Col. *E. B. Johnson*, C.B.

29 March 1867.

now in the Indian army is raised for general service?—Theoretically it is.

1637. Actually they are, are they not?—Their oath makes them actually so, but practically I do not think you could carry it out.

1638. Has it failed whenever it has been tried?—It never has been tried, except for active service, when I do not think there would be any want of readiness to come forward on the part of regiments, whether raised for general service or for local service.

1639. You say it never has been tried; will you give me the garrison at the present moment at Aden?—There are two batteries of garrison artillery.

1640. European artillery?—Yes, European artillery. The head-quarters of a battalion of the 2nd Foot.

1641. It is not a complete battalion, I think, is it?—There are nine companies.

1642. *Chairman.*] What is the strength?—Five hundred and twenty-six at present. There is one wing of native infantry there, consisting of 338 men of all ranks, and one company of native artillery apparently, and two companies of native sappers.

1643. Major *Anson.*] Will you give the number of men of the native artillery and the native sappers and miners?—There are 220 of all native ranks of the sappers and miners, 69 of a company of native artillery, and 325 men of a wing of the 7th Native Infantry.

1644. Captain *Vivian.*] In addition to the two batteries of British artillery?—Yes.

1645. Major *Anson.*] As a military man, do you not consider Aden to be one of the most important possessions we have?—Yes.

1646. Not merely in an Indian point of view, but in an Imperial point of view?—Yes, from an Imperial point of view.

1647. Can you give the distribution of our army in Burmah at the present moment, at Rangoon, and the different stations there?—At Rangoon there is one battery, consisting of 77 of all ranks.

1648. Captain *Vivian.*] Is that a native battery?—No British; there is also the 2nd battalion of the 24th Regiment, consisting of 656 of all ranks, and the 26th Native Infantry, consisting of 700 of all ranks; that is at Rangoon. At Thyetmoo there is a battery of British artillery, consisting of 137 of all ranks, a wing of British infantry, consisting of 437 of all ranks, and a regiment of native infantry, consisting of 719 of all ranks. At Tonghoo there is a battery of British artillery, consisting of 55 of all ranks, a wing of a British regiment, consisting of 393 of all ranks, and six companies of native infantry, consisting of 592 of all ranks. At Shoaygheen, two companies of native infantry, consisting of 126 of all ranks; at Moulmein there are seven companies of native infantry, consisting of 617 of all ranks; at Port Blair, in the Andaman Islands, they have one company of British infantry, consisting of 109 of all ranks: one company of native sappers, consisting of 122 of all ranks, and one company of native infantry, consisting of 89 of all ranks; that is all. In the return there is put "moving in division a battery"; that is merely in course of relief; it does not belong to the garrison. The artillery, I should say, consists of two garrison batteries, and one field battery; I did not make the distinction before.

1649. Major *Anson.*] Will you state to the Committee the exact reasons why you think it is advisable that Aden should be garrisoned with a mixture of European and native troops as it is now, and that the Mauritius should not be garrisoned at all by native soldiers?—Considering its importance, Aden could not wisely be left with purely a native garrison, and therefore they have British troops there; but Aden belongs, and has belonged for 30 years to the East India Company; it was taken, in fact, by men of the Bombay army, and they are aware that it was a possession of the company, and there was never any difficulty about going there; I may add however, with reference to the natives going to Aden as a garrison, they take it as a duty, but it is exceedingly disliked by them; they object to it personally, extremely.

1650. Lord *William Hay.*] Is it more objected to by them than by Europeans?—I do not know that it is more uncomfortable for them than it is for Europeans. Aden is a hateful place for anybody, but what I meant is, that it is more distasteful to natives than to Europeans, because the natives, as a rule, extremely dislike leaving their own country, and the sea voyage is in itself an objection.

1651. *Chairman.*] Do they ever resist?—Never that I am aware of.

1652. Do they ever desert in order to avoid going there?—I have no detailed experience of that sort with regard to Bombay, personally. The garrison has always been found either by Bombay or Madras. I believe at one time Madras troops occupied it in turn with the Bombay troops, but I am not very certain of that. I know nothing whatever about its effect upon the Bombay troops in that respect, as to whether it induces the men to desert or not. But I have heard, on good authority, that it is disliked; in fact, a Bombay officer of great distinction told me the other day, when I asked him about this very place, Aden, that it was excessively disliked by the men, and that they hated it as a station.

1653. Major *Anson.*] In the same way as Europeans dislike it, I suppose; it is the most unpopular station in the world?—Yes; but then it has this extra disadvantage to the natives, that it is the only garrison across the sea that the Bombay troops occupy. Though they sometimes go, I believe, to Kurrachee by sea from Bombay, still Aden is quite a different place to them from Kurrachee.

1654. Still the fact remains that the most disagreeable place almost upon the face of the earth is garrisoned by native troops from Bombay as a matter of course?—Yes.

1655. *Chairman.*] They have the power of taking their discharge generally, after they have been in the native army three years, have they not?—Yes, provided the company or the regiment (I forget which) to which they belong is not 10 per cent. below its establishment.

1656. When the troops are ordered to Aden, you do not know whether habitually there is a large application for discharges?—No, I do not know.

1657. Major *Anson.*] Where could we find out that fact?—No doubt you could get a return from the India Office.

1658. You stated that there was great objection to raising troops in India, except for the purposes of the Indian Government; the troops raised in

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in India are raised, I believe, not for the service of the Indian Government, but for the service of the Queen?—For the service of the Queen.

1659. Mr. *Laing.*] From your answer with regard to Aden, I gather that upon military grounds you see no objection to a mixed garrison, where you have an European force sufficient to become master of the situation?—I speak of Aden as an exception. I say that there is no objection to native troops occupying Aden, because it has been an accepted fact for the last 30 years, and the circumstances under which we obtained possession of Aden, are well known to the native troops; it was a conquest of their own, and they have occupied it ever since; but I should have added, in answer to Major Anson, that none of these reasons apply to render the Mauritius an agreeable station to them, or an acceptable one.

1660. I think I gather that on military grounds the reason why you do not object to the mixed garrison at Aden is that it is a place of that importance, that we have there, at any rate, an European infantry regiment and European artillery; a sufficient force, therefore, to be quite master of any two regiments of native infantry which may supplement them?—Yes, quite so.

1661. That would apply on merely military grounds to any mixed garrison where there was a sufficient European force to secure our predominance?—Yes.

1662. That bring it to these questions merely, first, whether native troops will go without disaffection; and, secondly, of the expense and inconvenience of substituting them, to a certain extent, for European troops?—Yes, and also the effect upon the colonists themselves.

1663. The mere military argument would apply, for instance, to Malta, just in the same way as to Aden?—There would be the same objection to the employment of a pure native garrison at Malta as there would be at Aden.

1664. I mean, supposing that at Malta, as at Aden, you had some two or three native regiments willing to go, and supplement part of the European garrison, there would be no more objection to having a mixed garrison at Malta than at Aden, so long as you had a sufficient European force to insure your control of the place?—No; there would not be any objection beyond this, that you must first find the equivalent for British troops in natives, and it would be difficult to say what that equivalent is; that would be a question, certainly, to be considered in a military point of view.

1665. Supposing this colonial duty were confined to the Madras Army, where we know that there is no difficulty in getting them to cross the sea in regular roster, would you see any objection to their partly supplying the place of European forces at the Mauritius, Ceylon, Singapore, and stations in China?—There would be this very great objection to my mind in replacing British troops even in part by the natives of India. At present the garrisons which occupy all these possessions of ours in the East are, in fact, a reserve to India in case of an emergency. It had a wonderful effect upon the native mind when the mutiny broke out, to find that from all those places regiment after regiment of British infantry kept pouring in. Now, if we replaced those British regiments by natives, that advantage, or prestige, would be considerably diminished. In fact, the advantage would be taken away altogether, because instead of having a reserve of strength at these places we should have no reserve, and we should have an anxiety on the spot; that is to say, we should be anxious for the safety of the Colonies in the event of a mutiny occurring, instead of deriving strength and prestige from them.

1666. As regards China, would not any European troops in England be as near India, by the overland route, as they would in China, in point of time?—I imagine they would.

1667. During the mutiny, I think, the arrangements by the overland route were not sufficiently completed to admit of our sending any number of troops that way; do you think that that would be so in case of another emergency in India?—The means and appliances for sending troops overland now are very limited; it has not been matured yet; in fact, the new system has not been introduced, nor will it be introduced till next autumn, and then only to a limited extent, and therefore we should still have to rely upon other means of bringing troops to our assistance in India than the overland route.

1668. In short, does not it come to this, that as long as we can command the money and the men, no doubt we are safer with European garrisons at all those places?—Yes, undoubtedly.

1669. But that if either the money or the men ran short, we could supplement the Europeans by natives, to a certain extent, without any very great military danger?—I will not say that we could do it without any very great military danger. I understand you to mean, that in all cases you would have a mixed force of British and of natives?

1670. Yes, I presume so; but of course everything is a danger which is short of absolute safety; we will say without greater danger than we run at Aden?—Without greater danger than we run at Aden.

1671. Sir *James Fergusson.*] I suppose the danger might exist for a long series of years, and yet no calamity result from it to the very end of that time?—Yes, as it occurred in India; the danger existed, undoubtedly, for a vast number of years before it came to a climax, or before accident brought on the mutiny.

1672. Major *Anson.*] You stated that one of the reasons why the natives did not object to garrison Aden was, that they had helped to conquer that place; would they have any objection to garrison China after having materially helped to conquer that country, or at all events assisted in the prosecution of our wars there?—The natives have now been so much connected with China in the wars which have taken place there (I think we have had three wars there within the last 27 years), that I think there would be much less difficulty in making service in China acceptable to them than service in any other place with which they have not been brought into immediate connection.

1673. So that you think, in fact, that all this is merely a matter of habit on the part of the natives, with regard to the garrisoning of these places?—No, I would not say that.

1674. Colonel Percy Herbert asked you whether you did not think that one of the great reasons why we got the natives of the Punjaub to come down and help at the taking of Delhi, was on account of the loot that they expected in consequence?—Yes.

1675. One of the great feelings that actuated them was revenge, and race hatred as well, was it not?



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Col. *E. B. Johnson*, C.B.

29 March 1867.

not?—Yes; they had a sort of vendetta to carry out against the Hindoos.

1676. Do you not think that it is rather unfair always to put the service of our native soldiers, who have done us good service in a great many places, upon this question of loot merely, or their hope of plunder?—I think it is an entire question of pay and self-interest.

1677. A question of pay?—Yes.

1678. Not of plunder?—A question of pay, and plunder, and self-interest; that has been the character of all mercenary armies. I do not say it at all against the native army, because it is the very characteristic of a mercenary army that the men should look to self-interest, pay, and plunder.

1679. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Great things are expected from 2*d.* a day in the English army?—Yes, by some.

1680. Major *Anson.*] The reason I asked you this question was, that you rather assumed that if there was a rising in the Mauritius amongst the coolies, the prospect of plunder would lead the native troops to join the coolies?—I say that that danger ought not to be lost sight of; it is a contingency. I do not say that it would occur; I say it is one of those dangers that should be borne in mind in introducing a new system.

1681. One of the great objects of these troops, when they get their plunder, is to transmit both their plunder and their pay home to their families, is it not?—Yes; or to take it home to their families.

1682. How would they propose, in case of their rising in the Mauritius, to take their plunder back to India with them to their families; do you not think that the Sikhs would take that into consideration, and think twice before they set to work to plunder the Mauritius?—I said, at the same time, that they were men of great impulse, and not very reasoning, but I do not know that they would count the cost when they joined with their fellow countrymen against us.

1683. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] If they were discontented and did rise, which do you think they would think the best people to plunder, the low native population or the rich European population?—They certainly would find more to gain in plundering the rich population.

1684. Is it not supposed to have had great effect upon the minds of the Sepoys in the commencement of the mutiny, that the treasury and the European property was at their mercy in a vast number of stations in India?—Undoubtedly.

1685. Major *Anson.*] Do you recollect the case of a Goorka regiment mutinying at Simla, and at Passowlee?—I believe they went very far towards a mutiny.

1686. Did not a detachment of their men go and seize the treasury at Passowlee?—I believe there was a detachment there on guard.

1687. They took possession of the treasury, did they not?—They took possession of the treasury.

1688. And there were no European troops, except the convalescent depôt at Dugshai; there were no European troops at Simla?—No.

1689. There was a large bank at Simla, over which the Goorkas mounted guard?—Yes.

1690. You recollect that circumstance?—Yes.

1691. After the Goorkas had taken possession of the treasury at Passowlee, what did they do with it?—I fancy, for a long time, they had not made up their minds what they would do with it, but eventually their loyalty returned, and the Government lost nothing by it, I believe.

1692. The regiment handed over the whole of the treasury back to the Government without the loss of a single rupee, was not that so?—I believe that was the case.

1693. Certainly, in that case, one of the most curious cases on record, it was not the mere prospect of getting possession of the treasury that incited them to rebel; there was no power to overawe them?—I think I must have mistaken Colonel Herbert's question; I do not know whether he asked me if that was the leading motive that induced the men to mutiny.

1694. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Was it one of the leading motives?—It was one of the leading motives in some instances.

1695. You see no objection to the continuance of the native troops at Aden, or to the composition of the garrison there?—No.

1696. You would have no objection to trying the experiment of having a few native troops to supplement the Europeans at Hong Kong?—No.

1697. You think that at those two places the native troops are habituated to serve, and that that would assist you in getting over any difficulties?—As regards China it is already, you may say, accepted as a fact.

1698. If you were to begin adding a great many other garrisons, and to say that they were to be composed of Europeans and natives mixed, do you think that that would have a good or a bad effect on the minds of the native army at large?—I hold a very strong opinion upon that subject, that it would have a bad effect.

1699. You have expressed an opinion that the colonists would not be satisfied with it?—I am quite of that opinion.

1700. Are you acquainted personally with the Mauritius in any way?—No, I have never been there.

1701. But you are aware that there are considerable fortifications there?—Yes, either existing or in course of erection.

1702. And that the small force of Royal Artillery there would be manifestly insufficient to deal with an insurrection of mercenary troops, if the infantry was entirely composed of them?—Most decidedly so, more especially considering the large native element there is in the Colony.

1703. You expressed an opinion that it was of great advantage in the Indian mutiny that our garrisons of English troops were echeloned on the route from England to India, at such places as the Mauritius, the Cape of Good Hope, and Ceylon?—It had an immense moral effect, besides its practical advantages.

1704. Under such urgent circumstances as then occurred, the garrisons remaining at those posts in the Colonies were reduced to a very low ebb?—They all spared, probably, more than they could have spared for any length of time.

1705. I believe they sent the whole of the Europeans away from Ceylon?—The only regiment there left it.

1706. And they left the Mauritius with one or two battalions?—Yes.

1707. There were some sent from the Cape also?—Yes.

1708. And they were a very valuable reinforcement?—Yes.

1709. If native troops were substituted generally for these, of course that supply would be entirely stopped?—Entirely.

1710. I think

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1710. I think you expressed an opinion that there would be no money saving in the transaction?—I stated at the time that I had not gone into the financial part of the question at all; I have not the data upon which to go into it; but I think that the double system of British and native garrisons, for the reasons which I have already given, arising from indirect expenses, that is, the constant reliefs, the extra pay to be given to the natives, and the various pension advantages, would prove probably a much less economical measure than those who advocate the system imagine it to be.

1711. I dare say you are aware that during their Caffre wars, a large amount of indigenous troops have been raised at the Cape to support the British troops?—Yes.

1712. Supposing that a garrison was to be composed mainly of native Indian troops, do you, as a military man, think that it would be a satisfactory state of things to raise a large force of indigenous troops to be brigaded with them?—No; I do not think so at all; I do not think that that would be a satisfactory arrangement.

1713. You would be almost as much afraid of your indigenous allies as of your enemies, if you had not a backbone of European troops?—Without the European troops, certainly; I think there would be great antagonism between the indigenous troops and the foreigners who were brought in, leading to all manner of unpleasantness.

1714. Without the presence of European troops to take the side of the Government on all questions you would not feel secure?—Certainly not.

1715. You alluded to a case, I think, of a European battery at Mhow during the mutiny?—Yes.

1716. Will you shortly narrate the circumstance to which you referred; what was the force of the troops?—I cannot tell you at all the force of the native troops, but I do happen to know that we had one battery of British artillery there, under a very energetic and first rate officer, Captain Hungerford, when the mutiny broke out. His tact and management, and the precautions he adopted, saved his company, and in fact he held that part of India with his one company of British artillery against the rebels. There was a strong garrison of native regiments at Mhow itself, and the nearest garrison, Neemuch (I think that is the nearest) as well as Nusseerabad was held by natives alone. The position Captain Hungerford took up with his one battery, and the influence he exercised over Holkar, whose residence is within 10 miles of Mhow, at Indore, were most important in their results. He threw his men into a fort, and he held it until assistance came.

1717. That was a very peculiar case, in which the moral control and the moral command of an intelligent English officer was strongly exemplified?—Yes

1718. Is that a state of things that you can expect to be able to rely upon constantly?—It is a most dangerous position to be in.

1719. It is not a position in which any officer would wish to be placed a second time?—No, it was a very false position.

1720. There was one very strong advantage in that case, was not there, that Holkar was more intelligent, being a great chief, than the ordinary run of Sepoys, and he had the conviction that our power would be supreme in the long run?—I think he was kept loyal to the Government entirely from the position taken up by this officer and his single battery; it saved Central India.

1721. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Where are the additional eight companies that are to be added to the Ceylon Rifles to be recruited from?—From Malacca; they will be of the same race as the present battalion.

1722. Do they not find it difficult to get Malays to enlist as soldiers?—They found a difficulty in getting Malays to enlist when the Ceylon Regiment was under the belief that it was going permanently to occupy Hong Kong; in fact, the occupation as a temporary arrangement alone, had a very unsatisfactory effect upon the enlistment among the Malays.

1723. What will be the strength of the Ceylon Rifle Regiment now?—Fourteen companies.

1724. Of which, how many will be stationed in the Straits?—Eight companies.

1725. Do you know at all where the West India Regiments are now recruited from?—An attempt has been made to recruit among the negro population of Canada, with what success I do not know, but I believe the main source of our West India recruits is among the creoles of our West Indian Islands and possessions.

1726. You seem to think that great objections exist to the employment of our Indian native army in our tropical Colonies; would the same objections exist to employing Chinese troops in those Colonies?—You speak apart from India altogether?

1727. Yes. The objections would not exist, I imagine, with reference to any indisposition on the part of the Chinese to serve abroad, and to stay abroad for any number of years; there would be no caste prejudices; all those objections, in fact, which apply to Indian troops would not apply to Chinese troops?—I have no knowledge of Chinamen beyond having seen them in the bazaars at Calcutta and other places; but I imagine that there would be no sort of objection on the part of the Chinese to serve anywhere.

1728. They would be in the West Indies as efficient, would they not, as the West Indian regiments are?—On that question, again, I could only speak without experience of the West Indian regiments. I have never seen one.

1729. You said that troops poured into India during the mutiny from the Colonies, but, with the exception of one regiment, I think, from Ceylon, one from the Mauritius, and two from the Cape, I am not aware of any having poured in, except the China expedition?—The China expedition was an abnormal thing, certainly; but those four regiments were a very large force of Europeans; it was a very great reinforcement.

1730. Do you think it was enough to create an impression on the minds of the natives?—Yes, as they came unexpectedly.

1731. Have you served at the Cape at all?—No, I have never been at the Cape.

1732. Then your answer with regard to what Colonel Percy Herbert asked you about was not based on your own knowledge?—No, it was not from experience, merely from my own idea and conjecture.

1733. Viscount *Hamilton.*] I think you stated that if sufficient pay was offered we could overcome all other scruples with regard to the natives serving in the Colonies?—I believe if sufficient



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Col. *E. B. Johnson*, C.B.

29 March 1867.

inducements in regard to pay were offered, you could get a certain class of men, raising them for the special service; but I guard myself against being supposed to say that any amount of pay or advantages would induce the regiments of the present army to go there with readiness or willingness as a tour of duty; but for active service, certainly they would go.

1734. In that case, supposing they were induced to go they would have no objection to go to those Colonies with which they have had no associations before?—If they were raised for general service of that sort, of course they would understand at once what the conditions of service were, and they would go where they were ordered. But I again repeat, that I think it would be extremely difficult to raise any number of men for that service, unless there was an absolute guarantee that they would be relieved periodically every three years.

1735. Colonel *North.*] We have been talking about the Colonies. With regard to employing these native troops at stations like Malta and Gibraltar, in the first place, the expense would be enormous, because you would have to relieve them every three years?—Yes.

1736. And it would be an unsatisfactory arrangement under any circumstances, I suppose, to have them in European Colonies like those?—I think it would be extremely unsatisfactory, for many reasons, to bring the natives of India into places and positions where neither their habits, customs, religion, or language were understood. There would be a constant danger of embarrassment, arising from accidentally hurting any of their prejudices. Very little moves a native if his religion or his habits are touched, and that might be done unwittingly by officers, or by the inhabitants of the place unacquainted with them; and there is no knowing what dangerous consequences might not result from an accidental circumstance of that sort. On all these grounds, including, among other considerations, the expense of relief, I think it would be a very questionable policy to employ them at these places.

1737. And independent of the danger which might arise from officers of other regiments, and from the inhabitants of the place, it has been often mentioned in evidence here, that the greatest one must be taken in the selection of the officers to command those regiments themselves?—They ought certainly to be officers well acquainted with the natives of the country.

1738. If it was necessary in order to carry out this policy, that some European regiments must be reduced, and that others must be increased, would that be a change that would be satisfactory?—If it came to be an absolute necessity to raise an army, or to raise regiments, and you had not the means of raising them from your own countrymen, you would naturally go to India for assistance, as you would go to our Colonies; we have raised regiments wherever we could.

1739. But you would reduce no European soldiers in India, in order to carry out the policy?—I do not think we have a single British soldier in India that could be spared.

1740. Captain *Hayter.*] The danger of mutinying, which you alluded to, would not apply in the case of mixed garrisons abroad, would it?—The natives of India are so peculiar, that anything might lead to discontent; the infringement of some prejudice or religious observance of theirs might lead to discontent, and from discontent you never know what will follow next.

1741. When surrounded by an unsympathising people, there would be less danger with reference to their joining the natives of the Colony in a revolt?—Of course there would be far less danger of a mutiny in conjunction with the inhabitants of a Colony, than if they were stationed in India.

1742. Then those cases, with regard to the Indian mutiny, which Colonel Percy Herbert put to you, are not parallel; I understood the questions to refer to the danger of disaffection in India, but that would not apply to the case of a distant Colony, where the native troops would be surrounded by an unsympathising people?—I think a mutiny or a rebellion in India would have its effect upon a native garrison, even at a long distance from India.

1743. But such a garrison would be unable to offer any assistance, or to take any part in it?—Yes, it would be cut off from all communication with its own country.

1744. Sir *James Fergusson.*] It has been stated before this Committee that there is no difficulty at all in getting coolies to go in large numbers for service in the Mauritius and other Colonies, and hence it is sought to be inferred that there would be no difficulty in getting soldiers to go to those Colonies; do you think that there is any parallel to be drawn between the two?—I do not think really that there is a parallel between them; a man goes entirely on his own account in the one case for his own interests, for his own gain; in the other case he goes in obedience to the orders of his superiors.

1745. Do you think it would be possible to raise any military force upon such liberal conditions as enter into the coolie engagements in respect of high pay, and the liberty of their families going also?—It would be impossible to send regiments to those places with their families.

1746. Would it be possible to raise a military force under the conditions which enter into the coolie engagements?—I do not know what the money arrangements are with the coolies, but if one of the inducements to emigrate to the Mauritius is, that they can carry their families with them, I do not think it would be feasible to raise soldiers on the same conditions.

1747. And the separation of Indian soldiers from their families must always be a very formidable difficulty to get over, must it not?—Yes, it is a very great difficulty, and they would very strongly object to the separation; it operates very much upon our own Indian army, when they are quartered in India; the men are so anxious to get to their families, that they look to and expect constant furloughs.

THOMAS CAIRD, Esq., was called in; and Examined.

*T. Caird*, Esq.

1748. *Chairman.*] YOU have been a Colonist in the Mauritius, I believe?—I have never been in the Mauritius; I was employed first by the Indian Government.

1749. Lord *William Hay.*] And afterwards by the Colonial Government, I believe?—Yes; I was nine years in the employ of the Indian Government, and afterwards, on Lord Ellen-



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borough's recommendation, I was transferred to the Colonial Government.

1750. *Chairman.*] You were in Calcutta, were you not?—Yes, I was in Calcutta for 18 years.

1751. Superintending the transport of coolies to the Mauritius?—Yes, to Mauritius and the West Indies. At first I had the entire superintendence of the whole of the emigration both to the West Indies and to the Mauritius, but afterwards the West Indian Colonies appointed agents of their own. From 1844 until 1858 I was the sole agent.

1752. Lord *William Hay.*] Can you state approximately how many coolies went to the Mauritius and the West Indies while you were in office?—About 6,000 a year went to the Mauritius.

1753. And to the West Indies?—I should think they averaged, possibly, from 2,000 to 2,500; that is exclusive of their wives and families; that would be the men alone.

1754. Did their wives accompany them generally?—We tried to get as many as we possibly could; but there was great difficulty in getting their wives and families to go.

1755. What per-centage should you say of married men went, out of the 6,000?—I cannot say how many were married men, but not more than from 15 to 20 per cent. were accompanied by their wives.

1756. Do you think that the rest were mostly married, but left their wives behind, or not?—There were a great many who were married, and also some who never had been married.

1757. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Do not their wives follow them, in many cases?—I have known instances where men have come back from the Mauritius, and have taken their wives over there.

1758. Lord *William Hay.*] Can you state from what classes your coolies were mostly obtained?—From all classes.

1759. I mean from what castes?—From all castes. The low castes were preferred, because they are the best labourers.

1760. The hardest working men?—The hardest working men.

1761. But you had no difficulty in getting Brahmins, Rajpoots, and other high-caste men, to go, had you?—There was a mixture of every caste; men of all castes went, from the highest to the lowest.

1762. The high-caste men showed no objection whatever to taking that sort of service?—No, not when it became known; in fact, they often concealed their caste in order to go.

1763. That is to say, you heard from them always what their caste was?—I never took high-caste men if I could get low-caste men to go.

1764. Did you make any peculiar arrangement for their passage, for their living on board ship, with regard to water, and so forth?—Everything they could require in regard to provisions and water was put on board.

1765. You do not recollect their making objections on the score of water?—None whatever; many who came back have told me that they had great difficulty in getting a sufficient quantity of water on board, and I have no doubt that they had.

1766. Can you state how many of these coolies returned to the Mauritius after having come back to India?—No, I could not; but I have known a great many make three, four, five, and six voyages; they were sent up by the planters in the Mauritius to recruit.

1767. Do you know whether amongst the coolies who went to the Mauritius or the West Indies there were any relatives of Sepoys?—I have no doubt there were.

1768. Do you know any instances of discharged Sepoys having gone to the Mauritius?—I was away in 1858 and 1859, but I was told when I came back to Calcutta, that a great many men belonging to the mutinous regiments had gone to the Mauritius.

1769. Men from the mutinous regiments had gone?—Yes, from the mutinous regiments, and men who had deserted.

1770. Can you give the number at all?—No, I cannot; there were a great many.

1771. Do you know whether any report of that was made to the Government?—I forget whether the acting agent stated it verbally or reported it in writing. I have a distinct recollection, however, of his telling me he had asked the Government if the mutinous Sepoys should be allowed to go without any enquiry being made whence they came, or if they had done anything for which they could be detained.

1772. You do not think that the natives of India, either of high or low caste, have any serious objection to crossing the sea?—They had at one time a great objection.

1773. You think they have not now?—I think it has been greatly removed of late years.

1774. Do you think that there would be any difficulty then in raising special regiments for service in the Colonies, supposing, on other accounts, it was desirable to do so?—I should think not; you might have a difficulty in starting in getting any large number, but I should think after a time you would not.

1775. It would be necessary to induce them to go by offering better pay, would it not?—Yes, certainly; and I think a great deal would depend upon the persons who were employed for that purpose. If they were officers who had been a great many years in India, and understood the native character thoroughly, they would not have any great difficulty in procuring recruits; but if a man went who was unacquainted with them, it would be a different thing.

1776. With regard to the pay which you give the coolies in the Mauritius, what proportion does it bear to the ordinary rate of wages in India?—I think, on the average, it must be double or treble; but it varies a great deal. Many years ago, the wages were very much higher than they are at present.

1777. Where?—In the Mauritius they were much higher than they are now.

1778. Then there is not the same difference with regard to the rate of wages now?—There is considerable difference still.

1779. What should you put it at?—I could not say exactly, but I should think at least double; more than double, I should say.

1780. Then with regard to food, do you think that living is more expensive in the Mauritius than in India?—Yes; but I think the planters there used to supply the men with rations, and deduct nothing. In the West Indies the men had to find their own.

1781. What increase of pay do you think it would be necessary to offer to the soldiers in India, to induce them to go willingly to the Colonies?—I should say three rupees a month, at the very



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*T. Caird, Esq.*

29 March 1867.

very outside, would be sufficient; about 6*s.*; that is my impression.

1782. That is, supposing that their rations were made up to the average rate of the rations in India?—Yes, certainly, that must be taken into consideration. If they had to find their own provisions, and had to pay more for them in the Colony than in their own country, you would have to pay them in proportion.

1783. Do you think that the natives in India would have any objection to the introduction of, say one or two, Chinese regiments?—I think it is a thing they know nothing whatever about. I do not think they would care the least about it.

1784. Viscount *Hamilton.*] You say that the natives used to conceal their caste on several occasions?—Yes.

1785. What was the object of that concealment?—As I stated I never took a high-caste man if I could get a low-caste man, because the low-caste men are so much better labourers; they have been accustomed to labour, whereas the high-caste men have not. A high-caste man never touches the plough at home, and will never do any work if he can possibly avoid it; that is why enlisting in the army is so very popular with them; they like a work of that kind, but they do not like labouring at home. They will always take service with any European at 5*s.* or 6*s.* a month in the Mofussil, sooner than work at home.

1786. And this concealment of their caste showed their desire to go to some foreign country?—Yes; I stated before that I never took them unless I was obliged to take them; unless I was very short indeed of men, I always refused them.

1787. Lord *William Hay.*] They sometimes deceived you?—Yes.

1788. What did the Brahmins do, for instance, with their Brahminical string?—They concealed it under their cloth; round their waist often.

1789. Viscount *Hamilton.*] You stated that at first you met with a difficulty in entering upon this system of emigration, but that it grew less?—It grew less; and I believe it is much less since I left India than it was before.

1790. Did it grow less every year?—I believe so; it is four years now since I left, in fact, nearly five years.

1791. Mr. *Laing.*] How many rupees a month do the coolies get in the Mauritius now?—I cannot say at present.

1792. What was it when you left India?—I think it averaged five, six, or seven rupees a month, that is 14*s.*

1793. Was that with the provisions found them?—Yes; I think with provisions found them, they were getting from five to seven rupees. Of course, men who had been in the Colony some years were getting more; new arrivals were not getting so much, until they became acquainted with their work; the longer they remained, the higher wages they got.

1794. Did you engage them for any fixed term on sending them there?—At first they were engaged for five years, and latterly for 10 years.

1795. Did you make them any advance?—None whatever.

1796. You merely paid their expenses?—We merely paid their expenses.

1797. Viscount *Hamilton.*] After they had been in the Mauritius a few weeks or so, were there many who were anxious to return at once, and expressed their desire to return to their own country, not being satisfied with the different system of life?—They could not come back before their five years had expired, unless they came back at their own expense, and paid something for their passage down. Many did that when they had saved sufficient money to pay their passage back. Passages to and from the Mauritius were at that time very moderate; they could take the passage back, I think, for 30*s.* Some did come back, but not many. Many get dissatisfied with any colony they go to or any place distant from their homes.

1798. Major *Anson.*] Do you think there would be any objection on the part of the colonists and planters in the Mauritius to employing native troops there?—I could not give an answer to that; never having been in the Mauritius, I do not know what the feelings of the colonists might be.

1799. If it was proved that the conduct of the native infantry regiments is infinitely superior in every way to the conduct of the European regiments, there would not be very likely to be any very great objections on the part of the colonists, would there?—I should think not; I do not know why there should; the native soldiers are much more easily managed.

1800. I believe you have been in the West Indies?—Yes, I was there for a short time.

1801. You heard the evidence of Colonel Johnson?—Yes.

1802. In which he stated that a West Indian regiment had been objected to by the European inhabitants of Demerara; do you not think that that was on account of their being negroes recruited from the population itself?—I do not know; I could not give an answer to that. I never heard them speak of it.

1803. Mr. *Laing.*] Do you know what wages the coolies get to go to the West Indies?—I cannot say what they are getting at present. When first they went there they were earning very large wages indeed; but a much larger number of them have been introduced since then, and wages have fallen.

1804. How much a month were they getting when you left India?—In the West Indies, particularly in Demerara and Trinidad, they were paid chiefly by piece work, I think. They were not paid by wages, they were paid by the quantity of work they did.

1805. In order to get the coolies to go out, what inducements did you hold out to them?—I told them that they could earn on the average at least six, seven, or eight, and perhaps nine rupees a month; that was the inducement held out to them.

1806. With the provisions found them?—With the provisions found them; but they could earn a great deal more than that if they chose to work.

1807. They were told that that was what they would be likely to earn?—Yes. I should like to say I think a great deal depends upon the water that is supplied to the natives on board ship. Natives never know the value of water on shore, and do not economise it when at sea. I have heard them frequently make complaints on their return from the Colonies that they had not had a sufficient quantity of water on board ship. I think if troops were going, care should be taken that they should have an ample allowance of water put on board.

1808. *Chairman.*]

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289

*T. Caird*, Esq.

29 March 1867.

1808. *Chairman.*] Is it a mere question of quantity of water, or is it complicated at all by difficulties of caste?—It is a mere question of quantity; they never know how to economise water. When they spoke of the Mauritius, and the quality of the water in the Mauritius, they always said the water was good there; they liked the drinking water there. That is a thing that a native regards a great deal more than anything else.

1809. That does not apply to natives of all parts, even of the Bengal Presidency, does it?—I think it does; you find that servants who have come down to Calcutta in the employment of Europeans have frequently declined to remain at Calcutta, because the water did not agree with them, and have left the best masters on that account. You find cases of servants who have been with men, 17, 18, or 20 years having left them on arrival in Calcutta, because the water did not agree with them.

1810. Lord *William Hay.*] They drink nothing but water, do they?—They drink nothing but water.

1811. *Chairman.*] There is a great deal of water in India which is not fit to drink, is not there?—In the neighbourhood of Calcutta it is all tank water; it is all water collected in reservoirs; in the Upper Provinces they drink nothing but well water.

1812. Further up, there is a great deal of highly saline water, is there not?—Yes; but still, I think, the water they get in the Upper Provinces agrees with them much better than the water at Calcutta; the latter brings diarrhœa and dysentery.

1813. Is it your impression that the natives of India are generally incapable of going to any other climate than their own, and that they suffer heavily in mortality in doing so?—No, I do not think they suffer much after their arrival at their destination.

1814. You believe them capable of going to climates analogous to their own without suffering more than Europeans do?—Certainly. I think that their own country is the most unhealthy of all; unquestionably Calcutta is. The West Indies are not nearly so healthy as the Mauritius.

1815. You did not hear any complaints of the unhealthiness of the climates to which they emigrated, compared with that from which they went?—I never heard them complain of the Mauritius; I did of the West Indies; they are subject there to the insect called the jigger; that annoyed them very much in the West Indies. I think they complained more of that than of anything else.

1816. That insect is never found in the Mauritius?—It is never found in the Mauritius.

1817. Lord *William Hay.*] Is not it true that the badness of the water at Aden is one of the reasons why it is rather an unpopular station with the native army?—Wherever you have bad water, or a difficulty in getting water, I should think it would be an unpopular station.

1818. Major *Anson.*] There is a fixed ration of water for every person at Aden, is not there?—I do not know about Aden.

1819. Have you any idea of what the number of the coolie population of the Mauritius is at the present time?—No, I have not; but it is a very large number I should think.

1820. You have formed no estimate of what it is?—No, I have not; but that could be easily obtained from the Emigration Commissioners here.

1821. Have you not a large influx of population from the Island of Madagascar at the Mauritius?—I believe a great many men go from Madagascar to Mauritius.

1822. You do not know what the European population of the Island of the Mauritius is, do you?—No.

1823. Is there a large half-caste population there?—I believe there is such a population; I do not know whether it is very large.

1824. *Chairman.*] Did you draw the mass of your coolies from any one particular part of India, or from any particular race, or were they of all kinds?—The best men came from the hill districts of Chuttanagpore, others came from between Gayah and Allahabad, mostly from Patna, Chupra, Jounpoor, and Arrah districts.

1825. The people from the neighbourhood of Chuttanagpore are as near savages as they can be, are they not?—I have heard that there are people there almost approaching to savages, but I have never seen any myself.

1826. They did not form the mass of your exportations?—No, the greater part were of what is called the Danghur caste; any planter in India is glad to get them.

1827. Do you mean the savages?—No, the Danghurs, a hill people.

1828. They are stouter than the others, are they not?—Yes, they are by far the best labourers.

1829. Do they ever enlist?—No, never, to my knowledge; I do not think an attempt has ever been made to get that class to enlist. They are very short men, they may be refused for that; at any rate I have never heard of their being enlisted.

1830. You never heard of any effort being made to induce them to enlist?—Never.



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## *Tuesday, 2nd April* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

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| Major Anson. | Lord William Hay. |
| Viscount Cranborne. | Colonel Percy Herbert. |
| Sir James Fergusson. | Mr. Laing. |
| Viscount Hamilton. | Colonel North. |
| Marquis of Hartington. | Mr. Oliphant. |

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

Sir GEORGE RUSSELL CLERK, K.C.B., K.S.I., called in; and Examined.

Sir *G. R. Clerk*, K.C.B., K.S.I.

2 April 1867.

1831. *Chairman.*] HAVE you given your attention to the subject that is now before the Committee, namely, the proposal to employ Asiatic troops in garrisoning colonial dependencies of the Crown?—I have seen it advocated in newspapers.

1832. Have you formed any opinion with respect to its practicability?—I have only served in one colony, South Africa. You would find ample means there, I think, of raising any force you required, if withdrawing your European troops.

1833. I suppose if it was found necessary to withdraw English troops from the Cape, you would prefer to raise your troops upon the spot rather than go to India for them?—Certainly; I should infinitely prefer that. I would rather have one Fingoe or one Kaffir than 10 Sikhs in South Africa, to say nothing of the great saving of expense. The idea at present is, I believe, that Sikhs should be introduced into those colonies; I think that is one of the wildest proposals I ever heard of.

1834. What is your objection to it?—I do not think the Sikhs would answer the purpose in any way. They would not willingly serve far from home, unless engaged in active warfare in a rich country. The Sikh has always lived in excitement in the Punjaub; conquests have been carried on in the Punjaub, and on the few occasions in which you, or Runjeet Singh, or other chiefs, have employed him out of the Punjaub, it has either been in a scene of active warfare, where his services have, I believe, proved useful sometimes, or otherwise his employment has been an utter failure. The Sikh is apt to be troublesome during peace; I have not seen our Sikhs under arms since the Punjaub was taken. When I was amongst the Sikhs, for many years, they were an independent State. I knew them well then; some of the divisions of the Sikh army were then commanded by French or Italian officers. I saw a great deal of them then, in rebellion, in mutiny, and in pursuit of plunder.

1835. You do not think they would make very good garrison troops in quiet times?—Decidedly not.

1836. In the first place, you doubt whether they would go; I presume they would go for a considerable amount of money?—They might so serve for a short time; but like all races in India, they are much bound by their domestic ties.

1837. Would they go for three years?—Yes, for certain objects, they might go for three years; but it would be an expensive arrangement, I presume, to send to a great distance Sikhs or any other tribes from India for a three-years' service only; therefore, I conclude that also financially it would not answer, nor would I go, even were the cost no consideration, so far to find men for soldiers who could, I think, be found of better quality upon the spot.

1838. If you went to India for your soldiers you could get the Indian officers trained in the Indian army, but if you took your Kaffir or your Fingoe on the spot you would have to have special localized officers who never would rise beyond that service: do you think that there is any force in that difficulty?—That is all I should require; I should look for my officers among the Europeans who colonize there, and the "Africander" Europeans, as they are called; much useful service was done by those men, and local levies, in all your Kaffir wars.

1839. You would not look for regular British officers to command those men?—Certainly not; why should you go to the expense of having more than you require to have to keep the Kaffirs in check? Good faith towards the Kaffir chiefs and the Kaffir tribes will keep them loyal; the people are obedient to their chiefs. It may be alleged that Kaffirs may break loose from the chieftainship, but I have never seen that.

1840. Such a thing as a famine occasionally throws them upon the border, does not it?—No, not a famine. When you get to the Kaffir country you get to the fine part of South Africa. The wretched part of South Africa is what we possess, called the Cape Colony; there is little there really but desert; there is nothing to be made out of the Cape Colony when its markets lose British troops and your military establishments. It improves when you advance on the east frontier, where it is well watered; but until there, no extent of good grazing for flocks is to be found. That has been the cause of our several Kaffir wars.

1841. In your view, what would be the feeling of the colonists if a proposal was made to them to defend themselves by means of black regiments levied on the spot?—I have talked upon that subject with the colonists, particularly with the Dutch boers, and they were willing to undertake it.

1842. And pay for it themselves?—And pay for it themselves, and carry it out in their own way;

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way; but then you check them from here; you will not allow a Dutch colonist to carry out what he calls a commando against a Kaffir tribe. If a tribe comes down and burns the homestead, then the Dutch colonists and the English, at least the few who are willing to join, will go and carry out a commando against any Kaffir tribe in a longer or shorter time successfully.

1843. Then they go out shooting Kaffirs as they would tigers, do they not?—Here it may be imagined so, and called an exterminating war, but I never saw anything of that. Mosheesh, with whom we have had so much to do, is a savage certainly, but not bloodthirsty. Shikonyella was another chief out fighting, with whom I had to do, and he deserves the same praise. They had a pitched battle not far from my camp. No greater outrages ensue from war in that part of Africa than are consequent on wars in Europe.

1844. The whole of those warlike operations are carried on as pitched battles; the colonists do not go out shooting any blacks they may see?—Certainly not; they know well enough the value of native labour, on which they are entirely dependent.

1845. Supposing the other plan was adopted, and Indian troops were taken to the Cape as a substitute for European troops, do you think that the colonists would object to paying for them?—I think they would; I think our Indian troops who have no bush fighting, would prove to be very inefficient when opposed to the stalwart active Kaffirs. The colonists would soon see that the expense would be much greater than that of raising local levies.

1846. Are Fingoe levies as capable of discipline as the Sikhs?—Yes, they may be just as well disciplined; they behaved well in the Kaffir wars under Mr. Mostyn Owen, and other civilian officers; General Sir George Cathcart employed them for many useful purposes.

1847. Are they intelligent soldiers?—Very. You have still a good corps there. If I was now responsible for the defence of that colony, for instance, and you withdrew from me the European troops (which I think would be a great mistake, for other considerations than the benefit of the colony), then I should propose increasing a force upon the same form as the existing corps there which you have now in the Royal service, called the Cape Mounted Rifles. I have, on my missions among the tribes, had them on service with me, and more active intelligent men I never wish to have out in the bush; they were well conducted, good horsemen, admirably mounted, and altogether, so far as I am capable of judging, they form a most serviceable corps.

1848. What is your reason for thinking that on other grounds it would be imprudent to remove the European troops from the Cape?—Because I think the keeping them there serves a sound Imperial purpose. England requires, I suppose, to have rather an imposing army, in order to hold our place among other nations. I do not mean to say that numerically you would have an army equal to those of some other States in Europe, but you require to have a greater force than you could keep in England without being questioned as to the supposed excess of your standing army. Now, it is very good soldiering in some of these colonies; take Sydney for example, and Australia generally; those are good quarters for troops, and the same is especially true of the Caffrarian frontier; that is a very fine climate, the finest in the world, so far as I have seen, in many countries. From the north-east frontier I brought away a company of the 45th, which had been there for five years; they had never had any serious illness among them, they had never had an epidemic; it was too far from headquarters for them to be relieved all that time, and the consequence was, this being so salubrious a climate, that those men were as hard and good soldiers as the veterans of battalions that Louis Philippe or Louis Napoleon sent to Algiers, who came back so thoroughly inured and fitted for active service. The troops there are exposed to the sun, as your Lordship is aware; but though a sunny climate, it is a very healthy one. There are no diseases there; cholera and fevers are never heard of. Therefore, I should have thought that it would pay the Government always to maintain a certain proportion of troops there, provided the colonists paid a fair share of the expense. That was a recommendation of mine to the Duke of Newcastle before I left. I do not know whether it has been carried out.

1849. Would not the troops be more available for any necessity of home defence or European warfare, if they were rather nearer than the Cape of Good Hope?—I think two regiments were brought to the Crimea; I am not quite certain about that; but I know you sent two or three regiments of well-seasoned troops thence to India on the breaking out of the rebellion there. I really have no title to express an opinion upon the subject, not being a soldier; but I should say that a regiment which had been soldiering in the bush at the Cape, would be better seasoned for campaigning than one coming from home quarters. In the bush they are marching about bivouacking with their *tentes d'abri*, and become handy for all purposes. I may not be quite correct, but I believe you despatched thence to India, during the rebellion, the 43rd, 45th, 73rd, and the 12th Lancers; and so, I presume, regiments could have reached the Crimea in a month.

1850. They would not go in a month from the Cape to the Crimea, surely?—One is a month in reaching England; what it might be direct to the Crimea, for instance, I cannot say.

1851. Do you know anything of the Mauritius?—I do not; Indian troops were employed there, along with European troops, in its capture, but it is so near their own homes that they were willing enough to go, and I dare say they would again go, on such an expedition.

1852. You think there would be no difficulty in inducing them to go there?—Not for three years' service, or a brief campaign.

1853. Do you know at all the freight, the cost of transport to the Mauritius?—No; it cannot be much.

1854. There would be no difficulty about feeding them in the Mauritius, would there?—It depends upon what description of Indian you employ there.

1855. I referred to the Sikhs?—No, it would not be difficult to feed the Sikhs; the Sikhs eat everything except the cow kind.

1856. Do they eat poultry?—They eat and drink anything except that one thing; they may not touch that, and they may not touch tobacco, but they make up for it in a preparation of opium, and all sorts of strong drink.

1857. Do you think that Aden could be garrisoned entirely by Indian troops?—I see no objection



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Sir *G. R. Clerk*, K.C.B., K.S.I.

2 April 1867.

tion to the employment of European troops there. Several important political considerations would lead me to prefer maintaining Europeans there. I have been at Aden three or four times; on one occasion an old friend of mine was commanding a wing of the 17th Foot there; a very fine regiment. He came off to see me, and to report (this was 20 years ago, when I was Governor of Bombay); he stated that his men were so healthy that none of them had suffered at all, except the master tailor, and he had had to let out every man's coat except two, they grew so lusty. That was, I believe, generally the case at Aden.

1858. That is because they can take no exercise, I suppose?—The heat is great, so that officers of course keep their men much under cover by day; but it is also hot at night, the temperature being very equable, so that there are no chills or checks upon the skin. That, I presume, may be the cause of the salubrity of the place. as I have observed it in other hot, but arid countries.

1859. The mortality is not high there?—No, quite the reverse. I believe it was once not higher than in quarters in England, which is extraordinary, unless to be ascribed to the cause I have mentioned. The year after I was there, there came a fall of rain; they had not had any rain for 10 years; they seldom have rain; and are better without it; and in the wake of that rain came scurvy and a little cholera; that was the first time they had ever had cholera there, and the first time they had been visited with scurvy severely. Since then it has rallied, I believe, but has never perhaps been so free from sickness as formerly.

1860. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Do you see any advantage to be gained by substituting Chinese or other foreigners for European troops in India?—Certainly not.

1861. Do you think that it would be ill received by the natives of India that we should employ other foreign troops?—Yes; I never would, under ordinary circumstances, have advocated anything of the kind, but I did on one occasion, to Lord Stanley, when we received news of the rebellion breaking out in India. I knew how short of troops they were down in the south-east of India, and I proposed that two of the West Indian regiments should be sent to garrison the forts on the coast; but only Fort William, Calcutta, and two or three other forts; not to be sent up the country, but merely to set free a wing of European troops here and there; they would have held such positions for a time, say for two years, in perfect safety.

1862. What would be your chief objections to the employment of foreign troops in India?—You would no longer recruit good natives of India for your own army. I think you are not only bound to recruit from the martial races of that country for service in it, but it is your interest to do so. Governing 200,000,000 of people there, it cannot be expected that you can keep them in subjection without a native army affording some of them a livelihood. I should say, in explanation of my remark, that you could no longer recruit good men, that they would be apprehensive that you were going gradually to get rid of them. That panic seized them a few years ago, when some people set forth in the public journals that we were going to introduce 200 or 300 Goorkas into every regiment; that would be quite an impossibility; for, first, their government would not allow it; and, secondly, the genuine Goorka cannot work in the plains, although he is a fine fellow in his mountains. Another statement was, that they were going to introduce 200 or 300 Sikhs into every regiment. That belief told very much upon the old recruiting ground on the Ganges, where the finest Hindoo sepoys were recruited; they gradually began to withdraw, and put their children to the plough, or sending them to serve in native states, instead of preparing them for the British army. In that way, and by the annexation of Oude, you alienated a fine race, which, for two generations, had been much attached to your service.

1863. Do you consider that the strength of Europeans which it is proper to maintain in India, is quite independent of the number of native troops which you also maintain?—No, I do not; I think there should be a certain proportion of European to native troops.

1864. You think that the strength of the European army should depend upon that of the native army, to which it should bear a certain proportion?—Yes.

1865. The native army, again, is calculated upon the requirements of the service?—Yes.

1866. And it would not be satisfactory to substitute for any portion of those Europeans any Asiatic troops not natives of India?—Not for any portion of the Europeans whom it is necessary to keep in India. I do not call the present the proper proportion; it is an excessive proportion.

1867. You mean that the European force in India might be reduced without danger?—Not now without danger, because, unless you observe good faith towards the people, of course you will require a very large force of Europeans to keep them down by the bayonet; but, until the last 20 years, we have not relied upon the British bayonet only to take the people along with us; they go willingly with us, if we are only true to them.

1868. Presuming, however, that the Government proceeds upon the principles of justice, you think that the force of Europeans need not be kept up as high as it is at present?—Certainly, I think it need not, putting it now as 65,000.

1869. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Do you know the difference between the European force in India now and the force maintained there before the mutiny?—Yes.

1870. What is it?—I cannot probably state it with great accuracy. But the success of the insurrection in India was not to be ascribed to a deficiency of European force in India at that time. I never looked upon it in that light. The success of the insurrection was owing to the greater part of your European troops being up in the north-west, holding one single province, leaving Hindostan proper denuded of troops. That was where the rebellion broke out.

1871. Sir *James Fergusson.*] It arose then from an insufficiency of troops in Bengal?—In army returns it is called the Bengal Presidency, but I allude to Hindostan proper. You had very few troops there, and, of course, when the people resolved to rise, they opened the ball where you had very few troops, but where you ought to have had an adequate force, and where you always had an adequate force before.

1872. Major *Anson.*] You refer to the mutiny in 1857?—Yes.

1873. Sir

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1873. Sir *James Fergusson.*] You stated you thought that there would be no difficulty in getting native troops to serve in the Mauritius, provided the service did not exceed three years, but even that extension of the present foreign service of the native army, so as to garrison the Mauritius, would require that those troops should be well paid, in order to induce them to leave their families? — It depends upon how you recruit; you must recruit men for general service, which you generally do not. Some good tribes will not recruit for general service. We have always had a few general service corps, to go to the Mauritius, Burmah, or places not distant; but generally the troops were not enlisted for such service.

1874. We have been told that, although practically it has not been expected of them, except in time of war, to go on general service, yet in fact the terms of enlistment since the mutiny have included general service, therefore they are nominally enlisted for foreign service also?—I was not aware of that being universal, but I know that foreign service is still disliked.

1875. What tribe would be willing to go if the best would not?—I did not mean that the best would not go to the Mauritius for a limited period of active service.

1876. Do you consider it preferable if Indian troops are to be employed for garrisoning colonies such as Hong Kong, that they should be regiments lent for a time from the Indian establishments rather than corps specially raised?—I think if I took any there, I should prefer that they should belong to the establishment; but I would take none at all. I would prefer Malays, who are nearer at hand to recruit for any stations beyond the Straits. The Malays are fine men. I think a battalion which I saw at Ceylon, the Ceylon Rifle Corps, was principally composed of Malays; I should prefer a corps of Malays to a corps of Hindoos for China, decidedly. A high-caste Hindoo of course does not like going to sea, because he cannot cook his food; it is against his caste, in fact.

1877. Mr. *Laing.*] I should like to have your opinion upon this matter with reference to the contingency of such another war as that in the Crimea occurring, in which the European troops in the East were reduced very much in number; that would be a great trial, I take it, for our whole dominion?—I do not think it necessarily follows that the people of India would rise against you, because you reduced your European army there for a time. However, it depends entirely upon your treatment of the influential classes in India.

1878. Still, supposing circumstances to arise which led you to reduce your European strength in India down as low as it was when the mutiny broke out, there would be considerable danger, would there not?—If we could not hold India with the force we had there before the mutiny, which is supposed to have been from 40,000 to 44,000 effective European troops, I think we ought to be ashamed of occupying India at all, and ought to withdraw from it.

1879. Looking to a contingency when the presence of every European regiment you could get in India was important for the safety of India, might there not be advantages in having some of your native Indian troops accustomed to cross the sea, so that you could garrison colonies like the Mauritius and Ceylon, and even the Cape of Good Hope with Indian troops, and withdraw your European troops from those colonies to India?—I should say it might be, if I did not feel that it would be preferable to raise local levies for that purpose.

1880. In the case of Burmah, that did happen in the mutiny, did it not, that having been accustomed to garrison it by Madras troops crossing the sea, we were able in the pinch of the mutiny to withdraw nearly all our European troops from it for service in India?—Yes, I believe that that was the case.

1881. Could that have been done if the Madras troops had not in time of peace been accustomed to cross the sea and garrison the province of Burmah?—Not unless you had had local forces which would have held it for you as well as the Madras troops. I have always advocated raising Burmese levies. The Burman is a powerful fine man.

1882. However, on an emergency, you would hardly have time to raise local levies, I suppose?—No; therefore I would have some at all times, keeping a few Europeans there. With regard to the garrison of India, putting it at 43,000 or 44,000 effectives, of course you could not withdraw many during a war in Europe, but you could withdraw a certain proportion, say, five or six regiments, I should think, without any danger, to the State; if that is, you governed with justice and maintained good faith towards the chiefs, who after all are your mainstay, and have been so during all critical times in India; for example, in 1817 and 1818, when the Marquis of Hastings had so many wars on his hands, he had only 18,000 European troops effective in all India; he had the Mahrattas to oppose, he had the Pindarries to oppose, he had the Goorkas to conquer, and he did subdue them all.

1883. Looking to the possible importance of having every European throughout the East available for service in India, do you think that it would be a wise preparation for you now, in time of peace, to accustom your Indian native regiments to go abroad to garrison these foreign places, or would you rather leave it till the emergency of war came, and then trust either to sending Indian troops or to raising local levies?—You might trust to local levies, but not to new local levies only; you should always have some nucleus to form levies upon in the colony. I would prepare the colonies for having levies of their own.

1884. You would think it a wise precaution to have the Cape, the Mauritius, Ceylon, Singapore, and China in such a position that you could, in case of need, withdraw nearly all the European troops to meet an emergency in India?—I can only speak of the colonies I know. With regard to the Cape, you might withdraw every European regiment thence for a time, leaving only the Cape Mounted Rifles, a local regiment, and the levies to be raised there; nothing else would be required temporarily. It may be otherwise, perhaps, in Australia. You have a regiment in Sidney, I believe, always, but I should think that the Australian colonists would smile if you were to say that you distrusted them on the withdrawal of a regiment from Sidney for India, or for service elsewhere.

1885. In short, your policy would not be to send troops of the Native Indian Army across the seas for garrison duty in time of peace?—Certainly not.



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Sir *G. R. Clerk*, K.C.B., K.S.I.

2 April 1867.

1886. Colonel *North.*] I understood you to say, speaking of levies at the Cape, that you would infinitely prefer those levies to having any Indian native regiments sent from India to garrison the Cape?—Yes; I would qualify what I have said with regard to never withdrawing native regiments from India by saying that for active campaigning I should have no objection to take them across the seas (sending them back to their homes when the campaign was over) for active service in Egypt or the Mauritius. If the French were preparing, as some say they will, to make a dash at the Mauritius, I would reinforce the European garrison there with general service regiments from India to aid in opposing their recovery of that Island.

1887. Mr. *Laing.*] You think that they would go cheerfully for such service?—Yes.

1888. Colonel *North.*] But in time of peace you would not keep them more than three years abroad?—Certainly not.

1889. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] What would be your opinion of employing the sepoy of India in garrisoning such colonies as the Cape or the Mauritius in time of war, when there was no particular menace upon those posts, but when it was necessary to garrison them?—I adverted only to the Mauritius and Egypt.

1890. I do not refer to active service in the field, but I was referring to garrisons in time of war?—I should not hesitate, in time of war, to send some native Indian regiments to join a British force in the Mauritius or in Egypt, but not in South Africa, because I there could find better men on the spot.

1891. Colonel *North.*] You would not, under any circumstances, bring a native regiment to garrison such places as Malta or Gibraltar?—Decidedly not.

1892. Or any colony or station in Europe?—Certainly not.

1893. Or the West Indies?—Certainly not; and the climate would affect them there; they would get disheartened immediately. It occurs to me that one regiment, which was called a Sikh regiment, was sent off to Burmah a few years ago, on the 15th Native Infantry refusing to go. A great parade was made of their zeal and their soldierly qualities; I thought I knew my old friends the Sikhs; they believed Burmah to be a very rich country, and that all its idols have stomachs full of gold and emeralds. Ships had to be taken up very soon to take them back again; a serious thing, because you had first to convey them in ships to Calcutta, and then to send them all the way to their homes, from Calcutta to the Punjaub.

1894. Major *Anson.*] What regiment was that?—It was a Sikh regiment.

1895. Do you know the number of the regiment?—No.

1896. In what year was it?—I cannot be sure of the year; it was seven or eight years ago, or more; it may have been in 1854 or 1855.

1897. Do you know what was the actual cause of their being obliged to send them back from Burmah?—The commanding officer, of course, insisted upon discipline, as our officers do wherever they go, but the Sikhs do not go forth from their own country to lead a peaceable listless life.

1898. What were the circumstances of that case?—They began to desert soon as want of excitement made them home-sick.

1899. Where did they desert to?—They did not find it easy to desert; some few, I believe, got into the forests, and then it was, I believe, that the Government at Calcutta determined to send them back, and accordingly they were taken away. They were disappointed; they thought they were going for active operations, and would be indulged in plunder. The Sikh requires to be kept actively employed; he does not submit to be restrained much; and, when in for insurrection, he goes great lengths. A division of a Sikh army rose once near my camp on the banks of the Sutlej, mutinied, and massacred poor Captain Fowkes; and Colonel Mouton, a French officer, now a colonel in the Cuirassiers at Versailles, had a very narrow escape. They had very little provocation in that case to mutiny; only that they were ordered to Kooloo, a place on the slopes of the Himalayas, a temperate climate, but new to them. They rose before they got there, killed their English officer, Captain Fowkes; and Colonel Mouton was only saved by some of his Sikh cavalry, when the battalions were coming across the plain to kill him. The provocation was, as I said, very slight. They had a notion that their paymasters had cheated them; some deductions had been made, which were very unpalatable to them, and they thought the only redress was to kill off all the European officers; and further than that, all the non-commissioned officers too, who were Sikhs like themselves. The way in which they set about it was this: they would get somebody to write a manuscript paper, and, well armed, walk through the streets, and, presenting this paper, ask some one who was passing, "Be so good as to read this;" and if he could read, they immediately cut him down, because he could read and write. They thought they had been imposed upon by the scribes in the regiment. But in Runjeet Singh's time, if they mutinied, he always had recourse to the garrison at Peshawur, which is now garrisoned by us with Europeans; he sent them there, as formerly our neighbours across the Channel sent the republican battalions of France to Algiers; he sent them there to die; they never came back. He generally kept 25,000 or 30,000 men there, and whenever a battalion showed any signs of disaffection, or want of discipline or disobedience to orders, they got their route for Peshawur; that was his remedy, by the advice of his French officers for insubordination.

1900. *Chairman.*] We send our troops there without any such provocation, do we not?—Yes.

1901. Colonel *North.*] Is that place now garrisoned by Europeans?—Yes, I am sorry to say it is, to some extent.

1902. Mr. *Oliphant.*] You expressed a high opinion of the military qualities of the Fingoes and Kaffirs?—Yes, as levies of a useful description, if commanded by men who know them.

1903. Do you not think that it would be possible to recruit from those people a few regiments for general service, officered by English officers, and available particularly for service in the tropical colonies, such as the colonies to which we were proposing to send the Indian troops?—I have never talked to them about it, but I should say it is scarcely likely that they would go.

1904. What objection would they have if they were properly paid; they have no caste objection of course?—You would take them far from their homes, and they are a pastoral people, attached to their vast plains and to the bush.

1905. There

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1905. There was a regiment of Kaffirs recruited in Mozambique, which served in Ceylon (not the Ceylon Rifles, they are Malays). I have seen them in Ceylon; they were disbanded about 20 years ago?—I was not aware we had Kaffirs there.

1906. Lord *William Hay.*] Was not a Sikh corps raised some time ago for service in Ceylon?—I did not hear further particulars of it, than that only half the regiment so sent down, 1,100 miles to Calcutta, embarked; but on reaching Ceylon and refusing to work, they were sent back from Ceylon, and the other from Calcutta, of course, at great expense to the Government. I believe that was in 1862 or 1863. I have been for some years out of the way of personally observing the Sikhs. My intimate acquaintance with the Sikhs, indeed, is of a long while back. I ought to say, therefore, that my opinion probably of the qualifications of the Sikh regiments, as they are now called, may not be worth much. I saw a great deal of the Sikhs under their French officers, and other Europeans in that service.

1907. *Chairman.*] As officers?—Yes.

1908. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] With regard to the question of the fondness for plunder on the part of the natives of India, have not cases come within your knowledge of servants and camp followers volunteering to go with officers without pay, in the prospect of a campaign?—I think you might find that in any country, if there was a promise of plunder; but it never came within my knowledge in India, nor do I think the natives of India generally are more addicted to plunder than European soldiers in European wars. The Sikh is an exception; there is no doubt a great deal to be said about the fondness of the Sikh for plunder. He came down, for instance, with a will to plunder Delhi, when you besieged it in 1857; but he did not do it for your sakes.

