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Reports from committees

Great Britain.
Parliament. House
of Commons

Pp. Eng. $\frac{1870}{5}$

REPORTS
FROM
COMMITTEES:
SEVEN VOLUMES.

—(1.)—

ABYSSINIAN EXPEDITION;
ARMY (COLONELS).

Session
8 *February* — 10 *August* 1870.

VOL. V.

1870.

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is to be preserved in the

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Oxford

7
1870



REPORTS FROM COMMITTEES.

1870.

SEVEN VOLUMES:—CONTENTS OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

N.B.—*THE* Figures at the beginning of the line, correspond with the N° at the foot of each Report; and the Figures at the end of the line, refer to the MS. Paging of the Volumes arranged for The House of Commons.

ABYSSINIAN EXPEDITION :

401. Report from the Select Committee on the Abyssinian Expedition; together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, and Index - - - - - p. 1

ARMY (COLONELS) :

385. Report from the Select Committee on Army (Colonels); together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, and Appendix - - - - - 739



1

R E P O R T

FROM THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

ON THE

ABYSSINIAN EXPEDITION;

TOGETHER WITH THE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE,

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE,

AND APPENDIX.

Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,
29 July 1870.

Friday, 18th February 1870.

Ordered, THAT a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the causes of the great excess of Cost in prosecuting the War with Abyssinia over the Estimate submitted to Parliament.

Ordered, THAT the Committee do consist of 19 Members.

Committee nominated :—

Sir Stafford Northcote.
Mr. Grant Duff.
Sir John Hay.
Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Eastwick.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. Christopher Denison.
Major Anson.
Mr. Howes.
Mr. White.

Lord Elcho.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Mr. Charles Turner.
Captain Beaumont.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Mr. Mundella.
Colonel Barttelot.
Mr. Holms.
Mr. Candlish.

Ordered, THAT the Committee have power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.

Ordered, THAT Five be the Quorum of the Committee.

Thursday, 24th February 1870.

Ordered, THAT the Minutes of the Evidence taken before the Select Committee on the Abyssinian War in the last Session of Parliament, be referred to the Select Committee on the Abyssinian Expedition.

Ordered, THAT Mr. Holms be discharged from further attendance on the Committee, and that Mr. Campbell be added thereto.

Thursday, 30th June 1870.

Ordered, THAT all Papers and Documents which have been laid before Parliament, having reference to the Abyssinian Expedition, be referred to the Select Committee thereupon.

Friday, 29th July 1870.

Ordered, THAT the Committee have power to report their Observations, together with the Minutes of Evidence taken before them, to The House.

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R E P O R T,

THE SELECT COMMITTEE appointed to inquire into the Causes of the great Excess of Cost in prosecuting the WAR with ABYSSINIA over the ESTIMATE submitted to Parliament;—HAVE considered the Matters to them referred, and have agreed to the following REPORT:—

YOUR COMMITTEE, in the discharge of the duties assigned to them, first directed their attention to the statement of the Government made to Parliament respecting the probable cost of the Abyssinian Expedition. From the evidence submitted to them, they have to report that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Disraeli, in asking, on the 26th day of November 1867, for a Vote of Credit for 2,000,000 *l.* on account of the Expedition, stated that although the Estimates could not be prepared with precision, and he must therefore describe them as “rough,” they were nevertheless “not careless Estimates”; that they had been submitted to as severe an investigation as was possible under the circumstances; and that they were submitted with a confidence “by no means slight.”

I. 31.

The Estimates then submitted to the House were prepared from materials supplied to the Treasury by the India Office, the War Office, and the Admiralty respectively, and based on circumstances necessarily hypothetical. Two possible alternatives were indicated: the one contemplated the possibility of merely having to land a force on the soil of Abyssinia; the other that the war would be carried on until the end of the month of April. Speaking on the former hypothesis, the Chancellor of the Exchequer said that if that result should happily occur, it would not be necessary to ask the House for any further vote in supply for the Abyssinian Expedition than 2,000,000 *l.*; and there was a strong impression on the minds of most of the Government, that the whole matter would be concluded at an expense of 2,000,000 *l.* Speaking of the second hypothesis, the necessary expenditure, it was stated, would be 3,500,000 *l.*, or under certain eventualities, 3,800,000 *l.*; but in no case did the Government contemplate the possibility of an expenditure of more than 4,000,000 *l.* to the end of the month of April.

I. 31-47.

I. 84.

On the 12th of February 1868, the honourable Member for Peterborough, Mr. Whalley, asked “whether the Estimate of the probable expenditure presented to the House in November last, when the expenditure was sanctioned, was likely to be exceeded;” to which inquiry the Chancellor of the Exchequer replied, “I have no reason to believe that the Estimates have been exceeded.” The only Estimate then before the House was 2,000,000 *l.* if the Expedition had not to advance into the interior of Abyssinia, and 3,500,000 *l.*, or possibly 4,000,000 *l.*, assuming that the war commenced and was carried on until the end of the month of April.

I. 40.

It would appear that at this date, and in making this answer, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had unfortunately either not seen, or not remembered, a private letter from the Governor of Bombay, dated 12th December, in which

I. p. 155.

his Excellency writes: "If the affair is brought soon to a termination all will be well; but do not disguise to yourselves that the cost will be enormous, if it goes on. My bill for transports alone exceeds 100,000 *l.* per month, besides coals, and not including our ships, to which your bill for transports has to be added. Our coal in Annesley Bay will cost not much less than 7 *l.* per ton. Probably, however short the affair may be, our coal bill will be three quarters of a million, our animals the same, and our commissariat charges a vast deal more. Then, though India pays the troops, there will be some 20,000 or 30,000 men besides you will have to pay for. Unless Theodore knocks under *at once*, which I cannot but think he will, I expect to see your three millions and a half largely exceeded, even for one campaign."

To the expenses here indicated, amounting seemingly to about 2,500,000 *l.*, which in the November estimate had been put down at only 1,150,000 *l.*, had to be added the charges then known to be accruing in the other presidencies; and also the heavy charges, amounting to nearly 2,000,000 *l.*, which had then been incurred in Europe. It would thus appear that at this date, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had omitted to inform himself of the facts within his reach, viz., that up to the end of 1867 liabilities had been incurred which amounted to a total sum of probably 5,000,000 *l.*

I. 47. On the 23rd of April 1868, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Ward Hunt, made his annual financial statement, and submitted a new Abyssinian Estimate to Parliament, in preparing which the Treasury further took into account the information they had received from Mr. Turner, who was dispatched by themselves to Bombay for the purpose of verifying and reporting on the expenditure. In that Estimate, he took as a starting point a liability of 2,000,000 *l.* incurred up to the 1st of January, and 600,000 *l.* per month onwards. He further anticipated that Sir Robert Napier would possess himself of our countrymen in time to commence his return march on the 20th of April, and that on that assumption the Expedition would last until the end of May. The Right Hon. Gentleman's language was, "We estimate the total expenditure for the Abyssinian Expedition, supposing that it is successful, and supposing, as we have reason to hope, that it leaves the country by the end of May, at 5,000,000 *l.*" "If there be any further charge, we believe it will be very small in amount, and it will probably be met by the supplies taken back by the Indian Government. Therefore we have no reason to suppose there will be any additional charge of more than an insignificant amount; assuming, of course, that the Expedition leaves the country by the end of May."

I. 64. Both in this estimate and in that of the 26th of November, the probable cost of the return of the Expedition was taken into the account, although no definite sum was put down for this prolonged service, as it was supposed that the value of the returned stores would be equal to the continued cost of the ships employed in conveying back the Expedition.

I. 238. On the same day (the 23rd of April) the Secretary of State for India also said, "I believe we may say that the estimate which has been taken is a very safe estimate, and supposing, what we all hope, that the Expedition has terminated successfully in the early days of the present month, there is reason to believe with confidence that the sum which has been taken will be amply sufficient to cover the whole cost of the Expedition." The only element of time, therefore, which entered into this statement was that Magdala should fall in the early part of April, and in that event the whole cost of the Expedition was estimated at 5,000,000 *l.* Magdala happily did fall, as was anticipated, on the 13th of April, and three days afterwards our troops were on their march homewards. But though the last man of the Expedition had left Annesley Bay before the month of June was out, the Expedition cannot be said to have completely terminated until all the transports had been discharged, and the last was not paid off till the 4th of September 1868, and until the troops had all returned to their proper stations in India, which was not till the end of October.

Your Committee having thus recited the facts, dates, and circumstances connected with the Abyssinian Estimates submitted to Parliament, and some selections from the ministerial statements then made, have now to add that the

total

total net cost of this Expedition, so far as the exact fact had been ascertained by the Treasury up to the 1st of July of the present year, amounted to :

App. No. 29.

£.	
1,921,600	spent by the Home Government.
5,578,400	spent in India.
1,300,000	spent in Abyssinia.
<hr/>	
£. 8,800,000	- - - TOTAL ;
<hr/>	

or 5,300,000 *l.* in excess of the first estimate, and 3,500,000 *l.* in excess of the second.

It would appear that the author of the first estimate does not himself acknowledge it to have been an estimate at all. General Jameson, who (if anyone) may be said to have prepared the estimates, both of November and of April, states that the November estimate submitted to Parliament "was merely an attempted approximation to the amount;" that "the word 'estimate' had been improperly used;" that the preparation of an estimate was in no way his official duty, or the duty of anyone connected with the India Department; that it was "only as a matter of official courtesy and convenience" that he gave the information which was embodied in the form of an estimate; that he did not at all contemplate being made responsible to Parliament; that the Government were told that the estimate could not be relied upon; and that no military power could have made even an approximate estimate of the expenses of the Abyssinian War. And to this Mr. Seccombe added, that it should not have been called an estimate at all, but "a memorandum for the information of the Secretary of State."

I. 335.

I. 280. 402. 508. 515.

I. 350.

I. 354.

I. 543.

I. 593.

I. 701. 708. 723.

It was also given in evidence before your Committee by Lord Napier of Magdala, the General in command of the Expedition, by General Sir William Mansfield, the Commander in Chief in India, and indeed by every military authority whom they consulted on this point, that the nature of the work assigned to the Expedition, and the peculiar circumstances under which we made war in Abyssinia, rendered even an approximate estimate of the cost utterly impossible.

II. 6. 175. 200. 576. 609. 5998, 5999.

29 July 1870.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE.

Thursday, 24th February 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Candlish. Sir Stafford Northcote. Sir John Hay.		Mr. Eastwick. Mr. Seely. Colonel Barttelot.
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Mr. CANDLISH was called to the Chair.

The Committee deliberated.

[Adjourned till Monday next, at One o'clock.]

Monday, 28th February 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. CANDLISH in the Chair.

Sir Stafford Northcote. Colonel Barttelot. Sir John Hay. Mr. Seely. Mr. Campbell. Mr. White. Mr. Eastwick.		Major Anson. Lord Elcho. Sir Patrick O'Brien. Mr. Baxter. Mr. Turner. Mr. Grant Duff. Mr. Mundella.
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The Lord Napier of Magdala was examined.

[Adjourned till Thursday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

Thursday, 3rd March 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. CANDLISH in the Chair.

Sir John Hay. Sir Stafford Northcote. Mr. Eastwick. Major Anson. Captain Beaumont. Colonel Barttelot. Mr. Denison.		Mr. Seely. Mr. Mundella. Mr. White. Mr. Turner. Sir Patrick O'Brien. Mr. Baxter.
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The Lord Napier of Magdala was further examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at Twelve o'clock.]

Friday, 4th March 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. CANDLISH in the Chair.

Mr. Seely.
Mr. Eastwick.
Sir John Hay.
Mr. Campbell.
Captain Beaumont.
Mr. Denison.

Major Anson.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Mr. Turner.
Colonel Barttelot.
Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Howes.

The Lord Napier of Magdala was further examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

Tuesday, 8th March 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. CANDLISH in the Chair.

Mr. Seely.
Sir Stafford Northcote.
Mr. Eastwick.
Mr. Turner.
Captain Beaumont.
Mr. Campbell.
Colonel Barttelot.

Mr. Denison.
Major Anson.
Sir John Hay.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Grant Duff.

The Lord Napier of Magdala was further examined.

The Committee deliberated.

Examination resumed.

[Adjourned till Friday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

Friday, 11th March 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. CANDLISH in the Chair.

Mr. Seely.
Mr. Eastwick.
Mr. Campbell.
Captain Beaumont.
Mr. Turner.
Sir Stafford Northcote.

Colonel Barttelot.
Sir John Hay.
Mr. Baxter.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Turner.

Colonel Wilkins, C.B., was examined.

[Adjourned till Friday, 29th April, at Twelve o'clock.]

Friday, 29th April 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. CANDLISH in the Chair.

Mr. Seely.
Sir John Hay.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Lord Elcho.
Colonel Barttelot.
Mr. White.

Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Denison.
Captain Beaumont.
Mr. Turner.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Mr. Baxter.

General *Jameson* was examined.

The Committee deliberated.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

Tuesday, 3rd May 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. CANDLISH in the Chair.

Lord Elcho.
Mr. Eastwick.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. Campbell.

Captain Beaumont.
Mr. Denison.
Colonel Barttelot.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Sir John Hay.
Mr. Howes.

Mr. *Markham*, Mr. *Foster*, and Captain *Sherard Osborne*, were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Friday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

Friday, 6th May 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. CANDLISH in the Chair.

Sir John Hay.
Mr. Eastwick.
Mr. Seely.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Major Anson.
Mr. Campbell.
Captain Beaumont.

Mr. Denison.
Mr. Howes.
Mr. Baxter.
Mr. White.
Mr. Turner.
Captain Barttelot.

Mr. *Tyndal Bright*, The Hon. *Montagu Mostyn*, and Sir *W. Power*, were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday, 10th May, at Twelve o'clock.]

Tuesday, 10th May 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Mr. CANDLISH in the Chair.

Sir John Hay.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. White.
Mr. Turner.

Captain Beaumont.
Colonel Barttelot.
Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Eastwick.
Mr. Baxter.

Admiral *Mends*, Mr. *Darke*, Captain *Whyniates*, Mr. *Otway* (a Member of the House), Mr. *Murray*, and Sir *W. Power*, were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Friday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

Friday, 13th May 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Mr. CANDLISH in the Chair.

Mr. Eastwick.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Lord Elcho.
Sir John Hay.
Mr. Seely.

Mr. Mundella.
Captain Beaumont.
Mr. Baxter.
Colonel Barttelot.

Captain *Steuart* and Colonel *Marriott* were severally examined.
The Committee deliberated.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

Tuesday, 17th May 1870..

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Mr. CANDLISH in the Chair.

Mr. Denison.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Lord Elcho.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. Campbell.
Captain Beaumont.
Mr. Eastwick.

Colonel Barttelot.
Mr. Grant Duff.
Mr. Baxter.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Howes.
Sir John Hay.

Colonel *Marriott* further examined.

[Adjourned till Friday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

Friday, 20th May 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Mr. CANDLISH in the Chair.

Mr. Eastwick
Colonel Barttelot.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Lord Elcho.
Sir John Hay.

Mr. Seely.
Captain Beaumont.
Mr. Howes.
Mr. Baxter.

Colonel *Marriott* was further examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

Tuesday, 24th May 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Mr. CANDLISH in the Chair.

Mr. James Elphinstone.
Sir John Hay.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. Campbell.

Captain Beaumont.
Mr. Eastwick.
Mr. Turner.

Colonel *Marriott* was further examined ; Colonel *Holland* was examined.

[Adjourned till Friday, 27th May, at Twelve o'clock.]

Friday, 27th May 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Mr. CANDLISH in the Chair.

Lord Elcho.
Sir John Hay.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. Campbell.
Sir James Elphinstone.

Colonel Barttelot.
Mr. Eastwick.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Mr. Turner.
Captain Beaumont.

Colonel *Holland*, Sir *W. Power*, Colonel *Sherrington*, and Major *Willoughby*, were severally examined.

The Committee deliberated.

Motion made, and Question, That the Committee do adjourn till this day fortnight—(Lord *Elcho*)—put, and *agreed to*.

[Adjourned accordingly till Friday, 10th June, at Twelve o'clock.]

Friday, 10th June 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. CANDLISH in the Chair.

Mr. Eastwick.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Mr. Campbell.

Captain Beaumont.
Sir John Hay.
Colonel Barttelot.

Major *Willoughby* was further examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

Tuesday, 14th June 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. CANDLISH in the Chair.

Mr. Eastwick.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Lord Elcho.
Sir John Hay.
Sir Stafford Northcote.
Mr. Seely.

Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Captain Beaumont.
Colonel Barttelot.
Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Turner.

Sir *C. Staveley* and Captain *Beaumont* (a Member of the House) were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Friday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

Friday, 17th June 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. CANDLISH in the Chair.

Mr. Turner.
Mr. Seely.
Sir Stafford Northcote.
Sir John Hay.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Colonel Barttelot.

Captain Beaumont.
Mr. Eastwick.
Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Grant Duff.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.

Captain *Beaumont* (a Member of the Committee), Admiral *Robinson*, Admiral *Mends*, Admiral *Richards*, and Colonel *Kennedy*, were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

Tuesday, 21st June, 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

MR. CANDLISH in the Chair.

Lord Elcho.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Denison.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Sir Stafford Northcote.
Sir John Hay.

Mr. White.
Mr. Eastwick.
Colonel Barttelot.
Captain Beaumont.
Mr. Baxter.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.

Mr. *Adams*, Colonel *Marriott*, Colonel *Kennedy*, and Sir *William Mansfield*, were severally examined.

The Committee deliberated.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That after to-day no further evidence be taken, except that of the Chairman—(Colonel *Barttelot*).—Amendment proposed, after the word “of,” to insert the words “Captain *Hosier* and”—(Sir *James Elphinstone*).—Question put, That those words be there inserted.—The Committee divided :

Aye, 1.
Sir James Elphinstone.

Noes, 9.
Mr. Denison.
Mr. Eastwick.
Lord Elcho.
Sir Stafford Northcote.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. White.
Captain Beaumont.
Mr. Campbell.
Colonel Barttelot.

Main Question put, and agreed to.

Resolved, That after to-day no further evidence be taken except that of the Chairman.

[Adjourned till Friday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

Friday, 24th June 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Sir Stafford Northcote.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Sir John Hay.
Captain Beaumont.
Mr. Turner.

Mr. Candlish.
Mr. Eastwick.
Lord Elcho.
Colonel Barttelot.
Mr. Seely.

Sir STAFFORD NORTHCOTE was called to the Chair.

Mr. *Candlish*, a Member of the Committee, was examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday, July 26th, at Twelve o'clock.]

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Tuesday, 26th July 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Mr. CANDLISH in the Chair.

Sir John Hay.
Mr. Eastwick.
Mr. Denison.
Sir Stafford Northcote.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Howe.

Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Mr. White.
Major Anson.
Mr. Campbell.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Captain Beaumont.
Mr. Grant Duff.

DRAFT REPORT proposed by the Chairman read the first time as follows:—

1. "YOUR COMMITTEE, in the discharge of the duties assigned to them, first directed their attention to the statement of the Government made to Parliament respecting the probable cost of the Abyssinian Expedition. From the evidence submitted to them, they have to report that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in asking, on the 26th day of November 1867, for a vote of 2,000,000 *l.* on account of the Expedition, stated that although the Estimates could not be prepared with precision, and he could only describe them as 'rough,' they were nevertheless 'not careless Estimates'; that they had been submitted to as severe an investigation as was possible under the circumstances; that he was therefore in a position to state the 'complete cost of the war,' if pursued, 'not only to its probable but to its possible termination'; and that they were submitted with a confidence 'by no means slight.'

I. 31

2. "The Estimates then submitted to the House were based on circumstances necessarily hypothetical. Two possible alternatives were indicated: the one contemplated the possibility of merely having to land a force on the soil of Abyssinia; the other that the Expedition would have to march to Magdala and take the prisoners by force. Speaking on the former hypothesis, the Chancellor of the Exchequer said that if that result should happily occur, it would not be necessary to ask the House for any further vote in supply for the Abyssinian Expedition than 2,000,000 *l.*; and there was a strong impression on the minds of most of the Government that the whole matter would be concluded at an expense of 2,000,000 *l.* Speaking of the second hypothesis, that of having to pursue the war to its possible termination, and of its being carried on 'until the end of the month of April,' the necessary expenditure, it was stated, would be 3,500,000 *l.*, or under certain eventualities which never happened, 3,800,000 *l.*; but in no case did the Government contemplate the possibility of an expenditure of more than 4,000,000 *l.*

I. 31-47.

3. "This Estimate seems to have been based upon the supposition that it would be necessary to send a force of 12,000 combatants, at least an equal number of camp followers, and from 16,400 to 25,000 animals of various kinds (Blue Book, pp. 48 and 440). Before, however, this Estimate was submitted to Parliament, it seems to have been reported to the Home Government that Sir Robert Napier intended to take about 15,000 combatants, which would, of course, increase the number of followers, the supplies, the animals, and the tonnage, and proportionately the cost. Nevertheless, it was not thought necessary, either on the 26th of November 1867, or on the 23rd of April 1868, to state this fact to the House, nor proportionately to increase the Estimate. On the 1st of December, it is true, the Secretary of State wrote to Sir Robert Napier: 'I do not think that you should take more fighting men than the 12,000 originally proposed'; but this does not appear to have been either intended or understood as a positive prohibition of the increase; for Sir Robert Napier had been previously invested with ample powers, and he replied, not that he would not take more, but, 'you may be sure that I will not take a soldier more than is necessary.' It clearly also was, or might have been, known to the Government, that his plan of campaign embraced a constant stock of six months' supplies in advance of the requirements of the force.

II. 6123.

II. 6133.

4. "On the 12th of February 1868, the honourable Member for Peterborough asked 'whether the Estimate of the probable expenditure presented to the House in November last, when the expenditure was sanctioned, was likely to be exceeded'; to which inquiry the Chancellor of the Exchequer replied, 'I have no reason to believe that the Estimates have been exceeded.' The only Estimate then before the House was 2,000,000 *l.* if the Expedition had not to advance into the interior of Abyssinia, and 3,500,000 *l.*, assuming that the war commenced and was carried on until the end of the month of April.

I. 40.

5. "It would appear that at this date, and in making this answer, the Chancellor of the Exchequer

I. p. 155.

Exchequer had unfortunately either not seen, or not remembered, a communication from the Governor of Bombay, dated 12th December, in which his Excellency writes: 'If the affair is brought soon to a termination all will be well; but do not disguise to yourselves that the cost will be enormous, if it goes on. My bill for transports alone exceeds 100,000 £ per month, besides coals, and not including our ships, to which your bill for transports has to be added. Our coal in Annesley Bay will cost not much less than 7 £ per ton. Probably, however short the affair may be, our coal bill will be three quarters of a million, our animals the same, and our commissariat charges a vast deal more. Then, though India pays the troops, there will be some 20,000 or 30,000 men besides you will have to pay for. Unless Theodore knocks under *at once*, which I cannot but think he will, I expect to see your three millions and a half largely exceeded, even for one campaign.'

6. "To the expenses here indicated, amounting seemingly to about 2,500,000 £, which in the November estimate had been put down at only 1,150,000 £, had to be added the charges then known to be accruing in the other presidencies; and also the heavy charges, amounting to nearly 2,000,000 £, which had then been incurred in Europe. It would thus appear that at this date the Chancellor of the Exchequer had omitted to inform himself of the facts within his reach, viz., that up to the end of 1867 liabilities had been incurred which amounted to a total sum of probably 5,000,000 £.

I. 47. 7. "On the 23rd of April 1868, a new Chancellor of the Exchequer made his annual financial statement, and submitted a new Abyssinian Estimate to Parliament. In that Estimate he took as a starting point a liability of 2,000,000 £ incurred up to the 1st of January, and 600,000 £ per month onwards. He further anticipated that Sir Robert Napier would possess himself of our countrymen in time to commence his return march on the 20th of April, and that on that assumption the Expedition would last until the end of May. The Right Hon. Gentleman's language was, 'We estimate the total expenditure for the Abyssinian Expedition, supposing that it is successful, and supposing, as we have reason to hope, that it leaves the country by the end of May, at 5,000,000 £.' 'If there be any further charge, we believe it will be very small in amount, and it will probably be met by the supplies taken back by the Indian Government. Therefore we have no reason to suppose there will be any additional charge of more than an insignificant amount, assuming, of course, that the Expedition leaves the country by the end of May.'

I. 64. 8. "Both in this estimate and in that of the 26th of November, the probable cost of the return of the Expedition was taken into the account, although no definite sum was put down for this prolonged service, as it was supposed that the value of the returned stores would be equal to the continued cost of the ships employed in conveying back the Expedition.

I. 238. 9. "On the same day (the 23rd of April) the Secretary of State for India also said, 'I believe we may say that the estimate which has been taken is a very safe estimate, and supposing, what we all hope, that the Expedition has terminated successfully in the early days of the present month, there is reason to believe with confidence that the sum which has been taken will be amply sufficient to cover the whole cost of the Expedition.' The only element of time, therefore, which entered into this statement was that Magdala should fall in the early part of April, and in that event the whole cost of the Expedition was estimated at 5,000,000 £. Magdala happily did fall, as was anticipated, on the 13th of April, and three days afterwards our troops were on their march homewards.

10. "Your Committee having thus recited the facts, dates, and circumstances connected with the Abyssinian Estimates submitted to Parliament, and the ministerial statements then made, have now to add that the total net cost of this Expedition, so far as the exact fact had been ascertained by the Treasury up to the 1st July of the present year, amounted to:

App. No. 29.

£.	
1,921,600	spent by the Home Government.
5,578,400	spent in India.
1,300,000	spent in Abyssinia.
<hr/>	
£. 8,800,000	- - - TOTAL

or 5,300,000 £ in excess of the first estimate, and 3,500,000 £ in excess of the second.

11. "The duty assigned to your Committee was to inquire into the causes of this great excess of cost over the estimates submitted to Parliament.

12. "In prosecuting this unexampled inquiry, your Committee have encountered, as might have been expected, unexampled difficulties. These difficulties arise, not altogether, but mainly, from the fact that many important witnesses are scattered to the ends of the earth. Under these circumstances they have had to keep three important considerations steadily in view; first, the completeness of the inquiry; secondly, in antagonism with that consideration, they have had to keep in mind the cost of the inquiry; and, thirdly, they have had to pay due regard to the length of time during which it would be well to prosecute the inquiry. They have endeavoured to balance these considerations, and to give what they conceived to be its due weight to each. Hence, in assigning a reasonable place to the second and third, they have had to trench somewhat upon the first. In deference to what they believe to be the wish of the House of Commons, they have thought it expedient to close their inquiry in the present Session. They have also shrunk from the enormous cost, and the serious interruption to the public service, which would have resulted from calling his Excellency

Sir

Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, for instance, and other officers of high position, both regimental and departmental, from India, to give evidence before them.

13. "Allowing these two considerations partially to influence their proceedings, their inquiry has not in all respects been so full and complete as might have been desirable; and hence some lines of inquiry are hereafter referred to the special consideration of Her Majesty's Government, with a view to such ulterior action as they may think expedient.

14. "In answering, then, your reference, your Committee would observe, in the first place, that the policy of the Government in relation to the conduct of the Expedition rendered any reliable estimate by the Home Government impossible. A *carte blanche* was given to the Governor of Bombay and the Commander in Chief of the Expedition, and hence anything worthy of the name of an estimate became an utter impossibility.

15. "It would appear that the author of the first estimate does not himself acknowledge it to have been an estimate at all. General Jameson, who (if anyone) may be said to have prepared the estimates, both of November and of April, states that the November estimate submitted to Parliament 'was merely an attempted approximation to the amount'; that 'the word 'estimate' had been improperly used'; that the preparation of an estimate was in no way his official duty, or the duty of anyone connected with the India Department; that it was only as a matter of official courtesy and convenience that he gave the information which was embodied in the form of an estimate; that he did not at all contemplate being made responsible to Parliament; that the Government were told that the estimate could not be relied upon; and that no military authority could have made even an approximate estimate of the expenses of the Abyssinian War. And to this Mr. Seccombe added, that it should not have been called an estimate at all, but 'a memorandum for the information of the Secretary of State.'

16. "It was also given in evidence before your Committee by Lord Napier, the General in command of the Expedition, by General Mansfield, the Commander in Chief in India, and indeed by every military authority whom they consulted on this point, that the nature of the work assigned to the Expedition, and the peculiar circumstances under which we made war in Abyssinia, rendered even an approximate estimate of the cost utterly impossible.

17. "It would thus appear in view of the facts that unlimited powers were given to the Bombay Government and to the Commander in Chief, and that the materials for forming an estimate were not in the possession of the professional gentlemen to whom the Government applied for guidance, that Parliament should not have been told in November that the estimates, though rough, were not careless, and that they were submitted with a confidence by no means slight.

18. "But, accepting the Government statement of November, that this was an estimate of the cost of finishing the war in April, and viewing it in the light of the actual cost, your Committee have come to the conclusion that the vast difference between the two is attributable to the inadequacy of the estimate on the one hand, and to the profuse and enormous expenditure on the other.

19. "First, as to the estimate. The inadequacy of the estimate of 2,000,000 *l.* to land the Expedition in force in Abyssinia, and of 3,500,000 *l.* to finish the war in April, has been manifested from many sources. Even at the time it was submitted, as it seems to your Committee, and on the facts then known to the Government, its inadequacy should have been apparent. On the 23rd of August the Admiralty informed the Secretary of State for India that to convey 12,000 combatants, 16,400 animals, and 9,500 muleteers and drivers to Abyssinia, with provisions for three months, would, exclusive of followers, require 132,000 tons of shipping, and suggested that more might be required for the conveyance of forage. On the 27th August, moreover, the Bombay Government informed the Home Government that to convey the force indicated to the shores of Abyssinia would require 150,000 tons of shipping for animals, and 90,000 tons for men and stores, or a total shipping of 240,000 tons. But, notwithstanding these very definite and important statements, the first being in the hands of Government in the month of August, and the second in the month of September, the estimate framed and submitted to Parliament in November only included 89,000 tons of shipping, at least two-thirds of which was only reckoned to be employed for four months. The Admiralty estimated price was 32 *s.* 6 *d.* per ton per month. All the shipping engaged in England and in India up to November, for service in India, had been engaged for six months. This would have brought the Admiralty estimate of the tonnage required up to a total cost of 1,287,000 *l.*, and the Indian estimate to 2,340,000 *l.* Yet the estimate for tonnage put before Parliament in November did not exceed 672,750 *l.*; that is to say, 614,000 *l.* less than the Admiralty estimate, and 1,667,000 *l.* less than the Indian estimate of tonnage necessary to land the Expedition in Abyssinia,—both of them being then in the possession of the Government.

20. "Again, in the November estimate, 20 *l.* a head was reckoned as the cost of mules; but it was then known at the War Office that we were paying 30 *l.* a head in Spain. Authority, too, to lay a railway and to construct a telegraph had been given; it was also then known that piers were in course of construction at Annesley Bay; but the cost of none of these large items was reckoned in the estimate. Thus it seems to be abundantly established that the estimates of November 1867 and of April 1868 were utterly inadequate.

21. "But whilst one source of the difference between estimate and expenditure is thus revealed, it will be also needful to advert to the evidence adduced before your Committee showing much extravagant expenditure. Their inquiry has diverged in every direction and in considerable detail, but your Committee think it will be most convenient to condense the results under a few general heads.

I. 335.

I. 280. 402. 508.

515.

I. 350.

I. 354.

I. 543.

I. 593.

I. 701. 708. 723.

II. 6. 175. 200. 576.
609. 6298, 5999.

B. B. p. 47.

B. B. p. 56.
II. 3402, 3403.

App. I., p. 150.

I. 382.

II. 1236.

"NUMBER OF THE FORCE.

22. "IN endeavouring to ascertain the causes of increased cost, your Committee naturally look first to the increase in the expeditionary force beyond the numbers first indicated.

I. 151.

II. 821.

II. 4235.

II. 58-60.

II. 49.

23. "The number in the Government Estimate was 12,424. There is some discrepancy in the evidence as to the number of combatants actually sent. Lord Napier states the number to have been 14,254; but Colonel Marriott handed in a Return stating the number of troops embarked to have been 14,410; to which he added 80 men of the Royal Engineers (who were sent out by the Horse Guards without any requisition from India), and 200 men of the Naval Brigade, making a total of 14,700. This would appear to be an increase on the numbers in the estimate of rather more than one-sixth.

24. "Colonel Marriott and Lord Napier both concur that this would add proportionately to the expense. If this be correct, the increased force will account for about a million and a half of the excess of cost. But it is evident that many charges would have been the same had the force not been increased, and probably one million of increased expenditure will be enough to attribute to that cause.

"PURCHASE OF ANIMALS.

25. "One of the heavy charges in the prosecution of the Expedition was for the purchase of animals.

26. "Animals were drawn both from Europe and from different parts of India. No evidence has been obtained as to the conditions under which the Indian purchases were effected; but the evidence shows that not a few of the purchases in Europe were of an exceedingly improvident character.

II. 2469.

II. 2482.

II. 3050, 3051.

II. 2977.

II. 2970.

27. "At the very outset, a city firm named Wetherell & Co., through a somewhat irregular introduction to the War Office, speedily effected a contract for the supply and delivery at ports in the Mediterranean of an indefinite number of Spanish mules at an indefinite price. The only defined terms of the contract (which will be found in the Appendix), were that the contractors were to buy as cheaply as they could, and to receive from 8 l. to 9 l. per head, in addition to the purchasing price, to cover commission and cost of delivery at the port of shipment; and the only restraint upon the action of the contractors was dependent on any subsequent communication from the War Office. The improvident nature of this contract was speedily recognised, and it was soon terminated; but not until about 1,100 animals had been purchased at a cost, including commission, of about 30 l. per head. Many of the animals purchased under the Messrs. Wetherell's contract were inferior to those purchased by Captain Whinyates, sent out by the War Office, who bought mules at an average price of 16 l. 17 s. Captain Whinyates found a large portion of the animals delivered by Messrs. Wetherell & Co. under this contract to be utterly unfit for shipment, and worth not more than 7 l. or 8 l. a head. The solicitor of the War Office, however, gave it as his opinion, that, according to the terms of the contract, Captain Whinyates had no power of rejection, and the rejected animals were resold in Spain at a loss of about 3,000 l. The contractors received l. commission for their services. This contract entailed a loss of probably not less than 20,000 l.

28. "Simultaneously with the conclusion of this contract, officers were sent from the War Office to purchase on the same ground whence the contractors were drawing their mules, so that a competition was for a short time established in the same market between these two purchasing authorities.

29. "Purchasing officers were sent to several ports of the Mediterranean. Those sent to Constantinople remained there some time, but left without effecting any purchases, and proceeded to Smyrna, where a large number of animals were purchased at higher prices than any given in the Mediterranean, those bought under Wetherell's contract alone excepted. In several instances junior and inexperienced officers were selected to proceed to the Continent to purchase animals, without any knowledge of the countries to which they were sent.

II. 3034, 5, 6.

II. 6150.

II. 5488.

30. "Your Committee also find that a contract for the supply and delivery of 250 camels at Suez was concluded on the 27th of April, the day after the fall of Magdala was known to the purchasing officer.

31. "One of the conditions of a contract for the supply of 500 mules at Damascus was that they should be subject to the inspection of Colonel Stanton, Her Majesty's Consul General in Egypt, at Suez. Under this condition, animals to the value of 1,832 l. were rejected; but previously to the inspection, the consul at Damascus, under whom the contract was carried out, had, contrary to its terms, paid for the animals, with the exception of a balance of 500 l. The loss of 1,332 l. thus sustained has never been recovered; and yet the consul, from whose negligence the loss resulted, was paid 715 l. commission for his services. This payment was made after appeal to, and on the ultimate decision of, the Home Government.

II. 5485.

32. "Colonel Stanton stated that if he had been entrusted with the purchase, he could have got mules delivered at Suez at 20 l., whereas the mules in Egypt in no case cost less than 26 l., delivered at Suez.

II. 2581.

II. 2595.

33. "The consular agency was employed in many instances to aid the purchasing officers; but although the consuls were in the employ of the Foreign Office, the War Office, without reference to the Foreign Office, strangely invested their purchasing officers with the discretion of paying to the consuls any commission up to 5 per cent. upon any purchases in which their aid might be employed. In the exercise of this discretion, the officers from the War Office in Cyprus paid this maximum commission of 5 per cent. to the vice consul there, amounting

amounting to 810 *l.*, or more than three years' consular salary, for less than three weeks' service. A similar commission was paid in other instances.

34. "Pack animals seem to have been made a much more costly item than they would have been had mules been less exclusively purchased. In October Sir Edward Lugard advised the India Office that 'The labour, expense, and risk attending the collection of animals would have been greatly diminished if pack horses had been more freely employed'; and Colonel Stanton, a high authority as to the character of the animals in Egypt, stated that donkeys would have been much better than mules, and could have been purchased at from 7 *l.* to 8 *l.* a piece; while they would probably have carried not less than three-fourths of the load of the mules, would have been easily and inexpensively fed, and would have required very little attendance.

35. "As regards the camels procured by the contractor at Aden, Mr. Haussmann says, 'Language fails to describe the pitiable condition of these animals when landed. Some were too young for work; others with sore backs, and ulcers frightful to behold; others so young, averaging from six months to one year, that they were utterly useless; and the majority landed in such a weak, debilitated condition that they could barely carry 100 lbs.'

36. "An increase of cost in the purchase of mules resulted also from the War Office having fixed a minimum size of 13 hands. Lord Napier informed the Committee that he should certainly not have made such a restriction, or fixed such a limit, as the result would be, as in point of fact it was, the rejection of superior mules of a smaller size in favour of larger mules of an inferior character; and this limitation of the field of selection of course tended to advance the price.

"LOSS OF MULES.

37. "But the money waste in the purchase of mules is as nothing compared with the money cost resulting from their loss. Probably nothing in the conduct of the Expedition accounts for so much of the excess of expenditure as the terrible waste of animals in Abyssinia.

38. "The animals from Suez were first landed on the coast of Abyssinia in the month of October, and successive deliveries rapidly followed. No arrangements seem to have been made for their reception and care. On the arrival of General Staveley, the second in command under Lord Napier, in Annesley Bay, on the 6th of December, he found an appalling state of things. The animals were all at large, with no one in attendance upon them; and, to use his own words, 'They were dying all over the place,' at least 1,000 having perished for want of forage and attendance.' This was before the ranks had been thinned by an epidemic by which they were afterwards visited. In the early part of January, no fewer than 15,600 camels and mules had been lost or destroyed. On this, Colonel Warden, on the 27th January, reports, 'I am startled at the deficiency as between the number at present shown in the returns and the number landed.'

39. "To this early grievous loss of animals must be attributed much ultimate heavy expense. Captain Tryon stated that the fact of sending the great amount of tonnage to Suez and to Berbera for additional animals, probably created a delay in the Red Sea of nearly one-fourth of the whole tonnage engaged in the Abyssinian War.

40. "The total number of animals landed in Abyssinia, exclusive of 18,906 obtained in the country, was 36,094. The total number re-embarked was only 7,421. The total number destroyed or abandoned was therefore 28,673. It is difficult accurately to determine the average value of an animal landed in Abyssinia; but your Committee are of opinion that they will not over-estimate the amount at 40 *l.* per head. Thus, by reason of the destruction and waste of animals alone, an expenditure is entailed of 1,147,000 *l.* Allowing for the normal waste under more favourable circumstances, we have here an excess of one million of expenditure.

"LAND TRANSPORT TRAIN.

41. "This frightful loss of animals no doubt resulted from that fruitful source of expenditure and embarrassment, the inefficiency of the Land Transport Train.

42. "On the landing of Sir Charles Staveley there was no organised Land Transport Train at all. On the 3rd of January, when Lord Napier landed in Annesley Bay, little had been done towards its formation. Lord Napier was consequently unable to advance until the 25th of January. On the 1st of February Lord Napier's Quartermaster General from Head Quarters at Senafé comments on the Transport Train as follows: 'The deficiencies of the Land Transport Corps are the cause of delay in the advance of the force, and the rapid melting away of the stock and of the camels and mules requires most serious consideration.'

43. 'The advance of the Commander in Chief was further arrested at Senafé from the 25th of January to the 4th of February, and more or less all along the line of march, by reason of the deficiencies of the Land Transport Train; and Lord Napier attributed the need of further supplies to the same cause. The train remained so imperfect, that on the 13th of February, the Assistant Quartermaster General at Head Quarters wrote to Colonel Holland as follows: 'By desire of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, I have the honour to inform the Controller of Supply and Transport, that it does not seem probable, owing to a want of land transport, that the campaign in Abyssinia will be concluded before the monsoon sets in. Arrangements should accordingly be made to bring supplies to this country sufficient to last for eight or nine months at least.'

II. 3126.

Rep. 1869, p. 360.

II. 5505.

App. No. .

II. 720, 721.

II. 5064-85.

II. 1588-60.

I. 1949.

I. 144.

II. 5118-5120.

II. 268. 5122.

App. No. 14.

II. 237. 268. 737.

App. No. 14.

I. 561.
II. 764.

44. "In the report forwarded to the India Office by Lord Napier, from Paris on the 1st July 1868, Colonel Warden says, that 'few of the muleteers and maccuddums belonged to the field column carriage under the commissariat; the rest were the off-scourings of the Bombay streets, consisting of broken-down native tradesmen, discharged Europeans and Eurasians from other departments, and the class termed 'loafers.' The inspectors and head maccuddums consisted, in the first instance, chiefly of civilians, that is, persons who may have been, or were, attached to the commissariat, railway, and similar departments. The first arrangement, so soon as the working of the campaign really commenced, broke down altogether. 'The strength of the corps under the command of the director finally reached the gigantic proportions shown at the close of the campaign, viz., 80 commissioned officers, 160 European inspectors, 400 native inspectors, and 12,000 followers. They consisted of every European nationality, besides Turks and Egyptians, and the interpreters were few in proportion. Many among those were so open to bribery and corruption that the correctness of their interpretation had to be purchased by the men. The wanton, barbarous cruelty of those men to their animals, and their unwillingness to work or to bear privations, besides being insubordinate in the extreme, led to their being discharged; and during the months of January, February, and March, 2,100 were sent back. These were replaced by some 5,000 men collected from the Punjaub, who answered admirably, and without whom the train could not possibly have worked. Difficulties and disasters met the officers at every step; mules landed without equipments in hundreds.' 'The state of the transport on the arrival of the director was truly appalling; for, what with the wretched state of the animals, insubordination, and Suez muleteers, and the enormous pressure put upon the train, commissariat, and other departments to meet the requirements of the army daily landing, success seemed hopeless; and, but for the unfailing energy, and perseverance and hard work, day and night, of the officers, the train must have been lost altogether.

App. No. 14.

45. "Colonel Holland also states that 'the organisation of the land transport, which was imperfect in India, has not, in my opinion, improved since its transfer to Abyssinia; and, admitting fully the difficulties under which the organisation of the corps was undertaken, I respectfully submit that more favourable results than these might have been expected.'

II. 4299.

46. "From this general description it seems to be needful to exempt what was known as the Highland Transport Train, under Captain Hand, composed mainly of the Punjaub muleteers, a body of men who were throughout found to be efficient. The Bengal Brigade also left Calcutta with its own transport train complete; and of it General Mansfield says: 'The consequence was that when those regiments which went from the Bengal Presidency landed in Abyssinia they were at once competent to march, and they did march on the day of their landing, precisely the same as if they had been in this country.'

47. "Such being the official record of the facts descriptive of the deplorable condition of the Transport Train, it seems to your Committee needful to inquire into the causes of such a state of things. They attribute those results, firstly, to the fact that it was composed of wretched materials; secondly, to the fact that it was wholly unorganised; and thirdly, to the variety of languages spoken by the muleteers, and the inability of the officers to communicate with them in their own languages. This last cause of inefficiency is too obvious to require remark.

I. 560.

II. 551.

48. "As to the material, there is no doubt that the main cause of the inefficiency of the train was the employment of Syrian and Egyptian muleteers, who, according to the evidence of Lord Napier, were engaged at the instance of the Home Government. That it was needful to go beyond India for muleteers seems to be more than doubtful. Lord Napier thought that they might have been obtained, if not from Bombay itself, at least from the interior of the country; for, although the price of labour at Bombay was high, and in Bombay itself there was not a large class of people who would be useful as muleteers, yet a large number of extra muleteers were sent from the Punjaub and the North-Western Provinces; and no doubt sufficient numbers might have been obtained if efforts had been made earlier.

II. 5959.

II. 3975.

49. "Secondly, the lack of organisation, and the delay in the formation of an efficient train in Bombay, appear to have been attributable to a difference of opinion between the Government of Bombay and the Commander in Chief. It seems to be undoubted, that muleteers having been so largely drawn from Syria and Egypt, any organisation and training before landing in Abyssinia was an impossibility; and hence it may be inferred that a supreme necessity existed for obtaining Indian muleteers, who could have been organised and rendered efficient as well from Bombay as from Calcutta and the Punjaub, before embarkation for Abyssinia. General Mansfield did not see why an organised transport train should not have been sent from Bombay similar to that sent from Bengal. Speaking of the divergent views between the Government of Bombay and the Commander in Chief, Colonel Marriott says: 'The difference originally expressed was very material, but not the difference which remained after the first concessions on either side.' On this point, Lord Napier, through the Assistant Quartermaster General, on the 1st of February 1868, states that 'the officer in charge of the Transport Train was not a free agent in the first formation of the corps, but acted in obedience to the Commissary General of Bombay. He consequently had no time to collect sufficient officers and non-commissioned officers, and those that were sent were not of his own choosing.'

50. "Your Committee cannot leave this branch of the subject without adverting to the anomalous position which seems to have been occupied during the Abyssinian Expedition by the so-called 'Controller of Supply and Transport.'

I. 4105.

51. "An officer was appointed under that appellation, whose duties, as defined by his instructions,

structions, were briefly as follows :—He was to act as agent for supply and transport, provisions, and clothing. He was to receive instructions from the Commander in Chief as to the quantity and description of transport, and he was responsible for its organisation and efficiency. He was to exercise an immediate supervision over the departments concerned in the supply of provisions, forage, &c., the collection of supplies, the economical application of local resources, the formation of dépôts and reserves, and over the arrangements for the custody and distribution of food for animals and men. He was to control all expenditure not provided for by regulations; he was responsible for all returns and documents connected therewith, and he was to submit to the Government of Bombay all demands for supplies from India. He was to keep the Commander in Chief perfectly informed on these matters, and to communicate to the Government thereon. He was to be the only staff officer directly responsible to the Government, and the only channel of sanction for unregulated expenditure; and he was to report clearly to the Government on all these points.

52. "It appears from the evidence of Major Holland, the officer in question, that he never advanced into the interior, being ordered to remain on the seaboard; and thus he could not discharge the duties assigned to him. The expenditure was to be under his control; but he did not control it. Documents and accounts were to be rendered to him; but he never received them. He was to be the only channel of unregulated expenditure, but he in no way superintended or sanctioned the purchases; almost everything was done without his sanction, and no accounts passed through his hands. He was to report to the Government, but he had nothing to report; and finally he came home without any official documents whatever. In fact, he was really superseded; he had no control and no responsibility; and on one occasion, when he took a particular step in the discharge of what he believed to be his duty, he was informed that the General 'considered the step premature.'

53. "It would thus appear, either that the appointment of the Controller of Supply and Transport by the Government of Bombay was unnecessary, and was a mistake, or that the manner in which he was ignored and superseded was unjustifiable.

"SUPPLIES.

54. "The evidence given before your Committee regarding supplies may be classed under three heads, viz.:—Quantities, Prices and Modes of Purchase, and Realisation of Surplus Stores.

"Quantities.

55. "The quantities seem to have been always determined by the Commander in Chief of the Expedition; and the rule which he seems to have established for himself was to have always a complete stock of six months in hand for both men and animals.

56. "The evidence as to whether or not this was excessive has been conflicting. Sir William Power, with whom other authorities concur, says that that quantity is reasonable; while General Jameson, on the other hand, states that he 'could not understand the enormous supply of stores; nor could he have imagined that such supplies were necessary as were ordered;' and Colonel Marriott considered that the Expedition was supplied more abundantly than any previous Expedition had been, that the supplies were 'profuse' (a word for which he refused to substitute 'abundant,' when such an alteration was suggested to him), and were asked for 'with a total disregard of pecuniary cost,' a remark which does not seem to have been limited merely to the supply of stores, but to be descriptive of the supplies of the Expedition generally. Sir William Mansfield, on the assumption that the country supplied nothing, thought that certain classes of stores should have been supplied for six months, such as medical stores, grain, and so on, but certainly not forage and other articles procurable in the country.

57. "Your Committee report no conclusion upon this point; but they desire to record the fact that the Expedition was within one month of supplies from Egypt, on which Lord Napier would have preferred to rely; and within six weeks of supplies from Bombay.

58. "On one point, however, your Committee are of opinion that an error was committed. Large supplies of forage, and other supplies of various kinds were obtained in the country; but no deduction on this account was made from the complete supplies ordered over sea. That some supplies were obtainable was known from the beginning; as the Expedition advanced, the actual measure of the supplies became apparent; and your Committee are of opinion that, in proportion as the supplies procurable were ascertained, the supplies ordered should have been diminished.

59. "In the matter of forage, it must have been always known that the Expedition must depend in the main upon the produce of the country. Lord Napier states that some forage was obtained from the country between Zulla and Senafé, that very little imported forage reached Senafé, and that none went beyond Antaló. General Mansfield says that it would have been quite impossible to feed the animals from the coast; and that if it were attempted to carry forage across a desert 200 miles long, where no forage was found, every animal would eat up all the forage he carried long before he got to the other side.

60. "To show the excess of shipments, and the total miscalculation as to the necessities of the Expedition, it may be mentioned that upwards of 35,000 tons of forage were shipped for Abyssinia, of which quantity only 7,000 tons, or about one-fifth, were consumed or abandoned. Four-fifths of the quantity shipped, or two years' consumption, remained on board

II. 4111.
II. 4125.
II. 4113.
II. 4173.
II. 4131.
II. 4127.
II. 4114.
II. 4142. 4140.
II. 4119.

II. 309. 386. 646.
3529.

II. 4526.
II. 1452. 1478.

II. 3505.
II. 4026-55.

II. 5983.

II. 590. 644.

II. 1349. 1629-97.

II. 416. 455.

II. 5986.

App. . Nos. .

ship, being wholly unnecessary, most of the cargoes never having been touched at all. Notwithstanding this plethora of forage, even so late as the months of March and April large purchases were made, both in Egypt and in India; and in the month of March 3,000 tons of compressed forage were bought in England, and duplicate supplies were sent from both England and India. Although supplies for the whole force were dispatched by the Bombay Government, complete supplies for 4,000 European troops were sent from England without any requisition from Bombay, and were consequently there in duplicate, as were also 11,500 blankets, the same quantity of boots, and a vast number of miscellaneous articles sent unordered from England. Warm clothing was issued to the troops at a cost of 203,989 *l.*, or 8 *l.* per man.

61. "Ten thousand water tanks, to hold 3,250,000 gallons, were supplied to the ships of the Expedition leaving Bombay, at a cost of upwards of 142,500 *l.* This represents a provision of 112 gallons of water for each man during a passage of 10 or 12 days, or at least 10 gallons a day per man. Why such an enormous quantity should have been shipped, seeing that it was so costly an article, it is difficult to understand. Colonel Marriott informed your Committee that the Bombay Government had asked the Marine Department for an explanation of the expenditure on water tanks, but, up to the time he left India, no explanation had been furnished.

62. "Speaking of supplies generally, Colonel Marriott said that they were sent upon the basis of what it was desirable to have, and not upon the basis of what it would be found practicable to carry.

"Prices and Mode of Purchase."

63. "Very little evidence in regard to the purchase of stores in Bombay, either as to the mode of purchasing or as to the prices, has been submitted to your Committee; but it may be mentioned that gram and rice were largely purchased at Bombay, while both might have been purchased at half the price, the former at Kurrachee, and the latter at Bombay.

64. "Five thousand packsaddles, bought at Poonah without having been tried, were rejected, without having been shipped. After delivery they were altered; but even then they had to be rejected as useless.

65. "It was a matter of no little surprise to your Committee to learn that the Home Government had sent 38 tons of rice and sugar to India.

66. "Colonel Marriott cannot account for the fact of the contracts in India having been almost exclusively obtained by native merchants. He makes the extraordinary statement that it is likely that the native merchants obtained, within 10 minutes after the decision of the Council had been arrived at, a knowledge of the wants of the Bombay Government in the matter of supplies, the consequence being that they bought up the articles which were in request, and then commanded their own prices.

67. "It appears that the Indian officers sent to Egypt to make purchases made Suez their headquarters, although there are no resident merchants there, and although Suez is in the desert and nearly 100 miles from the producing districts of Egypt.

68. "On the 21st of December 1867, a notice inviting tenders to be sent in by the 1st of January, for the supply of 2,200 tons of European hay, was posted at the Consulate in Suez. This advertisement did not appear in the public papers of Alexandria until the 26th of December, when of course it was utterly impossible for the merchants of Alexandria to make arrangements for tendering in time. European firms of position in Alexandria complain that they were thus precluded from competing. One firm, instead of tendering, sent in a written complaint of the proceedings. The conditions of this tender were also onerous, and such as greatly to enhance the price; for the hay was not subject to inspection and rejection in Alexandria, but was not inspected until it had travelled over upwards of 200 miles of railway to Suez, where, if rejected, it would be comparatively valueless to the contractors.

69. "The purchases of rations for animals in Egypt seem to have been improvident; for whilst 1 *s.* was paid for a ration of 6 lbs. of barley and 8 lbs. of straw at Alexandria, a ration of 8 lbs. of barley and 12 lbs. of straw might have been procured and delivered at Alexandria from Cyprus and Beyrout for 6½ *d.* Considering that about 10,000 animals passed through Egypt, this difference would, in the aggregate, amount to a very large sum of money.

"Realisation of Surplus Stores."

70. "Great loss was sustained in the realisation of surplus stores, both in India and Egypt.

71. "Lord Napier endeavoured to induce the Bombay Government and the Government of India to take the surplus stock; but, generally speaking, without effect. He strongly urged that many of the stores should be put into magazines for use as required, without their being paid for at once, the value being in the meantime set out in a suspense account. He especially recommended that the packsaddles, Maltese carts, harness, and ovens, should be taken by the Bombay Government; but they declined to purchase them, and the articles were sold for inappreciable sums. On the refusal of the Government of Bombay, Lord Napier appealed to the Government of India, but his views were overruled.

72. "So far from leading to a realisation of assets, the return of the hay to India entailed enormous expense, and greatly enhanced the cost of the Expedition. As a rule it was valueless. Much was given away, and much was thrown overboard.

73. "The

73. "The evidence received by your Committee respecting the realisation of stores is very defective; but there is no doubt that on the whole it was exceedingly unsatisfactory. It is a subject of regret that articles which might have been of ultimate value should have been thus inconsiderately sacrificed; and the result has been a very heavy loss.

74. "Your Committee have had no evidence as to the mode of realising surplus stores in Calcutta, whither a considerable quantity of stores were sent.

75. "On the 1st of April, a contract was made in Alexandria for 1,000 tons of hay, at 10*l.* 12*s.* 6*d.* per ton. No portion of this hay was delivered, but on the 3rd of May an agreement was concluded with the contractors by which 8,500*l.*, or four-fifths of the purchase money, was paid in compensation, not one single ounce of the article having been delivered. On the 22nd of April, an inquiry was made as to the price of 223 tons of beans. Although there is no evidence of any agreement having been concluded, 5*l.* per ton was paid as an indemnity for non-completion of the purchase.

76. "It appears also, that 440 tons of compressed forage, which cost about 13*l.* 15*s.* in England, were sold for 1*l.* 11*s.* per ton in Alexandria, were sent home on a freight of 17*s.* 6*d.* per ton, and were sold at Liverpool at from 6*l.* to 7*l.* per ton. At this very time the Indian troopships plying between Alexandria and Southampton had ample stowage room, and could have brought it home for nothing; and if this course had not been thought expedient, the same rate of freight was open to the Government as was paid by the private purchaser. Again, 400 tons of surplus hay was sold at Suez at 6*s.* per ton, and instantly and on the spot the purchaser re-sold it at 16*s.* per ton, realising 200*l.* by the transaction.

77. "Under a contract made on the 15th March with Mr. Davis, of Mile End, a payment of 10,000*l.* was made in consequence of the non-completion of a purchase of 3,000 tons of compressed hay at 14*l.* per ton, about 550 tons of which only was delivered, the payment being at the rate of more than 4*l.* per ton for the quantity not delivered.

78. "It appears also that the loss on medicines was 35,829*l.*, a loss never equalled in General Jameson's experience; and that the loss on ordnance stores was 99,253*l.* It does not appear to your Committee that there was any reason why loss should have accrued on ordnance stores, but that those as well as many other articles should have been taken over by the Indian Government.

"TONNAGE.

79. "As is well known, by far the largest expenditure for the Expedition was for the hire of tonnage.

	<i>Tons.</i>
"Total hired tonnage, according to Admiral Mends - - - - -	301,386
"Tonnage purchased, say - - - - -	2,743
"Seventeen other vessels belonging to the Bombay Government, and to the Royal Navy, say - - - - -	17,000
"Eighteen ships, not included in the first return, 'Sakura,' 'Dacca,' 'Ellora,' 'Talisman,' 'Krishna,' &c., say - - - - -	8,000
TOTAL - - - Tons	329,129

80. "The payments for the hire of tonnage, exclusive of the cost of vessels purchased, and of the vessels of the Indian Government, seem to have been in India 2,766,017*l.*, and in England 606,135*l.*, making a total of 3,372,152*l.*; but from the imperfect state of the accounts, it is difficult to arrive at accurate results. This being exclusive of ships hired by the trip, the total cost of the tonnage will not be over-estimated at 3,500,000*l.* Another return states the total amount to have been 3,449,310*l.* To this must be added, for freight of stores, troops, and treasure, for ships not on time charter, a sum of 547,092*l.*, making the gross total cost of tonnage the enormous sum of 4,000,000*l.*

81. "In general terms, the excess of cost of tonnage is attributable to two leading causes: firstly, the high prices paid, and secondly, the failure adequately to utilise the tonnage engaged.

82. "The average rate of hire paid for tonnage engaged was as follows:—

"STEAMERS.

Where Engaged.	Number.	Tonnage.	Hire per Ton per Month.	Time Employed.
			<i>£. s. d.</i>	<i>Mths. Days.</i>
England - - - - -	18	34,282	2 2 5	8 15
Bombay - - - - -	32	30,854	2 7 5	7 21
Calcutta - - - - -	19	17,197	2 17 3	7 18
	69	82,333		

"SAILING VESSELS.

						£. s. d.			Mths. Days.	
Bombay	-	-	-	180	179,726	1	2	6	6	26
Calcutta	-	-	-	24	28,737	1	12	10	7	22
				204	208,463					
Average						2 6 8			7	26
						1 4 2			7	0
General Average						1 11 2½			7	6

83. "It thus appears that the whole shipping was engaged for more than seven months.
84. "Excessive prices seem to have been paid, both in England, in Bombay, and in Calcutta. The prevalent mercantile rates for steam tonnage at the time of the Expedition were 20 s., or a little over 20 s.; but in England we paid twice this price; and whilst those high rates were given, suitable ships were obtainable at a much less price.

85. "The 'Ottawa,' a fine new ship, of 1,830 tons, built by Messrs. Laird, of Liverpool, was refused at 26 s. per ton per month, if discharged at home, and 31 s. if discharged abroad; while the 'City of Manchester,' an old ship, was accepted at 35 s. per ton, if discharged in England, and 45 s. per ton if discharged abroad. The 'Ottawa' was offered at 5 s. per ton extra if discharged abroad; while 17 s. 9 d. extra was given to the 'Peruvian,' and 17 s. 6 d. to the 'Bosphorus,' if discharged abroad. The 'Ottawa' was then at Antwerp, and her owners offered either to pay the expense of sending a surveyor to Antwerp, or to bring her to the Thames, where she would have been ready for survey in 24 hours. She was, however, refused on the technical ground that she was at Antwerp, while another ship which had not arrived at Queenstown, from America, was ordered for survey.

86. "The 'Minia,' 1,906 tons, a new ship, was offered at 25 s. per ton per month, whether discharged at home or abroad, and was rejected. The ground of her rejection was, that she was at Glasgow, and would not be ready in less than 10 days. Those 10 days, however, were within the terms of the advertisement, and she could have been surveyed in Glasgow as soon as she could have been surveyed in London. This offer of a vessel for 25 s., for discharge either at home or abroad, was rejected, whilst we accepted vessels at 50 s. discharged abroad.

87. "A serious mistake entered into the conditions of these home charters. Instead of a defined additional sum for discharge abroad, an additional rate per ton was paid. The 'Peruvian' was in service about 10 months, and her total hire was 57,965 l. Of this sum 20,577 l. was paid in consequence of her being discharged in India rather than in England. Had this vessel been two years in service, as she might have been, her extra pay for discharge in India would have been 50,000 l. But the operation of this condition of the charter need not be further illustrated, as the Admiralty subsequently became conscious of its improvidence.

88. "As it seems to your Committee, nothing could be more unwise than the proceedings of the Admiralty in chartering ships on England to convey mules from the Mediterranean ports to Alexandria. Five ships were engaged for this service at from 24 s. 9 d. to 34 s. 6 d. per ton per month. According to the evidence of Sir William Power, the cost per head for conveying animals in these vessels was 28 l. 5 s. According to the statement handed in by Admiral Mends, the cost was 15 l. 9 s. 4 d. per head, exclusive of provisions and forage. It may probably be safe to conclude that in truth the cost was about 20 l. per head. The improvidence of this arrangement is evidenced by the fact that the War Office chartered four ships to convey animals from Spain at 7 l. 10 s. and 8 l. per head, including forage and attendance for the voyage. In the case of the five Admiralty chartered ships, the Admiralty supplied fittings at a cost of 5,500 l.; whilst the rate paid for the conveyance of animals by the ships chartered by the War Office was exclusive of the fittings, the ship finding fittings, forage, and everything necessary for the conveyance of the mules.

89. "But even these War Office arrangements were not the best available. It is in evidence before your Committee that tonnage to any extent was available at Alexandria and the other ports in the Mediterranean, of which the home authorities might have been fully advised by telegraph, either by our consuls in the Mediterranean, or by Captain Willoughby, the resident Indian transport officer at Alexandria; and this mode of conveyance was available at a cost of from 2 l. to 4 l. a head, according to the distance the animals had to be carried. Captain Willoughby and Colonel Stanton both bear witness to this fact.

90. "The price paid for tonnage at Bombay was, on the average, about 10 s. per ton per month less than was paid at Calcutta. At the latter place, however, as a rule, water tanks and fittings were supplied by the shipowners; whilst at the former, they were supplied by the Government. The fittings supplied mainly from Bombay appear to have cost the enormous sum of nearly a quarter of a million of money. This, added to the rate of charter, would bring the rates at Bombay and Calcutta respectively pretty nearly to a par.

91. "The rates paid at Calcutta were probably much enhanced by an error at the outset of the chartering operations there. Advertisements inviting tenders fixed the period of service at three

23

three months, whilst the vessels were required for six months at least. This short term of service necessarily led owners to tender at higher rates than if the service had been fixed at a longer period. After the tenders had been received, attempts were made to get the vessels at lower rates; but the prices having been already defined, these attempts wholly failed with regard to steamers, and only partially succeeded with regard to sailing vessels.

92. "Another circumstance which fixed a generally high rate of steam-tonnage was the existence of a mail contract between the Government of India and the British India Steam Navigation Company. A remarkable and unaccountable clause in this contract provided that in the event of the vessels of the company being required for other than postal service, the price to be paid by the Government for such other service should be 55*s.* per ton per month.

II. 3859-63.

93. "As an illustration of the high rates given, it may be mentioned that for a few months' hire vessels obtained payment to the extent, in some cases, of *four times* their market value. The 'Continental,' for instance, an old American-built sailing ship of 1,464 tons, without any character, and whose value was therefore not more than 4*l.* per ton, or say 6,000*l.*, was chartered at 34*s.* per ton per month, and received for 9½ months' hire 24,000*l.*, or four times her value. It may also be mentioned that the three hospital ships, which cost for freight 135,123*l.*, were sold on their return for 50,000*l.*

II. 2144. 2859. 2862.
Admiralty Return.

II. 3859-61.

94. "In further illustration of the same point, it may be mentioned that the British India Steam Navigation Company had nine steamers chartered for the Expedition, whose gross capacity amounted to 10,114 tons. The average time during which each vessel was employed was 9 months 19 days, and for this service they received a total payment of 257,460*l.*, which is 28,606*l.* per vessel, or at the rate of 25*l.* 9*s.* per ton for the whole fleet, a price which must have been equal to their total value. The Bombay and Bengal Steam Navigation Company offered to *sell* their vessels to the Government at 27*l.* per ton.

Admiralty Return.

II. 2139. 2868.

II. 3824.

App. No. 21.

II. 2915.

II. 3794-3803.

95. "It may also be mentioned, that the price of tonnage in the ordinary market was not materially increased beyond the normal rates, and that vessels had to come to England during that period at 'miserably low rates.'

