

Appendix, No. 4.

PAPERS handed in by Colonel *Gambier*.

App. No. 4.

ROYAL ARTILLERY.

RETURN of the Age at which each of the SIX SENIOR OFFICERS in each Rank, from Colonel downwards, in 1826, 1836, 1846, 1856, and 1866, entered the ROYAL MILITARY ACADEMY, WOOLWICH; the Time they remained at the Academy; and the Time between passing their Examination and being Gazetted to the ROYAL ARTILLERY.

YEAR.	RANK.	Age on entering the Academy.	Time at the Academy.	Time between passing Examination and being Gazetted to the Royal Artillery.	REMARKS.
		<i>Yrs. Mo.</i>	<i>Yrs. Mo.</i>	<i>Yrs. Mo.</i>	
1826	Colonels - - -	15 0	2 0	Cannot be ascertained.	This information has been obtained from the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, and the statement cannot be completed from the records in the office of the Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Artillery.
		13 10	2 10		
		15 7	5 9		
		14 11	5 10		
		Cannot be given	4 1		
	Lieutenant Colonels -	12 4	9 4		
		14 2	1 11		
		16 0	2 0		
		Never in Royal Military Academy			
		Never in Royal Military Academy			
	Captains - - -	15 6	2 2		
		Never in Royal Military Academy			
		15 2	1 0		
		14 0	1 9		
		15 8	1 4		
	Second Captains -	15 8	1 2		
		14 1	2 6		
		15 8	1 6		
		14 2	2 4		
		14 1	2 2		
	Lieutenants - - -	14 0	2 8		
		14 1	2 7		
		15 3	1 11		
		14 8	2 1		
		14 8	2 8		
	Second Lieutenants -	14 2	1 10		
		14 4	2 7		
		14 10	2 8		
		15 0	2 5		
		15 3	2 2		
		14 8	3 2		
		14 5	4 6		
		14 5	5 7		
		14 0	4 3		
		16 0	4 10		
		15 1	6 6		

AGE at which each of the Six Senior Officers entered the Royal Military Academy, &c.—*contd.*

App. No. 4.

YEAR.	RANK.	Age on entering the Academy.	Time at the Academy.	Time between passing Examination and being Gazetted to the Royal Artillery.	REMARKS.
	ROYAL ARTILLERY.	<i>Yrs. Mo.</i>	<i>Yrs. Mo.</i>	<i>Yrs. Mo.</i>	
1836	Colonels - - -	Never in Royal Military Academy	12 4	9 4	This information has been obtained from the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, and the statement cannot be completed from the records in the office of the Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Artillery.
		15 5	5 4		
		14 9	5 5		
		14 6	5 8		
		15 1	4 8		
	Lieutenant Colonels - -	Never in Royal Military Academy	15 10	1 7	
		Never in Royal Military Academy	14 4	1 7	
		Never in Royal Military Academy	14 3	1 11½	
			14 9	3 0	
			14 6	2 8	
	Captains - - -		14 5	1 10	
			14 4	2 2	
			14 9	1 5	
			15 0	3 0	
			14 8	1 11	
	Second Captains - -		14 9	2 4	
			14 1	1 8	
			14 1	3 0	
			14 0	2 1	
			14 4	2 2	
	Lieutenants - - -		15 3	6 0	
			15 7	3 8	
			15 2	4 1	
			15 3	6 10	
			15 6	2 11	
	Second Lieutenants - -		15 5	3 8	
			14 3	4 9	
			14 4	4 10	
			14 5	2 7	
			14 2	3 7	
1846	Colonels - - -		14 2	3 7	
			14 3	3 4	
			14 3	1 7	
		Never in Royal Military Academy	14 0	1 11	
		Never in Royal Military Academy	14 0	1 8	
	Lieutenant Colonels - -	Never in Royal Military Academy	14 2	2 7	
		Never in Royal Military Academy	14 10	1 10	
			14 6	2 8	
			14 9	1 5	
			15 0	3 0	
	Captains - - -		14 1	3 0	
			14 0	2 1	
			14 4	2 2	
			14 4	2 3	
			14 10	2 7	
	Second Captains - -		14 2	1 10	
			15 0	6 7	
			15 7	5 6	
			14 4	6 7	
			15 9	5 3	
	Lieutenants - - -		14 4	6 3	
			14 9	6 4	
			14 0	3 10	
			14 2	2 10	
			14 0	3 4	
	Second Lieutenants - -		16 1	4 1	
			14 2	4 4	
			14 11	3 10	
			15 3	2 10	
			15 5	2 10	
	Lieutenants - - -		15 1	2 10	
			15 5	3 4	
			16 0	2 10	
			15 1	2 4	
			15 1	2 4	

App. No. 4.

AGE at which each of the Six Senior Officers entered the Royal Military Academy, &c.—*contd.*

YEAR.	RANK.	Age on entering the Academy.	Time at the Academy.	Time between passing Examination and being Gazetted to the Royal Artillery.	REMARKS.
1856 -	ROYAL ARTILLERY.		<i>Yrs. Mo.</i>	<i>Yrs. Mo.</i>	<i>Yrs. Mo.</i>
	Colonels - - -	14 3	0 11	Cannot be ascertained.	This information has been obtained from the Royal Military Academy at Wool- wich, and the statement cannot be completed from the records in the office of the Deputy Adjutant Ge- neral, Royal Artillery.
		14 9	1 2		
		15 6	2 9		
		14 1	1 11		
		14 10	2 10		
		14 4	2 2		
	Lieutenant Colonels -	14 3	6 6	3 0 3 4 2 7	
		14 3	6 5		
		14 0	8 3		
		14 4	6 0		
		15 0	6 7		
		14 4	6 3		
	Captains - - -	14 3	2 10	- nil.	
		16 0	3 7	- nil.	
		14 1	4 4	- nil.	
		14 2	4 1	- nil.	
		14 2	3 10	- nil.	
		14 3	4 4	- nil.	
	Second Captains - -	17 0	2 10	- nil.	
		15 2	3 4	- nil.	
		15 5	2 10	- nil.	
		15 10	3 4	- nil.	
		15 0	2 10	- nil.	
		15 0	2 10	- nil.	
	Lieutenants - - -	15 3	2 11	- nil.	
		14 0	2 3	- nil.	
		15 0	2 8	- nil.	
		14 2	2 7	- nil.	
		15 8	3 7	- nil.	
		15 5	3 7	- nil.	
Colonels - - -	14 5	3 1	Six weeks.		
	14 10	3 2	- nil.		
	14 0	1 9	- nil.		
	14 5	3 10	- nil.		
	14 11	2 10	- nil.		
	14 0	3 7	- nil.		
Lieutenant Colonels -	14 1	4 4	- nil.		
	14 2	3 10	- nil.		
	14 10	4 1	- nil.		
	14 2	4 4	- nil.		
	14 2	4 4	- nil.		
	14 1	4 4	- nil.		
Captains - - -	15 1	2 10	- nil.		
	15 5	3 4	- nil.		
	16 0	2 10	- nil.		
	15 4	3 4	- nil.		
	15 6	2 10	- nil.		
	15 1	2 10	- nil.		
Second Captains - -	14 11	2 10	- nil.		
	14 3	3 5	- nil.		
	14 1	3 5	- nil.		
	14 1	2 10	- nil.		
	14 1	3 4	- nil.		
	14 6	3 4	- nil.		
Lieutenants - - -	The officers of this rank were never in the Academy.				

G. Gambier, Deputy Adjutant General.

ROYAL ENGINEERS.

RETURN of the Age at which each of the SIX SENIOR OFFICERS in each Rank, from Colonel downwards, in 1826, 1836, 1846, 1856, and 1866, entered the ROYAL MILITARY ACADEMY, WOOLWICH; the Time they remained at the Academy; and the Time between passing their Examination and being Gazetted to the ROYAL ENGINEERS.

YEAR.	RANK.	Age on entering the Academy.		Period at the Academy.		Time between passing Examination and being Gazetted.		REMARKS.
1826 ¹ -	Colonels - - -	1	16	8	3	5	- nil.	No record at the Royal Military Academy.
		2	14	3	4	7	0 2	
		3	14	4	4	4	1 8	
		4	14	5	3	3	- nil.	
		5	-	-	-	-	-	
		6	15	0	2	1	- nil.	
	Lieutenant Colonels	1	16	0	1	3	- nil.	
		2	15	0	1	5	- nil.	
		3	14	5	2	1	- nil.	
		4	14	3	1	10	- nil.	
		5	14	0	1	5	- nil.	
		6	14	3	1	7	- nil.	
	Captains - - -	1	-	-	-	-	-	No record at the Royal Military Academy.
		2	14	0	2	3	0 5	
		3	14	11	1	10	0 6	
		4	-	-	-	-	-	
		5	-	-	-	-	-	
		6	-	-	-	-	-	
	Lieutenants - -	1	14	11	3	7	Doubtful.	
		2	14	11	4	2	- ditto.	
		3	14	5	4	8	0 7	
		4	15	2	3	1	0 7	
		5	15	0	3	7	0 7	
		6	14	4	4	1	0 8	
Colonels - - -	1	16	8	3	5	- nil.		
	2	14	3	4	7	0 2		
	3	14	4	4	4	1 8		
	4	14	5	3	3	- nil.		
	5	14	6	3	11	- nil.		
	6	14	1	1	0	- nil.		
Lieutenant Colonels-	1	16	0	1	3	- nil.		
	2	15	0	1	5	- nil.		
	3	14	5	2	1	- nil.		
	4	14	3	1	10	- nil.		
	5	14	0	1	5	- nil.		
	6	15	1	1	10	- nil.		
Captains - - -	1	14	0	1	7	0 8		
	2	16	0	2	3	0 10		
	3	15	6	2	11	0 6		
	4	14	0	1	11	0 8		
	5	14	0	1	10	0 7		
	6	14	0	2	2	0 6		
Lieutenants - -	1	14	3	2	11	0 8		
	2	15	9	2	9	Doubtful.		
	3	14	8	3	8	0 9		
	4	14	2	4	6	0 9		
	5	14	5	4	6	0 9		
	6	15	6	2	10	0 9		

App. No. 4.

AGE at which each of the Six Senior Officers entered the Royal Military Academy, &c.—*cont.*

YEAR.	RANK.	Age on entering the Academy.		Period at the Academy.	Time between passing Examination and being Gazetted.	REMARKS.
1846 -	ROYAL ENGINEERS.		<i>Yrs. Mo.</i>	<i>Yrs. Mo.</i>	<i>Yrs. Mo.</i>	
	Colonels - -	1	14 3	1 7	- nil.	
		2	15 1	1 10	- nil.	
		3	14 0	2 11	0 6	
		4	14 1	1 7	Doubtful.	
		5	- - -	- - -	- - -	No record at Royal Military Academy.
		6	15 4	1 11	- nil.	
	Lieutenant Colonels	1	- - -	- - -	- - -	No record at Royal Military Academy.
		2	14 3	2 7	1 8	
		3	14 0	1 4	0 7	
		4	15 6	1 6	0 9	
		5	- - -	- - -	- - -	No record at Royal Military Academy.
		6	14 3	2 0	1 1	
	Captains - -	1	14 10	2 7	0 7	
		2	15 11	2 3	Doubtful.	
		3	14 8	2 11	0 8	
		4	14 1	3 1	Doubtful.	
		5	14 6	2 11	0 6	
		6	14 11	1 9	0 7	
	Lieutenants - -	1	15 9	3 1	0 7	
		2	14 2	3 7	0 6	
		3	14 0	2 10	0 7	
		4	14 0	2 4	0 7	
		5	15 0	3 4	0 6	
		6	15 11	3 4	0 6	
1856 -	Colonels - -	1	14 11	2 10	0 5	
		2	14 7	2 7	0 8	
		3	14 6	2 8	0 8	
		4	14 4	2 5	0 6	
		5	14 10	2 7	0 7	
		6	15 11	2 3	-	
	Lieutenant Colonels	1	15 6	2 10	0 9	
		2	15 7	3 7	0 5	
		3	14 4	4 2	1 5	
		4	15 0	1 3	2 8	
		5	15 6	5 3	- nil.	
		6	14 8	5 7	0 4	
	Captains - -	1	14 0	2 8	0 9	
		2	15 10	2 4	0 8	
		3	15 1	2 4	0 9	
		4	15 9	2 10	0 8	
		5	14 0	4 4	0 9	
		6	15 9	3 1	0 7	
	Lieutenants - -	1	15 11	2 2	0 4	
		2	15 1	2 7	0 5	
		3	15 4	2 7	0 5	
		4	15 3	2 2	0 4	
		5	15 10	3 2	0 4	
		6	15 11	2 2	0 4	
1866 -	Colonels - -	1	14 3	5 11	3 9	
		2	14 9	5 10	2 3	
		3	14 1	6 0	3 1	
		4	14 8	6 2	1 9	
		5	14 8	5 10	1 4	
		6	15 5	5 8	1 6	
	Lieutenant Colonels	1	14 0	2 8	0 9	
		2	15 1	2 4	0 9	
		3	15 9	2 10	0 8	
		4	14 0	4 4	0 9	
		5	15 0	3 4	0 6	
		6	14 1	3 1	0 7	
	Captains - -	1	15 1	3 0	0 10	
		2	16 0	2 10	- nil.	
		3	16 2	3 11	- nil.	
		4	16 4	2 4	- nil.	
		5	15 11	2 10	- nil.	
		6	16 4	2 4	0 7	
	Lieutenants - -	1	15 7	2 2	0 1	
		2	15 7	2 2	0 1	
		3	14 1	2 1	0 2	
		4	15 0	2 6	0 1	
		5	18 9	0 8	0 1	Appointed by a direct nomination to the practical class.
		6	17 10	0 8	0 2	

Horse Guards, June 1867.

J. Broune, Colonel, A. A. G., R. E.

Appendix, No. 5.

PAPER delivered in by Brigadier General *Lefroy*, 17 June 1867.

MEMORANDUM on the probable position of the Officers of the Old ROYAL ARTILLERY in respect to Length of Service, in the Years 1875, 1880, and 1885, and the Number of Retirements that will be necessary if no Colonel is continued on the Effective List beyond 40 Years' Service. The Retirements to be such that no Officer shall be a Captain beyond 27 Years' Service, or a Lieutenant Colonel beyond 34 Years' Service.

App. No. 5.

THERE are now (1867) 25 officers of more than 40 years' service, and 34 others who, if they all live, will complete 40 years' service in or before 1875. Of the former, it is probable that 11 will be then surviving; and of the latter, 26. There will, therefore, be 37 officers over 40 years' service, 26 over 34 years' service, and of less than 40 years; and there will be 120 officers over 27 years, and less than 35 years. In all, 63 officers above the limit assigned for a lieutenant colonel, and 183 above the limit assigned for a captain. Now there are on the establishment 66 officers above the rank of Lieutenant Colonels, consequently the limit of service assumed for that rank will not be reached in 1875, but there are not 183 officers on the establishment above the rank of captain. There are only 142 consequently to bring the junior of the above 183 into the rank of lieutenant colonel, 41 vacancies must be made by retirement, or at the rate of six a year.

Life Decrements.	
2.2	in 1867.
2.3	" 1868.
1.9	" 1869.
1.8	" 1870.
1.6	" 1871.
1.6	" 1872.
1.2	" 1873.
1.2	" 1874.

13.8
25.
11.2

There will be 46 officers who will complete 40 years' service in or before 1880, of whom the two ranks of commandant and general officer absorb 32, leaving 14 to be provided for by retirement; 63 who will complete 34 years, 143 who will complete 27 years; in each case making the full deduction for deaths. In all, therefore, 109 who will have passed the limit assumed for service in the rank of lieutenant colonel, of whom 43 must make vacancies by retirement in order that the junior may reach the rank of colonel, and 252 who will have exceeded the service assumed for the rank of captain, of whom 110 must make vacancies by retirement; but we have already assumed 41 retirements before 1875, leaving 69 + 43, or 22 a year to be made to retire between 1875 and 1880.

Again, there will be 72 surviving officers who will complete 40 years' service in or before 1885, of whom 32 are provided for as before, that is to say, they will fill the ranks of colonel commandant and general officers on the establishment, and 14 are assumed to have already retired, leaving 26 to retire; 104 who will complete 34 years, and 239 who will complete 27 years. In all, 176 who will have passed the limit assumed for service in the rank of lieutenant colonel, of whom 110 must make vacancies by retirement, if the junior is to reach the rank of colonel at 34 years' service. We have already assumed 43 of these retirements before 1880, leaving 67 to be made from that date to 1885, or 13 a year.

With regard to the captains, there will be 415 officers beyond the limit of service assigned for that rank, of whom 273 must retire to bring the junior within the list of lieutenant colonels. We have already assumed 153 of these retirements, leaving 119 to be made between 1880 and 1885; 119 in five years is at the rate of 24 a year.

We can arrive at the expense of this amount of retirement pretty nearly, but it is necessary to assume some scale of retirement, and it must be one that will be reasonably likely to tempt officers to retire in sufficient numbers unless a limit is fixed for service in each rank, and retirement made compulsory, which I do not advocate for any rank except that of colonel. Such a scale I submit, and for the purpose of this calculation suppose it to be the one in force.

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ESTIMATED

App. No. 5.

ESTIMATED Expense of the Retirements necessary to realize the foregoing results, dividing them equally over all the Lengths of Service.

	1875.		1880.		1885.	
	No.	£.	No.	£.	No.	£.
To retire at 40 years' total service, unless removed by promotion to the rank of Major General.	-	-	14	8,400	14 26	8,400 15,600
Required to retire voluntarily in order that the rank of Colonel may be reached by officers of 34 years' service.	--	--	43	10,000	43 67	10,000 14,840
Required to retire voluntarily in order that the rank of Lieutenant Colonel may be reached by officers of 27 years' service.	41	7,678	41 12	7,678 2,247	41 12 70	7,678 2,247 15,356
TOTAL - - -	41	7,678	110	28,325	273	74,121

To the foregoing sums are to be added the amount now appropriated to the half pay and full-pay retirements; and from the total is to be deducted the probable falling in of pensions by the deaths of retired officers, as follows:—

	1875.	1880.	1885.
	£.	£.	£.
Foregoing new retirements - - - - -	7,678	28,325	74,121
Present full pay retirements - - - - -	32,000	32,000	32,000
Estimated amount of half-pay list - - - - -	9,000	9,000	9,000
	48,678	69,325	115,121
To be deducted, —			
By falling in of retirements on 600 <i>l.</i> a year at one annually.	4,800	7,800	10,800
By falling in of retirements on smaller pensions, which average 270 <i>l.</i>	7,039	10,192	13,000
By falling in of half pay - - - - -	4,000	6,000	8,000
Prospective annual charge to secure that no officer of the Royal Artillery shall serve as captain beyond the age of 48, or Lieutenant Colonel beyond the age of 55, or Colonel beyond the age of 60.	32,839	45,333	83,321

Of the foregoing charge, a proportion is strictly to be considered a part of the expense of the Indian Establishment, and should either be directly contributed by the Indian Revenue, or covered by the Capitation Grant. There are about 83 batteries of artillery maintained for service in India, and 122 for service elsewhere; the officers added to the Royal Artillery since the amalgamation, to meet this liability, will begin to complete 15 years' service in 1875, and thenceforward all retirements should be divided *pro rata*; that is to say, officers commissioned before November 1860, remain chargeable to the Imperial Revenue at whatever period they may retire; officers commissioned in and after November 1860 are chargeable on retirement in the proportion of 60 per cent. to the Imperial Revenue, and 40 per cent. to the Indian Revenue.

PROPOSED

PROPOSED SCALE of RETIREMENT based on Length of Service, irrespective of Rank.

Under 15 years, when compelled to retire by Wounds, Sickness or Disability, contracted in the Service, £. 100.

This Sum is almost exactly intermediate between the Half Pay of a Captain and a Lieutenant.

SERVICE.	Estimated Age.	Proposed Pension on Retirement.	Approximate Capitalized Value.	REMARKS.
Under—		£.	£.	
15	-	100	-	
15	35	100	1,706	
16	36	110	1,873	
17	37	120	2,006	
18	38	130	2,145	Present Provision.
19	39	140	2,281	No retirement by right unless from effect of disability, then half pay :—
20	40	150	2,420	£.
21	41	160	2,537	Lieutenants - - - - - 76
22	42	170	2,567	Captains - - - - - 134
23	43	185	2,847	Lieutenant Colonels on Major's pay - - 184
24	44	200	3,028	On Lieutenant Colonel's pay - - - 206
25	45	220	3,273	
26	46	240	3,504	Half pay by right. Full pay under certain circumstances up to a fixed annual charge of £. 32,000 :—
27	47	265	3,794	£.
28	48	290	4,066	If Lieutenant Colonels - - - - - 330
29	49	320	4,391	If Brevet Colonels - - - - - 400
30	50	350	4,697	If Colonels of 30 years' service - - 600
31	51	380	4,984	Beyond that charge, half pay.
32	52	410	5,254	
33	53	440	5,506	
34	54	470	5,742	It is proposed that officers who have attained the rank of full Colonel with 30 years' service, and elect to remain on the effective list and to succeed to a battalion, retire on 500 l. a year whatever their service. If they renounce all claim to succeed to a battalion, the retirements to be as here stated.
35	55	500	5,961	
36	56	520	6,050	
37	57	540	6,128	
38	58	560	6,197	
39	59	580	6,255	
40	60	600	6,300	

TABLE I.—OFFICERS of the ROYAL ARTILLERY who will complete the Term of SERVICE stated in the First Column in each successive financial Year, supposing them not to Die or Retire in the Interval.

The Officers inserted as Completing 15 Years' Service in 1867 were those Commissioned between 1 April 1852 and 31 March 1853, and so on.

Years' Service.	1867.	1868.	1869.	1870.	1871.	1872.	1873.	1874.	1875.	1876.	1877.	1878.	1879.	1880.	1881.	1882.	1883.	1884.	1885.	1886.	1887.	1888.	1889.	1890.	1891.	1892.	1893.	Years' Service.	
Commissioned.	1852.	1853.	1854.	1855.	1856.	1857.	1858.	1859.	1860.	1861.	1862.	1863.	1864.	1865.	1866.														
	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	
	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	
	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	
	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18	
	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	
	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	-	-	-	-	-	-	20		
	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	-	-	-	-	-	21		
	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	-	-	-	-	-	22	
	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	-	-	-	-	23	
	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	-	-	-	24	
	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	-	-	25	
	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	-	26	
	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	27	
	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	28
	11	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	29
	5	11	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	30
	7	5	11	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	31
	5	7	5	7	11	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	32
	6	5	7	7	5	11	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	33
	3	6	5	5	7	5	11	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72
7	3	6	6	5	7	5	11	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	35
4	7	3	6	5	7	5	11	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	36
4	4	4	7	3	6	5	7	5	11	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	37
4	4	4	4	7	3	6	5	7	5	11	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	38
6	4	4	4	4	7	3	6	5	7	5	11	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	39
-	-	6	4	4	4	7	3	6	5	7	5	11	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	40
Above 40	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Above 40	

TABLE II.—OFFICERS of the Old ROYAL ARTILLERY who may be expected to be Living in each Successive Year, arranged according to Length of Service and taken to the nearest Whole Number.

Years' Service.	1867.	1868.	1869.	1870.	1871.	1872.	1873.	1874.	1875.	1876.	1877.	1878.	1879.	1880.	1881.	1882.	1883.	1884.	1885.
1867	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51				
15	25	15	53	67	45	52	19	53	67	61	42	46	86	42	45				
16	21	25	15	53	67	45	51	19	52	67	61	41	45	85	42	45			
17	28	21	25	15	52	66	45	51	19	52	66	60	41	45	84	41	44		
18	21	28	21	24	14	52	65	44	51	19	51	66	60	40	44	84	41	44	
19	14	21	28	21	24	14	51	65	44	50	18	51	65	59	40	44	83	41	44
20	34	14	21	27	20	24	14	51	64	43	50	18	51	64	59	40	44	82	40
21	22	34	14	20	27	20	24	14	50	64	43	49	18	50	64	58	39	43	81
22	12	22	33	14	20	27	20	23	14	50	63	42	49	18	50	63	57	39	43
23	21	12	22	33	13	20	27	20	23	14	49	62	42	48	18	49	63	57	39
24	13	21	12	21	33	13	20	26	20	23	14	49	62	41	48	18	49	62	56
25	13	13	21	12	21	33	13	20	26	20	23	13	48	61	41	47	17	48	61
26	15	13	13	20	12	21	32	13	19	25	19	23	13	48	60	41	47	17	48
27	2	15	13	13	20	11	21	32	13	19	25	19	22	13	47	60	40	46	17
28	3	2	15	13	12	20	11	21	32	12	19	25	19	22	13	47	59	40	46
29	11	3	2	15	12	12	20	11	21	31	12	18	25	19	22	13	46	58	39
30	5	11	3	2	14	12	12	19	11	21	31	12	18	24	18	22	13	46	58
31	7	5	11	3	2	14	12	12	19	11	20	30	12	18	24	18	21	13	45
32	5	7	5	11	3	2	14	12	12	19	11	20	30	12	18	24	17	21	13
33	6	5	7	5	11	3	2	14	12	12	19	11	20	20	12	18	23	17	21
34	3	6	5	6	5	11	3	2	13	12	12	18	10	19	29	11	17	23	17
35	7	3	6	5	6	5	10	2	1	13	11	11	18	10	19	28	11	17	23
36	4	7	3	6	5	6	5	10	2	1	13	11	11	18	10	19	28	11	17
37	4	4	7	3	6	5	6	4	10	2	1	13	11	11	17	10	18	28	11
38	4	4	4	7	3	5	4	6	4	10	2	1	13	11	10	17	10	18	27
39	6	4	4	4	7	3	5	4	5	4	10	2	1	12	10	10	17	9	17
40	—	6	4	4	4	6	3	5	4	5	4	10	2	1	12	10	10	16	9
41 to 72	25	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	{ 11 } { 26 }	—	—	—	—	{ 6 } { 40 }	—	—	—	—	72

The figures in the top line show the number of officers serving in 1867, the survivors of whom will complete 15 years service in each successive year following.

The figures in the last line show the officers who will have completed 40 years service in the years 1875, 1880, and 1885, making proper reduction for deaths in the intervals.

App. No. 5.

The General CONCLUSIONS of this Paper may be Summarised as follows:

1875 :									
Remanets of those now over 40 years	-	-	-	-	-	-	11		
Will complete 40 years by that time	-	-	-	-	-	-	26		
Survivors of those now under that service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	37	
Will be over 34 years, under 40 years	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26	
Will be over 27 years, under 34 years	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	63
									120
There are above the rank of first Captain	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	183
									142
Therefore must retire, in order that no first Captain may have more than 27 years' service (all of them above the junior officer of 1848)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	41 A.
1880 :									
Remanets	-	-	-	-	-	-	6		
Will complete 40 years before 1880	-	-	-	-	-	-	40		
Will be over 34 years, under 40 years	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	46	46
								63	— 32
									14 D.
Total over 34 years' service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	109
Will be over 27 years, under 34 years	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	143
									— 66
Total over 27 years' service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	252
There are, above first Captains	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	142
									43 E.
Therefore must retire, in all	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	110
Supposed to have retired above	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	41 A.
Leaving to retire, 1875-1880	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	69 B.

Of whom 14 D. must be above the junior officer of 1849, in order that no Colonel may be over 40 years' service; 43 E. must be above the junior officer of 1846, in order that no Lieutenant Colonel may have more than 34 years' service; and the whole 110 above the junior officer of 1853, in order that no Captain may have more than 27 years' service.

1885 :									
Remanets	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Will complete 40 years' service	-	-	-	-	-	-	72		
Will be over 34 years, under 40 years	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	72	72
								104	— 32
									40
									— 14 D.
									26 F.
Total over 34 years' service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	176
Will be over 27 years, under 34 years	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	239
									— 66
									110
									— 43 E.
									67 G.
Total over 27 years' service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	415
There are above the rank of first Captain	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	142
									— 142
Therefore must retire, in all	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	273 I.
Supposed to have already retired before 1880	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	110 A. & B.
									273 to retire H.
Therefore must retire, 1880-1885	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	163 K.

Of whom 26 F. must be above the junior officer of 1845, in order that no Colonel may have more than 40 years' service; 67 G. above the junior officer of 1851, in order that no Lieutenant Colonel may have more than 34 years' service; and the whole 273 above the junior officer of 1858, in order that no Captain may have more than 27 years' service.

(signed) J. H. L.

Appendix, No. 6.

PAPER delivered in by Admiral *Dacres*, 20 June 1867.ABSTRACT of the Cost of the FULL PAY RETIREMENT of OFFICERS of the
ROYAL MARINES, for the past Ten Years.

App. No. 6

Y E A R S.						Total Yearly Amount of Retirements.	Surplus unexpended.		
						£. s. d.	£. s. d.		
1858	-	-	-	-	-	27,895 6 8	7,104 13 4		
1859	-	-	-	-	-	29,677 15 -	5,322 5 -		
1860	-	-	-	-	-	32,001 10 10	2,098 9 2		
1861	-	-	-	-	-	32,372 12 11	2,627 7 1		
1862	-	-	-	-	-	28,596 8 4	6,403 11 8		
1863	-	-	-	-	-	32,228 2 11	2,771 17 1		
1864	-	-	-	-	-	30,222 3 4	4,777 16 8		
1865	-	-	-	-	-	32,019 15 10	2,980 4 2		
1866	-	-	-	-	-	32,807 5 10	2,192 14 2		
1867	-	-	-	-	-	31,252 19 7	3,747 - 5		

Royal Marine Office, }
17 June 1867.Geo. C. Langley,
Deputy Adjutant General.

Appendix, No. 7.

PAPER delivered in by Colonel *Gambier*, 20 June 1867.

App. No. 7.

ROYAL ARTILLERY.—FULL PAY RETIREMENTS.

THE present system of Full Pay Retirement which was established by the Royal Warrant of 1854 (when an annual grant of 32,000*l.* was substituted for the mode, then in existence, of allowing a certain number of lieutenant colonels, captains, and lieutenants, of 21 years' service, to retire each year upon the full pay of their rank) has been found open to several objections, the more prominent of which may be thus stated:—

1st. It increased the qualifying period for Full Pay Retirement, from 21 to 30 years, and deprived the regiment of the promotion which had previously accrued from the retirement of officers of between 21 and 30 years' service.

2nd. As the grant of 32,000*l.* had to include all officers who retired upon full pay, between 1840 and 1854, the number of unattached general officers and regimental colonels who could then avail themselves of the retirements on 600*l.* a year was necessarily limited, and was not equivalent to the number of steps which would have resulted from retirements in the lower grades under the old system.

3rd. The officers who had retired since 1840, and who were included in the grant of 32,000*l.*, were comparatively young men, so that the money available by their death only became again disposable at uncertain periods, and by slow degrees.

4th. The augmentations which took place soon after 1854 gave the senior officers, who would then have retired had funds been available, a much better prospect of reaching the rank of colonel commandant, and consequently they declined the retirement which they would previously have accepted.

5th. The retirements on 600*l.* a year have therefore, generally, been taken by junior regimental colonels, and thus the flow of promotion has been retarded by the money being locked up in the lives of the younger instead of the older officers.

6th. The retirements on 400*l.* and 365*l.* a year offered to lieutenant colonels of 30 years' service has been almost inoperative, from the fact that the same period of service is required in this rank as in the higher, and the officer therefore naturally prefers to wait for promotion

to colonel, when he can retire upon 600*l.* instead of 400*l.*

7th. The 30 years period for retirement, therefore, practically excludes all officers, below the rank of regimental colonel, of any right to retire upon full pay.

At the present time, however (notwithstanding these objections) the age and length of service of officers of all ranks in the Royal Artillery must be considered satisfactory, being but little behind the rest of the army; but it must not be forgotten that this state of things has arisen mainly from the large augmentations which have occurred during the last 20 years, and that promotion from this source can no longer be reckoned upon; but, on the contrary, the additions thus made to the number of officers will eventually tend, in a great measure, to increase the future stagnation against which it is now sought to provide.

The prospects of attaining the rank of major general which are now held out to officers joining the regiment, have already been stated in evidence, and need not therefore be here repeated.

In order to provide for the future efficiency of officers in all ranks, it has been generally admitted that it is necessary to fix some stated period at which officers should be removed from the Effective List, and also that some outlet should be provided for the retirement of officers who have not completed 30 years' service.

The following plan for the attainment of these objects is therefore proposed:—

1st. To remove all officers who have completed 38 years' service, and who are not colonels commandant, to a retired list in the ranks they now hold.

2nd. To allow these officers the option of retiring absolutely upon 700*l.* a year, with a step of honorary rank, or of remaining upon their present rate of pay, and succeeding to colonel commandant, and the higher grades of general officer, according to their army rank.

3rd. Officers so removed from the regimental list who elect to remain on their present pay, with a view to further promotion, to be eligible, while on the Retired List, for any employment (not regimental), and to retain the appointments they may now hold, until the usual five years period of holding them shall have expired.

4th. To

4th. To give an unqualified right of retirement to officers of less than 38, but of 20 years' service and upwards, upon the following scale per annum :

30 Years' Service :		£.
Permanent pension	- - -	600
To capitalize	- - -	450
25 Years' Service :		
Permanent pension	- - -	400
To capitalize	- - -	300
20 Years' Service :		
Permanent pension	- - -	200
To capitalize	- - -	150

These retirements to be governed by length of service, and irrespective of the rank the officer may have attained.

They should also be available at any time (after the stated period of service is completed) without reference to vacancies on the Retired List, or in the amount of the annual vote for retirement.

5th. Every facility to be afforded to the officers who retire with less than 38 years' service to capitalize their retiring pension at the rates laid down for each period of service in paragraph 4.

Intermediate periods of service to be calculated, both for permanent retirement and for capitalizing, and the scale raised in proportion.

6th. The present Retired Full Pay List to be discontinued as vacancies occur therein.

7th. The Half Pay List to be also discontinued, except in the case of officers of less than 20 years' service, who may be incapacitated for duty from wounds in action, or from ill health contracted in the service.

The number of officers who have not reached the rank of colonel commandant, but who have completed 38 years' service is 17 ; viz., 14 major generals and 3 regimental colonels.

During the next 10 years the number who will reach 38 years' service (not deducting deaths or retirements in the meantime) would be 55, including the above 17, being an average of $5\frac{1}{2}$ promotions, from the top of the list alone, for each year.

The 17 officers who have now completed 38 years' service, exactly correspond with the number of colonels commandant, and as promotions to that rank would almost invariably be made from the retired list of officers on major general's pay, that number of steps would be lost as vacancies occur, and the annual average of retirements at the top of the list would thus be reduced to about four for the next 10 years.

As the regiment now stands it is not calculated that there would be any officers, under 38 years' service, who would retire, except for the purpose of capitalising their annuities, and the expense of the proposed plan as regards these officers would, therefore, be inconsiderable.

The number who might retire for this purpose would not exceed 20 for the present year in the three periods combined ; and, therefore, supposing

this number retired, the total vacancies for the lower ranks this year would be 37. App. No. 7.

Of the officers of 38 years' service and upwards, who would be removed from the regimental list, it is calculated 12 would elect to remain on their present pay to succeed to colonel commandant, and the expense of starting the proposed plan would be as under :—

	£.
12 officers to retire upon their present pay (478 l. a year) - - -	5,736
5 officers to retire, absolutely, on 700 l. a year - - -	3,500
	9,236
Against which there would be a saving from the full and half-pay list - -	6,700
Actual Cost - - £.	2,536

In the money estimated to be saved is included 5,200 l. which has been sanctioned by the Treasury (subject to the Vote of Parliament) for next year as the balance of the increased grant of 10,400 l. to which the regiment is entitled for the number of officers, of the old Royal Artillery alone, added to it since the 32,000 l. was first granted in 1854, and for whom no retiring allowances have hitherto been provided.

The foregoing remarks, and proposal, have applied solely to the old Royal Artillery, but the amalgamation of the Indian Artilleries have added (and continue so to do annually) a large number of lieutenants to the general list ; and, consequently, when the present Indian lists of officers have died out, there will be a regiment nearly twice the strength of the old Royal Artillery at the present time, with retiring allowances for only one half.

In the meantime the Indian Government bear the expense of the retirements of all those officers of Artillery who were on the Indian lists at the date of the amalgamation ; and, in addition, pay to the Imperial Government a capitation grant, for retirements and pensions, of 3 l. 10 s. for every officer and soldier of the Royal Artillery embarked for India.

The same rate of capitation is paid for the Cavalry and the Line ; but the Indian Government have nothing further to do with the retirements and pensions for these branches of the service.

It will thus be seen that the Imperial Government have been receiving a certain rate for the retirement of the whole list of Indian Artillery officers, since the date of the amalgamation, and have not hitherto applied any portion of it to that purpose.

The additional expense therefore involved by the plan now proposed, or any other that may be decided upon, may be fairly met by the sum of money which has thus been paid into the Imperial Treasury by the Indian Government for the purposes of retirement of Artillery officers, but which has not been yet applied.

G. Gambier, D. A. G.

20 June 1867.

Appendix, No. 8.

PAPER handed in by Colonel *Adye*, 24 June 1867.

App. No. 8.

For a general history of promotion, see Royal Commission of 1854, pages 18 to 21. Causes of the rise and fall of promotion.

PROMOTION IN THE ROYAL ARTILLERY.

THE promotion of officers in a corps strictly regulated by seniority would appear at first sight to be a simple matter, and were no disturbing elements to interfere with the ordinary succession, no doubt such would be the case, and the ages of the officers of each rank could be calculated with comparative ease. But in considering the past history of the Royal Artillery, it will be found that a variety of causes, such as sudden augmentations or reductions of the establishment, alterations in the proportions of the separate grades, changes in the pension rules, &c., have considerably upset this theoretical simplicity, and that, consequently, the ages of the officers in the several ranks have varied very much at different periods.

It will be sufficient for our present purpose to sketch the outlines of the promotions and of the successive changes which have occurred during the present century, because within that period the corps has twice undergone the varieties of fortune arising from the operation of the causes above specified.

In the year 1800, the regiment consisted of a horse brigade of six troops, and six battalions of 61 companies, with a total of 340 combatant officers. During the following years, between 1801 and 1808, it received large and successive augmentations, so that at the latter date its establishment had increased to a horse brigade of 12 troops, and 10 battalions of 101 companies. Two rocket troops were subsequently added, and the establishment in 1814, and the approximate ages of the officers of each rank, were as follows:—

1814.

	Number of each Rank.	Age of Senior.
Colonel Commandant - - -	11	78 years.
Colonels - - -	22	61 "
Lieutenant Colonels - - -	35	53 "
Majors - - -	11	43 "
Captains - - -	115	41 "
Second Captains - - -	127	33 "
First Lieutenants - - -	249	30 "
Second Lieutenants - - -	99	-
TOTAL - - -	669	

It will be observed that the effect of these large augmentations, which had nearly doubled the regiment, combined with the casualties of a very protracted war, was to raise the corps to a fair state of efficiency as respects the ages of its officers. At all events, their position at that time in this particular was very much more favourable than for many years subsequently; and it is only in these present days that the operation of similar causes has once again restored prosperity and efficiency to the corps.

The general peace which succeeded Waterloo soon led to extensive alterations in the establishment.

In 1817, five troops of horse artillery, and one battalion of 10 companies, were reduced, the officers being placed on temporary half-pay, to be brought back as vacancies occurred. Again in 1819 a further reduction of two troops and 18 companies took place, the officers being dealt with as before, so that no less than 133 officers of various ranks were at that time waiting to be brought back to their places.

The effect of these measures was almost to paralyse promotion in the regiment, especially in the lower ranks; a general stagnation ensued, which continued for many years, depressing the

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the officers, and greatly injuring the service. The whole corps, as it were, grew old, and the promotion was so slow, that the second lieutenants appointed in 1817, 1818, and 1819, remained between eight and nine years in that rank. It was with reference to the condition of the regiment at that period that the late Lord Hardinge, then Clerk of the Ordnance, wrote in 1825, saying that he was quite in despair at the state in which it was allowed to fall. Various attempts were made from time to time to remedy this state of affairs. A certain number of officers were allowed to withdraw by the sale of their commissions; a few were transferred to the line and staff corps; and a considerable number accepted permanent retirement on half-pay. These measures, however, proved quite insufficient to remedy the evil, which, in the junior ranks, reached a climax about the year 1840, the establishment of officers at that time being 439, and the ages of the seniors of 1840, each rank as follows, taking 18 as the age of entering the corps:—

Senior Colonel Commandant	-	76 years.
„ Colonel	- - -	64 „
„ Lieutenant-Colonel	- -	61 „
„ Captain	- -	55 „
„ Second Captain	- -	50 „
„ Lieutenant	- - -	38 „

App. No. 8.

See evidence of Sir A. Dickson, Cator, &c. Royal Commission of 1840.

In 1840 a Royal Commission was assembled to consider the subject of army promotions generally, and reported that the retiring allowances of the Royal Artillery were quite insufficient. Accordingly, in the following year, they were considerably increased. By the previous regulations, the fixed establishment of the retired full-pay list had been limited to—

Royal Commission of 1840, p. xii.

8	Lieutenant Colonels.
12	Captains.
8	Subalterns.
<hr/> 28	

By the new warrant, four lieutenant colonels and four captains, who were unfit for service from age or infirmity, were allowed to retire annually on full pay, in addition to the above. Certain minor advantages as regards half-pay were also granted, and the effect of these measures, added to the numerous vacancies arising from natural causes, was to give a considerable impetus to promotion in the lower ranks, which was still further accelerated by the augmentations of four brigades between 1846 and 1855, the establishment of the regiment, and the approximate ages in the latter year, being as follows:—

Page xix.

See Royal Commission of 1854, page 56.

Colonel Commandants	- - -	14	-	Age of Senior	80 Years.
Colonels	- - -	28	-	„	69 „
Lieutenant Colonels	- - -	56	-	„	56 „
Captains	- - -	113	-	„	40 „
Second Captains	- - -	126	-	„	30 „
Lieutenants	- - -	337	-	„	25 „
		<hr/> 674			

1855.

It will be observed that although promotion in the lower ranks had considerably improved, that of the colonels had become worse than before. In the meantime, however, in the year 1854, a second Royal Commission was assembled, which reported that the inducements held out by the previous one had not proved sufficiently attractive to the full extent authorised, and that a considerable portion of the annual retiring grant had lapsed. Their recommendations were embodied in a Royal Warrant, and are shortly as follows:—

Royal Commission of 1854, page 21.

Royal Commission of 1854, page 25, para. 114.

Royal Commission of 1854, pages 53, 56, 57.

1. A fixed establishment of general officers, including colonel commandant, as follows:—

Generals	- - - - -	6
Lieutenant Generals	- - - - -	10
Major Generals	- - - - -	16
		<hr/> 32

2. An annual fixed retiring allowance of 32,000 £., the scale of pensions to be as follows:—

Royal Commission of 1854, page 26.

Unattached Generals and Colonels	- - - - -	£. 600 per annum.
Unattached Lieutenant Colonels of 30 years' service	400	„
Officers between 21 and 30 years' service	- - -	Full pay of their rank.

The officers wishing to retire under the above rules could only do so in the event of a vacancy on the retired list.

Independently of the above, the officers over 25 years' service were allowed to retire on half-pay at their option. These measures proved advantageous to a limited degree, and a subsequent augmentation of three brigades, added to the casualties of the Crimean and

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Indian

App. No. 8.

1867.

Indian wars, have since contributed largely to stimulate the promotion of the regiment; the general result being that at present the establishment of the old Royal Artillery, and the respective ages, stand as follows:—

Colonel Commandants	-	-	-	17	-	Age of Senior	88	Years.
Major Generals (unattached)	-	-	-	15	-	"	—	"
Colonels	-	-	-	34	-	"	57	"
Lieutenant Colonels	-	-	-	76	-	"	48	"
Captains	-	-	-	150	-	"	40	"
Second Captains	-	-	-	181	-	"	34	"
Lieutenants	-	-	-	432	-	"	31	"
				905				

Royal Commission of
1854, paras. 95 and 96.

If the rates of promotion of recent years could be maintained, the prospects of the officers would be fair, and the service efficient; but the very fact that the present condition of the corps has been produced chiefly by large augmentations, and by thus pushing up into the higher ranks men comparatively young in years, is in itself a proof that unless some outlet is given, the subalterns of the present day will have to endure a stagnation much similar to that which crippled the regiment for so many years subsequent to Waterloo.

It is true that there are no half-pay officers to be absorbed, as after Waterloo, and that the present pension rules are more liberal than of yore, but still the exceptional impetus has been so great that the senior colonel of the regiment is only 57 years old, and this is a proof that the ordinary promotion must be very slow for many years to come.

It must also be borne in mind that of late years the average age of officers on receiving their first commission has been about 21 years, in contrast to 18 as formerly, and further, that, in consequence of the augmentations, large batches of young officers have joined the corps in rapid succession and all nearly of the same age, all which circumstances considerably prejudice their chance of reaching the upper ranks even moderately young.

In a seniority corps there are but three ways of obtaining promotion:—

1. By death vacancies.
2. By promotion of colonels to be generals.
3. By retirement with pension.

Death vacancies.

The first is a constant quantity, that is, it will occur at a certain proportionate rate, but as the average duration of life far exceeds that of efficiency in an officer, it is not of itself sufficient to maintain a regiment in a sound condition. The second outlet is by the promotion of colonels to the rank of general. There are, however, but 32 officers of the latter grade, including the colonels commandant, to a regiment of over 900 officers, so that promotions from that source are very few. It is to be observed that on the abolition of periodical brevets in 1854, the above number of generals was fixed for the Royal Artillery, as being in proportion to those of the cavalry and infantry. Since that date, however, the other two branches have received certain augmentations and an increase to their generals accordingly, whereas, though the Royal Artillery have been augmented from 14 to 17 brigades, the number of their generals remains the same. It also appears that the Royal Marines have 11 unattached generals to 489 officers, whereas the Royal Artillery have 15 to 905.

Promotion to general.

Royal Commission of
1854, page 62, for
number of generals by
former brevets.

Royal Commission of
1854, page 25, para,
113, and page 29.

There would therefore appear to be valid reasons for somewhat increasing the number of general officers of the Royal Artillery, and such a measure would to its extent prove beneficial to the corps, as adding to the proportion of those in the higher ranks.

Pensions.

The third and apparently only effectual method of maintaining regular and sufficient promotion in a seniority corps is by a system of pensions or retiring allowances. Those of the Royal Artillery previous to 1840, it will have been observed, were reported as quite insufficient, and evidently proved so, and although in the latter year some considerable improvement was made in this respect, still again in 1854 a second Royal Commission recommended a more liberal scale of pension and an increase in the numbers. Since 1854, three more brigades have been added; consequently the amount there given, even if sufficient at that time, is evidently not so now. It is not only known that the annual grant has not kept pace with the augmented establishment of the corps, but there are inequalities and other defects in its distribution which seem to require alteration. The rules hitherto in force in this matter appear for the most part to have been temporary expedients rather than parts of a comprehensive plan; and although the general design has always been to provide against extreme age and consequent inefficiency in the upper ranks, still no definite limit of age or of service has ever been laid down, at which officers are to cease performing regimental duties.

Limit of service.

Thus within the last few years we have seen colonels doing duty when over 70 years old, whilst others have obtained 600*l.* a-year retirement when they were under 50. Cases of this kind can hardly have been contemplated by the Royal Commissioners of 1854.

It appears to me that an essential rule in a seniority corps is to define the limit of service at which officers should cease to perform regimental duties, and I would suggest 40 years' service as appropriate.

Royal Commission,
1854, page 24, para.
109.

My view is that each officer who on arriving at the head of the list of colonels (by army rank) has 40 years' service,* shall, at the discretion of the military authorities, either be promoted at

* This is laid down on the supposition that each officer is about 20 years old at first commission.

at once as a supernumerary major-general, or else shall be called upon to retire on 600 *l.* a year, with a step of honorary rank. Of course, if an officer reaches the top of the colonels before 40 years' service, he would be promoted in due course, whilst by thus giving a discretionary power to the military authorities, they would be enabled, should promotion languish, to retain occasionally as generals, such colonels of 40 years' service as might be considered desirable. The generals so promoted as supernumeraries would be gradually absorbed into the fixed establishment as vacancies occurred. The great advantage of this limit of service at the top of the colonels would be, that the regiment, even in time of peace, would never fall below a certain level, and the other ranks would also fall into a natural gradation of length of service.

Pensions by service, not by rank.

Another point calling for remark is, that hitherto pensions have been generally given by rank rather than by length of service, and this operates unequally; for instance, within the last few years, we have seen colonels accepting pensions of 600 *l.* a year when over 70 years old, whilst now the officers eligible for the same amount are not 50; so that, in the latter case, the recipients have not only enjoyed good fortune during their career, but find themselves entitled to large pensions on retirement; thus an inducement is held out to the comparatively young and prosperous officers to retire, whilst the object should be just the reverse.*

The accession to rank is, in fact, uncertain and various, as the history of the regiment shows, whereas service is certain, and uniformly progressive; and, in my opinion, it would therefore be advisable that all pensions should be regulated by length of service quite independently of rank, as is the system in the Indian army.

See Appendix (B.)

Again, the grant of pensions hitherto has been in a great measure limited, to the higher ranks, and, more especially of late years, the tendency has been almost to exclude the junior officers from a chance of retirement. To a certain extent, no doubt, this is a correct principle, but, when carried to excess, it inevitably checks promotion, as it almost forces the whole of the officers who enter the corps to remain in it throughout their career. Now, there are many causes which tend to induce men of middle age, and sometimes even those of short service, to leave the regiment; and if some fractional and increasing value were attached to each successive year passed in the corps, it is possible that a graduated scale of pensions might be framed, which, without unduly pressing on the finances, would still assist promotion, and would tend to break up the uniformity of increasing age in a long seniority list.

Royal Commission of 1854, page 18, paras. 82, 83.

The following may be quoted as some of the causes which predispose officers to early retirement:—

1. Disinclination for a military life.
2. Early marriages, and the consequent expense of frequent removes, and the education of children.
3. Service in the Colonies sometimes ends in emigration.
4. Inheriting private property.
5. Failure in health.

It must also be borne in mind, as already pointed out, that the augmentations of late years have not only blocked up the upper ranks with officers of comparatively short service, but large batches of lieutenants have joined the regiment in quick succession at the bottom, all so nearly of the same age that their prospects are irretrievably injured, and a graduated scale of moderate pensions would therefore possibly tend to lighten this part of the list.†

See Royal Commission of 1840, Colonel Cator's evidence, page 37, question 676.

Those who are in the lower ranks argue, and with some show of reasoning, that whereas a pension of 600 *l.* a year, when given to a colonel, only creates one vacancy, the same amount, if distributed amongst the captains, would probably be sufficient to purchase the retirement of three or four, and would thus materially benefit the subalterns. Should the principle of a graduated scale of pensions according to length of service be considered sound, I would advocate the combination of a small bonus on retirement as a part of the scheme, and also a step of honorary rank.

The following is the outline of a proposed scheme of the kind, the details of which could be modified at discretion:—

PROPOSED SCALE of PENSIONS and BONUSES, according to Service, counting 20 Years as the Age at entering the Service.

- | | |
|---|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Officers from 15 to 20 years' service wishing to retire, to be allowed 1,000 <i>l.</i> bonus on leaving the corps. 2. Officers from 20 to 25 years' service wishing to retire to be granted a pension of 150 <i>l.</i> per annum, with a bonus of 150 <i>l.</i> | <p>A limit to be fixed as to the number of officers retiring under these rules; say, two of the first, and four of the second, per annum.</p> |
| 3. Officers | |

* The regulations as to retirement on full or half pay after a certain number of years also act unequally, as they depend on the rank held at the time of retirement.

† Five-sixths of the corps are captains and subalterns.

App. No. 8.

3. Officers of and over 25 years' and up to 40 years' service to be granted pensions at the following rates, and to be free to take them, without limit as to numbers :—

Average Age.				Years' Service.	Pension.	Bonus.
					£.	£.
45	-	-	-	25	250	200
46	-	-	-	26	270	
47	-	-	-	27	290	
48	-	-	-	28	310	
49	-	-	-	29	330	
50	-	-	-	30	350	250
51	-	-	-	31	370	
52	-	-	-	32	390	
53	-	-	-	33	410	
54	-	-	-	34	430	
55	-	-	-	35	450	300
56	-	-	-	36	480	
57	-	-	-	37	510	
58	-	-	-	38	540	
59	-	-	-	39	570	
60	-	-	-	40	600	350

See Royal Commission of 1854, page 59, first and last paras.

Royal Commission of 1854, page 25, para. 119.

Should the foregoing scale of pensions be considered as framed on sound principles and of moderate amount, it does not appear to me that it could then be necessary to limit its operations to any particular number of retirements in each year after 25 years' service; in fact, any such limitation would, I think, very much interfere with its beneficial working. The scheme of full-pay retirements granted to the regiment in 1840 was never taken full advantage of, and the Royal Commissioners of 1854 stated their opinion that its partial failure was due to the restriction imposed as to the number of retirements allowed in each year. In the Indian service the system of retirements at will according to a graduated scale after 20 years' service, and without reference to numbers, has prevailed for years, and has not, I believe, led to any undue increase to the pension list; and in various branches of the Civil Service similar arrangements as to superannuation are found to work beneficially. It does not appear to me possible to regulate the pensions of a great seniority corps by a narrow adhesion to an annual fixed grant, and still less so when any sums not accepted in one year are considered as forfeited, and lapse to the Government.

A consideration of the promotion of the officers of Royal Artillery during the present century tends, I think, to prove that the present organisation, if left to itself, and without the stimulus of considerable retiring allowances, is quite inadequate to maintain efficiency in point of age in the several ranks. (*Vide* Appendix C.)

There are only two periods when the regiment has risen to a fair rate of promotion, and on each occasion it was produced chiefly by large augmentations in consequence of great wars. It should, however, be borne in mind that the mere increase of numbers to a corps, though beneficial to individuals for the moment, does no permanent good; on the contrary, it creates a fictitious prosperity, which is sure to be succeeded by a corresponding reaction. We have seen this reaction already occur once, namely, after Waterloo; and unless some steps are taken to prevent it, the second epoch of retardation, which has already commenced, will lead again to depression and inefficiency.

Defects. The chief defects in the present organisation and condition of the regiment appear to be as follows :—

1. Insufficient number of general officers.
2. Want of limit of service at the top of the colonels.
3. Insufficient grant for retiring allowances. *
4. Defective appropriation of the present retiring allowances.
5. Abnormal state of the regiment from great augmentations.

The remedies I would propose, are—

Proposed remedies.

1. An increase in the establishment of generals in proportion to the augmentation of three brigades, which have occurred since the fixed establishment of generals was first laid down in 1854.

2. A limit of 40 years' service at the top of the colonels.

3. A graduated scale of pensions with bonus, to be given by service, and not by rank. (The rules to be very simple and few.)

4. An honorary step of rank on retirement.

5. Officers to enter the corps at about 18 years of age.

6. The establishment of subalterns not to be kept full in time of peace.

Hitherto

* The Marines have 35,000 l. per annum to a total of 489 officers.

The Royal Artillery have only 32,000 l. per annum to a total of 888 officers.

The annual rate for the Royal Artillery, if raised to that of the Royal Marines, would be 63,558 l. per annum.

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Hitherto I have spoken of the regiment as consisting only of 17 brigades, but as by the amalgamation in 1862, 14 more have been added to it from the Indian^a army, it now amounts to 31 brigades, with upwards of 1,600 officers, the whole of whom will eventually rise in one long seniority list; and when it is considered that of this vast body about five-sixths are captains and subalterns, it will be conceded that the question is not only important, but that its future difficulties must be met in a large and liberal spirit.

As regards the present question of retirement, those officers who are still on their separate Indian lists, are eligible for pensions according to a graduated scale by Indian rules, and will continue so throughout their career, and therefore require no remark. But the subalterns who have joined the old Royal Artillery since the amalgamation, to replace casualties in the Indian lists, and whose numbers are daily increasing, are not provided for either in the Indian or home rules of pensions and retirements, and consequently their case has to be considered. It may perhaps be argued, that as these young officers are not at present eligible for retirement, and will not be so for some years, their case demands no immediate decision.