1909. The Sikhs did not come down against Delhi for our sakes?—No; anybody who knows the Sikhs knows that they had a very long reckoning to pay off at Delhi. On the decline of the Mussulman empire, the Sikhs sacked the viceregal city of Sirhind, putting all its inhabitants to the sword; the retaliation on the part of the Delhi army was to go into the Punjaub, collect all the horned cattle, drive them to Amritsir, and cut their throats on the brink of the Sikhs' sacred tank, and thus signally defile its waters. The Sikhs had never forgotten that, and they had vowed that they would lay Delhi in ashes sooner or later. That was accompanied by another vow, that they would do the same by Calcutta. The third was Hyderabad in the Deccan. The Sikh looks upon Hyderabad in the Deccan as the wealthiest city in India, containing more bullion, as I believe it does, than any other. There he proposes to end his pursuit of plunder.

1910. You expressed an opinion that the natives of India ought not to be kept down by British bayonets?—Not unless disposed to rise against authority.

1911. I think you expressed an opinion that the natives of India were now kept down by British bayonets in a degree in which they were not 20 years ago?—I meant rather that our authorities rely now upon keeping them down by an overwhelming force of European troops only, rather than by using other means also. India was as large and as populous in the days of the Marquis of Hastings as it is now.

1912. You expressed an opinion afterwards that if we cannot govern India with from 40,000 to 44,000 European troops, we ought to withdraw from it?—Yes.

1913. Can you tell the Committee generally the amount of the population of Lower Bengal?—It is many years since I was there; the census I have seen may not be very accurate, but I believe it is about 35,000,000.

1914. Is that the province under the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal?—Yes.

1915. There is a very small proportion of European troops employed in that district, is there not?—I believe very small.

1916. What is the character of the population there; are they very effeminate?—Remarkably so.

1917. Are they very easily kept in order by very few troops?—Yes; when there in 1846, I was told that the European force in the whole Province consisted of only a wing of a regiment in Fort William, with a detail of artillery not far off.

1918. I believe it is a common practice of robbers when they wish to plunder a village in Lower Bengal to beat drums at one end of the village, and the men then run out and leave it defenceless?—I was not aware of that; but they are a patient, pusillanimous nation, excepting a sprinkling of Islam. Wherever that is there is a degree of courage, more or less. There is a growing sect of that persuasion there, which some day may give trouble, if not watched. I first tried to direct attention to that sect, called Ferazzees, 18 years ago.

1919. In the Punjaub the population is very warlike; they are a very different class of people altogether from that in Lower Bengal, are they not?—Very different from the population of Lower Bengal.

1920. The proportion of European troops necessary to maintain our dominion in that province is very much larger than that in Lower Bengal, is it not?—The proportion employed there is larger; I should not say the proportion necessary to maintain our dominion was larger, were it not that we are now in contact with the fanatical Afghan borderers.

1921. Would you undertake to keep the North-West Provinces with one regiment of Europeans?—I would say of that what I said just now of the whole of India; I would not continue so very costly an experiment as holding the Punjaub portion of the North Western Provinces, if not to be securely held by a less numerous garrison of Europeans than some think requisite.

1922. You would withdraw from it?—Yes; in that case to within the Indus; for it shows a constant annual deficit of a million and a half sterling, and is no real strength to us.

1923. You would recommend then that we should withdraw from the Punjaub?—No, not now you are there; and supposing all to the line of the Indus might, with vigilant government, be held without excessive force of European troops. I would never have taken it, because I consider that the greatest security we had in India was maintaining the Sikh dominion between Hindostan on the one side, and Islam on the other.



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Sir *G. R. Clerk*, K.C.B., K.S.I.

2 April 1867.

1924. As you do not think we ought to withdraw from the Punjaub, would you advocate any very large reduction of the garrison of the Punjaub?—I am not aware what the garrison now is, exactly; but the European troops within it are, I believe, from 13,000 to 14,000. I dare say it may be susceptible of being reduced to some extent; it was very large when the rebellion broke out, I know; there were 18,000 European troops in it, and supporting the position there. When the general officers sat in committee in 1858 in Westminster, the Government of India, in answering the Committee, asked for 22,600 Europeans, and 52,000 native troops. That was for the Punjaub alone, exclusive of the North Western Provinces, now, in part, annexed to it.

1925. At any rate I apprehend you would not think it possible to maintain British dominion in the Punjaub by the small force which you mentioned we maintained in Lower Bengal some few years ago?—No; you might almost say you had no force there at all. I certainly did not consider it to be fully garrisoned; and the Punjaub must require the larger garrison, because you have to hold in check the tribes beyond.

1926. If the whole population of India either consisted of the warlike tribes of the north-west, or of the effeminate tribes of the district near Calcutta and Lower Bengal, generally the force required to maintain British supremacy would vary in an enormous ratio?—Yes; it would vary considerably.

1927. Then would you explain the grounds upon which you come to the conclusion, that if we cannot hold India with 40,000 or 44,000 European troops, we ought to withdraw from it, as showing that we have governed badly?—I do not admit that many in India are warlike tribes, or that any require a larger amount of European troops to keep them contented with our rule. I put the force at 44,000 effective.

1928. Would you explain the grounds upon which you express that opinion, and why, supposing we find it necessary to keep more than 50,000 or any other number, we should withdraw, and why it would imply that we were governing India in an immoral way?—I think it would imply that our rule was not popular with the agricultural classes, and that our supremacy sat heavily on the minds of the chiefs.

1929. Will you give any grounds for that opinion, taking into consideration the very great difference of the nature of the people we have to govern in different parts of India?—If I state the grounds of my opinion, I should state all the causes which excited the people to rebel in 1856 and 1857, and those were various. I do not know that those causes have come to an end yet. You know there was great dissatisfaction among the people; it was not dissatisfaction of the army only; it was a rebellion and not a mutiny; the people were up as well as the soldiers.

1930. Major *Anson.*] When was this?—In 1857.

1931. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] When the soldiers and the strong hand of Government were taken away from the people, is it not the case that they broke out into feuds and broils among themselves?—I never heard of that, further than that some of course profited by the occasion to recover some rights, lands, and jurisdictions, which we had unjustly transferred to others,

1932. Did you never hear in the north-west of feuds of 50 years' standing breaking out afresh during the mutiny?—Not particularly then. I have always seen them cherish these hereditary feuds; they are very averse to forego them. I have had a great deal to do with the suppression of feuds; they will in some localities continue while land is to be reclaimed and has a value. Large tracts once very fertile, under the Mussulman Empire, are now covered with forests. As they are reclaimed, the ancient inhabitants, the agricultural classes, come and fight for the land. In that way many an old feud is revived now, which in the days of the anarchy consequent upon the decline of the Mussulman Empire never occurred. In those days there were no feuds, because the land was going to waste; the land now has some value; it is not cultivated now as it was 200 years ago; it is a very small portion yet that is brought under cultivation, but the ploughs are advancing, and there may still be fights for it. I am not aware that more of these wholsome feuds broke out after the rebellion, or during the rebellion, than before.

1932*. Colonel *North.*] The establishment in India at this moment appears to be 61,672 British troops?—I thought it was approaching 70,000.

1933. You think that that is too many?—Putting it at 50,000, I suppose you would have 43,000 or 44,000 effective troops whenever you wanted them, and then you could spare five or six regiments for Europe.

1934. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] You think that being able to govern with a particular number of European troops is a sound test of the morality of our Government?—I do.

1935. Major *Anson.*] You stated just now that the outbreak in 1857 was a rebellion as much as a mutiny?—I think so.

1936. What part of India was in a state of rebellion?—The North-West Provinces especially, but by no means exclusively.

1937. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Do you think it would be desirable to have Europeans recruited for service in India, and that it should be understood by them that they would not be liable to service elsewhere, and that there should be certain advantages held out to them in the shape of military colonies in the hills after a few years' service, which should operate as an inducement to them to recruit?—I do not think it would be a good plan. I am not aware that it would be an attraction to the soldier to remain there; and with regard to colonies of European soldiers, I should doubt their succeeding.

1938. In the old East India service, I imagine that the European regiments were very much superior to the European regiments in the Imperial army?—I doubt that being admitted by any Queen's officer who has seen them both under arms in the field; of course I am no judge, but I doubt their concurring in it. With regard to colonising by European soldiers, I do not believe that the English soldier makes anywhere a good colonist to begin with, and the only climate they could live in is that which you allude to in the hills. Now, the soil in the hills is a wretched one; it requires an enormous amount of industry to produce anything there.

1939. Not in the Neilgherries, I believe; perhaps that may be the case in the Himalayas?—The Neilgherries are better, but almost all the land that is available or cultivable there is occupied, and the estates are sold, I believe. Again, even

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even in the hills, in the second or third generation, Europeans degenerate very much.

1940. Major *Anson.*] In the case of a colony like the Cape, you approve of defending that colony by levies from the very people whom we have to keep in subjection?—They have done more good by raising levies of Hottentots and Fingoes than Kaffirs, who are our so-called enemy there; as I said before, if they were always treated, as Sir George Cathcart treated them, with justice, I do not think they are at all enemies of the British Government. With that exception, I should say that those are the best men you could employ in that colony.

1941. On all those occasions when those local levies have been raised, you have had English soldiers with them, I think?—I cannot assert that they have never been employed on detached duties, even during a campaign, but, generally speaking, of course there was a large reserve of European troops in the field.

1942. We always had a very large European army in the Cape on those occasions?—During the last war several regiments.

1943. Would you also provide for the defence of Burmah by raising a large number of Burmese?—I would not say a large number, but I have never understood why we should not enrol Burmese levies. The subject, no doubt, has been considered lately, though I have not been in the way of hearing of it. My own opinion has been that I should raise Burmese levies, not to any great extent, but I should have thought they might have assisted to hold the country, the population of which is only 20 to the square mile.

1944. *Chairman.*] You think that those Burmese levies would be sufficient to hold their own country?—Yes.

1945. Major *Anson.*] We tried that experiment in India in 1857, when we had a very large native army recruited only from the inhabitants of India, and then the result was that it ended in the mutiny; at least, without discussing whether it was a mutiny or a rebellion, the whole of the Bengal army mutinied, and left us, and fought us?—They had been very faithful to you previously; they had gone from one end of India to the other for you over and over again, under many difficulties.

1946. Still, judging from the fact, that in 1857 the army which had been faithful to us for so long, actually mutinied; do you think that would be wise to trust to Burmese levies to hold Burmah?—I did not contemplate absolutely withdrawing every European soldier from Burmah. And with regard to rebellion, it should be remembered that whenever those who rose against our troops, or met our poor defenceless people, they had but one war cry, and that was, "Deen! deen! deen! Our religion! our religion! our religion!" No other cry was ever heard from those rebels or mutineers than that.

1947. Whatever the cause was, it was a fact that we depended at that time entirely upon the natives of the country for the defence of it; and the result was the mutiny of the native army?—At that time certain important provinces had been left with scarcely any of their usual complement; Cawnpore, for instance, with 22 European soldiers instead of three regiments; those European regiments had been all withdrawn and sent up to the Punjaub, and that part was left open and exposed, while the people's feelings had been outraged. The outbreak began from what we chose to regard as a small matter; of course when we forced impure food down men's throats, they became dissatisfied, and sent their emissaries round to the villages, telling the people that they were all going to be treated in the same way. The people in that country are as credulous as they are in some other countries, and they believed it, though the information came from the convicts; but it was believed, and with good reason, so far as related to our jails.

1948. You think the cause was the withdrawal of European troops from the districts in which they had formerly been; the insufficient number, in fact, of European soldiers?—Yes, the number was insufficient to suppress it at first. You wanted a force sufficient to check it at once, as at Meerut, where we had, when the rebellion first broke out, one of the largest forces of European soldiers of any station in India, I believe.

1949. But the native troops at Meerut did mutiny?—Yes; but the mutineers at Meerut mounted their horses and rode away; they did not raise the standard of rebellion there; they went over to Delhi, which was without Europeans, and there they raised it.

1950. There were some native infantry regiments not mounted on horses at Meerut?—Yes, they went over to Delhi too.

1951. You say that in former years (say 20 years ago) we governed India simply through good government, and the love of the people?—The love of the people is more than we should expect, but a good understanding prevailed, because we observed better faith towards the people than latterly; they were better satisfied to be governed by us than they were subsequently. There must have been some cause for that, and I ascribe the cause to some change in our system of policy pursued towards the natives; I have no doubt of it in my own mind. We interfered more with their prejudices; we interfered even with the native army in the way which I alluded to just now, by proposing to introduce Goorkas, and proposing to introduce Sikhs, and people of different castes in the battalions of the native infantry, and to employ all across the salt water; that of course would have been very unsatisfactory to the men of high caste, and indeed to many others. The troops enlisted in Upper Hindostan, are men of caste; they had always served well under the British Government, but their caste had been respected; a panic was spread that their caste had been interfered with; legislation was going on at a great pace, you were legislating for the re-marriage of their widows, and a variety of other things very vexatious to them. They did not understand it; such legislation may be very civilised, but they were much disgusted with it.

1952. You referred to a time when, although we had our seven wars going on at one time in India, we were able to manage with a very small number of European troops: do you not consider that the circumstances of India are very much changed now from what they were then with reference to our position in India; at that time we were constantly fighting in the country, we kept alive the hatred of race and caste; the natives were very much divided amongst themselves, but at the present time the tendency of our rule in India is to make them much more of a united people?—I do not know that they were divided in former days in those sentiments in which they are now united.



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Sir *G. R. Clerk*, K.C.B., K.S.I.

2 April 1867.

1953. Do you think that that makes no difference at all in our position in the country now?—I think you are right regarding native soldiers, so far as that; there was more inducement to be attached to their corps in those days, because there were conquests to be made ahead, but I do not know that there was more dissension among the people themselves; you had chiefs who stood by you as good allies; no doubt they were influenced by knowing that there were territories to be acquired by them in reward for their services; that told, no doubt, and may then, as recently, have helped to secure their alliance.

1954. Then you do not think that the tendency of our rule now is to soften off the differences of caste and race in India?—Not the differences of caste; on the contrary, I think you rather throw them back to hug their prejudices; whenever they find that you are disposed to try experiments with their caste, it only makes them more careful to cherish their caste feelings. I have even seen that with the Sikhs, who are sprung from Jats, the greatest latitudinarians among all the Hindoos.

1955. You said that in case of a European war it would be very easy to withdraw our troops from the colonies and send them up to wherever they were wanted, and you instanced the Crimean war as a case in point?—I said, doubtingly, that I thought two regiments had gone to the Crimea, but I am not certain about it; I know that some regiments went to India from the Kaffir country.

1956. As long as you have your enemy's fleets shut up in their own harbours, that is all very well; but do you not think that it would make a great difference if the sea was swarming with cruizers, being obliged to bring our regiments home from distant places like Australia and the Cape?—Of course it would make it more difficult to get them home.

1957. It is rather a dangerous experiment to keep your regiments away at the Cape and Australia, is it not?—The same might apply to the relief of regiments if you were at war; you must do something, I suppose, to relieve them, or you would get very inefficient service.

1958. I suppose our ordinary reliefs would be somewhat interrupted in case of a maritime war?—I think our European army in India being so far from its recruiting ground as it is, at a distance of 15,000 miles off, if you put the figure for its total strength as high as it is now, I do not see how you are to keep up the recruiting, from England. Of course I do not consider India as being approximated to England by the European and Egyptian line of route, because that is through another's country; we hold that on sufferance. During times of disturbance, of course we must trust to the old ocean route round the Cape.

1959. You said that in case we were obliged to withdraw our troops from the colonies in time of war, it would be better to raise local levies for the time being, rather than to bring regiments from India?—I think so.

1960. How would you propose to get disciplined soldiers to do the work in a short space of time, and how would you propose to get officers to officer those regiments in a hurry?—I think I said I would have some formation of local levies at all times, and upon that nucleus I would form corps adequate to all the duties that would devolve upon them when you withdrew temporarily the European troops. At this moment, if you insist upon withdrawing all the European regiments from the Cape, I suppose the Government there, or the authorities upon the border, will immediately consider the expediency of raising additional levies, either adding to the strength of the Cape corps or raising another such corps with other small levies. It is not a system which I would advocate as a permanent one, because it is a good station for British troops.

1961. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] What is the constitution of the Cape corps; are they natives or Europeans?—They were originally all Hottentots; in Sir James Jackson's time he thought it would be good to have two troops of Europeans; he introduced them accordingly.

1962. What is it now?—It is nine years ago since I was serving there. I was lately asking Sir Percy Douglas, who is now Commander in Chief there, and he also appeared to think well of the corps. I understood from him that the proportion of Europeans is now rather more than it was in his predecessor's time. I think the strength is about 800, and very efficient. All Commanders in Chief there have, I believe, found them very useful in ordinary times, and in their campaigns.

1963. Major *Anson.*] You think it a great military and political mistake for us to utilize the military tribes and races we possess in India for Imperial purposes?—I think so with reference to the Sikhs, for it is the Sikhs who are principally alluded to, I suppose; I think it is a mistake to cherish a military spirit amongst the Sikhs. It was a mistake that was committed before our occupation of the country. It was of course all very well for the French generals; it was a fine provision for them; they got their major generals' commissions from the King of France for it; but why the British Government should have also done all it could to encourage the formation of Sikh and Mahomedan armies by Runjeet Singh, I never could understand; however, they did so, and the consequence was those great field days which occurred on the Sutlej, when the Sikhs invaded the country south of the Sutlej, on provocation given to them, that led to those great battles. Then, again, when you took the Punjaub, you pursued the same system of cherishing a military spirit in the Sikhs, and you are pursuing it still. Now, the Sikhs are perhaps the finest cultivators in India; there are none better, being for the most part converted Jats. I should have thought that the right policy would have been to have brought them back as much as possible to the plough, providing for a moderate number only in our police or local regiments.

1964. You think it is a mistake to have Sikh soldiers in India at all?—I doubt whether you have many genuine Sikh soldiers. What are called Sikh battalions are, I conceive, too numerous.

1965. I mean men enlisted from the Punjaub?—On the contrary, I would give a provision of that kind to a fair proportion of the inhabitants of every province I held. I would not attempt to hold India without offering a provision, military, civil, and in all departments under the Government, to the natives of the country. I should not allow them to look upon our rule as despising the Hindoo chiefs and averse to Hindoo sepoys; at the same time we may go too far in enrolling Sikhs or Goorkas with the idea that you ought entirely to replace the Hindoo sepoy, because

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299

Sir G. R. Clerk, K.C.B., K.S.I.

2 April 1867.

because the Hindoo sepoy, with his fraternity in the villages and towns, was provoked to rise in rebellion.

1966. I do not wish to replace the Hindoo sepoy; I wish to utilize the whole of the army as it stands at present: have you any objection to utilizing the Hindoo, the Madras, or the Bombay sepoy in the way proposed?—No, I think that that is quite right. I would have a due proportion of them, and also of Punjaubees.

1967. You would employ them in the colonies?—No, not in the colonies; I think you have enough for them to do in India.

1968. Mr. *Laing.*] We have reduced the Sikh force, have we not, very greatly, since the mutiny?—I am not aware whether we have or not. I doubt about the Punjaub force being reduced. By the Sikh force you mean the frontier force, I presume.

1969. I mean the number of Sikhs in the native Indian army?—I know not how many genuine Sikhs are in the army. The Sikhs are but a small proportion of the inhabitants of the Panjaub, as you are aware; about Umritsir and Lahore is the chief settlement of the real Sikhs.

1970. If I recollect rightly, the number of Sikhs in the last year of Lord Canning's administration had been reduced to 25,000 men, just to carry out the policy you indicate, of weaning them from the pursuit of arms to agricultural pursuits?—I do not know what the actual strength of the Punjaubees is, but I should suppose it to be in excess of that.

1971. Major *Anson.*] You object, I suppose, to the employment of native troops at Aden?—I do not see why general service corps should not take their turn of duty there.

1972. They have taken their turn of duty for a long time, but you do not think that that is a good principle, as I understand you?—I see no objection to it, provided you do not withdraw the European garrison.

1973. Why should there be no objection to it at Aden and a very strong objection to it at Mauritius?—I excepted the Mauritius during active service or for brief periods.

1974. Do you except China and Ceylon?—No, not Ceylon, except that I have seen as useful a corps in Ceylon as we could send there. If Malays have been found to serve the purpose there, I would not bring from India our native regiments for a service which is unpopular with them.

1975. Why do you except China?—It is more distant; it is a new country, and it is unhealthy, at least where our troops are quartered; if they once get panic-stricken as to their health, the consequences will be felt for a long while. The natives of India are very chicken-hearted in those matters; and if they suffer from an epidemic, or anything of that sort, they do not get over it for a long time.

1976. Do you except Singapore and the Straits settlements?—I should have no objection to employ a general service corps at Singapore, which is so near.

1977. When you speak of general service corps, I believe the whole of the Indian army are general service corps now?—I was not aware of that; I do not see any objection to employing them in the Straits, because they are so near their homes that they could be easily relieved. I think that is about the limit, Ceylon, the Straits settlements, and Aden; but in the case of Ceylon, I think you could do better by having a corps of Malays.

1978. And the Mauritius?—The Mauritius, I really know nothing of its attraction for sepoys, but that they served there well, I believe, in the expedition sent to capture it in 1810.

1979. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] I think you said you were prepared to hold the Cape with a Cape corps only, and the levies you could raise there?—Yes.

1980. Did you speak of that as a permanent arrangement, or did you mean only that on an emergency, if the British troops were withdrawn to Europe you would be prepared to run the risk there?—On an emergency; because, though I do not think it necessary at any time to have any large force of European regiments there, I think it is advisable that they should be there, as being good quarters for a part of the British army.

1981. Should you call the force we have had there of late years, namely, four or four and a half battalions, a large force?—Yes, I should.

1982. *Chairman.*] You only think that it is advisable that they should stay there for their own benefit, not for the benefit of the colony?—Yes, for the benefit of both; for in peace also the colony benefits by the presence of our troops. When I was there I proposed that if a reduction of the force was considered an economy, and in all respects expedient, imperial and other as well as colonial, I would reduce from six regiments, which were left when Sir George Cathcart came home to be Adjutant General, to four regiments, for a year; and then in the following year to reduce the force to two regiments, and then to adjust the whole thing upon the frontier between Cape corps and levies, if the European soldiers were all wanted to be withdrawn on account of a Russian war, for which you were then preparing.

1983. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Are you aware what the force was at the time Sir George Cathcart took the government over from Sir Harry Smith, and during Sir George Cathcart's operations?—There must have been 10 or 11 regiments.

1984. Of Europeans?—Yes.

1985. What was the force of native levies?—I could not say exactly.

1986. Was it about 13,000 or 14,000 men?—No, not so much; half that, I dare say. Sir Stephen Lakeman raised a corps also; his corps was composed of Europeans.

1987. They were sailors, were they not?—Yes, and a few colonists.

1988. Do you consider them a great success?—No, an utter failure.

1989. Do you think that there was too large a proportion of Europeans for such a war as we were engaged in at that time?—No, certainly not.

1990. And to guard against the outbreak of a war, would you think that two battalions of the ordinary strength of English regiments would be sufficient?—Yes, quite sufficient. There was great provocation given to the Kaffirs at that time; you need not have had a Kaffir war. Unfortunately, the Kaffirs hold all the good pastures; and there is a tendency to trespass, and then, of course, the Kaffirs will retaliate, as they did on that occasion, and on former occasions.



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Sir *G. R. Clerk*, K.C.B., K.S.I.

2 April 1867.

1991. You think that they are a people of a long-suffering nature, and that they never give provocation by stealing cattle in the colony?—None, without provocation. That was the way in which they showed their resentment, by cattle lifting.

1992. You think that they never showed their resentment before the provocation?—No; I had proof of that in the Orange River territory, when I had to negotiate between the Dutch boers and the Kaffir tribes; the Dutchmen admitted that they never had a difficulty with the Kaffir tribes till Sir Harry Smith went up there, and declared the sovereignty of the Queen of England over all those territories. Then, of course the position of things was altered very much indeed; there was nobody to explain what was meant, and some of the European colonists then laid hands upon lands which they held on very easy tenure from the Kaffir chiefs; they had held it a very long time, till our authorities went up there, upon a tenure which was perfectly satisfactory to both parties, and there never had been any trespass on one side or the other before. Though the Dutchman grazed his flocks there on almost a nominal rent, the right of the Kaffir to regard it still in his hunting grounds was never questioned.

1993. Do you think that the outbreak of the war in British Caffraria, in 1850 and 1851, and the massacre of those colonists near the Amatola Mountains, was entirely brought on by the colonists?—Yes, it was entirely brought on by the Kaffirs' sense of the colonists' encroachments.

1994. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Do I rightly understand you to say that the frontier might be safely and cheaply left to the commando system, and that the only objection to that system is a philanthropic one?—I mean that a mistaken philanthropy imagines, on no good grounds, that the Dutch boer is addicted to exterminating Kaffirs.

1995. Would there be a very great saving to the Imperial Government if that were done?—The saving would be in not having to pay colonial charges out of the military chest for troops there. But our settlers like to have our troops, and like a Kaffir war for many reasons.

1996. Major *Anson.*] Where could the Committee obtain the facts with regard to that Sikh regiment which you said was obliged to be sent back from Burmah in order to find out what the real causes were, and when they went?—I will endeavour to obtain if you please any official record there may be in the India Office.

Colonel KENNETH MACKENZIE, C.B., called in; and Examined.

Col. *K. Mackenzie*, C.B.

1997. Major *Anson.*] You were Quartermaster General to the Army in China in 1860, I think?—Yes.

1998. You had the control of the whole of the transport of the army between India and China during the time it was in China?—Yes, quite so.

1999. Did you have any great difficulties with the native soldiers?—No, I had no difficulties with the native soldiers.

2000. Did you find that the transport of the native soldiers was cheaper than that of the Europeans?—The transport of the native soldiers is cheaper, because the vessels are all taken up at so much a ton, and in vessels which will take, say, 300 Europeans, you might put 450 natives.

2001. We found the greatest possible advantage from the employment of native soldiers during that war, did we not?—I do not think we could have done so well without them.

2002. In garrisoning Hong Kong, Canton, and Shanghai afterward, when the war was over, we also found a great amount of benefit from having them there?—Certainly. I think Shanghai at one time was entirely garrisoned by native troops, with the exception of either a battery or half a battery of artillery.

2003. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Was it a battery or half a battery of artillery?—I forget which; I think it was half a battery.

2004. Major *Anson.*] As Quartermaster General, you never had any difficulty in time of peace in providing the quarters for the native force stationed at Hong Kong, Shanghai, or Canton?—I had no difficulty.

2005. They were far more easily quartered and provisioned in every way than the Europeans, were they not?—They were more easily provisioned in one way; but if you provisioned a vessel for native troops, you were obliged to put native troops in it.

2006. But as regards their quarters in China, there was no difficulty in procuring them?—Not the smallest.

2007. Do you think, as a military man, that it is a good principle in an unhealthy climate like China, to employ native soldiers, they being better adapted to the climate than Europeans?—I think so, certainly, provided there is some European artillery there.

2008. Should you have any objection as a military man to have stations like the Mauritius, China, and Singapore, garrisoned by native soldiers, with European garrison artillery?—I have never been to the Mauritius; at Singapore and China I would not.

2009. You think the artillery would require some European soldiers to support them in China?—No; provided you had European artillery there, I think native troops would do all the work that was required of them, both at the Straits and in China.

2010. You are aware that we have had nothing but native soldiers and European artillery for something like 50 years at Singapore?—Yes.

2011. And that at the present moment they are about to change that system, and have a wing of a European regiment at Singapore?—Yes.

2012. Do you think that that is a wise alteration?—I think not.

2013. Do you not think that it would be infinitely better to provide those native soldiers for work in China from our Indian army, than to establish local corps?—I have a great objection to local corps; it is always difficult to keep up the discipline of local corps; I will go so far as to say that one of our best regiments should not be kept more than 12 or 18 months at the outside in one place.

2014. *Chairman.*] Do you mean by that in one colony?—No, I mean in one locale, in one colony such as China, for instance; of course in India you can move them; but I think a regiment even in a town in Great Britain, if left there more than 12 months,

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12 months, gets local ties, and altogether it is a bad arrangement.

2015. Major *Anson.*] You heard the evidence which the last witness gave in favour of the system of trusting to local levies in case of an emergency, do you think that that will be a very practicable thing?—I should be very sorry as a military man to have anything to do with them.

2016. You think that it would be far better to have native soldiers from India whenever we wanted them for the colonies than to trust to such a system as that?—I think so, certainly.

2017. Do you think with regard to the Cape itself, that it would be wise to raise several regiments of Fingoes and Kaffirs to do the work of English soldiers?—I have had no experience of those soldiers, but I should think not.

2018. It would not be nearly so safe as to have troops from India?—No, certainly not.

2019. You have commanded a regiment, I believe?—No, I never commanded a regiment.

2020. Is it your opinion that the colonial work of the British army is a great deal too heavy at present?—I think there can be no doubt of it, especially in the case of my own regiment. It went out in the time of the mutiny, and came back at the end of 1862; therefore the regiment has been little more than four years at home now, and it is going back again to India.

2021. Do you think that the amount of foreign service which the English soldier has to undertake now has a bad effect upon recruiting?—I think it has, certainly.

2022. Viscount *Hamilton.*] Which was your regiment?—The 92nd Highlanders.

2023. Colonel *North.*] Did they go out direct to India?—They went from Gibraltar overland.

2024. Viscount *Hamilton.*] Do you see any possibility of decreasing the amount of work in the British army in any other way than by substituting in some of those colonies native soldiers from India for the European soldiers who are now employed there?—I see no other way, and I see no objection to that.

2025. Do you not think that in time of war it would give us a far greater hold upon the native army in case we had to withdraw a large number of European troops from India?—Yes; I think if you employ them in the way proposed in time of peace, and keep them, as it is proposed, not too long away from their homes, they would be more likely to stick to you in time of war.

2026. You think that it is more advisable, as a question of military policy, to make use of the whole of the army of India for general military purposes, than merely to keep in garrison?—I think so, certainly.

2027. Marquis of *Hastings.*] You stated that you thought that the contemplated arrangement of sending a British regiment to Singapore was a bad one; why do you think so?—I think, with the difficulty which we have in recruiting our army, it should not be frittered away in small quantities, such as a wing of a regiment at a station; you would not have 300 men out there.

2028. Where?—I refer to the wing of a regiment which, I understand, is proposed to be sent to Singapore.

2029. Are you acquainted with the climate of Singapore?—I have been there twice.

2030. It is not an unwholesome climate, is it?—I should say that it is not a very wholesome one; it is almost on the line.

2031. Your objection is not upon the ground of the unhealthiness of the climate, but upon the ground that you object to having a small force anywhere?—I object to having a small force anywhere; one objection is, because I think, when regiments go to those distant places, the men who get sick do not go home quickly; they die there, and that interferes with the recruiting of the army. If a man gets sick at Singapore he has no way of getting home quickly.

2032. Do you think that the wing of a regiment, which it is proposed to send there, a battalion of the Ceylon Rifles, is a sufficient garrison for Singapore and the other Straits Settlements?—Yes; as long as you have European artillery there, and your fleet, which, of course, will be always, more or less, in the way. The Ceylon Rifles is a local regiment. If I understand the proposal rightly, it will be sent there to remain. I think corps from India have got more military organization, and are more likely to do the work well as soldiers than any corps you could raise from a place like Ceylon.

2033. Mr. *Oliphant.*] It is a Malay regiment; it is not raised in Ceylon?—It is local in this sense: my principle is, that if soldiers do not see other soldiers they very seldom become good soldiers. If you raise people who fancy they are soldiers without seeing other soldiers, I think the chances are that they do not turn out so well.

2034. Viscount *Hamilton.*] Without mixing with other soldiers?—Without seeing other soldiers.

2035. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Do you think that Pointe de Galle is a favourable place for a wing of a European regiment to be quartered at?—I would rather see the whole than the half of a regiment stationed anywhere, especially in a colony.

2036. Do you not think that it would be more desirable to have the whole of the regiment on the top of the mountains in Ceylon at a sanatorium?—Ceylon is not a very unhealthy place, but I think it is a bad plan dividing regiments in the way it is often done.

2037. Colonel *North.*] You mentioned that if 300 of our soldiers were on board ship, you could cram 450 black soldiers on board?—No; I say that ships are taken up at so much a ton, in Calcutta, for instance; and a ship that would take 300 European soldiers would be quite large enough to take 450 natives. In the first place, the ships for the conveyance of natives have little or no fittings; that takes up a great deal of room; and besides, the natives live a great deal on deck. You are aware that there are double awnings, and the men are quite safe on deck. A British soldier requires more protection, more accommodation, and more looking after in every way.

2038. There is no regulation as to there being so many cubic feet allowed for the native troops?—Not to the extent that there is for the European troops.

2039. With regard to the employment of native troops, would you advise their being employed in European colonies like Malta and Gibraltar; do you think that that would answer?—If we had a European war, Malta and Gibraltar are two of the most important places we have, and could be most easily fed from home, but there would be no objection to have them employed in Egypt, provided troops are required there. With regard to



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Col. K. Mackenzie, C.B.

2 April 1867.

the new arrangement of conveying troops overland to India, and I suppose to China also, you may, at any moment, in case of a continental war, bring your troops either way. I think the employment of Sikhs, and other soldiers of India, in the way proposed, would make them ready to come when they were wanted, otherwise they might not be quite so ready.

2040. Mr. *Laing.*] Have you formed any idea of the comparative expense of garrisoning a place like Singapore by native troops and by Europeans?—I should say that native troops would be very much cheaper; they do not require the same buildings; in fact, they are in their own country.

2041. You would have to relieve them very much more frequently, would you not?—Yes, you would have to relieve them every three years, or thereabouts. But then they leave their wives and families behind them, whereas our soldiers take 12 per cent. of women and as many children as these women have got; that is a vast expense.

2042. Even taking into account the expense of relieving them every three years, you think that they would still come much cheaper than European troops?—I think so, certainly; if a European soldier becomes sick you cannot get him home to his own country without great expense. The system which has prevailed in India, and which prevails now, I suppose is that during certain months in the year you send European soldiers home. That system lessens the expense, but there must be a great many who, if they could get away at once, might recover, but as they cannot get away at once die in the meantime.

2043. Marquis of *Hartington.*] With regard to expense, are you aware what the garrison of the Straits Settlements has been up to the present time?—The garrison of the Straits, as far as I know, has consisted of natives. They were all natives when I was there.

2044. Do you know the amount of the force?—No, I cannot say.

2045. Do you know what the proposed garrison is?—The proposed garrison, as I understand, is a wing of a European regiment, and a corps of Malays.

2046. And some artillery?—Yes, and some European artillery.

2047. You are not aware then, that it is expected that the new garrison will be much less expensive than the old one?—That requires to be proved; if you build barracks for European troops that will make a great difference.

2048. The barracks are built?—That is a very expensive item itself. Besides that, there is bringing the sick men home, which has a very important influence on the recruiting; men like to have a certainty that if they become ill they can get away to their own country.

2049. Sir *James Fergusson.*] The climate of Singapore is exceedingly damp, is it not?—The climate of Singapore is very damp; they say it rains every day in the year there.

2050. *Chairman.*] In a military point of view, do you think that the system we pursue of dotting about our army in small detachments all over the world is advantageous for the army itself?—Certainly not.

2051. Would it not be much better, supposing the circumstances of the empire rendered it possible to do so, to mass it in large bodies at a few points?—Most certainly.

2052. Major *Anson.*] That would apply especially to the case of the West Indies; do you not think that it is a great mistake to have detachments of our troops scattered all over the West Indies?—I have no doubt of it; I have been there, and I have felt it myself.

2053. Do you not consider that it would be a much better plan, instead of pursuing the system at places like the Mauritius, which Sir George Clerk recommended at the Cape, namely, employing troops enlisted from the population itself, to employ other natives of tropical countries who would be adapted to the climate?—Yes, I think it would be much better than employing the population itself.

2054. That would save the European troops the exposure to what is to them an unhealthy climate?—Of course it would.

2055. Great stress has been laid upon the bad character of the Sikh soldiers, and our other Indian soldiers, and their propensity to loot; during our expedition to China, in 1860, there were great temptations thrown in their way in that respect, I believe?—Certainly.

2056. Did they distinguish themselves beyond either the French or the English soldiers in bad discipline, or in their propensity in that direction?—Not in the smallest degree. The French set the example, but nobody seemed to follow it to the extent they did.

2057. In fact, as far as discipline went, there was no comparison between the French army and our Sikhs?—I think not.

2058. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] You have been asked a question about the West Indies; will you state the force of British infantry in the West Indies at present?—There is a regiment at Jamaica.

2059. One battalion at Jamaica?—One battalion at Jamaica, and the head quarters of a battalion at Barbadoes; I think that is all; the remaining portion of that regiment is scattered in the other Windward and Leeward Islands.

2060. There are, I think, only two battalions of British infantry in the West Indies?—Yes, and artillery.

2061. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Are there no infantry in the Bermudas?—Yes, there are; but that was, and I believe is still, in the Halifax command.

2062. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Is your proposal to substitute Indian troops for Europeans confined to places eastward of India, or how far would you extend the doctrine?—I would not bring them this side of Alexandria.

2063. Will you name the stations where you would propose to employ them?—I think they might be very well employed at Hong Kong, certainly; and in all China.

2064. That is, at Hong Kong. We have no troops anywhere else in China, have we, now?—And at Japan.

2065. Would you employ native Indian troops at Japan?—I would employ them at Japan.

2066. Would you not employ European troops at Japan?—Not as long as you have artillery there, and your fleet.

2067. But the fleet is a moveable force?—I believe it has always been the theory of our Government that in case of war Hong Kong and all such places will be more or less defended by the navy. If it was so arranged that the navy, in

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in going to such places, could take an extra number of marines, those men might be available if they were wanted, and they could be kept healthy on board ship.

2068. If you could induce the Admiralty to undertake our colonial garrisons?—I do not go so far as that. I only say they might send a few extra marines; that has been done already; they sent some in that way to Ireland the other day.

2069. Would you propose to withdraw the Europeans altogether, except a small detachment of artillery, from Japan?—Not a small detachment.

2070. Except a detachment of artillery?—Yes; I should like to see the artillery a larger force than it is now everywhere.

2071. What artillery, or what garrison would you maintain at Japan?—That would be a difficult question to answer, particularly with regard to artillery.

2072. Major *Anson.*] It is very difficult for anybody to know why we keep any soldiers in Japan at all, is it not?—Yes; it is, of course, not the same as one of our own colonies.

2073. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] I understand you to say that you would propose to employ Oriental troops instead of Europeans in Japan. I do not ask you to discuss the policy of employing troops in Japan; but I ask how you would propose to compose the garrison there, if you withdrew the Europeans?—I would have English artillery and a native regiment.

2074. When you say English artillery, do you mean one battery of garrison artillery?—I should like to see a couple of batteries, if we could afford it.

2075. In the case of Hong Kong, would you propose to withdraw the Europeans altogether?—All, except the artillery.

2076. You propose to withdraw all except a couple of batteries of artillery, I presume?—I think Hong Kong would require more than that.

2077. How much; I believe you are well acquainted with Hong Kong?—Yes, well. But I look upon it, that the fleet could always add very much to our strength in all such places.

2078. Will you confine yourself to the garrisons; what garrison do you think it would be necessary to leave at Hong Kong if we were to withdraw the British infantry altogether, and leave one battalion of Indian native infantry there?—The garrison of Hong Kong depends very much upon what crisis there may be. I would take all the soldiers out of Hong Kong if I possibly could and put them on the opposite side.

2079. I do not mean in a time of crisis; of course that requires special remedies; but with regard to the ordinary garrison for Hong Kong, or for Hong Kong and Kowloon, speaking of it as one post, how would you constitute the garrison if you withdrew the British infantry altogether?—For every British infantryman taken away I would send a native.

2080. What force of British artillery do you think it would be necessary to leave there?—If you had to defend Hong Kong without the assistance of a fleet, you would require a very large amount of artillery.

2081. Major *Anson.*] If you had the whole of the British army quartered at Victoria, they would not be the slighest defence against a fleet unless you had a fleet in the waters there?—Exactly.

2082. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] What is the ordinary garrison of Hong Kong and Kowloon?—I could not say.

2083. You said that you would propose to substitute Indian troops for European at Singapore and the Straits settlements?—They have always been there.

2084. You propose that the garrison should be exclusively composed of them with a detachment of artillery?—Yes; with plenty of artillery; that is the main point.

2085. And in the Mauritius?—I have never been to the Mauritius, but I see no objection to Indian troops going there too.

2086. Should you like to see the Mauritius garrisoned with native troops entirely, with the exception of some artillery?—I think so, with artillery. I understand that there has been a considerable amount of money spent upon building fortifications at the Mauritius. I do not suppose it is intended that we ever should send sufficient soldiers to defend these ports without the aid of the navy.

2087. You think not?—I suppose not. I mean to say that the force at the Mauritius now is not fit to do it.

2088. Do you think that the defence of the harbour of Mauritius will be rendered more difficult by the erection of more fortifications?—I do not know anything about the locale.

2089. Should you propose to employ Indian troops as a substitute for European troops at the Cape of Good Hope?—I have never been at the Cape of Good Hope. I do not know, and therefore I cannot say; but my view is to substitute Indian troops as much as possible, to lessen the hard work which our own troops have to do, especially at unhealthy places.

2090. Does the Cape come under that category?—I do not know; I can only say this much about the Cape, that there was a very fine regiment which came to China after having been to the Cape for some years, and that was the most unhealthy regiment of all the British white force there.

2091. Were they unhealthy before they left the Cape?—No; they would not have been sent if they had been.

2092. Would you propose to send Indian native troops to the West Indies instead of the European troops?—I think not; because I do not think the Indians would care about going so far away as that.

2093. You mean that they would care a good deal about going so far?—Yes; they would be averse to going to the West Indies.

2094. At any rate the cost of transport there would be much greater from India than that of sending troops from England to the West Indies?—Yes; of course it would; but then that is a large question, involving considerations of the healthiness of the West Indies.

2095. If there are to be European troops maintained there at all, I suppose you admit that the force of the garrison is now reduced to about the lowest point that it very well could be?—Yes; I consider that the troops in the West Indies cannot do much now.

2096. Mr. *Oliphant.*] When were you last in China?—I left China on the 14th of February 1861.



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Col. *K. Mackenzie*, C. B.

2 April 1867.

2097. Viscount *Hamilton.*] Do you consider that one battery of European artillery would be sufficient for every native regiment?—Yes.

2098. Then why would you require two in Japan as against one native regiment?—Because Japan is so far away, and on account of the health of the place, in case of sickness or casualties, it would take much time to replace them.

2099. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Japan is the most healthy place in the world?—I do not know that; one regiment that was there, the 20th, did not find that the case.

2100. Mr. *Laing.*] Do you not think that there is anything in the objection that artillery should not be left without the support of European troops?—I do not think they should ever take the field without the support of European troops. It is true of field artillery, but it is a very different thing behind walls, because you can make infantry of them, if you please, directly.

2101. In the case of garrison artillery, you see no objection to having a battery of European artillery at a place like the Mauritius, with only native infantry?—I would have more than one battery, because in case of casualties or sickness it would be difficult to replace them soon.

2102. Supposing you could only have one battery, would you think it objectionable to have at one place one battery of European artillery, with a native regiment as a permanent garrison in time of peace?—If you had one battery of artillery and one regiment of native troops, or one battery of artillery and one regiment of European troops, I do not think it would make much difference, as far as the troops go, for garrison duty.

2103. Major *Anson.*] That is, behind stone walls?—Yes; they would be equally effective.

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315

*Friday, 5th April* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

| | |
|---|---|
| Major Anson. | Viscount Hamilton. |
| Viscount Cranborne. | Colonel Percy Herbert. |
| Sir James Fergusson. | Colonel North. |

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

COLONEL JAMES MITCHELL MACDONALD, called in; and Examined.



2104. *Chairman.*] YOU belong to the Ceylon Rifle Corps, do you not?—Yes.

2105. How many years were you in Ceylon?—I joined my regiment in Ceylon in March 1831, and I have been there ever since.

2106. How long were you in the regiment?—I am still in the regiment; I have come home on medical certificate from China; I took four companies of my regiment to Hong Kong, when the 2nd battalion of the 11th Regiment were removed in consequence of sickness.

2107. Of what race is the regiment chiefly composed?—Of Malays entirely, with the exception of two companies of Sepoys.

2108. Where do the Sepoys come from?—The Sepoys originally come from Madras, but they have all been dead now for some years, and we have enlisted on the island; we have kept up the companies of Sepoys by enlistment on the island.

2109. From Madrasees who have emigrated?—Not Madrasees, a mixture; in fact, we are allowing them to die out, if possible; we have two companies remaining.

2110. What is the whole strength of the corps?—The whole strength of the corps is about 1,100, but we are below our strength; there ought to be 14 companies; some of the Malay companies are weak; perhaps there are 66 in each company.

2111. Are the Malays all drawn from the island?—They came originally from Singapore, Penang, and Malacca, most of them; now they are from the island; there are a good many soldiers' sons who have grown up there and enlisted.

2112. What pay do they receive?—They get 11 *d.* a-day.

2113. Including stoppages?—We have no stoppages; a farthing a-day, I think, is paid to the hospital, that is all, and then they have a seer of rice a day, which they pay 2 *d.* for. A seer of rice is equal to a quart; sometimes the rice is much more expensive, and the Government of the colony then pay the difference.

2114. Are those all the advantages that they get?—That is all.

2115. Is there anything in the way of clothing?—They get their clothing the same as European regiments.

2116. And pensions?—There are small pensions paid by the colony; some pensions of 7 *s.*, and some of 12 *s.*; that is about the outside; they are all paid by the colony.

2117. Is there any bounty?—Yes.

2118. What is it?—Just the same as a European's bounty.

2119. What is it?—£. 1 and a free kit.

2120. Do you increase their pay when you take them to China?—No; they get exactly the same pay; the only advantage they had in China, was that they got a ration of meat free, because the medical men thought that they were not sufficiently fed.

2121. But the pay was the same?—The pay was the same precisely. When we were there before, when I took on a wing of the regiment in 1850, there was a difference. Then the men were only receiving 9 *d.* a-day, and afterwards, when they arrived in China, they were put upon the same footing as Europeans regarding pay; that is, they received 1 *s.* a-day.

2122. They received 1 *s.* a day in China instead of 9 *d.*?—Yes; that was in 1850.

2123. Now they are only receiving 11 *d.*?—Now they are receiving 11 *d.* and a free ration of beef.

2124. Are they enlisted for general service?—Yes; for general service.

2125. Was there any discontent among them when the order to go to China was received?—Not the slightest.

2126. Do they like foreign service?—They like foreign service very well, but they do not like China; they do not like the cold; they find that they suffer in the winter.

2127. Do they dislike garrison service?—Not at all.

2128. Is there any difficulty in inducing those among them who are Hindoos to go by sea?—We have no Hindoos in the Malay companies; they are all Mahometans.

2129. None of the sepoys are Mahometans, are they?—No; not the sepoys; at least, there are a few of them.

2130. They made no difficulties, I suppose?—Not the least; we had not any difficulty; they were ready to proceed the moment they were ordered.

2131. Is the regiment entirely officered by Europeans?—By European and native officers.

2132. How high do the native officers go?—They are called captains; they are subadars and jammadars, captains and lieutenants.

2133. As I understand, the pay of the soldiers in that regiment is very much the same as the pay of the English soldier, is not it?—It is a penny a day less.



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Col. *J. M. Macdonald.*

5 April 1867.

2134. That is the whole saving upon it?—Yes; I think the European soldiers do not receive their beer money abroad.

2135. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] But then there is no free ration?—No; the Europeans get the ration for a very small sum; it is made up to them in that way.

2136. *Chairman.*] Do you find that the cost of transport is equal in the case of this corps to what it is with Europeans?—No; I do not think they require so much.

2137. They do not require so much room?—No.

2138. Do they take their wives with them?—They took their wives with them on the recent occasion; that was rather a mistake, because the women and children amounted to as many as the men themselves.

2139. Did they do that in 1850?—No; only when they went to China the other day. They went out by orders from home. There was a telegram from home to send four companies and their families; the consequence was that all the families were sent off.

2140. That was entirely a mistake in the telegram?—We suppose it was a mistake in the telegram.

2141. That was the other day?—Yes; it was all done in a great hurry.

2142. Did they take their children too?—Yes; they took the children; the women and children amounted to nearly the same number as the soldiers.

2143. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Did they stick to one wife?—Yes; they are only allowed one.

2144. Colonel *North.*] I think the number of men was 387; and altogether there were close upon 800?—There were 369 men, and there were nearly 800, including women and children; it was upwards of 700 I know.

2145. *Chairman.*] How many English officers are there to this corps?—There is a captain, a lieutenant, and an ensign to each company.

2146. They are paid, I suppose, entirely out of the colonial funds?—They have what they call the island allowance paid by the Colony, and the Queen's pay is of course paid at home.

2147. Some part of this 11*d.* a-day is Queen's pay, then?—The soldiers' pay, I believe, is all paid by the Colony; I allude to the officers. We have an island allowance; for instance, an ensign gets 10*l.* a month, island allowance, and he has his Queen's pay of 5*s.* 3*d.* a day besides. A lieutenant gets, for what is called island allowance, 12*l.* 10*s.*; a captain gets 19*l.*; a major 30*l.*, and a lieutenant colonel 40*l.* a month; that is independent of the Queen's pay.

2148. Do the officers exchange out of English regiments into the Ceylon regiment?—Frequently.

2149. And backwards?—Yes; backwards too constantly.

2150. It is part of the general English service?—Yes; quite so.

2151. When you get above the regimental rank, do you join the general list of field officers?—Yes; the same as others.

2152. Do you find the men healthy in Hong Kong?—They cannot stand the cold in winter.

2153. They do not suffer from the diseases to which the Europeans are subject?—No; they generally are carried off by colds, and so forth: for example, they suffer from bronchitis, now and then; they are very well in summer, but in winter there are a great number of them laid up. Between 1850 and 1854 we lost a great number of men; the mortality was something fearful.

2154. Colonel *North.*] The mortality was much worse than that in a European regiment, was not it?—Yes; during that time.

2155. *Chairman.*] Do you know what the death-rate is or was?—No; but I could very easily ascertain it, because there is a surgeon living now in London, who was there the whole time as assistant-surgeon with the regiment. I had some conversation with him a short time ago, and he said he should be happy to give any information he could.

2156. What is his name?—His name is Dr. Croft.

2157. Have you been in action with those troops?—No; I have been in one or two little rebellions which have occurred; there was one in 1848 when Lord Torrington, I think, was there, but we had not anything much to do; the Singalese never stood for a moment.

2158. These are Singalese in your regiment, are they not?—No; they are Malays.

2159. You mean by the Singalese, the people of the island?—Yes; they are the race of the island.

2160. The Malays in the island are not numerous enough to rebel, I suppose?—No; they are very few; they are so much thought of there that the merchants and coffee-planters get hold of them and give them any amount of pay. Our men, when they take their discharge, get 3*l.*, 4*l.*, 5*l.*, and occasionally, as much as 10*l.* a month, as trustworthy men to look after the estates, and keep the keys of the stores; they can all read and write, and they are good accountants.

2161. How do they come to enlist with you at all?—We enlisted them as boys.

2162. For what term of service do you enlist them?—Now it is a 10 years' enlistment.

2163. And you never can get them unless you enlist them as boys?—Not in Ceylon; or at any rate very few; now and then you may pick up a few, but very few indeed.

2164. At what age do you take them?—When they are very young, from about seven years of age, they get half-pay; they are employed as orderlies, and so on; they learn to do the duty of soldiers, and when old enough to bear arms they are put in the ranks; these are Malay boys; we call them half-pay boys.

2165. Have you ever seen the Ceylon regiment working together either in the field or in garrison with Indian troops?—No; I have never seen them with Indian troops.

2166. Do you know anything of Indian troops?—Nothing; I have been all my life in Ceylon, with the exception of a few years in China, and there I have never been garrisoned with any Indian troops.

2167. During those rebellions, have the Malays ever shown the slightest inclination to take the side of the rebels?—Not the slightest; during the mutiny the only European regiment we had there, the 37th, went on in a hurry from Ceylon to Calcutta, and people then thought there might be some cause for fear, but there was not the slightest symptom of anything to cause alarm.

2168. Have they ever shown the slightest sympathy

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sympathy with their co-religionists in the north of India?—Not the slightest.

2169. They have no communication with them?—No; they are more like Europeans; the officers mix with them; they play cricket and quoits, and all other games with them; they are quite different from any native regiment.

2170. Are they a religious people at all?—Yes; they have their priests.

2171. Do any of the Malays in the island go pilgrimages?—None of them.

2172. They never go to Mecca?—Not a man has ever gone, or asked to go.

2173. Has the sect of the Wahabees extended among them?—No.

2174. You never heard of it?—I never heard of it.

2175. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Which sect of the Mahometans do they belong to?—I do not know; their religion is Mahometan, and founded on the Koran, and they have a priest, and a mosque at each station.

2176. *Chairman.*] Do any difficulties occur about food?—No; we have not had any difficulty at all about food; we allow them to mess themselves; they eat beef, but the beef must be killed by one of their own people.

2177. On board ship how do they manage?—On board ship we take the salt provisions; for instance, fish.

2178. Salt pork?—No; they never touch pork at all; it is against the Mahometan religion, and caste; they will not even carry it. We had some of our Malays as waiters at mess, they did not seem to like even to carry a ham to the table.

2179. What cereal food do they eat, rice or wheat?—They eat nothing but rice and curry; they make a curry of almost anything, with vegetables of any description. They eat fish also, which is very plentiful, and they eat eggs and fowls.

2180. Had you any difficulty in keeping them in rice at Hong Kong, when you were in China?—Not the least. I was only there this last time for five weeks. I went there ill, and was obliged to leave.

2181. Sir *James Fergusson.*] You do recruit some of the Malays from abroad?—We have not been able to get any lately from abroad, in fact, we have not tried; we have not sent a recruiting party for some years.

2182. *Chairman.*] You had some difficulties in recruiting, had you not?—We had; the last time, there was only an officer and a few men sent, for a short time, and they got hardly any recruits. We believe that if recruiting parties were sent to Singapore, we should be able to recruit the regiment, and keep it up to the full strength. But the complaint of the Malays is, that when they leave their own country, they never return to it from Ceylon. The reason is that they are much better off in Ceylon, but the people at home fancy that it is very strange that they do not come back to their own country; that is one of the things I have heard from the recruiting officer.

2183. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Could not you get them by sending a recruiting party of Malays?—No; I do not think so; we have tried it on two or three occasions, but it has not been successful.

2184. You could not then depend upon getting more considerable supply, in order to garrison other places?—Not without having the head quarters there, and a band; they are very fond of music, and that attracts them very much. I am quite sure, if we had four or five companies at Singapore we should have no difficulty in getting recruits.

2185. Major *Anson.*] Do any of the Malays speak English?—Every one of them; they are drilled in English, and all speak it very well indeed, and there is not, I suppose, a man in the regiment that does not sign his name in English, or else he signs it it in Malay. It is an extraordinary thing, comparing them with a European regiment, where you see so many marks made by men who cannot write, whereas in our regiment there is not a man who cannot write his name, either in English or in Malay; they write a beautiful hand. They are very clever, and good accountants; that is the reason they are picked up by the merchants.

2186. There is no occasion for the officers who join the regiment to learn anything about their caste or their habits?—No; we do not interfere with their caste at all. We do not know of such a thing as the complaint, "It is against my caste," and so on; the thing is not known in the regiment. They are almost like Europeans; they mix with the European soldiers, they play together at cricket, and so on; they are quite a different class of people altogether from the natives.

2187. Do you think it would be possible to recruit Malays from Singapore for the Indian army?—No; I am afraid not; I do not think you would get sufficient. I know that Lord Clyde, on his way out to India, stayed with me at Pointe de Galle, where I was commandant, and he was very much taken with the appearance of the Malays. He said that he had not seen any native troops that he liked so much. They are small, but very hardy, and very intelligent; there is no trouble with them; and when the drill is once learned, they never forget it; they do not drink. The Sepoys we have do drink, and give a great deal of trouble; they have imaginary grievances, and are never satisfied. I have had some conversation with officers in the East India Company's service, and they have told me the same thing; they said the Sepoys had always given them trouble in that way, with some imaginary grievance or other.

2188. Do you think, in fact, that the Malays are so good that it would be very useful, if they could be got, to have them introduced into the native army in India?—Decidedly; I think they would be of use if they could be had.

2189. *Chairman.*] You would have to pay considerably for them; they do in India, I believe?—I think so; but the living, the price of rice, and everything of that kind, is very much cheaper in India. I fancy you would have to give them better pay.

2190. Major *Anson.*] Is rice cheaper in India than it is in Ceylon?—Very much; we get nearly all our rice from India. The higher portion of the island is all under coffee.

2191. *Chairman.*] How many seers do you get for a rupee?—There are 32 seers in a bushel; a bushel of rice varies in price from 6 *s.* up to 18 *s.*, and sometimes 1 *l.*, in times of scarcity; I have frequently known it 1 *l.*

2192. Six shillings a bushel is your lowest, and 18 *s.* is your highest price?—Sometimes when there is a great scarcity it is higher; only the



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Col. *J. M. Macdonald.*

5 April 1867.

other day I had letters from Ceylon saying that they were paying as much as 2 *l.* a bushel for it; that was only for a short time, till the vessels came in. On the average I should say the price is about 8 *s.* for 32 measures.

2193. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Still the expense of a Malay soldier is 11 *d.* a day, with a ration?—Yes; it is 11 *d.* a day, with one seer of rice, for which he pays 2 *d.*

2194. Major *Anson.*] He gets 9 *d.* a day and a free ration?—Yes.

2195. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] I think you said something about a meat ration which they got gratis?—That is in China.

2196. Then it is 11 *d.* a day, and a meat ration?—In China they had that, and a little vegetable.

2197. That is more than is given to the British soldier?—I do not know what the British soldier gets; I think he gets 1 *s.* a day there, and pays a little for his rations; he gets a pound of meat and other things, which cost him 3 *d.* or 4 *d.*, but I cannot speak about that with any certainty.

2198. A soldier in the Ceylon Rifle Corps pays nothing for his ration?—He pays for that seer of rice 2 *d.*

2199. Major *Anson.*] What sort of barracks do you have in Ceylon for your men?—The barracks are very good. When I first joined the regiment they had no barracks at all; they used huts made of sticks and mud. Now the barracks are very much improved; they are made of brick upon a single floor, and covered with tiles; they are not nearly so expensive as European barracks, but still they are as comfortable.

2200. When you went to Hong Kong this last time where were you quartered?—We were quartered in the barracks that the 2nd-11th Regiment vacated two days before we arrived.

2201. The European barracks?—Yes.

2202. Your men have not, I suppose, occupied the huts at Kowloon or the native lines in Victoria that the Sepoys occupied before?—The huts at Kowloon were merely mat sheds; they have all disappeared, and the lines that were built on the Hong Kong side were merely a temporary kind of thing; they are blown down and vacated; they are quite given up.

2203. Would your men consider the accommodation that the Sepoys and Sikhs used to have, when they were there, sufficient accommodation for them?—I think they would be very well pleased with that; all they want is a room that is dry, they do not like the thatch. Now that they have been accustomed for 20 or 25 years to have comfortable barracks, of course they feel the difference very much, but you might put them in a very much cheaper building than the European barracks; you might have a large shed erected with pillars, and built in with single brick, and tiled; they would be perfectly satisfied with that, but the Europeans in China must have an up-stairs room; they do not occupy any of the lower rooms, because they are so unhealthy.

2204. Still, finding the Malays quarters, would be more expensive than finding quarters for the native troops from India?—Yes; I think it would, if they got the same description of quarters that they get now.

2205. Do you think that for service in China, a local Ceylon corps of Malays is the best description of native soldiers you can send there?—No; I have been told that the Indian troops stand the cold in the winter better than the Malays; the Malays are always in a hot climate; they are accustomed to a hot climate.

2206. The climate at Hong Kong is not so very cold, is it?—To a native of Ceylon it is very cold; in fact in the winter months, the European soldiers are dressed as they are at home; they mount guard at night, with a great coat, gloves, and so on, just the same as in England.

2207. For garrisoning a place like Singapore, do you think that it is a good plan to use only a local Ceylon corps, or would it not be better to draw troops from a large army like the Indian native army, so as to have regular relief?—I do not know; I think the Malays would do admirably there, and a great advantage of it would be, that we should be able to keep up the regiment in Ceylon.

2208. In case of any military operations having to be undertaken in that part of the world, either in China or about the Straits, you would not be able to expand a local corps sufficiently to make use of them in case of war, would you?—Where you have native troops, I think you must always have a proportion of Europeans; I would not have a place garrisoned entirely by natives; I do not think that would be at all desirable.

2209. In case of military operations having to be undertaken in that part of the world in time of war, we should have to depend very largely upon native troops; do you think you would be able to expand your Ceylon corps sufficiently for such a purpose?—I could not say.

2210. You could not increase it to 2,000 or 3,000 men, or to 4,000 or 5,000 men?—I think not with Malays, they could not be had.

2211. We should be obliged then to have recourse to the native army in India?—Yes.

2212. Do you not think that it is much better to have one large army of native troops for service in tropical climates that can be relieved continually, than to have merely local corps like the Ceylon rifles?—The proposal was, that the six or eight companies in Ceylon would relieve the Singapore companies after any fixed time; say after two or three years.

2213. Should you object to garrisoning a place like Singapore, with nothing but Malays or other native troops, and European garrison artillery?—I think there ought to be European garrison artillery. If you had a good proportion of artillery, that would do very well; but I think it would be advisable to have the wing of a regiment there.

2214. Is that opinion of yours based on the fact that there is a large Malay population at Singapore?—At Singapore there is a large Chinese population, we have more Chinese there than Malays. I suppose there are at least 25,000 or about 26,000 Chinamen at Singapore; I do not think there is anything like that number of Malays; I cannot tell exactly, I have only touched at Singapore in going to and coming from China, but in driving through the place, I was told that there were 25,000 Chinamen; the number of Malays, it struck me, was not nearly so great as the number of Chinamen.

2215. Singapore, I think, is only two or three miles from the main land; that is, from the Malay's own country?—It is a greater distance than that.

2216. Do the Malays mix very much with the Chinese?—Not at all; they dislike each other exceedingly; I know in China I have seen several little rows between them; they hate each other.

2217. The

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319

Col. J. M. Macdonald.

5 April 1867.

2217. The Malays did not like their service in China?—No; on account, I think, of the winter; they could not stand the cold.

2218. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Did you lose many men?—We lost a great many; I do not know how many we have lost this time, because I left them after being out a very short time in China.

2219. Colonel *North.*] It appears from the returns that you lost more in proportion in China than even the 11th or the 9th?—Very likely; I was only there five weeks this time; when I left I think we had about 36 or 38 in hospital; that was a week or two after we arrived.

2220. Major *Anson.*] In case of an epidemic amongst your men the loss is very serious to your regiment?—Yes.

2221. Therefore a merely local corps of that description may at any time become totally inefficient and useless?—If they have no means of recruiting, of course there is nothing else for it.

2222. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] You said that you enlisted a good many regimental boys in your regiment?—Yes.

2223. Are you obliged to enlist them as boys, or do they get other employment if you allow them to grow up as men?—If you allowed them to grow up as men they would get employment as fast as possible, especially if they were educated; once they enter the school as half-pay boys, they are bound to enlist, unless they are rejected as unfit.