96. "The defects of management in the chartering of vessels in India receive a striking illustration in the case of the 'Himalaya.' This vessel, belonging to the Bombay and Bengal Steam Navigation Company, was chartered at Bombay, together with three others belonging to the same company, at 48*s.* per ton per month. Some weeks afterwards the same vessel was chartered at Calcutta at 55*s.* The agency of the representative of the company at Bombay, although acknowledged as regarded the three other vessels, was repudiated as regarded the 'Himalaya,' and she was paid at the higher rate. This double chartering of the same vessel, and competition between Bombay and Calcutta, became possible through the failure of the Bombay Government to inform the Government at Calcutta of the charters which the former had concluded.

II. 3508 3815, 3816.
3819.

97. "The 'Dacca' was in May 1868 chartered at Calcutta, in obedience to a requisition from Bombay, at 55*s.* per ton, to proceed to Annesley Bay to convey troops. On arriving at Aden it was found that she was not wanted, and she returned to Bombay *without having done anything whatever*. For this she received 6,328*l.* Again, the 'Sakura' was engaged, also at the enormous rate of 65*s.* per ton, at Bombay on the 20th of June, after the main portion of the Expedition had returned, and she was discharged on the 5th of August. Why she was employed does not appear; but her gross freight for those six weeks' hire was about 4,262*l.*

Admiralty Return.

98. "Your Committee are of opinion that tonnage could have been procured much more cheaply, both in England and in India, had not the chartering authorities slavishly adhered to the precedent of contracting by competition rather than by special agreement; and that a much more economical result would have ensued had they, in some degree at least, if not altogether, either fixed a price at which they would have accepted tonnage, or had recourse to the advice and assistance which mercantile authorities could have rendered.

99. "But the cost of the Expedition seems to have been even more largely increased by the failure adequately to utilise the tonnage engaged than by the excessive rates of hire. A very large proportion of the sailing vessels made only one passage to Annesley Bay on their engagement at the beginning of the Expedition, and another passage back at its close.

100. "A vast amount of tonnage lay at anchor for many months. The following figures will show at a glance the detention of vessels in Annesley Bay, and in the port of Bombay on their return:

"Ships detained in Annesley Bay:

Above 2 months and under 3 months	-	-	-	44
" 3 months and under 4 months	-	-	-	36
" 4 months and under 5 months	-	-	-	60
" 5 months and under 6 months	-	-	-	20
" 6 months	-	-	-	2

"Ships detained in Bombay:

Above 1 month and under 2 months	-	-	-	97
" 2 months	-	-	-	22

"Ships lying at Anchor:

Above 150 days and less than 180 days	-	-	-	22
" 180 days and less than 210 days	-	-	-	14
" 210 days	-	-	-	9

101. "Three vessels indeed lay at anchor during eight months: the 'Vanda,' 241 days; the 'Howden,' 244 days; and the 'Indian Chief,' 254 days.

Admiralty Return.

102. "The amount of hire paid to vessels when lying at anchor in Annesley Bay approximates to one million of money. The amount paid to vessels during the time they were lying in Bombay Harbour after the close of the Expedition was nearly 300,000*l*. These figures are collated from returns handed in to your Committee.

II. 3210-3243.

App. No. 18.

103. "Many vessels were detained also at Aden after the fall of Magdala. The 'British Princess' arrived at Aden on her way from Bombay to Annesley Bay on the 29th of April; and although the fall of Magdala was then known, she did not sail for Bombay until the 26th of May. Other vessels were detained at Aden for longer periods. That ships should have been detained at Aden after the fall of Magdala seems incomprehensible.

II. 3900.

App. 20 B.

I. 1962. 2073, 2074.

104. "A further source of great expenditure was the tonnage engrossed by hay shipped for Annesley Bay, but never required and never discharged. As each ton of hay required about four tons of shipping, this could not amount to less than 100,000 tons; and inasmuch as the cost of this tonnage was somewhere about 25*s*. per ton per month, it would appear that this hay (which was not required for the purposes of the Expedition, and which was four times beyond what Lord Napier had calculated as necessary for the force, viz., six months' supply) was thus kept on ship board at an expense of about 125,000*l*. per month. Well, therefore, might Colonel Marriott say that the ships were 'very costly warehouses.'

105. "Whilst, undoubtedly, a large tonnage would be required to convey the Expedition from the shores of Abyssinia (Admiral Mend's calculation being 132,533 tons), it is difficult to understand why vessels fully laden should have been detained there, and not dispatched immediately the fall of Magdala was known at the coast; yet Lord Napier after the fall of Magdala instructed Captain Tryon that no ships should leave the coast. Although there were obstacles in the way of sailing ships leaving the Red Sea, yet had the steam vessels not been engaged otherwise than for the transit of the army they would have been available for the towage of the sailing vessels.

I. 1962.

App. No. 20 A.

I. 1955.

106. "Much tonnage was withdrawn from the purposes of transit to be employed in condensing water in Annesley Bay, 12 or 14 first-class steamers having been more or less engrossed in that duty. Four steamers were also told off and employed in carrying the letters periodically to Suez, which would have been employed for transit purposes if the telegraph had been laid.

II. 2304-2332.

II. 2335.

II. 6161.

App. No. 21.

107. "As has been already mentioned in a general paragraph, much expense was incurred by the detention of shipping in Bombay Harbour. The 'Albertine' may be mentioned as an illustration. This vessel arrived at Bombay on the 16th of June, her cargo consisting of nothing but horses with the necessary forage. On the 19th of June everything was discharged except about one ton of hay, 18 buckets, a small quantity of bran, and some water tanks, the whole of which were not worth the cost of taking on shore. She was nevertheless detained with those trifles on board 43 days, that is until the 31st of July; for which, her freight being 1,522*l*. per month, she received a payment of 2,700*l*. Many other ships were detained in a similar manner.

108. "The 'Royal Edward' arrived on the 1st of February at Annesley Bay with 11,425 bales of hay, of 75 lbs. each, on board. She left Annesley Bay on the 3rd of May with her cargo untouched, and she arrived at Bombay on the 23rd of June; she lay there undischarged until the 19th of August, when one-third of her cargo was given to the owners. For this service she received 12,602*l*. on freight, or rather more than 3½*d*. per lb. for the hay carried to Annesley Bay and back again.

II. 2092-2166.

I. 2497.

109. "The 'Alsager' was chartered at Bombay, and arrived at Annesley Bay on the 6th of February. She lay there with her cargo untouched until shortly after the 1st of May, when she left for Bombay, arriving on the 14th of June. She was not towed, but sailed from Annesley Bay, and out of the Red Sea. She lay eight weeks in Bombay Harbour, at the end of which time the authorities made her a present of the undischarged portion of the hay, and she was paid off on the 7th of August. Her gross freight was 8,743*l*., and the freight of the hay to Annesley Bay and back cost 5½*d*. per lb. She received 1,890*l*. for the 54 days during which she lay in Bombay Harbour. The same terms of discharge would have been accepted in June as were accepted in August. Ships were also sent to Bombay when they were under charter to return to Calcutta.

110. "Another material fact, from which your Committee infer that there was a failure adequately to employ the tonnage chartered, is, that although the shipping engaged up to the 31st December 1867 must have been sufficient to land the whole Expedition in Abyssinia, yet 95,000 tons of shipping were engaged during that date.

II. 3305, 3306.

I. 2284 *et seq.*

111. "A thing unknown in chartering vessels on time employment occurred in connection with this Expedition. A universal condition of time charters is, that during any period of a vessel's disablement her pay shall cease. At the time when the terms and form of charter were settled at Bombay it was pointed out by Captain Tryon that there were not words in the charter specifically excluding payment during disablement. The Government solicitor, however, advised that the terms of the charter were security against claims for payment when the vessels were disabled, and that 'a ship under the Bombay charter-party is only entitled to freight on production of her certificate from the agent for transports, or other duly authorised officer, that she is afloat, and has up to that time well and truly performed the contract.' Notwithstanding this legal opinion, ships were uniformly paid for the time during which they were disabled. On the authority of Colonel Marriott, it is incredible that those payments should have been made without legal sanction, and that sanction was most probably given by the same legal authority which advised that the charters, as drawn, afforded

II. 3308.

II. 3310, 3311.

II. 3312.

afforded protection against all such claims. A considerable number of ships were disabled, failed to perform their stipulated service, and their certificates were withheld, yet a large sum of money was thus, contrary to all precedent, expended in payment for services never rendered. One ship, indeed, the steamer 'Far East,' engaged at 3,377*l.* per month, was, during several months, disabled, and received pay as though she had been engaged in active employment.

Admiralty Return.

112. "It seems to your Committee that the Bombay Government did not avail themselves of all the means at their disposal for the discharge of vessels when the vessels returned to Bombay. In the first place, no work was done at night; and it would appear that night work, although it was the time of the south-west monsoon, was practicable in moderate weather. It would appear that the whole of the shipping lay in the exposed part of Bombay Harbour, whilst the shelter available behind Butcher's Island was not made use of. On Butcher's Island, too, there were facilities for landing stores of a certain character, but those advantages were never utilised.

II. 2002, 3.

113. "The main difficulty in discharging appears to have arisen from the want of barges; nevertheless at this very time the Public Works Department in Bombay had from 50 to 60 barges of from 40 to 100 tons each, and two steam tugs unemployed. Those boats were used in embarking stores on the dispatch of the Expedition, but it appears never to have occurred to anybody that they might have been employed in disembarkation on its return. The tugs were employed in towing the transports into Bombay Harbour, and that work having been accomplished, they, with the barges, disappeared from the scene, and were hauled up for the monsoon, although barges and tugs were of the most pressing necessity for the purpose of discharging the transports. Colonel Kennedy states that those barges would have been available if they had ever been applied for.

II. 5758-5762.

II. 5730.

II. 5734.

"Hospital Ships."

114. "The Bombay Government requested the Home Government to dispatch one hospital ship from England. They nevertheless dispatched three, the 'Golden Fleece,' the 'Mauritius,' and the 'Queen of the South.' The hire of those ships amounted to 136,123*l.*, or to 90,000*l.* more than the one ship requested by the Bombay Government.

App. No. 4.
I. 1831.

115. "It has been strongly urged before your Committee that great economy and advantage would have resulted from the employment of coast-guard ships for this purpose. Lord Napier stated that he would have preferred such vessels to merchant ships for hospital purposes. Captain Tryon said, line-of-battle ships were more airy, and higher 'tween decks. At that time we had eight vessels fit for this service, all of which would have been available both for hospital and transport purposes. Those ships were, at the time of the Expedition, ready to go to any part of the world. Admiral Robinson says that they could have made the passage out in about 75 days. Admiral Mends says they should have been there in 90 days; and the Hydrographer of the Navy says they should have been there in 100 days. Captain Sherard Osborn, who had commanded the 'Donegal,' stated that she made the passage within 70 days. Admiral Robinson says that the coast-guard ships could have been fitted as quickly and as cheaply for hospital ships as the merchant ships were. Admiral Mends says that they could have been got ready for sea in a week. Assuming that the passage would have occupied three months, and that they had left in the early part of September, they might have been at Annesley Bay by the beginning of December, in ample time for the purposes of the Expedition. Admiral Mends adds, 'I now think it would have been better to have sent ships of the line; and certainly the cost would have been very much less.'

II. 1940. 2026.
2722, 2723. 2726.
2759.
I. 2456.
II. 5519. 5529.
II. 5533.
II. 5667.II. 5565. 5657.
II. 2725.II. 2038.
II. 5663.

116. "It is most remarkable, notwithstanding this evidence, that the question of sending those ships, instead of hiring vessels, appears never to have been raised at the Admiralty, and no inquiry as to the practicability of sending them was ever addressed either to Admiral Robinson or to Admiral Mends.

II. 2776. 5564.
5570.

"Troop Ships."

117. "A judicious and economical suggestion to employ the Indian troop ships, the 'Jumna,' the 'Malabar,' and the 'Euphrates,' in the conveyance of troops to Abyssinia, was made by the Governor of Bombay. Those ships would have carried 8,000 men, and their supplies from Bombay to Abyssinia, in two months, or 12,000 in three months. The Government negatived the suggestion, although the only inconvenience would have been either the delay of the Indian reliefs, or the necessity of sending them home by some other means. But, without at all interfering with their ordinary work, those ships were available for bringing home the Expedition, inasmuch as one had finished her part of the relief service for the season on the 10th of March, another on the 10th of April, and the third on the 20th of April, after which dates those ships of course would have been most valuable. It is difficult to understand why such admirable and economical means of transport should have been disregarded.

B. B. 1867, p. 56.
II. 3849.
II. 3839.

App. No. 22.

118. "It is of course impossible with any precision to define the increased cost entailed upon the Expedition, either by the large prices paid for tonnage, or by the excess of tonnage employed; yet from the facts which have been mentioned it would not appear to be a violent inference that at least one million of money has been expended over tonnage more than the necessities of the Expedition justified.

"WATER SUPPLY.

119. "There was a most unfortunate and costly delay in ordering pipes for the transmission of water from Koomayli to Annesley Bay. The failure of the supply at Zulla was obvious in October, at the time when Annesley Bay was finally selected as the point of debarkation. Pipes were not ordered until the 24th of December, when 19 miles were telegraphed for from England, which arrived in Annesley Bay about the end of February; but they were never laid. Had they been ordered in October, as soon as the failure of water at Zulla was ascertained, they could have been laid, and in use, for the supply of the Expedition by the end of December, or before the arrival of Lord Napier.
120. "The cost of the water condensed by the steamers was about 4·35 *d.* per gallon, or 6 *l.* per ton, which, on 35,000 tons supplied by condensation, would be a total of 210,000 *l.*, and to this must be added the water condensed by Her Majesty's ships of war, or on shore, which will probably make the total cost upwards of a quarter of a million. Thus, had only ordinary calculation and forethought guided the proceedings, a quarter of a million would have been saved to the Expedition. But, even though it had been necessary to supply the Expedition with water by condensation, a much more economical process might have been adopted. It is stated that by the inexpensive process of a boiler, funnel, and pumps on shore, the Expedition might have been amply supplied with water at a very trifling cost.

"RAILWAY.

121. "A similar delay, and of course a similar consequence, namely, increase of cost, resulted from the neglect promptly to supply a railway. With one exception, all the witnesses who have been questioned upon the subject have declared that a railway would have been of the greatest advantage.
122. "On the 12th of September, Lord Napier recommended that a railway of a light description should be sent, and laid down in Annesley Bay, but a delay for a time was caused by the intervention of the Home Government, who declared on the 30th of September that they had determined to take no steps respecting the laying down of the railway. However, on the 10th of October, permission to lay down a railway was given to the Government of Bombay. Nothing seems to have been done on this permission until about the end of November. Thus the delay of the work seems equally attributable to the Home Government and the Government of Bombay.
123. "The progress of the work was greatly bungled; the rails were old and crooked, and of different patterns; the bolts did not fit; there were two descriptions of chairs; the holes in the fish plates and rails did not agree; no augers were sent; the gauge was of five feet six inches, with a six-wheeled locomotive, both gauge and locomotive being unsuitable for the work; and the railway did no effective work until the month of April. Even then it was not completed to the first station at Koomayli, and land transport had to be introduced between the terminus of the line and the dépôt. The total cost of this imperfect work was 89,191 *l.* The Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company had they been applied to could have supplied the necessary length of railway complete, and new rails and chairs of corresponding pattern; but the Bombay Government made no application to that company.
124. "Such is the history of this railway; but from the evidence before your Committee, it appears that on the 2nd of September Sir John McNeill, on the 7th of September Mr. Brassey, and on the 25th of September General Simmons, all high authorities, severally reported that a light narrow gauge railway could be without difficulty laid from Annesley Bay; and Sir John McNeill and General Simmons stated that it could be laid in three months. Mr. Brassey seemed to be willing to undertake the laying of a railway at the rate of five or six miles a week, and at a cost not exceeding 3,500 *l.* per mile, including plant. Had the railway been undertaken when the Expedition was resolved upon, a much cheaper and more efficient line might have been completed by the end of December; and the terrible disasters and heavy expenditure which resulted from the failure of the land transport train would have been greatly reduced.

"TELEGRAPH.

125. "Lord Napier, General Mansfield, Colonel Marriott, Colonel Stanton, Sir William Merewether, and all witnesses concur that direct telegraphic communication between Suez and Annesley Bay would have been of the first importance, and must have resulted in a large saving of money. Lord Napier speaks in the strongest term of the importance of telegraphic communication. He says it would have saved much expenditure in postal steamers and much anxiety; that he would have ordered a cable the very first thing, and that it is difficult to name a point in which it would not have saved expenditure. Another witness adds that telegraphic communication is almost as important as food for the troops.
126. "In the latter part of October 1867, the Telegraph Construction and Maintenance Company communicated with the Secretary of State for India with a view to the construction of a telegraph; and the evidence before your Committee is, that if an arrangement had been made on the 1st of November, the whole line could have been laid, and telegraphic communication could have been established by the 1st of January; but had the Company been applied to in the month of August, they could have had a permanent telegraphic communication established before the arrival of the troops at Annesley Bay.

127. "Unhappily

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127. "Unhappily the proposals submitted to the Government for the laying of this telegraphic communication were not accepted; although promptitude of communication, and all its resulting advantages and economies, might have been obtained for an outlay of 60,000*l*.

" COALS.

128. "The wisdom of the proceedings adopted for the supply of coals seems to your Committee to be exceedingly doubtful.

I. 1242.

129. "The Home Government appear to have undertaken to coal their own vessels at the Cape de Verde Islands, Saint Helena, Ascension, the Cape of Good Hope, and the Mauritius, and, in general terms, to have depended upon the Peninsular and Oriental Company for the necessary supply at Bombay, Aden, Suez, and Annesley Bay. Contracts existed for such supplies as the Admiralty might require at the de Verde Islands and the Mauritius; but they had to furnish their own supplies at the Cape of Good Hope and Ascension. To the latter places 14,684 tons of coal were shipped at a cost of 18 *s. 6 d.* per ton, free on board at Liverpool, the ordinary price being about 11 *s.* per ton. At the close of the Expedition there were about 11,000 tons lying in store at the Cape of Good Hope.

I. 1243.

I. 1314.

130. "The freight paid for the conveyance of 6,871 tons of coal to the Cape of Good Hope by steam vessels was 6*l. 9 s. 5 d.* per ton; the freight being, in one instance, through an improvident condition of charter, upwards of 9*l.* per ton; while at the same time the ordinary freight by sailing vessels to the Cape of Good Hope was about 2*l.* per ton. These extra prices were paid for conveyance by steamers on the supposition that coals would be wanted at the Cape for the use of the transports on their way from England to India. The necessity for thus supplying coals at the Cape at this enormous cost seems to be more than doubtful, inasmuch as the transports chartered could, if attention had been paid to the matter, have received on board coals enough to steam them to India. In no case did the quantity of coals consumed by those vessels throughout the whole passage from England to India exceed their carrying capacity.

I. 1257.

L 2536.

I. 1305.

Rep. 1867, p. 207.
Admiralty Return.

I. 1262.

131. "Notwithstanding that at the Mauritius and the Cape de Verde Islands there were contracts for the supply of all coals required, 2,000*l.* in excess of the contract price was paid as a bonus for the supply at the former place, and 825*l.* at the latter.

132. "The arrangements with the Peninsular and Oriental Company for the supplies in India and the Red Sea were of an exceedingly indefinite character. The price charged was virtually left to the determination of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, who were never asked to enter into a contract as to price, but were left to charge what prices they pleased. The final prices paid by the Government were, at Aden, 73 *s. 6 d.*, at Bombay, 70 *s. 6 d.*, and at Suez 70 *s.* The prices at Alexandria at that time ranged from 28 *s.* to 33 *s.*, and the railway rate thence to Suez was 20 *s.* per ton; making a total of from 48 *s.* to 53 *s.*

L 1266.

I. 1287.
App. No. 18.
App. No. .

App. Nos. .

133. "It may be here parenthetically remarked, as an evidence of the strange confusion and inaccuracy in the accounts of the Expedition, that the quantity of coals supplied at Suez by the Peninsular and Oriental Company is stated by the Accountant General to have been 13,342 tons; while the quantity, as shown by a return from the company's books, was 17,779 tons.

134. "The prices paid for coal at Aden varied from 60 *s.* to 90 *s.* per ton; and in one instance 7*l.* per ton was paid. These coals, as well as many other cargoes from Bombay, Galle, and other ports in India, were bought on board ship, and the ships were then and there put on time-charter. By way of example, six of these vessels, viz., the 'Peerless,' the 'Napier,' the 'Calcutta,' the 'Sidney Dacres,' the 'David Molkinson,' and the 'Bruce,' were so chartered; their cargoes were, in the whole, 9,739 tons, for which they received, as freight only, 62,369*l.*, or 6*l. 8 s.* per ton of coals conveyed. The only service rendered by these vessels, besides carrying these coals, was to convey such part of the Expedition as was put on board on their return to Bombay. Deducting the probable value of this latter service, and adding the first cost of the coals, the price at Annesley Bay could not have been less than 9*l.* per ton. Such a want of forethought was manifested on one occasion, that a steamer proceeded to an outport in the Red Sea without coals enough to steam her back again, and had to purchase coals for that purpose at 12*l.* per ton.

I. 843.

II. 6161.

I. 842.

135. "A notable instance of mismanagement in the purchase of coals appears in the case of the 'Scotland.' This vessel left England with 1,776 tons of coal on board in the month of June 1867. In September her cargo was offered to the Admiralty, delivered in Annesley Bay, at 78 *s.* per ton, but the offer was declined. Upon her arrival in Annesley Bay, her cargo was sold by its owners at 72 *s.* per ton; it was re-sold to the Government at 80 *s.* per ton; and at the same time the vessel was put on time-charter at 20 *s.* per ton per month, to proceed with her cargo to Annesley Bay. She was four months on that service, and received 4,680*l.* for delivering the coal. Thus, this cargo, which was at first offered delivered in Annesley Bay at 78 *s.* per ton, cost ultimately 7*l.* per ton.

II. 5797 *et seq.*

137. "The owners of the cargo *per* 'Scotland,' also gave another instance of the action of the Home Government in the purchase of coal. In February 1868, they offered to the Government 5,000 tons of best Cardiff steam coals at 78 *s.* per ton, if delivered at Annesley Bay, or 70 *s.* per ton if delivered at Aden; so that in the event of the war being over on the arrival of the coals, they could have been received at Aden or Bombay, where they would have been available for after use. Together with this offer was sent a statement showing that by its acceptance, on the assumption (which seems still to be within the actual cost, since Mr. Turner estimated the cost of coal at Bombay at 8*l.* per ton) that the Govern-

II. 5767 *et seq.*
App. No. 26.

I. 2367.

ment were paying at Annesley Bay 7 £ 12 s. per ton for coals, a saving of 18,600 £. would have been effected on this single transaction. It may be added that this offer came from a firm in the City of the highest respectability. The correspondence will be found in the Appendix.

I. 2540. 138. "Offers were made to supply coals in the Red Sea at prices seemingly between 60 s., and 70 s., but they were rejected without reference to the price, on grounds of policy; the policy being the extraordinary one that the Government did not wish to excite competition in the home market against the Peninsular and Oriental Company, that it would have been 'highly inexpedient to have entertained competing offers from anybody whatever,' and that it would have been unjust to have gone into the market against that company.

II. App. No. 21. 139. "The price paid to the Azziziah Company, who coaled their ships direct from their own stores at Suez, was, with regard to the greater part of the coals, 3 £ 16 s., and for some of them the enormous amount of 5 £ 8 s.; and their own account of the quantity used was accepted.

II. 3784, 140. "The realisation of surplus coals has been most unsatisfactory. Coal is doubtless one of the articles to which Lord Napier referred as being desirable to be taken over by the Bombay Government. Portions of these surplus coals were sold at 25 s. per ton, and portions have been kept in hand unused until the early part of the present year, when they were sold for 28 s. per ton, or at prices little more than one-third of their original cost.

II. 3890. 141. "The estimate for coals was 316,260 £.; and it appears from the Admiralty returns that the net cost of coals was 835,480 £.; the excess of cost over estimate being therefore 519,230 £.

App. No.

142. "As was remarked in an earlier portion of this Report, the inquiry of your Committee is incomplete in some particulars; and they would suggest to the Executive Government the expediency of further and searching inquiry into the circumstances, terms, and conditions under which coals for the Expedition were purchased at Galle and Aden, and of the Peninsular and Oriental Company generally.

143. "Your Committee would also suggest a fuller inquiry into the circumstances under which mules were not bought at Constantinople, and were bought at Smyrna.

144. "Another field for close investigation is the purchases made for the Expedition in Bombay, and the realisation of surplus stores, both at Bombay and Calcutta. The same inquiry is also urgently demanded in reference to the purchases of stores, and sales of surplus stores in Egypt.

145. "Your Committee having thus made somewhat detailed reference to excessive expenditure, the question very naturally suggests itself, why such profusion, and who is to blame?

146. "Instead of attempting in detail a specific answer to a question of that character, your Committee believe that they will best discharge their duty by clearly and sharply defining the facts, leaving conclusions and inferences beyond those already mentioned to the judgment of Parliament.

147. "In preference to occupying themselves by affixing further personal blame to individuals, your Committee would offer some suggestions which they think may be beneficial for future guidance; and the relevancy of these suggestions lies in the belief of your Committee that had they been carried out and in operation during the Abyssinian Expedition, efficiency and economy would have been the result.

II. 4624. 148. "In the first place, a more perfect business organisation and business training than exists at present, should be worked into our military system. The traditions of the profession of arms have tended to inspire military men with a feeling very much akin to contempt for everything in the nature of business. A military witness of good position who appeared before your Committee, when questioned respecting a business operation, and asked to explain it, answered that he was a soldier and not a man of business. Lord Napier himself stated that expense was 'quite out of his province'; and that his business was to take Magdala, and he 'never thought of the cost.' That a more efficient business training, and something like a business department should be introduced into our military system, is a view sustained by an officer of the high authority and great military experience of Lord Napier. His Lordship would have liked to have had an officer placed at his disposal entirely for purposes of business; and he was of opinion that 'an organisation inside the army, or attached to the army for the special purpose of business, as we have now an organisation attached to the army for special engineering purposes, would be an improvement on our ordinary army organisation,' provided that the business officer had no control in military matters. Amongst other duties, the head of such a department might be always informed, and at any time able to determine, where the supplies necessary for an army could be best and most cheaply supplied in every part of the world. A store of such knowledge at the period of the Abyssinian Expedition from which the Executive could have drawn, would have been invaluable. Sir William Power states that since the Expedition changes in this direction have been in progress in the War Department, and your Committee are of opinion that such an organisation cannot be too soon brought into operation.

149. "It also appears to your Committee that it should be a special duty of the Engineering Department of the army, to be always ready to lay their hands upon railway materials of a defined character, and that they should be trained in railway construction.

150. "As

150. "As the operations of Government are carried on by subdivisions of labour and by administrative departments, it seems to your Committee to be of the first importance, that instead of an elaborate and minute system of correspondence between department and department, the heads of departments should meet at one board for executive purposes in times of war. Much delay in coming to determinations on matters of administration in connection with the Abyssinian Expedition, occurred through the necessity for inter-departmental correspondence; whereas had the heads of departments met as one board, conclusions might have been arrived at in an hour, which by the system of correspondence were not attained for many days. Sir William Power said that in his opinion a War Board would be an advantage, and that 'the heads of each department should be present, accompanied by the leading member of the branch in each case to which the business in hand referred;' and again, this would 'no doubt obviate great delay, expense, and difficulty.'

151. "The following is an instance of the preliminaries necessary under the present system to move the few troops that were sent from England to Abyssinia:—'First, the Military Secretary asks the Secretary of State's sanction; secondly, the Secretary of State conveys his sanction; thirdly, the Horse Guards takes the Queen's pleasure; fourthly, the Horse Guards informs the War Office that the Queen has signified her pleasure; fifthly, the War Office informs the Quartermaster General that the Admiralty may be requested to provide tonnage; sixthly, the Quartermaster General makes the requisition upon the Admiralty; seventhly, the Admiralty informs the Horse Guards of the ship which has been allotted for the service; eighthly, the Horse Guards informs the War Office, and the information is circulated.' Even if a solitary officer has to proceed from England to Gibraltar, it is necessary to 'go through the mill,' and the routine thus described is indispensable. A similar process is equally indispensable in the conveyance of munitions of war, and even provisions for troops; and although a change has recently been made in the system, Sir William Power describes it as a change for the worse. Evidently a change that will secure more prompt and direct action is a paramount necessity. The process described entails a month's delay. It might lead beyond the scope of the reference to your Committee, to indicate with any elaboration of detail a remedy for this state of things; but the leading principle of an effective change seems to be to give direct action in the transmission and conveyance of their own troops, munitions of war, and provisions, to the War Office and the Admiralty respectively; and for valuable suggestions on this point the clear and able evidence of Sir William Power, Questions 4388 to 4501, may be referred to.

II. 4496.
II. 4500.

II. 4497.
II. 4431.

II. 4460.
II. 4436.

II. 4472.

II. 4435.

II. 4447.

152. "Before closing this Report, your Committee are of opinion that one remarkable feature in the conduct of this Expedition, viz., the abdication of all administrative control by the Home Government, should be distinctly noticed.

153. "It seems to your Committee a strong measure, and a straining of the doctrine of administrative accountability to Parliament to the uttermost to have transferred the whole of this Expedition, and all the Expenditure incidental thereto, to an authority not accountable to Parliament. Under the arrangements finally adopted, the Home Administration were utterly helpless as regards the control of expenditure; and they even formally renounced that control by investing the Bombay Government and the Commander in Chief with a *carte blanche*. There can be no doubt that this abdication and transference of responsibility and control was a source of heavy expenditure. It seems to your Committee that it was the duty of the Home Government—in consonance with that doctrine of accountability to Parliament which lies at the very basis of the English constitution—to have transferred to Bombay a Secretary of State duly authorised, and accompanied by all needful professional assistance and advice, who should have assumed and exercised supreme control over expenditure there. Beyond the mere fact of responsibility for the war itself, every other responsibility was flung off by the Home Government; and that such a procedure should ever have obtained even the tacit consent of Parliament is a matter of astonishment and regret."

I. 85.

DRAFT REPORT proposed by Mr. Eastwick, read the first time as follows:—

"1. THERE were two estimates submitted to Parliament, the first on the 26th¹ of November 1867,² by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Disraeli; and the second,³ submitted to Parliament on the 23rd April 1868,⁴ by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Ward Hunt. These estimates were prepared from materials supplied to the Treasury by the India Office, the War Office, and the Admiralty respectively; and in the case of the second the Treasury further took into account the information they had received from Mr. Turner, an officer dispatched by themselves to Bombay for the purpose of keeping a check on the expenditure.

"2. Before considering the amount of these calculations, your Committee would observe that the use of the term estimate in regard to them has been objected to by General Jameson, the auditor of the Home Accounts of India, by whom the returns furnished from the India Office were prepared. He states,⁵ 'I think that the word "estimate" has been improperly used; if it had been called a vote of credit for 2,000,000 £. or 3,000,000 £. it would

¹ Appendix to Report of 1867, p. 154.

² Hansard's Debates, vol. cxc. (3rd series), p. 162.

³ Appendix to Report of 1867, p. 152.

⁴ Hansard's Debates, vol. xcxi. (3rd series), p. 1150.

⁵ Evidence, 9 July 1869, Q. 335.

¹ Hansard's Debates,
vol. cxc., p. 182.

have been much more appropriate. I have regretted ever since that anything so definite and decided should have been stated, because we really had no means whatever of arriving at a correct estimate.' The Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the 26th November 1867, in submitting the first calculation, warned the House of its unprecise character. He said, 'The estimates before us, I need hardly remind the Committee, cannot be prepared with the precision with which estimates are usually laid upon the Table of the House, because they refer to an expenditure taking place in a distant country, and they must, therefore, be described as *rough* estimates; but I wish the Committee to understand that, though I avail myself of an epithet in common use, and call them *rough* estimates, they are not *careless* estimates.' Your Committee are of opinion that this description of the calculations in question is accurate, and that with reference to the deficient data on which they were based, they were necessarily *rough*, and, therefore, imperfect, but by no means *careless* estimates.

² Evidence, 7 July
1869, Q. 28.

"3. The original calculation of General Jameson, dated the 11th October 1867, is divided into two parts. The first part is for expenses up to the 1st of January 1868, which are spoken of as 'liabilities already incurred,' an expression which has been explained to mean 'the expenditure which would be sufficient to place the force on the shores of the Red Sea.' In regard to the facts then known, this calculation cannot, in the opinion of your Committee, be viewed otherwise than as a fair approximation to the actual result, except in the matter of transports engaged in India, of the extent of which item there was not in England the slightest idea 'at the time.' It must be observed that this in calculation was framed for 12,424 combatants, with a follower for each man.³ But the actual number of combatants was 14,700,⁴ and of non-combatants 49,056, or 36,632,⁵ more than were calculated. Of this excess of followers, however, a very great number were engaged after the close of 1867, and would, therefore, not affect the accuracy of the first part of the so-called estimate of 11th October 1867. On the whole, it is sufficiently accurate to say that that calculation was framed for a number of persons less by one-fourth than the actual number engaged in the Expedition up to 1st January 1868, and that therefore 25 per cent. or half a million sterling should be added to its amount, making 2½ millions, which your Committee believe to be very nearly the sum expended to the close of 1867.

³ Evidence, 9 July
1869, Q. 332.

⁴ Evidence, 29 April
1870, Q. 1304.

⁵ Evidence, 27 May
1870, Q. 4236.

⁷ Appendix to Report,
1869, No. 2, p. 3.

⁶ Blue Book, p. 18,
No. 20, and Evidence,
28 February 1870, Q.
40.

⁹ Evidence, 28 February
1870, Q. 41.

¹⁰ Evidence, 28 February
1870, Q. 36.

¹¹ Evidence, 3 March
1870, Q. 209.

¹² Evidence, 24 May
1870, Q. 3264, 3963.

¹³ Evidence, 17 May
1870, Q. 3359; and
28 February 1870, Q.
47.

¹⁴ Evidence 28 February
1870, Q. 4748.

¹⁵ Appendix to Report
of 1869, p. 153; and
Evidence, 16 July 1869,
Q. 1533, 1537.

¹⁶ Evidence, 16 July
1869, Q. 1509.

"The increase of the force above the strength named by Lord Napier, *i.e.*, 12,000 soldiers and 3,000 men of the Cooly Corps,⁶ who were reckoned in the 'active part of the Expedition,' and not⁷ among the followers, was owing to the increase of the strength¹⁰ of the native regiments ordered by the Government of India,¹¹ as mentioned in a letter to the Bombay Government, dated Simla, 4th October 1867, and of that of the European regiments made by the Horse Guards,¹² and to some slight additions to the force made at the request of Lord Napier.¹³ These additions were made in consequence of the Cooly Corps, in the first instance, not being sent, though they came subsequently.¹⁴

"5. The second part of the calculation of 11th October 1867, which gives the monthly expenses of the Expedition from the 1st of January 1868, at 370,000 £, was based on wholly imperfect data. Thus the sea transport was reckoned at 150,000 £, and the tonnage at 125,000 or 131,000 tons,¹⁵ while the actual expenditure was 430,000 £ per month, and the tonnage employed 301,386 tons.¹⁶ Your Committee are of opinion that it was impossible at that time to arrive at anything like a correct estimate of the monthly expenditure, owing to vessels being engaged at places so distant as London, Suez, Aden, Bombay, Karachi, and Calcutta.

"6. The calculation of 11th October 1867, was used by Mr. Disraeli in his statement of the 26th November 1867. He added to the two millions for placing the force on the shore of the Red Sea, 1½ million for monthly expenditure, from 1st January 1868, to 1st May 1868, which is at the rate of 375,000 £, instead of 370,000 £, named in the calculation of 11th October 1867. To this he added 300,000 £ for replacing the forces lent to the Imperial Government by India, and these forces were in fact replaced by the increase to strength of regiments already noticed. He further added 200,000 £ for margin, making the whole estimate to the end of April, four millions. To this must be added half a million for the increase of the force, raised from 12,000 to 14,700. Thus the total sum would be 4½ millions, which fell short of the actual expenditure about a million, owing to the monthly estimate being 370,000 £ instead of what it was afterwards shown to be, 600,000 £.

"7. The second calculation made by General Jameson on the 12th of March 1868, gives a total of 5,351,000 £, which, with half a million for the increased force, would be in round numbers six millions for the expenditure to the end of May 1868. It is to be regretted that General Jameson did not allow in this estimate for the increase given to the force by strengthening the regiments; but he has stated¹⁷ that he was misled by the idea that the whole force would not land in Abyssinia. The note appended to this calculation is as follows:—'If continued beyond the 31st of May next, it would be safe to estimate a further charge of 600,000 £ for every month beyond that date.' But though the last man of the Expedition had left Annesley Bay before the month of June was out, the Expedition cannot be said to have completely terminated until all the transports had been discharged, and the last was not paid off till the 4th of September 1868, and until the troops had all returned to their proper stations in India, which was not till the end of October. The monthly expenditure, therefore, of 600,000 £ must be reckoned to have gone on till the end of August, and a half month must be added for September and October. This would add

¹⁷ Evidence, 24 June,
Q. 6133-38.

2,100,000 £

2,100,000 £ to the six millions calculated up to the end of May, making a total of 8,100,000 £ or within 700,000 £ of the actual expenditure. Considering, therefore, that in all calculations referring to military expeditions a very large margin must be allowed,¹ and that a far greater uncertainty attended this Expedition than any other on record;² your Committee are of opinion that the statement of Mr. Hunt on the 23rd of April 1868, based on the estimate of General Jameson, dated the 12th of March 1868, was far from being unreasonable.³

"8. The expenses for the return of the army were protracted in a way which was not foreseen, and they, therefore, greatly exceeded the idea that had been formed of them,⁴ and they were further swelled by the donation batta to the troops (130,000 £) which, owing to the uncertain issue of the enterprise, could not have been taken into account, and by losses of animals and stores, which, but for detention in quarantine of the two officers sent out to superintend the disposal of them, and the death of one of these officers, might in part have been avoided.

"9. Your Committee have had submitted to them very extended evidence as to the 'preventible expenses' of the Expedition, having reference principally to the tardy supply of landing and railway accommodation, and the want of telegraphic communication and of water pipes, and of a proper organisation of the Transport Corps; but after careful consideration they are of opinion that, in view of the 'exceptional' character of the enterprise, nothing has been established to detract from the merit of an expedition which has received the thanks of Parliament, and in which, as stated by a high authority,⁵ 'everyone, from first to last, laboured with an utter disregard of health, of exertion, of fatigue, and of every personal feeling.'

"10. Your Committee have received a good deal of evidence on matters connected with the Expedition, but which do not properly fall within the order of reference. Much of this will be found valuable and interesting, and your Committee would especially direct attention to the recommendations of Sir W. Mausfield as regards the distribution of transport, which carry with them also the authority of Lord Clyde, and they would further express their belief that the establishment of the Control Department at the War Office, especially if certain arrangements as to sea transport, which have been suggested, be adopted,⁶ 'will obviate many of the difficulties which were encountered in the Abyssinian Expedition.'

"11. In conclusion, the Committee think it right to notice the heavy responsibility which was laid upon the Government of Bombay, to which the duty of fitting out the Expedition was assigned by the Home Government. The Governor, while careful to maintain his position and anxious to keep down expense, so far as was consistent with efficiency, appears to have rightly considered that it was his primary duty to support the Commander in Chief, and, in the opinion of your Committee, deserves much credit for the successful arrangements on which the success of the campaign so materially depended."

RESOLUTIONS to be proposed by Lord *Elcho*, read the first time as follows:—

"1. THAT the total cost of the Abyssinian Expedition, as shown by Parliamentary Papers 0.46—(29), 6th July 1870, will amount when all outstanding accounts are paid, to 8,800,000 £.

"2. That the estimated cost was 5,351,000 £ for the expenditure to the end of May 1868.

"3. That there has thus been an excess of 3,449,000 £ over the estimates or calculations submitted to Parliament.

"4. That owing to the peculiar circumstances of the Expedition, and the absence of all reliable data and certain knowledge as to the state and resources of the country and the disposition of the people, any estimate or calculations as to the probable requirements and cost of such a war must necessarily have been vague, uncertain, and calculations so made cannot properly be called estimates.

"5. That the calculations as to the probable cost of the war were described by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Disraeli), on the 26th November 1869, as being 'rough estimates,' and General Jameson, Auditor of the Home Accounts of India, by whom the calculations were made, stated to your Committee that he thought the word estimate had been improperly used; that if it had been called a vote of credit for 2,000,000 £ or 3,000,000 £, it would have been more appropriate; and that he had regretted ever since that anything so definite and decided should have been stated, because they really had no means of arriving at a correct estimate.

"6. That the excess of expenditure over the estimated cost appears to have arisen mainly under certain heads, viz., Transport, Baggage, Animals, and Forage.

"7. That this excess is due to unusually large stock of provisions, which, owing to the absolute unproductiveness of the country, it was necessary to send with the Expedition, the

destruction of animals by epidemic, disease, and owing to the want of proper and efficient attendants, whose services could not be obtained, and the delay in the return and discharge of transports occasioned by the monsoon.

" 8. That in addition to the causes here assigned for excessive expenditure, your Committee are disposed to concur in the opinion given in evidence by Sir W. Mansfield, viz.: that extravagance must necessarily arise where responsibility is divided, as it was in the case of the Abyssinian Expedition, the preparations having been mainly made in India, while the Exchequer at home was responsible for all payments.

" 9. That in the opinion of Lord Napier, the General in Command, as well as in the opinion of Sir W. Mansfield and Colonel Marriot, Military Secretary of the Bombay Government, the number of troops employed, the supplies and transport, and the preparations made were not in excess of the requirements of the Expedition, considering the nature of the climate and country, and the uncertainty attending the operations to be undertaken.

" 10. That the soundness of this view has been proved by the fact, that although the total number of troops in Abyssinia was 14,700, with 49,056 non-combatants and camp followers, and from first to last transport animals, there were, owing to the necessity of garrisoning depôts and maintaining detached posts along the line of march, as well as patrols to keep open the communications, only men available for the attack on Magdala, and the troops so employed found themselves for two days on reduced rations.

" 11. That the speedy termination of the Expedition was due to King Theodore having come out of his fastness to offer battle, and that the war would have been greatly, if not indefinitely, prolonged, and its cost proportionately increased, if he had retired into the country beyond Magdala.

" 12. That the General in Command, looking to the possibility of such a prolongation of the war, and to all the circumstances of the Expedition, thought it necessary to have six months' supplies in reserve; that Sir W. Mansfield and Colonel Marriot coincide in this view, and that your Committee are not prepared to dispute the wisdom of this provision against possible contingencies.

" 13. That with regard to the transport of the Expedition, your Committee would draw your attention to the evidence of Sir W. Mansfield, who has stated that each regiment of the brigade organised by him for Abyssinia, in the Presidency of Bengal, had its proper number of transport animals allotted to it, for which the commanding officer was held responsible. That the commanding officer was thus necessarily interested in their proper treatment and custody upon which the efficiency of his regiment depended. That this system was the one in force in Lord Clyde's military campaigns, and that it had been found to work well, and insured the ready effective mobility of the army.

" 14. That a reference to the evidence of Sir W. Power, points to the division of responsibility in the matter of land and sea transport, the land transport having been under the military, while the sea service was under the Admiralty, by whom all sea transport was taken up, as being a fruitful source of wasteful expenditure and possible confusion. His evidence also points to the non-existence at the time of the Abyssinian Expedition of a control department charged with the supplies and transport of the army, such as has since been created, and is now being completely organised, as a cause of defective transport organisation, and consequent inefficiency and waste; and that in his opinion, in any future wars, it may be reasonably expected that greater efficiency and economy will be attained, in which opinion your Committee are disposed to concur.

" 15. That looking to all the circumstances attending the preparations for, and the conduct of, this most remarkable and signally successful Expedition, your Committee, while pointing, as they have done, to what appears to them instances of defective organisation and insufficient control over the expenditure of public money, bear ready testimony to the zeal and energy of all concerned, by which the Expedition was carried to so successful an issue.

" 16. That looking also to the privations which our troops suffered in the Crimea, through defective transport and supplies, culpability amounting to crime would have attached to those charged with the conduct of this Expedition, whether at home or in India, if the troops engaged had suffered, or the success of the undertaking had been endangered, and the lives of the prisoners had consequently been sacrificed from these causes."

[Adjourned till Friday next, at Eleven o'clock.]

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Friday, 29th July 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Mr. CANDLISH in the Chair.

Mr. Eastwick.
 Sir John Hay.
 Sir Stafford Northcote.
 Mr. Seely.
 Mr. Baxter.
 Sir James Elphinstone.
 Mr. Howes.
 Mr. Turner.

Mr. Denison.
 Mr. Duff.
 Mr. Campbell.
 Sir Patrick O'Brien.
 Mr. Mundella.
 Captain Beaumont.
 Mr. White.
 Colonel Barttelot.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Draft Report proposed by the Chairman be now read a second time, paragraph by paragraph"—(Mr. *Seely*).—Amendment proposed to leave out from the words "that the" to the end of the Question, in order to insert the words "Resolutions to be proposed by Lord Elcho be now taken into consideration"—(Sir *John Hay*)—instead thereof.—Question put, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question.—The Committee divided :

Ayes, 8.
 Mr. Duff.
 Mr. Seely.
 Mr. Baxter.
 Mr. Mundella.
 Mr. White.
 Mr. Campbell.
 Sir Patrick O'Brien.
 Captain Beaumont.

Noes, 7.
 Mr. Eastwick.
 Mr. Denison.
 Mr. Turner.
 Sir James Elphinstone.
 Sir John Hay.
 Sir Stafford Northcote.
 Mr. Howes.

Main Question put.—The Committee divided :

Ayes, 8.
 Mr. Duff.
 Mr. Seely.
 Mr. Baxter.
 Mr. Mundella.
 Mr. White.
 Mr. Campbell.
 Sir Patrick O'Brien.
 Captain Beaumont.

Noes, 8.
 Mr. Eastwick.
 Mr. Denison.
 Mr. Turner.
 Sir James Elphinstone.
 Sir John Hay.
 Sir Stafford Northcote.
 Mr. Howes.
 Colonel Barttelot.

Whereupon the Chairman declared himself with the Ayes.

Draft Report proposed by the Chairman, read a second time paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraph 1.—Amendment proposed, to leave out from the word "circumstances," in line 8, to the word "termination" in line 11—(Mr. *Denison*).—Question put, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the paragraph,—put, and *negatived*.—Paragraph, as amended, agreed to.

Paragraph 2.—An Amendment made.—Another Amendment proposed, to leave out from the end of the last Amendment to the end of the paragraph—(Sir *S. Northcote*).—Question, That the words "based on circumstances" stand part of the paragraph.—The Committee divided :

Ayes, 9.
 Mr. Denison.
 Mr. Duff.
 Mr. Seely.
 Mr. Baxter.
 Mr. Mundella.
 Mr. White.
 Mr. Campbell.
 Sir Patrick O'Brien.
 Captain Beaumont.

Noes, 7.
 Mr. Eastwick.
 Mr. Turner.
 Sir James Elphinstone.
 Sir John Hay.
 Sir Stafford Northcote.
 Mr. Howes.
 Colonel Barttelot.

Other Amendments made.—Paragraph, as amended, *agreed to*.

Paragraph 3.—Amendment proposed in line 1, to leave out the words “This Estimate”—(Sir S. Northcote).—Question put, That the words “this Estimate” stand part of the paragraph.—The Committee divided :

Ayes, 7.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Mundella.
Mr. White.
Mr. Campbell.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Captain Beaumont.

Noes, 9.
Mr. Eastwick.
Mr. Denison.
Mr. Turner.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Sir John Hay.
Sir Stafford Northcote.
Mr. Duff.
Mr. Howes.
Colonel Barttelot.

Remainder of paragraph *disagreed to*.

Paragraphs 4 and 5 amended, and *agreed to*.

Paragraph 6.—Question put, That this paragraph stand part of the proposed Report.—The Committee divided :

Ayes, 8.
Mr. Duff.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Mundella.
Mr. White.
Mr. Campbell.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Captain Beaumont.

Noes, 8.
Mr. Eastwick.
Mr. Denison.
Mr. Turner.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Sir John Hay.
Sir Stafford Northcote.
Mr. Howes.
Colonel Barttelot.

Whereupon the Chairman declared himself with the Ayes.

Paragraph 7.—Amendment proposed in line 2, after the word “Parliament,” to insert the words “in preparing which the Treasury further took into account the information they had received from Mr. Turner, who was dispatched by themselves to Bombay for the purpose of verifying and reporting on the expenditure”—(Mr. Eastwick).—Question, That those words be there inserted—put, and *agreed to*.—Paragraph, as amended, *agreed to*.

Paragraph 8.—Amendment proposed in line 2 after the word “Expedition,” to insert the words “if entirely completed before the end of May”—(Sir John Hay).—Question, That those words be there inserted.—The Committee divided :

Ayes, 8.
Mr. Eastwick.
Mr. Denison.
Mr. Turner.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Sir John Hay.
Sir Stafford Northcote.
Mr. Howes.
Colonel Barttelot.

Noes, 8.
Mr. Duff.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Mundella.
Mr. White.
Mr. Campbell.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Captain Beaumont.

Whereupon the Chairman declared himself with the Noes.

Question put, That this paragraph stand part of the proposed Report.—The Committee divided :

Ayes, 10.
Sir Stafford Northcote.
Mr. Duff.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Mundella.
Mr. White.
Mr. Howes.
Mr. Campbell.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Captain Beaumont.

Noes, 6.
Mr. Eastwick.
Mr. Denison.
Mr. Turner.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Sir John Hay.
Colonel Barttelot.

Paragraph

Paragraph 9.—Question put, That this paragraph stand part of the proposed Report.—The Committee divided :

Ayes, 9.
Mr. Denison.
Mr. Duff.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Mundella.
Mr. White.
Mr. Campbell.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Captain Beaumont.

Noes, 7.
Mr. Eastwick.
Mr. Turner.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Sir John Hay.
Sir Stafford Northcote.
Mr. Howes.
Colonel Barttelot.

Amendment proposed, after Paragraph 9, to insert the following new paragraph : " But though the last man of the Expedition had left Annesley Bay before the month of June was out, the Expedition cannot be said to have completely terminated until all the transports had been discharged, and the last was not paid off till the 4th of September 1868, and until the troops had all returned to their proper stations in India, which was not till the end of October."—Question put, That this paragraph be inserted in the proposed Report—(Mr. Denison).—The Committee divided :

Ayes, 8.
Mr. Eastwick.
Mr. Turner.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Sir John Hay.
Sir Stafford Northcote.
Mr. Grant Duff.
Mr. Howes.
Colonel Barttelot.

Noes, 7.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Mundella.
Mr. White.
Mr. Campbell.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Captain Beaumont.

Another Amendment proposed, after the last new paragraph, to insert the following new Paragraph : " The monthly expenditure, therefore, of 600,000 *l.* referred to in Paragraph 7, must be reckoned to have gone on till the end of August, and a half month must be added for September and October. This would add 2,100,000 *l.* to the six millions calculated up to the end of May, making a total of 8,100,000 *l.*"—(Mr. Denison).—Question put, That this paragraph be inserted in the proposed Report.—The Committee divided :

Ayes, 8.
Mr. Eastwick.
Mr. Denison.
Mr. Turner.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Sir John Hay.
Sir Stafford Northcote.
Mr. Howes.
Colonel Barttelot.

Noes, 8.
Mr. Grant Duff.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Mundella.
Mr. White.
Mr. Campbell.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Captain Beaumont.

Whereupon the Chairman declared himself with the Noes.

Paragraph 10.—Amendment proposed, in line 1, after the word "recited," to insert the words "some of "—(Sir Stafford Northcote).—Question, That those words be there inserted.—The Committee divided :

Ayes, 7.
Mr. Eastwick.
Mr. Denison.
Mr. Turner.
Sir James Elphinstone.
Sir Stafford Northcote.
Mr. Howes.
Colonel Barttelot.

Noes, 7.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Mundella.
Mr. White.
Mr. Campbell.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Captain Beaumont.

Whereupon the Chairman declared himself with the Noes.

Another Amendment proposed, in line 1, after the words "recited the," to insert the word "main"—(Captain *Beaumont*).—Question, That the word "main" be there inserted, —put, and *negatived*.

Another Amendment proposed, in line 1, to leave out the word "facts"—(Mr. *Denison*). —Question put, That the word "facts" stand part of the paragraph.—The Committee divided :

Ayes, 8.	Noes, 8.
Mr. Duff.	Mr. Eastwick.
Mr. Seely.	Mr. Denison.
Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Turner.
Mr. Mundella.	Sir James Elphinstone.
Mr. White.	Sir John Hay.
Mr. Campbell.	Sir Stafford Northcote.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.	Mr. Howes.
Captain Beaumont.	Colonel Barttelot.

Whereupon the Chairman declared himself with the Ayes.

Question put, That this paragraph stand part of the proposed Report.—The Committee divided :

Ayes, 8.	Noes, 8.
Mr. Duff.	Mr. Eastwick.
Mr. Seeley.	Mr. Denison.
Mr. Baxter.	Mr. Turner.
Mr. Mundella.	Sir James Elphinstone.
Mr. White.	Sir John Hay.
Mr. Campbell.	Sir Stafford Northcote.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.	Mr. Howes.
Captain Beaumont.	Colonel Barttelot.

Whereupon the Chairman declared himself with the Ayes.

Paragraphs 11, 12, and 13, *disagreed to*.

Paragraph 14.—Amendment proposed, in line 1, after the word "observe," to insert the words, "that owing to the peculiar circumstances of the Expedition, and the absence of all reliable data and certain knowledge as to the state and resources of the country and the disposition of the people, any estimate or calculations as to the probable requirements and cost of such a war must necessarily have been vague, uncertain, and calculations so made cannot properly be called estimates"—(Mr. *Denison*).—Question, That those words be there inserted.—The Committee divided :

Ayes, 8.	Noes, 8.
Mr. Eastwick.	Mr. Grant Duff.
Mr. Denison.	Mr. Seely.
Mr. Turner.	Mr. Baxter.
Sir James Elphinstone.	Mr. Mundella.
Sir John Hay.	Mr. White.
Sir Stafford Northcote.	Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Howes.	Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Colonel Barttelot.	Captain Beaumont.

Whereupon the Chairman declared himself with the Noes.

Paragraph *disagreed to*.

Paragraphs 15 and 16, amended, and *agreed to*.

Remaining paragraphs, *disagreed to*.

Amendment proposed, after paragraph 13, to add the following new paragraph
 "In conclusion, the Committee think it right to notice the heavy responsibility which was laid upon the Government of Bombay, to which the duty of fitting out the Expedition was assigned by the Home Government. The Governor, while careful to maintain his position, and anxious to keep down expense, so far as was consistent with efficiency, appears to have rightly considered that it was his primary duty to support the Commander in Chief, and, in the opinion of your Committee, deserves much credit for the successful arrangements on which

which the success of the campaign so materially depended"—(Colonel *Barttelot*).—Question put, That this paragraph be added to the proposed Report.—The Committee divided :

Ayes, 7.	Noes, 8.
Mr. Eastwick.	Mr. Duff.
Mr. Denison.	Mr. Seely.
Mr. Turner.	Mr. Baxter.
Sir James Elphinstone.	Mr. Mundella.
Sir John Hay.	Mr. White.
Sir Stafford Northcote.	Mr. Campbell.
Colonel Barttelot.	Sir Patrick O' Brien.
	Captain Beaumont.

Question, That this Report, as amended, be the Report of the Committee to The House—put, and *agreed to*.

Ordered, To Report, together with the Minutes of Evidence, and an Appendix.

EXPENSES OF WITNESSES.

N A M E OF W I T N E S S .	Profession or Condition.	From whence Summoned.	Number of Days absent from Home, under Orders of Committee.	Expenses of Journey to London and back.	Allowance during Absence from Home.	TOTAL Expenses, allowed to Witness.
				£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Tyndall Bright - - -	Shipowner - - -	Liverpool - - -	2	3 3 6	2 2 -	5 5 6
Hon. Lloyd Mostyn - - -	Officer - - -	Delvin (Ireland) -	4	6 19 -	4 4 -	11 3 -
George Steuart - - -	Mariner - - -	Liverpool - - -	3	2 17 -	1 10 -	4 7 -
Captain Whyniates - - -	Officer - - -	Woolwich - - -	1	- 4 6	1 1 -	1 5 6
Major Michael Wicks Wil- loughby.	- ditto - - -	Rugby - - -	2	1 13 -	2 2 -	3 15 -
Ditto - - -	- ditto - - -	- ditto - - -	3	1 18 -	3 3 -	1 -
Michael Kennedy - - -	- ditto - - -	Leighton Buzzard	1	1 5 -	1 1 -	2 6 -
H. W. Holland - - -	- ditto - - -	Dublin - - -	10	6 10 -	10 10 -	17 - -
				TOTAL - - -	£.	50 3 -

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MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

Monday, 28th February 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.
Colonel Barttelot.
Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Candlish.
Mr. Grant Duff.
Mr. Eastwick.
Lord Elcho.

Sir John Hay.
Mr. Mundella.
Sir Stafford Northcote.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. Charles Turner.
Mr. White.

JOHN CANDLISH, ESQ., IN THE CHAIR.

The Right Honourable ROBERT BARON NAPIER OF MAGDALA, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., &c., &c. (attending by permission of the House of Lords); Examined.

1. *Chairman.*] YOUR Lordship was Commander in Chief of the Expedition sent from India to Abyssinia in the Autumn of 1867, were you not?—I was.

2. Will your Lordship state when you were appointed to the command?—It was in the month of August; I first received a telegram, saying that I had been proposed to be appointed; and, subsequently I received demi-official letters; but I have not brought them here, though they can be furnished to the Committee if requisite.

3. You are aware, are you not, that the estimate of the cost of that Expedition was put before the House of Commons as 3,500,000 £.?—At the time when the Expedition was in preparation, I was so much occupied with the preparation for the Expedition, that I did not pay attention to what was proceeding in England. I did not see the newspapers regularly, and I did not see the debates or the proceedings in Parliament when that estimate was laid before Parliament. Therefore I cannot say that I knew of it beyond the general fact, mentioned and accepted everywhere, that such was the case.

4. Has not your Lordship subsequently become aware of that being the fact?—I apprehend that that is a point which appears upon the records of Parliament, and therefore there is no doubt about it.

5. And subsequently you have ascertained, I presume, that the ultimate cost has been approximately nine millions of money?—That I know from public report. No estimate was ever placed before me, nor have any complete returns of expenditure ever been placed before me. Therefore of my own knowledge from documents I know nothing, either of one or the other; but

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from public report, and what has appeared in the public papers, I am aware that the fact is that the reputed estimate was 3,500,000 £., and that the expense was, I suppose, about 9,000,000 £.

6. Inasmuch as probably there is no man living so well informed as to the facts respecting this Expedition as your Lordship, I think I shall be most respectful if I pass on to you the question which the House of Commons has referred to this Committee, namely, what is the cause of the great excess of the cost of prosecuting the war with Abyssinia over the Estimates submitted to Parliament?—Before making any reply, I would beg that if my replies are reserved, or if there is any hesitation in my answers, the Committee will attribute it to my desire not to give weight to anything of which I am not myself cognizant, so that no reply of mine which might be recorded on a subject of which I am not fully informed might be injurious or inconvenient; therefore I desire to be very careful in any reply which I may make; and if that should give an appearance of hesitation or reserve, I beg the Committee will understand it in its right sense. The question now put to me is whether I know why the cost of the Abyssinian Expedition was so much greater than the first estimate which was placed before Parliament. I am entirely ignorant of the grounds on which the first estimate was made; but I think that no human being could have made a correct estimate of the probable expenses of such an Expedition, of which every single quantity but the force which we intended to take with us was an unknown quantity. The coast upon which we were to land, and the particular point of that coast upon which we were to land, were unknown, and could only be determined after

Right Hon.
Lord Napier.

28 February
1870.

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Right Hon. after special inquiry and examination. When the coast was examined, it was found, after a period of 15 or 20 days (I will not be particular as to the number of days), that the route which was the only one suitable for us was one containing very many difficulties, for which no previous knowledge of the country could have prepared us. The reconnoitring party which was sent to examine the country, found a stream of water, which they were led to believe would answer for the port of disembarkation; but it proved afterwards that this water was merely a transient supply; so that the whole of the troops, and the whole of the people who attend an army, and who congregate about the ports of disembarkation during an expedition, were dependent for water upon the condensing engines in the steamers, which were supplemented by detached condensers. It was impossible to limit the number of people who came to assist the Expedition (for their own advantage, no doubt, but who still were of assistance to the Expedition, and to the auxiliaries to the Expedition), or to put any check upon them; and it was impossible to deny them water. It was necessary to provide water for the whole of the British subjects who were there. Had any of those perished from the refusal of the authorities to supply them with water, I believe that those authorities would have been held by the nation to have been extremely culpable. For the living mass of human beings there, and for the cattle, as much as 200 tons of water were condensed in one day, I believe, at the point of highest expenditure. That was an expense which could not have been foreseen, but which was inevitable, and which must be counted as one cause of the excess of the expenditure over the estimate. I speak here of those who had a claim on the State. For the Bayars and indigenous population a very scanty supply of indifferent water was drawn from wells. A second cause was that the coast was found to be subject to an epidemic disease, which destroyed great numbers of mules and camels. There was no previous knowledge of the coast sufficient to forewarn us of the extent and severity of this calamity. Thirdly, the state of the port, of the coast, and of the climate, were such that it was impossible to incur the liability of detaining a large force without having the means of re-transmitting them to India, or to Europe, as the circumstances might require. We could not have kept a large force upon the coast at Zulla, without imminent danger of great sickness. Such a calamity as a cyclone dispersing the condensing steamers, might have cost us extreme disaster. Nor could we have retained the bulk of the force for any time above the pass; that is to say, above the Kumeli Pass, on the high land, without danger of being intercepted by the rainy season, and detained there until the season of floods should have passed away. We were therefore obliged to be equipped and ready for every contingency. If we had dismissed the sea transport as soon as the troops were disembarked, and had the transports been able to make their way out of the Red Sea, we could not have reckoned upon having them back again at the time when we might have been ready to leave the country; but, in fact, had we desired to dismiss the sea transports, they could not have made their way out of the Red Sea against the monsoon in any case without the aid of powerful steamers, and in several in-

stances in which the attempt was made, I believe I am correct in saying that the attempt failed. I think those were the principal causes why the expense exceeded the estimate.

7. The force which was adjudged expedient in the first instance was 12,000 combatants, was it not?—It was. In speaking of a number of men for an expedition, you would speak generally of the rank and file. In asking for a force of 12,000 men, I should mean 12,000 rank and file.

8. I think your Lordship sets out in a paper in the Blue Book what you intended by 12,000 men?—I have before me a copy of my memorandum, dated Poonah, the 23rd of July, and written when I first heard of the probability of the Expedition. Speaking of the duty before us, I say, "For this purpose about 12,000 men would be required to enable us to hold the first base near the sea; to have a force in support about half way, and to maintain the communications of an advanced party of about 5,000 men, which might operate over the last 200 miles to Magdala, or such other place as the prisoners might be conveyed to."

9. The details of the 12,000 men are set out in a memorandum by the Quartermaster General at page 267; so many British artillery, cavalry, and infantry, and so many native cavalry, sappers, and infantry, making a total of all ranks of 12,075 men, including officers. The Commissariat Estimate is set out on the following page, 268, for a total of 11,600 men, including officers:—"Memorandum of the Commissary General, Enclosure 8, in No. 572." The whole force of men and officers is detailed there, making a total on the one page of 11,600; while in the Quartermaster General's statement of the contemplated force, the total amounts to 12,075; that is so, is it not?—Yes; that includes officers and rank and file.

10. Is your Lordship aware that early in that year (I think in February or March) Colonel Merewether had reported his opinion that 6,000 men would be sufficient to relieve the prisoners at Magdala?—I am aware of that.

11. Are you also aware that the Government of India had also put forward an official document, in which they set out, I think, 7,500 men?—I was not aware of any such document by the Government of India.

12. At page 200 of the Blue Book, there is the following memorandum: "In the event of the reserve being called up, which would probably be the case before the operations were concluded, Government must be prepared to supply its place by a reinforcement from India, or, better still, by one held in readiness at Aden of a like strength. The 1st and 2nd Brigades would be about 4,000 men; artillery, 300 men; sappers, 200 men; cavalry, 900 men. Total 5,400 men. Reserve Brigade, infantry, 2,000 men; artillery, 150 men; sappers, 100 men. Total 2,250 men." That was the suggestion of the Government of India, under the date of 10th of July, was it not?—It makes a grand total of 9,900 men.

13. Seven thousand six hundred and fifty, it is suggested, should be landed on the coast of Abyssinia, and a reserve of 2,250 men was to be kept in readiness at Bombay or Aden; was that so?—Yes. That memorandum was not communicated to me during the time that Expedition was under preparation, though I became

became aware of it afterwards. This memorandum is dated the 10th of June.

