

Sing, which has sometimes been anticipated, will assuredly never be exhibited, so long as he has life in himself or strength to prevent its exhibition in others. The interest of future rulers of Cashmere will hardly be less urgent than his own to induce them to cultivate friendly relations with the Government of India. If they should not be friendly, neither the wealth and power they hold, nor the character of the people they rule, are sufficient to make them formidable to us.*

The points, then, on which attack is most probable are the frontiers of Cabool and the borders of Nepal.

13. Whatever may be the feelings of the Affghans towards us at the present time, or whatever they may become hereafter, I think it highly improbable that they would ever venture to attempt an attack in force on the British territories, of their own motive or for their own purposes only; but such an attack, at the instigation of a European power, is not so an improbable an event; and, if it should be seconded by a rising among our own subjects on the borders, closely connected with the Affghans by many ties, and if it should be further swelled by any outbreak of the old Khalea spirit among the Sikhs of the Manjha, the occasion would call for the full exercise of all our strength.

In such an event, after providing for the several points (para. 6) which it has been shown will always require a permanent protection or control, the Government of India would be able to bring 12 regiments of European infantry into the field for the western frontier; and, as there are already 11 regiments cantoned beyond the Jumna, comparatively little time would be consumed in the assembly of that force. Once assembled, I regard it as sufficient to destroy any army which is at all likely to be brought against us in that quarter.

14. An attack upon British territories by Nepal is, at least, as improbable as an Affghan invasion. Nearly 40 years have now passed since our war with Nepal was ended. During all that time the states have been in close contact along an extensive frontier, but the peace which was framed in 1817 has never been broken. There is nothing at the present day which renders a breach more probable than at any time since the treaty was signed.

Nevertheless, such an event is not impossible, and we ought never to be unprepared for its occurrence. The propriety of this prudent precaution received strong illustration not long since. For some months in 1854 Nepal was arming. A very large force was gathering; great stores were being prepared near our Darjeeling frontier, and Jung Bahadoor had intimated that it was his intention to march a considerable body of men along the Terai from Katmandoo eastward. The durbar had announced that all those preparations were intended for the attack of a province of Thibet. There was no reason to doubt that this was their real end; but we could not fail to see that they might at any time have been diverted suddenly from that end, and might have been employed in an attack on our lower provinces.

The ultimate result of so mad an outrage

would have been beyond doubt. But it cannot be denied that at the present moment, and for many years past, the Government of India has been insufficiently prepared for promptly meeting such an attack.

Even so late as the time of Lord William Bentinck, little more than 20 years ago, after Bhurtpore had been taken, after the Burmese war had been long successfully concluded, and when our posts had already been pushed beyond the Jumna, it was thought prudent always to keep a strong force in these lower provinces. Six European infantry regiments were at that time stationed below Allahabad.* When I assumed the government of India, I found but two regiments within that space, and the means at my command have never yet enabled me to strengthen this very insufficient force, however sensible I may have long been of the prudence and propriety of doing so.

It must further be observed, that even of the inconsiderable European force which we have in the lower provinces, one-half, viz., the regiment in Fort William, is more than 400 miles distant from the spot which is most likely to be the first threatened by the Nepalese; while the position of the great mass of our European force, far removed to the westward, would render it impossible to collect even a small army upon the lower frontier until after a long and injurious delay.

15. These considerations alone must, I think, suffice to convince any one who may consider this question, that the European infantry in Bengal ought to be reinforced. The necessity of a greater force of that arm being permanently stationed in the lower provinces will become still more apparent when it is remembered that, although in these later times the native states in India have shown little aptitude for combination against a common enemy, still such a combination is never impossible in itself. We ought, therefore, to contemplate the contingency of our being attacked by both our border neighbours at once, and, inasmuch as in such case no aid could well be given from the more distant and more critically situated positions in the west, we ought so to strengthen ourselves in good time upon the frontier where we now are weak—in the east—as to be able to present a sufficiently strong front to both our antagonists at the same time.

16. The force which is detailed below, is the least which would enable the Government of India to assume the attitude I have just described.

				Battalions.				Battalions.			
				<hr/>				<hr/>			
Peshawur	-	-	-	3	Meerut	-	-	-	2		
Rawul Pindee	-	-	-	1	Agra	-	-	-	1		
Sealkote	-	-	-	1	Cawnpore	-	-	-	1		
Lahore	-	-	-	1	Dinapore	-	-	-	1		
Ferozepore	-	-	-	1	Calcutta	-	-	-	1		
Jullundur	-	-	-	1	Berhampore	-	-	-	1		
Umballah	-	-	-	1	Hazareebaugh	-	-	-	1		
The Hills	-	-	-	2							
					<hr/>						
					In all	-	-	-	19		

I mention

* Minute, 20 April 1853, para. 19.
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* Calcutta, 1; Chinsurah, 1; Berhampore, 1; Bhau-
gulpore, 1; Dinapore, 1; Ghazepore, 1: Total, 6.

App. No. 16. I mention 19 battalions as the minimum force of European infantry which ought to be maintained upon the Bengal establishment. Twenty battalions would be better, and even more would not be superfluous. If, however, this force of 19 European infantry regiments shall be allotted to the stations which I have enumerated, the Governor General in Council, by bringing up a regiment from Madras as a temporary garrison for Fort William, would have it in his power to hold securely the several districts to which I have referred above; and, at the same time, to bring into the field two armies on the frontier of Cabool and Nepal, which should each contain* eight regiments of European infantry, or which should include† ten regiments in the one army, and six regiments in the other.

17. To maintain this force permanently would require three regiments more than are now present within the limits of the Presidency of Bengal. I proceed to state in what manner I propose that those regiments should be obtained.

18. The province of Pegu is now garrisoned jointly by the armies of Bengal and Madras. The general officer commanding the division may be selected from either army, and a Bengal and a Madras officer have already held it in succession. But considerable inconvenience seems to be involved in this permanent mingling under one general officer of the troops of two armies, differing from each other in many details of regulation and practice; obviously it would greatly simplify all arrangements and correspondence if the province were to be held by the troops of one army, the General reporting, of course, to the Supreme Government, as at present.

Accordingly, I propose that the Pegu division should be made over entirely to the Madras army. The details of the transfer will be explained when I come to consider the establishment of the Madras army in its several branches.

The transfer of Pegu will liberate two regiments of European infantry belonging to the Bengal army, which are now cantoned there, and, with the corps now temporarily withdrawn to Europe, but hereafter to be restored, will supply the three corps which are required for the proper occupation and adequate defence of the Bengal Presidency, in the manner described in paragraph 16, by an establishment of 19 battalions of European infantry.

19. I have only further to observe, with reference to the Bengal Presidency, that I have mentioned Hazareebaugh and Berhampore as the stations for the two additional regiments, because experience has proved the former to be exceedingly healthy for European troops, and because the latter already possesses excellent barracks,

* Sealkote and Umballa	-	-	-	-	2
In the Field	-	-	-	-	8
					10
Agra	-	-	-	-	1
In the Field	-	-	-	-	8
					9
					19
† Sealkote and Umballa	-	-	-	-	2
In the Field	-	-	-	-	10
					12
Agra	-	-	-	-	1
In the Field	-	-	-	-	6
					7
					19

which appear to me to have been abandoned without any sufficient cause. The final selection of stations, however, may be made hereafter.

20. The establishment of European infantry in the Presidency of Madras, including one battalion, which is temporarily withdrawn to Europe, consists of seven battalions, which are distributed thus:

Pegu	-	-	-	-	-	2
Secunderabad	-	-	-	-	-	1
Bellary	-	-	-	-	-	1
Fort St. George	-	-	-	-	-	1
Bangalore	-	-	-	-	-	1
Cannanore and the Hills	-	-	-	-	-	1
TOTAL	-	-	-	-	-	7

In the Presidency of Madras, as in that of Bengal, there are certain points which ought never to be left without the protection or control of European infantry.

So long as the Nizam retains in his service at Hyderabad the large bodies of Arabs whom he has long entertained, the presence of those formidable and lawless bands will continue to render it indispensably necessary that a regiment of European infantry should form part of the British subsidiary force which is maintained in the cantonment of Secunderabad.

For general reasons, which have been already given (para. 6), Fort St. George and the seat of Government of Madras will call for the services of one regiment; and one regiment should, in prudence, be kept to the southward, or on the western coast.

But if these points are held, as they undoubtedly ought to be, the Government of Madras could not place more than three regiments of European infantry in the field, whether in the north* or in the south.†

21. It will be apparent, I think, that this force is inadequate to provide security against all the contingencies which belong to a tract so wide as that which is held by the army of the Madras Presidency, and that the establishment ought to be restored to the scale on which it stood previous to the reduction ordered in 1847; while such proportionate additions should be made as may be required by the subsequent conquest of the province of Pegu.

22. I have already proposed, in a previous paragraph (p. 18), that Pegu should be made over entirely to the Madras army. The force which was originally suggested for that province, and which will be fully adequate for the purpose in time of peace, was three regiments.

Wherefore the force which is detailed below is the least which can be regarded as sufficient for the military want of the Presidency of Madras:—

Pegu	-	-	-	-	-	3
Secunderabad	-	-	-	-	-	1
Bellary	-	-	-	-	-	1
Madras	-	-	-	-	-	1
Bangalore	-	-	-	-	-	1
Trichinopoly	-	-	-	-	-	1
Cannanore	-	-	-	-	-	1
TOTAL	-	-	-	-	-	9

A 10th

* Pegu, 2; Madras, 1; Cannanore and Bangalore, 1; in the Field, north, 3: Total, 7.

† Pegu, 2; Madras, 1; Secunderabad, 1; in the Field, south, 3: Total, 7.

A 10th regiment, to be stationed also at Bangalore, would render the establishment more complete. If this establishment of nine infantry regiments should be conceded, the Government of Madras will have it in its power to hold securely the several points which need protection or control, and, at the same time, to place a force in the field sufficient for any necessity which we can contemplate as likely to arise.

23. If the King of Ava should renew the war, three European regiments could be sent from the Presidency of Madras to reinforce the European troops which are ordinarily to be kept in Pegu. This aggregate force will be amply sufficient for ever purpose in Pegu. For, if five regiments of European infantry were enough to conquer the province, six regiments will assuredly be more than enough to hold it.

24. In like manner, if hostilities should occur to the northward in the state of Hyderabad, or in the Mysore and the southern countries, the Government would be able to hold the requisite points, and to place in the field a force of four battalions of European infantry, which might at once be increased to five battalions, if the garrison of Fort St. George should be temporarily supplied from the Bengal army.

25. But, to accomplish these objects, two regiments of European infantry must be added to the present Madras establishment. I propose to obtain these regiments in the following manner:

I propose that a fourth European regiment should be raised for Madras. But, inasmuch as it is desirable to avoid, if possible, all augmentation of military expense, and as the Madras regular native infantry regiments are very numerous in proportion to those of the other two armies, I have to suggest that the 4th European Infantry Regiment should be raised on the same principle on which it has already been proposed to raise the European cavalry for the company's service.

The native officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the 51st and 52nd regiments of native infantry should be disbanded with pensions and gratuities, or should be absorbed into the other 50 regiments of the line, and the European officers of those two regiments should be transferred to the 4th European infantry, the men of which corps must, of course, be sent from England.

Thus the first regiment will be supplied.

II. The second regiment may be formed by transferring from the Bengal to the Madras establishment one regiment of Queen's Infantry, thus restoring the Madras establishment of Royal regiments to its former scale.

26. The deficiency created by this withdrawal of one Queen's regiment from the Bengal establishment may be supplied by raising a fourth regiment of European infantry for that Presidency; also transferring the European officers of the 73rd and 74th Regiments of Bengal Native Infantry to the new 4th European regiment, and disbanding or absorbing the native officers and Sepoys, as before described. If 20 regiments should be allowed to Bengal, I would pursue still further the principle above mentioned, by converting the 71st and 72nd Regiments Bengal Native Infantry into a fifth European regiment.

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The proportions of European regiments in the three Presidencies would then be; five for Bengal, four for Madras, three for Bombay; while the proportions of native infantry regiments would be, 70 for Bengal, 50 for Madras, 30 for Bombay, including the Marine Battalion.

27. The establishment of European infantry in the Presidency of Bombay consists of seven regiments, which are distributed thus:

Belgaum	-	-	-	-	-	1
Poona	-	-	-	-	-	2
Bombay	-	-	-	-	-	$\frac{1}{2}$
Aden	-	-	-	-	-	$\frac{1}{2}$
Deesa	-	-	-	-	-	1
Scinde	-	-	-	-	-	2
TOTAL						7

Of these stations, Bombay, the capital of the Presidency, and Aden, a fortified post of importance, could certainly never be left with smaller garrisons than the wing of a regiment by which each is now held.

One regiment, I apprehend, would be quite sufficient for the temporary control of the country above the Ghats; and Scinde would be perfectly safe with one European corps, now that Meer Ali Morad has been deprived of even the semblance of power, while the Punjab has become a British province.

Wherefore the Government of Bombay would have it in its power at any time to bring a force of five European infantry regiments into the field, in any part of the Presidency, or to detach a force of four such regiments beyond its bounds.

28. Under these circumstances, the European infantry force now in the Bombay Presidency does not seem to me to be inadequate for the purpose it has to serve.

29. Having thus considered the wants of the several Presidencies in succession, I am brought to the conclusion that the smallest amount of European infantry which can be relied upon as fully adequate for the defence of India, and for the preservation of internal tranquillity, is 35 battalions, of which 19 should be allotted to the Bengal Presidency, nine to Madras, and seven to Bombay.

30. The European infantry force, according to the establishment of the several Presidencies, is made up of Queen's and Company's troops, in the following proportions:

Presidencies.	Queen's Regiments.	Company's Regiments.	TOTAL.
Bengal - - - -	16	3	19
Madras - - - -	4	3	7
Bombay - - - -	4	3	7
In all India - - -	24	9	33

The European infantry force which I propose for

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App. No. 16. for the Indian military establishment in future will be distributed in the following proportions :

Presidencies.	Queen's Regiments.	Company's Regiments.	TOTAL.
Bengal - - - -	15	4	19
Madras - - - -	5	4	9
Bombay - - - -	4	3	7
In all India - - -	24	11	35

Thus it will be seen that the establishment of Her Majesty's regiments of infantry to be employed in the Indian territories is proposed to consist hereafter of 24 battalions, as at the present time, including two battalions which are only temporarily withdrawn; no addition to the present establishment is immediately asked for, but it is my deliberate and decided opinion that no permanent diminution of it ought to be made.

31. When in the course of years railways shall have been constructed throughout the whole of Bengal and Hindoostan, when connecting lines shall have united the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay with that of Bengal, so that their three armies shall be rendered rapidly and almost equally available in every part of these dominions, great changes may, perhaps, be made. I purposely abstain from offering any suggestions regarding a future, over which I shall have no control, and with which I have no right to meddle; my proposals refer only to the circumstances of the present period, and are intended to provide only for the necessities and contingencies by which the Government of India is now, and will still for some time to come, be affected. These proposals will in no respect hamper the free action of those who may hereafter be charged with the administration of India. They are not framed on any ideal standard of fitness, but are limited to the very minimum of sufficiency; I trust, therefore, that the Honourable Court of Directors and Her Majesty's Government will be pleased to maintain the establishment of European infantry, which I now propose as not more than is adequate and necessary for the security and defence of the Indian empire.

32. I beg further respectfully to represent, that it is of great moment that the Government of India should have confidence not only in the sufficiency of this vitally important force, but also in its permanency.

At this time the only portion of the European infantry whose services the Governor General in Council can count upon without fail, are the nine battalions in the Honourable Company's service. There is no fixed establishment of Royal infantry; any portion of it might be at any moment recalled, and although the Government of India can feel no reasonable apprehension that Her Majesty's Government would ever act on the published suggestion of a distinguished officer lately deceased, and would suddenly withdraw the Royal infantry in India to meet troubles and dangers which might have arisen in Europe, yet serious evils may readily be seen in the uncertainty of the hold which the Indian Government has upon

Royal troops, without supposing any resort to so extreme a measure as that to which I have just referred. For, since the establishment of European infantry in India is in its normal condition kept down at a minimum, even a partial and temporary reduction of it by the orders of Her Majesty's Government, must always cause great and well founded anxiety to the Indian Government, and might lead to very serious embarrassment. The supposition is by no means an imaginary one. The Government of India has already been placed in the very position I have represented.

33. I do not now propose, by way of remedy for this evil, either that the regiments of Royal infantry should be increased in number, so as to admit of some being withdrawn when they are needed, or that the European regiments in the Company's service should be largely and permanently increased, while the Royal regiments are diminished in number.

The remedy which I beg respectfully to propose is, that the number of 24 regiments of Her Majesty's infantry, already mentioned, shall be declared by Her Majesty's Government to be the establishment of Royal infantry for India, and that a formal assurance shall be given that no one of those regiments shall at any time be withdrawn without relief, unless with the full consent of the Honourable Court of Directors.

34. I venture to think that there is nothing which is not reasonable in this proposal. The establishment named is that which was fixed five years since. Even half a century ago Her Majesty's army gave no less than 13 regiments of infantry to India. Having regard to the vast additions of territory which have since been made, bearing in mind that, although by conquests our enemies have been diminished in number, yet the extension of our limit has widely scattered our European troops, and has thus rendered the larger force which we now possess less compact and effectual, perhaps, than the lesser force of 50 years ago; keeping in mind that the whole maintenance of a very large proportion of the infantry of the Royal army is borne by the Indian Treasury; considering that the service in India gives to that army the richest command which it possesses, and that the chief of those commands has always been reserved hitherto exclusively for officers of the Royal army; lastly, above all, looking to the vast importance and value of these Indian possessions to the British Crown, in every point of view, military, political, and commercial, I venture to entertain a confident expectation that the suggestion which I have submitted regarding the permanency as well as the numerical amount of the Royal infantry which should be set apart for service in India, will be considered as no more than is reasonable and right.

35. If, for any reasons, it may seem good to Her Majesty's Government, or to the Honourable Court of Directors, to determine that the establishment of Royal infantry shall henceforth consist of less than 24 regiments, I would then propose that the Indian establishment should be made up to its full amount by converting a further number of regiments of native infantry of the Bengal and Madras armies into European regiments in the Company's service.

But still, and in every case, I beg permission to urge that whatever may be the number of Royal

Royal regiments attached to the Indian establishment, that number shall be fixed and unalterable, except with the consent of the Honourable Court.

36. If by thus, in many instances, converting two native regiments of infantry into one European corps, the number of native regiments should be diminished more than seemed expedient, irregular native regiments may be embodied in their room. These will serve every requisite purpose for the time, and may easily be got rid of when they are no longer needed.

37. In conclusion of this part of the question of military establishments in India, I have the honour to recommend—

1st. That the Indian establishment of European infantry shall consist, at the very least, of 35 battalions.

2nd. That the present establishment of 24 regiments of Royal infantry shall be continued.

3rd. That 15 Royal regiments shall be allotted

to the Bengal Presidency, five to Madras, and four to Bombay. App. No. 16.

4th. That the establishment of Royal regiments, whatever may be the number determined upon, shall be declared fixed, and shall not be altered without the consent of the Honourable Court of Directors.

5th. That a fourth regiment of European infantry shall be added to each of the armies of Bengal and Madras, by converting two regiments of native infantry into one of European infantry, in each respectively disbanding the native officers and sepoys, and transferring the European officers to the new European corps.

(signed) *Dalhousie.*

5 February 1856.

(True copy.)

(signed) *R. J. H. Birch*, Colonel,
Secretary to the Government of India,
Military Department.

Appendix, No. 17.

PAPERS handed in by Major General Balfour, C.B., Royal Artillery, 26 July 1867.

FIXED STRENGTH, also PAY and COST of INFANTRY of the LINE for SERVICE in INDIA.

	Establishment in India According to the War Office Estimate of 1867-68.		Establishment in India according to the Military Estimates of India for 1865-66.				
	Regimental Establishment.	For 52 Regiments.	Regimental Establishment.	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	TOTAL.
Number of Regiments - - -	1	52	1	33	10	10	53
Number of Companies - - -	10	520	10	330	100	100	530
Officers - - - - -	39	2,028	39	1,287	390	390	2,067
Non-commissioned Officers - - -	49	2,548	46	1,584	480	480	2,544
Drummers - - - - -	21	1,092	21	698	210	210	1,118
Corporals - - - - -	40	2,080	40	1,320	400	400	2,120
Privates - - - - -	770	40,040	810	26,730	8,100	8,100	42,930
TOTAL of all Ranks - - -	919	47,788	958	31,614	9,580	9,580	50,774

DESIGNATIONS.	Pay of Regiments of Infantry of the Line in 1865-66.				
	Strength.	Bengal, 33 Regiments.	Madras, 10 Regiments.	Bombay, 10 Regiments.	TOTAL, INDIA, 53 REGIMENTS.
Officers - - - - -	2,067	Rs. 58,21,003	Rs. 17,12,103	Rs. 16,70,662	Rs. 92,03,768
Non-commissioned Officers - - -	2,544	6,12,856	1,86,260	1,92,659	9,91,775
Drum-Majors and Drummers - - -	1,118	1,13,284	34,329	34,329	1,81,942
Corporals - - - - -	2,120	2,49,150	75,500	75,500	4,00,150
Privates - - - - -	42,930	37,28,835	11,29,950	11,29,950	59,88,735
TOTAL Drummers, Corporals, and Privates - - - - -	46,163	40,91,269	12,39,779	12,39,779	65,70,827
TOTAL Non-Commissioned Officers, Drummers, Rank and File - - -	48,707	47,04,125	14,26,039	14,32,438	75,62,602
TOTAL all Ranks - - -	50,774	105,25,128	31,38,142	31,08,100	167,66,370

Cost of Establishments for 53 Regiments:

Educational - - - - -	66,624	22,660	20,787	1,10,071
Subordinate Medical and fixed Hospital - - -	3,27,170	55,562	90,142	4,72,874
Native Artificers and followers - - - - -	2,08,059	32,008	70,740	3,10,807
Command, Staff, and Horse Allowances - - -	7,10,975	2,20,257	2,07,494	11,38,726
Contract Allowances - - - - -	82,278	24,480	24,660	1,31,418
Family Allowances - - - - -	2,31,108	94,300	78,354	4,03,762
Good Conduct Allowances - - - - -	3,96,075	84,000	1,17,119	5,97,194
Good Shooting Allowances - - - - -	31,320	4,800	5,000	41,120
Hutting Money - - - - -	1,122	-	-	1,122
TOTAL Cost of Establishments - - - Rs.	20,54,731	5,38,067	6,14,296	32,07,094
GRAND TOTAL for 53 Regiments - - - Rs.	1,25,79,859	36,76,209	37,17,396	1,99,73,464
Deduct Pay of 336 Officers; viz., 230 in Europe, 89 on the Staff, 17 in the Public Works - - -	8,75,776	3,28,614	4,36,050	16,40,440
NET COST - - - Rs.	1,17,04,083	33,47,595	32,81,346	1,83,33,024
The net Regular Estimate in 1864-65, was - Rs.	1,18,00,000	33,50,000	32,00,000	1,83,50,000
The Establishments of Officers and Men being -	34,003	9,580	9,586	53,169

The pay charge in 1867-68 for the established number of Privates of Infantry (40,010), at the rate of Rs. 11. 10a. per month, is 55,85,676 rupees for the year, against 59,88,735 rupees for 42,930 Privates, the establishment in 1865-66, according to the above statement.

The pay of the 2,890 Privates, diminished from the fixed strength in 1865-66, in the establishment of 1867-68, is 4,03,059 rupees, thereby reducing the charge for non-commissioned rank and file from 75,62,602 rupees, as above, to 71,59,543 rupees; but leaving the charge for officers and other establishments of the Regiments undiminished in amount.

The pay of 42,930 Privates included in the above 1,99,73,464 rupees being 59,88,735 rupees, there remains 1,39,84,729 rupees for all other ranks and charges, or nearly 2,63,865 rupees per Regiment, per annum.

The pay of 1,000 Privates may be stated at 1,46,250 rupees per annum, and the cost of 36,000 Privates, formed into 35 Regiments, would be about 51,00,000 rupees. The pay of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, Drummers, and Corporals, and all the regimental establishments may be stated at 2,63,865 rupees for each of the 35 Regiments: Total 93,00,000 rupees, making for 35 Regiments a grand total of 1,44,00,000 rupees, or 54 lacs less than at present for the 52 Regiments, and with the advantage of seconding all officers absent. This saving does not include the reduction in charges for rations, barracks, arms, stores, hospital diets, and other departmental charges, which would largely increase the saving.

Appendix No. 18.

PAPERS handed in by Major General *Balfour*, C.B., Royal Artillery, 26 July 1867.

RETURN of NATIVE TROOPS on FOREIGN SERVICE, on 1 April 1857, Extracted from the Parliamentary Return, No. 56, of 1858.

	MADRAS NATIVE TROOPS.								
	Regular.	Irregular.	Regular.	Irregular.	Native Artillery.			Sappers.	GRAND TOTAL.
	Native Cavalry.	Native Cavalry, Irregular.	Native Infantry.	Native Infantry, Irregular.	Golundaz.	Gun Lascars.	TOTAL.		
Rangoon - - - -	-	-	807	-	-	29	29	-	-
" - - - -	-	-	828	-	-	55	55	110	-
" - - - -	-	-	502	-	-	-	-	-	-
" - - - -	-	-	818	-	-	96	96	-	-
" - - - -	-	-	770	-	-	-	-	-	-
" - - - -	-	-	812	-	-	-	-	-	-
" - - - -	-	-	270	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total, Rangoon - -	-	-	4,807	-	-	180	180	110	5,097
Moulmein - - - -	-	-	793	-	-	21	21	-	-
" - - - -	-	-	414	-	-	-	-	-	-
" - - - -	-	-	13	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total, Moulmein - -	-	-	1,220	-	-	21	21	-	1,241
Sittang - - - -	-	-	278	-	-	10	10	-	288
Burmah - - - -	-	-	-	-	82	16	98	-	98
Tonghoo - - - -	-	-	825	-	-	-	-	-	-
" - - - -	-	-	764	-	-	21	21	115	-
Total Tonghoo - -	-	-	1,589	-	-	21	21	115	1,725
Thayetmye - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	115	115
Padongmyo - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	109	109
Bassein - - - -	-	-	208	-	-	10	10	-	218
Thayghern - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	8	8	-	8
Henzadah - - - -	-	-	495	-	-	-	-	-	495
Menghee - - - -	-	-	162	-	-	-	-	-	162
Mergui - - - -	-	-	57	-	-	-	-	-	57
Tavoy - - - -	-	-	72	-	-	-	-	-	72
Beeling - - - -	-	-	73	-	-	-	-	-	73
Kyounkkee - - - -	-	-	91	-	-	-	-	-	91
Pegu - - - -	-	-	293	-	-	-	-	-	293
GRAND TOTAL in Burmah and Pegu - -	-	-	9,345	-	82	266	348	439	10,132
Penang - - - -	-	-	581	-	44	5	49	-	-
Malacca - - - -	-	-	214	-	28	6	34	-	-
Singapore - - - -	-	-	588	-	80	15	95	-	-
" - - - -	-	-	615	-	-	-	-	-	-
Labuan - - - -	-	-	115	-	25	14	39	-	-
Total in Straits - -	-	-	2,113	-	177	40	217	-	2,330
China - - - -	-	-	72	-	-	6	6	-	78
Hong Kong - - - -	-	-	326	-	-	17	17	-	343
China - - - -	-	-	167	-	-	-	-	-	167
Total in China - -	-	-	565	-	-	23	23	-	588
Persia - - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	122	122
GRAND TOTAL of Madras Troops - -	-	-	12,023	-	259	329	588	561	13,172

RETURN of Native Troops on Foreign Service, on 1 April 1857—*continued.*

	BOMBAY NATIVE TROOPS.								
	Native Cavalry.		Native Infantry.		Native Artillery.			Sappers.	GRAND TOTAL.
	Regular.	Irregular.	Regular.	Irregular.	Goludaz.	Gun Lascars.	TOTAL.		
Aden - - - -	-	-	830	-	-	-	122	94	1,046
Sind - - - -	-	-	1,683	-	-	-	232	-	1,915
Bushire - - - -	462	86	867	768	-	-	119	238	-
" - - - -	-	60	782	-	-	-	-	-	-
" - - - -	-	802	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
" - - - -	-	400	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total at Bushire - -	462	1,348	1,649	768	-	-	119	238	4,584
Mohumra - - - -	-	-	803	-	-	-	72	-	-
" - - - -	-	-	827	-	-	-	25	-	-
" - - - -	-	-	918	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total at Mohumra - -	-	-	2,548	-	-	-	97	-	2,645
Persian Gulf - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	269	-	269
TOTAL in Persia -	462	1,348	4,197	768	-	-	485	238	7,498
TOTAL ABROAD - -	462	1,348	6,710	768	-	-	839	332	10,459
Add— Madras Native Troops -	-	-	12,023	-	259	829	588	561	13,172
	462	1,348	18,733	768	259	829	1,427	893	23,631
	1,810		19,501						

Appendix, No. 19.

PAPER handed in by Major General *Balfour*, C.B., Royal Artillery, 26 July 1867.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT OF THE INFANTRY OF THE LINE.

RANK AND FILE.

DISTRIBUTION.	1. 1st January 1846.		2. 1st January 1847.		3. 1st January 1848.		4. 1st January 1849.		5. 1st January 1850.		6. 1st January 1851.	
	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.
In Great Britain - - - -	19,220	15,293	14,560	15,908	18,800	20,535	19,740	23,073	20,580	21,298	21,400	21,037
In Ireland - - - - -	22,540	17,544	24,010	21,819	24,250	23,048	21,640	25,767	19,420	19,636	18,580	18,225
Total in United Kingdom -	41,760	32,837	38,570	37,727	43,050	43,583	41,380	48,840	40,000	40,934	39,980	39,262
Depôts of Regiments serving:												
In Colonies and on Seas - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
In India - - - - -	120	1,620	120	1,620	95	1,100	110	1,078	120	1,150	120	1,348
In United Kingdom - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total in United Kingdom -	41,880	34,457	38,990	39,347	43,145	44,683	41,490	49,913	40,120	42,084	40,100	40,610
In Colonies, and at Sea -	20,000	28,364	28,130	28,465	27,740	27,890	28,820	29,243	26,680	28,870	26,320	27,281
GRAND TOTAL on British } Establishment - - - -	70,880	62,841	67,120	67,812	70,885	72,573	70,310	79,161	66,800	70,954	66,420	67,891
In India - - - - -	23,880	23,425	23,880	21,834	13,905	19,645	21,890	23,078	23,880	24,549	23,680	23,693
GRAND TOTAL at HOME } and ABROAD - - - -	94,760	86,266	91,000	89,646	89,790	92,218	92,200	102,239	90,680	95,503	90,300	91,584
GRAND TOTAL ABROAD -	52,880	51,809	52,010	50,299	46,645	47,535	50,710	52,321	50,560	53,419	50,300	50,974
GRAND TOTAL at HOME -	41,880	34,457	38,990	39,347	43,145	44,683	41,490	49,918	40,120	42,084	41,100	40,610
GRAND TOTAL at HOME } and ABROAD - - - -	94,760	86,266	91,000	89,646	89,790	92,218	92,200	102,239	90,680	95,503	90,300	91,584

DISTRIBUTION.	7. 1st January 1852.		8. 1st January 1853.		9. 1st January 1854.		10. 1st January 1865.		11. 1st January 1866.		12. 1st June 1866.	
	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.
In Great Britain - - - -	22,890	21,003	22,860	22,237	33,800	29,144	17,780	17,283	18,150	17,141	17,260	17,241
In Ireland - - - - -	17,590	14,536	17,480	16,863	17,800	14,644	6,520	6,262	9,800	9,482	11,840	11,553
Total in United Kingdom -	40,480	35,539	40,340	39,100	51,600	43,788	24,300	23,545	27,950	26,623	29,200	28,794
Depôts of Regiments serving:												
In Colonies and on Seas - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,140	5,745	6,000	6,298	5,570	4,923
In India - - - - -	120	1,581	120	1,578	120	1,204	5,500	5,653	5,300	5,942	5,200	8,246
In United Kingdom - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,200	3,876	-	-	-	-
Total in Depôts - - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	15,840	15,274	11,300	12,240	10,770	13,168
Total in United Kingdom -	40,600	37,120	40,460	40,678	51,720	44,992	40,140	38,819	39,250	38,863	39,970	41,902
In Colonies, or at Sea - -	20,720	30,364	29,860	29,995	27,800	26,034	38,020	35,935	35,785	32,879	30,720	31,892
GRAND TOTAL on British } Establishments - - - -	70,320	67,484	70,320	70,693	79,520	71,026	78,160	74,754	75,035	72,742	70,690	73,854
In India - - - - -	23,880	23,440	23,880	23,046	23,880	22,080	46,750	45,891	45,050	43,061	41,080	39,350
GRAND TOTAL at HOME } and ABROAD - - - -	94,200	90,924	94,200	93,719	103,400	93,106	124,910	120,645	120,085	115,803	111,770	113,110
GRAND TOTAL ABROAD -	53,600	53,804	53,740	53,041	51,680	48,114	84,770	81,826	80,835	76,940	71,800	71,148
GRAND TOTAL at HOME -	40,600	37,120	40,460	40,678	51,720	44,992	40,140	38,519	39,250	38,863	39,970	41,932
GRAND TOTAL at HOME } and ABROAD - - - -	94,200	90,924	94,200	93,719	103,400	93,106	124,910	120,645	120,085	115,803	111,770	113,110

App. No. 19.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT of the Infantry of the Line—continued.

ALL RANKS OF INFANTRY OF THE LINE.

DISTRIBUTION.	1st January 1865.		1st January 1866.		1st June 1866.	
	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.
Infantry in Regiments:						
In Great Britain - - -	20,574	20,125	21,267	20,194	20,230	20,343
In Ireland - - - -	7,489	7,213	11,437	11,096	13,715	13,520
Total in United Kingdom -	28,063	27,338	32,704	31,290	33,945	33,863
Depôts of Regiments serving:						
In Colonies and on Seas - -	7,189	6,794	7,029	7,351	6,532	5,878
In India - - - -	6,648	6,814	6,407	7,053	6,285	9,473
In United Kingdom - -	4,934	4,593	—	—	—	—
Total in Depôts in United Kingdom - - - }	18,771	18,201	13,436	14,404	12,817	15,341
Total in United Kingdom -	46,834	45,539	46,140	45,694	46,762	49,214
In Colonies or at Sea - - -	43,488	41,203	41,201	39,083	35,685	36,811
GRAND TOTAL, on British Establishment - - }	90,322	86,742	87,341	84,777	82,447	86,025
In India - - - -	52,714	51,596	50,792	48,538	46,772	44,506
GRAND TOTAL at HOME and ABROAD - - }	143,036	138,338	138,133	133,315	129,219	130,531
GRAND TOTAL ABROAD -	96,202	92,799	91,993	87,621	82,457	81,317
GRAND TOTAL at HOME	46,834	45,539	46,140	45,694	46,762	49,214
GRAND TOTAL at HOME and ABROAD - - }	143,036	138,338	138,133	133,315	129,219	130,531
	Regiments.	Companies.	Regiments.	Companies.	Regiments.	Companies.
In United Kingdom - - -	35	350	37 ⁶ / ₁₀	438	42	436
Depôts in United Kingdom - -	-	282	-	206	-	198
In Colonies or at Sea - - -	51	510	50 ⁴ / ₁₀	504	47	470
In India - - - -	55	550	53	530	52	520
	141	1,692	141	1,678	141	1,624

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Appendix, No. 20.

PAPER handed in by Major General *Balfour*, C.B., Royal Artillery, 26 July 1867. App. No. 20.

GENERAL ENLISTMENT ORDERS.

(No. 1012.)

GENERAL ORDER by the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council.—Fort William, 25th July 1856.

EVERY recruit enlisting into a native regiment, is required to take an oath, that he "will never forsake or abandon his colours," and that he "will march wherever he is ordered, within or beyond the Company's territories."

It has been the practice of the Government to consider this oath, when not otherwise explained at the time of enlistment, as not in itself binding the soldier to proceed on service beyond the sea; and therefore whenever regiments have been raised for service beyond sea, no man has been drafted or enlisted into them, but with his own consent, and with a full and clear understanding of his engagement to serve beyond sea, when required to do so. From this practice the Government will not depart.

It is with a full and clear understanding of this engagement to serve beyond sea, when required to do so, that the native artillery, horse and foot, and six regiments of native infantry, the 25th, 40th, 47th, 65th, 67th and 68th, which are the only corps of the Bengal army available for general service, have been recruited.

The cheerful alacrity with which these regiments have at all times done their duty, whenever it has called them, and the distinction which they have won for themselves, are well known to the army, and will never be forgotten by the Government of India.

Neither does the Government forget how often, when it has needed the service of its troops in foreign countries, the native officers and soldiers of other regiments have come forward to form volunteer battalions, or to proceed as entire corps, to serve beyond sea.

The readiness with which they have done this, is honourable to themselves, and is thankfully acknowledged by the Government.

But it has become very inconvenient to Government, and it is hurtful to the State, that a small portion only of the native army of Bengal should be surely available for the service of the State beyond sea; and this inconvenience is not much diminished by the fact that the entire armies of Madras and Bombay are enlisted without any limitation of their place of service.

For this reason, the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council will not henceforward accept the services of any native recruit for a regiment of Light Cavalry, of Irregular Cavalry, of Infantry of the Line, or for the *Khelat-i-Ghilzie*, *Ferozepore*, and *Loodianah* Regiments, in the army of Bengal, who does not at the time of his enlistment distinctly undertake to serve beyond sea, whether within the territories of the company or beyond them.

His Excellency the Commander in Chief will be requested to take the necessary measures to ensure the due fulfilment of this determination of the Governor General in Council, by enjoining officers commanding the regiments above mentioned, to be strictly careful that, from and after the 1st September next, no recruit shall be enlisted, except for general service, and that each recruit, on taking the prescribed oath, shall be made clearly to understand the conditions on which he is enlisted.

By the Commander in Chief.

2. The following rules are to be entered in the Military Regulations in substitution of the present Articles 31 and 32 of Section 31, with effect from the 1st September 1856; and the Commander in Chief will hold all officers responsible for the strictest observance of the same.

31. All recruits for Cavalry, regular or irregular, or for the Infantry of the Line, or for the corps named in the margin, are to be enlisted for general service; and no man is to be entertained for any of the above named corps who does not distinctly undertake to serve beyond sea, whether within the territories of the Company, or beyond them.

Khelat-i-Ghilzie
Regiment.
Regiment of *Ferozepore*.
Regiment of *Loodianah*.

32. The liability to be sent on foreign service, and the peculiar obligations in this respect under which they voluntarily place themselves, is to be distinctly explained to all such recruits at the time of their being originally entertained, and also at the time of their being required to take the prescribed oath under the colours of their regiment, upon parade. The benefits and indulgences which are accorded by the Government to men who proceed on foreign service, as detailed in the Regulations, are also invariably to be fully made known to these recruits before they are sworn in.

Appendix, No. 21.

RETURN received from the ADMIRALTY.

RETURN of the Cost incurred in moving the following

No.	Regiment.	Embarked.		Disembarked.		Ship.	No. of Days on Voyage.	Numbers.				Freight or Passage Money.
								Officers.	Men.	Women.	Children.	
1	61st	India	June 1859	Mauritius	-	Not performed under the directions of the Admiralty						£. s. d.
		Mauritius	18 June 1860	England	18 Sept. 1860	Donald Mackay	93	26	659	29	35	15,744 - -
2	3rd (1st Batt.)	Calcutta	13 Oct. 1859	Hong Kong	11 Nov. 1859	Armenian, Steamer -	30	33	1,133	-	-	8,463 18 8
		"	15 Nov. "	"	18 Dec. "	Coromandel, I. N., Steamer.	34					
		"	15 " "	"	-	Tasmania, say -	40					
		"	11 Jan. 1860	"	13 Feb. 1860	Her Majesty's Ship Adventure.	34	31	1,117	-	-	17,102 14 8
		China	6 Dec. "	England	24 Apr. 1861	Miles Barton, wrecked 8 Feb. 1861. Sir Wm. Peel, Steamer	-					
		"	19 Nov. "	"	16 " "	Tasmania -	149					
		"	9 Dec. "	"	16 " "	Athlete -	129					
		"	8 Jan. 1861	"	4 " "	Mauritius, Steamer -	87					
3	1st (2nd Batt.)	Gibraltar	6 July 1858	China	25 Oct. 1858	Lord Raglan	112	32	805	50	84	12,331 10 -
		China	12 Dec. 1860	England	27 April 1861	Cressy	137	25	616	5	9	7,664 18 2
		"	18 Dec. "	"	19 " "	Macduff	123					
4	2nd (1st Batt.)	England	27 June 1851	Cape	4 Sept. 1851	Sumner	70	29	667	39	45	628 17 8
		"	24 June "	"	26 Aug. "	Her Majesty's Ship Birkenhead.	64					
		"	7 July "	"	29 " "	Her Majesty's Ship Cyclops.	54					
		Cape	- Mar. 1860	China	-	Information defective.		24	678	6	4	14,446 7 1
		China	15 Dec. "	England	16 May 1861	Alfred	153					
		Hong Kong, Peiho.	15 Nov. "	"	7 " "	Indomitable	174					
5	5th (1st Batt.)	England	24 July 1847	Mauritius	6 Nov. 1847	Her Majesty's Ship Resistance.	107	42	1,122	72	87	-
		"	8 Sept. "	"	18 Dec. "	Her Majesty's Ship Apollo.	102					
		Mauritius	23 May 1857	India via Singapore.	5 July 1857	Her Majesty's Ship Simoom.	44	20	699	26	42	-
		India	8 Mar. 1861	England	8 July 1861	Walmer Castle	122					
		"	12 Mar. "	"	30 " "	Cambodia	140	82	1,066	68	113	9,335 7 5
6	37th	England	18 Nov. 1846	Colombo	9 Mar. 1847	Minerva	112					
		"	17 Nov. "	"	10 " "	Castle Eden	114					
		"	-	Trincomalee	23 " "	Sibella	127					
		"	7 Nov. 1846	Colombo	30 " "	Romeo	144					
		"	7 " "	"	8 " "		122					
		Ceylon	3 Nov. 1857	Calcutta	18 Nov. 1857	Her Majesty's Ship Adventure.	16	2	76	3	6	-
The remainder of the regiment does not appear to have proceeded under orders from the Admiralty.												
		India	20 Mar. 1861	England	10 July 1861	Matilda Atheling	112	21	535	17	20	-
		"	7 " "	"	12 " "	Nimrod	127					
7	59th	England	11 June 1849	China	11 Feb. 1850	Her Majesty's Ship Apollo.	245	17	640	46	35	2,535 15 11
		"	22 " "	"	22 Oct. 1849	Hugh Walker	123					
		Hong Kong	19 Nov. 1858	Cape	18 Jan. 1859	Lord Raglan	61	28	612	62	94	4,130 3 6
		Cape	21 Oct. 1861	England	14 Dec. 1861	Indomitable	55					
		"	20 " "	"	16 " "	Boanerges	58					
8	60th (2nd Batt.)	England	15 July 1851	East London	3 Oct. 1851	Her Majesty's Ship Retribution.	81	25	651	41	47	-
		"	15 " "	"	3 " "	Her Majesty's Ship Sidon.	81					
		Cape	- April 1858	India	-	Information defective.						

Appendix, No. 21.

RETURN received from the ADMIRALTY.

REGIMENTS between ENGLAND, INDIA, and the COLONIES.

Coals for Steamers.	Other Expenses when not included in Freight.				TOTAL COST.	Abate Mess and Ration Stoppages.	Net Cost.		Share of Expense paid by India.
	Fittings.	Mess of Officers.	Provisions and Medical Comforts.	Bedding.			Amount.	Per Soldier.	
£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d. The whole.
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	15,744 - -	1,955 6 6	13,788 13 6	20 18 6	Nil.
1,064 4 6	- - -	518 7 -	915 16 2	566 10 -	11,528 16 4	1,222 3 -	10,306 13 4	9 1 11	Nil.
1,506 5 2	- - -	3,185 12 -	6,279 16 -	712 10 -	28,786 17 10	4,484 - 6	24,302 17 4	21 15 2	Nil.
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	12,331 10 -	2,881 4 -	9,450 6 -	11 14 9	Nil.
- - -	- - -	2,549 12 -	3,415 19 6	312 15 -	13,943 4 8	2,521 4 6	11,422 - 2	18 10 10	Nil.
2,749 18 1	39 2 6	450 - -	2,204 11 10	364 5 -	6,436 15 1	1,185 1 6	5,251 13 7	7 17 5	Nil.
- - -	- - -	3,122 8 -	4,981 15 11	343 - -	22,893 11 -	3,433 7 -	19,460 4 -	28 14 1	Nil.
- - -	- - -	877 16 -	6,024 12 11	618 15 -	7,521 3 11	3,101 1 3	4,420 2 8	3 18 9	Nil.
1,149 1 -	- - -	330 - -	1,565 11 7	373 - -	3,417 12 7	922 18 -	2,494 14 7	3 11 5	Mess and victu- alling.
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	15,055 3 -	not known	Exclusive of abatment for stoppages.	27 1 7	The whole.
- - -	482 2 10	1,664 - -	6,877 18 10	595 5 -	18,954 14 1	4,148 7 -	14,806 7 1	13 17 10	Nil.
93 - - -	- - -	12 - - -	62 8 5	24 12 -	192 - 5	36 - -	156 - 5	2 1 1	Mess and victu- alling.
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	14,661 6 -	not known	Exclusive of abatment for stoppages.	27 8 1	The whole.
- - -	- - -	539 - -	5,882 - 10	266 15 -	9,223 11 9	3,695 15 3	5,527 16 6	8 12 9	Nil.
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	8,555 15 -	1,261 3 6	7,294 11 6	11 6 2	Nil.
- - -	- - -	- - -	1,879 5 11	360 10 -	6,369 19 5	1,143 15 6	5,226 3 11	8 10 9	Nil.
4,652 4 7	- - -	405 - -	2,672 6 9	357 15 -	8,087 6 4	1,394 4 3	6,693 2 1	10 5 7	Nil.

No.	Regiment.	Embarked.		Disembarked.		Ship.	No. of Days on Voyage.	Numbers.				Freight or Passage Money.
								Officers.	Men.	Women.	Children.	
8	60th - - (2nd Batt.) —contd.	Calcutta -	29 Feb. 1860	China -	28 April 1860	Alfred - - -	60	32	904	-	-	£. s. d. 8,953 10 4
		" -	29 " "	" -	20 " "	Indomitable - - -	52					
		" -	29 " "	" -	28 " "	Hougomont - - -	60					
		China -	1 Nov. 1861	England -	25 Feb. 1862	Her Majesty's Ship Simoom.	117	25	861	-	-	3,773 8 9
		" -	27 Dec. "	" -	19 April "	Flying Cloud -	114					
9	85th - -	England -	27 Jan. 1853	Mauritius -	16 April 1853	Marion - - -	80	23	604	38	61	5,800 5 6
		" -	28 " "	" -	23 " "	Roman Emperor -	86					
		Mauritius -	18 May 1856	Cape -	7 June 1856	Her Majesty's Ship Penelope.	21	19	590	-	-	-
		Cape -	24 April 1863	England -	8 June 1863	Her Majesty's Ship Himalaya.	46	24	649	41	87	-
10	31st - -	Gibraltar -	27 May 1858	Cape -	4 July 1858	City of Manchester -	39	34	863	63	119	13,152 - -
		East London -	12 Oct. 1858	Bombay -	2 Dec. 1858	Her Majesty's Ship Simoom.	52	33	833	14	15	-
		Bombay -	15 Feb. 1860	China -	28 Mar. 1860	Earl of Clare - -	43	30	1,096	-	-	3,069 7 -
		" -	15 " "	" -	27 " "	Assaye, I. N., Steamer	42					
		" -	17 " "	" -	23 April "	Athletæ - - -	67					
		" -	16 " "	Singapore -	16 Mar. "	Victoria, I. N., Steamer	29					
		Singapore -	17 Mar. "	China -	16 April "	Athletæ - - -	31	27	646	-	-	13,788 - -
		Shanghai -	29 June 1863	England -	20 Nov. 1863	West Derby - -	145					
" -	11 July "	" -	30 " "	Caroline Coventry -	143							
11	13th - -	Gibraltar -	7 Aug. 1856	Cape -	19 Sept. 1856	Imperatriz, Steamer -	44	23	741	34	52	5,328 3 9
		Cape -	7 Nov. 1857	India -	19 Jan. 1858	Her Majesty's Ship Megæra.	74	9	252	-	-	-
The remainder of the regiment does not appear to have proceeded under orders from the Admiralty.												
12	70th - -	India -	- July 1861	New Zealand	Not performed under the directions of the Admiralty			-	-	-	-	-
		Auckland -	2 Jan. 1866	England -	28 Mar. 1866	Ida Ziegler - -	86	21	592	30	50	11,941 15 -
" -	5 " "	" -	7 April "	Siam - - -	93							
13	43rd - -	England -	10 Oct. 1851	Cape -	17 Dec. 1851	Her Majesty's Ship Vulcan.	69	25	652	40	65	-
		Cape -	- Dec. 1853	India -	Does not appear to have been performed under the directions of the Admiralty.			25	699	56	60	33,177 12 -
		India -	- Oct. 1863	New Zealand -	- - 1863	Lady Jocelyn, Steamer Light Brigade - -	-					
		New Zealand	16 April 1866	England -	4 July 1866	Silver Eagle - -	80	21	593	35	62	12,550 5 -
		" -	29 Mar. "	" -	7 " "	Maori - - -	101					
		14	40th - -	England -	13 July 1852	Australia -	5 Nov. 1852	Her Majesty's Ship Vulcan.	116	25	652	79
" -	29 Aug. "			" -	18 Dec. "	Isabella Blyth - -	113					
New Zealand	16 June 1866			England -	10 Sept. 1866	Holmesdale - -	87	24	539	52	105	14,549 17 -
" -	8 May "			" -	10 Aug. "	Mary Shepherd - -	95					
15	67th - -	Calcutta -	23 Sept. 1859	China -	26 Oct. 1859	Australian, Steamer Indomitable, say -	34	35	993	-	-	4,705 12 -
		" -	23 " "	" -	- - -	Her Majesty's Ship Adventure.	40					
		" -	7 Jan. 1860	" -	12 Feb. 1860		37					
		China -	1 Mar. 1865	Cape -	15 April 1865	Her Majesty's Ship Tamar.	46	27	792	25	27	-
		" -	26 July "	" -	13 Sept. "	- ditto - - -	49					
		Cape -	24 July 1866	England -	23 Sept. 1866	Far East, Steamer -	62	23	549	34	35	12,472 2 -
		" -	24 " "	" -	25 " "	White Adder - -	64					
16	57th - -	Malta -	12 May 1858	Alexandria -	18 May 1858	Her Majesty's Ship Princess Royal.	7	19	635	-	-	-
		The remainder of the service to India was not performed under the directions of the Admiralty.										
		Bombay -	- Nov. 1860	Auckland -	- - -	Star Queen - -	-	22	750	-	-	18,560 10 -
" -	" "	" -	- - -	Castilian - -	-							
		Auckland -	31 Mar. 1867	England -	- - -	Maori - - -	-	22	555	54	76	14,656 - -
		" -	12 April "	" -	- - -	Electric - - -	-					
						say	90					

Coals for Steamers.	Other Expenses when not included in Freight.				TOTAL COST.	Abate Mess and Ration Stoppages.	NET COST.		Share of Expense paid by India.
	Fittings.	Mess of Officers.	Provisions and Medical Comforts.	Bedding.			Amount.	Per Soldier.	
£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
- - -	- - -	1,472 - -	2,205 2 3	452 - -	13,082 12 7	1,666 8 -	11,416 4 7	12 12 7	Nil.
4,648 14 2	- - -	1,102 1 -	4,565 14 8	430 10 -	14,520 8 7	3,016 13 -	11,503 15 7	13 7 3	Nil.
- - -	263 3 8	966 - -	2,508 1 4	336 5 -	9,873 15 6	1,587 3 -	8,286 12 6	13 14 4	Nil.
1,035 6 -	- - -	79 16 -	627 9 3	295 - -	2,037 11 3	324 14 3	1,712 17 -	2 18 1	Nil.
3,139 11 3	- - -	414 - -	1,591 - 4	366 15 -	5,511 6 7	939 11 -	4,571 15 7	7 - 11	Nil.
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	13,152 - -	1,073 9 6	12,078 10 6	13 19 11	Nil.
1,063 7 -	- - -	643 10 -	2,112 8 9	427 5 -	4,246 10 9	1,383 4 -	2,863 6 9	3 8 9	Mess and victu- alling.
4,358 9 2	- - -	1,295 4 -	2,479 6 2	548 - -	11,750 6 4	1,783 13 -	9,966 13 4	9 1 10	Nil.
- - -	- - -	- - -	4,546 19 5	323 - -	18,657 19 5	3,005 - 6	15,652 18 11	24 4 7	Nil.
1,116 - 10	- - -	506 - -	1,700 11 3	400 10 -	9,051 5 10	992 4 -	8,059 1 10	10 17 6	Nil.
1,046 11 2	- - -	249 15 -	905 4 1	126 - -	2,327 10 3	582 15 -	1,744 15 3	6 18 6	Mess and victu- alling.
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	The whole.
- - -	- - -	- - -	164 - 8	323 10 -	12,429 5 8	1,651 6 6	10,777 19 2	18 4 1	Nil.
849 1 3	- - -	345 - -	2,326 9 -	362 5 -	3,882 15 3	1,189 7 9	2,693 7 6	4 2 7	Nil.
- - -	- - -	- - -	335 18 8	532 15 -	34,046 5 8	not known	Exclusive of abatment for stoppages.	48 14 2	23,512 6 4
- - -	- - -	- - -	164 6 2	329 10 -	13,044 1 2	1,617 - 6	11,427 - 8	19 5 5	Nil.
1,108 15 -	54 14 5	1,137 10 -	4,031 12 -	387 5 -	8,256 2 11	2,388 6 6	5,867 16 5	9 - -	Nil.
- - -	- - -	- - -	149 6 11	321 15 -	15,020 18 11	1,619 18 6	13,401 - 5	24 17 3	Nil.
1,972 2 1	- - -	516 16 -	805 19 1	496 10 -	8,496 19 2	1,191 - 6	7,305 18 8	7 7 2	Nil.
5,006 4 5	- - -	486 - -	1,853 14 4	415 5 -	7,761 3 9	1,184 2 -	6,577 1 9	8 6 1	Nil.
- - -	287 18 11	719 - -	2,410 1 11	300 5 -	16,189 7 10	1,113 19 -	15,075 8 10	27 9 2	Nil.
275 13 -	- - -	79 16 -	217 9 1	- - -	572 18 1	134 8 -	438 10 1	- 13 10	Mess and victu- alling.
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	18,560 10 -	not known	Exclusive of abatment for stoppages.	24 14 11	The whole.
- - -	- - -	- - -	153 15 7	323 10 -	15,133 5 7	1,595 5 -	13,538 - 7	24 7 10	Nil.

No.	Regiment.	Embarked.		Disembarked.		Ship.	No. of Days on Voyage.	Numbers.				Freight or Passage Money.		
								Officers.	Men.	Women.	Children.			
17	77th -	England	15 June 1857	Sydney	30 Sept. 1857	Palmerston	108	36	728	89	88	£. s. d. 8,737 1 -		
		"	17 " "	"	30 " "	Orwell	106							
		Sydney	28 April 1858	Calcutta	15 June 1858	Raby Castle	49	35	567	88	106	1,900 5 -		
"	20 " "	"	14 " "	Her Majesty's Ship Megera.	56									
18	50th -	England	30 June 1857	Colombo	19 Oct. 1857	Medina	112	33	713	45	49	10,789 11 1		
		"	2 July "	"	11 " "	Captain Cook	102							
		Colombo	9 Oct. 1863	Auckland	15 Nov. 1863	Her Majesty's Ship Himalaya.	38	37	785	51	76	2,502 13 4		
		Auckland	3 Oct. 1866	Sydney - Brisbane	9 Oct. 1866	Auckland, Steamer	7							
		"	26 Sept. "	"	15 " "	Alice Cameron	20	17	437	34	44			
		Australia	-	England	-	Estimated	-							
New Zealand	-	"	-	-	-	Head Quarter and one wing		400		Say 700 men, with officers and families				
						One wing		300						
19	5th - (2nd Batt.)	England	11 Aug. 1858	Mauritius	8 Nov. 1858	Great Tasmania	90	30	787	57	65	9,365 1 1		
		Mauritius	16 April 1863	Cape	27 April 1863	Her Majesty's Ship Himalaya.	12	25	791	25	42	-		
20	99th -	Calcutta	11 Jan. 1860	China	12 Feb. 1860	Her Majesty's Ship Adventure.	33	say	1,030	-	-	7,028 16 -		
		"	3 Feb. "	"	-	Octavia	-							
		"	3 " "	"	-	Walmer Castle	-							
		"	4 " "	"	-	Mars	-	40	28	801	36	32		
		Hong Kong	1 Mar. 1865	Cape	13 April 1865	Her Majesty's Ship Tamar.	44							
		"	26 July "	"	12 Sept. "	- ditto -	49							
		Cape	-	England	-	Estimated	-	Say 700 men, with officers and families						
21	9th - (2nd Batt.)	Gibraltar	3 Nov. 1864	China	8 Feb. 1865	Her Majesty's Ship Tamar.	98	33	840	48	85	-		
		China	20 Mar. 1866	Japan	30 Mar. 1866	Her Majesty's Ship Adventure.	11	28	626	12	9	-		
		"	28 April "	"	9 May "	- ditto -	12							
22	11th - (2nd Batt.)	England	6 July 1861	Cape	8 Sept. 1861	Boanerges	65	34	877	67	77	5,418 3 7		
		"	16 " "	"	19 " "	Indomitable	66							
		"	6 " "	"	30 Aug. "	Conflict	56							
		Cape	10 April 1865	China	31 May 1865	Her Majesty's Ship Tamar.	52	27	708	55	90	-		
		China	19 May 1866	Algoa Bay	17 July 1866	White Adder	60							
		"	29 " "	"	16 " "	Far East, Steamer	49							
		Cape	-	England	-	Estimated	-	Say 450 men with officers and families						
23	20th - (2nd Batt.)	England	20 July 1863	India	-	St. Lawrence	-	say	35	820	86	98	12,930 10 8	
		"	24 " "	"	-	Conflict	-							
		"	25 " "	"	-	Blenheim	-							
		Calcutta	21 Nov. 1863	China	9 Dec. 1863	Nubia, Steamer	19	36	820	84	95	25,368 5 3		
		"	28 Jan. 1864	"	26 Mar. 1864	Holmsdale	58							
		China	28 June 1864	Japan	15 July 1864	Queen of England	18	27	611	-	-	4,730 12 10		
		"	28 " "	"	14 " "	Chanticleer	17							
		Japan	17 May 1866	China	27 May 1866	Her Majesty's Ship Adventure.	11	30	663	27	34	-		
		"	11 April "	"	19 April "	- ditto -	9							
		China	-	England	-	Estimated	-	Say 600 men, with officers and families						

Note.—The information inserted has been obtained, as far as possible, from the accounts of the actual expenses, and is exclusive of the cost of conveyance. In the cases in which the ships were employed on continuous service, or in conveying other troops at the same time as those specified, the expense Majesty's ships and transports on monthly pay, it not being practicable to estimate the sum apportionable to each particular service during the

Admiralty, }
25 July 1867. }

Coals for Steamers.	Other Expenses when not included in Freight.				TOTAL COST.	Abate Mess and Ration Stoppages.	NET COST.		Share of Expense paid by India.
	Fittings.	Mess of Officers.	Provisions and Medical Comforts.	Bedding.			Amount.	Per Soldier.	
£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
- - -	- - -	1,923 - -	4,271 14 7	430 10 -	15,362 5 7	2,617 13 -	12,744 12 7	17 10 1	Nil.
1,795 14 5	- - -	719 5 -	1,856 13 2	255 - -	6,526 17 7	1,119 11 6	5,407 6 1	9 10 9	The whole cost of Raby Castle and mess, and vic- tualling of Her Majesty's Ship Megera.
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	10,789 11 1	2,531 14 -	8,257 17 1	11 14 5	
3,939 6 -	- - -	527 5 -	1,553 13 5	437 - -	6,457 4 5	991 16 -	5,465 8 5	6 19 3	Nil.
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	2,502 13 4	135 - -	2,367 13 4	5 8 4	Nil.
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	{ In Her Majesty's Ships - - -		5,964 11 8	8 10 5	Nil.
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	{ or In hired Ships - - -		15,863 15 -	22 13 3	
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	9,365 1 1	2,243 5 -	7,121 16 1	9 1 -	Nil.
611 13 8	- - -	112 10 -	465 5 7	418 10 -	1,607 19 3	289 16 -	1,318 3 3	1 13 4	Nil.
485 5 2	- - -	950 12 6	1,706 3 9	515 - -	10,685 17 5	1,261 1 -	9,424 16 5	9 3 -	Nil.
3,028 12 8	- - -	465 15 -	1,763 4 2	426 10 -	5,684 1 10	1,109 1 6	4,575 - 4	5 14 3	Nil.
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	{ In Her Majesty's Ships - - -		5,652 10 -	8 1 6	Nil.
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	{ or In hired Ships - - -		5,976 5 -	8 10 9	
5,720 4 7	- - -	1,212 15 -	4,229 10 7	465 5 -	11,627 15 2	2,623 19 -	9,003 16 2	10 14 4	Nil.
1,731 - -	- - -	122 5 -	474 5 4	192 15 -	2,520 5 4	237 14 -	2,282 11 4	3 12 11	Nil.
- - -	- - -	- - -	2,922 7 9	491 5 -	8,831 16 4	1,812 5 6	7,019 10 10	8 - 1	Nil.
3,425 2 -	- - -	526 10 -	1,984 10 1	404 - -	6,340 2 1	1,166 2 -	5,174 - 1	7 6 2	Nil.
- - -	204 19 4	703 - -	1,789 7 6	253 10 -	11,936 5 8	878 3 6	11,058 2 2	24 1 10	Nil.
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	{ In Her Majesty's Ships - - -		3,633 15 5	8 1 6	Nil.
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	{ or In hired Ships - - -		3,841 17 6	8 10 9	
- - -	- - -	- - -	115 9 11	366 1 -	13,412 1 7	2,553 - -	10,859 1 7	13 4 10	Nil.
- - -	- - -	475 4 -	2,531 2 11	204 17 11	28,579 10 1	713 19 6	27,865 10 7	33 19 8	Nil.
- - -	322 18 4	383 16 -	489 17 6	183 6 -	6,110 10 8	353 12 -	5,756 18 8	9 8 5	Nil.
1,301 8 10	- - -	115 10 -	459 18 9	212 2 -	2,088 19 7	221 16 6	1,867 3 1	2 16 4	Nil.
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	{ In Her Majesty's Ships - - -		11,797 10 -	19 13 3	Nil.
- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	{ or In hired Ships - - -		17,460 - -	29 2 -	

of small detachments, and the passage of officers proceeding to join the corps after the arrival of the regiments at the respective stations. has been apportioned to the services with regard to the numbers conveyed and the periods of the voyages; but no charge has been inserted for fitting Her employment of the ship.

