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some Sikhs were sent to Ceylon, and were afterwards employed, not in military duty, but in road making, and the whole arrangement broke down?—It is the same question which Colonel North's Committee so clearly and well brought out; and Colonel North's report upon the employment of the troops in China is an exceedingly good paper to have before us with regard to the mistaken mode in which you employ troops. You go and scatter the commissariat stores, the ordnance stores, the naval stores, the treasuries, and every kind of store you can possibly think of, and for every store so scattered you require a European guard. The consequence is, you have your European soldiers dying off by hundreds. Therefore I pressed very strongly upon the Supreme Government of India to draw up and order to be carried out a regulation, which is not carried out yet, laying down the difference between guarding and protecting all establishments, which is one thing, and the means of watching them as policemen would do, which is another thing. For instance, in this country you have now, with great advantage, in the last 20 years introduced a large force of police to watch the dockyards. I think before that system was established you had several hundred men on guard daily to protect your arsenals and dockyards. The substitution of the police for them has incurred some expense, but nothing in comparison with the cost which you did incur by employing soldiers to do the duty which the police are now known to do with far more efficiency than the soldiers ever did before. Therefore, if you send native soldiers, or even European soldiers, to the colonies, I think General Peel's recommendation to the Government in 1859 was a very wise one, that you should not allow your troops ever to be employed in performing those duties in the Colonies which it was the bounden duty of the Colonies to do by means of their own police. But in many places—for instance, both in Singapore and in Burmah (as it was when I went down there in 1860), and likewise from Colonel North's Committee, you will find that many duties were taken up by the soldiers which ought to have been confided to the police. Therefore, if you kept your European soldiers solely as military men in those colonies, I do not myself see that you could ever fall into any mistake with regard to the duties to be performed.

3627. Is not that a question rather between the military authorities as to what amount of duty the soldiers are to do, than a question for the Civil Government?—As I have already stated to the Committee, the last thing that a commanding officer ever does is to object to demands made upon him by the civil power; you will find that the last thing a commanding officer, if he receives a requisition from the civil authority ever does, is to say I will not obey; he complies with the requisition as a matter of course, and receives it as an order to be obeyed; the consequence is that you will rarely or never find a commanding officer objecting to the employment of his men upon guards.

3628. Supposing these duties to be defined between the Supreme Government of India and the government of the colony, the troops need not be employed upon any duty which is not military duty; but the police duties are regarded in those colonies as military duties, and the Sikhs were employed upon work which was distasteful to them as soldiers?—I think there was some mistake about the Sikhs; they were brought down

from the Punjaub, not to be soldiers in Ceylon, but to be employed on the roads as labourers, and I think there was some misunderstanding; either they were deceived by the officer who enlisted them, or some misconception arose in their minds, and hence, when they arrived in Ceylon, and were turned to duties which they were either misinformed upon before they entered the service, or did not choose to perform when they were in Ceylon, they were discontented?—I believe these were the facts of the case.

3629. Would you tell me whether you are prepared, having sent the native troops to a colony to leave the entire garrison in the hands of the native regiments, excepting the artillery?—Surely, we have done it repeatedly, and what harm will these men do by mutinising?

3630. You must understand that that is in direct contradiction to what Lord Strathnairn's evidence was?—Every man has his opinion; that is my opinion. I was in the Straits with natives for years, and I never knew of a mutiny among them. Lord Strathnairn was never, I believe, in command of natives; but he must know that Mhow, where there was one of the most dangerous mutinies we ever had, and which he occupied immediately, had been left for years with natives only, and that many other garrisons had been left for years simply with native infantry. There were three regiments of natives and a weak company of artillery, in a wretched little redoubt built in 1819, which I had frequently condemned as utterly worthless, but which had been kept up; and that little place was simply occupied by artillery, and held out with great success. Saugor also was occupied by the Madras Ordnance Department, which was under me at the time of the mutiny; there was a wretched fort there that held out against four regiments of sepoys. Then Nagpore for many years was left entirely to the occupation of native troops, and many other parts of India were left to the occupation of native troops. And the singular thing with regard to mutinies in India is this, that all the mutinies, or rather the greatest mutinies you have ever had in India have been in those places where the European troops have been the strongest. That is a very remarkable thing. In my own Presidency we have had many mutinies; the mutiny of Travancore, the mutiny of Murra, and the mutiny of Hyderabad; and each of those confirms my remark. And in Bengal the greatest mutiny of all was at Meerut. There was no part of India so well supplied with European troops of all branches as Meerut was; you had a force there of Europeans which would have been sufficient, and was sufficient, for you to have overcome 20,000 or 30,000 native troops, which they eventually did.

3631. Sir James Fergusson.] The only reason they did not put down the mutiny at Meerut was that the troops were not used; was not that the case?—The remarkable thing, I say, is, that the places where the mutinies have been most prevalent have been the very places where the force of European troops was the largest.

3632. In those cases they have been promptly suppressed?—The mutinies at Travancore and Hyderabad were not promptly suppressed.

3633. Colonel Percy Herbert.] What do you say to the case of Dellore?—There was a large force of Europeans there, the 69th Regiment.

3634. Sir Henry Rawlinson.] Is it your impression

pression from that, that the presence of an European force irritates the natives?—No; the natives never calculate, as you are aware.

3635. Captain *Hayter*.] With regard to the colonial garrisons, Lord Strathnairn's opinion is that the presence of one European regiment has a good effect not only upon the population, but upon the rest of the garrison?—Take the case of Mauritius, the population of which is composed of a great variety of races, the men there have no interest in muntinising. Then take Singapore: the population there is composed also of classes of every kind; there are Arabs, and Malays, and Chinese, and a very various population. I have sat down to dinner, 40 years ago, with about 15 races; I think there were 10 European races at the table. And in like manner with regard to the natives in India, there are different races of every kind.

3636. Irrespective of the garrison, do you think that the inhabitants of the Colonies would be equally well satisfied with the native troops?—No; I have already mentioned the difficulty in that respect. You have now raised up a feeling which you will find great difficulty in overcoming. These colonists are now told to pay subsidies for the forces maintained there, and what they pay is based upon a calculation of the strength of the European force in each colony. Therefore they will naturally, and I think with very great reason, say, "Why should we have natives sent here?" First of all, there is no question but what they are an inferior force. I am not praising the native soldier as being in any way equal or to be compared to the European soldier; but I say that the natives are a good and useful force so long as they are well cared for. That force, nevertheless, is an inferior force, and you can hardly expect the people of Mauritius, of the Cape, of Ceylon, or of Singapore, to say, "We would rather have natives than Europeans." They will cry out for Europeans, no doubt. That is one of the difficulties which has to be overcome in arranging for the garrisoning of these places by means of native soldiers.

3637. With regard to the dépôts, is the system the same in the India dépôts, of the men only going to their own regiments, according to the English system; in the English dépôts, which are amalgamated now into the dépôt battalion, the men only go to their own regiments, as you are probably aware?—The Royal Commission of last year has recommended a change in that respect, and there is an Act now passing through both Houses of Parliament to effect that change; but every soldier in the British army is enlisted for a particular regiment.

3638. He enlists for a particular regiment now?—Yes; when the Bill is passed he will not enlist for a particular regiment, but at present not even Her Majesty can transfer that soldier from the regiment for which he has enlisted to another without the man's consent: therefore the whole system has been that of regimental establishments. But if you remember, our Commission recommended that a change should take place, that a man should be enlisted for the service generally, but that having been once posted to a particular regiment, he should be in the same position as he was before, that he is not to be removed from that regiment without his own consent.

3639. Is that the same with the Indian regi-

ments?—The old system of the European Army of India was this, that the men enlisted for the infantry and the artillery, and were draughted off into the sappers as engineers, and I believe also into the cavalry, as the authorities might see fit: having once joined the artillery or those branches, they were not transferred usually, unless it was for some strong reason: the men were given their option, for instance, instead of discharging any artillerymen whom it was not necessary to keep, the option was given to him of discharge or serving in the infantry. The service was in such favour that the men generally preferred taking service in the infantry to taking their discharge.

3640. If general service is introduced, as is proposed, that which you think would be the most advisable system would be much more easily carried out, would it not?—It was to meet this general objection on the part of the Commander in Chief that the Commission was induced to make this recommendation. He said that particular dépôts were strong in recruits, and that other dépôts were not strong in recruits, and that he could not therefore transfer a man from one dépôt to another dépôt, or to another regiment, without the man's consent: and that that consent was never obtained except by offering a bounty to the soldier, I think of 1*l.* or 2*l.*, to induce him to volunteer for a particular regiment: hence the Recruiting Commission recommended two things; they recommended first, that the men should be allowed to enlist for service generally at first, and that they should be formed into large dépôts, and that the Commander in Chief should have at his disposal a considerable dépôt in excess of the fixed establishment of the army, with a view to enabling him to fill up a particular regiment from the general service dépôt. But these rules have been only partially carried out as yet; however, if a man is once posted to a particular regiment, he is not to be removable without his own consent.

3641. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] You have spoken with great admiration of the Minute of Lord Dalhousie, of 1854 and 1855; are you of opinion that that is applicable to the present requirements of India?—I used that Minute in India, and I have no reason whatever for departing from it; the stations which are mentioned there are still in existence; we have not made much change in the territory under the Government of India since that date; I will look at the point which Sir James Fergusson mentioned, about the annexation of Oude, and see the exact date; but there was only one regiment employed extra in consequence of Oude being occupied in that way. If you will put red points upon the map, representing the places which Lord Dalhousie fixed upon as the places requiring European infantry, I think your own great experience connected with India will enable you to decide whether Lord Dalhousie's recommendations were soundly based or not. These are matters upon which it is difficult to form an opinion, and every man forms his opinion according to the experience he has had.

3642. Do you not think that the experience we have had of the events of the mutiny should have a great influence upon the question?—On the contrary, I think we have been freed from many difficulties in consequence of the mutiny. The mutiny was a terrible calamity to all of us; but I think we got rid of many erroneous ideas, with

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3643. You do not think that we need more Indian troops there now than we did before?—No; I will mention another matter, the proportion of Europeans to natives, which is a matter of importance as regards the native army; no doubt if you increase the relative numbers of any particular portion of the army, you will raise up jealousies or suspicions in the other branches which are not so favoured. The remarkable thing is this: that, in 1837, you had barely five natives to one European soldier, whereas when the mutiny broke out I have no hesitation in saying that you had at least eight natives to every European soldier; that increase was largely in the Bengal Presidency, where the greatest danger arose, and where we suffered most; and the least proportionate increase was in the Madras and Bombay Presidencies; in these presidencies the difference was not nearly so great. You have never had before you, in the fullest extent, the actual strength of the native troops in India at the time of the mutiny; all the returns which have been given to you are incomplete. My calculation is, that you had about 300,000 native soldiers in India, or nearly that number, at the time of the mutiny.

3644. To how many Europeans?—You had 256,000 effective natives against 37,091 Europeans; whilst, on the one hand, I exclude the European officers from the number of Europeans I have given, on the other hand I exclude the European officers from the native soldiers, but I include the native officers. It is very usual to say native officers, non-commissioned rank and file, whereas it is the ordinary custom to say European non-commissioned rank and file. The native officers, you know, are not many, and therefore it is a usual thing to include them, but I could very easily, if necessary, give the exact figures without them.

3645. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] They will not materially alter the proportions?—No; therefore in the whole of India you had upwards of eight natives to every European soldier, and if you take Bengal, I have no hesitation in saying that you had 10 natives to every European soldier. Now you have got rid of 133,000 natives.

3646. Major *Anson.*] Should I be wrong in saying that the number of natives in the Bengal Presidency alone, including the irregular commands under the Governor General, was 190,000 men; you must take into account also the forces of the native princes under the Government of Bengal?—I have here an original paper, it is a memorandum given by Sir William Mansfield to General Wilson, when he was up the country; that is, 47,000 men; they are usually not shown in the returns of the native troops, but these belong to the Bengal Presidency.

3647. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] I should like to ask you with regard to the excess of Europeans which you consider there is at present; you put it down at 10,000; that is Lord Dalhousie's estimate, as compared with the present effective force, allowing for 5,000 European artillery, instead of natives; if this saving was effected by the reduction of 10,000 Europeans, do you suppose that they would have to be replaced by native levies?—No.

3648. Do you think that the whole army of India, native and European together, might be

reduced by the 5,000 Europeans whom you would withdraw; or would you replace them with natives?—I would not replace them with natives; my impression was rather that you would cut down particularly the native infantry very low; it has been cut down since I left; but I never myself thought that 90,000 privates of native infantry were too much for India; that was the establishment that I always thought a good establishment to go by. If they are kept in that proportion, the other branches of the service being also reared up in proportion to that number, you would be able to make a very efficient army, provided you kept those native infantry to their own military duties, free from all those multifarious duties to which Lord Strathnairn referred. Under those circumstances you might keep the native army in a state of high discipline. I have already looked upon those guards as objectionable; and almost the last words Lord Clyde said to me before he left India were, of all things, to remind Lord Canning that he had promised carefully to withdraw all the small detachments of Europeans, and to keep the native troops well together in battalions, and not to scatter them in small guards away from their European officers, getting into indiscipline and bad habits, and mistaken ideas. It was with that view that I have always argued that you ought to maintain the natives and the Europeans in the smallest possible numbers, and that that organization was the best suited to the wants of India which would enable you to maintain discipline in the highest possible degree. I have always looked upon it that it was mainly the indiscipline of the Bengal army that led especially to the mutiny; and if the men had been kept together more than they were, and if the regiments had been kept under discipline more, I do not think you would have had the mutiny to the extent you had.

3649. You offered some very important suggestions with reference to the future of India, especially with regard to the military organization. I think you said that you would suggest that either the native army should be attached to the Home Government as the European army is; or that the native and European armies of India as a whole, should be formed into a local service, something on the footing of the old service; that I believe is what you suggested?—Yes.

3650. Have you considered that subject at all carefully; have you formed any definite plan with regard to the formation of this local service, as to its dependence upon the Home Government, and its organization, the means of supply and reliefs, and questions of that kind?—A paper was moved for about two years ago, of reports from the Military Finance Commission, of which I was a member, and of which General Jameson, who is now at the India Office, was the President. We were called upon when at Bombay, by the Government of India, to report upon the changes in the organization and the formation of a staff corps for India. We were not able for 10 months to report upon the subject, but in May 1860 we sent in our report, and in it we condemned the staff corps, and assigned our reasons for that view, saying that it was not a suitable thing.

3651. That was before the amalgamation, was it not?—It was a year and a half before the amalgamation; that report has in many respects been borne out by events, as being thoroughly sound in the statements we made; we then submitted various considerations for the improvement of

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of the then existing organization of the army of India; of course, since I have been at home here, I have necessarily been forced into discussions with various parties, but I have never been called upon officially excepting by the Commission over which General Acheson presided, and by Lord Strathnairn's Transport Committee, to express opinions on the whole organization of the army of India; but necessarily I have been obliged to give my attention and my consideration to the subject, and I have endeavoured to keep myself acquainted with the changes which have been going on.

3652. And you are in favour of the notion of reforming a local army of India, distinct from the Royal Army, but equally under the Crown?—I think that few of those who have had experience of India in former days can have any doubt with regard to the policy of that, that it is in every way advisable to give to the Government of India, being the immense empire that it is, its own power and its own army, and to supply us with the great resources which you are so well aware were obtained by the Government of India in former times from their army, I think that the wisest way would have been to have searched out quietly and calmly the great defects which existed in the army of India, because it is of no use concealing the fact that defects existed, and to have carried out a remedy for those defects. But this much I will say, and your own experience will enable you to judge how far I am right, if you had taken as much care of your regiments and of your officers for those regiments, as you did in taking officers away from those regiments for the new staff duties, I think you would have had an army in India unparalleled in the world; you had a high degree of military training there; officers in India give themselves up to their profession to an extent which you never see in Europe, or in any other pursuit; they have no other employment, they have nothing else to turn their attention away from their duties, and therefore the officers in India devote themselves to their duties in a marvellously great degree; but if you had removed from the army many men who were either incompetent from age, from knowledge, from power of body, or from power of mind, and if you had made arrangements by which the best officers could have been kept with the army, and above all, if you had supplied that army with the number of officers equal to those you withdrew for the staff, I have no hesitation in saying that you would then have had that Indian army in a very different state from what the army in India is now.

3653. With regard to the European portion of that army, you remember under the old system that a very small proportion was under the Indian Government, the greater portion was temporarily supplied from the Crown; under the new system you propose, you would have the whole of the Europeans belonging to the local army, do you think that you would be able to recruit sufficiently for the purpose of maintaining that army?—Yes; because both in the recruiting commission of last year, and that of 1859 and 1860, the thing which struck us more than anything else was this, whilst the Imperial Army could not get recruits, the Indian Army were invariably supplied with recruits; that was distinctly reported in the previous commission, and if I had not been an old Indian officer, I am sure Lord Dalhousie, the President of the Commission, would have been very glad indeed to have recorded that

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opinion himself; as it is, if you read the report, you will find that in many respects the Indian service was stated to have been exceedingly popular.

3654. The demand was, however, more limited in former times than it would be under the new system?—The strange thing was that in 1858 and 1859 we sent home 10,000 European soldiers who refused to be transferred to the army while you kept them in the European army, but very few European soldiers comparatively, and then, when the amalgamation was effected, out of 18,000 soldiers of the native army, 17,500 came over with the bounty which a commission which I served upon in Calcutta advised the Government to give the soldiers, and you have never heard a murmur with reference to that local force. The bounty was given them by our advice, and the soldiers took it, and you have no discontent whatever. It cost the Government 160,000 £, whereas the previous discharge of the 10,000 men cost the Government at least 1,000,000 £. Then, in a year and a half you had a vast force assembled in India by the recruiting of the Indian establishments in this country. I may mention also to you that which is notorious, I believe; I do not unnecessarily refer to private conversations. I have no hesitation in saying that General Wetherall, the adjutant general of the army, distinctly stated in conversation (it may not be worth much) that one drawback to the Indian army was that the Indian army took away the recruits from the English army; and more than that, for years and years the Indian army was not allowed to recruit in any part of the country except London. By degrees the Indian recruiting establishments were extended, first to one place and then to another, until at last the Indian army were allowed to have six establishments; but originally the Indian recruiting was confined to London. Moreover, I may also remind you that in the last century, after India had been conquered by our own gallant European troops, because it is to our own Europeans, aided by natives, that we owe the conquest of India, we had 12 European regiments belonging to India in the last century, and they were popular, and therefore it is absurd to say that it would be difficult to obtain men. I believe myself that there is a class of the population here which is always desirous of going to India. The minds of the people of Scotland are certainly favourable to India, and whilst they look upon their sons going into the English army as men lost to them for life, they look upon their sons entering the Indian army as men going out to a place where they may rise in standing in the world. I think there is also another point of view in which you might look upon it; the marines, for instance, obtain a class of men whom the army do not get, and do not take. I think it would be even now a wise measure if you allowed that class of the population to be drawn upon for the Indian army, instead of having, as you see here in all our establishments, as I heard last year, a great difficulty in recruiting the army, for which difficulty, indeed, our commission was assembled. You could have, as you invariably had in the Indian army, the depôts filled with men ready to go out whenever the Government required them.

3655. Colonel Percy Herbert.] I gather from your remarks, that you are very much opposed to the system of employing the troops in India

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Maj. Gen. on treasure escorts, and such duties as that?—
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3656. I do not know what the system is now, but a few years ago was not it sometimes the case, that there were as many as five guards over treasure in one cantonment?—I think at Meerut alone, when the Governor General gave me the power of passing bills for police to guard treasures, I passed seven different bills for seven different treasuries.

3657. Major *Anson*.] Was that at Meerut alone?—Yes, at Meerut alone. I speak from recollection, of course. I passed the bills with Mr. Laing's approval, and, of course, I took immediate measures to order the whole of the cash in these treasuries to be deposited in one head quarter treasury. I think Mr. Laing will bear witness to the immense advantage we derived from that in all India. Nothing was more effectual than for us to call up the cash balances belonging to the establishment. The whole of these cash balances were then deposited in the Civil Treasuries, and Mr. Laing was then able to say what amount of available cash he had at his command. We cut it down as far as possible, and, except Tessore, I do not think we had any military treasuries where more than 10,000*l.* were left. Tessore, as Sir Henry Rawlinson well knows, is difficult of approach during the monsoon. We were obliged to keep 60,000*l.* there, I think, in order to meet the expenses of the troops during those months in which they could not get a supply of money.

3658. Colonel *Percy Herbert*.] In 1857, when I was commanding at Cawnpore, there were five treasuries; there was the pension paymaster, the commissariat, the regimental paymaster, and so on. I know there were five altogether?—Yes, very likely.

3659. I suppose that was the case in a great many stations?—In every station in India the same thing existed.

3660. Meerut, of course, was an exceptionally large case?—Yes.

3661. That state of things is remedied now, is it?—If the orders are carried out it is. The Military Finance Department has the power of paying the bills for the police employed as guards for those treasuries, and up to the time of my departure I enforced that with the greatest degree of strictness.

3662. You stated, in the early part of your evidence, that six square feet were allowed to a sepoy on board ship, and that nine square feet were allowed to a European. I did not gather whether there was any sufficient reason for that, or whether it was merely that a native was worse treated than a European as a matter of economy?—No, I do not think so. I was a member of the Madras Marine Board for several years, and all the contracts for shipping were made by that board, and every ship was examined by a marine officer subordinate to the board, and examined by the quartermaster general.

3663. And nine feet was considered absolutely necessary for the health of Europeans?—To tell the truth, I do not think in the eastern seas it signifies very much what the space is; unless you crowd them to an enormous extent, you will have men in those seas sleeping on deck. I have been on board a good many transports, and I never found that either the six feet or the nine feet was wrong.

3664. You never found nine feet too much for

a European?—No, nor too little; I do not think it is intentional, or based upon any reason; but I have never found any practical inconvenience arising from it.

3665. Major *Anson*.] The natives have different habits altogether to the Europeans, have they not; they have not the slightest objection to half a dozen of them huddling together?—No.

3666. Colonel *Percy Herbert*.] You do not think it important as a question of health?—With sea air no question of health arises.

3667. I suppose troops suffer from being crowded on board ship, just as everybody else does?—I have been very much crowded; but, if care is taken to keep the decks open, there is no harm in it.

3668. Suppose you have bad weather, and are obliged to stay down below?—That is bad, certainly; I have been on board ship when the hatches were fastened down, and then it was terrible.

3669. That is not unusual, is it?—I have been in typhoons, in China, when we have had it.

3670. During the monsoon there is a great deal of bad weather, is not there?—No; it is not bad weather, for, being steady, you know what to do; it is the battering down of the hatches that is objectionable. I have been on board ship when the hatches were battened down, and then, whether you have few or many on board, all men battened down in that way would cry out; but, with fair weather, in the tropics you know there is not very much space required.

3671. You gave us an account of some rather interesting operations, in 1839, against a native chief, with a combined force of Europeans and natives, in which you, I think, were personally engaged?—Yes.

3672. You have had no experience of native troops without the support of Europeans?—No; personally I have had none whatever.

3673. Except in those cases where they were attacking our own troops?—I was not engaged then.

3674. You alluded to some, I think, at Mhow?—I alluded to the Mhow affair, where a weak company of artillery stood against three native regiments, and they were quite sufficient; the natives did not withstand them. At Saugor, also, a weak company of artillery, and a small ordnance department were quite sufficient to withstand four regiments.

3675. That may give us a measure of what their value would be against an European enemy, unless they were largely supported by European troops?—That is a curious problem; I have asked questions about it of those who have been engaged with natives. I put the question to a very intelligent officer, who was a prisoner with the Sikhs in 1849; he was made prisoner when the Punjaub was overrun, and he and another officer were tied to the guns and threatened with death. I asked him what his impressions were, with regard to the natives, and his reply, I think, was a very fair measure of what Asiatic troops are. He said that the Sikh soldiers, who had only one or two European officers; in fact no European officers at all, appeared to be as much terrified when the Pandies came against them, led by European officers, as the Pandies appeared to be terrified when they were attacked by the Sikhs, led by European officers; and that the whole

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whole difference appeared to be in the leading of the European officers.

3676. It is a question of leading?—Yes.

3677. I think it was said by them: "If you will only give us the Sahibs, we will be able to fight the Sikhs"?—Yes.

3678. Native troops are, of course, inferior to Europeans, and you said you apprehended that the colonists would object to pay for them on that score, if they were employed in the Colonies?—I do not think I put it in that form; I put it thus: that inasmuch as they are now paying for European troops, and the garrisons of the colonies are composed now entirely of European troops, the colonists would naturally say, "Why should you thrust upon us an inferior description of troops, when we are paying for a superior description of troops?"

3679. Are there any of the colonies where they pay for the whole expense of the troops?—I would answer that question also by saying that in the Mauritius they are paying, I should myself say, for the full amount of the military force which they can possibly require for the protection of that small island. They are not paying the full cost of the troops now located there, because they are 2,000 in number; and that island, according to Sir John Burgoyne, would require 6,000 European troops to garrison the place and to occupy the forts which have been built by the Imperial Government, in the event of a European war taking place.

3680. When did Sir John Burgoyne give that evidence?—In 1861.

3681. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] They are paying 17,000 *l.*, I think?—It has been increased to 45,000 *l.*; they used to pay 17,000 *l.* in 1858, but they are now paying 45,000 *l.* in 1866–67; the contributions of both Mauritius and Ceylon have been increased.

3682. Colonel *Percy Herbert*.] Is there any case where the colonists are paying for the whole of the troops quartered in the colony?—I look upon Singapore as a fair illustration.

3683. I should like to keep to the Mauritius for the present; at the Mauritius they do not pay for the whole?—They pay about from one-third to one-fourth of the cost of the troops now located there.

3684. Then you went on to say, just now, that you considered that they paid for that amount of troops which was necessary for the protection of that small island?—Yes.

3685. Which you placed at about 1,000 men, I think?—I place it at even much less than that.

3686. What would you place it at?—I should think 600 men would be quite ample for a small island like that.

3687. When you say "a sufficient protection for that small island," in what sense do you use the word "protection"?—I mean internal protection, solely apart from Imperial considerations.

3688. Do you mean for the defence of the island?—Merely internally.

3689. You think that if the colonists there have to pay the 45,000 *l.* a year, they will prefer having English troops to troops from amongst the natives of India?—Undoubtedly.

3690. You expressed an opinion, I think, that the troops in the Mauritius ought to be composed of native troops, and ought to be in some sort of way a reserve for the Indian forces in India?—I did not wish to convey that; I thought myself

that India, with its large army, and especially an army formed as Sir Henry Rawlinson has mentioned, could with ease supply to these small islands a very good and useful military force; and this would save England from the necessity of sending out valuable European troops to occupy garrisons which can be held equally efficiently, and as safely, by an inferior force, if I may so call it, and a force more easily raised than our Europeans can possibly be.

3691. At whose cost would that force be maintained?—The cost of that small force would be infinitely less than the cost of the present force; and if it were formed with reference to the wants of the island, the sum now paid would be equal to providing that small force.

3692. You apprehend that the colonists there would object very strongly to paying that money for that force, if I understand you rightly?—They would raise that objection which all the colonies who do pay money now raise; Ceylon now raises it very strongly. Those two islands which are the most prosperous in the Eastern seas, namely, Ceylon and Mauritius, are called upon to make contributions by the Imperial Government for military forces, because their funds are in good order, to a far greater extent than the expense which any other colony is called upon to bear.

3693. In Mauritius there is no serious complaint that we have heard against paying a proportion of the expenses of the garrison?—Except that they have been obliged to tax every kind of necessary; they have taxed the wine which has been hitherto free from taxes; they have taxed almost everything they could possibly do, and they are now preparing to tax the rice which is coming in to support the immense population which is employed in the cultivation of sugar in the island.

3694. Is that owing to the increase of the contribution to the English Government, or to the expenditure of money in various ways in the island?—To both. The 45,000 *l.* which they pay now for the military contribution, and the 120,000 *l.* which Ceylon pays, would enable the Governments to take off from the articles which they now tax either the whole of the duties, or else a considerable portion of them. In Ceylon the people have been crying out, and representations have been made to Parliament here very strongly, that the rice imported from India is taxed in Ceylon for the purpose of carrying on the Government, and 120,000 *l.* is more than sufficient to take off that tax on rice.

3695. However, you consider that the colonists would object to paying the sum they are paying now, if they had the inferior native troops substituted for the European troops in the garrison?—I think they would justly, and with great good reason, raise an objection to it; why should they be taxed; why should the planters of the Mauritius, who raise sugar there, be taxed heavily as they are now for the sugar which they make, when Jamaica, Barbadoes, and these West Indian Islands, who equally raise sugar, are free from that taxation. They say justly that they have received no favours from England, that the sugar they make is finer than the West Indian sugar, and yet the taxation upon their sugar was the highest possible rate you could levy here; whereas the taxation upon West Indian sugar was two-thirds the sum which it is upon the Mauritius sugar, and yet because they themselves

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3696. All those arguments would apply equally to the present contribution they are paying. My question was whether they would object more strongly to the present contribution which they pay, if they had the native troops of India substituted for European troops?—I think it is conclusive that they would.

3697. Will you explain to me why you think that the British public would be better satisfied to pay for these troops, as the cost of course would fall upon them if they go the Mauritius, instead of having their own troops employed, which of course are more to be relied upon in case of difficulty arising?—I argued thus, that you have got now in the very heart of your empire an insufficient force available for the purpose of keeping up those troops, and that in the event of any necessity arising, not only India, but Mauritius, Ceylon, and other colonies, would be drained of European troops for the purpose of maintaining the defence of the empire. My first recommendation was based mainly upon that consideration, that it is wise for you to make arrangements in time of peace which in time of war you must make, and that therefore it is better now to do it than to wait until events arise which force you, as was the case in India, to withdraw troops at the time when the Governor General of India considered it most dangerous to do so.

3698. Major *Anson.* Colonel Percy Herbert has apparently divided the expense of the force in the Mauritius into two parts, one being the 45,000 *l.* which would represent what may be called the army of Mauritius itself, that is the force maintained for the purposes of the colonists themselves, and the rest being for Imperial purposes; in that army which they provide for their own defence, with the 45,000 *l.*, what right have they to employ auxiliary troops, which Englishmen in the Mauritius would be, if they pay 45,000 *l.* for soldiers, and those soldiers are Englishmen, they may be called auxiliary troops in that respect, may they not?—Yes.

3699. If we were to say to them, we decline to send our regiments to the Mauritius, you must find your own army, would they not probably have to recruit from the natives of India, that is to say, from the coolie population of the island?—Yes, they do so now. The police is a very efficient body, and it is composed of natives of India who have been brought there as immigrants.

3700. So far for the force supposed to be devoted to the purposes of the Mauritius people themselves: now, with regard to the remainder of the force maintained there for Imperial purposes, I take it that we have a perfect right, without reference to the Colony, to employ whatever force we think most suitable and advantageous for the purpose?—Yes, quite so. That sum of 45,000 *l.* is based upon some proportion which it bears to the 150,000 *l.* or 170,000 *l.*, the expense of the present military force. Therefore if you employ another force which is cheaper, the Mauritius people will certainly have a right to say, "Do not tax us more in proportion than you do other colonies."

3701. Colonel *Percy Herbert.* You stated that a force of something like 600 men was quite sufficient for the defence of Mauritius; have you any personal knowledge of Mauritius?—No.

3702. You spoke of it, of course, merely for internal defence?—Yes.

3703. No doubt it would be sufficient for that purpose?—Yes.

3704. I suppose you are of opinion, with other witnesses who have been before us, that the Mauritius is a very important post to this country, as a halting place on the way to India; as a coaling depôt, in fact?—Yes, as a coaling depôt, I think it is; but I think that the reasoning upon which the Imperial Government is acting is obsolete; and Sir John Burgoyne particularly with his vast knowledge, going back so many years as he does to times before any of us were born, I think, is applying the reasoning of the last century to the present state of affairs with regard to the East. In his evidence before the Colonial Committee of 1861, he brings in the fact that we lost 7,000,000 *l.* sterling by privateering in the last century. Now it is a very remarkable fact that the enterprising French captain who caused us the most loss, instead of going to the Mauritius to refit, went and occupied Nagwa, on the Tennasserim coast, a position which we took from the Burmese in the war of 1826, when we found there the defences and batteries thrown up by that captain to defend his ships whilst they were being refitted, against any attack made by our vessels. It was our perfect ignorance of that remarkable peninsula that enabled him to take refuge there. The place which he occupied is a very noble harbour. That French captain went actually into the Bay of Bengal and took refuge there, and refitted his vessels, therefore it was not the Mauritius that gave him support against our vessels. No doubt the Mauritius did give support to enemies' vessels, but our main losses were occasioned by our not having occupied that coast on the opposite side of the Bay of Bengal. We do now occupy it, and the civil administration there is now in full force as much as in any part of India.

3705. Still, as a military man, are you not of opinion that the Mauritius, by its position, is a valuable post for coaling and for victualling?—Restricting my reply to the simple question of its being a coaling depôt, I admit that it is of some use; but I do not think myself that it is of that great use which people are inclined to ascribe to it; for this reason, that there are many other places which we could establish for the purposes of coaling depôts, which would not entail upon us the necessity of having a large civil government, as we have in an island like Mauritius.

3706. Is that any expense to us?—It is not any expense to us, but it is an important consideration, because we are obliged to defend that island, by reason of the large population which is there located. If you look to the question of a coaling depôt in the simplest possible form of what that means, I think you could establish a coaling depôt in some other island where it would be equally as useful to us as the Mauritius would be.

3707. Will you mention any place that would be suitable for that purpose?—Dograths and Sachetties. At the former I think a sergeant of police is stationed, and that is the extent of our civil administration in that island. There are 10,000 or 15,000 people there.

3708. There is some advantage, is not there, in denying such a place as Mauritius to an enemy?—I look upon the command of the seas as an essential point for that purpose. We may

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as well expect to fly as to hold the Mauritius unless we have the command of the seas. It is useless for us to disguise from ourselves that the command of the sea is necessary for keeping these islands. You, having been out in the East, are well aware of that.

3709. Supposing that we cannot hold that island without the command of the seas, yet in the event of a naval war, is not it a post of very considerable importance to us for the purpose of supplying and refitting our cruisers, and so forth?—I will admit that much, that it is an exceedingly useful port in the Eastern seas, and that a great number of ships do go into Port Louis. Vessels are very liable to be dismasted in a typhoon in those seas, and they come in great numbers to take refuge in Port Louis and get repaired; so much so, that they have got employment for three docks there. In that respect it is of importance, undoubtedly.

3710. Those docks, I suppose, would enable a small man-of-war to refit?—Yes; we have occasionally a large vessel refitted there, in fact.

3711. *Chairman.*] Has a vessel any business to be in the path of the typhoon unless it is going to the Mauritius?—Yes; many vessels which are not going to the Mauritius are dismasted and blown to the island. No doubt it is advantageous as a maritime post in that respect.

3712. What course does the typhoon lie in?—I forget now. I would not undertake to say in regard to it, but there is no doubt that vessels bound to the Cape do go into the Mauritius.

3713. *Colonel Percy Herbert.*] You complain that the regiments in India are kept very much under their establishment?—Yes.

3714. But you say that the force in India is altogether too large?—Yes.

3715. And you say that that will cause danger by increased taxation?—Yes.

3716. Will you just specify briefly which are the taxes that you specially allude to?—Mr. Laing has very fully reported upon them, and they are all before the House of Commons; they are taxes upon trades and professions. As Mr. Laing justly said, they involved the taxation of 20,000,000 of people.

3717. *Mr. Laing.*] You mean the income tax and the license tax?—No, they have put on the old taxes which you refused to put on.

3718. *Colonel Percy Herbert.*] What taxes are there?—There are the income tax, which was partly in operation when Mr. Laing was there, and which Sir Charles Trevelyan took off; there are also new taxes, which Mr. Laing, under Lord Canning's Government, refused to carry out, though hard pressed by Sir Charles Wood to do it; those are what they call the taxes on trades and professions.

3719. Can you tell the Committee, roughly, what amount those specially obnoxious taxes bring in to the Government of India?—In the Madras Presidency, they had a tax upon trades and professions in operation for many years, and it brought in, I think, a very insignificant sum.

3720. *Mr. Laing.*] We may take it generally, that from a million to a million and a half sterling economised in the expenditure would just make the difference of being obliged, or not obliged, to put on those taxes?—Yes, I quite agree to that.

3721. *Colonel Percy Herbert.*] You said that the force in the Marquis of Dalhousie's time was 0.58.

dangerously small, and the force which you spoke of as being requisite for India was 3,000 cavalry, 35,000 infantry, and 10,000 artillery, upon the supposition that the artillery was to be European. That amounts to 48,000; you put it in round numbers as 50,000 men?—Yes.

3722. You stated that the force now is considerably too large, did you not?—Yes.

3723. I think you stated that the actual number was not more than 58,000 men?—About 58,000, taking Sir William Mansfield's statement.

3724. But there can be no question about it; he gave the establishment, and you took off the average deduction; was not that so?—I would explain that; I accept Sir William Mansfield's statement to that effect; but, in 1862, Sir Charles Wood issued an instruction to send out 5 per cent. in excess of the establishment, 10 per cent. being the calculated ratio of the casualties in the year, so that to make them equal on the whole year round, you require that 5 per cent. in excess of the fixed establishment should be sent out to India, and I am not aware of any change in that order, though, of course, my ignorance is not a proof of its not having been changed. Therefore, I accept Sir William Mansfield's statement, that a change of policy has taken place, and that instead of the army of India being kept up to its full maximum establishment, it is now allowed to fall below that establishment, by reason of all the casualties which take place in the establishment being supplied once a year, whereas if the excess of 5 per cent. had been kept up, he would, upon the average of the year, have had the establishment the same.

3725. That leaves a difference of only 8,000 between your figures of what you think is requisite, and what is actually there?—Yes; I corrected that deficiency of 8,000 rank and file by saying also that that branch of the military force which was the least expensive of all, I mean the soldiers, was kept below its establishment, whilst the most expensive of all, the officers and non-commissioned officers, was kept up to the full maximum establishment required by the organisation; so that you have been unnecessarily keeping up an organisation which is exceedingly expensive for India.

3726. By whom is the establishment in India fixed; has not the Indian Government a good deal of influence in fixing the force of each battalion?—On the contrary, I had occasion to make some representations, which having been taken up by the Government of India, of course became those of the Government of India, and not mine; but Sir Charles Wood expressed his displeasure that I should make any representations. As I said, they were not mine, because when Mr. Laing, and Sir Bartle Frere, and Lord Canning approved of any suggestions, I think they were theirs; but I think the Government of India was frequently told to mind their own business.

3727. I mean, not the Government of India out there, but the Secretary of State for India in this country?—I am sorry to say that there has been a long correspondence between the Secretary of State for India and the Horse Guards and the Secretary of State for War; I think you will find that the ideas of the Home Government were mainly allowed to operate in fixing the force, and that the strength of the depôts

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3728. That is to say, that the Home Government protested against the depôts being kept at so low an ebb as they had been, as being insufficient to maintain the force out in India?—I believe if you were to double the depôts upon the present organisation, you would find them insufficient.

3729. Am I to understand that the Government of India, represented by the Secretary of State for India, has no influence in fixing the establishment of the regiments in India who are to compose the force occupying India?—I can only speak from my limited means of knowledge; I have not access to all the official documents, but I have now for many years past been giving attention to that subject, and I must frankly say to you that the influence of the Government of India has been very limited in that respect.

3730. Have you no knowledge of its having been exercised in order to reduce the establishment of the regiments that are serving in India below what was proposed by the military authorities in this country?—You are all aware that the English Government refused to take back troops.

3731. I speak of the establishment of the regiments serving in India; is not it a fact that the Indian Government, represented by the Secretary of State for India, have put a pressure upon the Home Government to send those regiments out in the weak state in which you describe them to be inefficient?—Taking the establishment of the regiments varying from time to time, as they have varied, the influence of the Home Government representative of India, that is to say, the Board of Control and the Secretary of State for India has been listened to very slightly in fixing those establishments; I think that influences have been at work, which have prevented the alteration of the establishments of the regiments; I do not believe that at the present moment the Indian Government here, or any Secretary of State, would ever have willingly consented to an establishment of officers and non-commissioned officers being maintained, for, say, 800 rank and file, when that establishment of officers and non-commissioned officers is equal to 1,200 rank and file.

3732. That is not my question; I have not asked you whether the Indian Government would object to the number of officers being maintained at the present strength, but whether the influence of the Indian Government has not been used to cause the strength of the rank and file of the regiments to be reduced to what it is now, as far as your knowledge goes?—Then I had better say I do not know; I have no official knowledge; I can only speak from the traditions of the Indian Government.

3733. I do not say official knowledge; have you any knowledge?—I have no knowledge of the direct action of the Secretary of State for India with the military authorities here.

3734. Has it ever come to your knowledge that any recommendations have been made by the Indian Government, or any demands, to have fewer battalions and to make them stronger, as you have advocated?—I have a knowledge that Lord Canning did approve of the memorandum which I gave in in November 1860, in favour of maintaining the strength to the maxi-

mum establishment possible, so as to diminish the number of cadres of regiments in India; I am also aware from the displeasure which Sir Charles Wood, now Lord Halifax, expressed to me upon my return home in 1862, with regard to my recommendations, that that was a portion of the advice which he considered to be uncalled for.

3735. Then it did not meet with the support of the Government of India in this country?—I judge from the conversation of Sir Charles Wood that he left those matters very much to be disposed of by the Secretary of State for War, and the Commander in Chief.

3736. Before the mutiny, was not there a question between the Indian and the Imperial Governments, with reference to increasing the force in India; was it not the case that the Indian Government wished to increase the local European force, and that the Home Government preferred to increase the number of Queen's troops?—No; they gave an increase of three regiments of Europeans, which raised them up to nine regiments of Europeans in India. Lord Dalhousie also proposed that additional Europeans should be raised by disbanding the native regiments, two native regiments being disbanded for every additional European regiment to be raised. That permission was refused, although they gave three additional European regiments without any disbanding of native regiments; that was in 1854.

3737. You spoke of the English cavalry as not having been of much use in India; was not it considerably engaged in the Punjaub wars?—What I meant was this, that the whole cost of a European cavalry soldier is immediately doubled on taking the field; it is an exceedingly troublesome arm to provide with supplies, and therefore it is that, although on all occasions, I need not say, the European cavalry have behaved with marked bravery and never been wanting, still it has not been a force which the Indian Government or the Commander in Chief were much in favour of maintaining in India, and if I mistake not, I think Lord Dalhousie was quite willing to have parted with the two regiments of cavalry. I will correct that on referring to the documents, if necessary, but I think after he sent away the 10th and 12th Regiments he was quite willing to give two more regiments from India for the war in the Crimea; however, as a general rule, the increasing of the force of European cavalry has not been for many years in favour with the Indian Government.

3738. There have been many occasions during our occupation of India when the European dragoons have been of great value, have there not?—Yes; it is not in that sense that I speak. A European squadron will go through any force.

3739. They were very valuable in the Punjaub war, were they not?—Yes.

3740. They did some extraordinarily good service in the campaigns under the Duke of Wellington, did they not?—Yes; the 19th Regiment charged a mass of cavalry at Assaye, in a manner that no other regiment has ever done.

3741. And again, in the operations against Scindiah and Holkar they were very valuable, were they not?—In the last war the three regiments of cavalry which General Lake lead, and the 789 European infantry soldiers he had, went against any amount of force, guns and all. It

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was not from undervaluing the European cavalry that I said what I did, but it was merely as being so expensive a force.

3742. They are so expensive that you would not have more than you could employ well?—No.

3743. You said also, speaking of the cost of a regiment of infantry, that the pay of the officers of a regiment of 950 rank and file, was two-thirds that of the men; I presume you meant pay and allowances?—It is about two-thirds. I will fill in the exact figures with regard to it.

3744. Does not that include barrack accommodation in the case of the officers?—No; you are aware that an European officer has no barrack accommodation.

3745. But do not his pay and allowances include barrack accommodation?—Yes.

3746. Does not it, therefore, include barrack accommodation in the case of the officers, and exclude it in the case of the men?—Yes. I am talking now merely of the number of rupees given to the officers and that given to the men.

3747. The number of rupees given to the officers includes horse accommodation, travelling, and tentage?—Yes.

3748. Whereas those items are all extra in the case of the men?—Yes; I am merely talking of the actual money paid, respectively, direct to the officers and direct to the men.

3749. That by no means represents the proportionate expenses of the two, does it?—Not at all; the proportion of the officers probably would be about one-fifth of the whole expenditure of a European force.

3750. I think you stated, also, that one objection, which you had to the present system of having two armies of royal troops was, that the force of Europeans in India would be removed in the event of an European war?—Yes.

3751. You would not object to that; if you have 8,000 too many now, you would allow us to take 8,000 away?—If you confined yourself to the 8,000 I would not object; but I am afraid you would go to the extent of 20,000.

3752. In your considerations, have you not been guided very much by the fact that you consider that you can always draw upon England for troops, in the case of an emergency in India?—I think it is solely due to this: although many instances can be brought forward where England has been called upon to supply extra European troops, I think those demands have been mainly increased by reason of the Government of India not having at their command a separate army altogether.

3753. Of Europeans?—Yes; however I do not think it is right for me to imply that England has not been essential in supplying the means of conquering India; there is no use in gaining saying that, for all the operations which have been going on in India, England has poured forth her soldiers. What I meant to say was, that the greatest danger is, not in contending with the force which you have at your disposal in England, but of having the force in India greatly reduced by the heart of the empire being endangered. I am afraid India will be endangered in case of any remarkable events occurring which will force the Imperial Government to make a great drain upon the Indian force.

3754. If you increase the force to meet any events that may occur in India and the Colonies, India especially, the whole expense of that in-
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crease will fall upon the Imperial funds?—My view is, that India is quite willing to pay, and ought to pay, for the expense of every increased force she receives. I believe, in proportion as you manage her finances well, so will you be able to pay for any troops which you keep up in England for the purposes of India. The stronger your reserves, and the more efficient and powerful those reserves, the more efficient is the force in India. It is for that reason that I want you to observe that I do not think that the reserves kept in England now are either efficient for maintaining the force in India, or properly sufficient.

3755. Then you would think it a perfectly fair and reasonable thing if the European force in India is reduced to as low an ebb as it can be properly reduced to in ordinary times, that a certain reserve should be kept up in England for Indian purposes, at Indian expense?—Not in the way in which the authorities in England think fit to keep the reserves at present. The Duke of Cambridge has said that the depôts in India cannot supply the requirements.

3756. I am not speaking of the depôts; of course there must be small depôts here to drill the recruits for the respective regiments in India; but what I want to put to you is whether it would not be fair, in your view, that a certain number of effective regiments should be maintained here at the expense of the Indian revenues?—I do say decidedly so; but I object to Imperial considerations swaying in the organization of the force; I will give you a remarkable fact to exemplify that; you are aware that a capitation tax has lately been placed upon India of 10 £. for every efficient man; Lord Canning took me up to Barrackpore, and for three days he entered into that question, and Mr. Laing also took it up with regard to the depôts, and, after three days he authorised me to consent to it; the plea upon which that 10 £. capitation was mainly based was, for the purpose of maintaining the depôts in England in a good position, and up to a high standard. The plea which was then urged was that the soldiers who would be furnished by this country, if the contribution was paid, would be drilled, and in the highest degree efficient, and that they would be sent out to India as trained soldiers, fit to take the field, and fit for every kind of duty in India. Now, it so happened that last year I went into that question upon the recruiting commission, and you will find that a portion of our report is, that far from that condition being fulfilled (we were obliged to report it in the quiet manner in which Royal Commissions should report), the recruits sent out to India were neither of the age proper for service in that country, nor were they sufficiently drilled to join the establishment, therefore, I think that has a strong bearing on the subject; you have no confidence that in this case the arrangements made between the Imperial Government and India will be fairly and honestly carried out.

3757. You are referring again to the question of the troops at the depôts; my question applied, distinctly, only to the question of maintaining efficient regiments here at the expense of the Indian Government, as a reserve for India in case of emergency; I think you said "Yes," and then diverted to the depôts?—I am afraid of my views being misunderstood; I frankly say that, I think, India ought to bear the burden of her wants, whatever she may require; but then India

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India ought to have a voice in those arrangements. I merely mention that in one instance, which I had proof of, the man who ought to have been trained at the dépôts, because their cost was borne by India, had not been so trained, and, therefore, we have no confidence that if a regiment was kept up as a reserve for India here, that regiment would not be sent away tomorrow to Canada, or any other place where an emergency required troops to be sent; and, therefore, India would have no certainty of having, in case of need, the regiment she had paid for.

3758. That is your only objection, otherwise you think it a fair arrangement, if it could be fairly carried out?—I think India ought to pay for every man she requires for her defence; she is wealthy enough, and, with good management, could do it.

3759. Inasmuch as the reliefs must always come from England, and inasmuch as a number of regiments are constantly occupied in going to India and coming back again, independently of the garrison of India, and you must also be ready to meet emergencies in India, would it be fair that a certain proportion of the army at home should be maintained at the expense of the revenues of India, they being efficient regiments and ready for service, the same as the other regiments?—I think that India ought to pay for any reserve which is deemed by Indian administrators to be needed for the support of India, and provided that the arrangement is honestly and fairly carried out. As far as my opinion goes, I think that India ought to pay for everything she requires.

3760. Mr. Laing.] All you mean is merely this: that as the House of Commons happens to sit in London, and not at Calcutta, there is always a tendency, more or less, to ease the English estimates at the cost of the Indian?—Yes, that is all.

3761. Colonel Percy Herbert.] I think you are a strong advocate for reverting to the old system of a local European force for India?—Perhaps I did not mention sufficiently strongly that that European force ought to be of sufficient strength to make it a respectable army. I think that formerly the force was not large enough to give experience and knowledge to the officers. I hold that similar training, and experience, and knowledge of military discipline, to what officers of European troops possess, may be gained by serving with European soldiers, and that influence would be exceedingly valuable if it were brought to bear upon the officers of the native troops; and, in that way, I have always thought that, if we had our Europeans officered by the same class of men as the officers of the native troops, the military *esprit* and military knowledge of how to manage troops, which the officers of the native army would acquire, would be most valuable to that army.

3762. Taking it in round numbers that your European force in India should be 50,000 men, would you propose that the whole of that should be a local army?—No; I think Lord Canning's proportion was a very good one, viz., 30,000 locals, and 20,000 auxiliaries.

3763. By auxiliaries you mean Queen's troops?—Yes, of the regular Imperial army.

3764. Is not there this inconvenience in having a large force of Europeans, that the same thing might recur again of a difference between

the troops and the Government upon some question of pay and allowances, and that you might have them mutinying, as they did in 1858?—I will state to you what was done in 1861. Lord Canning put me upon the Amalgamation Commission to reduce the instructions from home to order. The first question that we had to consider was that of bringing home the European force. There were three artillerymen on the commission, of whom Sir William Eyre and myself were two. The question was as to the European soldiers being deprived of what they had been accustomed to in India, and the accustomed conditions of the service being changed; for instance, whenever their term of service expired after the 10 years or 14 years, or whatever the term might be, or when they were taken on again in any form, they received a bounty.

3765. Whenever they were transferred from one regiment to another?—No; because they were transferred occasionally in the ordinary course of things; it was chiefly when their 14 years' service was expired, and there were separate bounties given to those soldiers on taking on. A soldier after 14 years' service was entitled to send in a warning certificate saying that he would or would not take on; if he took on with the service he received a bounty. In 1861 the question was raised how to get the 18,000 soldiers of the local army to take on; we proposed that a bounty should be given to those that took on; that bounty was approved of by the Government and sanctioned by the Commander in Chief, and it was alone sufficient to induce nearly the whole of the 18,000 soldiers to come over. I am perfectly satisfied that in 1858 the measures taken against the local army never would have been taken against the Imperial soldiers. I believe that the principle upon which the Horse Guards and Her Majesty's Government have always acted has been to respect the rights and claims of European soldiers, and that they have never, on any other occasion, infringed them in the manner in which they attempted to infringe the rights which the soldier had, or thought he had, in 1858.

3766. You are aware that the law officers of the Crown gave it as their opinion that the soldiers were enlisted to serve the Queen, and that the terms of their enlistment were not changed; and that they were called upon to do what was perfectly within the terms of their enlistment?—I am quite aware of that.

3767. And also that the oath of the soldier was, that he was sworn to serve the Queen, as well as to obey the orders of the East India Company?—Yes.

3768. In the event of so large a proportion of the European force in India being the local army, as you propose, is there any danger of questions, upon the subject of pay and allowances, between the troops and the Government, producing a mutiny similar to that in 1858?—I have, myself, no apprehension upon the subject. With care and attention, on the part of the Government, equal to that which the Government at home pay to their soldiers, I am perfectly convinced that the European soldier in the local army in India would be as faithful and as true to his colours as any Queen's soldier.

3769. Do you think that corps raised for local service are as easily maintained in a state of complete efficiency as regiments which are moved from

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from one place to another?—I would have wished to have a larger force maintained, and to get more experienced officers in India than we used to do; but I add, that of the four regiments that went before Delhi, two were Company's regiments and two were Queen's regiments, the 52nd being one of them. They equally performed service as gallant as you could desire. The losses by death were equally great, and yet as regards efficiency, at the end of the time the two Company's regiments were much stronger than the two regiments of the Queen's Army. The 52nd Regiment, under Colonel Campbell, as good a regiment as you could desire, marched away with 118 rank and file under the colours, and there was not one of the two regiments of the

Company's army that did not march away with double that strength. Therefore I maintain that in India the local troops have certainly been efficient, and there has been no great crime in the case of the local European regiments; they have been, in some respects, inferior to the regular regiments coming from England, but only in some respects. I remember when General Goodwin saw the two Company's regiments who were at Rangoon, and compared them with the regiments of the Queen's Army, he said that he had never seen such fine men. Sir Hope Grant has also given evidence before a Committee in regard to the fineness of the men. I would simply add, that the courts martial will show very fairly in favour of the local European troops.

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Friday, 26th July 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.
Viscount Cranborne.
Sir James Fergusson.
Viscount Hamilton.

Lord William Hay.
Captain Hayter.
Colonel Percy Herbert.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

Major General GEORGE BALFOUR, called in; and further Examined.

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3770. Major Anson.] ONE of the great objections taken to the scheme of the employment of Indian troops in the Colonies is the difference between the scale of pay and allowances to Indian officers and European officers; have you any remarks to make on that question?—It is as well to explain, that in India the system upon which the Government have proceeded from time immemorial, has been to give to the Indian officers a certain quantity of silver, and to debar them from taking advantage of the public service in adding to their means in any way; and the consequence is that house rent, servants, and everything are included in the number of rupees which the officers get. In contrast with that, the system of the English army has been to supply officers, and indeed men, with almost everything that is wanted in kind, and to give the smallest amount of money to the officers. I have, however, on many occasions made comparisons between the relative cost of the officers of the Indian army and those of the British army, and I have come to the very decided opinion that it is in no way either more economical, or more efficient, to supply the officers with articles in kind, in contradistinction to giving them silver. My own belief is strong, that if you look to the relative cost of the troops in the Colonies, you will find, taking China, Ceylon, and perhaps the Mauritius (those three places I can speak of), that the relative cost of the troops there is below the average cost of European troops in India. If the Committee will permit me, I will ask them to receive this statement; it is one that has been printed in a paper which has been laid before Parliament, and it is very desirable that you should have an official statement, and not my bare opinion; it is one taken from the Report of the Military Finance Department, made by my successor, after I left India. It is one of the best statements, next to the French, that I have ever seen given with regard to the cost of the European troops; it has also a short summary of the cost of native troops; the whole of the data are stated in this Report in the Colonies, and as it will serve as a model in other respects, I will hand it in. It is with regard to the cost of troops in India itself, but it involves a portion of the troops serving in the Straits of Burmah.

3771. Does it show the distinction?—No, it does not show the distinction; it takes the Indian establishment as a whole; the average cost per man both for European and Native troops is given. I put this in with regard to the statement which you have annually placed before you in the War Office Estimates; from that statement so placed before Parliament, it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain any information with regard to the real cost of troops in the Colonies. You have not any figures given you with regard to the numbers in the Colonies, and therefore you are at a loss to guess what proportion the different charges bear to the numbers of the different arms and branches of the service. Now I would particularly refer to Hong Kong, for instance; that is a Colony of a very extensive nature. I can speak of the barracks that I saw myself, at the time when I passed through from Shanghai, 20 years ago. The chief engineer invited me to inspect the barracks for the officers, and I was struck with the cost to the Government of those quarters for officers. The contrast was the greater, because at that very time a regiment of native infantry was stationed at Hong Kong, and the officers were receiving Indian allowance and tentage, which covered the house rent. I satisfied myself that, taking the relative systems of paying in money and providing quarters, the money system is infinitely the more economical to the Government. Mixing, as I did for a few days, with the officers of the native infantry, I found them infinitely more comfortable than they could be in the apparently fine barracks supplied to the officers of the European force.

3772. Can you state whether the officers at that time in the European force were placed on Indian pay and allowances?—It was in that year that an effort was made to withdraw the native troops from China, on purpose to bring back the troops stationed there to the English system of supplying them in kind. I did, on my arrival in this country, express a strong opinion that they would do that infinitely more economically by the change than they would by giving the officers the allowances they had been accustomed to get in India.

3773. Living at the Colonies, especially in China, is becoming very expensive, and no doubt the

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the pay of the officers is far below what would enable them to live comfortably, is it not?—Yes; at all those settlements the expense of living is exceedingly high; I first went out to Singapore in the year 1826; living was very high, so much so that the Government were forced to give, in addition to the Indian allowances, the island allowance to aid the officers; in China particularly no one can mix with the merchants without seeing their great luxury and wealth, and the expenditure they incur, and the consequence is that the officers of the English army appear at a great disadvantage in contrast with the society in which they move.

3774. Colonel *Percy Herbert*.] Will you state to the Committee the amount of the island allowance?—I have got a table of that, showing the scale: a subaltern has 120 rupees for island allowance at Singapore, but from that they deduct what they call the tentage, leaving therefore 70 rupees in excess of what he had before received; the net allowance is 70 rupees for a subaltern, or nearly 8 l. at that time, but it is not more than 7 l. now; then the island allowance is 105 rupees, or 10 l. 10 s. for a captain, and 130 rupees for a major, that is in addition to the other sum.

3775. Major *Anson*.] You do not think that adopting the Indian system in those Colonies where the English officer is considerably underpaid now would lead to a large additional expense in maintaining our troops?—No; on the contrary, I believe that you would indirectly save money in many ways; for instance, with regard to the staff and the establishments, those especially bring up the cost of the army, and not the money which you may reasonably give either to the officers or to the men. In the East, especially where you must have establishments and followers, the establishments swell up the expenses; in any case you might safely give the money whenever you can possibly reduce the establishment. Let me remind the Committee that the Ceylon expenditure at the present moment is very much based on the Indian one; in fact, the Ceylon expenditure of the present day is simply converting the various allowances given in India to the troops originally located in that island into a round sum; the relative position of the officers in Ceylon and the officers in India is very much the same.

3776. What are the allowances given to the officers in the Mauritius in addition to the ordinary pay?—There was formerly an allowance which was a little more than in Ceylon, which has been lately changed in consequence of the island having ceased to contribute to the direct support of the troops, and the whole of the money which the islands, both Ceylon and the Mauritius, now pay is paid direct into the Imperial Treasury. I cannot tell you what they are, but they have been very much reduced; and I am very sorry to say that the officers have been obliged to shut up the mess at the Mauritius in consequence of that reduction; I think a measure of that kind interfering with what is so necessary for the well-being of a regiment is very deeply to be regretted, and any saving which the Government may fancy they would make does not counterbalance the great evil of changing the regimental system of the army.

3777. A great deal has been said with regard to our troops in the Colonies being used as a reserve for India; and great stress has been laid before this Committee upon the fact that in the

year 1857 they obtained reinforcements from those Colonies in time to assist in the suppression of the mutiny; can you state whether the troops which they received in India started first from England, or from the Cape of Good Hope, in the year 1857, in consequence of the mutiny?—My impression is strong, and the dates would confirm or gainsay it, that the assistance was first started from this country; and if I remember rightly, the troops from this country actually arrived there before the troops from the Cape of Good Hope. It would seem ungrateful to say that the troops from the Cape were of no use, because it has been recorded that they were of great use; but my conviction is strong that the necessary assistance could have been obtained from this country to the full extent required.

3778. Colonel *Percy Herbert*.] You do not mean to say that the troops from the Mauritius and Ceylon did not arrive in India before the troops which were sent out from this country?—I said the Cape of Good Hope. I omitted Ceylon; they took away the 37th Regiment from Ceylon.

3779. Major *Anson*.] Do you recollect what the garrison of the Cape was at that time?—The garrison of the Cape at the time of the Indian mutiny was between 4,000 and 6,000 men, if I recollect rightly.

3780. It was 11,000, was it not?—It was very strong at all events; I know that they parted with the troops with the greatest possible ease.

3781. But if they could only spare three regiments from the Cape at that time, with a force of 11,000, it is not likely that they would be able to send a very large reinforcement at the present time to India, supposing that anything happened to call for that reinforcement, with only a garrison of 4,000 men?—My conviction is very strong that really you ought not to lock up a single soldier in any one of those places for any emergencies in India. I think that India should provide for itself, and, in fact, that all those Colonies, China and Singapore, and all those places, ought to have a force sufficient to overcome any risings which might be expected to take place.

3782. It seems almost absurd, does it not, that a great power like India should depend for its safety upon reinforcements from small Colonies scattered all over the world?—All that I have observed in the administration of Indian affairs proves that they can make their own arrangements. Moreover, I will say this (and the past history of India proves it), that India has given fully as much support to the Imperial Government in carrying out the measures which they have ordered as those islands have ever given to India. I do not believe myself that you could have carried on the operations in China without assistance from India.

3783. I gather from your evidence that you are decidedly of opinion that the neck of the mutiny in the year 1857 was broken before a single soldier arrived in India from abroad?—Decidedly so; it has not been so broadly asserted as that, because it looks as if you were denying to this country the credit of the assistance which was given; but looking at the events at Delhi, and the noble stand which that small band of soldiers made, and looking at the success of their operations, I think the capture of Delhi in September 1857 was the greatest blow which the discontented population received in India. At all events, I can speak for Hyderabad; that

Major Gen. G. Balfour. was the most dangerous part of the empire except Delhi; and the fall of Delhi entirely prevented any designs at Hyderabad being carried out there, which an immense number of Arabs and bands of armed men had always entertained against our power to be put in force at some day or other.

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3784. Lord *William Hay*.] When did the first regiment land in Calcutta?—The Madras Fusiliers were the first to get there, and the 37th Regiment was the next, I think.

3785. I mean from abroad?—The 37th Regiment came from Ceylon, and that was the one that succeeded the Fusiliers.

3786. When did they arrive?—The Fusiliers could not possibly have got there before the middle of June.

3787. Colonel *Percy Herbert*.] When did the regiments of the China expedition arrive?—I do not think they got there before the end of August 1857.

3788. Lord *William Hay*.] Did not their arrival have a material influence on the issue of the mutiny, by holding in check the rebels in the South of India; in Gwalior, for instance?—Not, certainly, Gwalior, because that contingent came down upon us from Cawnpore.

3789. Not until some time after the fall of Delhi?—The question asked of me was this: Was not the neck of the mutiny broken by the means then existing in India; and I say, Yes.

3790. Yes; but the neck of the mutiny was broken by the fall of Delhi, was it not?—Yes.

3791. The arrival of those troops from abroad began long before the fall of Delhi, and must have had a good effect, must it not?—In trampling down the mutiny, and putting out the embers of it, no doubt. The satisfactory state which India was brought to in the year 1860, was occasioned by the arrival of an immense force from England. It quenched every effort made by the different native chiefs to keep up opposition to us.

3792. But what I mean is this; did not several regiments arrive from abroad long before it can be said that the neck of the mutiny was broken?—I hold that the fall of Delhi was the breaking of the neck of the mutiny; it thrilled throughout the country.