14. It is an enclosure in a Despatch from the Government of India to the Secretary of State of a later date, is it not?—The first direct intelligence which I received was dated the 12th of July.

15. Previously to the dispatch of the force from Bombay, was your Lordship aware of the suggestion of the Indian Government, that the force should be 7,650 men, with a reserve to be dispatched, if necessary, of 2,250 men?—I cannot say when I became aware of that, but that estimate would not have made the slightest difference in my own.

16. Was it not the fact that the force designated for the service in Abyssinia was ultimately raised to very nearly 15,000 men?—I have here a memorandum of the force which actually landed, and the number was 12,437 effective rank and file, exclusive of officers.

17. Has your Lordship seen a report of the proceedings of this Committee last year?—I have seen portions, but not the whole.

18. Has the return handed in by Captain Tryon been under your Lordship's notice?—Not particularly. No copy of those proceedings was sent to me officially. I saw occasionally detached papers, but I am not aware of the whole of the proceedings. The force landed, according to the return of the Adjutant General, consisted of 4,212 British troops, and 9,223 Native troops, making a total that came to Zullah of 13,435 men.

19. Besides the numbers mentioned, there was a further detachment on board ship in Annesley Bay, was there not, which never landed?—Yes, besides those mentioned.

20. What did that detachment number?—There were two regiments of Native infantry which never landed.

21. Were they in the Bay?—One was in the Bay, but one, I think, did not go so far as the Bay. One went to Aden, and the other came to Zoullah, and returned without landing.

22. Do you remember the numbers?—I could not speak as to the exact number, but there were two regiments.

23. Was there not a further addition to that force told off for shipment at Bombay?—There was one battery of artillery; and there were two regiments that were held in readiness to be sent for, when required; these regiments embarked but never landed.

24. Was shipping engaged to convey them?—Shipping was engaged to convey them. There were only unused two regiments of Native infantry and one battery of artillery.

25. Is your Lordship aware that the total number, as given by a Return of the Quartermaster General at Bombay, was 14,410 men?—I have not those details before me, but I have the Adjutant General's Return, from which I took the details this morning. The troops which actually came to Zoullah amounted to 11,804 men; of those, 574 men were taken for the use of the Transport Train, which, therefore, should be deducted from the amount of the fighting force. It became necessary to take those men to supplement the Transport Train. There were also a certain number of men who were invalided to England, who, during the voyage, became unfit for the Expedition, and were sent direct to England without even landing.

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26. Was that number large?—Not very large.

27. Was that a smaller number than was usual in such a force?—That I cannot say; but I should think that it probably might amount to 100 men or to 150 men.

28. Does your Lordship know the figures to which I have been adverting, 14,410, with a further number of 88 Royal Engineers sent from England?—I do not know those figures.

29. Is your Lordship aware that the number has been corrected, and that the final number has been discovered to be within 10 of 15,000?—I am not aware of that.

30. Would the additions which have been indicated shipped and ready for shipment, but not landed, raise the number to that amount?—I should hardly think it would raise it to that amount, but it is possible; the exact returns of numbers vary every day, so that it is quite possible that a return made a month before the Expedition might be different from a return made exactly at the time of the Expedition.

31. May the final number have been approximately 15,000?—It may or may not have been so. I am not aware of that fact; but I am not prepared to say that it was not so. It is simply a matter of returns.

32. Those incidents of sickness and death and disablement, from one cause or another, are inevitable in all expeditions, and would be in your Lordship's view when you put forward the number of 12,000, would they not?—Yes, I included a per-centage.

33. Would not this be a material cause of increase in the cost, namely, the raising of the force from 12,000 to 15,000; would not that, in point of fact, add one-fourth to the original cost, or in proportion to the arithmetical increase?—No doubt every increase to the force would cause an increase to the expenditure.

34. Was that increase made without reference to the views of the Home Government, or of the Bombay Government, or of the Indian Government?—It certainly was not without reference to their views; that is to say, no force was ordered by me without the consent of the civil authorities, because I could not have ordered a man; every requisition for the force was made by me to the civil authorities, and they were cognisant of them.

35. May I ask if the Government of Bombay concurred in that increase?—The views of the Government of Bombay as to a smaller force were conveyed to me in a memorandum by Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, in which his Excellency observes: "If I have understood the Commander in Chief, he does not contemplate the probability of a larger force than 5,000 to 6,000 men being required for actual operations in the field, after the Expedition has fairly penetrated the interior and reached Antalo, but rather that the necessity for the force he suggests arises from its being required to keep up communication with the coast and secure the depôts he proposes to establish at different points on the route. I do not feel competent to enter into these purely military questions, although a force of 7,000 men seems a large number for such a purpose, opposed to such an enemy, and in a distance of less than 250 miles; but the risk of the operations being prolonged to a second year, from the impossibility of moving on account of insufficient transport, and the accompanying danger to an army of being detained in a country of which little is

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is known but that, at certain periods of the of the year, it is most unhealthy, is my excuse for thus bringing the subject in this formal manner under the consideration of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, and requesting him to say, for the information of myself and our colleagues, whether, assuming that 20,000 mules, or their equivalents, is the strength which we may fairly calculate upon for our land transport service; that number is sufficient, in his opinion, for an army of 13,000 men, besides followers; if insufficient, whether he recommends a proportionate reduction of the number of the force; if any reduction is made, whether it should not rather be in the strength of the European infantry than in that of any other part of the force." That is dated the 24th of August 1867.

36. I think the Government at home, the House of Commons, and the country, knew well enough from the very outset of the Expedition, that it was contemplated to send a force of 12,000 men; I am not putting these questions with the view of giving prominence to the opinion that it should subsequently have been made less, but with a view of eliciting from your Lordship why the force was made larger in the face of those considerations; the opinions of General Merewether (then Colonel Merewether), the opinion of the Indian Government, and the opinion of the Bombay Government, being all in favour of a smaller force than 12,000, how came it about that your Lordship saw it needful to raise the force from 12,000 to 15,000?—The way in which the numbers of the force were raised was in some respects irrespective of my own will. It was my desire to take the regiments in fair numbers as they stood. I was satisfied that I required a certain number of regiments. The Commander in Chief in India and the Viceroy of India considered that those regiments should be raised to a greater strength than they consisted of when I proposed to take them to form the Expedition.

37. Then the increase did not result from your Lordship's view as to the necessities of the Expedition in Abyssinia itself?—I could not say positively that I should not require more; had I thought that more would be required, I should not have hesitated in the slightest degree on the spur of the moment to have added any force which I considered necessary.

38. But that contingency did not arise, did it?—The contingency so far arose that the difficulties disclosed when the reconnoitring force reported the state of the country obliged me first to increase the labouring part of the force. In the first proposal of troops to be taken, I mentioned one regiment of Sikh Pioneers and two companies of sappers; but I mentioned also a corps of 3,000 coolies. The 3,000 coolies were not procured, and were not at the moment procurable; so that I was obliged to increase the working part of the force; and I added (I think) four companies of sappers, two from Madras and two from Bombay. I took one company from Aden, which I retained, one additional company from Bombay, and two from Madras.

39. But was the increase of force your own proposal, or did it result incidentally from an increase of the regiments having been effected through the action of the Viceroy and the Commander in Chief in India?—It arose from both causes. It arose from the increase to the number of men in the regiments, which were ordered

to be made up to a certain strength; and it arose from the increase of the number of labourers, because the number of coolie labourers, whom I expected to get, and whom I mentioned in the estimate as 3,000, were not procured.

40. Then were the 3,000 coolies intended in the first instance in excess of the 12,000 combatants; and is it your Lordship's view that, in point of fact, the force was not increased when you took the 15,000 combatants to Abyssinia?—The force would have been 12,000 combatants and 3,000 labourers, similar to the coolie corps which we had in China.

41. I presume that under the head of "followers" would be embraced every man not a combatant; and that would include a vast number of labouring followers, would it not, doing the work which it was contemplated that those 3,000 coolies should do?—The term "followers" is not usually applied to those who form the active part of an expedition, such as would have been the coolies; but rather to the servants, to the hospital attendants, and other people, who are auxiliary to the troops.

42. Were combatants withdrawn from their proper work as soldiers and sent to do such labouring work as the 3,000 coolies would have done?—I do not exactly understand the expression "withdrawn from their work as soldiers." There were a large number withdrawn from the soldiers for the service of the Transport Corps, for the Commissariat, and for the railway. They were, and should properly be, deducted from the original estimate of the force. All other work done by the soldiers was calculated upon from the beginning. I calculated that every regiment would work.

43. Can the numbers so withdrawn and specially set apart for railway work and other labouring work be given?—They can be given. I can give an approximate amount; 574 men were taken for the service of the Transport Train, 100 officers were in the Transport Train, and 26 officers were in the Commissariat.

44. You stated a short time ago to the Committee, that the increase of combatants from 12,000 to 15,000 would account for a proportionate increase of the cost of the Expedition; I apprehend that, if the facts be as they are now indicated, your Lordship would wish to qualify that statement, for really it was only the substitution of one class of men for another, which would not account for the increased cost to that extent?—It would so far account for it, that a part of that increase arose from circumstances irrespective of my decision; and part of the increase arose from the regiments being made of greater strength than I would have made them, had I taken them.

45. Would that account for an increase of 2,000 men?—That I could not say. There is no doubt that if the number sent was 15,000 men, they must cost more than if the force had been 12,000; but I do not think the estimate had anything to do with either the one or the other, because I think it is impossible to make an estimate of an expedition under such circumstances.

46. That may be; but when the estimate was submitted to the House of Commons, was not the force known to be 12,000?—Every man who was there in addition to the 12,000 men, no doubt caused an additional expense to what would have been

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been incurred if there had been only 12,000 men.

47. We naturally infer that; but I understood your Lordship just now to state that, although the 12,000 combatants were increased to 15,000, yet there was a subtraction of 3,000 coolies; and that, in fact, the actual number sent would not be very largely increased, although they were sent under a different designation; if so, that would not account for the increased expense, would it?—I do not demand that the whole of the 3,000 coolies should be a subject of deduction, because there were subsequently some working men sent there. There was an Army Works Corps sent there, and there were some coolies sent for the commissariat; but the coolie corps, such as I included in my estimate, was not formed; and seeing the greater amount of labour which was expected, I added the four companies of Sappers to the working force.

48. Then, although the coolies were not there as an organised force, their substitutes were there under some other name; was that so?—They came subsequently.

49. And if the force was increased from 12,000, as first intended, to 15,000, the expense would be proportionately increased, would it not?—No doubt the expense would be proportionately increased; but still I require it to be borne in mind that I anticipated a corps of 3,000 coolies being supplied. Such a corps was only in part supplied; and the absence of such a corps ready to go with us, obliged me to add to the military part of the force four companies of Sappers.

50. What is the total strength of four companies of Sappers?—Probably 450 men.

51. Then still there would be, in point of fact, an increase of 2,500 men, would there not?—Then you would have to take the 674 men (including officers) who were taken from the fighting part of the force for the transport train, and if to those you add the 450 men, the four companies of Sappers, you have a total of 1,024 men.

52. Were those men deducted in Abyssinia?—They were deducted in Abyssinia.

53. Therefore there could be only about 500 assigned to other work deducted from the 15,000 landed in Abyssinia, would not that be so?—Yes.

54. Captain Hozier was on your Lordship's staff, and he is the author of a book entitled "The British Expedition to Abyssinia," which I hold in my hand; has your Lordship read that book?—I have read the book cursorily and generally, but I am not answerable for the book in the slightest degree.

55. Captain Hozier states as to the condition of Theodore, that "in April 1867 the rebellion brought about by his misdeeds was almost general against Theodore. Except his fortresses and his camp, little of his acquisitions owned his authority." That was known to your Lordship before leaving for Abyssinia, was it not?—I should say with reference to that, that it was impossible to say where Theodore's authority commenced or ended, because his name was held in such terror in the country that I believe every one of the princes and chiefs dreaded to incur his anger, and that their conduct would have been influenced, and was very much influenced, by the possible consequences to themselves had they eventually fallen within his power.

56. There is a subsequent passage to this effect: "By desertions, death, and his own executions,

his army" (in October) "was reduced to about 5,000 men;" that is Captain Hozier's statement; then we have your Lordship's own statement of 23rd July, that Theodore had made enemies of all his neighbours, and that the people of Tigre, in the north, and the Gallas, in the south and west, would readily join against him; that his resources and followers were much reduced; subsequently to your knowledge of those facts, and to your knowledge of the view of Colonel Merewether of the view of the Bombay Government, and of the view of the Indian Government, the force was fixed at 12,000, and you ultimately raised it to 15,000; that was so, was it not?—To whatever point it was raised it was raised with my full cognizance of the views of Sir William Merewether and the Bombay Government and of the Indian Government.

57. Your Lordship has been speaking hitherto solely of the combatants. It appears from the evidence put before this Committee during the last Session of Parliament that about 30,000 followers, of one sort or another, were landed in Abyssinia; in other words, that upwards of 42,000 persons were landed, 13,000 being combatants; are you aware whether that is the fact?—Possibly that may be so, but I have no return of the followers before me.

58. Were any troops sent from England by the Horse Guards?—One company of Royal Engineers, numbering about 80 to 90, was so sent out.

59. Were those sent on your Lordship's requisition?—They were not sent on my requisition, but they were an extremely valuable addition.

60. Was the interposition of the Horse Guards in sending those men at your Lordship's instance?—I think that it may be said in a certain sense that they were sent at my instance, because I recommended the use of the electric telegraph as far as it could be furnished, and a part of those men were, no doubt, sent upon that requisition; or, if they were not, they must have been sent from the conviction that such an addition to our force would be extremely useful.

61. Was there not a corps especially told off and dispatched for the management of the telegraph?—No.

62. Then your Lordship never sent home any requisition for any combatants being sent out from England?—Not that I am aware of.

63. Any such requisition could only be an inference on the part of the Horse Guards?—It could only be an inference; I sent no such requisition, because I preferred, in every case, to have troops that were seasoned in India; but it is quite possible that those Sappers may have been sent in consequence of my expressed opinion of the advantage of the telegraph.

64. Were the European regiments in India, which were taken to Abyssinia, increased in strength on the requisition of the Horse Guards?—Certainly not, so far as I know.

65. Might it have been so without your Lordship's knowledge?—It might have been without my knowledge of course, but I do not think it could have been so; the first intimation which I had that it was desired that regiments should be of greater strength, was a communication received through the Bombay Government from the Government of India.

66. Your Lordship is not aware whether that was at the instance of the Horse Guards?—I am not aware, but I believe it was not. I think that

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it originated with the Commander in Chief in India, but of course I cannot say. The increase to the number of men in each European regiment was objected to by me very strongly on the ground that I wanted a flexible force with a great deal of organisation, and that the greatest strength of the regiment would not be of so much use to me as a regiment complete in its organisation, but of smaller numbers.

67. How did it happen that this increase took place, notwithstanding your Lordship's objections?—Simply by the order of the Commander in Chief in India. I would beg to add, to prevent misapprehension, that the proposal of the Commander in Chief in India was that I should have three regiments of greater strength, instead of four regiments of lesser strength. I objected to the exchange. I considered the regiments quite strong enough for my purpose, but I wanted the four regiments.

68. Then the objection was not to the absolute increase of numbers, but to the mode of increasing the numbers; was that so?—I wanted the four regiments; the four organised bodies; and I would have taken those four bodies at a lesser strength than that to which they were raised by the orders of the Commander in Chief in India.

69. To what extent was the total number raised in excess of your Lordship's wishes?—The same took place with reference to the native regiments. It was ordered that 100 men should be added to every native regiment throughout India. That was not by my advice at all, nor did I consider it necessary. That is of course an element in the increase of the cost of the Expedition to the extent to which it was carried out.

70. How are the Committee to understand that your Lordship's wish would have been not to have had fewer men but to have had an additional regiment?—Yes; that is to say, not to have had a regiment taken away from me in order to add additional strength to the regiments.

71. Was one taken away?—No, I had all the force which I required.

72. Your Lordship did not consider that you had too many men for your work?—Certainly not. I considered that it would have been very much better if I had had some more men in Abyssinia at one time.

73. Then the objection was to the mode of increase by addition to regiments, rather than by additional regiments, was it not?—Yes; when I say that I should have been very glad to have had more men in Abyssinia, it must be borne in mind that I did not have all the regiments there, nor were they all there at the time when I most needed them. There was a time when I considered the posts of communication in great danger before the arrival of the 26th Regiment, the Cameronians; the post of Senafé was very weak. It was surrounded by robber tribes on the slopes of the table land of Abyssinia. It had an insurgent force belonging to a rebel against Kassai, Prince of Tigre, in arms and hovering about the post; and it was so weak that I was obliged to send to the fleet to call up 200 sailors to assist in its protection, when their march was arrested by the arrival of the 26th Regiment. So that at one time, before the 26th Regiment arrived, I actually had so few men that several posts were in danger of being overpowered.

74. Mr. Seely.] At what period was that?—

It is difficult to mention exact dates; but it was before the arrival of the Cameronian Regiment.

75. *Chairman.*] Were any of the posts along the line of march assailed by the natives at any time?—Yes.

76. Was there anything more than a mere roving expedition of a few robbers, or a mere burglarious assault?—There was that threatening demonstration, which obliged them to use their arms.

77. Was it in force?—In force superior to the numbers of my parties. If one party had been cut off, or if one party had been brought into such hostile collision as to oblige them to use their arms, there would have arisen a feud between my troops and the people of the country, which might have caused us the greatest disaster, because there was not a mile of road in the whole of the country in which, had the inhabitants of the country been encouraged by any success to oppose our passage, they might not have entirely interrupted the communication by small parties, and have delayed the communication by larger ones, so that my great object was to keep every post in such strength as to deter them from an attempt at collision. The Committee can understand that a large body, a superior force of people, who believed themselves to have some military prowess, finding themselves in front of a small force (whose peaceable demeanour deceived them into believing that they were afraid to fight, and into believing that the soldiers were, as they said, religious students, who paid for everything that they wanted, instead of taking it according to the custom of the soldiers of the country), being able to envelope them, would be tempted to try to disarm them, or to mob them; and had such an attempt been made, the soldiers would have been obliged to use their weapons, and would no doubt have driven off such a party in attack. But this would have raised that flame in the country which I was so anxious to avoid, and which would certainly have delayed our Expedition much longer than the time which it took to accomplish it.

78. It was a possible danger, was it not, and not an actual danger?—It was an actual danger averted, I believe, only generally by the occasional passage of larger troops.

79. Then in point of fact some risk was run in consequence of the smallness of the force?—Certainly.

80. And your Lordship would rather have had it larger than smaller?—I would rather have had it larger than the force in the country was than smaller, if I could have had it at the time when I wanted it. But it was impossible to have it all there at the time when I wanted it, because in the first place the port at Zoullah was not prepared to receive more than a certain number of men. I could not have supplied them with water. That is the reason why I could not have all the troops at the precise time when I wanted them.

81. Did not some of the troops arrive at Zoullah about the end of April, after the news of the fall of Magdala had reached the coast?—Yes, the 5th.

82. Did not your Lordship expect to have had to leave the high lands about the end of May on the setting in of the floods; if you had not accomplished your object in Abyssinia, would you not have had to retreat towards the coast?—I do not know at what period you think I expected that.

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I hoped to leave the high lands before the rainy season commenced.

83. Even if the object of the Expedition had not been accomplished?—No, I would not have returned at all if it had not been accomplished. I thought it quite possible that the force might remain over the rainy season, and I was quite prepared for the contingency.

84. Are you aware if the fact of the force having been increased from 12,000 to 15,000 ever reached the Home Government?—I am not aware; but I conclude that reports of everything were sent immediately. I have here the exact words of my memorandum on the proposed increase of the strength of regiments. I have not the memorandum here of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, which I presume is in the Blue Book. The date of my memorandum is the 25th of October 1867, and I conclude that during the month of October the Commander in Chief's memorandum would have been written.

85. With regard to the number of followers, 29,500 followers appear to have landed in Abyssinia, according to the evidence of Captain Tryon. According to an estimate of supplies put before your Lordship by Colonel Dunsterville, the Commissary General at Poonah, on a basis of 11,600 men (for that is the number in his table), he sets out 7,900 followers; namely, 5,598 public followers, and 2,276 private followers, making in all approximately, 7,900; in other words, about two-thirds of the number of combatants. We know very well that there was a great deal of special work to be done in Abyssinia, yet that would only account for somewhere about 10,000 followers for the 15,000 men which you ultimately took, the total number being 29,000 of all sorts. Were the followers, strictly so called, determined on the Indian scale, or on the European scale?—On neither; the followers required consisted of two, or, I may say, of three bodies. There was first the Transport Train; those were estimated in the first instance upon a proposal for a transport train of, so far as I remember, about 12,000 men, drivers and others. The second portion of the followers are those immediately connected with the troops. The third portion of the followers are those belonging to the Commissariat Department. As the necessities of the Commissariat Department developed, they would have sent for more followers, and they did send for more followers, as far as I remember, irrespectively of any number previously calculated. Colonel Dunsterville's estimate was merely a rough estimate, and the best that he could form when the Expedition was proposed; but no one acquainted with military affairs and military expeditions could possibly suppose that the first rough view of an expedition would comprise every man required for it. If there could be a general who, having named a force of so many thousand men, would say, "I will not have another regiment;" or, "I will not have another battery," the sooner you put a millstone round his neck, and put him in the sea, the better. The first estimate of the force was such as appeared sufficient, at the first view, to the officers of most experience in the Presidency; but, as the Expedition developed, difficulties became apparent, and an item here was added, and an item there was added. If the Commissariat officer had said, "I want so many men," I should have accepted his assertion at

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once. Any hesitation to supply what men were required might have produced the most fatal consequences. Therefore I have answered the questions as to the number of men, and I have endeavoured to give the information required; but there is no doubt that the increased number, whatever the increased number was (and I will not pledge myself to actual numbers, without reference to the actual returns), caused an increase in the expenditure. If difficulties and circumstances required more men, they were asked for, and they were sent immediately. No estimate could have prepared a Government for them; but no Government could hesitate in giving them, under such circumstances, the moment they were wanted; so that, throughout the Expedition, there were continual references for additions, which, added up, swelled the total. But, during the Expedition, there were many gaps when those additions became necessary, so that at many times there might actually be a smaller number of people present with the Expedition, although all the people sent with the Expedition amounted to a greater number than the total proposed.

86. The total number sent back before the accomplishment of the objects of the Expedition was about 4,000, was it not, so that there must have been at least about 27,000 perpetually, or for a considerable period, present with the army in Abyssinia?—When the force was being prepared, the officers of the highest experience—the regimental officers, the commissariat officers, and the medical officers, were all consulted. The circumstances of the country, such as we knew them, were explained to them, and they were all consulted as to the indispensable wants of each portion of the force, and according to the best of all our judgments, the number of followers was ordered for them. We had to provide first for a climate on the shores of the Red Sea; the hottest and most oppressive and trying climate which we know of. In such a climate it was impossible that Europeans could do for themselves many of the things which in a better climate they are able to do. It was necessary to provide for those conditions. As we approached a better climate, we found that some of those followers could be dispensed with, and that it would be advantageous to dispense with them. Exactly as we found that we dismissed them, and sent them back; but if we had not had them at first, we might not have had the men to advance with. With the thermometer at such a temperature that if you put the bulb into your mouth it came down 10 degrees, to blood heat, you cannot expect a European to exert himself and to expose himself to the sun as he could do in a cold climate, and more or less that is the case in India. You would lose more soldiers by making them do for themselves what they can do here, than would be represented by the cost of their followers. Upon such conditions, we provided for them during the time when they were likely to be in a hot climate. We could not tell how long that might be. Our knowledge at first, although we got all the information we could, was still very slight. After we got into a better climate, we dismissed by degrees all the followers, until the men had really little beyond what they carried; and I think I can safely say that no follower for the troops was sent whose services had not been maturely and fully considered, whose services were not at one time required, and whose services

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Right Hon. might not have been required for a much longer time than actually proved to be the case.

Lord Napier. 87. But your Lordship is distinguishing between followers for the troops and followers having charge of the mules, are you not?—Yes, and the followers for the commissariat; because their wants could not entirely have been foreseen; and, as their wants grew, so they applied for and obtained followers.

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88. The first number of followers was designated by your Lordship as 7,900, was it not, in the estimate for provisions which is before me?—I conclude that the first number of followers was designated by me in conference with the principal departmental offices of Bombay.

89. The scale of the Expedition was known at that time, and the climate, both on the coast and in the high lands, was known at the time, for it is mentioned in a note of your Lordship in the Blue Book; the main portion of the circumstances which the Expedition had to encounter were known at the time, as shown by the statements submitted to the Bombay Government and sent home from India, and previous reports by Colonel Merewether and the Quartermaster General, Colonel Phayre, were also submitted to the Government of Bombay, and, I presume, would be in your Lordship's hands; it was alleged that the climate of the high lands of Abyssinia was, in point of fact, superior to the European climate; that is the last paragraph but one in your Lordship's memorandum; there is a very great deal more in this book bearing on climate and on the physical features of the country, all of which I take for granted was known to your Lordship when you indicated both the number of combatants and the number of followers, so that it was not merely after-knowledge that corrected the figures, was it?—If the Honourable Chairman alludes to the enclosure to the Minute dated the 23rd of July, I would say that every published account of the country had been examined previously.

90. From those accounts the climate would be known, would it not?—The climate, as far as it could be known, was known, but the climate was various; the climate of the coast was quite different from the climate of the high lands. One traveller was there in one season and another in another season. One traveller gave it a most deadly character, and another a better character, and we could only form an estimate from those reports; but I may say that upon the whole the climate turned out to be better than we expected.

91. Can your Lordship state what were the circumstances which called for an increase of followers from 7,900 to 29,000, or a fourfold increase?—This is a statement exhibiting the carriage of camels and mules for the conveyance of 30 days' provisions for a force consisting of four batteries of artillery, one squadron of cavalry, three regiments of European infantry, four regiments of native cavalry, eight regiments of native infantry, and two companies of sappers. I believe that that memorandum refers to an inquiry made in the first instance of the Bombay Government by the English Government. I think the Right Honourable Baronet, the Member for North Devon, will recollect that Her Majesty's Government sent an inquiry, simply as to what would be required for a certain force, and I think this is about the force: "Four field batteries, one squadron of European cavalry, three regiments

of European infantry, four regiments of native cavalry, eight regiments of native infantry, and two companies of sappers." It was the first memorandum, inquiring how soon we could prepare carriage for a certain force; I sent for the Adjutant General, the Commissariat General, and the Quartermaster General, and that paper was laid before them, and in considering all the circumstances, those memoranda were the result of that conference.

92. Sir *Stafford Northcote*.] You speak of "a certain force;" do you remember what the force was?—I think that the force must be what is mentioned here. There is a memorandum here which I received, which will explain this. The question was, in what time could an expedition, fully equipped and provisioned, be ready, comprising three European infantry regiments, seven native regiments, four cavalry regiments, four batteries of field artillery, and two companies of sappers, the Punjaub pioneers; and what vessels would be required for transport; that was the question and the force detailed by Her Majesty's Government; and the answers given related to that force.

93. Was not that a force that was estimated at 10,000 men?—I think it was a force estimated at 10,000 men. It was not my estimate of the force at all; it was a question from England.

94. *Chairman*.] But the figures are given in this very table, giving the number of followers. The number of combatants is 11,600 men, is it not, with 7,900 followers?—I think the Honourable Chairman is not quite correct on that point, if this is the memorandum which I have; because the extent of the force given in one, differs from that given in the other. This table makes it in round numbers, 11,600.

95. And the corresponding number of followers is 7,900, is it not?—The corresponding number of followers is 7,900.

96. In other words, the force which your Lordship ultimately put forward is that with which you proposed to proceed to Abyssinia, viz.: 12,000 combatants, is it not?—No. This is the means for the conveyance of 30 days' provisions simply for that force.

97. The relative proportions of combatants and followers being as 12 to 8?—Yes, but this is only for 30 days' conveyance of provisions for the force. This does not include the followers for the depôts and various incidental necessities of the force. This is simply a memorandum for the conveyance of 30 days' supply for this force mentioned.

98. When and how was it that the number of followers was subsequently increased so largely?—The number was increased on every occasion when the probable wants of the force were considered. No one ever conceived for a moment that he was making an estimate of the number of men which would be a guide as to the number required for the Expedition. It was almost impossible for the most experienced officers to predict the exact number of men that would be required. This was a rough estimate, given at the moment as an answer by the Commissary General of the transport of the provisions for this force for 31 days. But there are a vast number of followers besides those for the transport of provisions, such as the followers for the sick, the followers of regiments, and so on.

99. In making an estimate of the requisitions of the Expedition, would it not have been the duty of the officer estimating, to have taken those things

things then into account?—It was impossible that he could do so, without knowing precisely the circumstances of the country, and that those circumstances should not change.

100. It was known that the whole force would have to march from the coast of Magdala; it was known that they would require a very large number of animals; it was known that those animals would require tending; all that was known to your Lordship at the very inception of the Expedition, was it not?—But this estimate has no relation to all the followers required for an Expedition. It is simply for the transport of 30 days' provisions.

101. Would your Lordship state what was the object which was put forward?—For the purpose asserted here; to explain what the conveyance of 30 days' provisions for the force would require; that was the commissariat estimate alone.

102. But it would be for the whole force, and not for a part of the force, would it not?—The carriage of 30 days' provisions for this whole force of 11,600 men.

103. Captain Hozier states in his book, with regard to the muleteers, that "the refuse of Egypt was flung on the shores of Abyssinia;" that "the muleteers were worthless for their purpose;" that those muleteers "who had been dispatched from Persia, Syria, and Egypt, had been almost entirely replaced by natives of India, who could understand and be understood by their officers, and by each other," and that "the sweepings of the Eastern world were conveyed to Abyssinia as muleteers;" was that the fact?—I should be very sorry to assert that the form of speech of a writer of a book is an actual fact, when such words are used as "the sweepings of the East;" but I have no hesitation in saying that the muleteers from Egypt were, in a great many instances, extremely worthless and extremely troublesome, and they had to be sent back. They found the work entirely different from what they had expected, and the kind of life and the hardships were different from their life in Egypt.

104. And 4,000 were sent back, were they not?—Very possibly; I could not answer as to the numbers; all that were found worthless were sent back.

105. The sending of those men to Abyssinia, whether from India or from Egypt in such large numbers, would necessarily very much increase the cost of the Expedition, would it not?—The sending of those men and their return would entail great expense. Those men did their work in the first instance, because they took charge of the mules and delivered them there; but there is no doubt that their worthless character necessitated their being replaced by other men; and so far the expense was increased.

106. Another statement is this: "The hosts of native followers which accompanied the troops from India, had been much diminished before the advance from Zulla, and were further reduced at every subsequent post, as the climate proved them to be much more an incumbrance than a necessity;" I presume that that is a fact?—Their presence was not an incumbrance when the troops were in a climate which required the assistance of followers; but whenever the troops could do without them they became a hindrance and an incumbrance, because they had to be fed, which was a matter of extreme difficulty.

107. Was not the fact that they were sent

back pretty strong presumptive proof that they were never needed?—No; I do not think that a follower was sent there at all who was not originally needed; that is to say, for the troops; I separate the troops from the commissariat, because they are entirely responsible for their own proceedings. I am not speaking of the commissariat, but only of the troops. For any followers ordered for the troops I am responsible.

108. Was there not an utter want of discipline in a large portion of the followers which rendered them a perfect nuisance to the Expedition; and was it not the object of the Commander-in-Chief to get rid of them as quickly as possible?—There was a want of discipline in a large number of the followers engaged for the transport train, because they were people who had been submitted to no previous discipline. They were collected from various uncivilised parts of the world, and there was no bond whatever to connect them together.

109. And such men would be a hindrance to the Expedition, would they not?—Such men would be a hindrance to the Expedition the moment they could be replaced by others; but we could not have done without such men at first, bad as they were.

110. Were they always useful?—They were useful to a certain extent. You had a mule and the man fed it, after he had fed himself. He took care to feed himself first if he were a bad man. When he had fed himself and was comfortable, then he might feed his mule. He would accompany his mule a certain stage with the convoy, and without his taking the mule, the mule could not have got there; but he mounted the mule as soon as he was out of sight of his superintendent, and therefore increased its load and hastened the time of its being worn out. So far the man was an encumbrance, and yet, until we had a better man, we could not do without him. Then there was a portion of the Egyptian and Persian muleteers, who were better, though some were very bad. The Egyptians, who came with the camels, were of an entirely different class from those who came with the mules. They are like the people of India. There is a special class there who attend the camels, and they are a far superior class to those who were engaged for the mules. The camel men were, I believe, very fair men, and there was no complaint of them.

111. Then did the followers who proceeded to Abyssinia from time to time proceed there with your Lordship's sanction, and subject to your Lordship's supervision and direction?—The followers connected with the troops, but not the followers connected with the transport train.

112. Could you from reference to documents, though perhaps not off-hand, state the number of followers divided, as your Lordship divided them a short time since, into so many personal followers, so many in charge of the transport train, so many muleteers, and so many in the Commissariat Department?—I have no doubt that an approximate number, sufficiently correct for all purposes, can be obtained.

113. Sir *Stafford Northcote*.] With reference to what you stated just now as to that memorandum of the 23rd of July having been drawn up in consequence of a question from myself, may I ask you whether you remember that in the earlier part of the year I had sent confidentially to the Governor of Bombay a memorandum by Sir William Coghlan as to the amount of force which he considered would be required, and was

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that communicated to you?—I do not remember that it was. I think that it was not, but I became subsequently aware of the proposal by Sir William Coghlan.

114. Did you see the message which I sent to Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, which was the occasion of the reference to you?—I did.

115. Did you subsequently see memorandums, of Sir William Coghlan's which, as you probably were aware, had been submitted to the Government here, and had been privately forwarded to India for consideration at a time when it was not in immediate contemplation to send the Expedition?—I do not think that I was cognisant of it at that time. I have since become aware of it, but at the time when I proposed the force the only previous estimate which was before me was that contained in the question. I cannot call it an estimate; it is simply a question.

116. Are you aware that that detail corresponds to the detail given in Sir William Coghlan's memorandum?—I am not aware of that.

117. Do you remember what the number of men contemplated by Sir William Coghlan was?—My impression is, generally, that it was 10,000 men.

118. It was subsequently, and at your own suggestion, that the number was made 12,000 instead of 10,000, was it not?—Entirely.

119. With regard to the difference of opinion as to the number to be sent, there is no question that Sir William Merewether and the Government of Bombay had suggested a smaller force; but with regard to the Government of India, you have been asked whether the Government of India did not contemplate a smaller force, on the ground of a memorandum made by Sir Henry Durand; do you consider Sir Henry Durand identical with the Government of India?—No.

120. Sir Henry Durand, I think, proposed a force of 7,650, with a further brigade of 2,250 to be held in reserve, making a grand total of 9,900. I observe that on the same day, and in the same communication, there was a communication of Sir William Mansfield's, in which this passage occurs: "With regard to Sir Henry Durand's proposal, I fear we cannot rely on Aden as an intermediate base between Bombay and the Abyssinian coast. There is such scarcity of water in that place, and so little spare room, that I can hardly conceive 2,500 additional troops being put up there, with their followers, without very great inconvenience, loss of health, and, perhaps, sacrifice of life. I should rather advocate that, given a good harbour and a place well supplied with water, on the Abyssinian coast, all reserves should be landed there at once." Do you infer from that that Sir William Mansfield was of opinion that the whole 9,900 should be sent at once?—Yes.

121. That letter was transmitted by the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India, enclosed in a letter, in which the Government say, "We are inclined to think that a force such as Sir Henry Durand has indicated would probably suffice;" that, I presume, may be taken to mean that they considered that the force of 9,900 men would be sufficient, but that the Government, as a Government, expressed no judgment as between Sir Henry Durand and Sir William Mansfield, as to whether the whole should be landed at once?—They appear not to have entered into the question as to the force

being landed at once or not, and they only say that it probably would be sufficient.

122. There is, therefore, nothing, is there, in that dispatch of the Government of India to show that they were of opinion that a smaller force than 10,000 men in round numbers would be sufficient?—Nothing at all.

123. That letter to which I have referred you was not communicated to you before your preparations were in some state of progress, was it?—I believe I am correct in saying that it was not.

124. But on the 25th of August 1867 I find that a letter was written from the Secretary to the Government of India, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay (page 270), in which, referring to your proposal, this passage occurs at paragraph 2: "His Excellency, Sir R. Napier thinks that about 12,000 effective men are required for the purposes of the Expedition, and His Excellency, in his memorandum, details that force. The Governor General in Council accepts the proposal as far as numbers go. May we not infer from that, that at the time when the important steps were taken the Government of India were in accord with you as to the number of 12,000?—Certainly.

125. Another question has been asked you with regard to the engineers who were sent from this country. At page 331 of the Blue Book, you will find a letter (No. 685) from the War Office to the Under Secretary of State for India, dated the 10th October, containing a letter from the Horse Guards with reference to the establishments that were to be sent out to Abyssinia for the organisation of the telegraphic, the signalling, and the photographic services; and you will find that a suggestion is made by His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief that it would be better to amalgamate those detachments of the Royal Engineers, who were to be sent for those services, into a single company, instead of sending them out in unconnected detachments. Those steps were taken by the authorities in England without any communication with you, I presume?—Quite so.

126. And you were not cognizant of that arrangement?—No.

127. But with regard to the services to be performed, were you aware that a certain number of engineers, or that some engineers, were to be sent out for the purpose of organizing those services; were you aware, for instance, that officers or men were to be sent out for the purpose of establishing field telegraphs?—It is difficult for me to say when I became aware that officers were coming out for the telegraph; but it is quite sufficient that I have in my memorandum expressed my desire for a telegraph, to make me responsible for any measures, within reason, that were adopted to carry out that suggestion; and certainly nothing could have been more useful or beneficial than the measures then taken to incorporate those men for the several services into one company. If I suggested that a telegraph was wanted, it was a prompt and excellent action on the part of the Government of Great Britain to send it to me in the most useful form.

128. Perhaps I may call your Lordship's attention to the telegram at page 46, No. 62, which we sent out from the India Office on the 22nd of August, asking, "Do you want a field telegraph apparatus for Abyssinia?" and to the reply of the Governor of Bombay, at page 67,

No. 128,

No. 128, "Let the field telegraph be sent by steam transport"?—The telegram from the Governor of Bombay to the Secretary of State for India, in reply to No. 62, was, "Let the field telegraph be sent by steam transport."

129. I presume that such a communication as that would have been made known to you before the answer was sent?—No doubt it was. If it was not made known to me, it would have been withheld in the full reliance that I meant what I said in my Minute of the 8th of August, in which I say, "100 miles of field telegraph would be very useful."

130. Then with regard to the signalling, at page 86, No. 189, I find this telegram from the Governor of Bombay to the Secretary of State for India: "The Commander in Chief" (that is yourself), "wishes to have a body of signallers trained by Captain Bottom to the new system of army signals, about 30 men under a subaltern, with telegraph codes and signalling apparatus." I presume that that telegram was sent at your request?—No doubt it was; I do not advert at the moment to the requisition, but no doubt it must have been.

131. Then you are not of opinion that either in the matter of the telegraph staff or the signalling staff there was any impertinent interference (if I may so say), on the part of the Horse Guards, to press upon you what was unnecessary?—Quite the contrary.

132. With regard to the photographic establishment, that, I think, was originally suggested from England; had you any reason to object to that?—Not the slightest; it was very useful.

133. Then the whole question as to organisation, as to whether it would be better that those men should be sent in separate detachments, unconnected with one another, or that a small body of engineers, capable of performing those three services, should be sent together, was a question of military organisation, which his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief took upon himself to settle, do you think that that was out of his province?—On the contrary.

134. Had you had any objection to the arrangement that was made?—On the contrary, I think it was very useful.

135. Sir John Hay.] The expression "Estimate" has been used; do you conceive that the expression "Estimate" can be duly applied in the sense of an estimate, which can be fairly considered after the event, as an expression of what is to be the cost of a great expedition; and do you think that a successful general can fairly be asked whether he has estimated what the cost of a war will be before the commencement of the Expedition?—Certainly not, I think it is quite out of his province. His province is to carry out the Expedition with the means which the country give him. If he were to embarrass himself in the first instance with the question of cost, the probability is, that he would never carry out the Expedition at all.

136. I gather from your answer that you do not think that successful war can be carried on by estimate and contract?—I entirely agree that it cannot.

137. Colonel Barttelot.] I think your Lordship stated that the force itself was known, but that the other quantities, which were necessary, were not known, that is to say, that the component parts, the followers, and so forth, could not pos-

sibly be known at the time the force was known?—Quite so.

138. Then would it not have been utterly impossible, supposing that you had been asked the question, that you could have formed any notion of what the cost of that Expedition would be?—I could not have formed any notion whatever.

139. So far as I understand from what has passed in this country, you were entrusted with the entire disposal and command of that force, to do what you thought best with regard to the undertaking in Abyssinia, was that so?—After the force was placed in my hands, I was, I understood, entirely responsible, and authorised to act according to the best of my judgment, to carry out the wishes of the British Nation.

140. In the embarkation and dispatch of the forces from Bombay, with regard to the quantity of transports that were provided, and considering the conditions of the passage and of the place where the forces must land, do you think that there was any unnecessary expenditure, or any expenditure which, if you had to go over the ground again, you could reasonably see any expectation of curtailing?—Certainly not. The absence of some additional transport prevented the Governor of Bombay from sending me transport animals when they would have been of the greatest possible use to me.

141. In organising a force of that kind it is absolutely necessary that you should have plenty of transports at your command; do you think that there was an excessive quantity of transports provided for the number of troops which sailed from Bombay to Annesley Bay?—Certainly not.

142. I think I understood from you that after you had arrived at Annesley Bay and had proceeded up the country, you found that you had no more troops than you either wished for or could reasonably dispose of in a military point of view?—Answering the honourable and gallant Member's question literally, I had not. So far from having a man in excess, there were points where I should have been much safer if I had been able to have more men.

143. How far were your stations one from another?—From 10 to 15 miles.

144. And what was the usual number of men that you had at each station?—The smallest number was at one time one petty officer and four horsemen. Those were merely the postal stations.

145. That certainly is a very small number, and in keeping communications open with an army in a country like that which you were going through, it was the very least you could possibly have done with, was it not?—It was the very least that I could possibly have done with. I was obliged to reduce them to that number in order to bring forward as many cavalry as I could to the posts nearer to Magdala itself.

146. Had you patrols between every two posts?—At a certain time patrols passed between each two posts, but the duty of patrols was done in a great measure by the detachments as they successively came forward. As every detachment passed, so for the time everything was calm; but if a long time intervened between the passage of two detachments, then the country began to get restive, and gave me grounds for apprehension. Towards the close of the Expedition I had to bring up General Malcolm with an additional force to keep in order the most disturbed line of country.

147. What was the minimum detachment that

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Right Hon. you considered safe to send through the country?
 Lord Napier. —At times I was obliged to send two horsemen
 with the post, and on one or two occasions the
 28 February horsemen were attacked and the letters taken
 1870. from them.

148. Did you consider yourself, then, rather short of cavalry?—Certainly.

149. In fact, if you had had another regiment, or two regiments of cavalry, you would have been better pleased, would you not?—I should have been more secure, but the cavalry at certain points were very difficult to feed on account of the deficiency of forage, so that I was obliged to keep them down on that account to the lowest possible point, and to keep them at certain places where they could be fed, although in some instances I might have desired to have them in other places in point of security, but I was always bound by the necessity of feeding the cavalry and keeping them in effective condition.

150. Do you think that, supposing there had been any serious opposition to you when you arrived near Magdala, you had one man too many when you arrived there?—Certainly not.

151. And supposing there had been any very serious opposition, you would perhaps have thought that you ought to have had a stronger reserve behind you than you had?—I should have been very glad indeed of another column to have sent round to the opposite side of Magdala. I could not venture to divide my force sufficiently to invest it on the side most remote from us, and I therefore was obliged to trust to the Gallas people to occupy the hills surrounding that part of the fortress.

152. Taking into consideration the questions which have been asked you by the Chairman, whether the number of men was 12,000, whether it was 13,000, or whether it was 15,000, do you distinctly state that you do not think that you had in Abyssinia one man too many?—I state so distinctly.

153. You perhaps had two considerations in view; not only did you consider the honour and credit of this country, but I dare say you also thought about our Empire in India, did you not?—Certainly.

154. Did you think that if there had been any chance of any disaster, it would have been a most terrible thing for our Indian Empire?—Certainly.

155. And, therefore, in any conclusions to which you came with regard to the force, I presume that you took very great care and pains so to satisfy yourself that you should have a sufficient force both for our credit at home and also for the security of our Indian Empire?—Certainly, so far as the security of the Indian Empire would be affected by a disastrous failure.

156. Do you, being well accustomed to Indian affairs, not consider that any failure upon our part, in regard to the Abyssinian Expedition, would have had great effect upon our Empire in India?—Certainly.

157. Therefore, whatever it might have cost this country, it was absolutely necessary at all hazards that we should be successful, was it not?—Certainly.

158. Under those circumstances, looking at the main question, do you think that, although the expense to this country may have been great, yet that it has not been thrown away?—Certainly. I consider that there may have been faults of omission or of commission here and

there, which may have increased the expenditure beyond what it might have been if everybody had been perfect; but I do not suppose that such an Expedition could possibly be carried out without such contingencies; and I believe that the excess of expenditure which was caused by sins of omission or of commission forms a very small part of the expenditure in the whole.

159. Sir John Hay.] And you say that after the knowledge of the event?—After the knowledge of the event.

160. Lord Elcho.] That is to say, that you consider the great mass of the expenditure to have been legitimate, and that it could not have been avoided, looking to the security of the success of the Expedition?—Certainly. I think there are certain points in regard to which the expenditure might perhaps have been diminished, but they were points of judgment. One matter which I submitted to the Secretary of State was a submarine cable. That cable might not have been laid in time, or it might not have succeeded; but if we had had one, it would probably have saved a good deal of expenditure in postal communication, and it certainly would have saved us a great deal of anxiety, and would have enabled us to know the wants and to supply them much more quickly than we could do as the case stood. But it was a matter for the considerate judgment of the Government in this country, whether they thought they could lay a cable in time, and whether they thought it was expedient to incur that expense for an uncertain advantage. If I had had the power to order, I would have ordered a submarine cable the first thing; but taking all the circumstances into consideration, I think that the increase of expenditure from any mistakes or omissions can form but a very small portion of the whole.

161. You have heard the quotation given by the Chairman from a work by Captain Hozier, in which that officer describes the muleteers as being "the sweepings of Egypt;" do you know what the number of muleteers was?—We have been in the habit of considering the muleteers altogether as numbering about 15,000; but the number was constantly changing. Some men deserted, some died, and new ones were brought on; so that it is impossible to say what was the exact number at any one time.

162. What proportion of those 15,000 muleteers do you suppose came from Egypt?—That I could not say without reference to the numbers.

163. Was it one-half, or one-third?—I should not venture to give the number without reference.

164. Do you know how the muleteers were engaged, or who engaged them?—The engagement of the mules in Egypt was not under me in any way, nor did any reports of those proceedings come to me.

165. Then you have no knowledge as to how those men were engaged, or what supply there was in Egypt in the way of muleteers?—No; I have no knowledge whatever of the proceedings in Egypt.

166. From your knowledge of the East, do you think that it would have been possible to get the required number of muleteers from Egypt, every muleteer being a man of very good character?—I should think not.

167.—Do you think that it would have been difficult to have had a character with every muleteer?—It would have been utterly impossible, either

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either in Egypt or anywhere else. Major Holland, the Deputy Quartermaster General, has details of that kind. Of course the Commander in Chief of an expedition would be lost if he descended into all those details. He must make use of the departmental officers under him, and make them responsible.

168. You must take your chance of the material you get, must you not, some being good and some bad, as in everything else?—Quite so. I am reminded that, among the muleteers, there were men of almost every nation. There were Frenchmen, Italians, Spaniards, Abyssinians, Egyptians, Persians, inhabitants of the Punjab, and inhabitants of the plains of India.

169. But had you more men than you required for those purposes?—Certainly not.

170. Mr. *Eastwick*.] Was the number of camp followers in Abyssinia, in proportion to the troops, very much in excess of the proportion of camp followers to troops in similar expeditions in India?—Judging from my recollection, I should say that the number was very much less. We had to consider carefully the space which they required in the transports. The desire was conveyed to the officers commanding regiments to reduce the number of followers as much as possible; and I have no doubt that it would appear upon a comparison that there were very many less than are usual, when the troops are employed on service in India. Gradually, as we were able to dispense with the followers, we drew them from the ranks, so that, with a few exceptions, no one had any follower or servant who was not a soldier from the ranks.

171. Supposing that your Lordship had been ordered to conduct an expedition against a fort as difficult of access as Magdala, at an equal distance from the base of operations into the Afghan country, for example, do you think that you could have taken with you a lesser number of troops?—I should have been very sorry to have planned an expedition to capture a fortress as difficult as that, at the same distance, with a lesser number of men, in any country. I think the natural difficulties of the fortress were greater than those of any position which I have ever seen. It was absolutely unapproachable except by one line, which was entirely commanded by a prominent hill, or natural bastion. The only means of approach ran round the sides of this hill; and if simply old women had been on the top, and hiding themselves behind the brow, had thrown down stones, they would have caused any force a very serious loss. Had Theodore not thrown away his position by launching his army against us, we could not have taken the position from him, except at a very serious loss.

172. Then would your Lordship be of opinion that had the smaller force recommended by Colonel Merewether been taken, in order to make a dash into the country, and endeavour to surprise Theodore, and that had such a force marched up they would probably have failed?—I believe not a man would have returned.

173. Supposing that Theodore had adopted the plan of leaving the fort of Magdala and gone further into the interior, or into some other part of the country, would not your Lordship have found that your forces were rather deficient?—I had then two regiments coming from India in reserve, and I had the means of calling a considerable reserve of British sailors from the fleet, so that I should not have hesitated to follow

Theodore, if he had made his escape then into his own country.

174. Sir *Patrick O'Brien*.] Your Lordship stated that as General of the Expedition your duty was not to consider estimates, but to work with the means afforded to you, and at the same time I think you stated that no human being could estimate anything connected with this Expedition except its force. Is it within your recollection that there have been many similar expeditions in India and elsewhere (the Afghan-istan Expedition, for instance, which has been referred to by the honourable Member), in which estimates have been prepared?—I never heard of an estimate having been prepared in such cases.

175. But assuming that an estimate was prepared or presented, can you imagine such a mistake occurring in an estimate as the difference between three and a half millions and nine millions of money?—As I do not apprehend the possibility of making an estimate, so of course I cannot give a reply to that question.

176. In this case I am not asking your Lordship as to making an estimate, but I am merely putting the question on the hypothesis of an estimate having been prepared by the Government; can you understand how such a mistake can have occurred as that an estimate should have been exceeded by the difference between three and a half millions and nine millions?—I may answer the question by saying that, supposing that the Government of India had been possessed of superhuman intelligence, and had made a correct estimate of what the cost of the Expedition to Afghanistan would have been, the result of that Expedition would have been most probably an increase of the cost by very much more than the difference to which the honourable Baronet now calls attention.

177. I believe the cost of the Afghanistan Expedition was about 10,000,000*l*. The Government knowing that an expedition to a distant and hilly country presenting natural difficulties of a very considerable character, cost that amount of money, would have a guide, would they not, in the first instance, so as not to have estimated an Expedition to Abyssinia at so low a figure as three and a half millions?—I think that they could not possibly make a comparison.

178. When there was any difference of opinion, as appears to have been existing between Colonel Merewether and your Lordship, in reference to the amount of force necessary for this Expedition, was it considered necessary that there should be any consultation of military authorities generally in India (Sir William Mansfield, for instance, the Commander in Chief, and yourself, and others), so as to take counsel in reference to what ought to be the proper force to employ in such an expedition?—That depends entirely upon the general command.

179. But, as a fact, was there any conference?—There was no such conference.

180. Your Lordship stated that you had originally calculated upon the service, as I understood, of 3,000 coolies, whom, afterwards, you were not able to have; may I ask your Lordship whether the increase in the number of combatants from 12,000 to 15,000, as would appear by the returns, arose from the circumstance of your not having been supplied with that cooly corps; in short, whether it was necessary to employ combatants in the position which would otherwise have been occupied

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occupied by the coolies?—It is assumed by the question that the increase in the force was to 15,000 men, of which I am not quite satisfied; but, supposing that it had been the case, then I cannot say that I consider the absence of the cooly corps to have been entirely the cause of that increase; but the absence of the cooly corps certainly obliged me to employ in labour men whom I otherwise had not intended to call for. Certainly I was obliged throughout the Expedition to employ combatants in labour in the plains of Zulla, much beyond the time when I should have desired to do so, and also not having the corps provided at the time when I desired to have it, I was obliged to add to the number of labouring soldiers, the Sappers, four companies more than I had originally intended. To prevent misapprehension it is necessary that I should explain that I said in my first memorandum, dated the 23rd of July, that it would be of great assistance if a corps of 3,000 porters, such as the Chinese cooly corps, could be formed of such races as would not be likely to fraternise with the Abyssinians.

181. Sir *Stafford Northcote*.] You contemplated forming that corps in the country, did you not, and not transporting it from India?—No. I contemplated transporting it from India, because the races in the country I should consider likely to fraternise with the Abyssinians. The corps might perhaps have been formed in Egypt.

182. Did you contemplate its being transferred from India when you wrote that memorandum?—Yes, I thought that possibly some might have been obtained from the shores of the Red Sea. There was a mythical story told us of certain labourers who might have been found in some of the ports on the shores of the Red Sea, of whom we could never hear anything; but I looked mainly to India for such a cooly corps, and eventually a certain number of men were sent, but not of the class that I desired. A certain number of men of the “bearer” class, who were useful for the commissariat, were sent, but they were not people who could perform the active labour of the cooly corps. The cooly corps would in fact have been almost a corps of pioneers.

183. Did you ever apply to the Government of Bombay for the formation of such a corps?—Yes.

184. Was your application declined?—It was considered that the price of labour in Bombay was so high that they could not get them. If my memory is correct, the Government of India was applied to, and it first considered that it was not able to supply them. A number were supplied from Madras, but they were supplied from time to time, and their services were almost immediately absorbed by the commissariat in landing stores and in various duties connected with the commissariat, so that really the assistance of labour was only supplied by the body subsequently sent, the Army Works Corps, which numbered about 1,000 men. I mean by these explanations not to assume that no men were sent as a substitute for this 3,000 coolies, because a considerable number were sent, and they might in the end have amounted to a couple of thousand men; but they did not come in that form and at that time when they would have saved me from applying for additional labour, or from employing as labourers the soldiers whom I added to the force.

185. Mr. *Mundella*.] I think I understood your Lordship to say that, looking back upon the war as a past event, you cannot discover that anything could have been done more economically or more effectually than it was done?—I would not say so comprehensively as that, that I might not think, on points of detail, there might have been improvement, but, taking the Expedition as a whole, I believe that the mistakes caused an expense which would form a very small part of the whole amount.

186. But do you think that such mistakes were of a nature which will always be incident to a war?—They were mistakes of a nature which have always occurred, I believe, in every warlike expedition. I do not mean to preclude myself there from saying that there were not individual points which I desired to be different from what they were, but those are minor details which I do not see that I am called upon to enter into; I should of course lay myself open to a charge of inconsistency if I said that everything was perfectly or exactly as I wished; but, upon the whole, I believe that the omissions or mistakes, or whatever they may be called, caused an expense which is inconsiderable as compared with the cost of the Expedition and with the value of the work done.

187. In your opinion, as regards the great features of the Expedition, the expenditure was not excessively lavish?—Certainly not.

188. Did it ever occur to you, during the whole of the campaign, that anything like lavish expenditure was going on?—Certainly not.

189. I think you stated that 4,000 muleteers were sent back as being men of bad character and unfit for their work?—I could not state the number without reference to the returns, but a large number was sent back who were found entirely unsuited to the work and useless.

190. Was not there a considerable number of women amongst the camp followers?—One hundred and eighty-four women were sent by the Commissariat Department for the purpose of grinding flour at the coast station at Zulla, and they ground 180,000 lbs. of flour. They were kept under guard, and protected. The men in Bombay would never grind corn; it is *infra dig.*, and women only perform those duties.

191. Were those women the wives of the Bombay soldiery?—Not of the soldiery, but of the Commissariat servants. The cost of living in Bombay is excessively high, and the poorer classes can only support themselves by making every member of the family labour. If those men had been sent there without their wives, they would have had to have a considerable portion of their pay deducted to support their wives whilst they were absent on the Expedition, and they were of a class accustomed to that labour, and accustomed to change their station, and to go with troops.

192. *Chairman*.] Have you yourself never made an estimate of the cost of the Expedition, or of any section of the work?—Never.

193–6. Were you never asked to do so?—I was never asked to do so; I considered it quite out of my province; at the same time I would say that I should never have asked for anything which I thought unnecessarily expensive; I always bore that in view, and especially with regard to the number of troops, and to the equipment of troops.

197. You spoke of a difference of opinion between yourself and Sir William Mansfield with regard

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regard to the troops which led to an increase in the size of the regiments; are the Committee to understand that His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief in this country had anything to do with that increase?—I am not aware of it; my impression is that he had not.

198. Had you any cause to complain, or to feel that in any differences of opinion between yourself and Sir William Mansfield you were not supported by His Royal Highness?—I received the support of His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge throughout, but I am not aware that any difference of opinion with Sir W. Mansfield was referred to His Royal Highness; such differences were disposed of between the Government of India and the Government of Bombay.

199. Mr. *Mundella*.] I think I understood your Lordship to say that it was quite impossible to make an estimate at the outset of the war of

what it would cost?—My belief is that it was utterly impossible.

200. And if it was impossible in India, it was equally impossible in England; is that so?—Equally impossible. With regard to the addition to the strength of the regiments, I would beg, in speaking of Sir William Mansfield, to remark that that addition probably came as the view of the Government of India; that is to say, as an opinion expressed by Sir William Mansfield as a component part of the Government of India. I am not positive in what form I received it, whether I received it as a command from the Commander in Chief in India, or whether I received it as his expression adopted by the Government of India; but whether it was in one case or the other, it came to me with the authority of the Commander in Chief, under whom I, to a certain extent, was placed.

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Thursday, 3rd March 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.
Colonel Barttelot.
Mr. Baxter.
Captain Beaumont.
Mr. Candlish.
Mr. Christopher Denison.
Mr. Eastwick.

Sir John Hay.
Mr. Mundella.
Sir Stafford Northcote.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. Charles Turner.
Mr. White.

JOHN CANDLISH, ESQ., IN THE CHAIR.

CAPTAIN GEORGE TRYON, R.N., C.B., called in; and Examined.

Captain
G. Tryon,
R.N., C.B.
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201. *Chairman.*] YOU have a record of the arrivals and sailings of the vessels employed in the Abyssinian Expedition, at and from Annesley Bay, have you not?—I have; it is a complete record of the services rendered by every ship, and of every sailing and departure from Calcutta and Bombay, and every port. It is a record which I kept for my own information.

202. Is it an official document?—No, it is a document for my own information and guidance.

203. Would you object to hand it in, so that the Committee may have it before them?—No.

204. *Sir John Hay.*] Does it differ at all from your official report?—In no respect, except that it is more complete; there are details in it which

would have to be extracted from a series of official reports.

205. Then do you think that it would be a convenient abridgement of your official report?—I imagine that it would.

206. *Chairman.*] You wished also to put in, I think, a copy of the instructions which you received from the Admiralty?—I observe that I answered to this Committee when I was asked whether the instructions had been put in, that they had been put in; and I find on examining the Blue Book, that they had not been put in; with the permission of the Committee I will hand them in.—(*The same were handed in, vide Appendix.*)

The Right Honourable ROBERT BARON NAPIER OF MAGDALA, G. C. B., G. C. S. I., &c., &c.
(attending by permission of the House of Lords); Examined.

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207. *Sir Stafford Northcote.*] DOES your Lordship desire to say anything in explanation of any of your evidence given at the last meeting of the Committee?—Having read certain papers since Monday, upon the point of the increase of the strength of the regiments, I have something clearer to say upon the subject than I was able to say on Monday.

208. Perhaps your Lordship will kindly state whether you wish in any way to qualify that answer which you gave on the last meeting of the Committee, with regard to the increase of the strength of the regiments?—At Question 64, I was asked this, "Were the European regiments which were taken to Abyssinia, increased in strength on the requisition of the Horse Guards?" and I replied, "Certainly not, so far as I know." Since then I have read my answers to the proposals of the Government of India for increasing the force, and I infer from reading my replies (for I have not the questions of the Government of India before me), that the opinion is essentially the opinion of the Government of India; and, therefore, that it was their opinion, and not the opinion of His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief in England.

209. It has been further said that the increase of the strength of the native regiments was on the requisition of the Commander in Chief of the Expedition (*i. e.* your Lordship); does your

Lordship desire to make any statement in regard to that point?—I should certainly say, if I spoke from my own recollection, that it is entirely incorrect. I am very unwilling to rely upon my own memory upon a point of that kind, because I might have made such a requisition, and have forgotten it; but if I may judge from the impression and conviction of my own mind, I should say distinctly that it is incorrect; and I think the text of my reply would conclusively show that. The letter from the Secretary of the Government of India (now placed before me), to the Secretary of the Government of Bombay, will place the whole question before you:

"Sir,

"Simla, 4 October 1867.

"I am directed to request that you will inform his Excellency the Governor in Council that your despatch, dated the 13th ultimo, and its enclosures, replying to my communication of the 25th August, relative to the projected expedition to Abyssinia, has received the most attentive consideration of the Governor General in Council, and I am now instructed to convey the views of his Excellency in Council thereupon. The Governor General in Council greatly regrets that the Government of Bombay has thought fit to reject in nearly every particular the advice offered by the Government of India, after very full attention to the subject, not only as effecting the efficiency of the Expedition,

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dition, but also with respect to the facility of providing a reserve, the necessity for looking to the general security of our empire in India, and the avoidance of unnecessary expenditure. But as the Secretary of State for India has placed the arrangements connected with the Expedition in the hands of the Government of Bombay, the Governor General in Council refrains from interference, save where time fully admits of a modification of what is proposed, and where such modification appears essential for the public interests. A distinction, however, must be clearly drawn between questions which have an exclusive bearing on the Expedition itself, and those connected with the public security of India, or as connected with the latter, even those which may be necessary for supplementing the Expedition hereafter, and I am to beg that this distinction may be understood and observed. The various telegrams and letters that have been sent to your address, will have shown what steps have already been taken by this Government by his Excellency the Commander in Chief in India, and by the various departments under the Government of India, to meet in every possible way the wants of the Bombay Government, and of Sir R. Napier for this Expedition; and it will be seen that every exertion has been and is being made to further its equipment and preparation; but I am to observe that the information as to the proceedings of the Bombay Government and of Sir R. Napier, in connection with the Expedition, ordered to be furnished to the Government of India by the Secretary of State, has as yet been very meagre indeed, a circumstance which has been the cause of embarrassment, and I am to beg that that full reports of what is ordered or arranged may be henceforth furnished with regularity. As yet the Government of India has not received a complete detail of the regiments to be employed, of the mode in which the troops are formed into divisions and brigades, or as to what staff is to accompany the force. All wants, as they arise, which it is believe may be supplied from the Bengal Presidency, should be at once communicated to me by telegraph, when by telegraphic orders from this they will, if practicable, be met; and the Madras Government has, as you are aware, by the copy of my message to that Government, dated 16th ultimo, been asked, as far as possible, to comply with all requisitions, although in many cases it will be obvious that those requisitions may be more conveniently made to the Government of India, which can then judge whether it would be advisable to supply the wants from the resources of Bengal or from those of Madras. It remains now to offer a few remarks on points touched on in your letter, or in the minute of Sir R. Napier, to which it gives cover, and then to convey certain suggestions or instructions that are deemed necessary by the Government of India. The Governor General in Council is strongly of opinion that the arguments used by Sir R. Napier against the employment of native troops of two Presidencies are of little weight as compared with the advantages to be derived from such a measure. Such differences as those suggested by Sir R. Napier exist in all armies, and are easily met by the judgment of the Commander, while in fact the troops of the several Presidencies have in times past habitually acted together on field service with the very happiest results. By such a course the best resources of each Presidency are brought

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into play, and in the present instance the proposal of the Government of India would have ensured the presence in the mountains of Abyssinia of troops composed of hardy northern races used to mountain warfare from their youth. Sir R. Napier has asked for two regiments of cavalry and two of infantry from Bengal, and as the Government of India only proposed two native infantry regiments in excess of the force desired by his Excellency, it does not seem that much more inconvenience could have arisen, even under Sir R. Napier's view, from the adoption of the proposals of the Government of India in this matter, than from a strict adherence to Sir R. Napier's own requisitions; I am further to point out that by detaching so large a portion of our army, with its staff, serious administrative difficulties may arise within the Bombay Presidency which might have been obviated, or at least much lessened, by distributing the strain over Bombay and the large Presidency of Bengal, aided, when necessary, by Madras. It is matter of regret, too, that Sir R. Napier should take such weak regiments to Abyssinia instead of filling them by transfers to the strength indicated by the Government of India. It is well known that the drain for guards, baggage escorts, &c., is nearly the same in a small regiment as in a strong one, so that a force composed of weak corps has many more men absent from the line of battle than a force of the same strength composed of stronger regiments, and the Governor General in Council much fears that the ordinary casualties sure to arise on service will speedily reduce the weak battalions going from Bombay to mere skeletons. The Commander in Chief in India has pointed out to the Governor General in Council the inconveniences likely to arise from taking four British regiments from Bombay, instead of in the proportion from each Presidency suggested from this. An extract of a letter from the Adjutant General on this subject is annexed, and I am to state that the Government of India concurs generally in the opinions therein expressed by Sir W. Mansfield. The alleged advantage of regiments being near the coast of Bombay seems not to be of much moment, as there would have been ample time to send regiments from Bengal and Madras, which could be at the point of debarkation as soon as those from Bombay are likely to reach. The Commander in Chief in India has further represented how desirable it would be if the artillery employed were to consist exclusively of rifled mountain guns, and his Excellency strongly deprecates the use of any smooth bore 6-pounder horse artillery. If, however, Sir R. Napier considers it absolutely necessary to take a battery of horse artillery, Sir W. Mansfield is prepared to transfer to it the 9-pounder Armstrong guns attached to one of the batteries of Royal Horse Artillery in Bengal. But whatever artillery goes, the Government of India urges that it be made efficient in men and animals for a campaign that may possibly be very prolonged, and therefore begs that the addition proposed in paragraph 4 of my letter of 25th August may be made to any battery of horse and field artillery proceeding to Abyssinia. The Government of India does not understand the reasons which would send batteries to Abyssinia on a weak peace footing, and whether the guns are of mountain calibre or of heavier metal, the number of men and animals should be ample.