JOHN HENRY BRIGGS,
Chief Clerk.

I N D E X

TO THE

R E P O R T

FROM THE

S E L E C T C O M M I T T E E

ON

ARMY (INDIA AND THE COLONIES).

*Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,
26 July 1867.*

ANALYSIS OF INDEX.

ALPHABETICAL and CLASSIFIED LIST of the PRINCIPAL HEADINGS in the following INDEX, with the Paging at which they will be respectively found.

	PAGE		PAGE
<i>Artillery</i> - - - - -	1	<i>Cape of Good Hope</i> - - - - -	10
<i>Bengal Native Army</i> - - - - -	6	<i>Mutiny</i> - - - - -	37
<i>Burmah</i> - - - - -	9	<i>Caste (Native Troops)</i> - - - - -	11
<i>Caste</i> - - - - -	11	<i>Hindoos</i> - - - - -	28
<i>China</i> - - - - -	13	<i>Sikhs</i> - - - - -	47
<i>Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops)</i> -	17	<i>Ceylon</i> - - - - -	12
<i>Furloughs</i> - - - - -	25	<i>Mutiny</i> - - - - -	37
<i>Hindoos</i> - - - - -	28	<i>Ceylon Rifle Corps</i> - - - - -	13
<i>Mauritius</i> - - - - -	34	<i>CHINA:</i>	
<i>Mutiny</i> - - - - -	37	1. <i>Feeling of Native Indian Troops as to</i>	
<i>Officers (Native Troops)</i> - - - - -	41	<i>Service in China; satisfactory results of</i>	
<i>Straits Settlements</i> - - - - -	49	<i>their occasional employment there</i> - - -	13
<i>Bombay Native Army</i> - - - - -	6	2. <i>Question considered as to expediency of per-</i>	
<i>Aden</i> - - - - -	1	<i>manent Garrisons of Native Troops in</i>	
<i>Caste</i> - - - - -	11	<i>Hong Kong, &c., in partial or total substi-</i>	
<i>China</i> - - - - -	13	<i>tution for British Troops</i> - - -	13
<i>Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops)</i> -	17	3. <i>Expense of Indian Troops and of British</i>	
<i>Families (Native Troops)</i> - - - - -	24	<i>Troops respectively</i> - - - - -	14
<i>Mauritius</i> - - - - -	34	4. <i>Cost of Transport</i> - - - - -	14
<i>Officers (Native Army)</i> - - - - -	41	5. <i>Sickness and Mortality</i> - - - - -	14
<i>Straits Settlements</i> - - - - -	49	6. <i>Barrack Accommodation</i> - - - - -	14
<i>British Army (Colonies)</i> - - - - -	7	7. <i>Means of rendering service in China more</i>	
<i>Cape of Good Hope</i> - - - - -	10	<i>satisfactory to British Troops</i> - - -	14
<i>Ceylon</i> - - - - -	12	8. <i>Use made of the Resources of India for</i>	
<i>China</i> - - - - -	13	<i>Operations in China</i> - - - - -	14
<i>Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops)</i> -	17	9. <i>Effect created in China by the diversion of</i>	
<i>Cost</i> - - - - -	21	<i>Troops thence to India at the time of the</i>	
<i>Duties of Troops</i> - - - - -	23	<i>Mutiny</i> - - - - -	14
<i>Malta and Gibraltar</i> - - - - -	33	10. <i>Strength of the Garrison of Hong Kong</i>	14
<i>Mauritius</i> - - - - -	34	<i>Ceylon Rifle Corps</i> - - - - -	13
<i>Mutiny</i> - - - - -	37	<i>Transport of Troops</i> - - - - -	52
<i>Straits Settlements</i> - - - - -	49	<i>Chinese Troops (India, &c.)</i> - - - - -	14
<i>War</i> - - - - -	53	<i>Colonial Contributions</i> - - - - -	16
<i>West Indies</i> - - - - -	54	<i>Australia</i> - - - - -	2
<i>BRITISH ARMY (INDIA):</i>		<i>Cape of Good Hope</i> - - - - -	10
1. <i>Present European Force in India</i> - - -	7	<i>Ceylon</i> - - - - -	12
2. <i>Evidence in favour of a Reduction of the</i>		<i>Demerara</i> - - - - -	22
<i>Force</i> - - - - -	8	<i>Mauritius, 3</i> - - - - -	34
3. <i>Evidence opposed to any Reduction</i> - - -	8	<i>COLONIAL AND FOREIGN SERVICE (NATIVE TROOPS):</i>	
4. <i>Views of Lord Dalhousie in 1854 and 1856</i>	8	1. <i>Legal Liability of the Native Troops to</i>	
5. <i>Views of the Governor General and Com-</i>		<i>employment out of India</i> - - - - -	17
<i>mander-in-Chief in strong disapproval of</i>		2. <i>Evidence favourable to the Foreign and</i>	
<i>any Reduction</i> - - - - -	8	<i>Colonial Service of Indian Troops under</i>	
6. <i>Explanations and Suggestions as to the Dis-</i>		<i>certain conditions</i> - - - - -	17
<i>tribution of the Troops</i> - - - - -	8	3. <i>Evidence opposed to Native Garrisons ex-</i>	
7. <i>Question of Withdrawal of Troops in the</i>		<i>clusively, though Mixed Garrisons are not</i>	
<i>event of a War in Europe</i> - - - - -	9	<i>objected to</i> - - - - -	18
<i>Artillery</i> - - - - -	1	4. <i>Feeling of the Natives upon the subject of</i>	
<i>Cavalry</i> - - - - -	11	<i>Foreign Service and Garrison duties</i> -	18
<i>Cost</i> - - - - -	21		
<i>Duties of Troops</i> - - - - -	23		
<i>Forts and Arsenals</i> - - - - -	25		
<i>Havelock, Sir Henry (the late)</i> - - - - -	28		
<i>Local European Army</i> - - - - -	30		
<i>Russia</i> - - - - -	47		

COLONIAL AND FOREIGN SERVICE, &c.—continued.		PAGE
5. Question of Raising Special Corps for Service out of India	- - - - -	19
6. Question of calling for Volunteers for Foreign Service, or of holding the entire Native Army liable	- - - - -	19
7. Great care necessary in the Application of a New System	- - - - -	19
8. Expediency of any New Arrangements being put in force in time of Peace	- - - - -	19
9. Considerations as to the Pay and Allowances of Native Troops on Colonial or Foreign Service	- - - - -	19
10. Limit necessary as to the Number of Regiments to be sent out of India	- - - - -	20
11. Larger number of Indian Troops than of British Troops required in any Colony	- - - - -	20
12. Number of Native Troops employed out of India at the time of the Mutiny	- - - - -	20
13. Views of the Governor General of India, the Commander in Chief, and other high authorities, upon the question of Native Garrisons in the Colonies	- - - - -	20
Aden	- - - - -	1
Arracan	- - - - -	1
Artillery	- - - - -	1
Bengal Native Army	- - - - -	6
Bombay Native Army	- - - - -	6
Burmah	- - - - -	9
Cape of Good Hope	- - - - -	10
Caste	- - - - -	11
Ceylon	- - - - -	12
China	- - - - -	13
Colonial Contributions	- - - - -	16
Cookie Emigration	- - - - -	20
Cost	- - - - -	21
Discipline	- - - - -	22
Duties of Troops	- - - - -	23
East Indians	- - - - -	23
Egypt	- - - - -	23
Families (Native Troops)	- - - - -	24
Hardinge, Lord (the late)	- - - - -	28
Health of Troops	- - - - -	28
Japan	- - - - -	29
Java	- - - - -	29
Madras Native Army	- - - - -	32
Mahomedans	- - - - -	33
Malta and Gibraltar	- - - - -	33
Mauritius	- - - - -	34
Pay and Allowances	- - - - -	42
Punjab and Punjab Regiments	- - - - -	44
Sikhs	- - - - -	47
Straits Settlements	- - - - -	49
Transport of Troops	- - - - -	52
War	- - - - -	53
Wellington, Duke of (the late)	- - - - -	53
West Indies, &c.	- - - - -	54

COST (BRITISH AND NATIVE TROOPS):

1. As to the relative cost of European and Native Troops in the Colonies	- - - - -	21
2. As to the cost of European and Native Troops in India	- - - - -	21
Cavalry	- - - - -	11
Hospital Expenses	- - - - -	28
Pay and Allowances	- - - - -	42
Transport of Troops	- - - - -	52

DISTRIBUTION (BRITISH ARMY):

1. In India	- - - - -	22
2. Generally	- - - - -	22

Local European Army	- - - - -	30
Madras Native Army	- - - - -	32
Arracan	- - - - -	1
Burmah	- - - - -	9
Ceylon	- - - - -	12
China	- - - - -	13
Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops)	- - - - -	17
Families (Native Troops)	- - - - -	24
Mauritius	- - - - -	34
Officers (Native Troops)	- - - - -	41
Straits Settlements	- - - - -	49
Malta and Gibraltar	- - - - -	33

MAURITIUS:

1. Conflicting evidence upon the question of substituting Native Indian Troops for European Troops	- - - - -	35
2. Amount and character of the local Population	- - - - -	35
3. Military Contribution by the Colony	- - - - -	35
4. Question of Difficulties arising in connection with the employment of Native Indian Troops	- - - - -	36
5. Question of employing Black Troops or Native Troops from South Africa	- - - - -	36
6. Returns of the Strength of the European Garrison, and of the allowances in force	- - - - -	36

Mutiny	- - - - -	37
China	- - - - -	13
Dalhousie, Lord	- - - - -	22
Native Army, India	- - - - -	38
Artillery	- - - - -	1
Bengal Native Army	- - - - -	6
Bombay Native Army	- - - - -	6
Caste	- - - - -	11
China	- - - - -	13
Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops)	- - - - -	17
Cost	- - - - -	21
Duties of Troops	- - - - -	23
Furloughs	- - - - -	25
Madras Native Army	- - - - -	32
Mauritius	- - - - -	34
Mutiny	- - - - -	37
Officers (Native Troops)	- - - - -	41
Pay and Allowances	- - - - -	42
Punjab and Punjab Regiments	- - - - -	44
Recruiting	- - - - -	44
Sikhs	- - - - -	47
Taxation	- - - - -	50

Officers (Native Troops)	- - - - -	41
Pay and Allowances (Native Troops)	- - - - -	42
Cost	- - - - -	21
Officers (Pay and Allowances)	- - - - -	41
Pensions	- - - - -	43
Rations	- - - - -	44
Punjab and Punjab Troops	- - - - -	44

REDUCTION OF ARMY:

I. India	- - - - -	45
1. British Army	- - - - -	45
2. Native Army	- - - - -	46
II. Generally	- - - - -	46
Havelock, Sir Henry (the late)	- - - - -	28
Insurrection (India)	- - - - -	28
Punjab, &c.	- - - - -	44
Railways	- - - - -	44
Russia	- - - - -	47

	PAGE		PAGE
<i>Reliefs (Native Troops on Foreign Service)</i>	- - 46	<i>WEST INDIES AND WEST INDIA REGIMENTS:</i>	
<i>Sikhs</i>	- - 47	1. <i>As to European and Native Indian Garri-</i>	
<i>China</i>	- - 13	<i>souls respectively</i>	- - 54
<i>Colonial and Foreign Service</i>	- - 17	2. <i>Local Volunteers and Militia</i>	- - 54
<i>Punjaub</i>	- - 44	3. <i>As to the West India Regiments</i>	- - 54
<i>Straits Settlements</i>	- - 49	<i>Barbadoes</i>	- - 5
<i>Ceylon Rifle Corps</i>	- - 12	<i>Demerara</i>	- - 22
<i>Term of Service</i>	- - 52	<i>Hincks, Governor</i>	- - 28
<i>Transport of Troops</i>	- - 52	<i>Honduras</i>	- - 28
<i>Relief (Native Troops)</i>	- - 46	<i>Jamaica Insurrection</i>	- - 28
<i>War</i>	- - 53		

INDEX.

[N.B.—In this Index the Figures following the Names of the Witnesses refer to the Questions in the Evidence ; and those following *App.* to the Pages in the Appendix.]

A.

ADAMS, Lieutenant Colonel H. A. Answers received from Lieutenant Colonel Adams commanding the 13th Regiment, Bombay Native Army, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of Native Indian troops in different British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 249, 250.

Aden. In the Bombay Army service at Aden is treated as foreign service, *Pears* 768—Relative number of British and Native troops composing the garrison of Aden : great importance of this post, *Johnson* 1639-1646. 1649. 1659, 1660—Statement as to service at Aden being greatly disliked by the Native troops, *ib.* 1649-1657—Approval of the employment of European troops at Aden, the place being exceedingly healthy, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1857-1859—Approval also of Native troops taking their turn of duty at Aden, *ib.* 1971. 1973.

Administrative Establishments (Indian Army). Comparative statement of the cost of military administrative establishments maintained in the three Indian presidencies, and in Ceylon, *App.* 318.

Affghans. Explanation with reference to the number of Affghans in the Indian Army, *Norman* 222-224 ; and *App.* 260.

African Troops. See *West India Regiments.*

Algerian Troops. Satisfactory service in France of the Native Algerian troops, from whom all traces of caste have almost disappeared, *Lord Strathnairn* 3381.

Allahabad. Importance of European troops at Allahabad, *Norman* 229.

Andaman Islands. Explanation relative to the force at the penal establishment in the Andaman Islands, *Norman* 453-456—Mixed garrison of Madras troops and of Europeans at the penal settlements, *Pears* 771-773.

Arracan. Temporary difficulty in sending Madras troops to Arracan in 1824 and 1825, *Sir W. Elliott* 619. See also *Straits Settlements.*

Artillery. Limited force of Native Artillery employed in India ; objection to any additional force, *Norman* 259-261—Non-objection to Native troops as garrison artillery in Malta or Gibraltar, *ib.* 260—Greater objection to having only Native troops with European field Artillery than with garrison Artillery, *ib.* 262-264—Explanation as to the course pursued in having European Infantry in support of European Artillery, except at Singapore, *ib.* 404, 405—Efficiency of natives as garrison Artillery or field Artillery, *ib.* 475-477.

Disapproval of a Native force of Artillery in India, though the Sikhs are excellent artillerymen, *Probyn* 941-943—Concurrence of objections to any Native troops as artillerymen, *Baker* 1059 ; *Johnson* 1629-1631 ; *Mangles* 3084, 3085—Expediency of some European troops in support of European Artillery at any colony, and of Native troops not being kept in fortified positions, *Baker* 1060-1071—Expediency of the Artillery in colonies being always European, *Keyes* 1162, 1163 ; *Johnson* 1629-1631.

Concurrence of opinions as to the inexpediency and danger of leaving European Artillery in any colony, supported only by foreign troops, *Sir Hope Grant* 1431-1436 ; *Johnson* 1529. 1589-1604. 1626-1628 ; *Duke of Cambridge* 2967, 2968. 2981, 2982 ; *Lord Strathnairn* 3394. 3405—Non-objection to garrison Artillery being unsupported by British troops, though it is highly desirable that field Artillery should be so supported, *Mackenzie* 2100-2103.

Contemplated employment of 10,000 Artillery in India, as not excessive, the present force being between 10,000 and 12,000, *Balfour* 3579-3582—Opinion as to the efficiency
478—I. A

Artillery—continued.

efficiency and fidelity of Natives as artillerymen, *Balfour* 3579. 3581—Grounds for concluding that colonies may be garrisoned with perfect safety by Native regiments and European Artillery; dissent hereon from the opinion of Lord Strathnairn, as to the importance of some European troops in addition to Artillery, *ib.* 3629-3635.

Return, dated 28th March 1867, showing the number of Artillery in the several colonies and dependencies, *App.* 282, 283.

Details of the establishment and cost of the Royal Artillery in Madras for 1865-66, *App.* 312.

Australia. Importance of a small European force in Australia as a nucleus for a local force, *Sir Hope Grant* 1455-1459—Decided objection of the colonists to a withdrawal of the European troops, and to their being replaced by Indian Native troops, *ib.* 1457.

Arrangement by which the military contribution by the Australian Colonies is placed at 40 l. a head for each European soldier, *Taylor* 2511-2516.

Return, dated 28th March 1867, of the number of troops borne on the strength of the Imperial Army, and stationed in the Australian Colonies, *App.* 282.

B.

Baker, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Moffat. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Commanded one of the general service corps in the Bengal Army, 1015, 1016—Statement as to this corps and some other regiments of Bengal Infantry having served in the China war without any difficulties having been experienced, 1017 *et seq.*—Absence of difficulty as regards the supply of water, and the cooking, on board ship; practice of providing dry rations for Hindoos on board on account of their objection to cook at sea, 1022-1024, 1040-1045.

Suggestions as to the increased pay and other privileges necessary in order to induce Native troops to go willingly on foreign service, 1029-1037. 1050-1058—Importance of the men going abroad with their own officers, 1029. 1037, 1038—Much greater cheapness of Native troops in China than of Europeans, 1039—Objection to any Native troops as artillerymen, 1059—Expediency of some European troops in support of European Artillery at any colony, and of Native troops not being kept in fortified positions, 1060-1071.

Explanation as to the general service corps in the Bengal Army having been formed expressly with a view to their serving abroad; practice of late years to enlist for the army generally with a view to foreign service if required, 1072-1077. 1098-1102—Difficulty as regards the supply of food for Native troops in Mediterranean garrisons; obstacle also on account of the separation from their families, 1080-1082. 1090-1093—Very good conduct of the Native troops on field duty and on garrison duty in China; satisfaction of the natives with the service, 1083-1089.

Balfour, Major General George. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Explains the various opportunities he has had of obtaining information connected with the foreign service of native Indian troops, 3454-3456—Has an exceedingly favourable opinion of the fitness and efficiency of Native troops for foreign service, provided certain conditions are fulfilled, 3457—Great importance of the European officers with Sepoy regiments being sufficiently numerous to look after the discipline and well-being of the men in a proper manner, 3458-3462—Importance also of Native troops on foreign service not being overburdened with duties, 3463, 3464. 3503.

Statement in favour of many of the duties now performed by soldiers in India being placed under the police; important economy thereby, whilst there would be much advantage on the score of discipline, 3465-3468—Unduly heavy duties now imposed upon the Native soldiers, 3467—Importance of abstaining from any interference with the pay and allowances to which Native troops consider themselves entitled when on foreign service, 3469, 3470—Expediency also of a proper limit upon the number of regiments sent on foreign service, 3471, 3472.

Calculation that, taking everything into consideration, the cost of one European soldier will be equal to that of two natives on foreign service, 3473, 3474—Statement in connection with the much less cost of transport of Native troops than of Europeans, 3475-3481—Great saving of hospital expenses by the employment of Native soldiers, as compared with Europeans, 3482, 3483.

Very satisfactory results of the employment of Native troops at Singapore, Penang, and Malacca since the year 1826; instance in 1842 of their bravery in action against the Malays, 3484-3494—Instance in 1839 of the efficiency of Sepoy troops against the

Balfour, Major General George. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

the Native forces of the Nabob of Canool, 3495-3499—Great usefulness of Native Indian troops in the operations which led to the treaty of Nankin, 3500.

Difficulty as regards Madras troops going on foreign service on account of the embarkation, rather than the distance, 3501—Expediency of a positive regulation respecting the police duties of Native troops serving abroad, 3503—Expected objection by the colonists to the substitution of Native troops for British troops, 3504. 3636—Unduly large contribution by the colonists in Mauritius towards the garrison there, the number of troops in proportion to the population and the size of the island being excessive, 3504-3516—Calculation that the cost of the troops in the Mauritius is about 100 l. per man, the colony paying altogether 45,000 l.; 3508-3513.

Argument that it is most essential to lay down a limit beyond which the military expenditure or taxation of India should not go, and to leave it to the military departments to secure all possible efficiency with reference to such limit, 3516. 3548, 3549. 3573-3593-3595. 3620—Soundness of the policy pursued by Mr. Laing, when in India, as regards military expenditure, 3516. 3545-3549. 3595. 3620—Facility with which a case might be made out for the full employment of a large increase of troops both in India and the colonies; that is, by an increase of civil and police duties, 3517-3520.

Statement relative to the very inadequate force at home, and the insufficiency of the depôts, with reference to the force in India and the colonies, 3520-3541. 3598-3600—Much more satisfactory distribution of the army in 1854 than in 1866, on account of the much larger relative force then retained at home, 3520, 3521. 3625—Reference to the views of the Duke of Cambridge as to the great difficulty experienced in regard to reliefs for the regiments in India, 3541. 3599—Grounds for the conclusion that it is very important to have fewer battalions in India, with a larger proportion of rank and file, 3541-3547—Great and unnecessary expense in maintaining establishments of officers out of proportion to the rank and file, 3542.

Opinion that the British army now in India is greater than there is any military necessity for; grounds for this conclusion considered, 3548 *et seq.*—Disaffection and danger likely to arise from the imposition of new taxes necessary for the support of the present large force, 3549-3551. 3593-3596. 3713-3720—Importance attached to a certain minute by Lord Dalhousie in 1854, in which he arrives at the conclusion that thirty-five regiments of European Infantry were quite sufficient for the garrison of India; adoption by witness of this minute in all its integrity, 3552-3558. 3641.

Statement as to the total effective force of non-commissioned officers, rank and file, on 1st May 1857, having been only 37,991; ample means at home to have supplied India with the full establishment, 3559-3573—Suggestion that the British force in India might consist of 35,000 Infantry, 3,000 Cavalry, and 10,000 Artillery, irrespective of officers, 3574-3584—Great expense of European Cavalry in India, so that, for this and other reasons, witness suggests that five regiments, of 600 sabres each, should suffice, 3575-3578—Contemplated employment of 10,000 Artillery, as not excessive, the present force being between 10,000 and 12,000; 3579-3582—Opinion as to the efficiency and fidelity of natives as artillerymen, 3579. 3581.

Calculation that the present establishment of European troops is about 61,000, or about 10,000 rank and file, more than is proposed by witness, 3585-3591—Large amount of the pay of the officers of any regiment as compared with that of the non-commissioned rank and file, 3592—Belief as to the facility with which India could provide herself with an efficient army for an expense not exceeding 12,000,000 l. a-year, whilst it is extremely essential that she should not be burdened beyond this amount, 3593-3596.

Comment upon the practice of withdrawing European troops from India for operations elsewhere, as in the case of the China war of 1840; 3597. 3600. 3604—Expected withdrawal of an unduly large force from India in the event of war in Europe, 3600. 3602—Facility of increasing to 20,000 men the local European army of India at the time of the mutiny, 3603.

Statement that any assistance derived by India at the time of the mutiny from the European garrisons at the Cape, Mauritius, and Ceylon was more than counterbalanced by the force previously taken from India for the Persian expedition, 3604-3607—Successful operations against the mutineers, irrespectively of the troops which came from the Mauritius, &c., 3607—Conclusion as to the entire ability of a much smaller European force than that now in India for overcoming any native force in the field, 3608—Great danger to be incurred by keeping up a very large army, on account of the oppressive taxation necessary, *ib.*

Opinion as to the exceeding impolicy of the present military system of India; that is, as regards the distinct separation between the European and Native armies, the former being under the Imperial Government, whilst the latter is under the Indian Government, 3609—Great efficiency of the old Indian Army, *ib.*—Immense advantage of the large body of trained and efficient European officers available under the former system; 478—I.

Balfour, Major General George. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

deficiencies of the present system on this score, 3609-3617—Direct effect of a proper supply of efficient officers in ensuring the efficiency of native troops, whether in India or the colonies, 3612-3617.

Statement in favour of largely increasing the forces and reserves at home by withdrawals from abroad, 3618-3625—Expediency of its being left entirely to the military departments to appropriate the military expenditure, the amount of such expenditure being first definitely fixed by the financial departments, 3620, 3621—Limited amount of the colonial military contribution, whilst its effect is probably to cause unnecessary expense in the employment of British troops in the colonies, 3622, 3623—Facility of adjusting the colonial contribution in any case, 3624.

Representation as to the importance of clearly providing that the duties of native troops in the colonies shall not embrace police duties of various kinds, 3626-3628—Grounds for concluding that colonies may be garrisoned with perfect safety by Native regiments and European Artillery; dissent hereon from the opinion of Lord Strathnairn as to the importance of some European troops, in addition to Artillery, 3629-3635—Instances of several places in India guarded by natives exclusively where no mutiny occurred, whilst mutinies have frequently arisen in places where the European troops were the strongest, 3630-3634.

Explanation of the changes recommended by the Royal Commission of 1866 in regard to the practice of recruiting, and the enlistment of men for particular regiments; conditions subject to which the men are to be enlisted for general service, 3637, 3638. 3640—System of enlistment formerly in force in the case of the European Army of India, 3639—Valuable experience taught by the mutiny, so that we are stronger in the country than we were before, 3642, 3643—Immense preponderance of Native over British troops at the time of the mutiny, the relative proportion in Bengal being as ten to one, 3643-3646.

Objection to the substitution of natives for the British troops proposed by witness to be withdrawn from India, 3647, 3648—Approval of a Native Infantry of 90,000 privates, 3648—Loose discipline sure to follow from scattering the Native troops on small guards and escort duties away from their officers; strong opinion of Lord Clyde on this subject, 3648. 3655-3661.

Further evidence in favour of the re-formation of a local European Army of India distinct from the Royal Army, and under the control of the Government of India, 3649-3652—Extremely efficient character of the army of India, if instead of the sweeping changes made certain defects had been remedied on the score of staff appointments, &c., 3652—Data for the conclusion that no difficulty would be experienced in recruiting for an Indian army, or local European army, 3653, 3654.

Doubt as to any evil arising from the transport arrangement by which each native soldier at sea is allowed only six square feet of space, whilst a British soldier is allowed nine square feet, 3662-3670—Illustrations of the great importance of European officers for the leading of Native troops, 3671-3677—Further statement as to the colonists naturally objecting to pay the same contribution towards Native troops as towards British troops; instance in the case of the Mauritius, 3678. 3695, 3696.

Statement as to the Mauritius now paying 45,000 *l.* a year towards the expense of the troops, there being a garrison of 2,000 men; conclusion as to the heavy pressure involved in this payment, 3679-3700—Dissent from the views laid down by Sir John Burgoyne as to the expediency of a very large force for the protection of Mauritius; opinion that a garrison of 600 men is sufficient for internal defence, 3679, 3680. 3684-3688. 3701-3704—Pressure of taxation in Ceylon as well as in Mauritius, by reason of the large military contribution required of the colony, 3692. 3694.

Expediency of making in time of peace those arrangements as to the garrisons of the Mauritius, Ceylon, &c., which in time of war must be made, 3697—Exceptions taken to certain conclusions as to the great value of the Mauritius in the event of war; it is, however, very useful for the refitting of vessels, 3704-3712—Utter impracticability of holding the Mauritius if an enemy had the command of the sea, 3708.

Difference of about 8,000 or 10,000 men between the British force contemplated by witness for India, and the actual force now in the country, 3721-3725—Great expense involved in keeping up the officers and non-commissioned officers to the full maximum establishment, whilst the rank and file are below the establishment, 3725. 3731—Examination to the effect that the Indian authorities have had but little influence in fixing the force or establishment of the battalions in India, 3726-3736.

Great expense of British Cavalry during war in India further adverted to; admission as to the undoubted efficiency of the Cavalry regiments, 3737-3742—Explanation in connection with the relative expense of the officers and of the men in a regiment of infantry, the actual pay not representing the proportionate expense, 3743-3749—Apprehension lest a very large withdrawal of British troops from India would take place if England were at war in Europe, and were threatened at home, 3750-3753.

Approval

Balfour, Major General George—(Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

Approval of India being called upon to pay for any reserve force necessary in England in order to keep up the force in India to such an amount as may be deemed necessary by Indian authorities, 3754-3760—Statement as to the inefficiency of the reserves and depôts in England for maintaining the force in India; instances of very unfit recruits having been sent out, 3754-3757—Opinion that a local European force, if re-established in India, should be larger than the former force, 3761. 3769—Great value of the trained and experienced officers to be obtained by means of a local European force, 3761.

Approval of a local European army of 30,000 men, and of an Imperial army of 20,000 men, 3762, 3763—Belief that with proper care no difficulty would arise in regard to the difference of pay and allowances between a local army and an Imperial army, 3764-3768—Success of the bounty given in 1861, in order to induce the Europeans of the local army to continue in service under the new arrangements, 3764, 3765—Conclusion as to the fidelity and the unquestionable efficiency of the local European troops, 3768, 3769.

[Second Examination.]—Evidence in explanation of the practice as to pay and allowances of European officers in the Colonies; great expense incurred in the shape of allowances for officers' quarters, &c., so that the system of direct money payment is more economical, 3770-3775—Reference to a certain official statement as containing a very accurate account of the cost of European and Native troops in India, 3770, 3771—Undue reduction made in the allowances to officers in the Mauritius, 3776.

Further statement upon the question of the mutiny in 1857 having been virtually overcome before the arrival of troops from the Colonies, 3777-3794—Strong objection to the maintenance of British troops in Ceylon, the Mauritius, &c., so as to provide for emergencies in India, 3781. 3795—India should, in fact, be allowed to provide for herself, 3781, 3782—Doubt whether the operations in China could have been carried on without assistance from India, 3782—Bad effect created in China through the diversion of the troops on their way thither at the time of the mutiny, 3796.

Belief that the employment of native Indian troops on foreign service may be made in the highest degree beneficial to the discipline of the Native army, 3797, 3798—Especial importance of strict discipline for Native troops, *ib.*—Comment upon the great indifference shown in the treatment of the Sepoy army, 3799—Belief that no difficulty need arise in connection with the employment of Native troops on foreign service; large extent of such employment at the time of the mutiny, 3800-3802.

Statement strongly in favour of the continued employment of Native troops in the Straits Settlements, rather than of sending out British troops; undue expense, moreover, if the latter proceeding be carried out, 3802-3806—With regard to Ceylon, witness is unable to see any necessity for the increase made in the European garrison, 3807, 3808—Small force likely to be kept in the Mauritius if the matter rested with the colonists, 3809—Efficiency of a mixed garrison of Natives and Europeans in the Mauritius, 3810.

Further statement that any system that may be determined upon should not be postponed till time of war, 3811, 3812—Doubt as to the expediency of employing Native soldiers at Malta or Gibraltar, 3813—Entire fitness of Native troops for operations in Egypt, *ib.*—Conclusion as to the very clear definition, by General Order in 1856, of the right to employ the Sepoy army on foreign service, it being most unwise to imply that such service is optional, 3814-3816—Decided disapproval of allowing men or regiments to volunteer for foreign service, 3815, 3816—Strong disapproval, also, of raising special corps for service out of India, 3817.

Reference to a statement (*App.* 337, 338) showing the distribution of the British army on 1st January in each year since 1846; 3818—Further explanation in regard to the relative cost of officers, and of non-commissioned officers and men, *ib.*

Balfour, Major General. Letter from Colonel Balfour in August 1861, to the secretary of the Government of India, in the Military Department, as to the employment of Native soldiers on foreign service on duties which might more properly be performed by policemen, and as to the rations and the accommodation and treatment of the men, *App.* 321-324.

Barbadoes. Difficulty in requiring Barbadoes to pay towards the expense of the troops stationed there, *Taylor* 2547.—*See also West Indies, &c.*

Bareilly Insurrection (1816). Particulars relative to the insurrection at Bareilly in 1816, as the most formidable that has occurred in India during the British rule, *Mangles* 3065, 3066.

Barkly, Sir Henry, K. C. B. Answers received from Sir Henry Barkly, Governor of the Mauritius, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the

Report, 1867—continued.

Barkly, Sir Henry, K.C.B.—continued.

the employment of native Indian troops in different British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 234, 235.

Barrack Expenses. The item (in a certain return) of barrack expenses in China, &c., includes the cost of hired buildings, but on this point witness will supply further information to the Committee, *Shadwell* 2627-2631. 2640-2664—Particulars, in paper submitted by Colonel Shadwell, relative to the cost of barracks at stations east of the Cape and at the Cape, *App.* 290, 291.

Beale, Colonel, E. C. Communication from Colonel Beale commanding the 22nd Regiment Bombay Native Infantry, as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 256, 257.

Belooch Corps. Witness doubts whether the Belooch Corps for Hong Kong will be easily raised in India, *Norman* 276—Steps being taken towards raising a Beloochee regiment for service at Hong Kong, *Johnson* 1552-1554.

Benares. Explanation in connection with the force at Benares, *Norman* 334, 335.

Bengal Native Army. Evidence relative to the very satisfactory service of Bengal regiments in the China war, without any difficulties having been experienced, *Baker* 1017 *et seq.*—Explanation as to the general service corps in the Bengal army having been formed expressly with a view to their serving abroad; practice of late years to enlist for the army generally with a view to foreign service if required, *ib.* 1072-1077. 1098-1102.

Doubt whether the regiments in Bengal are prepared for a system of foreign service; lower standard of discipline in this respect than in the case of the Bombay army, *Lord Strathnairn* 3391. 3406. 3446—Strong disapproval of the option given to the men to volunteer for foreign service, *ib.* 3406. 3410. 3422.

Memorandum showing the composition of the native army as regards non-commissioned officers and rank and file of its principal branches, *App.* 260.

Statement showing the detail of the establishment and cost of a regiment of native infantry in the Bengal Presidency, *App.* 306.

See also *Burmah.* *Caste.* *China.* *Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops).* *Furloughs.* *Hindoos.* *Mauritius.* *Mutiny.* *Officers (Native Troops).* *Straits Settlements.*

Bermuda. Opinion that Africans might with advantage be employed at Bermuda, *Fonblanque* 2831.

Return, dated 28th March 1867, of the number of troops borne on the strength of the Imperial army and stationed at Bermuda, *App.* 283.

Beville Major, H. Answers received from Major Beville, commanding the 1st Belooch Regiment, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 253.

Black Troops. Belief as to the black troops at Hyderabad being Abyssinians, *Norman* 470-472—Considerable number of blacks from Abyssinia, &c., on the western coast of India, who would form excellent troops, *Sir W. Elliot* 538-545.

See also *West Coast of Africa.* *West India and West India Regiments.*

Bombay Native Army. Evidence as to the willingness evinced by the Bombay army to serve in *Burmah*, *Norman* 19-26. 30-33; *Sir W. Elliot* 481-484—Instances of the readiness of Bombay troops to serve out of India, *Lord Strathnairn* 3389. 3406—The men are ordered for foreign service without any option being given them; inexpediency of any option in the matter, *ib.* 3389. 3406. 3410.

Answers received from the commanding officers of regiments in the Bombay army, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee, as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 245-259.

Memorandum showing the composition of the native army as regards non-commissioned officers and rank and file of its principal branches, *App.* 260.

Return showing that on 1st April 1857, there were 10,459 Bombay native troops on service out of India, *App.* 336.

See also *Aden.* *Caste.* *China.* *Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops).* *Families (Native Troops).* *Mauritius.* *Officers (Native Army).* *Straits Settlements.*

Bounty

Bounty (Re-enlistment). Question considered whether it is not desirable to raise the bounty for British soldiers re-enlisted in India on discharge there, the present bounty varying from 10 *l.* to 15 *l.*, whereas the cost of bringing each man home is about 50 *l.*, *Norman* 411-415. 424-427. 437-445—Circumstance of the Government of India having been prepared to recommend an increase of the bounty in India, *ib.* 445.

Considerable expense of bringing discharged men home from India, so that it would be well to increase the bounty given in India for re-enlistment, *Sir Hope Grant* 1471-1473.

Success of the bounty given in 1861, in order to induce the Europeans of the local army to continue in service under the new arrangements, *Balfour* 3764, 3765.

BRITISH ARMY (COLONIES):

Importance of the Colonies having European troops to defend them in the event of war, *Sir Hope Grant* 1209-1213—Imperial importance of garrisoning the Colonies with British troops, though in the event of a war in Europe it might be found necessary to bring the troops home, and to supply their places abroad with native troops, *ib.* 1291-1300. 1308-1316. 1336-1346. 1420-1430—Conclusion that for each British regiment withdrawn from any Colony two native regiments would be necessary, and that about ten or twelve British regiments might be withdrawn if the principle of mixed garrisons is adopted, *ib.* 1438-1445—Valuable reserves for India in time of emergency, as during the mutiny, through there being British garrisons in certain Colonies, *Johnson* 1665-1667. 1703-1709. 1729, 1730—Advantage of European garrisons at the Mauritius and other places, sufficient to beat off the attack of a small expeditionary force in time of war, *Taylor* 2553, 2554.

Decided objection to a reduction in the European troops at large, through the increased employment of an inferior article in the Colonies in the shape of native troops, *Duke of Cambridge* 2965, 2966. 2969-2971. 3032-3034—Grounds for concluding that if the colonial service of the British army were reduced by the increased employment of native troops in the Colonies, the aggregate strength would also be reduced, *Duke of Cambridge*, 3047-3057; *Sir H. Storks* 3296-3308.

Apprehended reduction in the British army if native soldiers were substituted for Europeans in the Colonies; strong disapproval of such reduction, *Lard Strathnairn* 3387, 3388—Important auxiliaries to our military strength in India by reason of garrisons at the Cape, Hong Kong, Mauritius, &c., *ib.* 3396-3400. 3431, 3432—Further statement that any advantages from the employment of native Indian troops in the Colonies would not counterbalance the evil of reduction of the British army, *ib.* 3420. 3433. 3444-3448.

Strong objection to the maintenance of British troops in Ceylon, the Mauritius, &c., so as to provide for emergencies in India, *Balfour* 3781. 3795—India should, in fact, be allowed to provide for herself, *ib.* 3781, 3782.

Answers received from persons in high official positions in India and the Colonies to questions as to the usefulness of British garrisons in certain Colonies for the defence of India in case of emergency. *App.* 212. 220. 222. 226. 228. 230. 232. 234 *et seq.*

Return, dated 28 March 1867, showing the number of troops in the several Colonies and dependencies borne on the strength of the Imperial army, *App.* 282, 283.

See also *Cape of Good Hope*. *Ceylon*. *China*. *Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops)*. *Cost*. *Duties of Troops*. *Malta and Gibraltar*. *Mauritius*. *Mutiny*. *Straits Settlements*. *War*. *West Indies, &c.*

BRITISH ARMY (INDIA):

1. *Present European Force in India.*
2. *Evidence in favour of a Reduction of the Force.*
3. *Evidence opposed to any Reduction.*
4. *Views of Lord Dalhousie in 1854 and 1856.*
5. *Views of the Governor General and Commander in Chief in India in strong disapproval of any Reduction.*
6. *Explanations and Suggestions as to the Distribution of the Troops.*
7. *Question of Withdrawal of Troops in the event of War in Europe.*

1. *Present European Force in India:*

Total of 58,212 European troops in the three Presidencies, *Norman* 3-5—Actual increase of European troops in India to the extent of only 13,000 men since the time of the mutiny, *ib.* 227—Total of 45,000 British soldiers in India at the beginning of 1867, the present number being about 58,000, *ib.* 310-314—Approval generally of the present proposition of two native soldiers to one European, *ib.* 319, 320.

Calculation that the present establishment of European troops is about 61,000, or about 10,000 rank and file more than is proposed by witness, *Balfour* 3585-3591—

Report, 1867—continued.

BRITISH ARMY (INDIA)—continued.2. *Evidence in favour of a Reduction of the Force:*

Expediency of there being a certain proportion of European troops in India, with reference to the native force, the present proposition being, however, excessive, *Sir G. R. Clerk*, 1863-1868—Statement that by governing India with justice, and by maintaining good faith towards the chiefs, greater safety will be insured than by keeping up the present large European force, *ib.* 1877, 1878. 1882. 1910-1934.—Witness considers that an army of 44,000 effective British troops should suffice for all India, *ib.* 1927.

Witness submits sundry data for the conclusion that the European army in India is unnecessarily large, and that no danger would be incurred in reducing both the British and native armies, *Mangles* 3061 *et seq.*—Great mistake in maintaining from 65,000 to 70,000 British troops in order chiefly to watch 135,000 native troops, there being, in truth, none else for the former to fight with, *ib.* 3067-3077. 3087-3089. 3128—Suggestion that the British army be reduced by 20,000 men, and the native army by 35,000, *ib.* 3070. 3090-3095. 3102. 3159-3164—Very little use of a large British force so far as the Nepaulese, Bhootans, Burmese, &c. are concerned, *ib.* 3072-3077—Increased control over the people by means of the improved arms now in possession of the European army, *ib.* 3085. 3095. 3128. 3148, 3149—The question of a further reduction in the aggregate of the Imperial army as a consequence of reducing the force in India should not in any way affect the latter reduction, *ib.* 3165-3167.

Opinion that the British army now in India is greater than there is any military necessity for; grounds for this conclusion considered, *Balfour* 3548 *et seq.*—Concurrence in the views of Lord Dalhousie in 1854 as to the sufficiency of thirty-five regiments of European infantry, *ib.* 3552-3558. 3641—Suggestion that the British force in India might consist of 35,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 10,000 artillery, irrespective of officers, *ib.* 3574-3584—Conclusion as to the entire ability of a much smaller European force than that now in India for overcoming any native force in the field, *ib.* 3608—Difference of about 9,000 or 10,000 men between the British force contemplated by witness for India and the actual force now in the country *ib.* 3721-3721—Suggestion further, that the European troops should consist of a local European army of 30,000 men, and an Imperial army of 20,000 men, *ib.* 3762, 3763.

3. *Evidence opposed to any Reduction:*

Additional forts and arsenals now garrisoned by Europeans, the present European army being anything but excessive, *Norman* 227-229—Strong objection to any reduction of the English army in India, *Sir Hope Grant* 1268-1271—Concurrence in the objection to any reduction of the British force in India, *Johnson* 1739.

Witness strongly objects to any reduction of the European force in India without reference to the native force; obstacle, moreover, to any reduction of the latter, *Duke of Cambridge* 3040, 3041—Objections to any diminution in the number of English troops in India, the number being in fact too low already, *Lord Strathnairn* 3401—Regulation of the number of troops in India by the state of the country, and the duties required of the men, the duties being extremely hard, *ib.* 3449, 3450.

4. *Views of Lord Dalhousie in 1854 and 1856:*

Minute by Lord Dalhousie, as Governor General of India, dated 13th September 1854, submitting reasons for objecting to the withdrawal of two European regiments from India, *App.* 325-327.

Detailed statement and suggestions in minute of Lord Dalhousie, dated 5th February 1856, in regard to the British and native forces of India, and the amount at which it is desirable to fix the limit of the Imperial troops, *App.* 327-333.

5. *Views of the Governor General and Commander in Chief in India in strong Disapproval of any Reduction:*

Grounds put forward by Sir John Lawrence for objecting to any important reduction in the strength of the British force now allowed for India, *App.* 212, 213.

Official communication setting forth the views of Sir W. Mansfield, in strong disapproval of any reduction of the British army in India, *App.* 293-299.

6. *Explanations and Suggestions as to the Distribution of the Troops:*

Statement as to its being in contemplation to place about twelve per cent. of the European troops at the hill stations; obstacle to any further removal to the hills, *Norman* 239-241. 248-252—Distribution of the British troops with a view to massing them to some extent, and at the same time so as to hold all the more important points, *ib.* 242—Difficulty in withdrawing the troops from all stations reported to be unhealthy, *ib.*

Opinion that the bulk of the British army should be kept at frontier posts, such as Peshawur, and the rest should be located in the large cities, such as Patna, *Mangles* 3080, 3081. 3098. 3107-3109—With regard to the number of British troops now stationed

Report, 1867—continued.

BRITISH ARMY (INDIA)—continued.

6. *Explanations and Suggestions as to the Distribution of the Troops*—continued. stationed at different posts and required for the local duties, witness contends that many of these posts might be given up altogether, the Native troops being reduced at the same time, *Mangles* 3151-3156.

7. *Question of Withdrawal of Troops in the event of War in Europe :*

Contemplated withdrawal of several British regiments from India in the event of a European war, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1877. 1882. 1932-1934—Further statement as to the nature of the facilities for withdrawing troops from India in the event of their being required for a war in Europe, *ib.* 1955-1958—Expediency of raising new levies at home rather than of withdrawing British troops from India in the event of a European war, *Duke of Cambridge* 3016-3018. 3037. 3038—Inducement to withdraw British troops from India in the event of a European war ; danger in so doing, *Mangles* 3111-3114—Apprehension lest a very large withdrawal of British troops from India would take place if England were at war in Europe and were threatened at home, *Balfour* 3600. 3602. 3750-3753.

See also *Artillery. Cavalry. Cost. Duties of Troops. Forts and Arsenal.*
Havelock, Sir Henry (the Late). Local European Army. Russia.

Browne, Colonel W. Answers received from Colonel Browne commanding the troops in Natal, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 241.

Burmah. Evidence as to the willingness generally of the Madras troops to serve in Burmah, *Norman* 19-26. 30-33 ; *Sir W. Elliot* 451-484—Amount of force now kept at Rangoon, Moulmein, &c., *Norman* 453—Explanation in connection with the refusal of the 8th Regiment of Madras Cavalry to embark for Burmah in 1858, *Sir W. Elliot* 515-518.

Garrison duty in Burmah is considered foreign service in the Madras army, Bengal troops only going there on field service, *Pears* 767-770—Difficulty experienced in connection with the employment of Madras troops at Rangoon ; large increase made in their pay, *Sir Hope Grant* 1233—Information relative to the number of British and native troops at Rangoon and other stations in Burmah, *Johnson* 1647, 1648—Approval of holding Burmah partly by Burmese levies, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1881. 1943-1946.

Statement showing the sickness and mortality among the Native troops in Burmah and Port Blair, for the years 1864 and 1865, *App.* 267.

C.

Caird, Thomas. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Had for several years official charge of the coolie emigration from Calcutta to the Mauritius and the West Indies, 1748-1751—Information relative to the extent of the coolie emigration, the wages in the Mauritius and the West Indies, and the degree of willingness on the part of the Natives to leave India for employment beyond the sea, 1752 *et seq.*—Small per-centage of married men among the emigrants ; difficulty in getting their wives to accompany them, 1754-1757—Preference given to low caste men as coolies, high caste men often concealing their caste in order to be allowed to go, 1758-1763. 1784-1788.

Limited objection shown by the coolies, in late years, to crossing the sea ; adequate arrangements as to the supply of water, &c., on board, 1764-1766. 1772, 1773. 1784-1790—Frequent instances of sepoys from the mutinous regiments having gone to the Mauritius as coolies, 1767-1771—Belief that with adequate pay and judicious arrangements, Native troops would willingly leave India on colonial service in the Mauritius, &c., 1774-1782—Statement of the rate of pay which induced the Natives to emigrate to the Mauritius and the West Indies 1776-1780. 1791-1797. 1803-1807.

Opinion that for three rupees extra per month, Native troops would willingly serve in the colonies, 1781—Necessity of considering the extra expense of rations, irrespectively of extra pay, 1781, 1782—Importance of every attention being paid to the supply of water for Native troops both on board ship and on foreign service, 1807-1812. 1817, 1818—Less prejudicial effect of the climate of the Mauritius than of India itself upon natives of India, 1813-1815—Instances of complaint by coolies against the climate, &c, in the West Indies, 1815, 1816.

Cambridge, His Royal Highness the Duke of. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Is strongly opposed, upon military grounds, to the proposition for substituting Native for European troops in the various colonies, 2961 *et seq.*—Great danger in attempting to hold any colony unless there be at least a nucleus of British troops, 2964. 2967-2971. 2976, 478—I. B 2977-

Report, 1867—*continued*.

Cambridge, His Royal Highness the Duke of. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—*continued*

2977-2980. 2985. 3032-3034—Approval of European troops being supplemented with Native troops, as is now the case in some colonies, 2965.

Decided objection to a reduction in the European troops at large through the increased employment of an inferior article in the shape of Native troops, 2965, 2966. 2969-2971. 3032-3034—Disapproval of European Artillery being left solely with Native troops in any colony, 2967, 2968. 2981, 2982—Expediency of some British troops, as well as of native Indian troops at Hong Kong, 2969. 2983-2987. 3021-3023. 3039.

Approval of the present system of scattering the army in small detachments throughout the colonies, rather than of massing the troops in positions nearer home, 2972-2975—Decided objection to the withdrawal of all European troops from so valuable a colony as the Mauritius; great importance of a garrison there of about 1,800 British troops, 2976, 2977. 3024-3031. 3051-3053—Disapproval also of the withdrawal of all British troops from Ceylon, 2978-2980. 2990, 2991.

Expediency of some British troops in addition to European garrison artillery in the Straits Settlements, 2988-2990—Contemplated occupation of Point de Galle by a wing of a European regiment, for imperial purposes, 2991—Statement as to the great inequality between the pay of officers with European regiments and of officers with Native regiments from India, when serving in the same colony; great expense involved in assimilating the pay of the former to that of the latter, 2992-3013. 3044—Objection to local corps in lieu of Indian native troops, except that in the former case no difficulty arises as to the pay and allowances of European officers and men serving in the same colony, 3004.

Contemplated employment of Indian native troops on active service in such places as Egypt, 3006, 3007. 3015—Advantage of some scheme by which European and Native troops should serve together without its being necessary to raise the pay and allowances of the former, 3008-3010—Greater facility in obtaining the services of Native troops out of India in time of war than during peace, 3014. 3018, 3019—Expediency of raising new levies at home rather than of withdrawing British troops from India, in the event of a European war, 3016-3018. 3037, 3038.

Advantage of the nucleus of British troops in the principal islands in the West Indies, 3020—Strong objection to any reduction of the European force in India; small increase made in the force since the time of the mutiny, 3035-3038—Regulation of the British force in India without reference to the Native force; obstacle moreover to any reduction of the latter, 3040, 3041—Difficulties which prevented the sending of some Sikh troops to New Zealand during the late war, 3042-3045.

Unwillingness generally of the colonists to contribute towards Native troops in substitution for British troops, 3045, 3046. 3053—Grounds for concluding that an increased employment of Native troops in the colonies will surely lead to a corresponding reduction in the aggregate of European troops in the army, 3047-3057—Desire of the authorities to shorten the term of colonial service, so that the British army may have not more two-thirds of colonial service for one-third of home service; prospect of this being arrived at, 3049, 3050. 3058-3060.

Campbell, Lieutenant Colonel E. Answers received from Colonel Campbell, commanding the 3rd Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 250.

Canada. The present British force in Canada cannot be considered too large, *Sir H. Storks* 3249.

Return, dated 28th March 1867, of the number of troops borne on the strength of the Imperial army, and stationed in Canada, *App.* 282.

Canadian Regiment (1857). Great expense of the Canadian regiment raised in 1857, whilst it was also an inefficient regiment, on account of the system on which established, *Sir H. Storks* 3285.

CAPE OF GOOD HOPE:

Importance of British troops instead of Indian native troops at the Cape, *Sir Hope Grant* 1279-1284—Danger in the garrison at the Cape being composed largely of Indian troops, *Johnson* 1711-1714. 1731, 1732.

Facilities for raising in South Africa an ample and efficient force of Kaffirs or Fingoes for the garrison of the Cape; suggestions hereon, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1831-1833. 1838-1847. 1884. 1890—Entire unsuitableness of Sikh troops for garrisoning South Africa in time of peace, whilst the expense would be very considerable, *ib.* 1833-1837. 1845—Importance of maintaining a European force at the Cape, the climate being excellent, and the troops being readily available for service in India, &c., *ib.* 1848-1850.

Statement in further approval of the defence of the Cape being entrusted chiefly to local levies, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1940-1942. 1960-1962—Small European force which
witness

CAPE OF GOOD HOPE—continued.

witness would propose at the Cape, in addition to a force raised locally, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1977-1995—Improbability of the Kaffirs rising in rebellion if unprovoked by the colonists encroaching upon their lands, *ib.* 1990-1993—Safety in leaving the Kaffir frontier to the defence of the colonists, under the commando system; economy thereby, *ib.* 1994, 1995.

Opinion that Indian troops are far preferable to Kaffir or Fingoe levies for the defence of the Cape, *Muchenzie* 2017, 2018—Probable withdrawal of the contribution of 41,000*l.* a year by the Cape colonists if the European troops were replaced by native troops from India, *Taylor* 2504-2508—Objection to any portion of the present force at the Cape being replaced by Sikhs or other native troops from India, *Sir H. Storks* 3175-3184. 3211-3222—Advantage of employing local levies at the Cape, such as Fingoes, in addition to British troops, rather than of bringing native troops from India; efficiency of the former in the event of a Kaffir war, *ib.* 3184-3190. 3282, 3283. 3290-3292—Question whether the settlers should not be left to take care of themselves against the Kaffirs, *ib.* 3214, 3215. 3278-3281.

Return, dated 28th March 1867, of the number of troops borne on the strength of the Imperial army, and stationed at the Cape, *App.* 282.

See also *Mutiny*.

Cape Mounted Rifles. Very efficient character of the Cape Mounted Rifles, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1847. 1884. 1961, 1962.

Caste (Native Troops). Information as to the different races and religions of which the Indian native army is composed, *Norman* 6-16—Regulations in force as to the number of men of different castes in the same regiment, *ib.* 12, 13—Necessity of keeping in view the religious prejudices of the Hindoos, &c. in considering the question of their being sent across the sea, *ib.* 17. 40-47. 67. 393-400—Detailed composition of the native regiments further adverted to; approval of a mixture of races and of castes, *ib.* 110-113—Probable difficulty in the event of native troops being sent to places where their prejudices as to caste, &c. are not understood, *ib.* 283.

Advantage in the native regiments being composed of as many different elements as possible, *Sir W. Elliot* 572. 578, 579. 621-631—Aversion of high-caste natives to cook on board ship, so that it is most difficult to employ these beyond the sea, *ib.* 623, 624—Prejudice of Rajpoots, &c. against cooking at sea; this difficulty, however, being easily surmounted, *Keyes* 660-663. 680—Several high-caste men in witness's regiment, notwithstanding which no difficulty arose as to the supply of water on board ship, or as to the cooking, *Probyn* 856, 857. 907-914.

Absence of difficulty as regards the supply of water, and the cooking on board ship, in the case of a Bengal regiment sent to China, under witness's command; practice of providing dry rations for Hindoos on board, on account of their objections to cook at sea, *Baker* 1022-1024. 1040-1045—With regard to the employment of Indian troops at Burmah, Singapore, &c., witness is not aware of any difficulty having been experienced on the score of caste prejudices, *Sir R. Montgomery* 2645-2650—Much stronger existence of caste in Bengal than in Bombay or Madras, *Lord Strathnairn* 3383, 3384.

See also *Hindoos*. *Sikhs*.

Cavalry (British Army). Very considerable expense of European cavalry in India, so that for this and other reasons witness suggests that five regiments of 600 sabres each should suffice, *Balfour* 3575-3578—Great expense of British cavalry during war in India further adverted to; admission as to the undoubted efficiency of the cavalry regiments, *ib.* 3737-3742.

Cavalry (Native Army). Great efficiency of the Bengal cavalry regiments, *Lord Strathnairn* 3421.

Cavenagh, Major General Orfeur. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Was governor of Singapore from 1859 until the present year, 3309, 3310—Entire efficiency of the Indian native troops at Singapore in time of peace, 3312, 3313. 3316-3323—Difficulty on financial grounds in obtaining European troops at Singapore from India in case of war, 3314, 3315—Obstacle to recruiting the Ceylon Rifles from the Malay population of the Straits, 3324-3327—Rate of pay and allowances of the Indian troops at Singapore, 3328-3330—Willingness of the natives to remain at Singapore if they had not been separated from their wives and families, 3331-3333.

Opinion that the native army in India should be re-organised, with a view to its being an integral part of the Imperial army, and to its serving in the colonies; deficiencies of the present organisation, 3334-3341. 3346-3352—Except in cases of emergency, native troops should not be employed westward of the Cape, 3335. 3337—Advantage of European artillery at Singapore, though a native regiment is sufficient for internal defence, 3342-3345.

Disapproval of the employment of Chinese troops in India, 3354-3358—Increased prestige of Great Britain in India if the natives were to serve in the colonies, 3359—478—I.

Cavenagh, Major General Orfeur. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

Particulars as to the payments made by the Straits Settlements for the garrison of Singapore, &c.; also as to the cost of the garrison to the Indian Government, 3360, 3361. 3370-3374—Explanation relative to the transfer of the Settlements to the Colonial Government, the reduced sum now paid by the colony, and the expense to the Imperial treasury through the want of longer notice of the transfer 3362-3369. 3375-3378.

CEYLON:

No inducements are necessary in sending Madras troops to Ceylon, *Norman* 209—Circumstance of part of Ceylon having for a long period been garrisoned by Malays without any evils having arisen, *ib.* 367-370—Grounds for concluding that it is inexpedient to garrison Ceylon with native troops exclusively; danger thereby, *Sir Hope Grant* 1207-1213. 1379-1381—Advantage of having a whole European regiment at the Sanatorium in Ceylon rather than at Galle, *ib.* 1402.

Very good and comfortable barracks in Ceylon, though not nearly so expensive as European barracks, *Macdonald* 2199—Character of the defences of Ceylon, and number of troops composing the garrison, *ib.* 2249-2255—Several parts of the island at which detachments of troops are located, *ib.* 2271, 2272.

Objection to Ceylon being garrisoned by native troops exclusively; feeling, however, of the planters that neither British nor native troops are required, *Fonblanque* 2752. 2794-2812. 2823-2825—Much greater cost of native troops in Ceylon than in the Presidencies; particulars hereon, *ib.* 2757—Amount of pay and allowances of British troops in Ceylon, *ib.* 2757. 2770-2774—Opinion in favour of barracks at Newara Eliya, as the best place in Ceylon for white troops, *ib.* 2869-2873—Nothing can be worse than the present European barracks in Ceylon, *ib.* 2889.

Disapproval of the withdrawal of all British troops from Ceylon, *Duke of Cambridge*, 2878-2980. 2990, 2991—Contemplated occupation of Point de Galle by a wing of a European regiment for Imperial purposes, *ib.* 2931.

Pressure of taxation in Ceylon as well as in Mauritius, by reason of the large military contribution required of the colony, *Balfour* 3692-3694—Witness is unable to see any necessity for the increase made in the European garrison of Ceylon, *ib.* 3807, 3808.

Return, dated 28th March 1867, of the number of troops borne on the strength of the Imperial army, and stationed in Ceylon, *App.* 282.

Extracts from report of the Deputy Commissary General in August 1865, relative to the provisioning of the European troops, *App.* 301, 302—Return containing particulars on the score of rations, and of stoppages from the troops, *ib.* 302, 303—Schedule of colonial pay and allowances authorised to be paid by the commissariat in 1864, *ib.* 304.

See also *Mutiny*.

CEYLON RIFLE CORPS:

Approval on the whole of an extension of the organisation of the Ceylon Rifle Corps for service in Hong Kong, &c., rather than of attempting to raise a distinct corps for the purpose, *Norman* 270-277—Intention of raising the Ceylon Rifle Regiment to fourteen companies, of which eight will be stationed in the Straits, *Johnson* 1721-1724.