2224. They would not enlist if you allowed them to grow up as men?—No.

2225. You can only get them as boys?—They are sent to school, and when they become about 12 or 13 years of age they are employed and drilled in the regiment, and get half pay.

2226. Supposing you allowed them to grow up as men, should you be able to get their services then?—I think not.

2227. How have you kept up the strength of the corps which you have maintained for the last five years?—We have kept it up by enlisting boys from the school, and we now and then pick up a few Malays in the island.

2228. Are they island men?—Some are, and some are not; some come by the vessels which touch at the island; they are seamen.

2229. What has been your strength during the last few years?—I think, altogether, about 1,100.

2230. You have maintained that strength on the average?—Yes; it has been about the same; there has been very little difference.

2231. Your establishment is 1,400, I think?—Yes.

2232. At any rate, your number wanting to complete the establishment has not increased?—No; it is on the decline rather.

2233. You think that if you had a detachment of four or five companies at Singapore you would be able to recruit a good many men?—I think so. I do not think we should have any difficulty then.

2234. To what extent do you think you would be able to maintain the establishment if it was proposed to increase it?—I think there would be no difficulty in getting up a second battalion.

2235. Up to a couple of thousand men?—Perhaps not; I am induced to think that that is a large number.

2236. What number would you say?—Fifteen hundred men, I dare say. It is quite possible that you might get 2,000; I cannot speak to that.

2237. You think that you would probably be able to maintain 1,500 men?—I think so; recruiting at Singapore is the only means. If we failed in getting them at Singapore, by sending four or five companies there, the regiment must go down, it must die off; that is about the last thing to be tried.

2238. You think that it would be satisfactory to the men of the regiment to be quartered at Singapore, and to be relieved from Ceylon?—I am quite sure upon that point, because I have heard the men themselves speak of it. When I was in command of them, when I was going with four companies to China, we allowed them to land there and bathe and get some fresh provisions for themselves; they said it was their own country, and that they would like to be there; they prefer it even to Ceylon, I think.

2239. There would be no difficulty about the women and children; you would be able to arrange that?—Yes; I think that some alteration ought to be made on that point. I think only a certain number of men ought to be allowed to be married; it should be something like what it is with Europeans; so many to each company. I think it is a mistake allowing them to marry just as they like. The intention of allowing them to marry was that it was thought they would have a sufficient number of children to recruit the regiment from, and keep up the strength, which was not the case.

2240. The women and children do not live in barracks with them, do they?—No; the single men live in barracks by themselves the same as Europeans, and the married people have small huts.

2241. How are they built; by themselves?—No, they are built by the Government, but they are built in a very cheap way; the walls are perhaps about 10 or 12 feet high.

2242. Are they built of brick?—The pillars are brick, and then they are filled in with mud.

2243. What is called wattle and daub?—Yes.

2244. You expressed an opinion that it was not desirable to have a place like Singapore occupied by the Ceylon Rifles alone without any Europeans?—I think wherever there are native troops we always ought to have a proportion of Europeans with the natives.

2245. Both with the view of securing their fidelity, and with the view of making them more efficient in case of any active service being required of them?—Yes.

2246. With both those views?—Yes; with both.

2247. Singapore is the only garrison you could well undertake in addition to Ceylon, inasmuch as you would have a great difficulty in increasing the establishment largely?—I believe it is intended to have five companies; I have been led to suppose that that is the present intention. General Hodgson, who commanded in Ceylon, and also Colonel Layard, the senior colonel of the regiment, told me that it was intended to send nine companies to Singapore, of which five companies were to remain at Singapore, two companies were to be sent to Penang, one to Malacca, and, I think, one to Labuan. I think that was the arrangement, and that 500 men should be kept in Ceylon.

2248. Five companies of 100 men each?—Yes; and



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Col. *J. M. Macdonald.*

5 April 1867.

and to increase the regiment to 16 companies; in fact, we could not get the reliefs unless we had 16 companies.

2249. Is that leaving sufficient for the duties in Ceylon?—If it is intended to increase the garrison, as I am informed it is, it may be. When I left Ceylon there was only one regiment, the 2nd battalion of the 25th Regiment, and one battery of Artillery, and our own regiment there; but I am told now that they intend having two batteries of Artillery, and a wing of a regiment stationed at Point de Galle, the other wing is to be sent to Singapore with the Malays. I saw that in some of the newspapers.

2250. What works are there at Point de Galle; what fortifications are there which are of any importance to be held by European troops in time of war?—There is an old fort there which, I believe, they intend to dismantle altogether, and knock the walls down, and to have just one or two batteries only to defend the harbour.

2251. The fort is of a very insignificant character, is it not?—It is a rotten old Dutch fort.

2252. It is not much more than a field work?—No; it was merely built by the Dutch to protect themselves against the natives.

2253. Are there fortifications at any other points, at Trincomalee?—I have never been at Trincomalee, but they have got a fort there, I know. They have got one of the best docks in the world there.

2254. You do not know what the defences for the dock are?—No; but the engineers have been working at it for some time. Colonel Laffan was out there; there was a committee sent out to Ceylon to inquire about building fortifications, and so on, and Colonel Laffan was one of the committee. It is very well fortified.

2255. Whether it is defensible or not you do not know?—I have not been at Trincomalee.

2256. Colonel *North.*] What duties did your men do on the 2nd battalion, 11th Regiment, leaving Hong Kong; did they take the night duties, or what?—They took the place of the 11th.

2257. Did they perform the same duties?—Exactly the same (and in Ceylon in the same way they perform the same duties as the Europeans), with the exception that the natives had all the escort duty and all the exposure to the sun.

2258. Did your men do the work of the daily escort to the Stanley Barracks at Hong Kong; Stanley Barrack is on the other side of the island, is it not?—Yes; the Stanley Barrack is on the other side of the island.

2259. Did your men find the daily escort to it?—Yes; before our men landed, a fast boat came alongside of us, and we sent a company to Stanley with a captain and a subaltern.

2260. Did your regiment when they landed occupy the north barracks?—Yes.

2261. Did the women and children all go into those barracks, or were huts built for them?—No; that barrack was merely used for the single men; it is a beautiful building, very roomy, with punkahs, and everything else, which we did not require. The women and children put the Government to a great deal of expense; they were obliged to find godowns and houses belonging to the merchants to put the women and children in; it cost something enormous; they might almost have built barracks, they might certainly have built huts for the money.

2262. Then a great portion of the barracks was empty?—The barrack we occupied had only two large rooms; each room contained 100 men; in a different building we had a mess room, and accommodation for about four officers.

2263. The second twentieth were with you then, I believe?—Yes; a portion of them.

2264. Some of them were in Japan, and some had come from Japan?—Yes; when I was there there was a portion of them, I think two companies, at Japan; they had not accommodation for them at Hong Kong; the Murray Barrack was not sufficient for the 11th; there was a company quartered in some part of the town.

2265. In M'Gregor's godowns?—Yes.

2266. Viscount *Hamilton.*] Do you consider that the Malay is more to be trusted than the ordinary Indian as an individual?—We put the greatest possible confidence in them.

2267. Can you tell me at all the proportion of boys you have enlisted in comparison with the strength of the regiment?—I could not give the slightest idea. The school consists of about 50 or 60 boys, and as they grow up they become orderlies, and as soon as they become sufficiently strong to carry a rifle they are put into the ranks.

2268. Would there be about 40 or 50?—Yes; the number would be something small.

2269. If there was a detachment at Singapore, would you be able to enlist the Malays as men, or would you go upon the same principle as you do now?—No; I think we would rather enlist men as well as boys, because they save the soldiers; they do the orderly duty, the running messages and taking letters; they do just as well as the soldiers, and they do it for just one-half the expense.

2270. In fact, you would prefer to have them as boys?—Some of our very best men have been enlisted in that way, but I would take boys if full grown Malays could be found ready to enlist. They can all read and write, and they are good accountants; they turn out first-rate clerks.

2271. There are one or two outlying detachments in Ceylon, I believe; how often are they relieved?—There are detachments, I may say, all over the island. We have generally four companies at Colombo, two companies at Point de Galle, three companies at Candy, three companies at Trincomalee, and one at Badulla; and a subaltern, with a detachment of 25 men, here and there.

2272. I think there was a company at Jafnapatam when I was there?—Yes; but it is done away with now; they were invalids; but we replaced them by Malays; there is, I believe, a company of Malays there now.

2273. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Why is it necessary to have three European officers, and also two native officers for each company?—Because there is so much detached duty they are detailed all over the island.

2274. In smaller detachments than companies?—Yes; we have some detachments consisting of 25 men. When four companies were ordered to China, they intended calling all the detachments in (I do not know whether they have done so) to Candy and Colombo; they had not men enough to do the duty.

2275. Could not those duties be as well done by police as by small detachments of soldiers?—That is what they are going to do.

2276. If

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2276. If the regiment is kept together it would not be necessary to have five officers to a company, would it?—No, I do not think so.

2277. With the two native officers, would one European officer be sufficient?—I would rather have two European officers and one native officer than have two native officers and one European, because the serjeant of the company would do a good deal of the duty very well.

2278. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] As it is now, you have got two sets of officers?—We have now; we have got a captain, a lieutenant, and an ensign who are Europeans, and we have a subadar and a jemadar.

2279. I suppose the fact is that the subaltern officers have very little to do?—The native officers have very little to do compared with the Europeans; the Europeans generally do nearly everything. With regard to performing their orderly duty the European officer is responsible; he goes round first, and then he sends one of the native officers in the interim, to see that all is right.

2280. Do the European officers do precisely the same routine of duty as they do in a European regiment?—Precisely the same duty, perhaps even more.

2281. Do they look after the men's kits?—Yes, they take their turn of garrison duties.

2282. What duties do the native officers perform?—They follow the European officers in a great measure.

2283. Are they merely dummies?—They have not much to do.

2284. What advantage is there in having them at all?—If they were done away with, we are afraid that the Malays would not enlist at all, because they look forward to this as a great prize.

2285. That is the advantage of it?—That is the great advantage; it is a boon conferred on old and well-conducted serjeants.

2286. When there is any active duty to be done, are they found to lead their men?—Yes: nothing could be better; you can depend upon them. Col. *J. M. Macdonald.* 5 April 1867.

2287. Those native officers have a good deal of gallantry?—Yes, they will lead the men anywhere; you can place the greatest possible reliance upon them.

2288. Viscount *Hamilton.*] The Malay does not mind wet, but he does cold, I believe?—They do not mind wet. In the rebellion, in 1848, we had them out in all weathers, and they were very useful in going into the thick woods and jungles, and getting hold of the priests and disaffected people, and bringing them in when the Europeans could not do so. I had command myself at Kornegalle. I had both Europeans and Malays under me, and I found that the Malays were best suited for the kind of work that was required; they stood the sun better than Europeans. I sent out a party of the 37th on one occasion, and one or two of them were knocked down by the sun. The Malays do all the escort duty, going about with the treasure, and the arms and ammunition. The native troops have all that duty to do; and besides, they do not require so many nights in bed as the Europeans.

2289. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] The present organisation of the Ceylon Rifle Corps you think is very satisfactory?—I think so; and every European officer who has inspected them, from the time of Sir Edward Barnes to this day, has spoken in the highest terms of them; they drill beautifully; we have not much trouble with them, and crime is less than that of a European corps; they are very well behaved. The great thing is, they do not drink.

2290. Major *Anson.*] A battalion of about 700 men would have, on the average, about 30 European officers, would it not?—Yes; some of the companies are smaller than others.

ALEXANDER CAMPBELL MACPHERSON, Esq., called in; and Examined.

2291. *Chairman.*] You are from the Mauritius, I believe?—Yes. *A. C. Macpherson, Esq.*

2292. How many years have you been there?—I have been there 20 years.

2293. You were a Planter, I think?—Yes.

2294. Are you at all acquainted with Indian troops; have you ever seen them?—I have seen them in Bombay for a short time.

2295. Do you think that the garrison duties at the Mauritius could be performed by them?—Perfectly.

2296. What amount of troops have you been in the habit of having at the Mauritius?—Two regiments generally, and two batteries of artillery, besides engineers.

2297. I suppose that that is almost entirely to guard against the possibility of external danger?—Yes. There is scarcely a possibility of internal disturbance; we have never had any internal disturbance.

2298. You never heard of such a thing?—No.

2299. There is no disaffection there?—No.

2300. The coolies are very quiet people, are they not?—Yes.

2301. They are not numerous enough to be troublesome, I suppose?—Yes, they are very numerous; there are 245,000 immigrants.

2302. But they have never shown any inclination to be troublesome or to create disturbance?—No.

2303. Then the duties which fall upon the regiment for the purpose of maintaining internal order are very light indeed?—They are nothing at all.

2304. Are the regiments both stationed at one place?—No, they are in detachments; the principal one is at Port Louis, where there is a barrack; and there is another at Mahebourg; there are two small detachments besides.

2305. Are they disposed for the purpose of resisting a possible external attack?—I think not; I think they are so disposed for sanitary purposes chiefly.

2306. Then for any emergency that has arisen within the last 40 years, I suppose they have been absolutely useless there?—They have been perfectly useless; we have never had to call upon the military in any one instance.

2307. Do you know whether their cost is defrayed by the Colony?—£.44,000 is paid by the Colony; the total cost is 137,000 *l.*, I think.

2308. The balance is defrayed by the Imperial Government?—Yes.

2309. Then such duty as there is now, which appears to be mainly keeping within walls, can



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*A. C. Macpherson, Esq.*

5 April 1867.

be done equally well by native or by European troops?—Perfectly; but I should not think it judicious to leave Mauritius with native troops only.

2310. You think that the native troops ought to have English troops by them?—Yes, with such a large Indian population as there is there; there are 170,000 male Indian emigrants, the rest are women and children. With such a large Indian population as that I do not know how far it would be judicious to give them a chance of anything like a rebellion.

2311. Your fear would be that the native troops might sympathise with the insurgents?—Exactly if there were such; not that I anticipate anything of the kind at all.

2312. That would be rather an argument against using Indians, and in favour of using soldiers of any other race, whether European or Asiatic?—Yes, exactly; but there are a great many different sects and different classes amongst the Indians, and they do not seem to fraternise in any way.

2313. The Coolies are almost entirely from Madras, or the Valley of the Ganges, are they not?—No; a great many come from Bombay and from Scinde.

2314. Are there any Sikhs among them?—No, very rarely; there may be a few, but they do not come often, I think.

2315. Any Mahometans?—Yes; there are plenty of Lascars.

2316. From what part of India do they come?—The Lascars are chiefly from Madras, but they come also from Calcutta, and from Bengal.

2317. Are there any Mahometans from the North West?—No, I think not; they are chiefly Hindoos.

2318. Of what caste; of low caste?—I hardly understand what the castes are in India; but they are men who are very particular about their food; that seems to indicate that they are not of low caste. The Hindoos will never touch beef, and of course the Lascars will never touch pork; and there are some men I have known who never will eat anything that has had life.

2319. Do any of them object specially to fowls?—The men that I speak of would eat nothing that had life.

2320. Are there any who have a special objection to fowls, of those who would eat any living things?—No, I never heard of any.

2321. What grain do they live on?—Rice and split peas.

2322. Do you grow rice in the Mauritius?—No.

2323. Where does it come from?—Madras and Calcutta.

2324. What is about the price of it?—It is about 1½*d.* a pound.

2325. Do you at all know what that is by the seer?—It is about 9*s.* a seer.

2326. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Are the coolies in the Mauritius usually contented?—They are very contented; the rations they get are sufficient to keep them, and they can save all their wages; we are obliged to feed them.

2327. What is the feeling of the inhabitants of the Mauritius as to the maintenance of a garrison; do you think that they look upon the maintenance of a garrison as very desirable?—They think it very undesirable that they should have to pay 44,000*l.* a year for the troops.

2328. Do you think that they would rather have none at all?—No; I think that for an island like that we require some troops certainly, but one regiment would be quite sufficient; they have always been in the habit of keeping two regiments there, but on several occasions some troops have been sent away; on two occasions we have sent regiments to the Cape; and during the Indian mutiny the Governor sent both the regiments away to Bombay.

2329. Is the desire to have at least one regiment connected with the maintenance of internal order?—With a large population of that kind I think it would be desirable that there should be a certain force there.

2330. If there was only one regiment the Colonists would desire that that should be a British regiment, I suppose?—If there was to be only one regiment it ought to be British.

2331. Major *Anson.*] You have got a very large and efficient police force at the Mauritius, have you not?—Very good.

2332. They are chiefly recruited from the Malays, I believe?—No; I think they are ex-apprentices, in a great measure.

2333. There is a great mixture of all sorts, is there not?—Yes, a great mixture; there are a great many English police too; but I think there are more ex-apprentices than anything else.

2334. You would be satisfied, I suppose, with a very small European garrison, if we did employ natives?—The proof of that is, that during the Indian mutiny we sent away the two regiments, and there was only one wing of a regiment left in the island.

2335. There would be very little chance of a native, a regiment that has left its families at home in India, helping the coolies in any rioting there might be, would there?—No, I think not.

2336. In fact, the European garrison artillery in the Mauritius would be almost, if not quite, sufficient for your purposes?—Amply; a few hundred European soldiers would be all that would be wanted, with some artillery, in case of need.

2337. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] You expressed an opinion that Indian troops would perform all garrison duties at the Mauritius with great satisfaction?—Yes.

3338. You modified that afterwards, and said that you should not like to have the place left without European troops?—With regard to the garrison duty, I think the native troops could perform that perfectly well.

2339. What do you mean by garrison duties?—I mean the ordinary duties which soldiers perform in garrisons.

2340. Merely mounting sentries and so forth?—Yes.

2341. But you think it would not be desirable to leave the place without European soldiers?—I think it would be rather a risk to leave a population, where the natives of India are in so great a majority, without any aid from European soldiers.

2342. Then, in fact, the native troops are not competent to perform all the garrison duties, if you would not feel secure without an English garrison?—I think it would be wrong to leave the island without any English troops at all.

2343. I presume that it is part of the object for which the English troops are there, to keep it secure for the English inhabitants?—As I mentioned, those troops have been almost altogether taken away from the island at times.

The

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313

A. C. Macpherson, Esq.

5 April 1867.

The Governor took upon himself in the he ght of the mutiny to send the two regiments to Bombay.

2344. Were they all sent away?—No; a few hundred men of one of the regiments were kept; that was the extent of the force left in the island.

2345. The Governor might be prepared to run risks in a great emergency like that, which he would not think desirable as a permanent arrangement?—Yes, quite so.

2346. Have you ever been connected with the military profession in any way?—No, except that my father and my four brothers have been in the army.

2347. But you have not been personally connected with the army?—No.

2348. Major *Anson.*] Is there any volunteer force in the Mauritius?—No; none.

2349. Viscount *Hamilton.*] What are the fortifications at the Mauritius; there is a citadel, is not there?—They have spent a very great deal of money upon the fortifications; they never seem to have finished; they begin one plan and then another.

2350. Will you describe the fortifications?—There are two forts at the entrance of the harbour of Port Louis, and there is a citadel to command the town.

2351. Does it command the harbour?—It commands the harbour also, but it is behind the town.

2352. It commands the harbour and the two forts?—It commands the two forts, the harbour and the town.

2353. Major *Anson.*] Is the citadel large?—No, not very large.

2354. Viscount *Hamilton.*] Is there any other good port in the island?—Mahebourg, that is the first town established by the Dutch.

2355. Is that as good a harbour as Port Louis?—It is a very good harbour indeed. At one time the shipping became so numerous in Port Louis, that there was hardly room for them, and then they talked of making this a port also; ships go into it perfectly well.

2356. Whereabouts is that other harbour?—On the south side.

2357. Are there any fortifications there?—No, there is an old fort which is useless.

2358. Is there any other fortification there?—There is a sort of fort at the entrance of the harbour, three miles off at Isle de la Passe.

2359. Is there any other harbour?—Nothing to speak of; when the island was taken, the troops landed at a place called Grande Bace, but there is no harbour there.

2360. What is the character of the coast there?—It is full of reefs.

2361. It is a dangerous coast?—A very dangerous coast, but the harbour of Port Louis is very easy to enter, and to go out of.

2362. It would be impossible for any enemy to make any use of that harbour so long as we have the citadel, I presume?—I think so.

2363. Then, in time of war, it might be of importance to have a small European garrison to hold that citadel, I apprehend?—Yes, I think so in time of war. The only object of having European troops, would be to keep the native troops in awe, in the event of anything occurring which we cannot forsee amongst the native population.

2364. Would there be any object gained in having native troops there now, instead of the European troops?—There is no object in having native troops.

2365. Would there be any object gained in having Indian native troops substituted for the Europeans that are now in the Mauritius?—The Government think it necessary to have two regiments there; I think one regiment might very well be a native regiment.

2366. There would be no object gained by that, would there?—There would be no particular object gained by it; Mauritius does not require for its own safeguard anything like the amount of troops kept up there.

2367. For its own safeguard against internal enemies?—Yes.

2368. You would be sorry to see it without one regiment for that purpose?—I think so.

2369. As regards our commerce, the harbour of Port Louis would be a very important one in time of war, would it not?—No doubt very important; upwards of 200,000 tons of shipping pass there regularly every year.

2370. It would be a very large economy only that would reconcile it to you then as a matter of policy to reduce the garrison, so that there would be any risk of its falling into an enemy's hands at the commencement of a war?—In case of war, I suppose it would be Imperial policy to keep up the garrison and to make it very strong, because it is a very important place in case of war. Ships come from all quarters there; it is on the route from India and from China, and to Australia too.

2371. *Chairman.*] Do you mean to say that ships go that way to India and China; do they not keep as far from the Mauritius as they can?—The vessels keep down south very much going to China, but constantly we have vessels touching there; if they get any damages, Mauritius is the only place they can go to.

2372. You are right on the top of the typhoon?—We have hurricanes.

2373. The beginning of the typhoon?—Typhoon is the name given to storms in the Chinese seas, which do not affect Mauritius.

2374. Viscount *Hamilton.*] Do ships often put in there for supplies?—Constantly; a vessel came from China the other day with a Belloochee Regiment going to India, she became leaky, and was very glad to fetch Mauritius; that is an example of the use of Mauritius.

2375. Should you be sorry to see the garrison so reduced as to run any risk of its falling into the hands of an enemy in time of war?—Of course, as an Englishman, I should be sorry to see Mauritius fall into anybody's hands but our own.

2376. I mean not as regards the policy of this country, but as regards the commerce?—The Government could not give up the Mauritius.

2377. Major *Anson.*] We should be sorry to see any colony fall into the hands of an enemy in time of war, I suppose?—No doubt.

2378. We are not always at war; and during the long years of peace, we might be as economical in our garrison at Mauritius as possible?—I think so.

2379. When war breaks out, if we find it necessary, we can always reinforce it?—There is one thing to be remembered, Mauritius may be considered a very central point; it is close to the Cape. We sent two regiments to India, and we sent a regiment to New Zealand, so that it is a very central point at which to have some troops.



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*A. C. Macpherson, Esq.*

5 April 1867.

2380. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] It is not very near England for getting reinforcements if war breaks out, is it?—No, it is not; and New Zealand is still further off.

2381. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Do you know what force the French have at the Isle of France?—I think they have about 1,000 men.

2382. Viscount *Hamilton.*] Would the general feeling of the colonists be against a partial withdrawal of the English troops?—I think not against a partial withdrawal; but it would be against the total withdrawal of them.

2383. Major *Anson.*] Where do you get your supplies from at the Island of Mauritius?—From India.

2384. I believe the island does not support its population, does it?—It does not grow anything but sugar; it produces the money to buy the food in other countries.

2385. The produce of the island does not supply the population, does it?—We grow nothing but sugar.

2386. I believe if the sea was in the hands of an enemy, the island would be starved into submission in a very short time?—No doubt.

2387. The defence of the Mauritius depends entirely upon the presence of a fleet; if we are not masters of the sea, it does not matter what the garrison is?—No doubt if we went to war with any power that had a fleet, Mauritius would be taken and retaken more than once.

2388. Have you any idea what length of time there are supplies for in the granaries at Mauritius?—For three or four months.

2389. *Chairman.*] You have to send elsewhere for your meat, have you not?—We have to send to Madagascar; but only the Europeans eat meat, and some of the creole families; otherwise the few blacks that are remaining and the ex-apprentices very seldom want meat, they live on rice and curries.

2390. Are there black aborigines?—No, there were no aborigines in the island, they are the descendants of the old black slaves. When the island was first taken there were none on it.

2391. Major *Anson.*] In the case of our losing the command of the sea just round the Mauritius, it would be far easier to provision a garrison of native soldiers than it would be to provision a garrison of European soldiers, who depend upon meat, would it not?—There are always a large quantity of bullocks in the place, for draught. In case of emergency those could be used for food.

2392. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Have you ever been at Bourbon?—I have.

2393. How far is it from the Mauritius?—Ninety miles.

2394. Does the trade wind blow from it upon the Mauritius?—The trade wind blows from Mauritius to Bourbon.

2395. Do you happen to know what the usual force of the French garrison is there?—It is about 1,000 men.

2396. Only one battalion of infantry?—One battalion, a marine battalion.

2397. There is no good harbour there, is there?—There is no harbour, it is an open roadstead; it is extremely dangerous. All the French ships are obliged to come to Mauritius to repair.

2398. *Chairman.*] Does that country support itself, or have they not to draw their supplies from elsewhere?—They live in the same way as Mauritius; they grow very little else but sugar, and a little coffee and spices. I was asked just now with regard to troops in case of war. I think a very small force might protect the harbour of Port Louis; but there are so many other places round the island where a landing could he effected, that it would be quite impossible that a regiment could keep the island against any marine force.

2399. If any marine force could blockade the island for a couple of months, you must all surrender at discretion?—No, not in a couple of months; because in a case of that kind the supplies would be economised, just as whenever rice becomes very dear, you see the consumption fall off immediately.

2400. Could you not grow anything except sugar?—We could grow anything. I grew 30 acres of oats last year; I always do grow a little rice, a few hundred bags.

2401. It is only that the land is more valuable under sugar?—Yes.

2402. Major *Anson.*] Do you know what sum of money was spent upon these fortifications in the island of Mauritius?—Some frightful sum of money.

2403. Something like 250,000 *l.*?—I expect it is much more than that from the beginning. Certainly, since I have been there, they have altered the plan two or three times.

2404. I believe it has been stated, by Sir John Burgoyne, that it would take 6,000 men to defend those fortifications in case of war?—That shows the absurdity of it, because an enemy's fleet would not come and place itself immediately before those fortifications. The place where we landed, when we took the island in 1810, was at Grande Baile; there are no fortifications there, and all round the coast there are small places where troops could land very easily.

2405. In fact the effect of keeping 2,000 European soldiers in an island, like the Mauritius, for the purpose of a garrison is, that in all probability if the enemy did land upon the island, we should lose the services of those 2,000 men if they had to defend fortications, which would require 6,000 men to defend?—It would be impossible to fortify the island, the only defence that the island could ever have is the navy.

2406. That is the proper defence for the island?—Yes.

2407. In fact, even in time of war, you might look upon the garrison of the place as doing a sort of police duty for internal purposes?—It would be very little more.

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315

*Tuesday, 9th April* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

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|---|---|
| Major Anson. | Colonel Percy Herbert. |
| Viscount Cranborne. | Colonel North. |
| Sir James Fergusson. | Mr. Oliphant. |
| Viscount Hamilton. | Sir Henry Rawlinson. |
| Marquis of Hartington. | Captain Vivian. |
| Captain Hayter. | |

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

HENRY TAYLOR, Esq., called in; and Examined.

*H. Taylor, Esq.*

9 April 1867.

2408. *Chairman.*] WILL you state your position in the Colonial Office?—I am a Senior Clerk.

2409. How many years have you been there?—For 43 years; I think over 43 years.

2410. Have your duties led you to an acquaintance with the way in which the coloured troops in the Colonies are working?—Yes, chiefly as to the West Indies and Mauritius. That is my division of the business in the Colonial Office.

2411. Are there any coloured troops in the Mauritius?—No, none.

2412. They only exist in the West India Islands and in Ceylon, do they?—Only in the West India Islands, the West Coast of Africa, and Ceylon; that is, there are only two coloured corps, the one of which consists of the West India regiments and the other of the Ceylon Rifle Corps, the West India regiments being Negroes, and the Ceylon Rifle Corps Malays. My business has only led me to know something about the West India regiments in the West Indies.

2413. What number of regiments are there in the West Indies?—There are four Black regiments in the West Indies and on the West Coast of Africa together.

2414. What is the strength of them?—In the whole there are four regiments, each consisting of from 700 to 800 men; you may take it at about 700 effective (for which I suppose you may reckon from 700 to 800 gross numbers), and therefore there would be about 2,800 effectives altogether.

2415. They are officered, are they not, by English officers?—Yes.

2416. Do they have the full complement of officers which an English regiment has?—I do not know that; I believe they have.

2417. Do you know what their pay is?—I do not know; I think the pay does not differ from that of other regiments.

2418. It is the same as that of the other soldiers of the Line?—I think so.

2419. Then they are in no respect cheaper than English soldiers?—I believe not at all, except in this sense, that with English soldiers you have the expense of sending them backwards and forwards to England when invalided, and also for reliefs, which you have not in the case of the West India regiments.

2420. And another advantage is, I suppose, that they are better fitted to bear the climate to which they are exposed than European troops would be?—Yes, certainly.

2421. Do you know at all what the death rate among them is?—Between two and three per cent. in the West Indies; on the West Coast of Africa four per cent. That is a rather high death-rate, considering that they are in the prime of life,

2422. I suppose the management of them is exactly the same as that of a White regiment; for instance, they do not carry their families with them, or differ in any social peculiarity from any ordinary private soldier?—Not that I know of; they perform their own fatigue duties, which white soldiers do not generally perform in the Windward and Leeward Island command.

2423. Are they supposed to be good soldiers?—That rather depends upon the purpose to which they are to be applied. It is a question upon which I am entitled to speak, not as giving my own opinion, but from the opinions of governors who have reported very largely upon the subject. Nobody doubts that they are very good and brave troops against foreign aggression. Then, as to their value as against their own race in the West Indies, in case of internal disturbances, the doubt which has arisen is principally a doubt having reference to a change in the source whence the recruits were derived. Till some 15 or 20 years ago they were recruited mainly from the cargoes of captured slavers, and from the coast of Africa.

2424. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] That is to say, from liberated Africans, I suppose?—Yes, liberated Africans. When that source failed, when slavers ceased to be captured in any large numbers, they had to be recruited from Creole Negroes; and then arose the question whether, being recruited from their own race in the West Indies, they would act with fidelity against their own race in those Colonies. That is a question upon which divers opinions have been maintained; and I think that if I were to give the opinion to result from the balance of opinions upon the subject, I should say that they were supposed to be good as against their own race as well as against foreign aggression, provided they were combined with white troops, or not acting in the Colony in which they had been recruited (which is mainly Barbadoes), and provided they were well officered and well handled;



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*H. Taylor, Esq.*

9 April 1867.

which last is, however, rather a pregnant reservation in the case of the West India regiments; because I believe the officers are apt to be deteriorated in health by serving very long on the West Coast of Africa and in the West Indies.

2425. *Chairman.*] Then this comparative inferiority of the officers, owing to the circumstances of their service, is sufficiently grave to make you doubt on the whole, whether these troops could, under such officers, be employed safely against their own countrymen?—I think they could; but I do not regard it as certain that they could; and having only derived my opinions from an examination of the opinions of governors, who are entitled to form an opinion upon such a question, I should wish just to give the Committee a sort of summary of the opinions of the governors. If you will allow me, I will begin with an opinion, given rather more at large, of a governor, who was also a military man, Colonel Ord. He had experience in the West Indies as the Lieutenant Governor of Dominica; he has been on the Gold Coast too, I think; and being an engineer officer of considerable experience, I should take his opinion as having a double value, military and civil. On the 22nd of November 1860, he was called upon to report upon the subject, and I give these extracts from his report: "As far as I am informed, the black regiments are now recruited almost exclusively from West Indian creoles. Recruiting, I believe, takes place when in Africa, but not to any considerable extent; and it appears to be the present constitution of the regiments which has led to the inference that, if it became necessary to employ them in any popular disturbance, these troops would be found indisposed to act against the native population, from which class they are recruited. I do not know exactly how this inference has been created, but if it be simply an opinion, to this moment unsupported by facts, I take leave respectfully, but strongly, to urge that the superior officers of the corps ought to be able to speak with more certainty on the point than anyone else can possibly do. I have no hesitation in expressing my opinion that there ought not to be the slightest reason for entertaining such a fear. All experience goes to prove that when once a man becomes a soldier, he loses his civilian tastes and his sympathy for the class to which he belonged. No doubt is ever entertained of the readiness of British troops to act under any circumstances against the people. The Irish police are not found to hesitate, even in that country of national sympathies, when their services are called for against their countrymen, and I can see no reason why there should exist in the West India regiments, even recruited as they now are, a different spirit from that which animates others of Her Majesty's troops. If their officers will but bestow upon them" (this comes, you see, to the question of the officers) "that care and sympathy to which they are entitled, if they will cultivate that relation with them which exists between the officers and men of those regiments standing highest in our service, it may safely be affirmed they will soon acquire an influence over their men which will justify any confidence that may be placed in them. In the absence of this intercourse between officer and soldier, there can be no certainty on the part of the former how far they can rely upon their men, and a force designed for protection becomes worse than useless, perhaps dangerous."

2426. Colonel *North.*] What is the date of that report?—The date of it is the 22nd November 1860; that is about seven years, I think, after the West India regiments came to consist of men recruited in the West Indies and not in Africa or from captured Africans. That, you see, is a very strong opinion, until you come to the condition which I before alluded to.

2427. You mean the question about the officers?—Yes.

2428. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] I observe that he speaks of creoles; does he mean that there is any intermixture of blood, or does he mean merely Africans born in Barbadoes?—He means Africans born in the West Indies; the word "creoles," means persons born in the West Indies, without reference to blood; a white man may be a creole, and a black man may equally be a creole.

2429. *Chairman.*] Do the natives recruited from Barbadoes speak any dialect of their own or do they speak English?—All the negroes speak a sort of dialect, but it is intelligible to those who are at all used to them.

2430. It is not a special dialect that would be known to the other negroes in other islands?—It is merely a sort of barbarous English.

2431. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] There is no expression of opinion, as I gathered from the paper you read, on the part of Colonel Ord, that the officers have not that acquaintance with their men which is considered desirable?—No, it is hardly expressed. "If their officers will but bestow upon them, &c." "they will soon acquire, &c.": you must take that for what it is worth.

2432. There is no expression of opinion there?—No. I believe that there are very good officers in the West India regiments. Officers go into the West India regiments from other regiments to get a step in promotion earlier than they otherwise would do; they remain in them a certain length of time; and some of them are of high character, and have served, I believe, with great credit. But then there are other officers who have been perhaps, in point of health, too long resident in hot climates on the coast of Africa and in the West Indies. What I propose to do now is to give a summary of the opinions of other West Indian governors upon the West India regiments, not in their own language, but so far as may be done in a few words, giving the general effect of each governor's opinions. Sir Benjamin Pine——

2433. Will you state where he was governor?—He was Lieutenant Governor of St. Christopher's, and he was also on the West Coast of Africa; he had a good deal to do with black troops; he is now administering the government of the Leeward Islands. Sir B. Pine is against the black troops if recruited in the West Indies in cases of internal tumult. Sir Charles Darling, who was Governor of Jamaica, on three occasions, in St. Lucia 1849, in Jamaica twice in 1859, had employed blacks, in 1849 recruited from Africa, in 1859 recruited from the West Indies, against negro rioters, and they behaved well, only needing to be restrained. That, I think, is a point which should be taken into account in looking into the character of black troops; it is not fidelity only which is in question, but the degree of humanity and moderation with which they would act, even against their own race. They require, according to Sir Charles, more than other troops, to be well commanded. Governor Hincks thought there

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was great hostility in Barbadoes to blacks without whites; better none than blacks only. Governor Hincks is now in this country, and I believe that you could have no better civilian witness as to military matters in the West Indies. I do not know that I agree with all his opinions, but they are the opinions of a man who is peculiarly competent, so far as a civilian can be so, to form opinions upon the subject. Governor Bayley thought that negro regiments would be trustworthy for all purposes if half or a third are African, or if many are rural and not town creoles. I believe that that is a condition which cannot be fulfilled; you must in general, I believe, recruit from the town populations in the West Indies. This Governor, like others, adds the condition that they must be commanded by officers not the worse for the tropics; and he, like Sir C. Darling, thinks that they require restraint rather than stimulation. He recommends (and this is bearing directly upon your inquiry) mixing Madrasees, as well as African blacks, with creole blacks in the same regiment.

2434. *Chairman.*] The Madrasees are of course the coolies who have been imported?—No, he did not mean that; he meant to fetch recruits from Madras.

2435. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Whose opinion have you been quoting?—The opinion of Governor Bayley; he was Governor of the Bahamas in 1861. As to that recommendation, the question would be, it seems to me, whether in the same regiment you could compact together two different black races. I do not think you could; I believe that the different black races have more of an aversion to each other than whites and blacks have to each other. They have the aversion without the respect which is felt by the negroes for the whites.

2436. *Chairman.*] Have you any practical knowledge that leads you to that conclusion. I mean has it come before you officially in any way?—I hardly know whence I get the impression; I think I may say it has. Negro troops have been employed against Yucatecan Indians in British Honduras, and there is a very bitter hatred between the negroes and the Indians, which there is not between the whites and the Indians.

2437. Would it be a hatred that would make it impossible to employ both in the same ranks?—If not impossible, I should think inexpedient; it is a matter of opinion. I do not mean to say that a conclusive opinion can be formed upon that, but I should doubt very much whether it would be expedient to employ two distinctly diverse black races in one regiment.

2438. Are there not two aspects to that hostility; if it make their co-operation in the ranks somewhat difficult, would it not also make mutiny almost impossible?—Yes; that is the view of Governor Bayley.

2439. Will you proceed with any opinions you have to read?—Governor Bayley thinks that the Madras soldiers would take root in the soil, as the Malays do in Ceylon; that they would live there and have their families. Then I have the opinion of Governor Hamilton, who was Governor in Chief of the Leeward Islands, to the effect that blacks are not trustworthy in a black and white quarrel, unless there be white troops at hand. All the opinions I have hitherto quoted were delivered in 1861; those which follow in 1865. Governor Eyre thinks that "blacks without whites at hand, would be a source of danger in many West Indian towns." That was in March 1865, previously to the outbreak in Jamaica in October, in which the blacks did act with perfect vigour and fidelity against the negroes.

2440. Was there any instance of desertion or indoor treachery on that occasion among the black troops?—None whatever; they behaved perfectly well.

2441. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*] You mean the Maroons?—No, I mean the West Indian regiments; it is true of both however. When I say they behaved well, I mean in point of fidelity. They required restraint; they were disorderly, and committed outrages.

2442. *Chairman.*] I speak merely of the question of fidelity?—As to fidelity, they were perfect. The last opinion I have to quote is that of Governor Walker, the Governor in Chief of Barbadoes and the Windward Islands, who would regard a black force as, in any outbreak, merely dangerous, and requiring the control of white troops.

2443. Did he found that upon any practical experience, or was it a general judgment?—I think, only upon general impressions. Those are the opinions which I have gathered from the despatches of Governors. Then I thought you might wish to be made acquainted with any facts and instances which might either illustrate the opinions or contravene them. The first instance I have to mention of the employment of black troops against negroes is of a date when creoles may not have been numerous in the West India regiments. In 1856, the negroes throughout British Guiana rose upon the Portugese immigrants. The Portugese immigrants, to the number of many thousands, had taken the huckstering business almost entirely into their own hands; all the small shops were in the possession of these immigrants; there was a great jealousy on the part of the negroes of the Portugese; and they were incited by a man who first began to agitate upon the question of Roman Catholicism as against the Portugese immigrants, and then instigated the blacks to make it a question of plunder; and they rose throughout the Colony.

2444. Do you mean to say that the blacks rose upon a Protestant cry?—The Governor said that this man began with preaching against the Roman Catholics; but that he knew what the state of feeling was, and his real object was to incite an outbreak of the negroes against the Portuguese immigrants for purposes of plunder.

2445. Is there a strong Protestant feeling amongst the blacks?—Not at all. This man was a mere adventurer, who was bent upon mischief, and he began it in that way.

2446. Major *Anson.*] They are almost entirely Baptists, are they not?—No, I think not; they vary much in different Colonies as to creed. I should think that in British Guiana the great majority are Anglican, Presbyterian and Methodist, there are not many Roman Catholics amongst the negroes, and I should think very few Baptists.

2447. *Chairman.*] Will you proceed with the instances you were citing?—The Governor, Sir P. Wodehouse, reports, that "the whole country was, it may be said, in insurrection;" and he adds, "One thing is clear, that it is a strife of races." That is very important, looking to what



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*H. Taylor*, Esq.

9 April 1867.

what the black troops did. The Governor applied for a reinforcement of troops to the extent of 200, to be partly white troops if possible. Two hundred men were sent from Barbadoes, but they were all black. The garrison in the Colony at the time was 484 men, who were also all black. The troops were reported as having "toiled cheerfully and perseveringly in support of the Government." Now, that is a case in which the military force was entirely black; in which it was a rising of the black population, and in which the rising was put down by the black troops without any assistance from whites. At the same time they were well led upon that occasion (Colonel Whitfield was then in command of the troops there); so that it may be considered as an instance of black troops, not wholly or perhaps mainly creoles, being available against black populations, if well led. The next instance of riots is of some which occurred in Trinidad; but I think those were hardly important enough to be worth mentioning; it was a mere town riot, and the white troops were in a large majority, so that the black troops could not have behaved ill if they had wished. It is, therefore, scarcely to the purpose. In Antigua there were riots in 1858. There were, at that time, no troops in the island, and no militia, but the riots were put down by the police.

2448. Were the police blacks?—They were riots of the blacks; and the police were black. Then comes an important instance. In St. Vincent's there were riots in 1862, which extended throughout the country. Troops were sent there from Barbadoes, but they did not come in time, and the riots had been put down, not by the black troops of the West India regiments, but simply by the police and a local force of blacks, for the most part raised at the moment. The Lieutenant Governor, in reporting the fidelity of the blacks, says, "It had a discouraging effect upon the malcontent population to find that their own race would act against them when put under white leaders." In that case, too, the blacks were ably led by the Attorney General of the island, not a military man. Those are the instances I have collected.

2449. Then, as I understand you, there is no instance of blacks having been unfaithful to their colours, when opposed to insurgents of their own race?—I believe none.

2450. Of course if they had to deal with coolies of an Indian race there could be no doubt of their fidelity?—I should think none.

2451. Mauritius is in your department, I think?—Yes, it is.

2452. There are a very large number of coolies there, are there not?—The coolies are about five-sevenths of the population, they amount to 250,000 out of a population of 350,000, I think, speaking in round numbers.

2453. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] What do the other two-sevenths consist of?—I can give it to you in round numbers; it is given in detail in a paper I have here, but if you do not want it in such detail, the population is about 350,000; the coolies 250,000, the negroes 100,000, and the whites, exclusive of the garrison, 4,000.

2454. *Chairman.*] Should you think that it was possible to raise a negro regiment in Mauritius, to replace the English troops?—I have never heard it suggested before; the negroes in Mauritius are a very lazy race.

2455. They are Mozambiques, I suppose, from the east coast of Africa?—I do not know; I should think very probably that a large proportion of them are the descendants of that race.

2456. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] They are the descendants of negro slaves, are they not?—Yes. I should doubt their being willing to serve as troops. They seem to be willing to do nothing almost, except huckstering and small shop-keeping; there are a few artisans; but they will not work in the fields; they work, I suppose, in provision grounds more or less; but they have sunk almost out of notice in the population. It might be tried to raise recruits from them. I suppose it would have been tried if the military authorities had thought they could succeed, because there has been great difficulty in getting recruits for the West India regiments. An attempt was made to raise a fifth West India regiment about two or three years ago, but it did not prosper; they raised about half after much delay, and then a decision was taken to reduce the garrisons on the West Coast of Africa, and it was disbanded.

2457. *Chairman.*] Do you know from what part of India the coolies in the Mauritius mainly come?—From Bengal mainly, from Madras partly.

2458. Do you know from what portion of Bengal?—I think not very far from Calcutta, and lately, in consequence of the famine, they have been taken from Orissa. I cannot give it to you more in detail than as distinguishing those from Bengal and those from Madras.

2459. Are they a docile and peaceable population?—I think they are, very.

2460. Have they ever shown signs in any of the West Indian Colonies of revolts?—Not the least.

2461. There has absolutely been no occasion upon which it has been necessary to employ force against them there?—No. Governor Manners Sutton reported upon them in reference to the garrison of Trinidad in the year 1865, and he said that they were a very harmless and peaceable race.

2462. Then you would not look upon a rising on their part as one of the dangers against which a garrison would have to provide?—I think not. They are capable of very ferocious private crimes, such as murders; but these arise mainly from quarrels about women, inasmuch as the women are not one-third of the number of the immigrants; and I think that that is quite a thing apart from their qualities as members of the community, and their dispositions as subjects of the State.

2463. Then there would be no danger in employing East Indian troops in the Mauritius, so far as the coolie population was concerned?—I think none.

2464. And still less in employing races from other parts of India from which they had not come?—I think there would be none. I should say, however, that there was a little alarm amongst the people of Mauritius after the outbreak of the Indian mutiny. When their garrison was taken away at the time of the Indian mutiny, they felt rather nervous about the number of Indians who were in the island without any garrison to control them. I do not believe that there was really much to be feared.

2465. It was an alarm that proved to be wholly groundless, as far as the actual facts were concerned, was it not?—It was; and there was this difference between the coolies and the Indian mutineers;

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mutineers; that the coolies in Mauritius have hardly any religion at all; their religion has been almost entirely effaced and obliterated.

2466. Have you not had rather a serious controversy about decapitation, in consequence of their religious scruples?—If you call that religion; superstition on that point no doubt exists among them; they do not like having their heads cut off, because they conceive that after the head is cut off, the head and the body will wander about for many ages in search of each other, before they can meet: whereas if they are hung or strangled, they think they shall pass at once into another state in all their integrity.

2467. There are no dangers of their religious feelings or their caste feelings leading to any popular disturbance?—I think not.

2468. And you do not think that any strong bond of nationality exists between them which would induce them to act together?—That I do not know; if they were induced to act I should think they would act together. But I think their circumstances make them naturally contented; they get high wages and they thrive. If the women were equal in numbers to the men they would be in a very happy and prosperous condition. I do not see why they should revolt, not having, as I believe, any adequate religious feeling to make them desirous to disconnect themselves from European dominion.

2469. I suppose the inhabitants, not only of Mauritius but of most other English Colonies, would always prefer European troops to Asiatic troops?—No doubt.

2470. Do you think that that is a feeling arising from a greater sense of security, or from a point of honour?—A greater sense of security, I think.

2471. Do you think that the people of Mauritius would be seriously alarmed if the English garrison were replaced by Asiatics?—I think they would not like it at all.

2472. Do you think that their distaste would rise to such a point as to induce them to demur to the payment which they now contribute to those troops?—I think they would consider it a fair occasion to request to be relieved from their contribution.

2473. Which would they rather have, Asiatic troops or no troops at all?—I should think they would rather have Asiatic troops than no troops at all; but I speak merely as a matter of conjecture.

2474. The question has never been put to them, and therefore any impression as to their feelings must be a matter of conjecture?—I think they would not anticipate any such measure; I do not mean with a view to internal peace; but they would bear in mind that Mauritius is within a short distance of Bourbon, where a large garrison is kept, and whence it might be very possible, in case of a war with France, to send an expeditionary force. The Mauritius people would, therefore, think it very unlikely that this country would be content to trust that island to any troops but Europeans.

2475. What is the size of the Bourbon garrison?—I cannot tell you.

2476. Is it a European garrison?—I believe so.

2477. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Can you ascertain?—I will endeavour to do so.

2478. It must be known in the Colonial Office?—No, I think not. I am not sure that I can ascertain; I am rather at a loss to know where we should find it.

2479. Will you inquire, and let us know if you are able to find it out?—I will do so. (*See* Appendix.)

2480. *Chairman.*] Have you paid any attention to the question of the defence of Mauritius in time of war; has that come before your department at all?—Yes, I had a good deal to do with it some years ago, when it was proposed to erect very extensive fortifications for the defence of Port Louis.

2481. But you have erected very expensive fortifications, have you not?—Not nearly such expensive fortifications as it was proposed to erect.

2482. How many men are now required to hold Port Louis?—The garrison consists now of from 1,800 to 2,000 men.

2483. But how many men are required to man the fortifications in case of attack?—That I do not know; but when there was a question of erecting very extensive fortifications, far more extensive than those which were afterwards decided upon, it was found, I believe, that the number of troops required to man the proposed fortifications would be far too large to make it desirable that such fortifications should be erected; and it was also found that without those extremely expensive fortifications it was in vain to hope to maintain Port Louis against an attack by troops landed in other parts of the island; that you might defend the harbour and the access to the harbour, but that you could not prevent Port Louis being taken in reverse, and that no troops that you could at all afford to keep there habitually would be sufficient to hold Port Louis against such an expeditionary force as might be sent by surprise to attack it.

2484. Then Port Louis is absolutely defenceless at the present moment?—I should say that the real security of Mauritius consists in the fact that it is not worth taking, because, being taken, it could not be kept without maritime superiority.

2485. Then what is the use of the 2,000 men?—In the event of a war they would prevent insult by a privateer or capture by a small force. But I feel I am venturing upon opinions on military matters which are not quite within my competency.

2486. With reference to the force now maintained in Mauritius and the defensibility of it, I gather your general opinion to be, that the defence of Mauritius in case of an attack would depend more upon a fleet than upon the garrison. I think the utmost extent to which you said the existing garrison would be of service in repelling an hostile attack was in the case of an accidental insult from a privateer?—Yes; a privateer or a small expeditionary force. At the same time I should say that these are military opinions which I can give rather by reflection from the opinions of military men, than from any real opinion of my own; but I rather gathered, when the question arose about those fortifications, that that was the view that would be taken, and was taken, by military authorities of some weight.

2487. Therefore it would not be a matter of very great Imperial importance whether the 2,000 men who were in that garrison were Europeans or were Asiatics, with reference to the repelling of any external attack?—No, I think not. I think that the Mauritius people would exceedingly dislike to have the Europeans exchanged for Asiatics, and that their contribution, which is, I think, 48,000*l.*



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*H. Taylor.* Esq. 9 April 1867.

48,000 *l.* a year, if I recollect rightly, speaking from memory, would be considered too much.

2488. What is our contribution, do you know?—I do not happen to remember it at the moment.

2489. Major *Anson.*] It appears that the Colony pays 45,000 *l.* and the Imperial Government 132,000 *l.*?—I did not remember the amounts.

2490. *Chairman.*] Is there not something besides that; do you not think that the colonists would look upon it rather from the point of view of dignity, than of actual safety; or at least that they would look upon it from the point of dignity, as well as from the point of actual safety?—I do not know. One thing is, that we have very few English there; the colonists are mainly French, and if there were to be an expeditionary force from Bourbon, there would be no Anglo-Saxon nucleus of a population for a military force to rest upon. A force could rendezvous at Bourbon, I imagine, which could be sent on an expedition to Mauritius in greater strength than any garrison, either Sikh or European, could at the moment resist. But then, on the other hand, when an expeditionary force came to be sent to retake Mauritius, it would entirely depend upon maritime superiority whether the French would not have gone to the trouble of taking it to no purpose.

2491. There is no telegraph, is there, to Bourbon?—No.

2492. There would be no means of ordering from Europe such a sudden *coup de main* as you contemplate, so as to prevent the English Government having time, in case of war, to garrison Mauritius as it might think fit?—No, I should think not.

2493. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Could they not send overland by the French line of steamers, which now runs direct to Mauritius?—Yes.

2494. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Only from Suez?—Yes, I suppose so.

2495. Sir *James Fergusson.*] It has not been uncommon in former wars, I believe, to give the Governors of Colonies, notice of the probability of war, so that they might be ready to act?—No; I suppose that must depend upon the circumstances under which war broke out.

2496. *Chairman.*] At all events the whole value of keeping the garrison, in case of such a contingency as that, would depend entirely upon the probability of the declaration of war coming with such rapidity that there would be no time to garrison Mauritius afresh?—Yes.

2497. And it is apparently purely for the sake of avoiding that contingency that we keep up this European garrison there?—That we keep it up to the force at which we do keep it up. I do not think that a Colony so large and important as Mauritius in point of numbers and wealth, could be left without some garrison competent to keep the peace in cases of any disturbance, (for though serious disturbance is not probable, it is, of course possible that there may be some disturbance), or as I said before, to beat off a privateer in case of war. Some garrison would always be required, I imagine, for such an important Colony as Mauritius.

2498. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Was the European garrison withdrawn at the time of the Indian mutiny?—Almost the whole of it, I think.

2499. And was there any volunteer force raised to take its place?—Not that I recollect.

2500. Do you think that the island remained without any military force for any considerable length of time?—I think it did for some time. Perhaps not without naval protection; that I do not recollect.

2501. Major *Anson.*] Considering that we pay three times as much for the defence of the Mauritius as the colonists do, we ought to have a far greater voice in the garrison we choose to keep there, ought we not?—Yes; but then it is to be borne in mind that it is only very lately that Mauritius has been called upon to pay the amount that it now pays.

2502. Can you tell me upon what grounds they are called upon to pay 45,000 *l.* towards the expenses of the garrison?—Only, I believe, upon the grounds that they ought to be partly at the expense of their own protection, and that they were a rich Colony which could afford to pay.

2503. Was it upon the principle that the troops are there to suppress any local disturbances?—Yes, and on that ground also.

2504. With regard to the Cape of Good Hope, I see that we pay not less a sum than 289,379 *l.* for the military defence of the Cape of Good Hope and Natal, and that the colonists only pay 41,000 *l.* towards their share. In the case of altering the garrison, they would not have any right to dictate to us what description of troops we should send there. In your opinion, it would be a matter for this country to decide, and not for the colonists of the Cape of Good Hope?—Yes, I think so.

2505. If we considered that native regiments from India were as efficient for the work that has to be done in the Cape as European soldiers, they could hardly raise any objection to our employing them, could they?—No, I do not think that they would have any right to raise an objection.

2506. Do you think that it would be likely that they would adopt any extreme measure if we chose to alter the garrison as we thought fit?—I should think it quite possible that they might be disposed to withdraw their contribution. Of course the answer to that would be the withdrawal of military protection; but when you come to that extremity, you come to a difficulty with your Colony, which it is not easy to get over.

2507. Do you think that such a result would be likely to occur merely from the exchange of one or two regiments?—I think that Colonies which have independent legislatures, and where the power of the Crown is very small, are very much disposed to have their own way upon all questions.

2508. Even though the Imperial Government pays for their defence?—Yes. Of course, there is always in reserve the power of the Crown to withdraw the military protection; but then that is a power which cannot be exercised except in deference to some necessity almost. I think what you have to do with Colonies in which the Crown is without legal power, is very much to consult their inclinations, and negotiate with them upon the ground of not coming to any extreme difference of view or opinion.

2509. Sir *James Fergusson.*] What do you exactly mean by a Colony in which the Crown has not legal power?—I mean Colonies in which a representative legislature has been constituted, and in which the Crown's only legislative power is the power of the veto.

2510. Major *Anson.*] Is that the case with the Cape

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Cape at the present moment?—Yes, that is the case at the Cape.

2511. I see, in the case of the Australian Colonies, that our military expenditure for maintaining garrisons there amounts to 170,696 *l.*, and that the colonists only contribute towards that, 43,000 *l.*; should we have any difficulty, as far as you know, with those Colonies as to withdrawing any troops that they do not pay for?—I think that the arrangement with those Colonies was made upon the footing of so much a head of the soldiers, and that if you withdraw a soldier you forfeit the contribution for that soldier. I think it was 40 *l.* a head which was to be paid by the Colonies for the troops that were employed there; 40 *l.* a head for infantry, and 70 *l.* for artillery.

2512. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Which Colony was that?—The Australian Colonies.

2513. Major *Anson.*] Would not that come to a great deal more than 43,000 *l.* in the Australian Colonies?—Not if you exclude Tasmania, which, having been so recently a convict Colony, is exempted at present from any share of the cost of its garrison. I think 70 *l.* or 80 *l.* a head is considered to be the cost of British soldiers, exclusive of the recruiting expenses, the transport, the invaliding, and the barracks; and about 100 *l.* a head inclusive of those and other items. I am speaking from recollection, and without very accurate knowledge; and indeed there has been much difficulty in finding the way to any correct computation of the cost of a soldier.

2514. Do you know that the reason we keep up that force there is at the request of the Australian people themselves?—I believe so.

2515. At their request?—I do not know whether at any particular application or request, but this was the arrangement made with the colonists, consulting their own wishes as to the troops they would desire to have.

2516. Do you suppose that if we told them that if they wanted a regiment they should have it if they paid for it, there would be any objection on their part to our not spending money for maintaining garrisons in that country?—I hardly know enough of the Australian Colonies to answer that question; I have never had anything to do with the Eastern Colonies except Mauritius in business; I should rather not express an opinion upon that point.

2517. Do you know anything about Ceylon; I see by the Parliamentary Return laid before the House this year, that Ceylon contributes 160,000 *l.* towards our military expenditure there, and that our expenditure is 157,759 *l.*; will you say whether that is a mistake or not?—I cannot explain that. In 1864–5, the total cost was about 200,000 *l.*, paid in equal portions by the Imperial and local Governments. In 1867, the Colony is to pay 150,000 *l.*; in 1868, 160,000 *l.*; this country paying the balance of the whole cost.

2518. Do you know anything about the arrangement which has been come to with regard to the Straits Settlements, now that they are taken over by this country?—I believe there is an intention to increase the Ceylon Rifle Corps, the Malayan Corps, and to send some companies of that corps to the Straits. The Straits pay the whole cost of the garrison they require, viz., 59,300 *l.* for two batteries of Royal Artillery, and six companies of Ceylon Rifles. It is intended to station there a wing of an infantry regiment; but this is for Imperial purposes, and on Imperial account.

2519. Has the question of expenditure upon that garrison been a subject of consultation between this country and the Government of the Straits Settlements?—I do not know.

2520. I suppose you do not know how much India expended upon that Colony while they had control of it?—No; I have no knowledge about the Straits Settlements.

2521. Or what revenue they derived from that Colony towards the garrison?—No; I do not know that. The Ceylon Corps is considered to be a very efficient corps, and they have no objection to be detached eastward; they can be sent, I believe, to the Straits, and they can be sent to Hong Kong. But there is no restriction as to the number of wives and families in the corps, and the consequence of that is, that moving them backwards and forwards becomes expensive if they are taken to great distances.

2522. I think you made some objection to the West Indian Corps, and said that one of the consequences of their being local corps was that the officers had to live a long time in tropical climates, and thereby became deteriorated both in health and physically in every way?—Yes, so I understand.

2523. Do you not suppose that that applies very much to a local Ceylon Corps?—I think not quite so much; I believe that the officers of the Ceylon Corps are moveable by exchanges to other regiments.

2524. So are the West Indian officers, are they not?—Not practically, I believe, to quite the same extent. But I may be mistaken.

2525. They are on the same system?—Yes, they are on the same system; but practically, I think that a large proportion of the officers of the West India regiments remain in the West India regiments, and in tropical service, either in Africa or in the West Indies, for a great length of time, if not wholly.

2526. Do you not think that that is the case also with the Ceylon regiment, as they are on exactly the same system?—I have made inquiry about that, and I understood that it was not so; that the officers were not fixed in the same way to the corps in the Ceylon Rifles; but my inquiry was not made of a military authority, so that I cannot speak with certainty.

2527. In China we have a military expenditure of something like 228,000 *l.*, and the colonists in China only contributed 15,000 *l.* towards that sum; I suppose the inhabitants of Hong Kong, therefore, would have no voice at all in the matter of what sort of garrison we should keep up in that country?—No, certainly not. Their contribution is, however, a little more than the sum you mention. It is 20,000 *l.* In a former part of my evidence, when speaking of the riots in St. Vincent's, I had meant to advert to a passage in a despatch from Lieutenant Governor Musgrave, then Lieutenant Governor of St. Vincent's, now Governor of Newfoundland, which the Committee may think it worth while to have read. The gentleman who had been the most prominent person in putting down the insurrection in St. Vincent's wrote to Lieutenant Governor Musgrave to suggest that there should be a local European corps formed at the expense of the St. Vincent's Legislature;—a small corps, which should be officered from half-pay officers of the English army, and should serve in St. Vincent's permanently. Lieutenant Governor Musgrave stated his objections thus:



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9 April 1867.

thus: "I should have great misgivings as to the possibility of preserving effective discipline in a small, entirely local, and purely military body, with nothing to do, and destitute of prestige or control, not belonging to a portion of Her Majesty's regular army."

2528. That was with reference to establishing a local corps upon the same principle as the St. Helena Corps?—I do not quite know what the principle of the St. Helena Corps was.

2529. The St. Helena Corps, I believe, is a corps raised for service in St. Helena, from Englishmen?—It did not succeed, and was abolished, I believe.

2530. Was not there a question this year, I think, in the West Indies, of a European population applying for troops when they were apprehensive of an outbreak, I think it was in Honduras, and the military authorities offered to send them some black troops, negroes, and they declined to have them?—No. There was an invasion of the Colony of Honduras,—in November last I think it was,—by the Indians, and they were met by 120 black troops, under a Major Mackay. He met them in the bush, and the black troops behaved exceedingly well; they were for about 20 minutes in conflict with the Indians; some of them were killed. Major Mackay thought that he was going to be surrounded, and ordered a retreat to be sounded, and they would not retreat; he had it sounded a second time, and at last they were persuaded to retreat. Afterwards, the retreat seemed to be rather a disorderly one; it was carried a good deal further than was thought by some people to be necessary; and there is about to be a military inquiry into the conduct of Major Mackay.

2531. There was some case of the European population applying for European soldiers, and they were offered black troops, and the colonists begged that they should not be sent; they were rather afraid of them, and would rather have none at all?—That was not in Honduras; there have never been any but black troops in Honduras for many years.

2532. *Chairman.*] It was in Demerara I think?—Yes, very likely.

2533. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Will you mention the date of that transaction in Honduras?—I think it was in November; it was some time last autumn.

2534. You say that a military inquiry is about to be held?—Yes, it has been ordered; the Commander of the Forces in Jamaica has been ordered to go to Honduras to conduct the inquiry into it.

2535. You were giving an account of what is supposed to have taken place on the part of the black troops; did you give it from any official report?—I have not the official report here, but I speak from recollection of an official report.

2536. From the Governor of the Colony?—From the Lieutenant Governor. There were very few officers with the garrison, and one of them was an invalid and unable to accompany the troops.

2537. I presume that it is on the report you allude to, that the inquiry has been ordered?—Yes.

2538–9. Major *Anson.*] Our expenditure in the West Indies amounts in round numbers to something like 276,000*l.*?—Yes.

2540. To which the colonists do not contribute a single farthing?—They do not contribute.

2541. And the duty which our troops have to perform there is almost entirely in the nature of a local police, is it not?—Except at Jamaica, where there is a dockyard, and a naval station, and a naval hospital.

