell*.] As a matter of fact, I think that your opinion as to the size of the force (which is contrary to that of Lord Napier), has at all events the authority of Sir William Merewether, has it not?—First of all he recommended 10,000, and subsequently, when he became better acquainted with the facts, I think he recommended 6,000 men.

1899. Lord *Elcho*.] With reference to the question of the investment of Magdala, the following questions (Nos. 150 and 151) have been put to Lord Napier, and answered: "Do you think that, supposing that there had been any serious opposition to you, when you arrived near Magdala, you had one man too many when you arrived there?—(A.) Certainly not. (Q.) And supposing there had been any very serious opposition, you would perhaps have thought that you ought to have had a stronger reserve behind you than you had?—(A.) I should have been very glad indeed of another column to have sent round to the opposite side of Magdala. I could not venture to divide my force sufficiently to invest it on the side most remote from us, and I therefore was obliged to trust to the Gallas people to occupy the hills surrounding that part of the fortress." Are you aware that Lord Napier has given that evidence?—No, I have not read it.

1900. *Chairman*.] Your mode of taking Magdala would have been by occupying the wells?—Yes.

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Mr. MORGAN H. FOSTER, C.B., called in; and Examined.

Mr. M. H. Foster, C.B. 1901. *Chairman.*] You are in the Treasury, I believe?—I am the principal financial officer of the Treasury.

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1903. Will you state from whom you received instructions respecting that estimate, and what your instructions were?—The first notice that we had on this subject was a letter from the Foreign Office, referring to the Expedition which was to be undertaken, and requesting that we would move the Lords of the Treasury to communicate with the India Office, in regard to the question of expenditure.

1904. What was the date of that?—The date of the letter was the 17th of August; upon the receipt of that letter we communicated with the India Office, and requested them to prepare the best estimate they could; we also wrote to the Admiralty and the War Office on the 3rd of October requesting them also to prepare estimates, and we received in reply an estimate from the War Office, and from the Admiralty a copy of the letter which they had sent to the India Office.

1905. Did you do anything between those dates?—No; we were waiting for the preparation of the estimates by the India Office. I may say that the whole Expedition being put under the Indian Government we looked almost entirely to the India Office to furnish us with information upon almost all subjects connected with it, and placed them in communication with the Admiralty and the War Office, to obtain from those departments such accounts of estimated expenditure as they could supply; and we looked to the India Office to supply it to the Treasury. But we also, on the 3rd of October, wrote to the Admiralty and the War Office, asking them to furnish us with the estimates which they had prepared. The Admiralty in reply, on the 12th of October, sent us a copy of their letter to the India Office, in which they placed their estimate of naval expenditure on account of the Expedition, exclusive of expenditure to be incurred by the Indian Government, at 638,000*l.* On the 12th of November we received a letter from the War Department stating that they placed the expenditure which they would have to incur at 380,000*l.*

1906. What was the next step taken by the Treasury in the prosecution of this work?—The next step was the supply by the India Office of an estimate of expenditure which had been prepared by General Jameson, which is contained in the Blue Book of the proceedings of the Com-

mittee last year. I do not think that the Treasury had any better means of arriving at the probable expenditure than what are supplied in that Estimate.

1907. You asked the Admiralty, and you asked the War Office, for their several estimates?—Yes, and those I have here.

1908. Have you each of those applications in writing?—Yes, and I have their replies here also.

1909. Will you hand in copies of those documents?—I will.

1910. The Treasury did nothing in the way of estimating, did they?—Nothing whatever, except carefully considering what was furnished to us. We put together the estimates of the Admiralty and the War Office to see how far they agreed with what the India Office supplied us with, and we found that they did agree.

1911. But that with which the India Office supplied you would be an exact copy of what the Admiralty and the War Office supplied to them, would it not?—Yes; the statement is in print in the Blue Book.

1912. The Treasury made no estimate?—We had no means of forming any estimate whatever. We were obliged to depend upon the several departments.

1913. Are the Indian accounts which have come home, whether copies or originals, in your possession?—No, they are furnished to us through the India Office, and they are all forwarded to the War Department, where there is a joint Committee of the War Office and the Admiralty who examine the accounts, and see what expenditure is properly chargeable to army funds, and what is properly chargeable to naval funds, and they report to us from time to time the amounts which they have passed as chargeable to their votes.

1914. Where are the accounts now?—With the War Department, unless the War Department have forwarded them to the Audit Office, but I think that the Audit Office examines them at the War Office.

1915. I will tell you my case, and perhaps you can help me to the paper which I want. Purchases were made in Egypt by the Indian officers, and I think contracts were then made. I have sent to the War Office, and Mr. Edmonds tells me that he cannot find the account which I want. Can you tell me where it will be?—I presume that the India Office would have sent it through the Treasury to the War Office. The account of those officers would then have been examined, and the charges verified, so that it would most likely be at the War Office.

Captain SHERARD OSBORN, R.N., C.B., called in; and Examined.

Capt. S. Osborne, R. N., C. B. 1916. *Captain Beaumont.*] I BELIEVE that in 1867 you were the Managing Director of the Telegraph Construction and Maintenance Company, were you not?—Yes.

1917. You made an offer to the Government with respect to telegraphic communication between Suez and Annesley Bay, I think?—Yes; the offer was made under two heads.

1918. Will you describe the nature of that

offer?—The first offer was in 1867, subsequently to an interview which I had with the then Secretary of State for India. I considered it necessary, as nothing had followed the interview, to put our offer on official record; and on the 15th of November I wrote to the Secretary of State for India a letter, which I will hand in to the Committee, dated the 11th of November 1867, in which, after giving the reasons, I told the Secretary

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Secretary of State for India that provided we got an order by the 1st of December, by the 31st of March we would have a telegraph cable laid from Suez to Massowah, which the force should have the use of so long as the Government required it; and that when it was no longer necessary for military purposes, we would undertake, in combination with a company then formed, to lease it from the Government on equitable terms. On the 22nd of November I received a reply, that Sir Stafford Northcote would not be disposed to enter into any such arrangement, but inquiring whether we would be prepared to enter into an arrangement with them for the temporary diversion of this line to Massowah; that is I presume that he thought that we would run a cable on to Aden eventually, but that while the forces were in Abyssinia, it should be diverted to Massowah out of the straight course.

1919. What was the date of your personal communication with Sir Stafford Northcote?—I cannot tell you. It must have been, of course, prior to this letter; I fancy about a fortnight, as I must have communicated with my brother directors, and our boards are at intervals of 14 days. I think it must have been about 14 days prior to the 11th of November.

1920. What made you apply at that time particularly? If you were alive to the necessity in view of the advantages to the Expedition of telegraphic communication, why did you not bring your views before the Government earlier?—As far as my memory serves me, I induced my brother directors to make this proposal in consequence of a private communication from Bombay, informing me that General Napier had expressed an opinion in favour of having telegraphic communication between Abyssinia, where he was bound, and Great Britain *via* Egypt. It was in consequence of that (although I could not make use of that information) that we had this prior conversation with the Secretary of State. Apart from that, having been connected with naval and military operations in different parts of the world, I knew the great value of telegraphy, and I considered myself bound, as a naval officer, to do my part in ensuring, if we could, the greatest economy in working out a military operation; and, in the second place, in the event of any misfortune or repulse, to do what I believed a very necessary thing for the safety of the force in Abyssinia.

1921. Your views generally on the matter of the probable utility of the cable are I think pretty clearly set forth in the letter of November the 11th, are they not?—I believe so. I have very little, or, in fact, nothing to add to it.

1922. Was any reason assigned to you for the refusal of your offer?—No. I remember making a note after the final interview upon the subject, and this is the purport of it; that I had seen General Pears and found that no practical result was likely to arise from my negotiation, and that it had better cease; and I was confirmed in that by a letter from the India Office, dated the 19th of December, in which I found that my letter had been forwarded for the information of Sir Robert Napier. I knew then that it was too late; that by the time it got out, was considered, and an answer returned, it was too late for me to be of any use, so I ceased to negotiate.

1923. And there was no disposition on the part of the Government to enter into correspondence  
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with you at all upon the subject, that is to say, assuming that the particular offer which you made did not suit them, they did not show any disposition to discuss the details of it?—No.

1924. In fact they threw cold water upon the proposal?—Yes, there was great civility, but nothing more; and though I was privately instructed by the capitalists who intended to carry out the line to India, if I saw the door opened for negotiation, to do all I could to encourage the Government to lay the cable, and that they would relieve the Government to a great extent of the cost by taking it over from them on fair and equitable terms, I found that the negotiations were not likely to take a practicable form, and that letter confirms it. It merely says: "I am to acquaint you, in reply to your communication, that it has been forwarded for consideration to Sir Robert Napier." I considered that that closed the door to further negotiations.

1925. Which you would have been ready to enter into had the Government shown any disposition to do so?—Most certainly.

1926. Was the substance of the two offers which you made, shortly this: that the first was, that for a payment of 300,000 £. you would be prepared to lay down within four months from the 1st of December (which would give the date for the completion by about the first of April) a permanent sub-marine line from Suez to Annesley Bay, which would be taken over afterwards and form part of the line which is now in working order between this country and India, and that the terms which you were prepared to submit to the Government were that they should find the capital of 300,000 £., and that the company, when it was formed, should pay a certain per-centage?—Yes, just interest upon the money which had been sunk. That was my first proposition.

1927. That is a similar arrangement, is it not, to that which obtains with reference to a portion of the lines which are leased by the company from the Government, that is to say, the lines in the Mediterranean?—Which were then leased from the Treasury.

1928. Assuming that the Government did not like the responsibility of expending the whole 300,000 £., subject to a permanent leasing guarantee from the company, there would have been no difficulty, would there, in making some arrangement by which, at a loss of, say, 20 per cent. at the outside at the completion of the war, the cable might have been handed back?—I think the present company would have been very glad to have taken that cable over from them, if it had been a good one, as we proposed, at a moderate reduction of, say, from 20 to 25 per cent. upon the original cost.

1929. Then 20 per cent. on 300,000 £. is 60,000 £., and therefore for a payment of 60,000 £. the Government might have had the advantage of direct communication, might they not?—There is not the least doubt of it.

1930. With reference to the second scheme, it was, I believe, to lay what you call a flying sub-marine line (which would be similar in its character to that which was laid across the Black Sea during the Crimean war) from the bottom of the Gulf of Suez, from Jubbal, a portion of the line down the Gulf being in existence at the time?—Yes.

1931. That would have cost 100,000 £., and in the event of the war being over, would have had  
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next to no value, except for the old materials, such of them as might have been brought back?—Quite so.

1932. Might that have been valued at, say, 5,000 *l.* or 6,000 *l.*?—I cannot tell you; it would have been taken over at a fair valuation; the insulating material is always valuable if it is recovered from the bottom.

1933. But it would not have been more than 10,000 *l.*, would it?—Probably not.

1934. The reason why I put the question was to draw a comparison between the two plans, and to get in evidence the cost of telegraphic communication so that it would stand in this way; that a permanent telegraphic wire, of the best construction might have been put down at a cost to the Government of 60,000 *l.*, and a flying line would have been put down (if you allowed 10,000 *l.*, which is the outside value, for the old material) for 90,000 *l.*; that would be so, would it not?—Yes.

1935. In point of time, the more permanent and better arrangement would have taken four months to do, which from the 1st of December would bring you to the 1st of April, while the flying line could have been laid in possibly half the time, could it not?—Yes; we purposed sending the flying line overland; and I think the loss to the Government would have been as little as in the other case, if there had been any disposition to entertain it, because we could have laid a flying submarine line from the end of the old cable, which is in the Gulf of Suez, and it would not have cost 100,000 *l.* My estimate was 100,000 *l.* from Suez to Massowah; but if the Government had entertained the idea at all, I have no doubt that in either case, for about 50,000 *l.* or 60,000 *l.* they would have had the advantage of a cable during the whole time of the Abyssinian Expedition.

1936. Then the 100,000 *l.* was an outside figure, and provided for making no use of the line which was then in working order?—Yes; and it could have been opened any day to Jubbal, the entrance of the Gulf of Suez.

1937. Therefore one may say (to sum up roughly) that if the Government had been disposed to enter into arrangements with your company, they might have had an efficient telegraphic communication for 50,000 *l.*?—Yes.

1938. And that might have been done in four months from the 1st of December, had they taken the more permanent and better description of cable, and in two months from that date, had they taken the lighter description of cable?—I think so.

1939. With reference to hospital ships, I am anxious to ask you one or two questions upon which your position as a naval officer will, I think, enable you to give some valuable information to the Committee. Were there any line-of-battle ships available for hospital purposes in August 1867?—Yes; there must have been a great many available.

1940. Have you any idea of how many were available?—If I had a Navy List of that date by me I could give you the names of the ships; but the coastguard ships, which form the First Reserve of the Navy, are supposed to be kept ready for sea and efficient; many of them were very fine two-deckers, possessing great engine-power, vessels, for instance, of the class of the "Donegal," the "Revenge," and the "Duncan"; I think they could have been available within a

few days, and they would have made most excellent hospital ships. I remember remarking with astonishment at the time, that such ships having been proved by the experience of the Crimean War to be utterly useless for fighting purposes, should have been left to rot in our dockyards, instead of being employed on this very Abyssinian Expedition, for what I believed they were eminently fitted for, viz., hospital purposes.

1941. About what is the rate of steaming of that class of vessels?—Ten knots; a vessel like the "Donegal," of which I just spoke, and which I commanded for some time, could have gone from England to Aden in 60 days under sail and steam.

1942. Would there be any difficulty in enabling her to carry the amount of coal with her engines which would require, combined, of course, with the use of the sails?—None whatever; they could coal if necessary at the Cape of Good Hope as other steamers did.

1943. What were those ships doing at that time?—Simply rotting in our harbours.

1944. But what were the ships which were in commission doing?—Those that were on the coastguard had probably gone out for a month's cruise in the summer, and then come back again to lie at anchor.

1945. But whatever duty they were doing, it would not have been a very difficult matter, I suppose, to have supplemented them by other ships?—No, most certainly not.

1946. It would only have been a question of the delay necessary to put the ships in commission, and to victual and crew them, I presume?—Yes; in the following year, 1868, I happened to make a note of the number, and then there were six of them available as coastguard ships, and at that time there were 27 others lying in the reserve, which could have easily filled their places if they had been sent out.

1947. How long do you suppose it would have taken to have got a ship ready from the reserve?—I cannot tell you how many of the 27 or 30 ships were in what is called the First Reserve, that is to say, ready for immediate commission; there would be more in 1867, I think, than in 1868; I could supply the information from the Navy List in a very few minutes.

1948. *Chairman.*] Would the same facts apply to both years?—I think there would be more in 1867 than in 1868; no merchant ships that could possibly have been supplied or hired could have been as efficient for hospital purposes as line-of-battle ships.

1949. *Captain Beaumont.*] An iron ship is not considered, I believe, to be well suited for an hospital ship, is it?—An iron ship has not the ports nor the ventilation that a line-of-battle ship would have with her guns out.

1950. Have line-of-battle ships ever been used, to your knowledge, for hospital purposes?—Yes, a long time ago, in the first Chinese war, up to 1844, we had two of them attached to the fleet, and they did excellent service in China. The French, during the Crimean war, worked their sick to and fro nearly altogether by a ship like the "Napoleon," which was a two-decker of the class I am speaking of.

1951. With reference to the time of fitting out ships, what length of time should you think ought to elapse between the order being given to fit out a ship and her being ready?—A line-of-battle

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of battle ship in the coastguard ought to be ready to go to sea within a week.

1952. And if she is taken out of the reserves, like one of those ships that you are speaking of as being available, and lying up in the creeks in the Medway and elsewhere, what time ought to elapse?—That would depend upon her state; there are different classes of reserve. There is the first, which is the most advanced state, and then there is the second, and so on. I could not tell (in fact, nobody could tell but the Admiralty) how many were in a sufficient state of progress to have them immediately available for hospital purposes; but there is no doubt that any line-of-battle ship which was then in the coastguard, by merely having her guns taken out, and the materials put on board, could have been fitted out by any intelligent officer on the passage out, for hospital purposes.

1953. Taking the case of a ship with her engines and boilers, and ready for service, it could not be I should think a matter of very long time to get her ready, could it?—I should think not. Of course, in fitting out men-of-war there are all sorts of expensive equipments put into them, but where you do not want a ship for fighting purposes, but for a hospital, you do not want her guns, and you want a very reduced crew in her, and it ought not to have been either a long or expensive job to have equipped such ships.

1954. In fact, it would amount to little more than getting the engines into proper order, if they were not in proper order (which I assume they would be in the case of the reserve) putting the crew on board, with the proper amount of victuals?—Yes, and the less fittings you sent, the better she would be adapted for hospital purposes.

1955. With reference to the cost of fitting those ships out, I should not like to ask you for a detailed opinion, but on the general view of the case would you think that the expense of fitting out a ship from the reserve could equal that of taking up a merchant ship, bearing in mind the price that you would have to pay for her charter?—Most certainly I should say it ought not.

1956. And if it is contended that it does exceed it, do you think, as far as your judgment goes, it would be a matter worthy of inquiry why that excess should exist?—I should be much astonished if anybody could show me that the fitting of a hospital ship, unless it were done in a very extravagant way, ought to cost very much.

1957. But it is quite clear upon, is it not, looking at the question from a *prima facie* point of view, that it would cost more to charter merchant ships than it would have done with any reasonable amount of extravagance to have taken ships from the reserve, and to have fitted them and sent them out?—Most certainly.

1958. Have you ever been in the Red Sea?—Frequently.

1959. During the monsoon time?—I had to study the question with respect to submerging the cable which we have just laid from Bombay, and I travelled eight times, both in the monsoon and out of the monsoon, between Bombay and Suez.

1960. Can full-powered steamers tow sailing ships at all times out of the Red Sea against the south-west monsoon, and I would except from my question when it was blowing a full gale of wind?—Yes, I see nothing in the Red Sea to prevent any ship at the lower portion of it being towed, or sailing herself out, as far as that goes. The

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south-west monsoon blows from Socotra right into Bombay Harbour. It would be difficult to bring up a ship from Bombay to Aden; but I do not quite understand how there should be any difficulty in getting out of the Red Sea.

1961. I think that we have had evidence which shows that there would be a considerable amount of difficulty in a sailing ship beating out of the Red Sea; you do not agree with that?—The great difficulty in the Red Sea is to get wind.

1962. Not in the monsoon time?—It is only just a puff in the entrance of the strait.

1963. At any rate, your opinion is that a sailing ship ought to be able to beat out of the Red Sea?—Most certainly. Why sailing ships cannot be used in the Red Sea is for want of wind; a sailing ship could not come up against the monsoon from Bombay to the Red Sea; but as far as the Red Sea goes, I know of no difficulty if you can get wind.

1964. I am nearly certain that I am right, when I say that this Committee has had before it statements to the effect, that sailing ships were unable, without the use of powerful steamers to tow them, to leave Annesley Bay, and to get out of the Red Sea?—I am very much astonished at that.

1965. You think that a smart ship ought to be able to beat out of the Red Sea?—Most certainly.

1966. Against any monsoon?—Yes; because it is not a monsoon in the Red Sea; it is just a prevailing wind which blows in at the two ends of the Red Sea. There is frequently a breeze blowing down the Gulf of Suez and into the Straits of Babel-Mandeb; but the great difficulty in the Red Sea is the want of wind. If I understand that going from Annesley Bay to Aden is difficult in certain seasons of the year for a sailing ship, I agree that a sailing ship might be a long time getting to Aden; but it is rather for want of wind than from force of wind.

1967. Then if it is possible for a sailing ship to beat out of the Red Sea, or to sail out if there was wind enough, *à fortiori* there is no difficulty in towing it out?—Certainly not.

1968. With regard to the arrangements for condensing, do you think that it was a wise and economical way of obtaining water from the sea by means of condensing, to use full-powered steamers for that purpose?—Do I understand that steamers were kept especially for that purpose?

1969. Yes; retained specially for that purpose on payment?—I should say that it was about the most extravagant way of doing it.

1970. Assuming that we wanted the condensed water as distinct from the question whether the water could have been got in any other way, and assuming that there was no other water to be had, do you think that taking full-powered steamers for the purpose of condensing, was a very expensive way of obtaining that water?—If I understand the honourable Member to mean that steamers were retained for that purpose on pay or demurrage, I should say that it was the most expensive way of doing it.

1971. Can you suggest any other way which would have obviated the expense?—I think the simplest way would have been to have a boiler, funnel, and pump on shore, and to have your own condensing machine on shore, such as we had at Kertch, for instance, during the Russian war.

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1972. Can you give a short summary of the state of affairs which subsisted at Kertch, which rendered that arrangement desirable; that is to say, the number of men that required water, and the arrangements which were made?—The naval officer who can give you the best information about it is Captain or Admiral Robert Hall, now captain-superintendent of Pembroke Dockyard. He was senior officer at Kertch during our occupation of it, with about 20 to 22,000 allied troops. A great deficiency of water was found to exist, and at one time I think it threatened to oblige us either to very materially reduce the force, if not to take them away. An old funnel belonging to a captured Russian steamer and a pair of boilers that were picked up somewhere were used, and an engineer was got out of some men-of-war sent down by Lord Lyons, and a rough practical condenser was fitted. I was in the neighbourhood, in the sea of Azof, and I understood (subject, of course, to the better information which the Committee will get from Captain Hall) that the great amount of water made by this apparatus enabled the garrison to hold its position, and contributed very much to its health and efficiency. To what extent it did so I cannot tell you; but I know that it worked well, and that we did not require to keep transports or ships stationed there to make condensed water for the troops.

1973. Was there any water available in the vicinity of the camp?—There was; but in the summer the whole of the Crimea dries up, and there was a terrible paucity, if not, at times, almost an entire deficiency of water.

1974. From your own knowledge you cannot quite speak to the number of men that were supplied with water by this condensing apparatus?—No, it was a very large number; but Captain Hall I am sure could give the Committee very good information upon that subject.

1975. You are very clear that to hire full-powered steamers, and to keep them on time charter for the purpose of condensing only, was at the first blush of the thing an ill-advised arrangement from a financial point of view?—Most certainly; because it does not require an engineer or a conjuror to condense water, and at Bombay the means could have been provided and carried to Annesley Bay for condensing water; that bears again upon what I say with respect to employing line-of-battle ships. There was not one of those ships that was not capable with her condensing apparatuses and boilers, of making very large quantities of water.

1976. Do you know Bombay Harbour?—Well.

1977. Do you know Butcher's Island and Hog Island?—Yes, well.

1978. Is it wrong to say that there is laying ground behind those islands fully sheltered from the south-west monsoon where ships could lie in still water, and discharge their cargoes?—There is a place behind Elephanta where in olden times the East India Company's ships used to go, and lie and discharge; I think it is between Hog Island and Elephanta; it is the old roadstead.

1979. And besides that, I think there is ground, is there not, behind Butcher's Island and behind Hog Island, which is never made use of as a roadstead, although it might be made use of?—Yes; but the other is a better one, behind Elephanta.

1980. Do you know any reason why night

work should not have been resorted to for discharging ships in Bombay harbour during the monsoon other than the obvious one that the work is more expensive?—I fancy you would have great difficulty with the native boatmen; they are so timid, and such indifferent boatmen, that I think you would have found very great difficulty in inducing them, even for pay, to work at night in the monsoon.

1981. I quite agree with you as to that, if the ships were lying in an open roadstead, but if they were placed in a sheltered position such as I have pointed out to you, do you think that that difficulty would vanish?—In discharging the ship they would have had to cross the stormy portion of the harbour unless you landed at Hog Island.

1982. That is what I meant?—There would be no difficulty then.

1983. Of course the advisability of taking such a course would depend upon the cost of the ships on time charter being set against the relative value of the stores as deposited on Hog Island or Butcher's Island, and the mainland?—Quite so; there is no difficulty in doing that.

1984. Sir James Elphinstone.] Are you aware that in consequence of the wind blowing into the Red Sea, they never were able to get but one ship to beat out of the Red Sea by herself during the whole time of the Expedition?—I am very much astonished to hear it.

1985. It is stated in evidence by Captain Tryon, that only one ship was able to beat out herself, and that was with the loss of her topmast and sails, and therefore that they were not able to discharge their transports in consequence of the strong wind that blows into the Red Sea up as far as the Dhalac Islands?—I have been there often at that season of the year, and I know the amount of wind and sea there pretty well. At that season of the year there is a fresh breeze blowing in, but I never saw it more than what a sailor in the Channel would call a double-reefed topsail breeze. You have always to remember, with respect to a transport upon charter, that the master does not push himself to get off his charter very much, but he hangs on to his charter-party. A good skipper keeps on to it as long as he can, for his owner's sake.

1986. But is there not a lee current at that season of the year also?—I think there is, but I saw no practical difficulty.

1987. I will read you Captain Tryon's answer to Question 2036. He said, "During nearly the whole time of the Expedition we had a foul wind in whichever direction we wanted to send the ship; the wind prevails from the north down the Red Sea to within 100 miles of the Dhalac group; and within 50 miles of it the wind prevails from the south in an opposite direction, and at no period could we rely upon getting the vessel out of Annesley Bay without towing her; we were in the zone of calm between the northerly and southerly winds." Do you agree in that?—I think he was right in saying he was in the zone of calm, and he had to tow out.

1988. With regard to getting line-of-battle ships out to Aden in 60 days, do you think you could have got a line-of-battle ship out there in that time?—Yes; I have sent a ship of inferior power out to Aden in 59 days at that season of the year, and would undertake to send others out in even 55 or 56 days.

1989. Are you aware of the time that it took the "Golden Fleece," with plenty of coals, to come

come home?—If it was a time charter, I am not prepared to say what time it would have taken.

1990. You have a great doubt about time charters?—Yes.

1991. With regard to Bombay Harbour, can you inform the Committee at what period it was that the East India ships lay at the back of Hog Island?—I cannot tell you, but I remember having frequent conversations with Sir Bartle Frere when I was at Bombay, as to the importance of carrying on the cotton trade and traffic of Bombay during the monsoon; and I remember his pointing it out to me. I have urged upon the Government the importance of making a railway communication from Hog Island up to Kampooli, and pointed out that by that means we could in the monsoon have brought the produce of India upon that side of the harbour, and loaded and unloaded it with the same facilities as is done in the fine weather in Bombay Harbour. I think Sir Bartle Frere agreed with me, and he it was who told me that there was no difficulty, in former days, in doing it, except the heat; it is hot, of course, between the Island of Elephanta and Hog Island, and it is not very healthy; but I understood from him that it was the usual roadstead in former times of the East India Company's ships.

1992. Are you aware that a very strong tide runs through there?—Yes; but not stronger there than in Bombay, generally.

1993. Are you aware that the south-west monsoon blows through with greater violence between Hog Island and Elephanta than through any other part of the harbour?—Of course, wherever wind is compressed between high lands, it will naturally have a little more force than in other places.

1994. But that is exactly the place where you are proposing that those ships should lie, is it not?—It is not the force of the wind that prevents ships loading and unloading at Bombay; it is the incessant rain, and the sea, and the indifferent boatmen that you have to deal with; but I never saw much wind as compared with the British climate.

1995. Are you aware that the Expedition returned in the height of this south-west monsoon?—Yes.

1996. Have you ever been in Bombay in the south-west monsoon?—Both in and out.

1997. Have you ever taken in or stowed a cargo there in the south-west monsoon?—I had to clear out a great many cargoes of coals when I was managing the Great Indian Peninsular Railway out there.

1998. Talking of discharging stores, and running to the back of Elephanta, are you aware that the rain is more violent there, that the tide is more violent, and that the wind rushes through between Hog Island and Elephanta, so that it is positively more exposed than it is in any other part of the harbour?—I should not have thought so.

1999. Then is there any water in Hog Island?—Of course, with the rainfall you have then, you have no difficulty in getting rain water anywhere.

2000. Then what is the distance of Hog Island from, we will say, the Custom House Bunder?—It is five or six miles.

2001. So that, in point of fact, you would require that they should go six miles farther?—No; I was asked the question as to discharging the cargo, and landing at Hog Island.

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2002. Are there any warehouses, or jetties, or anything of that kind, at Hog Island?—There was nothing there when I was there, but I believe that a good deal has been done since. There is abundance on Butcher's Island.

2003. It is rather a rocky coast: is there a bunder on Butcher's Island?—Yes; there is everything at Butcher's Island. There was a naval establishment, with sheds, and tanks, and other things.

2004. But it is more an establishment for invalids, is it not, than for stores?—No; I think that the Government landed all their coals there during the Abyssinian Expedition. I know that I was offered 20,000 tons of coals which were on Butcher's Island the other day.

2005. With regard to working at night in the south-west monsoon, is that the sort of thing that you would suppose could be done with any effect in Bombay Harbour?—Decidedly not; I believe I said that I did not think that you would get the boatmen to work in the night-time in Bombay Harbour.

2006. How many days in the height of the south-west monsoon in the month of June are there when you cannot open your hatches to discharge anything of a perishable nature?—It would be difficult for me to say. It does rain very heavily, but a good deal of that old fashion of not working in the monsoon has been reformed, steadily and quietly, owing to Bombay having become the great port which it has, and the railway, and other things; commerce cannot stop entirely during the monsoon, as it used to do. I am told that the trade of Bombay, both as regards its imports and exports, is increasing steadily in the monsoon, showing that the difficulty is being overcome.

2007. Possibly it may be so; but with an enormous influx of shipping in the middle of the monsoon, would you suppose it possible to discharge those ships by night?—I was not at all astonished to hear that they had not been able to discharge them in the monsoon.

2008. You would have been very much surprised if that had been done, should you not?—I should, knowing Bombay and their *laissez aller* system during the monsoon. Everybody wants to go away to the hills and take it easy.

2009. And I do not suppose that, as a sailor, you would have recommended that they should run up to Hog Island for the purpose of bringing the goods across the harbour, to land either at Mazzagong or at the Custom House Bunder?—I think that, looking at the enormous expense entailed by demurrage, I would have gone to great lengths to clear the ships and get rid of the charge.

2010. Is there not a limit to the mode of clearing ships in Bombay?—I think I would have sent them to the other side (as was suggested just now) and got rid of the goods and cleared them out. I understand that some of them were told to throw their cargoes overboard to be rid of them.

2011. How would you have cleared them; how would you have got boats?—There were heaps of boats when I was there, connected with the reclamation works and ordinary service of the port.

2012. Had not the harbour been ransacked to send boats to Abyssinia?—That is not within my knowledge.

2013. Was it not a considerable reason for the difficulty

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difficulty of discharging ships, and a great obstacle to the trade of the port, that a great number of their best lighters had been taken away to Abyssinia?—If they sent them all away, of course there must have been a deficiency.

2014. Then you would have to fall back, I suppose, upon open cotton boats?—Yes.

2015. And, of course, with reference to stores, such as medicines, clothing, ammunition, arms, and matters of that description, it would not be at all advisable to land them in open boats in the monsoon, would it?—I think the first consideration was to get the ships of charter, and that it was desirable that everything should be done to attain that object, and I presume that everything was done, though, of course, I do not know.

2016. Sir John Hay.] On the subject of the telegraph cable, the proposition which was made in November to the Secretary of State for India, as I understand, was that the Government was to be at the original outlay of 300,000*l.*; and, having incurred that expenditure, and having laid the line (if they did lay it successfully) it would have been available for them probably by April?—Yes; that was what we understood.

2017. Then the position would have been this, would it not, that during the greater part of the time of the Expedition, at which it would have been necessary, the cable would not have been available for use?—Of course we could not foresee that the Expedition was going to end at the time at which it did end; my idea was, that very likely the monsoon would come in long before the Abyssinian Expedition had fulfilled its mission. Then the communications with Bombay would have been very much interrupted; and I strongly doubt whether they could have maintained Bombay as the base for supplies; they would have looked then to Egypt; and with a cable in that direction you would, at any rate, have had the means of perhaps saving your force in the event of disaster or want of supplies or anything of that sort.

2018. But, as a matter of fact, is it not the case that no exertion on the part of the Government would have laid the cable in time to be of use during the greater part of the Expedition?—A flying line might have been laid.

2019. But the special cable of which you spoke could not have been laid in time, could it?—No, but the flying line could have been laid like the one which we laid from Varna to Balaclava. That might have been sent overland to Suez, and it might have been laid in very much less time if the Government had been at all disposed to do it.

2020. But that would not have reference to your proposition, would it?—Yes, we made both propositions, and neither was accepted.

2021. What was the suggested financial arrangement regarding the flying line?—The first cost would have been 100,000*l.*, and then we would have coiled the cable up as much as we could, and repaid the Government the price of the old material, as it would not have been of any use for commercial purposes.

2022. Having made that proposition in November, within what time do you think that the cable could have been sent out and laid down?—The Government when they decided on the Abyssinian Expedition (which I believe was as early as August), went to the expense of a wire from head-quarters to Massowah.

2023. That was a field telegraph, was it not?

—Yes, a field telegraph. What appeared to me to be so inconvenient was, that when they reached the sea the telegraph had to be put on board a ship, and then the ship had to steam for a week, either to Bombay or to Suez. Common prudence I should have thought would have dictated laying a cable or a flying line of wire, so that there should have been a telegraphic system throughout, and I am still puzzled to know why it was not done.

2024. But your proposition for the flying line did not come forward until November, did it?—No; as a last resource; but in conversation I am sure we spoke of both propositions as early as October.

2025. With regard to another point, on the subject of the line-of-battle ships, which you think were available in 1867 to be sent out at once as hospital ships, you have no accurate knowledge, I suppose, upon that point?—No; but with the Navy List I could tell you; we had evidence, if you remember, before Mr. Seely's Select Committee upon the uselessness of those ships, and the number which was in the hands of the Admiralty, and it struck me as very strange that none of those ships were utilised in the only direction in which they could have been of any public use, except as firewood.

2026. But looking at the fact that for some time previously, under the previous administration as well as under the one then in office, it had not been the practice, in consequence of the inutility of those ships, to repair them, are you aware at what cost any of them could have been got ready for the purpose of which you speak?—I know that you had in 1868 (and I am not sure that it was not as early as 1867) six of them in commission; I can tell of course by referring to documents; but in 1868 you had six, the "Trafalgar," the "Royal George," the "Duncan," the "Donegal," the "Revenge," and the "Saint George"; you had them as coastguard ships.

2027. Arrangements being made to replace them by iron-clads?—Yes; and the next year they were replaced by iron-clads, and two of them are now afloat abroad.

2028. But I daresay that you are aware that arrangements had already been made to replace those vessels by iron-clads, and that they were merely kept as vessels in which the crews could be exercised and trained, and that no expenditure was incurred to make them sea-worthy?—Two of them have gone to China and one to India since, so that they must have been sea-worthy.

2029. Are you aware what expenditure it took, or how long it took, to make them sea-worthy?—I am not; but I know that it is professed that the coast-guard service is the first reserve of the country, and they are supposed to be ready to go to sea to-morrow; when a coast-guard fleet consisted of line-of-battle ships, that was the first reserve of the country, and it was publicly said and understood that they were ready to go to sea.

2030. Was it publicly said and understood in that year?—So I believe; I referred to 1867 and 1868.

2031. Are you aware, then, that there was any public statement that the wooden line-of-battle ships employed in the coast-guard were in a fit state for war?—I am under the impression that I can find such a statement.

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2032. Will you kindly put that statement in?—I will try and find it.

2033. Of course you are not personally cognizant of the condition of those ships, except from general impression?—I formerly commanded one, the "Donegal," and I saw her frequently at the very time of the Abyssinian Expedition, and I know that the same ship has since gone to China.

2034. And you are under the impression that the "Donegal" could have made the voyage to Annesley Bay, or wherever she was wanted, within 70 days?—Yes.

2035. How often would you propose that they should coal?—I would coal them at St. Vincent, if it was necessary, but certainly at the Cape.

2036. How many days' steaming did the "Donegal" carry?—I cannot tell you straight off the reel; but a great many, with economical working of sail and steam.

2037. Are you under the impression that they could have arrived there as quickly as the steam transports which were engaged for that purpose?—They might have arrived quite soon enough for the purposes of the Expedition.

2038. At what date would you think that it would have been soon enough for the purposes of the Expedition?—I would have sent them away in September, and then they would have been there before it was necessary.

2039. Are you under the impression that there were wooden line-of-battle ships which could have been fitted out in September and despatched, and could have arrived in Annesley Bay in time for the Expedition?—I think so.

2040. *Chairman.*] Your first communications with the Secretary of State for India, touching the telegraph, you think were about the latter part of October?—Yes, I think so; I fancy that it must have been about 14 days before the 11th of November.

2041. If you had arranged by the 1st of November you could have had a telegraph cable laid by the 1st of January, could you not?—We could have had a flying line laid down by the 1st of January.

2042. And if you had had an arrangement made for the more permanent line you could have had that laid by the end of February, could you not?—Yes.

2043. Had you not an earlier communication with the Government, touching the laying of that Red Sea line, about July 1867?—Yes; but not with reference to the Abyssinian Expedition. We commenced a correspondence on the 12th of December 1866.

2044. Was there not a specific communication on August the 5th, 1867?—Yes.

2045. What was the nature of that communication?—That communication was one to the Secretary of State for India, pointing out that we were on the point of carrying out the recommendations which were made by the Select Committee of the House of Commons, of which Mr. Craufurd was Chairman, and that the commercial world, being dissatisfied with the telegraphic communications overland to India, were urging us to carry a cable from Suez to Bombay, and we asked the Indian Government to assist and co-operate with us in doing so; it is a long letter, but that was the object of it.

2046. If at that time you had had any encouragement from the India Office, you could have had your telegraphic communications laid

before the month of October, could you not?—Yes; the reply to that came on September the 24th, after the Abyssinian Expedition was decided upon.

2047. That communication itself being dated the 5th of August?—Yes; but September the 24th is the date of the reply to the letter of July, and you will see by its tenour that though the Government had then decided upon the Abyssinian Expedition, they were not prepared in any way to make proposals which were likely to be accepted by any commercial company.

2048. You complain of the extravagant arrangements for the condensing of water at Annesley Bay; will you describe to the Committee how you think it could have been done more cheaply?—I am astonished to hear that ships were retained upon charter, simply for the purpose of making water, when a boiler and a funnel, and proper arrangements on shore could have been maintained so very simply, I think, for supplying any quantity of water.

2049. With no permanent expense except the expense of labour and coals?—A pair of boilers and a funnel, and very simple apparatus indeed would have done.

2050. You said the ships were very suitable for hospital ships, would not our old ships of war have been available also for carrying troops, for instance, between Bombay and Annesley Bay?—Large ships like those would have been admirably adapted for carrying away the force at any moment, and they would not have rotted a bit faster in Annesley Bay than they were rotting in the dockyards at home; I have seen a French line-of-battle ship with 2,000 men on board, and those ships could run before the monsoon, and having steam power they could do anything.

2051. As regards Bombay Harbour I think you stated that there was not only one but two shelters for vessels?—Yes, it is all one roadstead; it is behind Butcher's Island and Elephantia; you may call it the foul weather roadstead.

2052. And in every case where the cargo or the material on board the ship was of less value than the freight paid for retaining the ships, that at all events would have been a good place to have got rid of it, would it not?—Yes, just as we did at the end of the Crimean war, we did not keep ships on charter at Balaclava to discharge it all; we almost threw it away to get rid of it.

2053. Neither rain or wind should have interposed to prevent the discharge of worthless cargo like that?—Certainly not, because very few of that class of stores when once sent out for an expedition are ever useful again; they are generally surveyed and condemned, and then thrown away.

2054. Can you conceive that a ship arriving in Bombay Harbour in June with a cargo of hay, and hay only on board, could have been retained and still kept on pay in the month of August?—I heard of it, and I was very much astonished at it.

2055. How often have you been in the Red Sea?—I think that I have been about eight times to and fro.

2056. Out of the Indian Sea into the Red Sea?—Yes.

2057. You must therefore be exceedingly well-informed about the winds and currents, I presume?—It is a place very little visited by naval officers. I commanded a man-of-war there for a

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short time, and then afterwards for the purpose of this cable, I made it my business to study the climate and the locality thoroughly, in order that I might effect this telegraphic communication between India and Egypt.

2058. Sir *John Hay*.] You do not doubt Captain Tryon's evidence as to the time at which he was there?—I do not in the least doubt that he had strong breezes into the Red Sea at that time, but nothing that a sailor in this country would call a gale of wind.

2059. *Chairman*.] You speak of the Red Sea as of Bombay Harbour, not with special reference to the facts, but generally?—Yes.

2060. And whether there were boats in Bombay Harbour or not at this time, you have no particular knowledge?—No.

2061. If a man, the owner of 60 or 70 boats, of 60 or 80 tons, told us that he would have had no difficulty in discharging from those vessels in Bombay Harbour at night, during the south-western monsoon, would you have supposed that we ought to have discredited his evidence?—I should not, because, as I have said, it is a very remarkable fact how the difficulty has gradually been got over of loading and unloading ships during the monsoon. Ten years ago it was almost looked upon as an utter impossibility, and people would not do it; but you will find, if you look at the imports and exports of Bombay, that every monsoon for the last few years the number of ships loading and unloading, has been steadily increasing.

2062. Mr. *Seely*.] If you had had to make arrangements for the Abyssinian Expedition would your attention have been directed to laying a cable as soon as you had determined upon that Expedition?—Most certainly, after the experience in the Crimea, and in every other part of the world where military operations have been carried on. It is a recognised fact that the telegraph is almost as important as the food for the troops; and that it was recognised by Lord Napier I am sure, because my information was confirmed, if he gave any evidence upon the subject before this Committee, that he did desire it, and he saw the absurdity of bringing the telegraph from the uplands of Abyssinia to the coast, and then putting it on board a steamer to run for seven days under steam at a great cost.

2063. Then, as the Expedition was determined upon in August, it would have been possible, would it not, to have had a telegraph laid before the troops got there?—There is not the least doubt of it. If I had been applied to in August I would have had a line down of some sort before a soldier landed in the place.

2064. Captain *Beaumont*.] The honourable and gallant Member for Portsmouth spoke of a lee current in the Red Sea, but I apprehend it would be correct to say that there is no current of any importance whatever in the Red Sea?—I think that on one side there is a current, but it is a surface current, owing to the force of the wind, and I believe that the very current of which the honourable and gallant Member speaks on one side of Perim runs out on the other side. A sailor, if he found the current strong against him on one side would make his boards and get out on the other; but I am astonished that in a fine clear climate like that any sailor should say that he could not beat out of the Red Sea if he had wind.

2065. Are you aware that in Bombay Har-

bour, a new Government work, consisting of a hydraulic dock, as a matter of fact is being built upon the opposite side of the harbour?—Yes; I had to do with the recommendation to induce them to go to Hog Island with that lift.

2066. And it is consequently in contemplation to change the business part of the town to a certain extent to the opposite side, is it not?—I believe so, for even military reasons.

2067. The coastguard ships are supposed to be in such a state that they can safely cruise about the coast of England, are they not?—Yes; I have always understood that that was the coast-guard ships' business.

2068. Then that being the case, ought not such ships to be able to undertake a voyage to the East, where we know that the ships are rigged more lightly, and the weather is more favourable, without any further preparation?—The ship should be able to do it. She is not in a fit state for the coastguard if she is not fit to go there, because in that case she is not fit to take any part in any sudden emergency upon the shores of Europe.

2069. The fact is, that any ship that is able to sail in English waters ought to be able to sail to the East, but the reverse of that would not hold good, because the weather is generally calmer in Indian waters than it is here, is not that so?—The only thing a man would have to consider would be the passage of a stormy point like the Cape of Good Hope, but a line-of-battle ship without her guns would involve very little expense in the way of equipment out of the coastguard.

2070. And she would not there in all probability have to contend with weather which is worse than she would have to meet with about the English coast?—No, not a bit.

2071. Sir *James Elphinstone*.] Is it a fact that ships were kept in Annesley Bay for no other purpose than to condense water?—I did not know how that was when the question was put to me, and I asked whether the honourable Member meant that ships were detained on charter for the purpose of making water.

2072. Colonel *Barttelot*.] You do not know of your own knowledge whether they were detained at all?—No.

2073. Nor do you know of your own knowledge what the stores were which were returned to Bombay?—No.

2074. You know nothing about that, except that certain stores as you think might have been taken on shore during the monsoon?—I was asked the question whether a ship in the monsoon could be cleared out, if not on one side of the Bombay Harbour, on the other, or words to that effect, and I said, "Yes, I think so."

2075. Of course that would depend upon what class of stores were on board that ship?—I know pretty well what military stores are, having seen a great deal of them.

2076. Sir *James Elphinstone*.] I will read a question, 2037, which I put to Captain Tryon, with his answer: "Is it not the normal state of the Red Sea that for nine months it blows up the Sea as far as Hodeida, and down the Sea as far as Djedda, with a belt of calm in the centre?" and his answer is, "Yes; and that is at Annesley Bay." Do you agree in that?—The wind draws into the two entrances of the sea, but I do not call it blowing; it is a moderate breeze.

2077. But are you not aware that the current runs invariably, with the exception of about 40 days

days in the year, into the Red Sea?—I think there is a current in, but nothing very remarkable.

2078. And therefore a transport returning after having done her work is not likely to exert herself sufficiently to stem that current?—That is the explanation of it.

2079. That is your opinion of the transport service generally, is it?—I know from my experience in the Black Sea that you have to keep your eyes pretty sharp upon them.

2080. They did not get home very fast, did they?—No; I have no doubt they prayed for a foul wind.

2081. Do you remember the Indian Navy?—Yes.

2082. Do you know what was the fastest passage which was ever made from Babelmandeb to Suez, sailing up and down the Red Sea, by any of those ships?—I do not; it might be any time; I know the colliers sometimes used to take 60 or 70 days.

2083. Would you be surprised if I told you that the fastest passage that any of the sloops, such as the "Cowper" or the "Elphinstone," or "Euphrates," which were good sloops of the period, made, was 38 days from the mouth of the Straits to Suez, or back again?—I am not at all astonished at that; but if you ask me why it was, I should say it was for want of wind; at any rate, your information proves what I believe, that ships can sail in and out of the Red Sea.

2084. But those were smart little ships, and were handled quite as well as an ordinary transport, I suppose?—Yes, better.

2085. With regard to the floating dock, the honourable Member for Durham asked you about the dock at Hog Island, and I think I understand you to say that you were one of those who recommended it?—I did; I was called upon to report upon it when I came back from Bom-

bay, and I strongly advocated it upon the very grounds which the honourable Member mentioned of Elephanta being such a splendid anchorage. It can be used in both monsoons, and in the event of a war it is protected from sudden attack.

2086. But were you prepared to shift the dockyard over there also?—The dockyard was, in my time, in a very dilapidated state and it would have been better to get rid of it out of Bombay. It was occupying very valuable ground which the community wanted for commercial purposes.

2087. Sir John Hay.] I would call your attention to Question 1956 of Captain Tryon's examination, in which this question was put to him, "You never had enough steamers to fulfil the requirements of the Commander in Chief for reserved steamers, had you?" and his answer was, "We never had that quantity of reserve steamers." If that be the case would you think that it was a bad employment of those steamers, of which there were never enough, to employ them when they were not doing anything else in distilling?—Certainly not.

2088. The officer in command of the transports, who was merely fulfilling the supposed necessities of the General commanding the Expedition, I presume, did not do wrong in employing those vessels in distilling water when he never had so many steamers in the bay as the General thought necessary for the base of his operations?—No, decidedly; a transport with condensing apparatus on board cannot do better than keep on making fresh water for the troops.

2089. Chairman.] You are assuming that they were lying there waiting for employment on some other day?—I assume that if they are wanted there for some public service, rather than keep them there doing nothing, it would be better to employ them in making water.

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Capt.  
S. Osborne,  
R. N., C. B.  
3 May 1870.

Friday, 6th May 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.  
Colonel Barttelot.  
Mr. Baxter.  
Captain Beaumont.  
Mr. Campbell.  
Mr. Candlish.  
Mr. Christopher Denison.

Mr. Eastwick.  
Sir James Elphinstone.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Howes.  
Mr. Seely.  
Mr. Charles Turner.  
Mr. White.

JOHN CANDLISH, ESQ., IN THE CHAIR.

Mr. TYNDALL BRIGHT, called in; and Examined.

Mr.  
T. Bright.  
6 May 1870.

2090. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE you are a member of the firm of Gibbs, Bright, and Company, shipowners at Liverpool?—I am.

2091. Had you any tonnage chartered for the purpose of the Expedition?—We had one ship.

2092. What was her name?—The “*Alsager*.”

2093. Of 1,209 tons register?—Yes.

2094. Is she a colonial-built ship?—She was built in St. John's, and classed five years French veritas.

2095. Where was she chartered?—In Bombay.

2096. When?—On the 1st of January 1868 she came on pay.

2097. For what purpose was she chartered?—As a store-ship, and to take in a cargo of hay for Annesley Bay.

2098. Was her cargo exclusively of hay?—Yes.

2099. When did she leave Bombay?—She left Bombay on the 18th of January.

2100. And when did she arrive at Annesley Bay?—On the 6th of February.

2101. Was she under sail?—Under sail.

2102. Was her cargo discharged at Annesley Bay?—Some few bales; I have not got the exact return, but it was a very small quantity.

2103. Until what time did she lie there undischarged?—Shortly before the 1st of May; I think it was on the 1st of May that she sailed back again to Bombay.

2104. Did she receive instructions to return to Bombay?—She received instructions to proceed to Bombay, and she arrived in Bombay on the 14th of June.

2105. Was she towed to Bombay?—No; she sailed back.

2106. Do you know whether she was towed out of Annesley Bay?—No, I think not.

2107. That was the time of the south-west monsoon, was it not?—Yes, it was.

2108. Nevertheless she sailed out of the Red Sea?—Yes, she did; she was six weeks going back.

2109. You would call that a tolerably fair voyage, would you not, considering the adverse monsoon?—Yes.

2110. What was done with her cargo on her arrival in Bombay harbour?—Nothing was done for some weeks; then they took some small quantity out of her, and then they let her lie with the rest of it in; and at last they ordered her to

go to pitch it overboard outside in the Bay, which we declined to do; we said that it was contrary to our charter party, unless they took the responsibility of the ship coming to damage.

2111. And the authorities acquiesced in that view?—Yes; and they made us a present of the hay.

2112. How much longer did you lie there from the time that you were ordered into the Bay to throw the hay overboard?—I think we settled for three days' pay after that; the authorities paid us up to the Saturday, the 7th August.

2113. On the 7th August you finally accepted your discharge?—Yes.

2114. Taking the present of the hay on board?—Yes.

2115. You left Bombay with the hay?—We left Bombay with about 5,000 bales of hay on board.

2116. And where did you go to?—To Callao.

2117. Did you sell it there?—Yes; for 277 l. 11 s. 8 d.

2118. If you had not taken the hay, you would have had to take ballast in Bombay harbour?—We should.

2119. What would that ballasting have cost you?—About 150 l. I do not know exactly the cost of ballast; but we should have required about 300 tons.

2120. You realised by taking the hay whatever you saved in not having to take ballast, and the price for which you sold the hay ultimately?—Yes.

2121. Was that from 400 l. to 500?—Yes, I suppose it would have been about that.

2122. Was the hay offered to you previously to this period, in August?—It was not exactly offered to us; there had been some discussion about it, but our agents were rather doubtful at first, whether it would pay to take it at all.

2123. Was that proposal submitted to you in June on your arrival, which was made ultimately in August?—No.

2124. If it had would you have accepted it?—I do not know. If our agent had thought that by thus accepting it the vessel would have remained no longer on pay he would have declined the offer.

2125. Would not that reason have operated equally in August?—No, the time had gone on so long then.

2126. You

2126. You began to be ashamed of it?—No, not to be ashamed of it, we were glad to have the employment.

2127. Had any negotiation been attempted you would have been prepared to settle in June?—Yes.

2128. What was your gross freight?—£. 8,743.

2129. You were seven months and seven days, were you not?—Yes.

2130. The monthly pay was how much?—About 1,100 £.

2131. How long did you lie in Bombay Harbour?—From the 14th of June to the 7th of August, nearly eight weeks.

2132. Were you chartered by the calendar month?—We were chartered by the calendar month of 30 days.

2133. That was 54 days that you were lying in Bombay Harbour?—Yes.

2134. For that time you have received nearly 2,000 £. freight?—Yes.

2135. Have you the exact amount?—£. 1,890.

2136. The reasons which induced you to accept the lay and your discharge in August, would have been equally in force in June, would they not?—Equally in force.

2137. And, am I right in inferring that you would have been quite as likely to have accepted your discharge on those terms in June as you were in August?—Quite so.

2138. You know something of the value of shipping generally, I dare say, having had a very great deal of experience?—I do.

2139. Speaking in general terms, and without reference to any particular ship, what would you suppose to be the value of a colonial-built ship, say seven years' class, new and ready for sea at that time, or now?—At that time it would be about 10 £. a ton; at the present moment it would have been about 9 £.

2140. You are alluding to a ship of from 1,000 to 2,000 tons?—Yes.

2141. When I use the words "ready for sea," do you understand me to mean provisioned and stored?—No; I understand you to mean with an East India outfit, classed and coppered.

2142. What do you suppose the value of such a ship, off the letter, would be?—It would be of small value now.

2143. What would it have been then?—About 5 £. a ton.

2144. Do you think 5 £. a ton would have been obtainable for a ship just off the letter in Liverpool at that time,—a ship of no character whatever?—I suppose it would have been from 3 £. to 4 £. a ton.

2145. And, if re-classed for two or three years, 5 £. a ton?—If she were actually classed, she would be worth 6 £. a ton.

2146. I suppose that general statement would be true as regards each particular class till within a 1 £. a ton, or so?—Yes, quite so.

2147. Have you ever known a ship chartered on time, to receive time pay when she was disabled through failure of machinery, or through being stranded and having to go into dock; would she receive pay during the time she had to be docked and repaired?—I have no particular case of that sort within my own knowledge; but I know the form of the charter, in which, in case of breaking down of machinery, or stranding, it is generally excluded. The Government pay, or charter pay, generally ceases during that time.

2148. The pay is for the time the work is being done?—Yes.

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2149. And you have never known a single instance of a ship under time charter receiving pay when disabled?—No; we have a case in point just now of a steamer of ours that got damaged in a gale of wind on the north coast, and we have to deduct the time that she was unable to do her work.

2150. Were you the owners or the charterers?—The owners.

2151. You have been extensively engaged in shipping, and have had all manner of experience in the management of ships all your life?—I have had great experience in that respect all my life.

2152. Sir *James Elphinstone*.] Your vessel, the "Alsager," left Annesley Bay on the 1st May, did she not?—Yes.

2153. And was six weeks getting to Bombay?—Yes.

2154. I suppose she took the south-west monsoons there in the Bight of Berbra?—I suppose she would.

2155. And I suppose she would run over to Bombay in eight days, from the Bight of Berbra?—I cannot answer that question.

2156. If that was so, she must have been five weeks getting the first 200 miles of her journey; but she must have had a fair wind from the Bight of Berbra?—I have not the log with me.

2157. *Chairman*.] You do not know how long she was in clearing the Red Sea?—I do not know that, but I will refer, if you will allow me, to the captain's letter.

2158. Did you ever know of a sailing ship going from the entrance of the Red Sea to Bombay in eight days?—We have had no experience of that; we do not usually run ships upon that line.

2159. Do you know the usual steam passage to be seven days?—I believe so.

2160-1. That is from Aden, 100 miles short of the entrance to the Red Sea?—Yes.

2162. Sir *James Elphinstone*.] What was the tonnage of your vessel?—1,209 tons.

2163. What was her length; was she a fast ship?—No; she was rather a slow ship; she was not a clipper; she was 176- $\frac{3}{4}$  ft. long, 38- $\frac{1}{2}$  ft. beam, and 29 ft. depth of hold.

2164. She certainly could do eight knots with a fair wind?—Certainly.

2165. A charter party, like every thing else, is a matter of bargain?—Quite so.

2166. And you would not be surprised if Government was unable to get steamers, under any other conditions, in a matter of exigency, that they should engage to repair them even if they broke down; that would be a matter of bargain?—As a matter of bargain it might be so, but I never heard of such a case as that.