The Ceylon Rifle Corps is composed of Malays, with the exception of two companies of Sepoys, the full strength of the regiment being about 1,100, *Macdonald* 2107-2111—Practice of enlisting the Malays in the island as boys, *ib.* 2111. 2160-2164. 2222-2228. 2267-2270—Particulars relative to the pay, allowances, &c. of the men; advantage when serving in China of a free ration of meat, *ib.* 2112-2123. 2133-2135. 2193-2198—Absence of difficulty in regard to the men serving abroad, *ib.* 2124-2130.

Officering of the corps by natives and Europeans jointly; statement in explanation and approval of this arrangement, *Macdonald* 2131, 2132. 2145-2147. 2273-2287. 2290—Less cost of transport of men of the Ceylon Rifles than of European soldiers, *ib.* 2136, 2137—Practice as to the wives and children of the men accompanying them to China; mistake recently made on this score, *ib.* 2138-2144—Considerable sickness and mortality among the regiment in Hong Kong, the climate being too cold for Malays, *ib.* 2152-2156. 2205, 2206. 2217-2221—Entire confidence of witness in the loyalty of the Ceylon Rifles, whilst their drill and discipline are excellent, *ib.* 2157-2160. 2165-2169. 2186, 2187. 2266. 2289.

Information relative to the religious and social habits of the Malays in the regiment; little, if any, difficulty on the score of caste, *Macdonald* 2168-2180—Considerable difficulty in recruiting for the regiment; advantage of keeping some companies in Singapore and of recruiting there, the regiment being much below its proper strength, *ib.* 2181-2184. 2207-2210. 2222-2237—Probability of better barrack accommodation being required for the Ceylon Rifles than for Indian native troops when serving in China, &c., *ib.* 2200-2204—Intention of sending nine companies of the corps to Singapore, Penang, &c., and to keep five companies in Ceylon, *ib.* 2247-2249.

Belief

CEYLON RIFLE CORPS—continued.

Belief as to its being intended to increase the Ceylon Rifle Corps and to send some companies to the Straits Settlements, *Taylor* 2518-2521—Material changes effected in the constitution of the Ceylon Rifle Regiment, the result being that the corps is much more expensive and much less efficient than it used to be, *Fonblanque* 2758-2763—Improvement if the regiment were again recruited chiefly from the Malayan Archipelago; difficulty hereon, *ib.* 2763-2769—Large proportion of European officers in the Ceylon Rifles as compared with the Punjaub regiments, *ib.* 2815-2818—Comment upon the representations of medical officers and others in favour of the Ceylon Rifles having as much space and accommodation per man, in barracks, as European troops, *ib.* 2877-2880. 2884, 2885—Obstacles to recruiting the corps from the Malay population of the Straits, *Cavenagh* 3324-3327.

CHINA:

1. *Feeling of Native Indian Troops as to Service in China; Satisfactory Results of their occasional Employment there.*
2. *Question considered as to the Expediency of permanent Garrisons of Native Troops in Hong Kong, &c., in partial or total Substitution for British Troops.*
3. *Expense of Indian Troops and of British Troops respectively.*
4. *Cost of Transport.*
5. *Sickness and Mortality.*
6. *Barrack Accommodation.*
7. *Means of rendering Service in China more satisfactory to British Troops.*
8. *Use made of the Resources of India for Operations in China.*
9. *Effects created in China by the Diversion of Troops thence to India at the Time of the Mutiny.*
10. *Strength of the Garrison of Hong Kong.*

1. *Feeling of Native Indian Troops as to Service in China; Satisfactory Results of their occasional Employment there:*

Dissatisfaction caused by Madras troops being ordered to China after the war in 1845, *Norman* 59, 60—Extremely good conduct of the Malay troops in China, *Sir W. Elliot* 510-512—Willingness of Madras troops to go on service to China, except that there have been some money difficulties, *ib.* 486-512—Service of witness's regiment and of other northern regiments in China in 1860 without any difficulty having arisen, *Probyn* 854-861. 867. 907-914—Good conduct of native regiments when in garrison in China, *ib.* 915-919—Statement as to the corps commanded by witness, and some other regiments of Bengal infantry having served in the China war without any difficulties having been experienced, *Baker* 1017 *et seq.*—Very good conduct of the native troops in field duty and in garrison duty in China; satisfaction of the natives with the service, *ib.* 1083-1089.

Less difficulty as to native troops going to China than to most other colonies, *Johnson* 1672, 1673. 1696, 1697—Great advantage of the employment of native troops in garrisoning Hong Kong, Shanghai, &c. during the war, *Mackenzie* 2001-2006—Nature of the duties performed by witness's regiment at Hong Kong, *Mucdonald* 2256-2259—Very satisfactory results of the employment of Punjaubees, Beloochees, and irregular horse in China during the last war; absence of difficulty as to rations on the score of religion, *Fonblanque* 2728-2749.

Excellent services rendered in China by the Loodianah regiment and the Beloochee troops, *Gordon* 2894-2901—Respect of the Chinese for the Sikhs, whereas they had contempt for the Sepoys, *ib.* 2896-2898. 2943-2947—Absence of any actual dissatisfaction in the Loodianah regiments at Shanghai, because they were kept in China longer than was agreed upon, *ib.* 2902-2912.

2. *Question considered as to the Expediency of permanent Garrisons of Native Troops in Hong Kong, &c., in partial or total Substitution for British Troops:*

Considerable difficulty apprehended as regards the permanent employment of natives of India in garrison duty in Hong Kong; large allowances necessary, *Norman* 212-217—Opinion that a sufficient supply of efficient British officers will be forthcoming for permanent service in China, with native regiments, *Probyn* 920-924—Conclusion as to the unfitness of native troops for garrisoning Hong Kong, and as to the unwillingness of the colonists to contribute to the expense, *Sir Hope Grant* 1177-1192—Objection to Hong Kong being garrisoned by European artillery, aided by native troops exclusively, *ib.* 1301-1307—Approval of a mixed garrison of European and native troops at Hong Kong; necessity of one European regiment there, *ib.* 1347-1356. 1407.

Reasons for objecting to native troops serving in garrison in China; probable prejudice on account of the climate, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1675—Approval of Hong Kong being held permanently by native troops, with the assistance only of one or two batteries of European garrison artillery, *Mackenzie* 2007-2009. 2063-2082—Opinion that Hong Kong might be garrisoned entirely by native troops, *Fonblanque* 2753, 2754—Wretched character of the Hong Kong police, *ib.* 2754-2756.

CHINA—continued.

2. *Question considered as to the Expediency of permanent Garrisons, &c.*—continued.

Grounds for objecting to the employment of Chinese troops at Hong Kong in addition to European troops, *Gordon* 2930-2934—Necessity of a reserve of English troops at Hong Kong, *ib.* 2948, 2949—Expediency of some British troops as well as of native India troops at Hong Kong, *Duke of Cambridge* 2969. 2983-2987. 3021-3023. 3039—Disapproval of Hong Kong being held by native troops only; approval of a mixed force there, *Lord Strathnairn* 3405. 3447, 3448.

3. *Expense of Indian Troops and of British Troops respectively :*

Much greater cheapness of native troops in China than of Europeans, *Baker* 1039—Exceptionally high rate of payment of Indian troops serving in China in 1860 and 1861, *Fonblunue* 2721-2726—Larger allowances and expenses in China than in India, *ib.* 2890, 2891.

Statement relative to the annual cost of the employment of Sikh regiments in China, *App.* 214-216.

4. *Cost of Transport :*

Statement of the number of Europeans and native Indian troops, conveyed in hired ships between India and China during five years, and of the cost per soldier of all expenses of transport, *App.* 288.

5. *Sickness and Mortality :*

Statement showing the sickness and mortality among the native troops serving in China during the second war, and the regiments garrisoning Hong Kong and Shanghai respectively, *App.* 267.

6. *Barrack Accommodation :*

Importance attached to the erection of barracks at Kowloon, as a means of improving the health of the troops in China, *Sir Hope Grant* 1272-1274. 1288-1290—Statement relative to the barrack accommodation at Hong Kong, and the great expense of hired buildings, *Macdonald* 2260-2265—Facility of reducing the ill-health of the European troops at Hong Kong; expediency of improved barracks on an elevated site, *Lord Strathnairn* 3405. 3447, 3448.

7. *Means of rendering Service in China more satisfactory to British Troops :*

Less objection of European troops to service in China if there were improved barracks there, and if the pay and allowances were increased concurrently with a reduction in the period of service, *Sir Hope Grant* 1451-1453.

8. *Use made of the Resources of India for Operations in China :*

Comment upon the practice of withdrawing European troops from India for operations elsewhere; as in the case of the China war of 1840, *Balfour* 3567. 3600. 3604—Doubt whether the operations in China could have been carried on without assistance from India, *ib.* 3782.

9. *Effects created in China by the Diversion of the Troops thence to India at the Time of the Mutiny :*

Conclusion as to the bad effect created in China through the diversion of the troops on their way thither at the time of the mutiny; feeling of the Chinese that this was owing to military weakness, *Balfour* 3796.

10. *Strength of the Garrison of Hong Kong :*

Return, dated 28th March 1867, of the number of troops borne on the strength of the Imperial army, and stationed at Hong Kong; total of 1,391 officers and men, *App.* 283.

See also *Ceylon Rifle Corps.* *Transport of Troops.*

CHINESE TROOPS (INDIA, &c.):

Impolicy of employing Chinese troops in India, whilst they would not be so cheap as native troops, *Norman* 243-247—Further evidence opposed to the employment of Chinese troops in India, whether in lieu of Europeans or of native troops; belief that it would have an extremely bad effect on the natives, and would weaken the British hold of the country, *ib.* 289-309. 358-362. 370-378—Doubt as to the fighting qualities of Chinese troops, *ib.* 290-294. 371, 372—Very objectionable practice of the Chinese in the formation of secret societies, as in the Straits Settlements, *Norman* 295-297; *Sir W. Elliott* 545.

Opinion that the employment of Chinese troops, or other foreign mercenaries in India, would not have any bad effect upon the native mind, *Sir W. Elliot* 533, 534. 625-628.

Bad

CHINESE TROOPS, (INDIA, &c.)—continued.

Bad feeling to be created by bringing Chinese regiments into India, *Kayes* 691-693 —Bad moral effects apprehended as regards natives of India if Chinese troops or other foreign mercenaries were employed there, *Pears* 791-795. 827-832—The Chinese are very good material for soldiers, *ib.* 793—Disapproval of the employment of foreign mercenaries in India, *Probyn* 925, 926.

Grounds for objecting strongly to the employment of Chinese or other foreign troops in India, *Johnson* 1558, 1559; *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1860-1862; *Cavenagh* 3354-3358—Alienation of good native troops if foreign troops, such as Chinese, were introduced, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1862.

Suggested employment of a Chinese regiment in Ceylon, the Chinese making admirable soldiers when properly officered, *Fonblanque* 2776-2778—Belief that the Chinese would serve for any period abroad if they were well paid, *ib.* 2813.

Great difficulty in making the Chinese efficient soldiers in their own country, though large numbers of men might, if well paid, be induced to serve abroad, where they would make good soldiers if properly officered, *Gordon* 2913 *et seq.*—Inducement to Chinese to serve abroad if allowed to take their wives with them, *ib.* 2939, 2940—Efficiency of Chinese if well led as against other Asiatics, but not against Europeans, *ib.* 2942—Numerous European officers in the Chinese regiment under witness's command; this was essential, *ib.* 2950-2955—Great obstacle to efficiency in a Chinese regiment when under Chinese officers, *ib.* 2955-2960—Objection to the employment of Chinese troops at Singapore, *ib.* 2966, 2967.

Objection by Sir John Lawrence to the Chinese or other races, not Indian, in India, *App.* 212—Decided objection by Sir W. Mansfield to the employment of foreign mercenaries in India, *ib.* 221.

Civil Employment (British Soldiers). Exceptional instances of British soldiers being allowed to take temporary service with planters and others; inconvenience of this practice, *Norman* 428-432—Grounds upon which it was decided not to allow soldiers to be employed by the railway companies, *ib.* 434-436.

Clerk, Sir George Russell, K. C. B., K. C. L. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Facilities for raising in South Africa an ample and efficient force of Kaffirs or Fingoes for the garrison of the Cape; suggestions hereon, 1831-1833. 1838-1847. 1884. 1890—Entire unfitness of Sikh troops for garrisoning South Africa in time of peace, whilst the expense would be very considerable, 1833-1837. 1845—Very efficient character of the Cape Mounted Rifles, 1847. 1884. 1961, 1962—Importance of maintaining a European force at the Cape, the climate being excellent, and the troops being readily available for service in India, &c., 1848-1850.

Willingness of Indian native troops to go as far as the Mauritius for three years at a time, 1851, 1852. 1873-1875—Absence of difficulty in feeding Sikh soldiers in the Mauritius, 1854-1856—Approval of the employment of European troops at Aden, the place being exceedingly healthy, 1857-1859—Grounds for objecting strongly to the employment of Chinese or other foreign troops in India, 1860-1862.

Expediency of there being a certain proportion of European troops in India with reference to the native force, the present proportion being however excessive, 1863-1868—Spread of the mutiny or insurrection of 1857, not through any want of European force, but because the British troops were chiefly in the north-west, whilst there were hardly any in Bengal, 1869-1872. 1947-1950—Difficulty in getting the best class of natives to go willingly on general service out of India, though they might go to such a place as the Mauritius, 1873-1875—Advantage of employing Malays rather than Hindoos for service in China, 1876.

Statement that by governing India with justice, and by maintaining good faith towards the chiefs, greater safety will be ensured than by maintaining the present large European force, 1877, 1878. 1882. 1910-1934—Contemplated withdrawal of several British regiments from India in the event of a European war, 1877. 1882. 1932-1934—Advantage in garrisoning certain colonies with local levies, the nucleus of which should be formed in time of peace, instead of in bringing native troops from India for the purpose, 1879-1886. 1959-1962—Approval of Indian troops for the defence of the Mauritius or Egypt in time of war, 1886-1890.

Decided objection to Indian troops for garrisoning Malta or Gibraltar, or any colony in Europe, 1891, 1892—Unfitness of sepoys for service in the West Indies, 1893—Statement as to the discontent among a regiment of Sikhs sent to Burmah seven or eight years ago, 1893-1899. 1996—Illustration of the excitable character of Sikh soldiers, 1899—Doubt as to the success of a proposal for raising Kaffir levies for service out of Africa, 1902-1905—Recurial propensity of Sikh soldiers for plunder, so that they are willing to join in any war where there is a prospect of booty, 1908, 1909—Very effeminate character of the population of Lower Bengal, 1912-1918.

Clerk, Sir George Russell, K.C.B., K.C.L. (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

Unduly large European force maintained in the Punjaub; opinion that it would be better to give up the territory altogether, unless it can be safely held with a much smaller force, 1919-1934.—Further reference to the outbreak of 1857 as having been to some extent a rebellion as much as a mutiny, 1929. 1935, 1936.—Objection to Europeans being recruited expressly for service in India, or to colonisation by European soldiers or pensioners, 1937-1939.—Statement in further approval of the defence of the Cape being entrusted chiefly to local levies, 1940-1942. 1960-1962.—Approval also of holding Burmah partly by Burmese levies, 1943-1946.

Respect in which the British Government of India has been less considerate of the prejudices of the natives in recent years, whilst we have not observed such good faith as formerly towards the people, 1951-1954.—Further statement as to the nature of the facilities for withdrawing troops from India, &c., in the event of their being required for a war in Europe, 1955-1958.—Opinion as to its being a mistaken policy to encourage warlike habits in the Sikhs; number of Sikhs in the native army adverted to hereon, 1963-1970.

Approval of native troops taking their turn of duty at Aden, 1971. 1973.—Adequacy of Malays for garrisoning Ceylon, 1974. 1977.—Reasons for objecting to native troops serving in garrison in China, 1975.—Non-objection to native regiments doing duty at Singapore and the Straits, 1976, 1977.—Small European force which witness would propose at the Cape, in addition to a force raised locally, 1979-1995.—Improbability of the Kaffirs rising in rebellion if unprovoked by the colonists encroaching upon their lands, 1990-1993.—Safety in leaving the Kaffir frontier to the defence of the colonists, under the commando system; economy thereby, 1994, 1995.

Clifford, Colonel, The Honourable H. H. (Assistant Quartermaster General, Horse Guards). (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Supplies some information relative to the practice in regard to reliefs and movements of troops eastward of the Cape, and between England and the colonies; will furnish to the Committee a detailed return on the subject for the last twenty years, 729 *et seq.*—Very rare instances of regiments being moved from China to India, 729-735.—Average of from two to five years at each foreign station, the rule being about ten years foreign service and five years at home, 739-742. 752-757.

Climate of Colonies (Employment of Native Troops.) Necessity of taking climatic considerations into account with reference to the employment of native troops out of India, *Sir Hope Grant* 1488-1491.

Colondas. Information relative to a class found all over India, called Colondas, to which class the Santals belong, and which has never been yet used as soldiers, *Sir W. Elliot* 546-550.

Colonial Contributions. Objection on the part of the colonists to pay towards the cost of native garrisons, *Sir Hope Grant* 1177-1182. 1204-1206. 1376-1420.—Difficulty in compelling those colonies which have independent legislatures to contribute, *Taylor* 2506-2510. 2545.—Very small contribution by the colonists in China towards the military establishments, *ib.* 2527.—Circumstance of there being no contribution by the West Indian colonists to the military establishment, *ib.* 2539, 2540.

Increased difficulties in the withdrawal of British troops and the substitution of native troops, in those colonies where contributions are made as compared with colonies not paying anything, *Taylor* 2555-2563.—Power respectively of the Crown and of the local legislatures of colonies in regard to the question of colonial payment towards the local military establishments, *ib.* 2752-2782.

Unwillingness generally of the colonists to contribute towards native troops in substitution for British troops, *Duke of Cambridge*, 3045, 3046. 3053.—Objection by those colonies which pay towards the troops to the substitution of Asiatics for Europeans, *Sir H. Storks* 3275, 3276.

Expected objection by the colonists to the substitution of native troops for British troops, *Balfour* 3504. 3636.—Limited amount of the colonial military contribution, whilst its effect is probably because unnecessary expense in the employment of British troops in the colonies, *ib.* 3622, 3623.—Facility of adjusting the colonial contribution in any case, *ib.* 3624.—Further statement as to the colonists naturally objecting to pay the same contribution towards native troops as towards British troops; instance in the case of the Mauritius, *ib.* 3678. 3695, 3696.

See also *Australia. Cape of Good Hope. Ceylon. Demerara. Mauritius*, 3.

Colonial Corps. Employment of only two colonial corps in the colonies, that is, in the West Indies and Ceylon, *Taylor* 2410-2412.—Opinion that there is no colonial race which could be advantageously recruited for general service regiments, *Sir H. Storks* 3284, 3285.—Return showing the number of colonial troops borne on the strength of the Imperial army, and employed in different colonies or settlements, *App.* 282, 283.

COLONIAL AND FOREIGN SERVICE (NATIVE TROOPS):

1. *Legal Liability of the Native Troops to Employment out of India.*
2. *Evidence favourable to the Foreign and Colonial Service of Indian Troops under certain Conditions.*
3. *Evidence opposed to Native Garrisons exclusively, though mixed Garrisons are not objected to.*
4. *Feeling of the Natives upon the Subject of Foreign Service and Garrison Duties.*
5. *Question of raising Special Corps for Service out of India.*
6. *Question of calling for Volunteers for Foreign Service, or of holding the entire Native Army liable.*
7. *Great Care necessary in the Application of a New System.*
8. *Expediency of any New Arrangements being put in force in Time of Peace.*
9. *Considerations as to the Pay and Allowances of Native Troops on Colonial or Foreign Service.*
10. *Limit necessary as to the Number of Regiments to be sent out of India.*
11. *Larger Number of India Troops than of British Troops required in any Colony.*
12. *Number of Native Troops employed out of India at the Time of the Mutiny.*
13. *Views of the Governor General of India, the Commander in Chief, and other High Authorities upon the Question of Native Garrisons in the Colonies.*

1. *Legal Liability of the Native Troops to Employment out of India.*

Power, legally, of sending native troops on foreign service, *Norman* 70, 71—Understanding of the men when having enlisted that they will not be sent on foreign service, though they know that they are liable to be sent, *ib.* 194-198—Conclusion as to the very clear definition by General Order in 1856 of the right to employ the Sepoy army on foreign service, it being most unwise to imply that such service is optional, *Balfour* 3814-3816.

Copy of General Enlistment Orders in 1856, in which it is clearly laid down that all natives are to be enlisted for general service, including service beyond the seas, *App.* 339.

2. *Evidence favourable to the Foreign and Colonial Service of Indian Troops under certain Conditions:*

Explanation that witness raises no objection to the employment of native troops on field service, or on occasions of emergency, out of India, the difficulty being in the case of garrison service, *Norman* 22. 68, 69. 283. 336-348—Several colonies to which troops might properly be sent for field service, *ib.* 286-288—Further approval of the employment of several native regiments out of India on field service, whilst their employment regularly on foreign garrison duty would be very objectionable, *ib.* 336-348—Necessity of having recourse largely to the Indian army in the event of war in China or Persia; objection, however, to foreign employment in time of peace, on account of the aversion of the natives to foreign garrison service, *ib.* 379-383—Prejudicial reports likely to be spread by native regiments on their return from foreign garrison duty, *ib.* 389-392.

In time of war there is no reason why some native regiments might not be employed in any part of the world, *Pears* 823—Evidence in approval of the employment of native troops on foreign service in the colonies; certain objections thereto considered, *ib.* 862 *et seq.*—Only as a last resource would witness replace British troops in the colonies by native troops in time of war, *Sir Hope Grant* 1377, 1378—Advantage rather than otherwise of the effect to be produced on the natives by seeing the extent of the colonial possessions of this country, *Sir R. Montgomery* 2690-2693.

Approval generally of the employment of Sikhs and other native troops in the colonies, though probably there would be no pecuniary gain thereby, *Mangles* 3115-3127. 3168-3171—Except in cases of emergency, native troops should not be employed westward of the Cape, *Cavenagh* 3335. 3337—Increased prestige of Great Britain in India if the natives were to serve in the colonies, *ib.* 3359.

Witness considers that in principle the employment of native Indian troops out of India is very expedient, *Lord Strathnairn* 3381-3386—Tendency of service out of India to render the natives more civilised, and to diminish the liability to native revolutions, *ib.* 3382—Further approval of the policy of employing the native Indian troops on foreign service, provided it does not lead to any reduction of the European force, *ib.* 3420. 3433. 3444-3448—Entire fitness of native troops for service in the colonies in time of war, *ib.* 3421—Usefulness of native troops for garrison duties in case of war as well as for field service, *ib.* 3430.

Witness has an exceedingly favourable opinion of the fitness and efficiency of native troops for foreign service, provided certain conditions are fulfilled; suggestions hereon, *Balfour* 3457-3472—Belief that no difficulties need arise in connection with the employment of native troops on foreign service, *ib.* 3800.

COLONIAL AND FOREIGN SERVICE (NATIVE TROOPS)—continued.

3. Evidence opposed to Native Garrisons exclusively, though mixed Garrisons are not objected to:

Impolicy generally of entrusting colonies to the care of native troops without a nucleus of European troops, *Norman* 473, 474—Anticipated good conduct of native troops in the colonies; expediency, however, of there being also some European troops at the same stations, *Keyes* 655-659—Doubt as to the expediency of placing native troops in any colony without some European troops also, *Pears* 818-820, 838-845—Importance in all cases of locating some European troops with native troops, *Keyes* 1156.

Witness submits several objections to the exclusive employment of Indian troops in colonial garrisons, *Sir Hope Grant* 1165 *et seq.*—Unfitness of Hindostanee troops for colonial service, *ib.* 1171, 1177—Various duties which the troops in the colonies are or may be called upon to perform; considerations as to the expediency of entrusting such duties to native soldiers, *ib.* 1275-1300—Approval of mixed garrisons at Hong Kong and other places, *ib.* 1406-1408.

Objection to native regiments being taken from the roster for foreign service, the Hindostanee troops being unfit for the purpose, *Sir Hope Grant* 1415-1419—There are other objections to native garrisons independently of the military objection; but on the latter score it would be highly imprudent to denude the colonies of British troops, *ib.* 1420-1433—Examination of the circumstances of Aden, Rangoon, and Singapore having until lately been garrisoned by native troops exclusively, *ib.* 1474-1483.

Expediency of some European troops in every colony where it may be decided to employ native troops, *Johnson* 1528, 1583—Inexpediency of mixed garrisons at the Mauritius, Malta, &c., though the system is found to answer at Aden, *ib.* 1659-1671, 1695-1702.

Witness is strongly opposed, upon military grounds, to the proposition for substituting native for European troops in the various colonies, *Duke of Cambridge* 2961 *et seq.*—Great danger in attempting to hold any colony unless there be at least a nucleus of British troops, *ib.* 2964, 2967-2971, 2976, 2977-2980, 2985, 3032-3034—Approval of European troops being supplemented with native troops, as is now the case in some colonies, *ib.* 2965.

Grounds for concluding that an increased employment of native troops in the colonies will surely lead to a corresponding reduction in the aggregate of European troops in the army, *Duke of Cambridge* 3047-3057; *Sir H. Storks* 3296-3308—Disapproval of the proposed employment of Indian troops in lieu of British troops in the colonies, *Sir H. Storks* 3172-3174.

Disapproval of colonies being held by Indian troops without any European troops; the two work exceedingly well together, *Lord Strathnairn* 3393, 3394, 3398—Inexpediency of a total removal of European troops from the tropical colonies, though there might be a partial exchange for native troops, *ib.* 3404, 3444-3448.

4. Feeling of the Natives upon the Subject of Foreign Service and Garrison Duties.

Conclusion as to there being considerable objection in the Madras army to foreign service, *Norman* 18 *et seq.*—Facility of getting native troops to leave India on field service, the difficulty only arising in the case of garrison duty, *ib.* 22, 68, 69, 283, 336-348—Prejudicial effect upon recruiting if the men were to go on foreign service for garrison duty, *ib.* 31, 53, 54, 64, 101-109—Great dissatisfaction, more especially in Bengal, if the regiments were ordered abroad in regular rotation, *ib.* 267—Evidence to the effect that native troops would readily take their turn to serve out of India in different colonies if satisfactory arrangements were made to bring provisions; necessity, however, of increasing the native army for this purpose, *Sir W. Elliot* 486-512, 563 *et seq.*

Great discontent among the native army in India if regiments for colonial duty were not taken by the roster, *Sir Hope Grant* 1167-1176—Difficulty in getting native troops to serve regularly in China and other colonies in time of peace, *ib.* 1317-1319, 1333-1335—Unpopularity of the native army in India if it were to take the roster for foreign garrison service, *Sir R. Montgomerie* 1517, 1519, 1520.

Belief that except for service in the field the native army in India would very reluctantly leave the country for foreign service, even with the inducement of increased pay, *Johnson* 1536-1550, 1623-1625, 1636-1638—Disturbing effect upon the native army if called upon for foreign service, *ib.* 1578-1580.

Belief that with adequate pay and judicious arrangements, native troops would willingly leave India on colonial service in the Mauritius, &c., *Caird* 1774-1782—Difficulty in getting the best class of natives to go willingly on general service out of India, though they might go to such a place as the Mauritius, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1873-1875—Greater facility in obtaining the services of native troops out of India in time of war than during peace, *Duke of Cambridge* 3014, 3018, 3019.

5. Question

COLONIAL AND FOREIGN SERVICE (NATIVE TROOPS)—continued.

5. Question of raising Special Corps for Service out of India :

Disapproval of special corps being raised, on the understanding that they were to go on foreign service; advantage rather of the power of sending any regiment required abroad in time of emergency, *Norman* 384-386—Approval of raising regiments expressly with a view to their serving abroad, *Sir W. Elliot* 573-581—Difficulties to be encountered respectively in raising a special regiment for foreign service, and in sending abroad a regiment of the existing army, *Pears* 807-817—Practicability of raising some special corps in India for garrison duty in the colonies, there being, however, serious objections to this plan, *Johnson* 1538. 1550-1556. 1632-1635. 1658—Strong disapproval of raising special corps for service out of India, *Balfour* 3817.

6. Question of calling for Volunteers for Foreign Service, or of holding the entire Native Army liable :

Importance of the power of sending any regiments of the native army abroad, *Norman* 386—Absence of necessity of calling for volunteers for field service out of India, *ib.* 387, 388—Facility of forming a regiment for foreign service by means of volunteers from different regiments, *Sir R. Montgomery* 2713-2715.

Strong objection to the native regiments being called upon to volunteer for foreign service, they having already taken the oath to serve anywhere, so that there should be no option in the matter, *Lord Strathnairn* 3399. 3406. 3410-3422—Expediency on the score of discipline of the Hindoo regiments and Sikh regiments being alike considered available for foreign service, *ib.* 3410, 3411—Decided disapproval of allowing men or regiments to volunteer for foreign service, *Balfour* 3814-3816.

Opinion of Sir John Lawrence that all native troops serving in the colonies should be volunteers for the special service, *App.* 211.

7. Great Care necessary in the Application of a New System :

Expediency of careful consultation of experienced officers before making any arrangements for employing ten or twelve native regiments on foreign service, *Norman* 266—Inexpediency of the worst colonies or stations being selected for native troops, *Probyn* 894. 938—Suggestion that service out of India be first tried on a small scale, and that the arrangements be left to the Government of India, *ib.* 1521. 2689. 2694—Great care necessary before carrying out any arrangements for the colonial service of native troops, *Sir R. Montgomery* 1517. 1521—Expediency of the employment of Indian troops in the colonies being left to the management of the Indian Government instead of the colonial governments, *ib.* 2682-2688. 2708-2712.

8. Expediency of any New Arrangements being put in force in Time of Peace :

Opinion that it would be better to employ the troops out of India in time of peace, rather than first to introduce the practice in time of war, *Sir W. Elliot* 527, 528—More ready and efficient service of native troops in time of war if employed on foreign service in time of peace, *Mackenzie* 2025, 2026. 2039—Expediency of settling in time of peace the details of any scheme for the employment of Indian troops in the colonies, *Sir H. Storks* 3247-3249. 3273—Concurrence in the view that the employment of native troops out of India should be commenced in time of peace, rather than postponed till war occurs, *Lord Strathnairn* 3422, 3423; *Balfour* 3697. 3811, 3812.

9. Considerations as to the Pay and Allowances of Native Troops on Colonial or Foreign Service :

Particulars as to the pay and allowances of the native troops when in India, and when on foreign service, *Norman* 88-100. 115—Large increase of pay necessary, in order to induce the natives to go freely in foreign service, *ib.* 149, 150. 181, 182. 201-217.

Character and amount of the allowances to Indian troops over and above their ordinary pay, when on service in China; in addition to full batta and free rations, pensions are given to the families of those who die or are killed, *Pears* 760-766. 805—Consideration as to the amount and character of the inducement necessary in order to obtain the willing services of native troops out of India, *ib.* 798-807—There need not be any difficulty in regard to the pay of a mixed force, *Probyn* 944, 945—Suggestion as to the increased pay and the privileges necessary in order to induce native troops to go willingly to foreign service, *Baker* 1029-1037. 1050-1058.

Necessity of considering the question of food in every colony in connection with the rate of pay of native troops sent to such colony, *Sir R. Montgomery* 1493-1506—Conclusion that with adequate pay and proper arrangement natives would willingly serve in the colonies, *Caird* 1774-1782. 1791-1797. 1803-1807—Opinion that for three rations extra per month, native troops would willingly serve in the colonies, *ib.* 1781—Suggestion as regards pay on foreign service, that the rations might be free; this, with extra batta, would be about equivalent to double pay, *Sir R. Montgomery* 2695-2699. 2704-2707.

COLONIAL AND FOREIGN SERVICE (NATIVE TROOPS)—continued.

9. *Consideration as to the Pay and Allowances of Native Troops, &c.*—continued.

Statement as to the inequality between the pay of officers with European regiments and of officers with native regiments from India when serving in the same colony; great expense involved in assimilating the pay of the former to that of the latter, *Duke of Cambridge* 2992-3013. 3016—Advantage of some scheme by which European and native troops should serve together without its being necessary to raise the pay and allowances of the former, *ib.* 3008-3010.

Slight weight attached to the objection as regards difference of pay of officers in the case of natives and British troops serving together, *Lord Strathnairn* 3435—Importance of abstaining from any interference with the pay and allowances to which native troops consider themselves entitled when on foreign service, *Balfour* 3469, 3470.

10. *Limit necessary as to the Number of Regiments to be sent out of India:*

Very few regiments which could be spared for foreign service, *Norman* 268, 269—Serious embarrassment of the Indian Government if required to send a dozen native regiments to the colonies; necessity at once of raising other regiments in lieu of them, *ib.* 284, 285—Expediency of a proper limit upon the number of regiments sent on foreign service, *Balfour* 3471, 3472.

11. *Larger Number of Indian Troops than of British Troops required in any Colony.*

Necessity of an increased number of native troops as an equivalent for a similar number of European troops withdrawn from any colony, *Pears* 794-797—Conclusion that two native regiments would be necessary for each British regiment withdrawn from any colony, *Sir Hope Grant* 1438-1445—Necessity of a larger force of native Indian troops than of British troops for the garrison of any colony, *Johnson* 1523-1527. 1587, 1588.

12. *Number of Native Troops employed out of India at the Time of the Mutiny:*

Large employment of native troops out of India at the time of the mutiny, *Balfour* 3800-3802.

Return of native troops of the Madras and Bombay armies on foreign service, in Burmah, China, Persia, &c., on the 1st April 1857; total of 23,631, *App.* 335, 336.

13. *Views of the Governor General of India, the Commander in Chief, and other High Authorities upon the Question of Native Garrisons in the Colonies:*

Official communications setting forth in detail the grounds of objection by Sir John Lawrence, Sir William Mansfield, and several other high authorities, to Indian troops being placed in any colony without European troops; several opinions on the other hand favourable to mixed garrisons under certain conditions, *App.* 211 *et seq.*

See also *Aden. Arracan. Artillery. Bengal Native Army. Bombay Native Army. Burmah. Cape of Good Hope. Caste. Ceylon. China. Colonial Contributions. Coolie Emigration. Cost. Discipline. Duties of Troops. East Indians. Egypt. Families (Native Troops). Hardinge, Lord (the late). Health of Troops. Japan. Java. Madras Native Army. Mahomedans. Malta and Gibraltar. Mauritius. Pay and Allowances. Punjaub and Punjaub Regiments. Sikhs. Straits Settlements. Transport of Troops. War. Wellington, Duke of (the late). West Indies, &c.*

Colonial Service (British Troops.) See *British Army (Colonies.)*

Coolie Emigration. Voluntary character of the coolie emigration, *Norman* 35-39—Important distinction between a coolie and a soldier as regards employment out of India, *ib.* 283—Willingness evinced by the coolies to go to the West Indies, the Mauritius, &c., *Sir W. Elliot* 602-608.

Absence of any real parallel between the emigration of coolies and the foreign service of native troops, *Johnson* 1774-1746—Great aversion of native troops to separation from their families whilst the coolies can take their families with them, *ib.* 1746, 1747.

Information relative to the extent of the coolie emigration, the wages in the Mauritius and the West Indies, and the degree of willingness on the part of the natives to leave India for employment beyond the sea, *Caird* 1752 *et seq.*—Small per-centage of married men among the emigrants; difficulty of getting their wives to accompany them, *ib.* 1754-1757—Preference given to low caste men as coolies, high-caste men often concealing their caste in order to be allowed to go, *ib.* 1758-1763. 1784-1788.

Limited objection shown by the coolies in late years to crossing the sea; adequate arrangements as to the supply of water, &c. on board, *Caird* 1764-1766. 1772, 1773, 1784-1790—Frequent instances of sepoys from the mutinous regiments having gone to the Mauritius as coolies, *ib.* 1767-1771—Statement of the rate of pay which induced the natives to emigrate to the Mauritius and the West Indies, *ib.* 1776-1780. 1791-1797. 1803-1807.

COAT

COST (BRITISH AND NATIVE TROOPS):

1. *As to the relative Cost of European and Native Troops in the Colonies.*
2. *As to the Cost of European and Native Troops in India.*

1. *As to the relative Cost of European and Native Troops in the Colonies.*

Doubt as to its being cheaper to have Indian troops on foreign stations to be relieved every three years than European troops relieved every five years, *Norman* 151, 152. 156—Respect in which a native soldier on service out of India would be much cheaper than a European soldier, *Probyn* 873-878. 939, 940—Larger number of native troops than of Europeans required for garrison purposes; increased cost on this score, *Sir Hope Grant* 1340, 1341. 1371-1376—Greatly increased cost of native troops when employed out of India, *ib.* 1357-1359—Necessity of relieving Indian troops after two or three years' service; expense on this score as compared with the relief of British troops every ten years, *ib.* 1360, 1361. 1367-1370.

Doubt whether there would be much economy in substituting native for British troops in the colonies, *Johnson* 1583-1586. 1710—Serious expense involved in the frequent relief of native troops, *ib.* 1584, 1585. 1710. 1735, 1736.

Conclusion as to the less expense of Indian than of British troops in the colonies notwithstanding the more frequent relief of the former, *Mackenzie* 2040-2048—Witness explains sundry items contained in a certain paper showing the estimated annual cost of maintaining a battalion of infantry at different stations east of the Cape, *Shadwell* 2618 *et seq.*—Conclusion that there would be a saving of expense by substituting a native for a British regiment out of India, *Lord Strathnairn* 3389—Great diminution in the saving of expense if frequent furloughs were necessary, *ib.* 3408.

Calculation that taking everything into consideration the cost of one European will be equal to half of two natives on foreign service, *Balfour* 3473, 3474.

Estimate of the annual cost that would devolve upon the British Government by the employment in China of two Sikh regiments, *App.* 263-266.

Approximate estimate of the annual cost of maintaining a battalion of infantry, consisting of 788 men of all ranks, at certain stations east of the Cape, and at the Cape, *App.* 290, 291.

2. *As to the Cost of European and Native Troops in India.*

Impression that the cost of a European regiment in India is about double that of a native regiment, *Norman* 116-118—Reference to a memorandum showing the actual cost of a native corps and a European corps in India, *ib.* 278-282—Reference to a certain official statement as containing a very accurate account of the cost of European and native troops in India, *Balfour* 3770, 3771.

Documents showing the cost and organization of Indian native regiments, the comparative cost of European and native regiments, the amount and mode of payment of non-effective charges, and the rates of Indian allowances, *App.* 305-315—Statement showing the total annual cost of the several branches of the European armies of the three Presidencies, *ib.* 309, 310—Statement showing the total annual cost of the several branches of the native armies of the three Presidencies, *ib.* 311—Detail of the establishment and pay of one European regiment of ten companies, *ib.* 314—Detail of the establishment and pay of one native infantry regiment of eight companies, *ib.* 315.

Statement showing the estimated cost of services and supplies for maintaining a force in non-commissioned officers and rank and file of 203 Royal Artillery, 800 European infantry, 816 native infantry, and 89 gun lascars, *App.* 316, 317—Statement showing the total estimated cost and the capitation rates due under each head of service, for the maintenance of a military force of 1,908 non-commissioned officers of rank and file in the artillery, European infantry, native infantry, and gun lascars, *ib.* 317.

Comparative cost for regimental pay and allowances, of a certain military force in each of the three Presidencies and in Ceylon, *App.* 318—Comparative statement of the cost of military administrative establishments in the three presidencies and in Ceylon, *ib.*

Paper handed in by General Balfour showing the fixed strength and the pay and cost of infantry of the line for service in India, *App.* 334.

See also Cavalry. Hospital Expenses. Pay and Allowances. Transport of Troops.

Crimean War. Reference to the large withdrawal of European troops from India during the Crimean war, in spite of the strong remonstrances of Lord Dalhousie; minute of Lord Dalhousie on this subject, *Balfour* 3600, and *App.* 325-327.

D.

Dalhousie, Lord. Importance attached to a certain minute by Lord Dalhousie in 1854, in which he arrives at the conclusion that thirty-five regiments of European infantry were quite sufficient for the garrison of India; adoption by witness of this minute in all its integrity, *Balfour* 3552-3558. 3641—Proposition by Lord Dalhousie in 1854 that additional Europeans should be raised, by disbanding two native regiments for every additional European regiment, *ib.* 3736—Refusal of the foregoing proposal by the Home Government, *ib.*

Minute by Lord Dalhousie, as Governor General of India, dated the 15th September 1854, submitting reasons for objecting to the withdrawal of two European regiments from India, *App.* 325-327.

Minute by Lord Dalhousie in February 1856, with reference to the future force of European troops in Bengal and throughout India, and the alterations desirable with a view to increased efficiency, *App.* 327-333.

Demerara. Instance in the case of Demerara of the strong objection of colonists to the substitution of native for European troops; the objection in this case was against a West Indian regiment, *Johnson* 1530-1534. 1615-1623.

Depôts and Reserves. Statement relative to the very inadequate force at home, and the inefficiency of the depôts with reference to the force in India and the colonies, *Balfour* 3520-3541. 3598-3600—Reference to the views of the Duke of Cambridge as to the great difficulty experienced in regard to relief for the regiments in India, *ib.* 3541. 3599—Expediency of a concentration of reserves and regiments at home by withdrawals from the colonies, *ib.* 3618-3625—Approval of India being called upon to pay for any reserve force necessary in England, in order to keep up the force in India to such an amount as may be deemed necessary by Indian authority, *ib.* 3754-3760—Statement as to the insufficiency of the reserves and depôts in England for maintaining the force in India; instances of very unfit recruits having been set out, *ib.* 3754-3757.

Discipline (Native Army.) Important advantage if by service out of India the prejudices of the native soldiers in regard to caste could be mitigated or removed, so as to prevent interference with discipline, *Lord Strathnairn* 3381-3386—Statement as to the injurious effect upon the discipline by a system of volunteering for foreign service, *ib.* 3389. 3406. 3410. 3422.

Belief that the employment of native Indian troops on foreign service may be made in the highest degree beneficial to the discipline of the native army, *Balfour* 3797, 3798—Especial importance of strict discipline for native troops, *ib.*

DISTRIBUTION (BRITISH ARMY):

1. *In India.*
2. *Generally.*

1. *In India:*

Statement explanatory of the extent to which the British troops in India are located at hill stations; contemplated distribution in this manner of twelve per cent. of the troops, *Norman* 239-241. 248-252—Distribution of the British troops with a view to massing them to some extent, and at the same time so as to hold all the more important points, *ib.* 242—Difficulty in withdrawing the troops from all stations reported to be unhealthy, *ib.*

Opinion that the bulk of the British army should be kept at frontier posts, such as Peshawur, and that the rest should be located in the large cities, such as Patna, *Mungles* 3080, 3081. 3198. 3007-3109—With regard to the number of British troops not stationed at different posts and required for the local duties, witness contends that many of these posts might be given up altogether, *ib.* 3151-3156.

2. *Generally:*

Objection to the practice of having a small European force in numerous colonies, it being preferable to mass the army as much as possible, *Mackenzie* 2027-2036. 2050-2052.

Approval of the present system of scattering the army in small detachments throughout the colonies rather than of massing the troops in positions nearer home, *Duke of Cambridge* 2972-2975.

Statement relative to the very inadequate force at home, and the inefficiency of the depôts with reference to the force in India and the colonies, *Balfour* 3520-3541. 3598-3600—Much more satisfactory distribution of the army in 1854 than in 1866 on account of the much larger relative force than retained at home, *ib.* 3520, 3521. 3625—Statement in favour of largely increasing the forces and reserves at home by withdrawals from abroad, *ib.* 3618-3625—The means of reinforcing the distant parts of the

DISTRIBUTION (BRITISH ARMY)—continued.2. *Generally*—continued.

the empire can be supplied much better from a central position than by keeping regiments located in the colonies, *Balfour* 3619.

Return, dated 28th March 1867, of the number of troops in the several colonies and dependencies borne on the strength of the army, *App.* 282, 283.

Statement showing the distribution of the British army on 1st January in each year since 1846, *App.* 337, 338.

Douglas, Lieutenant General, R. P. Letter received from General Douglas, Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, dated July 1867, together with answers in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment if it be decided upon, *App.* 242, 243.

Durand, Sir Henry. Communication from Sir Henry Durand, dated Simla, 29th May 1867, as to the inexpediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 221-223.

Duties of Troops. Importance of native troops on foreign service not being overburdened with duties, *Balfour* 3463, 3464. 3503—Statement in favour of many of the duties now performed by soldiers in India being placed under the police; important economy thereby, whilst there would be much advantage on the score of discipline, *ib.* 3465-3468—Unduly heavy duties now imposed upon the native soldiers, *ib.* 3467—Expediency of a positive regulation respecting the duties of native troops out of India, *ib.* 3503.

Facility with which a case might be made out for the full employment of a large increase of troops, both in India and the colonies; that is, by an increase of civil and police duties, *Balfour* 3517-3520—Further representation as to the importance of clearly providing that the duties of native troops in the colonies shall not embrace police duties of various kinds, *ib.* 3626-3628—Loose discipline sure to follow from scattering the native troops in small guards and escort duties away from their officers; strong opinion of Lord Clyde on this subject, *ib.* 3648. 3655-3661.

Views expressed by Colonel Balfour in 1861 upon the subject of imposing guard duties upon native troops on foreign service, *App.* 322.

See also *Police (India).*

E.

East Indians (Half-Castes). Suggestion that the East Indians, or half-castes, might with advantage be enrolled for service out of India, *Sir W. Elliot* 529-532.

Edwards, Colonel, Sir Herbert, K.C.B. Answers received from Sir Herbert Edwards, dated 14th May 1867, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 229-232.

Egypt. Contemplated employment of Indian native troops on active service in such places as Egypt, *Duke of Cambridge* 3006, 3007. 3015—Approval of the employment of Asiatic troops in Egypt, *Sir H. Storks* 3274—Entire fitness of Indian native troops for operations in Egypt, *Balfour* 3813.

Elliot, Sir Walter, K.S.I. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Was in the Madras Civil Service from 1822 to 1859; 478-480—Alacrity with which Madras regiments have gone on service to Burmah, 481-484—Composition of the Madras army adverted to as comprising chiefly low-caste men, there being however men of all castes, 485. 497-500. 523. 594-600—Instances of Madras sepoys having objected to go on service beyond the sea, through some difficulty about their pay or pensions; absence of difficulty on religious grounds, 486-512. 519. 520.

Recruiting of the Madras regiments chiefly from particular localities, the families living with the regiments and forming a sort of military colony, 500-503. 513, 514—Practice when the men have been serving out of India, for the family pensions to be paid directly to the families left behind, 504-506—Extremely good conduct of the Madras troops in China, 510-512—Explanation in connection with the refusal of the 8th Regiment of Madras cavalry to embark for Burmah in 1858; 515-518.

Belief that no evil would result from the employment of Madras troops in the colonies in time of peace, as well as during war, 521-528—Circumstance of caste not being recognised in the Madras army, 523—Suggestion that the East Indians or half-castes might with advantage be enrolled for service out of India, 529-532—Opinion that the employment of Chinese troops or other foreign mercenaries in India would not have any bad effect upon the native mind, 533. 534. 625-628.

Report, 1867—continued.

Elliot, Sir Walter, K.S.I. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

Instance of several warlike tribes in Madras from whom valuable troops or regiments might be organised, 535-537—Considerable number of blacks from Abyssinia, &c. on the Western Coast of India, who would form excellent troops, 538-545—Information relative to a class found all over India, called Colondas, to which class the Santals belong, and which has never yet been used as soldiers, 546-550—Opinion that with proper arrangement discharged European soldiers might with advantage be induced to settle in the Neilgherries and other hill districts, 551-562.

Further expression of the opinion that native troops would readily take their turn to serve out of India in different colonies if satisfactory arrangements were made as to pay and pensions; necessity, however, of increasing the native army for this purpose, 563 *et seq.*—Advantage in the native regiments being composed of as many different elements as possible, 572, 578, 579, 629-631—Approval of raising regiments expressly with a view to their serving abroad, 573-581—Fitness of native troops for garrison duties in Malta; less cost than by employing British troops, 574, 584, 585, 588, 589.

Expediency of limiting to three years the period of foreign service of Madras regiments, 575, 581-583, 591—Tact required on the part of the commanding officers in colonies where Indian troops might be employed; doubt as to any serious difficulty arising on this score, 601, 609-618—Willingness evinced by the coolies to go to the West Indies, the Mauritius, &c., 602-608—Temporary difficulty upon the occasion of sending Madras troops to Arracan in 1824 and 1825; 619—Except to China and the Straits Madras troops have not gone on garrison duty out of India, 620.

Cause of the mutiny in 1815 in connection with the sending of native troops to Java, 621, 622—Aversion of high-caste natives to cook on board ship, so that it is most difficult to employ these beyond the sea, 623, 624—Very little disaffection in the Madras army during the mutiny of 1857, though there have been several former mutinies from various causes, 629-632—Objection to enlisting Mahrattas for the Madras army, unless in connection with other castes in the same regiment, 633-635.

Enlistment (Native Troops). See *Colonial and Foreign Service*, 1. *Recruiting.*

European Troops. See *British Army (Colonies).* *British Army (India).* *Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops).* *Local European (Army India).*

F.

Families (Native Troops). Considerations as to the obstacle to foreign service on account of the separation of the men from their families, whilst it would be impracticable for the latter to accompany the regiments, *Norman* 27-31, 136-150, 157 *et seq.*—Regularity with which the men transmit a portion of their pay to their families, *ib.* 124-127—Doubt as to the absence of men from their families for a period of three years leading to any gross immoralities, *ib.* 173-190, 218, 221.

Recruiting of the Madras regiments chiefly for particular localities, the families living with the regiments and forming a sort of military colony, *Sir W. Elliot* 500-503, 512, 514—Custom where the men have been serving out of India for the family pensions to be paid directly to the families left behind, *ib.* 504-506—Practice of the native troops in Burmah and Singapore to live on very scant fare, in order to save as much as possible for their families at home, *Sir Hope Grant* 1233, 1319-1323.

Great aversion of native troops to separate from their families, *Johnson* 1746—Willingness of the native troops to remain at Singapore if they had not been separated from their wives and families, *Cavenagh* 3331-3333.

See also *Coolie Emigration.*

Fidelity (Native Garrisons). Opinion as to the trustworthy character of Indian troops in garrison at Hong Kong, Singapore, &c. in the event of local riot, *Keyes* 1156-1161.

Field, Lieutenant Colonel J. Answers received from Colonel Field, commanding the 10th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 251.

Fonblanque, Edward B. de, Deputy Commissary General. (Analysis of his Evidence).—Has had experience of the employment of native Indian troops in the West Indies, China, and Ceylon, 2716-2719—Exceptionally high rate of payment of Indian troops serving in China in 1860 and 1861; 2721-2726—Very satisfactory results of the employment of Punjaubees, Belloochees, and irregular horse in China during the last war; absence of difficulty as to rations or on the score of religion, 2728-2749—Excellence of Punjaubees and Belloochees for garrison and sentry duties; their advantage over British troops as sentries, 2729, 2730, 2750-2752, 2792, 2793, 2881-2883.

Objection to Ceylon being garrisoned by native troops exclusively; feeling, however, of the planters that neither British nor native troops are required, 2752, 2794-2812.

2823-

Fonblanque, Edward B. de. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

2823-2825 — Opinion that Hong Kong might be garrisoned entirely by native troops, 2753, 2754 — Wretched character of the Hong Kong police, 2754-2756 — Much greater cost of native troops in Ceylon than in the Presidencies; particulars hereon, 2757 — Amount of pay and allowances of British troops in Ceylon, 2757. 2770-2774.

Material changes effected in the constitution of the Ceylon Rifle Regiment, the result being that the corps is much more expensive and much less efficient than it used to be, 2758-2763 — Improvement if the Ceylon regiment were again recruited chiefly from the Malayan Archipelago; difficulty hereon, 2763-2769 — Approval of a Malay garrison at Singapore, 2775, 2776 — Suggested employment of a Chinese regiment in Ceylon, the Chinese making admirable soldiers when properly officered, 2776-2778.

Statement showing the great misunderstanding which prevailed, and the sore feeling created, in regard to the experiment of sending 1,000 Sikhs to Ceylon, 2779-2791 — Belief that the Chinese would serve for any period abroad if they were well paid, 2813 — Contemplated enlistment for a period of ten years in the case of Indian troops employed in the colonies, 2814 — Large proportion of European officers in the Ceylon Rifles as compared with the Punjaub regiments, 2815-2818.

Evidence as to the constitution of the West India regiments, and as to their efficiency, whilst they are much more economical than European troops, 2825-2843. 2852-2863 — Opinion that African troops might be employed with advantage at Mauritius, 2831 — Also at Bermuda, *ib.* — Statement as to the West India regiments being now recruited in the West Indies instead of on the west coast of Africa; difficulty in recruiting from Africa, 2832-2836. 2874, 2875 — Willingness of African troops to settle in any colony if they are allowed to have their wives with them, 2838-2848.

Equal docility of Malays and Africans as of European troops, 2844. 2849-2852 — Indisposition of Malays to settle in any colony, 2847, 2848 — Advantage of African troops in being able to stand cold as well as heat, 2853-2862 — Considerable sickness and mortality among the officers of the West Indian regiments, caused very much by indulgence in drink, 2864-2868.

Opinion in favour of barracks at Nuwara Eliya, as the best place in Ceylon for white troops, 2869-2873 — Comment upon the representations of medical officers and others in favour of the Ceylon Rifles having as much space and accommodation per man in barracks as European troops, 2877-2880. 2884, 2885 — Nothing can be worse than the present European barracks in Ceylon, 2886 — Larger allowances and expenses in China than in India, 2890, 2891.

Foreign Mercenaries (India). See *Chinese Troops (India).*

Foreign Service (British Troops). Average of from two to five years at each foreign station, the rule being about ten years foreign service and five years at home, *Hon. H. K. Clifford* 752-757 — Rule as to the regiments serving ten years in India and the colonies, and five years at home, *Sir Hope Grant* 1252, 1253 — Statement showing that in numerous instances it has been found necessary to depart from the regulation of ten years' service abroad and five years at home, *ib.* 1254-1267 — Further explanation relative to the system whereby it is intended that the army shall have ten years foreign service and five years home service, *ib.* 1382-1398. 1454.

Desire of the authorities to shorten the term of colonial service, so that the British army may have not more than two-thirds of colonial service for one-third of home service; prospect of this being arrived at, *Duke of Cambridge* 3049, 3050. 3058-3060 — Maximum reduction already effected in the British army, so that the troops do not now get five years' service at home for ten years abroad, *Lord Strathnairn* 3433, 3434.

Return of the movement of regiments during the last twenty years to and from India, the Cape, and all colonies east of the Cape, and of the time passed by each regiment included in the above return, at each station during that period, *App.* 268-278 — Return of the movement of regiments during the last twenty years to and from the West Indies and the Bermudas, and of the time passed by each regiment at each station, *ib.* 279-281.

Foreign Service (Native Troops). See *Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops).*

Forts and Arsenals (India). Several arsenals and forts which it is extremely desirable to hold with British troops; number of forts, &c. now garrisoned by Europeans, *Norman* 227-238 — Considerable number of fortifications in India, many of which require European garrisons as guards, *ib.* 283, 284.

Furloughs (Native Army). Practice as to furloughs in the Bengal and Madras armies respectively; deduction made from the pay when on furlough, *Norman* 128-133. 138 — Long and frequent furloughs in the Bengal regiments, *ib.* 128. 131-133.

G.

Garrisons of Colonies (Native Troops). See *Artillery.* *Cape of Good Hope.* *Ceylon.*
China. *Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops).* *Cost.* *Duties of Troops.*
Egypt. *Malta and Gibraltar.* *Mauritius.* *Mutiny.* *Straits Settlements.*
Transport of Troops. *War.* *West Indies, &c.*

Gell, Colonel Sherbrooke. Answers received from Colonel Gell, Deputy Quartermaster General of the Bombay army, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 245-248.

Gibraltar. See *Malta and Gibraltar.*

Goorka Regiments. The men of the Goorka regiments mostly come from Nepal, but not many of them are real Goorkas, *Norman* 12-15—Peculiar difficulty in getting the Goorka regiments to serve out of India *Norman* 265; *Johnson* 1557.

Gordon, Colonel Charles. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Went to China in 1860, and served there for four and a-half years, 2892, 2893—Excellent services rendered in China by the Loodiana regiment and the Beloochee troops, 2894-2901—Respect of the Chinese for the Sikhs, whereas they had a contempt for the Sepoys, 2896-2898. 2943-2947—Absence of any actual dissatisfaction in the Loodiana regiment at Shanghai, because they were kept in China longer than was agreed upon, 2902-2912.

Great difficulty in making the Chinese efficient soldiers in their own country, though large numbers of men might, if well paid, be induced to serve abroad where they would make good soldiers if properly officered, 2913 *et seq.*—Grounds for objecting to the employment of Chinese troops at Hong Kong, in addition to European troops, 2930-2934—Objection also, to the employment of Chinese troops at Singapore, 2936, 2937—Inducement to Chinese to serve abroad if allowed to take their wives with them, 2939, 2940.

Efficiency of Chinese troops, if well led, as against other Asiatics, but not against Europeans, 2942—Necessity of a reserve of English troops at Hong Kong, 2948, 2949—Numerous European officers in the Chinese regiments under witness's command; this was essential, 2950-2955—Great obstacle to efficiency in a Chinese regiment when under Chinese officers, 2955-2960.

Government of India. Argument that by governing India with justice and by observing good faith towards the chiefs greater safety will be ensured, than by maintaining the present large European Army, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1877, 1878. 1882. 1910-1934—Respects in which the British Government of India has been less considerate of the prejudices or the natives in recent years, whilst we have not observed such good faith as formerly towards the people, *ib.* 1951-1954.

Grant, Lieut. General Sir Hope, G. C. B. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Is Quartermaster-General, 1164—Submits several objections to the proposed employment of Indian troops in colonial garrisons, 1165 *et seq.*—Great discontent among the native army in India, if regiments for colonial duty were not taken by the roster, 1167-1170. 1416, 1417—Unfitness of Hindostanee troops generally for service in the Colonies, 1171. 1177. 1418, 1419—Probable fitness of the Sikhs, Goorkas, and others for colonial garrison service, the difficulty being to get them to leave India for the purpose, 1172-1176.

Conclusion as to the unfitness of native troops for garrisoning Hong Kong, and as to the unwillingness of the colonists to contribute towards their expense, 1177-1192—Sufficiency hitherto of Madrasees for garrisoning Singapore, it being a peculiarly quiet place, 1183-1190—Approval of withdrawing British troops from Singapore in the event of a war in Europe; they might be brought home in about a month, 1193-1200—Objection to the Mauritius being garrisoned by native troops exclusively; adverse feeling of the colonists in the matter, 1201-1206. 1376.

Grounds for concluding that it is inexpedient to garrison Ceylon with native troops exclusively, 1207-1212—Importance of the Colonies having European troops to defend them in the event of war, 1209-1213—Much greater cost of transport of British troops than of natives from Madras to Singapore and Burmah, the native troops being much more crowded together on board; explanation hereon, 1214-1224. 1467, 1468—Relative fighting powers of the Sikhs, the Madrasees, and the Chinese, 1227-1232.

Difficulties experienced in connection with the employment of Madras troops at Rangoon; large increase made in their pay, 1233—Practice of the native troops in Burmah and Singapore to live on very scant fare, in order to save as much money as possible for their families at home, 1233. 1319-1323—Greater difficulty in arranging for the service of native troops in the Mauritius, or more distant places than in the Straits Settlements, 1234, 1235—Considerable expense on the score of pensions to the widows of native soldiers dying on foreign service, 1236.

Reference

Report, 1867—continued.

Grant, Lieut. General Sir Hope, G. C. B. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

Reference to a certain return from witness's department as showing the present number of regiments in Australia, China, Ceylon, &c., and the alterations being carried out, 1239-1251—Rule as to regiments serving ten years in India and the Colonies, and five years at home, 1252, 1253—Statement showing that, in numerous instances, it has been found necessary to depart from the regulation as to ten years' service abroad and five years at home, 1254-1267—Strong objection to any reduction of the English army in India, 1261—Popularity of service in India to British soldiers, 1268-1271.

Importance attached to the erection of barracks at Kowloon, as a means of improving the health of the troops in China, 1272-1274. 1288-1290—Various duties which the troops in the Colonies are or may be called upon to perform; conclusion as to the inexpediency of intrusting such duties to native soldiers, 1275-1300—Imperial importance of garrisoning the Colonies with British troops, though in the event of a war in Europe it might be found necessary to bring the troops home, and to supply their place abroad with native troops, 1291-1300. 1308-1316. 1336-1346. 1426.

Objection to Hong Kong being garrisoned by European artillery aided by native troops exclusively, 1301-1307—Difficulty in getting native troops to serve regularly in China and other Colonies in time of peace, 1317-1319. 1333-1335—Inferiority of the Madrasees to Sikh troops, 1327-1330—Larger number of native troops than of Europeans required for garrison purposes; increased cost on this score, 1340, 1341. 1371-1376—Approval of a mixed garrison of European and native troops at Hong Kong; necessity of one European regiment there, 1347-1356. 1407.