2542. Is there a Royal dockyard in Jamaica?—Yes. Jamaica might serve as a naval base of operations, which is a distinction to be taken in the case of Jamaica from our other West Indian Colonies.

2543. With the exception of that one place, almost all the duties the British troops have to perform in the West Indies are of a sort of local police nature, are they not?—I believe so. I think the subject was fully gone into in a Committee of which the noble Lord in the chair was a member,—the Colonial Military Expenditure Committee. There is not one station in the West Indies, with the exception of Jamaica, which there could be any hope of defending against a considerable expeditionary force. All that the local garrisons can do is to beat off a privateer, and to keep peace in the Colony. They are there for the suppression of disturbances; and in case of war, for the beating off of one or two privateers.

2544. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] What do you mean by police duty?—I mean military duty in the sense in which military duty is performed in this country by troops who are called to assist a civil magistrate in suppressing tumult; they are required there as well as here.

2545. Major *Anson.*] Do you agree with the opinion expressed in this paragraph of the Report of that Committee to which you have just referred: "With respect to the West Indies, it appears that about 4,200 troops (consisting of European and coloured regiments in nearly equal proportions) are now maintained there, mainly for the purpose of securing those Colonies against internal disorder; that the defence in time of war of these possessions of the British Crown, as well as of other distant Colonies, must be principally naval; and that it is for many reasons inexpedient that the duty of a local police should be performed by scattered detachments of Imperial troops at the cost of this country"?—No, I should say that I do not agree in it totally; I cannot agree in the whole of it. I think that if you are to keep those Colonies at all you must take care of them, in the sense of having some such military assistance as is necessary in support of the civil power in case of tumults and disturbances; and then as to their power of paying for it, I should think that very many of them cannot afford to pay for it; and there is another difficulty in their paying for it—that each island if required to pay for it, would expect to have a detachment within its own precincts; whereas I believe every military authority would condemn the notion of detaching a company here and a company there, or half companies, as disorganising to the army, and not consistent with military discipline.

2546. Still that is done to a very large extent in the West Indies, at the present moment?—Not to a very large extent, I think. We have a small detachment, about 150 men, in British Guiana, and another such in Trinidad, and not a very small detachment, about 500 men, in the Bahamas; all the rest are either at Jamaica or Barbadoes, which are head quarters of commands; so that it is only in two places in the West Indies that you have small detachments. In British Guiana

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Guiana I think there are usually one company of whites and two of blacks, and there are two white companies in Trinidad. Those are the only places in the West Indies where there are any very small detachments.

2547. Do you not think that they might be called upon to pay some share, or to provide in some way for their own internal peace?—If you mean those Colonies where the troops are stationed, excluding those for whom they are to be also available where they are not stationed, then it would come to be a difficult question to arrange what was due from each Colony. For instance, in Barbadoes there are troops, I suppose, to the extent of about 1,100. The monthly distribution for March gives 1,017 effectives. We might call upon Barbadoes to pay for some of those 1,100 men; but Barbadoes has an independent legislature, which can do as it likes. You cannot make it pay. If you were to say, "Pay, or we shall withdraw the troops," the answer is, you would imperil not only Barbadoes, but all the islands in the Carribean Sea, which depend upon the troops at Barbadoes for detachments being sent when they require protection. Therefore Barbadoes is tolerably sure of having a garrison, more than sufficient for itself, for general West Indian purposes,—for Windward and Leeward Island purposes.

2548. Why should not those other Colonies pay a small share in prospect of the future benefit, in case of a riot, of being able to withdraw troops from Barbadoes?—I presume you mean those Colonies where you do not station troops, but which would call for troops if an emergency arose. They might be called upon to pay a share, but they would always have the answer, "The troops are distant; you do not give them to us to be on the spot when the emergency arises; all the mischief may be done before the troops arrive; we have to beat up to windward, to Barbadoes, to send word that we want them, and then the troops have to go from Barbadoes to us;" and they would probably add, "All we shall have to suffer will be suffered before they come." They would say (not very justly, but plausibly enough for their plea) that they were not worth very much to them.

2549. A proposition was once made to organise a local police force upon the principle of the Irish constabulary, I believe?—It was made by Governor Hincks; I mentioned before that his evidence would be valuable to the Committee.

2550. Do you not think that that would be a better plan than employing our own soldiers; the colonists would be obliged to pay for it themselves, then?—That is what they have to do now. Those Colonies, which are the greater in number, where no troops are stationed, have to provide for their own security by their own police, at their own cost, but still having that resource, in case of extreme and prolonged emergency, of sending to Barbadoes for troops. And St. Vincent's has just now said that it would like to have a company of British troops at its own cost, and is going to get them. But that Colony can afford to pay for them; I am afraid that the others may not be so able; very few, I am afraid, of those Colonies can afford to pay for them. It will cost St. Vincent's between 3,000 *l.* and 4,000 *l.* a year, I think; and that would come in the case of some of those Colonies to almost a fifth or sixth of their whole revenue. It would be a serious charge upon them, and I do not think they could afford it.

2551. Mr. *Oliphant.*] The chief military expenditure at the Cape is for the defence of the frontier, is not it?—Yes, I believe so; I am not conversant with Cape affairs.

2552. You do not know, then, whether the colonists would not prefer, as they did in the case of New Zealand, to manage their own internal wars?—I do not.

2553. With reference to your having stated that the force at the Mauritius and other small Colonies was sufficient to beat off a privateer, it might so happen that a squadron able to land a couple of thousand or 1,500 men might attack one of those Colonies, in which case would it not be desirable to have a garrison sufficient to beat off an attack of that kind?—Yes, I think it would be desirable to have a garrison of such strength as to beat off a small expeditionary force; such a force as might be sent by surprise from Bourbon, for instance, against Mauritius.

2554. But for instance, a French squadron cruising either in the West Indies, or in the East Indies, consisting of four or five ships, perhaps one of the line, and three or four corvettes, might land a very large force at Ceylon, or in any Colony that they happened to choose to attack, probably that would be the form which the attack would take, would it not?—Then in that case, I think that the question would be, whether we can afford to keep up permanently and habitually in a Colony, such a force as an outbreak of war might make it desirable to have there when the outbreak should take place; which I do not think we could in all our Colonies; then as then; I should think that we must rely upon meeting the emergency as it arises.

2555. Marquis of *Hartington.*] I gather from your answers to some previous questions that you would anticipate serious difficulties with some of the Colonies in the event of its being determined to send Indian instead of British troops to them?—Yes; I think those Colonies which pay for troops would consider that they ought to have British troops.

2556. And although it would of course be in the power of the Imperial Government to decide what the garrison should be in any case, you yourself would attach great weight to the feeling of the Colonies, should you not?—Yes; I should attach a good deal of weight to it; I would not defer to it implicitly.

2557. Do you think that in any case the difficulties which might arise with a Colony from their aversion to the proposed arrangements might be so great as to be almost insuperable?—I think where the Colony pays, the difficulties would be perhaps insuperable.

2558. Do you think there would be no difficulty where they do not pay?—There would be no difficulty that you need find insurmountable.

2559. For instance, in Hong Kong, where they do not pay much, would there be very great difficulty in carrying out the proposed substitution, supposing it was against the feeling of the Colony; would not the colonists be inclined to think that they no longer derived any benefit whatever from the connection with this country?—No; I should think that the aversion would not go to that extent; a good deal would depend upon what the troops proved to be when they had had experience of them; but I should not think that matters would go to that length in an Asiatic colony upon the mere name of the troops being Asiatic.

 2560. Supposing

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9 April 1867.

2560. Supposing the aversion was very strong, it would be very difficult to force upon a Colony a garrison which it did not want, would it not?—I imagine that there is now no anticipation of a difficulty in sending Malayan troops from Ceylon to Hong Kong.

2561. That is in addition to an European force, it is not in substitution for it?—Yes. I apprehend, then, you were supposing a case where there should be no Europeans.

2562. If you propose to withdraw Europeans altogether, and to substitute an Asiatic force instead, would you think it right even in the case of Hong Kong, which does not contribute largely, to insist in opposition to the wishes of the colonists upon making an entire substitution of that kind?—Yes, unless they chose to pay for their preference for European troops.

2563. Then, in your opinion, it is a question of payment or non-payment?—I think that the payment would be a test of what the substantial reason for the aversion amounted to, and also of the intensity of the aversion. If they chose to pay for their preference, you would know their preference to be founded on something more than an imaginary or fanciful ground of preference.

2564. You are aware that in many cases the Colonies are now doing something for their own defence in the way of raising militia and volunteers?—Yes.

2565. I think you say you have some knowledge of the Cape?—No, I have almost no knowledge of the Cape. The West Indies and Mauritius is my field of knowledge.

2566. I believe there are no militia or volunteers raised in any of the Colonies about which you have been questioned yet?—Yes, in the West Indies there are generally corps of volunteers and militia. In Mauritius there is none. I have a return of militia and volunteer corps here.

2567. *Chairman.*] Will you put that return in?—Yes, I am afraid it is not of very late date, but it is the latest that I could procure. (*The same was handed in,* vide *Appendix.*)

2568. Marquis of *Hartington.*] Would not the substitution of Asiatic for British troops be rather a discouragement to the Colonies in the matter of raising militia and volunteers. Is not the presence of British troops rather an encouragement to them?—No, I think not; because now in Barbadoes the Governor has found very great difficulty in raising a volunteer corps or an effective militia, really on the ground that the Colonists conceived that whether they exerted themselves or not, the head quarters of the Windward and Leeward Islands' command being at Barbadoes, there would always be an adequate European force there for their purposes, that is to say, for the mere defence of Barbadoes. The force intended for the defence of the whole of the Windward and Leeward Islands having its head quarters at Barbadoes, and only two small detachments being elsewhere, namely, in Trinidad and British Guiana, it followed that the colonists thought they could afford to dispense with efforts of their own, in reliance upon that necessary presence of the British troops at the head quarters of the command.

2569. In the case of their services being required, would not a small British force be a sort of nucleus to the militia and volunteers?—No doubt it would.

2570. And without the presence of some such small force, might they not think it hardly worth their while to organise themselves in that manner. An Asiatic Force would not form a similar nucleus, I suppose?—No, hardly; but I do not think that the presence of troops would promote the formation of local volunteer or militia corps.

2571. You do not think that the presence of British troops would do so?—No; not the presence of British troops: the presence of black troops, of the troops of West India regiments, would not dispense with the formation of local volunteer and militia corps; but the presence in any adequate number of British troops would, I think, dispense in their apprehension with the necessity of forming them; it would, at any rate, tend to dispense with it; they might perhaps still be urged and induced to raise a militia or volunteer corps, as they have in the case of Barbadoes.

2572. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] I wish to ask you a question, in order to make this question of the payment more clear. I presume that in those Colonies where there is a local legislature, the amount of contribution to be paid by the Colony for military expenses is passed every year by the legislature in an annual vote, in the assembly at the Cape of Good Hope for instance, and in Australia?—I do not know whether they are annual votes, or whether they are more permanent charges upon the revenue of those Colonies. In the West Indies, with which I am acquainted, there are no such votes.

2573. It is dependent at any rate upon the decision of the Assembly, the Assembly having the power of taxation in its own hands?—Yes, in the chartered Colonies, not in the Crown Colonies.

2574. In the Crown Colonies, such as Ceylon and the Mauritius, where there are no local legislatures, I presume that the amount of the military contribution to be paid is virtually arranged between the Colonial Office and the War Office in London?—No, because there always is a local legislature with a certain number of colonists in it. In the Mauritius there is a majority of unofficial colonists in the Legislative Council; it is true they are nominees of the Crown, and the Crown has a very considerable influence in the legislature; but it is not an influence which it would wish, I imagine, to push to any extreme point, so as to carry its own views against a large majority of the colonists in the legislature.

2575. I believe they call it the Council at Mauritius?—Yes.

2576. Would the Council have the power of vetoing this military contribution if they did not approve of the constitution of the garrison?—They would not have the legal power, because, although the Crown may be very unwilling to resort to such an extreme exercise of power, yet the Crown could lawfully, if it saw fit, pass an Order in Council, which would be binding upon the community of Mauritius.

2577. In Ceylon, how would the popular opinion express itself upon the subject?—It would not express itself conclusively, or, perhaps, effectively, if the Crown insisted upon a given contribution.

2578. In reality, taking Ceylon and Mauritius, is there any means of ascertaining the real views of the colonists in regard to the amount of military contribution which they pay and the military defence which they get for it?—It rather depends upon what you call the colonists;

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nists; because, if all the inhabitants of a Colony were called colonists, you would have a population which cannot be supposed to have any voice at all upon any such question. But if you come to the merchants and planters, who are perhaps more commonly called the colonists, their voice would be expressed by the unofficial members of the Legislative Council, who might be considered as representing their views; and in dealing with the legislature of a Colony of that kind, though the Crown may, in the last resort, have absolute power, it is a power which would not, I imagine, be pushed to any extreme legal bound or limit; there would be a certain respect evinced for any general feeling on the part of the unofficial members of the legislature, unless their feeling were a very unreasonable and unwarrantable feeling.

2579. And you are of opinion, from what you know of Mauritius, that the general feeling would be against the substitution of native troops for the European garrison?—Yes, I have no doubt of that.

2580. And you think that that feeling would be expressed through the channel you have indicated, namely, by the unofficial members of the legislature?—Yes, I do not doubt it.

2581. Mr. *Oliphant.*] In the Cape the Government is a responsible one; in Ceylon it is not a responsible Government, is not that the case?—Ceylon is a Crown Colony in the strictest sense of the word.

2582. Therefore, in the Cape, there might be a much more distinct manifestation of public opinion shown than in Ceylon?—Yes; I think with regard to the Cape, practically, you have no power, except the power of withdrawing the troops they will not pay for; that would be the real remedy.

2583. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Some Governors of the West India Islands have, I think, from what you read or stated to us, expressed an opinion that black troops are not required there?—I think that, generally speaking, the Governors are indifferent to the presence of black troops with white troops, and opposed to the presence of black troops without white troops; but I was speaking, in that case, of opinions expressed in the year 1861, which were gathered from all the Governors in that year. Since then there has come the Jamaica outbreak, and that, I think, ought to modify, and probably has to a considerable extent modified, the opinion previously entertained of the black troops; because in the Jamaica outbreak of October 1865, the black troops were employed with good effect, and with not the slightest doubt apparently of their fidelity; and when troops were called for as a reinforcement from Barbadoes, it was black troops which were sent. It is true that white troops were co-operating with them, even in St. Thomas-in-the-East; and other white troops were not far distant at Newcastle Barracks; so that the black troops had the white troops over them, even if not close upon them. However, there was never the slightest doubt apparently, or hesitation, about detaching black troops, even at the first moment of the outbreak, to protect the white inhabitants, including the women and children, from the insurgents. That, I think, ought to make a considerable change in the distrust which had been theretofore expressed as to the fidelity of the black troops.

2584. Have any Governors expressed an opinion, to your knowledge, that they could do without European troops in the West Indies?—Governor Hincks, who was Governor of Barbadoes and the Windward Islands, and is now Governor of British Guiana, has expressed an opinion that a constabulary, like the Irish constabulary, might be formed, which would dispense with European troops to a great extent.

2585. Is that constabulary to consist of Irishmen?—No. You would hear, if you summoned him before you, more distinctly from him what his views are upon the subject. I do not myself quite understand how a constabulary raised from the population of the islands would be more trusted by the whites than the black troops, raised also from the population of the islands.

2586. Did you understand his recommendation to apply to his particular island or islands, or to the West Indies generally, and altogether?—I think that at one time he applied it to the islands generally; he has lately proposed it for British Guiana specifically and separately. It was in 1861, I think, that his more extensive scheme was propounded; and we must always recollect that since the Jamaica outbreak, if there is a more favourable feeling in regard to black troops, there is also a greater fear of the populations of these islands, and the possibility of revolts and disturbances is more distinctly recognised; so that I do not know whether Governor Hincks would now go as far as he once did in his views of the extent to which a constabulary force might dispense with European troops.

2587. Have you any knowledge of any objections that have been raised by military men or others to the employment of European troops in the West Indies without any native troops?—Yes, the Horse Guards have raised strong objections to the employment of white troops without black troops. The first objection was, that the blacks were required to perform fatigue duties for the whites; but I think that objection proved to be inapplicable to the Windward and Leeward Island command, because it turned out that the white troops had a corps of military labourers to perform their fatigue duties, and that the blacks did not perform the fatigue duties for the whites, but only for themselves.

2588. I think when some of the black troops were taken away to the West Coast of Africa, there was an arrangement made to increase the number of military labourers, for the purpose of avoiding fatigue duties being thrown upon the white troops; have you any knowledge of that?—I have no knowledge of that; but according to my recollection, the taking away of the black troops would not have any effect upon the whites as to fatigue duties, because the fatigue duties for the whites were always performed, not by the black troops, but by military labourers, a corps maintained, at a considerable cost, for that purpose.

2589. There are a good many duties performed by black troops in the low parts of the islands, in parts of the islands near the water's edge, which are very unhealthy to be performed by white troops, are there not?—So it was stated, but I think our Governors in the Windward and Leeward Islands, and in British Guiana, did not agree in that statement. I think Governor Hincks, who was in British Guiana, said that guard was not mounted at any post where it was not mounted alternately by black and white



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*H. Taylor*, Esq.

9 April 1867.

troops, without injury to either; and I think that Governor Walker said that in Barbadoes there was no post where they might not be equally employed. I recollect its being said that military labourers were necessary for the purpose of carrying their food to the sentries and guards, and for various purposes in which white soldiers would be exposed to the sun; and I made some inquiry of Governor Hamilton, who was over in this country, upon that point; and he said that Europeans in the islands habitually walked in the sun for moderate distances, and that the white troops, in his opinion, would be none the worse, but rather the better, for having some active exercise and duty to perform.

2590. Kingston and Port Royal are somewhat unhealthy ports in Jamaica, are they not?—Yes, I believe they are not very healthy. I was speaking of the Windward and Leeward Islands.

2591. Barbadoes is one of the healthiest islands of the whole of the West Indies, is it not?—Yes. I do not know whether they have found the barracks as healthy as might be expected in so healthy an island.

2592. But Kingston and Port Royal in Jamaica are unhealthy places, are they not?—Kingston and Port Royal are unhealthy places, I believe, for white troops.

2593. There are a great many duties to be performed there?—Yes, which are performed by black troops. In Jamaica I believe black troops to be very desirable for the performance of duties which white troops cannot so well perform. The white troops are in the Newcastle barracks, which are healthy, and there are duties to be performed, as you say, at Kingston and Port Royal.

2594. Which would be injurious to the health of the European troops, if they were thrown upon them?—Yes, just so.

2595. As a matter of policy, should you think it was expedient to withdraw European troops from all our West Indian possessions?—No; I should think it inexpedient.

2596. You think that it is right, as a matter of policy to maintain a small reserve force there in support of the Civil Governments of those islands?—I think so.

2597. So long as we maintain them as British possessions?—I think so.

2598. Are you of opinion that Mauritius is an important post to us for our commerce in both war and peace?—It is important to our commerce; and in war, as a military and naval station; it can hardly, however, be called a very important naval station, because, I believe, it cannot be occupied as a naval station at all times of the year; but as a military station, and a place of occasional refuge in time of war, it is important.

2599. And as a coaling depôt in time of war?—I do not think it is used as a coaling depôt.

2600. Would it not be of great importance as a coaling depôt in time of war, as being a half-way house between India and the Cape?—Perhaps it might; I do not know.

2601. Port Louis is a good harbour now during the greater part of the year, is not it?—Yes, I believe it is.

2602. Have you any knowledge as to whether there is any good harbour in the Island of Bourbon?—No good harbour, as far as I know.

2603. Can you tell the Committee what the fortifications are which exist at Port Louis?—No; I have not sufficient military knowledge to say.

2604. You do not know the names of the principal forts?—No.

2605. You do not know the number of them?—No.

2606. I suppose you scarcely know the size of them?—No.

2607. I need hardly ask the question, then, you are scarcely aware with what special object the new works have been constructed?—They, no doubt, were constructed with a view to make the town somewhat less vulnerable.

2608. They were constructed for purposes of defence, of course?—Yes.

2609. Beyond that, you do not know whether they were constructed specially for the defence of the town or the harbour, or as against a landing?—No.

2610. You stated that the population of the Mauritius was, in round numbers, 250,000 coolies, 100,000 negroes, or negro descendants, and 5,000 Europeans?—Yes, about those numbers.

2611. Of which 5,000 Europeans the most part are of French descent?—Yes. I can give you the numbers of the population with more accuracy and with a more detailed classification, thus:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1st. | Whites— | |
| | Not British subjects | 2,709 |
| | British subjects (English origin) | 1,444 |
| 2nd. | Coloured— | |
| | French Creoles of mixed blood | 10,385 |
| 3rd. | Negroes | 101,097 |
| 4th. | Indians and Chinese | 246,049 |
| | TOTAL | 362,684 |

2612. Then of the European population there are about 1,400 in round numbers, who are British subjects by birth?—Yes, just so.

2613. Do you think that under such circumstances the maintenance of a garrison there, composed of English troops, is a prudent policy?—Yes.

2614. And would it be an imprudent policy to withdraw it and substitute for it an Asiatic force?—Yes, I think it would be imprudent to withdraw the British garrison and substitute an Asiatic force, in so important a Colony with so little of an internal support to any military force in the shape of a population of the Anglo-Saxon race.

2615. You think both with reference to its importance in time of peace as a rich Colony, and also with reference to its possible importance, in time of war, as having a pretty good harbour where harbours are rare, that it is of importance to maintain a European force there for its defence?—Yes.

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*Tuesday, 7th May* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

| | |
|---|---|
| Major Anson. | Colonel North. |
| Sir James Fergusson. | Mr. Oliphant. |
| Lord William Hay. | Captain Vivian. |
| Colonel Percy Herbert. | |

THE HONOURABLE MAJOR ANSON, IN THE CHAIR.

Captain WILLIAM ROBERT MENDS, R. N., C. B., called in; and Examined.

Capt. *W. R. Mends*, R.N., C.B.

7 May 1867.

2616. *Chairman.*] As the Committee wish to institute a comparison between the cost of the transport of native troops and Europeans from the different ports in India to China, and from China to India, would you be able by extending the period from five to ten years or so, to give us the cost of both the European and native troops, in each of those cases?—Certainly; we can give the entire cost from our department for many years past.

2617. Will you hand that return in to the Committee as soon as you have made it out, according to this form (*handing a Paper to the Witness*)?—Yes; I shall be able to furnish it.

Lieutenant Colonel LAWRENCE SHADWELL, called in; and Examined.

Lieut. Col. *L. Shadwell.*

2618. *Chairman.*] THIS paper which has been printed in "Appendix No. 8," was, I believe, handed in by you?—Yes; that is the original, and this is a supplementary paper of the expenses at the Cape, which was not asked for in the first instance (*producing the same*).

2619. Does the first item of your estimate, namely, "Regimental Pay and Allowances," include the twopence a day which has been recommended by the Government, on the report of the Recruiting Commission?—No; it does not.

2620. Would you put in, as an Appendix to this paper, the amount which that would come to?—Certainly, I will give the Committee the amount which the regimental pay and allowances would come to, if the troops were receiving the extra twopence a day.

2621. Under the head of "Special Allowances," what items come in?—Those are allowances to officers only; they include forage and all things of that sort.

2622. Does the item of "Regimental Pay and Allowances" include any colonial grants of money to the soldiers?—No, that is the actual regimental pay and allowances which they draw according to their respective ranks.

2623. In any of those Colonies are there any colonial allowances to the men?—Yes. The question of allowances in Australia is still unsettled.

2624. Which are not included in the return?—No, everything is included in this return; it is the whole of the actual cost.

2625. It includes the actual colonial allowances?—Yes, everything.

2626. With regard to the fourth item, the "Cost of Provisions, Forage, Transport (including Wives and Children)"; that is only the cost of transport in the Colony, is it not?—Yes, that is the internal transport.

2627. With regard to the item of "Barrack Expenses," that, I suppose, is only the annual repairs of the barracks?—That means fuel and light, lodging money and barrack furniture; nothing else.

2628. How comes the item for barrack expenses in China to be so very high?—Because there are so many hired buildings there; I particularly asked that question.

2629. There is a note explaining it?—Yes.

2630. What steps are being taken now, with regard to building barracks in China?—That question I cannot answer; the subject is entirely out of my department, but I can easily get the information for the Committee; I know that there are some papers relating to it at present in the office; I do not think anything has been actually determined; I think one item under consideration is the construction of a barrack at Kowloon.

2631. Can you hand in to the Committee any papers with reference to the building of any barracks either in that or any other part of China, in the Straits Settlements, or in Ceylon?—I can ascertain what there is in the office; at this present moment I do not know, because it is not a question which ever comes before me.

2632. With regard to the item, "Average Cost per annum of Arms, Accoutrements, Ammunition," does that only represent wear and tear?—It represents the original cost of the arms and accoutrements, spread over the term that the arms and accoutrements are supposed to last, or will last, together with the cost of maintenance.

2633. The next item is "Pay of Invalids, Time-expired Men, and Drafts on Passage during the Year"; I apprehend there is no passage money included



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Lieut. Col. *L. Shadwell.*

7 May 1867.

included in that, or the cost of provisioning them on their return?—No, that is the actual pay of the men on board ship. I must tell you that this approximate estimate is framed on the supposition that a regiment goes to a colony, and is relieved in 10 years; it is over a space of 10 years; of course it very often happens that a regiment goes to three colonies in the course of its 10 years' service abroad.

2634. Does the next item, namely, "Depôt Charges (including Recruiting Expenses) Establishment of Depôt" include the bounty, the free kit, and everything?—It includes the depôt companies and everything connected with recruiting of every sort and kind; all the expenses connected with the recruits that join those particular depôts.

2635. With regard to the next item, namely, "Average Annual Charge for Pay during the Period of Relief, taking the Average Service of a Battalion abroad at 10 years," is that simply the cost of paying the troops, that is to say, the agency or the loss on exchange?—No, that is supposed to be the average annual charge for pay during that period of relief. Of course you must multiply that by 10 in order to get the whole sum.

2636. What is the actual charge intended for?—It is merely the pay which those people receive.

2637. For paying the troops?—Yes, for paying the troops.

2638. Does the item "Medical and Purveyors' Expenses" include all the hospital charges, the cost of dieting the men in hospital, and so on?—Yes, and medicines.

2639. It includes every expense of that kind?—Yes, medicines are a very small item, I should think.

2640. Will you procure from the War Office and hand in to the Committee, as soon as you possibly can, any papers connected with building barracks in China, the Straits Settlements, and Ceylon?—Yes.

2641. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Stating the places at which they are to be built?—Yes; I understand that the Committee wish to know what steps are being taken to provide barracks in China, the Straits Settlements, and Ceylon, specifying the places where they are to be built. The witness who will attend the Committee from the War Office on the subject will be able to state the extent of the accommodation.

2642. Colonel *North.*] Is this sum of 26,901 *l.* in China all for the hire of buildings; there is a remark at the bottom with regard to the expenditure in China for the hire of buildings being exceptionally high?—The item of barrack expenses includes the hire of buildings in China, because they have an immense quantity, an exceptional quantity, of hired buildings in China.

2643. The whole of that sum is for the hire of buildings?—No, it includes also the fuel and light, the lodging money, and the expense of barrack furniture.

2644. Is the expense of the hut which has been built in Kowloon included in that?—I do not know; that subject does not come under my official recognisance, but this item is taken to include everything which is paid for under the barrack Vote, in which the hire of buildings is included.

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*Tuesday, 14th May 1867.*

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.
Viscount Cranborne.
Sir James Fergusson.
Marquis of Hartington.
Lord William Hay.
Captain Hayter.
Colonel Percy Herbert.
Mr. Laing.
Colonel North.
Mr. Oliphant.
Captain Vivian.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

Sir ROBERT MONTGOMERY, K.C.B., called in; and further Examined.



2645. Major *Anson.*] IN answer to the last question that was put to you when you were before the Committee, you alluded to the proposal of employing Indian troops in the Colonies as one to be tried on a small scale at first. I suppose you are aware it has been constantly done, for many years past, in China, Singapore, and Aden?—I alluded to the Sikh troops. I was not aware that it had been tried with Sikh troops.

2646. With regard to all other races, it has been tried in those colonies, with troops from Bengal, Bombay, and Madras, I believe?—Do you allude to Burmah?

2647. I allude to Burmah, to Singapore, to China, and to Aden?—I was aware that it had been lately done in the case of Aden, as well as Burmah; but I was not aware that native troops had been employed in garrisoning Singapore and China.

2648. With regard to Singapore, the garrison there has been found from Bengal and Madras for the last 50 years, I believe, without any European soldiers at all, or with only a few Europeans as an exceptional thing?—Yes.

2649. You never heard of those troops ever having made complaints with regard to their caste prejudices having been offended in any way?—No, never.

2650. All the difficulties that have ever arisen in India as to employing troops beyond seas have simply arisen upon questions of infringement of their pay regulations, I believe; can you speak to that point at all?—No, I cannot; I have no experience upon it.

2651. We have got a minute here of the Marquis of Tweeddale, in which he refers to very great hardships having been undergone by the Indian troops who had been employed beyond seas in Ava and in China, in 1844, and he gives a long account of those hardships, and of their losses: he says, "The first reinforcement to the corps in Ava was supplied partly by recruits, but chiefly by volunteers from different regiments, to the number of 600; these men all knew that they were wanted to fill up the places of the sick and dead, and they were for some time at Wallajahbad, preparatory to their embarkation, yet all went forward cheerfully. The average number of sick and wounded at Wallajahbad during the same year was 470, reaching at one time to 817, of whom 105 died in hospital; the recruits had thus constantly before their eyes numbers of wretched sufferers from sickness and wounds, and had full opportunity of becoming well acquainted with the nature of the service on which they were to be employed, and of the privations to which they were likely to be exposed, yet without any bad effect; no feeling of dissatisfaction was engendered, nor did foreign service become in consequence unpopular. The recruits were still found perfectly willing to embark; upwards of 2,000 embarked in successive detachments;" do you think that that good feeling on the part of the natives in Madras and Bengal would be imitated by the natives in the Punjaub?—I suppose it would; but I might ask whether those troops received any additional pay on going to the Colonies.

2652. They received their usual batta?—I should imagine that there would be no difference between the Sikhs and the other natives.

2653. Only one case has been brought before this Committee, of discontent on the part of the Sikhs employed abroad, which was a case of a Sikh battalion raised for service in Ceylon; do you know anything with regard to that case?—Yes, I do know generally about it. I have not the details very particularly. I remember a communication being received at Lahore, which was sent by the Supreme Government to the local government of the province. It was to the effect that the Ceylon Government were desirous of raising a corps of pioneers for service in Ceylon. It appears that after the siege of Delhi, two pioneer corps were raised; they were very popular corps, and subsequently did very good service in Oude, and indeed wherever they had been they had been found very useful both as troops in garrison, and also in working about the cantonments. Apparently the Ceylon Government must have heard something of these volunteer corps, for they applied to the Government of India to have one raised for service in Ceylon. As I said before, it was intimated to me that an officer would be sent to Umritsir, to raise a pioneer corps, and that I was to afford whatever assistance the Government could fairly give, which was merely directing the district officers that they were to aid the officers who came to recruit, and to give them any assistance in their power, that is all I had to do with it. I think the officer who had charge of the recruiting was named Major McMullen; he came to Umritsir, and in a few days, or a few weeks at any rate, his regiment was filled up. The fact of the matter was, that service in the new pioneer corps was very popular, owing to the knowledge of the



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Sir *R. Montgomery*, K.C.B.

14 May 1867.

people regarding the other two pioneer corps; they supposed it was to be a similar corps; and besides that, the pay which the Ceylon Government proposed to give was very high; I think it went up for skilled artizans, from 13 to 14 rupees a month, to as much as 20 or 30 rupees. I do not exactly remember the figures, but I know they were high rates of pay; the consequence was that the Sikhs who had been a great many of them disbanded, rushed, I may say in hundreds, to enlist in this corps. The corps went down to Calcutta, and embarked there, or rather a portion of it embarked there, and was sent to Ceylon. When it arrived in Ceylon (I speak now merely from remembrance), the officers who accompanied the regiment to Ceylon were removed, and the Sikhs were broken up; 100 were sent to one place, 50 to another, and 100 to another; they were sent into the interior of the country, and they were told to work, and my remembrance is that they asked for arms; they said they had come to be soldiers; they admitted that they had come also to work, but they looked to soldiering much more than working. They were then told by the authorities that they had nothing to do with soldiering, that they had been enlisted merely to work; there was at once, of course, a complete misunderstanding, and the Sikhs I think generally refused to work. I do not know that the Ceylon Government was in a position to coerce them; but some of their own native officers tried to persuade the men to work for a few days until Major McMullen or some other officer who had come over with them, should come and explain to them what their duties were. I believe some of the gangs began to work, but they had no heart in the work, and threw it up after a few days; apparently for some time no officer came, and the Ceylon Government put them upon half rations, which to a Sikh is not at all a satisfactory thing, and after a time, what with despondency and the half rations, a good many became ill; I believe the hospital became crowded, and I think on the recommendation of the medical officers they were again put upon full rations. During this time one of those pioneers died, and some of the Sikhs took the body about, and tried to get up excitement, but they were very powerless, for they had no arms, and there was nothing that they could do; at last one of their own officers came and explained to them that they were expected to work and not to soldier; they said that they had never understood that, that it had never been told them; that they had been told that they were to have the same duties as the pioneer corps raised after the siege of Delhi, and that they would not act merely as labourers. It resulted in their all being broken up, and I think the Ceylon Government sent them to India, and gave each of them two rupees to find their way home. No doubt two rupees were quite insufficient; the whole business created a good deal of sensation in Ceylon, and also in Bengal, and the Bengal Government took a great deal of interest in the Sikhs, because they thought they were hardly treated; there had been a misunderstanding, apparently. They therefore directed all their officers wherever they found the Sikhs to give them money, and to get them conveyed up to the Punjaub. A good many of them did not reach the Punjaub, some of them went and took service at Hyderabad. I have been told that many of them were ashamed to go back, because they thought they would be laughed at by their comrades for taking service and coming back so soon. Accordingly some took service under the native chiefs at Hyderabad, and a few found their way back to the Punjaub. That, as far as I know it, is the history of the thing.

2654. If I recollect rightly, the two regiments of pioneers raised at Delhi were chiefly Musbee Sikhs, were they not?—Yes.

2655. They were actually raised as a military body?—Yes.

2656. And employed as a military body?—Yes, they were a kind of soldier workman, both for fighting and working.

2657. They were very much the same sort of corps as the English sappers and miners, only that they were not a skilled corps, of course they had to do all those duties?—Yes, they had to perform all duties of that kind.

2658. They were drilled and armed as soldiers?—Yes; they took all the duties of the cantonment.

2659. But those men who went to Ceylon had neither a uniform given them nor arms of any sort or kind; they were not recognised as soldiers?—No, they were not recognized as soldiers.

2660. Therefore it is hardly fair to look upon that case as going against the employment of Sikhs as soldiers out of India?—No, it was a misunderstanding altogether. I think the Supreme Government were a good deal annoyed about it; and the Ceylon Government, in arguing with them, said, "If you refer to our letter, you will find it was written from the Public Works Department, and you ought to have known that the pioneers were not meant to be a military corps, but only a corps for civil work."

2661. Mr. *Oliphant.*] You are aware, are you not, that there was always a pioneer corps in Ceylon, long before this occurrence, employed entirely upon the roads?—Yes.

2662. That corps never had been armed; they had always been employed upon the roads, and had gradually died out?—Yes, I think I have heard that.

2663. The Ceylon Government wanted to replace this corps by another, and assumed that the Indian Government knew the position which this old corps had held in Ceylon, and that it was not a military corps at all?—I do not think the Indian Government knew that; I would almost go as far as to say that the officers who raised them did not know it; but the district officers and the Punjaub authorities generally had not the least idea of it; some old soldiers, men who had done service in the mutiny, joined the corps as officers, and they would hardly have gone to form a body of mere labourers, I think.

2664. Major *Anson.*] You stated, speaking in regard to the pay of those Sikhs, that artificers of the first class were paid as high as 30 rupees a month, but the ordinary sapper and miner, the rank and file of the corps, apparently only received the rate of pay of *Rs.* 7. 8 *a.* a month?—I am not aware of that; I only remember from conversation with the natives that the pay was very high, in some cases as high as 20 and 30 rupees a month.

2665. Have you heard of any case lately of an endeavour being made to raise any Sikhs in the Punjaub for service in China?—Yes; Major Hutchinson, the inspector general of police for the Punjaub, a very intelligent officer, has come home, owing to sickness in his family; he has got leave only, I think, to be in England about 17 days altogether; he was staying at my house the other day, when he passed through London on his way to Bristol, and he happened

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331

Sir *R. Montgomery*, K.C.B.

14 May 1867.

pened to mention that he had been raising 100 Sikhs for service in China. I did not then ask him any particulars, but when I received a summons to attend here, I wrote him a note, and put several questions to him. I asked him regarding the terms, and what pay they were to have, and what they were to do, and so on, and he wrote me a note, which I have here, in reply. If you would like to hear what he says, I shall be happy to read it; I could tell you the substance of it, but perhaps it would be better if you would allow me to read it; it is not very long, and there is a good deal of information in it. This is Major Hutchinson's reply: "I am afraid I cannot reply as exactly as you require, for all the arrangements were not completed before I left." (He had left, I think, about the 17th day of April). "I can only tell you the plan I proposed, and on which the local Government" (that is the Punjaub Government) "sanctioned the proceedings of the enlistment being commenced pending further reply from China." The question I put to him was, "Who asked you for them?" his answer is, "The governor of Hong Kong wrote to a young officer in my police, who is a friend of his, by name Creagh, and offered him 400 *l.* a-year if he would bring 100 Sikhs, the men to be bound to serve for, I think, seven years." Then another question I put was, "Did the Government specify any time?" He says, "The Supreme Government insisted on adequate arrangements being made to insure the comfort of the men, &c.; I proposed that the men were to enlist for a term of, say, five years, to be entitled at the end to a return passage free, unless they chose to re-enlist for a term of years. The pay, it was supposed, would be 20 to 30 rupees a month, as we did not think they would go for less, but the point had not been fully tested; I offered to make my office the channel for communication between our Sihks in China sent for police by me, and their relatives, as I felt that if I could ensure the safe receipt and despatch of letters and money to the families, &c. the men would be happy and the families also. Moreover as the families would look to the Punjaub Government for protection and help, and to some extent so would the men, for you know natives will do so, even though they take service under other Governments, I felt it absolutely necessary I should have a full certainty, by having the communication in my own hands." The next question was, "Was the enlistment popular?" His answer is, "Young Creagh told me that numbers were bothering him to go, but I think they did not quite understand that there was no war and no loot. You know China as yet makes a Sikh think of loot. However, there were confident hopes that many would go." The next question was, "Was the pay left to you?" "No, but I insisted upon adequate pay being given, and I managed that I could receive the men's remittances for their families." "How many did you send, and what pay was given?" "The Hong Kong Government only asked for 100 men, and non-commissioned officers in proportion. The pay would, I understand, be left to the Indian Government to fix, and, I think, none would go under 20 rupees a month." "What class of men went?" "Sikhs only that had not been worked out, but Creagh had permission from me to offer service to any man he liked, and he would pick out the best. All must be Sikhs, that the China Government insisted upon." In the Punjaub there are a great many soldiers perhaps quite as good as Sikhs. The Chinese Government no doubt had an idea that the Sikhs were the only men whom they ought to take; but there are a great many others who are just as good in the Punjaub. The next question was, "Did you specify anything about food?" "The general treatment as regards food, and the same arrangement on the voyage, would be made for them as is made for native troops. No difficulty there. General treatment was left to China governors. I only suggested the Indian Government should insist upon fixed points, such as pay, length of service, return passage, &c." "For how long were they enlisted? Were the duties they were to perform, defined?" "I think the term was five years; they were told police duties, but probably more of a preventive semi-military character; but all police duties, and the men know well what that means; at any rate they know in the Punjaub, for they escort treasure, as you know, and prisoners, and patrol, and pursue dacoits, and fight if needed, and watch and detect, &c." "Could you have got a large number to go, if the Government had desired it?" "I believe I could get any number if the pay is good, and the arrangement for returning in a fixed time, and for communicating with their friends, and if their own European officers go with them. That is a very important point. The chief man at any rate they should know, for they will look to him to protect them." "Was any arrangement made to pay a portion of the salary to the families left behind?" "I proposed as stated above." That is the reply to the queries I sent him, and it perhaps may bear in some degree upon your inquiry.

2666. Colonel *North.*] What is the date of that letter?—The 10th of May.

2667. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Who is the writer of it?—Major Hutchinson, the inspector general of police. He has a large body of police, 15,000 or 18,000 men, under him.

2668. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Are the police in the Punjaub generally armed?—They are all armed. I think he told me that latterly they have been taking away the arms from a portion of them, but we are obliged along the frontier to have armed men, because the tribes who come down are all armed.

2669. The police have to carry arms?—Yes.

2670. *Chairman.*] What arms do they carry?—A fusee and a sword.

2671. Captain *Vivian.*] Are they drilled in bodies at all?—They are taught to form line, and countermarch, nothing more. They are very excellent men.

2672. *Chairman.*] They have no rifles?—No, they have a small short fusee; but Major Hutchinson told me that they were beginning rather to decrease the number of arms. I think I understood that there was a considerable number now without arms, but the main body still have them.

2673. Captain *Vivian.*] Are their officers military men?—They are almost all military men; there are some who are not, chiefly in the subordinate grades.

2674. Major *Anson.*] Do you happen to know the number of police in India at the present moment?—No, I cannot tell you the number, but I dare say in India altogether, in round numbers, probably 100,000; but you can get it in any of their returns.

2675. I think it appears according to that letter, that those Sikhs volunteered for service in China before any question was raised with regard



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Sir *R. Montgomery*, K.C.B.

14 May 1867.

to the pay they were to receive?—Apparently so; from this letter, I gather it was left undefined, but no doubt it was explained that they would get good pay: apparently none have been sent off yet, I suppose pending the reference to the Chinese Government.

2676. Should you not consider that a pay of 20 rupees a month was enormously high for them? —It is high; but I think it requires good pay to make them go, and be happy when they are there; I think you can get any number of Indians to go on foreign service if you give them good pay; you may not always get any class you like, but you can get any number to go if you give them good pay, or else plunder, which latter they will not have in time of peace; without that they will not be happy.

2677. *Chairman.*] The 20 rupees a month includes everything, I suppose?—It certainly, I conclude, includes everything.

2678. Major *Anson.*] All arrangements with regard to pension are included in that; there are no promises of pension besides?—No, I should imagine not.

2679. *Chairman.*] There is no bounty of any kind?—No.

2680. And they feed and clothe themselves for that?—I should think that most probably they will get a uniform from the Chinese Government; but very likely there will be a small deduction from their pay for clothing.

2681. Sir *James Fergusson.*] You are not sure that they do not give them rations besides?—No, I am not sure; in fact they have not gone there yet; the arrangement is not completed. Major Hutchinson left the arrangement incomplete; but apparently the Chinese governor is so anxious to get them that he will agree to almost any terms.

2682. *Chairman.*] I observe that the Indian Government think it necessary to take great precautions as to the treatment the natives are likely to meet with in going to another power. I suppose that is occasioned by the belief that those who are not accustomed to native races are likely to offend their prejudices?—That is quite so. The English Government in India are alive to the necessity of good treatment; and that is the ground of what I said before with reference to a tentative experiment. I am sure the employment of Indian native troops ought to be conducted entirely by the Government of India, for you observe in this case that the Government of India are insisting upon certain things; they are taking care that good treatment shall be shown to them.

2683. You think that if you left the English Colonial Governments alone, the probability is that they would not treat the Sikhs in the way in which they ought to be treated?—With every desire to do it, they have not the necessary experience.

2684. It requires very special experience, and few know how to do it?—Yes; supposing both the English Colonial Government and the Indian Government were anxiously desirous that everything should be done for the soldiers, the commanding officer of the regiment going with them would ensure good treatment.

2685. In that unfortunate Ceylon experience, if the Ceylon Government had been personally acquainted with the Sikhs of the Punjaub, it would not have proposed such an arrangement as it did propose, I apprehend?—I think it would have proposed it in a different way; it would have explained that labourers were wanted, and labourers only. I believe that, even then, they would have got any number to have gone as labourers; but unfortunately the Sikhs did not understand it under the name of soldiers. They could easily have raised any number of labourers.

2686. They would have been different persons? —Yes.

2687. Less martial?—Yes, not so martial.

2688. Major *Anson.*] In fact, they would have been more of the class of the coolies who go to the Mauritius?—Yes, more of the coolie class.

2689. Supposing all these difficulties were got over, and the Colonial Governments were instructed how to treat the Sikhs, and their own officers went with them, and looked after them, should you as a person with large experience in India, object to its being carried out, provided it was shown to be practicable?—I think that on a small scale it might be fairly tried; I think it would be a pity to extend it at once without having tried the experiment, and to make it a sort of general army question. I would much prefer, so far as my experience goes, to take one Colony or two Colonies, and send a regiment there, asking them to volunteer for that service; I believe you would have no difficulty in getting volunteers who would go, and after an experience of two or three years, the probabilities are that if the pay was good, and the climate suited them, it might become very popular, and then after that you might, if necessary, extend it to the whole army; but I certainly would not do that at first. I would make the experiment on a small scale, and by having done that, you would feel your way, and know how to work it.

2690. As a matter of course if everything went smoothly, under those circumstances you would not have any political objections to Indians going abroad?—Not on a small scale; that is, to a limited extent.

2691. Do you think it would be of advantage to the natives to see more of the world, as it were, and to leave their own country?—It depends upon what country they go to; I do not think that there would be any advantage in their coming to England to garrison a town here; but in Colonies resembling India or among races who have an affinity to the Indians, I do not see any objection to it.

2692. The mere fact of our employing them in other places besides India, would not give them an idea of the weakness of our military power, would it?—I do not think so.

2693. On the contrary, seeing our extended empire would probably give them a greater idea of our strength?—I certainly do not think that it would give them any idea of our weakness, perhaps it might rather give an idea of power.

2694. *Chairman.*] How would you think it better that they should go, in regiments specially formed for that purpose, or as a portion of the Indian army?—Bearing in mind what I have said as to a tentative experiment, I should be inclined, supposing it was determined to do it, to say to the Government of India, we want to send one or two or three regiments to a certain place, will you arrange about it, and ascertain what regiments will go. I should suppose that the Supreme Government would in that case communicate with some officer in whom they had trust and confidence in the management of Sikhs, and that officer would probably go to his regiment, and say to them, "Now, the Government of India want a regiment to go to Singapore or China, will you volunteer?" They are under a general service agreement at present, as I understand; but

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but as I said before, they suppose that that is for war and not for peace; I think the probabilities are, that three-fourths of the regiment to whom that question was put would agree at once to go; probably the whole regiment would, but certainly three-fourths would go. Then, with regard to those who did not go, I would not put them in any worse position for it, so as to make their not going a punishment; but I would draft them into other regiments, giving them the same position as they had before, and even saying, where it was possible, that when the regiment came back they might join the regiment if they liked; that would be putting it on a fair footing, and there would be no difficulty in filling up the one-fourth, or one-third, or whatever the proportion might be, of the regiment that did not volunteer, from the other regiments; there would be plenty of men to go; if the experiment were tried in that way, I think it is quite possible that the foreign service might become so popular that there would be no difficulty in getting any regiment to go. Then, you might hereafter extend it to the general army if necessary; but I think you would have no difficulty in getting volunteers, and probably almost whole regiments, to go; the service, in fact, might become popular.

2695. You contemplate a high rate of pay?—This is a mere opinion of my own; I do not know very much about it; how would it do to give them their whole pay and let the rations be free? I mean, give them the rations in addition to pay.

2696. Would they care so much for that?—I think so; that would give them up a good purse; that would make it popular; I believe they get eight rupees a month; the amount of pay varies; I estimate roughly the rations cost the Government four or five rupees a month, and then if you gave them batta besides, it would make it up to about 15 rupees.

2697. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Is not the batta that they would get, as a matter of course, on going on foreign service about four rupees?—I do not know exactly, but supposing the pay was eight rupees and the batta four, that is 12 rupees, the rations would cost from three to four rupees a month more, I suppose.

2698. Major *Anson.*] How much do you allow for the rations?—Of course it depends upon the cost of supplying the Colony with the particular food required; I think a Sepoy in India can generally feed himself for something under two rupees a month; it would cost more in the Colonies.

2699. In China *Rs.* 3. 8 *a.* is the estimate of the Indian Government?—It would probably come to 14 or 15 rupees a month for each Sepoy. Even if it came to that it would be very much less than the cost of a European soldier.

2700. *Chairman.*] Those regiments are officered much more cheaply than the European regiments, are they not?—Yes; they have now only five or six officers, and that would be quite enough in a colony; how far that number would be sufficient if they remained any time in a colony, and if the officers became sick and went away, I cannot say; that is a matter of detail which must be thought of.

2701. Of course the officers would be supplied, as they have always been, from India?—Yes.

2702. Captain *Vivian.*] They would be men accustomed to handle native troops?—Yes.

2703. *Chairman.*] I suppose you would lay that down as a cardinal principle that they should never be entrusted to men who were not accustomed to handle native troops?—This must never be departed from; that is quite essential.

2704. Major *Anson.*] Do you know that some two years ago the English Government called for an estimate from the Indian Government of the probable expense of a Sikh regiment in China, and that they estimated the cost of their ration money at *Rs.* 3. 8 *a.* a month?—I estimated in my own mind it would be about three or four rupees.

2705. The pay of a Sepoy is seven rupees?—Yes; but it varies with service.

2706. And the extra batta at *Rs.* 3. 8 *a.*?—My idea would be to give them the rations; I think that would make them quite contented, together with the extra batta and their own pay, and then I think you would get any number of men.

2707. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] In point of fact, that is doubling the pay?—Yes, it is in fact doubling the pay.

2708. You stated that it was very desirable that the Indian Government should negotiate any transaction of this kind respecting the employment of natives of India abroad?—Yes.

2709. In the event of any similar case arising to that which occurred in Ceylon, of a body of men being engaged by a Colonial Government, and being dissatisfied with the arrangement, on their return home or on their communication with their friends, should you apprehend that any great disaffection might arise in India?—I think, if it touched their caste or religion, that would be the case.

2710. Or if they considered that faith was not kept with them?—Yes; and if it touched upon their caste or religion, of course there would be much more danger. If it was merely a matter of pay, it would cause dissatisfaction, and nothing more; but in a matter of caste or religion, it would cause very great dissatisfaction indeed; more than that, disaffection.

2711. Supposing it was merely a matter of pay and allowances, or the duties they were called upon to perform?—It would certainly cause dissatisfaction.

2712. And if they were men of a military class, who had served in the army, it might cause disaffection in some of the regiments?—It would cause dissatisfaction; I do not know that it would cause disaffection exactly. It would make foreign service unpopular.

2713. You said that you would recommend, that if native troops were to be employed in Hong Kong, or other colonial stations, a complete regiment in India should be taken, which had volunteered for the service. If that was not found practicable, would it be in any way practicable, do you suppose, to form a regiment specially for the service from volunteers from different regiments?—There would not be the least difficulty in doing that; it could be done quite easily.

2714. To serve for a certain term, and to be restored to their regiments after their individual term of service is ever?—I should suppose that that would be quite possible.

2715. It might be worth consideration?—Yes, certainly, quite so; I do not think there would be any difficulty in it.



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EDWARD B. DE FONBLANQUE, Deputy Commissary General, called in; and Examined.

*E. B. De Fonblanque*, D.C.G.

14 May 1867.

2716. *Chairman.*] YOU have been in Ceylon, have you not?—Yes, I was there two years ago, on the commission, the report of which you have in your hand; I was a member of that commission.

2717. Have you also been in China?—I have been in China also, for two years.

2718. You are acquainted with the working of native troops in British employ?—Yes, I have had opportunities of observing it in the West Indies, in China, and in Ceylon.

2719. You are acquainted with it, not only with reference to their efficiency in the service, but also with reference to the economy of the expenditure upon them?—I am to some extent.

2720. Will you put in the documents which you furnished to that commission, respecting the relative expense of native and English troops in the various presidencies and Colonies with which you are acquainted?—I can only do it with regard to Ceylon at present.

2721. You can do it with regard to Ceylon in comparison with the Indian presidencies?—Yes; but the employment of native troops in China, when I was there, was under very exceptional circumstances, and a higher rate of pay was given during the late war than would be the case if the troops were regularly employed for garrisoning that Colony.

2722. Why was the pay higher than if they were regularly employed?—Because they were kept for a particular service; it was an exceptional thing. The Government called for volunteers, and offered greater inducements than they would do if it were a regular part of their duty.

2723. Then you believe that the fact that it was service in the field in that case was not an additional cause of attraction, and that they would serve more cheaply if they had to perform regular garrison duty in the Colonies?—I do not think they were quite aware of the nature of the service when they went to China, and the Government found it necessary to offer a money inducement, as well as the inducement of active service.

2724. You do not think that the prospect of loot attracted them?—The prospect of loot always attracts an Eastern soldier; but I think they were not sufficiently aware of the nature of the service to be much influenced by it in that case.

2725. Then you think that the inducements held out to them ought not to be taken as a measure of the inducements it would be necessary to hold out in order to get Indian troops to serve in China on garrison duty?—I think they were exceptionally high.

2726. Captain *Vivian.*] The troops were wanted in a hurry on that occasion?—Yes; they were wanted in a hurry and on an emergency, and the Government made the best terms they could to induce men to go.

2727. *Chairman.*] Have you any idea of the amount of pay that it would be necessary to give to Indian soldiers, to induce them to serve in China regularly in time of peace?—I could not give it offhand, but I think I could ascertain it.

2728. Can you put in an estimate of it?—Yes, I will do so. The Indian troops that were employed in China when I was there during the last war were Punjaubees, Belloochees, and irregular horse.

2729. You formed a high opinion of their efficiency, did you not?—Very; I think the Punjaubees and the Belloochees make the best sentries in the world.

2730. You think that their efficiency was as much shown in the ordinary garrison duty as in the fighting and the active duty generally?—It was principally in the ordinary garrison duty that it was shown. The Belloochees garrisoned Shanghai for a whole year, and they made an admirable garrison.

2731. They were quiet and well conducted?—They were quiet and well conducted, and very trustworthy.

2732. Colonel *North.*] In what year was that?—In 1860 and 1861.

2733. *Chairman.*] They gave no cause of dissatisfaction to the European residents?—None whatever.

2734. Were they acting with British troops?—Part of the time, and part of the time they were in Shanghai alone.

2735. During the time they acted with British troops, did they act in harmony with them?—Yes, perfectly. I was for a year in Tientsin; the first year we occupied it, we had Fane's Horse there, with three battalions of European infantry, and they were on the best possible terms with the European troops.

2736. Were those native troops officered by Indian or by English officers?—They were officered entirely by Indian officers. I mean by English officers in the Indian service; they had their native officers, of course, besides.

2737. Officers who were familiar with them before they came to China?—Yes; officers who had been brought up among them.

2738. On what system were they officered; on the English or the Indian system?—Fane's Horse was exceptionally officered, because it was considered a staff appointment. The officers were all placed on the staff from various regiments, and detached to Fane's Horse; but the Punjaubee troops were officered on the Indian system, and had a very much smaller number of officers than there would be with a European regiment; for instance, we had three officers to a company, and they had only one.

2739. That corps was officered on what they call the irregular system, was it not?—Fane's Horse was, but not the other native troops, not the Punjaubees.

2740. Major *Anson.*] I think there were only two infantry regiments in China officered upon the old system?—There were two regiments of Punjaubees which were so officered.

2741. There were some other infantry regiments there during the war, that were organised upon the irregular system?—That was before my time.

2742. In 1860?—I speak of after the war, when they garrisoned Shanghai.

2743. Then you were not there during the war?—I came to China just as the war was over, having been in Japan before that; I was in China during the time of the occupation of the north of China.

2744. Then the natives knew perfectly well that there was no prospect of any further loot or plunder at that time?—Yes.

2745. But they were quite satisfied to remain there?—Yes.

2746. *Chairman.*] You never heard of any dissatisfaction?—None whatever; on the contrary,

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trary, I always heard that the service was very popular.

2747. Major *Anson.*] Were there any difficulties with regard to supplying them with food?—None whatever.

2748. *Chairman.*] Did any difficulties of religion ever arise?—None whatever.

2749. Colonel *North.*] Nor on board ship?—Nor on board ship; it was of course much more difficult to supply a number of troops always with the different supplies they required, than it would be to supply regiments who were fed upon one system; but there were no insuperable difficulties whatever.

2750. *Chairman.*] For garrison duties should you say that those Indian troops would be as efficient as an equal number of Englishmen?—In some respects I think they would be more efficient: for instance, to put as sentry over stores, I should always prefer a Punjaubee to an Englishman.

2751. On account of their less liability to thieving or to drinking?—Both from their less liability to thieving and to drinking; my experience is that an English soldier, placed as a guard over public property, is about the worst guard you can have.

2752. You think that for garrison duty it would be safe to replace British regiments entirely by Punjaubees?—I should think so. I would not go so far as to say "entirely," because it must depend upon the nature of the country in which they are serving: for instance, I would not have only native troops in a place like Ceylon. I think it would be desirable to have a a certain admixture of English troops always there.

2753. Should you think that such a place as Hong Kong might be garrisoned entirely by natives?—I should think it might entirely, because I think there is so little possibility of any sympathy between the two races, the Chinese and the Indians.

2754. We have had it stated in evidence that they are not equal to cope with such people as the Hong Kong pirates, and the vagabond population of that part of China; do you think that that is true?—I should hardly think it is likely, because the Hong Kong police, when I was there, were about the worst police in the world, and yet they did to a certain extent keep these pirates in order.

2755. From what race is this police force recruited?—From Manilla men, and China men from Hong Kong and the provinces; they are a mixed force of all kinds of people.

2756. They take anybody they can get, in fact, into that force?—They take anybody they can pick up; they were then very bad, but since then I believe they have been improved.

2757. In Ceylon it is the case, is it not, that the native troops cost very much more than they do in the Presidencies?—Very much more. I can give you the statistics. The regimental pay and allowances of a European infantry man in Ceylon amounts to 36 *l.*; of a European artillery man, 51 *l.*; of a native infantry man, 30 *l.*: whereas, in Bengal, a native infantry man costs 20 *l.*; in Madras, 29 *l.*; and in Bombay, 20 *l.* The pay of a European is, in Ceylon, 36 *l.*; in Bengal, 41 *l.*; in Madras, 48 *l.*; and in Bombay, 40 *l.*: but a native infantry man costs 10 *l.* a year more in Ceylon than he does in any one of the Indian Presidencies.

2758. What is the cause of that difference?—It arises from the higher rate of pay, and the more expensive establishment of the Ceylon Rifle Regiment.

2759. In officers?—Yes, in officers: they keep up a European establishment of officers which is a very large one in comparison with the Indian establishment; I mean the regimental establishment.

2760. Why is it necessary that the pay should be higher?—The Ceylon Rifle Regiment has undergone a great many changes; originally it was a very efficient and a very economical corps; but by degrees, partly owing to the wish of the commanding officers to be placed more upon a European footing, and partly from other causes, they have raised the pay of the soldier, and the general expense of the regiment to that of a European corps. Some very strong evidence was given to the Commission on that point by Major Skinner, who is the Surveyor General in Ceylon, and who was once in this regiment; probably no man in Ceylon has had more experience in relation to it. In reply to this question which was put to him, "Has the Malay Regiment much changed in its character since you knew it, and in what respect?" he said, "Yes, it has very materially changed its character since I first knew it. I joined it not long after we had given up possession of Java, from whence it had then but recently been largely recruited; it was purely Malay, and native princes were amongst its native officers. Sir E. Barnes on his arrival here from the Peninsula, and the army of occupation, pronounced it to be the very beau idéal of what native light troops should be. At his first parade of them he happened to say it was a pity that the men wore long hair, which they then wore plaited, and neatly looped up under their shakos; the men heard of it, and without any persuasion on the part of their officers, at the next parade the following day every man appeared with his hair cut. It is necessary to understand the importance which Asiatics attach to habit and custom to appreciate the significance of such an act of acquiescence in the mere wish or opinion of their general, and it deserves to be recorded to the honour of the regiment. At the time I am speaking of, the men possessed useful qualities, which I have regretted to see dying away, till they have now almost ceased to exist. They were, in any position in which they could be placed, the most self-reliant troops that could be conceived. They built their own barracks and lines with a degree of celerity and neatness which no other men could effect. They would run up their officers' bungalows or mess-houses almost free of cost to the public. Their time was nearly equally divided between fatigue duties and their drill, and no regiment could approach them in the perfection of their movements on parade. Their officers were proud of and attached to them, although they were then as free from the imputation of wearing ammunition boots and socks as an antelope, and their barracks were unencumbered with wooden cots and regimental boxes, in the necessity for or desirableness of which I could never concur; I am of opinion that no native soldier should ever be taught such artificial wants; they are, I believe, unknown in the Indian Native Army." That, I think, is the general opinion there, that the effect of the change has not only been to make them less efficient, but very much more expensive.

2761. The direction of those changes has been to assimilate them with the Europeans?—Yes.

2762. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Has not one





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*E. B. De Fonblanque*, D.C.G.

14 May 1867.

change been also that there is a large proportion of Sepoys amongst them now?—The Sepoys were originally in the regiment; there were always two companies of Sepoys, I think.

2763. Does the praise bestowed upon the regiment generally apply to the Sepoys also?—No; it applies exclusively to the Malays; they endeavour now to recruit the corps as much as possible from the Malay element.

2764. *Chairman.*] Can a Malay be obtained as cheaply as an Indian soldier?—I think so, if the service were made popular; but one objection is, that the very fact of employing Sepoys and Kaffirs makes it disagreeable to the Malays; they dislike serving in a mixed regiment.

2765. What recruiting ground have we to go to for Malays?—All the Malayan archipelago, Burmah, and Siam.

2766. Do you think it would be safe to raise the Malays from countries not under British rule?—Yes, I think, perfectly so; there has been a good deal of difficulty of late in recruiting them for the Ceylon Rifles.

2767. They have had to trust almost entirely, have they not, to the children of old soldiers?—Yes, in a great measure to the half-pay boys; they have drawn very largely from them; all the evidence we could get was to the effect that if they established recruiting depôts in various parts of the Malayan archipelago, they would get recruits in sufficient numbers.

2768. And your opinion is, that they would get both a cheaper and a more efficient regiment if they returned more to Oriental customs?—Yes, but the Ceylon Rifles never could be restored to their original state now; it would be very difficult to bring them back to the old habits.

2769. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Is it not exceedingly difficult to get the Malays to leave their homes?—No, I do not think the difficulty is very great if you hold out inducements to them: it was noticed, that whenever well-affected men who had got the higher rate of pensions went back to places where the Malays were settled, they always sent back recruits; but stories had got about among the Malays at home, that when the Ceylon riflemen became worn out as soldiers, they were carried into the mountains, to be eaten by tigers. Those stories were spread by men who had been discharged from the regiment on insufficient pensions, and that affected the recruiting a good deal.