3793. That was on the 14th of September?—It came to Madras while I was there, and they felt the throbs of it throughout the empire.

3794. But the first regiment arrived in June or July?—They had no effect on the fall of Delhi; but I should wish to say that the troops that came from England were of course invaluable to India.

3795. Major *Anson*.] The reason why I ask that question is, that although those troops from the Colonies had been used on a great emergency for India, you consider that the emergency was over in India by the time they got there in 1857?—I quite agree to that. I never heard up to that time that troops were maintained for that purpose in the Colony. I have never seen any Indian officer or administrator who ever entertained that idea; the idea has been prevalent since the mutiny, but it did not exist before; and I think it is a military mistake to make arrangements for the Colonies, so as to provide for events in India.

3796. There is no doubt that altering the destination of the troops that were then on their way to China was very useful for India; but do you

not consider that it may have had a very bad effect on the minds of the Chinese?—At the time I thought so. My experience leads me to say that any signs of weakness that we have ever shown in the management of our affairs with respect to that country have always been a cause of great trouble to us. I do not say that now for the first time, because in 1847, when Lord Palmerston wished me to return to China, and offered me great inducements, I refused to go back, unless the Government made up their minds to come to a distinct understanding with the Chinese with regard to Canton. If the Government in the year 1847 had resolutely come to a determination that they would not allow the mismanagement of the Chinese to exist any longer, that would have given me the power to carry out what I was commissioned myself to do, and the subsequent danger by our disputes with the Chinese would not have happened. The necessary thing in China is never to show any signs of weakness. Whatever threats you make you should well consider them first; but having made those threats, you should enforce them to the fullest extent. I have no doubt when the Chinese heard that we could not send troops, then with all the Asiatic conceit which that fine nation has, they supposed that we were reduced to great weakness, and we have many enemies in China who are quite willing to make that plain to the Chinese.

3797. Do you think it would be of more use to India itself, if you were able to send your native troops to those Colonies than to have European troops there on the chance of their being brought to India in case of emergency?—I have always considered that the sending away of native troops on foreign service from India may be made beneficial in the highest degree to the discipline of the native army. I mentioned in my last day's evidence, that I was anxious in the extreme to have a larger European force as a component part of the Indian army, and that I thought it would be useful in training up the officers to that kind of discipline which is necessary in European regiments. I would say that the necessity of attending to the sepoys on foreign service is so much greater when abroad than in India, that if you can get officers to attend to their duties in that respect, you would add very much to their knowledge, and enable them to enforce discipline more strictly than ever. I would like, for my own character as much as anything, to explain that there is a remark in a reply of Colonel Merewether's which is exceedingly applicable to native troops. It is that you require to have strict discipline for native troops. He is an officer who has had peculiar opportunities of judging; he has been all his life on foreign service in Scinde. And the discipline which General Jacobs introduced into his fine force was very much the same kind of discipline that you require to have on foreign service. I would strongly advise that, as giving the Indian army a wider field; the more widely you can spread their services, the more likely they are to be efficient.

3798. Any shortcomings, or any laxity in their discipline, is more likely to be observed by taking them out of the sphere of Indian life, and putting them elsewhere?—Yes; and I would say, from having been an adjutant for many years of a native battalion of Artillery, that with the European troops any laxity becomes apparent in a very short time. In India, on the contrary,

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with the sepoys, that laxity may remain for months smouldering, and never become visible until something takes place of a violent nature. But on foreign service it is not possible to happen without its being as quickly brought to notice as it is with regard to European troops.

3799. Do you not think that we ought to look on the discipline of the army in India with as much anxiety, if not more anxiety, than we look on the discipline of the army at home?—It has been a source of regret to see with what indifference that fine army of India has been hitherto regarded. There has been a jealousy and an indifference, which, considering our Asiatic power and the immense importance to this country of India, and the dangers which are coming upon us from Russia, it has been a matter of deep regret to many who have considered the subject, to see with what indifference the sepoy army is looked at.

3800. You do not anticipate any difficulty whatever in employing those troops, judging from the manner in which they have been before this employed in foreign countries, do you?—I cannot myself enter into the doubts and hesitation which I observe are entertained by many; but the fact is, that I am a Madras officer myself, and I have never seen reason to expect any difficulty. I have had, as adjutant, as heavy trials as most adjutants to provide men for foreign service. I have even been obliged to force poor fellows who have returned for a few months, to go back again for foreign service; I made them every compensation of, course. But with regard to these difficulties, the remarks of the Marquis of Tweeddale's excellent Minute apply. That Minute, which has been moved for lately, gives full information connected with the Madras army for more than 100 years, and except in Bengal, Bombay, and Madras, the armies have never been found wanting; I took up the only Return laid before Parliament that I could find, and I would present to you here the number of Madras and Bombay troops that were on foreign service at the time of the mutiny; namely, 20,670 native non-commissioned officers, and men. That will show the extent to which those armies were taken at that time for foreign duties.

3801. Will you mention the sum total in any one year?—That was on the 1st of April 1857; we had then 20,670 native troops employed out of India on that day. I have merely extracted this myself; it is subject to correction, but I believe it is correct enough to be received by this Committee, if not perfectly correct.

3802. Without reference to the extent to which that proposal is carried and leaving that to the Executive, you think that the principle ought to be enforced?—I think so, in any of those Colonies. In those seas, you might with great propriety entertain the idea of occupying them partly by native troops; in fact, as we have hitherto been doing in the Straits.

3803. With regard to those Straits, the honourable Member for Oxfordshire asked you a question, if you had heard when it was proposed to raise a regiment of Indian troops for the Straits Settlements, that the authorities in this country had to reduce an equivalent number of men from the English army; is not it the fact, that before we took over the Straits Settlements the whole of the military expenditure of the Straits was found by itself?—The accounts of the Straits Settlements, after paying all the civil charges of every

kind, showed a sum of money as a surplus which has been hitherto considered fully equal to the expenses of the troops located there; and I have no doubt myself, that if those Straits Settlements had been called upon to pay directly the money into the military treasury, the surplus would have been sufficient to pay those charges.

3804. When we took over the government of the Straits Settlements, I think we also made them pay the sum total of their military expenditure, did we not?—I am told that the sum which has been calculated is 59,900 £.; it is within a fraction of 60,000 £.; but I have no hesitation in saying that if a garrison to the extent which I see named in this paper is supplied to those Straits, you will not pay that garrison, or anything like it; it is three batteries of artillery, the wing of a regiment, and eight companies, I think, of the Ceylon Rifle Corps.

3805. Was not that done by way of not incurring any extra expense for the garrison of Singapore?—That was the ground on which it was done; but I repeat to you that I think the garrison would certainly cost much more than the available revenues in the Straits.

3806. But if that is the possibility on which we are going, how came it that, because they raised a certain number of men for service in the Straits Settlements which the Straits Settlements were to pay for, we reduced a certain number of men in the English army which this country was to pay for?—That is a political question which I cannot answer; but having regard to the result of the inquiries on the Recruiting Commission last year, I would strongly submit that you have never been denuded to such a great degree as you are now; and so far from reducing the army it would be better to consider how you could collect your forces now in hand, instead of spreading them all over the world in settlements which are totally unworthy of being occupied by European troops. I would not send a single man more than Mr. Crauford asked for. He is a man of great experience and of great knowledge, passing over an immense number of years; a man who formed Singapore, and who knows it from the time it was a jungle. All he asked for was 200 European artillerymen to occupy the forts, and an undertaking on behalf of the people of Singapore that they would provide efficient constabulary, organised and equipped in an efficient manner, so as to relieve the European troops from every ordinary duty, and simply require their presence in the forts, as rallying points in case of any unexpected emergency. With all his knowledge of the Malay character, he considered that that army was sufficient for the purpose.

3807. You know, I suppose, that we have increased the garrison at Ceylon by the wing of a regiment at Point de Galle?—Yes.

3808. Do you not think it probable that the fact of their sending European soldiers to the Straits Settlements gave them an excuse for finding that it was necessary to have a European garrison at Point de Galle?—I believe it was in consequence of sending a European force to Singapore that the troops in Ceylon were increased. I have never been able to understand the necessity of increasing the force in Ceylon.

3809. For purely garrison purposes, such as the troops have to do with in the Mauritius say, in times of peace there would not be the slightest necessity to increase the garrison, would there, because

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because you substitute a regiment of natives for a regiment of Europeans?—On the contrary, I believe that if you leave the Mauritius and Ceylon to do that which General Peel so wisely recommended in the year 1859,—that the Colonies shall be called on to say what force they would wish, and if they objected to contribute to the expenses in some fixed proportion,—you would find in the Mauritius and Ceylon that the colonists would voluntarily offer to reduce the force. I believe, if you left the Mauritius to themselves, and said, “What military force would you like, and you will have to pay one-third or one-fourth of the expense?” that instead of having 2,000 men, they would be content with only 500.

3810. For the work which they would have to do in case of war, do you consider that a mixed native and European force would not form an efficient garrison?—I think that would be quite equally efficient. Supposing Sir John Burgoyne’s view of the defence of the Mauritius is correct, and that you require 6,000 men for that little spot in the Indian Ocean, I am perfectly satisfied that a better force you could not have, or one more suitable for the island and more suitable for the supplies, than having a mixed garrison. First of all, the population themselves would be useful to the native troops in many ways; the supplies obtainable in the island would be exceedingly useful; but I do not believe myself, that you could ever occupy the Island of Mauritius a single month, unless you had command of the sea. The Island of Mauritius is fed almost week by week; so little is cultivation carried on, that supplies are poured in from Madagascar and the Cape, and all parts. The garrison, taken as a garrison only, would be starved in a fortnight.

3811. You have expressed your opinion that any system which you would think advisable in times of war, ought to be carried out in times of peace?—I should say certainly, in all parts, both England and India, you ought to have as few changes, when a war breaks out, as possible.

3812. Especially in dealing with the difficult question of what the army of India may have been accustomed to; I suppose that making a change in the duties which they have been accustomed to, would be a very dangerous experiment?—Yes, the less stir, the less anxiety, and the less change you make, the better; the more you make it a matter of regular routine the better it is for the Asiatic, because, whenever you stir his mind up, he begins to form ideas opposite to your own.

3813. Do you see any very great objection to employing the native soldiers; I will not say constantly, but merely so as to give them an idea that they might be called on to serve, say, in Malta or Gibraltar?—I have never served at Malta in that way, but I would rather not. If operations had to be carried on in Egypt, you could scarcely employ a more suitable force than that of 20,000 or 30,000 sepoys; in fact, I have had men serving under my orders, who have been employed in Egypt under General Baird, and they spoke in no way whatever of its being an extraordinary country; they seem to take it as a matter of course. In fact, the system which we pursue in India of very early parades in the morning, was carried on in Egypt in the same manner; I have known officers who had served in Egypt, and they spoke of it as a matter of course. The difficulties which they described of going up the Red Sea we have of course over-

come now, but there was nothing particularly different in the service in Egypt from the service in India.

3814. It has been argued that, if you were to employ those men in times of peace, you would also employ them in times of war; but if you let the General Service Act fall into abeyance for a certain number of years, do you not consider that you might have some difficulty with the native troops?—I have been reading the evidence which has been given before this Committee, and I am at a loss to understand how, in the face of this general order, issued in the year 1856, it can possibly be argued that you have not the right to send the native troops on foreign service. I hold in my hand the general order which was issued on the 25th of July 1856. It is a very comprehensive order indeed, and in fact it recites the conditions under which the Bengal Sepoys had formerly served, and that it is not desirable that the Madras and Bombay army should not be allowed on any condition to furnish troops for foreign service.

3815. *Chairman.*] Will you kindly read the operative clauses of that order?—The operative clauses are: “It has been the practice of the Government to consider this oath, when not otherwise explained at the time of enlistment, as not in itself binding the soldier to proceed on service beyond the sea; and, therefore, whenever regiments have been raised for service beyond sea, no man has been drafted or enlisted into them but with his own consent, and with a full and clear understanding of his engagement to serve beyond sea, when required to do so. From this practice the Government will not depart. It is with a full and clear understanding of this engagement to serve beyond sea, when required to do so, that the Native Artillery, horse and foot, and six regiments of Native Infantry, the 25th, 40th, 47th, 65th, 67th, and 68th, which are the only corps of the Bengal army available for general service, have been recruited. The cheerful alacrity with which these regiments have at all times done their duty, wherever it has called them, and the distinction which they have won for themselves, are well known to the army, and will never be forgotten by the Government of India. Neither does the Government forget how often, when it has needed the service of its troops in foreign countries, the native officers and soldiers of other regiments have come forward to form volunteer battalions, or to proceed as entire corps to serve beyond sea. The readiness with which they have done this is honourable to themselves, and is thankfully acknowledged by the Government. But it has become very inconvenient to Government, and it is hurtful to the State, that a small portion only of the native army of Bengal should be surely available for the service of the State beyond sea, and this inconvenience is not much diminished by the fact that the entire armies of Madras and Bombay are enlisted without any limitation of their place of service. For this reason, the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council will not henceforward accept the services of any native recruit for a regiment of Light Cavalry, of Irregular Cavalry, of Infantry of the Line, or for the *Khelak-i-Ghilzie*, *Ferozepore*, and *Loodianah* regiments, in the army of Bengal, who does not, at the time of his enlistment, distinctly undertake to serve beyond sea, whether within the territories of the Company, or beyond them.” With this order before

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me, it has appeared to me very strange that any hesitation should ever be expressed. The fact is, there was a very injudicious system, which Lord Strathnairn referred to, of forming volunteer regiments for service beyond the seas; and on every occasion when the Government wanted men to go, the first consideration was promotion; it was very beneficial for the native army of Bengal that those promotions should take place; and hence it is that you have never been wanting in the Bengal army of volunteers. The five regiments which went to Java were promoted because they had been kept on service too long.

3816. But you think that is a bad system, because it implies that you cannot force them to go, if you wish it?—As a soldier, I object decidedly that you should ever be placed in a position to have to solicit the will of the soldier. If the officers are not to command, it is better to be without an army; but Lord Strathnairn's evidence on that point is of great importance. He thought it objectionable that you should select a few volunteer regiments, as was proposed, because at other times you would not be able to command the service of our other regiments.

3817. Do you consider that the late proposal to raise troops for China and the Straits Settlements as a distinct service would also have a very bad effect with regard to the native troops, looking upon the service as binding?—To go and raise special regiments as has been proposed is, in my opinion, highly objectionable. I had a proposal before me to raise a regiment for Singapore, and I strongly advised Lord Canning's Government not to accept it. I handed up a statement of the relative cost, and I showed that there was no advantage, so far as money went; that I could not see how it was possible to carry on a good system of discipline, having regiments constantly kept in the Straits. When I first went to the Straits, the first thing I saw was a great number of men in the local regiments undergoing corporal punishment, that state of things arising simply from a want of discipline. I have never been able to recommend any system by which you localise regiments. I think the Indian army, with

some 150 native regiments, is capable of supplying a good force without the necessity of raising special corps.

3818. *Chairman.*] Is there anything that you wish to add to your evidence?—I wish to refer the Committee to two minutes of Lord Dalhousie's and one of Lord Canning's, which bear on the same question. There is a strange force in the remarks of the Committee of 1853, and it is important in this light, that the distrust which so many statesmen have entertained with regard to deprivation of the means for the defence of India is very strongly marked there, and these reports are very little known. Colonel Herbert asked me a question with regard to relative cost in the United Kingdom and abroad, at different dates. I have prepared a table for January 1865: the honourable Member said I had done it for the 1st of June; it is my habit not to prepare statements that tell in my favour, but this new statement tells more in favour of my argument than the other did. This statement appears to me to be very important, as showing how we are scattering our troops at this moment, and how necessary it is that attention should be given to that subject (*vide Appendix*). Colonel Herbert also asked me a question with regard to the relative cost of the officers in reference to the other ranks. My argument went to the fact that the present organisation was a most expensive one, and that the changes now making were not beneficial. I have done what the honourable Member desired; I have taken the 53 regiments that were in India in 1865–66 from official papers, showing the whole cost of those 53 regiments. So far as the direct payment of money made to the regiments, irrespective of rations, clothing, and barracks, and other articles contributed by the Government goes, the whole cost is as nearly as possible 2,000,000 £ sterling. The pay of the officers is 92 lacs of rupees. The direct pay of non-commissioned officers and men is 75 lacs of rupees; that also bears on the evidence which I have given with regard to the point that I have always found that economy is the result of true efficiency.

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Q U E S T I O N S.

1. WHAT is your opinion as to the expediency of substituting Indian for English troops in our Colonies, in time of peace ?

2. State in which of our Colonial possessions you would propose to employ them.

3. Have you any special knowledge, from residence, of the Colonies referred to by you ?—If so, state it.

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4. If it were determined to employ natives of India for service in the following Colonies, what races would be best adapted for such a duty :—

a. South Africa.

b. Mauritius.

c. Ceylon.

d. Straits Settlements.

e. China.

f. Malta.

g. Gibraltar.

h. West Indies.

i. New Zealand.

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5. What arrangements with respect to reliefs would be necessary, supposing them to be employed in any of the Colonies named in the last question?

6. State whether there are any special difficulties that would hinder the races you have named from undertaking garrison service beyond sea, either in respect to religious prejudices or social habits; and whether those difficulties are insuperable in their nature, or could be overcome by an increase of the advantages offered to the soldier?

7. What amount of pay and other advantages, over and above those at present enjoyed by the soldiers of the native Indian army, would, in your opinion, be necessary to procure native troops for such a service?

8. Would native Indian troops be a sufficient garrison in the above-named Colonies in time of peace—

- a. Wholly unsupported by British troops?
- b. Supported by British garrison artillery only?
- c. If not, what proportion of British infantry would be necessary to support them?

9. Would they afford thus entirely, or partially unsupported, sufficient protection to the Cape Colony against the frontier tribes; or against internal disturbances in the following Colonies:—

- a. South Africa.
- b. Mauritius.
- c. Ceylon.
- d. Hong Kong.
- e. West Indies.

10. What is your opinion of the expediency of employing Indian troops in these Colonies in time of war, either in substitution for Europeans or as a supplement to them?

11. Could they be sufficiently relied upon for such a service as materially to lighten the strain to which the military resources of Great Britain are subjected in time of war?

12. Would they be capable of protecting the above Colonies against an attack by a civilised Power as adequately as the existing garrisons? And if not, in what proportion do you think that it would be necessary to increase the numerical strength of the garrisons in order to attain that object?

13. In case of pressure at home, would it be more advantageous to withdraw European regiments that might be wanted in England, from the Colonies, filling up their places with native soldiers from India, or to withdraw them from India?

14. Would the effect of garrison service in these Colonies in time of peace upon the loyalty and general disposition of the native soldier after his return to India be advantageous, or otherwise?

15. Would it be better—

- a. In the interests of India—
- b. In the interests of the Colonies above named—

to take for such a service regiments from the native Indian army according to their turn; or to raise fresh regiments in India, specially and exclusively for Colonial service?

16. Are you of opinion that the presence of British troops in neighbouring Colonies is of material importance to the defence of India in case of an emergency?

17. State from what Colonies troops could be withdrawn in such a case; and whether it would be easier to obtain reinforcements from England than from those Colonies.

18. Would Indian troops, in your judgment, be more efficient for the protection of—

- a. South Africa,
- b. Mauritius,
- c. Ceylon,
- d. Hong Kong,
- e. West Indies,

against either external or internal danger, than troops locally raised from the native populations in or near those Colonies; and would their greater efficiency, if any, counterbalance the greater cost which the transport of the Indian troops from India would involve?

19. Do native soldiers recruited since 1856 believe that they are practically liable to service beyond seas; and if not, would it be desirable to enforce the obligation imposed upon them by their present terms of enlistment?

20. If so, do you think the present a favourable moment for effecting such a change?

21. Now that India belongs to the Crown, do you think that the native army would draw a distinction between service in Aden and Burmah, and the Mauritius and China; and, if so, what distinction would they draw?

22. Give, so far as you know them, any cases of discontent that have come to your knowledge in consequence of the employment of native soldiers on Colonial duty or beyond the seas, whether in territories belonging to the Government of India for the time being or to the Crown, and give the causes of such discontent.

23. State whether you think that the employment of the native Indian army in the British Colonies would tend to give to it more of the character and feeling of an Imperial army; and whether, in your opinion, such a result would be desirable.

24. Would it be possible, or desirable, to recruit from the native population of the Colony in which you reside, regiments for general service?

25. State your opinion as to the policy of employing, either in India or in the Colonies, troops recruited from the Chinese, Malay, African, or other races not Indian, distinguishing between considerations of a military, civil, and political character.

ANSWERS.

ANSWERS of the Right Hon. Sir J. L. Lawrence, Bart., G.C.B., Viceroy and Governor General of India.

1. I THINK that this would only be expedient to a very moderate extent, and ought to be limited to colonies of an oriental climate and type. Considering how few are the English troops in such colonies, I would rather advocate that these troops should be in addition to, than in substitution for, the English troops, so as to enable the authorities to keep the latter in the most salubrious positions, and to save them from as much exposure in times of peace as may be practicable.

2. In time of peace, I would only employ native troops, if actually required, in the Straits Settlements and in China; but, as a temporary measure, during war, they might also be sent to Ceylon, the Mauritius, the Northern Coast of Africa, the Coast of Arabia, and Egypt.

3. I have very little personal knowledge of the colonies, but I have been at the Cape and in Ceylon.

4. I do not advocate the sending Indian troops to any places except those which I have named; but if it be decided to employ such troops in any, or all of the colonies mentioned, I am of opinion that the most suitable races would be Mahomedans, such as the Beloochees of Sind, the Pathans of the Punjab frontier, the Mahomedans of the interior of the Punjab and of the North-west Provinces. All should be volunteers for the special duty.

I do not think that men of the Hindoo races, such as Sikhs, Ghorkas, Rajpoots, Brahmins, or the like, are well suited for colonial service; but if any volunteered for such service, and were in all respects fitted for the duties of a soldier, I would not reject them.

I mention Mahomedans as best suited for colonial service, because they have no religious or social prejudices against going across the seas; and they can also readily accommodate themselves to the circumstances of a foreign life. Hindoos, on the other hand, have a strong feeling against travelling by sea, and have many difficulties and prejudices to overcome in so doing. In other respects, the Sikh, from his martial qualities and strong constitution, is well adapted to a colonial life.

I have no doubt, however, that many Mahomedans and Sikhs would volunteer for colonial service; the want of military employment being very strongly felt in India, more particularly at the present time. I think, however, that gradually such service, in times of peace, would cease to be popular.

5. I think that all corps so employed should be relieved every three years. To do this, it would be necessary to have double the number of corps enlisted for such service, so that one corps might be in India near their homes, while another was in a colony, supposing that regiments specially raised for foreign service are only so employed.

6. I have already replied to this question; the difficulties of colonial service in the minds of native soldiers of India could, no doubt to a considerable extent, be overcome by increased advantages.

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7. The native troops who went to China during the last war in that country received full rations free, besides Indian pay and full batta. A statement of the cost of a native infantry in China is attached to this paper, and the same scale would apply to any other colony. But I am not prepared to say that even this would make the service popular, particularly for troops raised expressly for this employment.

8. I would in no case place Indian troops in a colony without British soldiers. And I would not consider that British garrison artillery would suffice. The proportion of British troops to native soldiers should not be less than one-half, but rather more.

9. I consider that native troops, such as I have described, would afford sufficient protection to the Colonies named both from frontier tribes and internal enemies, when joined with British troops.

10. I would prefer employing native Indian troops in the Colonies in time of war, rather than in time of peace, if they were limited to those places I have named, and as a supplement to British troops.

11. Subject to my limitation, they might be relied on, to the extent suggested, if well managed and well commanded. But the extent of relief would scarcely be of consequence to the resources of Great Britain, if properly organised.

12. I do not consider that either a native garrison, or one composed partly of native and partly of British troops in a colony would be as effective against the attack of a civilised power as an equal number of British troops. On such occasions there would always be also more or less distrust of the native troops, which of itself would be a cause of weakness. On an expedition, on the contrary, a mixed force would, I believe, prove more efficient than if composed solely of English soldiers.

I could not say in what proportion a garrison should be increased when partly composed of native troops, so as to render it as effective as at present. This would of course depend on the quality of the native troops thus employed, their fighting qualities being so different.

13. It would not in my judgment be expedient to reduce the British troops either in India or in the Colonies to any appreciable extent, in the event of any pressure at home. In India, China, Ceylon, Mauritius, and the Straits Settlements, the circumstance that England was in danger would act on these countries and colonies. But South Africa and New Zealand ought, in such a contingency, to be able to spare a portion of their British troops, supplying their place by volunteers of English race.

With due deference I would here say that if England desires to retain a firm hold of her Asiatic and African Colonies in times of danger, and also to be safe at home, she must make adequate arrangements by wise measures for this object; she ought not to look to India or these Colonies for any important assistance, though no

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doubt the authorities in these countries would do all in their power loyally to assist her.

Of the two alternatives, it would probably be better to withdraw some British troops at such times from India than from colonies of an Oriental character. Much would, however, depend on the state of feeling at the time in India.

14. I do not think that the effect of garrison service in these colonies in time of peace would have much influence one way or the other on the loyalty and general disposition of the native soldier. If well treated and contented, the general effect might be considered beneficial, otherwise the case would be reversed. I do not consider, however, that the result of service in a colony of a European population would be good, for the native soldier would there gradually learn a good deal to which he had hitherto been a stranger, and which might lessen his estimate of European institutions and habits. On the other hand, in a colony, the main population of which was Oriental, the evils which he would find would be similar in character to those which he was accustomed to in his own country.

15. It would be better for the colonies on the whole to raise regiments especially and exclusively for colonial service, rather than by turn to supply them from the Indian army generally,—

First. Because in that case the men would all be volunteers; and,

Secondly. Because, as a body, they would be better suited to such service. On the other hand, to the Government of India it would be convenient that these regiments, if few in number, were taken from the native Indian army. Hitherto the Madras army has furnished two regiments for the Straits, and the Bombay army for a time one, and sometimes two, for China.

16. I do not think that this is of much importance to the defence of India, if the country has a sufficient garrison of its own.

17. The only colonies which could readily supply British troops for India in an emergency would be Ceylon, China, and the Mauritius. But these colonies, perhaps, with the exception of the last-named one, with their present garrisons, could hardly with safety spare any appreciable body.

18. With a suitable proportion of British troops in each colony, I should consider that native troops raised in these colonies, or in their vicinity, in moderate numbers, ought to be more efficient for service in them, than Indian troops, but probably they would not be considered so trustworthy. Service in South Africa and the West Indies would surely prove very unpopular with Indian troops, and even in Hong Kong and Ceylon such service would in the long run be distasteful; but not to the extent that it would be in the other places.

19. I do not think that the native troops of this Presidency generally think that they are liable to service beyond seas, nor would it be desirable to enforce this obligation. On the contrary, it would in my opinion, be extremely imprudent to do so. General service, in their minds, means service on the continent of India and the adjoining countries.

20. This question is answered in the preceding one. I am not in favour of any change; but if one must be made, this is as good an opportunity as any other which is likely to occur.

21. The native troops in such a matter would not be influenced by the circumstance that India belongs to the Crown. Service in Aden and Burmah is employment in the vicinity of India; while service in the Mauritius and China is employment at a considerable distance from their own country, and, in the case of the Mauritius, a novelty. The number of native troops at Aden also is so small as hardly to be of any account.

22. The only case of the kind of which I have heard was at Java, shortly after the conquest of that island, during the war with France. The details I don't know; but I have understood that a good deal of discontent was at that time expressed by the Indian troops who were kept there in garrison. Indian troops from the Bengal Presidency have been so little employed beyond seas, that it is impossible to judge from actual occurrences what would be the effect of such employment on their minds. But these troops, as well as those of the old native army of Bengal, do not like service even in India and the adjacent countries at a long distance from their homes, more especially as regards the majority of the present army, in times of peace. Service in Burmah, in Assam, and even in Bengal Proper, is not popular among either the native soldiers of the Punjab and that border, or among those of Hindoostan. The Madras native soldier is much more accustomed to such service, and so are to some extent those of the Bombay Army; but even as regards the former, there has, in general, been a pressure put upon the authorities to bring back native regiments from China, as soon as possible after the termination of hostilities.

23. I do not think that such employment would have much effect in this way. I do not myself see what the native soldier is likely to gain by such employment.

24. This question does not appear to apply to India.

25. I am not in favour of employing Chinese, Malays, Africans, or other races not Indian, in India. Such troops would be very distasteful to our Indian troops, as showing our distrust of them, and as giving away to strangers employment which is much coveted by themselves; and it would not engender much confidence among our own countrymen. Of the different races enumerated, perhaps African soldiers would prove the most suitable. Such men, however, would probably become Mahomedans in course of time, and gradually fraternise more or less with those of India.

As regards the Colonies, perhaps a small number of Chinese and Malays might be employed with advantage in South Africa, and African troops in China and Ceylon. But I have little doubt that English Colonists, in times of commotion, would only repose confidence in British soldiers.

I have now replied, to the best of my ability, to the questions which have been put to me; but I think it right to add a few remarks bearing on this very important subject: first, as to the number and composition of the troops which are required for the secure tenure of India; and, secondly, as regards the policy of employing native Indian troops in British colonies.

On the first point, I am very strongly of opinion that no important reduction in the strength of the British force now allowed for India, would be politic. The actual returns of that force are now below 80,000 rank and file. We can, indeed,

deed, spare some Artillery, and one regiment of cavalry, and, if necessary, two regiments of infantry; but I would prefer retaining the latter.

For a few months, for an expedition in any emergency, we could manage to do without 3,000 or 4,000 British troops, but not more. In the event of a war in Europe, in which England was engaged, particularly if hardly pressed, no doubt the influence of such circumstances would extend to, and be felt in India.

No Asiatic or African troops could, with advantage, be substituted for any of the British troops; none could supply their place satisfactorily; on none would the confidence of Englishmen in India be placed in times of commotion and great danger. The British troops are necessary in India in considerable strength, not only for their fighting powers, but for the value of their very presence. They overawe our enemies, and give confidence to our friends and supporters. At all times have the European population in India been liable to sudden panics, and especially so since the mutiny of 1857. Such panics are, it is evident, calculated to do much mischief; they spread over India, and extend to Europe, and bring the Government of India into disrepute; they are only to be allayed by the presence of English troops in sufficient force, in good strategic and central positions.

It is, I consider, a very serious, but a very general error, that the number of native troops now maintained in India is much too large; and that, but for this system, the strength of the British troops could be largely reduced. This is undoubtedly a mistake. If we had fewer native troops in India, we must either overwork the English regiments, or add to their strength. No doubt the British troops act as a counterpoise to the native forces; but this is no evidence that we could do with much fewer of the latter.

The fact is, that the area of India is so vast and so diversified, its population so numerous, its frontier so extensive, and in many parts so accessible to predatory attack, that the number of British and native troops which are maintained for the security of our power in India, only suffice for the work, owing to the high qualities of these troops, the great efficiency of their equipment, the large resources at their command, and the beneficent character of the civil and political administration of the country. Even with these advantages, it must also be admitted, that the docile and gentle character of the mass of the population, and their general respect for authority have much to do with the success of our rule, and the order and obedience which are maintained.

It has been said that a British force of moderate strength could march from one end of India to another, with little danger of much opposition; and no doubt this is true; but to hold so great an area as we now do, to overawe and subject so mighty a population, even with the best system of government which may be practicable, must, in the nature of things, require what appears to be a large physical force.

The higher are the physical and moral qualities of our native troops, the more we draw on the northern races of India and the border countries for such soldiers, the more necessary it must be to have a fair proportion of English soldiers. On the other hand, if we prefer numbers to quality as regards the native troops, the case will hardly be different. It was mainly the great number of our native troops in 1857, the vast disproportion between them and the British troops, that led to that

disastrous outbreak. As bearing on this question of the number and composition of the army required to hold India, I shall forward with my reply, copy of a memorandum which Colonel Norman, the Military Secretary to the Government of India has drawn up, in answer to a late work by Colonel Sir Henry Havelock. In Colonel Norman's views I fully concur.

As regards the employment of Indian native troops in British Colonies, I do not think that much can be done with advantage. The climate of those peopled by English and European races would often prove ungenial and insalubrious. The social condition of things would also be quite unsuited to them. Neither would the English colonists like Indian troops, nor would these soldiers feel happy with such a population. The case would be different with people of the Oriental type; but in colonies of that kind, the distance from their homes, the long voyages which in most cases would be necessary, would greatly militate against the advantages of such service. While thus employed, the native soldier would long to visit his home. The want of military employment among the martial races of the country is now so great, that many will volunteer for such service, while I am by no means sure that it will long continue popular. On the whole, I would say, if such troops are required, their employment in the Colonies I have indicated, should be tried, in the first instance, at any rate, on a very moderate scale.

The mode in which native troops destined for colonial service shall be raised and officered, is a point of much importance. It would hardly be expedient that they should be entertained by officers who have little knowledge of the people of India, and practically independent of the Government of this country; while perhaps the opposite system would not be acceptable to the authorities in England.

Then, again, the officers of such corps should be men who have been accustomed to native troops, and who not only understand their language, but who have a sympathy and respect for them, and such officers would naturally expect to retain Indian pay and allowances; for these reasons, it will probably be the best course to take such regiments from the Government of India, rather than to raise regiments for such service, even though, on the whole, the quality of such troops may prove inferior to that which might be raised by careful selection.

Further, it must be borne in mind that we cannot spare permanently from India more than three or four native regiments; while that, if such regiments be raised especially for service beyond seas, we will have to reduce an equal number of native regiments, thus leading to discontent, as only one-half of the former should be at the same time in the colonies. Should the expense also of the new corps prove greater than that of the same number on the present Establishment in India, the Government of England ought to bear the additional cost.

Lastly, it is quite possible that some cause of discontent might give rise to ill-feeling among the native troops in the Colonies, which would certainly re-act very strongly on those in India, and might lead to the latter in their turn, demurring to embark for such service.

John Lawrence,
Govr. Genl. of India

27 May 1867.

App. No. 1.

(No. 1500 B.)

STATEMENT of the Cost of SIKH TROOPS in INDIA.

MEMORANDUM.

WITH reference to Military Department letter, No. 132, of 4th March last, and to Schedule No. 98, Case 1, the papers relating to which are herewith returned, the undersigned begs to submit the statements called for of the estimated cost of two Sikh regiments of the present established strength, if employed in China.

2. The cost during employment would be nearly the same, whether the regiments were taken from the regular establishment or specially raised for such service; the only difference would be, that in the latter case the bulk of the privates would be short-service men. In the non-effective charges this would be more than counterbalanced, as the amount of the gratuities payable on discharge would exceed the value of the pensions entailed by an ordinary term of service.

3. The actual amount payable in China, for the full strength employed in that country, is shown in Statement A., aggregating 5,68,626 rupees for the two regiments, and includes pay, extra batta, ration money, hutting money, and half-passages money, and also sea provisions to and fro.

4. This would give an average of Rs. 399. 3., or, say, in round numbers 400 rupees for each native commissioned or non-commissioned officer and private.

5. Statement B. shows the amount payable in India for the same body, for clothing, half-passages money, and sea provisions, &c., as also for the maintenance of a dépôt for each regiment, equal to the strength of a company, so as to admit of the corps being kept at their full establishment abroad. The wear and tear of equipments is likewise included, based on the regulated period of duration, together with the cost of the annual supply of ammunition and medical stores.

6. The total of these charges is 1,76,979 rupees, which, for the full establishment, would give an average of Rs. 124. 2. per man, of all grades.

7. Lastly, Statement C. exhibits the non-effective charges; viz., an estimate of the proportion of pensions and gratuities fairly chargeable to the Imperial Government, as also transport charges in India, to and from port of embarkation, and extra furlough allowances for three months, a boon to which the men might be fairly considered entitled after a tour of foreign service, together with a sum of 5,000 rupees per regi-

ment for contingencies. The total of these charges would be 24,011 rupees per regiment, or an average of Rs. 33. 7. per man.

8. The undersigned, on the foregoing data, would suggest that if the Imperial Government bore all the charges payable in China for pay, rations, hutting money, and half the passage money, and sea provisions included in Statement A., an annual capitation sum of 125 rupees per man on the average strength in China, for the effective services payable in India, and of 35 rupees for non-effective services, would cover all certain charges, and allow a fair margin for unforeseen contingencies, whilst such an arrangement would materially simplify the adjustment of the expenditure.

9. It will be noted that the establishment of European officers is in excess of that allowed in India, but it corresponds in a great measure to that which has been sanctioned on former occasions; viz., one officer per company in addition to the Staff.

10. As regards passage and hutting money, the calculation is made on a triennial relief; but, in addition to passage for the whole corps, passage to and fro annually for 10 per cent. of strength, to allow for men invalided and on sick leave and to replace them, has been provided for, as also for two European officers per regiment annually.

11. The rates assumed, and two-thirds those of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, which, it is considered, would afford a fair average, and cover the freight of clothing, ammunition, &c.; and the calculation has been made, that half of the passage money and sea provisions would be paid in China and half in India.

12. In the allowance for clothing, provision is made for a cost of trousers annually, as also for a pair of ankle boots, all of which may be considered as necessary for service in China.

13. The money ration has been calculated at the ordinary rate of Rs. 3. 8. for each fighting man, and Rs. 2. 8. for establishment followers.

(signed) A. Broome, Colonel,
Accountant General,
Military Department.

Military Department, Accountant's Branch,
7 January 1865.

STATEMENT (A.)
CHARGES payable in CHINA.

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ESTIMATE of the Annual Cost that would devolve upon the British Government, &c.—*continued.*

STATEMENT (B.)

	Rate.	TOTAL.		Rate.	TOTAL.
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>		<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Clothing:			Non-Combatants:		
8 Subadars - - - - -	17 - 9	136 6 -	1 Lascar - - - - -	5 12 -	5 12 -
8 Jemadars - - - - -	15 15 4	127 10 8	2 Bhistees - - - - -	5 - -	10 - -
40 Havildars - - - - -	11 2 -	445 - -	2 Sweepers - - - - -	4 - -	8 - -
40 Naicks - - - - -	9 - 10	362 1 4	2 Cooks - - - - -	5 - -	10 - -
1 Drum major - - - - -	14 12 11	14 12 11	1 Mutsuddy - - - - -	5 - -	5 - -
1 Pife major - - - - -	11 2 -	11 2 -	2 Weighmen - - - - -	3 - -	6 - -
614 Drummers and sepoy - - - - -	9 - 4	5,538 12 8			
Boots for all ranks - - - - -	5 - -	3,560 - -	Medical and Hospital Establishment:		
TOTAL - - - Rs.	- -	10,195 13 7	1 Medical charge - - - - -	30 - -	30 - -
			1 Native doctor - - - - -	20 - -	20 - -
			1 Cook - - - - -	4 - -	4 - -
			1 Bhistee - - - - -	4 - -	4 - -
			1 Sweeper - - - - -	4 - -	4 - -
			1 Coolie - - - - -	5 - -	5 - -
			Non-Effective Allowances:		
Half-passage money for two officers annually - - - - -	- -	1,480 - -	1 Company payment allowance - - - - -	20 - -	20 - -
Half-passage money for 10 per cent. sick annually - - - - -	- -	8,540 - -	1 Repair of camp equipage - - - - -	2 8 -	2 8 -
Board ship provision and equipment for ditto - - - - -	- -	1,450 - -	1 Butts and targets - - - - -	4 - -	4 - -
Proportion of passage money for one year for the whole corps - - - - -	- -	33,721 - -	1 Drill naick - - - - -	5 - -	5 - -
Ditto - of board ship provision and equipment - - - - -	- -	4,823 - -	1 Pay havildar - - - - -	5 - -	5 - -
TOTAL - - - Rs.	- -	50,014 - -	TOTAL Pay and Allowances of Depôt - - -	- -	1,258 - -
			Ditto - per annum - - - Rs.	- -	15,096 - -
Depôt Charges:					
1 Lieutenant in charge - - - - -	325 12 -	325 12 -	Wear and tear of arms and accoutrements - - - - -	- -	4,358 - -
1 Subadar - - - - -	80 - -	80 - -	Wear and tear of camp equipage - - - - -	- -	428 - -
1 Jemadar - - - - -	35 - -	35 - -	Annual expenditure of ammunition, &c. - - - - -	- -	5,876 - -
5 Havildars - - - - -	14 - -	70 - -	Annual expenditure of medical stores - - - - -	- -	1,352 - -
5 Naicks - - - - -	12 - -	60 - -	Clothing for depôt company - - - - -	- -	1,170 - -
2 Drummers - - - - -	7 - -	14 - -			
75 Sepoys - - - - -	7 - -	525 - -	TOTAL of STATEMENT B. - - -	- -	88,489 13 7
			TOTAL for 2 Corps - - - Rs.	- -	1,76,979 11 2

STATEMENT (C.)

	Annual Amount.
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Non-Effective Charges:	
Pensions and gratuities - - - - -	1,720 - -
Annual proportion of transport charges in India - - - - -	11,573 - -
Ditto - - - of three months' leave, pay to the corps on relief after three years - - - - -	5,718 - -
Contingencies - - - - -	5,000 - -
TOTAL of STATEMENT (C.) - - -	24,011 - -
TOTAL for 2 Corps - - - - - Rs.	48,022 - -

(signed) A. Broome, Colonel,
Accountant General, Military Department.

MEMORANDUM by Colonel *Norman* on Sir Henry Havelock's Book, referred to in Reply to the 25th Question.

App. No. 1.

THE object of that portion of Sir Henry Havelock's book which relates to India is to show,—

I.—That we have too many British troops in India under any circumstances; but that the reduction which is now feasible could be carried to a greater extent by substituting a force of mounted riflemen for some of our present troops; and in arguing on this matter he assumes that we maintain our present force of British soldier here to provide a reserve force for England.

II.—That by adopting his views, India would be held not only more cheaply than at present, but in far more security. Sir Henry actually asserting (*see* page 31) that the establishment of a body of mounted riflemen in sufficient numbers would secure us at once and for ever against the contingency of another revolt in India; and the sufficient numbers are elsewhere shown to mean about 7,890 men.

III.—That the saving of expense by adopting his proposals would enable England to maintain a reserve force at home.

IV.—That the native army in India is too large, and should be reduced.

In drawing out these arguments, Sir Henry falls into various errors which seriously damage their force, while, on other grounds, his views appear unsound on several points.

I will not allude here to his system of a home reserve, or of special enlistments for India (*see* page 15); but the latter would be of difficult application as the roster and even periods of foreign service must always be liable to derangement when exigencies arise for the employment of troops in different parts of the world; just as of late we have seen the formerly insignificant force in New Zealand raised for a time to ten regiments, again to be reduced to one, while the force in British North America has been nearly quadrupled.

To proceed to the purely Indian part of the book, it seems necessary, in the first place, to protest against the assumption put forth by Sir H. Havelock, that the present British Force in India is maintained at what he considers an excessive amount, solely to provide a reserve for England; this is quite an error. The question of what amount of British Force will suffice for India, has been carefully gone into in the most minute manner by the various Governors General, Commanders-in-Chief, and other of the most competent authorities in India, and has been fixed on the most extended information with reference to the wants of India alone; and, as circumstances change from year to year (I may say every year since 1859), reductions have been made where they seem feasible on Indian grounds, and on Indian grounds alone.

The army in India is believed to be not a man in excess of our wants; though, doubtless for a campaign, a few thousand British soldiers with a respectable native force might be temporarily spared for what may be called semi-Indian purposes in China, Japan, or Egypt.

But then Sir H. Havelock's estimate of the force in India is so erroneous that his argument as to excess, even on his own grounds, breaks down.

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At page 115 he quotes the British Force in India as 73,000 men. The present actual strength of non-commissioned officers, drummers, farriers and privates, is under 59,000, although the establishment is 62,000. This includes, of course, sick men, men about to be invalided, and men recovering their strength at convalescent depôts, so that probably not more than 50,000 cavalry, artillery and infantry could be turned out in all India (including Burmah and Aden) to-morrow; that is, 50,000 men fit for the field.

Sir Henry's proposals, indeed, extend to the reduction of 20,000 men, leaving us with 53,000; but as we have barely 60,000 men, the force he considers proper for India would only involve a reduction of 7,000 men.

Whether we have too many troops or not in India must, to a certain extent, be a matter of opinion; but certainly the weight of authority is entirely against Sir H. Havelock; while, as above shown, a reference to actual facts proves that admitting his views to be correct as to the actual force needed, the reduction would only amount to a third of what he proposes.

To proceed to the second point, viz., that by adopting Sir Henry's views, India would be held not only more cheaply but far more securely than at present, the security being gained by the employment of 15 small regiments of mounted riflemen as part of our British army in India:—

The idea of any sufficient saving arising from Sir H. Havelock's proposals may be at once dismissed, as his calculations on this head are erroneous.

His estimate at page 31, that a reduction of even 18,000 men in India would allow 2,500,000*l.* to be applied to other purposes, is strangely inaccurate.

He states that 68,000 men (exclusive of officers) in India cost 15,774,456*l.*, but the real fact is that this 15,774,456*l.* maintains not only the whole British army in India but the depôts in England, alluded to at page 30 by Sir H. Havelock, and amounting to 9,000 or 10,000 men, a native army of 124,000 men, all the staff establishments, cattle and equipment for the united British and native army in India, and the heavy pension list and non-effective charges of the Indian army, enormously heavy just now in proportion to the strength of the army, owing to special inducements having been held out to officers to retire on the reduction of a large proportion of the native army, besides a large contribution towards the non-effective charges of the British army.

The saving really to be effected would be comparatively small, as shown in a Statement appended to this paper; so that, in point of fact, Sir H. Havelock's proposals would reduce the army by several thousand British soldiers, and make no sufficient saving available for the reserve to be kept in England.

Thus, one of the main objects of the book, that of providing a reserve army at home, will fail to be met by the very proposals purposely made to meet that object.

This, therefore, disposes of the third point, viz., that a sum could be made available from India, by the adoption of his views, which would maintain a large home reserve.

But we have still to meet part of the second argument, viz., that with a force constituted as he proposes,

E B

App. No. 1. proposes, we would hold India far more securely than at present, and render revolt impossible.

This desirable end is to be attained by the employment of about 8,000 mounted riflemen, in place of a much larger force of British cavalry and infantry; I say cavalry and infantry, for his estimate of cavalry and horse artillery for India is only 6,000; and as we have 3,000 horse artillery, and I do not perceive that he proposes a reduction in this arm, and as we have 5,000 cavalry at present, I assume that 2,000 are to be reduced. If, however, Sir Henry means to retain the present force of cavalry as well as 8,000 mounted riflemen as part of his 53,000, the total cost under his proposals would be considerably larger than the cost of the present army.

I will now proceed to the arguments used to show the alleged great advantages to arise from the use of a force of mounted riflemen; but before doing this I would observe that I think this description of force would be useful in India to a certain extent, and an experiment might be tried of employing two or three regiments in substitution of a similar number of our present dragoons. In fact, they could be our present dragoons, altered as to arms and equipment, and trained to act on foot when wanted. The expediency of officering such troops from the officers "doing general duty" will be doubted by many in India (see page 202).

To suppose that we would reap such advantages from a force of this description, as Sir H. Havelock imagines, is, I think, out of the question; but to show this we must examine the subject in detail.

In the first place, there are vast tracts of country in India, such as the mountains to which our campaigns have of late years been confined, where mounted riflemen would be useless; where, in fact, they could not act, and where their horses would perish for want of forage; so in Assam and Burmah, and parts of Bengal, mounted troops could not move during the greater part of the year, and the horses would, for the most part, die from exposure and climate.

Then, again, India is so vast that, even if fifteen regiments of mounted rifles were posted in the most judicious manner, revolt might break out at places far distant from the nearest corps, and where railways are not even thought of.

Again for protecting lines of railway, if in case of insurrection people are bent on destroying railways, we can never keep them uninjured by any force of mounted riflemen; and, in fact, for this purpose, good British troops would be of no more use than the cheaper and more abundant element of good native cavalry.

On the Calcutta and Delhi line, a line of a thousand miles, with branch railways running off at various points, could the whole force of mounted rifles for all India, say 6,000 effective men (for Sir H. Havelock's force must be subject, as all other forces are, to considerable deductions for sickness, &c.) secure us against removals of rails, &c., which can be quietly effected at any point, at night, by a few men?

The powers of rapid movement supposed to be possessed by mounted riflemen will not bear close examination. Mounted riflemen, like other British troops, require food and comforts of a nature not to be had, save from the Commissariat; and provision must be made to carry these comforts, and to carry those who fall sick or may be wounded.

Of course, for an enterprise lasting for three or

four days everything might be carried by the men, or be dispensed with; but, for a longer period, baggage animals and doolies, or ambulances, must be taken, and with these, or even I may say without these, 20 miles a day would not be maintained for many days.

The feat of 5,000 riflemen riding from one end of India to the other at the rate of 25 miles a day (stated to be possible, at page 112), carrying all before them, is simply impossible.

This march would last for a hundred days; and supposing they carried all before them, including forts, &c., what time would have been left to clear the country on the flanks of the line of march? What possible impression would have been made by such a mode of campaigning? What would have become of the sick and wounded, of the numerous lame horses (for every one who has served knows that, even on a second day's 25-miles' march, many horses will have fallen lame, or will have sore backs, out of 5,000)? How are the grass-cutters to obtain grass if day after day they have to march 25 miles; and how are meat, rum, and bread to be obtained for the men?

Any such style of movement would be impracticable; still less "the power of moving over the surface of India at a uniform rate of 30 or 40 miles a day continuously," or that where "14,000 men (cavalry and horse artillery) are able to move 30 miles a day for weeks together." Has Sir H. Havelock ever seen or read of such movements?

It is quite certain that no force of British troops in India could move continuously for more than 20 miles a day, and after ten days they certainly would require a halt, even if going at this rate.

Native troops can do more, as they have less incumbrances; but, even by these, I believe the best march on authentic record (not alluded to by Sir H. Havelock), that of the guide cavalry and infantry from Murdan to Delhi only averaged about 26½ miles a day for 22 days, and this was in a country the resources of which were entirely at their disposal, aided by a settled British civil administration; the corps, moreover, being full of zeal to reach Delhi, and commanded by a very active officer.

It may be noted that the celebrated march of cavalry and horse artillery under General Smith in 1805, so praised and thought so much of by Sir H. Havelock (see page 140), was made at an average of only 16½ miles a day, a rate that was over and over again exceeded by forces of all arms during 1857-58. Lord Lake is quoted as having got over 405 miles in 43 days. Why, this is the rate of ordinary relief marching! It seems very clear that the mounted riflemen would not be able to move for a continuance any faster than our troops can at present.

Sir H. Havelock finds fault with the size of our Native army, and thinks it might be reduced from 135,000 (it is about 124,000, including the Hyderabad contingent) to 80,000. Probably he is not well informed as to the heavy duties that devolve on it, notwithstanding reductions of guards, escorts, &c. Nor is he aware how difficult it is for our border campaigns to get together, anywhere, more than 5,000 or 6,000 men. Very competent authorities, with good means of forming a judgment, believe that our Native as well as our European force is at a minimum, and that a reduction of either British or Natives would have to be followed by an increase of the other description.

tion of force ; so nicely are the duties and requirements of the public service balanced.

Sir H. Havelock's allusion to the French having only some 10,200 Natives in Algeria seems unfortunate as an argument for our doing with fewer than we have, as it appears that, with such a small province, a limited frontier compared to that of India, no Native states with armies in the heart of their territory, and the possibility of in a week having a reinforcement of 20,000 or 30,000 men from Marseilles and Toulon, they keep 65,000 to 70,000 French troops. I take it that if we had Algiers, and held it on the Indian system, we should probably have 30,000 Natives and 15,000 British soldiers at the outside, instead of 80,000 men, of whom seven-eighths are Europeans.

In truth, though we hold India, I believe with a sufficiently secure grasp, it costs England nothing, while Algiers is, and probably ever will be, a drain on France.

I purposely abstain here from remarking on Sir Henry Havelock's criticisms on various Indian wars ; but would observe that some of his strictures appear open to easy reply, founded as they are on inaccurate statements of facts, of which I will give but two specimens.

At page 160 he says that Lord Clyde had at Lucknow nearly 3,600 most efficient native cavalry. The returns published in G. O. show that, of all ranks, the native cavalry under Lord Clyde at the commencement of the siege amounted to 1,997, joined on the 4th March by 397 under General Franks, a total of 2,394 instead of 3,600, and Sir H. Havelock ought to know that some of these were hardly trained and certainly not most efficient.

Again in an account of the affair in the Raptée on the 31st December 1858 (to which exception may be taken on other grounds), he says the force engaged was "about ten horsed guns, the 7th Hussars, the 6th Carabineers, about 1,200 excellent native horse (amongst them Hughes's splendid regiment of Irregulars, the 1st Punjab Cavalry)," &c.

From this it would be believed that two regiments of British cavalry were present, say 800 sabres, or 2,000 cavalry in all, and ten horsed guns. In reality there were only six horsed guns with Lord Clyde's column ; the Carabineers had but one squadron, three squadrons being in quite a different part of the country, and 50 men detached with another column, while the native cavalry consisted only of Hughes's regiment and a small detachment of Hodson's horse under Sir H. Havelock himself.

Thus there were barely 1,000 sabres in the field instead of 2,000, as would be gathered from Sir Henry's book.

Before concluding, however, I would say that it seems odd that Sir H. Havelock should have failed to refer to the Camel corps formed by Lord Clyde in 1858, and which, for campaigning purposes, was most useful. It was composed of 400 camels, each camel having a driver, armed with a carbine. For each camel there was also a soldier who, in a few days, became quite accustomed to the camel's motion, and could stand the longest marches with little fatigue. Two hundred admirable soldiers of the Rifle Brigade, and 200 Punjab Infantry made up this corps of 400 men, besides drivers.

Under an active and intelligent commander, the corps made some extraordinary marches ; and, as provision for the men's comfort could be carried on the camels, while no forage was neces-

sary to be taken for the animals, the powers of movement of such a corps were far superior to any that could be expected of mounted riflemen.

The 400 drivers could at all times protect the animals, and 400 excellent infantry were thus capable of being brought fifty miles in a night and thrown into action without leaving a man with the animals that carried them. A record of the marches of this corps would be most interesting ; but at the end of the war it was not thought desirable to keep it up in time of peace. At the battle of Calpee it bore a conspicuous part, and it rendered other valuable service.

Such a corps, or several such corps, doubtless, would be formed again when wanted, and would, I think, be at least equal in value to any mounted rifle regiments.

17 May 1867.

H. W. N.

RELATIVE COST of a British Force of 53,000 Men (including Officers) proposed for India by Sir H. Havelock, and the present Army of 60,000 Men.

Cost of Sir H. Havelock's Force :		£. per ann.
20 Batteries of Horse Artillery, 3,000 men, average cost 19,480 l. per battery	- - - -	396,600
44 Horse field batteries, 6,600 men, 17,680 l. per battery	- - - -	777,920
7 Heavy field batteries, 560 men, 12,560 l. per battery	- - - -	87,920
60 Garrison batteries, 4,800 men, 8,323 l. per battery	- - - -	499,380
7 Regiments cavalry, 3,451 men, 68,836 l. per corps	- - - -	481,852
15 Regiments mounted Riflemen, 7,395 men, 68,836 l. per regiment	- - - -	1,032,540
30 Regiments British infantry, 26,970 men, 80,100 l. per regiment	- - - -	2,403,000
52,776 Officers and men, at	- - - -	5,679,212
Add cost of 224 mounted Riflemen, at 80 l. per annum, to complete to 53,000 men	- - - -	17,920
Add annual cost of remounts, to keep up 5,700 additional horses on Indian establishment, 684 horses, at 80 l. each	- - - -	41,040
	£.	5,738,172
Cost of present British Force in India :		
20 Batteries Horse Artillery, 3,000 men	- - -	396,600
44 Horse field batteries, 6,600 men	- - -	777,920
7 Heavy field batteries, 560 men	- - -	87,920
24 Garrison batteries, 1,920 men	- - -	199,752
11 Regiments British cavalry, 5,423 men	- - -	757,196
52 Regiments British infantry, 46,748 men	- - -	4,166,200
64,251 Officers and men, for	- - -	6,384,588
Deduct, say 4,000 non-commissioned officers and men wanting to complete, at the low average of 60 l. each	- - -	240,000
	£.	6,144,588

Apparent less cost of Sir H. Havelock's force, 406,416 l., instead of 2,500,000 l.; and on the other side it must be recollected that there would be a first outlay of probably 600,000 l. to mount, arm, and equip the Mounted Rifles, while the decrease of 7,000 men would reduce the Indian payment to the British Exchequer for the maintenance of depôts, &c., by 94,500 l. annually.

NOTE.

In neither calculation have I added the cost of the head quarter staff of brigades of Artillery, which I do not exactly know.

To simplify calculations I have estimated the corps of Mounted Rifles at the present strength of cavalry regiments, viz. 493 men, and have added 224 men to make up 53,000. This slight deviation from Sir H. Havelock's numbers of riflemen makes the calculation more favourable to him.

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He estimates for 12,000 field and garrison artillery. By counting only the present strength of field artillery out of the 12,000, the calculation is more favourable to him than if the present proportions of field and garrison artillery were preserved.

I have estimated for seven regiments of cavalry, under the view taken at page 4 of the memorandum.

In all cases I have estimated for the capitation

allowances paid to the British Government for maintenance of depôts, for pensions, &c.

My estimate, besides capitation allowance, covers (for all ranks) pay and allowances, cost of followers, commissariat charges, feed of cattle, medical and hospital charges, clothing, barrack and ordnance charges, and all miscellaneous expenses; but not the cost of purchasing or providing horses or other cattle.

17 May 1867.

H. W. N.

ANSWERS of His Excellency General Sir *W. R. Mansfield*, K. C. B. and G. C. S. I.,
Commander in Chief in India.

1. My opinion is very decidedly against the proposal.

2. I would not employ them at all except in settlements of an Indian or Chinese character.

3. I have no experience of colonies planted by British settlers. But I served formerly in the Mediterranean.

4.—(a.) Men from the Punjaub, but none should be so employed.

(b.) Bombay regiments.

(c.) Either Bombay or Madras regiments.

(d.) - - ditto - - ditto.

(e.) - - ditto - - ditto.

(f.) (g.) (h.) (i.) I consider all these out of the question for any of the Indian races in time of peace

5. They should be relieved regularly every three years.

6. I do not believe in any insuperable religious difficulties. But there are many things in the habits, motives and impulses of natives which might easily alienate British colonists from them and cause blood feuds between the colonists and the sepoys. For instance, revenge on a wife for infidelity taking the form of mutilation; assaults on prostitutes of British blood for assumed infidelity or misconduct; anti-conservancy habits. If native troops were called out to aid the civil power in putting down a riot, they would never be forgiven either in South Africa or New Zealand.

7. I should think it would be necessary to give about nine (9) rupees a month to the private soldiers, with free rations. I rather think they enjoyed some such rates when serving in Hong Kong.

8. As I cannot conceive any measure more strangely impolitic than the use of native troops in European or British colonial garrisons, I have a difficulty in answering the question. If, however, they should be employed, the rule should be followed which is observed in India, viz., to keep the proportion of Europeans and natives about equal, the artillery being British.

9. Never having served in these colonies, it is better for me not to commit myself to a reply.

10. For service in the field it is possible that a proportion might do useful service as a supplement, but certainly not in entire substitution for European troops.

11. No, I think not, except in the East, *e. g.*, Persia, China, and so forth.

12. No; I do not think that any increase in the numerical strength of garrisons could com-

pensate for the capital error of substituting Indian sepoys for British soldiers.

13. This is a question which can only be answered at the time with regard to the present circumstances of India and the colonies. It would, with the exception of Indian and Chinese stations, be better to depend on volunteer forces or special corps raised in the colonies than on Indian troops.

14. In all probability his loyalty would not be affected by it after his return. But there is no doubt that the original detachment on such service would be distasteful to the vast majority of the men.

15. I think that in the interests of both it would be better to take regiments from India according to such orders as the Government of India might deem it expedient to issue. This would give the means of relief and of discontinuing the experiment without much difficulty or expense if it failed. The Government of India would besides, I should think, strongly object to the raising of soldiers in India on terms and rates differing from those of its own armies, or under any authority but its own. Such measures must be viewed with relation to the impressions they would create on the existing Indian armies, as also on the mind of the classes from which the sepoys come.

16 and 17. India should not again be left in a state which can render such a case of emergency possible. Probably troops might be spared from the Cape, but, according to existing arrangements, I know of no other source.

18. I have little doubt of the superior expediency of raising local troops in South Africa, Ceylon, and the West Indies. Perhaps for Hong Kong Indian regiments would be better than locally raised regiments. I cannot answer as to Mauritius.

19 and 20. There is now no limitation in the sense of these questions, but I should think the employment of them as proposed extremely impolitic except in Chinese or Indian stations, as before said.

21. Yes. China is essentially foreign service, whereas Aden and Burmah are recognised by the troops as part of India, as being under the Indian Government.

22. I cannot give instances in detail; but every one knows the aversion of the Indian to cross the water, more especially in the case of the Hindoos, who fast, as it were, the whole time that they are at sea. They are, besides, separated from their families, and during the term of such service their domestic relations would be entirely broken up.

23. No;

23. No; I am not aware that any such result is desirable. The distinction established by the question does not however enter into the heads of the native sepoys.

25. I am against all such proposals. It should be recollected that Indian populations consist of numerous rival races and religious castes. If you cannot have a sufficient army, you must ensure the country by political measures through the population of it, and not attempt to introduce mongrel foreigners. To do the latter, would be a certain indication in the minds of the population of India, that that which is so often alleged in the public prints had come to pass, viz., that our resources were dwindling, and our prestige had departed from us.

In conclusion, I would say that, after a most serious domestic convulsion, the object of which was to drive the British out of India, the country

was finally reduced to order at the end of 1859, with the result of the temporary disruption of those feelings of regard for the British rule, which in many parts had existed for a century. It cannot be believed that the feelings of animosity generated by the struggle have yet been altogether allayed. On the contrary, signs are not wanting that such is not the case. We cannot hope for anything else till a generation shall have passed away. In the meantime, we must hold the country strongly; and we must on no account lessen our influence, or weaken the idea of our prestige and resources by entertaining such notions as those suggested by these questions.

W. R. Mansfield,
General.

Head-quarters, Simla,
27 May 1867.

ANSWERS of Sir Henry Durand.

1, 2, 3, 4, 5. With reference to Questions 1, 2, 3, and 4, I have no acquaintance with any of the Colonies specified in question 4, except such very superficial knowledge of them as a short residence at the Cape many years ago, and frequent voyages to and from England afford to a passenger at Gibraltar, Malta, and Ceylon. Of the Mauritius, China, the West Indies, and New Zealand, I have no practical knowledge whatever.