2167. You would not be surprised at such a case in an emergency?—Not in a case of emergency.

2168. *Chairman*.] In the event of the charter being silent upon that point, would you be exceedingly surprised to hear that the charterers had got to pay it?—I think that if the charter was silent upon that point the charterer would have to pay the continuous month.

2169. Would not usage rule?—The charter is a bargain between man and man; there is no such thing as usage in a charter; a charter is just a question between one man and another as to what arrangements they can make together.

2170. Sir *James Elphinstone*.] If the parties disagree the question must be settled by common law?

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law?—If the parties disagree it must be settled by common law.

2171. Mr. *Eastwick*.] Do charters, as a rule, expressly exclude contingencies of that kind?—If you break down, or sustain any accident preventing you from doing your work, you receive no pay during that time.

2172. *Chairman*.] In the absence of any other condition you would expect that to be the rule?—If I had a charter with that clause left out I should certainly endeavour to enforce the payment of the whole time.

2173. Had this vessel of yours any special characteristics distinguishing her in any way from other sailing ships?—No; she was a vessel we built ourselves, and she was particularly well built; we build our own ships, at St. John's.

2174. Mr. *Eastwick*.] Does the log show that any attempt was made to unload her during the six weeks that she was lying in Bombay harbour?—Yes, they took out a little of her cargo in Bombay harbour; they took out 420 tons of hay by the 30th June.

2175. Have you any statement to make with reference to any difficulty in discharging her?—No.

2176. *Chairman*.] Do you know whether the crew of the vessel was at all employed at Annesley Bay?—We have no report of that at all.

2177. Then she lay there, with her anchor down, from the 6th of February until the 1st of May?—Yes.

The Honourable MONTAGUE MOSTYN, called in; and Examined.

Hon.  
M. Mostyn.

2178. *Chairman*.] WHAT is your profession?—I am a Paymaster in the Army; I am at present in the 21st, and am just being transferred to the 101st.

2179. Where were you in 1867?—I was in India with my regiment.

2180. In what capacity were you engaged?—As paymaster.

2181. You hold also a diploma, I believe?—Yes, I do.

2182. In what capacity?—As Member of the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons.

2183. Where were you stationed in India?—At Secunderabad.

2184. And had you any duties to discharge in connection with the purchase of animals for the Abyssinian Expedition?—At Poonah I was employed in passing bullocks and buying ponies, and also at Berbra, and also in Abyssinia.

2185. I understand that you bought 100 ponies?—I did not buy them; they were sent up to me.

2186. One hundred ponies were purchased?—Yes, at Sholapore, at the cost of 6 l. 10 s. each.

2187. To which had to be added eight rupees for travelling expenses?—Yes; eight rupees for travelling expenses, as they were eight days upon the road, at a rupee a day.

2188. Out of that number 54 were rejected?—Yes; 54 were rejected out of the 100.

2189. Where did you examine them?—At Poonah, in the Horse Artillery lines.

2190. How far had they travelled when they came under your inspection?—Seven days; Sholapore is at a rough guess about 70 or 80 miles from Poonah.

2191. Do you know how they were purchased; were they purchased by contract?—They were purchased by a committee.

2192. What became of those you rejected as unfit for service?—They were kept for about a month, and then sold by auction.

2193. Do you know what they realised?—From one to two rupees each; I do not think that any of them exceeded three rupees.

2194. Were they purchased by the Commissariat department?—No, by a committee.

2195. By whom was that committee appointed?—By the officer commanding the station at Sholapore.

2196. They were brought down seven days' march to Poonah?—Yes.

2197. You then found 54 of them to be utterly unfit for service, and they were rejected, and re-sold by auction at one or two rupees a-piece?—About that; the Transport Train handed them over after they were rejected to the Commissariat, who sold them; I was not at the sale, but I know that that was what they did fetch.

2198. By whose authority were they sold?—By the authority of the Commissary General.

2199. There was no question as to your inspection and rejection of that number?—I took the inspecting veterinary surgeon of the Presidency along with me the day after I had cast them, and no further questions were asked.

2200. He concurred in your opinion?—Entirely.

2201. How long, do you say, they were retained there before they were sold?—About a month.

2202. What was about the cost of their maintenance during that period?—A rupee a day; I have no record here of the date, but they were sold before I went down to Bombay, which was on the 22nd of November.

2203. Sir *James Elphinstone*.] Do you mean they cost a rupee a day each for maintenance?—Yes.

2204. Did that include the pay of the Ghorah Wallahs?—No, because our own men attended them.

2205. *Chairman*.] Why were they retained so long after having been rejected?—I believe in consequence of some correspondence between the Director of the Transport Train and the Commissary General.

2206. With regard to pack-saddles, you are aware that very much complaint has been made, and very much loss is supposed to have resulted from the character of the pack-saddles which were used in Abyssinia?—Very great loss resulted on that account.

2207. You turned your attention to the pack saddle, did you not?—I did.

2208. Did it occupy much of your attention?—It was brought under my notice every day.

2209. Will you tell the Committee what you did in reference to that matter?—I cannot speak exactly to the dates; I was appointed to the Transport Train on the 4th of October, and a few days after that the inspecting veterinary surgeon asked me what steps had been taken about saddles; I told him there had been none.

2210. To

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M. Mostyn.  
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2210. To what office where you appointed in the Transport Train?—I was appointed veterinary surgeon.

2211. What followed upon that?—I wrote a letter to the director, by the direction of the inspecting veterinary surgeon, suggesting that some form of saddle should be tried before ordering any great number of one pattern; the director appointed Colonel Briggs, I think, of an infantry regiment, who had been out in the Cape, to make a model of a Cape saddle, of which 5,000 were ordered.

2212. Was your suggestion acted upon?—It was never acted upon.

2213. What steps were taken by the authorities?—They ordered 5,000 of those modified Cape saddles, and 40 of them were tried one morning and found perfectly useless.

2214. After the 5,000 had been contracted for?—The contract was taken for 5,000; I do not know how many were delivered; they were then ordered to be altered at a cost, as the contractor told me, of two or three rupees extra; I do not know what number was ordered, nor what number came in; but I know they were perfectly useless when ultimately altered; I do not think they even came down to Bombay; I never saw them in our yard at Bombay.

2215. Where were they purchased?—At Poonah.

2216-17. Were they ever dispatched from Poonah?—Not to my knowledge.

2218. Do you believe that they were never used?—I believe they were never used.

2219. Do I gather your statement to be this; that 5,000 pack saddles were ordered without having been tried, notwithstanding a suggestion was made by you that a trial of various patterns should first be made; that when those 5,000 were delivered they were found to be useless, and from two to three rupees were paid to have them altered; that they were so altered and were yet as useless as ever, and that as far as you believe, they were never delivered at Bombay?—I never saw them at Bombay.

2220. What was the contract price for those saddles?—I am not certain, but I think five rupees; I have no note of it here; I am speaking merely from my recollection of a conversation with the contractor.

2221. What was the construction of that saddle?—It was a common pad, like the Bombay pad, made of sacking lined with coir; on this were placed two wooden blocks with straddles across and two hooks.

2222. You say that both Mr. Collins and yourself, beforehand, gave it as your opinion that they would be utterly useless?—Yes.

2223. And they were, to use your own word, "cast" as unsuitable?—They were.

2224. You mentioned the contractor; who was he?—He was the forage contractor; Framjee Prestonjee.

2225. Is he a native contractor at Poonah?—He is the forage contractor.

2226. This same contractor who supplied the saddles, also supplied the forage for the animals of which you have been speaking, did he not?—Yes.

2227. Besides the mules there were some ponies purchased in the Bombay presidency, were there not?—Sholapore is in the Bombay presidency.

2228. There were ponies purchased as well?—

Yes; all the animals of that kind were ponies more than horses, and to avoid confusion it is better to class them generally as ponies.

2229. Where were they purchased?—At Ahmednugger.

2230. Do you remember what number was purchased that came under your official and professional notice?—I have no record here, but I think about 160; they came up in two batches.

2231. What was the character of those horses or ponies of which you are now speaking?—They were better than the Sholapore, but the horses were very bad.

2232. Did you reject them?—No.

2233. Those were satisfactory then, were they?—Mr. Collins and myself were of opinion that they were not fit for work, but that as they were bought it was no use to reject them, as we could not get better.

2234. Do you know their price?—I am not aware of that.

2235. Did they go on to Abyssinia?—After I left Poonah, I do not know what became of them.

2236. Did you go to Abyssinia?—I did.

2237. They did not go with you?—No.

2238. I believe you wish to speak of some purchases at Kattiawai; what number were purchased there which came under your notice?—970 I took over in charge from veterinary surgeon, Lamb.

2239. Did they pass under your inspection?—I did not inspect them with reference to soundness; I took over the veterinary charge of them.

2240. Sir James Elphinstone.] Were those tattoos?—Yes, they were ponies of different classes.

2241. Chairman.] Out of the 900 you cast 300, I believe?—Later on. I was ordered in the beginning of January to inspect them, and to put on one side those that were unfit for service.

2242. When did you receive them in charge?—On the 24th of November.

2243. You did not reject any then?—I was not asked to do so.

2244. It was not your duty to do so?—No, I was merely in the veterinary charge of them.

2245. At a later period, what were you asked to do?—I was told to select those that I considered fit to go Abyssinia.

2246. Where was this?—At Bombay. I was to put the others on one side, and I rejected over 300. I have not got the casting book here, as my reports were handed over at Bombay to the Transport Train. I was along with two other officers on each casting board; the president kept the accounts.

2247. How long were those in your charge at Bombay?—They were in my charge till they were sold, about the 14th of January.

2248. On your rejecting them, were they sold?—About 70 of them were sold in one day.

2249. In Bombay?—In Bombay.

2250. By private arrangement, or by contract?—By the order of the Commissariat.

2251. Were they sold by auction?—Yes, they were.

2252. What did they realise?—From two to five rupees each.

2253. They were all sold?—They were advertised to go up the next day; there was another batch to be sold, and an order came from Poonah to stop the sale.

Q 3

2254. Do

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2254. Do you know how long those ponies were in our possession?—I do not know.

2255. Do you know what the purchasing price of them was?—No, I do not.

2256. How long were they under your care before they were sold?—They were under my care from the 24th of November till the date of their sale. I have not the date of that here, because after I had cast them they were always handed over to the Commissariat.

2257. It would be about seven weeks, would it not?—That was the time I was in charge of them.

2258. And you were retaining and feeding all those useless animals all this time?—Yes.

2259. At a rupee per day per animal at that time?—I do not know the price at Bombay; it is a different contract from Poonah.

2260. You do not know the price of the animals' rations per day?—I do not know what they cost.

2261. From Bombay you proceeded to Abyssinia?—I did.

2262. In what vessel did you go?—In the "Royal Standard."

2263. What was the vessel loaded with; with bullocks and officers' chargers?—Yes; and forage for those animals during the voyage.

2264. Was she a steamer?—No; a sailing ship.

2265. Had she a complete cargo of these animals?—Yes.

2266. As many as she could carry?—Yes.

2267. Then there would be very much unused space in the vessel; was that filled with hay?—The lower part of the ship was full of hay; she carried as many animals as she could.

2268. When did you arrive in Annesley Bay?—On the 6th of February.

2269. Having sailed when?—I embarked on the 14th of January, but we did not sail until 3 o'clock on Thursday the 16th.

2270. Sir John Hay.] Did you observe anything with respect to the arrangements for landing the animals?—The landing arrangements were good in February; I can only speak with regard to my own horses.

2271. Chairman.] There were many animals lost in Abyssinia, were there not?—Yes; there were.

2272. From what cause were they lost?—Principally from sore backs.

2273. From what did the sore backs result?—From bad fitting saddles, and neglect of the animals when they came in after a day's march.

2274. Was that neglect, in your opinion, mere carelessness, or want of knowledge on the part of the muleteers?—It arose from both causes.

2275. What proportion of the animals lost were lost from those causes?—Roughly speaking, I should say eight out of ten.

2276. In your opinion, were the muleteers in charge accustomed to loading pack animals?—With the exception of the Lahore men, and the train that came down from the Punjab, the muleteers, as a body, knew nothing of it.

2277. That remark would comprehend all the Egyptian muleteers, would it not?—I had nothing to do with the Egyptian muleteers; they had left before I arrived back in Annesley Bay. As soon as I arrived, on the 6th February, I was ordered to proceed to Berbera, which I did on the 12th, and I did not return to Zulla till the 17th March.

2278. Had they all left?—Yes, except the farriers.

2279. And the mischief to those animals had been done before your arrival?—No, it was going on the whole time I was there.

2280. Of which muleteers did you speak as being ignorant of their work?—Of the Indian muleteers.

2281. As being unable to load the animals, and not knowing how to take care of them?—Yes.

2282. What proportion of muleteers would there be from India?—They were all of them from India that I had anything to do with.

2283. Then your field of observation would necessarily be somewhat limited; how far did you proceed up the country?—I went up to Dildi; that is about 300 miles.

2284. That was the furthest principal station that you went to?—Yes.

2285. What course was necessary, do you think, to have prevented this state of things, and, when it arose, to have improved it?—When the animals came in, the saddles should have been properly dried and cleaned, and any saddle that did not fit should have been re-stuffed.

2286. Then the defects which you noticed, and their continuance, would argue not merely ignorance on the part of the muleteers, but ignorance on the part of the officers in command?—In many cases.

2287. Did the inconvenience and injury to the animals result from the inability of officers and men to speak the same language?—Partially, but in a great measure the officers and men were not accustomed to animals, and knew nothing of their work.

2288. From that remark you exempt certain persons?—Yes.

2289. Whom?—Our officers were taken from all branches of the service, but it came under my notice that the divisions commanded by artillery officers, and under-officered by artillerymen, always came in in very much better condition than the others.

2290. Did you point out any of the defects you have been mentioning to any officer who had authority to remedy them?—I mentioned them to the officer commanding the transport train at Senafé.

2291. Who was that?—Captain Annesley.

2292. What was his view of the case?—He concurred in my view.

2293. And proceeded to remedy the defect?—It could not be remedied then.

2294. You had the men there, and you had to make the best of them?—We had to make the best of the men and the saddles.

2295. When did you leave Abyssinia?—On the 1st of June.

2296. You are aware that 55,000 animals were landed in Abyssinia, and that 7,000 only were re-embarked?—No, I have no knowledge of that.

2297. Assuming that to be the fact, to what in general terms would you attribute this enormous sacrifice?—To two or three causes; neglect of the animals, the arrangements for encamping and feeding the animals, bad fitting saddles, and bad shoeing, and in some cases insufficient food.

2298. Sir John Hay.] There was an epidemic, I believe?—There was an epidemic before I arrived in Abyssinia, which was called the Abyssinian glanders, but I never saw a case of it.

2299. But a great number of the animals which the honourable Chairman alluded to died of

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of that, I presume?—I do not know; I was not there myself, but that would of course account for a great number.

2300. (*Chairman.*) Not having observed the epidemic yourself, or the circumstances under which it prevailed, you would know nothing with reference to its cause?—Nothing whatever, of my own knowledge; but from conversations with veterinary surgeons who were present, can quite understand the reason of its existence.

2301. Would you not have supposed it to be the most judicious way of saddling those animals to have got the saddle where the animal was got, and to have bought them together; to have bought the saddle which the animal had been accustomed to wear?—We had animals from so many different places that we should have had a very great variety of saddles.

2302. Would that have been a disadvantage?—Yes; very great.

2303. Would not the advantage of having in every case saddles to fit the animals have been far more than equivalent to any disadvantage in the variety of pattern?—No pattern would prove of use unless the men in charge of them attend to the cleanliness, and proper bearing of the loads, and no saddle will fit the same animal in good condition and in bad condition. I am of opinion it is not desirable to have different patterns of saddlery, as the men, unless previously instructed, would be sure to be confused on getting a different pattern to the one they had been previously accustomed to, with a disciplined corps; this difficulty would not be felt in the way it would have been in the transport train, in which so few of the men knew anything of the sort.

2304. You left Annesley Bay on the 1st of June, I think?—On the 1st of June.

2305. In what vessel?—In the “Albertine.”

2306. Is that a sailing vessel?—A sailing ship; she was towed out of Annesley Bay.

2307. She was laden with animals, I presume?—She had on board the horses of the 3rd Dragoon Guards, which had been selected to go back to India.

2308. And when did you arrive in Bombay?—On the 16th of June.

2309. How far were you towed?—The tug “Courtney” let us go about noon on the 4th of June.

2310. Where were you then?—In the Gulf of Aden.

2311. Were you out of the Red Sea?—We were past the mouth of the Red Sea.

2312. Do you know when the “Albertine” was discharged from pay?—I do not.

2313. You stated that you arrived at Bombay on the 16th of June, with horses on board and some hay?—There was some hay for the horses.

2314. Was anything else on board but the horses and the hay for them?—There were the officers’ chargers of the 3rd Dragoon Guards, besides the troop horses.

2315. Was there no other cargo?—There was no other cargo.

2316. The horses would be very soon discharged?—The horses were discharged on the 19th of June.

2317. Then if the ship was kept on pay until the 31st of July, 43 days afterwards, what was she doing?—She was lying in the harbour.

2318. How occupied?—Doing nothing.

2319. Was everything out of her?—The day

before we arrived, I went into the hold where the hay was, to find out how much hay we had on board, and there were as nearly as I can recollect, 30 bales. The reason I did so, was that some of the bales that came up, had a great quantity of bad hay in them, and I was anxious to give the horses the good hay, and to cast the bad hay. Instead of the regulation allowance, I used to have several bales brought up and pick out the good hay, and I was anxious to know how much we had.

2320. You threw the bad overboard, I presume, during your voyage?—Yes, during the voyage; there was also a small quantity of bran on board that I took in at Aden. I got a special order for bran; there were also the usual fittings of galvanised iron buckets and brooms.

2321. And with the exception of those few bales of hay and small miscellaneous articles which you have mentioned, the cargo was discharged out of the ship on the 19th of June?—It was.

2322. You know that she was not off pay then?—I am aware of that.

2323. But you do not know how long she remained on pay?—I do not; I left Bombay myself on the 30th of July. A few days before that I met Captain Stapleton, the commander of the “Albertine,” and he informed me that he was still on pay.

2324. All that time there was no other reason for keeping the vessel than that those small articles were on board?—No.

2325. What lighterage would have been necessary to have cleared those articles from the ship, would one lighter have done it?—It depends upon what sort of lighter it was.

2326. A 60 or 70 ton lighter there, the usual Bunder lighter?—There were some large floating lighters that were towed by steamers.

2327. Would one of those have taken away at one trip all that was left in the ship?—Everything.

2328. Will you just describe what was left on the 19th?—About 30 bales of hay, about two dozen brooms, either 16 or 18 galvanised buckets (I remember that, because there were two lost, and they wanted to make me account for them), and a small quantity of bran. I could not say how much. I was allowed to take a small quantity of bran on board at Aden which would last for the voyage, that would be probably under half a ton.

2329. That is as full a catalogue of the remaining cargo as far as you can remember?—And the water in the iron tanks.

2330. Did those tanks belong to the Government or to the vessel?—The Government.

2331. What number of those tanks were there on board?—I have no knowledge of that.

2332. So that if your freight was 1,522*l.* a month, she would be paid about 2,700*l.* for the six or seven weeks she laid there with those articles on board?—She would.

2333. Which articles were not worth the cost of landing, with the exception of the tanks?—No.

2334. You do not know the value of the tanks? I know they were selling upon the Bunder for a very trifling sum.

2335. You have been speaking of this particular ship; can you give the Committee any information with reference to any other vessel in Bombay Harbour or with reference to the shipping generally?

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rally?—The majority of the ships were kept on, as I understand, from the officers who left them, and from the captains of them whom I met, with the same proportion of the articles on board.

2336. Sir *James Elphinstone*.] You do not know that of your own knowledge?—Merely from meeting them every day at the club and at the Fort; they told me what they had left on board.

2337. *Chairman*.] From your general observations, have you any reason to believe that the state of things was better as regards other vessels than as regards yours?—It was the same with regard to the majority of them.

2338. Mr. *Eastwick*.] Have you had experience in the sale of cast horses, in the cavalry for instance?—I was four years in the Royal Dragoons, and I am acquainted with the usual practice of cavalry regiments in India.

2339. What would the cast horses fetch?—The price varies according to the age of the animal and the reason why it is cast.

2340. You had no experience there of the sale of ponies, I suppose?—No.

2341. Do you think that it would have been possible to have found persons owning a number of animals who would have gone with the Expedition?—I understand you to mean contractors who would have gone to Abyssinia with their own animals at a certain fixed sum.

2342. Quite so; do you think such persons could have been procured?—I have no knowledge of that, but from what I know of the Hindus I should not think so; they have a great objection to crossing the water.

2343. Sir *James Elphinstone*.] You had a great difficulty, as I understand, in getting people to go at all?—I know nothing about that of my own knowledge; I had nothing to do with enlisting the men; they were merely handed over to me with the animals.

2344. I think I understand you to say that a certain number of tattús were bought at Sholapore or Secunderabad?—They were bought at Sholapore.

2345. By a committee?—Yes.

2346. Of whom did that committee consist?—The three first officers for duty upon the general roster.

2347. And they were sent up to Poonah to you?—Yes.

2348. Do you know the names of those officers?—No, I do not.

2349. You cast 54 horses out of the lot?—Yes.

2350. What did you generally cast them for?—I cast about 30 for being only two-year olds, and the others for being either diseased or unfit from extreme old age, or from their conformation.

2351. And then you examined 970 Kattiwar horses?—Yes, they were under my charge.

2352. They appear to have been a better lot?—Yes.

2353. From your acquaintance with the Decan, do you think that if anybody went into the market for a thousand tatoos at any time, without any previous notice, he could make up a thousand serviceable tattús within a reasonable time, in any of the cantonments?—Not in one place; notice having been given at seven or eight different places, a committee, by spending two or three days in each place, could have selected out of the number presented, probably that amount of serviceable animals.

2354. Now, with regard to the ship in which you returned from Annesley Bay. I understand you to say that she was left with some buckets and things that were not worth taking ashore?—That was the ship I returned in.

2355. In reference to the ship in which you went over, was she discharged with horses in Annesley Bay?—The “*Royal Standard*,” which was the ship in which I went over to Annesley Bay, went over with bullocks.

2356. You had no difficulty in discharging her I believe?—I left the bullocks on board the ship; when I quitted her I was not in command of them.

2357. The ship remained there for the purpose of bringing away the Expedition, did it not?—Yes.

2358. And you came back to Bombay in another ship?—Yes, I did.

2359. Which contained the serviceable horses of the 3rd Dragoon Guards?—Yes, it did.

2360. As soon as you arrived at Bombay, I presume, the horses were landed?—Yes; we arrived on the 16th, and they were all discharged on the 19th.

2361. You went on shore, did you not?—I went on shore.

2362. What means had you of knowing what became of the ship after you left her?—I went on board of her on one or two occasions to pay a visit to the captain.

2363. Were you aware of the relation in which she stood to the Government?—I had his word for it.

2364. The captain told you that he was not discharged?—He told me that he was not discharged.

2365. Did you see those mules which were brought back from Abyssinia to India, and which were sent round to Secunderabad, and eventually some of them to Bangalore and Madras?—I have seen them in the lines, but they were not in my charge.

2366. You are aware that a considerable number were brought back and attached to the Commissariat Department in those places?—I left India on the 30th of July, so that I do not know that.

2367. *Chairman*.] This (*handing a book to the Witness*) is a list of hired steam and sailing ships employed in the Abyssinian Expedition?—It is.

2368. Do you see that this contains a record of when those ships were discharged?—I do.

2369. Do you find by that record that this ship, the “*Albertine*,” in which you returned was discharged on the 31st of July?—Yes, I do.

2370. Do you know whether this ship belonged to Bombay, or whether she had English owners or management?—I do not know that.

2371. Do you know the firm of Rennie, Scobell, & Company?—There is a firm of that name in Bombay.

2372. Do you find that Messrs. Rennie, Scobell, & Company are the charterers of the “*Albertine*”?—It is so in the official record.

2373. And they are at Bombay, are they not?—They have a house in Bombay.

2374. You say that other ships belonging to Bombay owners were detained as this was?—Yes.

2375. Can you mention their names?—I do not know the names of the ships, but I know the name of the firm; it was Messrs Nicholls to whom they belonged.

2376. You

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2376. You cannot give the circumstances under which those ships were detained?—No; except merely from a conversation which I had with one of Mr. Nicholl's partners or managing men.

2377. You have prepared a memorandum of your evidence upon this point; will you read it?—Yes, "On arriving in Bombay, ships with a few brooms or cooking pots in them were kept on, as, until all Government articles are out, the contract holds good."

2378. Are you there speaking of other ships besides the ship in which you returned?—Yes.

2379. But you cannot speak in more than general terms; you cannot specify the ships?—I was on board the "Royal Standard," and her captain informed me that he was kept on in a very satisfactory way.

2380. Sir James Elphinstone.] Did he represent that those buckets were there?—He spoke of them.

2381. Had he made a formal representation to the authorities that those buckets were there?—I have no knowledge of that.

2382. I suppose the captain would rather wish to stand by the buckets as long as he could?—From what he told me, I considered that he wished to stand by his buckets on that account.

2383. Chairman.] The "Royal Standard" was a steamer, was she not?—No, she was a large Australian sailing ship.

2384. Do you know what the "Royal Standard" brought back to Bombay?—No, I do not.

2385. Do you know when she arrived?—No, I do not; I know she was commanded by Captain Whineray.

2386. Do you know that the charterers, Messrs. Lawrence and Company, are a Bombay house?—I do.

2387. Do you find from this official record that she was discharged from pay on the 3rd of August?—From this record I do; I saw her two or three times when I was at Berbea; I was sent down there, and I went on board of her again, as the captain was a great friend of mine.

2388. You see by this entry that she had been to Berbea?—Yes; I was on board of her many times at Berbea.

2389. You do not know what she brought to Bombay from Annesley Bay?—She brought a return cargo.

2390. Consisting of what?—I do not know.

2391. Were you on board of her in the month of July in Bombay Harbour?—I was.

2392. What did you find on board of her then?—I did not go over her; I only had a conversation with the captain.

2393. Were they discharging cargo from her when you were there?—There were no lighters there, and they were not discharging cargo.

2394. They were doing nothing?—They were doing nothing.

2395. Sir James Elphinstone.] And of course they were making no effort to get rid of the cargo? They were not. There was another ship that I could speak of, called the "Irwell."

2396. What do you know of her?—I was on board of her some time in the month of June or July, and the captain informed me that he was kept still on pay with a few articles on board.

2397. What were they?—He did not specify them.

2398. I want to ask you one or two questions about the weather; you stated that on your 0.46.

return voyage you were towed out of the Straits; how many days were you in tow?—We were towed from Annesley Bay on the 1st, to past Pirem; we passed Pirem at 7 o'clock on Wednesday morning the 3rd.

2399. Then did the tug cast you off?—The tug cast us off about noon.

2400. And then you made sail?—We did.

2401. How was the wind?—I do not know.

2402. How long were you going from there to Bombay?—We had to put into Aden, and take in the bran I mentioned.

2403. You were then going from Pirem to Bombay?—Yes, we left Aden on the 6th, towed by the "Mulah."

2404. And how far did she tow you?—She took us in tow about 10 o'clock, and cast us off about 5 p.m.

2405. And you had a fair wind to Bombay?—Yes.

2406. How many days were you going from there to Bombay?—That was the 6th of June, and we arrived at Bombay at 7 p.m. on the 16th, opposite Colaba church.

2407. That would be 10 days, would it not?—Yes, 10 days.

2408. Chairman.] I believe there are some facts of importance which you can state to the Committee respecting the purchase of animals?—I should like to make a statement with regard to the purchase of mules in Abyssinia, at Antalo: the officer who was buying them, just had them trotted up; any mule that came, and passed into the line; I was a veterinary surgeon passing through, and I saw that he was passing in animals which I knew never could do a day's work, and which would come into our lines immediately, so I offered to assist him, but I was told to mind my own business.

2409. Who was that purchasing officer?—Captain Seaton.

2410. Of the Commissariat?—No; he was in the Transport Train.

2411. What did you see that was objectionable?—I saw animals being passed in that were many of them lame, and many of them never could, from their conformation, be of the slightest use.

2412. Are you speaking of mules?—Of Abyssinian mules.

2413. What number were purchased in this way; was it an insignificant number or a considerable number?—A considerable number in the aggregate, as they were purchasing at different points all along the line.

2414. But you are limiting your remarks now to Antalo, are you not?—To Antalo.

2415. And the number of animals of that character purchased was considerable?—Yes.

2416. How do you account for that proceeding on the part of an officer; what motive could Captain Seaton have in purchasing animals which were useless?—I do not think he was aware that they were useless; in fact I am certain from my knowledge of him, that he was not aware that they were useless, but he, as a non-professional man, could not see points which a professional man could see. Captain Seaton was an infantry officer, and I considered great danger was run in purchasing by any officer who was not a professional veterinary surgeon, from the likelihood of diseases such as glanders being overlooked, which introduced into the ranks, would have led to serious losses.

2417. Then the purchase of such animals, instead

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stead of adding to the efficiency of the Train, would be a positive hindrance, as they would have to be attended to and fed by you?—Some had to be admitted to the sick lines for treatment almost immediately.

2418. Do you wish to add anything further to your evidence?—I should like to add that before I started for Abyssinia, I was sent for to Tanna, which is near Bombay, to inspect and to report upon the efficiency of bullocks, which had been handed in to the Transport Train, but which the officer in command had objected to receive; I cast upwards of 180 of them.

2419. What was the total number?—2,700 was the strength.

2420. And did they all pass under your inspection?—They did.

2421. About 200 were rejected?—Yes; and they were sold, I believe.

2422. Had those been specially purchased for the Expedition?—They had.

2423. Where were they purchased, and when were they delivered?—They were purchased at Asirghur, and sent up to Tanna.

2424. I suppose they had been in course of collection for some time in Tanna?—No doubt.

2425. The number you rejected would be about 8 per cent. of the whole number, would it not?—180 odd was the number; I have not got the books here; I think it was 184.

2426. In purchasing a large lot of animals of that character, would it not almost necessarily follow that an officer might be led into taking some that would not pass ultimate inspection?—Not such a number, and I went down with the Commissary-General, after his inspection, having previously objected to my Report, he told me if anything, I had been too lenient, and that there were many animals not fit to do their work.

2427. Can you estimate the excess of cost that the purchase of those animals and their keep, before inspection and ultimate rejection, would entail upon the Expedition?—I did not know their cost; I did not know how they were purchasing at Tanna.

2428. Is that the only bullock transaction in which you have been concerned?—I was employed to buy bullocks at Poonah in consequence of a report that I made of sick bullocks being passed into my lines; I passed them from the contractor, and those bullocks were handed over to Captain Boyle's division, and nearly all my bullocks were good at the time that I left Abyssinia.

2429. That transaction would have been an economy to the Expedition, and not an expense?—No doubt; I merely state it to show that, in consequence of the number I rejected (they only passed myself and Mr. Carnac), from those presented by the contractor, the ones admitted to

the Transport Train did good service to the end.

2430. What Mr. Carnac is that?—Mr. Rivett Carnac, the brother of the cotton inspector.

2431. He is a lieutenant, is he not?—He is in the 19th Hussars.

2432. Were you further concerned in the purchase of mules in Abyssinia or elsewhere?—I was sent to Berbea two days after arriving at Zulla, to purchase ponies; I was there a month, and I did not buy any.

2433. Why did you not buy at Berbea?—Because the quality of the animal was not sufficiently good. I was ordered to advise in the purchase of camels and other animals; during a three days absence, some very bad animals and some cows were admitted, for which I was blamed on arrival at Zoulla. The ponies at Berbea were deficient in every quality required for our work.

2434. Were there any that came from Berbea?—No.

2435. What supplies were brought from Berbea?—Camels, sheep, bullocks, and donkeys.

2436. Have you formed any opinion with reference to the employment of donkeys in the Transport Train, as compared with the mules, as a matter of efficiency and economy?—For certain loads they do very well.

2437. To put a general question, can you add to the evidence which you have already given, anything that would elucidate the question referred to this Committee; namely, what has increased the cost of the Expedition beyond what we supposed it would cost when it was projected?—Owing to the ignorance of the buyers a greater number of animals were required than would have been if proper selection had been made; a vast number of animals were purchased totally unfit for the work required of them, adding thus greatly to the number of the train, without adding to its efficiency. The general non-suitability of the equipment to the animals used, the ordinary sizes of the otago pattern, though almost perfection when properly attended to, for the large Spanish and Italian mule, were quite unsuited for the small native mule. The Bombay pad I consider a very bad saddle, and peculiarly unfitted for a train composed, as the Abyssinian was, of men not accustomed to animals. The almost universal ignorance of proper knowledge of fitting, loading, and general care of animals among the officers and men, which was not avoidable, owing to the manner that the train was organised; a division was often formed, in which not an officer or man had a proper knowledge of their duties in loading and care of animals, entailing an immense expenditure of animals before they gained the necessary knowledge. Many animals were disabled solely from want of farriers to remove the old shoes, not to speak of re-shoeing.

Sir WILLIAM JAMES TYRONE POWER, K.C.B., was called in; and Examined.

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K. C. B.

2438. *Chairman.*] WILL you state to the Committee what position you hold in the War Office?—At present I am Assistant to the Controller in Chief, Sir Henry Storks.

2439. You were there also in 1867, during the time of the Abyssinian Expedition, were you not?—Yes; I was there at the time as Commissary General in Chief.

2440. You have a full knowledge amongst

other things, of the arrangements which were made for procuring the shipping for the uses of the Expedition?—I know some of the circumstances connected with that subject, but I had nothing to do with the preliminary arrangements under which the Admiralty was to procure vessels.

2441. I will confine you just now to the vessels procured for the transport of mules in the Mediterranean;

terranean; the Admiralty engaged five ships, I believe?—Five ships.

2442. What were their names?—The “Bolviv,” the “Commondouros,” the “Empress,” the “Venetia,” and the “Parana;” they were fitted up to carry 805 mules.

2443. The War Office also engaged vessels for the same service?—Yes: on finding that there was some delay in getting those vessels from the Admiralty it was determined to procure them by War Office agency, and a contract was entered into for two vessels at Marseilles, of 1,000 tons burden each.

2444. What were the special circumstances which made action necessary upon your part to procure tonnage?—It was owing partly the delay in procuring the vessels from the Admiralty, but chiefly, I think, on the ground that it was considered more advantageous to procure them in the Mediterranean, where they were close to their work, and where also they could be procured very much more cheaply.

2445. Did you engage any vessels at all in England?—Yes; two.

2446. What were the names of those you engaged in the Mediterranean?—The “Touraine” and the “Bretagne,” belonging to a Marseilles company.

2447. And what were the names of the two that were engaged in England?—The “Achilles” and the “Thomas Snowden.”

2448. Besides those vessels, other vessels were engaged by the War Department officers in the Mediterranean?—Yes, they arranged to convey mules from Malta by special contract; for 300 mules the contract was 3*l.* a head: that was rather more than it should have been, but the vessel was placed in quarantine in consequence of going to Malta. There were the “Atlantic,” the “Emo,” the “Iberian,” the “Mary Antoinette,” the “Minia,” the “Minnieh,” the “Persian,” and the “Theban.” Besides that there was a contract with the Italian Navigation Company for the conveyance of mules, at the rate of 60 francs per mule, and for 60 in each vessel, from Brindisi to Alexandria.

2449. In general terms can you tell the Committee what were the rates paid to those vessels that were engaged, not by the War Office, but by the War officer in the Mediterranean?—£.3 per head from Malta to Alexandria.

2450. Could you generalise your information upon this subject without giving all the details?—It ranged from 2*l.* to 3*l.*; 1*l.* 10*s.*, was all that was paid from Cyprus; 3*l.* was the maximum, and 2*l.* the minimum, except for the Cyprus mules, which were very close at hand.

2451. Will you state what was paid to the vessels which you engaged in England to proceed out, to the “Touraine” for example?—£.8. a head was paid to the two French vessels for each mule landed, the owners providing everything, food, water, hoisting in and out, care on board, in fact defraying every expense, and being paid only for such as were delivered, they being liable for any loss not arising from causes entirely beyond their own control. A similar contract was made with the two English vessels that were hired in England, the “Thomas Snowden” and the “Achilles,” at the rate of 7*l.* 10*s.*; they were smaller and rather inferior vessels, but they answered our purpose, for they were of light draught, and suitable for the harbour of Alicante, where vessels drawing only 15 feet of water could

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enter. Those two vessels were taken up with a view to relieving that port, which was very much overdone with mules.

2452. In that case the owners provided everything for the animals?—They provided everything for the animals, in the same way as the French vessels, and paid all the expenses for the fittings of every description, and for veterinary medicines.

2453. In fact the payment of 7*l.* 10*s.* in the one case and the 8*l.* in the other, covered all the cost of conveyance?—And all risks except those beyond the control of the people having charge of them on board, and they were only paid for the mules they landed.

2454. Have you looked to see the cost of conveyance per head, in the vessels chartered by the Admiralty?—At one period I entered into a calculation with some gentlemen at the Admiralty with reference to what they would cost, and they estimated, I believe, at that time that some of the mules would cost about 17*l.* 10*s.* each for freight and expenses.

2455. Was not that upon the supposition that each vessel would carry 270 mules, and each vessel make three trips?—Yes, it was upon the latter supposition.

2456. Did you find, in point of fact, that instead of carrying 270 mules per vessel, they only carried 167?—They carried altogether 2,516 mules.

2457. Those five vessels carrying that total number would give 15 single trips, or 167 animals to each trip; have you worked that out?—The first trip they could only carry 805 mules altogether; they were afterwards increased in carrying capacity. They knocked three or four or five stalls into one, thereby greatly increasing their carrying capacity.

2458. Having carried 2,516 animals, each vessel making three trips, that would work out 15 trips at 167 animals per trip?—Yes, I presume that is correct.

2459. Have you made this calculation, that if conveying 270 per trip would cost 17*l.* 10*s.* each, conveying only 167 per trip, would cost 28*l.* 5*s.*?—That was about the rate I calculated they would cost, owing to quarantine and other causes of delay.

2460. Then we may come to the conclusion that the animals conveyed in ships chartered by the Admiralty cost 28*l.* 5*s.* per head?—I think that appears to be a correct calculation if your premises are correct.

2461. The shipowners not being responsible for any loss in the Admiralty ships as they were in the ships chartered by yourself?—There was no liability upon them.

2462. Do you know whether this 28*l.* 5*s.* includes fittings on board, and forage and water?—I have not the details of the calculation now. I have only the result (*viz.*, 17*l.* 10*s.* per mule), which I used for the purpose of comparison with the rate of the contract which we were about to enter into, in order to see if the terms were advantageous.

2463. If that was not included in the 28*l.* 5*s.* the cost would have to be added, and thus make the disproportion between the Admiralty payment and your payment greater by that amount?—Undoubtedly.

2464. These then are the facts, that we paid from 1*l.* 10*s.* to 3*l.* for conveying them in locally chartered ships, and 7*l.* 10*s.* and 8*l.* for ships chartered

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chartered by the War Office here and in France, and 28 l. 5 s. for conveying them in the ships chartered by the Admiralty?—Yes, but it is to be remembered that the vessels paying 2 l. and 3 l. were from the nearest ports, excepting Malta, whereas the others were from Gibraltar, Alicante, and Valentia, at which places the vessels were all placed in quarantine.

2465. But the War Office engaged the ships which conveyed the mules from Spain, from Valentia and Alicante, and Gibraltar?—Yes; I must mention that those ships were all placed in quarantine, which had an influence, no doubt, upon prices at that period.

2466. From what you now see you would infer that the cheapest way of getting tonnage would have been to have engaged it in the ports of the Mediterranean?—Undoubtedly.

2467. When you speak of the cost of conveying mules in the Admiralty chartered ships you speak from calculations which were made at the Admiralty?—Yes, from their calculations. I will endeavour to procure a memorandum of them.

2468. You have made, I believe, a very elaborate and complete analysis of the operations of the War Department connected with the purchase of animals for this Expedition?—I have a complete *précis* of the whole arrangements and correspondence of and with the War Department.

2469. Amongst other arrangements which were made, an arrangement or contract was entered into between the War Office and Messrs. Wetherell and Co. of the City, for the purchase of mules in Spain, I believe?—Yes.

2470. Have you a copy of that contract with you?—I have (*producing the same*).

2471. Had you other contracts for mules purchased by officers sent out from the War Office?—There was one at Valencia and one, I think, at Smyrna, but the rest were all purchases direct from the persons who brought them in.

2472. At Cyprus, was there not?—At Cyprus they were chiefly collected through the agency of the consul.

2473. Was there not a contract at Cyprus?—An officer was sent over to make the purchases; Major Shervinton.

2474. Any contracts which you possess we should be glad if you would favour us with?—I will hand them in if it is desired, and with the authority of the Secretary of State.

2475. Will you state how this contract of Messrs. Wetherell's was entered into; how it came about that the War Office made that contract?—I was not at the War Office at the time that the arrangements were made with Messrs. Wetherell, and therefore I can only speak in some measure from hearsay, and from such of the documents as I saw afterwards; but I should rather recommend you to get that information direct from the Director of Contracts, who negotiated the contract. I will give you any information I possess from my own knowledge; but the arrangements for this contract were all completed before I came to London, having been telegraphed for.

2476. The first thing you came in contact with was the contract completed?—Yes, I saw it in print for the first time.

2477. Will you kindly tell the Committee the provisions of that contract?—They were to purchase, as economically as possible, mules, on account of the War Office.

2478. That contract was for an unlimited quan-

tity?—In the first instance no quantity was mentioned.

2479. And at an unlimited price?—No; a price was mentioned, that it was not to exceed 30 l.

2480. The purchase might be arrested and a limit fixed, on the intervention of the War Office, that no further purchases were to be made?—They were to report when they had purchased 500 mules, "When purchases have proceeded to the extent of 500 mules," that was the expression in the contract.

2481. Sir John Hay.] Where were they to be purchased?—Anywhere in the north of Spain; they were to purchase where they pleased, so long as they did not go into the neighbourhood of any depôt of the officers sent out by the War Office, so as not to come into competition with the War Office at all.

2482. Chairman.] The terms of that contract were that they were to purchase as reasonably as possible, and receive as commission for their first purchase of 500, 9 l. per animal?—They were to receive 9 l. each for the first 500, 8 l. 10 s. for the second 500, and 8 l. for all beyond 1,000.

2483. That included conveyance from the interior to the port of shipment?—Conveyance, feeding, care, and a new set of shoes for each mule.

2484. To any port of shipment?—Alicante and Cartagena were named as the places of delivery. There was a limit in this way, that they were to purchase at the lowest price, with the knowledge of the veterinary surgeon, and upon his certificate that the mules not only were suitable, but that the prices were fair; the statement in the contract is "that the prices charged are the actual prices paid with his sanction."

2485. Beyond that there was no further limit of the price at which they were to purchase?—No; it was within the discretion of the War Office to fix a limit, if they thought fit, on ascertaining the actual prices in Spain.

2486. There was nothing in the contract to define in what part of Spain they should purchase?—No; the contract does bind them to do any specific locality.

2487. Then they could purchase anywhere in Spain?—They could purchase anywhere in Spain.

2488. At Alicante itself, or its immediate vicinity?—The mules were to be sent from the place of purchase to Alicante and Cartagena.

2489. They might have purchased in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar?—They might have purchased there, but it would not be for their advantage to do so.

2490. And for delivery at Alicante they received 9 l. per animal?—Yes, for the first 500; 8 l. 10 s. for the second 500, and 8 l. for all beyond 1,000.

2491. As a matter of fact, you found, did you not, that they came in contact with the purchasing officers sent out by the Admiralty?—I think not.

2492. In pursuance of the object of this contract, Messrs. Wetherell and Company purchased mules from their sub-contractor in Spain at 22 l. a head, I believe?—Yes; at 100 dollars (21 l. 5 s.).

2493. That sub-contractor had entered into a contract with another person to supply him at 18 l., 80 dollars; is not that so?—That we do not know; it is so stated, and there is a large correspondence upon the subject from Capt. Griffiths, an officer who was deputed to inquire into the performance of this contract, which correspondence

dence I think you should have before you, unless you can get Capt. Griffith's own evidence.

2494. You have that correspondence, I believe? Yes.

2495. And you can put it in?—I can put it in, with the sanction of the Secretary of State.

2496. Have you not reason to believe that those same Messrs. Wetherell had an interest in the contracts which their sub-contractor made with some one from whom he purchased?—There was a supposition to that effect; it was so alleged.

2497. On your becoming cognisant of that contract and its conditions, what steps did you yourself take?—I recommended the Under Secretary of State to telegraph to stop the proceedings altogether, to report progress, the price they were paying, and not to purchase more without further orders.

2498. With what object did you do that?—Because I thought that the conditions of the contract were very unfavourable, and the prices too high. The commission also was too high, and therefore I wished to limit them to 500 mules, which by clause 9, we were bound to take, but I do not consider that they performed any portion of their contract; I consider that every portion of the contract was vitiated by the method they adopted.

2499. What knowledge had the department of Messrs. Wetherell previously to entering into this contract?—I do not think the department had any knowledge of them at all; I think they were represented as persons having a knowledge of Spanish business; they were recommended by more than one good house, I think, in the City of London.

2500. More than one?—Messrs. Gibbs & Company were referred to, and I think Messrs. Baring, but upon that subject I would recommend you to get the evidence of the Director of Contracts.

2501. The references they gave were to persons with whom they had business transactions?—Yes; I presume so.

2502. Beyond those references did the War Office know anything of them?—I suppose they did not; I presume somebody in the War Office must have mentioned them.

2503. Is it a firm which is now in existence?—I know nothing of them whatever, except what appears upon this paper. I have no knowledge of them even by sight.

2504. The animals that were required to be purchased in the Mediterranean were about 7,000?—7,000 were ordered in the first instance; afterwards reduced to 5,000, which number was subsequently increased to 8,000.

2505. If those persons had purchased according to the War Office Department contract they would have had a commission of 8*l.* per animal, amounting to 40,000*l.*?—Yes, unless the contract had been stopped they could have claimed for that amount.

2506. I am speaking of the reduced number, 5,000?—Yes, which was again increased to 8,000.

2507. If they had bought the 8,000 they could have claimed a commission of 64,000*l.*?—Yes, no doubt; at the time they were stopped they said they had bought 1,000, and they compelled us to purchase them, although I believed that they had not actually purchased more than 100.

2508. You think that that was a colourable version of the affair?—I think 100 was all that we ought to have been compelled to take.

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2509. They cost you about 30*l.*?—Yes; some of them nearly 22*l.*, with 9*l.* added, making nearly 31*l.*

2510. Did you find, with regard to some of those animals, that the inspecting officer reported them to be apparently 25 or 26 years old?—I do not know that I heard of any of them which were so old as that, but there were some of them of great age; the contract was reported to be "carried out disgracefully," the officer at Ali-cante reported so, the officers in Alexandria and Suez all reported very ill of them; they said that they were the worst mules they had; that they were old, over-worked, ill-fed, and generally bad, in fact the worst that were purchased or obtained at all.

2511. You do not know what steps were taken by the War Department to inform themselves with reference to the ability of this City firm to supply them with mules, assuming that they thought it expedient to buy in that way?—I do not suppose that any City firm would have been competent to supply them at the short notice that was given, and I think the best proof of that is, that we did not, I believe, receive tenders from any firm in the City.

2512. You did not advertise for tenders, I believe?—No: as a matter of fact, very large tenders were sent in from various houses from time to time, but too late to be of use; and generally on unfavourable terms.

2513. Can you understand the War Department entering into a contract which you thought it your duty to terminate as soon as you became acquainted with its provisions?—I think that there existed a great fear on the part of those managing the business at first, that the time was so short and the number of mules required so great, that without some extraordinary effort the work could not be accomplished.

2514. At that time the War Department were uninformed of the sources from whence animals in the Mediterranean could be derived?—There was a general knowledge, but I do not think there was any specific information possessed by anyone in the War Office at the period when this contract was made.

2515-17. By what officer of the War Department was this contract concluded?—By the Director of Contracts, I presume, under the authority of the Secretary of State.

2518. Are there any other points in that contract that you would like to bring under the notice of the Committee?—No, I think there is nothing else; in fact, I would rather not have given any evidence upon the contract at all, as although I saw the working of it, I have no knowledge of the circumstances under which it was made.

2519. In point of fact, it is a contract on terms unexampled in your experience, namely, for an unlimited quantity at an unlimited price, except so far as it was circumstantially limited as you have described?—There was a presumed limitation in this way, namely, the concurrence of the veterinary surgeon in the daily purchases, and the necessity of reporting from time to time their progress, and the anticipated process of purchasing, in detail, from day to day, in consequence of the price being more than was expected; but no one could have expected that the price of mules in Spain would have been so low as it was; various circumstances made it very low.

2520. Did 20*l.* startle you as being a low price?—Yes.

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Sir W. J. T. —Yes; I have been a good deal in Spain, and I never knew Spanish mules so cheap as that before to be any good. There were scarcely any mules in Europe offered at so low a price as that.  
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2521. I see by the précis of proceedings which has been placed in my hands, that the War Department was advised that mules were to be purchased at about 16*l.* at Bastia, but that nothing was done upon it?—That information arrived too late; I do not think that Corsica could have furnished a large number of mules, or that they could have been furnished at that price, but in any case the offer appeared at too late a period.

2522. Have you the date of it; that does not appear from your notes?—I could give you the date by reference to the papers, but I know that it was considered that it was too late.

2523. From Baghdad it was reported to the War Office that the mules could be purchased at 11*l.* a head?—Yes, but it would have cost a great deal of money for them to be brought from Baghdad, and it was beyond our limits; we were to purchase on this side of Egypt, and the Indian officers on the other side.

2524. You will observe that it is stated that the sea voyage would have been cheaper from Baghdad than in the case of taking them from the Mediterranean?—That perhaps might have been so, if they could have been delivered within the time allowed, but it would have been beyond our limit altogether; we were confined to the Mediterranean side of Egypt.

2525. Was this communication conveyed to the Bombay Government?—No doubt it was; we sent all those communications on to the India Office as soon as we received them.

2526. But whether it was communicated to and acted upon by the Bombay Government you do not know?—I do not know; every information that would assist the Indian Government we forwarded at once to the India Office.

2527. I find in the same minutes that there are several communications of that kind; there is one from Florence?—But too late; and Leghorn and Genoa were both in quarantine, so that we were obliged to break up our depôts at Genoa and remove them to Brindisi.

2528. The report speaks of being able to purchase mules at Florence at 13*l.* equipped with pack saddles; do you know anything about that?—We had an offer at 27*l.* 10*s.* for mules delivered at Leghorn. There was no place in Italy where we could purchase at greater advantage than at Brindisi both as regards price and shipment.

2529. What did you pay?—We bought them at about an average of 18*l.*, and we paid 60 francs for the freight to Alexandria.

2530. It was also reported that good animals were purchaseable for about the sum of 13*l.* in the Sea of Azof?—But in the month of November it would have been a very bad place to take them from.

2531. But by your steamers the passage would not be more than 40 hours?—It would be about from eight to 10 days. From what I know of the Tatar ponies they would not have been of much use with the drivers and muleteers, that we had to manage the horses and mules.

2532. There is a communication from the Dardanelles, where the vice-consul reports that they are to be purchased at 12*l.* each?—We had the same class of mules and ponies nearer at hand at Aleppo and Smyrna.

2533. But at a very much higher price?—A

higher price than he alleges he could get them for, but if we had sent for them we should have had to pay a higher price; if we had established a very large depôt upon the Dardanelles, the inhabitants would soon have tested our power of spending money. I know the Dardanelles, and I know that we got them more cheaply at Aleppo and Smyrna than we could have done at the Dardanelles; at Smyrna there is a large mercantile population, with whom you can do business, while at the Dardanelles there is a vice-consul, and no one else, you may say.

2534. I find that you have, last and least, good mules offered you at 3*l.* 2*s.* 6*d.* each by the British Consul at Tangier?—From the father of the Vice-Consul. If he could have delivered them they would have taken them readily enough, by our officers at Gibraltar, when they were paying 22*l.* for them elsewhere. I think there must have been a mistake about that price, no mules could have been delivered at that rate; that statement cannot be accurate.

2535. Then the inference we must draw is that the British Government send out vice-consuls and consuls without being able to rely upon the statements they send home?—He may have purchased one in the interior at that rate, but when you send into the market to buy a number the price at once rises.

2536. You had a large contract for forage with Mr. Davis of Mile End, had you not?—Yes.

2537. How was that contract concluded?—It was concluded, I presume, by the Deputy Commissary General, under orders from the War Office.

2538. In a way similar to that in which the contract for mules was concluded?—No; Davis's forage is well known; it has been used for special purposes in every war since the latter end of the Crimean war.

2539. Is it a patent article?—It is a patent article of very great value on account of the great compression to which the forage is subjected; it is compressed under intense heat, so much so that one ton of forage will occupy only about 60 feet measurement.

2540. Is it obtainable from anywhere else?—Not compressed to that extent; several people have competed with him but no one has been able to do it.

2541. Did you invite in the same way tenders from him?—No, that being a patent article we were obliged to give him his own price, within a reasonable limit.

2542. But you say other firms competed with him?—At various times they have, but unsuccessfully; they could not supply so suitable an article.

2543. Is this a patent in respect of the pressure to which the forage is subjected?—I believe so; it is compressed in iron boxes under intense heat.

2544. I find that you concluded a contract with him on the 18th of January?—That was the Indian Government, I think; for at that period all our transactions had ceased; the contract must have been made by the Indian Government and the forage inspected by our officers.

2545. I find from that Report that a contract was concluded for 3,000 tons on the 3rd of March with the same person?—Yes, that also was by the Indian Government.

2546. And 10,000*l.* was paid to him by the Indian

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Indian Government for breach of contract?—Yes, that was so.

2547. The Committee can have those contracts, and the circumstances under which they were made?—They can, no doubt, be procured from the India Office.

2548. Can you say, of your own knowledge, whether these contracts were made at the instance of the Bombay Government?—By the India Office in London, at the instance, no doubt, of the Bombay Government.

2549. You know nothing of the enormous provision of forage that was collected together in the Red Sea, on board vessels, at the very time when those large contracts for the supplies were made?—Nothing whatever.

2550. After the conclusion of the Expedition there was a considerable quantity of this compressed forage left in Alexandria, was there not?—Yes, there was, about 500 tons, I think.

2551. There was a correspondence with the War Department, I think, upon the subject as to how it should be dealt with; do you remember that?—Yes, there may have been.

2552. That was with reference to the expediency of bringing it to England, was it not?—It was reported how it was disposed of.

2553. When it was determined not to bring it to England, do you know upon whose authority that determination was come to?—That of the India Office, for it was in their charge at that time.

2554. You are aware that some 500 tons of this forage, which cost 13 l. 10 s. a ton here, was sold in Alexandria at 30 s. per ton?—It would be worth there not much more than its weight as common forage of the country; but the 500 tons was most probably compressed hay (not forage), which cost 9 l. per ton.

2555. Are you aware that it was brought to England at the rate of 15 s. a ton freight?—No; I do not know anything of the ultimate destination of it.

2556. I should have thought that having been purchased by your department, you would have known that?—I am not aware of that; but the 500 tons purchased by the War Department was compressed hay, not forage; and it was, I believe, sold at 50 s. per ton.

2557. Are you not aware that it was sold in Liverpool at 7 l. a ton, and that the speculation realised a large profit to the speculators?—No; I am not acquainted with that fact.

2558. Do you know that at that time the Indian transport ships were running between Alexandria and England?—Yes.

2559. Do you think that there would have been any difficulty in bringing it in one or more of those vessels from time to time?—It might have been objected to as a dangerous article, with troops on board; they are not freight ships, and I think it would have been objected to, as they have generally objected to carry freight.