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The mountain battery proceeding from this was ordered to be made up to 100 gunners and 195 mules, prior to receipt of your telegram, asking for mortars to be attached, and it will now be made up to 120 gunners. I am again to point out the extreme advisability of endeavouring to form a coolie corps, at or near the point of debarkation, of people accustomed to the country, and am to convey a warning that no trust can be placed in a corps of coolies or kahars sent from Bengal, who, it is to be feared, will suffer from disease and rapidly become useless, or nearly so. There remain some points on which the Governor General in Council desires me to convey instructions; and, first, I am to urge the necessity of being prepared with reserves to replace casualties, whether by sending drafts or by replacing regiments employed in Abyssinia. If the campaign lasts more than a few weeks (and certainly if the troops have to advance far into the country, there will be a necessity to send more native troops) active measures for recruiting should commence; and though the Governor General in Council leaves the details of this measure to the Government of Bombay, he would suggest the enlistment of 100 additional men for each regiment of cavalry and infantry on the Bombay establishment. The Governor General in Council does not share in any way in the apprehensions of the Bombay Government that there will be a difficulty or inconvenience in absorbing supernumeraries. His Excellency in Council thinks deaths and invalidings will do this to a great extent, but even if an inconvenience does arise, it is less than the trouble that might ensue if large reserves were wanted a few months hence, and we had really no more to spare.

"So convinced is the Governor General in Council of the necessity of being prepared to throw a fresh force into Abyssinia, that he is about to order each company of native infantry on the Bengal establishment to be completed to 85 sepoys; and whether a similar course is pursued in Bombay or not, the Governor General in Council begs that recruiting may be carried on actively in the Bombay Presidency in both cavalry and infantry, to an extent which, in the aggregate, will equal 100 men per regiment, or thereabouts.

"The next point on which I am to convey orders is, that, with respect to the employment of five regiments of the Madras army within the Bombay Presidency, and adverting to the large exodus of Bombay staff to Abyssinia, a certain portion of the staff of the Madras army should move into Bombay, and I am to suggest that the staff of one whole division, or at the very least of a district, should be furnished from Madras complete, the Madras regiments serving in Bombay being, for the time, as far as possible, placed in that district or division."

That, I think, shows that the increase was according to the opinion of the Government of India; and also, I think, it will show that the answers that I had devised were devised on considerations of economy. If I am permitted I would read my note in reply to those remarks:—"I am in receipt of copies of correspondence from the Government of India, referring to the previous letters noted in the margin, regarding the preparations for the Expedition to Abyssinia. The Government of India has particularly remarked on the following points: 1st. The selection of

four British regiments from this Presidency. The reasons given against this selection by his Excellency the Commander in Chief in India are, that the regiments are incomplete, and that it is better to have three strong regiments than four incomplete ones. On this point I would submit with every deference to the opinion of so high an authority as his Excellency, that the question of four weak regiments or three strong ones must depend upon the nature of the service, as I shall subsequently explain. The regiments which I have selected, after the rejection of all men unfit for active service, will go in very fair strength, and any deficiency can easily be made good by volunteers." The second point noted in the letter was the difficulty of providing for the depôts. I remarked, "Regarding the family depôts, I am glad to say that satisfactory arrangements can be made for them." (An objection made to using the regiments in Bombay was that it would interfere with the autumnal reliefs.) "I trust that the interference with the autumnal reliefs will not cause any greater inconvenience than would have been the case had specially selected regiments for foreign service, as suggested by his Excellency the Commander in Chief in India, been drawn from other parts of India. The journey by land and sea of the regiments going from hence must be less expensive than that of regiments from Bengal or Madras, and I would explain that in the selection of the British Regiments from this Presidency, the fact of their movement being comparatively inexpensive was kept in view." Now, I had an especial reason in selecting the regiments at Bombay, because I knew that the Government in this country were very averse to having an Expedition, and hopes were entertained that possibly the prisoners might be released. And expectation was very strong upon the part of many people that upon the first appearance of troops in Abyssinia the prisoners would be released. I was therefore anxious to do nothing which would cost money to undo. Having the troops on the coast, I had them under my hand the moment I wanted them; and if I did not want them, there was no sensation created, and no expense in leaving them alone. Therefore, with every deference to the opinion of the Government of India, I adhered to my own determination to press to have the regiments on the coast of Bombay. I had also an additional reason, which was that I knew those regiments intimately; we were bound by mutual ties of obligation and acquaintance. I was certain that I should have to call upon them for extraordinary exertions, and I felt that I could better call upon those regiments that I knew, than upon regiments selected by other authorities, and from a distance.

210. *Chairman.*] Had the whole force been drawn from the Bombay Presidency, would the expenses of the Expedition have been thereby reduced?—To a certain extent no doubt they would have been reduced, because there would have been less expense in sending regiments to replace those in the Bombay Presidency, than was incurred by sending them round from other Presidencies. The "Punjab Pioneers" was a regiment specially adapted for the service, and one which I made a point of asking for from the beginning. It was a special regiment which was particularly desirable for such an Expedition; and, therefore, at any cost I had desired to have it.

it. "The 10th paragraph of the Government of India's letter expresses regret that such weak native regiments should be taken, and apprehensions are entertained that they will be reduced to mere skeletons. To these observations I would repeat the explanation already offered: that the nature of the service that I anticipate requires a flexible force, easily divided without loss of organisation, and that for such service four British regiments of fair strength (and they average 733 rank and file), are better than three of greater numbers each, and nine native regiments more valuable than eight of more solid proportions. In both cases the exchange would have been a loss in organisation and of officers." 5th. It is observed that the Government of India does not understand the reasoning which would send batteries to Abyssinia on a weak peace footing. The addition of 20 men and 32 horses to each battery is one which I did not consider necessary, for the following reasons. "Although we shall require artillery, we shall not be likely to meet with the losses that would be incurred in long artillery engagements, or through arms of precision in the hands of the enemy. The batteries are of greater strength than they were in many former Indian wars. The field artillery which I may take into the interior will be carried on elephants until such time as it may require to be mounted on carriages, and I shall have all the spare horses saved by mule carriage for ammunition." 6th. Referring to the objection which I offered to the introduction of a complete Bengal Division, with its organisation distinct and separate, I may refer in confirmation of my objection to the 19th paragraph, which explains the views of the Government of India regarding the unity of the Bengal Brigade and its carriage." That paragraph expressed a hope that I would not break up a brigade, that is to say the brigade which would have been supplied from Bengal; that I would leave it in its entirety with its own officers. That brigade was in substitution for what the Government of India had proposed, viz.: a whole division. Therefore, in an Expedition of this extraordinary nature, in which I required to have the confidence of every man, and that every man should have confidence in me, I was to have had introduced into the Expedition a whole division, no doubt selected by the superior judgment of his Excellency the Commander in Chief in India; but it would not have been my selection, and such a division would have been extremely inconvenient, inasmuch as no members of it would have liked it to be broken up. Now, I wished to have my force so constituted, that I could mix it up or use it in any way that I wanted, and that there should not be a feeling that one Presidency was left behind while another was brought forward, which I could not have avoided if I had had one whole division. Therefore, I explained this fully, because as a subordinate and in an inferior position, I maintained my own opinion and resolution, and in opposition to superior authority and no doubt superior judgment. "His Excellency the Commander in Chief in India hopes that, if I choose to encumber myself with horse artillery, I will take rifled guns; and his Excellency has obligingly sent me the equipment of a 9-pounder Armstrong Battery, which I have accepted." (I considered it proper to accept what was offered.) "There is every reason to believe that I may require horse art-

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lery in Southern Abyssinia; having used both the Armstrong and smooth-bore on actual service, I am able to state that, notwithstanding the admirable precision and range of the Armstrong guns, there are not unfrequently situations in which the smooth-bore is preferable, the more especially that case shot and common shell are wanting to the Indian rifled battery; and there is too often ground of complaint regarding the fuses." (Upon the whole, if I had been left, I should have been quite content to have had the smooth-bore which was upon the spot, but I willingly accepted what was proffered by superior authority.) "I deeply share the feeling of responsibility indicated in the 18th paragraph of the Government of India's letter, regarding the care of the drivers and followers of all kinds. His Excellency the Viceroy may rely upon my not losing sight of my obligations to provide for their care and protection, as far as may be possible. In paragraph 8 it is observed that I have asked for two regiments of cavalry and two of infantry from Bengal, and as the Government of India only proposed two regiments in excess to the force desired by his Excellency the Governor, it does not seem that much more inconveniences would have arisen from the adoption of the Government of India's proposals in this matter than from a strict adherence to my own requisition. To this I must observe that, in suggesting the application for the Bengal troops, I originally proposed the alternative of regiments being given in relief or for service, and I was guided in subsequently asking for the regiments for service by my desire to meet the wishes of the Government of India. With reference to the remark in paragraph 11, that there would have been ample time to have sent regiments from Bengal and Madras, his Excellency the Governor in Council will remember that this could not have been said when the Expedition was ordered to be prepared from this Presidency, and I beg the permission of his Excellency the Governor once more to repeat a fact which should be kept in view, that one reason for selecting the regiments on this coast was the avoidance of expense, because they were at hand immediately, if required, and if not required there would be nothing to undo. In gratefully acknowledging the assistance afforded me by the Government of India, I must express my regret that the partial adoption only of their suggestion should have been a cause of the dissatisfaction expressed in the letter under reply." The 19th paragraph of a letter from the Secretary to the Government of India to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, dated Simla, 25th August 1867, is as follows:—"His Excellency in Council would strongly recommend that no wheeled carts, save gun carriages and ammunition carts of the artillery, should be taken. To procure carriages from England, as suggested by Sir R. Napier, would involve great delay, and the use of such would probably be found very inconvenient. Everything should be carried by baggage animals, save the guns and a portion of the ammunition, the coolies being used to supplement these animals, and to make themselves useful in various ways. His Excellency in Council would gladly send telegraphic wire sufficient to reach from the sea to the furthest point likely to be reached. I am to inquire if it would be convenient to send telegraph officers, and the wire, from Bombay, or whether they had better

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be sent from this side of India." I may mention, with regard to my adhering to my own views, that I believe that the fact of our advance being practicable when it was, was the result of our having carts. I believe that had we depended entirely upon mule carriage to convey our provisions to the first post upon the high lands, we should not have been able to advance for a very considerable time after the time when we were ready to advance, and we were saved from that dilemma entirely by the use of carts. This bears upon the question of expenditure in this way—that some one might hereafter say that there was a great expense incurred in having carts. There is one more point as to which it is possible that it might be said that my decision had increased the expenditure, viz.: that I had desired to have a small portion of European cavalry, a desire which was disapproved of by the Government of India; but I considered it necessary always to have a certain portion of European force with every Native force, and I think it is wise always to adhere to that point.

211. Colonel *Barttelot*.] Will you kindly state what quantity of European cavalry you had?—One wing of the 3rd Dragoon Guards, raised up to 204 men. It was found convenient, at the last, instead of sending a squadron, from the condition of the regiment, to take a wing. My reason for desiring to have a proportion of Europeans was, that I learned, from all the histories of Abyssinia, that the climate in the high lands was severe, and also that the food of the country (such as the beef) was more suitable to Europeans than to the Natives of India. Therefore, I felt it necessary to have the proportion of Europeans, both of infantry and cavalry, that I have indicated. I would beg to observe that the opinion expressed by the Government of India, in the letter which I have read, would lead the Committee to infer that the increase of the regiments was from their own conviction, and not stimulated by any instructions from his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief in England.

212. Sir *Stafford Northcote*.] In those differences of opinion between yourself and the Government of India, did His Royal Highness, the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief interpose in any way?—His Royal Highness could have no knowledge of them, because they were settled before any intimation or reply could have been received from His Royal Highness.

213. Mr. *Eastwick*.] Supposing that the Bengal Government had made no suggestions at all, would not your Lordship have preferred to take the whole force from the Bombay army, as being more likely to act together well, and possibly, on the whole, being cheaper, having the same sort of equipments, and also, perhaps, a lesser train of camp followers?—I should certainly have preferred to take the whole force from the Bombay Presidency, for reasons of economy, and for the sake of having a uniform force; but I do not think that the camp followers would have made any difference. The Punjaub Pioneers, of course, I should always wish for; but the camp followers were subject to careful consideration, and any excess would have been cut off.

214. Upon the whole, the Bengal regiments generally have more camp followers with them than the Bombay regiments, have they not?—I think they would be pretty nearly the same in that respect, but I am not prepared to say. The Bengal regiments brought their carriage with

them complete; they landed complete and ready to move; whereas the Bombay regiments were dependent upon the transport train for their carriage. Therefore the total amount of followers borne upon the list of the two different services, of course, would be different. But I believe that if you came to analyse what each regiment, or each man in the service takes, you would find that, upon service, they all take very much the same.

215. Mr. *Christopher Denison*.] We were given to understand last Session, that a not inconsiderable proportion of the extra expense of the expedition was caused by replacing in India soldiers withdrawn from India; were any orders given by you as Commander in Chief, to carry out the orders of the Government of India, to increase the strength of every regiment in the Bombay Presidency by 100 men?—I, as Commander in Chief, gave no such order as that, initiatory to incurring expense; but the Bombay Government, no doubt, in consequence of the desire of the Government of India, ordered an increase of 100 men to every regiment in the Presidency.

216. Did that increase actually take place?—A great part of it did. I am reminded that, on one point, I suggested a certain increase. I desired to have a regiment of the Scinde Horse from the frontier, and Sir Henry Green, commanding the frontier, was asked whether he could spare a regiment without having it replaced. I will not be certain whether it was a direct proposal from me, or whether it was a suggestion offered demi-officially by the Government of India, that he should be able to add a certain number of men to each troop of his force, so as to enable him to dispense with another regiment; but that permission was given to him, and, in addition to that, he had a wing of the Poonah Horse sent to reinforce the frontier. It has been mentioned by the Bombay Government as an objection to increasing the regiments, that if the increase should not be permanently required, there is a difficulty in disposing of the surplus men when there is a reduction. That difficulty certainly is one to be considered. It is a great inconvenience to transfer men to other regiments. A reduction is very vexatious afterwards.

217. Major *Anson*.] With regard to the engineers sent out from this country, I believe that there were a number of engineers required to be sent for the boring of wells in Abyssinia?—Some were sent out for that purpose.

218. It was far preferable, I presume to have an organised company of engineers, than to have detached men and officers sent out?—Far preferable; a detachment of men without their proper complement of officers, is very difficult to take care of. By sending a complete corps their interests were taken care of, and the necessary measures for their pay and food were all much better arranged, and they were sent in an organised body, which could not have been so much the case if they had been sent in detachments.

219. Colonel *Barttelot*.] I think it is quite plain, from the letter which has been read from the Government of India, that they fancied that the campaign might be a very protracted one?—Quite so.

220. And, therefore, they thought it absolutely necessary that there should be some strong reserves ready to embark in case of necessity?—Evidently.

221. Consequently all that tended very much to

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to increase the expenses of the campaign, did it not?—No doubt that measure did increase the expense of the campaign.

222. But looking at it as prudent men, and as men responsible that the affair was carried to a satisfactory termination, you could not conscientiously have considered that you ought to have been unprepared for the contingency of a long campaign?—I should never have been unprepared for such a contingency, but I provided for it by writing to His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, and asking him to have two regiments at Malta, ready to send by the shortest possible route, in case I wanted reinforcements, and they would have come much more conveniently than from India. His Royal Highness immediately complied with my request, and I believe instructions were given at Malta for two regiments to be ready to come.

223. *Chairman.*] Troops were not moved for for that purpose; those troops were at Malta, were they not?—They were.

224. So that no expense was incurred on that score?—No expense was incurred on that score, but of course the expense would have been incurred if they had been taken away, because they must have been replaced.

225. *Sir Stafford Northcote.*] Do you think that time was saved or lost in the organisation of the Expedition by the action of the Government at home in placing the matter in the hands of the Bombay Government rather than in those of the Government of India?—I consider that there was a great saving of time in placing it in the hands of the Bombay Government.

226. *Sir John Hay.*] Was not that saving of time a very great element of success, looking to the necessity for completing the campaign within a given time?—A very great element of success. Everything depended upon time.

227. *Chairman.*] Was there not much difference of opinion between the Commander in Chief and the Bombay Government as to the organisation of the Land Transport Train?—There was a difference of opinion, which was shown by the correspondence in the Blue Book.

228. Did not the Government of Bombay want to retain the Land Transport in the hands of the Commissariat, your Lordship wishing to have a distinct military organisation for that express purpose?—Yes.

229. Was the consequence of that difference of opinion to delay an efficient organisation before the Expedition started?—Undoubtedly.

230. And that inefficiency was experienced on your landing at Annesley Bay, was it not?—Certainly.

231. That particular deficiency detained you on the coast for some three or four weeks, did it not?—I am not prepared to say that my detention there was solely due to that particular fact. I had hoped, when I had made my plans for the Expedition, that all preliminary arrangements on the coast would have been completed before I arrived. I considered it more important that I should remain at Bombay to superintend the complete preparations for the Expedition, and to be sure that I had everything in my hands that I wanted before I started, than to go to the coast and to find myself there obliged to send back for something which might be indispensable; I therefore desired that the whole of the preparations on the coast should be completed, and that a supply of provisions should be transported

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to the first post on the high lands before my arrival, so that on the first notice of my arrival on the coast it might be conveyed to Theodore and to the people in Abyssinia that my advance immediately followed my arrival. I thought that a long delay on the coast would have a prejudicial effect.

232. Was your delay there in some material degree consequent upon the defective organisation of the land transport corps?—In some degree it was; but it arose generally from the quantity of carriage anticipated not having been furnished.

233. Had your proposal for a separate organisation been accepted by the Government of Bombay at the time it was proposed, would the land transport corps have been in a more efficient condition, and could they have advanced more promptly on your arrival on the coast?—I believe that they would have been in a much more efficient condition, and that considerable loss of animals would have been saved by their being sent to receive them when they arrived on the coast; but I should be sorry to assert positively that any delay on the coast was owing entirely to the incompetency of the Land Transport.

234. I did not put the question in that absolute way; but did the defective organisation of the land transport delay you?—No doubt the defective organisation was a cause of delay.

235. Was it also a cause of retarding your advance as you got further into the country; would you have advanced with more speed and facility, and promptitude, had your views as to the organisation of the Land Transport Corps been accepted previously?—I do not think that I could have advanced immediately, even supposing that I had had the most complete land transport corps.

236. But after you left the coast at Senafé, for instance, where you rested some considerable time, do you think no delay was caused by the defective organisation of the Land Transport Corps?—There were various causes of delay. In the first place, the coast was such that I could not collect there a large body of troops. I was obliged to exercise the greatest caution in not having a man more than I could water and feed; and exactly as I made room for them, and was able to push them on to the front and feed them, so I was able to bring up more troops.

237. Were you not detained on account of the inability to bring on provisions for the army?—I was.

238. Would not that detention have been at all events lessened if your Lordship's views as to organisation had been accepted?—No doubt, generally, the hesitation to comply with my requisition at first was a cause of delay.

239. You just said that time was of much consequence, and that the objects of the Expedition were jeopardised in some degree by waste of time; did not this particular element of the defective organisation of the Land Transport Corps in some degree jeopardise the results of the Expedition by the delay which it occasioned?—No doubt it did; but in giving that answer I would beg leave to add some remarks which I think will elucidate it. That answer in a certain sense has a bearing against his Excellency the Governor of Bombay. I believe (and the Right Honourable Baronet the Member for North Devon will correct me if I am wrong) that the

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first intention was to place the organisation of the Expedition entirely in my hands. I believe that there arose in this country (I suppose I am not called upon to say where) a cry that that was an abdication of the power of the Civil Government. I speak now from opinion; I believe that the reflection of that cry reached Bombay, and that the result of it was the desire of his Excellency the Governor of Bombay to resume that function of civil government which, according to the impression here, had been abdicated by giving me the complete control of the organisation of the Expedition. Therefore, I believe that his Excellency the Governor was probably influenced by the feelings at home in wishing to exercise more control than had perhaps originally been intended.

240. Sir John Hay.] From economical motives?—Entirely from economical motives; and I desire to say distinctly that I believe that in any points in which there was a difference of opinion between his Excellency the Governor of Bombay and myself, his Excellency was guided by a view of economy. The difference of opinion of course was on the point of what economy was, whether it was economical to withhold expenditure at that time, or to incur it. That was the point upon which we differed; but I am quite certain that his Excellency's motive in everything was that of economy, and that his desire was to meet the views, or supposed views, of this country. If I assume anything of his Excellency which is wrong, I must submit to be corrected by his Excellency, but I can only give my opinion.

241. Chairman.] The retardation of the advance would add materially to the cost, would it not, inasmuch as it prolonged the Expedition?—No doubt there were various parts of the Expedition which had to concur, and without the concurrence of those several parts, an advance could not be made. The whole were connected one with another; for instance, I could not advance without carriage, but if I had had carriage, I could not advance without food; if I had had food, I could not advance without having my troops on the spot. Again, all those things were controlled by the peculiar nature of the country, by the fact that we had originally no *pied à terre* on the land that we were to operate upon, and that we were obliged to make our means, and to receive only just such men as we could accommodate at the moment; so that every one of those points of action or occurrence, had to combine to permit me to advance, and I cannot lay the delay of the advance entirely upon one point or the other.

242. Was not the main hindrance the inefficiency of the means of conveying provisions to the front?—That was partly the main hindrance, because, as I say, even with food and with carriage I could not have advanced beyond a certain point without troops; I could not have collected the troops all at once.

243. Sir John Hay.] And you had also to make roads, had you not?—We had also to make roads.

244. Chairman.] The troops could have gone up more rapidly if the provisions had gone up more rapidly, could they not?—They could not have gone more rapidly than their power of making a road before them or of opening the way; I speak of a road as an exaggeration.

245. How long did Theodore precede you at Magdala?—I think about a fortnight, but I do not recollect exactly without referring to dates.

246. If the Land Transport Train had been organised satisfactorily, and had worked according to your expectations, would not that have enabled you to reach Magdala before?—I think that if it had done so it would have been the most disastrous thing that could possibly have happened for the Expedition. We might have saved a portion of the prisoners in Magdala itself, but I believe that the whole of the prisoners in the camp of Theodore would have been sacrificed. If we had been in possession of Magdala itself Theodore would have carried them off or destroyed them; if we had attacked his camp it is scarcely possible that they could have been saved in the tumult; therefore I think that it was the greatest mercy of Providence that things turned out as they did, that Theodore collected his prisoners there, and gave us only one point to operate upon.

247. But in a military point of view, would it not have been a special advantage to reach Magdala before him?—It might have been an advantage, but it was absolutely impossible.

248. Because of the interruption of the transport?—No; even if we had had wings and could have flown, we could scarcely have done it from the distance at which we were. As soon as we arrived at the coast, he was so near that, abandoning his guns, he might have conveyed himself and his prisoners into the fortress.

249. Ultimately the Land Transport was organised rather in accordance with your Lordship's first views, than in accordance with the views imposed upon you, was it not?—Certainly.

250. You remodelled it on the basis which you yourself considered desirable, did you not?—In the best manner that I could remodel it in the course of its being employed at the same time.

251. And therein lay the consumption of time?—Therein lay certainly a consumption of time, and a certain consumption of means.

252. On the last meeting of the Committee you attributed the increase of cost to the mortality among the animals on their arrival at the coast; upon whom depended the responsibility of the organisation for the reception of the mules which were landed in October and November, long before your Lordship's arrival?—The purchase of mules in Egypt and Abyssinia, and their transit to the port of disembarkation were not ordered through me, although I became aware from time to time of what was being done.

253. My question rather pointed to Abyssinia itself and to Annesley Bay itself; who was responsible for the reception and care of the mules on their being landed in Annesley Bay?—I have here a copy of my demi-official letters and memoranda, and I find amongst them the following memorandum of mine, dated the 22nd of September: "With reference to the telegrams noted in the margin, Sir Robert Napier requests the attention of Colonel Marriott to the following questions: Have any instructions been given as to the mode of shipping, space, and attendance on mules sent from Persia? Will it be safe to direct any large number of mules to Massowah until we know what can be done for them there? In case of difficulty or delay in deciding a landing-place, have any alternative orders regarding mules been thought of? Should not part of the Land Transport have been sent to meet them; that is, portion of officers and superintendence?" Those are recommendations made by me on the 22nd of September 1867, from which I think it will be inferred that I was not

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not in a position to give orders upon this point, but I merely made suggestions.

254. Do you know what was done on your suggestions?—I am not prepared to answer that question without reference to documents. I was not in a position then to give orders; in fact, the military authority in India can give no orders, because the Government always reserves to itself the power of issuing any order creating expense; the military authority can only recommend.

255. Do you remember the date when your authority and responsibility there would accrue?—The moment I landed in Abyssinia.

256. Mr. *Seely*.] Is your Lordship aware that there was an impression in England that you had full power given you with regard to the Expedition?—I think that answer shows that that impression was incorrect.

257. Did you suggest to the Governor of Bombay, in the month of August, a definite scheme for the organisation of the Land Transport Train?—The correspondence of the Blue Book shows that on the 22nd of August 1867, a letter, No. 2,412, was addressed through the Quartermaster General of the Bombay army to the Secretary to the Governor of Bombay, proposing a scheme for a Land Transport Corps.

258. When did you receive any notice from the Government with regard to that?—On the 12th of September, I received a draft resolution in reply to that.

259. Did that give the Governor's scheme for the Land Transport Train?—It gave the reply of the Government of Bombay; but previously to that, Minutes of Council had been passed, which, I think, are also to be found in the Blue Book, dated the 12th of September. The Governor's Minute was dated the 31st of August.

260. But when did you receive any reply?—I received a reply with that draft resolution, which was the decision of the Government, on the 12th of September 1867.

261. When was the scheme for the organisation of the land transport train settled?—On the 20th of September the first order was issued by the Commissary General, in pursuance of the Government resolution of the 12th.

262. Was the scheme for the organisation of the land transport train settled before the middle of October?—As far as the first order for the transport train, as carried out by the Commissary General was concerned, the first order was issued on the 20th of September.

263. But was not that order subsequently modified by some representations of yours?—It will be seen from the Minutes which are published in the Blue Book, that I did not concur in the proposals of the Government of Bombay for the formation of the transport corps.

264. What was the best season for operations in Abyssinia?—The best season for operations was undoubtedly that in which we were in the country; but it would have been better had we been able to commence earlier.

265. At what time does the rainy season usually commence there?—It is usually supposed to commence in June; but the year of our being there was an exceptional year; and I believe that we had very nearly as severe weather during the time that we were on the high lands of Abyssinia, or during the latter part of the time, as is usual during the rainy season.

266. What time does the rainy season usually

last?—I believe nearly the same time as the rainy season in India, viz., part of June, July, August, and part of September; but then the rainy season on the high lands is different from the rainy season on the coast.

267. Was there anything to have prevented field operations in Abyssinia even in the month of December?—Nothing; I apprehend that December would have been one of the best months in which we could have operated.

268. I think you landed at Zulla on the 3rd of January, went on to Senafé on the 25th, from thence went to Adegerat on the 4th of February, and you left that place on the 18th, was that so?—I have no doubt the honourable Member is correct in his quotation.

269. Did the Deputy Commissary General at any time propose to put the troops upon half rations?—Yes.

270. Did you object?—Yes. With reference to the previous question, I have my demi-official letter of the 5th of October 1867, which was the first time when I inspected the Land Transport Corps. It was the first time when one division of the Commissary General's Transport Corps was ready for inspection. The letter of the 7th of October was published by his Excellency the Governor of Bombay in connection with a Minute which was explanatory of the action of the Government of Bombay in regard to the Land Transport Corps.

271. Mr. *White*.] Will your Lordship explain what is the difference between "official" and "demi-official" letters?—I never make any difference between official and demi-official letters; I consider that every line which I write with regard to the public service, is official, and I always expect it to be used; but there is a difference maintained between the two. What is written as a demi-official letter is not placed on public record, although it is liable to be produced at any time if called for; it is usual to ask permission to make use of a demi-official letter; at the same time no man should write a line which he is not prepared to have produced at any time. The purport of my letter on the 5th of October, is to take exception to the quality of the Land Transport Corps; and the same was repeated on the 7th of October. On the receipt of my letter on the 7th of October, his Excellency gave orders for an increase to the Land Transport Corps.

272. Mr. *Seely*.] Were the provisions at one time consumed nearly as fast as they were landed?—At one time that was so.

273. So that no store could be got for you to rely upon in advance?—At one time the provisions for the advanced post on the high lands at Senafé were very short indeed. At the time that I landed, I was informed that they depended entirely upon a convoy which was on the way to them, and regarding the arrival of which there was some anxiety. It did arrive, and they did not incur any inconvenience from the want of provisions; but there was no store there at all upon which reliance could be placed; there was no such store as would have permitted of the immediate advance of any troops.

274. Did you, when you were in Abyssinia, order any mules to be bought?—Yes; I ordered all officers in authority to buy them wherever they could; and I requested officers who were not in authority to buy them as a matter of private obligation, and said that they should be repaid from the public funds.

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275. At that time, of course, you were deficient in mules?—Yes.

276. Are you aware whether any mules and pack bullocks were at Bombay at that time?—There were some at that time.

277. Were there 2,000 pack bullocks at that time at Bombay?—I believe there were 4,000; at any rate, there were a considerable number.

278. Then, can you tell us what was the reason that those pack bullocks were not in Abyssinia?—I believe that they were not sent from want of transports. I am more able to answer as to whether I had them or had them not, than as to the reasons why they were not sent; but I have no doubt that, in the first instance, there may have been hesitation to incur the great expense of sending them before it should appear that they were absolutely necessary; and I apprehend that subsequently they may not have been sent from deficiency of carriage; but no doubt any point of that kind would have been subject to correction by his Excellency the Governor of Bombay, or by any one conversant with the correspondence. On the 17th of December 1867 I have a memorandum, which is official: "I desire to bring under the consideration of his Excellency the Governor in Council the position of the Land Transport for the Abyssinian Expedition. Colonel Merewether reports that many mules at Annesley Bay are without drivers, and many had died from want of care. The evils were caused apparently by having an insufficient number of drivers in the first instance, and increased by refractory muleteers being sent back to Egypt or Persia, instead of being brought to order under military law. I am aware that the Government of India has been addressed by telegram to engage more muleteers, and it is hoped that some may be supplied from that quarter. There are about 2,000 mules fully equipped, with drivers, at Kurrachi, waiting for transport. In and near Bombay there are about 3,700 pack bullocks; and draught bullocks, 249, for which the carts have been sent to Abyssinia. There are also 1,000 baggage ponies, with their establishments complete, and only requiring equipment. The monthly cost of this establishment is probably much over a lakh of rupees; and it appears necessary to utilise it. I am given to understand that there has been delay in their shipment. Tonnage was applied for a considerable time ago. I have requested the Quartermaster General to inquire how the transport of the Kurrachi mules could be effected, and to submit the result for the consideration of the Government." I had nothing to do with the arrangements for engaging shipping, and I am not at all aware of what was going on in that department. Therefore there may have been very good reasons why they were not sent. I only know that I wanted them to be sent, and asked for them to be sent. I would desire to add that whatever delay there may have been in supplying me with animals, every animal in the country was sooner or later required. Although those animals were not there at the moment when I should have desired them to be there, they were required when they did arrive; and not only were all the animals that were sent to Abyssinia required, but I was obliged to buy more to enable me to bring the force back.

279. Mr. Mundella.] Did I correctly understand your Lordship to say that it was by the use of carts only that you were enabled to reach the first post in the high lands?—I do not think

that that was quite my answer. It was the possession of carts which enabled me to accumulate a supply of provisions at Senafé, sufficient to enable me to advance earlier than I could possibly have advanced if I had been dependent entirely upon beasts of burden.

280. I think you just stated that every animal in the country was ultimately found useful, and that you availed yourself of it; was there not a very great loss of animals?—There was a very great loss.

281. From what cause did that loss arise?—The greatest loss, I believe, was through stress of work, and the fatigues incident upon the country. But the Quartermaster General, Major Holland, has the whole of the returns of the transport, and can state exactly the numbers landed, those that died, and how they were disposed of.

282. I think you stated that the first intention was to place the control of the Expedition entirely in your hands?—Such, I believe, was the intention.

283. But through some feeling in this country against that course, the Civil Government in Bombay resumed their functions, and created some delay and excess of expenditure in consequence; was that so?—Of course I can only apprehend such to have been the reason; but the Expedition was never entirely in my hands, and I believe that it was the intention at first to place it so.

284. But was delay the result really of its not being entirely in your hands?—Certainly; delay to a certain extent.

285. In your opinion, then, in similar expeditions in future, will economy and success be more probable, if the expedition be placed entirely under the control of the commander of the forces engaged in that expedition?—I think that, in this case, the Expedition was one of a very peculiar nature, for which very few people have undergone a training and experience to prepare them. It had been my good fortune, during many years of service, to be exactly in the condition to prepare an officer for a campaign of the kind; and therefore I think that I might have provided sufficiently and in time for our wants, better if there had been no difference of opinion between me and those over me. But I am not prepared to assert that in every expedition the commander of the expedition should have entire control. Indeed, I think that the responsibility of incurring expenditure is one which he would be glad to share with a concurrent authority. But he would desire always to have what he considers necessary given to him, or that somebody else should be placed in charge of the expedition, and that he should be relieved. I certainly would not have taken the Expedition if I had been materially interfered with in the requirements which I thought necessary—that is to say, the moment I saw that the materials for the Expedition were reduced to such a degree as to make me apprehensive of failure. I should then have retired, and begged that some one else might have been sent, and so I think a commander ought always to do.

286. Mr. White.] Your Lordship has told us that any difference of opinion which arose between you and the Governor of Bombay had reference to the point of economy; that is to say, as I infer, that what you deemed to be the necessary requirements of the service were ob-

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jected to by the Governor on the score of expense; is that your view?—Such is my opinion. The views of the Governor of Bombay are fully set forth in the Minutes of the Blue Book upon that subject; and my opinion is also set forth, except that being an inferior authority, and also viewing the absolute necessity of harmonious action as far as possible, I think my views will be found expressed with moderation. It is necessary for me to say that, excepting where the Governor of Bombay considered it his privilege to exercise his judgment, as far as all personal relations could go, no one could be more courteous, or more desirous to meet my wishes, than his Excellency was. His Excellency felt himself under responsibility to exercise his own judgment; and that point was, as I say, a matter of judgment. I think that my answer requires to be supplemented; and I think, perhaps, it is not inappropriate to say how much I owed to the cordial support of his Excellency the Governor of Bombay, in maintaining my own requisitions for the Expedition, as compared to those alterations which the Government of India wished to introduce.

287. But, as I infer, the difference that did arise was in the direction of a desire to economise?—Certainly.

288. For which you are not to blame, because you had to secure the success of the Expedition over which you had taken the command?—I apprehend that it is a question of fact one way or the other, and not of blame.

289. You, of course, had copies of the Minutes of the Evidence taken before the Committee of last Session?—I beg to say that I did not receive copies. I got some demi-officially, but I got none officially; and I did not read all of those which I got demi-officially.

290. I will read some portion of the evidence where your Lordship's name is mentioned. The Right Honourable Baronet the Member for North Devon was examined by the Committee with reference to the magnitude of the expenditure, as compared with the last estimate of the Government, which was five millions. The Right Honourable Baronet being asked at Number 74 this question: "When did the Government become aware that the estimate of 5,000,000 £. would be exceeded?" replied; "I can hardly say. Mr. Hunt stated the other day in the House of Commons, that the first information that he received was on the 10th of August 1868. I received a good many hints from different persons which were very contradictory and conflicting. I ought to say that very shortly after the Expedition had closed, Sir Seymour Fitzgerald told me, in private letters, that he was afraid that the expenditure would turn out greater than we had reckoned upon. He could not give me any definite information, and I had nothing that I could go upon. On the other hand, Lord Napier of Magdala, when he was in this country, did not appear to think that there would be any material excess." Have you any remark to make upon that?—I recollect perfectly the circumstance; and, if I am wrong, I rely upon the Right Honourable Baronet to correct me. When I was in England, after the Expedition was over, I learnt (I do not know where), that the expense would be five millions. Perhaps Sir Stafford Northcote himself told me; but from wheresoever I learnt it is immaterial. So I was informed: and it appeared to me then

that the thing being done, there was nothing more to cause expense, and I believe in that way I probably expressed my opinion to Sir Stafford Northcote. I remember something of the kind, though I would not be positive as to precise words; but I had nothing to judge from but my knowledge that everything had come away from the coast. If that was the expenditure, then what more was there to cost money.

291. It is evident that the Home Government was influenced by what they gathered. I put the following question to the Right Honourable Baronet at Number 92: "You have stated, have you not, that before the end of the Session you felt convinced that the estimate of 5,000,000 £., as made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his financial statement in 1868, would be exceeded?" he replied, "I do not know that I went the length of saying that I felt convinced of it. I had reason to fear that it would be so on account, as I say, of the suggestions which were made to me by various persons returning from the country, and from the expressions in some of Sir Seymour Fitzgerald's letters; but, on the other hand, so far as my communications with Lord Napier of Magdala went, I had reason to think that those apprehensions were probably exaggerated." As I gather from your Lordship, any difference which arose in Bombay between you and his Excellency the Governor of Bombay was on the question of the magnitude of the expenditure, you requiring what was, perhaps, absolutely necessary; therefore it would impress the Committee with the notion that you would rather have the idea of a greater extent of expenditure than Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, because he was for doing all he could to diminish the expenditure. Then there is another question, No. 140, put to the Right Honourable Baronet:—"I gather from your answers to some inquires, that Lord Napier all along thought that the campaign would be much less expensive than it has turned out to be?—I do not know that I said that. I said that I gathered from my conversations with Lord Napier of Magdala, when he was over here after the Expedition had concluded, that there could not be any very great excess upon the estimate. That was my impression." Then, again, this question is asked:—"I understood you to say that Sir Seymour Fitzgerald warned you that in his opinion the expenditure would be considerably in excess of that estimate; but that, in communication with Lord Napier, you found that he differed from that opinion?" The Right Honourable Baronet answered "Yes." I should say that from the beginning of the matter Sir Seymour Fitzgerald always advocated a smaller expedition, and had always been uneasy as to the probable expenditure which would take place. The demands of the Commander in Chief were considerably criticised by Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, and as far as he felt himself able to do so, they were restricted; but the Government supported Sir Robert Napier in his demands, and we believed that Sir Seymour Fitzgerald took a rather exaggerated view of the probable expenditure of the Expedition. When, therefore, I found at the end of the Expedition that Sir Seymour Fitzgerald was merely saying in a loose way that he thought the expenditure was exceeded, and when I found, on the other hand, that Lord Napier did not think that it probably had been, I did not attach the same weight to Sir Seymour Fitzgerald's conjectures

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as perhaps, under other circumstances, I might have done." I merely draw your Lordship's attention to that evidence?—There are two or three words in the Honourable Member's question which I think require an answer. I think that they imply something which I will not admit. But I think my first answer explains the general question. When I was told that the expenditure was 5,000,000 *l.*, a considerable time after every ship and every man had left the coast, I could not conceive then what cause there could be for increased expenditure. Now I can see some cause, though not a very great one, for increased expenditure; but a cause for which I blame entirely the authorities in this country. It is not a very large matter. That opinion, of course, rests upon the correctness of the 5,000,000 *l.* as an estimate. At the same time, I desire to repeat what I said before, that beyond a desire to incur no expenditure which was unnecessary as to the general cost of the Expedition, I did not concern myself with it at all. I considered that it was no business of mine, beyond avoiding having a single thing or a single man which I thought unnecessary. On the contrary, in my very first Memorandum on the Expedition, I impressed upon the Government the fact that it would cost a great deal of money.

292. Mr. *Christopher Denison.*] It is in your Memorandum of the 23rd of July 1867, is it not?—Yes. My object in pressing them was, both to inform the Government in this country and also to justify the Governor of Bombay in complying with such requisitions as I might make. In the first instance, I say, "It is hardly necessary to observe, that no such Expedition could be carried out without very great expenditure, and that the very best arrangements may be crippled by some misplaced economy." I said also, "It would be essential to success, that the Government that immediately directs the Expedition should have free authority to provide everything necessary for the health and comfort of the troops, and for making such staff appointments as may appear to them to be required, being guided in fixing the allowance by the usages of the service." I had reference, in making that remark, to such irregular or contingent appointments as might be necessary, such as the Intelligence Department, political officers, and various duties which perhaps you cannot lay down definitely from the beginning, but which you require authorities to supply at the moment when they are wanted. It was repeatedly brought forward in different directions that we could not get carriage. Indeed, if I had listened to those objections, I should have sat down and said, "We cannot go;" but I was convinced that such was not the case, and therefore I repeated my applications and recommendations, and ultimately carriage was produced from those very quarters. I said: "We have to consider this great difficulty, that at present we have no place of rendezvous, where, without fully developing our intentions, we can gradually collect our cattle; and to deliver them at once on any given point would require an amount of transport that might be unattainable; and therefore we must commit ourselves to the landing of a Brigade on the coast of Abyssinia, and the occupation of an advanced post, in the healthiest situation that we can find, for a very considerable time before we can complete the collection and organisation of our land transport, in preparation for an advance into the interior of the country; and,

should all our present efforts fail in obtaining carriage enough for the Expedition, the Brigade might be detained many months before an advance could be permitted; but I cannot believe such an issue to be possible. Our great and indispensable want is land transport, which can only be delivered at the point of action at a very vast expenditure. Under other circumstances the expenditure might be in the transport of great masses of artillery and gigantic siege trains. The cost of the highly perfected ammunition of the present day expended in the course of a month's siege would be enormous; here our expense must be in the transport and maintenance of beasts of burthen; and if the British Government consider it necessary to prosecute the Expedition, I conclude that the expenditure must be incurred, even if it be necessary to transport a considerable part of our baggage-cattle from India." I do not think a clearer warning of expenditure could have been given.

293. Mr. *White.*] That prevision and sagacity which you indicated in those Minutes or representations to the Government, I need not say, would entitle any opinion which you gave with reference to the ultimate cost of the Expedition, to great respect and confidence, although, as a soldier, we do not look to you, nor does it rest with you, to give an opinion with regard to the expenditure; you have only certain work to do, and you must have the appliances to do it; but still, you having pointed out what large expense would be incurred, and then subsequently having returned home after the Expedition, it would be satisfactory to the Committee if you could afford any explanation why an expenditure which you thought would only be five millions, ultimately became nine millions?—I suppose the reason of that was that they were totally wrong who said that it was five millions. I had nothing to go upon but the assertion of five millions; but I do not think that the Right Honourable Baronet knew exactly the extent of knowledge of expenditure which I had, and therefore rested only upon my general judgment, that the cause of expenditure having ceased, there was no reason to anticipate that the expenditure would exceed the five millions which had been asserted to be the cost of the Expedition.

294. Sir *Patrick O'Brien.*] Your Lordship stated just now that for part of the excess of expenditure, you had in some measure to blame the Home authorities; to what part of the expenditure did you refer?—That part of the expenditure I consider was in the disposal of the stock after the Expedition. The instructions from this country were that the Government of India, if it chose to take any part of the stock, was to pay a certain price for it; and the Government of India, being limited in funds, did not conceive themselves justified in taking that stock, at the price put upon it, for a contingency which might never happen. I thought it a great pity that valuable material which had cost a good deal of money should be sold in the market for very little, and I strongly urged that it should be put into our magazines; but the Governments of Bombay and of India said, "If we take this we are obliged to take it at two-thirds of what it cost, or whatever the sum may be." So little satisfied was I with it, that I caused an appeal to the Government of India; but the fact was so undeniable, that the revenues of India could not afford to take those articles on speculation at a high price, that

that I was silenced, and obliged to acquiesce in the sale of those articles for, I believe, the most trifling sums.

295. Are you able to state whether that suggestion of yours to the Government of Bombay was communicated by the Bombay Government to the India Office at home?—I am not able to say; probably it was; but the India Office were not the parties who put the price on the articles, I think.

296. When your Lordship used the phrase "Home authorities," I presume you meant the India Office, did you not?—We generally class the Home authorities in one lump, without being able to know from which particular quarter the orders come, except that there is a distinction between the War Office and the Horse Guards, and the India Office. The pack saddles, which were an item of considerable cost, I thought would be extremely useful in case of any hill expeditions in India, and I was very anxious that they should be put into our magazines; if the price of those pack saddles could have been put into a suspense account, which would have been the most economical way of doing it, the Government of India would have been quite willing to pay for them when they wanted them, but as it was, I believe they were sold for very small sums.

297. Are you able to state whether that suggestion was made to the Horse Guards or to the War Office?—That I cannot say; it was made by me to the Government of Bombay; I do not go further than that.

298. Is it within your Lordship's knowledge that that communication was further sent, either to the Horse Guards or to the War Office?—No; my view does not go further than the Government of Bombay on that point, except that I caused it to be referred to the Government of India, and I conclude that the arguments of the Government of Bombay were sufficiently strong to convince the Government of India that they were right in doing what they did.

299. Apart from your communication to the Government of Bombay, you made no official communication to the Horse Guards or the War Office?—None; I should not have thought of making such a communication outside of my Government; I communicated officially with the Adjutant General of the Indian army, explaining the probable future use of those articles, and I have no doubt that my communication was used, but the result was, that it was not considered expedient to encumber the Government of Bombay or the Government of India with those articles at a large cost, when they might or might not come into use. The same remark applies to the Maltese carts, which I thought would be extremely valuable, and which I have no doubt cost a good deal of money; and to the sets of harness, which were very valuable; also ovens; all these were sold off.

300. I need not ask your Lordship whether they were not sold off at a great depreciation?—I have no doubt that they were sold off for what you might call inappreciable sums.

301. In reference to the purchase of animals for the transport, which it was necessary to employ in Abyssinia, you of course made the requisition as requiring a certain amount of transport; but the manner in which that transport was procured, or how it was purchased, this Committee is more likely, I presume, to learn from

another witness?—Yes; I had nothing to do with that, beyond suggestions which are found in my public correspondence.

302. That is to say, you required a certain amount of transport accommodation, but the purchase of the transport you had nothing to do with?—I suggested the quarters where transport animals might be found. I recommended that the Home Government should try in Europe, as we were told that mules could not be got in India.

303. Is your Lordship able to state whether there were Government employés bidding against one another in the same market for the same animals?—I do not know it; but I do not believe it.

304. Major *Anson*.] With reference to the question which you have just been asked, your Lordship has stated that you are utterly ignorant officially of the cost at which your land transport was purchased, in the shape of mules and carts, and you are also ignorant, I presume, as to the manner in which the transports were hired, both in England and in India?—Entirely.

305. Are you aware of the cost at which they were taken up?—No; I never interfered in the slightest degree with that. It was a matter for the civil Government; but I am aware that an effort was made at Bombay to reduce the hire of the transports to as low a sum as possible. I am under the impression that the lowness of the price offered led to shipping leaving the port unemployed; which a higher price would have secured. That is a point upon which I may be contradicted; but my belief is, that at the early part of the Expedition the desire to keep down the price of shipping was so great, that ships left the port to seek for service elsewhere, and that we should have been very glad afterwards if that shipping had been retained at a higher rate.

306. Strictly speaking, as Commander in Chief of the Expedition, your Lordship is not cognisant of the expenditure that was incurred in the English spending departments, either in the purchase of coal, hay, provisions, or anything of that nature?—Not at all.

307. I ask that question because I think the answer which you gave to the Honourable Member for Sheffield at the last sitting of the Committee is liable to be misunderstood: in answer to certain questions, you stated your general approval of the economy and efficiency of the Expedition; when you state that, I presume that you do not mean to say that you believe that everything that was done in connection with the sea transport, or in the purchase of land transport, was done in the most economical manner possible?—No; I speak merely to the sufficiency of it for our wants, the description of it, and the quantity of it. I think nothing could have been better done than the prompt engagement of steam transport in England. It was of the utmost importance at the earliest moment to know what we should have to enable us to move. A promise of steamers would have been of very little use to us; but we learnt that on the first information as to our wants being received, steam transports had been engaged for the troops and for the hospitals in England, and sent out with the greatest expedition. I think no point of our equipment was more valuable than the promptitude with which that arrangement was made.

308. In fact, when you gave those answers, you meant to express your satisfaction at the manner in which you had been supplied with everything that

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that was requisite to enable you to carry out the Expedition in a satisfactory manner; but did you wish to express any opinion as to the cheapness of the hire of the transports, or of the other articles?—No, that I had nothing to do with; but I think that my answer bears upon the point, that the value of giving us steam transport at the moment that we wanted it, assuring as to what we could do was worth a very high cost.

309. I suppose that a great quantity of stores were supplied from the Government of Bombay; were those stores only supplied on requisition from you?—I believe they were supplied on my explanation and demand, that we should first have a supply of provisions for six months; and be constantly kept with a supply for three months in hand; so that in fact we should be prepared for a considerable time beyond what the Expedition actually incurred. It was quite possible that we might have been detained, and then of course a Government which left us without food would have been very culpable indeed. The Government, therefore, provided for the contingency of a long Expedition. No one could say how long the Expedition might last, and I conclude that no one would have been satisfied if it had come away without doing the work that was intended. That would have been the worst thing of all that could have happened. Therefore we were prepared for every contingency; and I believe that whatever might have happened we should have been justified by the result of our preparations for the Expedition.

310. Are you aware of any stores having been supplied by the Bombay Government that were useless when they arrived in Abyssinia, or were of an obsolete pattern?—That is a very large question, but if the Honourable Member will indicate what he alludes to, I will answer clearly yes or no; it is possible that some stockings for soldiers may have been sent which were not good, but I objected to them in Bombay; if the question refers to them I can answer it, but as a broad question, I should answer no, although examples might perhaps be adduced in particular cases.

311. With regard to the sale of stores on leaving Abyssinia; has a general commanding an expedition of that nature any power whatever as to the disposal of the stores left in the country?—I consider that I had entire power over everything that was in Abyssinia, and I should have acted in every instance upon my own judgment, without reference to any other authority, but I should have taken advantage of all the means at my disposal for obtaining a correct opinion; that is to say, on questions of food, I should have referred to the head of the Commissariat Department to know whether it was better to send away or to destroy, or to sell; and in the same way as to cattle; but I should have taken upon myself the whole responsibility of doing what was necessary.

312. Mr. Christopher Denison.] At No. 2402 of the evidence of last year, this question was asked of Captain Tryon: "You stated that it would have been in a pecuniary point of view preferable to have abandoned the stores in Abyssinia, rather than to have taken them away; but I think you led the Committee to infer that there were other substantial considerations which, on the whole, rendered that policy unadvisable; will you state what those considerations were?—(A.) I can understand that to abandon baggage and animals in some cases might look more as if one

had sustained a defeat than as having gained a great success, and for political reasons I can understand its being desirable to take away a great portion of the equipments of the army; a considerable number of the mules, I heard, were promised to be returned to the Government of India, who could not replace them elsewhere." That is mere matter of opinion. Then the next question is: "In your opinion, were the reasons which you now mention to the Committee, of sufficient weight to justify the large pecuniary loss incurred?—(A.) I never had to decide the point, but I may mention that there was nothing embarked to my knowledge, without a board first sitting upon it, composed of competent officers, who thought that the stores which were returned were worth sending to Bombay. The mass of the things that did not realise money at Bombay, were things that were not landed from transports at all." Then there is a further question: "Then that board was responsible for the course that was taken in embarking all the stores, was it not?—(A.) It was responsible for the advice that it gave. (Q.) To whom?—(A.) To the General. (Q.) And the General issued his orders?—(A.) The General issued his orders." Has your Lordship anything that you would wish to say in contradistinction to that, or in amplification of it?—No, I think I should say that it is entirely correct.

313. With regard to the Transport Corps, referring to your Memorandum of the 23rd of July, as Commander in Chief at Bombay, you said it would be a great assistance if a corps of 3,000 porters, such as the Chinese Coolie Corps could be formed of such races as would be likely to fraternise with the Abyssinians. The Government of India, on the 23rd August, reply in these words: "Sir R. Napier thinks a large corps of coolies necessary, and the Governor General in Council concurs in this, and hopes that steps will be at once taken to form one at or near the point of debarkation. If liberal terms are offered there seems every probability of success in forming a useful corps of this description." From that I infer that the difference of opinion between yourself and the Government of India was as to the formation of this coolie corps, whether it was to be formed in India or Abyssinia. If it had been left entirely to your own judgment, would your Lordship at that early date have formed that coolie corps in India irrespective of the rate of wages or anything else, and thereby have saved time in the debarkation of the troops in Abyssinia?—Some one informed us that there was a race of people at one of the ports of the Red Sea whom we could employ as labourers, but we could find no such people.

314. A former paragraph is this: "His Excellency in Council considers that carriage must be provided in Abyssinia, and his Excellency trusts measures have already been taken to collect this; to get together and send to Abyssinia the amount of transport required would seem to render the expedition almost impossible, and Colonel Merewether has already reported that there is abundance of carriage to be had. This would consist of camels, mules, and ponies, and both the Bengal and Bombay divisions should take saddles, ropes, and suleetahs sufficient for either description of carriage. The only animals, save cavalry horses, to be taken should be elephants." That is, from the Governor General of India to yourself, is it not?—That, of course, proved

proved to be an erroneous opinion in the first instance.

315. My question is this, whether, if the matter had been left entirely to your own judgment, you would have formed that coolie corps in India at Bombay, and transported it bodily to the shores of Abyssinia?—That would have been obviously the first intention, because it would have been most easily done, and my belief was that such a corps might have been formed in India if sufficient pay had been offered; but we were informed, as I observed before, that in one of the ports of the Red Sea, hardy labourers could be got who could bear the exposure, and we did think of those, but no one could ever hear of them. At Bombay the prices were so very high, and the demand for labour so great, that very little progress was made in creating a corps of that kind; and we were mainly dependent upon Bengal and Madras for those whom we got, but they were not quite of the class that I had desired. I should have enlisted the class whom the Honourable Member remembers in India as *bildars*, a class of men who would act either as porters or as diggers; whereas the class sent were mainly, in the first instance, from Madras, palanquin bearers, men who merely carry loads.

316. Then you would not have attached much importance to the objections of the Government of India on the score of health and disease, as likely to overtake Indians transported to the shores of Abyssinia, probably with insufficient clothing?—I think that with insufficient clothing and food they would have been likely to suffer a great deal, but I endeavoured to obviate those wants.

317. Colonel *Barttelot*.] I think you stated in the earlier part of your evidence to-day that your great object in remaining at Bombay was to have everything ready to your hand, so that when you arrived in Abyssinia you might at once proceed towards your destination?—Yes.

318. That was, generally speaking, so that the natives of Abyssinia might understand that when the Commander in Chief did arrive, operations would at once take place?—Yes.

319. Was your land transport ready when you left Bombay?—No, the whole of the land transport was not ready, but a very large quantity of transport had been sent to Abyssinia. From the report which I received I was under the impression that a very much larger body of carriage would be available than I found when I got there from various causes. In the first instance, it will be seen that I was promised a supply of 5,000 hardy camels from Aden. A great many of those camels were furnished at different times; but a great many died. I did not find a body of 5,000 hardy camels ready to carry the food up to the first point in the high lands. That is a point as to which it is not fair to throw blame on anybody. Everybody did the best that he could; but the whole of the circumstances were not known to everyone. Camels from another part of the country did not thrive in Abyssinia: they were found unequal to the work. Then another cause why we did not get them was, that the contractor was unable to procure shipping to send them from Aden to Abyssinia; so that they came during that time by small detachments in native craft. He also was not altogether to blame, because a good deal of the craft that he had depended upon was absorbed for the use of the people at Zuela, and probably for the

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public works. He counted upon the state of the shipping as it existed upon the coast; but when there came in other demands for shipping, he could not get what he wanted. Therefore he had some excuse. But the result is, that I did not find the carriage there to the extent to which you will find it promised in Sir Seymour Fitzgerald's Memorandum.

320. But both the Governor and yourself fancied, did you not, when you started, that there would have been sufficient land transport for you when you arrived?—Yes; sufficient land transport to admit of an advance; but not all that we required. I knew at the time there were five or six thousand animals at Bombay and Kurrachee, which I intended to have in Abyssinia.

321. How long after you arrived were you detained before you could advance?—I think I advanced on the 25th of January, having landed on the 3rd; but I had many things to attend to besides the land transport. In the first place, I had to assure myself as to a supply of water for the port. I had to see that the arrangements at the base of operations were such as would keep us going during our occupation of the high lands. There were a great many points which it was necessary that I should look to before I felt that things were matured for my advance to the high lands. To have gone myself to the high lands, and waited there doing nothing until other people brought up things to me, would not have been a good position. I felt it desirable that wherever I appeared an advance should follow as soon as possible, and where that did not take place it was from the absence of something or other that I required, when flour or food, for instance, was not brought up in sufficient time.

322. Then your detention was not alone dependent upon the Land Transport Corps?—To a certain extent it was dependent upon that, but other causes came in to assist us. For instance, the first instructions which I gave to the reconnoitring party and to those in charge of the earlier part of the Expedition, were to endeavour to engage the carriage of the country. I had calculated a good deal upon that at first, because I knew that there was a very active salt trade there. That carriage did not come into play there at first. From the description of officers who had been on the coast, we were led to believe that we could get the carriage easily. The proprietors and drivers were very slow at first in coming into our service, but afterwards they came more freely, so that we were fortunately assisted by the resources of the country where we might have been otherwise delayed by the want of land transport.

323. I think I understood your Lordship to say that your own views were that the land transport should have had a more military organisation?—Certainly.

324. And, although the Governor of Bombay thought that he had a right to follow the precedents which he had before him, namely, that it had formerly been under civil control; yet, viewing the campaign as it has taken place, you still think it would have been better if the organisation had been military?—Yes.

325. In any campaign of that kind, in a country of that sort, from your experience, do you think that would be the best organisation for the future?—Certainly; and I am justified, I think, by the second paragraph in the Report of the Commission under Lord Strathnairn, which

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326. Sir *Stafford Northcote*.] You have stated (and I may say, in passing, with perfect accuracy) that you had reason to believe that, from the first contemplation of this Expedition it was the intention of the Home Government to concentrate, as far as possible, the responsibility, and to place you as far as possible in the direct management of the steps which were to be taken. May I ask you whether any authority was ever officially given or proposed to be given to you which was subsequently withdrawn or modified; did the Home Government ever represent to you that you were officially placed in a position from which you were afterwards told that you were displaced?—From the Home Government I received no direct authority, except such letters as I called demi-official.

327. With regard to official correspondence, there was in fact no official communication made directly to you which intimated that you were placed in a different position from that which you afterwards occupied, was there?—I received no official communication directly from the Home Government, although I received demi-official letters from yourself. Speaking from memory, the impression which I gathered from your first letter was, that you looked to me to be responsible for everything; that is to say, that you trusted to me to provide everything; that you left, in fact, the conduct of the Expedition in my hands. That I think was the tenor of what was said in Parliament upon the subject, but I was aware that in India it has always been the custom to reserve for the civil Government all authority of incurring expenditure, and I never expected any such authority as that, but I expected that my views and decisions as to the military equipment of the Expedition would have been final.

328. With regard to the expense of this Expedition, that expense you were aware, were you not, was ultimately to be borne by the Imperial funds?—Yes.

329. It was therefore to be expected, was it not, that the representatives of the home Government, who would be responsible to Parliament, should take care that proper precautions were taken that no undue expenditure was incurred?—Certainly.

330. There were, therefore, several branches of the home Administration (strictly speaking, the English Administration), who must, in the ultimate resort, be held responsible to Parliament. Of those branches there would be the Treasury, there would be the War Office (and in the War Office I include His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief), and there would be the Admiralty. May I ask whether you were interfered with at all in any matter which you considered important by any of those branches of the home Government?—On the contrary; I considered that every action of theirs was, I may say, exactly what I desired. If I may be permitted, with reference to such high authorities, to use such an expression, there was a promptitude in meeting or anticipating the necessities of the Expedition, which was of the greatest assistance to me.

331. The Expedition, although it was organised in India, was, of course, in a military sense, under the supreme direction of His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief. Does the remark which

you have made with regard to the various branches of the State which I have mentioned apply also to His Royal Highness?—Certainly.

332. You are probably aware, from having seen the papers which have been published upon the subject, that the course adopted by the Government at home was to place the responsibility of the direction of this Expedition in the hands of the Indian authorities. What is the supreme authority in India?—The Viceroy.

333. Are you aware that in the arrangements which were made the course (which would, perhaps, have been the most regular course, under ordinary circumstances), of referring the conduct of these affairs to the Viceroy and the Government of India was departed from, and that a much greater amount of authority than would usually be given in such cases was given to the Government of Bombay?—Yes.

334. You have already said that you think that that course was one which was advantageous?—Even though I might be assured that the Government of Bombay would not be in accord with me, and that the Government of India would be in accord with me, still, in point of principle, I should consider that, for the efficiency of an expedition, the Government at the post at which it is fitted out should have full authority, and be made fully responsible.

335. By that course, then, a very large amount of friction was avoided, was it not, as between departments at home and the representatives of the Indian Government at home and the representatives of the chief Government of India in India?—Certainly.

336. With regard to the direct authority which was given to the Government of Bombay, you are probably aware that a telegram, in the first instance, was sent from the Secretary of State for India to the Governor of Bombay, on the 14th of August, which was followed by a letter on the 16th of August 1867, the tenor of both of which letters was to leave all preparatory measures, as it is said in the telegram, "to your discretion;" that is to say, to the discretion of the Government of Bombay. May I ask how the Government of Bombay is composed?—It consists of the Governor with a Council, of which the Commander in Chief is an extraordinary member.

337. You held, at that time, the office of Commander in Chief at Bombay, did you not, and you were, therefore, an extraordinary member of the Government?—Yes.

338. Do you not think that it might have been reasonably supposed by the Government at home, in issuing those orders, and at the same time in informing the Governor of Bombay that Her Majesty's Government having great confidence in Sir Robert Napier, desired to place the whole conduct of the negotiations, as well as the military direction of the armed force in his hands, that you would be consulted in all matters that affected the preparations and the conduct of the Expedition, so far as it appeared necessary to consult you?—No doubt.

339. And of course a very important question was the question of the formation of the land transport corps; you have stated that you brought that matter under the cognisance of the Government on the 22nd of August; I observe that a Minute was made by the Governor of Bombay on the 31st of August, and that other Minutes are made by other members of the Government, Mr.

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Mr. Ellis and Mr. Mansfield, on the 2nd of September; and that a Minute is made by yourself on the 9th of September; may I ask in what way business is done in the Council of the Government of Bombay; do the Council meet?—No; no meeting of the Council took place in Bombay until I pressed for one just before I left. The business is done by the circulation of papers.

340. Is that the ordinary practice there?—It is not according to the constitution of the Government, there ought to have been meetings of the Council; but they have not been held.

341. But is it the ordinary practice to circulate Minutes instead of holding councils?—It is the ordinary practice.

342. I think you stated that it was on the 12th of September that the resolution of the Government was communicated to you; but you were aware before the 12th September of the objections which were entertained by members of the Council, were you not?—My Minute shows the objections.