It appears to me, however, that every year of an officer's service from his entering the corps, has a fractional and increasing value towards future retirement, and that as the pension lists of the Indian Artillery will receive no more candidates for ultimate pensions subsequent to amalgamation, so the Indian funds ought from that date to begin subscribing annual grants towards the general retiring allowances of the regiment as it gradually progresses to unity. The amount to be paid is a matter of calculation for an actuary: it will be small for some years to come, but will increase hereafter in proportion as the existing Indian Artillery officers' pensions decrease.

In short, the aggregate amount of annual pensions hitherto paid to the officers of Indian Artillery, should be transferred to the home funds, concurrently with the gradual formation of the 14 brigades which will ultimately be added to the Royal Artillery, and whose pensions ought to be paid by the country which requires their services. In addition also, to the 14 Indian brigades, there are two brigades of old Royal Artillery serving in India, making 16 in that country out of 31; consequently, the proportion of pensions for the two extra ones ought also to be provided out of Indian revenues.

I would take this opportunity of observing, that in like manner, the funds of India ought to be called upon to subscribe, so as to give increased pensions to the widows and children of artillery officers. Several officers of the old Royal Artillery have been killed, or have died in that country since 1857, but neither their widows nor children have derived any provision from Indian revenues.

In the foregoing observations on the Royal Artillery, I have limited my remarks to what appear to me the best means of improving the promotion of the officers by certain alterations in the pension rules, &c., and by other minor proposals, but without advocating any radical changes in the organisation of the corps. I am quite aware, however, that the subject has another aspect, and that it is thought by many, that the difficulties of promotion, and the disadvantages of a long seniority list, from which no officer can emerge either by talent or even by fortune, would be removed by a complete reorganisation, and by a subdivision of the corps into separate regiments. This, however, is a very large and difficult question with many aspects, and without either advocating or rejecting it, I would at present merely name it as one which is thought by many as worthy of grave consideration.

June 1867.

(signed) John Aclay, Colonel, R.A.

App. No. 8.

Amalgamation.

Appendix (A).

Appendix (B).

App. No. 8.

Appendix (A).

PRESENT ORGANISATION of the ROYAL ARTILLERY.—February 1867.

	Old R. A.	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	TOTAL.
Colonels Commandant -	17	7	4	3	31
Major Generals, unattached	15	10	8	2	30
Colonels - - - -	34	13	8	5	60
Seconded - - - -	-	4	5	4	13
Lieutenant Colonels -	67	28	16	12	123
Seconded - - - -	9	5	2	2	18
Captains - - - -	139†	55	32	24	250
Seconded - - - -	11	7	7	7	32
2nd Captains - - - -	164	63	36	27	290
Seconded - - - -	17	9	1	-	27
Lieutenants - - - -	482	94	43	24	593
Added for Indian Brigades	137	-	-	-	137
	1,043	295	157	110	
GRAND TOTAL - - -					1,604

* Generals - - - 61	} 275 = 1/8
Field Officers - - - 214	
Captains - - - 599	} 1,329 = 5/8
Lieutenants - - - 730	
	1,604 1,604

† Detail of Captains.
130 Batteries.
2 Unmanned batteries.
11 Seconded.
2 Gentlemen Cadets.
1 Riding establishment.
4 Depot.
150

* The future establishment of Generals is to be 58 (Royal Warrant, 15 June 1864).

	Generals.	Lieutenant Generals.	Major Generals.	TOTAL.
Royal Artillery - - -	6	10	16	32
Indian Artillery - - -	5	8	13	26
	11	18	29	58

Appendix (B).

INDIAN PENSION RULES.

Old Rules.		£.	s.	d.
35 years' service, including cadet service, with three years' furlough in England	- - - - -	456	5	- per ann.
31 years' service, including cadet service, with three years' furlough in England	- - - - -	365	-	- "
27 years' service, including cadet service, with three years' furlough in England	- - - - -	292	-	- "
23 years' service, including cadet service, with three years' furlough in England	- - - - -	191	12	6 "
New Rules.		£.	s.	d.
32 years' service, including cadet service, with four years' furlough	- - - - -	456	5	- "
28 years' service, including cadet service, with three years' furlough	- - - - -	365	-	- "
24 years' service, including cadet service, with two years' furlough	- - - - -	292	-	- "
20 years' service, including cadet service, with two years' furlough	- - - - -	191	12	6 "

Or full-pay of his rank at any time after 20 years in India.


Appendix (C.)

APPROXIMATE AGES of the Senior Officers of each Rank of the Royal Artillery, as they would be if left to Regimental Seniority as at present, and with 86 Retired Officers included.

Senior Colonel, nearly 75 years old.
 Senior Lieutenant-Colonel, between 60 and 65 years old.
 Senior Captain, between 50 and 55 years old.
 Senior Second Captain, between 40 and 45 years old.
 Senior Lieutenant, between 30 and 35 years old.

Diagram of Promotion in the Royal Artillery from 1800 to 1865.

(Adopted from Genl Leffroy's Pamphlet.)



Appendix, No. 9.

PAPERS furnished by Mr. *Finlaison*.

TABLE showing the Number of Years' Purchase, and also the Price in Cash, of an ANNUITY of £. 100 on the LIFE of a MALE of an Age undermentioned; the Interest of Money being taken after the Rate of FIVE PER CENT. per Annum payable half-yearly, and the Law of Mortality being that adopted for the Tables regulating the Grant of Annuities on Male Lives at the National Debt Office.

Age.	Number of Years' Purchase.	Present Value of the Annuity of £. 100.	Age.	Number of Years' Purchase.	Present Value of the Annuity of £. 100.
		£. s. d.			£. s. d.
20	15.06861	1,506 17 3	51	11.21356	1,121 7 1
21	15.00258	1,500 5 2	52	10.98145	1,098 2 11
22	14.96111	1,496 2 3	53	10.75133	1,075 2 8
23	14.92519	1,492 10 5	54	10.52560	1,052 11 3
24	14.88969	1,488 19 5	55	10.30351	1,030 7 -
25	14.85191	1,485 3 10			
			56	10.08363	1,008 7 3
26	14.80890	1,480 17 10	57	9.86670	986 13 5
27	14.74746	1,474 14 11	58	9.64896	964 17 11
28	14.67951	1,467 19 -	59	9.42649	942 13 -
29	14.60551	1,460 11 -	60	9.19800	919 16 -
30	14.52581	1,452 11 8			
			61	8.95666	895 13 4
31	14.44054	1,444 1 1	62	8.70132	870 2 8
32	14.35005	1,435 - 1	63	8.43435	843 8 8
33	14.25257	1,425 5 2	64	8.16571	816 11 5
34	14.14731	1,414 14 8	65	7.89583	789 11 8
35	14.03442	1,403 8 10			
			66	7.62437	762 8 9
36	13.91473	1,391 9 6	67	7.37082	737 1 8
37	13.79016	1,379 - 4	68	7.11881	711 17 8
38	13.66060	1,366 1 2	69	6.86850	686 17 -
39	13.52738	1,352 14 9	70	6.62170	662 3 5
40	13.38854	1,338 17 1			
			71	6.38068	638 1 4
41	13.24313	1,324 6 3	72	6.14448	614 8 11
42	13.08568	1,308 11 4	73	5.90561	590 11 8
43	12.92050	1,292 1 -	74	5.65540	565 10 10
44	12.74483	1,274 9 8	75	5.39538	539 10 9
45	12.55834	1,255 16 8			
			76	5.12566	512 11 4
46	12.36096	1,236 1 11	77	4.81532	481 10 8
47	12.14690	1,214 13 10	78	4.50565	450 11 3
48	11.92339	1,192 6 9	79	4.20762	420 15 3
49	11.69128	1,169 2 7	80	3.91477	391 9 6
50	11.45362	1,145 7 3			

TABLE showing the Number which will survive at the Ages undermentioned out of 100,000 Males of the Age of 20 Years, according to the Law of Mortality which is the basis of the preceding Table.

AGE.	Number Surviving.
20 - - - - -	100,000
30 - - - - -	87,507
32 - - - - -	85,310
40 - - - - -	77,005
46 - - - - -	70,962
50 - - - - -	67,051
54 - - - - -	62,137
60 - - - - -	52,621

National Debt Office, }
17 July 1867. }

Alexander Glen Finlaison,
Actuary of the National Debt.

App. No. 9.

TABLE showing the Number of Years' Purchase, and also the Price in Cash, of an ANNUITY of £. 100 on the LIFE of a MALE of an Age undermentioned; the Interest of Money being taken after the Rate of SIX PER CENT. per Annum payable half-yearly, and the Law of Mortality being that adopted for the Tables regulating the Grant of Annuities on Male Lives at the National Debt Office.

Age.	Number of Years' Purchase.	Present Value of the Annuity of £. 100.	Age.	Number of Years' Purchase.	Present Value of the Annuity of £. 100.
		£. s. d.			£. s. d.
20	13·21716	1,321 14 4	51	10·25251	1,025 5 -
21	13·16986	1,316 18 9	52	10·05787	1,005 15 9
22	13·14346	1,314 6 11	53	9·86440	986 8 10
23	13·12289	1,312 5 9	54	9·67436	967 8 9
24	13·10323	1,310 6 6	55	9·48710	948 14 2
25	13·08211	1,308 4 3	56	9·30135	930 2 8
26	13·06696	1,305 13 11	57	9·11782	911 15 8
27	13·01511	1,301 10 2	58	8·93307	893 6 2
28	12·96973	1,296 19 6	59	8·74346	874 6 11
29	12·91849	1,291 17 -	60	8·54773	854 15 6
30	12·86260	1,286 5 2	61	8·33943	833 18 10
31	12·80212	1,280 4 3	62	8·11731	811 14 8
32	12·73736	1,273 14 8	63	7·88343	788 6 10
33	12·66670	1,266 13 4	64	7·64703	764 14 1
34	12·58941	1,258 18 10	65	7·40847	740 16 11
35	12·50557	1,250 11 2	66	7·16739	716 14 9
36	12·41591	1,241 11 10	67	6·94224	694 4 6
37	12·32198	1,232 4 -	68	6·71770	671 15 5
38	12·22380	1,222 7 7	69	6·49394	649 7 10
39	12·12250	1,212 5 -	70	6·27270	627 5 4
40	12·01629	1,201 12 7	71	6·05620	605 12 5
41	11·90429	1,190 8 7	72	5·84363	584 7 3
42	11·78150	1,178 3 -	73	5·62787	562 15 8
43	11·65172	1,165 3 5	74	5·40060	540 1 2
44	11·51237	1,151 4 9	75	5·16317	516 6 4
45	11·36307	1,136 6 1	76	4·91557	491 11 2
46	11·20362	1,120 7 3	77	4·62780	462 15 7
47	11·02864	1,102 17 3	78	4·33929	433 18 7
48	10·84454	1,084 9 1	79	4·06063	406 1 3
49	10·65200	1,065 4 -	80	3·78571	378 11 5
50	10·45371	1,045 7 5			

National Debt Office, }
24 July 1867.

Alexander Glen Finlaison,
Actuary of the National Debt.

THE Present Values, according to the Government Life Annuity Tables, of an ANNUITY of £. 100 on a MALE LIFE of an Age undermentioned, where the Rate of Interest is respectively FOUR, FIVE, or SIX PER CENT. per Annum.

Age.	At Four per Cent.	At Five per Cent.	At Six per Cent.
	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
20	1,743 11 4	1,506 17 3	1,321 14 4
25	1,708 14 11	1,485 8 10	1,308 4 3
30	1,659 18 2	1,452 11 8	1,286 5 2
35	1,591 6 5	1,403 8 10	1,250 11 2
40	1,504 19 2	1,338 17 1	1,201 12 7
45	1,398 5 2	1,255 16 8	1,136 6 1
50	1,262 12 4	1,145 7 3	1,045 7 5
55	1,124 10 10	1,030 7 -	948 14 2
60	993 11 8	919 16 -	854 15 6
65	843 19 3	789 11 8	740 16 11
70	700 9 1	662 3 5	627 5 4
75	564 11 5	539 10 9	516 6 4
80	405 3 2	391 9 6	378 11 5

National Debt Office, }
24 July 1867.

Alexander Glen Finlaison,
Actuary of the National Debt.

I N D E X

TO THE

R E P O R T

FROM THE

S E L E C T C O M M I T T E E

ON

ARMY (SYSTEM OF RETIREMENT).

Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,
26 July 1867.

I N D E X.

[*N.B.*—In this Index the Figures following the Names of the Witnesses refer to the Questions in the Evidence; those following *App.* to the Pages in the Appendix; and the Numerals following *Rep.* to the Pages in the Report.]

A.

ACADEMY (WOOLWICH). See *Age of Entry.* *Examinations.*

Adye, Colonel John M., C.B. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Has considered the question of retirement and promotion in the Royal Artillery, and has prepared a paper on the subject, which he submits to the Committee, 1449-1452, and *App.* 138-144.—Enumeration of the several causes of the present unsatisfactory condition of the corps in regard to promotion and efficiency, 1453, 1454. 1459.—Insufficiency of the number of general officers as compared with the rest of the army; claim to an addition of six more major generals, 1454-1456. 1459. 1491-1498.—Want of a limit of service at the top of the list of colonels; proposition hereon for retiring every officer after 40 years' service on a pension of 600*l.* a year, with a bonus of 350*l.*; 1454. 1456, 1457. 1459. 1464. 1469, 1470. 1485. 1514.

Inadequacy of the present grant for retiring allowances in the Artillery, whilst the appropriation is defective, 1454.—Great clog to future promotions on account of the comparatively young age of officers in the higher ranks, *ib.*—Suggestions for a graduated scale of pensions, with a small bonus in each case, to be given according to length of service, 1457. 1460-1471. 1487. 1507-1517.—Proposal that on retirement an honorary step in rank be given, 1457. 1472, 1473.—Suggestion that officers should enter the corps at about eighteen years of age, 1457.—Also that the establishment of subalterns should not be kept full in time of peace, 1457. 1518, 1519.

Witness reads an extract from the paper before referred to, in elucidation of his views on the subject of promotion, 1458, 1459.—Suggestion that two officers, of from fifteen to twenty years' service, be allowed to retire annually without pension, but with a bonus of 1,000*l.*; 1460-1462. 1471. 1511-1513.—Examination to the effect that witness has not calculated the cost of his scheme, it being impossible to ascertain the number of officers who would avail themselves of it, 1474-1490. 1514-1517.—Anticipation that the proposed scale of pensions, together with a bonus in each case, will have a very salutary and equable effect as regards future promotion and efficiency, without leading to any undue expense, 1474-1489. 1514-1517.—Facility of calculating the relative amounts of pension after forty years' service and after thirty years or twenty years, 1490. 1507-1510.

Statement that promotion in the Royal Artillery is not at present impeded or prejudiced by the promotion of subalterns in the Bengal Artillery, 1499, 1500.—Grounds for concluding that there is a claim upon the Indian Government to pay towards the pensions of officers of the Royal Artillery serving in India, 1501-1503.—Opinion as to the unduly large number of officers of the unmanned batteries serving in India, though it can hardly be said that they are employed in duties alien to those of the Royal Artillery, 1504-1506.—With regard to the proportion of subalterns in the corps, there is great elasticity in this respect in the French service, 1520-1522.

AGE OF ENTRY:

Impression that between 1820 and 1826 there were some Artillery cadets who did not get their commissions for some years after leaving the Academy, *Gambier* 132, 133.—Average of about twenty-one years of age at which Artillery officers have obtained commissions since 1860, whereas in former years the average of age was four years younger, *Brigadier General Lefroy* 578-580.—Entire efficiency of the officers who formerly entered the service at the age of sixteen or seventeen, though their mathematical attainments were, as a rule, much less than are possessed by young men now entering the service, *ib.* 580, 581. 641-643.

Facilities for the acquisition of superior scientific attainments after young men have entered the service, *Brigadier General Lefroy* 581, 582; *Major General Dickson* 1377.—Conclusion that the mischiefs likely to arise from a late age of entry to the service are not counterbalanced by the advanced attainments on entry, *Brigadier General Lefroy* 581-583.—Opinion that eighteen rather than twenty-one should be the age of entry 482-1.

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entry to the Artillery; practice hereon in the French army, *Brigadier General Lefroy* 625-627—Suggestion that if the age for entering the Artillery were lowered, ample mathematical attainments may be secured in a sufficient number of officers by providing that certain appointments shall only be held by officers having special qualifications, *ib.* 638-641.

Further statement in favour of reducing the age at which first commissions are granted, *Brigadier General Lefroy* 704. 708, 709—Probable improvement if, instead of reducing the age of entry to the service, the time at the Academy, or part of the time, were allowed to count towards retirement, *ib.* 708, 709—Suggestion that admission to the Academy might be restricted to the ages from sixteen to eighteen, and that service should count from the age of nineteen, *ib.* 709—Objection to the lower limit of age being reduced to fifteen, *ib.*

Opinion in favour of reducing the age of entry to the Academy to the old standard, *Gambier* 1060-1062—Approval of placing the age for entering the Academy at from fifteen to seventeen, *Keane* 1135-1139. 1168-1170. 1189-1196; *Major General Dickson* 1427, 1428—Objection to the time at the Academy counting towards retirement, *Keane* 1239, 1240.

Conclusion that the advantages to be gained by young men obtaining their commissions at the age of eighteen would more than compensate for the loss of the high standard of examination under the present system, *Major General Dickson* 1350-1354. 1377-1383. 1413-1415—The present average age of getting commissions is about twenty-one or twenty-two, *ib.* 1350. 1423.

Suggestion that officers should enter the Artillery at about eighteen years of age, *Adye* 1457—Grounds for the conclusion that it would be better if young men entered the Artillery at the age of eighteen, though with less theoretical acquirements than at the present age of twenty-one or twenty-two, *Biddulph* 1580-1591. 1593-1597. 1636-1646—Statement to the effect that the age of entering the Academy might be advantageously reduced, *ib.* 1636-1642.

Opinion in favour of Engineer officers entering the service at eighteen rather than twenty-one or twenty-two years of age, *Ewart* 1723-1729. 1777-1782—Means by which advanced attainments might, if necessary, be acquired after joining the regiment, *ib.* 1729-1732.

Evidence in favour of cadets entering the Academy at from fifteen to seventeen years of age, though this would involve the necessity of lowering the examinations which are now very severe, *Duke of Cambridge* 1866, 1867. 1942-1946.

List of the six senior colonels of engineers (1866), showing their age on entering the Royal Military Academy, the time they remained at the Academy, and the time between passing their examinations and being gazetted to the Royal Engineers, *App.* 115.

Returns of the age at which each of the six senior officers of Artillery and of Engineers in each rank from colonel downwards in 1826, 1836, 1846, 1856, and 1866 entered the Academy; the time they remained at the Academy, and the time between passing their examination and being gazetted to the Royal Artillery, *App.* 124-128.

Circumstance of its being the unanimous opinion of the witnesses that the age of admission to the Academy is too high, *Rep.* vi.

See also *Examinations*.

AGES OF OFFICERS:

Decrease since 1856 in the ages of the senior colonels and senior lieutenant colonels of Artillery, whilst the ages of the senior lieutenants have increased, *Gambier* 10—Considerable increase since 1826 in the age of the senior colonels of Engineers, *Keane* 62, 63—Decrease since 1836 and 1846 in the age of the senior lieutenant colonels, *ib.* 64, 65—Decrease also in the age of the senior captains, *ib.* 66, 67—Statement in explanation of the difference between age and service in the case respectively of the senior colonels and of other ranks of the Engineers, *ib.* 69-72—Fault of the present system that it allows officers of considerable age to remain at the head of their respective ranks, *Gallon* 180-182—Difference of twelve years between the average age of lieutenant colonels and captains of Artillery, *ib.* 283.

Exceptional circumstances owing to which there are at present nearly 300 officers in the Artillery from twenty-three to twenty-five years of age, *Brigadier General Lefroy* 444-448. 513-516—Calculation that in thirty years' time there will be about 200 officers between the ages of fifty-three and fifty-five; grievance consequent hereon, *ib.* 445-454—Details with further reference to the large number of Artillery officers who are nearly of the same age, and the dead level to be created thereby in the service in future years, unless retirements are greatly expedited, *ib.* 644-651—Estimate that about thirty per cent. of sixty first commissions will complete thirty-seven years' service, *ib.* 688-694.

Comparatively young age of the colonels of divisions of Marines and of the captains, at the present time, *Admiral Dacres* 799-804. 909-913—Unduly high age in the senior ranks of the Engineers, *Keane* 1105-1111—The senior colonel of the Engineers is now 65½ years

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65½ years of age, *Keane* 1107—Very unsatisfactory operation at present of the system adopted in 1854 as regards the Artillery, the condition of the regiment as to the age of the several officers having greatly altered in the interval, *Biddulph* 1528-1530—Great improvement since 1854 in the state of the upper ranks, on the score of age, *ib.* 1529, 1530—Want of improvement in regard to age in the rank of lieutenant, in which rank the age has been on the increase, *ib.* 1529-1531.

Return showing the ages of the six senior officers in each rank of the Royal Artillery, from colonel downwards, in the years 1826, 1836, 1846, 1856 and 1866, *App.* 101—Similar return relative to the Engineers, *ib.* 110—Similar return relative to the Marines, *ib.* 116.

Return of the ages of officers of the Royal Marines, of the rank of colonel and upwards, on retiring, in each of the years 1826-66, *App.* 122.

See also *Age of Entry.* *Age Retirements.* *Compulsory Retirement.* *Promotion.*
Service Retirements. *Voluntary Retirement.*

AGE RETIREMENTS :

Evidence in favour of a system of compulsory retirement in the Artillery and Engineers at a certain age in each rank down to that of captain, *Galton* 179. 182 *et seq.*—Suggestion that the age for retiring colonels be sixty or sixty-two, *ib.* 204-211—Proposed retirement of lieutenant colonels at the age of fifty-five or fifty-eight, *ib.* 212-218—Recommended retirement at the age of fifty in the rank of captain, *ib.* 219, 220—Question considered as to the operation of a system applying the same age for compulsory retirement in all ranks, *ib.* 271-284—Expediency of retirement being regulated by age rather than by length of service; probable occurrence, however, of many cases of hardship on account of the difference of age at entry, *ib.* 332-338. 362, 363.

Importance of the age of compulsory retirement being settled with reference mainly to time of war, *Galton* 390, 391—Means of obviating injury to the country in time of war in the event of a colonel or general officer in active command arriving at the age for retirement, *ib.* 392-396—Objection to a different age for retirement in the Artillery and Engineers, *ib.* 397—Further approval of but one system of retirement with reference to age, the special or voluntary retirements being abolished, *ib.* 438-440.

Approval of a fixed age for retirement in the rank of colonel, *Brigadier General Lefroy* 465-470. 480—Objection to a fixed age of retirement from the ranks of captain or lieutenant colonel, *ib.* 478—Proposal that in the rank of captain the retiring age should be fixed at forty-seven, *ib.* 532, 533—Expediency in any case of retiring inefficient men by fixing a maximum of age, *ib.* 659.

Effect of the proposed compulsory retirement at the age of sixty in keeping down the ages of the officers in the upper ranks of the Marines, *Admiral Dacres* 788—Approval of compulsory retirement at the age of sixty, it being easy to weed out inefficient men before that age, by not appointing them to divisions, *ib.* 854-867—Expediency in any case of compulsory retirement at the age of sixty, *ib.* 950-954.

Concurrence of evidence in favour of the retirement of colonels at the age of sixty, or of their being placed on a separate or reserved list on arriving at that age, *Keane* 1114-1122. 1126-1128; *Ewart* 1681-1693. 1733-1762—Reason for preferring a system of retirement regulated by age rather than by length of service, *Keane* 1119. 1125. 1166, 1167; *Biddulph* 1622-1625; *Ewart* 1706-1712. 1722—Expediency of a power to make exceptions, in the event of a rule as to retirement by age, *Sir J. Burgoyne* 1181—Approval of a right to retire on 450 *l.* a year at forty-six years of age respectively of the rank of lieutenant colonels being reached, *Keane* 1215-1217. 1250.

Objections to compulsory retirements in the Artillery at the age of sixty or at fixed periods of service; hardship to be caused thereby whilst many officers at sixty are thoroughly efficient, *Major General Dickson* 1301. 1307-1310. 1332-1335. 1359-1361. 1384-1392. 1411, 1412. 1416-1420—Less objection to the compulsory retirement of lieutenant colonels at the age of sixty than of colonels, *ib.* 1384-1389. 1416-1420—At the age of sixty-five colonels might be fairly required to retire, *ib.* 1390.

Approval of compulsory retirement in the upper ranks at the age of sixty, though this by itself would be far short of what is required, *Biddulph* 1532-1547. 1621-1625.

It would be infinitely preferable if after a certain age or length of service every officer might retire, instead of retirement depending upon a limited fund, *Duke of Cambridge* 1842, 1843. 1865—Approval of compulsory retirement at the age of sixty, or after thirty-eight years' service, *ib.* 1844-1846. 1869-1925—Expediency of the military authorities having the power of retaining in command any colonel of Artillery or Engineers on arriving at the fixed age for retirement, *ib.* 1907-1909.

Approval by the Committee of the principle of a limit of age for compulsory retirement
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ment from active duties, *Rep.* iv.—If the principle of a maximum age be admitted, the limit should be fixed at sixty years, *ib.*

<i>See also Artillery.</i>	<i>Compulsory Retirement.</i>	<i>Cost of Retirements.</i>	<i>Medical</i>
<i>Department (Army).</i>	<i>Service Retirements.</i>	<i>Voluntary Retirement.</i>	

Annual Retirements. Very general regret in the Artillery through the superseding of the warrant of 1841, by which four lieutenant colonels and four captains were permitted to retire annually, *Brigadier General Lefroy* 468, 469.

Advantage of the annual retirements from the Artillery on the score of health, allowed under the warrant of 10th April 1841; suggested revision and extension of this warrant, length of service being adopted as the basis of retirement, *Major General Dickson* 1286–1276—Proposition that, for a sum of 5,000 *l.* a year, two full colonels, four lieutenant colonels, and eight captains be allowed to retire annually, this giving fourteen steps every year, *ib.* 1276–1278—Provision of twenty-one steps annually if 7,500 *l.* a year were available, *ib.* 1278.

Question whether the option of retirement in each rank should be given to the senior officers, or to those who could satisfy a medical board that they are unfit for service, *Major General Dickson* 1283–1289, 1393–1400—Proposal that the length of service by which the annual retirement should be regulated should be, for colonels thirty years, for lieutenant colonels twenty-five years, and for captains twenty-one years, *ib.* 1289–1291—Necessity of an increased number of annual retirements beyond that contemplated by witness if the regiment were augmented, *ib.* 1294–1296, 1401–1410—Advantage of the proposed annual retirement with reference to the case of officers of less than twenty-five years' service, who have been rendered inefficient by tropical service, *ib.* 1438–1442.

Army Reserve Fund. Disapproval of the use made of the reserve fund at the War Office in connection with the sale of commissions in the Artillery and Engineers, *Duke of Cambridge* 1930–1932, 1951–1957.

Recommendation by the Committee that the practice of purchasing commissions by means of the Army Reserve Fund be discontinued, *Rep.* vi.

ARTILLERY:

Provision of all the full pay retirements in the Royal Artillery, out of a sum of 32,000 *l.* a year, granted as a retiring fund in 1854, *Gambier* 18–23—Great defect in the Artillery as at present constituted, in there being no sufficient outlet at the top to produce a healthy current of promotion, *Brigadier General Lefroy* 444—Summary of witness's views for facilitating retirement, and for improving the efficiency of the service by more rapid promotion, *ib.* 698–703.

Conclusion as to the insufficiency of the inducements to retirement in the Artillery, *Gambier* 710, 711—Augmentation in the Artillery at the time of the late wars, the establishment having been exceptionally low at the time, but being now at its full force, *ib.* 716, 717, 736–740—Sundry details in explanation of witness's scheme for improving the retirement in the Artillery, *ib.* 965 *et seq.*, and *App.* 136, 137.

Witness considers that the present system of retirement in the Royal Artillery, as being confined to the higher ranks, is very insufficient, the retirements being altogether too few to give a proper flow of promotion, *Major General Dickson* 1262–1265—Total of only thirteen retirements on full pay in the last five years, *ib.* 1265.

Witness has considered the question of retirement and promotion in the Royal Artillery, and has prepared a paper on the subject, which he submits to the Committee, *Adye* 1449–1452, and *App.* 138–144—Enumeration of the several causes of the present unsatisfactory condition of the corps in regard to promotion and efficiency, *Adye* 1453, 1454, 1459—Inadequacy of the present grant for retiring allowances in the Artillery, whilst the appropriation is defective, *ib.* 1454.

Contemplated application of the same system of retirement to the Artillery as is proposed by witness for the Engineers, *Ewart* 1747–1752.

Return showing the ages of the six senior officers in each rank of the Artillery, from colonel downwards, in the years 1826, 1836, 1846, 1856, and 1866, *App.* 101—Statement of the length of service of the six senior officers in each rank in the years 1826, 1836, 1846, 1856, and 1866, *ib.* 102.

Return showing the establishment of combatant officers on the 1st January in the years 1826, 1836, 1846, 1856, and 1866, together with the augmentation and reductions which have been made in the several grades during those periods, *App.* 103.

Statement showing the number of officers of each rank on retired full pay in the years 1826, 1836, 1846, 1856, and 1866; also the number and ages of officers permitted to retire in each year since 1826, *App.* 103–105.

Memorandum by Colonel Gambier explanatory of the system of retirement of officers of the Royal Artillery on full pay, *App.* 108, 109.

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Memorandum on the probable position of the officers of the old Royal Artillery in respect to length of service in the years 1875, 1880, and 1885, and the number of retirements that will be necessary if no colonel is continued on the effective list beyond forty years' service; the retirements to be such that no officer shall be a captain beyond twenty-seven years' service, or a lieutenant colonel beyond thirty-four years' service, *App.* 129-134.

Diagram of promotion in the Royal Artillery from 1800 to 1865, *App.* 144.

Conclusion of the Committee as to the inadequacy of the increase during the present year in the sum available for retirements in the Artillery, as compared with the augmentation of the corps since 1854, *Rep.* iii.—Effect of the present regulations, that at a future date promotion in the Artillery will be completely paralysed, *ib.* iv.—Suggestions for the adoption of limit of age for a compulsory retirement from active duties, *ib.* iv-vi.—Also for a graduated rate of retired pay which every officer should be entitled to claim after a given number of years' service, *ib.*

See also *Age of Entry. Ages of Officers. Age Retirements. Annual Retirements. Bonus on Retirement. Captains. Colonels. Commutation of Pensions. Compulsory Retirement. Cost of Retirements. Death Vacancies. General Officers. Half-Pay. India. Lieutenant Colonels. Promotion. Purchase. Reserved List. Sale of Commissions. Seconding of Officers. Service Retirements. Subalterns. Voluntary Retirement.*

B.

Biddulph, Lieutenant Colonel, R. A. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Was for some time military secretary to the Commander in Chief at Madras; has considered the question of retirement in the Artillery, 1523-1527—Very unsatisfactory operation at present of the system adopted in 1854, the condition of the regiment as to the age of the several officers having greatly altered in the interval, 1528-1530—Great improvement since 1854 in the state of the upper ranks on the score of age, 1529, 1530—Want of improvement, more especially in the rank of lieutenant, in which rank the age has increased since 1854; 1529-1531.

Approval of compulsory retirement in the upper ranks at the age of sixty, though this by itself would be far short of what is required, 1532-1547. 1621-1625—Statement in favour of a well-matured scheme of optional retirement after twenty years' service, conjointly with compulsory retirement at the age of sixty, 1548-1567. 1620-1627—Insufficiency of half-pay retirement after twenty-five years' service, 1548-1553—Suggestion that reference be made to the Indian pension rules in fixing the retiring rates, 1553-1555.

Statement explanatory of the arrangements made as to the skeleton or unmanned batteries at the time of the amalgamation of the Indian and Imperial regiments, 1568-1579—Unfavourable effect as regards future promotion by reason of the excess of officers in respect of the unmanned batteries; question hereon whether the lieutenants might not be reduced in the meantime, 1574-1579. 1592.

Grounds for the conclusion that it would be better if young men entered the regiment at the age of eighteen, though with less theoretical acquirements, than at the present age of twenty-one or twenty-two, 1580-1591. 1593-1597. 1636-1646—Statement that the Artillery education is very little learnt at the Academy, 1588. 1593. 1594—Absence of any legal claim of Artillery officers to a retiring allowance unless they have served twenty-five years, 1598-1606. 1615-1618. 1654—Regulation that when an officer is retired on temporary half-pay his promotion is stopped; exception taken thereto, 1607-1620.

Circumstance of there being no unattached or half-pay list for the Artillery, like that for the rest of the service, 1616, 1617. 1647-1649—Advantage of retirement having reference to age rather than length of service, 1622-1625—Approval of a bonus as an inducement to retirement on twenty years' service, 1628-1631. 1655-1659—Opinion as to the necessity of three subalterns for each field battery, 1632-1635.

Question considered whether the age of entering the Academy might not be advantageously reduced, 1636-1642—Severity of the examinations at the Academy, the effect being to increase the age, 1643-1646—Circumstance of a colonel of Artillery going on half-pay being able to sell his commission, 1650-1653—Necessity of Artillery officers, notwithstanding the high standard of examination, going through the staff college in the same way as infantry officers before getting on the staff, 1666.

BONUS ON RETIREMENT:

Advantage if officers were allowed to subscribe privately in order to provide retirement bonuses, with a view to their own promotion, *Brigadier General Lefroy*, 504—Evidence in explanation and support of witness's proposition that the junior officers in the Artillery should be permitted to provide a bonus fund as an inducement to officers to retire at an earlier period than at present, or after fifteen years' service, *ib.* 524 & *seq.* 595-604 & *seq.*—Willingness expressed by about 380 of the captains and lieutenants

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lieutenants to contribute to a bonus fund, *Brigadier General Lefroy* 526—Inducement to many of the younger officers to retire, if they could receive a lump sum in lieu of an annuity, *ib.* 528—Advantage if portion of the sum allowed for retirements in the higher grades were appropriated as bonuses in the lower grades, *ib.* 534-545. 551-562. 572.

Insufficiency of 1,500 *l.* as an inducement to officers to retire after fifteen years' service; probability, however, that there would always be a few officers willing to retire for such sum, *Brigadier General Lefroy*, 545. 549-562—Benefit rather than detriment by the operation of a bonus fund, as the less zealous officers would be the most likely to accept it, *ib.* 573-577—Readiness expressed by a large number of Artillery officers to contribute 10 *l.* a year to a bonus fund; belief that this would be fully compensated in their earlier promotion, *ib.* 596-603—Distinction between the mode of contribution proposed by witness and the proposal to contribute 10 *l.* a year, *ib.* 597, 598—Necessity of a trial of the bonus system for some years in order to prove how it will work, *ib.* 603.

Contemplated provision of a bonus fund by Government and also by the officers, the arrangement being voluntary rather than compulsory in the latter case, *Brigadier General Lefroy*, 604. 618-622—Opinion as to the facility of preventing the payment of much larger bonuses than the prescribed amount, *ib.* 607-610—Belief that no bad feeling would arise through some officers not contributing though sharing in the advantages, *ib.* 620-622. 695, 696—Broad distinction between the bonus system proposed by witness for the Artillery and the purchase system in the Line, *ib.* 632, 633. 696, 697.

Necessity of the proposed system being recognised by the Secretary of State and the Commander in Chief, though at present there is no actual regulation against its voluntary adoption, *Brigadier General Lefroy* 634-637—Though there have been numerous assents some officers have dissented, *ib.* 634—Consideration of objections to witness's proposition as involving the retirement of efficient officers; improvement nevertheless in the general efficiency of the corps, *ib.* 652-662. 697.

Objection to a bonus system as an incentive to retirement in the Engineers, *Kean*^e 1256-1259.

Explanation of witness's scheme for granting a pension and a bonus conjointly on retirement after different periods of service, *Adye* 1457. 1460-1471—Suggestion that two officers of from fifteen to twenty years' service be allowed to retire annually without pension, but with a bonus of 1,000 *l.*, *ib.* 1460-1462. 1471. 1511-1513—Approval of a bonus as an inducement to retirement on twenty years' service in the Artillery, *Biddulph* 1628-1631. 1655-1659.

Disapproval of a bonus contribution by officers as an incentive to retirement, *Duke of Cambridge* 1862.

Disapproval by the Committee of a bonus fund created by the officers, as involving the evils of the purchase system, *Rep.* v—Objection to combining a small bonus with a reduced rate of pension, both to be provided by the State, *ib.*

See also *Commulation of Pensions*.

Burgoyne, General Sir John, Bart., G.C.B. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Considers that at present no great inconvenience arises from the ages of the senior colonels in the Engineers, but that unless there be some amended system of retirement, great inconvenience will be experienced in the future, 1178-1183—If there be a compulsory age retirement as a rule, there should be power to make exceptions, 1181—With regard to the seconding of officers, it is very advantageous to the corps, 1184.

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Cambridge, His Royal Highness the Duke of, K. G. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Considers that the present system of retirement in the Ordnance corps is extremely unsatisfactory, 1839-1842—There is no proper flow of promotion in the junior ranks, whilst in the higher ranks it is altogether accidental whether the retirements are accepted by efficient or inefficient men, 1841, 1842—It would be infinitely preferable if after a certain age or length of service every officer might retire, instead of retirement depending upon a limited fund, 1842, 1843. 1865.

Approval of compulsory retirement at the age of sixty, or after thirty-eight years' service, 1844-1846. 1869. 1925—Proposal that after twenty years' service every officer should have the option to retire, 1847-1849—Careful consideration necessary in fixing the amount of retirement after twenty years' service, 1849-1851—Expediency of improving the rate of retired pay at the centre rather than at the top of the list, 1852.

Approval of the present retirement of 600 *l.* a year, together with a step in rank, being maintained in the case of colonels compulsorily retired at the age of sixty, 1852-1854. 1880—Contemplated establishment also of a separate list for colonels at the age of

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of sixty, on which list they should have a claim to succeed to the major generals' establishment, and the command of battalions, 1855-1857. 1880. 1882-1890.

Advantage if officers retiring after twenty or twenty-five years could commute their annuities, though this would exempt them from any further claim on their services, 1858-1860. 1870. 1879. 1926, 1927. 1958, 1959—Importance of the Commander in Chief being free to dispense with the services of any officer; expediency on this score of a retiring allowance after twenty years' service, 1861. 1871, 1872. 1877, 1878. 1891-1896. —Disapproval of a bonus contribution by officers as an incentive to retirement, 1862 —Hardship in officers who are permanently disabled by ill-health not being placed on permanent half-pay, 1863, 1864—Inexpediency of half-pay being considered as a means of promotion, 1865. 1877, 1878. 1933, 1934.

Evidence in favour of cadets entering the Academy at from fifteen to seventeen years of age, though this would involve the necessity of lowering the examinations, which are now very severe, 1866, 1867. 1942-1946—Preference, on the whole, for the test of service rather than of age, as the basis of retirement, 1869. 1925—Satisfaction expressed with the present system in regard to the seconding of officers, 1873-1876—Approval of a step in honorary rank on retirement, 1881—Decided objection to any reduction in the number of subalterns attached to garrison brigades, 1897. 1947-1949.

Absolute necessity of the unmanned batteries of artillery in India, 1898. 1901. 1950 —Practice in India as to officers of manned batteries being allowed to take civil employments or going into the staff corps; effect as regards promotion, 1899-1903—Advantage in some respects if colonels of Artillery employed in semi-civil duties were seconded, 1904-1906—Expediency of the military authorities having the power of retaining in command any colonel of Artillery or Engineers on arriving at the fixed age for retirement, 1907-1909.

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Wesley, Major General, R.M. Special circumstances connected with the retirement of Major General Wesley on 2*l.* 5*s.* a-day, *Admiral Dacres* 770, 771.

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I N D E X

TO THE

R E P O R T

FROM THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

ON

ARMY (SYSTEM OF RETIREMENT).

*Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,
26 July 1867.*

482—1.

Under 4 oz.

19

R E P O R T

FROM THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

ON

ARMY (INDIA AND THE COLONIES);

TOGETHER WITH THE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE,

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE,

AND APPENDIX.

Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,
26 July 1867.

Tuesday, 26th February 1867.

Ordered, THAT a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the duties performed by the British Army in India and the Colonies; and also to inquire how far it might be desirable to employ certain portions of Her Majesty's Native Indian Army in our Colonial and Military Dependencies, or to organise a force of Asiatic Troops for general service in suitable climates.

Wednesday, 6th March 1867.

Select Committee nominated of—

Viscount Cranborne.	Sir William Russell.
Mr. Childers.	Captain Vivian.
Sir James Fergusson.	Viscount Hamilton.
The Marquis of Hartington.	Mr. Laing.
Captain Hayter.	Lord William Hay.
Mr. Oliphant.	Colonel North.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.	Major Anson.

Ordered, THAT the Committee have power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.

Ordered, THAT Five be the Quorum of the Committee.

Wednesday 13th March 1867.

Ordered, THAT Colonel Percy Herbert be added to the Committee.

Friday, 26th July 1867.

Ordered, THAT the Committee have Power to Report their Observations, together with the Minutes of Evidence taken before them, to The House.

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R E P O R T.

THE SELECT COMMITTEE appointed to inquire into the Duties performed by the ~~British Army~~ in *India* and the Colonies ; and also to inquire how far it might be desirable to employ certain portions of Her Majesty's Native Indian Army in our Colonial and Military Dependencies, or to organise a Force of Asiatic Troops for General Service in suitable Climates ;—
HAVE considered the matters to them referred, and have agreed to the following REPORT :—

YOUR Committee have examined numerous witnesses upon the matters referred to them ; and they have also directed that questions should be sent to a number of persons in high official positions in India and the Colonies. It is not possible that all the answers to these questions should arrive in England within the period to which the Session of Parliament ordinarily extends. They have therefore agreed to report the evidence they have taken to the House, and to recommend that the Committee be re-appointed at the commencement of next Session, for the purpose of considering their Report.

26 July 1867.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE.

Friday, 8th March 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Sir Henry Rawlinson. Captain Hayter. Lord William Hay. Mr. Childers. Viscount Cranborne. Mr. Laing.		Colonel North. Major Anson. Marquis of Hartington. Sir James Fergusson. Mr. Oliphant. Captain Vivian.
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Viscount CRANBORNE was called to the Chair.

Colonel *H. W. Norman* examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at One o'clock.]

Saturday, 9th March 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Major Anson. Sir James Fergusson. Colonel North. Lord William Hay. Mr. Oliphant.		Captain Vivian. Sir Henry Rawlinson. Captain Hayter. Sir William Russell.
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Order of the House of 8th March giving leave to the Committee to sit this day, notwithstanding the adjournment of the House, read.

Colonel *H. W. Norman*, further examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at One o'clock.]

Tuesday, 12th March 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Sir Henry Rawlinson. Major Anson. Captain Vivian. Mr. Oliphant.		Captain Hayter. Lord William Hay. Colonel North. Sir James Fergusson.
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Sir *Walter Elliot* and Colonel *Keys*, were severally examined.

The Committee deliberated.

[Adjourned till Friday next, at One o'clock.]

Friday, 15th March 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Sir James Fergusson.	Lord William Hay.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.	Colonel North.
Mr. Oliphant.	Mr. Childers.
Captain Hayter.	

Colonel *H. H. Clifford*, v.c., examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at One o'clock.]

Tuesday, 19th March 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Major Anson.	Colonel North.
Lord William Hay.	Sir James Fergusson.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.	Sir William Russell.
Mr. Oliphant.	Marquis of Hartington.
Captain Hayter.	Captain Vivian.

Major General *Pears*, Colonel *Probyn*, v.c., Captain *Mends*, R.N., and Lieutenant Colonel *F. M. Baker*, were severally examined.

Lieutenant Colonel *Keyes*, further examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at One o'clock.]

Tuesday, 26th March 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Major Anson.	Colonel North.
Lord William Hay.	Marquis of Hartington.
Viscount Hamilton.	Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. Oliphant.	Captain Hayter.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.	Mr. Childers.
Colonel Percy Herbert.	

Lieutenant General Sir *Hope Grant*, and Sir *Robert Montgomery*, were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Friday next, at One o'clock.]

Friday, 29th March 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Major Anson.
Colonel Percy Herbert.
Lord William Hay.
Sir James Fergusson.
Viscount Hamilton.
Mr. Oliphant.

Captain Vivian.
Colonel North.
Mr. Laing.
Captain Hayter.
Marquis of Hartington.

Colonel *Johnson* and Mr. *Thomas Caird*, were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at One o'clock.]

Tuesday, 2nd April 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Viscount Hamilton.
Lord William Hay.
Mr. Oliphant.
Mr. Laing.
Sir James Fergusson.

Major Anson.
Colonel North.
Colonel Percy Herbert.
Marquis of Hartington.

Sir *George Russell Clerk* and Colonel *Kenneth Mackenzie*, were severally examined.

The Committee deliberated.

[Adjourned till Friday next, at One o'clock.]

Friday, 5th April 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Colonel North.
Sir James Fergusson.
Major Anson.

Colonel Percy Herbert.
Viscount Hamilton.

Colonel *Macdonald* and Mr. *Alexander C. Macpherson*, were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at One o'clock.]

Tuesday, 9th April 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Major Anson.
Colonel Percy Herbert.
Mr. Oliphant.
Colonel North.
Captain Vivian.

Lord William Hay.
Viscount Hamilton.
Marquis of Hartington.
Captain Hayter.
Sir James Fergusson.

Mr. *Henry Taylor* examined.

The

The Committee deliberated.

Motion made, and Question put, "That printed questions be sent out to witnesses to be selected, upon subjects referred to this Committee"—(Mr. *Chairman*).—The Committee divided.

Ayes, 8.
Sir James Fergusson.
Marquis of Hartington.
Captain Hayter.
Mr. Oliphant.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Viscount Hamilton.
Colonel North.
Major Anson.

Noe, 1.
Colonel Percy Herbert.

[Adjourned till Thursday next, at One o'clock.

Thursday, 11th April 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Major Anson.
Lord William Hay.
Colonel Percy Herbert.
Captain Vivian.
Mr. Childers.
Colonel North.
Viscount Hamilton.

Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. Laing.
Captain Hayter.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Mr. Oliphant.
Marquis of Hartington.
Sir William Russell.

The Committee deliberated.

Several questions to be sent to witnesses, agreed to.

Motion made, and Question put, That the following question be sent:—"In case of pressure at home, would it be more advantageous to withdraw European regiments that might be wanted in England from the Colonies, filling up their places with native soldiers from India, or to withdraw them from India"—(Major *Anson*).—The Committee divided :

Ayes, 10.
Sir James Fergusson.
Captain Hayter.
Mr. Oliphant.
Sir H. Rawlinson.
Sir William Russell.
Captain Vivian.
Viscount Hamilton.
Lord William Hay.
Colonel North.
Major Anson.

Noes, 2.
Marquis of Hartington.
Colonel Percy Herbert.

Several other questions agreed to.

[Adjourned till Friday, 3rd May, at One o'clock.

Tuesday, 7th May 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Major ANSON in the Chair.

Colonel North.
Lord William Hay.
Captain Vivian.

Sir James Fergusson.
Colonel Percy Herbert.
Mr. Oliphant.

Captain *Mends*, R.N., further examined.

Lieutenant Colonel *Shadwell* examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at One o'clock.

Tuesday, 14th May 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Major Anson.
Colonel Percy Herbert.
Captain Vivian.
Captain Hayter.
Lord William Hay.

Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. Oliphant.
Colonel North.
Mr. Laing.
Marquis of Hartington.

Sir *Robert Montgomery* further examined.

Mr. *E. B. de Fonblanque* and Colonel *Charles Gordon*, were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Friday next, at One o'clock.]

Friday, 17th May 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Major Anson.
Colonel North.
Mr. Laing.
Colonel Percy Herbert.
Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. Oliphant.

Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Viscount Hamilton.
Captain Hayter.
Marquis of Hartington.
Sir William Russell.

His Royal Highness the Duke of *Cambridge* (attending by permission of the House of Lords) examined.

The Committee deliberated.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at One o'clock.]

Tuesday, 21st May 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Mr. Laing.
Mr. Childers.
Major Anson.
Colonel North.
Sir H. Rawlinson.

Marquis of Hartington.
Sir James Fergusson.
Captain Hayter.
Mr. Oliphant.

Mr. *Ross D. Mangles*, Sir *Henry Storks*, and Major General *Kavanagh*, were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Friday, 12th July, at One o'clock.]

Friday, 12th July 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Major Anson.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Colonel North.
Lord William Hay.

Mr. Oliphant.
Captain Hayter.
Sir James Fergusson.

The Lord *Strathnairn*, attending by permission of the House of Lords, examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

Tuesday, 16th July 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Viscount Cranborne.
Major Anson.

Colonel North.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.

[No quorum being present, the Committee was adjourned till Tuesday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

Tuesday, 23rd July 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Major Anson.
Lord William Hay.
Captain Vivian.
Captain Hayter.
Mr. Laing.

Colonel North.
Sir James Fergusson.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Colonel Percy Herbert.
Viscount Hamilton.

Major-General Balfour, examined.

[Adjourned till Friday next, at One o'clock.]

Friday, 26th July 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Lord William Hay.
Captain Hayter.
Major Anson.

Colonel Percy Herbert.
Viscount Hamilton.
Sir James Fergusson.

Major-General Balfour, further examined.

DRAFT REPORT proposed by the Chairman, read the first and second time, and agreed to.

Ordered, To Report, together with the Minutes of Evidence and Appendix.

EXPENSES OF WITNESS.

Name of Witness.	Profession or Condition.	From whence Summoned.	Number of Days Absent from Home, under Orders of Committee.	Expenses of Journey to London and back.	Allowance during Absence from Home.	TOTAL Expenses allowed to Witness.
James M. Macdonald -	Colonel (Cey- lon Rifles).	Edinburgh -	3	£. s. d. 7 10 -	£. s. d. 3 3 -	£. s. d. 10 13 -

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Friday, 8th March 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.
Mr. Childers.
Viscount Cranborne.
Sir James Fergusson.
Marquis of Hartington.
Lord William Hay.

Captain Hayter.
Mr. Laing.
Colonel North.
Mr. Oliphant.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Captain Vivian.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

Colonel HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, C.B., called in; and Examined.

1. *Chairman.*] WHAT office do you hold?—I am Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department.

2. How long have you held that office?—For five years.

3. *Major Anson.*] Can you give the Committee the numbers of the native army in India, in Bengal, Madras, and Bombay?—The number will be found slightly to vary in any return that you obtain; but according to the latest information that I have had access to, the following was a return of all the ranks of the army in India, exclusive of commissioned officers. Bengal army Proper, 34,890 British soldiers; 45,376 natives. Punjaub frontier force, 11,770 natives. Madras army, 11,576 British soldiers; 29,964 natives. Bombay army, 11,746 British soldiers; 25,452 natives. Hyderabad Contingent, 7,807 natives. Contingents in Rajpootana (including a regiment of Bengal cavalry temporarily under the Governor General's agent), 4,581; the Governor General's body-guard, 127; and the Resident's escort in Nepaul, 94; making a total of 58,212 British soldiers, and 125,171 native soldiers; but the Hyderabad Contingent and the Rajpootana Contingent, I would remark, are maintained under treaties, and are paid for to some extent by the native states.

4. *Colonel North.*] They are included in the total you have given?—Yes; they were separately specified.

5. *Chairman.*] Is not the Hyderabad Contingent entirely paid for by the native state?—A territory is made over which is to cover the expense of it. The Indian establishment of British troops is as follows, exclusive of depôts in England: 20 batteries of horse artillery, consisting of 2,929 men; field and garrison artillery, 8,930 men; eleven regiments of cavalry, 5,069 men; 52 regiments of infantry, 44,744 men.

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There would seem, therefore, on the 1st of October last to have been 3,460 British soldiers wanting to complete the establishment in India.

6. *Major Anson.*] Can you give the Committee the different races of which the native army is composed?—It is rather a long detail.

7. Will you put it in?—An exact return could be obtained from the India Office with regard to each regiment; it is sent home from India periodically; I could give in a general way the composition of each of the armies; perhaps the Committee would wish me to read out the composition of one branch of the service.

8. *Chairman.*] Which branch do you propose to take?—Perhaps, I had better take the Bengal Infantry, which is the largest branch. The composition of the 49 regiments of the Bengal Infantry under the orders of the Commander in Chief, is as follows: 283 Christians—

9. What does that mean?—Most of them are East Indian, I apprehend.

10. Are they natives?—Yes, some few are native Christians.

11. Are there any Karens?—Not in the native army; there are 2,539 Hindoostanee Mahommedans, 2,622 Hindoostanee Brahmins, 3,924 Hindoostanee Rajpoots, 1,007 Jats, 66 Mahrattas, 4,953 other castes of Hindoostanees, 2,889 Punjaubee Mahommedans, 774 Punjaubee Hindoos, 4,850 Sikhs, 1,719 Muzubee Sikhs, 507 Affghans, 664 of the Trans-Indus Border Hill tribes, 29 Belloochees, 36 Persians, 3,319 Goorkas, 1,346 Dogras, and 986 of other Hill men.

12. *Sir James Fergusson.*] Is not there a regulation against there being only one caste or religion in a regiment; is not the maximum proportion of each religion fixed by regulation?—Yes, but certain regiments are race regiments, regiments of one description, such as the Goorka regiments. There are detailed rules in force regulating

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regulating the composition of every regiment in the service, but there are different rules for different regiments; each particular regiment has its own regulations laid down by the Government.

13. *Chairman.*] As to religion or as to race, or both?—The two are very much mixed up together. The Goorka regiments are supposed to be purely Goorkas; they enlist none but Goorkas or men who are supposed to be Goorkas. There are other regiments in which there are a certain proportion of Sikhs, and there are other regiments in which there are a certain proportion of Hindoostanees, but there are rules in force, of which there are no doubt copies in the India Office, as to the composition of the whole of the Indian army, or Bengal army at all events, for that was gone into very carefully a few years ago.

14. *Lord William Hay.*] There are very few real Goorkas in the Goorka regiments, I believe?—I think they are limited in number, except in the 2nd Regiment, which is composed to a great extent of Goorkas.

15. *Mr. Oliphant.*] Those men come very much from Nepaul, do they not?—Most of them come from Nepaul; they are not real Goorkas, or what are generally called Goorkas, but they are better men than Jung Bahadoor's own Goorkas. I have similar information with regard to the other armies.

16. *Chairman.*] Will you hand in those papers?—I will.

17. *Major Anson.*] Do you know which of those races object to being recruited for general service or have religious prejudices against service beyond the seas?—I think all Hindoos have a prejudice against service beyond the seas on religious grounds.

18. *Chairman.*] Does that apply to the Madras regiments?—To a great extent it does.

19. Do they not go to Burmah?—They go, but I do not think they like it.

20. It is not an insuperable objection, then?—With regard to service in Burmah, there was some considerable correspondence many years ago about the employment of Madras troops on foreign service; and it was considered purely optional with a man to go or not up to a comparatively recent date. If a regiment was going on foreign service, the men were given their option of leaving it not very long ago; but when Lord Hardinge was Governor General, he laid it down that there was a broad distinction between service across the seas in our own territory, such as at Burmah and the Straits Settlements and Aden, and foreign service, such as service in China; and he considered that that should be optional with them; but all service in the territories of India, whether it were across the seas or not, should not be optional; and since the year 1856, every enlistment in all the Indian armies has been for general service, distinctly, "wherever ordered, whether by land or by sea," those words being used in the oath taken by the recruit.

21. *Major Anson.*] Since India has been under the Crown, and has ceased to belong to the East India Company, do you suppose that the natives would draw a distinction between Burmah and China, or between Aden and the Mauritius, and other places like that?—I think they would to some extent; they have been accustomed to go to Burmah and the Straits, but if they found

they were going to other places, they would hardly know where the limit would be drawn.

22. There were a great number of Sikh regiments employed in China a short time ago; did they raise any objections on their return home to their employment there?—They raised no objection, and I do not think there would be any difficulty in getting native troops to go on field service anywhere; but what they would object to would be prolonged absence from their families on garrison duty.

23. They were in China for some time after the conclusion of the war; did they raise any objection that you are aware of while they were on garrison duty in China after the conclusion of the war?—I have not heard that they did, but none of them were there for three years; the last regiment returned within three years; if they had been kept longer, I do not know whether they would not have objected. There is a case in point in Java, where the troops were kept some time after the field service had been concluded, and it ended in a very serious mutiny.