2560. But knowing the price at which it was bought, namely, 13 l. 10 s., and that it was sold in good condition for 30 s. a ton at Alexandria, would you consider that a justifiable transaction, England being accessible as it was, if not by those ships I have mentioned, yet by other ships, who could bring it at 15 s. a ton freight?—There is very little demand in ordinary times for such an article as that. It is very valuable for forage on board vessels, or in the time of war; but generally people would not pay more than they would pay for ordinary forage; it is only economical

as regards freight; the process is not an improving one to the forage.

2561. But the market being, as I have stated, at Alexandria, should you not have brought it home to England?—It is very doubtful what it would have brought in England, particularly if it was Government property.

2562. You do not know that Mr. Davis was asked to take it back at half price?—I do not suppose that he would have done so; he could not be compelled to take back a portion of the forage he had prepared for the Indian Government, which was in excess of what was ultimately found necessary.

2563. You do not know anything of the circumstances under which he was paid 10,000 l. for breach of contract?—I know that the India Office sent to the War Office to know if they could assist in the matter, and I saw Mr. Davis and asked him to make liberal terms, and deal fairly with the Government; that was with regard to what he had still got to deliver and not what he had delivered.

2564. How much that had been contracted for was undelivered?—I cannot tell at this moment; it was a considerable quantity; I was merely sent to to ascertain what could be done in the matter, and I endeavoured to induce him to make good terms with the Government, particularly with that portion of the forage he had not already delivered, and to induce him to keep it himself, or sell it elsewhere, and he said, with some truth, that it was an article of immense value when required, but comparatively of little value at any other time.

2565. The principle upon which the profit should have been awarded should not have been in excess of the profit he would have made if he had delivered it?—I think that principle was adopted, but I do not know the final arrangements which were come to.

2566. I see you had other offers for the delivery of compressed hay?—Yes, but not so compressed; the great expense of exporting hay is always the freight of it, and, therefore, compression is of the first importance; in the field compressed hay is also very suitable for transport on the backs of mules, which the ordinary packed hay is not.

2567. Do you concur in the policy of conveying large masses of this forage from England to Abyssinia?—As a reserve a certain quantity was very desirable; it was impossible to say that the Abyssinian campaign would not have lasted a very considerable period, and it would have been too late to have applied for more of such forage when the horses were actually requiring it; and it was suitable for carriage in Abyssinia, as well as to Abyssinia.

2568. Do you know if this was sent out to feed the cavalry horses, or to feed the pack-animals?—It was suitable for either purpose, but it was too valuable for any but the cavalry horses, unless no other could have been procured.

2569. Would it not have been a wise arrangement for the pack-animals to have been fed from the countries from which they came themselves?—That would have been from Spain, Syria, and other countries in which forage is very scarce.

2570. It is not scarce in Egypt, I believe?—We had great difficulties at that time in getting supplies in Egypt.

2571. If they had been kept at home they would

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would have been fed?—Yes; but very few mules were bought in Egypt.

2572. And when they were withdrawn their consumption would have been liberated from those localities?—But it would have been very difficult to have swept it up from all those places.

2573. Would it not have been very easy for the purchasing officers to have collected it together?—But the articles that they use in their own country, such as maize-leaves and chopped straw, as in Spain, you could not conveniently carry.

2574. But that is obtainable in Egypt and Alexandria, and in every part of Syria?—Yes; but it would have cost more in freight than it was worth to have taken it from those places; it would not have been cheaper including freight, and you could not have carried that stuff up the country.

2575. Are you aware, as a matter of fact, that from Beyrout and Cyprus forage of this character, namely, chopped straw, was obtainable at a much cheaper rate than it could have been sent from either here or purchased at Alexandria?—But I say that chopped straw is practically useless; it may do upon the spot, but to land it from boats on wharves at Alexandria, and carry it through Egypt to Suez, and put it into fresh ships and then carry it up the country on the backs of mules, would have been (speaking familiarly) like sending out the wind.

2576. If that was done, would you say it was a very absurd practice?—Yes, certainly.

2577. Are you aware that that has been done, and that some of it was carried to Abyssinia?—No doubt a small quantity may have been.

2578. If that was so, you would condemn it as an act of extreme folly?—Yes, it must have been as costly as the forage, and not have been worth so much when it was there.

2579. The War Office sent out officers to purchase mules, did they not?—Yes.

2580. Will you kindly put in the instructions which were given to those officers?—I will.

2581. One of those instructions was that the purchasing officers should be free to remunerate the consuls assisting in the purchase of those animals up to a limit of 5 per cent. upon the purchase?—Yes; when purchased by the agency of the consuls.

2582. It was left to the discretion of the purchasing officer to determine whether, in his judgment, any claim for that commission had arisen?—The officers reported it for the approval and concurrence of the Commissariat officers, who were also authorised to employ consuls or other officers to purchase mules, and to allow as a commission a fixed sum, not exceeding 5 per cent., on approved purchase.

2583. That arrangement did not reserve the power of allowance or disallowance to the War Department, but vested it absolutely in the purchasing officer, did it not?—Yes.

2584. All those consuls are also servants of the British Crown, are they not?—Many of them at a very small salary though, and eking out the remainder of their income by commercial pursuits, and it would be in their commercial character that they would make these arrangements for purchasing mules.

2585. Do you think it becoming that we should create these perquisites in order to eke out small

permanent salaries?—I should think not, but that is a matter for consideration.

2586. Seeing that the officers you sent out were not men of high official rank, but veterinary surgeons, and lieutenants in the Army, and so forth, do you think it was judicious to give so much absolute power to these officers as was therein conveyed?—The great object was to obtain the mules. If they could not be obtained by the direct agency of these officers they were then directed to pay what I presume was estimated to be a fair rate of commission.

2587. That is not an answer to the question?—Then I would think that the maximum of 5 per cent. was not excessive.

2588. Do you concur in the propriety of that arrangement?—Subject to the condition that the assistance of those gentlemen was essential.

2589. Subject to the discretion of the purchasing officers?—Subject to the condition that the mules were obtained by the agency of those gentlemen.

2590. Their discretion was to determine what the agency was worth?—Up to 5 per cent.

2591. But had not the War Department, if not directly, yet through the Foreign Office, absolute power over the services of those gentlemen?—I do not know; I suppose not, as, I presume, this arrangement was made with consent of the Foreign Office. I may state that I had nothing to do with those arrangements, and perhaps you are obtaining information from the wrong person; this matter was arranged at a meeting between the heads of the War Office, the Treasury, and the India Office.

2592. Do you think that the purchasing officers sent out by the War Department could not have obtained the services of those consuls and vice-consuls as efficiently as they were rendered without having the power to offer them a commission?—I presume not, for there is a case at Aleppo, of which I made a note, as one of the places at which the consul was paid. It was reported from Aleppo that mules could not be obtained under from 24 *l.* to 28 *l.*, and upon that report being received, instructions were sent to break up that dépôt. On those instructions being received at Aleppo it was found that mules could be obtained at from 17 *l.* to 18 *l.*; they were actually obtained for 17 *l.* and horses at 11 *l.* This was one of the places at which the consul was paid a per-centage; he received 605 *l.*

2593. I must ask your opinion upon another point. The vice-consul at Cyprus, filling an appointment bearing a salary of 250 *l.* a year, was paid a commission at the rate of 5 per cent., amounting to 810 *l.* for three weeks' service, do you think that your authorisation of paying commission up to 5 per cent. worked satisfactorily in that case?—We got mules at a reasonable rate, and I think that we would not have got them without that assistance.

2594. I pointed your attention to the sum of 810 *l.* being paid for the services of three weeks?—But you well know that in commercial transactions large sums are made in one day.

2595. Do you think that a gentleman whose salary is 250 *l.* a year is entitled to 810 *l.* for three weeks' service?—I have no doubt that he did more service in those three weeks than he had done in any previous three years.

2596. You stated that at Cyprus the mules were purchased in the open market through the agency

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agency of the vice-consul?—That is my impression.

2597. If you look at the Returns you will see that they were purchased by contract and not in the open market at Cyprus. Have you the accounts for the purchase of those mules?—Yes, I have an abstract of the accounts here before me.

2598. Have you the sum paid for mules at Cyprus?—No; Cyprus and Alexandria are included under one head; they were under one direction.

2599. There were about 800 mules purchased there, I believe?—Yes, about that.

2600. At 20*l.* a head or thereabouts?—Yes.

2601. Which makes 16,000 *l.*?—Yes.

2602. Which is 800 *l.*, at 5 per cent.?—Yes. I have not got those particulars before me.

2603. Do you know anything about a return being furnished to the House of Commons of the names of the officers sent out to make those purchases?—I believe such a return was furnished.

2604. Mr. Seely.] I think I understand you to say that the India Office deputed the War Office to purchase the mules and to arrange for the transport of them?—Yes.

2605. And that the War Office obtained transport direct at much lower rates than the Admiralty?—Yes.

2606. Will you explain how it was, if you had the power to arrange for transport, that you did not get transport for the whole of the mules at, say, 8 *l.*?—We had only power by permission of the Admiralty; the money was charged in the Admiralty vote, and the War Office had no power to hire any vessels or incur any liability under the Admiralty vote; therefore, we had to apply to the Admiralty to obtain any tonnage required; it was only when delays occurred, and partly on the suggestion of the officers of the Admiralty, that we, with the permission of the Admiralty, undertook to obtain what additional transport was required, and then those vessels were first taken up.

2607. Then, if the India Office had undertaken to obtain the transport necessary for those animals, they would have been in the same position with reference to the Admiralty as the War Office was?—Undoubtedly, as regards any sum chargeable to Imperial expenditure.

2608. Then the public were under a misunderstanding that the India Office had the complete control, and that upon them rested the sole responsibility?—They had only that control in India; they had not any control here, because they had no funds here; they had the control so far as using the agency of the public departments went, and the public departments did everything that the India Office required: but the India Office, I think, no more than the War Office, could have hired transport independently of the Admiralty, as the Treasury would not have admitted it as a charge against any but the Naval Vote.

2609. What was the main cause of the difference of the cost of transport of the animals sent by the War Office and of those sent by the Admiralty?—The main cause was the difference of the way in which the vessels were fitted. The Admiralty vessels were fitted up rather to carry cavalry horses than mules; each horse or mule was provided with a separate stall. The consequence was, that vessels of the same tonnage would only carry half the quantity, as compared

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with the War Office vessels, which were fitted up in pens, carrying about six or eight between each bulk-head. In that way a larger number could be carried than by having separate stalls, of the regulation length and width. I may mention that afterwards somewhat the same principle was adopted in the Admiralty transports, by knocking two or three stalls into one, which nearly doubled their carrying capacity.

2610. But although the Admiralty vessels carried in proportion to their tonnage fewer mules, do you know whether the loss in the transit was not much greater in the vessels which the War Office used?—With the exception of two casualties, one of which was ascribed to a severe gale in which the vessel lost her rudder, there were scarcely any horses lost by the War Office; the losses in the Admiralty vessels were 55 mules while the losses in the vessels hired by the War Office were only nine mules, except on board those two vessels on which the severe casualties I have mentioned occurred; one was the "Tou-raine," which disabled her rudder in the Gulf of Lyons; she lost 161 mules; she fell into the trough of the sea, and lost half her cargo. The other was a Brindisi vessel, which fell in with a hurricane off Alexandria, and which lost 55 mules.

2611. If the Admiralty vessels had suffered in the same way, would they have lost fewer mules in consequence of having fewer on board?—Undoubtedly they could not have lost so many.

2612. But in proportion?—I should think that in proportion the loss would have been quite as great, as they also would probably have carried away the bulkheads.

2613. May I ask whether the Admiralty fitted up the vessels by direction of their own officers?—Yes; assisted by an officer of the Quartermaster General's Department from the Horse Guards.

2614. Do you mean that he advised the Admiralty, or did he direct that certain fittings should be used?—I have no doubt that he directed the adoption of what was considered the regulation stall.

2615. Then the Admiralty complied, in point of fact, in regard to the fittings, with the directions of the Horse Guards?—No doubt.

2616. Then we come to this fact, do we not, that the War Office can order certain fittings in a vessel, and the Horse Guards can order other fittings to be put up?—Probably, if it had struck the officer of the Quartermaster General's Department who had that duty, that for mules a different description of fitting was suitable, and even better, he would have adopted it, but his knowledge was confined probably to the transport of cavalry horses.

2617. But am I not right in believing that the Horse Guards had complete power to order what fittings they thought best?—Undoubtedly, founded on regulation.

2618. Sir John Hay.] I think that the five mule ships which were fitted in England and dispatched, were fitted in accordance with the ordinary regulations established by the Horse Guards or the War Office, and generally complied with by the Transport Department of the Admiralty; is that so?—Undoubtedly they were.

2619. The other vessels to which you allude were not fitted in England?—Two of them were fitted in England, and the rest in the Mediterranean.

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2620. Captain

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2620. Captain *Beaumont*.] Was any preliminary inquiry made as to the quantity of transport available in the Mediterranean for taking the mules from their points of purchase to Alexandria? —I do not think that any preliminary inquiries were made at all upon this matter; the first notice to the War Office was given on the 26th or 27th of September, and between that period and the 30th of October the whole of the mules were to be purchased, and by the middle of November to be delivered in Egypt; therefore, there was no time to make any preliminary inquiries; the whole time would have been taken up in the actual search.

2621. Are not most of the ports within telegraphic communication with London, and is it not a natural assumption that there would have been transport available in the Mediterranean at a cheaper rate than it would have been available here?—I should think so; I should have preferred adopting that plan.

2622. Did you, on reflection think, that the question of time was of such importance that the information which could have been sent by telegraph in a day, was not procurable in the time?—I do not think that much practical information could have been obtained in that time, as it would require a good deal of communication as to the nature of the cargo, and its delivery, and where the mules required could be most readily procurable.

2623. Is there usually a large amount of steam tonnage available at Alexandria?—A very considerable quantity.

2624. Have we not a resident transport officer there?—We have.

2625. Whose opinion would have been valuable on that point, and who might have been communicated with by telegraph?—Undoubtedly.

2626. And whose opinion was not taken?—I am not aware that it was not taken; as he was an officer of the Indian Government I should suppose it was taken by the Indian Government, who only applied to the War Office to do what they could not do so conveniently for themselves.

2627. But the information, if obtained, was not acted upon by the War Office?—That was so.

2628. I understand from your replies to the honourable Member for Lincoln that the relations of the Admiralty to the War Office were such as to preclude the possibility of the best arrangements being made; that is to say, that the War Office was to a certain extent tied to the Admiralty before they could go into the question themselves with reference to the best and cheapest way of supplying transport?—The War Office could take no steps whatever for supplying this transport without the consent of the Admiralty; in fact, it was not contemplated that the War Office should take any steps at all; the theory would have been that the Admiralty would supply all the transport that was required.

2629. Therefore such an enquiry as I am suggesting with reference to the quantity of transport available in the Mediterranean would belong more properly to the Admiralty than to the War Office?—Exclusively so.

2630. And it was only when the Admiralty failed to supply the transport, that the War Office took it upon themselves to do so?—Partly at the suggestion of the Admiralty and with its concurrence.

2631. You were good enough to say that you

would hand in the instructions to the officers leaving England to purchase mules; were those instructions at any time altered?—Yes, there was a revise of them, but I do not know whether much alteration was made. It will be easy for the Committee to get copies of both.

2632. The effect of that revision was that more power was to be given to the commissariat, and less to the purchasing officer?—The commissariat was the purchasing officer in the first instance; at least such is my idea. The military officer would go about and send mules in for purchase, the veterinary surgeon would inspect them, and the commissariat officer make the contract and pay for them.

2633. In fact that the business part of the arrangement was to be conducted by the commissariat officer, and that the purchase and passing of the mules and general arrangements were to be made by the veterinary surgeon and the purchasing officer respectively?—Yes, that was so.

2634. Do you think that a proper use was made of the consuls, apart from the question of remuneration; would it not have been possible, and perhaps a more direct and satisfactory mode of carrying on the business, to have made the consul do the business part of the work, and undertake the duties that were performed by the Commissariat Department?—That is a matter of opinion, but I should think not.

2635. Could you say why not?—They have not been trained to the habits of the War Office and the Treasury as regards the method of negotiating bills of exchange, and vouching for expenditure; they were not known personally, nor how they would have co-operated individually with our officers; all their information and assistance and knowledge was supposed to be at the disposal of our officers; and instructions were given to those officers to consult the consuls. The Foreign Office sent instructions to the consuls to afford every assistance, and therefore their aid was supplementary.

2636. Are not the entire of the accounts and contracts that have to be kept and made of so simple a character that any person acquainted with ordinary accounts could have done the business satisfactorily?—I think so, but it was an object to have it done by the servants of the War Office, subject to them, and accountable to them in every respect, which the consuls would not be.

2637. Might not you assume that if the vice consuls and consuls had had instructions to act, there would have been perfect cordiality and co-operation between them and your officers?—It was not found to be so in every instance.

2638. Was there any regular scale by which the consuls were to be paid?—Five per cent. was to be the maximum that they were to receive.

2639. And the giving of that was discretionary?—On employing their agency.

2640. Therefore, in some cases it may have been given, and in other cases the services of the consul may have been taken for nothing, or for very little?—Unless their agency was directly employed in purchases, I should say it was not right to have given this commission, which was intended for that special purpose.

2641. As a matter of fact, the proportion of the remuneration given to the consuls has been very various, assuming also its proportion to the amount of work that they did; is not that so?—

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I cannot tell what amount of work was done; some appear to have done none, some appear to have opposed the officers, and some to have given their cordial assistance.

2642. While the rate of pay they received was not quite in proportion to the service they rendered?—Very possibly not.

2643. Was there any instance of a clashing of authority between the Commissariat and the purchasing officers?—No doubt there were some small differences; the only case I can call to mind in which a difference of any kind occurred between them was at Alicante, and that was merely as regards the power of the Commissariat officer to pay for negotiating Treasury Bills.

2644. Which did you consider was the senior officer, the purchasing officer or the commissariat officer?—I do not think there was any question of seniority; but according to the general rule of the service, the combatant officer is always the senior officer.

2645. And, therefore, he was in charge of the general arrangements?—Yes.

2646. You do not remember a case where the commissariat officer took a different view to that, and insisted on considering himself superior to the purchasing officer?—The only case of that sort that I know of as having occurred, would be the case of Deputy Commissary General Watt who, acting under the authority of the Commissary General at Gibraltar, was in charge of the arrangements in the whole of Spain, and in that respect he would have been the superior to every officer employed.

2647. If in that case the combatant officer assumed to override the decision of the commissariat officer you would have considered him to be acting wrongly?—Yes; with that exception I considered that the combatant officer was the senior officer; but I considered that Mr. Watt was perfectly justified in what he did.

2648. *Chairman.*] You have a special report upon Messrs. Wetherell's contract drawn up by the officer who was sent out to Spain to investigate that case, have you not?—Yes, Captain Griffiths was sent to inquire into the circumstances under which that contract was being carried out, there being a suspicion that it was not carried out according to the terms agreed upon, and that there was some unfair dealing; The Committee can procure that from the War Office.

2649. *Mr. Seely.*] There was a correspondence between the War Office and the Foreign Office upon this question, was there not?—Yes.

2650. And then between the Foreign Office and the minister in Spain?—Yes, every effort was made to obtain evidence; I think that will all appear in the correspondence.

2651. Was the War Office led to take active steps in engaging transports in consequence of the delay on the part of the Admiralty in doing so?—In consequence of the delay in the supply of transports by the Admiralty, Lord Longford anticipated that we should have had the transports in a week or 10 days from the time that the requisition was addressed to the Admiralty, but it was nearly a month before we had them. I should say that the 25th, the 26th, and the 30th of September were the dates upon which the vessels left England, and under those circumstances it was found utterly impossible that the mules could be in Egypt at the time fixed, if they

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went so slowly as that. It was in consequence of the pressure put upon the Admiralty that it was proposed that the War Office should take steps to procure transport as quickly as they could; but the approval of the Admiralty was obtained with regard to each agreement.

2652. *Chairman.*] In some cases you stated to the Committee that you found the consuls working adversely to the interests of the Government?—Yes.

2653. There was a case of that kind in Barcelona, I believe?—Yes, a very flagrant case.

2654. Will you state to the Committee the facts of the case?—Barcelona had been the head quarters of mule purchasing at the time of the Crimean War, at which time mules were a very much higher price indeed than they were when these recent purchases were made; and the dealers of Barcelona, probably anticipating similar prices held back, and we found we could get no mules at all at anything like the limit we had put, which was 20 *l.* Finding that, we broke up our establishment and removed our officers after due notice, and as soon as the officers were removed, a report was dispatched by the consul to the Foreign Office, and from there to the War Office, to the effect that faith had been broken with the dealers in Barcelona, as a considerable number of mules were collected for us. Fearing that large demands for compensation might be made upon us on this ground, we ordered our officers back to Barcelona; but on arriving there, they could find no trace of the mules which the consul had reported about and had alleged to exist, and thereupon a very acrimonious correspondence ensued. After that 14 mules were produced from somewhere or other, eight of which were at first rejected, but were finally taken, as it was alleged that they had been purchased for us.

2655. What was the upshot of this correspondence; is that consul still in the consular service?—I suppose so; he was so some time afterwards, and I believe he is so still.

2656. And the Foreign Office entered into that correspondence, did they not?—Yes; the Foreign Office was addressed on the matter; the War Office expressed themselves very strongly upon the conduct of the consul.

2657. Did they take any steps?—I do not know.

2658. There was a correspondence between the two departments, then, I suppose?—There was.

2659. Will you kindly put in the correspondence?—I will endeavour to procure it for the Committee.

2660. Would you tell the Committee who it was that made the War Department Estimates for the cost of this Expedition in 1867?—The War Department's share would be a very small one as regards the Abyssinian Estimate, as the War Department was only called upon to furnish 3,000 mules, and a small quantity of the forage, and a few stores, so that probably in the whole the War Office expenditure did not much exceed 300,000 *l.*

2661. Who can give the Committee information with reference to who furnished the Estimate?—I should think the India Office must know who furnished it.

2662. Who would be the official in the War Office to speak to that?—Mr. Foster, of the Treasury, came to the War Office to ascertain it: I think I gave him a rough estimate of the price of the

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Sir W. J. T. the mules at 200,000*l.*; that would be about 40 *l.*  
*Power,* a head in our expenditure for 5,000 mules; their  
 K. C. B. conveyance to Zulla from Suez would be in the  
 Indian Estimates.

6 May 1870. 2663. Then the War Office authorities here  
 made no estimate for the expenditure for the  
 Indian portion?—No; the War Office only made  
 an estimate for the expenses of that portion which  
 they themselves were undertaking.

2664. You found, as a matter of evidence, that  
 the conduct and responsibility of this Expedition  
 were entirely shifted from the Home Government  
 to the Bombay Government?—Yes, I presume  
 that was so.

2665. Did you ever know so much money to  
 be spent upon home account without the interven-  
 tion of the Home Government?—I think there  
 was a similar case in the first China War, with  
 equally unsatisfactory results.

2666. The scale of that Expedition was very  
 much smaller, was not it?—No, I should think it  
 was very similar.

2667. The responsibility and conduct of that  
 Expedition was transferred to India, was it not?  
 —Yes.

2668. And who was it repaid by?—In part  
 by the Imperial Government.

2669. Have you any opinion to offer to the  
 Committee with reference to the policy of trans-  
 ferring the responsibility and power of spending  
 money to one government, the money having  
 to be repaid by another?—I should say as a  
 matter of opinion that it is obviously impolitic.

2670. If you had known at the India Office  
 more fully the capabilities of the different ports  
 in Spain to supply mules at that time, you would  
 have been saved from a good deal of trouble,  
 would you not?—I was not consulted in the pre-  
 liminary arrangements, otherwise I should have  
 objected to obtain any mules from Spain at all,  
 unless possibly from Gibraltar, for a first cargo  
 from transports going out.

2671. If there had been an organization for the  
 conduct of any war, and more especially of this  
 Expedition, by representatives from each of the  
 departments, the India Office, the War Office,  
 the Admiralty, and the Foreign Office, meeting  
 in the same room and deciding matters as an  
 executive board, are you of opinion that very  
 much time, trouble, staff, and correspondence  
 between department and department would have  
 been saved?—Undoubtedly.

2672. And executive efficiency, you think,  
 would be the result?—I think it would be.

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*Tuesday, 10th May 1870.*

## MEMBERS PRESENT:

Colonel Barttelot.  
Captain Beaumont.  
Mr. Campbell.  
Mr. Candlish.  
Mr. Eastwick.  
Sir James Elphinstone.

Sir John Hay.  
Sir Patrick O'Brien.  
Mr. Seely.  
Mr. Charles Turner.  
Mr. White.

JOHN CANDLISH, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Rear Admiral WILLIAM R. MENDS, C.B., called in; and Examined.

2673. *Chairman.*] I HAVE asked you to attend the Committee to-day in consequence of the extreme difficulty which I find in getting the returns, forms of which have been placed in your hands; if you have the papers before you, will you describe those returns to the Committee, and state what is the difficulty in the way of getting those returns?—The first return asked for is, “A return of all ships and craft of every kind, distinguishing steamers from sailing vessels, purchased by the Indian Government for the use of the Abyssinian Expedition; the tonnage, age, class, and price of each vessel; where, and of whom purchased, with a statement of the cost of navigating and supplying each vessel with everything not supplied to chartered vessels; what vessels have since been sold; to whom, and at what prices; what vessels have since been employed; where, and how long, and what prices obtained for, or what the estimated value of the work they had done.” Upon the whole of the returns required in the accompanying Paper, I reported, in the first instance, to this effect to the Board of Admiralty on the 21st March: “This can be prepared in this department; but it will be most voluminous; and the collection of so great an amount of detail would involve much clerical labour, which, if bestowed during office hours, would occupy two clerks upwards of three weeks with great hindrance to the current work. It is to be observed that it would apply to the employment of over 300 vessels during several months. The books containing the principal part of the information, in so far as it came under Captain Tryon’s superintendence in Annesley Bay, have been already in the hands of the Committee, and sent by Mr. Candlish to this department; but have not been sent to me by Captain Tryon officially, being merely records on which he made his reports from time to time. When prepared with all the information which this department possesses, the return would still be an incomplete statement, as services were being performed by ships engaged by the Indian Government, on the coast of India and elsewhere beyond the control of Captain Tryon.” This was referred to a member of the Board of Admiralty, and Mr. Baxter was asked for his opinion, and Mr. Baxter conferred with Mr. Candlish. “Mr. Candlish having been informed privately of the labour this return will occasion, has replied that he considers that the information sought to be so valuable, that it

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will well repay the trouble it may cause. Under these circumstances the return should certainly be furnished.” “Director of Transports” (this is an order for me): “I understand that you have received formal application for this return. You will prepare it and immediately report what additional clerical assistance you require.” When I came further to look into it, I found that I could not prepare it; that the documents were not either in my office, or in that of the Accountant General, but that they were with the Indian Government; therefore, after communicating that to yourself in a letter (a copy of which I have not here), I prepared at the Board of Admiralty a schedule of the returns (six in number) required by the Committee for their Lordships’ information, and the following observations have been made, addressed to Mr. Candlish, in regard to the preparation of them. Return No. 1 (which I read just now), is a return which the India Office alone are competent to complete.

2674. Are you aware whether the India Government are taking any steps to make out such a return?—I am not.

2675. Is it beyond the power of the Admiralty to give it?—It is.

2676. What is the second return?—Return No. 2 is “A return of the coals supplied to and consumed by steamers engaged by the Bombay Government in the Abyssinian Expedition; ship, voyage, from, to; coals supplied, tons, where, when sailed, when arrived; days under steam, distance steamed, coals charged to owner, tons, price, consumed by ship in propelling ship, other purposes; statement of ship’s coal, consumption per day, when chartered; remarks; if consumed for other purposes than propelling ship, state what purposes.” To that I reply: “It is found that this can only be rendered completely by the India Office; whence, on application being made by the Committee, orders would doubtless be issued for its preparation.” I referred to the Accountant General to furnish me with what he could, and that I believe was placed in the hands of the Chairman’s secretary last night.

2677. What was your authority for saying that the India Office could give that return?—In the first instance I referred to the Accountant General of the Navy, and I make that statement on his authority; I made this reference to him: “The Chairman of the Committee of the House of Commons on the Abyssinian Expedition having requested

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requested that a return on the annexed form may be furnished to him for the information of the Committee, the Accountant General is requested to inform me whether the preparation of the same can be undertaken in the department under his control." His reply was: "The Director of Transports is informed, that from the coal accounts which are attached to the vouchers for the balance of hire of most of the ships engaged in India for the Abyssinian Expedition, some part of the information required might be given, and it is not imagined that the preparation in this department of such particulars as can be gathered would occupy any considerable time; and he is requested to state whether the work shall be proceeded with." My reply to that was: "It is requested that a return may be prepared so far as the information in the Department of the Accountant General will permit, and that the Accountant General will have the goodness to inform me, as soon as possible, where, or from what source the remaining detailed information required is to be obtained." He makes this Minute: "Let this return be put in hand at once; report as soon as practicable what portions can be furnished, and if known, where the remaining details may be obtained." The India Office will now make up what is deficient in the Accountant General's return.

2678. What is Return No. 3?—It is "A return in tabulated form of the date of the arrival and sailing of each vessel (distinguishing sailing from steam) at each port; of the days occupied in making each passage; of the days each vessel lay in each port; of the special causes of detention, if any; of the cargoes she carried, distinguishing the number of troops, followers, and the various kinds of animals; the quantity of heavy and the quantity of measurement cargo; and, generally, the quantity of work done by each vessel; also, when the hire began, and when it terminated, together with the gross sum paid for the hire of each."

2679. That you can give, can you not?—That I can give in part.

2680. What can you not give?—I can give it so far as it relates to the ships taken up in England, and that is now complete, or will be completed; "and, in regard to these, a statement containing complete information will be taken in hand immediately; but as regards all engagements made in India, the information can be obtained only through the India Office."

2681. You have, in Captain Tryon's book, a record of all the arrivals and sailings, with the dates of each at Annesley Bay, have you not?—Captain Tryon's books were sent to me by yourself, and I had never seen them until then. He claims them as his own, as a private record upon which he based or framed his general reports from time to time; and also by your request they were sent back to him, I think, two days ago.

2682. Have you not records from which you can give the information as to the arrivals and sailings contained in those books?—Yes, at Annesley Bay; but I have applied to Captain Tryon again for his books instead of having to go through the whole of the loose sheets and papers. We shall get it much more easily from his books, and, therefore, in a note this morning, I have requested him to furnish them.

2683. You have said that you have never had those books officially; are you not aware that they were handed in to the Committee for the

use of the Committee, and being in the Committee's possession were handed over to you?—I had not received them in that sense, and if I had I would have kept them officially. However, there will be no difficulty in obtaining them.

2684. Then you cannot give the arrivals and sailings at Aden?—No, I think not completely.

2685. Can you give the arrivals and sailings at Bombay?—No.

2686. Can you give the arrivals and sailings at Suez?—No.

2687. Can we get the arrivals and sailings by communicating with those respective places?—I have no officers there whatever who are responsible to me: they are responsible to the India Office entirely.

2688. But, as a matter of ordinary procedure, there will be a custom house record of arrivals and sailings at each of those places, will there not?—Certainly I should think so.

2689. There is not a custom house at Aden; but there is a harbour office there, is there not?—I do not know. When a ship becomes a transport she flies a pennant and is relieved from customs and customs notation.

2690. But there will be an official record of their arrivals and sailings at those places, will there not?—I should think so, at those ports unquestionably.

2691. Then to whom should the Committee apply to gain this information?—To the India Office direct.

2692. You have spoken several times of the India Office; do you mean the Indian Government, or the India Office here?—I mean the India Office here, who will order its officers to prepare this.

2693. Will you further oblige us with a return of the arrivals and sailings at Annesley Bay?—I can get that very quickly; by the end of the week, certainly.

2694. So far as those records of Captain Tryon's are concerned, you can give all the facts indicated in your return which they contain?—Yes, I think so.

2695. What is the fourth return?—No. 4 is "A return of the number of ships, distinguishing sailing from steam, disabled when under charter to the Government for the purposes of the Abyssinian Expedition; the nature of such disablement; when and where it took place; the time under which each disabled vessel was out of service; where and at whose cost each vessel was repaired, and the amount of pay each vessel received for the time she was out of service."

2696. Can you give that return?—I have given it here, as regards the ships taken up in this country: "The particulars of all ships taken up in India can alone be furnished through the Indian Office from the Government of India. As regards the ships engaged in England the Accountant General of the Navy has been requested to prepare a return thereof" (which came into my office this morning), "the necessary documents and books having been transferred from this department on the reorganisation of the office."

2697. But the accounts in the India Office will show all that, will they?—Yes.

2698. You say that you have prepared a return of ships chartered in England paid when out of service?—It is a return of the ships which were chartered, disabled, and how they were treated.

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2699. Is it an ordinary condition of Admiralty charters for transports to pay them when disabled from service?—No.

2700. How do you account for their having been paid on this occasion?—They were not paid; they were off pay.

2701. But the return asks for those which were paid when off hire?—We have no such instance. This is a return showing that they were placed off pay for a certain number of days.

2702. Is it the universal practice that ships chartered on time shall be off pay if they are unable to do their work?—In the case of ships chartered by the Admiralty, unquestionably that is so.

2703. Can you explain how it happens that that rule has not been observed in India, and that disabled ships have there been paid during the time of their disablement?—I cannot account for it.

2704. Have you seen a copy of their charters?—I think I have, but I do not recollect it at this moment.

2705. You do not recognise any provision of that nature in the charter, that they shall be paid when disabled?—No; we have a code of regulations under the Admiralty which are stated to be incorporated in the charter-party, and they are taken to be so legally considered, and, therefore, the charter-party is combined, and in accordance with the regulations, in fact; and in the regulations, we have a clause specially notifying that ships becoming disabled will be placed off pay, and will not come on pay again until their representatives, or the representatives of their owners, state that they are fit for service.

2706. The proceeding in India, of their having been paid while off work, is totally contrary to the home practice, is it?—Certainly.

2707. And the India Office will be able to give the return asked for?—Yes.

2708. Mr. Seely.] Is there any difference between the charter-party made by the Admiralty and the charter-party made by the Indian Government?—Yes; I think it was commented upon by Captain Tryon himself at Bombay, who called attention to it immediately. In some particular clauses it was at variance with our charter-party, and they have no regulations.

2709. The charter-parties made in India were different, then, from the charter-parties made in England?—Yes.

2710. Would that difference enable the parties who owned the vessels taken up in India to require pay during the time they were disabled?—Without seeing the two charter-parties and the clauses, I should not like to pronounce a decided opinion; but as far as the Admiralty are concerned, unquestionably we never pay a ship if she becomes disabled.

2711. Chairman.] You hand in a statement of ships disabled under time charter, do you not?—Yes, and how they were treated. (*The same was handed in, vide Appendix.*)

2712. They received no pay during the period when they were disabled?—No.

2713. What is Return No. 5?—No. 5 is “A return of the dates of the arrivals and sailings of each Indian relief transport, and of the numbers of troops carried each voyage during the season 1867–68, with an estimate of the cost of carrying the same troops from and to England by the ordinary means.” This is now in course of preparation in the Transport Department of

the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for India having signified his approval of the return being prepared. It is very nearly complete. We wait for some papers from the India Office, and I think it will be completed to-night or to-morrow morning.

2714. Can you tell the Committee when you think that the whole of those returns may be in the hands of honourable Members?—As relating to myself, the whole will be in their hands by the end of the week.

2715. Can you speak as to those which the India Office alone can give?—No.

2716–19. They all lie between the Admiralty and the India Office, do they not?—More with the India Office direct. They did all their own work in India, and would render it direct from the ports in which the ships were engaged.

2720. Sir James Elphinstone.] I think you have commanded a steam line-of-battle ship?—I have.

2721. Do you remember the three hospital ships which were taken up and sent to the Red Sea?—I do.

2722. It has been suggested that there were steam line of battle ships in England at that time which could have been sent out as hospital ships; is that so?—I think I was asked that question before, or something bearing upon it. I believe there were ships; but I do not think they would have made their way to Annesley Bay in the same time as the others did.

2723. It has been stated by Captain Sherard Osborn that those ships could have been got ready in a very few days, and that they would have made the passage out to Aden in 60 days; do you think that they could have done so?—I do not think that a line-of-battle ship would have made the passage within the time taken by those ships which were engaged; I think if there were time, unquestionably it would have been a much more prudent and better thing to have taken the ships which we had, but everything was very much pressed at the moment.

2724. It would have taken a considerable time, I suppose, to have fitted those ships as hospital ships, would it not?—It ought not to have taken long in the dockyards to have fitted those ships; I should not think it would have taken a considerable time.

2725. How long?—I think a week ought certainly to have completed them as to their fittings.

2726. What would have been the relative expenses?—That I have not gone into, and I should not like to speak on it off hand, but I should think it would have been cheaper to have taken ships of the line; ships which we possessed.

2727. Were there any ships ready at that time for that purpose; could they have been sent out without being docked and refitted?—I do not recollect all the circumstances attending the condition of the ships in the reserve at that time. There are certain documents which would show the state of the ships in the reserve and ready, but I should not like to speak from memory so far back as that.

2728. I suppose they could not have carried coal enough to have gone there without coaling at Ascension or at the Cape?—No, their coal stowage was insignificant, and that makes me think that their passage would have been so long.

2729. I suppose that in reference to the previous question we should get a better answer from Sir Spencer Robinson?—Yes.

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2730. Sir *Patrick O'Brien*.] Could not the coast guard vessels have been very readily fitted up as transport ships; as, for instance, those which were in the harbour at Kingstown, or the "Royal George"?—Her draught of water is very considerable. They are unhandy ships in what are called narrow waters, or shoal waters. I do not think they would be desirable as troop ships.

2731. Might they not have been fitted as hospital ships?—They might have been temporarily fitted as hospital ships, and there is no doubt that if they had been on the spot they would have been useful ships if they could have got there in time.

2732. Sir *James Elphinstone*.] But do you think that a ship in the ordinary state of a coast guard ship would be capable of going out to Abyssinia with the prospect in all human probability of remaining there for 18 months or two years without a thorough refit?—The ships in the first-class steam reserve, and the district ships on the coast guard are supposed to be in a very good condition, and certainly should be available. They are considered the first reserve, and they should be available to proceed to sea at any moment.

2733. To any part of the world?—To any part of the world. I believe that to be the intention of the first reserve.

2734. *Chairman*.] The coast guard ships are always supposed to be ready to go anywhere, are they not?—They are now specially kept ready to go to sea at a very short notice.

2735. That has been the procedure at the Admiralty for years, has it not?—It has been for the last 10 or 12 years. The ship that I last commanded on the coast guard was always ready for sea.

2736. In 1867, I think you had seven or eight ships so ready?—On the coast guard there were. The coast guard ships were ready.

2737. And they could have proceeded to Annesley Bay even more promptly than the ships then hired, could they not?—I think not. I do not think they would have made the passage so quickly.

2738. But they could have been dispatched more promptly, would they not?—They might possibly have got away from the country more quickly, the energies of the dockyard being given to fitting the ships up rapidly.

2739. Sir *Patrick O'Brien*.] In short, the principal difficulty I presume, would be in removing their guns?—There were certain fittings required by the medical officers which were very unusual, and they were most exacting at that time as to the fittings. It is fair to say that we had no example of a hospital ship properly fitted at all until those ships were fitted up.

2740. *Chairman*.] Are there any better ships afloat for hospital purposes than those old men-of-war?—I have heard very many conflicting opinions as to the utilising wooden ships of war for hospitals. In the first place, it is I believe a very remarkable fact, that the number of decks generally increases the mortality in case of any bad disease coming into a ship; and it is also on statistics that the three-decked ships suffer more than the two-decked ships, and the two-decked ships more than the single-decked. I have seen it in practice and experienced it in the case of the Crimea. The three-decked ships suffered very

severely with cholera, and on board the two-decked ships it was less, and on the frigates less again in proportion.

2741. But with ample tonnage with six ships when you only wanted three, you could have limited the number which you would have placed on board any one of those ships in the same way as they were limited on board the chartered hospital ships, would you not?—Yes.

2742. You have not given me your own opinion as to their being suitable, or otherwise?—Large ships are very unwieldy in such narrow waters with shoals in the neighbourhood; and as I carry my mind back to that time, looking to the fact of the ground not being very well known, line-of-battle ships would not have been advisable ships to send to those places. They are only auxiliary powered ships.

2743. But as hospital ships, which would have to lie at anchor in Annesley Bay, would they not have been suitable?—I think that if there had been time they might have been available.

2744. Bombay Harbour is a large harbour, with abundance of deep water, is it not?—Certainly.

2745. Would they not have been equally well adapted for troop ships as for hospital ships?—Of course, if you sent line-of-battle ships they could have been used. Bombay Harbour is quite capable of holding a large number of the ships of the line.

2746. You do not remember how many you had then ready for sea in reserve?—I do not. The returns published month by month under the Admiralty of ships in commission and ships in reserve would show their state and condition; but I should not like to answer that question without reference to the documents.

2747. Sir *James Elphinstone*.] Are you aware that, whatever may be the theory of the first-class reserve, in practice Parliament does not give sufficient money to keep those ships in sea-going order?—I have always understood that the ships of the first-class steam reserve are not so classed, or considered to be classed, unless they are in an efficient condition.

2748. Are you aware that one of those steam coast guard ships, the "Hector," was the other day obliged to be towed round from Southampton Water to Portsmouth, being unable to reach Portsmouth by her own machinery?—I heard of that case.

2749. Are you also aware that the "Penelope" was brought round from Harwich, and that nearly a month was occupied in getting her in a seaworthy condition?—Yes; but I fancy that would be an exceptional case. I think it was so as regards the "Hector." I happened to hear it at Portsmouth.

2750. *Chairman*.] But the machinery of chartered transports will get wrong, will it not?—Yes, it may.

2751. And the machinery in the cases mentioned was out of order, was it not?—The machinery of the "Hector" was out of order.

2752. Sir *Patrick O'Brien*.] It is the practice, is it not, for those ships to go to sea for a month in each year?—They do so every year.

2753. To try their efficiency?—Yes.

2754. *Chairman*.] At this moment, have you not 10 or 12 ships which you could dispatch to any part of the world within a fortnight?—Yes; there are certain ships, I conclude, ready to go to any part of the world. The coast guard ships are

are now iron-plated ships, and they are very efficient and in very good condition.

2755. You would not have had to do more than supply the crews and coals to those ships, would you?—And the hospital fittings.

2756. But you had to supply the hospital fittings to the ships which you engaged, had you not?—Yes.

2757. And you supplied the coals to the ships which you engaged, did you not?—Yes.

2758. The difference, then, would simply be between the not finding a crew in the one case, and finding it in the other?—Yes.

2759. And you think, therefore, that your own ships could have been much more cheaply employed than the transports?—I should think that the ships of the Admiralty could have been more cheaply employed.

2760. Sir *James Elphinstone*.] If, as the Chairman suggests, you had employed two ships for one, do you think that would have been cheaper than the arrangement which was entered into by the Admiralty?—That is a matter of calculation, and I cannot answer that.

2761. *Chairman*.] Do you believe that any one of those ships to which you have referred would have accommodated fewer invalids than any one of the transports which you engaged for that purpose?—No, I think not.

2762. Sir *James Elphinstone*.] Is it not the fact that those line-of-battle ships cannot carry coal, except for very short distances?—They do not carry a large quantity of coal.

2763. How much coal do they carry?—About 500 or 600 tons, I think; but going out on an expedition of that kind, and going out empty, coal might have been taken on their decks.

2764. *Chairman*.] When you say 600 tons, you mean coals in their bunkers, do you not?—I should think 1,200 tons might have been put into them.

2765. Would there have been any difficulty in putting coals enough on board to steam them to the Cape?—No line-of-battle ships that I know of could steam to the Cape.

2766. What coaling places have you on the way to the Cape?—Cape de Verde, Sierra Leone, Ascension, and St. Helena.

2767. Sir *Patrick O'Brien*.] The calculation that they would arrive in Annesley Bay in 60 days was on the supposition that they would em-

ploy both sail and steam, I presume?—Knowing something of that latitude, I do not think that ships of the line would have got there in 60 days.

2768. *Chairman*.] You chartered those ships in August, did you not?—Yes.

2769. When did they sail?—I think it was on the third week in September.

2770. You could have sent your own ships away by the middle of September?—I should think with the work put on the dockyards properly, the ships ought to have left by that time.

2771. Sixty-five days from the middle of September would have been the middle of November, would it not?—Yes.

2772. Would they have gone in 65 days, as Captain Sherard Osborn thinks?—It is merely hazarding an opinion, and I daresay the officer who answered that question has studied it, whereas I really have not done so. It is merely a matter of calculation and winds, and I think that it would be very easily settled by examination of the chart.

2773. It is not a very marvellous thing for sailing vessels to go to Aden in 90 days, is it?—They do so.

2774. Therefore, if those ships had gone in 90 days, they would have been there by the middle of December, would they not?—Yes, they would; but the Government of this country pressed for the ships to be there in November.

2775. Could not your ships have done that if they had made their passage in 80 days?—Yes, I suppose they could.

2776. Did the Admiralty consider the expediency of employing those ships of the line, instead of hiring hospital ships, and other transport ships?—I do not know whether they did. I received orders to take up those ships under Board's order. I concluded that they considered they had no ships, or they would have ordered them.

2777. Were you ever consulted as to the practicability and advisability of using ships of the line?—If an order of the Admiralty directs me personally to do it, or if there is a Board's order, as upon this occasion, I am not consulted as to the expediency of utilising ships of the line.

2778. And whether there was or was not any consideration of the matter by the Board of Admiralty is not known to you?—No.

Captain WILLIAM DARKE, called in; and Examined.

2779. *Chairman*.] You are a large Shipowner in London, are you not?—Yes; we have a large number of vessels.

2780. What is your firm?—Temperleys, Carter & Darke, of Cornhill.

2781. You tendered vessels to the Admiralty in answer to advertisements inviting tonnage for the Abyssinian Expedition, did you not?—Yes.

2782. Amongst other vessels you tendered the "Ottawa"?—Yes.

2783. What was her tonnage?—About 1,830 tons gross.

2784. What was her horse power?—240.

2785. Was she a new ship?—Nearly new.

2786. When was she built?—I think she would be about two years old when she was tendered.

2787. By whom was she built?—By Messrs. Laird of Birkenhead.

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2788. The date of your tender is the 27th of August 1867, I believe?—Yes.

2789. You offered her at 26 s. per ton per month if discharged at home, and 31 s. per ton per month if discharged in India, did you not?—Yes, I think those were the terms.

2790. When you tendered she was in Antwerp, was she not?—She was.

2791. Sir *Patrick O'Brien*.] Was she a screw steamer?—Yes.

2792. *Chairman*.] You reported her ready for survey at Antwerp on the 28th of August, did you not?—Yes; she was just then out of dry dock.

2793. And in London on the 31st of August?—Yes; she might have come over immediately.

2794. You offered to bring her over to London to be surveyed if the Admiralty required it, or  
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to pay the expenses of sending a surveyor to Antwerp, I believe?—Yes.

2795. What is the steaming distance from Antwerp to London?—We reckon it 12 hours from Flushing across to Gravesend.

2796. So that, for practical purposes, you think that she was as ready for employment as though she had been in the Thames?—Yes.

2797. And her survey would have been as inexpensive to the Admiralty, whether it took place at Antwerp or in London?—Yes.

2798. Do you know any of the other ships which were accepted on that occasion?—I do not, from my personal knowledge, know any of the vessels which were accepted; but I know that there were some vessels tendered which had not arrived in Queenstown at the same time, and one of them was accepted.

2799. Sir Patrick O'Brien.] Was she coming from America?—Yes.

2800. Chairman.] Was she tendered at the same time as yours?—Yes.

2801. What ship was it?—I forget her name now, but I know the fact.

2802. Your ship, you say, was two years old; she was built by a first-class builder, Messrs. Laird of Birkenhead; and she had just come out of dry dock at Antwerp?—Yes; she was perfectly ready for sea; indeed, we brought her over on the chance of having her taken up on a subsequent tender.

2803. She was then clean painted and ready for sea?—Yes.

2804-5. Do you know the rates at which other ships were chartered at the same time that yours was refused at 26 s. and 31 s.?—I do.

2806. Do you know the "City of Manchester"?—I think I know her; indeed, I know a great many of those Liverpool ships.

2807. Do you know that she was taken up at 35 s. if discharged at home, and 45 s. if discharged abroad?—Yes.

2808. Thirty-five shillings as compared with your 26 s., and 45 s. as compared with your 31 s.?—Yes.

2809. Sir Patrick O'Brien.] Was she a higher classed ship than the "Ottawa"?—No, I do not think that those vessels are classed at all.

2810. Chairman.] Do you know her age?—I do not.

2811. This is a Return presented to the House of Commons in July 1869 (*showing a Paper to the Witness*); you see there the "City of Manchester;" when was she built?—In 1851.

2812. What was her tonnage?—2,096 tons.

2813. The tonnage of the "Ottawa" was 1,830, was it not?—Yes.

2814. Do you know the tonnage, clear of engine-room, of the "Ottawa"?—1,179, without the spar deck; that is her net tonnage underneath the main deck.

2815. She was in every way suited for carrying troops, was she not?—She was admirably suited for carrying troops.

2816. What work has she done since that?—She has been employed in the passenger trade to New York, and she is so employed now. She will take 650 passengers.

2817. You tendered another ship at the same time, lying at Sunderland, the "Iron Age," did you not?—Yes.

2818. She was 1,094 tons, tendered at 24 s. 6 d., if discharged at home, and 29 s. 6 d. if discharged abroad, I think?—Yes.

2819. She also was rejected was she not?—Yes.

2820. Had you any communications from the Admiralty respecting those ships?—None whatever; we merely got the rejection.

2821. Mr. Seely.] Do you mean to say that you had no reply from the Admiralty?—Merely the rejection; I went up and saw Captain Mends about the "Ottawa." We were very much disappointed at her not being taken, because we knew she was so very eligible a ship. Captain Mends said that we had not complied with the terms of the tender, as the vessel was not actually in port.

2822. Mr. Campbell.] Was that the only respect in which he said you had not complied with the terms of tender?—Yes; we brought her over immediately, at our own expense, with the chance of tendering her.

2823. Chairman.] Did the tender state that the ship must be in a certain place, or in a certain port?—Yes.

2824. What port?—In England.

2825. The "Iron Age" was in England, was she not?—Yes, she was at Sunderland.

2825. And she too was rejected?—Yes.

2827. Assuming that the "City of Manchester" was built in 1851, the "Golden Fleece" in 1854, and the "Queen of the South" in 1852, those vessels would, at the time they were chartered, have been 15 or 16 years old, would they not?—Yes.

2828. Approximately, and in general terms, what would ships of that age be worth, as they were lying in the dock?—The value of the ships would depend very much upon what employment they were required for.

2829. I mean as merchantable ships in the market?—If you take them at 9 l. a ton for the ship, and 30 l. a horse power for the engines, you will come very near the value of them.

2830. Do you know what power they had?—I think they had, nominally, 300 horse-power, if I recollect rightly.

2831. That would be somewhere about 4 l. per ton for the engine, would it not, on the tonnage of the ship?—Yes.

2832. Your estimate is, that those ships would be worth 13 l. or 14 l. per ton, with the engines on board?—Yes, that would be the very outside of the cost of them.

2833. Are you aware that the "City of Manchester" received 25 l. 19 s. per ton for the time of her hire?—The "City of Manchester" would be in a very much better condition than those vessels which were in the Victoria Docks, because she was constantly employed.

2834. And you think that she would be worth more than that?—Yes, she has been constantly well kept up, and I should think that that vessel would be worth 16 l. a ton on her register.

2835. Do you mean that the ship, with her engines, was worth 16 l. a ton?—She would be worth more than that; she would be worth 16 l. a ton on the shell. The engine would be worth from 32 l. to 35 l. per horse power.

2836. Then, you think the "City of Manchester" would be worth about 20 l. a ton?—Yes.

2837. Then if she received, say, 26 l. per ton for the time she was employed, she would receive 6 l. a ton more hire than her intrinsic value, would she not?—Decidedly.

2838. If her employment was for 11½ months, her

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her owner would, in those 11½ months, receive her value, *plus* 6*l.* a ton, would he not?—Yes.

2839. And all that he would have to supply would be the crew, and oil for the engines?—Yes; crew stores and engine stores.

2840. Can you say what that would be per month?—I should think her insurance, wear and tear, interest, engines, stores, and everything else, would come to very nearly 2,000*l.* per month; that is, reckoning the wages of the crew and everything right through.

2841. That would be 23,000*l.*, would it not?—Yes.

2842. Then, if the owners received 13,000*l.* more freight than her value, they would be paid the value of the ship, and everything she cost, *minus* 10,000*l.*, would they not?—Yes.

2843. Then the other ships you mentioned were the "Golden Fleece," the "Mauritius," and the "Queen of the South"?—Yes, there were four of them; the "Golden Fleece," the "Mauritius," the "Queen of the South," and the "Hydaspes."

2844. Those were ships of lower value, were they not?—Yes; they were sold for an old song when they came home.

2845. They were not worth more in the best market that could be found in the world, than 13*l.* or 14*l.* a ton, were they?—Oh dear no.

2846. And they, having received 20*l.* a ton hire, would be more than paid their value, even deducting all charges?—Yes; the expense of getting them out, the Committee must understand, was very heavy.

2847. But are you not aware that they were fitted out as hospital ships by the Admiralty?—Yes; but a great deal of it would fall upon the ship. The expenses were very heavy indeed.

2848. What were those fittings?—The vessels had to be decked and cleaned, and thoroughly examined, their engines put in repair, and the whole of the expenses were frightfully heavy. I had to go through the whole of the accounts afterwards.

2849. But you were counting that, I apprehend, when you said that they were worth 13*l.* a ton?—Yes.

2850. The expenses of cleaning the ships and making them ready for sea, would be covered by the value which you put upon them of 13*l.* a ton, would they not?—They were sold for considerably less than that when they came home.

2851. What were they sold for?—I think the four of them were offered for something like 75,000*l.* or 80,000*l.* I am quite sure that 80,000*l.* would have bought the four of them after they came back again.

2852. Mr. Seeley.] In your estimate of 13*l.* a ton, did you consider that they were fitted up for hospital ships, or did you say that they were worth 13*l.* a ton before any fittings were put into them by the owners?—I should think the hospital fittings would do the ships no good as merchant ships; that is to say, that the whole of the fittings put on board the ships as hospital ships were of no earthly use.

2853. Then they were worth 13*l.* per ton irrespective of the fittings which were put into them to make them ready for hospital ships?—Yes.

2854. Chairman.] The "Golden Fleece," the "Mauritius," and the "Queen of the South" were sold at Liverpool for 50,000*l.* after they returned, were they not?—I should think it very likely that they were.

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2855. Then if their hire amounted to 136,000*l.*, they would receive 86,000*l.* more as hire for those 10 or 11 months' employment, than they were sold for after it was over, would they not?—Yes.

2856. That would be about their value twice over, and all the owner's expenses besides, would it not?—It would appear so from that calculation.

2857. What would, at about that time, be the ordinary value of American sailing vessels when new, of from 1,000 to 2,000 tons?—I should think about 8*l.* a ton.

2858. Coppered and ready for sea?—They might have been had, I should think, from 8*l.* to 9*l.* a ton, from five to seven years class.

2859. Then an American ship off the letter, out of all books, and having no character at all, would be worth how much?—I should think about 3*l.* a ton.

2860. What would be the value of a ship of 1,464 tons off the letter without character, her original class being seven years?—She would be worth no more in England than about 3*l.* or 3*l.* 10*s.* a ton; indeed, you would hardly get a market for her. She would be worth a little more out there.

2861. She might be worth 5,000*l.* or 6,000*l.*, I suppose?—Yes, that would be the outside value.

2862. Then if she were employed for 11 months, and she received 24,000*l.*, she would be paid four times her value for her term of employment, would she not?—Yes.