Greatly enhanced cost of native troops when employed out of India, 1357-1359—Necessity of relieving Indian troops in two or three years; serious expense on this score as compared with the relief of British troops every ten years, 1360, 1361. 1367-1370—Explanation as to the per-centage of wives now allowed to be taken abroad with the regiments, 1362-1366—Only as a last resource, would witness replace British troops in the Colonies by native troops in time of war, 1377, 1378—Danger to be incurred by garrisoning Ceylon with native troops exclusively, 1379-1381.

Further explanation relative to the system whereby it is intended that the army shall have ten years' foreign service and five years' home service, 1382-1398. 1454—Advantage of having a whole European regiment at the sanatorium in Ceylon, rather than at Galle, 1402—Expediency of a European regiment at Japan in addition to one at Hong Kong, 1403-1406—Approval of mixed garrisons at other places besides Hong Kong, 1407, 1408—Obstacles to the formation of European settlements in India as the nucleus of a local European force, 1409-1414.

Witness further objects to native regiments being taken from the roster for foreign service, the Hindostanee troops being unfit for the purpose, 1415-1419—There are other objections to native garrisons, independently of the military objection, but on the latter score it would be highly inexpedient to denude the Colonies of British troops, 1420-1430—Danger in leaving European Artillery supported only by native troops, 1431-1436—Conclusion that for each British regiment withdrawn from any Colony two native regiments would be necessary, and that about ten or twelve British regiments might be withdrawn if the principle of mixed garrisons is adopted, 1438-1445.

Decided objection to any native troops at Gibraltar or Malta, under any circumstances in time of war, 1446, 1447—Less objection to service in China if there were improved barracks there, and if the pay and allowances were increased concurrently with a reduction in the period of service, 1451-1453—Importance of a small European force in Australia as a nucleus for a local force, 1455-1459—Expediency of a European force at Singapore, 1460-1466.

Considerable expense of bringing discharged men home from India, so that it would be well to increase the bounty given in India on re-enlistment, 1471-1473.

Examination on the circumstances of Aden, Rangoon, and Singapore having until lately been garrisoned by native troops exclusively, 1474-1483—Completion of the barracks at Singapore for only one wing of a European regiment, 1484-1487—Necessity of taking climatic considerations into account with reference to the employment of native troops out of India, 1488-1491.

Grant, Lieutenant General James. Answers received from General Grant, Governor and Commander in Chief at Malta, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment if determined upon, *App.* 238-240.

Green, Lieutenant Colonel Sir Henry, C.B., K.C.S.I. Communication from Sir Henry Green, Commandant of the Sind Frontier Field Force, as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 257.

Report, 1867—continued.

Guy, Major General. Views of General Guy, commanding the Forces in China and Japan, upon the question of the employment of native Indian troops in different British Colonies, and the best mode of carrying such employment into operation, *App.* 240, 241.

Gwalior. Expediency of the fort at Gwalior being garrisoned by Europeans, *Norman* 229-233.

H.

Hardinge, Lord (the late). Views of Lord Hardinge in 1845, in disapproval of foreign garrison service being forced on the native troops, *Norman* 64-66

Havelock, Sir Henry (the late). Memorandum by Colonel Norman, in opposition to the views and arguments of Sir Henry Havelock in favour of a large reduction in the British army in India, and also in the native army, *App.* 217-220.

Health of Troops. Very heavy and unhealthy duties of British troops in the Colonies, so that the substitution of native troops is very expedient, *Mackenzie* 2019-2024. 2054-2089-2091—Advantage, as regards climate, by the substitution of colonial troops for Europeans, *Taylor* 2420-2422—Approval of mixed garrisons in tropical colonies, with a view to protecting the health of the British army as much as possible, *Lord Strathnairn*, 3447, 3448.—See also *Sickness and Mortality*.

Hill Stations (India). Proposed arrangement for stationing about twelve per cent. of the European troops on the hills, *Norman* 239-241—Obstacle to any further removal of European troops to hill stations, *ib.* 248-252.

Hincks, Governor (British Guiana). Views of Governor Hincks, of British Guiana, in favour of the formation of a constabulary force in the West Indies as a means of dispensing with European garrisons, *Taylor* 2584-2586.

Hindoos. Strong religious prejudice of Hindoos against service beyond the seas, *Norman* 17. 40-47. 67. 393-400—Comparatively small proportion of Hindoos in the Madras Army, *ib.* 43—Difficulty as to foreign service in the case more especially of high caste Hindoos or Brahmins, *ib.* 47-50—Unfitness of Hindoo troops generally for service in the Colonies, *Sir Hope Grant*, 1171. 1177. 1418, 1419.

Opinion of Sir John Lawrence, that men of the Hindoo races are not well suited for colonial service, *App.* 211.

See also *Caste.* *Colonial and Foreign Service.*

Hodgson, Major General. Answers received from Major General Hodgson commanding the troops in Ceylon, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 232, 233.

Honduras. Good conduct of some black troops upon the occasion of an invasion of Honduras in November last, *Taylor* 2530-2537.

Hong Kong. See *China*.

Hospital Expenses. Great saving of hospital expenses by the employment of native soldiers as compared with Europeans on foreign service out of India, *Balfour* 3482, 3483.

I.

Immorality (Native Troops). Much less immorality and drunkenness in native regiments than in European regiments, *Norman* 176-180. 185-187.

Insurrection (India). Witness maintains that, if the army be reduced, there need be no apprehension of an insurrection of the people of India as distinct from a mutiny; experience of the last 100 years adverted to in support of this conclusion, *Mangles* 3061 *et seq.*—Witness further repudiates the idea that any danger arises from the population of the country, *ib.* 3129-3133. 3146. 3150.

J.

Jamaica Insurrection. Opinion expressed by Governor Eyre in March 1865 that black troops without European troops at hand are a source of danger in the West Indies; this was disproved during the subsequent outbreak, *Taylor* 2439-2442—Fidelity of the black troops in the Jamaica outbreak of 1865 further adverted to, *ib.* 2583.—See also *West Indies, &c.*

Japan

Japan. Expediency of an European regiment at Japan in addition to one at Hong Kong, *Sir Hope Grant*, 1403-1406—Contemplated garrison of Indian troops, with a battery or two of European Artillery, in Japan as well as Hong Kong, *Mackenzie* 2063-2074. 2097-2099.

Return, dated 28th March 1867, of the number of troops borne on the strength of the Imperial army, and stationed in Japan, *App.* 283.

Java. Serious mutiny formerly through native troops having been kept in Java after field service was over, *Norman* 23—Cause of the mutiny in 1815 in connection with the sending of native troops to Java, *Sir W. Elliot* 621, 622.

Johnson, Colonel Edwin B., C.B. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Is assistant Military Secretary to the Commander in Chief, 1522—Necessity of a larger force of native Indian troops than of British troops for the garrison of any Colony, 1523-1527. 1587, 1588—Expediency of some European troops in every Colony, where it may be decided to employ native troops, 1528. 1583—Inexpediency of British artillery in any Colony being supported solely by native troops, 1529. 1589-1604. 1626-1628—Instance in the case of Demerara of the strong objection of colonists to the substitution of native for European troops; the objection in this case was against a West India regiment, 1530-1534. 1615-1622.

Belief that except for service in the field the native army in India would very reluctantly leave the country for foreign service, even with the inducement of increased pay, 1536-1550. 1623-1625. 1636-1638. 1733, 1734—Practicability of raising some special corps in India for garrison duty in the Colonies, there being, however, serious objections to this plan, 1538. 1550-1556. 1632-1635. 1658—Steps being taken towards raising a Beloochee regiment for service at Hong Kong, 1552-1554—Difficulty in obtaining a supply of Goorkas for foreign service, 1557—Strong disapproval of the employment of Chinese troops in India, 1558, 1559.

Danger of native troops in the Mauritius taking part with the Coolies in the event of a rebellion, 1560-1578. 1674-1694—Disturbing effect upon the native army in India if called upon for foreign service, 1578-1580—Doubt whether there would be much economy in substituting native for British troops in the Colonies, 1583-1586. 1710—Particulars relative to the garrison at the Straits Settlements; alterations contemplated, 1600-1614.

Circumstance of there having been an unsupported battalion of European artillery at Mhow when the mutiny broke out; witness attributing the safety of Central India and the loyalty of Holkar to the influence of this battalion, 1626. 1715-1720—Objections to the employment of native artillery in the Colonies, 1629-1631—Relative number of British and native troops composing the garrison of Aden; great importance of this post, 1639-1646. 1649. 1659, 1660—Information relative to the number of British and native troops at Rangoon and other stations in Burmah, 1647, 1648.

Statement as to service at Aden being greatly disliked by the native troops, 1649-1657—Inexpediency of mixed garrisons at the Mauritius, Malta, &c., though the system is found to answer at Aden, 1659-1671. 1695-1702—Advantage of British garrisons in the Mauritius, Ceylon, and the Straits Settlements, as constituting a reserve for India in time of emergency; instance of this at the time of the mutiny, 1665-1667. 1703-1709. 1729, 1730—Less difficulty as to native troops going to China than to most other Colonies, 1672, 1673. 1696, 1697—Danger in the garrison at the Cape being composed largely of Indian troops, 1711-1714. 1731, 1732.

Intention of raising the Ceylon rifle regiment to fourteen companies, of which eight will be stationed in the Straits, 1721-1724—Great difficulty of inducing native troops to serve in the Colonies, unless under an absolute guarantee that they would be relieved every three years, 1733, 1734. 1747—Extremely unsatisfactory and expensive arrangement in garrisoning Malta and Gibraltar with Indian troops, 1735-1737—Objection to any reduction of the British force in India, 1739.

Less danger on the score of mutiny when a native regiment forms part of a mixed garrison in a Colony than when it is in India, 1740-1743—Absence of any real parallel between the emigration of coolies and the foreign service of native troops, 1744-1746—Great aversion of native troops to separation from their families, whilst the coolies can take their families with them, 1746, 1747.

K.

Kaffir Levies. Doubt as to the success of a proposal for raising Kaffir levies for service out of Africa, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1902-1905.

Keyes, Colonel C. P. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Has been connected with the 1st Punjaub Infantry for eighteen years, 636, 637—The regiment is composed chiefly of Pathans, Sikhs, and Dogras, the latter being mostly Rajpoots, 638, 639—Belief that
478—I. D 3

Report, 1867—*continued.*

Keyes, Colonel C. P. (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

that men could readily be raised in the Punjaub to go on foreign service if sufficient inducement were held out, as by doubling the present pay and providing rations, 640-645. 709-722—Difficulty in inducing natives to serve abroad in garrison duty for a longer period than three years, or even for that period, 646-654. 664-679.

Anticipated good conduct of native troops in the colonies; expediency, however, of there being also some European troops at the same stations, 655-659—Prejudice of Rajpoots, &c., against cooking at sea, this difficulty, however, being easily surmounted, 660-663. 680—Fitness of the Punjaub regiments for service in cold climates, 681-686—Very little prejudice among the Pathans in regard to food, 687-690—Bad feeling to be created by bringing Chinese regiments into India, 691-693.

Doubt as to the willingness of witness's regiment to go on foreign service for three years or any indefinite time, though by liberal pay there is no doubt but men might be recruited expressly for foreign service, 697-715—Greater difficulty of late years in obtaining recruits for witness's regiment, 722-724—Considerable difficulty anticipated in providing occupation sufficient to keep Pathan soldiers contented for three or five years in a foreign colony, 725-728—Disapproval of native regiments being officered by natives, 729.

[Second Examination.]—Explanation relative to the command of the Punjaub Frontier Force, to which witness's regiment belongs; performance by the force of police duties, as well as of military duties, 1103-1119—Probable mode of accounting for the reduced number of natives of good position who now enter the army, 1120, 1121—Inexpediency of the tendency to curtail the powers of reward and punishment formerly exercised by the commanding officers of regiments in the Punjaub, 1122-1129—Advantage if commanding officers had power to give rewards on the spot for distinguished service in the field, 1127-1129. 1146-1151.

Evidence in favour of jagheers or grants of land being given to native officers for long and faithful service, 1130-1145—Gratification to many native officers if, when deserving of reward, they could come to England for a time as aides-de-camp to the Queen, 1140-1142—Amendments suggested in the system of pensions, with a view to making the service more popular to the natives, 1152-1155.

Opinion as to the trustworthy character of Indian troops in garrison at Hong Kong, Singapore, &c., in the event of local riot, 1156-1161—Importance in all cases by locating some European troops with native troops, 1156—Expediency of the artillery being always European, 1162, 1163.

L.

Laing, Mr. Soundness of the policy pursued by Mr. Laing when in India, as regards military expenditure, *Balfour* 3516. 3545-3549. 3595. 3620.

Lawrence, Right Hon. Sir J. L., Bart. Feeling of Sir John Lawrence in regard to the great danger arising in India from a large native force, *Mangles* 3087-3089. 3128.

Views of Sir John Lawrence as to the very limited extent to which it is desirable to substitute native for European troops in the colonies, in time of peace or during war, *App.* 211-213—Strong objection by Sir John Lawrence to any reduction of the British force in India, *ib.* 212, 213.

Le Marchant, Lieutenant General Sir J. Gaspard, K.C.B. Answers received from Sir Gaspard Le Marchant, Commander in Chief in Madras, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 233, 234.

Little, Major A. B. Communication from Major Little, commanding the 25th Bombay Native Light Infantry, as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment if it be determined upon, *App.* 252, 253.

Local European Army (India). Objection to Europeans being recruited expressly for service in India, or to colonisation by European soldiers or pensioners, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1937-1939.

Facility of increasing to 20,000 men the local European army of India at the time of the mutiny, *Balfour* 3603—Great efficiency of the old Indian army, *ib.* 3609—Immense advantage of the large body of trained and efficient European officers available under the former system; deficiencies of the present system on this score, *ib.* 3609-3617—System of enlistment formerly in force in the case of the European army of India, *ib.* 3639.

Further evidence in favour of the re-formation of a local European army of India distinct from the Royal Army, and under the control of the Government of India, *Balfour* 3649-3652—Extremely efficient character of the army of India if, instead of the sweeping changes made, certain defects had been remedied on the score of staff appointments,

Local European Army (India)—continued.

appointments, &c., *Balfour* 3652—Data for the conclusion that no difficulty would be experienced in recruiting for an Indian army, or local European army, *ib.* 3653, 3654.

Opinion that a local European force, if re-established in India, should be larger than the former force, *Balfour* 3761. 3769—Approval of a local European army of 30,000 men, and of an Imperial army of 20,000 men, *ib.* 3762, 3763—Belief that with proper care no difficulty would arise in regard to the difference of pay and allowances between a local army and an Imperial army, *ib.* 3764–3768—Conclusion as to the fidelity and the unquestionable efficiency of the local European troops, *ib.* 3768, 3769.

Local Levies (Colonies). Advantage in garrisoning certain colonies with local levies, the nucleus of which should be formed in time of peace, instead of bringing in native troops from India for the purpose, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1879–1886. 1959–1962—Grounds for objecting to the colonies being held by levies raised locally, it being much better to garrison them with troops from India, *Mackenzie* 2013–2026. 2032–2034. 2053, 2054—Views of a former Lieutenant Governor of St. Vincent, as to the difficulty of preserving discipline in a small and entirely local force, *Taylor* 2527.

Objection to local corps in lieu of Indian native troops, except that in the former case no difficulty arises as to the pay and allowance of European officers and men serving in the same colony, *Duke of Cambridge* 3004.

Local Volunteers or Militia (Colonies.) Probable effect of the presence of a European force and of a native force respectively, as regards the raising of volunteers and militia in any colony, *Taylor* 2568–2571.

Lower Bengal. Facility of overawing the population of Lower Bengal, as being very effeminate, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1914–1918.

M.

Macdonald, Colonel James Mitchell. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Has belonged to the Ceylon Rifle Corps since 1831; 2104–2106—The regiment is composed of Malays, with the exception of two companies of sepoys, the full strength of the regiment being about 1,100; 2107–2111—Practice of enlisting the Malays in the island as boys, 2111. 2160–2164. 2222–2228. 2267–2270—Particulars relative to the pay, allowances, &c., of the men: advantage when serving in China of a free ration of meat, 2112–2123. 2133–2135. 2193–2198—Absence of difficulty in regard to the men serving abroad, 2124–2130.

Officering of the corps by natives and Europeans jointly; statement in explanation and approval of this arrangement, 2131, 2132. 2145–2147. 2273–2287. 2290—Less cost of transport of men of the Ceylon Rifles than of European soldiers, 2136, 2137—Practice as to the wives and children of the men accompanying them to China; mistake recently made on this score, 2138–2144—Considerable sickness and mortality among the regiment in Hong Kong, the climate being too cold for Malays, 2152–2156. 2205, 2206. 2217–2221.

Entire confidence of witness in the loyalty of the Ceylon Rifles, whilst their drill and discipline are excellent, 2157–2160. 2165–2169. 2186, 2187. 2266. 2289—Information relative to the religious and social habits of the Malays in the regiment; little, if any, difficulty on the score of caste; 2168–2180—Considerable difficulty in recruiting for the regiment; advantage of keeping some companies in Singapore and of recruiting there, the regiment being much below its proper strength, 2181–2184. 2207–2216. 2222–2237.

Very good and useful soldiers obtained from Malays, so that if they could be introduced into the Indian army it would be very desirable, 2185–2188—Much higher cost of rations in Ceylon than in India, 2189–2192—Very good barracks in Ceylon, 2199—Probability of better barrack accommodation being required for the Ceylon Rifles than for Indian native troops when serving in China, &c., 2200–2204—Further statement in favour of garrisoning Singapore partly with the Ceylon Rifles, it being desirable, however, to have some European troops also, 2207–2216 2238–2246.

Intention of sending nine companies of the Ceylon Rifle Corps to Singapore, Penang, &c., and to keep five companies in Ceylon, 2247–2249—Character of the defences of Ceylon, and number of troops composing the garrison, 2249–2255. 2271, 2272—Nature of the duties performed by witness's regiment at Hong Kong, 2256–2259—Statement as to the barrack accommodation at Hong Kong, and the great expense of hired buildings, 2260–2265.

MacDonnell, Sir Richard Graves, C. B. Answers received from Sir Richard MacDonnell, Governor of Hong Kong, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 236, 237.

Mackenzie, Colonel Kenneth, C. B. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Was Quartermaster General of the army in China in 1860; 1997—Much greater expense of transport of European troops to China than of Indian native troops, 1998-2000. 2037, 2038—Great advantage of the employment of native troops in garrisoning Hong Kong, Shanghai, &c., during the war, 2001-2006—Approval of Hong Kong being held permanently by native troops, with the assistance only of one or two batteries of European garrison artillery, 2007-2009. 2063-2082—Advantage also in garrisoning Singapore with native troops and European artillery, whereas it is now decided to place a wing of a European regiment there, 2009-2012. 2027-2032. 2083, 2084.

Grounds for objecting to the colonies being held by levies raised locally, it being much better to garrison them with troops from India, 2013-2026. 2032-2034. 2053, 2054—Opinion that Indian troops are far preferable to Kaffir or Fingoe levies for the defence of the Cape, 2017, 2018—Very heavy and unhealthy duties of British troops in the colonies so that the substitution of native troops is very expedient, 2019-2024. 2054. 2089-2091—More ready and efficient service of native troops in time of war, if employed on foreign service in time of peace, 2025, 2026. 2039—Objection to the practice of having a small European force in numerous colonies, it being preferable to mass the army as much as possible, 2027-2036. 2050-2052.

Disapproval of Indian troops being employed at Malta or Gibraltar, or eastward of Alexandria, 2039. 2062—Conclusion as to the less expense of Indian than of British troops for garrisons in the colonies, notwithstanding the more frequent relief of the former, 2040-2048—Mistake in having small detachments of British troops scattered over the West Indies, 2052. 2058-2061—Good discipline of the Sikh troops in the China war as compared with the French, 2055-2057.

Contemplated garrison of Indian troops, with a battery or two of European Artillery, in Japan as well as Hong Kong, 2063-2074. 2097-2099—Approval of the Mauritius being held by native troops, and some European artillery, 2085-2088—Doubt as to the expediency of garrisoning the West Indies with native troops from India, 2092-2095—Non-objection to garrison artillery being unsupported by British troops, though it is highly desirable that field artillery should be so supported, 2100-2103.

Macpherson, Alexander Campbell. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Has been in the Mauritius for about twenty years, 2291-2293—Considers that the Mauritius might be efficiently and safely garrisoned by Indian native troops exclusively, but that, on account of the large coolie population, it is desirable to have a mixed force of Europeans and natives, 2294 *et seq.*—Payment by the Colony of 44,000 *l.* towards the expense of the troops; dissatisfaction as to so large a contribution being required, it being considered that one regiment is sufficient, 2307. 2327, 2328. 2365-2368. 2382.

Very good police force at the Mauritius, so that a very small European garrison is all that is required for internal purposes, 2331-2336—Question considered as to the means of defending the island against external attack; inexpediency of a large European force being located in the fortifications, 2349 *et seq.*—Considerable importance of the Colony, so that it is very desirable properly to defend the place in time of war, 2369-2380.

Madras Native Army. Grounds for concluding that there is considerable objection to foreign service on the part of the men in the Madras army, *Norman* 18 *et seq.*—Explanation with reference to the employment of Madras troops in Burmah and the Straits Settlements without any great difficulty having been experienced, *ib.* 19-26. 30-33—Practice in the Madras army for the men's families to live with the regiment, except when on foreign service; obstacle on this score to an extended system of foreign service, *ib.* 27-31. 136-150. 157 *et seq.*

Alacrity with which Madras regiments have gone on service to Burmah, *Sir W. Elliot* 481-484—Composition of the Madras army adverted to as comprising chiefly low caste men, there being, however, men of all castes, *ib.* 485. 497-500. 523. 594-600—Instances of Madras sepoys having objected to go on service beyond the sea, through some difficulty about their pay or pensions; absence of difficulty on religious grounds, *ib.* 486-512. 519, 520. 563 *et seq.*—Belief that no evil would result from the employment of Madras troops in the colonies in time of peace, as well as during war, *ib.* 521-528—Circumstance of caste not being recognised in the Madras army, *ib.* 523—Existence of several warlike tribes in Madras from whom valuable troops or regiments might be organised, *ib.* 535-537—Except to China and the Straits, Madras troops have not gone on garrison duty out of India, *ib.* 620.

Belief that no difficulty of any moment has ever been experienced in regard to Madras troops serving in Burmah or China, *Pears* 774-775. 789. 798-800—Inferiority of the Madrasees to the Sikh troops, *Sir Hope Grant* 1327-1330—Interference with the pay and allowances, &c., to which is owing the dislike evinced at times in the Madras army to go on foreign service, *Balfour* 3469—Excess to which calls have been made on the Madras army for foreign service, *ib.* 3471, 3472—Difficulty as regards Madras troops going

Madras Native Army—continued.

going on foreign service, on account of the embarkation rather than the distance, *Balfour* 3501.

Memorandum showing the composition of the native army as regards non-commissioned officers and rank and file of its principal branches, *App.* 260.

Return showing that on 1st April 1857 there were 13,172 Madras native troops on foreign service, *App.* 335.

See also *Arracan.* *Burmah.* *Ceylon.* *China.* *Colonial and Foreign*
Service (Native Troops). *Families (Native Troops).* *Mauritius.* *Officers*
(Native Troops). *Straits Settlements.*

Mahomedans. Objection of Mahomedan soldiers to foreign service, though they have not the same objection as Hindoos to cross the sea, *Norman* 52-57—Statement opposed to the view that the Mahomedan element in India is a source of much danger, *Mangles* 3129-3133. 3146-3150—Discretion necessary as regards the employment of Mahomedan troops from India in a colony where the natives are Mahomedan, *Lord Strathnairn* 3412, 3413.

Opinion of Sir John Lawrence that the Mahomedan races are the best for service out of India, *App.* 211.

Mahrattas. Very few Mahrattas in the Bengal army; explanation hereon, *Norman* 225, 226—Objection to enlisting Mahrattas for the Madras army, unless in connection with other castes in the same regiment, *Sir W. Elliot* 633-635.

Malacca. See *Straits Settlements.*

Malays. Very good and useful soldiers obtained from Malays, so that if they could be introduced into the Indian army it would be desirable, *Macdonald* 2185-2188—Advantage of employing Malays rather than Hindoos for service in China, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1876—Adequacy of Malays for garrisoning Ceylon, *ib.* 1974. 1977—Approval of a Malay garrison at Singapore, *Fonblanque* 2775, 2776—Indisposition of Malays to settle in any colony, 2847, 2848—Equal docility of Malays and Africans as of European troops, *ib.* 2848, 2849. 2852.—See also *Ceylon Rifle Corps.*

Malta and Gibraltar. Fitness of native Indian troops for garrison duties in Malta; less cost than by employing British troops, *Sir W. Elliot* 574. 584, 585. 588, 589—Doubt as to the policy of employing native troops on garrison duty at Malta or Gibraltar; obstacle also to the men being accompanied by their families, *Pears* 821-826—Opinion that no serious difficulty would arise on social grounds through having a mixed force of natives and Europeans in the Mediterranean, *Probyn* 943. 946-950—Difficulty as regards the supply of food for native troops in Mediterranean garrisons; obstacle also on account of the separation from their families, *Baker* 1080-1082. 1090-1093.

Decided objection to any native troops at Gibraltar or Malta, under any circumstances, in time of war, *Sir Hope Grant* 1446, 1447—Extremely unsatisfactory and expensive arrangement in garrisoning Malta and Gibraltar with Indian troops, *Johnson* 1735-1737—Decided objection to Indian troops for garrisoning Malta or Gibraltar, or any colony in Europe, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1891, 1892—Disapproval of Indian troops being employed at Malta or Gibraltar, or eastward of Alexandria, *Mackenzie* 2039-2062.

Decided objection to coloured troops at Malta, except as supplemental to British troops; the latter should not in time of peace number less than 6,000 men, *Sir H. Storks* 3204-3207. 3262-3267. 3286-3289—In time of war the garrison of Malta should be 10,000, *ib.* 3206. 3288—Large garrison required at Gibraltar as well as Malta, in the event of war, *ib.* 3244-3246—In time of war the garrison of Gibraltar should be at least 7,000, *ib.* 3245—Anticipated local objections in Malta to the introduction of Asiatic troops as a permanent arrangement, *ib.* 3262-3266.

Doubt as to the expediency of employing native soldiers at Malta or Gibraltar, *Balfour* 3813.

Return, dated 28th March 1867, of the number of troops borne on the strength of the Imperial army, at Malta and Gibraltar respectively, *App.* 283.

Mangles, Ross D. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Submits sundry data for the conclusion that the European army in India is unnecessarily large, 3061 *et seq.*—Perfect safety in reducing the European army if the native army be reduced, the latter being almost the sole cause of danger, *ib.*—Witness maintains in fact that there need be no apprehension of an insurrection of the people, as distinct from a mutiny; experience of the last 100 years adverted to in support of this conclusion, *ib.*

Statement showing that during the last mutiny there was no rising of the people, and no popular disaffection, save in the case of Oude: peculiar circumstances which accounted for the latter exception, 3061. 3063, 3064. 3085. 3089. 3104-3106. 3139-3147—Particulars relative to the insurrection at Bareilly in 1816, as the most formidable that has occurred in India during British rule, 3065, 3066—Great mistake in maintaining

Report, 1867—continued.

Mangles, Ross D. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

from 65,000 to 70,000 British troops, in order chiefly to watch 135,000 native troops, there being in truth no one else for the former to fight with, 3067-3077. 3087-3089. 3128.

Contemplated reduction of their forces by Scindia and the Nizam if the British force be reduced, 3068, 3069. 3082—Suggestion that the native army be reduced to 100,000 men, that is, by about 35,000, and that the British troops be reduced by 20,000; 3070. 3090-3095. 3102. 3159-3164—Very little use of a large British force, so far as the Nepaulese, Bhootans, Burmese, &c., are concerned, 3072-3077. 3107-3109.

Sufficiency of the police force for keeping in check any insurrectionary movement of the people, if taken in time, 3077, 3078—Fallacy of the notion that danger is to be apprehended from what is termed the military police of India, 3077. 3171—Inexpediency of any reduction of the European army unless the native army be reduced, whilst the unnecessarily large strength of the latter is the only obstacle to a reduction of the former, 3078, 3079. 3110.

Opinion that the bulk of the British army should be kept at frontier posts, such as Peshawur, and that the rest should be located in the large cities, such as Patna, 3080, 3081. 3098. 3107-3109—Greater fidelity of the native army accordingly as its power for mischief is curtailed by reducing the number of men, 3083. 3086. 3102—Approval of artillery not being allowed in the hands of native troops, 3084, 3085—Increased control over the people by means of the improved arms now in possession of the European army, 3085. 3095. 3128. 3148, 3149.

Confidence of the native army in its overwhelming relative strength, as compared with the British army at the time of the mutiny, 3086. 3092-3094. 3103—Feeling of Sir John Lawrence in regard to the great danger arising from a large native force, 3087-3089. 3128—Effect of the maintenance of a large native army in fostering military habits and a warlike spirit among the population, 3097.

Inducement to withdraw British troops from India in the event of a European war; danger to India in so doing, 3111-3114—Approval generally of the employment of Sikhs and other native troops in the colonies, though probably there would be no pecuniary gain thereby, 3115-3127. 3168-3171—Statement opposed to the view that the Mahomedan element in India is a source of much danger, 3129-3133—Slight apprehension entertained by witness of any danger to India from the gradual approach of the Russian frontier, 3134, 3135—Facility of sending troops from home in time to meet a Russian invasion, 3134. 3136. 3157, 3158.

Witness further repudiates the idea that any danger arises from the population of the country, 3146. 3150—The large native army is, in fact, the real source of danger, 3146—With regard to the number of British troops now stationed at different posts, and required for the local duties, witness contends that many of these posts might be given up altogether, the native troops being reduced at the same time, 3151-3156—The question of a further reduction in the aggregate of the Imperial army, as a consequence of reducing the force in India, should not in any way affect the latter reduction, 3165-3167.

Mansfield, General Sir W. R., K.C.B., G.C.S.I. Answers received from the Commander in Chief in India in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 220, 221—Strong objections made by Sir William Mansfield to any such employment, *ib.* 220.

Letter from the Adjutant General to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated 18th March 1867, submitting the views of Sir William Mansfield upon the question of a reduction in the army in India; grounds for strongly objecting to any diminution, *App.* 293-299.

Marine Battalion (Native Army). Practice formerly of recruiting in Bengal for certain marine battalions, *Pears* 777-780—Particulars relative to the marine battalion in the Bombay army, *ib.* 784-788.

MAURITIUS:

1. *Conflicting Evidence upon the Question of Substituting Native Indian Troops for European Troops.*
2. *Amount and Character of the Local Population.*
3. *Military Contribution by the Colony.*
4. *Question of Difficulties arising in Connection with the Employment of Native Indian Troops.*
5. *Question of employing Black Troops or Native Troops from South Africa.*
6. *Returns of the Strength of the European Garrison, and of the Allowances in force.*

1. *Conflicting*

MAURITIUS—continued.

1. *Conflicting Evidence upon the Question of Substituting Native Indian Troops for European Troops:*

Difficulty anticipated in substituting Native for European troops in the Mauritius; the experiment might be tried under a good commanding officer, *Norman* 165-168. 188-190—Objection to the Mauritius being garrisoned by Native troops exclusively; adverse feeling of the colonists in the matter, *Pears* 819. 838-845; *Sir Hope Grant* 1201-1206. 1376—Approval of Indian troops for the defence of the Mauritius or Egypt in time of war, *Sir G. B. Clerk*, 1886-1890—Opinion in favour of the Mauritius being held by Native troops, and some European Artillery, *Mackenzie* 2085-2088.

Witness considers that the Mauritius might be efficiently and safely garrisoned by Indian Native troops exclusively, but that on account of the large coolie population it is desirable to have a mixed force of Europeans and Natives, *Macpherson* 2294 *et seq.*—Very good police force at the Mauritius, so that a very small European garrison is all that is required for internal purposes, *ib.* 2331-2336—Question considered as to the means of defending the island against internal attack; inexpediency of a large European force being located in the fortifications, *ib.* 2349 *et seq.*—Considerable importance of the colony, so that it is very desirable properly to defend the place in time of war, *ib.* 2369-2380.

Doubt as to the policy of withdrawing the European troops from the island whilst a considerable French garrison is kept at Bourbon, *Taylor* 2474-2479. 2490-2497—Less extensive fortifications carried out at Mauritius or Port Louis than were first intended, the island being in fact easy of capture irrespectively of the garrison of about 2,000 men in Port Louis, *ib.* 2480-2486—Considerable importance of the Colony, so that it is on the whole very expedient to maintain a British garrison there, *ib.* 2598-2615.

Decided objection to the withdrawal of all European troops from so valuable a colony as the Mauritius; great importance of a garrison there of about 1,800 British troops, *Duke of Cambridge*, 2976, 2977. 3024-3031. 3051-3053—Great importance of the Mauritius in a political and military sense, so that even in time of peace it is essential to maintain a European garrison of 1,600 or 1,800 men, *Sir H. Storks* 3195-3202. 3223-3242. 3269—Strong French feeling in the Mauritius, thus rendering an adequate British garrison the more essential, *ib.* 3199. 3241, 3242. 3255, 3256—Greater reason for the maintenance of an unmixed British garrison at the Mauritius than in the Straits Settlements at Aden, *ib.* 3238-3342.

Necessity of British as well as Native troops for so important a station as Mauritius, *Lord Strathnairn* 3398-3400—Approval of the Mauritius being reinforced by native troops from India in the event of war, *ib.* 3424-3427—Want of a large garrison for the defence of Port Louis, *ib.* 3424.

Dissent from the views laid down by Sir John Burgoyne as to the expediency of a very large force for the protection of Mauritius; opinion that a garrison of 600 men is sufficient for internal defence, *Balfour* 3679, 3680—Exceptions taken to certain conclusions as to the great value of the Mauritius in the event of war; it is, however, very useful for the refitting of vessels, *ib.* 3704-3712—Utter impracticability of holding the Mauritius, if the enemy had the command of the seas, *ib.* 3708—Small force likely to be kept in the Mauritius if the matter rested with the colonists, *ib.* 3809—Efficiency of a mixed garrison of Natives and Europeans, *ib.* 3810—Witness repeats that without the command of the sea the place must soon yield to an enemy, *ib.*

2. *Amount and Character of the Local Population:*

Total of about 250,000 coolies in the Mauritius, there being about 100,000 negroes, and 4,000 whites, *Taylor* 2451-2453. 2610-2612—Docile character of the coolie population in the Mauritius, whilst they have no such strong prejudices of caste or of religion as are likely to lead to revolt, *ib.* 2457-2468—Use likely to be made of the coolie population in aid of the garrison in case of foreign attack, *Sir H. Storks*, 3198. 3230. 3250-3254.

3. *Military Contribution by the Colony:*

Payment by the Colony of 44,000 *l.* towards the expense of the troops; dissatisfaction as to so large a contribution being required, it being considered that one regiment is sufficient, *Macpherson* 2307. 2327, 2328. 2365-2368. 2382—Probable discontent of the English colonists if the European troops were withdrawn, and if a colonial contribution were required for Asiatic troops, *Taylor* 2469-2473. 2487-2490. 2501-2503—Further statement that the colonists in the Mauritius would oppose the substitution of Native for European troops, *ib.* 2579, 2580.

Considerable payment by the Mauritius towards the expense of the troops, *Sir H. Storks* 3276—Unduly large contribution by the colonists in the Mauritius towards the garrison there, the number of troops in proportion to the population and the size of the island being excessive, *Balfour* 3504-3516—Calculations that the cost of the troops in the Mauritius is about 100 *l.* per man, the Colony paying altogether 45,000 *l.*, *ib.*

MAURITIUS—continued.**3. Military Contribution by the Colony**—continued.

3503-3513—Statement as to the Mauritius now paying 45,000 l. a-year towards the expense of the troops, there being a garrison of 2,000 men; conclusion as to the heavy pressure involved in this payment, *Balfour* 3679-3700.

4. Question of Difficulties arising in Connection with the Employment of Native Indian Troops.

Difficulty, by any increase of pay, of making the Native troops contented to serve in the Mauritius, *Norman* 201-208—Greater difficulty in arranging for the service of Native troops in the Mauritius or more distant places than in the Straits Settlements, *Sir Hope Grant* 1234, 1235—Danger of Native troops in the Mauritius taking part with the coolies in the event of a rebellion, *Johnson* 1560-1578. 1674-1694.

Less prejudicial effect of the climate of the Mauritius than of India itself upon natives of India, *Caird* 1813-1815—Willingness of Indian Native troops to go as far as the Mauritius for three years at a time, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1851, 1852. 1873-1875—Absence of difficulty in feeding Sikh soldiers in the Mauritius, *ib.* 1854-1856.

5. Question of employing Black Troops or Native Troops from South Africa:

Reliance to be placed on West India troops in the Mauritius, *Taylor* 2450—Difficulty of raising a negro regiment in the island, *ib.* 2454-2456—Opinion that African troops might be employed with advantage at Mauritius, *Fonblanque* 2831—Objection to the employment of Fingoe levies from the Cape as part of the garrison of the island, *Sir H. Storks* 3191-3195.

6. Returns of the Strength of the European Garrison, and of the Allowances in force:

Return, dated 28th March 1867, of the number of troops borne on the strength of the Imperial army, and stationed at the Mauritius, *App.* 282—Particulars of allowances in force for the several staff officers, and for the regimental officers, *ib.* 300, 301.

See also *Coolie Emigration. Mutiny.*

Mediterranean Garrisons. See *Malta and Gibraltar.*

Mends, Captain William Robert, R.N., C.B. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Supplies certain particulars relative to the cost of transport of troops between England and Hong Kong; will furnish returns containing details of the cost of transport between different places, 951 *et seq.*—Explanation of the practice as to the conveyance of a certain proportion of soldiers' wives and children, and as to the rate of charge, 956-963. 990-1001—Statement of the cost of freight and victualling of Native regiments between India and China; less cost than in the case of European troops, 971-973.

Instances of the great expense of transport in hired troop-ships between India and China, and China and the Cape, 980-985—Intention still to carry out the transport service to the Mauritius and Ceylon round the Cape, irrespectively of the new arrangements for the Indian service, 1002-1010—Very little difference in the cost of transport to Singapore and to China, 1011.

[Second Examination.]—Will supply the Committee with a return showing the comparative cost of the transport of Native troops and Europeans from the different ports in India to China, and from China to India, 2616, 2617.

Merewether, Lieutenant Colonel W. L., C.B. Answers received from Lieutenant Colonel Merewether, Resident at Aden, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 227, 228.

Military Expenditure (India). Expediency of its being left entirely to the military departments to appropriate the military expenditure, the amount of such expenditure being first definitively fixed by the financial departments, *Balfour* 3516. 3548, 3549. 3593-3595. 3620, 3621.—See also *Cost. Taxation.*

Mixed Garrisons. See *Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops).*

Montgomery, Sir Robert, K.C.B. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Difficulty in getting the best class of men in the Pujaub and the north-western provinces to leave India on foreign garrison service, 1492. 1507-1520—Necessity of considering the question of food in any colony in connection with the rate of pay of Native troops sent to such colony, 1493-1506—Reluctance of the Pathans and Sikhs to leave the neighbourhood of their homes for foreign service generally, though they would be quite ready to go for fighting service, 1507-1517.

Unpopularity of the Native army in India if it were to take the roster for foreign garrison service, 1517. 1519. 1520—Great care necessary before carrying out any arrangements for the colonial service of Native troops, 1517. 1521—Apprehension lest from
some

Montgomery, Sir Robert, K.C.B. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

some cause or other the religious prejudices of Native troops serving in the colonies might be offended, and lest dissatisfaction might thus be created throughout the entire Native army, 1518, 1519—Suggestion that service out of India be first tried on a small scale, and that the arrangements be left to the Government of India, 1521.

[Second Examination.]—With regard to the employment of Indian troops at Burmah, Singapore, &c. witness is not aware of any difficulty having been experienced on the score of caste prejudices, 2645-2650—Probability of Sikhs being as willing as Natives of Madras and Bengal, if equally well paid, to serve out of India, 2651, 2652—Information relative to the employment of a "pioneer corps" of Sikhs in Ceylon; entire failure of this arrangement, the Ceylon Government having wanted the men for work, whilst the latter enlisted for the service, with a view chiefly to soldiering, 2653-2664.

Particulars as to some recent steps for raising a body of 100 Sikhs for service in Hong Kong; enhanced rate of pay and other inducements stipulated for in this case, 2665-2667. 2675-2681—Large number of police in the Punjab; way in which armed and officered, 2668-2673—Expediency of the employment of Indian troops in the Colonies being left to the management of the Indian Government instead of the Colonial Governments, 2682-2688. 2708-2712.

Small scale on which the experiment should first be tried of employing the Indian Native army on foreign service, 2689. 2694—Advantage rather than otherwise of the effect to be produced on the natives by seeing the extent of the colonial possessions of this country, 2690-2693—Importance of special care as to the command and officering of Native troops out of India, 2694. 2700-2703—Suggestion, as regards pay on foreign service, that the rations might be free; this, with the extra batta, would be about equivalent to double pay, 2695-2699. 2704-2707—Facility of forming a regiment for foreign service by means of volunteers from different regiments, 2713-2715.

Mooltan. Importance of a European force at Mooltan, *Norman* 235, 236.

MUTINY:

Proportion of five sepoy to one British soldier at the time of the mutiny, whereas it is now deemed essential to keep the proportion at two to one, *Norman* 349-357—Very little disaffection in the Madras army during the mutiny of 1857, though there has been several former mutinies from various causes, *Sir W. Elliot* 629-632—Circumstance of there having been an unsupported battalion of European Artillery at Mhow when the mutiny broke out, witness attributing the safety of Central India and the loyalty of Holkar to the influence of this battalion, *Johnson* 1626. 1715-1720—Advantage of British garrisons in the Mauritius, Ceylon, and the Straits Settlements, as constituting a reserve for India in time of emergency; instance of this at the time of the mutiny, *ib.* 1665-1667. 1703-1709. 1729, 1730—Less danger on the score of mutiny when a Native regiment forms part of a mixed garrison in a Colony than when it is in India, *ib.* 1740-1743.

Spread of the mutiny or insurrection of 1857, not through any want of European force, but because the British troops were chiefly in the north-west, whilst there were hardly any in Bengal, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1869-1872. 1947-1950—Further reference to the outbreak of 1857, as having been to some extent a rebellion as much as a mutiny, *ib.* 1929. 1935, 1936.

Probability that the mutiny would never have occurred, but for the weakness of the British army in India, *Duke of Cambridge* 3038.

Statement showing that during the last mutiny there was no rising of the people, and no popular disaffection save in the case of Oude; peculiar circumstances which accounted for the latter exception, *Mangles* 3061. 3063, 3064. 3085. 3089. 3104-3106. 3139-3147—Confidence of the native army in its overwhelming relative strength as compared with the British army at the time of the mutiny, *ib.* 3086. 3092-3094. 3103.

Statement as to several former mutinies having all been occasioned by questions connected with the pay and allowances of the sepoy, *Balfour* 3469—Statement as to the total effective force of non-commissioned officers and rank and file of British troops on 1st May 1857 having been only 37,091; ample means at home to have supplied India with the full establishment, *ib.* 3559-3573—Grounds for the statement that any assistance derived by India at the time of the mutiny from the European garrisons at the Cape, Mauritius, and Ceylon, was more than counterbalanced by the force previously taken from India for the Persian expedition, *ib.* 3604-3607—Successful operations against the mutineers irrespectively of the troops which came from the Mauritius, &c., *ib.* 3607.

Instances of several places in India guarded by natives exclusively where no mutiny occurred, whilst mutinies have frequently arisen in places where the European troops were the strongest, *Balfour* 3630-3634—Valuable experience taught by the mutiny, so that we are stronger in the country than we were before, *ib.* 3642, 3643—Immense preponderance of Native over British troops at the time of the mutiny, the relative proportion

Report, 1867—continued.

MUTINY—continued.

portion in Bengal being as ten to one, *Balfour* 3643-3646—Further statement upon the question of the mutiny in 1857 having been virtually overcome before the arrival of troops from the Colonies, *ib.* 3777-3794.

See also *China*, 9. *Dalhousie*, *Lord*.

N.

Nankin, Treaty of. Great usefulness of native Indian troops in the operations which led to the Treaty of Nankin, *Balfour* 3500.

Napier, Lieutenant General Sir Robert, K.C.B. Answers received from Sir R. Napier, Commander in Chief at Bombay, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of the Native Indian troops in different British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment if it be decided upon, *App.* 243-245—Grounds for strongly objecting to the proposed substitution of Native for British troops, *ib.*—Conclusions favourable to the employment of Native troops together with British troops in certain Colonies and under certain conditions, *ib.*

NATIVE ARMY (INDIA):

Detail of the number of Native troops in the several presidencies of India; total of 125,171 natives, including the Hyderabad and Rajpootana contingencies, *Norman* 3-5—Decrease of 10,000 in the Native army since the year 1857, *ib.* 227—Doubt as to the expediency of any reduction in the Native army, *ib.* 319, 320.

Perfect safety in reducing the European army if the Native army be reduced, the latter being almost the sole cause of danger, *Mangles* 3061 *et seq.*—Suggestion that the Native army be reduced to 100,000 men, that is by about 35,000, and that the British troops be reduced by 20,000, *ib.* 3070. 3090-3095. 3102. 3159-3164—Inexpediency of any reduction of the European army unless the Native army be reduced, whilst the unnecessarily large strength of the latter is the only obstacle to a reduction of the former, *ib.* 3078, 3079. 3110—Greater fidelity of the Native army accordingly, as its power of mischief is curtailed by reducing the number of men, *ib.* 3083. 3086. 3102—Effect of the maintenance of a large Native army in fostering military habits and a warlike spirit among the population, *ib.* 3097—The large Native army is in fact the real source of danger, *ib.* 3146.

Opinion that the Native army in India should be re-organised with a view to its being an integral part of the Imperial army, and to its serving in the Colonies; deficiencies of the present organisation, *Cavenagh* 3334-3341. 3346-3352.

Element of safety in the mixed composition of the Indian Native army, *Lord Strathnairn* 3412, 3413—Undue reduction already made in the Native army, the duties being now much too severe, *ib.* 3427-3429, 3450—Approval of the proportion of two Native soldiers to one British soldier, *ib.* 3449.

Instance in 1842 of the bravery of Indian troops when fighting against the Malays, *Balfour* 3484-3494—Instance in 1839 of the efficiency of sepoy troops against the Native forces of the Nabob of Carnool, *ib.* 3495-3499.

Opinion as to the exceeding impolicy of the present military system of India, that is, as regards the distinct separation between the European and Native armies, the former being under the Imperial Government, whilst the latter is under the Indian Government, *Balfour* 3609—Objection to the substitution of natives for the British troops proposed by witness to be withdrawn from India, *ib.* 3647, 3648—Approval of a Native infantry of 90,000 privates, *ib.* 3648—Comment upon the great indifference shown in the treatment of the sepoy army, *ib.* 3799.

Memorandum showing the composition of the Native army as regards non-commissioned officers and rank and file of its principal branches, *App.* 260.

See also *Artillery*. *Bengal Native Army*. *Bombay Native Army*. *Caste*.
China. *Colonial and Foreign Service (Native Troops)*. *Cost*. *Duties of*
Troops. *Furloughs*. *Madras Native Army*. *Mauritius*. *Mutiny*.
Officers (Native Troops). *Pay and Allowances*. *Punjab and Punjab Regi-*
ments. *Recruiting*. *Sikhs*. *Taxation*.

Native Princes. Contemplated reduction of their forces by Scindia and the Nizam if the British force be reduced, *Mangles* 3068, 3069. 3082.

New Zealand. Difficulties which prevented the sending of some Sikh troops to New Zealand during the late war, *Duke of Cambridge* 3042-3045.

Nichollett, Captain G. Answers received from Captain Nichollett, commanding the 2nd Belooch Battalion, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of Native Indian troops in British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 254-256.

Norman,

Norman, Colonel Henry Wyke, C.B. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Is Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, 1, 2—Shows in detail the number of Native and of British troops in the several Presidencies of India; total of 58,212 British soldiers, and 125,171 Natives, including the Hyderabad and Rajpootana contingents, 3-5—Information as to the different races and religions of which the Indian Native army is composed, 6-16—Regulations in force as to the number of men of different castes in the same regiments, 12, 13.

Strong religious prejudice of Hindoos against service beyond the seas, 17. 40-47. 67—Grounds for concluding that there is considerable objection to foreign service on the part of the men in the Madras army, 18 *et seq.*—Explanations with reference to the employment of Madras troops in Burmah and the Straits Settlements without any great difficulty having been experienced, 19-26. 30-33—Facility of getting Native troops to leave India on field service, the difficulty arising only in the case of garrison duty, 22. 68, 69—Serious mutiny formerly through Native troops having been kept in Java after field service was over, 23—Practice in the Madras army for the men's families to live with the regiments, except when on foreign service; obstacle on this score to an extended system of foreign service, 27-31. 136-150.

Prejudicial effect upon recruiting if the men were to go on foreign service for garrison duty, 31. 53-56. 64. 101-109—Frequent representation made for a reduction of the term of service of the Madras army; this is never beyond three years, 33, 34—Voluntary character of the coolie emigration adverted to, 35-39—Comparatively small proportion of Hindoos in the Madras army, 43.

Less unwillingness of Sikhs and Affghans than of Hindoos to go across the seas, 46. 58—Difficulty as to foreign service in the case more especially of high caste Hindoos or Brahmins, 47-50—Objection of Mahomedan soldiers to foreign service, though they have not the same objection as Hindoos to cross the sea, 52-57—Views of Lord Hardinge and the Duke of Wellington, in 1845, in disapproval of foreign garrison service being forced on the Native troops, 64-66—Power, legally, of sending the Native troops on foreign service, 70, 71—Objection to any increase of European officers when Native regiments go on foreign service, 72-82.

Information relative to the practice of recruiting in India; no bounty has hitherto been given, 83-88. 90, 91—Increased difficulty in raising recruits, on account chiefly of the smallness of the pay with reference to the increased price of provisions, 88. 101-107. 115. 197—Particulars as to the pay and allowances of the Native troops when in India and when on foreign service, 88-100. 115.

Detailed composition of the Native regiments further adverted to; approval of a mixture of races and of castes, 110-113—Very few Mahrattas in the Bengal army; explanation hereon, 114. 225, 226—Impression that the cost of a European regiment in India is about double that of a Native regiment, 116-118—Regulations as to the pensions of the Native soldiers according to length of service, 119-121—Power of the men to claim their discharge after three years' service, 122, 123—Regularity with which the men transmit a portion of their pay to their families, 124-127.

Practice as to furloughs in the Bengal and Madras armies respectively; deduction made from the pay when on furlough, 128-133. 138—Long and frequent furloughs in the Bengal regiments, 128. 131-133—Large increase of pay necessary in order to induce the natives to go freely on foreign service, 149, 150. 181, 182. 201-217.

Doubt as to its being cheaper to have Indian troops on foreign stations to be relieved every three years than European troops relieved every five years, 151, 152. 156—Further considerations as to the obstacle to foreign service on account of the separation of the men from their families, whilst it would be impracticable for the latter to accompany the regiments, 157 *et seq.*

Difficulty anticipated in substituting Native for European troops in the Mauritius; the experiment might be tried under a good commanding officer, 165-168. 188-190—Doubt as to absence of the men from their families for a period of three years leading to any gross immoralities, 173-190. 218-221—Much less immorality and drunkenness in Native regiments than in European regiments, 176-180. 185-187—Facility of finding Natives for service in Arracan and the Straits, 193. 210, 211—Understanding of the men when being enlisted that they will not be sent on foreign service, though they know that they are liable to be sent, 194-198.

Difficulty, by any increase of pay, of making the Native troops contented to serve in the Mauritius, 201-208—No inducements are necessary in sending Madras troops to Ceylon, 209—Considerable difficulty as regards the employment of Natives on garrison duty at Hong Kong, 212-217—Explanation with reference to the number of Affghans in the Indian army, 222-224.

Actual increase of European troops in India to the extent of only 13,000 men since the time of the mutiny, 227—Additional forts and arsenals now garrisoned by Europeans, the present European army being anything but excessive, 227-229—Decrease of 107,000 in the Native army since the year 1857; 227—Several arsenals

Norman, Colonel Henry Wylie, C.B. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

and forts which it is extremely desirable to hold with British troops, 228-238 — Expediency of the fort at Gwalior being garrisoned by Europeans, 229-233.

Proposed arrangement for stationing about twelve per cent. of the European troops on the hills, 239-241 — Distribution of the British troops with a view to massing them to some extent, and at the same time so as to hold all the more important points, 242 — Difficulty in withdrawing the troops from all stations reputed to be unhealthy, *ib.* — Impolicy of employing Chinese troops in India, whilst they would not be so cheap as Native troops, 243-247.

Obstacle to any further removal of European troops to hill stations, 248-252 — Explanation as to the withdrawal of troops from Roy Bareilly, 250, 251 — Also as to the employment of Native troops with European Artillery in the Straits Settlements, 256-259, 264 — Limited force of Native Artillery employed in India; objection to any additional force, 259-261 — Greater objection to having only Native troops with European field artillery than with garrison artillery, 262-264 — Peculiar difficulty in getting the Goorka regiments to serve out of India, 265.

Expediency of careful consultation of experienced officers before making any arrangements for employing ten or twelve Native regiments on foreign service, 266 — Great dissatisfaction if the regiments were ordered abroad in regular rotation, 267 — Very few regiments which could be spared for foreign service, 268, 269 — Approval on the whole of an extension of the organisation of the Ceylon Rifle Corps for service in Hong Kong, &c., rather than of attempting to raise a distinct corps for the purpose, 270-277.

[Second Examination.] — Memorandum delivered in showing the composition of the Native army in the Three Presidencies, 278 — Reference also to a memorandum showing the actual cost of a Native corps and a European corps in India, 278-282.

Explanation that witness raises no objection to the employment of Native troops on field service, or on occasions of emergency, out of India, 283 — Important distinction between a coolie and a soldier as regards employment out of India, *ib.* — Probable difficulty in the event of Native troops being sent to places where their prejudices as to caste, &c., are not understood, *ib.* — Further explanation relative to the pensions of the Native troops, *ib.*

Considerable number of fortifications in India, many of which require European garrisons or guards, 283, 284 — Causes of the non-occupation of Roy Bareilly with a large force further adverted to, 284 — Serious embarrassment of the Indian Government if required to send a dozen Native regiments to the Colonies; necessity at once of raising other regiments in lieu of them, 284, 285 — Several Colonies to which Native troops might properly be sent for field service, 286-288.

Further evidence opposed to the employment of Chinese troops in India, whether in lieu of Europeans or of Native troops; belief that it would have an extremely bad effect on the natives, and would weaken the British hold of the country, 289-309. 358-362. 370-378 — Doubt as to the fighting qualities of Chinese troops, 290-294. 371, 372.

Total of 45,000 British soldiers in India at the beginning of 1857, the present number being about 58,000; 310-314 — Grounds for concluding that the railways, though very useful to some extent for the movement of troops, will not for some years be so far complete as to justify any material reduction of European troops, 315-318 — Approval generally of the present proportion of two Native soldiers to one European, 319, 320 — Inexpediency of any sensible reduction either in the Native force of 125,000, or in the British force of 60,000; 319, 320. 349-357.

Special duties required of the European troops as a check upon fanatical outbreaks in large towns, 320-329 — Statement of the force kept at Secunderabad, 330-333 — Explanation in connection with the force at Benares, 334, 335 — Approval of the employment of several native regiments out of India on field service, whilst their employment regularly on foreign garrison duty would be very objectionable, 336-348 — Proportion of five sepoys to one British soldier at the time of the mutiny, whereas it is now deemed essential to keep the proportion at two to one, 349-357.

Performance by the police of many of the duties formerly fulfilled by the Native troops else so large a reduction of the latter could not be carried out, 363-366 — Circumstances of part of Ceylon having for a long period been garrisoned by Malays without any evils having arisen, 367-370 — Necessity of having recourse largely to the Indian army in the event of war in China or Persia; objection, however, to foreign employment in time of peace on account of the aversion of the natives to foreign garrison service, 379-383.

Disapproval of special corps being raised on the understanding that they were to go on foreign service; advantage rather of the power of sending any regiment abroad in time of emergency, 384-386 — Absence of necessity for calling for volunteers for field service out of India, 387, 388 — Prejudicial reports likely to be spread by Native regiments on their return from foreign garrison duty, 389-392 — Necessity of keeping in view the religious prejudices of the Hindoos, &c., in considering the question of their being sent across the sea, 393-400.

Further

Norman, Colonel Henry Wylie, C.B. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

Further explanation as to the course pursued in having European infantry in support of European artillery, except at Singapore, 404, 405—Disapproval on the whole of any Native regiments being officered entirely by natives, 406-410—Question considered whether it is not desirable to raise the bounty for British soldiers re-enlisted in India on discharge there, the present bounty varying from 10*l.* to 15*l.*, whereas the cost of bringing each man home is about 50*l.*; 411-415. 424-427, 437-445.

Absence of any special inducement to discharged men settling in the country, 416-418—Objections to discharged soldiers settling on the north-west frontier, 419-423—Exceptional instances of British soldiers being allowed to take temporary service with planters and others; inconvenience of this practice, 428-432—Privilege to the European soldiers in being largely employed on the unattached list, as in the Public Works Department, &c., 432, 433—Grounds upon which it was decided not to allow soldiers to be employed by the railway companies, 434-436.

Circumstance of the Government of India having been prepared to recommend an increase of the bounty in India, 445—Comment on the circumstance of less space being allowed on board the transport ships for native than for British troops between India and Burmah, 446-450—Good health of the British troops in Burmah, 451, 452—Amount of force now kept at Rangoon, Moulmein, &c., 453—Explanation relative to the force at the penal establishment in the Andaman Islands, 453-456.

Further information relative to the system of recruiting in India; this system might well be adopted in the case of regiments serving out of India, 462-469—Belief as to the black troops at Hyderabad being Abyssinians, 470-472—Impolicy generally of entrusting Colonies to the care of Native troops without a nucleus of European troops, 473, 474—Efficiency of natives as garrison artillery or field artillery, 475-477

Norman, Colonel. Memorandum by Colonel Norman in contravention of certain conclusions arrived at by Sir Henry Havelock in favour of the reduction of the British and Native armies in India, *App.* 217-220.

North American Colonies. Return, dated 28th March 1867, of the number of troops borne on the strength of the Imperial army and stationed in the several North American Colonies, *App.* 282, 283.

Number of Battalions (India). Grounds for the conclusion that it is very important to have fewer battalions in India, with a larger proportion of rank and file, *Balfour* 3541-3547—Examination to the effect that the Indian authorities have had but little influence in fixing the force or establishment of the battalions in India, *ib.* 3726-3736.

O.

Officers (Establishment in India). Great and unnecessary expense involved in keeping up the officers and non-commissioned officers to the full maximum establishment, whilst the rank and file are below the establishment, *Balfour* 3542. 3725-3731.

Officers (Native Troops). Objection to any increase of European officers when Native regiments go on foreign service, *Norman* 72-82—Disapproval of any Native regiments being officered entirely by natives, *ib.* 406-410—Tact required on the part of commanding officers in Colonies where Indian troops might be employed; doubt as to any serious difficulty arising on this score, *Sir W. Elliot* 601. 609-618—Disapproval of Native regiments being officered by natives, *Keyes* 729.

Suggestions as to the officering of Native regiments sent on foreign service, *Probyn* 871, 872. 898-902. 936—Importance of men going abroad with their own officers, *Baker* 1029. 1037, 1038; *Sir H. Storks* 3277—Importance of special care as to the command and officering of Native troops out of India, *Sir R. Montgomery* 2694. 2700-2703—Great importance of carefully selected officers for Native regiments serving in Colonies; absence of difficulty on this score, *Lord Strathnairn* 3435-3443.

Great importance of European officers with sepoy regiments being sufficiently numerous to look after the discipline and wellbeing of the men in a proper manner, *Balfour* 3458-3462—Valuable supply of trained and efficient officers in the time of the old Indian army, *ib.* 3609, 3610—Direct effect of a proper supply of efficient officers in insuring the efficiency of Native troops, whether in India or the Colonies, *ib.* 3612-3617—Illustrations of the great importance of European officers for the leading of Native troops, *ib.* 3671-3677—Great value of the trained and experienced officers to be obtained by means of a local European force, *ib.* 3761.

Officers (Pay and Allowances). Statement as to the great inequality between the pay of officers with European regiments, and of officers with Native regiments from India, when serving in the same Colony; great expense involved in assimilating the pay of the former to that of the latter, *Duke of Cambridge* 2992-3013. 3044—Slight weight attached to the objection as regards difference of pay of officers in the case of Native and British troops serving together, *Lord Strathnairn* 3435.

Report, 1867—continued.

Officers (Pay and Allowances)—continued.