2770. Major *Anson.*] I think you stated that the cost of regimental pay and allowances of European troops in Ceylon was 36 *l.* a-head?—A European infantry soldier in Ceylon cost 36 *l.*, and an artillery man 51 *l.*

2771. Does that include the pay and allowances only?—Yes, that is all; if you want the entire cost according to the capitation rates we fixed, which include all the expenses of clothing, his share of pensions, his share of transport to and from the Colony, we made out that an artillery man costs 114 *l.*, a European infantry man 99 *l.*, a native infantry man 64 *l.*, and a Lascar 53 *l.*

2772. What do you put a native soldier at, including everything?—We put a native soldier, including everything, at 64 *l.*, but then, of course, the expenses of transport and reliefs, which are a large item in the case of a European soldier, do not apply to the native soldiers.

2773. Against that 36 *l.*, representing pay and allowance, we have got here returns from the War Office, which only make it 20 *l.* a-head; can you explain the difference?—I do not think that that can be correct. My figures were the result of a very close calculation.

2774. Will you look at the return; do you think that the first item is right; 22,900 *l.* is put down as a lump sum for the regimental pay and allowances of a battalion of infantry in the Colonies?—I can form no idea what this return is taken from; but I know that my figures are correct; they are taken not from estimates, but from the actual expenditure incurred.

2775. Captain *Vivian.*] If you think that the Malay regiment has become so degenerated, on account of its being too much assimilated to the European regiments, and that it would be impossible to get it back again to its former state, what should you recommend, in the way of native troops, as a substitute for it?—I would recommend Malays certainly, for many purposes.

2776. For service in Ceylon, I mean?—For instance, I would have a Malay garrison at Singapore, which is principally composed of Chinese; and on the other hand I should not at all object to have a Chinese regiment in Ceylon; I apprehend that the Chinese would make admirable soldiers; I have seen a great deal of their qualities, not actually as soldiers, but what very nearly approaches that, as coolies attached to the army.

2777. There would be no religious difficulties in the case of the Chinese, would there?—None whatever; they are the most easily taught, trained, and fed of any men under the sun, I believe.

2778. Are they reliable as soldiers?—They are perfectly reliable if they have confidence in their officers; they have a great respect for the English now; we saw it exemplified in the case of Colonel Gordon, who turned the most untrained class of Chinamen into a perfectly disciplined army.

2779. Would you prefer Chinese troops to Sikhs for garrison service in Ceylon?—I do not say that I would prefer them to Sikhs, but I believe that there would be great difficulty in getting Sikhs to go to Ceylon after that unfortunate experiment which was alluded to this morning.

2780. Do you know anything about the details of that case?—Yes; I can give you the evidence of the same Major Skinner, part of whose evidence I read just now; he was the person entrusted with the command of this corps; but it was a very sore subject at the time the Commission took the evidence, and he makes the best of it. In reply to this question, "Did not a recent attempt to import Punjaubees from India for the Public Works Department prove a disastrous failure, and a great and useless expense to the Colony?" he said, "A thousand Sikhs were engaged for this Government out of, I think, 3,000 or 4,000 who offered their services to the Colony; 500 of them were imported, and another wing of 500 was on the point of embarking at Calcutta for Colombo. Of the 500 who were brought over here, some were tampered with, and refused to work; others went to work, but were persuaded by their comrades subsequently to refuse; we still have a few of them, who have turned out excellent workmen. The 500 who formed the right wing at Calcutta heard all the objections which had been raised by those who were in Ceylon, and still expressed their willingness to come here, and do that which the left wing had refused to do. The plea set up by the men in Ceylon was that they had been led to expect that they would be armed, and be allowed to work as the regiments

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ments of sappers and miners did in their own country. On the other hand, the 500 in Calcutta stated that they knew they were engaged solely as civil pioneers, that they would be required to work upon roads if they came here, and that they were perfectly willing to come for that purpose. I consider the attempt broke down solely from the interference of people who had nothing to do with it. It is much to be lamented that it did, for that force of 1,000 Sikhs would have been an invaluable acquisition to the country. I would repeat the attempt, if I were permitted to do so, with the most perfect confidence of success. The men who remain, six or eight in number, have offered to go back to their own country to bring their relatives and friends."

2781. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Who is that evidence given by?—Major Skinner, the Surveyor General in Ceylon, who was the head of the Works department there.

2782. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Do you know to whom that reference is made, where he speaks of persons who interfered with the enlistment?—The whole subject was one that created very strong feeling in the Colony, so much so that the military secretary was brought to a court martial for having written a letter accusing the Ceylon Government of having broken faith with those men.

2783. In fact, may it not be interpreted as being this, that those under whom the Sikhs were living, took great pains to prevent their being enlisted, in a way that would give offence?—Yes, they did certainly.

2784. Colonel *North.*] Did they not land as a battalion?—Yes.

2785. Were they told off into companies commanded by officers?—Yes; so are the men of the ordinary Pioneer Corps in Ceylon now, who are employed in very large numbers; they are all drilled as soldiers to a certain extent. We had it in evidence from Major Skinner, that he would have no objection whatever to the withdrawal of every soldier, European and native, from Ceylon, and that he would entrust the safety of the island to his pioneers.

2786. The wing of the Punjaub Corps that landed in Ceylon, landed under the impression that they were to do military duty, did they not?—So it was always understood.

2787. And faith was broken with them?—They considered that faith was broken with them, there is no doubt of that; there was some misunderstanding as to the terms upon which they were brought over; but the story I heard was that the agents who went over to India, in their zeal to secure these men for the Ceylon Government, made promises which they were not authorized to make, and that the Ceylon Government threw them over.

2788. Those unfortunate men were very ill-treated, were they not, in Ceylon?—Unquestionably they were ill-used.

2789. It was not that Major O'Brien had been tampering with them in any manner?—No, not in the least.

2790. He was one of the few that understood their language?—Yes, he was one of the few who understood their language and their ways, and he managed, when they broke out in mutiny, to make them submit.

2791. He was not in any way to blame for what occurred?—Not in the least as far as I know.

2792. You mentioned that English soldiers were the worst sentries over stores, and so on; did you speak with regard to stores of liquor, or all kinds of property?—With regard to stores of liquor I have had a great deal of experience with them, and I believe they almost invariably break in.

2793. You do not mean to say that they steal the property they are placed over?—No, but if they are placed in charge of property, they are so easily made drunk that they are not to be trusted as sentries; I do not mean that they would steal the property, and make away with it, but they would be made drunk, and it would equally get lost; they are careless sentries. I was in China when we received the indemnity money from the Chinese Government; there was no place where we could deposit it; it consisted of huge nuggets of silver in very ricketty boxes, and you could even see it through the boxes. We deposited them in an open courtyard of a house in Tientsin with two Punjaub sentries over them, and even the officers who were in charge of them found it difficult at any time of the day or night to approach those boxes, so much were the sentries on the alert.

2794. Mr. *Oliphant.*] You say that you do not think it would be advisable to leave Ceylon without European troops?—No, from what I have seen of Ceylon, I think the presence of a portion of European troops there is desirable.

2795. Which race do you think is dangerous, the Cingalese, or the Tamil population?—The Cingalese I look upon as the most opposite people to everything dangerous under the sun. An able writer on Ceylon (I forget at the moment who) describes the Cingalese as being the women of the human race.

2796. What race do you regard as dangerous in the island?—I think the other races, the Tamils, who are employed now in large numbers (I think 250,000 is the number of the resident population of Indians and Tamils) might become dangerous; their numbers are so very much in excess of those of the Europeans who employ them.

2797. You allude to the coolies?—Yes.

2798. But the whole of the northern part of the island is inhabited by the same race, the Tamil race?—Yes.

2799. We have no troops amongst them to speak of?—None except very small detachments.

2800. Probably there would be no danger to be apprehended from them; there has never been any rising on the part of the coolies, I believe?—The evidence we took in Ceylon on the subject was extremely conflicting. The planters as a class saw no necessity for troops in the island at all; but then I must tell you that the planters were the class who would be principally taxed for the support of the troops.

2801. Still they would require their protection?—They would require protection; but the evidence of almost everyone was in favour of the removal or reduction of the troops.

2802. *Chairman.*] Of all troops of all kinds?—Of all troops of all kinds; they said that they were perfectly willing to trust to themselves.

2803. Mr. *Oliphant.*] And Major Skinner's opinion was strong to that effect, was it not?—Yes, Major Skinner was of opinion that they did not want a soldier in the island. In fact, Sir Hercules Robinson told me, not in evidence, but in conversation, that if it were not for the honour of the thing, he would dispense with every soldier in the island, trusting perfectly to the people.

2804. Colonel *North.*] What report is that which you have been quoting from?—It is the "Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into



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14 May 1867.

into the Military Expenditure and Establishments of Ceylon in 1865," of which I was a member. The object was to transfer all the military establishments from the Colonial to the Imperial Government, and assess the amount which the Ceylon Government was to pay for their military force, with a pretty strong hint that they were to pay everything. Consequently, it was to their interest to have as few soldiers as possible. The evidence of all the planters, and of almost all the officials, was in favour of doing away with the troops, or reducing them to a very small number.

2805. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Do you not think that the natives have a much greater dread of a Malay than of a European in Ceylon?—I do not think they would as soldiers; I think they are much more in the habit of being kicked and cuffed by Malays than they are by Europeans; in that sense they are more afraid of them, but not as soldiers.

2806. In the rebellion, are you aware that the Ceylon Rifle Regiment met with very little difficulty from the natives?—Yes, the natives made no stand; they are so little a warlike people.

2807. In what way do you think it would be desirable to take away the Ceylon Rifle Regiment, and replace them by others when they seem so perfectly fit to do the duty they have to do?—They do the duty very well; but they are so very expensive; it is only a question of economy.

2808. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Are all the inhabitants of Ceylon of the same character?—No; the population is a very mixed one.

2809. What are the people in the neighbourhood of Candy?—They are a mountain race in contradistinction to the lowlanders.

2810. Are they a warlike race?—More so than the others. The inhabitants of Ceylon are very mixed; we had these figures given to us—"Low country Singhalese, 1,000,000; Kandyans, 400,000; Tamils (indigenous), 500,000; Tamils (immigrant), 250,000; Moormen, about 130,000."

2811. The Kandyans are a warlike race, are they not?—In comparison with the lowland Singhalese, they are.

2812. There was some rather severe fighting in the Kandyan war, was there not?—Nothing very severe, and in the late rebellion they never did anything; they never would face the soldiers.

2813. Captain *Hayter.*] Supposing this arrangement were tried, what is the maximum foreign service you would put the native troops to; how long would you make them serve?—I think in the case of a Chinaman it would be immaterial; I think, as long as he was well paid, the term of service would matter very little to him.

2814. I mean the Indian native troops, who might be employed in any of the Colonies?—I should enlist them for a term of, say, 10 years, renewable at the end of the 10 years.

2815. Do you know the strength of European officers of the Punjaub regiments?—I think it is one officer to a company, not more, whereas the Ceylon Rifles have adopted the English plan; they have got three officers to a company, and everything on the same scale.

2816. How many companies are there in that regiment?—Fourteen companies.

2817. The field officers are English, I suppose?—Yes, and in addition to that they have to every company four native officers.

2818. Would not the European officers, not having the same local ties, be less likely than the men to be dissatisfied with their change of service?—I think an English officer is so accustomed to be sent to out-of-the-way places, that he would not grumble more in one than he would in another; it would matter very little to him whether he was in Ceylon or in an out-of-the-way part of India.

2819. Sir *James Fergusson.*] You have no personal experience of Indian native troops, have you?—No, I have no personal experience of India.

2820. Major *Anson.*] With the exception of the Indian native troops in China?—Yes, I had experience of them in China, but I have had no local experience of India.

2821. *Chairman.*] Have you any knowledge of the Mauritius or the Cape?—No.

2822. You have had no experience of any other Colony except Ceylon?—I have had no experience of any other eastern Colony except Ceylon and Hong Kong; I have also served in the West Indies.

2823. Are those opinions of the planters to which you have referred, as to there not being any necessity for troops in Ceylon, on record anywhere?—They are on record in the Report of the Commissioners on Military Expenditure in Ceylon in 1865.

2824. Will you put that Report in?—I will; this is the only copy I have, but I think it could be obtained, on application, at the War Office or the Colonial Office.

2825. Colonel *North.*] Did the Committee sit in Ceylon?—Part of the Committee was sent out to Ceylon. I think you will find a good deal of information in the Report that bears immediately upon the subject of your inquiry, and you will find it a useful document. I do not know whether this inquiry refers only to the employment of Indian or Asiatic troops, but I may perhaps mention that I have had a good deal of experience of the blacks in the West India regiments; I was in the West Indies for some time.

2826. *Chairman.*] What is your opinion of them?—I formed a very high opinion of them indeed.

2827. In point of efficiency?—In point of efficiency, and in point of economy.

2828. They are not more economical, are they, than European troops?—Yes, they are, considerably.

2829. Do they take a lower rate of pay?—They have a lower rate of pay; and one of the great expenses which we have with European troops is avoided, that is, the constant reliefs, owing to sickness and mortality, among the Europeans.

2830. You mean that the blacks can be kept for any length of time?—They can be kept for any length of time, and the casualties amongst them are very few.

2831. Do you think that they could be employed at such a place as Mauritius?—I think they might be employed at Mauritius, and they might be employed at a place like Bermuda, a place which is rather destructive to European constitutions.

2832. Of what race are the troops with which you are acquainted; are they creoles or are they Africans?—When I served in Jamaica, some 10 or 12 years ago, they were recruited entirely on the west coast of Africa; but since then they have recruited among the creoles in the different islands, among the coloured men. I do not know how far that has affected their efficiency, but I know

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know that when the order came out for it, it was apprehended that it might very greatly weaken their efficiency as soldiers, and that they would not be so reliable.

2833. Were those recruited on the west coast of Africa taken from the native population on land, or were they simply liberated slaves?—Both; they took volunteers; originally they were all liberated slaves, but latterly they used to recruit from the population there, and they had no difficulty in getting volunteers.

2834. Did they all undestand English?—They knew very little of English indeed; they picked up a sufficient amount of English to understand the words of command and to make themselves understood.

2835. Do the officers learn any language except English?—The officers adapt their language to that of the black soldiers; what they speak is very much the same kind of English that the Chinaman in Hong Kong speaks, what they call the "pigeon English."

2836. Do you imagine that an equally efficient soldier could be got off the east coast of Africa?—I think there would be greater difficulty there.

2837. Then there would be considerable cost of transport in garrisoning places like Singapore or Hong Kong with blacks?—Yes; but the mortality and sickness would be very much less than it is with European troops.

2838. You think that when once imported they might be kept there permanently?—I think they might be kept there permanently.

2839. They have no wives and families whom they would want to go back to?—No; they generally establish their wives and families wherever they are, and the longer you leave them at a place the more satisfied they become.

2840. Then you would have to import their wives and families too?—No, you would not have to import their wives, as you have in the case of the Malays.

2841. You believe them to be a quiet and peaceable race?—Yes, they are very docile, and become very much attached to their officers.

2842. They are not liable to outbreaks of passion, are they?—No; in all my five or six years' service in the West Indies I do not remember any outbreak except once, when a very moral commanding officer wanted to prevent their women coming into the barracks; then they broke out of the barracks and scattered themselves about the place.

2843. Then, if morality is not imposed upon them, there is no difficulty with them?—No; it can hardly be looked upon as a point of morality, because wherever they went the outgoing regiment transferred their women, who became their wives for the time.

2844. Have you ever known any outbreaks of Malays?—No, not at all, I never knew any instance of it; I believe when the Ceylon Rifles went to Hong Kong the other day, every man took his wife.

2845. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] And some two?—Yes, polygamy prevails there.

2846. Sir *James Fergusson.*] It has been stated to the Committee, that that arose from a mistake?—I believe they would not have gone without their women.

2847. *Chairman.*] If the Malays were employed to garrison either Mauritius or the Cape, would they require to go home?—I think they would; I do not think the Malay would like to settle.

2848. But the African would?—The African would be very much more apt to settle in any place where he was located than the Malay would be.

2849. We have heard in England of Malays running-a-muck; is that a myth, or the reality?—I have seen Malays run-a-muck in China, and I have seen English soldiers do exactly the same thing under the same influence.

2850. Under the influence of bhang?—Under the influence of samshoo.

2851. You do not think that the Malay race is more exposed to it than any other?—No; I have seen two instances of English soldiers fairly running-a-muck. I recollect, on one occasion, an English soldier attacking half-a-dozen American officers who were coming up the street; he rushed up to them, and laid about him wildly with a bludgeon he had with him.

2852. I understand the general tenor of your evidence to be, that the English soldier, in point of docility and quietness, is not preferable to any other race, either African or Asiatic?—No, not in those points, and there is an enormous difference in the effect of climate upon the two classes.

2853. In that respect do you think that the African is more hardy than the Indian?—Yes, I think he is much more hardy; the African has the advantage of being able to stand cold as well as heat.

2854. As between the Malay and the Sikh, which has the advantage?—I should say that the Sikh has the advantage of the Malay.

2855. You say that the African stands cold as well as heat; where have you seen that tried?—In Canada, and more especially on board ship.

2856. But that is the acclimatized African?—The imported African stands it, they say, very well.

2857. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Do you say that the imported African stands cold?—Yes; I have heard that he becomes inured to it.

2858. Where has he been tried?—In America, in the States.

2859. When were the last Africans imported there?—It has been proved in the case of runaway slaves who have come over to Canada.

2860. When were the last Africans imported into America?—I cannot say when they are actually imported; but when they have been accustomed to nothing but hot climates, they come over to Canada, and they stand the cold there.

2861. You are aware that no slaves have been imported into the United States of America for a considerable time?—Yes.

2862. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Although the African does not die under exposure to cold, he is in a very inefficient condition as long as it lasts, is he not?—I should not say that that is so to any great extent. I have seen the Africans very jolly in the west of Canada, in the coldest winter; but the Chinaman, as you are aware, stands the cold, and seems perfectly indifferent to it.

2863. *Chairman.*] The African is a very much more efficient and muscular soldier than the Chinaman, is he not?—Yes, he is physically a much finer animal than any Eastern.

2864. We have had it in evidence that the climate to which the African regiments are exposed is fatal to their condition, and that, even when they do not die, the officers become inefficient; is that your experience?—There is a good deal of sickness amongst the officers of the West Indian regiments; I should hardly attribute it in any great measure to climate.

2865. We have heard about something more than



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than physical inefficiency; it has been stated that it affects their minds, and that they become demoralized?—Whether it is owing to climate or what, I cannot say; but it is an unfortunate fact that the officers of the West India regiments generally drink harder than any other class of officers. I remember meeting one officer who told me that he was the survivor of a batch of 11, who went out to the West Coast of Africa, and, with the exception of two who were transported, the others had all died of *delirium tremens*.

2866. What do you mean by transported?—They were tried and transported for some crime.

2867. So that out of the 11 officers, eight had died, two had been transported, and only one remained?—Yes.

2868. You have nothing but European officers in the West India regiments; there are no native officers?—Nothing but English; we have white non-commissioned officers.

2869. Mr. *Oliphant.*] With regard to the barracks in Ceylon, you are aware, perhaps, that there is going to be a change with regard to the European troops, and that one wing is to be quartered at Point de Galle. I see you recommend, in your report, Nuwara Eliya as a sanitarium, and that two companies should be quartered there; do you think it would be more desirable to have the whole wing at Nuwara Eliya?—My opinion was very strong in favour of having the whole of the white troops at Nuwara Eliya, but I was overruled by everyone. They say that it has a good effect upon the people to see white soldiers about.

2870. That was not the same people who said they did not want troops at all in Ceylon for their protection, I suppose?—When I say that I was overruled, I mean by the members of the Commission.

2871. Do you happen to know what the death-rate in Colombo was at that time?—I do not remember at the moment; it is in the evidence.

2872. In your opinion, it would be much better to have all the European troops that are necessary for the island, at Nuwara Eliya?—I think it would be well to leave the wing of a regiment in Nuwara Eliya; and the mere fact of their being in the island would have a certain moral effect, and that is really all that European troops are there for; the only object is the moral effect that they produce. Then you must have artillery; we recommended that the artillery should be increased by one battery; they of course would be in the lowlands, but the intention was to be continually changing the companies, and giving each company a turn every year in the mountains.

2873. With reference to this proposal of the Government now, to build a barrack for a wing at Point de Galle, you think it would be more advisable to have that barrack built in Nuwara Eliya?—I was very strongly of that opinion.

2874. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Do you know at all why the West India regiments ceased recruiting on the West Coast of Africa?—I believe the wish of the people of the West India islands to find employment originally led to it; there was a large floating population, particularly in Jamaica, who were anxious for military service, and they made an application to be allowed to enlist.

2875. Was not it the case that there was difficulty in getting men from the West Coast of Africa?—I did not hear that; it may have been so. I heard that the original cause which led to the change was the wish of the inhabitants of the islands to become soldiers.

2876. Are you aware of what has been stated before the Committee, namely, that the West Indian negro suffers very much from the climate on the West Coast of Africa when on service there?—I never heard it; I never was on service on the West Coast of Africa.

2877. You have never heard that stated when on service in the West Indies?—No, I never heard it. While on the subject of barracks, I may mention that the medical officers have given it as their opinion, that the same accommodation, in point of cubic space, should be given to native troops, that is to the Ceylon Rifle Regiment, as to the European; that is one thing which has given great dissatisfaction to the men themselves, because they are not accustomed to a large amount of cubic space, and they do not like ventilation; it is a great trial to them; they say it has injured their health; it is only another instance of the wish to assimilate the two systems, and to raise the native troops in all respects to the level of the European, even to the inconvenience of the men themselves.

2878. Mr. *Oliphant.*] That is a fancy, I suppose, on the part of the officers?—Yes; of the medical officers, in this case.

2879. *Chairman.*] Is it the medical officers who have insisted upon that?—Yes, the medical officers and the commanding officers; they have given it in evidence that a Ceylon rifleman should have exactly the same accommodation as a European, whereas formerly they ran up their own bungalows, and were much happier and better in them. They have now been taught to sleep in beds, whereas no native, even of a rank higher than a non-commissioned officer, ever sleeps on anything better than a mat; but these men get cots and hair mattresses given to them.

2880. Which do they like best?—They like their beds better, because it gives them a certain consequence.

2881. Major *Anson.*] You were Deputy Commissary General in China, I think?—I was.

2882. You stated at the commencement of your evidence that you would prefer, as far as garrison duty went, having native soldiers as sentries over your stores, to Europeans?—Yes.

2883. In China, at that time, you had charge of all the stores of the army, I suppose?—Yes; of all stores belonging to the army, as well as the money.

2884. Sir *James Fergusson.*] I will read to you the evidence which Colonel Macdonald, of the Ceylon Rifles, gave upon the subject at Question 2203: "Would your men consider the accommodation that the Sepoys and Sikhs used to have when they were there, sufficient accommodation for them?—I think they would be very well pleased with that; all that they want is a room that is dry; they do not like the thatch. Now that they have been accustomed for 20 or 25 years to have comfortable barracks, of course they feel the difference very much; but you might put them in a very much cheaper building than the European barracks; you might have a large shed erected with pillars, and built in with a single brick and tiled. They would be perfectly satisfied with that, but the Europeans in China must have an upstairs room." According to that, it would not be necessary to give them expensive barracks?—No. Of course you can teach a soldier any want; but these are all artificial wants to the native soldier, which he is very much better without; and they only put the

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*E. B. De Fonblanque, D.C.G.*

14 May 1867.

the Government to an enormous expense. The Malay is naturally a barefooted animal; we take pains to make him wear shoes in the Ceylon Rifles.

2885. Colonel Macdonald says the barracks "are not nearly so expensive as European barracks, but still they are as comfortable"?—The old barracks were not as expensive, but according to the plans they wish to carry out, they want to give the same space, and consequently it would be the same expense for both; the natives were formerly doubled up much more than our men, and consequently the barracks for them were less expensive.

2886. Colonel Macdonald says, "Now the barracks are very much improved; they are made of brick upon a single floor, and covered with tiles; they are not nearly so expensive as European barracks, but still they are as comfortable;" so that they may be as large and still not so expensive?—Nothing can be worse than the European barracks in Ceylon.

2887. Colonel *North.*] Have you been at Hong Kong since 1860?—I left in 1861; I have not been there since.

2888. Major *Anson.*] Do you know anything of the arrangement with regard to hutting money for the Indian troops in China and at Kowloon?—No, I do not.

2889. You do not know what allowance they received?—No, I do not; I never was quartered at Hong Kong. I was up the country always at Shanghai and Tientsin.

2890. Colonel *North.*] The expenses in China are very considerable, are they not?—Very considerable.

2891. They are more than in India?—Yes, I should think they are more than in India.

Colonel CHARLES GORDON, called in; and Examined.

Colonel *C. Gordon.*

2892. *Chairman.*] IN what year were you in China?—I went out in 1860.

2893. How long were you there?—Four years and a half.

2894. You had an opportunity of seeing the conduct of East Indian troops while you were there, had you not?—Yes.

2895. What was the impression that you formed of them?—The Indian troops I saw were the Loodiana regiment, and the Beeloochees, and both of those were very good, and did very good work.

2896. You saw them in the field?—Yes, I saw them in the field against the rebels; but I do not think the Madras troops were so efficient; the Madras sappers were, but not the Sepoys.

2897. Not in the field?—I do not think that the Chinese respected them much.

2898. You think the Chinese did respect the Sikhs?—Yes, undoubtedly.

2899. Do you think they are better soldiers than the Chinese?—No doubt they are better.

2900. Had you any opportunity of seeing them in garrison as well as in the field?—Yes, both.

2901. Do you think that they were good soldiers in garrison?—They were very steady, and very good sentries; they gave very little trouble.

2902. Had you any ground for thinking that they were discontented with the garrison duty?—No, I do not think so; I never heard it mentioned.

2903. They were not restive under the tediousness of it?—No; the Loodiana Regiment were taken to China on an agreement for a certain number of years; they were kept on, I think, about a year over this time. I remember some discussion about this; there was no dissatisfaction; they merely expressed a wish to go home; and some of them fell out, and stated this to the general at the half-yearly inspection.

2904. Colonel *North.*] Was that during the war?—That was at Shanghai, during the rebellion.

2905. When they were in the field?—It was at Shanghai; we were hardly in the field; we were called in the field, but it was more garrison than field duty.

2906. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] How long had they been there at the time when they expressed this dissatisfaction?—They came out to the war in 1859 with Lord Elgin's expedition.

2907. When did this take place?—This took place about 1862 or 1863; at the end of 1862, I think.

2908. They had been three years there then?—I imagine so; I am not quite sure of that.

2909. Had they agreed to come for a certain term?—They had agreed to come for the China expedition.

2910. And this was after the China expedition was concluded?—Yes; they were retained on account of the troubles with the rebels.

2911. Major *Anson.*] Was there any official correspondence on the subject?—I am not sure; I suppose there must have been the half-yearly inspection returns.

2912. It is only on rumour that you speak, is it?—I cannot speak positively, for I did not see the papers; I know it was the talk of the garrison at that time.

2913. You have had great experience of the Chinese; you commanded them, I think, for a long time in China?—Yes.

2914. Do you think that it would be possible for English officers to make good soldiers of them?—I do not think so in their own country.

2915. Do you think it would be possible to raise regiments of Chinamen for service in India?—I think from the neighbourhood of Hangkow or Pekin you would get good picked men, who, when taken to India, would make good soldiers; they would not make good soldiers in their own country, for they would get sick of it, and desert, which they could not do in India.

2916. I suppose the men that you commanded were hardly regularly enlisted soldiers, were they?—We could not make any agreement with them.

2917. You had but slight power over them, had you?—Whilst they were with us we had power over them, but not when they went to their homes; the Chinese mandarins have; but it is a power which we could never exert over them, viz., capital punishment.

2918. Do you think that the Chinese would stand the climate of India well?—Very well.

2919. *Chairman.*] What sort of pay would they require to go?—The Imperialist troops got about 26*s.* a month, nominally, but sometimes they were 20 months in arrears with their pay.

2920. Do they feed themselves?—When they are in the field or active service, the Government feed them.



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Colonel C. Gordon. 14 May 1867.

2921. When they are in garrison do the Government feed them?—They never keep the men in what we would call garrison; they always keep them in entrenched camps.

2922. Do they feed themselves then?—No, they would be supplied at a deduction from their pay; but when they are actually in face of their enemy, they get their food for nothing.

2923. Then, practically, that 26*s.* a month, covers their pay as well as their keep?—Yes; those who served with European troops, like those who served with me, got about from 32*s.* to 34*s.* a month.

2924. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] From the Chinese Government?—Yes.

2925. *Chairman.*] I suppose they would require a little more to leave their own country?—They would require more, I think, to enter into an engagement to leave their country; that would weigh more in their minds; they would require some guarantee that they would be brought back.

2926. How many years would they be content to go for?—You would get them to go for seven years, I should think, or ten years.

2927. Colonel *North.*] Would they require a pension?—All those things would be great inducements to them, particularly the certainty of pay and of pension, which are things they do not have in their own country.

2928. Mr. *Laing.*] For how much a month do you think you could get them to go abroad for a seven years' engagement?—I could not say.

2929. Do you think that a large number could be got by paying a high price?—I should think you could get any number, say 10,000 or 12,000, by high pay.

2930. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Will you state your objections to the employment of Chinese troops at Hong Kong, in addition to European troops there?—I do not think that the authorities could keep them together.

2931. I mean in English pay?—I do not think they could retain them. I think that the discipline would make them discontented.

2932. *Chairman.*] You mean that they would desert?—Yes; and they would be in collusion with the low populace of Hong Kong.

2933. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Are there no races which could be employed which would not be in collusion with them?—I do not think you could trust any of the Chinese races, for their sympathies would be with the dregs of Hong Kong.

2934. Are not the Chinese Government able to employ under their own mandarins any men who are at all trustworthy?—They do it in this way; they get a surety for them, what you would called security; they take the name of the village the conscript comes from, and of the head family of the village, and of the head man of the village, and they make him surety for the conscript; but even then the men desert.

2935. *Chairman.*] What do they do to the surety if the conscript deserts?—They cut his head off, unless he pays up what they may ask.

2966. It would not be safe, I suppose, to employ Chinese at Singapore, because there are too many of their own countrymen there?—No; there are too many of their own countrymen at Singapore.

2937. You could only employ them where there are no Chinese in the neighbourhood?—Exactly; the Chinese always cling together too much for safety to other people.

2938. Mr. *Laing.*] Should you think that if you had a regiment of Chinese at a place like the Cape or Mauritius, where there is no special Chinese population, there would be any particular danger to the discipline of the regiment from the men belonging to secret societies?—No, not when away from their own country. I think they would do anything you wanted away from their own country.

2939. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Do they care about having their women with them on foreign service?—I think they would accommodate themselves wherever they went.

2940. They are not so domestic as the Sikhs are?—No. Of course having their wives would be a great inducement to them to leave their country; they would go more willingly. Marriages with this soldier class are merely arrangements; it is scarcely recognized; it is not a binding thing; they can put away a wife, or take a wife, as they like, or three or four if they please.

2941. Mr. *Laing.*] How would that class of men do for service in the Colonies as regards the climate; would they stand almost any climate, either cold or hot?—Yes, and they do not eat much meat; they do on very little.

2942. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Do you think that if they are well led they are very brave, and make good soldiers against other races?—They would against other Asiatic races, I think, but not against Europeans; they would never meet them. You would get some few men to meet them, but as a rule they would not; they would fight behind works, but not in the open, against Europeans.

2943. Would they fight Indian troops, do you think, if led by English officers?—I think so; they had a great contempt for the Sepoys.

2944. Mr. *Laing.*] Do you include the Sikh regiments in that?—No, they had not a contempt for the Sikhs.

2945. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Then they drew the distinction between the different classes of Indians very clearly?—Quite; some of the Belloochees took their discharges from the Belloochee regiment, and entered into the force I had, as officers; they were capital men; in fact, if we had remained there I would have got as many more as I could.

2946. Of the Belloochee officers?—Of the Belloochee men, made officers.

2947. Chinese soldiers had confidence in them?—Yes, they liked them very much; we had no trouble with them; the Belloochees began to pick up the Chinese language very quickly.

2948. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Should you be disposed to entrust the security of Hong Kong to a garrison composed exclusively of Asiatic troops of any race whatever?—No, I think that would be unsafe.

2949. You think it would be necessary to keep some English troops there?—Yes; you must have a reserve of English troops.

2950. Mr. *Laing.*] How were your regiments officered; how many European officers had you?—We had about 22 Europeans to a regiment; that was the number of regimental officers; then there were two or three staff officers; altogether 25 officers to each regiment.

2951. To what force of natives?—Five hundred.

2952. What native officers had you?—All the non-

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non-commissioned officers; the serjeants and corporals were Chinese.

2953. Then you had a very large proportion of European officers to the native force?—Yes.

2954. Was that absolutely essential to the efficiency of the force in the field?—Yes; success just depended upon whether you had them or not.

2955. If you had been upon the regular Indian footing of six or seven officers, you could not have done anything with them?—Not unless you had very superior Chinese officers, who were very rare; if you took a force of 500 men, you might get a Chinaman who would command it with a great deal of energy, and do his work well, but he must have his own way, and be allowed to decapitate when he liked, and that would not do with us.

2956. Colonel *North.*] What officers would he have?—He would pick his own men.

2957. Chinese officers?—Yes; the Imperialist forces are sometimes very good indeed.

2958. Would he have the power of decapitation without a court-martial or anything?—Yes, at a word.

2959. Mr. *Laing.*] Without being called to account, or being responsible in any way?—Yes.

2960. Then everything depends upon the native commanding officer in that case?—Yes.



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*Friday, 17th May* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.
Viscount Cranborne.
Sir James Fergusson.
Viscount Hamilton.
Marquis of Hartington.
Captain Hayter.
Colonel Percy Herbert.
Mr. Laing.
Colonel North.
Mr. Oliphant.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Sir William Russell.
Captain Vivian.

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

Field Marshal His Royal Highness the Duke of CAMBRIDGE (attending by permission of the House of Lords), Examined.

H.R.H. The Duke of *Cambridge.*

17 May 1867.

2961. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE the evidence which has been taken before this Committee has been shown to your Royal Highness?—Yes; I think I have seen most of it, if not all.

2962. Will you favour the Committee with the opinion you have formed, both from the evidence and also from your own knowledge and experience, upon the subject of our inquiry?—The evidence has not shaken my opinion, which originally was, that the proposal to substitute native for European troops was a most unadvisable arrangement.

2963. Do you come to that conclusion upon military grounds?—Upon military grounds.

2964. Do you think that it would be impossible to hold the various colonies and dependencies with native troops?—I think it would be perfectly impossible to hold any colony unless there was a fair proportion of European troops in it.

2965. You would not object to an admixture of native with European troops?—I should not object to supplementing European troops with native troops, as is the case now in colonies where the climate requires it; but I should object extremely to substituting the one for the other, because, in proportion as the native troops are increased, the European troops of the army at large must be diminished.

2966. Therefore, it is as much with reference to the numbers of the British army as a whole as with reference to the holding of individual places, that your Royal Highness objects to this proposal?—I object to it on both grounds.

2967. Do you think that it would be possible to hold such places as Singapore or the Mauritius with native troops supported merely by batteries of artillery, or should you think it necessary to have British infantry there besides?—I think it is extremely undesirable to have native troops with British artillery alone. I think there ought always to be with native troops a certain proportion of European troops, which is, I believe, the principle laid down for all the arrangements in India, because I remember when I was on the Commission which sat upon the Indian army there was one thing on which everybody was agreed, namely, that European artillery ought never to be left solely with native troops, but that there ought always to be an admixture of European troops added.

2968. You would extend that view as much to the colonies as to India?—I should.

2969. The supplementing of the garrison of Kong Hong would not meet with any objection from your Royal Highness on the ground of the climate?—I think that the climate of Hong Kong reqnires that there should be a proportion of native troops there, and, as you are aware, it is intended at this moment to raise a native regiment, or to arrange in some way for a native regiment to be at Hong Kong in addition to the European troops already quartered there. But even in that case the general aggregate of the European troops of the army is to be reduced to the extent of the new regiment of natives which is now going to be sent to Hong Kong. That bears out my original objection, that if you largely increase the native element in the army, you will have proportionately to reduce the European element.

2970. Would it materially diminish your objection if you could be secured against that result?—It would considerably modify it, but only to the extent of my not objecting to native troops being employed. I should still object to any colony being held by native troops without a due admixture of Europeans.

2971. Would that be on the ground that, under trying circumstances, their fidelity might be doubtful, or that you could not trust them against a foreign enemy, or that they would be distasteful to the inhabitants of the place?—I should participate in all those objections; but the great objection that I have is that you would introduce a worse article for a better, because nobody can question that a European soldier is worth a great many native soldiers; therefore, if you are obliged to reduce the number of Europeans, you get a worse article instead of a good one. Without in the least wishing to say one word against native troops, it cannot be denied that a native soldier of whatever description he may be, is an inferior military machine, if I may so express it, to a European.

2972. Supposing that all question of the diminution of the army could be put aside, would you, with reference to the security of this country, and

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and the possible employment of troops in Europe, prefer that the army should be scattered about in small detachments in one colony and another, or that it should be massed in some position nearer home, where the troops could be more within reach?—If I was perfectly certain that I could mass the troops at home, and could retain them, there might be some advantage, no doubt, in having them massed; but I feel such a doubt upon that subject, that I confess I think it is much better as it is, and that I have more security of keeping the army up to an efficient state by having them scattered, than I should have if the present arrangement did not exist. Therefore, I contend that for the advantage of the army itself, it is better that they should be scattered as they are now, than that we should have too large bodies in central positions, because that arrangement I am satisfied could not be long maintained.

2973. You would still recognise that in case of a war there would be an objection, and a difficulty arising from the necessity of having to bring home small detachments across such large areas?—No, I should not; I think the detachments are all perfectly safe where they are now quartered, as long as we have the command of the sea, and that command I do not think there is much fear of our losing.

2974. Do you think they are available as well as safe?—I do; I would give you the instance of what occurred during the Indian Mutiny; that was an emergency in one of our most distant possessions; it came upon us quite unexpectedly; of course nobody knew what was going to happen, and we had nothing in the different Colonies but the ordinary garrisons, which are there at this very moment; as soon as the Mutiny broke out, the authorities in India naturally at once sent in every direction for assistance, and the Governors of the Cape, the Mauritius, and Ceylon all sent on every available man they could lay their hands on to India; and though the force so sent was in itself a small force, still the moral effect produced by the arrival of these troops before any reinforcements could come from England had, I have no doubt, a material effect in giving that new tone to the state of affairs in India, which resulted in our perfect success eventually.

2975. Putting aside the question of bringing all the troops home, assuming that the same number were kept out in those seas as are kept there now, should you prefer their being kept in as many different detachments as they are now, or should you prefer their being massed in a few great possessions or colonies?—I think they are better as they are now.

2976. Is that, even if it was established, that troops were not wanted in the Mauritius, for instance, you would yet prefer as a matter of military distribution to leave them there, rather than mass them in some other Colony?—I do not see how you could get on in the Mauritius without European troops; that is one of the important points with regard to this subject; I say that I do not think any Colony, and particularly a valuable one, like Mauritius, could be left without European troops.

2977. For defence against a foreign enemy, or for defence against the Coolies?—Both; but especially against a foreign enemy.

2978. Are you aware that the planters in Ceylon have expressed a wish to have no troops?—I was not aware of it. We had a commission which sat there last year and the year before, and there was a new arrangement proposed, but there was no proposal to take away the troops altogether.

2979. We have had Mr. Fonblanque before us who, I think, was a member of that commission, and he said, "that as soon as the planters heard that they were to pay for the troops, they expressed a desire not to have them." But from a military point of view, your Royal Highness would not coincide in that proposition?—Not at all. They pay very largely now; their contribution amounts to 119,000*l.* odd, I think, a year,

2980. Then the conclusion to which your Royal Highness comes, is, that against no sort of enemy, whether external or domestic, would you like to leave any Colony entirely or mainly dependent for its defence upon native troops?—Certainly.

2981. Major *Anson.*] With regard to the remarks your Royal Highness made about the evidence taken before the Commission which sat in 1859, as to European artillery not being employed with native troops, did not that apply more particularly to the employment of field artillery, with native troops in the field?—I have no doubt that field artillery would be a more delicate arm to deal with than garrison artillery; but I look upon artillery as almost the same, whether it is garrison or field artillery.

2982. Do you not think that a strong force of garrison artillery would be sufficient as a support for native troops employed in garrison work?—If you had a large force of garrison artillery, of course it would come to the same thing, because some of them, not being obliged to attend to their guns, might be put on garrison duty, but for that purpose you must add so largely to the artillery, which is a much more expensive arm in the mere pay and allowances of the men than the infantry, that there would not be the slightest saving, unless you put them on an equality.

2983. Does your Royal Highness consider that Hong Kong is defensible by its garrison against a foreign attack, or that it is absoluely dependent upon the fleet?—I think that the garrisons, supplemented by a portion of the fleet, in all our Colonies ought to be able to take care of those Colonies.

2984. The duty that the troops at Hong Kong have to perform is chiefly against internal disturbance, is it not?—Yes.

2985. For that purpose would not your Royal Highness consider that an inferior description of soldier to the British soldier might be sufficient?—I think that no British Colony ought to be left without British soldiers, because that is what every colonist and every Englishman looks to as his protection. Supplement them as much as you like with native troops or volunteers, but Englishmen are the nucleus round which everything else must form; and even in the case of volunteers, supposing you could raise volunteers, a nucleus of British troops with volunteers added, would be a valuable force, but a nucleus of volunteers without British troops would be of very much less avail, at all events.

2986. Does not your Royal Highness consider the service performed by English troops in China to be rather detrimental to the British Army than otherwise; for instance, a regiment coming home from China is not so efficient as a regiment you have had at home for some considerable



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H.R.H. The Duke of *Cambridge.*

17 May 1867.

siderable time?—Of course a regiment coming from a less healthy climate will always be for the moment less healthy than a regiment coming from a healthy climate, but, with that exception, I conceive that a regiment ought to come home in just as good order from China as from any other Colony.

2987. Would you not consider the British army stronger for purposes of European warfare, if it consisted of 100 battalions and had no duty to perform in China at all, than if it consisted of 101 battalions and had to garrison China?—No; I would rather have the 101 battalions and have to garrison China, because I consider that you would not be able to look upon China as a real colonial possession of the Crown or of the country, if you had not a European force there as well as a native force.

2988. We have just taken over the Straits Settlements from the Indian Government: I believe that the garrison in the Straits Settlements has hitherto, for the last 50 years always consisted of native infantry and European garrison artillery?—Yes.

2289. Does your Royal Highness think that it is absolutely necessary to alter that system which has hitherto been sufficiently efficient for its purposes?—The circumstances are altered, because it becomes a colonial possession instead of being an Indian possession. When it was an Indian possession the Indian army was in itself sufficiently strong to send a reinforcement there at any moment, which of course would have been done if there had been any danger as regards the Straits Settlements. But now that it is a colonial possession we have no right to assume that India will at once be able to send assistance to it, and we have no other assistance to give it unless we have some force there which is available at any moment. Therefore I think that the circumstances are to that extent altered, and that although the possession might be considered as safe as an offshoot from India, you can hardly consider it so when it is a colonial possession dependent upon itself without having any force in reserve to fall back upon from any of the other colonies, whether it be from China, or whether it be from Ceylon, those being the nearest colonies.

2990. Although only half a battalion of European infantry is sent for duty there, it has in reality added a whole battalion to the colonial duty of the British army, has it not?—It has and it has not. It has, certainly, to some extent, because a half battalion has to be kept there, but as a result of the Commission to which allusion has been made which has been sitting at Ceylon, the necessity almost arose of having another wing of European infantry at Ceylon; therefore, whilst we send one wing to the Straits Settlements, we are able to carry out the object which was recommended more or less by that Commission, of having an additional wing of a European regiment at Ceylon; so that your remark is correct to a certain extent, but not altogether.

2991. Did not the report of that Commission go strongly against any increase of the European force in Ceylon?—The report of that Commission left it entirely to the Imperial authorities to say what should be done with Point de Galle. The report of that Commission did not take Point de Galle into account. If, for Imperial purposes, Point de Galle were to be occupied, it was stated that that was an Imperial question, and not a colonial one, and that it must be dealt with and paid for, for Imperial purposes, by the Imperial Government. I believe the Imperial Government think that it is of importance as an Imperial question to occupy Point de Galle, and are therefore prepared to send out a wing of a regiment to occupy that post.

2992. Your Royal Highness recognises the necessity of employing native Asiatic soldiers of some description in those three colonies, China, the Straits Settlements, and Ceylon; but you object to having those soldiers sent from India from the native Indian army?—That is objectionable for this reason,—that if you send native soldiers from India with European officers on Indian pay and allowances, you must raise the pay and allowances of every officer serving with a European regiment in those colonies; and therefore, as a matter of finance, I believe it would be found very much more expensive.

2993. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Your Royal Highness does not object to that, I believe?—I do not object to it: but I do not advocate it because I consider that it would add considerably to the expense.

2994. Major *Anson.*] Do you think that it is absolutely necessary that such should be the case?—I think it is absolutely necessary; and perhaps I may be permitted with reference to that question, to point out the enormous difference in pay and allowances which would exist between an officer serving with a European regiment and an officer serving with a native regiment. A lieutenant colonel commanding in China with a European regiment at present receives per annum only 876 *l.*; and a lieutenant colonel commanding, serving with a native regiment, would receive about 1,714 *l.* I consider that the difference between 876 *l.* and 1,714 *l.* is so enormous, that it would not only place the officers serving with European troops socially in a most unfavourable position; but I think it would altogether lower the character of the one at the expense of the other, and in the wrong direction, because there is no question that 800 men of a European regiment is a much larger, and to my mind, more important charge than 800 men of a native regiment; if you pay the one officer who has charge of the most valuable force only 800 *l.* a year, and pay the other 1,700 *l.* a year, I think that is a sort of arrangement which is perfectly impossible to be maintained; hitherto as the Committee probably are aware it has been found impracticable to mix up European and Native troops without putting the officers serving with the one on the same allowance with those serving with the other, wherever they might be thrown together. I merely gave the difference of pay in the case of a lieutenant colonel; but I would observe that the same proportions run right through; a lieutenant colonel not commanding a European regiment gets 821 *l.*; a major of a European regiment gets 675 *l.*, whilst a major of a native regiment would get 789 *l.* In the case of captains there is more similarity, still the difference runs through the whole; decidedly the higher grades are very much less well paid than the others.

2995. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Does your Royal Highness hold that opinion after taking into consideration that the officer commanding a native regiment is considered a staff officer, that his pay is consolidated staff pay, that there are only six or seven European officers with one of those regiments and that the commanding officer is responsible

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sible for many duties in connection with his regiment which do not devolve upon the commanding officer of a European regiment?—I do. I think you ought to maintain, wherever the two forces are joined together on service, the relative proportion of pay and allowances which they have in India. I should be satisfied if you maintained the relative pay and allowances of officers serving with European troops in India, and officers serving with native troops in India. I think there ought always to be the same relative proportion.

2996. But you do not think that the fact of the commander of a native regiment being a staff officer, would account to the European officers for the inequality of position in which they would be placed?—No, because if it does not in India, why should it elsewhere. All I ask for is, that the same relative pay and allowances should exist in any other place as do exist in India.

2997. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] The Honourable Baronet's question, no doubt, alludes to the establishment of irregular regiments, which are officered by five or six officers, would your Royal Highness inform the Committee what the usual rank of the officers commanding those irregular regiments is?—That is quite accidental.

2998. Is it not often the case that the commanding officer is a captain?—I believe so; he may be a captain, a major, or a lieutenant colonel. I believe a certain proportion will be found to be captains.

2999. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] The whole native army is on the irregular system now, I believe?—Yes.

3000. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] If the officer commanding one of those regiments happened to be of a lower rank, either a captain or a major, he would be receiving a much larger rate of pay than a lieutenant colonel commanding a Queen's regiment, would he not?—There is a certain rate of pay for command, and there is a certain rate of pay attached to his position, whether he be a captain, a major, or a lieutenant colonel. The rate of pay for command is added to whatever the rate of pay may be for his position in the army, and therefore what he would receive would always be more than what an officer of corresponding rank in a European regiment would receive.

3001. Sir *James Fergusson.*] For the reason that it is staff pay?—Exactly; it is staff pay.

3002. Major *Anson.*] Would it not be looked upon in exactly the same way as the staff pay, which English officers upon the staff receive, and the regimental pay?—I do not think that it could be looked upon in that light, because the duties performed are exactly similar. The one officer is serving with a native regiment, and the other is serving with a European regiment, that is the only difference.

3003. Does not your Royal Highness consider that the officers of the English army would make this distinction between the two, that the officers belonging to the European regiments would soon be coming home to England, or that they at all events are not bound to serve abroad all their lives, whereas the officers of the Indian regiments, after they had done serving in China, for instance, would have to go back to India as their home?—I do not think you would find that that would make much difference. I do not think that you would ever find that the officers of the English army would be able to get on comfortably with the officers of the Indian army, if they were to be thrown together on different rates of pay and allowances.

3004. It is on these grounds that your Royal Highness prefers that the native troops to be employed should be a local corps raised by the English Government for the purpose of taking them from the Indian army at large?—I should be sorry to say that I prefer a local corps, because all local corps I think are very objectionable; they are generally very difficult to keep in a state of discipline; but there is so great a difficulty for the other reasons I have stated, in combining native and European troops, unless you are prepared to raise the pay and allowances of the officers of the European regiments, that rather than that there should be that discrepancy between the pay and allowances of the officers, I should prefer a local corps, though at the same time I do not like local corps; and I have little doubt that a regiment from India would be a better body of men than a local corps.

3005. If any scheme could be proposed by which the difficulty with regard to the pay regulations could be got over, your Royal Highness would prefer having recourse to the Indian native army?—Under such circumstances I should be disposed to modify my opinion as to the employment of the Indian native army, certainly.

3006. In case of a great European war, would you look to employing the soldiers of our Indian army at all?—To any extent that it is possible to use them.

3007. Both actually in the field, in places like Egypt, for instance, and as garrisons for our colonies?—Yes, most assuredly; though at the same time, of course, you would always have to be prudent as to how you used native troops in European countries; there might be some difficulty about that; I have heard that with other armies there have been difficulties in that respect; I do not know that these might not be got over; no doubt native troops could be used in a campaign in Egypt, and I think that you might find it very advantageous to employ them there.

3008. Under those circumstances, I suppose the whole of the English army which came in contact with them would have to be put upon the pay and allowance your Royal Highness has spoken of?—Certainly, when serving together.

3009. That is an additional reason, is it not, why some attempt should be made to organize some scheme by which they could be made to serve together without having to make any difference in their pay and allowances?—Of course any scheme that would bring the pay and allowances together would be an advantage; there is no doubt of it.

3010. *Chairman.*] How far would you extend that principle, would you say that if there were two corps, one English and the other native, combining in a single movement and meeting for that purpose, it would immediately be necessary to raise the pay of the officers of the English corps?—If any European corps were used in any service in any admixture with a native corps, the pay and allowances of the officers serving in the European corps ought to be the same relatively to those of the officers serving in the native corps, as they are in India.

3011. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] You would not say that, supposing a force landed in Egypt from Europe, and a native force landed in Egypt from the East Indies happened to act in combination, therefore the whole English army must have its



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H.R.H. The Duke of *Cambridge.*

17 May 1867.

pay raised?—No, only when they were actually serving together.

3012. Serving together as a brigade?—Yes, as has been the case constantly in China; and invariably, whenever Indian troops have gone to China the European troops serving there have been placed upon what is called Indian pay and allowances.

3013. *Chairman.*] Does your Royal Highness remember whether that it is carried out at Aden?—Yes, certainly, it is carried out at Aden.

3014. Major *Anson.*] You assume as a matter of course that, in the case of a war, when you wanted those Indian troops, you would be able to lay your hands upon them at once, and get them to leave India and go wherever you liked?—I think in case of war soldiers will go anywhere; and though, of course, I cannot speak with any degree of authority upon that point, having had no experience of Indian troops, I should imagine, from all I have heard, that there would be at all events much less difficulty in getting the willing services of Indian troops during war than there would be during peace.

3015. I apprehend that a great many of the duties which you would call upon those troops to perform would be garrison duties; you would not take them actually before the enemy?—I have no doubt that a great proportion of the duties they would perform would be garrison duties; but that would depend upon the circumstances of the case, as to where the contest was going on, the climate, &c.; for instance, in Egypt, I see no reason why you should not largely employ native troops actively in the field, and the same with regard to eastern countries generally. If you come further away from India, I very much question whether it would be prudent to take native troops beyond their own climate, and their own habits.

3016. You would have, in all probability, to withdraw at such a time a large number of European soldiers from India?—I hope we never shall withdraw largely European troops from India.

3017. If you were hard pressed for European troops at home, do you not think it likely that you would have to withdraw some European troops from India?—I would rather raise new levies at home than bring Europeans away from India.

3018. In case such a thing as withdrawing a large force of Europeans from India did happen, it would not be a very good time to make a change in the duties that the native troops are accustomed to perform; it might be dangerous in time of war to make any innovation of that sort, might it not?—Of course that must entirely depend upon the feeling of the country at the time when it takes place; I do not apprehend that there would be more difficulty at one time than at another if there was a good feeling existing; of course if the loyalty of the troops could not be depended upon, the probability would be, even in time of peace, that if they were largely employed abroad they would show some symptoms of disaffection, which might become very inconvenient.

3019. Does not your Royal Highness consider it would be much better to organise a system of that description, and accustom the minds of the native soldiers to employment in our colonies in time of peace, than merely to begin it in time of war?—If I rightly understand, from what I have seen in the evidence, and from other sources, the feeling of the Indian army, I apprehend that the Indian army would not make much objection to being employed abroad in time of war, but that they would in time of peace; if that is a correct view, I do not think the arrangement of employing them in time of peace—I will not say against their will, but when they did not much care about it—would at all operate favourably to their employment in time of war, when they might be induced to act with greater vigour, and with a greater desire to serve the country.

3020. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Your Royal Highness, in one of your answers, said that no British colony ought to be left without British troops. I apprehend you were speaking very generally; you did not mean that every West India Island ought to have European troops, or that every colony which was not of importance ought to have them?—No; but even in the West Indies we have a nucleus of troops in the principal islands, which I conceive we require for the other islands as well; and therefore, though every individual island is not occupied, and it is not desirable that it should be, still we have the means available and at hand to send European troops to every island, if it is thought necessary.

3021. With regard to Hong Kong, I apprehend that you wish to have a reserve of a small body of Europeans kept there as a sort of inlying picket for the garrison?—I wish to have a nucleus of Europeans.

3022. Of course, a harbour like Hong Kong, which is very easily assailable, must depend for its real defence upon the operations of the fleet?—Certainly.

3023. But the fleet may be absent on duty at other ports of the very wide station it covers, and then a small garrison may be of use against some inroad or attack of an enemy's cruisers?—Yes.

3024. In the case of the Mauritius, perhaps your Royal Highness can tell the Committee, in round numbers, what the force garrisoning the Mauritius is?—There are two regiments, and two batteries of artillery.

3025. Would the number be 1,600 or 1,800 men?—About 1,600 or 1,800 men.

3026. The questions put to some witnesses who have been examined before the Committee have indicated rather a fear on the part of some members of the Committee that 1,600 or 1,800 men would be useless for all purposes of defence in the Mauritius; may I ask your Royal Highness to state what would be the views with which you would make use of so small a garrison there; you would not, of course, pretend to prevent the landing of a large force upon an island of the extent of the Mauritius; but might it not be useful to hold one or two important points, such as the harbours that would be available for maritime purposes, and deny them to an enemy; and would not so small a garrison be sufficient to deny those harbours to the enemy, if they were supported by fortifications?—Small though the garrison may be considered to be, still I contend that it is sufficiently strong within itself, with the assistance of the fleet, to hold its own, and to give support to the well-disposed portion of the inhabitants until assistance can come from elsewhere; and with that object in view, if there were, as there ought to be, and as it was intended originally that there should be, two or three strong fortified points into which that garrison could

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could be thrown, there is no doubt that it could maintain its position.

3027. And to obtain possession of any permanent footing in the island would require operations on a large scale on the part of the enemy, would it not?—If we had 1,800 Europeans there, it would be necessary to bring a very large force to turn them out, in addition to a fleet; therefore I maintain that that is an adequate force to occupy, for a time, an important position such as the Mauritius, which is in itself a very valuable colony, and important also as regards our trade to and from India.

3028. There being only two ports of any note in the island of Mauritius, a force of 1,800 men in the island of Mauritius might very well deny those ports to an enemy for a considerable period in the supposed absence of the British fleet?—Certainly.

3029. Has your Royal Highness any knowledge of the losses, or have you heard any statistics of the losses, which took place to our trade in the great war with France, from cruisers and privateers coming out from the Mauritius?—As a matter of course, if we do not possess the Mauritius, the power which is in possession of the sea will avail itself of so good a harbour, and very largely cramp if not entirely destroy our trade with India, and that portion of our trade which is accessible from that port. Therefore, that very fact alone, in my opinion, renders it essential for commercial purposes that we should hold the Mauritius in such a manner that there is no risk of anybody else occupying it.

3030. The Mauritius is on the high road to India; it is on the track of our commerce, is it not?—Yes.

3031. Colonel *North*.] With regard to the Mauritius, even if no attack from an enemy was expected, considering that the population is French, who are not very well disposed towards us, and that an enormous proportion of the population are coolies, would you think that the island would be safe, merely in the possession of native troops?—Certainly not, as I think I have already stated before. I think it would be one of the worst places to give up entirely to a native garrison.

3032. Colonel *Percy Herbert*.] Your Royal Highness stated in answer to the questions from the noble Lord in the chair, that there were two objections to the substitution of native Asiatic troops for Europeans; one was that it necessarily involved, from your Royal Highness's knowledge of how these things are arranged, a reduction of the European army, and the other was the objection to leaving posts of importance garrisoned by native troops alone?—Yes, I did.

3033. Do you consider that either of those objections, taken separately, is quite sufficient in itself, without considering the other?—I do.

3034. Either, or both?—I consider that they are both so important, that whether it be upon one ground, or whether it be upon the other, I should object to the proposal.

3035. Sir *James Fergusson*.] If your Royal Highness objects to the substitution of native troops for English troops in the Colonies, I apprehend you would still more strongly object to the reduction of European troops in India with Oriental troops in exchange for them?—I do not see how it is possible to reduce the European garrison of India; it has been really much less increased than is generally supposed, since the period when the two armies were amalgamated; in fact, since the mutiny, I believe you will find that the increase does not amount to more than 14,000 or 15,000 Europeans. Knowing how strong the impression was, and is to this day, that at the time of the mutiny the European force serving is India was not equal to the requirements of the service, I consider that in point of numbers a mere addition of 14,000 or 15,000 men is really nothing when you come to look at the vast extent of the country to be occupied, and to the arduous and important duties which that force has to perform.

3036. I believe that all the commanders in chief who have held office in India of late years, have considered that the European army could not possibly be reduced further, consistently with safety?—Certainly; the original schedules sent in by Lord Clyde, Lord Strathnairn, and others at that time, were far in excess of what the number has been reduced to now; and it is only recently that I saw a very important letter from Sir William Mansfield, which I believe is before the Committee, which strongly deprecates the idea of any sort of reduction below what is now the number of European troops serving in India.

3037. And your Royal Highness entirely concurs in that opinion?—Entirely; to such an extent that when a question was put to me, whether it would not be possible to make a considerable reduction of the European troops in India in case of war, I deprecated that idea most strongly; I think that every attempt should be made to raise forces at home or elsewhere in case of war, in preference to reducing any Europeans in India.

3038. Many good authorities have considered, I believe, that the India Mutiny would not have taken place had it not been for the unusual weakness of the British army in India?—That belief is strongly impressed upon the minds of many; I confess I share that opinion very strongly; and upon that ground, I say, should such a circumstance arise again as a European war, in which we required reinforcements, we ought not to look to India to get reinforcements, at all events of Europeans.

3039. Mr. *Oliphant*.] What amount of troops in Hong Kong would you consider sufficient as a nucleus?—I think a regiment of Europeans and a battery of artillery is a good nucleus for that colony to form upon. I consider that the European discipline and organisation leavens the whole body, whether it be supplemented by native troops or by local volunteers; that these are influenced by the European element, and that their discipline is ensured by their having a European corps serving with them.

3040. Sir *James Fergusson*.] It is a fact, is it not, that the two branches of the Indian army, the European and the Native branches, are fixed according to the duties required of each, and without any connection with the numerical strength of each other?—Yes, there are certain stations in India which it is considered necessary should be occupied by European troops, and it is with reference to the number of those stations that I believe the European force has been fixed as it is now.

3041. It is quite an erroneous statement, is it not, to say that if the native army was weakened still further, you would be able to dispense with European troops?—That, of course, is a question which is decided in India, and upon which I am



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H.R.H. The Duke of *Cambridge.*

17 May 1867.

not consulted; but I apprehend that, as I have just stated, the European force is calculated upon the requirements of European troops at certain stations, and not with reference to the number of natives that there may be under arms at the time; at the same time probably the Committee is aware that there is a strong impression that any reduction of the native force in India would be an impossibility.

3042. Marquis of *Hartington.*] Does your Royal Highness remember what took place upon the outbreak of the last New Zealand war, with reference to sending Sikh regiments to New Zealand?—Yes.

3043. Was it the intention of the Government to send two or three of those regiments to New Zealand?—It was at one time thought that they would send some Sikh regiments to New Zealand.

3044. Does your Royal Highness remember why that arrangement was not carried out?—First of all it was thought that there might be some difficulty in raising the regiments, and getting the men to go, but the main difficulty, as I understood, was on account of the expense, because it was thought that if the Sikhs were to be sent to New Zealand, the pay and allowances of the officers serving with them were such that you would have to raise the pay and allowances of all the officers serving with the European troops with whom they would be co-operating, and that therefore the expense would be at least as great, if not greater, than the expense of sending one or two additional European regiments.

3045. I do not know whether you remember the circumstance, but I believe it is the fact, that when the intention of sending the Sikhs became known in New Zealand, very great dissatisfaction was felt in the colony?—The colonists objected very much; that is a point which I have not yet referred to. I believe you would find that all the colonies would object very much, and I doubt whether any of the colonies would pay their quota, or their share towards the maintenance of the force, which they are now called upon in some cases, or at all events desired to pay, if the troops they were to pay for were not European troops. I think you would find that all the colonies would object strongly to paying for native troops.

3046. Mr. *Laing.*] Why does your Royal Highness think it so certain that any substitution of native for European troops in the colonies would be objected to by the colonists?—Because I think that all the colonists knowing that the European soldier is the element of strength and protection they want, would consider him superior to a native soldier, of whatever description that native soldier might be; and as they prefer paying for the best description of troops they could get, they would naturally pay willingly for a European, when they might have great hesitation in paying for a native.