24. *Mr. Laing.*] Have not the Madras troops furnished the garrisons for Singapore as well as the Burmese settlements for several years?—The Bengal troops furnished the garrisons for Singapore for many years, and the Madras troops have done that duty now for many years past; but those places have formed part of the Indian territory; the native troops have been accustomed to go there ever since we took the Straits.

25. In fact, have not the Madras regiments been serving beyond seas either in Burmah, Singapore, or China in such numbers that in the course of rotation almost every regiment in the Madras service has had a turn of service beyond the seas?—I suppose every regiment must have had a turn, because eight out of the 52 regiments were always on foreign service.

26. Did you ever hear of an objection on the part of the men in the Madras army to that service?—I believe that evidence could be produced to show that they do not like it at all.

27. *Sir James Fergusson.*] The Madras regiments take their families with them, do they not?—No, not when they go on foreign service.

28. But they differ from the other armies in that particular, do they not; that when in India their families live with them?—Yes.

29. In the other armies the wives and families live in their native villages?—Yes; the families live with the Madras regiments, so that when a regiment moves the total number is 3,000 or 4,000 souls; but when the men cross the sea the families are collected in a depot, and remain there.

30. So that the objection on account of removal would apply even more strongly in the case of Madras soldiers, who usually have their families with them?—Yes, I presume it would. I might mention that several representations were made to the Government of India about the unhealthiness of the troops in the Straits settlements, and that they had not sufficient money to live upon; and that one of the reasons why they had not sufficient money to live upon was that the remittances to their families absorbed so much of their pay that they had not enough left to provide for themselves.

31. *Mr. Laing.*] It would be mainly a question of pay and allowances on the one hand and the length of the service allowed on the other, would it not?—I think not, altogether; the liability

lity to go on foreign service as a regular part of their duty would seriously affect the recruiting.

32. That regulation has applied to the whole of the Madras army for many years back, has it not?—Until we took Burmah, in 1853, they had a comparatively small number on foreign service; there were two regiments on foreign service in China during the war; but there were but few regiments on foreign service compared to what there have been during the last few years.

33. Since 1853 they have had a considerable turn of foreign service in the Madras army, have they not?—Yes; but I have always understood that representations have been constantly made to reduce the foreign service in consequence of the frequency with which the turns came round.

34. Mr. *Oliphant*.] What is the term of foreign service?—Never beyond three years.

35. Lord *William Hay*.] No difficulty is found in getting coolies to go to the West Indies in large numbers, I believe?—They do go in large numbers, I know.

36. Do you know whether any difficulty is found in inducing them to go?—I am not acquainted with the system which is pursued; I cannot say whether any great bounty is offered to them, or not.

37. They are chiefly Hindoos, are they not?—No, I think the majority of the coolies are the people of the Kole districts and the Sonthal districts; I do not think they are regular coolies.

38. Mr. *Oliphant*.] A great many go to Ceylon, do they not?—Yes, but then Ceylon is almost a part of India; there is no difficulty about that.

39. Mr. *Laing*.] Is not the sugar cultivation in the Mauritius carried on almost entirely by coolies from the Madras territory?—It may be; I believe it is carried on by coolies, but I am not sufficiently acquainted with the subject to say from what place they come.

40. *Chairman*.] What share does the religious objection bear in the matter; I do not suppose that the religious objection is in any way affected by the fact of this or that bit of territory belonging to the Government of India, or being under the Colonial Office?—It only applies to the sea voyage.

41. Then the religious objection appears to be pretty well got over?—I do not know whether it can be said to be got over, because a Hindoo would object to going to sea at all.

42. Still he does go?—I do not think the class of men who go as coolies is the same class of men as that which forms our native army.

43. I spoke of the Madras army going to Rangoon?—There are only a comparatively small proportion of Hindoos in the Madras army compared with the other armies, and the voyage to Rangoon is a short voyage by steamer.

44. Still they do go without objection, and I suppose the fact of its being a short voyage or by steamer does not affect the objection against going to sea?—I think it does to some extent, because a Hindoo will not cook on board ship; if he is only on board ship for two or three days, that is a comparatively trivial difficulty, but if he is on board for six weeks or two months, as in the case of the Chinese expedition in 1842, it is a very serious matter; in the case I have mentioned the natives died by hundreds of dysentery.

45. Major *Anson*.] But the Sikhs, and the Affghans, and others, from whom the army is largely recruited, have not got those objections; a Sikh would cook on board ship, would he not?
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—He might; a Goorka certainly would not, and a very strict Hindoo would not.

46. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] Does not it depend mainly upon the question of caste; has not a high-caste Hindoo a very much greater objection to go on board ship than a low-caste pariah?—A much greater objection.

47. Is not it also the case that when any Hindoo comes back, having lost caste, it is absolutely necessary for himself to pay a certain sum in order to regain his caste, and therefore going across sea involves a positive money loss to them?—They have great difficulty in regaining caste at all if they have broken it.

48. Sir *James Fergusson*.] Have very high caste regiments ever to your knowledge been sent across sea?—Yes, I think the two Bengal regiments which were sent to China, one in the year 1840, and the other in the year 1842, were both composed of high caste men, but owing to their prejudices and the difficulty about cooking on board as they were a long time at sea (they were sent in sailing vessels), the mortality among them was very great indeed.

49. Major *Anson*.] But the regiments are not now recruited from the old high caste Brahmins?—Several of the regiments are composed much the same as they were formerly.

50. Sir *James Fergusson*.] There are very few high-caste men in the Madras army, are there?—Comparatively few, in fact, very few. I have the numbers here.

51. Major *Anson*.] Caste does not exist at all among the Sikhs, does it?—No.

52. Lord *William Hay*.] What you have said upon this question does not apply to Mahomedans of any kind, does it?—Certainly not on religious grounds, but they have imbibed so many Hindoo prejudices that, practically, a great many of them will not cook on board ship to my knowledge.

53. Is that on religious grounds, or because they object to going to sea at all?—I think the religious objections could be got over, because there are a great many of them to whom the objection on religious grounds does not apply at all, but I think their dislike to being separated from their families and being sent on foreign service, and especially to distant countries, is so great that the liability to foreign service would have a very serious influence on recruiting.

54. *Chairman*.] As I understand it, your fear is that the liability to foreign service would affect the recruiting, not that the being sent across sea would cause them to mutiny or resist when they have been recruited?—I would not say that, but I think if a rule were to be laid down now, that in future eight regiments of the Bengal army were always to be on foreign service in Mauritius or the Cape, or even at Malta or Gibraltar, there might be great discontent.

55. Major *Anson*.] They would not always be on foreign service; it would be only that occasionally they might have to serve abroad?—There would be a probability that every man would have his turn of foreign service; there would be a liability to foreign service.

56. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] You think that there would be greater difficulty in obtaining recruits under those circumstances?—Yes, and that the existing regiments would strongly object to going. I do not say that it would amount to mutiny on their part, but I think they would not like going at all.

57. Captain *Vivian*.] It would be only a question of pounds, shillings, and pence. I suppose

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pose if you increased their pay that would set it right?—I doubt whether any increase of pay that would be likely to be given to them would compensate them for it. They have a great increase of pay when they go on foreign service now.

58. Captain *Hayter*.] Do the Sikhs entertain all these objections to going across the sea?—Not on account of the caste, but they are so utterly unaccustomed to the sea that I do not think they like it.

59. Lord *William Hay*.] Can you state to the Committee how often regiments have mutinied on proceeding to foreign service, or on being sent or ordered to go on foreign service?—I do not think there have been very many mutinies, but there have been instances of discontent and dissatisfaction. I found that there was some dissatisfaction about the Madras troops in China, when a relief was required after the war; they were retained there for some time; there was some correspondence about it.

60. Major *Anson*.] After which war?—In 1845. In Bengal there was the instance of the 47th Native Infantry, which mutinied when ordered to Burmah, but then that arose out of other questions connected with their pay and allowances.

61. *Chairman*.] Does any desertion take place on those occasions?—From Bengal, in my time, we never sent regiments abroad save on field service.

62. So that you are not very familiar with the question of sending native regiments abroad personally?—I have read a great deal about it.

63. But you have had no actual experience of it?—No; I have had no experience of the sending abroad of the Madras and Bombay regiments beyond reading what has come up in the correspondence.

64. Major *Anson*.] In the case of the Bombay and Madras regiments, they never have deserted when they have had to go to Aden or the Straits Settlements, or to Burmah, have they?—That I cannot say. I observe Lord Hardinge says, in June 1845, writing to the Government of Madras, "The discontent of the regiments in China was notorious; the service at Hong Kong had no longer the stimulus of active service before an enemy in the field, and the Governor General in Council was clearly of opinion that in cases such as Egypt, Java, China, Mauritius, &c., where the service is really foreign service, the option ought to be given. Lord Hardinge also stated in the same despatch, that it would be "imprudent to force the question of foreign service too far with the native army, and that it being voluntary it ought to be made popular by the honour and reputation to be gained against the enemy. Their ardour for foreign service against the enemy should not be damped by permanent garrison duty in remote and unhealthy localities." In the same despatch, the Duke of Wellington was quoted on the proposal to send native troops to the West Indies. His Grace noticed the serious blow which would be struck at recruiting, and observes that "the families would see with disquiet men enlisting in a service which rendered them liable to be sent to an unknown country," and the duke considered these arguments to apply equally to the Cape.

65. Mr. *Childers*.] That was before the native soldiers were enlisted for general service, was it not?—I believe the theory was, that the Madras army was always enlisted for general service, but

in practice a sort of option appears to have been given.

66. Major *Anson*.] It was also at a time when we were in much greater dread of the native army than we are now. It was when we had a far greater number of native troops than our own troops, and when we had a much larger proportion of fortified places in their hands than we have at present; therefore we were very much more afraid of making innovations in anything affecting the native army than we are at present?—Decidedly.

67. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] Are you aware that the sea is called "The Black Water," "Kala-pani," and that a Hindoo has an especial horror of crossing the black water?—Yes.

68. Major *Anson*.] In the Chinese expedition in 1860, our native troops had not only to go from India to Hong Kong, but they were kept on board ship for several weeks together, and that was the case with all classes of native troops. Did you ever hear of any complaint having been made of that as one of the consequences of a state of war on the part of the native soldiers?—No, I heard no complaints, and I have a strong belief that with good officers the present army would go anywhere with a prospect of service.

69. Mr. *Laing*.] Of active service?—Yes, I mean of active service.

70. Marquis of *Hartington*.] Have you the power, if you choose, to send the native troops into Europe?—We have the power to send them anywhere, legally.

71. They are enlisted for general service, just in the same way as an English soldier is?—They are enlisted to serve wherever they are ordered, by land or sea, that is the oath they take.

72. Sir *James Fergusson*.] When you say that you think native regiments will go anywhere, if they are well officered, do you think if a regiment were sent for a course of foreign service, it would be necessary to give it a larger proportion of staff corps officers than the native regiments have at present?—I think if the present system is continued, when it has developed itself, the regiments will not require more European officers than they have at present; indeed I think they would be injured by it; I presume you speak of field service against the enemy.

73. Supposing the Indian regiments were sent for a course of service out of India proper, do you think it would be necessary to send a larger proportion of European officers than they have at present?—I think not; I think that sending officers suddenly to a regiment who do not know the men, and who, perhaps, are not picked officers for the service, would be rather detrimental than otherwise.

74. When you said just now, "If the present system is continued," you meant, I presume, the present system of keeping officers as far as possible in the regiments to which they are posted?—Yes.

75. If the officers were moved about from one regiment to another, it would be necessary to add to their number, would it not?—I think it is very undesirable that they should be often moved about.

76. In that case you could not depend upon the number of officers being sufficient?—It would render the corps less efficient, certainly.

77. Mr. *Laing*.] Did they not send additional doing duty officers with all the regiments that went to China during the late war?—They did, but then they had not the system of European officers

officers commanding wings and squadrons which they have now; a native regiment then had only a commandant, a second in command, who had no real assigned duties, and an adjutant; now an infantry regiment has an experienced officer to command each wing, as a sort of major, and a cavalry regiment has an officer to command each squadron, besides which, they both of them have a quartermaster, two subalterns attached, and a medical officer.

78. Colonel North.] What is the strength of a regiment?—Seven hundred and twelve of all ranks for an infantry regiment, and 427 for a cavalry regiment.

79. Including the officers?—Excluding the European officers, which are eight in number in each case, but including the medical officer.

80. Are the non-commissioned officers any of them Europeans?—No, none of them.

81. Sir Henry Raulinson.] Are none of the serjeant-majors Europeans?—No.

82. Captain Vivian.] How many mounted officers are there?—They are all considered to be mounted if wanted; they all draw horse allowance.

83. Chairman.] Will you now give the Committee some idea of the mode of recruiting adopted for native regiments?—For regiments serving in India the recruiting has been carried on entirely under the orders of the commanding officer of the regiment; if he finds his regiment is running short, he obtains permission to send a small recruiting party into the district where he wants to get a particular class of men.

84. Do you mean to say that that course is adopted whenever a vacancy occurs?—No; suppose there are a good many vacancies, and recruits are not coming in readily at the head quarters of the regiment, the commanding officer then gets this permission.

85. Then there is a certain amount of spontaneous recruiting going on constantly?—A great deal; the relatives of men in the regiment come to enlist sometimes in expectation of a vacancy, and at other times knowing that there is a vacancy. If a regiment is away from the usual recruiting districts, the plan resorted to is, to send a non-commissioned officer and two or three men to the district from which they wish to get recruits, to raise them and bring them to the regiment. If the recruits are approved, they get the travelling allowance, that is an allowance for travelling from the district from which the recruits come.

86. Is anything per head given to the recruiting officer?—No.

87. Is there any bounty given to the recruit?—No, not at present.

88. Major Anson.] Has any question of giving a bounty been raised in India?—There has been a question raised about it, but it has not been done as yet. There was some difficulty two or three years ago about recruiting, and the pay was supposed to be insufficient in consequence of the dearness of provisions. The Madras Government strongly represented the difficulty they had in raising recruits, and said that the men were altogether half starved. They had not sufficient pay, which was not met altogether by the allowance that was given to them on account of the dearness of provisions, and certain advantages were then given to the native army by the Government of India after considerable correspondence; but instead of a direct increase of pay, it was given in the shape of giving good conduct

pay at earlier periods of service, and making some advantageous alterations in the regulations for compensation for dearness of provisions. I might mention that each native soldier, if the articles which comprise his ration exceed in price half his pay, that is Rs. 3. 8. a month, is entitled to compensation for the difference.

89. Chairman.] Does he find his own lodging?—The huts are built at some places; they are now found by the Government altogether; at other places the sepoy receives an allowance on coming to a new station for the construction of his hut, or on coming to an old one for the repair of his hut.

90. Colonel North.] Every article of his kit is found, I suppose, as he gets no bounty?—No; his coat and pantaloons are found for him, but his shoes and white clothing, and so on, are found by himself, and deductions are made from his pay for them, but those come rather heavily on a recruit; afterwards they are comparatively small. In the Bengal Army the deductions are limited to five rupees per annum.

91. Major Anson.] That does not apply to a recruit during his first year of service, does it?—During the first year of a recruit's service, the deductions are much greater, and it was thought if the measure became necessary that it would be a most desirable thing to give him a free kit.

92. What is the actual pay of a sepoy?—A sepoy on enlistment, and not on foreign service, receives seven rupees a month in all the three presidencies.

93. Is that the pay of an infantry soldier?—Yes, for an infantry soldier; a cavalry soldier on enlistment now receives 27 rupees a month; out of that he has to furnish his horse, and arms, and clothing, and to keep his horse.

94. What is the pay of the men when they go upon foreign service?—The ordinary rate of pay, and they receive in addition the old full batta, which was Rs. 3. 8, and if at sea, provisions, or if they do not receive provisions they receive Rs. 3. 8. in lieu of provisions. There may be some local differences here and there, but in the main that is what a sepoy receives; and each grade receives also the full batta of its grade. In the year 1864, it was proposed to employ two sepoy regiments in China, and we were called upon for an estimate of the cost; the establishment of European officers put down differed slightly from the present establishment; the present establishment has the advantage in point of economy, but only to a very small extent. It was supposed then that to cover every cost of paying the men, feeding them, clothing them, arming them, relieving them, and hutting them; and to allow for the cost of pensions, 560 rupees annually would be required for every man in the regiment, that is, 56 l. The cost of a regiment thus estimated would be about 39,000 l. per annum, that includes the European officers.

95. That was in China?—Yes; giving them what I mentioned, that is, seven rupees for each sepoy, Rs. 3. 8. for batta, and Rs. 3. 8. for provisions.

96. Captain Vivian.] That is 56 l. per head per soldier?—Yes; including the European officers and the native officers.

97. Including the whole expense of the regiment?—Yes.

98. Major Anson.] I think you included in that the hutting of the men?—Yes.

99. That would be far heavier last year than it will be in subsequent years, would it not?—

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That is the average of what it costs us in India. I do not know that it would cost less in China.

100. What is the average cost of a native soldier in India, including all those things?—I am not prepared to say, it varies so much in different parts of the country according to whether he gets compensation for provisions or not; an average might be struck, but it would not be of any practical use, I think.

101. *Chairman.*] Is there any part of the country now where you have any difficulty in recruiting?—I am informed constantly that the men wish to take their discharge in considerable numbers, and that pressure is put upon them by the commanding officers to keep them in; it is said, that the pay is hardly sufficient to retain them in the infantry.

102. Is that the case all over the country?—We have had representations from Bombay and from Madras, and the commanding officers have said so in Bengal, but the present efficiency of the establishment of native infantry in the three Presidencies, and the Punjaub frontier force, is 94,695 men, and the actual number on the 1st of October was 92,065, leaving 2,630 men wanting to complete the establishment, although the great reductions of late years have lessened the demand for recruits, and have left a good many supernumerary native officers, and non-commissioned officers. Of this deficiency 880 vacancies are in the Bengal native regiments.

103. Is there any more difficulty in recruiting now than there was before the words were inserted in the oath, "wherever ordered by land or sea"?—There is a greater difficulty, because there was very little difficulty then, but the army has been reduced by more than 100,000 men since that time.

104. I suppose if there is an increase of difficulty it is more to be attributed to the rise in the price of provisions than to the words of the oath?—I should conclude so, for I do not think the men believe that they are liable to foreign service as a rule, although they take this oath.

105. Do you know any part of the country where the recruiting has been hindered by the fact that regiments have been sent abroad either to Rangoon or elsewhere?—No; but no regiment from Bengal has been sent abroad except on field service.

106. You have never heard from Madras of a difficulty which has been stated to arise from that source?—No, I have not.

107. *Mr. Laing*] The general rise of wages throughout the country must account for a great deal of the increased difficulty in recruiting, must it not?—No doubt, and the rise in the price of provisions, and other things also. People formerly given to warlike pursuits are now settling down as agriculturists and traders.

108. Then, in fact, the effect of obliging every regiment to serve across the sea, if it had any effect, would be that of excluding the high caste men, who were the most dangerous before the mutiny, and might be the most dangerous again, if they preponderated in any regiment?—I am not at all certain that they are the most dangerous.

109. *Major Anson.*] They are more likely to be discontented, and more likely to be worthless as soldiers, are they not?—They are not such good soldiers; I do not know that they are more likely to be discontented, except about caste matters.

110. *Mr. Oliphant.*] Some regiments are composed exclusively, I suppose, of one race, as, for

instance, the Goorkas; but others are mixed, as I understand it?—Yes.

111. Are the castes mixed also?—Yes, the castes are mixed sometimes. There has been a desire to avoid uniformity in the composition of regiments as much as possible; some are composed of various races, by companies, and others are composed entirely of one race, but those are few. In the Madras army no alteration has been made.

112. Do you think that the system of mixing the castes and races is a good system, or that it would be more easy to get regiments recruited for foreign service by classifying them?—I should be sorry to give a positive opinion about it, seeing how much the matter has been discussed, and how many valuable opinions have been given on both sides, but I think it is desirable to avoid uniformity in the army, and to have regiments of different kinds; to have some class regiments, and some mixed regiments; it may sometimes be desirable to employ class regiments, and it may sometimes be very desirable to employ regiments which have no preponderance of any one class.

113. By having them mixed you might always have some men in one regiment who might object to going on foreign service, but if you had class regiments you might have some regiments where there would be no men who would have any objection to going?—You might get over the difficulty in that way, but regiments of one class, if they were in their own part of the country, would be very dangerous in case of insurrection.

114. *Lord William Hay.*] How do you account for there being so few Mahrattas in the Bengal army?—The Mahrattas mainly enlist in the Bombay army; there are very few in the Bengal army.

115. *Major Anson.*] You have stated that the pay of a native soldier is seven rupees a month; have they not to find out of that seven rupees a month the whole of their food?—Yes, entirely.

116. *Mr. Laing.*] Can you give any estimate of the comparative expense of a European regiment and a native regiment of the same force in India?—I believe that a European regiment costs nearly double what a native regiment costs, but I speak with some doubt about that.

117. Is not the difference considerably more than that?—If you include the cost of the barracks it may be, but the new standard barracks are hardly constructed yet, and we have no means of knowing what the cost will be.

118. If you include rations, and provisions consumed, ought not the estimate to be something like 100,000 *l.* for a European regiment against 35,000 *l.* for a native regiment?—I do not think it is as high as that; I have seen an estimate which puts the cost of each European soldier at 60 *l.* or 70 *l.* a year.

119. *Major Anson.*] Can you give the Committee some idea of what the pensions are of the soldiers after a certain length of service?—The pensions vary according to the grades; four rupees is the pension of a sepoy.

120. Per month?—Yes; four rupees per month.

121. After how many years' service?—If he is invalided after 15 years' service, but he must be declared to be invalided and unfit for service in order to get that pension. Formerly he could never get a pension unless he was invalided, and declared to be unfit for service, but now the rule has been relaxed, and after 40 years' service he can get a pension; but in the Madras and Bombay

bay armies, the pension rules have certainly been more open; they have allowed men to go more easily.

122. Mr. Childers.] What is the term of enlistment, or is there any term?—There is no term; a man can always claim his discharge in time of peace, provided his regiment or troop is not more than 10 below its strength.

123. Major Anson.] After any number of years' service?—After three years' service.

124. Will you state what are the arrangements for the wives and families of the native soldiers?—In Bengal, and I believe to some extent in Bombay, they do not live with the regiments.

125. They leave them at home?—Yes.

126. Do the Government transmit to them the men's pay?—The men are most regular in remitting a portion of their pay to their families; those who do not do so are very much looked down upon in their corps.

127. That is done by the men, not by the Government?—It is done by the men, but facilities are afforded to them by the Government for doing it; they get drafts on the treasuries.

128. Sir James Fergusson.] The men get long furloughs, do they not?—Yes, they get long and frequent furloughs in the Bengal regiments; the men are in the habit of taking their discharge if the furlough is stopped at all; they are very fond of going to their families; in Lower Bengal the men object, and are desirous to get out of the service, if they are kept away from their families more than two years.

129. Chairman.] Do they get all their pay when they are on furlough?—They get Rs. 1. 8. deducted out of the seven rupees, leaving Rs. 5. 8.

130. Is there any limitation to the amount of furlough?—Furlough is usually only given in the hot weather to a certain per-centage of men, as laid down in the general orders.

131. For how long a time is the furlough given?—About seven months. If the regiment is near the homes of the men, that is divided into two or three periods, so that two or three sets of men go on furlough in the seven months; besides that, in the hot weather when the regiments are near their homes, an extra number of men get leave between musters to go to their homes.

132. Then this pay which you have spoken of is given them all the year round without deduction, though you lose a portion of the regiment?—We do not lose a portion of the regiment; 10 per cent. is the number fixed for furlough at a time during seven months.

133. Major Anson.] Do you give each man a furlough every year?—No; it may come round about every three or four years; it depends on how near the men's homes the regiment is; if it is at a distance, each man gets seven months; if it is near, each man gets half that time, and then the turn comes round quicker.

134. Lord William Hay.] The Goorka regiments have their families with them, have they not?—Yes.

135. All the Goorka regiments?—Yes.

136. Sir James Fergusson.] In the Madras army the families always live in the lines, do they not?—Yes.

137. How is it in the Bombay army?—As far as I am informed, they keep a certain medium between the Madras and the Bengal systems, but certainly a great many of their men have not

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their families with them, because a great many of their recruits are or were from Bengal.

138. Chairman.] Do those whose families live in the lines require furlough?—I do not think the Madras army takes furlough to the extent that the Bengal army does.

139. Mr. Childers.] If the native troops were sent to a colony which had been garrisoned by European troops, could they be put into the barracks where the European troops had been?—They could certainly; that is to say, a native regiment on foreign service without its families could.

140. Would there be any objection on the part of the men to that being done?—I think not; they would probably like to run up partitions, and they would rather injure the barracks by their habits.

141. Sir Henry Rawlinson.] Do you not think they would object to being shut in out of the air, accustomed as they are to pendals?—I do not know that that would be a very serious objection, because in many forts they are put into places much more enclosed than the ordinary run of barracks.

142. Colonel North.] When a native regiment is ordered to do garrison duty at Gibraltar or Malta, or at any places of that kind, would they be obliged to bring all their families with them?—No, I presume not; they never take their families on foreign service.

143. I do not know whether that would be considered foreign service or not?—I presume they would be relieved within three or four years. Certainly it would add greatly to the difficulty and expense of sending them if they were allowed to take their families.

144. Chairman.] Otherwise you say they would get discontented, unless they got furlough every two or three years?—Yes, unless they were relieved every two or three years.

145. In fact, without their wives and families they would not stay more than two or three years in one place?—I think they would object very strongly to doing so; they are all married, as a rule.

146. Sir James Fergusson.] Besides their wives they have a number of relations living with them, have they not?—Where they have their wives, they have their friends living with them to a certain extent.

147. Lord William Hay.] The Goorkas have a particular objection, have they not, to being separated from their wives and families?—A great objection; we have had to do it sometimes even in India: for instance, when a Goorka regiment went to Bushire, we had constant applications from them to be relieved, or to have their families sent up; and the other day we had to move a regiment on that account.

148. Chairman.] Does that apply to the Affghan Hill soldiers you have referred to; are they equally anxious to have their wives and families with them, or to return to them?—To return to them. In the case of Coke's Rifle Corps, which was mainly composed of Border Affghans, he has told me that if the men could not pretty often get to their homes, they wished to take their discharge, and in some cases they had deserted.

149. Is there any race in India which will be contentedly absent for five years from India without their wives and families?—I am not aware of any.

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150. Do you think that any efforts of money would overcome their objection?—I suppose a sufficiently high offer would tempt men to do almost anything; but I do not think anything which is likely to be offered to them would compensate for their continued absence.

151. Mr. *Oliphant*.] Would it not be cheaper to relieve native regiments every three years than to relieve European regiments every five years, considering the great difference in the cost of the regiments?—You mean, I presume, if the European regiments were relieved from England?

152. European regiments are now generally stationed for five years in a place, for instance, at Malta; would it not be cheaper to make a transfer of a native regiment more often, considering how much cheaper the cost of a native regiment is?—I have not sufficient information to say whether it would or not; but I apprehend that from most stations there would be a constant return of men on sick leave from the foreign stations, and their places would have to be supplied. I think that would not apply to the stations in the Mediterranean, for I apprehend that they would agree with them pretty well.

153. *Chairman*.] Are you aware that Colonel Merewether has organised a force at Aden of Belloochees?—Yes, a small force.

154. Do you imagine that they will not be able to remain five years at Aden without being relieved?—They may have peculiar advantages, and he has peculiar influence over that class of men, from his knowledge of them; but I am not aware of the circumstances under which that force has been organised.

155. Mr. *Laing*.] Do you know how long the native regiments which have been stationed at Aden have remained there?—They have never remained more than three years; that is the only foreign station that the Bombay army has, so that the turn to serve there comes round very seldom, and there are many men in the Bombay army, of course, who have never seen Aden.

156. The cost of the relief would depend mainly upon the distance of the station; take, for instance, Mauritius. The cost of relieving the regiment there every three years from Bombay would be very small as compared with the cost of relieving a European regiment, which would have to come all the way from England?—Yes, necessarily.

157. Colonel *North*.] I think you stated that an Indian regiment, with all its appendages, would amount to 4,000 souls; have the men followers besides their wives and children?—The amount of followers of a native infantry regiment on foreign service would be very few, if you did not take their families.

158. I mean taking their families?—That would, of course, vary; it is estimated at from 3,000 to 4,000 souls for an infantry regiment in India. The number of followers for an infantry regiment on foreign service is only 56.

159. Supposing the system of a native infantry regiment being stationed in European quarters, such as Malta and Gibraltar, were adopted; and, supposing they brought their families with them, do you think that their number would amount to anything like 3,000 or 4,000?—I am informed so.

160. Captain *Vivian*.] What limit do you put to the followers of a regiment; the number, 3,000 or 4,000, of course includes many besides the wives?—I am not aware of any limit in the

case of a regiment in cantonment; of course there are the wives and mothers, and so on.

161. Do you allow each man to take as many as he likes?—I am not aware of any limit; of course they do not go on service.

162. Sir *Henry Raulinson*.] Are you aware of any case of a regiment having taken their wives and children on foreign service?—No; I believe it would be quite impracticable.

163. Sir *James Fergusson*.] To remove troops who have been always accustomed to live amongst their families, as in the case of the Madras army, or to make frequent visits to them, as in the case of the Bengal army, to a foreign station for from three to five years, makes a very great and violent change in their habits, does it not?—Yes, undoubtedly.

164. In many points of view the removal of an Asiatic regiment in that manner is open to serious objections, is it not?—Yes, it is, in my opinion. There is, of course, the alternative of having local regiments composed of men who enlist specially for foreign service; but I think they would be inferior to the existing regiments of the army.

165. Mr. *Childers*.] Would the objection you have just mentioned extend to the Mauritius; do you think there would be any difficulty in substituting a native regiment for a European regiment in the Mauritius, with three years' reliefs?—Mauritius is nearer than some other places, but I think there would be great difficulty about it.

166. Practically it is very little further than Aden?—Anything that added to the amount of foreign service, or cross sea service, for the native troops would be viewed with dislike.

167. Is it much further, or at all further, than Singapore?—It is certainly further; I do not know what the exact distance is, or how long the steamers take going, but it would add to the amount of foreign service.

168. Do you think that they would distinguish between the Mauritius and Rangoon?—I think they would; they are very acute, and rather over-suspicious at to new measures being brought into force.

169. Major *Anson*.] The system pursued by the Government with respect to the Madras army, as regards the wives and families of the soldiers, gives them a far greater power over the soldier than the system pursued by the Bengal and Bombay Governments, does it not?—Yes, but you could not alter the system prevailing in the Bengal army so as to let them have their wives with them, as the men have in the Madras army; they leave their wives in the villages; they have been accustomed to that system, and you could not carry out the Madras system in Bengal.

170. Lord *William Hay*.] What becomes of the wives of the soldiers in the Madras army when a regiment goes on foreign service?—They remain in dépôt somewhere.

171. Where?—I suppose it depends upon the station from which the regiment marches.

172. Do they remain in dépôt at that station?—Not necessarily at that station; they might be moved to a dépôt in their own provinces.

173. Sir *James Fergusson*.] Has it been found very demoralising to a regiment to be quartered as they are at Aden, for a period of years?—I have not heard so; I have not heard that there is a great mortality or sickness in Aden, but the regiments that were in China in the years 1842, 1843, 1844, and 1845, were greatly disorganised.

174. I mean

174. I mean to ask whether it has been found to be the case, or whether you would be apprehensive that it would be the case, that a regiment would become seriously demoralised from the change in their domestic habits?—I have had no experience on the subject, and Aden is such a peculiar place that we could hardly judge by that. It is almost a mere fortification.

175. I think, therefore, it would bring out what I wish to know in the very strongest way?—I have never heard that they are demoralised by being at Aden.

176. Major *Anson*.] The immorality, and the drunkenness, and crime, in a native regiment is infinitely less than in a European regiment, is it not?—Infinitely less; drunkenness is the rarest possible thing except amongst certain men. The Sikhs occasionally may drink a little, but very much less than the Europeans, and they are seldom in hospital from any diseases owing to themselves.

177. Sir *James Fergusson*.] Gross immorality is very rare because the habits of the men are extremely domestic, is not that the case?—Yes; and if a man commits immorality he is looked down upon by his colleagues.

178. But if you removed a regiment from the habits to which the men had always been accustomed, it would probably make an utter change in the characters of the men, would it not?—It might, but I am not able to say.

179. Major *Anson*.] Have you looked at the medical reports of the army in China for the last five or six years?—Yes, I have.

180. Have you observed with regard to such a question as that which was being referred to that the venereal diseases are almost unknown in the native regiments, whereas a very large proportion of the European regiments have suffered from them?—I am quite aware of that from my own experience of the native regiments. There are very few men in hospital with venereal disease, or unfit for duty on that account.

181. *Chairman*.] What is the origin of the practice of the families living in the lines in the Madras army; do you know whether it prevailed under the princes who preceded us, under the Nabob of the Carnatic?—I presume it must have done so, because it appears to have been in existence as soon as the Madras army came under our control.

182. Does it exist in Hyderabad?—It does exist in the Hyderabad Contingent.

183. And on the Nizam's force?—I do not know.

184. Marquis of *Hartington*.] You are not aware of any moral objections which there would be to garrisoning the European stations with native troops, leaving their families behind them; Malta, for instance?—It is difficult to say; the thing has never been tried, I think.

185. Should you have any apprehension of making the experiment?—I do not think I should have much apprehension with a good commanding officer. I think that the tendency of natives to run riot has been rather exaggerated, as far as I can see, in the public press.

186. Sir *James Fergusson*.] For instance, is the general conduct of the native regiments quartered at Hong Kong, or has anything in their conduct towards the inhabitants, been bad?—I never heard any complaints, and I see that General D'Aguiar, in writing to the Madras Government about the conduct of the regiments

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at Hong Kong which suffered very severely, speaks very highly of the native regiments.

187. *Chairman*.] You do not think that they would be worse at Malta than the English soldiers?—I should think not, if they went there contentedly.

188. Mr. *Childers*.] Would you have any hesitation in trying the experiment at the Mauritius, where there is a very large Indian population?—On those grounds I should not, with a good commanding officer.

189. *Chairman*.] It depends singularly, does not it, on the character of the commanding officer in dealing with native troops whether they behave well or ill?—To a very great extent.

190. Much more so than with European troops?—To a very much greater extent, for a good British regiment with a good system is not very much affected for a long time by a change of commanding officers, but a native regiment looks to its commanding officer in a way that is quite unknown to British soldiers, I believe.

191. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] If you were to ask a native regiment, either a Sikh or an ordinary Bengal regiment, to volunteer, not for field service, but for garrison duty, do you think they would go willingly; would they volunteer?—I do not think they would go willingly; certainly not unless very great advantages were held out.

192. Mr. *Childers*.] In the shape of more batta?—Yes.

193. Mr. *Oliphant*.] Do you think it would be possible to recruit regiments who would go willingly out of any class in India?—Yes, with very great advantages. In Bengal we had certain regiments called General Service Corps, they took the duty for many years in Arracan and in the Straits. There was no difficulty in recruiting the number of men we wanted for those corps.

194. Captain *Vivian*.] All the men are now recruited for general service, are they not?—Yes.

195. And they know very well that they are liable to be sent at any time across the seas?—They know that they are liable, but they know that it is not done.

196. At all events they know that they are liable?—If they do not it is their own fault, for they take the oath, which says so expressly.

197. Is the supply of recruits equal to the demand?—As I showed, there are about 2,600 men wanting to complete the Indian establishment, but I have not the slightest doubt that the men believe that they never will be sent across the sea, except for field service, without their own consent.

198. Is there any secret understanding with them when they are enlisted, that although they take this oath, they are still to be kept in India?—None whatever; they only judge by the practice of past years.

199. Major *Anson*.] Could we obtain a return of the numbers and races of the native soldiers who have been employed in China, Aden, and Burmah?—I think so, but the ordinary regiments have gone, quite irrespective of race, except that a Belooch regiment was sent from Bombay a little time ago to China, and remained there three years.

200. Could we get a return of the races of the native troops employed in China since we have employed native troops there?—I think so.

201. Mr. *Childers*.] You stated that the native troops

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troops would require peculiar advantages if they were sent beyond seas to do garrison duty; at what do you assess those peculiar advantages; in the case of the Mauritius, for instance, would the whole batta be enough?—No, that they are entitled to by regulation.

202. How much besides would be required?—I cannot say, but I should think to make them like to go, it would have to be a considerable addition.

203. How much would you add to that normal rate of 56 l., at which you estimated the cost of a native regiment per head at Hong Kong?—I should say if you were to give them double batta that would be equal to about 4 l. extra. I do not say that that would be successful, but that that would be as far as you could think of going.

204. That would raise the cost per head from 56 l. to 60 l.?—Yes, it would give them double batta and rations, or an allowance in lieu of rations.

205. And you think that that would be sufficient to make the men satisfied with going, say to the Mauritius?—No, I do not think so; I am not certain unless you were to give them something which it would be quite out of the question to give, that they would be satisfied to go.

206. To go for three years' service on garrison duty to Mauritius?—I do not think you would satisfy them.

207. How much would you add for that purpose if you can reduce it to figures?—It is a pure matter of conjecture as to what would be necessary; I cannot say that I feel certain that any pecuniary reward which it is possible to give would make them contented, say double pay, for example.

208. Major Anson.] You have not commanded a regiment or had anything to do with soldiers who have been ordered abroad, have you?—I have talked to them very often, both before they have gone and after they have come back.

209. Mr. Childers.] Would any peculiar advantages be wanted in the case of Ceylon?—Ceylon is almost part of India; I do not think there would be any difficulty in ordering a Madras regiment to Ceylon on the ordinary terms.

210. Would any peculiar advantages be wanted for the Straits settlements after they ceased to be part of the Government of India?—No; I think if a Madras regiment had been kept there not a word would have been said, because they do not know anything about the Colonial Office.

211. Captain Vivian.] Have they their wives and families there with them?—No, I think not.

212. Mr. Childers.] Would more than 56 l. per head be wanted to keep up the reliefs at Hong Kong; I mean to keep up a number of native regiments relieved every three years?—Not if the regulated pay given in this estimate is adhered to; it would only cost 56 l., including the reliefs.

213. You think that at 56 l. a head, the reliefs being for three years, there would be no difficulty in future?—No; I do not say that there would be no difficulty about making men contented or making them like to go.

214. Cannot you put down any figure at which they would be contented to go, they having been accustomed for many years to go to China?—They have not been accustomed to go

to China to garrison it; after each war troops have been kept there for a certain period until other arrangements could be made; that is all.

215. How many years is it since the last war?—Six or seven years; there are no native troops there now, nor have there been for some years.

215.* Mr. Childers.] Only two years, I think?—Yes, they were withdrawn two years ago.

216. Major Anson.] They were there for three years?—Yes, they were relieved by two regiments from Bombay.

217. Mr. Childers.] At what price could that practice have been kept up?—I suppose it could have been kept up at 60 l. per head if it had been continued to that extent, namely, two regiments.

218. Chairman.] It has been suggested by various persons that the evils which arise from the very large disparity of the sexes would be very much aggravated in the case of Asiatics left for several years on garrison duty; is it your opinion that that does apply to the character of the Indian soldiers as you know them?—I am afraid it might to some extent after a considerable period of absence from their families and female society.

219. Would it apply more to any one race in India than to others?—I do not know much about it, but I believe it would be the case with the Sikhs and Affghans more than with Hindoos of caste.

220. Lord William Hay.] In the case of Affghans it would not make them worse than they are now, or than they are supposed to be now, would it?—I do not think that they are very bad in the sense you mean in the regiments; we know that in their own country their habits in their towns are very bad, but I do not think such a thing is tolerated in any of the regiments composed of Affghans.

221. Do you think their being employed on foreign stations would make any alteration in their moral conduct?—I think so, because they go home now from time to time.

222. Sir Henry Rawlinson.] Can you tell me where these 507 Affghans are employed; do those numbers you mentioned of Affghans employed in the Bengal army include details from the different regiments, or do they form one distinct body?—They are mixed up in regiments. These 507 are pure Affghans from Afghanistan; but there are a much greater number of Border men, such as Afreedies and Eusufzais; but the largest number of Affghans, I may mention, is in the Punjaub frontier force, whose proportion I did not give. There are 1,853 Affghans, and Border Affghans, in the Punjaub Infantry.

223. Sir James Fergusson.] In some regiments there are whole troops, or half troops, of Affghans, are there not?—Yes; what I gave was the number of the infantry; I have the number in the cavalry here.

224. In some cases there are whole troops of Affghans, are there not?—Yes.

225. Lord William Hay.] Can you account for there being so few Mahrattas in the Bengal army?—An effort was made after the mutiny to raise two regiments of Mahratta infantry and two regiments of Mahratta cavalry, but very few would enlist; it appears that though numbers of them go into the army they have a great field for enlisting in Scindia's service; he has 4,000 or 5,000 cavalry.

226. They prefer the local service?—Yes. The designation

designation of Mahratta had to be given up altogether in the regiments which we commenced to raise as a Mahratta regiment, because so few enlisted.

227. Major *Anson*.] You have already given us, I think, the number of European troops in India; will you give the Committee your opinion as to the necessity of maintaining this number, and the causes of their increase since 1857?—The increase of European troops, though larger on paper, has actually been only about 13,000 men, which does not seem excessive, considering that we have substituted European artillery for native artillery, and that we garrison all forts and arsenals with European troops now, which we did not before; for instance, Delhi, one of the largest places, was entirely in the hands of native troops, and sanitary considerations also have led the Government to keep a larger percentage of men on the hills in convalescent depôts, they being supposed to require a change of air; and, whilst there is an increase of 13,000 in the number of the Europeans, there is a decrease of 107,000 in the native troops, who were, of course, very useful for many duties. I think that our present army is not an excessive European army for India, when we consider that it garrisons Burmah and Aden, as well as India proper; it protects something like 4,000 miles of frontier, and though there are railways in progress, they do not as yet touch many parts of the country, and the line of railway for hundreds of miles in places is without a single soldier upon it, and is therefore liable to be destroyed and taken up.

228. What is your opinion of the advantage of having fortified places in India for Europeans to garrison?—I think there is a great advantage in having a certain number of them, not too many, so as not to force too many troops to be devoted to their defence in time of war; but wherever you have an arsenal, I think there ought to be a decent sort of fortification, which might also be a place of refuge for the European population in the surrounding country.

229. What fortified places are there in India at the present moment which would require European troops to garrison them?—There is Fort William, a large fortification and arsenal, which is absolutely necessary to be held by European troops, I think. Then there is Allahabad, a large arsenal, and a very important strategical point for the North-Western Provinces. At Benares, the arsenal is probably a small one, but it is a very large and important city; it commands the passage of the Ganges. Agra is also a very important position, and it has an arsenal; at Gwalior there is a fort, and it appears desirable that we should hold it.

230. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] That is not garrisoned by Europeans, is it?—Yes, it has been ever since the mutiny.

231. *Chairman*.] That is not very much in the way of a fort, is it?—No; but as long as we had a garrison at Gwalior, and by treaty we have one, it was considered very undesirable that we should give up the fort. For some time a sort of promise had been given to Scindia that he should have the fort; but it appeared impossible to let him have the fort, and let our comparatively weak garrison remain there with his large army in the cantonment, he holding the fort. He was, therefore, induced to let us keep the fort, upon allowing him to have more field artillery than he had previously had.

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232. Sir *James Fergusson*.] It was through the fort in Gwalior that the Europeans were saved, was it not?—I think it was more owing to their getting to Agra.

233. The Rajah would not have been able to save them if they had not been in the fort?—I think they got to Agra as soon as they could.

234. *Chairman*.] They are building fortifications at Peshawur, are they not?—Yes; it is very desirable to have a fortified place there; there was an old Sikh fort, but it is tumbling down; it is very badly situated, and hardly strong enough to hold a garrison. There are some old native fortifications, which, though not as good as they might be, yet it is very desirable to hold, such as Attock, on the Indus; it would cost a great deal to erect a regular fortification there; and for most of the purposes for which we are likely to have to use it, it is probably sufficient.

235. Major *Anson*.] Delhi is still a fortified place, is not it?—There is no regular fortification at Delhi; the garrison and the magazine are, as you are aware, in the palace, which, to a certain extent, of course is a fortification; and they have adapted it more for purposes of defence. At Lahore there is an old native fort, which commands the town in some way, and in which we keep a small garrison, a company or two of Europeans; and Mooltan they are now, I believe, making a fortified place.

236. Captain *Vivian*.] Is that an important post?—Mooltan, I think, is a very important post; it is a support to the Punjaub frontier, and there is a magazine there which contains the stores.

237. *Chairman*.] There are several small works along the Indus, are there not?—All along the frontier there are small posts right down from Peshawur, and in the Peshawur Valley; there are small posts for one or two companies.

238. Major *Anson*.] Those are chiefly held by native troops?—Entirely by native troops, I believe.

239. Mr. *Oliphant*.] What arrangement is proposed to be made with regard to hill stations for the troops?—It is proposed to be arranged that about 12 per cent. should be in the hills, some portion of which is composed of regiments that have been shaken by disease, and the other portion is made up of men who are thought to require change of air by the medical officer.

240. Are there no regular stations on the hills?—There is a station for one regiment at Subathoo, and one at Dughai, and there is one making in the hills near Mussooree.

241. Lord *William Hay*.] Those are hill stations proper?—Yes; and there is a wing of a regiment at Darjeeling.

242. Major *Anson*.] There has been a great discussion as to which is the best system, massing the European troops in healthy stations or scattering them broadcast over the country; can you give the Committee any information about that?—I think if you obtain all the documents that have been received in this country, mainly, I believe, at the India Office, regarding the distribution of troops in India, it will be seen that all those considerations have been very fully gone into, with a view to endeavour to mass them to some extent, and at the same time to endeavour to hold every important point. With regard to unhealthy stations, those that have proved themselves to be unhealthy have been, in some cases, abandoned, if there were not strong military or political considerations

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siderations for holding them. But some stations which are unhealthy it is absolutely necessary to hold; others get a reputation of being unhealthy one year and recover their good reputation the next; so that it is very difficult to decide that a certain station shall be given up merely because it is unhealthy for a year or so. If it is given up, very likely when the troops are removed it will turn out to be a very healthy place afterwards; for example, Allahabad was given up as a very unhealthy place some years ago, although it is a cool place; but at the time of the mutiny the pressure of circumstances rendered it necessary for troops to be sent there, and it then turned out to be very healthy indeed, and troops were subsequently sent there to regain their health; but it seems now to have gone back to its former character, and there has been a good deal of fever there.

243. Do you think that it would be advisable to employ, in places where it is desirable to have other than native troops, a certain number of Chinese troops to do the work of Europeans?—I do not know much about the Chinese, but I think it would be a very bad plan; it would have a very bad effect upon the natives. The natives would dislike our bringing other Asiatics amongst them, and collisions would probably occur between the two descriptions of troops.

244. *Chairman.*] Do you think that the Chinese are better soldiers than the native troops themselves?—I have never seen the Chinese as troops.

245. *Captain Vivian.*] You have heard of the very fine body of Chinese Regulars that were raised in 1862, I think, by Colonel Gordon of the Engineers?—Yes, but I have no particular knowledge of the character of the fighting they have had with their own countrymen; naturally with European officers they would be better, I think, than other Chinese without European officers. It is not their fighting qualities that I so much doubt as I should doubt the expediency of having them in India. They would not be so cheap as native Indian troops, I fancy.

246. *Mr. Oliphant.*] The Malays do not conflict, I think, with the natives of the Island of Ceylon; the Ceylon Rifle Regiment is composed entirely of Malays, I believe?—It is very small in number, and I think you will find that it is not composed entirely of Malays by any means; there are a large number of Madrasses; they have found a great difficulty in getting Malays.

247. Formerly they were all Malays, and the Malay element did not conflict at all with the native element in the island?—Yes; but I do not think the Singalese are a warlike nation, who would look with jealousy upon any other native soldiers brought amongst them, as our Sikhs and Affghans would upon Chinese garrisoned amongst them.

248. *Lord William Hay.*] One of the recommendations of the sanitary commission which has been referred to was, that a sufficient number of hill stations, or stations on elevated ground, be provided, and that a third part of the force be located in those stations, in rotation; can you say how far that recommendation has been carried out?—That was a recommendation of the sanitary commission, who had not before them the political and military considerations which have to be taken into consideration in India. The question was discussed upon that report with an anxious desire to have as many of the troops in the hills as possible, and it was thought that at present

there were no places from which troops could be withdrawn, beyond three or four regiments, and a per-centage of the men of other regiments; and so many of the plain stations were as healthy in point of per-centage of sickness and mortality as hill stations, that the necessity for carrying out the recommendation did not seem so important.

249. Such stations as Geloondra?—Yes; Geloondra, Rarapondra, Shahghur, and Bareilly.

250. In Lord Strathnairn's evidence before the Recruiting Commission, he complains of the withdrawal of the troops from Roy Bareilly, a place which he says is admirably adapted for the reserves wanted for Allahabad?—The regiments were not wanted in Oude; they were wanted elsewhere in the general reductions of the army, and Roy Bareilly seemed a place which, though it might be slightly healthier than the others, might be given up, whereas the others could not be given up; and it was not thought that it would be of any use for the defence of Allahabad, for really the Allahabad garrison is killed with taking care of itself, and could not be reduced by having half of it at Roy Bareilly without danger, there being a large arsenal and fort to be protected.

251. The expression which Lord Strathnairn uses is, that "Roy Bareilly ought to be a support and reserve for Allahabad and Cawnpore"?—That whole question was gone into by Lord Strathnairn with the Government of India, and after much consideration it was thought better to have a small garrison at Allahabad, no more than was necessary; and it was considered that it hardly required a reserve, and that having a force at Roy Bareilly would interfere with the withdrawal of the troops out of the plains as much as possible. I am not aware of any station in India, certainly not in Bengal, from which the authorities would like to see troops withdrawn at which they now are.

252-5. Is not it true that Sir John Lawrence was rather at issue upon that question of massing the troops in the hills, with such authorities as Lord Strathnairn?—Lord Strathnairn said that he would like more regiments in the hills; but I do not think there was any definite plan proposed, or that he exactly clearly said what stations could be given up, but of course he was very anxious for the health of the troops. The question was most carefully discussed (the Papers are accessible, I have no doubt) in the beginning of 1865, when a complete scheme for the distribution of the army was sent home after all the local governments and the Commander-in-Chief had been consulted, as well as the sanitary considerations taken into account.

256. Do you happen to know what, up to the time of the transfer of the Straits Settlements, was the garrison maintained there?—Two regiments of native infantry from Madras and three batteries of garrison artillery.

257. Of British artillery?—Yes; that includes a detachment sent to Behar.

258. Is it an arrangement which is considered satisfactory by military men, to have British artillery supported by native infantry?—No; it is not satisfactory; it would have been desirable to have had European infantry there, and barracks were constructed long ago for them; but it was not easy to spare them, and it was considered that they might be sent there if occasion arose.

259. There is no native artillery there, is there?—No; there is no native artillery, but the Punjab frontier force has a small mounted battery, and there are three batteries of native artillery

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lery in the Bombay Presidency to give relief to Aden. Sir William Mansfield having represented that if there were not a large force available for that purpose, gun lascars might have to be raised, which was considered objectionable, and there is also a small battery of native artillery where it was considered requisite to have guns, at Kanderpore and at Attock; but, practically, for the purposes of offence against us, it may be said that the native artillery is nowhere except at Hyderabad, where four native batteries form part of the contingent force, which, I believe, under treaty cannot be converted into Europeans, but they have only four guns each there.

260. Supposing that a plan could be adopted for employing native troops to replace British troops in the colonies, as has been proposed, do you know of any objection that there would be to employing native artillery as well as native infantry, and do you know of any objection to raising native artillery force for that purpose?—I do not. If natives would willingly go, I should think they might be very usefully employed as garrison artillery in such places as Malta or Gibraltar.

261. But you would not recommend raising a native artillery force to be employed in India?—I think we ought not to add any more to the native artillery force which is kept up, more as a matter of necessity, in order to avoid having the European in unhealthy and distant places than from choice.

262. Do you yourself consider the arrangement of garrisoning a station by British artillery and native infantry only, an objectionable one?—I do not think it is a good one, but we must draw a distinction between field artillery and garrison artillery. I should think it would be highly objectionable to have only a native force with British field artillery, whose guns they might perhaps seize, or, at all events, hamper them, and prevent them from acting. I think that objection would not so much apply to garrison artillery.

263. Apart from the possibility of the guns being seized, is it not necessary that artillery should be supported by an infantry force in whom they have complete confidence?—It is desirable; but we know that over and over again we have had none but native troops with European artillery in action in India, and very considerable achievements have been performed by them. It is the experience of the mutiny that has led us to dread it.

264. Are you aware that the Commander in Chief, and the other authorities of the Horse Guards, have always protested against leaving at any station a force of British artillery unsupported by British infantry?—Yes; we have endeavoured in India to prevent that as far as possible. When any regiment has been withdrawn from sanitary considerations from some station, wherever it could be managed, a company or two has been left, but the Straits Settlements have always been garrisoned in this way; and there is so little temptation to the native troops to mutiny there, and there is so little likelihood of their doing so, that the objection has not quite the same force there as it would have elsewhere.

265. As the native army is now composed, do you consider that all the native regiments would be equally available for garrison duty out of India?—No; I think some are composed of races which it would be more difficult to move than

others; for instance, I think Goorkas would be very difficult regiments to take; there would be very great difficulty in employing them abroad.

266. Have you any idea what arrangements you would make if you were told that in future, as a permanent arrangement, 10 or 12 Indian regiments would be required to go abroad out of India, and you had to make the best arrangement you could, either by raising new regiments, or by supplying them from your existing force?—I think it would be a matter to be settled by very serious consultation with some of our most experienced officers of the native regiments as to what would be the best plan, whether to raise particular corps for the service by volunteers from the present corps, or to employ the corps as they stood from the roster, or to call for volunteers to enlist for the service.

267. You do not think that you could take Indian regiments from the roster just as they stood, taking them from the Bengal, Bombay, and Madras armies in regular rotation?—I think that would create great dissatisfaction, and a great feeling of disquietude in Bengal certainly, and to a lesser extent in the other Presidencies.

268. In any arrangement it would be necessary to raise new regiments; you do not think that any of the existing regiments could be placed at disposal for this service?—Two of the regiments have been placed at disposal from the Straits, so that we could not say that two regiments could not be spared, and some of the native Madras regiments will not be wanted in Bombay, so that altogether, probably, three or four regiments might be spared, but then they are the only reserve we have in case of war to replace the regiments at the seat of war.

269. If they are not wanted for the purpose I have referred to, they will be reduced by the India Government, will they not?—Yes; no doubt. There is every year great difficulty about the estimates; four regiments of Madras native infantry were reduced three years ago on that account; we hoped that two regiments of Bombay native infantry might be reduced, but they said they could not spare them, and they remain with 30 regiments. Whether any reduction will take place in consequence of this reduction of two regiments from the Straits Settlements, I do not know, I should suppose it would.

270. Have you any personal knowledge of the Ceylon Rifle Corps?—I have seen them two or three times, or portions of them rather, at Colombo and Galle.

271. Do you know whether they are considered an efficient corps?—For the simple duties which devolve on them there, I presume they are, but I do not know how they would do for a campaign involving much marching about; they are quite untried for anything of that kind.

272. They are not composed entirely of Malays, are they?—A great many Madrasses are in the corps now, I believe. I may observe that they are highly paid.

273. Do you think it would be possible to extend the organisation of the Ceylon Rifle Corps by adding new battalions which might be composed of other races than the Malays and Indians, and which would be able to replace existing colonial corps, or even British troops in the colonies in the tropics?—It might be; but I have heard that when the Ceylon rifle regiment furnished a detachment for Hong Kong, as they did some years ago,

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ago, and I believe are now doing again, they had a difficulty in getting any recruits they liked to take.

274. Then they recruited or attempted to recruit entirely from Malays or Madrasses?—I believe so; the system you allude to would get over one difficulty, namely, that with regard to the pay of the officers; according to the present arrangement a junior subaltern in a native infantry regiment draws more pay than a lieutenant colonel of a regiment of the line.