6. With respect to Question 6, quite independently of considerations of creed, race, and moral habits, there is one point common to every race in India, which is greatly opposed to their permanent employment as mercenary troops out of India, or out of the countries bordering India, and within easy reach of its shores, such as Burmah. The practice of early marriages is, it may be said, universal, and although there may be differences in the degree to which wives and families are actually present with the native troops of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, in their military cantonments in India, it is merely a question of degree. They are nearly all married men, with families dependent upon them for support; and much moral turpitude attaches to the sepoy who neglects the maintenance of his family. They may be always with the soldier, as in the Madras Army, or more partially so in the Bombay Army, or, comparatively speaking, rarely so in the Bengal army; this is a point depending much on the habits of the particular army, and the districts and races from which recruits are drawn, as also on the areas over which the cantonments of the various armies are dotted, and on reliefs and the distances marched over; still, the normal fact remains the same, and pervades the whole, namely, that the responsibility of wives and families lies, as a rule, upon the whole body of our native troops, and that their social habits and feelings have, on this point, to be met either by the families being with the men, or by frequent and long furloughs to their homes. This is a condition essentially different from the present constitution of our own European army, and it is one of those radical conditions which render all comparison difficult. Where such a condition exists incidentally, to a certain extent, as in armies formed on the Prussian system, the necessity of accepting the considerations it imposes is met by 058.

the short periods of service, and the arrangements which seldom call out the second and third lines, or reserves, save in case of absolute urgency. Now this is a very material consideration, and one imperatively essential prominently to keep in view, when the idea of employing Indian troops at a distance from India is discussed. No Indian experience is required in order to give weight to to such a vital consideration, and any Members of the Select Committee who have a practical acquaintance with the feelings of Prussian or French married conscripts of the line, are as able to form a judgment as an officer of Indian experience, except that the latter superadds a knowledge of points of character due to creed and caste, which greatly intensify the dislike of the Mussulman, the Hindoo, and the Sikh, to protracted service beyond seas. Those who know French troops, or indeed any European troops but our own English line, must be aware of the feelings with which they embark for service beyond seas, and of the aversion they entertain to ship-board. French officers make no secret of the fact as one which is a point of remarkable difference between the French and the English soldier. Intensify this feeling fifty-fold, and you have the measure of the Mussulman's aversion to being long separated from his family; intensify the feeling a hundred-fold, and it may approach the deep disgust and sense of defilement with which, from a caste point of view, the Hindoo regards board-a-ship life, and service beyond seas, and separation from his family. The aversion of the Sikh, if of a respectable village family, is hardly less than that of the Mussulman; of any of these three main classes of our native subjects, the "Free Lances," or material for such, are very small in number as compared with former times. This is a consequence of the peace, the internal peace and good order of the empire, the security to life and property, and the greatly increased value of land; the old state of things and the habits it engendered, has passed away; but even when the Mah-rattas under the Bhonsla, Holkar, or Scindia could sweep with hordes over the country, or the Pindarees pass over it like locusts destroying everything, the "Free Lances" of all these worthies had India for their field, not lands beyond the ocean, and in no country in the world, considering

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considering the extent of its coasts, and the great value of its products, has the spirit of adventure at sea been so little developed as in India. Its agricultural millions are essentially a land loving people, and the sea, or service beyond seas, repugnant to their social habits, to their creeds, caste feelings, and every aspiration of their lives, for the present, or, in the case of the Hindoo, for the future. Except the off-scourings of the cities, the "budmashes" of towns or cantonments, not by any means fit material for soldiery, I know of no class whose repugnance to protracted service beyond seas could be compensated really by such an increase of advantages to the soldier as would be within reason, and not render their employment more costly and troublesome than is at all contemplated by those who propose the measure. The scum of our cities and cantonments is not worth enlisting at any price; they are worthless; and even "budmashes" would demand pay and advantages quite disproportionate to the value of their services, for in peace they would be a nuisance, and in war a weakness.

7. Nothing but actual experience would enable any answer to be given to Question 7.

8. Knowing nothing of the colonies I am unable to offer an opinion on Question 8, except, that wherever you have British artillery it should have a support of British infantry, and not be left to the sole support of native troops. For the foregoing reason, ignorance of the colonies—

9. I can offer no opinion on Question 9.

10. With regard to Questions 10 and 11, we have employed native troops in Egypt, the Mauritius, and China in time of war; and if properly organized I see no reason why native troops should not again be made useful, when associated with European troops, for active operations in any of those quarters, although their aversion is great to protracted service, mere garrison service, beyond seas, under the emergency of war, with its prospects of rewards, promotion, and foreign service claims, the feeling is different, it is regarded as an exceptional incidence of their contract, a necessity which justifies Government in employing regiments beyond sea, and which, when the regiments are not too long absent from India, confers renown and credit, besides usually being accompanied by more solid advantages. In hot countries, native troops properly officered, may be of great utility as auxiliaries to the European troops; much of the wearing fatigue duties of an army can be better taken in hot countries by the native than by the European troops. The mere friction of war in trying climates falls heavily on English troops, and much of this destructive friction can be avoided where native troops are a component of the force. Their utility in this respect is great, quite independently of their fighting power or value.

12. With regard to Question 12, I cannot conceive any British colony left to depend for its defence entirely on mercenary native troops.

13. So many and very various considerations are involved in Question 13, that it would take much time and writing to reply in a suitable manner. Much must depend on circumstances whether one or other alternative were had recourse to. The nature and danger of the pressure at home, the sphere and character of the war, actual or im-

pending, the special risk incurred by particular colonies, the state of this vast Indian empire at the time, the command we might have of the sea generally, of the Levant specially, our position with regard to Egypt and the Suez route, all these circumstances would bear on the question, and have to be weighed. As a rule, if England were in vital peril, the withdrawal of troops from India would, probably, prove too slow a process to meet the emergency.

14. With respect to Question 14, my previous reply to Question 6 will have shown that the expatriation of native regiments for garrison service in the Colonies would not, in my opinion, prove popular with our native troops, or their connections in India; therefore, so far as loyalty depends on the measures of Government being acceptable to the people, it hardly seems likely, considering the possibility of Colonial Governments occasionally failing to understand the temper, prejudices, and peculiarities of native troops from India, that the result should be increase of loyalty here. Every cause of discontent which arose in a Colony would be echoed and exaggerated by their relatives in India, and its Government would, though powerless to interfere, be held responsible for the treatment its native subjects met with when beyond its control.

15. In reply to Question 15, I must remark that India has no native troops redundant, and that to introduce a system of Colonial service and of Colonial reliefs, would necessitate a large increase to the Indian armies, and many consequent sources of augmented expenditure which the Colonial military budgets would not meet. Moreover, such a system of Colonial service and reliefs would render our service very unpopular, and commanding officers would find the recruiting more difficult than it is at present; for the men know that at the expiration of three years they can now obtain their discharge if they please, and do so to an extent of which commanding officers complain much; but such a facility for obtaining discharge could not endure compatibly with a system of Colonial service and reliefs except at great cost and inconvenience if maintained, great discontent and distrust if abrogated. I am therefore of opinion that it would be better to raise regiments in India exclusively for Colonial service, and quite distinct from our existing Indian armies, the present organisation of which is, in my opinion, unsuited to Colonial service. The British Government could organize and officer these regiments as it pleased, and would have to bear all the expenses of raising, of furloughs, of pensions, &c. I do not think either course advisable; but of the two the raising fresh regiments, unhampered by the traditions of our native armies, unsaddled with native commissioned officers, and having to conform to a system which must mould and adapt itself to the exigencies of a distinct service, seems far the most preferable course. Her Majesty's European regiments who have served or are serving in India could provide the nucleus of European officers, having some acquaintance with native soldier classes, on which to build up, gradually, such fresh regiments; it must be fully understood that the experiment would be a serious one.

16, 17. On more than one occasion, India has had to apply to neighbouring Colonies for the immediate assistance of European troops; and therefore

therefore Question 16 must be answered in the affirmative. At that time, however, the dispatch of troops through Egypt had not been arranged, and therefore regiments could be drawn from the Mauritius, or the Cape sooner than from England. Now, if no pressure were on England, and the Suez route open, reinforcements can be more speedily obtained from England. A telegraph message to Malta, or Gibraltar, or England, could set regiments moving for India in very short time.

18. I have but slight knowledge of South Africa or its races, nor do I know the estimation in which the Cape Mounted Rifles were held; except as settlers in our own provinces on the eastern side of the Bay of Bengal, I have had no opportunity of judging of the Chinese or Malays. The question how the Chinese or mixed Tartar and Chinese of the northern coasts of China would stand our discipline is a problem untried; but they are represented as being fine men in some of the provinces, and there should be fair material for native troops on that coast. Both in South Africa, and on the coast of China, the experiment of raising native troops from the native populations in or near those Colonies, seems preferable to that of introducing Colonial service and Colonial reliefs into our native armies, or of raising fresh regiments in India for Colonial service. In reply to Question 18, therefore, I should say that the advantages, if it can be safely done, of raising a few corps in South Africa, and on the coast of China, are very great.

19, 20. I have already answered Question 19, when I stated that the native soldier regards his liability to service beyond seas as an incident to which under his contract he is bound; but as being one practically limited to the emergencies of war, our native armies being so reduced as barely to meet the requirements of our occupation of India. In case of war, the obligation would have to be enforced, and their utility in hot countries as auxiliaries to European troops, has already been touched upon; but except for war, and beyond the ordinary reliefs in British Burma, Aden, and the Straits, it is not desirable to enforce the obligation with our weak armies.

21. In reply to Question 21, I do not think that the fact of India being directly under the Crown, instead of indirectly as formerly was the case, makes the smallest difference in the feeling of native troops towards service beyond seas.

22. In reply to Question 22, I must observe

that beyond a reluctance on the part of some Madras regiments to embark for China on the occurrence of the first war in China, and a reluctance on the part of a Bengal regiment to embark for Burmah in the time of Lord Dalhousie, I have known no instances of discontent; on neither occasion was the reluctance very serious, or insurmountable.

23, 24. With regard to Question 23, it must be borne in mind that India is a vast empire, and that its races having more or less the feeling of the fact, are apt to consider that the sovereignty of this country when acquired, of itself confers an Imperial diadem. Service in petty Colonies would most assuredly lower, rather than raise their idea of our power. They can understand England ruling India, and holding it in part with native troops, for this is in strict accordance with the practice and traditions of former conquerors; but the poverty of resources in men which calls for the occupation by native troops of distant Colonies, like the Mauritius, Hong Kong, West Indies, &c., can produce but one effect, and that an effect far from favourable to their sense of our military means and power which cannot find men for what they will regard as dwarf territories.

25. I have answered Question 25 previously. It is a matter which actual experiment can alone prove. As far as India is concerned, the feeling of our native armies since 1857, is that they are not trusted; and the introduction of Chinese, African, or Malay troops, would augment this feeling, and do harm. In India we are better without such foreign troops, upon which no greater reliance could be placed than upon our own Indian races, whom it is not good policy thus to alienate. Nor would the substitution of such troops enable us materially to reduce our English garrison. If the magnitude of the Indian empire, the millions it contains, and the growing wealth of the country are considered, the European garrison of India is in my opinion moderate, and not more than a country like England can and should bear without murmur. On the contrary, what with the alienation of the Indian troops, and the resentments that might crop up, besides the peculiar temper of Chinese, Africans, and Malays, which renders them in some respects more difficult to manage than Indians, whether Hindoo or Mussulman, we should be compelled to maintain an equal, if not superior, European force to watch the experiment.

H. Durand.

Simla, 29 May 1867.

ANSWERS of Sir R. Temple, Hyderabad.

1. I AM decidedly in favour of making the experiment of substituting Indian for English troops in our Colonies, in time of peace. The measure would afford some, though not great relief to the English army in time of peace. The system thus established could be expanded in time of war, so as to form an appreciable, though not very considerable, addition to our military resources, and if good Indian troops were selected, as I believe they might be for this service, then the circumstance would add something to our national

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prestige in the estimation of other military countries.

2. I would propose to employ, to a limited extent, Indian troops in Ceylon, the Straits Settlements, China, New Zealand, Mauritius, South Africa, Malta and Gibraltar; but I would not propose to employ them in Australia, because they would probably not get on well with the colonists; and I feel doubts about employing them in the West Indies. I speak with diffidence, but I should fear there might arise ill blood between

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3. I have not any special knowledge from residence of any of the Colonies.

4. This question relates to the races of India who might be best employed as soldiers in the following Colonies, viz.:

- a. South Africa.
- b. Mauritius.
- c. Ceylon.
- d. Straits Settlements.
- e. China.
- f. Malta.
- g. Gibraltar.
- h. West Indies.
- i. New Zealand.

I believe that Madras regiments could always be employed in Ceylon and the Straits Settlements, perhaps also in the Mauritius; they have, as is well known, been already employed in the Straits Settlements; but I would not recommend them for employment in any other of the Colonies. The Madras troops are drawn from the southern portion of the Indian Peninsula, of Telooogo and Tamil speaking races. Bombay troops have already been employed in China, and might be permanently so employed; perhaps also they might be employed in the Mauritius. The Bombay troops are drawn from the Western Deccan and coast districts, that is, from Mahratta races, partly also from Goojerat and from Central India, with a mixture also of Hindoostanees.

As already stated, I cannot recommend any class of Indian troops as suited for the West Indies. There remain South Africa, New Zealand, Malta, Gibraltar. For employment in these I would propose Punjaabee troops, and besides them I know of no races in India adapted for such a duty. The Punjaabees would also be well suited for service in China; indeed, as is well known, they did good service there in the last war. Having served in various capacities in the Punjaub, I have necessarily a special knowledge of that province and people. By Punjaabees are meant not only Sikhs, but Mahomedans, natives of the Punjaub and especially of the Trans-Indus frontier. I have for years past heard military officers both of the Royal army and the late Company's army, who had seen the Punjaabees on service and in action, speak in the highest terms of the soldierly qualities of these troops. Indeed, I never heard but one opinion expressed on this subject. In physical power and endurance, owing to the severer climate wherein they are born, and in martial spirit, owing to a variety of circumstances, they altogether surpass all other Indian races. Especially also they can well bear frost and even snow. In New Zealand and in South Africa they would render capital service, in such wars as those which have of late years occurred in those regions. In Malta and Gibraltar they could certainly take a part of the garrison duty. Their bearing and appearance would be such as might well bear to be exhibited before European nations. And if their appearance were to be thus approved of, then the consideration that there must be plenty more where they came from, might add something to our repute as a military empire. In time of

need they would not equal the Zouaves, but they might not be much inferior to Turkish troops. Even in such a war as the Crimean war, a small contingent of Punjaabee troops would not be much less valuable than a Turkish contingent. If well managed and cared for, the Punjaabees would stand much inclement weather and climate. And in the event of operations in Egypt, a body of Punjaabee troops would be useful auxiliaries to the British troops, even in the face of an European enemy. I assume in this answer that the troops to be employed would be infantry; but, if required, the Punjaabee cavalry would go to any country where the infantry went. As is well known, in the last China war the Punjaub horse did excellently well up to the very walls of Pekin. I should here, perhaps, allude to the Hyderabad contingent under my control. Though a very fine body of irregular troops, they would not (so far as I can learn) be suited for service in the colonies. Though they comprise many races, still the majority are Deccanee; and their ideas and traditions are all bound up with the Deccan itself.

5. The reliefs would have to be at short intervals not exceeding two years. The affording of frequent reliefs indeed is the main, if not the only practical, difficulty in this matter. If this could not be managed, or if to manage it would prove too expensive, then the whole scheme would fall to the ground. The well-assured certainty of frequent reliefs would be particularly essential. Though eager to go to distant places for a time, for excitement, for enterprise, for advantage and for hard work in which they might take interest, the Punjaabees are not patient of monotony. They even soon tire of uneventful service in Bengal Proper. With the steam transport services, now existing and now further organized with a view to military reliefs, there could be no difficulty whatever in respect to Indian troops serving in the Mediterranean. Probably similar facilities could be secured in regard to China.

As regards New Zealand and South Africa and the Mauritius, there might be more of difficulty, but it would probably not be insuperable. The reasons necessitating frequency of relief are probably too well known to require mention here. It may be added that the Punjaabee and the Bombay troops would be without their families. The Madrassee troops would have their families with them; and with the Madras army the intervals of relief have always been much longer than with the other Indian armies.

6. There are no special difficulties whatever in respect to the races mentioned in Answer 4. Advantages would certainly have to be allowed, and some expense would be necessary; but probably not any such expense as would counterbalance or seriously detract from the advantages of the plan.

In a word, I should say that the Punjaabees would go with pleasure anywhere, provided they thought the expedition would not last too long and would afford excitement and advantage.

7. Sepoys employed on service out of India should have, extra to their pay, batta of Rs. 1. 8. each per mensem, and free rations; this is granted to the Madras troops when on service in Burmah, China, or the Straits. This is the lowest scale of remuneration which I could suggest. I cannot, of course, tell what the rations would cost in the colonies, but taking an average at one-half the Indian rate of European rations, which might suffice

suffice for Indian troops anywhere, the extra cost to an Indian battalion of 1,000 men of all ranks would be, per mensem :

	For 1 Man per Mensem.	For 1,000 Men per Mensem.
	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
Batta - - -	1 8 -	1,500 - -
Rations - - -	3 4 -	3,250 - -
TOTAL - - -	Rs. 4 12 -	4,750 - -

Or, per annum - Rs. 57,000, or £. 5,750.

These figures represent nothing more than an approximation; but the aggregate does not seem great, while, on the other hand, the rate per man would be a sensible addition to the sepoy's income as an inducement to go on distant service.

8. Indian troops would not be a sufficient garrison in time of peace in the colonies above mentioned, either (a) wholly unsupported by British troops or (b) supported by English garrison artillery only. The proportion of English troops necessary to support them would vary in different colonies. Speaking roundly, I should say that in the Mediterranean one-fourth of the garrison might be Indian; in New Zealand and South Africa one-half (assuming that one of the main troubles in these two colonies will be from native tribes); in China and the Mauritius one-third; in Ceylon two-thirds. The only exception would be the Straits Settlements, where probably Indian troops supported by English garrison Artillery might suffice.

9. I should think Indian troops only partially supported (but not entirely unsupported) would suffice to suppress internal disturbances in Ceylon, the Mauritius and Hong Kong. Under the same conditions Punjaabee troops would be able to cope with Kaffirs in South Africa or with Maories in New Zealand. But I do not think that the last-named work should be entrusted to any Indian troops except Punjaabees.

10. I should think it quite expedient to employ Indian troops in the Colonies mentioned in the

foregoing answers as supplementary or as auxiliaries to the English troops. I hesitate to recommend such employment in substitution of English troops, to any large extent, but this might be done to some slight extent.

11. They could not be relied on in such a service, as to materially lighten the strain to which the military resources of Great Britain are subjected in time of war. They might do so to some slight extent, perhaps. In time of peace a total strength of ten or twelve thousand Indian troops might be employed out in India in the places above described. In a general war with European Powers, the above strength might be increased to fifteen or sixteen thousand. But this would partly depend on our power and position at the time. If we were waging a doubtful or at all a losing contest in any part of the world, then the case under discussion becomes altered as regards Indian troops.

12. They would not be able to protect the Colonies above-mentioned as well as the existing garrisons, and therefore some increase of numbers would be necessary in a mixed English and Indian garrison, as compared with a purely English garrison; but not to such an extent as to neutralise or impair the advantages of the measure.

In South Africa there appear, according to the latest Army List, to be

4 British Regiments	- 4,000 men of all ranks.
5 „ in New Zealand	5,000 „
2 „ in China	- 2,000 „
1 „ in Ceylon	- 1,000 „
2 „ in Mauritius	- 2,000 „
4 „ in Malta	- 4,000 „
4 „ in Gibraltar	- 4,000 „

On these data I should suppose that the present English garrison, contrasted with a mixed garrison of English and Indian troops, might be something as follows, numerically, including men of all ranks :

COLONY.	Number of Regiments.	Present Strength, English.	Proposed Strength.			Saving of English.	Increase of Strength proposed over present.
			English.	Indian.	Total.		
South Africa - - -	4	4,000	3,000	2,000	5,000	1,000	1,000
New Zealand - - -	5	5,000	3,000	2,000	5,000	2,000	—
China - - - - -	2	2,000	1,500	1,000	2,500	500	500
Ceylon - - - - -	1	1,000	500	1,000	1,500	500	500
Mauritius - - - -	2	2,000	1,000	2,000	3,000	1,000	1,000
Malta - - - - -	4	4,000	3,000	2,000	5,000	1,000	1,000
Gibraltar - - - -	4	4,000	3,000	2,000	5,000	1,000	1,000
TOTAL - - -	22	22,000	15,000	12,000	27,000	7,000	5,000

N.B.—The Straits Settlements are omitted from the above calculation, as no British infantry are stationed there.

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This increase in total strength would not cause any increase of expenditure, because Indian troops are so much less expensive than English. There would indeed, on the contrary, be some saving of expense by the arrangement.

13. Inasmuch as our English garrison in India is, or ought to be, no more than what is really necessary, the thought of English regiments being withdrawn from India, in case of pressure at home, cannot be contemplated, save with serious concern. Writing in India, I must say that if such pressure arose, it were better to withdraw English regiments from the Colonies, filling up their places by Indian troops, than to withdraw English regiments from India; but then, on the other hand, if the Colonies in particular were threatened by an European enemy, any considerable substitution of Indian for English troops might not be practicable there.

14. The effect of service in the Colonies above named would no doubt enlarge the ideas of the Indian troops employed. It has been thought, in 1857 and subsequent years, that to employ Indian sepoys in a great variety of distant stations imperializes their minds, so to speak, and renders them less amenable to the dominant influence of their European masters. But in the case now put, I hardly see that any prejudicial effect would be produced; and even, on the contrary, sepoys might after such service return home with some notion of our world-wide power.

15. In answer to this question, I should say that for this Colonial service the best plan would be to select regiments composed of the particular races required, which corps might possess the requisite qualities, and might be imbued with the spirit that is needed for such a duty. It would be practicable, and also desirable, to ascertain beforehand whether the corps selected would be for the most part volunteers for the work. This mode would be preferable, as regards efficiency, to either of the modes proposed in the question, namely, taking regiments from the Indian army according to their turn, or raising fresh regiments in India for Colonial service. In this point of view it would be better, both in the interests of India and in the interests of the Colonies. Indeed, assuming that Punjaubees are mainly to be the troops employed, I do not perceive how any plan could be perfectly arranged by the roster of turn, because in the Bengal army the Punjaub regiments are not numbered consecutively, but bear various numbers scattered about in the list. Moreover, some of the regiments most likely to be chosen would be those of the Punjab irregular force, which are not in the Bengal regular army at all.

16. I do not think that the presence of British troops in the neighbouring Colonies is of material importance to the defence of India in case of emergency. Some assistance was indeed derived in this way in 1857. (I do not include the China force at that time so fortunately diverted from its destination.) But nothing material could, as a rule, be reckoned on.

17. Understanding that the English troops in the Colonies are or will be kept at only such strength as is absolutely required, I could not venture to name any Colony whence reinforcements could be expected for India in time of need.

18. I am not able to answer this question with confidence, not having personal knowledge of the

Colonies; but I should suppose that well-selected Indian troops would be much superior for the defence internal or external of these Colonies than any levies that could be raised from the local population. Indian troops are known to be capable of attaining a high state of organisation and discipline. Probably the same could not be said of native levies raised locally in the Colonies; with a few exceptions, at all events; and if there be this superiority on the part of Indian troops, it would be worth the incurring of the extra cost of transport in order to obtain them.

19. I apprehend that native soldiers on enlistment give little thought to the obligation they have now incurred of foreign service. If this were found to be the case, then I would try to avoid having to enforce the obligation, however clear it might be. A few discontented men might make the duty of foreign service unpopular with the corps generally. I understand that in the Madras army the sepoys whose regiments are ordered on foreign service, are usually, as a matter of grace, permitted to have the option of leaving the regiment if they do not like to accompany it, and no inconvenience seems to arise from this indulgence.

20. I would not alter the present system. I would continue to enlist them for general service anywhere, but I would try to avoid having to make them go on important service beyond the seas against their will; especially if, as I should hope, it be possible by offering inducements and by selecting regiments, to get men to go willingly.

21. I should not think the Indian troops would now draw any distinction between service in Aden and Burmah on the one hand and China and the Mauritius on the other. They certainly would go to China without hesitation; indeed they have gone in recent times and have won distinction there. I am not so positive about the Mauritius, but inasmuch as thousands of Indian labourers go there annually, it seems probable that Indian troops would go there, too, without difficulty.

22. I have seldom heard of any instances of discontent of the native army when employed on colonial duties beyond the seas. I except, of course, the cases of the Bengal sepoys objecting to go to Burmah, as those instances are well known. I do not know that the sepoys made any objection when they were sent to Egypt, at the beginning of this century.

23. I certainly think that the employment on colonial service of troops belonging to the Indian army would tend somewhat to give it the feeling of an imperial army. Such a result has at times, since 1857, been regarded as objectionable. But in this case, for the reason given in my answer to Question 14, I should not regard the objection as serious.

24. As I am in India this question which relates solely to those residing in the Colonies, is not answerable by me.

25. I am not in favour of employing in India troops recruited from the Chinese, Malay, African, or other races not Indian. In the period following 1857, this was frequently proposed in India. It was thought that non-Indian troops would be equally inured to Asiatic heat, and just as good as Indian troops; while being removed so far from their homes, they would be more bound to us, and would serve as a check on the Indian troops. I believe

I believe, however, that now this notion is nearly, perhaps entirely, abandoned. I suppose that as a military body, such non-Indian troops would be inferior to Indian troops, and would be more expensive and more troublesome to manage. On the other hand, the non-Indian troops would not really be more reliable; but would, on the contrary, join the Indians if the latter turned against us or otherwise went wrong. Chinese troops might not perhaps coalesce with the Indian; but the Indo-Chinese, the Malays, the non-Indian Asiatics, the Africans, could not be trusted. There are now African and Arabian troops at Hyderabad. No person of any experience on the British side would place any particular reliance on the above named, in any Indian mutiny or rebellion.

CONCLUSION.

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Having thus answered the several questions put, I would add that, as the proposed measure is of a novel and experimental character, I have recommended its adoption to only a limited extent at first. If it be tentatively worked, there will be no harm done even if it fail. But if it succeed, then it could be further developed hereafter.

(signed) *R. Temple,*
British Resident

at the Court of Hyderabad.

The Residency, Hyderabad,
30 May 1867.

ANSWERS of Lieutenant Colonel *Merewether*, C.B., Resident, *Aden*.

1. CARRIED out to a certain extent, it would be a most politic move. Besides relieving the English army of the heavy drain upon it which now exists, it would place the Colonies in a better position, should an European war break out, than they otherwise would be; because, in the event of such occurring, every English soldier that could possibly be taken, would be withdrawn. The Indian troops would then be something left.

2. In the Eastern Colonies, that is Mauritius, Ceylon, Straits Settlements, China, and the Cape. For New Zealand, under the improved state of affairs there, I should think there would be no difficulty in raising soldiers on the spot, well suited for the purpose required. Malta and Gibraltar, I consider should always be held by English troops alone. The West Indies are provided for already in the West India regiments, which might be increased if required. Further, the great distance from India would be objectionable in arranging details.

3. None.

4. I would specify none. The Indian army might be increased to meet the new wants, and regiments would take their tour of colonial duty. Men should be enlisted for general service, without any distinction and without any reference to caste or persuasion. They should be taken merely for their physical fitness for a soldier's life.

5. A regular systematic course of reliefs every three years, the regiments leaving their families and other impediments at fixed head-quarters, or at certain established depôts. The fixed head-quarter system would be the preferable of the two, if it could be generally introduced, and I see no reason why it should not be.

6. I know no special difficulties whatever as regards the classes in India who would enlist for general service, and the supply would be plentiful. Difficulties were encountered formerly in India, but they originated as much, indeed almost entirely, from the faulty management of the men, not from the men themselves. Extra allowances would have to be given to the men serving abroad, in the same manner as was granted to the 3rd, 5th, 22nd, and Belooch Regiments of the Bombay army lately in China.

7. Replied to in previous answer.

8. Not having any personal knowledge of the colonies, or of their requirements, it is difficult to 058.

answer this question; but speaking generally I should say that where two English regiments are now located, one might be withdrawn, and its place supplied by one or two native Indian regiments, according to the amount of duty required of them. In some of the places, such as Ceylon, and some of the minor stations in China, native troops might be with advantage used alone. Artillery would have to be kept up in all stations as in peace time now. There is an objection with some to training native Indian artillery again, to which I in nowise hold. It would be a good opportunity to revive Indian native artillery by sending some batteries to the Colonies. These will form a good nucleus when the Indian local army has to be reorganised, as which, sooner or later, it will have to be.

9. I think so, certainly.

10. As a supplement to Europeans in time of war, the advantage would be found very great. It would be cheaper. It would allow of the Europeans being relieved of much duty which is now found to tell heavily upon them, but for which the natives are far better suited. It would economise the most expensive material, the European soldier, and it would place so many more men at the disposal of the Home Government. The chequered brigade, one European and two native regiments, forms a most effective force; would be excellent against any Asiatic enemy, and I think would not be found wanting when opposed to an European one.

11. Certainly.

12. The Indian makes an excellent soldier when well commanded and strictly disciplined; when treated for their qualifications as soldiers, not as Bhramins, or what not, the Indian annals show instances of military spirit, endurance, and courage, which will bear comparison with any in the world. Merely to quote a few within the last half century. I would mention the last storm of Bhulpoor, when a Bengal native regiment led; the battles of Korregaum, Scetabundee, Meanee, Guzerat. In the last-mentioned, natives led the cavalry attack against a very superior force, supported by English dragoons. The purposed garrisons would be as adequate as existing garrisons; but I should conclude, if the war extended to the Colonies, extra provision would have to be made.

13. Want of personal knowledge of the requirements of the Colonies prevents my answering this question

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question fully. But with regard to India, I would observe, that when once the maximum European force is fixed for that country, none of the English army should on any account be withdrawn from it, unless they are replaced at once by others, to form an European local army.

14. Decidedly advantageous. It would enlarge their experience, and confirm them in the feeling that they are soldiers of the State, ready to serve anywhere.

15. It would be better for both interests, until the Colonies can provide for themselves within their own limits, that regiments should be taken from India in their turn, the Indian army being increased to meet the greater demand.

16. Now that troops are about to be sent regularly overland, India would be reinforced from England more easily and more quickly than from any of the Colonies. The presence of European troops in the Colonies for this purpose is therefore immaterial.

17. Replied to in the above.

18. Certainly, as far as we can judge from experience as regards South Africa and Ceylon. The attempt to raise local troops in both these places has been tried and failed. In Mauritius I should imagine equal difficulty would be experienced as in Africa or Ceylon. In Hong Kong, I have been told, the material at present available is quite unsuited to the purpose. The West Indies seem to be provided for already. For the four first, then, it would appear indispensably necessary; and the saving in having native troops in place of European would more than pay the cost of transport. The Europeans would equally have to be relieved with the natives, and at a much greater cost.

19. I am not quite certain how this stands with regard to the native army in Bengal; but in Bombay, the soldiers are enlisted for general service, and are ready and willing to proceed beyond seas, or anywhere. In 1860, when the 3rd and 5th W. I. were ordered to China, the announcement that they were to go was received with acclamation.

20. The rule, if it does not exist, should certainly be introduced and adhered to, that troops

should be enlisted to go wherever they are ordered, and the exigencies of the service required them to be. I know of no reason why it should not be done.

21. No; I do not.

22. From personal knowledge, I can give no cases. But the records of India, show that regiments in Bengal and some few in Madras objected to go to Burmah, and China in the former, because they considered they were not enlisted to serve anywhere out of India. They equally refused to go to Scind or Afghanistan. Till a few years ago, there were regiments in the old Bengal army who were styled volunteer regiments, because the men entered them with the understanding they were to serve out of India. I believe, however, even these did not prove a bit more willing when the time came for them to go. But this was owing to a faulty system which allowed the men to consider, or feel they had a choice in the matter. It is to be hoped such a mistake will never be fallen into again. Men should only be taken who enter the army to obey orders and go where they are bid.

23. I think it would have a very excellent effect in raising the morals of the men, and it could not fail to be of benefit by enlarging their experience.

24. The Arabs and Somallees (an African race), who form the mass of the population at Aden, are as they exist now utterly unsuited for soldiers. The Arabs are active and energetic, but they would not conform to discipline. The Somallees are the laziest most useless people on the face of the earth. A body of mounted police being required for this station, I found it necessary to recommend they should be raised in and sent from India. They could not be found at Aden.

25. Having no personal experience of these races, I can give no opinion, beyond what appears generally in the answers given above.

W. L. Merewether, Lieutenant Colonel,
Resident, Aden.

Aden Residency,
20 May 1867.

ANSWERS of Colonel Sir *Herbert Edwardes*, K.C.B.

1. THIS question must be looked at from two points; firstly, what is expedient for England? secondly, what is expedient for India? With regard to England, I should say that any arrangement which would economise even a single British battalion would be expedient. I have no doubt that improving the condition of the British soldier would quickly do away with the difficulties of recruiting. But, supposing this to be done, and recruits to be abundant, who would use up his best material when second best would do? Turning to India, I do not consider it a wise policy for our empire there to open new military careers for the native races. What we want is to settle the population down to peaceful pursuits, so that in a few generations they may become disused to arms. The break-up of the Sikh power in the wars of 1845-6, and 1848-9, sent thousands of soldiers in the Punjab sulkily back to the plough, whence Runjeet Singh had, only a generation

before, with great difficulty drawn their fathers. These men and their sons were the treasure-house from which we mainly drew the large Punjab levies of 1857; and it may be said that this was well for us. As it happened, it was; but they would have been equally available against us. Under the circumstances, they were invaluable to us in putting down the old Sepoy army; but that object having been effected, we must take care that the remedy is not as bad as the disease. It is quite sufficient to draw on the Sikhs, the border Pathans, and other martial races of the Punjab, for as many soldiers as we actually require to keep up the balance of races in our new native army in India, without turning whole races once more into soldiers by profession. So with the Poorbeas, who were the main body of the old Sepoy army. They have now passed, or are passing, through the wretchedness of transition from a century of hereditary soldiering to a future

future of agriculture. I would strongly deprecate any disturbance of the process, even if they would enlist in any numbers, to cross the sea, which, being high caste, and full of prejudice, they probably would not. Now, comparing these considerations of what is good for England and what is good for India, it is obvious that a large part of the problem before Parliament is how to diminish the British garrison in India, and I should conclude that whatever policy disarms the people of India diminishes the necessity for a European garrison; and *vice versa*. On the whole, therefore, it seems expedient to substitute Indian troops for British to a moderate extent, in a few pressing tropical colonies, but certainly not to carry out the policy on a great scale beyond the Indian seas.

2. China, the Straits, Ceylon, and Mauritius.

3. I have not lived in any of the Colonies which I have named above. I have touched several times at Ceylon; and, from having served in India since the beginning of 1841, of course I have some knowledge of all these adjacent countries.

4. (a). South Africa.—I should have thought local races could be found here well suited to oppose those who annoy the Colony. The divisions of barbarians can always be turned to account. But if it be determined to draw on India, I would recommend half Hindoos and half Mahomedans, from the Bombay Presidency, accustomed to see their countrymen go to Aden, and come back again. The Bheels, if they would go, are a race well suited to bush-fighting. There is a large body of Eurasians in India, to whom the Cape climate would be permanently suited. A corps of these might be raised, and made locals. Recruits could be supplied, when wanted, from India.

(b). *Mauritius*.—Mauritius is well suited by climate to natives of India, who go there freely as hired labourers, to cultivate sugar; stay periods of five or ten years, and return with large savings to India. Many seem to stay there for good, and I understand that they now form a moiety of the 400,000 total population of the island. These coolies come chiefly from the hill tribes of Bengal and Orissa, and the Tamils of the Madras coast.

The Orissa men would not make soldiers, but the Tamels form a good class of the Madras native army; and I should think a corps could be raised out of these on the spot, and constantly recruited, without the trouble of bringing men from India. They should be balanced by an equal number of Mahomedans from the Madras Presidency.

Mauritius is said to have good fortifications, and natives fight almost as well as Europeans behind works.

I believe there are no Aborigines in Mauritius, from whom a local corps could be raised.

(c). *Ceylon*.—In Ceylon, the races are cognate with those of the southern coast of India; the climate is similar, and the distance small. In the Ceylon rifles, I believe there are many Malays (a race introduced into the island as mercenaries, by the Dutch), and that they do well.

But they are Mahomedans, and should be balanced by other races. I do not know whether any Kandians from the Ceylon hills have been enlisted, or would enlist, but if possible, they should be, as they are said to be a fine highland race.

The Telingas of Madras and the Dekhan, are well suited to service in Ceylon; at one time, they conquered it.

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(d.) *Straits Settlement*.—All the races which supply the Madras army, are accustomed to serve in the Straits settlements, but I should think it would be good policy also, to have some Malays of the country.

(e.) *China*.—In China, also, the Madras military races have been accustomed to serve cheerfully, and this is half the battle. As a rule, the Indians of the interior and upper provinces, dislike foreign service, and especially the sea, so that they should be last resorted to. Belooches, from Sindh, would be well suited to China. I should not advocate raising local corps of Chinese, because they are not our own subjects. As a race, too, they are notorious for secret conspiracy.

(f.) *Malta*.

(g.) *Gibraltar*.—My judgment would be decidedly against bringing Indian troops to Europe. It is quite enough to take them to the Indian and China seas, and among Buddhists, Mahomedans, Hindoos, and Kaffirs.

But should Parliament resolve on such a measure, then all that remains, is to bring the robustest races who can be induced to come, and I would recommend men of the Punjaub and its border, half Mahomedans and half Sikhs.

(h.) *West Indies*.—The special objection to sending Indian troops to the West Indies, is the great distance. But Indian coolies have gone there as sugar labourers, and if the measure be determined on at all, Madras coast Hindoos would go the most cheerfully.

(i.) *New Zealand*.—Here I would object, not only to the distance, but to the needlessness of sending to India for auxiliaries; and I would strongly recommend the policy so successful in India, of raising regiments from the natives of the country. The Maorees are a most martial race, and to keep them always as enemies, is not making the best use of them. At first sight, it may seem unlikely that Maorees would fight for us against their own countrymen, but those who have dealt with wild races, know the contrary. Not only does all experience in India prove it, but I would appeal to the experience of the late war in New Zealand, in which the Han-hau fanatics 200 strong, made an expedition to exterminate the Europeans in the settlement of Wanganni, were encountered by a body of friendly natives, and after a severe fight, were all either killed or dispersed. Subsequent to this, a small colonial force, with the help of a friendly native contingent, expelled the Han-haus from the east coast, and seized and carried to Auckland 30 or 40 natives implicated in the murder of the missionary Volkner. In fact, the powerful element of religion comes in aid of policy, in New Zealand, as it does not do in India. Christian Maorees would naturally take service with us, and be elevated in doing so; and the two races would be drawn more together. Again, the Maorees are at least equal, and probably superior, to the best races in India, in soldierly qualities. To bring Indians against them, would be as aggravating as enlisting them on one side would be tranquillising to the Colony.

5. The Indian troops in Colonies would require to be relieved as a rule, every three years, as the Madras troops used to be in China, the Straits, Burmah, &c., and the arrangements for making those reliefs would turn upon the way in which Question 15 may be decided. If a Colonial regiment

App. No. 1. ment be borrowed from the Indian native army, an extra regiment will be kept up in that army, and regularly relieved in its turn. If the Colony wish to have a local corps, and can get it, it will be necessary to let one-third of the men go on furlough every year; and the corps must be one-third stronger and more costly in consequence. The native officers on furlough would then recruit for the regiment. But I do not think that any of the races of India, except Eurasians, would enlist to be made locals in any other Colony than Ceylon, which is really a fragment of their own country.

6. I have only named those races which have been accustomed for years to cross the sea on service, or would be likely to consent to do so. As a general remark, all the races of India dislike foreign service and crossing the sea; but most of them will go for a consideration. The high caste men of Oudd and the north-west provinces of Bengal refuse, in bodies, to go to sea, as they say it breaks their caste; but even these men, as individuals, when enlisted in the Bombay and Madras armies, and cut off from social prejudices, go everywhere, and do everything with their comrades, though they may talk a little about it, to keep up their own dignity. I have heard a Madras officer of experience relate his amusement and surprise at catching a high caste Hindoostanee native officer buying a "sheep's head and trotters" in the bazaar in China, because he could no longer stand the climate without animal food. When laughed at, he laughed too, and said "When I get back to Hindostan I can make it all right again with the Brahmins."

7. Experience has long shown that the terms granted by the Madras Government to its sepoy when on foreign service, quite content the men. The details can be readily got from the India Office; but the general features of the arrangement are:—

1. Provision for regular payments to the soldier's families left behind.
2. Pensions to ditto, in case of casualties abroad.
3. Free rations, in excess of Indian pay.
4. Stated reliefs.

8. In all the Colonies in the Indian and China seas, which seem to me suited for Indian garrisons, I think the Indian system, to which the natives are accustomed, should be adhered to, of having a nucleus of British troops, more or less, according to the Colony, even in times of peace. You cannot tell when war may arise in such places as the Cape and China; and the system on which you intend to fight, must be kept up in peace, if only in skeleton. I would always keep the guns in the hands of Europeans; and in other arms, one European to three native soldiers.

9. Yes; three Indian regiments brigaded with one British, and backed by British artillery, are good against all comers.

10. See answer to No. 9.

11. Ditto, ditto.

12. No one would pretend that any coloured troops in the world, whether Indians or others, are equal to British soldiers. Therefore, if you

substitute black troops for white, you must have more of them. Where it is a question of open field, I would say three for one. Where it is the defence of fortifications, two for one.

13. This would depend much on the quarter from which the pressure came. If we were at war with Russia we could not withdraw British troops from India; for Russia is very wisely closing her Asiatic frontier on our own. The only object which could repay her for all the trouble she is taking, is to have a check upon us in case of another war. When that war comes, we shall find that we are no longer free in India to turn our attention and our resources to the Baltic and the Black Sea. We shall find unaccountable intrigues springing up in the native courts of India; and if the war lasts long enough, we shall find our frontier alight, and Central Asia in commotion. Again, if the European enemy be a great maritime power, we could not denude the Colonies of British troops; though otherwise we could do so. The true policy would seem to be this, to establish in peace a system that would stand in war; to lead each Colony to undertake its own defence as far as practicable; to enlist local races as the groundwork of local defence; to back these with the minimum of British troops (*i. e.* the maximum you could spare in war), and then if necessary, and not otherwise, supplement these with Indian auxiliaries. Our home resources would then be so economised, that we could draw on them for all the demands of a European war, without making the alarm vibrate to the outer edges of the Empire, by calling home battalions from India and the Colonies.

14. This is entirely a question of treatment. The service itself must always go against the grain of the natives of India; but if it be made profitable, and not too long, so that when the soldiers return home again they may find they have saved more money than they could have done in India, there will be nothing but good feeling about it.

15. In my answer to Question 3, I have expressed my opinion that there is little choice in this matter, as it is not probable that any natives of India (unless it be Eurasians), would accept permanent service in any Colony except Ceylon. Eurasians might agree to be localised at the Cape, or in China, or indeed, anywhere. There are other obvious difficulties in such an arrangement; the greater expense entailed by furloughs and recruiting, and the officering of the local corps. On the whole I think it quite practicable for the Colonies I have named in Answer 2, to borrow regiments regularly from India, and adjust the accounts; but impracticable to raise and maintain Indian regiments of their own.

16. If the British garrison of India be kept up to its standard, this should be sufficient to meet all emergencies. In 1857, we had so few European troops in India, that we were obliged to call on the Cape for assistance. But the contingency of helping India ought not to be an argument for keeping in any colony more British troops than the colony itself requires.

17. As a question of time, Ceylon, the Straits, China, and perhaps Mauritius, could send reinforcements to India, sooner than to England.

18. From my answer to Question 4, it will be

be seen that I strongly advocate the policy of enlisting the races of the country, which has pacified many of the most troublesome parts of India. This policy is at once the easiest, cheapest, justest, and most efficient.

19. In considering this question, it is necessary to bear in mind that there are three presidencies, and three native armies in India. In the Bombay and Madras armies, I believe general service has always been both the theory and the practice; and notably so in the Madras army, which has habitually taken the garrison duty of China, the Straits, and the Pegu Provinces. But in the Bengal army caste and prejudice ran high, and to get the native troops on general service was always a matter of volunteering and couxing. Previous to 1856, there were a few regiments in the Bengal native army called volunteer corps, who had accepted the conditions of general service. And in 1856, Lord Canning ordered that all future enlistments throughout the Bengal Presidency should be for general service. In the reorganisation of the native army after the mutiny of 1857, general service was, I believe, the basis; and this is so recent, that no native soldier can be unaware of it. But, having been employed on purely civil and political duties during the three years (1862, 1863, 1864) that I have been in India since the new army was organised, I am unable to speak to the feeling of the men upon this point. Terms, however, have a tendency to become obsolete if not enforced; and with the exception of Colonel Probyn's and Colonel Fane's regiments of Punjab Cavalry, who took such a distinguished part in the last China war, I cannot call to mind that any native troops from Bengal have crossed the sea. Referring to the Army List for January 1867, I find, that whereas the Madras Native Army had sent six battalions across the sea to garrisons in the Straits and the Pegu provinces, the Bombay army had sent only one to Aden, and the Bengal army not one. When then it is remembered that the Pegu provinces are a part of the Bengal Presidency, it does not look well for the general service principle in the Bengal army, that the Madras troops are still taking the sea duties. No doubt there are some good reasons for it, but they would have to be inquired into before this 19th Question could be answered satisfactorily.

20. The fewer changes you make in Indian armies the better; but if any have to be made, a time of peace like the present, is of course the best for making them; especially while there is a Governor General on the spot like Sir John Lawrence, who knows the native troops.

21. If the men like it, and see an advantage in it, they will draw no distinction. If they don't like it they will soon find a distinction, that China is further than Burmah, and Mauritius further than Aden. As far as I understand, going across the sea, has always been reconciled to the Madras troops by pecuniary advantages.

22. The only case strictly in point which I can remember during my service (*i.e.* since January 1841), was that of a corps of Sikh pioneers, raised in the Punjab about 1859, by Captain O'Brien, for service in the Crown colony of Ceylon. When they reached Ceylon, there proved to be a misunderstanding as to the duties on which they were to be employed. My impression is, that the

Sikhs expected to be military pioneers, but found they were required only as an organised corps of labourers on the roads. A hot dispute arose as to the terms of enlistment, ending in insubordination and commotion.

Public opinion was greatly divided about the merits of the case. Reports of harsh and unfair treatment reach the men's homes in the Punjab, and coming just after the great services of the Sikh race in the Sepoy war of 1857, created uneasiness for the time, and the experiment was dropped. The cause of the failure was a want of full understanding beforehand. The mutiny of the Bengal regiments, and discontent of some Madras regiments when ordered to Sindh, after its annexation in 1843-44, though not so literally in point, is really as much to the purpose; because what they quarrelled about was going to a distant and, to them, quite foreign country without being paid extra for it. The moral of which is, that any service far from their own homes is, in itself, distasteful to the natives of India. The reasons are obvious: Firstly, the men have to leave their families behind, and to provide for them respectably in their absence, which is difficult, precarious, and expensive. Secondly, the change of climate is feared. Thirdly, so is association with alien races and religions, and where it is a question of crossing the sea, the difficulty increases in the ratio of caste. Fourthly, furlough, which is a much-prized privilege, becomes almost impracticable. To surmount these difficulties, therefore, some solid compensation must be given.

(I have not mentioned the Barrackpore mutiny of 1824, because it was before my time; but we all know that it was caused by a mixed fear of losing caste by going to sea, and disgust at an unhealthy foreign service.)

23. Whatever raised the sentiment of loyalty to the Crown in the native army would of course be desirable. But I do not think foreign and distant service, in strange climes, would have that effect. Quite the contrary. We have only to look at home, and inquire with what feelings foreign service is regarded by our own British troops and officers, though they are supported by every sentiment of patriotism.

24. Answer not required.

25. Both in India and the Colonies, the first economical and conciliatory policy is to enlist as far as possible the people of the country. Safety can generally be given to it, by balancing local races, religions, and interests. Neglect of this precaution gave such serious proportions to the Sepoy mutiny of 1857. The Bengal army had become a great brotherhood. Even then, we raised a new native army from other martial races at our disposal, and thus enabled the handful of Europeans in the country to break the neck of the mutiny before reinforcements came from England. Local races, too, are always the most efficient. Until quite lately, the difficulty in India was to find employment; and it would have been highly unjust and impolitic to import Africans, or other foreigners. Many things have combined to work a great change in this respect. The war of 1857 finished what Clive began in 1757. It settled the question of supremacy in India. All classes accepted the fact, and settled down to the arts of peace. Lord Dalhousie's great system of railroads began to come into play, at once absorbing labour, and opening fallow districts. The introduction of

App. No. 1. tea cultivation, the call for cotton in consequence of the American war, and the assumption of the Government of India by the Crown, have all produced a rush of European enterprise. The result is a great development of both trade and agriculture, and a wonderful rise in the prices of produce and labour.

Still, I do not anticipate that there will ever be

a scarcity of recruits for the native army; and I am quite sure that no other coloured races would prove more docile and loyal in our hands than our own native subjects in India.

Herbert B. Edwards,
Ventnor, Isle of Wight, Colonel.
14 May 1867.

ANSWERS of Major General *Hodgson*, Commanding Troops in *Ceylon*.

1. I AM of opinion that substituting Indian for English troops in our Colonies would be perfect madness, a moral suicide. Any magazines, forts, or artillery entrusted to them would be turned against us sooner or later; any moment might see our Colonies exposed to mutiny, devastation, and bloodshed. The only form in which they should be employed are as police, and even then they must be well watched by Europeans.

2. Not in one as a substitute.

3. I have special knowledge of many Colonies, but I would not trust the protection, internal or external, of a single one to natives of India.

4. Should it be finally determined upon to employ natives of India in place of Europeans in any of the Colonies named in Question No. 4, the consequences would, in my opinion, be so certainly fatal that I must decline specifying any race to commence the experiment with. Whatever the race, the fatal result would be merely a question of time and opportunity.

5. Supposing the determination carried out, these native troops must be scrupulously relieved every three years at the very least. They are very suspicious, and the slightest delay would produce serious evil, however good their conduct until then.

6. I do not consider that religious prejudices would operate in any great degree, social habits probably would. Any increased advantages would assuredly lead at some critical moment to a further demand.

7. Wherever they might go they would regard themselves as our protectors, and, as mere mercenaries, would place the highest price on their services. They would require the same pay and advantages as European soldiers, perhaps more, as they would believe themselves indispensable, and that we were bankrupt in soldiers of our own race. They would insist upon no limit to women and children, and if persuaded to embark without them on a sacred pledge of being relieved at the end of three years, and of their families during that period being supported by Government, they would ere long become discontented, from which there will be but one step to revolt.

8.—(a.) Certainly not.

(b.) Certainly not; far better be without British artillery, if unsupported by British infantry.

(c.) Just as many European troops as if there were no natives at all.

9. With a large number of European officers and non-commissioned officers, they might perhaps do some service against frontier savages, or a pusillanimous race like the Cingalese, especially if there was a prospect of pillage, but in cases of internal disturbances generally they would be as little to be trusted as the inhabitants.

10. To employ them as a substitute would be fatal, and as a supplement they would cause anxiety, instead of giving a feeling of security. If I demanded 5,000 Europeans to defend a position, and were asked how many I should require if 2,000 natives of India were sent, I should ask for 6,000 Europeans instead of 5,000.

11. Certainly not; no pay, no indulgence, no privilege, no conciliation can acquire for us their love or loyalty. Alien to us in colour, creed, and race, without one feeling in common, they have proved by the late mutiny that they regard us with unmitigated hatred, and that they cannot be relied upon.

12. Assuredly not; not if they were five to one; not if commanded by the best officers in Europe; not if led by the Sovereign in person.

13. Our military force in the Colonies is so small that it could be of little use there in the event of a war; its certain capture would add to the disaster. The Colonies may be said to be defenceless; troops are maintained chiefly for local purposes; I am of opinion, therefore, that, in the event of a great pressure at home, it would be advisable to withdraw the troops from the Colonies, not, however, filling their places by natives from India, but leaving the Colonies to their own resources.

14. Certainly not; he would be discontented and insubordinate while serving, and return to his native country with foreign vices added to his own, and probably a great deal of dangerous knowledge.

15. It would be better to raise fresh regiments in India specially for colonial service, and then they could make no complaints, as their position would be clearly defined at the period of enlistment, whereas regiments already formed might declare they had been entrapped from their original engagement.

16. The knowledge that there are British troops in the neighbouring Colonies would never prevent one of those sudden risings to which Asiatics are so prone; neither would it prevent a deep-laid conspiracy. They are only to be checked by the sight of a powerful and avenging arm upon the spot. Reduced, moreover, as the military force is in all the neighbouring Colonies, and which is well known in India, the fear of anything that could be sent would produce no practical effect.

17. I know of no Colony from whence 200 men could be conveniently withdrawn; certainly not from those where I command, Ceylon, Singapore, and the Straits.

I do not mean to imply that the withdrawal of a couple of hundred men would lead to an outbreak, but all proper military duty would collapse; the attempt to carry it on would entail such a pressure

pressure upon the troops that the loss of life among them would be great; in fact, all that makes a military body would be destroyed.

These are considerations which do not weigh with colonists in their clamour for military reductions. They are blind to all military considerations.

A few months ago there were riots in Ceylon owing to fears of a famine, and had the arrival of rice been delayed 24 hours there would assuredly have been an outbreak, in which event I must have allowed all but the capital towns to be pillaged; I could not have spared one man from head quarters. Other colonists are similarly situated; how, therefore, could British troops under such circumstances be of the slightest importance for the defence of India, in case of an emergency?

18. I utterly object to the employment of Indian troops in any of the places named; they would increase external or internal danger. Dangerous as is a purely local force, better trust to it than to natives from India.

19 and 20. I have no cognizance.

21. The Bombay and Madras troops have for many years served at Aden, Burmah, and in the Straits Settlements; they might not object to China, but they would probably consider the Mauritius too foreign.

22. I have no knowledge.

23. It would not be profitable to give to a native Indian army the character and feeling of an

Imperial army. Their patriotism and loyalty are not for us. Their belief in the stability of our power is not as strong as formerly, and to hatred of us will be added contempt if they believe we cannot find soldiers of our own race.

24. Utterly impossible, either for general or local service; I once saw a native corps raised here, but it soon collapsed amidst the jeers of the people themselves.

25. I see no objection to employing in India troops of races not Indian, but no advantage would be gained thereby. Native troops of any race or clime would combine against us if there should not be a preponderating European force at hand. An army for India, though composed of races not Indian, could never be a substitute for Europeans; it could be merely a supplement, and must be of equal strength with the present army.

Chinese, Malay, African, or other race not Indian, could not with safety be employed in any Colony without a European force amounting to at least one-third of their number, and under all circumstances native troops of whatever race should be armed with an inferior weapon to that in the hands of the European troops on the spot. If the latter have breech loaders, the former should merely have the ordinary rifle.

Studholm Hodgson,
Major General,
Commanding H. M. Forces in Ceylon.

Ceylon, 26 May 1867.

ANSWERS of Lieutenant General Sir J. Gaspard Le Marchant, R.C.B., Commander in Chief, Madras Army.

1. I THINK it most inexpedient; but if it were so decided, then in the Colonies within the Tropics, if not too far removed, and where there is never any extreme cold, the native troops of the Madras Presidency might be employed, provided distinctly that they are accompanied by a proper complement of European officers, but not with the few laid down for the existing organisation of the native army.

2. Mauritius, Ceylon, Straits Settlements, and Hong Kong.

I have omitted the West Indies, solely, however, on account of the distance from India. The passage would be extremely long and tedious, the men would suffer in health from their long confinement, and the changed nature of the food for so protracted a period, and the want of frequent and quick communication with their families and relations would also be an insuperable difficulty.

3. No, with the exception of the Straits Settlements, which have hitherto been garrisoned by the Madras Army under my command.

4. The classes from which the Madras infantry is recruited, are the best adapted for military duty in the Colonies specified in Answer 2. The high caste Hindoos, such as Rajpoots, &c., would not be likely to enlist for such service. Beloochees and Sikhs would only answer for warlike operations when plunder can be obtained.

5. If Madras regiments are so employed, they would expect to be relieved at the expiration of "three" years' service away from their homes.

0.58.

6. I should apprehend no special difficulties. The advantages now enjoyed by the native troops of this Presidency would, I think, be all that are required, namely, rations and batta, with pensions to the heirs of the men who die when on such service, or after their return, from disease contracted on the said service. The Madras regulations on this point are complete, and should be "scrupulously" observed.

7. In my opinion, the pay and advantages above mentioned (Answer 6), are sufficient. If there is any idea, however, of enlisting men specially for service in the Colonies without stipulating for their periodical relief triennially, the terms upon which the Pegu Sappers battalion was raised might induce some natives to enlist, but it would be to a very limited extent, probably not more than sufficient for two corps; and those who would be willing to enter such service would be men of bad character, who would take advantage of the opportunity to get out of the country.

8. I think it would be very impolitic to leave such troops by themselves in Colonies in which they had never previously served, until at all events they had acquired confidence in themselves, and a knowledge of the people. The support of a proportion of British infantry would be necessary, except perhaps in the Straits Settlements, where eventually artillery might suffice.

The proportion of British infantry and artillery must depend on local circumstances.

9. Only if duly supported by British troops, and in the Colonies mentioned in Answer No. 2.

G G

10. Not

App. No. 1.

10. Not in substitution certainly, but as a supplement to British troops, occasions might arise, when it could be done with advantage; this system is pursued in India in all foreign wars.

11. Yes; I think they could.

12. Native troops, by themselves, would be inadequate; and for such portion of the British garrison as may be replaced by native troops, at the very least two of the latter should be substituted for every one of the former withdrawn.

13. The former would, undoubtedly, be preferable; in such case the European force in India ought not to be weakened.

14. Such service would not affect the native soldier's loyalty or original disposition in any way.

15. The Madras Presidency would have to be chiefly depended upon for troops for Colonial service; and it is very doubtful whether a sufficient number of recruits could be enlisted specially and exclusively to form regiments with reliefs for such service; it would therefore be necessary to take regiments from the Indian army, according to their turn; but with the "present number" of Madras regiments the service for the Colonies could not be undertaken. The temper of the army would not bear to be harassed unduly with tours of foreign service.

16. The proximity of European troops must have a certain moral effect; but little absolute assistance could be looked for from them. During the great mutiny this was very practically illustrated, when but few were obtained from the Colonies before they were replaced from home. Those that first arrived were diverted while on their passage to China, at Singapore.

17. They could be now obtained from England more easily than elsewhere, except Ceylon, which probably would not be able to spare any of its garrison.

18. It must be chiefly a local question how far troops raised upon the spot can be wholly relied on to act against their own races in cases of internal disturbances. Against external enemies troops raised on the spot might prove in every way efficient; but, again, it requires a knowledge of the population of the Colony itself, and local experience to speak decidedly on this point.

19. The Madras native soldier knows that he is liable to service beyond seas.

20. Answered by preceding Question No. 19.

21. The Madras troops would be as willing to serve at the Mauritius or China (as they have already done at the latter place) as they now are to go to Burmah and the Straits, provided they are sent on the same terms.

I may here add, that jealousy would doubtless arise between the European officers of the Royal troops and those of the Indian army, should they be serving together on Colonial duty, in consequence of the marked disparity of the Colonial allowances of the former, as compared with the more liberal pay of the Eastern officers.

22. I personally know of none as "the consequence" of employment beyond seas.

Instances of insubordination and discontent in this army have almost invariably arisen on questions of pay and allowances.

23. Nothing of the kind; they are essentially mercenaries, and care little whether they serve the Crown or not. If the choice were now given them they would prefer to revert to what they consider the good old days of the Honourable Company.

24. See Answer No. 7, as regards Southern India.

25. It would be inexpedient, on every account, to employ such in India. Further, I doubt the practicability of embodying any force from those nations in sufficient strength or numbers to render them efficient or of importance. I have only recently returned from a tour of inspection through Singapore, the other Straits Settlements, and Burmah; Malays cannot be found even to supply the Rifle regiment in Ceylon.

The Chinese have physical and other qualities to recommend them, but these again are marred by the difficulty of the language, and the ineradicable taint of "Secret Societies," which prevail universally amongst them, and render them ineligible from its dangerous consequences for enrolment as troops.

(signed) *J. Gaspard Le Marchant*,
Commander in Chief, Madras Army.

Head-quarters, Ootacamund,
10 June 1867.

ANSWERS of Sir *Henry Barkly*, K. C. B., Governor of the Mauritius.

1. To a limited extent, and subject to certain restrictions, I think it might advantageously be done.

2. The West Indian Colonies, Ceylon, Straits Settlements, China, Mauritius, Natal, Cape of Good Hope, and, perhaps, New Zealand.

3. I was Governor of British Guiana, 1848-53, of Jamaica from 1853-56, and of Mauritius from 1863-67.

I have visited the Cape and Ceylon.

4, 5. For the West Indies, Mauritius, and other Colonies, containing a large population of Indian immigrants, the troops employed should in my opinion be Sikhs, Goorkas, or others of different

creeds or proclivities to those of the natives of India who emigrate.

In Mauritius especially, I should strongly deprecate the employment of a sepoy regiment, as there are a quarter of a million Hindoos in the island.

6. I am not aware of any. Regiments of Beloochees touched here last year on their way back from China, and seemed to get on well in the place.

8. No. I should not advocate the leaving of native troops entirely, without the example and check of a certain number of British soldiers. I do not think artillery would suffice for this purpose.

In

In Mauritius, one regiment of the line instead of two as now, would be essential. In Jamaica also, a European regiment should always be kept in reserve at Newcastle. In British Guiana, I believe there are now no white troops.

9. Yes, if supported as above.

10. Supported by a sufficient number of British troops, I have no doubt they would be efficient.

11. I think so. I am under the impression that sepoys formed a portion of the force which captured Mauritius.

12. As far as garrison work went they might, the Sikhs, in particular, being excellent gunners; but in the open field they could not, of course, be so much depended on as Europeans.

13. This is a question of degree. England, no doubt, must be the first consideration, India next, and then the Colonies, according to their value and capabilities for self-defence. It would be unwise under any circumstances to leave India short of British troops.

14. Advantageous as giving him an idea of the extent and power of British rule, and lessening the great ignorance stated to prevail in India on that subject.

15. I should say, to raise special regiments with a distinct understanding that they were liable to Colonial service. It would be better probably

to begin by limiting the service to the Eastern App. No. 1. Colonies.

16, 17. It certainly proved so during the mutiny. Regiments from Ceylon, Mauritius, the Cape, and, I believe, even Australia, reached India sooner than any aid from England.

It may be different when a well-arranged relief system is established in regular steam transports *via* the Red Sea, but is it prudent to reckon upon that route being under all contingencies available?

18, 19. I cannot venture to pronounce any opinion as to South Africa; but with reference to the other Colonies named, I should say decidedly yes, with a slight reservation only as to native African troops in the West Indies, which, as far as I can judge, are quite as efficient in case either of external or internal danger, and probably more so in the West Indies, than Indian troops would be.

They are, however, fiercer and more cruel in warfare, and I believe that as the slave trade declines, and captures are fewer, it becomes more and more difficult to obtain recruits for our West India regiments, and if it becomes necessary to recruit largely from the Creole population of the West Indies, such regiments might, in case of internal disturbance, become dangerous.

(signed) *Henry Barkly.*

Government House, Mauritius,
5 June 1867.

ANSWERS of Colonel *H. St. George Ord*, C. B., R. E., Governor of the Straits Settlements.

1, 2, 3. My acquaintance with Indian troops is so slight that I do not feel competent to offer any opinion as to the expediency of substituting them for English troops in the Colonies in time of peace.

4. In the Straits Settlements I understand the low caste natives of Southern India are found to be very well adapted for duty as soldiers.

5, 6. They require to be relieved about once in every three years, but I believe that if it were desired to establish a local force, arrangements might be made for securing their services for longer periods, probably, in some cases, as long as was desirable, by permitting their families to accompany them.

7. No difficulties are found to exist to the employment of natives of Southern India in the Straits Settlements, and I have recommended to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that I may be permitted to organise a force of armed police in substitution of a small force of Ceylon Rifles, which it has been proposed to allocate for the service of the settlements.

8. I should not like to rely solely on native infantry in the Straits Settlements, but I believe

that the European force which has been appropriated for their defence, viz., half a regiment of infantry and two batteries of garrison R. A., to be quite sufficient.

25. I have long been of opinion, and have advocated in communications to the Colonial and War Departments, the employment of Africans in the West Indies and Bermuda. I am satisfied that under proper arrangements, which I have defined, they might, to a great extent, supply the place of European troops. They can perform all garrison duties better than the latter, and in most cases would be as useful in the suppression of internal disorder. They would not be capable of protecting a Colony against an attack by a civilized force; but, from their capability of resisting exposure to the sun and night air, they would be very useful auxiliaries to European troops under such circumstances. I should be very glad to have the services of such a force in the Straits Settlements, but I presume the expense of transport would be an obstacle to their employment.