2863. You have had very much experience in those ships, have you not?—Yes; I have had a very great deal of experience.

2864. You have also had very much experience in screw steamers, I believe?—Yes; I have commanded one myself.

2865. What do you regard as the present value of a screw steamer, with ordinary proportions between tonnage and propelling power, say of 1,500 tons?—I have just made contracts now for vessels of 2,500 tons register, and 450 horse-power, guaranteed to steam 11 knots, for 64,000*l.*, fitted complete.

2866. That is about 22*l.* a ton, is it not?—Yes, somewhere thereabouts.

2867. They were rather higher, were they not, in 1867?—Yes.

2868. What would you suppose to be the value in 1867?—About 25*l.*, including her engines and everything. It depends very much upon the horse-power, because the small horse-power makes a wonderful difference in the price of the ship. I think the "Ottawa" cost 48,000*l.* when she was new.

2869. What is her speed; is she a very fast ship?—Yes; 10 knots.

2870-1. When I tell you that 10 steamships, belonging to the British Steam Navigation Company, were chartered for an average period of nine months and 18 days, and that for that they received an average hire of 26*l.* 13*s.* per ton, what would your inference be as to the pay which they received in proportion to their value?—Many of those vessels are of greater value than I have stated; they are so very expensively fitted up. Some of those vessels would cost from about 22*l.* to 25*l.* per ton on the builder's tonnage for building alone, without the engines, and then they lose a great deal by going out of their regular lines also.

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2872. Do

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2872. Do you know the "Punjaub"?—Yes.

2873. Take her as a sample ship; her tonnage is 1,030 tons and her horse-power 200, and she was built in 1864; what would that ship be worth per ton approximately in 1867?—I should think that at that age in 1867 she would be worth about 19,400 l.

2874. That is rather less than 20 l. a ton, is it not?—Yes.

2875. That is one of those which received, on an average, 26 l. per ton; you would think her very well paid, would you not?—Yes; they were well paid, no doubt.

2876. If you would have taken 26 s. per ton per month for your ship the "Ottawa," of 1,830 tons, would you not think that other vessels of less tonnage received more than they ought to have done?—We have just time-chartered the "Medway," of 1,864 tons register, for a four months' voyage at 18 s. per ton.

2877. And you regard from 20 s. to 25 s. as a good rate?—A very good rate.

2878. Then, regarding the 26 s. which you offered your own ship at to ply in India, as satisfactory to you, you would regard 55 s. per ton per month as twice as much as it ought to have been?—If we were tendering the ship we should have been very glad to have got it. There is great risk in vessels going out from England to ply abroad, in consequence of the damage to which the machinery is liable.

2879. But you counted that when you offered at 26 s., did you not?—Yes.

2880. And the ship which got 55 s. you think got twice as much as she ought to have had?—I do not think they got too much for the owners.

2881. But for the charterers?—We should not liked to have paid it if we had been the charterers.

2882. Then, wanting tonnage at that time, had you been in the Admiralty, would you have supposed that the best way was to advertise for tonnage, or would you have employed any respectable City broker to have engaged for you the tonnage which you needed?—I do not think that I should have employed any broker. I think that if I had been advertising for tonnage, I should have advertised for so many ships at so much per ton per month, and I think I should have got as many as I wanted.

2883. Instead of inviting a rate you would have fixed a rate and invited ships?—Yes, I am quite sure that almost any of those ships for which they paid so very high a rate, they would have got for 25 s.

2884. Inasmuch as they were not in any way better than yours for which you would have taken 26 s.?—Yes; the hospital ships were those four vessels which were chartered in the Victoria Docks.

2885. And you think that if they had fixed a rate it would have been better; what rate would have secured those ships?—I am quite sure that those vessels would have gone at from 22 s. to 25 s.; I am quite positive of it, they would have been glad to have got it.

2886. Any of the ships which were chartered in England, if the rate had been fixed at from 22 s. to 25 s., could, you believe, have been procured?—I think they would have got all the tonnage which they required at that rate.

2887. Mr. White.] Do you not think that the fact of the Government wanting such an amount of tonnage being known, the owners of the ships

would have put up their price?—They always put up the price when vessels are tendered for. They very often throw in a tender with a chance of getting it, and sometimes they are taken when they hardly expect it.

2888. Mr. Campbell.] The agreement was, that so much should be paid per month if the vessel was discharged at home, and so much more per month if it was discharged abroad; do you think that is the most economical and proper arrangement to make?—I do not see how it is to be got over, because, when a shipowner has a vessel thrown on his hands abroad, there is so much tonnage thrown into the market.

2889. Do you not think that it would be a fair thing to engage tonnage at a certain rate per month, and then say that if the vessel is discharged at a certain port abroad, so much shall be given for the expenses as a sort of consolation, instead of making it depend upon the length of the time?—Yes; I think that if they had advertised for ships at so much per ton per month, stating that if a vessel were discharged so much time would be allowed to let her make her passage home, that would have met the whole of the difficulty.

2890. In fact, the loss to the shipowner by his vessel being discharged abroad, does not at all depend upon the length of time during which his vessel has been employed, does it?—If a vessel is employed for a very long time at a very good rate, of course the shipowner would not care very much whether the ship was discharged abroad, or at home.

2891. Sir James Elphinstone.] You stated that you had two ships unemployed at the period of those tenders, one at Antwerp, and the other at Sunderland; and that you tendered them to the Government; why did you tender them to the Government?—We tendered them because we thought that we should like to make some money of course, and employ the ships in a very profitable way both for ourselves and for the Government.

2892. You thought it would be a very good thing to get them employed by the Government?—Decidedly.

2893. They were rejected, were they not?—They were rejected.

2894. Were reasons given you for their rejection?—No.

2895. The ships that were mentioned, the "Hydaspes," the "Queen of the South," the "Golden Fleece," and the "Mauritius," were accepted, were they not?—Yes.

2896. And you considered them not such good ships as yours?—They were as good ships as they could possibly have had for hospital ships. There is no mistake about that; they could not have found better ships anywhere.

2897. And they had previously been in the employment of the Government, had they not, in the Crimea, and other places?—Yes, but they were different ships then. They had the spar decks off them at that time.

2898. But the Government knew that they were ships that would answer their purpose, did they not?—Yes; they knew the ships well.

2899. And therefore you did not think it a hardship that those ships should be preferred to yours?—Not at all; not in the slightest degree.

2900. Then with regard to the sale of those ships at Liverpool; you are probably aware that they formed part of the bankrupt estate of Overend, Gurney & Co.?—Yes.

2901. And

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2901. And that the sale price was really no indication of their actual intrinsic value?—No doubt the vessels were sold for less than they were worth; but you must understand, that although they were such very excellent ships as hospital ships, as merchant vessels they would have had to undergo very considerable alterations; the engines would have had to be taken out, and all the arrangements altered.

2902. In short, they were ships admirably calculated for the purpose for which the Admiralty took them up, but they were not of that speed and character which the improved knowledge of the times has created?—They were utterly useless as merchant ships unless the engines were taken out of them, because they were neither one thing nor the other.

2903. But they were very good for the purpose for which they were taken out, were they not?—Very good indeed.

2904. The "Punjab" was chartered in India, was she not?—So I believe.

2905. Are you aware that freights in India for steamships are very much higher than they are in this country?—Quite so.

2906. Have you ever had any of your own ships employed in India?—I have commanded ships in India myself, and steamers also.

2907. You know, of course, that if a steamer breaks down, or if there is a collision, the difficulty and expense of repairing her there is enormous?—Very great indeed.

2908. You know the freight markets; you know the number of ships which resort annually to Bombay, Kurrachee, and Bengal?—Yes.

2909. Do you think that the Government could go into the market at most of those ports for 50,000 tons of freight without the freights going up cent. per cent.?—The freights would go up immediately.

2910. Enormously?—Enormously.

2911. May it not be that a Government fitting out an expedition rapidly would have, in some cases, to make bargains which would not be exactly in conformity with the usual practice of taking up vessels at home?—I think it is very probable indeed. I think that suitable ships might be very hard to get out in India, especially if they were pushed to get them.

2912. They would have great difficulty in getting the sort of ships they wanted; and even then they must pay enhanced prices for the accommodation, must they not?—Yes; in cases like that in India, where there is not a very large selection, some vessels would be worth three times the amount of others which were not so suitable.

2913. Take a colonial ship which might happen to have been at Bombay at the period of the breaking out of the Abyssinian War, a ship without class or character; if that ship was surveyed, and satisfied the marine authorities there, would she not be quite as good for the purposes of that expedition as a ship with an A1 character?—She would be quite as good as the most valuable ship afloat for that purpose.

2914. Consequently, although she might not be worth in the market at home more than 3*l.* per ton, she was worth any freight which was given to any ship there, I presume, provided she could do the business of the Government?—Yes.

2915. Are you aware that during the Abyssinian War freights were driven up in India to an enormous figure?—Freights were higher, but

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they were never very high all the time of the Abyssinian War, in my recollection.

2916. Ships, I suppose, came out from India, and replaced those?—Yes; they flocked in, in fact, from all parts of the colonies, and everywhere else.

2917. Did not that raise the value of freight in every part of the world?—I think that it made very little difference in India, according to my recollection. We had vessels there which came home at miserably low rates.

2918. Do you know what effect it had at Colombo?—Colombo is a different freight market, because they are almost all small vessels which load at Colombo, of from 400 to 600 tons.

2919. Are you aware that it drove the freight up 100 per cent. at Colombo?—It is very possible; but I am not absolutely aware of that fact.

2920. Are you aware that it also sent up the freight in China, Java, Manilla, and at every port whence those supplies were drawn?—I do not think the freight was ever anything very extraordinary. All the time of the Abyssinian War the vessels flocked in from Australia. Vessels which would have come home direct from Australia with a cotton freight rushed up to India, on the chance of being taken up; indeed, everyone was mad about it.

2921. The hiring of transports in England, I suppose, was not calculated to keep down the rate of freight, was it?—No, not at all.

2922. Is there anything as to which you, as a shipowner and a practical mercantile officer, who have had great experience in India, can blame the Government of India in taking up the shipping for that expedition, or in the management of the freight department in India?—I do not think that there is, from my knowledge. Those vessels which were taken up in London of course were taken up at a very high rate. We should have been very glad to have had the rate, if the ships had belonged to us; but I was very glad to see that they had such ships as the "Golden Fleece," and those vessels, to put their hands upon.

2923. You did not think that it was an extravagant rate for war charges?—Not under the circumstances.

2924. *Chairman.*] Do you know the conditions under which they chartered vessels in India?—I am speaking of the vessels which were here; those vessels which were in the dock, the hospital ships. About the India rate I know very little.

2925. You think that they were not high rates, although you would have taken less for your ships?—I think that the rates were high; but possibly they might not have been able to get them without that. I think that if they had advertised for vessels, at a certain rate right through, they would have had them.

2926. You have said that those three ships were sold; I think the language used in the question was whether they were thrown away?—I think there was six of them sold.

2927. If the three which were used for hospital ships had been sold at what you regard as their value, namely, 13*l.* per ton, the price would have been 80,000*l.*?—Yes.

2928. And they got 136,000*l.* freight, did they not?—Yes.

2929. So that even though they had been sold at the estimate which you put upon them, and

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not

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not thrown away, they would have had 56,000*l.* more hire than the price?—Yes.

2930. Do you know the “*Venetia*,” of 754 tons?—Yes, I do.

2931. Do you know that she got 34*s.* 6*d.* freight, for carrying mules to the Mediterranean?—I know she got a very good freight out there.

2932. Do you think that was a judicious charter on the part of the Admiralty?—It depends very much upon circumstances.

2933. She was chartered in London, was she not?—Possibly she was out at the proper place at the time when they required her.

2934. Assuming that she was chartered in London, would you think it an extravagant rate?—I should think so.

2935. You would have been glad to have got 20*s.* for a ship like that, would you not?—Not 20*s.* I think that the smaller the vessels, the higher the price you want for them.

2936. Do you know the “*Empress*”?—I do not recollect the “*Empress*.”

2937. Another ship of 1,100 tons got 35*s.* per ton per month; would you think that a high rate for carrying mules?—Yes.

2938. You have already told the Committee, I think, that you believe that they would have

got ships at from 20*s.* to 25*s.*?—I think so. If they had advertised for tonnage, I cannot say that they would have got such suitable ships as they did get; but I think they would have got all the tonnage which they required.

2939. Did you not say, previously, that they would have got the same ships, or as good ships, as they did get, if they had fixed a rate?—I think they would have got as good ships.

2940. Then anything in excess of that sum would be an improvident bargain for the Admiralty?—There are many things that we do not know anything at all about, as to why they wanted those particular ships.

2941. Sir *James Elphinstone*.] You said, did you not, that the Government would have done better to have advertised for tonnage at a rate?—I said that that was my opinion.

2942. Supposing that the Government could not have got ships at that rate, but that it had leaked out that there was going to be a war and a shindy, and that there would be a number of ships taken up, and that there had been a combination, what would have been done?—I think there is no fear of combination amongst shipowners; they are not to be trusted.

2943. Sir *Patrick O'Brien*.] As a matter of fact, they would have got them?—I think so.

Captain WHINYATES, R.H.A., called in; and Examined

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2944. Colonel *Barttelot*.] I THINK you are a Captain in the Royal Horse Artillery, are you not?—I am.

2945. I think you have been in the service some 20 years?—Twenty years next month.

2946. You are at present quartered at Woolwich, are you not?—Yes.

2947. I think in the year 1867 you were appointed to go out to Spain to buy mules?—At the end of August 1867.

2948. You were sent to Alicante, were you not?—Yes.

2949. There was another officer sent, I think, to Valentia, and one to Barcelona?—Yes; besides the officers of Artillery who went out to those places, there was a Commissariat officer and a veterinary surgeon with each.

2950. What orders had you as to the purchase of mules?—I had orders to buy mules and also to receive mules that were bought in the interior of Spain, and to embark them.

2951. To what price were you limited as to the purchase of mules?—I received no orders when I left England, but after being at Alicante about a week or 10 days, I got orders not to exceed 22*l.*

2952. Who was the contractor; who was buying mules in the interior?—His name was Quintas; he was a Portuguese, I think, and the agent of Messrs. Wetherall & Co., in London.

2953. Who had the contract for buying the mules; was it Messrs. Wetherall?—Messrs. Wetherall & Co. had the contract; Mr. Quintas was their agent.

2954. Do you know to what price they were limited?—They were limited to 22*l.*, I think. They offered, after they got out to Spain, a contract for 1,000 mules, I think, at 22*l.*

2955. But before they offered that contract, what was the price to which the Government allowed them to go for the mules?—They were not to exceed 30*l.*

2956. Had they a commission besides that?—They had a commission of from 8*l.* to 9*l.* on each animal.

2957. You, I think, were strictly confined to 22*l.*?—Yes.

2958. What were your duties with regard to the mules purchased by the contractors?—My orders were to receive their mules at the port of embarkation, but any that arrived in low condition I had power to reject.

2959. Had you any other orders?—Not with reference to the mules; I was merely to receive them and put them on board ship; but I had the power of rejection of any in low condition and not fit for embarkation.

2960. Did you find that you could buy good mules in that neighbourhood at 22*l.* a head?—The mules that I bought I paid less than 17*l.* for on an average. It was about 16*l.* 17*s.*

2961. And, as a whole, they were a good class of mule?—Yes, I think they were very good. Colonel Kennedy, who was at Alexandria, wrote to the War Office expressing his satisfaction with the mules that I bought at Alicante.

2962. What class of mule were the mules that the contractors bought?—From the very commencement I do not think they were as good as what were bought at Alicante; but after the first two or three lots had been received, they began to fall off very much in quality.

2963. How many came down in a lot?—They varied; they came down in different numbers. For instance, the first lot that came down was 62.

2964. Did you pass all that lot?—The whole of the first lot were passed, I think.

2965. Do you know the price of the first lot?—I cannot exactly state what the price was, but it must have been 22*l.*

2966. And 8*l.* to 9*l.* commission?—Yes; then they came in lots of 63, 167, 48, 62; seven of the 62 that came down were rejected; 92 came down, and there were 26 rejected; 40, with 14 rejected;

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40, 13 rejected; 89, 16 rejected; 14, three rejected; 162, 71 rejected; 38, two rejected; 64, nil rejected.

2967. What price should you think those mules had cost in the interior?—I should think they could not have cost much more than 14*l.* or 15*l.*; I could certainly have bought them at Alicante for that money.

2968. And in the interior we know that as a rule they are cheaper than they are on the coast, is not that so?—I can hardly say whether that is so.

2969. Did you not, after having cast some mules, have some further order from the War Office?—Yes; I got an order, I think, on the 12th October, ordering me to receive the mules which I had refused to take; after that I had other consignments of mules from the interior, which I was obliged to take, though many of them I thought were not fit to embark, but I was obliged to take them on account of the order which I had received.

2970. Do you know why that order was sent to you?—I believe it was owing to a particular view of the contract. The matter was referred to the Solicitor of the War Office, and it was his opinion that by the terms of the contract, I had not the power to reject those mules, although my own reading of the contract was that I had.

2971. Your orders from the Horse Guards were, that you were to reject those mules if they were unfit for service?—Yes; but the orders were from the War Office.

2972. If you had been left to do what you thought right, you would have cast the whole of those mules which were mentioned as being unfit for service, I presume?—Certainly.

2973. Have you heard of the great mortality among the mules when they got out to Abyssinia?—Yes.

2974. In your opinion, did many of these mules die from being unfit for the work which they had to perform?—The mules that I rejected were not sent out, because towards the close of the embarkations, I got the officer at Valentia to come to Alicante, and he, and a veterinary surgeon, who had recently come into harbour, looked over the animals and pronounced that they were not fit to send. I then wrote again to the War Office reporting this opinion, and I received orders not to put them on board ship.

2975. Do you know whether the contractor was paid for them?—I do not think I can answer that question; I think he was paid for them, but I cannot say positively.

2976. According to your opinion then, the contractor could have bought the mules, commission, and all for 20*l.*?—I should say so certainly; I paid for mine 17*l.*, but I think that if I had had to buy in larger numbers, I should have had to pay more for them, because I took a great deal of trouble in bargaining for each animal.

2977. What do you think was the value of the mules that you rejected?—I should not think they were worth more than 7*l.* or 8*l.*

2978. And they cost the country 30*l.*, did they not?—Yes, with the commission that the contractor received.

2979. Were there many mules purchased at Gibraltar?—I think from what I heard, that they bought 1,300 there, or thereabouts, but I am merely speaking from hearsay.

2980. Did that raise the price of the other mules?—The prices paid at Gibraltar, when I

first went to Spain, were very large, and it had the effect of raising the prices throughout the whole of Spain. I wrote or telegraphed (I forget which) to the War Office stating this, and orders were sent to Gibraltar not to pay so much.

2981. You were associated with a commissariat officer and a veterinary surgeon, were you not?—Yes.

2982. Did you consider yourself the senior?—I did.

2983. And was that carried out to the end, or was there any order with regard to the commissariat officer at any time superseding you or the other officers sent out to buy mules?—No, nothing that I am aware of; we never had any dispute, and, therefore, no question ever arose. We always got on very well together.

2984. How many mules did you embark?—I embarked 1,405.

2985. In how many ships?—They were embarked in seven ships.

2986. What ships were they?—The first ships that came out were the “*Venetia*,” the “*Empress*,” the “*Commodouros*,” and the “*Bolivar*.” The “*Bolivar*” held 131; the “*Commodouros*” 170; the “*Empress*” 112, and the “*Venetia*” 114.

2987. How were they fitted up?—They were fitted up very well indeed.

2988. Were they fitted up more for horses than for mules?—The only fault in the fittings was that they were a little too large. They were of the same nature and dimensions as those employed for taking horses to the Crimea, and so some of the smaller mules got down in the stalls and were injured.

2989. Were any French vessels employed in that service?—We had two French vessels, the “*Touraine*” and the “*Bretagne*.”

2990. How were they fitted up?—With a series of pens, five animals in each pen.

2991. Was not it found that the pens answered the purpose much better than the stalls?—I believe that was the opinion, but I certainly myself think that had I been sending any animals that I cared about, I should have preferred sending them by steamers such as the “*Empress*” and the “*Venetia*.” I think if the stalls had been a little smaller they would have answered admirably.

2992. But the other was the most economical, was it not?—The other was the most economical. The two French vessels were very well ventilated and very clean, and the men on board seemed to understand everything that they had to do. They arranged the mules in the pens very fast; in fact, the ships were very well fitted up, and every possible provision made. Then there was a ship called the “*Achilles*,” she was an English vessel. I put 240 mules on board of her, and she then went on to Valentia to receive mules. She came out to Alicante laden with coal, and her fittings were very insufficient; in fact, you could hardly say that there were any proper fittings at all; and, therefore, she was obliged to be delayed several days before she was fit to put to sea.

2993. Was she a line-of-battle ship?—No, she was a large steamer; I cannot remember now who the owners were, and I forget what was paid for her.

2994. Were the War Office well satisfied with what you did with regard to the purchase of mules?—I believe so.

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2995. *Chairman.*]

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2995. *Chairman.*] Do you know who chartered the "Achilles"?—I cannot say; but I think that if I heard the name I should remember it.

2996. Colonel *Barttelot.*] From your experience of what took place during the Abyssinian Expedition with regard to the purchase of mules, what would you think would be the best course in case of any future war of that kind; supposing that we had to purchase mules again for any other expedition, what would you suggest as the best and the cheapest means of doing it?—Supposing that animals had to be bought on a future occasion, I do not think that the system that was pursued in 1867 could be improved on, viz., sending officers to different parts of a country.

2997. You do not think it desirable that it should be done by contract?—No; certainly not. I do not think that it is at all a beneficial thing to employ contractors, from what I saw of it in Spain. I think a country is a great deal more likely to be well served by officers. For instance, the mules bought in Alicante cost only about 17 *l.* each; and in the same way the officer at Valentia, I think, paid 22 *l.* for his mules; and of course in that case the commission was saved.

2998. Do you suppose that the contractor went to the War Office and made out any statement that he was not being properly treated out there with regard to the mules?—Yes, I know he did. He said that his mules had not been fairly treated at Alicante; that they had been improperly fed and exposed unnecessarily to the weather.

2999. And that was perfectly untrue, was it?—Quite so; his mules were treated in just the same way as the mules that were bought by the commission at Alicante; they had exactly the same rations of food, and they stood in the open air as all the other animals did.

3000. And I suppose you thought it rather a curious thing that after it had been sanctioned that you should cast those mules, they were afterwards taken in order to be sent out, although they were not sent out?—From what I could make out, it might be attributed to the wording of the contract, because I certainly was under the impression, from reading the contract, that I had the power of rejecting. The War Office solicitor said that he considered that they ought to be taken.

3001. Then for the future you would suggest that an officer should be sent out in the same way as you were sent, and you think he would purchase at a very much cheaper rate than any contractor would be likely to do?—Decidedly.

3002. You had, I think, nothing further to do with the Expedition than purchasing those mules?—Nothing more.

3003. And after you had done that, then you came home?—I then came home.

3004. Captain *Beaumont.*] Were there any alterations in the orders which you received from the War Office, and the instructions under which you acted?—Not that I remember; none of any consequence. I received printed instructions before leaving England, and some fresh ones were sent me after my arrival in Spain, but I do not remember their affecting the original ones in any important points.

3005. There was no material alteration in the instructions under which you acted?—No.

3006. With reference to the duties that were done by the commissariat officer, are you of opinion that had you been put in direct relation-

ship with the consuls, the consuls might have done the business part?—I do not think it would have answered half as well as the system pursued.

3007. Why not?—The consuls of course have a very great knowledge of the country, but I had not arrived in Alicante half an hour before the consul came to me and said that if I had any intention of making a contract, he hoped that he might have something to do with it; the same desire for participating in the purchase was manifested by consuls elsewhere, and the refore I think it would cause more expense if the consuls were employed.

3008. Then you would base your objection to employing the consuls, as I understand, upon your opinion that they cannot be thoroughly trusted?—I do not say that they cannot be thoroughly trusted, but I certainly heard that the consuls in Spain had made a good deal of money during the Crimean war. I think that a consul, living continually on a spot, may have people whom he prefers to employ. I think it possible that he may have local interests.

3009. That rather, I think, bears the implication that I put upon it: that the consuls are not altogether to be trusted. Assuming that they were to be trusted, and that you might dismiss the possibility of their being interested parties, in an improper sense of the term, do you not think that the business arrangements which it was the duty of the commissariat officer to carry out, might, in that case, have been performed by the consuls?—I do not. I think the Commissariat had a great deal of difficult and complicated work. There were a great many payments to make; there were men to be hired; there was forage to be supplied; there was ground to be hired for forming the camp; there were shoes and nose-bags to be provided, and watering places to be constructed; and I think such work required a man to be an accountant and habituated to affairs of this nature.

3010. In fact you think that it would have been beyond the province of a consul?—I think so, certainly.

3011. You purchased the greater part of the mules, I think, directly, did you not?—I purchased them directly.

3012. Did you enter into contracts?—I entered into no contracts; I purchased them one by one from the owners.

3013. And you did not employ any agent?—No, further than the few men whom I sent into the country to collect the mules.

3014. Do you consider that a better arrangement than making contracts?—I think it depends entirely upon whether you are very much pressed for time or not. It is a longer operation buying in that way, but it is a cheaper one.

3015. Assuming that you had put the purchasing of the mules into the hands of a responsible firm, and given them a per-centage, would you have considered that to be more satisfactory than purchasing by contract?—It would have given very much less trouble, but I think you would not have got the same class of animals for the same money, as by purchasing directly. I think the course that I pursued was the cheapest by far.

3016. I want to get from you the expression of your opinion as to whether, when the article is exceptional, as is the case with mules, it is not ill-advised to enter into a contract at all?—I am certainly

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certainly against a contract; but I think if you want an immediate supply of an article, say mules, you get it sooner by making a contract than by direct purchase.

3017. You think that the worst way would be to employ a contractor; that the next best way would be to get a responsible agent, who, from his knowledge of the country, would be able to do it, and in fact would, under other circumstances, have been a contractor; and that the best way of all, if you have the time and the means at your disposal, is to go into the country and purchase yourself; does that express your view?—It does. The mules that were bought in the interior of Spain, although they were under Messrs. Wetherall's contract, were purchased by an agent.

3018. But I meant an agent employed directly by the Government. In place of giving Messrs. Wetherall the contract, assuming that they were responsible and honest parties, would it not have been better to have given them a certain commission on the purchase money, and let them have acted as agents?—I can hardly say, I am certainly in favour of purchasing direct.

3019. And, generally speaking, you are against contracts where the circumstances are exceptional, and the demand more than is likely to be met in the ordinary circumstances of the market?—Yes.

3020. Mr. Campbell.] I do not exactly understand in what capacity you were sent out; were you sent out to check the execution of the contract by Messrs. Wetherall?—No, I was sent out to purchase mules for the Government, and also to receive those that were bought by Messrs. Wetherall's agent, and to put them on board a ship.

3021. Then was there no danger of your being a competitor with Messrs. Wetherall in the market out there?—You can hardly say that I was a competitor, because he was buying in an entirely different part of Spain from where I was.

3022. But they came down to Alicante, did they not?—Yes; they were bought round Madrid and that part of Spain, several hundred miles from where I was, but they were sent by railway to where they were to be embarked.

3023. But you made considerable purchases yourself at Alicante, did you not?—I bought 512 mules, I think.

3024. How did you purchase those mules?—After I arrived at Alicante, I sent out handbills into the country, and after a few days mules were brought in by their owners, and I bought them one by one. I asked a man what he wanted for his mule, he said so much, and I offered him half.

3025. You dealt personally and directly with the man, without an interpreter or go-between at all?—I dealt personally with them.

3026. Is the consul at Alicante an Englishman or a Spaniard?—An Englishman.

3027. Is he in business there?—He is not in business there; he was in the army originally, and his name is Barry. He has been for years and years in Spain, and he is half a Spaniard.

3028. But I think you said that you thought a consul was not the proper person to manage such things, because of his being resident there, and therefore being possibly interested?—I did say so.

3029. But his residence there, if he was an honest and judicious man, would be rather an advantage from his knowledge of the country and of the people, would it not?—I think it might be so.

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3030. And any person who was of a character and position such as we are apt to suppose consuls are, or ought to be, would be rather a desirable agent, would he not, if he fulfilled the conditions that we presume the representative of Her Majesty's Government ought to fulfil?—Certainly; always provided that he possessed the special knowledge required for the matter in hand.

3031. Sir Patrick O'Brien.] You stated that there was considerable advantage, as you believed, in making individual purchases in Spain yourself personally, and that you got them much cheaper than by means of a contract, and I gathered that you did not require an interpreter; that you spoke the Spanish language?—I can speak Spanish a little.

3032. Sufficient to carry on ordinary contracts for the purchase of mules in the neighbourhood of Alicante?—We had an interpreter at first, and he was partially a clerk. There was a great deal of writing required in making out contracts for forage and horse shoes, and all those sort of things; but after a time he was sent away.

3033. That might be, perhaps, in regard to the preparation of the contracts; but in the ordinary bargaining were you sufficiently acquainted with the language to communicate with the persons from whom you purchased?—Yes; we had enough Spanish between us.

3034. Are you aware whether that was the fact as regards all the officers employed in Spain for the purpose of purchasing mules?—I do not think all of them were able to speak Spanish.

3035. Are you aware of individuals in the Artillery, and other branches of the service, long conversant with Spain, having been quartered at Gibraltar, having applied to the War Office to be appointed on this service, and of their not being appointed, but a junior officer totally ignorant of the language having been appointed to perform the duty by the War Office?—I only heard of one such case.

3036. Was that at Barcelona?—Yes.

3037. Was that where the difference of opinion occurred between the consul and the person sent out by the War Office?—I never heard the particulars, but I heard that there was some difference of opinion there.

3038. Are you able to state how long that officer was at Barcelona, and the number of mules that he was able to purchase for the Government account during the period that he was there?—I could not state the number, but I believe very few were bought at Barcelona.

3039. Would it be inaccurate if I said that he did not buy 25 mules during the months he was there?—I do not believe they bought more than 25, if so many, but they were there a very short time. I believe the commission was recalled. The mules about Barcelona were exceedingly dear; they are all bought up for the Spanish Artillery, and they could not get them there for anything like the price that was laid down by the Government.

3040. Was not it a great advantage to be acquainted with the country, and to have a certain knowledge of the language, in filling the position which you occupied at Alicante?—Certainly.

3041. Is it within your knowledge that several officers similarly qualified to yourself had applied to the War Office for these appointments, and had not been appointed?—I know of only one.

3042. And at the same time (without asking any names) you are aware that persons not so qualified

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qualified were appointed by the War Office to fill those positions?—I only know of this one case.

3043. Mr. *Eastwick*.] Were those agents that the Messrs. Wetherall employed, Englishmen, or Spaniards, or what?—There was only one agent, and he was, I believe, half a Portuguese. He spoke Spanish quite like a native, and he spoke English very well. I should have said he was more a foreigner than an Englishman; certainly he looked one, and he had relations in Spain.

3044. Was the commission a sum per head, or was it a per-centage on the price?—The commission was a sum per head; 9 *l.* for the first 500 bought; 8 *l.* 10 *s.* for the second 500, and 8 *l.* for all bought beyond 1,000.

3045. Out of that commission of course went the expenses of the agent; his living there, and so on?—I cannot tell.

3046. At all events, your expenses and the expenses of the two officers with you must be added to the price of the mules in order to see what they really cost, must they not?—I suppose so.

3047. Have you any idea of what that would be?—I have not made the calculation.

3048. What should you think, with the experience which you have had now, that the prices of the mules were really amongst the natives themselves?—That is rather a hard question, because the prices of mules vary so much according to their quality; for instance, a pair of mules for a carriage at Madrid would cost 200 *l.*

3049. But what was about the average cost for the army?—I should think 20 *l.* is about what they really cost amongst the natives themselves; I should think I bought them very nearly at the same price that the natives would have paid for them.

3050. What would the average price be?—The average price was, I think, 16 *l.* 17 *s.*

3051. But as there were three officers employed there, the cost of your travelling expenses being added to the price of the mules, that would make them, I suppose, rather dearer than the mules that were bought by the contractors, as there would only be the commission and the expense of one agent?—I should not think that even if the expenses of the officers were added to the cost of the mules, it would be as much as the price of the mule with the commission. The mules that we bought, I think, were very good, and the ones that came down from the contractor were inferior. They certainly did not represent the sum of money that they cost.

3052. Colonel *Barttelot*.] I suppose the War Office selected the best officers that they could find, as they thought?—The selection was made by the Horse Guards. The War Office sent for a certain number of officers, and the Horse Guards selected the officers.

3053. And, I presume there were reasons which we need not go into, why they chose the officers whom they did choose, and did not choose those that applied?—I suppose so.

3054. I think you stated that only in one instance was there a case of an officer not having come up to the work?—I did not say that he did not come up to the work. It was merely a question as to whether a better might have been taken.

3055. But there was only one instance of that kind, was there?—Only one in Spain.

3056. And that was at Barcelona?—Yes.

3057. Sir *James Elphinstone*.] And there there were no mules?—There was great difficulty in getting mules, I believe. I believe they are all bought up there for the Spanish Artillery.

3058. Sir *John Hay*.] There was good reason to anticipate mules at Barcelona, from the experience of the Crimean War, was there not?—I believe Barcelona was looked on as a point where a good many would be got.

3059. And as soon as it was discovered that it was no longer a good market, the commission was recalled?—Yes.

3060. *Chairman*.] The price at which you purchased, you say, was under 17 *l.* an animal; was that including delivery at the place of embarkation?—It was at the place of embarkation.

3061. Then that was as compared with 29 *l.* or 30 *l.* which was paid to Messrs. Wetherall, under their contract?—Yes.

3062. Was there not a veterinary surgeon sent out with Messrs. Wetherall to pass the mules?—There was.

3063. Then the mules which you found it your duty to cast had been previously passed by that veterinary surgeon, had they not?—They had been.

3064. Did you come in contact with him?—Yes; he came down on one or two occasions to Alicante to see the condition in which they were, and to endeavour to find out what was the cause of their arriving in such bad condition.

3065. Did he, on inspecting them at the place of embarkation, hold to his original opinion, or did he concur in your rejection?—I hardly know what opinion he came to on the subject, because he did not look at them in company with me. It was the same day on which the board saw them that he inspected them.

3066. The board confirmed your rejection of the animals that he had previously passed?—The board confirmed my rejection.

3067. Would the conveyance from the place of purchase where he passed them to where you inspected them, account for any deterioration of condition?—Certainly, as regards the second or third lots that came down. I was told by the muleteers who came down with them that they had been 48 hours in the train without food or water.

3068. That would not permanently affect their condition, would it?—No; but that was one of the reasons mentioned by those muleteers for their looking so bad.

3069. In point of fact, they would not be the worse for that after rest and food, would they?—No; they ought to recover very shortly, certainly.

3070. Who was that veterinary surgeon?—Veterinary Surgeon Thacker.

3071. You were not the officer sent out to Spain specially to inquire and report to the War Office upon this contract, were you?—No.

3072. You stated that the consul at Alicante expressed an expectation that you would do nothing without him; did he interpose in any way?—When I arrived in Alicante the consul called upon me and took me to see some ground that he was rather anxious we should hire for the encamping of the animals that we were going to buy. I saw it, and I gave him an undecided answer. I told him I could not make up my mind as to whether it would do or not. After that I saw some ground which I thought would do

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do much better; it was where the bull fights used to take place; it was much more secure, and altogether better than what he proposed, and we then hired this place and some ground adjoining it; and from that day the consul held aloof from the commission. I do not say that he in any way thwarted us, but he gave very little assistance to the commission; and towards the end of the business it came out that he had said that we had compromised him in the matter of the ground that he had shown us.

3073. Did you put any interpretation upon that?—The interpretation I put upon it was, that he had promised somebody that we would take the ground.

3074. You do not know whether he was personally interested in your occupying it?—I heard that he had something to do with it, but it was mere hearsay.

3075. You did not feel that he crossed you or thwarted you in your operations?—No, he merely held aloof. He was quite neutral.

3076. If the resident consul there, or anywhere, would act with fidelity to British interests in purchases of this nature, would not his knowledge of the country, his knowledge of the supplies obtainable, and of the persons from whom those supplies were obtainable, be all circumstances enabling him to purchase more cheaply than any stranger sent out directly from England for the purpose?—I should say certainly it would. A man who knows the country, and is a resident, must have great advantages over a person coming out who does not know the country.

3077. And the one thing that would make you hesitate in employing that agency would be the fear of his being interested otherwise than merely as the agent of the British Government?—I think that the Government would be much better served by sending an officer out, because I think he would have more energy, and would take more trouble about it.

3078. Sir John Hay.] A military officer?—Yes.

3079. *Chairman.*] Does not that rather conflict with your answer just now, that the best agency would be the consular agency?—I think in some respects it would be the best, inasmuch as he would have the advantage of knowing the country; but I think, from my knowledge of the service, that officers when they are sent on this kind of expedition, always work to the utmost of their energy, and do the best they can; and it is a thing you may rely on.

3080. And if the consuls worked in the same way, and with the same spirit, the result then, you think, would be more satisfactory, from their knowledge of the country?—Yes, supposing them to possess the knowledge requisite for the matter in hand, such as officers selected would have.

3081. What you say of consuls would apply, perhaps, still more emphatically, would it not, to resident merchants, instructed to buy upon commission, and who would buy more satisfactorily still, probably, than the consuls who were not merchants; all the conditions of character, of course, being equal?—Yes.

3082. The "Venetian" steamer came from England, did she not?—Yes.

3083. You did not provide for the feed of the animals going by the French boats, did you, on the passage from Alicante to Alexandria?—No, I think the forage was provided by the parties

who took up the vessels; the attendants and the water for the animals were all on board.

3084. Was the forage, and the attendance, and the water found to be a very costly item in transmitting the animals by the English vessels?—That was a question which came more within the cognisance of the commissariat officer than of myself.

3085. Can you inform the Committee what they cost per head for feeding and tending to Alexandria?—I could not.

3086. The cost of those mules of Messrs. Wetherall's was nearly 30*l.* a head, was it not?—Yes.

3087. Are you aware that the cost of conveyance by the "Venetia," for instance, was 28*l.* 10*s.* per animal?—No, I know nothing about the prices of the vessel.

3088. You could not calculate the cost of their keep and agency from Spain to Suez?—I could not with anything that I have at present in my possession.

3089. Then I need not ask you what would be your estimate of the cost of one of those animals on the shore of Abyssinia?—I suppose it must have been more than double the original cost. An animal that originally cost 30*l.*, I suppose, by the time he got to Suez would have cost the country about 60*l.*

3090. You will see at once that it would be more than double when the freight was 28*l.* 10*s.*?—Yes.

3091. What became of those animals that were rejected by you, and by the board who sat after you rejected them?—They were sold.

3092. Do you know what they were sold for?—I think they sold for nearly 5*l.* a-piece.

3093. How many were rejected and sold in that way?—I think there were 111 to 114.

3094. Then the British Government would lose 25*l.* an animal upon all that number, would they not?—Certainly.

3095. That would amount to a loss of about 3,000*l.*, would it not?—Yes.

3096. You had nothing to do with the consul at Barcelona, had you?—Nothing whatever.

3097. Mr. Eastwick.] Would not an artillery officer, with his knowledge of accounts, and having nothing else to do, have a great advantage over a consul who must be supposed to have some other avocations, and who, perhaps, generally speaking, would know nothing about animals at all?—I should say so, certainly.

3098. Would not that apply also to merchants?—Yes, I think an officer would be more likely to know the kind of animal that was wanted, and he would have the whole of his time to devote to the matter.

3099. *Chairman.*] You do not know of your own knowledge what the War Office limit of price to Messrs. Wetherall was?—Yes, I was supplied with the terms of the contract.

3100. But the contract did not define any price whatever, did it?—I think the terms of the contract were, that he was not to exceed 30*l.* He was to proceed to Spain and to purchase as economically as possible, not exceeding 30*l.*

3101. So that was to be added to the commission, was it not?—Yes; upon every animal purchased.

3102. So that the animals might have cost, even at the port of embarkation, 39*l.* a head, might they not?—Certainly.

Mr. ARTHUR JOHN OTWAY, a Member of the House ; Examined.

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3103. Sir *John Hay*.] SOME questions have been asked on the subject of the service rendered by the consular body in the Mediterranean in the year 1867, to the War Office authorities, who were employed for the purchase of mules for the Abyssinian Expedition. It has been stated that 7,000 mules were required to be purchased by certain officers at various places for shipment to Suez; and that they were required to be purchased within a given time; that the consular authorities, consuls, and vice consuls were requested to give their assistance; and that to stimulate them to assist the officers in making those purchases it was guaranteed to them that they should receive 5 per cent. on the purchase of those animals. Do you conceive that that was a payment in excess of the value of the special service to be rendered by those authorities upon that occasion?—The amount of payment would of course depend upon the number of mules purchased; and there is no doubt that in two cases the consuls who made those purchases did receive very large payments. It amounted to a very large sum in the case of Consul Skene, and the vice consul at Cyprus; but I must say that it struck those who were then in the Foreign Office as being so large that inquiries were made of the War Office why this sum of money was paid; and we were informed by a War Office letter, which I have now in my hand, that Consul Skene had incurred certain expenses, and had rendered good service, and that it was considered proper to repay him by a commission of 5 per cent., which had been promised, as the honourable and gallant Baronet states, to those officers. The fact is that, in those two cases the consular officers made very large purchases, and no doubt they were fortunate in obtaining a large sum; but if the purchases had not been numerous, I think that gentlemen will hardly say that a payment of 5 per cent. to a consular officer, who is not overpaid as it is, considering the expenses to which he may be put, and the certain amount of risk and additional trouble, if the purchase is not a large one, would be an excessive payment. In those two cases, as I said before, the purchases were large, and therefore the sums paid to the consuls were also very large. Consul Skene, I think, received 605 *l.*, and the vice consul at Cyprus received 810 *l.*

3104. But as the number of mules was a fixed quantity, and 5 per cent. upon their purchase was also probably a fixed quantity, was it not a stimulus to each individual consul to endeavour to do his best; and would it not be exactly the same in the view of the Government whether it was paid to an individual who gained a prize for a successful exertion, or whether it was distributed over a larger number of persons who had succeeded in giving similar assistance for that purpose?—Unquestionably the amount would be the same, whether paid to one, or, as the honourable Baronet says, spread over several persons.

3105. Then looking at it as a prize or reward for greater exertions, when greater exertions were demanded, would you feel that those consuls have been over-rewarded?—In the two particular cases to which I have alluded, I think they got a very liberal reward; but I entirely agree with what I take it the honourable Member means to imply by his question, namely, that

by promising a fixed reward of this kind to the consular officers, you gave them a great stimulus to carry immediately and beneficially into effect that which the Government desired, namely, the rapid acquisition of mules.

3106. Without adding anything to the charge to the Crown?—Without adding anything to the charge to the Crown beyond the 5 per cent.

3107. Without adding anything to the charge to the Crown, granting that 5 per cent. was to be paid for the mules?—Yes.

3108. Are the vice consuls all salaried officers?—No; I should say that most of them are unsalaried officers.

3109. And therefore any extraordinary exertion beyond the ordinary work of a vice consul for which he is remunerated by the honour of hoisting the English flag, ought to be paid for by the country, ought it not?—I think so, in the case of an unsalaried officer unquestionably. My own opinion is, that where an officer receives a salary from the Government, all his time and faculties ought to be at the disposal of the Government; but any extra expense which may be put upon them, I think that the Government should always defray. In the case of a vice consul who is an unsalaried officer, when he accepted that office, it was under certain conditions, of which he was then cognizant; if you put on him any additional labour of any kind, I should say that he is fairly entitled to look for remuneration, and of course all expenses to which he is put by the Government should be defrayed by it.

3110. You have been so good as to answer the Committee on the subject of certain consuls who have been well paid for doing their duty well; but certain evidence has been given with reference to a slackness of exertion on the part of certain consuls, especially, I think, with regard to a consul at Barcelona. Are you able to give any information upon that subject?—I am sorry to say that I am not able to give any information upon that. I may mention that I attended the Committee out of respect to the summons which I received from the Chairman; but, as the Committee are aware, all those matters took place when I was not in office, and the current business of the Foreign Office is quite sufficient to occupy one's time without going into matters which have passed by; but Mr. Murray is in the room, who was Assistant Under-Secretary at the time, and who was principally engaged in the conduct of this business; and I have taken the liberty of asking him to attend here to-day, thinking that the Committee might like to examine him on all those points, with which he is thoroughly acquainted.

3111. Mr. *Seely*.] I think you stated that where a consul was paid by a salary, you thought that he ought to give his entire services to the Government, and do whatever they required?—I hold that as a general rule.

3112. But may not many consuls have a fixed salary, and yet may it not be understood that they have only for that fixed salary to perform certain duties?—That may be understood; but I still retain my opinion, which is, that the Government have the right, in the case of any person in their employment, to all his time and faculties when he is their paid officer. It is for them to consider (and it is a point on which I think Govern-

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ments are generally disposed to act liberally: we are accused of acting too liberally in that way in the Foreign Office, if they impose additional labour, and tax a man's faculties more than he had reason to expect when he accepted that office, whether they should give additional remuneration for that circumstance. It is well known to honourable Members that additional remuneration is occasionally given to officers of departments of the Government for special work.

3113. *Chairman.*] Was the allowance of 5 per cent. given by the War Office, or by the Foreign Office?—Entirely by the War Office; the Foreign Office had nothing whatever to do with the matter.

3114. How do you explain the fact of the War Office intervening to pay the servants of the Foreign Office?—They proposed to us (and the gallant admiral just now prefaced his question by allusions to the fact) that consular officers should be employed to assist officers who were sent out by the Government in procuring those mules, and the question of commission came before the Foreign Office in 1868, but we had nothing at all to do with fixing it. We inquired at the War Office, and asked for information on the subject, and they told us that a commission was the usual thing. The only words were, as it was given to me in a Memorandum, that it was well-earned.

3115. I do not know whether the honourable and gallant gentleman has the facts rightly or not; it was not a guarantee of 5 per cent., but a permission to the purchasing officers to allow a commission not exceeding 5 per cent.; were those instructions issued by the War Office, without reference to the Foreign Office, in 1867?—Upon that point I am unable to speak. Mr. Murray, I have no doubt, will inform you upon that subject.

3116. You have stated, have you not, that in your opinion consuls and vice consuls paid by fees should be paid for extra service?—I beg your pardon; I said that under certain circumstances I thought they should be paid for extra service, but that, as a rule, I thought that their entire services were at the disposal of the Government.

3117. If they were paid by fees, do you think they might properly be paid extra pay for extra services?—I am not aware that the word "fees" was introduced. I wished to draw a distinction between salaried consuls and unsalaried consular officers, but not from any peculiar mode of payment. No doubt there are consuls paid, as the honourable Chairman says, some by fees and some by fixed salaries.

3118. You are clear that in all cases where the salary was fixed, the salary should cover such services as the Government asked them to perform?—Yes, subject to consideration by the Government, to which I have before alluded.

3119. Is Consul Skene a salaried officer?—Consul Skene is a salaried officer.

3120. Was the 605 £. at the rate of 5 per cent. commission?—That was, I conclude, at the rate of 5 per cent. commission.

3121. Was that allowed by the purchasing officer?—It went through whatever department it was necessary to go through before he obtained it. If it had to be sanctioned by the purchasing officer, I conclude that it was sanctioned by him.

3122. Do you know what services he rendered?—He purchased a number of mules, which entitled him to that amount of per-centage.

3123. Do you know the time and labour which he spent over it?—No, I cannot say that I do exactly; but I see that it is stated in the War Office letter to us, that Consul Skene did good service, and that he incurred expense.

3124. How much was his expense, or money out of pocket, and how much was his commission, you do not know?—No.

3125. What is his salary?—About 500 £ a year.

3126. Then for the service that he rendered during the purchasing period, be it short or long, he received 105 £., less money out of pocket, more than one year's consular salary?—Yes, that is correctly stated.

3127. The consul at Cyprus also, I think, is a salaried officer?—I think that he has a small salary of about 250 £. He is a vice consul.

3128. You are aware, of course, that he received 810 £.?—Yes.

3129. Do you know the extent of service which he rendered, or the time he was occupied?—No; I conclude that he must have purchased the number of mules which entitled him to the per-centage which was allowed for the purchase.

3130. Are you not aware that he did not purchase any mules at all, but that they were purchased by the purchasing officer direct from a resident in Cyprus?—No; I should conceive that under those circumstances he had not entitled himself to the 5 per cent. commission.

3131. Are you aware that, from the time the purchasing officer landed until the animals were shipped, not more than three weeks elapsed?—No; those are all circumstances of which I have no knowledge whatever.

3132. That being true, it will follow, will it not, that, without being a purchasing officer at all, and merely on account of the intercourse which the purchasing officer had with him, which did not extend over a period of more than three weeks, he received 810 £., or more than three years' consular salary?—It would follow, as the honourable Chairman observes; but I see that it would not be in conformity with the War Office letter that we had on the subject, which says, "I am to take this opportunity of informing you that 815 £. 6 s. was paid to Her Majesty's Consul in Cyprus for similar services" (that is to say, services similar to those rendered by Consul Skene) "rendered to the War Office agent, Major Shervington, for the purchase and collection of 810 mules in that island;" and this letter is signed "Edward Lugard."

3133. It might follow from that letter that the services rendered by Consul Skene were no more than those rendered by the vice consul at Cyprus, might it not?—Except that you have General Lugard's statement that it was paid for the purchase and collection of 810 mules in that island. Of course I do not presume to give any opinion upon the matter, but we did inquire how this sum of money came to be paid. It struck us as being a very large sum to pay a consular officer, and this was the information given to us.

3134. Assuming that the purchasing officer, Major Shervington, purchased directly from a resident in Cyprus, and that the whole transaction was over in three weeks, would you give me your opinion as to the pay of 810 £., or upwards of three years' salary, for a service which could have been rendered in that time?—I unhesitatingly

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tingly say that if a consular officer, or any other officer, did not do the duty to which a certain payment was assigned, he could not be entitled to that payment.

3135. Have you any document in your department which defines the duty which is expected for the payment?—The purchase and collection of mules we understood was the duty, so we were informed by the War Department; but I mentioned before, that the action of the Foreign Office was very simple in this matter. It consisted simply in carrying out instructions from the War Department.

3136. The authority on the point would be General Lugard, I apprehend?—I should think so; because it is clear, as I mentioned before, that we wrote to the War Department, and we got from Sir Edward Lugard this answer in reply, in which he says that 815 l. 6 s. was paid to Her Majesty's consul in Cyprus, under circumstances not at all similar to those which the honourable Chairman suggests; but for services rendered to the War Office agent, Major Shervington, in the purchase and collection of 810 mules in that island.

3137. Are you aware what was paid to Mr. Rogers at Damascus?—No; I conclude that he was paid the 5 per cent. commission on the number of mules which he purchased. Anything paid in excess would be an improper payment, of course.

3138. But I understand that the Foreign Office was not consulted as to the propriety of paying a commission at all before the authority was given to the purchasing officers to pay such a commission as they thought expedient, limiting the amount to 5 per cent.?—We were not consulted on that amount at all. Our communications with the War Office commenced by a request on their part that we should issue instructions to consuls at various places to report upon the power of procuring mules, and the commission was fixed by the War Department.

3139. Do you know anything of the behaviour of the consul at Barcelona in connection with this matter?—No; I know that a difference of opinion existed between him and the officer sent to purchase mules. Of course to every question there are always two sides. The consul has subsequently been removed from Barcelona, and he is no longer there; he is now at another place.

3140. Is he still in the consular service?—He is still in the consular service.

3141. Is he promoted?—No, he is changed.

3142. Sir Patrick O'Brien.] Did the Foreign Office support him as against the War Office authorities on that occasion?—I would rather you asked Mr. Murray about that, as I am not cognisant of the circumstances. All those circumstances were before I went there, or I should have been better prepared, perhaps, to answer upon points upon which the Committee might wish for information.

3143. Sir James Elphinstone.] Are you aware that two honourable Members of the Committee which sat last Session upon the Abyssinian War proceeded to the ports in the Mediterranean where mules had been procured?—I was not aware that they proceeded to the ports of the Mediterranean; I was aware that they had proceeded upon some travels, as I understood, to make inquiry into this matter, and, naturally, to the ports of the Mediterranean they must have gone.

3144. Did they carry with them any authority from the Foreign Office to authorise them to put consuls and vice consuls under examination?—No; there was no authority of that kind, if I remember rightly. Mr. Candlish applied to me for some letters (he will correct me if I am wrong); but if so, it would be one of those letters which are given to gentlemen of this House whenever they are going abroad, to ask consular officers to give them any facilities.

3145. Was it an open letter of introduction?—It was not of a social character; not what we popularly term a "ticket for soup," but one directing the consular officers to give them any facilities they could.

3146. Are you aware that under that authority those gentlemen assumed an official or demi-official character, and proceeded to place your consuls and vice consuls under examination?—No, I was not aware of that; but I have no doubt that if any Member of Parliament proceeded to interrogate a consul, it would put him in a great state of terror, and he would think that his post was going to be disposed of immediately.

3147. Will you produce to the Committee a copy of the letter which you furnished to those gentlemen?—If it was a letter from the department, I have no doubt that I should be able to do so. We keep a copy of all letters.

Mr. JAMES MURRAY, C.B., F.R.G.S., called in; and Examined.

Mr.  
J. Murray,  
C.B., F.R.G.S.  
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3148. Sir John Hay.] HAVE you heard the questions which have been asked of the Under Secretary of State?—Yes.

3149. Would you kindly give the Committee any information, first of all, as to the arrangements which were made between the War Office and the Foreign Office, with regard to the remuneration of the consuls and vice consuls, for assisting in the purchase of mules for the Abyssinian Expedition in the year 1867?—There was none whatever. We knew nothing of any remuneration to the consuls at the time when we were asked to instruct the consuls to assist the War Office officers who were to be sent out.

3150. When was the promise of a 5 per cent. payment to those gentlemen made?—We knew nothing of it, until we heard from the War Office,

in answer to a question which we put to them about Consul Skene of Aleppo, with regard to the large reimbursement, as we considered it.

3151. Had it been a practice ever before adopted to remunerate consuls for giving such assistance to the public service?—I cannot call to mind now; but I recollect, certainly, cases in which consuls have been remunerated for what might be called special service.

3152. It was not unprecedented?—Not at all.

3153. And looking to the great haste which was required, and the exceptional character of the duty, do you conceive that 5 per cent. was a very large remuneration?—Not in the case of Consul Skene, although we thought so at the time. The War Office explanation gave us to understand

understand that he had taken a very great deal of trouble, and had incurred very heavy responsibility; and that therefore the sum given to him was not considered by the War Office to have been improperly paid. We had nothing to do with it, nor could we express any opinion upon it.

3154. And the fact that he had been engaged only three weeks upon that duty would show, would it not, that he had really hastened the public service, and therefore deserved a higher reward?—Yes. Consul Skene is a man very well versed in animals, and his skill and his knowledge how to get them are very great. I should think that he was perhaps the best man in the whole of Syria to do it. I believe that he has the best breed of horses there.

3155. Those two consuls, the consul at Aleppo and the vice-consul at Cyprus appear to have earned their reward?—Of Cyprus, we know nothing whatever. All we know is that the War Office told us that he had received a commission, but why he should have got it we did not know.

3156. Except so far as Sir Edward Lugard's letter informed you?—That is all.

3157. That is an official letter from the War Office, stating that he purchased 810 mules, is it not?—Yes. That stated that he purchased 810 mules, and that he received a commission upon them.

3158. Owing to a report of Major Shervington, the officer of the War Office, who had been there to seek his assistance in that purchase?—Precisely.