275. Would it not be possible to add another battalion (say a Chinese battalion) to the Ceylon rifle regiment for service in Hong Kong, the officers to be interchangeable from Ceylon to Hong Kong, and *vice versa*; but the Chinese men always to remain and do duty at Hong Kong?—I presume it would be possible; but I am told that there would not be much confidence in a Chinese regiment at Hong Kong.

276. In the same way, it would be possible to

recruit for fresh battalions of the Ceylon rifles in India for service in Hong Kong?—That experiment remains to be tried; I have my doubts as to whether this Belooch corps, which has been talked of for Hong Kong, will be easily raised in India.

277. Would there not be some advantage if, instead of raising a distinct corps as is now proposed by the War Office to be done, it was attached to and formed of the organisation of the Ceylon Rifle Corps?—That appeared to me to be the most obvious plan; but I was told that recruiting in the Ceylon Rifles was so difficult, that it could not be thought of when I mentioned it, but possibly, as you say; they might be recruited from other races; that has not been tried yet; but I do not know of any but the Malays and the people of India, except the Chinese, whom I believe there is great objection to employing in China.

Saturday, 9th March 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.
Viscount Cranborne.
Sir James Fergusson.
Lord William Hay.
Captain Hayter.

Colonel North.
Mr. Oliphant.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Sir William Russell.
Captain Vivian.

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

Colonel HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, called in; and further Examined.

278. *Chairman.*] HAVE you anything to add to your evidence of yesterday?—Yes, I should like to add to it on some points. I wish to put in a memorandum of the composition of the native army as respects the non-commissioned officers and rank and file of its principal branches for the armies of the three Presidencies.—(*The same was handed in, vide Appendix.*) Mr. Laing asked me some questions about the relative cost as respects pay of British and native corps. I have prepared a memorandum showing the pay and allowances, and charges for the different corps of the different branches of the army, exclusive of the commissariat, ordnance, clothing, and barrack charges, and the capitation allowance to the British Government, which is at the rate of 13 l. 10 s. per annum.

279. Are those figures adjusted to corps of equal sizes?—To the corps complete.

280. Are the native and foreign corps equal in the number of men of which they are composed?—No; but the number of men is shown in each corps in this memorandum.

281. You have not reduced it to the cost per man?—No; but that could be done very easily by calculation. There is the cost of each corps, native and European, in the Indian army in this paper.

282. Will you put it in?—I will.—(*The same was handed in, vide Appendix.*)

283. Have you any further information to add to that which you gave us yesterday?—Yes. I would ask leave to observe, that the objections I raised to the employment of native troops on colonial service in no way extended to their employment on field service anywhere, or, in case of emergency, to their temporary employment in the colonies, supposing it was necessary to withdraw British troops for any temporary and pressing emergency. I would allude also to the difference between a soldier and a coolie. As I understand the coolie emigration, the coolie goes out of his own free will, with a view to better himself; and, in fact, in a few years to come home with what to him is a considerable fortune. He also is allowed, I believe, in most cases, to take his family with him. No such option could well be given to the native soldier as the coolie has, nor could he be allowed to take his family, nor has he the same prospect of making a fortune, nor does he in any way better his position. There is also a danger which strikes me may arise from regiments being sent to the colonies, and being

there placed under generals who, with their staff, are quite ignorant of the prejudices of the native soldiers, and who may have, in some cases, rather a contempt for them. In 1864, at the request of the Ceylon Government, a corps of pioneers was formed in the Punjaub, and sent to Ceylon on liberal terms of pay, but when they reached there a misunderstanding occurred with the local authorities as to the terms of the men's service, and how they should be employed, and it resulted in the bulk of the regiment deserting and making their way up through Ceylon and through the Madras Presidency towards the Punjaub, some of them dying in the jungles on the road. Major Anson asked me a question as to the pensions of the native troops, I did not answer it as completely as I should like to have done. The pension of a sepoy is four rupees a month, but it goes up according to the grade, until the pension of a subadar major of 40 years' service is 65 rupees a month; a pensioner also takes with him any order of merit pay which he may have gained for valour in the field during his service. If he is a member of either of the Orders of British India he takes with him, when he retires on his pension, the pay of that order, so that it is possible that a subadar major and a suda bahadur, which is the first class of the Order of British India, would have 125 rupees a month pension. Major Anson asked me to specify the fortifications in India: I only mentioned a few. Probably it would be hardly expected of me to mention all of them immediately, considering how numerous they are, but I might mention generally, that of fortifications in the European sense there are very few.

284. *Major Anson.*] All I wanted to know was the fortifications that were garrisoned by European soldiers; they are not so very many, are they?—Those which are garrisoned are not so very many, but there are a good number that have a European regiment at hand, which gives a guard for them; many of them are hardly garrisons in a European sense, though no doubt they could be held against any native enemy. With regard to Lord William Hay's questions about Roy Bareilley not being occupied as a large station, in compliance with some recommendation of Lord Strathnairn's, I might add to what I said, that the Government of India were not satisfied, from the experience of a comparatively short time, with a small body of troops at Roy Bareilley, that its healthiness was so assured as to

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justify them in forming a very large cantonment there. The Marquis of Hartington asked what would be the measures taken if the Government of India received orders to send 12 native regiments to the Colonies; I think that if the Government of India received such an order they would receive it with feelings almost amounting to dismay, certainly with a great sense of difficulty. But the first consideration would be, in what manner to replace these men, supposing they were taken away; for I apprehend that the Government of India would be quite unable to spare 12 regiments for permanent garrison duty from the present native army, without raising other regiments in lieu of them. I think I have nothing else to say with regard to the evidence of yesterday. I wish now to speak about the employment of Chinese troops.

285. Colonel North.] In speaking of the Colonies, do you refer to our colonies bordering upon India, or to all of our colonies; for instance, you mean the Mauritius and Ceylon; but would you come further towards Europe?—Just now I was only alluding to the withdrawal of 12 regiments; for whatever colony they were intended, the drain upon India would be the same.

286. I understand you to say that in time of war the native troops would go to any of our colonies?—To any suitable colony; perhaps there might be rather a difficulty about Canada, but the Cape they could go to.

287. The Cape, Mauritius, and Ceylon?—Yes, and of course such foreign service as in Egypt.

288. You would include Gibraltar and Malta?—If it was necessary for native troops to be sent there in time of war, I do not think there would be any insuperable objection to it.

289. Major Anson.] What are your objections to the employment of Chinese troops or other troops, not European, foreign to India?—I think, to bring Chinese troops, or any other Asiatic troops to India, if they were intended to replace Indian troops, would be very dangerous, and very costly. If they were intended to replace European troops; it would be equally dangerous, and the arrangement would, I consider, tend very materially to weaken our secure hold of the country.

290. Why do you think it would be dangerous to replace European troops by Chinese?—Because I do not consider that Chinese troops would be equal to European troops in any way; they could not be depended upon either for fighting qualities or for fidelity, and certainly the European population in India would not have the confidence in Chinese troops that they have in British; nor do I think our artillery (a question was asked on that point yesterday) would feel they had sufficient support in Chinese troops, or at any rate, a support equal to what they have in British troops.

291. Captain Vivian.] Have you had much experience of Chinese troops?—No.

292. Upon what do you base your opinion that Chinese troops would not be as good soldiers?—On all I have read of the wars with the Chinese, and the accounts I have read of large masses of them being defeated by small bodies of our troops, and driven from strong positions with very small loss on our part.

293. Chairman.] When you say “our own troops,” do you mean British troops?—Both British troops and native Indian troops.

293*. Captain Vivian.] Have you read, on the

other hand, of the conduct of the Chinese troops led by Colonel Gordon in the last wars in China?—They were fighting against other Chinese, and they were organised by British officers, and led by British officers. I should have no doubt that a body of Chinese troops organised and led by a British officer would easily thrash another body of Chinese troops led by their own people.

294. Do you not think that any body of Chinese officered by British officers would equally hold their own against any body of native troops that could be brought against them in India, whether Sikhs, or Affghans, or Mahrattas, or whatever they might be?—I am not certain of that.

295. Chairman.] Are not the Chinese very liable to be enrolled in secret societies?—Yes, most of the Chinese in Singapore are said to be so.

296. Is not the tendency of those secret societies to undermine the Government, as was the case in China?—I am not aware of what the tendency of those secret societies is; but they would be very dangerous in the army, certainly.

297. It was those secret societies that produced the rebellion at Sarawak, was not it?—I have no information upon that subject.

298. Major Anson.] Do you think that our employing foreign mercenaries would have a bad effect upon the minds of the natives of India?—I think it would have the very worst effect; I think they would believe that we for some reason or other were unable to furnish British troops, and I think the foreign mercenaries would be very apt to come into collision with the natives in various ways.

299. Chairman.] Do you apply that remark to all Asiatic foreign mercenaries?—I should apply it to Malays and all people who come from out of India whom the natives are not accustomed to see employed as soldiers in our service.

300. Is not there a black contingent at Hyderabad?—If your Lordship means under the Nizam, I am not aware what troops the Nizam has. Very many native princes have had a few Abyssinians and people of that sort in their service for special purposes.

301. Have they shown any tendency to quarrel with the natives of India?—I am not aware, but the Arabs have always given much trouble there, I believe.

302. There are many Arab troops in Kattywar, are there not?—There may be under natives.

303. Major Anson.] Why should it have a worse effect upon the natives for us to employ Chinese than to employ Beloochee troops?—Because the Beloochees are much more like all other natives of India than the Chinese are, who are of an entirely different religion and of different habits.

304. Sir James Fergusson.] I suppose the natives of all parts of India are very well aware of the existence of nations belonging to other parts of Hindostan, and know the Beloochees to be natives of Hindostan, whereas if Chinese were employed, the natives of India would know very well that they belonged to a different country altogether?—Perfectly, and the inhabitants of some districts are so very like those of the adjoining district that there is sometimes very little distinction between them; for instance, it is difficult to tell except from his dress or language a Beloochee from an Affghan, and they are Mahometans too.

305. Major

305. Major *Anson*.] We have many men in our service of the same religion as the Chinese, I suppose?—I am not aware of that.

306. Are there none that we enlist from the hills who are at all events well acquainted with the Chinese religion?—Some of them may know something about it, but I am not aware that there is a single Buddhist in the Indian army.

307. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] Do you not think that the parallel hardly holds good between European and native Governments employing foreign Asiatic troops, inasmuch as a European sovereign would naturally use his own people, and the employment of Arabs or Beloochees would be exceptional, whereas when a native prince uses the same mercenaries it is the ordinary custom of the country. In Hyderabad and in Kattywar, and wherever they use foreign troops, the native Governments use those foreign mercenaries according to old-established custom, as if they were their own people, so that for the Government of Baroda, or the Government of the Nizam, or the chiefs in Kattywar to employ Arab troops is very much the same thing as for the British Government to employ British troops. But the point that would strike the natives would be, that if a European Government employed Arabs he could not get Europeans, whereas if a native employed them it would be his natural military resource. Is that your view of the case?—I believe a native prince generally brings in those mercenaries as a sort of body-guard for himself, and as a safeguard against an insurrection of his own people or among the troops of his own nation and territory; but it does not always succeed.

308. *Chairman*.] What construction do you imagine the natives would put upon our employing Chinese: that the Englishmen would not serve, or that we had got poor, or what?—That we were unable to keep up the army which they had been accustomed to see in India of European soldiers.

309. They would not understand the view of economy?—I am not certain that there would be such a great economy in it; but whatever passes in England is very soon known by the natives, and I have no doubt that the native press will give information about the difficulties of recruiting, and so on, in the British army.

310. Captain *Vivian*.] The natives have not always been accustomed to see the large British army which there now is in India?—There are only 13,000 men more than there were before the mutiny.

311. That is a very large increase, is it not?—No; we now hold many places which we used not to hold, and we have greatly reduced the native army. If those 13,000 British soldiers were replaced by 13,000 Chinese, I think it would seem to the natives a sign of weakness.

312. There are more than 13,000 more British troops than there were before the mutiny, are there not?—No, there were 45,000 European soldiers in India at the beginning of 1857, and there are 58,000 and some hundreds now; there ought to be more.

313. Sir *James Fergusson*.] The number is 68,000, is not it?—No, 58,000. The establishment, including officers, is 65,000 according to the War Office Estimates; 3,065 of those are officers, and there are vacancies, so that according to the last returns there are 58,700 men actually in India of non-commissioned officers and rank and file, of whom about 54,000 were fit for duty

out of hospital; that includes all branches and all ranks, except officers.

314. Colonel *North*.] You stated, I think, that they were 3,000 under the establishment besides that?—Between 3,000 and 4,000.

315. Major *Anson*.] In the case of another outbreak in India, such as the mutiny of 1857, what effect do you think railways would have upon the war in the upper part of the country?—To a certain extent they would no doubt be very useful; but we must not rely upon them too much, for we have in many places sections of railway for 200 or 300 miles without a single station upon the line. Under those circumstances it would be almost impossible to protect the whole line of railways. At the same time, no doubt the railway would be of great use in bringing up the men and in bringing up the stores. But when you get to the end of your railway, unless you have carriage and equipment for the troops, so as to make them moveable, the railway is not of much use except to protect the place at the end of the line of railway itself.

316. In case the railways were broken up in different places, would there not be greater difficulty in procuring transport than you had before the railways were opened?—I believe the difficulty of procuring carriage has increased, and the number of cattle kept up by the Government is much less than it used to be; but still at most of the large stations there is a small moveable column of all arms kept ready equipped to take the field at the shortest notice.

317. Is there any instance of moving the troops by railway in India lately that you can mention to the Committee?—Nearly all the reliefs of infantry are carried out by railway when their course lies along a line of railway; for instance, British regiments (or even Indian regiments) coming from the North-Western Provinces come by rail from Delhi to Calcutta, and *vice versa*. The railway is used as much as possible, but it is not used much for artillery and cavalry, as so much rolling stock is required for the conveyance of the horses and the grass cutters and ponies that accompany the cavalry and artillery, that it is a very long business to convey a whole regiment of dragoons, or even a battery of horse artillery by rail, so they generally march; but the railway is very extensively used for the infantry for drafts of men without horses. With regard to the question of carriage, I may mention that when the Umballah campaign was going on in 1863, and troops had to be moved up from Meerut to support the troops in the field, a great difficulty was experienced in getting carriage to move them, and there was delay in consequence in marching from Meerut and other places, where formerly the carriage used to be more abundant.

318. You do not think, then, that the establishment of railways should ever be made an excuse for reducing the number of European troops in India?—I cannot at present anticipate any such completion of the railway system for many years to come, as would in my humble opinion justify a reduction much below the present strength of the European troops in India. I think the reduction has been made in anticipation of railways that have yet to be made.

319. I suppose you think that the European force in India should always be kept up in proportion to the number of native troops you have, as the native army is our chief source of anxiety

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in India; is that your view of the case?—I do not think there need necessarily be any fixed proportion between the native army and the European army. Of course it would be unwise to have a much larger native army than the European army; but with the present proportion, which we may take as, in round numbers, two natives to one European, I do not think there is any probable danger to be anticipated from a mutiny; I would not much increase the native army, without making some increase in the number of Europeans. I believe that they are both at the minimum for their duty; I believe that you could not reduce the native army now without throwing the duty a great deal too hard upon the men that remain.

320. *Sir James Fergusson.*] The establishment for both arms of the service is calculated upon the amount of duty to be performed, is not it?—Yes, I do not think we have any necessity for retaining a single British soldier in India at the present moment in excess of the duties required from them, on account of the native army. Supposing that we could do with 80,000 native soldiers instead of 125,000, I do not think there would be any reason for reducing the Europeans. Nor, supposing it was thought desirable to increase the European army for any particular duty that might be required of them, do I think it would be desirable to increase the native army above its present strength. The duties required of both are really separate, and to be judged of for each separately.

321. *Sir Henry Rawlinson.*] In fact, you regard the European army as being kept there rather for the purpose of protecting the general interests, and supporting the Government of the country, than for the purpose of watching the native army?—Yes; at the same time, one would not like to see the native army without the European army.

322. *Chairman.*] What towns are there in India of such a size that you think they require to be watched by European troops?—There are a great number; most of the large cities. I do not mean to say that any great or very widespread injury would arise from an insurrection at any of them, but of course the presence of a few European troops might save loss of life, and the murder of all the Europeans in case of an outbreak at places such as Delhi, or Benares, or Patna, or Agra, or Secunderabad.

323. Or Peshawur?—At Peshawur, the city, I think, is a comparatively small place, compared to the immense number of hostile and warlike tribes who are within a few miles of the cantonment. The city could be overawed by a comparatively small body of troops.

324. At all those places you are liable to fanatical outbreaks, are you not?—At any moment.

325. And it is only in that case that the army can be said to be doing the police duty of India, in the sense of keeping a watch over those large centres of population?—Quite so; I may mention that when Colonel Mathieson was assassinated at Peshawur, I happened to be there, and though it was the act of a single fanatic, immense excitement immediately followed; I have not the slightest doubt that if there had not been a considerable force on the spot, there would have been a general rising.

326. *Captain Vivian.*] You mean a force of European troops?—Of European and native troops.

327. Are the native troops of any use in putting down a fanatical rising of that nature?—I think they may be generally trusted; of course there may be cases where a large body of Mahometan troops might sympathise with a Mahometan rising; but we have endeavoured to have them mixed in the garrisons as far as possible.

328. *Sir Henry Rawlinson.*] A rising at Peshawur would have been almost entirely Mahometan, would it not?—Yes; and at that time the native troops we had there would not have sympathised with anything of the kind.

329. *Sir James Fergusson.*] You have derived this advantage from having your regiments mixed; that whatever the religious fanaticism may be, a large portion of the native troops at your command cannot possibly share in it?—That is the case with regiments of mixed composition; but some regiments are formed of one description of men.

330. *Chairman.*] How many men do you keep at Secunderabad?—We keep at Secunderabad a battery of horse artillery, two light field batteries, a heavy field battery, a regiment of dragoons, a regiment of light cavalry, two regiments of British infantry, and three regiments of native infantry.

331. Of what class are the native troops?—They are Madras regiments.

332. They would, therefore, be Hindoos?—No, the Madras army has a large proportion of Mahometans; I think the proportion is one-third in the infantry, and seven-eighths in the cavalry.

333. *Sir Henry Rawlinson.*] The numerical statement you have given of the troops at Secunderabad is exclusive of the Contingent?—Yes; none of them are at Secunderabad, though there is a garrison of them a few miles off.

334. *Major Anson.*] What troops are there at Benares; are there any Europeans?—There was a regiment of European infantry there lately, but in consequence of sickness a wing was removed to the hills. We have there now a troop of horse artillery, four troops of dragoons, a wing of British infantry, and a regiment of native infantry.

335. *Sir James Fergusson.*] But that establishment is only temporarily reduced, is not it, pending the erection of new cantonments?—I doubt whether the wing will ever be sent back, as it has gone to the hills; and there was a general impression that the troops now stationed there would be sufficient for the local purposes of Benares, and that it would be undesirable to have any more troops there than were necessary, as the place, I believe, will always be more sickly than many of the stations higher up. It is also to be borne in mind that Benares and Dinapore are important positions if there should ever be differences with Nepaul, as there is a long line of frontier to be protected.

336. *Major Anson.*] Have you ever thought what would be the effect upon India if we were engaged in a great European war, and had to withdraw large bodies of troops from India?—Yes. If we had to withdraw large bodies of European troops from India for a long time, of course there would be a risk.

337. Do you not think, then, that it would be desirable to be able to withdraw native troops at the same time, and do for a short time with as few troops as possible?—I think that you could not do for any length of time, certainly, with
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any much less native force than you have now; and if you sent a native army of 20,000 or 30,000 men on foreign service, you would have to raise some in their room, and I believe your doing so would have a good effect upon the population. I think that was shown very much during the mutiny. In those districts where we were able to raise troops on the north-western frontier, we enlisted all the turbulent people for the time being on our side, and Peshawur was never more quiet than during the mutiny; all the bad characters were sent down to fight our battles.

338. Have you ever thought over the possibility of our employing a native army in connection with Europeans in Egypt, or places of that sort?—I have very often thought over it.

339. *Chairman.*] Supposing there were differences with Abyssinia, how many troops could you spare from India for such an operation?—I suppose that 8,000 or 10,000 men could be sent for a time; perhaps it might be necessary to replace them by temporary levies in particular places.

340. You could do with 10,000 men short?—I am not certain that we could without raising some in their room, but they could be sent off, and the Government of India could arrange for other men in their places until fresh levies could be got together.

341. *Major Anson.*] If you had to employ a large number of native troops out of India, there would be no objection to raising other regiments to do the duties which it is proposed for them to do?—There might be, but if there were an emergency of the kind it would be necessary to resort to exceptional measures, which would always bring in men.

342. By offering a bounty?—Either by a bounty, or by an offer of commissions to men of influence for bringing in a certain number of men; that was done during the mutiny.

343. *Sir Henry Rawlinson.*] Do you remember how many native troops we sent to the Persian Gulf?—I speak with some doubt, but I think we sent about six regiments of native infantry, and two of native cavalry; we could have sent a great many more of course at that time.

344. In the Affghan war we must have sent double or treble that number?—I should think we must have had 15,000 or 16,000 troops in Affghanistan at the time that General Pollock and General Nott were both in Affghanistan together.

345. *Major Anson.*] Do you not think that if we had several of the native infantry regiments dispersed in our colonies and completely in our power, it would give us a great hold upon the other native regiments in case we had to withdraw European regiments from India in time of pressure?—I would not rely upon that as a security.

346. The native regiments are recruited in the same districts, and they know each other well; there are friends and relations in different regiments?—If the men in India were inclined to mutiny, I do not think that would keep them from mutinying; they would know that we should not deal harshly with the regiments in the colonies on their account.

347. Do you not think that it would be useful to have the power, in case of any disturbance in a regiment, of sending it off to an out-of-the-way colony, to remove it from influencing other regiments?—I think that that would be rather a dangerous measure.

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348. You do not consider that there would be any danger of mutiny in a colony, in a place like China for instance, or the Mauritius on the part of the native troops?—Not much; if they were in a minority. I am not aware what the strength of the European troops in Java was when the mutiny of the native troops took place there; but I have no doubt that there was some body of European troops there.

349. *Captain Vivian.*] Do I rightly understand you to say that, in your opinion, it is impossible to reduce the strength of either the European or the native troops in India, without endangering the safety of our hold upon that country?—That is rather stronger than I have put it. I think that for the purposes of complete security, we have not too large an army of either British soldiers or natives. As I mentioned yesterday, there are some regiments available now; there are two from the Straits which are in excess of the establishment. I conceive that, perhaps, they might be dispensed with, and owing to a redistribution of troops, a small Madras force has been dispensed with in Bengal; so that, perhaps, to a small extent a reduction might be made. But, speaking generally, I think we are at about the minimum.

350. Speaking generally, you think it is necessary to keep about 125,000 native troops, and about 65,000 European troops in India?—I think so; I do not think that a few thousand native troops, more or less, would materially affect our security.

351. What was the strength of the sepoy army?—Two hundred and thirty-two thousand men.

352. How many Europeans had we in India before the mutiny?—Forty-five thousand of all kinds.

353. The proportion, then, was 45,000 Europeans against 230,000 natives?—Yes.

354. And now it is 125,000 natives against 60,000 Europeans?—Yes; it was more than five to one at that time.

355. Why do you think that such a much larger proportion of Europeans is necessary now?—Because experience has shown us that we had much too small a proportion then; we had large garrisons without a European soldier at that time, we had most important positions held entirely by natives.

356. *Sir James Fergusson.*] And our territory has largely increased, has it not?—Yes; we have a British garrison at Gwalior, which was held by the Maharajah himself before, and we have a British garrison at Jhansi.

357. *Captain Vivian.*] What is the strength of those two garrisons?—The garrison at Gwalior consists of four batteries of artillery, including a garrison battery, a regiment and a half of British infantry, a regiment of native infantry, and two of cavalry. And the garrison at Jhansi is a field battery, a wing of British infantry, a regiment of native cavalry, and a regiment of native infantry; but it is proposed to give up Jhansi again, and to move the troops into our own territory, there being some political difficulty about Jhansi; it belongs to Scindia, and his troops occupy the fort, and it is considered an objectionable arrangement that his troops should be in the fort, and ours in cantonment. The same difficulty arose about Gwalior, but we got him to give up the fort there.

358. Looking at it from a political point of view,

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view, do you think that it would be desirable to bring Chinese troops to India, to replace certain Indian regiments, and to take those Indian regiments to China?—No; I think that that would be a double evil; you would create ill feeling by bringing the Chinese into India, and you would create further ill feeling by sending natives to China, who would much sooner serve in their own country.

359. I understand you to say that it is the habit of the native princes to bring certain foreign troops into their own country to protect them against their own armies?—Yes.

360. Why should not we adopt the same principle as is adopted by the native princes?—The natives can quite understand our bringing our own people into India; they have seen British soldiers for the last century, and they have learnt to some extent, certainly, to look upon them with respect, but I think if we brought in Chinese, they would have quite a different feeling.

361. The principle a native prince has in view is not to use foreigners to protect his own people, but to protect himself by foreigners against his own people?—Yes, but I am not aware that the system has succeeded with the native princes; we find them very often getting upset.

362. It is the system that still prevails, at all events?—I do not know to what extent it prevails.

363. Lord William Hay.] Are many of the duties which formerly were performed by that native army now performed by a police force which has a semi-military organisation?—The police take many of the duties which were formerly taken by the native army, or else it would be impossible for us to do with the present reduced native army; but we can hardly now say that the police has a semi-military organisation; they are, to a certain extent, drilled; but so are the police here and everywhere, I believe, and on certain occasions, and at certain places, they have arms; but the per-centage of arms is fixed; at gaol posts, for instance, they have arms. There is a per-centage of arms kept at certain posts, otherwise they would not be able to resist the dacoits.

364. Chairman.] Can you say how many arms have been supplied to the police force?—I can only say, in a general way, I understand that 25 per cent. of the force have arms; or, at least, that there are arms for them.

365. Do you know the strength of the force?—I could not speak with any certainty about it.

366. Lord William Hay.] Do you not think that the strength of the regular army depends a good deal on the strength of that police force?—Yes; and I think that if any great reduction in the police force were to take place, so that they could not perform some of the duties they now perform, such as escorting treasure and stores along the lines of road, you would have to add probably to the native army, for the regiments are very weak.

367. Mr. Oliphant.] Are you acquainted with the southern part of India at all?—Very little, except that in my position as military secretary I see the correspondence about it.

368. Do you know that the population of the northern part of Ceylon is precisely the same as the population of the southern part of India?—Yes.

369. And that Ceylon has been garrisoned entirely by Malays, without any objection on the part of the people of the island, who are of just

the same race as the people of the southern part of India. It is true that latterly, as you have said, the Madrasees have to some extent composed the Ceylon Rifles, but formerly all the garrisons of Jafnapatam and Trincomalee, and other posts in the northern part of the island, were Malays; do you not therefore think that, as the population of the south of India are not so warlike a race as the people in the north, the same objection would not exist to introducing Chinese or Malays, or other non-Indian troops into the south of India, which would in the case of the north?—I am not sufficiently acquainted with Ceylon to speak upon that subject, but the number of Malays in the north part of Ceylon is very small; I believe it is limited to a few companies of one regiment, and the people of Ceylon are unwarlike in their character.

370. They are of the same race as the population of the southern part of India?—They have had those Malays, as far as I know, almost ever since we had the island, and they are accustomed to them as part of our system; but any alteration of the military system of India, by bringing in the Asiatic mercenaries, not being Indians, certainly would create a good deal of excitement amongst the native population, in my opinion.

371. Have you heard much of the way in which the Chinese Military Train behaved under fire during the war in China?—I presume you refer to the coolies; I believe they behaved very well.

372. So that, as far as our experience of Chinese troops go, they have behaved very well under fire?—I do not think that that is a criterion of their qualities as soldiers, because I have observed that the natives whom we take as coolies will stand being shot at, though they will not fight actively. I remember that at Delhi we raised a corps of them, and used them to bring up ammunition to the batteries, and they stood so well under fire that I think, in a small corps, there was something like 200 casualties. Those men would have been perfectly useless to attack any enemy, but the mere fact of one of them being shot over every now and then did not appear to have any effect upon the rest.

373. With respect to the Chinese triad and other similar societies, are you aware whether they were originally formed for purposes which were not political, though they have sometimes taken a political character afterwards?—I have heard that they are a great source of anxiety in the Straits Settlement.

374. Colonel North.] Even if the Chinese were received in a friendly manner by the natives of India, it does not follow that the climate of India would agree with them. It appeared in the evidence which we received last year in the Hong Kong Committee, that the Ceylon troops when they were sent to China suffered even more than the tremendous mortality which took place in the 11th and 9th Regiments, therefore we could not be certain that the climate of India would not be equally unhealthy for Chinamen going there?—We have no experience, I think, which enables us to say how the Chinese would stand employment in various parts of India, but I may mention one fact: there are Chinese in India in various employments, in Calcutta and on the tea plantations in the hills, and we find that they generally marry natives, and in some degree become assimilated to the people around them, which I think would be a great argument against supposing that they would ever be equal to European troops.

375. Major

375. Major *Anson*.] The Chinese quarter at Calcutta is perfectly distinct from the native quarter, is it not?—To some extent; but the Chinese there marry natives, Portuguese, and those I have seen in the hills on tea plantations, appeared also to marry native women.

376. Sir *James Fergusson*.] If you were to bring Chinese troops into the south of India, would not the mere fact that Chinese troops had been brought into any part of India immediately become known all over India, and create great excitement?—I think it would have a very bad effect where it was known.

377. Is not it a fact that any fresh intelligence, especially of a military character, becomes very rapidly known from one end of India to the other?—I think it probably would become known, particularly if it was done to any extent.

378. Captain *Vivian*.] Do not you think that the natives would get accustomed to it, in a little time?—I do not think they would ever particularly like it.

379. Major *Anson*.] In case of our having another war in China, or in Persia, or on the coast of Africa, we should be obliged to have recourse to our Indian native army in the same way that we had in 1860. The native corps we have raised, the Beloochee battalion for Hong Kong, and the Singalese corps for the Straits Settlements, would not be sufficient to enable us to carry on war in China and other places, would they?—No, not nearly sufficient.

380. And we should be obliged to have recourse to the native army in India, you think?—I think it would be absolutely necessary.

381. Do not you think from your knowledge of military matters generally that it is infinitely better to have the system regularly organised in time of peace which you are obliged to use in time of war?—No, I do not see that at all. I do not see that it is desirable to keep troops in an unhealthy or an unpleasant locality in time of peace, simply because you might have to use them there in time of war. I think it would have the effect of making the natives dislike the service in China.

382. If you get the native army to believe that they are not called upon for service abroad, might it not happen that when the time arrived that you wanted their help for foreign service, they might object to it. If you allowed an interval of 10 or 12 years to pass before you employed them again out of India, they might make a serious objection to leaving their country?—I think it is hardly a question of "getting" them unaccustomed, they are already unaccustomed to foreign service except for field service; that is the present state of the army that we have to deal with. If we were to form a new army the question might arise as to whether we should not habituate them to foreign and colonial service, if it was thought desirable to do so, but you have an army, and an army that is unaccustomed to foreign service already, and which on almost every occasion of being employed on foreign service has been dissatisfied.

383. Would there be any very great difficulties in our habituating the army in future to look to foreign service as a natural consequence of their being enlisted?—I think that any change of the kind would produce great excitement and disturbance in the native army.

384. Even if it was effected very gradually?—You might, of course, raise particular corps to

commence at once on the understanding that they were to go on foreign service, then the men would enter those corps with their eyes open. But I see great objections to that; you would have to give them greater advantages than the other men in the service have.

385. Only while on foreign service, I suppose?—I think you would have to give them greater advantages at first to induce them to enlist.

386. Mr. *Oliphant*.] Would it be desirable, in your opinion, to take the form relating to general service out of the oath, so as to have a distinction between the two classes of troops?—No; I think it is desirable that you should have the power of sending any regiments of the native army abroad, because otherwise they might refuse to go on field service, and it might be necessary to send a regiment to a colony even. I think that should be done as sparingly as possible, but, supposing a case of imperial necessity arose, the difficulty would have to be met.

387. Lord *William Hay*.] I understood you to say yesterday, that you would have to call for volunteers in case of requiring regiments to go out of India?—No; I said that in the Madras army that was the practice, as I have ascertained from documents, until comparatively recent years, but I do not think there would be any necessity to call for volunteers for field service.

388. In the Madras army they used to call for volunteers even when the regiments were recruited for general service?—They used to do so, I am not aware that they do now.

389. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] If a regiment were sent on garrison duty to one of the colonies, what do you think would be the effect when it returned; would the reports brought back by the men be favourable or unfavourable?—It would entirely depend upon the circumstances they had encountered. If they had had no sickness, and if they had been to a place the climate of which they liked, and if they had been well treated, and if the duty had not been very hard, and if all things had gone very smoothly with them, perhaps it might have a very good effect upon the other natives in lessening their objection to serve abroad; but if anything had gone wrong with them, if they had had much sickness or mortality, or if they had been mismanaged by the officers in command, or conceived themselves to have been aggrieved in any way (and the natives often conceive themselves to be aggrieved without any cause), they would spread a very unfavourable report. I have not the slightest doubt that the regiment of pioneers which was sent to Ceylon in 1863, and came back, has spread the most unfavourable report about Ceylon, all over the regiment.

390. Sir *James Fergusson*.] There would always be the difficulty about the separation from their families, to which they could hardly be expected to become reconciled?—That would be a great difficulty.

391. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] What has been the effect on their native comrades of the reports of the regiments which returned from China?—I believe there has not been any unfavourable effect, but they went on field service and enjoyed it; they were proud of having been to Peking, besides having had great extraordinary advantages of various kinds.

392. I meant with regard to the garrison duty at Hong Kong particularly?—I am not aware what report those two regiments which came

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Col. H. W.- back last from China may have made to their comrades about it.

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393. Major *Anson*.] Do you not think that we are very apt, in India, to lay too much stress upon the religious prejudices of the natives in considering any alterations which are proposed, and too apt to find excuses for them on those grounds?—That is a very difficult subject to deal with; on the one hand, we do not allow religious prejudices to interfere too much with the efficiency of the system, but, on the other hand, we cannot altogether ignore them.

394. When railways were first started in India it was generally said that the high caste natives would never make use of them?—I never heard that. I was with a high caste native regiment, just after the railways were opened, and they were loud in their praise of them; some people may have said so in the newspapers, but I do not think it was well founded.

395. *Chairman*.] It was a misapprehension of the religious prejudices of the people?—Yes, by people who did not know much about the subject.

396. Major *Anson*.] It was said that the high caste natives would come in contact with people of the lower castes in the railway carriages?—There may have been something said about it.

397. *Chairman*.] Is the avoidance of contact with people of different castes one of the prejudices of caste?—Only contact with people of very low caste. And so far as that goes that extends to the Sikhs. I can give an illustration of that. During the mutiny two companies of Muzabee sappers were sent down to Futtyghar, and the other Sikh sappers refused to stand in the ranks with them; they were given every chance of withdrawing their objection, but they would not; they all preferred to take their discharges and leave the service sooner than fall in with Muzubees.

398. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] The essential objection, I imagine, to going on foreign service, is in reference to cooking on board ship, that is the great difficulty arising from caste?—That is the great difficulty of the Hindoos.

399. And that objection does not apply to railway travelling, because necessarily that difficulty would never arise in railway travelling?—I do not think that the experienced officers ever anticipated any difficulty with regard to railway travelling.

400. Sir *James Fergusson*.] But as a matter of fact, there is considerable difficulty in railway travelling, is there not, on account of the want of accommodation for cooking at the stations?—Many of the railway arrangements are very bad, and many of the natives who travel long distances suffer great hardships on that account, that applies to all third class passengers as well as troops; they are not allowed time practically to get food or perform any necessary office, nor have they any place at which they can do it.

401. Mr. *Oliphant*.] Are there any Bhootias who are Buddhists in the army?—I do not think so; if there are, they would be so few that they are not included in any separate column; there is a column for "other hill tribes," they may be included in that.

402. Lord *William Hay*.] In the Goorka regiments, are there no Buddhists?—I could not say that there were not two or three. I never heard of them. If there are, they are so few that they are disregarded in the returns.

403. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] Are there any Jain men in the Bengal army?—I am not aware of any.

404. Major *Anson*.] With regard to that question which the Marquis of Hartington asked yesterday about the complaints that have been made on the part of the Horse Guards to European artillery being entrusted to the support of native troops, I think that applies to India itself?—I have never seen any complaint to that effect. It was arranged that artillery should always be placed with European troops, and that principle is observed, I think, in every place, with this one exception of Singapore in the Straits, where there are three batteries of garrison artillery and only one regiment of native infantry.

405. There is not the same objection to garrison artillery being supported by native troops as there would be in the case of field artillery, and there is not the same objection to the arrangement at Singapore that there would be to batteries in India being supported by native troops?—Not the same amount of objection, but of course there would be the same objection; the Straits are a peculiar case; the reason for not having European artillery supported by native infantry, was a doubt in the mutiny as to the fidelity of the native troops, but that would hardly apply to Singapore, where a mutiny would be very unlikely.

406. Lord *William Hay*.] Do you see any objection to having one or two regiments entirely officered by natives?—I think it would be better not to have them; but I am aware that very high authorities, including Sir Henry Lawrence, were in favour of it.

407. Were not such regiments employed during the mutiny?—Yes, as a sort of military police, in Oude.

408. Did you ever come across such a regiment yourself?—No, I think not.

409. Do you not remember one commanded by Meer Jaffer?—I know Meer Jaffer intimately, but I did not see him after he was in command of a regiment, or rather while he was with his regiment; but I think there are many objections to raising up a class of native leaders.

410. It would be a good opportunity of rewarding very distinguished native officers, would it not?—I would sooner reward them in any other way; but there is no reward that could be too great for a man like Meer Jaffer, whose fidelity might be depended on under almost any circumstances, I should think; but you might not always get a man of that stamp in command if you once established the system.

411. *Chairman*.] Have you ever had under your consideration any plans for retaining in India a certain number of English troops who had served their time, and were coming home; has that subject ever been under the consideration of the Indian Government?—Yes, and the bounties were fixed at what was thought a liberal and sufficient scale some years ago; but the question still remains whether more men would not stay if a larger bounty was offered to them.

412. The bounties have been found to be practically very inefficacious, have they not?—A considerable number of men have renewed, but a vast number have not done so, and I do not know that any addition to the bounty would very materially alter the number of men who renew, because the temptation is so exceedingly great to them to come home.

413. They

413. They do not take to Indian life at all?—I think they like it as a rule; but this is the sort of temptation which is presented to them: say a man is with his regiment at Peshawur; he gets away from all drill and duty for three months while he is coming down through the Presidency, and then he has the voyage home, and he sees his friends and relations in this country, and then, in a short time, he can go and re-enlist without forfeiting his previous service. It is a sort of temptation that it must be very difficult to resist; but still many do renew, and of the regiments coming home, from a third to a fourth of the men remain, and they are the best men of the regiment. I say the best, because men of bad character, and men who are sick or physically unfit for the service, are not allowed to remain.

414. What is the average age of the men in the service?—I could not say that; I should think it must have considerably altered in the last three or four years, owing to the number of men who have taken their discharge under the 10 years' Act.

415. They are generally very young men, are they not?—Yes; I may mention that I saw all the men who took their discharge from all the regiments in 1864 and 1865, which was very great indeed, pass through Calcutta, and they were the very flower of the army, I should think.

416. Do you encourage men who are taking their discharge, and who do not intend to enlist, to stay in India?—No; there is no organised system of encouragement on the part of the Government, but good men can get employment on the railways.

417. You have no system of granting land to them in parts of India which are fit for the European constitution?—None whatever.

418. Has any such plan ever been under the consideration of the Government?—It has been mooted; but whether it has come to be officially considered by the Government, I do not know; I think not.

419. Do you think that, on the north west frontier, it would be possible, by any such arrangement, to add to the security of the frontier from small inroads or disturbances?—No, I think not; and if these men were to locate themselves in places where there is a liability to disturbance, they would be a great source of anxiety.

420. That is, if they did not locate themselves in numbers sufficient to take care of themselves?—Yes, and on the north western frontier, they would require to be in very large numbers indeed to be able to take care of themselves. By the north western frontier I mean Afghanistan.

421. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] And there is this circumstance also to be taken into account, that it is particularly unhealthy along the base of the hills?—Yes, and if they were in large numbers they would not be able to support themselves by agricultural operations on those very barren hills.

422. Lord *William Hay*.] I suppose they would be liable to insult or injury on the part of the fanatical tribes around them?—Yes, and as mere labourers, which most of them would be, they could not compete with the natives, who could live on much less than they could.

423. You think they could not make a good living in such a way?—I think certainly not.

424. Colonel *North*.] Is there any difference between the bounty given to the men who be-

longed to the Indian army before the amalgamation of the services and that given to our own troops, to induce them to remain, or is it the same?—It is the same. There are very few men left of the old local army, and who have gone into the British army. There are only 39 of those men in Bengal altogether. I think they do not renew their service unless they go into the British army.

425. What is the amount of bounty that they receive for remaining in India?—It depends upon the length of time they have to serve, the number of years that are unexpired of their service; I suppose you mean to induce them to remain when the regiment comes home.

426. I mean the time-expired men, who may be entitled to their discharge at the end of their 10 years, from regiments which have perhaps only just come to India, or only been serving in India a few years; what bounty would they receive to induce them to re-engage for another period?—The exact sum I cannot say at present, but I think it is nearly as much as 15*l.* in some cases; it is certainly 10*l.*

427. I suppose it ought to be large to induce them to remain?—There was some proposal to increase it some little time ago, but it was not carried into effect.

428. Lord *William Hay*.] Are not the soldiers in our Indian regiments allowed to take service with planters and others whilst still in the regiments?—No, not that I am aware of.

429. I remember a case of a man who was librarian in the Simla library whilst still in the army?—I know the case you mention; there have been a very few cases of men being allowed furlough for the purpose of taking employment; but, generally speaking, the furlough has been limited to a few months; and I think in the case you allude to, the man's employment was rather contrary to regulation.

430. During the whole time I was at Simla, we employed a man of that sort; it was not the same man all the time?—That makes a difference; in the hot weather furloughs are given to the men to go to the hills; that was done even before the mutiny, and they were allowed to take any sort of employment they liked during the hot weather.

431. Do you see any objection to increasing that system?—I think we have reduced the establishment so low now, and there are so many men at the convalescent depôts, that if you had a great many men away from the regiments on employment with planters and others, the duty would fall very heavily on those that remained.

432. You think you could not supply their place with other men in the regiment?—No; I may mention that I think nearly a thousand men of the British army are employed on the unattached list; they become supernumeraries directly they take employment in the Commissariat, the Ordnance, or in the Public Works Department. There are a large number of men who have well paid employment, and remain away from their regimental duty for years; some of them never return; they become assistant commissaries or conductors, or receive other appointments.

433. Sir *James Fergusson*.] Their places are filled up, are they not?—Yes; I think that that has hardly been dwelt upon sufficiently as an inducement to enlist. There is no doubt that a soldier enlisting now in the British army with a fair education, and going to India, can get employment

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employment there, and rise to a very respectable position. That used to be confined to soldiers in the service of the East India Company, but now it is open to the British army.

434. Lord William Hay.] Might they not be kept on the railways and still retained in the army?—A proposal of that kind was made some years ago; but I think the Commander in Chief and the Governor General of India rather objected to it.

435. Upon what ground?—Upon various grounds. The men so employed would not be under military control in any way; they are under military control on the unattached list; in nearly every case they are under military officers, and in all cases they are under officers, under the Government.

436. They would be liable to be sent back on misconduct of any kind being proved?—Yes; but it would be difficult to take the report of a station master or an officer of that kind against a soldier as conclusive. There are a great many discharged and pensioned soldiers employed as guards on the railway; some of them do very well, others take to drink and break down, and become rather a nuisance to the community.

437. Sir James Fergusson.] What is the bounty at present offered to European soldiers to re-enrol in India?—I am sorry I did not bring a memorandum of that. It varies under different circumstances; I think in some cases it is 10*l.*, and in others it is as high as 15*l.*

438. It costs, on the whole, about 50*l.* to bring a European soldier home on discharge, does not it?—Not the passage money.

439. But altogether?—That must depend upon the station at which the regiment is at the time the man takes his discharge; of course it is much more expensive to bring a man home from a regiment far up the country, because there are not only the transport charges down by railway, and so on, but he charges his pay so much longer after he has ceased to do duty.

440. Chairman.] What is the cost from Southampton to Bombay?—The ships have come home round the Cape hitherto; the cost varies every year.

441. Do you know what the charge is to be in future under the new system?—No, I do not know; but I know sometimes it is as high as 30*l.*; I think even as high as 34*l.* for soldiers from Calcutta to England.

442. Colonel North.] It was 29*l.* last year?—Every year it varies according to the tenders made by the shipowners.

443. Sir James Fergusson.] Supposing a man took his discharge in the North West Provinces, the bringing him down to the Presidency, his passage home, and his pay to the time of his discharge, would not come to much less than 50*l.*, would it?—No; I have not the slightest doubt that it would be a pecuniary gain to give any good soldier in any part of India 50*l.* to induce him to renew.

444. At present what is offered to him is not much more than 10*l.*?—I think not.

445. Chairman.] Are you aware whether any objections were raised by the Home authorities against raising the amount of the bounty?—I am not quite certain what the Home authorities said about it; but I think they discouraged any attempt for the present to raise the bounty; it may have been because there were questions under consideration respecting the pay of the

soldier, and the conditions of the service generally; but I think the Government of India were quite prepared, as was recommended by Lord Strathnairn, to advocate an increase of bounty.

446. Do you know anything with respect to the cost of transport of a native soldier, for instance, to Rangoon?—There is a contract with the British India Steam Navigation Company for the conveyance of soldiers to and from Burmah. I am not aware of the exact cost, but native soldiers are charged rather less for than European soldiers would be.

447. On what ground is the charge less in the case of a native soldier?—On the ground, which I think is an unsound ground, that they are given less space.

448. Are they given less space?—If the steamer or vessel was full they would have less space, and instances have occurred of native troops being excessively crowded on board ship, and sickness taking place in consequence. From what I have seen of troop ships, I cannot imagine that the space allowed for European soldiers would be at all too much for the natives.

449. A native soldier is not more able to endure crowding than a British soldier, is he?—No, and he is less on deck, probably.

450. His constitution is no stronger, is it?—No, it is weaker.

451. Major Anson.] In that climate, namely, the climate of Burmah, is his constitution weaker than that of a European soldier?—In Burmah of late years, the British soldier has been remarkably healthy. Rangoon has been a perfect sanatorium for several years past for the British soldier.

452. But not up the country at Tatmoo?—Even there, the mortality has not been very great, except that there has been an outbreak of cholera. At Tatmoo and Taungmoung the mortality is not more than 30 per thousand.

453. Chairman.] What force have we in Burmah?—The garrison at Rangoon is, a battery of garrison artillery, a regiment of British infantry, detaching a company to the Andaman Islands, and a regiment of native infantry. The garrison at Moulmein is a regiment of native infantry, detaching two companies to the Andaman Islands. Tongo and Tialmoo are widely separated from each other; the garrison at each is a battery of artillery, a wing of British infantry, and a regiment of native infantry.

454. Those detachments to the Andaman Islands are entirely for penal purposes, are they not?—Entirely; and there is also a company of British sappers.

455. Do you think that soldiers are necessary to do that gaol duty?—There were no soldiers there for a long time, but they had what they called the Indian Naval Brigade, of seamen who were partly ashore and partly manned a gunboat or two; but a superintendent who was sent down about the year 1862 thought that that was not an efficient arrangement for security, and asked for European troops, and the Government of India, in one of the civil departments, decided that they were requisite.

456. As I understand you, there are about 800 European troops in the Andaman Islands?—No; one company of British infantry, two companies of native infantry, and one company of British sappers.

457. Major Anson.] Do any of the native troops that have been employed in China, Singapore,

gapore, or Aden, have furlough during their term of service there?—Not if they are relieved every three years; but men on sick leave, on the recommendation of a medical committee, or of their medical officers, return for a time while on sick leave to their own Presidency.

458. *Chairman.*] Do you know the cost of transport to Aden per head?—No, I do not.

459. Nor to Hong Kong?—No; it must vary very much from time to time according to circumstances.

460. Should we be able to get those figures at the India Office, or should we have to send to India for them?—I should think you would very likely have to send to India for them; but they must vary from time to time according to the rates of freight, and the facility with which ships can be got to take troops.

461. Could not the British India Steam Navigation Company give us the information?—The British India Steam Navigation Company could tell you what their rates were for taking troops from one part of the coast to another; to Burmah and the Straits, for instance; but I do not think their steamers go to China.

462. *Captain Hayter.*] You explained yesterday that the mode of recruiting for the native army, was by detaching small parties with non-commissioned officers?—Yes, when necessary; but very often a regiment can get its recruits from men who come voluntarily to the head quarters of the regiment.

463. The system of recruiting is something similar to the English system, is it not?—Yes; except that it is entirely done by a regimental arrangement, and there is no general system for the army. A commanding officer obtains permission to send a party to whatever district he thinks most favourable.

464. Do particular regiments send to particular districts?—Yes, very much so, because the regiments are formed of particular classes of men, and the regiment must send to the districts where they can get the class of men they want.

465. If this system of employing Indian native troops in the colonies were adopted, do you anticipate any difficulty in recruiting for the troops so quartered beyond the sea, so far as the system is concerned?—No difficulty in the system, because we should form a small dépôt for a regiment under some competent officer, who would look after the recruiting, and supply the vacancies which he would know of from time to time by the men of the regiment who were left in the dépôt. There would be no difficulty in the system, but I guard myself against saying that there would be no difficulty in getting recruits. As far as the system goes you might, whenever a regiment was on foreign service, have a small dépôt where you would keep the sickly men, and

drill instructors, and the recruits would be brought in and drilled there.

466. The recruiting parties would be attached to the dépôt as in England, I presume?—Yes.

467. And the men could be equally well drilled under that arrangement?—They could be sufficiently well drilled.

468. The recruits in England are drilled at the dépôt?—Yes, there would be no difficulty about that.

469. There would be no difficulty about the drilling them?—No, none whatever.

470. *Chairman.*] I think you stated that you knew nothing about the black troops at Hyderabad; you do not know from what part of the world they come?—No; I have heard that they are Abyssinians, or Africans of some kind.

471. Are they Christians or Mussulmen?—I do not even know whether they are Mahometans or not.

472. *Lord William Hay.*] Are they negroes?—Yes, I think so; they are Abyssinian Seedees of some kind, but I have no information really about them. Some two years ago it was deemed rather of importance to ascertain exactly what was the force kept up by each prince in India, and we had the greatest difficulty in getting any reliable information at all; the information we got from Hyderabad was very meagre indeed.

473. *Sir William Russell.*] Do you think that it would be safe to trust either China, or any one of our colonies to the native troops, without a nucleus of Europeans at the same place?—I do not think it would be a satisfactory arrangement, but we have entrusted the Straits for many years to the native troops, with only a small portion of European artillery.

474. Do you consider that they are to be relied upon for active service without a nucleus of Europeans upon which to fall back?—I think it would depend greatly upon the enemy that was brought against them; but that there might be danger in a colony, if there were none but native troops stationed there, of some outbreak amongst them which might be disastrous.

475. *Major Anson.*] All the duties to be performed in our colonies would be garrison duties, which the native troops are very well adapted to do, for they make very good gunners, do they not?—Yes, they make very good gunners.

476. *Captain Hayter.*] You think favourably of them, as garrison artillery?—I think very favourably of them as garrison artillery and as field artillery too.

477. With European troops or with native troops?—With any troops. They used to be very good gunners; the native horse artillery were excellent. It was because they were such good artillerymen that we rather objected to having any of them.

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Tuesday, 12th March 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Major Anson.
Viscount Cranborne.
Sir James Fergusson.
Lord William Hay.
Captain Hayter.

Colonel North.
Mr. Oliphant.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Captain Vivian.

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

Sir WALTER ELLIOT, K.S.I., called in ; and Examined.

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478. *Chairman.*] WHAT office have you held ?
—I was in the Madras Civil Service.

479. At what time ?—From 1820 to 1859.

480. Were you in Madras all that time ?—No ;
I was employed in different parts of the country ;
for the first 13 years I was employed under the
Bombay Presidency in the Southern Mahratta
country.

481. During the time you were in Madras it
was the custom to supply Burmah with Madras
troops, was it not ?—Yes.

482. Used they to go willingly ?—Yes ; gene-
rally with the greatest alacrity.

483. What was the composition of the troops
who went ?—Madras Infantry and Sappers.

484. I meant as to race and creed ?—The
general run of the Madras army, almost all the
corps in succession, at least a great many of them,
went.

485. Then they were all Hindoos ?—No ;
Hindoos and Mahometans, the usual composition
of Madras sepoys.

486. Did you ever hear any objection made
by them to crossing the sea ?—Yes, on one or
two occasions I did ; in 1841 or 1842, I think,
the 4th and 41st Regiments were ordered out as
a relieving force to China, and they made some
objection to embark, but it was owing to some
difficulty about the family pensions.

487. It was purely a money question ?—Purely
a money question.

488. It was not a religious question ?—Not in
the slightest degree.

489. Have you ever heard of any religious
objection being taken to crossing the sea ?—No.

490. You do not believe that any discontent
ever existed among the troops on that account ?
—No ; certainly not in Madras troops.

491. Was there any amount of desertion pre-
vious to the embarkations of the regiments going
on foreign service ?—No ; on the contrary, when
some of the corps went out, men were known to
come down long distances from leave to join their
corps.

492. I suppose they got certain advantages ?—
Yes, in the shape of additional allowances ; the
Madras troops have constantly been in the
habit of serving across the sea since some
time in the last century. They went on the
expedition to Java ; they went to the Mauri-
tius ; in fact, they have served wherever the
Indian army has been employed across the sea ;

Madras troops have almost always formed part
of the expedition.

493. The only solicitude they have ever shown
upon such an occasion has been upon the question
of money ?—That was all, and that only after
some changes were introduced. After our pos-
sessions in India had extended very much, the
pension rules and the pay rules were all assi-
milated to those of Bengal. From that time
there has been constant discontent, but only
from the men not understanding what the Govern-
ment meant, and distrust being infused into their
minds by those changes, which they thought
were not keeping faith with them.

494. Were those expeditions always for field
duty, or were they sometimes for garrison duty ?
—Originally they were for field service, but lat-
terly they have been for garrison duty.

495. The men have gone equally willingly to
the garrison duty and to the field service ?—
Quite so, except on those occasions when there
was a change in the original rule to which they
had been accustomed with regard to their pen-
sion or allowances.

496. What was the term of years for which
they went when they were to perform garrison
duty ?—I think it was never more than three
years ; it seemed to be understood that three
years was the rule.

497. Were there any Brahmins in those corps ?
—A very few ; there are very few Brahmins
in the Madras regiments.

498. They were all low-caste men ?—Yes ;
men of the ordinary Hindoo castes, commonly
called Sudras ; good Hindoos and Mahometans.

499. You never heard of such Brahmins as
there were making any special objection to going
abroad ?—Never. There are generally a few
Bengal Brahmins in some of the corps ; they
have a small number, from 10 to 15 or 20. They
never made the slightest difficulty that I ever
heard of.

500. Of course there was no difficulty about
the Mahometans ?—No. The Madras regiments
have almost all of them got their men from par-
ticular localities. From an early period of our
possession of India, the men have all been taken
in the old provinces ; each regiment has some
particular village or town from which it is prin-
cipally recruited, and they merely take the
classes of men belonging to that particular loca-
lity. There are regiments composed principally
of

of Telugus, and others composed principally of Tamils.

501. Did they take their families with them?—Not abroad; they have not taken them across the sea.

502. Not even to Burmah?—No.

503. When they are in India they always live with their families, I believe?—Yes, in fact, a Madras regiment forms a sort of military colony; it has everything within itself; the men are not only recruited from the original place where the regiment is raised, but they are also recruited very often from the individuals in the regiment, and accompanying the regiment. The stoutest and most promising sons of sepoys are enrolled from their earliest years into a body called recruit boys. It was an institution peculiar to the Madras army; they recruited the sons of sepoys, who were fit for the ranks, when they were quite little, receiving some small pay—I think, three and a half rupees a month; they went through a certain amount of drill, and learned military discipline, and then, as the boys grew up to man's estate, they were taken into the ranks. Thus, the regiments were almost military colonies; not only the men's wives, and children, and families, but all their relations used to live with them constantly, at least a considerable number of their relations.