(signed) *H. St. George Ord*,
Governor.

Singapore, 21 June 1867.

App. No. 1. ANSWERS of Sir Richard Graves MacDonnell, c.B., Governor of Hong Kong.

1. IN Colonies where white troops suffer from heat, such as Ceylon, the Straits, and Hong Kong, the principal part of ordinary garrison duty might be performed by Indian troops, composed of Sikhs and the hill tribes: there should not, however, be less than a battalion of English troops at Hong Kong, with a full battery of British royal artillery.

The injurious effects of night-duty upon European troops in the tropics cannot be over-estimated; moreover, the comforts required by western constitutions in these exhaustive climates, do not seem to come within the reach of present pay and allowances. The substitution of Indian for English troops, with the restriction above mentioned, would, therefore, probably be a decided improvement.

2. I can only suggest the above Colonies, because, though I have administered a government in the West Indies, and believe that Indian troops, of the quality alluded to in Reply No. 1, would be, for many reasons, preferable to negro regiments, I question if Her Majesty's Government has any serious plans on that subject, while the expense would probably prevent any change in the present arrangement for the West Indies.

3. I administered the government of St. Vincent, in the West Indies; have travelled in Ceylon; passed through the Straits Settlements, and am Governor in Chief of Hong Kong.

4. I think, as before stated, that the Sikh and hill tribes should alone be employed; it seems to me throwing money away to raise such corps as the Ceylon Rifles and Gun Lascars. I could rout the whole force (upwards of 400 men) with 115 Sikhs whom I lately caused to be raised in the Punjab, for service in the Hong Kong police. Only recently some Chinese thieves broke open a powder magazine here, containing 48 tons of powder, watched by two sentries of the Ceylon Rifles, and carried off several of the heavy metal cases containing the powder, having first opened the cases, and emptied on the floor of the magazine the inclosed bags of powder. The thieves appear to have intended to melt the cases (which have since been recovered), and use them for coining false money. I drew the attention of the general to this very disgraceful negligence of two sentries, and there has been an inquiry, resulting in the substitution of European sentries at that post.

In fact, troops like the Ceylon Rifles and the Gun Lascars now in garrison here, are only of use where no real danger is apprehended, and where it is not essential to repose thorough confidence in their watchfulness or courage; they are given to opium-eating, and quite disqualify themselves thereby for duty.

5. I cannot undertake to do more than suggest that, for reasons of policy, a longer stay than four years of the same body of native troops in the same place does not seem expedient.

6. I have experience of Sikhs and natives from Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras; a little attention to their comfort in certain small matters connected with rations and cooking supplies will surmount the special difficulties alluded to.

7. I cannot answer this definitely; but am cer-

tain that to have good troops they must be contented, and that they will not be contented unless liberally treated. The pay in the police force here, with allowance for rations and clothes, may be regarded as equivalent, in the case of a private, to 3*l.* per mensem.

8. Native Indian troops would not alone be sufficient at Hong Kong in times of peace, nor, I believe, in any other Colony; the heart of the force should be British. Here, as above stated, one European battalion is, in my opinion as Governor, absolutely essential. The greater the number of Indian troops employed in addition, the less fatiguing will be the garrison duty to the British soldiers. Six hundred (600) native Indian troops, in addition to the English battalion and artillery would suffice. Here there is always a risk of hostilities.

10, 11. Good Indian troops have frequently behaved well both in India and China, and would again be a material aid here, as supplementary, and only as supplementary. Nothing is a substitute for British troops in moments of actual danger and emergency.

12. This question is for a military man; but I suggest that the proportion of British troops maintained in any British Colony should always be adequate to bear the brunt of either attack or defence in the event of actual hostilities.

13. Supposing the number of European regiments in the Colonies to be not in excess of the force necessary (as stated in reply No. 8), it would seem at once more advantageous and more expeditious to draw upon India for home requirements.

14. From what I see here of the willingness of the Sikhs who have already served in China, to continue service there, and from the general bearing of the men, I think their loyalty has been improved by Colonial service.

15. This is a difficult question; but having had experience of local corps, I must say that I object to them as having no "*esprit du corps*," and offering a narrow and dreary field of service. Even if a regiment was to be specially raised for Colonial service, it should still be one of the regiments of the Indian army, and its officers members of the Indian service. I trust that grave consideration will be given to the subject before more local corps are raised, such as the Cape Corps and the Ceylon Rifles; they necessarily degenerate in every way after a short time.

16. No; it is unlikely any force would be employed during peace in the Colonies, over and above what is required for ordinary service. In an emergency of an extensive kind, I could send to India the European battalion stationed here, and increase the police force, but such a course would not be safe.

17. I think the telegraph would bring reinforcements first from Europe.

18. I cannot speak as to South Africa; but I certainly consider that in all the other Colonies mentioned, and more especially at Hong Kong, Indian troops would be far superior, for reasons of policy, to any troops enlisted in those Colonies.

19, 20. I cannot

19, 20. I cannot answer these questions from my own knowledge.

21, 22, 23. I see no difficulty—though, of course, my opinion on that subject carries little personal weight—in removing the Indian army to service in climates of suitable character, and by liberal treatment making it feel more an Imperial force. Those who have served here liked it. It might be very important to popularise Colonial service with the Indian officers and soldiers, and I believe it quite practicable to do so.

24. Impossible, of course, to recruit for any portion of Her Majesty's forces at Hong Kong.

25. Chinese soldiers would not answer at all. I cannot speak personally of many Malays, except from specimens in the Ceylon Rifles; I should not rely on them in either civil or military emergencies. The African negro is brave, and physically strong; I have been more than once in action with him; but the experiment in his case has been tried by former West Indian regiments, and others can give evidence more in point on that subject.

(signed) *Richard Graves MacDonnell*,
Governor.

ANSWERS of Sir *H. G. R. Robinson*, Governor of Ceylon.

1. I AM of opinion that Native Indian Troops may be employed with advantage in many of our Colonies, in which there are indigenous Native populations, as a supplement to Europeans, but not in entire substitution for them, either in time of peace or war. The proportion of Native to British Infantry should not be greater than three to one, and British garrison artillery should always be supported by British infantry.

2. I would employ them in,—

Hong Kong and China.
The Straits Settlements.
Ceylon.
Mauritius.
South Africa.
New Zealand, and the
West Indies.

3. I have administered several West Indian governments, as well as those of Hong Kong and Ceylon, and have also been employed on special service in the Straits Settlements.

4. The Seiks and other warlike tribes in Upper India, who could probably be enlisted in considerable numbers for this service, make very good soldiers, and might be employed with advantage in all the places specified in Answer 2. I doubt whether Native troops could be effectively employed in garrison service in such places as Malta or Gibraltar. Malays make excellent soldiers, but they are difficult to get, and their social habits are inconvenient, from the number of women and children, and the aged and infirm, who are dependent on them for subsistence, and cling to them for protection and support. The Caffre regiments formerly in Ceylon are understood to have been good soldiers so long as they could be kept sober. But of all Oriental races that I have met with, the Chinese have always appeared to me to possess in the highest degree the attributes of good soldiers. They are equally brave as the Seiks, and at the same time steadier and less excitable and impulsive. They have no fear of death; are not cowed by defeat; and if well disciplined and well led, would, I believe, be found inferior only to European troops. Their cost, however, would be far above that of any Indian Native troops, and, probably, but little below that of British infantry.

The Natives of Southern India and of Ceylon do not appear to me to possess any of the essential qualities of a soldier.

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5. If Indian troops were sent to the Colonies, they would carry with them Indian pay and allowances, which would then have to be given to the other troops in the command. I assume, therefore, that if the proposal were carried out, Natives would be specially enlisted for colonial service. In such case they should not be employed in any Colony for more than five years at a time. They should then be moved to another station, and they should be granted leave to visit their homes, say once in every six or seven years, which might be the means also of inducing others to enlist, and so of keeping up the force.

6. I know of no prejudices, religious or otherwise, which would hinder the races I have named from undertaking military service beyond sea.

7. The cost of living varies so much in the different Colonies I have named, that in the event of a special force being raised for colonial service, I would suggest a free ration being part of the engagement. The pay and allowances which would have to be offered in addition, would depend upon the condition of the labour market from which it was determined to draw the supply for such a service.

8. Replied to in Answers 1 and 2.

9. Replied to in Answers 1 and 2.

Native Indian troops alone would certainly not afford sufficient protection against internal disturbances in Ceylon.

10. Replied to in Answer 1.

11. Yes. They could no doubt be relied on, when brought into discipline, to lighten the strain on the resources of Great Britain in time of war; but not to a greater extent than that indicated in Answer 1. In my opinion, any Native force should be held in check by Europeans.

12. The permanent defence of our Colonies depends upon the naval superiority of the mother country, and upon her retaining command of the seas. In none of the Colonies named are garrisons maintained of sufficient strength to repel, in the event of our losing the supremacy of the sea, any regularly organised naval and military expedition which might be fitted out against them by any first-class power; nor would it be within the resources of Great Britain to place its Colonies in a state of defence which would guard them against such a contingency. But while retaining command

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App. No. 1. command of the sea generally, it is quite possible that we might be overpowered for a moment at any particular point, and the danger which is most to be apprehended by our Colonies, and which alone it is possible to guard against, is an attack upon some important point by a small force of the enemy which had either run the gauntlet, or escaped the vigilance of our cruisers. An attack of such a kind would be made, I apprehend, not with the view of holding the position assailed, but to deal a blow at our power and prestige, and to destroy our establishments. The possession of Trincomalee, for example, is of great value to a power possessing command of the sea; but if taken by a small force during the temporary absence of our vessels, and occupied by a power not having command of the sea, we should either recapture it or blockade the port, and in either case so much of the enemy's force would be rendered harmless till the end of the war. All that can be done therefore in the way of rendering a Colony like Ceylon secure from aggression, is to place important positions like Trincomalee, Colombo, and Galle in such a state of defence as will prevent their being entirely at the mercy of a hostile frigate or two which might make a dash at them during the temporary absence of our squadron in another part of the station. For protection against such an attack, it would not be possible to compensate by an addition to the Native troops for the withdrawal of any portion of the existing European garrison of Ceylon without infringing the proportions laid down in Answer 1. For example, the garrison of Ceylon, as laid down by the military commission, is 800 European infantry, 200 artillery, and 900 Natives; total 1,900. If the European infantry were reduced to 500, the Natives could only be increased to 1,500, or 3 to 1, and the garrison would then consist of 500 European infantry, 200 artillery, and 1,500 Natives; total 2,200, against 1,900 before, or a substitution of 600 Natives for 300 Europeans, which would not be an equivalent, at all events, in repelling an attack by a civilised power. I am disposed to think, however, that in garrisons in which there may at present be no native troops, and in which therefore it may be possible to substitute three Natives for each European infantry soldier, such an increase might be adequate even in the case of a foreign attack. For example, if an existing garrison consisted of two European regiments of 1,000 each, and three Native regiments of 1,000 each were substituted for one of the European regiments, the new garrison of 1,000 Europeans and 3,000 Natives would, I think, be capable of repelling a foreign attack as effectually as the existing garrison of 2,000 Europeans.

13. This would depend very much upon the strength of the European force in India and the several Colonies. If the pressure at home were

urgent, they would, I suppose, be withdrawn from whatever quarter they could be soonest obtained, without regard to either Indian or Colonial considerations.

14. The effect of Colonial service upon the native soldier would probably be advantageous. If well paid and well cared for, his loyalty would be strengthened, and his intelligence would be enlarged by an acquaintance with other countries besides his own.

15. It would, in my opinion, for the reason I have already given in Answer 5, be better to raise fresh native troops specially and exclusively for Colonial service.

16. Experience has shown the presence of British troops in the neighbouring Colonies to have been of the most material importance to the defence of India in cases of emergency.

17. Having regard to the facilities now afforded by the telegraph between India and England, and by the new system of transport through Egypt, large reinforcements could be obtained from England in a much shorter time than formerly. Small detachments could, no doubt, be drawn, in the event of any very pressing emergency, from Ceylon, the Straits, and China in less time than from England, but they would have to be replaced immediately by reinforcements from England.

18. Troops locally raised from the native populations of Ceylon would, as already observed, be wholly inefficient for the protection of Ceylon against either external or internal danger.

19. The Malay soldier has never objected to serve beyond the seas, and it was a great disappointment to the whole of the Ceylon Rifle Regiment that they were not sent on to India during the mutiny.

23. I have no doubt that the employment of the native Indian army in the British Colonies would give to it more of the character and feeling of an Imperial army and be attended with advantageous results to itself, but I have already expressed the opinion that in a financial point of view it would probably be found more economical to raise separate native corps specially and exclusively for Colonial service.

24, 25. It would not be possible to recruit regiments for general service from the native populations of Ceylon, but I know of no objection to the employment of troops recruited from the Chinese, Malay, or African races, in any of the Colonies named under the restrictions as regards relative numbers specified in Answer 1.

Hercules G. R. Robinson,
Governor, Ceylon.

The Pavilion, Kandy,
Ceylon, 28th June 1867.

ANSWERS of Lieutenant General Grant, Governor and Commander in Chief, Malta.

1. In my opinion it would be very inexpedient.
2. If employed at all, Ceylon, Straits Settlements (local), China, New Zealand, Cape.
3. I never have resided in any of our Colonies.
4. If it should be determined to employ Natives of India in our Colonies, Sikhs and Mahomedans of the countries beyond the Indus would be best fitted for the duty.

5. I feel persuaded that none of the races of India would consent to expatriate themselves for a longer period than three years at the utmost.

6. Many special difficulties, I am confident, would arise, both in respect to religious prejudices and social habits, and I do not think that the difficulties could be overcome by any advantages that could be offered.

7. I do

7. I do not believe that the Natives of India would consent to accept employment in the Colonies for any lengthened period; but if they did, they would certainly stipulate for relief every three years, and for the usual furlough to visit their homes during that period. An increase of at least 50 per cent. to the ordinary rates of pay and allowances would also be required, and, above all, they would require that their religious prejudices and feelings should be carefully protected.

8, 9. My replies to the previous questions answer these queries.

10. If Native troops are employed in the Colonies in time of war, it could only be, having a due regard to safety and efficiency, as a supplement to Europeans.

11. I do not think they could, but certainly only as a supplement to British troops.

12. Certainly not.

13. I am not prepared to say what might be the effect upon the Colonies of withdrawing British regiments from them, and filling up their places with Native soldiers from India. But the Natives of India of all classes are so suspicious and credulous, that I should anticipate the worst effects to accrue from any attempt on the part of the Government to employ them permanently on foreign service, and I strongly hold that the British force in India never should be under seventy thousand (70,000) non-commissioned rank and file of all arms.

14. Very disadvantageous, in my opinion.

15. Of the two evils, the least would be to raise fresh regiments in India, specially and exclusively for Colonial service.

16. The presence of British troops in neighbouring Colonies is of material importance to the defence of India in case of an emergency; for example, the providential circumstance of the force intended for China being within reach, saved India at the commencement of the mutiny. And I ascribe the adherence of the Sikhs to our cause throughout the mutiny; 1st, to the presence in the Punjab at that critical period of the only British force of any magnitude at our disposal in India; 2ndly, to the wise foresight of the Governor General, Lord Dalhousie, whose first act on annexing the Punjab was effectually to disarm the whole population. Of the countless stores of cannon of all calibres, of matchlocks, and arms of all descriptions, with which the country teemed previous to the annexation, not one was left in the possession of the people; so effectually was the disarming carried out, that even their swords were taken from them. Had their former vast supplies of arms been available, and had the Punjab been denuded of British troops like every other part of India, the Sikhs, I feel convinced, would have made common cause with the mutineers. They do not love us, no native of India does; but they fear us, and we shall find them docile subjects as long as we have a large British force in the country, and abstain from interfering directly or indirectly with their religious prejudices and feelings. When these are assailed, or, which is the same thing, when they think they are in danger of being so, they never hesitate at any sacrifice to protect their faith. Experience proves too that the black man will

always band with the black man against the white.

Notwithstanding their unceasing wars, and seemingly implacable animosity towards one another, the Affghans, with their ruler, the head of the Mahomedan religion, took part with the Sikhs against us in the last Punjab campaign, and, despite their intense hatred of the Mahomedan race, was not the Mahomedan King of Delhi the chosen sovereign of the Hindoos who composed the majority of the insurgents during the mutiny? And again, during the recent insurrection in Jamaica, "Colour for colour," was the gathering cry amongst the Natives. So it has ever been, and so it ever will be, and in India, and in all our Colonies, a proportion of British troops must be, I conceive, our chief safeguard.

17. From England, now that the overland route for the conveyance of troops is about to be efficiently established, and that we can reckon on the militia and volunteer forces of the country for efficient auxiliary support to the troops of the line.

18. For every reason I should prefer raising troops for employment in the Colonies from the local population.

19. I am convinced that they do not believe it in the Bengal Presidency, and that, practically, recruits nominally enlisted for general service do not consider themselves obliged to proceed on foreign service. I always considered the General Order of 1856 a grave error, and one of the many causes to which the mutiny may be ascribed.

20. The change can only be effected by raising regiments for "general service." Enlisting recruits for regiments not originally raised for general service will be practically inoperative.

21. I do not think that the transfer of India to the Crown would have any effect on the native mind in those respects. Service beyond sea is always disliked by the native army of India. I know it is so in Bengal and Madras; and I believe, from all I have heard, that the tour of duty at Aden is distasteful to the native soldiers of the Bombay army.

22. The records in the India Office will exhibit numberless proofs of the noted dislike of the Bengal native soldier to proceed on service beyond sea; and I know that in the Madras native army service in Burmah is looked upon with great dread and abhorrence, notwithstanding the high rate of pay and the promise of the term of absence from their families never being protracted beyond three years.

23. I do not think that the employment of the native Indian army in the British Colonies would tend to give to it the character or feeling of an imperial army; nor, if it had this effect, should I consider such a result at all desirable.

24. It would be possible, I conceive, to recruit from the native population of a colony for local service, and I should consider that measure liable to less objection than the employment of natives of India in our Colonial possessions.

25. I have already stated, and I think adduced ample proof in support of my opinion, that, sinking all animosities of race, colour, and religion, the black man will always unite with the black against the white man; wherefore, on all considerations, military, civil, and political, I am

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strongly opposed to the employment, save from the local population when absolutely necessary, either in India or the Colonies, of Asiatic troops. We must always have a native army in India to take those duties which, from exposure to the climate, would be injurious to the health of Europeans; but, in time of peace, let the native army be purely local; and, for field service abroad, call for volunteers, and they will always be forthcoming, as they were for Egypt, Ceylon, the Mauritius, Burmah, and China. I would urge that the employment of natives of India, and all coloured races, should be strictly confined to the cavalry and infantry branches, never on artillery duties of any description; and let it be a fixed and unalterable rule to place all arsenals, magazines, war materiel of every sort, and principal Commissariat depôts, under the protection of British soldiers.

It was the possession of the Delhi magazine and arsenal, with its large stores of ammunition and materiel of war of all kinds, which mainly

enabled the mutineers to protract the struggle as they did. Notwithstanding the earnest remonstrances of every Commander-in-chief, from Lord Hastings to Lord Gough and Sir Charles Napier, the grand arsenal for the Upper Provinces was persistently maintained at Delhi without a single British soldier nearer to that station than Meerut, upwards of 40 miles distant. A tenable post, such as was the magazine at Delhi, held by even a small detachment of British soldiers, would have formed a safe refuge for all the Europeans at the station who were so ruthlessly butchered; and the preservation of our stores of materiel, which would have been insured, would have effectually crippled the mutineers, and brought their resistance to a speedy termination.

(signed) *Jas. Grant,*
Lieut. General.

The Palace, Malta,
16 May 1867.

ANSWERS of Major General *Guy*, Commanding Her Majesty's Forces in China and Japan.

1. THE partial substitution of Indian for English troops in some of our Colonies is, in my opinion, extremely desirable.

2. In Mauritius, Ceylon, Straits Settlements, and China.

3. A residence of nearly 10 years in Mauritius, and two years and eight months in China, convince me that the employment of Indian troops in the Colonies above mentioned would be attended with great advantage, by affording relief to European soldiers from garrison duties in those exhausting climates.

4. I consider the Sikhs superior to all other Indian troops; the Beloochees, Punjabee Musulmen, and men from the Peshawur frontier, also make excellent soldiers when properly officered.

5. Men of the races above named, might be induced to serve in the Colonies for five years, if the terms offered to them were sufficiently advantageous; as a rule, the natives of India object to serve for a long period out of their own country, as many of them are married, and they prefer not to take their families with them.

6. There are no special difficulties or religious prejudices of a nature to prevent the races above-named from undertaking garrison duty beyond sea, if sufficiently remunerated for their services. A fine body of Sikhs, 120 men, have lately arrived at Hong Kong, for enrolment in the police force of the Colony. The terms of service, and rates of pay, are as follow:—

1. Engaged for five years certain, with option of re-engaging for another term of five years.

2. A free passage back to India, but no bonus or gratuity at the expiration of the first term of service.

3. After 10 years' service, they are entitled to a pension equal to a quarter of the average salary for the last three years' service.

4. The rate of pay agreed to is 20 rupees per mensem, with the understanding that they are to be formed into three grades at 20, 25,

and 30 rupees per month respectively, with clothing and quarters, but without rations; the Governor has, however, gratuitously granted five rupees additional for expenses of living.

7. I think the pay and allowances granted to the gun lascars at this station, viz., 13 rupees per month, with clothing, quarters, and free rations, would induce the Indian races to engage for service in the Colonies for a period of five years.

8. No.

(a.) No.

(b.) No.

(c.) A proportion of at least one-third British infantry as a support to native troops.

9. Not having served in South Africa, I do not offer an opinion as to the requirements at that station. In the other Colonies referred to, I think ample protection would be afforded by good Indian troops against internal disturbances, supported by British troops as before described.

10. In time of war it would not be safe to substitute Indian troops entirely for Europeans in the Colonies; as a supplement, however, to British troops, Indians might be employed in such proportion as would materially relieve the Europeans from the ordinary garrison duties.

11. I think that Sikhs employed as above would be very efficient, and, to a certain extent, might lighten the strain on the military resources of Great Britain in time of war.

12. They would not. Two native corps, at least, should be substituted for one European regiment.

13. If India were in a tranquil state, I should prefer, as a temporary measure, to withdraw a limited number of European regiments from India. I do not think the number of British troops in many of our Colonies could be safely reduced in time of war, but this question would no doubt be decided by the actual state of India at the time.

14. I think it would produce an advantageous effect upon the loyalty and general disposition of the native soldier.

15. I think

15. I think the best plan would be to raise fresh regiments in India, specially and exclusively for Colonial service.

16. Certainly, in a case of emergency; this was exemplified during the late Indian mutiny.

17. From Mauritius, Ceylon, and Straits Settlements; but it would be preferable, if time admitted, to obtain reinforcements from England.

18. Indian troops, in my opinion, would be more efficient, and their greater efficiency would counterbalance the extra cost which the transport of troops from India would involve.

19, 20. I think not; neither would it, in my opinion, be desirable to enforce the obligation upon them.

21. I am not prepared to answer this question.

22. I have never heard of any cases of discontent referred to in this question.

23. I think the native troops employed in the Colonies would acquire the feeling and character of an Imperial army, and such a result would no doubt be desirable.

24. This is a most important consideration. From all I have seen and heard of Chinese, particularly of the valuable services rendered by a corps of these men, attached to the British army during the late operations in China, I have not the least doubt that it would be very advantageous to employ corps of Chinese *out of their own country*; in India, for instance, their services would be very efficient, and, in case of British regiments being required for European service, corps of Chinese would be the best possible substitute for them in India, as they would act as a check upon the native troops.

25. Well-disciplined and well-officered corps of Chinese would doubtless be very efficient for service in some of the Colonies, viz., the Cape of Good Hope, Mauritius, and Ceylon.

I am not aware of any objections that could be raised to this plan.

(signed) P. M. N. Guy,
Major General, Comm. H. M.'s Forces
in China and Japan.

ANSWERS from Colonel Browne, Commanding the Troops, Natal.

1. Not favourable, unless supported by Europeans.

2. Those eastward of the Cape of Good Hope.

3. Commanded the garrisons of Hong Kong and Japan for three years; am now in command in Natal; have served in East Indies.

4. Sikhs or Belooches would probably be the best suited for any of these.

5. Regimental reliefs from three to five years.

6. None that cannot readily be met.

7. None; unless in the shape of provision for their families.

8. I am of opinion that they would not, unless supported by British troops, both Royal Artillery and Infantry.

The support required depends much on local circumstances, 1 to 2 might generally suffice.

9. Not if unsupported; a proportion of British troops will always be necessary.

10. Not favourable, unless largely supported by British.

11. Yes; in relief of British troops performing ordinary duties.

12. I do not consider that, under any circumstances, they could be relied upon without support of Europeans.

13. India would supply regiments in far less time than they could possibly be relieved and withdrawn from the Colonies. It might not be prudent at such a time to extend the protection of the Colonies to native troops.

14. Probably advantageous, if well treated.

15. Regular relief from India would be preferable, and in view of preceding questions might be productive of valuable results; the periods of relief should be short.

16. The possession of the Cape and Straits Settlements must affect India to some extent.

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17. If the Red Sea is open, assistance could be obtained easier from England. The Cape and China are next.

18. I do not think that any native troops can be relied upon unless in the presence of Europeans; regiments from India, regularly relieved, would be in every respect preferable to local levies, whose loyalty might at times be doubtful.

19, 20. I am not prepared to say.

23. I think so, and that such a feeling would carry with it increased attachment and loyalty.

24. Not at present.

25. In a military sense, good troops may be made of all these races. I do not see that any serious objection could arise from a "civil" point of view.

Politically, the introduction of such troops might give rise to jealousies, and would probably tend to lower the standard of respect in which the British laws are held.

With reference to Questions 1, 10, 18, 24, I beg to enclose some remarks from the Colonial Secretary for Native Affairs, who has great experience of this Colony.

W. Browne, Colonel, 20th,
Commanding Troops, Natal.

1. In a Colony like Natal, whose native population is so overwhelming in point of numbers in comparison with the whites, it appears to be both inexpedient and unwise to add to the coloured force, not in apprehension of any disloyalty among the Indian troops, but that their prestige would be less with the native inhabitants, who look with very little respect upon the Indian population already introduced into Natal as labourers; it is therefore probable that the effect of the presence of such troops in a proportion much greater than white troops would, in time of peace, furnish a temptation to the natives to do that which otherwise they might not have attempted.

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10. In time of war there can be no doubt that the employing of Indian troops, supplementary to European, would be effective.

18. It is but natural to suppose that Indian troops would be less likely to make common cause against the Government, with a population between which and themselves no common bonds of sympathy exist, than troops raised from that population itself; and although I believe that a most effective force might be raised in the Colony of Natal, always thoroughly reliable if officered by

white commissioned and non-commissioned officers, against any external danger, I cannot but believe also that in the nature of things they would be less reliable for the suppression of internal disturbance.

24. I think not at present, but I believe it will be possible in a few years.

T. Shepstone.

Pietermaritzburg, Natal,
20 June 1867.

From Lieutenant General *Douglas*, Lieutenant Governor of the Cape of Good Hope.

Sir, Graham's Town, July 1867.

IN returning these queries, I am unable, from my little knowledge of the races in our Indian possessions, to afford information of any value in regard to the main question raised by these queries; viz., whether it would be advisable to employ any of these races in the military occupation of this Colony, in consideration of their special fitness for military service in this rather exceptionally circumstanced Colonial possession. I am in a position, however, from my knowledge of this frontier, to offer an opinion as to whether this replacing the European troops by any Asiatic levies, whether belonging to the army of India or raised especially for service in this Colony, is calculated to meet the requirements of our peculiar position; and I am decidedly of opinion that Asiatic troops are not suited to the special necessities of the Cape of Good Hope; necessities which are divisible into two distinct categories, viz., Imperial and Colonial. The former has reference to the defence of the western portion of the Colony, comprising Cape Town and the Peninsula, which contains the anchorage and naval arsenal of Simon's Bay, for offence upon, and shelter of, the immense commerce from the eastward, which, on the voyage to Europe and America, sights the eastern coast of this Colony.

The latter relates to the protection of the widely scattered European population, intersected by native tribes, possessing tribal rights, who have been placed in their present location by the Imperial Government, not by the Colonial Governors, that is to say, by the Governors of the Cape of Good Hope, in their separate and distinct capacity as High Commissioners of Her Majesty, constituting a state of things which if (as apprehended by the colonists) containing the elements of danger to the European population, it behoves the Imperial Government alone to provide all reasonable means for effecting both the feeling of security and the reality of safety.

Query No. 16 seems to me to justify my expressing my opinion how this may be effected, in a manner important to the financial benefit as well as to the defence of our Indian possessions; viz., by continuing the system, which has now largely prevailed for some time past, of constituting the Cape of Good Hope a connecting military link between England and her eastern possessions, in the matter of reliefs.

At no place could reinforcements of troops destined for the defence of India be more economically maintained than at the Cape; from no place could they be more conveniently or expeditiously transported to Indian ports; at no place short of the United Kingdom could troops who have suffered from service in India be reasonably expected to recruit more quickly and perfectly in

health than here. Experience in the cases of the 99th, 67th, 2-20th, and 2-11th regiments from China, appear to me to be conclusive upon this subject. On the other hand, it is to be presumed that the result of sending the 2-10th and 96th regiments from here to India has been satisfactory, or it would not have been subsequently determined to send the 1-9th regiment from here to Ceylon and Singapore.

Let me put a case. If one British regiment from each Indian Presidency were maintained here on Indian account, the saving in their maintenance would be very considerable, their transport to India rapid, and their replacement practicable, by a force partly native and partly European (the latter consisting of men requiring a temporary absence from India, to be formed into a *dépôt* or provincial battalion), might serve for the purpose of frontier protection, or against internal troubles here, should circumstances be such at the Cape as not to permit the safeguard of this frontier to the burgher force, which ought now to be placed on an effective footing.

I have faith in the suggestion to maintain, and even to carry out further, the system latterly adopted in regard to the Cape of Good Hope being the connecting military link between England and her eastern possessions; and this is in the twofold consideration of affording reinforcements for the defence of India on the one hand, or of the United Kingdom on the other, whither the reinforcements of troops (who will have been maintained cheaply in the meantime) can be transported from South Africa in 28 or 30 days.

There is, moreover, reason to apprehend that, if the troops were withdrawn from the Cape, they might not continue to be available for the defence of the United Kingdom, for the simple reason that any pressure to reduce the military Estimates might result in the sudden decision to reduce such additional regiments in excess of the home garrisons heretofore kept up, under circumstances which shall appear to hold out the promise of peace in Europe.

To illustrate the latter supposed case, I would invite attention to the results of sending from here the regiment named in the margin, to the Crimea, and of those sent from hence as reinforcements to India in the great mutiny. It will be easy to ascertain whether the services of these regiments were such as to justify the opinion, that the Cape of Good Hope is, in point of climate, a good place for preserving the health of troops in a condition to fit them for general active service.

	To the Crimea.	
	Regiments.	Time in S. Africa.
1st Batt. Rifle Br.	-	7 years.
To India.		years.
1-6th	-	11
1-13th	-	1½
31st	-	1½
2-60th	-	6½
73rd	-	12
80th	-	1½
89th	-	1½

There

There can be no question in regard to the time required to convey regiments from here to India or the United Kingdom; and the comparative cost of maintenance of troops in South Africa, India, and in England, can be readily ascertained by reference to the War Office.

If such reference issue in the results I expect, there would still remain one other source of expenditure of which to consider the fair mode of providing; and I venture to throw out the suggestion that this Colony might perhaps be able and willing to pay a fair amount for the transport of troops kept here for Colonial purposes; that is to say, for the protection of the frontier against native troubles.

I have, &c.

R. P. Douglas,
Lieutenant General.

Charles Eales, Esq.,
House of Commons.

ANSWERS.

1. I think that the garrisons of all places should be suited for times of war, and as this query implies a doubt upon this subject, I do not think it expedient under such circumstances.

2. In the Mauritius; but as a portion of its garrison for times of war, as of peace, and in smaller proportions in South Africa and St. Helena.

3. Yes, of the Mauritius, as a Company's officer in 29th regiment, and aide-de-camp to Sir C. Colville for upwards of six years, as commander of the forces in South Africa and St. Helena.

4. Not in a position, from my antecedent services, to suggest any special races.

5. The ordinary arrangements, under which troops should not be left too long in one place.

7. Not acquainted with the rates of pay of Indian army; but I must state that any Asiatic troops should be well paid, or they would become a great embarrassment. Rice-eating Asiatics would have to be fed upon imported food. The constant droughts in South Africa forbid the hope of growing the grain for these races.

8. (a.) Not so, in my opinion; to guard against internal native troubles in South Africa.

(b.) Idem.

(c.) At least one-half. The peninsula, which contains the naval arsenal of Simon's Town, and the only safe anchorage in

north-west winds for vessels which make the coast of the Cape of Good Hope on the homeward voyage, should be jealously guarded by the best of our troops, *i. e.*, by regulars of the British army.

9. Partially they might against the frontier tribes, who would, in my opinion, hold Asiatic troops in less dread than Europeans. The Kaffirs think themselves to be at least equal to any Colonial races.

10. If South Africa cannot be wholly garrisoned by Europeans, they may be supplemented by Indian troops for time of war. But to be maintained with due regard to the peace of this community, Indian troops should be accompanied by their wives and families, and this would lead to expense and embarrassment; and a disregard of this would probably lead to worse results.

11. I can offer no opinion.

12. In my opinion, certainly not. I can perceive nothing in the history of Indian wars to lead me to the conclusion that the Asiatic races are equal to the British as soldiers. I am of opinion that at the Cape of Good Hope Asiatics should not exceed the proportions of one-half, and that, hence, the numerical strength of the garrisons would have to be increased in order to maintain existing efficiency.

13. A difficult, almost impossible, query to answer. The expediency must depend upon the condition of matters at both extremes.

14. Cannot offer an opinion.

15. The adoption of purely Colonial regiments would not, in my opinion, be advisable.

16. Yes.

17. South Africa.

18. South African troops could not be raised nor depended upon.

19. No natives of South Africa lately enlisted. They proved an utter failure at the Cape.

24. Neither possible nor desirable.

35. I can give no opinion, but I do not think that the Cape Legislature would consent to pay for any of these races as soldiers.

R. P. Douglas, Lt. General,
and Lt. Governor, Cape of Good Hope.

Graham's Town,
8 July 1867.

ANSWERS of Lieutenant General Sir *R. Napier*, K.C.B., Commander in Chief, Bombay.

1. Any substitution of Indian for English troops in our Colonies, in order to relieve the British people from performing a part of the military duty of the empire in time of peace, would be highly objectionable.

The population of Great Britain can well afford the number of men required for the military service of the empire in time of peace, and they will be forthcoming, if a sufficient inducement is held out to them. At present the soldier's condition is in many respects inferior to that of the working classes of similar status. When he (the pensioner) is discharged without pension, or retires on an insufficient one, with few inducements to maintain a good character, he too often occupies a very low place amongst the civil working population.

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I should consider inexpedient any substitution of Indian troops which would relieve the country from the necessity of making the British soldier's condition what it ought to be, in order to bring sufficient numbers to the ranks.

But the employment of a few regiments of Indian troops in our Colonies might be very advantageous as an experimental measure, in order to train them gradually to take their place with British forces in other than Asiatic fields of warfare. If employed in the large Colonies, in doing duty with English troops, they would feel a pride in being associated with them, and would emulate them in all military spirit, proficiency, and discipline.

Should the experiment be found to answer, it might be continued until each Presidency has a number

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App. No. 1. number of regiments that has served in Europe, and would be prepared in time of war to give a powerful contingent as auxiliaries to our European forces.

It is doubtful if the Indian regiments would be cheaper than English ones, as they would have to be clothed and fed, in addition to their pay, and would require more frequent reliefs. In India the native soldier lives cheaply, but in a cold climate he would require meat, and at least as much clothing as the British soldier.

I think that even in our European Colonies their orderly habits, and patient obedience and good humour, would soon win the goodwill of the people; but if they were viewed with prejudice and dislike, they would feel it very much, and the service would become generally distasteful.

The soldiers of our native army throughout India are nominally enlisted for general service, excepting the remnant of the old Bengal army, but they accept this as meaning service in our Eastern possession and adjacent countries, and I think it would be necessary to give them the option of serving in Europe. In Bengal even, for service in China, it was thought necessary to call for volunteer regiments; I think it was an error, but having been done, it has settled the precedent for that Presidency. The Bombay and Madras regiments have gone to China as a matter of duty, without question.

In the first instance, the regiments which might be taken for foreign (that is, English Colonial) service, might be volunteers; but should the experiment be found to answer, and to be satisfactory on both sides, the necessity of calling for volunteers at each relief might be obviated, by forming in each Presidency a foreign legion, into which selected native regiments would be admitted on application; the distribution of these regiments would continue precisely as at present, but they should have a distinct and attractive dress, with some special badge of an ornamental character; no additional pay in India, but on embarking for Europe each man should receive a sufficient gratuity or bounty, to leave with his family if he desired it; and the foreign service pay, rations, and clothing, should be given from the day of embarkation.

These foreign legions of each Presidency would furnish regiments in regular rotation for Colonial service, European or Foreign, so that in course of time each army would have a number of regiments that had actually served in our Colonies, and others that would be prepared to do so; and thus a valuable contingent of 30,000 or 40,000 men could be rapidly furnished from India, to take their place in the field with a British force, or to reinforce our Colonies, and release a portion of British regiments for the home service.

I feel sure that the Indian regiments, properly selected, would be very proud of their association with British troops, would benefit by it in military spirit and loyalty to the empire; they would be more closely united to us in feeling. They would, of course, look for the increase of pay which they have had in our Eastern Colonies, in addition to their food and clothing, and some further consideration might be given for service in Europe; the difficulty of the measure would rest in the fact of the difference in allowances of the officers with native Indian regiments, compared to those of British regiments. If this objection were insuperable, it would preclude all Colonial service with British troops. But the difficulty must have

been overcome when an Indian and a British force met in Egypt, in the Mauritius, and in Java.

2. In time of peace. South Africa, Mauritius, China, Malta, Gibraltar, New Zealand.

3. China.

4. Sikhs, Hindustanees, Mahomedans, Punjaub Pathans, Rohillas, North West Frontier Hill Tribes, Goorkhas, Maharattas.

The Bombay regiments of mixed races have always done well on foreign service; our Bengal troops formerly served in the Mauritius and Java, and more recently did well in China.

5. At first, reliefs every three or four years.

6. There are no difficulties that could not and have not been easily overcome by a very little management, which would still be necessary under any advantages offered to the soldier.

7. The same pay as now given on foreign service; free rations and warm clothing; free passage back in case of invaliding.

I would add one year of European service to count as two years for pension, and no discharge from unfitness produced from service without some pension.

8. (a.) No.

(b.) No; a small support of British troops, in proportion of one British to two natives.

(c.) Generally one British to two natives; but in time of war, no doubt, additional strength might be given by adding more native troops, where an increase of British troops might not be available.

9. Considering the general result of our warfare with British troops against the Caffre tribes, I should consider an equal portion of British and Indian troops to be necessary, but I have no doubt that our best Punjab regiments or Goorkhas would meet the Caffre on equal terms.

General Nott's division in Affghanistan is a memorable example of what a force composed almost exclusively of native troops could do; still the moral support of a portion of British troops is always desirable; I would say the same in regard to internal disturbances.

10. As a supplement to British troops their services would be most valuable. In times of great emergency they might be substituted entirely for British troops, and would, I believe, fully justify the confidence placed in them; but it is always desirable, both for political considerations and on grounds of general prudence, to have a portion of Europeans.

11. I believe they could be made to form a most useful auxiliary force to Great Britain in time of war, if gradually prepared for it by some such process as I have described.

12. I do not think that any number of Asiatics would entirely compensate for the absence of Europeans; but if a Colony were considered fully garrisoned in time of war by two European corps, one European and two native corps of equal strength would add very materially to their security; the one European regiment would always be held available for the point of danger, and natives would fight side by side with it, after a little comradeship, with a pride and confidence which nothing else could give; as long as the European would

would stand, the native would stand or fall by him.

13. Certainly draw from the Colonies, and supply the vacancies with Indian regiments.

14. Most advantageous, if he should have been fairly and considerately treated.

15. I have replied to this in answering No. 1.

16. The Overland transit has rendered the presence of British troops in the Eastern Colonies of less importance: as long as the European force in India is not further reduced, I do not apprehend any emergency that could not be met with sufficient promptitude now that the main lines of railway are connected.

17. Ceylon is the only Colony that could send a support sooner than the Mediterranean; but if Egypt were closed, of course South Africa and the Mauritius would be looked to.

18. Certainly, in all but South Africa; I have no knowledge of the local troops of that Colony.

19. If the employment of Indian troops were confined to the Eastern Colonies the Madras and Bombay armies would take the duty as a matter of course, and no volunteering would be required. With regard to the Bengal army, any service to which the regiments have not been accustomed would require either volunteering or the employment of certain regiments which are known to have no objection to such duty.

Many regiments of all the Presidencies would be fit for ordinary Colonial service; but the severer kinds of service, such as in the North of China, New Zealand, South Africa, would be better suited to the harder northern races.

I believe there is so good a spirit in the Indian army generally (I can speak of Bengal and Bombay, but I am not acquainted with Madras), that any prospect of field service, any-

where, would be received with the greatest satisfaction by many regiments, irrespective of the increased pay; but many interests connected with their families, their share in their village farms, &c., depend on the pay of the native soldiers, and it is for these, and not for personal expenditure and indulgence, that higher pay becomes a necessity when on foreign service.

20. The change could only be effected safely by some such measure as I have indicated.

21. The armies of Madras and Bombay would draw none; the Bengal army would do so now; but, for war, many regiments would volunteer for any service.

22. The Bengal 47th Regiment was destroyed about 1824 or 1825, for refusing to march to Burmah; but it is believed that the origin of the discontent arose from want of consideration on the part of the Government of the day.

The mutiny of the Bengal regiments in Sind is matter of history; dislike to the service rose to mutiny on account of reduction of pay.

The sufferings of Hindoos of high caste on board ship are always great, and a little want of consideration may make them intolerable; but they have often been borne with exemplary patience and cheerfulness.

Nothing could have been better than the spirit of the troops that went to China; they eagerly adopted every device to meet or cover the demands of their creed.

23. Certainly; employment in company with British troops, especially in Europe, would give the army more of an Imperial character, and be most desirable.

25. I am not prepared to give an opinion on this question.

(signed) *R. Napier, L. G.,*
Commander in Chief, Bombay.

The following Answers are from the Commanding Officers of certain Regiments in the Bombay Army, and were transmitted to the Committee, with the accompanying Letter, by Lieutenant General Sir Robert Napier, Commander in Chief, Bombay.

Sir,

I HEREBY enclose replies to the questions contained in your communication of the 18th of April. It appeared to me that the opinions on the several questions of certain experienced commanding officers of native regiments would be valuable to the Committee. The replies were sent to me, at my desire, confidentially, and under no expectation that they would go beyond my office; but the officers concerned have consented to their being communicated to the Committee. It should be noted that these officers have experience only, with one or two exceptions, of the regiments of this Presidency, and are not acquainted with the more hardy and warlike races of the north-west frontier.

C. Eales, Esq., &c.
House of Commons.

I am, &c.
(signed) *R. Napier, Lieut. General.*

ANSWERS of Colonel Sherbrooke Gell, Deputy Quartermaster General of the Bombay Army.

1. INDIAN troops, of the description hereafter specified, may, I think, be employed with advantage, in time of peace, as a substitute for British troops in those Colonies of which the former have some knowledge traditionally, or by experience, in which, either physically, or mentally, and morally, they have the advantage of the occupants whom they are expected to coerce, and in

which the climate is one suited to their habits and origin. They would in such localities, I am of opinion, be found a well conducted, inoffensive, temperate, and easily satisfied garrison, easy to manage, inexpensive as compared to British troops. Trustworthy as guards, with a soldierly spirit, sufficiently capable, as soldiers, to be relied upon in all ordinary emergencies, having great powers

App. No. 1. powers of patient endurance, and would be very unlikely whilst on foreign service to cabal with occupants of Colonies against their masters. Still it never should be forgotten that they are mercenary troops, that they serve, not because they love an idle, roving, adventurous life, but, as they say themselves, "pait-ki-waste," for the belly; and, therefore, that the fault of mercenaries is their impatience of any diminution or irregularity in the issue of the remuneration they have been led to expect.

2. The Bombay army generally, in which each regiment, with the exception of two class regiments, comprises in its ranks, in greater or less numbers, all those races who, in Hindoostan, embrace the profession of arms, is adapted for duty in the following Colonies:—

Mauritius.

Ceylon.

The Straits Settlements.

China.

Class regiments of Sikhs, Belooches, or Hill men from the north-west frontiers, might be useful in time of war in South Africa or New Zealand, but should be removed immediately the war was over. Malta and Gibraltar are not, in my opinion, adapted to the peculiarities of native troops of any class, and the West Indies are too far off to make it either profitable or advisable to employ these troops from this country. In effect, I would confine them to Asiatic limits, which, as Mauritius is largely cultivated by coolie emigration, would comprise that island.

3. It has been the custom to relieve native troops in China, and latterly, in Aden, every two years. I consider it of great importance, in establishing a new system for native troops, to adhere to any rule which is founded on custom; and as I do not believe that Colonial service would be palatable to the Indian army for any reason other than the opportunity it gives them of amassing more money than they could do on home service, to deprive them for a longer period than two years of the privileges of furlough, which are so liberally given in India, and so highly appreciated, and of intercourse with their families, should, I think, be avoided.

4. I do not think that the religious prejudices of Indian troops have been, or would be, any bar to their employment in the Asiatic Colonies. A long sea voyage is, of course, trying to those castes whose religion prohibits cooking on board, and are consequently obliged to subsist on parched grain, &c.; but this hardship is very much mitigated by the fact that rations on board ship are free; and I have known it voluntarily and cheerfully encountered for the sake of the advantages to be obtained by service in China. The social disabilities, such as separation from their families, is one that does not press very heavily on Indian troops, who have great facilities afforded them by Government in subsisting their families during absence. Bengal Sepoys, almost invariably, by choice and from custom, used never to permit their wives to enter the regimental lines for the whole period of their service, keeping them at their own villages, and making regular remittances for their subsistence. I am not of opinion that there are any insuperable difficulties on this score. The amount of prostitution caused by it is singularly small; nor are native troops in general likely to form permanent alliances with the women they

meet in Colonies; I believe some of the Belooch Battalion did so to a small extent; but in line regiment almost all are married at an early age, or have prospects of such connection in their own country.

5. The advantages enjoyed by the Bombay troops lately on service in China were, I believe, successful in making that on the whole a popular service, though the Sepoys there employed had to put up with much discomfort.

These advantages were free quarters and free rations, extra pay to the amount of one penny and one farthing a day, some addition to their under-clothing (*see S. O.*, page 90), flannel drawers and shirt, shoes, blankets, and a canteen. Those in the north of China received also gratis a flannel frock and service pantaloons; all were able, and most of them did save the whole of their pay. On return to Bombay, a double percentage, viz., 20 instead of 10 per cent., were allowed to proceed on furlough. Like advantages would, I think, make Colonial service within the limits I have named, as to locality and period of absence, far from unpopular.

It is true that there was some difficulty in procuring recruits for some regiments of natives whilst in China, but other causes peculiar to native troops produced this result.

In order to keep the two regiments of which I speak up to their full strength, volunteers from the army at large were called for. In my own regiment, and in the one quartered in the same cantonment, when they were aware of the advantages held out, a large number of volunteers came forward, and had they been able to go by companies so as to keep together, or to return to their respective regiments after the termination of the service, they would have been more than willing to go. But becoming aware that the transfer to other regiments would be permanent, that the vacancies caused by their departure would be filled up, and that they were leaving for good the officers whom they knew, and the relations and friends who were their comrades, to hold in a new regiment the position of strangers, they gradually withdrew their names, and eventually, I think, three or four from each regiment took advantage of the opportunity. These, I feel sure, were the true reasons, not because sufficient inducement was not afforded or the service was unpopular.

6. With the exception of the Cape Colony and South Africa, for reasons hereafter detailed, Indian troops would, I think, entirely unsupported, be sufficient protection against internal disturbances in the Mauritius, Ceylon, and Hong Kong (and the West Indies, if they were not so far off); but they must be properly armed with the best weapon procurable, not as they now are with a percussion smooth-bore muzzle loader.

With respect to the Cape and South Africa, Sikhs, Puthans, Belooches, and Hill tribes might perhaps be employed with advantage against Kaffirs, though I doubt it; but the nature of the warfare—bush fighting in a close country, the stamp of enemy are unencumbered Kaffirs of very superior physical capacity, with great activity—would be a very formidable opponent to men who require to fight under the eye of their European officers, of which the number now given is far too small to do more than exercise in general superintendence, makes me doubt whether any Indian troops would be relied upon either at the Cape or

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in New Zealand to meet the natives of those Colonies in warfare.

7. I think, in time of war, with the chance of meeting a European, for supposing that there was a deficiency of British material for duty in the Colonies, that it would be highly expedient and economical to supplement the British garrisons with Indian troops; but though I am of opinion that they might be relied upon and would do good service, yet I would not substitute them entirely for English troops.

8. Yes, I am of opinion that Indian troops, in certain proportions, might be so sufficiently reliable for Colonial duty as to allow of a reduction of the ordinary garrison to be effected.

9. I do not think that Indian troops would, man for man, under all circumstances, be as capable of protecting a Colony against a civilized power as are garrisons composed of Europeans only. The Indians want the physical power, the dogged courage of Englishmen, and perhaps no numbers, in very emergent and trying cases, when such qualities alone are required to ensure success, can compensate for their absence; still, in certain proportions and for ordinary circumstances, when endurance, faithfulness, temperance, obedience, and discipline are of any avail, Sepoys, armed with weapons on a par with their antagonists and friends, would be an efficient substitute. If a garrison in time of war required a strength of 1,000 British troops, I should say that that number of Indians, with 250 English troops, would be very nearly, if not quite, an equivalent. The Sepoys, fully appreciating both the strength and the weakness of their fairer skinned comrades, would rely upon them for sure support in moments of difficulty, and think it only fair that all the more laborious duty and the inferior food should fall to their own share; whilst the Europeans, occupying the position of *corps d'élite*, would be nursed, taken care of, and held in reserve for the supreme moment, when, I think, they also would fight under better circumstances and with more bravery than they would have done as the components of a garrison entirely British.

10. I think it would be more politic, in case of pressure for troops from England, to withdraw a portion of the British garrisons in the Colonies, replacing them with a due proportion of Indian troops, than to draw English troops from this country. The natives of this country have not now to learn for the first time that from one cause or another their aid is required to supplement our home forces; as long as the British army in India is kept up to its normal strength, so long are the conditions, in their eyes, under which we hold the country not greatly dissimilar, either in peace or war with a foreign foe. That strength they are aware is sufficient to put down rebellion, and the chances of combination with the foreign enemy at the opportune moment are remote; the one is a present fact, the other a distant contingency. Should, however, a hostile civilized Power succeed in landing a force within our Indian boundaries, our strength to resist would be greater by having English troops with which to meet them, in a country so decidedly held by the sword as India is, than by having an equivalent or an additional number of native troops, who, if false to us, would be fighting on their own soil.

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The temptations to be unfaithful, to strike for their own lands, for their own rule, would be greater if they saw our enemies arrayed against us in India, than if they witnessed the same thing in a Colony, when, probably, other counterbalancing circumstances might exist; nor should it be forgotten that the employment of native troops abroad enables us to employ a larger number of our more turbulent races in this country.

11. The effect of foreign service, such as that in China, upon native troops after their return, is, I believe, highly beneficial. Whilst abroad they are relieved in some measure from the depressing enslaving power of caste. Edges are smoothed down, mutual benefits encouraged; but more than all, the English officer becomes better acquainted with and better known by his men; he occupies a place nearer their affections when in a distant land among strangers than he does when they are at home and he is abroad; they have more in common with him than with those amongst whom their sojourn is limited, who in all likelihood cannot speak their language, and who probably do not regard them with very friendly eyes.

I do not think that the Sepoy looks much to secondary causes, yet the extent of our power must have some sensible meaning even to him; and I believe it is an admitted fact that Indian troops who have seen foreign service, either in war or peace, are more rough and ready soldiers, more intelligent, and very much more loyal than those who have not had this advantage.

12. I think it would be more advisable that service in the Colonies should be carried out by soldier from the line, than by special corps raised solely for Colonial service.

In the latter case the period of service would necessarily be very limited, entailing a large number of ineffectives as recruits, and also men on furlough, thus necessitating the employment of a larger number, and consequently, on the score of economy, it would be a measure detrimental to interests of the Colony. I think it is more than doubtful that the special corps would not maintain so high a state of discipline, not improbably that they would suffer in health by being so long removed from the country of their birth. At times, too, local causes might render it difficult to obtain recruits; and I think I have already shown that in the interests of India, as inseparably united to the best interests of her native army, would be best consulted by employing it in the Colonies within the limits I have specified.

13. Yes, I believe native soldiers—the Bombay army—are fully aware that they are liable to serve beyond the sea. Still I think there are, in their opinions, limits to this sea, that they would be very much astonished if required to serve in the Mediterranean, or in the West Indies, on garrison duty. Within Asiatic limits they would now go, as they have gone, without a murmur, even if the service was unpopular, which, with the advantages referred to, would not, I think, be the case.

14. But to call on Indian troops to serve in New Zealand, the West Indies, the Mediterranean, at the present moment, would not, I think, be prudent.

The amalgamation, with its changes, is still too recent; they are, too, lately learning to serve with a not unfrequent change of officers, a change abhorrent to their peculiarities, and altogether I think, that though in many ways the amalgamation was

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App. No. 1. an era from which their position began to improve, yet they have not yet learned to look on the new arrangements as stable; and, consequently, it seems to me that native troops are not yet, if they ever will be, in a condition fit to be experimented upon.

15. I do not think any distinction would be drawn by native troops between what are now Colonies of the Crown and what were dependencies of India under the East India Company, so long as Asiatic limits were not exceeded.

16. I know of no cases of discontent caused by Colonial service amongst the natives of the Indian army; I have heard their European officers, who served in China, complain of their miserably inadequate quarters whilst there, and for which they had to pay a high rate of house rent.

17. Employment within the limits I have named would not, I think, give to the Indian army an Imperial character. They would still regard themselves as belonging to the Presidency in which they were recruited.

It would no doubt raise their moral status to be able to feel an interest in the success of the Imperial army. I do not think, however, it is attainable at present.

18. The three classes named have each a marked military disability. The Chinese want

active courage. The Malays have a proud, sulky, revengeful temper, easily provoked, difficult to allay. The African is quarrelsome, and incapable of attaining a high state of discipline.

In civil life they would be bad subjects. The Chinese are exceedingly immoral and filthy in their tastes, of a cruel disposition.

The Malays would inspire dread and dislike, from their reckless ferocity on small provocation, their too ready resort to the creese, and their improvident habits; the African, from his drunken, disorderly conduct, his proneness to women, debauch, and intrigue.

Consequently, the advantages to be gained by the employment of such troops in India, in a political point of view, as being entirely unconnected with the people of this country, an advantage of no very extended or reliable character, considering that two of them are Mahomedans in religion, would be more than counterbalanced by the distaste to our rule which disgust, contempt, and dread of their peculiarities would engender in those of our Indian subjects amongst whom they were employed.

(signed) *John S. Gell*, Colonel,
Deputy Quartermaster General
of the Bombay Army.

ANSWERS of Lieutenant Colonel *Thacker*, Commanding the Marine Battalion.

1. I CONSIDER it inexpedient to entirely substitute Indian troops for English in our Colonies in time of peace, but I think they would form a desirable supplement to European troops, say in the proportion of two-thirds natives to one-third Europeans.

2. If so determined, I consider the following races would be best adapted for such duty:—

- A. Sikhs, Punjaubees, Pathans, Beloochees,
- B. Mussulmans, and such castes of Hindoos as
- C. are employed in the Bombay and Madras
- D. armies, are, in my opinion, capable of serving
- E. in any of these Colonies. I am not suffi-
- F. ciently acquainted with the constitution of
- G. many of the Bengal regiments to pronounce
- H. an opinion as to their general adaptability for
- I. Colonial service.

3. I do not think that native troops would like to serve out of India for a longer period than three or four years at a time. The question as to the general system of relief is one which I am not competent to answer.

4. I am not aware of any special difficulties that would hinder the races I have named from undertaking garrison service beyond sea. Many Bombay and Madras regiments have served in China, Aden, and elsewhere; and there has been no difficulty when the men have been liberally and fairly dealt with.

5. The present rates of pay, batta, rations, and family pensions, together with the warm clothing granted to the native troops of the Bombay army when on service beyond the seas, would, I think, amply suffice to procure troops for such service.

6. I think they would, if partially supported.

7. In time of war, I would in no case substitute Indian for European troops, but Indian troops

would form an excellent supplement to Europeans.

8. I think so.

9. I think not. I would form the garrisons in the proportion of two-thirds Europeans and one-third natives.

10. Whenever European regiments are urgently required at home, they will probably be equally required in India. I would therefore withdraw such European troops as could be spared from the Colonies, and supplement the remaining Europeans with Indian troops.

11. I think highly advantageous. I have never seen native troops which have been employed beyond the seas which have not been improved in these respects from contact with other races and an acquaintance with other countries; such service expands their minds, tends to destroy petty prejudices, and gives them an idea of the extent of our power. The 3rd, 5th, 22nd Regiments, Native Infantry, and Belooch Battalion of the Bombay army, are, I think, generally considered to have benefited by their service in China; and the 21st Regiment Native Infantry, or Marine Battalion, which has served in nearly all parts of our Eastern possessions, is extremely handy and useful.

12. I see no reason why, in the interests of both A. and B. regiments of the existing Indian army should not take service in the Colonies, according to their turn. I would not raise regiments especially and exclusively for the Colonies, as I believe such regiments would not be willing to serve out of India for a longer period at a time, or for less pay, &c., than existing regiments. The regiments of the existing Indian army would require to be better armed, and to have more European officers attached to them, before they could perform Colonial service efficiently.

13. I believe

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13. I believe so. Probably, however, some Bengal troops may imagine such service beyond sea was intended only in time of war, when their services might be urgently required, and never understood it to mean protracted service in the Colonies in times of peace. Bombay and Madras troops have for years served in Aden, China, Burmah, and elsewhere, and I should say fully understand their liability to serve in what are generally considered our Eastern possessions; but I doubt if even they would consider service in the West Indies, New Zealand, Gibraltar, and Malta, as coming within the terms of their engagement. I should not, therefore, consider it prudent to enforce such service in these Colonies.

14. But I believe it is a favourable time to sound the feelings of the native troops generally as to their readiness to serve in the Colonies named in Question No. 2. The conditions of such service should be most fully explained to them, as regards pay, batta, rations, pensions to families, warm clothing, and period of foreign service; and I think Government would find that the races I have named in Answer No. 2, and the whole of the regiments composing the Bombay and Madras armies, would engage for Colonial service.

15. I do not think they would make any such distinction. It has not been made hitherto by the Bombay and Madras armies as regards China, and I do not think there would be any objection to service in the Mauritius, where so many natives of India are employed as labourers.

16. The only case of discontent within my

experience, that I can remember, was that of the 47th Regiment, Madras Native Infantry, which objected to proceed to Aden about 25 years ago, in consequence of what it considered was a breach of faith on the part of Government with regard to some item of batta, rations, or family pensions; I forget which. I was Brigade Major at Aden for seven years, viz., from 1855 to 1861, and never heard of any discontent on the part of the Bombay or Madras troops quartered there during that or any former period; on the contrary, they were well satisfied, and invariably returned to India with a considerable sum of money, which they had saved during their tour of foreign service.

17. I think so, and that such a result would be highly desirable.

18. This is a very comprehensive and important question, and one which I do not consider myself competent to answer, with my limited knowledge of Chinese, Malays, Africans, and other races not Indian.

Note.—I consider the West Indies as too distant to be occupied by Indian troops, either efficiently or economically.

The above replies are forwarded to the Military Secretary to his Excellency the Commander in Chief, in compliance with Colonel Dillon's Memorandum, dated Mahablesheer, 24th May 1867.

(signed) S. Thacker, Lieut. Colonel,
Commanding 21st Regt. N. I., or
Bombay, M. Battalion.

11 June 1867.

ANSWERS of Lieutenant Colonel Adams, Commanding 13th Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry.

1. HIGHLY desirable.

2. I would recommend only South Africa, Ceylon, Mauritius, Straits Settlements, and China, to be garrisoned by Indian troops, which should be composed of the mixed races generally enlisted for the Bombay army.

3. A regiment should be relieved on the completion of five years' service; after two years a furlough should be granted, for a period of one year, to 10 per cent., with a free passage to and fro.

4. There may be certain prejudices to overcome; but if the families are allowed to accompany the men, and increased advantages offered, they would not be insuperable.

5. The pay should be the same as that of the British soldiers, with ration money, or rations when supplies are not procurable in the market; the families to be placed on the same footing with those of European troops.

6. Would not recommend the Cape Colony to be denuded of European troops; neither should South Africa, Mauritius, Ceylon, and Hong Kong be entirely unsupported by European troops.

7. As a supplement to European troops, in the proportion of two-thirds native to one-third European, I consider they would be employed with advantages.

8. Yes, perfectly so; if aided by European troops.

0.58.

9. Yes; if armed as British soldiers, and with the same complement of European officers, as under the old organisation, the garrison should be increased one-third, including a small proportion of British troops.

10. I consider it would be more advantageous to partially withdraw the European troops from the Colonies, filling up their places with native soldiers from India.

11. Advantageous, rather than otherwise, as I think it would tend to dispel many of their prejudices, as well as enlighten the mind of the native soldiers.

12. Take the regiments of native infantry according to their turn of duty for foreign service.

13. They are aware they are liable to be called on to serve beyond seas; but it would be advisable to inform them of the increased advantages they would derive, and allow them to volunteer for such service.

14. Yes; the present time is as favourable as any other.

15. Sepoys being averse to sea voyage in general, the distinction they would draw between service in Aden and Burmah and the Mauritius and China would be the relative distance of each.

16. None have come to my knowledge personally, but I am aware several instances of discontent are recorded in history, arising chiefly from a misunderstanding regarding their allowances.

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17. Not

App. No. 1. 17. Not answered.

18. In a military point, it would be objectionable to entertain Chinese and Malays as soldiers, on account of their unruly dispositions, but Africans and other races, in a political point of view, might with advantage be employed in India and

the Colonies; but I would not recommend any regiment to be composed of any one race.

(signed) *H. A. Adams*, Colonel
Commanding 13th Regiment,
Native Infantry.

Camp, Kolapore,
31 May 1867.

ANSWERS of Lieutenant Colonel *Campbell*, Commanding 3rd Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry.

1. I AM of opinion that, in time of peace the substitution of native troops for English in our Colonies would be very inexpedient and distasteful to the colonists as well as to the native troops, and attended with no advantage socially, or in a military or political point of view.
2. If it were determined to employ them, I think the races north of the Indus would be the best for all the Colonies, except Ceylon, China, and the Mauritius, to which places any native regiment might be sent.
3. The regiments should not be absent from India more than three years; and a company should be left in India as a depôt, with which the families who did not return to their own villages could remain, also the weakly and old men who are likely soon to invalid. They should always be transported in steamers, as the long sea voyage is very distasteful to Hindoos.
4. I know of no special difficulties. They should have the pay and advantages laid down by the regulations for them when proceeding on foreign service.
5. If they are relieved every three years regularly, I think that no advantages over and above those at present enjoyed by native troops when on foreign service would be necessary. But troops who had to remain away from India for a longer period would not be procured without nearly double the pay at present enjoyed by native troops in India.
6. I think, so far as I can judge, that they would not afford sufficient protection unsupported in any of the Colonies except Ceylon.
7. I think they may be employed in time of war as a supplement to European troops, and would prove a very valuable auxiliary force.
8. They are to be relied on for such service, in my opinion, provided they are supported by Europeans, volunteers, militia, or regular troops. But they should be armed with the best weapon procurable, and be organised and officered on the same system as the Ceylon Rifle Regiment and the West Indian regiments.
9. They would not be capable of protecting the Colonies against an attack by the civilized powers as adequately as the existing European garrisons; it would be necessary to increase the numerical strength of the garrisons in the proportion of two to one of the northern races, viz., Punjaubees, Sikhs, and Beloochees, and three to one of the native infantry, as at present in the Bombay army.
10. It would be more advantageous to withdraw European troops from the Colonies, filling up their places by native troops, in the proportion I have mentioned.