343. Therefore, you were a party to discussion which were going on for some days?—That is to say, I had one voice with two voices against me. In every proposition, if there are two voices against one, to allow yourself to continue to be a party, of course, would be a very unwise proceeding; and the moment I found that I would be partly responsible for a proceeding which I had really no power to influence, I threw myself out of it at once, by casting upon the Governor the responsibility of making the establishment, and reserved to myself the power of reporting upon it when it was made. I had no idea of continuing to be out-voted and helpless in a matter, and to be responsible for it afterwards. I therefore threw myself out of the matter, and considered myself as a Commander in Chief, not in Council then.

344. But in the first instance, and before you had ascertained what the views of the majority were, you had the opportunity of representing to the other members what your views were, and what your objections to their views were, had you not?—That was represented fully by the Quartermaster General. The Quartermaster General is the pen of the Commander in Chief in his department, and my views were fully set forth in the letter of the Quartermaster General.

345. Is that the letter which preceded those minutes?—The letter which proposed the establishment. That was simply my letter.

346. But do you consider that the other members of the Government of Bombay would have been justified in accepting the scheme, under the instructions which had been given to them, without, at all events, considering it on what appeared to them to be its merits?—They would have been wrong, of course, to take any action without considering it.

347. Supposing that the matter had gone still further, and that the Government had not only concentrated matters and the responsibility upon the Government of Bombay, but had concentrated them entirely upon the Commander in Chief, do you think that you could have carried on the Expedition without the support of some civil authority in India, or elsewhere?—I could have no authority whatever without the support of the civil authority. Supposing that I could have issued orders, or if you had made me Viceroy, I would very soon have had the Expedi-

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tion up, and I would not have allowed a moment's hesitation as to anything which I wanted; but the moment when I come to have to ask another authority, of course I am in his power, and only get what he chooses to give me.

348. Therefore you would say that, if absolute plenary authority had been given to you while you were in India, you could have organised the Expedition entirely in your own way, and with much greater rapidity?—Certainly. When I asked for carriage first, it was said it could not be got, but ultimately it was obtained; and if the same pressure had been put on at first as was put on afterwards, we should have had the thing sooner. I do not mean to say that there is blame for that. Of course it is quite necessary for the authorities to consider matters, and I cannot expect that they should have the same reliance upon me which I have upon myself.

349. Supposing that the Commander in Chief of the Expedition had had that authority given to him during the time the force was being organised in India, could it have been continued to him after he had reached the shores of Abyssinia?—So far from it, according to the regulation, and according to the condition in which it was expected that I should have been placed, I might have continued to exercise the command of the army. I might have influenced all promotions, and I might have caused them to be submitted to me. But I considered that I was incapable of executing the two commands at the same time, and therefore I resigned into the hands of my *locum tenens*, General Gordon, the whole power of the Commander in Chief of Bombay, and did not interfere in a single appointment, even though perhaps I would have desired to make some. I considered that I could not possibly exercise the command. Therefore, if in a military point of view I could not do it, still less could I do it in a civil point of view.

350. You will observe, that I am trying how far it would have been possible to give to yourself as Commander in Chief of the Expedition, greater authority than was actually given to you; we have got so far as to find, that the direct interference of the Home Authorities and of the Government of India, was as far as possible kept in abeyance, but with regard to the necessity for some civil authority, I was anxious to know whether you could have organised and conducted the Expedition in India, and whether you could have continued to do so after it had left India. Supposing that when you had left India it had been left to you absolutely to command the resources of India for the purposes of the Expedition, no doubt it would have been of advantage to you in relation to the conduct of the Expedition itself, but might it not have been seriously inconvenient to the general administration of affairs in India?—If I had been regardless of those affairs, it would; that is to say, if I had considered merely my own wants, without reference to the general wants of India, it would have been very inexpedient.

351. But could you at the distance which Abyssinia is from India, have been so far cognisant of the wants of India at any particular time, as to be able to form a correct judgment as to those wants?—That is a comprehensive point. As matters stood, I think I know pretty well what India wanted. If there had occurred any very extraordinary circumstance, such as a great invasion, or a great revolt, of course I could not

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say what the requirements of India might be; but, as matters stood, I think I could have judged very fairly what I could take away, and what I could not.

352. Looking to the official authority which was given to the Government of Bombay, do you consider that the Governor personally, or the Government as a body, in any way exceeded the limits of the authority which was conferred by the Home Government in this matter, as between the Government of Bombay and yourself?—They could not exceed the authority because they had by their constitution full authority. It was entirely a matter of judgment, and of course they were responsible for the result of their judgment.

353. That judgment may have been fallible and may have been in fault upon certain points; but that is a matter of course upon which you would have an opinion in which possibly many persons might agree; but with regard to their interference, as it is called, do you consider that they did anything that they had not authority to do?—Certainly not.

354. Do you consider that it would have been possible in prudence for the Government of England to have given to them less authority in this matter than they did give?—No. I do not know how far my answer is intended to extend. I consider that they should have had the full authority which you gave them, and that they should not have been interfered with by the Government of India; but I think that understanding from you that you left to me the entire preparation of the Expedition, they should have followed up your desire by leaving it to me; that is to say, that the requisitions which I made should have been attended to at once.

355. You specified amongst the errors of judgment which you thought had been committed, the refusal of a submarine telegraph cable which you asked for. That is perfectly true, and the responsibility of refusing it rested upon the Home Government; may I ask in which way you think that the laying of that cable could have saved expenditure?—I think it is difficult to name a point in which it would not have saved expenditure. Our communication was extremely slow; I think that I could point to numerous communications of mine to the Government of Bombay, expressive of the inconvenience which we felt from the slowness of the communication.

356. Were you speaking of a cable between some point on the coast of the Red Sea and Bombay, or of a communication between the coast of the Red Sea and England?—I should have laid a cable both ways; I should have had a cable from Suez to Zulla, and from Suez to Bombay.

357. How long do you suppose that it would have taken to lay such a cable?—That would of course depend upon the preparation of the cable; but I suppose with a cable prepared, it would have taken very little more time than it would take to sail from one point to the other.

358. But the cable not being prepared, how soon do you suppose that that cable could have been laid, so as to be of practical use to the Expedition?—I believe that it could have been laid in time.

359. By what time do you imagine, speaking roughly, that it could have been made?—Of course I should find it difficult to give a definite

answer to that question, because I do not know whether there was a reserve of submarine cables in England; but I cannot suppose that there would have been any difficulty in England, say within a month, in supplying a submarine cable.

360. Then, when you say you consider that it was an error of judgment that the cable was not laid, you say that upon the assumption that the cable could have been laid very early in the day?—Yes; I had communication from Bombay to Suez; therefore, the first requirement would have been a communication from Suez to Zulla. The Committee will remember that there was a portion of the old Red Sea cable which was reported efficient to the Island of Gebel, I think; and, therefore, there would have remained only that part of the cable from Gebel to Zulla.

361. Are you aware that inquiries were made with regard to the state of that cable, and that it was reported that it was not to be depended upon, or that it was a matter, at all events, upon which there was a good deal of consideration bestowed, and that it ended in the Government at home deciding upon not complying with your requisition in that matter?—If the Government at home can say that it was impossible, of course there is an end of the matter. If it had been possible, it would have been of the greatest possible value; and the next point which would have been of value would have been an efficient postal communication. As a point of experience for future expeditions, I think it may be assumed that one of the first steps is a good postal communication. That was not established, and our communication was precarious. When it was improved from what it was at first, it was arranged that the post should go from Zulla to the Island of Gebel Teer, and there be picked up by the Peninsular and Oriental steamers. That was a very unfortunate arrangement; we were constantly without communication there.

362. Sir John Hay.] The Commander in Chief is an extraordinary member of the Council of Bombay; how many other members are there?—Two other members.

363. Therefore, in the controversy with regard to the matters which you in your judgment conceived to be necessary for the Expedition, the Government was supported by the whole Council except yourself?—Yes.

364. Their views were, of course, governed by economical considerations; had those other councillors military experience?—None.

365. Mr. Mundella.] I think you stated that you had at the close of the Expedition a large amount of valuable material, which was sold for an inappreciable amount?—Yes.

366. Do you think that that material would have been valuable in the future to the Indian Government?—Yes.

367. And it was not taken into account by the Indian Government, through the price having been fixed to it by the authorities in England?—Yes.

368. Was there nobody on that side who had authority to say at what price the Indian Government might take those stores?—I think there was no referee then.

369. And in consequence those valuable stores were sacrificed?—Yes.

370. Sir Stafford Northcote.] Of course those stores were the property of the War Office and the Home Government?—Those stores were the property

property of the War Office and the Home Government.

371. Are you aware that two officers were sent out towards the close of the Expedition, from home, in order to assist in the disposal of those stores, and that one of them unfortunately died at Zulla; and that, in fact, both of them were detained in consequence of the vessel having unfortunately been put into quarantine?—Yes.

372. Owing to the non-arrival of those officers, and to the rapidity with which you were proceeding to leave the country, it was impossible, was it not, to get the authority of the home officers to bear upon the disposal of the stores?—Yes; but it goes further than that. I think that the authorities here were very anxious to close the accounts, as they were in India; and there was no one prepared to say that those stores might remain as an inefficient balance until they were wanted. But it actually would have cost the country less if they could have remained unaccounted for until the Indian Government wanted them. The Maltese carts must have cost a considerable sum, and I think they were sold for 26 s. each.

373. Mr. *Mundella*.] And the stores to which you refer are the stores which were landed in Bombay?—Yes.

374. There was a large quantity which was not landed, was there not?—I was in England then. I heard that there was, but I know that the delay of landing at the port of Bombay is so great that it is quite possible that the value of the stores might be exceeded by the demurrage on the ships. I have myself had articles on board ship in Bombay for two months, which could not be landed.

375. Then it would have been cheaper to have thrown them overboard at Zulla, would it not?—

If we had known it, certainly it would have made it come to exactly the same. I think the ships were engaged to be discharged at Bombay, and not at Zulla, and we could not honourably have discharged the ships at Zulla, knowing that they could not get out of the Red Sea. I spoke above of my own private stores, which I could not get out of the harbour of Bombay.

376. Mr. *Eastwick*.] Could you indicate the way in which the information obtained in this Expedition might be made valuable, so as to save money on a future expedition?—I think that the whole of the details have been incorporated in a work by the Scientific Department, who have been in possession of every document connected with the Expedition; and I hope that when that book is produced it may be of use as a guide to future expeditions.

377. Mr. *Christopher Denison*.] Taking the whole expense of the Expedition at 9,000,000 l., and making due allowance for the fallibility of human judgment, and mistakes of omission and commission, do you consider, from the best opinion which you could form, that the whole of those mistakes, if put together, make up any considerable proportion of that expenditure of 9,000,000 l.?—No.

378. It is a mere matter of opinion; but no doubt you have given a great deal of attention to the subject; do you think it would be one-tenth?—I should say that if all those mistakes or differences of opinion were collected together their cost could not make an amount which would be worthy of the attention of a great nation. I should say that, even if they cost 200,000 l. or 300,000 l. out of 9,000,000 l., that must be taken as a margin which must accompany every Expedition.

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Friday, 4th March 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Major Anson.
Colonel Barttelot.
Mr. Baxter.
Captain Beaumont.
Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Candlish.

Mr. Christopher Denison.
Mr. Eastwick.
Sir John Hay.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. Charles Turner.

JOHN CANDLISH, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

The Right Honourable ROBERT BARON NAPIER OF MAGDALA, G. C. B., G. C. S. I., &c., &c.
(attended by permission of the House of Lords); and further Examined.

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379. *Chairman.*] Do you wish to make any statement in correction of your evidence given before the Committee yesterday?—If the Committee will allow me, I should like to correct a statement which I made yesterday. I said that there were no councils held at Bombay. I was right, in the ordinary acceptance of the term, in saying that there were no councils for the general business of the country, but there were two or three meetings, which may be called councils, shortly before I sailed on the Expedition, during which matters with regard to the preparations for the Expedition were discussed, and when the Commissariat officers, and several authorities of Bombay, were present. I had forgotten those meetings. One or two of those meetings took place before I left, and several afterwards; but I did not consider them to be meetings of the council in the ordinary acceptance of the term. They were meetings of the Government, and of the principal officers at Bombay, for the affairs of the Expedition. There were reports of those meetings printed with the proceedings.

380. *Sir John Hay.*] Will they be found in that book of confidential papers which you have in your hand from the India Office?—No; I do not think they went beyond the Government of Bombay, but they may have been furnished. Major Holland will know whether he has any of them, but they were very large sheets, containing all the proceedings of the Commissariat, as to stores sent, and so forth. I do not know whether I mentioned it yesterday, that no councils were held in the Presidency, except at my requisition to council specially, to consider special matters before I left Bombay.

381. *Chairman.*] Would the matters considered at those council meetings concern this inquiry?—The matters considered in the meetings which I first mentioned, before I sailed on the Expedition, were connected with the preparation of the Expedition. It was a report from each of the departmental officers at the Presidency of what they had done during the week.

382. It would be in the month of December, I suppose?—It would be in the month of December, I think. I was present at two of those meetings, and I introduced my *locum tenens*, General Gordon, to be present at them after I should have left. The two meetings which I mentioned, which took place just before

my leaving the Presidency in last year, were for special business, at my own request; but, ordinarily, it was not the practice to hold meetings of council at Bombay during the period of my command.

383. At the special meetings, or at any of the meetings to which you refer, did the business concern the question referred to this Committee, as regards the matter of cost?—The question of cost was not introduced. It was a question of preparation and supply. Each officer of the departments at the Presidency—the Marine Department, the Commissariat Department, and the Quartermaster General's Department, reported what he had done, during the week, in forwarding the Expedition.

384. At any of those council meetings, was the question of supplies for the Expedition considered, discussed, and determined?—Very possibly. Even some questions as to quantities may have been discussed, but none of the great questions, or broad points, were discussed. It was merely details of supply.

385. In general terms, the supplies sent from Bombay would be sent on your requisition, I apprehend?—In general terms. I gave the total amount of supplies which I required, but, of course, the Commissariat Department exercised their discretion. If they thought anything necessary, they, of course, would have added it. I asked supplies for an army for so many months, and I indicated the principal points which I considered essential; but any supplementary points the departments would, of course, have added, and I should have accepted their addition as a matter of course.

386. Inasmuch as that introduces the question of supplies, perhaps I may ask your Lordship this question: You said, in general terms, those supplies were on your own requisition; in the first instance you requested supplies for six months, did you not?—To the best of my recollection it was six months' supplies, and then a continuous supply for every three months. This is my memorandum on the subject: "I have in the course of consultation expressed to the Commissary General my opinion of what is required, which is, that I want six months' supplies for 9,500 men to be ready at Post No. 2, when I am able to advance from that point." Post No. 2 was Senafé.

387. Do you remember whether the total supply

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supply accepted for Abyssinia was 15 months?—I could not say how much afterwards was sent, but it was sent, no doubt, upon the report of the principal commissariat officer upon the spot as to what our requirements were. They would have been sent from Bombay. Of course he would not have waited to refer to me 300 miles off.

388. Did you ever have at Senafé the quantity mentioned in the memorandum which you have read?—No. "If three months are consumed in arriving at that condition, supplies will have been consumed by all the force that leaves Bombay, corresponding with the portions of those three months during which they may have been between Bombay and Post No. 2." I would place that in support, or correction, of anything I may have said yesterday from memory. "In round terms, six months' supplies should be delivered intact as soon as possible for the whole force, and three months' supplies should be ready for current expenditure. After that the expenditure should be replaced so as to leave always six months' in hand. Such supplies as are perishable should be sent as required, for the time during which they will keep. Flour, properly packed in barrels, keeps a long time. For native followers corn and hand mills, or other portable mills will be required. The provision of forage for the mules which will soon arrive in Abyssinia will have to be considered at once. Many of the mules will be able to feed on grain inferior to gram, and more easily procurable, such as barley, &c."

389. What was the date of that?—The 26th of September 1867.

390. That was a direction to the Commissariat Officer at Bombay, was it not?—It was a communication to the Government of Bombay, explaining what I had pointed out to the Commissariat as necessary, in order to obtain the endorsement of that instruction to the Commissary General.

391. Then it would be the duty of the Commissariat Officers of the Department at Bombay to have forage for mules landed in October ready for their reception, would it not?—It was the duty of the Commissariat at Bombay to lay my requisition before the Government, and to obtain the orders of the Government to carry it out.

392. You did not indicate any specific quantities, but you indicated numbers of animals and numbers of troops, and the time for which you wanted them, and you left the Commissariat to deduce from that the quantities, did you not?—Yes. It is very probable that during the course of the Expedition, if the Commissariat officer had referred to me to say, I want so many hundred tons of forage, he would at once have received my sanction to apply for it, he being an officer of great experience and high position. He was quite aware of the confidence I placed in him, and he never would have hesitated for a moment to make his requisition instead of referring to me for orders.

393. Whilst mentioning forage, may I ask whether you had ever, after you landed in Abyssinia, any specific request put before you for additional supplies of forage?—I think so; I think that there was a requisition on England for compressed forage.

394. Was that put forward by your Lordship?—It was probably put forward by me, but I am sure that the commissariat officer, if he did so, did so with judgment. I am responsible for

anything which Colonel Lucas ordered from Zulla. I read the other day an extract from a memorandum by Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, the purport of which was really to throw upon me responsibility of taking a larger force than that which he indicated was necessary, although he said that he did not venture to dictate in the matter; and also to throw upon me the responsibility of taking it with the contingency which his Excellency pointed out, of not having sufficient carriage for it; that is the explanation of this memorandum of mine in reply. By that memorandum which I have quoted, the responsibility was placed upon me of taking a larger force, which was clearly indicated by the Civil Government to be greater than was thought necessary, and also the responsibility of taking it when it was pointed out to me by that Government that they doubted whether they could get carriage enough for it. The result of my shrinking from that responsibility would have been to say, "We cannot go this year, we must give it up."

395. Sir John Hay.] Did you object to the responsibility?—Not in the least. In continuation of the remarks which I quoted from a previous memorandum, I may place before the Committee an extract from another memorandum, in reply to that one of the Government. I say on the subject of supplies: "I have explained my views on this point to the Commissary General, and he is now working out the problem in detail, but I may say, generally, that I hope the Commissariat Department may succeed, by means of local resources, in conveying to Post No. 2 the supplies for 9,000 men for six months, before the main body of the troops arrive at that point." That was the requisition which I made to the Commissary General.

396. Chairman.] Did you request the supplies to be forwarded to Abyssinia, irrespectively of the supplies of the country?—Certainly; I calculated upon getting no supplies at all from the country; that is to say, I considered it probable that we should get them, but I did not consider it safe to reckon upon what was a mere speculation.

397. Had it not been reported by the pioneer corps, and specially by Colonel Merewether, that supplies of a certain nature were abundant in Abyssinia?—Yes. I should like Colonel Merewether's reports to be quoted, because I should not think that I was justified in quoting his reports from memory. The general tendency of the reports, in the first instance, was very sanguine indeed, but they were not always realized.

398. At a very early date your Lordship discovered that you could feed your pack animals between the coast and Senafé, and indeed onwards; I think that is quoted in Captain Hozier's book, page 89?—In the first period of my being at Zulla, so difficult was it to feed the baggage animals between Senafé and Zulla, that at times they were reported to be without food. Then by sending officers to examine the hills by employing the native agent whom I had taken for the purpose, of negotiating with the Abyssinians, Akbar Ali Khan, a gentleman of Hyderabad, who spoke Arabic, and was a man of religious reputation, the Mahometan inhabitants of the passes were induced to bring a small supply of grass. It was very precarious, but still it was a great assistance; that, however, was not made available until the time of my actual advance.

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399. I will read to your Lordship two quotations; it was said that "a healthy climate would be found, with abundance of good water, forage, fuel, meat, and grain." That is Colonel Merewether's language; and your Lordship's language on 23rd July, when in Bombay, is this: "It seems probable that by proper arrangements meat, corn, and forage may be procured in the country." Are those quotations correct?—The sentence in my memorandum runs thus: "It seems probable that by proper arrangements meat, corn, and forage may be procured in the country; still it is clear that to render a force efficient, a very large quantity of carriage will be required."

400. Did your Lordship's discovery that the forage of the country was tolerably abundant in January or February modify the requisitions which you had forwarded or left at Bombay?—No, I made no change whatever. I was prepared to take everything that I could find, but I did not consider it safe to trust to anything but what I took with me.

401. Are you aware that from a statement of the Bombay Government, it appears that 17,117 tons of compressed hay were shipped at Bombay?—If you have the statement from authority I will accept it. I am sure that whatever forage was ordered by the Commissariat was ordered only after a full consideration of its necessity.

402. That same return discloses the fact that of that, 4,015 tons only were landed at Zulla, 13,102 tons being therefore never landed at all; in other words, three-fourths of that whole shipment was never needed. There is another item touching the same supply. By that same return it appears that 6,372 tons of compressed hay were bought at Suez, only 302 tons of which seem to have been shipped, 6,070 tons being never shipped at all, and never landed at Zulla. Is your Lordship aware of these facts?—It may possibly have been consumed by the mules which were in depôt at Suez. I could not answer that question, but you have an officer in the country, the Comptroller of the Commissariat, with the Expedition, Colonel Holland, who would no doubt be able to give an answer upon that point.

403. Did not about 10,000 animals come through Suez?—There were many animals in depôt at Suez. In the first place, sometimes I was obliged to check the dispatch of animals, because I could not feed them.

404. However, was there not a large excess of shipment of hay beyond any possible requirement on the part of the Expedition, when 4,000 tons only were consumed in Abyssinia throughout the whole period, 17,000 tons having been shipped; in other words, assuming that the Expedition was six months in continuance, was not two years' supply of hay put on shipboard, if that be so?—I do not know whether I am to understand that two years' supply for the whole force of transport animals was put on board.

405. I was rather asking your Lordship's deduction from the return; does not that follow?—That I could not say; but I may explain that the smallest accident might have caused us delay. Any quarrel caused by an inadvertent Commissariat subordinate with the people of the country, anything which might have offended Khassai, Prince of Tigre, anything which might have embroiled us with one of the chiefs between

his country and the country around Magdala; any one of those circumstances might have obliged us to halt, and to vindicate our military prestige to avoid the appearance of being hunted out of the country.

406. Will that apply to supplies of all sorts?—It would apply to every kind of provision.

407. Would your Lordship feel that that would impose upon you the need for having two years' supply of anything on shipboard?—The quantity of supplies which I thought necessary I mentioned in the memorandum which I wrote, but I cannot but think that there must be a mistake in supposing that two years' supply for the whole force was shipped. That would be a point which, of course, the Commissariat officer would have to explain.

408. Your Lordship knew, did you not, that supplies of forage were coming forward both from Europe and from India?—It is very possible that seeing that supplies were not likely to come from India in time, the Commissariat officer may have sent an emergent indent on Suez.

409. Are you yourself aware of that?—I am not; I do not remember at this time, but that is a point, I think, which the Commissariat officer should explain.

410. Sir John Hay.] If he did so, should you think him to blame?—I should think that he would have deserved the greatest possible punishment which could have been inflicted upon him if he had left us a single day without forage. I put the comptroller at Zulla, and I said, "If anything is wanted you are responsible," and therefore, if under that pressure he exceeded his authority, or exceeded what might be prudent, I am prepared to take the blame for it.

411. Chairman.] Would you suppose that he had reasonably exceeded his instructions if he thought it expedient to put two years' supply of forage on board ship?—If he did put two years' supply of forage on board ship, it must have been under some hallucination or some error; but I should like to see it mathematically proved that he had done so, and I should like to have him here to answer it; but I cannot help thinking that that cannot be correct.

412. That is the interpretation which I put upon the official return of the Commissariat at Bombay?—Then I would suggest that Colonel Holland should be invited to explain those returns. I do not pretend to enter into the returns at all, I simply put on the Commissariat officer the responsibility of supplying us.

413. Then we have the fact which I have mentioned, whatever may be its significance, namely, that there were 13,000 tons of forage on board ship either at Aden or at Annesley Bay which were never landed; if at Aden, detained at Aden because they could not be utilised in Annesley Bay; would your Lordship regard it as imprudent in the month of April to buy a thousand tons more in Egypt?—I would decline to answer upon that point, because I think that any answer which I might give would be injurious, and that the Commissariat officer would probably make it quite clear.

414. Sir John Hay.] You would have found fault, of course, with the Commissariat officer if the supply had been short?—Yes.

415. But you would consider him erring on the safe side, would you not, if he took care to have an abundant supply?—Certainly. As I explained,

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explained, the very fact of the early rainy season might have detained us at Senafé. I have with me the letter of an officer who, even during that season, had the narrowest possible escape in going down the pass, which shows that had the rainy season come it would have been almost impossible to have taken troops down to Zulla without the greatest peril; and had we been detained there we must have had a very large quantity of supplies at the port. Nothing was to be got at the port.

416. *Chairman.*] But, in point of fact, the forage never reached the high lands to any great extent; certainly, if I am correct, it never went beyond Antalo?—No, I do not think that any forage went beyond Antalo.

417. And a very small portion reached Senafé, I believe?—That I cannot say without returns, but we were very often dependent upon our own supply of grain.

418. Then the object of getting abundant supplies of all sorts would be to get them up on to the high lands at Senafé, and within reach, would it not?—To have them within reach; but we might have had the means of getting them up to Senafé even supposing they had been at Zulla, because we should have employed the natives, who would have gone by bye-paths, by their own intricate and remote tracks.

419. Your powers of discharging vessels at Annesley Bay were strained to the utmost, were they not?—Yes.

420. Then there was no power of landing this surplus 13,000 tons, was there, unless it was specially wanted?—The whole of the means of landing were occupied certainly, but of course anything very urgent would have had precedence. I was not at the port after I left it on the 23rd of January until the 10 days or so that I passed there before my leaving the country, so that I could not well answer the question, but I am sure the Commissariat officer would be able to give a clear and satisfactory explanation upon those points.

421. *Sir John Hay.*] Supposing that the urgency of the service had been such that it would have been necessary to land the forage which was then embarked at the port, and that there was insufficient means in the way of jetties and other arrangements; under such great urgency as that would not the officers of the transport, or of the Navy there, have made some arrangements by which the people would have been saved from starving?—There never was any emergency which was not met, and I believe no emergency of the kind would have arisen for which means of remedy would not have been found.

422. *Chairman.*] To the extent to which the wants of the service for the time being required the discharge of those vessels containing the 13,000 tons of forage that was not wanted, would they have been discharged?—I do not know of 13,000 tons which were not wanted; but I think that if that case were put in writing before the Commissariat officer he would be able to give an explanation. The 13,000 tons divided by the number of animals to be fed may not prove to be so large a quantity. It requires an arithmetical calculation which I am not prepared in my head to work out, nor have I the quantities, but I believe that you would get a good explanation on that head. It was incumbent on the Commissariat officer to provide for a very much longer residence on the coast than was proved to be necessary.

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423. You never requested more than six months' supply of any article to be sent forward in advance, did you?—No. My instructions were plain there; but I think that I should only involve something which perhaps would require correction afterwards if I attempted to give any reply upon that point.

424. If ships with hay had been lying three or four months at Aden, and throughout the whole expedition in Annesley Bay, would that not argue too large a shipment?—I believe that a great quantity of the stores were on board ship at Annesley Bay, because the ships were the very best storehouses that we had until the things were wanted. The hay exposed on the coast was liable to damage, and if it had not been wanted then there would have been the re-loading of it again, so that it was our general principle to keep the ships as storehouses until we could dispose of their contents.

425. From your Lordship's point of view, would you not from this fact infer a miscalculation in the quantity of hay sent forward; a ship is chartered in Bombay in December, she receives on board upwards of 11,000 bales, she proceeds to Annesley Bay, and lies there with the hay untouched until Magdala falls, when with the hay still untouched she is returned to Bombay, where she arrives in June and lies in Bombay Harbour two months, when it is discovered that one-third of her cargo is still on shipboard, and instructions are given to throw it overboard, for which service she receives upwards of 12,000 £. as freight or hire; in other words, will it not argue miscalculation if that ship was paid 12,000 £., or at the rate of 3½ d. per pound for carrying the hay to Annesley Bay, bringing it back to Bombay, and throwing it into the sea?—I should reserve any opinion upon that point until I heard the explanation of the Bombay Government. That is a question which they or the Commissariat officer at Bombay would have to explain.

426. Supposing that you issued requisitions for stores in Abyssinia, what would be the time necessary to convey them to the Commissariat Department competent to send the supply, and what time would it further require to bring the supply forward to Abyssinia?—The shortest mode of communication to Bombay would have been by steamer to Suez, which occupied about a week or ten days, and thence by telegraph. I doubt if you could calculate upon the order reaching Bombay under 18 or 20 days.

427. From Bombay to Annesley Bay I suppose would be about 10 or 12 days?—That would depend very much upon the season. It would take about 14 days, I think. I went in Her Majesty's ship "Octavia" to Aden in nine days, and it would be about three to five days more.

428. Then would it not have been safe to have dispensed with so large a supply as six months' standing stock in that case?—No, I do not consider that it would have been safe to be without six months' supply. The monsoon, the periodical season of wind, binds you very much. The communication at times is difficult.

429. Is it very much so in a steamer?—Yes, even in a steamer; but you would not send all the forage by steamer; you would send forage in sailing ships.

430. But I am speaking now rather of supplies generally?—It was my desire to draw from Egypt

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Egypt as much as possible, and it is quite possible that seeing supplies from Bombay delayed, the Commissariat officer in an emergency may have written to Egypt rather than run the risk of being without, and may in that way have had a double supply. I notice that I say in my Memorandum of the 26th of September, that the expenditure should be replaced so as to leave always six months' supply on hand. I am supplied with a Memorandum by the Quartermaster General, showing that the 13,000 tons is a supply for 72 days for the animals.

431. Will the Quartermaster General be able to explain how it was that if 4,000 tons lasted throughout the Expedition, he required 13,000 tons for 72 days?—The animals which were up the country, which were on the tableland, were assisted very much by the country, but they were not entirely fed by the country.

432. Were they not mainly fed by the country?—I should say not. Grain we had to carry with us. The quantity of grain we got was often very slight indeed. I should like to refer to the returns on that point.

433. Might I ask your Lordship if you could supply the Committee with a statement of the quantities of provisions purchased in the country, the number of transport animals, and the number of men in charge of those animals who were hired as muleteers, or in the Transport Train, and the various services which they rendered?—I have no doubt that that return has been made up.

434. In January it is stated by Captain Hozier, that "an agreement had also been made with 14 chieftains of tribes inhabiting the pass through the mountains, not only to allow of the free passage of convoys through the fastnesses, but to carry on native cattle some of the supplies required by the troops from the plains to the tableland;" did that modify your Lordship's view as to the quantity of supplies which you would require to be brought to Abyssinia?—I did not rely in the least upon anything which we might get from the country. It might cease at a moment, and at some most critical times it did cease. I availed myself of every assistance, but I did not rely upon it all until I had actually got it in my possession.

435. Mr. Campbell.] Is there one season better than another for procuring forage in Abyssinnia?—Yes; there is a rainy season, which brings forward the vegetation.

436. Therefore, would it not be easier to get forage during the rainy season than at other times?—After the rainy season.

437. Then the reason which would necessitate your having a large supply of stores, and in contemplation of which you thought it necessary to have a large supply, was that you might be detained by the rains; would not those rains at the same time increase the supply of native forage?—Very possibly they might do so; but I should have been an idiot if I had trusted to anything but what I was certain of. There were plains where there was grass, and there were plains where no forage whatever was to be procured.

438. Then your Lordship says that you did not trust at all to the native supply; but, as a matter of fact, as the honourable Chairman pointed out, only 4,000 tons of imported forage seemed to have been consumed; is not that so?—I would ask whether you include grain with forage, or whether it is merely hay?

439. Hay; of the 17,000 tons shipped from Bombay only 4,000 tons were used; so that there must have been a large consumption of native forage during the time of the Expedition, must there not?—I think that I should do no good in answering these questions, because they are matters of detail. The facts upon which the questions are based might be liable to correction if they were placed before the Commissariat officers, and any replies which I might make regarding them would be liable to mislead the Committee, so that I think you had better refer those questions to the Commissariat Officer himself.

440. The questions refer not so much to the absolute amount consumed as to the chances of the requirements of the force; if it had been the experience of the force that they got a sufficient quantity of hay in the country to supply their wants, with the exception of the 4,000 tons said to have been consumed, was not that a reason to expect that even in the rainy season had you been detained, there would have continued to be a sufficient supply?—There was no security that that supply would have been available for us. Whenever the natives were alarmed, or suspicious of us, they burnt the grass. Miles of grass were burnt in front of our path. Indeed the burning of dry grass was often a source of some anxiety for our own camps.

441. Then, if this large quantity of reserve hay was down at Zulla, or at Aden, if the rains prevented the force from going down, and shut you up at Senafé, would they not equally, by flooding the defiles, prevent the supplies of forage coming up?—No; because there would be an interval between the floods in which the native carriers might have found their way up, and had we not seen a prospect of returning, we should, no doubt, have taken more active measures to collect a supply at Senafé.

442. Sir Patrick O'Brien.] May we gather, that this large requisition was made upon the ground that you were unacquainted with the country, and could not rely upon the tribes of the country?—Entirely.

443. Mr. Eastwick.] Is it not the fact, that the people of the country withheld their supplies until they ascertained that your force, unlike the troops to which they were accustomed, could pay for the supplies which they furnished?—On the first arrival of the advanced detachment of our force, supplies were brought which, for that small number, appeared to indicate something like plenty, but that was very rapidly used; and, subsequently, whether from our having consumed all which was within reach, or from disinclination to bring it, the first point, Senafé, which had promised to be well supplied, was found to be absolutely destitute, and depended entirely upon the port for its subsistence, even for forage. At first it supplied grass, which was carried down, and which was purchased and stacked, but, subsequently, all within reach was used, and then it was entirely dependent upon the port; and I think it probable that, if we could see the returns, we should find that a considerable part of the forage consumed there latterly was supplied from below. As we advanced, there was at times great scarcity, and frequently the animals were without food, or had only a very scanty feed. I think that Colonel Milward, commanding the artillery, has made a report

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report that his mules, for a considerable time, very seldom got a full feed. After my interview with Kassai, he made great exertions to supply us, and at Antalo, after one interview, and after there had been time for his orders to take effect, our supplies increased very much. Generally, I may say, that as the presence of a large force gave weight to our demands, they were met, and when there was not the pressure of a considerable force, and posts were left for some time without the support that the large forces had given, the supplies diminished very much. It may have arisen, in some instances, from our having consumed all that was near. In other instances it may have arisen from disinclination to give it, from a natural apprehension in the country that we should consume so much of their supplies that they would suffer great distress; and I believe that, after we left the country, in some parts, there was great distress on that account.

444. Was it not the fact that, about the middle of February, when the force was at Adigerat, there was information received from the Commissary General that he could not feed any more men from the high lands?—Yes.

445. And, simultaneously, was there not also information from the chief Commissariat officer that the supplies had not arrived from below?—Yes; there was a time when there was considerable anxiety as to supplies from below, particularly those which I most required; but that anxiety was afterwards relieved by the arrival of a shipload of flour. The Deputy Commissary General at Zulla reported that he could not feed any more men in the high lands, and proposed to put the men on half rations.

446. But, generally, the country furnished much less supplies than could have been expected; did it not?—In some places supplies were furnished, even more extensively than I could have expected, and in others much less than we were led to expect from the delusive appearances which greeted the first party, the reconnoitering party, and the advanced party; they being a small body, and finding the resources of the country untouched, considered that there was plenty; but the moment there came a large pressure upon those supplies, they were rapidly consumed, and then we were at times in great distress. We had to manage our cavalry so as to give it the benefit of the best resources, and we had to exercise great care in doing this. Our supply was often very precarious indeed, and we were obliged to pay well for it.

447. At all events, did not the uncertainty of the supplies from the country lead to the necessity of preparing a greater quantity of stores than perhaps would have been required in other expeditions where the country was very fertile?—I may say certainly that I placed no reliance upon the country, because any accident might have cut off our supplies.

448. In your answer to Question 6, you have given the three principal causes why the expense exceeded the estimate; might it not be added as perhaps a slight, or at all events a supplementary, cause, why the expense exceeded the estimate, that the supplies from the country were comparatively insufficient and so precarious?—The supplies from the country were insufficient and precarious; they were not to be relied upon, and that of course rendered it necessary to be pro-

vided with supplies for the whole force. Therefore the tenor of my requisition and instructions was to provide supplies for the whole force irrespective of what might be procured from the country.

449. *Chairman.*] From the first?—From the first, that was the general tenor of my instructions to the Commissariat. My first order was for a period of six months; but the Commissariat officer, as soon as he became able to appreciate our wants, would have provided for the whole force, irrespective of anything to be got from the country. I may say incidentally, that I believe that if the expense of our food in the country were examined, it would be found that the cost was not great in many articles, perhaps less than it would have been at Bombay.

450. *Mr. Christopher Denison.*] As bearing upon the possibility of being able to order or counter-order certain supplies at any moment, what was the nature of the postal communication between Zulla and Bombay; was it a regular communication twice a week, or something of that sort, or was it an irregular communication?—At first the postal communication was irregular, and when there was a necessity to send a letter or communication a steamer was sent. Subsequently it was arranged to send a communication by the Peninsular and Oriental steamers as far as Gebel Tor, and there a steamer from Zulla was to wait and take the mails, and deliver the outgoing mails to the Peninsular and Oriental steamer. That arrangement failed so constantly, that I communicated to the naval officer on the station an authoritative requisition to establish postal steamers to Bombay and Suez. There had been three mails, I think, without any communication to Suez, and the greatest possible inconvenience and loss might have occurred.

451. What period of time would it have taken for a post to have got down to the coast, say from Antalo, when you first arrived in the country?—When we first arrived in the country the post was established by Colonel Merewether through the local authorities, through the chiefs on the spot. The post was to be carried by the Shohoes. Those wild people sometimes delivered the letters and sometimes did not. But when I arrived I found there really was no communication at all. It sometimes took a week to go 50 miles, and sometimes a man went away with the letter-bag altogether.

452. Latterly I suppose you were able to make use of the field telegraph, were you not, down to the coast?—Latterly we were. Finding this difficulty of communication, I had in the first instance to send my two staff officers from Zulla up to the furthest mule, and they rode back counting the mules to bring me a report of what numbers there were, because no one could count upon getting or receiving reports by the post. I then established a postal communication of soldiers with mules, and that gave us much more regularity, but then we found that we wanted post-offices. There being no postmasters at short distances, the post got irregular in passing detachments and isolated posts, and from the want of proper means of packing, the letters were very much broken up.

453. Under the best of circumstances it must have taken a very considerable time for any order of yours, as Commander in Chief, to reach Bombay, and to counter-order anything in the shape of supplies; and your order might possibly have

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have reached Bombay after ships had been chartered, and all arrangements made, might it not?—Very possibly; sometimes orders and communications were quicker than at other times. Sometimes, by a mistake of a horseman, a bag of letters was carried back from the point to which it had been taken to be delivered and brought up the country again; such mistakes, of course rendered communication precarious, but, upon the whole, it was astonishing how well we were able to communicate after we had established ourselves upon the high lands; some letters were lost.

454. The Chairman has more than once referred to Captain Hozier's book, therefore I presume that it is open to me to direct your attention to page 111 of that book, which bears upon the questions which have already been put; it is this:—"At Adigerat the Commander in Chief halted till February 18. He had much to do in that time. There was still a great deficiency of transport, without which the troops could not be supplied, and without supplies they could not move. The country was found to improve slightly in fertility and cultivation as the army pushed forward, but the people were so poverty-stricken by constant civil war, that no supplies to support an army, except cattle and sheep, could be obtained from the natives. So attenuated were the resources at this time, that the Deputy Commissary General proposed to put the troops on half rations, but Sir Robert Napier considered that the men, unless sufficiently fed, could not perform the labour expected from them, and declined to entertain the proposal. He was justified in doing so, as the Transport Train, though still deficient in animals, was daily improving," &c. &c.; that is, I presume, a pretty faithful account of the nature of the interior of the country?—That is a faithful account of the interior of the country at that point; but at Antallo, after the friendly exertions of Prince Kassai, I succeeded in getting a large supply of flour, which really enabled me to advance earlier than I should have done otherwise; but I did not advance from Antallo until I had secured the flour, and had got it all under guard, and when I had sufficient, then I was able to advance. We were assisted by native carriage considerably, but it was a carriage which never could be relied upon; for at the very last, within a few days of Magdala itself, it broke down through the misbehaviour of one of the intermediate chiefs, a robber chief, who had professed the greatest possible friendship, but who interrupted the communication; and within a few marches of Magdala I had to send back Sir William Merewether (then Colonel Merewether), Major Grant, and Captain Moore, expressly to restore the communication, and I also had to call up more troops in order to maintain our authority upon the line of communication, and it was some time before it was thoroughly restored; but again, through the assistance of the political officers, that is to say, the officers of the Intelligence Department, other chiefs were made friendly by presents and liberal treatment, and we got a further supply, which enabled me to advance against Magdala itself. I knew that I had resources from the coast coming up, and that before very long they would come up to my support, but still for some time it was a matter of great anxiety.

455. Was any portion, or any considerable

portion, of the seaborne hay and compressed forage conveyed to the high lands of Abyssinia beyond the second post?—I do not think that any hay was conveyed beyond Antalo, but I should prefer that that question should be put to the Commissariat officers. The pack animals carried their own food for a certain distance; at the time I kept myself constantly acquainted with the quantity of supplies at each post. My adjutant general, to whom I had entrusted that duty, had daily reports, so as to keep me thoroughly informed of what I had and what I could rely upon, but I cannot trust to my memory, at this distance of time, to retain any exact remembrance of the reports.

456. Sir John Hay.] I suppose the famous maxim of the Duke of Berwick with regard to Spain, that in Spain small armies are beaten and large armies starve if they rely upon the resources of the country, will apply with equal force to Abyssinia?—Certainly.

457. And I presume that it was upon such considerations that you based the force which you considered necessary, and which you had, and that you made the arrangements for its supply from external sources?—Entirely; I had a very simple form of calculation. An ordinary hill position is always very difficult to invest, although you can invest a smooth plain easily, and I calculated that the smallest number of men that would answer for any such position was 5,000 or 6,000 men; then by a very simple process, considering the distance and the parties that would have to pass to and fro, I found that the force which I fixed upon was the very minimum that was safe.

458. That would rather bear out, would it not, the remark made by another very distinguished commander, the Duke of Wellington; "Nor has the experience of any officer realised the stories of which all have read, of whole armies being driven by a handful of light infantry or dragoons"?—I have seen large bodies chased by a small force when they were taken by surprise.

459. But the proposal to advance upon Magdala with a small force did not meet with your approbation, did it?—Certainly not.

460. And probably for the same reason as I have just stated?—I sent a Memorandum on that subject to the Secretary of State, explaining what I thought would be the inconveniences experienced by a small force; the worst thing which could possibly have happened to any force of ours would have been its detention in a helpless condition in front of the enemy; if you were to deduct from a force of 1,500 or 2,000 men, the number required to guard their baggage, to guard their sick, and to make the roads, there would be nothing left to face the enemy.

461. I see that in the Memorandum prepared by Major Warden, at page 427 of the Blue Book, Clause 8, in two or three places he alludes to dearly bought experience in the Crimea; I suppose that one of the main causes of prolonged and sometimes unsuccessful war has been the neglect to accumulate abundant supplies for the army in the field, with a reserve for all its necessities?—No doubt such neglect would be most likely, and indeed certain, to entail disaster at some time or other.

462. It might have very probably have detained you and the Expedition much longer in the country if you had not had sufficient supplies, might it not?—Most undoubtedly, if we had not had

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had supplies; it was the certainty of having supplies to support me coming sooner or later, which enabled me to trust more to the native supplies than I possibly could have done otherwise. I could make an advance on trust when I saw a probability of getting native supplies, when I knew that if I found them diminishing, I should pause until I had my own supplies coming up to me; an army three days without food, and with no supplies, would have been in a very useless condition, and in three or four days such an army would have perished and have broken up.

463. That, I presume, was a responsibility which you were not prepared to face?—Certainly not.

464. A question has been asked with reference to the time which it would have taken for you to draw your supplies from Bombay, as they might have been required, by means of the communications which you have stated were possible, which would represent, at the shortest time (supposing that a steam vessel had been there, and loaded), something like a month between the date of your order or requisition and the re-delivery; the shortest mode of communication between Zulla and Bombay was, as you have stated, by steamer to Suez, thence by telegraph to Bombay; and then there would be a fortnight's steaming from Bombay, would there not, even supposing the vessel to have been ready?—I do not think it was possible that any requisition from me could have been answered from Bombay within two months; in the first place, the supplies had to be got, and had to be shipped, which is not an easy thing in Bombay, for Bombay is very singularly deficient in lighterage.

465. Evidence was given before this Committee last Session by the Director of Transports, that there was only 27,000 tons of steam transport available in India, without interfering with the ordinary passenger traffic of the country; looking to the fact of the enormous amount of tonnage which was required to supply the Expedition, is it probable that there would have been steam-vessels available at Bombay for the purpose of bringing up supplies in case you had depended upon the telegraph, and the communication which has been suggested?—I do not think that the port could possibly have supplied steamers unless they were taken up. When an expedition is being carried on, communication is made to all the ports within reach that steamers are required, and numbers flock to the port; but they would not flock there for the precarious chance of employment in case of a requisition, and they would not have been found there certainly.

466. Almost all the available steamers in India were employed, were they not?—So much so that I believe Captain Tryon could inform you that the Government of Bombay were obliged to employ some of the steamers of the Expedition for the domestic transport of the country, whilst the troops were remaining in reserve at Bombay until I called for them.

467. Then it would have been very unsafe, would it not, in the unfavourable season, to have trusted at all to supplies from Bombay?—Very unsafe. The tenor and spirit of my instructions to the Commissariat officers were to trust to Egypt rather than to Bombay. I doubted very much, after the first supplies had been drawn from Bombay, whether they could produce the supplies required without considerable delay,

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whereas Egypt had abundant supplies and was much closer at hand.

468. Granting that in all wars there must be some waste, do you apprehend that the waste in the Abyssinian War has been very excessive?—I believe that the Commissariat officers and the Government of Bombay acted under a very heavy sense of responsibility with regard to economy, and I feel confident that neither of those officers would have incurred the slightest expense which they did not consider necessary, or would have permitted the slightest waste which they could avoid. As I mentioned before, I have entered no more into the question of supplies than in making my requisitions; but I can very confidently state that from the character of the officers concerned, and, as I have explained, from his Excellency the Governor's view of economy, it would be the furthest possible thing from the minds of those officers either to incur unnecessary expenditure or to permit waste.

469. Sir Patrick O'Brien.] In reference to a question put to you by an honourable Member, as to whether the supply of forage in Abyssinia having in some instances fallen short of what was expected may not have affected the estimate; do you think that, forage supplies sufficient for six months having been provided from Bombay, any subsequent failure of native supply in Abyssinia itself could have affected the estimate?—If in advancing into the country we found that the first hopes of supplies were delusive, we should naturally at once have warned the commissariat officer that we expected him to direct his attention to being prepared with further supplies.

470. But were not the supplies actually at Zulla for six months?—I do not know whether the supplies were at Zulla for six months, but I understand the question to be whether a deficiency or otherwise of native supplies in the country would affect the estimate for supplies from Bombay. It would not affect the estimate, because my estimate was for the full time, and for the full quantity of troops. I determined not to rely upon the resources of the country at all.

471. Mr. Eastwick.] What I meant to imply by my question was, that it probably affected your Lordship's first estimate; had there been evidently supplies in the country, and had that been well known, had the country been as well supplied as we know many countries are, your Lordship's original estimate would probably have been less, would it not?—If I had had certain grounds to rest upon regarding the supply, of course I should not have demanded so much from an extraneous source. The first reports of the country were very favourable. The first description of the land between Zulla and the high lands was that it was a plain of grass, with herds of wild animals feeding upon it. But we did not find anything of the kind; we found it a bare plain of sand. There appeared to have been a succession of bad seasons, and the whole country appeared entirely destitute of forage until we reached the high lands. Even the first journeys through the passes disclosed no grass. It was only subsequently by making friends with the wild inhabitants of the hills that we found that there were supplies of grass on the hill sides, which none but those men could have got; our men would not have been able to climb those precipices; and they would probably

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probably have been speared or had their throats cut if they had attempted it. We could only get it from those wild people by the kindest treatment and the most liberal payment; but it was worth anything to us to get it, because it saved our carriage. It was demonstrated at one time by some gentleman, to the great alarm of the Commissariat officer on the spot, that a mule must consume his whole load of provision between Zulla and Senafé, but I was able to show by mathematical calculation that that was not the case, and I knew that in a short time I should have the carts, which would put the question at rest; but in the meantime a miscalculation of some mathematical friends had very much disquieted the minds of the commissariat officer, and the director of the transport train.

472. As it would have taken two months to answer a requisition for supplies from Bombay, and a considerable period to answer a requisition from Egypt, and as Theodore's movements were quite uncertain, was it not the more necessary to keep a large amount of supplies at the base of operations, because any sudden and unforeseen movement of his might have led to the necessity of establishing a new line of depôts?—Certainly; if Theodore had escaped to his own country, we must have formed a new depôt at Magdala itself, and from thence have proceeded to follow him, as we did proceed to follow him, to Magdala. But although that was a contingency, I endeavoured to provide against it by at once putting a very large price upon his head in case he had made his escape, and I believe that the Gallas would never have let him through their country; but that, within 48 hours, or within a very short time of his escape he would have been brought back. They would never have let go the prospect of such a great reward. But had it happened, we must have followed him; we could never have come away with the business incomplete.

473. Of course this would account in some degree for the necessity of keeping this large supply of compressed hay at Annesley Bay, would it not?—No doubt; I always held out to the Commissariat that the time of our return was uncertain. They had my general instructions at first to keep up a supply of six months in hand, and we were more than six months in the country, so that it is quite possible that they might even have engaged for three supplies of six months. I feel confident that the Commissariat Department will be able to explain their operations satisfactorily.

474. *Chairman.*] The failure to get supplies in the country in no way affected your requisitions for supplies from the Bombay Government, did it?—No.

475. Then any failure of the supplies in Abyssinia could not increase the cost of the supplies shipped, could it?—No, it made no difference at all in my requisitions.

476. Your Lordship was never, at any period, asked for an estimate of the cost of the Expedition?—Never.

477. Then you never did estimate it?—I never thought of it, beyond bearing in mind always avoiding making requisitions for anything that I considered would add to the expense unnecessarily.

478. You stated that it would require two months to order in Abyssinia supplies from Bombay, and to get them in return from Bombay to Abyssinia; have you thought how long it

would have taken to get them from Egypt?—I should think that we ought to have got supplies from Egypt within a month; it always takes some time to purchase and to ship. The transit from Zulla to Egypt varied from a week to 10 days, according to the wind; the winds were very variable there, and sometimes they were adverse.

479. *Captain Beaumont.*] With respect, first, to the supply of water pipes, I believe that the reconnoitring party at Annesley Bay recognised the failure of the supply of water that they reckoned upon at first, but a short examination of the environs showed that there was a supply of running water at two places, at Hodeida and at Weeah, so that I may say that there was a supply of running water within 16 miles of the camp; is that correct?—Yes.

480. Would there have been any very great difficulty in laying down pipes to convey that water to Zulla, and am I not right, as an engineer, in stating that those pipes might have been laid down, had they been on the ground, at the rate of something like three miles a day; that is to say, that if you had had the pipes there, you might have had a plentiful supply of good water at Annesley Bay within, say, a week's time of the delivery; and, under these circumstances, might not the following results have been counted on, to have released the condensing steamers, allowing them to have been used for towing ships out of the Red Sea; to have given an unlimited supply of water which the condensers failed to afford?—The question I understand to be whether if the pipes were on the ground they could not have been laid between Weeah and Hodeida in a week, so as to save the condensing of water at the port. When the reconnoitring party, after finding the diminution of the water at Zulla, found a stream of running water at Weeah, they were apparently (I speak now from assumption) so delighted at finding water, that their description of it was very favourable indeed. I rode out with Colonel Wilkins to Weeah to see the water; it was 17 miles, and we rode in the heat of the weather, with the sun at the temperature that I have described. I measured the water of this stream; I had had visions of bathing in it, but when I measured the stream it was 18 inches broad and half-an-inch deep over sand; and when I put my foot into it, the subsoil of it was the blackest mud and filth possible. The stream of the water had covered this filth, which was the collection from the cattle of probably many many years, with a thin surface of sand, which delivered the water apparently clear over it; but the moment you stirred up the bottom, you had an unlimited depth of mud below. There was, a little further in this stream, a spring with hot water bubbling up, but it would have required a good deal of labour to have cleared out a reservoir, and prepared it, so as to draw the water. It would have required either a dam to collect the water, or it would have required a good deal of excavation to prepare a supply to be delivered from the pipes, so that it could not have been done in a week, and it probably would be difficult to say how long it would have taken.

481. Even assuming that it took a fortnight, or three weeks, to do, the works in connection with it might have been completed before the pipes could have come on to the ground, might they not?—There was a good deal to consider.

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The ground was not flat, but undulated, and there would have been some cutting. There was some considerable fall in the country, and yet there was undulation, so that there would have been some engineering required, regarding the strength of the pipes. Some stand-pipes would have been required, and some assurance as to the quantity of supply. I believe that, had I found it necessary to have the pipes laid, I should have preferred laying them from the wells, where the water was drawn up, by the Bastier's pumps, from a fresh hot spring, rather than from the Weeah River, although the Weeah River was a resource better than none.

482. I apprehend that there were no undulations of the ground that could not have been got over by giving a sufficient head to the supply, because there is no object in laying water pipes level, provided you have a sufficient head to overcome the rises of the ground, and consequently, had the pipes been on the ground, they might have been laid at such a speed as the nature of the work permitted. I quite recognise the fact which your Lordship mentions as to the supply of water, and if the water supply was insufficient, of course the pipes would have been useless?—There was a supply, the discharge of the water on the calculation I made would have given a supply to the pipes; but the moment it became disturbed at all, the water would have been foul, and it would not have been fit to deliver without the preparation of a reservoir; there would have been considerable labour in that; the Honourable Member has no doubt been sufficiently concerned in hydraulic works to understand that great care is required in dealing with a spring. You have to be acquainted with the whole of the soil surrounding it, otherwise, if you shut it up at one point, it escapes at another. No doubt the spring at Weeah could and would have been made available, had our detention on the coast been continued, but the engineer, I believe, found, that when the pipes had arrived, and were ready, there was a sufficient prospect of the close of the Expedition to preclude the necessity of their being laid down; I understand that Colonel Wilkins is detained here in order to give his evidence before the Committee, and I think I would refer all engineering questions to him.

483. I may point out that the desirability of utilising the supply of water that was available, would appear to have been recognised, by the demand for pipes having been made immediately by the reconnoitring party; the point at which I wished to arrive is, from what causes the delay in the supply resulted, and whether your Lordship specially represented to the Bombay Government the urgent nature of the service?—If the Honourable Chairman permits me, I will read my Memorandum to the Bombay Government on that subject, dated the 3rd of December 1867. This was written on receipt of a report of the advanced party of the state of the water: "The supply of water at Zoulla, which promised well at the time when Colonel Merewether landed, proved unreliable as a permanent resource, although the occurrence of rain may restore it occasionally. The supply by condensers is being provided for, but is liable to contingencies, and there are no convenient means of having a reserve in case of temporary suspension. If the campaign should be of any long duration, the necessity of a better arrangement appears to be beyond doubt.

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Even should the campaign be short, the re-embarkation must entail the collection of a large number of men and cattle of all descriptions at Zoulla. There are places between Zoulla and the Weeah River, where troops and establishments could encamp if there were water. I therefore recommend that a supply of pipes to carry water from the Weeah River to Mulkutto, be ordered from England, overland; tanks could be furnished from Bombay, or the materials for tanks might be sent with the pipes, all ready to be rivetted together, if this course should be found preferable. Tanks would, I am informed, be necessary to break the pressure of the water inter-immediately, and a supply of water might be thrown off at such places between the Weeah River and Mulkutto as may require it. It will require the professional decision of engineers conversant with this branch of hydraulics to determine the description of piping that should be sent, and any subsidiary arrangements for meeting the pressure consequent on a considerable difference of elevation between the extreme points of the piping. Should the Expedition terminate so soon as to render the piping unnecessary for Abyssinia, there will be no difficulty whatever in applying it to one of the numerous cantonments in the Bombay Presidency, which labour under the disadvantage of the want of a sufficient supply of good water."

484. *Chairman.*] Was that communicated to the Bombay Government before your Lordship left Bombay?—That was communicated to the Bombay Government before I left Bombay, immediately on receiving from the reconnoitring party a sufficiently mature report as to the state of the water to enable me to form a judgment on the matter.

485. *Captain Beaumont.*] Was not an earlier report than that sent directly to your Lordship from the reconnoitring party, reaching Bombay in October, or dated in October, shortly after the landing of the reconnoitring party?—I did not think that there were data to enable me to determine upon putting the State to the expense of getting the pipes until I received the report. I have not here the report upon which I wrote the memorandum which I have just read.

486. Your Lordship would appear, then, to have recognised thoroughly the necessity for the pipes?—Yes; and on the 4th December I find this: "Proposed telegram to be forwarded by his Excellency the Governor to Colonel Wilkins, Royal Engineers, Abyssinia." Those were instructions to Colonel Wilkins to send to the Secretary of State from Suez a telegram giving the details to enable an engineer to prepare the pipes.

487. On what date were they prepared?—That, I think, had better be referred to Colonel Wilkins.

488. *Sir John Hay.*] When would that reach Colonel Wilkins from Bombay?—In all probability in a fortnight or three weeks.

489. About Christmas?—I suppose probably about Christmas. It took over three weeks to receive communications from the reconnoitring party; but if you will mention the date on which the report was made we could easily find it.

490. *Captain Beaumont.*] It is stated in one of the first reports from General Merewether, that there was water within a certain distance, and he recommended that pipes should be supplied; but I am not quite certain (speaking from memory) whether the pipes that were demanded

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demand, referred to the whole 16 miles, or whether they referred only to the local requirements of the camp?—Colonel Merewether's Report adverted not to the Weeah River, but to another stream, as to which a requisition was made for pipes immediately, and they were actually put on board the steamer to be sent from Bombay; and then the route was abandoned, and another route was adopted; so that those pipes were not sent. I remember now that some pipes actually were supplied from Bombay and put on board ship, and upon the change of route they were re-landed. It was a matter of regret on my part that they were re-landed, because I thought that they might have been useful for other purposes. I have no doubt that I can find upon the records the history of that report and transaction. I think it was for a supply of four miles of pipe that the requisition was made. All those reports are recorded. Colonel Wilkins will be able to explain the whole of the engineering questions.

491. The desirability of conveying water by means of pipes to Annesley Bay, appears to have been thoroughly recognised by your Lordship; but you are unable to give the date on which the pipes were supplied, or to state whether there was any undue delay, or any cause of complaint from delay in the supply of those pipes?—I think the pipes were supplied as soon as possible upon the requisition. The first report of the reconnoitring party (I speak generally from memory, but I think, upon the whole, I may rely upon my recollection of the general points) mentioned a pass which had a good supply of water, and the delivery of this water at the coast by pipes was suggested. I think it was not more than four miles. Some pipes were procured in Bombay, and actually loaded in a steamer or in a ship to go; and then, upon the arrival of a subsequent report, the pipes were taken out and some other load was put in the steamer. That was the report, that they had abandoned the route that they had first thought of, and adopted the Koomali Pass.

492. Was your Lordship at Bombay at the time that the question of the supply of a railway to communicate between the sea-coast and the base of the pass was under consideration?—Yes.

493. Did you direct your attention specially to that point?—Yes.

494. Were you of opinion from the first that it was extremely desirable that a railway should be supplied, and that it should be supplied in such a condition that it could be laid down with the greatest possible rapidity?—I was of that opinion. I should like to place on record a memorandum, which I submitted to the Government of Bombay on the 12th of September. On that date I say: "Sir Robert Napier believes that a tramway of the lightest description procurable would be most valuable, and recommends that the materials for it should be forwarded to the coast with the Expedition. The rails might be laid down quickly for a few miles towards post, No. 1, and would be found of much assistance in the removal of materials, stores, and baggage from the landing places." Subsequently there came from the Secretary of State an offer by Messrs. Brassey & Co. to lay a 3-foot 6-inch railway at, I think, 2,500*l.* or 3,000*l.* a mile. Our knowledge of the ground was not very great; but I was inclined to recommend that the risk should be run of ordering

this railway from the coast to the high land. However, I did not consider it so urgent as to press it upon the Governor as a requisition upon which I rested. I laid the matter before his Excellency the Governor, and his Excellency, considering all the circumstances, did not feel inclined to incur the responsibility of making a requisition for this railway.

495. Sir John Hay.] On account of the expense, I suppose?—Yes.

496. Captain Beaumont.] A railway was supplied; and I am right, I think, in stating that it was the five-foot-six gauge; the Indian gauge; that it was composed of second-hand materials to a great extent, if not entirely; that those materials were sent more or less worn out; that the engines were not in a satisfactory condition; and that the materials and the patterns of the chairs and fastenings were so diverse that it was a source of considerable delay in laying down the line. At the same time I believe that the expense will be found, when it is fairly compared, to be equal to that at which Mr. Brassey offered to lay down the line. Under these circumstances, was it the Bombay Government that decided alone to take that course with reference to the railway?—Yes.

497. Had you been consulted, would your Lordship, as an engineer, have suggested the advisability of sending a five-foot-six gauge railway to be laid down in a country of that nature, bearing in mind the necessity for speed that existed; or would you rather have preferred to have had the plant sent from England, which would be complete in itself and of the smaller gauge, which I believe I am right in saying engineers generally consider as the best for military purposes?—I was inclined to accept the offer of Messrs. Brassey & Co. They offered to lay 30 or 50 miles of railway, I think, or any amount that was required. There was a good deal to be said on both sides. If it had been left to me to decide, I should have decided upon calling for the railway; but I did not consider the case sufficiently clear to induce me to press it upon his Excellency the Governor.

498. Are you aware that similar proposals by General Simmons, of the Royal Engineers, and by Sir John McNeil, all more or less agreeing in principle, were submitted to the Indian Government in England, but were passed on to the Bombay Government?—Very probably. They passed on all the proposals which were made to them to the Bombay Government directly.

499. Were they submitted to your Lordship?—I dare say they were; I remember only Messrs. Brassey & Co.'s principally.

500. Am I right in understanding, then, that the Bombay Government were responsible for the course which was eventually taken?—Entirely. The Bombay Government were fully possessed of my opinion that a railway was desirable.

501. Would it not be extremely desirable that the scheme for a military railway should be prepared, that the patterns should be in existence, and that we should have contracts arranged in this country with responsible firms who would be capable of efficiently carrying them out, so as for the future to avoid the question of doubt which, apparently in this case, has arisen; would it not be a matter of the first importance, according to your Lordship's judgment, as an engineer and a soldier, that no doubt should exist

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exist as to the pattern of railway which we should use, and as to the possibility of supplying it in a given time, with reference to future operations?—It would be a very great advantage to military operations if the question were placed in that settled state.

502. With reference to the telegraph, assuming that a responsible company were willing to lay a telegraph cable from Suez to Zulla for a moderate sum, I think that your Lordship has stated that it is difficult to estimate the advantage that would have accrued if it could have been laid in time. The point upon which I desire to ask your Lordship's opinion is this: Would it have been worth while to lay the cable if it could have been laid in three months?—Looking to the immense power of development in this country, I should think there could be no difficulty in laying a cable in three months; but that is a matter which those conversant with submarine cables can better answer than I can.

503. Possibly it might explain my meaning better if I were to say that an offer by the Telegraph Construction and Maintenance Company was made to the Government to lay down a portion of the cable, which they are now laying down to India, at once from Suez to Zulla, but it could not have been done even by them in a month; and of course there was a limit of time beyond which the Government would have been unwise in entertaining the proposition. What would be your opinion as to the length of time, assuming that the company had said, "We can do it in three months from September"?—I should have accepted it at once.

504. Would you have accepted it at a longer date than that?—With the uncertainty before us of the length of the Expedition, I would have accepted, I think, even a later date. It is not as if the thing would have been thrown away, but the cable was half way between England and India. A cable which would deliver a message at Zulla was half way between Suez and Bombay; therefore it had simply to be continued to Bombay, and there was half the work done which is being done now. If it had been laid from Suez to a point opposite the port of Zulla, a branch might have communicated with the cable from Zulla.

505. Assuming (as I believe was the case) that nineteen-twentieths would have been available, your Lordship states that your opinion is, that almost any terms in reason should have been entered into with a responsible company, who were willing to have had a cable down and in working order before the end of 1867?—If I had had to decide I would have accepted that offer. I would beg to say with reference to the terms, that I, of course, could not offer an opinion as to whether the Government were justified or not in rejecting any terms. I can only say that I would have had a cable if it were possible.