504. Was any discontent shown by these men when they had to go abroad without their wives and families?—No, not the least; these family pensions seemed to do away with all difficulties; the families were generally taken to the place where the regiment was raised, or to some other convenient place, and remained there until the troops returned.

505. Was the money paid to the families or to the men?—To the families.

506. Not to the men on service?—No; there was a local paymaster who distributed the money at the place where the families were left.

507. What is the habitual food of the Madrasees?—Rice, principally.

508. Did they get that when they were on foreign service?—I believe so; the commissariat were bound to supply them as well as the other troops.

509. Did you ever hear of any sickness resulting from a change of food?—There was great sickness when they went to China. I do not know whether it was owing to a change in their food, or to other causes.

510. Was it at sea, or after they landed?—Both, principally after they landed. The 4th embarked in a sickly condition, and suffered very much on the voyage, and very much afterwards also. From first to last they suffered most severely. I recollect, also, that testimony was borne to the good conduct of the corps under these circumstances. They never showed the least discontent; though they lost a great number of men, they behaved very well throughout.

511. They never behaved riotously at all?—Never.

512. There were no great irregularities in consequence of it, then?—No.

513. Do you know anything of the system of recruiting in the Madras army?—Yes; it is principally done by recruiting parties being sent to the place where the corps for which they are recruiting was originally raised, as I mentioned just now; and, also, men come down from their native villages to their relations in the regiment

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and remain in camp, and they are taken into the ranks from time to time; and, also, the children of sepoys are constantly taken into the ranks.

514. Had the difficulties in recruiting, of which we have heard in the Madras army, commenced before you left India?—Not that I heard of; I certainly did not hear of anything of the kind.

515. Major Anson.] You mentioned the case of the sickness of the 4th Regiment embarking for China; do you know anything of the mutiny of the 8th Cavalry when they were ordered to embark for Burmah?—Yes, I recollect it. I was a member of the Government at the time they were ordered out; it was in 1858, I think, whilst the mutiny was going on; they were at Bangalore, and when they were ordered down they were asked whether they had any objection to go, and they complied with the order most cheerfully. On the way down they were repeatedly asked whether they wished to go, or whether they had any objection to going, and they were asked so often that, when they came to Poonamalee or somewhere near Madras, they said they would rather not go.

516. By whom were they asked?—By the commanding officer, and he was a very good officer, too. I do not know why it was done, but at that time men's minds were a good deal disturbed by various things that had happened, and were happening in Bengal. These cavalry regiments were composed of Mahometans, and the Mahometans were the most active instigators of the mutiny; of course there was a little excitement in their minds about it. When they came to Madras, their horses and arms were taken away from them, and they were ordered back to Arcot, the head-quarters of the cavalry, and after a time the native officers were all dismissed.

517. Did they present any petition to the Government?—Yes, they presented a petition some time afterwards to the Government, in which they said that they had been quite willing to go, and had thought very little about going, but they were asked this question so often, that they thought the Government did not wish them to go. They made this a sort of reason for asking to be pardoned, and restored to their rank. Their dismissal was a very serious loss to these men, many of whom were very old officers, almost on the verge of getting their pensions; some of them were men of 30 or 40 years' service, and to them it was a very severe punishment.

518. If they had been ordered to embark and no questions asked on the subject, you do not think they would have objected to go?—I do not think so, and many others I know did not think so.

519. Do you know a case of a mutiny in the Madras 47th Infantry, when they were sent to Surat?—I know it merely from the public papers; I was not in a Government office at that time.

520. They went to sea without any objection, but they afterwards mutinied at Bombay?—Yes, at Bombay some change was made in their pay and allowances, and that gave rise to discontent; in fact, I do not think that a case of mutiny has ever occurred, as far as my knowledge goes, in the Madras army, which was not connected with pay and allowances.

521. Do you think that it would have a bad effect politically in India upon the minds of the natives, if we were to employ native troops in

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the colonies in places which were well fitted for them?—No, I do not think so, because many regiments of the Madras army have been employed everywhere, and they have not made the least objection to it.

522. You do not think that it would injure our military prestige at all?—No, not at all; I think the Government during Lord Tweeddale's time represented strongly the necessity of not interfering with the men's pay and allowances, and Lord Tweeddale said that he would pledge himself that the native army would go wherever it was required so long as the old pay and allowances were not interfered with. He was then Commander in Chief; I think that statement of Lord Tweeddale's is on record.

523. You never encouraged, in the Madras Presidency, caste and religious prejudices in the army; in the way they used to encourage them in the old Bengal army?—No; men of the highest and the lowest caste will stand side by side on parade; they have not the slightest objection to that. As soon as parade is over, of course they retire to their respective quarters, and then there is no communication between them; but on parade there is not the slightest difficulty, nor had we ever any difficulty about those matters in Madras. We do not recognise caste at all in Madras; it is probably owing to the state of society. In Madras all our domestic servants are men of the lowest caste—Pariahs, in fact; I think that that has been one great reason why there has been so much less prejudice on account of caste in Madras than elsewhere. In Bengal most of the men in service are of better caste, and there you have the same sort of tyranny amongst the domestic servants as amongst the sepoys. The domestic servants there will not do anything that they say is contrary to caste; it is a sort of way they have got of laying down their conditions of service, and they adhere to them most strictly amongst themselves. I can give an instance of that. I had myself a Bengal servant, a man of high caste, who went with me all over India, and did all I wanted for about 18 or 19 years. He was a khidmutgar of Sir William Rumbold's, a smart Qui Hy, when he went with me up the country. Had he been in Calcutta, he would not have done anything like what he did for me.

524. In 1852, when the Indian Government had to provide garrisons for Pegu, did they not find themselves under considerable difficulty about supplying native garrisons for that place?—I was up the country in 1852, and I had not much opportunity of knowing what was going on beyond the district in which I was.

525. The native army at that time was not enlisted for general service, and it was not accustomed to the idea of serving abroad, was it?—No, I think not; but that was introduced afterwards.

526. Do you know whether at that time there were only six regiments in the Bengal army enlisted for general service?—I have heard so.

527. Do you not think that in case of a European war, or our being obliged to employ European troops out of India, there would be great danger in our not having accustomed in time of peace the minds of the natives to perform general imperial duties in the colonies and elsewhere?—Yes; I think it would be inadvisable to introduce it then for the first time.

528. Do you think it would be an advisable thing to do in time of peace, in case we should

have to do it in time of war?—Yes; I think it would be objectionable to have to introduce it in time of war in the first instance.

529. Are there any other classes or races in India which you think might recruit the native army?—Yes; I think there is one class particularly, namely, the East Indians, who might be very useful.

530. You mean the half-castes?—Yes; the half-castes; they are continually increasing in number, and they will increase much more now that a greater number of Europeans resort to India. I do not see why they should not be enrolled. They have been employed very usefully already; there was a corps of them 30 or 40 years ago in the Madras army, called the Carnatic Ordnance Artificers, who were a most exemplary class of men; they were a superior class of men, but they were selected. They were employed in the Ordnance Department as artificers. During the mutiny we raised a corps of volunteers in Madras entirely of half-castes; the service improved them, and they turned out very well; they took pride in the service, and they were very efficient soldiers. These half-castes are used a good deal in other places. The Spaniards use them in the Phillipine Islands; they have a large force of them there, and they are exceedingly good soldiers, and the sailors employed in their marine are entirely drawn from the same class of men.

531. Do you know whether the French have borrowed some of these half-castes from the Spaniards?—Yes; at the time the French force at Saigon suffered so much from sickness they got two corps from Manilla, who did all the exposed service, and saved the Europeans immensely.

532. They are not nearly so costly as Europeans, are they?—No, I should think not.

533. Do you think that the effect upon the native mind, of the employment of foreign mercenaries, probably Chinese mercenaries, would be to weaken our power?—No, I do not see why it should at all. I may mention also a fact, which occurred during the mutiny, which is rather remarkable; there are a great many native Christians in the south of India, in Tinnevely and Madura; they petitioned the Government to have a corps enrolled from their body, and the only condition they made was, that they were not to be treated as native soldiers; they were to be treated in matters of pay and allowances, and so on, not like sepoy troops, but more like Europeans. I do not mean as to the amount of pay, but as to the general conditions of their service. That offer was declined; it was not thought necessary to have them.

534. You do not think then that, politically, the employing of foreign mercenaries, such as Chinese, would have a bad effect in India?—No, I do not think so. I do not think that the general body of the people have any great feeling on the subject. The great body of the agricultural classes submit very quietly to any arrangements the Government choose to make in these matters. There are a number of warlike tribes in India who have never been enlisted at all.

535. In the Madras Presidency?—In the Madras Presidency we have, and they might, I should think, with proper tact, and if care was taken, be made useful, but they belong to parts of the country which were acquired after the

the Madras army had been principally formed, and therefore no corps were ever raised from them. I refer to all that class of men such as the Polygars and the people under the native chiefs in the hills; there are several very warlike tribes amongst them, the Marawars, Kallars, Bédars, Ramoosees, Kooles, Bheels, Goojars, &c., and people of that kind; they are very warlike in their habits and very different from the rest of the Hindoos, and very little under the control of the Brahmins. I should think if they could be organized they would prove valuable troops. There have been local corps raised amongst them; for instance, one raised in the Deccan by Captain Macintosh, from the Ramoosees, who were of exactly the same class.

536. *Chairman.*] Is not it difficult to get troops of that kind to submit to discipline?—The difficulty is not to get them to submit to discipline so much as to bring them under control at all, because they are ignorant and unacquainted with civilized life. But when once they are under control they are very easily disciplined by men who understand how to deal with them; such men as Sir James Outram, for instance; he began his career by raising a corps of Bheels, which he made very useful.

537. They are far less accessible, are they not, to pecuniary inducements than the ordinary natives?—They are, on account of their very scanty wants; still I think they would be very glad to be remunerated, and I think their fidelity might be insured by a suitable remuneration; but they are very independent; they are fine, athletic, large men, very fond of warlike pursuits, and generally addicted to the chase in their own country; I merely make the suggestion of employing them; it never has been tried.

538. Are there any foreign mercenaries employed at Hyderabad?—Yes, they have a large force of Arabs, and they have likewise a large force of Sikhs, and they have also, I think, Beloochees.

539. Have they no blacks?—Yes, they are all black; I presume your Lordship means negroes. I do not know whether they have any negroes now; they used to have them in considerable numbers, particularly in the Bejapoor State, which was only destroyed at the beginning of the last century; they had a large force of negroes, and there are still a great number of those men remaining on the coast of the continent. There is a place called Janjeera in the S. Konkan, where there is a Hubshee colony; they have remained there permanently, and I have also found them all down the western coast in different villages; some of them are landowners and heads of villages.

540. Those are the remains of the old mercenaries?—Yes.

541. From what part of the coast did they come?—From the opposite coast, the Abyssinian coast.

542. Of what religion are they?—They are generally Mahometans; they were all converted to the Mahometan faith when they entered the service of the Mahometan Government, and they remain Mahometans still. I think Aurungzebe's fleet was almost entirely manned with that class of men, and the admiral was one of them, and I believe in fact it is the descendants of that admiral who occupy Jazeerah now.

543. I suppose those troops were all slaves, were they not?—They were bought as slaves, un-

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doubtedly; and some years ago, when there was a difficulty in getting men for the Bombay marine, one of the officers proposed to recruit from the Coast of Africa, in the same way as had been done before, and he got a considerable number of boys; but not having acted with much prudence or inquiry, it turned out afterwards that the lads had been brought down by one of the chiefs as slaves, though he was not aware of it; he was tried before the Supreme Court and sentenced to seven years' transportation, but was pardoned because he had not known that they were slaves. There is no doubt that they are a very valuable class of men, and might be employed with great effect in India.

544. It is difficult to obtain them by voluntary enlistment, I suppose?—It is difficult unless you set about it in the right way. I daresay in Natal you might get them, or some of the liberated slaves might be willing to take service on those conditions; they are exceedingly hardy, and are a fine class of men; at present all the heavy duty on board the steamers is performed by men of that class. The stokers and the men who have the very heavy work to do are all of this class.

545. Which would you say are the best materials for soldiers, they or the Chinese?—I should say they were, because they are much more simple-minded and much more easily controlled than the Chinese, who have their own peculiar characteristics, which make it difficult to bring them under perfect discipline, especially their habit of forming secret societies which they seem to carry with them everywhere; they have them at Singapore, and I should be afraid they might carry on the same thing if they were embodied in regiments; it seems to be a principle of their constitution to combine in that way.

546. *Major Anson.*] You stated a short time ago that there were in each Madras Regiment some Bengalese, amounting to 15 or 20; are there not in many cases a great many more than that?—There may be; I only spoke of cases under my own observation. I recollect a case I had to try magisterially, in which the men of the 23rd Regiment came before me; in that instance, there were about that number in the regiment. I only know the general circumstance with regard to the men engaged in other corps, but I do not know their exact number. I might mention, perhaps, with regard to other classes of men who might be enlisted, that I think the ethnology of India has been very little studied hitherto; there are some very remarkable races, of which the military class I have mentioned is one, and there is another class which is very remarkable also; they are generally shepherds, and are found all over India, from the south up to Bengal. In the south they are called Kooroobars or Dhangars. The Santals belong to that class; they are remarkably simple, and a fine class of people; one of their principal characteristics (it is a very curious one in India) is, that that they always speak the truth; every person who has observed them has borne testimony to that particular characteristic.

547. *Sir James Fergusson.*] Of what religion are they?—I do not know; their worship is of a very simple character. I think they worship the deities of the hills and trees and mountains; they are altogether an exceedingly simple race. Those found in the plains worship the inferior Hindu deities.

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548. *Chairman.*]

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548. *Chairman.*] Where do they live?—They are found all over India. They were formerly in the south the dominant race; they were called Kurumbars at that time, and they are still called Kurubars in the south. They are found in Mysore, and all the country of the Carnatic, and as you go north you find them as the Santals. The Koles, I think, belong to that class; they have the same characteristics throughout; they are shepherds by profession, and they are extremely simple in their way of living, and very truthful.

549. Have they ever been used as soldiers?—Never; all those people are without the pale of civilisation; we only became acquainted with the Santals by their rebellion a few years ago, in 1856 or 1857.

550. *Sir Henry Rawlinson.*] They are the race which we suppose to be the aborigines of the country?—I suppose they are one of the earliest. The slave classes, I think, are the aborigines; those are people you find in great numbers, and in all parts of the south. I think there is very good evidence of successive tribes of people having come in, and occupied the country one after another. Those shepherd classes were at one time certainly the dominant race. We have records of their existence in Madras from a very early period, and then come these Polygar races, which you find from Delhi down to the south. The Goojars round Delhi, I suppose, are of the same race, and the Ramoosees and the Bheels and the Bedars. I think the Koolis of Guzerat belong to that race, but I think the Koles belong to the other—to the Santal class.

551. *Mr. Oliphant.*] Would there be any means of employing European soldiers after their period of service has expired, such as the establishment of colonies in the hills, which would operate as a sufficient inducement to keep them in India, as a kind of reserve?—I should think that might be done, because a great number of the hardest and toughest soldiers who are pensioned off are located as pensioners at different places; there is a large number of them at Cuddalore, to the south of Madras, and another large body of them at Poonamalee, and there are others at various other places. Those men are pensioned and left to do what they choose, and they drink hard and do very little good. I think it would be easy to utilise them on the hill stations.

552. In the Neilgherries, on the chinchona and coffee plantations, might they not be used as superintendents; there might be a colony of them organised by the Government, might there not?—Yes, many of the best of them are employed as superintendents; but, I think, instead of letting them live there as they please, it would be a very good thing to give them land and encourage them to cultivate.

553. It would be better for them to be placed under control, would it not?—Yes, it would be better for them to be under suitable officers. Certainly, the materials for the experiment are there; they never think of coming home, they live and die there; but then these were men who had been enlisted for the East India Company's regiments.

554. It is rare now, is it not, for a man to take his discharge and remain in the country?—I do not know. I left India at the time of the amalgamation, and I do not know what has happened since. Those old pensioners settled down for good; they never dreamt of coming back to

England; they lived with their families quite settled in India; some of them were even comparatively young men who had been invalided from some accident.

555. Do you think it might be possible to encourage them to do this on a large scale, if there was a system organized so as to hold out an inducement to them to remain and settle in the country?—I have no doubt it would.

556. It would be quite healthy for them?—Yes, I think so; it would be exceedingly beneficial to the men themselves.

557. Do you know anything of a corps, the remains of which still exist in Ceylon, of men recruited from Mozambique?—No, I have never had any means of knowing about that.

558. *Lord William Hay.*] There is ample land available in the Neilgherry hills for such a purpose?—Yes, a great quantity.

559. Much more than in any other hilly part of India?—I think on many of the hills, if they were explored, there would be found to be equally good positions.

560. In the south of India?—Yes.

561. Not in the Himalayas?—I did not mean there; there is a place above Mangalore, to which the civilians are in the habit of going for change of air, and where they have built houses, which is just as good as the Himalayas. The Bellarungan hills are also adapted for this, and there are the Pulny and the Sherwaroyah hills; in fact, there are many places which, if explored, might be turned to account in that way.

562. Do you think that the average European soldier would be able to support himself with his own labour in those places?—I should think with his pension he would, quite; the experiment has to be tried. I do not see why he should not.

563. *Sir James Fergusson.*] I understand you to give us your opinion that native corps might be sent with advantage to garrison colonial stations, either corps such as at present exist, or corps specially raised from other native races?—I do not think there would be any difficulty about it, as far as I know the people myself, if they were treated with good faith, and if they had officers with tact who could manage them properly.

564. And you grounded that opinion very much upon there having been no difficulty hitherto in getting Madras troops especially to go when desired?—Certainly.

565. But have those occasions not been in the regular routine of service to certain stations, or in case of field service?—In the first instance it was always in the case of field service, but latterly, in Burmah and China, they did ordinary garrison duty after the war was over.

566. But the stations to which they were sent were so few, that the turn of any regiment came round very rarely, and also those stations were recognised as specially belonging to the garrisons of India?—Yes; they were recognised from time to time as the occasions arose, but the number of them increased as the occasions arose, and there was never any difficulty about sending the troops to them; therefore, I do not see why there should be any difficulty in increasing the range still further.

567. Do you not recognise there being a certain hardship upon troops of the habits of the Madras troops in being separated for a certain number of years from their families?—I do, certainly; it is a privation, but it is a privation to which they are ready to submit, and they always have

have been ready to submit to it, provided the term of foreign service is not longer than they have been accustomed to.

568. What time is that which it should not exceed?—Three years, I think.

569. Do you not think that if this practice came to be much more resorted to, so that the term of service would come round oftener to each regiment, the hardship would be more severely felt?—Of course it would be more severely felt, no doubt; just as in our own army the hardship of going to India makes the service much more irksome than it used to be, and many officers leave the service in consequence.

570. Might not the prospect of certain separation from their families for lengthened periods, at regular intervals, operate against the recruiting?—I do not know; it would make the service more trying. If you increase the number of places at which they are employed, it follows that you must increase the army. I think if you adopt a policy of the kind that is proposed, it would be necessary to raise other men.

571. You think that it would be necessary to increase the native army for that object?—I think so. If you increase the number of places at which they are employed, I think it follows, as a necessary consequence, that you must increase the number of your soldiers; and if you raised them from other races than those who now compose the bulk of the army, I think it would facilitate the service very much.

572. Major *Anson*.] You would not look upon increasing the native army as a drawback, provided we do not give it too great a preponderance in India itself?—No; the great danger is that of having too large a number of men of one class. As I said before, the Madras troops were all raised in particular districts, just as the Bengal troops were raised very much from Oude and the neighbouring localities. The greater the number of elements you bring into the ranks the greater the chance of safety you have.

573. Lord *William Hay*.] Do you think that there would be any difficulty in raising regiments for special service?—No; I think it would require a good deal of tact and management; but what has been done before can be done again. I have no doubt that it could be done if it were set about in the right way.

574. Colonel *North*.] Do you confine your opinion to colonies bordering on India, such as Mauritius and Ceylon; or do you include any of our other colonies, such as Gibraltar and Malta?—I should say that there would be very little difficulty about the Mediterranean; Malta is almost an Oriental place.

575. If they were bound to be relieved every three years, the sending them to the Mediterranean would be attended with considerable expense. Our regiments now serve in India 10 years or more?—Yes, it would be attended with considerable expense, no doubt; but I should confine the term of foreign service to three years. The Madras regiments are more like military colonies than regiments; of course, you cannot take men away from their homes and connections without holding out some prospect to them of returning. If you raised men expressly for that sort of service, which you might do from other races and classes, I think the difficulty would be diminished.

576. Would these men be satisfied to be away from their families for a succession of years?—

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I should think, if you raised them in the way we were speaking of, by enrolling Africans, Seedees, and so on (these are men who have no family ties—apparently they come and live abroad for years and years, without any family ties at all), it would be perfectly easy.

577. Major *Anson*.] In fact, you think that those are difficulties which you only have to face, in order to overcome?—Yes.

578. Sir *James Fergusson*.] You have recognised the great loyalty and uniform good conduct of the Madras troops?—Yes.

579. You attribute that, do you not, partly to the absence of caste prejudices amongst them, and partly, also, to the character of a military colony which those regiments have assumed?—Yes, and to keeping good faith with them.

580. But would those elements of safety not be wanting in the case of regiments raised under different conditions; for instance, regiments raised from special races, and having different habits to those Madras troops, would be wanting in those characteristics to which you ascribe their loyalty and safety?—I do not exactly know that; I think if you raise mercenaries, and pay them well, and keep faith with them, they will serve anywhere; those military colonies are a peculiarity in the Madras army, but I do not know whether it is an advantage that they should continue to form them.

581. Would it not be the nature of regiments raised with a view to service abroad, that they should not have these peculiarities of having all their families with them, and so forth?—For that purpose you must raise regiments from other races than those from which you raise them now. Every Indian, whether a Mahometan or a Hindoo, marries at a very early age; it is a part of their system of society, and is so closely interwoven with all their habits that they could not depart from it; so long as you have that class of men, you must have their families with them. That system has its advantages as well as its disadvantages. You have a hold upon their fidelity, their good conduct, and their morality; those are the advantages. Then you have the disadvantage of not being able to move those regiments where you wish, without moving these impediments with them.

582. Or leaving them behind?—Yes, which you could only do for a time. You could not expect men to leave all that they prize, all their families and connections and ties, for more than a very limited time.

583. Is not three years, or it might be five years if they went to a distant station, a very long time to make the separation?—The habit of limiting the period to three years has become so well understood that it is just one of those points which you could not depart from without shaking their confidence, just like tampering with their pay; they would feel that it was departing from what had been promised them over and over again. They would feel any change on that point like a change in their pay and allowances.

584. Captain *Vivian*.] Do you think that the climate of the Mediterranean would suit the natives of India?—Yes, I think it would; it is a very fine climate, as far as my experience goes.

585. And you think that Malta, being rather an Eastern kind of place, would suit the habits of the natives?—I think it would.

586. You have been asked whether you do not think it a great hardship to Indian soldiers to be sent across the seas. I suppose it is your opinion that

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that every soldier thinks it rather a hardship to take his turn of foreign duty?—Yes, it is a trial.

587. It is not in the least a worse trial for a native than it would be for a European, is it?—No.

588. Can you tell me what is the cost of a native soldier?—No, I have no financial experience; I could not say what the cost of a native soldier is.

589. Do you apprehend that it would be much more expensive to relieve the native regiments at Malta, bringing them from India, than it would be to relieve a European regiment from England?—Speaking generally, I should say it would be much less expensive, judging merely from what I know, but I cannot say from actual experience.

590. And if it was a general principle that those native regiments were to be relieved every three years or thereabouts, then the hardship would not be considered great by the native soldiers, would it?—No, it would not be so great.

591. And there would be no great objection on their part to crossing the water, would there?—Not if the turn of service did not come round too often. If it came too frequently, there would be a hardship felt.

592. You think that those men whom you would bring away from India would be reliable men?—I think so; I think they would be more reliable away from India than in India.

593. When they were away from their own homes, and their own traditions, they would be more to be trusted than in their own country?—Yes; in fact, the only times that their fidelity has been doubtful have been on the occasions of those Mahometan *émeutes* which have arisen from time to time, and which arise from a totally different cause from all others in the service.

594. Can you tell the Committee the names of the different castes which there are now in the Madras army?—I think I could if I had a little time for recollection.

595. Are there any Sikhs?—There are a very few Sikhs; scarcely any. I do not think I ever met a Sikh soldier. There are men of all castes. I could easily find them out with a little care. There are the ordinary Suddra castes, the mixed castes of the Tamil, and Telugu country, the cultivators and weavers, and people pursuing occupations of that kind, and a few Pariahs, and a certain proportion of Mahometans. I could give a complete list with a little inquiry.

596. Are there not any Pathans?—Yes, there are some.

597. Lord William Hay.] Are there no Mahrattas?—There are a very few Mahrattas in the Madras cavalry, but not many.

598. Do they not take service readily in our army?—No, I think not, because they have such a large field in the armies of their own chiefs, such as Scindiah and Holkah, that they do not care for our service.

599. They make excellent light cavalry, do they not?—Yes; some of the best troops of Scindiah and Holkar were composed of the Pariahs; a class called Hool-sawars, Pariahs mounted on the chief's own horses, and forming part of his pagah or household troops, were celebrated.

600. Were not the founders of the Mahratta dynasties very low-caste men?—They were the cultivating class principally.

601. Mr. Oliphant.] Do you think that any

inconvenience would arise from the employment of native troops in Colonies, where the commanding officer was not at all accustomed to the Indian army, never having had any such troops under him?—Yes, it requires considerable tact and knowledge of the men, I think, to manage them well. I think to manage them well there must be a good deal of consideration for them as men as well as soldiers. A very rigid military rule with those sort of men, requires to be tempered with a good deal of discretion.

602. Lord William Hay.] Do you know from what classes the coolies who go to the West Indies are drawn?—Yes, they are drawn principally from the lower classes of the Tamil race; the same class of men, in fact, as are taken into the army. Many of them are Pariahs.

603. Has any difficulty been found in inducing them to go to those distant Colonies?—None, rather the reverse. The Government had rather to restrain the emigration, and to see that they were not taken away under false pretences; they were ready to go, and consequently a number of crimps took advantage of that for their own benefit, and carried them away, so that it was necessary for the Government to interfere to protect them.

604. They took advantage of their anxiety to go?—Yes, their readiness to go.

605. Do the coolies generally make money by those emigrations?—A few made money and came back. Of course those few were held up as examples to all the others; many did not come back at all.

606. Mr. Oliphant.] Those who go to Ceylon come back regularly, do they not?—Yes, they merely go across the Paumbum Straits and return; they get fully double wages in Ceylon.

607. Major Anson.] If the native troops find that their fellow-countrymen, and people of the same class as themselves, are in the habit of going to the Mauritius for their own profit, they would not be likely to look with any great horror upon going there for service, would they?—No, I should think not; they went readily on the expedition to the Mauritius.

608. Lord William Hay.] The prospect of finding their friends and relations there might be an inducement to them to go?—Perhaps it might, but they would not have many friends and relations out there. Many of the regiments are a world in themselves, and have very little intercourse with the outside world.

609. Chairman.] It is not usually thought desirable, is it, to put native troops under English officers, who are not accustomed to the management of them?—I think it would be objectionable.

610. And, therefore, it would not be safe to send native troops to a colony where there was only an English officer in command, untrained in the management of native troops?—It would not be advisable, certainly.

611. It would, therefore, follow that you must either use them alone, with their own officers, or not at all?—You must either use them with their own officers, or not at all.

612. The commanding officers at the places where they were in garrison, must be officers accustomed to the management of native troops?—Yes; or at least willing to attend to the representation of their own officers.

613. Mr. Oliphant.] There would be no objection to a mixed garrison, would there?—I do not

not think so: they generally fraternise very well with European troops; they are on very good relations with them.

614. Captain *Vivian*.] As long as the regimental officers know how to manage the native troops, it does not much matter whether the commanding officer knows much about them or not, does it?—No; except the commanding officer were to interfere.

615. Major *Anson*.] Are there not a great many English officers who have commanded at the stations in India, where there are mixed garrisons of European and native troops?—Yes.

616. Therefore, those English officers have got into the habit of being aware of the feelings of the native troops, to a certain extent?—In my time the staff was always taken from the native army. A Queen's officer might be the brigadier commanding at a station, but his staff was always taken from the native army.

617. The more the native army and the English army are brought to work together, the better, is it not?—Certainly. I think there is a danger of giving in too much to the prejudices of the officers of the native army. I think that one great cause of the difficulties we had in 1857 was, that the Bengal officers were so much in the habit of listening to the prejudices of the men, and pampering them.

618. There would always be the regimental officer commanding of the native troops, their colonel, in case they were serving in any colony like the Mauritius, who would be able to inform the general commanding at the station, of the feelings, the want, and the wishes of his men, and look after their interests in every way?—Certainly.

619. Lord *William Hay*.] Did not the Bengal as well as the Madras troops take part in the early campaigns in Burmah?—Yes; it was during the first expedition that a difficulty took place with the Madras troops; it was in the expedition to Arracan in 1824 and 1825. An order of the Supreme Government cancelling the allowances to the Madras troops caused the first difficulty to arise. It was represented very strongly to the Governor General, and the order was rescinded, and the claims of the Madras troops were recognised.

620. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] Where have the Madras troops gone on garrison duty out of India?—I think, simply on garrison duty, they have only gone to the Straits, and to China; I am not aware of any other places.

621. Were there any Madras troops in Java at the time of the mutiny in 1815, or were they all Bengal troops?—There were Madras troops too, I think; there were certainly Madras troops.

622. Are you aware that the mutiny there was mainly caused by keeping the troops beyond their promised time of service?—I believe it was; that I only know from what I have heard and read.

623. Did you never hear of high-caste Hindoos losing caste in consequence of being obliged to cook on board ship?—I have known instances of men of high caste who would not cook on board ship; I took round a very valuable servant to Bombay, and he made himself so ill on the voyage that he died after landing in consequence of his sufferings from want of food.

624. Is not that a very strong objection to any high-caste men being sent across the sea?—As

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regards high-caste men, it is a very strong objection, undoubtedly.

625. What do you think would be the effect on the native mind generally of our bringing in foreign Asiatic mercenaries in the place of Europeans. Would it be favourable or unfavourable to our prestige. Would it give an impression of our power in being able to make use of foreign mercenaries, or would it create an impression that we had no English troops at our command, and were, consequently, obliged to use what we could get?—No, I think not. The only inference the natives would draw would be that, as the native troops had failed so signally in their fidelity, we were obliged to have recourse to other means.

626. I say in place of Europeans?—We have added so much to our European force that they would not draw that inference, because we did hold the country formerly with a less body of men than we have there now. The great body of the agricultural classes in India are perfectly indifferent upon the subject; they do not care in the least; they look upon the Government as the ruling power of the day, and submit quietly to whatever may be laid down; they never trouble their heads about the matter.

627. That is the agricultural population?—Yes, the great mass of the people.

628. Not the native Courts, or the people attached to the Courts?—No.

629. Was it not the fact that there was very little disaffection in the Madras army during the Mutiny in 1857?—Very little.

630. Was that attributable mainly to the mixed constitution of the army?—Yes.

631. To there being so very few high-caste men in the army, and its being recruited from different classes?—Yes. I may perhaps be allowed to add, that there have been again and again great symptoms of disaffection in the Madras Army; even in my own time, I recollect several instances; that has generally arisen from a different cause; from disaffection amongst the Mahometans, and from their stirring up the others.

632. The mutiny at Vellore was entirely Mahometan, was it not?—Yes, entirely. Then there was another mutiny afterwards in 1828 or 1829 (I forget the year), when there was a considerable amount of disaffection in some of the corps. And again, in 1832 there was a very serious outbreak at Bangalore amongst the artillery and amongst the Mussalman people generally. In 1838 there was a general mutinous feeling throughout the whole of the Madras Army, which ended in the resumption of Karnool and Wodigherry, belonging to Mahometan chiefs, who were also implicated. There was a very interesting Memoir drawn up upon that subject by Mr. Bailey, the Secretary to the Madras Government, in which it was stated that it had been found that Wahabee emissaries had come to every corps in the service, and had been inciting the Mahometan soldiers to take part in a religious war. There are three or four instances, in my own recollection, in which that has taken place. I think that is a chronic event, which will always require to be guarded against.

633. Some questions have been asked you with regard to the Mahrattas; are you not aware that during the time of the mutiny the Mahratta country generally, and especially the

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Southern Mahratta country was in a very unsatisfactory state?—It was.

634. And that one of the very few regiments which mutinied in the Bombay army at Kolapoor, was a regiment raised almost exclusively of those Mahrattas?—Yes.

635. Therefore, the precedent is not much in favour of enlisting Mahrattas except in combination with other castes?—Exactly, that is my

opinion; but you know that the South Mahratta country is a very trying place; it is one of our latest acquisitions; there are many local chiefs there to whom the people have feelings of attachment. No doubt they worked upon the troops considerably, and in that way, I think it was a most unfavourable place for a Mahratta corps to be stationed just at that crisis; it was a severe trial for them.

Colonel C. P. KEYES, called in; and Examined.

Colonel
C. P. Keyes.

636. *Chairman.*] In what capacity were you in India?—As commanding the 1st Punjaub Infantry.

637. How many years were you there?—I have been connected with the 1st Punjaub Infantry for 18 years; I was originally nominated by Sir Henry Lawrence as the Adjutant of the 1st Punjaub Infantry when it was first raised; and in 1854 I was removed to the command of the Scinde Rifle Corps, and remained in command of that corps until 1857, when I came home in ill health upon a medical certificate; upon my return to India I assumed the command of the 6th Punjaub Rifles again; but only remained about a month, when I was requested by General Chamberlain to return to the 1st Punjaub Infantry, after the departure of Major Coke; Major Lambert succeeded Major Coke, but he also went home on sick leave, and General Chamberlain wished me to return to the 1st Punjaub Infantry, and I did so, and have been with it ever since.

638. Of what race was the 1st Punjaub Infantry composed?—Chiefly of Pathans, Sikhs, Dogras, and Punjaubee Mahometans.

639. Lord *William Hay.*] Dogras are Rajpoots, are they not?—Yes, chiefly Rajpoots; the best of the Dogras are Rajpoots; there are some Brahmin Dogras.

640. *Chairman.*] Is it your impression that either of those races could be induced to go abroad for garrison duty in British colonies?—Does your Lordship mean the regiment as it stands now, or that men should be raised for the purpose?

641. Either that, or that a regiment for that purpose could be formed for that purpose out of the existing troops?—If a sufficient inducement were held out, I have no doubt that men could be raised for that purpose.

642. Would the inducement have to be very much larger than the present pay of the native soldier?—Yes, I think considerably larger.

643. How much is the present pay of the force which you command?—A sepoy of six years' standing gets seven rupees; after six years' standing it is raised to eight rupees, and after 10 years' standing to nine rupees.

644. What increase on that do you think would be necessary in order to induce the men to go abroad, and to enlist for the purpose of going abroad?—I should say very nearly double the pay, or at least five rupees in addition to that rate.

645. Would it be more attractive to them in the form of pay, or of bounty or pension?—I should think pay, because I do not think that they would serve with any intention of remaining any length of time in the service.

646. For how many years could they be safely

enlisted for garrison duty in a colony across the sea?—I think it would be difficult to induce them to bind themselves to any particular time.

647. Do you mean to say they would require of you to take them back whenever they were tired?—The men enlisting in the army at present are bound to serve for three years; they cannot demand their discharge until they have served three years.

648. And you think they would demand the same term in any enlistment for foreign service?—I should say so.

649. You do not think that they could be induced to go for a longer time?—I do not think they would bind themselves for a longer period.

650. Major *Anson.*] Has it ever been tried?—Not that I am aware of.

651. Have you ever made inquiries in the regiment about it?—I have never made inquiries about garrisoning any of our colonies, or simple garrison duty out of their own country, but I have frequently spoken to the men on the subject of service abroad.

652. *Chairman.*] That was field service?—Yes, field service.

653. I suppose that is always connected in their minds with a certain amount of booty?—Yes, I think that is the first thing that occurs to them, the chance of bettering themselves by getting booty; but I think the Pathans, as a race generally, are fond of excitement; for a short time they would go with the greatest pleasure.

654. The idea of an expedition abroad without booty is not familiar to them?—I do not think so.

655. Do you think that if they were taken abroad on garrison duty their behaviour would be more or less regular than that of European soldiers?—I should say much more regular; they are more easily managed than the English soldier.

656. Their habits are not such as would produce great disturbance in any European community in which they were placed?—No, certainly not.

657. Would they be liable, do you think, to mutiny if they were placed in any colony by themselves, without European soldiers to check them?—No, I do not think they would.

658. Would it be safe, for instance, to entrust Singapore or Hong Kong or the Mauritius to their exclusive guardianship?—I do not think it would be wise to do so, because, I think precaution is better than cure; but I do not think they would mutiny, from my experience of them, or that it would be dangerous; still, I think, it would be much better for British soldiers to be at the same station with them wherever possible.

659. Do you think it would be necessary that the number of British soldiers should be equal

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to that of the natives, or would a smaller number suffice to prevent any mischief?—A smaller number would be sufficient.

660. Are they very averse to going to sea; have the races with which you are acquainted, a strong prejudice on the subject?—No; certainly not. I think there is a great misunderstanding on that point; I have never heard any man object to going across the sea, or on the sea at all; in fact, I have often spoken to the men on the subject, they would have been only too happy to have gone to China or Egypt, or anywhere else they were asked to go on service.

661. Take the Rajpoots, for instance, would they have no difficulties about their cooking?—No doubt there would be difficulties, and they would be put to inconvenience, but the difficulties would not be insurmountable.

662. They would not be insurmountable, in their own view?—No, I do not think so. I think it is a prejudice; but I think it is a prejudice that can be got over. The natives do like, of course, to adhere to the custom of the country, and it has hitherto been the custom, especially of the Bengal army, to have all those little prejudices attended to; they like fostering them, and keeping them up, if they get their own way; but it is not at all necessary that those prejudices should be observed in the strict manner that people generally suppose.

663. There is no prejudice that would stand against the attraction of an offer of double pay?—I do not think so; I am not aware of any. The Dogras, who are Rajpoots, dislike drinking out of leathern vessels, as the Mahometans and other classes of the regiment do, and they have asked me on service to get them their own water-carriers. Where it was inconvenient to do so, I have never had any difficulty in denying them their wish. I have told them that it was simply a prejudice on their part. I was very sorry that they should suffer by it, but as it was simply a prejudice, it would be inconvenient for the Government to give them any assistance on the subject, and they have always, without the slightest difficulty, procured water for themselves. But, no doubt, if the prejudice was given in to, they would like to maintain all those little things. They look upon it as a little privilege, but it is not at all necessary that it should be adhered to.

664. I suppose you have often kept troops under your command for a long time in the same cantonments?—Yes.

665. Have you ever found them restless under those circumstances, from having had to remain a long time at the same place and doing the same duty?—No; simply for the reason that they had a large amount of leave; if they were detained on duty for any length of time without being allowed to go to their homes and see anything, they would be restless; and when it has been inconvenient to give the men leave, I have frequently had excellent men in my regiment ask me for their discharge, simply because they could not go to their homes. The same men have come back and re-enlisted, in many cases.

666. At what intervals do they require their leave, on the average?—They like to get home every year, if they can. With regard to the Pathans, the Punjaubese, and the Sikhs, or, at least, the nearer race of Sikhs, it is so generally managed that they do usually, once in the year, get away to their homes for a short time.

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667. Do they think it a hardship if they cannot get away within less than two years?—Yes, certainly; and it is one of the greatest difficulties I have had to keep the men contented and happy, without constantly giving them leave to go to their homes.

668. Then if they were enlisted for a term of three years, it would be rather a strain upon their ordinary habit?—Certainly.

669. A strain for which you would have to pay heavily?—Yes; it is not only that, but it is the idea of the indefinite time. You might say three years, but practically it might be much longer.

670. You mean, supposing any active service to arise?—In case active service should arise, or supposing it was not convenient for the Government to relieve them at the end of the three years. If they were in a distant colony, and it was not convenient for the Government to relieve them at the end of three years, they would have to remain longer. They could not divest themselves of the idea of the indefinite time they would have to serve. When once away from their homes they could not realise to themselves that they really would see their homes again at the end of three years.

671. Of the races at your command are there any which, more than the others, would be willing to go abroad, or which would be more indifferent to the absence from their homes?—I think the Dogras would be the least inclined to go. As regards the Sikhs and Pathans, their disinclination would be very much the same.

672. Have you had any Beloochees under you?—No, never.

673. Or Affghans?—Yes.

674. Or Affghans who were not Pathans?—I have not had any other race under my command than those I have mentioned. Before the mutiny there were a few Hindostanees in my regiment; a company of Hindostanees, and they did excellent service during the mutiny at Delhi; none in the regiment did better, but they gradually died out, or have been removed, and they have never been replaced.

675. Major Anson.] Is your regiment the same that Colonel Coke commanded at Delhi?—Yes; he commanded at Delhi.

676. Do you think that if the commanding officers promised their men that they would only have to serve abroad for three years they would disbelieve them; do you not think that they would have confidence in their commanding officers?—I do not think they would disbelieve them, but they would doubt whether an exigency of the service might not arise so that they could not carry out their promises; they would not disbelieve the word of their commanding officer.

677. Do you not think that though there might be slight objections at first, after they found that the relief was very regular and that they were not detained more than three years, they would very soon lose all objections to going once in their lives for three years abroad though there might be a little feeling of doubt about it at first?—There is no doubt that they would have a doubt of it at first, and it could be only told by experience and by time whether that doubt would be removed; it is impossible to say that yet, but that they would start with that doubt there is no question.

678. If they found that they got extra pay, or double

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double the pay which they get in India, or something that made it worth their while to go, that would go very far to make them settle for three years in some colony, or even for a longer period, would it not?—As I said before, there is no doubt you could raise men for the purpose. I do not know whether your question referred to the existing regiments.

679. Even with regard to the existing regiments, do you not think that an increase of pay would tempt them to stay abroad for three years?—No, I do not think so.

680. Colonel *North*.] With regard to crossing the sea, the native troops might not care for a voyage of a few days, but to bring them to Malta or Gibraltar would take many weeks; how would they like that?—I do not think they would dislike it at all; of course it is the first prejudice that must be overcome. If the prejudice exists, it would have to be combated; I maintain that it is simply a prejudice, and that there is no actual objection to their going abroad.

681. Lord *William Hay*.] Do you think that the regiments under your command would be able to stand the climate of China better, for instance, than the European soldiers can?—No, I do not think they would be better than the European soldiers are there.

682. *Chairman*.] Would they prefer a colder climate?—Decidedly; I think many of the men of my regiment suffer from the heat quite as much as I do myself, or more.

683. Colonel *North*.] Is your regiment a Bombay regiment?—No, it is one of the Punjaub irregular regiments on the Punjaub frontier; it is close to the hills.

684. The two Indian regiments that were serving at Hong Kong hardly suffered at all; the climate agreed with them perfectly. I think they were Bombay regiments?—It depends entirely upon the amount of exposure they are put to.

685. Lord *William Hay*.] There would be no objection on the score of climate to the employment of your regiment in a cold climate, such as the Mediterranean or even in England, would there?—No certainly not; I think it would agree with them exceedingly well, provided they were properly clothed and properly fed. An Affghan, or Pathan, requires the same feeding almost as a British soldier.

686. As much meat?—If he could get it he would always eat meat.

687. Are not the Pathans singularly free from prejudice in regard to eating and drinking?—Yes.

688. For instance, would any of your men eat with you?—The head native officer in my regiment has frequently sat down to table with me, and if I am eating a biscuit or anything at the table, and eat only a portion of it, he will take up the remainder and eat it.

689. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] They are Mahomedans, are they not?—Yes.

690. There is no distinction of caste among them?—No; but the lower classes, our personal servants, for instance, would fancy, at least they would pretend to fancy, that they were dishonoured and disgraced by having touched our food, that is to say openly; but they would go in private, and if they liked what was on the table, they would finish it up very readily.

691. Mr. *Oliphant*.] What would be the effect upon the other native regiments in that part of India of the introduction of regiments composed

of Chinamen, or men of an entirely different race; do you think it would injure our prestige in India?—I should not think it would be good at all to introduce regiments composed entirely of Chinese into India.

692. Lord *William Hay*.] Or negroes?—I think that the introduction of foreign levies, whether natives of China or negroes, would, as it were, cast a suspicion upon the natives; of course they already feel that we have not the same confidence in them that we had before the mutiny; they cannot divest themselves of that idea, whether true or not; I have no doubt of that.

693. And you think that that feeling might be increased?—I think it might increase that feeling of separation between us.

694. Have you ever commanded negroes?—No, never.

695. Or had any under you in the Scinde Corps?—There was one Seedee in the Scinde Rifle Corps; he came from the Bombay army; there was one individual only.

696. The men of the regiment had no objection to serving with him?—No, none whatever.

697. Captain *Vivian*.] You have stated that the pay of the native soldier is seven rupees a month?—It is, up to six years.

698. But he feeds himself for that, does not he?—He feeds himself and clothes himself for that.

699. For seven rupees a month?—Yes.

700. If that pay was doubled, do you think that that would be an inducement to them to go abroad?—Certainly. Taking the regiment as it stands now, as a whole, I think there would be a great objection to sending them abroad to serve, because to many of the men it would be most distasteful.

701. Supposing we were to put it to your regiment, as it is now composed; it is proposed by the British Government to send you to garrison Malta for three years, and you are to have double pay, how do you think it would be received by the regiment?—I should be sorry to put it to them in that way, because I maintain that the Government has a right to send the troops wherever it pleases; they are enlisted expressly on the understanding that they are to go wherever they are wanted to go, and, therefore, to introduce a system of volunteering in that way, I think, would be very injurious to the army.

702. I will put it in another way. Supposing we were to say to them, you are ordered to go to garrison Malta for three years, and you are to have double pay; would that create discontent?—No; many men might feel distressed at having to go, but that it would create discontent in the regiment I am not prepared to say.

703. You would have no fear of a mutiny, or of having any difficulty in inducing the regiment to embark?—No, none whatever; because I think I should have sufficient influence over the men to make them go; still I do not think that it would be politic to do so without first ascertaining very clearly (without putting it in the form of volunteering) what the feeling of the regiment was, and how many men it would affect.

704. Have you ever heard any desire or inclination expressed by the men to visit Europe?—Frequently. My own men, not the body of the regiment, but many of my native officers, were particularly desirous to come with me

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me this time, when I came home; one was especially desirous of coming.

705. Do the men generally correspond much by letter among themselves?—Not the Pathan regiments much, I think.

706. Do you think that a native regiment being sent to a garrison like Malta would have a good effect in India itself when the news was spread, supposing the men wrote home to their friends, and told them what great things they saw?—It depends upon the light in which those men saw it. If they were put to great hardships and felt themselves aggrieved at going, no doubt the feeling that they would spread would be that of discontent.

707. When they got there, if they found that there was no hardship, and that they were very luxuriously treated, what effect would it have?—They would no doubt speak accordingly.

708. In short, you think that it is a prejudice which might be very easily got over?—I think that, where men find their interest in anything, of course it is not difficult to make them act accordingly; but if they found that the foreign service was inconvenient, it would have a contrary effect. There is no doubt that self-interest and self-convenience would be the ruling motives for men going anywhere.

709. Mr. *Oliphant*.] You think that there would be no difficulty in raising a new regiment of Pathans, for instance, distinctly upon the understanding that they were to be sent on foreign service?—No, I think not.

710. You think that there would be no difficulty in finding recruits for that service?—No; I do not think there would provided it was made worth their while; it would depend very much upon how those men were treated, and how they liked the service, whether you would get any others to follow them.

711. Sir *James Fergusson*.] You have stated that the seven rupees per month, which is the pay of a native soldier in India, includes clothing and rations?—The men have to provide for themselves what they call half mounting, that is to say, the ordinary fatigue dress; and now that is really a great hardship with the men, for what cost my men seven years ago Rs. 2. 8., they have now to pay Rs. 6. 8. for, that is 200 per cent. above what they used to have to pay.

712. As a matter of fact, they have considerable difficulty now in living on their pay, have they not?—An increase has lately been made to men of six years' service; that is the late order. I think it is a very good one, and has a very good effect; but still I think it is as little as a man can possibly live upon.

713. What was the late order to which you refer?—An increase of one rupee after six years' service, and an increase of two rupees after 10 years' service.

714. In case a regiment was sent abroad, the double pay which you say would be necessary, in your opinion, to reconcile them to that service, would be exclusive of rations, would it not; you would have to give them their rations besides?—You would have to provide rations for them certainly.

715. Besides any extra pay?—Yes.

716. Captain *Vivian*.] You would provide them with rice, I suppose?—Yes.

717. Lord *William Hay*.] Did you say that you would have to provide rations for them, besides their extra pay?—I said so, but it depends very much upon the price of food. If the price of food was very much in excess of what they have to pay in their own country, of course their pay would have to be raised accordingly.

718. Captain *Vivian*.] That is the principle followed now in the army, is not it?—That is the principle. When the price of provisions rises to famine rates, a certain allowance is made to them.

719. Mr. *Oliphant*.] I suppose rice is their staple food anywhere; they would never be satisfied without their rice?—The Pathans very seldom eat rice.

720. Lord *William Hay*.] It is considered a luxury by them, is not it?—They eat it now and then.

721. Is rice not regarded as a luxury by the people of the north of India?—It is not a general article of food amongst the Pathans.

722. Have you now any practical difficulty in obtaining recruits for your regiment?—I do not think they come quite so readily as formerly, but I have not much difficulty in obtaining recruits for the regiment. When my native officers and men whom I can trust go upon leave, as they frequently do, I make them always look out for good men, and bring them back with them for recruits, and though the regiment may be full, I keep them there to ensure my having them when I want them.

723. On the whole, is not there more difficulty now than there was a few years ago in getting recruits?—I think the same class of men do not come so readily as they did.

724. Is the present class an inferior or a superior class, do you think?—They are not quite of such good families; they are more needy; they are mostly the same class of men, but they are more needy men who come.

725. Sir *James Fergusson*.] Is there anything in the habits of those races who compose the Punjaub regiments that would render them unsuitable for a European colony?—I think there would be the greatest difficulty in a European colony to give the men occupation to keep them contented to remain so long as three or five years away from their homes. I do not think that their simple duty would be sufficient occupation for them to keep them contented and quiet. I do not mean to say exactly quiet, but they would have home sickness, and always be desiring to return home.

726. *Chairman*.] They would find it dull?—Yes; and the Pathan race is a most excitable one; they are very much like the Europeans in their temperament; they require change and excitement just as much as Europeans do.

727. Captain *Vivian*.] Not more?—I think the Europeans require pretty much of it.

728. Mr. *Oliphant*.] European regiments will stay in a garrison, will they not?—Yes.

729. Lord *William Hay*.] Do you see any serious objection to having regiments commanded entirely by native officers?—For myself, I do not approve of it; I think that the generality of natives are not fit to command a body of men. There are exceptions to it, of course, but as a rule, I think it is objectionable.

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Friday, 15th March 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Childers.
Viscount Cranborne.
Sir James Fergusson.
Lord William Hay.

Captain Hayter.
Colonel North.
Mr. Oliphant.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

Colonel the Honourable H. H. CLIFFORD, V. C., Assistant Quartermaster General, Horse Guards; Examined.

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729*. *Chairman.*] WHAT are the subjects upon which you are prepared to give evidence to the Committee?—The only questions upon which I am prepared to give evidence are those of the movements of regiments from England, to and between the various colonies east of the Cape, to India, and to the West Indies, and of the mode in which the reliefs are carried out. All movements of corps at home and to foreign stations are first considered and ordered by his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief himself; that is the case with every move that takes place. The regiments at colonies eastward of the Cape, excepting India, are generally relieved by corps from India, but those in the West Indies are sometimes relieved by corps from Europe, and sometimes by corps from British North America. The corps eastward of the Cape, on being relieved, are sometimes brought to the Cape of Good Hope and sent to India, and sometimes brought to this country, whilst those in the West Indies have for the last 10 years been invariably brought home.

730. Do you mean to say that a corps in China on being relieved is never taken to India, but always either to the Cape of Good Hope or home?—Generally speaking, it is moved from China to the Cape, or brought home; I do not think there is an instance of a regiment having been brought, of late years, from China to India.

731. *Mr. Childers.*] To Australia or New Zealand?—The regiments are generally moved from China either to the Cape or home.

732. There was a corps sent to New Zealand in one case?—Yes, in one case.

733. *Lord William Hay.*] I remember the case of the 98th Regiment coming from China to India under Lord Clyde; Colonel Campbell, as he was then?—That was at the time of the mutiny, I presume?

734. No; it was long before the mutiny?—I am not fully acquainted with the facts of that case.

735. *Colonel North.*] The 2nd Battalion of the 11th Regiment were under orders to go to India from China; but in consequence of their being in bad state of health they were sent off to the Cape; however, I believe, it is very rarely

that that is done?—Very rarely indeed; if the Committee require a statement of that kind with regard to the actual regiments, I can furnish it.

736. *Chairman.*] Will you let the Committee have a return of all the reliefs and movements of troops east of the Cape during the last 20 years; I suppose it will not be a very onerous duty to prepare such a paper?—I will; I suppose you would not require small drafts to be mentioned.

737. Merely regiments, of course?—I will prepare it as soon as I can.

738. *Sir Henry Rawlinson.*] There is no need to give movements in India itself, but only movements from one country to another?—There is no fixed rule as to the distribution of corps on being relieved at stations eastward of the Cape of Good Hope, as the place to which they are sent depends very much upon the length of their service abroad, and the stations at which they have been serving, and also upon their previous foreign service; regiments are sometimes exchanged between the Cape of Good Hope and the Mauritius, and between the Cape and China.

739. *Chairman.*] Are the reliefs arranged only with a view to those considerations you have named, or with a view to economy?—They are arranged also with a view to economy. Their period of service at each station averages from two to five years, and their foreign service averages about ten years. I mean that that is the average of a regiment's stay at a colony; sometimes it is two years and sometimes it is five years.

740. *Sir James Fergusson.*] Ten years' foreign service is the intention, but that time is often exceeded, is not it?—Yes.

741. *Lord William Hay.*] Does that statement apply to India?—This is exclusive of India. Regiments generally stay a longer period in India than two or five years.

742. Does the average of 10 years include India, or is it exclusive of India?—The 10 years is inclusive of India. Ten years is supposed to be the period of foreign service.

743. *Chairman.*] Would you be good enough to include in that return, of which you have taken a note, also the time during which each regiment on foreign service has remained in each country:

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country: it is merely the same facts in another form?—Yes. In the return of all regiments relieved during the last 20 years, east of the Cape, is it the wish of the Committee that India should be included?

744. Certainly?—I will take care that that shall be done.

745. Colonel North.] At this very moment there are many regiments in India that have exceeded their 10 years of service there, are there not?—Yes.

746. Sir James Fergusson.] Your intention, in the statement which you were making to the Committee, was to show the ordinary system of relief to colonies other than India?—Yes; other than India. Such a return as that of which I have just taken note having been called for, it would be useless to enter into any minor detail of what reliefs there have been. In order to give an idea of the time that regiments have stayed, I have prepared one, merely relating to the last three or four years, but, as a return is now called for for the last 20 years, that would comprehend everything I have, so that it would be useless my entering into any detail now.

747. Has there not been a new scale of foreign service laid down since the Crimean war?—The whole system has been reconsidered since the Crimean war.

748. Chairman.] Have you any further information to give to the Committee?—No.

749. You have no knowledge of the cost of transport, have you?—I should not like to speak about it officially, because we do not deal with it; it rests entirely with the War Department, and an officer of that Department is preparing the necessary detail, and is going to give evidence before the Committee with regard to it.

750. Was it part of your duty to undertake or direct the movement of Indian troops, such as the Sikhs, during the Chinese war?—No, I had nothing to do with them.

751. Nor the Ceylon Rifles?—No.

752. Mr. Childers.] When you stated that the average stay of a regiment in a colony is from two to five years before relief, you meant that the Horse Guards rule is that the reliefs are in five years, but it frequently happens that for the convenience of the service regiments are left for a much longer time before being relieved, does it not?—Frequently.