11. I think it would be advantageous, so far as it would improve their minds and ideas, and give them an enlarged view of the extent of Her Majesty's dominions, and of the power of the Government they serve.

12. I think it would be better for the interests of both, that regiments should be raised specially for Colonial service.

13. The native troops are perfectly aware that they are liable to serve beyond seas, but they don't expect to be called on, except in time of war, or some great emergency.

14. There appears to me to be no necessity to effect any change; they perfectly understand the terms of their enlistment, and have only to be ordered when required.

15. I don't think they would draw any political distinction—they would draw a local distinction—because to Aden they can take their families, and are generally conveyed in steamers, and they have frequent opportunities of getting away on leave, either on urgent private affairs, or in case of sickness, which they would not have at the other places named; besides, Aden is a very short sea voyage compared with the voyage to the other places.

16. No such causes of discontent have come to my knowledge. The 3rd Regiment Native Infantry went most cheerfully to China, and were satisfied with the advantages given them, and with the arrangement made for their families. The objection is made on account of the sea voyage, which is disliked by Hindoos, who are particular about their water, and who do not cook on board a ship. To men who can cook, and who will take meat and grog rations, there can exist no objection, except that which is common to most men who are obliged to be separated from their families; but this is soon overcome, provided separation only lasts for two or three years, and the family remittances are regularly paid.

17. I think that no such feeling exists, or would be likely to exist in the native army; they know they serve the British Government and are paid regularly, and they look to their local government and their immediate superiors for all advantages, and not beyond.

18. I have had no experience with troops composed of these races; I think it would be objectionable to employ regiments entirely recruited from these races, especially Malays, who are bigoted Mahomedans, of whom throughout India we already have enough. For the Colonies it would be different. The Ceylon Rifle Regiment, and the West India and African regiments appear to answer very well, and have the credit of being good soldiers.

(signed) *E. Campbell*, Lieut. Col.,
Commanding 3rd Regiment, N. I.

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ANSWERS of Lieutenant Colonel *Field*, Commanding 10th Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry.

1. I SHOULD be strongly in favour of the employment of sepoys on garrison duty in the Colonies, if our covenant with the native army was not opposed to the measure; the effect of such service on the men would, in all respects, be good and wholesome; it would remove them for a season from Braminical influences, break through the prejudices of caste, and give them enlarged ideas of the British dominion and power, and at the same time foster in them a manly and self-reliant spirit.

Under the present terms of enlistment, it would not be expedient to substitute Indian for English troops, for although the oath of allegiance sets forth that the sepoy will go wherever ordered, yet it is understood to apply to service in time of war only, and not to garrison duty in time of peace.

2. Men of all the races found in the native army could perform service in the Colonies, and no particular adaptability need be looked for, especially for employment in Ceylon, Straits Settlements, and China. For service in South Africa, and the other stations, the best adapted would be the Seiks and Mahomedans, and next to them, Purwarrees and other low caste men.

3. The sepoys would be without their families, and it would be therefore necessary that the reliefs should take place after two, or at the most three years.

4. No special difficulties with respect to religious prejudices or social habits would be experienced; the advantages of superior pay, &c. would counterbalance all such.

5. The same pay, rations, &c. which have been usual when native regiments have been serving in China; and in addition I would suggest, that the year's service abroad should count as two years towards pension.

6. They would, unsupported, do well all the service that might be required of them at the Cape against frontier tribes, if armed with rifle, and likewise be able to quell internal disturbances when employed in the other Colonies.

7. It would not be wise to employ them thus in substitution for European troops; but as a supplement to them they would do well.

8. Yes; but they must be efficiently armed.

9. Certainly not, and no increase in the strength of the garrison would compensate for the want of

European troops; under the circumstances mentioned, native troops should only be used as a supplement to Europeans. App. No. 1.

10. It would be better to send native troops to the Colonies, rather than withdraw European troops from India; but in time of war, as before remarked, European must be associated with native troops for the protection of the Colonies.

11. I believe it would be in all respects advantageous; and inasmuch as it would raise the sepoy in his own estimation, it would tend also to improve the spirit of the native army.

12. I consider it would be better, both in the interests of India, and also for the Colonies, that the native regiments should take their turn for employment abroad, rather than that new regiments should be raised exclusively for such duty.

13. They believe that they are liable for service beyond seas, but not for garrison duty in the Colonies in time of peace.

14. It would not be desirable at the present time to attempt to enforce such an obligation upon them.

15. I can only speak regarding Aden, which is looked upon as a station for garrison duty to which each regiment is liable to be sent in its turn.

The Mauritius and China are looked upon as foreign service.

16. No cases of discontent have come to my knowledge in consequence of the employment of native soldiers on Colonial service.

17. I think it would tend to produce this impression, and the same would be wholesome in its effect upon the minds of the native soldiers.

18. The employment of native foreign troops in India would be viewed with great jealousy by our native soldiers, and might be expected to lead to disturbances between them and the strangers. Such a policy would work injuriously also, by leading the native army as well as the people of the country to the conclusion that the Government no longer placed the same confidence as before in the native soldiers of India.

(signed) *J. Field*, Lieut. Colonel,
Commanding 10th Regiment, N. I.

Mahableswher,
28 May 1867.

ANSWERS of Lieutenant Colonel *Taylor*, Commanding 5th Bombay Native Light Infantry.

1. I CONSIDER it will be highly advantageous if the native army be employed in the Colonies, but I would always keep a proportion of European troops as well.

2. From the experience I derived when the regiment under my command was in China (over three years), where we were stationed with Seiks and Beloochees, I should say that a Bombay regiment of mixed castes is just as well adapted for this duty as either of the above-mentioned castes. I found our men stood the climate of China (both hot and cold) equally as well, and we certainly

had fewer sick. If the men are well cared for (as they were in China), and have good rations, well housed and clothed, they will do the work well. I should recommend the scale of rations being altered, and meat issued on this duty. I answer this question from what I observed of the regiment under my command in China; we are a mixed regiment, but a large proportion of the men are Mahrattas.

3. Experience would show this: at first, regiments might be relieved after three or four years' service; a lengthened service must be deprecated,
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App. No. 1. from the fact that the men would be unable to take their families with them.

4. There are none that I am aware of: regiments are always available for foreign service; they would, in the same way, be available for garrison duty or foreign service.

5. I would recommend pay and batta, free rations, and all other advantages now given to regiments embarking for foreign service being continued; I would likewise recommend that every man be provided yearly with a pair of English boots (gratis), and that all articles of regimental necessaries be supplied to him by Government, at a fair cost, as the price of these articles will be, it is presumed, more expensive there than in India.

6. I would, as before mentioned, keep a proportion of European troops; after-experience would decide the number.

If native troops, well armed with the best weapon, they will do good service.

In China, I found the men did all that was required of them. I am not sufficiently acquainted with South Africa and the West Indies to answer that part of the question.

7. In case of emergency they might be altogether employed; but I should always prefer having European troops as well.

8. Yes.

9. No, certainly not.

If unsupported by Europeans, their numbers must be largely increased; at least two-thirds more.

10. Withdraw them from the Colonies.

11. I consider it would be most highly advantageous. A native regiment going on foreign service

to a civilised country returns a different regiment—the moral and tone of the regiment is highly improved—the men lose in a great manner their narrow and bigoted ideas. I consider a tour of foreign service the making of a native regiment.

12. I would, in this instance, withdraw them from the Colonies in preference to India. I do not think that it would be possible to raise regiments for exclusive duty in the Colonies, as I do not think you would be able to obtain the men if you did; I think the difficulties in keeping them up to their full strength, would be insuperable.

13. Certainly they do. *Vide* Articles of War for Native Troops, c. 1, Enlistments and Discharge, p. 3. Every man on enlistment takes an oath he will go wherever ordered by land or sea.

16. I do not think they would draw any distinction as all service beyond sea is looked on as foreign service.

17. Yes; I think it would, and I consider it a measure highly desirable.

18. It would be advantageous to employ these troops (if procurable) both in India and the Colonies.

The Chinese would make excellent soldiers, as they are fine and brave men, but I do not think they would enlist. I would not enlist Malays, as they are proverbially treacherous.

The African, from all I hear, makes a good soldier; but I have no personal knowledge of this race; I feel diffident in expressing an opinion.

(signed) J. Taylor, Lt. Col.,
Commg. 5th Regt. N. L. I.

Belgaum,
1 June 1867.

ANSWERS of Major Little, Commanding 25th Bombay Native Light Infantry.

1. I CONSIDER that Indian might be substituted for English troops in some of our Colonies in time of peace; by some I would mean all those mentioned in Question 2, excepting "Malta, Gibraltar, and the West Indies."

4. Seiks, Punjaubees, Patans, Purdasees, Mahomedans, Mahrattas, Christians, and Jews, in fact, a mixture of all races, such as the Bombay army is now composed.

5. I do not consider myself now competent to give an opinion as to the arrangement which would be necessary to be made with respect to reliefs; but I would venture to suggest that no regiment should be kept away from India for more than three years.

6. I consider that no difficulties would be raised to render the races above mentioned from undertaking garrison service beyond sea.

7. I do not think that any other advantages than those now granted to soldiers of the Indian army when on foreign service would be required to procure native troops for such service.

8. I think they should be supported.

9. I consider that Indian troops might be employed with great advantage to the State in time of war as a supplement to European troops.

11. Most certainly.

12. No; but the proportion I would recommend for garrison duty should be one-third European, and two-thirds native. In time of war two-thirds

European and one-third native. I am also strongly of opinion that a better description of arm should be issued to the native army, and two European officers given to each company.

13. In case of pressure at home, I consider it would be more advantageous to withdraw troops from the Colonies, supplying their places by native soldiers from India, than to withdraw European troops from India.

14. I consider that the effect of garrison service in the Colonies in time of peace would be highly advantageous as regards the loyalty and general disposition of the native soldier on his return to India, for he would carry home to his friends enlightenment as regards the extent (hitherto but little known) of the British dominions; he would there meet relations who had very probably served in other Colonies far distant from where he had served, and hence would the power and greatness of England be better known; many other reasons might be quoted, but this one point I consider would have greater weight in the minds of the native of India than almost any other.

15. I think it would be better for the interests of India to take regiments according to turn, than to raise fresh ones for such a service.

I think also for the interests of the Colonies such a system would be preferable.

19. The native soldiers recruited since 1856 are fully

fully aware that they are liable to serve beyond sea; but were they not so I consider it would be desirable to enforce the obligation imposed on them by their present terms of enlistment.

20. Yes, I think the present would be a favourable moment to effect such a change.

21. I do not think that the native soldier would draw any distinction between service in Aden and Burmah, and the Mauritius and China.

22. I knew of no such case.

23. I think the employment of the native army of India in some of the Colonies would tend to give it more of the character of an Imperial army, and I consider such a result would be highly desirable.

24 & 25. At the present moment I do not consider myself competent to answer these questions.

(signed) *A. B. Little*, Major
Commg. 25th Regt., N.L.I.

ANSWERS of Major *Beville*, Commanding 1st Belooch Battalion.

1. Looking only on the effect it would have on the native troops, I think it would answer admirably, improving those employed, tending to rouse their pride, and at once stamping them as superior troops to those not so selected.

Politically considered, I do not think they should be employed in the Colonies named, save Ceylon, the Straits, China, and the Mauritius; they should not be employed where the bulk of the population is white (Africa, Malta, Gibraltar, New Zealand), or where the land is owned and the country ruled by its white settlers (West Indies), nor entrusted with the defence of important fortresses (Malta, Gibraltar), liable to attack from first-class European powers.

2. Belooches, Patans, Sikhs, Punjaubees; I am not acquainted with the native troops in the Madras Presidency.

3. The answer to this depends very much on whether the State proposes to allow families to accompany the regiment. If the men had the option, under certain arrangements, for their families being rationed at fixed rates, I think absence from India might extend to seven years, otherwise three years; but, again, very much would depend as to what furlough, if any, would be allowed to the men during such absence.

4. I consider there are no special difficulties that would hinder the races I have named from being so employed.

I know the 1st Belooches would hail with delight an order to proceed to Japan or the Mauritius.

5. No increase of pay, but men to be liberally rationed and well provided with clothing, bedding, quarters, &c. All remittances to their families to be remitted free of loss in exchange, and their correspondence "franked."

6. Well officered and properly armed, they would afford full protection to the Colonies named.

7. They would be a most valuable supplement to European troops; but even alone I believe they would render good service.

8. Most certainly.

9. This is, in fact, comparing them with European troops; the answer must be in the negative.

One-half, or perhaps two-thirds, might be composed of natives.

10. Withdraw them from Colonies, relieving them by native regiments; India cannot afford for many a day to lose a single European regiment.

11. Advantageous; the resources and power of England would become better known in India.

12. (a.) Government will in the first instance select the races deemed most fitted for colonial service; the terms and conditions will be fully explained. To all regiments in the service, recruited from the races selected, the option of volunteering should be given, either exclusively for Colonial service or for certain tours, to be relieved in turn.

If more regiments are required, I think it might be advisable to raise them specially for Colonial service; but I deem this a fitting opportunity for recording my opinion that Government must alter the enlistment for life system if they hope to obtain native troops generally for Colonial service.

(b.) I do not feel competent to give an opinion.

13, 14. I consider that if it was *bonâ fide* for "field service" they would not think of repudiating their liability; but I doubt, if merely for the purpose of garrisoning the Colonies named, they* would consider themselves liable for such service; I should not consider it desirable to enforce the latter obligation. It would be putting an interpretation on the 1st Art. of War (Act No. xxix. of 61), which I believe was never intended to be conveyed.

* I refer to regiments generally.

15. If they did draw a distinction, it would be in favour of Aden and Mauritius.

16. I have never heard of discontent; I have heard men of the Belooch regiments, who served in China, express disappointment at the nature of their service, as they had great expectation of seeing field service when they left India.

While complaining of the great cold and damp, they always gratefully acknowledged the care taken of them.

17. It might, perhaps; but doubtful.

18. Without a personal knowledge of the races named, it is difficult to give an opinion on the subject.

(signed) *H. Beville*,
Major Commandant,
1st Belooch Regiment.

Kurachee,
11 June 1867.

ANSWERS of Captain *Nicholett*, Commander, 2nd Belooch Battalion.

App. No. 1.

1. THAT native troops might be substituted in European troops with great advantage to both European and native armies; to the European in saving the men from serving in unhealthy climates, and also in preventing necessity of sending English troops so far away from Europe and locking them up to the native army; in raising the tone of the army by showing confidence in it, in opening the men's minds, and in sending them back to India better impressed with the power of England and extent of her dominions.

All other powers that have native troops in their pay use them for imperial purposes; Russia has Cossacks and Circassians, France Turcos and Indegines, whom both made available in European wars; and there is no reason that I can see, except prejudice, why England, which has a resource in India of unlimited extent, including in the north and adjacent countries races quite equal to the southern races of Europe, and perhaps superior, should not make better use of them for imperial purposes also.

2. The best men in all service are the Northern Indian races; they are free from prejudices, more warlike, and better adapted to stand changes of climate than the more southern races.

The 2nd Belooch Regiment is composed of Sindees, Beloochees, Brahoors, Affghans, including the inhabitants of the Khybur and hills north of Peshawur, Sikhs and a few Hindoostance Mussulmen, Hindoos, Jews, African See-dees, &c. &c.; they were in China in time of peace, so far as our operations went, so that there was no plunder to be got. In fact, they garrisoned Shanghai for three years, having a part of the time a detachment in Japan.

The regiment stood the service remarkably well; it suffered nothing from the cold; the men were cheerful, and, though glad to return to meet their families, many of them now would be glad to return to China.

Regiments composed of these races, or some of them, should certainly be sent to the following Colonies:—

South Africa, China, Malta, Gibraltar,
New Zealand,

because in Africa, China, and New Zealand the natives are of a more formidable character, and Gibraltar and Malta should have the best troops and those with least prejudices. In Ceylon, Mauritius, and the Straits, inferior troops would do, such as are composed of the Hindoos and less powerful men of Southern India.

Northern Indian regiments, also, should be sent to the West Indies, as the voyage is long, and troops with fewest prejudices should go, and probably Hindoos would not like it; but these Colonies are so far off that it would be hardly worth while to garrison them from India at all, on account of the reliefs.

3. Reliefs should take place at most every four years, and the regiment should be brought back straight to India. A native regiment always has a large number of women and children who must be left behind, and to whom the men wish to return.

In time probably this might be changed, either by allowing men to volunteer from other regiments into the regiments going abroad, and drafting the married people who did not wish to go, to other

regiments, or by introducing a shorter period of service, and so inducing a man to put off his marriage until his service was over; but as the service stands at present, and until service in the Colonies becomes a well-known routine, the reliefs should be as frequent as possible.

As none of the Colonies mentioned, except the West Indies, are so far off, that regiments serving in them could not be relieved from Bombay, Calcutta, or Kurrachee, in three months, it is probable that the new transport steamers might be able to carry out such reliefs between the cold weathers, when they would not be required for the overland reliefs. Reliefs should always be carried out by steamers, as the men much dislike the tedium of sailing ships.

4. There are no such difficulties. The 2nd Belooch Regiment in China were quartered in a large joss-house turned into barracks; they drew their rations from the Commissariat, they will eat and drink with Europeans, in fact, there is no obstacle to their being employed abroad. Mussulmen, of course, would not eat pork, nor Sikhs and Hindoos beef; but if this caused inconvenience, the men could always draw the money, and provide themselves.

5. The 2nd Belooch Regiment received no more pay in China than they do; indeed, the highest amount for a private, including good conduct money, being 10½ rupees per month; but they had liberal rations and warm clothing, which enabled them to remit money to their families, and they were perfectly contented. The ration was worth in China, when things were dear, about eight rupees a month.

The supply of warm clothing was but fair, as a native soldier has to provide all his necessaries at an expense of between 40 and 50 rupees, and to keep them up, and receives no bounty on enlistment.

6. The troops that kept the Peshawer frontier for a series of years, would, I should say, perfectly protect the Cape Colony against Caffirs; they would deal with any internal disturbance in Ceylon, Hong Kong, or the West Indies; and though at the Cape and Mauritius, they might meet Dutch Boors and French Creoles, yet as native troops have beaten both these races at Java and the Mauritius, they would, no doubt, do the same again.

7. I believe the best native troops might be used with great advantage in time of war; but of course the present organisation would not do against European troops. They should never be used as a substitute entirely for Europeans; but no doubt by employing them, you might dispense with these to a great extent; troops are so easily raised in India, and the supply of men so abundant, that any one of the Colonies mentioned, except the West Indies, could be flooded with them in a few weeks in such numbers as would make an attack by any force that an European power could despatch to such a distance, quite hopeless.

8. The best Indian troops are, I should say, superior to those of the southern natives of Europe, the men are more powerful and larger limbed; individually, they will readily face an Englishman, and I have known a Punjaabee fight an English soldier for half an hour. The way in which

which these people faced the English army on the Sutlej and in the campaign of 1848-9, gives every reason to suppose that they would face European troops. It is a mistake to suppose these races have any dread of an European as such. The English are their masters, and have a great prestige amongst them, but they have no very great respect for other Europeans. The 2nd Belooch Regiment met French troops in China, and were on an expedition with them; and from what I have heard, I am sure they would face them, if required. I conclude, therefore, that they might materially lighten the strain in Great Britain in time of war.

9. Not adequately, certainly, for if so, Indian troops would be as good as English, which against an European enemy they are not likely to be; for instance, no Asiatic troops would probably have stood so long the fire of Waterloo; but neither would many European nations.

However, as in case of a war, no one would be likely to attack us, except the French or Americans, whose troops are but little inferior to the British, I think an increase of one-half should be given, and here I understand that the native troops should be of the best quality, armed with the best weapons, and well officered by European officers.

N.B.—This question is a difficult one to answer; but I ground my opinion on the accounts of the Sikh wars of 1845-6. The Sikh troops there were not very superior in numbers to the British, and though they had in some of the actions a much superior artillery, still they had no European regiments or officers, and their generals could not manœuvre them. At Aliwal they had 15,000; Sir Harry Smith, 11,000, and he manœuvred skilfully, which they could not. Considering therefore the small odds on the Sikh side, Sir Harry Smith's advantages in Europeans and generalship, the Sikhs appear to have shown a fighting power which would warrant the above estimate.

10. Withdraw them from the Colonies certainly, and replace them by natives from India. If you take them from India, you may have a rebellion and lose the country; but if you lose a Colony, you may take it again from India at any time, if it is in the Indian seas; besides, by sending the native troops abroad, you reduce the proportion between the two armies in India, and they being quite in your power abroad, would be hostages for the good behaviour of their friends and relations serving in India.

Another consideration is this: once establish as a principle that India is to take its share in the common defence of the empire, and your power is almost unlimited; if you find it necessary to withdraw the few thousands that garrison the Colonies, you may throw a hundred thousand natives into them; India would easily supply them; you only want officers.

11. I believe so, in every respect, if he was well treated, and not troubled and looked down upon. They are very proud of having seen foreign countries, and like to talk about them; they get Europeanised; I have heard men of the 2nd Belooch Regiment talk very intelligently about China, Ceylon, Japan, and the Mauritius, which latter place some of them touched at on the way home, and where many of them say they would like to go again.

In saying this, I do not allude to Hindoo regiments; they have more prejudices to get

over, and I know little about them, as the few we have very soon lose them, and are no criterion.

12. In the interests of both parties, it would be better to send regiments in their turn. It is doubtful if men would enlist for exclusive service in the Colonies, without much higher pay, and there would be difficulty in recruiting a regiment a little by itself; it goes at once; the men know one another, and take their house with them, but it is a very different thing to catch a raw recruit, and to get him to face the sea, to go to an unknown land.

When the 2nd Belooch Regiment was in China, I was commanding the 1st Regiment in Hyderabad, a number of men were required for the 2nd, but not a single recruit could be got throughout Sind. I was ordered to call for volunteers, and 250 men came forward, of whom 115 went; it is true each man got a bounty of 20 rupees, but such a bounty would not have got recruits.

If it should be decided to send the Sikhs and Punjabee regiments only, it would probably be necessary to raise some, but that is not for me to say. I only advert to it with reference to the reliefs, as the turn should not come round too often at first; eventually, probably, men would not be sorry to leave India again, after having been back from foreign service a few years; but it would be well to accustom the army to the change gradually.

13. Native troops know perfectly well that they are bound to go anywhere, and I have no reason to suppose they would be unwilling to do so. The 2nd Belooch Regiment went willingly, and as a matter of course, to China in 1862, though they did not know they would get anything more than their ordinary pay. Madras troops go to the Straits and Labuan, the 5th and 22nd Bombay Infantry went to China, and several regiments to Persia in 1857; and I never heard that they thought of its being anything but a matter of course.

14. Answered above.

15. I doubt if the Indian army ever did draw any distinction between Crown Colonies and Indian possessions; it all belonged to the Sirkar. If a native soldier went to China, he probably never inquired who Hong Kong belonged to. I never met a native soldier who knew what the "Company" meant; they know perfectly now, that everything belongs to the Queen.

16. I have never personally known such a case. I have heard that a Madras regiment, some years ago, when in Bombay for the purpose of being sent to Aden, showed a disinclination to go, and was made to do so, but it was before I came to India. A Bengal regiment refused to embark for Burmah in the last war, and was sent by land. I presume the causes were in both cases a disinclination to go to sea, and in the first case, perhaps, to going to Aden, but if it was, it soon wore off, as native troops of Madras as well as Bombay have gone there since as a matter of course.

17. No doubt such employment would give the Indian Army an Imperial character, which would be a most desirable thing to do, as it would increase its *esprit de corps*, and render it more faithful and to be depended on.

As long as the army sees nothing beyond India it remains neither more nor less than a militia. A native soldier knows all about India by hearsay, and wherever he goes he finds the country and people not foreign to him; if a Mussulman, he finds people

App. No 1. people of the same religion and manners as himself; if a Hindoo, the same; he sees a governor occasionally, and certain indications of British power, but his own atmosphere is not changed; the ideas that he has been brought up with remain in him; he is ignorant and credulous as ever, and just as likely to listen to the silly stories of designing men, such as drove him mad in 1857.

But take the same men abroad, let them see the power of England at Malta and Gibraltar, the fortresses and fleet, transport them in men of war, a more imposing emblem of power than anything else, send them to England itself, keep them away for a few years from their village ideas and feelings, and accustom them to totally different ones, let them feel that they are really of use, that they are really helping British soldiers to defend the empire, and I feel convinced that even if they are never to be employed in European warfare the benefit of such a treatment would be incalculable in securing the loyalty of the native army in India; opportunity, too, might be taken to introduce the sons of Indian nobles, who would educate themselves for it so as to be fit associates for British officers, like the Arab officers in the French, and the Circassian and other foreign officers in the Russian service; such men would be looked up to by

those below them, and, associating with English officers, and with minds expanded by education and foreign travel, would identify themselves with the English rule, and form a link between it and the army, the value of which cannot be over-estimated.

18. You can get better troops in India than either Chinese, Malays, or Africans, and they come from your own dominions, which the others do not; you know the home of a native of India, and can find out his family, which is a certain guarantee for his respectability.

Politically speaking, if there is any truth in the argument that England should not trust the defence of her Colonies to Indian troops, though raised from a part of the British empire, it applies still more forcibly to troops entirely mercenary and subjects of other potentates; it would be humiliating to owe the safety of our Colonies to subjects of the Emperor of China, the Rajah of Burni, or the Sultan of Muscat or Zanzibar.

(signed) *G. Nichollett*,
Captain Commandant 29th or
2nd Belouch Regiment.

Hydrabad,
7 June 1867.

ANSWERS of Colonel *Beale*, Commanding 22nd Regiment Bombay Native Infantry.

1. THAT they should not be entirely substituted; a small body of British infantry should also be present, and British artillery of course.

2. (a.) Mahrattas from Dekhun and Konkun, Purwarrees and Mochees, and Sikhs, and a few Mahomedans and native Christians.

(b.) Ditto - - ditto.

(c.) Ditto - - ditto.

(d.) Ditto - - ditto.

(e.) Chiefly Sikhs and Beloochees.

(f.) Ditto - - ditto.

(g.) Ditto - - ditto.

(h.) As above first mentioned.

(i.) Chiefly Sikhs and Beloochees.

3. This would depend on whether raised for Colonial service or furnished from the present native Indian army. In any case five years should be the limit, and always in steam transports.

4. In the existing regiments by far the greater part of the men are married, and this would be a difficulty. Regiments being expressly raised for Colonial service single men would mostly be entertained. Religious prejudices are to be overcome, and the first objection also, by offer of superior pension on retirement at a fixed period of service, say 15 years, without stipulating that a man be pronounced unfit prior to sanctioning such pension.

5. The pay allowed in India, together with batta and free rations, with a fixed and on conditional period of service, say 15 years, for pension for a private not less than five rupees, and other ranks in proportion.

6. They might be efficiently officered, but I consider there should always be present a handful of British troops.

7. That in time of war they may always be employed as a supplement to Europeans, the number of which latter might be proportionably decreased and withdrawn for service elsewhere.

8. Whenever it is known to the regiments composing the native Indian army that war is the cause of their being called on to cross the sea, I believe they will always be found ready, and can be relied on to the extent of materially aiding the Government.

9. Supported by only a small number of British soldiers, I believe in such cases they would be found equal to the occasion, if equally well armed, with every enemy that might appear.

10. Both might be done, from India sparingly, from the Colonies liberally, leaving a small band of Europeans as a rallying point, and supplying the place of the rest with native Indian troops.

11. As a general thing the native of India is rather indifferent about such things, but by degrees they would of course appreciate the power of the country under which they serve; solid advantages derived to themselves would be a primary consideration with them.

12. Constituted as the regiments now are it would be better to raise regiments specially for Colonial service; at some future time, it might be declared that, from a specified date, not less than 10 years hence, all regiments will take their turns of foreign service, the advantages before established being equally applicable to them.

13. The terms of enlistment referred to are clear; all native Indian soldiers of the Bombay Presidency considered themselves liable for active field service beyond sea, and were most willing for it previous to the date referred to; it admits of some doubt whether they believed they would be employed on garrison duty whenever required in British Colonies unless under extraordinary circumstances.

14. No.

15. Greater distance is one distinction; no sudden employment of the native Indian army generally on tour in the British Colonies should be carried

carried out: special corps should be raised for the purpose at first.

16. I do not consider the service (garrison duty) in China was popular with the 22nd Regiment Bombay Native Infantry. They left India expecting to see field service. But I believe the chief reason for their not liking the service was the peculiar way in which they were housed in long sheds with a breadth to each man of 3 feet of surface by some 7½ in length. This, for 2½ years, it must be admitted, was trying, and long

absence from their families, about 560 of them being married men; but I never heard any expression of discontent from them. Their pay, with batta was sufficient, as they had rations free, and these were ample and very good: App. No. 1.

(signed) *E. C. Beale*,
Colonel Commandant,
22nd Regiment B. N. I.

Poonah,
29 May 1867.

ANSWERS of Lieut. Colonel Sir *Henry Green*, C.B., K.C.S.I., Commandant in Chief, Sind Frontier Field Forces.

1. I AM of opinion that the general substitution of Indian native troops in our Colonies would be inexpedient either in time of peace or war.

2. If it were determined to employ native Indian troops, I consider that no particular race should be selected for any of the Colonies named, but that men should be enlisted without regard to tribe or race, having been first clearly informed of their proposed destination, and all the conditions of the Service upon which they are to be employed, and which latter should be most faithfully adhered to.

3. Reliefs should take place every three or four years.

4. If the men were enlisted, as proposed, in reply to Question 2, I do not see why any difficulties should arise.

5. The pay would have to be regulated according to the price of articles of consumption in the Colony in which the men might be stationed, unless they were fed by the State, which latter proceeding would be liable to cause difficulties, and probably much discontent.

6. I am decidedly of opinion that native Indian troops of any description would fail, if employed unsupported against the frontier tribes of the Cape Colony, or against internal disturbances in the Colonies named, but that if supported in the proportion of one British regiment to two natives, they might be of service in Ceylon and Hong Kong.

7. My opinion is, that they would not give satisfaction under either of the conditions named.

8. I think not.

9. Decidedly not. No numerical strength would make up for the withdrawal of garrisons composed of British soldiers.

10. Either course will be equally liable to lead to disaster.

11. I do not think that the native of India understands the meaning of the word loyal, in the sense that an European does; so long as we are successful in arms, and pay him well and regularly, he will be true to us, provided no severe religious pressure is brought to bear upon him; but he behaves well more from a feeling of self-interest than that of loyalty or gratitude.

12. I think that it would be better to raise fresh regiments exclusively for Colonial service.

13. Native soldiers recruited since 1856, understand that they are liable for service beyond the seas, but not for any lengthened period, and only in case of war.

14. The native soldiers would begin to consider where their employment beyond the seas would be likely to stop. Service at Aden and Burma is most unpopular amongst native troops, and China and the Mauritius would be equally so.

16. I am not quite certain of the year, but I think that it was between 1841 and 1845 that a Madras native regiment in Bombay, en route to Aden, refused to embark. Many similar instances can, I believe, be found on the records, both of the Bengal and Madras armies.

The real cause in all these instances, I believe, to have been the dislike to proceed beyond the seas.

17. I do not think that the employment of the Native Indian Army, as proposed, would in any way affect its feeling, with regard to being an Imperial Army, or that any real advantage would accrue by that feeling being instilled into it.

18. I am averse to the employment in India, as soldiers, of natives of other countries, when we have such a selection of material at hand; but I see no reason why Chinese, Malays, and Africans should not be employed in the Colonies in the same manner as the Indian army is in India. I have been given to understand that the Chinese make good soldiers, and if such be the case, a contingent might be raised to assist the British garrison in that Colony, and the same might be done wherever materiel exists for the purpose. Both the Ceylon rifles, composed of Malays and the West Indian regiments of Africans have, I believe, been found to answer, and such being the case, I see no reason for employing Native Indian troops, who would be far more costly, and from being unaccustomed to the climate, and manners and customs of the people, must be less useful.

(signed) *Henry Green*, Lieut. Col.
Commandant Sind Frontier
Field Force.

Jacobabad,
4 June 1867.

App. No. 1.

ANSWERS of Colonel *Schneider*, Commanding Second Regiment, Grenadiers, Native Infantry.

1. I THINK it would be unwise to substitute Indian for English troops in our Colonies in time of peace, except as auxiliary troops. I doubt whether native regiments would be very effective for Colonial service under the present system of officering them.

2. If it were determined to employ natives of India in the Colonies here specified, as a general rule only men recruited from the northern parts of India, such as Beloochees, Sikhs, Punjaubees, Mahomedans, and Ghoorkas should be selected for foreign service. Men from southern India, particularly Hindoos, the majority of whom do not eat meat, would probably be unable to endure the rigour of climates such as I understand may be met with in South Africa, New Zealand, &c.

3. The reliefs should be made every three years, and invariably by steamers instead of sailing transports.

4. I believe there are no difficulties that would render the races I have named from undertaking garrison service that could not be overcome by the offer of increased advantages for such service.

5. The present pay, with the addition of "double or donation batta." Free rations would also have to be issued, as in China and at Aden, together with an ample supply of warm clothing, boots, and woollen socks.

6. It would be a very hazardous experiment to rely entirely on Indian troops in their present organization for protection to the Cape Colony against the frontier tribes, or against internal disturbances in the other Colonies herein named: they should be well supported.

7. It would not do to employ Indian troops in the Colonies referred to in the preceding question as a substitution for Europeans. They might be employed to supplement them.

8. Only as a supplement to British troops. It is apprehended that the bare fact of its being known that Indian troops were employed in the place of British troops might of itself invite an attack in time of war.

9. Certainly not. No increase of numerical strength would, in my opinion, compensate for the loss of the moral effect caused by the presence of British troops.

10. It would be better to withdraw European regiments from some of our Colonies. There might be danger in reducing such garrisons as Malta and Gibraltar, which are in the vicinity of the great European Powers. Portions of garrisons withdrawn from distant Colonies might be replaced with Indian troops.

11. The loyalty of the native soldier is not diminished by foreign service. It shows him the power of the Government he serves, and in that respect must do good. He also has less regard for caste prejudices, and thus becomes a more efficient soldier.

12. It would be better, both in the interests of India and of the Colonies, if native troops are to be employed, that fresh regiments should be specially raised and officered for Colonial service. Government would thus secure, by volunteering and enlistment, a picked body of native soldiers, all of whom would thoroughly understand what was expected of them.

13. It is quite understood by the native soldier that he is required by his affirmation, to go wherever he is ordered, by land or sea. I have no doubt that every regiment in this Presidency would respond to the call of foreign service, placing entire faith in the "Sirkar" that they would not be sacrificed by being required to serve in climates which by nature they are physically incapable of enduring. No possible advantage could accrue to Government by requiring its native soldiers to serve in countries unsuited to them.

14. Answered in the above reply.

15. I do not think that any distinction would be drawn, going across the sea or "Kala Paurier" is all they recognise wherever it may be; and provided they could withstand the effects of climate, and pay, rations, and clothing were sufficient, they would go where ordered.

16. I know of no such discontent having occurred, though I think that Kaye, in his "History of the Sepoy War," refers to this subject.

17. I do not think the sepoys of the native Indian army have any feeling on the subject of becoming part of an imperial army. On being pensioned or discharged, they revert to the population, and to their original calling as cultivators of the soil, thinking nothing further on, but little of the part.

18. If troops other than British are to be employed in our Colonies, it may not signify as far as those Colonies are concerned, whether they be recruited from the Chinese, Malay, African, or other tribes not Indian, provided they are well commanded and amply officered by British officers accustomed to deal with native troops. But I would remark, that I have always understood the three races above mentioned to be difficult to manage, and it may be regarded as a certainty that, unless supplemented with British troops, they would give trouble, and cause dissatisfaction among the colonists.

As there is no difficulty in providing native soldiers for service in India, I do not see that any advantage would follow from employing in it races not Indian, except as a matter of policy to set one race in antagonism to another, on the supposition that it would provide against the chances of another mutiny. On the other hand, the *esprit* of the native army in India might be humbled by the introduction of foreign troops other than those of their conquerors, by whose side they take a pride in serving, and with whom they have consolidated our empire in India. To the inhabitants of India themselves, there can be but little doubt the employment of Chinese, Malays, and Africans, or other races not Indian, in the place of their country men, would be regarded with the greatest jealousy and dissatisfaction. We have only to remember that the feelings obtained a few years back in the Nizam's territory, when Rohileas and Arabs were extensively employed there, to judge how distasteful it would be to native residing in British territory, to see the races such as are under notice, forming a part of the Indian army.

(signed) J. W. Schneider,
Colonel Commanding 2nd Grenadier
Regiment, N. I.

Surat, 10 June 1867.

ANSWERS of Major Thomson, Commander, 26th Regiment, Native Infantry.

ANSWERS respectfully submitted by Major G. L. Thomson, commanding Her Majesty's 26th Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry, to certain confidential Questions forwarded to him by the Military Secretary to his Excellency Sir R. Napier, K.C.B., Commander in Chief, Bombay Army, as to the advisability of employing Indian Troops in the British Colonies.

1. **ADVISABLE** to a certain extent.
2. Most of the regiments, as at present recruited in the Bombay army (with a few additional Punjab men), if efficiently officered, would be suitable for any of the Colonies named.
3. Not to be detained longer than three or four years at a time on Colonial service. But whatever period may be fixed upon by Government for their absence from India, should be strictly adhered to. The troops in transit should be kept at sea for as short a time as possible, on account of their caste, as they suffer more than Europeans.
4. None but what might be easily overcome, if proper arrangements are made for cooking, &c. for the different castes, and by an increase of pay and other advantages.
5. It is difficult to say, as so much would depend on the cost of provisions and other necessities in the different Colonies, but sufficient ought to be granted to enable them to make remittances to their families in India.
In Persia they had pay, batta, and rations, and every man made considerable savings; they were thoroughly contented, and considered that Government had behaved generously to them.
6. They would do so, if efficiently commanded by an adequate number of European officers, with whom they were well acquainted, and had confidence in.
7. Most advisable as a supplement in the five Colonies named, if properly officered and armed with modern weapons.
8. I can truly say, I think they can be relied upon, as during the mutinies of 1857, 1858, and 1859, they were fully tried, more especially those men under my immediate command at Nassick and Trimbuck, as these places were the hot-beds of intrigue and discontent, and contained the relations and friends of the Nana Sahib, and also rebels of the Peait and other States; but a different mode than at present, of officering the regiments, would be required.
9. Certainly not, against a well-disciplined European or North American army. Two natives to one European would be required for garrison.
10. I think it would be better to withdraw European troops from the other Colonies named, filling up their places with Indian regiments to a certain extent, than withdraw European regiments from India, as was done during the Crimean war.
11. Decidedly advantageous, as it would not only do the native soldier good, but his experience of the power of Great Britain would be beneficially impressed on all those with whom he came in contact after his return to India.
12. It would be better, in my opinion, to take them according to roster, than raise new regiments exclusively for Colonial service, as I think it would be most difficult to get native soldiers to leave India for any long period.
13. All men on enlistment are made fully aware that they are liable for service beyond the seas.
14. As stated above, the troops being liable for foreign service no change is required.
15. I do not think they would draw any distinction.
16. I have never heard of any, except that a regiment sent to China was considered hardly used on account of its being detained there for a longer period than was at first intended.
17. Yes, I think so, and would be most beneficial in every way.
18. I do not think it would be politic to have the races named recruited for service in India, as I do not consider sufficient reliance could be placed on them, for they might easily be induced to turn against us, and their being brought into our Indian army would disgust the military races of India.

(signed) *G. L. Thomson,*
Major Commanding Her Majesty's
26th Regiment, Bombay N.I.

Camp Baroda, 15 June 1867.

Appendix, No. 2.

PAPERS handed in by Colonel Norman, 9 March 1867.

(A.)

MEMORANDUM of Composition of the NATIVE ARMY as respects Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File of its principal Branches.

MEMORANDUM of Composition of the NATIVE ARMY as respects INDIAN COMMUNITIES.																							
NATIVES OF INDIA, EXCLUSIVE OF PUNJAB.												PUNJAB.				TRANS-INDUS or PERSIAN.				HILL TRIBES.			
	Christians.	Mahomedans.	Brahmins.	Rajpoots.	Tamils.	Jats.	Telingas or Gen- toos.	Mahrattas.	Bheels.	Parwarces.	Other Castes.	Mahomedans.	Hindoos.	Sikhs.	Maybees.	Afghans.	Border Tribes.	Bellooches.	Persians.	Goorkhas.	Dogras.	Other Hill Men.	
Bengal Cavalry, 19 regi- ments.	13	2,542	404	543	-	688	2	2	-	-	159	717	204	1,745	19	320	441	147	21	2	341	31	
Native Infantry Bengal Army, 49 regiments.	283	2,530	2,622	3,924	-	1,070	-	66	-	-	4,953	2,880	774	4,850	1,719	507	664	29	36	3,319	1,346	986	
Punjab Cavalry, five regiments.	-	669	31	113	-	2	-	-	-	-	26	267	71	718	6	188	177	33	16	-	76	-	
Punjab Infantry, 12 regiments, including Guide Corps.	5	193	103	60	-	53	-	-	-	-	57	1,629	228	2,521	6	806	1,047	16	66	538	1,009	341	
Madras Infantry, 40 regi- ments. (b)	1,546	10,056	(a) 936	-	2,781	-	10,117	287	-	-	1,656	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Bombay Cavalry, seven regiments. (c)	-	2,369	220	238	-	7	-	527	-	-	-	55	6	63	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Bombay Infantry, 30 regiments. (d)	245	1,851	1,320	1,030	-	43	230	7,403	5	3,245	3,697	560	106	253	2	224	118	508	99	6	3	1	

(a) Rajpoots and Brahmins are included under one head in the Madras Returns.
(b) The four regiments Madras Cavalry are nearly all Mahomedans.
(c) Thirty-nine men Bombay Cavalry unclassified.
(d) Also 246 Jews in the Bombay Infantry.

(B.)

B E N G A L.

PAY and Allowances and Charges for different Corps, exclusive of Commissariat, Clothing,
Ordnance and Barrack Charges, Capitation Allowance, &c.

			<i>Rs.</i>	<i>a.</i>	<i>p.</i>	
A Battery Horse Artillery (151 men)	-	-	94,994	11	-	per annum.
A Light Field Battery (151 men)	-	-	78,723	12	6	„
A Heavy Field Battery (82 men)	-	-	58,142	10	-	„
A Garrison Battery (80 men)	-	-	38,619	2	3	„
A Regiment Dragoons (493 men)	-	-	358,091	11	6	„
A Regiment Native Cavalry (465 men)	-	-	238,128	12	-	„
A Regiment British Infantry (899 men)	-	-	340,619	7	8	„
A Regiment Native Infantry (720 men)	-	-	138,132	12	-	„

There are some slight deviations from this rule in the other Presidencies.

Appendix, No. 3.

PAPERS handed in by Major General *Pears*.

App. No. 3.

EXTRACT.—Fort William, Military Consultation for January 1865.

(No. 615.)

MEMORANDUM, No. 1500 B.

WITH reference to Military Department Letter, No. 132, of 4th March last, and to Schedule No. 98, Case 1, the papers relating to which are herewith returned, the undersigned begs to submit the statement called for of the estimated cost of two Sikh regiments of the present established strength, if employed in China.

2. The cost during employment would be nearly the same whether the regiments were taken from the regular establishment or specially raised for such service; the only difference would be that in the latter case the bulk of the privates would be short-service men. In the non-effective charges this would be more than counterbalanced, as the amount of the gratuities payable on discharge would exceed the value of the pensions entailed by an ordinary term of service.

3. The actual amount payable in China for the full strength employed in that country is shown in Statement (A.), aggregating 5,68,626 rupees for the two regiments, and includes pay, extra batta, ration money, hutting money, and half-passage money, and also sea provisions to and fro.

4. This would give an average of Rs. 399. 3., or say, in round numbers, 400 rupees, for each Native commissioned or non-commissioned officer and private.

5. Statement (B.) shows the amount payable in India for the same body for clothing, half-passage money, and sea provisions, &c., as also for the maintenance of a dépôt for each regiment equal to the strength of a company, so as to admit of the corps being kept at their full establishment abroad. The wear and tear of equipments is likewise included, based on the regulated period of duration, together with the cost of the annual supply of ammunition and medical stores.

6. The total of these charges is 1,76,979 rupees, which, for the full establishment, would give an average of Rs. 124. 2. per man of all grades.

7. Lastly, Statement (C.) exhibits the non-effective charges, viz., an estimate of the proportion of pensions and gratuities fairly chargeable to the Imperial Government, as also transport charges in India to and from port of embarkation, and extra furlough allowances for three months, a boon to which the men might be fairly considered entitled after a tour of foreign service, together with a sum of 5,000 rupees per regiment for contingencies. The total of these charges would be 24,011 rupees per regiment, or an average of Rs. 33. 7. per man.

8. The undersigned, on the foregoing data, would suggest that if the Imperial Government bore all the charges payable in China for pay, rations, hutting money, and half the passage money and sea provisions included in Statement (A.), an annual capitation sum of 125 rupees per man on the average strength in China for the effective services, payable in India, and of 35 rupees for non-effective services, would cover all certain charges, and allow a fair margin for unforeseen contingencies, whilst such an arrangement would materially simplify the adjustment of the expenditure.

9. It will be noted that the establishment of European officers is in excess of that allowed in India, but it corresponds in a great measure to that which has been sanctioned on former occasions, viz., one officer per company, in addition to the staff.

10. As regards passage and hutting money, the calculation is made on a triennial relief, but in addition to passage for the whole corps, passage to and fro annually for 10 per cent. of strength to allow for men invalided and on sick leave and to replace them, has been provided for, as also for two European officers per regiment annually.

11. The rates assumed are two-thirds those of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, which it is considered would afford a fair average, and cover the freight of clothing, ammunition, &c.; and the calculation has been made that half of the passage money and sea provisions would be paid in China and half in India.

12. In the allowance for clothing, provision is made for a cost of trousers annually, as also for a pair of ankle boots, all of which may be considered as necessary for service in China.

13. The money ration has been calculated at the ordinary rate of Rs. 3. 8. for each fighting man, and Rs. 2. 8. for establishment followers.

(signed)

A. Broome, Colonel,

Accountant General,

Military Department.

Military Department, Account Branch,
7 January 1865.

ESTIMATE of the ANNUAL COST that would devolve upon the BRITISH GOVERNMENT by the Employment in *China* of the Two existing Regiments of SIKH INFANTRY.

STATEMENT (A.)—CHARGES PAYABLE IN CHINA.

						Military Pay.	Staff Salary.	Total per Mensem for One Regiment.
						Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
I. European Officers :								
1	Commandant	-	-	-	-	640 14 -	600 - -	1,240 14 -
1	Second in command	-	-	-	-	374 1 6	270 - -	644 1 6
1	Adjutant	-	-	-	-	225 12 -	200 - -	425 12 -
1	Quartermaster	-	-	-	-	225 12 -	150 - -	375 12 -
8	Doing-duty officers	-	-	-	-	225 12 -	100 - -	2,606 - -
1	Medical officer	-	-	-	-	- - -	- - -	600 - -
TOTAL - - -						- - -	- - -	5,892 7 6
						Pay.	Extra Batta.	Total per Mensem for One Regiment.
						Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
II. Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers and Men :								
2	Subadars	-	-	-	-	100 - -	15 - -	230 - -
2	"	-	-	-	-	80 - -	15 - -	190 - -
4	"	-	-	-	-	67 - -	15 - -	328 - -
4	"	-	-	-	-	35 - -	7 8 -	170 - -
4	"	-	-	-	-	30 - -	7 8 -	150 - -
40	Havildars	-	-	-	-	14 - -	5 - -	760 - -
40	Naicks	-	-	-	-	12 - -	5 - -	630 - -
16	Drummers	-	-	-	-	7 - -	8 8 -	168 - -
100	Sepoys	-	-	-	-	9 - -	3 8 -	1,250 - -
200	"	-	-	-	-	8 - -	3 8 -	2,300 - -
300	"	-	-	-	-	7 - -	3 8 -	3,150 - -
TOTAL - - -						- - -	- - -	9,376 - -

App. No. 3.

STATEMENT (A.)—Charges Payable in China—*continued*.

	Pay.	Extra Batta and Extra Allowances on Foreign Service.	Total per Mensem for One Regiment.
	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
III. Educational Staff:			
1 Moonshee - - - - -	20 - -	3 8 -	23 8 -
1 Grunthee - - - - -	10 - -	3 8 -	13 8 -
TOTAL - - -	- -	- -	37 - -
IV. Native Followers:			
1 Tindal - - - - -	9 8 -	3 8 -	13 - -
4 Lascars - - - - -	5 12 -	2 8 -	33 - -
16 Bhistees - - - - -	5 - -	2 8 -	120 - -
8 Sweepers - - - - -	4 - -	- -	32 - -
16 Cooks - - - - -	5 - -	- -	80 - -
1 Chowdry - - - - -	11 - -	3 8 -	14 8 -
1 Nutsuddy - - - - -	5 - -	3 8 -	8 8 -
2 Weighmen - - - - -	3 - -	3 8 -	13 - -
TOTAL - - -	- -	- -	314 - -
V. Medical and Hospital Establishment:			
2 Native Doctors - - - - - { 1 on	20 - -	5 - -	45 - -
- - - - - { 1 on	15 - -		
2 Cooks - - - - -	4 - -	1 - -	10 - -
2 Bhistees - - - - -	4 - -	1 - -	10 - -
1 Head Sweeper - - - - -	6 - -	1 - -	7 - -
4 Sweepers - - - - -	4 - -	1 - -	20 - -
1 Goorzah - - - - -	4 - -	1 - -	5 - -
1 Shop cooley - - - - -	5 - -	1 - -	6 - -
TOTAL - - -	- -	- -	103 - -
		Rates.	Total per Mensem for One Regiment.
		Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
VI. Contract and other Allowances:			
1 Adjutant's allowance - - - - -	50 - -	50 - -	50 - -
8 Company payment allowance - - - - -	20 - -	160 - -	160 - -
1 Repair of camp equipage - - - - -	25 - -	25 - -	25 - -
1 School shed - - - - -	5 - -	5 - -	5 - -
1 Butts and targets - - - - -	4 - -	4 - -	4 - -
1 Subadar major's allowance - - - - -	25 - -	25 - -	25 - -
1 Drill havildar - - - - -	5 - -	5 - -	5 - -
1 Drill naick - - - - -	2 8 -	2 8 -	2 8 -
8 Pay havildars - - - - -	5 - -	40 - -	40 - -
8 Color havildars - - - - -	2 - -	16 - -	16 - -
1 Drum major - - - - -	7 - -	7 - -	7 - -
1 Fife major - - - - -	5 - -	5 - -	5 - -
1 Mess allowance - - - - -	100 - -	100 - -	100 - -
1 Band - - - - -	100 - -	100 - -	100 - -
Order of merit pay - - - - -	50 - -	50 - -	50 - -
TOTAL - - -	- -	594 8 -	594 8 -

STATEMENT (A.)—Charges Payable in China—*continued*.

					Rateš.	Total per Mensem for One Regiment.
VI. Contract and other Allowances— <i>continued</i> .						
Ration Money :					Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
712	Native Commissioned and Non-commissioned Rank and File				3 8 -	2,492 - -
56	Non-combatants	-	-	-	2 8 -	140 - -
TOTAL - - -					- - -	2,632 - -
Field Establishment of dooley bearers					- - -	488 - -
Half passage money, to and fro, for two officers, annually					- - -	1,480 - -
Ditto - - for ten per cent. sick, annually					- - -	8,540 - -
Boardship provision, equipment for ditto					- - -	1,450 - -
Total Annual Expenditure for one Regiment - - -					- - -	2,44,713 10 -
Hutting Money :						
8	Subadars	-	-	-	30 - -	240 - -
8	Jemadars	-	-	-	15 - -	120 - -
80	Havildars and Naicks	-	-	-	10 - -	800 - -
616	Drummers and Sepoys	-	-	-	3 - -	1,848 - -
Non-combatants					- - -	160 - -
Half of passage money, to and from, for an entire regiment to be relieved every three years					- - -	1,01,164 - -
Boardship provision and equipment for ditto					- - -	14,470 - -
TOTAL - - -					- - -	1,18,802 - -
Proportion for one Year - - -					- - -	39,600 - -
GRAND TOTAL of Annual Charges for One Regiment, payable in China					- - -	2,84,313 10 -
Ditto - - ditto - - for Two Regiments - - -					- - -	5,68,626 4 -

STATEMENT (B.)

					Rate.	Total.
Clothing :					Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
8	Subadars	-	-	-	17 - 9	136 6 -
8	Jemadars	-	-	-	15 15 4	127 10 8
40	Havildars	-	-	-	11 2 -	445 - -
40	Naicks	-	-	-	9 - 10	362 1 4
1	Drum Major	-	-	-	14 12 11	14 12 11
1	Fife Major	-	-	-	11 2 -	11 2 -
614	Drummers and Sepoys	-	-	-	9 - 4	5,538 12 8
Boots for all ranks					5 - -	3,560 - -
TOTAL - - -					- - -	10,195 13 7
Half passage money for 2 officers, annually					- - -	1,480 - -
Half passage money for 10 per cent sick, annually					- - -	8,540 - -
Board ship provision, and equipment for ditto					- - -	1,450 - -
Proportion of passage money for one year for the whole corps					- - -	33,721 - -
Ditto of boardship provision and equipment					- - -	4,823 - -
TOTAL - - -					- - -	50,014 - -
Depôt Charges :						
1	Lieutenant in charge	-	-	-	325 12 -	325 12 -
1	Subadar	-	-	-	80 - -	80 - -
1	Jemadar	-	-	-	35 - -	35 - -
5	Havildars	-	-	-	14 - -	70 - -
5	Naicks	-	-	-	12 - -	60 - -
2	Drummers	-	-	-	7 - -	14 - -
75	Sepoys	-	-	-	7 - -	525 - -

App. No. 3.

STATEMENT (B.)—Charges Payable in China—continued.

	Rate.	TOTAL.
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Non-Combatants:		
1 Lascar - - - - -	5 12 -	5 12 -
2 Bhisteas - - - - -	5 - -	10 - -
2 Sweepers - - - - -	4 - -	8 - -
2 Cooks - - - - -	5 - -	10 - -
1 Mutsuddy - - - - -	5 - -	5 - -
2 Weighmen - - - - -	3 - -	6 - -
Medical and Hospital Establishment:		
1 Medical Charge - - - - -	30 - -	30 - -
1 Native Doctor - - - - -	20 - -	20 - -
1 Cook - - - - -	4 - -	4 - -
1 Bhistee - - - - -	4 - -	4 - -
1 Sweeper - - - - -	4 - -	4 - -
1 Coolie - - - - -	5 - -	5 - -
Non-effective Allowances:		
1 Company Payment Allowance - - - - -	20 - -	20 - -
1 Repair of Camp Equipage - - - - -	2 8 -	2 8 -
1 Butts and Targets - - - - -	4 - -	4 - -
1 Drill Naick - - - - -	5 - -	5 - -
1 Pay Havildar - - - - -	5 - -	5 - -
TOTAL Pay and Allowances of Depôt - - -	- - -	1,258 - -
Ditto - - - per Annum - - -	- - -	15,096 - -
Wear and tear of Arms and Accoutrements - - -	- - -	4,358 - -
Wear and tear of Camp Equipage - - -	- - -	428 - -
Annual expenditure of Ammunition, &c. - - -	- - -	5,876 - -
Annual expenditure of Medical Stores - - -	- - -	1,352 - -
Clothing for Depôt Company - - -	- - -	1,170 - -
TOTAL of Statement (B.) - - -	- - -	88,489 13 7
TOTAL for Two Corps - - -	- - -	1,76,979 11 2

STATEMENT (C.)

	Annual Amount.
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Non-effective Charges:	
Pensions and Gratuities - - - - -	1,720 - -
Annual proportion of Transport Charges in India - - -	11,573 - -
" of three months' leave Pay to the Corps on relief after three years - - -	5,718 - -
Contingencies - - - - -	5,000 - -
TOTAL of Statement (C.) - - - - - Rs.	24,011 - -
TOTAL for Two Corps - - - - - Rs.	48,022 - -

India Office, Military Department,
22 March 1867.(signed) A. Broome, Colonel,
Accountant-General, Military Department.

STATEMENT showing the SICKNESS and MORTALITY among the NATIVE TROOPS
in *Burmah* and Port *Blair*, for the Years 1864 and 1865.

Year.	Strength.	Admitted into Hospital.	Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.
1864 - - -	2,751	2,714	46	16·80 per 1,000
1865 - - -	2,577	2,150	34	13·20 „

STATEMENT taken from the Sanitary Reports of the Army Medical Department
presented to Parliament, showing the SICKNESS and MORTALITY among the NATIVE
TROOPS serving in *China* during the Second War, and the Regiments garrisoning
Hong Kong and *Shanghai* subsequently.

Year.	Strength.	Admitted.	Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths.
1859 - - -	2,009	3,283	109	*53·73 per 1,000
1860 - - -	5,275	11,180	168	31·85 „
1861 - - -	3,128	3,958	82	26·45 „
1862 - - -	1,725	2,500	41	23·77 „
1863 - - -	1,562	1,842	31	19·85 „
1864 - - -	1,553	1,683	40	25·75 „

* The deaths amongst the Natives invalided to India are not included.

India Office, Military Department,
23 March 1867.

Appendix, No. 4.

PAPERS received from the Horse Guards.

App. No. 4. RETURN of the MOVEMENT of REGIMENTS during the last 20 Years to and from
*India, the Cape, and all Colonies East of the Cape, and of the Time passed by each
 Regiment included in the above Return at each Station during that period.*

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	—
57th Foot - - - -	Australia - -	March 1825	March 1831	Yrs. mos. 6 0
	India - - -	March 1831	Sept. 1846	15 6
			Total -	21 6
31st Foot - - - -	India - - -	Feb. 1825	Dec. 1846	21 10
39th Foot - - - -	Australia - -	July 1826	July 1832	6 0
	India - - -	July 1832	June 1847	14 11
			Total -	20 11
9th Foot, 1st Battalion - -	Mauritius - -	Nov. 1832	Oct. 1835	2 11
	India - - -	Oct. 1835	July 1847	11 9
			Total -	14 8
62nd Foot - - - -	India - - -	June 1830	July 1847	17 1
17th Foot, 1st Battalion - -	Australia - -	June 1830	March 1836	5 9
	India - - -	March 1836	Aug. 1847	11 5
			Total -	17 2
63rd Foot - - - -	Australia - -	Oct. 1828	Dec. 1833	5 2
	India - - -	Dec. 1833	Aug. 1847	13 8
			Total -	18 10

Note.—The date *first* shown in the service of each regiment is intended to mark the period of embarkation from this country, and the date *last* shown, as the time of the return to this country.

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	Yrs. mos.
12th Foot, 1st Battalion -	Mauritius - -	Aug. 1837	Mar. 1848	10 7
35th Foot - - -	Mauritius - -	Jan. 1837	April 1848	11 3
27th Foot - - -	Cape - - -	May 1835	April 1848	12 11
90th Foot - - -	Ceylon - - -	Nov. 1835	Feb. 1846	10 3
	Cape - - -	Feb. 1846	April 1848	2 2
			Total -	12 5
91st Foot - - -	St. Helena - -	Nov. 1835	June 1839	3 7
	Cape - - -	June 1839	April 1848	8 10
			Total -	12 5
21st Foot, 1st Battalion -	Australia - -	Mar. 1833	Feb. 1839	5 11
	India - - -	Feb. 1839	May 1848	9 3
			Total -	15 2
28th Foot - - -	Australia - -	July 1835	June 1842	6 11
	India - - -	June 1842	May 1848	5 11
			Total -	12 10
50th Foot - - -	Australia - -	June 1834	Jan. 1841	6 7
	India - - -	Jan. 1841	June 1848	7 5
			Total -	14 -
4th Foot, 1st Battalion -	Australia - -	Oct. 1831	Aug. 1837	5 10
	India - - -	Aug. 1837	Sept. 1848	11 1
			Total -	16 11
95th Foot - - -	Ceylon - - -	Oct. 1838	Mar. 1847	8 5
	China - - -	Mar. 1847	Aug. 1850	3 5
			Total -	11 10
Rifle Brigade, 1st Battalion -	Malta - - -	Nov. 1840	Mar. 1843	2 4
	Ionian Islands - -	Mar. 1843	Aug. 1846	3 5
	Cape - - -	Aug. 1846	Aug. 1850	4 0
			Total -	9 9
Rifle Brigade, 1st Battalion -	Cape - - -	Jan. 1852	Jan. 1854	2 0
18th Foot, 1st Battalion -	Ceylon - - -	Jan. 1837	May 1840	3 4
	China - - -	May 1840	Nov. 1847	7 6
	India - - -	Nov. 1847	May 1854	6 6
			Total -	17 4

App. No. 4.

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	Yrs. mos.
80th Foot - - - -	Australia - - -	Dec. 1836	Aug. 1844	7 8
	India - - -	Aug. 1844	June 1854	9 10
			Total -	17 6
94th Foot - - - -	Ceylon - - -	Oct. 1838	April 1839	0 6
	India - - -	April 1839	June 1854	15 2
			Total -	15 8
51st Foot - - - -	Tasmania - - -	July 1838	Aug. 1846	8 1
	India - - -	Aug. 1846	Aug. 1854	8 0
			Total -	16 1
96th Foot - - - -	Australia - - -	Nov. 1840	Jan. 1843	2 2
	Tasmania - - -	Jan. 1843	Feb. 1849	6 1
	India - - -	Feb. 1849	April 1855	6 2
			Total -	14 5
15th Foot, 1st Battalion -	Ceylon - - -	Sept. 1845	May 1855	9 8
98th Foot - - - -	China - - -	Dec. 1841	July 1846	4 7
	India - - -	July 1846	May 1855	8 10
			Total -	13 5
22nd Foot, 1st Battalion -	India - - -	Jan. 1841	July 1855	14 6
25th Foot, 1st Battalion -	Cape - - -	Dec. 1839	Aug. 1842	2 8
	India - - -	Aug. 1842	Aug. 1855	13 0
			Total -	15 8
11th Foot, 1st Battalion -	Australia - - -	July 1845	Jan. 1847	1 6
	Tasmania - - -	Jan. 1847	Aug. 1848	1 7
	Australia - - -	Aug. 1848	Feb. 1858	9 6
			Total -	12 7
12th Foot, 2nd Battalion	Cape - - -	Nov. 1842	May 1843	0 6
	Mauritius - - -	May 1843	Aug. 1851	8 3
	Cape - - -	Aug. 1851	Sept. 1858	7 1
			Total -	15 10

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	Yrs. mos.
58th Foot - - - -	Australia - -	May 1844	April 1845	0 11
	New Zealand - -	April 1845	Dec. 1846	1 8
	Australia - -	Dec. 1846	June 1847	0 6
	New Zealand - -	June 1847	March 1859	11 9
	Total -			14 10
45th Foot - - - -	Cape - - -	Feb. 1843	June 1859	16 4
10th Foot, 1st Battalion -	India - - -	April 1842	July 1859	17 3
86th Foot - - - -	India - - -	April 1842	Aug. 1859	17 4
32nd Foot - - - -	India - - -	May 1846	Aug. 1859	13 3
84th Foot - - - -	India - - -	April 1842	Sept. 1859	17 5
78th Foot - - - -	India - - -	April 1842	Jan. 1857	14 9
	Persia - - -	Jan. 1857	May 1857	0 4
	India - - -	May 1857	Sept. 1859	2 4
	Total -			17 5
29th Foot - - - -	India - - -	April 1842	Sept. 1859	17 5
60th Foot, 1st Battalion	India - - -	July 1845	Aug. 1860	15 1
53rd Foot - - - -	India - - -	August 1844	Aug. 1860	16 0
8th Foot, 1st Battalion -	India - - -	April 1846	Sept. 1860	14 5
61st Foot - - - -	India - - -	July 1845	June 1859	13 11
	Mauritius - -	June 1859	Sept. 1860	1 3
	Total -			15 2
3rd Foot, 1st Battalion -	Malta - - -	April 1851	Nov. 1854	3 7
	Greece - - -	Nov. 1854	Mar. 1855	0 4
	Malta - - -	March 1855	April 1855	0 1
	Crimea - - -	April 1855	May 1856	1 1
	Ionian Isles -	May 1856	Nov. 1858	2 6
	India - - -	Nov. 1858	Nov. 1859	1 0
	China - - -	Nov. 1859	April 1861	1 5
	Total -			10 0
1st Foot, 2nd Battalion -	Ionian Isles -	Jan. 1853	April 1855	2 3
	Crimea - - -	April 1855	June 1856	1 2
	Malta - - -	June 1856	May 1857	0 11
	Gibraltar - -	May 1857	July 1858	1 2
	China - - -	July 1858	April 1861	2 9
	Total -			8 3

App. No. 4.