3047. Supposing a European regiment to be withdrawn from a colony, and brought home, is it your Royal Highness's feeling that it is certain that the House of Commons, in some fit of economy, would reduce the army by that regiment?—From the experience I have had now for 10 years, I am satisfied that if you were to increase, as you would then do, the force at home beyond what it is now, you would be called upon to reduce that force. As an instance of this I may state that, recently, when there was an idea of raising a native regiment for Hong Kong, we were called upon to reduce the aggregate number of European troops, in order to make up for the increase which would come on to the Imperial establishment of native troops; that is to say, supposing the regiment consisted of 600 natives, we were called upon to reduce 600 Europeans.

3048. Has not the feeling a good deal changed now, is not there a strong feeling in favour of the creation of an army of reserve, and other measures to ensure our having a strong military force at home?—Yes; but an army of reserve has a very different organization from a body of troops permanently maintained. I was alluding entirely to the permanent establishment of the army. I do not think that in that point of view the present feeling with regard to an army of reserve would have any effect in preventing a corresponding reduction of Europeans, supposing you were to take natives on to your pay to a large extent.

3049. Do you not think that the present term of colonial service is so long as to be oppressive upon the British army?—I think it is long, and it is practically longer than it is intended. The object of every Secretary of State with whom I have had to deal, and of the military authorities, has been that the army should have two-thirds of its service abroad, and one-third at home; but we have never arrived at that point yet.

3050. Then it would be desirable, would it not, to diminish the amount of colonial service, if you could do so without a fear of having a reduction in the total establishment of the army?—Yes, but if the intention is carried out of bringing back those regiments that are still serving in New Zealand we shall very nearly, if not quite, have arrived at the point when the infantry will be one-third at home and two-thirds abroad; so that the object we have been striving at would in that case have been attained.

3051. To take the case of the Mauritius, which perhaps may bring to the best practical test the argument for this, if it be worth anything; there are two European regiments now, I think, in the Mauritius?—There are.

3052. Supposing an Indian regiment to be substituted for one of those European regiments, that would still leave the nucleus of a European force in the Mauritius?—Yes.

3053. Supposing a state of things to arise, such as a European war, when we found great difficulty in keeping up a sufficient European force for safety in India, might it not be very desirable to be able to withdraw a European regiment from the Mauritius and substitute an Indian regiment for it?—In time of war I should be very glad to do it, if we cannot help ourselves; but I think it would not be desirable in time of peace, because I think the colony would object to it. I think that 1,800 Europeans are not at all too many for the safety of a very important colony such as the Mauritius. I should feel more security with a garrison of 1,600 or 1,800 men, or whatever the force may be, if they were Europeans, than if they were half natives and half Europeans.

3054. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] The case put by the Honourable Member would, I apprehend, involve an immediate increase of the estimate to be laid before the House?—That is the exact point. As I apprehend the question put to me, it

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it would be substituting 600 or 800 natives for 600 or 800 Europeans; therefore you must increase the estimate to that extent.

3055. Or reduce the Europeans?—Yes, because whether it be natives on Imperial pay, or native regiments lent, say by the Indian Government, from the day they leave India they would be on Imperial pay, and you would naturally increase your Imperial estimate to the extent of the numbers that you either raised for yourself, or that you were allowed to use by the Indian Government.

3056. And your Royal Highness apprehends that whatever the decision of the House of Commons might be, you would have a difficulty in getting the Secretary of State for War to propose to the House of Commons those increased estimates?—I think the Secretary of State for War would be very much indisposed to do so, certainly. The experience I have had with all the Secretaries of State I have known, leads me to think that they would not like to increase the estimates in a time of profound peace like the present, by taking on a considerable number of men who, though they be natives, would add directly to the general estimates for the army.

3057. The Belloochee Regiment now about to be raised for Hong Kong is a case in point, is it not?—Yes, that is a case in point.

3058. Major *Anson.*] Apart from the question of employing Indian troops in colonies, do you not think that the service of the army abroad in the colonies ought to be established in the proportion of two-thirds abroad, and one-third at home?—I do; I have always thought so.

3059. And that the House of Commons ought to keep up a sufficient number of troops in England to enable that to be done?—I think that is most essential; but I ought to add that I think the arrangements which are now going on, will probably, in a very short time, make us arrive at that point. It must be borne in mind that we have had some very exceptional years to deal with, and, therefore, the service in the colonies and in India, has been rather more heavy of late than it would be under ordinary circumstances, but if we once return to the due proportion, then I quite agree that the due proportion, having been adjusted, ought to be kept up by Parliament maintaining such a force as to enable the troops to serve one-third of their time at home and two-thirds of their time abroad.

3060. *Chairman.*] Looking to our extended empire, and the innumerable interests always coming into play, it is not very unlikely that we should find it necessary to increase our garrisons anywhere upon certain occasions; something might happen in China, or Japan, or the Cape of Good Hope, or Canada, that would lead to an increase of the army?—I must say that my experience is, that we have never been able to attain to the one-third of the service at home and the two-thirds abroad.



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*Tuesday, 21st May 1867.*

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.
Mr. Childers.
Viscount Cranborne.
Sir James Fergusson.
Viscount Hamilton.
Marquis of Hartington.
Captain Hayter.
Mr. Laing.
Colonel North.
Mr. Oliphant.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

ROSS D. MANGLES, Esq., called in; and Examined.

*Ross D. Mangles, Esq.*
21 May 1867.

3061. *Chairman.*] WE understood that you had information with reference to the subject of our inquiry which you were willing to lay before the Committee?—I was desirous of giving evidence before the Committee, because I have formed, after much thought and inquiry, very strong convictions with regard to the army in India, which I was desirous to submit to Parliament and the public through this Committee. I believe that the European army in India is kept up at an unnecessary strength; quite unnecessary, that is to say, as regards the population, but yet necessary as long as we persist in maintaining so large a native army. I believe that if you were to reduce the native army considerably, you might then, with perfect safety, reduce your European army also very considerably. I am aware that it is not likely that soldiers would ever agree that any army of any description, either white or black, should be reduced, but I am quite sure that in the late mutiny there was no danger at all except from our own native soldiers. I am satisfied that there was nothing approaching to an insurrection of the people; in fact, I believe (though of course it is carrying the matter to a great length to say so) that if we had had no native soldiery at all, nothing but the police and our own European troops, we should have had no insurrection at all. A century has passed since we have had the government of India, and in no case have we been in the slightest danger (I speak it advisedly) from any insurrection of the people. We have never had any formidable insurrection, and I believe we never shall. They are a people, as I believe, very easily governed, and they are a people who, owing to circumstances, particularly the differences of religion, do not readily combine; they are a people, generally speaking, with the exception of certain tribes and castes, very timid, and very unsoldierlike; and I believe that our maintenance of the native army at the present strength causes danger, if there be any danger from the population, by keeping up a military spirit among the people. It is clear that if our native army was greatly reduced, fewer tribes and families would have kinsmen in the army; and I think that the history of all countries and of all ages teaches us how very soon even a military people not employed in war, and not kept under arms, settle down into a peaceable, agricultural, commercial, and trading people. I believe that is a matter of universal experience.

3062. Do you consider, then, that none of the native wars in which we have been engaged in India were to such an extent shared in by the population that they may be looked upon as showing hostility on the part of the people?—No, I think not.

3063. The Mahratta wars, for instance?—There is probably more nationality among the Mahrattas, with the exception of the Rajpoots, who, however, are very much divided into different clans, than among any other people in India. I speak now mainly of what I know best, which are the North-Western Provinces, Bengal, and the Punjab; and I say it deliberately and advisedly, having looked into it, that in no single case was there any rising of the people in the years 1857 and 1858 where there were not sepoys. There were many districts where the magistrate and the collector had not a single European to guard them, and nobody but their own police, where 100 insurgents might have robbed and murdered every European at the station with impunity, and robbed the public treasury; and there was not a single instance of such an occurrence. There were districts with a comparatively warlike population, for instance, the province of Behar, where there was not a European soldier, except at Dinapore (the cantonment of Patna), where there was a regiment, while the population amounted to seven millions, occupying an area of 24,000 square miles, and in no single instance did the people rise in insurrection, until, as at Arrah, three regiments of sepoy mutineers had marched into the station.

3064. Was that equally true of Oude?—No, it was not true of Oude, for this reason: the rural population of Oude were the sepoys, so to speak; they were the brothers, cousins, uncles, and fathers of the sepoys. Theirs was not an ordinary insurrection against the Government. The talookdars, I believe, did rise. That was more of the nature of a rebellion than anything else that took place in India, and it was caused by their having been recently dispossessed; but the fighting population in Oude (who certainly did not love the talookdars, and could not love them, because they had been most cruelly oppressed by them, merely rose because they were identified with the sepoys. When the sepoys were pent-up in Lucknow, the population saw that

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that their only chance of rescuing them was to make common cause with them. Many of them had been sepoys, many of them were looking to be sepoys; they were the same class of men; they may be said to be the sepoys themselves.

3065. Your induction is based upon 100 years' experience, but then your experience is limited to the North-West Provinces, Bengal, and the Punjab?—No; I said that I do not know so well what happened elsewhere in the mutiny, as I do in regard to those districts; but my experience of 100 years is, of course, historical experience, and I know that there has been, during that long period, no insurrection of the people which threatened the smallest danger to the Government. If the Committee will allow me, I have an extract here which I should like to read. The most serious insurrection I am aware of in India, though I was not in India at the time, was the insurrection at Bareilly in 1816. There had been an obnoxious tax put on, and there had been some blood shed in collecting it, or in connection with it, and there was a fanatical feeling on the part of the Rohillas, who are confessedly, I suppose, after the Sikhs, the most warlike tribe in India. They were well armed in those days with matchlocks, spears, and swords, and they were and are men of reckless courage. They rose in what appeared to be a serious insurrection. Some say there were 5,000 men, some say there were as many as 12,000 men, actually in arms. We had 270 men of the 27th Regular Native Infantry, with two guns, and 150 of a provincial battalion, a sort of local militia, and we had a regiment of irregular horse; that was our whole force against the fighting men of a province. In order to show what the result was, perhaps you will allow me to read a passage from Dr. Wilson's continuation of Mill's History. He says, "The first attack was made upon the sepoys. Being formed in a square, the troops repulsed every charge, though the assailants fought with fury, some of them making their way into the square, where they were cut down or bayonetted. On his side, Captain Cunningham's Horse charged the masses of the multitude, and threw them into confusion; repulsed in their forward movements, they took up their ground in a grove defended by a low wall, but were driven out of it by the troops, who pursued them into the old town, and set fire to the huts in which they had taken shelter. This put an end to the conflict. The insurgents dispersed, leaving between 300 and 400 dead," exceeding the number of the regular troops opposed to them, "and a greater number wounded and taken prisoners. The loss of the troops was inconsiderable, 21 killed, 62 wounded." I was told when I was at Bareilly, some five or six years after the event, by an officer who took part in the conflict, that our troops were so weak that, although the historian says they formed a square, in fact they had not men enough to form a square, they formed a triangle. I instance this because I believe it to have been the most formidable insurrection of the people that ever took place in India during our rule, and you see how easily it was put down.

3066. Was there any native person of note at the head of it?—I cannot answer that.

3067. Do you not think that any insurrection which we are ever likely to have to dread will be an insurrection forming itself round some native prince as the centre?—Yes; but I think there is nothing to dread in that. We have got 130,000 native troops, and we have got from 65,000 to 70,000 Europeans to watch them (that is the great mistake we commit). I have often asked the question who are those troops to fight with? We required a large number of native troops when there were men like Scindia in power, with great armies disciplined by Frenchmen, and with a tremendous force of artillery. We needed then a large force to form line against them, but such powers no longer exist in India. I say that I have asked the question over and over again, from men who maintain an opposite opinion to mine, who are those soldiers maintained to fight against? and I have never had any answer to it.

3068. While there exist native princes of considerable power, a tolerably large force is necessary, is it not?—They are not great Powers; it is not like a disarmament of Europe, where you must conciliate every Power. We are in that position in India that in reducing our own force we should have a moral right to call upon the native princes to reduce theirs and keep them reduced.

3069. Do you think they would do so willingly?—Yes, I think they would do so willingly if they saw that we were reducing ours too; always upon that supposition.

3070. To what point do you think that the native army of India might be reduced?—It is now 130,000. I think you might strike off 30,000 or 40,000 of them, and then you might reduce 20,000 of our European force.

3071. Have you seen a Minute that has come home from Sir William Mansfield on the subject of the force in India?—No, I think not. I may have seen an abstract of it, but I have not seen the Minute itself. But Sir William Mansfield, and whoever holds the opposite opinions to mine, should have that question pressed upon him, and should be obliged to show who those men are to fight with.

3072. As far as I remember, Sir William Mansfield gives a reply to that; he states that a number of frontier stations must be maintained; that Nepaul, for instance, cannot be counted upon as permanently peaceful?—I am glad your Lordship has mentioned Nepaul, because I think that the late campaign in Oude proved, if we did not know it before, that the Nepaulese are quite powerless on the plains. They are formidable in their native mountains, where we have no business to follow them; but every soldier of whom I have asked the question, who saw them in Oude, speaks of them as quite feeble and helpless on the plains. They are as much frightened at cavalry as all highlanders are, as our own Scotch Highlanders were years ago; and I believe that a regiment of dragoons would ride over them all.

3073. Do you apply that view equally to Bhootan?—The Bhootanese fight with bows and arrows; they are most contemptible fellows.

3074. We did not find them contemptible?—They made some resistance behind a stockade, but they could not face our troops.

3075. Our troops did not face them?—A particular brigade did not face them; but it is impossible to consider them formidable enemies.

3076. As a matter of actual experience, was it not a fact that we had considerable difficulty in establishing our positions in that country?—You had the difficulties which there are in all these frontiers;



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*Ross D. Mangles*, Esq.

21 May 1867.

frontiers; malaria, and snow and no or bad roads, and difficulties of that sort.

3077. A condition precedent of your policy is, that you should retire from all country which is too difficult for troops to act in?—No, I did not say that; but I think you need not follow men into their fastnesses, certainly not with large bodies of Europeans. Within a year or two there has been a disturbance in the hills lying above what are called the Northern Circars, districts of Madras, on the coast of Coromandel. Sir Henry Montgomery told me only yesterday, that they had been entirely put down by the police, without a single soldier being employed; that bears out my opinion. The views one hears expressed are almost ludicrous. Even in Parliament the other day, when your Lordship made your speech upon the Budget, I observed that Members of Parliament enlarged greatly on the danger of what they called the military police. Of course you can drill the police into a state which renders them as efficient and nearly as dangerous as native troops; but it is your own fault if you do. You have the matter in your own hands, and you may have your police drilled and disciplined up to any point you think fit, and if you think they are becoming formidable you may reduce their discipline and their efficiency. I believe that a police force would do nine-tenths of the duties which are now devolved upon native troops; and there is this great difference between a police force and a force of sepoys, that there is a brotherhood among the native soldiery; they move about from station to station, they meet and fraternise, they come in many cases from the same part of the country, and belong to the same tribes and castes. But the police force in India is generally raised in the district where it is employed, and has a knowledge of the police employed on the frontiers of the adjoining district, but nothing more. The police of Patna, for instance, know no more of the police of Meerut, and have no more connection with them, than they have with the police of Berlin or Madrid; they know nothing of them; they have no means of knowing them; there are 300 or 400 miles between them. But the native soldiers move from station to station; one regiment is stationed at Patna, and another at Meerut, and next year they change places; they meet on the road, and there is a brotherhood between them; that was the great strength of the mutiny. The native troops were all engaged in it. It appears to me quite absurd to hear how the danger of a police force enlarged upon, while at the same time nothing is said of the dangers of a large military force.

3078. Would your proposition be, that these large provinces with considerable numbers of Mohamedan or other fanatical population should be kept in check entirely by a police force?—No, I do not go to the extent of saying that there should be no native army, but I say that the present native army is much too large, and that a very much smaller number would be sufficient and that any insurrectionary movement of the people taken in time, as it ought to be, would, I think, in 99 cases out of 100, be checked by the police if it was not allowed to gather head.

3079. You must always allow for the chance of blunders, and have a sufficient military force to be able to retrieve them, must you not?—Yes, mine is not an extreme view; I do not say we could do without an army at all, far from it, but I say we should be most imprudent to reduce our European force (which I take it is the main subject which this Committee are considering) without reducing our native force. The only reason why you cannot reduce your European force is, that you persist in maintaining a very large native force.

3080. Your policy would be to reduce the military force that watches over the great cities, and to abandon the frontier posts on the north?—No.

3081. To reduce the frontier posts?—No, I do not know that I would; I should keep the bulk of my force at frontier posts, and I should keep a good portion of the rest in the large cities you speak of where there is danger; I should like a European regiment at Patna.

3082. You would dispose of Hyderabad and Gwalior by calling upon the Nizam and Scindia to disarm?—Not to disarm, but to reduce their forces as we reduce ours.

3083. Have you ever drawn out in your own mind anything like a scheme of distribution which would account for the reductions which you propose?—No, I have not; I never went further than the principle. I am satisfied that the main use of our European force is not to keep down the population, who do not as a general rule need keeping down, but to be our watch and guard against the native army; and I say, as a principle, that the smaller the native army the more likely is it to be faithful, and the larger it is the more likely it is to be the reverse.

3084. Have you ever considered the question of artillery; I believe it is now a maxim that no artillery should be in the possession of native troops?—Yes; I think that is a very wise and sound maxim.

3085. Consequently, if you reduce the British force, you must very largely reduce the artillery?—Yes, you would have a smaller force, but you need not put it into the hands of the natives on that account; there is this to be considered as regards the people of India, that every day, and every year, we are making our military arm stronger by better weapons; you have Armstrong guns, you have breach-loaders; if you believe that there is danger from the people of India, they never can acquire those arms, and I say that a company armed with breech-loaders would probably be as powerful against insurgents, as a wing of a regiment armed in the old-fashioned way; as those advantages, and all those improvements in the weapons of war must be on the side of the civilized Power, that is, on our side in India, and against the native population, even if they were disposed to rise; but as I say, we had examples in India in the last mutiny, of whole districts of warlike people who never dreamt of rising, and in some cases they took part against the sepoys. In the province of Behar, for instance, the Commissioner at Patna called in the European officers; he thought they were in great danger, and summoned them to come into Patna, leaving their stations, and among others, two very large districts in particular, Saran and Tirhoot, full of a warlike population, for many of our sepoys came from thence. The European officers left the stations; they were left in charge of native civil officers; and in neither case were the Treasuries plundered, in neither case was any person or property injured, and in both cases when the European

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European civilians went back, the districts were handed to them in order.

3086. Do you assume it as a certainty that no future rebellion or mutiny will be better managed than that of 1857?—I assume this as a certainty, that even with our present native force, there never can be so formidable a mutiny from the mere reduction in the numbers of the native army, and if my opinion were to prevail, it would be still less formidable, because you would have fewer sepoys. I used the expression that the smaller the native army the more likely is it to be faithful, and the larger the reverse, because I believe that one great stimulus and encouragement to the mutiny was, that the native troops believed that they were masters of the position. They saw that there was one European regiment at Calcutta; another at Patna; there was a third divided between Lucknow and Cawnpore, and there was a fourth at Agra. In those 800 miles, there were only four European regiments. The native troops knew that, and they knew their own numbers; they knew to a man, probably, how many thousands and hundreds of thousands there were of native troops, and they believed that they were masters of the situation. That I believe was one of the great inducements to them to rise. They believed that they could crush so small a body of European troops, though they knew what sort of men they were, by their superiority in numbers.

3087. Have you ever been able to persuade Sir John Lawrence of the correctness of your views?—I am afraid not. At the same time, "*Magna est veritas et prevalebit.*' Many other people, I daresay, have the same sort of confidence in their views; but I am so certain that I am right about the matter, that I am confident that, sooner or later, my opinions will prevail.

3088. I asked you that question, for the purpose of asking this further one: there must be in the minds of men like Sir John Lawrence, holding a strong opinion upon the subject, some reason or information upon which that opinion rests; have you ever, in correspondence with him, ascertained the point on which he conceives your views to be fallacious?—No; I have written to him upon the subject, but he has not answered me.

3089. Did you discuss the matter with him when he was in England?—No, I do not know that I did. I discussed the mutiny with him, and he agreed with me entirely that it was not in any respect an insurrection of the people, that those who did rise simply followed the sepoys; but that there was no insurrection of the people, properly speaking. That is the opinion, as we know by their publications, of many intelligent and distinguished foreigners; Montalembert and De Tocqueville, for instance; they both hold that opinion very strongly. But there are some Englishmen who are so determined to believe that our government of India is very oppressive, that they will not be satisfied unless we agree with them that the outbreak in 1857 was an insurrection of the people against our intolerable tyranny. I believe that the people were with us; I am sure that the great bulk of the people, especially after they had tested what the government of the sepoys was, were with us.

3090. I forget whether I asked you to name the amount of British and native troops to which you would reduce the two armies?—The native army now consists of about 135,000 men. I think you might well strike off 30,000 or 35,000, and so reduce it to 100,000, and then you might take away 20,000 European troops.

3091. Then you would reduce the European troops to a lower point than that which they held at the outbreak of the mutiny?—No, it would not be so, certainly.

3092. We have had it frequently stated here, on the authority of his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge and others, that the difference between our force before the mutiny and our force existing now is not more than 13,000?—All force is relative; the British force, before the mutiny was too small, because there was then an enormous native army of 100,000 men stronger than it is at present. I should say it is a matter of proportion.

3093. Then your only remedy for the military evils that produced the mutiny would have been a reduction of the native troops; you would not have thought it necessary to reduce the English force?—I think it would be the same thing whichever you do.

3094. You regard it purely as an equation?—Yes; you had, certainly, too large a native force at that time; but if you had added 20,000 or 30,000 men to your European force, I think it very likely that the natives would not have risen at all.

3095. Then you think that, if by any happy contrivance we could get rid of our native force, we should get rid of our English force too?—No, you must not reduce me *ad absurdum* in that way. I know that no country can be ruled without an army, but an army is a great evil, and the smaller you can make that army the better; it beggars your country. Here you find great difficulty in recruiting. I am satisfied you could lessen that evil to the extent of 20,000 men, if you would begin by reducing your native troops, because all experience, I repeat, shows that you are in no danger from the people of India, and every day which adds to the excellence and precision of your warlike weapons increases your comparative superiority over people who fight with bows and arrows or matchlocks, at the best; and where are they to get breech-loaders, or Armstrong guns?

3096. You said just now, that there was some little difficulty in filling up the ranks of the native army?—No; I referred to recruiting here.

3097. Have you never heard the argument used by Indian authorities, that one of the great evils of reducing the native army is the discontent you produce among the military classes in India?—I have heard that, and I think I have answered it by anticipation. I say I think we create and foster military classes by the very fact of keeping up such large forces. I believe that the Sikhs, who are the best agriculturists in India, would, in the course of a generation, settle down into peaceable habits, and lose their military tendencies. You see that in all nations, and in all ages, it has been the case that a military people will very soon settle down into unmilitary habits. I suppose the people of England have not nearly the same military disposition that they had in times when they were liable to be called out to service, as they were in feudal times. I say that the farmers of Huntingdonshire at present are very little like Cromwell's Ironsides. I see how quiet the Highlanders are compared with what they were; they never think of war. We encourage that spirit in India, and we keep up the military classes. Before our ascendancy was established,



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almost every man in Hindostan, the Deccan, and the Mahratta country, was either a soldier or a robber. During the time of the breaking up of the Mogul empire the whole of India was fighting; every man was at every other man's throat. You may keep up and foster that spirit by keeping up large armies, or you may reduce it by dismissing the people to the plough and the loom.

3098. How would you deal with the case of frontier outrages; supposing the Affghans or other people from the north-west came down and committed some great outrage?—Of course I would keep a very considerable force at Peshawur, or upon the frontier.

3099. Was not there in the Umballa campaign very considerable difficulty in getting together a force large enough to make an impression?—I speak there with great humility; as your Lordship asks me the question, I must answer it. I think there was a mistake in following them into their hills. I do not think you ought to have done that.

3100. How do you propose to chastise them, if you do not follow them into their hills?—You could chastise them when you catch them in the plains giving you provocation.

3101. Then you must keep continual watch?—No doubt; you must be very watchful. I think it would be very likely that you could, if you tried it, hire one of the tribes to chastise the other, which would be better still.

3102. Colonel *North.*] With regard to the reduction of 20,000 European troops which you mentioned, if you only reduced 30,000 of the natives, do you not think that that would be a very large proportion of Europeans to reduce in comparison with the natives?—No, for the reason I have stated; because I think that if the natives knew that they were weaker they would be less likely to give you trouble.

3103. Major *Anson.*] With respect to your remarks about the causes of the mutiny, all the fortified places in India at the time were also in the hands of the native army, were they not?—Yes, they were.

3104. In the case of Oude, we had just annexed the province, and the talookdars, the great landed proprietors there, had never given allegiance to anybody before hardly?—They were very bad subjects to the king, no doubt.

3105. They all held independent forts, from which they plundered their neighbours, and I think we captured something like 300 of them in one campaign?—Yes, the country was studded with forts.

3106. And therefore Oude was in a totally different position altogether to the rest of India?—Quite so. It is quite clear why the talookdars were dissatisfied; they had reason to be dissatisfied, for, right or wrong, the land settlement had been very unfavourable to them. I do not say whether it was right or wrong, but they had great reason to be dissatisfied with it; however, I am quite sure that their countrymen, the people of Oude, I mean the fighting population, would never have risen except because the quarrel was in fact their own quarrel.

3107. There is very little doubt, as you say, that the lesson we learnt from the mutiny was to be very careful about the native army, and to have a great dread of a preponderance of the native army?—Yes, I apprehend there is no other cause for fear in India. There are wild tribes, the Santals and the Bheels, and there are frontier dangers, but there are after all only two frontiers to be watched, the Peshawur and the Bhootan frontier. The Himalayahs are quite impassable, and the people beyond our frontier are not disposed to trouble us at all except at those points I have mentioned.

3108. *Chairman.*] And the Burmese frontier?—I think we are much more likely to invade the Burmese than they are to invade us.

3109. You have had two wars there?—Yes; I was in the first Burmese campaign. I may say of them what I said of the Bhootans: they were a miserable enemy; they never could face us for a moment. The only difficulties were the difficulties of the country; our troops were fed on salt provisions. We had no means of carriage, and there were no roads. These were the only difficulties; it was not the enemy; and so it was in Bhootan. In the particular case alluded to by the noble Chairman, there was great mismanagement; I believe they cut off our water, and of course we were obliged to come away then.

3110. Major *Anson.*] You think our military system in India, in fact, at the present moment is a wrong one?—I think it is wrong in this respect, that we keep up an unnecessarily large native army. Having this large native army, we are obliged in prudence to maintain a large European force; I would not on any account reduce the European force without reducing the native force in the first instance.

3111. In time of peace that is bad enough, but in time of war would you apprehend the withdrawal of large numbers of European soldiers if we had a war in Europe?—There would be a great temptation to the Imperial Government to withdraw European troops from India.

3112. More especially, now that they are all Queen's regiments?—Yes, exactly; they could not withdraw the Company's regiments in former days, but they would reduce them, no doubt, in any future war; and I think they might safely reduce them, but only if they had reduced the native force.

3113. His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge said that he did not think they would withdraw any European soldiers from India; but do you not think it is extremely probable when the time came, and they wanted troops, that they would do so?—The inducement would be very great. If we were fighting upon the Continent, and met with any reverse, I think the inducement would be too strong to be resisted to take 10,000 or 20,000 European troops from India.

3114. That would be the time, of all others, when the native force, finding the European force in India reduced, would take the opportunity of rising against us?—Certainly it would.

3115. Do you not think it would be a far wiser plan to endeavour to turn the warlike energies of such races as there are in India to the defence of the empire away from India, where there would be no danger to us?—I have no doubt that the Sikhs would willingly take service in that way; I think the rates of pay would be a difficulty, but I think the Sikhs would go anywhere where they could get fighting and plunder.

3116. Apart from the question of pay, you think it would be a wise thing to make use of them where they could be no danger to us?—I think it would. If there was what the Americans call any "difficulty" in Egypt, they might be very

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very useful there. I think you might send a large force there, and, led by English officers, I think they would be a match for any troops in the world.

3117. Do you not think you might also find them very useful for doing garrison duty in our colonies?—I do not know about that; the Sikhs are a restless people; they like fighting, and they like plunder; I do not think they would like garrison duty much.

3118. They never have shown any objection to it yet, have they?—They have never had any.

3119. In China?—They had fighting there.

3120. After the fighting was over?—If they thought it was going to last a short time, they might bear it; but they are a restless people.

3121. Other tribes, of whom we have made soldiers, have been very useful in garrison duty; in the Straits Settlements, at Aden and in China, they have done their work very well?—No doubt they have; they would do so.

3122. Do you think that that was a wrong system which we adopted then, to employ those troops in those colonies?—No, I do not think so at all.

3123. I believe the Indian Government adopts that system still at Aden, and there is no reason, is there, why, if they employ Indian troops at Aden, they should not employ them in the Mauritius, for instance?—No; I do not know why they should not.

3124. Politically, you think that there would not be the smallest objection to doing so?—I do not think there would.

3125. On the contrary, you think it would be rather advisable to do so?—They must be classes who do not object to going to sea, or regiments enlisted for general service.

3126. The Indian regiments are all enlisted for general service now, are they not?—Yes, I think they are.

3127. His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, in his evidence, admitted that in all probability it would be very advisable to employ those soldiers out of India in time of war; do you not think that it would be rather a dangerous time, when you were hard pressed at home, to commence any new system with your native soldiers in India; and would it not be much more advisable to begin it gradually in time of peace?—It would be much more advisable to commence it in time of peace, no doubt.

3128. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] All the evidence which has hitherto been given before the Committee has stated that the number of European troops employed in India is regulated rather with reference to the military requirements of the country than for the purpose of watching the native army; are we to understand that that is not your opinion?—That is clearly not my opinion. I do not see the military acquirements of the country, with the exception of those that the noble Chairman has mentioned, our frontier stations espicially; I think that the military requirements of the country are otherwise exceedingly small. I have no fear whatever; from the experience of 100 years, of any danger from any of the population; we have less danger now than before, because we have disarmed them in a great measure; they have no gunners, they have no practised artillerymen, and we have the daily increasing superiority of our improved arms. Therefore, I cannot see for what purpose the European troops are maintained except to watch the native army. The chief lesson that the mutiny has taught me, and I believe has taught most thinking men, that which it has taught Sir John Lawrence, to my knowledge, is, that our great danger, so preponderating a danger that it may be called our sole danger, is from our native troops. Therefore I suppose that, seeing no danger in any other quarter, the European troops are maintained that we may be upon our guard against the native troops.

3129. Let me recall to your recollection one very important and necessary element of danger which always must exist in India, the simple fact of a Mahometan population, the Mahometan being by nature an enemy of the Christian?—I am afraid it would take rather a long time to go into that subject, but I am quite prepared to do so. I disbelieve it; I think that we are in error in supposing that. Just as we should be wrong, in fact, in supposing that every man who calls himself a Christian is governed by Christian motives entirely, in all his thoughts, words, and actions; so we are utterly wrong in supposing that all Mahometans are necessarily inimical to Christians. In the late mutiny many of our staunchest friends and supporters were Mahometans; I could name you instances over and over again, of hundreds and thousands of Mahometans who were faithful. I was told by the highest authority, that two-thirds of the native troops who marched down from the Punjab to assist us in the capture of Delhi, and who rendered the most essential service there, were Mahometans; they came and fought on our side, the Guides and the other men of the Punjab also, with the greatest fidelity and gallantry; I could bring to your knowledge scores of such instances.

3130. Where Mahometans are placed under European or English guidance, it is very possible that that may be the case, and that the feelings of religion are then to a very considerable degree modified; but still I must bring it to your recollection, that whenever we have Mahometan nationalities as opposed to Christian nationalities, the Mahometan prejudice comes out with the greatest virulence. We may take the case of Algeria; from the very commencement there has been an implacable, and undying enmity between the two races there, which exists to this time; it has been exactly the same with the Mahometan provinces of Russia. The very rebellion which has been quoted at Bareilly was essentially a Mahometan rebellion; it was raised by a Mahometan fanatic, who placed himself at the head of it, and it was on that ground that the insurrection attained such formidable proportions. I think from your Indian experience you must know that we always have looked upon the Mahometan element as one of excessive danger?—I think it has always been very much exaggerated, and my opinion of that exaggeration has gathered force from the experience of what I heard, and read during the mutiny. If I had time, and you had patience, I could give you hundreds of cases where Mahometan soldiers, and other individuals, behaved in the staunchest way towards us in that mutiny; but it is enough to mention the single fact that two-thirds, I am told, (I think it was Sir Robert Montgomery who told me, I know I had it on the highest authority) of the soldiers who marched down and gave their blood and their lives for us at Delhi were Mahometans.

3131. I was mentioning to you that in that



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*Ross D. Mangles*, Esq.

21 May 1867.

case there was no religious fanaticism involved; the mutiny was not a Mahometan mutiny; we should never have obtained them if it had been otherwise?—I will give you the proof of a case where it was a Mahometan mutiny. There were a number of Wahabees at Patna, as you know; they formed a conspiracy, subscribed money, and fostered the very insurrection beyond the frontier which the noble Chairman spoke of; they were detected in it, and some of them were hung; but the man who denounced them was a Mahometan police officer in the Punjab, who found reason to suspect that this conspiracy was going on. He laid the case before a magistrate, but he had not sufficient evidence at the time to induce the magistrate to act upon it. Accordingly this Mahometan sent his son into the Sitana country, where he obtained evidence sufficient for these men's conviction. The son came back, and the father laid the case again before the magistrate; the men were tried, convicted, and executed upon this Mahometan's evidence, this being really a religious war, a real crusade against the Christians.

3132. *Chairman.*] Was the Mahometan a Wahabee?—No, he was not a Wahabee, but he was a Mahometan.

3133. Is not it true that the Wahabees are extending very largely throughout India?—They may or may not be; I do not know.

3134. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] With respect to the reduction of our European force in India, has it ever occurred to you that the gradual approach of the Russian frontier is an element of consideration in this question?—I have not much apprehension of a Russian invasion of India; but, supposing it to be so, I say that we could, if need were, send troops from England to Bombay and Peshawur much faster than the Russians could march from the Sea of Aral to meet us.

3135. I am not talking of a Russian invasion, but of the gradual approach and absorption year by year of territory, which is taking place before our eyes every day; when our territories march with each other, do you think it will then be prudent to avail ourselves of that time to reduce our army by 20,000 men?—I think it will be a long time before the Russian frontier marches with ours.

3136. *Chairman.*] When the territories do march, you will be prepared to revise the establishment?—Yes; I think we could send troops to India faster than they could march them through Affghanistan.

3137. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Besides the actual frontiers you have mentioned of Bhootan and Peshawur, we have considerable frontiers by sea upon which we may be required to act, such as Abyssinia, Turkey, Egypt, and Persia, which are all frontiers where troops from India may be required to act at any time?—Just so; I think those would be the very places where we could send some of our superfluous native troops to; but as to Abyssinia, with the present means of communication, it is nearer to England than to India.

3138. As to the reduction of the native army, the question is whether we must consider that it is merely with reference to the immediate frontier we are to maintain either our European or our native army; or whether we must not take into consideration our frontier beyond sea, where Imperial purposes may require both European and native troops to be employed?—It would be very easy to augment them, and raise second battalions if necessary.

3139. I will not go now into the question of the mutiny at all; it is a very long question; I merely would like to ask you, in reference to your observation that it was only where troops were present that an insurrection took place, whether it has not occurred to you that in all cases of insurrection it is necessarily the military element which originates and bears the brunt of the insurrection; the agricultural population never take arms in the first instance, but it is the military element that first comes into the field, and necessarily so, is it not?—We have happily in this country very little experience of insurrections at all; but, for example, in the Highlands in 1715 and 1745 there were no military to rise; it was the population who rose in those cases.

3140. The chiefs and the retainers of the chiefs were all military?—So you may say the population were military; they were not trained soldiers, we have happily very little experience of that. Another case occurs to me, namely, the insurrection in La Vendée, in France, in the great French Revolution; they were not soldiers who rose, they were the agricultural population.

3141. They were retainers, almost all of them?—There were thousands of them. They could not all of them have been retainers. Again, in Poland, in the late insurrection, there were no soldiers to rise; it was the population, the peasantry, that rose, I believe.

3142. No; I believe the soldiers rose?—No regiments mutinied that I know of.

3143. With regard to Oude, do you not consider the war in Oude really to have been an insurrection, in the regular sense of the word, not a mutiny?—I think it was, but I think it may be accounted for. The causes were peculiar. I will admit that that was an insurrection; but Oude was a newly-acquired territory then, and there was that peculiar cause which I stated, which was that the whole population were, in fact, sepoys.

3144. Major *Anson.*] Two-thirds of the men employed by those native princes, the talookdars, in Oude, were our own sepoys, I believe?—Very many were, no doubt; but the whole population were the brothers, the fathers, the sons, the cousins, and the brothers-in-law of the sepoys; they were the same people.

3145. During the siege of Delhi, it is notorious that if the population of the country had joined in with the sepoys, we could not have held our position there a week?—Yes; there are strong facts connected with the mutiny which tell in the same direction. During the time that we were shut up in Agra there were civil officers riding about the country, and a small band of volunteers in the middle of the Doab holding their own, having no fear whatever of the population, and only being obliged every now and then to get out of the way of the sepoy regiments which were marching to Delhi. After the victory of General Adrian Hope, who was sent out by Sir Colin Campbell from Futtyghur, and routed the enemy there, Mr. Charles Raikes, the Civil Commissioner, who was with the force, says that in the native correspondence which was found in the rebel camp, there were letters denouncing the whole Hindoo population of that part of the country as being in league with the English. Mr. Raikes said that two Civil officers, whom he named, came in, who had been for weeks

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359



weeks riding about the country, and said they found that in the villages they were everywhere well received. I believe that there was hardly a case of any men who tried to get from any of the neighbouring districts to Agra, who did not get safely across hundreds of miles of country. The present Sir Francis Outram carried his mother behind him on a pony; he carried Lady Outram for 100 or 200 miles into Agra in that way in perfect safety.

3146. Sir *James Fergusson.*] All that only proves that it was not an insurrection, but a mutiny; it does not follow that the circumstances would be the same if there were a chance of insurrection in the country?—I do not believe that the elements of insurrection exist. It appears to me that it is little short of madness, if you are satisfied that it was our native army which rose against us, and which alone put us in any real difficulty, that you should insist upon still keeping up not so formidable certainly, but a very formidable native army. Danger for danger, I believe you are in much more danger from a regiment of native soldiers than you are from a million of the cultivators, the artisans, and the peasantry of the country.

3147. Major *Anson.*] There is another fact which is worth mentioning. During the whole of the war in India in 1857, 1858 and 1859, although we marched over the whole of the North-western Provinces and Oude, we never had the slightest difficulty in getting any amount of supplies for our army from the people themselves; did you ever hear of any difficulty of that sort?—No, I did not.

3148. Sir *James Fergusson.*] You said you thought a very small force of Europeans would suffice, because a company of English soldiers armed with breech-loaders would be a match for almost any number of natives?—Yes.

3149. Does not that presume that our enemies, whoever they are, are concentrated. If you reduced your European force very low, and you had to deal with a number of forces scattered about the country, your smallness in numbers would be very injuriously felt?—The proportions would be the same; I believe all the advantages of superior weapons would be on our side, and that that is, and must be, a continually increasing advantage.

3150. We reckon upon that at any rate; the European force in India is already in extreme disproportion to the population of the country, under any circumstances any force we had must be exceedingly small in any place?—I repudiate altogether the belief that we are in any danger from the population of the country; we have the experience of a century, and we never have been in danger. If ever the population would have risen against us, surely they would have risen against us when they had the encouragement of a large army of their own countrymen, drilled, and disciplined, and supplied with weapons of all sorts; surely they would have taken advantage of that opportunity if they were disposed to rise.

3151. You said you thought the present European force altogether unnecessary provided the native army was smaller; but you recognise that there are certain places where there must be European regiments kept, such as Patna?—Yes.

3152. Is it not the case that the European troops are scattered over India, with especial reference to the necessity of guarding similar places?—Some of them are, but there are many places where they might be dispensed with, if you had not native troops.

3153. Is it not the case that the European force in India is divided in comparatively small detachments all over the country, with an especial view to the duties to be performed at the particular posts where they are placed?—Of course they have been placed judiciously, that I have no doubt of, from the character of those who have had the placing of them, but they are not scattered; nothing below half a regiment is stationed at any place.

3154. I mean they are stationed, a wing here and a wing there, one regiment in one place, and another in another, all with especial reference to the necessities of the posts at which they are placed?—With reference to the supposed necessities, no doubt.

3155. Has it ever entered into the minds of military authorities in India to place a European regiment, say at Agra, because there is a native regiment there; is it not placed there because they think there is a necessity for a European regiment at that place, and then there is a native regiment put there also, to do the duties which would be very severe upon the European soldier?—No doubt, there must be a certain native force kept up to do what you may call sun duties, and to act as the light troops did with the Roman Legions in case of war; but I do not think the authorities have sufficiently estimated the fact of what is the real danger to our Government in India.

3156. I quite understand your view, what I want to ask is this—has any military authority in India ever placed European regiments at particular posts on account of the number of native troops there already; has not it been always that the European troops are supposed to be wanted for the duties of the post, and that the native regiments are there to help them?—Yes; I suppose you are right as to their views; I do not think they see and feel sufficiently what, I believe, to be the real danger.

3157. You would reckon reliefs from England to meet any possible attack from without, but have you considered that if the European force in England is greatly reduced, you would not have British soldiers in England to send?—Before the Russians could put you in any real danger, you might raise any number of troops.

3158. Then you must depend upon the facility with which you could raise troops in England specially?—Yes, I think so; I think you might as well be at war as keeping up a large army because at some distant date you may have war.

3159. Captain *Hayter.*] Would you state again the strength of the European garrison in India?—It is between 60,000 and 70,000, I think, at this moment.

3160. Are we to understand that that is the actual or the nominal strength?—I should suppose the actual strength is about 60,000, and the nominal strength 70,000.

3161. The nominal strength is 70,000, and the actual 65,000, is not it?—Yes; I speak from memory.

3162. Then the proportion between the two armies, after the reduction you propose, would be as nearly as possible the same, would it not?—Yes.

3163. That is to say, you would reduce the 70,000 men to 50,000, and the 135,000 men to 100,000?—Yes.



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*Ross D. Mangles*, Esq.

21 May 1867.

3164. Which is within 5,000 men the same proportion?—Yes.

3165. Are you aware that the objection to such an arrangement by the military authorities in this country is based upon the very probable contingency that, after the reduction of the mixed garrison in India, the House of Commons would in equal ratio reduce the strength of the Imperial army?—No.

3166. That was stated by his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge?—I do not think that is a reason why you should not do what you believe to be right, because other people will do what you believe to be wrong.

3167. Then you do not consider that objection fatal to any proposal for the reduction of the native and European armies in India?—Certainly not.

3168. Colonel *North.*] With regard to the Sikhs you propose to employ them?—I did not propose it; I was asked whether I thought they might be employed. It was no proposition of mine.

3169. From the evidence we have had, it appears that all the native troops require to be relieved every three years, and that you cannot get them to remain in any colony beyond that time, because they want to get back to their families?—I think they would bear a longer expatriation than that.

3170. I think you said their pay must be increased, and their other allowances?—Yes.

3171. That would place the cost of them very much on a par with the cost of European troops?—Yes; the advantages, I take it, would be very much the reduction of the strain upon the country in getting men, that would be the great advantage. I should not look to a pecuniary advantage. With regard to the military police, I should like to say one word more. There is a great disposition (indeed I saw it, as I said, in the last debate upon India in the House of Commons) to talk with great fear of a military police as being a very dangerous element in India. Now, Sir Henry Montgomery gave me an extract from a letter from Mr. Robinson, the inspector general of police at Madras, a very able officer indeed, in which he says what I should like to place on record: "The discussion in Parliament anent police shows that there is an impression that our police in India is military in its character and dangerous, and the form of return sent by the clerk of the House of Commons is framed on this supposition. I need scarcely say that there is no military tone or character in ours" (that is in the Madras police), "either as respects organisation or administration, indeed far too much is made of errors in this respect committed in some places. A police never can be made military or formidable, though folly in that direction may make them very inferior, or even useless as police." I think there is a very great deal of truth in that.

Lieutenant General the Right Hon. Sir HENRY STORKS, G.C.B., called in; and Examined.

Lieut. Gen. The Right Hon. Sir *H. Storks*, G.C.B.

3172. *Chairman.*] WHAT is your opinion with reference to the employment of Indian troops in those of our colonies with which you are acquainted?—If I am to understand, by employing Indian troops in the colonies, that they are to take the place of British troops, I think that it would be a very dangerous experiment.

3173. To any extent?—To any considerable extent. Perhaps it might be practicable and desirable to employ them to assist the British troops in some colonies.

3174. On what do you ground your opinion that it would be a dangerous experiment to employ them in place of British troops?—Because I do not think that the colony would have the same confidence in them as in British troops, nor would it be in the same state of security. Perhaps if your Lordship would refer to particular colonies, I could illustrate better what I mean.

3175. Are you familiar with the Cape of Good Hope?—I have served at the Cape of Good Hope.

3176. Would Indian troops be incompetent to maintain the frontier against the Caffres?—I do not say that they would be incompetent, but I do not think they would do it as well as a small body of British troops, supplemented by native levies if further assistance were required.

3177. You do not think that a saving in point of money would be obtained by employing them instead of British troops?—No, I think not, if I rightly understand that the Indian troops have a higher rate of pay and allowances than the British troops.

3178. Not the troops?—But the officers have, I think.

3179. Major *Anson.*] Have you gone carefully into the question of the comparative expense of English and native troops?—No; I know that there is a difference in the pay and allowances of the officers; and I apprehend that if you had Indian troops doing duty with British troops, the British officers would look for the same increase of pay; they would expect to have the same rate of pay as the officers serving with the Indian troops were receiving.

3180. *Chairman.*] I did not ask the question so much with reference to the comparative expense, as to the point of whether you imagined that an equal efficiency could be obtained without employing a much larger number of Indian troops to that which is at present obtained with our English troops; you do not think that for the purposes of frontier defence, an equal number of Indian troops to that of the British troops now employed would be adequate to the purpose?—I do not.

3181. Do you think that it would have to be largely increased in order to gain the present efficiency?—Yes; I think you would require a considerable increase of force; I should think that the climate of the Cape of Good Hope would be also very much against an Indian force.

3182. On what account?—On account of the cold.

3183. Some of the Indian troops are capable of standing cold, are they not?—Yes; some from the north of India are.

3184. Then, so far as you would wish non-European troops to be employed in the Cape of Good Hope at all, you would prefer that they should be raised on the spot?—I should.

3185. What experience have you had of South African troops?—I think that the native levies, which we had during the Caffre war under the command of English officers, did very well; I think what were called the Burghers, who were a sort of volunteers, did very badly.

3186. They were Dutch, were they not?—They were Dutch and English settlers at the Cape. Some of our Hottentot levies did very well,

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well, and some of the Fingoe levies also did very well, for there is a great enmity existing between the Fingoes and the Caffres; the Caffre police has also done very well, I am informed, since the war of 1853.

3187. The Fingoes are physically very strong men, are they not?—Yes; I think they are as fine a race almost as the Caffres.

3188. Did they behave well in the field?—Yes, very well.

3189. Was their discipline good?—They were under English officers, who of course exacted discipline from them; they obeyed orders, and they did not desert.

3190. Is there much difficulty in keeping them from riot and misconduct?—No, I think not.

3191. Is it your opinion that they might be exported as local troops with advantage, that they might be used, for instance, at such a colony as the Mauritius?—No, certainly not.

3192. On what ground?—I do not know that they would go in the first place.

3193. That would be a question of money, I suppose?—No, I am not so sure of that; I think that they have very strong feelings on the subject of country, and they have a great dislike to the water, that is to crossing the sea.

3194. They have a great dislike to going to sea?—Yes, I think so. In all the intercourse which I have had with them, they have always expressed that feeling; and the Mauritius, I should think, would be a place very ill suited to have such a force.

3195. Would they not be competent to maintain order there?—I do not consider that it is a question so much of order; I think it is a political and military question as regards the Mauritius.

3196. What is the political aspect of it?—I look upon the Mauritius as our great stronghold in the Indian seas, in a smaller degree, but in the same way as I look upon Malta as our great stronghold in the Mediterranean.

3197. Do you think that the garrison which we should maintain at the Mauritius, would be sufficient to withstand any serious attempt to reduce the island?—The garrison there now is about 1,500 or 1,600 men, I think. When we took the Mauritius in 1810, the French had a considerable force there, with about 300 guns in position in different parts of the island; we landed in the North, and marched straight upon Port Louis, and after one or two days the garrison capitulated; the conduct of the French general in command of the garrison was approved by the Emperor; he was afterwards employed in Spain, and I think was killed there; it was General Decden, but Port Louis in those days was in a very different state to what it is now. As England is a great naval power, the object of any general in command at the Mauritius would be, I apprehend, supposing we had lost the command of the sea for a time, to hold out as long as he could with his garrison until he was relieved. Large sums of money have been spent upon the port and fortifications at Port Louis, and I should say that those fortifications would enable a determined officer to hold out for a considerable time.

3198. With a garrison of 1,800 men?—He might do a good deal with that force and with the assistance of such local means as he could get there. No doubt he would be able to raise men, and he would raise as many as he could get to do the work of the garrison. There is a large Indian population of coolies in the island, and he would probably get as many of those as he could to relieve the garrison of fatigue and other duties of a like description, but I should think it very doubtful if Mauritius would ever be besieged *secundum artem.*

3199. You look upon the garrison of the Mauritius as perpetually maintained there in expectation of a possible war?—It is a great possession. Any one who reads the account of what took place at the end of the last century and the beginning of this, will see the injury which was done to our commerce at that time by the French holding the Mauritius; there is a very strong French feeling in the island, although the French inhabitants of the Mauritius are very glad to be under English rule, as regards their commercial transactions.

3200. Do you think that it would be likely, or even possible, that the Mauritius should be reduced by any naval force of any foreign power before we found means to relieve it?—I do not know what force the French could bring against us there. The French have got Bourbon, which is close by. There is no harbour there certainly, but they have a considerable force there, and they are also trying to make settlements or to have a port in Madagascar; all, I suppose, ultimately with a view of looking after English commerce in those seas.

3201. Supposing that the political question were set aside, that is to say, supposing the possibility of a foreign war were set aside, should you think that coloured troops were adequate to maintain order in the Mauritius?—I should think that any troops almost would do. I do not apprehend that there would be much difficulty of that kind. Of course it would be very desirable to have a portion of English troops there.

3202. You look upon the garrison of the Mauritius as mainly political, as mainly military, in fact?—Yes, I look upon the Mauritius as a great military station. There is a great difference between English colonies proper, that is to say, colonies founded by Englishmen, such as Australia, and those which have been acquired by conquest or cession, and originally colonised by foreigners, which is the case with almost all our colonies; it would be more proper to call them foreign possessions; English colonies is not the proper term for those which are of foreign origin. In those cases, of course, we have difficulties which we do not meet with in colonies of British origin. The Cape of Good Hope was originally a foreign settlement, with the exception of the frontier part of it. The Mauritius is a colony of foreign origin; it was settled by the French. Ceylon was originally Dutch; and so we may go on.

3203. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] And Malta?—Yes, you may include both Malta and Gibraltar.

3204. *Chairman.*] After what you have said about the Mauritius, it is needless to ask you whether you would like to have coloured troops in Malta?—Certainly not. I have just come from Malta, and I should be very sorry to see coloured troops there.

3205. You would not like any?—No, not any beyond those we have. We have a regiment called the Malta Fencibles, and that is a regiment which it is very difficult to keep complete.

3206. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Do you go the length



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Lieut. Gen. The Right Hon. Sir *H. Storks*, G.C.B.

21 May 1867.

length of saying that if your European regiments were very weak, you would not like to have them supplemented by native troops?—No; I would rather have them supplemented than not. The garrison of Malta is 6,000 men now. I think it certainly ought to be 10,000, if there is anything approaching to a war. We have in Malta 5,930 of all ranks; and the establishment is 6,294 of all ranks.

3207. *Chairman.*] If there was any difficulty about getting English troops, I suppose there is a good deal of work in the garrison that could be done by coloured troops?—Certainly, I should be very glad to have their assistance as supplementing the English troops, always supposing that we could feed them.

3208. Major *Anson.*] You could feed them rather easier than you could English troops, could you not?—I do not know about Indian troops; I should think that there would be great difficulty in feeding them.

3209. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] What would you say to Sikhs?—They have not the prejudices of caste which the Hindoos have.

3210. Major *Anson.*] The wants of the native soldiers are much fewer, and they do not eat so much as the Europeans?—No; and the Sikhs have not the difficulties of caste which you have to deal with in the case of Hindoos.

3211. You said, I think, that you would object to the use of native Indian soldiers at the frontier of the Cape, that they would not be up to their work there; do you think that they would not be able to compete with the Hottentots or the natives of South Africa in the field?—I do not think that they would be so useful; but my opinion is not worth much as regards that, because I never served in India, and I do not know much about Indian troops beyond what I have heard or read.

3212. Do you base that opinion upon their not being able to do so much work as English soldiers, or upon their not being so brave, or upon their not standing the climate?—I think that the climate would be much against them.

3213. Is that your only objection?—I should prefer to have English troops myself if I had to work that country.

3214. In time of peace do you not think that the cheaper material (supposing that the native troops are cheaper) would do the ordinary work at the Cape equally as well as the English soldiers?—I should be very much inclined to let the colonists at the Cape take care of themselves. I think that what we ought to look to is more the Cape proper, so to say, than the frontier. Of course a Caffre war is always a very popular thing in the colony, amongst certain classes who profit very largely by it. The settlers on the frontiers are in rather isolated positions, because they have large tracts of country for sheep farming. At the same time, when I was at the Cape, they professed their readiness to take care of themselves if they had been permitted to do so.

3215. Whether they took care of themselves or not, in a money point of view, still they would call upon us to find the troops for them, would they not?—They do now, because we will not allow them to pursue the Dutch system, the commando system, as they call it, which was for the settlers to meet together, and make a raid together against the Caffres, and eat up the Caffres; probably they were more savage than the Caffres themselves. That was the old Dutch system.

3216. Do you think that in a military point of view it is absolutely necessary to keep up the garrison which we have at the Cape at the present moment?—The garrison now at the Cape is 4,536 men of all ranks, including officers. Looking at the present policy as regards the Cape, I should say that the garrison is not too small.

3217. Then you do not consider that the troops there would be of the slightest use for service elsewhere, if required; you do not think that you would be able to send troops from the Cape to India, in case of any disturbances in India?—I do, because troops were sent from the Cape to India during the mutiny.

3218. What number of men were there at the Cape at that time?—I have not got the numbers of the force exactly.

3219. Were there as many as 9,000 men?—Probably there were, but I cannot answer that question off-hand.

3220. They did not at that time reduce the garrison of the Cape below what it is at present, did they?—No; because they were very apprehensive of another Caffre war at the time; but I think that another great advantage of having European troops at those different stations or colonies is, that they can mutually assist each other. We saw an instance of that recently, when a regiment went from Halifax to Jamaica, and another portion of a regiment was sent from Barbadoes to Jamaica. In the same way, when the Mutiny broke out in India, troops were sent to India from the Mauritius, from Ceylon, and from the Cape of Good Hope.

3221. The large number of places we have to find garrisons for really finds the work for the British army, does it not?—So long as you have British commerce all over the world you must have certain harbours and depôts for its assistance, and you must have these places defended and garrisoned.

3222. If officers who had had experience of the Indian native soldiers considered that they were quite equal to the work to be performed at the Cape against the Hottentots or against the Caffres, should you have any objection to employ them?—I should be very glad to have them to supplement English soldiers, but I should not like to have a force of Indian troops and no other force there.

3223. With regard to the Mauritius, what length of time do you suppose the island of the Mauritius could hold out, supposing an enemy's fleet had the command of the sea?—With what garrison?

3224. With the garrison that is there now?—I am supposing that all the fortifications were finished, then with a garrison of 1,800 men I should think the officer in command ought to hold out for from three weeks to a month.

3225. He could not hold out much longer than that on account of the provisions, could he?—I do not know what provisions they have. We are naturally very dependent at Mauritius for our meat upon Madagascar. There is always a supply of salt meat kept; I think there is enough for three months, but I cannot say exactly.

3226. When the fortifications are finished, I believe it is the opinion of Sir John Burgoyne that they will require something like 6,000 men to

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to hold them efficiently?—They will require probably more than 1,800.

3227. Supposing we were engaged in a European war (I do not mean such a war as the last Russian war), and that we were hard pressed, should we be able to fill up our garrisons at Malta, Gibraltar, and the Mauritius and all those places, from the troops at home, or should we not find it very convenient to be able to draw troops from India to reinforce those garrisons?—Supposing we had an army in the field, or had to send troops to those places?

3228. In all probability if we were engaged in a European war we might have some army in the field; in Egypt, for instance?—Taking places like Malta and Gibraltar, what we want there is principally artillerymen.

3229. Taking Mauritius, do you suppose we could send 6,000 men from England to fill up the garrison of Mauritius at such a time?—No, certainly not; all the commanding officer there could do would be to make the best fight he could till help came.

3230. Therefore he would be very glad to be able to send to India for men?—Certainly, or to do anything he could to reinforce the garrison; the officer there would, no doubt, have all the work he could done by natives, whom he would hire, and keep his soldiers for the active parts of the duty, and to act as gunners.

3231. Have you ever heard that the natives of India make the most excellent gunners?—Yes, as field artillery.

3232. And garrison artillery?—Yes, I have always heard that they are very good gunners, particularly in field artillery; for garrison artillery strong men are required. I do not know whether the natives of India are men of great muscular power; they are, I believe, fine tall men, but for moving large guns we require strong men.

3233. Supposing, again, that the native soldier is very much cheaper than the European soldier, should you see any objection to having a regiment of European soldiers and a regiment of native soldiers at the Mauritius in time of peace?—I should not be inclined to reduce the force at the Mauritius as regards British troops.

3234. Not in time of peace?—Not in time of peace. I think the garrison of the Mauritius at this moment, is at a minimum; we have two batteries of artillery, two companies of engineers, and two regiments of infantry.

3235. You would not substitute a regiment of natives for a regiment of Europeans?—No.

3236. Is that on account of the importance of the place?—Yes; and I think also, as regards the inhabitants, that, politically, the garrison there ought to be a British garrison. Of course, an officer would be very glad to have another regiment even of Indian troops, but I would not reduce the British force below what it is now.

3237. Do you consider that the command of the Mauritius is of very much greater importance to us than that of the Straits Settlement of Singapore?—I do not know that it is of greater importance; I am sure it is of equal importance.

3238. Yet we have always hitherto been perfectly contented with the garrison in the Straits Settlements, which has consisted of European garrison artillery, and two regiments of native infantry; that regiment has always done its work very efficiently?—You must remember that all the commerce of India which goes round the Cape, passes in the immediate neighbourhood of the Mauritius. Mauritius played a most important part at the end of the last century and the beginning of this, in the days of Duplcix, the Bailli de Suffren, and Dida Bourdonnaye.

3239. Take another place, Aden. I think everybody would admit that that is the most important place we have next to Malta and Gibraltar, commanding, as it does, the entrance to the Red Sea; the garrison there has always been a mixed one of Europeans and natives, and no injury has ever resulted from that politically?—I should not like to see the garrison of Aden entirely native. I suppose you would not propose that.

3240. I do not propose that the garrison of the Mauritius should be entirely native, I propose to assimilate it to that of Aden?—Aden is very near Bombay.

3241. Is it much nearer Bombay than the Mauritius is?—I should think it was, perhaps, about the same distance, but the same amount of commerce does not pass by Aden as passes by the Mauritius. Besides that, we are dealing with a large French population in the Mauritius, and we have got Bourbon close by us. If one might be allowed to look back to the past, I think it was a great mistake on our part not to keep Bourbon.

3242. In a military point of view, you would sooner see Mauritius in the hands of the French than Aden, would you not?—I should be very sorry to see either of them in the hands of the French. But the French holding Bourbon gives them a great advantage, and there is a good deal of French feeling in the Mauritius. I do not know any place where there is so strong a national feeling as there is in the Mauritius towards France. I have lived with those people, and know their feelings.

3243. Do you object to the employment of native Indian troops in China?—I have never served in China.

3244. Could you tell me what the garrison of Gibraltar would be in time of war?—No. I can give you the strength of the garrison of Gibraltar at this moment. It is 4,805 of all ranks; the establishment is 4,983.

3245. What should you suppose is the proper garrison for it in time of war?—I should think that the garrison of Gibraltar ought to be at least 7,000 men; I should say so. I do not know Gibraltar well. I have been at Gibraltar, but I have never served there.

3246. Then you would have 22,000 men for the Mediterranean garrison alone?—You know the works at Gibraltar and the works at Malta are of very great extent. Now at Malta, in consequence of the new docks, and other great naval works which are going on there, there is a new project of defence, which of course will require a good many men to man the works.

3247. Looking to the enormous amount of duties which have to be performed by the English army, and the enormous garrisons we have got to keep up in India, in Canada, and in our numerous colonies and possessions, do you not think that it would be most useful to organise, in time of peace, a system by which you might be able to supplement those garrisons in time of war by efficient men from India?—Yes, I should think it would, to supplement them.

3248. Do you not think that it would be far more advisable to do it in time of peace than to leave



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Lieut. Gen. The Right Hon. Sir *H. Storks*, G.C.B.

21 May 1867.

leave it till war came, and run the risk of having a disturbance with the population of India in consequence?—Every preparation for war ought certainly to be made in time of peace.

3249. You think, in case of war, that it would be useful to have those men?—Certainly. Take the case of Canada; I should think the defence of Canada ought mainly to consist of the Canadians; a large force of militia, assisted probably by a small force of British troops. Our present force in Canada is 12,082 men; and when you look at the extent of Canada, you cannot consider that a large force.

3250. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] You know Mauritius personally, do you not?—I was there for three years.

3251. Do you know anything of the coolie population there?—Yes.

3252. What character do they bear; are they quiet?—They are very quiet, very well-behaved, and very industrious.

3253. Would it be possible to raise levies from them, for the purpose of supplementing the European garrison in time of war?—I should certainly do it if I commanded at Mauritius; I do not know that I should make fighting men of them, but I should endeavour to assist the garrison by making use of them for garrison duties.

3254. Are there any local levies at present employed from the inhabitants, whether French or coolies?—None.

3255. And you think that in time of war, certainly, if we were at war with the French, for instance, it would not be safe to rely upon the French population?—No, I think not.

3256. In fact, you think it would rather be necessary to take precautionary measures?—I think they have a very strong national feeling towards France; I think they are attached to England for their interest's sake. Mauritius has become a very great place, in consequence of the quantity of sugar they make and grow, owing to the facilities afforded by labour from India; that is the great advantage the Mauritius has over the West Indies.

3257. Marquis of *Hartington.*] Do you think that there would be any advantage in substituting Asiatic troops for the black troops, in the West Indies?—No, I think not.

3258. Would there be any disadvantage?—I think they would be less suited to the country than the black troops are, the black troops are very fine troops.

3259. You think that the black troops are perfectly fitted for the duty they have to perform in the West Indies?—I think they perform the duty very well. There is a regiment of white troops in Barbadoes, and there is a regiment of white troops in Jamaica; I should be very sorry to see large places like Barbadoes and Jamaica with black troops alone, and I am quite sure that all the white inhabitants would.