753. Captain Hayter.] The general rule for foreign service is 10 years abroad and five years at home, is it not?—Yes.

754. Sir James Fergusson.] That was the new scale laid down, as you mentioned, subsequently to the Crimean war, was not it?—I could not say for certain; I think there was no alteration in the time then. I think the same time, namely, 10 years abroad and five years at home, existed before then.

755. Chairman.] I understand you to say there is no rigid rule of any kind, but that it is a matter of absolute discretion on the part of the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes, there is nothing laid down; if the Commander-in-Chief thought it advisable that a regiment should remain a longer period abroad, it would remain there.

756. So that when a regiment goes to a station no man in it can prophesy how long he is likely to stay there?—He cannot be certain within a year; he knows that within a year or two at most the foreign service of the regiment will be 10 years; on going abroad a man knows that his foreign service is 10 years.

757. But he does not know where he will pass that 10 years?—No.

758. Are you at all acquainted with the question of the cost of relieving the troops in the various stations?—No, I am not prepared to give evidence on that subject.

Tuesday, 19th March 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Major Anson
Viscount Cranborne.
Sir James Fergusson.
Marquis of Hartington.
Lord William Hay.
Captain Hayter.

Colonel North.
Mr. Oliphant.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Sir William Russell.
Captain Vivian.

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

Major General THOMAS TOWNSEND PEARS, C.B., called in ; and Examined.

Major Gen. 759. *Chairman.*] HAVE you any information
T. T. Pears, with respect to the cost of the transport of troops
C.B. perhead per day from one oriental port to another?
19 March —No, I have not. I think there is no such in-
1867. formation in the India Office at the present time.

I have an estimate by the Government of India of the probable cost of the transport of a Sikh regiment from India (that is to say, Bengal) to China, but it is a mere estimate. It is the only information upon the subject I could find in the India Office. I have seen a statement, made also officially, on the occasion of a regiment returning from Hong Kong to Bombay a very few years ago. A vessel was offered at Hong Kong to take the whole regiment to Bombay for 5,000 *l.* That may give some notion of what the transport of a regiment would cost from one port to the other, but we have no returns of the actual cost from the Governments of India.

760. Have you any knowledge of the increased pay which was given to the Sikhs who were employed in China?—I do not think they had anything beyond the ordinary money privileges given to the troops going to China upon other occasions.

761. What are those privileges?—They have what is called full batta; they have that whenever they are on active service.

762. What is the amount of full batta?—It varies with the ranks; the amount to a private soldier is a rupee and a half a month.

763. Over and above his pay?—Over and above his pay, and then they have free rations besides when on foreign service.

764. Ordinarily they have seven rupees a month; then they have their food besides?—Seven rupees is their full pay ordinarily apart from good conduct pay, or length of service pay, which they get after a certain number of years' service. They get rations, estimated at 3½ rupees a month.

765. Have they any other privileges?—They have other privileges occasionally according to the service on which they are engaged. When we went 25 years ago to China, the troops had warm clothing of various descriptions given to them free of expense; but that is not part of the regulation.

766. Have they any pension privileges?—Yes, very great privileges. It is only the heirs of men who die, or are killed on foreign service, who get any pensions at all, and they do.

767. What is the increase of pay given to the Madras troops going to Rangoon; is there any?—It is the same as they get at other foreign stations; it is considered foreign service; all service beyond sea that involves the troops going on board ship has been always considered by the Madras Government and the Madras army as going on foreign service.

768. Only by the Madras army; the Bombay army often moves by sea, does not it?—They do; and they have not, as I understand, the same privileges; they have at Aden, but not in Scinde. Scinde is considered as a portion of the Presidency. Aden is considered foreign service, and they get the same privileges there.

769. Does any part of the Bengal army ever go to Burmah?—They have been, but they do not go there as a part of their ordinary routine duty.

770. Is that treated as foreign service in their case?—I am not certain; the last time they went was for active service there; therefore no doubt it was in that case; I cannot speak to a certainty.

771. From what Presidency do the troops come who garrison the penal settlements?—They have a small detachment of European troops, and they have natives.

772. From Madras?—From Madras, I am almost certain. I know that the Madras sappers are there, and I am almost certain that a Madras infantry regiment is there too.

773. That is treated, I suppose, as foreign service too?—Quite so.

774. Do you, from your experience, confirm the statement that no difficulty has ever been found in inducing the Madras troops to go upon that Burmese service?—I do not think that any difficulty has ever been found, excepting in cases where alterations have been made in their privileges as to pension.

775. It is always a question of money, and not of religion, is not it?—Entirely so.

776. From your experience, do you know if any difference took place in the case of men of high caste belonging to that army; are you aware whether they showed more reluctance than others to going on foreign service?—I have never heard of any such reluctance; I had a few men of high caste among my own men when we embarked for China in 1840, but there was not the least difference in their behaviour under orders for embarkation;

barkation; they all went with equal cheerfulness and readiness.

777. Lord *William Hay*.] Do you know anything of certain battalions styled Marine Battalions, which were raised in Bengal for foreign service?—I have reason to believe that there were such battalions many years ago, but that when they introduced the practice of enlisting men for general service they withdrew the name of "Marine Battalion" from those regiments, paying them a compliment, and saying that they would thenceforward be considered as regiments for general service.

778. Do you know the terms upon which they were raised?—No, I do not, further than that, judging from their name, I have no doubt they were raised with a view to foreign service.

779. Colonel *North*.] Do they form a part of the Madras army at this moment?—No; they were in the Bengal army, and they are in the Bengal army now.

780. Lord *William Hay*.] Were they not recruited generally from natives of good caste?—I do not know how they were recruited.

781. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] Do you remember an extra allowance that used to be given to what was called the Trans-Indus service, that is, to all troops serving beyond the Indus?—I remember hearing of the withdrawal of such an allowance.

782. An extra allowance similar to that has never been restored, has it?—I believe not to the army of Bengal.

783. The withdrawal of it, you may remember, in Sir Charles Napier's time, caused a great deal of dissatisfaction?—Yes, I believe it did.

784. Speaking of marine battalions, do you know anything of a Bombay marine battalion which was raised specially for service on board ship?—Yes.

785. Does that exist at present?—Yes, it does; it is one of the regular regiments in their army.

786. But the Bombay Marine Battalion was especially employed in detachments on board the ships of the Indian navy?—I believe it was.

787. As the Indian navy is now abolished, how are those troops employed?—The Marine Battalion remains as one of the regiments on the establishment of the army in its regular number; in fact it had always a number, even while it was the Marine Battalion, and it retained that number by express order when the Indian navy was abolished; but it had no regular organised establishment of officers, and therefore it was looked upon as an exceptional regiment in its organisation till the whole army was organised upon its present footing, and then it took its place according to its number; I think the number was and is, the 21st.

788. Are you aware that that regiment was composed exclusively of low-caste men?—That I am not aware of.

789. Is it your opinion that high-caste men would go on board ship as readily as low-caste men?—All the men of the Madras army do, and many of them are men not of high caste, in the sense in which the term would be used in Bengal, but good caste men. They are men very particular about caste observances, as many men in the south of India are.

790. There are very few Brahmins in the Madras army altogether, I believe?—There are very few Brahmins.

791. Sir *James Fergusson*.] Have you any opinion upon the degree in which troops raised

out of India, such as Chinese, would be acceptable to the natives of India as a garrison?—I should think that they would be anything but acceptable. I should think that their employment in India would be an offence to the natives of India.

792. Do you think that it would tend to raise the native estimate of the strength of this country if they found a part of the garrison of India, which had previously consisted solely of European troops, made up by contingents of that kind?—I should think certainly not. I should not think that it would raise the character of the British power in any part of the world.

793. Do you think that, man for man, such contingents would make up for a corresponding deficiency of European troops?—I have always thought that the Chinese were a very good material for soldiers. I think that they are a remarkably able-bodied and bold set of men, and if they were disciplined and organised they might in action, wherever they were employed, do very good service.

794. Do you suppose, if you reduced the establishment of, say, 60,000 European troops in India by 5,000 or 10,000, that 5,000 or 10,000 Chinese would suffice to make up for that reduction?—No, certainly not; and, I think, what they might make up in physical power would be in a great measure sacrificed by the moral effect of having them in lieu of British troops; for the British soldiers are looked up to with respect by the natives of India, and I doubt whether any foreign mercenaries whom we brought there would be looked up to in the same way.

795. In point of finance, therefore, you could not hope that any saving would be effected?—I think not.

796. What would be your opinion as to the success of substituting native Indian for European troops in an East Indian colony; would an equal number of native troops be in your opinion an equivalent for Europeans?—No; certainly not anywhere.

797. Wherever you placed troops raised in India, of whatever class or race, you think that the number would have to be considerably in excess of the European troops whose place they took?—I should think that a certain number of native troops for mere garrison purposes in a time of peace might be employed in substitution for an equivalent number of Europeans; but not, certainly, in time of war, unless it were such men as the Sikhs, and I should be sorry, even with them, to say that a certain number of Sikhs were equivalent to the same number of British troops; but the native troops might perhaps be employed with advantage as a mere garrison in a colony in time of peace.

798. At present the service of native Indian troops out of India has been confined either to certain known stations, or to the emergencies of field service, has it not?—Yes.

799. And native troops rarely object to go anywhere for field service, do they?—No, never, I think; certainly not those I know anything about; that is to say, the Madras regiments.

800. I suppose their employment in garrisoning places like Rangoon and Hong Kong in time of peace has not been agreeable to them, but they have submitted to it?—Yes; I think it is always distasteful to them, certainly; but they have certain advantages given to them which make up for the discomfort that they are subject to in separation from their families and exposure to an uncongenial

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uncongenial climate ; for, strangely enough, it seems that all climates out of India disagree with the natives more or less. All foreign countries disagree with the natives of India, apparently.

801. But that consideration of the separation from their families is a very great hardship, I suppose, upon troops, especially upon troops with the habits of the Madras troops?—Yes ; I think it is felt to be a great discomfort, but they will make great sacrifices for their families, even in separation from them. For instance, if they could hope to save money they would go for two or three years, and leave their families behind.

802. Do you think that they would go very willingly if the practice of employing them out of India became more general, as it would, for instance, if other colonies made a steady annual demand upon the native army for garrison duty?—That would depend, of course, upon how they were treated. I think such inducements might be held out to them as would encourage others to follow their example cheerfully, and promote a succession of volunteers for foreign service.

803. But you would have to compensate them for the hardships that such a service would entail by increased pay, would you not?—Yes, and by pensions to their families and other privileges ; inducements, in fact, for them to go and undertake what is a serious discomfort for a time, in the hope of benefiting their families or themselves afterwards.

804. Can you form any opinion as to what increase to their pay and allowances would be sufficient to make up to them for the hardship of the change of life?—I think as far as regards the men of the Madras Presidency (and they are the only men of whom I have any personal knowledge) very little would be required beyond what they now get.

805. What is that?—They get their field allowance, full batta as it is called, and rations and pensions to their families. The only reluctance within my experience which has been shown by any of the men to proceed on foreign service, arose out of an interference with the regulations of pension as affecting their families, not themselves. The rule of the service is, that if a man is killed on foreign service, or dies on foreign service, his next heir gets the pension, which he would not do if he died in his own country ; and 40 years ago this rule was extended, or, at all events, it was applied at the time of the first Burmese war to the heirs of those who died after their return to the coast before they were discharged from the hospital. The Government of India some years afterwards ordered that clause to be rescinded ; that created great dissatisfaction amongst the native sepoys, and the Government at home desired that it should be restored, and so the rules now stand, and they give perfect satisfaction to all the sepoys who go abroad.

806. Then the difficulty of employing native troops further than has been the practice out of India beyond sea, is really a question of money?—I do not know that. I think it is a question of discipline also ; it is a question how you would supply them with officers to maintain the corps when it was out of its own country in a state of efficiency and discipline.

807. *Chairman.*] That is a question of money too, is not it?—Not altogether. I think there are two ways in which a corps might be furnished from India for service at the Mauritius, either by raising volunteers to form a local corps, or by

sending a regiment of the existing army. If you send a regiment of the existing army, you send officers with it, who have very high pay for a special service. I am told that that always caused some embarrassment if there were any troops of the British army serving there at the same time. If you raised a local corps for the service, you would find great difficulty in keeping up the supply of British officers.

808. Are not the officers of the British army of such a different description, and so differently situated, that no comparison would arise between them and the officers accompanying the Indian regiments?—Yes, they are ; but the amount of pay which an officer of a native regiment would receive under the present system in India, would be very much higher than that of an officer commanding a British regiment. Their circumstances would be totally different, certainly, but I have been told that it would be considered rather an objectionable comparison.

809. *Major Anson.*] The Indian officer is a staff officer now, is he not?—He is a staff officer.

810. The English officers employed with them either in the artillery or elsewhere, would look upon their case as a different one to their own, inasmuch as the Indian officer would have to go back to India as his home, whereas the English officer would expect to come back to England?—I think they might very fairly look upon it in that way.

811. *Chairman.*] The Indian officer rises in a different way, and he has got into his profession in a different way, has he not?—Entirely so ; and he is in a different profession, and the profession gives him different prospects ; he has to serve all his life in India, while the other has only an occasional and temporary sojourn abroad.

812. *Sir James Fergusson.*] You were going on to say that, although they might very fairly balance those advantages, yet there would be some difficulty resulting from it in practice?—I have heard it suggested that there might be some difficulty, and there have been instances of it in China and India ; but as has been pointed out, the difference in their position now that the Indian officers are all staff officers, might make a difference in the comparison, and in the effect of the comparison.

813. *Major Anson.*] No officers commanding Indian troops have served with European soldiers in China since that system has been established in India, have they?—No.

814. *Sir James Fergusson.*] Is not there a regiment serving in China now which was serving there before that system was established?—There is no native regiment now in China.

815. Is not there a European regiment still serving there which is continued on the high scale of pay?—I believe there is.

816. I was asking you just now if the difficulty with regard to the native regiments going beyond sea was not mainly a question of finance ; I mean as regards themselves, but as regards the advantage of the service, it would always be necessary, would it not, to place some European troops beside any native regiments so employed?—I should think so, decidedly.

817. And then the questions of differential allowances would come into play?—They might do so ; but, as was observed just now, there is no question of allowances as between the native soldier

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soldier and European soldier; it is merely as between the officers; and it is very possible that the officers of British regiments might see that the position of staff corps officers serving with native regiments was entirely different from their own position, and that there was no question of uniformity of pay and allowances between them; but, as a matter of fact, there would be a very marked difference in their pay.

818. At all events, the placing of native regiments in eastern colonies could never be in substitution for European troops, but only supplementing them?—I should think so; I do not know of any colony in the East where you would like to leave native troops entirely by themselves, unless it were the Straits Settlements, where they have recently determined to put them out.

819. Then, in fact, except as enabling a commanding officer to dispense with the services of European troops for duties which are peculiarly unhealthy for European troops, the object of garrisoning that part of the world would be as well attained by having European troops in each necessary point from which assistance could be given to other points in case of emergency?—Native troops at any of those colonies would no doubt be very useful to take the ordinary garrison guards and other duties which are now taken in uncongenial climates by European soldiers; for instance, at the Mauritius, which would be the most suitable post for a native regiment, I think there are a great many daily duties which might be injurious to European soldiers, but which might be taken by native troops. There is a large population of natives of India there, so that a native regiment might be suitably placed amongst them and would be very useful; not, however, without some Europeans as a check upon them, and as a support to the European population generally.

820. Mr. *Oliphant*.] At the Cape of Good Hope, or in Natal, or on the frontier, do you think it would be of advantage to have native regiments?—No, I should not think it would.

821. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] Have you ever considered the question of employing native troops on garrison duty in the Mediterranean?—I have never considered it until lately.

822. Are you of opinion that it would be, I will not say possible, but desirable to use native troops either at Malta or Gibraltar?—I should think not; I should think you would be able to get native troops of the best description to go there, if they were sufficiently paid for it, but I do not think that it would have a good effect in Europe to show that we were dependent on Asiatics for the maintenance of our chief garrisons in Europe.

823. Do you not think that a native regiment isolated in Malta or Gibraltar would be in a very anomalous and exceptional position?—I think it would; I think it would be distasteful to them; their social habits, and their religion, and their feelings altogether would make their position unpleasant to themselves as well as to the population and to the rest of the garrison. But I do not see, in time of urgent need, in time of war, for instance, why you might not have the advantage of a brigade or two of Sikh soldiers in any part of the world.

824. I speak especially of garrison duty?—I do not think that it would be a good plan to have native troops there to form a portion of the ordinary garrison.

825. Colonel *North*.] I believe three years has

been the longest period hitherto for which Indian troops have served in the colonies, but if they were sent to Malta or Gibraltar in all probability they would be required to remain for a longer period in order to save the expense of sending them backwards and forwards; do you consider that there would be any objection to prolonging the period of their foreign service?—Yes, I think there would be very great difficulty in doing so. The men are accustomed to return to their homes from any foreign service, at longest, in three years, and if it is a notoriously distasteful service, in a shorter time. We have kept them in China, excepting those who were employed during the war, for only two years, and they were somewhat dissatisfied even then.

826. It would be impossible to bring their families to a place like Gibraltar, or Malta, would it not?—Quite impossible.

827. Mr. *Oliphant*.] The experiment of having foreign mercenaries in India has never yet been tried; it is a matter of pure speculation whether it would be distasteful to the natives or not, is it not?—We may judge, I think, from what we know of the people, and the feelings with which they look upon foreigners.

828. I refer to the employment of Chinese or foreign troops in India; there has never, except in the case of the Ceylon Rifle regiment, which has been a success, been a case of any foreign mercenaries being garrisoned in India; we cannot form an idea, except by pure speculation, of the effect that it would produce upon the Indian mind?—No; except by a knowledge of the feelings of the natives themselves.

829. Lord *William Hay*.] Do you think that the natives of India have an antipathy to the Chinese?—I do not know that they have more than to any other strangers and foreigners.

830. Are you aware that Chinese are now employed extensively on tea plantations in different parts of the country?—I have heard that they have been employed.

831. Are they not treated with marked respect by the natives of those parts?—I am not aware.

832. Are you aware also that they intermarry with the people of the hills?—No; I know nothing of the people of the hills.

833. Sir *James Fergusson*.] At all events it is a different thing being in a country as a settler and being there as a soldier to keep guard over the people?—Yes, I should think so.

834. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] Do you remember one remarkable instance that has occurred of the employment of native troops at a colony out of India, namely, the garrisoning at the beginning of this century, or the end of last century, of Nootka Sound, on the Coast of America, by a wing of the first Grenadier Bombay regiment for six months?—I was not aware of that. We send natives of India to the West Indies; so far as that goes, if you give them sufficient inducement they will go anywhere for a time.

835. *Chairman*.] It is a question of time?—Yes, they will go for a time.

836. Major *Anson*.] How long have we been in possession of the Straits Settlements?—I should think it is 50 years since the days of Sir Stamford Raffles. I am not quite certain as to the dates.

837. During that time what has been the garrison there?—Ever since I can remember it has been a native regiment or two, and some European artillery.

838. You stated that, in case of war, you thought it would not do in colonies of that sort to

Major Gen. have nothing but native soldiers; do you not
T. T. Pears, think that, if they were supported by European
C.B. artillery garrison, that would be quite sufficient?
 19 March —It would depend very much upon whom we
 1867. were at war with; not if we were at war with
 any European power, I think.

839. In case of war with any European power, places like China and the Mauritius would have to depend mainly upon our naval power, would they not?—I suppose they would; and so would India, I presume.

840. It would be fighting behind stone walls, which native troops could do?—Yes.

841. The fleet would be able to throw in a force of marines if necessary?—Yes.

842. *Sir James Fergusson.*] Did you not mean that either in time of war or in time of peace you would not think it desirable to place a native garrison in one of the colonies without any Europeans by their side?—Yes, I did mean that.

843. *Chairman.*] What is your objection to doing that in time of peace?—I think war might break out at any time very suddenly, and I think that where there is a large European settlement, the colonists themselves would object to there being no European troops at all in the place. In the Mauritius a large number of the population are natives of India. If you had only native regiments there, I think the European portion of the population would feel uncomfortable if they had no British troops at all there.

844. That is merely a question of feeling on their part, it is not a question of strategical necessity?—Not at all.

845. *Sir James Fergusson.*] When a colony is called upon to pay, as is the case now, the cost of its own garrison in whole, or in part, the colonists

might naturally object, might they not, to having, without disparagement of native troops, a description of force not the very best we possess?—I should think so; but that is a point which is a mere matter of opinion. I should think that Her Majesty's Government, and particularly the Colonial Department, would understand that matter much better than I do.

846. *Major Anson.*] There have been no complaints from the Straits of being garrisoned simply with native regiments, have there?—No; but it was near at hand to India, and it was always looked upon at times when war threatened, with some anxiety, into which a force should be thrown immediately if it was required.

847. *Chairman.*] Have you any records of the death-rate of Indian troops at Rangoon, or the Straits Settlements, in the India Office?—I think we have.

848. Could you give the Committee a return of them for the last 10 years?—Yes, I have very little doubt we can; I will endeavour to find them.

849. *Sir James Fergusson.*] I think you have ascertained that it would be impossible in the India Office to procure a statement of the cost of transport of troops from the Indian ports to the stations at which they have been hitherto employed?—Yes; we have not got it.

850. *Chairman.*] Have you the death-rate for the Indian troops employed in China as long as they were there?—We have, certainly, for the two or three years after the war.

851. Perhaps you will include those in the return I have mentioned?—Yes, we may have them during the war; I am not quite certain of that. They were not quite so regularly kept up during that time.

Colonel DIGHTON PROBYN, C.B., V.C., called in; and Examined.

Colonel
D. Probyn,
C.B., V.C.

852. *Major Anson.*] You have commanded a native cavalry regiment in India for the last 10 years, have you not?—Yes, for the last 10 years.

853. During that time what class of men, or races of men have you had under your command?—They have been entirely northern men.

854. You served in China in 1860, I think?—Yes, during the war in 1860.

855. Had you any difficulties in getting your men to go on foreign service?—No, none; not the slightest; not a single objection was raised by any of my men.

856. No religious objections of any kind were made?—Not the slightest. My senior native officer was a man of one of the first families in the Punjab, a high-caste Brahmin, and I never heard a murmur of any sort from him, or from any of them.

857. With regard to supplying your men with water on the voyage, you had no difficulties, had you?—No, none; not the smallest. When we were marching down to Calcutta from the North West Provinces, I was ordered by Sir Robert Napier to send men of all the different castes I had in the regiment (one from each caste) to superintend the pumping of the drinking water into the casks. I sent them off at once; but I hardly think it was necessary, as at Hong Kong, when we had to take in fresh water, Sir Robert Napier, not wishing to break faith in any way with the native soldier, again told me to see that the men had the same opportunity of superintending the

pumping of the water into the casks as they had in Calcutta. I told this to my native officers, and they said, "Anything you order we will do, but it is quite unnecessary." The senior native officer in particular (the Brahmin I have just spoken of) said, "I do not care who pumps the water into the casks I have to drink from. If you order me to send a man to superintend the operation, of course I will do so, but it is quite unnecessary making any trouble about it, and if I do not care why should the other men care?" The water was afterwards pumped in by the Chinese, and I never heard a dispute of any sort raised about it, either in going to China, in China, or in coming back from China.

858. After the conclusion of the war in China, how long did you remain there?—My regiment was away from India for about a year. It was just eleven months from the time it first embarked to when it disembarked at Calcutta. My regiment came away immediately after the war; Major Fane's regiment remained in China for a year after the war.

859. Did you hear of any difficulties in the case of Major Fane's regiment?—I have heard Major Fane say that he had no difficulties of any sort.

860. While remaining in China?—Yes, while remaining in China; he used to write to me continually from China, and he frequently told me that he had no difficulty with his men. They did not feel the cold in the least; they were never more healthy than when in China.

861. It

861. It was a very severe climate, was it not? —It was a very severe climate in the north of China; I think I am right in stating that Major Fane told me he lost only one man during the whole time he was in China, except those killed in action; those I do not know about. He wrote me word in the winter that he had lost one old man out of his whole regiment.

862. Do you think that there would be any difficulty in getting native soldiers to serve abroad in time of peace?—I do not think so, if they were paid properly.

863. What do you think it would be necessary to pay them?—The pay of an infantry soldier in India now is seven rupees; that is always considered one rupee too little by all the infantry commanding officers, even for serving in India. I think if they had eight rupees a month for going on foreign service, and had their food and uniform found them, that would be sufficient.

864. Do you think that it would have a bad effect upon the minds of the natives to employ them on the roster of the English army for colonial duty?—I do not see why it should; I do not think so.

865. Do you consider that it would be advisable to do it?—Yes, I think it would be advisable; I think it is a pity, if we have such troops, that we should not make more use of them than we do now.

866. Do you think that there would be very strong objections raised on the part of the officers to our doing so?—I do not think there would; I think the officers would be likely to object if the pay for the natives was not good; if it was not considerably better than it is now in India; but you can make the pay very much better for them, and they would still cost a great deal less than the European soldier.

867. Colonel North.] We have had it in evidence, that in some regiment (I forget which), going from India to China, a great number of men died during the passage in consequence of their not cooking on board, owing to their caste; I suppose you had no men of that description under your command?—I only had men from the Punjaub; but I had in my regiment going to China several Brahmins from the Punjaub. I had Dogras in my regiment, but I heard no man make any difficulty about going. I do not think what you mention could have occurred in the case of any troops employed in the last war in 1860. There were only northern regiments sent there then.

868. Chairman.] The Sikhs have a great objection to remaining a long time away from their homes, have they not?—They have.

869. Would there not be some difficulty about arranging furloughs for them while on foreign service?—I do not think they should be kept for more than three years away from their homes, unless they were recruited specially for foreign service for a longer period, knowing beforehand that they were not to be relieved in a less time than that stated on enlistment.

870. Do you think that you could induce men to enlist on those conditions?—Yes, certainly, on good pay and with their own officers.

871. Major Anson.] Should you not consider that a garrison in a place like Mauritius or Singapore, or in China, of native soldiers supported by European garrison artillery, would be quite sufficient?—I think so; they must have officers with them who understand them thoroughly. Of

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course, if you put strange officers with them it would be a different thing altogether.

872. With the officers they had in India?—Yes, with the officers they had in India it would do very well.

873. You consider that a native soldier is infinitely cheaper in every way than a European soldier?—I should think so, in every way.

874. In the way of food, and hospital expenses?—Certainly; there are no hospital expenses at all for native troops; very little medicine does for them.

875. They do not require such expensive barrack accommodation, do they?—No, and they would not require the same amount of accommodation; they never have it in their own homes.

876. Do you consider that the cost of transport by sea is less in the case of native soldiers; do they require less room on board ship than European soldiers?—Much less; the natives can pack much closer than Europeans can.

877. You would not object in the slightest degree to have your regiment, in case you were ordered by sea, more closely packed than the Europeans?—No; the facts upon that question could be easily found out by the coolies sent away from Calcutta; they pack them much closer than they do other men, and yet they have plenty of room.

878. Sir James Fergusson.] You would not like your regiment to be treated like coolies, would you?—No, not like coolies, but it would be a short voyage, and the coolies on board ship are well cared for, and I believe do not complain of want of room.

879. Lord William Hay.] Do your Sikhs mess together?—Yes, at times they have not the slightest objection to messing together.

880. Do they mess with the Muzubee Sikhs?—I have no Muzubee Sikhs in my regiment; I have nothing but high-caste men; perhaps they would not like to mess with Muzubees.

881. Your men would not mess with the Muzubee Sikhs?—They might do so on service, but they probably would raise an objection to it; I should think they would certainly.

882. They do not object to standing on parade with the Muzubee Sikhs, do they?—No, not in the least, but I have not got a Muzubee Sikh in my regiment; I never had a Muzubee in it.

883. Have you had any experience of Chinese soldiers?—Only in fighting against them.

884. Sir James Fergusson.] You stated that you thought it was advisable that Indian troops should take their turn of colonial service?—Yes.

885. Do you mean that it is advisable as contributing to the men's self respect and pride, as belonging to the general army?—Yes, I think that is one reason; I think too, as I said before, it is a pity that as we have such fine soldiers, they should not be made use of out of India; that is another reason. I think, also, that it would tend to make the men think more of our power if we let them see that we have other possessions besides those in India.

886. Your regiment would, of course, not be suitable for the sort of service that honourable Members have been pointing at?—Mine is a cavalry regiment.

887. Your regiment is a regiment of a peculiar kind; it could not, of course, be taken as a specimen of the general native regiments of India?—Yes, I think so. We have several

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good regiments constituted in the same way as mine; the Guide Corps for instance.

888. Yours is a specimen of a *corps d'élite*, is not it?—Every officer tries to make his regiment as good as he can, or he should do so at any rate. Other commanding officers, I dare say, think their regiments as good as mine. It is composed of the same sort of men as Colonel Keyes has in his; his is an infantry regiment, and mine is a cavalry regiment; but they consist of the same sort of men, recruited in the same countries. Colonel Brownlow, of the 20th Punjaub Infantry has also much the same sort of men, recruited from the same districts. Some of my men have friends and relatives in his regiment.

889. You think that, on the whole, good as these regiments are known to be, they need not be taken as exceptionally good ones?—No, I do not think they need.

890. Except as regards any particular circumstances of them at present, they need not be taken as extraordinary?—No; I do not think they need. Many cavalry commanding officers may, perhaps, in their own imaginations, think their regiments quite as good if not better than mine.

891. Your experience of the service of such regiments abroad has been confined, has it not, to time of war?—Yes, in time of war.

892. And the idea of going to take part in a war has an extraordinary attraction to a Sikh soldier, has not it?—Yes; the Sikh race is a martial race. I think they are fond of fighting, and they have a better chance of promotion, of course, in a campaign than in time of peace.

893. It is a very different thing, is not it, to being employed almost as hewers of wood and drawers of water at a dull garrison station?—Yes; but I think the increased pay they will get while on foreign service will be quite a sufficient inducement to make them like it; of course they would get more pay while serving out of India than they would in India.

894. It would be a very different thing, would it not, for the Sikh soldiers to find themselves sent habitually to Hong Kong, in order to take duties that were thought rather too bad for the European soldiers?—I think that if only the worst of our colonies were selected for the native troops, and if they did not take a share of the best as well as the worst colonies, it might shake them a little, unless their pay was very good; it naturally would do so. As yet they have, I think, only had experience, in time of peace, of the worst foreign stations; Aden, for instance. They have never been allowed to go to any of the best foreign stations.

895. A great deal of the good conduct of the regiments on the foreign stations would depend, I suppose, upon the character of the officer?—Certainly, and the way in which the men are managed; if the men are not understood, of course difficulties will naturally arise.

896. The character especially of the commanding officer, we will say of a northern regiment, is of the first importance?—Certainly, of the very first importance.

897. And, I suppose, these regiments unless very well officered are more liable to get out of order than a European regiment?—I believe that officered as they are now, is sufficient, without any special officering. All I wished to avoid and guard against is the fear of officers who did not understand them being sent to them;

and in the event of fresh regiments being raised, I should be sorry to see officers who do not understand the natives sent to command them. The officers who command them now are quite sufficient to command them abroad, or anywhere else.

898. There are very few such officers now, are there; there were only three or four in China, I think?—No, I had 19 officers with me in China.

899. Specially attached?—Yes, specially attached; or rather there were in all 19 British officers with the regiment.

900. Usually the number was three or four, and it is now seven, I think?—Yes, it is now seven.

901. Would you contemplate having an increase of the number of European officers in case of the regiment going abroad, or would you be content to take it abroad as it is?—I should be content to take it abroad as it is with seven officers.

902. You would consider it necessary that that number should be always kept up?—Yes.

903. *Chairman.*] What additional pay do you propose should be given to the native soldiers on going abroad; anything more than full batta?—Yes; the pay of an infantry soldier now is seven rupees, and then he has to feed himself out of that seven rupees, and sums are deducted from it for part of his uniform; I consider that he should have eight rupees a month, and that there should be no deductions of any sort; that his food should be found him, and his uniform found him.

904. That is about identical with what is now the allowance on foreign service given to the troops who go to Rangoon, is it not?—That I am not quite sure about; I do not know exactly what pay they get.

905. You do not think that any larger sum than what you have stated would be necessary?—I do not think so.

906. If it was the habit to send native regiments, as part of their duty, to the colonies, would there be any more difficulty in recruiting for those regiments?—No, I do not think there would be any more difficulty.

907. Did I rightly understand you to say that there were no difficulties with respect to cooking in the transport of high-caste troops by sea?—Yes, I said so, and I repeat it.

908. It has been stated by other witnesses that high-caste natives feel so much difficulty in cooking at sea that they will abstain from food rather than submit to the difficulties of cooking?—I can only repeat what I stated before with regard to my regiment when I took it to China; my senior native officer in those days was a high-caste Brahmin of very high family in the Punjaub, and there were several of his own men with him. The Sikhs are all Hindoos; and I had a great many Dogras in the regiment besides. The regiment was composed of two-thirds Hindoos and one-third Mussulmen; I had no difficulty whatever, and I never heard that any dispute arose about cooking.

909. And beyond the precaution of Sir Robert Napier's about pumping in the water, were there any other precautions taken by the officers?—No. There were two cooking places made on board the ships; one was used by the Hindoos to cook at, and the other by the Mussulmen.

910. Major *Anson.*] Is not there a little difficulty

culty about the cooking?—I never heard of any difficulty at all.

911. Did you never hear of any similar difficulties in the case of other native troops not under your own command?—Not in the case of any of those going to China during the last war.

912. The troops going to China were a long time on board ship at different times, not merely going from India to Hong Kong, but afterwards?—Yes. On our return from China we were two months on board ship; the men did not land.

913. They were two months on board ship without landing?—Without landing; they may have landed for an hour or two at a time at Hong Kong and other places, that was all.

914. And also in going from Hong Kong up to Talien Whan Bay?—Yes; they were about two months on board altogether, I think.

915. Do you recollect when the army went up to the north, whether a Punjaub regiment was left at Shanghae; one of the native infantry regiments?—Yes, I think one was left at Shanghae.

916. Do you recollect whether one was left at Tientsin when we went on to Pekin?—Yes, I think one was left there too, at Tientsin.

917. Did you ever hear of any great discontent among these regiments at not going on with the army to share in the plunder?—They always consider being left behind rather a disgrace; any regiment does; but it is not fair to put this idea down solely to a love of plunder.

918. Exactly the same as a European regiment?—Exactly the same as a European regiment.

919. But there were no difficulties in the cases of the regiments so left?—No, I never heard of any difficulties at all.

920. It is proposed to raise a regiment of Beloochees and men from the frontier of India, I believe, for perpetual service in China; what class of officers do you think they will be likely to get for that service; would they be as good as the British officers who officer the Indian army now?—I suppose good officers are to be found. I dare say a good many British officers would be glad to serve in China.

921. *Chairman.*] The not having such a career as is offered by the Indian army, would diminish the attractions of the service, would it not?—I think you would find a great many officers who would be very glad to leave India, even for China.

922. *Major Anson.*] Temporarily they might, but would they if they had to remain in China for life?—Yes; I think there would be no difficulty about that. There might be a difficulty in getting native officers.

923. You think they would get an inferior class of men?—Yes, I think, certainly, you would get an inferior class of native soldiers, and native commissioned officers to serve in China always as a local regiment, but as regards British officers, I do not think you would have much difficulty in getting them.

924. Still, considering the very limited career before them at a place like Hong Kong, they are not likely to be such good officers as when they have all India before them?—I think you would find very many officers who would be quite willing to go and give up all the prospects they may have in India.

925. *Mr. Oliphant.*] What is your view with reference to the employment of mercenary troops in India?—I do not think it would answer at all; but it has never been tried.

926. In what way do you think it would not

answer?—I think it would be very distasteful to the natives themselves; we can always raise as many men as we like from the country; they would say, "Why are those men brought in?"

927. *Lord William Hay.*] You stated just now that two-thirds of your regiment were Hindoos?—Yes.

928. Are there any of them Sikhs?—I have three troops of Sikhs, one troop of Dogras Brahmans, and other Hindoos of the Punjaub, and one squadron of Mussulmen, composed of trans-Indus Pathans, Kusoor Pathans, Huzara Pathans, Towannas, &c.

929. The Sikhs have no caste, have they?—Yes; they are all Hindoos.

930. They are supposed not to have any caste?—They have fewer prejudices; they have hardly any prejudices.

931. They worship the cow?—Yes, they worship the cow; there are three, or rather four things a Sikh will not do: he will not kill a cow, he will not eat a cow, and he will not smoke, and he will not cut his hair; at least those things are what they tell you are forbidden by their religion, and consequently what they will not do; but you can even get them to do any one of those things if you like when they know you.

932. Have you found that the Dogras are more particular?—Yes, the Dogras are more particular.

933. *Sir Henry Rawlinson.*] I think your experience of the conduct of native troops on board ship is drawn especially from field service?—Yes.

934. Do you think that there would be the same freedom from caste prejudices among troops proceeding on garrison duty?—I think so.

935. You do not think that that makes any essential difference?—I do not think it does in a regiment with a proper spirit in it, which they are supposed all to have.

936. *Chairman.*] It would be quite indispensable, I suppose, that any regiments that went abroad should be wholly under the management of officers who are supposed to understand them?—Yes, certainly.

937. From your acquaintance with the manners of Sikh soldiers, is there any reality in the suggested danger that the evils arising from the disparity of sexes would be peculiarly felt if they were placed in a European colony?—I do not think so.

938. *Sir James Fergusson.*] Do you think that the regular return of foreign service would be popular among the Sikh regiments if one of the duties was a prolonged residence, as a jail guard at the Andaman Islands, for instance?—No, of course not; they like good stations as well as other men; men of any nation like good stations, and if they are kept continually at the Andaman Islands that certainly would not be popular; but I do not think there would be the slightest difficulty in getting any regiment to take its share of bad places with the good.

939. *Colonel North.*] If those troops received an extra rupee a day, together with their uniforms and rations free, would not that increase the expense of them very considerably, and bring it very near the cost of European troops?—It would increase the expense very much, but I do not think it would bring it near to the cost of European troops.

940. Their position is different from that of British soldiers, because our men have their rations deducted from their pay, while these native

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native troops get theirs for nothing, and also their uniforms?—Their uniforms are a very small affair, their kit is still smaller, and their rations are not so expensive as those of a British soldier.

941. Captain *Hayter*.] We have had very high testimony from Colonel Norman to those men as artillerymen; what is your opinion, in a military point of view, of their acting in that capacity with European troops in the Mediterranean garrisons?—I think the Sikhs are such good artillerymen that it is much best not to use them as artillerymen; they are too good for us; they are so good, and stick so well to their guns, that in the event of any mutiny again occurring we should find them dangerous as artillerymen opposed to us.

942-3. Could they act with European troops, forming part of a mixed garrison in the Mediterranean, keeping them as infantry?—Certainly; I think so, as infantry, but not as artillerymen; I would not recommend them as artillerymen, for the reasons I have just stated.

944. The difficulties which we have heard of are, first with regard to the difference in the pay of the officers, and secondly, the social difficulties; can you give the Committee any idea whether those difficulties could be got over?—I do not think there need be any difficulty upon the first point; I do not see why there should be. The officers of the British army have other advantages

which those of the Indian army have not. It is only fair that the Indian officers should have a little more pay; they have got to serve in India for their lives without a chance of getting home to England, except under very great disadvantages.

945. You think that the difficulty with regard to the difference of pay could be got over?—Certainly.

946. With regard to the social difficulties, we have had evidence that such difficulties would arise from putting a mixed force in the Mediterranean garrisons?—I do not see why they should be spoken of and treated as difficulties.

947. You do not think that there would be any difficulty in keeping native regiments in mixed garrisons?—No, I do not think so.

948. With respect to the population, as well as the rest of the garrison?—Yes; I do not think there need be any difficulty on this point, but I have heard it spoken of as a difficulty before.

949. You have had considerable experience with Indian troops, besides those of your regiment, have you not?—I have always been with Indian troops; I have mixed with them for the last 17 years.

950. Major *Anson*.] Such a thing as drunkenness and crime is hardly known in your regiment, is it?—It is hardly known.

Captain WILLIAM ROBERT MENDS, R.N., C.B., called in; and Examined.

Captain.
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951. *Chairman*.] CAN you give the Committee any information as to the cost of the transport of European soldiers from this country to India?—Returns are now in course of preparation, showing the whole cost of transport to the colonies for a series of years, by order. If I were to enter upon that, I could only give you one or two instances at present, being a portion of the returns which are now in course of preparation.

952. You refer to past returns, under the sailing-ship system?—In sailing-ships, or Her Majesty's troop-ships.

953. Have you any estimate of the expense, or probable expense, under the new system?—No; I have not any estimate with me.

954. Will you give the instances of which you have spoken?—The estimated cost for the transport of a battalion to Hong Kong from England in a hired sailing-ship is, for a voyage of, say, 120 days, and for the following strength, namely, 38 officers, 750 men, 87 women, and 160 children, for freight, 7,746*l.*; for mess of officers, 2,280*l.*

955. Have you taken out the figures per head per private soldier?—I am coming to that; victualling, 6,983*l.*; bedding, 458*l.*; fittings of ship, 471*l.*, being a total of 17,938*l.*, or 18*l.* 15*s.* 8*d.* per adult.

956. That is per adult; but have you taken it out per soldier; there are a number of women included in that?—We always take women and children with soldiers; they are all cast in at two children to an adult.

957. Perhaps you could draw up that statement, so that we could see the cost per soldier, treating the women and children as part of the cost of a soldier?—They are so; they are a part of the cost of the hire of the ship, and they are cast into the rate per head in the whole sum.

958. Are those women and children according to a regular allowance?—Yes.

959. An invariable proportion?—Yes.

960. What is it?—Twelve per cent. to India, China, Australia, or New Zealand, 6 per cent. to certain colonies, and 8 per cent. on coastwise voyages at home.

961. What is that difference owing to?—I do not know; we simply carry out a requisition from the War Office. The practice as regards India is 12 per cent.

962. Twelve per cent. for wives?—Yes, 12 per cent. for wives, exclusive of children.

963. Exclusive of any children there may be?—Yes, for those wives.

964. That makes it the more necessary to take the figures out as per soldier, because, of course, the children are an uncertain element?—They are, rather.

965. Will you have the return modified in that sense?—Yes. We are preparing a statement of the cost of conveying officers and troops, with their families, between Great Britain, the Mauritius, China, Ceylon, and the Straits Settlements; also native troops between India and China.

966. And in that you will state the cost per soldier?—Yes.

967. Perhaps you will also give us a list of the colonies to which these respective ratios of wives apply?—Yes.

968. You say you have no knowledge of the probable cost per head under the new transport system?—I have not got it with me.

969. It is larger than the old cost, is not it?—It is about 18*l.* and some shillings per adult.

970. If you can get the material for that, will you draw it out in the same form, that is as per soldier?—Yes.

971. Have you any knowledge of the cost of transport

transport from India to China?—Yes, I have a statement of it here: the 22nd and 29th regiments of Bombay native infantry were conveyed from Bombay to Hong Kong in 1862 in the sailing transports, “Dora” and “Coloroon,” and a small number in the “Emu” steamer. The voyage in the sailing ships averaged 36 days; the numbers conveyed were 11 European officers, 849 native officers and men. The cost was for freight, 4,646 *l.*; mess of officers, 528 *l.*; provisions and stores, 1,924 *l.*; and fittings, 257 *l.*; the total cost being 7,355 *l.*, or 8 *l.* 11 *s.* per adult. The native troops are not accompanied by their families.

972. Apart from that question of families, are the native troops more cheaply transported than the European troops?—The cost of freight would be rather cheaper, and their victualling costs considerably less; they do not cost more than about 8 *d.* per head per day for victualling.

973. Have you any record of the cost of the transport of European soldiers from India to China?—What I first gave was the estimated cost between Hong Kong and England of a regiment; I have now given the cost between India and China of the transport of a native regiment.

974. You have not got the cost of transport between India and China of a European regiment?—No, not with me.

975. Do you know the cost between India and the Straits?—No, I do not.

976. Have you the material for obtaining it?—I do not think we have; all engagements of that kind for troops in India are made in India, and hitherto it has been entirely an Indian question; we have never had anything to do with it.

977. I suppose you could not any more inform us of the cost of transport between India and the Mauritius?—No.

978. The cost between England and the Mauritius, I presume you can give?—Yes, we could give it.

979. Perhaps you will give that too as per soldier?—It shall be put in the Return.

980. Major *Anson*.] Is there much difference in the cost of transport between Bombay and China, and between Calcutta and China?—Yes; it would be rather more from Bombay.

981. Have you any returns of the cost between Bombay and China which you can put in?—I think we could give you details.

982. With regard to the cost of that regiment you mentioned, from Hong Kong to England, is that the average rate of freight?—The freight varies from time to time; it depends very much upon the state of the market, and also upon the emergency of the Government. The Government emergency is of course the shipowners' opportunity. If we go into a matter in a hurry, if a service requires to be performed with rapidity, we are obliged to take up ships more quickly than we otherwise should, and of course that enhances the cost. I have compared the cost of the transport of that regiment with the cost of a regiment conveyed in one of Her Majesty's troop-ships, and the cost by a troop-ship is considerably less.

983. *Chairman*.] If there are any very wide differences in the cost owing to the question of emergency, will you put in two or three instances of it?—Yes; that being an average case, the cost by the “Tamar” would be 14,710 *l.* against 17,938 *l.* by a freight ship conveying the same number.

984. That is owing to the ship having been 0.58.

taken up on an emergency?—That would be the relative cost even with an average service.

985. Colonel *North*.] We had evidence last year confirming what you have stated, to the effect that when the 11th were to be sent to the Cape, 35,000 *l.* were asked for the transport from Hong Kong to the Cape alone?—Yes, that was an enormous sum.

986. *Chairman*.] Could you give a list of the prices that have been paid for the transport of troops in the last five years; would it be very voluminous?—It would take some little time to get it out; a week or eight days.

987. You could do it?—Yes.

988. What we want is a return of all the payments made during the last five years for the transport of troops?—It could be done with ease.

989. And if possible it should always be taken out on the average cost per soldier?—Yes; of course the conveyance of the wives and families much enhances the freight; therefore the wives and families must be cast in to the cost of conveyance of the soldiers themselves.

990. Lord *William Hay*.] You stated that 12 per cent. of the men of a regiment going to India were allowed to take their wives?—Yes, 12 per cent.

991. Are they allowed to bring them back to England?—A certain portion return.

992. Is transport provided for 12 per cent. on returning?—Yes, equally, if required.

993. What becomes in England of the three per cent., the difference between nine per cent. and the 12 per cent.?—I do not know really; we only carry under requisitions from the War Office the numbers sent to us.

994. You have no knowledge as to what becomes of the extra three per cent. on their return to England?—No.

995. *Chairman*.] If European troops are ordered from India to China, do they take their wives with them?—Not during war.

996. For garrison duty?—Yes.

997. Do they carry all over the world those 12 per cent. that they have started with?—They carry that 12 per cent. all over the world. The Indian regiments sent from India to China are accompanied by their families.

998. Supposing they have been sent to India with 12 per cent. of wives, and are then sent from India to a six per cent. colony, that is a colony where the proportion of wives is six per cent., what becomes of the other six per cent. of wives?—They have to be provided for.

999. They are sent home again?—Yes, with the troops.

1000. Lord *William Hay*.] In practice they remain in India, do they not, as a matter of fact?—We act according to the requisition in the arrangements for the special Indian service; we are prepared to provide for the same number home as out, of women and children; that is, 12 per cent. of soldiers' wives upon the number embarked.

1001. *Chairman*.] Is the per-centage calculated on the number of private soldiers, or on the number of private soldiers plus officers?—It is calculated on the number of private soldiers.

1002. Major *Anson*.] Under the new system of transport, how will the reliefs be provided for the Mauritius and for China; would it be in connection with the new system, or is the new system to apply only to India?—The new system applies only to India.

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1003. The relief then to Mauritius, China, and the Straits, will go round the Cape as usual?—If those reliefs were arranged in connection with India, the ships which for fully 2-5ths of the year would not be employed upon the strictly Indian direct service could be utilised for those reliefs.

1004. *Chairman.*] That is during the hot season?—Yes; we could not trust the same ships out and home by the Cape; there would not be time.

1005. Major *Anson.*] If you garrisoned all those places from India you would only have that one system of transport between England and the East?—Yes.

1006. *Chairman.*] Is not it the fact, that the system of transport as at present arranged will not be adequate to the entire transport of the troops, and that you will still have to send some round the Cape?—Yes; it will not be quite adequate.

1007. Major *Anson.*] Was not it intended to make it adequate?—It was never intended to provide for more than about two-thirds of the Indian relief service. We may be able to do more; the ships will, I think, be able to do rather more than was contemplated.

1008. *Chairman.*] It is about one regiment short, is not it?—Yes, about one regiment short.

1009. The Mauritius service, then, will still be done by ships round the Cape?—It will still be done by ships round the Cape; it will be an Imperial service.

1010. And the same to Ceylon?—The same to Ceylon.

1011. I suppose, that to Singapore it would be decidedly more economical, would it not, to do it round the Cape, and the loss of time would not be very great?—No; I should suppose that to Singapore it would be a little less than to China, perhaps 1*l.* per head, or something of that sort. The Straits Settlements we have not hitherto had under our control; we have no services in connection with them.

1012. Will you prepare a statement of the estimate of the expenditure on the new system compared with the old expenditure of the transport service?—I will.

1013. Perhaps you had better submit it to the India Office before you send it in, for any remarks they have to make upon it?—The statement we have prepared has been approved and concurred in by the India Office.

1014. The expenditure upon these transports has increased very considerably since the original design with regard to them, has it not?—No; the whole has been laid before Parliament.

Lieut. Colonel FREDERICK MOFFAT BAKER was called in; and Examined.

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1015. Major *Anson.*] You commanded a regiment of native infantry in the Bengal army, did you not?—I did.

1016. What regiment was it?—The 65th General Service Corps in the Bengal army.

1017. Did you serve abroad in China at all with it?—The regiment has served both in Aracan, in Burmah, and in China since I have been a member of it.

1018. Was it one of the regiments enlisted as general service regiments?—Yes, it is a general service corps.

1019. At what time did your regiment leave India for China?—Sometime in 1858; I am not certain as to the date.

1020. During the progress of the Bengal mutiny?—Yes.

1021. Had you any difficulties with your men in China, or on proceeding there?—None whatever; the men never behaved so well, as far as my experience is concerned. They had the Chinese on one side of them, and the Europeans on the other, and they could not help themselves.

1022. Of what class of men was your regiment composed?—They are a peculiar regiment; they are composed principally of a caste of men who are called Zemindar Brahmins, or agriculturists of the priestly caste; that is, men who have given up their priestly caste to follow agriculture; they are men principally from the province of Behar; of course there are Mussulmen among them and low-caste men, but the mass are composed of Zemindar Brahmins.

1023. You had no difficulty with them on the voyage on board ship with regard to their caste prejudices?—None whatever.

1024. With regard to the cooking?—No, not the slightest; the Hindoos do not cook on board.

1025. What other regiments of native infantry

were there quartered in China at the same time as yours?—The 47th and the 70th.

1026. Were those regiments enlisted for general service?—The 47th was enlisted for general service, but not the 70th.

1027. Did you come in contact with the 70th at all; did you see anything of the men or the officers?—We were brigaded in Canton together, that is to say, not in the same brigade; we were in the 2nd, and they were in the 1st.

1028. There were no objection made by the men who were not enlisted for general service serving there than on the part of your men, were there?—None whatever that I am aware of.

1029. From your experience of India, do you think that there would be any difficulty in generally garrisoning China by regiments of the Indian army?—Not if three things were attended to; there must be proper arrangements; the men must have high pay, and they must go with their own officers. The men would be placed in a country where they could hold no communication with either the inhabitants, or the foreign residents, or anyone else, and they would be solely dependent upon their own officers. In my opinion the present system, of having two or three officers to a regiment, will not answer for a permanency, as far as I can see at least.

1030. What do you consider high pay?—What they received before, the full batta and ration money.

1031. How much was that?—It varies according to rank. I should not like to state exactly what it is; it varies, of course, because they receive a certain fixed allowance for rations, and the cost of rations is deducted, they receiving the balance.

1032. Have you any idea what that allowance was?—I think the allowance for ration-money was about two rupees for a private per month.

1033. That was in addition to his regular pay?—It

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—It is an addition to it in this way: they receive a ration, or the pay for the ration; the ration does not cost generally so much as the allowance granted by Government for it, and they receive the balance.

1034. You cannot tell me what the exact pay in hard cash was to the sepoy?—No, but it is all detailed in the pay and audit regulations.

1035. Was the pay at that time the same as it is now?—I believe so.

1036. Seven rupees a month?—I believe so; it is now seven years ago, and I could not speak with certainty; the pay was seven rupees, eight rupees, or nine rupees, according to a man's service; a sepoy gets seven rupees pay at first; he gets eight rupees after 15 years' service, and nine rupees after 20 years' service.

1037. At all events, as far as regards the employment of native soldiers in China, and places of that description, it is simply a question of money?—It is simply a question of money and proper treatment. Our men received great advantages in many respects; they went there with their own officers whom they knew; their officers were mostly men who had been with them for long periods, and spoke their own language fluently. They also received other slight advantages, such as extra clothing, woollen socks, flannel waistcoats, and things of that sort. It would be a very different thing to move native troops abroad under officers promiscuously attached to the regiment, to what it would be with officers who had been with them for years.

1038. Of course they ought to have the officers to whom they are accustomed?—Yes, and they require more officers abroad than they do in India.

1039. Do you consider that it is far cheaper for native soldiers to live in a place like China, than it is for European soldiers?—Yes, decidedly. China is a wild place at present; provisions at Hong Kong, I understand, are enormously expensive; the rise is something enormous.

1040. Colonel North.] Did you find any difficulty when you were taking your regiment from India to China about cooking on board?—No; for those who understand these things, it is as simple as possible; the same objection is frequently made as to water, but that has always been overcome. I have been on board ship more than once with my own regiment, and I have always overcome that difficulty by a very simple process, which is merely to let the men fill their own water. The Hindoos have one set of casks, the Mussulmen another. I make the Hindoo officer answer for the water; he puts a Hindoo sentry over the Hindoos' water, and a Mussulman sentry over the Mussulmen's water; they serve it out themselves, and you never hear another word about it. I never heard the slightest question about it.

1041. We have it in evidence that one regiment going from India to China suffered severely, and many men died in consequence, because they would not cook on board?—Hindoos do not cook on board.

1042. Lord William Hay.] How do they support themselves then?—They eat the chapanny, a species of parched grain; they eat sugar, and they get an allowance of tobacco, and various spices are furnished by the Commissariat Department as the men's ration. A Hindoo receives a certain ration, and a Mussulman receives a certain ration; the Hindoo's ration is dry; he eats it dry,

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in the condition in which he receives it, but the Mussulmen cook on board.

1043. When you use the word Hindoo, to what people do you refer?—All those are generally classed as Hindoos who are not Mussulmen, in a Hindostanee regiment.

1044. It would not be true of the Hindoos of the Punjaub, for instance?—The Hindoos of the Punjaub are quite a different race; I speak of the Hindoos of Hindostanee regiments. I have been for many years in the Punjaub, and I know that the Hindoos there are of quite a different race.

1045. You refer to Rohilcund and Oude?—I refer to Behar, Rohilcund, Oude, and the Doab; most of the old Hindostanee regiments were drawn from the Doab, Oude, and Behar, with a few Rohillas, and a few Bhondelas.

1046. Marquis of Hartington.] When your regiment went to China it was on field service, was not it?—It was on field service; I was not with them at the time they went, I joined them afterwards.

1047. Was your regiment one which remained as part of the garrison in China after the war was over?—It remained at Canton. The three Hindostanee regiments I have mentioned remained at Canton till the beginning of 1860, when they were relieved by three Punjaub regiments, consisting of men who also, I believe, had volunteered for service there.

1048. You have no personal experience of the employment of Indian troops out of India, then?—No, excepting being with them; I brought part of the regiment.

1049. I understood you to say that you did not go with them to China?—I did not go with them to China, being on staff employment, but I was ordered there, and I joined the regiment subsequently.