Large amount of the pay of the officers of any regiment in India as compared with that of the non-commissioned rank and file, *Balfour* 3592—Explanation in connection with the relative expense of the officers and of the men in a regiment of infantry, the actual pay not representing the proportionate expense, *ib.* 3743-3749.

Evidence in explanation of the practice as to pay and allowances of European officers in the Colonies; great expense incurred in the shape of allowances for officers' quarters, &c., so that the system of direct money payment is more economical, *Balfour* 3770-3775—Undue reduction made in the allowances to officers in the Mauritius, *ib.* 3776.

Further explanation in regard to the relative cost of officers and of non-commissioned officers and men, *Balfour* 3818.

Ord, Colonel H. St. George, C.B., R.E. Views of Colonel Ord upon the question whether the West India regiments are to be depended upon as against their own countrymen, *Taylor* 2425-2432—Answers received from Colonel Ord, Governor of the Straits Settlements, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of Native Indian troops in different British Colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 235.

Overland Route. Estimate of the cost of conveyance of troops by the Overland and Cape routes respectively; considerable difference in favour of the former, *App.* 286.

P.

Pathans. Very little prejudice among the Pathans in regard to food, *Keyes* 687-690—Considerable difficulty anticipated in providing occupation sufficient to keep Pathan soldiers contented for three or five years in a foreign Colony, *ib.* 725-728—Reluctance of the Pathans and Sikhs to leave the neighbourhood of their homes for foreign service generally, though they would be quite ready to go for fighting service, *Sir R. Montgomery* 1507-1517.

PAY AND ALLOWANCES (NATIVE TROOPS):

Particulars as to the pay and allowances of the Native troops when in India and when on foreign service, *Norman* 88-100. 115—The ordinary pay is seven rupees a month, out of which the men have to find the whole of their food, *ib.* 92, 93. 115—Large increase of pay necessary in order to induce the natives to go freely on foreign service, *ib.* 149, 150. 181, 182. 201-217.

Character and amount of the allowances to Indian troops over and above their ordinary pay when on service in China; in addition to full batta and free rations, pensions are given to the families of those who die or are killed, *Pears* 760-766. 805—Consideration as to the amount and character of the inducement necessary in order to obtain the willing services of Native troops out of India, *ib.* 798-807—There need not be any difficulty in regard to the pay of a mixed force in any Colony, *Probyn* 944, 945—Suggestion as to the increased pay and other privileges necessary in order to induce Native troops to go willingly to foreign service, *Baker* 1029-1037. 1050-1058.

Necessity of considering the question of food in any Colony in connection with the rate of pay of Native troops sent to such Colony, *Sir R. Montgomery* 1493-1506; *Caird* 1781, 1782—Conclusion that, with adequate pay and proper arrangements, natives would willingly serve in the Colonies, *Caird* 1774-1782. 1791-1797. 1803-1807—Opinion that for three rupees extra per month Native troops would willingly serve in the Colonies, *ib.* 1781—Suggestion as regards pay on foreign service, that the rations might be free; this, with the extra batta, would be about equivalent to double pay, *Sir R. Montgomery* 2695-2699. 2704-2707.

Advantage of some scheme by which European and Native troops should serve together without its being necessary to raise the pay and allowances of the former, *Duke of Cambridge* 3008-3010—Importance of abstaining from any interference with the pay and allowances to which Native troops consider themselves entitled when on foreign service, *Balfour* 3469, 3470.

Statement of the pay and allowances and charges for different corps in the Bengal army, exclusive of commissariat, clothing, &c., *App.* 261.

Annual cost of granting 2 d. a day extra pay to the non-commissioned officers and men of a battalion of infantry, comprising 788 men, all ranks, *App.* 299.

Particulars of the pay and allowances of Native and European regiments in India, *App.* 306-315—Statement showing the amount of regimental pay and allowances of each grade of commissioned and non-commissioned officers and rank and file of the several branches of the European army serving in India, *ib.* 308—Statement showing the rates of pay and allowances of medical officers and of subordinate grades having half and full batta rates of pay, *ib.* 309.

Statement

PAY AND ALLOWANCES (NATIVE TROOPS)—continued.

Statement showing the comparative cost, under the head of Regimental Pay and Allowances, of a given military force in each of the Three Indian Presidencies and in Ceylon, *App.* 318.

See also *Cost.* *Officers (Pay and Allowances).* *Pensions.* *Rations.*

Pears, Major-General Thomas Townsend, C.B. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Explanation that there are no returns in the India Office of the cost of removal of regiments from one Oriental port to another, 759—Offer made a few years ago to take a regiment from Hong Kong to Bombay for 5,000 *l.*, *ib.*—Character and amount of the allowances to Indian troops, over and above their ordinary pay, when on service in China; in addition to full batta and free rations, pensions are given to the families of those who die or are killed, 760–766. 805.

Garrison duty in Burmah is considered foreign service in the Madras army, Bengal troops only going there on field service, 767–770—Garrison of Madras troops and of Europeans at the penal settlements, 771–773—Belief that no difficulty of any moment has ever been experienced in regard to Madras troops serving in Burmah or China, 774–776. 789. 798–800—Practice formerly of recruiting in Bengal for certain Marine battalions, 777–780—Particulars relative to the Marine battalion in the Bombay army, 784–788.

Bad moral effect apprehended as regards the natives of India if Chinese troops or other foreign mercenaries were employed there, 791–795. 827–832—Necessity of an increased number of Native troops as an equivalent for a smaller number of European troops withdrawn from any Colony, 794–797—Considerations as to the amount and character of the inducement necessary in order to obtain the willing services of Native troops out of India, 798–807—Difficulties to be encountered respectively in raising a special regiment for foreign service, and in sending abroad a regiment of the existing army, 807–817.

Doubt as to the expediency of placing Native troops in any Colony without some European troops also, 818–820. 838–845—Exceptional character of the Straits Settlements as regards the employment of Native troops exclusively, 818–836. 837. 846—Objection to the Mauritius being garrisoned solely by Native troops, 819. 838–845—Doubt as to the policy of employing Native troops on garrison duty at Malta or Gibraltar; obstacle also to the men being accompanied by their families, 821–826—Importance of the question of time as regards the willingness of Native troops to serve out of India, 825. 834. 835.

Pensions. Regulations as to the pensions of the Native soldiers according to the length of service, *Norman* 119–121. 283—Practice when Native troops have been serving out of India for the family pensions to be paid directly to the families left behind, *Sir W. Elliot* 504–506—Careful consideration necessary upon the subject of pensions to the families of men going on foreign service, *Pears* 801–805—Amendment suggested in the system of pensions with a view to make the service more popular to the natives, *Keyes* 1152–1155—Considerable expense on the score of pensions to the widows of Native soldiers dying on foreign service, *Sir Hope Grant* 1236.

Police (India). Performance by the police of many of the duties formerly fulfilled by the Native troops, else so large a reduction of the latter could not be carried out, *Norman* 363–366.

Opinion as to the sufficiency of the police force for keeping in check any insurrectionary movement of the people, if taken in time, *Mangles* 3077, 3078—Fallacy of the notion that danger is to be apprehended from what is termed the military police of India, *ib.* 3077. 3171.

Statement in favour of many of the duties now performed by soldiers in India being placed under the police; important economy thereby, whilst there would be much advantage on the score of discipline, *Balfour* 3465–3468—Expediency of a positive regulation prohibiting the imposition of police duties on Native troops serving abroad, *ib.* 3503. 3626–3628.

Probyn, Colonel Dighton, C.B., V.C. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Has commanded a Native Cavalry regiment in India for the last ten years, comprised entirely of northern men, 852, 853—Service of witness's regiment, and of other northern regiments, in China in 1860 without any difficulty having arisen, 854–861. 867. 907–914—Several high-caste men in witness's regiment, notwithstanding which no difficulty whatever arose as to the supply of water on board ship, or as to the cooking, 856, 857. 907–914.

Belief that by certain inducements in the shape of extra pay, and of food, &c., Sikh troops would readily serve on garrison duty out of India for three years at a time, 862, 863. 868–870. 891–894. 903–906—Evidence in approval of the employment of Native troops on foreign service in the Colonies; certain objections thereto considered, 864 *et seq.*—Suggestions as to the officering of Native regiments sent on foreign service, 871, 478–I. 872.

Probyn, Colonel Dighton, C.B., V.C. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

872. 895-902. 936—Respects in which a Native soldier on service out of India would be much cheaper than a European soldier, 873-878. 939, 940.

Inexpediency of the worst Colonies or stations being selected for Native troops, 894. 938—Good conduct of Native regiments when on garrison in China, 915-919—Opinion that a sufficient supply of British officers would be forthcoming for permanent service in China, 920-924—Disapproval of the employment of foreign mercenaries in India, 925, 926—Different castes of which witness's regiment is composed, the Sikhs having very few prejudices, 927-932.

Anticipated good conduct of Sikh soldiers on garrison duty abroad, as well as on field service, 933-937—Disapproval of a Native force of artillery, though the Sikhs are excellent artillerymen, 941-943—Opinion that no serious difficulty would arise on social grounds through having a mixed force of Natives and Europeans in the Mediterranean, 943. 946-950—Nor need there be any difficulty in regard to the pay of a mixed force, 944, 945.

Public Works Department (India). Privilege to the European soldiers in India in being largely employed on the unattached list, as in the Public Works Department, *Norman* 432, 433.

Punjab, and Punjab Troops. The 1st Regiment of Punjab Infantry is composed chiefly of Pathans, Sikhs, and Dogras, the latter being mostly Rajpoots, *Keyes* 636-639—Belief that men could readily be raised in the Punjab to go on foreign service if sufficient inducements were held out, as by doubling the present pay and providing rations, *ib.* 645. 709-722—Fitness of the Punjab regiments for service in cold countries, *ib.* 681-686—Doubt as to the willingness of witness's regiment to go on foreign service for three years, or any indefinite time, though by liberal pay there is no doubt but men might be recruited expressly for foreign service, *ib.* 697-715.

Explanation relative to the command of the Punjab frontier force, to which witness's regiment belongs; performance by the force of police duties as well as of military duties, *Keyes* 1103-1110—Probable mode of accounting for the reduced number of natives of good position who now enter the army in the Punjab, *ib.* 1120, 1121—Inexpediency of the tendency to contract the powers of reward and punishment formerly exercised by the commanding officers of regiments in the Punjab, *ib.* 1122-1129.

Difficulty in getting the best class of men in the Punjab and the North-Western Provinces to leave India on foreign garrison service, *Sir R. Montgomery* 1492. 1507-1520.

Unduly large European force maintained in the Punjab; opinion that it would be better to give up the territory altogether, unless it can be safely held with a much smaller force, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1919-1934.

Large number of police in the Punjab; way in which armed and officered, *Sir R. Montgomery* 2668-2673—Excellence of Punjaubees and Beloochers for garrison and sentry duties; their advantage over British troops as sentries, *Fonblanque* 2729, 2730. 2750-2752. 2792, 2793. 2881-2883.

Memorandum showing the composition of the Native army of the Punjab as regards non-commissioned officers and rank and file of its principal branches, *App.* 260.

Statement showing the detail of the establishment and cost of a battery of Punjab artillery, *App.* 307.

R.

Railways (India). Grounds for concluding that the railways in India, though very useful to some extent for the movement of troops, will not for some years be so far complete as to justify any material reduction of European troops, *Norman* 315-318.

Rangoon. See *Burmah.*

Rations. Necessity of considering the extra expense of rations for Native troops in Colonies irrespectively of extra pay, *Sir R. Montgomery* 1493-1506; *Caird* 1781, 1782—Much higher cost of rations in Ceylon than in India, *Macdonald* 2189-2192—Suggestions as regards pay on foreign service, that the rations might be free; this, with the extra batta, would be about equivalent to double pay, *Sir R. Montgomery* 2665-2699. 2704-2707—Communication from Colonel Balfour in August 1861 upon the subject of the rations and the cooking for Native soldiers on foreign service, *App.* 321-324.

Recruiting (India). Prejudicial effect upon recruiting if the men were to go on foreign service for garrison duty, *Norman* 31. 53-56. 64. 101-109—Information relative to the practice of recruiting in India; no bounty has hitherto been given, *ib.* 83-88. 90, 91—Increased difficulty in raising recruits, on account chiefly of the smallness of the pay with reference to the increased price of provisions, *ib.* 88. 101-107. 115. 197—Further information relative to the system of recruiting in India; this system might well be

Recruiting (India)—continued.

be adopted in the case of regiments serving out of India, *Norman* 462-469—Greater difficulty of late years in obtaining recruits for witness's regiment (the 1st Punjaub Infantry), *Keyes* 722-724.

Explanation of the changes recommended by the Royal Commission of 1866 in regard to the practice of recruiting, and the enlistment of men for particular regiments; conditions subject to which the men are to be enlisted for general service, *Balfour* 3637, 3638, 3640.

Copy of General Enlistment Orders issued in India in 1856, *App.* 339.

REDUCTION OF ARMY:**I. India:**

1. British Army.
2. Native Army.

II. Generally.**I. India:****1. British Army:**

Conclusion that the British force in India is now at its minimum with reference to the duties required of it; approval moreover of the proportion of one British soldier to two native soldiers, *Norman* 319-325, 349-357—Strong objection to any reduction of the English army in India, *Sir Hope Grant* 1268-1271; *Johnson* 1739.

Expediency of there being a certain proportion of European troops in India with reference to the native force, the present proportion being however excessive, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1863-1868—Statement that by governing India with justice, and by maintaining good faith towards the chiefs, greater safety will be ensured than by keeping up the present European force, *ib.* 1877, 1878, 1882, 1910-1934—Witness considers that an army of 44,000 effective British troops should suffice for all India, *ib.* 1927.

Strong objection to any reduction of the European force in India without reference to the native troops; obstacle moreover to any reduction of the latter, *Duke of Cambridge* 3040, 3041.

Witness submits sundry data for the conclusion that the European army in India is unnecessarily large, and that no danger would be incurred in reducing it, *Mangles* 3061 *et seq.*—Great mistake in maintaining from 65,000 to 70,000 British troops in order chiefly to watch 135,000 native troops, there being in truth no one else for the former to fight with, *ib.* 3067-3077, 3087-3089, 3128—Suggestion that the British army be reduced by 20,000 men, *ib.* 3070, 3090-3095, 3102, 3159-3164—Very little use of a large British force so far as the Nepaulese, Bhootans, Burmese, &c., are concerned, *ib.* 3072-3077—Increased control over the people by means of the improved arms now in possession of the European army, *ib.* 3085, 3095, 3128, 3148, 3149—With regard to the number of British troops now stationed at different posts, and required for the local duties, witness contends that many of these posts might be given up altogether, the native troops being reduced at the same time; *ib.* 3151-3156.

Objection to any diminution in the number of English troops in India, the number being in fact too low already, *Lord Strathnairn* 3401—Regulation of the number of troops in India by the state of the country, and the duties required of the men, the duties being extremely hard, *ib.* 3449, 3450.

Opinion that the British army now in India is greater than there is any military necessity for; grounds for this conclusion considered, *Balfour* 3548 *et seq.*—Concurrence in the views of Lord Dalhousie in 1854, as to the sufficiency of thirty-five regiments of European infantry, *ib.* 3552-3558, 3641—Suggestion that the British force in India might consist of 35,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 10,000 artillery, irrespective of officers, *ib.* 3574-3584—Conclusion as to the entire ability of a much smaller European force than that now in India for overcoming any native force in the field, *ib.* 3608—Difference of about 9,000 or 10,000 men between the British force contemplated by witness for India, and the actual force now in the country, *ib.* 3721-3725—Suggestion that the European troops should consist of a local European army of 30,000 men, and an Imperial army of 20,000 men, *ib.* 3762, 3763.

Grounds put forward by Sir John Lawrence for objecting to any important reduction in the strength of the British force now allowed for India, *App.* 212, 213.

Official communication setting forth the views of Sir W. Mansfield in strong disapproval of any reduction of the British army, *App.* 293-299.

Detailed statement and suggestions in minute of Lord Dalhousie, dated 5th February 1856, in regard to the British and native forces of India, and the amount at which it is desirable to fix the limit of the Imperial troops, *App.* 327-333.

REDUCTION OF ARMY—continued.**I. India**—continued.**2. Native Army:**

Inexpediency of any sensible reduction in the native force of 125,000 on account of the increased duty to be thrown thereby upon the British troops, *Norman* 319, 320—There is a strong impression that any reduction of the native force would be an impossibility, *Duke of Cambridge* 3041.

Perfect safety in reducing the European army, if the native army be reduced, the latter being almost the sole cause of danger, *Mangles* 3061 *et seq.*—Suggestion that the native army be reduced to 100,000 men, that is by about 35,000, *ib.* 3070. 3090–3095. 3102. 3159–3164—Inexpediency of any reduction of the European army, unless the native army be reduced, whilst the unnecessarily large strength of the latter is the only obstacle to a reduction of the former, *ib.* 3078, 3079. 3110—Greater fidelity of the native army accordingly as its power of mischief is curtailed by reducing the number of men, *ib.* 3083–3086. 3102—Effect of the maintenance of a large native army in fostering military habits and a warlike spirit among the population, *ib.* 3097—The large native army is in fact the real source of danger, *ib.* 3146.

Undue reduction already made in the native army, the duties being now much too severe, *Lord Strathnairn* 3427–3429. 3450—Approval of a native infantry of 90,000 privates, *Balfour* 3648.

II. Generally:

Decided objection to a reduction in the European troops at large, through the increased employment of an inferior article in the shape of native troops, *Duke of Cambridge* 2965, 2966. 2969–2971. 3032–3034—Grounds for concluding that an increased employment of native troops in the colonies will surely lead to a corresponding reduction in the aggregate of European troops in the army, *ib.* 3047–3057.

The question of a further reduction in the aggregate of the Imperial army, as a consequence of reducing the force in India, should not in any way affect the latter reduction, *Mangles* 3165–3167.

Conclusion that if the colonial service of the British army were reduced by the increased employment of native troops in the colonies, the aggregate strength would also be reduced, *Sir H. Storks* 3296–3308—Apprehended reduction in the British army if native soldiers were substituted for Europeans in the colonies; strong disapproval of such reduction, *Lord Strathnairn* 3387, 3388—Further statement that any advantages from the employment of native Indian troops in the colonies would not counterbalance the evil of reduction of the British army, *ib.* 3420. 3433. 3444–3448.

See also *Havelock*, *Sir Henry (the late)*. *Insurrection (India)*. *Punjaub, &c.*
Railways. *Russia*.

Reliefs (British Troops). Witness supplies some information relative to the practice in regard to reliefs and movements of troops eastward of the Cape, and between England and the colonies, and will furnish to the Committee a detailed return on the subject for the last twenty years (*App.* 340–345); *Hon. H. K. Clifford* 729 *et seq.*—Very rare instances of regiments being moved from China to India, *ib.* 729–735.

Reliefs (Native Troops on Foreign Service). Expediency of limiting to three years the period of foreign service of Madras regiments, *Sir W. Elliot* 575. 581–585. 591—Difficulty in inducing natives to serve abroad, in garrison duty, for a longer period than three years, or even for that period, *Keyes* 646–654. 664–679—Importance of the question of time as regards the willingness of native troops to serve out of India, *Pears* 825. 834, 835.

Necessity of relieving Indian troops in two or three years; serious expense on this score as compared with the relief of British troops every ten years, *Sir Hope Grant* 1360, 1361. 1367–1370—Serious expense involved in the frequent relief of native troops, *Johnson* 1584, 1585. 1710. 1735, 1736—Great difficulty of inducing native troops to serve in the colonies, unless under an absolute guarantee that they would be relieved every three years, *ib.* 1733, 1734. 1747

Expediency of arrangements for the frequent relief of native troops serving out of India; increase of cost thereby, *Lord Strathnairn* 3395. 3407, 3408.

Opinion of Sir John Lawrence that native troops employed out of India should be relieved every three years, *App.* 211.

Religious Prejudices (Native Troops). Necessity of keeping in view the religious prejudices of the Hindoos, &c., in considering the question of their being sent across the sea, *Norman* 393–400—Apprehension lest from some cause or other the religious prejudices of native troops serving in the colonies might be offended, and lest dissatisfaction might be created throughout the entire native army, *Sir R. Montgomery* 1518, 1519.

See also *Caste*.

Reserves.

Reserves. See *Depôts and Reserves.*

Réunion. Paper explanatory of the strength and composition of the troops in the French colony of Réunion, *App.* 292.

Rewards (Native Troops). Objection to the limit placed upon the powers of the commanding officers of Punjab regiments in regard to rewards and punishments, *Keyes* 1122-1129—Advantage if commanding officers had power to give rewards on the spot for distinguished service in the field, *ib.* 1127-1129. 1146-1151—Evidence in favour of jagheers or grants of land being given to native officers for long and faithful service, *ib.* 1130-1145—Gratification to many native officers if, when deserving of reward, they could come to England for a time as aides-de-camp to the Queen, *ib.* 1140-1142.

Robinson, Sir H. G. R. Answers received from Sir Hercules Robinson, Governor of Ceylon, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 237, 238.

Roy Bareilly. Explanation relative to the withdrawal of troops from Roy Bareilly, *Norman* 250, 251. 284.

Russia. Slight apprehension entertained by witness of any danger to India from the gradual approach of the Russian frontier, *Mangles* 3134, 3135—Facility of sending troops from home in time to meet a Russian invasion, *ib.* 3134. 3136. 3157, 3158.

Reference to the dangers which are coming upon us from Russia, *Balfour* 3799.

Remarks by Lord Dalhousie, in minute of September 1854, upon the strong feeling in the native mind as to the power of Russia, *App.* 326.

S.

Schneider, Colonel J. W. Answers returned from Colonel Schneider, commanding the 2nd Grenadier Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the inexpediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 258.

Secunderabad. Statement of the force kept at Secunderabad, *Norman* 330-333.

Settlers in India. Absence of any special inducement to discharged men settling in the country, *Norman* 416-418—Objection to discharged soldiers settling in the north-west frontier, *ib.* 419-423—Opinion that, with proper arrangements, discharged European soldiers might, with advantage, be induced to settle in the Neilgherries and other hill districts, *Sir W. Elliot* 551-562—Obstacles to the foundation of a European settlement in India, as the nucleus of a local European force, *Sir Hope Grant* 1409-1414.

Shadwell, Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Explains sundry items contained in a certain Paper (*App.* 7), showing the estimated annual cost of maintaining a battalion of infantry at different stations east of the Cape, 2618 *et seq.*—The item of barrack expenses in China, &c., includes the cost of hired buildings, but on this point witness will supply further information to the Committee, 2627-2631. 2640-2644.

Sickness and Mortality (Native Troops in China, &c.) Statement showing the sickness and mortality among the native troops in Burmah and Port Blair, for the years 1864 and 1865, *App.* 267—Particulars of the amount of sickness and mortality among the native troops serving in China during each of the years 1859-64, *ib.*

Sikhs. Less unwillingness of Sikhs and of Affghans than of Hindoos to go across the seas, *Norman* 46. 58—Belief that by certain indemnity in the shape of extra pay, and of food, &c., Sikh troops would readily serve on garrison out of India for three years at a time, *Probyn* 862, 863. 868-870. 891-894. 903-906—Different castes of which witness's regiment is composed, Sikhs having very few prejudices, *ib.* 927-932—Anticipated good conduct of Sikh soldiers on garrison duty abroad, as well as on field service, *ib.* 933-937.

Probable fitness of the Sikhs, Goorkas, and others, for colonial garrison service, the difficulty being to get them to leave India for the purpose, *Sir Hope Grant* 1172-1176—Relative fighting powers of the Sikhs, the Hindostanees, and the Chinese, *ib.* 1227-1232.

Statement as to the discontent among a regiment of Sikhs sent to Burmah seven or eight years ago, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1893-1899. 1996—Illustration of the exciteable character of Sikh soldiers, *ib.* 1899—Peculiar propensity of Sikh soldiers for plunder, so that they are willing to join in any war where there is a prospect of booty, *ib.* 1908, 1909—Opinion as to its being a mistaken policy to encourage warlike habits in the Sikhs; number of Sikhs in the native army adverted to hereon, *ib.* 1963-1970.

Sikhs—continued.

Good discipline of the Sikh troops in the China war as compared with the French, *Mackenzie* 2055-2057—Probability of Sikhs being as willing as natives of Madras and Bengal, if equally well paid, to serve out of India, *Sir R. Montgomery* 2651, 2652—Information relative to the employment of a "pioneer corps" of Sikhs in Ceylon; entire failure of this arrangement, the Ceylon government having wanted the men for work, whilst the latter enlisted for the service with a view chiefly to soldiering, *ib.* 2653-2664—Particulars as to some recent steps for raising a body of 100 Sikhs for service in Hong Kong; enhanced rate of pay and other inducements stipulated for in this case, *ib.* 2665-2667. 2675-2681.

Statement showing the great misunderstanding which prevailed, and the sore feeling created, in regard to the experiment of sending 1,000 Sikhs to Ceylon, *Fonblanque* 2779-2791—Willingness of the Sikhs to go anywhere for fighting and plunder, but not for garrison duty, *Mangles* 3115. 3117—Less difficulties as to food and caste in the case of Sikhs than of Hindoos; willingness also of the former to go on active service out of India, *Sir H. Storks* 3207-3210. 3271, 3272. 3293-3295.

Much less caste feeling among the Sikhs than among the Hindoos generally, *Lord Strathnairn* 3385—Conclusion as to the superiority of the Sikh soldiers over every other native soldier in India *ib.* 3411. 3440.

See also *China. Colonial and Foreign Service. Punjaub, &c.*

Singapore. See *Straits Settlements.*

Special Service Corps. Disapproval of special corps being raised in India on the understanding that they were to go on foreign service; advantage rather of the power of sending any regiment required abroad in time of emergency, *Norman* 384-386—Approval of raising regiments expressly with a view to their serving abroad, *Sir W. Elliot* 573-581—Difficulties to be encountered respectively in raising a special regiment for foreign service, and in sending abroad a regiment of the existing army, *Pears* 807-817—Practicability of raising some special corps in India for garrison duty in the colonies, there being, however, serious objections to this plan, *Johnson* 1538. 1550-1556. 1632-1635. 1658—Strong disapproval of raising special corps for service out of India, *Balfour* 3817.

Storks, Lieutenant General, The Right Honourable Sir Henry, G.C.B. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Disapproval of the proposed employment of Indian troops in lieu of British troops in the colonies, 3172-3174—Objection to any portion of the present force at the Cape being replaced by Sikhs or other native troops from India, 3175-3184. 3211-3222. 3268—Advantage of employing local levies at the Cape, such as Fingoes, in addition to British troops, rather than of bringing native troops from India; efficiency of the former in the event of a Kaffir war, 3184-3190. 3282, 3283. 3290-3292.

Objection to the employment of Fingoe levies as part of the garrison of the Mauritius, 3191-3195—Great importance of the Mauritius in a political and military sense, so that even in time of peace it is essential to maintain a European garrison of 1,600 or 1,800 men, 3195-3202. 3223-3242. 3269—Use likely to be made of the coolie population of the Mauritius in aid of the garrison in case of foreign attack, 3198. 3230. 3250-3254—Strong French feeling in the Mauritius, thus rendering an adequate British garrison the more essential, 3199. 3241, 3242. 3255, 3256.

Decided objection to colonial troops at Malta, except as supplemental to British troops; the latter should not in time of peace number less than 6,000 men, 3204-3207. 3262-3267. 3286-3289—Less difficulties as to food and caste in the case of Sikhs than of Hindoos; willingness also of the former to go on active service out of India, 3207. 3210. 3271, 3272. 3293-3295—Question whether as regards the Cape the settlers should not be left to take care of themselves against the Kaffirs, 3214, 3215. 3278-3281.

Greater reason for the maintenance of an unmixed British garrison at the Mauritius than in the Straits Settlements, or at Aden, 3238-3242—Large garrison required at Gibraltar as well as Malta in the event of war, 3244-3246—Expediency of settling in time of peace the details of any scheme for the employment of Indian troops in the colonies, 3247-3249. 3273—Objection to substituting Asiatic troops for black troops in the West Indies, 3257-3260—Approval of the employment of black troops on the West Coast of Africa, 3261.

Anticipated local objection in Malta to the introduction of Asiatic troops as a permanent arrangement, 3262-3266—Approval of the employment of Asiatic troops in Egypt, 3274—Objection by those colonies which pay towards the troops, to the substitution of Asiatics for Europeans, 3275, 3276—Importance of native troops in the colonies being commanded by their own officers, 3277.

Opinion that there is no colonial race which could be advantageously recruited for general service regiments, 3284, 3285—Great experience of the Canadian regiment raised in 1857; 3285—Grounds for concluding that if the colonial service of the British army were reduced by the increased employment of native troops in the colonies, the aggregate strength of the army would also be reduced, 3296-3308.

STRAITS SETTLEMENTS:

Facility of finding natives of India for service in Arracan and the Straits, *Norman* 193. 210, 211—Explanation as to the employment of native troops with European artillery in the Straits Settlements, *ib.* 256-259. 264—Exceptional character of the Straits Settlements as regards the employment of native troops exclusively, *Pears* 818. 836, 837. 846.

Sufficiency heretofore of Madrasses for garrisoning Singapore, it being a peculiarly quiet place, *Sir Hope Grant* 1183-1190—Approval of withdrawing British troops from Singapore in the event of a war in Europe; they might be brought home in about a month, *ib.* 1183-1200—Expediency of a European garrison at Singapore, *ib.* 1460-1466—Necessity of Europeans to defend the place if a war were to break out, *ib.* 1479—Completion of the barracks at Singapore for only one wing of a European regiment, *ib.* 1484-1487.

Particulars relative to the garrison at the Straits Settlements; alterations contemplated, *Johnson* 1600-1614—Non-objection to native regiments doing duty at Singapore and the Straits, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1976, 1977—Advantage in garrisoning Singapore with native troops and European artillery, whereas it is now decided to place a wing of a European regiment there, *Mackenzie* 2009-2012. 2027-2032. 2083, 2084—Very indifferent character of the climate of Singapore, *ib.* 2030. 2049—Statement in favour of garrisoning Singapore partly with the Ceylon Rifles, it being desirable, however, to have some European troops also, *Macdonald* 2207-2216, 2238-2246.

Expediency of some British troops in addition to European garrison artillery in the Straits Settlements, *Duke of Cambridge* 2988-2990—Disapproval of there being artillery only with the native troops at Singapore, *Lord Strathnairn* 3394.

Entire efficiency of the Indian native troops at Singapore in time of peace, *Cavenagh* 3312, 3313. 3316-3323—Difficulty, on financial grounds, in obtaining European troops at Singapore from India in case of war, *ib.* 3314, 3315—Rate of pay and allowances of the Indian troops at Singapore, *ib.* 3328-3330—Advantage of European artillery at Singapore, though a native regiment is efficient for internal defence, *ib.* 3342-3345—Particulars as to the payment made by the Straits Settlements for the garrison of Singapore, &c.; also as to the cost of the garrison to the Indian Government, *ib.* 3360, 3361. 3370-3374—Explanation relative to the transfer of the Settlements to the Colonial Government, the reduced sum now paid by the colony, and the expense to the Imperial treasury, through the want of longer notice of the transfer, *ib.* 3362-3369. 3375-3378.

Very satisfactory results of the employment of native troops at Singapore, Penang, and Malacca since the year 1826; instance in 1842 of their bravery in action against the Malays, *Balfour* 3484-3494—Statement strongly in favour of the continued employment of native troops in the Straits Settlements, rather than of sending out British troops; undue expense, moreover, if the latter proceeding be carried out, *ib.* 3802-3806—Circumstance of Mr. Crauford, who has had great experience in Singapore, having asked for only 200 European artillery, in addition to a local constabulary force, *ib.* 3806.

Return showing that the force is to comprise about 1360 officers and men, *App.* 282.

See also *Ceylon Rifle Corps*.

Strathnairn, the Right Honourable Lord. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Considers that in principle the employment of native Indian troops out of India is very expedient, 3381—Important advantage if by service out of India the prejudices of the native soldiers in regard to caste could be mitigated or removed, so as to prevent interference with discipline, 3381-3386—Satisfactory service in France of the native Algerian troops, from whom all traces of caste have almost disappeared, 3381—Tendency of service out of India to render the natives more civilised, and to diminish the liability to native revolutions, 3382.

Much stronger existence of caste in Bengal than in Bombay or Madras, 3383, 3384—Much less feeling of caste among the Sikhs than among the Hindoos generally, 3385—Apprehended reduction in the British army, if native soldiers were substituted for Europeans in the colonies; strong disapproval of such reduction, 3387, 3388—Conclusion that there would be a saving of expense by substituting a native for a British regiment out of India, 3389.

Strong objection to the native regiments being called upon to volunteer for foreign service, they having already taken the oath to serve anywhere, so that there should be no option in the matter, 3389. 3406. 3422—Instances of the readiness of Bombay troops to serve out of India, *ib.*—Improbability of Sikh troops in the West Indies coming into collision with the European or local population, 3391. 3403—Doubt whether the regiments in Bengal are prepared for a system of foreign service, 3391. 3406. 3446.

Disapproval of colonies being held by Indian troops without any European troops; the two work exceedingly well together, 3393, 3394. 3398—Objection to native troops, supported only by European artillery, 3394. 3405—Expediency of arrangements for the

Strathnairn, the Right Hon. Lord. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

frequent relief of native troops serving out of India; increase of cost thereby, 3395. 3407, 3408—Important auxiliaries to our military strength in India by reason of garrisons at the Cape, Hong Kong, Mauritius, &c., 3396–3400. 3431, 3432—Necessity of British as well as native troops, for so important a station as Mauritius, 3398–3400.

Objections to any diminution in the number of English troops in India, the number being in fact too low already, 3401—Approval of an interchange of West Indian and Indian troops, by way of trial, 3402, 3403. 3414–3419—Inexpediency of a total removal of European troops from the tropical colonies, though there might be a partial exchange for native troops, 3404. 3444–3448—Disapproval of Hong Kong being held by native troops only; approval of a mixed force there, 3405. 3447, 3448—Facility of reducing the ill-health of the European troops at Hong Kong, 3405.

Expediency, on the score of discipline, of the Hindoo regiments and Sikh regiments being alike considered available for foreign service, 3410, 3411—Conclusion as to the superiority of the Sikh soldier over every other native soldier in India, 3411. 3440—Discretion necessary as regards the employment of Mahomedan troops from India in a colony where the natives were Mahomedan, 3412, 3413—Element of safety in the mixed composition of the Indian native army, *ib.*—Improvement in the case of the West India regiments if they were to serve in India, 3414–3419.

Further statement that any advantages from the employment of native Indian troops in the colonies would not counterbalance the evil of reduction of the British army, 3420. 3433. 3444–3448—Entire fitness of native troops for service in the colonies in time of war, 3421—Expediency of the employment of native troops out of India being commenced in time of peace, rather than postponed till war occurs, 3422, 3423—Approval of the Mauritius being reinforced by native troops from India in the event of war, 3424–3427.

Undue reduction made in the native army, the duties being now much too severe, 3427–3429. 3450—Usefulness of native troops for garrison duties in case of war as well as for field service, 3430—Maximum reduction already effected in the British army, so that the troops do not now get five years' service at home for ten years' abroad, 3433, 3434—Slight weight attached to the objection as regards difference of pay of officers in the case of native and British troops serving together, 3435—Great importance of carefully selected officers for native regiments serving in the colonies; absence of difficulty on this score, 3435–3443.

Further approval of the policy of employing the native Indian troops on foreign service, provided it does not lead to any reduction of the European force, 3444–3448—Regulation of the number of troops in India by the state of the country, and the duties required of the men, the duties being extremely hard, 3449, 3450—Approval of the proportion to two native soldiers to one British soldier, 3449.

T.

Taxation (India.) Argument that it is most essential to lay down a limit beyond which the military expenditure or taxation of India should not go, and to leave it to the military departments to secure all possible efficiency with reference to such limit, *Balfour* 3516. 3548, 3549. 3573. 3593–3595. 3620, 3621—Disaffection and danger likely to arise from the imposition of new taxes necessary for the support of the present large force, *ib.* 3549–3551. 3593–3596. 3713–3720—Strong objection made by Lord Canning to the imposition of new taxes, with reference to an increased military force, *ib.* 3549—Belief as to the facility with which India could provide herself with an efficient army for an expense not exceeding 12,000,000*l.* a year, whilst it is extremely essential that she should not be burdened beyond this amount, *ib.* 3593–3596—Great danger to be incurred by keeping up a very large army, on account of the oppressive taxation necessary, *ib.* 3608.

Taylor, Henry. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Is senior clerk in the Colonial Office, 2408, 2409—Employment of only two coloured corps in the colonies, that is, in the West Indies and Ceylon, 2410–2412—Total of about 700 effective men in each of the four West India regiments stationed in the West Indies, and on the West Coast of Africa, 2412–2414—Employment of English officers in the West India regiments, 2415, 2416—Pay of the men adverted to; saving of expense on the score of reliefs and invalidings, as compared with European troops, 2417–2419—Advantage, as regards climate, of the substitution of coloured troops for Europeans, 2420–2422.

Necessary recruiting of the West India regiments at home since about the year 1853, whereas they were formerly recruited on the West Coast of Africa from liberated Africans, 2422, 2423—Question considered whether the West India troops, being now recruited from the native population are to be depended upon in the event of popular disturbance or insurrection; summary of the opinions of various governors in the West Indies on this point, 2423 *et seq.*—Conclusion arrived at by witness that on the whole the West India

Taylor, Henry. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.

India regiment can be relied upon as against their own countrymen in the event of civil tumult, 2424, 2425.

Importance attached to the efficient officering of the West India troops, as regards their services in time of local disturbances, 2424-2427—Doubt as to the expediency of mixing Madrasees with African or West Indian blacks in the same regiments; views of Governor Bayley in 1861 in favour of such mixture, 2433-2438—Opinion expressed by Governor Eyre in March 1865 that black troops without European troops at hand are a source of danger in the West Indies; this was disproved during the subsequent outbreak, 2439-2442—Instances of outbreaks in the West Indian, on all which occasions the black troops have shown their fidelity, 2443-2449.

Reliance to be placed on West India troops in the Mauritius, 2450—Total of about 250,000 coolies in the Mauritius, there being about 100,000 negroes and 4,000 whites, 2451-2453. 2610-2612—Difficulty of raising a negro regiment in the Mauritius, 2454-2456—Docile character of the coolie population in the Mauritius, whilst they have no such strong prejudices of caste or of religion as are likely to lead to revolt, 2457-2468.

Probable discontent of the English colonists in Mauritius if the European troops were withdrawn, and if a colonial contribution were required for Asiatic troops, 2469-2473. 2487-2490. 2501-2503—Doubt as to the policy of withdrawing the European troops from the island, whilst a considerable French garrison is kept at Bourbon, 2474-2479. 2490-2497—Less extensive fortifications carried out at Mauritius or Port Louis, than were first intended, the island being in fact easy of capture irrespectively of the garrison of about 2,000 men in port Louis, 2480-2486.

Probable withdrawal of the contribution of 41,000 *l.* a year by the Cape colonists if the European troops were replaced by native troops from India, 2504-2508—Difficulty in compelling those colonies to contribute which have independent legislatures, 2508-2510. 2545—Arrangement by which the military contribution by the Australian colonies is placed at 40 *l.* a head for each European soldier, 2511-2518—Belief as to its being intended to increase the Ceylon Rifle Corps, and to send some companies to the Straits Settlements, 2518-2521—Less objection as regards deterioration of officers in the case of the Ceylon corps than of the West India regiments, 2522-2526.

Very small contribution by the colonists in China towards the military establishment, 2527—Views of a former Lieutenant Governor of St. Vincent as to the difficulty of preserving discipline in a small and entirely local force, *ib.*—Good conduct of some black troops upon the occasion of an invasion of Honduras in November last, 2530-2537—Further statement as to the effect of climate in deteriorating the services of the officers of the West India regiments, 2530. 2536-2538.

Circumstance of there being no contribution by the West Indian colonists to the military establishment, 2539, 2540—Except at Jamaica the duties devolving on the troops in the West Indies are almost entirely in the nature of police duties, 2541-2544—Objection to withdrawing the troops from the West Indian stations, whilst at the same time all the islands cannot afford to bear the expense of the troops, 2545-2550.

Advantage of European garrisons at the Mauritius and other places, sufficient to beat off the attack of a small expeditionary force in time of war, 2553, 2554—Increased difficulties in the withdrawal of British troops, and the substitution of native troops in those colonies where contributions are made, as compared with colonies not paying anything, 2555-2563—Several instances of volunteers or militia being raised in the West Indian colonies, 2564-2567—Probable effect of the presence of a European force, and of a native force respectively, as regards the raising of volunteers and militia, 2568-2571—Powers respectively of the Crown, and of the local legislatures of colonies, in regard to the question of colonial payment towards the local military establishments, 2572-2582.

Further statement that the colonists in the Mauritius would oppose the substitution of native for European troops, 2579, 2580—Fidelity of the black troops in the Jamaica outbreak of 1865; further adverted to, 2583—Views of Governor Hincks of British Guiana, in favour of the formation of a constabulary force in the West Indies, as a means of dispensing with European garrisons, 2584-2586.

Objection by the Horse Guards to the employment of white troops in the West Indies without some black troops for performing fatigue duties; question as to there being good ground for this objection, 2587-2594—Opinion, that as a matter of policy the withdrawal of all British troops from the West Indies is very undesirable, 2595-2597—Considerable importance of the Mauritius colony, so that it is on the whole very expedient to maintain a British garrison there, 2598-2615.

Taylor, Lieutenant Colonel J. Answers received from Colonel Taylor, commanding the 5th Regiment, Bombay Native Light Infantry, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, if it be determined upon, *App.* 251, 252.

Temple, Sir R. Communication from Sir R. Temple, British resident at Hyderabad, as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 223-227.

Term of Service (Native Troops). Frequent representation made for a reduction of the term of service of the Madras army; this is never beyond three years, *Norman* 33, 34 — Power of the men to claim their discharge after three years' service, *ib.* 122, 123 — Expediency of limiting to three years the period of foreign service of Madras regiments, *Sir W. Elliot* 575. 581-583. 591 — Difficulty in inducing natives to serve abroad, in garrison duty, for a longer period than three years, or even for that period, *Keyes* 646-654. 664-679.

Importance of the question of time as regards the willingness of native troops to serve out of India, *Pears* 825. 834, 835 — Necessity of relieving Indian troops in two or three years; serious expense on this score as compared with the relief of British troops every ten years, *Sir Hope Grant* 1360, 1361. 1367-1370.

Considerable expense involved in the frequent relief of native troops, *Johnson* 1584, 1585. 1710. 1735, 1736 — Great difficulty in inducing native troops to serve in the colonies unless under the absolute guarantee that they would be relieved every three years, *ib.* 1733, 1734. 1747.

Contemplated enlistment for a period of ten years in the case of Indian troops employed in the colonies, *Fonblanque* 2814.

Expediency of arrangements for the frequent relief of native troops serving out of India; increase of cost thereby, *Lord Strathnairn* 3395. 3407, 3408.

Opinion of Sir John Lawrence that native troops employed out of India should be relieved every three years, *App.* 211.

Thacker, Lieutenant Colonel S. Answers received from Colonel Thacker, commanding the Marine Battalion, Bombay Army, in reply to questions transmitted by the Committee as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, if it be decided upon, *App.* 248, 249.

Thomson, Major G. L. Communication from Major Thomson, commanding the 26th Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry, as to the expediency of the employment of native Indian troops in different British colonies, and as to the best mode of carrying out such employment, *App.* 259.

Town Garrisons (India). Special duties required of the European troops as a check upon fanatical outbreaks in large towns, *Newman* 320-329.

Transport of Troops. Comment on the circumstance of less space being allowed on board the transport ships for native than for British troops between India and Burmah, *Norman* 446-450 — Offers made, a few years ago, to take a regiment from Hong Kong to Bombay for 5,000 *l.*, *Pears* 759.

Witness supplies certain particulars relative to the cost of transport of troops between England and Hong Kong, *Mends* 951 *et seq.* — Explanation of the practice as to the conveyance of a certain proportion of soldiers' wives and children, and as to the rate of charge, *ib.* 956-963. 990-1001 — Statement of the cost of freight and victualling of native regiments between India and China; less cost than in the case of European troops, 971-973 — Instances of the great expense of transport in hired transports between India and China, and China and the Cape, *ib.* 980-985 — Much less cost in Government troop ships than in hired vessels, *ib.* 982-985 — Intention still to carry out the transport service to the Mauritius and Ceylon round the Cape, irrespectively of the new arrangements for the Indian service, *ib.* 1002-1010 — Very little difference in the cost of transport for Singapore and to China, *ib.* 1011.

Much greater cost of transport of British troops than of natives from Madras to Singapore and Burmah, the native troops being much more crowded together on board; explanation hereon, *Sir Hope Grant* 1214-1224. 1467, 1468 — Larger expenses of transport of European troops to China than of Indian native troops, *Mackenzie* 1998-2000. 2037, 2038 — Statement in connection with the much less cost of transport of native troops than of Europeans, *Balfour* 3475-3481 — Doubt as to any evil arising from the transport arrangement by which each native soldier at sea is allowed only six square feet of space, whilst a British is allowed nine square feet *ib.* 3662-3670.

Extract from the regulations for the transport service in regard to the number of women and children allowed to embark with the troops, *App.* 285.

Estimate, prepared in the transport department, of the comparative expense of the overland and Cape routes between England and India, for conveyance of 14,400 soldiers, with officers and families; difference of 4 *l.* 16 *s.* 9 *d.* per adult in favour of the overland route, *App.* 286.

Return

Transport of Troops—continued.

Return of the net cost per soldier of the transport of troops between certain stations of Great Britain, in hired ships and in Government troop ships respectively ; large saving in the latter case, *App.* 287.

Particulars of the relative cost of conveyance of British troops and of native troops between India and China, *App.* 288.

Estimate of the cost of transport of a battalion to Hong Kong from England in a hired sailing ship, for a voyage of 125 days, *App.* 289—Estimate of the cost of the same service by Her Majesty's troop ship "Tamar" for a voyage of ninety days, *ib.*—Enhanced cost per soldier in the latter case, *ib.*

Return, dated, Admiralty 25th July 1867, showing the cost incurred in moving various regiments between England, India, and the colonies, for several years past, *App.* 340–345.

See also *Relief (Native Troops)*.

V.

Volunteers for Foreign Service (Indian Army). Facility of forming a regiment for foreign service by means of volunteers from different regiments, *Sir R. Montgomery* 2713–2715—Strong objection to the native regiments being called upon to volunteer for foreign service, they having already taken the oath to serve any where, so that there should be no option in the matter, *Lord Strathnairn* 3389. 3406. 3410. 3422—Decided disapproval of allowing men or regiments to volunteer for foreign service, *Balfour* 3814–3816.

Opinion of Sir John Lawrence that all native troops serving in the colonies should be volunteers for the special service, *App.* 211.

W.

War. Importance of our colonies having European troops to defend them in the event of war, *Sir Hope Grant* 1209–1213—Imperial importance of garrisoning the colonies with British troops, though in the event of a war in Europe it might be found necessary to bring the troops home, and to supply their place abroad with native troops, *ib.* 1281–1300. 1308–1316. 1420–1430—Only as a last resource would witness replace British troops in the colonies by native troops, in time of war, *ib.* 1377, 1378.

Contemplated withdrawal of several British regiments from India in the event of a European war, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1877. 1882. 1932–1934—Statement as to the nature of the facilities for withdrawing troops from India, &c. in the event of their being required for a war in Europe, *ib.* 1955–1958.

More ready and efficient service of native troops in time of war, if employed on foreign service in time of peace, *Mackenzie* 2025, 2026. 2039—Advantage of European garrisons at the Mauritius and other places sufficient to beat off the attack of a small expeditionary force in time of war, *Taylor* 2553, 2554.

Greater facility in obtaining the services of native troops out of India in time of war than during peace, *Duke of Cambridge* 3014. 3018, 3019—Expediency of raising new levies at home rather than of withdrawing British troops from India in the event of a European war, *ib.* 3016–3018. 3037, 3038.

Inducement to withdraw British troops from India in the event of a European war ; danger to India in so doing, *Mangles* 3111–3114—Expediency of settling in time of peace the details of any scheme for the employment of Indian troops in the colonies, *Sir H. Storks* 3247–3249. 3273.

Entire fitness of native troops for service in the colonies in time of war, *Lord Strathnairn* 3421—Importance of the employment of native troops out of India being commenced in time of peace, rather than postponed till war occurs, *ib.* 3422, 3423.

Expected withdrawal of an unduly large force from India, in the event of war in Europe, or of England being threatened at home, *Balfour* 3600. 3602. 3750–3753—Expediency of making in time of peace those arrangements as to the garrisons of the Mauritius, Ceylon, &c., which in time of war must be made, *ib.* 3697. 3811, 3812.

Water Supply (Native Troops). Importance of every attention being paid to the supply of water for native troops, both on board ship and on foreign service, *Caird* 1807–1812. 1817, 1818.—See also *Caste*.

Wellington, Duke of (the late). Views of the Duke of Wellington and Lord Hardinge in 1845, in disapproval of foreign garrison service being forced on native Indian troops, *Norman* 64–66.

Report, 1867—continued.

West Coast of Africa. Approval of the employment of black troops on the West Coast of Africa, *Sir H. Storks* 3261.

WEST INDIES AND WEST INDIA REGIMENTS:

1. *As to European and Native Indian Garrisons, respectively.*
2. *Local Volunteers and Militia.*
3. *As to the West India Regiments.*

1. *As to European and Native Indian Garrisons, respectively:*

Instances of complaint by coolies against the climate, &c., in the West Indies, *Caird* 1815, 1816—Unfitness of sepoys for service in the West Indies, *Sir G. R. Clerk* 1893—Mistake in having small detachments of British troops scattered over the West Indies, *Mackenzie* 2052, 2058–2061—Doubt as to the expediency of garrisoning the West Indies with native troops from India, *ib.* 2092–2095.

Objection to withdrawing the British troops from the West Indian stations, whilst at the same time all the islands cannot afford to bear the expense of the troops, *Taylor* 2545–2550—Except at Jamaica, the duties devolving on the troops in the West Indies are almost entirely in the nature of police duties, *ib.* 2541–2544—Objection by the Horse Guards to the employment of white troops in the West Indies without some black troops for performing fatigue duties; question as to there being good ground for this objection, *ib.* 2587–2594—Opinion that as a matter of policy, the withdrawal of all British troops from the West Indies is very undesirable, *ib.* 2595–2597.

Advantage of the nucleus of British troops in the principal islands in the West Indies, *Duke of Cambridge* 3020—Objection to substituting Asiatic troops for black troops in the West Indies, *Sir H. Storks* 3257–3260—Improbability of Sikh troops in the West Indies coming into collision with the European or local population, *Lord Strathnairn* 3391–3403—Approval of an interchange of West Indian troops by way of trial, *ib.* 3402, 3403, 3414–3419.

Return, dated 28th March 1867, of the number of troops borne on the strength of the Imperial army, and stationed in the West Indies, *App.* 282.

2. *Local Volunteers and Militia:*

Several instances of volunteers or militia being raised in the West Indian colonies, *Taylor* 2564–2567.

Return, dated 2nd January 1865, of the local militia, volunteers, and military police in the West India colonies, actually embodied and effective, *App.* 284.

3. *As to the West India Regiments:*

Total of about 700 effective men in each of the four West India regiments stationed in the West Indies and on the West Coast of Africa, *Taylor* 2412–2414—Employment of English officers in the West India regiments, *ib.* 2415, 2416—Pay of the men adverted to; saving of expense on the score of reliefs and invalidings, as compared with European troops, *ib.* 2417–2419—Necessary recruiting of the regiments at home since about the year 1853, whereas they were formerly recruited on the West Coast of Africa from liberated Africans, *ib.* 2422, 2423.

Question considered whether the West India troops, being now recruited from the native population, are to be depended upon in the event of popular disturbance or insurrection; summary of the opinions of various governors in the West Indies on this point, *Taylor* 2423 *et seq.*—Conclusion arrived at by witness, that on the whole the West India regiments can be relied upon as against their own countrymen in the event of civil tumult, *ib.* 2424, 2425—Importance attached to the efficient officering of the West India troops, as regards their services in time of local disturbances, *ib.* 2424–2427.

Doubt as to the expediency of mixing Madrassees with African or West Indian blacks in the same regiments; view of Governor Bayley in 1861 in favour of such mixture, *Taylor* 2433–2438—Instances of outbreaks in the West Indian, on all which occasions the black troops have shown their fidelity, *ib.* 2443–2449—Less objection as regards deterioration of officers, in the case of the Ceylon corps, than of the West India regiments, *ib.* 2522–2526—Further statement as to the effect of climate in deteriorating the services of the officers of the West India regiments, *ib.* 2530, 2536–2538.

Evidence as to the constitution of the West India regiments and as to their efficiency, whilst they are much more economical than European troops, *Fonblanque* 2825–2843, 2852–2863—Statement as to the regiments being now recruited in the West Indies instead of the West Coast of Africa; difficulty in recruiting from Africa, *ib.* 2832–2836, 2874, 2875—Willingness of African troops to settle in any colony if they are allowed to have their wives with them, *ib.* 2838–2848—Docility of African troops, *ib.* 2847, 2848—Advantage of African troops in being able to stand cold as well as heat, *ib.* 2853—

Report, 1867—continued.

WEST INDIES AND WEST INDIA REGIMENTS—continued.**3. As to the West India Regiments**—continued.

2853-2862—Considerable sickness and mortality among the officers of the West Indian regiments caused very much by indulgence in drink, *Fonblanque* 2864-2868.

Improvement in the case of the West India regiments if they were to serve in India; approval of an interchange between them and native Indian regiments, *Lord Strathnairn* 3402, 3403. 3414-3419.

See also *Barbadoes. Demerara. Hincks, Governor. Honduras. Jamaica Insurrection.*

Wilson, Lieutenant Colonel, T. F. Memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel Wilson, 7th Bengal Cavalry, on the question of the employment of native troops from India in the colonies; doubt as to the expediency of such employment, *App.* 319, 320.

I N D E X
TO THE
R E P O R T
FROM THE
SELECT COMMITTEE
ON
ARMY (INDIA AND THE COLONIES).

*Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,
26 July 1867.*

[*Price 8 d.*]

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Under 8 oz.

711

R E P O R T

FROM THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

ON

MILITARY RESERVE FUNDS;

TOGETHER WITH THE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE,

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE,

AND APPENDIX.

*Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,
22 July 1867.*

Tuesday, 14th May 1867.

Ordered, THAT a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the Origin of the Military Reserve Funds, the Sources from which they are derived, and the Objects to which they are applied.

Wednesday, 19th June 1867.

Select Committee nominated of,—

Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Childers.
Mr. Goschen.
Colonel Hogg.
Marquis of Hartington.
Colonel North.
Colonel Wilson Patten.
General Peel.

Mr. O'Reilly.
Sir Charles Russell.
Mr. Trevelyan.
Sir John Trollope.
Captain Vivian.
Mr. Percy Wyndham.
Lord Hotham.

Ordered, THAT the Committee have power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.

Ordered, THAT Five be the Quorum of the Committee.

Monday, 22nd July 1867.

Ordered, THAT the Committee have power to Report their Observations, together with the Minutes of Evidence taken before them, to the House.

REPORT	- - - - -	p.	iii
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE	- - - - -	p.	iv
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE	- - - - -	p.	1
APPENDIX	- - - - -	p.	41

R E P O R T.

THE SELECT COMMITTEE appointed to inquire into the Origin of the MILITARY RESERVE FUNDS, the Sources from which they are derived, and the Objects to which they are applied:—HAVE considered the matters to them referred, and have agreed to the following REPORT:

YOUR COMMITTEE have proceeded with the consideration of the question referred to them, but in consequence of the late period of the Session, and the great importance of the subject, are not in a position to complete the inquiry. They have therefore agreed to report the Evidence already taken, and to recommend to the House that the Committee be re-appointed in the next Session of Parliament.

22 *July* 1867.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE.

Tuesday, 25th June 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Sir Charles Russell.
Colonel North.
Mr. Baxter.

General Peel.
Lord Hotham.

Lord HOTHAM was called to the Chair.

The Committee deliberated.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at One o'clock.]

Wednesday, 26th June 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Lord HOTHAM in the Chair.

General Peel.
Mr. Baxter.
Colonel Hogg.
Colonel North.
Mr. O'Reilly.

Sir Charles Russell.
Sir John Trollope.
Captain Vivian.
Mr. Percy Wyndham

Sir *Edward Lugard* and Mr. *Thomas C. B. Cave*, were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Friday next, at One o'clock.]

Friday, 28th June 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Lord HOTHAM in the Chair.

Colonel North.
General Peel.
Sir John Trollope.
Sir Charles Russell.
Major O'Reilly.
Captain Vivian.

Mr. Percy Wyndham.
Colonel Hogg.
Mr. Trevelyan.
Marquis of Hartington.
Mr. Baxter.

General *Forster* examined.

[Adjourned till Wednesday next, at One o'clock.]

Wednesday, 3rd July 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Lord HOTHAM in the Chair.

Colonel North.
Sir Charles Russell.
Mr. Percy Wyndham.
Captain Vivian.
Mr. Baxter.

General Peel.
Colonel Hogg.
Mr. Trevelyan.
Mr. Goschen.

Major *Marvin* examined.

[Adjourned till Friday, 12th July, at 12 o'clock.

Friday, 12th July 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Lord HOTHAM in the Chair.

Colonel North.
General Peel.
Mr. Trevelyan.
Mr. Childers.
Colonel Hogg.

Mr. Goschen.
Sir John Trollope.
Marquis of Hartington.
Mr. Percy Wyndham.
Sir Charles Russell.

Colonel *Haliday* examined.

[Adjourned till Monday, 22nd July, at 12 o'clock.

Monday, 22nd July 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Lord HOTHAM in the Chair.

General Peel.
Colonel North.
Mr. Percy Wyndham.
Sir John Trollope.
Colonel Hogg.

Sir Charles Russell.
Marquis of Hartington.
Mr. Trevelyan.
Captain Vivian.

The Committee deliberated.

Draft Report, proposed by the Chairman ; read the first and second time, and *agreed to*.

Ordered, To Report, together with the Minutes of Evidence, and an Appendix.

LIST OF WITNESSES.

Wednesday, 26th June 1867.

	PAGE
Lieutenant General Sir Edward Lugard, G.C.B. - - - -	1, 10
Thomas C. B. Cave, Esq. - - - -	9

Friday, 28th June 1867.

Lieutenant General William Frederick Forster, K.H. - - -	11
--	----

Wednesday, 3rd July 1867.

Major William Marvin - - - -	17
------------------------------	----

Friday, 12th July 1867.

Colonel William Robert Haliday - - - -	27
--	----

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

Wednesday, 26th June 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Baxter.
Colonel Hogg.
Lord Hotham.
Colonel North.
General Peel.

Mr. O'Reilly.
Sir Charles Russell.
Sir John Trollope.
Captain Vivian.
Mr. Percy Wyndham.

LORD HOTHAM, IN THE CHAIR.

Lieutenant-General Sir EDWARD LUGARD, G. C. B., called in ; and Examined.

1. *Chairman.*] You fill the office of Permanent Under Secretary of State for the War Department?—Yes.

2. I believe, in that capacity, all matters relating to the Military Reserve Funds pass through your hands?—Yes.

3. Will you tell us the origin of the Military Reserve Fund?—Perhaps you will allow me to read a short memorandum which I wrote some years ago, chiefly compiled from evidence given to the Royal Commission of 1856–57, on purchase and sale of commissions:—"Prior to 1825 the Commander in Chief used to sell first commissions occasionally for the benefit of widows of deserving officers; this Half-pay or Reserve Fund, as it was called, was placed under public control by Lord Palmerston in 1826, and the amount accumulated (80,000 £.) was paid into the Exchequer. This balance arose partly from half-pay officers having been allowed to commute their half-pay, many of whom were only entitled to a portion of the full value of their commissions, the difference between the regulation price and the amount to which they were entitled being placed to the credit of the fund. In 1841 the Secretary at War assumed the direct control of the fund, paying the balance periodically to the Paymaster General in aid of the public service until 1851, when Lord Panmure, then Secretary at War, decided upon retaining the money for the purpose of extinguishing any supernumerary commissions that might exist. The first quarterly account, dated 31st March 1851, rendered by Messrs. Cox & Co., in whose hands the fund had been placed, showed a balance of 8,265 £. From that time the fund has been augmented by sums short of the full value of commissions deducted from officers selling out, whose service did not entitle them to the regulation price paid by their successors. 2nd. By the difference between a full and half-pay commission paid by officers re-

stored to full pay who had received that amount on going to half-pay. 3rd. By the sale of cornet-cies and ensigncies in succession to officers retiring upon full or half-pay, when the promotions were allowed without purchase, owing to long service, &c. 4th. By the sale of first commissions on the augmentation of the army in 1854, by Mr. Sidney Herbert, then Secretary at War, for the purpose of meeting and reducing the great increase to the half-pay list on the cessation of hostilities, and consequent reduction of the army." (This has never been done since 1859.) "The purposes to which the fund is applied are various, all most useful to the army and beneficial to the State: 1st. To reduce the half-pay list by purchasing the commissions of such half-pay officers as desire to realise the value thereof, thus conferring a great boon on many deserving officers, and saving the Exchequer the annuities payable to these officers. (In the year 1862," when this memorandum was drawn up, "there were 61 commissions purchased from half-pay officers at a saving of about 8,000 £. per annum to the half-pay vote.) 2nd. To reduce the prices paid for cavalry commissions, by paying to each officer on retirement from the cavalry the amount of difference to which he may be entitled between the old and new price of cavalry commissions, provided he entered prior to 1860, when the prices were reduced."