506. I specially used the words "terms in reason," which admit of considerable latitude. Three hospital ships were sent from England at a very considerable expense; it has been suggested that the ships which are laid up in ordinary could have been used, do you know any reason why that should not have been done?—There might, perhaps, have been difficulty in towing them round. They could not have arrived so quickly as the steam hospital ships, and I had experienced before the very great benefit of

having the transport of which we were certain delivered in a short time. I should have preferred for a hospital ship a large man-of-war with an open deck, because the steam machinery occupies a good deal of space, and obstructs ventilation. If an ordinary man-of-war could have been towed round in time, I should have preferred it for a hospital ship, always having steam available to tow it, if we wanted to send the sick troops away.

507. The ships to which I allude are steamers themselves; ships that are laid up in ordinary. If steam men-of-war had been available at that time, is there any reason why steam men-of-war should not be as suitable for hospital ships as those ships which were hired?—I have not before me at this moment in my mind a plan of a steam man-of-war. Upon seeing those hospital ships, if I could have had a large line-of-battle ship, with an open deck from stem to stern, for a hospital ship, I should have preferred it to a steamer, of which the midships is blocked up by machinery; but there are great advantages in having a steamer, because occasionally the sick can be relieved by a cruise in the oppressive heat; and when a steamship was full it might make a short trip to Suez to deliver the sick there, so that there are advantages in having a steamer. Of course I am not able to speak of the comparative advantages of using the steamers which came and the steamers which may have been in harbour or in dock here, or as to the policy of using steam or sailing vessels; that is a question belonging to this country. I could not see beyond Zulla.

508. Sir John Hay.] Were the hospital ships which were sent there in good time?—Yes.

509. And were they useful?—Yes; and I think it is due to the authorities who sent those ships to lay emphasis on the fact that their early arrival was of the greatest advantage.

510. Captain Beaumont.] Was it not suggested that the Indian transport ships should be used for the conveyance of troops, and if that had been done would it not have resulted in a considerable economy?—I think not; it would have interrupted the transit and relief of troops to and from India.

511. They were asked for by the Government of India. I think Sir Seymour Fitzgerald asked for them, did he not?—Yes.

512. Was it not his opinion that an interruption of five or six weeks to the troop service would have placed the ships at the disposal of the Expedition, arrangements being made for sending the Indian reliefs home otherwise?—I do not remember the correspondence which took place on that subject, nor whether I saw it all, but I remember that the subject was considered, and it was thought that at that early stage of the overland transit it would be very inexpedient to interrupt its regularity.

513. Your Lordship is not of opinion that it would much have affected the question of cost. I would ask your Lordship to bear in mind the peculiar circumstances of the case which obtained at Bombay where every ton of steam transport in the harbour was taken up; would it not seem, at first sight, that the fact of having a considerable amount of steam tonnage available would have given those who were chartering steamers a certain command of price, which they could not have when they were obliged to take up all the tonnage which there was in the harbour

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bour of Bombay?—That is a question of administration as to whether it would be expedient to interrupt the relief of troops from India; and that is, I think, a question upon which I could hardly be expected to pronounce an opinion, because it would be pronouncing an opinion upon superior authorities.

514. Your Lordship would hold one opinion and his Excellency Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, would hold another, he being in favour of employing the ships and you being of opinion that it was not desirable to employ them; it would result that, upon that point, there was a diversity of opinion?—I do not think that the question came at all for my opinion. I could not have interfered in the slightest degree in the disposal of those ships, or in the question of reliefs. It was a matter entirely conducted between the Supreme Government and the Government of England.

515. You would have considered it, therefore, beyond your province?—I should have considered it beyond my province.

516. Sir John Hay.] Was it not desirable that any steam transport which might be sent with troops to Annesley Bay should be of a character which could have been detained for any given time, for the purpose of distilling for the troops, and for the purpose of acting as a barrack or a store?—That proved to be necessary.

517. Chairman.] In point of fact, was it not the case that a very great many steamships which carried troops to Annesley Bay, did not remain in Annesley Bay to receive back those troops, but were employed in all intermediate service between the time of their first landing those troops, and their ultimate discharge from service?—Yes; some were sent back to Bombay. I think the disposal of the ships is fully reported upon by Captain Tryon, and I do not think that I could add anything to his report supplement beyond this, that I never would have allowed the troops to be left without a sufficient supply of steamers at Zulla; I do not think that the Naval authorities would have ventured to deprive me of the means of removing the troops; in fact, I think that the removal or the detention of the steamers finally rested upon my decision.

518. Captain Beaumont.] Was it not one of the reasons which was very strongly urged in favour of the present Transport Service for the service of the East, that those ships would be available in the event of a war for transport service, that they would give to a certain extent the command of the market, by having that amount of Transport Service available, and that at the same time they would afford what was considered at the time, the great advantage of the ship taking one or two regiments complete, with their staff, horses, and so forth, so that they could be disembarked at once?—I have some recollection of those advantages having been pointed out, but it is not a correspondence that would have come through my office.

519. Your Lordship will pardon my putting the question, but I am anxious to get your opinion upon a point of such great importance, and from an officer of your distinguished position?—It would depend entirely upon the importance of the occasion for which it was required. The detention of a regiment in India beyond its fair period of service, or even of its detention, as I think in the case of some of the regiments, beyond their fair period of service, in consequence of the

mutiny (I am not quite certain whether I am right upon that point), would be a question for the military administrators to determine, as to how far it would be proper to keep troops in the country, or to suspend the supply of reliefs for a military operation.

520. But I apprehend that the matter of suspending the reliefs for six or eight weeks, would not be considered deserving of being weighed against the desirability (if desirability it was) of utilising those ships for the Abyssinian Expedition?—The period of the reliefs is a very short one, and if you deducted six or eight weeks from it, you would probably drive the troops into a very inconvenient season for shipment or for moving in the country.

521. At any rate, although it did not come before your Lordship to decide, your opinion is that the Indian transports ought not to have been used, as they were not used?—I think that there were objections; it was not merely transport on the side of the Red Sea, but they were also connected with steamers in the Mediterranean on the European side. If one had been cut off, the other would have been useless also, and it would have deranged the whole service of reliefs for that season.

522. With reference to the landing of the stores; in the first place, when the disposal of surplus stores was under consideration, was the question thought of as to the disposal of them in different places, that is to say, if they were (as they were) sent to two or three markets, the natural result of that would be a glut of the market, and the things would have practically no value. Were there any responsible advisers under you to whom your Lordship could refer for an answer to that question, and for a consideration of the best way generally of disposing of the stores?—The disposal of the stores was considered; there was a proposal to send some of the mules to the Mauritius for sale; an intimation was received from the Mauritius, that if mules were sent there a good sale would be found for them; but upon approaching the question, it appeared that the whole of the risk of delivering the mules after this long sea-voyage would have been upon the Government, and then they must have taken any prices that might have been offered at the Mauritius, and the keep of such an animal every hour adds to his cost, so that the Government having incurred the expense of delivering the animals, must have parted with them for nothing if no one offered any money; it would have been better to have killed them than to have kept them.

523. But was the question from a considered broad point of view?—Yes.

524. By whom under your Lordship?—I do not remember with whom the decision upon that point would have rested. I certainly should not have taken upon myself to have sent the mules to the Mauritius with that liability upon them. On the other hand, if it had been clear to me that I could have saved the Government anything by sending them there I would not have hesitated to do so. So removed as I was from the seat of Government at that time, any measure which appeared to me to be clearly for the benefit of the Government, I would have carried out on my own responsibility.

525. With the multifarious duties which would devolve upon your Lordship, it would be impossible, would it not, to give that subject due consideration

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sideration unless you had somebody to whom you could refer?—I had excellent authorities, I consider, on the spot. Captain Tryon would have given me a very good opinion; Colonel Lucas, the Head Commissariat Officer, would also have given a sound opinion.

526. Then, were they consulted upon the point with reference to the disposal of the stores generally, or who were those (without saying that the best steps were or were not taken with reference to them) who advised your Lordship with reference to the disposal of the stores, and was the course taken decided after due consideration?—Yes; there were only two courses to pursue with the stores, either to abandon them on the coast, or to send them away. To send them to Egypt could only have been done in ships belonging to Egypt, because there would have been the extra voyage to pay for, whereas the ships belonging to Bombay were bound to return to Bombay. Such of the stores as were required for Aden were delivered at Aden, some of the forage was delivered at Aden, and was found extremely valuable. All that was asked for was delivered there, and had the officer in command there had sufficient experience of the value of it, he would have demanded more. It would have been a good thing if we had left a considerable quantity more than was delivered there. It was also considered that forage was very scarce at Bombay itself, and if the ships had to return, it was better that they should return with the forage to Bombay than that they should leave what was in the ships on the coast at Zulla. There was a committee appointed to consider these questions upon the spot, and they advised what was best to be done.

527. What are the names of the officers on that committee?—That is a matter of record; the officers were General Russell, Colonel Holland, and Captain Tryon; General Russell was the Commanding Officer at the coast, Colonel Holland was the Controller, and Captain Tryon was in charge of the transport.

528. Then the question was referred to the committee, and your Lordship acted upon the suggestions of the committee?—Yes. With reference to the transport animals also, committees were held in a similar manner; those that were considered altogether unfit for service were given to the natives, those that were considered worth sending were entrusted to Mr. Munzinger to take to a part of Abyssinia where they could be fed and well sold, and the account was rendered to the Bombay Government. A certain number were returned to India because India had been denuded of its transport animals, and if they had not been returned to India, India would have had to buy more in Persia, to which market she resorts for her transport animals.

529. My remark would apply to stores generally, but especially to hay. Speaking generally, did the committee submit to your Lordship any document or official statement of the value that the stores were likely to realise at the different ports of debarkation as compared with the cost of taking them there, or was your decision arrived at from the general submission of the opinion of the committee by word of mouth?—I have no distinct recollection, but the proceedings of all such committees are always placed on record, and they pass through the departmental officers to me, and the departmental officers might show me the papers and receive my instructions. I am reminded by Major Holland that General Russell,

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who commanded at the port of embarkation was instructed to carry out the recommendations of the committee, and whether those recommendations were made before I left or after I left, he would have carried them out. I could do nothing else but accept the advice of the best advisers, nor could he.

530. And was that advice tendered in such a shape as to show by figures the reasons for the course that was recommended?—I have no doubt that it was properly placed on record, but I do not remember the details.

531. Was your Lordship in Bombay when the ships returned?—No.

532. Is your Lordship acquainted with Bombay Harbour?—Yes.

533. Do you know that there would have been any difficulty in towing the ships behind Butchers' Island, or in discharging the ships in various parts of the harbour, not opposite to the bunders where they were discharged; and would not such a course have been advisable, depending upon the value of the stores when landed, as compared with the hire of the ships under time charter?—That is a question which I do not feel competent to answer. One thing is very clear, that if the demurrage of a ship is greater than the value of the stores there are on board, then it would be cheaper to sacrifice the stores than to keep the ships. That is a simple matter of arithmetic, and that I conclude is the point which decided the authorities of Bombay. I know that the harbour of Bombay at times is subject to such bad weather that ships may be many days without being able to unload, and at other times, even during the bad season, there may be calm weather, during which they may be unloaded.

534. Under these circumstances the question should be looked at from the point of view which your Lordship states; that is to say, putting the value of the stores when landed against the cost of the demurrage of the ships?—It appears to me that the question is very simple. If the hay or the forage was on board the ships, we could not discharge the ships at Zulla, because they were engaged to be discharged at Bombay. It was better, therefore, to send the forage to Bombay, to give it a chance of being of use. It might have been calm weather then and they might have been able to land it.

535. My question was with reference to the discharging of the ships in Bombay Harbour. Supposing that it had not been considered necessary to discharge them in the formal way in which they were discharged on the Bombay bunders, the ships might have been unloaded by making other arrangements, towing them to different parts of the harbour, or behind Butchers' Island, where the water is calm and free from the effects of the monsoon wind, and where they might have been discharged, possibly, in one-third of the time?—That is a naval question, which I could not answer at all. Beyond my knowledge of the fact that the Bombay Harbour is extremely deficient in proper means of lighterage, and that there is not a good class of lighter in the Bombay Harbour for rough weather.

536. My object in raising the point was merely to put it upon record as your Lordship's opinion, that the propriety of taking such a course would be a matter of money calculation only?—Entirely.

537. Sir John Hay.] I think your Lordship used

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used the expression "discharged" in a different sense from that in which it was used by the Honourable Member?—I used the word "discharged" as to the ceasing of the contract.

538. Mr. *Eastwick*.] With reference to the possibility of unloading, I think that there are very deficient means of unloading vessels in Bombay Harbour; and except at the bunders, it would be almost impossible, would it not, to unload a great number of vessels in different places?—There are a number of boats for receiving cotton, which they call cotton boats, in the harbour of Bombay; and in calm weather those boats are of great use in receiving cargoes from ships, but in rough weather the cargoes could not be landed in that way.

539. But would not those boats be required for their usual work at the different bunders?—I believe that the supply is not abundant, and my impression from the general tenor of opinion at Bombay is, that the harbour is extremely ill-supplied with lighterage. Certainly, for military purposes, at the time of the Expedition, nothing could have been more desirable than it was.

540. But are you not aware that the vessels do not discharge at the bunders at all, but that they discharge in the stream?—They discharge in the stream.

541. Then, whether they were or were not near the bunders was a matter of very small importance, was it not, so far as the unloading was concerned?—Those near the bunders can discharge more quickly than those which cannot approach them, and have to trust to tenders.

542. I believe no ship can go alongside a quay or wharf in Bombay?—No.

543. Captain *Beaumont*.] Ships come into Bombay in the height of the monsoon, and the difficulty there consists in getting the bunder boats, the discharging boats, alongside in such heavy weather. If they go behind Butchers' Island, they are lying in still water, and can discharge night and day, working double tides, can they not?—I have no doubt that if it had been practicable to land the stores, they would have done so. There could not have been any wanton desire to throw them overboard; it must have been a simple arithmetical calculation.

544. *Chairman*.] But your Lordship argues the matter rather than gives evidence as to facts?—I was not there; I simply know that, at times, there may be calm weather when unloading may go on, and at times there may be rough weather, when unloading becomes impossible, and that the rough weather may last for days. It was with reference to that that I made the remark of its having happened to me to have stores for two months on board ships in the harbour, that I could not get on shore in consequence of the bad weather.

545. Captain *Beaumont*.] I would remind you that without imputing waste or want of care one may imply want of consideration; the two things are distinct, though the result may be the same?—I think that what I have said was with reference to general considerations of economy, that there could have been no want of consideration. There may have been an error of judgment on the point, but I do not think that there was.

546. There was a difference of opinion between your Lordship and his Excellency the Governor of Bombay, with regard to the organisation of the Land Transport Corps, was there not?—Yes.

547. Your Lordship was of opinion that a military organisation of that corps was essential to success, were you not?—Yes.

548. His Excellency Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, on the contrary, was in favour of the organisation which is known as the "Maccuddum" organisation, was he not?—I never heard it called by that name before; but that was a name which was invented then.

549. That is the organisation under which the land transport was previously organised, and which his Excellency thought was the one which was best adapted to the circumstances of your requirements; was not that the principal point of difference?—The point of difference was that the Governor, supported by the two members of Council, was of opinion that the ordinary form of transport establishment in use in the Commissariat Department was sufficient.

550. Was there any prejudice against the military organisation on the part of that class of the population who would be applied to in India to supply men for the land transport?—Such was asserted to be the case, but my impression is that there was nothing of the kind; that sufficient payment would have induced men to accept service under a military organisation, just the same as under any other organisation; and I am not aware that a single man of those who were enlisted under the civil organisation objected to the military organisation, or deserted from it.

551. I fancy that few military men would have two opinions as to whether, with time to organise it, a military organisation is or is not the best. But the circumstances of the question now under discussion were peculiar, because it was a question of changing from one organisation to another on the eve of active service. It would depend also both on the time which was necessary to organise the men and also on the material. Now, the worse the material, the more you would assume that it was desirable that a military organisation should subsist. The difficulty that would appear to have been experienced was owing to the nature of the material which the officers in charge of the Land Transport Train had to control, who was responsible for the enlistment of the Levantines and foreigners who composed the Land Transport Corps?—I would not say who was actually responsible for that, but I conclude that the Bombay Government made a requisition to the officers employed to purchase or to forward mules to engage muleteers for them; and it must have been the local officers employed at the markets where the animals were purchased who engaged the muleteers. For instance, the consuls or British agents at the ports in Persia, where mules were purchased, would have engaged and sent muleteers with them; without them they could not have sent the mules. They were responsible for the materials supplied, and the Government no doubt was responsible for the order given to them, but I suppose that they sent the only material which they could find there. There was considered to be much greater difficulty in procuring muleteers than ultimately proved to be the case. The prices of labour at Bombay are extremely high, and immediately at Bombay itself there is not a large class of people who would be useful as muleteers; but farther up the country in Hindostan, a large number might have been procured, and ultimately were procured. I forget exactly the number which were

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were sent down, but a very large body of muleteers were sent from the Punjaub and the North-West Provinces; and no doubt had the emergency appeared so great at first as it was afterwards, they might have been procured earlier.

552. I can understand that the enlistment of men for the purpose merely of conducting the mules to the point of disembarkation was a matter of minor importance, but the breakdown in the system occurred, I believe, from those men being employed afterwards, and forming part of the permanent organisation of the Land Transport Corps. Was that a matter of original contemplation; is it one on which there is official correspondence, showing the expressions of opinion upon it, and was that in accordance with your Lordship's wish?—My wish is contained in the Quartermaster General's letter, proposing the Land Transport Corps. Colonel Phayre proposed the Land Transport Corps, and Colonel Warden assisted in preparing the scheme for it, and it was based generally upon the transport corps which had existed in Bombay in the Persian Expedition. That was also corrected by the experience of the corps formed in the Crimea. In fact, upon the best information and experience available, the scheme of a Land Transport Corps was prepared. As the Committee will see from the proceeding on record, that was not approved of, and the argument used against it was, that the inhabitants of Bombay would not have enlisted under a military organisation; but I am of opinion that that was not at all a sound conclusion, and that the same amount of pay would have procured as many people for a military organisation as came for a civil organisation; in fact, the whole basis upon which the argument rested was, I think, clearly refuted by my memorandum on the subject, explaining what really was the system upon which they rested their objections. The system of carriage in the Commissariat in India is conducted generally by contract. A portion of the animals is the property of the Government, and there is an establishment of people who take care of them, and conduct them in the field, but the greater part of the carriage is hired, and the people who own the cattle have conductors, camel drivers, or bullock drivers in their employment, who are generally perhaps connected with the owner of a certain group of animals. He himself is owner and part driver, he accompanies his property, and probably many of the drivers may be his connections; at any rate he has a sort of influence over them, which gives the effects of discipline. In ordinary cases, there is a bond between those men and their immediate employers, the middlemen, between the Commissariat officers and the drivers, which enables those men to control the drivers, and if there is any loss, those middlemen are generally men of some substance, who can replace the loss. The Maccuddum is the head of a certain number of those drivers, probably equally connected with them, and chosen or elected by themselves as their head; it is part of the patriarchal constitution of the people of India, but the circumstances at Bombay were entirely different; there was no such connection there; there was no such body of camels or camel drivers there; they were hired wherever they could be found, and they had no more connection with those supposed heads or middlemen, than they had with anybody else; they were merely people picked up on the spur of the moment, and there-

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fore there were all the inconveniences of the Commissariat system, without any of the advantages of the military system.

553. I presume that there would be no difference of opinion as to the desirability, if it could have been carried out, of the enlistment of the Land Transport being entirely in India?—No; I think it was contemplated as possible that for the large body required we might have to draw upon other countries, and that made it essentially necessary that there should be a military organisation for them; had it been in our power to get them all from Hindostan, we of course would have preferred doing so, and I think that in the first place it was intended to enlist them all in Hindostan.

554. Would not that have been the best arrangement?—That certainly would have been the best arrangement.

555. Was it ever tried, or how came it that a scheme should have been considered for the enlistment in India of all the men required for the Land Transport, and that it should not have been carried out?—There was an opinion that the men could not be had, and that it would require increased rates of payment; it involved considerable exertion and inquiry. It is natural that on the first proposal of such a thing, a Government should demur a little; seeing the very high prices acquired, they would naturally pause to be satisfied of the urgency of the occasion before raising the prices, and that is a matter which, from my experience in war and military preparations, would retard the Government very much.

556. Then, if I understand your Lordship rightly, everybody being of opinion that India was the best field for recruiting the men of the Land Transport Corps, the proposition was abandoned; not after an attempt so to enlist them, but simply because it was thought that a mistake had been made in considering that that course was possible, and it was abandoned without actual trial?—Yes; the scheme proposed was not accepted, and the formation of the Land Transport Corps was placed in the hands of the Commissary General. The Commissary General was put in communication with me, but he was not at all subject to my orders. In fact, my scheme, the Quartermaster General's scheme, was not accepted, and the Commissary General's proposals were accepted.

557. Sir John Hay.] That being the ordinary established custom?—Yes, it was the ordinary routine form.

558. Captain Beaumont.] Then on the Commissary General would devolve the responsibility of taking no steps with reference to this course (which everybody would agree was desirable) of looking upon India as the field of enlistment rather than going elsewhere to the ports of the Levant, and obtaining a class of men to deal with which is known by past experience to be almost useless?—I do not think that you can say that the Commissariat is responsible. The Commissariat Department is responsible for the advice they give to the Government, but the Government is responsible for not having prepared an efficient transport. The Government were advised to prepare one, and they did not prepare one. Their defence for not doing so is contained in an elaborate Memorandum by Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, which I think it is well, perhaps, the Committee should read. I do not agree to the whole of that Memorandum, but I did not con-

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sider it expedient at the time to answer it. I thought that it was a controversy which it was of no use to enter into, and which it was not expedient to enter into. I considered that it had been made sufficiently clear by what had been already published in the Blue Book without any reference to that at all.

559. Your Lordship said that it would be better to refer to reports, but in some instances there are not reports, and it is exactly the written evidence which I want to get with reference to this point, as to who decided that the Levantines should be enlisted; where can I turn for a written statement of the reasons why it was impossible to enlist men from what was generally recognised as the best source, namely, India; and why, without making an attempt to do so, were the Levantines enlisted; in India I have heard a very different opinion; I have heard that if proper steps had been taken, India was the natural and proper place to turn to; am I justified in this view of the case according to your Lordship's opinion; that though, undoubtedly, a military organization, *ceteris paribus*, is the best, bearing in mind yet still that the *Maccuddum* under the commissariat had in past times done good service, either one system or the other, with good material, would have answered the purpose, and would not have led to the lamentable consequences which ensued; and that, consequently, the gist of the ills arose from the fact of a large proportion of the men comprising the Land Transport Corps having been enlisted from a class which had no business to be appealed to; is that, in a few words, a correct exposition of your view of the case?—I think it is not; because I should not have excluded the possibility of employing muleteers from other countries. So large a body of muleteers, that is to say, men accustomed to the care and loading and tendance of mules, might not have been found in India in so short a time. Therefore I should not have excluded the employment of natives of Persia.

560. I would point out that five-sixths of the muleteers who were enlisted abroad were sent back for the express reason that they were not muleteers, and knew nothing of their work?—I knew nothing of the course of enlistment out of India. I knew nothing of the orders given for the engagement of muleteers in Europe or in Egypt, beyond this, that it having been asserted that men were not to be found in Bombay, the employment of men from foreign countries was not excluded. I am informed that the instructions for the enlistment of muleteers in Egypt and in Europe emanated from England, and not from India. I do not think that I can give more information on this point than what is contained in my Minutes in the Blue Book, in my proposals for the Land Transport Corps, and in the letter which since has been supplied here, objecting to that corps, as I inspected it after it had been formed.

561. Who is responsible for the employment and enlistment of the Levantines who composed the great bulk of the Land Transport Corps; I am not now speaking of the men who were enlisted for the conveyance of the mules from their point of purchase to Annesley Bay, but of the policy which contemplated that those men should form the bulk of the Land Transport Corps?—I think that the Government of Bombay being directed by the Government in this country to prepare carriage for an expedition, were urged

by me, finding that their endeavours to procure mules in India and in Asia were not so successful as was desirable, to apply to the British Government to assist them through the political staff on the shores of the Mediterranean, and that they simply said, "Send us mules;" the natural accompaniment for mules was drivers, and as we could not get drivers in India, in the first instance, in sufficient numbers, or at least as they were not procured, and it appeared that they were not procurable, we were glad to accept such drivers as came with the mules.

562. According to that view, the class of men who were supplied to the Land Transport Train would appear to have resulted from the haphazard engagement of muleteers without instructions on the part of the officers under the War Office; but there were instructions given by the War Office, were there not, to engage muleteers for service, if need be, in Abyssinia?—I am informed by Major Holland that the orders are upon record, but I am not cognisant of what took place beyond my recommendation, which I find on the 21st of August 1867, in a demi-official letter to the Governor of Bombay, I say here, "Would it not be desirable to send officers to Egypt by next mail to purchase mules, and to ask the Home Government to stimulate the Consul General to assist us? Might not the political officers in this Presidency and Rajpootana, and also all the collectors, purchase for us all serviceable cattle (ponies) in their several districts? Ponies do the carrying work of the Deccan. In Egypt and Abyssinia they use donkeys; we shall be a trifle more dignified. A liberal price would be a great inducement to the owners of mules or ponies; and we are sure of what we could get in the country."

563. That refers to the purchase of animals, does it not, and not to the men, unless it be assumed that where you purchase the animal, the driver of the animal, or the man who is engaged to look after it, is to be the permanent muleteer?—The first proposal, as the honourable Member is aware, was to raise a transport corps of muleteers in India; that proposal in its entirety was not accepted, and an attempt was made through the Commissariat Department to raise a transport establishment (I will not say a corps, because the regular corps was rejected) in India. It was not found to be easy to engage a sufficient number of men, at least those employed did not find it easy; and no doubt on that consideration both Persia and Egypt, and the markets from which mules were supplied, were looked to also for muleteers.

564. Then, to put it shortly, the scheme which all agree to be most desirable for the organization of the Land Transport Corps, so far as the supply of men was concerned, that is to say, to appeal to India for supply, was abandoned without its being fairly tried, and the supply of men resulted from the haphazard arrangements which were entered into by the officers purchasing the mules in the various countries, is that a short but correct explanation of the state of affairs?—The nature of the supply resulted from not adopting the first proposition. I object to adopt the expression "haphazard," or to use any word which may be considered as applied in a way which from me would be objectionable towards the authorities then engaged in the matter. All that I can say is, that the result of not adopting the first proposal of enlisting a regularly organised

ganised corps in India was that muleteers were supplied from other countries; beyond that I am not prepared to go.

565. The character of those men was inferior, was it not?—The character of a very large portion of those men was very bad indeed.

566. With reference to the scale of the Expedition I gather that your opinion is that neither in men nor followers was the army too large?—Certainly not.

567. Will that opinion hold equally good as to supplies, or the manner in which the army was equipped?—I have guarded myself before by saying that everything was not exactly as I wished, but generally there was no over-equipment of the army.

568. Was it not on an unusually large scale; that is to say, that no army has ever yet taken the field equipped on anything like a similarly munificent scale?—I do not know what the equipment of the army in the Crimea was, because I was not there, but I should not call it munificent certainly. I should say that it was sufficient and proper.

569. Was not the equipment generally, including land transport, sea transport, and everything which pertained to the equipment of the army, on a scale larger than ever was previously the case?—That I am not prepared to say; but the supply of everything was sufficient, and generally, of its kind, excellent.

570. I gather also that the necessity for the numbers which were sent was from a wish to overawe the people, and so to avoid a collision, rather than from fear of being absolutely beaten when attacked; that with a smaller number of men you would have been quite certain to have beaten, practically speaking, any number of natives so far as a collision with them went, but that possibly they would have surrounded you, and that there would have been difficulties arising from the collision even though you were successful?—That would appear to be applying my words with regard to the small posts of communication to the whole force. The accounts which I had of the country represented very large bodies of men in arms, and we knew at the time that on our flank in Tigre, Kassai had a force of 10,000 men extremely well armed; those whom I saw when we met were very well armed. A large proportion of them had good double-barrelled percussion guns, and there was a certain amount of rude discipline among them, which rendered them not by any means despicable. Then we knew that Gobaze, who was in rebellion against Theodore, had a very large force; of course it was exaggerated, but by some people it was estimated at 30,000 or 40,000 men. We knew that he had a large body of cavalry; he sent one of his officers, who came to call upon me with 1,000 horse, such as they were; they were much better cavalry for acting in that mountainous country than our horses of the plains, because they crowned the hills like light infantry; those cavalry soldiers, upon the ponies of the country, swarmed over the steep hills as infantry would have done; they were quite a formidable enemy in such a country as that. Then Theodore's force was quite uncertain, and we did not know what quantity he might have. The histories of Abyssinia represented also that the Gallas were a nation of cavalry, so that I quite contemplated the possibility of having a very large combination against me; and I cal-

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culated my force with reference to that as well as to keeping up the communication.

571. The gist of my last question was that in a fair fight, such as that which took place before Magdala, you could hardly lay down a proportion which would subsist between the Abyssinian forces, and the number of disciplined Europeans, which would balance them?—I have a letter from Colonel Cameron, who commanded the 4th Regiment in the action at Arogi, which describes that he never, on any occasion, had to be more careful in meeting an enemy on irregular ground than he had on that day in meeting the Abyssinians. Acting with his men, as light infantry, he found that he had an enemy not in any way to be despised, and he was obliged to be extremely careful. I think that had not Theodore been tempted by the prospect of plunder to throw his army upon us in that irregular way, they might have made a very much better resistance, and that it would have been extremely imprudent in me to have taken a less force into a country where so many armed bodies were in existence.

572. Bearing in mind the difficulties of the route, apart from those of fair fighting and meeting the enemy in the field, was it not essential (I use the word guardedly) to success that you should be on friendly relations with the people?—Yes.

573. And with such an enemy as they were, would it not have been practically impossible for you to have advanced on Magdala, even with the number of men you had, had the people been hostile to you, assuming that they were decently equipped?—If the whole country had been hostile I certainly could not have advanced with that force. If Kassai had opposed us I should have had to take Tigre as a base first; I could not have advanced with that force on my flank if I had not made a friend of him.

574. Then had the people been hostile, the estimate of the expenditure of 9,000,000 £. might very easily have mounted up to three times that amount, might it not, or to any amount?—If a campaign of six or eight months cost 9,000,000 £., of course you might put down a campaign of 16 months at double the money, I suppose; if you mean that any accident or any extension of the campaign would have cost a great deal more money, and that it was well avoided by the expenditure of what we laid out, I quite agree to that.

575. What I meant was this, that the success with the number of men who were employed involves the question of the friendliness of the people?—Certainly.

576. I presume that you consider that no estimate, in the proper sense of the term, was submitted?—I cannot speak as to what was submitted, but I do not think that there existed grounds for any complete estimate, or that it could have been prepared.

577. Therefore, when a minister comes to the House, and says that such and such a war is estimated at so much, it is your opinion that wise people will say that such an estimate is illusory?—I think that those responsible for a war are bound to say, as far as they can, what the expense will be, but their data must be very uncertain. Still, of course, they would endeavour to say what the expense would be, so far as they could, and those who received their report would of course bear in mind how very uncertain

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tain the data were, and would be prepared for very great differences; but you cannot make war as you would go to build a house. If you want to build a house, you get your architect to tell you what it will cost; but in war you must be prepared for the most uncertain of all operations.

578. You have doubtless read the statements which were made by the former Minister in the House of Commons, with reference to the expenditure?—I have said before, that I was very much occupied with the Expedition when the proceedings were taking place in Parliament, so that I saw the papers very irregularly, and I cannot say that I read them continuously.

579. Do you consider that the language of confidence which was used then was justified by the information which they had?—I must decline altogether to answer that.

580. There would appear to have been a certain difference of opinion between yourself and his Excellency the Governor of Bombay; would it not have conduced to economy that the duties of the two should have been defined?—There was no want of definiteness as regarded our duties, because it was my duty to recommend, and it was the duty of the Governor to exercise his judgment as to accepting my recommendations. The military authority in India, as in most other places, is entirely subordinate to the civil authority. I do not think that the military authority could supersede the civil authority with advantage. It was a question for the judgment of the civil authority, whether to accept or not the proposals of the military authority.

581. Was it not a fact leading to expenditure that at the outset of the Expedition, when matters of considerable importance, like that of the organisation of Land Transport, had to be considered, there should have been a difference of opinion between yourself and his Excellency the Governor?—I think the difference of opinion did lead to certain extra expense.

582. You stated that a certain sum would represent the total expenditure resulting from causes which might be set down as impossible to be foreseen or to be prevented; would you in that sum include the expenditure which you referred to in your last answer?—I do not remember that I have defined a sum particularly, but generally I have observed that a margin of expenditure must always occur, unless everybody is perfect in every expedition and in every undertaking, beyond what might possibly be the

case. But I think that you must always count upon such a margin, and I do not think that all the incidental expenses which may be said to have been preventible, amounted to so large a sum as to be worthy of the present inquiry.

583. Would it not have conduced to economy to have taken either one of those courses; either for you to have possessed a power which would have given you practically the control of the Government of Bombay, that is to say, that they should have acted as your agents, and subject generally to your wishes in the matter, or for the selection of the officer in command to have been left in the hands of the Bombay Government which was charged, by the English Government, with the conduct of the Expedition, when the views of the commanding officer would have been entirely in accordance with their own?—I consider that an inexpedient question, and I beg permission not to reply to it. With reference to such Expeditions as we have had, there is one remark which I think it would be useful to make, and which has, I may say, a direct bearing upon expenditure. I think it would be extremely valuable in every such Expedition to have a distinct department for embarkation and disembarkation; one, of course, at the port of departure, and one at the port of arrival. I think that a great deal of inconvenience and delay were incurred by the insufficient strengths of the departments employed to ship and transmit stores from Bombay to Abyssinia, and also by the absence of a distinct disembarkation department at Zulla. The general superintendence was admirably managed by Captain Tryon; but his authority was only partial, and did not extend to the shore. There should have been on shore a receiving department, and at Bombay there should have been a transmitting department. The Commissariat were overburdened with work, and were not equal to the duty of embarking and transmitting all the stores; the result was, that the Governor found it necessary to supplement their action in sending the Engineers' stores by employing the Secretary to the Government in the Public Works Department, and there was there some action in parallel lines. If there had been a distinct department, and an officer with sufficient assistance at Bombay, merely to receive, and embark and transmit stores, and a similar officer at Zulla properly supported, I think that matters would have been facilitated, and in future would go much better than they had usually gone.

Tuesday, 8th March 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.
Colonel Barttelot.
Mr. Baxter.
Captain Beaumont.
Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Candlish.
Mr. Christopher Denison.

Mr. Grant Duff.
Mr. Eastwick.
Sir John Hay.
Sir Stafford Northcote.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. Charles Turner.

JOHN CANDLISH, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

The Right Honourable ROBERT BARON NAPIER OF MAGDALA, G. C. B., G. C. S. I., &c. &c.
(attending by permission of the House of Lords); further Examined.

584. Sir *Stafford Northcote*.] IN your last examination at Question 574, in answer to a question put by the honourable Member for Durham, you said, "If a campaign of six or eight months cost nine millions, of course you might put down a campaign of 16 months at double the money, I suppose." Do you, on reflection, adhere to that answer?—If the whole of my answer is read, I think it does not require any addition. It is a general assumption that the extension of the campaign would add in an equal proportion to the expenditure.

585. Was not the expense of that campaign (and I suppose it would be so with any campaign) divisible into three proportions; one, the expense of conveying the force to the country where it was to be used; the second, the expense of maintaining it when there; and the third, the expense of bringing it back?—Yes.

586. Would the maintenance of such a force in the country for double the time, have added anything to the expense of taking it there, or to the expense of bringing it back?—Not that I can perceive.

587. Therefore, the maintenance of such a force for double the length of time would only have doubled the expense of its maintenance while there?—That is very true; but then under the circumstances under which the Abyssinia campaign was placed, the maintenance there involved the retention of the means of taking the force away. What I meant was that you could not have run the risk of being left there without the means of going away; so the transport was necessarily maintained the whole of the time.

588. Do you suppose that if that campaign had lasted over the whole rainy season, and had gone on into another year, you would have retained all those ships at Zulla during the whole of the 12 months?—That would depend, of course, upon circumstances; but if you had not retained the ships, you would have had to take them up again, and you would have had to pay for a certain period of their going to the scene where they were required; so that more expense would have been incurred. Of course, I am not prepared to say with mathematical precision that the expense would be exactly double.

589. But that is just what you do say in the answer; the answer is, "If a campaign of six or
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eight months cost nine millions, of course you might put down a campaign of 16 months at double the money, I suppose"; I ask whether, on reflection, you adhered to that calculation and that statement?—It is an assumption, and may just go for what it is worth, as it is stated there.

590. Was not a very large proportion of the stores which were furnished to the force furnished in anticipation of the possibility of the force being detained beyond the rainy season?—Undoubtedly.

591. Supposing that the force had been detained over the rainy season, you would not have had to buy those stores twice over, would you?—We should not.

592. Therefore, as far as the expenditure was concerned, on the purchase of stores for the maintenance of the army, supposing that by any misfortune you had been detained, surely you cannot think that you would have doubled the expenditure for stores?—There are, of course, certain stores which you would not have doubled, but you would have probably found other sources of expenditure upon which you had not calculated.

593. It was stated (I do not know whether it will turn out to be perfectly correct) in one of the questions which was put to you, that two years' supply of stores had been provided, at all events in certain branches of supply; if that was the case, surely it would not have been necessary to have provided any more of that class of stores even if the Expedition had lasted for another year?—If that were the case, certainly not, but I did not argue upon the assumption that more was supplied than what I had asked for; a supply of six months in hand, and a continuous supply of three months.

594. Are you not aware, with regard to the compressed forage, that the reason why that was sent out in such large quantities at the last, was in anticipation of the possibility of your being detained?—I have no doubt that it was so; it was the general tenor of my requisition, that we should be prepared for a longer detention.

595. Then, again, supposing that the force had been maintained there for a greater time, would you not have found it possible to organise a supply of provisions from Egypt?—It would have been our proper course to look to Egypt more than to India.

596. That would have been less expensive,
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would it not?—That ought to have been less expensive, certainly.

597. Speaking generally, was not one main cause of the great expense of this Expedition, the fact that everything had to be done with great rapidity, and that the supplies had to be brought from a considerable distance, owing to the want of time for organising the cheapest mode of supplying them?—Yes.

598. Moreover, in consequence of our ignorance of the nature of the country, and of the circumstances of the campaign, we were obliged to make provision for unforeseen contingencies, were we not?—Yes.

599. If the Expedition had lasted another year, would not the expense have been very materially reduced by the experience which you would have acquired by your being able to order only what you really did want, and by your being able to organise a supply from the cheapest markets?—No doubt that would have been a means of economy, but in a continuous campaign you would have had other drains; you would have had to replace casualties, and to send reinforcements; but I do not desire to defend as an actual fact, what I have stated as a general assumption; I stated it as a general possible calculation, that if a campaign of six months cost a certain sum, you might consider that the average of a long campaign.

600. The question of course was put with this idea, that the Government, in mentioning the sum which they thought would be required for the Expedition, had taken a sum which, even as matters turned out, was very much below the actual cost, and which, if matters had turned out otherwise, would have been enormously below it; and that question so answered by yourself, confirms the view in which I presume the question was put. My object in asking you the question which I have put, was in order to ascertain whether you adhered to the answer which you gave as to the increase of expenditure, which would have followed upon the prolongation of the campaign. Supposing, on the other hand, that the campaign had fallen very short of the time that it did, and that instead of lasting six or eight months, Theodore had struck at once, and that the campaign had therefore lasted only a month, do you suppose that you could have reversed the calculation, and could have said that the campaign would only cost one-sixth of the money?—No; but of course that argument might be reduced to an absurdity, by bringing the time down to any minute period of time from the commencement of the Expedition.

601. But my object is, with all due respect, to reduce your Lordship's calculation here *ad absurdum*, because if you accept the arithmetical scale in the case of multiplication, I should ask whether you would accept it in the case of division; if you say that it would not have been necessarily the case, that a campaign occupying one-sixth of the time would have cost one-sixth of the money, I ask whether, if it had lasted double the time, it must necessarily have cost double the money?—In the expenditure of the campaign which we are discussing, I understand the very great item to have been that of transport. The equipment of the Expedition was no doubt, expensive, and a great deal of the equipment would have been useful throughout a much longer expedition.

602. With reference to the estimate upon which

several questions have been put to you, have you seen a paper that was presented to Parliament in 1868, which contains the estimate furnished by the India Office, upon which the Budget Estimate of 1868 was founded?—I have not.

603. All that I wish to ask you is to look at that paper and to observe the principle upon which it is drawn up; does the principle upon which the estimate is formed appear to you to be a reasonable principle, having reference chiefly to the monthly estimate, which you will find in the second page of that paper, and which shows a presumed expenditure of 589,250*l.* a month?—I observe that that is so.

604. Supposing any person or office to be called upon to frame the best estimate they could of monthly expenditure, do you think that the heads which are given there are the right heads to divide such an estimate into, or do you see any other heads which ought to have been included?—The heads there are, "Pay of troops," "Transport," "Provisions for troops and followers," "Provisions for baggage animals," "Foreign service allowances" (I do not know what they mean), "Coals," and "Miscellaneous," which, of course, includes everything which is not mentioned in the others.

605. Does it appear to you that there are any large heads of expenditure which are omitted in that calculation?—Yes; there is one item omitted, which is the equipment of the troops.

606. By "equipment," do you mean equipment in the first instance?—Yes.

607. But this is with reference to the monthly expenditure after the Expedition had started; you will observe that there was an original estimate of the cost of placing the force in the country, including the shipping, the purchase of mules, and the Store Department charges; those, you will observe, are included in a lump sum in the beginning of the estimate; subsequently a further estimate is given of the charge per month; and what I wish to ask is, whether you think that in estimating the charge per month after the force had been placed upon the shores of Abyssinia, any large items are omitted which ought to have been included?—This I understood to be the estimate for the maintenance of the force. There is no provision here for replacing animals expended in the service.

608. That, you think, ought to have been included?—The result shows that it ought to have been included, but you could never have anticipated that it would have been such a heavy item as it was. I have said in my previous answers that I believe that it was impossible to make a correct estimate of such an Expedition.

609. The point to which I wish to draw your attention is this: the propriety of the estimate (accepting for the sake of argument the term) laid before Parliament by the late Government, had been challenged on the ground that they were altogether insufficient. The principle upon which those estimates were formed was this: a certain calculation was made as to the cost of placing the Expedition on the shores of the Red Sea; a further calculation was made of the probable monthly cost of the force. I would ask your Lordship, in the first place, whether you think it reasonable that such a system should have been followed in forming an estimate; that is to say, that first of all an estimate should have been made of the cost, once for all, of sending the force

force there; secondly, whether it was reasonable to take a certain monthly calculation as to the cost of maintaining it?—That is a reasonable outline of proceeding; but I think that it is proper to remind you that you could not possibly here, when you made such an estimate, have had in view the indispensable wants which might arise upon the spot where the Expedition was being prepared, or where it was being entered upon.

610. Can you suggest any other mode in which an estimate could have been formed?—I have already answered that by saying that I believe that a correct estimate of all the liabilities of such a campaign could not have been formed. I do not know any other way in which you could arrive at an approximation than by taking the pay of the troops and the several items here, except that is, that as an engineer, if I were estimating for a work I should have put a very large margin for contingencies.

611. Subject to any large margin for contingencies, do you think that there is anything unreasonable in the sums which were put down here under the different heads; transport, for instance, 400,000*l.* per month?—I have before said that I did not go into the items of expenses; and, therefore, I do not feel competent to offer any judgment as to the reasonableness of the sums. But I have expressed my opinion, as I said before, that you could not have given a correct estimate beforehand of the cost of any such expedition; that you had not the materials for making it; and that you could not here foresee or conceive the circumstances which would arise at the point of preparation, and at the commencement of the Expedition, which would inevitably lead to expense.

612. We are quite aware of that; but what I am now wishing to get as far as I can is, your Lordship's opinion as to how far under the necessity under which the Government were placed of presenting some account before Parliament, the account which they presented was, on the face of it, a reasonable one or an unreasonable one; you have already stated that you think a large margin should have been added for unforeseen contingencies. Admitting that, would you have thought it necessary or right to have put down larger sums than those which appear in this estimate to which I am now directing your attention?—I think that I may remind you that you are asking me now to pass a judgment upon the action of the Government which was concerned with the Expedition. At the time I did not consider the question of expenses, nor have I ever gone into the items of the cost of transport, or other matters, in the mass; so that I do not think that I can be called upon to state whether I think such an estimate was reasonable or not. By giving an opinion as to whether the estimate was reasonable or not, I am giving an opinion upon the conduct of the Government under which the Expedition was conducted.

613. But I must, of course, remind you that I put the question as having been a Member of the Government which was responsible, and I merely put it for the sake of eliciting your Lordship's opinion. I am not in the least aware of what that opinion may be on the point which I am anxious to ascertain. If you are not prepared to answer the question, of course you will say so; but if you are able to answer the question, in the interests of truth, I shall be only too glad that you should say anything that you

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thought right to say?—I feel that I cannot answer the question, because I am speaking now after the result. The estimate now appears to me a small one; but if you had asked me at the time, most probably I should have said that I thought it was a reasonable estimate.

614. But if your Lordship will forgive me, the object of this Committee is to ascertain why the expenditure so greatly exceeded the estimate. That may have been either because the estimate was framed with reference to circumstances which turned out wholly different. I wish to ascertain in what particulars our estimate failed, and then, perhaps, we may find the causes of failure; and if your Lordship will tell us that you think it was deficient in any particular head, we may follow up that head and ascertain how it was that it was deficient?—I could not, of course, answer that question without going into a catalogue of the preparations of the Expedition, and without testing the correctness of those several amounts that are put down according to rates of pay or cost. All of those are items which it would be necessary for me to know before I could say whether the estimate was a reasonable one.

615. If your Lordship will look at the next page you will see that in the original estimate of the preceding autumn it was supposed that the monthly expense would be 370,000*l.*, including the pay of troops, and that that was subsequently raised to 589,000*l.* a month, excluding the pay of troops; that transport in the original estimate was taken at 150,000*l.* a month, and that it was afterwards found that it was very greatly underrated, and that item was corrected in the month of March following. Do you suppose that we ought to have known in March 1868 that the transport ought to have been taken at more than 400,000*l.*?—I think that I must fall back upon my previous answer. I have given no attention to the cost of the Expedition, which was out of my province, and therefore any opinion which I give now, I think, cannot be of any value, because it is an opinion after having seen the result. If my opinion had been asked then, I think I should have probably accepted what was proposed, unless I had gone into the calculation closely. The cost of transport, of course, must depend upon the rate of tonnage. You could not tell that the rate of tonnage would rise the moment the Government came into the market nor could you tell how much it would rise.

616. *Chairman.*] With regard to the examination of the Right honourable Baronet the Member for North Devon, you see in the Paper in your hand, under the head "Disbursements by the Imperial Government," a total of 1,039,000*l.*; would you not have expected that the Home Government would have been able to estimate their own expenditure pretty accurately, admitting the uncertainties and want of information about the expenditure in India and Abyssinia?—If it is intended to include in the expenditure of the Home Government the purchase of the transport animals in Europe, I would ask, how could they know what the price of animals would rise to upon there being a demand? They would know how much a certain number of mules would cost at the price current of the time, but they could not know what alteration would take place in the price current.

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617. I want to direct your Lordship's attention to the fact that this is the estimate of March 1868, before which time all the animals purchased by the Home Government had been purchased; so that they had absolute knowledge, or the means of absolute knowledge, of their cost?—How could they know what quantity of coals would be consumed? How could they know that an addition of 50 or 60 tons of water a day would be required, costing so many more coals? They could not have known that so many more coals would be used.

618. Of course you will concur in this statement, that the Home Government knew exactly what tonnage they had then themselves engaged without reference to the Indian tonnage?—They would naturally know what tonnage they had themselves engaged.

619. That would lead them, would it not, to a pretty distinct conclusion as to the quantity of coals which they would require?—No, because they could not know that those steamers would be employed in condensing water for one month or for many months, or what quantity of coals would be required for that purpose.

620. But in March they knew that the steamers would be employed in condensing water, did they not?—But they did not know how much coal they would use.

621. Would you have expected, with an estimate of one million for Home expenditure, that the ultimate result would be two millions?—I think that my answer to that question would not be of any value; it would be a mere opinion, for which I have no data. As I have said before I did not enter into the question of the expenses, and I think that if a general were to do so, and were to have the balance-sheet before him every day, it would impair his judgment for the campaign exceedingly.

622. You would have expected a considerable sum in the estimate for expenditure in Abyssinia itself, do you find anything in that estimate which is before you covering that expenditure?—I do not see any item under that head except "Miscellaneous."

623. I believe that the actual expenditure of money in Abyssinia, the money left on the soil of Abyssinia amounted to upwards of a million sterling?—The entire amount expended for all the supplies, as shown in the statement, amounted to 893,852 dollars. That, again, was an item that could not have been calculated here, because it was proposed to be prepared with all the provisions which we might require. I thought it quite possible that we might not get anything from the country. If we had not made the people of the country our friends in the manner we did, we might have been entirely dependent upon the provisions which we carried with us.

624. When you say that it could not have been calculated, you mean that the exact amount could not have been calculated?—But there would have been expenses in the country as would be natural.

625. And large expenses?—Large expenses.

626. If that is not covered in figures before you, that would be an omission from the estimate of an item which ought to have been foreseen, would it not?—No doubt that is a contingency which would require a large margin to cover it. I have said before, that if I had estimated even for a public work, I should have put a large margin for contingencies.

627. Sir *Stafford Northcote*.] When you say that a large sum was left on the shores of Abyssinia, what was, roughly speaking, the nature of the services for which that money would have been expended?—That expense was for supplies for the carriage of supplies and for the purchase of animals.

628. That would come under one of the heads included in this estimate; that is to say, either "provisions for troops and followers," or "provisions for baggage animals;" it may have been under-estimated; but that is not the point; the question is, whether the head is omitted?—The head is included there.

629. *Chairman*.] The designation is in the estimate that you would apply to the work done in Abyssinia for the money expended there; but whether the money actually expended there is in that estimate or not, your Lordship does not know?—That I cannot say; but, with the permission of the Committee, I would, with every respect, make one remark upon the series of questions to this point. I think that the opinions as to the estimate or as to the way of making the estimate should be a question settled between the Members of the House; and that I should not be asked my opinion upon a point which may be used by one side of the House or by the other against Members of the House.

630. Respecting this estimate, I will ask you only one question; that has been placed before you to day for the first time, has it not?—Yes.

631. Then, in point of fact, you really know nothing whatever as to its completeness?—No, I know nothing as to the grounds upon which the estimate was made, beyond what I see there, nor was I concerned with the estimate of the cost of the Expedition.

632. And before you could form an opinion upon that point you would have to consider how far it embraced all the heads of expenditure, would you not?—I should have to go into the accountants' office and do their duty.

633. Sir *Stafford Northcote*.] Supposing that the civil government had been altogether set aside in Bombay, and that everything had been put entirely into your own hands, should you have considered it necessary for you to go into the question of expenditure?—Certainly.

634. Do you think that so doing would have thrown a greater additional burthen upon you than would have been convenient with reference to the conduct of the Expedition?—I should have taken such means of assistance as would have enabled me to accomplish it.

635. What sort of means would you have taken?—I should have called the ablest members of the service or of the Government to my assistance, and have allotted the duties according to their departments and capacities, and have seen to the general results myself. Whether I should have succeeded or not, of course is a point as to which I cannot speak: but I have said before that a concurrent authority for such duties would be a support which a general in command would always desire.

636. *Chairman*.] You have been asked whether or not you would expect the cost of the Expedition to be enlarged in proportion to the extended time it occupied; and you have answered generally, I think, that you would?—Generally with reference to such an Expedition in which the transport was liable to be detained, in

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in order to take the troops away from a coast which might be very unhealthy.

637. If you would have expected the Expedition to cost double the amount if it had continued double the time, would you not also have expected it to cost half the amount if it had only continued half the time?—It would depend upon circumstances.

638. Reference was made to forage as an item on which you would not have to double your outlay; but forage was supplied to the Expedition on the same basis and according to the same calculation as all other stores were supplied to the Expedition, was it not?—Yes.

639. And if there was a large surplus of forage it resulted from your having found more forage in the country than you did of the other stores, did it not?—Partly from that circumstance, but partly because it would be naturally calculated that there would be a large collection of animals at the coast, the coast being the *dépôt*, and the coast being the largest *dépôt* of animals.

640. It has also been pointed out that in the event of the Expedition continuing and of your having had more time, you would have had recourse to the cheapest market for your stores; in point of fact, had you not recourse to the cheapest market?—I had recourse to the cheapest market.

641. The cheapest markets being Egypt, Bombay, and Kurrachee?—The resources of Egypt were not known at the beginning of the campaign. At the beginning of the campaign it was necessary to have the forage to start with. There was no time for delay, and no time for hesitation. Hesitation to take the forage which we had on the spot might have lost us the opportunity, and we might not have got it at another market.

642. But you did get it from the cheapest market, did you not?—We got a portion of it from the cheapest market.

643. Was the forage of Egypt the cheapest?—I believe it was; but that is a question which I think the Commissariat should answer, because they know the prices.

644. But your Lordship answered the Right honourable Baronet as though it were not correct that you had recourse to the cheapest market; the question was put hypothetically: if you had had more time you would have had recourse to the cheapest market; the inference, therefore, would be that the first supplies were not drawn from the cheapest market; is that so in point of fact?—In order to answer that question, I should know exactly what was paid for those supplies, and I do not know; but I think I may mention what is to the point in explaining the action of the Home Government, and my own action upon this matter. It became evident to Sir Stafford Northcote, who was then Secretary of State, that Egypt was a point to which we should direct our attention for supplies. I received a letter from Sir Stafford Northcote directing my attention to that point, and my reply was that I had already written to the Commissary General at Zulla, to the effect that he was to look to Egypt for all his vital supplies, and not to Bombay, from which the arrival of supplies was precarious. I have no doubt but that it might be found that if the Commissariat officer became anxious for the arrival of supplies from Bombay, if they were overdue, and he had not news that they had been ordered or were coming, although he had made

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a requisition for them, he would not have neglected the opportunity of getting supplies from Egypt.

645. Sir Stafford Northcote.] Are you aware that in the beginning there was a political objection raised to our having supplies from Egypt, or having any connection with Egypt?—I know that there was an impression of that kind, which was put forward with a considerable degree of weight, although I never attached much importance to it.

646. Chairman.] You have stated to-day, as I understand, that the procedure in the matter of supplies was this: that six months' supply should be ordered, and a constant stock of three months should be kept up?—Our place was to have a supply of six months in hand, and a continuous supply every three months, so as to keep, if possible, six months in hand, in case of our being detained and the communication being interrupted; so that, if the passes had proved as dangerous and as much obstructed as was supposed, we might have been in the highlands with subsistence for six months.

647. You never had anything like six months' supply upon the highlands, I believe, at any time?—We never had that amount. In round terms, six months' supplies should have been delivered intact as soon as possible for the whole force, and three months' supplies should have been ready for current expenditure.

648. The honourable and gallant Member for Durham, on the last time the Committee sat, asked you some questions about the railway; if you had had the railway on your landing in January, it would have been of essential service to the Expedition, would it not?—I think I may safely say that it would.

649. The railway never was completed up to what you knew as the first station, I think?—It was never quite completed so far as that.

650. You had to introduce the Land Transport Train between the terminus of the railway and the first station, had you not?—For a very short distance.

651. The completion of the railway in January, for instance, would therefore have saved a good deal of expense, would it not?—Yes.

652. Did you ever know of any hindrance imposed by the Home Government in the way of the Bombay Government constructing the railway?—Certainly not. The Home Government sent immediately to the Government of Bombay every proposal for railways, or for any mechanism which was offered by contractors or others to forward the Expedition.

653. Speaking generally, their action is in the Blue Book, is it not?—Yes.

654. The water pipes were never laid at all, were they?—No.

655. In the middle of October, was it not known that the water on the coast at Zulla had failed?—On the 20th of October, Sir William Merewether wrote thus:—"Under any circumstances I think it is certain that Aráfalli will have to be used. The cascade is a short three miles from the entrance of the gorge, and only three and a half from the fine plain in which the troops could be encamped; that length of 3-inch iron piping, if it could be readily and quickly obtained, would give a continuous flow of water right into camp, and render us independent of the wells at Aráfalli. The fall is 95 feet per mile." I think Colonel Wilkins will be able to explain that point.

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point. At that time, based, I believe, upon this paragraph, it was supposed that the landing would have taken place near Aráfáli. At any rate a supply of pipes was procured, and was placed on board ship.

656. The statement here is, that in the middle of October it was known that the water at Zulla, namely, at the point of debarkation, had failed. Assuming that to be the fact, would there not have been time to have had pipes, either from Bombay or from England, laid from Koomayli, and in use to the beginning of the year, namely, from the middle of October to December or January?—It was not until the first of November that the reconnoitring party abandoned the idea of an Eastern route, and determined upon the route which they ultimately adopted. They say, “All our energies will be now concentrated on the Koomayli Pass, which must be the chief route.”

657. Then, at that date, and possibly previously to that date, they would be in a condition to act, and it was then known, was it not, that water could not be had at Zulla?—I see this in my letter of the 14th of November: “The Governor has consented to a works corps of 1,000 men, who are being raised. He is also sending four miles of piping.” So that the letter of the 1st of November could not have reached us earlier than the 14th, and the moment any requisition of that kind was made, if it could be met, or was considered expedient, it was instantly attended to.

658. Had the pipes been ordered on the 1st of November, or on the 14th of November, either from Bombay or from England in sufficient quantity to reach from Koomayli to the coast, could they have been on the ground and laid by the beginning of January?—In the first place, we did not know sufficient of the details of the ground or of the stream to give directions for the pipes. It was not until a subsequent report arrived that we were sufficiently aware of the circumstances to be able to determine upon the expense of pipes. As soon as we were aware of them, instructions were sent by telegraph.

659. I presume that you are speaking of Bombay, when you say “we”?—I am.

660. The commander of the reconnoitring party would know the ground and the circumstances under which the pipes could or could not be laid, would he not?—I see here a paragraph of mine, dated the 16th of November, to the Quartermaster General: “We have to consider if the small depôt must remain at Mulkutto, whether it will not be cheaper to lay down a small pipe from the Weeah River to Mulkutto, which will give an intermediate supply at the high ground you mention, suitable for a camp six miles further on.” I think there was some doubt for some considerable time as to which would be the permanent camp; whether the camp might not be nearer the supply of water than otherwise.

661. I need hardly ask your Lordship whether, if the pipes had been laid in time, much money would not have been saved?—I may reply that, even if they had found pipes ready laid, still more money would have been saved; but my answer, of course, that if pipes had been laid much money would have been saved, implies some blame for pipes not having been laid. I wish to guard against that inference.

662. Do you know when the pipes did reach the Abyssinian coast?—They did not come all at once, I think. Colonel Wilkins will be able to reply upon that point.

663. I think it is stated, certainly, that they were not laid when they did come, because of the lack of labour, all the available labour being employed on the railway?—I think that was probably the reason; they were sent as expeditiously as they could be. I think they were sent out immediately overland.

664. Would it have been practicable to have constructed either floating piers or pile piers into deep water alongside of which the ships could have come, without the intervention of lighterage craft?—I do not think it would have been possible, with the means which we had, to have made piers quicker than they were made. Nothing but the most extraordinary exertions of the Engineer Department, and the officers and men there, and of the Sappers, enabled them to have the piers as soon as they were ready. Of course, if Bombay could have furnished the materials for piers ready made, and they had been sent at once, some time might have been gained.

665. There was an enormous outlay for landing, tonnage, lighterage, and so on, and, of course, had there been a pier alongside of which ships could have gone, that would have been saved, would it not?—If you consider the number of ships which had to unload, even supposing there had been a pier or two piers at which a ship could lie alongside, still that, I think, would not have done away with the necessity of a great deal of lighterage.

666. That would have depended upon the extent of the pier accommodation, would it not?—It would have depended upon the extent of the pier accommodation.

667. The point of disembarkation having been determined by the end of October, or the beginning of November, could not floating piers have been drawn from England within a month?—I should doubt it. I am not aware that they had anything in England ready made of the kind which would be required, because the water shallowed very much.

668. It was not a very broad beach, I think; it was about half a mile, was it not, into deep water?—From the foreshore to the deep water where the ships lay, I think it was about 700 or 800 yards.

669. Do you remember what length of pier would have been required to reach a ship?—The section of the pier here is 943 feet long, but that only allowed lighters to come alongside, and not ships.

670. Is 943 feet the distance to where it first touches the water?—No; the 943 feet is the length between the shore and the point where landing boats and lighters could come alongside the pier.

671. Do you remember what length of pier would have had to be constructed to have met a floating ship?—The ships lay as near as they could safely. They might have come a little nearer to the pier. I should say that you could not calculate less 700 or 800 yards as the length of pier to have enabled the ships to come alongside.

672. Would floating piers have been practicable if they had been obtainable?—Certainly, of a peculiar construction. The water shallowed very gently indeed, so that the piers would have required to be of very little draught, and then to carry heavy weights they would have required to cover a great surface.

673. And that would not, surely, have saved expense,

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expense, but added vastly to the facilities of landing, would it not?—A sufficient number of piers would have had that effect, but one or two piers at which the ships could be alongside would still, I think, not have obviated the necessity of a great deal of lighterage.

674. Your Lordship mentioned as a cause of the heavy expense, the fear of a cyclone dispersing your shipping. It is said in Captain Hoyier's book, that Annesley Bay is a natural first-rate harbour: "Its entrance is on the north, but the waves raised by the northerly winds which sweep savagely down the Red Sea are debarred from agitating its waters;" do you concur in that?—In ordinary times it was a very sheltered harbour, but occasionally, when the wind came down in the direction of the harbour, it would be liable to very serious storms; and, in fact, we were warned by the naval authorities, that in case of a storm coming in the direction of the Bay it might prove to be very serious; and on one or two occasions there was room for great anxiety.

675. With regard to the tonnage engaged, did you ever yourself make any calculation of the tonnage?—No.

676. You put forward your requisitions for ships to convey certain stores, certain animals, and certain troops, I presume?—Yes.

677. Have you seen in the Blue Book (page 48) a statement which appears to me to indicate 130,000 tons as the tonnage necessary to put the whole Expedition, men, animals, troops, and followers, afloat at one time?—Yes; I did not enter into the question of tonnage.

678. Are you aware that 300,000 tons of shipping was engaged?—That even is a point into which I did not go. I may say with reference to my absence of knowledge upon that point, that had I entered into those questions it might have appeared and it might have been considered an intrusion into civil duties.

679. With regard to the troopships, to which reference was made at the last meeting of the Committee by the honourable Member for Durham, would there have been any further disadvantage from the employment of the troopships than the delay in effecting the exchanges to bring the troops home; or would there have been any further inconvenience if the troopships had been employed than keeping the troops in India another season?—Supposing that the reliefs by those ships had been entirely suspended, there would have been other inconvenience, because all the invalids and time-expired men had to be sent home.

680. Could not those men have been sent by the ordinary Peninsular and Oriental boats to Suez?—I think that the Peninsular and Oriental boats probably would have had no room for them unless there were special boats engaged; and I think they would not have been inclined to receive that kind of cargo. The passengers of the Peninsular and Oriental boats would not have been content to have the boats turned into invalid ships at all.

681. Would the measure of the inconvenience have been, first, that the reliefs would not have been brought home, and secondly, that the invalids would have been left?—The time-expired men had a right to their passage home.

682. In time of war, troops expect some inconvenience, do they not?—In time of war, if the emergency is considered sufficient, a time-expired

man can be kept according to the old enlistment two years beyond his agreement.

683. Then in times of war we are in the habit of considering mainly the exigences of war, are we not?—It is generally considered that it must be an exigency of war; that is to say, one which requires you to keep the troops, and not one which requires you to save your money. The troops would be perfectly content if they felt they were detained for a military purpose; but if they were detained simply as a measure of economy, they feel that their right had been infringed.

684. Those troopships would have been a great convenience to you in bringing troops and munitions of war and stores from Bombay, would they not?—Undoubtedly.

685. Would they carry 2,000 men each?—I think they are calculated to carry a regiment, or 1,300 men.

686. And in an emergency on the passage to Annesley Bay, they would carry a couple of thousand, I suppose?—That is a point which of course depends upon the measurements of the ships.

687. And those ships would do the passage to Annesley Bay in about 10 days, would they not?—Under favourable circumstances I should think they would.

688. With the north-east monsoon, which you had with you when you came?—Yes; but by employing those ships you would have thrown out of work all the ships in the Mediterranean on this side.

689. But your Lordship will probably see that they might have been just as usefully employed in the same work on this side; are you aware that we hired a great deal of tonnage to go to the Mediterranean, and that tonnage was hired in England to go round the Cape also?—That is a point beyond my knowledge.

690. Are you aware how many troops are relieved in the season?—I think there is no absolute number.

691. You are aware, are you not, that that proposal that those troopships should be employed in carrying troops for the general service of the Expedition was put forward by the Bombay Government, and negatived by the Home Government?—The correspondence did not pass through me.