1050. What did you refer to when you spoke of the arrangement which it would be necessary to make to prevent discontent among Indian troops employed in the colonies: I mean general service corps, such as I understand your own to have been?—A general service corps was bound to go wherever ordered; and in the last 24 years, or rather during 24 years, not the last, my own regiment has been three times on foreign service of two years each; that is to say, for a fourth of its time it has been on foreign service. The arrangements I refer to are, in regard to the water and the supply of provisions, through the commissariat, not through the Navy, or anything of that sort. There must be a supply of provisions which the men may eat, and which they are accustomed to eat. Another great cause of discontent is, that during their absence their lands are liable to be disposed of for arrears of revenue, and matters of that sort; that is one very sore point with the men.

1051. As to the arrangements which would be necessary at the station itself, there would probably be no great difficulty in those commissariat arrangements, and so on?—There were none at Canton.

1052. The arrangements there were satisfactory, were they?—Perfectly so.

1053. What pay did the privates in your regiment receive?—The usual pay, the extra batta and rations.

1054. I mean in India; what did they receive?—According to their length of service, seven, eight, and nine rupees respectively.

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1055. Captain *Vivian*.] The pay is seven rupees up to six years' service, is not it?—Up to 16 years' service, I think it is.

1056. Up to six years' service, seven rupees; that is the general pay of European troops?—It used to be up to 15 years. I know nothing of the present arrangements.

1057. Marquis of *Hartington*.] Colonel Probyn mentioned, I think, eight rupees a month, with no stoppage for rations, or for clothing, or uniform, as what would probably be sufficient to pay Indian regiments in garrison employment; do you think that would be sufficient?—That is less than some men receive at present. They receive nine rupees after 20 years' service.

1058. Have they not to find their own food out of that?—No, not out of that; they receive ration-money. Colonel Probyn's men have all been enlisted, I should think, within the last 12 years or so. What I mean is, they are not men who would come probably upon the increased pay for length of service. I am not speaking with any actual knowledge.

1059. Do you think that it would be desirable to garrison any of our colonies in the East exclusively with Indian troops?—If you mean with Indian troops and European artillery, I do not consider it expedient ever to put artillery in the hands of natives.

1060. Is there not an objection on the part of British artillery officers to serving without any European infantry?—Probably there is, I should say.

1061. Have you never heard such an objection?—Never; I have never heard the question discussed.

1062. I think it is one which might very probably be raised?—I think it is very possible that it might if there were not a small force of Europeans, but the best force for that purpose would be marines and sappers.

1063. Major *Anson*.] That objection to their guns being supported by native infantry would apply to service in the field?—Yes.

1064. Not to garrison artillery such as you would have at the Mauritius or Hong Kong?—I should think that decidedly the best support are European troops. There is no question about it.

1065. Marquis of *Hartington*.] That applies either to garrison artillery or to field artillery?—Yes, because the mere fact of the artillery and the supports being men of the same nation would bring them into closer union.

1066. Major *Anson*.] Still the general objection as regards service in India is, that artillery officers do not like to have their guns unsupported by European cavalry, or European infantry; that is, in the field in action, but in the case of a garrison it is a totally different thing; they are not afraid of the sepoys running away with the heavy guns?—In regard to garrisons, I should think that the best plan would be to keep the artillery in fortified positions, and the natives never in fortified positions. We have plenty of forts in India, which would hold a very large portion of the European troops who are now there.

1067. Marquis of *Hartington*.] But you do not mean that if you sent Indian troops to one of our colonies you would not put them into fortifications?—Certainly not; but I would put the artillery either stockaded or with a slight breastwork around them, so that they might be always secure from a sudden rush of the people. The

artillery should never have their guns exposed on an open plain; they should always have either a breastwork or a stockade round their positions.

1068. Do I understand you to say, that you would not put the Indian troops into fortifications in one of our colonies?—I would not.

1069. In some of our colonies, are not the fortifications the only place you would put them in?—Then it is inevitable; but what I mean is this: I would keep the fortifications for the Europeans only; I would make the natives canteen near the fortifications, both on account of giving more room, and being more salubrious by not crowding the men together, and also that they should be at hand to support the fort, but they should not be actually in it.

1070. Then I understand you on the whole, to think that it would not be desirable to garrison any of our colonies exclusively with Indians. You would certainly have European artillery?—I would certainly have European artillery.

1071. As I understand you, you would prefer also to have some portion of European infantry, and you mentioned sappers?—Sappers, marines, or infantry.

1072. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] Your regiment, I think, was one of the old Bengal army?—It was one of the old Bengal regular regiments.

1073. When you speak of it as being "a general service corps," I do not exactly understand what you mean, because we have had it in evidence that the oath of enlistment was altered to include general service in 1856, and as your regiment must have been enlisted before 1856, in what sense do you mean that it was a general service corps?—The origin of the general service corps was this: there was originally a marine regiment, that was divided into two regiments, the 25th and 40th, which were general service corps; then when an increase took place, certain regiments which were then added to the Indian army were made general service corps; that is, they took the oath to go on board ship, and to go wherever they were ordered over the Black water, or anywhere else. Those regiments were about seven or eight in number, I think.

1074. Out of the whole army?—Out of the regular infantry there were seven or eight of those regiments; they have been almost everywhere; men of my own regiment have been at the Mauritius, I believe; they go wherever they are ordered. These are what are called the general service corps.

1075. Then it was not necessary when your regiment was ordered to China to ask for volunteers; they were ordered to go in the regular course of duty?—During the time of the mutiny things were in such a state, that the fidelity of the native army generally was doubtful; the men volunteered; they could have been sent without any volunteering.

1076. As a matter of fact, they did volunteer?—They did volunteer; they were willing to go; they would have gone any way, but it was not their turn to go on foreign service; they had lately returned from foreign service in Burmah; the consequence was, it had not come round in the usual course of duty for them to go on foreign service again, but they volunteered to go out of their turn.

1077. It was only those six or seven exceptional regiments enlisted for general service that were sent from the Bengal army, either to Burmah or to China; up to that time it was only one

one of those few regiments that ever went, was it?—No, these were the only troops that were used for general service up to that period. There had been instances of men volunteering for other service; for instance, some volunteered for Egypt, and others volunteered in other similar cases, but they were exceptions. These were troops that were bound by their enlistment to go on foreign service when ordered.

1078. With regard to the troops on board ship, have you ever observed from your experience that the Hindoos suffer in health from living merely on dry rations during a long sea voyage?—Yes, it decidedly decreases their strength; a man living in that way must more or less suffer.

1079. Do you not consider that a reason (I do not say an insuperable reason) against employing them out of India?—I consider it a slight reason, I do not think it is one of any grave importance; they equally starve themselves frequently to save money; they suffer quite as much in Aracan, where they can buy cheap provisions; from buying cheap provisions, that is, feeding upon rice instead of upon flour, for their own avarice.

1080. Have you ever considered the position that a native corps, for instance such a regiment as the one you commanded yourself would occupy if employed in garrison duty in the Mediterranean, at Malta, for instance?—Except in active service, I think it would be hardly possible to employ the men in the Mediterranean.

1081. You think the garrison duty would be so very distasteful?—I do not see how the men could procure provisions that would suit them, to begin with, and I think the separation from their families, and from all associations would create a feeling of discontent, excepting on active service.

1082. They would also have no distractions; they would have none of their usual sources of interest when they were isolated in a British colony like Malta?—I do not think that that is of very much consequence, because they had none in China; they would have as much in the Mediterranean as they had in China.

1083. How long did your regiment remain in China?—About two years.

1084. Would there have been any difficulty in keeping it there longer?—No, I believe none whatever.

1085. That is, if active service had continued?—I do not think there would have been the slightest difficulty; the fact is, the men returned rather with regret; they had made very heavy savings, and were laden with money, and I think they rather regretted returning.

1086. You have had no actual experience yourself of the conduct of a native regiment in garrison duty in any of our colonies in China, or Hong Kong, or the Straits?—I think that the native regiments at Canton might be considered in garrison duty, and the farewell orders issued by Sir Charles Straubenzee were the most flattering that could be penned regarding the conduct of the native troops in China.

1087. Mr. *Oliphant*.] In fact, you had no fighting at all to do in Canton, had you, or scarcely any?—Yes, at the first commencement; the regiment had not when I was with them, but they had had previously.

1088. Merely the taking of Canton?—Yes, there was the taking of Canton, and there were

various expeditions about the country, and things of that sort; a serious attack was made upon them.

1089. It could hardly be called active service, could it; had the regiment anybody killed or wounded in it?—I believe so; I should not like to say what number, but I believe there were some casualties.

1090. At Malta, for instance, where rice is difficult to be procured, would there be any difficulty in finding food for Sikhs or Pathans or people who do not care about rice?—The sepoy does not feed upon rice; wheaten flour is his principal food.

1091. He would be able to get that?—Yes, he can get the wheaten flour.

1092. I understood you to say that the difficulty would be to provide them with food in those places?—Yes; but although the flour is one principal ingredient in their food, a preparation called “ghee,” which is a species of butter, is almost the only portion of what you may call animal food that a Hindoo takes.

1093. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] Dansupari would be difficult to obtain, would it not?—Yes.

1094. Major *Anson*.] Do you know how many regiments there were in the Bengal army that did not mutiny?—Fourteen regiments of the regulars, I think.

1095. Were there 14 regiments that did not mutiny at all, either partially or entirely?—There were 14 regiments that were retained.

1096. Out of that 14, did not several of them partially mutiny?—Yes, I fancy they did.

1097. Three regiments were serving in China; there was no such thing as a mutiny amongst them, was there?—There was no such thing as a mutiny amongst them, and the conduct of two or three regiments in the Punjaub was most praiseworthy; the 4th, the 21st, and the 31st Regiments.

1098. You were asked just now about the five or six regiments of the Bengal army which were enlisted for general service; the whole of the Bengal army now is enlisted for general service, and put upon the same footing as those five or six regiments; were you aware of that fact?—Yes; it is so now, but not those men I spoke of.

1099. They are all upon the same footing as those five or six regiments you were asked about a short time ago, like your own regiment?—As I understand it, it only affects those who have been enlisted subsequently to a certain date, the old men who previously enlisted; for instance, the men who were enlisted 30 years ago have not been enlisted anew for general service.

1100. Captain *Vivian*.] Then they are not liable for general service, in short?—I understand not.

1101. There must be very few of them left now?—They are long lived.

1102. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] The change in the enlistment took place in 1856, that is 11 years ago; I suppose there are a very considerable number of old soldiers who enlisted before that still remaining?—There are only a very few of the old regiments left; there are only about 15 of those old regiments altogether left, and therefore, comparatively speaking, there would only be a very small number of the old men in the service, because all the new regiments have gone upon a different organization altogether.

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Lieutenant Colonel CHARLES P. KEYES, called in; and further Examined.

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1103. Lord *William Hay*.] THE regiment you command belongs to what is called the Punjaub Frontier Force, I think?—Yes, it does.

1104. Are your men recruited for general service?—Yes.

1105. Is not there a sort of understanding that your regiment shall not leave the Punjaub?—No; there is no understanding of that sort that I am aware of.

1106. Under whose authority is the Punjaub Frontier Force?—Under the Lieutenant Governor of Punjaub directly; of course, under the Supreme Government. It is under the Civil Government.

1107. Under the Civil Government of the Punjaub?—Yes.

1108. What are the duties of the force?—They are used as troops, in a military capacity, for the protection of the frontier.

1109. Especially for the protection of the frontier?—Yes.

1110. Extending from what place to what place?—From Mittunkote to the Hazara district.

1111. How many miles in extent should you say it is?—Between 300 and 400 miles.

1112. Peshawar is a very important point in that line of frontier, is not it?—Yes, it is supposed to be the key of the whole position; it is garrisoned by troops under the Commander in Chief; in fact, it has the largest garrison in any part of the Punjaub.

1113. Has any inconvenience arisen from the fact that the force which is employed for the defence of the Punjaub frontier is under different commands, that is to say, that a portion of it is under the Civil Government of the Punjaub, and the rest of it directly under the Commander in Chief?—Certainly not, to my knowledge; on the contrary, it has been found of much convenience.

1114. In time of peace the Punjaub frontier force is not under the Commander in Chief, is it?—No, it is under the immediate orders of the Punjaub Civil Government.

1115. But on war breaking out with any of these frontier tribes, would it be placed under the Commander in Chief?—Of course; immediately that it is necessary to employ regular troops with the Punjaub troops, it would be under the immediate command of the officer appointed to undertake whatever operation was in view.

1116. Are any duties of a purely civil or police character performed by the Punjaub Frontier Force?—Yes, they have frequently to escort treasure, and to form personal guards for the commissioners of districts.

1117. Then they perform duties which are not performed by the regular army?—Yes; I consider that both those duties are expressly duties belonging to the police.

1118. Then, in that respect, you think their being under the civil authority is objectionable?—No, I do not think that that is consequent upon their being under the civil authority. Where that custom is maintained there are no regular troops in the station with them; indeed, I suppose, that even if there were, they would not be told off for that duty, as personal guards for the district officers: the probability is that, what are supposed to be called the civil troops

would be employed for that purpose, but both regular and irregular regiments have to escort treasure.

1119. There would be no difficulty in relieving the frontier force of those duties, would there, by the employment of police?—None whatever; the police are not in sufficient numbers to take those duties.

1120. On Tuesday last you stated to the Committee that natives of the same high position are not attracted now to the service in the same number as formerly; can you suggest any means by which the service could be rendered more attractive to natives of that stamp?—That is a question which is more easily asked than answered, simply for the reason, that it is more a feeling that has forced itself upon me, and I believe upon all officers who have been for any length of time on the frontier, than an established fact. I have conversed with officers on that point, and although they had the same convictions, yet no cause has ever been arrived at to explain it. I have also tried to draw out the men of my regiment upon the subject; and shortly after the mutiny the answers generally were, to use their own expression, that they were surfeited with the good things they had got during the mutiny.

1121. Do you not think that the Indian military service would be rendered more attractive if rewards of a more substantial character were offered to native officers who had done good service?—Yes; after the mutiny, the men have still stated that any number of men could be procured, and certainly numbers have come, but whenever I have found fault with the quality, they still say that they could procure better; but, I think, that they have never yet denied the fact that the men do not come so readily as formerly. This may be partially accounted for by the fact that when the Punjaub was first annexed we found many men who had been landholders dispossessed of all they had; these men were readily attracted by our service, not only by its novelty but as a means of gaining a livelihood. As the country prospered many regained their land and others have found occupation on it; for where there was one acre under cultivation when no man felt sure that he would reap what he had sown, there are more than ten now; the supply then of the class alluded to, dependent on military service, is not so great.

1122. Has there been any change in the power of commanding officers of such regiments as you command since the mutiny?—About the time of the mutiny they had very large powers; they had the power of magistrates, but that power has been taken away from them.

1123. Do you not think that the popularity of these irregular corps depends in a great measure upon the large power in the hands of the commanding officers; I mean, of course, the European officers?—Yes, undoubtedly; an officer in command of a regiment feels that he has a much higher position, and very much more influence over his men, when he has power to punish and reward.

1124. Do you think that those powers have been unduly curtailed of late, or is there any tendency to curtail them in a manner likely to affect the efficiency of the army?—I think the tendency is to drift into the old system of centralisation.

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1125. You think that there is a tendency in that direction?—Yes.

1126. Which, if indulged in, would prove most mischievous to the army?—Yes. I think it is very inexpedient to curtail the powers of officers in rewarding and punishing; and, I think, the Pathans, of all people in the world, have a greater respect for a man who has authority, and can exercise it for chastisement or reward.

1127. What power have you of rewarding a man who has distinguished himself in the field, for instance?—I have no power, of course, except promotion in the regiment. If a man has shown any distinguished conduct in the field, he can be recommended for the Order of Merit, and, during the Umbeylah campaign, I think, there was a very wise and very good innovation upon the old system. The general officer commanding there had given to him the authority to bestow the Order of Merit upon men recommended to him by the officers on the spot; I think that was excellent in the feeling of emulation which it created, and it was also good in the speedy manner in which the men met with the reward that was recommended for them.

1128. Captain *Vivian*.] The general officer commanding had power to decorate men upon the field?—Yes.

1129. Instantly?—Yes, and it was acted upon at Umbeylah; I think that power would be of the greatest value to commanding officers, and create a great spirit of emulation.

1130. Lord *William Hay*.] Would you not think it advisable to reward the men in a more substantial manner; for instance, by granting small jagheers?—Yes, I think the men of the higher class, in high positions in the regiments are very often, especially in the frontier regiments, men of family who have either themselves or their forefathers had possession some time before of land, and I think the *summum bonum* of their existence is to repurchase land, or to become jagheerders or landholders; there is, for instance, a native officer in my own regiment whose utmost wish is to obtain a jagheer, and I think his services have entitled him to the consideration of Government in that respect.

1131. *Chairman*.] What amount of jagheer do you think he ought to receive?—What he has asked for is the grant of his own village.

1132. What amount of revenue does that represent?—I should say about 900 rupees a year.

1133. If you rewarded all officers in that way you would make a hole in your land revenue very soon?—I would not reward all officers in that way, only men of superior claims, and there are not very many of them. The jagheers or grants of land were very largely given after the mutiny, for services. I have no doubt that the Government have in consequence found it rather embarrassing to meet all the hopes and wishes of those who perform very good service; I would not recommend that an officer should be removed from his regiment to become a jagheerदार; I think, after continued good and faithful service for a term of years if a guarantee were given to him that he would have this grant, when Government could reasonably dispense with his services, it would in a measure satisfy him, and is not more than he deserves.

1134. It is a hereditary grant, as I understand, that you propose?—Yes, certainly.

1135. A pension of 90*l.* a year for all generations, is rather a large pension to give to a
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deserving officer, is it not?—It would not be extensively given, nor ought it to be extensively given, but there are men who have performed such services to the Government that I think it is a fitting way to reward them, and would not be too much.

1136. You would not recommend it as the ordinary reward of any faithful service, but merely for exceptional cases?—No, for exceptional cases; there are very few men in the service to whom it should be given.

1137. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] It is also the natural way of rewarding men in India, and that which has been adopted, I believe, under all native Governments?—Yes.

1138. Lord *William Hay*.] There is no reason why it should be hereditary; the grant might be for one or two or three lives?—There is no reason why it should be hereditary; but in rewarding great and faithful service why deprive the reward of its chief value and attraction. It should only descend to direct male heirs, and being held on the condition of good service it could always be resumed in the case of wrong-doing. Every effort would be made to improve an hereditary estate, whereby many people might be benefited, but where there was only a life interest the desire would be to make the most of the present to the injury, in all probability, of others.

1139. Under the native rulers, it often was not hereditary, I believe?—Yes.

1140. Mr. *Oliphant*.] A suggestion has been made that a certain number of native officers very highly deserving of reward should be allowed to come to this country as aides-de-camp to the Queen; have you met with that suggestion?—No, I have never met with the suggestion before; I scarcely think that it would be a popular idea, unless the man was perfectly untrammelled with any home or any family ties.

1141. As I understand the suggestion, he would come here for a year or two, and be appointed in a certain capacity, answering to that of aide-de-camp to the Queen, which he would retain in India, as an honorary title?—I have not the slightest doubt that it would be very gratifying to many native officers.

1142. It would be a cheaper way of rewarding them than a grant of land?—Yes, certainly; but where men by their services were deserving of a grant of land, the shadow should never be substituted for the substance.

1143. Lord *William Hay*.] If the native officers were paid partly in land, and partly in cash, would it not be very attractive and popular with the native officers?—The natives in that part of India especially covet the possession of land, and to be in the position of a jagheerदार or landholder.

1144. A reward of that description would go much further than in any other shape, would it not?—I think so, certainly; it would be the most valuable and the most attractive reward you could offer them.

1145. Captain *Vivian*.] You speak now of a reward for long and faithful service?—Yes; it would include a very few men; there are very few men of that stamp, or who could show the services that I allude to, which would entitle them to such an honorary reward.

1146. I understand you to say that you think that there should be two classes of military reward, one for distinction in the field, given on the spot, if possible?—Yes.

1147. And

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1147. And the other given in the shape of pay or of pension, or of land, for long and faithful service?—A reward in the field has always been given in the army, but it has been much more difficult to get ordinarily than it should be.

1148. Has it been given on the spot?—It has never been given on the spot before.

1149. Except in this campaign which you mentioned just now?—Yes, in this campaign it was so given, and had a most excellent effect.

1150. You recommend that commanding officers should have the power of rewarding in that manner?—Certainly, I think it is the greatest boon possible. Of all the races I have met with, I think the Pathans are about the most sanguine: and if on the other hand a Pathan cannot immediately get what he has set his heart upon, he is just as easily cast down; therefore, if rewards are to hang very much upon the future, the men cannot realise to themselves often that they will obtain them.

1151. A man does not care half as much about a reward given for gallantry in the field if it is not given upon the spot, but six months afterwards, does he?—No; but I was alluding especially to rewards promised to the men for long service. Of course, as regards a military reward for gallantry in the field, to give it on the spot is more gratifying to everybody, I think.

1152. Lord William Hay.] Are not pensions given to the wives of men who have fallen in service?—Yes; and I think that the pension rules with regard to our frontier troops are very defective indeed; there is such difficulty in procuring the pensions very often, that rather than surmount those difficulties they forego the privilege.

1153. The delays are so great in obtaining the pensions, that those who are entitled to them go without them sometimes?—Yes, not only are the delays so great, but they have to come sometimes from long distances. They have not only first of all to come to verify their claim, but they have to wait until it goes through the different offices; sometimes they have to wait for months, and then there is a recurrence of the difficulty of coming up, because they must always appear in person to claim their pension; and with regard to old men and women, who, under other circumstances are not allowed to go abroad, and who live at a distance, that is the greatest hardship possible, and very often, rather than meet this difficulty, people give up their claim. There is a suggestion I would make, that I think would materially do away with the difficulty. We all know how frequently fraud has been committed in the pension establishment, and how many fraudulent pensions have been given for years. I think, speaking with regard to pensions, that if a man's life was valued at a certain sum, and he were permitted to will it to whom he pleased, it would be very much more valuable as a boon. In the present instance there is a certain line of succession, and they can nominate any heir within the prescribed line; it may be a wife, or it may be a daughter, and those people very often rather than come for their pension, give it up. But if this sum, according to the valuation, were given for a man's life lost in action, he might will it to whom he pleased, and then there could be no chance of fraud. That would do away with the cumbrous pension establishment, and I think in a while it would be a saving to the Government. I am certain that to the Punjaub troops it would be a great boon.

1154. Is not it particularly important in the case of regiments liable to foreign service, that this matter of pensions for the wives of those who have died in action should be attended to; it is more important in the case of regiments liable to foreign service, or employed on foreign service, than in other cases, is it not?—Yes, certainly; because the boon is no boon whatever if it is hedged round with so many difficulties that practically it is unattainable; for instance, in my regiment, which was first raised in 1849, up to the date when I left it, between 500 and 600 men have lost their lives; they have either been killed on the field, or have died of wounds received in action. With many of these cases I have had more or less to do in procuring pensions, and I can speak to the difficulty there is, and the delay, and how often, as I said before, the people forego their claim altogether. I think it is a hardship that such should be the case, and I think it could be easily met by valuing a man's life at a certain rate. A fair value might be easily arrived at by ascertaining the average duration of pensions, and the aggregate amount paid; and I think on the whole it would be more satisfactory to the Government as well as to the men themselves.

1155. You think that the removal of those difficulties would enhance the popularity of the service very much?—Yes, I think it would have a great effect in that way.

1156. Marquis of Hartington.] You stated in your last examination, in reply to a question as to whether it would be safe to entrust Singapore, or Hong Kong, or the Mauritius to the exclusive guardianship of Indian troops, that you thought it would not be wise to do so, referring to the possibility (not the probability) of a mutiny; do you think, putting the subject of mutiny out of the question altogether, that it would be wise to entrust any of our colonies to the exclusive guardianship of Indian troops?—No; I think for every purpose it would be better that Europeans should be located with them.

1157. Do you think that under good officers they can be trusted in a time of riot or disturbance as implicitly as you can trust European troops?—Do you mean in the case of a riot among Europeans or among the natives?

1158. I refer more particularly to riot among other natives; in China, for instance?—Certainly, I think they could be trusted.

1159. Take, for example, a riot among the Chinese; would you trust as implicitly to Indian troops as you could to Europeans?—Yes, I should say so.

1160. Do you think that the colonists would have the same confidence in a garrison composed exclusively of Indian troops as they would if there were Europeans in the garrison?—I think it is very questionable whether they would or not.

1161. You believe that they might have the same confidence?—I believe that they might; it would depend very much upon the behaviour of the men, and the estimation in which they are held by their own officers, and those who were employing them.

1162. Would you, under any circumstances, have Indian artillery as well as infantry in a colony?—No, certainly not.

1163. Then you would have the artillery, at any rate, always European?—Yes.

Tuesday, 26th March 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.
Mr. Childers.
Viscount Cranborne.
Sir James Fergusson.
Viscount Hamilton.
Marquis of Hartington.

Lord William Hay.
Captain Hayter.
Colonel Percy Herbert.
Colonel North.
Mr. Oliphant.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

Lieutenant General Sir HOPE GRANT, G.C.B., was called in; and Examined.

1164. *Chairman.*] YOU are the Quartermaster General?—I am.

1165. Have you formed any opinion as to the possibility of employing native Asiatic troops in colonial garrisons?—I have.

1166. Would you kindly state your opinion to the Committee?—May I ask, in the first place, is it proposed that these colonial troops should be localized?

1167. I imagine that the weight of authority is in favour of their being borrowed from the Indian army, and not being localized; but without entering into the question, do you think it would be possible satisfactorily to discharge the duties of colonial garrisons by the help of Asiatic troops?—If you took them from the Indian troops you could not keep to the Sikhs, you would have to take the army generally by roster.

1168. What is the impossibility of taking any particular kind of troops, such as the Sikhs; would it excite discontent, do you think?—I do not think it could be done by the Government; I think, if they are called upon to supply so many regiments for such a service, they would have to take them by the roster.

1169. Supposing they did not take them by the roster, but confined themselves to one particular class of troops, say to the regiments of one Presidency, or half of one Presidency, what would be the result of that?—I think that would cause great discontent among the troops.

1170. Do you think that the competition for this kind of employment would be so keen as to cause discontent?—I think any employment, good, bad, or indifferent, would cause discontent among the troops, if they were taken out of one class.

1171. And your opinion is, that the mass of the Indian army would not be fitted for the service?—I think, decidedly not.

1172. In your opinion, if it was possible to confine them to the Sikhs, the Sikhs would be fitted for such a service?—The Sikhs might be fitted for such a service; but I think it would be very difficult to satisfy them and to please them. Going upon garrison duty is very different from going upon active service. The Sikhs and the native troops are always ready to go on active service, but not to remain in garrison at any foreign station.

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1173. If it was so disagreeable a duty, do not you think that the other troops would rather congratulate themselves that the Sikhs alone were selected for the duty?—I think not.

1174. Do you imagine that the objections of the Sikhs would be of a character that money could not overcome?—Money might overcome their objections, no doubt; in the first place, they would, in all probability, go very willingly, till they found it injure their health, or anything of that sort; then it would become an unpopular service, and they would not like it.

1175. Do you think that all the other races employed in India, except the Sikhs, would be unfit for this service of garrisoning colonial stations?—I should think the Goorkas would be very good.

1176. And the Affghans?—And the Affghans too, but I should think it would be more difficult to get them to go willingly than any other classes.

1177. But you think that the high caste Hindoos of Bengal and Behar would not do?—No, they would not do, I think. I will tell you, for example, what happened in China: before I went there, during the last war, they had native troops at Hong Kong. The Chinamen there are a very bad class of men; they are the worst class in the whole of China; pirates, murderers, and thieves congregate in Hong Kong, because it is the only place they can go to; they are shut out of their own country; but Hong Kong is open territory, and any person may go there who is not known to our Government. There was a guard of native soldiers there. A Chinaman one night came, while a sentry was walking upon his post, and with a long stick tripped him up, and took away his musket from him; the consequence was that when I arrived, Sir Hercules Robinson applied to me for a European guard. He said it was not safe to leave a native guard there. The result is, that the whole of the Europeans think very badly of the native troops, and I am very certain of this, that if you were to propose to supply them with native troops, in the place of European troops, they would say, "If you do so we will object to pay any of the money we are now called upon to pay for troops."

1178. Who would say that?—The European residents at Hong Hong.

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1179. They would not exactly be asked?—I think they would object to pay the money which they pay now, and as far as I can make out, that is a considerable sum; it is 20,000*l.* a-year, and moreover it is a very valuable Colony to this country. I believe as much as 3,000,000*l.* passes through this country in consequence of the great supply of tea sent from thence; of course it is very necessary to look after the interests of the European population there.

1180. Do you know what the cost of garrisoning Hong Kong is?—I am not aware of the cost of the garrison there; I cannot speak to that.

1181. You do not know what proportion is paid by the Colony?—The Colony pays 20,000*l.* a-year.

1182. What proportion is that; how much is the whole cost?—I cannot say what fraction of the whole it is.

1183. You stated that you did not think that the Bengal and Behar Hindoos would be good soldiers to employ in such a service; do you think that the Madrasees would be any better?—No, I think not; they are very good troops in their way, but I should not think they would be at all good troops to employ under those circumstances.

1184. Do they not actually undertake the garrisoning of all the Burmese stations?—Yes, along with European troops. They take the Straits without European troops, but there is to be half a European regiment now sent to Singapore.

1185. Is that in consequence of its having been discovered that the Madrasees are insufficient?—No; the Madrasees are taken away from Singapore altogether, and there is to be a part of the Ceylon Rifles sent there; there are to be eight companies sent there.

1186. What is the ground of that alteration?—The Straits Settlements are taken over by the English Government now.

1187. It is purely on that ground?—It is purely on that ground, I believe.

1188. Hitherto the Madrasees have garrisoned Singapore without any injury to the public service, have they not?—Yes, but that is one of the quietest places in all India; the climate is good, and there is no reason at all why any troops should not take care of that place.

1189. There are an abundance of Chinamen there, are there not?—There are a good many Chinamen there, but they are very quiet in their habits.

1190. I thought it was a fear of the Chinamen that led you to say that you thought the ordinary Bengal and Madras regiments would not be fitted for garrisoning Hong Kong?—Yes, but those Chinamen who come to Singapore come for traffic; they are quite a different class of people altogether from those at Hong Kong. The people at Hong Kong are all pirates and other dangerous characters.

1191. They are a much more dangerous class?—Yes, a much more dangerous class.

1192. You think that the Madrasees would be incompetent to deal with them?—Quite incompetent.

1193. But you see no objection to Singapore being garrisoned by native troops?—No, not much objection; there is only a wing of a European regiment sent there now; it is a point of importance which would need to be protected if there came to be a war, because there are fortifications, and guns, and different things

there which it is necessary, of course, to take care of.

1194. If there was a war should you like to lock up any notable proportion of the British Army at Singapore?—Not if they were required in England; but if there was a great war in England or Europe, and we required more troops than we could possibly get here, I do not see any insuperable objection to removing the European troops from Singapore. Of course there would be an objection, but I do not know why you should not remove the European troops away in that case, and put native troops in their places, and I do not think the natives would object to that.

1195. That would be rather a lengthy process, would it not?—I think it would not be a very lengthy process. If an order was to come out to send 10 or 12 regiments from the different Colonies, I think native troops from India could be found in a very short time to replace them; of course you would have to raise fresh troops in India to take the place of those you sent away.

1196. How soon would you get your English troops home?—You send them overland now, and, of course, in a very short space of time you would get them over land, after they were once embarked, in a month at the outside.

1197. Major *Anson*.] From Singapore?—When once they were embarked you could get them home in a month from Singapore; you would get them home from Calcutta in a month, and Singapore is no further than Calcutta.

1198. *Chairman*.] The mails by the Peninsular and Oriental Company do not come from Calcutta in a month?—Yes, the letters go or come back in a month.

1199. It is three or four days over a month, is not it?—It may be a little over sometimes. From Bombay they go home in three weeks occasionally.

1200. Sir *James Fergusson*.] They go through France?—Yes, the letters go through France. Coming round by Gibraltar would make it a little longer, perhaps.

1201. *Chairman*.] Do you think that the Mauritius could be safely garrisoned by native troops?—No, there would be a great objection to that in consequence of there being so many French people there.

1202. Why do French people object to native troops?—I should think they would.

1203. Do you think they like Englishmen better than Asiatics?—Decidedly.

1204. You mean that your fear is that they would object to pay for native troops?—The colonists would, in general, decidedly object to pay for native troops.

1205. If the colonists indulged in the costly luxury of English troops, do you not think it would be fair that they should pay for every man they got?—That is a matter upon which, of course, I cannot give an opinion. Have you got the power of obliging them to pay?

1206. We have got the power of taking the troops away if they do not?—I am aware of that; you might try it, but I think there would be very great difficulty in doing so, as many of these colonies are of great use to England.

1207. Do you think that Ceylon might be garrisoned entirely by Indian troops?—The only thing I can say with regard to that, is that of late they have reduced the native troops very much there,

there, and have added to the European Troops. For example, the Ceylon Rifles amount to 1,400; they will be reduced to six companies.

1208. On what ground is that?—I am not able to state the ground of it at all. I can only say that we have just received an order to supply half an European regiment, in addition to what was there before, and they have reduced the native troops to six companies, but I cannot myself say what the reason is. It appears to me from that, that they think it is not quite safe without European troops.

1209. You have no military knowledge of any danger that would be run by garrisoning Ceylon with native troops?—I am not aware of any military danger under the present circumstances. I think all these colonies would require to be taken care of, in case of war. If war broke out in this country, it would be necessary to defend them as well as you could; of course, European troops are the proper force to defend them.

1210. Could Ceylon be defended against external aggression to any large extent by European troops?—No; but it could be defended from gunboats or vessels of war coming and landing a force of marines.

1211. Would any small number of European troops be of any great use in case of an attack of that kind; would you not have to rely upon your native troops in the long run?—I think not, because the amount of force that a ship could land would not be very great; perhaps only 200 or 300, or it might be 400 or 500 men. They would go in and make a raid against a town, and burn a town, but European troops would be the proper force to keep them out and stop them; I think they would be much better than native troops for that purpose.

1212. Your idea is that the European force in Ceylon is kept up in case of a war breaking out, which might produce a raid upon some town in Ceylon?—Yes, certainly.

1213. And you think that native troops would be wholly incompetent to repel such an attack?—I do not know that they would be wholly incompetent, but not nearly so competent as European troops.

1214. Have you any knowledge of the cost of transport from one oriental port to another?—I commanded in Madras lately, as you are aware, and a regiment went over from there to the Straits; and as far as I can tell you (I cannot tell you with any certainty), I think the cost of transport only amounted to about 10 rupees for every native, and 15 rupees for every European sent over to the Straits.

1215. That was from Madras to Singapore?—Yes, that was from Madras to Singapore, and from Madras to Burmah.

1216. To Rangoon?—Yes. I cannot speak with any certainty; but as far as my belief goes, it amounted to 10 rupees for every native, and 15 rupees for every European; but that, of course, changes according to the market.

1217. What is the reason why a European costs 50 per cent. more to take than a native?—Because you put the natives so much closer into a vessel. A vessel that holds, say 500 natives, you would only put 300 Europeans into.

1218. On what ground is that; is it because the natives are smaller?—I think it is on no ground at all. I think it is rather a hardship upon the natives; but then the distance is not 0.58.

very great, and it is very seldom that there has been any accident or cause of complaint.

1219. Then the Europeans might be put into a vessel as close as the natives are?—You are obliged to give a European so many cubic feet; you are obliged to give them so much room.

1220. By Act of Parliament?—No, by the orders of the Indian Government, I think it is.

1221. Then the orders of the Indian Government do not take care of the native troops in the same way as of Europeans?—Not in the same way, certainly.

1222. You cannot give the reasons for this difference?—I cannot give the reasons, except that it is usual for natives to live in their houses crowded up together, and it is not supposed to go against their usual habits.

1223. That is rather the way with Englishmen, is not it?—It is not the way now; they are obliged to be in the most open rooms, and have abundance of air and plenty of cubic space.

1224. Have you found the natives die, or is there more sickness amongst them than amongst the Europeans in consequence of this arrangement?—No, I think not; in China, for example, the per-centage of deaths and sickness of Europeans was very nearly double that of natives.

1225. Had you any opportunity of observing what races of natives bore the Chinese climate best?—No, I cannot say for certain, because during the time I was there with the army it was the very best season of the year. It was during the cold weather, when there is very little sickness. The native troops I had there were uncommonly healthy and well.

1226. Those native troops were all Sikhs, were they not?—They were all Sikhs that I took up the country, but there were a Madras regiment and two Bombay regiments. I did not take them with me on service, they were left at Hong Kong and Canton.

1227. You had no opportunity of seeing the fighting powers of the Madras and Bombay regiments?—Not in that war; I saw it in the first war, in 1841.

1228. Did you form a high impression of them?—I think they could fight against the Chinese troops, because the Chinese troops were not well drilled, well armed, or anything else; and, except in forts, they were not a dangerous force to meet in the field.

1229. Were you much struck with their inferiority to the Sikhs?—I think they were decidedly inferior to the Sikhs; the troops in the Chinese army were badly armed; their swords were not sharp even; they had nothing but a matchlock; in short, they were not well armed.

1230. I was asking whether you were much struck with the inferiority of the Madrasees to the Sikhs?—I thought you were referring to the Chinese. No, I think the difference is just three to one and two to one; that is to say, a European is equal to three of the Hindostanee or the Madras troops, and equal to two of the Sikhs.

1231. And what kind of relation do you assign to the Chinese?—The Chinese, I should think, would be as fine soldiers as any, if drilled, disciplined, and armed.

1232. As fine soldiers as Europeans?—No, not as fine soldiers as Europeans; as fine soldiers as the Sikhs.

1233. You no doubt frequently saw embarkations of Madrasees going from Madras to Rangoon; did you ever hear of any objection on the

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score of caste or religion?—No, it has been an old habit for them to go. First of all, the Government thought it was so very expensive sending those Madras troops over, that they formed two local regiments; but that arrangement so completely and utterly failed, that they were obliged to give it up, and send the Madrasces again. Then they thought to send their wives and families there, to make them more satisfied with the country, but that utterly failed. It was put to the Madras troops whether they would have their wives and families with them or not, and every man said no, they would not have them, so they were obliged to leave it, and the Madras troops are sent over as a matter of course. They have been long accustomed to that work; they are kept there three years; they leave their wives and children at a station that is appointed for them; they send almost all their money over; indeed, they even starve themselves in the country to send their money home to their families. First of all, a sepoy has seven rupees, that is, 14s. a month of pay; then, while on foreign service he has full batta, that is, three rupees eight annas, or 7s.; and then he has his rations found him; that amounts to another three rupees eight annas, so that his pay actually amounts to almost as much as a European soldier; in fact, quite as much, because they have got what is called good-conduct pay. They get, after a period of six years, an additional rupee, and another rupee after 10 years. It was formerly after 16 years and 20 years, but now they have increased it very much in consequence of a representation which I made as to the way in which they were paid. I considered they were so badly paid that they could not live upon their pay; the Government increased it, and gave them this extra rupee after six years' service, and another rupee after 10 years' service, instead of after 16 and 20 years. When the men go over to Singapore or Burmah they almost starve themselves; they send all their money, and almost everything they can get, to their wives and families, and they live there as best they can. Of course they do not actually starve themselves, because that would be taken notice of, but they do not live nearly so well as they do in their own country.

1234. Would there be any difficulty to induce them, for the sake of pay, to garrison for similar periods, such places as the Mauritius, Hong Kong, and Ceylon?—I do not think there would be any difficulty, but they would not like it, because the same difficulties of supplying their families would occur there as do now, and perhaps more so with regard to those far-distant settlements.

1235. They would have the same advantage?—Yes, they would have the same advantages; at least I do not see how you could send them otherwise.

1236. These advantages would be sufficient to induce them to go, would they not?—There is another thing to be taken into account; if a sepoy dies on foreign service his wife is pensioned; that seems to be another great expense to the Government; the wife's pension is, I think, 2 rupees 12 annas, that is 5s. 6d. a month.

1237. Do you know at all the relative cost of the Indian and European soldier?—I cannot answer that question; I do not know.

1238. You mentioned the cost of passage from Madras to Singapore; do you happen to know the cost of passage from Madras to Hong Kong?

—No, I cannot say; I think that was done by a ship taken up according to the market-rate; it cost a great deal of money, I believe, but I do not know exactly what it did cost; the ship was sold for a time for a certain price, and as many men were put on board as they could send.

1239. Major Anson.] That is a return from your department which has been put in, is it not (*handing a paper to the Witness*)?—Yes.

1240. All the reliefs of regiments to the Colonies go through your office, I think?—Yes, they do.

1241. In this return I find that there are at the present moment five regiments in Australia, two of which are coming home this year?—Yes.

1242. There are five regiments at the Cape?—There are only to be four regiments at the Cape.

1243. Is one of them coming home?—One of them is coming home this year.

1244. And not going to be relieved?—It is not going to be relieved.

1245. There are two in China, are there not?—One in Japan, and one in China.

1246. And two in the Mauritius?—Yes.

1247. One at Ceylon, one at Jamaica, one at Barbadoes, and one in Bermuda?—One and a half are to be at Ceylon.

1248. Where is that wing of a regiment to be taken from?—It is going from the Cape. The 9th Regiment will go out and send one wing to Singapore.

1249. The other wing remaining at Ceylon?—The other wing is to remain at Ceylon.

1250. Is there to be another regiment in addition in Ceylon?—There is to be only a wing of a regiment in Ceylon in addition to the regiment there before.

1251. There is to be a regiment and a half there?—Yes.

1252. At the present moment what is nominally the length of service regiments abroad and at home?—Ten years is the length of service of regiments all over the Colonies and in India.

1253. How many years is it at home?—Five years at home.

1254. I find here that there are two regiments that are expected home this year, 1867, one of which has had 14 years' service abroad, and the other 12?—Yes.

1255. I find that there are two regiments coming home in 1868, both of which regiments have had 12 years' service abroad?—Yes.

1256. I find that there are five regiments coming home in 1869 that have had either 12 or nine years' service abroad?—Yes.

1257. And that five regiments are expected home in 1870 which have already had nine years and nine months' service abroad?—Yes.

1258. Six regiments are expected home in 1871 and 1872, that have already had nine years and eight months of service abroad?—Yes.

1259. How is it expected to be able to reduce the service of these regiments and bring them all home within the 10 years?—It cannot be done with those regiments, and the system cannot be carried out thoroughly for about four or five years. That has been caused in this way; for example, several of those regiments go out from England under four years.

1260. Under four years' service at home?—Yes, that has been caused by the second battalions having in many cases been obliged to be brought home in consequence of consisting of short-service time men; and also in consequence of

of so many regiments having been required to be sent out to India during the mutiny; that altered the roster altogether, and it will be some time before it falls into its proper form.

1261. The way in which you propose to bring about the 10 years' service abroad and five years at home would be by reducing the English Army in India, I think?—No, not at all; we have no intention of reducing the English Army in India; that would be one of the most dangerous things you could do, probably. I do not think India could be held with any certainty if you were to reduce a man in India.

1262. If you have got regiments up to the year 1872, which have been as long as 14 years abroad, I do not see by what process you are to reduce the length of the service of the regiments that are leaving now?—The number of regiments in India have been considerably reduced since the mutiny; there were 82 regiments, including the nine Indian regiments, at that time. There are now only 52; so that 30 regiments have already been sent home.

1263. Do you know how long the regiment that has been longest at home has been at the present time in England?—Five years and seven months, I think, is the longest.

1264. What regiment is that?—It is the 59th foot, it has been five years and seven months in England.

1265. How many regiments are there at home at the present moment that have been five years in the country?—The 2nd battalion of the 60th regiment has been five years and seven months, and the 1st battalion of the 6th, five years and four months; there are no more that have completed the five years.

1266. Can you give me the number that have been four years at home?—The 83rd, on embarkation for foreign service, will have been at home four years and eleven months; the 75th, four years and eleven months; the 92nd, four years and six months; the 85th, four years and six months; the 21st, 1st battalion, four years and one month; the 39th, four years and one month; the 71st, four years and four months; the 17th, four years and three months; the 66th, four years and five months; the 89th, four years and four months; the 81st, four years and five months.

1267. Will any of those regiments be going out this year?—The 54th, the 60th, the 83rd, the 6th, the 75th, the 92nd, the 85th; all those go out this year which have had over four or five years' service at home.

1268. Do you not consider that at the present moment there is a great deal too much colonial work performed by the British army?—I do not see how you can avoid it.

1269. For the sake of the army, do you not consider that there is a great deal more than there ought to be?—Why should you say on account of the army?

1270. For the general good of the army, do you not think it is fairer that the soldiers should have more time at home?—For example, take India, I should think the soldier prefers India very much to England; in fact, you will find every regiment coming home from India always leaves 200 or 300 men behind who have volunteered to other regiments. Look at the old Indian service, how easily they got recruits, and what fine recruits they got; theirs was the finest artillery in the world; they had the largest and

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finest men, and there was no difficulty in getting them.

1271. The English soldier gets great advantages in India, does he not?—Of course, his accommodation is very much better in India for himself and for his wife and family; they have all got two excellent rooms and a cooking room besides.

1272. Do you think they are equally fond of the service in China, and the Mauritius?—No; I confess they do not like China; but there is one thing I should like to mention, which is this: that China would be greatly improved if the Government would determine upon building a barrack at Kowloon. The existing barrack is built against the side of the hill, where there is no south south-west breeze, and when the hot weather comes on, it gets fearfully hot, fearfully close, and very unhealthy. Kowloon lies in exactly the same position as Macao does, that is, open to the south-west monsoon, with no hills behind it, to stop the circulation of air. When once the ground has been finally opened and settled and built upon, it will become very healthy. It is not the fault of the Government that they have not done more, for they had so much cause, in consequence of the reports of sickness and ill health to stop the building, but they have merely built a trial hut for a company; that is all that is now completed. It takes two good years or three years to settle the ground, before it becomes fit for troops to live there. All that territory requires the ground to be perfectly settled for three years, in order to become healthy. After building this trial hut, if you were to put troops into it, and then to build another hut alongside of it, it would become unhealthy again. The Government ought at once to build the barrack completely, and let the ground all settle; do not let there be any more breaking up of the ground alongside of it, and you would then find that the troops would get much more healthy there.

1273. The Government would have to go to an enormous expense, would it not?—No; and the expense is to be incurred.

1274. Are you aware what the estimate is?—No, I am not aware what the estimate is, but it is settled what barracks are to be built there. They have begun upon this plan, for the sake of trying whether it is healthy or not.

1275. What duties do you consider that the English troops in places like China, the Straits Settlements, the Mauritius, the Cape of Good Hope, and Australia, have to perform at the present moment?—In China, I think, European troops ought to be very much exempt from all night duties, because the change of temperature is so very great; in the day it is excessively hot, and in the night it gets excessively cold.

1276. The duties they have to perform at these places, generally, are mainly to act as a sort of garrison?—Yes, of course.

1277. In China, against the Chinese themselves?—For the protection of the Colony in every way.

1278. In the case of the Mauritius, it is to garrison the fortifications that were built to defend the place against a naval attack?—Yes.

1279. At the Cape the troops are chiefly used for frontier work against Caffres, and probable attacks of that nature?—In the first place, the Cape is 6,000 miles from Calcutta; it is just half way between England and India. If you were

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to relieve your troops there every three years, you would find the expense very great indeed.

1280. Would you not call it nearer two-thirds of the way to India?—No; I have got the particulars here.

1281. I do not care about the distance; the duties they have to perform there are to defend the Colony in case of difficulties with the Caffres or the native tribes in South Africa?—More than that; in the first place, it is the half-way house between India and England, and all our ships go in there to coal, and everything else. It appears to me to be a most important point to take care of.

1282. That refers to Cape Town?—Yes.

1283. Out of the four regiments we are going to have quartered at the Cape of Good Hope, how many will be quartered at Cape Town?—Two, I should think.

1284. Are there two there now?—As far as I remember, there are two; I think it is two, but I am not quite certain.

1285. What do you consider to be the duty of the three regiments of English troops that are in Australia at the present moment?—It strikes me, with regard to Australia, that the people there would, in the first place, I should think, object most strongly if you were to think of placing native troops there.

1286. I do not talk about placing native troops in Australia, I only ask what you consider to be the duties performed by the British soldiers in Australia now?—They are to keep their regiments together, not to scatter them over the country, but to keep them together in case of any disturbance; I do not know exactly what the duties are.

1287. Do you not think that those troops would be more useful at home in the country, than in Australia?—Certainly, they would be more useful at home than in Australia, if they are kept up; but that is one of the questions.

1288. What do you think is the effect upon the health and discipline of the regiments that are quartered in China, at Singapore, and the Mauritius; do you think that it has a bad or a good effect upon their health, and their discipline?—Of course it is not so good for their health as being in England; for example, in China, during the last six years the per-centage of deaths has been $5\frac{1}{10}$ ths per 100; that is, counting the very bad season which has taken place there. If you changed them over to Kowloon, I am sure they would be much more healthy.

1289. At present there are no barracks at Kowloon?—At Kowloon there is nothing but one hut barrack.

1290. There is no place to take European troops to at present there?—There is only accommodation enough for one company; but, for example, in the Mauritius the per-centage of deaths has been $1\frac{1}{10}$ ths in the 100, and at Ceylon it is $2\frac{1}{2}$ in the 100.

1291. Do you think that these duties which the English troops are called upon to perform in those places are of very great imperial importance?—I think they are, decidedly; I think it is a most necessary thing that you should take care of the colonists, by whom the great wealth of this country is caused. I think it is necessary to support them.

1292. You consider that they are so important that you ought to use your best troops for that purpose?—I think so, decidedly.

1293. If you were in command of an army in the field, should you use all the powers of your army in taking care of your baggage, and performing outpost duty, or should you use what you considered not your most valuable troops for baggage guards, and the ordinary work of the army, apart from work in the field?—I should consider that an army ought to be equally good in every part of it, and I should certainly take very great care of my baggage, whatever I did.

1294. You would generally keep your best troops together, would you not?—Yes, I would certainly keep them together, but I certainly would have my outposts particularly good, and my baggage guard good.

1295. You have often been in the field in India, and elsewhere, with native troops and Europeans under your command?—Yes.

1296. If you had to use troops on very harassing duty, but not duty of very great importance, you used always to employ the native soldiers under your command, in preference to the Europeans, did you not?—Do you mean for difficult and dangerous duty?

1297. No, not before the enemy?—Yes, certainly, because considering the state of the country and the heat of the country, and the exposure, and everything else, the natives being acclimatised to the country as natives of it, I would of course employ them.

1298. Do you not think that the English army in Canada, in India, at home, and in Europe, in the great garrisons of the Mediterranean is called upon to perform much more important duties in time of war than are performed by the troops in China or the Mauritius?—I think, for example, that Malta and Gibraltar are two of the most essential posts to take care of, and that our best troops ought to be there, and of course in Canada also, which on account of its being so near to the American frontier, is a most necessary Colony for you to protect and take care of as well as you can.

1299. Do you not think that it is most important, considering the limited number of our army, and the enormous amount of duty it might be called upon to perform, to be able to concentrate our best troops as much as possible?—Decidedly.

1300. It is not your opinion that you could use native troops in any of those colonies, I believe?—I think it would be a false plan to go upon to make use of them.

1301. Can you give me any particular reason why you think we should not have China, for instance, Hong Kong, garrisoned with European artillery and native regiments?—It has always been a principle since the mutiny, especially in India, never to leave European artillery solely protected by native troops.

1302. When you went up to the north of China in 1860, what force did you leave at Shanghai?—I left a small force of Europeans and natives.

1303. Did you leave some artillery?—I think a battery of artillery was left there. There was one battery of artillery left there as far as I remember.

1304. When you went up to the north you left 475 Punjaub infantry, 50 Madras artillery, and 82 men of the 89th European Regiment?—I see, the force I left at Shanghai, at least, when I left the country, consisted of the Lodiana Regiment, a Punjaub Regiment, and half a battery of European

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European artillery. You speak of when I went up to the north.

1305. That was at a time when there were great disturbances all round the neighbourhood of Shanghai, and it was being threatened by the Taepings, was it not?—Yes.

1306. When you came down from the north of China you altered the garrison of Shanghai, and I think you left the Punjaub infantry, the Lodianna Regiment, and half a battery of European artillery to garrison the place?—Yes, exactly.

1307. Without any European infantry at all?—Without any European infantry at all.

1308. In case of a great European war, do you consider that these scattered detachments of European soldiers all over the world are a great strength to the English army at home?—No, certainly not at home, they cannot be.

1309. In all probability you would have to send out reinforcements to them, would you not?—You might; my belief is that if you were in a regular war you would have to give up the Colonies; you could not protect them; I mean those small Colonies.

1310. Why?—Because if you were in a regular European war, for which you required every man you had, if recruits did not come forward readily, you might require to take your European regiments away from the Colonies, and not be able to supply their places with native troops at once.

1311. Why should you not supply their places with native troops?—You might supply their places with native troops in course of time.

1312. *Chairman.*] I thought you told me that you proposed to keep the European troops in the Colonies in case of war?—If you had a war going on and were distressed in this country for the want of troops, and were obliged to send from this country for European troops from the Colonies, you might supply their place with native troops.

1313. What do we keep them there for now?—To take care of the Colonies.

1314. In case there is a war?—Yes.

1315. But the moment that a war breaks out, you would send them away?—No; only in case of our not being able to get recruits here.

1316. In case of your being hard run?—Yes.

1317. *Major Anson.*] Do not you consider that it would be better to have your system organised, and be able to call upon the Indian army to provide garrisons for those places in case we required to withdraw the European troops?—I think quite the contrary; at first you would get the troops to go very willingly if you had them, but when they found they had bad health at those stations, they would be much disgusted at it, and you would find a difficulty in getting them to go when you required them.

1318. Would there be much difficulty in getting them to go to China?—On the contrary, during the war, they were pleased with the service, but then you took them to the best climate; you kept them there six months, and they had plenty of loot to take back.

1319. Have either the Bengal or the Madras army, who have had to perform the duty at the Straits, shown great symptoms of discontent, or been much disgusted at having to perform the service there?—No; but I do not see how any men can be happy when they starve themselves and send their pay away. They go there to live in the most economical way they can, hoping to

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get back to their families as quickly as possible; they cannot like it, it is impossible.

1320. Did you ever hear while you were Commander in Chief in Madras, any great complaints from the men on that ground?—I heard great complaints of the men being very badly fed there.

1321. *Chairman.*] From the men?—I did not hear the men complain themselves, but their commanding officer stated that that was the case.

1322. The commanding officers complained that the men did not feed themselves?—Yes; they complained that the men did not feed themselves.

1323. *Major Anson.*] That was purely voluntary on their part?—It was purely voluntary on their part; but then it would appear that it could not have been very pleasing to them, when they had to send back all their money to their relations and friends in Madras, and to live as best they could themselves upon the small remainder of their pay.

1324. I think you said just now, in answer to the Chairman, that at Canton you left some native troops alone, without any Europeans?—No, not without Europeans. There were two Bombay regiments left, and one European regiment.

1325. Alone?—No.

1326. *Chairman.*] And a Madras regiment you told me, I think?—No, the Madras regiment was at Hong Kong.

1327. *Major Anson.*] You spoke very disparagingly of the Madrases, compared to the Punjaubees; I think when you were campaigning in Oude you had a Madras cavalry regiment in your division, which did very good service?—Not in my division; there was a cavalry regiment with me, but only for a few days, and it was never in my division regularly.

1328. You constantly had some Madras sappers and miners, had you not?—The Madras sappers and miners are the best troops in the Presidency, to my mind; however, do not let it be understood that I speak disparagingly of the Madrases as troops, but I do not think they are equal to the Sikhs.

1329. You consider the Sikh to be one of the finest soldiers in the world, do you not?—No, I do not say that.

1330. Second only to the Europeans?—They are the best by far in India; the best of the Indians, certainly.

1331. Did you ever issue any general order while you were Commander in Chief at Madras, upon the subject of commanding officers discussing the question with their men about going on foreign service?—No; I do not remember it.

1332. Or asking their opinion upon it?—I do not remember it.

1333. Your chief objection, then, to the employment of the native troops in our Colonies, is that it would disgust them with it?—That the native troops would not like it.