3260. It would never occur to you to substitute Asiatic troops for the black troops?—No, never.

3261. And you would have the same opinion with regard to the garrison kept up on the West Coast of Africa?—Yes; I think the negroes, that is to say, the present black troops, are the best suited for that duty.

3262. You would have no objection to supplementing the garrison of Malta by Asiatic troops in time of war?—No; I should be glad to have any troops there that would increase my force.

3263. Do you think that there would be a very serious objection to the employment of Asiatic troops in Malta as part of the permanent garrison?—Yes; I should not like them as part of the permanent garrison.

3264. Would you mind having a certain number of Asiatic troops in addition to the present garrison?—I should not be inclined to object to it, because the duties in Malta are very severe, and of course having a larger force the duties would come lighter on the troops, and they would be better done.

3265. You do not know of any social or moral reasons why part of the garrison should not consist of Asiatics?—I do not think it would be a popular thing in Malta.

3266. Do you think it might lead to any very inconvenient results?—The population of Malta is a very large one in a very confined space, and I think that there might be great inconveniences arising from it; inconveniences on the score probably of religion more than anything else. The Maltese are an extremely good people; they are very much attached to their religion, and they are very intolerant, I think, as regards the religion of other people, and probably they would be more than intolerant as regards Mahomedans and Hindoos.

3267. At any rate, in your opinion, any Asiatic troops employed in Malta ought to be in addition to, not in substitution for, any part of the present garrison?—Certainly, I think the garrison of Malta is at the minimum; it is 6,000 men.

3268. I understand your opinion to be the same with reference to the Cape. You would not reduce the present garrison of the Cape, consisting of about 4,000 men?—No, I would not reduce the present garrison of 4,000 men, supposing that the present policy as regards the Cape is maintained. If you say to the colonists that you leave them to settle their own affairs, the chances are you might reduce the garrison.

3269. In the Mauritius also you would not reduce the present force of two battalions?—No, certainly not.

3270. I think you said you did not know China?—I have never been in China.

3271. With regard to an answer you gave Major Anson, have you reason to suppose that if it was desired to use Asiatic troops in time of war, there would be any difficulty in obtaining their services?—I should think not.

3272. Have you not always understood that they have been very willing to volunteer to serve for actual service?—I have always understood that the Sikhs from the north of India have been.

3273. Then you would not attach very much importance to the consideration of organising a system during the time of peace of using Asiatic troops?—I should like always to see the system which you are going to employ during war organised during peace, because I am sure that nothing is done well which is done in a hurry, which it would be if such a system were organised on the spur of the moment when hostilities were commencing.

3274. Do you apprehend that there would be very much difficulty in organising a system under which the Asiatic troops would be employed in time of war?—I should think not; I should think Asiatic troops might be employed with great advantage,

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vantage, supposing for instance we had to send a force to Egypt.

3275. Colonel *North.*] Do you think that those colonies which pay for the troops would be satisfied to receive native troops in place of Europeans?—No, I am sure they would not; you refer, I suppose, to Australia.

3276. *Chairman.*] Does not the Mauritius pay?—The Mauritius pays in the shape of colonial allowances to the troops; I do not know the exact amount of the total sum that they pay, but it is a very considerable sum.

3277. Colonel *North.*] We have heard also with regard to the employment of native troops, that they must be commanded by officers who have been accustomed to command them, and that serious difficulties might arise if officers were attached to them who had not been accustomed to command them?—I should think that would be the case, first of all, because the officers attached to them require to know the language; I consider that it is a great inconvenience for officers to command men without being able to talk to them.

3278. Mr. *Oliphant.*] The objection to leaving the colonists at the Cape to look after their own frontier wars, is chiefly philanthropic, is it not?—I think so.

3279. Do you think that it is a well-founded philanthropy?—I am not prepared to answer that question.

3280. Do you think really that very serious cruelties would arise from leaving them to themselves; do you think that it would make any great difference?—I think the Caffres would have a bad time of it.

3281. Do you think that we are justified in keeping a large garrison there, at a very increased expense, on account of the assumed cruelties, or possible cruelties, that might be committed?—I am not prepared to answer that question.

3282. Captain *Hayter.*] If you desired to increase the garrison of the Cape, would it not be the most natural mode of doing so, to raise a local corps like the Cape Mounted Rifles, or to add to that corps?—The Cape Mounted Rifles behaved ill in the war of 1853, for the greater part of them deserted, and went over to the enemy; but the native levies that we had in my day, when I was at the Cape, in the war of 1846, 1847, and 1848, behaved very well; so did the Cape Mounted Rifles; they behaved very well indeed then.

3283. If you could raise native levies, you would save the transport by doing so?—Yes; and you might disband them again, when the war was over. As I say, they behaved very well when I was there; they were commanded by English officers; by Colonel Hogg, who is dead, and Colonel Bourchier, of the Engineers. In fact, they could work the country, which our own men could not.

3284. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Is there no South African race which you think would be available for recruiting for general service regiments?—I think not.

3285. Do you think that there is any colonial race from which it would be desirable to add to the strength of the army, general service regiments, recruited anywhere?—No; I think the Canadian regiment which we raised in 1857, has been a very expensive regiment, and an inefficient regiment, too; not inefficient as regards the men, because they were remarkably fine men. I had the regiment a long time under my command, but it was an expensive regiment, and I do not think it answered; it was not a good arrangement.

3286. Captain *Hayter.*] With regard to the Mediterranean garrisons of Malta and Gibraltar, does not it almost entirely depend upon whether your fleet have the command of the sea?—Yes; if you lost the command of the sea, of course we should be blockaded in Malta; but looking at the naval preponderance of England, I do not think that anybody would ever come and try to take Malta *secundum artem.* They might, however, make a dash at Malta, and, so far as the defences of Malta go now, they might do a great deal of injury; they might land and burn the dockyard, and insult us, and go away. I do not think that that is a position in which a great place like Malta ought to be left; but the works which will be ultimately carried out will, I think, put it out of the power of any power to do that.

3287. That would all occur only in the event of a great European war?—Yes.

3288. In which case the garrisons of Malta and Gibraltar would be strengthened in other ways than from Indian troops?—I suppose they would be strengthened from home. I have always said that a garrison of 6,000 men was the very smallest number, even in time of peace, for Malta; I fixed the strength of the garrison at 10,000 in time of war.

3289. Looking at the opinions you have expressed as to the Mediterranean garrisons, is it not your opinion that the object of this inquiry ought to be limited altogether to the colonial dependencies in the eastern seas?—Yes; perhaps so.

3290. You are opposed altogether to the employment of native troops at the Cape?—I should have no objection to the employment of native troops at the Cape to assist the British troops there; at the same time, if I wanted an additional force at the Cape, I would rather raise it on the spot from local levies.

3291. *Chairman.*] But you would prefer to have no troops at all at the Cape?—As far as the frontier goes.

3292. Captain *Hayter.*] You would rather have local levies than native troops?—Yes, for a Caffre war; and I contemplate no other reason for having a force at the Cape except to keep the Caffres down.

3293. Major *Anson.*] You said, in answer to the Marquis of Hartington, that you thought there would be no difficulty, in case of war, in getting native troops from India; you have not a large knowledge and experience of the character of the Indian troops, I believe?—No, I know very little about them.

3294. Do you happen to know of a case that occurred some years ago when the Indian Government wanted to garrison Pegu, they tried to send some regiments from Calcutta who were not accustomed to the idea of foreign service, and they were unable to do so, so they were obliged to have recourse to Madras, where the troops were accustomed to the idea of crossing the sea, and taking foreign garrison duty?—I have heard of it, but I have no knowledge of it.

3295. Do you not think that that would be very much the case?—I always understood that the Sikhs from the north of India would go anywhere.



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Lieut. Gen. The Right Hon. Sir *H. Storks*, G.C.B.

21 May 1867.

3296. Marquis of *Hartington.*] Of course, as a soldier, you would be glad to see the colonial service of the British army reduced, would you not?—Yes, naturally.

3297. Do you think that, supposing through the employment of Asiatic troops nine or ten English battalions were relieved of colonial service, the army would be likely permanently to get the benefit of it?—No; I think they would be reduced at once.

3298. Major *Anson.*] By how much would they be reduced, by the number of regiments relieved of colonial duty?—Yes; I should think they would be reduced by the 10 battalions, or whatever the number might be that were relieved.

3299. Do you not consider that that would be a great gain?—No, I do not consider that it would be a gain, if there were that diminution in the number of battalions.

3300. Would you not think it a great gain for the British army to have its duties reduced as much as possible?—I cannot contemplate the benefit which the British army would gain from having the number of its battalions reduced from 120 to 110.

3301. Not if you saw that the duties were reduced in proportion?—No; I would rather see 120 battalions than 110.

3302. Then I will ask you the same question that I asked his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge the other day, remembering that the climate of Hong Kong is the most unhealthy climate in the world, do you think that the British army is stronger, consisting of 101 battalions, and having to find a regiment for duty at Hong Kong, than it would be with 100 battalions, without having to find a regiment for that duty?—I would rather have the 101 battalions than the 100, even finding a regiment for that duty. We had 4,000 men in the Ionian Islands who were set at liberty by the cession of those islands to Greece; and although we did not reduce four battalions, we reduced 4,000 men. I think if you refer to the Army Estimates for 1865, you will find a reduction of 4,000 men.

3303. Then you consider that our military position is stronger for all purposes of war, having to maintain a garrison in China, than if we had not to maintain a garrison in China, without entering into the question of whether we ought to have it there or not?—I do not think that is a question that I can answer as it is put. Of course the battalion in China would not be available for service in Europe in the event of a European war.

3304. Supposing you relieved your garrison in China, and brought it home, and next month a war broke out in Europe, do you think that the men of that battalion would be able to take the field at once, in point of health?—Yes; I should think that with the voyage they would pick up a good deal between China and England; at any rate I should put them in line if I wanted them. I would send them to the army.

3305. Do you not think that they would be more likely to fill the hospital than anything else, looking to the general effect of the climate of China upon the constitution of the English soldier?—China is a very unhealthy place, certainly, and our troops have suffered there very much; but I do not think the effect would be what you describe.

3306. Captain *Hayter.*] What is the length of the voyage from China to England, coming round the Cape?—About 100 or 110 days.

3307. That would make a considerable difference in their health, would it not?—Yes; a battalion disembarking is not like the same one that embarked.

3308. Colonel *North.*] In confirmation of your opinion, are you aware that when a native battalion was raised the other day of 600 rank and file for the Straits Settlements, the same number of European soldiers were ordered to be reduced?—I think there was a reduction.

Major General ORFEUR CAVENAGH, called in; and Examined.

Major Gen. *O. Cavenagh.*

3309. Major *Anson.*] YOU were, until very recently, Governor at Singapore, I believe?—Yes.

3310. During what years were you Governor there?—From the year 1859 until the present year.

3311. During the whole time you were Governor there, you had a garrison of native soldiers?—Yes; we had a garrison of native soldiers with European artillery.

3312. Did you ever make any complaints to the Indian Government upon the nature of the garrison?—Not as regards the preservation of internal peace, but I did certainly consider that in time of war the native troops should be backed by European troops, because it was an important settlement to hold.

3313. In time of peace, you had no objection?—None at all.

3314. Of course, if war had broken out, there would have been no difficulty whatever in sending Europeans from India to supplement the garrison?—The difficulty would be, whether India could supply the European troops.

3315. You would not have a greater difficulty in getting European troops from India now than you had three or four years ago, or at any time before the Straits Settlements were taken over by the Colonial from the Indian Government?—The only question would be a question of finance. Three or four years ago, if I had sent for troops from India, I should not have had to pay for them, but if Colonel Ord were to send for troops from India, certainly India would not pay for them.

3316. You did not find any inconvenience from native soldiers as a garrison?—Not the slightest.

3317. They were well behaved?—Yes.

3318. As well-behaved as the European soldiers?—As a general rule native soldiers are better behaved than Europeans, because there is less drinking amongst them.

3319. They got on well, I suppose, with the European artillery?—Very well.

3320. Did you see any great inferiority, on the part of the natives, to the Chinamen at Singapore?—No; the Chinaman is stouter than the Madras sepoy, but I do not think he would be a better man than the Bengal sepoy or the Sikh. In fact, the Chinamen were afraid of the Sikhs.

3321. You have a very large Chinese population

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tion at Singapore, have you not?—Yes, about 80,000.

3322. They are rather a rough lot, are they not?—They are inclined to be turbulent.

3323. You have never been apprehensive of any outbreak as long as you had native soldiers; you never wished for European soldiers?—No; I felt perfectly satisfied that I could overawe them with the troops I had with the European Artillery.

3324. Sir *James Fergusson.*] I think you have seen a good deal of the Malay troops?—Not of the Malay troops, because we have no Malay troops. I have seen a good deal of the Malay population of course.

3325. Have you not seen something of the Ceylon Rifles recruited from the Malays?—I should hardly be justified in saying that I have seen a good deal of them, but I was in Ceylon for some time in 1850.

3326. Do you think that many recruits could be got amongst the Malay population of the Straits for the Ceylon Rifles?—No, certainly not.

3327. From what does the indisposition to take service arise?—In the first place the Malay is a great deal too comfortable to like military service, and in the next place he is a great deal too indolent to undertake the regular duties which you would require from a soldier.

3328. Colonel *North.*] Can you state what were the pay and allowances of the native troops you had at Singapore?—They received, in addition to the ordinary pay, full batta and the usual rations.

3329. What is the full batta?—One rupee eight annas.

3330. Did they receive any allowances of clothing?—No, we gave none. At Labuan, a station which though not under my government was so far connected with it that we had to superintend the military arrangements, they did give them extra clothing because it was so unhealthy.

3331. Did the native troops you had bring their families to Singapore?—No, only a few of them. I was very anxious that more should do so, but very few of them did.

3332. Might they have done so if they had chosen?—No; we had a correspondence with the Madras Government upon the subject; they asked us what provision we would make for the sepoys' families; and in our reply we said we should be happy to do everything in our power to meet the wishes of the Madras Government, and to build lines for those reported as willing to come over, but only a few came.

3333. Did they look to going back at the end of three years?—Yes, I think so, from the fact of their being separated from their wives and families; I do not think they would if their wives and families came with them. My servants in Singapore were all natives of India, yet they were with us all the time we were in Singapore, and I left some of them with the new Governor.

3334. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Do you think that it would be desirable to employ Indian native troops for Imperial purposes, to a greater extent than is now the case?—I think the native army should be organized and regulated more with a view to possible Imperial requirements and not merely to the requirements of India itself; it should be an integral part of the Imperial army, and capable of being sent wherever Her Majesty might choose to order it to proceed.

3335. To any Colony?—Yes, to any Colony; but, as a general rule, not to be employed westward of the Cape.

3336. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Who is to pay for the excess of the army maintained over the requirements of India, until it is employed in the Colonies?—I apprehend, that if the Indian army were employed in China, the Hong Kong Government would of course pay its proper share; and in the same way if it were employed in the Straits Settlements, Ceylon or the Mauritius, those Colonies would bear their proportion of the expense.

3337. Did you not say that it should not be employed in the Colonies until it was wanted?—No; I said that the Indian troops ought not to be employed westward of the Cape, except in case of emergency.

3338. *Chairman.*] I understood you to say, that the strength of the Indian army was to be maintained at such and such a point, more with reference to the possibility of its being wanted than to actual requirements?—No; because you might reduce the strength of your regiments, and be able to expand it again when an emergency arose; at present we have no system to meet emergencies.

3339. No elasticity?—No elasticity; we can get men, but to have efficient regiments you must have organization, and we have none.

3340. You would like to have a larger skeleton of an army than we have now?—I should like to see a more efficient skeleton of an army; I think our present army is entirely without organization.

3341. You refer to the present system?—Yes, the new system.

3342. Is Singapore a place which might be easily taken by a *coup de main* from the sea?—One could not possibly defend Singapore from a *coup de main*, because it is an island and open in every direction; but I see no reason why we should not hold Fort Canning until it was relieved by the fleet.

3343. Is the force that is now at Singapore sufficient to hold Fort Canning?—To hold Fort Canning against a European Power, I should myself prefer to have a portion of my troops Europeans.

3344. The present force at Singapore is European, is not it?—Yes, if you allude to the force which is now going there, I think it is sufficient; it is supplemented with natives at present, but apparently there are in future to be no natives there, or only about 200 natives.

3345. Setting aside the possibility of an attack from a European Power, do you think that the present garrison at Singapore is required for purposes of internal police?—Not the European portion of the infantry; if you retained a native regiment it would be sufficient.

3346. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Do you agree with Mr. Mangles with regard to decreasing the native army in India?—So many years have elapsed since I have actually been in India and visited a military station, that I should feel some hesitation in expressing a very decided opinion; but I think it possible that if the army were rendered more efficient, it might be subjected to some reduction, but not to a very great reduction.

3347. Captain *Hayter.*] In what respect, more efficient?



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Major Gen. O. Cavenagh. 21 May 1867.

efficient?—I consider that the present regiments are useless for real service.

3348. You mean the native troops?—The native troops as at present officered and organised.

3349. *Chairman.*] For want of officers?—For want of officers and for want of the connection between the officers and the men which formerly existed, but has ceased to exist.

3350. In fact, you are hostile to the irregular system?—No, I am not hostile to the irregular system, for I served the greater part of my active military career with irregulars; but I am hostile to it as a system for the whole army.

3351. Major *Anson.*] You have not got the pick of the officers, as you had in former days?—No; in former days we prided ourselves on being selected; now every officer is an irregular officer.

3352. It is not every English officer who is adapted to the irregular system, is it?—No; moreover it must be remembered that by the old system no man became old at the head of irregulars, because directly he became a field officer he generally went back to his corps in the line; so that we were always either captains or subalterns in the irregulars.

3353. *Chairman.*] Have you ever served in China?—No, I have never served in China.

3354. Major *Anson.*] What is your opinion upon enlisting Chinamen for service in India, and having one or two Chinese regiments at the Hill stations; do you think that that is a bad principle?—I believe officers who are more acquainted than I am with the Chinese as soldiers are averse to it. I only judge of them as a peaceful population. Certainly, they are most energetic and active; but they have great powers of combination, and they might use those powers against their officers.

3355. They are not likely to do that in India, away from their own people, are they?—I should doubt whether they would be likely to have the attachment to their officers which formerly did exist amongst the native races; the Chinamen would in fact look down upon their own officers, instead of looking up to them.

3356. They generally do look down upon all Englishmen, do they not?—Yes; they have a large amount of self-conceit.

3357. Do you think it would have a bad political effect upon India?—Politically, I should think not.

3358. The natives of India would look upon it with perfect indifference, whatever troops we used?—Yes.

3359. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Do you think that it increases the prestige of the empire amongst the natives, for natives to be regularly taken to garrison Colonies?—Certainly; I think that every native soldier who returns from a foreign country, is impressud with a sense of our power which he had not when he left India.

3360. Marquis of *Hartington.*] Did not the Straits Settlements pay anything for the garrison maintained there?—We did not pay any actual contribution, but all the excess of our payments went to the Government of India, and, as a rule, we may have paid from 60,000 *l.* to 70,000 *l.*

3361. That was the excess?—That was the excess of our receipts over expenditure; but the Supreme Government paid some items of expenditure which were never submitted to us, therefore we had no control over them, such as the pensions of officers, and their pay when in Europe.

3362. Were you cognizant of all the negotiations that went on with regard to the transfer of the Straits Settlements from the Indian Government to the Colonial Government?—I do not quite understand the question. If you mean, was I cognisant of any recent correspondence, I can only say that I received no correspondence at all till I was superseded.

3363. You received no correspondence with regard to the transfer?—Not as to the actual circumstances under which the change would be effected. Of course I was aware that for the last eight years the transfer of the Straits Settlements has been under consideration. I was myself upon a Commission appointed to report upon the military force of the Straits Settlements.

3364. Are you aware of any representation which was ever made by the European residents as to the costliness and comparative inefficiency of the garrison?—Yes; I am quite aware that a great deal of that sort of thing was represented in petitions, simply under the impression that they would not be called upon to pay any portion whatever of the military expenditure if the natives were relieved by Europeans.

3365. You are not of the same opinion, I believe?—No.

3366. You do not think that the garrison was particularly costly?—I do not think that the garrison was costly, nor do I think that it was excessive.

3367. And you think it was efficient?—Perfectly so; but we were debited with large sums in the Indian accounts, with which we were not fairly chargeable; we were debited with them in consequence of Labuan, which is a very costly garrison.

3368. Are you aware that some portion of the European residents wished to have no garrison at all, except a force of artillery?—No, I think, if I remember right, that the greater part of the residents were of opinion that there should be a portion of Europeans, either marine artillery or marines, and a local corps of natives.

3369. Were the greater part of the European residents averse to the system of having native regiments as a part of the garrison?—I doubt whether they thought much about it; the simple question was the idea of getting off taxation.

3370. Major *Anson.*] Then, if I understand right, the Colony of the Straits Settlements paid the whole cost of their garrison, and sent some 70,000 *l.* or 80,000 *l.* back to India?—No, that is what we paid. The local Government simply exercised control over the civil receipts and expenditure. For the military we made advances to the Madras Government, and those advances were from 60,000 *l.* to 70,000 *l.*, in fact the whole of our balance; but we had to draw upon India besides, because we had to furnish Labuan, which was, as I have stated, a very expensive and costly garrison.

3371. Marquis of *Hartington.*] Did you ever see any calculation of the actual cost of the garrison to the Indian Government?—Yes; in the correspondence between myself and the Indian Government, they sent me down a memorandum, (but I had not the power of testing its accuracy), in which it was, I think, estimated at 86,000 *l.*, but that included Labuan, which of course ought not to have been a charge upon the Straits Settlements.



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369

Major Gen. O. Cavenagh.

21 May 1867.

3372. Major *Anson.*] Did that 86,000 *l.* include the two regiments of native infantry, and the two batteries of artillery, or the one battery of artillery?—It included everything, even the pensions to the troops.

3373. Will you hand that Paper in to the Committee?—I have got the Paper here; it is in the correspondence of the Government.

3374. Where would it be; in the Colonial Office?—I fancy it will only be in the records of the Supreme Government. It included the two companies at Labuan.

3375. Mr. *Oliphant.*] The amount which Singapore pays under the new arrangement is 58,000 *l.*, is it not?—£. 58,800 *l.* I think it is, under the new arrangement.

3376. What do you think the expense will be of keeping the present Indian establishment there until they can be relieved, as they are to be, by the new arrangement?—The question is a difficult one to answer, because I have no actual details before me of the expenditure; it is simply a statement made in a letter from the Indian Government, to the effect that this was the actual sum expended; but a great deal of our expenditure at Singapore was incurred on account of Labuan, though I believe it was debited against the Straits. For instance, there are two companies on duty at Labuan; in the event of a man dying or becoming sick, we had to send a healthy man at once to fill up the vacancy, and, in the latter case, to keep the sick man in hospital, maintain him one or two months inefficient at Singapore, and eventually, perhaps, to pay his passage back to Madras.

3377. What I wanted to get at was, what would be the total expense of the transfer of the Straits Settlements from the Indian to the Colonial Government, which would come out of the Imperial treasury, in consequence of the delay that would occur in the change of the Indian garrison for the Imperial garrison?—I should think it would be from 15,000 *l.* to 20,000 *l.*

3378. Would that expense have been saved had more notice been given on making the transfer?—I think that the expense might have been saved if more notice had been given, because they might have retained only one regiment, and performed the civil duties by some police corps, or armed police.



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*Friday, 12th July 1867.*

MEMBERS PRESENT:

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|---|---|
| Major Anson. | Captain Hayter. |
| Viscount Cranborne. | Colonel North. |
| Sir James Fergusson. | Mr. Oliphant. |
| Lord William Hay. | Sir Henry Rawlinson. |

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

## The Right Honourable Lord STRATHNAIRN, attending by permission of the House of Peers, Examined.

Right Hon. Lord *Strathnairn.*

12 July 1867.

3379. *Chairman.*] HAS your Lordship seen the evidence which has been laid before this Committee?—Not the whole of it.

3380. But have you seen sufficient to enable you to form a judgment on the subject?—On a good deal of it.

3381. May I ask you generally, what your opinion is as to the questions which have been referred to the Committee, and which are dealt with in the evidence?—I think as a principle, political and military, it is very expedient that Indian troops should serve out of India, but as regards other considerations, there are a great many I think which are against their doing so. The great evil in the case of the Indian troops is caste, because it interferes so materially with discipline, and I think the more they serve out of India, the more is caste, I may say, rubbed away and made to disappear. That has been the experience of the French with regard to their Algerian troops; there are no traces of caste amongst them. I was told so the other day by a very good judge, General Trochu. They are in barracks, and fed exactly like French troops, except with the general understanding that certain things forbidden by their religion do not form part of their rations. For instance, if they do not like grease, they give them some substitute in the shape of a sweet. They do not take their women with them, and they have their own religious worship. There is one battalion of them at Paris, and they do the duty well; they do not come at all in contact with any European observances or feeling. The spahis or cavalry did not succeed so well, says General Trochu, because they are native proprietors, or mounted men, not regular troops, who give military service for holding lands; they sent them back to Algeria.

3382. Do you know at all, on economical grounds, how the French experiment has succeeded; whether it saves the Treasury, or whether it is an expense to the Treasury?—I cannot say; I have no data to go upon. As regards Indian troops, I think a higher class of man, generally speaking, enlists in India than in England, particularly the inhabitants of the Punjaub and Oudh. He has more to do with land, generally speaking, and I think that service out of their country and completely under English control is a guarantee for their good conduct. They would become more English and civilised in feeling, not so apt to believe the ridiculous reports which at times convulse India sometimes. Lord Canning told me that he had such an opinion of the danger of those reports, that he did not know of any element so much in favour of revolution as they were. This occurred in 1862, after the mutiny, when we had gained complete power over India. The movement of Dost Mahomed against Herat gave rise to the wildest reports that Russia was going to march against him. The whole of the north of India, I may say down to Dinapore, was agitated with these reports; so much so that a sort of panic seized the European inhabitants, and the natives universally believed that Feroze Shah had actually marched through the Bholam Pass on his route to Kurrachee. These reports lasted four or five months; they affected the moneyed interest, and created a political panic. Native troops, especially the officers, except men of low caste, being often of a respectable class, would be less apt to rise against us, if native regiments served out of India; I think that for the reasons stated it would have a good effect, and would go far to do away with those native prejudices, for such they are when they not connected with religion.

3383. Did you, in your experience, find that those prejudices were a serious obstacle to military discipline?—In some respects; lately they have been modified or have disappeared. I never would allow, as far as I was concerned, any prejudice to interfere with discipline or with an order; but I saw great traces of it in Bengal, far more than in Bombay, of which I will give one instance: In the campaign, I was going round the camp one day, and stopped to speak to an officer of the irregular cavalry, who had been sent out to make a reconnaisance. He said that if I would come into his tent, he would show me his report and a rough map which he had made. I dismounted, and told the sowar, or native orderly, to hold my horse. The officer looked very much confused, and said, "If you will allow me, I will hold your horse;" he would not let the orderly hold the horse simply because that orderly thought that it was a disgrace to him, and that it would discredit

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credit him in the eyes of his comrades to hold a Christian's horse, although I was the general officer in command. In Bengal a man was tried by court martial by my order for refusing to hold the horse of the brigade major; he was on duty at the general officer's quarters, and he refused to hold the horse of the brigade major, who came up with an order; the man was found guilty.

3384. At what date was that?—That was about 1862 or 1863. It may be said that, in Bengal generally, the feeling of caste is more considered by the Civil Government, and therefore, as can easily be imagined, by the natives, than in Madras, where there is none of it hardly, or in Bombay. The sowar I spoke of was not in a Bombay regiment; he belonged to the Hydrabad Cavalry.

3385. What is the state of things in the Punjaub and the North Western Provinces?—The Sikhs, as you are aware, are Hindoo Protestants. They protest against what they consider the prejudices and the more than prejudices of the Hindoos, and they have not nearly so many caste feelings as the Hindoos of Hindostan, but they also have their feelings. When a Sikh regiment was ordered to embark at Kurrachee for China, the quartermaster general of the Bombay Service complained to me that he had great difficulty in supplying it with a particular oil, which they must have for their hair; they never cut their hair from the day they are born, they must have a particular oil for it, otherwise they are not satisfied; and there were also some little peculiarities as to their food which gave him trouble. Again, the Loodiana regiment, when they were going to China, refused to drink water which had been pumped for them by the sailors of the Royal Navy, because they considered it contaminated. However, that regiment had not a good commanding officer, and was not in proper discipline. This occurred, as I have said, in a Loodiana regiment, south of the Sutledge, and these Sikhs are not considered so much as the other Sikhs.

3386. Then you think, for the general purpose of educating the native mind, such a change, if it were otherwise possible, would be desirable?—I think so.

3387. You mentioned that you saw objections to it in detail; will you state what those objections are?—There are objections which I think serious. One is, that we have only to refer to history to see that Parliament in this country have always been prone to reduce the army. Whether it is the insular position of this country which induces the belief we shall not be attacked, and that it is against our interests to interfere in foreign wars, I cannot say; but the distaste of the people of England, which is of course represented by their representatives, for standing armies and preparation for war is undeniable. We have never organised as yet for war at any period of our history that I have heard of. Consequently, if by substituting native for British troops abroad, there would be a reserve of the latter at home, Parliament would reduce them, which would be fatal. I cannot fancy anything worse than reducing the British army by substituting for them native soldiers.

3388. You deprecate the reduction of the British army, and you think that this would lead to it?—Yes.



3389. Are there any other objections which you see to the plan; do you think there would be a saving of expense, or the reverse?—I think there would be a saving of expense. I have details which show that a native regiment only costs 18,000 *l.* a year, whereas a British regiment costs 60,000 *l.* Allowing that native troops, when serving out of India, get 3 ½ rupees battah a month, and some rations, still I think there would be a saving; there are fewer officers. The officers on the irregular system are much higher paid, but on the whole, if the high rates of pension of British troops are taken into consideration, there would be a saving. When the Government of India required Indian regiments for China, they called upon them to volunteer, although they were on general service terms, had taken the oath to serve anywhere, which I consider very prejudicial to discipline. It is an anomaly to make a man swear that he will go anywhere, and then ask him to serve out of India; the effect upon that man's mind is very bad; it makes him think lightly of the value of the oath that he has taken. Colonel Probart told me that some of his native officers said to him, "Why do the Government ask us; it is a foolish thing asking us to volunteer when we have sworn to go anywhere." When I commanded the Poonah Division in the Bombay Presidency, the 3rd and 5th regiments under me got their orders one night for China, and marched the next morning like an English regiment; they were halted for a few days near Bombay, and embarked cheering as they went up the ship's side; they were a good regiment in every point of view; there was no demur or doubt about their going; I believe it was the same when Bombay troops went to Persia. I do not think there was any volunteering.



3391. And you think there would be no difficulty with the other soldiers with whom they served and the population among whom they might come?—I think there would not; for instance, in the case of the West India regiment there is a very large number of European residents in the West Indies, and I do not see any great difference, or even so much, in this case as in that of a Sikh regiment serving in the West Indies; a Sikh adapts himself readily to circumstances; the Sikhs in Calcutta do not come into collision with the European residents there, or with the large European communities in other parts of India, such as Agra and Lucknow: but certainly I do not think that the regiments in Bengal are prepared for such a change, both as regards women and other things. On the other hand, they are now putting them into barracks in Bengal; they have given up the hut system, which they had till very lately. The huts were not visited individually by the orderly officer, but the quartermaster was answerable for their cleanliness.

3392. Major *Anson.*] Is that system done away with now?—The principle of putting them into barracks has been accepted, I believe.

3393. *Chairman.*] Do you think that such places as Ceylon, or Singapore, or Hong Kong, could be held entirely by Indian troops?—No; certainly not. I never would station Indian soldiers alone, they work much better with English soldiers. The fact is, that although not naturally sympathetic, practically they work well together. In a campaign, in a well-disciplined force, it almost amounts to friendship between



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Right Hon. Lord *Strathnairn.* —— 12 July 1867.

them. The 81st, an Irish regiment, and the 25th Bombay regiment, who were under me, and they were exactly like comrades; and so were the 60th Rifles and the 1st Gourkas; the Gourkas imitated the 60th, and would share their rations or their duties with them; the best feeling existed between them.

3394. Then you would not be content that the natives at such places as I have named, should be supported only by Artillery?—No; it is the case at Singapore; we have batteries there with native troops, but the arrangement, I think, is objectionable; I would always have English and natives together; they get on very well together.

3395. If the natives were so employed, they would require frequent relief, would they not?—Yes; a native soldier requires leave for various reasons; if any man has a little land left him, he wishes to see it, or he is to marry, or wishes to see one of his sons or daughters married, I would do what I could to meet his wishes in this or in any other respect. The Sikhs and the Hindoos are very fond of home, and of going to see their relations occasionally.

3396. Do not you think that in a military point of view, there is this objection with so small an army as the British Army, to have it scattered about in small detachments in different quarters of the world, which would make it very difficult on an emergency to collect it?—As long as we are strong on the sea, I think that it assists us; the Mauritius and the Cape of Good Hope support India; if it had not been for the Cape of Good Hope we should not have had above 700 British soldiers in Bombay at the time of the mutiny. When the 33rd arrived there, it caused an ovation amongst the inhabitants. I think that the very fact of our holding those distant possessions shows that we are very strong on the sea; I would not say that we are omnipotent on the sea, but the fact of our having those distant possessions shows that we are very strong upon the sea; and as long as that is the case those possessions assist us very materially, the troops there being interchangeable. We sent troops to New Zealand from Australia, and in India we were assisted most materially by troops from outside in 1857 and 1858. The arrival of British troops at Calcutta from Hong Kong at a critical time of the mutiny had the best results.

3397. Do you mean by impressing the natives with an idea of our strength?—Yes; but not only the moral, but the material effect was of greatest service.

3398. Even if you could be secure against the interference of Parliament in the way of reduction, you yet would not like to see our British Colonies east of the Cape held exclusively by Indian troops?—No; it is better that European and native troops should always serve together. I think that the inhabitants would object very much to Indian soldiers alone. I think that at the Mauritius they would not mind seeing an English regiment and a very good Indian regiment, because the discipline of those Indian regiments is very good, as shown by the returns; sometimes in a year, there is not more than one or two courts martial in a native regiment; possibly the inhabitants at first starting might not like it, but when they saw that those Indian regiments were orderly, well-behaved men, and above all very good soldiers, who would protect them in case of need, I think that any feeling of that sort would disappear; but the native must always be combined with English troops.

3399. Do you think that Mauritius is a place which ought to be always held in strength?—Yes.

3400. What object do you imagine it to serve, in a military point of view?—It is on the route to India and Australia; it assists the Cape, India, and our power in all that part of the world.

3401. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Do you think that it would be desirable to employ in India troops raised or recruited from other races, for instance, the Chinese or Malays, so as to relieve the number of English troops employed in that country?—I would not wish to diminish the number of English troops. I think that they are lower in number than they ought to be, considering the great reductions to which they are liable from disease in India; sometimes a regiment loses half its number by cholera, the other half, being under choleraic influences, is more or less inefficient.

3402. Would it be desirable to reduce the number of Indian troops, and substitute for the amount of reduced, regiments raised either in Africa, from Mozambique or the Kaffir races, or from China, or from the West Indies; and then to make them interchangeable, so as to render our tenure of India more safe?—It would certainly have that effect, they would not be subject to Indian political influences of an unfavourable description. Objections exist to the employment of mercenaries in India, but the Affghans and Goorkhas whom we employ are mercenaries because not under British rule. At any rate, the condition should be that such troops should be commanded by selected officers and under perfect discipline. I think that it would be a good plan to try as an experiment the exchange of West Indian troops with Indian troops. Evidence which I read shows that some gentlemen of experience do not entertain a favourable opinion of the West Indian regiments, not so much on account of their individual qualities as on the general principle that they are local; one gentleman said that the best officers were very old, and that some of them who had performed distinguished services, were now not able to do so, from illness and the effects of climate. For many reasons I think that local regiments are always inferior; thus West Indian troops would be interchangeable with Indian.

3403. So as to have them all for Imperial service?—Yes; for service in any part of the world. I would utilise India as much as possible. No doubt three or four Sikh regiments in the West Indies would have an excellent effect. As I said before, I have the highest opinion of them, and I am convinced that they would do any duty required of them; and they would not have homogeneous feelings with the inhabitants, which it is always desirable to avoid. It is not politic to control a nationality by soldiers of the same nationality when it can be avoided.

3404. If you were to introduce this system of interchanging in tropical Colonies troops raised in tropical Colonies, could not you then begin to reduce the amount of European troops employed in tropical Colonies?—I would not reduce them, because the prestige of European troops is everything. I think the prestige not only acts upon the inhabitants, but upon the native troops. In times of political ferment and exaggerated reports,

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ports, a native soldier might be influenced by feelings of nationality; but when he sees an English regiment, or a number of English regiments, near him, those thoughts do not influence him, the sight of them acts as a preventive.

3405. In a Colony like Hong Kong, for instance, where there are such great disadvantages of climate, are they not more than counterbalanced by the mere effect of our prestige upon the population of Hong Kong, which is a very mongrel population; do not you think that the West Indian regiments could perfectly well hold Hong Kong supported by the fleet?—It is better that the garrison should be a mixed one, of British and native. The fleet might go away. I think that if good and elevated barracks were constructed at Hong Kong, on proper principles of ventilation, and the duty were not too heavy, or the men thought they were not too much crowded, the climate would not be so injurious to European soldiers as it is now; I believe that Calcutta is quite as unhealthy as Hong Kong, and indeed more so in certain months. The average of sick-rate ran up once to 27 per cent.; but now, owing to the sanitary precautions which I have noticed and which have been adopted, it has fallen to about 7 or 8 per cent. The great thing is not to overwork them by drill or give them too much night duty; I do not think it would be prudent to leave Hong Kong with native troops and British Artillery only.

3406. Colonel *North.*] You stated just now that you think this system might be tried in the West Indies; do you think it would answer at Gibraltar or Malta, for instance?—As I stated before, the Bengal regiments have not been tried in that way. To put them at once in the midst of a European community, I think, would not be advisable. The men take the oath to serve abroad, but the Government of India always ask them to volunteer; which is a practical proof that the standard of discipline which exists in Bombay has not been required in Bengal. The effect of this difference on their minds is not favourable to discipline. As I said before, in Bombay the regiments are ordered on, not asked to volunteer for, foreign service, and they obey.

3407. Are you of opinion that they would require to be removed every three years?—Yes; every three years I think; but after the native troops had been accustomed to service out of India, the term might be prolonged; furlough, for the reasons previously stated, being granted them as much as possible.

3408. Would not that very much diminish the saving?—It would.

3409. We have it in evidence that there were nearly 600 or 800 men ordered to form as a garrison for the straits; but the Duke of Cambridge stated that he was called upon at once to reduce the number, and not to man it with British troops?—Yes; that just confirms what I have just stated; I think it is quite inevitable myself; the whole question depends upon this consideration.

3410. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Supposing that it were decided to send a few regiments to assist the European garrisons in some of our Colonies; do you think, as a matter of military discipline, that it would be advisable to select regiments, or to make foreign service come on the regular roster of the army?—I would not select regiments, and I advised Lord Elgin in this sense in 1863. Sir Charles Wood wrote out that he wished to have 2,000 men to serve in New Zealand, and his idea was to send those Sikh regiments. I ventured to observe to Lord Elgin, that, as commander in chief, my duty was to preserve the *esprit de corps* of the army, which is a very important element, and I thought that it would have a mortifying effect on the Hindoo regiments, who are essentially Hindoo and not Sikh, always to ask the Sikhs to volunteer, as if they were the only fighting regiments. Those Hindoo regiments have now selected officers; they are in high order and they have done very well. I have confidence in them, and I should strongly recommend that they should form part of the expedition; it is no use having an army, and to mistrust them.

3411. You think that their foreign service should come on the regular roster of the ordinary regiments?—Yes, I think so. I do not mean to say that there should not be a selection if there was some severe struggle going on, but that the superiority of one class of troops to another should not be put forward as a principle: there can be no doubt that the Sikh is superior (and that is equally the opinion of every experienced officer) to every other soldier in India. He is cool and temperate in attack, and equally so in retreat; he does not lose his head; he has a good feeling towards the English, and he always volunteers. When Colonel Sarel endeavoured to penetrate from China to India, four Sikh soldiers immediately volunteered to accompany him: the Christian Missionaries persuaded Colonel Sarel after he had advanced a long way to return, because the undertaking was impossible, the Chinese intending to cut off their supplies; the Sikh soldiers were much mortified, and said that if he would go on to India, they had 60 rounds in their pouch, and were certain that they could carry him through. Those men may be taken as representing, generally speaking, good Sikhs: as soon as they came back to India, I promoted them all to be native officers of regiments.

3412. With regard to regiments exclusively formed of Mahomedans, we know that they would be free from all caste prejudice in respect of foreign service; but do you think it would be advisable to employ them in foreign countries were the inhabitants were Mahomedans, as for instance, at Aden or in Egypt, the troops that would be sent from India being of the same creed as that of the country?—There you must exercise discretion, but we have no infantry; exclusively Mahomedans. I have always stated to the Government, that one guarantee for the safety of India was the mixed composition of the army. The matter was for some time under consideration, whether the mixture should be by what is called brigade or regimental mixture: but the principle was fully admitted that it was a great guarantee of safety that the composition of the native army should be decidedly mixed as much as possible.

3413. Would that apply to the frontier service corps?—There they are not under the commander in chief. There are a good many Mahomedans amongst the regiments of that force, but they are mixed with others, Sikhs, Ghoorkas, and some Hindoos. In the Umbayla operations, the conduct of those Punjaub regiments was most distinguished; nothing could be better, generally speaking, with one or two exceptions; but, as a principle, as I said before, I do not think it is humane to the men themselves to control a nationality by a nationality if you



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Right Hon. Lord *Strathnairn.*

12 July 1867.

can possibly avoid it, and as a policy it is not wise.

3414. Captain *Hayter.*] In a case like the Jamaica insurrection, supposing it had spread further, would you have liked to trust to Sikh soldiers to put it down?—Yes, certainly; I do not say anything in disparagement of the West India regiments; they are not homogeneous generally, but I believe blacks from Africa, and not natives of Jamaica.

3415. Major *Anson.*] They used to be raised, used they not, from the West Coast of Africa, but of late years they have been recruited entirely from the small islands?—Then, as I said before, this is another reason for prefering a Sikh regiment; I think it would be better for themselves and the Government.

3416. Captain *Hayter.*] My question was rather with reference to the inhabitants, as to how the troops would behave towards them?—It all depends upon whether they are well disciplined. If you mean to inquire whether they would be cruel or not, I do not think they would; with selected officers their discipline is as good as it possibly can be, and certainly one of the chief elements of discipline is not to injure an unarmed man, or to plunder.

3417. In a military point of view, you would rather trust them than a West India regiment?—Yes, certainly; I think also the West India regiments would be considerably improved by serving out of the West Indies. I think you will recollect the evidence of one or two gentlemen who did not seem to speak very favourably of those regiments. Some papers also were sent to me with the evidence of Mr. Henry Taylor, of the Colonial Office; I do not know him myself, but his evidence has made me think that the local character of their regiment has had a bad influence upon them.

3418. It is the opinion of their own officers, is it not?—I think that locality hurts a regiment more than anything; they get listless, have not the same hope of a career, and lose their *esprit de corps.*

3419. So that an advantage in that respect would be gained by the exchange of Indian troops with the West Indian garrisons?—I think you might, with advantage, send West Indian regiments to Bombay, and Bombay regiments to the West Indies; I do not see any objection; on the contrary, I think it would have a very good effect. I think the inhabitants of the West India islands would be much less likely to entertain bad intentions if they had amongst them Bombay regiments, which are uncommonly good, than if they had some of their own friends with whom they were in daily intercourse. This appears to me perfectly natural.

3420. Major *Anson.*] Is not this your chief objection to the employment of those Indian troops in the Colonies, that it would lead to the withdrawal of the European troops from those Colonies, and their diminution when they arrive in this country?—Yes.

3421. In time of war you would be willing to employ those native troops to any extent, would you not, wherever they possibly could be employed?—Yes; the regiments of the Bengal Cavalry are, I think, as good cavalry as can be seen anywhere; they go across country like fox-hunters, and are very light weighted; they are about three or four stone lighter than European cavalry.

3422. Do you think that if a war were to break out in Europe, and we were very hard pressed at home, that would be a very advisable time to commence a new system with respect to those natives, and to take them out of the country?—No; I do not think that any great change is good on the eve or in the midst of a war. As I said before, the system has prevailed in Bengal of asking regiments to volunteer when they may be ordered under their terms of general service. The Government did not like to order them in 1863 to go New Zealand. Lord Elgin said that he agreed with me in my view of the matter, but that his orders were that they should be asked to volunteer. The principle that I laid down was that it was bad to ask a soldier who was on terms of general service to go anywhere. This is the oath of the recruit: "I solemnly affirm, in the presence of Almighty God, that I will be faithful to Her Majesty the Queen, and will go wherever I am ordered, by land or by sea, and will obey every command." If you ask a man, "Will you go?" and allow that man to say that he will not go, and moreover, give him a great many inducements to go, which is done, I consider this very prejudicial to discipline.

3423. If we were to allow that oath to remain as a dead letter for 10 or 12 years, and never employ them beyond the seas, do not you think they would be very apt to look upon it as an infringement of their rights if they were ordered to go?—I think so; I think it would be better to accustom them to go. If there is any change, it would be better to commence it prudently on a small scale, and see, as you go on, how it succeeds.

3424. In Colonies like the Mauritius, in case of war, you would require, would you not, a great many more soldiers to defend the place than you have at the present moment?—*Yes; it* is a very difficult place to defend. Port Louis could be taken in the rear.

3425. In that case you would require a very large garrison, because a small garrison would be of no use in a place like the Mauritius?—Precisely so.

3426. And the only means by which they could obtain reinforcements in case of war would be by having native troops from India?—The Cape of Good Hope might not be able to send them.

3427. In a time of war, might not the Cape be threatened at the same time as the Mauritius?—Yes. The army of India now is so reduced that difficulties would attend the detachment of troops from India; in fact, they are reduced below what they ought to be. The duties are so severe upon them, that the men have only sometimes two or three nights a week in bed, and three nights is an exception. I was obliged to write to the Government of India very earnestly upon the subject. The men of the native regiments, especially in the Peshawur Division, got sick, and would not re-engage; their very hard duties made the service so distateful to them, that they took their discharge, which the Indian soldier can do after three years' service by giving proper notice.

3428. Of course if you are to find extra duties for the native army, you will have to increase the native army?—Yes.

3429. There would be no objection to doing that, if you located the native army by themselves?—Native troops should never be located by themselves. I think that the native army ought

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ought to be increased; they have no reserve; when the Umbayla operations took place, we were obliged to denude the frontiers imprudently to make up the force.

3430. In case of war, you would anticipate, would you not, having to use those native soldiers, not merely actively in the field before the enemy, but also as part of the garrison of the Colonies?—Yes. They are most useful for some duties.

3431. With regard to the fact of our having European soldiers in the Colonies being a support to India at the commencement of the Indian Mutiny, our garrison at the Cape was something like 11,000 men, was it not, which enabled you to draw troops from there?—Yes; still that increased garrison was owing to the increased disturbances there; but if the country is quite quiet, it could afford to assist another Colony.

3432. With the means which you have of communication with England now, you would always be able, would you not, to get reinforcements from England quicker than from the Cape?—That depends upon the state of affairs in Europe; the passage through Egypt might be very difficult, if not impossible. It is impossible to speculate upon the safety of the sea route, because even if we were very strong on the sea, the fleet might be called elsewhere, and some roving ships might render the communications unsafe.

3433. You do not think that the great military and political advantages which you would expect to be derived by India from the proposal, would counterbalance the dangers of the reduction of the British army as it exists at present?—No, I do not; I think nothing would. The British army is reduced to the lowest point, and too low; the regiments now do not get five years at home; they have 10 years' service abroad, but they do not have the benefit of five years' service at home.

3434. Do you consider that five years is the very least that they ought to have at home, and 10 years abroad?—Yes; it is good for recruiting, and good for the men and officers also; it is a fair turn of home service after 10 years in bad climates, and sometimes not very agreeable stations.

3435. There is one other objection besides the reduction of the English army that has been made, which is the difference of pay between the two services; do you think that that would be a very serious objection to the proposal?—At first sight it appears so, but we have a difference of pay in our own service. The Royal Engineers have double pay; the Horse Artillery have more pay than the field batteries, and there are a great many exceptional rates of pay. I do not think that that is a valid objection; and I think the best practical proof of this would be that if the officers of British regiments serving with officers of Indian regiments, were asked whether they would exchange with the Indian officers, they would not. Therefore I do not think that an officer who enjoys so many advantages in his own service that he will not exchange with those in another service, can complain of any difference in the rates of pay; officers of English regiments can exchange with officers of the Indian Staff Corps. Those officers also are staff officers, and they have greater responsibility than in English regiments; there are only six of them to a regiment, and they are all strictly selected officers; at least they were so; and the irregular service never can prosper unless they are strictly selected, as regards their merits as officers.

3436. With regard to your considering that it is absolutely essential to have European soldiers with natives, in China, for instance, the Indian army as it is constituted at present, have always been found to be quite efficient against organized Chinese troops in the field without the assistance of European soldiers, have they not?—But they had British troops, including artillery, on their right and left.

3437. Do not you think, from your experience, that the difference lies more in the discipline that is maintained in the corps, and the quality of the officers who have the command of those regiments?—Yes; certainly I had under me quite a first-rate regiment, the 25th Bombay Infantry, and also the 24th. The former regiment had the most opportunities of being engaged; I trusted them in the worst posts and with the hardest work.

3438. All the regular corps that were existing in India up to within the last few years originally came from the Punjaub, did they not?—They were not all Punjaub regiments.

3439. And they had the great advantage of having all their officers selected from the East Indian army?—Yes.

3440. If you took the same pains with the whole of the army to secure such discipline as you have in those regiments, do not you think they would be almost as good soldiers as those who came from the Punjaub?—There is a great deal in the *esprit de corps* of a regiment. This 25th Regiment had been at Meanee and had distinguished themselves much there, and they had a great regimental spirit amongst them; but still I cannot say that I think a native Hindoostanee has the fighting element in him that a Sikh has. He is worked up, he is imitative and emulative; you draw out those qualities, and he does well. I had under me regiments of cavalry and infantry of the Hyderabad Contingent, and I have known instances of great devotion and courage amongst native officers and men. I once sent a picket of Hyderabad cavalry to watch a ford on the river Betwah, as the enemy I thought were trying to turn my left and relieve Jhansi; up to the last the picket watched the ford, counting every gun and almost every horse and man; they were nearly all killed or wounded in doing so, and the native officer himself came in very severely wounded at last. But if it is a question of the nature of the men, certainly I think that the Sikhs, except the Goorkhas, have no equal as regards fighting qualities, and I believe that every Indian officer will bear me out in that opinion.

3441. Sir *James Fergusson.*] It is by no means certain, is it, that you could command in the army such a supply of officers with those peculiar qualities, as would suffice to make every regiment that which a few Sikh regiments have been made?—I think it is; I think that the class of English officers would be quite sufficient if you only reward their merit.

3442. You would not be afraid of being able to find a sufficient number of first-rate officers to make their regiments as good as a few Sikh regiments?—I would not have the least apprehension on that subject.

3443. Major *Anson.*] Is not this all that you have to do, to keep the officers up to the mark, and induce them to look more carefully after the discipline of the army?—Yes; I think that the reward of selection is quite enough to make them qualified thoroughly for it, and the proof of that



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Right Hon. Lord *Strathnairn.*

12 July 1867.

is that all through the Indian campaign there was no dearth of candidates, and worthy candidates.

3444. *Chairman.*] I deduce from your evidence generally, that the only strong ground upon which you would advocate trying this experiment, is the education of the natives themselves; but to that if it was possible you would attach very great importance?—No; I think I have said that it is very important to utilise all the means at our disposal, whether Indian or any other, and to make them interchangeable; I do not think that that is the only advantage.

3445. Then would you be willing to reduce, though not entirely to withdraw, the British force from certain of our dependencies, for the purpose of substituting for them Indian troops?—No, certainly not; I would not reduce the English element on any account.

3446. Then the only mode in which you would propose to utilise the Indian force would be by increasing the force at various of our dependencies, that augmentation consisting entirely of Indians?—No; I think it would be good policy to utilise our Indian force by letting them serve abroad, as a general principle; that, I think, would be utilising our great military resources in India. I think that the principle is very good, but the objections are what I have stated, and I do not think that the Bengal troops are so well prepared for service in European countries as the Bombay army are; but Indian should always be mixed with British troops, and I would on no account employ native troops out of India, if this would entail any reduction whatever of British troops.

3447. But any employment of Indians in the Colonies must be in addition to, and not in supercession of, the existing British garrisons?—No; in exchange of part of them. For instance, supposing the two English regiments at Hong Kong exchange a native with one of the English regiments; there would be then at Hong Kong one British and one native regiment. The desideratum is to avoid subjecting British troops to a tropical climate and sun disease, and for that reason I think it would be extemely desirable to associate on the same service, in tropical climates, native troops with British; but then I would not think it advisable to entrust any of our Colonies exclusively to native troops, for the very reasons I have stated.

3448. But supposing you were secure against any general reduction of the army, you would have no objection to reduce *pro tanto* the British garrison at Hong Kong and substitute a portion of the native Indian troops?—No, certainly not; I think it would be very desirable. The more the English soldier is relieved from diseases of tropical climates, which diminish his efficiency and shorten his life, the better.

3449. Sir *James Fergusson.*] It has been stated before this Committee, that the number of troops in India might be reduced, because there is no necessity for keeping up so many; and other witnesses have said that the number of European troops is regulated according to the nature of the native army; I would ask you whether that is so, or whether it is not that the number of troops is regulated in accordance with the duties required, and from no other consideration?—The number of troops is regulated by the state of the country. The proportion before the mutiny was five to two, now it is very nearly two to one: I think that is a very good proportion, because the English troops may be any day very much diminished by cholera or Indian diseases.

3450. But, in point of fact, the strength of the army is determined solely by the duties required of the men?—Yes, certainly; the duties are extremely hard, as I said; for instance, the ordinary duties, regimental guards, pickets, escorts, treasury guards for the civil authorities in all the stations; the civil authorities require a guard for treasuries, and gaols, and the mint; for there is a long list of guards at Calcutta which would surprise you. The duties of the native army in India are necessarily very severe; even if we had not the slightest idea of a revolt or an invasion, the mere ordinary garrison duties are very severe. There are only about 42,000 men for Bengal to defend a line of 1,200 or 1,300 miles from Calcutta to Peshawur.

3451. *Chairman.*] Have you any papers which you desire to put in?—No. If anything should occur to me, perhaps I may be allowed to send it in.

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*Tuesday, 23rd July* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.
Viscount Cranborne.
Sir James Fergusson.
Viscount Hamilton.
Lord William Hay.
Captain Hayter.
Colonel PercyHerbert.
Mr. Laing.
Colonel North.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Captain Vivian.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE BALFOUR, called in; and Examined.

Maj. Gen. *G. Balfour.*

23 July 1867.

3452. *Chairman.*] HAVE you seen any of the evidence given before this Committee?—Yes, I have looked over a portion of the evidence; I think a greater part of it.

3453. Have you formed an opinion upon the subjects referred to the Committee?—I have for a long time past entertained very strong opinions with regard to the employment of sepoys out of India.

3454. Will you be kind enough to give your opinions on the subject to the Committee?—Perhaps it will be useful for me to mention my experience with regard to foreign service, in order to enable the Committee to judge to what extent my evidence is of any value. I embarked on foreign service with native troops within a few months after I joined my head-quarters after leaving the Military College.

3455. In what year was that?—At the end of 1826; I had then about 150 native artillerymen under my charge. We were six months on the voyage to Penang, which was our destination.

3456. Where from?—From Madras. I was then sent on to Singapore in command of a detachment of European artillerymen and gun Lascars attached. The Government then decided on relieving the European artillerymen at Singapore, and I was sent to Malacca to command the native artillery at that station, a senior officer to myself taking the command of the force of artillery at Singapore. I returned to Singapore again in command of the artillery, and was there for some months and was then removed to Penang, to command the European artillery. I returned to Madras after some months of command there, and within a few months afterwards was sent over to Malacca in command of reinforcements of European and native artillery. I remained there after the service was over. We had then operations against the Malays in the interior of Malacca. I was subsequently employed both on the general staff of the artillery and on the general staff of the Madras army, which gave me some considerable opportunities of seeing the working of the foreign service of the Madras army, it being one of the most important parts of the duty of the Adjutant General's department. I proceeded to China in 1840, as a staff officer of the Madras troops, and as staff officer of the artillery, with a force which remained there until the end of the operations, and as consul at Shanghai. I had then an opportunity of seeing the native troops at Chusan, and hearing the statement of how the native troops conducted themselves in China during the whole of the time I remained as consul there. I returned home, and then proceeded to Madras, where I was appointed a member of the Military Board of Madras, which was a Board formed similar to the Ordnance Board of England, and had control over all the departments of the army, excepting as regards the direct pay of the troops and the discipline of the troops; those two points being excluded from the control of the Military Board. The foreign service relations of the Madras army necessarily came more or less under the notice of that Board. The expedition to Burmah in 1852, was also under the control of that Board. Subsequently in 1859, I was appointed a member of the Military Finance Commission, and afterwards chief of the Military Finance Department of India. In that position I had necessarily experience of the whole of the foreign service, of the whole of the Indian army, both of the Bengal and Madras army; and in various ways I had the means of obtaining some information connected with the foreign service of the sepoys. Lord Canning in 1860, desired me to go down to Burmah to inquire especially into the whole of the arrangements connected with the native troops, and the general arrangements connected with the European troops. In those various offices, therefore, I have had some means of obtaining information connected with the foreign service of the native troops.

3457. What is the opinion that you have formed with respect to the capacity of the native troops to serve abroad?—My opinion with regard to the native troops, is exceedingly favourable to their efficiency in all respects, provided the Government will take those measures which will ensure their efficiency whilst on foreign service.

3458. Will you describe the measures which you think should be taken for that purpose?—I think first of all that it is of great importance that the officers of the sepoys should be sufficiently numerous to look after their discipline and well-being, in a manner which is probably more called for



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Maj. Gen. *G. Balfour.*

23 July 1867.

for on foreign service than when the men are serving in India, often with their families around them.

3459. Captain *Vivian.*] Do you confine your remarks to the sepoys?—I confine myself entirely to the sepoys.

3460. Major *Anson.*] You mean the natives of India generally?—Yes, the natives of India generally.

3461. Captain *Vivian.*] Of all classes?—Yes.

3462. *Chairman.*] By officers, I suppose you mean European officers?—Entirely European officers; in speaking of officers I would wish it to be understood that I speak of European officers, for I consider them to be the soul and life of the Asiatic troops.

3463. Are there any other measures besides the appointment of a sufficient number of officers which you think important for the native troops on foreign service?—I think it is of great importance that the duty required from native troops whilst on foreign service should be within the powers of the men to perform. This, of course, applies equally as much to the European soldiers as to the native soldiers. That remarkable evidence which was given before Colonel North's Committee of last year I think is a good illustration of the way in which Europeans may be worked to death, by having duties thrown upon them which might and ought to be placed upon other parties. I had occasion to call the attention of the Government of India to the necessity of attending to the health of the sepoys in the Straits and in Malacca, consequent on reports being sent to me by the Inspector General of Hospitals, wherein he said that he found that the natives, both in Burmah and in Singapore, were so severely worked as to fill the hospitals, and to send the men over to India as invalids.

3464. What species of work had they to do?—Chiefly guards, treasury guards, and police guards of every kind which might with great propriety, and ought to have been undertaken by policemen.

3465. Are policemen cheaper than native soldiers in those Colonies?—In the course of my examination into the military finance of India, I have had occasion to go minutely into the question of the relative cost of native soldiers and policemen, and the calculations I have made most satisfactorily prove, and indeed the Government acted upon those calculations, that the cost of an efficient policeman was not equal to half the cost of a sepoy. It may possibly be within the recollection of this Committee that various inquiries were made into the police of India; the Police Commission sitting at Calcutta called upon me for a report upon the subject of the employment of soldiers and police, and it is contained in this Report of the Police Commission (*producing a paper*), and upon this the Government of India acted, and issued the following resolution, which, if the Committee wish, I shall be very happy to read to them. "The Honourable the President in Council entirely concurs in the principle advocated by the Military Finance Commission, namely, that regular soldiers should not be employed on duties of mere watchmen, and is of opinion that the enforcement of this rule should be commenced at once at every military station throughout India, and his Excellency the Commander in Chief should be requested to issue the necessary orders to the military authority in each district, or the officer commanding at each station, to take measures at the earliest possible period to relieve every military guard in cantonments, except those required for purely military purposes, for which not mere watchmen but disciplined military sentries are on purely military grounds considered necessary, and to arrange with the civil authorities for the substitution of police guards of departments, whether commissariat public works or others, requiring such special police guard, having to pay for the same, or being debited with the expense."

3466. Then your view is, that if this principle was more extensively acted upon, and police substituted for soldiers wherever military reasons did not forbid it, the Indian soldiers would be more healthy and more efficient?—I am decidedly of that opinion, and I would add that I never would have been a party to urge on the Government of India to the extent I did if I had not received from the Government of India a positive assurance that they would invariably relieve the soldiers from those various duties which wore the men out, and rendered the service naturally distasteful.

3467. Do I rightly gather from that answer that they have not fulfilled the expectation you entertained?—I judge from the evidence I heard Lord Strathnairn give, just as he was closing it, when he referred strongly to the number of escort guards and various other duties still required from the native soldiers of India; that they had not that rest and that repose which was necessary, and moreover that they had not that number of native soldiers which was necessary for carrying on the public duties; I also observe in a letter from Sir William Mansfield, the Commander in Chief in India, now before this Committee, that he also refers to those duties being still severe.

3468. You imagine that escorts of treasure or stores could be always done by the police?—They could be entirely done by the police to this extent. I recommended, and the Government approved of the recommendations, that when soldiers were required for defence they ought invariably to be employed on all such operations, but that the duty of watchers should invariably be performed by another class of men, who would do it more effectually and at a far cheaper rate than that at which you could get soldiers to perform it.

3469. Are there any other points which you think ought to be attended to, especially in the treatment of native soldiers serving in foreign parts?—My impression is strong, that much of the distaste connected with the foreign service has been occasioned, especially as regards the Madras army, by the various meddlings which have taken place at various times with the conditions upon which the soldiers have gone on foreign service. You have before this Committee, I think, at all events Sir James Fergusson has moved for, an exceedingly good minute of the Marquis of Tweeddale's. I can hardly add any information beyond that which that minute supplies. I think that in that instance, I may say in every instance where distaste was shown by native troops to proceed on foreign service, it was due to some difficulty occasioned by an interference of the Government with the pay and advantages and other allowances to which the sepoys considered themselves entitled. Indeed, I may mention that it is my conviction that on the occasion of almost all those mutinies, excepting probably the great one of 1857,

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1857, those excitements had been occasioned mainly by questions involved in the pay and allowances of the sepoys.