4. For how long did that system of selling commissions occasionally for the benefit of the families of deserving officers continue?—As far as I can learn from the evidence given before that Commission, it ceased in 1826.

5. From 1826 to the present time the operations of the fund have become gradually extended?—Quite so.

6. Before this system came into force, what commissions, according to the practice of the army, were sold, and what always went in their regiments?

Lieut.-Gen.
Sir
E. Lugard,
G.C.
—
26 June
1867.

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regiments? Was not it the case that no person could sell his commission who had not purchased it, except he were a very old officer whose length of service enabled him to get permission to do so?—I find in the Appendix to the Report on Naval and Military Promotion, 1840, this memorandum: "For more than 100 years it has been held that an officer who desired to retire by sale should be allowed to receive the value of those commissions he purchased, however short might be the period of his service; and by a regulation dating from the time of Queen Anne, the claim of an officer to retire by sale who had purchased none of his commissions is also recognised, on the condition only that he had rendered a certain period of service in the army. According to the last regulations on the subject, the periods of service required to give a title to this privilege were, in 1823, fixed at 20 years for a field officer or captain, 15 years for a lieutenant, and 12 years for an ensign, one-half of which was to have been passed on full-pay, or in the performance of military duties."

7. Then, up to a certain period, the only commissions that could be sold were commissions that had been purchased, and the commissions of officers who had entitled themselves to sell their commissions by a service of 30 years originally, and 20 years by subsequent limitation?—That was so.

8. I think vacancies occasioned by sentences of courts-martial were never allowed to go in the regiment?—No.

9. And I think, also, vacancies occasioned by misconduct in the regiment were not allowed to go in the regiment?—No, generally speaking, they were not.

10. But all death vacancies, all vacancies by the retirement of those who had not purchased, as a matter of course, went in the regiment?—Quite so; but very few officers retired; you could not get them to retire, because they would not give up their commissions for nothing.

11. But still if an officer did retire, his vacancy went, as a matter of course, in the regiment, without purchase?—I believe it did.

12. Will you be so good as to tell us exactly when the first sale of commissions on the more extended scale took place?—The memorandum from which I have just read proceeds as follows:—"In 1840 a practice was adopted of granting not only the officer who had purchased his commission the price he had paid, but also of allowing officers of shorter periods of service than those before laid down, who had not purchased, 100 *l.* for each year they had served, provided the amount did not exceed in the aggregate the value of the commission which they held at the time of sale. The principle of granting to an officer, after a certain period of service, the value of a commission he never purchased, the same as to an officer who had paid for his commission (thus, as it were, rewarding the one for his services, and not the other), was very carefully considered and reported upon by the Royal Commission presided over by the Duke of Wellington, from 1838 to 1840, and the following opinion recorded thereon:—"We are disposed to consider the earlier possession of rank and command a sufficient compensation to the purchasing officer, and that in selling, he who has purchased and he who has not should be treated alike." But this equality was only to be acquired by the non-purchasing officer by means of service; according to the regulations of 1833."

13. You have told us that a large number of

commissions were sold outright by Mr. Sidney Herbert when he was Secretary at War?—Yes; at the time of the Crimean war.

14. That continued a certain time, and then stopped?—Yes.

15. The system of allowing officers who are not entitled to sell their commissions to retire upon 100 *l.* for each year's service, has been very largely extended, has it not?—No, it has been rather contracted; because now the practice is to give every officer who wishes to retire, who has not purchased his commission, 100 *l.* for each year of foreign service, and only 50 *l.* for each year of home service.

16. That has had the effect of contracting the operation of the system of retirements rather than otherwise?—Yes; because an officer does not get so much, and therefore there are not so many who avail themselves of it.

17. Is not it the fact that very few commissions go without purchase now compared with what used to be the case?—Until the time when General Peel last came into office, it was the practice to credit the whole of the difference between the price received by the officer retiring, and the price paid by his successor, to the Reserve Fund; but General Peel laid down a rule which has been strictly observed since, that when that sum amounted to or exceeded 450 *l.*, the price of an ensigncy, that ensigncy should be given without purchase, instead of the sum being credited to the fund.

18. Has the Military Reserve Fund been devoted to any other purpose than those of reducing the Half-pay Fund and paying the difference between the old and the new price of cavalry commissions?—Yes, it has; it has been to a certain degree devoted to the purchasing out of gentlemen at arms and yeomen of the guard, for the purpose of replacing them by officers of long service in the army. Formerly the commissions in those two corps were trafficked in and were purchased for considerable sums, but Lord Herbert arranged that those gentlemen who wished to sell out of those corps should be paid a certain sum on the understanding that their places should be filled by old officers of the army.

19. Who has the appointment of old officers of the army to those corps?—They are appointed by Her Majesty on the recommendation of the Commander in Chief. The Commander in Chief sends the name to the commander of the corps, who submits it to Her Majesty.

20. Colonel *Hogg*.] Have not the officers in command of those corps their own lists?—I do not know, but I do know that the Horse Guards send in their names.

21. Is the recommendation of the Horse Guards always attended to?—To the best of my belief.

22. Sir *John Trollope*.] None of those appointments are granted now to civilians?—No.

23. Captain *Vivian*.] Do you know what was paid to Sir *T. Phillips* to retire?—I think 8,000 *l.*; that was in 1862. He was not a gentleman at arms; he was lieutenant of the yeomen of the guard. In June 1861 there were six gentlemen at arms purchased out at 1,200 *l.* each. Captain *McDonald* was paid 5,300 *l.*, as Exon of the yeomen of the guard. Those amounts were fixed by Lord Herbert.

24. Whatever may be the advantages of this system

716
 Lieut.-Gen.
 Sir
 E. Lugard,
 G.C.B.
 26 June
 1867.

system as it at present is worked, the funds necessary for carrying out the purpose of the Reserve Fund are all provided by officers who have to pay for their commissions, but who, under the former system, would have been entitled to their commissions without purchase?—The question is whether they would be entitled under the former system to get them without purchase. At present vacancies are all given without purchase.

25. I understand from you that formerly nobody could be obliged to pay for a commission except it was a commission that had been previously sold, or a commission which an officer was entitled to sell in virtue of 30 or 20 years' service?—Yes; that was previous to 1840.

26. But now in order to keep up this fund in a state sufficient for the purposes to which it is devoted, persons who otherwise would get commissions without purchase are obliged to pay for them?—Scarcely so, I think, to keep up the fund; it is to keep up the stream of promotion more than the fund. Officers would not retire unless they got the money, and therefore there would be a stagnation of promotion.

27. They would not retire so soon?—Nor in such numbers, and therefore there would not be the stream of promotion as at present.

28. General *Peel*.] With respect to the appointments to the Yeomen of the Guard, does not the Commander in Chief submit to the Captain of the Yeomen of the Guard a list of five officers from whom he selects anyone he pleases to recommend to the Queen?—I believe so.

29. Is not there a certain qualification with regard to the heights of those officers that are submitted to the Queen for promotion?—Yes.

30. Therefore if an officer did not come up to the requisite height by a certain number of inches he would be excluded from admission into the corps?—Yes.

31. Is any number of medals required to be possessed by the officer in order to entitle him to admission?—No; but I believe a preference is given to those officers who have distinguished themselves.

32. Captain *Vivian*.] The appointment is supposed to be an appointment without purchase?—Yes.

33. Therefore, formerly, any arrangement between the gentleman going out and the gentleman coming in, was simply an arrangement between themselves?—Yes.

34. And those gentlemen who have already been bought out by the Reserve Fund, and retired from the corps, have been private individuals who have consented to give up their place on condition of being paid a certain sum to recoup them for the money they have already paid for their own commissions?—On condition of being paid a certain sum; I can hardly say to "recoup them," because in certain cases they were bought out at half the sum they paid. They are not allowed, as formerly, to sell their commissions to any person in the market, but they are obliged to sell them to the fund, for a certain fixed sum.

35. Supposing an old soldier, who has been appointed to that corps, wishes to retire from it, is he allowed to sell out at a fixed amount?—No.

36. General *Peel*.] Was not it a purchasing corps up to a certain point?—Yes.

O 127.

37. The object of paying for those commissions out of the Reserve Fund was, that the corps should cease to be a purchasing corps and become a non-purchasing corps?—Yes.

38. There being a certain number of civilians on that corps who were entitled to be paid for their commissions on retiring, the object was to purchase them out?—Yes.

39. How many are there in that corps now who are entitled to sell when they wish to retire?—Thirteen gentlemen-at-arms, besides the lieutenant and the standard bearer.

40. *Chairman*.] When an officer wishes to retire, and expresses that wish to the proper authority, what determines whether the succession consequent upon his retirement goes by purchase or without purchase?—It is determined by the manner in which he retires. If he retires on full pay, then the promotion goes without purchase always.

41. Supposing he retires on half-pay, how is it?—If he retires on half-pay after 25 years' service, which he is entitled to claim, the rule is that the commissions in succession shall be sold.

42. In all cases, if he retires on half-pay after 25 years' service, the commissions in succession are sold?—In all cases, except where the senior officers have had a very long and distinguished service; for instance, in the case of a lieutenant colonel going, when the major had 39 years' service of a very distinguished character, he was allowed to have the promotion without purchase.

43. Does the rule now exist that after two years' service a person is eligible to be a captain, and after six years' service he is eligible to be a field officer?—That rule exists now; those are rules more for the Horse Guards.

44. I have before me a number of cases of retirement, the first of which is this: a lieutenant colonel retires upon half-pay; the major has nineteen and a quarter years' service on full pay, five years and a-half as major, and five years as captain; should you not have thought that he was entitled to the succession without purchase. Then the captain who succeeds him has 17 years' service on full pay, and seven and three quarter years' service as captain, he is likewise made to purchase?—I should say that that was not a case deserving of special consideration; unless the lieutenant colonel retiring was within about two years of his promotion to major general; according to agreement with the Treasury, we could not allow the step to go without purchase.

45. General *Peel*.] You have said that the rules as to length of service, before an officer is entitled to purchase his company, are more for the Horse Guards than the War Office, but there must have been a regular fixed rule laid down between the Secretary of State for War and the Commander in Chief, must there not?—It is in the Regulations of the Army, page 70, paragraph 24, issued by the Adjutant General.

46. When the submission paper came to the War Office, supposing that the officer to be promoted had not served the fixed period, would not it be your duty to object to that?—Yes.

47. That is the control which the War Office has?—Yes.

48. You would be able to tell us that that rule had been enforced, that every officer should serve the fixed period before he could obtain his promotion?—For many years no officer has been promoted who has not far exceeded that period.

49. When the submission paper came to the War

Lieut. Gen.
Sir
E. Lugard,
G.C.B.
26 June
1867.

War Office before it was submitted to the Queen, if the officer had not served the number of years provided for by the regulation, it would be your duty to object to it?—Yes, the terms upon which they may retire are laid down in the Army Regulations.

50. Captain *Vivian*.] Who laid down that regulation?—It is now included in the Royal Warrant.

51. General *Peel*.] What is the date of that Royal Warrant?—3rd February 1866.

52. *Chairman*.] I have another case; where a lieutenant colonel retires upon half-pay after 30 years' service?—Though the major has served 17 years, and though he is told by the regulation that after having served six years he is eligible to be a lieutenant colonel, you make him, after 17 years' service, purchase. Though the captain is told that after six years' service he is eligible to be a major, you make him purchase though he has served 15 years; and as to the lieutenant, who is eligible to be a captain after three years, though he is a subaltern of nine years' service, he is made to purchase?—It was only on condition that the steps in succession were sold that the officer could go to half-pay. Formerly, before this regulation was made, that officer would have had to exchange. He would have had to find a half-pay officer to exchange with him, either to serve or to sell; and then, if he served, there would be no step in the regiment, and if he sold, the officers, instead of the regulation price, would have had to pay a certain excess to the officer who came in.

53. There was a question of age with regard to the person coming in, was there not?—He was required to be within five years of the age of the officer who went out,

54. Would they have taken him five years younger?—Yes; under certain circumstances a difference of five years was allowed; that is to say, he must not be five years older than the man who went on half-pay.

55. Then you consider that inasmuch as a person would not retire unless he was able to retire on those terms, it is beneficial to the regiment that those commissions should go by purchase in the way that I am describing?—It is beneficial to the regiment, and an improvement on the old system; it was considered a boon to the army for officers to be allowed to retire in this manner, the money going to the Reserve Fund, for the purpose of purchasing out other half-pay officers.

56. We are not here to enter at all upon the question of the purchase system, but still there is no doubt that whatever may be the advantages of the system into which we are inquiring, the purchase system prevails very much in the service?—Quite so.

57. And it leads to a considerable amount of supercession of officers (I mean going over the heads of others). There is a case, for instance, in the 60th Regiment, of a person purchasing a company passing over the heads of four persons, three of whom had 12 years' service, and the other 11; therefore, it leads to a vast deal of supercession in that way?—That is one of the effects of the purchase system.

58. There is another point upon which I wish to ask you a question or two, namely, as to the different footings upon which a purchasing officer and a non-purchasing officer are placed by the operation of this arrangement. Let us take the

case of two officers who go into the army on the same day; their conduct is equally meritorious, but the one purchases all his commissions, and the other is fortunate enough to get all his commissions without purchase. At the end, we will say, of 10 years, both those officers who went into the army on the same day determined to leave it on the same day; is it not the fact that the officer who has purchased all his commissions merely gets back the money that he has paid, whereas the officer who has not purchased any of his commissions gets a bonus of 100*l.* for each year that he has been on foreign service, thus putting him upon a so much better footing than his brother officer?—I can only reply to this in the words of the report of the Duke of Wellington's Commission, which I read before (*see* Question 12). From my experience in the army, I feel convinced that the non-purchasing officer gains a great advantage by the purchase of the purchasing officer; he is gradually brought up to the top, whereas by a system of seniority he would remain till a certain amount of money could be got to induce the seniors to retire.

59. Then in all those cases of retirement, whether the succession is by purchase or without purchase, depends upon whether the officer retires upon full pay, or whether he retires upon half pay?—Yes, except in the case of a lieutenant colonel within two years of his promotion to major general. A difference was made in that case, for this reason, that had that officer remained till he was promoted to be major general the step would have gone without purchase through the regiment, and therefore it was deemed advisable to allow the step still to go without purchase. In those cases that was allowed, and in some very exceptional cases of distinguished service.

60. He would be considered as if he had served the full time?—Yes.

61. General *Peel*.] Suppose that a lieutenant colonel wishes to retire upon half pay, you sell his commission?—No, we do not sell his commission; the commissions in succession are sold in the regiment.

62. And the price of it goes to the fund?—Yes.

63. Then the Government sell the lieutenant colonel's commission, and the price of it goes to the Reserve Fund?—Yes.

64. Supposing that an officer, having been placed upon half pay, wishes to realise his money, and says, "I want to sell," what do you do?—We pay him the regulation price from the fund; he sells under the circular prescribing the terms on which half-pay officers can sell.

65. Is not that circular for a certain period only?—It was issued in consequence of there being a large balance in the Reserve Fund, viz., 187,000*l.* That was in February 1861, when the rule was first established for purchasing half-pay commissions, for one year, and subsequently the regulation was continued.

66. *Chairman*.] Have there been many orders published with reference to this fund?—Only that one order, which was published on the 15th of February 1861, for the purchase of half-pay commissions. Once we suspended it for a short time, in consequence of the fund having got very low, and then it was revived again.

67. Will you put in a copy of it?—Yes. (*The same was handed in. Vide Appendix.*)

68. General

721
 Lieut.-Gen.
 Sir
 E. Lugard,
 G.C.B.
 26 June
 1867.

68. General Peel.] You say that, prior to 1825, this was merely a charitable fund, in the hands of the Commander in Chief?—So I understand.

69. There was no control over it, and no return of it was made to Parliament; it being merely a charitable fund at the disposal of the Commander in Chief?—I find that the Duke of York did furnish an account in February 1820, to the House of Commons.

70. I find, in the evidence before the Commission on Purchase of Commissions, that it was not the custom to do so?—The evidence appears to be a little at variance with the returns.

71. In 1825 the system was altered, and the system introduced of half-pay officers being allowed to sell their half-pay commissions?—Yes, and full-pay officers bought them.

72. Was not the result of that that the men who purchased those half-pay commissions were so much junior in age to those who sold them that it was found to be so bad a bargain on the part of the country substituting so much younger lives for those who went out that it was put a stop to?—Yes.

73. That was the end of the second Reserve Fund?—Yes, so far as I can trace.

74. Then there arose the third arrangement under which the officer who had received the difference before he went upon half-pay, when he was allowed to be brought in to sell, paid back the difference?—Yes.

75. When did this system of giving 100 *l.* to the officers for each year's services originate?—In 1840.

76. Is there any record of it showing by whom it was done, or for what purpose it was done?—I presume it was upon the recommendation of the Duke of Wellington's commission already quoted.

77. You say that by allowing an officer who has not purchased 100 *l.* a-year for each year of his service, you place him upon an equality with an officer who has purchased his?—Yes.

78. That is all very well for an officer, who has not purchased, who retires from the service altogether, but an officer who remains in the army all his lifetime never gets this 100 *l.*?—No, but he gets rank and pay instead.

79. He is purchased over. The very ground upon which you allow an officer to retire, the 100 *l.* for each year's service, is, that he has been placed at a disadvantage by other people purchasing over his head?—Yes.

80. An officer who remains in the service till he becomes a major general, having been subjected to all this disadvantage of people purchasing over his head, receives no 100 *l.*, or 50 *l.*, or anything of the kind, therefore the 100 *l.* and the 50 *l.*, is only an advantage to a non-purchasing officer who is about to retire; that is to say, you pay the man, who is about to retire, a reward, which you do not give either to the officer who has purchased his commission, or to the officer who remains in your service and who has gone through the whole ranks of the army?—No; but the man who remains in the service is so far benefited, that by the retirement above him of men who would not have retired if they had not got such a sum as 100 *l.* for each year's service, he gains the advantage of earlier promotion.

81. In the case of a man who retires for this 100 *l.* for each year's service, his commission is sold, the consequence of which is, that a junior may purchase over the head of the old officers who remain?—It is not so, except in certain cases.

O.127.

82. It is not the case, is it, that an officer who has purchased his commission has a right to sell it; though it is the custom, it is not the right of an officer who has purchased his commission to sell it?—There are different opinions given upon that, because in the report of the commission of 1840, which was presided over by the Duke of Wellington, they say that he has the right.

83. I see that Sir Charles Yorke in his second examination before the Commission, on purchase of commissions on the 4th of June 1856, says—“I should like to correct partially a statement that I made the other day. I was asked whether an officer who had purchased his commission had a right to sell it; I said that he had a right, but it is more proper that I should explain it in this way, that he has a claim to sell a commission which, except on account of misconduct on his part is never refused; but the right he certainly has not.” Then in the examination of the Duke of Cambridge in 1859, he said that not only was there not the right, but during the Indian mutiny, when a great many officers applied to sell their commissions, it was positively refused?—That is to say, as I consider you refuse them permission to leave the army. My interpretation of the right is this, that if the authorities permit them to retire, they then have the right to the money for their commissions, but not that any officer can claim the right to quit the service when he pleases.

84. He cannot claim the right to sell his commission at any time he chooses?—He cannot claim the right to leave the service.

85. Captain Vivian.] Do you know that on many occasions an officer has been refused permission to leave the service on a regiment being ordered on foreign service?—Yes; such cases have occurred within my own knowledge; but that is the right to leave the service, not the right to sell. The permission must be first given to retire; when permission to retire is given, then the officer has the right to the money.

86. General Peel.] What is the rule with regard to officers who have not purchased their commissions, and who now apply to retire, receiving this 100 *l.* for each year of service; they are recommended, I take for granted, by the Commander in Chief to the Secretary of State for War?—Yes.

87. Is there any fixed number of years before they are allowed to retire?—The last regulation was that they should not get anything under three years' service.

88. Therefore, supposing two ensigns go in on the same day, one who has purchased his commission and the other who has not, if, at the end of three years both wish to retire, one gets 100 *l.* for each year of his service and the other only gets his own money back again?—It would depend upon the service performed by the one who entered without purchase. He would get 100 *l.* if he served abroad and only 50 *l.* if at home, but the purchaser would not have obtained a commission at all had he not purchased, whereas the other earned it by competitive examination.

89. When was the change as to the 50 *l.* for the home service made?—In May 1860.

90. What have you paid for the purchases of commissions during last year?—£. 73,400, relieving the State of an annual payment of 3,800 *l.*

91. So that you paid 73,400 *l.* for purchasing up merely a life annuity amounting to 3,800 *l.*?—That is looking at it in a mercantile point of view;

Lieut.-Gen. view; but you must bear in mind the boon it was to those officers, many of whom were able by its means to emigrate, or provide otherwise for their families.

Sir
E. Lugard,
G.C.B.
—
26 June
1867.

92. Do you know how many commissions were held out to the cadets at Sandhurst to be competed for without purchase, say two years ago?—I am not able to state that from memory.

93. Do not you imagine that if you could offer a certain number of first commissions for competition at Sandhurst it would be a great inducement to cadets to go to Sandhurst?—There is not the slightest doubt of it.

94. You admit that the number you have the power of offering is very much affected by this fund?—Yes, I think it is, but under the old system it would be almost the same, because, anstead of our taking the money on account of in officer going to half-pay, the money would go into the pocket of the half-pay officer, who exchanged with him and sold in the regiment.

95. The regulation is, that no officer is entitled to go upon half-pay till he has served 25 years?—Yes.

96. Therefore, it is not a question about half-pay?—Except that where an officer has served 25 years, we allow him to go direct to half-pay without any exchange, the promotion in the regiment going by purchase, and the money going to the fund. But it was so formerly, the only difference being that we now save the officer the bonus which he would have to give to the half-pay officer to exchange with him. It was in consequence of its coming to the knowledge of the Secretary of State that large sums were paid for that purpose, that he arranged with the Treasury to allow those officers to go direct to half-pay, on the condition that the money realised by the succession should be applied to the reduction of the half-pay list, thus increased by the officer being placed on it without an exchange.

97. Will you furnish the Committee with the numbers of first commissions without purchase during the course of last year?—Yes.

98. *Chairman.*] Whatever arrangement might have been made between the officer retiring and the officer coming in in his place, the first commission, at all events, would have been disposable without purchase, would it not?—No; it must be purchased in order to make up the 4,500 £, which would be required in the case of a lieutenant colonel going out.

99. What makes the vacancy for the first commission which you now sell?—The senior ensign for purchase in the regiment obtains the lieutenancy, then some gentleman has to purchase the ensign to make up the money for the higher commission.

100. *Captain Vivian.*] You say that this Reserve Fund is contributed to entirely by purchasing officers, that is to say, that the officers themselves contribute to it by the purchase of commissions?—Yes.

101. You say it is applied to three purposes, viz., reducing the half-pay list, paying the difference between the present and the old cost of cavalry commissions, and purchasing out gentlemen belonging to the corps of Yeomen of the Guard and Gentlemen-at-Arms?—Yes.

102. Are there any other purposes to which it is applied besides those three?—At times it is expended in absorbing supernumeraries. Supposing there is a supernumerary captain in a regiment, we would absorb him by means of the fund, that is, if the captain sold out, we should,

instead of succeeding him, pay him his money from the fund, and bring the regiment down to its proper complement.

103. Would you do that with a second lieutenant colonel of a cavalry regiment coming from India?—No, unless he desired to sell.

104. What happens to him?—He would be placed upon half-pay.

105. And would lose his money?—He is not removed from the service.

106. If he is not brought again upon full pay, he has no chance of regaining the money he has paid for his commission?—No, unless he retire by sale; that is a consequence of all reductions in the army.

107. He has no claim upon the Reserve Fund?—No, except he be entitled to permanent half-pay, in which case he could sell to the Fund; but this reduction to half-pay does not take from him any previous claim he may have had upon the Fund.

108. *General Peel.*] If he wished to sell, you would pay him the regulation price?—Yes.

109. *Captain Vivian.*] The Royal Artillery is a non-purchasing corps?—Yes.

110. Do the colonels of the Royal Artillery ever get any benefit from the Reserve Fund?—That comes under the head of reducing the half-pay. If the fund is in a flourishing condition and an artillery officer on permanent half-pay applies to sell, we buy his commission in the same way as we do that of any other officer, but never to the detriment of the officers who contribute.

111. You pay him 4,500 £.?—Whatever the amount of his commission is.

112. A colonel or a captain of Royal Artillery who has contributed nothing to this Reserve Fund, and who belongs to a non-purchasing corps, nevertheless because he is on the half-pay list, can claim a sum of money which has been contributed only by purchasing officers?—No, he cannot claim it as a right, but when the Fund will bear it, artillery and engineer officers who are entitled to permanent half-pay, are allowed to sell to the Fund, in lieu of the privilege they had previously of selling their half-pay commission on condition of their settling in the colonies.

113. Do not you think that a fund which has been created entirely by purchasing officers, should be devoted entirely to the benefit of those who have contributed to it?—Many other officers who get the benefit of it have never contributed to it at all.

114. If that is so, does not that appear to you to be rather a misapplication of the fund?—It would be difficult to eliminate those officers from the others who have contributed to it.

115. Do not you think that the reduction of the half-pay list is a matter that ought to be undertaken by the State, and not by such a fund as the Reserve Fund?—I must tell you honestly that I consider the Reserve Fund a great advantage to the army.

116. If properly applied?—Yes.

117. Do you approve of all the purposes to which this Reserve Fund has been applied?—It is not for me to give an opinion contrary to decisions of Secretaries of State whom I have served under.

118. To what extent does the power of the Secretary of State for War go as regards this Reserve Fund?—He, in conjunction with the Treasury, is supreme.

119. Can he apply it to any purpose he likes?—No,

723
 Lieut.-Gen.
 Sir
 E. Lugard,
 G.C.B.
 26 June
 1867.

—No, he cannot; only to those purposes which are periodically shown to Parliament.

120. What is the limit to his power; under what regulation or warrant is his power controlled?—There is a Royal Warrant dated February 1866, which places the control in the hands of the Secretary of State for War.

121. Is there any regulation, or order, or warrant specifying to what purposes this fund shall be applied?—No.

122. Therefore the Secretary for War has, subject to Parliamentary criticism, absolute power over this Reserve Fund?—Subject to the control of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

123. General *Peel*.] Was any return ever made to the Chancellor of the Exchequer with regard to this fund previously to the year 1860?—No.

124. Captain *Vivian*.] Therefore the Secretary for War has absolute power over this Reserve Fund, subject only to the criticism of Parliament?—Subject to the audit, the accounts are all audited.

125. *Chairman*.] The audit is merely to see that the money is properly accounted for, is it not?—It is more than that; the decisions are questioned.

126. Captain *Vivian*.] Since when has this Reserve Fund come under Parliamentary control?—Since 1860.

127. Before then the Secretary for War might administer it, subject to no control whatever?—Quite so.

128. Mr. *Percy Wyndham*.] Assuming the fund to be beneficial to the service, do you think it would be more advantageous that the use of it should be laid down within a definite limit, than that the disposal of it should depend entirely upon the opinions of successive Secretaries of State?—I think certainly it would be an advantage to have definite rules laid down for its disposal.

129. Colonel *North*.] In what way is the Chancellor of the Exchequer mixed up with it?—As regards the audit.

130. Mr. *Baxter*.] I understood you to say, that the Secretary of State exercised a control over the fund in conjunction with the Treasury?—The regulations relative to the retirement to half-pay, and meeting that by the Reserve Fund, were all framed in concurrence with the Treasury.

131. Colonel *North*.] Does not it sometimes occur, that the wishes of the Secretary for War, with regard to particular things, are vetoed by the Treasury, and that they will not allow them to be carried out?—I submit that that is scarcely a question for me to answer.

132. The Treasury do exercise considerable power over the administration of the Secretary for War?—No doubt. The controlling power is in the Treasury, and you cannot always have either the executive or administrative power in accord with the controlling power.

133. General *Peel*.] That can only have been since 1860?—Since 1860, with regard to the Reserve Fund.

134. Colonel *North*.] Do not you think that this system has acted most injuriously to the interests of cadets at Sandhurst, and that those very

commissions ought to have gone to them. Are not you aware that there have been many very hard cases of boys having been passed over, though they had passed first-rate examinations, because there were no commissions to give them?—The answer to that question is involved in the purchase system altogether. It is not harder upon Sandhurst than the former system; in short, quite the contrary. I think that more commissions are now given than were before.

135. Mr. *Baxter*.] What took place in 1860 enabling the Treasury to interfere in the management of this fund?—The whole question of the Reserve Fund was then brought before Parliament.

136. Colonel *Hogg*.] You say that you consider it a great convenience to officers of long service to be enabled to retire upon half-pay without having to seek out half-pay officers to exchange with them; and you consider that this system enables that to be carried out?—Yes.

137. And you consider it a benefit to the public as well as to the officers themselves?—Yes.

138. An officer could not go upon half-pay after 25 years' service unless a fund of this sort existed?—The going on half-pay after 25 years' service has nothing to do with the fund.

139. Supposing, after 25 years' service, a man goes upon half-pay, his commission is sold?—Yes.

140. That goes to the Reserve Fund?—Yes.

141. You might give these commissions for nothing, if you chose?—You might give them for nothing, but they are sold in order to recoup the State for the annuity to be given to the officer who comes upon half-pay.

142. It is not necessary to sell them?—That was the arrangement with the Treasury at the time.

143. Major *O'Reilly*.] An officer has the right to be paid by the State after 25 years' service, and he would have that right though there was no Reserve Fund?—No, he has not the right to retire upon half-pay; his right is to exchange to half-pay. Under this arrangement we allow him to go at once.

144. You say that the first use to which the Reserve Fund was applied was purchasing half-pay commissions; but in the case of Artillery officers the sum given is for the purchase of their commissions?—No, it is the purchase of their half-pay. We calculate it according to the price which a corresponding commission in the Line is worth.

145. You say that you purchase their half-pay, but you calculate the price which they are to pay for that half-pay, not according to what it is worth, which is the annuity, but according to what an analogous commission in the Line would be worth?—Yes.

146. On what principle do you do that?—I may repeat what I stated in reply to Question 112: "Prior to 1861, when Artillery and Engineer officers had the privilege of selling their half-pay commissions for the purpose of settling in the colonies, the price of their commissions was calculated according to what an analogous commission in the line would be worth."

147. You are purchasing an annuity, and instead

Lieut.-Gen.
Sir
E. Lugard,
G.C.B.

26 June
1867.

stead of calculating the value of that annuity, and paying it down, you give a sum calculated on a matter which has no earthly relation to it, viz., the relative value of a purchase commission?—Quite so.

148. Do you think that a reasonable proceeding?—That is the regulation laid down by the Secretary of State at the time.

149. And so far you relieve the State of the obligation of paying half-pay to that Artillery officer for the remainder of his life?—Yes.

150. And you do that at the expense of the officers of the other branches of the army?—Yes, but you must remember that there is an advantage to the other officers of the army, because in doing that we are able to allow an officer of the line of 25 years' service to go direct to half-pay. The money that we get from the officers who purchase the step, goes to the general reduction of half-pay. We should not be able to allow a lieutenant colonel, or a major, to come upon half-pay and increase the Non-effective Vote, unless we had some means of relieving the Non-effective Vote by the fund. When the fund is in good condition, we relieve the Non-effective Vote indiscriminately by applying the fund to Artillery officers as well as the Line officers.

151. Why is it necessary to take an Artillery officer, for instance, off the half-pay list by purchasing him up by the reserve fund, in order to give an opportunity to another officer of 25 years' service to go on the half-pay list?—It is not exactly to give an opportunity for an officer of 25 years' service in the Line to go on half-pay; but in making the arrangement with the Treasury, it was provided that the money realised by permitting an officer of 25 years' service to go direct to half-pay without exchange, that is, without relieving the half-pay list of an officer of the same rank, should be appropriated towards the reduction of the half-pay list generally.

152. Do not you think it would be perfectly fair to an ordnance officer on half-pay, if you paid him the calculated value of the annuity which he would receive for his life by remaining on that half-pay list, without any reference to the value of a purchase commission in the other branches of the service?—It would, if he would take it; he would not take it; he would prefer remaining on his half-pay.

153. Do you purchase the commission of any officer on half-pay who applies?—No; only if he is on permanent half-pay, and under 60 years old.

154. What is the rule as to officers not on permanent half-pay?—An officer not on permanent half-pay may be brought to full pay at any time.

155. Another purpose to which the Reserve Fund is applied, is reducing the price of cavalry commissions?—Yes.

156. Are you aware whether the result of reducing the price of first cavalry commissions has been to augment the price paid (not the regulation price) in the subsequent steps?—At the time Mr. Sidney Herbert determined to reduce the price of cavalry commissions it was next to impossible to fill up the cornetcies; we had at that time 60 to 64 vacancies, and we could not get cornets to fill them; it was then decided by Mr. Sidney Herbert that he would make the cavalry commissions the same price as the in-

fantry commissions, and we have never had any difficulty since.

157. My question is this: do you know whether or not the reducing the price of first cavalry commissions has been to increase largely the sum paid for the subsequent steps?—No, I do not.

158. You stated that last year you purchased up commissions to the value of 73,400 *l.*, and relieved the State of the annual payment of 3,800 *l.* That was the annuity which the State was paying. Supposing the value of that was calculated at 10 years' purchase, it would be something like 38,000 *l.*, or half the sum you paid for it. If you paid more than the value of that annuity, was not the State so far the loser?—The State was not the loser.

159. The State gained the value of the annuity, whatever it was, of 3,800 *l.* a-year, and the officers of the army paid the consideration for that at the rate of 73,000 *l.*?—Then you must take into consideration the great benefit which it was to officers who were able to realise the value of their commissions at once, and the saving to the State of the pensions to the widows and orphans.

160. You have enumerated four uses to which the Reserve Fund has been applied; has it ever been applied to any other use?—It has been applied to the gradual conversion of the Military Train to a non-purchase corps, which was originally a purchase corps.

161. All the first commissions in it were sold?—Originally they were.

162. To whom did the purchase-money go; was it to the State?—I think the officers, in a great measure, were transferred from other regiments.

163. I mean so far as the commissions were sold; to whom did the original purchase money of the first commissions in the Military Train go; did not it go to the State?—Mr. Cave, who was in the office when that corps was formed, says that no first commissions in the Military Train were sold at all. The officers were transferred from the army; the greater proportion of the junior officers were from the Land Transport Corps and non-commissioned officers of Artillery, and so on.

164. May I take it that, when the Military Train Corps was created, the commissions were granted as rewards to meritorious officers in other corps, the commissions being treated as purchased commissions?—Yes, they were looked upon as purchased commissions.

165. Which those officers could sell?—Yes.

166. Then the Government decided on making it a non-purchasing corps?—Yes, converting it.

167. And, in order to do so, they determined to pay those officers the regulation price of their commissions?—No.

168. Gradually, is not that what you are doing, in order to make it a non-purchasing corps?—Only as they leave the army.

169. You will gradually pay those officers the price of their commissions?—Yes.

170. The fund out of which that is proposed to be done is the Reserve Fund which is contributed to by purchase officers in other branches of the army?—And by officers of the Military Train also.

171. Sir Charles Russell.] You said just now that you considered that the Reserve Fund was a great

725
Lieut.-Gen.
Sir
E. Lugard,
G.C.B.
—
26 June
1867.

a great advantage to the army, and you pointed out as one of its advantages that at present if an officer who has served 25 years wishes to go, instead of his having to find an officer to exchange with him, you pay a sum of money from the Reserve Fund to enable that officer so to retire. Do not you think supposing there was a limited number of half-pay officers allowed upon the list, and all in excess of that number for meritorious service were to be provided for by the Treasury instead of out of the Reserve Fund, the fund would be more advantageously and justly applied?—There is no doubt if the Treasury would purchase out half-pay officers, there would be more money in the fund for other purposes, but I scarcely know to what purpose you would convert it.

172. At present, as far as I understand, this fund is in a great measure used in alleviation of the charge to the State, and is not applied solely and exclusively to the benefit of the army, who entirely provide the fund?—If I understand you rightly, you would propose that every officer, after 25 years' service, should go direct to half-pay, and the steps in succession should go without purchase. There is no doubt that could be done if the Treasury would find the money.

173. At present, as I understand, the fund is contributed to by officers serving in the army, or who have served in the army; and, practically, it is in alleviation of the charge to the State that this money is applied?—Yes, to a certain extent; but it enables an officer who goes direct to half-pay at once to sell his commission when he wants to do so. I do not think the State or the Treasury would ever consent to allow that officer to go direct to half-pay, giving the promotion entirely in the regiment, and then allow him to sell his half-pay afterwards.

174. General Peel.] Is not this the case, that you are doing now, by means of this fund, that which, when the Treasury did it on their own account in 1825, they found such a very bad bargain, that they put a stop to it at the end of a year?—But, in 1825, for every officer that you took off the list, another came on who was probably much younger; that is not the case

now. From this fund we purchase the half-pay commission of any officer whatever. As far as the fund goes; we may purchase up the whole half-pay list without bringing a single other man upon the list, except those who applied to be put on it, having served their 25 years.

175. Is not it the fact that the State are dealers in commissions, and that they sell commissions which would not otherwise be for sale?—That is involved in the system of purchase.

176. With respect to the non-purchase regiments from 101 to 109, do you purchase up the half-pay of any of those officers?—No; all the old officers are still upon the Indian regulations as to half-pay.

177. But naturally those officers will be absorbed, and another class of men will come into those regiments which are now purchasing regiments; do you give them the 100 l. and the 50 l. for their services if they wish to retire?—I do not think we have had any case; every officer of those regiments has retired upon the Indian regulations and the Indian pension.

178. A new regulation was laid down when those regiments were amalgamated with the British Army?—Every officer who belonged to those regiments was guaranteed the conditions upon which he entered the service; that is, he could claim from the Indian Government the pension or half-pay which he would be entitled to according to their regulations.

179. What I was asking you is this: supposing an officer who has been appointed to one of those regiments from Sandhurst, after a service of six years, wishes to retire, do you allow him to retire, receiving the 100 l. and the 50 l.?—No, because he is in a non-purchase corps.

180. Then you have another class of officers, who do not obtain the advantage of the 100 l. and the 50 l.?—They are in the same category as the Artillery and Engineers.

181. In fact, the difference between the old and the present price of commissions in the cavalry, the purchase of the Gentlemen-at-Arms, and the purchase of the half-pay officers of Artillery, and other non-purchasing corps, all fall upon the purchasing officers of the line?—Yes.

THOMAS C. B. CAVE, Esq., called in; and Examined.

182. General Peel.] You are a Clerk in the War Office?—I am.

183. Have you anything to add to what Sir Edward Lugard has stated, or any explanation to give?—Only as regards the question you asked about the limited number of non-purchase first commissions given to Sandhurst, I may mention that in January 1861, the Duke of Cambridge represented to Mr. Sidney Herbert the difficulty experienced in providing with commissions the 44 cadets who had obtained over 3,000 marks at the December 1860 examination. Non-purchase commissions had been promised to the 20 cadets who stood highest on the list, but the friends of the remaining 24 considered that they also were entitled to this reward, though there were not a sufficient number of vacancies at the time. The Secretary of State and his Royal

Highness admitted the claim, and Mr. Herbert met the difficulty by allowing 24 ensigncies, which were vacant in succession to retirements, and which would have been filled by purchase, to be given to these 24 cadets without purchase, and the amount required by the retiring officer was paid from the Reserve Fund, on the understanding that the Council of Education would announce to competitors at future examinations, that all who obtain the minimum number of marks will not be entitled to gratis commissions, but that the number of non-purchase vacancies to be competed for will be duly announced beforehand.

184. Will you furnish the Committee with a return of the number of commissions given without purchase to Sandhurst, since the year 1860?—Yes. (*Vide Appendix.*)

T. C. B.
Cave, Esq.
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Lieutenant General Sir EDWARD LUGARD, G.C.B.; further Examined.

Lieut.-Gen.
Sir
E. Lugard,
G.C.B.

26 June
1867.

185. *Chairman* (to Sir *Edward Lugard*).] ARE officers of Artillery and Engineers allowed to go on half-pay after 25 years?—They have regulations of their own.

186. However beneficial in your opinion to the cavalry and infantry this system of retirement on the 100 *l.* and the 50 *l.* may be, still I know many officers who belong to the purchasing branch of the service consider that the Artillery and Engineers, which are now purchase corps, ought not to benefit by that to which the officers of Infantry and Cavalry contribute; the Artillery and Engineers benefit by the system without contributing to it as the others do?—That is so, if they are on permanent half-pay; they are only purchased when doing so will not interfere with the purchase of the line.

187. Have you any idea how soon this arrangement of paying the difference between the old and the present price of cavalry commissions will cease?—It is almost impossible to calculate.

188. You have no knowledge how many there are who have a claim upon the fund?—No; every officer who entered the cavalry before 1860 has a claim.

189. What number of the Military Train will there be to benefit by this arrangement?—It is only some of the junior ranks that it would apply to.

190. It is not a numerous body, is it?—It has 24 captains, and I suppose 48 lieutenants.

191. Major *O'Reilly*.] You have purchased some?—Only the ensigncies; you can only commence with the first commissions.

Friday, 28th June 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Baxter.
Marquis of Hartington.
Colonel Hogg.
Lord Hotham.
Colonel North.
General Peel.

Mr. O'Reilly.
Sir Charles Russell.
Mr. Trevelyan.
Sir John Trollope.
Captain Vivian.
Mr. Percy Wyndham.

LORD HOTHAM, IN THE CHAIR.

Lieutenant General WILLIAM FREDERICK FORSTER, K.H., called in; and Examined.

192. *Chairman.*] You are Military Secretary to the Commander in Chief?—Yes.

193. What is the rule under which officers can retire upon full pay?—They are allowed to retire on full pay after 30 years' full pay service, the promotion going in the regiment without purchase provided there are no supernumeraries.

194. Has not that 30 years been recently reduced?—No.

195. What is the regulation in reference to an officer going upon half pay?—He must have served 25 years on full pay, or he must get a medical certificate, if he has served under that period. If he goes upon half pay by what I should call his right, which cannot be disputed after 25 years' service, then the commission is sold for the benefit of the Reserve Fund. But supposing a lieutenant colonel were retiring upon half pay, if the major were a man having great claims on account of long service, he would, with the concurrence of the Secretary for War, probably obtain the promotion without purchase; and the rest of the promotion, if the claims were not sufficiently great to warrant the Commander in Chief in recommending it to go without purchase, would go by purchase; so that really and truly if the lieutenant colonel were to sell his commission, the value of which is 4,500 *l.*, if the senior major were a man of great claim and good service, he would get the promotion (if approved of by the Secretary at War) without purchase; and the sum of money that would go to the Reserve Fund would be 4,500 *l.*, minus 1,300 *l.*

196. The major would get the benefit of his service?—He would get the benefit of his service without purchase.

197. *General Peel.*] That would go through all the ranks, would it not; supposing, for instance, the senior captain was an officer of very long service, and the Commander in Chief recommended the Secretary at War to allow him to have his promotion without purchase, he would have it, would he not?—It depends entirely upon the claim of the individuals; but it does not always follow that the whole of the officers are of sufficient standing, or of sufficient merit, to warrant their being recommended for promotion without purchase.

198. *Chairman.*] I presume there are not

many captains and subalterns who seek to retire upon half pay, having served 25 years?—Very few.

199. I presume that everything connected with the reserved funds, with which the Horse Guards is concerned, passes through your hands?—Yes; that is to say, all the recommendations. I have nothing to do with the money. Every application of the Reserve Fund takes place upon the recommendation of the Commander in Chief through the Military Secretary.

200. We have understood that the pecuniary advantages of this fund have been extended to the Artillery and Engineers, is that so?—Yes. I must make this remark upon that subject; there is this strange anomaly with respect to the Artillery and the Engineers: those two corps, being non-purchasing corps, do not receive any benefit from the fund as long as the officers are on full pay; but when they are placed on half-pay they are permitted in certain instances to sell their commissions, which they could not sell as long as they were on full pay.

201. Then they benefit pecuniarily by a fund to which they have, none of them, contributed anything?—Certainly; but then I think you must look upon it in a financial point of view. You must look upon it as an insurance. If you allow a man 120 *l.* a-year, at a certain age, you go to a notary and say, what is the annuity worth?

202. *General Peel.*] That is, in fact, what you do not do; you do not go to a notary and ask what is this annuity worth, but you give him the price of his commission?—That is so, but it is supposed, in most instances, to be a benefit to the country.

203. *Sir John Trollope.*] By way of reducing the annual charge of half pay?—That is another advantage; but what I am referring to is allowing these officers to go upon half pay, for the express purpose of selling their commissions.

204. *Chairman.*] Can you state the number of officers of artillery and engineers who have benefited by the Reserve Fund, in the way to which you have referred?—Twenty-one Artillery officers; 17 officers of Engineers.

205. Is not it the case that a large number of Engineer officers are frequently employed in civil situations?—Yes.

Lieut.-Gen.
W. F.
Forster, K.H.

28 June
1867.

Lieut.-Gen.
W. F.
Forster, K.H.
—
28 June
1867.

206. Sometimes more and sometimes less?—
There are a considerable number so employed.

207. Do they receive their full pay during the time they are so employed?—No, I think not; I think there is a rule providing that if the civil emolument is so much greater (by three times, I think it is) than the amount of their pay, they are not to receive their pay. It is only where the civil emolument is of small amount that they receive their pay.

208. Is it the general rule that, when an officer of Engineers is employed in a civil situation, he is seconded?—For the most part. There are a number of appointments in which Engineers participated, which are called military-civil departments; and if such an officer was serving in any of those departments, to which anything of a military character can be attributed, he would be entitled to receive his pay; but where his employment was of a purely civil nature, he would then be seconded.

209. That officer taking rank in the same way as if he were serving with his corps?—Yes.

210. So that it not unfrequently happens that an officer goes away from his regiment as a captain, is away many years, and comes back as a colonel?—No doubt there are many instances of that sort.

211. That is a benefit which no other part of the army enjoys?—No.

212. Besides those two non-purchasing corps, are there also 12 Indian regiments, which now form part of our own army, which remain non-purchase corps?—Yes.

213. Am I right in my belief that all the officers of those regiments who got their commissions before the amalgamation, remain, as regards retirement and so forth, subject to the Indian rules?—Yes, they have all the advantages secured to them which formerly attached to the regiments when under the East India Company.

214. But all those officers who have entered since the amalgamation come upon the same footing as our own army?—Yes, with this difference; that they cannot sell their commissions whilst serving in those regiments.

215. If it is assumed to be right and proper that the non-purchase corps of Artillery and Engineers should profit by the advantages of the Reserve Fund, it may be also assumed that all the officers of those Indian regiments who have been appointed subsequently to the amalgamation ought to profit by those advantages also?—I presume that they would be considered as entitled to participate in the benefits of the fund. When the amalgamation took place, certain stipulations and certain rules which then subsisted were understood to remain in force. Their rules are not the same as our own. They have no half-pay, for instance.

216. Will not the officers of those 12 Indian regiments who have joined those regiments since the amalgamation be likely to consider that they have as much claim upon the Reserve Fund as the Artillery and Engineers have?—No doubt.

217. And therefore that will very much increase the large number of claims upon the fund, to which the claimants have made no contribution whatever?—Yes, just so; provided their claims be admitted.

218. General Peel.] Is there any difference between those non-purchasing Indian regiments and the Artillery and Engineers in this respect; supposing one of the officers of those non-pur-

chasing regiments retires, do you give him the 100 *l.* a-year for each year of foreign service, and the 50 *l.* a-year for each year of home service?—No; being non-purchase regiments, sales are inadmissible.

219. Was not there a distinct regulation at the time of the amalgamation that those officers who went into those regiments should not be entitled to the 100 *l.* and the 50 *l.*?—Yes; such was and is the rule.

220. Will you turn to the examination of His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief before the Select Committee on Military Organization, and read what he says as to the greater pecuniary advantages which an officer who has not purchased his commission receives as compared with an officer who has purchased his commission?—“Question 3905. The difference therefore is that the one officer who has purchased his commission receives only 72 *l.* a-year for his four years' service, and the officer to whom a commission is given receives 190 *l.* a-year?—Certainly; there is no doubt of that.”

221. Supposing that to be a correct account of what the one officer receives as compared with the other, the officer who is obliged to purchase is at a disadvantage as compared with the officer who obtained his commission without purchase?—Yes, to a certain degree he is; but you must recollect that the man who purchases has a great advantage, because in the first place he gets the advantages of the senior rank, while the other man continues to serve in the junior rank, and he gets it at a much earlier date.

222. But if you refer to the questions preceding that to which I have called your attention, you will find that the two officers are supposed to have entered a regiment as ensigns on the same day, and to have left it on the same day, neither of them having obtained any promotion whatever?—If they have both served the same time, no doubt the officer who purchases receives less than the officer to whom the commission is given.

223. How are the officers appointed to the corps of gentlemen-at-arms?—There is a list kept of persons nominated to the corps, and certain stipulations are required; the candidate must have seen service; must be under 50 years of age, and must be five feet eight in height; I think officers who are decorated are preferred to others.

224. Are they recommended by the Commander in Chief, or how are they selected?—They are recommended by the Commander in Chief, that is to say, the Military Secretary is ordered by the Commander in Chief, when there is a vacancy, to send in certain names. Those names are sent to the captain of the corps, and he takes the Queen's pleasure.

225. Captain Vivian.] Are the gentlemen-at-arms and the yeomen of the guard two distinct corps?—Yes, I have here two memoranda regulating the admissions into those two corps. (*The same were handed in, vide Appendix.*)

226. General Peel.] What advantage do those officers who are appointed to those corps receive in addition to their half pay?—I think it is somewhere about 70 *l.* a year.

227. The way they are appointed is that a sum of money is paid out of the Reserve Fund to purchase out the persons whom they succeed?—That at present is the case. The gentlemen-at-arms purchased their commissions originally; but it has been lately decided that those gentlemen-

729
 Lieut.-Gen.
 W. F.
 Forster, K.H.
 28 June
 1867.

men-at-arms who so purchased their commissions and who wish to retire, should be paid back the money they gave for their commissions. That money has been paid out of the Reserve Fund, which has enabled the Commander in Chief to lay before the Queen certain meritorious officers for appointment to that corps, the purchase money being paid out of the Reserve Fund. It has afforded a great opportunity of rewarding old officers.

228. Then comes the question whether the benefit that the old officers so receive from this Reserve Fund, is equivalent to the burden thrown upon the army generally; we have had it in evidence that 8,000 *l.*, for instance, was paid out of the Reserve Fund for the retirement of one officer from this corps?—He was the chief officer, the lieutenant.

229. *Sir John Trollope.*] The lieutenant of the corps would be paid a higher rate than the privates?—Yes, there are privates and officers; the officers are paid more.

230. That is the reason why the amount given to the lieutenant was so high?—Yes; those who have purchased their commissions now sell them; but those who succeed them will never be able to sell their commissions.

231. Are there many civilians who originally purchased their commissions, still remaining in those corps?—I think there are some few remaining.

232. *General Peel.*] When a non-purchasing officer wishes to retire, receiving this 100*l.* a year for every year he has served abroad, or 50*l.* a year for every year he has served at home, is not a recommendation that he should be allowed so to retire, sent, in the first instance, from the Commander in Chief to the War Office?—We state what the officer's service is, and then we refer to the Secretary of State to know what he allows him; if the sum is short of the full price of his commission, the overplus is given to the Reserve Fund.

233. Is there any rule or regulation as to the period of service which entitles an officer to be recommended under those circumstances?—He cannot get anything under three years' service.

234. An ensign after three years' service, if you recommended him, might receive the 100*l.*?—I believe so; but there are certain considerations in particular cases, for instance, cadets who get commissions from the Military College, and also there are a certain number of officers who entered the line by bringing recruits from the militia. I think they are generally dealt with upon more favourable terms.

235. Is not the effect this, that it makes almost every retirement from the service, a retirement involving the purchase of a commission; if an officer has purchased his commission, and retires, he sells it as a matter of right?—Yes.

236. If a non-purchasing officer retires, his commission is sold in order to enable him to receive a certain amount for his services?—It has that effect.

237. Does not that reduce very much the number of first commissions without purchase in the army?—It must have that effect; but the probability is, if you did not give some encouragement to those officers to go out, they would remain.

238. After I came into office, I established a rule that when the amount required for the

officer retiring exceeded by 450 *l.* what he was to receive, the first commission should not be sold; the operation of that would be to give a great many more first commissions without purchase?—Yes; but, under existing rule, only to cadets from the Royal Military College.

239. Do not you think that very desirable?—It is very desirable.

240. It would be a great advantage, if you could offer a greater number of first commissions for competition at Sandhurst, to officers who had risen from the ranks, and to the sons of persons who had a claim upon the service?—Yes.

241. Were not you, a year or two ago, obliged to reduce the number of competitions at Sandhurst?—Yes; because we could not provide for the men.

242. Therefore, it would be a great advantage if there were a greater number of commissions to give?—Certainly.

243. The operation of this fund, by the sale of first commissions, is to reduce that number?—It must be, of course; but in some instances the money has been paid from the Reserve Fund to the retiring officers, and the commission has been given without purchase.

244. No doubt it is an advantage to a non-purchasing officer who retires from the service to receive this 100 *l.* for every year of foreign service, or 50 *l.* for every year of home service. But what is the effect on the non-purchasing officer who remains in the service; is not he more liable to be purchased over by the sale of these commissions than he would otherwise be?—I do not exactly see that.

245. Supposing a captain retires, receiving the price of his commission, and the commission is sold in order to reimburse the fund; and supposing the senior lieutenant does not purchase, a junior officer to him purchases over his head?—Yes.

246. *Chairman.*] In the case of a field officer of a regiment wanting to go upon half-pay, is it in the power of the senior officer to stop the promotion by refusing to purchase; or, if he refuses to purchase, is he compelled to see another person go over his head?—If he cannot purchase the next to him has the option. Everybody who has the means of purchasing has the right to say, I will take advantage of my position.

247. And go over any number of heads above him?—That is at the discretion of the Commander in Chief; he would not allow a very young officer to do so. It is considered advisable that promotion should go as far as possible in the regiment without bringing in other officers over their heads. If they are to be purchased over they would rather have an officer of their own corps put above them than an officer from another corps.

248. I have a case before me, of a senior captain of a regiment who has had nearly 25 years' service, and who has been 12 years a captain; reckoning upon living five years longer, when he might be able to retire upon full pay, he might prefer remaining as senior captain, taking the chance of the death of one of the three officers above him; would he be compelled to purchase, or to see a junior officer go over his head?—In such a case as that, the major wishing to sell, the probability is that the purchase-money would be provided by the fund, and the senior captain would be promoted without purchase. For instance, the other day, on Colonel Stuart,

Lieut.-Gen.
W. F.
Forster, K.H.
—
28 June
1867.

Stuart, of the 21st Regiment, wishing to retire, on half pay, Major Dalyell, an officer of 20 years' service, became lieutenant colonel without purchase, and the senior captain, Captain Collingwood, who was an officer of 20 years' service, obtained his majority without purchase.

249. General Peel.] Was not it one of the objects of the last warrant to compel an officer to retire after he had served a sufficient time to entitle him to his promotion as brevet colonel?—The Commander in Chief has the option of forcing an officer to retire when he has attained the age of 60, but in some instances a man at 60 may be as young as a man of 40; there are exceptions to all general rules; several officers have been compelled, from increasing years and ineligibility, altogether to retire upon retired full pay.

250. In those cases, where those officers are compelled to retire on account of age, the step goes in the regiment?—Yes; but there are many cases, where there are supernumeraries, where of course there is no promotion at all.

251. No promotion goes in the regiment in that case, because there is a supernumerary who would be absorbed?—Yes.

252. Marquis of Hartington.] You have stated that Major Dalyell and Captain Collingwood obtained their promotion without purchase; under what regulation or warrant was that?—There is no warrant regulating it. The Commander in Chief recommends it to the Secretary at War, and the Secretary at War approves of it, or not, as he thinks proper. The Commander in Chief could not do it without the concurrence of the Secretary at War; this was a special case.

253. You do not know of any warrant which defines the cases in which officers may be allowed to take their promotion without purchase?—Yes; the 54th clause of Warrant, 3rd February 1866.

254. If the major and senior captain had not had long and distinguished service they would both have had to pay for their commissions?—Yes, according to the ordinary rule.

255. But the Commander in Chief was able, with the consent of the Secretary of State, to allow the step to go, exceptionally, without purchase?—Yes, the sum being lost to the Reserve Fund.

256. General Peel.] How would it be in this case; supposing the lieutenant colonel went out and the senior major was not an officer of any long standing, or the senior captain an officer of any long standing, and the commission was sold for the purpose of the Reserve Fund. If the senior lieutenant was an officer of any length of service, would it be in the power of the Commander in Chief to recommend to the Secretary at War that that officer should go without purchase?—Yes.

257. Or the senior ensign in the same way?—Yes.

258. In fact, there is no rule about it?—No, it is left to the discretion of the Secretary at War to say whether the officer whom we recommend for promotion without purchase should obtain it or not.

259. Colonel North.] In 1861 and 1862 no less a sum than 20,500*l.* was paid to purchase out six gentlemen-at-arms, 8,000*l.* being given for the retirement of Sir Travers Phillips, and 5,300*l.* being paid for the retirement of Captain McDonald?—They were two officers.

260. In order to produce that amount, 45 first commissions must have been sold?—The amount would be equal to the price of 45 first commissions.

261. Do not you think it rather a hardship that a fund of this description should be taxed to that amount to buy out those six or eight gentlemen-at-arms, an amount which might have provided 45 commissions, which might have been offered to 45 boys at Sandhurst?—I can only say that the buying out of those gentlemen-at-arms was decided upon by the Secretary at War in 1861 or 1862.

262. With respect to the 100*l.* a-year for each year of foreign service and 50*l.* a-year for each year of home service, when was the change to 50*l.* for home service made?—The alteration was made in 1862, and the regulation on the subject is included in Royal Warrant, 3rd February 1866, clause 84.

263. Considering that it is not a matter of choice with an officer to serve at home or abroad, do not you think it a hard thing to mulct him in 50*l.* because he was ordered to serve at home instead of abroad?—I think it is very fair that an officer whose long period of service has been abroad should receive more than a man who has never been out of England. In the case of a man who serves abroad there are all the vicissitudes of the climate and the dangers of epidemic diseases to be considered. There is always a certain degree of sympathy shown to those who have been a long time abroad.

264. It is not a matter of choice with an officer whether he shall serve in England or abroad?—A great many officers say, I prefer going here or going there; some are very anxious to go abroad, and others, for their own objects, are glad to stay at home. I do not think there is any hardship in the difference of allowance.

265. Mr. Trevelyan.] What proportion of the Reserve Fund comes from the infantry, and what proportion from other branches of the service?—Practically, it all comes from the infantry.

266. Colonel North.] The Cavalry, the Artillery, the Engineers, the Indian regiments, and the Marines all benefit by the operations of the Reserve Fund, though they pay no share towards it?—They all benefit, with the exception of the non-purchase regiments of Cavalry and Infantry and Marines.

267. Mr. Percy Wyndham.] You stated that the Reserve Fund had not yet been applied to paying any officer of those Indian regiments the 100*l.* a-year for each year of foreign service, and the 50*l.* for each year of home service?—No; they are ineligible to receive it.

268. There is no regulation or warrant preventing the Secretary at War for the time being from applying the fund to the purpose of buying out the half pay commissions of officers of those 12 Indian regiments?—Those officers who entered those regiments previous to amalgamation can only go on half-pay on medical certificate under Indian regulations, which do not affect the Reserve Fund. Those who have entered subsequently come under the ordinary regulations for retirement on full or half-pay.

269. Do you think the fund is of use in quickening promotion?—Yes, certainly.

270. It is, I presume, in order to increase the fund that the amount per year given to an officer who has got his commission for nothing has been reduced

731
Lieut. Gen.
W. F.
Forster, K.H.

28 June
1867.

reduced from 100*l.* to 50*l.* for home service?—It has that effect.

271. But, practically, it is reduced?—Yes.

272. Is not that rather an inducement to that officer to stop on longer in the service, seeing that he has a commission that is worth a good lump, but which he is not allowed to sell; the less he gets a-year the more likely he is to stay on longer, is he not?—He only gets 50*l.* a-year for home service, and 100*l.* a-year for foreign service; therefore, to benefit to the greatest extent, he must go abroad.