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	—
				<i>Yrs. ms.</i>
2nd Foot, 1st Battalion -	Cape China - - -	June 1851	March 1860	8 9
		March 1860	May 1861	1 2
			Total -	9 11
87th Foot - - -	India - - - China - - -	April 1849	April 1860	11 0
		April 1860	June 1861	1 2
			Total -	12 2
5th Foot, 1st Battalion -	Mauritius - - - India - - -	July 1847	May 1857	9 10
		May 1857	July 1861	4 2
			Total -	14 0
37th Foot - - -	Ceylon - - - India - - -	Nov. 1846	Oct. 1857	10 11
		Oct. 1857	July 1861	3 9
			Total -	14 8
24th Foot, 1st Battalion -	India - - -	May 1846	July 1861	15 2
73rd Foot - - -	Monte Video - - - Cape - - - India - - -	Sept. 1845	July 1846	0 10
		July 1846	March 1858	11 8
		March 1858	Aug. 1861	3 5
			Total -	15 11
64th Foot - - -	India - - - Persia - - - India - - -	Jan. 1849	Nov. 1856	7 10
		Nov. 1856	May 1857	0 6
		May 1857	Sept. 1861	4 4
			Total -	12 8
59th Foot - - -	China - - - Cape - - -	June 1849	Nov. 1858	9 5
		Nov. 1858	Dec. 1861	3 1
			Total -	12 6
60th Foot, 2nd Battalion -	Cape - - - India - - - China - - -	July 1851	April 1858	6 9
		April 1858	Feb. 1860	1 10
		Feb. 1860	Feb. 1862	2 0
			Total -	10 7
83rd Foot - - -	India - - -	Jan. 1849	May 1862	13 4
6th Foot, 1st Battalion -	Cape - - - India - - -	Aug. 1846	Dec. 1857	11 4
		Dec. 1857	May 1862	4 5
			Total -	15 9
75th Foot - - -	India - - -	May 1849	June 1862	13 1

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	Yrs. ms.
92nd Foot - - -	Ionian Isles - -	March 1851	March 1853	2 0
	Gibraltar - -	March 1853	Aug. 1855	2 5
	Crimea - -	Aug. 1855	May 1856	0 9
	Gibraltar - -	May 1856	Jan. 1858	1 8
	India - -	Jan. 1858	May 1863	5 4
		Total -		12 2
85th Foot - - -	Mauritius - -	Jan. 1853	May 1856	3 4
	Cape - -	May 1856	June 1863	7 1
		Total -		10 5
31st Foot - - -	Ionian Isles - -	Jan. 1853	May 1855	2 4
	Crimea - -	May 1855	June 1856	1 1
	Malta - -	June 1856	April 1857	0 10
	Gibraltar - -	April 1857	May 1858	1 1
	Cape - -	May 1858	Oct. 1858	0 5
	India - -	Oct. 1858	Feb. 1860	1 4
	China - -	Feb. 1860	Nov. 1863	3 9
		Total -		10 10
13th Foot, 1st Battalion - -	Gibraltar - -	May 1851	June 1855	4 1
	Crimea - -	June 1855	May 1856	0 11
	Gibraltar - -	May 1856	Aug. 1856	0 3
	Cape - -	Aug. 1856	Aug. 1857	1 0
	India - -	Aug. 1857	April 1864	6 8
		Total -		12 11
69th Foot - - -	India - -	Nov. 1857	May 1864	6 6
74th Foot - - -	Cape - -	March 1851	Nov. 1853	2 8
	India - -	Nov. 1853	June 1864	10 7
		Total -		13 3
28th Foot - - -	Malta - -	Feb. 1854	April 1854	0 2
	Turkey - -	April 1854	Aug. 1854	0 4
	Crimea - -	Aug. 1854	May 1856	1 9
	Malta - -	May 1856	Oct. 1858	2 5
	India - -	Oct. 1858	March 1865	6 5
		Total -		11 9
52nd Foot - - -	India - -	June 1853	March 1865	11 9
48th Foot - - -	Ionian Isles - -	Feb. 1853	April 1855	2 2
	Crimea - -	April 1855	May 1856	1 1
	Malta - -	May 1856	Aug. 1857	1 3
	Gibraltar - -	Aug. 1857	Sept. 1858	1 1
	India - -	Sept. 1858	April 1865	6 7
		Total -		12 2
71st Foot - - -	Ionian Isles - -	March 1853	Jan. 1855	1 10
	Crimea - -	Jan. 1855	June 1856	1 5
	Malta - -	June 1856	Jan. 1858	1 7
	India - -	Jan. 1858	May 1865	7 4
		Total -		12 2

App. No. 4.

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	—
66th Foot - - - -	India - - -	Aug. 1857	June 1865	<i>Yrs. ms.</i> 7 10
89th Foot - - - -	Gibraltar - -	April 1854	Dec. 1854	0 8
	Crimea - - -	Dec. 1854	May 1856	1 5
	Gibraltar - -	May 1856	Aug. 1856	0 3
	Cape - - -	Aug. 1856	Aug. 1857	1 0
	India - - -	Aug. 1857	Aug. 1865	8 0
			Total -	11 4
81st Foot - - - -	India - - -	July 1853	Aug. 1865	12 1
65th Foot - - - -	New Zealand - -	May 1846	Jan. 1866	19 8
72nd Foot - - - -	India - - -	Sept. 1857	Feb. 1866	8 5
56th Foot - - - -	India - - -	Aug. 1857	March 1866	8 7
44th Foot - - - -	India - - -	Aug. 1857	March 1860	2 7
	China - - -	March 1860	Oct. 1861	1 7
	India - - -	Oct. 1861	March 1866	4 5
			Total -	8 7
70th Foot - - - -	India - - -	Jan. 1849	Feb. 1861	12 1
	New Zealand - -	Feb. 1861	Mar. 1866	5 1
			Total -	17 2
64th Foot - - - -	India - - -	Aug. 1857	April 1866	8 8
18th Foot, 1st Battalion -	India - - -	Nov. 1857	May 1866	8 6
68th Foot - - - -	India - - -	Dec. 1857	Nov. 1863	5 11
	New Zealand - -	Nov. 1863	June 1866	2 7
			Total -	8 6
80th Foot - - - -	Cape - - -	July 1856	Nov. 1857	1 4
	India - - -	Nov. 1857	June 1866	8 7
			Total -	9 11
43rd Foot - - - -	Cape - - -	Oct. 1851	Dec. 1853	2 2
	India - - -	Dec. 1853	Oct. 1863	9 10
	New Zealand - -	Oct. 1863	July 1866	2 9
			Total -	14 9

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	Yrs. ms.
40th Foot - - -	Australia - - - New Zealand - - -	July 1852	July 1860	8 0
		July 1860	Sept. 1866	6 2
		Total -		14 2
67th Foot - - -	India - - - China - - - Cape - - -	Sept. 1858	Sept. 1859	1 0
		Sept. 1859	July 1865	5 10
		July 1865	Sept. 1866	1 2
		Total -		8 0

Regiments now Abroad.—Service made up to March 1867.

57th Foot (expected home in 1867).	Ionian Isles - - -	Feb. 1853	Sept. 1854	1 7
	Crimea - - -	Sept. 1854	May 1856	1 8
	Malta - - -	May 1856	May 1858	2 0
	India - - -	May 1858	Nov. 1860	2 6
	New Zealand - - -	Nov. 1860	March 1867	6 4
	Total -			14 1
12th Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home in 1867).	Australia - - -	July 1854	Jan. 1857	2 6
	Tasmania - - -	Jan. 1857	April 1858	1 3
	Australia - - -	April 1858	Sept. 1863	5 5
	New Zealand - - -	Sept. 1863	March 1867	3 6
	Total -			12 8
27th Foot expected home, 1867-68).	India - - -	July 1854	Mar. 1867	12 8
35th Foot (expected home, 1867-68).	India - - -	Aug. 1854	Mar. 1867	12 7
46th Foot (expected home, 1868-69).	Crimea - - -	Oct. 1854	May 1856	1 7
	Ionian Isles - - -	May 1856	Sept. 1858	2 4
	India - - -	Sept. 1858	Mar. 1867	8 6
	Total -			12 5
91st Foot (expected home, 1868-69).	Malta - - -	Dec. 1854	March 1855	0 3
	Greece - - -	Mar. 1855	Feb. 1857	1 11
	Ionian Isles - - -	Feb. 1857	Sept. 1858	1 7
	India - - -	Sept. 1858	March 1867	8 6
	Total -			12 3
33rd Foot (expected home, 1868-69).	Mauritius - - -	Feb. 1857	July 1857	0 5
	India - - -	July 1857	March 1867	9 8
	Total -			10 1
90th Foot (expected home, 1868-69).	India - - -	April 1857	March 1867	9 11

App. No. 4.

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	—
				<i>Yrs. ms.</i>
82nd Foot (expected home, 1868-69).	India - - -	May 1857	March 1867	9 10
4th Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home, 1869-70).	Mauritius - - India - - -	May 1857 Nov. 1858	Nov. 1858 March 1867	1 6 8 4
			Total -	9 10
23rd Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home, 1869-70).	India - - -	June 1857	March 1867	9 9
93rd Foot (expected home, 1869-70).	India - - -	June 1857	March 1867	9 9
77th Foot (expected home, 1869-70).	Australia - - India - - -	June 1857 April 1858	April 1858 March 1867	0 10 8 11
			Total -	9 9
95th Foot (expected home, 1869-70).	India - - -	June 1857	March 1867	9 9
50th Foot (expected home, 1869 or 1870).	Ceylon - - - New Zealand - - Australia - - -	July 1857 Oct. 1863 Oct. 1866	Oct. 1863 Oct. 1866 Mar. 1867	6 3 3 0 0 5
			Total -	9 8
88th Foot (expected home, 1870-71).	India - - -	July 1857	March 1867	9 8
7th Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home, 1870-71).	India - - -	July 1857	March 1867	9 8
Rifle Brigade, 3rd Battalion (expected home, 1871-72).	India - - -	July 1857	March 1867	9 8
1st Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home, 1870-71).	India - - -	July 1857	March 1867	9 8
19th Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home, 1870-71).	India - - -	July 1857	March 1867	9 8
79th Foot (expected home, 1870-71).	India - - -	July 1857	March 1867	9 8
38th Foot (expected home, 1871-72).	India - - -	Aug. 1857	March 1867	9 7
20th Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home, 1867).	India - - -	Aug. 1857	March 1867	9 7
97th Foot (expected home, 1867).	India - - -	Aug. 1857	March 1867	9 7

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	Yrs. ms.
Rifle Brigade, 2nd Battalion (expected home, 1868-69).	India - - -	Aug. 1857	March 1867	9 7
34th Foot (expected home 1867).	India - - -	Aug. 1857	March 1867	9 7
60th Foot, 3rd Battalion (expected home, 1871-72).	India - - -	Aug. 1857	March 1867	9 7
42nd Foot (expected home, 1867-68).	India - - -	Aug. 1857	March 1867	9 7
94th Foot (expected home, 1867-68).	India - - -	Oct. 1857	March 1867	9 5
98th Foot (on passage home)	India - - -	Oct. 1857	March 1867	9 5
51st Foot (on passage home) -	India - - -	Oct. 1857	March 1867	9 5
5th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1867).	Mauritius - - - Cape - - -	Aug. 1858 April 1863	April 1863 March 1867	4 8 3 11
		Total -		8 7
99th Foot (expected home in 1870).	India - - - China - - - Cape - - -	Sept. 1858 Feb. 1860 Feb. 1865	Feb. 1860 Feb. 1865 March 1867	1 5 5 9 2 1
		Total -		8 6
9th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1868).	Ionian Isles - - - Gibraltar - - - China - - - Japan - - -	Oct. 1858 June 1864 Nov. 1864 April 1866	June 1864 Nov. 1864 April 1866 March 1867	5 8 0 5 1 5 0 11
		Total -		8 5
13th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1867).	Cape - - - Mauritius - - -	Feb. 1859 Mar. 1863	March 1863 March 1867	4 1 4 0
		Total -		8 1
22nd Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1867).	Malta - - - Mauritius - - -	May 1859 July 1865	July 1865 March 1867	6 2 1 8
		Total -		7 10
10th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home, 1871-72).	Cape - - - India - - -	Jan. 1860 Dec. 1864	Dec. 1864 March 1867	4 11 2 3
		Total -		7 2
9th Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home in 1870).	Ionian Isles - - - Gibraltar - - - Cape - - -	Jan 1860 June 1864 Aug. 1865	June 1864 Aug. 1865 March 1867	4 5 1 2 1 7
		Total -		7 2
24th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1871-72).	Mauritius - - - Burmah - - -	March 1860 Oct. 1865	Oct. 1865 March 1867	5 7 1 5
		Total -		7 0
14th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home, 1870).	New Zealand - - - Australia - - -	Sept. 1860 Oct. 1866	Oct. 1866 March 1867	6 1 0 5
		Total -		6 6

App. No. 4.	CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	—
					<i>Yrs. ms.</i>
11th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1871).	Cape	- - -	July 1861	April 1865	3 9
	China	- - -	April 1865	May 1866	1 1
	Cape	- - -	May 1866	March 1867	0 10
	Total -				5 8
96 h Foot (expected home, 1873-74).	Cape	- - -	Feb. 1863	Nov. 1865	2 9
	India	- - -	Nov. 1865	March 1867	1 4
	Total -				4 1
18th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1873).	New Zealand	- -	April 1863	March 1867	3 11
21st Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home, 1874-75).	India	- - -	July 1863	March 1867	3 8
20th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1873).	India	- - -	July 1863	Nov. 1863	0 4
	China	- - -	Nov. 1863	June 1864	0 7
	Japan	- - -	June 1864	May 1866	1 11
	China	- - -	May 1866	March 1867	0 10
Total -				3 8	
25th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1873).	Ceylon	- - -	July 1863	March 1867	3 8
36th Foot (expected home in 1874-75).	India	- - -	Aug. 1863	March 1867	3 7
19th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home, 1874-75).	India	- - -	Aug. 1863	March 1867	3 7
76th Foot (expected home, 1874-75).	India	- - -	Oct. 1863	March 1867	3 5
55th Foot (expected home, 1874-75).	India	- - -	Nov. 1863	March 1867	3 4
11th Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home, 1875-76).	India	- - -	July 1864	March 1867	2 8
12th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home, 1875-76).	India	- - -	July 1864	March 1867	2 8
58th Foot (expected home, 1875-76).	India	- - -	July 1864	March 1867	2 8
45th Foot (expected home, 1875-76).	India	- - -	July 1864	March 1867	2 8
10th Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home in 1874).	Cape	- - -	Sept. 1864	March 1867	2 6
41st Foot (expected home, 1875-76).	India	- - -	July 1865	March 1867	1 8
26th Foot (expected home, 1876-77).	India	- - -	July 1865	March 1867	1 8
49th Foot (expected home, 1876-77).	India	- - -	Aug. 1865	March 1867	1 7

Quarter Master General's Office, Horse Guards, }
18 March 1867.

J. Hope Grant,
Quarter Master General.

WEST INDIES.

ADDENDA to Return dated 18th March.

RETURN of the MOVEMENT of REGIMENTS, during the last 20 Years, to and from the *West Indies* and the *Bermudas*, and of the Time Passed by each Regiment included in the above Return at each Station during that period.

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	Yrs. ms.
77th Foot - - -	Malta - - -	Nov. 1837	Feb. 1842	4 3
	Ionian Isles - - -	Feb. 1842	Jan. 1843	0 11
	Jamaica - - -	Jan. 1843	Jan. 1846	3 0
	Nova Scotia - - -	Jan. 1846	Sept. 1846	0 8
	Canada - - -	Sept. 1846	June 1848	1 9
				10 7
71st Foot - - -	Canada - - -	April 1838	Oct. 1843	5 6
	West Indies - - -	Oct. 1843	Jan. 1847	3 3
				8 9
23rd Foot, 1st Battalion - -	Nova Scotia - - -	May 1838	Oct. 1840	2 5
	Canada - - -	Oct. 1840	Sept. 1843	2 11
	West Indies - - -	Sept. 1843	Mar. 1847	3 6
	Nova Scotia - - -	March 1847	Oct. 1848	1 7
				10 5
48th Foot - - -	Gibraltar - - -	Sept. 1838	Jan. 1844	5 4
	Jamaica - - -	Jan. 1844	April 1847	3 3
				8 7
7th Foot, 1st Battalion - -	Gibraltar - - -	Nov. 1839	Dec. 1844	5 1
	West Indies - - -	Dec. 1844	April 1848	3 4
	Nova Scotia - - -	April 1848	June 1850	2 2
				10 7
1st Foot, 1st Battalion - -	Gibraltar - - -	Nov. 1839	Feb. 1846	6 3
	West Indies - - -	Feb. 1846	April 1848	2 2
	Nova Scotia - - -	April 1848	Aug. 1851	3 4
				11 9
38th Foot - - -	Ionian Isles - - -	Sept. 1840	March 1843	2 6
	Gibraltar - - -	Mar. 1843	Nov. 1845	2 8
	Jamaica - - -	Nov. 1845	March 1848	2 4
	Nova Scotia - - -	Mar. 1848	Aug. 1851	3 5
				10 11
88th Foot - - -	Malta - - -	Dec. 1840	Jan. 1847	6 1
	West Indies - - -	Jan. 1847	May 1850	3 4
	Nova Scotia - - -	May 1850	July 1851	1 2
				10 7
42nd Foot - - -	Ionian Isles - - -	Jan. 1841	Feb. 1843	2 1
	Malta - - -	Feb. 1843	Feb. 1847	4 0
	Bermuda - - -	Feb. 1847	June 1851	4 4
	Nova Scotia - - -	June 1851	June 1852	1 0
				11 5

App. No. 4.

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	Yrs. ms.
20th Foot, 1st Battalion	Bermuda - -	Sept. 1841	April 1847	5 7
	Nova Scotia - -	April 1847	Sept. 1847	0 5
	Canada - - -	Sept. 1847	July 1853	5 10
			Total -	11 10
72nd Foot - - -	Gibraltar - -	Nov. 1844	Feb. 1848	3 3
	West Indies - -	Feb. 1848	July 1851	3 5
	Nova Scotia - -	July 1851	Oct. 1854	3 3
			Total -	9 11
66th Foot - - -	Gibraltar - -	July 1845	Jan. 1848	2 6
	West Indies - -	Jan. 1848	May 1851	3 4
	Canada - - -	May 1851	Oct. 1854	3 5
			Total -	9 3
54th Foot - - -	Gibraltar - -	Oct. 1845	Dec. 1846	1 2
	Malta - - -	Dec. 1846	Dec. 1847	1 0
	West Indies - -	Dec. 1847	June 1851	3 6
	Canada - - -	June 1851	Oct. 1854	3 4
			Total -	9 0
19th Foot, 1st Battalion	Malta - - -	Sept. 1840	Jan. 1843	2 4
	Ionian Isles - -	Jan. 1843	Dec. 1845	2 11
	West Indies - -	Dec. 1845	April 1848	2 4
	Canada - - -	April 1848	July 1851	3 3
			Total -	10 10
34th Foot - - -	Ionian Isles - -	Oct. 1845	March 1848	2 5
	Gibraltar - -	March 1848	March 1850	2 0
	West Indies - -	March 1850	June 1853	3 3
			Total -	7 8
16th Foot, 1st Battalion	Gibraltar - -	Jan. 1846	March 1847	1 2
	Ionian Isles - -	March 1847	April 1851	4 1
	Jamaica - - -	April 1851	Sept. 1854	3 5
	Canada - - -	Sept. 1854	July 1857	2 10
			Total -	11 6
56th Foot - - -	Gibraltar - -	Dec. 1846	May 1851	4 5
	Bermuda - - -	May 1851	Jan. 1855	3 8
			Total -	8 1
36th Foot - - -	Ionian Isles - -	Jan. 1847	March 1851	4 2
	West Indies - -	March 1851	Sept. 1854	3 6
	Jamaica - - -	Sept. 1854	July 1857	2 10
			Total -	10 6
69th Foot - - -	Malta - - -	Nov. 1847	April 1851	3 5
	West Indies - -	April 1851	May 1857	6 1
			Total -	9 6
67th Foot - - -	Gibraltar - -	Jan. 1848	June 1851	3 5
	West Indies - -	June 1851	March 1857	5 9
			Total -	9 2

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	Yrs. ms.
26th Foot - - - -	Gibraltar - -	Mar. 1850	April 1853	3 1
	Canada - - -	April 1853	Nov. 1854	1 7
	Bermuda - - -	Nov. 1854	Nov. 1859	5 0
			Total -	9 8
39th Foot - - - -	Gibraltar - -	April 1854	Dec. 1854	0 8
	Crimea - - -	Dec. 1854	May 1856	1 5
	Canada - - -	May 1856	Oct. 1859	3 5
	Bermuda - - -	Oct. 1859	Aug. 1864	4 10
			Total -	10 4
14th Foot, 1st Battalion -	Malta - - -	April 1854	Jan. 1855	0 9
	Crimea - - -	Jan. 1855	June 1856	1 5
	Malta - - -	June 1856	Aug. 1858	2 2
	Ionian Isles -	Aug. 1858	Feb. 1860	1 6
	Jamaica - - -	Feb. 1860	May 1864	4 3
			Total -	10 1
21st Foot, 1st Battalion -	Crimea - - -	Aug. 1854	May 1856	1 9
	Malta - - -	May 1856	Mar. 1860	3 10
	West Indies -	Mar. 1860	Aug. 1864	4 5
			Total -	10 0
49th Foot - - - -	Barbados - -	Feb. 1857	May 1860	3 3
41st Foot - - - -	Jamaica - - -	April 1857	May 1860	3 1
2nd Foot, 2nd Battalion	Malta - - -	Feb. 1858	Aug. 1858	0 6
	Ionian Isles -	Aug. 1858	June 1862	3 10
	Gibraltar - -	June 1862	June 1864	2 0
	Bermuda - - -	June 1864	Nov. 1866	2 5
			Total -	8 9
3rd Foot, 2nd Battalion -	Malta - - -	April 1858	June 1862	4 2
	Gibraltar - -	June 1862	June 1864	2 0
	Barbados - -	June 1864	June 1866	2 0
			Total -	8 2

Regiments still Abroad.

6th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1867).	Gibraltar - -	May 1858	June 1862	4 1
	Ionian Isles -	June 1862	Mar. 1864	1 9
	Jamaica - - -	Mar. 1864	Mar. 1867	3 0
			Total -	8 10
16th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1871).	Nova Scotia -	Dec. 1861	May 1866	5 5
	Barbados - -	May 1866	Mar. 1867	0 10
			Total -	6 3
61st Foot (expected home in 1876).	Bermuda - - -	Oct. 1866	Mar. 1867	0 5

Horse Guards, }
20 March 1867. }

Appendix, No. 5.

PAPER handed in by Lieutenant General Sir *Hope Grant*.

RETURN of the Number of TROOPS in the COLONIES and DEPENDENCIES borne on the Strength of the ARMY.

DEPENDENCIES.	Number of Troops (Officers and Men) borne on Strength of Imperial Army.					
	Cavalry of the Line.	Infantry of the Line.	Colonial Corps.	Artillery.	Engineers.	TOTAL.
COLONIES PROPER :						
<i>North American :</i>						
Canada - - - - -	504	8,449	1,095	1,848	221	12,117
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick - -	-	2,903	-	488	204	3,595
Newfoundland - - - - -	-	-	199	95	-	294
British Columbia - - - - -	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil.
<i>Australian Colonies :*</i>						
New South Wales - - - - -	-	356	-	111	9	476
Victoria - - - - -	-	468	-	111	-	599
South Australia - - - - -	-	185	-	-	-	185
Tasmania - - - - -	-	282	-	-	2	284
Queensland - - - - -	-	91	-	-	-	91
New Zealand* - - - - -	Military Train, 292	2,083	-	-	-	2,375
<i>South African Colonies :</i>						
Cape of Good Hope,† Natal, and British Kaffaria - - - - -	-	8,511	491	152	213	4,367
Ceylon‡ - - - - -	-	880	853	88	5	1,826
Mauritius - - - - -	-	1,464	-	244	133	1,841
<i>West Indies :</i>						
Jamaica - - - - -	-	772	700	91	3	1,566
Honduras - - - - -	-	-	504	1	-	505
Windward and Leeward Islands, com- prising Barbados, Trinidad, and British Guiana - - - - -	-	754	456	104	5	1,319
	504	22,218	4,298	3,333	795	31,440
<i>Straits Settlements, Force to be about</i> - -	-	400	740	220	-	1,360

* The force in Australia and New Zealand is to consist of three regiments only, about 2,700 ; all other troops to be withdrawn.

† The force at the Cape is to be reduced by one regiment of infantry.

‡ The force at Ceylon is to be increased by half a regiment of British infantry and one battery of artillery ; the other half of the regiment borne at the Straits.

DEPENDENCIES.	Number of Troops (Officers and Men) borne on Strength of Imperial Army.					
	Cavalry of the Line.	Infantry of the Line.	Colonial Corps.	Artillery.	Engineers.	TOTAL.
MILITARY GARRISONS, NAVAL STATIONS, CONVICT DEPÔTS, and DEPENDENCIES maintained chiefly for Objects of Imperial Policy.						
<i>Mediterranean :</i>						
Malta - - - - -	- -	4,299	619	815	187	5,920
Gibraltar - - - - -	- -	3,784	- -	811	304	4,899
Ionian Islands - - - - -	- -	- -	- -	Nil.	—	—
Hong Kong - - - - -	- -	822	450	85	34	1,391
Japan - - - - -	- -	735	- -	57	- -	792
St. Helena - - - - -	- -	204	- -	71	72	347
Bermuda * - - - - -	- -	822	- -	187	310	1,319
Bahamas - - - - -	- -	- -	473	- -	1	474
Falklands - - - - -	- -	- -	- -	Nil.	—	—
Western Australia - - - - -	- -	- -	- -	Nil.	—	—
Labuan—Force to be two Companies Ceylon Rifles, out of the Force for the Straits Settlements - - - - -	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>West African Settlements :</i>						
Sierra Leone - - - - -	- -	- -	590	- -	- -	590
Gambia - - - - -	- -	- -	203	- -	- -	203
Gold Coast and Lagos - - - - -	- -	- -	357	- -	- -	357
	—	10,666	2,692	2,026	908	16,292
GROSS TOTAL - - -	504	32,884	6,990	5,359	1,703	47,732

* The Force at Bermuda is to be increased by one Regiment of Infantry, to be taken from New Brunswick, which will be thereby reduced one Regiment of Infantry.

Horse Guards, }
28 March 1867. }

J. Hope Grant,
Quartermaster General.

Appendix, No. 6.

PAPER handed in by Mr. *Taylor*, 9 April 1867.

RETURN of the LOCAL MILITIA, VOLUNTEERS, and MILITARY POLICE in the WEST INDIAN COLONIES, actually Embodied and Effective.

COLONY.	Description of Forces.	Number of Officers and Men.	Field Guns.	Date of Return.	REMARKS.
Bahama Islands -	Militia Artillery -	169	5	Aug. 1862.	<i>Jamaica.</i> —The Militia numbers 22 regiments of infantry, three regiments of cavalry, and eight companies of artillery, or 4,991 men in all, but has not been called out or drilled since 1849.
Turk's Islands -	Volunteers, Infantry -	88	—	July 1862.	
	" Artillery -	33	3		
	Militia -	55	—		
Jamaica -	Volunteers, Infantry -	304	—	- -	<i>Antigua.</i> —From Note to October last Return, it appears that the "artillery and infantry have for some time been virtually disbanded."
	" Cavalry -	336	—	June 1863	
	" Artillery -	27	—		
Virgin Islands -	Volunteer Militia -	100	—	1860.	Parade once a month.
Antigua -	Militia, Infantry -	55	—	- -	<i>Grenada.</i> —The term of service of the Militia having expired in 1862, there are now only 37 officers. In 1862 there were 300 riflemen and 65 gunners.
	" Yeomanry -	74	—	Oct. 1864	
	" Artillery -	23	2		
Montserrat -	None -	None.	—		The Militia, 1,033 men, exists on paper only.
Dominica -	Militia, Rifles, and Artillery.	203	3	Jan. 1864	
Grenada -	Militia -	37	—	Jan. 1864	
Nevis -	Military Police -	80	—	July 1863.	
	Volunteers, Infantry -	116	—		
	Police -	9	2	July 1862.	
St. Kitt's -	Volunteer Artillery -	36	2		
	Militia, Infantry -	103	—	July 1864	
	" Yeomanry -	105	—		
Barbados -	Volunteers, Infantry -	174	—	June 1864.	
	" Yeomanry -	337	—		
	" Artillery -	158	10	Aug. 1864.	
St. Vincent -	Volunteers, Infantry -	108	—		
	Militia, Infantry -	121	—	May 1863.	
	" Cavalry -	49	—		
	" Artillery -	53	4	July 1862	
St. Lucia -	Police -	50	—		
	Military Police -	48	—	Jan. 1864.	
Tobago -	Neither Militia nor Volunteers.	-	—		
Trinidad -	- ditto - ditto -	-	—	A Volunteer force has now been formed in Honduras; total number, 175; 30 of these are artillery.	
Honduras -	Nil -	-	—		
British Guiana -	Militia, Infantry -	324	—		
	" Cavalry -	9	—	Jan. 1864.	
	" Artillery -	78	—		
SUMMARY.					
West Indian Colonies.	Volunteers, Infantry -	790	—		
	" Cavalry -	678	—		
	" Artillery -	254	15		
	TOTAL -	1,717	15		
	Militia, Infantry -	1,016	—		
	" Cavalry -	241	—		
	" Artillery -	398	11		
	TOTAL -	1,655	11		
	Military Police -	137	2		
	GRAND TOTAL -	3,509	28		

Topographical Department, War Office,
2 January 1865.

(signed) *F. Miller*,
Major, R. A.

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Appendix, No. 7.

PAPERS handed in by Captain *Mends*, R.N.App. No. 7.

EXTRACT from the REGULATIONS for HER MAJESTY'S TRANSPORT SERVICE.

ARTICLE 132.

THE regulated number of women (with their children) allowed to embark with troops, and for whom free conveyance will be provided, is as follows, viz. :—

To and from Foreign Stations.

1. The wives of the regimental staff serjeants.
2. The wives of the serjeants in each troop, battery, or company, in the following proportion, viz. :—

2 out of 4 or 5 serjeants.
3 out of 6 or 7 „
4 out of 8 „
3. The wives of all other non-commissioned officers and men in the proportion of 4 to 60 men ; or, should a larger number of men be embarked, then in the proportion of 6 to 100 men.
4. When troops are embarked for India, China, Australia, or New Zealand, the total number of women (with their children) for whom free conveyance will be provided, will be 12 to 100 men, including staff serjeants and all others.

(signed) *W. R. Mends*,
Director of Transport Services, Admiralty.

App. No. 7.

ESTIMATE prepared in the TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT of the COMPARATIVE EXPENSE of the OVERLAND and CAPE ROUTES between *England* and *India*, for Conveyance of 14,400 Soldiers, with Officers and Families (concurring in by the Secretary of State for India).

PARTICULARS.		Overland Route.	Cape Route.
		£.	£.
Total expense of Cape route, } 899,978 £. - - - }	Freight of men, women, and children outward, at 10 £. 1 s. 5 d. per adult - - - - -	- -	87,475
	Ditto - - ditto - homeward, at 28 £. 6 s. 4 d. per adult - -	- -	227,156
	Passage of officers outward, at 100 £. 9 s. 6 d. - - - - -	- -	33,559
	Ditto - - ditto - homeward, at 127 £. 2 s. 10 d. - - - -	- -	35,600
	Medical comforts - - - - -	- -	5,821
Working expenses of Overland } route, 209,014 £. - - - }	Bedding - - - - -	12,510	10,367
	Wear and tear - - - - -	46,406	—
	Wages and victuals - - - - -	43,893	—
	Coals - - - - -	62,820	—
	Mess of military officers - -	9,225	—
Charges upon capital and in- } surance account, 71,595 £. - }	Victualling of men, women, and children - - - - -	30,621	—
	Wages and victuals, wear and tear, and coals for tugs, and wages of boatmen - - - - -	3,539	—
	Annual charge for replacement of capital (1,007,034 £.) in 25 years	34,195	—
	Average interest upon amount of unredeemed capital at 5 per cent.	22,228	—
	Insurance upon the average value of ships, tugs, and boats, at 5 per cent. per annum - - - -	15,172	—
Additional charges, 35,575 £. -	Transit of the Isthmus - - -	25,575	—
	Expense of management; being for establishments at Home and Abroad, under the control of the Director of Transports - -	10,000	—
	TOTAL Amount of Working Expenses and Charges on Capital - - - - - £.	316,184	—
	Cost of Cape Route (computed on data furnished by India Office) -	- -	899,978
	Per Adult - - - - £.	18 5 -	23 1 9
	Difference in favour of Over-land Route - - - - £.	4 16	9 *

* The above rate of 4 £. 16 s. 9 d. per adult is equal to 5 £. 16 s. 5 d. per soldier (including officers, women, and children), and is irrespective of mess and ration stoppages.

W. R. Mends,
Director of Transport Services, Admiralty.

RETURN of the Net Cost per SOLDIER of the TRANSPORT of TROOPS with Officers and Families between the undermentioned Stations and *Great Britain*, after deducting the regulated Mess and Ration Stoppages; in Hired Ships, based on the Payments made for the Numbers conveyed during Five Years; and, in Her Majesty's Troop Ships, on the Cost of the Conveyance of a Battalion with Officers and Families, including the Cost of Coals, Wages and Victuals for the Crew, and a per-centage charge (at the rate of Eight per Cent. per Annum) for wear and tear of a Troop Ship of the "Tamar" class, calculated for the Average Period of Voyage.

STATIONS.	Average Days' Voyage.		Cost of Transport per Soldier.					
	For Hired Sailing Ships.	For Her Majesty's Troop Ships.	OUT.			HOME.		
			In Hired Ships.*	In Her Majesty's Troop Ships.	In Hired Ships.	In Her Majesty's Troop Ships.		
			£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	
West Indies - - -	40	22	†19 18 8	4 13 7	†35 12 5	5 13 10		
Mauritius - - -	85	60	14 8 6	15 6 1	33 5 -	17 2 1		
Ceylon - - -	105	75	19 17 10	19 16 3	38 4 4	22 - -		
Straits Settlements - -	105	80	no case -	14 19 -	no case -	17 13 3		
China (<i>see Note</i>) - -	125	90	21 16 4	23 18 9	29 2 -	27 - 8		
Japan - - -	145	100	no case -	26 9 6	no case -	29 11 4		
Australia, Tasmania, and New Zealand - -	100 out 90 home	80	16 16 1	12 12 3	22 18 3	15 1 5		

The transport of troops from Great Britain to India is not included, it having hitherto been undertaken by the Indian Government; but an estimate of the cost of this service by the Overland and Cape routes is annexed.

* Should these vessels make an empty voyage home the cost would be increased.

† These rates are high, steam conveyance having been employed, and the troops proceeding *viâ* Gibraltar.

NOTE.

With the exception of the engagement (not included in the above statement) of the "Far East" steamer, and "White Adder," for the conveyance of the 2nd Battalion of the 11th Regiment from Hong Kong to the Cape, calling at Mauritius, and of other troops from the Cape to England, the homeward engagements in China show no marked variations from the average rate of 29 l. 2 s. per soldier.

The "Far East" and "White Adder" cost, on the numbers embarked at Hong Kong, 55 l. 4 s. 3 d. per soldier, but this is on the presumption that the same freight would have been demanded for the direct voyage to England. The rate also includes a payment for 200 men short embarked.

App. No. 7.

RETURN of Numbers of EUROPEAN and NATIVE INDIAN TROOPS conveyed in Hired Ships between *India* and *China* during Five Years, and of the Cost per Soldier of all Expenses of Transport.

	Officers.	Men.	Women.	Children.	Rate per Soldier.
					£. s. d.
From Bombay to Hong Kong - { Europeans	-	-	-	-	-
{ Natives -	11	849	-	-	8 13 3
„ Calcutta to Hong Kong - { Europeans	36	820	84	95	33 19 8*
{ Natives -	-	-	-	-	-
„ Hong Kong to Bombay { Europeans	27	1,070	2	2	15 - 9
{ Natives -	16	1,735	1	2	9 12 10
„ Shanghai to Bombay - { Europeans	-	-	-	-	-
{ Natives -	13	1,282	13	26	13 18 7

* This rate is exceptionally high, it having been necessary to engage a steamer for the service.

The mess and ration stoppages of the European troops have been abated.

W. R. Mends, Director of Transport Services.

S U M M A R Y.

The average cost of conveyance by sailing vessel between India and Hong Kong may be taken as follows, viz. :—

	£.	s.	d.	
For Natives - - - - -	9	10	-	per soldier.
„ Europeans - - - - -	15	-	-	„ „

The cost of conveying native troops between India and Shanghai is about 14 £., and for Europeans it is considered that it would be about 22 £. per soldier.

W. R. Mends, Director of Transport Services.

ESTIMATE of the COST for TRANSPORT of a BATTALION to *Hong Kong* from *England* in a Hired SAILING SHIP, for a Voyage of 125 Days, and for the following Numbers :

38 Officers. 750 Men.							87 Women. 160 Children.		
									£.
For freight	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,746
" mess	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,375
" victualling	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,794
" fittings	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	471
" bedding	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	458
							£.		18,844
Abate mess and ration stoppages	-	-	-	-	-	-			3,175
or 20 l. 17 s. 10 d. per soldier	-	-	-	-	-	-	£.		15,669

ESTIMATE of the COST of the same Service by H. M. Troop Ship "*Tamar*," for a Voyage of 90 Days.

									£.
For mess of officers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,282
" victualling of troops	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,237
" bedding for troops	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	458
" wages and victuals of the crew	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,452
" wear and tear, at 8 per cent. per annum on first cost	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,076
" coals	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,738
							£.		20,238
Abate mess and ration stoppages	-	-	-	-	-	-			2,286
or 23 l. 18 s. 9 d. per soldier	-	-	-	-	-	-	£.		17,952

Note.—Should the vessel make an empty voyage home, the cost would be increased.

W. R. Mends,
Director of Transport Services, Admiralty.

Appendix, No. 8.

PAPER handed in by Colonel *Shadwell*.

APPROXIMATE ESTIMATE of the Annual Cost of maintaining a Battalion of Infantry, consisting of 788 all Ranks, at the following Stations East of the Cape.

	Australia.*	Tasmania.	New Zealand.†	China.‡	Mauritius.	Ceylon.*	West Indies.	Jamaica.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	
Regimental Pay and Allowances.	22,900	22,900	22,900	(a) 23,100	22,900	22,900	22,900	22,900	(a) One additional Assistant Surgeon.
Military Labourers - - -	-	-	-	735	840	-	2,262	730	
Special Allowances - - -	2,080	2,080	2,080	7,665	5,000	7,152	1,450	1,450	
Cost of Provisions, Forage, Transport (including Wives and Children).	4,992	6,716	9,950	9,566	4,708	12,980	10,506	8,447	
Clothing - - - - -	2,624	2,624	2,624	2,595	2,640	2,640	2,632	2,632	
Barrack Expenses - - -	4,790	4,104	6,566	26,901	3,695	3,254	3,452	3,452	
Divine Service and Martial Law.	225	225	225	357	355	258	272	335	
Medical and Purveyor's Expenses.	1,350	1,350	(b) 2,100	4,815	2,650	5,730	3,558	3,565	(b) Two additional Assistant Surgeons.
Educational Expenses - -	185	185	185	185	(c) 250	(c) 250	(c) 200	(c) 225	(c) Detached Schools at these Stations.
Average Cost per Annum of Arms, Accoutrements, Ammunition.	548	548	548	548	548	548	548	548	
£.	30,694	40,732	47,178	76,467	43,586	55,712	47,780	44,284	
Pay of Invalids, Time-Expired Men, and Drafts on Passage during the Year.	500	500	457	660	360	556	134	123	
Depôt Charges (including Recruiting Expenses), Establishment of Depôt, 140 all Ranks.	6,648	6,648	6,648	6,648	6,648	6,648	6,648	6,648	
£.	46,842	47,880	54,283	83,775	50,594	62,916	54,562	51,055	
Pay of a Battalion for the period of the Voyage to and from the several Colonies.	10,036	10,036	10,036	11,292	7,526	9,408	2,760	2,760	
Average Annual Charge for Pay during the period of Relief, taking the Average Service of a Battalion abroad at 10 Years.	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,129	752	940	276	276	

* Arrangements have only recently been completed, by which various expenses hitherto paid direct by these Colonies, will become chargeable to Imperial Funds; the information possessed at the War Office as to the exact expenditure for these services is not definite, as no accounts including the new charges have as yet been received. As the special allowances to be granted in Australia in future have not been determined upon, a sum on their account has been included, calculated at the same rate as that granted for Tasmania and New Zealand.

† As this Colony has for several years past been in a constant state of disturbance, the expenditure recently incurred there scarcely affords satisfactory data for an estimate of normal expenditure for provisions and barrack services.

‡ The expenditure in China for hire of buildings pending the construction of barracks and other arrangements is at present exceptionally high, and is the cause of the excessive charge for barrack expenses.

Note.—The Straits Settlements (Singapore) have not been included, as no returns of expenditure of any kind have been received; it is expected, however, that the expenditure will be about the same as at Ceylon.

April 1867.

William Brown, Accountant General, War Office.

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Appendix, No. 9.

PAPER handed in by Colonel *Shadwell*.

APPROXIMATE ESTIMATE of the Annual Cost of Maintaining a BATTALION of EURO- App. No. 9.
PEAN INFANTRY, consisting of 788 All Ranks, at the Cape of Good Hope.

	£.
Regimental Pay and Allowances - - - - -	22,900
Military Labourers - - - - -	—
Special Allowances - - - - -	1,040
Cost of Provisions, Forage Transport (including wives and children)	5,332
Clothing - - - - -	2,575
Barrack Expenses - - - - -	3,857
Divine Service and Martial Law - - - - -	280
Medical and Purveyors' Expenses - - - - -	1,752
Educational Expenses - - - - -	185
Average Cost per Annum of Arms, Ammunition, and of their main- tenance - - - - -	548
	38,469
Pay of Invalids, Time-expired Men, and Drafts on Passage during the year - - - - -	235
Depôt Charges, including Recruiting Expenses - - - - -	6,648
	45,352
Pay of a Battalion for the period of the Voyage to and from the Colony	4,642
Average Annual Charge for Pay during Relief, taking the average period of service of a Battalion abroad at 10 years - - - - -	464

War Office,
7 May 1867.

W. Brown,
Accountant General.

Appendix, No. 10.

PAPER put in by Mr. H. Taylor.

App. No. 10. EXTRACT from "Notices sur les Colonies Françaises" publiées par ordre de S. Exc. le Marquis de Chasseloup-Laubat, Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat de la Marine et des Colonies.

LES forces militaires de la Réunion se composent des troupes de la garnison et des milices locales.

L'effectif de la garnison est de 46 officiers et de 1,124 sous-officiers et soldats, répartis entre divers détachements d'infanterie et d'artillerie de la marine, de disciplinaires des Colonies, de génie, et de gendarmerie Coloniale.

Voici la composition de ces divers corps :—

Etat-major.—Un lieutenant de vaisseau, attaché à l'état-major général; 1 capitaine d'infanterie de marine, adjudant de place à Saint-Denis.

Génie.—Un chef de bataillon directeur; 1 lieutenant, et 3 gardes du génie; une compagnie indigène d'ouvriers du génie composée de 3 officiers et de 93 sous-officiers et soldats. Total: 8 officiers, 93 sous-officiers et soldats.

Artillerie de la Marine.—Un chef d'escadron directeur; un sous-chef ouvrier d'état; un garde d'artillerie de 1^{re} classe; un maître armurier; une batterie d'artillerie de marine, composée de 4 officiers et de 96 sous-officiers et soldats; une section de canonnières ouvriers composée d'un officier et de 45 ouvriers. Total: 8 officiers et 144 sous-officiers et soldats.

Infanterie de Marine (4^e régiment).—Un lieutenant colonel; 1 chef de bataillon; 1 capitaine major; 1 capitaine adjudant-major; 1 chirurgien aide-major; 1 lieutenant officier payeur; 1 sous-lieutenant chargé de l'habillement; 4 compagnies, chacune de 114 hommes, dont 3 officiers*. Total, 19 officiers et 444 sous-officiers et soldats.

Disciplinaires des Colonies.—Une compagnie composée de 5 officiers et de 281 sous-officiers et soldats.

Gendarmerie Coloniale.—Une compagnie composée de 4 officiers et 162 sous-officiers et soldats, dont 90 à cheval, 67 à pied, et 5 enfants de troupe.

Milice.—L'effectif de la milice s'élevait en 1862 à 9,970 hommes, dont 295 officiers.
* * * * *

Station Maritime.—La Station locale de la Réunion se compose de trois bâtiments de l'état le Lynx, aviso à hélice, de 150 chevaux et de 2 canons; les goëlettes à voiles la Turquoise et la Perle, armées chacune de 2 canons.

La Réunion est aussi le centre de la division navale des côtes orientales d'Afrique.

* Une cinquième compagnie qui compte à la Réunion est détachée dans les îles de Mayotte, Nossi-Bé et Sainte Marie de Madagascar.

Appendix, No. 11.

PAPER put in by Sir James Fergusson.

COPY of a LETTER from the Adjutant General to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

App. No. 11.

Sir,

Head Quarters, Calcutta, 18 March 1867.

WITH reference to your letter, No. 302, of the 8th instant, I have the honour, by desire of the Commander in Chief, to submit his Excellency's remarks regarding the possibility of reduction of the army in India, in which, it is understood, the armies of Bombay and Madras, British and Native, are included, as well as that of the Presidency of Bengal.

2. Much time will be required to collect and reduce the returns demanded in your letter of the 1st February, which refers more particularly to questions affected by the report of the Royal Commission on recruiting.

3. The subject, however, of your letter of the 8th March, now under reply, admits of a large treatment, on consideration of the principles according to which the empire of British India is held. For this purpose round numbers, which are readily available, will suffice.

4. His Excellency would commence by the statement of certain simple facts. The British army in India, taken as a whole, numbers about 61,000 men. This figure includes the officers, non-commissioned officers, and private soldiers of the British corps, and the British officers in military service on the staff and with Native corps. The Native force, including the armies under the three Commanders in Chief and the forces under the several Governments, amounts to about 122,000 men. Thus in all, we have a mixed force of about 183,000 men, there being two natives to one British soldier.

5. In the year before the war of the mutiny, which was also a year of peace, the forces stood as follows :—

British force about	-	45,000 men, including all officers	
Native force in Presidency of Bengal,		with British and	
about	-	Native regiments.	
	-	160,000	"
Ditto in Madras	-	57,265	"
Ditto in Bombay	-	38,850	"
		<u>301,115</u>	

Consequently there has been a gross diminution of armed men in the peace establishment of India, if the years 1856 and 1867 be compared, amounting to about 118,000 men.

6. If we decompose the items, we find on the other hand, that there is an actual increase on the establishment of 16,000 men, while the Native establishment is diminished by 134,000 men.

7. In other words, the increase of 16,000 British soldiers is placed against a decrease of 134,000 Natives.

8. I should mention that the Bengal Native army, including those under the Commander in Chief, as well as those under Government, stands at - 65,659 per last returns.

The Madras at	-	31,524	"
The Bombay at	-	25,345	"

122,528*

The gross nominal strength, or the sanctioned establishment of British non-commissioned officers and private soldiers, is 61,257. The nominal establishment is never permitted to be exceeded, under the orders of the Secretary of State for India.

This being so, the practical consequence is obvious, that real or actual strength is never equal to nominal strength in an army, which, serving at a distance from England, receives its recruits but once a year. The causes of decrease, namely, death, invaliding, and discharge, are constant, and the results appear in the Returns from month to month.

Consequently, with rare exceptions, Her Majesty's regiments in India are always more or less incomplete in numbers, or in other words, below their nominal strength.

This is even seen in the regiments just arrived from England, and notably so in the case of those which came this year, some of them being among the weakest corps now in India.

It is therefore perfectly safe on an average of months, to reckon the actual strength of the British army in India at about six per cent. below the nominal or sanctioned establishment.

This has been done by the Commander in Chief for the purpose of this letter, in order that there may be no possible delusion with regard to the real facts which should be in the mind of Government with respect to the question put to his Excellency for report, and the military strength the Government has to rely on.

The result is, that the figure 61,000 is found sufficient to represent the average or actual strength of the British forces proper in India throughout the year, the same including the officers with native corps and on the staff, as well as those serving with British regiments.

This excludes the Hyderabad Contingent of 8,000 men, which is not strictly speaking part of the British army, as it is paid for by the Nizam, and maintains the peace of His Highness' territories. It is not included in the Statement of Native Forces in para. 5.

* This is the total strength. But with respect to armed strength in cantonments, we must recollect that the system of the Native Indian armies in time of peace permits of a large privilege of furlough, which weakens the regiments by 10 per cent. for periods varying from six to nine months. The effective strength is further diminished by the per-centage represented by the recruits, which may be represented at six per cent.

App. No. 11. 9. His Excellency would ask the Government now to consider the area which is thus guarded by an army of about 183,000 men, and the conditions under which the troops are posted.

10. Attention to the map is requested.

11. Peshawur is in the 71st degree of east longitude, whereas Debroghur, which is a military station also, on the confines of Assam, is in the 95th degree of east longitude.

12. Again, Peshawur is in the 34th degree of north latitude, and Cape Cormorin is in the 8th degree of north latitude.

13. In addition to the area thus roughly illustrated, the Indian armies provide garrisons for the provinces lately wrested from Burmah, as also a garrison for the important post of Aden, on the coast of Arabia. They have hitherto found garrisons for the Straits Settlements, including two batteries Royal Artillery, and two Native Infantry regiments. The latter return to India, and the batteries will now be struck off the Indian establishment.

14. If we consider the conditions under which the army is posted, the most remarkable facts of frontiers and distances present themselves. Thus, on the west and north-west, stretching from Beloochistan in the south to Peshawur and Hazarah in the north, along the entire length of the Indus, our outlying regiments, including the force at Jacobabad, the several stations occupied by the Punjab force, and the great garrison of Peshawur, are constantly fronting hostile tribes, which, but for the presence of those troops, would harry our territories without ceasing.

15. There cannot be a doubt that any native power holding such a frontier would employ at least 100,000 men for the purpose, whereas the work is done by our soldiers in numbers not much exceeding 20,000, made up as follows—

The Garrison of Peshawur	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,768
The Punjab Force	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11,912
The Scinde Horse	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,508
The 30th Native Infantry, Bombay Army	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	708
Total								20,889

16. The out-posts thus described find their supports at long distances, at Rawul Pindee in the North, at Mooltan in the South of the Punjab, and at Hyderabad and Kurrachee in Scinde.

17. His Excellency further observes that besides the mountain tribes, we have to consider the semi-hostile Government of Affghanistan, that country from which have proceeded the numerous Mahomedan invasions of India.

18. His Excellency is confident that the Government of India will agree in his opinion, that any relaxation of grasp of our frontiers on the North-West would be followed by inroads from Affghanistan, the Government of India being thus landed in an Affghan war, which would compel it, however pacifically inclined, ultimately to undertake the permanent occupation of Affghanistan.

19. Sir William Mansfield inclines strongly to the belief, that when we consider the manner in which we maintain the security of our North-West frontier, and the necessary supports to which allusion has been made, we are not merely preserving order in a recently conquered country filled with a warlike population, we are not solely keeping the police of a rugged mountainous frontier, along which every man is a warrior from his youth, but we are also staying off foreign war, which, if it ever breaks out in that direction, can hardly fail to lead to territorial extension in an uncivilized and poor country, the latter being, as his Excellency understands, entirely opposed to the existing policy of Her Majesty's Government.

20. The Northern frontier, which looks more especially to the kingdom of Nepal does not display the warlike development which, as shown above, is indispensable in the North-West.

21. Nevertheless, it must be recollected that an accident occurring to one single minister in Nepal might possibly be attended with great political change, rendering an armed attitude necessary on our part. In the meantime, Nepal is watched from the military stations lying adjacent to the East India Railway, and the Ganges, the forces in those stations maintaining the peace of the districts and the great cities of Hindustan, according to the object set forth by Government in its distribution of the troops.

22. If we travel eastward in the consideration of our frontier, his Excellency would remind Government, that whether with regard to Bhootan or to the wild tribes lying east and south of it, it has been found necessary, within the last two years, to place the Eastern frontier on a more military footing than had hitherto prevailed.

23. This was a consequence not only of the disturbances of the Bhootas, but also of the very unruly conduct of the tribes of the Kossyah Hills, and those lying North of the Brahmapootra.

Brahmapootra. Our villagers, in those distant, but very extensive districts, are constantly exposed to raids and plundering, while, on the other hand, our tea planters are spreading over the land. That frontier extends from Darjeeling to Debrogurh, a distance of not less than 700 miles as the crow flies. But with regard to existing communications, a measurement of miles conveys no idea of the distances and the difficulties to be overcome between the two points. Some five native regiments, with two batteries of native and Eurasian artillery possessing mountain guns, are employed in all, in support of the frontier police, the details of the occupation of the frontier having been settled in consultation last year by their Excellencies the Governor General and Commander in Chief, and his Honor the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal. The support of the frontier out-posts is in Calcutta itself, the communication being maintained by rail as far as Kooshteah, and then by the Brahmapootra.

24. It may be as well to mention here, that with the exception of the Peshawur Garrison and the supports at Mooltan and Rawul Pindee, the British troops proper are not employed in the system of frontier defence, unless war actually breaks out. The native troops are used for this purpose alone, because they are more fit for it, and are less liable to suffer from the necessary exposure to climate, &c.

25. Before dismissing the question of frontier defence, his Excellency would briefly allude to the Burmese Provinces, the troops there stationed being required, not only for the support of the British Government in the provinces themselves, but also to hold a check on the Court of Mandalay, and prevent the recurrence of a Burmese war. Although small in numbers, the forces under the Chief Commissioner of Burmah operate on the mind of Mandalay, as the garrisons of Peshawur and Rawul Pindee on the Ameer of Cabul.

26. His Excellency would now turn to considerations of a different character, but perhaps even of more importance than those to which he has as yet invited the notice of the Governor General in Council.

27. It will be in the recollection of Government, that before the conquest of the Punjab, the provinces of Bengal and the North-West were held as strongly by British troops as they are in the present day.

28. Thus, 25 years ago there was a strong British force at Calcutta and Dum-Dum, British troops occupied Berhampore, Dinapore, Ghazee-pore, Allahabad, Cawnpore, Agra, and Meerut, in large proportions of all the arms.

29. Subsequently to the annexation of the Punjab, some of these stations ceased to have any British troops, whilst the garrisons of all were greatly weakened. The head quarters of the artillery quitted Dum-Dum; Berhampore, Ghazee-pore, and Allahabad were left without British troops; the regiment of British Dragoons left Cawnpore; Meerut was reduced by one British regiment.

30. Afterwards, when Oude was annexed, Cawnpore, instead of having 2,500 British troops as it had in former days, was, his Excellency believes, reduced to four companies of British infantry. Oude, though annexed, received, as his Excellency understands, the head quarters and six companies of a British regiment in all.

31. Without venturing to describe the causes which led to the insurrection and mutiny of 1857, it is clear to his Excellency that what had been considered the necessary means of demonstration till 1846 of British strength proper, in the North-Western provinces and Behar, ceased to be so considered after that year, the climax of the change of policy in the maintenance of a due proportion of British soldiers, with the large force of Native regiments in Oude and the old provinces, having been reached subsequently to the annexation of the former.

32. His Excellency would now draw attention once more to the figures stated in paragraphs 4 and 5. It appears that, according to existing establishments and real averages, we have an actual British force stronger by 16,000 men than we had in 1856, that being the year immediately preceding the mutiny, one of peace establishment, and also one in which, as shown above, the Government of India had reached the climax of non-demonstration of white faces in the vast tract stretching through Behar, the Doab, Rohilkund and Oude.

33. It is also necessary at this stage to advert to the fact of the enormous area comprised in the Gwalior territories, in Bundelkund, in the Saugor and Nerbudda territory, in Malwa, and in Rajpootana, which were absolutely devoid of British troops, notwithstanding that a great portion of the country was held by Princes more or less mediatized, but who possessed standing armies, and throughout whose territories the population was armed.

34. The only representation of British power was to be found in British agents and Native regiments, some belonging to the regular army, but the larger proportion of them being contingents of irregular troops under different denominations.

35. In 1857-58, the whole of that system broke up. The Native regiments and contingents had turned against us. Some of the Native Princes threw off their allegiance to the British Empire and met us in the field. Scindia was deposed by his insurgent troops, and afterwards reinstated by our arms. After a two years' campaign the vast area was

App. No. 11. again reduced to order, and security taken for the future by placing garrisons of British soldiers where they had not been seen before, viz., at Morar, Jhansi, Nowgong, Jubbulpore, Saugor and Mhow, the number of Native troops having been reduced to a bare minimum.

36. In like manner, when the war of the mutiny came to an end, the errors of too great confidence in native loyalty as briefly illustrated above, were repaired. The provinces which had been entirely denuded of British troops, in which consequently the military mutiny swelled to the proportion of civil war, British Government and administration having been for a time swept away, were occupied properly. British garrisons were given to Benares, to Allahabad, to Cawnpore, to the several stations in Rohilcund, and Oude. Although the numbers thus allotted are not nearly so great as they were at the termination of hostilities in 1859,* a constant reduction having been in progress since that date, the country is, his Excellency thinks, now occupied in a sufficient manner.

37. It is this occupation which accounts chiefly for the difference in the amount of British force of 16,000 men, as shown in figures of 1867 and 1856.

38. His Excellency cannot believe, with the recent experience of the difficulties of 1857-58-59, that any thinking statesman could possibly revert to the military policy of the year preceding the mutiny. For that policy trusted to an occupation of India by means of an enormous Native army, without a sufficient demonstration of British forces proper, by which the people in certain vast and warlike districts could be reminded of the existence of British power.

39. In support of the above, his Excellency would briefly recapitulate the additional British forces thus distributed in great cities and countries, which, under the old and now broken up system, were entrusted to Native troops. Hazareebagh and Berhampore one regiment of infantry; Benares one regiment of cavalry, one wing of infantry; Cawnpore one regiment British infantry, instead of four companies as before the mutiny; Oude four regiments of British infantry and one regiment of cavalry, instead of one regiment of infantry as before the mutiny; Delhi, one wing British infantry; Bareilly one regiment British infantry; Shajehanpore one wing British infantry; Moradabad one wing British infantry; Roorkee one wing British infantry; Gwalior two regiments British infantry, and one of British cavalry; Jhansi one regiment British infantry, the regiment there stationed ultimately to go to Nowgong; Nagode, Jubbulpore, and Saugor, two regiments British infantry; Nusseerabad one regiment British infantry; Neemuch, one wing British infantry; Mhow one regiment British cavalry and one of British infantry.

40. Yet after all what does the addition amount to? Four regiments of cavalry and 16 regiments of infantry, the establishment of the individual regiments being now much less than in the former times.

NOTE.—The nominal establishment of non-commissioned officers and private soldiers of the several corps of the different arms, is—

Cavalry	-	-	-	-	-	-	460
Artillery	-	-	-	-	-	-	145
Infantry	-	-	-	-	-	-	860

41. There is one other item of calculation, which has to be considered when we investigate the full meaning of the additional British forces, as compared with those of the days preceding the mutiny.

42. About six years ago, it was determined, after the most prolonged consultation between the Secretary of State and the several Governments of India, that the experience of 1857 forbade the entrusting of artillery to native hands; accordingly the field artillery required for this empire, amounting to about 426 guns, is now entirely manned by British soldiers. Before the mutiny, the natives constituted probably three-fourths of the artillery force.

43. His Excellency has, he believes, now accounted for the difference of the European force as shown in the years 1856 and 1867.

44. It has often been stated in newspapers, and it has even been argued by men of authority in England, that we keep up an European army in India for the purpose of doing nothing; or if it does anything, that it is maintained to overawe a great unwieldy native army.

45. Yet the figures above cited show that the Native forces of all descriptions have been diminished by 134,000 men since 1856.

46. One chief employment of the Native army of the present day has been displayed in the necessary guard of the frontiers.

47. Another use is shown in the necessity of having at least one Native regiment in the vicinity of large cities, in which our policy, according to the reasoning above given, demands the presence of a British regiment proper. Many duties of guards, detachments, treasure parties, and so forth, are taken almost exclusively by the Native troops, for the purpose of encouraging health and life among the Europeans, whose constitution is unequal to the consequent exposures and fatigues in the climate of the plains of India.

48. Accordingly, if we except the hill stations, wherever we see one such British regiment, the purposes of administration require the presence of a Native one also.

49. There

* In 1861 the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of the British regiments serving in India, amounted to 82,166.

In the previous year, 1860, the strength stood at 94,829.

These figures are taken from the Report of the Royal Sanitary Commission.

49. There are a few stations in out-of-the-way districts in Bengal on our side of India, in Bombay in the west, and Burmah in the extreme east, in which a certain demonstration of military force is required, but where, for obvious reasons of climate and economy, it would not only be inconvenient, but extremely unwise and extravagant to employ Her Majesty's British regiments.

50. His Excellency could name several such stations under this presidency, and the stations in Kattywar, Guzerat, Candeish, and Dharwar, in the Presidency of Bombay.

51. His Excellency is not so well acquainted with the Presidency of Madras, but it may be presumed that there are stations of similar character occupied by the native army in Madras, which the government of that presidency would be unwilling to see denuded.

52. His Excellency is reminded by reference to the two minor presidencies, that it would seem hazardous to reduce the European strength, which, if investigated, appears not to exceed what existed previous to 1856.

53. Thus, the difference of what was maintained in the Bombay Presidency, in the comparison of 1856 and 1867, is, as shown above, all devoted to what is called the Mhow Division, or in other words, Malwa and Rajpootana; in the stations of Mhow, Neemuch, and Nusseerabad. The Mhow division is a division of the Bombay army, although the country occupied by it is under the Governor General's agents.

54. In like manner it would appear, although his Excellency is not sure about it, that the extra British regiments now borne on the rolls of the Madras Presidency are devoted to Burmah, and not to Madras proper.