3470. The point to be kept in view is to adhere strictly to the engagement, whatever it is, that has been made with those men before they embark?—I quite agree to that, and I would add also that you should not make changes connected with the pay and allowances of the soldiers which from time immemorial they have considered themselves entitled to expect.

3471. Is there any other point which you desire to mention with reference to the treatment of native soldiers serving abroad?—I would also mention that it is of great importance that in requiring native soldiers to embark on foreign service that you should keep the demand within reasonable limits, and not, as in the case of the Madras army, go beyond those limits.

3472. Do you mean the demand for soldiers, or the work imposed upon them?—I mean the number of regiments sent on foreign service. I do not say this on my own authority, because the Commander in Chief of the Madras army, whose report we quoted in 1860, distinctly pointed out the excess to which the calls upon the Madras army for foreign service had been made.

3473. To what extent do you think it would be a saving in point of expense to substitute native for English soldiers?—The calculation which was made in India was as nearly as possible to reckon the expense of one European soldier as equal to that of four natives. I think that that ratio is altered by the foreign service, and that you are perfectly safe in considering that one European soldier will be equal in point of expense to two natives on foreign service.

3474. Would you include in that estimate the fact that a native must be relieved oftener than a European, on account of his attachment to his home?—Yes, I include that and every possible expense you can be put to. You have before you an exceedingly good estimate furnished by the officer who succeeded me in the Military Finance Department of India, wherein he shows clearly that the cost of a native soldier would be equal to about 550 rupees per man. That includes every cost which you can possibly incur, excepting that for general command; that portion of the charge is omitted from that estimate. That estimate is, moreover, exceedingly high in reference to the economy with which you could conduct the service; for instance, the charge in that estimate for the expense of passage is far beyond anything which I can possibly suppose could arise. The formation of the cadres, for instance, which you have in that estimate, is exceedingly heavy for 1,200 sepoys; he proposes forming them into 16 companies; the depôt strength which he proposes to keep up for maintaining that force is also exceedingly heavy, and beyond what I believe the requirements to be.

3475. Do you calculate the cost of passage for a native as being as great as the cost of passage for a British soldier?—No, not nearly so high.

3476. What would be the proportion?—I should say that a European soldier would cost probably half as much again as a native soldier; if you take one-fifth more than the natives cost going to China, I think you would be safe in that calculation.

3477. To what circumstances do you attribute that difference?—The space required for a European soldier is much more than half as much again compared to that which is allowed to a native soldier.

3478. Is that in consequence of the inability of Englishmen to bear the heat?—It is partly from that; I believe myself, however, that there is in reality no good reason for it, excepting that natives manage to sleep together and manage to lie upon the deck of a vessel much more easily than European soldiers.

3479. In short, the Englismen would complain and the natives would not?—The hammocks of the European soldiers would occupy more space between decks.

3480. Is the European soldier a bigger man?—Not at all, nor does it appear at all reasonable that he should require more space; but the practice is to allow a sepoy six square feet, and to allow an European soldier at least nine square feet of space.

3481. Has the fact that the European soldier lives more upon meat than the native, anything to do with it?—No. I think there is no connection between those facts; it is simply a practice which the Government have got into; I merely mention the routine. I have never myself seen much inconvenience resulting from the difference of space, and the native soldier does not seem to regard with jealousy that speciality which is given to the European soldier. I have been on board of transports where both Europeans and natives had been mixed together, and nothing could equal the harmony which prevailed between the two classes.

3482. With reference to hospital expenses, are native soldiers more or less costly than Europeans?—They are infinitely less costly.

3483. Both in respect of the number that have to go in, and the treatment they require in hospital?—In the treatment they require, and the food they receive, and in other ways. They are well adapted for recovery if you can provide them with sufficient support.

3484. Have you formed any opinion as to the military question of intrusting places of importance either to natives solely, or to natives only supported by English artillery?—That is a question of opinion, of course. My opinion is simply like that of any other officer, and it must be taken for what it is worth; it is not so good as that of many officers who are at least as able to give a military opinion as I am. But I would mention to you a fact with regard to the Straits, of which I have some knowledge from 1826. When I went to that part of the world until now, the three settlements, Penang, Malacca, and Singapore, have been held in entire safety, and for many years they were held with only 50 European artillerymen in the three places, that number being stationed at Penang. The native artillery were two companies in strength, and the regiments of infantry were two in number. One company of native artillery was withdrawn, because they required the services of the native artillery in Burmah. The Madras native army could not supply the number necessary for the two garrisons, and they therefore sent over a company of European artillery to garrison the Straits, instead of the native artillery. Hence arises the fact of your having had until lately a company of European artillery at Singapore. A change is now about to be made; you are to send three batteries of European artillery, a wing of a regiment, and, I believe, eight companies of the Ceylon Rifles there.



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Maj. Gen. G. Balfour. 23 July 1867.

3485. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Will you state the garrison of those places you mentioned, Penang, Singapore, and Malacca; what force of sepoys was kept there?—Two regiments of infantry, two companies of native artillery, and half a company of European artillery.

3486. In the three places?—In the three places, Penang, Malacca, and Singapore.

3487. *Chairman.*] And there was never any apprehension felt that that garrison was in an insecure condition?—On the contrary, the affairs of those three settlements have been conducted with the utmost degree of quietude. You have never heard in England of anything happening in the three places; you have never had any trouble with them. In 1842 we unfortunately got involved in a rebellion by a native chief, about 40 miles from Malacca, and although it required six months to overcome him, and it was an exceedingly difficult work to cut through the dense jungles of the Malay peninsula, and although the whole of the neighbouring parts of the peninsula poured in assistance to this native chief, yet two wings of native infantry and a small detachment of European artillery were quite sufficient to overcome the opposition that was raised against them. Stockades of the most formidable description were raised in the night by the Malays, but they were stormed and successfully captured with ease, entirely by the native infantry. It is quite true that the regiment which bore the brunt of it was one of the oldest of our Madras regiments, which was exceedingly well officered, yet the sepoys followed their officers exceedingly well, and overcame every opposition.

3488. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Who was the enemy?—He was a chief, calling himself the Pongoloo of Naning.

3489. What was the character of the men brought against our forces?—Malays.

3490. *Chairman.*] They were rather good soldiers?—They were exceedingly good soldiers.

3491. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Had they any amount of discipline?—All the Malays are, more or less, able to act together. I have no hesitation in saying that many of those men who were employed against the troops, must have been employed on piratical operations; they were always accustomed to carry cuisses, and quite ready to use them.

3492. They were accustomed to arms?—They were accustomed to carry cuisses, and were well supplied with firelocks.

3493. Speaking as a military man, should you say they had any pretence to discipline?—I look upon all these Asiatic troops, the Burmese and Malays, and so forth, as having more or less of discipline; their disregard of life and bravery enable them to act together, and induce them to combine; then again, if you regard the habits of the Malays, they are almost all accustomed to go on board ship, or on board of their prows.

3494. Major *Anson.*] At all events, they are the same class of enemy that the European troops would have to act against?—They are quite the same class of men in every respect.

3495. *Chairman.*] Have you seen native troops acting in the field on any other occasion by themselves?—We had an affair on the banks of the Tampoota in 1839, against a Wahabee chief of great fame, surrounded by a band of as fine a body of Arabs, Candaharese, and Punjaubese and northern men of India as could be got together.

3496. How did they get there?—You are aware that the Nizam has from time immemorial invariably had great bands about him; it was one of those remarkable things that have occurred in India, but which are little known in this country; it was one of these plots which constantly existed in India. The Nabob of Canool raised up an immense storehouse of guns, ammunition, and gunpowder and warlike stores to an amazing amount, and the Nizam's brother, who was subsequently confined in Golconda, was appointed to be Commander in Chief of the Army of the Faith; hence it was that the Nabob of Canool got about him this band, under the leader Shah-wallyhan, a man six feet six inches in stature, and singularly looked up to and respected; he stood the fight, and his men also.

3497. And you saw native troops in the field against this man?—Yes; on that occasion we had 450 rank and file of native infantry, and 88 rank and file of European infantry, four guns, a troop of European cavalry, and a squadron of native cavalry, and the band of the Nabob was defeated and destroyed nearly to a man.

3498. Have you ever seen native troops acting entirely without European soldiers?—No; I never have.

3499. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] In what year was this?—It was in 1839.

3500. Major *Anson.*] Were you in the operations in China, before Nankin?—Yes; I was engaged to the last in the operations before Nankin, and I recollect a circumstance which happened on that occasion, which I may mention to you, namely, that the main force that was sent to press Nankin was chiefly composed of native infantry and European artillery; the force before Nankin, reserved by Sir Hugh Gough to storm the place was kept on board ship, to be landed when the breaches were made, and a brigade was sent down under the command of Lord Saltoun, Sir Hope Grant being then the brigade major of Lord Saltoun's brigade; the chief portion of the force was composed of infantry, if my recollection serves me rightly; we had 16 companies of native infantry there, and two companies of European infantry; the 98th Regiment, under the late Lord Clyde, was about five miles in our rear, but they had been so destroyed by the passage out from England, that they were quite unfit for any operations in the field. I believe I am quite right about this; I had the means subsequently of ascertaining the fact, and on that occasion it so happened that I was sent by the Plenipotentiary to Sir Hugh Gough, to press on the movement against Nankin, which was known to be regarded with great jealousy by Ke-ying; I have no hesitation in saying that that pressure on that day against Nankin, was the chief cause of the treaty of Nankin being concluded; I beg the Committee will understand that there were no operations, it was simply the occupation of the heights overlooking a great portion of the city of Nankin which induced Ke-ying to report to the emperor that pressure had been put upon him to bring about the treaty.

3501. *Chairman.*] Do you think that there would be any difficulty on the part of the natives of India themselves, if it was proposed to them, to employ them on foreign service?—I think the Marquis of Tweeddale's minute gives a very good idea of it; I was looking at it this morning, and I think the remarks which he makes

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makes there are corroborated entirely by what has come within my own experience, that the difficulty is the embarkation on board ship, not the distance, or the place you sent them to, so much as getting them across the sough at Madras; of course, I speak of Madras, which has been the chief place to supply troops from India for foreign service.

3502. You know nothing of the Sikhs?—Merely that I saw them in 1860, when they were embarking for China.

3503. An apprehension has been expressed that the treatment to which the native troops might possibly be subjected at the hands of inexperienced officers, if they served in foreign parts, might create discontent amongst the native populations themselves in India, when the soldiers came home; what is your opinion upon that?—I have no doubt that the treatment which the native soldiers received on foreign service would have a great effect upon the enlistment into the service afterwards; for instance, with regard to the Madras army, which perhaps would be as good an indication as any,—this is my report (*producing a paper*), if it is of any value I will put it before the Committee; in it I strongly remonstrate against the mode in which the sepoys were being treated, at Singapore, with regard to the guards. This report of mine was based upon certain detailed reports; it also bears upon the food of the European soldiers. I think the important point, with regard to the employment of sepoys on foreign service, is simply that you should establish a positive regulation respecting the police duties, and the various detailed employments which Colonel North's Committee so strongly brought out, with regard to China; if you could prevent those duties from being imposed upon the native troops, I think, myself, that there could be no possible objection to the employment of native soldiers on foreign service.

3504. Have you ever observed, on the part of the colonists in the English settlements where they have been employed, any repugnance to their presence?—I have no hesitation in saying that there would be great repugnance to them; you have induced the colonists to feel that repugnance by your present arrangements. Take, for instance, the case of the Mauritius, it so happens that I am connected with a company which is deeply interested in that little island; now it would be greatly to the disadvantage of that colony to have the European soldiers, who are there at present, changed for native troops.

3505. In what way would it be a disadvantage?—It would be a disadvantage in this respect, that the expenditure on account of these European troops is of some importance in the island; the colonists are called upon to pay a contribution, to the Imperial Government for these troops, to a vastly greater amount than they could possibly be called upon to pay if they had a voice in forming their own garrison. You have got a garrison, for instance, in that little island, of 2,000 European soldiers; that is to say, you have got a soldier to every one-third of an acre of land in that little island.

3506. Are there only 6,000 acres in the island?—No; there are 250,000; I mean to every 200 acres; a small space of 120 feet by 120 feet is the space covered by each soldier.

3507. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Have you any return of the troops quartered in the Mauritius?—You have got it before you; there are 1,950, I hope you will understand that I speak in round numbers. I am not desirous to exaggerate; but you can bring them up to 2,500, or bring them down to 1,500, according as you keep the establishment complete or not.

3508. Lord *William Hay.*] How much does the island pay?—They are now paying 45,000 *l.*

3509. How many soldiers does that cover?—You have various statements before you: I think none of them can be relied on. You have the troops, in 1858, valued at two-thirds of the sum you now put down for more than double that strength; but if you will take the calculation at 100 *l.* per soldier, which I think is not very far from the mark in those Colonies, then you will be able to approximate very nearly to the real cost of a European soldier in the Mauritius and in Ceylon.

3510. *Chairman.*] Then they pay about a quarter of the expense?—They pay for about a quarter of the garrison which the Government see fit to keep there.

3511. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] That is taking it at 100 *l.* per man per annum?—100 *l.* per annum per soldier.

3512. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] May I ask how you arrive at this expense of 100 *l.* per man per year?—If you will take these reports, from 1850 to 1858, of the War Office, I think you will get as fair a calculation as you can possibly desire of the estimated cost of the European soldiers in the different Colonies (*handing in some papers*).

3513. I do not see anything about per head here?—If you look at the final column and divide the sum you see there by the number of soldiers, you will get the figures per head.

3514. *Chairman.*] But, if this contribution of 45,000 *l.* is so great a burden to the colonists in the Mauritius, I do not quite understand why they should be unwilling to have it lessened by the employment of the cheaper native troops, instead of the more expensive European troops?—I think myself that the force you would require at the Mauritius, if you rate it according to Ceylon, would be 100 European soldiers, and about 300 or 400 native soliers.

3515. That is your idea of the garrison that would be necessary?—It is not my idea of what is necessary, I only deduce it from the proportion which the force in Ceylon bears to the whole area, and to the population of Ceylon; that force also is very nearly the same as what you have in India, with reference to the population and the area of that country.

3516. That is taking the area and the population together?—Yes; taking the area and the population together; but upon that point I would wish to speak with great deference. I have never yet seen any distribution statement of the troops prepared on any satisfactory basis. I have seen many statements connected with the Indian troops, and have taken part in the distribution, so as to arrive at some idea as to the number of troops you would require for India, but of all the statements which have been prepared, and I suppose every Commander in Chief in India has prepared one, none has been more carefully prepared than that of Lord William Bentinck; he took an immense deal of trouble to prepare one. I think the conclusion at which Sir Charles Metcalfe and the Government of India arrived, with regard to Lord William Bentinck's valuable paper was, that you ought to keep up as great an army as you can possibly



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Maj. Gen. *G. Balfour.*

23 July 1867.

pay for, and that it is no use aggregating a force here and a force there; it all comes to nothing, because in the end it is simply a question, can you provide the money to pay for them? I am sure that the Honourable Member for Wick, who took such a distinguished part connected with the Indian military finances, and gave so much of his time to that subject during the short period he was administering the finances of India, will bear me out in saying that his desire, and that of the Viceroy of India, as well as of Sir Bartle Frere, was simply to keep up as large a force as the finances of India could bear. The Honourable Member to whom I allude is now present in this Committee, and I would frankly appeal to him with regard to the result. I do not remember on any one occasion that he ever desired to cut down the army unnecessarily; my recollection is, that he was quite willing to keep it up in the highest state of efficiency, and to as large an extent as he could possibly provide the funds for. I believe that Mr. Laing's idea was simply this, if we could manage to keep your military expenditure within 12,000,000 *l.*, or 12,500,000 *l.*, we had done everything which could possibly be desired connected with the finances of India.

3517. Mr. *Laing.*] You mean that, taking station by station, a good case could be made out for the necessity of the presence of troops at a great many more stations than you could afford financially to keep them in?—Yes; you have expressed very clearly, and very soundly, the view which I should be very glad indeed to express.

3518. *Chairman.*] You would be inclined to extend that to the Colonies, would you not?—I should say that you ought to extend it to the Colonies.

3519. You can always find reasons for having soldiers, if you can find money for them?—I never saw a Commander in Chief who was not able to provide duty for double the force he had at any station under his command. I think that is the general rule with regard to military officers, and for a good reason. You will find that the civil authorities are always perfectly willing to put upon the troops any amount of police duty which the military commanding officer will take. It is so in India, in Ceylon, and in China. In the Mauritius the police happen to be very good, and that is not the case there. But that system saves the Civil Department from expenditure which they would otherwise incur, and an essential point of a military officer is this, that he will render obedience to the civil power, so that the last thing that a military commanding officer ever thinks of doing is to raise an objection to any demand that is made upon him for the employment of his soldiers. Therefore, in the way which Mr. Laing has justly expressed it, you can raise up reasons to any extent you like for doubling or trebling the force whenever you may please to consider it necessary.

3520. And you believe that principle to be of universal application, and not limited simply to India?—I believe it to be of universal application, and I have strong reasons for saying that. There is a matter which I will mention to the Committee with reference to this subject. I have had some little experience in India, and also last year I had the honour of being employed on the Recruiting Commission in this country, and I was struck particularly with the way in which we have been going on for some considerable time, with regard to our army. I have never seen any objections raised at any time to the employment of our army away from England, but I took up the returns for the last year we had before us in that commission, and I found this state of things; I will only mention one point. On the first of January 1854, we had of effectives 48,114 rank and file of infantry of the Line employed out of the kingdom; that includes both India and the Colonies. For the relief of that body we had 44,992 at home, that is to say, we had an equal number at home to what we had abroad.

3521. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] At what period was that?—In 1854, just before the Crimean war. I have the returns for the other years; I will take any other year you like. I have got the 1st of June 1851, or the 1st of January 1846; I have left blank columns to fill up some of those years, which I can do if you choose. I will now give you the establishment. As an establishment you had 51,680 who ought to have been abroad; and you ought to have had 51,720 at home, but evidently in that year you were far below your numbers. Now, on the 1st of June 1866, which is the latest time for which we had the Adjutant General's Return before the Recruiting Commission, you had 71,148 out of the kingdom, against 41,962 at home; that is to say, you had nearly double the strength out of the kingdom compared with the means of relieving them from those you had at home.

3522. Sir *James Fergusson.*] That is 71,000 between India and the Colonies?—Yes.

3523. Major *Anson.*] In the last number, 41,962 of those we had at home on the 1st of June 1866, you include also the Guards, do you not?—Not now; I mention only the infantry of the Line.

3524. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Is that including also the Indian and colonial depôts?—The 41,962 includes the Indian and colonial depôts. I may mention also (and this is a very serious matter) that excluding the depôts, which I will give you the number of, the thing that startled me most of all was this, you had actually only 28,792 infantry of the Line, that is to say, regimental men, at home.

3525. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] To relieve 71,000 men?—The others were composed of depôts. I was never more startled in my life than when I took these figures out of the returns; they were not made use of in the Recruiting Commission, because it was found that although the Commission from the Queen gave the Commissioners power to inquire into the organisation of the army, the restrictions of the Secretary of State prevented that question being gone into, so that the question of recruiting merely was taken up. If you glance at that paper for the last two years, that will show what I am alluding to (*handing in a paper*).

3526. Captain *Hayter.*] That gives 13,000 for the depôts?—Yes; 4,000 for the colonial depôts, and 9,000 for the Indian depôts.

3527. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Those depôts of reserves at home are liable to constant demand for extraordinary services, are they not?—They are simply intended to feed the troops abroad.

3528. But, as a matter of fact, they are called upon nearly every year to supply demands for forces

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forces which were unexpected? — The object simply is to keep up the troops abroad.

3529. Supposing anything occurs in Canada or New Zealand, or elsewhere, they are frequently called upon for extraordinary service, are they not?—Never, I believe; that is why I draw a distinction. That 28,000 infantry of the Line is the only force you have got to meet these demands; the depôts are not more than sufficient to do what they have to do.

3530. I meant this, the troops at home, the total of which you have given, are constantly called upon for other services besides the ordinary reliefs?—Never.

3531. You have stated the total number of troops on service, and the number of those at home for their relief?—Yes; I will exemplify my view in this way: inasmuch as the establishment in India, for instance, on the 1st of June 1866 was 41,080 rank and file infantry of the Line, the effectives in India were only 39,256; therefore you are keeping up a most expensive force in India of officers and non-commissioned officers equal to the supply of three or four regiments, in consequence of the depôts at home which were then 8,246 strong being unable to keep up the establishment in India with the men necessary for carrying on the duties there; therefore the two depôts, which were then 4,222 of the regiments in the colonies, and 8,426 of the regiments in India, were insufficient to supply those forces abroad with the numbers which the Government had thought fit to fix as being necessary for the defence of those places.

3532. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] I think you said that on the 1st of June 1866, the effectives were 2,000 odd under their establishment?—Yes, in India.

3533. And you said that that was because the depôts were unable to supply those 2,000?—You can assign any other reason for it you like, but inasmuch as you were keeping up an exceedingly expensive establishment of officers and non-commissioned officers, it was unwise not to have your depôts so strong as to be able to keep up the maximum strength of effectives.

3534. Is not it the case that the depôts in this country send out the men to India later than the month of June?—That is so, and that is the reason why I took the month of June 1866, instead of the 1st of January. I have also got here the 1st of January 1865. If you take the 1st of January, and then again the 1st of June of a year, you have then a very fair criterion to go by, but if I had taken the return for the 1st of January alone, I should then have shown the minimum force at home, whereas I was desirous of showing the maximum force at home, in order to bear out my argument connected with the great demand for troops abroad.

3535. And if you had taken the date of the 1st of January, you would equally have shown the maximum number in India, which would have militated against you?—No, I should have had equally the same argument, because it would have shown a smaller force at home, to meet the large force in India.

3536. What was the force on the 1st of January preceding the 1st of June, which you have given us?—This will be a very good answer to it. On the 1st of January 1866, you had 87,547 effective infantry of the line, of all ranks, abroad, and in India, and you had only 45,694 at home.

3537. What I wanted to ask was this: you showed that on the 1st of June 1866, there was a certain number, namely, 41,000 odd, which was the establishment in India of rank and file?—Yes.

3538. And that the effectives were 39,000, or about 2,000 less than that establishment in round numbers?—I did.

3539. You argued from that, as I understood you, that the depôts were unable to supply those wants; I wanted to know what was the deficiency of the effectives compared with the establishment on the 1st of January preceding?—I have not put it down here; it is a very considerable labour to get this out, but I will fill that up in my evidence, and give it you with great pleasure.

3540. You are aware, of course, that the recruits go out from the depôts in the autumn?—Yes, I am aware of that.

3541. You made a statement before with regard to the depôts not being in your opinion apparently very efficient as a home defence; perhaps you would state, for the information of the Committee, whether those depôts are not composed principally of very young recruits, and soldiers who have returned home non-effective?—I will. Perhaps you will permit me, instead of giving my own opinion, to give the evidence of his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge on that subject. I need not say the great respect we all feel for his Royal Highness, but the clearness and fullness with which he gave his evidence before the Royal Commission struck me particularly. This is the evidence he gave before the Recruiting Commission: "We do not know what we are to do in sending regiments to India, because some of the finest men, if they will not take on, have to be kept at home. For instance, the 36th Regiment went abroad two years ago; they were one of the finest regiments that we had at home; they had not been in the Crimea, and they were perfectly contented men; still the men did not choose to re-engage; and I think that 130 or 140 men were left at home. There was more than the establishment in the depôt, and consequently we could not take a single recruit till all those men had served for 10 years. The regiment was at that moment under the establishment, as it is now" (that was nearly two years afterwards), "because we have never been able to make up the losses occasioned by these 130 men, whom we could neither employ in India, nor with good effect at home at the depôt. That happens continually in the service, and the difficulty of sending regiments under these circumstances abroad is something which cannot be told; and I think that we ought to have authority to send men who have a shorter period unexpired than 18 months, perhaps 6 or 8 months may be desirable; and my belief is that many of those men, if they once embarked, would re-engage." The conclusion which his Royal Highness drew from that was against the limited service Act. That is not the conclusion which I came to, because on looking over the establishment and the strengths of the regiments in India, which, if you wish it, I can put in, you will find that almost all are below their strength. Therefore the reasoning which his Royal Highness applied to one regiment, though perfectly correct and sound, was strictly speaking general for all regiments; it was not true of one regiment going abroad only, but of all the regiments



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Maj. Gen. *G. Balfour.*

23 July 1867.

then serving in India. Very few of them were kept up to their established strength.

3542. Major *Anson.*] It is notorious that for years past the actual strength in India has been far below the established strength, is it not?—I can answer that question fairly, because Mr. Laing is aware of the repeated representations, I may say, that were made by Lord Canning's Government during the time that he was Finance Minister of India, complaining very seriously of the remarkable difference between the established and the effective strength; and I may say that it is a cause of great and unnecessary expense to that country in maintaining establishments of officers for regiments, which is in reality the expensive part, and not keeping up the rank and file of the regiments, which is the least expensive of all, to the full numbers. If that had been done, it would have enabled you to have dispensed with several regiments from India.

3543. Sir *James Fergusson.*] That opinion would go in the direction of having fewer battalions, but a greater proportion of rank and file?—That is exactly the conclusion which Lord Canning's Government came to; and I think it is the conclusion which everyone acquainted with actual service would desire, namely, that you should keep as few men in the field as you possibly can; and you ought to consider service in all those colonies, and in India in particular, as entirely services in the field; and you should multiply your reserves to any extent that is necessary to keep the force there efficient and complete, but diminish the number of men who are exposed to many different kinds of casualties, to as few as possible in the field.

3544. That was not exactly the point to which I asked you to direct your attention; I understand the result of the statement you have just made to the Committee to be, that in your opinion it would be better to have a smaller number of battalions, with a greater number of rank and file in each?—Yes; on the grounds I stated.

3545. I think you ascribed the great cost of the army in India, in a great measure, to the disproportionate number of battalions as compared with the number of rank and file in each?—Yes, that is the case; and if you desire to have this confidential memorandum which Lord Canning desired me to prepare two or three months before Mr. Laing came out to India, I shall be happy to put it in, wherein I urged that very strongly; and I believe Lord Canning fully and entirely adopted it, and it was the principle upon which Mr. Laing afterwards acted—to diminish the number of battalions in India to the fewest possible. For instance, you had an establishment of officers and non-commissioned officers equal to 1,200 rank and file of infantry; I think you have brought them down now to 750 rank and file of infantry. In this memorandum I urged very strongly that, instead of having 56 or 60 regiments of infantry, which was one-third in fact more than you wanted, you should have only 40 regiments. Lord Canning went most carefully over this memorandum, and devoted many hours to the examination of it, I being present; and he finally gave his entire concurrence to the principle which I laid down, that instead of having 56 or 60 regiments of the Line, 40 regiments in India would be quite sufficient for the garrison of India.

3546. Those 40 regiments having the same number of rank and file which are now distributed over the 60?—Yes, as it was at that day. You are aware that the diminution of the strength of the infantry has been very considerable since that date, and the European force is now 10,000 below what it was at the time when Mr. Laing formed his calculations with reference to the finances of India; but the number of regiments diminished has only been four since that period.

3547. The diminution having been in the rank and file?—Entirely, or almost entirely, in the rank and file.

3548. When you stated the desire of successive Commanders in Chief to have been in effect that they should have as many troops as the finances of India could bear, you did not mean to imply that in your opinion there are more troops in India than are necessary for the protection of the country, I suppose?—Yes, I do most decidedly say that the whole difficulty which Mr. Laing had to deal with in order to bring the finance into order, which he did, was to bring the number of troops within what we could pay for. At that time we were urging more and more reductions, but it was then considered to be perfectly impossible to reduce, but since then reductions have taken place to the extent of 10,000.

3549. Then am I right in understanding your opinion to be that the army in India is greater at this moment than there is any military necessity for?—I think so; I think you should look only to the finances; I think the information which is now coming home from India to the Board is exactly the same thing for which Mr. Laing so nobly contended, and in which Lord Canning fully concurred with him; it is this (but Mr. Laing is here to speak for himself, and will no doubt do so): that there are taxes now being placed upon the people of India which I hold to be in the highest degree dangerous, and if I mistake not, and Mr. Laing will, perhaps, kindly correct me if I am wrong, I think Lord Canning said that rather than impose those taxes upon the people of India he would run the risk of holding India with 40,000 European troops.

3550. The considerations you now speak of are financial considerations; namely, that the taxation of India is oppressive; but I want to ask you your opinion upon military considerations; do I understand you to state distinctly that in your opinion the forces which are now maintained by the Government of India are greater than there is any military necessity for?—I must reply to that in this way: if, in order to maintain the army, you give rise to those feelings which are occasioned in India by those taxes, no European force which you can send from England, and no native force which you can keep up in that country, will ever be able to overcome the opposion which those classes who are affected by that taxation will bring against you. It is quite true that I am a soldier, but it is equally true that I have been engaged for some years past in some important situations under the Government; and I think where I have been employed and selected, as I was by the Government of India for important public duties, I ought not to shut my eyes and my ears to considerations which will bear most seriously upon the efficiency and the power of our military forces in India.

3551. Those considerations would actuate you to urge very strongly the reduction of the army

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Maj. Gen. *G. Balfour.*

23 July 1867.

to the lowest limit compatible with safety?—They would.

3552. As your opinion is expressed in a military sense, can you tell the Committee as closely as possible, in what parts of India you think there is an unnecessary military force kept up?—I would ask the Committee not to take my opinion, but to take the opinion of an exceedingly able Governor General, who gave his devoted attention to the subject of the army, and I must say this for him, having read very many of his papers, which have never been published, that no man could have devoted himself more thoroughly to entering into the details of any affair than the Marquis of Dalhousie did. I ask you to read up his Minute of 1854, wherein he specifies distinctly the strength of the European infantry which he would require for the defence of India. You may call in question the reasons which he gives there, but I think that there are very few men who are qualified by experience, by knowledge, and by dangers, such as those he went through, to contend against the Marquis of Dalhousie in the reasoning which he then gave.

3553. Is not it the case that the Marquis of Dalhousie, in 1854, considered that the army in India at that time was below what it ought to be?—He did; it was exceedingly dangerously reduced. I look upon the same dangers which he then pointed out as likely to arise, as being the cause of the great evils which we are now suffering from. I believe that if his advice had been followed then, we never should have had that great mutiny; we should never have had occasion for the employment of the great European force which we now have; and more than that, we should never have had in subsequent times, those vast and unexampled changes in the military organisation of India, which you have had in the last few years. In that Minute of the Marquis of Dalhousie's, he gave you station by station, where he would require European regiments to be stationed, and he came to the conclusion, after all his experience, that 35 regiments of European infantry were quite sufficient for the garrison of India. I may also remind the Committee, that we have been legislating with regard to the force in India, upon very false data, with regard to their duties.

3554. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] You stated that Lord Dalhousie considered 35 regiments sufficient; what force did he consider should be maintained?—They should be regiments of 1,000 strong.

3555. Thirty-five regiments of 1,000 strong?—Yes.

3556. Sir *James Fergusson.*] That was before the annexation of Oude, was it not?—That was just as the annexation of Oude was taking place.

3557. The annexation of Oude took place in 1856, therefore it was two years before that event occurred?—Yes, it would be so; I will look at the Minute, and correct the date of it if it is wrong.

3558. You would adopt the opinion laid down by Lord Dalhousie in 1854, that 35 full battalions of European infantry are sufficient, and you give it as your opinion that that force would be sufficient at the present time, without condescending to details?—I will simply answer that question by saying that I adopt Lord Dalhousie's estimate, and I adopt the stations. I have gone over it myself when in India, and when I had occasion to submit my information to the Board, which I was frequently called upon to do, and to give my reasons for many of the recommendations I had to make. I adopt that Minute of Lord Dalhousie in all its integrity.

3559. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Do you not think that the events which have happened between that time and the present have altered the state of things with regard to the force which should be maintained in India; we have had the mutiny since then?—You have never had before you the actual force in India at the time of the mutiny. You have had two statements before this Committee, one by Colonel Norman, and one by Sir William Mansfield, that at the time of the mutiny there were 45,000 European troops in India. Now, in this confidential memorandum which I gave in to Lord Canning in November 1860, I made out that you had only 37,091 non-commissioned rank and file of artillery, infantry, and cavalry; that was the total number of effective Europeans in India.

3560. Sir *James Fergusson.*] In what year was that?—When I was writing in 1860 I had all the returns before me, and I prepared for Lord Canning a statement of the European and native forces in India in 1857, with a view to base the calculations of the expenditure of the future army in India upon this fact.

3561. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Was not the 45,000 the establishment and your figures the effective?—Yes, it is a difference between the effective and the establishment, which is an important thing; I was going to call the attention of the Committee to that. Sir William Mansfield and Colonel Norman both made references in such a manner as to say that you have only got now 16,000 European troops more than you had on the 1st of May 1857 in India. They also show in various ways that at one time they speak of the establishment (because it is only supposition that the 45,000 men was the establishment) and at another time they speak of the effectives, so that they contrast the establishment in the one year with the effectives in another year, which is not a usual mode of comparing.

3562. Sir *James Fergusson.*] But was not the disparity between the establishment and the effectives in 1857 altogether peculiar; did not it arise from the fact that after the Crimean war the ordinary reinforcements did not come out to the regiments in India?—The answer to that is simply this, I think you had ample means at home to have supplied India with the full establishment; I think from the correspondence which took place with regard to it, that there was apparently no want of men at home, especially considering that there were large reductions in the Crimean army; I think you could easily have supplied India with the effective strength necessary for its defence.

3563. Is not it historically true that two regiments of cavalry (we are talking of infantry) were withdrawn from India in 1854 to go to the Crimea?—They were.

3564. That the ordinary reinforcements of regiments in India did not come out for two years previous to the mutiny?—Yes.

3565. And that a certain number of European troops were sent to Persia also?—I answer that question by saying that the 10th Hussars, and the 12th Dragoons, I think, were the two regiments that went from India; the former went from Bombay, and the latter from Madras; the 12th went to the Crimea; indeed I believe both did,



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Maj. Gen. *G. Balfour.*

23 July 1867.

and served and kept remarkably healthy; then they went home to England, where they arrived in January 1857. Four months before the mutiny broke out the regiments had all come home from the Crimea, therefore there was no want of troops at home, either as respects the number of regiments, or the number of men; besides that, the army was then subject to great reductions.

3566. Still, as a fact, they did not come out?—You are pressing me to say that the people at home did not do their duty, and that is what I do not want to say.

3567. As a historical fact, and in order to show how far the return of 1857 is a trustworthy criterion, I want you to admit, as I think you will do, that the state of the army in 1857 was altogether abnormal?—I cannot admit it, and will not; it was entirely owing to the want of effort to send them out.

3568. As a matter of fact they were not sent out; is not it the case, that as a matter of fact, the establishments in India were not kept up?—I quite admit that.

3569. So that there being that disparity between establishments and effectives in 1857, the actual effective force of European troops in 1857 was hardly a fair criterion?—I quite admit that; but besides only having 37,500 effective European non-commissioned officers' rank and file, in India on the 1st of May 1857, we had 5,000 and upwards up in the Persian Gulf, away from India.

3570. *Chairman.*] Out of this 37,500?—Yes; 5,000 out of the 37,500; I will take for purposes of contrast the most economical government we have had in India for the last 40 years, which was Lord William Bentinck's government; on the 1st of May 1857 we had within 10,000 European non-commissioned rank and file of the strength we had on the 1st of May 1837, that was just before the Affghanistan war, and therefore the time between those two dates was, as Sir Henry Rawlinson well knows, the most economical time for military expenditure we have ever had; on the 1st of May 1857 we had upwards of 20,000 European soldiers stationed in localities which were not in the possession of the Government of India 20 years before, on the 1st of May 1837; therefore, in 1857, we were actually occupying the old territories which we had held 20 years before with a force of about 15,000 European soldiers.

3571. Sir *James Fergusson.*] That was in 1857?—Yes, on the 1st of May 1857.

3572. Just when the mutiny broke out?—Yes.

3573. Would not the moral of that be, that you had an insufficient force there then?—The moral is, that Sir Charles Metcalfe and Lord William Bentinck, and all those men, distinctly said we were insufficiently provided with European troops, but Lord William Bentinck and Sir Charles Metcalfe also, in excellent Minutes which they wrote then, distinctly recommended that whatever the desire might be of statesmen in India, the necessity of being able to pay for troops was the great counteracting power which prevented you from having more troops than you had.

3574. Mr. *Laing.*] I think I understand you to say, that a force of 35 complete regiments, of 1,000 men each, was Lord Dalhousie's estimate of the requisite force for India, is that so?—Yes.

3575. What total European force would that mean; what addition would you have to make to that number for the proper complements of artillery and cavalry?—The European cavalry in India has rarely been thought of much real importance in service, and you will find upon the whole that the conclusions arrived at by most of the statesmen who have considered the subject of the European force are, that four or five regiments or so, something within 3,000 European cavalry, is a force which is amply sufficient for India. It is an exceeding expensive force to employ in the field; it is difficult, also, for the commissariat, as you are aware, to provide the means of moving European cavalry, and, therefore, it has always been held to be very desirable indeed to reduce that branch of the army to the lowest possible footing. Taking 3,000 European cavalry as the maximum strength, we now proceed to the artillery.

3576. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Is this what you would propose?—I am mentioning what most statesmen would recommend.

3577. Three thousand cavalry sounds a very small force; how many regiments do you say?—Say five regiments.

3578. Is that five regiments of 600 sabres each?—Yes, five regiments of 600 sabres each.

3579. Mr. *Laing.*] What would the artillery be?—It depends entirely upon the opinion which has changed with regard to the artillery. You are aware, that an idea has come up that you shall now have no native artillery. In former days, it was thought quite safe to employ native artillery. The consequence was, that you had only 6,500 European artillerymen; so that with the 35,000 infantry, and say 10,000 cavalry and artillery together, you would have about 45,000 European non-commissioned rank and file of all arms; and if anyone would take the trouble to look at the map of India, and to post that European strength in different localities where danger was likely to arise, I think he would find that in most of these stations that force would have been sufficient to have provided the necessary strength for the protection of the country.

3580. What force of European artillery have we at present in India?—We have got now between 10,000 and 12,000; there have been changes of late, of which I have not sufficiently made myself master to be able to speak upon the subject, but I should say we have now 10,000 European artillerymen.

3581. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Do you say that that is excessive, taking your estimate of five regiments of cavalry of 600 sabres, amounting to 3,000 men, and 35 regiments of infantry of 1,000 each, that is 35,000?—It is a matter of opinion; I have formed a different opinion altogether; with regard to the native artillery, I have never entered into that, and I do not know that it is necessary for me to express an opinion upon it. I think they proved themselves, during the mutiny, quite as trustworthy as any other branch of the army; in fact, on several occasions, the artillery, particularly my own regiment, behaved exceedingly well throughout the mutiny; they never once deserted us. I believe the same thing could be effected in future. I believe, myself, that there is no service to which you can turn the natives of India which would be more acceptible to them than the artillery; and I believe, myself, that they are just as staunch to the British power as any other portion of the army. But, apart from this view of mine, if you say

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say that no native artillery shall be employed, then I admit that 10,000 European artillerymen is not very excessive with reference to the number of guns you require for the army of India.

3582. Then we may put the artillery at 10,000?—Yes.

3583. Mr. *Laing.*] Assuming you are not to employ native artillery largely, at any rate you would have about 50,000 British troops, as I understand you, composed in this way: 3,000 cavalry, 10,000 artillery, and 35,000 infantry, making, in round numbers, 50,000?—Yes, 50,000 men is what I have long thought an amply sufficient force for securing the safety of India.

3584. That is irrespective of officers?—Yes.

3585. What is the present effective force?—The present effective force, as near as I can make out, is 61,000; I will correct the exact figures afterwards; but you may take the effective force, for the present, at 61,000; I think it is about 2,000 below the establishment.

3586. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] That is rank and file, exclusive of officers?—Yes, non-commissioned rank and file exclusive of officers. Sir William Mansfield's letter, you will see, mentions it as being 61,257.

3587. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Is that the memorial establishment?—He calls it the fixed establishment. The army estimates of this year give a greater strength than 61,000; I think they give 62,000, but there is not much difference.

3588. Mr. *Laing.*] That was the establishment?—Yes.

3589. *Chairman.*] Sixty-one thousand is the establishment?—Sixty-one thousand two hundred and fifty-seven. Sir William Mansfield says that the effective force is always 6 per cent. below the establishment; that is nearly 4,000 men.

3590. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] You say the establishment this year is 61,000 odd?—Yes.

3591. Mr. *Laing.*] According to that view, we have about 7,000 or 8,000 effectives in India more than you think would be required?—We have effective officers and non-commissioned officers for 12,000 men more than that number of rank and file; with these new transports you will have 10,000 rank and file more than the 50,000.

3592. What is the comparative expense of the officers and non-commissioned officers of a regiment, and of the rank and file?—The pay of the officers of a regiment, of course, varies to some extent with the establishment of rank and file; but with 950 rank and file, you will generally find the pay of the officers more than two-thirds more than the amount of pay of the non-commissioned rank and file. I think that is the proportion; but I will correct those figures in my evidence.

3593. Then is your argument this, that even if you assume 60,000 Europeons to be requisite for the security of India, India is put to an unnecessary expense owing to the regiment being too small, and not being kept up to their full establishments, and a large useless expense being consequently incurred in officers?—I do not wish to convert this into a question of military expenditure, because you yourself decided the question that as long as the expenditure was kept within 12,000,000 *l.*, India could safely pay that sum, but if you remember, my argument was that we are now employing abroad a vastly larger amount of force than the security of the country requires, and than the power of keeping up that force abroad can fairly bear.

3594. The expenditure in India is now very considerably above 12,000,000 *l.*, is it not?—It is considerably above 12,000,000 *l.*

3595. And you think that they are obliged to impose unpopular taxes in India, because the system under which our European army is supplied from this country is unnecessarily expensive?—I thought so at the time, when I was serving under your directions in India. I thought that the arguments which the Viceroy and yourself and Sir Bartle Frere all used, that it was very desirable to avoid imposing unpopular taxes were well founded, and I think so still, and the experience since then has fully proved the correctness of the views you then acted upon, that it was far better to risk a good deal for the sake of having such an army in India as you could pay without the necessity of imposing taxes, which would create discontent, and raise up enmity amongst a class of men by whom we have hitherto been looked up to with great respect.

3596. Do you think that if India were free to raise and organize the greater portion of the European force she required in her own way, that is to say, in the least expensive way, and that most suitable for the country, she could provide herself with an army for an expense not exceeding 12,000,000 *l.* a-year?—I have no hesitation in saying that she could very easily do so.

3597. Looking at the immediate effect of this measure, of native troops serving in the colonies, from an Indian point of view, I suppose it must be a question mainly of keeping up the largest available reserve of European force for India, in case of emergency?—That was one of the views I had in contemplation when I drew up this memorandum. It often appeared to me to be a strange thing that in the various operations we have been carrying on, the force in India should have been drawn upon as it has been. Take, for instance, the expedition to China in 1840; at that very time we were terribly pressed in Affghanistan; at that very time also, if I remember rightly, you had four or five European regiments between the Mauritius and Ceylon, and although we sent one regiment from Ceylon and took it from the Indian establishment, to go to China, yet we could easily have occupied Ceylon and Mauritius with native troops, and sent a much larger force than we did to China, to bring about the peace which was effected at Nankin.

3598. At present, if I understand you rightly, you say that even in time of profound peace, while we keep up these establishments in India and the colonies, we have only 28,000 odd effective rank and file left at home to meet all the emergencies of the service?—I do, plus the strength in the depôts.

3599. And that the strength in the depôts, even now in a time of profound peace, is insufficient to feed the regiments serving abroad as they ought to be fed?—I believe that the strength of the depôts is insufficient. The Commander in Chief has borne testimony to the difficulty he finds in sending men abroad to fill up the regiments serving abroad, as he would desire as an efficient military body.

3600. Then do you consider that if the least strain came upon our resources, if there were a European war in which we were pressed, India might incur



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Maj. Gen. *G. Balfour.*

23 July 1867.

incur a very great danger from an insufficient European force being kept up there?—Yes, you have the experience of the Crimean war, when in spite of the strongest remonstrances of Lord Dalhouse (and no man could write more strongly than he did) the Government withdrew European troops from India, and it was with the utmost degree of difficulty that he could ever get the Government at home to allow European regiments of the Indian army to be raised for the purpose of replacing those regiments which the Imperial Government thought fit to withdraw for the events in Europe. I therefore look upon it that there will on all future occasions be the same liability, but in an increased ratio, because of the small amount of resources you have at home, and the large extent of resources you have in India.

3601. *Chairman.*] Will you hand in the Marquis of Dalhousie's Minute?—I will. (*The same was handed in,* vide *Appendix.*)

3602. Mr. *Laing.*] Do you consider it clear that in case of a European war, especially a protracted European war, we should be exposed to a most imminent risk in India of seeing the European force brought down, not merely below its present strength, but below even that which Lord Dalhousie thought requisite?—I think no one who has looked to past events can doubt that the first consideration of the Government here will be the safety of the heart of the empire.

3603. Under the former system you had a certain reserve, or nucleus of a European force in the local European army, had you not, and in case of any emergency at home that would not have been affected?—At the time of the mutiny you had a local force of upwards of 14,500 men, and that was capable of being increased with the utmost possible ease, without any or much augmentation, at all events, of the cadres, to nearly 20,000.

3604. I want to see how you will meet what has been perhaps the main objection urged to this proposal, namely, that this European regiment in the Mauritius, Ceylon, &c. are really in case of emergency available as a reserve for India, and if now, in time of peace, you supply their places by native troops, and bring them home to England, the probability is that they will be reduced, and then you would lose that reserve which you now have for India in those colonies?—I meet that question in this simple manner, that in the first operations against China in 1840 you only withdrew one regiment from these two islands, that one being from Ceylon, for the purpose of going to China, although we were then engaged in oporations in Affghanistan, which were approaching to a crisis; Sir Henry Rawlinson can speak infinitely better than I can upon that point, still the Government at home, although the war in China was entirely an Imperial question, forced India, or called upon India to supply a European force, which was necessary for the war in that country; after our disasters in Affghanistan, and when the Government of India were hard pressed for European troops, none of the European force was withdrawn from China; on the contrary, I think, if I remember right, one regiment of European infantry and some artillery came on to China to reinforce us, besides a large force of native troops, so that practically, when we have had any real difficulty, I have not found that Ceylon or Mauritius were drawn upon until this great event of the mutiny of 1857, then, no doubt, they were drawn upon largely.

3605. In the Mutiny, what number of regiments did we get in fact to aid India in its emergency from those colonies?—We got one regiment from Mauritius, and one from Ceylon, and I forget the force from the Cape; I am told that it was three regiments from the Cape. At that time we had, I think, seven regiments up the Persian Gulf; that was also an Imperial question; so that in reality the troops that came out from home to go on to China under Lord Elgin, and the troops taken from the Mauritius, the Cape, and Ceylon, were not in excess of the force which we had sent to Persia for an entirely Imperial question.

3606. I want to see how you meet this objection; in point of fact we did get five regiments to aid India from those colonies, but supposing this measure had been in operation, and that instead of those five European regiments you had either had corps locally raised or native corps from India in the colonies, and those five regiments had been sent home or disbanded, and the army reduced to that extent, you could not have got them to aid the army in India?—Neither would you have sent seven regiments from India to the Persian Gulf.

3607. Apart from the expedition to the Persian Gulf, looking to the future, supposing this measure were adopted, and that four or five European regiments now in Mauritius, Ceylon, and the Cape were removed, and Indian native regiments sent there in place of them, do you not think that when the European regiments were sent home to England they might possibly be disbanded, and then you would not have them as a reserve for India if a pressure should come?—I think I can best answer that in this way: look at what happened in the Mutiny. We stood the fight with Delhi with the European force we had in the North-West Provinces. Not a single soldier that came from the Mauritius, from Ceylon, or from the Cape, or from China, was of the slightest avail in the capture of Delhi. Therefore India was self-reliant then, and I think that India must on all occasions be self-reliant. I think the operations are so rapid in India, that you have not time to call in reserves from distant parts; each locality must stand or fall by the means which it has at its command to meet the emergency. I would also submit for your consideration that if the force had not gone to Persia the result would have been very different. Lord Canning, in one of his minutes very shortly before the outbreak, pointed out in strong language the great danger he was incurring in parting with another regiment from India. I think that if the force which we sent from India had been retained, and if the establishment which we ought to have had in India had been complete, you might have had outbreaks from the mutiny of sepoys, but those outbreaks would have been put down with a promptness which would have prevented the army of Bengal from mutinying to the extent they did. I would also remind you of one very important fact with reference to the Persian expedition, namely, that one regiment, the 1st Madras Fusiliers, under their gallant Colonel Neil, were fortunately recalled from the Persian Gulf by a telegram from Bombay. Cruisers were sent out in every direction to stop them in their progress up the Persian Gulf; they were stopped, they came back, and landed at Madras,

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Madras, and it was not many days before they were pressed on to Bengal. I think you will allow that that one regiment alone did most important service in reference to the salvation of the provinces of the lower part of Bengal. Therefore, if we had had the other regiments which were employed away in Persia, I think myself that India would not have gone through the terrible ordeal she did in 1857.

3608. Admitting that India was to a certain extent sacrificed to imperial objects, I am afraid, looking forward to the future, we must look forward to the possibility of the same kind of thing occurring; I want to see what is the best thing to be done as a practical measure for the security of India; I wish to state the objection clearly to you, because I am sure that if anybody can answer the objection you can; I want to have the objection answered; for my own mind I take the objection to be this, that if in time of peace you replace a certain number of European regiments in these Colonies by native troops, unless you can be sure of keeping of those European regiments when they have been sent home to England, you will not have them for a reserve for India as you had in the Mutiny of 1857?—I would submit that it is a matter of opinion. It is a very difficult problem to solve, no doubt; but I submit to this Committee that you have never had in India yet any operation in the field in which, however small the European force has been, you have not been able to overcome your enemy. We have never been defeated in the field yet, that I can recall to my recollection at this moment. You have had great slaughter in actions, but in the long time that we can look back to in our experience of India, you will always find that a few Europeans have done marvellous things in the field, and it really is a very remarkable thing to say, but the fact is that in proportion as you diminish the European force in the field, it appears to me that that small force acquires a vigour and a power which are not to be equalled on the fields of Europe. I do not mention this as my own experience, but it is the experience of the Duke of Wellington and of Lord Ellenborough, both of whom are, of course, men entitled to the highest respect for their knowledge connected with Eastern affairs. The Duke of Wellington himself, in more than one of his despatches, especially when writing from Spain (I remember it well, although I cannot quote the exact words), said that a small body of European soldiers in India seemed to be able to do that which a force much larger in number could not do. And there is no doubt, as all of us who have had experience in the East have seen, that European soldiers in proportion as they are diminished in number, and as the numbers of the natives round about them are increased, seem to acquire on the parade ground and turn out and move with a degree of firmness and solidity, which I have never seen equalled by any European force in England. It is in that light, therefore, that I think myself that, having based your army upon a proper organisation in India, and having made up your mind that you can pay, and having resolved to keep the force in the highest state of efficiency, seeing to it that every man is kept in the best possible state of health and trained to the highest degree of perfection, you ought to leave India to herself, and simply let them be prepared for all eventualities. I am quite convinced if you keep 50,000 European soldiers in India, and prevent the great mass of the population in India from being roused to opposition against you by oppressive or unjust measures, that force together with a native army would be quite ample to maintain India in peace and quietness. But if you tax the country heavily and wrongly, and if you carry on your government badly, I do not believe that any amount of European or native force will ever enable you to hold India.

3609. Looking forward to the permanent safety of India, in a military point of view, which of the two would you prefer, the re-establishment of a permanent local European force, officered by a special body of officers, trained for service in the country, or a system by which native troops should be sent abroad to the Colonies to supplement the Queen's European troops, and you should trust for your supply of European troops in India to having Queen's regiments sent there as at present?—I hold the present system, by which you are controlling the army of India, to be an exceedingly unwise one; you have neither amalgamated the Indian with the imperial army, nor have you made the Indian army a separate and independent body of men. The remarkable difference between the two systems, I think, is shown in this wise, that when the change of the Government took place, in 1858, the Commander in Chief made a demand upon the Secretary of State, through General Peel, who was at the head of the War Department, that the whole Indian army should be given over to him, as the Commander in Chief of Her Majesty's forces. Lord Stanley, on that occasion, after taking the advice of his law officers, declined to accede to that demand, and intimated that the opinion of the law officers was decidedly that the army of India could be maintained in all its integrity as a separate army from the imperial army, and that it required no change. Since then, however, you have gone to a hybrid system; you have taken away the whole European force of India which makes the army of India respectable, and you have made it a portion of the Imperial army, and you have left the native army of India to be a separate army under the Secretary of State for India. I hold that to be a very vicious principle; and I think that now you should either resort to the principle of placing the whole native force, equally with the European force, under the superintending eye of the Commander in Chief, or you should fall back upon the old system of having a separate army for India, that army being composed of different branches of the service, in due proportion, to make the whole army one mass, and to make the army respectable. Of course, as an old Indian officer, I cannot but look back to the remarkable degree of efficiency which the army in India presented, and to the advantage which I think the Government of India possessed in having a vast body of officers, upon whom they could draw to any extent for any duty they required to have performed; those officers being men trained up in the East, who went to India without any desire to return to England until they had retired from the service in India, and having all the *esprit de corps* which a large army gives. When I look back to that army, in spite of the defects which surrounded it, and there were many defects, I think myself that it is greatly to be regretted, for the reasons I have given, that we should ever have parted with such a vast machine as that for the present objection-



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Maj. Gen. *G. Balfour.*

23 July 1867.

able, and I will say dangerous, position in which you have placed the army of India.

3610. At present are you not living upon your capital, as it were, by working up the officers who had been created under the old system, and not training up new ones to replace them?—I believe you are going forward in a very remarkable way, to the great danger of India; you had a large body of officers left after supplying the five or six officers who were considered necessary for each regiment of native troops: there are a large number of these officers ready, and still available, in case of necessity; but I say that, remembering the difficulties of raising up officers and the number of men who fall short of that efficiency which you must always expect in a body of men, I do not myself see how you can ever expect to obtain from the Imperial army either the number of officers, or the number of trained officers, which you must eventually look forward to needing in case of any necessity arising in the East.

3611. Ten or 15 years will pretty well see out the present generation of old Indian officers, will it not?—I think at present you have very few subalterns of the old Indian army left.

3612. Then the real trial of the present system will come when your old school of officers is exhausted?—Yes; and in a time of war or a time of emergency it is utterly impossible, labour as you will, to provide them on a sudden; all who have had occasion to be engaged during emergencies in India know perfectly well that it is almost impossible on a sudden emergency to raise up those means which you require in the field; and I look upon it in another point of view also; I do not think myself, from all I have read and from all I have seen, that there is much difference between one native of the East and another; some may have more peculiar advantages, but the difference is not so great as to prevent you from seeing that it is the European officers who are the life and soul of Asiatic troops, and that all the organisation in the world, the irregular organisations, or what ever you choose to call them, are nothing in comparison with the European leadership; it is the white faces leading on the black men that makes an efficient soldiery, and in proportion as those officers are trained and attentive to their duties, and in proportion as they attend to their men, so will the efficiency of the native soldiers be in the field.

3613. When the black regiments have gone abroad for service in the field, we have been obliged to supplement the number of white officers very largely, I think?—Yes, on every occasion; when the native troops went to China the first thing that was done was to add a large number of officers, who were selected for their great experience and great knowledge, to those regiments that went to Pekin.

3614. Especially in the case of the native regiments going abroad on foreign service, would it not be quite essential that they should have officers with them who were well known to the men, and well acquainted with their feelings and prejudices?—Yes: the difference between a regiment in which the men know the officers and the officers the men, and a regiment in which the contrary is the case, is something enormous. I was an Adjutant of native artillery for nearly 10 years; although I was frequently absent from my duties, I did not resign my adjutancy until I was appointed consul at Shanghai; during that time I had frequent opportunities of knowing the feelings and wishes of the native soldiers; and I have had great experience also among other natives, and I have been able to contrast the treatment of soldiers by their officers in some regiments with those in others, and I have observed that there is a marvellous difference between the promptness and efficiency in every way of a regiment where the men were well looked after by their officers, especially where they had officers of some degree of standing and military knowledge, and a regiment which was not in that condition; the difference is something which I cannot possibly describe.

3615. Therefore you would think it a source of very considerable danger if you were sending native troops largely out of India to garrison distant Colonies, unless you were quite sure of having a good supply of regimental officers with them who were both thoroughly well acquainted with India and its habits, and had been connected with the regiment for a considerable time?—Yes; you have got a remarkable illustration of that in these papers which have been laid before the Committee. This paper shows the cost of employing two Sikh regiments in China, which illustrates the argument in a strong manner; it must have been sent in, I think, whilst Colonel Norman was Military Secretary in Calcutta. It was sent in by the officer who succeeded me in the Military Finance Department. It shows the establishment and the cost of the two regiments to be employed in China. You will see that it is proposed that there should be 26 officers employed with 12,000 sepoys.

3616. Colonel *North.*] Those would be European officers?—Yes, we are now speaking entirely of European officers; that is what was conceived to be the proportion in Calcutta, because, from the appearance of the document, I can have no doubt that the instructions were issued to the Military Finance Department, giving them the establishment in order for that department simply to prepare the cost.

3617. Mr. *Laing.*] Then, do I correctly gather the substance of your opinion to be that you see great danger for the future of India as long as you have not got a large permanent local European force, and a machinery for training up a large body of European officers specially for Indian service?—I do, decidedly.

3618. As long as you continue to follow the present system of trusting for your European force to the ordinary Queen's army, do you not think that there is considerable force in the objection, that simply to substitute for the European regiments in the China native regiments, and to bring the European regiments home and probably disband them, would be rather to add to the dangers of India than to diminish them?—With regard to the last part of the question, I might reply to it in this wise, that I think so far from disbanding the regiments you bring home, you should take every means you can to increase the available forces at home; for instance, only about two years ago you reduced no less than two companies from every regiment of infantry of the Line, but so far from reducing these two companies, I think it would have been politic at that time to have kept up those two companies. I think also that it would be politic if you can possibly bring home the cadres of regiments, to do so, to any extent you can, and if you do bring them home, it would be advisable to maintain them

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them in all their integrity, for the purpose of training young recruits in the event of any sudden emergency requiring them. Instead of having, as at the present moment, only 42 regiments in the United Kingdom, or 34 as you had four years ago, I think myself that you should never be content until you have at least 90, or I will say 80 regiments at home, and the other regiments sent abroad kept up to the full extent at which they can be maintained, the depôt at home acting as a sort of nucleus for feeding the regiments abroad; then you would have a force for meeting eventualities. You should have a large number of cadre regiments at home; I would not care how much you reduced those cadre regiments. I think the rank and file should be reduced to the smallest number, so long as you keep up the officers and non-commissioned officers, trained in the highest degree of perfection. Therefore what you suggest in your question, namely, disbanding the regiments on their return home, does not necessarily follow, from what I submit for your consideration, namely, that it is advisable to diminish the numbers abroad, but to have large resources at home.

3619. You would rather draw in as many forces as possible from the outlying colonies, in order to keep up a large reserve at home?—Yes, I maintain that from a central position you can more readily supply the means of reinforcing the distant parts of the empire, than you can by keeping regiments located in the colonies for those eventualities.

3620. Colonel *North.*] Are you not aware that within the last few months, when a native force was organised to garrison the Straits Settlements, his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge was directed to reduce man for man of our troops for those who were sent there?—Of course the House of Commons, and the Secretary of State, will do anything they please, but I think it is much to be regretted that there is not a line drawn between the duties of the different departments. When Mr. Laing was the Finance Minister of India, he was quite content to maintain the efficiency of the army in the highest possible state, provided the expense was kept within a certain limit. That is one point in which I have always admired the wisdom of Mr. Laing with reference to his financial arrangements. He contented himself with knowing to what extent the troops would cost money, leaving it to the departments to maintain the force in its highest state of efficiency. I think, myself, that most of those orders are issued by the department as a financial measure, but I think that they enter into details as to the mode of carrying out the system, which might be left to the departments which are more experienced in the details. And it is in this light that I have looked upon the objections raised in the House of Commons, and I suppose that the ministers only speak that which they think the House of Commons will wish. I have always considered that it would be far better to say you shall only spend so much for your military expenditure, leaving that expenditure to be appropriated in the way most suitable to the army, and most likely to make it efficient. I am sure if you fixed upon a sum of money as the sum to be expended from the military force of the empire, you could bring down the army to a strength which would keep the expenditure within the limit.

3621. Mr. *Laing.*] If you were to bring home the 10,000 men, or any part of the 10,000 men, who you think could be spared from India, that would at once cause an increase in the military estimates at home, would it not; you must either disband your force to that extent, or have an increase in the army estimates at home?—My impression is strong, that you might bring the military expenditure at home, even if you brought home and maintained those 10,000 men, within the present sum which is allowed for the army, and that, therefore, if this sum can be spared by the Treasury, you might allow the departments concerned to maintain the force in that form which would be likely to be efficient for military purposes, and yet capable of being expended in case of necessity.

3622. But until we get that reform in military finance at home, if you bring home the troops from India you cast the whole cost of them on the English Army Estimates; and if you bring home the troops from the English Colonies, you lose the Colonial contributions, so that in either case you tend to increase the Army Estimates, and if the House of Commons, or the Treasury, are unwilling to increase the estimates, the only alternative is to reduce the force?—I would observe, that the contribution from the Colonies is a matter of no importance. I do not think it has ever been 300,000*l.* in any one year.

3623. It probably does not cover the increased expense of keeping the troops in the Colonies, instead of keeping them at home?—I believe that that very contribution is the cause of unnecessary expense being incurred in the employment of European troops abroad.

3624. If Indian troops were sent to replace European regiments in the Colonies, the expense, I presume, must be borne by England and the Colony jointly?—That is, as you know, a mere matter of account, and can be easily arranged. At present the expense of the force in Labuan is very easily settled; the Government of England pays 40*l.* per man for the native troops employed at Labuan; it is entered in the Army Estimates regularly every year, and it is a matter of adjustment between the Secretary of State for India and the Treasury at Home. There is no difficulty in settling a matter of that kind; you have only to agree upon what the cost shall be, and then it becomes a mere matter of account and adjustment.

3625. Colonel *North.*] If the native troops were sent, say, to the Mauritius, to the Cape, and to Ceylon, and if the result was to be what has already taken place in other cases, that the English troops were to be reduced man for man for the natives sent out there, would that meet with your approval?—No; on the contrary. I think before you came in I had referred to that. I would remind the Committee that I did not introduce this as a finance question, but as one involving the interests of the empire, considering that the distribution of the troops at the present moment was so much inferior to what it was in 1854, that we have now double the force abroad which we had in 1854. It was as a purely military question of reserves that I advocated the bringing home of as many regiments as you could.

3626. Captain *Hayter.*] Supposing these Indian troops were employed in garrisons abroad, would it be possible for the Supreme Government of India so to define their duties that there should be no difficulties arising afterwards; I ask the question with reference to a case in which some



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