273. Captain *Vivian*.] I understood you to say, with regard to the Royal Artillery and Engineers benefiting by this fund, that they benefit by it "in certain instances;" what did you refer to by that?—I referred to officers of Engineers who have civil situations. When an officer of Engineers has held a civil situation a certain number of years, he must either elect to join his corps or to give it up; he is to be seconded or to give up his corps, whether to be placed upon half pay or not I do not know. Then a great many of those officers who decide to remain in civil employment go upon half pay, and then sell their commissions, by which they get rid of the whole thing and retain their civil appointment, getting the benefit of whatever sum of money was awarded for their commissions.

274. That is one of the instances in which officers of Royal Engineers benefit by this reserve fund; but that does not apply to the Royal Artillery?—No.

275. Can you tell us whether the Royal Artillery, being a non-purchasing corps, do not, under certain circumstances, also benefit by this reserve fund?—I think there are a great many instances of officers of Artillery having sold their half-pay commissions.

276. That is to say, being on half pay, they have received the value of their commissions, whatever their rank may have been, from the Reserve Fund?—Yes. Then the Reserve Fund has been very useful, when it has been found necessary to make a reduction in the army, by the Reserve Fund purchasing those commissions. As regards the operations of the fund, one can hardly call this a fair year to judge from, because we have not carried out yet the reductions ordered last year; we are only absorbing officers at this instant, and therefore there are not so many commissions to give away.

277. Are you able to state how much the Horse Guards has spent in purchasing commissions of gentlemen-at-arms, in order to replace them by old soldiers?—I find the whole amount expended since 1860 has been 45,000*l.*, which was for three appointments connected with the yeomen of the guard, and 21 connected with the gentlemen-at-arms; the whole making 24.

278. How long has this system of purchase of commissions of gentlemen-at-arms out of the Reserve Fund existed?—In 1861 it began.

279. Major *O'Reilly*.] You have stated that, in fact, the Reserve Fund is contributed to only by the infantry; practically, is not it the case that the cavalry never have contributed, and you do not see any prospect of their contributing?—The cavalry do contribute in some degree; and since the alteration in the prices of cavalry commissions, considerable sums have been paid from the Reserve Fund to remunerate cavalry officers on their retiring.

280. You said that you thought the giving of 0.127.

a sum, equivalent to the purchase value of his commission, to a half-pay officer of a non-purchasing corps, was something analogous to buying up the value of an annuity?—I fancy that is the argument that is made use of.

281. If it was simply a matter of purchasing up an annuity, it might be done by the Commissioners of the National Debt, might it not?—I believe I have heard it advanced as an argument (it is not one I advance myself) that it is analogous to buying up an annuity.

282. If this annuity was to be purchased up, do you see any reason why it should be done by a fund contributed to, as you have said, by officers of Infantry of the Line?—The only thing is this: I am afraid if it was not done by some arrangement of that sort, it would not be done at all.

283. Do you think that the officers who contribute to this Reserve Fund gain any advantage by the paying of these sums of money to half-pay officers of non-purchasing corps?—No, I do not conceive that they do.

284. But the country does?—Yes.

285. Do you say that more consideration is shown to cadets who have obtained their commissions on retiring from the service than to other persons who have not purchased their commissions?—If a cadet has won his commission by passing through his examination at Sandhurst, and if he retired from the service after two years, he would receive the value of his ensigncy.

286. Do not you think that if a young man has got his education at Sandhurst free, or partly free, and then has got a commission in the Line free, and has received his pay while he held it, he has very little claim to receive a sum from the State on retiring from the service, probably to take advantage, in civil life, of the acquirements he has gained at Sandhurst?—We will not say that he has received his education gratuitously, because very many of those have paid 100*l.* a-year.

287. I only put it "if;" take the case of the Queen's cadets; why should a man who has received his commission free, and received the pay of his rank whilst he served, be paid a sum of money on retiring from the service?—I can see no reason for it.

288. If the whole army were non-purchase, would you consider it just that the State, besides paying the regular rate of pay to officers whilst serving, should pay a sum of money down to any officer retiring (not founded on any system of retirement after serving his full time)?—That would be a consideration for the State, not for me; I cannot solve the question.

289. Sir *Charles Russell*.] You said just now that you could see no reason why a sum of money should be paid to an officer retiring who had paid nothing for the purchase of his commission; does not it very much quicken promotion, that is to say, does not it tend to induce men to retire?—I think it quickens promotion.

290. Sir *John Trollope*.] Do you keep the accounts of this fund?—Of whatever passes through my hands; when the fund arrives at any considerable sum of money it is always invested in Government securities.

291. Captain *Vivian*.] Your account of the fund is simply a second-hand account, is not it?—Yes; I keep an account, and Messrs. Cox keep an account.

292. Sir *John Trollope*.] What is the present amount of the fund?—The present amount is 68,365*l.*

Lieut.-Gen.
W. F.
Forster, К.Н.

28 June
1867.

293. There has been a rapid accumulation lately, has not there, there having been probably a small demand upon the fund?—That is so.

294. Can you state the number of operations that this Reserve Fund is subject to annually?—No.

295. Is it uncertain in the number?—Quite uncertain; say that 1,800*l.* is paid for a commission, the officer is only allowed to receive 1,200*l.*, and the 600*l.* is handed over by the agent to Messrs. Cox and Co., who are obliged to account for it.

296. You stated that when the sum amounted to a considerable amount it was invested?—Yes.

297. In what?—In Exchequer Bills.

298. And the interest carried to the account of the fund?—Yes.

299. Colonel *Hogg*.] Formerly was not it the case that where an officer got his commission for nothing, when he retired he got the money back from the officer who succeeded him, the State getting nothing?—No; in such an instance an officer could not have received the full value of his commission on retirement, until he had served 20 years; then he was allowed to sell.

300. Then he got the whole money?—Yes.

301. Now a portion of the money is taken away from him if he has not served the full time?—Yes.

302. The money going to the State for this Reserve Fund?—Yes.

303. *Chairman*.] Can you tell us what number of cavalry officers still continue who will be entitled to be reimbursed the difference between the old and the new price of commissions by the Reserve Fund?—We might endeavour to find it out, but it would be a very laborious affair; we will do it if it is practicable.

304. What is at present the time that an officer is required to remain in his particular grade before he can be promoted to a higher grade?—He must be two years a subaltern before he can become a captain, and he must be six years in the service before he can become a major or a lieutenant colonel.

305. You said that one officer belonging to the former Indian service had very recently applied to be allowed to go on half-pay?—Yes, it has only been within a short time settled that they were entitled to half-pay, on medical certificate, for they have no half-pay in the Indian service.

306. Assuming that his application should be granted, I presume he would not be allowed to take advantage of the Indian retirement and of the Reserve Fund likewise?—No; certainly not.

307. Sir *John Trollope*.] The Indian regiments are now upon the same footing as the Queen's army?—They retain the same privileges which they had in the Indian service.

308. Do they take the same tour of duty?—They will when they come home.

309. *Chairman*.] Those who entered prior to the amalgamation have the advantages of the Indian service, while all those who have joined since are dealt with according to the regulations of the Queen's service?—Yes.

310. Mr. *Trevelyan*.] Will you furnish a return of the number of first commissions given for two or three years past; distinguishing those given by purchase, those given by non-purchase at Sandhurst, those given by non-purchase elsewhere, and those given to non-commissioned officers?—I will furnish that return. I have here the number of commissions given by purchase and without purchase from 1st June 1866 to 31st May 1867: 298 to direct candidates, and 101 to cadets, Royal Military College, by purchase; 106 cadets, Royal Military College, without purchase; 14 commissions to other candidates.

311. *Chairman*.] To whom were the 14 non-purchase commissions given?—To non-commissioned officers, I presume.

312. General *Peel*.] That would include three examinations at Sandhurst?—No, only two (*see Appendix*).

313. Major *O'Reilly*.] Those 12 Indian regiments are entirely non-purchase corps, are they not?—Yes.

314. No officer in those corps would be able to sell his commission, even after any length of service?—No, not as at present arranged.

315. Then if the officers retiring from those 12 regiments are to be paid a sum of money on retiring, like other officers in other regiments who have obtained their commissions without purchase, will not it require a very large sum?—They are not entitled to receive a sum of money on retirement; but there must eventually, I presume, be some change in the present arrangement.

316. Those regiments having become Queen's regiments, if 20 years hence the officers of those 12 regiments do not get any sum of money on retirement, calculated at 100*l.* or 50*l.* per annum as the case may be, for their length of service, while officers of other non-purchase regiments in the service do receive those sums, will not it be considered a case of very great hardship?—I apprehend it will.

317. Am I right in concluding that when those 12 regiments come entirely upon the Queen's establishment, this difficulty will necessarily arise, either the Reserve Fund will be overstrained to pay all the officers who retire from those 12 Indian regiments, a sum of money on retirement to which they themselves have not at all contributed, or a case of great hardship will be established in that the officers of those 12 regiments will receive no sum of money on retirement, while the officers of other non-purchase regiments receive a sum on retirement?—In the way you put it, it seems to me to be a matter well worthy of consideration.

733

Wednesday, 3rd July 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Goschen.
Colonel Hogg.
Lord Hotham.
General Peel.

Sir Charles Russell.
Mr. Trevelyan.
Captain Vivian.
Mr. Percy Wyndham.

LORD HOTHAM, IN THE CHAIR.

Major WILLIAM MARVIN, called in; and Examined.

318. Captain *Vivian.*] WHAT appointment do you hold in the War Department?—I am Examiner of Military Services.

319. Does the Reserve Fund come under your Department?—No; I have nothing to do with the working of the Reserve Fund; but in the course of my examination into military services, the operation of the fund sometimes comes under my notice.

320. You are intimately acquainted with the operation of the fund and the purposes to which it is applied?—I cannot say that I am intimately acquainted with it; I shall be glad to give the Committee any information I possess on the subject.

321. Will you state what you know with regard to the Reserve Fund, and the purposes to which it has been applied, both before 1860, when the fund came under Parliamentary control, and since that time?—Its accumulation arises from the difference between what an officer selling is entitled to receive, and the officer purchasing is required to pay, the balance going to the Reserve Fund. Before 1825, I believe, there was a practice, introduced by the Commander in Chief, of selling first commissions for the benefit of widows and orphans of deserving officers.

322. Do you know whether the Reserve Fund was frequently applied to that purpose before 1825?—No; I have merely ascertained by reference to official papers that that used to be done; to what extent I have no means of stating, not having given my attention specially to the subject.

323. Since the period to which you have referred, to what purposes has the Reserve Fund been applied?—It has been applied to buying up half-pay commissions of officers becoming settlers in the Colonies, and in some cases to the absorption of commissions of officers who become supernumerary by the reduction of the regimental establishment. The system of selling to settle in the Colonies was discontinued in 1861 or 1862; since then, officers on the half-pay list, who would otherwise have sold to settle in the Colonies, are allowed to realise the value of their commissions by payment from the Reserve Fund.

324. Before 1861 or 1862 I understand you to 0.127.

say officers desiring to settle in the Colonies received a sum of money out of the Reserve Fund, for the purpose of enabling them so to settle?—Quite so; their places in the half-pay list, I believe, were filled by promotions from the effective list to the unattached list; and therefore the money was realised from payment by the officers who got the promotion. In effect it is the same now as it was formerly.

325. To what other purposes has this Reserve Fund been applied?—It has, I believe, been applied to the purchase of the appointments of gentlemen-at-arms. It has also been applied to the purchase of the half-pay of artillery and engineer officers, but up to the time that the system of selling to settle in the Colonies was discontinued, officers of artillery and engineers were allowed to realise the value of their commissions for the purpose of settling in the Colonies, and when that system was discontinued they were allowed to sell their commissions to the fund. That is indirectly an advantage to officers of cavalry and infantry, who are the only contributors to the fund, inasmuch as the buying up of the half-pay of an artillery or an engineer officer enables an officer of the line to retire to the half-pay list, such officer taking the place of the artillery or engineer half-pay officer; promotion, by that means, being afforded to the line regiment by purchase.

326. There is no limit to the half-pay list, is there?—The Treasury will not allow you to exceed the half-pay by a single shilling, without their consent; but my opinion has always been that an officer who has acquired the right to retire upon half-pay after 25 years' service should do so; the promotion going in the regiment without purchase. In the artillery and engineers the steps are filled without purchase, and I see no reason why the promotion should not go in the same way in the line; at present the Treasury will not allow you to increase the half-pay list; and therefore for every one you put upon the half-pay list you must take one off.

327. You think that the application of this Reserve Fund to the purpose of buying out officers of artillery on half-pay is, to a certain extent, justified by the fact, that it makes room for an officer, in a purchase corps, to go upon the half-pay list?—Quite so, and it is merely from continuing

Major
W. Marvin.
3 July 1867.

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Major
W. Marcin.
3 July 1867.

continuing to the artillery and engineer officer the practice that has existed from my earliest recollection; a military officer was always allowed to realise the value of his commission to settle in the Colonies.

328. *Chairman.*] Was that always the case?—I remember an artillery officer being allowed to realise the value of his commission to settle in the Colonies, in 1825 or 1826.

329. When was it that the sale of unattached commissions first began?—I should think about the year 1825.

330. Was not it at that time that something was done for the artillery in the way of allowing them to sell their commissions?—I cannot say whether anything was specially done for them at that time.

331. *Captain Vivian.*] Since what time has this Reserve Fund come under your cognizance, as connected with your department?—I have had a knowledge of the working of the fund to the extent stated in my answer to No. 319, since about the year 1855–56. If the services of an officer are in anyway connected with the Reserve Fund then I see the working of it.

332. The Reserve Fund came under Parliamentary control in 1860?—I believe so.

333. Before 1860 it was under the absolute control of the Secretary for War, was it not?—Quite so.

334. That is to say he could manage that fund exactly as he liked, and could apply it to any purposes he liked?—Yes.

335. Can you tell the Committee whether it was differently applied before it came under Parliamentary control?—I do not think there has been any difference in its application, except so far as regards the purchase of the appointment of the gentlemen-at-arms, and paying the difference between the old and new price of cavalry commissions of officers retiring. They are the only additional charges upon the fund that I am aware of.

336. Since 1861, when the price of cavalry commissions was altered, the difference between the old and the new price of those commissions has been borne by the fund?—Yes.

337. The placing of the fund under Parliamentary control has caused no difference, you say, in the application of it, so that the control has been neither a benefit nor a disadvantage to it?—I do not see any difference; Parliament knows now how the fund is being worked, which they did not know before.

338. Do you think the reserve fund is a benefit to the army generally?—I think it is; I think it enables the Commander in Chief sometimes to give first commissions without purchase. It enables him also to give commissions to officers of long standing, who, by the accidents of the service, have stood a long time in their grade, and who perhaps have not had the means of purchase. In cases where the retiring lieutenant colonel of the regiment is within a short period of becoming a general officer, the commission is given, as a rule, to the regiment, without purchase. In some cases some of the commissions are bought up, and others are given away without purchase, but the money for the officer who is selling must be made up.

339. You say that the Reserve Fund enables the Commander in Chief to give commissions to officers of long standing without purchase; but does not it also to a certain extent cripple and confine the power of the Commander in Chief

of giving away first commissions, inasmuch as those commissions are very often sold for the purpose of paying the money to the Reserve Fund?—It is frequently the case, that they are sold for the benefit of the Reserve Fund; but if you had no Reserve Fund you would have invariably to sell them to make up the money for the officer retiring.

340. Do you mean that if there were no Reserve Fund, there would be no first commissions to give away?—I should say so, except in death vacancies, and vacancies caused by retirements on full pay or by promotions to the rank of general officer, or by augmentation.

341. Are not first commissions, arising from death vacancies, very often now sold for the benefit of the Reserve Fund?—That I cannot say; in some cases it may be so, but I cannot positively say that such is the case.

342. So far as death vacancies occur, if there were no Reserve Fund, all those first commissions might be given away?—Certainly.

343. They might be given to cadets at Sandhurst, for instance?—Quite so.

344. Is there any other information you can give the Committee with regard to the Reserve Fund which you think would assist them in their inquiry?—I am not aware of anything beyond the answers I have already given.

345. *General Peel.*] When an application comes from the Horse Guards to the War Department to allow an officer to retire, is it submitted to you to make inquiry whether his services entitle him to retire?—My duties are to investigate all special claims of officers and soldiers in respect of promotion, former service, &c., which may be referred to me by the War Office authorities. If it is a clear case, it is settled without coming to me; but if it is a special case, calling for investigation, I have to investigate the claim.

346. That has nothing to do with the application of the Reserve Fund?—No.

347. You say, that by purchasing up the half-pay of an engineer or artillery officer, it enables an officer of the line to go upon half-pay in his place?—It enables an officer of 25 years' service to go to half-pay.

348. Only an officer who has retired after 25 years' service?—Yes.

349. Supposing an officer wished to retire who had not served for 25 years, the Reserve Fund would sell that commission, would they not?—There are two lieutenant colonels, four majors, and two captains allowed to be promoted annually to the unattached list, and the money or the half-pay that is sold to the Reserve Fund enables those officers to go to half-pay without increasing the half-pay charge.

350. The purchasing up of their half-pay is a benefit to the country, and not to the officers, is it not?—It is a benefit to the country. If officers could go to the half-pay list, without the necessity of having any half-pay bought up, to make room for them, then it would be an advantage to the officers.

351. Are you aware of the rule I laid down when I was last in office, that when the difference between the price received by the officer retiring and the price paid by his successor amounted to 450*l.*, the first commission should go without purchase?—Yes.

352. That of course materially increases the number

735
Major
W. Marvin.
3 July 1867.

number of first commissions to be given away without purchase?—Yes.

353. Is not the effect of this Reserve Fund to make every retirement from the service a question of purchase. If an officer has purchased his commission he sells it in order to receive the price he has paid for it. If, on the other hand, he retires, not having purchased his commission, the commission is sold in order that he should receive that allowance of 100*l.* a year for every year of Foreign Service, or 50*l.* for every year of Home Service?—Yes.

354. Therefore, it makes every commission on retirement a commission by purchase?—Yes, except in the cases I have referred to.

355. Supposing there was no Reserve Fund at all, an officer after a certain number of years' service would be entitled to go upon half-pay?—He has an unqualified right to go upon half-pay after 25 years' service.

356. And the promotion would go in the regiment?—Yes.

357. Instead of that, the Treasury allow him to sell his commission for the benefit of the Reserve Fund?—His commission is sold in order to buy up a place on the half-pay list to which he can retire.

358. If there were no Reserve Fund, he would be equally entitled to go upon the half-pay list, and the promotion would go in the regiment?—Yes.

359. The fund therefore must interfere, necessarily, with the natural promotion in the regiment of the officers who do not purchase?—Certainly.

360. Colonel North.] I think from the evidence given before this Committee, it appears that though the Secretary of State for War, after having gone most minutely into the case of any officer that might be brought before him, may have decided upon a certain plan, that plan may be completely upset by the decision of the Treasury?—The Secretary of State endeavours to come to a conclusion in accordance with what has been done in former cases by the Treasury.

361. Supposing the Secretary of State has not succeeded in doing so, the Treasury may upset the decision of the Secretary of State for War?—Quite so, if it is at variance with the plan previously laid down by the Treasury.

362. They lay down plans, like that regulation, to meet their own views?—This regulation was established in 1861, upon the case of an officer of a regiment of cavalry who wanted to go to half-pay, and who said, "I want to retire upon half-pay, and I want to give the regiment the benefit of the promotion, and I cannot do that without finding an officer upon the half-pay list to come to full pay, and to whom I must pay a considerable bonus; therefore I would propose for the consideration of the Secretary of State, that I should be permitted to go to half-pay, and that the promotion should go in the regiment by purchase, and the purchase money go to the Reserve Fund to buy out some other half-pay officer. That was submitted to the Secretary of State, and by him referred to the Treasury, and this was the regulation founded upon that case. This is an extract from regulations to be observed with reference to retirements on half-pay, dated War Office, 10th September 1861: "1. Vacancies occasioned in regiments of cavalry and infantry by officers of 25 years' service retiring on half-pay under the provisions of clause 46 of the O.127.

Royal Warrant of 14th October 1858, as amended by Royal Warrant of 20th March 1861, shall be filled up by purchase, and the purchase money carried to the credit of the Reserve Fund; except in cases where the officers retiring on half-pay will probably obtain the rank of major general within a period of two years, and where the officers next for promotion in the regiment have been, from various circumstances, placed in an unfavourable position as compared with other corps, but from the length and distinguished nature of their services have a claim to be favourably considered; when it will rest with the Secretary of State to decide upon the merits of each case to what extent the vacancies should be filled up by purchase or otherwise."

363. General Peel.] Supposing a lieutenant colonel applies to go on half-pay, and his commission is sold by the Reserve Fund, and the Horse Guards make a recommendation to the War Department, that in consequence of the long services of the senior major or the senior captain, they should be allowed to be promoted without purchase; are the services of that officer then submitted to you to report to the Secretary of State for War whether or not you consider his services sufficient to entitle him to obtain a commission without purchase?—I should be required to report on such a case to the Under Secretary of State so far as regards the officer's services, and any special circumstances connected therewith.

364. Then in fact you have nothing to do with the Reserve Fund as Examiner of Military Services?—No.

365. Colonel North.] Can you tell the Committee when the allowance of 100*l.*, for every year of service, to an officer if he had served at home, was reduced to 50*l.*?—I think four or five years ago.

366. Was that a War Office, or a Horse Guards regulation?—It was a regulation of the War Office; the old regulation was that the officers were allowed the 100*l.*, whether for service at home or abroad; then it was found that there was no positive authority for having given that sum, and it was reconsidered, and determined that 100*l.* should be given for each year of foreign service, and 50*l.* for each year of home service.

367. Considering that an officer cannot of himself choose whether he will stay at home, or serve abroad, do not you think that that is rather hard upon an officer who has been obliged to serve at home?—I am quite of opinion that you should give greater facilities for promotion in regiments, without purchase, than exist at present, but while the Treasury object to the increase of the half-pay list, you cannot do it by means of retirement to half-pay.

368. Mr. Percy Wyndham.] If an officer retires upon full pay, his promotion invariably goes without purchase?—Yes.

369. But it does not invariably go without purchase when he retires upon half-pay?—Certainly not; it goes invariably in the case of retirement upon full pay, because there is a fixed sum of 60,000*l.* a-year to provide for such retirement.

370. Do you think the necessity, real or assumed, of keeping up the Reserve Fund, leads to many of the steps caused by retirement on half-pay, to go by purchase, which, but for the existence of that fund, would be permitted to

Major
W. Marvin.
—
3 July 1867.

go without purchase?—If the State would sanction an addition to the half-pay list, there is no reason why every vacancy should not go without purchase.

371. If it was not for buying up those steps, would there be any necessity for the Reserve Fund at all?—If the State would allow an unlimited half-pay list, there would be no necessity for it.

372. If the steps caused by the retirement of an officer to half-pay do not go without purchase, an officer who does not purchase has a very small chance of promotion?—His chances of promotion are confined to death vacancies and other casualties mentioned in my reply to 340.

373. In the case of a major receiving an unattached lieutenant colonelcy after long service, would that step go without purchase through the regiment?—No; he would be replaced from the half-pay list, or his commission would be sold for the benefit of the Reserve Fund.

374. That leads very often to officers of long service being passed over, does it not?—Frequently; an officer who has not money to purchase is inevitably passed over.

375. Do augmentation steps go without purchase?—Yes, unless there are supernumeraries to absorb.

376. Invariably?—As a rule they go without purchase, except where there are supernumeraries to absorb. Sometimes an officer may be brought from the half-pay list to fill the augmentation vacancies.

377. I have a case before me in which, on two majors retiring to the unattached list, the two senior captains, who were men of long service, got their steps without purchase; but the two senior lieutenants (one of whom had served 13 years and the other 10 years, and one of whom had been purchased over 14 times, and had served during the whole of the Indian mutiny) were purchased over in order that the money might go to the Reserve Fund. If it were not for the necessity of keeping up the Reserve Fund, I suppose that the probability is that those steps would have gone without purchase?—In such a case, they must have gone without purchase. If the two senior captains got their promotion without purchase on account of long service, I am not prepared to say why the others should not have had theirs in the same way.

378. Is it in contemplation to allow the officers of Indian regiments to benefit by the Reserve Fund?—I should say not; they can have no claim to it.

379. What is the pay of a gentleman-at-arms and a yeoman of the guard?—I think the pay of the gentleman-at-arms is about 60*l.* or 70*l.* a year. The old members of the corps used to calculate that they got about five per cent. upon what they paid for their appointments.

380. *Chairman.*] There were advantages besides their pay; for instance, exemption from serving on juries, and so on?—Yes; the officers of the line who have contributed to this fund have, however, benefited indirectly by those purchases, inasmuch as the appointments are being filled from the half-pay men, who in their time contributed to the Reserve Fund.

381. Mr. *Percy Wyndham.*] The Reserve Fund is, in fact, taking money from A. to benefit B., C., and D., is it not?—Yes.

382. *Chairman.*] Do not those officers who are

appointed to the corps of gentlemen-at-arms remain upon the half-pay list?—Yes.

383. How do the officers of the army benefit if they remain on the half-pay?—I mean that the officers on the half-pay list who get the appointments, and who formerly, (while on full pay) contributed to the fund are benefitted.

384. Mr. *Baxter.*] Have you known any instances in which the decision of the Secretary for War, with regard to the Reserve Fund, has been altered by the Treasury?—Not as regards the application of the fund; I do not think the Treasury could interfere with the application of the fund; they could interfere with any arrangement proposed by the Secretary of State, the effect of which would be to increase the half-pay list.

385-6. I understood you to say that you did not consider that the Treasury had anything at all to do with the Reserve Fund; they have no direct control over the Reserve Fund?—No.

387. Mr. *Goschen.*] To whom do you consider that the Reserve Fund equitably belongs?—It belongs to the officers of cavalry and infantry who contribute to it.

388. Captain *Vivian.*] The cavalry have not contributed to it, have they?—Yes, in precisely the same way that an infantry officer contributes to it. The cavalry officer retiring on half-pay, if he entered the cavalry before the 31st January 1860, gets the difference between the old and new price of his commission.

389. *Chairman.*] Have there been many instances of the fund being so contributed to in the case of cavalry officers?—Yes.

390. Mr. *Goschen.*] You have stated that, according to your view, the fund arises from the contributions of cavalry and infantry officers?—That is my opinion.

391. Does the fund arise from the contributions of officers in service and on full pay, or from the contributions of officers who are only on half-pay?—Half-pay officers do not contribute at all; it is the officers on full pay; in fact, it is the difference between what one officer receives on selling and what the other officer pays on purchasing his commission.

392. In what way can you say that it is contributed to by the officers; does it come out of their pockets?—An officer who buys, we will say, a company or a troop of cavalry, pays 1,100*l.*, the difference between his lieutenancy and his company or troop. The officer who sells has, perhaps, bought his company and paid 1,100*l.* for it, and, perhaps, he has had six years' home service, which would be 300*l.* more, making 1,400*l.*, which he would receive; whereas the officer who gets the company pays 1,100*l.* for it. Then the ensign who gets the lieutenancy pays 250*l.*, and the price of the first commission is 450*l.* in addition, making 1,800*l.* altogether; whereas the officer retiring would only get 1,400*l.*, the difference going to the Reserve Fund.

393. That difference does not come out of the pocket of the man who sells?—No, he has never paid it.

394. On the other hand, the retiring officer gets no advantage from the system of the Reserve Fund, does he?—An officer who retires gets the 100*l.* or the 50*l.* for each year's service.

395. *Chairman.*] That is, if he has not purchased?—If he has not purchased all his commissions. If an officer retiring has purchased only one of his commissions, he gets the 100*l.* or the

50*l.*

737

Major
W. Martin.

3 July 1867.

507. to make up the full value of his commission, if he has served long enough to entitle him to the full value.

396. Mr. *Goschen*.] Is not the effect of the Reserve Fund to compel officers in a regiment to pay more during a given number of years for the purchase of steps than they would have to pay if the Reserve Fund did not exist. As I understand you, the Reserve Fund, in fact, gets the difference between the price paid and the money received, which difference is paid by the officer who retires?—That difference is paid by the promoted officer, because he pays more than the officer who retires receives.

397. The officers in a regiment really pay more than they would have to pay for promotion, if it were not for the action of the Reserve Fund, do they not?—No. In any case, the officer would pay the full value of his commission, unless you made the arrangement that the officer promoted should only pay what the officer retiring received; then you would do away with the regulation price of commissions.

398. The Reserve Fund gets the difference between the two prices for the commission; out of whose pocket does that difference come?—The difference comes out of the promoted officer's pocket; but he gets his value for it in the superior commission.

399. Then is it not a grievance upon the promoted officer?—No.

400. Therefore, as he gets the full value for what he pays, you can scarcely say that the fund belongs to him?—Certainly not; I merely meant that the fund arose from payments made by those officers.

401. The fund arises out of those differences, which are a grievance to nobody; therefore you cannot well say that it belongs to the officers, because they have not suffered, inasmuch as they have received full value for everything they have paid?—Quite so.

402. Instead of saying that the fund belonged to the officers of cavalry and infantry who have contributed to it, it would be more correct, would it not, to say that the Reserve Fund has accumulated from the right of the State to sell commissions?—In saying that it belonged to the officers, I simply meant to convey that the accumulation arose from the difference between what the one received and the other paid.

403. In the case of the sale of first commissions, the money goes to the fund also?—Yes, ordinarily.

404. Therefore the Reserve Fund might be described as the price which the State has received either by the sale of first commissions or by the sale of promotions?—It might be so described, but I do not consider that the State has any claim to the fund.

405. Consequently the Reserve Fund belongs rather to the State than to any particular branch of the service?—I scarcely know how to answer that; because, if there were no purchase of commissions there would be no Reserve Fund, and the State would have nothing to do with the question.

406. It depends upon whether it is right or wrong for the State to sell commissions at all?—It arises from that. If there were no such thing as the sale of commissions, there would be no Reserve Fund.

407. The fact that a portion of the Reserve Fund had been applied to relieve the ineffec-

tive vote, would afford some ground for regarding it as belonging to the State?—It serves the State, I admit.

408. The State has sold commissions on the one hand, and relieved itself of a certain amount of half-pay on the other?—Yes, the State has been so relieved by the fund.

409. Colonel *North*.] It was never State money in any way, was it?—No, never.

410. Mr. *Goschen*.] It is State money so far that it arises from the act of the State in selling a commission which it is entitled to sell, and which nobody else has a right to sell. If the Commander in Chief or the Secretary for War in the name of the State sells a certain number of commissions, the profits of those commissions belong to the State, whether the money is voted by Parliament or not?—In that sense, I suppose it might be taken to be so.

411. You admit that the purchasing officer gets the full value for his payment?—He gets the market value.

412. If the market price is paid for the commission, and that market price is divided between the Reserve Fund and the officer who is retiring, the officer retiring does not get the market value?—Quite so; the difference goes to the Reserve Fund, and though it may be at variance with what I said before, I cannot help viewing that difference as property belonging to the officers of cavalry and infantry.

413. If the purchaser pays the full market price, and if the State retains a portion of the price, the man who goes out does not get the full market value?—Just so; but the officer who retires is able, by means of the Reserve Fund, to get that which he would not have been able to get before.

414. It has been suggested that those officers suffer over whose heads you pass by this system, who, if there were no purchase, would get promotion, but who lose the step by the purchase taking place. Do you regard those officers as real sufferers by the system?—If there were no system of purchase no such vacancies would occur. An officer retires by the sale of his commission, and if there were no such thing as the sale of commissions, he would not retire at all, and the officer who, under the existing system is now passed over, would remain in his proper place.

415. Parliament require an audit of this fund, do they not?—They require a report to be made to them annually; I believe it is audited by the chief auditor of the War Office.

416. As I gather from the evidence which has been given, the Secretary of State for the War Department and the Horse Guards have dealt with this fund at their discretion, according to whether the fund was high or low?—Quite so; they have been guided by the state of the fund, in its application.

417. Sometimes they have relieved the State by buying up half-pay annuities, and sometimes they have not?—If they have not had the money, the transactions have been suspended.

418. Is it considered a grievance generally in the army that the money has been applied in that way?—I have not heard it spoken of as a grievance.

419. It is relieving the annual estimates of a certain amount of charge, is it not?—Quite so, because an officer of 25 years' service has an unqualified right to go to half pay, and if there

Major
W. Martin.

3 July 1867.

were no Reserve Fund to buy up half-pay to make room for the retiring officer, the State would have to bear the extra expense.

420. The relief to the State by this system is dependent upon the discretion of the Secretary for War; he has been able to relieve the estimates or not according to his discretion, and according to the state of the Reserve Fund?—He has been enabled to prevent an increase to the half-pay by its means.

421. It was not his duty to decrease the half-pay list by means of this Reserve Fund; it was within his discretion entirely?—The Treasury prevent his increasing the half-pay list. According to the existing arrangements, if an officer goes to half-pay, you make room for him by buying up some other officer's half-pay commission. You cannot incur any additional charge to the half-pay list without the special sanction of the Treasury.

422. As a matter of fact, without any vote of Parliament or any interference of Parliament, has it lain in the discretion of the Treasury and the War Office, whether the non-effective vote should be increased or decreased?—It has been ruled by the Treasury that the half-pay vote should not be increased without their special sanction.

423. Colonel *Hogg*.] Do you consider the general operation of the Reserve Fund beneficial to the army?—I do.

424. Does not the country benefit directly by the Reserve Fund, which has been entirely contributed to by officers of the army?—Yes.

425. You consider that the fund belongs to the army?—That is my impression.

426. The only persons who could possibly be said to be aggrieved by the operation of the Reserve Fund, would be officers going upon half-pay, and young officers in the regiment who would have to pay for their commissions on succession to their steps?—They would have to pay for their commissions, whether there were a Reserve Fund or not.

427. Supposing an officer went to half-pay after 25 years' service, if there were no Reserve Fund the step would go without purchase, would it not?—Yes.

428. Officers, by means of the Reserve Fund, are able to go on half-pay with more facility than they would if there were no Reserve Fund, so that they get a benefit directly from it, do they not?—I think it would come to the same thing if there were no Reserve Fund, because if they had served 25 years they would be entitled to go to half-pay; I consider that an officer would have a claim to half-pay after a service of 25 years, whether there was a Reserve Fund or not, and an officer in a non-purchase corps has the same claim.

429. This Reserve Fund is a benefit to the army, because formerly an officer who had not purchased his commission could not sell it except he had served for 20 years?—Yes.

430. Now, he gets 100*l.* for every year of foreign service, and 50*l.* for every year of home service?—Yes, and this, I think, is a very useful arrangement, as, without such an inducement, the officer would not retire, and in that case no promotion would occur.

431. General *Peel*.] Is not this the case that it is not the man who retires, nor the man who purchases, who suffers, but the man who is obliged to purchase the first commission which

he might otherwise obtain without purchase?—Yes, it might be given to him without purchase.

432. By his having to purchase, he loses the interest of his money, because when he retires he merely gets his own money back again, and does not get the 100*l.* for every year of foreign service, or the 50*l.* for every year of home service?—Quite so, except in the case of an officer who has purchased some of his commissions. He gets the 100*l.*, and 50*l.* for every year of service, to make up a sum not exceeding the full value of his commission.

433. Therefore it is a hardship upon that class?—Yes.

434. *Chairman*.] You have said that this Reserve Fund is contributed to entirely by the infantry and cavalry; what is the effect upon those who contribute to the maintenance of this fund by letting in the artillery and the engineers who contribute nothing towards it?—It is a privilege continued to the artillery since the discontinuance of the privilege they enjoyed of selling their commissions to settle in the Colonies, and the purchase of their half-pay makes room for an infantry or cavalry officer to go to the half-pay list. By an officer of artillery retiring upon half-pay, on getting the value of his commission from the Reserve Fund, an opening is afforded for another officer retiring from the line to the half-pay list.

435. If an artillery officer who has contributed nothing to the fund is allowed to benefit by it, he must do so at the expense of those who have contributed to it, must he not?—If he were to benefit by it to the exclusion of a cavalry or an infantry officer who applied to sell his half-pay, then of course it would be an injustice; but I do not think in any case the application of an artillery officer to sell his half-pay has been granted to the exclusion of an infantry officer. No application from an infantry officer or a cavalry officer who has served 25 years, to commute his half-pay, has been rejected that I am aware of. If the fund is in a condition to admit of it, an artillery officer is allowed to do the same; and when that is the case, it is a benefit to the line, inasmuch as there is an opening for a half-pay retirement.

436. If the fund were at any time not sufficient in amount to enable the applications of both infantry officers and artillery officers to be granted, preference would be given to the infantry officers?—Yes, artillery officers are not allowed to avail themselves of the benefit of the fund, as a matter of course; it is only in special cases that they are permitted to sell their half-pay commissions; they cannot claim the right to sell.

437. Captain *Vivian*.] Is an artillery officer on half-pay allowed to sell his commission at whatever age he may be, or in whatever state of health he may be?—No, he must be under 60 years of age, and must have served 25 years, and be in good health.

438. If a lieutenant colonel of artillery of 59 years of age is on half-pay, he may sell his commission for 4,500*l.*?—If the fund will stand it, and the Secretary of State chooses to allow it, he is granted the privilege as a favour.

439. Mr. *Goschen*.] He can sell to nobody else than the Reserve Fund?—He must sell to the Reserve Fund.

440. Captain *Vivian*.] The State benefits to the extent that it buys up an annuity?—It buys up an annuity, but you create another annuity by sending an infantry officer to fill his place in the half-pay

739
Major
W. Marvin.
3 July 1867.

half-pay list. The money with which you buy up the half-pay of the artillery officer makes room on the half-pay list for an infantry or cavalry officer. The state is in the same condition as before.

441. An officer of artillery on half-pay of 59 years of age who sells his commission, makes a very good bargain?—No doubt.

442. And he makes a very good bargain at the expense of a fund created by purchase officers?—Quite so; but you must keep in view the fact, that the cavalry and infantry derive the benefit of having those vacancies to go to.

443. General Peel.] The 4,500 *l.* which you pay to buy up the commission of a lieutenant colonel of artillery, would enable you to give without purchase 10 first commissions?—If you did not buy out the artillery officer, you would prevent a line officer going to half-pay of the corresponding rank to the artillery officer who sells, and no vacancy would be created.

444. Not if he is entitled to go upon half-pay?—The Treasury do not recognise his title if you increase the half-pay by it.

445. Mr. Trevelyan.] In your opinion, how is this 70,000 *l.* a year (or whatever the amount of the Reserve Fund may be) obtained; is it obtained without any loss to the infantry in general?—I should say it is.

446. And it benefits the cavalry, the artillery, and the yeomen of the guard?—It is benefit to those who wish to realise.

447. Chairman.] The operations of the fund extend also to the engineers and the marines, do they not?—Not to the marines.

448. Mr. Trevelyan.] If this fund is so beneficial to the service, why should not its operations be still further extended by selling all commissions in the line, instead of only a certain number?—It must be half-pay commissions simply, because commissions in the line are bought by officers who are promoted.

449. Is the system carried as far as it can be carried; is there any restriction upon the sale of half-pay commissions?—The only restrictions are that the officer shall be in a sound state of health; that he shall have served 25 years; that he is upon permanent half-pay by reason of such service, and that he is under 60 years of age.

450. This 70,000 *l.* comes from the infantry; they must suffer some sort of disadvantage in order to provide the 70,000 *l.*; is not that disadvantage the price of the first commissions; is not the effect of the Reserve Fund that there are a smaller number of first commissions to be given away?—I cannot see that. If it were not for the Reserve Fund, every first commission, except in death and augmentation vacancies, and other non-purchase vacancies I have already referred to, must be sold, to make up the sum due to the officer retiring by sale.

451. It enables a far smaller number of commissions by purchase to be given, does it not?—I do not see it at all.

452. Where does the money come from; what is the disadvantage to the infantry which is represented by this 70,000 *l.*, or whatever it is?—It is the difference between what one man pays and the other man receives.

453. Mr. Goschen.] With reference to the artillery, if they sell, they get too much?—A lieutenant colonel of artillery gets the same as a lieutenant colonel of infantry.

454. It is more than the value of the annuity, 0.127.

if calculated by an accountant?—It is more than an actuary would give; but then it must be taken into consideration that by buying out the officer you not only buy up his half-pay, but you buy up his widows' and orphans' pension; this would be taken into account by an actuary.

455. If you take all that into consideration, does he still get more than he would be likely to cost the State?—That is a question which only an actuary could answer.

456. Captain Vivian.] What is the half-pay of a lieutenant colonel of artillery?—Eleven shillings and eight pence a day; while that of an infantry lieutenant colonel is 11 *s.*

457. Mr. Goschen.] If the artillery officer gets too much, the State makes a bad bargain in buying him out at 4,500 *l.*?—It is the same in the case of the line officer; with merely this difference, that you give 4,500 *l.* for 11 *s.* a day, the infantry lieutenant colonel's half-pay, and the same sum for the artillery half-pay, which is 11 *s.* 8 *d.* a day.

458. The officer himself gets a bonus?—Quite so; he prefers the 4,500 *l.* to 11 *s.* 8 *d.* a day.

459. Mr. Trevelyan.] Is not it the case that on account of the Reserve Fund, there are fewer commissions to be given without purchase in the infantry?—I do not think that the Reserve Fund affects it in the slightest degree.

460. By the system of the Reserve Fund, officers are enabled to sell their commissions who otherwise would not be able to sell them, are they not?—If they were not able to sell their commissions by means of the Reserve Fund, they would remain in the service, and there would be no first commissions to give away.

461. Chairman.] It has been given in evidence that by the operation of the Reserve Fund the number of commissions appropriated to the Military College has been of late years considerably diminished?—I was not aware of that.

462. With respect to the engineers, there are many officers of engineers holding civil employment, are there not?—Yes.

463. And during the time that they hold that civil employment they are seconded, their rank going on in the meantime?—Yes.

464. Do you think that it ought to be open to those officers (after they have been in civil employment for a great many years, and after, perhaps, some of them have got good civil situations), through the means of this Reserve Fund, to sell their commissions, and put so much into their pockets from a fund to which they have never contributed a farthing?—It would be unfair if the infantry officers did not receive that indirect advantage to which I refer, namely, a vacancy on the half-pay list.

465. Do you give to the infantry officer any advantage at all to be compared with the advantage which those engineer officers can derive through the means of this Reserve Fund?—The advantage to the engineer officer is great, it is true, but I cannot see that the line officer loses anything by it, so long as the fund is capable of meeting all the line demands.

466. Do not you think that it must create a bad feeling in the minds of officers of infantry and cavalry who contribute towards this fund to see gentlemen, who have been civilians for perhaps many years, becoming soldiers again for the moment, and then selling their commissions and taking the money from the Reserve Fund?—

c 4

I certainly

Major
W. Marvin.
—
3 July 1867.

I certainly consider that infantry and cavalry officers have the first claim upon the fund; no consideration should be extended to officers of artillery or engineers, that would infringe upon any advantage which officers of infantry or cavalry (the only contributors) might otherwise obtain from the fund.

467. There have been recently added a certain number of Indian regiments to our establishment?—Yes.

468. Those Indian corps are all non-purchase corps?—Yes.

469. I believe the arrangement is that all those officers who entered the Indian service before the amalgamation, are allowed to take advantage of the then existing Indian arrangements, but all who have come in since will be subject to the arrangements in our own army. Some years hence, when the officers of those Indian corps come under the new system, will they not have the same claim to come upon the Reserve Fund as the artillery and engineers?—They would be in precisely the same category as the artillery and engineers. If they come upon the Reserve Fund at all, it would only be in special and rare cases. It is only in rare cases that officers of artillery and engineers are allowed to sell. If it were done in the case of the officers of those Indian regiments it would only be in consideration of their making way on the half-pay list for an infantry or cavalry officer of a purchased corps.

470. That would be for the benefit of the State?—Yes.

471. But do not you think it will produce a bad feeling on the part of the officers of infantry and cavalry if they see that they have not only to provide for the retirement of artillery and engineers, but for those non-purchase Indian regiments?—All I can say to that is, that I think no concession would be made to non-purchasing corps that would in any way deprive the legitimate claimants on the fund of what they could possibly get.

472. That is to say, that no Indian officer should be allowed to benefit by this fund, so long as there was any English officer desirous of doing so?—Quite so.

473. Would it not be objectionable, as a military arrangement, if one year one officer was able to do that which another year another officer, in precisely the same service and with precisely the same claim, would be prevented from doing, merely because the fund happened to be in one year high and the other year low?—It would be objectionable if it were not that it would only be done in rare cases; and if it were not, as I have already said, that the purchasing up the commission of such an officer, is an indirect advantage to an infantry officer. If there were any reason for closing the door against a non-purchase regiment, the Secretary of State would be at liberty to do it, and would do it at once, no doubt.

474. The time for closing the door would be before anybody was allowed to go through it, would it not?—Each case is specially considered in the first instance, and if there is any ground to suppose that injustice would be done to others by granting the application, it would be refused.

475. I will now ask you one or two questions which would probably have been put to you by another Member of the Committee, if he had been here to-day. If the officers retiring from

those Indian regiments are to be paid a sum of money on retiring, like other officers in other regiments who have obtained their commissions without purchase, will not it require a very large sum?—I do not think they should be taken into consideration at all till other claims were satisfied. If the fund has accumulated a large balance, and the fund can afford to buy out officers of non-purchase corps, then it might be done specially, but I do not consider that they have any claim, and the claim ought to be ignored.

476. Do not you think that it would be a dangerous military arrangement that a person should be allowed an advantage one year, and another person in the same position refused the next?—It is only contingent upon the state of the fund. Many artillery officers have applied to sell, and have been refused over and over again because the fund would not admit of it.

477. You consider that they have no legitimate claim to it?—I do.

478. Nor would the non-purchase regiments of the line have any claim; they would be in the same category as the artillery?—Yes.

479. Those Indian regiments having become Queen's regiments, if 20 years hence the officers of those regiments do not get any sum of money on retirement, calculated at 100*l.* or 50*l.* per annum, as the case may be, for their length of service, while officers of other non-purchase regiments in the service do receive those sums, will not it be considered a case of very great hardship?—The artillery and engineers do not get this 100*l.* for every year of foreign service, and 50*l.* for every year of home service; the artillery and engineers never get anything unless they have served 25 years, and then they get the full price of their commissions.

480. And yet officers of artillery and engineers have retired altogether?—Yes, those who have been bought out have retired after 25 years' service. We do not consider that an application from an artillery or engineer officer to be allowed to realise the value of his commission can be entertained at all unless he has served 25 years.

481. Am I right in concluding that when those Indian regiments come entirely upon the Queen's establishment this difficulty will necessarily arise: either the Reserve Fund will be over-strained to pay all the officers who retire from those Indian regiments a sum of money on retirement, to which they themselves have not at all contributed, or a case of great hardship will be established, in that the officers of those Indian regiments will receive no sum of money on retirement, while the officers of other non-purchase regiments receive a sum on retirement?—No provision can be made by means of the Reserve Fund for any of those officers of the Indian army.

482. They may be dealt with in the same way as the engineers and artillery?—Yes; which is very exceptionally. If numerous claims were to arise from those new regiments, you must close the door altogether not only upon them but upon the artillery as well.

483. Captain Vivian.] You have said that there have been very few instances in which the artillery and engineer officers have benefited by being allowed to sell their commissions?—A few only have benefitted.

484. And that a great many officers, both of artillery and engineers have been refused, who have made applications?—Yes; frequently an officer

741
Major
W. Marvin.

3 July 1867.

officer of artillery or engineers, who wants to realise the value of his commission, has ascertained beforehand that he would not be allowed to do so, and therefore he has not applied.

485. Have those refusals been based upon the state of the fund only?—Yes; and the necessity for providing for other claims.

486. Not having regard to the services of the officer?—No application is entertained from an artillery officer, unless he has served 25 years.

487. If two officers of artillery applied to commute their half pay, both of whom had served 25 years, and both of them had that claim to sell, one of whom was a distinguished officer, and the other of whom had not had an opportunity of distinguishing himself, would any more consideration be paid to the one than the other?—The services of the officer would be taken into consideration. If two officers applied, who had both served 25 years, I believe the officer who had seen most service, and had been most useful to the country, would have the preference.

488. Who decides upon those claims?—The Secretary of State for War.

489. Not the Horse Guards?—The Horse Guards may recommend. The Commander in Chief may refuse applications that the Secretary of State for War never hears of, but if he represents a case to the Secretary of State the Secretary of State has the decision.

490. You have stated that, in the application of this fund, the preference is given to officers of the line?—Yes.

491. You hold that the line officer does not suffer really by the artillery officer being allowed to sell his commission for 4,500*l.*, because it gives him a vacancy on the half-pay list, which he would not otherwise obtain?—That is an indirect advantage which is worth something to the line officer.

492. Is it worth 4,500*l.* to him?—I do not know that it is worth that to him, but it affords promotion.

493. That is to say, it affords one vacancy on the half-pay list?—One vacancy on the half-pay list to which the officer of the line can retire.

494. If that 4,500*l.* had not been applied to purchasing the commission of the lieutenant colonel of artillery on half pay, it would have allowed the State to give 10 first commissions without purchase?—Yes; and then, of course, you would have had the artillery officer remaining on half pay. The State would have had to continue his half pay.

495. The State does not pay him what the value of his half pay would be, according to the estimate of an actuary?—No; they pay him the value of an analogous commission.

496. Whether the lieutenant colonel was 40 years old, or within a month of 60 years old, he would be equally paid 4,500*l.*?—That is the regulation.

497. Therefore his annuity is not purchased upon an estimate of its value?—No, it is the regulation value of his commission.

498. Mr. Goschen.] It would be correct to say, would it not, that the loss to the Reserve Fund, in buying his commission at the price of 4,500*l.*, is not really the 4,500*l.*, but the difference between that and the value of the annuity?—It loses the 4,500*l.* altogether, and the public gets the benefit of the half pay, if the half pay is not taken up by a line officer.

499. When it has paid the 4,500*l.*, is the half

pay officer struck off the non-effective vote?—Yes.

500. Supposing the Reserve Fund merely acted as a banker, by giving on the one hand the purchase money in a lump to the officer, and on the other hand receiving the half pay, that would in the ordinary course accrue to the officer, the half pay being voted as usual; but being taken in cash by the Reserve Fund, there would not be the same hardship as now exists, would there?—No; the Reserve Fund would then, we may say, be recouped.

501. Would it, in your opinion, be advantageous to the army if a system like that were adopted, thereby extending further the system of buying half-pay commissions, the purchase-money being recouped to the Reserve Fund, by its being paid the half pay of the officers bought out?—It would require, perhaps, a good deal of machinery to work a thing of that sort, but it would, no doubt, be an advantage to the fund.

502. It is desirable to reduce the number of half-pay officers by buying them out at a lump sum, rather than continuing their half pay, is it not?—It is an advantage to the State to reduce the half-pay list.

503. And it is an advantage to the officer also, is not it, to receive the value of his annuity in cash?—Yes.

504. So that if the price were fairly adjusted, the officer getting the fair value of his half pay, it would be an advantage to the army, and also an advantage to the State?—Yes.

505. It would assist promotion?—Yes; and would be no loss to the Reserve Fund.

506. Captain Vivian.] But, then, under those circumstances, as a matter of course the value of every officer's half pay would have to be decided by an actuary?—In that case you would not pay so much as the 4,500*l.*

507. It would depend upon his age?—Yes.

508. Mr. Goschen.] Is not it a defect in the present system that an officer gets the same price, whatever the proper value of the annuity might be, from this fund?—It has always been the regulation of the service.

509. Have there been many cases of the fund being so low that its operation has been stopped?—In the cases of artillery and engineer officers it has been frequently stopped.

510. Has it been stopped frequently in the cases of infantry officers?—I am not prepared to say, but I think the fund has met all the claims of the infantry and cavalry.

511. Could a return be made out of the number of cases, extending over a certain number of years, where the applications have been refused because the fund was not sufficient to enable them to be acceded to?—I do not think there is any record of all the refusals in the case of the artillery and the engineers, because an officer of artillery or engineers who intends to realise feels his way first. If he finds that there is no chance of getting his commission bought up, he remains in the service and does not go to half-pay. Any return you might call for would not give you all the information you required, except in the case of cavalry and infantry officers.

512. The system at present is not a fixed system, because it is uncertain whether an officer will be able to avail himself of the Reserve Fund or not, it being dependent upon the high or low state of the fund?—I do not think the fund has ever

Major
W. Marvin.
—
3 July 1867.

ever been so low as not to enable it to comply with the claims of cavalry and infantry officers.

513. Captain *Vivian*.] Was not it so low last year that its operation was stopped?—Perhaps so, I am not able to speak positively.

514. Mr. *Percy Windham*.] You stated that augmentation steps went without purchase?—Yes; supposing a second battalion were added to an existing regiment, all the promotion in the augmentation would go without purchase, either by promotion from the first battalion and other regiments, or by the absorption of supernumeraries, or by bringing officers in from the half-pay list.

515. In the case of a regiment being augmented by two companies, would promotion go without purchase?—As a rule, it would go without purchase; either by the transfer of supernumerary officers from another regiment, or by bringing in an officer on the half-pay list who had been reduced from some other regiment.

516. It would not go without purchase down the regiment itself?—Not in a case of augmentation; except under very special circumstances.

517. Captain *Vivian*.] Lieutenant colonels of cavalry regiments coming home from India are not so transferred to other regiments, are they?—No, they are not transferred; they go to half pay.

518. Mr. *Percy Windham*.] With regard to the Indian officers, must not one of two things

result, either that the Reserve Fund will be charged with the burden of buying their half-pay commissions, or that they will very much encumber the half-pay list?—They must, as a rule, encumber the half-pay list. They would not be permitted to come upon the Reserve Fund unless the Reserve Fund were in a very good condition.

519. *Chairman*.] Is each of the various cases which come to the Secretary of State for War decided upon its own merits, or is there any warrant or regulation by which he is governed?—There is a warrant which prescribes the service necessary to entitle an officer to retirement on half pay, and then all special cases, all cases not strictly provided for by the regulation, come under the Secretary of State's notice, and are decided on their own merits.

520. If the case was an ordinary case within the rule laid down, there would be no necessity to apply to the Secretary of State?—It would come to the War Office, and would receive the sanction of the Under Secretary, if not the Secretary of State; but all special cases are considered and decided upon their own merits.

521. Will you furnish the Committee with a copy of all orders or warrants in reference to full and half-pay retirements in the line, and also in the corps of artillery and engineers?—I will do so.

743

Friday, 12th July 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Childers.
Mr. Goschen.
Marquis of Hartington.
Colonel Hogg.
Lord Hotham.
Colonel North.

General Peel.
Sir Charles Russell.
Mr. Trevelyan.
Sir John Trollope.
Mr. Percy Wyndham.

LORD HOTHAM, IN THE CHAIR.

Colonel WILLIAM ROBERT HALIDAY, called in; and Examined.

522. Mr. *Trevelyan*.] WHAT post do you fill at present?—I am Commandant of the School of Musketry at Fleetwood.

523. I believe you have paid great attention to the question of purchase and retirement?—For some years past my attention has been a good deal turned both to the purchase question and also to the operation of the Military Reserve Fund.

524. Do you know from what sources the Military Reserve Fund is raised?—It is raised from two sources: the first is the purchase of commissions by regimental officers in succession to vacancies which are caused in regiments by officers retiring on half pay; I believe formerly, in a few instances, on full pay, and in a few instances, each year by officers being promoted by purchase out of their regiments to unattached commissions of superior rank, and the steps in succession to them being purchased; from these last, I think that about 25,000 *l.* per annum must have been received of late years. The other source from which the fund receives money is the difference between the prices of commissions purchased by officers in regiments in succession to vacancies caused by officers retiring who, from not having purchased, are not allowed to receive the full prices of their commissions. The difference between the price received by the retiring officer and that paid by the purchasing officer goes to the fund.

525. With respect to those two sources, do you consider that there is any ground for objecting to the first?—Yes; I conceive there are very strong grounds for objecting to the first. In the first place, it is objectionable on public grounds; I conceive it to be derogatory to the State, to sell commissions through the Secretary for War to its own public servants. The second objection to it is this, that when officers retire on half pay, in accordance with the provisions of the Royal warrants, the commissions which they hold, or rather the vacancies which they make by retiring in the regiment, ought to be filled up without purchase. The State permits those officers, after a due length of service, to retire upon a modified provision, and I think that the officers of the regiment ought to obtain the commissions in succession without purchase, just as much as in cases of retirement on full pay. These objections

O.127.

are distinct; the first is founded on the ground of public policy; the second on the consideration that it is a hardship upon officers who have done their duty in their respective ranks, to be debarred from the promotion that might be given to them, unless they consent to pay to the Secretary of State for War a large sum of money, the interest of which they lose, and which therefore is tantamount to a considerable deduction from their pay, that pay being already too small.

526. Do you see any valid objection to the second of these two sources, viz., the difference between the sum the retiring officer receives, and the sum that is paid by the purchasing officer?—I think, whatever objection exists, it is analogous to the general objection to the maintenance of purchase; but that, while the purchase system continues, it would not be equitable to deprive officers who have not purchased, of the right of selling their commissions, if not for the full price, at all events for a modified amount. Inasmuch as there is no adequate retirement for those officers, they would undoubtedly feel aggrieved if they were not allowed to obtain retirement for themselves by selling their commissions.

527. Supposing the first of these two sources were to be discontinued, do you think that the second could also be put an end to?—I do not think that while the purchase system is continued it could be put an end to; the money arising from this source must be held or applied in some way. If the retiring officers do not receive the full value of their commissions, which, as a matter of policy, I think they should not, the money must be retained or applied in some way. I believe that a mode of applying it could very easily be found. If I were at liberty to suggest, I should say that that money might very properly be kept in a public fund held by the Secretary for War, or in any other way, and invested, because looking forward to the possibility, at a future day, of the purchase system being abolished altogether, unquestionably one of the great difficulties which would attend its abolition would be the buying up of claims which officers would have who had invested their money in the purchase of their commissions. Against the very heavy sum which that would cost, this money might legitimately be kept to form the nucleus of a future fund, accumulating with whatever interest accrued upon it

D 2

Colonel
W. R.
Haliday.12 July
1867.

Colonel
W. R.
Haliday.
—
12 July
1867.

it. It is public money, and might be kept for that purpose.

528. In fact that it should be a sinking fund, to extinguish the purchase system eventually?—Yes.

529. Why should it not still be applied to buying up half-pay commissions, thereby reducing the annual charge thrown on the State?—Because it would not be equitable to the officers who have contributed that money; I think the State is bound to find the retiring allowances for those officers to whom they grant such allowances by a Royal warrant, founded, it may be presumed, on full consideration, and if therefore the State wishes to extinguish that annual charge, the State ought to pay for it, and not the working officers of the army.

530. It has been stated that the application of the fund to the purpose of purchasing half-pay commissions, is beneficial to officers of the line, by making room for officers of considerable length of service to retire on half pay; is that the case or not?—It is not at all beneficial to those officers, and cannot properly be said to make room for them, for their right to retire on half pay is not saddled with any avowed condition that they, as a class, are to provide the fund for their retirement at their own cost; and moreover the money taken from them to form this fund is applied not only to purchase up half-pay commissions for the benefit of the State, but also to a large extent to expedite and cheapen the promotion of officers of cavalry, from which the infantry derive no benefit whatever. It is in fact a tax levied on the officers of infantry, in other words, on the poorer class of officers of the army for the exclusive benefit of the richer class, the officers of cavalry; and I can show that a very large sum has been applied in that way within the last six years. Within that time upwards of 200,000 *l.* levied almost exclusively upon the infantry officers, has been paid to expedite the promotion of cavalry officers.

531. Colonel North.] Do you mean from this very fund?—Entirely.

532. Colonel Hogg.] Do you mean that no cavalry officers contribute to it?—Very few indeed; there are a few instances in which they do, but a very small proportion is contributed by cavalry officers, as compared with the large amount which has been contributed by infantry officers.

533. The cavalry officers are fewer than the infantry, and so of course they cannot contribute so much?—Yes; but then that proportion tells the other way; though they have contributed little, they have derived the exclusive benefit; if they have paid a few thousand pounds, they have received 204,000 *l.* since the 1st April 1861, and a further amount must have been similarly applied in the preceding year, of which no detailed account has been laid before Parliament.

534. Mr. Trevelyan.] Have you anything further to add upon that point?—I think it is a point of very great importance, because if the system is to continue, it constitutes a permanent tax to be levied upon infantry officers for the benefit of cavalry officers alone, a tax very inequitable.

535. Is such the opinion in the army?—I am convinced that such is the opinion of all officers who have turned their attention to the application of the Reserve Fund; such is the opinion I have heard invariably expressed by all officers with whom I have conversed upon the subject;

but I do not believe that the majority of the officers of the army have paid much attention to the application of the Reserve Fund, or are at all aware of the sums that have been expended annually out of it.

536. Do you think that the light that has been thrown upon the subject by this Committee, will turn the attention of officers in the line to the question?—I am persuaded it will turn their attention to it very much.