3159. There have been some questions also with regard to some consuls who do not seem to have given the same assistance as the other officers; and the consul at Barcelona, I think, has been specially alluded to in the evidence before this Committee. At Question 2652 Sir William Power is asked: "In some cases you stated to the Committee that you found the consuls working adversely to the interests of the Government?"—A. Yes. Q. There was a case of that kind in Barcelona, I believe?—A. Yes, a very flagrant case." Can you give the Committee any information with regard to the flagrant case of the Barcelona consul?—There was a difference of opinion between the consul and the War Office officer. The consul complained bitterly of the conduct of the War Office officer. He alleged that he had done what he had been requested to do. On the part of the War Office, the officer said he had not. It was a matter which it was impossible for the Foreign Office to go into. We merely passed the correspondence to the War Office, not being able to judge in the least which side was in the right. The opinions remained at variance throughout the whole correspondence, and so it ended. It is a question, in point of fact, of crediting one man or the other. The Foreign Office, of course, could not enter into the question, but left it entirely to the War Office, who said that, by the report of their officer, the consul was wrong. The consul maintained that he was not, and even asked that an apology should be made for the terms used to him. With that the Foreign Office, of course, declined to comply, saying that that was a matter they did not enter into.

3160. Then the Foreign Office, who are the masters of this gentleman, Mr. Swift, do not consider it a very flagrant case?—The Foreign Office could not decide between the two parties.

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3161. Sir *Patrick O'Brien*.] Did they not actually support their officer against Sir John Pakington?—No. According to my recollection (not having the papers before me), we merely referred it to the War Office.

3162. Sir *John Hay*.] And at present Mr. Swift does not stand discredited at the Foreign Office?—Not specially on that account.

3163. Is he still employed?—He is still employed.

3164. Sir *Patrick O'Brien*.] You say that he is not specially discredited; he is not at all discredited, I presume?—Not on that account.

3165. Sir *John Hay*.] Then that would rather go, would it not, to show that, so far as the Foreign Office are concerned, they do not conceive the case of Mr. Swift to be a very flagrant one?—They felt that they could not judge; they were unable to form any judgment upon a matter which did not relate to Foreign Office affairs in the least, and in which there was a decided difference of opinion between the War Office officer and the consul. All we did was to communicate to him the statement of the War Office.

3166. Mr. *Seely*.] What was the "heavy responsibility" which Mr. Skene incurred?—That we do not know. It was only the statement of the War Office that he incurred such a responsibility.

3167. Mr. *Charles Turner*.] It might be pecuniary, I suppose?—It might be pecuniary.

3168. He might make himself responsible for the value of the mules, might he not?—He might make himself responsible; but we have not the means of knowing.

3169. Sir *Patrick O'Brien*.] Arising out of the correspondence in connection with the dispute between the War Office authorities and Mr. Swift, is there, so to speak, any black mark, or any reflection, at the Foreign Office as against Mr. Swift as an officer of the Foreign Office?—No.

3170. Mr. *Charles Turner*.] I suppose you do not take upon yourself to decide whether the official of the War Office, or your own official, behaved properly?—Certainly not.

3171. And of course you would put no black mark against a man without knowing that he had behaved ill?—Of course not; we do not consider ourselves competent to decide in a case of which we know nothing.

3172. *Chairman*.] I have not heard it mentioned that Mr. Skene was employed only three weeks, except by the honourable Baronet; have you any knowledge upon that point?—None whatever. I do not know how long he was employed. There might be some reference to it in the papers, but I have no recollection of it.

3173. Mr. *Charles Turner*.] But he did buy 800 mules, did he not?—He did buy mules, but how many I do not recollect.

3174. *Chairman*.] You were not called upon to judge as to the propriety of the 810*l.* to the Cyprus consul, or the 615*l.* to the Aleppo consul?—No, we had no means of doing so.

3175. You merely acquiesced?—We did not even do that; it was the decision of the War Office.

3176. Were you asked whether you acquiesced or not?—We merely asked why the sum was given, considering it rather a large sum.

3177. You paid fees to a great many consuls, did you not?—That is to say, fees are allowed by Act of Parliament.

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3178. The

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3178. The consuls and vice-consuls in Egypt, and the consul general in Egypt got paid for services in connection with this Expedition, did they not?—I think the agent, and consul general was allowed money for clerk hire.

3179. That is not given him by Act of Parliament, is it?—No; that is not fees.

3180. Can we have a return of all sums paid to the civil officers of the Foreign Office on account of their services in connection with the Abyssinian Expedition?—I do not know that the Foreign Office would have the means of supplying it; but the Treasury would have the means of doing so, because the Foreign Office can pay nothing. It is only the Treasury that authorises payments.

3181. Then you were not consulted, and had no discretion as to any of those payments?—We always consult the Treasury if a requisition is made to us by a consul for money.

3182. The course would be this, that the War Office requested payment?—Not in the case of such a thing as clerk hire. The War Office would probably have nothing to do with that.

3183. Do you know that payments were made for clerk hire in Egypt?—There was a case of Colonel Stanton applying for remuneration for extra labour, and he did receive some.

3184. Sir John Hay.] As a matter of fact, those payments were made upon the recommendations of the War Office, but by the authority of the India Office; was that so?—Yes; but I think they would rest with the Treasury.

3185. But under the authority of the Secretary of State for India?—Yes.

3186. Chairman.] You apprehend that there will be no difficulty in getting a return of those payments, the persons to whom they were made, and the amounts paid to each?—I should think not.

3187. Where is Mr. Swift now consul?—He is now consul at Brest.

3188. Is that a better appointment than Barcelona?—No, I think Barcelona was 700*l.* a year, and I think Brest is 550*l.*

3189. Did he go there of his own choice?—Yes.

3190. Can you explain how he has been promoted downwards?—He asked to be removed from Barcelona, because Barcelona did not suit him, and Brest was nearer home. In fact he was permitted to exchange with a gentleman who was appointed to Brest.

3191. Then he gets Brest on his own application?—Yes.

Sir WILLIAM JAMES TYRONE POWER, K.C.B., called in; and further Examined.

Sir W. J. T.  
Power, K.C.B.

3192. Chairman.] HAVE you anything to say with regard to the case of the Barcelona consul?—As regards the nature of the evidence, the Barcelona consul made certain statements upon which claims might have been founded for alleged collections of mules, which we sent our officers immediately back to verify, and which were not verified. Of those large collections I think only 14 were produced.

3193. Do you remember the allegations which he put forward as to the number purchased?—I do not remember the number specifically; but I could furnish that on the next occasion on which I come here.

3194. And what amount of money they represent, and what on inquiry you find to be the facts?—Yes.

3195. Sir Patrick O'Brien.] Was there any arrangement made, preliminary to sending out purchasers for mules in Europe, to ascertain the qualifications of the military officers?—An application was made to the Horse Guards to appoint such officers as they could recommend, I presume, for they nominated them. The War Office had nothing to do with the nomination of those officers.

3196. Then, in short, the War Office did not indicate to the Horse Guards the propriety of those gentlemen having special qualifications, either as regards language or knowledge of mules and horses?—Yes, it was essential that they should have knowledge of mules or horses, but I do not think that language was one of the qualifications which could be commanded at such short notice.

3197. Or knowledge of the country?—No.

3198. As a matter of fact, do you know that they were appointed irrespectively of such qualifications?—I fancy that they must have been appointed without any reference to such qualifications; the sole qualification was their capacity for judging of horses; they were either cavalry, artillery, or Military Train officers.

3199. In all cases?—There was one case of an officer of the Royal Engineers.

3200. Was a subaltern officer appointed, not belonging to either of those corps, and not being acquainted with any of the languages of the district, either Italian or Spanish, which I believe were the two languages necessary?—I do not at this moment remember.

3201. Do you happen to know whether the appointments were made by the military secretary?—I do not know by whom they were made at the Horse Guards; the officers selected were ordered by the Horse Guards to report themselves to the War Office, and on reporting themselves they were appointed; this I know rather by hearsay than by direct knowledge, because I was not at the War Office when the preliminary arrangements were made; I was engaged in the business subsequently, and therefore I have only a general knowledge of what took place before.

3202. And you are not aware whether any officer applied to the Horse Guards to be appointed for this work?—I know that several applied, but the arrangements had already been made under great pressure.

3203-9. In short, anything upon this subject could be better obtained either from Lord Longford or from Colonel Foster than from you?—Yes.

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*Friday, 13th May 1870.*

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## MEMBERS PRESENT :

Colonel Barttelot.  
Mr. Baxter.  
Captain Beaumont.  
Mr. Campbell.  
Mr. Candlish.  
Mr. Eastwick.

Lord Elcho.  
Sir James Elphinstone.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Mundella.  
Mr. Seely.  
Mr. Charles Turner.

JOHN CANDLISH, ESQ., IN THE CHAIR.

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Captain GEORGE STEWART, called in; and Examined.

3210. *Chairman.*] You are the Captain of the "British Princess," belonging to Mr. Davis, a Member of this House, are you not?—I am.

3211. What is her tonnage?—1,401½ tons.

3212. Were you chartered for the Abyssinian Expedition, at Bombay?—Yes, for four months.

3213. And you were loaded with stores at Bombay for Annesley Bay?—For Aden and Annesley Bay.

3214. It was in the month of March that you were chartered, was it not?—On the 10th of March I was chartered.

3215. You arrived at Aden, on your way to Annesley Bay, on the 29th of April 1868, did you not?—On the 29th of April 1868.

3216. On arriving at Aden, what did you do?—I went on shore, and reported to the Government that my ship had arrived with stores; the Governor told me to call every day for orders.

3217. And you did so, until when?—I called every day till the 26th of May; on May the 26th I got orders to proceed, under sail, to Bombay.

3218. What were your orders then?—He wrote on a piece of paper for me to proceed to Bombay.

3219. Your cargo was never touched at Aden, was it?—Never touched.

3220. What was your cargo?—There were, I think, some 500 or 600 bales of hay; all the rest was a kind of peas, rice, flour, ghee, and dhol.

3221. Was it mainly forage?—It was a kind of stuff just fit for native troops, most of it, except the flour; the ghee is a kind of dirty butter.

3222. When did you sail from Aden?—I sailed the moment I got orders.

3223. You lay four weeks in Aden, I think, from the 29th of April to the 26th of May?—Yes; I sailed on the 26th, when I got orders.

3224. When did you arrive at Bombay?—I arrived in Bombay on the 12th of June.

3225. And you were finally discharged on the 28th of July, were you not?—I was discharged 0.46.

on the 28th of July, in four months and nineteen days.

3226. You were rather more than six weeks lying in Bombay, were you not?—About that time.

3227. On arriving at Bombay in June, did you find the fleet of transports returned and returning?—Yes.

3228. And there was a great fleet of ships there, was there not?—A great number came in at the same time.

3229. Had you arrived there a month earlier you would have been before the returned fleet, would you not?—Yes.

3230. And you would have got discharged immediately, would you not?—I should have got discharged quickly.

3231. Do you know when the news of the fall of Magdala reached Aden?—There were rumours of it from the time I first went there, but the Government agent could not tell us if the war was over; he said that he did not hear anything of it, when we asked him; there were rumours that it was partly over, or over, but we did not hear it till the latter end of the time, until we were nearly ready to go.

3232. What was your hire per ton?—Fourteen rupees per ton, per month of 31 days.

3233. How much did that come to per month?—I really do not know exactly the sum, but it was nearly 2,000 £, although not quite 2,000 £.

3234. Mr. *Seely.*] On what terms were you chartered with regard to your discharge?—I was chartered for four months certain employment, and as long as they liked to keep me afterwards they could keep me at the same rate.

3235. Giving you any notice?—They would give me only one day's notice, I believe.

3236. Sir *J. Elphinstone.*] There were a great number of ships at Bombay at that time, were there not?—There were a great number, and they persevered very hard to get lighters. The captain of Marines used to come on board our ship twice a day to get them out; he did all he

Captain  
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he could, but he could not get lighters. The weather was very bad, and it rained all the time we were discharging at Bombay.

3237. Did it rain continually?—It mostly rained constantly.

3238. Was there a very strong wind?—A very strong wind.

3239. And strong tides?—Yes, strong tides.

3240. Were you visited repeatedly by the Superintendent of Marines?—Yes; we had a man on board keeping an account of the cargo, and he had to report if we did not exert ourselves.

3241. Is it your impression that there were lighters and appliances in the harbour to have cleared you faster than they did?—I think not; I think they had everything employed that was in the harbour.

3242. So that you could not possibly have been discharged sooner than you were?—No, not from the time when we arrived.

3243. Sir J. Hay.] And you were kept 19 days over your charter?—Yes.

3244. Sir J. Elphinstone.] Was the harbour full of ships?—The harbour was full of ships.

3245. And were ships daily arriving?—Ships were daily arriving.

3246. And the appliances of the harbour for discharging were limited?—Yes, they were limited. We could not get lighters.

3247. What eventually became of your cargo?—I believe it was sold to some of the natives. It was considerably damaged through the hatches being opened, and through being discharged in the rain.

3248. There were many days, I suppose, if you had been left to yourself, you would not have opened the hatches?—No, if we had been employed by anybody else we should have ruined the cargo.

3249. But the Bombay Government were so anxious to discharge you, that they opened the hatches, and endeavoured to discharge the cargo by every means in their power?—Yes; but I went first and got a guarantee against damage, otherwise I would not have opened the hatches.

3250. Chairman.] Did you make any personal inquiry as to the supply of boats and lighters in Bombay yourself?—I did.

3251. Of the Government agent?—Everyone was complaining about not getting boats; we could not get a boat to bring our stores off for double the former price.

3252. If you had been sent from Aden on your arrival, how would it have been then?—Then we should have had plenty of boats.

3253. You would have been in ample time, would you not then, to have got discharged within the four months?—I am certain that we should.

3254. Sir J. Hay.] But the fall of Magdala was not known at the time when you arrived at Aden?—No.

3255. Nor until some time afterwards?—Not until we were nearly ready to go on shore; the "Royal Saxon" towed up to Aden with engines on board; I do not know what else she had on board.

3256. Chairman.] The fall of Magdala was not known to you?—No.

3257. Sir J. Elphinstone.] Then it could not have been known to the Government, otherwise they would not have sent that ship on to

Abyssinia?—There was a rumour in Aden that it was over, but the Government sent on that vessel to Abyssinia.

3258. In point of fact, the Government had nothing official before them; it was all report?—It was all report.

3259. Sir J. Hay.] I suppose the horses would have required to have been fed whether Magdala was taken or not?—I believe that they would.

3260. Sir J. Elphinstone.] And also the forces?—Yes.

3261. Chairman.] You do not know whether your cargo was required to feed them?—It was what they called "cargo in reserve."

3262. Sir J. Elphinstone.] Your cargo consisted of dhal, ghee, and rice, did it not?—Yes, and a good deal of flour and hay.

3263. Supposing that you had sailed from Aden as soon as you got there, and that you had been ordered back to Bombay, would you not have made a much longer passage across to Bombay?—I would not.

3264. Had you a strong monsoon across?—We had very light winds and calm; we had a long passage. The "Red Jacket," the fastest ship out of Liverpool, a very large ship, was on the same lay as I was, at 14 rupees a ton, and she was lying there nearly all the time I was lying at Aden, and we started together, and I arrived a few hours after her.

3265. You had light winds and calm across the whole way?—We had very strong breezes half the way.

3266. After you got past Cape Fartak, I suppose?—After we had got about half way. The last few days of the passage it blew very hard, and we had a very heavy sea.

3267. You had a very strong monsoon the last three or four days?—Yes.

3268. If you had started a fortnight before, would you have had that strong monsoon?—We should have had adverse winds.

3269. Consequently, you would have made a much longer passage, would you not?—We should have made a much longer passage.

3270. Chairman.] When do you get the south-west monsoons in that sea?—They do not set in up at Aden, I think, up to the latter end of May, but at Bombay they are sometimes in at the latter end of April. Sometimes the winds are very variable about Bombay in the latter end of April.

3271. Sir J. Elphinstone.] But does the monsoon regularly set in in Bombay harbour, as a rule, before the old King's birthday, the 4th of June?—I do not think that it regularly sets in before that time.

3272. Chairman.] Then if you had been there before the 4th of June, you would not have been subject to the inconvenience of the monsoon in discharging?—I think not. The winds were all light foul winds when we were towing up, and when we were coming back we found foul winds after we started, but they were very light.

3273. Sir J. Elphinstone.] Supposing that you had started from Aden as soon as you got there the next day, would you not in all probability have had a much longer passage to Bombay than the passage which you made eventually?—I really think we should have been twice as long.

3274. Chairman.] That would have been a month's passage?—Yes.

3275. Sir

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3275. Sir J. Elphinstone.] So that, in point of fact, you would not have arrived in Bombay much sooner than you did?—Not very much sooner.

3276. Chairman.] You lay a month in Aden, did you not?—Yes.

3277. Then, if you had made a month's passage, you would have been in Bombay by the time you left Aden, would you not?—We should have been in Bombay by the time we left Aden.

3278. Then you would have been 17 days sooner, at all events?—I should have been so much sooner, no doubt.

3279. Then, even if you had been detained as long at Bombay in discharging as you were ultimately, that would have brought you within the four months, would it not?—Two days over the four months.

3280. But you believe that if you had got there on the 1st of June, you would have had a quicker dispatch?—I think so.

3281. And for the reason that the fleets had not come back in force?—For that reason.

3282. You say that the "Red Jacket" lay at Aden with you?—Yes.

3283. Was she there when you went?—She arrived from Bombay after I arrived.

3284. And she sailed with you?—She sailed a long time before me.

3285. But she sailed with you from Aden to Bombay, did she not?—Yes.

3286. She arrived at Aden from Bombay. bound to Annesley Bay?—Yes.

3287. What had she on board?—She had nearly all hay on board; she was a very large ship.

3288. When was she discharged at Bombay?—She commenced discharging when I did.

3289. When was she ultimately out?—She was not out when I was there.

*Tuesday, 17th May 1870.*

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Colonel Barttelot.  
Mr. Baxter.  
Captain Beaumont.  
Mr. Campbell.  
Mr. Candlish.  
Mr. Christopher Denison.  
Mr. Grant Duff.  
Mr. Eastwick.

Lord Elcho.  
Sir James Elphinstone.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Howes.  
Sir Patrick O'Brien.  
Mr. Seely.  
Mr. Charles Turner.

JOHN CANDLISH, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Major General G. J. JAMESON, Major General THOMAS TOWNSEND PEARS, Colonel WILLIAM FREDERICK MARRIOTT, called in; and Examined.

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3290. *Chairman* (to General Pears).] As Chairman of this Committee, I have asked for several returns which Admiral Mends states are obtainable only at the India Office; have they been sent to your department?—There was one return; I do not remember exactly the terms of it regarding the vessels taken up, I think, in Bombay.

3291. One was a return of ships purchased by the Indian and Bombay Governments, distinguishing steamers from sailing vessels?—I am inclined to think that that is included in this return which we presented to Parliament the other day; but we are not very confident as to those returns; we do not think that we have them all complete.

3292. The minute which Admiral Mends attaches to that is: "This is a return which the India Office alone is competent to complete in all its details"?—The returns of the vessels purchased we have not the means of furnishing. We have a return from India, of vessels taken up or chartered, but we have no return of the vessels which were purchased.

3293. What should this Committee do to obtain such a return?—We can refer to India for it by telegraph, and we should have it probably in the course of six weeks.

3294. We were told in India that all accounts, either in the original or copied, had been sent home to England; is that so?—If this information is to be found as a matter of detail in the accounts, it would be passed through the Finance Department to the Treasury, and I should not have seen it all.

3295. I think we were told by Major Chitty, at Bombay, that either the originals or copies of all the accounts had been sent home to England?—Then they would have been passed on to the Treasury, but I have not seen them; they might be able to pick out from those accounts the details regarding the vessels purchased; but I think the simplest plan will be to send to Bombay or Calcutta for them.

3296. Another statement for which I asked was as to coals consumed by steamers engaged by the Bombay and Indian Governments; and the statement is also that this could be obtained more reliably and more fully from the Indian Government; by the Indian Government, Admiral

Mends explained that he means the India Office?—I am afraid that I must refer you to Mr. Secombe, the Financial Secretary, for that; those things would not come under my department.

3297. (To General Jameson.) Do you know that those accounts were received in the India Department?—No; I understood that all the Abyssinian accounts received from India were sent on to the Treasury, and I have never seen them. Mr. Secombe explains this in reply to Questions 753, 754, page 46, of the Committee's Report, 31st July 1869 (Blue Book).

3298. (To General Pears.) I have also asked for ships disabled, the particulars of disablement, and what pay they received during the time of their disablement; can you give that?—I have no means of giving it, and I do not think it will be found in the India Office at all.

3299. Where will it be found?—In India.

3300. But we hear from India that all the accounts are in England?—I think that would hardly come to the India Office clearly enough to satisfy the Committee; there would be considerable details required. I have only heard of one ship being disabled and paid for, and that came under my notice only incidentally.

3301. Do I understand you to say that those facts are not obtainable in England at all?—As far as my department is concerned they certainly are not, and I do not think that they will be found anywhere.

3302. (To Colonel Marriott.) Will you state to the Committee your official position?—I was Secretary to the Government of Bombay in the Military and Marine Department during the time of the Abyssinian Expedition.

3303. Have you any opinion upon the point to which reference has just been made?—Yes; the statement of the ships purchased on account of the Expedition by the Bombay Government, I should have said, would be easily obtainable from accounts sent home, because the purchase of those vessels would be a distinct item of account. I have no doubt whatever, that how much was paid to vessels disabled would not be discoverable from any account sent home, because such questions as to whether they could claim on account of disablement or not would be at once decided there, and the accounts would show nothing of that

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that discussion. (General Pears.) I believe that exactly accords with what I said just now.

3304. Lord Elcho (to Colonel Marriott).] That is to say, that any allowance for disablement would be included in the gross sum that they received?—The account would merely show so many vessels at such a rate; the fact of the question of whether or not they ought to be paid having occurred in one or two instances, would not appear in the accounts.

3305. Chairman.] You had some proceedings or discussions at Bombay as to the expediency of those payments, had you not?—I infer that there have been some, but my knowledge of the matter is this: at an early period of the Expedition Captain Tryon pointed out that the charterparty in use by the Bombay Government did not specifically provide for excluding payment in the case of disablement of the vessel. The Government solicitor advised that the construction which would be legally put upon the terms of the charterparty, though not specific on that point, combined, I think, with traditionary practice, would provide the same security as the specific clause in the English charterparties; and on other grounds it was thought advisable not to change the charterparty unnecessarily. So much I can say with certainty. I have heard in a manner that leaves me in no doubt whatever of the accuracy of it, though I do not speak strictly from official knowledge, that notwithstanding that opinion as regards the ships that were disabled, there has been action directly contrary to that opinion since. How it has happened, I do not know; but I learn that it has been so.

3306. Are you aware that the discussion which took place at Bombay respecting the form of the charterparty resulted in an expression of an opinion on the part of the legal adviser of the Bombay Government, that the charterparty adopted would not enable the owner to sue for payment for the time his ship was disabled?—Yes, Mr. Hearn is the Government solicitor, and his words are: "A ship under the Bombay charterparty is only entitled to freight on production of a certificate from the agent for transports, or other duly authorised officer, that she is afloat, and has, up to that time, well and truly performed the contract, and if the ship is not maintained and kept during the continuance of the contract tight, staunch, strong, well-maintained, fitted and found, she comes within reach of the forfeiture clause." That was in answer to a suggestion of Captain Tryon's, that "The Bombay charterparties do not provide, as the English ones do, for any circumstance that may arise by which a ship may cease to perform the service efficiently, owing to the breakdown of engines, owing to any defect or cause whatsoever."

3307. You are aware, I think (probably reliably enough to give evidence before this Committee), that there were such breakdowns as were there contemplated?—I have heard it on such information as leaves me in no doubt that such have occurred.

3308. Are you aware that, notwithstanding that declaration of opinion, sums have been uniformly paid during the time ships were so disabled?—That also I have heard on information which leaves me in little doubt that it must be true, much surprised as I am at it.

3309. Do you know upon what grounds the Government of Bombay paid those sums?—Not

the slightest. If it be worth while, I may answer that I doubt whether the question was ever formally brought before them; if it were, it must have been done on legal advice.

3310. You do not anticipate, do you, that the sum would be paid, in the teeth of that opinion, without further legal advice?—It would be incredible that it should be; it could not have been.

3311. You therefore infer that legal advice had been given?—I have no doubt that it has been done on further legal advice; but whether that legal advice was specifically brought under the notice of Government, contrasted with the previous advice, I do not know, and I doubt it.

3312. Would the second legal opinion be given by the same legal authority, Mr. Hearn, who gave the first?—Probably; but it is possible that his opinion might have been overruled by the Advocate General. I have no reason to suppose that that was so, only that in important cases the Government solicitor, either of his own accord or at the instance of Government, refers for the Advocate General's opinion.

3313. Now that the facts have come to the knowledge of the Bombay Government, I presume that that Government would regard it as their duty to make a formal inquiry as to how that payment was made?—I cannot doubt it.

3314. By whom would the payment be made?—By the Accountant General, Bombay.

3315. Was there not one executive officer to pay all Abyssinian accounts?—In some cases payments for transports would be made by the Commissariat; in other cases by the Accountant General on certificates of claim, given by the officers of the Marine Department. In the instances under consideration, the payments would be made by the Accountant General.

3316. Lord Elcho.] Do you know to whom such a case would be referred, or before whom it would first come?—I presume that in such a case the captain of the ship would not be able to provide the certificate, which is an essential voucher to his claim; the certificate, if given, would have been given, I believe, by Captain Tryon, or under his authority. I have reason to believe that no such certificate was given; therefore the person whose business it was in the first instance to entertain the claim must have been met by the check of not having the requisite certificate, and he could not have paid without the authority of Government, or at least without a legal opinion to guide him.

3317. But who that person is you cannot say?—I am not certain in this instance.

3318. Mr. Seely.] Who would be able to give the Committee information upon that point?—I think, on another occasion, I shall either be able to answer it myself or to say who will be able to do so.

3319. Chairman (to General Pears).] That has rather led us away from the subject as to which I called you, namely, how it was that we could not get those returns?—I can send to Bombay for any return, and we can get it in six weeks, I think.

3320. From the evidence given, you see the importance of being able to define accurately what sums were paid under the circumstances mentioned; will you undertake without being applied to further, to furnish those figures to the Committee by some means?—Yes, if you will be kind enough to let me have a memorandum. I

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have one that was merely sent to me by Admiral Mends; if you will let the clerk of the Committee send to me what is wanted, I will look into the matter in the Indian Department first, and if we do not find it, I will send to Bombay for the information which is required.

3321. May I ask you what part you took in the preparation of the October estimates?—I took, in fact, no part at all; I was asked by Sir Stafford Northcote if I could prepare an estimate of what would be wanted; he told me that they would have to go to the House for money for a certain number of months, and I said I would do my best, and consult the financial authorities. I found upon consideration, after consulting Mr. Seccombe and General Jameson, that General Jameson was a far more likely man than myself to do it well, and he very considerably undertook it, and so it passed out of my hands; but I gave them any information as to the number of troops which were going which the military department could afford; I gave them the account of troops which were under orders for Abyssinia, and any returns as to the vessels which were taken up.

3322. Do you remember if that number was 12,000 combatants, and a corresponding number of followers?—Yes, it was 12,000; and it was increased afterwards, I think, to 14,000; but every information that I had, they had of course.

3323. You made no estimate of necessary tonnage or necessary supplies?—No; I made the attempt in the first instance, but I found that I had no personal experience of the matter, and General Jameson had, and he very kindly undertook it.

3324. The Committee, a fortnight or three weeks ago, through me, asked the India Office to supply a tabulated statement, showing in contrasting columns the estimate as made, and the sums expended under the subdivision which the estimate showed. I learned to-day that nothing whatever has been done in the preparation of that statement; do you know the reason of the delay?—No; I have heard nothing about it, except in private conversation with General Jameson. It would not come into my hands at all; but I presume that it is a question of payment of expenses. I should think that it is a question for the Imperial Treasury to sanction. I suppose the preparation of a thing of that kind would cost some money.

3325. Then the course would be for the India Office, having an intimation of that kind from this Committee, to apply to the Treasury for their sanction, would it not?—If I might suggest, I should think the proper course, when all the accounts have gone to the Treasury, would be for this Committee to apply to the Treasury..

3326. If the India Office was requested to make some returns, would it not be the duty of the India Office to go to the Treasury and get the necessary sanction?—I really cannot undertake to say what the Secretary of State might do in the finance department, but I have not seen anything of it. I do not know what they have done or what they could do; if it had come to me I should have just done that or else suggested to the Committee to apply to the Treasury. I presume that some communication to the Treasury has been made, but I am not aware of it.

3327. If the India Office found an impediment in the way of preparing the return, on the ground which you have stated, *i. e.*, for want of

money, and could not supply the return until they got the Treasury's sanction, would it not have been a natural thing to have made that reply to an application for the return?—I should think so; but as it is in another department from my own, I do not like to make any statement on the subject.

3328–30. (To Colonel Marriott.) When did you first hear of the Expedition to Abyssinia being contemplated?—In July 1867, I think.

3331. What was the communication which was then made to the Bombay Government?—It was a warning, I think, to consider what would be necessary in the event of the British Government deciding on the Expedition. A telegram from the Secretary of State of July 31st was the first which ordered the Government of Bombay actually to make any preparation.

3332. What were you then instructed to do?—To collect animals.

3333. And to provide supplies?—No; it only authorised us to collect animals.

3334. Were you asked as to the nature and dimensions of the force necessary for the purpose?—Yes, about that time; but not by that particular message of the 31st, to which I have alluded.

3335. Do you know what was the reply which was sent as to the dimensions of the force?—Sir Robert Napier thought that about 12,000 men would be necessary.

3336. Was that Sir Robert Napier's personal opinion, or was it the opinion of the Bombay Government?—It was sent as Sir Robert Napier's opinion, without any official expression of opinion by the Bombay Government, and it was accepted by the Bombay Government.

3337. Was the question considered by the Bombay Government as a Government?—I have reason to know that it was considered in his Excellency the Governor's own mind; but it was not considered in the sense of any formal discussion being recorded on the subject.

3338. Then did no formal discussion of the question take place in the Bombay Council?—None.

3339. That Council constitutes the Government, does it not?—It does.

3340. At the same time, or shortly afterwards, was it known to the Government of Bombay that the Government of India took a different view as to the size of the force?—I cannot speak with certainty as to the time; I think we were only aware of it from the Blue Book.

3341. Was it unknown to the Government of Bombay until they learnt it from the Blue Book?—To the best of my belief, it was.

3342. The opinion expressed by the Government of India was, that a force of 7,500 men would be sufficient; would not that be known to the Government of Bombay?—I believe it was not.

3343. That opinion of the Government of India was conveyed to the Secretary of State for India, was it not?—Yes.

3344. Was it never transmitted to Bombay, either from the Government of India or from the Secretary of State?—To the best of my belief, it was not.

3345. Were there direct communications between the Government of India and the Government of Bombay regarding the force?—Yes.

3346. What were those communications, as distinguished from the communication of which I have

have been speaking?—There was a communication from the Government of India founded upon Lord Napier's specific proposals as to the constitution of the force.

3347. That was at a much later period, was it not?—At a later period than the Government of India's suggestion of the 7,500 men.

3348. But should this communication, which is the first from the Government of India as to the size of the force, on the 17th of August, have come to you as a matter of procedure?—No; it was at the pleasure of the Government of India.

3349. It would be in the discretion of the Secretary of State for India to communicate it to you or not?—Yes.

3350. You had a subsequent correspondence with the India Government as to the size of the force, had you not?—I should hardly give a correct impression by saying that it was as to the size of the force. In the main, at that time, they accepted the strength of the force proposed by Lord Napier, but they discussed its constitution in detail.

3351. Did they not also discuss its magnitude?—No; speaking generally, they accepted the magnitude.

3352. The inference which you would draw from the fact that the Secretary of State for India was in possession of Lord Napier's view of the size of the force, and of the Government of India's view of the size of the force, would be, they not having sent the Indian opinion to you, that they accepted Lord Napier's view?—Yes.

3353. The force was subsequently increased considerably, was it not?—Yes.

3354. To pretty nearly 15,000 combatants?—To 14,410.

3355. From subsequent information, have you reason to believe that that was 14,900 and upwards?—I cannot answer that by a simple "yes" or "no"; I received at one time a non-official statement in detail, which showed a larger number than the official statement, but I never had the means of ascertaining which was accurate, and the carefully prepared official statement shows 14,410.

3356. But the unofficial statement which you saw, showing a larger number, was from the same official source as supplied the official return, was it not?—Yes.

3357. And that was within 10 of 15,000, was it not?—I forget.

3358. Do you believe that it was somewhere thereabouts?—I believe that it more nearly approached 15,000.

3359. Will you tell the Committee how the force was increased from 12,000 to 15,000 combatants?—The British regiments were sent at a greater strength than was at first intended; the British cavalry was slightly increased from a squadron to a wing; four or five integral companies of Sappers were added; and the native Infantry were also sent in rather greater strength than was at first calculated.

3360. On what authority was this increase made?—As regards the European British regiments, on a letter from the Adjutant General, Bombay, implying that it was the desire of the Horse Guards; but I am aware that it has been represented that the Adjutant General at Bombay inaccurately stated that it was the desire of the Horse Guards, and that it was done at the suggestion of the Government of India. I cannot answer for the intended motives; I am only sure

that the Bombay Government accepted it in the belief that the Horse Guards were responsible for it.

3361. Have you that letter?—No, I cannot find that.

3362. That letter will be in existence, will it not?—Yes.

3363. In whose custody will it be?—The Secretary to Government, Bombay.

3364. By whom was it written?—By the Adjutant General in Bombay.

3365. Did he write in the name and by the authority of the Horse Guards?—He must have written by the authority of Lord Napier, but stating that it was at the suggestion of the Horse Guards.

3366. Then the Horse Guards communication would be to Lord Napier direct?—Yes.

3367. What ground is there for saying that it was on the suggestion of the Government of India?—That I only gather from Lord Napier's evidence before this Committee. He mentions that the Government of India would have preferred a greater strength than he proposed of the British regiments.

3368. Do you know of anything on record showing the mind of the Government of India in the matter?—Yes.

3369. Was that as to the composition of the force?—Yes.

3370. Do you infer from what is on record that the Government of India had, in any way or at any time, indicated such a wish?—My impression is that they rather, on the whole, indicated a wish for fewer regiments at a greater strength, than for the same number of regiments with a lesser strength.

3371. But not for an increase of numbers?—Not for an increase of numbers on the whole.

3372. Is there nothing on record to show that they wished for a larger number of men on the whole?—Nothing.

3373. Nor a larger number of Europeans?—No.

3374. What was the authority for the increase of natives?—It was done at the recommendation of Lord Napier. Again I must say, that he says he recommended it because the Government of India had desired that the native regiments should be generally increased in consequence of the Abyssinian Expedition.

3375. Is there any communication from the Government of India to that effect on record?—Yes.

3376. Will you state where it is?—The communication is on record. The impression which I received from it was, that it was a desire that the regiments which stayed behind should be increased.

3377. Is it in that Blue Book which is before you?—I should think it must be.

3378. The request of Lord Napier, the Commander in Chief, that the number might be increased is also in writing, is it not?—Yes.

3379. Have you that?—I have not.

3380. Is that in Bombay?—Yes.

3381. Both those letters could be put in, I presume?—They could be obtained.

3382. Mr. Seely.] Had not Lord Napier full authority from the India Office to settle the amount of force which should be employed?—No.

3383. Then who had?—The India Office asked for Lord Napier's opinion; I do not wish to be misunderstood;

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misunderstood; I am not speaking of what was the power practically given to him, but there was no formal authority to Lord Napier to decide what force would be requisite.

3384. Then who had that authority?—The formal authority was not given to anyone that I know of, and therefore it may be supposed to have been retained by the Secretary of State in England.

3385. *Chairman.*] Then Lord Napier advised 12,000 combatants, and that communication was sent home?—Yes.

3386. Are you aware whether the further increase to 15,000 was ever sent home?—It was reported, undoubtedly.

3387. Do you know whether that had formal sanction by the Home Government?—I do not think that any formal sanction as to number was ever given by the Home Government.

3388. You feel clear that it was known to the India Office that the numbers had been increased to that extent?—Yes, I find that a despatch from the India Office of the 3rd of February inquired the nature and necessity of the augmentation of the force in excess of the number, 12,077 of all ranks, stated by Sir Robert Napier, in July and August.

3389. Is that all that you had from the India Office upon the subject?—Yes, the reply was sent by the Bombay Government explaining it.

3390. Have you the communication which was sent home intimating that the numbers had been increased?—I do not know whether I have it or not at this moment, but I very likely have it.

3391. This increase of combatants would largely increase the expenses of the Expedition, would it not?—It would, proportionally.

3392. An increase of 3,000 upon 12,000 would increase the expense by 25 per cent., would it not?—I am not prepared to say that it would increase it to that extent, but it would increase it largely.

3393. Of what did the increase of 3,000 consist; what were the proportions of native combatants and of Europeans?—Premising that I do not admit an increase of 3,000, but of about 2,400, we may say that there were 1,900 natives and 500 Europeans.

3394. Lord *Elcho.*] That is to say those 500 Europeans being out of the 2,400?—Yes, there were 431 European infantry, and 76 cavalry.

3395. So that the unsettled increase from England was 500 men, consisting of Sappers, Cavalry, and increase to the Infantry regiments?—No, the number attributed, whether rightly or wrongly to the wish of the Horse Guards, is 431 Infantry. The increase of Cavalry was at Lord Napier's own wish.

3396. Those 431 men were entirely Infantry, you say?—Yes.

3397. Among how many regiments were they divided?—Four.

3398. And therefore rather more than 100 men were added to the strength of each regiment?—Yes.

3399. Do you know what that made the total strength of each regiment?—The total strength of the four regiments was 3,387, averaging about 845.

3400. Of all ranks?—Of all ranks.

3401. Including those 100 men?—Including the 100 men.

3402. *Chairman.*] You told the Home Government, did you not, on 27th, August 1867, that

you wanted 150,000 tons of shipping to convey animals, and 90,000 tons to convey men and stores—Yes.

3403. That represents 240,000 tons of shipping, does it not?—Yes.

3404. Your requisition was known to the Home Government as early as September, was it not?—Yes.

3405. You, on that day, sent a telegram to the Secretary of State for India, did you not?—The Governor sent a telegram.

3406. Conveying the facts which you have just given in evidence?—The telegram does not necessarily exhibit the total, because it does not state the number of animals.

3407. But the number of animals had been previously given, had it not?—Hardly, on August the 27th, I think, though I am not sure.

3408. Can you state when Lord Napier stated that he wanted 25,000 animals?—I am not aware of his having specifically stated it previously to September the 6th.

3409. Then, on the Home Government learning that the number of animals required by Lord Napier was 25,000, they would know that 150,000 tons of shipping was wanted, would they not?—Yes, so far as those 25,000 animals would be brought by sea.

3410. With regard to forage, the estimate for forage and supplies sent to India was irrespective of anything which the country would produce, was it not, both as regards forage and supplies for the troops generally?—Yes, excluding, of course, fresh meat.

3411. Do you know to what extent engagements for supplies were made by the Bombay Commissariat up to the end of 1867, and to what extent they were shipped to Abyssinia?—I cannot answer precisely as to the extent to which engagements were made, but I have the means of giving tolerably correct information about the quantities sent to Abyssinia. All the information that I could give is inferable from the following: that on the 31st of March I find it recorded under my hand, that before receipt of a letter from Colonel Holland, Comptroller of Supply and Transport, dated the 8th of March, six months' reserves were on their way or had arrived at Zoula, excepting about 20 per cent. of the hay, and that four months' additional had been ordered before the receipt of that same letter, and that the shipment of the whole was close on completion on that date, the 31st of March. A good deal is inferable, I think, but I do not know that I can give anything more.

3412. You sent the supplies for the whole force, European and native, did you not?—Yes.

3413. But supplies were also drawn from England to some extent, I believe?—To a considerable extent as regards some things.

3414. Notwithstanding that your supplies were sent completed, you found, did you not, that the English Government sent supplies for 4,000 European troops for three or four months?—We did not absolutely send them complete in one respect, because we applied to England for the forage. In every other respect, we sent them complete. With that correction for the sake of accuracy, I proceed to answer the question. There were supplies sent out in the steamers for three months, I think, for the 4,000 Europeans.

3415. Can you give the Committee a list of the supplies sent from England without the authority

authority of, or without any requisition from, the Bombay Government?—The stores mentioned at pages 74 and 75 of the Blue Book, as follows, were sent as three months' supplies on shipboard for 4,000 Europeans:

| Provisions.                 | Lbs.   | Tons. |
|-----------------------------|--------|-------|
| 1. Sugar - - - - -          | 57,856 | 38    |
| 2. Tea - - - - -            | 11,250 | 14    |
| 3. Split peas - - - - -     | 22,856 | 19    |
| 4. Suet - - - - -           | 6,428  | 8     |
| 5. Raisins - - - - -        | 12,856 | 10    |
| 6. Mustard - - - - -        | 1,607  | 2     |
| 7. Pepper - - - - -         | 1,607  | 2     |
| 8. Vinegar - - - - -        | 1,071  | 8     |
| 9. Boiled mutton - - - - -  | 57,856 | 114   |
| 10. Boiled beef - - - - -   | 57,856 |       |
| 11. Rice - - - - -          | 12,856 | 10    |
| 12. Mixed pickles - - - - - | 19,286 | 15    |
| 13. Salt - - - - -          | 6,428  | 2     |

| Medical Comforts.               | Tons.       | Ft. |
|---------------------------------|-------------|-----|
| Sugar, lump - - - - -           | 5,400       | 8   |
| Sugar - - - - -                 | 7,200       |     |
| Tea, best black - - - - -       | 720         | 30  |
| Vinegar - - - - -               | 90 gallons  |     |
| Port wine - - - - -             | 2,800       | 20  |
| White wine - - - - -            | 1,440       |     |
| Preserved meats - - - - -       | 1,060       | 30  |
| Essence of beef - - - - -       | 18,000      |     |
| Rice - - - - -                  | 2,880 lbs.  | 3   |
| Lime juice - - - - -            | 2,120 pints | 4   |
| Brandy - - - - -                | 360 bottles | 2   |
| Porter - - - - -                | 4,500 pints | 10  |
| Pearl barley - - - - -          | 1,080       | 4   |
| Sago - - - - -                  | 720         |     |
| Arrowroot - - - - -             | 1,440       | 30  |
| Rum - - - - -                   | 90 gallons  |     |
| Ale - - - - -                   | 4,500 pints | 10  |
| Preserved milk - - - - -        | 7,200       | 5   |
| Chloride of zinc - - - - -      | 1,440       | 1   |
| Soap - - - - -                  | 720 lbs.    | 20  |
| Preserved potatoes - - - - -    | 4,320       | 3   |
| Compressed vegetables - - - - - | 1,080       | 20  |
| Prepared soup - - - - -         | 4,320 pts.  | 4   |
| Pickles - - - - -               | 360 bottles | 10  |
| Tons - - - - -                  | 83          | 20  |

Of the following articles mentioned in page 94 of the Blue Book

|                                    |            |
|------------------------------------|------------|
| Gloves - - - - -                   | 4,000      |
| Blankets - - - - -                 | 11,500     |
| Boots - - - - -                    | 11,500     |
| Spare bootlaces - - - - -          | 11,500     |
| Bell tents - - - - -               | 1,000      |
| Hospital tents - - - - -           | 50         |
| Filters, portable - - - - -        | 5,000      |
| Carts, Maltese - - - - -           | 400        |
| Grease for Maltese carts - - - - - | lbs. 2,800 |
| Packsaddles - - - - -              | 5,000      |
| Harness - - - - -                  | sets 1,800 |
| Traces, short - - - - -            | pairs 900  |
| Whips - - - - -                    | 400        |
| Rifles, Snider, infantry - - - - - | 4,000      |

I have reason to believe that some were ordered by the Bombay Government, and I think possibly some were not. I should like to take this opportunity of explaining how it is that I, as secretary of the Government, am obliged to speak with uncertainty. Under the pressure of the time, requisitions were sometimes made by his Excellency the Governor by telegram at the request of Lord Napier, which did not go through the strictly official routine of the office.

3416. You do not find any communications of that character in the Blue Book respecting stores?—I cannot say that I have found them, but I have not ascertained that they are not there; I have reason to believe, for instance, that the first seven items, banyans, flannel shirts, comforters, Jersey shirts, stockings, night caps, and gloves, were asked for by telegram.

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3417. But you find blankets and boots, to the extent of 12,000, and you see by the telegram that only 500 were ordered; in other words, 11,500 blankets and boots were sent more than were ordered?—For the reason that I have explained. I cannot undertake to say that a thing was not ordered, merely because I have no record or memory of any strictly official proceeding.

3418. You sent large medical stores from Bombay, I believe?—Yes.

3419. Do you remember whether their value was 50,000 l.?—I do not remember ever hearing the value stated.

3420. And all those were in addition to those large stores which were sent by the hospital ships from England?—Quite so.

3421. I presume that those medical stores sent from Bombay would be sent on the requisition of the Commander in Chief of the Bombay Army, and not upon the requisition of the Bombay Government?—Yes; but under the authority of the Bombay Government, an authority no doubt guided by Lord Napier's requisitions.

3422. The quantity of medical stores was not a matter under the consideration of the Bombay Government, but they were the executive merely for sending the supplies which the Commander in Chief required; was that so?—I do not think that I should give a correct impression by simply answering that question by saying yes. Lord Napier decided the time for which he required to be provisioned; that being accepted, it was a matter between the inspectors general and the Government as to the quantities to be sent, the Government being of course guided by the advice of the inspectors general.

3423. Where can we get the value of the medical stores which were sent?—I have no doubt that the gross value must be in the accounts at home in England, and readily obtainable.

3424. It was known to the Bombay Government at a very early period that the water supply at Zulla had failed?—Yes.

3425. Was the propriety of laying water-pipes considered by the Bombay Government, or was that entirely in the hands of the Commander in Chief?—It was immediately considered by the Bombay Government.

3426. It was known that there was an abundant supply at Kuméli and up the Suru Pass?—I am not prepared to say that the abundance of the supply was known, but it was known that there was a comparatively abundant supply.

3427. Colonel Merewether's report would be before the Bombay Government?—Yes.

3428. I think that you have a documentary record of the proceedings of the Bombay Government, in connection with the water supply, have you not?—I have not, because the execution of the wishes of the Bombay Government in that respect was entrusted to the Public Works Department of Government.

3429. You know the vast number of animals which were lost early in Abyssinia, before the arrival of the Commander in Chief?—I know generally that there was a vast number lost.

3430. You have some report on the character of the packsaddles that were in use in Abyssinia, have you not?—No, I find allusions to the packsaddles, but I have not only not found, but I have no recollection of receiving any distinct report upon the packsaddles.

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3431. Have you a report by Captain Hand on the packsaddles?—Yes.

3432. Will you hand that in as an official document?—Yes.

3433. Have you also a report upon the Highland Transport Train?—Yes.

3434. Will you furnish the Committee with a copy of that report, and also with a copy of Colonel Warden's report upon the Land Transport Train?—Yes.

3435. You have also some other statistical returns bearing upon the supply of provisions, and the supply of forage, have you not?—Yes.

3436. Will you hand those in also?—Yes.

3437. With regard to the mode in which the Bombay Government conduct their business, did the members of Council meet in Council from time to time, and deliberate on the matters connected with this Expedition?—The whole Council did not as a matter of fact meet and deliberate, but the Governor and Lord Napier frequently met in an informal manner.

3438. In point of fact, throughout this Expedition, was there ever what you would call a meeting of Council composing the Government of Bombay?—In the sense of a strictly official meeting of Council, there was not.

3439. Would you say how the proceedings are conducted?—Every member of Council has the right to give his opinion upon every subject, and that right he has the opportunity of exercising exactly as far as he pleases; but to a certain extent, of course, the members of Council leave the less important matters of certain departments to others, the Commander in Chief is a member of Council, and on the undertaking of the Abyssinian Expedition, I assumed that he would wish particularly to know everything that was done by Government in connection therewith; to save the great delay that would have attended the actual formal submission to him of every paper, it was arranged between him and myself, that I should give him a copy of every order, whatever issued by Government, important or unimportant, connected with the Abyssinian Expedition, it being perfectly understood that if in any way it did not meet his views, a word from him would have sufficed either to recall the order, or to suspend action thereon.

3440. How many members of the Bombay Council are there?—Four; the Governor included.

3441. How is the Council constituted?—It consists of the Governor, two civil members of Council appointed by the Secretary of State, and the Commander in Chief *ex officio*.

3442. They communicate with each other by minutes, do they not?—So far as convenient; in the first instance almost always.

3443. Do they ever meet to deliberate?—I will not say that they never meet to deliberate. It is a matter of fact that they have not had formal meetings very often of late.

3444. Lord *Elcho*.] What are the offices of the two civil members of Council?—They are members of Council; as a matter of fact, amongst themselves the Council make a distribution of departments; but it is not one which is openly and constitutionally recognised.

3445. They are two of the civil servants chosen to be on the Council, I presume?—Yes.

3446. Are they chosen for legal qualifications?—There is no constitutional theory upon that; as a matter of practice it is, I believe, considered

desirable to get one member with judicial qualifications and the other with what we call in India revenue qualifications.

3447. They are chosen by the Governor?—They are chosen by the Secretary of State.

3448. Are they chosen for life?—No, for five years.

3449. Has the Council stated times of meeting?—No.

3450. When they do meet, how are they brought together?—There is a formal mode of summoning them by the Governor.

3451. Has that formal mode been in abeyance for any length of time?—No.

3452. During the time of the Abyssinian Expedition did they meet?—No; as a matter of fact they did not.

3453. I do not mean with reference to the Expedition, but did they meet at all?—I do not think they met on any occasion during the Abyssinian Expedition.

3454. During how many months did they not meet at all?—During several months.

3455. What was the date of their last meeting?—I cannot answer since I left India.

3456. But when was their last meeting before you left?—We had a meeting just before Lord Napier left.

3457. What was discussed at that meeting?—The opinion formed on the Abyssinian Transport Corps accounts.

3458. Was that before Lord Napier left to come home, or before he left for Abyssinia?—Before he left to come home.

3459. *Chairman*.] After the Expedition was over?—After the Expedition was over.

3460. Lord *Elcho*.] During the Abyssinian Expedition, while Lord Napier was in Abyssinia, or while the Expedition was in preparation, was there any formal meeting of the Council upon the subject?—I think not.

3461. Mr *Grant Duff*.] Have you any official knowledge as to meetings of the Council in Bombay?—Yes; I necessarily have official knowledge of every Council.

3462. While you were absent in Abyssinia?—I was not in Abyssinia.

3463. Lord *Elcho*.] Has the practice of not calling together this Council, which really appears to have a nominal existence, been recently introduced, or has it always been the custom that the Council, though they have had an existence, did not take an active part in the transaction of business?—Different governors have had very different practices on the subject; of late it has so happened that it has been the practice not often formally to assemble the Council.

3464. The formal assembling resting not upon any statute or any formal periods or times that are stated and laid down, but upon the will of the Governor?—Yes.

3465. Mr *Eastwick*.] The business was carried on by writing instead of by oral discussion; the papers were circulated to each member of the Council, and when they chose to write minutes they did so, I presume?—Yes; but I must be allowed to add to that, that my statements do not exclude oral discussion on other occasions than a formal Council.

3466. But the discussion was carried on by written papers, and by informal meetings where necessary?—Yes.

3467. Mr *C. Denison*.] Are you aware that Lord Napier stated, that during the whole

whole time he had been Commander in Chief, there never had been a formal meeting of the Council?—That could not be quite accurate, because, at least there was always a formal meeting to swear in a new member of Council, and therefore there must have been one (and I was present at it) when Lord Napier was sworn.

3468. *Chairman.*] With that exception he was not present at any meeting?—He must have been present when another member was sworn in.

3469. *Mr. C. Denison.*] Were you Military Secretary under Sir Bartle Frere, the predecessor of the present Governor?—Yes.

3470. Was the same practice then adopted with regard to meetings of Council?—They were infrequent. My experience goes back to former governors who had them very regularly.

3471. *Lord Elcho.*] With regard to the business being transacted in writing, though they did not meet formally, was there any point connected with the Abyssinian Expedition upon which the opinions of the two civil members of Council were asked, in written documents referred to them for their opinion, and were those opinions, having been so formally given by them, laid before the Governor and Lord Napier?—Yes, there was one instance as regards the organisation of the Transport Corps.

3472. Was that the only case?—To the best of my belief it was the only occasion on which the business of the Abyssinian Expedition was formally submitted to the two civil members of the Council. I kept them informed of what had been done.

3473. But upon this point which they had specifically referred to them, with regard to the transport, was there unanimity, and was the decision in accordance with the general view of the Council, or was the decision contrary to the view of those gentlemen to whom it was referred?—I should be glad, with the permission of the Committee, to answer that question rather fully, because I think there has been naturally, as the discussions appear in the Blue Book, some attention drawn to it, and I think it has been misunderstood by the public. If I rightly understand the noble Lord's question, it was whether in that discussion there was any difference of opinion, and whether the action of the Government was according to the opinion of the majority. There was not perfect unanimity, as is evident from the proceedings (which appear in the Blue Book at page 46); but it will be easily understood that the subject was one on which the special responsibility of Lord Napier was recognised. The proposed scheme for the formation of the Transport Corps was submitted to the Government by the Quartermaster General, and it was understood that it was rather a scheme drawn up by himself and Major Warden, who was afterwards director of the Transport Train, and accepted by Lord Napier, than the result of his Lordship's own deliberate consideration of the matter. That that supposition is correct is proved by the words of Lord Napier himself, who, in the first place, speaks of admitting that the numbers were very great, and that he was prepared to try any reasonable reduction which might be proposed by certain other persons whom he names; and it is still more plainly admitted by his statement on a following day, that he was quite unaware that the question of the department to which the Land Transport should belong (which, I may mention parenthetically, was what the Governor in his

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Minute on the subject had treated as the principal point) had already been discussed; and that had he been informed of that discussion, he would not have permitted the proposal to be made.

3474. That discussion being where?—That discussion being on the records of Government.

3475. And it having been discussed by whom?—By a previous Commander in Chief and the Government.

3476. Before Lord Napier became Commander in Chief?—Yes, when the same officer was Quartermaster General. The points upon which the Government thought it right to invite Lord Napier's further consideration I may call threefold, two of principle and several suggestions of detail; the one which he spoke of as the principal point, namely, whether it should be under the Commissariat or the Quartermaster General's Department, Lord Napier frankly accepted; his words are: "I accept, without hesitation, his Excellency's decision to place it under the Commissariat"; there cannot, therefore, be truly said to have been any difference of opinion upon that, the principal point. The second point was, whether the immediate superintendence of the muleteers should be by a class called "Mukadams" (which the Committee will correctly understand by substituting the English word "foremen," men from the same class as the muleteers), or whether they should be immediately superintended by soldiers taken from the ranks; there were certain other suggestions of detail as to numbers. Lord Napier, after, as I said, accepting the first point, proposed that a scheme should be drawn up by the Commissary General in accordance with the Government's views, and submitted to him that he might state his objections thereon; this was understood as meaning that if they discussed the thing abstractedly they might misunderstand each other; whereas, if what was suggested was put before him in the concrete, he would give his objections accurately and specifically; and it was received as a very reasonable means of settlement; accordingly, what is called a resolution of Government, which is really an order of Government, upon the letter, expresses a decision of the point in which Lord Napier concurred, and suggests other points, according to the views of the Governor and of the civil members of Council, and these words were added: "The Commissary General will keep his Excellency the Commander in Chief informed of the detailed arrangements made under these orders," and there is a note against that in my handwriting, that those words were added to meet Lord Napier's wishes as to the opportunity of offering his opinion on the transport organisation; that was on the 12th of September. That the order of the Government was understood in that sense, as putting the suggestions of Government before Lord Napier for his deliberate consideration, and not as settling those points, is proved by the fact that the reply by the Commissary General on the 28th of September submits a scheme in all its details, in the main, in accordance with his Lordship's views, and not in accordance with the suggestions of Government; not only had that scheme, before it came to the Government, been submitted by the Commissary General, according to the Government's orders, to Lord Napier, in order that he should give an opinion; but, to prevent any mistake, when I received it from the Commissary General, I sent it to his

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Lordship, as a member of the Government, to know if he had any objections before the Government gave effect to it; it was returned to me, without objection; that was on the 28th of September; subsequently, Lord Napier wrote to the Governor, on the 7th of October, to say, in effect, that, on further consideration, he must have more soldiers to superintend the muleteers and other drivers; and it was immediately conceded, without a word of objection by the Governor, and orders were issued accordingly. I have stated this rather fully, but, in answer to the question put to me, it will be seen that, although there was a difference of opinion, the actual action of the Government was in accordance with Lord Napier's wishes and views.