1334. That in course of time they would be so disgusted with it that you would not be able to get them to serve then, when you wanted them in time of war?—I think, in all probability, that would be the great difficulty.

1335. You think that that would counterbalance the advantage of efficiently organising in time of peace, the system which we might be called upon to use in time of war?—I think it would be a most dangerous plan to attempt.

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1336. Colonel

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1336. Colonel *Percy Herbert*.] I understood you to say that it was, in your opinion, desirable to maintain troops in many of our Colonies, which we may call Colonies proper, in contradistinction to military posts, such as Malta, Aden, or Gibraltar?—Certainly.

1337. Both for British interests, and for the interests of the colonists?—Yes, for both.

1338. I should like to ask your opinion (I do not think it has been expressed yet) as to whether it would be possible, with a consideration of security from outbreak, to garrison any of these Colonies permanently with native troops alone without Europeans?—I do not think that would be advisable.

1339. It would be imprudent?—It would be very imprudent.

1340. I presume from the scale of the value of the different troops you have mentioned, that you would consider that a smaller number of Europeans would give equal, or greater security, than a larger number of natives?—Decidedly.

1341. Therefore the relative cost, man per man, would not be a fair criterion of the cost of employing the two garrisons?—Certainly not.

1342. You said that you contemplated, in case of war, that it might be necessary in a European emergency to withdraw European troops from some of our Colonies?—Yes.

1343. I presume you meant altogether?—I mean altogether from any of those Colonies that have been mentioned to me.

1344. I believe you mean to say that in time of war it may be necessary to abandon many posts that are of great importance themselves, in order to maintain still more essential posts?—Yes, exactly.

1345. That is an ordinary practice in war, is it not?—Yes, I believe so.

1346. At the same time you would maintain them at those outposts at those distant Colonies, so long as circumstances permitted?—Yes.

1347. The objections to employing garrisons entirely composed of native troops, would not apply in the same way, I presume, to employing a mixed garrison of Europeans and native troops?—No, I think not.

1348. Would there be any objection, in your mind, to employing such a garrison as that at Hong Kong?—There is a garrison of that description there now.

1349. Is there any objection in your mind to employing such a garrison there?—It is necessary to have native troops there to do certain duties which Europeans could not do in that country.

1350. By that means, is the number of Europeans necessary for the garrisons in any way reduced?—I do not think they can be reduced below a regiment; I think one regiment is quite necessary there.

1351. Would one regiment be sufficient without the native troops?—No.

1352. Then the number of Europeans there is less than it would be if the garrison were composed exclusively of Europeans?—Yes, when I was there I recommended that more Europeans should be there, besides the present native force.

1353. Under present circumstances do you think that so large a European force is necessary?—One European regiment is, I consider, quite as little as can be placed there.

1354. If the native troops were withdrawn, it would be necessary largely to increase the Eu-

ropean force, would it not?—It would be necessary to increase it largely.

1355. You think that the present arrangement tends to the efficiency of the service as well as to the saving of European life?—It does; but even the number that is there now is very much smaller than the number which I really believe ought to be put there for the benefit and health of the troops and everybody else. The duties are very severe.

1356. At any rate the principle of a mixed garrison is the right one to maintain at Hong Kong?—Certainly.

1357. I think you stated that the cost of native troops with double batta, amounted to almost as much as that of European soldiers?—I should think it would amount to more, because, in the first place, I do not see how you could well send native troops to garrison these places without increasing their pay. I do not think you could make a general rule of it without offering them a larger amount of pay than they have now. They get seven rupees pay now, and seven rupees more when they go upon foreign service; that is the general custom of India. That makes 28 s. a month, and besides that, there is the good-conduct pay, amounting to two rupees a month more, when a man has been 10 years in the service.

1358. Then do they have their rations?—Three rupees eight annas per month are given to the men for rations.

1359. Does the 28 s. include the cost of rations?—Yes. Besides that, you have to pay a man's wife's pension if he dies on service, so that the expense would be actually more than the amount I have stated.

1360. I think you have expressed an opinion that it is absolutely necessary to relieve native Indian troops every two or three years?—I think decidedly it ought not to be longer than three years; I should say two years.

1361. Therefore, that is to be added to the cost of their employment as against the cost of European troops in the case of garrisons such as the Cape of Good Hope?—Of course it is. There is one thing to be taken into consideration on the other side, namely, that you do not take their wives, which you do with European troops; that makes it a smaller expense in the case of the native troops.

1362. *Chairman*.] What per centage of wives do you take with European troops?—Seven per cent. is all that is allowed by Government everywhere.

1363. It varies, does it not, from six to nine and twelve per cent.?—No, it was changed the other day at the War Office, and it is now to be seven per cent. for all the Colonies, and for home, and everywhere else; India is the only place where they give now twelve per cent.; that is an Indian arrangement made by the Indian governments. But then we only allow seven per cent. of wives to go out with the men; they marry there; it seems rather singular. This change is quite a recent one; until within a very short period, there were eight per cent. of wives allowed at home, and only six per cent. in the colonies.

1364. I thought it was nine per cent. at home?—No, eight per cent. at home; six per cent. on the Colonies; Australia, 12 per cent.; and 12 per cent., not including serjeants' wives, in India. It was the most confused arrangement that could possibly be conceived; but now it is seven per cent. everywhere except in India.

1365. Lord

1365. Lord *William Hay*.] May they bring home that 12 per cent. of wives?—They never bring them home, because almost all the married men stop in the country.

1366. *Chairman*.] What happens to the five per cent. that are married in India, when they get home again?—They do not come home; almost all the married people stop out in India.

1367. Colonel *Percy Herbert*.] Reverting to the question of the relief of troops, you stated that it would be necessary to relieve the native Indian troops, at the furthest, every three years?—Yes.

1368. What is the time for the relief of European troops at the Cape of Good Hope?—Every 10 years.

1369. Therefore there would be three reliefs, and rather more, of native troops, the cost of which would probably exceed the cost of the one relief of European?—The distance to the Cape of Good Hope is 6,000 miles.

1370. The cost of the one relief of a regiment from England to the Cape of Good Hope in 10 years would be very much less than the relief of three or three and a-half battalions of native troops, would it not?—I should think so, certainly.

1371. Moreover, I presume, from what you have said before, that the garrison at the Cape of Good Hope would have to be more numerous if a large proportion of it was composed of native troops?—It certainly would.

1372. I will take the case of the Mauritius; what does the garrison there now consist of?—Two European regiments and two batteries of artillery.

1373. Those two European regiments seem a very small force for such an island as the Mauritius?—Yes.

1374. Would it be possible even, or, at any rate, would it be prudent, if you sent native Indian troops there, in any way to reduce that force, as a permanent measure?—I do not see how you could do it without sending more native regiments there. You have now only 1,388 Europeans there altogether; if you took away one European regiment, you would have to send, I think, two native regiments.

1375. You think it would not be prudent to do otherwise?—I think not.

1376. There would be no gain in point of finance there?—It appears to me that there would not; and then I think that the Colonies would object very much to pay the money which they pay now, if native troops were sent to them. The Mauritius alone, I think, pays 35,000*l.* a-year.

1377. Nevertheless, in time of war, you would be prepared to run the risks of such arrangements, and to withdraw the troops from many of those places, filling them, to the best of your power, with Indian native troops, or any other troops you could substitute?—I would only do it as the last resource.

1378. You would be prepared to do it as a last resource?—Yes.

1379. It is hardly necessary to ask you, would it be possible to garrison Ceylon with either native troops from India, or the Malay troops, without the services of Europeans?—You know they have got six companies now; they had formerly 1,400 men.

1380. Would it be possible to garrison that Colony with Oriental troops alone?—I do not think it would be advisable.

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1381. It would not be safe?—I do not think it would.

1382. Your attention has been drawn to the question of the relief of European regiments, of late years. I believe it was laid down some years ago that it was desirable to maintain the proportions of 10 years' foreign service to five years' service at home?—It was.

1383. That has been very much disturbed, I believe, by the exigencies of the Russian war, and of the Indian mutiny?—Yes, it has been disturbed by the Indian mutiny, and the 2nd Battalion's coming home.

1384. But principally by the exigencies of the active service in India, and in Turkey, and the Crimea?—Yes.

1385. Are the proportion of battalions in India and the Colonies, at the present time, such as will give for the future, in quiet times, that amount of relief?—The proportions at present are these: in the Colonies throughout there are 42 battalions; at home there are 39.

1386. And in India?—In India there are 52 battalions altogether; that is to say, counting Madras and Bombay also.

1387. Are there not 141 battalions altogether?—Yes.

1388. Marquis of *Hartington*.] The numbers you have given do not add up to 141?—Yes, but there are eight on the passage home; that makes the 141.

1389. Colonel *Percy Herbert*.] The present distribution of the army would give 47 at home, or on their passage, would it not?—Yes.

1390. Then, on the average, there are some five on their passage nearly all the year round, are there not?—There must be.

1391. Therefore it gives a proportion of about 42 for reliefs?—Yes.

1392. That will not do more than give a relief of five years at home to 10 years abroad?—No.

1393. Making some allowance for emergencies and contingencies?—Yes.

1394. But in the course of a few years you will be able to attain that if there is no great disturbing cause?—We hope to do it in between four or five years.

1395. I apprehend, from the length of time at home and abroad, that you have read out to the Committee, that the object of the Commander in Chief has been rather to lengthen the service abroad than to shorten the service at home below the fixed number?—Yes.

1396. It has been rather thought politic to let a regiment serve over 10 years abroad than to allow regiments to go abroad with very much less than five years' service?—Yes, that has been the case.

1397. That has been the policy?—Yes.

1398. You apprehend that, in a short time, you will be able to maintain the 10 years' service abroad and the five years at home?—Yes.

1399. Mr. *Oliphant*.] You stated that there was a regiment and a-half of Europeans quartered in Ceylon; where are they quartered?—There is only one regiment there now.

1400. There is going to be one and a-half, as I understand it?—Yes. They are going to build barracks for them at Galle; I believe so, at least; I am not quite certain. There is a certain amount of the regiment there just now. The barracks are very bad. I believe they mean to build a barrack there.

1401. Are not the invalids sent up to Newere Ellia;

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Ellia; there is a sanatorium there, to which invalids are sent?—Yes. I do not know much of that place. That is arranged by the Commander in Chief and the Government there themselves. I do not know much of Ceylon.

1402. Do you not think, as a general principle, that it would be more advisable to have a whole regiment at the sanatorium under the new arrangements?—Decidedly.

1403. With reference to the regiment which is at Japan, is it intended to be kept there permanently?—It is at present intended to be kept there permanently.

1404. Is there an arrangement with the Japanese Government to that effect?—Yes, and the Japanese Government have just now repaired all the huts they are quartered in.

1405. Would it not be available for Hong Kong at very short notice, without the necessity of keeping a large European force at Hong Kong?—I think not; it is a great distance from Hong Kong.

1406. It is six days from Yokohama to Hong Kong?—Sometimes you could hardly get across the water when a severe monsoon sets in, with constant typhoons. Besides, Japan is a place where it is very necessary to have a force at present.

1407. There has been an objection taken to the idea of mixed garrisons in some of the Colonies; you find that a mixed garrison at Hong Kong answers very well, do you not?—It is absolutely necessary at Hong Kong; you could not do the duty without it.

1408. Therefore there would be no objection to a mixed garrison in any other colony, provided there were no other objection on the ground of expense, or otherwise?—I do not think there would. There is one at Ceylon too.

1409. You stated that, under the old East India Company, the European troops were of a very first-rate class?—They were a fine class of men.

1410. Would it be possible, do you think, to have a local corps recruited in England for Indian service alone now?—I think it is greatly to the advantage of the soldier to come home; I think it makes his discipline so much better.

1411. If you held out a prospect to him of colonising the hill country of India after a short term of service, do you not think that you would establish the nucleus of a local army there?—No, I think not; India is a country which you may depend upon; we can never colonise regularly.

1412. What objection is there to settling men permanently in the hills; they have settled there already?—In very small numbers indeed; there are a few at Simla, and in some of those places. They have settled on some of the coffee plantations, and for similar purposes; but altogether they have settled to a very small extent only.

1413. Is not that because there are not facilities at present; if the Government were to help them, do you not think that there would be the means of establishing colonies of that kind?—I question very much whether they would settle.

1414. Then, in your opinion, it would not be advisable to have a local European force in India?—No; in the first place, every European who goes there, marries a black woman or a half-caste, and then their progeny is not very efficient in any way; they all dwindle down.

1415. Marquis of Hartington.] I think you stated, in reply to Major Anson, that in your

opinion, it would be a mistake to employ, as it is proposed to do, Indian troops in our Colonies to a greater extent than they are now employed?—Yes.

1416. You stated several objections to the proposal; would you state what are in your own mind the principal reasons that, in your opinion, would make it a mistake?—The first great reason I mentioned was this; in the first place, you must apply to the Indian Government for troops; that is what Major Anson proposes to do, as far as I understand him, and then the next thing is, the Indian Government would have to give them throughout the army; they could not confine them to any particular corps; they could not take Sikhs altogether, they would have to take them from the army generally.

1417. In what way is that an objection?—I think it is an objection, because it is always usual to take troops according to the roster, and the other troops would, in all probability, be very much disgusted and very much annoyed to find they were not taken, and had not their share of the same duties, and the Sikhs themselves would say, "Why are we called upon to do all this bad duty, and the other native troops are not called upon to do any?"

1418. Why would it be objectionable to take the troops regularly from the whole Indian army?—Because the Hindoostanee troops are not reckoned a good and useful branch of the service.

1419. That is one of your objections?—Yes.

1420. Do you feel any other strong objections?—I think a strong objection is, that you would have to increase their pay so much; then another great objection is, that all the European settlers would object strongly to the system; and, as I stated before, they would in all probability object very much to pay the amount they pay now towards keeping up the army,

1421. Supposing those objections did not exist, would you, as a military man, be glad to see a number of European troops in our Colonies relieved by an equal number of native Indian troops?—Certainly not.

1422. You do not think that that would be a good military arrangement?—I do not think it would be a good military arrangement.

1423. I suppose if you could bring home, and keep on your establishment, all the British troops that were so relieved, you would admit that it would be an increase to your military force?—Of course it would; but it is a matter, in my opinion, of certainty, that whenever you brought European troops home to this country, the country would cry out, or Parliament would cry out, if there were more troops than were absolutely necessary for the purposes of the Government in this country. Then, if any were reduced, you would be substituting inferior troops for good troops.

1424. Major Anson.] Is not that your principal reason?—No, not at all. I think that is one of the most cogent and the strongest reasons; it is a very strong reason, but it is not my strongest. I think the objection which the troops themselves would have to it would be one of the strongest, besides the want of confidence on the part of the settlers.

1425. Sir James Fergusson.] Besides that you keep the troops in the Colonies for the protection of the Colonies, not as a reserve for the troops in Great Britain, do you not?—Certainly, for the protection of the Colonies.

1426. Marquis

1426. Marquis of *Hartington*.] Do you think, in a military point of view, that it is an unmixed disadvantage that our garrisons should be as scattered over the world as they now are; are there not some advantages in it?—There are great advantages in it. In the first place, our conditions are very peculiar; we have more Colonies over the world than any other nation. These Colonies bring in a large amount of money to the Home Government, and you must take care of and preserve those Colonies which enrich the country.

1427. Looking at it in a military point of view, is it not the fact that the garrison of one Colony is sometimes able to assist the garrison of another on the breaking out of war?—Certainly.

1428. Did not the case occur in the Indian mutiny; I understand that the first reinforcements that arrived in India were from the Cape?—From the Cape and from China.

1429. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] They were on their way to China, were they not?—They were on their way to China to a war that was to take place in China, and that was the great saving of the country of India.

1430. Marquis of *Hartington*.] In that one instance, at any rate, it was an actual advantage to us to have our garrisons scattered?—Decidedly it was.

1431. You state that an objection has always been felt to the practice of leaving European artillery unsupported by any but native troops, will you explain the grounds of that objection?—It is very natural; because in India, when the mutiny broke out among the troops, there was no protection for the artillery; the native troops in case of a mutiny would be most likely to seize the artillery.

1432. Supposing you could rely entirely upon the fidelity of your native troops, would you even then be willing to support artillery merely with native troops?—I do not think that as a principle I should.

1433. You want for the support of artillery, troops not only in whose loyalty, but in whose excellence as troops you have the highest confidence?—I look upon the artillery as the great stand-by of an army. If you lose your artillery you lose your army, you lose your power; it is a most necessary thing to take care of them to the utmost extent of your power.

1434. The artillery are not able entirely to take care of themselves?—No.

1435. They must rely upon the support of infantry?—They must necessarily rely upon the support of infantry.

1436. Major *Anson*.] Does that apply to garrison artillery as much as to field artillery?—Not so much to garrison artillery, because they have only charge of heavy guns which could not be moved about. Those guns might be destroyed; they might be put hors-de-combat, but the support of infantry would not be of so much consequence to garrison artillery.

1437. Marquis of *Hartington*.] Could you have prepared, in your office, a return made up to the latest date, similar to the return in the Report of the Committee on Colonial and Military Expenditure, without the money?—Yes.

1438. I gather from your answers to former questions, that you think it would be quite impossible to do more than establish mixed garrisons?—I think so, decidedly.

1439. In no instance would you rely entirely upon a native garrison?—No.

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1440. Have you then considered, supposing the principle was adopted to that limited extent, what number of troops would be the utmost that you could replace by Indians?—I should think for every one regiment you would certainly require two native regiments.

1441. You have not considered how many British regiments it would be possible to relieve, and how many native regiments it would be necessary to send to replace them?—I suppose you would not include the Cape, because that would be so very expensive on account of its distance.

1442. I believe the Cape is included; I only asked if you had considered how many English regiments it would be possible to relieve by a partial application of this principle by the establishment of mixed garrisons, instead of purely English garrisons?—I should think about 10 or 12.

1443. And you think that it would be necessary, supposing you did relieve 10 or 12 regiments, to send 20 or 24 regiments of native Indian troops to replace them?—I think certainly double the number should be sent.

1444. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] Would it not be necessary to replace the native regiments sent from India by fresh levies?—You would have to replace those regiments by other regiments in India.

1445. The 20 or 24 regiments sent to the colonies to relieve the European regiments, must be replaced by fresh native levies on India?—Yes; of course they would have to be replaced by native levies in India.

1446. Colonel *North*.] You stated that under a certain pressure of war, you would withdraw the European troops from the Colonies, and hand over different settlements to native troops?—Yes.

1447. Would you, under any circumstances of pressure in time of war, garrison either Malta or Gibraltar with native troops?—Certainly not.

1448. You mentioned just now, I think, that the pay of a native sepoy was seven rupees and so many annas?—Seven rupees.

1449. That includes his uniform as well; he finds his own uniform for that?—No, he does not find his own uniform, he finds only the white clothing; the jacket is paid for by the Government.

1450. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] And the shoes?—Yes.

1451. Colonel *North*.] You mentioned, also, that our European troops did not like being sent to China?—Yes.

1452. Provided they had the barracks built as you propose, and that they had proper allowance of pay, would that objection still exist, do you think; because it appears that the expenses of China are very considerably greater than those of India?—Yes, of course they are.

1453. But the pay and allowances of the troops there are not even up to the Indian pay; if they were properly paid, and if barracks were built as you propose, do you think the same objection would exist?—I think the same objection would not exist, provided they were not kept there too long; I think it was a mistake to keep them there so long; they are only to be kept there two years now.

1454. Did I rightly understand you to say, that in consequence of the 2nd battalions of regiments being brought home, because they contained a number of time-expired men, the regiments now abroad were thrown out of their proper

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proper turn of coming home?—Yes, out of the roster.

1455. Sir *James Fergusson*.] In keeping a small European force in a country like one of the Australian Colonies, it is intended to serve as a nucleus for troops locally raised in cases of emergency, is it not?—Yes.

1456. Therefore their place would be very ill supplied by native troops, who could not be regarded in that light at all?—Decidedly.

1457. I suppose you do not at all recognise the comparison of Australia with the outposts of Great Britain, in a military point of view, do you?—No; and I think the Australian colonists would object to it most strongly. My authority is General McCleverty, who was stationed there for a long time, and is now commanding at Shorncliffe. I asked him if he thought the settlers there would object to native troops being sent; and he said, they would object in the strongest way possible, if there were an idea of their being sent out there.

1458. The fact is, that the small establishment of troops there is calculated and paid for by the colony, as only a sufficient nucleus for their own defence?—That is all.

1459. It has no reference to the general defence of the Empire at all?—No, I presume not.

1460. With regard to the garrison at Singapore, may I ask why it is thought necessary to have a garrison of European troops there now, when there was not one before?—It was always a place that the Indian Government thought of so much importance that they built a barrack there for Europeans before any European troops were sent out to them. It is a post where the enemy would be sure to land if they intended any attack upon India, or any other place belonging to us.

1461. And it is therefore not thought proper to leave it without European infantry at all?—No, it is not.

1462. *Chairman*.] Do you think that any enemy could hold Singapore, who had not command of the sea?—A strong fortification has been built there.

1463. Still for an enemy that had not command of the sea to take Singapore would be very difficult?—Yes, very much so.

1464. And when taken it would be very difficult to hold, would it not?—Your ships of war would probably be employed where your war was going on; it would be very difficult to send out ships there.

1465. Colonel *Percy Herbert*.] Would there be any difficulty in laying it under contribution?—I should think not.

1466. Major *Anson*.] If the enemy attempted to do such a thing as lay it under contribution, do you not think that the Chinese population would fight very ardently upon our side?—The Chinese population are utterly useless as soldiers, just now.

1467. Sir *James Fergusson*.] With regard to the closer packing of native troops than Europeans in the transports, I suppose that in that climate it is more necessary for Europeans to have ample breathing space than for the natives?—Yes, of course it is; but then the distance is so very short (it is only five or six days), that I do not think it is of so much consequence.

1468. But the comparative space given to the two classes of troops is on account of the greater

necessity for breathing space in that region for Europeans?—Yes, of course it is.

1469. You mentioned that a considerable number of British soldiers volunteered to remain in India when their regiments came home?—Yes.

1470. But there are a great number still, are there not, who at the end of their service come home to England, and take furlough before re-enrolling?—There are a great many.

1471. It is in evidence before the Committee, that the expense of bringing soldiers home under those circumstances is very considerable, being equal in many cases to 50*l.* per man?—I cannot conceive that it can be 50*l.* per man, or anything like it by the new regulations; because the five ships which have been built by the Government are to bring home and take out the troops at 18*l.* per man, so that it could not be so much as you mentioned, I think.

1472. At present the cost of transport for a soldier from Bombay to England is something over 30*l.*?—£. 23 I think it is; I may be wrong; the expense does not lie in my department.

1473. The question I want to ask is this; do you not think that it would be well worth while to offer troops a much larger bounty than has yet been tried, to induce them to re-enrol in India?—Decidedly; I do not think you would go far wrong in offering a much larger bounty. I made a mistake just now; coming home from India is much more expensive by the present plan than going out; it is only 23*l.* going out, therefore I think it would be quite cheap to give a man 25*l.* bounty.

1474. Major *Anson*.] One of your great objections to the employment in these colonies of troops in the Indian army, is that you would have to put the whole Indian army upon the roster for foreign service, including the Madrasees and other regiments?—I do not say that exactly, it might be limited to Bengal.

1475. You think that in all probability we should have to do so?—Yes.

1476. I believe they have garrisoned Aden, which is one of the most important military positions which we have; perhaps not even excepting Gibraltar, with native troops from Bombay, for a great number of years?—Yes, they have.

1477. They have also garrisoned Rangoon, which is likewise a place upon the sea, with Madras troops for many years?—Yes; but along with an European regiment.

1478. They have also garrisoned the Straits Settlements and Singapore, which you state is such an important position, with Madras troops for many years, and in the latter case even without the support of a European soldier; there has been no great change just recently, which makes the Madras troops less useful to the service than they have been during past years, has there?—No, I do not think so.

1479. If the Indian Government could entrust those possessions with safety to their care, is there any reason why the English Government should not do the same?—Singapore has never been attacked. It is in itself a quiet place, and native troops hold it very well; but if a war were to break out, it would require Europeans to defend it.

1480. Then do you consider that it is very short-sighted policy on the part of the Bombay Government, having had an Indian garrison at a place like Aden, and do you think the sooner it is done away with the better?—There is a

European

European regiment at Aden now, and there is a native regiment too, a Bombay regiment.

1481. There is only a wing of a European regiment, I think, at Aden?—It is a whole regiment consisting of 600 men; there is some small portion left behind; I do not know for what reason.

1482. That is one of the most important garrisons we possess; Gibraltar can hardly compare in importance with it?—Yes.

1483. We still supplement European troops there with Indian troops?—Yes.

1484. Mr. *Oliphant*.] Do you happen to remember the barracks at Singapore; are the large barracks for the Europeans finished?—They are finished for a wing.

1485. How many Europeans do they accommodate?—About 500 altogether, I think.

1486. Not more than that?—Not more than 500, I think.

1487. I thought they were being built for a very large number of men?—So they were, but they have not completed that other portion of the barracks; they have only completed them for about a wing.

Sir ROBERT MONTGOMERY, K.C.B., called in; and Examined.

1492. *Chairman*.] WHAT is your opinion with reference to the possibility of raising troops on the north-west frontier, and in the Punjab, for colonial garrison duty?—I think a certain quality of troops could be raised for garrisoning a Colony.

1493. Upon what terms do you think it would be possible to raise them?—If you mean the amount of pay, I could hardly say that; a great deal would depend upon the Colony they went to; it would depend in some measure upon the price of food in the Colony they were to go to, because the native troops cannot eat any kind of food. Generally speaking, in different parts of India they have different foods; and it would be almost necessary to think of what was the price of food, and the particular food they eat, at the Colonies they were to go to, before one could say what amount of pay they should receive.

1494. In the part of India with which you are most acquainted they always eat wheaten flour, do they not?—Yes.

1494*. Can they get wheaten flour at a reasonable rate at all the Colonies?—I do not know.

1495. I presume that wheaten flour must be the main article of food for the European soldiers in garrison?—Yes; but they would buy their wheat, and grind it themselves; they could not import wheat ground, it would deteriorate on the voyage.

1496. That would be a breach of their caste?—Yes, it would be a breach of their caste. I do not mean that it would be a breach of their caste to eat imported flour; but in addition to its liability to deteriorate, it would give room for the idea that it had been tampered with to cause them to lose their caste.

1497. And you think that that would be an objection which would be insuperable?—No; I merely mentioned it because you asked me as to the rate of pay; and I think, to a great extent, you must take into consideration the prices that prevail at the Colonies they are to go to for the particular food they are accustomed to. With regard to the Sikhs, the principal food of the Sikhs is wheat; but they are very fond of milk, and they are very fond of vegetables, and sheep and goats. If they were sent to a Colony where

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1488. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] With regard to the climatic considerations, have you ever observed any effect of a very cold climate on the natives of India; I do not refer to the northern men or the Sikhs, but the ordinary men of the Bengal army?—No; I have known the Sikhs placed in a cold climate, but never the Hindostanees.

1489. Do you think, to put the matter plainly, that the ordinary men of the Bengal army, natives of a southern climate, would be fit to support the cold weather of the Cape of Good Hope or of Southern Australia, or New Zealand?—I am not aware what the climate is in New Zealand, but I believe it is very cold there. I should think they might bear the climate of the Cape, because I believe there is not any very cold weather at the Cape, as far as I have experienced it.

1490. You are aware that in the Affghan war the Bengal regiments were disorganised by the severity of the climate?—Yes.

1491. Consequently, climatic considerations must be taken into account in the employment of native troops out of India?—Certainly.

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those things were very scarce, or only to be procured by paying a very high sum for them, it would require a large amount of pay to reimburse them for the outlay.

1498. They would object to beef, I suppose, in any form?—They would object to beef.

1499. They would object to pork in any form?—Yes, in any form; and they would also object to poultry in any form.

1500. Does that apply to Affghans and Pathans, and all the races you are familiar with, in fact?—Yes, I think so; all the fighting races.

1501. Sir *Henry Rawlinson*.] Not the Mahomedans?—No, I alluded to the Sikhs.

1502. *Chairman*.] Would the Mahomedans object to nothing?—They would object to pork.

1503. Not to beef?—No.

1504. Nor poultry?—Nor poultry.

1505. Do you think that that would practically operate upon the minds of the soldiers when they were enlisted with a knowledge that they were liable to be sent according to the roster to the colonial stations; do you think that they would count up the cost of provisions at the various stations?—I think so; I think it is their great thought; a sepoy is always thinking of his food, of what he is to eat, and the cost.

1506. He is always well informed about it, you think?—Yes.

1507. Do you think that if the custom of making them serve on colonial garrisons were introduced, recruiting would be hindered thereby?—It would not actually be hindered, but you would not get as good a class of men; if it was to be understood that the whole army was to take the roster turn of duty in the colonies, at least judging from what I know of the Punjab, and the north-western provinces of India, I do not think you would get as good a class of men.

1508. What do you mean by not getting as good a class of men?—You would not get as good a fighting class of men; for instance, you would not get the Pathans of the border, who are the finest soldiers, because they are very fond of their homes; they would not leave India to go on garrison duty.

1509. Not

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1509. Not on any terms?—Hardly, unless you gave them leave very frequently; they are very fond of their homes; I speak of the Pathans of the border.

1510. Would they not go across the sea for three years?—No, I do not think they would. They are very fond of their homes. There are a great many of them in the Punjaub Border force, and it is necessary to give them, very frequently, leave to go to their homes; they have it every two or three months, I mean very often, indulgence leave, and if they do not get that leave they will cut their names and leave their regiments.

1511. Does that apply to the Beloochees?—I do not know about them.

1512. I understand you to say it does not apply to the Sikhs?—It would apply to the Sikhs to a certain extent, not to the same extent as to the Pathans, but it would apply to the Sikhs also to a limited extent, for they also are very fond of their homes.

1513. Colonel *Percy Herbert*.] Will you explain to the Committee what you meant by leave every two or three months?—You are aware that the frontier regiments are recruited largely from the Pathans from the hills, and their homes are close by. They are very fond of the service, and the furlough regulations are very liberal; but in addition to that, I have heard that the commanding officers are occasionally obliged to give them leave to go to their homes for a few days, otherwise the men get dissatisfied, and as soon as their term is up they leave the regiment; that class of men (and they are amongst the best fighting men in India) would not willingly go on garrison service, they would be quite ready to go for fighting service, but not for garrison service.

1514. *Chairman*.] Then what sort of people are they that would go for garrison service?—You would get a class of Pathans that would go on garrison service, and you would get a class of Sikhs who would go on garrison service, but you would not get what we consider our best men; I speak now of the Punjaub.

1515. Are they people to whom you could trust at all to fight?—I think they are very good men in their way, but you would not get the best men.

1516. Do you mean by that, the best men in physical force, or the best in martial spirit, or the best in point of family?—In martial spirit.

1517. Major *Anson*.] If the Sikhs and Pathans found that there was no difficulty in obtaining good food, and in obtaining their particular food at a cheap rate, that the Government took care that they did not suffer from the dearness of provisions, they would have no objection upon that score to going and serving abroad, I suppose?—I think if they were very liberally treated, and good arrangements were made, and great consideration altogether shown to them, you would get men to go; but what I meant to say was, that if it was to be an understood thing that the whole army of India was to take the roster of foreign service for garrison duty, I think that it would be unpopular with the army, and that you would not generally get the best class of men; I speak with regard to my particular part of India.

1518. Supposing that the officers commanding our best regiments now coming from the Punjaub and the north-west of India, find no difficulty in getting their men to go and serve abroad, and as they do not suffer from want of recruits, do you think that, politically, it would be a good

thing for India to employ our native army in our own Colonies?—There are two great questions involved in this; one is the political difficulty, and the other is the military difficulty. The political difficulty would be this: supposing you got a regiment to go on foreign service, that that was all arranged, and that the regiment had arrived either in China, or Singapore, or the Mauritius, if anything offended the caste or the religious prejudices of that regiment, and they got dissatisfied, the political fear might be that it might re-act upon the army of India, and that it might give an unpleasant feeling to the general army, so that when it became necessary hereafter to send another regiment, there might be certain hesitation in going. That is one difficulty.

1519. But provided that great care, we will say the same amount of care, was taken of their religious prejudices, such as they may be, in the Colonies as is taken in India at the present moment, there would be no greater difficulties in the Colonies?—No, if nothing of that kind occurred; but that is one of the difficulties we must be prepared to meet. Such a thing might occur; it is not necessary that it should occur, but it is possible that it might occur. The cause of it might be the merest trifle; it might be such a thing as it would be difficult to provide against; the matter of the greased cartridges was a small affair in itself, yet it was really the thing that set the whole of India in a flame. Therefore, although it might be a very small thing in itself, it might make the men dissatisfied, and create some reaction in India; I think that is one of the difficulties. The military difficulty might be the point I have already alluded to, that if the whole army became a general service army, then I think that it would be unpopular in India.

1520. It is a general service army now, is not it?—It is a general service army for war; I doubt whether the men understand that it is a general service army for peace; and if you were to say "You have agreed to go on foreign service," and were then to take them, and locate them in a quiet, out-of-the-way place, far beyond the seas, without again asking them to volunteer for it, I think it is possible that they might consider it a breach of faith; I do not think that they ever originally contemplated garrison duty when they volunteered to go beyond the seas. Although there was nothing said, I think the probability is that in their minds they supposed it to be for war only.

1521. Supposing those difficulties were overcome, do you not think that it would be for the benefit of India at large, that the army should be employed in our Colonies if we took great care of their caste, and their religious prejudices there, and if we also overcame the scruple with regard to serving on the garrison duty?—I am of opinion that if it is considered necessary to resort to it on account of the difficulty of getting European troops, then it might be done as a tentative measure on a small scale at first, with great care, and with good pay; and it should be done under the direction of the Government of India; I say the Government of India, because although the Governor General for the time being may be a person unacquainted with Indian matters, still he has about him a council and secretaries who are aware of all the difficulties that might occur in sending troops abroad, and they, and the Governor General under their advice, would be prepared to take all the precautionary measures which their experience dictated, and which would avert any evil that we might fear.

Friday, 29th March 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.
Viscount Cranborne.
Sir James Fergusson.
Viscount Hamilton.
Marquis of Hartington.
Lord William Hay.

Captain Hayter.
Colonel Percy Herbert.
Mr. Laing.
Colonel North.
Mr. Oliphant.
Captain Vivian.

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE IN THE CHAIR.

Colonel EDWIN B. JOHNSON, C. B., was called in; and Examined.

1522. Sir *James Fergusson*.] You are Assistant Military Secretary to the Commander in Chief, are you not?—Yes.

1523. Have you considered the question referred to this Committee of the propriety of substituting Indian troops for British in some of the Colonies?—Yes, since it became the subject of discussion.

1524. From your experience in India, will you state whether, in your opinion, the service would be as well performed by Indian as by British troops?—No, certainly it would not.

1525. You do not consider that an equal number of native troops would be an efficient substitute for Europeans?—To admit that would be to admit that the native troops are equal to British troops as soldiers. Now, without wishing to detract in any sort of way from the fighting qualities, the soldier-like qualities, and the discipline of the native army, I cannot for a moment suppose that the one can be compared with the other.

1526. Therefore, to be an equivalent, you would require to have a considerable increase in numbers?—Yes, to put it on that ground you would require a larger force of natives than you would of British troops for any service in which fighting was concerned.

1527. But for ordinary garrison duty, taking the present number of European troops in any colony as not in excess of the requirements, you would require to increase that number in order to produce an equivalent of native troops?—Certainly.

1528. Even then do you consider that it would be in all cases requisite to have a certain force of Europeans beside them?—On many accounts, indeed, on every account, it would be desirable.

1529. Of troops of the line as well as of artillery?—I never, under any circumstances, where it could be possibly avoided, would place British artillery with the sole support of anything but British soldiers.

1530. Have you ever served yourself in any eastern Colony?—My service has been almost entirely in India; in no Colony.

1531. Then you have no opinion as to the degree in which the inhabitants of one of those Colonies would be ready to receive native troops as a substitute?—One instance has come before

me officially quite recently of a decided objection on the part of a Colony to be placed in the hands of a native force; it was a West Indian force in that case.

1532. It was a case of a West Indian Colony, was it not?—Yes.

1533. Will you state what occurred in that case?—The matter all came before me officially. It was proposed, in consequence of the great mortality which occurred at Demerara last year, to remove (in fact, they were removed, but I mean to remove altogether), a British garrison from that settlement, and to substitute a purely native force, that is, a West India Regiment. The Lieutenant Governor of the place who was in this country, sent in a letter to the Colonial Office, objecting, on the part of the colonists, very much to such an arrangement.

1534. They said, in fact, that they would rather have no troops at all than have black troops without white troops also, did they not?—Yes, that was what they said; they would rather make provision for their own safety than that.

1535. Have you any knowledge of the comparative expense of garrisoning an eastern Colony with native Indians and with European troops?—I do not think we have any data; I have no knowledge, certainly.

1536. I have asked these questions as to the efficiency of the proposed arrangements in the interests of the service, but now, as regards the effect upon the army of India itself; from your own experience, do you think that an extension of colonial service, in time of peace, would be acceptable to the native army?—I think it would be most distasteful.

1537. We have had evidence before this Committee of the willingness of certain races in India to serve out of India in the field, but you would draw a great distinction, I suppose, between that willingness to serve in the field, and the willingness to garrison a Colony in the ordinary way?—I think that the native Indian troops are most ready and anxious to be employed in time of war anywhere, but they would draw a very broad distinction between being sent for such a purpose as that, and being sent for mere garrison duty.

1538. I suppose they could be got to go by offering them the temptation of high pay?—I think regiments could be raised for that purpose;

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I think you would find it very difficult to induce regiments now in existence to go, even for increased emoluments of pay, though it would be feasible to raise regiments for that express purpose, and for that defined duty.

1539. You mean, I suppose, to take colonial duty, in excess of that which is now the ordinary routine of the service?—Beyond some settlements which were under the Government of the East India Company, and now belong to the Crown, there is no colonial duty.

1540. Although Rangoon is an Indian possession, the duty there is practically a colonial duty, is it not?—Practically it is; it does not belong to India, certainly.

1541. It comes under this description because the troops do not take their families there?—No, they do not take their families.

1542. The term of colonial service which certain regiments have been accustomed to take, is no test of the general effect upon India, I suppose, because those Colonies have been garrisoned from Madras?—Not always from Madras; Bengal formerly used to supply Aracan and Singapore.

1543. Did high-caste regiments go to Aracan?—General service regiments, volunteer regiments went.

1544. Do you think that some races in India would be more likely than others to acquiesce in colonial service?—I think it would be less objectionable to the lower class of Mussulmans than it would to any class of Hindoos, for instance.

1545. Take the Sikhs, Pathans, Affghans, Beloochees, and Goorkas, supposing you could get them?—I do not think any of the races you have mentioned would consent willingly to serve, out of their own country, beyond a very limited period.

1546. *Chairman.*] How long?—Three years is the outside of what any native would like to be away from his own country.

1547. *Sir James Fergusson.*] And you think that they would not go, even for that time, without great reluctance?—Certainly not without great reluctance.

1548. Without the temptation of high pay?—It would be necessary, in fairness, to give them higher pay than they receive in their own country.

1549. They always receive large allowances when they go abroad?—They always receive large allowances when they go on foreign service.

1550. Do you think it would be necessary to give them greater temptations than that; say the temptation of double batta?—I do not think that anything you could offer to the troops, as they now exist in India, anything in reason, at least, would tempt them to serve there willingly; and I believe that if it were proposed to undertake the duties of the Colonies by means of the native troops, it would be most decidedly necessary to raise troops for that especial service.

1551. Are you aware of the objections that exist to the raising of troops in India for service not under the Indian Government?—I imagine nothing of the sort would be attempted without the concurrence of the Government in India.

1552. Do you not see any objections to the practice of raising troops, naturally subjects of the Government of India, for service directly under the Home Government?—I think it would be objectionable beyond a very limited scale indeed. You are aware, of course, that it is

being done now for one garrison, that is for Hong Kong; they propose to raise a regiment of Beloochees for that purpose.

1553. That is only proposed, is it not?—It is concurred in, excepting as regards the Government of India; it has been concurred in by the Secretary of State for War, and by his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge; and I believe it is now under consideration by the Government of India in this country, in communication with the Government in India.

1554. Are you aware that the Government of India have expressed a strong preference for the employment of one of their own regiments, rather than the raising of a special corps?—I know that they entertain that opinion. I forget the terms of the despatch in which it was communicated, but I know that they do prefer it. They see difficulties, I believe, to what has been proposed.

1555. There might be difficulties, might there not, in practice, arising from the troops being raised by one Government and employed by another, in the event of their becoming dissatisfied with their service?—I think there might be difficulties of detail in regard to pensions and furloughs, and all those minor matters which would be insignificant as applied to one regiment, but of immense importance if that principle were extended.

1556. Supposing a regiment were raised from a particular district for a particular service, necessarily by the Government of India, though for service directly under the military authorities at home, and supposing the exigencies of the service required that those men should be kept abroad for a prolonged period, and that the dissatisfaction that they might feel was communicated to their friends at home; do you not see that inconvenience might arise from that?—The gravest inconvenience would arise in that manner. If there was an impression at all that the troops that were serving abroad were dissatisfied, and had reason to be dissatisfied, it would exercise a very injurious influence all over India in regard to our native army.

1557. Something has been said about the excellence of Goorkas for service, and especially in different climates; are you aware that great difficulties have arisen in procuring Goorka soldiers at all?—We have great difficulty in enlisting the true Goorka now; there is great jealousy on the part of the Nepaulese Government, and I imagine that the greater number of those who are called Goorkas in our own force at this moment are very spurious. I do not think it would be possible to obtain any number of true Goorkas beyond what we now have in the Indian army.

1558. The employment of Chinese has been talked of as a possible means of relieving some of the English regiments in India; do you think that that would be found to work well?—I think it would be a most ruinous proposal. In the first place, a Chinaman cannot for a moment be accepted as equivalent for a British soldier, and, secondly, its effects upon the country would be extremely bad.

1559. The effect upon the mind of the native population?—Yes.

1560. *Chairman.*] What is your view of the duties of a colonial garrison; what is the object of it?—There are two duties: that of defence and that of offence, external and internal; the one to defend Her Majesty's possessions from any enemy on the seaboard in time of war, and the other

other for the preservation of the peace internally.

1561. In fact, besides the ordinary military duty of defending the country against an enemy, they partially act as a reserve police force?—Yes.

1562. Do you imagine that for the latter duty the natives would be unfit in countries mainly inhabited by Orientals?—For mere police duties of a restricted nature, they would not be unfit, but there would be always an objection; supposing them to be at the Mauritius, they might be inclined, possibly, in the event of a rebellion or riot among the natives of India, who largely abound at the Mauritius, to side with them. They would be then a source of danger rather than of security.

1563. Do you think that a regiment composed of Pathans of the border would side with a rebellion of coolies in the Mauritius?—I have a strong opinion that where there is anything like an opposition to the white men, the blacks of all classes would combine.

1564. Then you think that any native subjects of Her Majesty in India, would, in all circumstances, and with any allies, combine against British officers?—I will not say that picked regiments would, but there is always that danger. There are some regiments in India, a great number of them magnificent regiments, whose loyalty has been proved in almost all circumstances; but those are not the regiments that you would find taking to colonial garrison duty with anything like pleasure or willingness.

1565. Was that our experience of the mutiny, that all coloured races would naturally side together in the contest against the white man?—The last was only a mutiny; but if there was a rebellion, I think you would see them all going together.

1566. The case we have before us is that of a Pathan or a Sikh regiment in the Mauritius, and a rebellion of coolies against the planters; your theory is, that the Sikh or Pathan regiment would combine with the coolies to exterminate the white men?—Not necessarily, but there would always be a danger of their doing it.

1567. Sir James Fergusson.] They might see that the power lay in their hands?—Exactly; the power would be in their hands.

1568. Chairman.] What is there in the former history of India to induce you to make such an assumption; has there been any case when we have had a difficulty with any of the natives of India where we have not found other natives of other races or creeds ready to help us in suppressing it?—I think self-interest has had a great deal to say to that.

1569. I presume that motive could be brought into action still?—Of course they might be moved by self-interest to remain loyal.

1570. Colonel Percy Herbert.] Are you of opinion that the prospect of looting Delhi had a considerable influence in securing the loyalty of the Punjaub troops?—That, and a very decided dislike to the Poorbias.

1571. Chairman.] Who are not of white colour, are they?—No, they are not of white colour.

1572. As to the question of loot, which do you imagine a Sikh regiment would look upon as most likely to be its best paymasters in the end, the rebellious coolies or the Europeans?—Undoubtedly the Europeans.

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1573. Surely the motive of self-interest would be in favour of loyalty then?—There is a very large population of coolies at the Mauritius, and if they rebelled, and the regiment of natives thought it was for their interest to do so, and that they had the power to overrun the island, perhaps they might think there would be a good prospect of loot there too.

1574. Do you think that there are any natives of India so deluded as to imagine that it could be for their interest to rebel on behalf of the coolies, in an island which, sooner or later, the British must re-conquer?—The native is not a very reasoning man; they are generally impulsive.

1575. You have had the natives in garrison at Singapore for I do not know how many years; have you ever heard of those impulses which you dread inducing them to prey upon the European population?—No; but then, again, Singapore is easily accessible from India; they are aware of our power in India in regard to the number of British troops available to send, and they are aware that their families are hostages in the hands of the Government, and that their pensions and everything are dependent upon their loyalty. Besides that, the service at Singapore was part of their regular duty, to which they were accustomed, and there was nothing novel in it; they accepted it as one of their stations, and the idea possibly never arose to them.

1576. I suppose there must have been a period when it was novel?—We have had Singapore, I think, about 50 years.

1577. Then in the 49th year it must have been novel?—We may say the same of most of our Indian possessions.

1578. And the time will come, if this proposed system is adopted, when it will no longer be a novel duty to garrison the Mauritius?—No, it will not be a novel duty, if it is accepted, of course, by-and-by. But there is, in the first place, the danger that may arise from introducing that novelty; and I think that that is a very great danger, in the influence such a measure would have upon the minds of the native army. If they supposed that they were to be called upon to garrison those places which are new to them, the idea would be a novelty, and it would have a very disturbing effect upon them.

1579. That would be a merely transitory danger, and in the course of a few years would pass by?—I do not think it would be a transitory danger, because the disagreeableness of that service would be always present, arising from the dislike of the natives to leave their own country.

1580. Do you imagine that that is a dislike which cannot be made up to them by money?—I do not think that, as regards the large body of the army certainly, it would be made up to them. I do not think that you would get the men to enlist in an army the tour of duties of which brought it into our Colonial garrisons. You might possibly raise regiments for the purpose.

1581. Have you any acquaintance with the Madras army?—I have seen one garrison of it; I have hardly any acquaintance with it; I have had no personal experience of it.

1582. You are not able to contradict what has been stated here, that the Madras army has always willingly undertaken the garrisoning of Rangoon, and that there has rather been a competition than

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than otherwise for the duty?—I have never heard anything against that.

1583. Are you able to give any opinion as to the amount of saving which, supposing the policy were approved, could be made by employing coloured instead of English troops at the Mauritius, Ceylon, Singapore, and Hong Kong?—I have not got the statistics or data to go upon, but merely taking my own views upon the subject, I should doubt whether it would be any economy to speak of; because I never would have them anywhere without a supplement of British troops, at any rate.

1584. Supposing that that was not thought necessary, do you think that any economy would result supposing you could strike for the present those stations out of the roster of the British army?—It would depend very much, in the first place, upon the amount of pay which would be found necessary to induce the men to go there as a duty. Then there are the indirect expenses which would be involved in a large increase to the pension establishment; you would have to give them certain privileges which they do not now possess, in the shape of family pensions. Another and a much more serious item would be the more constant reliefs that would be found necessary.

1585. You would have to relieve every three years, I suppose?—I should think certainly as often as that.

1586. You have never attempted to draw out in figures the probable results of such a change?—No, I have not.

1587. Major Anson.] You stated in answer to Sir James Fergusson, that you thought if you had to replace European troops by native troops, you would have to send a far larger number of native troops than Europeans, and increase the garrisons of those places in the Colonies?—Yes.

1588. That is, assuming that the minimum garrison is established at the present moment, and that you could not decrease the garrison of any of the Colonies?—I do not know any Colony where it could be decreased.

1589. You say that there is a very strong objection to apportioning artillery with native troops, and that it is absolutely necessary to have Europeans?—Quite so.

1590. Is there not a very considerable difference between field artillery and garrison artillery?—It is more objectionable in the case of field artillery than in the case of garrison artillery, undoubtedly.

1591. Garrison artillery are very much the same as infantry of the line; they would have exactly the same amount of influence over native soldiers that infantry of the line would have?—Yes.

1592. They have not got their field guns to look after?—No, they have not their field guns; but we must suppose that every garrison battery has its battery of guns, and in the case of an *émeute* or anything of that sort, in which British infantry would be called into play, or would be required, it would be hardly safe to withdraw the whole of the European artillery to supply the place of infantry from their guns; you would have to leave some of them, at any rate, with their guns, as a guard to them.

1593. Still you would have sufficient in all probability to be a support to the infantry?—A garrison battery is only 60 men in India.

1594. If you had 200 European artillerymen,

as I believe they have at the Mauritius, would not that be quite sufficient for the support of two native regiments?—I should be very sorry to place them so.

1595. Sir James Fergusson.] The artillery are very scattered at the Mauritius, are they not; they occupy a great number of posts?—I believe so.

1596. Major Anson.] Besides that there are two or three companies of engineers, I believe?—Two, I think; there was one, and one I think has come from China to it.

1597. Colonel Percy Herbert.] That is a temporary arrangement, is it not, during the construction of the works?—I believe one company of engineers is the normal garrison, but I cannot speak with any certainty about it.

1598. Major Anson.] Has it always been the opinion of military men that it is not safe to leave European garrison artillery with native troops in Colonies?—Our attention has been far more directed to it since the mutiny, but even before that I doubt whether any artillery officer liked to be entirely dependent for his support on native troops.

1599. Was not the chief lessons we learnt by the mutiny, to have no native artillerymen?—It was one of the great lessons.

1600. How came it that the Indian Government for 50 years garrisoned Singapore with nothing but native infantry and artillery, both before and after the mutiny?—There was not that distrust of the natives before the mutiny.

1601. But they have done it since the mutiny and during the mutiny?—It may have been a necessity to do so, in consequence of a want of European infantry in India; we have not had the means of supplying all these places with British troops.

1602. Still they have done it for 50 years, and for the last 10 years, since the mutiny, they have garrisoned Singapore with native infantry and European artillery?—Yes; but Singapore you may consider as being so apart from India that it was not under the influence of the mutiny in the same way that one of our mere Indian possessions would have been.

1603. It is the general principle of leaving them so that you object to?—It is the general principle that I object to.

1604. Still it has been done by India?—It has been done, I imagine, from not having sufficient European troops to send to Singapore.

1605. Have you got your distribution returns here?—Yes.

1606. Can you give us the force at Singapore, or rather at the Straits Settlements?—There are three British garrison batteries.

1607. Will you state the number of men?—Two hundred and twelve, of all ranks.

1608. Colonel Percy Herbert.] Of British artillery?—Yes, of British artillery; there are two regiments of native infantry.

1609. Colonel North.] What is the strength?—The total strength is 1,418 men.

1610. Sir James Fergusson.] You only intend to have, for the future, two batteries, I believe?—We intend, for the future, to have two batteries of British artillery, and a wing of British infantry.

1611. Colonel Percy Herbert.] Will you explain the distribution of the infantry: are they at Singapore, or where?—At Penang there are six companies, at Malacca two companies, at Singapore

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Singapore six companies, and at Labuan two companies.

1612. Major *Anson*.] Are there no Madras sappers and miners?—No.

1613. Are there no engineers in the Straits Settlements at all?—No.

1614. Colonel *North*.] Will the wing of a European regiment be in addition to the two native regiments, or will it replace part of the native troops?—Eventually they are going to take away the two native regiments altogether, and send them back to Madras, and replace them by eight companies, which are going to be added to the Ceylon regiment; so that the garrison will be reduced very much in point of numbers.

1615. Major *Anson*.] You mentioned a case that had come under your experience, of an objection of colonists to the employment of native troops; it was a case that occurred in the West Indies this year, I believe?—Yes.

1616. What were those native troops you referred to?—They were West Indian troops.

1617. Do you know how they are recruited, and from what people they are recruited?—If we can we get recruits from the real African negro.

1618. That was the case formerly, but they do not recruit from the west coast of Africa now?—No, they cannot now.

1619. In fact, those regiments were composed from the very people who, they were afraid, were at that time intending to rise in revolution against them?—Yes.

1620. And they preferred, under these circumstances, to have an English regiment sent down to them instead of the West India regiment that was offered to them?—Yes, a detachment.

1621. That is a very different thing indeed, is it not, to the employment of natives of India amongst the Chinese, or the employment of a higher race of natives in our army amongst the coolies in the Mauritius?—The cases are not exactly parallel; but what I wished to imply was, that the colonists would have a far greater dependence on British troops than on any alien troops that could be brought there; they would much rather that the money that they may pay for their defences should be applied to British troops than to East or West Indians.

1622. Do the West Indian colonists pay anything for their military defence?—I am not quite certain, but I can tell by reference whether they do or not. I find they do not.

1623. You stated that you thought it would be extremely distasteful to the native army to serve in these colonies; what practical experience have you had to lead you to that belief?—No practical experience of my own.

1624. Did you serve with a native battery of artillery?—Once I served for three years with a native troop of horse artillery; a Mussulman troop.

1625. The rest of your time, I believe, you served with Europeans?—With Europeans and on staff.

1626. Mr. *Laing*.] Were there not several stations during the mutiny in which there were only European artillery and native troops?—Yes; when the mutiny commenced we had the fortunate accident of an European battery at Mhow; in my opinion that saved Central India, although it had no European support.

1627. I think there was, in fact, no instance where we had European artillery where that artillery was overcome by the native troops in 0.58.

the mutiny, was there?—You may say that that was the case with the artillery at Cawnpore. I think they had one battery of European artillery and two companies of British infantry at Cawnpore; they were, as you are aware, all overcome.

1628. I suppose you would say that, though in the other places we may have escaped, it was too hazardous an experiment to repeat?—Most decidedly so.

1629. As regards employing any native artillery in the Colonies, how would the objection be met, that if they are to be relieved every three years, you must have a considerable number of native artillerymen always stationed in India for relieving the colonial garrisons, and that that would be contrary to the policy of the Indian Government in not allowing a large number of native artillerymen to be maintained?—I think it would be a fatal objection to the employment of native artillery in the Colonies, that it is opposed to our policy altogether to employ the natives as artillerymen in India, and therefore, on relief, there would be well trained artillerymen in India doing nothing.

1630. What number of native artillery would have to be continually kept in India for the reliefs. Supposing that you adopted the system of having native garrison artillery, say, for the Mauritius, Ceylon, Singapore, and Hong Kong?—You must have at least the same amount in India as in the Colonies, and that would be allowing a bare relief every three years. If you had a battery of native artillery at the Mauritius, you must, according to my theory at least, have one native battery to relieve it in India, and that native battery, whilst in India, would be doing nothing.

1631. We may take it, that for every native battery of artillery employed abroad, you must keep an equal battery at home in India for reliefs?—At least a corresponding number, probably more.

1632. Major *Anson*.] You said that you thought that if any scheme was carried out for the employment of native troops in the Colonies, it ought to be done by regiments raised for the express purpose?—Yes.

1633. You mean by that, I suppose, local corps such as it was recently proposed to raise for service in China?—Yes.

1634. Do you think that that regiment would be as good in the course of a few years, either in point of the men who compose it, or of the officers who command it, as regiments relieved from India, belonging to the large army there?—I think a regiment of that description localized, would very soon become demoralized and useless. Though I said that the regiments must be raised for that purpose, I did not intend to say that when raised, they were to be permanently located at those places. I do not think you would find it possible, on any large scale, to raise regiments for permanent foreign service. The objection, with respect to which I have just replied, in regard to the artillery, would equally apply to the infantry. You would have to keep regiments for the express purpose of relieving those that were abroad.

1635. You mean that you would have to keep regiments upon the same system as the six Bengal regiments which existed before the mutiny, which were raised for general service?—Yes.

1636. Is it not the fact that every regiment now