537. It has also been stated that the Reserve Fund is of benefit to the officers of the line, by enabling the Commander in Chief to give commissions without purchase to deserving officers, and also first commissions without purchase (I presume since the alteration introduced by General Peel); does it appear to you that such is the case?—No, I cannot conceive that it can possibly be the case; had commissions to the value of the 204,000 *l.* thus expended entirely on purchased steps in the cavalry, been given as they might have been given, without purchase to the officers of the line, it is clear that this would have afforded a large amount of promotion without purchase, as well as of first commissions gratis, which has by this operation been absolutely stopped from them; and a still larger amount has been expended out of the fund in buying up half-pay commissions for the benefit of the State. This shows to what an extent the power of giving promotion to higher rank, and also first commissions without purchase, has been curtailed, and it appears to me obvious that so far from facilitating the giving of commissions without purchase, it has very seriously impeded it; it has greatly curtailed the power of giving such commissions.

538. Do you consider that there is any advantage whatever derived by officers of the line from the practice of purchasing, out of the Reserve Fund, commissions of officers of Artillery and Engineers, who have retired upon half pay?—Certainly none whatever. The officers of the scientific corps have never contributed anything whatever to the Reserve Fund, and therefore whatever money, raised from the pockets of the working officers of the line, is applied towards purchasing up their half pay, is solely a benefit to those corps and to the State. It is purchasing up annuities with which the State is chargeable; certainly not to the benefit of the officers of the line, but on the contrary that, as well as the purchase up of half-pay commissions generally, constitutes a tax permanently levied upon one branch of the service, in addition to the income tax which they already pay. They already contribute to the revenues of the State in the same way as other public servants, and this constitutes virtually an additional tax raised out of their pockets for the purpose of lightening the burthens of the State. It may be expedient that the half-pay list should be reduced, or partially extinguished, but it cannot be right that this should be done by taking the money from the officers of the line, the interest of which money is virtually a deduction from their pay or the remuneration assigned them for their services, and which pay so far from being excessive, is really insufficient in the junior ranks to defray the cost of living.

539. You regard this as a tax upon the infantry for the purpose of purchasing up half-pay commissions, and thereby relieving the State?—Yes, that tax is composed of two elements; the first, which arises from the purchase of commissions sold directly by the State, forms a large proportion

745
Colonel
W. R.
Haliday.
12 July
1867.

tion of the fund; the other, which is from the difference between the prices paid and those received by the retiring officers, forms a very much smaller proportion of the fund; but still in whatever way the tax is raised, that tax is raised out of the pockets of the working officers of the line.

540. The only way of preventing that tax being raised from their pockets would be by abolishing the fund altogether?—Abolishing I will not say the fund, but abolishing the compulsion upon officers to purchase commissions that might be given without purchase.

541. Do you consider that there is any other special objection to this system besides that which you have named?—I do; the source of income to the fund is so entirely dependent on the practice of selling commissions directly on behalf of the State, that it is objectionable on this ground: when the Secretary of State sells commissions direct on the part of the country, it is, I conceive, a very different thing from the original practice of permitting the sale and purchase of commissions in the army; and it has a tendency to establish as a precedent that it is a legitimate thing to sell an appointment in the public service; and the example thus set by the State, has a strong tendency to encourage a lax tone of morality among subordinate persons in the public offices, and may lead to corrupt practices. What the Secretary for War, as the authorised servant of the State, does for the public is likely to be imitated by some of its employes in an underhand way for their own individual profit, whenever they can get a consideration for their good offices. I conceive that, when the system of permitting the sale and purchase of commissions was first established, and until this mode of operating through the Reserve Fund was introduced, whatever one's ideas might be of the policy or propriety of it, it was, at all events, defensible; and I have myself, in former years, in talking with civilians upon the subject, defended it, explaining to them that they were mistaken in supposing that the State actually sold commissions; I have often had to explain to them that that was not the case, but that the operation of the purchase system was this: that when a regimental officer was admitted to be duly qualified for superior rank, he was permitted to succeed to that superior rank, if he was the senior officer so qualified, and had the means, regulated by a fixed price, to induce another officer to retire. That was, in point of fact, what he did; the State permitted him to hold out to another officer an inducement to retire, to make way for him to succeed to an appointment for which he was declared to be duly qualified. The State did not at that time itself purchase or sell any commission, but now that the Secretary for War sells commissions, which are not commissions that have been held by another officer, which are not commissions transferred by the retiring officer to another, but are directly and actually new appointments, the State sets the example of selling appointments to its own servants, which I conceive is a very different thing from the old system of purchase that existed so many years, and till this mode of dealing with the Reserved Fund came into practice.

542. Is it, in your opinion, beneficial to the officers of the line who have contributed to this fund that the commissions of officers on half pay, in general, should be bought up out of the Reserved Fund?—No; I am of opinion that it is

not beneficial to them. I conceive that the right of retirement on half pay, which has been established by successive Royal Warrants, gives those officers an unqualified right to their retirement after a due period of service of the best years of their life given to the State, and that it is, therefore, not equitable to impose upon them any additional tax, which this system undoubtedly entails upon them, for the benefit of the State. I consider that the charge ought to fall upon the State alone, and not upon the officers, and that, consequently, the buying up of such commissions, where the money with which they are bought up is levied from the officers of the line, is injurious to them, and not beneficial in any way whatever.

543. Is it not, at all events, advantageous to the State that the fund, if still maintained, should be so applied?—I doubt whether it is beneficial to the State; my observation of the class of officers who sell half-pay commissions leads me to conclude that they are, generally speaking, men advanced in life, verging on, if they do not even often exceed, the 60 years laid down as the limit; and that, consequently, in obtaining the regulation prices of their commissions, they get much more than an assurance company would give for an annuity of that value. I do not believe that any established assurance company would purchase up the half pay of officers generally at the rates that they obtain in the regulated prices of those commissions; and I imagine that any actuary, taking the average ages, which of course could be furnished by the War Office, of those officers, would say that those prices considerably exceed the value of their annuities.

544. Do you conceive that there is any other special objection to the system, besides your impression that the regulated prices of half-pay commissions, thus paid, exceed the value of such half-pay commissions, calculated as an annuity?—The chief objection is, that it is difficult to restrict the application of it to that branch of the army from whose pockets the money has been obtained, and that the money is (as I have said) taken from the officers of the line, and constitutes *pro tanto* an additional tax levied upon them as a class, in addition to income tax and other taxes which they have to pay, in common with others, towards the revenues of the State.

545. I conclude, from one of your previous answers, that the application of part of the Reserve Fund to paying the difference between the old and the new price of commissions in the cavalry, appears to you to be open to objection, as being a tax upon the infantry for the benefit of the cavalry?—In the first place it is open to that great objection, that it is a heavy tax upon the infantry for the sole and exclusive benefit of a much wealthier class of officers; and it is, I conceive, also impolitic. I have no doubt whatever that the former difference between the regulated prices of commissions in the cavalry and commissions in the infantry, was founded simply upon the difference in the rates of pay in the two branches. The price of a commission of a lieutenant colonel of cavalry was formerly 6,175 £.; it is now reduced to 4,500 £., constituting a difference of 1,675 £. to be paid out of the Reserve Fund whenever that lieutenant colonel of cavalry retires; and, moreover, each successive commission held in a cavalry regiment in the same way is subject to that difference. A major of cavalry formerly paid for his commission 4,475 £., he now pays

Colonel
W. R.
Haliday.
—
12 July
1867.

pays 3,200*l.*, making a difference of 1,375*l.* A captain paid formerly 3,225*l.*, whereas he pays now 1,800*l.*, making a difference of 1,425*l.* A lieutenant paid 1,190*l.*, whereas he now pays 700*l.*, making a difference of 490*l.* A cornet formerly paid 840*l.*, whereas he now pays 450*l.*, making a difference of 390*l.* On the other hand, you find that those old rates were actually proportional to the rates of pay of the cavalry. A lieutenant colonel of cavalry receives 1*l.* 3*s.* per diem, but a lieutenant colonel of infantry receives only 17*s.*; that is quite sufficient to account for the difference in the former regulated rate of the cavalry lieutenant colonel's commission as compared with that of the infantry. A major of cavalry receives 19*s.* 3*d.* (considerably more than a lieutenant colonel of infantry). A major of infantry receives only 16*s.*; the difference, therefore, was proportionate to the different rate of pay. A captain of cavalry receives 14*s.* 7*d.* per day, but a captain of infantry only receives 11*s.* 7*d.*, a difference of 3*s.* a day. The rate of pay of a cavalry captain (approximating to that of an infantry major) accounts to a great degree for the fact that the former regulated price of his commission differed by only 25*l.* from the regulation price of a major's commission now. A lieutenant of cavalry receives 8*s.* 6*d.* a day, but a lieutenant of infantry only 6*s.* 6*d.* A cornet of cavalry receives 7*s.* 3*d.*, while an ensign of infantry receives only 5*s.* 3*d.*

546. Has the alteration of the regulation price of cavalry commissions had the effect of diminishing the prices actually given for cavalry commissions?—I speak only from information I have obtained from frequently conversing with cavalry officers; but I believe, from what I have heard from them, it has not had the slightest effect. I am told by them that cavalry commissions are sold now at as high prices as they ever were. If there be any difference, I am convinced that it does not amount to more than the difference between the former price of a cornetcy and the present, and that, you observe, is not paid by an officer of cavalry purchasing promotion. That difference is felt only by, I may say, the friends of the young officer who purchase his first commission in the cavalry.

547. If the regulation prices of commissions in cavalry regiments had not been assimilated to those in the infantry, how could the difficulty experienced in 1858 and 1859, in filling up the vacant cornetcies in cavalry regiments, have been met?—The difficulty of filling up those vacant cornetcies might have been met by simply reducing the price of the cornetcy, without going any further. It was the first commission that the friends of young gentlemen who desired to become cavalry officers, purchased for them, and to fill up the vacant cornetcies it was only necessary to reduce the price of the cornetcy. Any advantage which may have been contemplated by Lord Herbert, as to the general reduction of the prices of cavalry commissions, or which the friends of a young man wishing to join a cavalry regiment, might have been supposed to look forward to, was only prospective, and the prices of the subsequent commissioners would not operate, as I conceive, to prevent cornetcies being filled up.

548. We have been told that large sums of money have been paid out of the Reserve Fund in purchasing up the commissions of gentlemen-at-arms and yeomen of the guard; has that attracted attention in the army?—I do not think it

has. I think it is very little known that the fund is applied to such purposes.

549. Do you think that great dissatisfaction would be created among officers of the line on their becoming acquainted with the fact, for instance, that Sir Travers Phillips was paid the large sum of 8,000*l.* on retiring from the corps of gentlemen-at-arms?—I am disposed to think there would; for this reason: that I conceive commissions in the two corps of the yeomen of the guard and the gentlemen-at-arms, never will be available for the officers of the line generally, and especially for the poorer class of them. It appears to me inevitable that the appointments to those corps must always be, to a large extent, matters of patronage, and probably will always be accompanied with certain qualifications as to age, appearance, height, and so on; and therefore, whatever benefit may be derived from appointing old officers to those commissions, will be partial, and will never be applicable to the officers of the line generally, whereas the exaction of those sums from them, by compelling them to purchase so many commissions, which I conceive ought to be given without purchase, inflicts upon them as a class positive tax from which the majority of them will not derive any benefit.

550. I gather, from what you have said, that you think it is expedient to allow non-purchasing officers the privilege of selling their commissions, and receiving part of the sum realised?—I do. As matters stand at present, I think that while the system of the purchase of commissions exists generally, it would be felt as invidious, in the case of a poor officer, who by perhaps long service, or by faithful and good service as a non-commissioned officer, had obtained his commissions, to deprive him of the right of selling them. It would be like depriving him of so much capital. An officer, generally speaking, in all purchase corps, looks upon his commissions as so much capital, which, if you deprive him of the power of selling them, you virtually take from him. To that class of officers, who perhaps have risen from the ranks, or who by long service have obtained promotion, it is a matter of course of great moment to have some capital for their families if they be married.

551. Do you think that commissions ought to be sold at the full price?—Yes.

552. Suppose a gentleman sells his commission for 1,800*l.*, what would you do with the 300*l.* constituting the difference between the regulation price of his commission, and the 1,500*l.* which he would be entitled to get?—I think it should go to a separate fund, to be kept in the hands of the Secretary for War, an account of which should be annually laid before Parliament; that it should form the nucleus of a fund which at some future time the country might deal with as they thought fit, but which I conceive might be most usefully applied to the extinction of the claims of officers who have purchased, if the country should at some future period come to the conclusion that it was judicious to abolish the purchase system.

553. Or it might be paid into the Exchequer without forming a separate fund?—Of course it might be paid into the Exchequer. To use it for the ordinary purposes of the State is open to the objection that it is virtually money taken out of the pockets of the officers, and therefore it would be levying a tax, and an arbitrary and capricious tax, upon the officers for the benefit of the

the country. I think I did not fully answer one question which you put to me with reference to whether the system of the Reserve Fund and its application, enabled the Commander in Chief to give commissions; I conceive that that point requires to be carefully considered. I am satisfied myself that it grievously curtails the power of giving such commissions; and I think that may be illustrated by the returns which have been given by the War Office, showing that commissions by purchase have been much more sparingly given of late years since the period of the Indian mutiny than previously. During the Crimean war, for two years the proportion of commissions given without purchase was very considerable; during the Indian mutiny also the proportion of the commissions given without purchase was very considerable, but from that time it has gradually declined, and the proportion of commissions given without purchase now, to those given with purchase, is very small. It impedes to a great degree the means of giving commissions to young gentlemen who have gone through the course at Sandhurst, and almost altogether shuts the door against deserving non-commissioned officers of the army, many of whom their commanding officers would be glad to recommend for commissions, and many of whom would fill those commissions extremely well, but who at present have no chance. A quartermastership is the only commission which a deserving serjeant major or quartermaster serjeant has now much chance of obtaining; possibly there are a few commissions in the West Indian corps available, but those are the only ones he can really look to.

554. Colonel North.] You mentioned that the sum of 204,000 *l.* had been expended in purchasing out cavalry officers; did you give that figure from any particular return?—I stated it from compiling the returns of the Reserve Fund laid before Parliament.

555. Since what time has that sum been so expended?—Since the commencement of 1861. You find the figures in the returns. (*The Witness handed in the following papers. Vide Appendix.*)

556. You referred to the difficulty that was experienced in getting cavalry commissions filled up in 1859; do you think that the price of those commissions had anything to do with the number of the vacancies at that time?—I am of opinion that the hesitation about paying large sums for commissions at that time among the class whose sons enter the service, arose partly from the fact that a very large number of commissions had been obtained without purchase during the Crimean war; and also subsequently during the Indian mutiny, owing to the augmentations of the army, and the many casualties from deaths and other causes, and people forgetting that those sources of vacancies for commissions without purchase would not continue, believed that that facility of getting them without purchase would still exist, and they were rather averse to expending large sums on commissions for that reason.

557. Your opinion is, that notwithstanding that the rate of commissions of cavalry is now on a par with that of infantry commissions, still the price of commissions in the cavalry is as high as it used to be?—Quite so.

558. And in many cases more is paid than formerly?—Yes; I have heard of 6,000 *l.* being paid for a troop, not unfrequently of late.

0.127.

559. Colonel Hogg.] The following question was asked of Major Marvin the other day: "To whom do you consider that the Reserve Fund equitably belongs?" The answer was: "It belongs to the officers of the cavalry and infantry who contribute to it." Do you agree with that?—I can scarcely go so far as to say that it belongs to them; those officers were not compelled to purchase; they had the option of purchasing commissions or not; but I think that in justice they ought to be the parties to benefit by it.

560. You think that it belongs to one branch of the service as well as another; to the cavalry as well as the infantry?—Certainly, in the proportions to which they have contributed to it.

561. Do not you think that a cavalry officer ought to get more pay than an infantry officer, considering the expense he is put to?—I conceive that those expenses are chiefly arbitrary; that those expenses consist simply in the mode of living. I consider that they might live as cheaply as the infantry officers, with the sole exception of their first outfit, which costs them somewhat more.

562. Is not the cost of horses a serious item in the expenses of a cavalry officer?—An officer may purchase his horse for 50*l.*; it is an addition undoubtedly to the expense of his outfit.

563. You would not put an infantry captain, who has no horse to provide, upon the same footing as a cavalry captain who has to find three chargers?—No.

564. Do not you think that he requires more pay, seeing that he has to keep three horses and two servants, than a man who has to keep no horses and only one servant?—Yes.

565. Are you not aware that the officers of cavalry have to pay 8 *d.* a day, or used to have, for forage, whereas an infantry field officer pays nothing?—Yes.

566. A cavalry officer, who cannot perform his duties without a horse, is obliged to pay so much a day for his horses' subsistence?—Yes. It amounts to 8 *d.* per diem, that is, 2 *s.* a day for three.

567. You allow that that man is put to greater expenses?—So far as that goes.

568. Ought not the State to furnish them with larger means?—Yes, and it does so.

569. I understood you to put it that it was rather an extraordinary thing, that a cavalry officer should have more pay than an infantry officer?—No, I did not at all mean to imply that it was an extraordinary thing that he should get more; I simply stated that the regulation price of his commission was founded on the higher rate of pay of the cavalry. I did not mean to say that he should not get a higher rate, or that it was extraordinary that he should get it; but simply that the regulation price of his commission was founded upon his receiving a larger rate of pay; and it should be borne in mind, that while his expenses from keeping horses and an additional servant are greater than those which an infantry officer is compelled to incur; these incidents of that arm of the service are in themselves sources of enjoyment. They are precisely what most young men like; and as the higher rates of pay enable them to have these advantages, the market value (if I may so call it) of their commissions is proportionally greater. When an infantry officer keeps horses, &c., he has to pay for his forage at a much higher rate, and to keep a private groom instead of a soldier, costing

Colonel
W. R.
Haliday.

12 July
1867.

Colonel
W. R.
Haliday.
—
12 July
1867.

costing very much more, and generally, also, to hire his stabling.

570. How do you think that cavalry officers, retiring from the service, ought to be compensated, the price of their commissions having been reduced by legal authority?—By the State. If it is a matter of policy to reduce the prices, the State ought to bear it.

571. Do not you think that it is a great convenience for an officer to be able to go on half-pay at once, by means of the Reserve Fund, instead of having to seek out an officer on half pay to exchange with?—It is not by means of the Reserve Fund that an officer is enabled to go on half pay; he has an unqualified right, by Royal warrant, to go on half pay after a certain time; but if he applies to go on half pay before that time, he is obliged now to exchange with an officer on half pay. If an officer goes on temporary half pay, he is now obliged to exchange with an officer on half pay.

572. After 25 years' service now, an officer has almost a right to go upon half pay, without having to seek out another officer to exchange with him?—Yes.

573. The Reserve Fund benefits officers in this way, does it not: an officer who has not purchased his commission receives 100 l. for every year of foreign service, and 50 l. for every year of home service; whereas formerly he had to serve 20 years before he got anything?—No; he had to serve 20 years, as I understand, before he could sell all his commissions.

574. That is what I mean. He could not sell his commission until he had served 20 years?—Such, I believe, was the case.

575. It must be a benefit to a poor officer who receives his commission for nothing, to be able to sell it?—Yes, it is a benefit to the officer, of course.

576. You said just now that the Fund was not beneficial to the State, on account of the age of the officer retiring; if it is not beneficial to the State, it must be beneficial to officers of the army, must it not?—Certainly, it is beneficial to those who retire by selling their half-pay commissions.

577. Marquis of *Hartington*.] You have stated that you regard the Reserve Fund as a kind of tax upon infantry officers?—Yes, I conceive that it amounts to a tax upon infantry officers, if they are called upon to pay considerable sums for the purchase of commissions, which I think ought to be given without purchase.

578. That is to say commissions which arise from vacancies caused by officers going on half pay?—The vacancies arising from officers going on half pay; commissions are then sold, not the commissions held by those officers, but fresh commissions issued by the State.

579. *Chairman*.] First commissions?—Commissions throughout the regiment, whatever the rank is. Suppose a major retires on half pay, he does not vacate his own commissions, he simply retires from his regiment to half pay; there is then vacant in the regiment a majority, and, if the officers are promoted in succession, the price of that majority is paid by the officer who succeeds, the price of the company is paid by the lieutenant who succeeds, and the price of the lieutenancy is paid by the ensign who succeeds, and of a first commission as ensign by the person appointed; all those sums are paid to the State for the fresh commissions.

580. Is not it merely a question of a bargain

between the State and the officer; does not the State tempt the officer out by the offer of half pay; that is a gift by the State to the officer?—That is a concession of the State to one officer who has done the State a certain amount of service.

581. If the State did not offer that half-pay the vacancies would never arise, and the officers of the regiment would never get promotion?—Just so; if the State afforded no means of retirement to its officers, there would be a great stagnation throughout the service. Some retirement, I conceive, is necessary for the military servants of the State as well as for the civil servants, otherwise the service could not be maintained in an efficient state.

582. Do you consider that there is any breach of any understanding entered into between the State and an officer, by the State asking the officer to pay for those commissions?—No; no breach of faith.

583. Nor a breach of any understanding?—No.

584. An officer gets a commission caused by a death vacancy for nothing, does he not?—As a general rule.

585. You would consider that there would be a breach of faith if the State were to ask an officer to pay for that commission?—No, I am not aware that it would be a breach of faith.

586. Does not an officer enter the army on the understanding that he will have to pay for his commissions as a general rule, but will have the benefit of death vacancies?—In reply to the first part of the question, I do not think that officers always enter the army with the expectation that they will have to purchase all their commissions. In answer to the last part of the question, I would say that officers expect that they will have the benefit of death vacancies, but I am not aware that the State has ever intimated in express terms that they are entitled to them; and I know instances have occurred from time to time where (if it were to be considered a breach of faith that they should not have them) that breach of faith has actually been committed, since the commissions of deceased officers are from time to time sold. I know of several instances where officers have died, and, subsequently to their death, their commissions have been sold.

587. It is the fact, is it not, that officers enter the army expecting that they will have to purchase all their commissions, except those which arise from death vacancies?—Not at all universally; many enter who do not expect to have the means of purchasing most of these commissions, and promotions in succession to full-pay retirements, promotion in succession to officers who attain the rank of major general are given without purchase, as also those in succession to officers seconded on being appointed to certain situations on the staff. There were also formerly many commissions given without purchase on the augmentation of regiments proceeding to India, a lieutenant colonelcy, two companies, and ten lieutenancies in each regiment.

588. Are not officers aware when they enter the army, or ought they not to be aware, that they will have to pay for commissions in succession to officers who retire upon half pay?—Not as an universal rule.

589. But as a general rule?—Officers entering the army who are prepared to purchase commissions, certainly expect that, in most instances, they

49
Colonel
W. R.
Haliday.
12 July
1867.

they will have to purchase the commissions of officers retiring on half pay; but at all times within my recollection there were instances where officers succeeded to vacancies caused by officers going on half pay, without purchase.

590. Has the number of those cases diminished since the Reserve Fund was placed upon the footing upon which it now stands?—Yes, I am clearly of opinion that it has diminished; it is a very rare thing now for officers to obtain commissions in succession to officers retiring on half pay without purchasing the commissions.

591. What would be the effect upon the officers of the army, if the system of the Reserve Fund was done away with altogether?—I conceive that it would be beneficial.

592. The first result would be this, would it not, that officers would obtain their commissions in succession to officers going on half pay, without purchase; that is the benefit that would accrue?—Yes; I conceive that if the Reserve Fund were done away with things would revert to what was the case before the Reserve Fund, managed as it is at present, was instituted. It is only within a few years past that the Reserve Fund has operated in the way I have mentioned, namely, extracting very large sums from officers for the purchase of their commissions, and expending the money in the two modes, which I conceive to be open to objection; the one, that of expediting the promotion solely of one branch of the service (*i. e.*, the cavalry); and the other, that of relieving the State of the charge of retiring allowances for its military officers at the expense of the officers of the Line. They have to bear the tax, and the return which I have already handed in, which I compiled from those laid before Parliament, shows how large the sums raised in this way have been, and how they have been applied. I find, for instance, that there has been received on account of the Reserve Fund, since the 1st of April 1861 up to the end of last year, by the sales of commissions in succession to officers retiring upon half pay, or upon full pay, &c., 338,678 *l.* And I further find that the amount received from the difference between the sums paid for commissions purchased, and those received by officers retiring who had not purchased all their commissions during the same period, namely, from the 1st April 1861 to the 31st December 1866, was 109,379 *l.*, the total of those two amounting to very nearly 450,000 *l.* Then, as regards the application of that fund, from the same period, namely, from the 1st of April 1861 to the 31st of December 1866, 204,881 *l.* 13 *s.* 4 *d.* has been expended exclusively in paying to cavalry officers retiring the difference between the former prices of commissions and those established in 1860. The largest item of expenditure is the amount paid to buy up half-pay commissions (for the benefit of the public, relieving them from the annual charge) from the 1st of April 1861 to the 31st of December 1866, 311,559 *l.* 10 *s.*; the whole of the money so expended having been raised from the officers of the Line.

593. Is not the purchase of half-pay commissions an advantage to the officer as well as to the public, or a greater advantage to the officer than the public?—Clearly an advantage. I think I have adverted to that in saying that I conceive that an officer in most instances receives a larger sum as the value of his commission, than he would obtain from an assurance company for an

annuity of equal value. With regard to the public, if the money with which they are purchased is to be looked on as the absolute property of the State, which it has a right to employ as it thinks fit, it is not, in my opinion, an advantage, since a larger sum is generally given for these half pay annuities than they are worth. But it cannot be denied that it is an advantage in a pecuniary sense, to extinguish part of the annual charge for half pay with money which has not been raised by general taxation, but obtained by the State, at the cost of one single branch of the servants of the State.

594. To that extent the officers in the army would suffer by the abolition of the Reserve Fund?—Those who are permitted to sell their half-pay commissions of course would be the losers, but the country is the loser at present. The question is between those two parties; I should like to add, also, to what I have said with reference to the advantage to the country of purchasing up those half-pay commissions, that there is one special objection applicable to the buying up of some of those half-pay commissions; I refer to the half-pay commissions of officers of the two scientific corps of Artillery and Engineers, who never purchase any commissions, and who never contribute in any way whatever to the Revenue Fund. Buying up their half-pay commissions out of the money raised in this way from the pockets of officers of the Line alone, is, I conceive, inequitable. And there are special cases, a small number certainly, but which it would not be difficult to point out, where officers, chiefly of the Engineers, holding lucrative appointments in the public service, and which, I believe, would preclude them from drawing their half-pay, have been permitted, almost immediately after receiving such appointments, to sell their half-pay commissions, thereby of course giving them a considerable benefit; but if they are not permitted to receive their half-pay while holding those lucrative appointments, it is clear that it is a bad bargain for the country, if it be considered the proprietor of the Reserve Fund, to pay those officers at once the price or the calculated value of an annuity which they are not drawing.

595. Do you consider that a very large increase to the half pay vote might be caused by the abolition of the Reserve Fund?—No, I do not conceive that it would be a large addition. I imagine that if you look to the returns laid before Parliament of the application of the Reserve Fund, it will be found that the number of half-pay commissions purchased up has been but small, and it would be quite possible to extract from those returns the amount of the relief to the public during those six years; because the form of the return is headed, I think, "To buying up half-pay commissions," thereby extinguishing such and such annual charge.

596. Mr. Goschen.] I understand you to object to the Reserve Fund both on account of the source from which it is derived, and on account of the way in which it is expended?—Yes; I think that there are objections both to the sources from which it is derived, and also to the mode in which it is applied. There are strong objections to both.

597–8. Do you consider that the object of the Reserve Fund would be properly described as a system to quicken promotion, and to hasten the retirement of the officers who desire to leave the service?—I should say that the largest amount of its

Colonel
W. R.
Haliday.
—
12 July
1867.

its expenditure has been to quicken promotion in cavalry regiments, and to relieve the public from a portion of the annual charge for half pay. By far the larger amounts have been expended on those two objects.

599. Is not the quickening of promotion, and an earlier retirement on half pay, beneficial to the army as well as to the public, and desired by the army?—The quickening of promotion by the operation of the Reserve Fund is a quickening of promotion of a particular branch of the service at the expense of another branch of the service; and an earlier retirement to half pay, I do not conceive to exist. In my opinion, so far from the operation of the Reserve Fund having enabled officers to retire earlier, it has been actually co-existent with (I will not say the cause of) their being precluded from retiring so soon. Until about the year 1860, 21 years was the period of full-pay service which was assigned, after which officers were to be allowed to retire on half pay; but about that time that period was extended from 21 to 25 years; and it is precisely during the period since 1860, that this operation of the Reserve Fund has been carried on; so that, so far from facilitating the retirement on half pay of officers who have devoted a number of the best years of their life to the service, the period of service required to give them that right has been extended.

600. Marquis of Hartington.] Before the Reserve Fund was organised, did there exist an unlimited right of retirement on half pay after 20 years' service?—I think there were warrants giving that right; I will not say previous to the existence of the Reserve Fund, because that dates very far back: I think the first existence of the Reserve Fund dates as far back as 1824, but I am referring principally to the operation of the Reserve Fund since 1860; that period during which it has been under the supervision of Parliament. I do not know how the fund was managed previously.

601. You do not connect the two things together of unlimited right of retirement on half pay after 25 years' service, and the operation of the Reserve Fund?—No, I do not think they have any legitimate connection; I conceive that the right of retirement on half pay after a period of 21 years at first, and subsequently 25 years, has been conceded as a reasonable and just thing to officers who have given so many years of their service to the public. There is naturally with most people a period of life at which repose is desirable; and it was conceded to them on those grounds, and that it tended to maintain the service in an efficient state, and not on the ground that the public were at the same time levying from that branch of the service a large amount of money; I do not conceive that it can be considered at all as a bargain; I look upon the Royal warrant giving a right of retirement on half pay as an absolute provision for officers so to retire; and I do not think it right that it should be read with a supposed secret understanding, that the State was at the same time to abstract from the pockets of the officers, a provision to form a fund for that retirement.

602. Mr. Goschen.] Supposing that the operations of the fund had been confined to infantry officers, would your objections to it have been as strong as they are now?—No, certainly not.

603. One of your main objections to it is the application to the cavalry of money which you

consider to be contributed by the infantry?—That is one of the main objections to it. I object to the payment of such a large sum as 204,000*l.* to cavalry officers within less than six years, when the money has been taken almost entirely from infantry officers. Another objection is to the payments out of the fund to officers of artillery and engineers who have not in any way contributed to it.

604. Colonel Hogg.] I understood you to admit that the cavalry had subscribed to the fund?—Yes, I guarded myself by saying that the fund belonged to the cavalry and the infantry, in the proportions in which they have contributed to it. It would not be difficult to see how much the cavalry had contributed, but having looked at the *Gazettes*, I have found that it is a very small proportion; only a few thousand pounds.

605. Mr. Goschen.] That amount which you refer to as having been paid to cavalry officers is the difference between the present regulated prices of cavalry commissions and the former prices?—Yes.

606. When a sufficient period has elapsed for the vested interests under the old system to have passed away, there would not any longer exist that objection arising from the paying of the difference between the old and the present price of cavalry commissions?—The amount invested in cavalry commissions still is so large that, if the system be continued, I can only look upon it as a continued tax to be still levied from the infantry officers to expedite the promotion of cavalry officers. It is a very large amount that has yet to be extinguished in that way.

607. You call it a tax on the infantry officers; but the infantry officer who pays the full rate to the State for his promotion, or for the commission, gets full value for what he buys, does he not?—He gets the same value, undoubtedly, if he purchases the commission direct from the State, as if he purchased it from the officer retiring; but it is objectionable in point of general policy; and it diminishes the chances and the amount of promotion without purchase that would otherwise be available for the officers of the Line; and thereby compels them as a class to pay more than they otherwise would.

608. Then the grievance rests rather upon the other officers, who do not get the promotion, than upon the officer who actually pays the money; the officer who pays the money gets the full value, in the same way as if he bought it from another person?—He gets the full value, in the same way as if he had bought it from an officer receiving the regulated price.

609. Therefore he is not taxed?—No, he is not taxed in that individual instance, unless he should be the senior of his rank, and who would therefore succeed to the step without having to pay for it.

610. You infer that the other officers who do not purchase lose the opportunity of promotion which they would have if the State did not take the money from the officer who is promoted; how do the other officers suffer from one officer purchasing his commission at the fair market price?—They suffer if a junior officer is promoted over their heads by purchasing a commission, which they have not the means of buying; and I conceive that the system of making officers purchase their commissions always, while the State retains the price, deprives the officers of the Line as a class of the fair remuneration for their

751
Colonel
W. R.
Haliday.
12 July
1867.

their service; it is simply an extension of the purchase system; and the more universal the purchase system becomes, of course the more the interests of the non-purchasing officers are damaged.

611. It would be more correct, would it not, to say that the Reserve Fund deprived officers of the advantages of promotion without purchase, than to say that they are so much money out of pocket because the officer does not pay more than the full value?—The individual officer purchasing the commission does not pay more than if he obtained it from the retiring officer at the regulated price; but it is an extension of the purchase system, and in its general effect, therefore, is damaging to non-purchasing officers.

612. In fact, the system would rather stand or fall with the general system of purchase; if the system of purchase itself is condemned, then this system is to be condemned also; but if the purchase system is maintained, this is merely a system that belongs naturally to it?—Yes; I think in a former answer I stated that I did not think that one special source of the income of the Reserve Fund could be abolished; that while the right of purchase and sale of commissions exists, it would not be equitable to those officers who had obtained commissions without purchase not to be allowed to sell them; and that therefore the second source from which the Reserve Fund is formed must still exist.

613. If the system were abolished (assuming the paying of the difference of price between old and new cavalry commissions to be discontinued), would not the infantry then lose the advantage of an earlier retirement on half pay?—No, not in the least; that right of retirement on half pay rests simply on the Royal warrant, which says that an officer after 25 years' full pay service shall have an absolute unqualified right to retire on permanent half pay.

614. Do you think the case might be put in this way: if this system of the Reserve Fund were abolished, and if the same facilities were given without the payment of money for the same retirement on half pay as are given now, there would be practically a better position given to all the officers in the army; they would have more rapid promotion, and they would have it without payment?—Undoubtedly; I think, allowing the Royal warrant to remain as at present, which gives the full right of retirement on half pay under certain conditions, that there is no necessity whatever for maintaining the Reserve Fund.

615. Does the Reserve Fund quicken promotion in the infantry or not?—I do not believe that it does in the least quicken it.

616. Is not part of the effect of the Reserve Fund that you give a man an inducement to retire on half pay, who otherwise would not do so?—No; there is no inducement given by it to the officer to retire on half pay; the Royal warrant gives the right of retirement on certain prescribed conditions; and when an officer retires on half pay he does so for his own convenience; the Reserve Fund does not facilitate or induce it.

617. Is not it probable that an officer, if he were to get a sum of money on retiring which might enable him to employ that money in any way he thought fit, would be more likely to retire on half pay than if he were allowed so much a year; is not it a boon to an officer retiring to get a lump sum?—If an officer retires on half pay at present, he does not get any lump sum.

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618. Under the present system of the Reserve Fund, does not the Reserve Fund give to certain officers, of whom the Reserve Fund buys their commissions, a lump sum instead of their annuity?—That is a different thing; after an officer has retired on half pay, supposing that at the end of several years he considers it would be more beneficial to his family to have his annuity capitalised, he then gets that lump sum from the Reserve Fund, but he does not do so in the first instance. If he were of that opinion when he was about to retire on half pay, he would, in place of retiring on half pay, sell his commission in his regiment, and get that capital sum from the officers of his regiment.

619. In most cases where the Reserve Fund buys the commission of a half-pay officer, it is bought some time after he has himself gone on half pay?—Always a considerable time after he has been on half pay, except in a few exceptional cases, such as those I have adverted to, where, perhaps, an officer of Engineers goes on half pay for the purpose of holding a lucrative appointment, and then converts his half pay into a capital sum; but in other instances as affecting the Line at large, when an officer goes on half pay, he does so with the intention of remaining on half pay in order to be able to succeed to higher rank at a future time. If he afterwards sells his half pay commission, it is from a change of circumstances, possibly from impaired health, possibly from marrying; at all events, with a different view from that with which he went on half pay in the first instance.

620. Then, you do not think that the Reserve Fund does quicken promotion?—I do not think it does at all.

621. But the sale of the half-pay commission of an officer sets a commission free, does it not?—No.

622. Is not it the fact, that by selling his commission when he is on half pay, he sets a commission free which somebody buys?—No; no other officer buys it; the country purchases it up, cancels it, and extinguishes his annuity.

623. You were a little time ago referring to a case where the purchaser pays 1,800*l.*, and the seller receives 1,500*l.*?—That is a case where an officer holding a commission in a regiment who has obtained his commission or some of his commissions without purchase, desires to sell his commissions in the regiment; in such cases he is permitted to sell them in the regiment, but the country step in and take from the purchase money a certain portion which they hold back from him, and which they put into the Reserve Fund.

624. That has nothing to do with the case of half-pay officers?—Nothing whatever.

625. You were asked whether you approved of the system of a non-purchasing officer being allowed to sell his commission, and I think you said you did not approve of it?—I said that I thought, while the purchase system continued in the army, it would be considered a hardship on officers who had obtained their commissions without purchase to be debarred from selling their commissions. It may be considered that an officer who has obtained a particular commission without purchase has generally been allowed to do so on account of good service in other ranks, or of meritorious or gallant conduct as a non-commissioned officer, and is entitled to a somewhat similar

E 2

Colonel
W. R.
Haliday.

12 July
1867.

similar privilege to that of an officer who has purchased his commissions.

626. But that sale on his part of his commission would operate on the remainder of the regiment in the same way as if the State were to sell the commission? While it would be to his personal advantage, it would prevent the promotion going without purchase, and be in itself an extension of the purchase system?—It may be considered that it would prevent the promotion going without purchase if that officer was compelled to vacate his commission; but I presume that he would not leave at all, except for the inducement of selling his commission.

627. You say that under the system of the reserve fund, the abstracting of money from the pockets of officers of the Line, by making them purchase commissions which otherwise might be given without purchase, was a general tax on the officers of the Line?—Yes.

628. In the case of officers selling their commissions who themselves had got their commissions without purchase, that is likewise abstracting money from the pockets of the officers who buy their commissions, thereby increasing the amount which is paid altogether; the two are both extensions of the purchase system, are they not?—Yes; in that sense of course the purchase system itself may be considered a system of taxing the officers of the army; it is simply taxing the officers of the army to provide their own means of retirement. If the country provided adequate means of retirement to prevent stagnation in the army, there would be obviously no necessity for the purchase system. The purchase system was invented solely to afford a retirement for those who wished to leave the service, at the expense of the profession itself, in place of its being at the expense of the country.

629. So that it comes to this, that the protest against this Reserve Fund system is in one form a general protest against the purchase system; it is a protest against the army being taxed for buying commissions?—As I have said before, I think a part of the system of the Reserve Fund, the process of extracting money from the officers, is an extension of the purchase system, but if by "protest" I am to understand my own statement of objections to the Reserve Fund, I object more strongly to the application of the fund than to the sources from which it is raised. The objections apply to both, but more decidedly to the application of the fund, because I have admitted that the other part of the system, namely, the obtaining of money by the difference between the prices of commissions obtained by officers who have not purchased and those paid for them, must be maintained as long as the purchase system itself lasts.

630. But you hold that that money does not belong to the State which is selling its reserved rights of promotion, but that it belongs to the body who contribute to it; that though the individual has got his full value for his money, his colleagues retain a kind of interest in the money which he has paid for value received?—I think I abstained from saying that the fund belonged to any particular class; I said that I thought that that class of officers who had contributed to it had equitable rights over it more than other classes, but, of course, if officers with their eyes open choose to pay their money for the sake of the appointment, they may be said to have parted with their right in that money, and that the

State has the power of keeping that money and applying it as it likes; but as a matter of equity I think the money so taken from a particular class should not be diverted to the benefit of a totally different class.

631. That is, that the taxation of any particular class ought to be spent upon that particular class?—In a general way; that is the fair way to view the question.

632. The whole title of any particular branch of the service to it would be merely an equitable title?—Certainly; it is not a legal title.

633. Of right it belongs to the State, in virtue of its right to sell commissions in general?—Yes; but I should rather say the practice than the right; for I cannot admit that is either proper or expedient that the State should do so.

634. Mr. Percy Wyndham.] Do you think before the existence of the Reserve Fund, or before it was applied to so many purposes as we hear it now is, more commissions were allowed to go without purchase than are now allowed to go without purchase?—More were available without purchase.

635. More commissions were allowed to go without purchase than are now allowed to go without purchase, within your knowledge?—It is difficult to say within one's knowledge; that would require reference to Gazettes, extending over a series of years, and so on. I can only give a general impression; but my impression is that more commissions were available formerly, and that it is more difficult now to give commissions without purchase to young men who have gone through the course at Sandhurst, or to deserving non-commissioned officers.

636. Do you think that the desire to keep up the Reserve Fund leads to steps being sold instead of being allowed to go without purchase?—Yes; I am of opinion that the Secretary for War, in the desire to save the heavy annual charge to the country, does require many commissions to be sold which the Commander in Chief would probably gladly have at his disposal without purchase.

637. So that this diminution of the number of commissions allowed to go without purchase can be directly traced to the existence of the Reserve Fund?—I do not know that I should say "directly traced" to it, but it would clearly have an indirect connection with it. If the Secretary for War brings any pressure to bear in the direction of requiring commissions to be sold rather than given away, of course that, *pro tanto*, limits the number of commissions available without purchase.

638. General Peel.] How long has this system of giving 100 l. for every year of foreign service, and 50 l. for home service, to officers on their retirement, been in operation?—As long as I can recollect, I think that officers who had not purchased their commissions were allowed to sell them after a certain length of service, which I think was then 20 years; the system of permitting them to sell their commissions at a modified rate, when they had served shorter periods than that, is of more recent origin, but I cannot state from memory at what date it was introduced.

639. It has nothing to do with the half pay, has it; because it comes into operation after an officer has served three years, at which period he would not be entitled to go to half pay?—It has no connection with half pay at all.

640. The

53
Colonel
W. R.
Haliday.
12 July
1867.

640. The rate of retirement on half pay is regulated by a warrant, is it not?—Clearly.

641. The right to this allowance is under no regulation whatever, is it?—It is under no regulation in the nature of a warrant, that I am aware of; there has been a rule or regulation or instruction with respect to it published; but I do not think it is in the nature of a Royal warrant.

642. There is no doubt that it is a great advantage to a non-purchase officer, who retires from your service, to receive this allowance?—Certainly.

643. From what fund would you pay him, supposing you did away with the Reserve Fund?—The money he receives at present is not paid out of the Reserve Fund, but by the officer who succeeds to the vacancy; that would be continued.

644. Supposing you did away with the Reserve Fund, how would you give the officer retiring the 100*l.* for every year of foreign service, and the 50*l.* for every year of home service?—The money thus paid him is part of that which the officers who succeed to his commissions by purchase at the regulated prices pay. None of it comes out of the Reserve Fund, and a portion of it stopped from the retiring officer goes to the fund. I cannot contemplate the possibility of entirely doing away with the fund, as regards that source of revenue; for, as I remarked before, I thought as a matter of equity the officer who had not purchased his commissions ought to have the right of retiring, by the sale of his commission, receiving a modified amount; and I would propose that the difference between the price he receives and that paid by the officer who succeeds him, should remain in the hands of the Secretary for War, as a fund to be applied, at some future period, to the extinguishing of the purchase system.

645. Previous to the giving of this allowance of 100*l.* for every year of foreign service, and 50*l.* for every year of home service, the purchase of commissions was confined to those cases where the commissions had been purchased?—Entirely so.

646. And therefore the effect of this fund is materially to increase the operation of purchase in the army?—Certainly, such is the tendency of the fund.

647. You admit that it is an advantage to the non-purchasing officer who retires from the service; but you say that the bad effects of it are felt by the non-purchasing officer who remains in the service?—Yes.

648. If this fund could be applied to the benefit of the non-purchasing officer who remains in the service, instead of being applied to purchasing half pay and so on, that would of course much tend to do away with the objections to it?—I do not think it would do away with the objections to the chief source from which it is raised; it extracts large sums from officers, by rendering purchase almost compulsory in the cases where officers retire on half pay; that operation of the fund I think ought to be put a stop to at once, while the other operation, *i.e.*, receiving money in the form of the difference between the price received by the officer who has not purchased selling, and that which the other pays, might be retained.

649. Take, for instance, the case of a captain, who, after a certain number of years' service, retires, and to whom you give so much a year for his services; purchase would be rendered compulsory, unless you paid him the money out of 0.127.

some other fund?—Yes, in that class of cases; and it so at present.

650. Do not you think that if the difference between the amount paid to the retiring officer, and the price paid by the officer succeeding to his commission, were applied to giving promotion without purchase in the regiment, that would have a good effect?—Certainly.

651. The fund was applied to the benefit only of those from whom it was derived, that is, from the Line (and eventually the Cavalry); the system would not be open to so much objection as it is now, when the fund is applied by the State to different purposes?—There would be much less objection to it; but I think if the fund continued to be raised from both the sources from which it is raised at present, you would be doing an injury with one hand while conferring a benefit with the other. If you extract large sums on the one hand by rendering the purchase of commissions compulsory, you would barely compensate for that by giving a certain number of other commissions without purchase. If the fund continued to be raised only from the difference between the prices paid for commissions, and the prices received by officers retiring, that application of the fund to which you refer might be a judicious one.

652. You proposed that the fund should accumulate for the purpose, at some future day, of purchasing the commissions of officers who had purchased their commissions, and so doing away hereafter with purchase?—Yes.

653. That has been practically the way in which it has been employed, to a certain extent, with regard to cavalry commissions, is it not; the State have, in fact, purchased the difference between the old regulation prices and the new regulation prices of cavalry commissions, out of this fund?—Yes, but the object aimed at has not been attained, for the prices given for commissions in the cavalry have not been practically diminished, nor is there any probability of their being so while the purchase system continues, since the purchaser will naturally always give the market value of the commission he wishes to get; and, therefore, if at any future time it should be determined to abolish the system of sale and purchase of commissions, and to compensate officers for their vested interests in the actual value of their commissions, including the sums they have given over the regulation prices as well as the regulation prices, it would be found that the total amount of the claims to be so extinguished would be as large as if this expenditure to buy up the difference between the old and the present regulation prices of cavalry commissions had never been incurred.

654. You object very much to the fund being so applied in the case of cavalry commissions, but you do not appear to object to the accumulation of the fund for the purpose of applying it on a large scale to the purchase of commissions of officers in the army?—For the purpose of extinguishing purchase at a future date; but I quite admit that such sums as might arise from the difference between the prices of commissions paid and the prices received, might legitimately and usefully be applied to giving first commissions without purchase.

655. If no more commissions were sold than were absolutely necessary to give officers retiring the money that they would be entitled to for their services, this fund would very soon be diminished

Colonel
W. R.
Haliday.

12 July
1867.

diminished to a very small amount?—Very soon.

656. Therefore, if it were confined to the purposes to which it ought, in your opinion, to be applied, there would very soon be an end to the fund itself?—If the plan of allowing officers who had not purchased all their commissions to receive only the modified rates alluded to on selling were still continued the fund would receive an annual amount, but that might be expended pretty nearly as fast as it was received in providing those first commissions.

657. *Chairman.*] You stated in a former part of your evidence that death vacancies do not always go without purchase; that you have heard of cases where such vacancies have been sold; have you known of many such cases?—No; the cases are exceptional, and in those cases, I believe, the commissions have been sold for the benefit of the widow or children of the deceased officers. The State has not, I fancy, in those instances taken any part of the money.

658. The cases were purely exceptional?—Yes.

659. Do you happen to know whether in any of those cases the standing of the officer who would succeed to the vacancy had anything to do with the commission going by purchase?—I do not think that in the exceptional cases to which I refer the disposal of the commissions was founded on that consideration. I think that it was founded solely on the circumstances of the deceased officer, or of his family; some of the instances have been where the resignation of the officer had been accepted, and where he had obtained permission to sell his commission, and then has died before the step was gazetted, notwithstanding which the sale has been allowed to be carried out.

660. Those cases were of a purely exceptional character?—Quite so.

661. I think that I must have misunderstood one of your answers, which I took down to the effect, that so long as the purchase system continued this Reserve Fund must continue?—I certainly meant, and I think I said, that as long as the purchase system continued the practice of permitting officers who had not purchased their commissions, or all their commissions, to sell them nevertheless at a modified rate, must be continued in equity to them. But I do not think the other source of supply of money to the Reserve Fund should continue; but the receipt of money into the Reserve Fund from that source above referred to, I think, must continue, as long as the purchase system in the army is maintained.

662. You stated that you thought that non-purchasing officers ought to be allowed to sell; under what circumstances would you give a non-purchasing officer that right?—In cases where he had served for a certain number of years, such as the 20 years already defined by the existing instruction, or order, and in cases where he had obtained his commission as a reward for very gallant or meritorious service in the ranks.

663. Where an officer has served a period entitling him to sell, whether he is a purchasing or a non-purchasing officer, he is equally entitled to do so when that period is completed?—Yes.

664. I presume you meant that there ought to be opportunities afforded for non-purchasing officers to sell who had not served sufficiently long to entitle them to do so under the existing

regulations?—I was merely contemplating the continuation of the present system by which an officer is allowed to receive 100 *l.* for each year passed on foreign service, or 50 *l.* for each year that he has passed in home service. I do not think it would be equitable to abolish that system as long as the purchase system is maintained.

665. In one of your former answers you expressed an opinion that the system that we are now considering did not increase promotion in the service?—I do not conceive that it increases it at all.

666. Does it not very much promote the retirement of officers who are induced to retire by reason of this 100 *l.* for each year of foreign service, and who without it would be obliged to hold on till they had served the period entitling them to sell?—Its effect in that way I take to be very slight.

667. You do not think that it greatly increases promotion in the service?—No; I do not think that it at all increases promotion in the service.

668. Surely many officers must be induced to retire by reason of that allowance who otherwise would have no other alternative than to remain in the service till they had served the full time?—If the State did not give such officers the right of selling at those modified prices, it must necessarily introduce some system of retirement for them, because among those officers are a number of men who have served many years in the ranks, and, seeing that they get their commissions as a reward for such past service, it would not be equitable to treat them exactly like a young ensign first joining; some allowance must be made for their past service, and they must be allowed to retire sooner than a man who comes in at 18 years of age.

669. But as the system now stands, surely promotion is considerably accelerated by this system of retirement?—No; the cases of non-purchasing officers wishing to retire in that way are very few in comparison with the great number of cases of officers who have purchased all their steps retiring.

670. You have given a great deal of attention to this subject, and I dare say you have watched the Gazettes from time to time; do you not meet with a vast number more cases where officers purchase over the heads of their seniors, than would have occurred but for this Reserve Fund system?—No, I do not observe much effect produced in that direction by the system of permitting officers who have not purchased all their commissions, to sell at these modified rates.

671. Do not you think that there are more vacancies created by this system of retirement?—Very few more. The officers who sell their commissions at those modified rates are very few in number. I know that practically to be the case, because I have often heard of officers who have not purchased all their commissions saying, "I shall not sell at present; I shall wait till I have completed another year or two's service, so as to entitle me to get the full value of my commission." An officer dislikes selling his commission for less than he considers the full value of his commission.

672. *Mr. Goschen.*] Is the 100 *l.* for each year of foreign service which a non-purchasing officer gets on retirement allowed for the whole time of his service in the army, including the time he has served in the ranks, or only the time he has served

755
Colonel
W. R.
Haliday.
12 July
1867.

served as an officer?—I think it refers only to his service as an officer.

673. Supposing you allowed a non-purchasing officer the regulation price for his commission, in the same way as any other officer selling his commission, you would not want a Reserve Fund at all?—No, or rather I should say you would cease to have that source of supply to the fund.

674. But, after a certain period of service, you give that non-purchasing officer the right of selling, and the only thing the Reserve Fund does by stepping between the two, to take a portion of the money?—That is its operation; to stop a portion of the money before it reaches him, and to place it in the Reserve Fund.

675. So far from its supplying the funds to induce a man to leave the service, it retains a portion of the funds, which might otherwise have been wholly applied to that purpose?—Yes, that is its operation.

676. You might give a non-purchasing officer the power to sell at a certain rate to an officer below him, without the Reserve Fund?—Yes; it does not require the Reserve Fund for that purpose.

677. Therefore, you need not mix up the two questions, the establishment of the Reserve Fund and the right of a non-purchasing officer to sell?—No; that source of income of the Reserve Fund is founded on the restriction of the right to sell of that officer who has not purchased; it arises from the refusal to him of the right to sell his commission at its full value, compelling him, instead, to accept a sort of commuted value, and thereby stopping a portion of the money which he would otherwise receive.

678. The abolition of the system of purchase would be very much equivalent to an increase of pay in the army, would it not?—Clearly so.

679. Therefore, the abolition of any portion of the purchase system is an extension of pay to the army?—Yes; indirectly the abolition of any portion of the purchase system is beneficial in that respect.

680. The sale of the commissions by the State, out of the funds of the Reserve Fund, is preventing the increase to the pay of the army, which would result from their having the promotions gratis?—Yes; that is the ultimate effect of any extension of the purchase system.

681. So that the result is rather this, is it not; the necessity for officers to purchase their commissions is depriving them of an advantage rather than extracting a sum from their pockets as a tax? The case is rather this, that the State selling those commissions, instead of allowing them to go in the natural course of promotion without purchase?—Yes; the State compels them to pay for that promotion, which they would otherwise obtain without paying money for it.

682. The State compels them to pay for that promotion in the same way as they pay for all promotions, except by death vacancies?—In the same way as they pay for all commissions which they purchase.

683. You are opposed to the system of purchase altogether; you would be glad to see the system abolished?—I conceive that it would be beneficial to the service at large, and for the best interests of the country.

684. The abolition of the purchase system is an increase of pay in this sense, is it not; that the promotion comes without purchase to those who would have purchased, and therefore they save so much money; and it comes more rapidly to those who cannot afford to purchase, and they move up and get promotion?—The first part of the question I see clearly; if an officer receives his pay, and at the same time is not subject to the loss of the interest of the money which he has invested in his commission, he is better paid; he is therefore better paid if he has not purchased that commission. I cannot answer the latter part of the question with any confident opinion.

685. I mean this: those who cannot afford to purchase gain by the abolition of the purchase system, because they get promotion gratis, which otherwise they would not get at all?—They get their promotion gratis, and they also get it more equally with the rest of the service.

686. Take the case of an ensign who could not afford to purchase; under the purchase system he remains an ensign much longer than he would if he moved up according to seniority, because none would purchase over his head?—Yes; probably it would be so; but the purchase system undoubtedly quickens promotion at large, because it provides, out of the pockets of the officers themselves, a retirement which prevents a stagnation among the ranks; but the objection to it is, that that retirement is obtained solely at the expense of the officers themselves, in place of being provided by the country.

687. *Chairman.*] Under this system of the Reserve Fund, a non-purchasing officer has a considerable advantage over a purchasing one, in this respect has he not. Suppose the case of two officers entering the army on the same day and leaving it on the same day, one having purchased all his commissions, and the other having purchased none; the one who has purchased all his commissions merely gets his money back, while the other who has purchased none of his commissions, gets the 100*l.* for each year of foreign service?—In the case supposed, no doubt the officer who has obtained his commissions without purchase, has a great advantage. He has made more out of the service; but it is to be observed that this does not arise from the existence or operation of the Reserve Fund, but entirely from the privilege accorded to him of selling his commissions, although he has not purchased them at these modified rates. We know that the existence of the Reserve Fund originated in great measure in that practice, not the practice from the existence of the fund.

688. Will you put in a return?—(*The Witness handed in the same. Vide Appendix.*)

LIST OF APPENDIX.

Appendix, No. 1.

Papers handed in by Lieutenant General W. F. Forster, 28 June 1867 :	PAGE
Circular Memorandum addressed to the Army at Home and Abroad, dated 15 February 1861 - - - - -	41
Circular Memorandum addressed to the Army at Home and Abroad, dated 6 August 1861 - - - - -	41
Circular Memorandum addressed to the Army at Home and Abroad, dated 15 July 1862 - - - - -	42

Appendix, No. 2.

Paper handed in by Lieutenant General Forster :	
Return giving the Number of Candidates appointed to the Army from 1 June 1864 to 31 May 1867 - - - - -	43
Commissions by Purchase - - - - -	43
Commissions without Purchase - - - - -	43

Appendix, No. 3.

Papers handed in by Major William Marvin :	
Royal Warrant, dated 14 October 1858 - - - - -	49
Royal Warrant, dated 28 March 1861 - - - - -	50

Appendix, No. 4.

Papers handed in by Colonel Haliday, 13 July 1867 :	
1.—Sums received on account of Reserve Fund by Sales of Commissions in Succession to Officers retiring on Half-pay, or Full-pay, &c. - - - - -	51
2.—Amounts received by Difference between Sums Paid for Commissions Purchased, and those Received by Officers Retiring, who had not Purchased their Commissions - - - - -	51
Amounts Paid to Cavalry Officers Retiring from that Branch of the Service, to make up the Difference between the former Regulation Price of Commissions and those established in 1860 - - - - -	51
Amounts Paid for the purpose of the Conversion of Military Train to a Non-Purchase Corps - - - - -	52
Amounts Paid to Buy up Half-pay Commissions - - - - -	52
Amounts Paid to Buy up Commissions of Gentlemen-at-Arms and Yeomen of the Guards - - - - -	52

Appendix, No. 5.

Return of First Commissions given between 1 January 1860 and 30 June 1867 - - -	53
Copy of Clause 84 of Royal Warrant of 3 February 1866, which provides for the Sale of Officers' Commissions, which have not been purchased by them - - -	53

Appendix, No. 6.

Paper referred to the Committee by the House :	
Return of the Names of all Officers of Artillery or Engineers who have Retired from the Service under the Operation of the Military Reserve Funds; distinguishing such as have held Civil Appointments, with the Names of such Appointments, and the length of time they have been held by each Officer - - - - -	54

Appendix, No. 7.

Paper received from the War Office, 27 July 1867 :	
The Guards' Fund - - - - -	55
Memorandum of Exchequer Bills held by Messrs. Cox & Co., on account of the Guards' Fund - - - - -	57
The Reserve Fund - - - - -	58
Memorandum of Exchequer Bills by Messrs. Cox & Co., on account of the Reserve Fund - - - - -	95

A P P E N D I X.

Appendix, No. 1.

PAPERS handed in by Lieutenant General *W. F. Forster*, 28 June 1867.

(General Number 106.)

CIRCULAR MEMORANDUM addressed to the Army at Home and Abroad.

App. No. 1.

Horse Guards, S.W., 15 February 1861.

1. His Royal Highness the General Commanding in Chief has had under his consideration the necessity of recalling to Full Pay Service all Officers now on Half Pay who are able to serve, and wishing also to give to Officers on Half Pay the opportunity of retiring from the service by the sale of their Commissions: he hereby announces, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for War, that they will be permitted to do so, to a limited extent, in the manner and under the restrictions hereinafter specified.

2. This arrangement to include General Officers who may be in receipt of the Half Pay only of the regimental rank in which they retired.

3. The individuals disposed to avail themselves of this arrangement, shall make application to the General Commanding in Chief, through the Military Secretary, according to the Form annexed.

4. The sales to take place under the following restrictions, viz. :—

No person to be allowed to sell who has passed the age of 60 years, or who cannot produce a certificate from the Army Medical Department at Head Quarters, or, if in a colony, the certificate of a medical board, or if no medical board can be assembled, the certificate of the Senior Medical Officer, showing that his retirement does not result from impaired constitution threatening earlier dissolution than a person of his age may expect in the common course of nature.

5. The price of the Commissions to be paid to the Officers selling out shall be the regulation price of the rank in which they retired, or such

portion as their services may entitle them to, less the difference received by them between Full and Half Pay.

6. It is to be understood that no Officer on the Half-Pay List, who may hold a garrison situation, will be permitted to retain it if he should sell under this arrangement.

7. The time allowed for the operation of this regulation shall be limited to six months for Officers at home, and to one year for Officers residing in the colonies.

8. Officers selling their Commissions under this Regulation will be granted the Brevet Rank to which they might be entitled had they been restored to Full Pay to sell in the usual manner, their names being retained as Retired Officers in the Army List accordingly.

9. As the funds at the disposal of the Secretary of State for War for this purpose are limited, the applications will be considered in the order in which they are received; and when the funds are expended no further sales will be allowed.

10. Officers of Artillery and Engineers on the Half-pay List who may be desirous of availing themselves of the benefit of this Regulation, so far as the provisions thereof can be made applicable to them, are at liberty to make application accordingly; but, as such Officers are not, under ordinary circumstances, eligible to dispose of their Commissions by sale, each application as received will be specially considered with reference to the previous service of the Officer.

By Command,

James Yorke Scarlett,
Adjutant General.

QUEEN'S BODY GUARD.

(General Number 146.)

CIRCULAR MEMORANDUM addressed to the Army at Home and Abroad.

Horse Guards, S.W., 6 August 1861.

Yeomen of the Guard.
1—1861.

THE Queen has been pleased to approve that the purchase of the officers' commissions in the 0.127.

corps of the Yeomen of the Guard should cease at the earliest possible moment, and to order that the future vacancies in the corps should be filled up by officers of the army of long and good service, to be selected from a list kept at the Horse Guards