3477. *Chairman.*] How long did all this discussion continue?—The Quartermaster General's letter proposing the scheme, is dated the 22nd of August.

3478. And the final determination is come to in October?—I, to whom it was addressed, did not receive it for a week later. The Governor's Minute is dated the 31st August, and that of the two members of Council, Messrs. Ellis and Mansfield, on the 2nd of September, and the papers were then sent to Lord Napier, whose Minute is dated the 9th, and the Resolution of Government is dated the 12th of September.

3479. And the final acquiescence was in October?—Without explanation, I would not admit that the final acquiescence was in October. Everything which he demanded in September, was given on the 23rd of September.

3480. Then that discussion continued about a month, did it not?—No; I would not admit that the discussion continued a month.

3481. It continued from the 22nd of August to the 26th of September, I think?—The Resolution is dated the 23rd of September.

3482. Then, all this discussion was going on in writing?—Yes.

3483. Throughout the whole of that period this Council never meets?—No.

3484. Had they met once or twice over it, would not the whole matter have been settled in two days, in one or two meetings, at the outside?—I do not see any reason to suppose that any means would have settled it quicker than it was done, because this time was not occupied in discussion between members of the Government, but in the Commissary General drawing up a scheme really in accordance with the views of Lord Napier.

3485. The question in point was the character of the Transport Train, as to how the land transport had to be managed and organised; whilst this discussion was going on, were not all active proceedings in suspense or abeyance as regards organisation?—No, such as were practicable were not interfered with.

3486. Do you see any difficulty in the way of the matter having been settled in the shortest possible period (say a day or two), if the procedure had been to meet and consider rather than to decide by correspondence or by minutes?—I do not think so; when you have so fully to state objections in principle, as appears in the Governor's Minute, I think it is a saving of time to put them once for all in writing, and let the other say what he has to say.

3487. You think that for expedition (for that is the point) a desirable mode of procedure is, that four members of a council living together

and having an opportunity of meeting together, shall, instead of meeting at the same table, communicate with each other by means of written correspondence?—Often that would be so; it entirely depends upon the circumstances of the business.

3488. And this matter was five weeks under consideration before the final settlement was arrived at, was it not?—I do not admit that.

3489. Let me recall the dates to you; the discussion began on the 22nd of August, did it not?—The Governor's Minute was the 31st of August.

3490. But a communication was made, I think, from the Quartermaster General on the 22nd of August?—The 22nd was the date of that letter; it was addressed to me, and I did not receive it for a week afterwards.

3491. And the final determination was on the 26th of the following month, was it not?—No, not practically.

3492. Actually, was it not so?—No; the 23rd is the date which, with deference, I think you mean; the 23rd is the date of the formal Government Order, giving effect to what had, for all practical purposes of organisation, been settled many days before.

3493. Are you of opinion that those four members of Council, constituting the Government, would have sat four or five weeks, or whatever the time is, over this question had they met in Council?—Certainly not.

3494. Then facility and expedition must be the result of meeting rather than of acting by correspondence?—By no means necessarily.

3495. *Mr. Eastwick.*] I suppose there was some delay while Major Warden was drawing up his scheme?—Yes, exactly. The honourable Chairman asked whether it was five weeks sitting; they would not sit while the man was drawing up his scheme.

3496. Their judgment was in suspense until they should receive this scheme, I suppose?—Yes.

3497. *Mr. C. Denison.*] I suppose as a rule the civil members of the Council are not consulted on military matters, are they?—Not unless either the subject is of such general importance in relation to Government as to warrant it, or unless a difference has arisen between the Governor and the Commander in Chief, which necessitates a vote, in order to obtain a formal decision.

3498. *Mr. Eastwick.*] In point of fact the members of Council take different departments, and in minor matters the other members do not much interfere; is that so?—Exactly.

3499. *Captain Beaumont.*] Was there not some complete estimate made of the requirements for the supply of the troops being sent to Abyssinia?—There was an estimate of the provisions and stores.

3500. Was that estimate on the Indian scale, or was it distinct?—It was, on the whole, on the Indian scale.

3501. Have you ever known an expedition sent from India that was equipped on the liberal scale that the Abyssinian Expedition was?—No expedition had been equipped from India during the time I held my present position, and therefore I have no means of speaking from anything but a general impression as regards other expeditions.

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3502. And yet I think you somewhat confidently said that the scale upon which this Expedition was equipped, was that on which an expedition from India would be equipped?—I understood the honourable gentleman's question to be on what scale the Expedition was equipped; that is to say, what rations, what followers, and so on there were; and I say that it was equipped on the Indian scale in that sense.

3503. Have you ever known a case in point where an expedition has been equipped from India, going anywhere on this same scale?—Yes, in the sense in which I used the word "scale"; but I do not know whether the distinction that I imply suggests itself to the honourable Member.

3504. To what distinction do you allude?—The scale of supply might mean the general abundance with which the Expedition was equipped, or it might mean that it was calculated that a native soldier was to have so much rice as a day's ration.

3505. The expression that you used, "abundance of supplies," exactly expresses what I mean. I can quite understand the ration per man, and the ration per horse, being a fixed quantity, with reference to the Abyssinian, as with reference to any expedition that might be undertaken from India; but it is with regard to the other view of the case, the abundance of the supplies, that I put my question?—I cannot speak with actual experience of previous expeditions, but I feel warranted in saying that my belief is, that the Abyssinian Expedition was more abundantly provided in proportion to numbers than any previous expedition.

3506. On what information was the scale of the Expedition based with respect to followers?—Generally on the established Indian scale, on the assumption that the requirements of Abyssinia would be much the same as those of India.

3507. On what basis was the supply of tanks for the Expedition made?—I presume according to the number of men and animals.

3508. Do you know the total cost of supplying the tank accommodation, and the amount in gallons of the accommodation that was supplied?—I do not.

3509. Captain Robinson informed me that the cost was about 14½ lacs of rupees, and that the number of gallons of tank accommodation supplied was 3,230,586; was that the case?—I have no doubt that if he told you so, it is correct.

3510. Lord *Elcho*.] Who is Captain Robinson?—He is now Superintendent of Marine in Bombay, and he was, at the time of the Expedition, Naval Marine Storekeeper.

3511. Captain *Beaumont*.] Is there a regulated scale of water allowance for men and animals on board the transports?—If you mean by a regulated scale, a scale authoritatively laid down by Government, I am not aware that there is; but of course some number was assumed by the Superintendent of Marine which did, as a matter of fact, regulate the supply.

3512. Is there not in the transport regulations a scale on which the supply of tanks for transport purposes would be regulated; and if there is not, on whose individual responsibility would this expenditure of 14½ lacs of rupees rest?—I have no doubt that there must be at least a traditional practice equivalent to an authoritative rule. The responsibility for the quantity of tanks purchased and provided rested practically with the Superintendent of Marine.

3513. And you think that the amount then was supplied rather on his opinion than calculated on any official scale?—I do not know how he calculated the requirements, but practically, the purchases were entirely regulated by his judgment of the need.

3514. I am aware that I am asking you a question that I should prefer to put to somebody who would be in a better position than yourself to answer it, but you are the only representative of the Bombay Government, as regards the transactions that took place at Bombay, to whom I can refer; is not 14½ lacs of rupees, in your opinion, a very heavy amount of money to pay simply for tank accommodation for transports?—I have no doubt that the price was far beyond what one would ordinarily pay for a smaller quantity, but I am not in a position to judge that it was more than inevitably attended the great demand.

3515. You will observe that you do not say that it was not an excessive charge. I want to know whether, under the circumstances, 14½ lacs of rupees was not, after the most liberal allowance for extravagance, more than an outside price to pay for 3,230,586 gallons of tank accommodation, and whether that amount of tank accommodation was not in excess of what might reasonably be considered necessary for the force?—To the first question, as to the price, I am really too ignorant of the price to give an answer; to the second question, whether the quantity of tanks supplied was in excess of the needs, I find that the Superintendent of Marine having, on the 21st of April 1868, reported purchases of 60 iron tanks, it was ordered that explanation should be requested, because some time before that it was understood that there was a considerable surplus of tanks on hand; that shows that there was some *prima facie* ground at that time for thinking that over-purchases had been made.

3516. *Chairman*.] You will remember that a return was asked for respecting those tanks, and the reasons why they were ordered, the extent to which they were ordered, and the prices paid, and generally what passed; are you aware that that return has never been furnished?—No; and I never got an answer to that communication to which I have just alluded.

3517. Would a telegram to the Governor get that forwarded?—I should think so, so far as it is possible to get it.

3518. Captain *Beaumont*.] A lac of rupees is 10,000 £, is it not?—Yes.

3519. So that 14½ lacs would be 142,500 £.?—Yes.

3520. Do you know how the number of transport animals which were taken up was arrived at; was any distinct estimate made of the requirements of the transport service in the same way that the question of the stores was dealt with?—No; I do not believe that any similar estimate was made.

3521. Would it not, looking at it from a common sense point of view, be right to consider the question in this manner; first, to know the amount of stores, then afterwards to consider the weight that each animal would carry, and then to write off a certain amount for the transport which might be available in the country, and after making allowance for sickness, to take the residue as representing the number of animals required?—It is a very reasonable way of looking at the question.

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3522. Are any documents in existence which will show that that course was taken?—I think not.

3523. The forage for the animals was sent on the assumption, I believe, that there was no forage obtainable in Abyssinia?—I cannot say that; on the contrary, it must have been assumed that there was forage in the country, as it would have been impossible to carry forage to the distance of Magdala.

3524. Do you know the proportion of forage that it was assumed would be afforded by the country?—I do not think there was any assumption on the point.

3525. Then, were not the supplies sent on a somewhat vague basis, since no assumption was made?—The supplies were sent upon the basis of what it was desirable to have, and not, so far as I know, on the basis of what it would be found practicable to carry, that practicability being an uncertainty.

3526. Is it not true that where animals have to carry their own forage, a certain point is arrived at beyond which it becomes disproportionately expensive to multiply the number of animals, since they cannot subsist themselves?—Undoubtedly.

3527. Then, in the case of Abyssinia, there should be a point beyond which mules could not advance, except by the resources of the country, or at an enormous expenditure of transport force?—Undoubtedly.

3528. Do you know whether the question was looked at from that point of view, and if so, at what distance that was assumed?—I do not think that any calculation was made upon that point.

3529. Then, was the scale on which the transport was arranged left practically to the demands of Lord Napier, without calling upon him to furnish Government with the information upon which he based his estimate?—Yes; without formally calling upon him so to inform Government; but Lord Napier was in constant personal communication with his Excellency the Governor, and I cannot undertake to say to what extent he may or may not have explained his demands to the Governor.

3530. I know there was great difficulty in supplying the baggage animals from India; was that difficulty beyond what it was anticipated would occur?—I think not; at a very early date we knew that a very small supply of mules could be obtained from India.

3531. Was the want of telegraphic communication between Suez and Zulla much felt?—No doubt the advantage which quicker communication would have given was constantly felt.

3532. If you had had earlier intelligence of the fall of Magdala, it would have made a difference in the expenditure that was taking place in connection with the Expedition, would it not?—Some difference would have been made, but not so much as would be supposed, because supplies up to the 31st of October had been dispatched before the actual fall of Magdala took place.

3533. Did the telegraphic communication down the Red Sea from Suez to Annesley Bay form the subject of consideration by the Bombay Government?—Yes.

3534. What steps did they take in the matter?—The Governor endeavoured that it should be arranged with the Egyptian Government to continue the Egyptian line from Sowakim to Mas-sawah. (See No. 107, p. 60, Blue Book.)

3535. Did the Home Government communicate with the Bombay Government upon that subject?—Yes. (See the Blue Book as above).

3536. Did you know of an offer made by the Telegraph Maintenance and Construction Company to lay a line of telegraph in a very short time, which would subsequently have formed part of the line that is now in course of construction between Bombay and Suez?—I cannot positively say that I recollect it, but there were so many proposals of various kinds, that I cannot say that it was not made.

3537. The matter did not come prominently before you in any official form?—No.

3538. The Commanding Royal Engineer made, through Colonel Merewether, a demand upon the Bombay Government to supply a railway, did he not?—Yes.

3539. Were communications from the Home Government received by the Bombay Government as follows: letters from Mr. Brassey, dated the 7th of September 1867; from Sir John McNeill, dated the 2nd of September 1867; and from General Simmons, dated September 1867; and were those papers submitted to the Bombay Government?—Yes.

3540. Was it through the Public Works Department that the arrangements for the line were made?—Yes.

3541. Certain statements have been made to me with reference to the description of plant which was sent from Bombay to Abyssinia for the purpose of a railway, and also with reference to the arrangements which were made for shipping and receiving the plant. If I put any question to you with reference to these subjects, will you be in a position to answer them?—Hardly. All the execution of whatever the Government undertook in that respect went on in the Public Works Department.

3542. And, therefore, if I asked you questions with reference to the plant being new or old, with reference to the reasons which determined the Government in choosing the gauge that they did with reference to the supply of materials, and whether a complete set of plant might or might not have been got from the existing companies in Bombay in place of assembling a heterogeneous mass of plant from different parts, those would be matter of which you could not speak?—No; I only know generally that the Governor paid the earliest attention to the subject, but all the details were in the Public Works Department.

3543. Lord Elcho.] But have you no knowledge of what the supplies of those things were in Bombay, or whether there was abundance of new rails to be had?—No; I am not able to speak with any confidence upon that point.

3544. And you do not know whether those things were got by tender, or how they were obtained?—I know, in a general way, that the Governor was influenced by the fact of a certain quantity of material from one of the railway companies being immediately ready to hand.

3545. Chairman.] On the general point of the railway, in the Blue Book, on the 30th of September 1867, the Secretary of State for India wrote to Bombay: "I have determined, at any rate for the present, to take no steps respecting the laying down of a railway from the point of disembarkation." That was so, was it not?—Yes.

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3546. You would regard that as interfering somewhat with the discretion of the Bombay Government?—Only necessarily as far as the Bombay Government might wish to get it from England.

3547. The statement is, that the Secretary of State for India had resolved to take no steps for laying down the railway; was that letter, which I have read, an answer to some communication from the Government of Bombay to the Secretary of State for India?—I am not able to say.

3548. You would infer, would you not, that that partook of the nature of a prohibition?—It would entirely depend upon the context, so to speak.

3549. On the 10th of October, that is to say, 11 days afterwards, a telegram was sent by the Secretary of State for India to the Government of Bombay to this effect, "Use your own discretion as regards the railway." It would follow, would it not, that until that time you did not feel yourselves free in the matter of the railway?—In all probability that discussion took place by telegram between the Governor and the Secretary of State for India, and I never was fully possessed of it; and, therefore, the effect of those words by the Secretary of State for India would depend upon what had previously passed.

3550. Would not the inference be, that up to the time when you got permission to use your own discretion, you had been restrained, and under the guidance or direction of the Secretary of State for India?—It is no necessary inference, because one very probable explanation is, that the point under discussion had been rather whether the supply should be made from England.

3551. Have you any knowledge whether it was so or not?—No.

3552. Captain Beaumont.] On the subject of the water pipes, an order was sent to England by telegraph, dated the 24th of December. I am informed by Colonel Kennedy that an order was received by the Public Works Department from the Military Department on the 14th of November, for those pipes. Between those dates no steps were taken by the Government or the Public Works Department. Whether any were taken in the Military Department Colonel Kennedy informed me that he did not know. Can you tell me whether any steps were taken in the matter between those two dates, or why it was suffered to remain in abeyance?—My impression is that the order received at the Public Works Department on the 14th of November for the three and a-half miles was according to the needs then reported, and that nothing took place in the Military Department from that time until the 24th of December, when, having learned that they needed the means of water supply from much further inland, 15 miles were asked for at once from England, in supercession of the former demand, it being impracticable to supply the 15 miles from India.

3553. On that same subject was not the information, on which the demand that was made on the Public Works Department on the 14th of November, sufficient to have enabled you to foresee the larger demand that was made on the 24th of December?—I can only say that I presume not, because, in fact, it did not.

3554. You infer the fact from the result?—Yes.

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3555. My own impression is, that there was no more urgent demand made than that which was embodied in the report from the Commanding Engineer, which was one of the earliest documents with reference to the water supply which reached Bombay?—I will refer to it if you wish it.

3556. I proposed to ask you some questions with reference to the rate at which certain monies to meet the more immediate expenditure in connection with the Abyssinian War were borrowed; are you aware that money was raised from the Bank of Bengal at 6 per cent.?—No; I have no information as to the mode adopted by the Finance Department for procuring the money; I only know of the demand for it.

3557. Are you aware that the money was absolutely raised at 6 per cent., while offers to supply it at 4 per cent. were submitted?—No, I have no knowledge of any kind upon the subject.

3558. In fact, for information upon that point, the Committee should refer to the financial secretary, I presume?—Practically, the person who could give the answer would be the Accountant General in Bombay.

3559. Is there any person in England to whom we could refer for information upon that point?—I should think it would be quite impossible to get it from anybody else but the Accountant General in Bombay.

3560. Who is responsible for the way in which the surplus stores were disposed of in Abyssinia?—Lord Napier.

3561. And in Bombay?—The Bombay Government.

3562. With reference to the disposal of the stores in Bombay, I presume that a return can be furnished to us of the stores which came back to Bombay, and of the way in which they were disposed of?—Yes.

3563. Will that be supplied?—It must be, I should think, in the India Office in England by this time; it may be in the Treasury, but it must have passed through the India Office by this time.

3564. Chairman.] As a return from Bombay, could you get it for us, I having had the greatest difficulty in getting those things?—Of course it is to be obtained there.

3565. Mr. C. Turner.] You were asked some questions with reference to a loan from the Bank of Bengal, at 6 per cent., when the rate of interest was 4 per cent., or when it could have been got from other parties at 4 per cent.; in point of fact, unless it is accompanied with some unusual conditions, is it not a fact that the banks at Bengal and at Bombay lend money to the Government at a lower rate than it would be lent by natives in the bazaars or by Europeans?—I am not prepared to answer that question, as I have not sufficient familiarity with the transactions.

3566. Do you suppose that the banks at Bengal and Bombay would not put the Government on the very best footing as regards loans; would they not treat them on the most favourable terms as customers?—Ordinarily.

3567. Therefore it would be a very unlikely circumstance, would it not, unless there were some peculiar conditions attached to it, that the Bank of Bengal would impose higher terms than the money could be got for from other parties?

—Certainly;

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—Certainly; as far as I can judge it is improbable.

3568. Captain *Beaumont*.] Do you know anything with reference to the landing of the returned stores in Bombay Harbour?—Yes.

3569. The evidence which this Committee has taken shows that the ships were kept in Bombay harbour a long time loaded, although apparently there was a course open which would have enabled the ships to be more speedily discharged, the main difficulty being the monsoon, which made it difficult for boats to approach the ships' sides; the course that was available was to tow the ships behind Butcher's Island and behind Hog Island, where the water was still, and where any number of boats might have been used, or, at any rate, a much larger number might have been used than could have been used in the open roadstead; can you speak with reference to whether that course was considered by the Government?—I do not think that it was specifically considered.

3570. Do you know Bombay Harbour yourself well?—Yes.

3571. And you know that the Abyssinian return stores fetched very little?—Yes.

3572. And consequently, it was of very little importance whether they were landed on Hog Island or whether they were landed on the Bombay side, I presume?—Yes, as respects a very large portion of the stores.

3573. Do you know any reason why the course which I suggest should not have been taken, namely, to tow the ships behind Hog Island and Butcher's Island, and so discharged them quicker?—It is a point upon which I cannot speak with any authority; I can conceive some good reasons.

3574. Would those reasons be anything beyond the financial one, of putting on one side the extra value of the stores if they were deposited in Bombay, as against what they would have cost if they had been put in a less convenient spot, and putting that against the sum which would represent the cost of the ships on time charter; is there any point which suggests itself to you which is irrespective of the financial aspect of the case?—I do not know whether any nautical objections might have been taken; but there would have been this to be said, that as the stores would certainly have been destroyed at that time of year by being landed there, and there would have been perhaps very little difference in the time occupied, because the taking them behind Butcher's Island would not have multiplied the number of boats, we should have been liable to the reproach of having thrown away the small value of the stores for nothing.

3575. Was not the cost of the ships waiting discharge at one time in Bombay Harbour something like 6,000 *l.* or 7,000 *l.* a day?—Very likely.

3576. And, therefore, a week's delay would represent 49,000 *l.*, would it not?—Yes, if the 6,000 *l.* or 7,000 *l.* is correct.

3577. And a month's delay would represent 196,000 *l.*, would it not?—Yes; may I be allowed to add that the moment the Government became aware of the inevitably great delay in landing stores they first offered the cargoes of hay, which were the largest portion, to the masters of the transports, and when they refused them, the Government ordered the transports out to sea to throw them overboard, and as soon as the masters

found that the Government were in earnest in that they accepted the hay.

3578. What do you suppose would be the value of the returned stores which were on board those ships?—I have not the least idea.

3579. Does it bear any proportion to the cost of retaining the ships?—I should think it would; if you had had convenient means of storing them and of keeping them; for instance, there was the four months' supply of provisions which came back nearly intact; there is a telegram from the Governor, saying that this supply was worth more than a quarter of a million.

3580. At any rate, assuming that if they had been landed at places other than at Bombay they would have suffered some deterioration, and that there would have been a certain amount of difficulty possibly in transporting them again to the Bombay side, that would affect their value to a certain extent only; and, after allowing for that, the cost of the course which I suggest would not have borne any reasonable proportion to the cost of retaining those ships on time charter, would it?—I should assent to your question, only that I am afraid that I should be seeming to admit that it might have been done very much quicker if the discharge had taken place behind Butcher's Island; and this I have not admitted yet.

3581. If it is the case that greater rapidity could have been effected in discharging the ships by taking that course, then the effect that I have pointed out would result, would it not?—If the difference of time could have been very considerable. The probability is that the value of that would have outweighed any thing arising from the greater deterioration of stores which were landed there, instead of in the usual place.

3582. Is it not a reasonable view to take, that the ships being towed into smooth water certainly could be discharged with greater ease than they could in the open roadstead in the face of the south-west monsoon?—Undoubtedly, *ceteris paribus*; but the great want was boats, I believe.

3583. From certain inquiries which I made in India, it did not appear that the want was boats; and, as a matter of fact, I believe the Government never made any demand on the Public Works Department for boats which they had and could have supplied; can you speak to that point?—I cannot speak to that point; all that I can speak to is, that the urgent need (on the very grounds suggested by the honourable Member's question, namely, the enormous cost of delay) to clear the ships was the subject of most anxious consideration, and of frequent communication between the Government and the Marine and Commissariat Departments concerned.

3584. That being so, would you be surprised if it should turn out that no demand had been made for boats upon the Public Works Department, and that the Public Works Department had barges which were available?—I certainly should be surprised if any boats which were fairly and readily available were not made use of.

3585. Would you not consider that the barges which were employed on the reclamation works, and on the harbour works, were well suited to the purpose, and would come within your definition as boats which would be readily available?—Yes, as far as I know.

3586. Colonel Kennedy informed me that he had boats which were available, and that no application had been made to him by any of the different

different departments concerned; does that surprise you?—I cannot account for the non-demand of any available boats for landing stores at that time, unless the Government were hampered by a contract.

3587. *Chairman.*] There was a boat contract, was there not?—Yes.

3588. Are you aware whether that excluded the Government from accepting boats outside that contract?—I am aware that the ordinary boat contract does exclude the Government from taking outsiders, but I am not aware whether the ordinary contract was made applicable, and treated as applicable, to the business of the Abyssinian Expedition, and whether, if it were so, the contractors so complied with every demand as to exclude the Government from going elsewhere.

3588.\* You do not know whether there was a special contract for this Abyssinian work?—My belief is that there was not.

3589. Would it not have been a sound economy to have disregarded any contract for the sake of getting rid of those vessels at an earlier date?—It entirely depends upon the extent to which the contractor met the demands upon him. If he met every demand, nothing would have been gained.

3590. But I understood you to answer my honourable friend that the delay in the discharge was caused by the want of boats?—I believe that to have been a principal cause.

3591. Then more boats would be demanded from him, of course?—Yes.

3592. And if he could not supply them it would have been judicious, would it not, to have gone outside the contract to get them irrespective of those conditions?—Yes.

3593. *Sir J. Elphinstone.*] Supposing that you had gone outside the contract, do you think that you could have got them?—That is another thing, of which I have no means of speaking. My impression would have been that we should not, but it is suggested that there is evidence, in fact, to the contrary.

3594. You would not be surprised if we had evidence here from a captain of a ship, that he could not for any money get boats to land his cargo?—That is what I should have expected from the reports from all the officers.

3595. You were asked if ever an expedition was fitted out so expensively; did you ever know an expedition sent to a country whose resources were so little known, where the basis was so distant, and where the whole condition of the campaign was so abnormal?—I think not.

3596. With regard to water, we are told that Captain Robinson provided tank accommodation for 3,250,000 gallons of water for the force; was that so?—I have no reason to question the correctness of those figures.

3597. Then, I think, dividing that by 29,000, the number of persons who went across, if my figures are right, it amounts to 112 gallons per man for the Expedition; if I am right in that calculation, would you consider 112 gallons to be an excessive supply per man for an expedition going to a coast where there was notoriously no water, and where it was absolutely uncertain how long the force might be detained before the means of procuring water were established?—I should think not; but I have imperfect knowledge of the calculations which would regulate the supply.

3598. You would not think that 112 gallons was an excessive amount per man to undertake

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such an expedition?—I am not sufficiently aware how far the transport people had to find water in their ships, and how far the Government, who took up the transports, had to do it.

3599. But, exclusively of animals, 112 gallons of water per man does not appear an excessive quantity for such an expedition, does it?—I cannot form an opinion about it, stated in that form.

3600. With regard to Hog Island, it has been stated that it would have been a great advantage to have sent the transports over to anchor under Hog Island, and that they were to be discharged in some place, I do not exactly know where, seeing that there is no jetty accommodation at Hog Island; but do you consider that there would have been any advantage in sending ships eight miles away to discharge, when you had not sufficient boats to discharge them in the usual anchorage within three-quarters of a mile from the shore?—I am not sufficiently *au fait* with every consideration which should govern the decision upon a proposal so to have landed; but as I have implied in previous answers, I do not, as far as I understand the matter, and as far as I know the facts, think that any considerable advantage could have been obtained by landing the stores on the other side of the harbour.

3601. As a matter of fact, there is no landing place at Hog Island, is there?—None whatever.

3602. And there is no water, is there?—Of that I am not sure; at that time of year there is a good deal of rain.

3603. But there are no tanks, are there?—No.

3604. So that they would have been dependent upon rain water had the ships been sent there; then the distance from Hog Island to Mazagon Bunder is eight miles, is it not?—I should think it must be fully that.

3605. And in discharging a cargo into boats at Hog Island in the south-west monsoon, for the sake of the supposed shelter to be found there, in the absence of jetties or means of landing there, the cargo boats would have to cross the harbour eight miles to get to Mazagon?—Yes.

3606. The ordinary anchorage is three-quarters of a mile off the shore, is it not?—Yes; perhaps rather more on the average.

3607. To the outside of the anchorage grounds it is about a statute mile, or a mile and a-half, is it not?—It is about that, I should think.

3608. So that by this proposal the cargo was to be landed at Hog Island, eight miles from Bombay, instead of a mile and a-half?—I think that nearly represents the facts.

3609. With regard to the Land Transport Corps, no time would have been saved under any circumstances, as you went on enlisting men notwithstanding the controversy which was going on as to the organisation of the corps; was that so?—So far as it was practicable to enlist them.

3610. Captain Griffith's division, which comprised all the men which it was possible to obtain in the Presidency, was formed at this time, and was among the most efficient, if not the most efficient which was in Abyssinia; was not that so?—I do not remember at this moment what Captain Griffith's division consisted of, but it may possibly meet the drift of the honourable Member's question if I say that only 700 mules

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(I mention mules because it was a question principally of the control of the muleteers) altogether went from Bombay, and the greater part of that number went at a very early time of the Expedition.

3611. What was the number of animals which went with the Land Transport Corps from Bombay altogether?—Altogether about 700 mules, 2,100 ponies, 3,700 bullocks, and 44 elephants went from Bombay.

3612. That bore a very small proportion to the amount of carriage animals in Abyssinia, did it not?—Very small.

3613. Consequently, the difficulties with the

Land Transport Corps in Abyssinia arose from the men of various nations who were collected there as muleteers, and not from the small contingent which went from Bombay?—Exactly; the mules which went from Bombay were well equipped, I believe, both in attendance and everything else, and I believe that they gave no trouble. The difficulty arose from the people there finding it necessary, or thinking it necessary, to send back the muleteers who came from Egypt; the great bulk of the mules came from Egypt.

3614. *Chairman.*] Will you put in a copy of the Bombay charterparty?—I will do so.

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*Friday, 20th May 1870.*

## MEMBERS PRESENT:

Colonel Barttelot.  
Mr. Baxter.  
Captain Beaumont.  
Mr. Candlish.  
Mr. Eastwick.

Lord Elcho.  
Sir James Elphinstone.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Seely.

JOHN CANDLISH, ESQ., IN THE CHAIR.

COLONEL WILLIAM FREDERICK MARRIOTT, re-called; and further Examined.

3615. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE that you desire to make some correction in the evidence which you gave before the Committee at its last sitting?—In reply to Question 3456, I stated, as to the date of the last formal meeting of council, that there was a meeting just before Lord Napier left; the answer would give the impression that that was the only meeting of council about that time; and, consequently, taken in connection with previous answers, that it was the only council which had been held for a long time; as a matter of fact, I recollected afterwards that there were three formal councils held within about a week; the one I mentioned, at which the principal subject of discussion was the opinion which had been formed upon the Abyssinian transport accounts; another was held within a day or two after that to discuss the course which Government should take with reference to the misconduct of a native prince on the western coast; and a third was held a few days after that on the occasion of the swearing in of the new Commander in Chief, Sir Augustus Spencer.

3616. That is more for the sake of accuracy than for any special significance as bearing upon our inquiry?—That depends upon the significance attached by any honourable gentlemen to the frequency of meetings of council.

3617. *Sir John Hay.*] Referring to your evidence regarding the absence of general councils at Bombay, do you consider that the absence of councils was any hindrance to the preparation of the Expedition, or to the arrangements of Lord Napier of Magdala in any way?—Certainly not. The council could only have given Lord Napier the opportunity of orally expounding his wishes, which he had every opportunity of doing, and in fact did frequently in personal communication with the Governor; and unless the Governor had differed from him, there could have been no advantage to him in the presence of any other members of council.

3618. If Lord Napier of Magdala had wished for a meeting of council, would it have been possible for him to have obtained one?—Undoubtedly; and the best proof is, that on one occasion, and that very one to which I alluded, of the consideration of the Transport Corps accounts, he did ask for a meeting of council, and it was immediately conceded.

3619. You stated in your evidence that Lord  
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Napier of Magdala was a member of the Civil Government. Had he practically, before his departure for Abyssinia, a full share, and therefore a full responsibility, in the action of the Civil Government in connection with the Expedition?—Undoubtedly; and I would explain that answer more fully. I think I showed by my answers to certain questions which were put to me at the last meeting of this Committee, that he had a full share in what I may call the initiative action of Government. Of course it will be understood that it is not sufficient for the Government only to give an order, but that it is also of importance that the subordinate officers of Government should effectively carry it out; and Lord Napier had as much power, and therefore as much responsibility, as any other member of the Civil Government in seeing that prompt effect was given to the orders. I might almost say that he had more power, because it will be easily understood that when he was charged with the preparation of the Expedition he was not much troubled with any other matters of civil government; and moreover, there was an officer appointed as Comptroller of Supply and Transport, Colonel Holland, whose sole business, previous to his departure for Abyssinia, was to see how the orders were being carried out and to keep his Lordship informed upon the point. For instance, Lord Napier, on the 26th of September, stated his desire to have six months' provisions intact at Senafé. That request was referred, on the 29th, to the Commissary General to report by what date that six months' supply could be provided. His report, received on the 9th of October, named two months from the date of his receiving the order. That report by the Commissary General that it would take that time, was submitted formally to Lord Napier as a member of the Government, and his initials are at the foot of it, which at least meant that he was so satisfied as not to have any objection to offer as to the time. It has since been stated by historians of the war, that the Government of Bombay failed to comply with Lord Napier's requisition on that point; whereas from what I have stated and from a comparison of the dates, it will be seen that, considering that two months bring the time at which the provisions would be ready at Bombay to the 12th December, that they had to be shipped and despatched to Zulla, and that to remove that quantity

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quantity of stores from Zulla to Senafé would have taken all the transport animals very many months, it was simply impracticable. The point of my present statement, however, is that, whether it was avoidable or unavoidable, Lord Napier had exactly the same power and therefore the same responsibility as any other member of the Civil Government in preventing such delay.

3620. The historian of the war, Captain Hozier, attributes great delay and also avoidable expense to the action of the Bombay Government, in exercising undue economy in taking up ships, and in not attending to the representation of Lord Napier of Magdala about lighterage and cranes; do you think that was so?—Certainly not; as regards the undue economy in taking up vessels, I remember generally the passage in Captain Hozier's book, to which the honourable Baronet alludes, and I remember that it is stated that in consequence of this undue economy, vessels at an early period of the Expedition left the harbour of Bombay to find employment elsewhere. It may be literally true that some masters of ships not foreseeing the great demand may have sailed away at an early period of the Expedition; I cannot say whether it was so or not, but what I can say is this, that no measures which were taken by the marine department, whether of economy or otherwise, interfered with the provision of ships, nor did their measures fail to provide the ships as fast as we wanted them. If they had taken every ship in the harbour at the first moment, because we foresaw the eventual need for them, it is difficult to say what price we might not have had to pay; but there was no want of ships so far as we had the means of embarking men or stores into them; and I may mention a circumstance of which I have a most clear recollection. I remember Lord Napier at an informal meeting of council, as I may call it, at which the Governor and all the heads of departments concerned in the preparation for the Expedition were present, saying that he had been informed by mercantile men that we did not pay enough; that there were some ships which we were not getting because we would not give a sufficient price. I remember the superintendent of marine most distinctly saying, "It is not the case. It is perfectly true that there are ships which have tendered, and at prices which I have declined, but they are ships which cannot possibly be ready, which will not have discharged their own cargo for many days, and I took advantage of that time to play with them; and the competition is such that I always in the end get them at about the price which we have hitherto paid." And when Lord Napier expressed some doubt, he challenged Lord Napier to procure from any merchant the name of any vessel whose acceptance had been delayed after she was ready to be taken. I heard the same kind of conversation, and the same challenge repeated on another occasion, and I know well that it was not met. As regards the other point, the passage in Captain Hozier's book is a remarkable one. The words are, "The early recommendations of Sir Robert Napier for lighterage and cranes were not early attended to, and at first three cotton boats were all that were sent to Annesley Bay, which were to accomplish the landing of the material and supplies of the army; while an officer of the marine department, who in his anxiety for the result, purchased six barges, was ordered to be held

personally responsible for their cost, as at first one alone was sanctioned." As regards the statement that the early recommendations of Sir Robert Napier were not early attended to, though I am not prepared to say that every recommendation was actually carried into effect, I am prepared to say every one was attended to, and that not one was denied by the Civil Government; but the execution of this particular arrangement was carried out according to the advice of Sir Leopold Heath, the Naval Commander in Chief of the Expedition, and nothing was refused that he advised. As regards the statement that three cotton boats were all that were at first sent to Annesley Bay, which were to accomplish the landing of the *matériel* and supplies of an army, it is literally true in the same sense as that, if it had so happened that the first purchase of mules had been a batch of 50, you might say that all that was purchased in the first instance for the carriage of the army was 50 mules. In no other sense is it true that at first three cotton boats were all that were supplied. Before those cotton boats had left Bombay, there were other lighters and barges. As to the concluding statement, that "an officer of the marine department, who in his anxiety for the result purchased six barges, was ordered to be held personally responsible for their cost," the foundation of the story is this, that the superintendent of marine wrote to me at Poona proposing to buy six barges. Sir Leopold Heath advised His Excellency the Governor that they were not suitable for the purpose, and consequently it fell to me to reply, "Do not purchase them." He rejoined, "I had already done it," and in consequence the thing was of course sanctioned. The story about his being held personally responsible for the loss is as simply without foundation as it is possible to be.

3621. At page 81 of the book which you have in your hand, you will observe this passage: After describing Annesley Bay, he says, "By the water's edge, a rude wharf was in course of construction, and near it lay crowds of boats and barges eager to discharge their teeming cargoes of merchandize of war." If that were so, would it seem that there was an insufficient supply of boats for the purpose intended?—Certainly, the inference suggested is inevitable; at the same time, I would admit that a very large number of boats were procured on the coast of Abyssinia, so that it is not absolutely conclusive evidence of the sufficiency of the supply sent from Bombay.

3622. *Chairman.*] Will you point out the other corrections which you wish to make?—The answers that I gave to Questions 3360 to 3365 bore upon the question of the authority on which an increase was made to the European British regiments, and I said that it was on a letter from the Horse Guards; I said so because I had a note showing that the Adjutant General had intimated to me that it was on the authority of the Horse Guards, and I assumed that it was a letter; as a matter of fact, I find that it is a note to a Return which I should not have characterised as a letter had I known exactly what it was; it was a Return explaining the causes of the difference between the numbers originally proposed and those embarked; and the words used are, "in explanation of the increase of strength as per Horse Guards letter dated the 20th of September 1867;" from that I should infer that

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that it was done on the authority of the Horse Guards, and that the inference is correct appears incidentally from Lord Napier's statement that his adjutant general wrote to the Commander in Chief in India saying that it was done by desire of the Horse Guards, although Lord Napier adds that that was not quite accurate. The point of this is that I believe that the increase to the European troops received no distinct or specific sanction from the Bombay Government. Lord Napier says that it was done according to the orders of the Government of India, and I have implied in my answer to the Question 3370 that I think his Lordship was mistaken in supposing that he had any warrant for it from the Government of India; a further investigation of the memoranda which I have confirms me in the correctness of my own statement.

3623. *Sir John Hay.*] I suppose that Lord Lawrence and Sir William Mansfield would be able to give conclusive evidence as to that?—Certainly; Sir William Mansfield would.

3624. *Chairman.*] If that were so, would it not be inconsistent with a communication in the Blue Book, where they indicated 7,500 men?—No; because antecedently to the letter to which I suppose Lord Napier to allude, the Government of India had expressed their acceptance of the gross total of 12,000. Question 3363 is this: "In whose custody will that letter be?" I should like to alter the answer in this way: The statement submitted to the Bombay Government, which implies that the increase was by the authority of the Horse Guards, happens to be with me. The letter to which Lord Napier adverts, written by his adjutant general, inaccurately stating that it was by desire of the Horse Guards, will be both in the office of the adjutant general in Bombay, and the office of the adjutant general of India, that is the office of the commander in chief in India.

3625. *Lord Elcho.*] Assuming, as you did in your last day's evidence, that 840 was the total number of men of all ranks in each of the European regiments, what number of rank and file would that give?—About 735.

3626. Do you know what is the standard strength at which regiments going out to India usually leave this country?—The standard strength of rank and file is 790. They are sometimes below, and sometimes above, but that is what they are intended to be.

3627. I suppose the wear and tear in India, irrespective of any campaigns in which they may be engaged, and simply from the climate, is very considerable?—Yes.

3628. Have you known regiments very much reduced in the Bombay Presidency, simply by the effects of climate?—Yes.

3629. Would it surprise you to hear that a regiment (I think it was the 61st) paraded once at Karachi at the general of the district's parade 13 strong?—Of course it would surprise me; at the same time if it were stated on good authority, I should not absolutely disbelieve it.

3630. With the uncertainty of the climate of Abyssinia, and of the work which we had to do, and with the knowledge that the heat at certain times of the year was excessive, would there have been anything unreasonable in sending strong regiments there with a view to the efficiency of the regiments?—Certainly not; I perhaps ought to add, that every sickly man was left behind by Lord Napier.

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3631. Then did he take 840 of all ranks, or have you to deduct from the 840 those sick men to whom you refer?—The 840 was the number of thoroughly effective men of all ranks which he took, after rejecting depôts and sick.

3632. Do you know what was the regimental state of the 21st Fusiliers at Karachi in February last?—Of February last I have no knowledge. I was ill at sea.

3633. *Chairman.*] I think the increase was about 500 Europeans of all ranks?—I think the increase of Europeans of all ranks was about 500.

3634. And that increase arose in the way you have mentioned?—Yes.

3635. Do you desire to correct your answer with reference to the increase of Indian troops?—Yes; in answer to Question 3374, I say, with regard to the authority to increase the number of native troops, "it was done at the recommendation of Lord Napier; but I must add that he says he recommended it because the Government of India had desired that the native regiments should be generally increased in consequence of the Abyssinian Expedition." I have since ascertained that his Lordship must have been mistaken upon that point, because it was done by the Bombay Government on the recommendation of Lord Napier in September; and the proposal of the Government of India for that general increase of the native regiments was not made until October, and was not carried out in Bombay until November.

3636. The proposal coming from the Government of India would have been inconsistent with what we know was the Government of India's view as to the whole strength necessary for the Expedition, would it not?—I should hardly like to say yes or no to that. I would ask to be permitted to answer that in this way. The Government of India's proposal regarding the native troops for the Expedition was that Lord Napier should take eight regiments of a greater strength, instead of nine at the proposed strength.

3637. The total number was not increased, you believe, at the instance of that Government at all?—No; the other proposal in October was for a general increase of native regiments for the security of India, in consequence of the number gone and liable to go to Abyssinia.

3638. *Sir John Hay.*] But it is the case, is it not, that the general desired, whether rightly or wrongly, for the flexibility of his force, to have a greater number of weak regiments rather than a smaller number of strong regiments?—Yes.

3639. And upon that point the Government of India differed from him, I believe?—Yes.

3640. *Chairman.*] Have you any further corrections to make?—I have not; but I should be glad to be allowed to add, on the point of the action taken by the Bombay Government to provide barges and means of debarkation, that I find a memorandum by Lord Napier of the 13th of September, mentioning "certain points for the consideration of the Government for the adoption of such means as may appear necessary, and may not have been anticipated"; and the first is "the purchase of steam barges of the most suitable description procurable to be employed on the Abyssinian coast, in landing troops, horses, mules, bullocks, elephants, guns, material, and stores"; and I find, in my own handwriting, in the margin, the word, "done," meaning that every necessary step had been already taken on that point at that early date; and I find a formal minute

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minute by his Excellency the Governor to the same effect.

3641. It was mentioned in Bombay, that the Bengal Steam Navigation Company offered you a screw steam barge for a sum of 2,000*l.* in the latter part of the year 1867; that that offer was submitted to you several times without its having been entertained, until, on the 17th February 1868, the same offer was made through a native merchant and at once accepted, at the price at which the barge had been offered some four or five months previously; I will read you the words: "I offered the 'Wadali' steam barge personally; the offer was frequently made to the Government authorities. The sum asked was 2,000*l.* I tried a second time during the latter months of 1867. I offered her again in writing, 17th February 1868, but this time through a native merchant, and sold her at once for 2,000*l.*; upon that I had to pay a commission of 5 per cent. I should have been glad to have sold her for 1,600*l.* if the negotiation had been entertained"; are you aware of that?—As Sir Leopold Heath did not sail for Abyssinia until, I think, the 24th of December, the words "the latter months of 1867" show clearly that the offer must have been made when he was present in Bombay; therefore I can only say that the acceptance or rejection of such things was practically determined by his advice. Of the circumstances under which the barge was actually purchased in February 1868 I have no recollection.

3642. The person whom I am quoting is Mr. Ketteridge, the manager of the Bombay and Bengal Steam Navigation Company, whom you know, I suppose?—Yes.

3643. There is an imputation in the history from which quotations have been made in the questions which have been put to you, that the Expedition was rather impeded for want of tonnage; is it not true that a very large quantity of tonnage was, throughout the whole of the Expedition, lying in Annesley Bay, because Captain Tryon had not force enough to discharge their cargoes?—I know that a large quantity of shipping lay in Annesley Bay with cargoes on board which certainly it would have taken a very long time to disembark.

3644. Then it could not be want of tonnage, whatever else it might be, that in any way impeded or hindered the Expedition?—I do not believe that the Expedition was in any way whatever impeded for the want of sailing tonnage.

3645. Did you engage all the available steam tonnage?—Yes. I am so anxious, for the sake of the Government of Bombay, to make it quite clear about the preparation of the lighters, that I beg permission to add, that I find a note from myself, dated September the 5th, to the Superintendent of Marine, with these words: "He" (that is his Excellency the Governor) "inquires about lighters for debarkation, obtainable or to be sent, and he suggests that some large ones, to form a floating pier, would be desirable." That is incidental evidence of the active part taken at a very early date by the Governor to procure those things.

3646. Was that suggestion acted upon?—I am not prepared to say what followed. That is a demi-official note from myself to the Superintendent of Marine, and I only offer it as evidence that at that early date his Excellency's mind was

occupied in providing those things which it is alleged were so neglected.

3647. Do you know whether anything was done upon that?—I do not doubt that something was done upon it; but I cannot pretend to connect the actual purchasers which, in fact, I do not know, in detail with the particular note.

3648. Sir James Elphinstone.] With regard to the tanks, the ships employed in the Abyssinian Expedition were mainly chartered at Bombay, were they not?—Yes.

3649. They were ships seeking for freight in the ordinary trade, and they had not resorted to Bombay with the expectation of being taken up as transports, I presume?—At first that was so; but how many came afterwards from hearing of the Abyssinian Expedition I cannot tell.

3650. That being the case, would they be likely to be provided with a larger number of tanks than they would be likely to require for their own use as merchant ships?—Certainly not.

3651. Could they have obtained the necessary number of tanks at Bombay if the Government had stipulated that they should so provide themselves?—They would of course have had the difficulty attending such a competition as it would have begotten.

3652. I presume that on a sudden emergency they would have had great difficulty in supplying themselves with tanks, had the Government insisted upon their doing so?—Undoubtedly.

3653. You would have had to pay a higher price for a ship so supplied with tanks, than you would have had to pay for her in her nominal condition as a merchant ship, would you not?—Undoubtedly.

3654. Consequently that may account, may it not, for the Government having been obliged themselves to supply what in this country would have been required of the transports themselves?—Yes.

3655. At page 94, of Captain Hozier's book, I find this statement, "By the end of January the railway was pushed on half-way to Kumeli, the telegraph was completed to Suru, shipping was despatched to bring camels from the coast of Arabia, extensive purchases of animals were made in the country. The disembarkation of these was carried on energetically by means of seven large barges, four tugs, three steam launches and 160 native boats, but the second pier for the Commissariat Department, owing to the want of skilled labour, progressed slowly;" does that look as though there was any great want of boat accommodation?—Certainly not, at that time, and as it must have taken some time to send all those boats and steam-tugs and steam-launches from Bombay, they must have been provided in Bombay at a very much earlier date than that.

3656. Then, at page 97, he says, "Never were operations carried on in a country so unfavourable to war; the very base of operations where, at the end of January, there was a population of about 12,000 men, and animals had to be supplied with water from the condensers and from the shipping. An accident to a delicate piece of machinery, or the breaking of the valve of a pump caused the stock of the precious fluid to run short, and inflicted a great inconvenience in the camp, where the water had to be doled out in daily portions of limited quantity, and a reduction of the ration told heavily on man and beast. A storm of sufficient severity to drive the condensing ships from their anchorage would have

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have caused a terrible calamity. To provide against such an accident every effort was made to provide a reserve of water in a great reservoir which was formed partly of ships' tanks, and partly of a tank sent in pieces from England, and put together on the spot. There was no timber in the country, there was no stone near the sea coast; every block of coral and every beam of wood for the construction of piers or storehouses had to be imported; every inch of rope had to be brought from the ships, every yard of road had to be made to allow the convoys to pass, every boat had to be brought to the coast for the disembarkation of troops and stores, for none were found there, though a liberal supply was expected by some who should have been better informants. The boats that there were could not at first approach the beach, as the water shoaled slowly and the beach was very flat. Not the least arduous of the duties of the campaign was the disembarkation of the cargoes of the ships, and its success was much due to the exertions of Captain Tryon, R.N., who, with limited means, achieved great things;" do you agree in the general tenour of those observations?—Yes.

3657. Colonel *Barttelot*.] I think you were the military secretary and confidential adviser to the Government of Bombay at the time of the Expedition?—I do not think that I have any right to say that it was constitutionally my duty confidentially to advise the Government.

3658. I presume that, as military secretary, it was your duty to counsel and advise them generally upon military matters?—Practically, to the utmost extent in my power; but the Commander in Chief is an *ex-officio* member of the Council, and it is his recognised and constitutional duty to advise. Theoretically, my duty was simply to do what I was ordered. I was merely secretary to the Council.

3659. Were you generally consulted by the Governor through the whole of the organising of the Expedition to Abyssinia?—In some instances when he had the advice of Lord Napier he gave his orders thereon at once without taking the trouble to consult me.

3660. But you were conversant with all the matters which went on with regard to the Abyssinian Expedition, were you not?—Yes.

3661. What were the first orders which came from England with regard to that Expedition?—The first order which involved any action on the part of the Bombay Government was a telegram of the 31st of July, desiring them to prepare at once to collect transport animals.

3662. Did that state at all the size of the force?—No.

3663. Was Lord Napier then at Bombay?—He was at Poona where the Governor was.

3664. Lord Napier was then Commander in Chief of the Bombay Army, was he not?—Yes.

3665. And he and the Governor, I suppose, took immediate steps to carry out the order of the Home Government?—Yes.

3666. Immediately after this, as I understand, Lord Napier was appointed Commander in Chief of the Abyssinian Expedition?—A telegram from the Secretary of State of the 13th August intimated that the command was to be given to Lord Napier.

3667. Then, within a fortnight of the first telegram, Lord Napier was appointed Commander in Chief, was he not?—Yes.

3668. Was there any order then that Lord

Napier was to organise the force as he thought best?—There was no formal order, because before his nomination to the command, he would, as the military adviser of the Government, have had a larger voice than anyone else, and the effect of nominating him to the command was merely to give him a still more weighty voice in the matter.

3669. I presume that when he was appointed Commander in Chief, the Expedition had been finally decided upon; what preparations did you then make?—Lord Napier at once submitted to the Government his views as to the strength of the force and the necessary provisions for the Expedition, and the Government without delay proceeded to give effect thereto.

3670. What mainly, as far as you recollect, decided the number of the force which was to be taken?—Lord Napier's individual opinion of his needs not only mainly, but wholly, decided the number of the force.

3671. Was that force in excess of the first force that the English Government presumed would be sent?—I am unable to answer because there is no statement of what the English Government presumed would be sent. We know that, before that date, smaller forces had been suggested to them, but what presumption they founded upon that advice I do not know.

3672. Had the smaller force been suggested by the Bombay Government?—No.

3673. Who was it that suggested the smaller force?—The Government of India, in August, had suggested a smaller force. I believe that Sir William Merewether had done so in some way. Sir William Merewether, as political agent at Aden, in certain relations of his office corresponded directly with the English Government, and therefore I am unable to answer precisely.

3674. But from the time when Lord Napier took the command he never wavered from his opinion that the larger force was necessary?—Never.

3675. Could the Government at home have formed any estimate at that time of the probable cost of the Expedition?—Of the total cost, certainly not; they might form some estimate of the monthly cost, but even that would be very uncertain.

3676. I think that Lord Napier's requirements were for provisions and stores for six months after the landing of the troops at Annesley Bay?—That was his first demand; but his general demand made in September was that he was to be kept with six months' supplies ahead. Every other particular demand was subordinate to, or intended to be in fulfilment of, that general demand.

3677. Then, were the orders issued by the Bombay Government, that six months' stores and provisions should be provided for the Expedition?—Yes, in the first instance, besides what they took with them.

3678. At that time were the resources of Abyssinia known?—No.

3679. Therefore, would it have been prudent to have started a force of that magnitude to Abyssinia, without having provided supplies and stores for the time named by Lord Napier?—I am unwilling, if I can be permitted to avoid it, to express an opinion either in approval or disapproval of Lord Napier's judgment and discretion.

3680. It was Lord Napier's decided opinion, was it not, that those six months' stores were necessary?—Decidedly.

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3681. I presume

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3681. I presume that when it was known in Bombay that those large quantities of stores would be required the prices immediately rose?—No doubt.

3682. They rose, no doubt, for animals, and for provisions, and for freights?—For everything.

3683. I think that vessels were taken up at Bombay, at Madras, and at Calcutta?—Yes.

3684. Were they taken up at various rates according to the different localities?—Yes.

3685. Therefore it would have been impossible, would it not, for you at Bombay to have estimated what the transport would probably or possibly cost?—Considering the very large proportion of tonnage taken up at Bombay, and considering that after certain experience we were pretty confident of the rate at which we could obtain tonnage at Bombay, I should perhaps be hardly warranted in saying that we could not at any period of the Expedition have made any estimate that would be worth anything.

3686. At what period could you have made an estimate of the tonnage which would have been reliable?—I should think we could have made an estimate in December.

3687. At what period do you think you could have made an estimate of the probable cost of the Expedition?—At no time could we have made an estimate worth anything as to the total cost of the Expedition. In December we might have made an estimate, which was worth something, of the current expenditure per month.

3688. But of the future expenditure, you could not possibly give any reliable or probable estimate, as I understand?—Not of the gross total.

3689. Have you seen General Jameson's month by month's estimate?—I have seen it.

3690. Looking at that estimate, and remembering what has happened, do you consider that to have been a fair and reasonable estimate?—Premising that I have not gone into it with such care as to make my opinion worth more than very little, my impression is that it is as accurate as it could be with the means of making it.

3691. With the exception of the transports, it has turned out to be a tolerably accurate estimate, has it not?—I have reason to believe so.

3692. The great object which of course you had in Bombay was to land the force in Abyssinia as soon as possible, was it not?—Certainly.

3693. And your duty, after the Expedition had sailed and landed, was then only to supply it with such things as were required from Bombay; you yourself individually had nothing further to do with the Expedition, I presume?—Nothing.

3694. Was every care taken that, looking at the size of the Expedition and the country to which it was going, so far as you were able, no unnecessary expense should be incurred?—Certainly, on the part of the Bombay Government.

3695. Sir *John Hay*.] Do you intend to convey by your reply to the honourable and gallant Member any reflection upon any of the other departments concerned in the prosecution of the Abyssinian War, either the Government of India, or the Government at home, with reference to their administration, economical or otherwise, of the Expedition?—Certainly not.