692. Sir *Stafford Northcote*.] But you yourself would have considered it disadvantageous to the military service in India if those troopships had been taken from their proper service for the purposes of this Expedition?—It would have been inconvenient, certainly.

693. *Chairman*.] Did that question come before the Bombay Government?—I daresay that there is a correspondence upon the subject, but I do not remember it at this moment.

694. I think you stated that the Members of Council in the Bombay Government did not meet in council, and I presume that it did not come before you?—It is quite possible that the correspondence may have come before me, but I do not remember it.

695. Sir *Stafford Northcote*.] But supposing that such a question as that was under the consideration of the Bombay Government, would not the Commander in Chief have been consulted, or have had an opportunity of making a Minute upon the subject?—Probably; any paper of that kind would most probably have been circulated;

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I may have been away; it was not the custom to send papers to the military member of council when he was on tour, or absent at all.

696. But, so far as you are aware, no such proposal was ever made by the Bombay Government?—I do not remember any such proposal. I do not remember the correspondence at all, although I have an indistinct recollection that the subject was on the *tapis*.

697. So far as you are aware, did anything more pass than the telegraphic communication from the Governor of Bombay, personally, to the Secretary of State, saying that he should find it necessary to use the troopships?—I should be unwilling to speak from memory; but if any evidence from me is required upon the point, I will search the records.

698. Allow me to direct your attention to a telegraph from the Governor of Bombay to the Secretary of State for India, on the 29th of July 1867, in the Blue Book presented to Parliament (page 4), in which he says, speaking of the time in which the preparations must be commenced: "To obtain transports now is easy, but if the decision is long delayed, we must use the new transport ships;" are you aware whether any other communication than that was made?—I do not remember it, although I have a general recollection of the subject having been mooted and having been settled. I think I should have pointed out that the diversion of transports on this side would have involved the loss of their services on the other side. I think that my remarks must have been applied to the possibility of employing (for service in Abyssinia) the regiments that were to be relieved.

699. *Chairman.*] With regard to the animals, your own estimate (as given at page 440 of the Blue Book) of the animals necessary was 25,000, and the number of animals actually landed was 36,094; was that irrespective of what you expected the country to furnish?—Yes; I hoped that the carriage of the country would have enabled the Commissariat to carry the whole of the reserve supply of provisions up to Senafe.

700. Have you a record of what number were procured in the country by purchase and hire; were any purchased?—A large number were purchased.

701. Whilst 36,094 animals were landed, I see by the same return that 7,421 only were re-embarked on leaving the country; would the difference, 29,673, represent the numbers destroyed in Abyssinia?—The difference would represent the numbers expended there; the number that were not worth bringing away, part of which were sold.

702. That destruction of animals, I presume, was altogether beyond your expectations?—Yes.

703. Do you remember what number had perished by the time when you arrived in Abyssinia?—That, I think, is on record. That was ascertained with great difficulty, as I mentioned.

704. Nothing would make so heavy a call for tonnage as the conveyance of animals, I presume?—Yes.

705. And the increased supplies which you drew from Egypt, and parts of India other than Bombay, would therefore add much to the cost of the Expedition, would they not?—Those which I drew from the coast of Arabia increased the expense to a certain extent, no doubt; but

the ships were able to go backwards and forwards there.

706. Were the relative advantages of employing horses, camels, mules, and donkeys considered by the Bombay Government, or was it determined by your Lordship alone?—It was determined by what we could possibly get. I should have preferred all mule carriage if I could have got it; but it was thought at first impossible to get anything like the number of mules that we really did get. The memorandum which I quoted of his Excellency the Governor's would give an idea of what the expectation was.

707. You are aware of a statement in the Blue Book, at page 360, dated October 14th, made by Sir Edward Lugard to the India Office, that the labour, expense, and risk would have been greatly diminished if other animals had been employed as well; he says, "If the demands on this Department" (that is, the War Office) "had not been hitherto so exclusively confined to mules, the labour, expense, and risk attending the collection of pack animals would have been diminished in proportion to the number of pack-horses demanded, as they are cheaper and more abundant (particularly in the Levant), and bear sea transport much better than mules;" was that considered, or brought under your Lordship's notice?—I think it was brought under notice, and pack-horses were purchased. Everything which could carry a load was purchased; the Home Government purchased a considerable number of pack-animals in Egypt.

708. Pack-horses?—Pack-horses; they were extremely useful for the carts, and altogether they were rather superior animals; but, upon the whole, the mules were the most serviceable animals which we could have had.

709. Horses are very much cheaper, are they not, in Europe?—No doubt; the report will show the relative value of the horses and mules.

710. You considered the question of the employment of donkeys, did you not?—I did; I considered every means of carrying the Expedition. I was met by doubts as to the possibility of getting carriage; and I felt convinced that if every effort was used we should get it; I never relinquished that conviction, and I pressed in every direction to get sufficient carriage.

711. We have it on very good authority, that an Egyptian donkey will carry as its ordinary load from 160 to 170 or 180 pounds, are you aware of that?—The donkeys were useful, but it was only because we could not get anything better that we used them; I was advised not to have carts; the Government of India said that carts would be of no use. Sir William Merewether, who was supposed to know a great deal about the country, at first was entirely averse to the use of camels. If all the advice which I received had been followed, I should have neither had carts nor camels, to which I owed a great deal. The camels were very useful; we carried back the sick for the last 200 miles upon camels, and they were invaluable; the carts, as I before explained, were extremely valuable.

712. You would regard the Consul General of Egypt as a very good authority as to Egyptian donkeys, would you not?—Yes.

713. Donkeys would have required very much less tending, and very much less tonnage, would they not?—I do not think they would require less tending.

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714. And less food?—Not much less; they could not work without food.

715. With regard to the pack-saddles, you found great trouble and inconvenience with them, did you not?—It is a source of trouble and inconvenience; the use of a pack-saddle is an art which is possessed only by experienced muleteers.

716. One of the authorities says that there was not a man in Abyssinia who knew how to load a mule. I suppose that is rather too strong an expression?—That is a very strong expression. There were some excellent muleteers, but we suffered much in consequence of the establishment generally not knowing how to saddle mules.

717. Would you not have supposed that the best way to get pack saddles would have been to get them with the animals from the country whence those animals were drawn, they being used generally for pack purposes in the country from which the animals were drawn?—We had a description of pack saddle at Bombay, which was not expensive to make, and which we thought was a very good one, because in the plains of the Bombay Presidency it answers extremely well. If I had judged from my experience of that, I should have taken only those saddles. We got saddles from Persia which are in use in that country, but we found the weight so great that really half the load of the animal was in the saddle. We did not find them useful as we had to use them, and they were found to gail the animals. We had some saddles from the Punjaub, which the Punjaub people considered perfection, but others did not like them; upon the whole, I should say that the best saddle, if I had to fit an expedition again, was the Otago saddle which we got from England.

718. Do you think that any given pattern would be suitable for animals of all sizes, drawn from all quarters of the world?—No single pattern would have been suitable, but there were three or four sizes of the English saddles. Of course a great deal is dependent upon the fitting of the saddle, and that was just one of the difficulties. No one could tell exactly what kind of animals we should get. Some of the mules were as large as horses, while others were as small as donkeys; but upon the whole, for general use, I should prefer the Otago saddle, as far as my experience goes.

719. In purchasing mules, did you think it an inconvenience and an embarrassment to fix a minimum size?—Yes; we would have taken anything we could get. Some of the smaller mules were the best workers.

720. Are you aware that the regulation for purchasing in Europe was a minimum of 13 hands?—I should certainly not have made such a restriction, or fixed such a limit as that.

721. Would you not have expected that the result would be that superior mules, of a smaller size, would be rejected to take inferior mules of a larger size?—Yes.

722. The muleteers were of every language, and kindred, and people, and tongue, were they not?—Yes.

723. And that was a very great element of embarrassment and weakness, was it not?—It was.

724. Do you apprehend that if adequate remuneration had been offered to coolies, you could have got them from the Bombay Presidency?—I do not know that we could have got them from

the Bombay Presidency alone, but we could have got them from all India.

725. Speaking the Hindoo language?—Speaking a dialect of India.

726. Which the officers could have understood?—Yes. Possibly we might not have got so large an establishment at the time, but we should have got a nucleus which would have started us much better than we were started, if the scheme for a transport corps had been accepted at once, and vigorously acted upon.

727. Although you might have to pay more for such a corps, for a transport train so supplied, do you apprehend that it would have been cheaper, as a matter of arithmetic, in the ultimate amount?—Certainly; and I cannot give a better example than by pointing to the service of the greater portion of the land transport corps which worked in the highlands. It was worked by men supplied from the Punjaub, principally old soldiers, men who had learnt discipline, and had been regularly organised and marched down to the coast in a body.

728. You expect the only difficulty of getting men of a common tongue was the failure to offer them pay enough?—Yes. I would not say that you could get experienced muleteers in India, but you would have got such a class of men as we did get. Under such circumstances I could not expect that a better body could have been collected than those men who were sent from the Punjaub.

729. And you limit your approval of the men to those who came from the Punjaub, do you not?—To a very great degree. There was a nucleus of excellent muleteers in the old servants of the Bombay mule establishment, who were probably retained since the Persian Expedition. They were an excellent body, and they worked throughout the campaign extremely well. They were, in fact, the great stand-by in the earlier part of the campaign; and I think it is very important to bear in mind how very valuable it must be to retain an establishment of that kind in time of peace.

730. Could you suggest any more precise, distinct, and perfect business organisation in connection with the army, for the purposes of conducting expeditions of this nature; for instance, an organisation in the army whose business it should be to know the produce of every part of the globe where an army could be employed; the best market, and the best mode of getting to that market; something beyond, and very much more perfect than, the commissariat establishment which we have at present?—We find the commissariat in India generally sufficiently acquainted with such subjects as are indicated in the question. For Indian service, they can generally give a fair opinion upon all such points as you have noted.

731. Do you think that it would not be expedient to have a special training for men to conduct the business operations of an army, as distinguished from the soldiers' operations, those business operations including the supply of everything which the army may need; and, as in this particular case, the supply of tonnage, the supply of animals, the supply of provisions and clothing?—I should have been glad, if I had had the entire conduct of the Expedition, to have had an officer placed at my disposal entirely for that duty. I would have undertaken the whole of that duty if I had had a competent officer placed

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732. Then do you think that an organisation inside the army, or attached to the army, for the special purpose of business, as we have now an organisation attached to the army for special engineering purposes, would be an improvement on our ordinary army organisation?—I think so, provided that there is no temptation for them to assume the control of military subjects. The inconvenience, I think, of a department of that kind is very great when they step beyond the limits of their proper duty, and I think that there is a great tendency to allow them to do so; because when a government or a supreme authority finds a difficult question or a disagreeable question, it is extremely easy to hand it over to the head of such a department to find objections upon which a refusal is rested.

733. Then the efficiency or otherwise would depend upon the organisation and discipline prevailing, I apprehend; but you think that would be a good thing in itself?—I think it would be a good thing in itself, if it were kept in its place; but it is very difficult to keep it in its place.

734. As a matter of fact, the movement of armies now, and even war itself has, I apprehend, with the increased means of destruction, and the improvement in warlike implements, become more a matter of business than a matter of fighting, has it not?—It always comes to fighting in the end; that settles the point in the end.

735. No doubt; but the fighting is a thing of a week, whereas the business is a thing of a year, is it not?—The preparation is, of course, much the longer, and preparation is of the utmost importance.

736. You were detained upwards of three weeks at Zoulla, and I think upwards of a fortnight at Senafé, and for shorter periods at other stations on the march to Magdala; in all, probably, about six or seven weeks, were you not?—I left Zoulla on the 25th of January. Up to that time I was occupied in preparing my base of operations, my mainspring.

737. The detention in the main was owing to two causes, was it not; the want of provisions, and the want of a land transport corps?—Mainly that was so; but it was also owing to the necessity of clearing a track. We could only advance at a certain rate, and we had first to make a road through the pass.

738. But the force which had been advanced and were making the road, were detained on several occasions, were they not, for want of supplies from the coast?—Up to the time when I made my advance from Zoulla to Senafé the road had not been opened for carts. Without the use of carts we could not for a very much longer time have advanced from Senafé, and there was the greatest possible objection to advancing any men unnecessarily, because the feeding of them exhausted our resources.

739. Then they would have to stop for want of provisions, would they not?—Not only from want of provisions, but also so as to avoid unnecessary using of carriage to supply the men ahead. I endeavoured to keep every man behind who was not necessary in front, because every man who went forward consumed my means of transport.

740. To put the question in another form, had you had your supplies and your transport train exactly as you would have wished them both,

would you not have advanced with very much more rapidity?—Yes.

741. Can you estimate or define the acceleration which you would have attained?—That I could not do; but if I had had supplies and carriage I could have received the troops much more quickly. I could have pushed them forward notwithstanding the difficulties of the road. I still could have advanced troops to certain points from which they could have combined all their labour to open the road.

742. In some measure, then, the want of a transport train was a cause of cost, was it not?—Certainly.

743. The want of provisions was a cause of cost, was it not?—Yes.

744. The want of a railway was a cause of cost, was it not?—Yes.

745. The want of water-pipes was a cause of cost to some extent, was it not?—Yes, to some extent. Colonel Wilkins will be able to tell you what the labour of laying the water-pipes would have been. The country was irregular, and they could not have been laid down as you would lay down a line upon the ground. There might have been a considerable amount of work.

746. The destruction of mules on landing was a matter of cost, was it not?—The destruction of mules, and camels, and horses, was a great item of cost.

747. Are you aware that a mule would not cost much less upon the soil of Abyssinia from the Mediterranean than about 50 l.?—I should like to know how that is made out. The first cost is about 20 l., I think.

748. I think 22 l. per head was paid for the Spanish mules; 16 l. per head and a fraction was the cost of conveying them to Alexandria, which made 38 l.; across the Isthmus and from Suez to Annesley Bay, reckoning their food, and the agency employed in their purchase, you will perhaps concur with me that 60 l. is not too high an estimate per head; but we will call it 50 l.; 20,000 of them were destroyed, were they not?—Not 20,000 of those brought from Europe.

749. Of the animals altogether?—But you would not put 50 l. as the average cost of the whole. I am sure that you would find it very much less than 50 l. per head, as the average cost of all the mules of the Expedition; because if you take the number lost, you must average the whole.

750. If that estimate is correct, I think it amounts to a good deal of money, does it not?—No doubt. The larger Spanish mules were of extreme value, first for the transport of mounted artillery for the transport of the rockets and for use in the Maltese carts, where they were used for postal communications and for the carriage of ammunition; in fact, for the carriage of all loads that required a larger animal they were most valuable.

751. Putting those items together, namely, the detention (which was certainly at the rate of a million and a quarter a month), the waste of animals, and the increased tonnage consequent thereupon, you would estimate the expense, which with happier arrangements might have been saved, at a much higher figure than you were inclined to assign to it the other day, would you not?—Yes, supposing that we could have foreseen everything, and supposing that the enemy would always have done what we wanted, as they did. Supposing that the enemy had not always done what

what we wanted, it might have been very different.

752. That would not have increased the cost, would it?—It would have increased the cost, as it would have increased our expenditure.

753. Was not all your cost upon the supposition that the enemy would not do what you wanted him to do?—Yes; but still, he doing what we wanted, the expenditure ceased at a certain point. If he had not done what we wanted, we should have lost more animals, and we should have been detained longer, and that would certainly have increased the cost.

754. But up to this point, anything that he might have done would not have increased the cost at all, though the continuation of the Expedition would have increased the cost, and not otherwise?—Supposing, for instance, that Kassai, of Tigre, instead of making friends and giving us provisions, had blocked up our road and obliged me to take Tigre, that would have increased the cost.

755. Had you been opposed in your advance to the high lands, would any amount of force, would 50,000 men, have enabled you to reach the highlands?—It would depend, of course, upon the opposition that we met. One could not predict exactly.

756. But a few old women up in the mountains, to which you yourself made reference the other day, would have been a very great impediment in the way of your passing, would they not?—Yes; there is not a mile in which they might not have caused us the greatest trouble.

757. Was Kassai's force sufficient to have stopped your advance into the high lands at all?—No, he would not have prevented our advancing at all; but if he had known his trade and been hostile, he would have cut off our communication.

758. Supposing that you had had 25,000 men, instead of the number you had, your power of assault would not have been increased even if he had been opposing you, would it?—Of course the power of assault is increased by having more men, but then you would have more men to feed and to take care of.

759. Captain *Beaumont*.] In reply to question 482, your Lordship states, with reference to the water supply, "There was a supply. The discharge of the water on the calculation I made would have given a supply to the pipes;" I wish quite to recognise that on all matters of detail I must turn for information to the Commanding Royal Engineer; assuming the necessary works, either pipes or reservoirs, to have been made, was there within 16 miles of Zoulla a sufficient supply of water to have made you independent of the condensing steamers?—I believe that in the soil there was a sufficient supply; but that supply was only discovered after great labour in sinking wells, and was lifted to the surface by means of pumps. The supply of the Weeah river, according to the calculation which I made of the discharge, would have filled a four-inch pipe, according to my rough calculation; but I could not say now whether that would have delivered as much water as was consumed in any one day.

760. Then I must turn to the Commanding Engineer for an answer to the question?—I think you had better refer that question to him, because he has the details.

761. I fancied from the accounts I have read, that on the assumption that the necessary works

had been made and pipes fitted, there was no doubt as to the sufficiency of the water supply within a distance of 16 miles?—I think there is no doubt that the spring at Koomayli was sufficiently abundant, if it had been all made available, to have furnished the supply at Zoulla. But if, as I understand, the honourable Member adverts to the entire water supply within a radius of 16 miles, taking Zoulla as the centre, and asks whether there was a sufficient quantity of water on the spot, and whether, if measures had been immediately taken to make it available, the expense of the condensers could have been avoided. I think that every one conversant with the subject would say that the time did not possibly admit of such knowledge or such arrangements as would have made that water supply available, and would have saved the use of condensers.

762. That was hardly the point which I put, because I assumed that the necessary works had been made, wishing to eliminate any question of engineering from the way in which I ventured to put it; that is to say, putting time on one side, putting difficulty of works on one side (on both of which points I shall refer to the Commanding Engineer), was there within the radius of 16 miles, before referred to, from Zoulla as a centre, a sufficient amount of water to have made you independent of the condensing steamers?—That is a matter of opinion; I believe there was. I believe that, had we known enough about the water, and had we had all the wells which might have been made there, and machinery to draw the water, we could have obviated altogether the necessity for using condensers; but you would require for that all the provisions necessary for raising the water, and for storing it so as to make it available; that is to say, for placing it in such a way upon the shore that it would have been available. Although you will get information from Colonel Wilkins, I think, with reference to your questions, that it is proper to advert to the contingencies which beset the water supply of which you speak, both the wells at Koomayli, and no doubt the stream of the Weeah river, were liable to very heavy floods, and there was very great danger that the whole of the waterworks, unless they were constructed in a very permanent and substantial manner, might be carried away at any moment; indeed, the wells in the bed of the river were obviously in danger of being filled up, which would have involved the stoppage of the supply for a considerable time, and that would have been dangerous.

763. Sir *John Hay*.] Would you, as Commander in Chief, have been satisfied to depend upon that water supply, and so have to dispense with condensers at that time?—No.

764. Captain *Beaumont*.] The last part of my question, number 559, had for its object to obtain your Lordship's opinion as to whether the failure of the Land Transport Train was not principally owing to the class of men enlisted. I hold in my hand the report signed by Colonel Warden, and published in general orders by the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, dated the 18th September 1868. At paragraphs 21, 22, and 23, I find it stated as follows:—"The organisation of the train was much affected by a change in the class of muleteers; for besides those sent from Bombay at the commencement, a very large number of muleteers, or believed to be such, were sent from Suez. They consisted

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of every European nationality, besides Turks and Egyptians, and the interpreters were very few in proportion. Many amongst them were so open to bribery and corruption, that the correctness of their interpretation had to be purchased by the men. The wanton, barbarous cruelty of these men to their mules, and their unwillingness to work or to bear provisions, besides being insubordinate in the extreme, led to their being discharged, and during the months of January, February, and March, 2,100 were sent back." Does your Lordship endorse the views which are contained in those three paragraphs?—I have full belief in them.

765. Then I would ask your Lordship whether, if that is correct, it does not clash to a certain extent with the answer which you were good enough to give to my question 559, where you say, "I think it is not, because I should not have excluded the possibility of employing muleteers from other countries"?—I should have preferred to have enlisted the whole of the drivers of mules in India, but the first demands for such a corps were met by opinions that the men could not be had. I cannot refer exactly to the replies, but the purport of the replies from Madras and from India was, that such a number of men as were required could not be had. In any delay in getting men from India, I should not have excluded the possibility of enlisting men in Egypt or Persia; but I should have taken special measures to enlist better men, and to have engaged a certain number of men of their own race and country to come with them, and to be responsible for them. At the same time, I should have placed them under the same restraints of military discipline that I proposed in the original Transport Corps. If I had enlisted muleteers from Persia, I would have engaged an agent in Persia to enlist and bring a certain number of muleteers, for whom he would be answerable, paying him well. But I would not have depended upon him to watch and manage all the business of the mules, because I think that required something of a military organisation. It required a number of agents to superintend mules. Such an agent as I described might have brought and controlled the conduct of a larger number of men than the number whose work he could superintend. He could have explained to them any differences; he could have interpreted more correctly the orders given to them, or the duties required of them. In fact, he would have been a buffer between them and the authorities over them in many points, which would have eased their working. At the same time, I should have required to have them subject to a machinery for discipline, such as the transport train would provide. I may be wrong, because I had no experience of Persia, nor did I ever engage any men in Egypt; but it seemed to me reasonable to suppose that such a plan would have produced us more amenable men than those we got.

766. Then do I correctly understand your Lordship, that you find more fault with the way in which the markets abroad for the supply of men for the land transport train were used than with the fact of those markets having been applied to at all?—I apprehend that your question means whether I condemn the action of the officers who enlisted the muleteers in Egypt.

767. I would hardly put it as asking whether you condemn the officers, because they were acting under orders; but would you condemn

the system, which resulted in those muleteers being engaged in the way in which they were engaged?—I think those officers, if they could be present, would deserve to have it put to them whether they could have engaged muleteers in any other way than that in which they did engage them, before I could venture to condemn them. That some of the muleteers were extremely bad, there is no doubt; but without an inquiry on the spot, I could not take upon myself to pronounce that they could not have got better ones.

768. Your Lordship will permit me to recapitulate the question which I put. I was putting forward the view that the evil effects that resulted from the Land Transport Corps, as it was organised, principally resulted from the nature of the men who were enlisted. I asked your Lordship whether you agreed to that view, as, if I understood you rightly, you implied it was necessary, and under the circumstances advisable, to appeal, to a certain extent, either more or less, to the various countries that were appealed to for the supply; but that you thought that the best means of obtaining men from those countries was not adopted. I may say that I have heard it very generally stated, and in fact it seems to me to be borne out by paragraphs 21, 22, and 23, which I have just read, that the main cause of the ill effects was attributable to those bad characters that were enlisted. Of course, if the markets were capable of producing a better article than those that were supplied, that is another matter. Accepting the first point, I would wish your Lordship's opinion as to whether the markets were properly appealed to?—I have described the way in which I should have set about engaging men in those countries.

769. Does your Lordship mean to say that you would have appealed to the countries, and to the extent to which they were appealed to?—That is a question which I cannot answer. Failing to get them from India, I should have been obliged to appeal to those countries. Men must have been engaged to bring the animals; they could not have come without a great number of drivers, but I should have preferred in the first instance to have engaged muleteers from India, if I could have got them. As we were not encouraged to believe that we could get them at first, it became a necessity to get them from other quarters. Had I myself set to work to engage them in other quarters, I should have proceeded in the manner that I have described; but I am not prepared to condemn the officers who did not proceed in that manner, because I am not acquainted with the circumstances of those markets, nor do I know whether they could have done what I suggest.

770. The preceding paragraph 20, from that same Report signed by Colonel Warden, is as follows: "The strength of the corps under the command of the Director finally reached the gigantic proportions shown at the close of the campaign, namely, 80 commissioned officers, 160 European inspectors, 400 native inspectors, 12,000 followers." Do not those words seem to imply that the numbers eventually reached were in excess of any original scheme?—The answer to that question is given by my first memorandum as to the 25,000 mules, and I proposed one driver to two mules, which gives nearly the number which you mention.

771. Referring to paragraph 21, where it says, "The

"The organisation of the train was much affected by a change in the class of muleteers"; does not that imply that no original scheme contemplated raising the bulk of the muleteers from the Levant?—The original scheme contemplated raising them in India.

772. And for the changes that were subsequently made from the original scheme which was not carried out, are the Bombay Government entirely responsible?—They are responsible for not adopting the scheme, and for not having, therefore, prosecuted it vigorously; but they are not entirely responsible for not having procured that number of muleteers from India, as I have said that their demands were not at first met with encouragement.

773. I believe your Lordship had a difference of opinion with the Government of India with respect to the employment of English cavalry in the Expedition?—Yes.

774. Was not one chief reason urged in favour of the employment of native cavalry, that the weight carried by the horse of an Indian sowar is very much less than the weight carried by the horse of an English cavalry man?—I have not here the letter objecting to the employment of European cavalry; but one objection made to the employment of European cavalry was in a letter which appeared in the newspapers, written by Mr. Dufton, who was subsequently killed in the Expedition, describing his journey through the country, and declaring that it was impossible for an army to go through it; he said that there were simply tracks along precipices by which people could go in single file.

775. Were the English cavalry on their reaching Magdala fit for active service, that is to say, were they in such a condition that they could have efficiently executed a charge?—Yes; they lost some horses from fatigue, and from the difficulty of the ground, but they traversed the whole journey from the sea to Magdala itself, and back again to the sea, without a sore back. Their extreme discipline, and their extreme care of their horses, were an admirable example. Whenever there was any difficult ground the men dismounted, and led their horses; and the return made by Major Holland and Captain Hozier in the Topographical Department, shows as follows: "Of these troops, the 3rd Dragoon Guards had landed at Zulla, numbering 204 men of all ranks, 224 horses, and 257 native followers. Before Magdala they numbered 173 of all ranks, 171 horses, and 78 followers;" they lost fewer than any other regiments.

776. It is a fact, I believe, that an Indian sowar rides considerably lighter than an English cavalry man?—The Indian saddle is very often very heavy; counting the saddles, the men of the Scinde Horse are lighter, but they carry a good deal with them.

777. Take the average weight of an Indian sowar and an English cavalry man, is not the former four or five stone lighter on his horse's back than the latter?—There is a difference of about two stone between Bombay native cavalry and the dragoons; and the dragoon horses are better. But I do not mean to say that the lightening of the cavalry is not a great desideratum. One of the arguments against taking European cavalry was that they require more commissariat and more carriage than the natives, and that there was no field for their employment; that there was no enemy for them. But we found

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the cavalry of the greatest possible use to us. In all the accounts which I had read of the country, and particularly of that part of the country to which we ultimately reached, it was stated that there were large bodies of cavalry. The Gallas were a mounted race, and essentially a cavalry people; and all the descriptions of Theodore's force formerly represented them as mostly mounted. Therefore, where cavalry exist on the enemy's side there is need for cavalry on your own, and if you have cavalry at all, as I have before mentioned, I consider it always essential to have a European element represented in it.

778. Mr. Eastwick.] The condensed water which was used for the force never produced any bad symptoms with regard to the health of the men, did it?—I consider that the comparatively great degree of healthiness must have been owing to the condensed water. I heard many people express the same opinion; and it was my conviction, that the immunity from disease at Zulla, which, considering all the disadvantageous circumstances, was remarkable, was due to the use of the condensed water.

779. Your Lordship stated that, in case water had been raised for the force, either from wells or in any other way, it would have been necessary to erect reservoirs; would those reservoirs have been covered or open?—They would have been open. They would have been better covered; but one would not have considered it indispensable.

780. In case of their being open, might not the dust and various other causes have created a deposit which might have rendered the water unwholesome?—Very possibly it would have been a disadvantage. As it happened, the reservoirs that we used were formed principally of tanks, so that they were all covered.

781. But even in tanks, water which remains a considerable time generally, I believe, produces animalculæ, which are bad for the health of those who drink it; is not that so?—No doubt stagnant water, except in very large masses, is injurious to health.

782. Then, apart from economical reasons, your Lordship would have preferred the condensed water?—I should have certainly preferred the condensed water to any supply which I saw at the Weeah River, but I think that the water which we drew from the wells at Koomayli was probably of a very good quality. It came up at a very high temperature. It may or may not have been as wholesome as the condensed water, but one knows perfectly well what condensed water is; whereas we did not know what that was. We had not it properly analysed, but it was perfectly clear, and being a hot spring, without any test whatever, I should have judged it to have been wholesome water, and it was so.

783. It might, however, have been of a mineral character, might it not?—It might. We were perfectly sure of the condensed water, and I believe it was a main cause of the sickness not being greater than it was.

784. Chairman.] You used the Koomayli water, did you not?—The Koomayli water was used by the people at Koomayli.

785. It was used by a large portion of your force in passing, was it not?—Yes, and by a large number of animals.

786. Did they suffer from its use?—I do not remember that they did; but no one stayed very long at Koomayli.

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787. Mr. *Eastwick*.] I think I am right in saying that the sum expended for all supplies on the high lands amounted in pounds sterling to 178,770 l.?—The total amount of dollars spent was 893,852.

788. That is equal, I think, to the amount in pounds sterling which I have stated; that is a very small sum as compared with the general expenditure, and do you not consider that it fully justified your Lordship in not depending on the resources of the country, and in keeping six months' stores always in reserve?—I think so, certainly; and not only that, but the report of the Commissariat officers upon the high lands was to the same effect. It was an obvious fact which one could not mistake.

789. *Chairman*.] But you limit your statement to the high lands; have you verified the other statement that a million was spent in Abyssinia?—No; I have here only the expenditure in the high lands. I have not the amount of the expenditure below; but I know that a considerable sum must have been spent below in the hire of the boats, the labour on the piers and roads, the labour on the railway, and the landing from the boats during the time when the piers were being constructed. There was a great deal of manual labour in lifting the stores from the boats to the shore. The cotton boats drew a great deal of water, and the coast boats that we employed drew a great deal of water, and they could not approach the beach, so that the men had to wade into the water to land the stores. The troops did that in the first instance.

790. Sir *John Hay*.] Was there any expenditure there that you are not prepared to justify?—It was absolutely necessary.

791. With reference to the very comprehensive question which the honourable Chairman asked your Lordship as to the railway, the water pipes, the mules, and the land transport, which appear to have cost a very considerable extra expenditure, looking to the fact of the previous imperfect knowledge, do you still adhere to your statement, that the extra expenditure is not of any very considerable moment?—I adhere to that statement. I do not mean to say that it is not necessary to check and avoid unnecessary expenditure; but viewing any excess of expenditure as the result of some want of perfection in the parties employed in an Expedition in which everyone from first to last laboured, as I never saw people labour, with an utter disregard of health, or exertion, of fatigue, and of every personal feeling, I think that the expenditure arising from imperfections is not worthy of consideration; that is to say, worthy of consideration in the direction of expressing blame, or being deserving of blame. I will say that I never in my life saw any people labour for the public service with so total a disregard to all personal considerations as the force in Abyssinia, and all connected with it, except the unfortunate Egyptian muleteers, who have received such prominence, and I cannot include them in the praise I have bestowed; but as regards all the others, I think that too much cannot be said, and especially as regards the officers of the Transport Corps. You saw an officer who had been the pink of the ball-room; he landed with a pair of shining boots and nice white breeches, turned out as he might be admired in Rotten-row; and you saw him in a month, and his mother would not know him. He had a torn wide-awake hat; he had slept,

perhaps, under a rock; his clothes were dirty, and his face looked as if he had not been washed for a week. But he had no thought beyond that of delivering his convoy safely at the end of the 50 or 60 miles which he had to go. Nothing too strong could be said in favour of the exertions of all those officers, and of all the parties employed generally.

792. There was one very large question to which your Lordship gave, I think, not quite a complete answer, and I think it is very desirable, looking to the fact that you have commanded armies, and may command them again, that this Committee should have a perfect answer upon this subject. It was with reference to the attaching of commercial persons to the army to perform certain duties; is it not as likely that you will find among military men, men as competent to undertake the purchase of supplies for an army as that you will find them among persons in any other course of life?—I believe entirely so, looking to an agent such as I have described; I do not at all preclude his being a military man; I think that I said that if I had had to manage the whole Expedition, I should have been willing to undertake every part of the provision, provided I should have had at my control an agent competent to manage the portion which related to the line of transport, the preparation, the equipment, and other auxiliaries, to the Expedition; but I do not at all think that such an agent should be a civilian exclusively; I would have taken the best man that I could find, whatever he was; if I had to choose such a man, I should prefer upon the whole that he should be a military man, because I think, perhaps, he might have more knowledge of the wants to which those things were applied than a civilian would have.

793. And it is far from impossible to find such men in the army, is it not?—I think it is quite possible.

794. There never has been any difficulty, I suppose, in finding such persons if they have been duly looked for?—I believe there never has been.

795. Colonel *Barttelot*.] Did I rightly understand your Lordship to state that a civil organisation might be good, so far as it went, provided it were under military control?—I think that the authority interested in the Expedition should have a complete control that no other individual can feel the entire responsibility in the degree that he does.

796. Your great idea is simply this, that the officer in command, whoever he may be, should have the complete control over all who have anything to do with an expedition, whether military or civil?—Yes; the moment he embarks on service, if he at all fulfils his mission, it is inevitable that he must have the control, because the moment that any serious results are pending it would be a very bold person indeed who would tie the hands of the commander responsible for the Expedition, and it would be a very weak commander, with the means in his hands of taking what he wanted, to allow his hands to be tied.

797. Referring to the transport and to the ships which were in Annesley Bay, supposing that the Expedition had not come to so satisfactory an end as it did, and that you had been detained in the country for some considerable time longer, would you have thought it prudent to discharge any of those transports which were detained, inasmuch as you of course might conceive the possibility, although not the probability, of having some re-

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verse and having to fall back upon your ships?—I can conceive circumstances in which I might not have considered the retention of the shipping necessary; for instance, had we determined to occupy a portion of Abyssinia, and had we established ourselves in the province nearer the sea, then I should have considered myself on a sufficiently assured base, having provisions, or knowing that I could get provisions, and then I should not have required the retention of the transports to take the troops back. We might have waited in a good climate then, and the objects of this country would have been in course of fulfilment; but with the object of going for an express purpose and returning directly, that was done. Unless I had seen my stay likely to be prolonged beyond anything that could come into the present discussion, I should have been extremely unwilling to have been left without the means of sending the troops away; I would not have parted with the transports if I possibly could have avoided it.

798. And even supposing that you had parted with the transports, do you think that they could have been taken up again as reasonably as they were in the first instance?—That is a point upon which I could not give a reliable opinion, but I should think probably not; I believe the prices rose immediately after the first engagements of shipping. There are seasons also when the shipping is in that part of the world, and there are seasons when it is away. At certain seasons I conclude that it would have been difficult without notice, and it would have taken time to engage the shipping; they would have had to be called from different ports.

799. And all that time a large expenditure would have been going on, would it not, in Abyssinia, where you still would have been?—No doubt.

800. I think you said that looking at the campaign as at first proposed, the estimate, as submitted to Parliament (not judging now, but judging then), was a fair estimate of what the expenditure might possibly be?—I do not think that I said that; I said that it is very possible that if that estimate had been shown me then, I might have considered it a reasonable estimate, because I had not entered into the calculations at all, but I never have entered into the question of the estimate, nor the calculations of prices and quantities, so as to enable me to make an estimate, or to form an opinion, so that I could not give a reply to that question.

801. Supposing, as was possible, that when Theodore knew that we certainly intended to send this Expedition, he had liberated the prisoners on your landing, or even before your own landing, then the estimate would have been within bounds, possibly, would it not?—The same answer applies to that, that I had not entered into any calculations of expenditure, so that I could not give a safe reply upon that point.

802. In fact, summing up the whole, your business was to succeed to the best of your ability, and really not to take heed of what the estimate came to?—I gave no thought to the estimate, but I gave great thought to taking nothing which I considered not necessary. I bore economy in mind, as in fixing the force, which I fixed at the very smallest possible number. I mentioned that it was the least force that I should consider safe in the first instance.

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I bore it in mind in selecting regiments near at hand, and generally I would not have asked for anything which I should have thought unnecessary, but beyond that, as to the actual cost, I never went into it.

803. Supposing that you had to carry out such an expedition, and looking at the hostile tribes which you had on each side of you, do you think that an expedition, got up in the same hurry as that was, could have been conducted in a much less expensive manner?—I do not think so. Of course I guard myself in that reply with reference to the points in which I say that I was not entirely satisfied. I do not mean to say that the thing was perfect, but I think that if one error had not occurred, some other probably would have occurred, and that generally, unless every body is perfect, there must be a margin of error, and, therefore, a margin of increased expense beyond what possibly might arise.

804. Do you think that, supposing another expedition of the same kind took place in a hurry, and you were put in command of that expedition, you could expect that the Home Government would be ready at once to supply you with railways and every other appliance, they not knowing, in the first instance, what was required?—The whole being, as far as details went, entirely a *terra incognita* to us, we could not, at first, have known what to have asked for in the way of railways, or the extent to which our demands should go; and even when we had some information there was ground for doubt as to whether what might be useful was worth the cost, or whether it could come in time. That leads me to a correction of a statement which I made in a former reply regarding the adoption of Brassey's railway. I think that the purport of my reply was that the subject was placed before the Governor, and that I did not feel sufficiently confident to press it, but that if I had decided entirely myself I would have taken it; but on referring to a letter of mine, addressed to Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, dated the 14th of December, before I left Bombay, I find this: "I send a memorandum which I think you would like to make use of." (I do not remember what that was now, but it was something to assist the Governor, by referring to an opinion given to him). "The gradient of the Koomayli Pass is 1 in 41. There may be a few places steeper, but I cannot say what they would be. I think we could cut the railway out of the rock in many places in narrow bits, so as to be out of the way of floods. I am sorry that we did not see our way to recommend the acceptance of Brassey's offer when made." Therefore, from this I infer that if I had an inclination in favour of the railway, yet that I did not put it in such a way as to induce the Governor to adopt it; and I think that, perhaps, my former reply may have led to the inference that the responsibility of not adopting the railway was the Governor's. I have no doubt that his Excellency would not shrink from a responsibility of that kind, but I thought it well to correct what might appear to be not quite right. I see that I evidently could not have advocated it in anyway so as to lead to its adoption. I dare say my memorandum would explain something, but I have not it at hand. I think it was a memorandum connected with the railway in case the Governor might have thought it desirable to order the railway, and, perhaps, showing how it might be useful, or something of that

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that kind; but I see that Brassey's offer arrived some time previously to this, and that when it at first came under view we did not consider it expedient to accept it. Colonel Wilkins will have something to say on that point when he is examined.

805. Then, although a railway might have been a good thing, water pipes might have been good things, and piers might also have been excellent things, yet, considering the nature of the Expedition which you had to undertake, you do not think that the Home Government could possibly have been supposed to know that you would require all those things?—The Home Government could not know that piers were required, because they could not know the nature of the coast that might be chosen for the landing of the Expedition.

806. And, therefore, of course whether expensive or not, you made use of the appliances which you had at hand for watering the troops and other purposes, such as the condensing apparatus?—The short notice obliged us to use a great deal that we had at hand, but I think that it is possible that in some instances we might have improved upon what we had at hand, had we felt sufficient confidence in our knowledge of the country that there was time to improve upon some of the materials which we had at hand.

807. Must there not always be a difficulty in war in an unknown country in regard to all those matters?—Undoubtedly; it is never free from difficulty, and there was always this element of doubt that we had to consider the expense of transporting everything overland from England, because there was no possible time for anything coming by the long sea voyage. What decided me upon indenting for the water pipes was the imminent danger of some calamity to the shipping, and that was an anxiety from which we were never free until we got reservoirs sufficient to contain a certain number of days' supply of water. I have no doubt that Sir Leopold Heath, as well as myself, was never free from a deep feeling of anxiety on that ground, and it was with a view to that, that as we saw with some confidence the probability of our being able to apply them usefully, we telegraphed for the water pipes.

808. Were the stores which were abandoned in Abyssinia abandoned by orders?—Everything which was done in Abyssinia was done by my orders.

809. *Sir John Hay.*] On your responsibility?—Yes, I am responsible; there was no fault committed in that way.

810. *Colonel Barttelot.*] And those stores which were abandoned were simply abandoned because you did not think that they were stores which it would have paid to carry away?—I do not know now to what stores the honourable Member alludes. There were certain stores of grain which we had when we first commenced our return. Those stores it would have been more expensive to carry with us. We knew that we should have stores coming up to us on the contingency of our longer detention, and that we should not have carriage. Such stores as were surplus food were given away in charity to the poorer Abyssinians, and given to the priests at the churches for the support of those who had left Magdala with the troops, to assist the poor of the country where we had made the provisions dearer than they had been before by our great consumption. Where they were

military stores the greatest care was taken, and they were destroyed with reluctance, and under such circumstances as to prevent the appearance of any necessity. Every effort was made to avoid such destruction; but it happened sometimes, from the breaking down of mule carriage, that there were no means of carrying on stores with the rear guard, and under these circumstances they—some ammunition and other stores—were destroyed.

811. It was the natural consequence of a campaign of that kind, was it not?—The natural consequence.

812. *Chairman.*] Your personal experience in the matter of shipping, I presume, has been very small?—Very small.

813. You cannot give any decided opinion as to whether the price was reasonable or not, can you?—No; but I had certain information upon that point, from inquiries which I made for a special purpose.

814. If you found a ship getting pay for three months' hire, equal to her market value, would you think it was a very reasonable price?—Every ship in a foreign port, with a three months' voyage home, has a three months' engagement there for certain.

815. But you have not given your mind to the shipping question, have you?—I have given my mind to it so far, that I am aware that the prices given at Bombay at first were very low, and were lower than those given in Calcutta, so that I speak more with reference to the Bombay shipping, which was the shipping first engaged. My impression was, that had the rate been higher, a larger amount of shipping would have been available there.

816. Although the Home Government could not tell what were the physical features of the country as to its fitness for a railway, and although they could not tell the exigencies demanding water, yet the pioneer force knew all about it, did they not?—There is one element, I think, which several honourable Members of the Committee have forgotten in looking at the dates when a requisition was made, because the communication was extremely slow. If a requisition was made from the reconnoitring party when they were at some distance from the coast, that added very much to the time of its reaching us. Sometimes the communication was three weeks before we received it.

817. In proportion as the expenditure is justified, the estimate will be condemned, will it not?—That is one of those questions which, I think, ought to be settled by Members of Parliament themselves.

818. *Mr. Eastwick.*] I suppose that the experience gained by officers and men in such an expedition as the Abyssinian Expedition, is of great value, and ought not to be omitted in a debtor and creditor account of the general result of the Expedition?—I concur in that.

819. *Chairman.*] If your Lordship wishes to correct any previous answer given to the Committee, the Committee will be glad to hear you now, or at any subsequent meeting?—I think the honourable Chairman said that he had learned from Colonel Marriott that the order for increasing the strength of the British regiments in preparation for the Expedition, was received from his Royal Highness the Commander in Chief.

820. I think the statement was that it was received

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received from the Horse Guards?—I replied that if Colonel Marriott knew that of his own knowledge, of course I could not contradict it; but my impression was that the order emanated from the Government of India. That was the purport of my reply.

821. I believe it was also stated that that requisition was in writing?—It was in writing. I quoted the letter of the Government of India, showing it to be the conviction of the Government of India that the regiments ought to be raised to their full establishment; but I have discovered, in examining the correspondence, a letter from the Horse Guards which was permissive. It was a letter describing the way in which the increase to the regiments was to be made, assuming that it were to be made. That permissive letter was accepted by the Adjutant General of Bombay as an order from the Horse Guards, and in forwarding it to the Commander in Chief in India, he used the expression "Under orders from His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief." Therefore, Colonel Marriott was justified in saying that it was by an order from the Horse Guards. It was an error in my office; that is to say, in the Adjutant General's office of Bombay, to assume that as an order from the Horse Guards, because it was merely a permissive letter instructing him how the increase to regiments by volunteering should be carried out. It was erroneously assumed as an order in the Adjutant General's office; but, although that justified what Colonel Marriott said, I still maintain that the spirit of the instructions to increase the regiments was received from the Government of India. It was in accordance with the convictions and views of the Government of India, set forth in their letter, that the strength of the regiments was increased; and it was according to their positive orders that the native regiments were increased. Having examined the numbers of that increase, and the number of the men taken away

from military duty, for service in the transport corps and commissariat, I find the total amounts to 2,382 men, which, deducted from the number which actually were sent to Abyssinia, which, by reference to returns, I make to be 14,254 men, leaves a balance of 11,872 men, who were actually available for the purposes of the campaign. I do not lay any stress upon this accuracy of agreement with my estimate, because, in making such an estimate, I never thought of being bound absolutely to a particular number of men; and no persons of military experience or knowledge would ever expect when you had spoken about 12,000 men, that you would be absolutely bound precisely to such numbers, or that you would not make an addition to them, as you might learn from circumstances to be desirable, but it so happens actually that those involuntary additions on my part really bring the number to very nearly what I had stated. I stated, also, that in fixing such a number, I should assume the rank and file, and not all the grades and officers connected with the Expedition. It was a mere accident that the number of regiments and batteries upon which I fixed came to that precise number of men. Generally, in fixing the number of men for military service, I should count the rank and file, because that really is the thing to reckon upon. It is the unity upon which you would calculate. I thought it as well to correct in my answer any appearance of inconsistency.

822. May I ask if the figures which you have just mentioned include the troops which reached Aden and Annesley Bay, who were prepared for being shipped at Bombay?—It includes all prepared for the Expedition, or that were embarked for Abyssinia. The only body not included in this is the troop of Horse Artillery, numbering about 147.

823. Does it include those who only reached Aden?—It does.

Captain FREDERICK E. B. BEAUMONT, a Member of the Committee; Examined.

824. *Chairman.*] You are a Member of this House and of this Committee?—I am.

825. Together with myself you took a journey to the East?—Yes.

826. There you got a considerable number of facts bearing upon this inquiry?—Yes.

827. And you have them in writing, have you not?—I have them in writing.

828. And you propose to hand them in to this Committee?—I propose to hand in the evidence we have taken of those facts, without comment of our own.

829. Will you prepare them and hand them in?—I will.

Captain
 F. E. B.
 Beaumont,
 M.P.

Friday, 11th March 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Colonel Barttelot.
Mr. Baxter.
Captain Beaumont.
Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Candlish.
Mr. Eastwick.

Sir John Hay.
Sir Stafford Northcote.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. Charles Turner.

JOHN CANDLISH, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Colonel HENRY ST. CLAIR WILKINS, R.E., called in; and Examined.

Colonel H. St. Clair Wilkins, R.E. 830. Captain *Beaumont*.] WILL you be good enough to state to the Committee your position with respect to the late Abyssinian Expedition?
—I was Commanding Engineer.

11 March 1870. 831. Were you with the reconnoitring force?
—I was.

832. On what date did you land in Abyssinia?
—We landed at Massowah on the 1st of October.

833. The subject of the water supply would naturally, I presume, occupy your early attention?—Yes.

834. You, I believe, are aware of the questions which I had the honour to put to Lord Napier, and the answers which his Lordship gave; referring to Question 762, his Lordship allows that there was a sufficient amount of water within a radius of 16 miles from Zulla to have rendered unnecessary the use of the condensing steamers; that is on the assumption that the works in the shape of reservoirs, pipes, &c., had been prepared and were available; do you concur in that view?
—Of course; only by actual experience could we have found whether there was sufficient water for the supply required, but there was a great quantity of water we knew.

835. Then on what date did you first recognise that the amount of water would be sufficient to warrant you in demanding pipes for the conveyance of that water to Zulla?—I think that was towards the end of November.

836. What was the nature of the demand which you then made?—As far as I can recollect (though I cannot say with certainty, because I have been separated from my records ever since the Expedition was closed), I think 17 miles of 5-inch piping was sent for, as well as means for raising the water, supposing that wells were required.

837. Would the pipes which were then asked for have been sufficient to have conveyed an amount of water which would have rendered you independent of the condensing steamers, either from the River Weeah or from Koomayli?—They would have been sufficient for either source; but I cannot say that they would have rendered us independent of the condensing steamers.

838. What quantity of water did you assume would be brought by those pipes daily?—I think it was 200 tons a day.

839. What steps were taken to procure the pipes?—They were sent for to England.

840. Were they sent by you?—I think I sent a telegram.

841. Did you send it direct to England?—I think so.

842. Can you give me the date of that telegram?—No, I cannot give you that date.

843. Do you feel very confident that the application was made by you direct to England?—I cannot say; I did not do it on my own authority; of course I got orders, I believe from Bombay, to telegraph to England for the piping.

844. At about what date did you send the telegram to England?—It must have been in December, but I cannot give the precise date.

845. Then those pipes were contemplated, on their being received, to convey about 200 tons of water per day?—Yes.

846. Do you assume that your works would have been ready to supply that quantity upon the arrival of the pipes?—No, the works could not have been ready; works for such a scheme as that would have taken some time to make.

847. Were they put in hand?—They were not put in hand.

848. Therefore, the pipes were ordered, and had they been received earlier they would have been of no use, because the works were not put in hand; was that so?—We never had sufficient labour to carry out that work, even when the pipes came.

849. Then am I right in assuming that the pipes were ordered as a precautionary measure in the event of more labour being required; but that on the date on which you ordered them, there was no immediate prospect of the works being completed, which would make those pipes of utility?—Of course we hoped to have put them down when they came, and we could not foresee that we should not be able to do so; but when they did come, I considered that it would not be expedient to attempt to put them down unless the campaign lasted.

850. Then the pipes having been ordered by telegraph in December, can you give me the date on which they were received?—It must be known at the India Office when the telegraph was

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was received, and that would be correct, whereas I am only speaking from recollection, and it is now a long time ago. I have no dates, but I think the piping was received towards the end of February.

851. Then, assuming that the pipes were ordered about the middle of December, that would give an interval of 10 weeks between the date of their order and the date of their supply, would it not?—My request would have to go to Bombay first; and if they were ordered by me (as I think they were), by telegraph, that was on receipt of orders from Bombay.

852. I understood from you that you ordered the pipes direct from England?—I could not order on my own authority without first getting the authority from Bombay to do so.

853. Then the telegraph was sent by you to Bombay, and was forwarded from Bombay to England; was that the course which was taken?—Authority was first sought for from Bombay, or the requisition was made on Bombay in the first instance.

854. Therefore I think that your reply, that in December you ordered the pipes direct from England, will require a little modification, will it not?—I think the proceeding was this: a requisition was made upon Bombay, and the reply came to send a telegraph to England for the piping, but I cannot give the date.

855. Can you give me a short idea of the nature of the works that would have been required to enable you to reap the full advantage and utility of those pipes?—There were two sources, the river Weeah and Koomayli, either of which would have required heavy works, such as forming reservoirs. For instance, at Koomayli the supply was many feet below the surface, and the water would have had to be raised to the surface, and the excavation would have had to be very large; otherwise, the supply would have speedily drained. The water filtered through the soil not quite so fast as it was drained, and it would have required a large reservoir. Then, again, to protect such works from floods would have entailed masonry works to some extent. The rivers are liable to come down at any time, and if the works were not permanent, they were liable to destruction. For instance, the water came down in that pass to the depth of 20 feet in one day, while we were there.

856. Can you give me the number of men, roughly speaking, that you would have contemplated that it would have been necessary for you to employ in order to complete the works, and the time that it would have occupied those men?—In the first place, we should have required a considerable number of masons, probably not less than 20 or 30. They would have required labourers; a whole company of Sappers, for instance, to have assisted them. That is for the head works alone; but other works were required on the sea coast besides such as receiving-reservoirs. Altogether, the work would have been rather a heavy one, not to speak of the labour of laying the pipes.

857. You must pardon me if I ask you to be rather more particular than that, because "rather heavy works" is a general term which, to the Members of this Committee, perhaps, would be hardly satisfactory; I should like to have the answer in numbers and time, something in this way: "If I had had two companies of Engi-

neers, and a couple of regiments of the Line to do the ordinary labourers' work, I could have done the work in three weeks or two weeks; then would have come the question of laying the pipes, which, with a certain number of men, would have taken so much;" would you kindly give me your answer in terms similar to that, those figures which I have used being, of course, purely hypothetical?—It would have taken, I think, besides professional masons, say to the number of 30 or 40, a full company of Sappers for the excavation and laying, and the conveyance of stone for the works, both at the head and at the sea coast, and it would have occupied certainly more than three weeks.

858. Then could those works, which were spoken of by you as very considerable, have been executed by a company of Sappers and 30 masons in three weeks, according to your professional judgment?—The pipes would have had to be laid extra to that.

859. But putting the laying of the pipes on one side, could the permanent works have been executed in that time?—But that is putting aside a great part of the work.

860. But what number of men in the time would be required to complete the works, or to put them in such a condition that they would have been used irrespectively of the laying of the pipes?—I believe that it would have taken time before they could be used, besides the three weeks, to allow the works to dry.

861. Then, upon the number of men that you have stated there you make no comment, but with respect to the time you say, that on the completion of the works a certain time would have been necessary before the works would have been fit to receive the water; will you state how much time you think it would have been necessary to allow?—It would have required probably about a week more.

862. How long would it take to lay the pipes, assuming that they were on the ground, and that the men who were previously employed on the execution of the works were set to work to lay the pipes during this week, or whatever time it might be necessary to allow for the tanks and reservoirs to dry?—Supposing that the pipes were landed on the shore, and had to be conveyed and laid on the ground, it would have taken a considerable amount of carriage to have conveyed them, and to have put them in their proper places. Those pipes are of great weight. I do not suppose that each pipe would weigh less than 180 lbs. Therefore carriage would have been required to convey them to their destination. If camels had been employed each camel would have carried two such pipes, but the operation would have taken several days, but no such carriage, of course, was available at that time.

863. At any rate, putting the question of carriage on one side, the pipes could have been laid for 15 miles in a fortnight's time, could they not?—Yes.

864. The pipes were demanded in December; no steps were taken to prepare the works because you were deficient in labour; the amount of labour to which you were deficient is represented by one company of Sappers and some 30 or 40 bricklayers; there could easily have been sent from Chatham that number of men and bricklayers, and had that course been taken, would it not have resulted in the works having been

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been completed by you ready for the laying of the pipes in the way that we have spoken about; so that the whole would have been completed and in working order within two months of the date of the order, that is to say, before the end of February?—That is upon the supposition that Europeans could have been employed on the work, which they could not in manual labour.

865. Then what labour did you contemplate using?—Native labour.

866. Were the pipes ordered on the assumption that native labour only could be used?—Yes.

867. Where did you expect to get the native labour from, particularly the bricklayers?—From Aden or Bombay.

868. What steps were taken to procure this native labour?—Thirty masons, I think, were procured from Aden.

869. Can you tell me the date of their arrival in Abyssinia, which I assume will be the same date as that on which they were set to work?—The masons that were obtained from Aden were not set to work on this work. I cannot give you the date, because, as I have said before, I have no records at all.

870. What use was made of the masons if they were not set to work on laying those pipes?—They were employed on the pier and embanking wall.

871. Were the masons demanded with a view to their employment on the waterworks, or with a view to their employment on the works under you generally?—For general employment; but I am inclined to think I had the reservoirs in view at the time.

872. Therefore no special demand was made for labour to enable you to complete the waterworks at the time that the pipes were demanded?—No other than mentioned before, and the plumbers.

873. Can you state why no such special demand was made?—At that time the force had not landed; therefore it was unknown what amount of labour would be available at any future date. No special requisition was therefore made for labourers.

874. But at the time that the pipes were ordered, was it not reasonable to assume that it should be in contemplation, at any rate, to make the works which were necessary to utilise those pipes?—We never had the labour available.

875. But when a deficiency of labour became apparent, was not some course considered with the view of increasing the supply of labour?—The labour sent up was supposed to be sufficient, but it was not sufficient, as it eventually proved.

876. Were no steps taken to supply the deficiency?—If you mean by that that no special number of men was sent for to carry out this work, I should say no.

877. Can you state the date when you first recognised the impossibility, from want of labour, of putting the works in hand?—I can only answer that by saying that labour was deficient during the whole campaign. Emergencies had to be met as they arose.

878. You said that Europeans could not have been employed, but were there not large working parties from the regiments continually employed?—Not of Europeans.

879. Were no Europeans employed on the works?—I do not say that. I say that they were not continually employed. They could only be employed occasionally.

880. Assuming that two companies had been sent from Chatham in place of one, that would have allowed the occasional employment only of Europeans, and the work might have been completed by them, might it not?—I do not think that the Commander in Chief would have approved of the employment of Europeans on such work.

881. May I ask on what ground he would have disapproved of their employment?—On the climatic ground.

882. I may ask you also to bear in mind the importance which attaches to a good supply of pure water, because I think that I am entitled to say that the evidence we have received points to the fact that most of the illness which appeared on the beach at Zulla resulted from an insufficient supply of water?—That was only at the first. There was always a sufficient supply afterwards.

883. Did the condensing arrangements never break down?—Never.

884. And was there always a sufficient supply of water?—It never came under my notice that there was any deficiency. There was not a large supply, but there was no actual deficiency, except at the beginning.

885. Supposing that the same circumstances were to come over again, would you not think it advisable to make special arrangements by getting engineers from Chatham to complete the works, almost at any cost of life or health, so as to be ready by the time the pipes were on the ground?—I do not think you could with safety employ Europeans in manual labour in such a climate.

886. May I ask what you mean by the word "safety" in war matters?—I mean that they would be liable to sun-stroke.

887. But war can hardly be said to be a safe profession; what proportion of men would have been struck down by sun-stroke; should we have lost a third of the men?—If Europeans had been employed in manual labour in such a climate, I should say that a larger proportion would have been lost.

888. The pipes were ordered by you in December, and they were supplied towards the end of February; is that consistent with the fact of there being no unnecessary delay?—I would repeat that I have no records by me from which I can give the exact dates; but the exact dates could be found from the India Office records of stores sent out, and the naval department would probably give the date when the ship conveying them arrived. My answers as to dates are subject to corrections, as I have no records to which I can refer.

889. Sir Stafford Northcote.] Are you quite sure that the pipes were ordered in December?—I have said that I am not sure, and that my answer on that point is subject to correction.

890. I will place in your hands a Blue Book presented to Parliament in the year 1868, called "Further Papers connected with the Abyssinian Expedition," containing a collection of the despatches of Sir Robert Napier, after he had landed on the coast; what is the date of the first despatch, addressed by Sir Robert Napier to the Secretary of State, after his landing at Zulla?—The 3rd of January.

891. Does not that despatch contain several enclosures, and amongst others a letter or a Minute by Sir William Merewether?—It does.

892. What

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892. What is the date of the letter of Sir William Merewether?—The 2nd of January.

893. Will you look in the course of that letter to the passage which I have marked in pencil, bearing on this subject, and read to the Committee?—"The proposal to bring water by pipes to the coast having been brought forward, the question followed which was the best head. Colonel Wilkins, chief engineer, quite concurs in the opinion that Koomayli is the preferable one; it is the nearest to the coast, and the supply is apparently inexhaustible. Colonel Wilkins has recommended that 17 miles of 5-inch piping should be procured from England."

894. That is to say that it had been recommended at that time; but that does not seem to imply that it had been ordered, does it?—My answer as to the date was that I had no records, and therefore I have no positive recollection of the date.

895. Mr. Charles Turner.] When speaking of the danger of employing Europeans, I understood you to say that in your opinion, although they might have been employed temporarily, they could not have been employed continuously without great danger to life?—Yes.

896. Was that a danger of such a kind as, in your opinion, it would not have been justifiable to allow them to incur?—It was.

897. And, therefore, you put entirely out of the question the employment of Europeans on a service of that nature?—Yes, on the plains.

898. In your opinion, were the pipes supplied, under all the circumstances, as soon as they could fairly be expected to be supplied?—Yes.

899. Captain Beaumont.] Was it part of your duty, as Commanding Engineer, to have submitted a scheme for the labour necessary to lay the pipes?—No, because I supposed that we should have the means of doing it with the Army Works Corps and the force which would subsequently be in the country.

900. Then, when the breakdown in the supply of labour occurred, did you bring it to the notice of Sir Robert Napier in writing?—No breakdown occurred, but we could always have employed a large number of men, and of that Sir Robert Napier was quite aware.

901. Perhaps "breakdown" is not a proper word to use; but when it became apparent that you would be deficient in labour for the laying of the pipes, and that they would come on the ground without the necessary labour being prepared, did you bring that prominently to the notice of the Commander in Chief?—No.

902. Could you state why you did not do so?—Because the piping, when it arrived, came too late for it to be advisable to have it laid down for that season.

903. I am not speaking of the date when the piping arrived; but, assuming that you contemplated (as I think you have said was the case) the construction of the reservoir previously to the arrival of the pipes, it must have been apparent to you that you had not labour enough to complete the necessary works; was that so?—We hoped to release other labour for the work.

904. Did you never lose the hope of that?—Never.

905. And no scheme was submitted in writing by you to Lord Napier, specifying in detail the number of men you would require for the works?—No.

906. Mr. Campbell.] When you say that you

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expected that a supply of labour would come with the force, did you expect a supply of the special labour which was required, of the bricklayers, for instance, that you mentioned?—No; those were sent for.

907. Would that have to be a separate requisition?—As a precaution, masons were sent for, but there are always a certain number of masons in the Sappers.

908. I understood you to say that there was ultimately abundance of water at Zulla, but that at first there was a deficient supply; how late would the expression "at first" extend, speaking approximately?—It was in October and November.

909. After November, was there a sufficient supply?—After the arrival of Captain Edye, in the "Satellite."

910. Chairman.] There was a great mortality among the mules at Zulla for want of water, was there not?—That was caused by the want of water and an epidemic together.

911. But the epidemic was greatly aggravated, was it not, by the insufficient supply of water?—The epidemic was as severe where there was water as where there was not water.

912. Mr. Eastwick.] In point of fact, did many baggage animals die from want of water?—I have no doubt that a good many did at the commencement.

913. You have said (subject to correction) that the pipes did not arrive until the end of February; and you have said that it would take 14 days to lay them after they did arrive; therefore, supposing that they did arrive at the end of February, they could not have been laid until the 14th March, could they?—They could not have been laid at that time; because, in the first place, we could not have landed them sufficiently rapidly.

914. At all events, after they were landed, it would have taken 14 days more to lay them, would it not, according to your own statement?—Yes.

915. The supply from the River Weeah, I think I understood Lord Napier to say, ran over a deposit of slime with a very thin coating of sand; and if that coating had been disturbed, it is probable that the water might have been unfit for use, was that so?—It was.

916. Would not the water raised at Koomayli, or which might have been raised at Koomayli, also have been liable to be filled with impurities from the dust, and from other causes, or, at all events, would it not have been liable to be much more unclean and unwholesome than the condensed water?—Certainly.

917. In saying that, it would take a company of Sappers and about 30 or 40 masons to complete the works in a time which, I think, you stated, at six weeks or two months, did you include the works which would have been required to protect the pipes from the rust of water in the rains and in the torrents, which you have stated to be 20 feet at one time?—At that time we had not experienced the depth to which the water first came down.

918. When did you first experience that?—On the 3rd of May.

919. Were European soldiers at all employed as labourers below the pass?—They were employed, but for a very short period of time, and for a short time during the day.

920. The heat below the pass, I suppose, would

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be equal to that of Scinde, or very nearly so, would it not?—The heat in March was 112° in a doubled-roofed tent.

921. Is it not probable that in such a heat had European soldiers been employed during the whole day, and for several days together, the whole number employed might have succumbed?—Certainly.

922. Colonel *Barttelot*.] I think you said that the piping arrived too late; when did Lord Napier arrive?—On the 3rd of January.

923. When did the army commence its movement from Annesley Bay?—Lord Napier himself left Zulla, I think, on the 25th of January.

924. Had the pipes then arrived?—No.

925. The condensing apparatus was in full work, I presume?—Yes.

926. Was it then supplying as much water as was necessary?—Yes.

927. I presume that you thought that, as the army was then advancing, and as you had sufficient condensed water there, the pipes, when they did arrive, would be useless if the Expedition succeeded?—I considered so.

928. Therefore, so considering, and the Expedition being successful, you did not think it necessary to take any notice of this matter, nor to apply for any men from Lord Napier; was that so?—I was in the act of preparing the pipes for being laid down when Magdala was taken, and I immediately suspended the work.

929. And I presume that you also considered that, supposing that Magdala had not fallen when it did, you would have been able to get sufficient labour in the rainy season to do the work which you required?—Yes.

930. And that in fact accounted, and does account, for the reason why the pipes were not laid down at all?—Certainly.

931. Sir *Stafford Northcote*.] After you had ordered the pipes, did it occur to you that there was an unreasonable delay in their coming?—No.

932. *Chairman*.] Did it occur to you to give, in answer to any of the questions of the honourable and gallant Member for Durham, the reason for delaying the pipes, which you have just given to the honourable and gallant colonel?—All the circumstances combined at the time when the pipes arrived led me to consider that it would be better not to proceed with the work until it was known whether the Expedition would be prolonged.