55. But in any case, it is to be recollected, that ten British regiments now, according to present strength, are not more than equal to eight regiments of the strength allowed to a British corps before the two last reductions in the rank and file.

56. It is therefore certain that, in the two minor presidencies, the European force is not greater than it was before the mutinies.

57. His Excellency therefore thinks that a case is made out, which entirely bars the entertainment of the notion that the army in India, whether European or native, admits of any considerable reduction.

58. On the contrary, Sir William Mansfield cannot divest himself of the strong opinion, that it is one of the most extraordinary facts in the history of modern administration and politics, that it should be possible to hold the vast area of India, with all the frontier requirements, and to preserve the most absolute internal tranquillity not only in our own territories, but among our dependent allies, by such a body as 183,000 men, of whom one-third only is recruited in the foreign country which effected the conquest.

59. It may be asserted with perfect safety, that such results of diminished military numbers in the occupation of India were impossible in former days. They have only become practicable in consequence of an improved communication on the rivers and coasts by means of steam-vessels, and through the completion of a large railway system. But for the latter, we must have still maintained a native force of considerable dimensions, not equal to that organized in 1856, but far larger than what is now found to suffice.

60. The character of the facts and the truth of the argument are displayed still more clearly, when it is recollected, that in addition to the maintenance of order amongst our own subjects, and on our frontier, we have to watch with a careful eye the limited sovereignties of the numerous native states, many of which have armed bodies at their disposal, and would be hostile if they dared, and all of which require to be awed into good behaviour.

61. It is to be observed that the notion of good behaviour of the native states and governments, includes not only abstinence from offence against us, but from internecine war between themselves.

62. As was seen in the north in Behar, the Doab, and Rohilcund, in 1857, so was it remarked in the southern Mahratta country in the south of India at the same time, that the military spirit of the people is not dead, and that it requires but opportunity to blaze up and be extremely dangerous.

63. The like will hardly be denied with respect to the Punjab, which was recently conquered, which is ready to furnish soldiers for all India, and whose late military traditions must still afford the themes of conversation in every village.

64. Such are the general considerations which his Excellency would lay before the Government of India.

65. Before closing this letter, Sir William Mansfield would allude to certain matters of detail.

66. His Excellency, in his place in Council, having been requested by the Governor General in 1865, to review the military establishments for the purpose of curtailing expenditure, he submitted, with a scheme for the reduction of the rank and file in the cavalry and infantry,

App. No. 11. infantry, the same having been effected, a plan for the reduction of expense in the artillery arm, which still remains in abeyance.

67. His Excellency did not consider this plan one of positive reduction of artillery strength, but rather one of modification of establishments, which, whilst diminishing the number of batteries, would have added greatly to the efficiency of all that were retained.

68. By the diminution of the number of batteries, a corresponding and not inconsiderable decrease would have been effected in the staff and the officers of the artillery in India. But there would have been but little reduction in the rank and file, which, according to his Excellency's plan, would have remained about the same as it is now in the Bengal Presidency, with a slight numerical decrease in the two minor presidencies.

69. His Excellency has always held an opinion, in common, he believes, with good artillery officers, that artillery differs in an important respect from the other arms, viz., that while you can afford to have skeleton regiments in time of peace, which are easily filled by recruits on the approach of war, it is bad policy to have skeleton batteries of artillery. The reasons of this are obvious; a certain number of men are required to work each gun; if the number of gunners barely suffices for the number of guns, a sickly season, or one sharp skirmish, renders the battery comparatively useless. And again, whereas you can make an infantry soldier in three months, and a cavalry soldier in nine, it takes three years to make an instructed gunner.

70. It is an undoubted fact that the present establishment of the field battery is a skeleton one. The same is true of the garrison battery in India. Artillery officers are unanimous in this view of their batteries. It may then be safely asserted that the existing establishments of single batteries are simply inadequate, except for mere parade purposes.

71. His Excellency therefore considered in 1865, and he still adheres to his opinion, that the modification alluded to would be advantageous; and that, while expense would be reduced if it were effected, the general efficiency of the army in India would certainly not be impaired, with regard to what is required of the artillery in peace and war.

72. With respect to native infantry and cavalry, it is believed to be impossible to effect even the slightest reduction in the army in Bengal.

73. His Excellency considers that we are absolutely without reserve. When we had to find the troops for the little Bhootan war, there was much difficulty in affording regiments for the purpose, and we were even obliged to weaken the force on the Punjab frontier. This was hardly a safe proceeding.

74. His Excellency was also compelled to suggest to Government the expediency of adding to the strength of regiments proceeding to Bhootan, which was done. On the other hand it may be observed that there is a slight reserve in the Madras and Bombay armies.

75. The Straits Settlements having been made over to the Colonies, the Secretary of State has announced that the two Madras native infantry regiments, now at Singapore and Penang, are to return to India.

76. Many authorities believe that some further reduction besides those two regiments is possible. His Excellency is disposed to concur in this view. It is probable therefore that the Madras authorities on a final review of the subject might not object to the reduction of four regiments of native infantry, and perhaps one of native cavalry.

77. In like manner, it may be said of Bombay, that the army of that presidency admits of the reduction of two regiments of native infantry. This was allowed by the Bombay authorities when two regiments returned from China in 1862-63.

78. His Excellency is aware that the late Governor of Bombay objected to the reduction of those two regiments—an objection which Sir William Mansfield himself supported on grounds of general policy, while as Commander in Chief of that presidency he admitted the reduction to be feasible.

79. Whilst, as in duty bound, his Excellency has thus indicated in what direction a slender reduction may be operated, Sir William Mansfield would suggest that it is open to question whether such a measure be one of good policy with regard to the numerous changes and reductions operated in the armies of Madras and Bombay during the last few years.

80. It is evident, he thinks, throughout the arguments pursued in this letter, that, taken as a whole, the native armies in India stand at a strangely low figure.

81. His Excellency need not remind the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council that, during the last 25 years, we have had frequent wars in China and a war with Persia.

82. We cannot be certain that similar exigencies may not arise again, thus causing demands on the forces of the two southern presidencies, at very short notice. The Bengal army, if required to furnish native regiments for foreign service, would certainly be obliged to raise men.

83. His

83. His Excellency would therefore hint that it is for Government to decide which is the more politic, viz., to trust to what the future may bring forth, and to cut down the two armies of Madras and Bombay to such an extent as has been suggested as possible, no reserve being left for contingencies; or to continue to act on the views which were believed to be sound in 1863. App. No. 11.

84. His Excellency would be inclined to recommend the preservation of the existing establishment, but that one regiment from the Bombay Presidency be offered to the Secretaries of State for War and the Colonies for service at Hong Kong, and that it be suggested that, instead of raising new troops for the Straits Settlements, the Madras Government should be invited to find what may be required for Singapore and Penang, according to the practice hitherto observed, the expense of these corps being borne by the respective Colonies while employed under Colonial Government.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. E. Longden*,
Colonel, Adjutant General.

Appendix, No. 12.

PAPERS received from the War Office.

ANNUAL COST of granting 2*d.* a Day EXTRA PAY to the NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS and MEN of a BATTALION of INFANTRY, 788 all Ranks. App No. 12.

50 Non-Commissioned Officers	} 750 Men, at 2 <i>d.</i> a day	- £. 2,281
20 Trumpeters and Drummers		
680 Rank and File - - -		

Depôt, consisting of 134 Men, at 2*d.* a day - - - - £. 408

War Office, }
May 1867. }

W. Brown,
Accountant General.

Appendix, No. 13.

PAPERS put in by Mr. *Fonblanque*.

EXTRACTS from the APPENDIX to the REPORT of the COMMISSIONERS appointed by His Excellency the Governor to inquire into the MILITARY EXPENDITURE and ESTABLISHMENTS of *Ceylon*, 1865.

Appendix (B).

EXTRACT from the "*Mauritius Blue Book*" for 1864.

COLONIAL ALLOWANCES.

THE Officers of Her Majesty's Forces in the Mauritius receive pecuniary allowances paid from the Colonial Treasury, in lieu of all the ordinary allowances, which at other stations they receive in money or in kind. These allowances were established at the capture of the island in 1810, and were modified and altered from the 1st May 1858, according to Despatch, No. 40, dated 5th October 1857, and published in this colony on the 20th April 1858.

THE following is the SCHEDULE now in force:—

SCHEDULE OF ALLOWANCES.		Amount per Menssem.	SCHEDULE OF ALLOWANCES.		Amount per Menssem.
<i>Staff.</i>		£. s. d.	<i>Regimental Officers.</i>		£. s. d.
Inclusive of lodging money, as these officers are not provided with Quarters.	Major General commanding the Forces.	125 - -	Exclusive of lodging allowance.	Colonel Commanding - - -	30 8 3
	Assistant Military Secretary, Aide-de-Camp - } Each as Captain	26 4 8		Lieutenant Colonel Commanding - -	23 17 7
	Deputy Quarter Master General, Lieutenant Colonel.	39 17 10		Major - - - - -	20 17 7
	Deputy Commissary General { after five years' service, Colonel.	43 8 3		Captain and Paymaster - - -	13 4 8
	Deputy Commissary General { under five years' service, Lieutenant Colonel.	36 17 10		Lieutenant - - - - -	8 11 7
	Assistant Commissary General, Major.	29 17 10		Ensign - - - - -	8 11 7
	Deputy Assistant Commissary General, Captain.	20 4 8		Adjutant - - - - -	13 16 7
	Acting Deputy Assistant Commissary General, Lieutenant.	13 11 7		Surgeon, as Major - - -	20 17 7
	Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals, Lieutenant Colonel.	36 17 10		Assistant Surgeon, after six years' service, as Captain.	13 4 8
	Staff Surgeon Major, Lieutenant Colonel.	34 17 10		Ditto Lieutenant - - -	8 11 7
	Staff Surgeon, Major - - -	29 17 10		Quartermaster - - - - -	13 16 7
	Staff Assistant Surgeon { after six years' service, Captain.	20 4 8		Regimental school - - -	- 8 4
	Staff Assistant Surgeon { under six years' service, Lieutenant.	13 11 7		Paymaster Serjeant - - -	1 4 -
	Purveyor to the Forces, Lieutenant	15 11 7	Regimental or Garrison Schoolmasters, 1st class, 4s. per diem.		
	Purveyor or other clerks, Ensign	13 11 7	Ditto - - ditto - - ditto - 2nd class, 2s. ditto.		
Exclusive of lodging allowances, these officers being provided with Quarters.	Dispenser to the Forces, Subaltern	13 11 7	Ditto - - ditto - - ditto - 2s. ditto.		
	Deputy Military Storekeeper, Major.	20 17 10	Ditto - - ditto - - ditto - 1s. ditto.		
	Barrack Master, Major - - -	20 17 10	Clerk to the Military Chaplain - - 16s. per menssem.		
	Military Store Clerk - - -	8 11 7	When Public Quarters are not provided, the following will be the Scale on account of Lodging money:—		
	Clerk of Works, Royal Engineer Department, Lieutenant.	13 16 7	Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel - 11s. per menssem.		
	Clerk, Royal Engineer Department, Ensign.	8 11 7	Major - - - - - 9s. ditto.		
			Captain - - - - - 7s. ditto.		
			Subaltern - - - - - 5s. ditto.		
			With 2l. additional on account of lodging, on account of departure.		
			An Officer for each horse he is required to keep is entitled to 3l. per month for Forage (provided such horse or horses be not already included in the above scale), and 2l. 5s. for each civil servant, as well as 1l. 10s. 5d., as provision allowance for a fourth servant, when such servant is allowed by Royal warrant.		
			<i>Command Allowance.</i>		
			The Officer Commanding at Mahebourg 8s. per menssem.		
			Each Officer Commanding a Corps or Post (except Mahebourg), 5l. per menssem.		
			<i>Recapitulation of the Military Expenditure during the year ended 31st December 1864.</i>		
				£. s. d.	
			By Great Britain - - - - -	105,252 18 5	
			By the Colony - - - - -	32,258 12 11	
			TOTAL - - - - - £.	137,511 11 4	

Appendix (B a).

App. No. 13.

SCALE in Detail of Colonial Allowances received by Officers serving with the Troops at Mauritius.

RANK.	Provisions.	Fuel and Light.	Forage.	Servants.	Rank Allowance.	Lodging Money.	TOTAL per Mensem.
	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£.	£. s. d.
Major General Commanding.	Fixed allowance	-	-	-	-	-	125 - -
Colonel - - -	1 10 5	1 12 5	6	8 5 5	13 1 -	11	41 8 3
Lieutenant Colonel -	1 10 5	1 12 5	6	6 15 -	8 - -	11	34 17 10
Major - - -	1 10 5	1 12 5	8	6 15 -	8 - -	9	29 17 10
Captain - - -	1 10 5	1 4 3	-	4 10 -	6 - -	7	20 4 8
Lieutenant and Ensign	1 10 5	- 16 2	-	2 5 -	4 - -	5	13 11 7
Adjutant - - -	1 10 5	- 16 2	3	4 10 -	4 - -	5	18 16 7
Quartermaster - -	1 10 5	- 16 2	3	4 10 -	4 - -	5	18 16 7

REMARKS.

Lodging money is only drawn when officers are not provided with public quarters.

Heads of Department draw 2*l.* additional under the head of lodging money.Officers of the Staff draw 3*l.* for each horse allowed by the regulations.When a Subaltern is mounted he draws 2*l.* 5*s.* for an additional servant.Officers entitled to four servants are allowed 1*l.* 10*s.* 5*d.*, only for the fourth servant.Officers in command of Corps and in command of stations, are allowed 5*l.* per month as command allowance.The Commandant at Mahebourg receives 8*l.* per month in lieu of 5*l.* as command allowance.

Departmental officers draw according to their relative army rank.

Appendix (D.)

REPORT on the Ceylon Commissariat Department, by *W. D. Bernard*, Deputy Commissary General, August 1865.

SECTION II.

32. HAVING thus far given a general sketch of the origin of the Ceylon Commissariat Department, and of the various modifications which it has undergone, until it has at length assumed overgrown proportions, and finds itself involved in complicated duties, in which military and civil requirements are so intimately blended as to have become almost inseparable, I proceed to point out what precise military duties it really now performs, and what civil duties would remain still to be provided for, if, under a new organisation, the military were altogether to be separated from the civil portion of the Commissariat.

Military Duties.

MILITARY DUTIES.

THESE consist first in the provisioning of all European troops in the island according to the authorised local scale, as noted in the margin. Of the articles named in that scale, the fresh beef and bread are obtained under annual contracts for each station separately, and therefore the advertising for, and settling the terms of all those contracts devolves upon the Deputy Commissary General, who himself is the sole party to the contracts on behalf of the local Government. But salt provisions (beef and pork) are obtained by the local Government, through the Crown agents of the colony in London, from the Naval Victualling Yard at Deptford. All charges connected with the receipt of these (including five per cent. to the Naval Department in England), and all losses upon the issues, and by wastages or deterioration, are borne by the colony. Biscuit is generally made in the colony, but not of very good quality. It is also sometimes obtained from Madras.

1½ lbs. fresh meat, or
1 lb. salt meat.
1 lb. of bread, or ¾ lbs.
biscuit, or ¾ quart rice.
½ pint, or 4 oz. rice.
1 oz. salt.
½ oz. tea, or 1½ oz.
coffee.
1½ oz. sugar.

33. The other articles named in the scale are generally purchased in Colombo without contracts, for the prices fluctuate much, and the qualities of the articles vary at different periods, so that it is usually found more advantageous to purchase them by samples from time to time, making the best bargain that the state of the market will permit, than to

App. No. 13.

attempt to enter into fixed contracts, which dealers will only undertake upon extravagant terms calculated upon contingencies the most adverse to government. At Trincomalee and Galle, contracts for rice have sometimes been made, the demands not being large; but Kandy, Nuwara Eliya, Badulla, and Kornegalle, are all supplied with rice, for native as well as European troops, from Colombo, which is the chief market of the island. Purchases of rice are made here according to the wholesale prices specially reported weekly by the Customs Department to the Deputy Commissary General, with a fair addition for the cost of delivery, wastage by dust, and remeasuring, &c. The fluctuations in the prices of the chief articles of food within the last three years are given in Table IX. Salt for all purposes is obtained chiefly at Colombo from the Government salt store at Putlam, during the favourable season once, or at most twice a year, in the proportion of about 10 tons at a time, at a cost of 4 s. 8 d. per cwt., besides the expense of freight by coasting vessels, delivery, &c.

34. Until within the last few years, the provisioning of European military hospitals devolved also upon the Commissariat, but this duty has now been transferred to the Military Purveyor's Department, although all articles of equipment, bedding, clothing, fuel, &c., are still provided by the Commissariat, as will hereafter appear.

35. The ration returns of detachments and corps are made up by the Commissariat, and the settlement of accounts and recovery of stoppages is also conducted by this department, although the money recovered is credited by the treasurer in the colonial accounts and not by the Commissary. The difference between the cost of the rations and the amount of the stoppages, or clear total loss upon the provisioning of the troops, is borne by the colony.

See Table.

The statements of wastages in store and on transport are prepared by the Commissariat half-yearly, and are submitted for the sanction of the governor; but there is no distinction made between wastages for military and civil purposes.

36. With regard to native troops, they provision themselves entirely, except in the single article of rice, which is supplied to them by the Commissariat in all parts of the island, at the fixed recovery of 2 d. per quart or 5 s. 4 d. a bushel, whatever the actual cost of it may be. That cost, inclusive of the expense of transport and loss by wastage, varies at the present time from 7 s. 6 d. or even 8 s. a bushel (the rate of the best white rice in Colombo) to 15 s. 9 d. and 16 s. 6 d. in Badulla. Every man's wife (and there are nearly half as many as there are men) receives one pint of rice daily free of charge, and every half-pay boy, of whom there are 80, receives one quart of rice daily, which is paid for at the same rate as the issues to the men, viz., 2 d. a quart. The transport of the rice to stations in the interior and to the barracks in Colombo, and the recovery of the amounts due by the men at all stations, rest with the Commissary, who credits the amounts in his monthly cash accounts. Formerly the native troops purchased their own rice, recovering from the Commissariat the difference in money between the average price of best rice in the bazar, as certified monthly by the commanding officer, and the 2 d. per quart to which the liability of the soldier for the expense of his rice was limited. That practice was altered about four years ago, chiefly owing to the great increase in the cost of rice.

APPENDICES to the Report of the Deputy Commissary General.

No. 3.

RETURN of Rations issued to the European Troops in *Ceylon* during the Month of May 1865, showing the Number and Cost of Rations issued to the Men, Women, and Children respectively, together with the Amount of Stoppages recovered from the Troops and the Loss to Government.

COLOMBO.

	£.	s.	d.		£.	s.	d.
By 12,069 rations to men at 10½ d. per ration - -	553	17	8½	To stoppages on 12,069 men's rations at 3½ d. per ration.	189	2	7½
" 536 rations to women at 5½ d. per ration - -	32	7	3½				
" 541 rations to children above seven years at 3½ d. per ration.	7	14	½	Loss to Government - - - -	426	8	9
" 1,986 rations to children under seven years at 2½ d. per ration.	21	4	1½				
TOTAL - - - £.	615	11	4	TOTAL - - - £.	615	11	4

TRINCOMALEE.

	£.	s.	d.		£.	s.	d.
By 3,954 rations to men at 11½ d. per ration - -	189	9	3	To stoppages on 3,954 men's rations at 3½ d. per ration.	57	13	3
" 279 rations to women - - - -	6	13	8½				
" 62 rations to children above seven years at 2 d. per ration.	-	10	4	Loss to Government - - - -	141	4	7
" 372 rations to children under seven years at 1½ d. per ration.	2	4	6½				
TOTAL - - - £.	198	17	10	TOTAL - - - £.	198	17	10

GALLE.

By 2,123 rations to men at 14 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per ration - -	£. s. d. 128 - 2	To stoppage on 2,123 men's rations at 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per ration	£. s. d. 30 19 2
" 124 rations to women at 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per ration - -	3 14 10	Loss to Government - - - -	103 8 11
" 62 rations to children above seven years at 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per ration.	1 5 -		
" 63 rations to children under seven years at 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per ration.	1 8 1		
TOTAL - - - £.	134 8 1	TOTAL - - - £.	134 8 1

KANDY.

By 4,003 rations to men at 1 s. $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per ration - -	£. s. d. 205 14 1 $\frac{1}{2}$	To stoppage on 4,003 men's rations at 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per ration	£. s. d. 58 7 6 $\frac{1}{2}$
" 327 rations to women at 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per ration - -	8 8 - $\frac{1}{2}$	Loss to Government - - - -	164 14 6 $\frac{1}{2}$
" 172 rations to children above seven years at 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per ration.	2 18 11		
" 471 rations to children under seven years at 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per ration.	6 1 -		
TOTAL - - - £.	223 2 1	TOTAL - - - £.	223 2 1

NUWARA ELIYA.

By 2,040 rations to men at 1 s. 7 d. per ration - -	£. s. d. 161 10 -	To stoppage on 2,040 men's rations at 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per ration -	£. s. d. 29 15 -
" 93 rations to women at 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per ration - -	3 13 7	Loss to Government - - - -	137 17 8
" 124 rations to children under seven years at 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per ration.	2 9 1		
TOTAL - - - £.	167 12 8	TOTAL - - - £.	167 12 8

For one month—Total loss to Government - - - £. s. d.
Total average annual loss, about - - - 973 14 5
11,000 - -

No. 4.

Cost of the Rations of Food of a European Soldier per Day for 1865 at each Station.

	Colombo.	Triscomalee.	Galle.	Kandy.	Nuwara Eliya.	
1 $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. beef - - -	d. 5 $\frac{1}{16}$	d. 6 $\frac{1}{2}$	d. 8 $\frac{1}{2}$	d. 5 $\frac{5}{16}$	d. 9 $\frac{1}{2}$	* Including cost of transport from Kandy to Nuwara Eliya.
1 lb. bread - - -	3	3	4	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	7*	
4 oz. rice - - -	- $\frac{1}{16}$	- $\frac{1}{16}$	- $\frac{5}{16}$	- $\frac{3}{16}$	- $\frac{11}{16}$	
1 oz. salt - - -	- $\frac{1}{32}$	- $\frac{1}{32}$	- $\frac{1}{16}$	- $\frac{1}{16}$	- $\frac{1}{16}$	
$\frac{1}{2}$ oz. tea } - - -	- $\frac{2}{16}$	- $\frac{2}{16}$	- $\frac{2}{16}$	- $\frac{2}{16}$	- $\frac{11}{16}$	
or - - -	- $\frac{2}{16}$	- $\frac{2}{16}$	- $\frac{2}{16}$	- $\frac{2}{16}$	- $\frac{11}{16}$	
1 $\frac{1}{2}$ oz. coffee } - - -	- $\frac{2}{16}$	- $\frac{2}{16}$	- $\frac{2}{16}$	- $\frac{2}{16}$	- $\frac{11}{16}$	
1 $\frac{1}{2}$ oz. sugar - - -	- $\frac{2}{16}$	- $\frac{2}{16}$	- $\frac{2}{16}$	- $\frac{2}{16}$	- $\frac{11}{16}$	
TOTAL Rations -	10 $\frac{3}{32}$	11 $\frac{1}{32}$	14 $\frac{3}{32}$	12	19	

- (1) Average cost of a man's ration - - - s. d.
(4) Average cost of a woman's ration - - - 6 $\frac{1}{2}$
(4) Average cost of a child's ration above seven - - - 4 $\frac{1}{2}$
(4) Average cost of a child's ration under seven - - - 3 $\frac{1}{2}$

In addition to the above, 3 lbs. of firewood are issued for each man's ration, and in proportion to the women and children also free of charge.

No. 5.

Cost of RICE issued to Native Troops throughout the Island, showing the Rate per Bushel at each Station, Cost per Man per Diem, and Total Cost for One Month (May 1865), also the Amount recovered and Loss to Government.

	At Colombo.	Trincomalee.	Galle.	Kandy.	Badulla.	Kornegalle.	Jaffna.	Hambantotte.
Rate per bushel average - - -	s. d. 7 8	s. d. 7 6	s. d. 7 3	s. d. 10 -	s. d. 16 -	s. d. 10 -	s. d. 7 6	s. d. 9 -
Proportionate cost per man per diem (1 quart).	- 3	- 2 $\frac{1}{8}$	- 2 $\frac{1}{8}$	- 3 $\frac{1}{2}$	- 6	- 3 $\frac{1}{2}$	- 2 $\frac{1}{8}$	- 3 $\frac{1}{2}$

At Colombo :	£. s. d.		£. s. d.
By issued 630 bushels 23 quarters of rice at 7 s. 8 d. per bushel.	241 15 6	To amount recovered from the men at 2 d. per ration	142 19 8
		Loss to Government - - - -	98 15 10
	£. 241 15 6		£. 241 15 6

No. 16.

App. No. 13.

Royal Engineers, Royal Artillery, Military Store Department, and Gun Lascars Corps.

SCHEDULE of "Colonial Pay and Allowances" authorised to be paid by the Commissariat in 1864, and the present Strength of the different Corps.

Colonial Pay and Allowances.						Fixed Establishment.	Provisional Salaries.	TOTAL.
EUROPEAN TROOPS.								
Royal Artillery.						£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Salaries:								
1	Lieutenant Colonel	-	-	-	-	480	-	-
	Command allowance	-	-	-	-	90	-	-
2	Captains, at 228 l. each	-	-	-	-	456	-	-
3	Lieutenants, at 150 l. each	-	-	-	-	450	-	-
1	Adjutant and quartermaster	-	-	-	-	186	-	-
4	Pioneers, at 9 l. each	-	-	-	-	36	-	-
Contingencies:								1,088 - -
	Petty expenses	-	-	-	-	-	-	5 - -
TOTAL, Royal Artillery						-	-	1,730 - -
Present Strength and Cost (in August 1865).						£. s. d.		
1	Lieutenant Colonel	-	-	-	-	480	-	-
	Command allowance	-	-	-	-	90	-	-
1	Captain	-	-	-	-	228	-	-
1	Lieutenant	-	-	-	-	150	-	-
1	Adjutant	-	-	-	-	186	-	-
TOTAL						1,134	-	-
Royal Engineers.								
Salaries:								
1	Lieutenant Colonel	-	-	-	-	480	-	-
	Command Allowance	-	-	-	-	90	-	-
2	Captains, at 228 l. each	-	-	-	-	456	-	-
	Command allowance to commanding engineer, Kandy	-	-	-	-	180	-	-
4	Lieutenants, at 150 l. each	-	-	-	-	600	-	-
Contingencies:								1,808 - -
	Petty expenses	-	-	-	-	-	-	5 - -
TOTAL, Royal Engineers						-	-	1,811 - -
Present Strength and Cost (in August 1865).						£. s. d.		
1	Lieutenant Colonel	-	-	-	-	480	-	-
	Command Allowance	-	-	-	-	90	-	-
1	Captain	-	-	-	-	228	-	-
	Commanding Kandy	-	-	-	-	180	-	-
2	Lieutenants	-	-	-	-	300	-	-
TOTAL						1,278	-	-
Salaries. Royal Engineer Establishment.								
Colombo:								
1	Assistant Royal Engineer, at 7 s. 6 d. a day	-	-	-	-	-	137 5 -*	-
	Head Clerk	-	-	-	-	120	-	-
2	Clerks, at 75 l. each	-	-	-	-	150	-	-
2	Ditto, 50 l. "	-	-	-	-	100	-	-
	Draftsman	-	-	-	-	75	-	-
	Superintendent and Interpreter	-	-	-	-	90	-	-
2	Assistant Superintendents, at 36 l. each	-	-	-	-	72	-	-
	Master Carpenter	-	-	-	-	48	-	-
	Ditto Mason	-	-	-	-	48	-	-
	Peon protecting military ground from trespass by cattle	-	-	-	-	10 16	-	-
	Messenger	-	-	-	-	10 16	-	-
Kandy:								
2	Superintendents at 36 l. 12 s. each, or 2 s. a day	-	-	-	-	72 4 -	-	-
	Master Smith	-	-	-	-	45	-	-
	Ditto Carpenter	-	-	-	-	45	-	-
	Ditto Mason	-	-	-	-	45	-	-
1	Additional Superintendent	-	-	-	-	-	60 - - †	-
	Extra Clerk, at 3 s. a day	-	-	-	-	-	54 18 - †	-
Galle:								
1	Peon protecting military ground from cattle	-	-	-	-	9	-	-
Contingencies:						941 16 -	252 3 -	1,198 19 -
Postage of letters to and from India by contract packet; bookbinder for stitching papers and binding books, and petty expenses.						-	-	15 - -
TOTAL, Royal Engineer Department						-	-	1,208 19 -

* Now chargeable against the military contribution.

† Now transferred to the fixed establishment of the Colony.

Appendix (E.)

DOCUMENTS showing the Cost and Organisation of Indian Native Regiments, the Comparative Cost of European and Native Regiments, the Amount and Mode of Payment of Non-effective Charges, and the Rates of Indian Allowances.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

Account Branch, dated 23rd September 1865.—No. 892, D.

MEMORANDUM.

PAPERS received with case 2 of schedule No. 99, case 1 of schedule No. 118, and case 2 of schedule No. 141, are herewith returned.

2. In the communications from the Ceylon Government, information is sought on the following specified points:—

I. The organisation in officers and men of native regiments in infantry and artillery, and the source or sources from which they are recruited.

II. The comparative cost of native and European regiments in infantry and artillery.

III. The amount and mode of payment to the Imperial Government on account of non-effective charges, and especially the mode in which the Government of India is assessed on account of sea transport of drafts, invalids and reliefs, arms and ammunition, and clothing charges at home for depôts and recruiting, &c.

IV. The rates of Indian garrison or half batta allowances.

3. As regards heading I., two manuscript statements are attached, marked A. and B. The establishment for the infantry regiment in statement A, is that obtaining in this presidency, including the second doing duty officer recently authorised for each native corps, and the revised establishment of weighmen laid down in Government General Order No. 839 of 1865. For the artillery the establishment given is that of a light field battery of the Punjab Irregular Force, with four pieces of ordnance.

4. The undersigned notices that the account branch is not called upon for information as to the sources from which the native army is recruited.

5. The information under heading II. will be found contained in the printed statement submitted by the undersigned in August last, copy of which is also herewith forwarded.

6. With reference to the next point, the undersigned would observe, that non-effective charges on account of native troops are disbursed locally and borne entirely by the Indian Government, but a capitation rate of 3*l.* 10*s.* per man based on the average number in India, during 12 months, is paid annually to the Imperial Government for the none effective charges of the British

troops serving in India, in addition to a capitation rate of 10*l.* per man per annum to reimburse the Imperial Government for all expenses incurred on account of regiments and drafts for service in India, and for maintaining them until arrival in this country. The payment is made by the Indian Treasury at home.

7. The transport charges on account of drafts, time expired men, invalids and reliefs, are borne entirely by the Indian Government, but the disbursement is made both in India and at home; according to the existing arrangement one-third of the amount for homeward passage is payable in India for both officers and men, and one-third for officers, and two-thirds for men, on account of outward passage; the remainder in each case is payable in England, but is charged against the Indian revenues.

8. The charges on account of arms and ammunition and clothing for the depôts of regiments on the Indian establishment are borne by the Imperial Government out of the capitation rate of 10*l.* per man paid by the Indian Government, but on the men coming out to India such charges fall on the revenues of this country.

9. The garrison or half batta allowances of each grade of the several branches of the European army in India, will be found in the statements marked C. and D., but as these rates of pay have practically ceased to exist since the 1st January last, except as regards staff corps pay, which is equivalent to the infantry garrison rates, the undersigned has given in juxtaposition under each branch of the service the field rates of pay which are now drawn by all officers.

10. As regards any other information connected with organisation or rates of pay, the undersigned would refer to the detailed appendices attached to the military budget estimates of each presidency for the current official year, a copy of which might, if the Government deem it desirable, be furnished to the Ceylon Government.

(signed) *Arthur Broome*, Colonel,
Controller General of Military
Expenditure.

(True Copy.) *H. Burne*, Lieutenant Colonel,
Officiating Secretary
to the Government of India.

App. No. 13.

(A.)—STATEMENT showing the Detail of the Establishment and Cost of a Regiment of Native Infantry in the *Bengal Presidency*.

R A N K S.	Numbers.	Rate of Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Annum.
		<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Commandant - - - - -	1	- - -	640 14 -	A. 34,704 12 -
Second in command and wing officer - - -	1	- - -	374 1 6	B. 374 1 6
Wing officer - - - - -	1	- - -	374 1 6	
Adjutant - - - - -	1	- - -	225 12 -	C. 225 12 -
Quartermaster - - - - -	1	- - -	225 12 -	
Doing duty officers - - - - -	2	225 12 -	451 8 -	
Medical officer - - - - -	1	- - -	600 - -	
	8			
Subadars, 1st Class - - - - -	2	100 - -	200 - -	
Ditto 2nd „ - - - - -	2	80 - -	160 - -	
Ditto 3rd „ - - - - -	4	67 - -	268 - -	
Jemadars, 1st Class - - - - -	4	35 - -	140 - -	
Ditto 2nd „ - - - - -	4	30 - -	120 - -	
Havildars - - - - -	40	14 - -	560 - -	
Naicks - - - - -	40	12 - -	480 - -	
Drummers - - - - -	16	7 - -	112 - -	
Sepoys - - - - -	600	7 - -	4,200 - -	
	712			74,880 - -
TOTAL Number - - -	720	And Pay per Annum - - -		1,09,584 12 -
<i>Command and Staff Allowances.</i>				
Commandant - - - - -	-	- - -	600 - -	
Second in Command and wing officer - - -	-	- - -	270 - -	
Wing officer - - - - -	-	- - -	230 - -	
Adjutant - - - - -	-	- - -	200 - -	
Ditto for office - - - - -	-	- - -	50 - -	
Quartermaster - - - - -	-	- - -	150 - -	
Doing duty officers - - - - -	-	100 - -	200 - -	
Subadar major - - - - -	-	- - -	25 - -	
Drill havildar - - - - -	-	- - -	5 - -	
Drill naick - - - - -	-	- - -	2 8 -	
Colour havildars - - - - -	-	2 - -	16 - -	
Pay havildars - - - - -	-	5 - -	40 - -	
Drum major - - - - -	-	- - -	5 - -	
Fife major - - - - -	-	- - -	5 - -	
Mess allowance - - - - -	-	- - -	100 - -	
Band allowance - - - - -	-	- - -	100 - -	
				23,982 - -
A. If a major.				
B. If a captain.				
C. If a Lieutenant.				
<i>Subordinate Medical and Fixed Hospital Establishments.</i>				
Native doctors - - - - -	2	20 - -	40 - -	
Shop cooley - - - - -	1	- - -	5 - -	
Bheesties - - - - -	2	4 - -	8 - -	
Goorgah - - - - -	1	- - -	4 - -	
Cooks - - - - -	2	4 - -	8 - -	
Sweepers - - - - -	2	4 - -	8 - -	
	10			876 - -
<i>Native Followers.</i>				
Moonshee - - - - -	1	- - -	20 - -	
Moulvie - - - - -	1	- - -	8 - -	
Pundit - - - - -	1	- - -	8 - -	
Tindal - - - - -	1	- - -	9 8 -	
Lascars - - - - -	8	5 12 -	46 - -	
Bheesties - - - - -	8	5 - -	40 - -	
Sweepers - - - - -	8	4 - -	32 - -	
Bildars - - - - -	2	3 8 -	7 - -	
Chowdry - - - - -	1	- - -	11 - -	
Mutsuddy - - - - -	1	- - -	5 - -	
Weighmen - - - - -	2	4 - -	8 - -	
	34			2,334 - -
<i>Contract Allowances.</i>				
Allowance to wing officers for payment and repair of arms - - -	-	80 - -	160 - -	
Allowances to quartermaster for repair of tents - - -	-	- - -	25 - -	
Allowances for butts and targets - - -	-	- - -	4 - -	
Allowances for school shed - - -	-	- - -	5 - -	
				2,336 - -
Add—				
Good conduct allowance - - - - -	-	- - -	- - -	4,208 5 4
Hutting money - - - - -	-	- - -	- - -	772 8 -
TOTAL per Annum - - - Rs.				144,065 9 4

(B.)—STATEMENT showing the Detail of the Establishment and Cost of a Battery of Punjab Artillery.

RANKS.	Numbers.		Rate of Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Annum.
			Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
Commandant - - - - -	1		- - -	433 10 -	A. - - -
Doing duty officer - - - - -	1		- - -	265 12 -	B. 8,392 8 -
		2			
Subadar - - - - -	1		- - -	80 - -	
Jemadar - - - - -	1		- - -	35 - -	
Havildars - - - - -	6		14 - -	84 - -	
Naicks - - - - -	6		12 - -	72 - -	
Buglers - - - - -	2		8 - -	16 - -	
Privates - - - - -	90		8 - -	720 - -	
Native farrier - - - - -	1		- - -	8 8 -	
		107			12,186 - -
TOTAL Number - - - - -		109	And Pay per Annum - - -		20,578 8 -
<i>Command Staff and Horse Allowances.</i>					
Commandant - - - - -			- - -	30 - -	
Commandant, horse allowance - - - - -			- - -	60 - -	
Doing duty officer (including horse allowance) - - - - -			- - -	150 - -	
Pay havildar - - - - -			- - -	5 - -	
Drill naick - - - - -			- - -	2 8 -	
					2,970 - -
A. If a 1st captain.					
B. If a lieutenant.					
<i>Native Artificers and Followers.</i>					
Tindal - - - - -	1		- - -	8 - -	
Tent lascars - - - - -	1		- - -	5 12 -	
Store lascars - - - - -	4		5 - -	20 - -	
Bheesties - - - - -	2		5 - -	10 - -	
Sweeper - - - - -	1		- - -	4 - -	
Saloobery - - - - -	1		- - -	15 - -	
Jemadar syces - - - - -	3		10 - -	30 - -	
Syces - - - - -	80		5 - -	400 - -	
Grass cutters - - - - -	95		4 8 -	427 8 -	
Bullock drivers - - - - -	10		5 - -	50 - -	
Mistry smith - - - - -	1		- - -	12 - -	
Filemen - - - - -	2		7 - -	14 - -	
Firemen - - - - -	2		7 - -	14 - -	
Hammer men - - - - -	2		6 - -	12 - -	
Mistry carpenter - - - - -	1		- - -	14 - -	
Carpenters - - - - -	2		10 - -	20 - -	
Moochee - - - - -	1		- - -	5 - -	
Mutsuddy - - - - -	1		- - -	5 - -	
Weighman - - - - -	1		- - -	4 - -	
Langrees - - - - -	2		5 - -	10 - -	
		213			12,963 - -
<i>Subordinate Medical and Fixed Hospital Establishment.</i>					
Native doctor - - - - -	1		- - -	20 - -	
Dresser - - - - -	1		- - -	6 - -	
Cook - - - - -	1		- - -	4 - -	
Sweeper - - - - -	1		- - -	5 - -	
Bheesties - - - - -	1		- - -	5 - -	
		5			480 - -
<i>Contract Allowance.</i>					
Allowance for stationery and repair of arms - - - - -			- - -	20 - -	
Allowance for four guns and waggons - - - - -			15 - -	60 - -	
Allowance for one spare carriage - - - - -			- - -	5 - -	
Allowance for one forge cart - - - - -			- - -	5 - -	
Allowance for two store carts - - - - -			5 - -	10 - -	
Allowance for shoeing 95 horses - - - - -			2 - -	190 - -	
Allowance for shoeing 32 yaboo - - - - -			2 - -	64 - -	
Allowance for repair of 88 sets of harness - - - - -			1 8 -	132 - -	
Allowance for repair of saddles - - - - -			1 - -	7 - -	
Allowance for repair of gram pots - - - - -			- - -	15 - -	
Allowance for cavassons and cotton ropes - - - - -			- - -	5 - -	
Allowance for eight sepoy's pauls - - - - -			- 10 -	5 - -	
Add—					6,216 - -
Good conduct allowance - - - - -			- - -	- - -	1,228 - -
TOTAL per Annum - - - - -					44,435 8 -

(C.)—STATEMENT showing the Amount of Regimental Pay and Allowances of each Grade of Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers, and Rank and File of the several Branches of the European Army serving in India.

	Horse Artillery.		Foot Artillery.		Cavalry.		Engineers.		Infantry.	
	Garrison Rates per Mensem.	Field Rates per Mensem.	Garrison Rates per Mensem.	Field Rates per Mensem.	Garrison Rates per Mensem.	Field Rates per Mensem.	Garrison Rates per Mensem.	Field Rates per Mensem.	Garrison Rates per Mensem.	Field Rates per Mensem.
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Colonel - - - - -	1,478 7 -	1,478 7 -	1,295 5 -	1,295 5 -	1,478 7 -	1,478 7 -	1,295 5 -	1,295 5 -	1,295 5 -	1,295 5 -
Lieutenant Colonel - - -	952 10 -	1,157 - -	837 14 -	1,032 4 -	952 10 -	1,157 - -	837 14 -	1,032 4 -	837 14 -	1,032 4 -
Ditto on Major's pay - - -	781 1 10	929 6 4	640 14 6	789 3 -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	640 14 -	789 3 -
Major - - - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	781 1 10	929 6 4	640 14 -	789 3 -	640 14 -	789 3 -
Captain - - - - -	521 11 4	563 - 4	392 5 -	433 10 -	521 11 4	563 - 4	392 5 -	433 10 -	374 1 -	415 6 -
Second Captain - - - - -	521 11 4	563 - 4	376 2 8	417 7 8	- - -	- - -	392 5 -	433 10 -	- - -	- - -
Lieutenant - - - - -	334 6 -	365 4 -	234 14 -	265 12 -	334 6 -	365 4 -	234 14 -	265 12 -	225 12 -	256 10 -
Second Lieutenant - - - -	289 15 10	310 10 4	192 10 6	213 5 -	- - -	- - -	192 10 6	213 5 -	- - -	- - -
Cornet - - - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	289 15 10	310 10 4	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
Ensign - - - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	182 1 11	202 12 5
Paymaster :										
On appointment - - - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	464 8 -	535 13 -	- - -	- - -	404 8 -	445 13 -
After 5 years' service - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	524 15 -	566 4 -	- - -	- - -	434 15 -	476 4 -
After 10 years' service - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	555 6 -	596 11 -	- - -	- - -	465 6 -	506 11 -
After 15 years' service - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	585 13 -	627 2 -	- - -	- - -	495 13 -	537 2 -
After 20 years' service - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	616 4 -	657 9 -	- - -	- - -	526 4 -	567 9 -
Quartermaster :										
On appointment - - - - -	356 12 4	387 10 4	290 3 11	321 1 11	328 5 10	359 3 10	- - -	- - -	244 - 3	274 14 3
After 10 years' service - - -	362 13 9	393 11 9	308 8 2	339 6 2	332 11 5	363 9 5	- - -	- - -	268 5 9	299 3 9
After 15 years' service - - -	370 15 7	401 13 7	316 10 -	347 8 -	370 15 7	401 13 7	- - -	- - -	286 10 -	317 8 -
Riding Master :										
Under 2 years' service - - -	289 15 10	310 10 4	- - -	- - -	289 15 10	310 10 4	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
After 2 years' service - - -	334 6 -	365 4 -	- - -	- - -	334 6 -	365 4 -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
Regimental Sergeant Major - - -	59 1 4	64 11 -	56 10 1	57 13 9	49 14 -	51 7 -	63 15 8	65 3 7	47 5 4	48 14 4
Bandmaster Sergeant - - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	49 14 -	51 7 -	- - -	- - -	47 5 4	48 14 4
Quartermaster Sergeant - - -	51 11 9	52 15 4	49 4 6	50 8 2	43 14 6	45 7 6	56 8 5	57 12 4	39 - 10	40 9 10
Troop Sergeant Major - - - -	51 11 9	52 15 4	49 4 6	50 8 2	41 1 10	42 10 10	- - -	- - -	38 - 2	39 4 11
Sergeant Instructor of Musketry, 2nd class.	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
Paymaster Sergeant :										
Under 3 years' service - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	28 4 8	28 10 4	- - -	- - -	23 5 1	24 9 10
After 3 years' service - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	35 10 3	36 - - -	- - -	- - -	30 11 5	31 15 5
Armourer Sergeant - - - - -	37 15 4	39 2 11	35 8 2	36 11 9	28 4 8	28 10 4	- - -	- - -	23 5 1	24 9 10
Schoolmaster Sergeant :										
Under 10 years' service - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	28 4 8	28 10 4	- - -	- - -	23 5 1	24 9 10
After 10 years' service - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	35 10 3	36 - - -	- - -	- - -	30 11 5	31 15 5
Hospital Sergeant :										
On appointment - - - - -	37 15 4	39 2 11	35 8 2	36 11 9	33 3 1	33 8 9	- - -	- - -	30 11 5	31 15 5
After 7 years' service - - -	45 4 11	46 8 6	42 13 9	44 1 4	40 8 7	40 14 3	- - -	- - -	38 - 11	39 4 11
Orderly-room Clerk :										
Under 3 years' service - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	28 4 8	28 10 4	- - -	- - -	23 5 1	24 9 10
After 3 years' service - - -	52 10 5	53 14 -	50 3 3	51 6 10	35 10 3	36 - - -	- - -	- - -	30 11 5	31 15 5
Colour Sergeant - - - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	30 11 5	31 15 5
Saddler Sergeant - - - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	28 4 8	28 10 4	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
Farrier Major - - - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	47 12 1	48 15 8	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
Sergeant Farrier Carriage Smith -	43 12 5	45 - - -	41 5 3	42 8 10	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
Shoeing and Carriage Smith - -	27 3 11	28 7 6	24 12 9	26 - 4	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
Farrier - - - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	30 9 10	31 13 5	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
Collar Maker - - - - -	24 2 11	25 6 6	21 11 9	22 15 4	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
Wheeler - - - - -	24 2 11	25 6 6	21 11 9	22 15 4	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
Trumpet Major - - - - -	37 15 4	39 2 11	35 8 2	36 11 9	28 4 8	28 10 4	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
Drum Major - - - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	23 5 1	24 9 10
Trumpeter - - - - -	25 11 5	26 15 -	23 4 3	24 7 10	14 14 8	16 7 8	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
Trumpeter on inferior pay - - -	15 - - -	16 3 7	12 8 10	13 12 5	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
Drummer - - - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	11 8 2	13 1 2
Sergeant - - - - -	37 15 4	39 2 11	35 8 2	36 11 9	28 4 8	28 10 4	36 10 5	37 14 3	23 5 1	24 9 10
Corporals - - - - -	28 2 7	29 6 2	25 11 5	26 15 -	17 12 11	18 14 10	26 11 4	27 15 3	14 2 8	15 11 6
Second Corporals - - - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	22 - 10	23 4 8	- - -	- - -
Gunners - - - - -	15 - - -	16 3 7	12 8 10	13 12 5	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
Bombardiers - - - - -	25 11 5	26 15 -	23 4 3	24 7 10	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
Drivers - - - - -	12 8 10	13 12 5	12 8 10	13 12 -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
Privates - - - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	12 9 11	14 9 11	11 12 10	13 - 9	10 1 -	11 10 -

Note.—The separate items which constitute the Garrison Allowance of Commissioned Officers are pay, batta, regimental house rent, tentage and horse allowance; but in the Foot Artillery, Engineers, and Infantry, the last item is included for Field Officers only. The only difference as regards field rates is that extra batta forms a component item, but not regimental house rent. The Officers are thus required to provide their own quarters and tents, and to keep up the regulation number of charges without any further assistance from Government.

(D).—STATEMENT showing the Rates of Pay and Allowances of Medical Officers and of Subordinate Grades having Half and Full Batta Rates of Pay.

R A N K.	Years' Service.	Relative Rank.	Half Batta Rates per Mensem.	Full Batta Rates per Mensem.	Horse Allowance when attached to Horse Artillery or Cavalry.
			<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Surgeon Major - - - - -	25	Lieutenant Colonel -	888 12 -	1,093 2 -	90 - -
Ditto - - - - -	20	Ditto - - - - -	852 3 7	1,056 9 7	90 - -
Surgeon - - - - -	15	Major - - - - -	677 6 11	825 11 5	90 - -
Ditto - - - - -	10	Ditto - - - - -	640 14 6	789 3 -	90 - -
Assistant Surgeon - - - - -	10	Captain - - - - -	410 9 5	451 14 5	90 - -
Ditto - - - - -	6	Ditto - - - - -	392 5 2	433 10 2	90 - -
Ditto - - - - -	5	Lieutenant - - - - -	304 14 2	335 12 2	60 - -
Ditto - - - - -	Under 5	Ditto - - - - -	286 10 -	317 8 -	60 - -
Veterinary Surgeon - - - - -	Under 10	2nd Lieutenant or Cornet.	229 15 10	250 10 4	-
Ditto - - - - -	Above 10	Lieutenant - - - - -	274 6 -	305 4 -	60 - -
Ditto - - - - -	Above 20	Captain - - - - -	431 11 4	473 - 4	90 - -
Ditto, appointed before 17th May 1851 - - - - -	Under 10	2nd Lieutenant or Cornet.	286 10 -	317 8 -	47 13 3
Ditto - - - - - ditto - - - - -	Above 10	Lieutenant - - - - -	310 15 6	341 13 6	47 13 3
Apothecary - - - - -	-	- - - - -	115 7 -	145 14 -	-
Second Apothecary and Steward - - - - -	-	- - - - -	95 14 -	126 5 -	-
Assistant Apothecary - - - - -	-	- - - - -	55 - -	70 - -	-

Arthur Broome, Colonel,
Controller General of Military Expenditure.

EUROPEAN ARMY.

STATEMENT showing the Total Annual Cost of the several Branches of the European Armies of the Three Presidencies.

PARTICULARS OF CHARGES.	Cavalry, One Regiment.	Infantry, One Regiment.	One Battery Horse Artillery.	One Light Field Battery.	One Heavy Field Battery.	One Garrison Battery.
	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>	<i>Rs.</i>
BENGAL PRESIDENCY:						
Regimental pay and allowances, including medical establishments and native followers, family allowances, and good conduct pay.	3,96,162	3,81,208	98,056	81,170	58,233	38,970
Commissariat charges, including victualling and loss on malt liquor.	85,972	1,53,438	24,142	24,142	12,873	12,516
Feed of horses and battery cattle - - - - -	27,562	-	13,444	10,462	18,902	-
Medical, including dieting patients - - - - -	7,270	12,944	2,128	2,128	1,062	1,062
Clothing, average of two years* - - - - -	18,973	22,010	4,804	4,712	2,380	2,307
Barrack, including bedding - - - - -	17,676	31,543	4,977	4,977	2,643	2,574
Ordnance charges* - - - - -	12,520	19,115	5,902	6,040	4,257	1,741
Miscellaneous, including carriage, proportion of sea transport to and from England after 10 years, bounty and kit money at 110 rupees per man.*	56,650	1,01,090	15,950	15,950	8,470	8,250
Capitation charges, effective and non-effective - -	69,520	1,24,060	19,570	19,570	10,390	10,120
TOTAL - - - Rs.	6,92,305	8,45,408	1,88,973	1,69,151	1,19,210	77,540
Average deduction for difference between Indian and furlough pay of officers in Europe.*	17,190	14,084	-	-	-	-
Ditto for officers on staff employ* - - - - -	5,005	7,808	-	-	-	-
Ditto for difference between full and net pay of officers employed in the civil and public works department.	-	858	-	-	-	-
TOTAL - - - Rs.	22,195	22,750	-	-	-	-
NET TOTAL - - - Rs.	6,70,110	8,22,658	1,88,973	1,69,151	1,19,210	77,540

* Average for all India.

STATEMENT showing the Total Annual Cost of the several Branches of the European Armies, &c.—*continued.*

PARTICULARS OF CHARGES.	Cavalry, One Regiment.	Infantry, One Regiment.	One Battery Horse Artillery.	One Light Field Battery.	One Heavy Field Battery.	One Garrison Battery.
MADRAS PRESIDENCY:						
Regimental pay and allowances, including medical establishments and native followers, family allowances, and good conduct pay.	Rs. 3,91,017	Rs. 3,67,620	Rs. 1,03,311	Rs. 81,864	Rs. 62,430	Rs. 42,619
Commissariat charges, including victualling and loss on malt liquor.	86,142	1,53,743	24,184	24,184	12,899	12,541
Feed of horses and battery cattle - - - -	67,107	-	28,733	20,514	25,717	-
Medical, including dieting patients - - - -	10,031	17,860	2,691	2,691	1,468	1,468
Clothing average of two years * - - - -	18,973	22,010	4,804	4,712	2,380	2,307
Barrack, including bedding - - - -	14,787	26,388	4,163	4,163	2,211	2,154
Ordnance charges* - - - -	12,520	19,115	5,902	6,040	4,257	1,741
Miscellaneous, including carriage, proportion of sea transport to and from England after 10 years, bounty and kit money at 110 rupees per man.*	56,650	1,01,090	15,950	15,950	8,470	8,250
Capitation charges, effective and non-effective - -	69,520	1,24,060	19,570	19,570	10,390	10,130
TOTAL - - - Rs.	7,26,747	8,31,886	2,09,308	1,79,688	1,30,222	81,900
Average deduction for difference between Indian and furlough pay of officers in Europe.*	17,190	14,084	—	—	—	—
Ditto for officers on staff employ* - - -	5,005	7,808	—	—	—	—
Ditto for difference between full and net pay of officers in the civil and public works department.*	-	858	—	—	—	—
TOTAL - - - Rs.	22,195	22,750	—	—	—	—
NET TOTAL - - - Rs.	7,04,552	8,09,136	2,09,308	1,79,688	1,30,222	81,900
BOMBAY PRESIDENCY:						
Regimental pay and allowances, including medical establishments and native followers, family allowances, and good conduct pay.	3,83,238	3,71,739	1,05,162	81,080	63,126	40,360
Commissariat charges, including victualling and loss on malt liquor.	86,806	1,54,928	24,374	24,374	12,998	12,637
Feed of horses and battery cattle - - - -	82,810	-	39,598	30,446	47,327	-
Medical, including dieting patients - - - -	13,485	24,011	3,618	3,618	2,241	1,973
Clothing, average of two years * - - - -	18,973	22,010	4,804	4,712	2,380	2,307
Barrack, including bedding - - - -	13,800	24,626	3,885	3,885	2,063	2,010
Ordnance charges * - - - -	12,520	19,115	5,902	6,040	4,257	1,741
Miscellaneous, including carriage, proportion of sea transport to and from England after 10 years, bounty and kit money at 110 rupees per man.*	56,650	1,01,090	15,950	15,950	8,470	8,250
Capitation charges, effective and non-effective - -	69,520	1,24,060	19,570	19,570	10,390	10,130
TOTAL - - - Rs.	7,37,802	8,41,579	22,863	1,90,275	1,53,252	79,398
Average deduction for difference between Indian and furlough pay of officers in Europe.*	17,190	14,084	—	—	—	—
Ditto for officers on staff employ* - - -	5,005	7,808	—	—	—	—
Ditto for difference between full and net pay of officers employed in the civil and public works department.*	-	858	—	—	—	—
TOTAL - - - Rs.	22,195	22,750	—	—	—	—
NET TOTAL - - - Rs.	7,15,607	8,18,829	2,22,863	1,90,275	1,53,252	79,398

* Average for all India.

Military Department, Accountant Branch,
1st May 1885.Arthur Broome, Colonel.
Accountant General.

NATIVE ARMY.

STATEMENT showing the Total Annual Cost of the several Branches of the Native Armies of the Three Presidencies.

PARTICULARS OF CHARGES.	One Regiment of Cavalry.	One Regiment of Punjab Cavalry.	One Regiment of Infantry.	One Battery of Light Field Artillery.	One Garrison Company of Artillery.	One Company of Sappers and Miners.
BENGAL PRESIDENCY:						
Regimental pay and allowances, including medical and educational establishments, and native artificers and followers.	Rs. 2,41,322	Rs. 2,52,986	Rs. 1,44,252	Rs. 44,895	Rs. 11,346	Rs. 26,281
Commissariat charges, including victualling and compensation for dearness of provisions.	2,007	2,164	3,084	465	324	465
Feed of horses and battery cattle - - - -	-	-	-	8,272	-	-
Medical, including dieting patients - - - -	1,253	1,525	1,961	272	218	272
Clothing charges - - - - -	-	-	3,674	492	352	492
Barrack ditto - - - - -	579	625	890	134	93	134
Ordnance ditto* - - - - -	1,027	1,107	5,000	4,637	1,174	714
Miscellaneous, including carriage at 12 rupees per man	5,556	5,988	8,554	1,272	900	1,272
TOTAL - - - Rs.	2,51,744	2,64,395	1,67,405	60,439	14,407	29,580
HYDERABAD CONTINGENT:						
Regimental pay and allowances, including medical and educational establishments, and native artificers and followers.	2,87,028	-	1,39,817	39,074	-	-
Commissariat charges, including victualling and compensation for dearness of provisions.	2,505	-	4,070	516	-	-
Feed of horses and battery cattle - - - -	-	-	-	6,099	-	-
Medical, including dieting patients - - - -	1,580	-	2,561	272	-	-
Clothing charges - - - - -	-	-	14,801	1,844	-	-
Barrack ditto - - - - -	3,808	-	6,187	777	-	-
Ordnance ditto - - - - -	1,280	-	6,594	4,637	-	-
TOTAL - - - Rs.	2,96,201	-	1,74,030	53,159	-	-
MADRAS PRESIDENCY:						
Regimental pay and allowances, including medical and educational establishments, and native artificers and followers.	2,83,970	-	2,24,744	-	33,288	35,534
Commissariat charges, including victualling and compensation for dearness of provisions.	15,466	-	28,227	-	4,571	4,914
Feed of horses - - - - -	53,409	-	-	-	-	-
Medical, including dieting patients - - - -	1,092	-	1,976	-	312	364
Clothing charges - - - - -	4,497	-	3,988	-	794	967
Barrack ditto - - - - -	597	-	1,076	-	176	169
Ordnance ditto* - - - - -	1,107	-	5,000	-	1,174	714
Miscellaneous, including carriage at 12 rupees per man	5,148	-	9,252	-	1,512	1,704
TOTAL - - - Rs.	3,65,346	-	2,74,263	-	41,827	44,366
Average deduction for difference between Indian and furlough pay of officers in Europe.	6,858	-	5,542	-	-	-
Average deduction for officers on staff employ - -	10,643	-	30,386	-	-	-
Average deduction for difference between full and net pay of officers employed in the Civil and Public Works Department.	3,456	-	4,435	-	-	-
TOTAL - - - Rs.	20,957	-	40,363	-	-	-
NET TOTAL - - - Rs.	3,44,389	-	2,33,900	-	41,827	44,366
BOMBAY PRESIDENCY:						
Regimental pay and allowances, including medical and educational establishments, and native artificers and followers.	2,63,207	-	1,48,035	-	37,201	28,400
Commissariat charges, including victualling and compensation for dearness of provisions.	22,604	-	32,284	-	3,958	5,246
Medical, including dieting patients - - - -	2,085	-	2,919	-	334	560
Clothing charges - - - - -	-	-	3,918	-	534	763
Barrack ditto - - - - -	750	-	1,068	-	132	177
Ordnance ditto* - - - - -	1,107	-	5,000	-	1,174	714
Miscellaneous, including carriage at 12 rupees per man	6,000	-	8,832	-	1,068	1,452
TOTAL - - - £.	2,95,753	-	2,02,056	-	44,401	37,312

* Average for all India.

Military Department, Accountant Branch,
1st May 1865.Arthur Broome, Colonel,
Accountant General.

EXTRACT from MADRAS MILITARY BUDGET ESTIMATE 1865-66.

ROYAL ARTILLERY.

Head Quarters' Staff of the 17th, 20th, and 23rd Brigades, and Details of the 14th Brigade.

DETAILS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT.

RANKS.	No.	Rate of Pay per Mensm.	Total Pay per Mensm.	Total Pay per Annum.	RANKS.	No.	Rate of Pay per Mensm.	Total Pay per Mensm.	Total Pay per Annum.
		<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>			<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Colonel Commandants.	-	-	-	-	Brought forward	-	-	-	3,55,727 8 8
Colonels	6	1,265 5 -	7,591 14 -	-	<i>Educational Establishment:</i>				
Lieutenant Colonels	9	1,002 4 -	9,020 4 -	-	Monshees	3	30 - -	90 - -	-
Lieutenant Colonels (of 14th Brigade).	2	1,002 4 -	2,004 8 -	-	Allowance to Librarian.	-	8 - -	24 - -	1,368 - -
Lieutenant Colonels on Major's pay.	3	759 3 -	2,277 9 -	-	<i>Subordinate Medical and Fixed Hospital Establishment:</i>				
Adjutants (Second Captains).	3	417 7 8	1,252 7 -	-	(See Recapitulation of European Artillery).				
Quartermasters	3	300 6 2	958 2 6	-	<i>Native Followers:</i>				
Surgeons	3	789 3 -	2,367 9 -	-	Chowdries	3	14 - -	42 - -	-
	20			3,05,668 2 -	Peons	6	6 - -	36 - -	-
Serjeant Majors	3	57 13 9	173 9 3	-	Horse-keepers	12	5 4 -	63 - -	-
Quartermaster Serjeants.	3	50 8 2	151 8 6	-	Grass-cutters	12	4 - -	48 - -	2,268 - -
Orderly-room Clerks	3	36 11 9	110 3 3	-		33			-
Trumpet Majors	3	36 11 9	110 3 3	-		36			-
Armourer Serjeant	1	-	36 11 9	-	<i>Contract Allowances:</i>				
Hospital Serjeants	3	36 11 9	110 3 3	-	Allowance for head and heel ropes.	2	- -	36 - -	-
	16			8,309 7 -	Allowance for repair of saddles	1	- -	18 - -	648 - -
TOTAL Number	45	and Pay per Annum	-	3,13,977 9 -	<i>Add—</i>				
<i>Command, Staff, and Horse Allowances:</i>					<i>For Spare Officers, including Officers' Batteries:</i>				
Brigade command allowance	-	400 - -	1,200 - -	-	Captains	9	433 10 -	3,902 10 -	-
Adjutant's allowance	-	227 - -	681 - -	-	Second Captains	9	417 7 8	3,757 5 -	-
Instructors of Gunnery	-	150 - -	450 - -	-	Lieutenants	18	265 12 -	4,783 8 -	-
Quartermasters	-	85 - -	255 - -	-	Ditto	9	43 5 -	389 13 -	1,53,909 - -
Orderly-room Clerks	-	14 14 6	44 11 6	-	<i>Additional pay for length of service to Surgeons</i>				
Provost Serjeant	-	9 12 9	29 6 3	-	<i>Family allowance to women and children</i>				
Serjeant Instructors of Gunnery.	-	14 14 6	89 7 -	-	TOTAL - - - Rs.				
Hospital Writers	-	10 - -	30 - -	-	5,25,689 8 8				
Horse Allowance	-	30 - -	690 - -	-					
				41,634 9 -					
Carried forward	-	-	-	3,55,727 8 8					

RECAPITULATION.

Total of Head Quarter's Staff of Brigades	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Eleven Light Field Batteries	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,25,689 8 8
One Heavy Battery	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8,90,072 15 4
Ten Garrison Batteries	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	61,930 10 -
										4,23,892 6 6
Add—										19,01,585 8 6
Pay and Allowances of two Veterinary Surgeons for Field Batteries	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9,486 - -
Ditto - ditto - of two Riding Masters for Field Brigades	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8,293 - -
Pay of Non-commissioned Officers of Local Detail	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8,836 - -
										19,28,200 8 6
Deduct—										
For Pay of Officers in Europe, &c. :-										
<i>In Europe:</i>										
5 Colonels.										
1 Lieutenant Colonel (as Major)										
8 Captains.										
10 Second Captains.										
6 Lieutenants.										
5 Lieutenants.										
<i>On Staff Employ:</i>										
1 Colonel.										
2 Lieutenant Colonels.										
1 Captain.										
4 Second Captains.										
6 Lieutenants.										
1 Lieutenant.										
<i>In Civil Employ:</i>										
2 Lieutenant Colonels.										
2 Captains.										
3 Second Captains.										
3 Lieutenants.										
1 Lieutenant.										
TOTAL per Annum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Rs. 3,51,160 4 -

ROYAL ARTILLERY—continued.