3696. Colonel *Barttelot*.] I find that the inefficient state of the Transport Corps in Abyssinia at an early period of the Expedition was attributed partly to the delay in altering the first proposed scheme of organisation, do you admit that?—

Certainly not, but of course I must explain that answer more fully. Practically, the only difference between the scheme, as first prepared and sanctioned under the orders of Government and accepted by Lord Napier, and that which, in more strict accordance with the first original proposal submitted by Lord Napier, was conceded in the beginning of October, was as to having rather a larger number of soldier superintendents over the muleteers and other drivers. The inefficient and unsatisfactory state of the Transport Corps at Zulla, a little before the time of his Lordship's arrival, was attributed, in the first place, to an epidemic which, I find in Sir Charles Staveley's Report on the 29th of December, was causing deaths at the rate of three per cent. daily. He does not state for how long that went on, but he uses the expression, "They are dying by the epidemic at the rate of three per cent. daily." Another cause of that inefficiency was stated to be the worthlessness of the Egyptian muleteers. Another was the utterly unforeseen circumstance that the tethering gear provided for a great proportion of the mules, namely those that came from Egypt, was made of cotton, and the mules ate it. Another circumstance was the pressing necessity to send on supplies, obliging them to use the carriage at once before it was organised. A letter, written by order of Lord Napier on the 1st of February, mentions as some of the causes, the arrival of the mules before proper arrangements had been made to receive them, the necessity to push up the first body of troops at any sacrifice, the heterogeneous materials of which the first detachments consisted, and the consequent difficulty of officers in communicating with subordinates preventing any effectual attempt being made to carry out the plan of organisation which had been determined on. Sir Charles Staveley, who commanded at Zulla before Lord Napier arrived, telegraphed on the 14th December, "Our transport is still very defective for want of muleteers, camel drivers, and maccudums, none having arrived except those of the advanced brigade; I regard as important a number of mucedams and native interpreters being sent extra to the establishment; European inspectors who do not speak the language are useless." The Committee will not have failed to observe the large extent to which those causes of inefficiency were unpreventable, at any rate by the Bombay Government, or unpreventable by any point of difference of opinion in the original conception of the organisation; but it might be urged that all those things were aggravated by the want of effective superintendents; I admit it might be so; but what I desire to assert is, that the difference between the superintendence conceded in the first instance, and afterwards given at a little later date when Lord Napier on further consideration demanded it, was unappreciable as regards this matter; it is quite true that the officers of the train did feel the want of subordinate superintendents under them, but they had not the superintendents that had been conceded by the first scheme; in fact, the subordinate superintendence which was common to both schemes, if it had been provided at all, would have been effective for that purpose. If anybody asks why they were not provided at all, that is quite a separate question. I am now saying that the delay in conceding that slight point of difference had absolutely nothing whatever

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ever to do with the inefficient state in which at one time the transport corps at Zulla confessedly was.

3697. The Panjáb train was generally admitted to be very superior in its organisation to the other portions of the transport corps, was it not?—It was very much more effective.

3698. And if there had been time to organise the other portions of the transport corps in the same way, would there have been any reason why they should not be equally efficient?—None whatever; if there had been time, it would have been equally efficient excepting so far as the homogeneous character of the muleteers of the Panjáb train was an advantage over the heterogeneous character of the other, which no time occupied in organisation would have wholly got over.

3699. And the others had this great disadvantage, had they not; that they were brought together at Annesley Bay or elsewhere, and had to be organised upon the spot, and spontaneously?—Undoubtedly; the great source of difficulty was the fact that the organisation of the most heterogeneous materials had to be effected at Zulla in the face of all difficulties of climate, water, and epidemic, with the further great difficulty of pressing daily demands to use them before they were organised; whereas the Panjáb train, as the honourable and gallant Member's questions suggested, was deliberately organised in the Panjáb before it was dispatched.

3700. Was the organisation of the Panjáb train more like what the Government of Bombay proposed, or more like what Lord Napier proposed?—It was very much more like what the Bombay Government proposed.

3701. And that organisation answered entirely with reference to the Panjáb train?—Undoubtedly.

3702. And you attribute its great superiority to it homogeneous organisation?—Yes; I do not attribute its superiority to the fact that in the particular points of its organisation it resembled the proposition of the Bombay Government rather than that of Lord Napier, but to the fact that it was thoroughly organised at all.

3703. It had an organisation of its own which the other had not, and there was no time to organise them in the same way?—Just so.

3704. In looking through this book of Captain Hozier's, there are two or three passages to which I should like to call your attention; one is this, at page 267: "The expense was however greater than the Commander in Chief anticipated, because the Government of Bombay, whether in the belief that Theodore would surrender his prisoners on the first threat of an invasion, or that they would be wrested from his grasp by the successes of rebels over him, or from some other cause, did not at the first take sufficiently energetic and vigorous measures;" is that correct, or is it not correct?—It is certainly incorrect.

3705. I think, from your statement to-day, that you have proved it to be incorrect?—I hope so.

3706. Here is another statement: "Whether the Bombay Government were credulous of the assertions of those who believed that Theodore would be terrified by the presence of even a single British soldier at Massowah, or whether supplies were not procurable at such short notice, they did not arrive sufficiently early;" is that true?—Of course I cannot know what was in the minds of

members of the Government, but I am able to speak with certainty that no such anticipation, if held in any way, influenced the action in meeting the supplies for the army, but they were made with the utmost possible expedition.

3707. After Lord Napier once took the command, the Bombay Government thought it was their bounden duty to carry out all the instructions which he gave them with regard to the Expedition, did they not?—I would qualify my answer to this extent: that I have no doubt that the Bombay Government considered it their duty to comply with whatever Lord Napier might formally and deliberately declare to be essential to the Expedition; but they had a distinct responsibility to weigh, and, if need be, to question, the necessities submitted to them.

3708. And did they weigh and consider every proposal which was submitted to them by Lord Napier?—Yes, and no one thing which he ever deliberately requested as being essential for the effective organisation of the Expedition was ever refused to him.

3709. *Chairman.*] With reference to the evidence which you have given this morning, are you of opinion that no inefficiency and no expense were consequent upon the difference of opinion between Lord Napier and the Bombay Government, as to the organisation of the transport trains?—Certainly.

3710. Are you of opinion that no delay resulted from that difference of opinion?—I think that, practically, no delay resulted.

3711. Have you seen Lord Napier's evidence in which he said that he was delayed, because of the want of organisation and efficiency in the transport train?—Yes.

3712. But you do not attribute that inefficiency of the transport train to the difference of opinion which prevailed between the Bombay Government and himself, as to its organisation?—I certainly do not, and I am surprised at the suggestion in his Lordship's evidence to the contrary.

3713. Delay, from whatever cause, would, however, be an element of expense, would it not?—It depends upon what was the subject of delay.

3714. Whatever caused delay in the advance to Magdala, in the progress of the Expedition, would be a source of expense, would it not?—Probably.

3715. It would add to the cost of the Expedition per month, would it not?—Yes.

3716. *Sir John Hay.*] In Question 225, in the examination of Lord Napier, you would find that there is a qualification to the reply to Question 229 (which is the answer to which I think you refer), because the General there states that he considers that there was a great saving of time in placing the matter in the hands of the Bombay Government; would not that, taken in connection with the other question, rather go to show that he did not attach very much importance to the slight delay which in answer to Question 225 he states did occur; but that he conceived that, on the whole, the action of the Bombay Government was such as to occasion a great saving of time?—I am afraid that I cannot accept the inference suggested, because I cannot doubt that Lord Napier's answer to Question 225 had sole reference to placing the matter in the hands of the Bombay Government, rather than in the hands of the Government of India, and that he meant

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meant that there was a saving of time in placing it in the hands of the Bombay Government, of whom he was one, rather than in the hands of the Government of India, and this would not preclude the accuracy of any statement that there was delay from the action of the Bombay Government.

3717. If you will turn to the answer to Question 791, as bearing upon this matter, you will see these words: "I think that the expenditure arising from imperfections is not worthy of consideration, that is to say, worthy of consideration, in the direction of expressing blame, or being deserving of blame;" does not that rather imply that the General, although there may have been slight differences of opinion, did not desire to attach any importance to them in the way of showing the *animus*?—I should certainly draw that inference from that statement alone.

3718. *Chairman.*] But not in connection with the rest of his Lordship's evidence?—I confess that it seems to me hardly consistent with what is implied in other statements.

3719. *Sir John Hay.*] But that special answer would seem to imply that, would it not?—Undoubtedly.

3720. *Chairman.*] The Indian army had, I think, no specially organised transport train previously to this Expedition?—No.

3721. Would not the early adoption of some specific plan of transport have enabled the Commander in Chief to organise and prepare the transport train before embarking from Bombay, the Indian army having been previously without a transport train?—My answer must be that the early adoption did enable him to do it, so far as it was practicable at all.

3722. The non-adoption of his own view as to what the transport train should be, would necessarily involve embarrassment and delay, would it not?—It would seem so, the question being so put; but as a matter of fact it did not necessarily do so; because there was so much to be done, which was not in any way implicated in the points discussed, that there was really not necessarily any delay.

3723. Did I correctly understand you to tell the Committee on Tuesday, that the whole of the expenditure in connection with this Expedition was on an extended and lavish scale, beyond anything of which you have had previous experience?—I did not use the word "lavish;" but, with that explanation, I have no objection to assent to the question.

3724. In speaking in that way you would refer, I apprehend, to the general preparation of supplies, to the transmission of supplies, and to the great number of attendants?—Yes.

3725. Entailing larger shipping necessities?—Perceiving the drift of the honourable Chairman's question, upon which my opinion is asked, I shall perhaps best meet the question, so far as it is appropriate on my part to express opinion at all, by repeating an illustration which I recently used in private conversation on the same point. I said, a rich man having to give an entertainment may reasonably do it by a *carte blanche* to Messrs. Gunter, preferring security against failure to any consideration of expense; but, having so done, he would not expect that the bill, either in its total or its items, would preclude the supposition that it would have been possible to do it at less cost. The British Government was rich enough to employ Lord Napier for its Abyssinian enter-

tainment, and the result was a success beyond our hopes. I have stated a case of an agency known to be profuse and costly, but nevertheless chosen to ensure success; and I have suggested a parallel which will convey to the Committee my opinion of the general cost of the Abyssinian Expedition.

3726. Then the illustration is, that in this case the gentleman giving the dinner is the British Government, and Messrs. Gunter is the Bombay Government; is that so?—No; Lord Napier. I said that the British nation was rich enough to employ Lord Napier.

3727. *Sir John Hay.*] Because by so doing it dismissed the probability of failure?—Yes.

3728. *Chairman.*] Carrying out the illustration, you would expect Messrs. Gunter's operations to be all perfect of their kind, and to be an entire success, would you not?—You are reasonably sure of success in both cases.

3729. *Sir John Hay.*] It was a great success, was it not?—It was an extraordinary success.

3730. *Chairman.*] With regard to the supply of water-tanks, is it not correct that a very large excess of water-tanks were supplied in Bombay beyond the necessities of the case?—I had the honour of explaining, at the last meeting of the Committee, that I remembered that the Bombay Government had *prima facie* reason to suppose that water-tanks had been purchased beyond our need, that inquiry was made in consequence, and that I never saw the answer.

3731. Are you still under the impression that the necessities of the case were greatly exceeded?—I cannot tell what explanation might be given; I think exactly as I thought then, that there was some good reason to suppose that the purchase, whether blameably or otherwise, had, in fact, exceeded our needs.

3732. You spoke of the loss of animals in Abyssinia resulting from an epidemic; do you give any opinion as to the cause of that epidemic?—None.

3733. If the cause was preventable, the epidemic would have been preventable, would it not?—Undoubtedly.

3734. And whether it was from neglect or want of food, or want of water, you do not know?—I had some evidence upon that subject, because it happened to me only very recently to read a statement of the principal veterinary surgeon, that mules and horses cannot live at Zulla in the months of January and February; showing plainly that the result of his professional inquiries was a conviction that it was something perfectly inevitable.

3735. But you are aware that they were unfed and not adequately watered?—At one time they were not watered adequately.

3736. Would not an unfavourable condition of temperature and climate, in connection with want of care, aggravate the tendency to disease, and so increase the loss?—No doubt; but it so happens that the reports show that the epidemic did not break out until the arrangements for the care of the animals had become comparatively efficient.

3737. *Sir James Elphinstone.*] Could we obtain the report of the veterinary surgeon?—The passage which I have in my mind is in a letter of Sir Charles Staveley's, who says, "Principal Veterinary Surgeon Lamb says" so-and-so. I can give that, if necessary. I have that letter of Sir Charles Staveley's.

3738. *Chairman.*]

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3738. *Chairman.*] You stated, did you not, that nothing was known of the provisions obtainable in Abyssinia previously to the Expedition?—Yes; but I did not use the word “nothing,” in an absolutely accurate sense.

3739. The Quartermaster General, under a very early date, says, “Sheep, cattle, wood, water, and forage appear abundant, especially as you proceed southward”; and Lord Napier, on July the 23rd, writes, “Meat, corn, and forage may be procured in the country”; were you aware of that?—In assenting to the words “nothing was known,” I merely meant that nothing was known with sufficient certainty to affect, in any considerable degree, the supplies to be made by the Bombay Government.

3740. *Sir John Hay.*] That knowledge was inaccurate, was it not?—It did not turn out to be wholly true.

3741. *Chairman.*] But you are not informed that the Expedition failed to draw supplies from Abyssinia, especially in the advanced portions of the march?—Of course they derived some supplies.

3742. *Sir John Hay.*] You would hardly, upon the point of the actual supplies to the army in the field, give evidence in contradiction to that of the General who was actually there, I presume?—Certainly not.

3743. *Chairman.*] Nor would you give evidence against the official Returns as to what was actually received in the country?—No.

3744. You assented to a description of the state of things at Annesley Bay, quoted from Captain Hozier's book by the honourable and gallant Member on my right (*Sir John Hay*). All the conditions under which the Expedition would land in Annesley Bay, such as the state of the shore, the modes of landing, the want of piers, every condition, indeed, under which the Expedition was to land, was known to the Commander in Chief before he started; and the state of things which he found there could not come upon him therefore as a surprise?—Excepting so far as the actual sight of such a state of things may be different from the impression which one has received from a written description, that is true, I believe, comparing the dates of Lord Napier's arrival, and the time immediately preceding his departure; but going on a little farther back than the time immediately preceding his departure, it does not hold good.

3745. Was not the minutest description furnished to the Commander in Chief by the expeditionary reconnoitring force of the state of things in Annesley Bay?—As a matter of fact, I rather think there were important points as to which he did not receive a correct impression.

3746. Were not all those circumstances which are stated in the extract which has been read from Captain Hozier's book known by the Commander in Chief before he left Bombay?—To begin with, I doubt if the reports which he received could have given him full information as to the extent to which he would have to supply the men and animals with water condensed by the steamers.

3747. The failure of the water at Zulla was reported to him, however, before that, was it not?—Yes, I did not say that he had no information.

3748. Then he would know that he had to supply water for the men and animals that he had under his command, whatever the number might be?—I could not undertake to say that.

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3749. With regard to the scale on which the Expedition was provided with stores, I presume that you would consider that from a month to six weeks would be quite sufficient time for a steamship to go from Annesley Bay to Bombay, to take on board stores at Bombay, and to return to Annesley Bay and land the stores there?—Yes.

3750. And the Commander in Chief could draw supplies from Egypt in about a month, could he not?—If the supplies were ready at Suez, he could do it in less time.

3751. *Sir John Hay.*] Could he place them on the highlands within that time?—No.

3752. *Chairman.*] What would have been the time necessary to furnish the Expedition with supplies from Bombay or Aden?—The passage for a steam vessel might be taken as a fortnight each way, between Bombay and Annesley Bay, and you must allow a certain time in Bombay for shipping whatever he sent for.

3753. Six or eight weeks would be a sufficient time, would it not?—Yes.

3754. *Sir John Hay.*] But would not that be dependent upon whether Lord Napier might have happened to be either at Zulla, or 400 or 500 miles from it?—Hardly, because he had a telegraph.

3755. *Chairman.*] How long would it take him to supply himself with stores in Abyssinia?—It would take probably from six to eight weeks by steamers to bring the stores to the coast; but how long it would take to carry them on to the front it is impossible for me to answer.

3756. Do you, with that fact before you, see any reason why there should have been a constant surplus stock of six months for the whole Expedition?—I know, in a general way, what Lord Napier would say if he were asked that question, and I am unwilling, as I have expressed on one or two other occasions, to be put in a position which would only reflect upon myself, of expressing a military opinion about the necessities in detail.

3757. You are aware, are you not, that Lord Napier's plan was to have 9,500 men with six months' supplies up as far as Senafé?—Yes.

3758. How long would it take to carry from the coast six months' supplies for that force?—There was a computation made, the accuracy of which I have no reason to question, that, allowing for the need to carry the range of the animals that would be required to carry the supplies, it would have taken something like 50,000 mules for two months.

3759. Then, in point of fact, it was utterly impossible for Lord Napier to supply himself with six months' provision on the highlands of Abyssinia, certainly within the year 1868, on the supposition that he had to remain there during a second campaign?—It was practically impossible for him to supply himself at Senafé before May with everything that was included in his six months' supplies. He might have everything that was absolutely necessary to keep the troops alive in less time, but the things that were included in the six months' statement could not have been all carried to Senafé by April.

3760. You are aware that he never had more than two months complete supplies at Senafé, are you not?—I do not know, but I have no reason to doubt that.

3761. *Captain Beaumont.*] If I understand you rightly, that is on the assumption that the land transport train was as it was?—Exactly.

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3762. *Chairman.*]

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3762. *Chairman.*] The object of having six months' supplies at Senafé was, if I mistake not, to make the Commander in Chief altogether independent of his communication with the coast, the probability being that in the rainy season his communication with the coast would be cut off?—I have no doubt that that was so. It is nowhere stated, but it is my inference.

3763. Then if the six months' supply was not got up to Senafé, there could be no object, could there, in having that supply sent to Abyssinia?—I should not like to say that, because it is conceivable that the troops might have been detained below Senafé.

3764. But I presume that Lord Napier never contemplated having to retire upon the coast again?—Of course he hoped not.

3765. Then the six months' provisions which were ordered, I think, in the month of January, and which were entirely despatched by the month of March, could never have reached Senafé during that season, before the rain set in, could they?—The whole of them could not certainly.

3766. Before they were landed in Abyssinia, the rainy season would have commenced, I suppose?—As far as I know about the date of the rainy season, no.

3767. It sets in about the end of May or June, does it not?—I believe so; but all the stores were in Annesley Bay long before that.

3768. Not the additional six months' supplies?—All except a portion of the hay.

3769. Are you aware whether any portion of them were landed?—I am aware that a very great quantity was not landed.

3770. The Comptroller of Supply and Transports sent forward a requisition to Bombay for six, or eight, or nine months' supply after he landed at Annesley Bay; was it possible for that to have been despatched and landed in the highlands before the rainy season set in?—I should say certainly not, as regards the whole of it.

3771. Could any appreciable quantity of it have been despatched and landed before that time?—I cannot undertake to say that no appreciable quantity could have been landed; they had all been despatched. The demands had been fully complied with by about the 31st March from Bombay; on the 31st of March the greater part had left Bombay, and therefore they may have been on the coast of Abyssinia by the middle of April. Between the middle of April and the rain setting in an appreciable quantity might have been forwarded to the front.

3772. The object being to get the provisions up to Senafé, and to make the Commander in Chief independent of the coast; if they had not been shipped in time the shipment would have been altogether in vain, and the cost of the purchase and the cost of the ships would have been thrown away, would it not?—Yes, on the assumption (which I have not intended to admit) that the making of the Commander in Chief independent of the coast was the sole object with which the supplies were asked for.

3773. Sir *John Hay.*] I suppose that if the provisions could not come to the army, a portion of the army would have had to go to the provisions?—Exactly.

3774. It would have been much more convenient to a starving army to have had the provisions at the coast than to have had them at Bombay or in Egypt?—Exactly; that was what was in my mind.

3775. *Chairman.*] If there was no communication between the coast and the army, it would make very little difference where they were, I presume?—Yes, on the supposition that there was no possible means of communication.

3776. I think you are aware that provisions were purchased both at Karachí and at Bombay, and that the price of gram at Karachí was 22 rupees, whilst at Bombay it was 26 rupees, it being purchased at both places for the use of the Expedition?—I have no personal knowledge of the prices, but I do not question the correctness of the information.

3777. Then there was no difficulty in drawing the supplies altogether from Karachí, was there?—I cannot answer that question.

3778. You do not know what proportions were drawn from Bombay, and what from Karachí?—No.

3779. There was a commissariat establishment at Karachí, the same as there is at Bombay, was there not?—There was a commissariat office established at Karachí.

3780. Were not transports proceeding from Karachí the same as from Bombay, with men and animals?—Yes.

3781. Do you know of any difficulty in drawing stores from Karachí, rather than from Bombay?—If I understand the question to be, that supposing they had been available at favourable prices at Karachí, was there any difficulty in purchasing there and sending from there, I know of none.

3782. Are you aware that rice at Calcutta was about half the price that it was at Bombay?—I am aware that it was very much cheaper, but I do not know exactly what it was.

3783. Are you aware that, nevertheless, it was drawn largely from Bombay?—Yes, but it was also drawn largely from Calcutta.

3784. The prices being about seven rupees, and fourteen rupees respectively, as I understand?—Yes.

3785. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] Rice was also obtained from Madras, was it not?—I doubt whether it was largely obtained from Madras.

3786. Sir *John Hay.*] I suppose it was procured wherever available tonnage could be procured for carrying it?—Yes.

3787. *Chairman.*] You are aware, I think, from the Blue Book that large supplies were sent from England, and amongst them, rice, sugar, and tea?—Yes.

3788. Not less than 38 tons of sugar were sent from England to India; how do you account for that?—I account for it by the fact that the English officers thought it desirable to send three months' supplies for 4,000 Europeans in the steamers they sent out; and having determined to send three months' supplies, they were sent complete in every article.

3789. Amongst other things they thought it desirable to send sugar and rice to India, did they not?—Yes.

3790. Were the prices largely raised at Bombay by the purchases of provisions which you had to make?—I do not know.

3791. Had you any means of knowing that the seeming competition which you had in response to the advertisements for tenders for supplies was entirely colourable; the various tenders being sent in by the same persons all interested in every tender?—I have no means of knowing it.

3792. I put

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3792. I put that question to Colonel Dunster-ville, and you interposed, saying, "I should prefer to answer that myself. The question, as put, goes beyond a mere question of fact, involving questions of the discretionary administration of the Commissariat Department." Will you favor the Committee with your answer to that question now?—My answer would be that I have no means of knowing whether it was so or not.

3793. Was there a combination for the purpose of defeating competition?—I do not know whether it was so or not.

3794. With regard to the shipping, the "Himalaya" was a ship belonging to the Bombay and Bengal Steam Navigation Company, was she not?—Yes.

3795. She was chartered at Bombay at 24 rupees per ton per month?—She was offered and accepted at 24 rupees; but I do not feel sure that it is correct to say that she was chartered.

3796. The negotiation, at all events, was complete in that way?—Yes.

3797. Was she subsequently offered and accepted at 27½ rupees at Calcutta?—Yes.

3798. Thereupon, did the company disown the authority of the Bombay agency, and did they accept that of the Calcutta agency, and were they paid upon the Calcutta charter?—Yes.

3799. Whilst disowning the Bombay agency in the matter of the "Himalaya," its agency was acknowledged in the matter of the other ships which were chartered; how do you account for that occurrence?—I can only account conjecturally that there being two agents of the same company, one of whom made an offer to the Bombay Government, and the other to the Government of India, the company naturally closed with the higher, the more profitable one, although it was not, in fact, the first one.

3800. Then the Government of India were not informed of what had been done in Bombay?—Exactly; that is the explanation.

3801. And the Government of Bombay permitted the transaction, and allowed the company to adopt the charter concluded, I think, six weeks later, at 27½ rupees, than the one into which they had at first entered at 24 rupees?—They represented, immediately they knew it, to the Government of India the fact that she had been offered at 24 rupees.

3802. But do you not hold that the ship's having been under engagement to you, offered to and accepted by you, was not free to be dealt with in Calcutta?—Not if it was known.

3803. It was known to you, and there was a correspondence about it, was there not?—Yes; but it was not known to the people, who accepted her at Calcutta.

3804. But before she was paid, the paymaster, namely, the British Government, being the same in both places, it was known, was it not?—Yes.

3805. I think you told me that you could get for me information as to when instructions were sent from Bombay to Calcutta to charter a steamer, which resulted in the chartering of the "Dacca"?—All that I am able to obtain is this; I find that the "Dacca" was taken at Calcutta on the 26th of May. I know that she was taken promptly on a telegraphic message from the Bombay Government requesting it. Therefore, though I cannot give the exact date, the request to the Bombay Government was very shortly before the 26th of May.

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3806. What was the object in instructing the Indian Government to take up that ship?—To hasten the return of the troops from Abyssinia.

3807. Are you aware that a great portion of them had left at that date?—I was not aware; but there is an officer in the room, Captain Tryon, who could tell you exactly.

3808. At whose instance was that ship chartered?—At the instance of the Bombay Government.

3809. On requisition from Abyssinia?—No; entirely on the part of the Bombay Government.

3810. Do you know what reasons weighed with them?—Yes; a general consideration of what steamers they had, and of the probability that it would be on the whole an economical measure to send this further steam power.

3811. Notwithstanding the fleet that was at Annesley Bay?—Yes.

3812. You are aware that that vessel proceeded to Aden?—Yes.

3813. On her way to Annesley Bay?—Yes.

3814. And on reaching Aden, was she sent back to Calcutta?—Yes.

3815. And she rendered no service whatever, did she?—I believe she rendered no service whatever.

3816. She received some 6,000 l. or 7,000 l. for the transaction, did she not?—I have no reason to question it; but I do not know whether that is so.

3817. Sir John Hay.] That is nothing unusual in war, I suppose?—No.

3818. Chairman.] After your description of the manner in which the Bombay Government conducted their business, who shall we say was the Bombay Government in this case?—Sir Seymour Fitzgerald.

3819. Another ship, the "Sakura," was chartered on the 20th of June, at 65 shillings, or 32½ rupees per ton per month, I believe?—I am sorry to say that I have endeavoured to find memoranda on that subject, and I have not found any, and therefore I can only state what I think is probable. I think that on inquiry from Captain Robinson, the superintendent marine, on the subject, he told me that she was taken to pilot vessels into the harbour. I also remember that I questioned on some ground (I do not know what) the accuracy of his information. My impression is that she was taken out to carry the returned muleteers and followers to Karachí on their way to the Panjáb; but I never had the opportunity of completing the inquiry.

3820. Sir John Hay.] You have the impression that she was taken up for some purpose?—Yes, I do not question the fact.

3821. Chairman.] She was taken up on the 20th of June, and discharged on the 5th of August?—I do not question it.

3822. That would be at a time when there was an enormous fleet of steamships and sailing ships in Bombay harbour?—That may have been so.

3823. She was chartered in Bombay?—Yes.

3824. The Bombay and Bengal Steam Navigation Company offered to sell you their steamers at 27 l. per ton; you had some Governmental discussion as to the advisability of buying the steamers instead of chartering them, had you not?—Every offer of that kind was considered. I have a distinct recollection of the question of buying vessels, or not, being more than once particularly considered. In fact, we did buy some

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some vessels, and we did refuse many other offers.

3825. Are you aware that the vessels of another company, the British India Steam Navigation Company, cost you at the rate of 26 l. and some shillings per ton during their hire?—It may be so; I do not see any reason to question it.

3826. Are you aware that the company were paid upwards of a quarter of a million of money, and that it came to 26 l. and some shillings per ton?—No.

3827. With regard to the ships which went out from England, do you concur in the statement of Captain Robinson, that in proportion to their tonnage they carried one-third fewer troops than the ships which you chartered in Bombay?—No, it is not a point as to which I should either concur or dissent.

3828. But you would be aware that fitting up ships to carry troops on the orlop decks in India, is a very bad arrangement?—I happen to have been informed on very good authority that in this instance the fittings of the orlop decks for troops was a kind of supererogatory arrangement in case they were wanted; and therefore, although I assent to the question, I should like to qualify its apparent application.

3829. Such a thing as carrying troops on the orlop deck in India is unknown, is it not?—I should not like to say that; but it is considered undesirable.

3830. The Bombay Government suggested to the Home Government that the troop ships should be employed in aiding to convey the Expedition from Bombay to Annesley Bay, did they not?—Yes.

3831. Was that suggestion declined by the Home Government?—Yes.

3832. What disadvantage would there have been to the relief service if that suggestion had been acted upon?—It would have been a very great inconvenience in disarranging the elaborate arrangement of reliefs. The arrangement of reliefs is a very complicated matter, and to have thrown that out would have been a very serious inconvenience.

3833. There were three of those vessels in the Indian seas, I believe?—Yes.

3834. Is it not a usual thing for troops to expect that in times of war they will have to submit to the inconveniences which war entails?—Undoubtedly.

3835. Then the only inconvenience would have been to have arrested the reliefs for a month or two, would it not?—I do not say that it would necessarily have arrested the reliefs; I only say that it would have upset the established arrangement of reliefs, and obliged us to make other arrangements.

3836. Could not you have arrested the reliefs altogether, and stopped the process for a while?—Of course it would have been possible to do so.

3837. Would there be any great difficulty about that?—No great difficulty, but it would have been a very great inconvenience, and, unless quite inevitable, a practical injustice to an enormous number of persons.

3838. Those ships would have carried a couple of thousand troops each, would they not?—I think 2,000 is too much to say; I believe that 1,200 is about the number.

3839. In a couple of months those three ships would have taken from Bombay to Annesley

Bay about 7,000 or 8,000 men, would they not?—Yes.

3840. And their supplies for the passage?—Yes.

3841. How many decks have they for troops?—They have two decks; there are three decks to some extent.

3842. Then all the hold below those decks will be available for cargo?—Yes.

3843. Do you know any reason why ships of the line from England might not have gone out and been employed?—The question is beyond my cognizance.

3844. Do you think that a ship of the line would have made a very good hospital ship?—I really have no knowledge upon the subject.

3845. The Bombay Government suggested to the Home Government that one hospital ship should be sent out, did they not?—Yes.

3846. Were not three sent?—Three were sent.

3847. Without any requisition from the Bombay Government?—Yes.

3848. Have you any knowledge how that happened?—No.

3849. Captain *Beaumont*.] With reference to the Indian transports being employed in connection with the expedition, was it not Sir Seymour Fitzgerald's opinion that that course should have been taken?—I am unable to answer that question; my recollection of what passed is not sufficiently accurate. I am aware that Sir Seymour Fitzgerald thought that it might be desirable; I am not prepared to say that as regards the preparation for, and sending of, the Expedition (I am not speaking of the return of the force), there was any juncture at which Sir Seymour Fitzgerald thought the need to use those vessels was greater than the inconvenience.

3850. I understood (whether rightly or wrongly I cannot say) from Sir Seymour Fitzgerald himself, that his opinion was very strongly in favour of that course being taken; you know nothing to gainsay the opinion which I formed from the conversation which I had with Sir Seymour Fitzgerald?—If you received that impression from Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, I know nothing which should make me suppose that you necessarily misunderstood him.

3851. *Chairman*.] Are you aware that the Bombay Government telegraphed home to England suggesting the employment of troop-ships?—I do not recollect the words of the telegram.

3852. It is dated the 27th August 1867: "If we can have the new troop-ships during all December, there will be no difficulty in getting good sailing transports which can be towed." Were you aware of that?—That seems exactly to agree with what I meant to imply, namely, that Sir Seymour Fitzgerald wished to have the authority to use them if it were necessary.

3853. Sir *John Hay*.] That was without reference to the fact that we might have had to detain them for the purpose of distilling water for the troops?—Quite so.

3854. *Chairman*.] But only a limited number of steamers were detained to distil water?—Certainly; all were not, but a very considerable number were.

3855. You had an offer from the Bombay and Bengal Steam Navigation Company to take supplies to Annesley Bay at per ton, month by month, by their steamers going from Bombay to Suez, had

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had you not?—Yes; I have a general recollection of it.

3856. Was that offer declined?—Yes.

3857. Do you know on what ground it was declined?—I can answer generally that the offer was upon terms which would have caused such enormous expense, in case of delay in receiving the stores when they arrived, that that alone was a great objection to it.

3858. Have you the terms of the offer?—No.

3859. In negotiating for tonnage with the British India Steam Navigation Company, you found a postal contract in existence, which defined the terms on which you should take their tonnage, if, during the period of that contract, the tonnage should be required for Government purposes?—There was a postal contract with that company which regulated the price which should be paid if the Government took without option on their part their vessels for the service of the Government.

3860. That was 27½ rupees per ton per month, was it not?—That was 27½ rupees per ton per month.

3861. That ruled the rates which you had to pay them in the main, did it not?—I think I may say that in the main it did; it so happened that they tendered four vessels at 24 rupees, which we took.

3862. Did they tender those vessels at that rate in ignorance of their own contract?—As far as I could make out they tendered at that rate in ignorance of their own power.

3863. At the time when you were compelled to give them 27½ rupees, you got the Peninsular and Oriental Company's vessels at 22 rupees, did you not?—Yes.

3864. Then you paid 11s. per ton per month more for those boats, because of that contract, than you did for the Peninsular and Oriental Company's boats?—Yes.

3865. Can you tell me what number of ships came to Bombay after the Expedition, which were ultimately bound for Calcutta, and subject to be discharged at Calcutta, under the conditions of their charters?—I cannot state the number, but I know that there were a good many.

3866. That would prolong their time of service, and increase their pay, would it not?—Yes.

3867. Had you any difficulty in getting coals in Bombay?—No.

3868. Do you know the terms under which the arrangement was made with the Peninsular and Oriental Company for supplying coals there?—I have had the terms under review, though I do not remember them perfectly; but I know that the very meaning of the terms was in dispute between the Bombay Government and the Peninsular and Oriental Company.

3869. What quantity of coals, taken from the Peninsular and Oriental Company, was left after the Expedition was over?—There was a considerable dispute as to the liability of the Government to take a quantity of coals which the Peninsular and Oriental Company claimed that they should take. The arrangement was made by the English Government, and therefore the Bombay Government could not speak authoritatively as to the meaning and intention of the arrangement; but they were under the impression that we had only to pay for what we required. The Peninsular and Oriental Company, on the other hand, claimed to be paid for what they had

sent out, in order to supply the Government. I think I have in the main accurately represented the difference of opinion which arose.

3870. Are you aware that there were 20,000 tons of coals which were left lying unused at Bombay at Christmas last?—I cannot answer that question. It was an open question, I think, when I last had anything to do with it, whether a very large quantity of coals belonged to the Government or to the Peninsular and Oriental Company.

3871. Have you taken over, for the use of the Bombay Government, a large quantity of coals left from the Expedition?—Yes.

3872. Would those coals be the coals received from the Peninsular and Oriental Company?—We had taken a certain portion from the Peninsular and Oriental Company. I recollect that at a certain time we said in effect that we would not take any more until this dispute was settled in England, but we had taken some.

3873. Sir John Hay.] Are you aware that a telegram was sent (No. 71 in the Blue Book) from the Government of Bombay to the Secretary of State for India, requiring 10,000 tons to be immediately sent to Aden and 10,000 tons to Bombay?—Yes. In saying that we had no difficulty in procuring coals, I included every means, by getting them from England and otherwise.

3874. Chairman.] Were we correctly told by Captain Robinson that 10,000 of those surplus coals had been taken over for the use of the Bombay Government at 12½ rupees per ton?—My impression is, that the quantity of coal, whatever it was, taken at that price of 12½ rupees, was only balances on board of transports which were sold to the agents of the transports.

3874.\* We had another statement from yourself or Colonel Dunsterville, I think, on January the 22nd, that the balances had been sold at 14 rupees per ton; do those statements apply to the same coals or to different parcels of coals?—No; I understood that the price of 12½ rupees only referred to balances on board the transports, and that any other price referred to some other coal.

3875. And the British Government bought these coals at 71s. 6d. per ton, which was the average cost at Bombay, and sold them at 28s.?—It is possible.

3876. And they were bought by the Bombay Government, were they not?—I do not recollect the transaction, but I do not question it.

3877. Sir John Hay.] Very great convenience resulted to the Expedition, I suppose, from the arrangement with the Peninsular and Oriental Company?—Very great.

3878. And they fulfilled their engagement, I will not say with considerable loss to themselves, but at a considerable amount of responsibility, did they not?—Yes.

3879. The telegram from the Governor of Bombay to the Secretary of State for India on the 23rd of August 1867, was, "At Aden 10,000 tons of steamer coal will be wanted, and at Bombay 10,000." Should you be surprised to learn that before those 10,000 arrived there, the Peninsular and Oriental Company had supplied upwards of 16,000 tons at Aden to the Expedition?—That was so, I believe.

3880. And if there had been no supply from the Peninsular and Oriental Company at Aden, probably the Expedition would have had to stop, would it not?—I should not like to say that they would have had to stop.

3881. There

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3881. There was no other means of supplying them at Aden, was there, but through the stores of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, except something like 4,000 tons in the stores of the Messageries?—But still certain quantities might have been sent from Bombay.

3882. But Bombay was at that time short of coal; are you aware that by a further telegram 10,000 tons more were sent for from Bombay?—No doubt that was done as a precautionary measure, but it so happened that a considerable number of ships laden with coal were coming in which we purchased.

3883. But supposing that those 20,000 tons had not been sent for from England, those coals which you did purchase would have been purchased at a higher rate, would they not?—In all probability.

3884. Therefore, the supply which you obtained from the Peninsular and Oriental Company kept down the price at Bombay where so large a demand was being made?—I should think so.

3885. As a matter of fact, was there in the month of December a large amount of coal disposable, in addition to the Peninsular and Oriental Company's coal at Bombay, over and above the requirements of the Expedition?—There were very considerable purchases of coal to arrive, which were more, as I believe, than was anticipated when that demand was made in August; but I do not in the least mean to imply that the two together were beyond what it was very desirable we should have.

3886. As a matter of fact, the Peninsular and Oriental Company having very large consumption of coal out there themselves, and having an arrangement with the Government which they had frequently carried out before, were the natural resource, were they not, to whom the Government would turn under such exceptional circumstances?—Yes.

3887. And they fulfilled their self-imposed duty satisfactorily, did they not?—Quite so.

3888. And, as a matter of fact, even before the extra war supplies which they were called upon to send out to India for the Abyssinian Expedition, they had from their ordinary sources at Aden alone supplied 16,871 tons, had they not?—I do not question it.

3889. And at Bombay they were giving equal facilities, as far as it was in their power to do so?—Yes.

3890. Captain *Beaumont*.] In the answer which you gave to the honourable Chairman with reference to the sale of the coal, you are, perhaps, not aware that I was informed by Commander Robinson on the 22nd of January that the whole of the stock of the Abyssinian Expedition coals had been disposed of by auction to the highest bidder in the open market, that it fetched 14 rupees, and 14½ rupees per ton, according to the lots; that the Bombay Government, who gave four annas a ton more than any other bidder would offer, were the purchasers; that there was a fair amount of competition, Nicoll and Company, the Peninsular and Oriental Company, and native dealers being bidders?—I was not accurately aware of it, but I do not question the accuracy of it now that it is stated.

3891. Was not a considerable amount of specie sent from England to Bombay for the purposes of the Expedition?—No.

3892. Did not some specie come from England

to Suez, and was it not thence sent to Aden and so on to Bombay, and from Bombay to Annesley Bay, thereby making three separate voyages, on each of which the captain of the ship received a commission which was paid to him?—The Accountant General in Bombay, or those who paid the freight allowance in England, would alone know for certain, but I cannot think that it can have come on to Bombay without my knowing it.

3893. All specie ought to have gone to Zulla direct, and not to Bombay, I presume?—Certainly not to Bombay, but some of it may reasonably have been sent to Aden.

3894. Is there any person in England to whom we can refer for official information with regard to the points which I have raised?—I presume that the Admiralty could tell what allowances for freight were paid to captains of ships; and from that you might infer the information which you desire to have. In no other way could it be obtained in England.

3895. With reference to the discharge of ships, would there have been any objection to the employment of night work in the harbour at Bombay?—I am not capable of judging.

3896. Sir *John Hay*.] You do not feel that your duties led you to investigate that particular subject?—Exactly.

3897. Captain *Beaumont*.] The Government, had they been requested to have done so by the naval authorities, would have made no difficulty, I presume, in over-riding the port regulations, and giving permission to work at night?—Certainly not, if they could, with legal propriety, do so.

3898. Sir *James Elphinstone*.] With regard to the six months' stores which Sir Robert Napier was so urgent on the Bombay Government accumulating for his use on the coasts of Abyssinia, would it have been practicable to have got those stores forward to Abyssinia from Bombay, had their accumulation been postponed until the south-west monsoon?—I should say not.

3899. If those stores had all been landed at Annesley Bay, would it not have been necessary to reload the ships with such stores as were left at the end of the Expedition?—No; because you might have abandoned them. Those which you wished to take away undoubtedly must have been reloaded.

3900. Were not the ships the best warehouses you could have had until the stores were actually wanted to be sent up?—That they were very good warehouses is indisputable, but as to the cost I have not calculated it.

3901. Setting aside the cost entirely, as a matter of convenience for the Expedition, what is your opinion?—They were most convenient.

3902. It has been stated that the price of rice in Calcutta was one-half of what it was in Bombay; assuming the distance from Calcutta to Bombay by the nearest route to be 2,300 miles, does it follow that the rice, by the time it had been brought from Calcutta to Bombay, would have been so much cheaper as was supposed?—I do not know how much it was supposed to be, but I imagine, so far as I can answer, without making an arithmetical calculation, that the difference of freight, under ordinary circumstances, would not equal the difference of half the price.

3903. I think there was a large quantity of rice purchased at Madras, was there not?—I know there was at Calcutta, but I do not know about Madras; perhaps Colonel Holland, the Comptroller

Comptroller of Supply and Transport, will be able to answer that question.

3904. Are you aware that rice is not infrequently cheaper in the English market than it is in many of the ports in India?—I do not know anything about that.

3905. You do not know that within the last two years it has been exported with considerable success to India?—I was not aware of it.

3906. *Chairman.*] Were not ships chartered at Bombay for the Expedition, bringing stores of all kinds and troops and animals?—Yes.

3907. The rice would have cost no more freight from Calcutta than from Bombay, I presume, as the ships were coming?—No.

3908. Do you produce a copy of the Bombay charter party?—I do. (*The same was delivered in, vide Appendix.*)

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Captain GEORGE TRYON, re-called; and further Examined:

3909. *Chairman.*] Do you produce a paper which you wish to hand in?—I do. (*The same was delivered in, vide Appendix.*)

Captain  
G. Tryon.

Colonel HENRY WILLIAM HOLLAND, was called in; and Examined.

3910. *Chairman.*] WERE you Comptroller of Supply and Transport in Abyssinia?—I was.

3911. When were you appointed in Bombay?—My appointment is dated the 9th of October.

3912. And when did you proceed to Abyssinia?—I left on the 5th of January, and arrived on the 18th.

3913. When there, at an early date you made a report to the Commander in Chief as to the con-

dition of the transport train, did you not?—I did, on the 27th of January.

3914. And you have his reply to your report?—I have.

3915. Have you copies of your report and his reply?—I have.

3916. Will you be kind enough to hand them in?—I will. (*The same were delivered in, vide Appendix.*)

Colonel  
Holland.

*Tuesday, 24th May 1870.*

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Mr. Baxter.  
Captain Beaumont.  
Mr. Campbell.  
Mr. Candlish.  
Mr. Eastwick.

Sir James Elphinstone.  
Sir John Hay.  
Mr. Seely.  
Mr. Charles Turner.

JOHN CANDLISH, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Colonel WILLIAM FREDERICK MARRIOTT, re-called; and further Examined.

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3917. *Chairman.*] ARE there any points in your evidence given at the last meeting of the Committee which you would wish to correct?—There are none which I wish to correct, but there is one answer to which, with permission, I would add something. Although on the subject of the infrequency of former councils at Bombay, I testified that they could not in any way have interfered with the preparation of the Abyssinian Expedition, and that in fact I was warranted in saying that if Lord Napier had needed them he could have obtained them (and that is all, perhaps, which is strictly relevant to the present inquiry), yet it has been suggested to me that the infrequency of councils has been so prominently noticed that it would be desirable to prevent misapprehension in incidental respects, that I should state once for all succinctly and clearly the mode in which business is conducted, and with the permission of the Committee I will do so. The theory of the action of the Government is, that every matter is submitted to every member of Government, and disposed of according to the view of the majority, excepting in the case of the use by the Governor of his reserved power on certain conditions of acting on his own view in opposition to the majority. But, of course, the multiplicity of the business makes this course impossible; and amongst other means of facilitating business it has been the practice for the Governor, at his discretion, to commit to each of the two civil members of council the initiative in certain departments, the Governor retaining the initiative in the other departments; the understanding being on both sides that matters will not be disposed of finally according to the views of the one who takes the initiative, when from their importance, or from other circumstances, they are such as he would believe that the others would wish to have a voice in. It will thus be seen that the need for oral discussion at a council cannot ordinarily arise except out of some difference of opinion; and even in case of difference of opinion, the one who first originated the difference would very probably seek a personal and informal interview with the Governor, and so it would be likely that, by compromise or otherwise, an agreement would be come to; and even if no agreement were attained that very discussion would be likely to bring the difference to so plainly stated an issue, that there would be no object gained by further oral discussion at a full council, and all that would be necessary would be to send the difference so stated to the other members to procure a

majority. Therefore it is only in the case of a complicated difference of opinion that a meeting of the whole council becomes absolutely necessary. I am not saying anything of the grounds on which, and the circumstances in which meetings of council may be otherwise advantageous, I am only stating how, in fact, the business is done, and done effectually, without frequent formal meetings of the council.

3918. *Sir John Hay.*] Do you happen to know, from your Indian experience, whether a similar practice prevails at the other Presidencies?—Yes, I am aware that the practice is different in other Presidencies. They have frequent formal meetings of council.

3919. Was this system originated by Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, or did it prevail at Bombay under previous governments?—It prevailed under the immediate predecessor of Sir Seymour Fitzgerald.

3920. *Mr. Seely.*] Then are there no fixed times for the council meeting?—Not of late in Bombay.

3921. *Chairman.*] Your previous answer is correct, that on matters specially affecting the Abyssinian Expedition, the council only met formally once?—It never met at all on such matters, unless the meeting in 1869 to discuss the Transport Train accounts be considered an exception.

3922. *Sir John Hay.*] How many official members of the council are there besides the Governor?—Two civil members and the Commander in Chief *ex officio*.

3923. Is the chief justice a member of the council?—No.

3924. Will you state what are the offices of the two civil members?—They are members of the Civil Service, appointed by the Secretary of State.

3925. Are they appointed without reference to the special office which they hold?—Quite so.

3926. But probably from their position, in addition to their duties as members of council, they have other important functions to discharge?—None.

3927. The Governor, of course, has other duties to perform besides those in council, and the Commander in Chief has other duties to perform besides those in council?—The Commander in Chief has other duties to perform, but nobody else.

3928. Have the other members of the council nothing to do but their duty as members of the council?

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council?—Nothing. The questions of the honourable Baronet suggest to me a point which I should, perhaps, have added previously, that in so speaking of meetings of council, I had only in my mind meetings of the council in its executive capacity. Meetings in its legislative capacity take place frequently enough, because, from the nature of the legislative work, it could only be done at formal meetings of the council.

3929. Does the Commander in Chief attend those legislative meetings?—Yes.

3930. But can any other discussion on executive business be raised at meetings of the council for legislative purposes?—No; for this reason: the council for legislative purposes consist of a larger number of persons than that for executive purposes. All the Governor's executive council are members of his legislative council; but all the members of the legislative council are not members of the executive council.

3931. As a matter of fact, when the Governor at certain seasons of the year has to proceed to other parts of his Government or to his residence at Poona, or elsewhere, as the case may be, do the civil members of the council accompany him?—Not necessarily.

3932. They may be without any special arrangement, by leave or otherwise, entirely absent from the society of the Governor?—Yes, by a confidential arrangement between the Governor and his council.

3933. But ordinarily, do the civil members of the council accompany the Governor wherever his residence may be for the time?—The practice has been so varied upon the point, that I can hardly say what is ordinarily done.

3934. Mr. Seely.] Has not the Governor power to do what he chooses irrespective of his executive council?—He has. He cannot act without taking his council's advice; although, of course, because of the great quantity of business, on a confidential understanding, he does so; but he cannot constitutionally act without taking his council's advice; but he is provided with a power of over-ruling the view of the majority, on condition of recording his reasons for doing so, and sending them immediately to the Secretary of State.

3935. With reference to this inquiry, had the Governor power to determine how the Land Transport Train should be organised without consulting his council?—Certainly not, because constitutionally he has no power to determine anything without consulting his council; but practically, on a point on which one member of his council, the Commander in Chief, would necessarily wish to express his view, he practically could not think of acting without it.

3936. The council did not meet formally to consider the question of how the Land Transport Train should be organised?—They did not meet in person; they did not meet formally.

3937. Did the Governor take any informal means to ascertain what the opinions of his council were with regard to the organisation of that Land Transport Train?—He took the formal means of sending his written views on the subject to the other members of council for their consideration.

3938. Were those replies in harmony with each other and with his own view?—Quite so, excepting the reply of the Commander in Chief.

3939. Then was the reply of the Commander in Chief in opposition to the opinions of the Governor?

vernor, and of the other members of the council?—Yes, as far as it went.

3940. After those replies were received by the Governor, did he not then call the council together to have the question argued?—No, for the reason which I had the honour of explaining in reply to a previous question, namely, that Lord Napier, instead of stating fully his own opinion, suggested that the scheme of organisation should be submitted to him complete, according to the views of the rest of the council, and that he would then state his objections to it.

3941. Was this done?—It was.

3942. And were those objections received?—He made none.

3943. Then was the scheme for the organisation of the Land Transport that which was proposed by the Governor in the first instance?—Not exactly, because in knowledge of the wishes of the Government, the Commissary General, in drawing up the scheme, adopted, in a very great measure, Lord Napier's views, rather than those expressed by the Government, and so left very little room for any objection on Lord Napier's part.

3944. Did the Commissary General prepare a scheme somewhat different from the proposal of the Governor for the organisation of the Land Transport Train?—Yes.

3945. Was this with a view of meeting what he supposed or knew to be the objections of Lord Napier?—Entirely, and in the knowledge that the Government desired that he should so meet Lord Napier's views.

3946. Then, practically, the three parties, if I may say so, the Governor, the Commissary General, and Lord Napier, were as one, were they not?—Quite so.

3947. Chairman.] Was that before Lord Napier left Bombay?—Yes.

3948. Sir James Elphinstone.] Was not the organisation of the Land Transport the subject of discussion during the government of Lord Elphinstone?—Yes.

3949. Were there not very full minutes recorded by him of the opinion of the Bombay Government at that period, embodying the opinion of the Commander in Chief as to the basis upon which that corps should be organised?—Yes, there was a very full discussion.

3950. Did not those Minutes, which were in the possession of the Bombay Government, guide Sir Seymour Fitzgerald and his Council very materially in their decision upon the question?—Yes, those Minutes, and the views of a Commission, of which, I think, the Earl of Longford was the President.

3951. So that whatever were the views adopted by Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, they were views which were based upon and homologated by those Minutes of Lord Elphinstone's?—Yes.

3952. Is it possible to obtain those Minutes, that they may be laid before the Committee?—Possibly from the India Office; but I have a copy of papers, which, though not including the actual minutes, contain a copy of the final resolution of Government, embodying the sense of those minutes, and I beg to hand it in.

3953. But did they not form the guiding principles upon which the subject of the Land Transport Corps was decided?—Those Minutes, and as I said just now, the views of the Commission on Military Organisation, of which the Earl of Longford was President.

3954. I think

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3954. I think you stated that every demand made for the purposes of the campaign by Lord Napier was met?—Yes.

3955. Then where was the restriction of expenditure effected by the Bombay Government?—What I said was, that every demand deliberately and formally made by Lord Napier as necessary for the Expedition was met. Restriction of expenditure was, I conceive, effected by the Bombay Government in requiring explanation of the need in each case, and I have no doubt that a restraint must have been felt by Lord Napier in that very necessity of explaining fully each separate demand. I would give one instance in illustration of my meaning; I am aware that Lord Napier proposed, or suggested, to his Excellency the Governor, that he should take with him the means in men and material of making a railway the whole way to Senafe; and considering that some 12 miles of railway up a similar mountainous range, when executed, within 30 miles of Bombay, took about eight years, and a million of money, it will be understood how much was involved in the conception of a railway to Senafe. A mere hesitation as to the assent to the proposal seemed to be accepted by Lord Napier as sufficient objection to it.

3956. Sir John Hay.] I suppose at that time the General had no personal knowledge of the difficulty of the ghaut to be ascended?—No personal knowledge; he had a knowledge from reports.

3957. Referring to Question 239, a question was put to Lord Napier of Magdala, to which he replied thus: "I believe that the first intention was to place the organization of the Expedition entirely in my hands; I believe that there arose in this country (I suppose I am not called upon to say where), a cry that that was an abdication of the power of the Civil Government. I speak now from opinion; I believe that the reflection of that cry reached Bombay, and that the result of it was the desire of his Excellency the Governor of Bombay to resume that function of civil government which, according to the impression here, had been abdicated by giving me the complete control of the organization of the Expedition; therefore I believe that his Excellency the Governor was probably influenced by the feelings at home in wishing to exercise more control than had perhaps originally been intended;" from your position and experience, do you confirm the evidence I have just quoted?—Of course I can know nothing of the intentions of the British Government; but I am able to say, that if such an intention to place the organization of the Expedition entirely in Lord Napier's hands did exist, it was unknown to his Excellency the Governor of Bombay; and therefore the supposition that a subsequent objection to that course caused the Governor of Bombay to desire to resume the functions of the civil government, is inaccurate in two respects; first, that his desire could not be founded on a circumstance of which he was unaware; and, secondly, that there was in no sense any resumption of the function of civil government, for he had never given it up; consequently, the following supposition that he was influenced by the feelings at home in wishing to exercise more control than had originally been intended is equally unfounded; I am also aware that he did receive a specific warning to exercise that ordinary responsibility for expenditure which attached to him as the civil Governor.

3958. Then the Right Honourable Baronet the Member for South Devon, who was a Member of this Committee, but who gave evidence before it, stated, "The time was very short, and it had been decided that the conduct of the Expedition should be entrusted to Sir Robert Napier, who was the Commander in Chief at Bombay; as the Expedition would necessarily start from Bombay, and as it was considered desirable that Sir Robert Napier should be at once able to act in all matters requiring dispatch, it was thought best to put the whole matter, in the first instance, into the hands of the Government of Bombay, requesting the Government of India to support and assist the Government of Bombay in the matter;" is that the view which you take of the method of conducting the business of the Expedition?—Exactly.

3959. *Chairman.*] You used the words "specific warning" just now, in answer to the honourable Baronet's question; from whom was that?—From the Secretary of State, Sir Stafford Northcote.

3960. Was it in a Despatch?—No; as far as I can recollect, it was a confidential letter.

3961. Can you quote it?—I cannot.

3962. Can you state its import?—Its import was, as far as I recollect, something like a request to keep down the expenditure as much as possible. That was the drift of it, but I am totally unable to answer for the words.

3963. In Question 3624 of the evidence taken at the last meeting of the Committee, you mention that the increase in the European regiments was at the instance of the Horse Guards, and you referred to a letter saying, "The statement submitted to the Bombay Government, which implies that the increase was by the authority of the Horse Guards, happens to be with me;" will you put that in?—Certainly; I have that letter. There are two documents under notice; one is a statement submitted to the Government of Bombay, which I happen to have; the other is a letter written by the Adjutant General of Bombay to the Adjutant General at Calcutta, to which Lord Napier adverts, and which I have not; I will put in the one which I have.

3964. You said that you had never heard of an expedition being so far from its base of supplies as the Abyssinian Expedition; was not the China Expedition as far from its base of supplies as the Abyssinian Expedition?—On the whole, I should say not.

3965-6. Are you of that opinion, keeping in view the fact that Abyssinia was not more than half a dozen days' sail from Egypt?—Yes; I have considered that point.

3967. It was stated to us that the first purchase of supplies for the Expedition was on the 2nd of August 1867; I asked you this question, "When did the Commissariat Department first receive instruction to make actual provision for the whole expeditionary force?" and you replied, "Colonel Dunsterville's letter tells me that it was on the 2nd of August 1867;" is that correct?—I must suppose it to be correct.

3968. How do you account for supplies being ordered for the expeditionary force on the 2nd of August, Lord Napier himself not having been appointed to the chief command until, I think, the 12th or 13th of August?—I have no difficulty in reconciling the two points as suggested by the question, but I confess that I am surprised at the date in respect to the impression which

which I had of the dates of the authority for commencing purchases from home.