933. It was known to the pioneer force, in the middle of October, that the water at Zulla had failed, was it not?—We always had sufficient water for our own party, and Zulla was only provisionally adopted.

934. You knew, in the middle of October, did you not, that there was not water there for supplying the Expedition when it arrived in force?—Yes.

935. You would therefore take immediate steps to ascertain where water was available, would you not?—Yes.

936. You have said that you have only learned by experience the nature of the supply at Koomayli, and on the River Weeah; you would immediately lay yourself out to get that experience in October, would you not?—Yes.

937. The discovery of the nature of the supply was a matter of days only, was it not?—It occupied a very long time; that is, it was a long time

before we discovered the abundant subterranean supply at Koomayli.

938. You reported that the supply at Koomayli was abundant, did you not?—Yes; including the supply at Weeah and Hadoda.

939. Was it not obviously abundant in October?—No, not at Koomayli alone.

940. But you concurred with the other officers of the pioneer force in advising Annesley Bay as the place of debarkation, did you not?—Yes.

941. Would not the reason for that advice be, that water was obtainable at Koomayli from the River Weeah?—Yes, at the three sources; the River Hadas at Hadoda, the River Weeah, and the Koomayli torrent.

942. Was not that advice given on the first of November?—The route was selected on the 17th of November.

943. When was the landing place determined?—That depended on a route being selected.

944. Were there not two possible routes from Annesley Bay?—There were three routes, but until we had investigated those routes we could not absolutely fix upon one.

945. Annesley Bay was adopted as the point of debarkation before the route into the interior was determined, was it not?—It was only provisionally adopted.

946. Can you fix the date when the pioneer force resolved to recommend Annesley Bay as the point of debarkation?—That was in October.

947. You would never have recommended Annesley Bay as the point of debarkation, would you, until you saw that Annesley Bay could be supplied with water?—No.

948. You, therefore, at that time knew, did you not, that Zulla having failed, the supply could only come from some point at some distance in the interior?—Yes; supplemented by condensers.

949. That was in the middle of October, was it not?—Yes.

950. Can you explain to the Committee how it was that you did not communicate your view as to the necessity for pipes (for whatever was the route into the interior, Annesley Bay being the landing place, water was required there) until some period in December?—Some other piping than that which has been referred to to-day was sent for much earlier from Bombay, I think, in October.

951. Did it arrive?—No, it never came.

952. Was it with a view of conveying water?—It was with a view of conveying water from a spot which we discovered at the head of the bay.

953. What was the distance to the spot whence you purposed to convey the water by the pipes which you ordered in October from Bombay?—From three to five miles, I think.

954. Do you know why those pipes never came?—On account of a subsequent requisition for a different class of pipe. Until we had seen the country we could not say where we should require the piping from; and it requires different kinds of piping according to different heads of water.

955. The subsequent requisition was in December, was it not?—We first sent in October, I think, for a very small amount of piping which would not have been adapted for bringing the supply from Koomayli, but was only adapted for bringing the supply from this spot near the head of the Bay.

956. But

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956. But that never came, did it?—That never came.

957. Can you account for its not coming?—Yes, it would not have come into use to have brought the water from Koomayli or Weeah. It was stopped, I think.

958. Was it stopped by you?—Not directly, but by other piping having been sent for.

959. In December?—The date I cannot give; but I suppose that it arose from my requisition for other piping arriving in Bombay, which stopped the supply which was first asked for.

960. Then before you finally determined upon Annesley Bay as the point of debarkation, you saw that you would have to be dependent either upon ships condensing water or upon Koomayli for a supply of water on the coast, did you not?—Yes; including the Weeah and Hadoda supplies.

961. Sir *Stafford Northcote*.] Was it not expected that there would be rain at an earlier period than there was?—Yes, it was quite an exceptional year. The rain did not come when it was expected.

962. *Chairman*.] But if you had had rain, that would not have given you a sufficient supply at Zulla, would it?—It would have very much increased the supply. We had a very large number of wells, and a great number of people were watered from those wells the whole time.

963. If, then, at this early period you had sent those requisitions for piping on the date which you have given, they might have been laid and in working operation by the end of December or the beginning of January, might they not?—We could not send for piping until we knew from what place it was to be brought.

964. But when you determined that the point of debarkation should be Annesley Bay, you, in the middle of October, saw that you would have to bring water from the interior; and whatever route you took from Annesley Bay to the interior, you would nevertheless want piping to supply the water, would you not?—There were many considerations.

965. That is so, as a matter of fact, is it not?—Yes. I have said we did send for piping in October.

966. And it was the recognition of that fact, that you could get water there, which induced you to advise Annesley Bay, was it not?—Yes.

967. If, when you saw that you had to bring the water from the interior, you had ordered the pipes, and men to lay them, could they not have been laid by the end of December or the beginning of January?—No.

968. Could they not have been laid if you had sent requisitions in October?—All our available force was occupied in making the piers.

969. But assuming that labour and pipes were both available if they had been ordered, might they not have been laid by the end of December or the beginning of January?—If our party had been strong enough to have laid them, they would have been laid, but not otherwise.

970. Then, at that early date you would be able to anticipate the enormous cost of condensing water on the one hand, and on the other the great convenience to the Expedition of having it brought from the interior, would you not?—If I say that, I should lay more value upon the piping than should be laid upon it.

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971. That is a matter of opinion; I want to ascertain the fact; you anticipated at that early day, did you not, that condensing water by means of shipping would be a very expensive process?—We never anticipated the immense amount which would be required, only we thought perhaps a small quantity would be required.

972. But you had ascertained and reported that the water had failed at Zulla, had you not, and that you would have to be dependent upon an imported supply, either from the shipping or from the interior?—Yes; but we did not anticipate the large quantity which would be required.

973. You would expect to have to provide a quantity equal to the necessities of the force, would you not?—Yes; but we never supposed that the force would remain at Zulla as it did.

974. The combatants never remained at Zulla any time, but they went into the interior rapidly, did they not?—Owing to the failure of transport, Zulla became the head-quarters of a large number of troops who would never have stayed there had there been carriage.

975. For temporary periods, I suppose?—Yes; we anticipated that only a very small force would be kept at Zulla itself.

976. But the number of combatants there was small in proportion to the large number of followers of one kind and another gathered there, was it not?—No; we had a large number of troops gathered there at one time.

977. But were they not out of all proportion to the followers, who were always the bulk of the men there?—Yes; there was a large number of followers.

978. And that they would always be there would be known to you beforehand, would it not?—Yes; but not to the extent they actually were.

979. You would always know that you would have to provide for a large number of men on the coast, would you not?—That became apparent from day to day, but we did not anticipate at first that we should require a large supply.

980. From the first you knew the calculation to be that you were dependent upon imported supplies, did you not?—We obtained large supplies from the wells at Zulla all throughout the campaign.

981. But is not the official statement that it failed in October?—We obtained a large supply.

982. Are you aware that the cost of condensing there has been actually about a quarter of a million of money?—I have heard since that it was 200*l.* or 300*l.* a day.

983. Assuming it to be a quarter of a million (and it is that, if not more), would not any possible outlay have been judiciously expended to have got pipes laid early in January?—I cannot say, further than it would have been impossible.

984. You said that when you determined to call for pipes, you sent to Bombay; that would be by steamer, would it not?—Yes.

985. There was no telegraphic communication, was there?—No.

986. Did the authorities at Bombay reply to you, "Order it from England"?—I think that was as it happened.

987. The time would therefore, I suppose, be at least three weeks?—The letter, or requisition, may

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Colonel H. St. Clair Wilkins, R.E. may have been sent while we were travelling, and that would add to the time, as we did not remain at Zulla altogether.

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989. I presume, in point of fact, that it would be more like four weeks, would it not?—Yes.

990. And you ordered from England?—As far as I can recollect, we ordered it from England.

991. That order would be sent by steamer to Suez, would it not, you having no telegraphic communication there?—Yes.

992. Then, before your requisition for pipes was sent by telegraph, from the time that you requested pipes until a telegraph could be dispatched to England, would be between 30 and 40 days, would it not?—Yes.

993. Would not very much time have been saved, if the authorities at Bombay had themselves telegraphed to England immediately, rather than have sent back authority to you to order from England direct?—I am so much at a loss from not having the record of dates when those pipes were sent for, that really I can hardly answer the questions about it.

994. Was there then a telegraphic communication between Bombay and England?—Yes.

995. Assuming the statements that you have made (as you believe truly, of course), it would follow, would it not, that had the Bombay authorities telegraphed to England direct, that requisition would have been in England at least 20 days sooner than it was by the course pursued?—Yes, if what I have said is correct.

996. Then if you had had telegraphic communication at Annesley Bay, all that time of between 30 and 40 days which it took to convey the message to England might have been shortened to 24 hours, might it not?—Yes; it is so long ago that I cannot recollect the dates. I have said that what took place in sending the requisitions is subject to correction.

997. Sir *Stafford Northcote*.] You are speaking from memory, are you not, and not from documents which are before you?—Entirely.

998. With regard to transactions which took place two years ago, and at a very busy time?—Yes.

999. You were not the person who was charged with the duty of transmitting communications to the Government of Bombay or to England, but you made your representations, I presume, to your superior officer?—To Colonel Merewether.

1000. And therefore you are only speaking from your general knowledge of the way in which business was done, and from your general recollection when you say that your requisition was sent to Bombay, was there considered, and that the Commander in Chief of the Expedition was then desired from Bombay to communicate with England and make the order?—Yes; there is some incorrectness, no doubt, in what I have stated; it may have referred to some other subject.

1001. Are you able to say that the Bombay Government, on hearing from Sir Robert Napier that the pipes were wanted, did not themselves directly communicate by telegraph to England?—I am not.

1002. *Chairman*.] But if there had been telegraphic communication, then the pipes would

have arrived very much earlier in Annesley Bay, would they not?—It never struck me that they did not come in very fair time after they were sent for.

1003. Considering the mode of communication?—Yes.

1004. Have I correctly understood you to say, that when pipes were ordered, there was no specific order for men to lay them, and for masons to construct the necessary adjuncts?—Yes.

1005. And the labour which was brought there in the form of masons was absorbed in making piers, and other works, was it not?—Yes.

1006. Had you never any means of taking off those men to lay the pipes?—No.

1007. Do you remember when the pipes came?—I believe it was the end of February.

1008. Do you know whether they were then landed?—No, they were not.

1009. Do you know if they made two or three passages, or at all events some passages, to Suez and back, and were never touched?—I believe that a ship containing piping was sent back to Suez, with the pipes on board, but only when it was found that they could not be landed in time, and that they would not be required in the time that she would take for the passage.

1010. Do you know that they went more than once?—I do not; that is only hearsay.

1011. Then the occupation of the ship's stowage room by those pipes would exclude other articles which she might have carried if they had not been there, would it not?—We were unable to land them; I may add, that plumbers for the pipes were sent from Bombay.

1012. Was that piping ultimately landed?—Not the whole of it.

1013. Do you know what proportion was landed?—I think two or three miles were not landed.

1014. Was it landed with a view to being laid?—Yes.

1015. Is that consistent with the other answers which you gave, that when it came it came too late?—Yes; because it was not known then whether the campaign would be prolonged or not.

1016. Your words were, if I remember rightly, that it was too late for the season; what did you mean by that?—I mean by "Too late for the season," that provided the operations were over for that season, it was too late to commence.

1017. If the operations had not been over, the pipes would have been of use, and usable and advantageous all the year through, would they not?—Yes, they would then have been laid.

1018. You did not mean the seasons of the year, but you meant the military operations?—The season for operations.

1019. Was there any difficulty in getting such mechanics as you wanted, at Bombay and Aden?—We got masons from Aden, and we had the Army Works Corps. We did not send specially for further labour, except the plumbers.

1020. Deficient as you were in skilled labour of this kind, can you explain how it was that you did not send for more?—Because we hoped to have men released from other works.

1021. But they were not released from other works, were they?—No.

1022. At that time the work would be before you, and you would see what work you had to do

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do, and what call you had for labour, would you not?—We could not see what work we had; I do not mean for the piping, but for the works generally.

1023. You said that you could not have had European labour there; a Return before the Committee shows that there were 14,000 men on board the vessels, and the naval transports in Annesley Bay did the work there all the time?—I do not think they worked after the earlier hours of the morning, or before late hours in the evening.

1024. The crews would have to assist in discharging the vessels, would they not?—I have no knowledge of what took place on the ships.

1025. Were the ships being discharged all day long?—The works on which the Europeans were concerned were suspended nearly all the day. Of my own knowledge, the landing operations did not go on all the day or in the middle of the day. The ships were in the harbour, but whether they were discharging the day time I cannot say.

1026. Was that the ordinary course of procedure, namely, a suspension of labour during the day?—In the very hot weather it was.

1027. Notwithstanding that you were landing by means of native labour?—Yes; the native labourers worked the greater part of the day, but still they did not work all day, and the Europeans only worked in the mornings.

1028. Was the suspension in consequence of the heat?—Yes.

1029. Then, when the natives worked, would not the Europeans work?—No.

1030. Not in discharging ships?—I cannot say as to discharging ships. I am speaking of the labourers on the piers.

1031. Sir *Stafford Northcote*.] It was suggested just now, by the honourable and gallant Member for Durham, that in time of war you ought not to be very particular about the amount of risk which men are called upon to run; but viewing it merely as a matter of economy, do you think that it would have been economical to have had a very large number of your men laid up with sunstrokes?—No.

1032. Would it not have been necessary to have supplied their places with others?—Yes.

1033. Would not that have entailed also the necessity for a greater strain upon your hospital accommodation?—Yes.

1034. Might it not have led to additional demands for transport for bringing over other men to replace those who were so laid up?—Certainly.

1035. In point of fact, looking at it simply as a question of economy, and without reference to the question whether men in time of war ought not to be prepared to run any risks, do you not think that it is part of the duty of a wise general to husband the resources and strength of his men?—Yes.

1036. I understand you to say that with the number of men at your disposal it would have been impossible to do all the work which you had to do within the time within which it was desirable that it should be done; and that to have done what has been suggested you would have wanted more men; would not those men have required an additional quantity of supplies and conveniences, all of which would have led to expense?—Yes.

1037. And would not a greater quantity of

water have had to be provided (to take one case only) for these very men?—Yes.

1038. It was therefore a balance of questions of economy, was it not, whether or not it was desirable to incur the expense of sending for those pipes and laying them?—Yes.

1039. At the time that you selected this point for debarkation, there was reason to suppose, as I understand, that there would be a supply of water on the spot, probably sufficient for that portion of the force which would be detained there; was not that the first impression?—The first impression was that the wells that we saw there, amplified by others being dug, would be sufficient for a small force. The point was selected because there was no other place where there was any water from which we could radiate, and make our excursions.

1040. Did you at that time contemplate that anything like so large a proportion of the force would be detained at Zulla as ultimately was detained there?—No.

1041. With regard to the supply of water which you had expected, you were disappointed in it, in consequence of the wells running dry much sooner than was anticipated; were you not?—Yes.

1042. Were you not informed at the time that the rains were much later than usual; but that when they came, those wells would be much more abundantly supplied with water than they had been?—Yes.

1043. Was it not, therefore, for some time a question whether with the supply of water which might be expected from the wells when the rain came, and with the other arrangements which might be made, it would be at all necessary to bring water by pipes down to the coast?—We did not attach so much importance to it.

1044. Of course, looking back, you can see that there was a necessity for a greater supply of water; but when did it become so evident to you, as you may say, that it now is?—When the piping was sent for we thought it would be a good auxiliary.

1045. *Chairman*.] That was in October, was it not?—That was the first quantity of piping. We thought it not unlikely that the head of the bay would be the point where we should settle the camp at that time.

1046. Sir *Stafford Northcote*.] There was some water there, was there not?—Yes, there was.

1047. And that point was thought of with reference to a different route into the high lands, which was subsequently abandoned?—Yes.

1048. *Chairman*.] Had you many cases of sunstroke?—Yes.

1049. In what number?—I cannot state the number.

1050. Were the hospitals at all crowded?—The men, when they got sick, were almost immediately shipped, and as far as the followers were concerned, you did not see it so much. They were shipped as soon as they were sick, and they went on board the ships, and were sent back.

1051. Was there ever any strain on the hospital accommodation?—There was, so far that we built a very large building on shore.

1052. Do you know how far the hospital ships sent there were utilized?—They were utilized, but I cannot say to what extent they were utilized.

1053. You have stated that all addition to the number of men would strain all other operations, and

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and increase the necessity for tonnage, and increase the necessity for supplies; I presume that the fact of there being fewer men would have operated in the other direction; the absence of the 4,000 men who were sent back before the Expedition closed was a great relief, was it not?—Yes, as regards the supplies.

1054. But had you ever any deficiency of supplies on the coast?—No.

1055. On the coast they were most abundant, were they not?—Yes.

1056. You would have fed 200 or 300 more men on the coast, I suppose, easily enough?—Yes.

1057. Captain *Beaumont*.] Referring to the debtor and creditor account to which the right honourable Member for North Devon has alluded, would it not be fair on the debtor side not to take the amount of money only which is shown to have been spent in condensing, but also to give credit for that which is extremely difficult to express in figures, viz., the extreme advantage which arises from an unlimited supply of water?—Of course it would have been very desirable to have an unlimited supply; but too much weight should not be put upon the project for bringing the water by pipes.

1058. Was not water sent in ships from Bombay, and was not its arrival at Annesley Bay looked upon as of the greatest possible advantage?—I have no knowledge of that.

1059. Could not Europeans have worked at night?—No, except in landing cargo on the pier.

1060. But could not Europeans have been employed on such works as the construction of the reservoir and laying the pipes by night, assuming that a body of men were specially told off for that work?—But then they would have to work in the dark.

1061. They would have to work in the dark with artificial light. Are you aware that we carry on siege works by night, and that the making of batteries, and all the work, in fact, is conducted at night?—I do not think that the men could have worked continually at night, and there is no twilight.

1062. Is the work in connection with the construction of reservoirs more difficult than that in connection with ordinary siege works?—In such a climate it would have been undesirable to keep the men up at night, I think.

1063. Then you are shifting your ground, I think, a little from that which was implied in the answer which you previously gave when you made use of the words, "in the dark." You would no longer bring forward the fact of its being dark as a reason for their not working?—I would not put it on that ground alone.

1064. Perhaps you will be good enough shortly to state the recommendation which you, as commanding engineer attached to the reconnoitring force, made for the supply of the piers and arrangements generally necessary to effect the debarkation of the force?—In the first place we commenced making a pier in the country ourselves; a requisition was then sent to Bombay for the materials to make other piers (pile piers), but the stone pier was commenced almost immediately after we landed at Zoulla, and was worked at until the timber arrived for making the pile piers.

1065. Was the subject of the arrangements necessary for the debarkation of the troops and stores generally one upon which you, as com-

manding engineer, submitted any written report at the earliest period after the point of debarkation was settled?—I sent to Bombay for materials for making piers.

1066. But was there any written report of the scheme which you proposed for carrying out the arrangements?—Most likely I wrote saying what would be required in the shape of piers, but I have no record with me. One pier was immediately commenced. There was no necessity for writing anything about that, and the other piers, the pile piers, were written for.

1067. What material did you demand from Bombay?—Timber for the pile piers.

1068. Did you demand any pontoons?—I may have done so, but I cannot say.

1069. Would pontoons have been applicable?—I do not think so now.

1070. Why do you think that they would not have been applicable?—A great length was required for the piers, and they would scarcely have been rigid enough for the work. If I had the records here I could give an exact answer, but I am not sure that I did not mention that a floating pier might be brought into use, as well as piers on piles.

1071. Would that floating pier have been constructed by using the ordinary military pontoon equipment, or would it have involved the construction of special pontoons?—I think it was proposed to be made of platforms laid on native craft.

1072. Was that proposal acted upon?—No, it was never carried out.

1073. Would there have been any difficulty, on account of the violence of the waves, in making a permanent floating pier?—Such a pier would not have been a good one at all. The pier which was made was very much better than any floating pier.

1074. Was the pier which was made a pile pier, with *pierres perdues* thrown between the piles?—No; there were no loose stones excepting at the head.

1075. Was it simply the piles driven by monkeys into the ground, and a superstructure placed upon it?—Just so.

1076. Did it occur to you to send to England for screw piles?—No.

1077. Was the subsoil such as would have permitted screw piles to be used?—Yes.

1078. Assuming that on your having settled the point of debarkation, and recognised the necessity of rapidly constructing a pier, you had telegraphed to England for screw piles, at what date do you think that you could have had pier accommodation in a satisfactory condition?—I can answer that by saying that the pile pier was written for, and it was supplied and commenced in December.

1079. That was an ordinary pile pier, was it not?—It was the pile pier which the honourable Member has just been describing, viz., the piles driven by monkeys.

1080. Would not a pier constructed of screw piles have been completed much more rapidly than the other?—I do not think it would.

1081. Have you had any experience in the construction of piers with screw piles?—No.

1082. Are you aware that screw piles can be screwed into soft ground (I may almost use the words) at any speed?—Yes, but the material is heavier to move.

1083. But your general opinion is, that a pier

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of screw piles would not have been constructed more rapidly than a pier constructed of piles driven by monkeys in the ordinary way?—I do not think so unless a special establishment had come out with it to put it together.

1084. But supposing that you had telegraphed to England for the screw piles, and that you had requested also a special establishment to be sent out, would you not then have been in a position to have your pier accommodation more quickly?—We had always to bear in mind the European labour.

1085. Then when you did not consider formally the question of telegraphing for screw piles, the matter was put on one side, possibly because you thought that had you employed screw piles you could not have used the European labour. Was that the reason that no more serious consideration was given to it?—Yes; and also because the authorities in Bombay were expecting a demand of the nature which was made upon them.

1086. What was, in a few words, the nature of the tackle which was sent to you to construct the pier?—Floating monkeys; pile-driving machines.

1087. Was a sufficient amount of piles sent?—Yes, and everything was cut to fit.

1088. In fact the pier was sent in pieces, which you put together, and with the means of drawing the piles?—Yes.

1089. Can you state at what rate that pier was actually constructed, and what number of men you had on it daily?—The pier was 1,200 feet or 400 yards long. It was commenced in December, but I have not got the actual date of its completion. We had a company of Madras Sappers and about 70 carpenters from India to put it together.

1090. Can you give me, approximately, the date at which the pier was finished?—I think it was in February, but both piers were being improved and added to the whole time, up to the end.

1091. Were the same circumstances to happen again, would you employ screw piles?—Provided we had the establishment to put them up, I would. I do not mean by this that I would have preferred screw piles to wooden piles, but that I would use screw piles if they could be readily obtained.

1092. Are you aware that there is very little difficulty in working the screw piles, and that any company of sappers, with an efficient officer over them, can drive screw piles?—Yes, but there are the platforms.

1093. I am aware that the necessary plant would be sent with the piles?—I think a screw pile pier would have been a very useful addition.

1094. And could it not have been, under the circumstances mentioned previously, more rapidly constructed than the pile pier which was used?—I do not know that it could. The pile pier was very rapidly put in.

1095. Then in what respect do you think the advantage of the pile pier would have consisted?—Merely in the simplicity with which it is put together.

1096. But how is simplicity an advantage, unless it gives either economy in construction or rapidity of execution?—For instance, in a screw pile pier, a pile must be correctly sunk to its exact point; it has to support a platform, and those piles would have to be placed at regular distances. By simplicity, I mean that in a pile pier, if a pile

was driven a few inches out of its exact spot, it would not matter. The whole of the pile pier was simple of construction, and carpenters were engaged in Bombay, and sent up, who were able to put it together. If I had had to set them on to a screw pile pier, probably the work would not have been quite so simple. If a European establishment could have been employed upon it, then no doubt it would have been more rapidly carried out.

1097. At any rate, you are decidedly of opinion that a screw pile pier could not, under those circumstances, have been constructed more rapidly than the ordinary pile pier which you carried out?—I do not think it could.

1098. Were you in a position to have suggested to your commanding officer the propriety of telegraphing for plant, the necessity for which was urgent, direct from England?—I myself had no authority, and, of course, the officer commanding would use his discretion.

1099. Did you suggest the propriety of such a course?—I did not suggest that he should send to England for a pile pier.

1100. Did you ever suggest to your commanding officer the propriety of taking advantage of the English market, with a view of getting plant which was urgently required for the success of the Expedition?—I looked to Bombay as the place from whence I should draw my supplies. What little was required I sent for to Bombay, which was at a distance of ten days' steam.

1101. Would it not have facilitated the construction of the works, and generally the objects of the Expedition, had you made more direct reference to the English market for such plant as you might require?—I do not think so. I always looked upon England as entailing a much longer sea voyage, besides the trans-shipment of stores across Egypt; and I considered that Bombay was virtually nearer as a base to supply everything that was required.

1102. Colonel *Barttelot*.] When did you arrive at Zoulla?—We landed on the 4th of October.

1103. And when did the army arrive at Zoulla?—The advanced brigade in support of the reconnoitring party arrived on the 21st of October, but the first brigade did not arrive until the end of November.

1104. Did you know when you landed at Zoulla the number of men that were likely to come in the Expedition?—Yes.

1105. I presume that your first object was to ascertain the best port for debarkation?—Yes.

1106. Was the place at which they actually landed different from that which you originally anticipated?—No further than moving nearer to the sea.

1107. Then, of course, almost the first point to which you found it necessary to direct your attention was as to how the troops and stores could best be landed, was it not?—That was almost the first point.

1108. Immediately you had considered that question, did you set about forming a pier?—Immediately.

1109. And you naturally thought that it was better to use all those appliances that you had at hand, than to send to England for other appliances?—We had not many appliances at the time, because,

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because, of course, it would depend very much upon the nature of the landing; for instance, if it had been a rocky shore we could not have used a pile pier. We immediately engaged a fleet of native craft to bring stone to make our pier, and we sent to Bombay for timber for the pile piers.

1110. You looked to Bombay to supply all that you required, did you not?—Yes.

1111. Supposing that you had to make the Expedition over again, you might very easily think that screw piles, or anything else, might be serviceable?—Certainly.

1112. But at the moment that you were sent there you were glad to make use of the best materials you could get, were you not?—Certainly.

1113. And your only object was to make the pier as quickly as possible?—Yes, as quickly as possible. There was another object in sending for a timber pile pier, which was this, that balks of timber can be worked up for so many purposes. I felt sure that timber would become very useful for a great many purposes if the piers were not finished, or if we could spare a small portion of it for any purposes, and so it proved. The spare timber was most useful, and I do not know what we should have done without it.

1114. Was the pier that you had sufficient for the landing of the troops, or was there great difficulty in landing them, notwithstanding the pier?—No; the troops themselves were landed with the greatest ease.

1115. Was that the case with regard to the stores?—Of course the stores were delayed in being landed when a great number of ships were there. There was difficulty in landing. Everybody wished to have all the stores pertaining to his department landed at once, but of course that was impossible.

1116. Could the large ships come up to the side of the pier?—No.

1117. Then, of course, there was some water carriage between the pier and the shipping?—Yes.

1118. And would anything that you could have done in the time have remedied that?—If the question is whether the piers could have been built out far enough for the ships to have come alongside, I imagine that there are two or three conditions attaching to such a course, such as full depth at low water, ample accommodation, and still water. You could not bring ships alongside of a pier without having, say 24 feet at low tide, unless they were swung out every tide, which would have been very inconvenient; and you must also have still water. Still water could only be obtained by enclosing a portion of the bay, and then the pier must be solid. An open pier would not protect the ships inside.

1119. Looking back at the time that you had at your command, could you have improved upon the communication that you then had?—Certainly not in the time; we could have had more piers, but we should have required more time or a larger force.

1120. And of course getting so large a supply of material from Bombay would have naturally taken up a great deal of tonnage, and a great deal of time, would it not?—Yes.

1121. You were asked by my honourable and gallant friend the Member for Durham, whether the men could not have worked in the dark; and he also asked you whether you did not know that men always did work in the trenches in the

dark; is there not this difference between the two descriptions of work, that the work involved in making a reservoir requires a great degree of skilled labour, whereas the work in the trenches is very rough work, and can be carried on very differently from that which is required in the making of a reservoir?—Certainly.

1122. And you did not think at that time that there was any necessity to employ this labour at night, did you?—No.

1123. Sir John Hay.] With regard to the subject of pipes, did the troops suffer from the want of the pipes?—No.

1124. Was the water that was supplied by condensing, of good quality?—It was excellent.

1125. Having the sea for your base, has it not been, at least of recent years, considered very desirable to trust to the supply of the condensed water in various expeditions?—As to various expeditions, I cannot say; but I may say that our garrison at Aden has been dependent upon condensed water for years.

1126. And in transport ships the persons who are being carried depend a great deal upon condensed water, I suppose?—Yes.

1127. When you made the application for the pipes for supplying water for such a force as might be landed, I presume that you did not quite contemplate the fact that there would be so large a supply of shipping upon which you could satisfactorily depend for water?—I merely thought that it would be an auxiliary to the condensed water.

1128. As a matter of fact, there was a very considerable fleet, was not there, whose duty was to supply the force, and the animals generally, with water?—There was.

1129. I do not know whether you gave assent to a statement which appeared to be implied in a question of the honourable Chairman with reference to the amount of coal and money expended in Annesley Bay; but in a Return before me I find that the total amount of coal supplied to Annesley Bay for all purposes was 19,651 tons, of which 8,020 tons was used for condensing water; would you imagine that that would represent the whole amount that was so used?—I have no knowledge of that.

1130. That being so, do you suppose that 8,020 tons of coal would represent 250,000 £.?—I have no knowledge as to what the price of coal was there.

1131. With reference to the question of the piers, the first man-of-war that arrived there, I think, was the "Satellite," Captain Edye?—Yes.

1132. He and his men were employed in making the first pier, were they not?—No.

1133. Did they give you great assistance in that matter?—I do not think they were employed in making the pier. They were employed in bringing water on shore.

1134. Was any European labour employed in making the pier at that time?—No.

1135. What was the temperature?—The temperature was about 104 degrees, I think, at that time.

1136. From your experience of the East, would it have been desirable to employ European labour in that temperature?—No; the sailors were only employed early in the morning in bringing casks of water on shore.

1137. That is the ordinary practice in tropical climates, is it not?—Yes.

1138. Were

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1138. Were they employed on works of any kind in the sun in the heat of the day?—No.

1139. And from your experience of service it would have been judicious so to employ them in such a climate?—Certainly not.

1140. Is it within your knowledge that the ships' companies of the "Octavia," and other ships suffered so much from the heat that those vessels had to go to sea for a short time to recruit the men?—I believe they had; many sun strokes occurred in the fleet.

1141. In speaking of Annesley Bay as a harbour, you do not speak of it as one that is free from any disturbance of water?—Certainly not.

1142. As a matter of fact, I believe the stone had to be carried 14 miles in a flat boat?—The stone was brought from the island of Dissee, which was a very long way off.

1143. And the island of Dissee was the protection from the wind, was it not?—Yes.

1144. Therefore there was 44 miles of drift in which, in case a gale of wind, the water would have been such as to render it an insecure anchorage for shipping, and especially unsuitable for the landing of boats?—Yes; and I may add that there was a great length of sea on the south, the other side, and from that side came the great gale that we had.

1145. In that gale was it impossible to communicate by boat for the purpose of landing and discharging cargo?—Quite so. The whole camp was flooded.

1146. With reference to the question which was asked upon the subject of pontoons and other assistances which it might seem desirable to some persons that you should have had, was it not the fact that there were some cotton boats towed across from Bombay?—I have no personal knowledge of that.

1147. But there was some considerable difficulty in towing from Bombay to Annesley Bay, was there not?—I should think so, but I have no knowledge of it. Two of our vessels towed a barge and a small tug steamer from Aden, and they gave us a great deal of trouble.

1148. On the whole, were you, as the commanding engineer, satisfied that you received all the reasonable supplies which you could desire on a coast which was hitherto unknown from the various bases from which you had to draw?—Yes.

1149. Sir *Stafford Northcote*.] With reference to the ordering of these pipes, I find on reference to the correspondence of the Indian Office, that on the 24th of December the Governor of Bombay telegraphed to the Secretary of State for India, that water pipes sufficient for 18 miles should be sent immediately to Suez for Annesley Bay; and that on the 2nd of January, the Military Secretary at the Indian Office, informed the principal transport officer of Egypt, that in compliance with this telegraphic message, arrangements would be made for the supply of 19 miles of 4-inch piping, which would weigh about 800 tons, 250 of which might be expected at Alexandria about the 5th of February, and the remainder a fortnight later; and requesting him to arrange for the transport and dispatch of the piping as quickly as possible. I see also that a telegraphic message was sent to the transport officer on the same day to the same effect, and a telegraph was also sent to the officer in command of the field force. Do you think that, considering that the demand came from Bombay on the 24th

of December, and that all the arrangements had been made by the 2nd of January, any time was lost in communication?—No.

1150. *Chairman*.] All that expense was incurred fruitlessly, was it not?—As it happened, it was; the campaign ending when it did.

1151. You had no power to land it, and no power to lay it until it was too late, had you?—That was so.

1152. Did you estimate the cost of laying those water-pipes?—No.

1153. Could you now give us an approximate estimate of the cost?—I did not estimate the cost, because I supposed that troops or the Army Works Corps would be employed. There was no payment for labour to be made in the country.

1154. You have been asked some further questions about the cost of the water; have you seen a Paper handed in to this Committee by Captain Tryon, in which he sets out the cost of the water, including the hire of the transports, at 4.35 *d.* per gallon?—I have not.

1155. On the quantity supplied, are you aware that that comes to upwards of 200,000 *l.*?—I am not aware of the expense.

1156. Are you aware that it is 6 *l.* per ton for 40,000 tons?—I did not go into any question as to the cost. If I may be permitted, I would add that there is one point in connection with the pipes which has not been touched upon. The pipes were not to be laid in a friendly country. They would never be safe for a day from being interfered with by the natives, especially when conveying such a valuable commodity as water. We could not, therefore, wholly depend upon the piping for our supply; it could only be considered as an accessory.

1157. Was not that whole plain most completely in your possession, with a very large armed force, and many thousands of men under your control?—Merely one line across it was in our possession; but even the telegraph, for instance, was, I may say, cut and destroyed daily on this line. Therefore, if the natives had been aware that a pipe, which they saw on the ground, contained water, upon which they place such great value, it would never have been safe.

1158. The inference which you would draw from that, then, was that it would not have been of much use?—We could not rely upon it wholly, and too much value should not be placed upon this scheme.

1159. Sir *Stafford Northcote*.] You could not so wholly rely upon it as to think it safe to send away the steamers, though it might have enabled you to dispense with the burning of the coals and the use of the condensing engines?—Quite so.

1160. *Chairman*.] Is that your only estimate of the use of the pipes, to save coal?—To save coal.

1161. You said that skilled labour would have been necessary to make a reservoir as distinguished from the labour of making a trench, apart from the masonry; are they not in both cases simply digging?—No; the reservoir at Zoulla would have had to be constructed on sand.

1162. Sir *Stafford Northcote*.] Will you explain what difference that would make?—It would have required a masonry reservoir, the stone for which would have had to be brought either from Dissee Island, across the harbour, or from the hills at some distance.

1163. *Chairman*.] On my asking Lord Napier

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if it was practicable to continue the pier into deep water, he referred me to you; was it practicable?—It would have been impracticable, I think. By that I mean that I think it would have been impracticable to have a pier so that ships could have come alongside to disgorge their cargoes. It would have been of no use to have a pier of that sort, except, I may say, upwards of 2,000 or 3,000 feet long.

1164. But first as to the engineering point; would its construction have been impracticable?—I do not know of such works, and I should say it was impracticable.

1165. Then was a floating pier impracticable?—It would have been half a mile in length.

1166. What length of pier beyond what you had would you have required to take you into 20 feet of water?—I should think double the length.

1167. That would be 800 yards, or 400 yards more than you had, would it not?—Yes.

1168. Would a floating pier of 400 yards in addition to what you had have been impracticable?—If it had only that depth at which a ship could come alongside at the end, it would have been of no use. It would have been impracticable to make a pier alongside of which ships could come, and which would have been of any use.

1169. In point of fact, you could have made a floating pier of any length in any depth of water, could you not?—Yes.

1170. Would that have been an expensive process?—Very much so, I should think.

1171. Had you ever any scheme before you for lengthening the pier in that way?—No.

1172. The cost of lighterage between the shipping and the shore was a very heavy item, was it not?—I dare say it was.

1173. If the shipping could have come alongside of the piers and discharged, all that cost would have been saved, would it not?—Yes.

1174. Had you ever any question before you as to the relative cost of the two processes?—No; because it would never enter into my head to propose such a thing.

1175. There was no engineering difficulty was there?—There would have been great difficulty and great cost, and it would have been of no use unless it was very extensive.

1176. But I understood you to say that the relative cost of the two processes never entered into your head?—I should never have proposed such a thing; it would have been impracticable.

1177. Would it have been impracticable from an engineering point of view?—Not impossible, but under the circumstances impracticable.

1178. Sir John Hay.] In the time and with the means?—Yes.

1179. Chairman.] Could you not have imported floating iron structures that could have been utilised and appropriated to a pier in a very short time?—If, as I understand, the question is, whether iron structures could have been erected to allow the shipping to come alongside, I dare say that might have been done.

1180. They might have been sent in a very short time from England, might they not?—No, it would have taken a long time to have sent them from England.

1181. But you never entered into the question, did you?—No.

1182. You say ships would not have lain alongside a pier in deep water; will you give your

reasons for that opinion?—They would not, unless the water was still.

1183. Was it not the normal condition of the water that it was quite still?—No; we frequently had strong breezes, which would have prevented ships coming alongside.

1184. Is not Captain Hozier right when he says that it was a perfect natural harbour and smooth?—Yes; but the harbour was 300 square miles in extent.

1185. But if it was so many thousands of square miles, if it was smooth would it make any difference?—It could not be always smooth.

1186. Sir John Hay.] It was not always calm, I suppose?—No.

1187. And I suppose the sea breeze got up a little sea?—Yes, sometimes.

1188. A sea that would make it awkward for a ship to lay one alongside the other, or alongside the pier?—Yes.

1189. Chairman.] Have you had any experience of beach works similar to those in which you were engaged there?—I have been employed at Bombay, on harbour works there. We had more conveniences for landing at Zulla at low water than they have at Bombay at this moment.

1190. You say that a depth of 24 feet of water would have been necessary, but if you could have accommodated only three-fourths of the ships you would have achieved a great object, would you not?—A great many of the ships were of large size, and the captains would not bring them alongside unless they had ample room.

1191. Sir John Hay.] I suppose you would have been very glad if you had found Southampton Docks at Zulla?—Just so.

1192. But you did not expect to find them?—No.

1193. Looking to all the circumstances of the case, for an Expedition of that sort, would you have contemplated at the beginning so enormous an expense as making piers and docks?—Certainly not.

1194. Chairman.] At the beginning you contemplated 12,000 combatants and 25,000 animals, and everything else in proportion, did you not?—Yes.

1195. You say you have not your memoranda here; did you not know some months ago that the Committee would have to avail themselves of your information?—No, I did not.

1196. Did you not receive an intimation from the India Office that you would have to give evidence here?—That was the 23rd December.

1197. Was it not in November or in the early part of December last year?—I think not.

1198. You could have communicated with Bombay in January and had a reply before this time, could you not?—Parliament was fixed to assemble the beginning of February, and there would apparently have been no time when I received the summons.

1199. But a Committee of this kind is not, as a rule, constituted immediately Parliament meets. Had you anything to do with the care of the animals which were landed?—No.

1200. Who can give us information about that?—Unfortunately, the head of the transport department is dead.

1201. But he was not in Abyssinia until December or January, was he?—No.

1202. Then

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1202. Then he would not be responsible for it, I presume?—No.

1203. Do you know who was responsible for the reception and care of the animals that arrived in Annesley Bay in the latter part of October, November, and December, until the landing of Lord Napier?—Two subalterns of the transport train accompanied the reconnoitring party, and the advanced brigade brought a captain, I think, of the transport train. Those were the officers of the transport train in the country at that time.

1204. Then the transport train and the reconnoitring force would be responsible for the reception of those animals, would they not?—I think when those animals came the advanced brigade had arrived, and the senior officer, whoever he might be, would be the responsible officer.

1205. The advanced brigade had not arrived in October, had it?—It arrived on the 21st of October.

1206. Who was that officer?—Colonel Field commanded the advance brigade, and Colonel Merewether was the senior officer.

1207. Do you know how many animals perished between October and January?—I cannot say.

1208. Did a very large number perish?—A large number, chiefly from the epidemic.

1209. Was not that superinduced by the want of attendance, and by the want of fodder and the want of water?—No; because the cavalry horses suffered, perhaps more severely than any others.

1210. Did they lose many?—Yes.

1211. They might be lost from the same cause, might they not?—The cavalry horses were of course well cared for.

1212. Did not very many of the pack animals really wander at large with no one to care for them at all, and were they not left to care for themselves, and were so lost?—No doubt that was the case with some of them.

1213. Would that come within the scope of your duties?—No.

1214. Captain *Beaumont*.] With reference to your answer to a question put by the honourable and gallant Colonel opposite as to the relative difficulty of siege works and reservoirs, the construction of waterworks and reservoirs, speaking of nine-tenths of the work, is a mere matter of digging; and is it not true that it is digging of the roughest character?—Yes, but it also includes the building of masonry work, which requires care.

1215. But nine-tenths, or a very large proportion of the work, will be of the character that I designated as simple excavation, will it not?—No doubt a large proportion, say three-fourths, at the head works, but not more than one-fourth at the other end.

1216. Would not the construction of a battery, bearing in mind that you have to get your line of fire right, and your levels right, and that the distances between the *genouilleres* and the gun portion must be correct, be a work which is distinctly more difficult to carry out than ordinary work in connection with a reservoir?—But then that would be carried out by men who are constantly accustomed to do it.

1217. As a matter of fact, the construction of a battery is more difficult than the construction of the dam of a reservoir, is it not?—No doubt, as regards the excavation of the reservoir.

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1218. Is it not also the fact that in siege works we are unable to work with an artificial light, whereas in the construction of a reservoir there would be no difficulty in the use of artificial lights?—I should not like to construct a reservoir at night.

1219. But comparing the nature of the two works, is it not the fact that you cannot use artificial lights for siege works, whereas you can use artificial lights for the construction of a reservoir?—Yes.

1220. With reference to another question put by the right honourable Member for North Devon as to the use of condensing apparatus for producing fresh water in different expeditions, is it not an expedient which is resorted to only in case of the failure of natural means; would anybody use a condensing apparatus to condense water if there was any other means of getting it?—Not if the other supply was a certainty.

1221. In point of fact, it is as an adjunct in case of the failure of the other supply?—Yes.

1222. Is it not the fact that there are large tanks at Aden for the storage of water, and that the condensers are only used in the event of the failure of those tanks to supply the water?—I do not think that is so; condensing apparatus is used in the harbour now constantly.

1223. But is not that on the assumption that there is a possibility of the tanks failing to supply the water?—No, I think not; I believe that the Peninsular and Oriental Company's agent there has a condenser of his own, with which he supplies the people there with water.

1224. Sir *Stafford Northcote*.] I place in your hands a Paper, which was in the India Office; is that a copy of a report originally presented by you at the time of the landing of the reconnoitring force?—Yes, on the 8th of October.

1225. Have you any remark to make with reference to that report in connection with the examination which has recently taken place?—I would say that this report is four days after our landing in the country; and it recommends that three piers should be prepared at Bombay, and sent up; it contains suggestions about the piers, but it states that as the construction of the pier must be in a great measure dependent upon the resources of the Government in Bombay, my proposals are only suggestions to the authorities in Bombay.

1226. *Chairman*.] Does it indicate the nature of the piers?—Yes; pontoon piers are mentioned, piers formed by stages on barges.

1227. Floating piers?—Yes; but those were only recommended as most temporary piers. If, however, they had been of that description they would not have been so useful as those which were constructed; for instance, the great difficulty was to clear the piers of the stores landed; to do that, it was necessary to have lines of railway running to the extremities, which would perhaps have been rather an awkward operation on floating piers, especially if there was much wind.

1228. What interposed to prevent those piers being constructed as you suggested?—It was merely a suggestion in a letter to Bombay, stating the requirements; that was merely thrown out as a suggestion.

1229. Did you propose any alternative scheme?—It states that a pier would be immediately commenced of stones brought by native craft, and suggests that three piers should be made which should be sent from Bombay.

1230. Sir

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1230. Sir *Patrick O'Brien*.] To whom was that report addressed?—To Colonel Merewether, commanding.

1231. *Chairman*.] There never were more than two piers, I believe?—Two piers only were made.

1232. Was the second pier ever completed?—Yes.

1233. When did the second come into use?—I cannot give the day when it was first used; but it was carried out into deeper water farther than was at first intended.

1234. Captain *Beaumont*.] When did you first recognise the desirability of the employment of a railway to communicate between the sea and the base of the pass leading to the highlands of Abyssinia?—In the first place, on the 9th of October I wrote for four complete sets of tramway, with waggons and gear of one mile each set, asking that these should be sent from Bombay. That was the first requisition. It was in November when the route was decided on that the railway was sent for.

1235. Did not the four sets of tramways of one mile each, refer to the service of the camp and wharves, and were they not to be for horse traction?—Yes.

1236. Then, was it in November that you first proposed to lay down a locomotive line?—Yes.

1237. What steps did you take then to carry out your proposal?—We had the survey commenced.

1238. In what despatch did you suggest to the Government of Bombay the employment of a locomotive railway?—It would be in a letter to Colonel Merewether, dated, probably, about the end of November.

1239. Did you in that letter give the details as to the difficulties which had to be overcome, and the nature of the railway which you would think it desirable to employ?—I gave no details as to the description which should be sent; but I said it was to cross the plains intervening between the sea and the base of the mountains.

1240. You simply applied for so many miles of railway to be sent as soon as possible?—Yes.

1241. Were you further consulted by the Bombay Government in the matter?—No.

1242. So that having made your demand you knew nothing further of the subject until the plant arrived at Annesley Bay, when it fell to your duty, as commanding engineer, to lay it?—No.

1243. In what state did that plant come?—It was mostly old; part was in a good state, but part of it was very bad; it was second hand, I think.

1244. Will you define the parts which were bad?—The rails were very crooked, and had to be straightened.

1245. Were there four or five different patterns of rails?—Yes, five.

1246. Were the holes in the fish plates bored, irrespective of the holes in the rails, so that the two would not go together?—For a few days there was a difficulty occasioned by finding that the bolts did not fit.

1247. Were two descriptions of chairs sent?—Two descriptions were sent.

1248. Was there not a considerable difficulty owing to the different patterns of the rails and the different patterns of the chairs not agreeing together, necessitating the sorting of the whole before the line could be laid down?—Yes.

1249. Then, with respect to the locomotive,

was not one locomotive sent with the wheels of the wrong gauge?—I do not think so.

1250. Was the plant arranged in the ships in which it was sent in such a way as that it could be landed readily?—It was necessary that the rails should be placed lowest, although they were the first portion which was required. Therefore, the waggons which were not required at first naturally were above the rails.

1251. Do you think that a better disposition, by proper organisation, could have been made at the time when the plant was shipped from Bombay?—No, not unless they had had more tonnage.

1252. Would it have been more satisfactory to have placed one engineer in charge of the preparation of the plant, with the duty of seeing to its embarkation, so that when he came to Abyssinia he would have had his plant complete and to his hand, and who might have been charged with the laying down of the railway?—I do not know that that would have facilitated it very much, though it might to some degree, because the difficulty was to get the plant landed.

1253. When were the earthworks commenced which, I presume, would be put in hand on the completion of your survey?—The earthworks were to be commenced as soon as the troops arrived and we had the means of making them.

1254. On what date would that be?—That would be in December.

1255. I believe a portion of the line was completed and in working order before the whole was so?—Yes; the engines commenced working trains near the shore in January.

1256. When was the last length completed, or on what date did the engines finally run to take trains up to the farthest limit which was reached by the line?—About a month or a month and a half before the termination of the campaign.

1257. What would be the date of that?—That would be, I think, at the end of April, as near as I can tell.

1258. Then the line was not in complete working order till the end of April, was it?—Not the whole of it, but a great part of it was in working order long before that.

1259. You have, no doubt, read in the Blue Book proposals from General Simmons, of the Royal Engineers, and also an offer from Mr. Brassey, and also a letter from Sir John McNeill, all concurring in the advisability of using the narrow gauge, and Mr. Brassey proposing to lay down a narrow gauge line, the whole of the plant being sent out from England, and engaging to do it in three months from the date of the order?—Yes.

1260. What result do you think would have been obtained had one of those offers been accepted at the time when it was made?—I think if Mr. Brassey's offer had been accepted, if his estimate is to be considered as a tender for the work, he would have been a loser.

1261. But if he was a loser the Government would have been a gainer, would it not?—Certainly, provided the contractor did not abandon the work when he began to lose.

1262. Do you, from your practical knowledge as an engineer, see any reason to think it likely, bearing in mind the circumstances of the case, that the line could have been laid, and the plant supplied in the time which is mentioned in those letters?—In answering that question, the very important question of agency must be considered;

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sidered; there is no special agency mentioned in Mr. Brassey's estimate.

1263. I am not alluding to the question of price, but to the question of time?—But I must mention the agency because some of the proposals are that a railway should have been made by navvies. I have already said that Europeans could not have made it in that climate. Supposing that Europeans could have made it in that climate, I should have said "Yes" to your question.

1264. Then you think that the scheme as laid down generally by this letter, could have been carried out, with the exception that it involves the employment of European labour, which you think would be inapplicable to the circumstances which obtained in Abyssinia?—Yes, with the addition of the construction of a special pier for the landing of their plant; that would have been necessary.

1265. Then if Mr. Brassey had been willing to have taken the responsibility of completing the line in that time, would you have thought that the difficulty which you mention would not be one which might fairly be supposed to come within the province of his consideration alone?—The three months allowed two months for the making of the railway, but he does not state the agency in his letter, and therefore I cannot answer the question.

1266. Do you not think that the narrow gauge is preferable to the broad gauge for the purposes of a military railway?—Certainly.

1267. And it could have been laid much more quickly, could it not?—Certainly, the engineer department was over-weighted with the broad gauge.

1268. Could you give an expression of your idea of the time that would have been saved had you had a complete set of plant all of one pattern, and on the narrow gauge, as compared with the time which was occupied in laying the railway with the broad gauge and with the plant which was at your disposal?—Providing the plant could have been landed at a pier of its own, and the narrow gauge had been adopted, with ample agency, the railway might have been laid down, I have no doubt, in a month.

1269. If that end could have been compassed, would it not have resulted in a very large economy, represented by a sum which would be disproportionate to any slight extra cost which might have been involved in the purchase of new plant?—It would have been most useful, no doubt.

1270. Have you any reason to impugn the estimate as to time which is mentioned in the letters to which I refer?—There are various times mentioned in those letters; I think one letter states that several miles a day could be laid.

1271. Do you not think that it would have been possible when the earthwork was completed to lay the rails at the rate of three or four miles a day?—But the earthwork must be included in the time.

1272. Then you would have had the time previous to the arrival of the plant to have prepared more or less of the earthwork, would you not?—Then it would have taken more time to have sent the agency, by which the railway was to have been made a head of the plant.

1273. Would it not have been possible to have procured the plant from England, and to have utilised the means at your disposal for the con-

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struction of the earthworks while the plant was being prepared?—The railway was made almost entirely by the troops.

1274. Then of course that suggestion would have been practicable, would it not?—The works could not have been commenced before the troops arrived, in the beginning of December.

1275. At any rate, as a matter of fact, would not you, as commanding engineer, have considered that, had a complete set of plant been sent to you, it would have been a matter of the very first importance?—If a complete set of good plant had been sent of the narrow gauge, it would have been of great importance.

1276. By what date might the line have been completed, on the assumption that the offer of Mr. Brassey with respect to the plant was accepted, and that you were informed that the offer had been accepted, that you were to look to England for plant, and that you had gone on, with such labour and means as were at your disposal, with the construction of the earthworks?—Twice as quickly; in half the time.

1277. As commanding engineer in the Abyssinian Expedition, do you not think that had a complete pattern of railway for military purposes been in existence in England, with contracts entered into with responsible firms to supply rapidly when required any amount of plant, such a state of affairs would have resulted, in the case of the Abyssinian Expedition, in a very considerable saving of expenditure?—Yes.

1278. Now that railways have become a necessary part of army equipment, would you not consider that the questions of pattern, manipulation, and the greatest possible rate of laying, by military labour, should be settled, so that there should be no difference of opinion upon them?—Yes, I have already published that opinion, but the agency is equally as important as that there should be a pattern of plant.

1279. By the agency do you mean the means of making the railway?—The means of making the railway. For instance, the railway on the plains of Zulla was made by the troops; and as soon as one regiment got well into the work they were moved away, and a new one had to take their place. That was a great source of delay.

1280. In my question I use the words, "the greatest possible rate of laying by military labour," because in reference to the break down of the Army Works Corps, I hardly suppose it possible that military railways can ever be laid down and manipulated by others than soldiers; do you concur in that opinion?—My opinion is, that they should be laid by men under military discipline, and at all events under the superintendence of the Royal Engineers.

1281. Do you think that the laying of a railway should be under military discipline, and should form part of the education at Chatham?—Certainly.

1284. *Chairman.*] It was at some period in November when you finally determined upon some route to be taken to the high lands, was it not?—Yes.

1283. But previously to that, it was known to you, was it not, that whatever route was taken you would have to pass over a considerable plain before you reached any of the passes to the high lands?—Yes.

1284. Then at a much earlier period I presume that you would have seen the advantage of a railway over that plain?—Yes.

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1285. Did

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1285. Did you indicate any wish for a railway at a much earlier period?—No further than what was necessary on the beach. That was asked for on the 9th of October.

1285. In point of fact, you took the shortest route to the high lands, did you not?—I think not the shortest.

1287. Was there a shorter one?—Yes, the alternative route was shorter, I think.

1288. Was it about 16 or 17 miles?—It was by a very few miles shorter.

1289. In any case a railway over the plain would have been an obvious advantage whatever route was taken, would it not?—It would, whichever of those two routes was taken.

1290. It has been said that there was very much difficulty in getting the railway plant out of the vessel which conveyed it; I suppose you have no personal experience in the loading of ships?—No.

1291. You say it was necessary to put the rails at the bottom of the ships; you had that from some other authority, I presume?—I only presumed that the dead weight of the rails could not be put above the waggons.

1292. What were the difficulties that you experienced in getting at the railway plant on account of its being inconveniently and improperly stowed in the ship which conveyed it?—Merely

that the space of the piers was limited for landing.

1293. Were not the difficulties incident to the stowage of the ship?—I do not think so.

1294. I suppose labourers from Egypt would have been as well acclimatised as labourers from India, would they not?—Yes; but our muleteers came from Egypt, and proved most unpracticable.

1295. And although Europeans were unsuitable to the climate of Abyssinia, the Egyptians on the other side of the Red Sea, on the Isthmus, or from any part of Egypt, would have been suitable, would they not?—Yes.

1296. Sir *Stafford Northcote*.] Did it occur to you, before you left Bombay, that a railway would be wanted?—I do not think it did, further than that we should most likely require one or two miles on first landing.

1297. Could you have formed any opinion until you had seen the country, as to what sort of use might be made of a railway?—No, certainly not.

1298. *Chairman*.] What was the distance between the terminus of the railway and the first station?—I think it was within a mile.

1299. And there they were obliged to have recourse to animals?—Yes.

1300. Mr. *Seely*.] Did you get any railway plant from the Suez Canal Company?—No.

Friday, 29th April 1870.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Colonel Barttelot.
Mr. Baxter.
Captain Beaumont.
Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Candlish.
Mr. Christopher Denison.
Lord Elcho.

Sir James Elphinstone.
Sir John Hay.
Sir Patrick O'Brien.
Mr. Seely.
Mr. Charles Turner.
Mr. White.

JOHN CANDLISH, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Major General G. J. JAMESON, called in; and Examined.

1301. *Chairman.*] SINCE you were last before this Committee, you have had an opportunity of seeing and examining a good many more of the Abyssinian accounts than you had up to that time, have you not?—Yes; I have endeavoured to examine them from the Blue Book containing the proceedings of the Committee, from Mr. Turner's statement, and I have compared the items with the estimate as far as I could.

1302. You have the items of your two estimates, have you not; that is, of October 1867 and of March 1868?—Yes; they are both in the Blue Book.

1303. Have you compared the items in these estimates with the items in the account, with a view to the discovery of where the excess in the expenditure arises?—The principal items that I have examined are sea transport, the purchase of pack animals, the rations of men and forage for animals and pay of drivers, coals, and sundry commissariat and miscellaneous charges, and I have found that the force was increased by nearly 3,000 men from the time of my estimate in March. I estimated for 12,000, and it was nearly 15,000.

1304. Did you estimate for 12,000 combatants?—Yes; I estimated for 12,424 combatants, and a follower for each man. I may observe that in the sum that I have estimated for the baggage animals, the feed of the animals and pay of the drivers are included. But, in excess of this, I have put 12,424 followers, that is a follower for each combatant, understanding that Lord Napier was to take a very small number of followers up above the passes.

1305. Taking the items which you have mentioned, in the order in which you have mentioned them, will you state, with regard to sea transport, the results of your examination and comparison?—I stated in the estimate of March last that the transport would amount to 400,000*l.* a month. Captain Tryon, at page 142 of the Appendix to the Committee's Report, gives it as a monthly charge of 433,000*l.* The necessity for purchasing a very large number of land transport animals reacted on the marine transport branch. Captain Tryon, at Question 1949, states that the fact of sending this great tonnage to Suez and to Berbera for additional animals, created a delay in

the Red Sea of nearly one-fourth of the whole of the tonnage engaged in the Abyssinian War. The whole of that tonnage would have been returned to Bombay, and would have saved the chartering of additional vessels by making a double trip, and also the delay of vessels in Annesley Bay. This accounts for a large increase of the estimate; and in addition there is the hire of transports after the 31st of May, and the heavy charge for demurrage or detention in Bombay Harbour during the monsoon. The payments for the transport service were estimated as follows: I take the whole of the estimates from September 1867. The pages I refer to are the pages of the Blue Book of the Committee's Report. At page 145 there is Mr. Romaine's letter, dated 17th September 1867, 340,000*l.*; at page 150, my estimate of October 1867 in India to the end of December, 390,000*l.*; my estimate made in March 1868 in India to 31st May, five months, at 400,000*l.* a month, 2,000,000*l.*, total, 2,730,000*l.* The actual payments made (*vide* Admiral Mend's answer to Question 1521) amounted to 3,372,152*l.*; the difference in excess of the estimate being 642,152*l.*

1306. When you speak of transport, do you mean sea transport?—Sea transport.

1307. To what period does Mr. Romaine, at page 145, estimate 340,000*l.* as the charge on sea transport?—It was not distinctly stated. There was an estimate for transport sent in, and Admiral Mend's will be better able to say what that was for.

1308. What was your estimate of 390,000*l.* for?—It was for India alone, up to the 31st of December.

1309. Do you not think that Mr. Romaine's estimate of 340,000*l.* is only a duplicate of your own?—No; because there must have been transports engaged for the dispatch of the pioneer force immediately, besides getting stores and troops and followers from Bengal and otherwise.

1310. Did you not include the tonnage necessary for the dispatch of the pioneer force in your estimate of 390,000*l.*?—That included the portion of the Admiralty transports that might be available. They were going out quickly at the time, and

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many of them would be available before the end of the year.

1311. But in the statement just now given, you have added Mr. Romaine's estimate of 340,000 *l.* to your own estimate of 390,000 *l.*, have you not?—In every estimate we have included the two. You will find that at page 145 in Mr. Romaine's letter, "In the Transport Department, 340,000 *l.*; Storekeeper General Department (for coals, &c.), 268,000 *l.*; Comptroller of Victualling (provisions, &c.), 300,000 *l.*" This we put into the estimate as 650,000 *l.*; we added 12,000 *l.* to the sum stated, 638,000 *l.*

1312. In making out your first estimate, did you not ascertain over what period the 340,000 *l.* estimate by Mr. Romaine extended?—I think they were engaged for six months.

1313. Did you understand this to be at per month or for the whole time?—Up to the end of December at any rate, or further.

1314. Then, in your estimate of 390,000 *l.*, did you include all outlay for sea transport?—In India only. It was very carefully considered at the time, and we believed that the 340,000 *l.* and 390,000 *l.* would be the whole cost of transport to the end of the year.

1315. Did you understand the 340,000 *l.* to be the transport charge in England, and the 390,000 *l.* to be the Indian transport charge?—Yes.

1316. Are you sure that you are correct in that supposition as regards Mr. Romaine's estimate?—At the time I took what was given me, and did the best I could with it.

1317. Did you not ascertain specifically whether that included the Indian charge as well?—It would of necessity include a portion of the Indian charge, according as the transports arrived there; but still it was impossible to say what part would be Indian. I understand that that was the charge for transport by the Admiralty.

1318. If it included a part of the Indian charge, would you not, in separately estimating the whole Indian charge, be duplicating the estimate?—There was no duplication, because putting the two together it would be certainly short of, or at all events not exceed, the actual cost.

1319. Do you find 3,372,152 *l.* to be the total charge for sea transport?—Admiral Mends says, I think, at Question 1521, that it is 3,372,152 *l.*

1320. Have you since looked to the account to see that this 3,372,152 *l.* is the correct total?—No; I have never seen any of the Abyssinian accounts up to this date, except those of our own expenditure in the India Office. They have been sent to the Admiralty and the War Office, and I have never even seen them. I took what I could get from the Blue Book.

1321. Assuming Mr. Romaine's estimate of 340,000 *l.*, and yours of 390,000 *l.* to be estimates of separate engagements, and not in any degree duplicate estimates, do you find that the total estimate for tonnage is 2,730,000 *l.*?—Exactly.

1322. The excess of expenditure being 642,000 *l.*?—The excess being 642,000 *l.*, as far as I have documents, though of course I might state it more minutely if I had access to the accounts.

1323. You have also made a comparison between your estimate and the accounts for the supply of pack animals, have you not?—The purchase of pack animals was estimated by me at 450,000 *l.* In Mr. Turner's final account, No. 13, the amount is 471,469 *l.* In item No. 16 of

the same account, Mr. Turner points to a further charge, but the exact amount for cattle cannot be separated. This item is "Cattle, gear, implements, &c." This is an addition to the charge for pack saddles or cattle gear sent from England. A very serious loss has occurred in the cattle department; the probability of such loss was pointed out by me, although I could not have imagined its extent. By Captain Tryon's report 55,000 baggage animals were employed, although not all at the same time, and as far as the Blue Book shows (there may be a recovery since perhaps), only 7,421 were re-embarked from Zoulla, showing a residue of 47,579 animals unaccounted for, and for which in these accounts there is absolutely no return of money. The loss may be shown as follows: Estimate in Europe (page 150), 200,000 *l.*; cost in India (page 182), 471,469 *l.*, the total being 671,469 *l.* The recovery by animals returned, items 49, 50, and 51 (page 183), is 55,804 *l.*, and (page 185) 8,206 *l.*, the total being 64,010 *l.* The absolute loss by baggage animals is 607,459 *l.*

1324. Are the figures which you are quoting now, of 200,000 *l.* cost in Europe, and 471,000 *l.* cost in India, your estimated cost?—The 200,000 *l.* cost in Europe is taken from the estimate, but the 471,469 *l.* is the actual cost in India as shown by Mr. Turner's account.

1325. But your 200,000 *l.* is an estimate, is it not?—The 200,000 *l.* is an estimate. My Indian estimate was 450,000 *l.*, against Mr. Turner's charge of 471,469 *l.*

1326. They are both estimates, are they not?—To show the loss, I have put in the estimate of 200,000 *l.* because I have not the total expenditure in Europe, and I have put in the actual account of the Indian expense from Mr. Turner's account, page 182.

1327. But, with all submission, I would suggest to you that that does not show the total loss, because the total loss will be the difference, not between the estimates, but between the purchasing cost and the sum ultimately realised for the remainder, is not that so?—Precisely so; but that is the amount, as far as I have documents. If I had the full accounts, of course I could give exactly what you wish; but from the documents before me, I am stating it as well as I can.

1328. The figures that you are now mentioning do not show the difference between the estimated and the actual cost of those animals, do they?—It would be shown by adding 21,469 *l.* to the 607,000 *l.*

1329. I think the 471,000 *l.* is still only an estimate; Mr. Turner's estimate?—It is an actual charge audited (page 139, Sir Seymour Fitzgerald).

1330. You have had nothing before you showing you the actual cost of the animals, have you?—No, except Mr. Turner's audited statement to which I have referred I have never seen a single account. I wish to give the Committee the best information I possibly can from the documents to which I have access.

1331. Was the number of animals for which you estimated in October 1867 the same number indicated as necessary by the Commander in Chief, Lord Napier?—I put in a document which will be found in the Appendix, Committee's Blue Book, estimating all the animals. You will find the number of camels and bullocks, and different animals for different corps.

1332. You