TEN GARRISON BATTERIES.

Detail of the Establishment of One Battery.

RANKS.	Nos.	Rate of Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Annum.
		<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Captain - -	1	- - -	433 10 -	- - -
2nd Captain - -	1	- - -	417 7 8	- - -
Lieutenants - -	2	265 12 -	531 8 -	- - -
Lieutenant - -	1	- - -	213 5 -	- - -
	5			19,151 - -
Staff Serjeant - -	1	- - -	50 8 2	- - -
Serjeants - -	4	36 11 9	146 15 -	- - -
Trumpeter - -	1	- - -	24 7 10	- - -
Ditto - -	1	- - -	13 12 5	- - -
Corporals - -	4	26 15 -	107 12 -	- - -
Bombardiers - -	4	24 7 10	97 15 4	- - -
Gunners - -	60	13 12 5	826 9 -	- - -
	75			15,215 13 -
TOTAL Number - -	80	And Pay per Annum -		34,366 13 -
Add—				
Five day's Pay for Non-Commissioned Officers and Men				211 5 3
<i>Command and Staff Allowances:</i>				
Battery command allowance -	-	-	30 - -	- - -
Pay serjeant and savings' bank clerk.	-	-	7 - -	- - -
Mess allowance - -	-	-	40 - -	- - -
				924 - -
<i>Native Followers:</i>				
Tindal - -	1	- - -	7 8 -	- - -
Store Lascars - -	6	6 - -	36 - -	- - -
Lascars - -	2	5 12 -	11 8 -	- - -
Puckallies - -	2	2 9 -	18 - -	- - -
Sweepers - -	2	4 - -	8 - -	- - -
	13			972 - -
<i>Contract Allowances:</i>				
Allowance for repair of arms -	-	-	30 - -	- - -
" " Petty stores - -	-	-	- 12 -	- - -
				369 - -
TOTAL for One Battery per Annum - - - <i>Rs.</i>				36,843 - -
TOTAL for Ten Batteries per Annum - - - <i>Rs.</i>				3,68,431 6 6
Add—				
Colonial allowance for officers - - -	-	-	-	15,120 - -
Allowance for educational establishment	-	-	-	540 - -
Family allowance to women and children	-	-	-	23,905 - -
Good conduct allowance - - -	-	-	-	13,200 - -
Good shooting allowance - - -	-	-	-	560 - -
				4,21,756 6 6
<i>For Mountain Train Battery at Tounghoo:</i>				
Nineteen artificers and followers	-	-	-	1,848 - -
Contract allowances - - -	-	-	-	288 - -
TOTAL - - - <i>Rs.</i>				4,23,892 6 6

ROYAL ARTILLERY DIVISIONS.

RANKS.	Nos.	Rate of Staff Pay per Mensem.	Total Staff Pay per Mensem.	Total Staff Pay per Annum.
		<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
<i>Command and Staff Allowances:</i>				
Commandant - -	1	- - -	300 - -	- - -
Ditto - -	1	- - -	200 - -	- - -
Adjutants - -	3	18 5 -	543 15 -	- - -
Serjeant Majors - -	2	14 14 6	29 13 -	- - -
Quartermaster serjeant.	1	- - -	14 14 6	- - -
Serjeants - -	5	10 - -	50 - -	- - -
	13			13,663 14 -
Additional Staff Allowances (detail not available) - -				4,410 11 -
TOTAL per Annum - - - <i>Rs.</i>				18,074 9 -

RECAPITULATION OF ROYAL ARTILLERY.

	Royal Horse Artillery.	Royal Artillery.	Royal Artillery Divisions.	TOTAL.
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Pay of Officers - - -	2,19,441 15 -	9,70,536 2 -	- - -	11,89,978 1 -
Deduct—				
For pay of officers in Europe, &c. - - -	46,621 14 -	3,51,160 4 -	- - -	3,97,782 2 -
	1,72,820 1 -	6,19,375 14 -	- - -	7,92,195 15 -
Pay of non-commissioned officers, rank and file - - -	1,43,226 4 6	5,13,816 10 6	- - -	6,57,042 15 -
Pay of Educational establishment - - -	756 - -	5,208 - -	- - -	5,964 - -
Pay of Subordinate medical and fixed hospital establishments:—				
Pay of 4 Second apothecaries, at <i>Rs.</i> 126 5 - each per mensem -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
18 Assistant ditto, at " 70 - - " " - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
2 Second dressers, at " 24 8 - " " - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
117 Servants, at various rates - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	2,503 - -
141				
Pay of native artificers and followers - - -	74,600 4 10	1,70,691 3 -	- - -	2,45,291 7 10
Command, staff and horse allowances - - -	49,799 7 -	1,01,682 9 -	18,074 9 -	1,69,556 9 -
Contract allowances - - -	40,044 - -	81,426 - -	- - -	1,21,470 - -
Family allowances to women and children - - -	12,960 - -	54,670 - -	- - -	67,630 - -
Good conduct allowance - - -	7,320 - -	29,040 - -	- - -	36,360 - -
Good shooting allowance - - -	370 - -	1,130 - -	- - -	1,500 - -
TOTAL - - - <i>Rs.</i>	5,01,896 1 4	15,77,040 4 6	18,074 9 -	21,29,513 14 10

INFANTRY.

NATIVE INFANTRY (FORTY REGIMENTS).

Detail of the Establishment of One Regiment of Eight Companies.

RANKS.	Numbers.	Rate of Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Annum.	RANKS.	Numbers.	Rate of Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Annum.
		<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>			<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
Colonel - - -	1	- - -	1,002 4 -	-			Brought forward - - -	- - -	2,13,427 - -
Lieutenant Colonel - - -	1	- - -	759 3 -	-	<i>Native Followers :</i>				
Major - - -	7	415 6 -	2,907 10 -	-	Chowdry - - -	1	- - -	14 - -	-
Captains - - -	11	256 10 -	2,822 14 -	-	Puckallies - - -	8	10 11 10	85 14 8	-
Lieutenants - - -	5	202 12 5	1,013 14 1	-	Peons - - -	2	6 - -	12 - -	-
Ensigns - - -	1	- - -	800 - -	-	Second Tindal - - -	1	- - -	7 - -	-
Surgeon - - -	1	- - -	450 - -	-	Lascars - - -	8	6 5 4	50 10 8	-
Assistant Surgeon - - -	1	- - -	- - -	-	Toties - - -	2	7 - -	14 - -	-
	27			1,17,069 13 -		22			2,203 - -
Surgeon Major - - -	1	- - -	64 - -	-	<i>Contract Allowances :</i>				
Quartermaster Serjeant - - -	1	- - -	57 15 11	-	Allowance for repair of Arms	20 - -	160 - -	- -	-
	2			1,463 16 -					1,920 - -
Subadars, 1st Class	2	100 - -	200 - -	-	TOTAL for One Regiment per Annum - - - <i>Rs.</i>				
Ditto, 2nd "	2	80 - -	160 - -	-					2,17,550 - -
Ditto, 3rd "	4	67 - -	268 - -	-	TOTAL for Forty Regiments per Annum - - - <i>Rs.</i>				
Jemadars, 1st "	4	35 - -	140 - -	-					87,02,000 - -
Ditto, 2nd "	4	30 - -	120 - -	-	Add—				
Havildars - - -	41	14 - -	574 - -	-	Pay, &c., of three additional Lieutenant Colonels	-	-	-	37,161 - -
Naicks - - -	40	12 - -	480 - -	-	Pay and Allowances of Officers doing duty :—				
Drummers - - -	16	11 - -	176 - -	-	From Staff Corps	-	-	-	-
Privates - - -	600	7 - -	4,200 - -	-	From General List Infantry, and Cadres of old Corps.	-	-	-	-
Recruit and pension boys.	56	3 8 -	196 - -	-	1 Lieutenant Colonel	-	-	-	-
	769			78,168 - -	13 Captains	-	-	-	-
TOTAL Number	798	And Pay per Annum	-	1,96,701 12 -	12 Lieutenants	-	-	-	-
<i>Command, Staff, and Horse Allowance :</i>					1 Lieutenant Colonel	-	-	-	-
Regimental Command - - -	-	- - -	400 - -	-	8 Majors	-	-	-	-
Company Allowance - - -	-	30 - -	240 - -	-	28 Captains	-	-	-	-
Adjutant's ditto - - -	-	- - -	192 7 -	-	132 Lieutenants	-	-	-	-
Quartermaster and Interpreter	-	- - -	132 - -	-	Additional pay for length of service of Surgeons and Assistant Surgeons.				
Subadar Major - - -	-	- - -	25 - -	-					36,600 - -
Havildar Major - - -	-	- - -	10 - -	-	Colonial Allowance for Officers of two Regiments serving in the Straits Settlement.				
Native Adjutants - - -	-	- - -	17 8 -	-					38,760 - -
Colour Havildars - - -	-	2 - -	16 - -	-	Additional Jemadar for carrying honorary colour of 20th Native Infantry.				
Orderly Havildars - - -	-	1 13 10	14 14 8	-					420 - -
Drum Major - - -	-	- - -	5 13 4	-	Batta for Men serving in the Pegu Division and Straits Settlement.				
Fife Major - - -	-	- - -	5 13 4	-					1,12,221 - -
Drill Havildars - - -	-	- - -	5 4 -	-	Medical Establishment serving in ditto				
Drill Naiques - - -	-	- - -	3 8 -	-					1,180 - -
Mess Allowance - - -	-	- - -	120 - -	-	Batta to Native Followers for ditto				
Horse Allowance to Field Officers.	-	30 - -	60 - -	-					3,024 - -
				14,979 4 -	Band Allowance for 36 regiments				
<i>Educational Establishment :</i>									43,200 - -
Moonshee - - -	1	- - -	30 - -	-	Family Allowance				
Allowance for Regimental School.	-	- - -	21 - -	-					21,354 - -
	1			612 - -	Good Conduct Allowance				
<i>Subordinate Medical Establishments :</i>									3,08,712 - -
Assistant Apothecary	1	- - -	70 - -	-	Deduct—				
Second Dresser - - -	1	- - -	24 8 -	-	For Pay of Officers in Europe, &c. :—				
	2			1,134 - -	<i>In Europe :</i>				
Carried forward	-	- - -	- - -	2,13,427 - -	6 Lt. Colonels.	19 Majors.	5 Lt. Colonels.	-	-
					5 Majors.	137 Captains.	1 Major.	-	-
					26 Captains.	65 Lieutenants.	7 Captains.	-	-
					30 Lieutenants.	15 Lieutenants.	-	-	-
					<i>In Civil Employ :</i>				
					1 Lieutenant Colonel.	1 Lieutenant Colonel.	-	-	-
					21 Captains.	130 Lieutenants.	-	-	-
					40 Lieutenants.	200 Ensigns.	-	-	-
						19 Surgeons.	-	-	-
						18 Assistant Surgeons.	-	-	-
					TOTAL per Annum - - - <i>Rs.</i>				
									63,55,800 - -

ARMY AND GARRISON STAFF.

	Budget Estimate 1865-66.		Budget Estimate 1865-66.
	<i>Rs. a. p.</i>		<i>Rs. a. p.</i>
<i>Divisional and Brigade Staff :</i>		<i>General Staff :</i>	
General Officer Commanding Division - - -	44,500 5 4	Deputy Adjutant General - - -	21,035 - -
Aide-de-Camp - - -	5,918 15 -	Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General - - -	9,468 12 9
Brigadier General, 1st Class - - -	25,800 8 -		
Ditto - - - 2nd " - - -	24,439 - -	<i>Garrison and Station Staff :</i>	
Assistant Adjutant General - - -	11,557 12 10	Senior Officer in Command - - -	6,000 - -
Brigade Major - - -	11,546 5 4	Fort and Town Adjutant - - -	13,655 - -
Office allowance to Assistant Adjutant General - - -	2,040 - -		
Office allowance to Brigade Major - - -	2,040 - -		

Appendix (J.)

STATEMENTS put in by Mr. *De Fonblanque*.

SCHEDULE II.

App. No. 13. STATEMENT showing the Estimated Cost of Services and Supplies for Maintaining a Force in Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File of 203 Royal Artillery, 800 European Infantry, 816 Native Infantry, and 89 Gun Lascars.

	£.
A. Upkeep and repair of Barracks -	5,000
B. Barrack furniture and equipment -	4,000
C. Hospital diets and equipment -	3,000
D. Provisions, including rice to native troops -	16,000
E. Local transport -	1,000
F. Ordnance charges -	2,500
G. Native Pensions -	8,000
H. Clothing -	4,770
I. Travelling and incidental -	2,000
J. Dépôts and recruiting -	5,667
K. Non-effectives -	9,027
L. Sea Transport -	9,027
M. Miscellaneous home charges -	1,600
	<hr/>
	71,591
See Schedule I. { Administrative -	22,333
{ Regimental Charges -	66,070
	<hr/>
	£. 159,994

(D.)

Provisions. £. 16,000.

The average annual expenditure under this head for the last three years gave about 13*l.* 10*s.* for the provisioning of each European, and 2*l.* 10*s.* for the rice of each native soldier.

The contemplated reduction of the more remote outstations will lead to some saving in the expenditure for rice, and there should be some saving effected in the provisioning of the European troops by a better system of supply and distribution under an organised imperial commissariat. On the other hand there will be some additional cost incurred by the proposed improvement in the European soldier's rations, and it may be assumed that there will be a progressive increase rather than decrease in the cost of most provisions.

The estimated rates, namely 13*l.* 18*s.* 6*d.* for each European, and 2*l.* 5*s.* for each native soldier should be fully sufficient to cover these charges.

(E.)

Local Transport. £. 1,000.

The average annual cost of moving troops by land and sea within the command.

(F.)

Ordnance Charges. £. 2,500.

The cost and freight of military stores of all descriptions, including gunpowder, and upkeep of all stores in the custody of the military storekeepers.

(G.)

Native Pensions. £. 8,000.

This is quoted at nearly 1,000*l.* in excess of the present native pension list, in order to meet the amount of pensions and gratuities which will become payable in consequence of the discharge of Ceylon Riflemen to bring their numbers down to 800.

Should the scheme of two companies of Malays to garrison Singapore, with the view to forming a recruiting dépôt be carried out, the number of discharges will be considerably less, but under any circumstances a large number of men in the Ceylon Rifles will very soon have to be pensioned.

I would not transfer the liability of the native pension list from the Colonial to the Imperial Government, since it is only through colonial agency that the identification and payment of pensioners who are scattered all over the island could be efficiently carried out. The sum of 8,000*l.* would not therefore form a part of the colonial contributions, but is included in my estimates in order to indicate the actual outlay to be incurred by the colony.

(A.)

Repairs and Upkeep of Barrack. £. 5,000.

This charge is computed to cover all repairs to barracks, hospitals, and magazines, as well as existing works, to maintain them in proper condition, and to meet unforeseen charges for temporary engineer establishments.

£. 30,000 is already voted for new constructions, and this sum will probably not be absorbed within the next four years, by which time the proceeds of military land ceded to the colony will, it is believed, be more than sufficient to meet the expenses of further new works and buildings.

(B.)

Purchase and Repair of Barrack Furniture. £. 4,000.

This sum is calculated on the scale of barrack equipment and furniture authorised by the War Office regulations, and includes freight of stores of this description sent from England; also cost of fuel and light for the troops.

(C.)

Hospital Diets and Equipments. £. 3,000.

This sum represents the cost of dieting the sick in Hospital and of cost and upkeep of Hospital furniture, equipment and clothing of all descriptions. The computation is based upon the actual expenditure of last year, and on the scale of equipment authorised by War Office regulations as far as it is applicable to this climate.

(H.)

Clothing. £. 4,770.

The average annual cost of clothing is computed at 2*l.* 10*s.* per man.

In the abstract of military expenditure in Ceylon, which accompanied the Colonial Office letter of October 1863, the colony is assessed at 13,000*l.* a year, under the head of "arms, clothing, recruiting expenses, depôts, &c." This estimate is based on a force of 2,634 non-commissioned officers, and rank and file of European and native troops, of which 1,118 are European, and 1,516 are natives.

The cost of clothing for this force at the above rate would give 6,685*l.*, leaving a balance of 6,315*l.* for recruiting expenses, depôts, &c., which charge is carried forward under head J.

The charge for clothing of the proposed force at 2*l.* 10*s.* a man, gives a total of 4,770*l.*

(I.)

Travelling Expenses, &c. £. 2,000.

This includes in addition to travelling expenses of officers, office contingencies, postage, stationery, printing, &c.

Ceylon, November 1865.

(J.)

Recruiting and Depôts. £ 5,667.

As shown under heading H., the sum of 6,315*l.* appears as the charge due for recruiting and depôt expenses for an European force of 1,118 men, giving about 5*l.* 13*s.* per man.

This rate on the reduced European force proposed, gives a total of 5,667*l.*

(K. and L.)

Non-effectives and Sea Transport. £18,054.

The sum of 10,000*l.* is charged in the abstract referred to under each of these heads for the force quoted, and applies to European troops only, giving about 9*l.* per man for each service, or for the force now proposed, a total of 9,027*l.* under each head.

(M.)

Miscellaneous. £. 1,600.

The sum charged under this heading in the abstract referred to, was quoted at 2,000*l.* for a force in excess, by 726 men, of that now proposed; and a reduction of 400*l.* under this head would therefore appear reasonable.

SCHEDULE III.

STATEMENT showing the Total Estimated Cost and the Capitation Rates due under each Head of Service for the Maintenance of a Military Force of 1,908 Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File in Artillery, European Infantry, Native Infantry, and Gun Lascars.

Reference to detailed Statement.	Services or Supplies.	Charges.	Royal Artillery.	European Infantry.	Native Infantry.	Gun Lascars
		£.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
For details see Schedule II.	Upkeep and repair of barracks - - - - -	5,000	2 12 5	2 12 5	2 12 5	2 12 5
	Barrack furniture and equipment, and fuel and light - - - - -	4,000	2 2 -	2 2 -	2 2 -	2 2 -
	Hospital diets and equipment - - - - -	3,000	2 7 10	2 7 10	- 13 3	- 13 3
	Provisions, including rice to native troops - - - - -	16,000	13 18 6	13 18 6	2 5 -	2 5 -
	Local transport - - - - -	1,000	- 10 6	- 10 6	- 10 6	- 10 6
	Ordnance charges - - - - -	2,500	1 6 3	1 6 3	1 6 3	1 6 3
	Native pensions - - - - -	8,000	- - -	- - -	8 16 10	8 16 10
	Clothing - - - - -	4,770	2 10 -	2 10 -	2 10 -	2 10 -
	Travelling and incidental - - - - -	2,000	1 1 -	1 1 -	1 1 -	1 1 -
	Depôts and recruiting - - - - -	5,667	5 13 -	5 13 -	- - -	- - -
	Non-effective services - - - - -	9,027	9 - -	9 - -	- - -	- - -
	Sea transport - - - - -	9,027	9 - -	9 - -	- - -	- - -
	Miscellaneous home charges - - - - -	1,600	- 16 10	- 16 10	- 16 10	- 16 10
	TOTAL for Services and Supplies - - - £.	71,501	50 18 4	50 18 4	22 14 1	22 14 1
See Schedule I.	Staff and departments - - - - -	22,333	11 14 1	11 14 1	11 14 1	11 14 1
	Regimental charges - - - - -	66,070	51 9 6	36 14 3	30 1 7	19 2 -
	TOTAL Expenditure - - - £.	159,904	114 1 11	99 6 8	64 9 9	53 10 2

RECAPITULATION.

Royal Artillery, 203 at 114 <i>l.</i> 1 <i>s.</i> 11 <i>d.</i>	- - - - -	£.	23,161
European Infantry, 800 at 99 <i>l.</i> 6 <i>s.</i> 8 <i>d.</i>	- - - - -		79,467
Native Infantry, 816 at 64 <i>l.</i> 9 <i>s.</i> 9 <i>d.</i>	- - - - -		52,622
Gun Lascars, 89 at 53 <i>l.</i> 10 <i>s.</i> 2 <i>d.</i>	- - - - -		4,762
TOTAL for 1,908 { Non-Commissioned Officers Rank and File }	- - - £.		160,012

It must be borne in mind that any increase in the numbers quoted will decrease the capitation charges under the head of Staff and Departments, while any reductions in the above numbers will increase those rates; the amount chargeable under those heads being invariable, and requiring to be spread over whatever number of troops are maintained. The capitation rate of Native Infantry and Gun Lascars will be reduced by 8*l.* 16*s.* 10*d.* if the Colony undertakes the charge for native pensions.

Ceylon, November 1865.

E. B. de Fonblanque.

App. No. 13.

Appendix (K.)

STATEMENT put in by Mr. De Fonblanque.

STATEMENT showing the Comparative Cost [under the Head of Regimental Pay and Allowances only] of a given Military Force in each of the Three Indian Presidencies, and in Ceylon.

Nos.	Description of Forces.	Ceylon.		Bengal.		Madras.		Bombay.	
		Regimental Charges.	Capitation Rate.	Regimental Charges.	Capitation Rate.	Regimental Charges.	Capitation Rate.	Regimental Charges.	Capitation Rate.
		£.	£. s. d.	£.	£. s. d.	£.	£. s. d.	£.	£. s. d.
1,000	European Infantry - -	36,712	36 14 3	41,488	41 9 9	48,000	48 - -	40,450	40 9 -
200	Ditto Artillery - -	10,295	51 9 6	10,400	52 - -	11,360	56 16 -	10,880	54 8 -
1,000	Native Infantry - -	30,079	30 1 7	20,133	20 2 8	20,017	20 4 -	20,100	20 2 -
100	Gun Bascars or native sappers and miners.	1,900	19 2 -	2,500	25 - -	2,650	26 10 -	1,315	23 3 -
	TOTAL Regimental Charges	78,986	- -	74,521	- -	91,027	- -	72,745	-

The foregoing calculations as regards Indian troops are based on the rates of pay and regimental allowances granted to them while serving in their own Presidencies. They would probably require a higher rate of pay if employed in Ceylon. Were the command of the forces in Ceylon placed under one of the Indian Presidencies, an officer below the rank of Major General might command on the spot and some reduction under the head of Staff and Departments could thus be contemplated, but, on the other hand, the staff allowances in India are very much higher than those in Ceylon, which would moreover have to bear its share of the general administration in India (*see* Table annexed). Under the head of services and supplies (Schedule II.) the same sums would be chargeable against an Indian as against the present force. A large saving could only be effected by the employment of an Indian force, on the supposition that a smaller number of troops would suffice to garrison Ceylon, if that colony were made a military dependency of one of the Indian Presidencies, and could therefore rely upon reinforcements being more speedily thrown into the island, on an emergency, than they would be, if required to be drawn from England. In the event of this scheme being carried out, a heavy charge would fall on the colony for the pensions to the Ceylon Rifle Regiment on its disbandment, unless arrangements could be made for transferring the services of that corps to some other command; but in the comparative statement the question of pensions has been left out of account.

E. B. De Fonblanque.

ANNEXURE.

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT of the Cost of Military Administrative Establishments maintained in the Three Indian Presidencies, and in Ceylon.

DEPARTMENTS.	Bengal Military Force in Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File, 111,438.	Madras Military Force in Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File, 48,940.	Bombay Military Force in Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File, 39,685.	Ceylon proposed Military Force in Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File, 1,908.
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1 Military Staff - - - - -	245,278	122,608	124,491	} 5,450
2 Administrative Staff - - - - -	98,652	50,352	49,236	
3 Commissariat - - - - -	191,014	65,227	63,133	3,774
4 Clothing - - - - -	7,903	4,626	3,929	-
5 Barracks - - - - -	75,549	17,744	11,526	-
6 Military Law - - - - -	19,342	14,393	8,700	-
7 Medical - - - - -	169,995	75,336	54,250	4,356
8 Ordnance - - - - -	108,183	81,614	75,222	3,696
9 Chaplains - - - - -	12,672	5,316	5,779	1,000
10 Educational - - - - -	24,570	7,135	4,418	-
TOTAL - - -	953,158	444,351	400,684	18,276
Add for Royal Engineers - - -	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000
TOTAL - - -	957,158	448,351	404,684	22,276
Average rate per Man - - -	£. s. d. 8 11 9	£. s. d. 9 3 2	£. s. d. 10 4 -	£. s. d. 11 14 1

The Barrack Department is included under the head Ordnance.

Appendix, No. 14.

PAPER received from the INDIA OFFICE.

MEMORANDUM on the Employment of NATIVE TROOPS from INDIA in the COLONIES.

I DOUBT the expediency of employing, to any extent, native troops from India in the Colonies, except under urgent and exceptional circumstances; and, in speaking of the Colonies, I allude to Ceylon, China, the Mauritius, Aden, and the South Coast of Africa. Our other possessions are, on account of climate, the length of voyage which they involve, and for other and obvious reasons, utterly unsuited as places in which to locate natives of Hindustan, and need not be discussed.

Every one who is acquainted with the natives of India is aware of their dislike to any protracted period of service at such a distance from their homes as not to admit of their visiting them, from time to time, at no very lengthy intervals. Even a short service in Lower Bengal and Assam is to a native of Upper India exceedingly distasteful; and to a sea voyage the Hindoos have an almost insuperable objection. This is not so much the case with the Mahomedans, whose manner of living is different, and consequently, while on board ship, they avoid many of the privations which the religion of the Hindoo compels him to undergo.

In the last war in China, the experiment of sending native troops from India to take a part in it was a success. But we must not be led into the error of believing that this has established a safe precedent; on the contrary, the case was, I think, entirely exceptional. The troops were quite newly raised and organised, they had acquired none of the prejudices and vices of the old Bengal army; they had a firm belief in the power and absolute will of the officers commanding them, and had not then learnt to look beyond him for redress of their grievances; they had just seen the old mutinous Bengal army scattered to the winds by the persistent courage of the British, and they were ready to have eaten the obnoxious cartridges of 1857 had they been ordered to do so.

In such a frame of mind, they were invited to go to China; the wishes of their officers were in most cases their wishes; they volunteered, and went on remarkably liberal terms. They had, I believe, Indian pay, batta, and free rations, and in the case of the two cavalry regiments, their horses were exchanged for Government stud-bred and Colonial horses, which they were afterwards allowed to retain. While in China they were employed in a campaign where they met just such an enemy, and just as much opposition from him, as suited them, and they acquired a considerable amount of plunder.

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They lived chiefly on the Government rations, saving most of their pay, and at the end of two years they returned to India, each with a considerable sum of money. Indeed, since the return of the troops so employed, so much have the tales of the wealth they brought been circulated and exaggerated among other regiments, that I believe, if another native force were now called for to proceed to China on similar terms, one-half of the Bengal army would volunteer for the service.

Very different would be the case of a regiment sent to a Colony in a time of peace. Devoid of all such continued change and excitement, without the opportunities of acquiring wealth; alone among foreigners, and confined to the dull routine of garrison duty for a lengthened period, they would, I think, be likely to become sullen and discontented, and, if not carefully managed, would probably proceed to some overt act which military discipline could not overlook; and on their relief and return to India would probably disseminate such reports as to their treatment as would induce others to decline to proceed on the same duty.

If, however, the experiment be tried, new regiments will have to be raised for the purpose, as the present native army is now probably at as low a strength as it is convenient to maintain it at; and though some consider that by arming the native soldier with a more effective weapon, such as a breech-loading rifle, that their number may be still further reduced. Yet I hold to a different opinion, and think that, for political reasons, they should never be entrusted with a better fire-arm than they now possess, which is sufficiently good for all ordinary purposes; and with reference to possible future events, it must be borne in mind that if we have to oppose Europeans in India, they must be met (to be met successfully) with a force in which the native army would form an extremely small proportion; perhaps the only exception it might be advisable to make in regard to arming them with a better class of fire-arm, would be in the case of some of the regiments or companies of the Punjab Frontier Force, who, from the peculiar kind of warfare in which it is occasionally employed, might be advantageously supplied with a better weapon.

It would not be necessary to give any regiment raised for the purpose of Colonial employ a larger proportion of European officers than corps on the irregular system now have; but they should be especially selected for the purpose. Indeed it would be essential to a prospect of success, that the English officers attached to such corps should be men thoroughly acquainted with the

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Probably the best method of forming such regiments would be by calling for volunteers from the commissioned and non-commissioned grades forming the present native army: each man so volunteering should receive a step in rank by promotion to a superior grade; the regiment should then be completed by recruiting; Belooches, Pathans, Afghans, Mussulmans, and Seikhs are best fitted for the purpose; Brahmins and Rajpoots I would exclude altogether.

Assuming that it is not intended that any native force should garrison or occupy any foreign station alone, but that they should be associated with and supplement British troops, I think that they should never be in a greater proportion than one-half to the number of Europeans. Circumstances might occur in which a large number would be likely to cause embarrassment.

As regards the length of time which they should remain on foreign service, I think that, with reference to the fact that while absent from India they could neither have the indulgence of furlough or leave, three years should not be exceeded.

In speaking of the European officers, I have omitted to observe that, if officers of the Indian army are employed on this duty, they will, I presume, draw Indian pay and allowances, in which case the anomaly will be presented of the officer attached to the native troops drawing a very superior rate of pay, while the officer belonging to one of Her Majesty's British regiments is confined to Colonial pay and allowances.

I have said that I doubt the success of the experiment of supplying the Colonies with native troops, and feel assured that it will be a duty

that will never be popular; but if it is to be tried, it should at first be in a very small way, with a regiment raised for the purpose; and at the time of its formation, every care should be taken that the men thoroughly understand for what purpose, and on what terms, they are enlisted; their pay, pension, clothing, any extra allowances, or rations, duration of foreign service, arrangements for their family remittances; whether barracks provided, or hutting money in lieu thereof; all should be explained and made clear to them, and every possible contingency provided for as far as practicable.

It was, I believe, a neglect of such precautions that caused the passive mutiny and consequent disbandment of the Seikh corps which was raised and sent to Ceylon, either in 1862 or 1863. In that case the men believed they were enlisted to do the duty of soldiers, but, on arrival, their arms were taken from them, and they were set to work in gangs on the roads; they refused, and were disbanded, and sent back to Calcutta at a considerable cost to Government. The men's complaint was "that they enlisted to serve Government as soldiers, but that, when they arrived in Ceylon, they wanted to make coolies of them."

In conclusion, I would urge that the strictest faith be kept with a regiment, and that no exigencies should induce the Government to keep it longer on foreign service than the time assigned it at its departure from India, and that, on its return, it should be sent to a good up-country station, and a liberal allowance of furlough extended to it.

(signed) *T. F. Wilson,*

Lieut.-Col., 7th Bengal Cavalry.

11 June 1867.

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PAPER handed in by Major General *Balfour*, C.B., Royal Artillery, 26 July 1867.

LETTER addressed to the Secretary of the Government of India, in the Military Department, as to the Employment of NATIVE SOLDIERS ON FOREIGN SERVICE ON DUTIES which might be performed by POLICEMEN.

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(No. 566 A.)

From Colonel *Balfour*, Chief of the Military Finance Department of India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

Sir,

Calcutta, 6 August 1861.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your docket, No. 191, dated 26th February 1861, forwarding, in original, a letter and its enclosure from the Government of Madras (as per margin), submitting various proposals connected with the rationing and dieting of native and European troops on duty in Pegu and the Straits of Malacca. These propositions I proceed to review seriatim; and I trust Government will excuse the length to which my remarks extend, in consideration of the important bearing of these points on the health, efficiency, and cost of troops employed on foreign service.

Herewith returned

From Government of Madras,
No. 2022, dated 1st June 1860.

To Lieut. General Sir J. H. Grant,
Commanding in China,
No. 62, dated 3rd July 1860.

From Government of Madras,
No. 400, dated 31st January 1861.

2. With regard to the proposition to sanction an establishment of cooks, for the hospital service of native regiments serving in Burmah and the Straits Settlement, I submit that I am opposed to any such addition to Government establishments; not only as entailing an increased, and I fear, unlimited expenditure on the State, but also as tending to obstruct the working of an efficient regimental system of control, which, whilst establishing a certain extent of supervision, yet leaves soldiers to act for themselves, thus encouraging in them that feeling of self-reliance so necessary to their complete efficiency.

3. I think it would be both more economical to Government and more advantageous to the soldiers, if, by means of a small grant from Government, to be laid out under regimental arrangements, convenient cooking places could be provided; so divided as to admit of separate rooms being given to different castes. This arrangement should be supplemented by a small allowance granted to each regiment, for maintaining cooks, to prepare under strict and economical regimental arrangements, food for men who are sick or absent on duty. The exact amount expended by the State on this account would be known, and the money would also, I think, be better applied than if Government provided an establishment of servants.

4. The great point is, however, to induce commanding and other officers to look carefully after the comforts of their men, when serving beyond seas. On such service, native soldiers need the greatest attention in respect to food, fully as much as European soldiers; and this attention invariably produces results highly favourable to the service. This is well known to those who have served beyond seas with natives; but the system prevailing in the continent of India, of abstaining from all interference in this respect, renders it difficult for officers, who have not had this experience, to realise the necessity for their looking to these arrangements for native soldiers when on foreign service.

5. One great difficulty connected with native troops on foreign service, is their propensity to sell the food provided for them by Government, and purchase inferior articles, as stated in the report of the Inspector General of Hospitals, forwarded to me; and it is well known that they often starve themselves, in order to hoard up money obtained by the sale of their rations.

6. This fact establishes the necessity of a reform in the present system of allowing native soldiers, on foreign service, to prepare their food without proper supervision. Great care is now taken by Government in respect to the food issued to native soldiers being of a good kind, and in proper quantities, and officers should always do their part to secure the good results that should follow on this liberal treatment, by taking care that the soldiers make a proper use of the articles supplied for keeping them in health and fit for duty. Regular hours should be established for native soldiers to cook; suitable places being provided for that purpose, and care taken to ascertain that the rations are properly cooked, and consumed by the men, not being otherwise disposed of, either before or after cooking.

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7. Attention to cooking, and care to prevent food being sold, would lessen disease and mortality; and any small additional expense that may be incurred by Government in aid of this object, in the way of providing cooking places, would be amply repaid by saving in the large sums at present paid for passage from the eastward, for sick native soldiers, and in the pensions, now granted to many who are sent to the coast as worn out, and to the heirs of those who die, mainly in consequence of this system of starvation, or use of inferior food.

8. I observe that the Madras Government have now ordered a diet for native soldiers in hospital on foreign service; and would suggest that the Government of India should call for a report on the advantages resulting therefrom, to be submitted as early as possible; the measures taken to see to the efficient application of the supplies, being also stated.

9. But whilst thus dwelling strongly on the necessity of preventing the selling of rations, as inducing sickness and death amongst native soldiers on foreign service, I would wish also to see other evils leading to the same results fully inquired into; such as the exposure and excessive amount of duty to which native soldiers beyond seas are very frequently, nay, generally subjected, which are a prolific source of disease and death, and induce dislike to foreign service.

10. The papers sent for report show, that guards are often posted at very considerable distances from the soldiers' lines. At Singapore, no less than three miles off, so that the men have to go a long way for their food; and it is even sometimes impossible to allow them to leave their guards from the time they mount, until relieved.

11. I believe further that it is the practice to employ the native soldiers at Singapore and other places beyond seas so constantly as to give them only every other night in bed; and sometimes not even that. The result is, their health is seriously affected, and their desire to remain in the service diminished, whilst their craving to return to their native country is naturally increased; and not only is expense constantly incurred in sending men backwards and forwards, but the pension list is constantly augmenting. In order to show the extent of this evil, I would advise returns being obtained from the Madras Government, showing the number of men who have, during any one year of the past few years, been sent back to Madras from a few regiments in the Straits, Pegu, and Tenasserim; stating the strength of each regiment on embarking, the additions subsequently made to it, distinguishing recruits and recovered men sent to rejoin the corps, as also the number of deaths, and the numbers invalided and pensioned.

12. It is, I believe, well understood that measures tending to increase the comfort of the soldier greatly increase the popularity of the service, whilst a proportionate distaste for the service is engendered by over-work; and of late, as Government are aware, the difficulties experienced in recruiting for the Madras army have greatly increased, owing to the heavy service beyond seas, imposed on the coast army. Whilst advocating on financial grounds a great reduction of the force at present located beyond seas, I think that every effort should be made still further to reduce the military expenditure of those provinces, by adopting measures calculated to diminish to the utmost, sickness and pensioning, among the native soldiers that must be retained there.

13. One obvious measure is to relieve them as far as possible from many fatiguing duties of distant guards, on which they are now employed. It is no doubt a wise economy to attend to the wants of the soldier so as to keep him as far as possible in health, and recover him as soon as possible from sickness; but at the same time care should be taken to avoid the exposure and overtasking which forces men into hospital, and leads to their being constantly 80 or 100 sick out of a regiment of 760, whilst, with due precautions, there need be only an average of about 20 sick.

14. I deferentially submit, as an opinion, that the Straits Government should be called on to maintain a police force in sufficient strength to allow of the native soldiers being freed from all the guard duties now universally recognised as properly belonging to police; and even when on duty as a military body, the soldiers should be entirely freed from duties of watch and ward. I do not think this police force would entail any unfair burden on the Straits Settlements, as Singapore possesses a flourishing local revenue; and the inhabitants have long boasted of this as sufficient to pay the cost of administration.

15. This relief from excessive duty,—combined with the erection of proper cook rooms, whereby the establishment of regimental supervision over the proper cooking of the rations supplied by Government, would be facilitated and misappropriation prevented, with the grant of a small regimental money allowance to ensure the supply of cooked food to men in hospital, who are too unwell to cook for themselves, and to men on guard, who are unable to leave their guards to cook their food, or are too distant from their lines to procure it,—would, in my opinion, be far more efficacious in keeping the men in health, than any Government establishment of cooks; whose salaries would considerably add to the fixed charges of the State, while the waste and peculation would be likely to entail endless and uncertain expense both on the Government and on the soldier, and would in all probability diminish, instead of increasing the comfort of the latter.

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16. With the smaller number of sick that would have to be provided for, with greatly diminished exposure and fatigue, and improved arrangements for the preparation of food, there would be less objection to the grant of extra hospital supplies, to ensure the restoration of the sick to health. The Military Finance Department, whilst endeavouring to check undue profusion, have in all their reports advised the most efficient measures being taken to restore sick soldiers to health, and when the medical officers are actively employed as medical examiners, it will be safe to grant whatever they may consider necessary for the cure of the sick; but with the present large number of sick, the medical establishment have not, under the arrangements hitherto in force, had the means of exercising effective control over the supplies furnished for the sick, and too great liberality on the part of Government would lead to peculation and waste.

17. Whatever measures be adopted for adding to the comfort of the sick, should, in my opinion, be entirely carried out under regimental arrangements, and officers commanding corps and companies should be specially enjoined to see that the duties involved in such arrangements, are strictly and efficiently supervised; special instructions being issued to provide for this daily supervision.

18. With respect to the further question referred, namely, the proposed increase of rations to European troops (as noted in paras. 11 and 19 of the Report on the Straits from the Inspector General of Hospitals), I fully admit the correctness of the principle that the soldier should not be in any way stinted; but still, before increasing the rations already allowed by Government on a most liberal scale, I think that other measures should be adopted, to reduce sickness and mortality to the very lowest ratio.

19. I submit that a good and sufficient ration can always be provided, by means of a judicious substitution, according to circumstances, of other articles and equivalents, within the cost now incurred for the liberal scale of ration authorised for European soldiers. In the proceedings of the Government of Madras (referred to in para. 5 of the Order No. 399 of 31st January 1861), I observe 2 lbs. of suet are proposed to be granted to the European soldier as a part of the daily ration; but I presume this must be a clerical error. I believe 8 oz. of suet a week, or 1 oz. daily, would be an ample ration of that article.

20. A scale of equivalents, as noted in the margin, shows how much the soldier's rations may, from time to time, be varied, without increasing either cost or quantity; and at pages 71 and 72 of the English Commissariat Regulations, the following equivalents are laid down:

" $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of suet and $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of currants, or 1 lb. of raisins, is to be considered equal to 1 lb. of flour.

"1 lb. of biscuit, $1\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. of soft bread, 1 lb. of flour, 1 lb. of rice, 1 lb. of sago, 1 lb. of Scotch pot or pearl barley, are to be considered equal to each other.

" $\frac{1}{2}$ pint of wine, 1 quart of strong beer, $\frac{1}{2}$ gill of spirits, are to be considered equal to each other.

"1 lb. of rice, 1 pint of peas, 1 pint of dhol, 1 pint of calavances, 1 quart of oatmeal, $1\frac{1}{2}$ pints of split peas, are to be considered equal to each other.

"1 oz. of chocolate, 1 oz. of cocoa, 1 oz. of coffee, $\frac{1}{2}$ oz. of tea, are to be considered equal to each other.

"1 lb. of butter, 1 lb. of sugar, are to be considered equal to each other.

"2 lbs. of cheese, 1 lb. of chocolate, 1 lb. of cocoa, 1 lb. of coffee, are to be considered equal to each other.

" $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of onions or leeks, 1 lb. of other vegetables, are to be considered equal to each other."

21. At places situated on the sea coast, such as Singapore, Cananore, Madras, Bombay, and Kurrachee, fish might frequently be issued with advantage once or twice a week, instead of meat; and in the Straits and Pegu especially, the variations of diet might be numerous, by reason of the great variety of articles procurable there. Barley, potatoes, yams, sweet potatoes, peas, onions, garlic, and various other kinds of vegetables, would all be agreeable adjuncts; as also pepper, raisins, and currants. Salt meat would also be acceptable occasionally, if judiciously served out with pease pudding; and a supply of lime juice, vinegar, and mustard, might be attended with good results.

22. The issue of salt, butter, and cheese, as proposed for Singapore, may also be admitted in substitution of a portion of the other articles of the ration. Indeed, whenever these changes may be considered advisable, and the articles can be supplied within the existing charge for ration, I think it would be well to authorise the exchange being made; but, as such changes might, if made independently of the Commissariat, lead to that department being over-taxed, it is essential that all substitutes should be fixed by communication between the commanding officer and the commissariat officer. I am quite satisfied, that with a good understanding between these two officers, there can be no difficulty in deciding on suitable substitutes; but I deprecate an arbitrary power of making changes being exercised by the commanding officer.

23. The time that substitutes are to continue in force should be defined, as also the quantity of each substitute; so that definite arrangements may be made by the commissariat

Bread $1\frac{1}{2}$ lbs.	} is equal to	Rice 1 lb.
or		Flour 1 lb.
Bread 1 lb. and		Biscuit 1 lb.
Rice 4 oz.		Peas $\frac{1}{2}$ pint,
Flour $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. is equal to -		or
		Dhol $\frac{1}{2}$ pint,
		or
		Beans $\frac{1}{2}$ pint,
		or
		Vegetables $\frac{1}{2}$ lb.
Beef 1 lb. is equal to -		Suet $1\frac{1}{2}$ lbs.
		Fish about 2 lbs.
Tea $\frac{1}{2}$ oz. is equal to -		Coffee 1 oz.
		or
		Cocoa 1 oz.
		or
		Chocolate 1 oz.

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sariat officer. It is also essential that the arrangement should be well understood by the men, and carefully attended to by the officers.

24. Under this view I do not feel justified, until further necessity for the measure be shown, in recommending Government to increase the rations in the manner stated, and to the extent proposed; which would considerably increase the cost. The Indian scale of rations is the most liberal fixed for any body of soldiers; and in support of this view I may refer Government to the remarks of the Commission on the sanitary condition of the army, and to Appendix XXVII. of that Report, on the scales of rations fixed for soldiers located in different Colonies.

25. As already observed, I fully admit that the articles to be supplied to soldiers should be of the most suitable description that can be obtained; but it is sometimes difficult to reconcile the opinions of medical officers as to what diets are best for health. In Appendix XXX., page 429 of the above Sanitary Report, I observe that soup made of head, shanks, and feet is suggested; as also hearts, fried liver, and tripe; and there can be no doubt that, with reference to the habits of the men before enlisting, these parts of the animal would be desired by some soldiers. It is also proposed that arrangements should be made for providing roast meat in all barracks; and no doubt some use might be made of all these suggestions.

26. I notice in the letter forwarded, that a better description of beef than that generally obtained by the commissariat in the Straits, can be procured from Java; I recommend that the Government of Madras be requested to call on the Commissary General, to ascertain whether this source of supply is one that can be resorted to. I am apprehensive that the source is too distant to be depended upon, or if resorted to, would only increase the already heavy charge for rationing European soldiers at Singapore; exceeding, when I last examined the accounts, 18 rupees per month, or nearly three times the cost of the ration at Secunderabad.

27. I am aware that it is exceedingly difficult for the commissariat to obtain supplies of beef at Singapore; but if further inquiries be instituted, and greater exertions made, some improvement might doubtless be effected in the rations of soldiers. I would point out that buffaloes, which are abundant in the Straits, might be made use of, for although the meat is generally too tough to be eaten, it is excellent for soup or stew, which might be served out in lieu of meat one or two days in the week; thus combining economy with a pleasing variety to the soldier, which is particularly recommended by the Commission at page 32 of the Sanitary Report.

28. Variety in the mode of cooking is also strongly urged by the Commission; and as there can be no doubt that such variety and good cooking of all kinds greatly conduces to the health of the soldiers, I recommend that greater attention be bestowed on these points. Convenient places for baking should be prepared in the European soldiers' cook-rooms, and attention should be given by the officers to the cooking being well done. The number of messes in each company may be sufficiently numerous to allow of the men having a choice; at the same time the mode of preparing the meals should not be so varied as to embarrass the cooking operations.

29. I would suggest that the Government of Madras be furnished with such parts of this Report as the Government of India may see proper to send; and be authorised to make such changes in the articles composing the soldiers' rations at Singapore, as they may see fit, as an experiment for 12 months. The changes thus authorised by the Government of Madras, or by the local authorities at Singapore, should be reported to the Government of India, showing the grounds for making them, and the results to be expected therefrom; the actual results on completion of the period being also fully stated, and the expenditure reviewed.

30. Before concluding, I would bring to the notice of Government, that the present is an instance of the incomplete way in which propositions for important changes are laid before Government. The suggestions I have here reviewed, although involving no little expense, and intimately concerning the Commissariat Department, are submitted without any report from the Commissary General and Commissariat officers, as to the departmental arrangements necessary to give effect thereto, or from the Controller of Military Finance as to the expense to be entailed by such changes; and I therefore strongly advise that it should be enjoined on all authorities, before bringing forward propositions for changes of any kind, to call for reports on points of this nature, from the heads of departments concerned on the measures proposed to be adopted. The responsibility of these officers for the outlay incurred for the services they control, should be respected; and their views should receive due consideration from Government, who will also be greatly assisted in the decision of the question by explanations of the bearing of the proposed measures.

I have, &c.
(signed) G. Balfour, Colonel,
Chief of the Military Finance Department.

Appendix, No. 16.

PAPERS referred to by Major General *Balfour*, C. B., Royal Artillery, 26 July 1867.

MINUTE by the GOVERNOR GENERAL, dated 13th September 1854.

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WITHDRAWAL of EUROPEAN INFANTRY from INDIA.

(Signed) D.

1. SOME time since a Despatch from the Honourable Court informed the Government of India that Her Majesty's 22nd, 25th, 96th, and 98th Regiments would this year return to England, and that Her Majesty's 27th and 35th Regiments would relieve the 22nd and 96th. The Despatch did not state that other two regiments would be named to relieve the 25th and 98th, but neither did it state that they would not be named; and thus the Government has hitherto been left in a state of uncertainty as to whether or not it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to withdraw two regiments from India, without relief at the end of this year.

2. The Commander in Chief has now transmitted to the Government a letter from the General Commander in Chief, Viscount Hardinge, from which it appears that it is his desire that the 25th and 98th Regiments should return to England this year, without relief, on the understanding that they will be relieved next year by Her Majesty's 82nd and 90th Regiments. Lord Hardinge adds, "I have understood that a communication has been made by Her Majesty's Government to the Governor General, requesting that this measure may be carried into effect, if his Excellency should consider that the force in India might, without risk, be diminished by two regiments for that time. (5 July 1854.)"

No communication of the nature alluded to by Lord Hardinge has been received by me personally, or by the Government of India. It is necessary, however, that an answer should be given to the Commander in Chief, for his Excellency's guidance in the course he is to take under the letter from the Horse Guards, which he has now submitted to the Government. I propose, therefore, to record the opinion which I should have felt it my duty to express, if the question of removing the 25th and 98th Regiments from India without relief, this year, had been referred to this Government by the Home authorities.

3. The natural impulse of my mind (springing from a long-settled and often-expressed conviction, that of European infantry soldiers the Government of India has now not a man too much,) was to inform the Commander in Chief at once that the Government entertained the strongest objection to the diminution of the European infantry arm at the present time, even as a temporary measure. But desirous of showing all deference to the declared wish of Her Majesty's Government, that with reference to "the demand for troops in Europe," two regiments might be sent

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home from India, without present relief, I have postponed our reply, in order that I might again most fully, and from every point of view, consider the practicability and prudence of complying with that wish.

4. The more I have considered this grave question, the more I have reflected upon our present position in India, the more closely I have calculated the chances and the risks of the times and the circumstances in which we are placed, the more I am confirmed in my first impression, that it is the duty of the Government to object to the withdrawal of two regiments of European infantry at this moment, and most earnestly to urge that such a measure may not be resolved upon by the Home authorities, unless under circumstances of much greater exigency than can as yet be alleged to exist.

5. The imprudence and impolicy of weakening our force of European infantry at the present time will be made evident, I think, by a brief review of the amount of that force which we actually possess, of the position in which we stand, and of the contingencies and risks to which we are liable.

6. The force of European infantry in India has been very inconsiderably augmented during the last seven years, notwithstanding the great changes which have occurred in the interval. In a Minute relative to the Punjaub, recorded last year, I showed that the European infantry force was larger then, by only two regiments, than it was in the year in which I was appointed to the Government of India, although a distant kingdom had since that time been added to our empire. The same may be said now. For, although authority has been given in the meantime to raise three new regiments of Company's infantry, those regiments are still in embryo, and cannot, for some time to come, be regarded as a portion of the effective force of the army.

The available force, therefore, of European infantry in India at the present time, exceeds the force employed upon the 1st January 1847, by only two battalions.

Yet how vast a mass of territory has been acquired in the interval. The annexation of the Punjaub in 1849, calling for the presence of an immense army, whose chief station is 1,560 miles distant from the capital; the unwelcome conquest of Pegu in 1852, a province separated by 1,000 miles of sea from the rest of India, and demanding, therefore, a self-sustaining force of all arms within

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within itself; the recent lapse of Nagpore, where formerly a regiment of European infantry was always kept; these new possessions have added immense tracts of country to the British possessions, imposing upon us the duty both of defending and of controlling them.

It is true that in the acquisition of these territories one formidable enemy has been wholly crushed, and that the power of another enemy has been greatly shaken. But the advantage thus gained in the actual diminution of hostile force which could be arrayed against us, is in a great degree counterbalanced by the larger extent of space over which our own force is of necessity spread, and the consequent diminution to us of the power of combining and concentrating our European strength.

7. Thus, partly from this cause, and partly from the condemnation of the barracks at Cawnpore as no longer fit for human habitation, the Bengal army has at present but a single European battalion intermediate between Calcutta and Agra, a distance of 800 miles.

Thus, too, the Madras army, called upon to aid in the protection of Pegu, has left within itself a force of European infantry quite incommensurate with the great extent of territory which it is called upon to control, and inadequate for the purpose.

The establishment of European infantry regiments in Madras was reduced, in 1847, to four regiments of Her Majesty's and two of the Company's infantry. Since that time two regiments have been employed in Pegu. The new 3rd European regiment is not yet in existence. Thus, for the whole vast space which the Madras army garrisons, from Nagpore to Cape Comorin, it has but four battalions of European infantry. Fort St. George and Bangalore have long had each but a single wing, and the Ceded Districts have none at all.

8. Such is the amount of European infantry now at our command, and such is its scattered condition under a necessity imposed upon us by the enormous extent of the territories with whose defence we are charged, and by the remoteness from each other of the principal points at which our precautions must be taken.

9. I confidently submit to the candour of Her Majesty's Ministers that, placed as it is amidst distances so vast, amidst multitudes so innumerable, amidst people and sects various in many things, but all alike in this, that they are the lately conquered subjects of our race, alien to them in religion, in language, in colour, in habits, in all feelings and interests, the Government of India has had solid ground for the declaration more than once made of late years, that the European force at its command is not more than adequate for preserving the empire in security and tranquillity, even in ordinary times; much more, then, has the Government solid ground for declaring that the force on which it mainly depends cannot rightly or safely be weakened now, when the course of events has led the British nation into formidable war with a race, whose enormous power is not less known, and is even more largely estimated, in the East than it is in Europe itself.

10. The war with Russia does not at present directly affect the British dominions in the East.

The navy of Russia in these seas is inconsiderable, both in numbers and force; and privateering by the universal consent of Europe and America appears to be most justly proscribed: by land, the invasion of a Russian army, most doubtful at all times, is I conceive at the present time a physical impossibility.

But although the war with Russia does not directly affect our Indian dominions, yet it is unquestionably exercising at this moment a most material influence upon the minds of the people over whom we rule, and upon the feelings of the nations by which we are surrounded, and thus it is tending indirectly to affect the strength and the stability of our power.

11. The authorities in England cannot, I think, be aware of the exaggerated estimate of the power of Russia which has been formed by the people of India. I was myself unaware of it until the events of the past year have forced it upon my convictions. Letters from various parts of India have shown me that the present contest is regarded by them with the deepest interest, and that its issue is by no means considered so certain as we might desire. However mortifying to our pride it may be to know it, and however unaccountable such a belief may appear in people living amidst the visible evidences of our might, it is an unquestionable fact that it is widely believed in India, that Russia is pressing us hard, and that she will be more than a match for us at last.

12. We know by our correspondence in the East that the King of Ava has declaredly been acting on this feeling, and that influenced by it he has been delaying the despatch of the mission, which many months ago he spoke of sending to Calcutta.

The flood of reports with which we are inundated from the west, bearing along rumours of Russian embassies to Khiva, and Russian treaties with Bokhara, and Russian armies in Kokan, show the same notion prevailing of approaching danger to us from that quarter.

13. Simultaneously with the exhibition of this feeling regarding Russia to the east and west of us, Nepal has begun to arm. The preparations made are ostensibly for attack on a province of Thibet; there is every reason to believe that that is their real object; but at the same time we cannot fail to remark the significant fact that Nepal armed in a similar manner on the last occasion on which it was believed we were about to come into collision with Russia. I know privately from the Resident at Katmandoo, that great interest has been exhibited there of late in the events occurring in Europe; that there (as at Umeera-poor, and other native courts) the English newspapers are regularly translated for the durbar; that much speculation has been afoot as to the large military preparations in progress, and that there are not wanting those who hint that the army now assembling may ultimately have another destination than Lassa.

14. The Court of Directors are well aware, for the events of the last seven years have given them opportunity of judging, that I am very far from being an alarmist; they will therefore, I trust, be the more disposed to place reliance on my judgment when I say that in full knowledge of the state of affairs around us, and in the face

of

of that feeling which I have just described to exist, it would be culpable imprudence in this Government to permit the European infantry in India to be lessened at this time by even a single man, if by remonstrance or protest it can possibly avert the measure.

15. India is now in perfect tranquillity from end to end. I entertain no apprehension whatever of danger or disturbance. We are perfectly secure so long as we are strong, and are believed to be so; but if European troops shall be now withdrawn from India to Europe; if countenance shall thus be given to the belief already prevalent, that we have grappled with an antagonist whose strength will prove equal to overpower us; if, by consenting to withdrawal, we shall weaken that essential element of our military strength, which has already been declared to be no more than adequate for ordinary times, and if, further, we should be called upon to despatch an army to the Persian Gulf, an event which, unlooked for now, may any day be brought about by the thralldom in which Persia is held, and by the feeble and fickle character of the Shah; then, indeed, I shall no longer feel, and can no longer express, the same confidence as before, that the security and stability of our position in the east will remain unassailed.

16. Already on a recent occasion, I have acknowledged the obligation under which we lie, and have proclaimed the desire by which we are actuated, to aid the Imperial Government in the great contest on which it has entered. Already the Government of India has given proof that these were not empty words, by placing at the disposal of Her Majesty's Ministers the four regiments of dragoons now serving in India.

But it must be borne in mind, that India has to play her own part in this contest; that, unlike Canada, and the Colonies of the Crown, she is in close proximity to some of those powers over which the influence of Russia is supposed to extend; that, although the war does not directly affect her now, yet she is already affected indirectly by the feelings to which the war has given rise; and that it is at least possible that those feelings may be quickened into hostile action, which she will then be called upon to meet by force of arms.

If this be borne in mind, I entertain a confident conviction that Her Majesty's servants, and the Honourable Court of Directors, will feel that the Government of India will have duly borne its share of this great struggle, if while contributing the four regiments, which it has already offered to the army in the field, it shall preserve the Indian empire in security and tranquillity with the means which are now at its disposal.

17. If it should be the pleasure of Her Majesty's Government to direct that the two regiments now required shall be withdrawn from India, without relief, the Government of India will of course at once obey the order, and accept whatever risks it may involve. But unalterably fixed in the belief that the European infantry force in India is not more than adequate for the ordinary purposes it has to serve, and keenly alive to the consideration that if the European force be weakened, the Government of India, unlike the Colonies of the Crown, has no element of national strength on which it can fall back, in a country where the entire English community is but a handful of scattered strangers, I feel it to be a public duty to record that, in my deliberate judgment, the European infantry force in India ought in no case to be weakened by a single man, so long as England shall be engaged in her present struggle with the Russian powers.

18. I propose, if my honourable colleagues shall coincide in these views, that they should be laid before the Honourable Court of Directors by the ensuing mail.

19. If after consideration of the representations proceeding from the Government which is responsible for the safety of the Indian empire, Her Majesty's Ministers shall still require that the 25th and 98th Regiments shall be despatched to England this year without relief, orders can be received here in the month of December, so as to admit of the embarkation of both regiments at the usual season of the year.

20. The Commander in Chief should be informed of the resolution of the Government, and of the course it has proposed to take.

(signed) *Dalhousie.*

13 September 1854.

MINUTE by the GOVERNOR GENERAL, dated 5th February 1856.

(No. 2.)

Military Department.—Military Establishment in India.—European Infantry in Her Majesty's Service.

1. WHEN, 50 years ago, the Governor General revised the European military establishment of India, he thus laid down the principle by which the amount of such establishment ought to be determined:—"The only safe mode," said Lord Wellesley, "of estimating the strength of European force in India is to exhibit a detailed statement of the distribution of every corps with reference to our wants, and to the different stations which it is indispensably necessary to occupy by European troops. Great errors would arise from

fixing the European military establishment by any given proportion which may be supposed to exist generally between our European and native establishments; it would be impracticable, under the real state of the case, to devise any accurate principle by which such general proportion between our European and native troops should be regulated." * * * "The most safe principle of calculation which can be used for determining the strength of our European military establishments must be derived from a detailed examination

App. No. 16. tion of the question, determining the number of European troops by a consideration of our detailed wants at every station of our armies."

I can conceive that the principle thus laid down by Lord Wellesley as the only one by which the amount of European force required for India could be safely and rightly determined, is as sound at the present day as it was half a century ago. The application of it now will differ widely from that which was given to it in 1805, but the rule itself is still one only sure and practical guide.

2. Following this guide, then, I shall endeavour to determine what are the wants of the Government of India in respect of European infantry throughout the territories for which it is responsible, and, thereafter, to show how those wants may best be supplied.

Before attempting to determine the necessary amount of European infantry, I referred to the Governors of Madras and Bombay in communication with the Commanders in Chief of those armies respectively. I have consulted also the Commander in Chief of the Army in India, his Excellency Sir W. Gomm. I believe that the proposals which I am about to make regarding European infantry in India will be substantially in accordance with the opinions which those officers held.

3. It may be assumed that it is the duty of the Governor General in council to maintain such a force of European infantry in India as shall be adequate to provide for the preservation of internal tranquillity, and, at the same time, to furnish for the field such army or armies as shall be sufficient for the effectual defence of British territory against every enemy to whose attacks it may be exposed.

4. In order to determine whether the present establishment is sufficient for these purposes, it will be necessary to examine in detail the means at the command of the Government in each of the three Presidencies, and the necessities which are to be met. In doing so, it will be convenient to treat the European infantry force, in the first instance, as a whole. The Royal infantry and the Honourable Company's infantry will afterwards be considered under separate heads.

5. The establishment of European infantry in the Presidency of Bengal consists at the present time of 19 battalions, of which one battalion has, from temporary causes, been recalled to Europe. Those temporary causes have, in some small degree, altered the usual distribution of the several regiments; but in ordinary course the force would be distributed as follows:—

Peshawur	-	-	3*	Meerut	-	-	2
Rawul Pindie	-	-	1	Agra	-	-	1
Sealkote	-	-	1	Cawnpore	-	-	1
Lahore	-	-	1	Dinapore	-	-	1
Ferozepore	-	-	1	Calcutta	-	-	1
Jullunder	-	-	1	Pegu	-	-	2
Umballa	-	-	1				
The Hills	-	-	2	Regiments	-	-	19

6. Certain of these stations must be provided with a permanent force, which could not, at any time, be removed from it without imprudence and risk.

The province of Pegu, remote from the great body of the Bengal army, separated by a thousand miles of sea from the Presidency, recently conquered, and, as yet, liable to the risks of internal disturbance, and of hostilities from Burmah, cannot for the present be left without a

force capable of sustaining itself under any circumstances which might arise.

Although Fort William and the capital are little exposed to the risks either of internal disturbance or of war, it will be universally admitted that the fort, the arsenal, the trade, and the many important establishments of Government which are collected round Calcutta, should always have the protection of one regiment of European infantry.

Dinapore, in the close vicinity of Patna, has long been, and is still, regarded as a station which requires the presence of a European regiment at all times, if possible.

The Doab could not prudently be altogether deprived of European infantry; if the operations of war should call the main force of the army to a distance, one regiment should always be retained in that tract of country.

The protected Sikh states, still enjoying a considerable measure of independence, and more likely perhaps than any other district within our bounds to show disaffection, if a fair opportunity for doing so should offer itself, undoubtedly require that a corps of European infantry should be kept between the Jumna and the Sutlej. Similar consideration and risks would indicate the prudence of reserving one European battalion also for the plains of the Punjab.

Thus, there are seven points† at which a necessary regard for the preservation of internal tranquillity and for the general security of our interests, would require that regiments of European infantry should be reserved whenever an army may be called upon to take the field within the Presidency of Bengal.

7. There will therefore be 12 regiments available for active operations.

8. In order to determine whether 12 battalions free to take the field do certainly constitute a sufficient European force for the Bengal Presidency, it is requisite that we should consider the number and the strength of those powers by whose hostility we may be threatened.

9. Having regard to the description of the present condition of the native states, which was given in the first of this series of Minutes on the Military Establishments of India, it may, I think, be safely assumed that our present European force is amply sufficient to meet any danger which could possibly arise among the powers which are enclosed within the limits of the British empire in India.

10. The only external powers of sufficient magnitude and resources to engage in a war with the Indian Government in this part of our dominions, are the King of Ava, the Rajah of Nepal, Maharajah Gholab Sing, of Jummo, and the Ameer of Cabool.

11. Since all reinforcements for Pegu, in the event of a renewal of war with the King of Ava, would probably be most conveniently drawn from the Madras and Bombay armies, a war with that power may be considered as not likely to affect the available strength of the Bengal army.

12. The extreme improbability of any attack by the rulers of Jummo has already been pointed out on a former occasion. "The hostility," I then wrote, "the hostility of Maharajah Gholab Sing,

* Including the regiment which is to be at Nowshera when the barracks are finished.

† In Pegu, 2; Calcutta, 1; Dinapore, 1; Cawnpore or Agra, 1; Umballa, 1; Lahore or Sealkote, 1: Total, 7.