3969. Are you in a condition to give any detailed statement of what purchases were made in August?—No, not at all.

3970. You also stated that the first official sanction was given on the 26th of August, and that it was for the strength of which you have constantly spoken, namely, 12,000 men; do you know what was done previously to that date?—No; I am unable to explain how it happened that, as appears to have been stated by the Commissary General, he received orders to make provision for the whole expeditionary force on the 2nd of August 1867. I can only suggest that the subsequent statement, that the first official sanction was given on the 26th of August 1867, was in reality in correction, and in supercession, of the previous answer; but it is only a supposition. I am unable to reconcile the two.

3971. I asked you, also, when the Commissariat Department first received intimation to provide supplies for the increased number of troops and followers who were ultimately sent; can you answer that question now?—I am sorry to say that I am unable to answer the question.

3972. *Sir John Hay.*] You have stated that when the Expedition was preparing at Bombay, the Bombay Government, the Governor in Council, endeavoured, as far as was in their power, to give effect to the wishes of their colleague, the general who was to command the Expedition?—Yes.

3973. It has been indicated that Sir Robert Napier at that time had full powers within the Presidency of Bombay; is it true that his full powers began before his embarkation?—Certainly not.

3974. The late Secretary of State for India gave this answer: "Sir Robert Napier, being at that time Commander in Chief of Bombay, was a member of the Government of Bombay; and all decisions that were taken by the Government of Bombay were, I apprehend, taken by a body of which the Governor and the Commander in Chief were members; I do not understand that until Sir Robert Napier left India he had any independent authority, except such as a Commander in Chief would have over the discipline and conduct of the force. If it were a question of supplies, for instance, I apprehend that Sir Robert Napier could not, of his own authority, have required that such and such articles should be supplied, unless he carried the Government of Bombay with him:" does that answer of the late Secretary of State convey your impression of the relative powers of the General and of the Government before he sailed?—Exactly.

3975. With reference to a statement that the General and the Governor differed materially with regard to the organisation of the Land Transport Train, you have already made certain statements upon that point; do you consider that the difference was very material?—The difference originally expressed was very material; but not the difference which remained after the first concessions on either side.

3976. And the arrangements by Colonel Dunsterville?—Yes.

3977. Do you think that the Secretary of State for India was rightly informed when he stated, that if the organisation of the Land Transport Train put forward by the General had been accepted by the Governor, time would have been

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saved, although he was not prepared to give a positive opinion upon the subject?—My belief is, as I have had the honour of representing in reply to some previous question, that, in fact, there was so much on which they were agreed which had to be done first, that the time occupied in discussion did not really cause any significant delay.

3978. *Chairman.*] Referring to Question 3696 of your evidence of Tuesday last, why was not the subordinate superintendence of which you spoke there as essential to both schemes of transport provided?—There is an officer, Colonel Holland, who is waiting in this Committee, who can speak so much better as to that point, that I shall perhaps best meet the purposes of the Committee by suggesting a reference to him.

3979. Have you no information yourself as to that?—I am not so ignorant but that I would answer, if there was nobody else who would do it better.

3980. Do you think that it would have been possible to have obtained an adequate number of muleteers in the Bombay Presidency or from India generally, speaking in the main one language?—It was practicable to get a large number from the Panjáb after a considerable interval; but it not only would not have been, but was proved to be, quite impossible to procure them in time to have met the earliest supply of transport animals at Zulla.

3981. You limited your answer to the Panjáb, but I am giving it a wider range; could you not have procured them from the Bombay Presidency?—No; the attempts we made were so large, that I may state confidently that it was impossible.

3982. Was there a fear, on the part of the natives, of the military organisation which was suggested by the Commander in Chief?—On that point I cannot speak from any personal knowledge; I can only say that some who were concerned held that opinion.

3983. Have you heard on high authority in Bombay, that the fear of the military organisation operated in deterring the natives of India from going as muleteers to Abyssinia?—I know that persons who were much concerned in the supply held that opinion.

3984. *Mr. Eastwick.*] In point of fact, is baggage carried on mules at all in the Bombay Presidency; is it not carried on tattús?—We have a considerable establishment of mules.

3985. But, generally speaking, they use tattús, do they not?—No; the transport animals which we keep up at ordinary times consist of elephants, camels, and mules.

3986. You are speaking now of the Government?—Yes. They are kept up by Government in ordinary times of peace.

3987. What number of mules do you keep up, and since when was this done?—I forget the total number of mules on the establishment, but I know that only about 700 were available to go to Abyssinia.

3988. Since how long have they kept up that establishment of mules?—I think since the Persian Expedition; certainly since the Mutiny year 1867.

3989. Before then, and even now, the baggage of ordinary travellers is carried on tattús, is it not?—Yes, except in so far as carts have superseded them.

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3990. But it is not carried on mules, generally speaking, is it?—No.

3991. The muleteers from the Panjáb would not be understood by any except the officers of the Panjáb regiments, would they, because they speak a language which is not understood by the officers of the Bombay Presidency, generally?—I am under the apprehension that they all understand a certain amount of Hindustani.

3992. But of course Panjābi is a different dialect, and is not intelligible to a Bombay officer unless he studied it?—No.

3993. *Chairman.*] Do you know the gross sum which was expended on water tanks in Bombay?—I do not know it otherwise than as I am aware that it is stated by Commander Robinson to be about 140,000*l.*, and I have no reason to suppose that his statement is incorrect.

3994. An explanation, or a return was asked of the numbers purchased and the reasons for the purchase. You say that you never saw that answer?—No.

3995. I recall the fact for the sake of asking you whether you know whether or not an answer was ever given?—I do not know that an answer was ever given.

3996. You called for an explanation in the name of the Bombay Government from the superintendent of marine?—Yes.

3997. And the superintendent of marine has never yet replied to the inquiry, has he?—He had not replied when I left India, and that was so long a period after the request that I infer that he has never replied at all.

3998. Does that imply a want of subordination, or accountability?—No, I presume that it was only forgetfulness.

3999. At Question 3734, you mentioned that a professional opinion is given, that in January and February horses cannot live at Zulla. Are you not aware that the dreadful mortality amongst our animals in Abyssinia was long before those dates?—Yes.

4000. Then the state of the climate at a later date would not be the cause of the deaths at the earlier date?—No, supposing the veterinary surgeon, whom I quoted, in specifying January and February to have absolutely excluded November and December.

4001. The epidemic was arrested in January, was it not?—It had been arrested as regards the cavalry horses at the time of Sir Charles Staveley's report, which was the 29th of December; but he then stated that it had broken out amongst the mules, and I am also rather under the impression that one principal cause of its being arrested among the cavalry horses was that they had been removed from the plains.

4002. I have never yet been able to get a definite answer to this question: whose duty was it to provide for the reception of the animals first landed in Abyssinia, in the months of October and November?—It lay between the officers of the transport train on the spot (I do not know who the senior was, but I think Colonel Holland will be able to state), and Colonel Field and Sir Charles Staveley, who were successively in command there.

4003. You do not yourself know who was responsible?—I have named Colonel Field and Sir Charles Staveley as two.

4004. Do you remember at what time Sir Charles Staveley landed in Abyssinia?—I do not remember.

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4005. When did the knowledge of the success of the Expedition reach Bombay?—On the 30th of April.

4006. When would it be known at Aden?—Probably about from the 20th to the 22nd of April.

4007. Of course, it would be certainly known to all the officials at Aden on the 29th of April?—Certainly.

4008. When did the relief ships commence their work at that season in 1867?—Early in October.

4009. Do you know what work they did that season?—I cannot remember the number of passages they made, but they carried out the programme.

4010. Do you know when they ceased their work as relief ships in 1868?—I think it was soon after the end of March.

4011. Then at the end of March they would have been available for the purposes of the Expedition without interfering with the reliefs, would they not?—That might have been so; but I must mention that the objection was made, that if they were then taken there would not be sufficient time for the necessary repairs before the next season's ordinary work.

4012. From the time when they ceased their work in the spring of 1868 to the time when they would be needed again in the August of the same year would be from four to six months, would it not?—Yes.

4013. By whom was it reported that there would not be time to have them ready for their work in the autumn, if they were employed for Abyssinian purposes?—By their commanders.

4014. It was at the very time that you were engaging fresh tonnage for the Abyssinian Expedition, namely, in the end of March or the beginning of April?—Yes.

4015. Even until May you engaged fresh tonnage, did you not?—Yes.

4016. Was not the "Dacca" engaged in Calcutta at the request of the Bombay Government, whilst the other ships were lying in Bombay Harbour doing nothing?—Yes; but we did insist upon one of the troop ships being got ready, notwithstanding the objection.

4017. Will you explain when she was got ready, and what she did?—I am sorry to say that I cannot remember; and I do not think that I can suggest where you are to obtain that information, unless it be from the commanders of the vessels, through the Admiralty.

4018. Do you know if this relief ship which you engaged went to Abyssinia?—What I stated was that notwithstanding the objection of the commander, the Government did order one of them to be got ready to assist in the return of the troops from Abyssinia.

4019. But you are not aware that she did anything?—I am not aware.

4020. *Mr. Campbell.*] Are the commanders of those vessels subject to and responsible to the Admiralty?—Yes.

4021. Have the Bombay Government any direct control over them?—It would be difficult to say that they had no direct control over them, but perhaps I shall meet the intention of the honourable Member's question by saying that they had not such control as would have enabled the Government to apply the vessels to other purposes, such as the Abyssinian Expedition, without the sanction of the Secretary of State.

4022. But of course the Government of Bombay

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bay could have communicated with England, to obtain power to use them?—Yes, and they did so.

4023. How long would it take before they got an answer?—Only the time of a telegram; there were times about that period when the telegraphic communication was interrupted, but I cannot undertake to say that it was at that particular time.

4024. So that the Government of Bombay could, within a short time, have received authority from the Admiralty to dispose of those transports in any way which was thought right?—Undoubtedly.

4025. *Chairman.*] But they were not disposed of; not because the commanders refused, but because of alleged unfitness?—Partially unfitness to go to sea at the time, and partially want of time for necessary preparations for next season's operations.

4026. What would you have done to have curtailed the profuse expenditure which was entailed upon the Abyssinian Expedition?—I considered myself warranted in implying that the demands for the Expedition were conceived in a profuse spirit. I used the word "profuse," deliberately, as one not involving a moral judgment. Profusion does not necessarily imply waste, however likely it may be to lead to it, but it does imply a disregard of pecuniary cost. So much I considered myself warranted in saying, for there are few men who have been more generally praised than Lord Napier, but I do not think that the partiality of personal affection ever attributed to his Lordship the virtue of pecuniary thrift. But if I were to go further and speak of the points in detail, in which I think expenditure might have been curtailed, I should put myself in the position, practically, of disputing with that high authority, his judgment in detail on military needs, a position which, for obvious reasons, I should be very unwilling to take.

4027. Are you aware of any difference of opinion between the Bombay Government and Lord Napier, as to what you call the profusion of supplies?—I am not aware of any expressed difference founded upon that.

4028. No special question arose between them?—No.

4029. Do you know of 5,000 pack saddles having been purchased at Poona, and thrown aside as useless, after they were delivered?—I know of something which that perhaps represents with approximate correctness, but I am not sure about the numbers.

4030. Do you know anything of the extent of the excess of prices which you had to pay for the Abyssinian Expedition, as compared with the normal prices in ordinary times?—I know that it was large in many instances, but nothing more particular.

4031. Do you see any good reason why the supplies purchased for the Expedition in Bombay should have been more costly, having to leave the country, than they would have been had they been purchased for consumption in the country?—No; on the supposition in either case of the suppliers knowing the urgency of the case.

4032. Do you think an advantage was taken of a special urgency to raise the prices?—I think so, undoubtedly.

4033. *Mr. Seely.*] With reference to the question of supplies, I find that Sir Stafford Northcote, in giving evidence before this Committee

last Session, said that a committee sat regularly in Bombay upon the arrangements with reference to supplies; how was that committee composed?—I have no doubt that Sir Stafford Northcote must have alluded to a meeting which was held every Saturday for some time, consisting of the Governor, of Lord Napier, so long as he was in Bombay, of myself, and of several heads of departments, such as the superintendent of marine, the commissary general, the quartermaster general, and there may have been one or two others.

4034. Was the question of supplies brought before this committee, as to how they should be furnished, and as to what extent they should be supplied?—Whether the extent was ever incidentally discussed, I am not quite sure; but the purpose of this committee was not to consider the extent of supplies, but to ascertain the progress made in the execution of the ordered supplies.

4035. Did not the committee take into consideration whether the supplies should be got?—Very probably that question must have incidentally arisen once or twice.

4036. It could scarcely be a committee composed of such clever men, simply to ascertain to what extent the supplies had been furnished?—Yes, the main purpose; or I might say almost the only purpose of the meeting was to bring a pressure upon the heads of departments to be active.

4037. *Chairman.*] How do you account for the fact, that all supplies were provided by natives, and none whatever by the vast number of mercantile Europeans in Bombay?—I am quite unable to account for it.

4038. It is the fact, is it not?—I have no personal knowledge of that.

4039. Have you any knowledge upon the point that it did happen, that all the supplies for the Abyssinian Expedition were provided by natives, and none by the many mercantile Europeans in Bombay?—I have no knowledge whatever as to that, except that derived from my acquaintance with the inquiries instituted by the honourable Chairman himself.

4040. Have you heard that the wants of the Bombay Government in the matter of supplies during the Expedition, were known outside the Government buildings, within 10 minutes of the determination within?—I cannot say that I have heard it; but I fully believe it to be likely.

4041. Are you aware that there is some arrangement by which contractors and parties interested know immediately the wants of Government?—I have no doubt that they know as quickly as it is possible.

4042. Do you know that they have more than once, on that prompt information, immediately bought up all articles wanted, and possessed themselves of all the marketable supply, and thereby commanded such a price as they were minded to ask?—It is very likely.

4043. Sir Stafford Northcote, I think, in the Blue Book speaks of four months of provisions untouched; in that lump form did those four months' provisions come back to Bombay?—I infer that they did.

4044. Would the Expedition account be credited with those provisions at the purchase price?—Certainly not as a matter of course; we should only have credited the Expedition account with such supplies as we needed, and at their then market value.

4045. I think

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4045. I think that you took 10,000 tons of coal at 12 rupees per ton, which cost the English Government 35½ rupees per ton; who appraised that coal on behalf of the Government?—I am unable to state the exact process of appraisal. The nearest answer I can give is, that it was done on the authority of the Bombay Government, guided by the advice of its heads of departments.

4046. It determined what it wanted, and bought at its own price; was that so?—I do not like to assent to the words, “at its own price,” in the sense in which they would probably be understood.

4047. Mr. Charles Turner.] They took the best means they could to ascertain the market value, and they took it at that price, I presume?—Exactly.

4048. Were not the coals deteriorated by exposure to the sun at Bombay, or from having gone to Abyssinia and back again?—All the coals would be somewhat deteriorated, no doubt, but I believe that the coals, which were sold at 12 or 12½ rupees per ton, to which the honourable Chairman adverted, were not only deteriorated, but were balances on board the transport vessels, which, if anybody else but the owners of the transports had purchased them, they would have had to land.

4049. But, in point of fact, the condition of the coals, and the price of coals, at that time, in the Bombay market, were taken into account; and, as far as your opinion is concerned, they were taken over at a fair value as between the Government at home and the Government at Bombay; was not that so?—I have no independent opinion about the fairness of the value, but I am quite certain that the value was determined in the way which the question suggests, and in the fairest spirit.

4050. That was your principle of dealing?—Yes.

4051. You have expressed an opinion that the requisitions which were made for the Expedition were conceived in a profuse spirit; and I think that at the same time you said that you would not take upon yourself to criticise the conduct of Lord Napier, who commanded the Expedition, and upon whose responsibility those requisitions were made; I cannot quite reconcile the two things in my own mind, unless you take upon yourself to decide as to what ought and what ought not to have been required?—I cannot dispute that a general expression of opinion must be, in reality, the result of observation in particular; but at the same time I have given my reasons for being unwilling to state particulars, and I have also stated why I consider myself warranted in representing the general impression which I received.

4052. But the wants of the Expedition were necessarily, in a great measure, speculative; the army was going to a country the knowledge of which was very imperfect, and without a perfect knowledge either to the state of the country, or as to the means of opposition which there would be in the country to oppose the advancing forces, or of what would be required for those forces; and the responsibility upon the Commander in Chief was that he was to neglect nothing which should insure the success of the Expedition: those being his general instructions, I do not see exactly upon what ground you conceive that the requisitions were made in what you call a

profuse spirit, because you can bring it to no accurate test?—If I might be allowed, I would point out that I particularly indicated that profusion might be reasonable.

4053. Sir John Hay.] Would “abundant” be a better adjective than “profuse”?—I do not wish to change the word; I will abide by what I have said.

4054. Mr. Charles Turner.] Then I think you said that you thought the requisitions were made with disregard to pecuniary cost?—I did.

4055. If certain things are necessary to insure the success of an expedition in the mind of the General Commanding in Chief, he may not disregard the pecuniary cost, although he may go to very great cost; the pecuniary cost may have a certain effect on his mind, but still the success of the Expedition is a matter of imperative importance, is it not?—Undoubtedly. I must repeat that I distinctly indicated that profusion might be reasonable. I only asserted that it implies disregard of pecuniary cost, and therefore implied most distinctly, as I intended, that the impression which I received of the demands for the Expedition were that they were conceived with a total disregard to pecuniary cost. That disregard might have been quite right; I have expressed no opinion upon that point.

4056. Then you would qualify that in the same way as you qualified it before; that looking at the general desire on the part of the English nation, and the public in general, that at all events the Expedition should succeed, nothing should be left undone to insure success; that any profusion would, in your opinion, be only reasonable, and that it does not follow that because the cost was very great therefore it was necessary?—It does not follow.

4057. And therefore you do not mean to imply by that, that the profusion was an unreasonable profusion, and that the cost was more than ought to have been undertaken, looking at the imperative necessity to secure the success of the Expedition?—I do not mean to imply an opinion either way, whether it was reasonable or unreasonable.

4058. The words “profusion of cost,” convey to ordinary minds, and especially to mercantile minds like my own, an idea of censure; and when there is censure, it implies something that is more than reasonable?—I was very desirous to be explicit, and I said I had chosen the word “profusion” as one not implying a moral judgment, and therefore not necessarily implying censure.

4059. Mr. Eastwick.] Do you think it possible that Lord Napier, having his mind occupied with the number of the force, and with the different arrangements for the success of the Expedition, could have taken in also the superintendence of the cost; could he have looked into that question at all?—Certainly not in detail.

4060. I suppose that the Governor considered that to be his peculiar province, and that he devoted considerable time to keeping down the expenses?—The consideration of cost in detail was, of course, more the duty of the civil government than of the Commander in Chief.

4061. But it was more particularly his province as a general question, I presume, because he could not possibly know the number of troops required to take such a place as Magdala; all those military questions being questions for the Commander

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Commander in Chief?—The military questions were questions for the Commander in Chief.

4062. I suppose that, at all events, the question of cost and of keeping down expenses fell more particularly to the Governor, and that he expended a great deal of time and thought upon that particular object?—It was so, as a matter of fact; but I do not see why the question of general cost on the whole should necessarily fall more particularly to him than to the Commander in Chief of the Expedition.

4063. Is not the collecting of supplies, and the engaging of transport, and everything which would assist the conveyance of the Expedition to the place of destination, rather a question of civil arrangement?—No doubt all the details of expenditure come under the cognizance of the civil Government in a way in which they do not come under the cognizance of the Commander in Chief of the Expedition; and if I said anything before which was seemingly inconsistent with it, it was from misconceiving the purport of the question.

4064. In point of fact, the Governor of Bombay did devote a great deal of his time and thought to the consideration of that question, I presume?—But only principally by giving thought to what were the general needs.

4065. I am not asking why he did so, but whether he did so?—If I may be allowed to explain the sense in which I understand the honourable Member's question, I understood it as being as to whether the civil Government was not more specially responsible than the Commander in Chief of the Expedition as regards the avoidance of unnecessary expenditure.

4066. My question was rather in this form: that the Commander in Chief of the Expedition, having his mind and his attention completely taken up with military arrangements, would not be able to give so much of his thought as the civil Government could, to the expenses of the preliminary arrangements?—He certainly, for the reasons stated, could not be expected to carry his calculations of expense into the same minutiae of detail.

4067. Are not the expenses of an expedition more dependent upon the attention given by subordinates, than upon the wish of the Government itself?—The general demands must, on the whole, determine the cost of the Expedition, and no doubt more or less efficient agency may enable you to purchase what is requisite at more or less cost; but still the main-cost must depend upon the general demands.

4068. That is so as regards the main outlay, no doubt; but is it so as regards the prices of the things purchased?—For all such things as that, the Commander in Chief of the Expedition has very little responsibility.

4069. I am speaking now, having myself experience of two expeditions, and I press this question home, as I am very anxious to have it answered; is it not the fact that the subordinate officers have very much in their power; in such a case, for instance, as this with regard to the pack-saddles, is it possible that the Governor or the Commander in Chief could have looked into such a matter as that; and was not, in fact, the subordinate officer the responsible man?—If I may be pardoned for saying it, the instance offered is an unfortunate one, because in that particular instance I believe it was entirely the act of Lord Napier, and it was the consequence of his own experiments in saddles.

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Everything in that matter was in consequence of his direct personal order. At the same time, putting that instance aside, I should not so entirely differ from the intended question.

4070. With reference to the question put by the honourable Chairman, as to why the European houses in Bombay did not furnish the supplies, and why the supplies were furnished generally by natives, is it not the fact that in our expeditions natives have generally been the suppliers of the stores; for instance, was not Jotee Prarsád a great supplier of stores?—Yes; I think that, as a matter of fact, so far as I am acquainted with the circumstances, natives have generally been the suppliers.

4071. And the probable reason of that would be, that they know the resources of the country, and are well acquainted with all those minor contractors, and therefore they have the means of getting information as to what supplies are procurable, while the European houses are engaged in their commerce with Europe; is not that so?—I think that is very likely to be the explanation in many cases.

4072. Recurring to the question of mules, the honourable Chairman asked why it was that the mules were not supplied from Bombay; you stated that the Government had an establishment of mules, and that it supplied, I think, 700 mules for the Abyssinian Expedition; is it not the case, that throughout the Bombay Presidency mules are not used, generally speaking, but that tattu's and horses are the baggage animals?—Mules are only used by the Government establishment, and I take the opportunity to say, that in speaking of the possibility or impossibility of getting muleteers, I do not mean men who had really had charge of mules, but men who have such knowledge of the care of a pony or a horse as would qualify them.

4073. Having had an experience myself with all sorts of baggage animals, I am of opinion, and I wish to ask you whether it is not the fact, that a muleteer would not be a proper man to have charge of a camel, or a camel-man of a mule, or a tattu-mans, of either; and whether it is not also the fact that in India people keep themselves very much to their own particular animals?—I am not prepared to assent to the question in respect of the interchange between the care of mules and ponies; no doubt a man who had charge of a mule would be fitter for the purpose than a man who had never had charge of anything but a pony; but excepting to that obvious extent, I should except that instance from the several ones suggested by the question.

4074. Sir James Elphinstone.] With regard to those Europeans who informed the Chairman that they were not employed by the Government, if the Government had employed them, would they not have had to go to the natives to find the supplies for which they had contracted with Government?—Undoubtedly, in most cases.

4075. Each European house has its own dubash, has it not?—Yes.

4076. And do not those dubashes do the whole of their business?—I do not like to say that they do the whole of their business, but they do a great quantity of it.

4077. Supposing that I were to order 5,000 bags of rice from an European house, would they not send for their dubash, and ask him to procure those 5,000 bags of rice, and then I should have to pay both the European house and the dubash's profit?—

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profit?—Probably, but undoubtedly they would have to procure it through native agency.

4078. I think that on the 11th of August Captain Young wrote you a letter about coals, did he not?—Yes; I received this letter from Captain Young, dated the 11th of August: “I wrote you yesterday about coal; we have now 5,000 tons on hand, 2,000 more expected in October, 6,500 more demanded, but no advice of its having left England. If there is a tolerable certainty of an expedition going, I would advise the purchase of coal at once; there is not a large supply in the market, it is to be got now for 35 rupees a ton, but once the Expedition is published to the world, the price would go up to 50 rupees in no time, and we shall be obliged to buy at whatever it may rise to; kindly let me know as early as possible if I am to buy.”

4079. What took place upon that?—Captain Young was confidentially and orally instructed to purchase in such a manner as not to attract notice and through various agents simultaneously as much coal as he could.

4080. How much coal did he get?—Between 23,000 and 24,000 tons.

4081. At what rates?—At rates varying from 64 s. to 80 s., but the quantity purchased at the highest price was small. The average price would be less than the average of those two sums. I think the average was about 68 s.

4082. The operation was conducted with considerable secrecy, was it not?—It was believed to have been so done.

4083. The natives did not get hold of that, at all events?—I have no evidence of their having done so.

4084. It was a transaction entirely with English houses, was it not?—I do not know.

4085. You had a subsequent letter from Captain Young; will you be good enough to read it to the Committee?—On the 29th of August, Captain Young transmitted a letter from the Marine Storekeeper to his address, in which the storekeeper reported having purchased certain specified quantities to arrive, which amounted in the gross to nearly 23,500 tons. He stated, “I have taken considerable pains and trouble to effect the purchases at as low rates, and as quietly as possible to prevent excitement in the market, and trust the measures I have adopted may meet with approval; I may add that very little, if any, coal earlier than August sailing is available for purchase in the market this day.”

4086. Then there is a minute of Sir Seymour Fitzgerald's, giving an extract from the price current at that time; will you be good enough to read that to the Committee?—I find it recorded in connection with those prices by his Excellency the Governor, that “the price, though apparently high, contrasted with the prices that have ruled since, or the price at which coal can ordinarily be laid down in Bombay (which is stated by the Accountant General to be 23½ rupees), was not greatly in excess of the price obtained at the time for coal then in the harbour, and considerably less than that demanded a month later.”

4087. The price of coal rose immediately that the Abyssinian Expedition was known, to 50 rupees, did it not?—Yes; I find that he records that the price paid for coal arrived was in August from 64 s. to 66 s.; and a month later for coal to arrive at was, from 96 s. to 100 s.

4088. Will you be good enough to read the statement of the price current at that time which

is stated in a minute of Sir Seymour Fitzgerald?—The published rates for coal as per price current, were as follows: For the week ending 24th June 1867, 64 s. to 66 s.; for the week ending 9th July, 64 s. to 68 s.; for the week ending 24th July, 66 s.; for the week ending 9th August, 66 s.; for the week ending 24th August, 66 s. to 76 s.

4089. And purchases were made of 23,000 tons on behalf of the Government at or about the current rates in the market?—Yes.

4090. And they afterwards rose to as high as 96 s. to 100 s., did they not?—They did.

4091. I think the greater part of correspondence was in your office, was it not?—Yes, entirely.

4092. Would you object to put that paper in as evidence?—I will do so. (*The same was delivered in. See Appendix.*)

4093. *Chairman.*] This statement was made to us by Mr. Ketteridge, the agent of the Bombay and Bengal Steam Navigation Company: “Our own coal, that is, the Bombay and Bengal Company's coal lying at Aden, some 2,000 or 3,000 tons, was offered by myself and partner to Captain Young personally, and he refused to take it, saying, as far as I can remember, he had enough. I then went to Moraji Go Raldas, a native of first-rate standing, offering him a third interest in this sale of coals, and in a couple of hours the matter was arranged.” That being true, it would not follow that all the coals were bought of Europeans, would it?—I do not undertake to say that they were all purchased of Europeans.

4094. In point of fact, the coals are nearly all in the hands of Europeans in Bombay, are they not?—I should think so.

4095. And the provisions which you purchased for the use of the Expedition in Bombay were in the hands of the natives, in the sense that they were grown in the country by the natives?—Yes.

4096. Not otherwise than that?—Probably the great grain dealers would be mostly natives in the same sense as it was suggested that the coal dealers in Bombay would be Europeans.

4097. The blankets which were purchased in Bombay for the Expedition would not be native produce, would they?—There are two kinds of blankets; there are European blankets which are called blankets, and there are native blankets which are usually called Ramlis; the latter would be in the hands of the natives.

4098. Do you know which two descriptions of blanket were purchased for the Expedition?—Both were purchased in large quantities.

4099. It would be only partially true that those were the produce of the country, would it not?—It would not be true at all as respects the European blankets.

4100. Is it not an administrative disadvantage that the proceedings of the Government going into the market to purchase should be known sooner than the Government themselves wished it to be known?—Undoubtedly.

4101. Have you attempted any means of stopping the leakage of the wants of the departments long before there is any public announcement of their wants, which so notoriously exists in Bombay?—I do not remember any special measures being taken for that purpose. The Government considers, on the whole, that it takes the best measures in making the best selection of the head of a department.

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4102. But such leakage will be detrimental to the interests of Government purchasing, will it not?—Undoubtedly.

4103. Mr. *Eastwick*.] With reference to that leakage, is it not the fact that not only is the information obtained as to public events in the most

extraordinary manner with reference to what takes place now under our Government, but that we know, historically, that it has always happened that they have information in the bazaar, even, before the parties in authority?—It is a common belief that it is so.

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Colonel HENRY WILLIAM HOLLAND, re-called; and further Examined.

4104. *Chairman*.] AT the last meeting of the Committee you were kind enough to say that you would hand in a copy of your report on the condition of the Land Transport Train made on the 27th of January, in Abyssinia, and of Lord Napier's reply to that report, will you now hand in those papers?—Yes. (*The same were handed in. See Appendix.*)

4105. Will you define the duties and responsibilities of your office as controller of supply and transport according to your apprehension of those duties and responsibilities?—The office was a new one in function as well as in name, and therefore I think that the nature of the duties and responsibilities would be best understood if I were to read the instructions which I received on taking the appointment. Those instructions were as follows:—"Lieutenant Colonel Holland may take the position of Controller of Supply and Transport of the Abyssinian Forces as proposed. 2. As the duties and responsibilities of the office of Controller of Supply and Transport are in some respects new in function as well as in name, his Excellency in Council gives the following instructions. 3. The Controller will be the agent of the Commander in Chief in the field for all that concerns supply transport provisions and clothing not supplied direct from the Clothing Department, and for communication with the marine authorities in respect of requisitions touching sea transports. 4. Regarding land transport the Controller will arrange under the instructions of the Commander in Chief, and in communication with the Commander in Chief and the Quartermaster General as regards strategic considerations and the nature of the country, the quantity and description of all transport to be maintained, apportioning it according to the wants of the various services, and being responsible for its organization and efficiency, as well as for its economic and judicious working. The number and material of the transport establishment will be constantly checked by the Controller by means of musters and inspections, of which periodical returns should be furnished to the Commander in Chief. The organization of local auxiliary transport and its incorporation with the regular transport will be an important duty of the Controller. 5. Recommendations for promotion in the Transport Corps will be made on the same principle as in the rest of the army. The director of the train will submit the promotions to the Controller for the approval of the Commander in Chief. 6. The Controller will exercise, under the authority of the Commander in Chief, immediate direction over the departments concerned in supplying the troops with provisions, forage, fuel, and light. The collection of supplies, the economical application of local resources, the formations of depôts and reserves, the arrangements for custody, preparation and distribution of food for man and beast, will be performed under the general direction of the Controller, who will keep the Commander in Chief informed of the state of

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such supplies. 7. The Controller will authorise, with the sanction of the Commander in Chief, subject to the confirmation of Government, all expenditure in what department soever, not provided for by regulations. 8. The controller will be responsible that all accounts, returns, and other documents required by the existing system be duly rendered by the officers of the departments under his control. 9. The Controller will submit to Government all demands from what department soever, for supplies from India. 10. The Controller will report to Government all extraordinary sanction of expenditure of money and stores, laying copies of his reports to Government before the Commander in Chief. 11. In taking up immediately the position of Controller of Supply and Transport of the Abyssinian Force, Lieutenant Colonel Holland must not interfere with the function and authority of the Commissary General, and his own function, until the departure of the force, will be restricted to organisation of the field arrangements, and such general cognizance of all preparations as will enable him to keep His Excellency the Commander in Chief perfectly informed, together with the duty of communicating to Government his Excellency the Commander in Chief's wishes in connection with these preparations." I subsequently received the following further instructions in a letter from Colonel Marriott, dated 23rd December 1867:—"His Excellency the Commander in Chief having left for Abyssinia, I am desired to request that you will proceed thither, as it is essential to the exercise of your functions, as stated in Government Resolution, No. 199A. of 9th October last, that you should be with the head-quarters of the force. As your office is a new one, and you will have no traditionary practice for guidance, I am directed to request that you will give careful heed to the spirit of the instructions given in the Resolution of Government above noted. You must remember that you are the only staff officer of the force directly responsible to Government. You are the only channel of sanction for unregulated expenditure, and in so constituting you the sole channel of sanction for such expenditure, the Government obviously commits to you the duty of representing to his Excellency the Commander in Chief any considerations affecting that expenditure, which, in your judgment, the Government wish to be offered. The cases are too various to allow more exact prescription of your duty in this respect. One general rule, however, is applicable to all cases; that you are responsible that the reasons for the expenditure be clearly stated in your reports to Government. The Government fully trusts in your discretion. A copy of this letter will be sent to the Quartermaster General with a request that a passage be provided for you."

4106. Sir *John Hay*.] Are those instructions addressed to yourself personally, or are they instructions addressed to all controllers of supply

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supply and transport? — They are addressed to me.

4107. *Chairman.*] By whom are those instructions signed?—By the Secretary to Government, Colonel Marriott.

4108. Then those are the instructions of the Bombay Government, and not of the Commander in Chief?—That is so.

4109. Your appointment not having been made by the Commander in Chief, but by the Bombay Government?—Exactly.

4110. Did those instructions apply to India before you went to Abyssinia?—No; my duties as Controller of Supply and Transport commenced on my arrival in Abyssinia.

4111. You did not advance into the interior with the Commander in Chief, did you?—I did not.

4112. You were left in charge on the coast, and consequently you were separated from them?—I was left on the coast.

4113. What was the effect of that separation upon you in the discharge of your duties?—My separation from head-quarters, which in Lord Napier's mind the exigencies of the service rendered necessary, prevented the possibility of my fulfilling in their entirety the functions of my office. My direct responsibility to Government, as required by the instructions which I received, was diminished; but my personal responsibility to the Commander in Chief was increased. Being separated from the Commander in Chief, I was unable to fulfil paragraph 10 of the instructions, which required me to report to the Government all extraordinary sanction of expenditure of money and stores, which I give as an instance of my responsibility being diminished; and the importance of that was brought to my notice by the Government, in the subsequent instructions which I have read, and which I received on Lord Napier's embarkation for Abyssinia, when I was directed to proceed with him.

4114. What action did you take in pursuance of those instructions?—I have stated that my responsibility to Lord Napier was increased owing to my separation from him, because I was obliged to act on my own judgment, not having the opportunity of consulting him, and in anticipation of his approval. I am sorry to say that I have not official documents to refer to, in verification of dates or details; but I will state the facts, and the dates, if necessary, can be afterwards furnished. I came home without any official documents whatever.

4115. You have known for a long time, have you not, that you would in all probability have to give evidence to this Committee?—I have.

4116. Then did it not occur to you to supply yourself with everything that would enable you to give the fullest information?—I have tried to do so.

4117. Have you not had time, since you knew that, to write to India for anything you needed?—Yes; but it was not possible to get what I needed without being there myself to get it.

4118. In whose keeping are the documents?—The documents would be in the Commissary General's office.

4119. Is it not true that there are copies of all accounts in England?—I could get copies of a great many things, but it was impossible for me to know what to send for. I may instance this case of my responsibility to the Commander in Chief being increased. When the force was

drawing near to Magdala, and when we expected that in a few days we should know the result, I wrote confidentially to the commissariat officer in Egypt, warning him against committing himself to any fresh engagements in the purchase of animals or supplies until further intelligence reached us from the front. I reported immediately to Lord Napier what I had done, giving him a full explanation for it; and the reply which I received was that he considered the step was premature.

4120. What followed upon that?—I then communicated to the commissariat officer in Egypt, that Lord Napier considered that what I had done was premature, and that therefore I cancelled those instructions, in fact; but I continued to warn him that we should know in a very few days what was likely to happen; so that he might act according to his own discretion.

4121. Was that Captain Willoughby or was it Major Stansfeld?—It was Major Stansfeld.

4122. How do you infer from that, that the circumstance which you name illustrates your increased responsibility to the Commander in Chief?—I acted there on my own responsibility. If I had been with the Commander in Chief, I should have known exactly what his wishes and intentions were. I did that to the best of my judgment; I thought it right to do so. It so happened that we expected to hear of the fall of Magdala much sooner than we did; and I had so far time to get an answer from Lord Napier down to Zulla again before we actually heard of the fall of Magdala.

4123. Was the communication between you and Lord Napier by telegraph?—Sometimes it was by telegraph, but generally it was by letter. If there was anything very important, I got telegrams and letters.

4124. Was the telegraphic communication always complete to the coast from the front?—No, it was never up with the Expedition; the Expedition outstripped the telegraph considerably.

4125. Will you state how far you advanced into the interior?—I did not go farther than Senafe. I was ordered to remain on the sea-board, and I simply went up there to inspect the stations in the pass.

4126. Was not it your duty to superintend all purchases in Abyssinia, and were they not to be made under your direction and on your responsibility?—Yes, all purchases would be sanctioned, so to speak, and all the demands for anything would be scrutinised, and, if approved, sanctioned by me.

4127. Would all the accounts of purchases come to you?—Statements of purchases would come to me. All accounts were sent down afterwards to Bombay, to the Accountant's department. No accounts passed through my hands.

4128. Was Lord Napier aware of the instructions under which you were appointed, and of the duties which you had to discharge?—He was; a copy of those instructions was sent for his information to the Quartermaster General.

4129. Did you regard your being detained on the coast, and being severed from the duties which you were appointed to discharge, as a supercession of the appointment?—No, by no means.

4130. Did you not feel yourself hindered in the discharge of the duties assigned to you?—

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The exigency of the service, in Lord Napier's mind, rendered it necessary to keep me there; my service was at his disposal. It was for the Government afterwards to interfere in the position in which I was employed.

4131. Then, as I understand you, you did not in any way superintend the purchases?—I in no way superintended the purchases. The purchases were made at distant points. Demands for what was required were submitted to me by the Commissariat and Land Transport Department, and, after considering such demands, the necessary orders for purchases were given by me from time to time.

4132. Do you mean that they were submitted to you, or that they ought to have been submitted to you?—Before I arrived at Zulla, which was not for some time after the Commander in Chief arrived, there was no opportunity of submitting such demands to me, and purchases were made without my intervention.

4133. But were the purchases made which were in Abyssinia submitted to you for approval before they were made?—Not all.

4134. If you were on the coast it would be impossible that such submissions could be made to you?—So far it was impossible, because there was not time to do it. If we had had plenty of time for it, it might have been done, but it was not done as a matter of fact.

4135. Then by far the greater number of purchases would be made without your intervention or inspection or authority at all?—A great part of them would have been made in that way.

4136. Have you records of the quantities purchased and of the places where they were purchased?—I have not.

4137. Did such records reach you from day to day or from week to week?—No, they did not come to me; they came to the office of the Deputy Commissary General in Zulla, and I had access to them, and they were submitted to me; but the pressure was so very great upon our office establishments, that we could not stick to form so closely as that. I was content to see those statements, and to initial them.

4138. For what purpose were they submitted to you?—For my information.

4139. In point of fact, they were merely submitted to you that you might be informed as to what was done?—Exactly.

4140. Not with any view to your control or responsibility in connection with the proceedings; you were designated Comptroller of Supplies; but in point of fact, you had no control, had you?—I had.

4141. I understood that you knew of the supplies only through the records of the purchases made afterwards?—I knew of all the supplies that were made out of Abyssinia, through commissariat agency and officers placed at different ports, and which were purchased under my orders.

4142. Were any of the purchases made in Abyssinia, on the line of march, in any way under your control, or direction, or management?—I do not think I could say that none of them were; but I know what you mean, and in that sense, none of the purchases that you may be considering at present would be under my management.

4143. Then the object of your knowing what was supplied and purchased in Abyssinia would be, I apprehend, that you might be informed as to  
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what additional supplies you had to derive from the shipping?—Exactly; that I might know to what extent we were being assisted by the produce of the country.

4144. Then I presume that you will have a record of what was received in the country?—I have not got it. Statements were sent in about once a month, or perhaps once a fortnight, to the Commissary General's office in Bombay, for his information, of the quantities of the supplies purchased in Abyssinia.

4145. Then did the supplies reported to you as obtained in Abyssinia influence your requisitions upon Bombay?—Only very slightly, because we could not reckon with any degree of certainty upon them.

4146. Neither as to forage nor as to supplies for the combatants and the followers?—As to forage, yes; but we did not take into calculation feeding any animals in advance of Senafe with forage, being convinced of the impossibility of transporting it beyond that.

4147. Is it not correct that in the first despatch of stores for the Expedition, forage was sent for the supply of the whole of the animals for six months, whether they were at work below Senafe or above it?—It was very soon found necessary to increase the number of animals to meet our requirements.

4148. You have probably seen it stated in the evidence before this Committee, that all supplies for both man and beast were despatched to Abyssinia altogether irrespectively of the supplies obtainable in the country; do you agree with that statement?—Yes; but only for the number of animals that was first of all fixed upon.

4149. What was that number?—28,000, I think.

4150. Then, is it not quite correct that you never, at any period of the Expedition, had 28,000 animals of all kinds under your care?—I cannot give you a correct account of the greatest number of animals under our care at any time without referring to the Returns.

4151. If your supplies were to feed 28,000 animals, and you never had that number to feed at any one time, would it not follow that your supplies were in excess of your necessities, altogether irrespectively of what you got in Abyssinia?—If the animals could have been obtained, I cannot say to what extent our transport would have increased.

4152. But you knew the extent to which you could procure animals, and you knew the animals that you had at work, did you not?—We knew the animals that we had at work, but we did not know to what extent we should get them. We were purchasing in all directions, and wherever we could get them; and we would have taken thousands more if we could have obtained them.

4153. In the months of January and February did you not know two things tolerably well: first, what animals you had in Abyssinia; and, secondly, the probable supply?—I am not prepared to say that we knew the probable supply.

4154. But you know that in the middle of February you only had 10,000 mules in Abyssinia, did you not?—That might be so.

4155. You never expected then that you had any resources from which you could make up 28,000 animals, did you?—We had agents at a great many points purchasing, and it was not known to what extent they would have succeeded in their purchases.

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4156. The Egyptian purchases were then in progress, but they were limited to 3,000, were they not?—No, there was no limit. There may have been an order for 3,000, but we had instructions from Lord Napier to purchase animals wherever we could get them. We simply invited tenders for a certain number at a time at different places.

4157. But you had been purchasing animals from the 2nd of August, had you not?—Yes.

4158. You knew then, through the autumn, the markets whence you could procure animals, and you were tolerably well informed as to what was purchasable in January and February, were you not?—I cannot say that we despaired of being able to draw more animals from where others had been got already.

4159. Do you know the largest number of animals you ever had in Abyssinia at one time?—I cannot answer that question.

4160. Have you any reason to believe that you ever had more than 20,000?—I have reason to believe that we have had more than 20,000, including those disabled and at the depôts.

4161. And to be fed?—And to be fed.

4162. Your calculation was for 28,000 animals, and you indented for forage on Bombay, on Egypt, and on Europe for that number, did you not, irrespectively of the supplies of the country?—Yes.

4163. Shortly after your arrival in Abyssinia you had communications with the Commander in Chief as to further supplies, had you not?—Yes.

4164. Will you state when that was and what those communications were, and in what they resulted?—I had a confidential memorandum from the Assistant Quartermaster General, dated 13th February.

4165. Was that the first conference you had with the Commander in Chief relative to increased supplies, after your arrival in Abyssinia?—I had no instructions to do anything until I got this memorandum; I had a confidential memorandum from the Assistant Quartermaster General on the 13th of February, informing me that as it did not seem probable, owing to the want of land transport, that the campaign in Abyssinia would be concluded before the monsoon set in, arrangements should be made to bring supplies into the country sufficient to last for eight or nine months, at least.

4166. Did you understand that to mean from that date?—It was difficult to understand exactly, but the whole scheme of the provisioning was understood in this way, that six months' ahead reserve was calculated.

4167. That has been explained, but let me ask you what you understood by that?—I understood by that that we were to secure provisions up to the 31st October.

4168. What did you do upon that?—It was communicated to the Deputy Commissary General, Colonel Lucas, who was in executive charge of the Commissariat under me in Abyssinia, and he prepared his indents for the additional supplies necessary up to the 31st October.

4169. Was it eight months or nine months?—It was calculated up to the 31st October, in addition to what we had.

4170. Had you not in February six months' supplies in advance of your necessities?—We had not six months' supplies in advance in February.

4171. To what period, then, would your supplies have sustained you?—You must not lose sight of the fact that we were to keep ahead six months. I had no option, the instructions having been given.

4172. In February had you a knowledge of what supplies had been furnished to the army?—Yes.

4173. How long would the supplies, then coming under your cognizance, have sustained the army?—I could not tell you that without referring to the statements; but I can probably get that information from an officer who is in this country, who was at that time in charge of the Zulla office, and who kept all the statements and returns. I had no regular inspection of the daily statements and returns. It was simply that the general demands were forwarded on through me.

4174. Then you are clear that the further supplies ordered were not eight or nine months in addition to the supplies previously ordered, but only such further supplies as would keep the army eight or nine months from that time, that is, to the end of October?—It was represented in all the requisitions sent to Bombay that what we indented for were merely our requirements up to the 31st of October, and the Commander in Chief was aware of that.

4175. Did you make a calculation of the necessary quantities?—I examined the calculations made, but they were not made in my office.

4176. How many men, including both combatants and followers, did you then reckon?—I cannot give that information, but I can get that from the officer who made it out.

4177. It is important that the Committee should know for what force you then indented, keeping in view the fact that at that date you returned some 4,000 followers?—We did.

4178. Did you still keep in view the 28,000 animals for which you had been forwarding supplies?—The animals were kept in view, as well as the combatants and non-combatants.

4179. You ordered forage for 28,000 animals up to the 31st of October, did you not?—We ordered forage for whatever number of animals we were calculating for (as to which I cannot give you a decided answer now), up to the 31st of October.

4180. Do you know that returns have been handed in to this Committee relative to forage, from which I infer that when the Expedition closed you had two years' forage afloat?—I may, perhaps, say that I entirely dispute the correctness of those returns. It is not possible that we could have had that quantity.

4181. Have you seen those returns?—I have just had a glance at them.

4182. Might we not infer, from your being Controller of Supplies, and all the accounts coming through you, that that return will be from documents furnished by yourself to the Bombay Commissariat?—Not at all; I never furnished any return of the consumption of anything.

4183. How have they got it, then, in Bombay?—That is sent by the executive officer who issued the things. I issued nothing. The executive officers issue, and furnish their statements of issues afterwards.

4184. The issues will represent the consumption, will they not?—Yes.

4185. Sir John Hay.] And the waste?—Yes.

4186. Chairman.]

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4186. *Chairman.*] Then those returns would come through you, would they not?—There were no regular returns of issues in my office.

4187. Was it not one of the first duties of your office to superintend and record all the receipts and issues of stores of every kind for the Expedition?—It was my duty to know to what extent the issues of stores had reached up to the time when another demand was made.

4188. You had periodical returns of the issues all along the line of march, had you not?—Yes; such returns were regularly furnished.

4189. Then those will be the documents from which the Bombay Commissary General made out the return which was issued in Bombay for the information of the Bombay Government?—Yes, I suppose so.

4190. Then I do not understand how it is that you question the accuracy of the returns?—On the item of “hay” I question their accuracy decidedly, but I do not question it in any other particular.

4191. *Captain Beaumont.*] Did you consider yourself directly responsible for the amount of the supplies that were sent to Abyssinia?—No.

4192. Then how do you reconcile that with the name of your official position as Controller of Supply and Transport?—It had been decided what supplies should be sent to Abyssinia before a controller was appointed.

4193. Do you generally agree with the scale on which those supplies were sent, or in other words, had your appointment been antedated, would you have suggested any change in the scale of the supplies?—No; I am not prepared to say that I should have suggested any difference in the scale of those supplies.

4194. Were you responsible for the number of animals sent to meet the requisitions of the Land Transport Train; the position of Controller of Supply and Transport, one would think, would mean a position to be occupied by a person who would say the number of animals which it would be necessary to employ to convey a certain amount of stores a certain distance; in fact, a person who would give official and definitive advice to the Commander in Chief on all matters which appertain generally to the question of supply and transport; if you were in that position, and were able practically to give effect to that position, I should put some further questions to you; but if you say that all those matters had been settled previously, I have nothing further to ask you?—The purchase of animals was made under the orders of the Commander in Chief, received from time to time.

4195. Therefore you do not consider yourself responsible in any sense of the term for the scale on which the number of animals for the purpose of the transport of the army was supplied?—No, not in fact; because Lord Napier's demands were not determined on any advice from me, though it would be my duty to furnish him with any information he needed to guide such demands.

4196. Were you responsible in any way for the organization of the land transport in the first instance?—I was not.

4197. Were you responsible afterwards for the working of the land transport?—I was not.

4198. Were you responsible in any sense of the term for the want of proper headstalls (if the want did exist) on the landing of the transport  
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animals in Abyssinia, or for the deficiency in the water arrangements, or generally for certain deficiencies which are alleged to have existed in the provision made for the reception of the transport animals at Annesley Bay?—No.

4199. Therefore I think that it is a fair inference that you were Controller of Supply and Transport in name only, and not in fact; that would follow, would it not, from your answers to the questions which I put?—I do not admit that after my arrival in Abyssinia.

4200. It seems to me an inference that may be correctly drawn from your replies to my questions; I have some questions which I should like to put to some person who had the control in those matters; as you say you had not that control, it is useless for me to address further questions on those matters to you. I have only one further question to put to you: of whom am I to ask questions with reference to those points?—I did not arrive at Zulla until some time after the Commander in Chief arrived, and I know nothing whatever of what took place from my own personal knowledge before my arrival.

4201. Who is the person who is responsible for the arrangements which were made for the reception of the transport animals at Annesley Bay if you, as the Controller of Supply and Transport, are not responsible?—Certainly I am not responsible; I was not there; I had not left India.

4202. Who is responsible?—On the chief commissariat officer at Zulla devolved the duty of receiving and looking after the animals until a portion of the Land Transport Train had arrived there to receive them.

4203. Who is that officer?—Colonel Mignon.

4204. Where is he now?—He is at Poona.

4205. Was he responsible for the preliminary arrangements which would have to be made in India for the proper reception of the animals at Annesley Bay?—The first portion of the animals arrived before there was any proper arrangement to receive them, as far as it could be understood by those who were not on the spot. For any shortcomings in the manner in which they were dispatched from Egypt to Zulla, the officers who shipped them there would be responsible.

4206. But I apprehend that the officers in Egypt had instructions only to make proper arrangements for the delivery of the animals at Annesley Bay, and it would not form a part of their duty to provide for their reception. It would be part of their duty to supply them with headstalls, and things of that sort, which you mentioned.

4207. The headstalls I believe were sent, but the mules had a peculiar fondness for eating them; and when spare headstalls were looked for, there were none there. A headstall of course is a very small matter; the fact, as I take it, was that the first detachment of mules arrived at Annesley Bay with practically no provision for their reception; you, as the Controller of Supply and Transport, upon whom the duty of making those arrangements would naturally devolve, say that you had nothing to do with it?—I say that the responsibility of that did not devolve upon me.

4208. Then it would not devolve, I take it, upon the officers in Egypt, because they had no instructions further than to deliver the mules at Annesley Bay; on whom, then, would rest the responsibility of making the preliminary arrangements?—I should be sorry to fix that responsibility on anyone

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anyone upon whom it could not be justly laid. There was not sufficient or clear information. We were not led to anticipate the difficulties which occurred, otherwise better and more efficient arrangements would have been made to meet them than had been made.

4209. Who would have made those arrangements?—The head of the Transport Train.

4210. Then the head of the Transport Train is responsible for not appreciating the difficulties which were before him?—I do not say that. It is a difficult thing to fix responsibility in a case where such difficulties could not possibly be foreseen.

4211. Assuming that the difficulties could not be foreseen, whatever responsibility in that matter there might be would attach to the officer you name?—The head of every department is responsible for the working of that department.

4212. Assuming that you had been placed earlier in the position in which you were, would you not consider that you would have been the proper person to have replied to the questions which I have put to you, and which you have stated your inability to answer?—That would depend entirely upon the terms of my appointment.

4213. Assuming that the terms of the appointment were the same as those under which you acted in Abyssinia, what would be your reply to my question?—The terms of the appointment could not be the same in India and in Abyssinia.

4214. I do not quite see why they should not be the same?—I could not be Controller of Supply and Transport in India. I was appointed controller of Supply and Transport for the Abyssinia force in Abyssinia.

4215. Mr. Eastwick.] Your duties were, in point of fact, I presume, to represent to the Bombay Government the supplies obtained in Abyssinia with the view to control any profuse expenditure?—Not to control profuse expenditure, but to report the reasons for profuse expenditure.

4216. Were the supplies obtained in Abyssinia considerable?—They were very inconsiderable as far as I am aware of them. They were very uncertain. We would hear for a day or two of a very promising quantity of supplies, but we could not judge by what was received the first day or two at a place of what would follow, because perhaps nothing would come after the second or third day. We could not calculate upon those supplies at all.

4217. It has been stated by one of the gentlemen who has given evidence before the Committee, the geographer, that he considers that there were large supplies of cattle to be obtained in Abyssinia; does your experience confirm that?—I do not think so; I have no information to that effect.

4218. In case Theodore had moved out of Magdala to some other part of the country, the surplus stores which you had on the coast would have come in very conveniently for laying the series of depôts in that new direction, I presume?—Certainly.

4219. Was there, in point of fact, great uncertainty as to the movements of the enemy?—I do not know that I should be warranted in giving my opinion, because I was not at the front, and there-

fore I could not give any reliable answer as to that; but it was very well understood that the movements of Theodore and his intentions, and everything were entirely in the dark, and the Commander in Chief himself could not up to the last moment foresee what Theodore was likely to do.

4220. And therefore the abundant supplies were in part calculations with reference to that uncertainty, were they not?—Certainly they were. It might have been necessary to detain the force.

4221. May I ask if you have been employed in any other expeditions?—I have not been actually employed in expeditions, but I have been employed in preparations connected with expeditions.

4222. What were those expeditions?—The Persian War was one.

4223. Are you aware of the fact, that in the case of an expeditionary force landing in a new country with no place to lodge in, and with absolute uncertainty as to the nature of the country, there would be very great difficulty in making a perfect arrangement as to the landing of animals and stores, and as to the provisioning and caring for transport animals; in fact, that it would be next to an impossibility?—I think that it would have been next to impossible to have made any arrangements at all approaching perfection at Zulla. The natural difficulties as regards the water and the climate were very great, as the epidemic proved.

4224. Chairman.] When did you receive the requisition of the Commander in Chief for eight or nine months' further supply?—About the 17th of February, I think.

4225. Then the supplies which you then ordered you drew in the main from Bombay, did you not?—We calculated upon drawing certain supplies more readily from Egypt.

4226. What supplies did you draw from Egypt?—Flour, wheat, and forage; but there were other things for which we looked entirely to India, and supplies of which we could only calculate upon getting after a certain time in limited quantities, and such only as could be conveyed by steamers. I am simply stating that from my own knowledge, but I cannot give you the amounts or the dates.

4227. Can you tell me when you despatched your requisitions for those additional supplies to Egypt and Bombay or the other ports whence you were drawing them?—I cannot.

4228. Would that be towards the end of February?—Probably.

4229. Was the object of those additional supplies, which the Commander in Chief ordered in February to strengthen his reserve of supplies in the highlands, and so to make himself independent of the coast, in the event of his communications with the coast being cut off during the monsoons?—The object of all those supplies was to give effect to the general scheme of our requirements. It was very uncertain to what extent we should be able to strengthen our reserve on the highlands before the rains set in.

4230. You would have no use for them upon the coast, I presume?—I beg to explain that we did not expect our communications with the highlands to be entirely cut off, and hoped, after the rains set in, to be able still to transport supplies of food by some means or other.

4231. There